THE DEMOCRAT AS A SOCIAL TYPE:

THE CASE OF TURKEY IN THE 1990s

A Ph.D. Dissertation

By

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Ankara

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In memory of Dicle Koğacıoğlu

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THE CASE OF TURKEY IN THE 1990s

Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences
of
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University

By

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DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

İHSAN DOĞRAMACI BİLKENT UNIVERSITY

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ABSTRACT

THE DEMOCRAT AS A SOCIAL TYPE:
THE CASE OF TURKEY IN THE 1990s

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PhD, Department of Political Science

Supervisor: Assistant Prof. Dr. Zeki Sarıgil

December, 2011

The main purpose of this dissertation is the explanation of the emergence of a new social type of political opinion producers in Turkey, namely, "the Democrat", throughout the two decades following the 1980 military coup. The common characteristics that constitute the Democrat is investigated utilizing the "social type analysis" approach. Within that methodological framework, the following analytical steps are followed: (1) First, in order to identify the components of the social type, a socio-historical analysis the political history of Turkey between 1980-1999 is completed, with three focal points: The September 12, 1980 coup (with specific emphasis on neo-liberal restructuring of Turkish

state and Özalism); re-emergence of the Kurdish Question; and the revival of the Islamic movement. (2) Secondly, collected qualitative data, through in-depth interviews with three representative figures of the Democrat (Ali Bayramoğlu, Etyen Mahçupyan, Kürşat Bumin) is analyzed in order to lay out the profile of the social type. (3) Lastly, the constitutive components of Democrat as a social type are brought together, in relation to the qualitative data and the socio-historical analysis.

Keywords: Social type, political opinion producers, the Democrat

ÖZET

BİR SOSYAL TİP OLARAK DEMOKRAT:
1990'LARDA TÜRKİYE ÖRNEĞİ

Akdeniz, Eylem

Doktora, Siyaset Bilimi

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Aralık, 2011

Bu doktora tezinin temel amacı, Türkiye'de 1980 askeri darbesini izleyen 20 yıl içinde yeni bir politik kanaat üreticisi sosyal tipinin, "Demokrat"ın ortaya çıkışını açıklamaktır. Demokrat'ı kuran ortak özellikler, "sosyal tip analizi" yaklaşımı kullanılarak araştırılmıştır. Bu metodolojik çerçeve içinde, şu analitik adımlar takip edilmiştir: (1) İlk olarak, Türkiye'nin 1980-1999 arası politik tarihi, üç odak nokta öne çıkarılarak, incelenmiştir: 12 Eylül darbesi (Türkiye devletinin neo-liberal yeniden yapılandırılmasına ve Özalizm'e özel vurguyla); Kürt Sorunu'nun yeniden ortaya çıkışı; ve İslami hareketin canlanışı. (2) İkinci olarak, Demokrat'ın üç temsilci figürü (Ali Bayramoğlu, Etyen Mahçupyan, Kürşat Bumin) ile yapılan derinlemesine görüşmelerle toplanan niteliksel veriler, sosyal

tipin profilini ortaya çıkarmak amacıyla, analiz edilmiştir. (3) Son olarak da, bir sosyal tip olarak Demokrat'ın kurucu unsurları, niteliksel veriler ve sosyo-tarihsel analizle ilişkili olarak, bir araya getirilmiştir.

Anahtar kelimeler: Sosyal tip, politik kanaat üreticileri, Demokrat

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

As the third term of the AKP government unfolds in contemporary Turkey, a certain level of democratization has been achieved and significant steps have been taken towards the normalization of civil-military relations (Heper, 2011), an area which had for long been a source of accountability problems. Parallel to this recent (albeit imperfect) advancement of democratic consolidation, compared to the period of two decades spanning 1980-2000, political discourse on democratization has also deepened and proliferated. “Democracy talk” in Turkey has, in only three or four years following the 2003 elections, has thoroughly encompassed previously “thinly debated” topics like civilian control of the military, Kurdish autonomy and normalization of Turkish-Kurdish relations, illegal paramilitary organizations backed by the state, and the democratic transformation of Islamism in particular and Sunni-religious voters in general.

In our contemporary era of media-orchestrated (chiefly by TV channels, newspapers and the Internet) circulation of political opinions, “who carries the word?” is a significant question. As there is ample “democracy talk” today, producers and diffusers of this vast discourse are in high demand. These individuals as they appear on TV debates, newspaper columns and nowadays on

social media websites, are competing for attention, influence and political alliances.

Therefore, the dissertation concerns itself with the producers/disseminators of liberal and democratic opinions during the democratic consolidation period in Turkey following the 1980 military coup – a period which has not yet been wholly concluded to this day. The liberal and democratic discourse, as commonly labeled in the political-scientific literature, can safely be said to be more widely diffused in Turkish academic and political circles only after mid-1980s, as the Turkish Armed Forces (henceforth, TAF) once again allowed the return to the multiparty system. The previous polarization inside the political structure during the 60s and 70s left little opportunity space for the diffusion of a critical, non-communist, libertarian discourse focusing on individual rights and liberties. While, after the return to the multiparty system in 1983, producers of political opinion of the liberal-democratic variety remained politically marginal, their reputation and the relative reputation of their ideas (as compared to, for example, "old-fashioned" socialist ideals) were strengthened inside the emergent political opportunity structure of Turkey.

The opinion producers that constitute the research subject of this dissertation are a distinctive group claiming to go beyond the conception of democracy defined within the theoretical and ideological limitations of the liberal thought. These figures argue for a democracy constructed upon multiculturalist values and ideals concerning the coexistence of cultural differences neglected by classical liberal thought. They raise sharp objections to what they regard inherent to liberalism, that of the instrumentalization of democracy, and define their political standing beyond the theoretical and ideological borders of liberal

democracy. Yet, drawing upon the central tenets of liberalism, they represent a certain juncture within the whole body of liberal and democratic thought. They contribute, albeit in a critical and often disapproving manner, to the development of a liberal and democratic agenda despite asserting a posture defined far beyond the liberal and democratic politics. The aspects and components of this contribution need to be examined in order to understand the facets of the democratic trajectory of the country.

Then, for the purposes of the study, the discursive content of what is said about democratization is secondary. The central focus will be the producers, carriers, disseminators, i.e., agents of the democratic and at times liberal way of speaking about politics. Rather than a thorough analysis of the democratic rhetoric, the discussion will be built around the particular social type of opinion producers who found new opportunities to pursue academic, journalistic, literary, etc. careers within Turkey's changing political scene throughout late 80s up until the first decade of the 21st century. Instead of only dealing with what sort of opinions are in circulation, the study aims to make its scientific contribution by investigating what type of individuals, under what socio-political conditions, fulfilling what purpose, have been supplying these opinions.

Throughout the dissertation, when I use the category 'opinion producers,' not only scholars / academics per se are included. Producers of liberal and democratic political opinions who later converge into the social type of the Democrat also include journalists, television commentators, publishers, editors etc. Furthermore, the kind of political opinions that will be associated with the social type of the Democrat in the dissertation embody two main dispositions: (i) emphasis on individual liberties; (ii) emphasis on an *ethical* approach to

democracy, that is, an understanding of democracy based on the dismantling of military tutelage, reinforcement of civilian rule, of rule of law and on a strong civil society; this defines the category 'democratic.'

1.1. Main Questions of the Dissertation

The main question that this dissertation aims to explore might be formulated as follows: Is there a causal relationship between the post-80s socio-political dynamics and the emergence of the "democratic opinion producer" as a social type in the same period? The aforementioned post-80s socio-political dynamics are going to be operationalized as: the September 12, 1980 coup (with specific emphasis on neo-liberal restructuring of Turkish state and Özalism); re-emergence of the Kurdish question; and, the revival of the Islamic movement during the 80s and 90s.

It is believed that the political dynamics set out in the research question are related to the emergence of the social type of the Democrat in a number of ways. First, since the liberal-leaning and/or democratically-oriented figures formulate their opinions with regards to the changing socio-political environment; the democratic challenges of these political developments constitute the very nature of the given social type. Secondly, these opinion producers sustain themselves through discursive attempts to shape the perceptions about democracy and democratization in Turkey. In other words, as they occupy positions in the media as columnists and television commentators and/or in the university as academics and/or in the publishing world as editors, they function as mediators of political opinion between the people and the government. They "translate" the democratic demands of the citizens for the government, and in reverse, they also "translate" the democratic intentions of government policies to the citizens. Therefore,

through these positions they are able to *produce* and *circulate* influential political opinions.

1.2. Methodology of the Dissertation

First, this dissertation regards the representatives of the social type of the Democrat as "producers of political opinions." There is a solid methodological reason behind the preference to speak about the Democrats as "producers of political opinions" instead of using the commonsensical, much-abused category of "intellectuals." For one thing, the newly emergent carriers of liberal democratic discourse cannot be seen as privileged and exempt from social analysis. Much like everybody else, their political dispositions, their career moves, their "public relations" strategies, media appearances, etc. are shaped and constrained by the overarching processes of change. Moreover, in Turkey where the value of "knowledge" is increasingly replaced by a moral political economy of "opinion" supply and demand, in all spheres of life, distinguishing a certain group of people as 'intellectuals' hinders our understanding of the relations between politics and society.

Furthermore, the category of 'intellectual' is a far too catch-all category. It also contains processes of knowledge production and issues specific to the field of academy. Since the dissertation is not interested in the processes of academic production with regards to liberal-democratic thinking, it is probable that the emphasis will be on the *production* of political opinions that are liberal-democratic. The broad concept of 'intellectuals' does not always lead us to opinion producers who may come from a broader spectrum of occupational positions. Therefore, it should be once more stressed that, the dissertation is

interested in the *production* of political opinions and the socio-political *conditions* shaping this production process.

Secondly, "social type analysis" is the dissertation's methodological framework. Throughout the study, rather than perceiving these categories and/or groups only in discursive basis in an ambiguous abstraction level; I will be able to describe the characteristics of this category of persons ('suppliers of liberal and democratic opinions') in a socially and historically grounded manner through the methodological advantages provided by *social type analysis*. Thus, the study will primarily try to explore the socio-historical moments that have constituted the *suppliers of liberal and democratic opinions* in Turkey. As it has been mentioned in the previous section, the following conjunctures will be examined as the "constitutive contexts" that shape the parameters and the criteria defining our 'social type': September 12, 1980 coup; the Kurdish movement and the Islamist movement during the late-80s and 1990s.

I contend that *social type analysis*, while avoiding the probable shortcomings arising from either over-theorized or over-sociologized accounts, will offer a methodological framework that recognizes the significance of the post-Kemalist political terrain in the flourishing of the Democrat.

There are three case studies in the dissertation completed using social type analysis: Opinion producers Ali Bayramoğlu, Etyen Mahçupyan and Kürşat Bumin are studied as representatives of the Democrat. These individuals are part of the heterogeneous group of scholars, journalists, writers, etc. that contributes to the shaping of public opinion on the democratic profile of rights, liberties and rule of law in Turkey. Their political opinions provide direct or indirect consultancy service to the government. They critically comment on the policies of the state

and provide insight for policy-makers about what the citizens think of those policies. They function as ‘gate-keepers:’ Through their liberal and/or democratic opinions they draw boundaries between what is properly political and what is outside the boundaries of the political.

1.3. Significance of the Dissertation

The literature on the democratization processes in Turkey almost never focuses on the *carriers* of the political opinions on these processes. This dissertation will be a contribution to the political-scientific literature on Turkey by making the category of “political opinions” and their “producers” the object of analysis. This perspective lacks in the literature debating democracy in Turkey.

One significant contribution of the dissertation is methodological. The dissertation primarily contends that political opinion production cannot be thoroughly explained by the catch-all category of intellectuals. Therefore, in order to analyze the trajectory of liberal and democratic opinion production in Turkey in a socially and historically grounded manner, ‘the Democrat’ as a type of opinion producer is offered to the literature. To accomplish the operationalization of ‘the Democrat,’ the methodology of social type analysis is utilized.

This dissertation further contends that the much used (and abused) concepts of *intellectuals* or *intelligentsia* fail to socio-politically *ground* what goes on in political opinion production. In the classical conceptualizations on ‘intellectuals’ (a discussion given in Chapter 2), although it is almost always submitted that the category emerges from the sphere of contentious politics, scholars tend to glorify the category by imposing trans-historical ‘missions,’ ‘functions,’ or ‘tasks.’ In other words, a concept that is supposed to explain a group of individuals whose conditions of existence are politically and historically

shaped is then misleadingly placed on an altar, outside history. This dissertation further contends that the much used (and abused) concepts of *intellectuals* or *intelligentsia* fail to socio-politically *ground* what goes on in political opinion production. Studying the opinion suppliers of a specific period who were socialized and politicized under distinctive historical circumstances (very different, for Turkey, than the positions of political opinion producers of late Ottoman modernization, or of the 1950s and 1960s) as an emergent and "living" social type enables us to treat them as ordinary social actors. They may have left their political or cultural impression on their era through their columns, TV appearances, books or academic works, but they are still mere creatures of the political events of their times. The significance of this dissertation is to demonstrate the Democrat's ordinariness and distinctiveness at the same time, in relation to three fundamental turning points in recent Turkish politics: The 1980 coup and its aftermath, the Political-Islamist movement and the Kurdish insurgency.

1.4. Organization of the Dissertation

The dissertation is planned in eight chapters. This first chapter introduces the purpose, research question, methodology and the organization of the dissertation. It also demonstrates the significance of the subject matter. The second chapter is divided into two major sections: Firstly, it presents a conceptual analysis. Secondly, it deals with the assessment of most common treatments of the category of intellectual and draws attention to the shortcomings of why "intellectual" is a cumbersome concept for this dissertation.

In the third Chapter, I lay out the theoretical and methodological framework that will guide the rest of the arguments in the dissertation: The

concept of “social type” and the methodology of “social type analysis” are analyzed and the specific application of social type analysis for the purposes of the dissertation is described.

The fourth chapter, positions the first step of my argument by revisiting the debates in Turkey concerning liberal and democratic politics and political opinions. In the Turkish political scene of the 1980s, two basic challenging positions have emerged, which attempted to objectify liberal-democratic opinion producers and analyze them: (1) the “nationalist scapegoating” position, which was overtly hostile and reactionary towards political proponents of liberal democracy, (2) the “orthodox Marxist” position, more rational than the first, which tended to reduce liberal and democratic opinions to class positions. On the one hand, this discussion is crucial for it demonstrates that the emergence of the Democrat as a social type within Turkey’s political arena has been noticed and political-intellectual adversaries felt the need to respond to and interpret this emergence. On the other hand, although both positions are political-ideologically motivated, they offer alternative ways to understand newly emergent liberal and democratic positions. Moreover, since they both suffer from bad reductionism (not a methodological reductionism) with varying degrees, both positions aim to destroy the credibility of their liberal democratic adversaries. Yet, it is believed that, the discussion of these two approaches will provide an opportunity to contrast them against social type analysis. The debate around civil society/left liberalism that we summarized above with its main features went on in the 80s rather as inner to the socialist left. Again as stated before, in spite of some weaknesses, the parties to the debate could develop their arguments on a specific theoretical and ideological base. Towards the end of the 90s, however, debates

over civil society or left liberalism largely lost this theoretical refinement and turned into a totally reproachful rhetoric. This rhetoric was adopted and reproduced especially by those sections of the left having some linkages with Kemalism. Meanwhile, since some Marxists no more regarded those opinion producers who declared their identity as 'democrats' as parties to any debate within the left, they opted for polemic loaded debates rather than theoretical-philosophical discussions.

I begin applying social type analysis in Chapters 5 and 6 which attempt to complete the socio-historical analysis phase of the methodology in order to situate the emergence of the Democrat as conditioned by Turkey's political transformations during the two decades following the 1980 coup. Chapter 7 completes my social type analysis by focusing on the three case studies.

In Chapter 5, what I call the "first moment" in the shaping of the socio-political conditions for the emergence of the Democrat is discussed: The 1980 coup, the initial attempts (during ANAP years) for democratic consolidation, and the authoritarian shortcomings of these attempts are explored. This first episode of weak democracy, I argue, paradoxically led to the proliferation of public discourse on democratic thought. The opinions produced in the journal *Yeni Gündem* are specifically investigated to make my case.

Chapter 6 lays out the "second moment" through which the Democrat social type consolidates itself in political debates: The challenges of the emergence of Political Islam and of the Kurdish Movement, while reshaping politics itself in Turkey, have also supplied those political opinion producers who can be grouped under the Democrat, with new problems to tackle with. Both challenges touched upon civil-military relations and through issues related to

religious and ethnic rights, allowed debates on the condition of civil liberties in Turkey and those conditions could be improved. In other words, for opinion producers working with democratic and/or liberal assumptions, the challenges of Islamism and Kurdish politics supplied argumentative opportunities and even new avenues of political contention against the regime – as a result, the Democrat social type came to be represented by increasing numbers of opinion producers and the characteristics defining the type have become more clear-cut.

In Chapter 7, the second tier of social type analysis is completed. My argument first tackles with the conceptual confusion of describing outspoken, publicly visible (especially in terms of media appearances) individuals with liberal and/or democratic leanings. The usage of various categories like "liberal," "left-liberal" are discussed, in order to demonstrate more recent attempts to classify the group under investigation in this dissertation. Secondly, the practical-political moment which became a locale of convergence for many exemplars of the Democrat social type, is analyzed: The brief New Democracy Movement (YDH) of mid-1990s and the discourse of "second republicanism." This political position is also where my three exemplary case studies (Ali Bayramoğlu, Etyen Mahçupyan, and Kürşat Bumin) intersected. With this background established, thirdly, I move on to the individual case studies in order to substantiate the common characteristics of the Democrat. In each case, the individuals' political life histories, their political writings and the in-depth interviews I conducted with them for the dissertation, are used to analyze their social-typical profile. The dissertation ends with an overall assessment of my social type in Chapter 8.

CHAPTER II

DISCUSSION ON INTELLECTUALS

2.1. Introduction

The term "intellectual" is very frequently employed in the literature and still remains to be largely an ambiguous concept. Due to the variety of political perspectives and theoretical approaches in which the term has been utilized, differing meanings and explanations has been attached to it, hence the ambiguity. As Bauman states, the common denominator of various definitions of the "intellectual" is the fact that "they are all self-definitions."[1] This statement implicitly conveys the idea that the content of any definition of the intellectual differs according to the methodological priorities and paradigms adopted by those who attempt to "define" it. Taking this point into consideration, this chapter devotes itself to the elaboration of the major theoretical positions that have made substantial contributions to the discussion of this category of the intellectual. In this regard, differing conceptions deriving from differing methodological concerns will be discussed in order to demonstrate that for the purposes of this

[1] By drawing attention to Bauman's argument, Eyerman makes a similar emphasis (Eyerman, 1994: 1).

dissertation, the theoretical baggage of the concept is too heavy to provide the necessary explanatory power.

Although the concept at hand, as mentioned, is burdened with ambiguity, the excursion proposed in this chapter should begin with an attempt to clarify the conceptualization of the "intellectual" (Bauman, 1987: 8). In this respect, the first section of the chapter will discuss and describe the historical roots and the evolution of the category. This section will include preliminary remarks concerning the early formulations on intellectuals. More precisely, it will offer a brief overview of the birth of the modern intellectual and historical development of the concept.

Since the problem of defining what intellectuals are mainly consists of the problem of categorization, categorization of various definitions itself is a theoretical issue to be resolved. Accordingly, the second section of this chapter will discuss existing categorizations and account for the theoretical strengths and weaknesses of these.

From the perspective of the main puzzle of this dissertation, that is, the explanation and analysis of the social type of the Democrat denoting emergent groups of political opinion producers in Turkey, the problematization of the category of the "intellectual" is important. The category is extensively used in political science, but most of the time, it fails to denote socio-politically determined common characteristics capable of explaining how a discernible group of political opinion producers can be lumped together.

2.2. Conceptual Analysis of the Category "Intellectual"

2.2.1. Historical Roots

It is a very difficult enterprise to propose a clear-cut definition of the concept of the intellectual, since the meanings ascribed to the notion vary from one framework to the other. Different scholars attempted to operationalize the concept in order to explain different things. However, leaving aside theoretical concerns for the moment, it might as well be argued that "intellectual," in its broadest sense, somehow relates to the faculties of thinking and knowing. That is, engagement with speculative thought and expressions of this thought, the art of "living with ideas," emerges as the principal criteria distinguishing intellectuals from other types of people (Mann, 1983:172-173). In this respect, the most common, but unfortunately the least elaborated, basic definition suggest that,

> intellectuals are persons possessing knowledge or in a narrower sense, those whose judgment, based on reflection and knowledge, derives less directly and exclusively from sensory perception than in the case of non-intellectuals (Michels, 1964: 118).

Although its emergence as a noun is no older than the last century, as an adjective naming anything relating to mind or knowledge, "intellectual" has long been utilized at least since the end of the sixteenth century.[2] Before being burdened with its "modern" meanings, in pre-industrial times, the term, devoid of any professional connotation, was meant to signify either a thinker or a "seeker of truth". In that sense, intellectual's role was equivalent to the role of the priest, the shaman, the philosopher or the artist (Marshall, 1998: 319). Yet, the real development of the concept began when it was no longer associated with the

[2] Its retrospective usage should not be mistaken with the debates on intellectuals that have commenced after the end of the 18th century (Brooker, 1999: 20).

religious rank-and-file (Shils, 1968: 407). The tension between the intellectual and the religious authority figure and the process of secularization of knowledge as a consequence of this tension paved the way towards the emergence of the first "modern intellectuals." The advancement of the Renaissance and the Reformation movements might be seen as the first significant historical moments in terms of the birth and development of the modern understanding of the intellectual.

Still, following the emphasis of Eyerman that "the idea of the intellectual is a child of Enlightenment and the forces that supported or opposed what has come to be called modernization" it can be argued that Enlightenment was the most important historical moment that established the grounds for the flourishing of the modern concept of the intellectual (Eyerman, 1994: 27). That is, "the idea of progress, of social development through the application of human reasons to the world, has been a central theme in the generational formation of intellectuals" (Eyerman, 1994: 27). As individuals who claim authority over reason and truth, the early intellectuals in Europe from the Renaissance onwards, represented the faith in reason and in that respect, have become both the carriers and products of modernity.

The modern notion of the intellectual, implying a significant social category whose members share a belonging, an identity, did not emerge until the episode of intellectual-political engagement of the Dreyfus Affair. The triggering event of the Affair was the arrest of a Jewish officer in the French Army on the grounds that he was spying for Germany. Contrary to the evidence, Captain Dreyfus was found guilty of espionage and treason. The Affair was a manifestation of the anti-Semitic prejudices within the French Army and society. As a reaction to the verdict, the novelist Emile Zola published "An Open Letter to

the President of the Republic", denunciating the army, titled with the famous phrase "J'Accuse" (I accuse). Following the publication of the letter in a daily, another letter supporting Zola's arguments circulated, which demanded a new trial for Dreyfus. The second letter was signed by academics, men of letters, artists, journalists, students and other citizens who protested the verdict. The event was tagged "The Protest of the Intellectuals" in an article by Maurice Barres, thus the word "intellectual" entered the Western vocabulary as a figure taking active role and responsibility inside the political field (Charles, 2008).

As intellectuals, who became generators of politically and ideologically-loaded opinions in the public sphere, engaged in contentious issues similar to the Dreyfus Affair, the usage of the category was also imbued with negative connotations. "Intellectual" was often used "as a term of abuse and of negative identification" (Eyerman, 1994: 23). Such negative associations further contaminated the concept with commonsensical notions that occasionally seeped into scholarly debates. As an after-effect of episodes like the Dreyfus Affair, where intellectuals occupied anti-establishment positions, the category was identified with individuals who were against the highest values and institutions of the established order. Being an intellectual was seen as synonymous with being a traitor. As Christopher Charles points out, the Dreyfus Affair defined the essential characteristics of intellectuals (2008). From this contentious episode on, the notion of the "intellectual" denoted the idea of struggling outside the socially and politically accepted norms: The Affair was an attack towards the highest authorities of the state. The letters circulated in support of Dreyfus took sides against discrimination, against anti-Semitism and against arbitrary abuse of power by state authorities. Moreover, French secular intellectuals openly attacked

Catholic prejudices that have influenced staff decisions within the army and rest of the bureaucracy. They called for a democratic "rule of law," which was raised as a voice parallel to but outside the system of party politics. As a result of all these, due to the collective affirmation of the birth of the category, the term "intellectual" has inherently retained a communitarian aspect. Once all these characteristics have been considered, it might well be argued that "intellectual" embodied a *political* character since its modern conception.

2.2.2. The Emergence of the Twin Concept: The Intelligentsia

The sibling concept, "intelligentsia,"[3] similarly emerged from within the terrain of the political and was imbued with its descriptive, or at times, explanatory powers through its politicized meanings. In terms of its roots and historical emergence, this term is older than the term "intellectual" (Eyerman, 1994: 21). In its early usage, "intelligentsia" referred to the déclassé elements of major estates in 19th-century Russia and denoted a small group within the educated elite of the society. The term gained its full content during the reign of Peter the Great and it can be argued that as a social category, it is a product of the process of Russian modernization set out by it. As Eyerman states, the intelligentsia were the group of persons whose identity was marked by education and an orientation towards European culture, an identity constructed by the modernizing policies of Peter the Great. In this political framework, Europe was identified with modernity, with "higher" education and intelligence (Eyerman, 1994: 21). Simply defined, the intelligentsia were the carriers of the values and norms of European culture. Still, their identity was not confined to only this

[3] In this section, the term "intelligentsia" is used as a collective noun referring to intellectuals as a social category.

aspect; a sense of mission, of duty and responsibility was an integral part of it. This mission was defined as the desire or even the obligation to carry enlightenment to the uneducated masses. Needless to say, the state was the principal ally of the intelligentsia throughout this process of "bringing light" (Eyerman, 1994: 21).

It might be argued that, building upon this historical heritage, the term came to be used to identify "the educated and half-educated individuals who carried the torch of ideological enlightenment and served various causes: *narod* (people), proletariat, progress, or revolution" (Nahirny, 1983: 5).

2.2.3. Conceptual Clarification: Intellectual or Intelligentsia?

The debate over the emergence and historical evolution of the concepts "intellectual" and "intelligentsia" offers more than a simple historical account. Such a discussion enables us to compare two different conceptual backgrounds. Although the enlightenment of uneducated masses is the dominant theme shared by both categories, there is a fundamental difference between each conceptualization. The "intellectual," as associated with political engagement episodes like the Dreyfus Affair, is conceived inside a struggle against established authorities of the state. In contrast, the "intelligentsia," historically associated with early Russian modernization, is more power-friendly: the state is its ally, its chief supporter.

The intellectual as crystallized during and after the Dreyfus Affair is the specific outcome of the historical processes which made the West what it is. While thinking and writing about the structures and dynamics of the world in universal terms, the intellectual always feels responsible for intervening in the political domain to transform the existing reality towards a more desirable one

(Ross, 1991: 69). Throughout the process of intellectual production, however, the intellectual always tends to maintain a distance between himself and the existing authorities and institutions; he is imbued with the task of "speaking truth to power" (Said, 1993: 23). To what extent intellectuals identify with this ideal position is of course a matter of argument. Still, the question of the autonomy of the intellectual has always occupied a prominent place within the theoretical of research-oriented debates on intellectuals. This question of the intellectuals' relation with power has always remained unresolved within the category itself – it can even be argued that the ambiguity of the place of power in the activities of the intellectual often helped the glorification of the category, and moreover, reinforced its usage as a catch-all phrase covering all sorts of opinion producers.

The other category, the *intelligentsia*, on the other hand, tells something about the tragedy of intellectuals in the modernizing or Westernizing countries, about their problematic relationship with the state. In that respect, once its historical origins have been taken into account, intelligentsia refers to a group of educated individuals sent to the West by the national government in order to import the technique and values of the Western civilization to their home country. In a way, they were the "offspring of the state" (Belge, 2001: 43-55).[4] Service to the state via service to the people was these individuals' reason for existence, and the question of "intellectual autonomy" either was not on their agenda or did not occur to them as a significant topic of debate. The conditions of intellectual formation within modernizing countries gave much more emphasis to duty and responsibility with respect to the state, and in turn, a comparably different typology of educated knowledge and opinion producers emerged. It could be

[4] As Belge states, defining the intellectual imposes the task of building a historical perspective. For an elaborate discussion of the emergence and historical evolution of the intelligentsia/intellectuals in two modernizing countries, see also: Belge, 1995.

argued that in countries like Turkey, while “intelligentsia” became a privileged group, invested in by the state, “loyal” to power; “intellectuals” became a category defined as “subversive” for the perceived dangers they pose to the regime.

Despite their differing origins and historical evolution, today, the terms “intellectual” and “intelligentsia” are used as synonymous. Late modern usages do not take into consideration the differences in the political character of each term. “Intelligentsia” is often employed as the plural form of “intellectual” (Leopold, 1983: 172-173).

Nevertheless, it would be too simple to be content with a brief account of the historical evolution of the terms which conceives them as synonymous. A theoretically deeper investigation is required in order to better observe the diverse framings of both concepts and understand the shortcomings of them as politically-loaded categories.

First of all, the definition of the intellectual differs according to the theoretical perspectives behind the use of the concept. Different dimensions are formulated according to the methodological priorities of different theoretical positions which necessitate distinct categorizations. The question of how to categorize various definitions appears to be the key issue. The following section will dwell upon the same problem of definition and categorization.

2.3. Problem of Definition

2.3.1. Two Contrasting Conceptualizations

The contrasting conceptualizations of the intellectual by Julien Benda and Jean-Paul Sartre would be an enlightening point of entry because of the way these idealizations (Benda’s “intellectual as cleric” and Sartre’s “engaged intellectuals”)

shaped the discussions on the topic in the 20th century. These two accounts represent two politically different (if not conflicting) views on the Dreyfusard intellectual, Benda's being located on the right, while Sartre's closer to the left.

In his prominent work, *La Trahison des Clercs* (1927, translated in English as *The Treason of the Intellectuals* in 1928), Benda offered a classic definition for the intellectual. According to him, an intellectual is a critically independent person loyal only to reason and universal truth. In that respect, he is over and above topical interests and therefore holds a privileged status within society.

In Benda's original formulation, the term "intellectual" refers to those clerics who devote their lives to knowledge and thought without having any practical interests and considerations. In contrast to laymen, "whose whole function consisted in the pursuit of material interests," clerics were defined by their indifference to worldly affairs and material interests (Benda, 1969: 43). Benda offered this formulation within an atmosphere of frustration concerning the intellectuals of his time, during the 1920s. As he stated, this was "essentially the age of politics" (Benda, 1969: 29) and intellectuals had lost their faith in universal principles of truth and associated themselves with worldly interests and partisan politics exemplified by their passions for class, race and nationalism. In Benda's account, only those who committed themselves to the pursuit of universal truth and justice were "true" intellectuals.

This was obviously a challenge to the not-very-popular, "subversive" understanding of who intellectuals were, which was formulated after the Dreyfus Affair. Benda's scholarly, if not scholastic, definition appeared to prohibit the realm of active politics for the sake of a pure search for truth.

A generation later, when political engagement was once again strongly introduced into the agenda of academics, artists and other "intellectuals," Jean-Paul Sartre challenged Benda's notion. He "epitomized the committed intellectual" (Drake, 2002: 4) in contrast to Benda's clerical emphasis where intellectuals were "disinterested," in pursuit of truth. Benda's intellectuals did not get involved in politics, and that was highly unsatisfactory for Sartre. Sartre's generation experienced the WWII and its aftermath, an episode where intellectual commitment reached its peak. During the Nazi occupation of France (as well as other European countries), intellectuals, along with everybody else, were faced with a choice – either do something against the occupation, or collaborate with the Nazis. Their choices shaped this new understanding of the "engaged intellectual": In the aftermath of the war, intellectuals' taking side in politics was regarded not as a choice, but as a prerequisite for intellectual work, almost inscribed in the job definition (Hewlett, 1998: 174).

In that context, Sartre defined the intellectual as someone who concerns himself with what is none of his business. In *What is Literature?* (*Qu'est-ce que la littérature*) he proposes that,

> the function of the writer is to act in such a way that nobody can be ignorant of the world and that nobody may say that he is innocent of what it is all about (Sartre, 1988).

In his formulation, since writing was defined as action, the writer who committed to writing as a form of action was an *engage* (Poster, 1998: 174). Clearly then, this was a definition constructed upon the Marxian dictum that intellectuals do not simply interpret the world but act upon it in order to transform it. The definition inherited the core points of Sartre's synthesis of Marxism and

his own version of existentialism. In that respect, freedom occupied a pivotal role in defining the position and the role of the writer.[5] Sartre's problematic rested upon the statement that humans' condition of freedom defined their condition of existence. Leaving no room for determinism, those lines of thinking bestowed upon human beings a limitless potential towards realizing themselves, since their response to the determining effects is always a matter of choice. That is, freedom constituted the basis of the intellectual's opportunity to have an effect on the world (Poster, 1998: 39).

Sartre's concept of the intellectual was the outcome of the historical specificity of the postwar period marked by great expectations for social progress and a strong faith in reason. Since the postwar period opened the way before a process of democratic rebuilding and renewal for Western Europe, Sartre's conceptualization rested upon the basic premises of the Western philosophical tradition, especially the emphasis on "progress." At the epistemological level, while maintaining the key assumptions of existential Marxism which dominated the intellectual atmosphere of France until the late 1960s, Sartre's approach also shared the general accent of the Enlightenment tradition. In that respect, essential to the Sartrean intellectual was his/her claim to defend and enrich universal ideals. Furthermore, this intellectual, through her claim to universality, donned the mantle of universalism herself – as a nationless, lone fighter of truth everywhere. Still, for Sartre the universalism of the intellectual was conditional upon the achievement of a classless society.

[5] Here "writer" refers to the "intellectual", since Sartre discussion on literature in his famous essay *What is Literature?* covers history and philosophy, too. As Mark Poster underlines, Sartre used the term in the broad 18th-century sense where literature included these two intellectual spheres (Poster, 1998: 38).

The distinguishing characteristic of this "universal intellectual" which actually came into being in the very person of Sartre was, inevitably, "engagement." In the sense that he was obliged to be concerned with the issues of his day, issues which were none of his business, this intellectual had to engage in active politics or take a political position. Sartre went one step further and argued that the intellectual should necessarily be on the left of the political spectrum. This statement, deriving from Sartre's original synthesis of Marxism and existentialism, constituted the major difference of his model of "universal intellectual" from the classic definition proposed by Benda. Sartre's "engaged intellectual" resembles Benda's "true intellectual" in the sense that s/he was the sole possessor of independent judgment owing loyalty to truth alone. Yet, the truth being pursued by the Sartrean intellectual was defined according to the dictums of existential Marxism which takes the class nature of actual society as granted. In this vein, while acknowledging the potential for the realization of freedom, Sartre admitted that the class structure of society stood as the major obstacle to this end. Since the class nature of the prevailing social conditions determines the vision of the writer and necessarily restricts his/her perception of reality, the intellectual does not possess the right to speak for the rest of the society but only for the certain groups with which s/he identifies. In Sartre's account, the intellectual can defend the interests of all only within a classless society, and thereby emerges as the sole representative of universality. That is, the question of universality, according to the Sartrean framework, is defined with regards to class analysis.

Now, despite the differences in emphasis between Sartre's and Benda's approaches, their distance is not substantial. As Steven Ulgar mentions, both thinkers share a common concern while casting the writer as the embodiment of

collective conscience (1988: 39). Yet, whereas Benda's "true intellectual" intervenes in temporal affairs in the name of mankind, Sartre's "engaged intellectual" intervenes in the course of history in the name of one specific class as she (he) herself (himself) is the product of a class-divided society and thus a product of history.[6] Hence, in contrast to Benda's *cleric* who puts a distance between himself and his society and who argues for non-material, non-immediate values, avoiding the particularistic conceptions of truth, Sartre's *engage* comes into existence when s/he engages in active politics, is involved with a social project or a movement in order to change the world.

These two seemingly contradicting variants of the Dreyfusard model of the intellectual have long been the common reference points in the discussion over the intellectual. In its Sartrean variant, the Dreyfusard ideal has been the source of inspiration for the contemporary discussion and analyses of the intellectual. Besides, questioning the Dreyfusard ideal has been the common concern shared by two major accounts analyzing the issue in completely different analytical planes: Marxian analysis of Antonio Gramsci and the post-structuralist account Michel Foucault's have been the two main contemporary contributions built on questioning of the conventional conceptualization of the intellectual (Broker, 1999: 120-122). Still, contemporary discussion over the role and function of the intelligentsia cannot ignore another key figure that emerges as a response to the Dreyfusard ideal. This last figure is Karl Mannheim whose work provided the major parameters of the definition of the 'intellectual' within a new synthesis.

[6] "The intellectual, the product of a class-divided society, … is thus a product of history. In this sense, no society can complain of its intellectuals without accusing itself, for it has the intellectuals it makes" (Sartre, 1988: 18).

2.3.2. Major Theoretical Approaches: Gramsci, Foucault and Mannheim

2.3.2.1. Karl Mannheim and the 'free-floating intelligentsia'

Mannheim conceptualized the intellectuals as a "free-floating" stratum situated over and above a particular class position. This concept emerged as a response to the Marxian and Dreyfusard conceptualizations. In contrast to the Marxian conception, which rests on particular sets of functions being fulfilled by the intelligentsia in favor of one of the antagonistic classes, Mannheim claims that intellectuals are to be defined a 'classless' or a 'transcended class' devoid of any sort of relationship or bounds with either of the antagonistic classes. He also refused the Dreyfusard claim that intellectuals constituted a significant class within the society. In this formulation intellectuals were defined as a social stratum of any sort of economic interest which enabled them to stand distanced to the terrain of ideology and to attach themselves with the domain of knowledge.

The roots of Mannheim's analysis of intellectual are found in the distinction he makes between the 'static' and 'modern' societies. First of all, Mannheim gives a general definition of the intellectual. According to him, the intelligentsia can be defined as the social group whose special mission is to provide an interpretation of the society of which it is a part. In static societies, this stratum has a well-defined status organized in the form of a castle. It enjoys a monopolistic control over the construction of the society's world-views. This stratum, composed of the medieval clergy, Brahmins and the magicians, possesses the power of reconciling the divergent world-views of the other social stratums (Mannheim, 1985: 10).

In Mannheim's schema, the defining characteristic of the modern times, in contrast to the Middle Ages, is the emergence of a free intelligentsia (1985: 11).

This is the outcome of the breaking of "the monopoly of the ecclesiastical interpretation of the world which was held by the priestly castle" before (Mannheim, 1985: 11). Once this monopoly is broken, intellectual production is exposed to free competition which in turn brings about "a sudden flowering of an unexampled intellectual richness" (Mannheim, 1985: 12).

As it has been noted in the previous paragraphs, the free-floating intelligentsia defined by Mannheim, is a relatively classless stratum (1985: 155). Despite the fact that, intellectuals come from very different social and economic backgrounds, the differentiation among them is overcome by the unifying power of "education" (Mannheim, 1985:155). Put it differently, education is given first and foremost importance in Mannheim's schema. It suppresses differences of birth, status, profession, and wealth among the intellectuals and binds them together (1985: 155). Still, the unifying power of the education does not eradicate the heterogeneous character of the intelligentsia as a social stratum. Accordingly, since its heterogeneity is maintained, the intelligentsia cannot be characterized as a 'class-in-itself.'

Mannheim devotes a particular priority to the social role and historical mission that are to be performed by the intellectual stratum. The primary mission of the intelligentsia, in Mannheim's analysis, is to provide knowledge; that is, providing the society a picture of itself as a totality (Longhurst, 1989). Accordingly, due to its relative uncommittedness, the intelligentsia is capable of producing disinterested and relatively objective knowledge. Utilizing the insights of the discipline of sociology of knowledge, of which Mannheim was the foremost exponent, the 'socially unattached intelligentsia'[7] acquires the power of

[7] Mannheim, himself, acknowledges that, he borrows the notion of 'socially unattached intelligentsia' from Alfred Weber: "This unanchored, *relatively* classless stratum is, to use Alfred

reconciling competing claims to truth raised by differing and opposite stratums within the society. Therefore, in Mannheim's formulation, the intellectuals serve as the synthesizers of the opposing worldviews, and in that way prevents the society from fundamental conflicts and turbulence.[8]

In that respect it might well be argued that, the missionary and indeed the privileged position ascribed to the intelligentsia in Mannheim's model, is provided by the virtues of the 'sociology of knowledge.' To put it differently, the theory of free-floating intelligentsia has been built upon the premises of a sociology of knowledge. Mannheim's sociology of knowledge was brought to full development in his most influential work, *Ideology and Utopia* (1929, translated into English in 1936) (Longhurst, 1989: 23). In the opening paragraph of the book, while clarifying the ambition of his work, Mannheim gives a brief explanation of the discipline: "(It) is concerned with the problem of how men actually think" (1985: 1). He maintains that, it is both a theory and an historical-sociological method of research (1985: 266). In Mannheim's own words,

> as theory it seeks to analyze the relationship between knowledge and existence; as historical-sociological research it seeks to trace the forms which this relationship has taken in the intellectual development of mankind. On the one hand, it aims at discovering workable criteria for determining the interrelations between thought and action. On the other hand, by thinking this problem out from the beginning to end in a radical, unprejudiced manner, it hopes to develop a theory, appropriate to the contemporary situation, concerning the significance of the non-theoretical conditioning factors in knowledge (1985: 264).

Obviously, Mannheim's detailed analysis in *Ideology and Utopia* rests upon a categorical distinction between the concepts of ideology and utopia. His

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Weber's terminology, the "socially unattached intelligentsia" *(freischwebende Intelligennz)"* (1985: 155).

[8] As Longhurst emphasizes, in Mannheim's model, intellectuals are portrayed to possess the 'potential' to perform the 'true' synthesis. Whether this is realized or not is with the historical and social conjuncture (Longhurst, 1989: 23).

account on the nature of ideology is of central importance for the theoretical model he built. For him, ideology is a vehicle utilized by the ruling groups to maintain power (1985: 40). In contrast, utopia is the tool that could be used by the ruled groups in their struggle for power (1985: 40). Unfortunately, it is impossible to arrive at the 'true knowledge' by utilizing either ideologies or utopias, Mannheim claims. The partiality that either of these two categorically separated domains retains stands as the main obstacle to the correct understanding of the totality and the process of capturing the reality. Unless these two categories are exposed to a critical examination, particularization and then a process of synthesis, the 'true knowledge' cannot be attained. This process of particularization and total synthesis can only be realized by some social group, namely the intelligentsia, utilizing the best method, that of the 'sociology of knowledge' in fulfilling their mission.

To recapitulate, sociology of knowledge has provided the main analytical domain for Mannheim's analysis of intellectuals. Endowed with this discipline, the intelligentsia would be able to perform its historical mission, that of achieving "the true synthesis of all the diverse aspirations of the existing groups in society" (1985: 154). In other words, sociology of knowledge would serve as the fundamental point of reference in intellectuals' attempts of integrating and evaluating the divergent views produced by different sections of the society. The dynamic synthesis of several partial perspectives provided by the intellectual stratum would in turn ensure the 'true' interpretation of the world and the correct view of reality (Mannheim, 1952: 171-179). In that respect, intellectuals, defined as the exponents of synthesis, have occupied a value-free position within

Mannheim's theoretical model and portrayed as the neutral arbiters between the views raised by antagonistic classes.

2.3.2.2. Gramsci and the theory of 'organic intellectual

The analysis of the political function of the intellectuals was the starting point for the studies of the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937). Utilizing the insights of Marxism and building up a theory of politics from which is implicit in Marx's analysis, Gramsci devoted particular emphasis to the functions to be played by the intellectuals in class-divided societies (Showstack-Sassoon, 1983: 194; Carnoy, 1984: 65). As many commentators have noted, he was the first Marxist to problematize 'intellectuals' on theoretical grounds (Karabel, 1976).

Gramsci's formulation rested on a distinction between the 'traditional' and 'organic' intellectuals. The major theoretical inspiration behind his conceptualization of the 'traditional intellectual' was a critical reading of Benda's 'true intellectual' and the questioning of the Dreyfusard ideal. According to the thinker, Benda's 'true intellectual' stood as the perfect exemplar of the 'traditional' intellectual. In that respect, the intellectuals who were engaged with speculative thought and knowledge and conceived of themselves as over and above the topical interests are defined as the 'traditional intellectuals.' This group was composed of the literati, philosophers, artists, and the clerics who assumed in themselves a certain amount of neutrality.

In Gramsci's analysis, intellectual activity is seen as a human potential commonly shared by all. Yet, the realization of this potential is conditioned by the specific social relations. More precisely, since engagement with knowledge necessitates certain amount of time to be devoted to this special activity, and since

access to knowledge requires certain material resources, only some privileged groups can have the opportunities absolutely essential for intellectual development. That is, only some 'function' as intellectuals. In Gramsci's original formulation, this issue is addressed as follows: "All men are intellectuals, but not all men have in society 'the function of intellectual'" (Gramsci, 1986: 8-9).

It is noteworthy here that the emphasis Gramsci attached to the question of intellectuals is closely related to the significance he devoted to 'the political.' Indeed, the major inspiration behind the thinker's whole body of work was politically motivated. That is, although the theory of intellectuals is one of the keystones of Gramsci's thought, it becomes valid when its connections with his conception of hegemony have been considered. Gramsci's starting point for his theoretical concern was composed of two questions on the failure of the socialist revolution in advanced capitalist countries of the West and its success in Russia. Once the thinker realized the inadequacy of the deterministic explanations towards the problem, he set out his explanation on a comparison of the political structures of the 'East' and the 'West.' Locating the relationship between state and civil society at the center of his analysis, he claimed that,

> In the East, the State was everything, civil society was primordial and gelatinous; in the west there was a proper relation between State and civil society, and when the state trembled a sturdy structure of civil society was at once revealed (1986: 238).

Gramsci's theoretical investigations addressed one core question: How can the ruling class manage to win the consent of the subaltern classes while achieving the reproduction of the capitalist relations (Carnoy, 1984: 69). The political ambition behind this question was to find out how the subordinate classes can manage to overthrow the old order via a socialist revolution and bring about a

new one? Gramsci developed his answer by according priority to the conception of 'civil society.' In his account, in contrast to Marx's original conceptualization which held that civil society referred to the realm of economic relations, the sphere of civil society embraced not only the whole body of the material relationships but also the entire complex of ideological and cultural relations.[9] That is, in the West, political power was not concentrated within the state instrument but dispersed throughout the tissues of the society and its whole body of ideological and cultural practices. This was indeed the explanation of what Gramsci called 'hegemony.' Briefly defined, it came to mean "the ideological predominance of the dominant classes in civil society over the subordinate" (Carnoy, 1984: 68). Put differently, hegemony referred to the attempts of the dominant class to offer its own rule as "all-inclusive and universal to shape the interests and needs of subordinate groups" (Carnoy, 1984: 70). Besides, it indicated the process within which a fraction of the dominant class enjoyed its control through its moral and ideological leadership over the other fractions of the dominant class (Carnoy, 1984: 70). To sum up, hegemony was the major vehicle through which the dominant class gained the consent to its rule. Although hegemony was a vehicle mostly enjoyed by the ruling classes, the whole complex of ideological and cultural practices were designed to gain the active consent of the masses to overthrow the existing social order and building up the socialist society. It was here that the problem of intellectuals appeared in Gramsci's political and thereby theoretical agenda. They occupied pivotal role within the

[9] There exist contradicting views concerning the meaning Gramsci ascribed to 'civil society.' For instance, Norberto Bobbio argued that Gramsci's conception of civil society was located to the superstructure. And thereby, it no longer referred to the relations in production, but rather to the ideological realm and the political expression of the relations embedded in it (Bobbio, 1988). In contrast, one another commentator, Texier, claimed that, there never existed some sort of divergence between Marx's analysis and Gramsci's account. While employing a working class perspective, Gramsci never ignored the fact that economy was the determinant in the last instance (Texier, 1982).

thinker's problematization of hegemony, since the hegemony in society was expressed as "the complex institutions, ideologies, practices, and agents that comprise the dominant culture of values" (Buci-Glucksmann, 1974). However, intellectuals' significance stemmed not only from the role they played in the process of building the hegemony of the dominant class but also from their potential to provide the basis for a revolutionary political strategy. This constitutes the major reason behind the elaborate analysis of the intellectuals in Gramsci's account.

Gramsci discussed the topic of intellectuals at length in his *Prison Notebooks (1929-35)* (1971). Throughout the book, he analyzed the composition and the functions of the intellectuals in modern society. His analysis did not focus upon the cognitive or intellectual engagement itself but the functions undertaken by the intellectuals in structural and superstructural levels. That is, in Gramsci's formulation, definition and the content of the intellectual was extended from the base to the superstructure.

As it has been indicated in the opening paragraphs of this section, Gramsci's analysis rested on a distinction between the 'traditional' and 'organic' intellectuals. The traditional intellectuals refer to the men of ideas whose positions in society derive from the past and present class relations which in turn conceals their attachment to class positions (Carnoy, 1984: 85). They represent "historical continuity, uninterrupted by even the most complex and radical changes in social and political forms" (Eyerman, 1994: 25). Put it differently, they are composed of the intellectual stratums of the former social formation; and, in a sense, the remnants of the historical bloc conditioned by the whole body of the structural and superstructural activities (Carnoy, 1984: 85). The class-less or the so-called

neutral appearance of this stratum derives from the historical and social characteristics of its coming into being.

Yet, the analysis of the traditional intellectuals is not confined to the above mentioned discussion. Having in mind the 'free-floating intelligentsia' of Mannheim, Gramsci added a new dimension to his analysis of 'traditional intellectual.' In this vein, he contended that, one sub-category of the traditional intellectuals was to be constituted by the intellectual stratum who regarded itself autonomous and independent from the class relations. Those intellectuals who believed to be the representatives of reason and objectivity strengthened their self-image through the intellectual power they enjoyed.

2.3.2.3. Foucault and the *"universal"* versus *"specific"* intellectual

In Foucault, the opposition to unitary bodies of theory, to global and systematizing thought, and the advocacy of autonomous decentralized forms of theorizing and criticism reinforces his distinction between two types of intellectuals: the "universal" and the "specific" (Smart, 2002: 66). He argues that intellectual's traditional role has been to reveal the truth to those who cannot perceive the truth. Therefore, this kind of "universal" intellectual was tasked with upholding reason, to stand by principles of justice, to represent universal values. In a way, the universal intellectual took it as his or her main task to be the conscience of everyone. Foucault disputed this seemingly neutral and benevolent understanding of the intellectual's role and function by arguing that events like May 1968 or struggles for prisoners' rights demonstrate the fact that "ordinary" citizens do not need intellectuals to express and defend universal values. People were quite able to acquire and act upon the knowledge of the unjust conditions they were forced to live in. They did not have to "outsource" their conscience to

be represented. To make things worse, according to Foucault, protesting citizens' access to local forms of knowledge have been marginalized and censured by a system of power in which intellectuals had complicity. Based on this observation, Foucault stated that intellectuals should not be concerned with attempting to represent "the truth of the collectivity" – a concern which was actually connected with an effect of domination (Smart, 2002: 67). Intellectuals should rather seek different ways of fighting against forms of power in which intellectual activity was embedded (Foucault, 1980).

Foucault contended that the understanding of the universal intellectual as the bearer of universal morals, theoretical and political values had been displaced by a radically different and more "political" intellectual subject, which he called the "specific intellectual":

> A new mode of the 'connection between theory and practice' has been established. Intellectuals have become used to working, not in the modality of the 'universal,' the 'exemplary,' the 'just-and-true-for-all,' but within specific sectors, at the precise points where their own conditions of life or work situate them (housing, the hospital, the asylum, the laboratory, the university, family, and sexual relations). This has undoubtedly given them a much more immediate and concrete awareness of struggles. And they have met here with problems which are specific, 'nonuniversal,' and often different from those of the proletariat or the masses. (Foucault, 1984: 68)

Faced with life challenges not very dissimilar to those faced by the proletariat, intellectuals, according to Foucault, have more stakes in representing "specific" issues that concern their own wellbeing, related to the struggles they find themselves in. The emergence of the specific intellectual is related to expansion of technical and scientific structures, to the growth and diffusion of forms of scientific rationality, and a series of occupations, offices, and subjects

bearing form of knowledge and techniques invested with scientific legitimacy (such as teachers, social workers, professional researchers, etc).

The specific intellectual, unlike the universal intellectual, is not a scholar, a "man of letters" so to speak. She or he is a practical expert with a localized connection to scientific knowledge. That form of knowledge the specific intellectual is engaged with is politicized through an immediate involvement in everyday struggles and conflicts. The key task of the new, specific intellectual is not that of restoring the purity and ultimate truth of scientific practice (which can be achieved through the mundane practice of criticism of ideological content). Intellectuals should no longer lose time with trying to free truth from power. Instead, they should endeavor to detach "the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic, and cultural, within which it operates at the present time" (Foucault, 1984: 75). This task defined by Foucault ultimately corresponds to a new "politics of truth" (Foucault, 1980: 133).

In other words, specific intellectuals should be aware that they too, through their monopoly over expert knowledge, are part of the system, or, "governmentality." Being part of the system, though, they are exposed to the same forces of disciplining and domination as the "masses". Yet once they being to learn to use tactics of political struggle according to this realization, they will not have to be confined within the space of "representation". Specific intellectuals can thus learn to stop thinking in terms of "what's in people's heads" and instead turn their attention to "the political, economic institutional regime of the production of truth" (Pritchard, 2000: 160).

Foucault's fundamental point in his distinction between the "universal" and "specific" is his rejection of the split between the externally situated

intellectuals and the internally situated practitioner. There is no justifiable separating line between intellectuals as free subjects and intellectuals as practitioners. The fact that the specific intellectual is, inevitably, embedded in institutional power/knowledge regimes is not self-defeating – this complicity is what politicizes and empowers. His notion of the specific intellectual pulls the rug out from underneath the "just-and-true-for-all" intellectual; problematizes the academic/practitioner relationship in new ways; resituates the intellectual as a practitioner and the practitioner as an intellectual.

2.4. Concluding Remarks

The classical debate on the concept of intellectuals might provide ammunition for political rhetoric, but is constraining for the political-scientific task of studying the emergent groups of political opinion producers during Turkey's experiences with democratic consolidation since early 1980s.

First, it is difficult to retool either the concept of the "intellectual" or that of the "intelligentsia" by attempting to eliminate the moralistic baggage that comes with it. As I aimed to demonstrate in this chapter, despite various well-intentioned attempts to historicize intellectuals by drawing upon their relation to politics, the category is always consecrated, surrounded by an aura of good or bad "missions", liked or disliked "functions" or overburdened "tasks." The best way to avoid this baggage is to utilize a different concept-method toolbox.

That alternative brings us to the second point, and closer to the unfolding of the dissertation's research questions: Instead of using a moralistic catch-all concept, a concept that can do the job of providing insights on a specific group of individuals with common characteristics embedded into a particular era of Turkish politics is preferable. It will be demonstrated in the following chapters that social

type analysis can deliver this: The Democrat of the two decades following the 1980 coup is an emergent, distinctive, nevertheless ordinary social type, no superior or sacred or special than the social types of the Hobo, the Stranger or the Loser. The Democrat of this era is not the same as the Democrat in 1950s' Turkey. Nor does he have a trans-historical "responsibility" (although she may misrecognize her "disinterestedness" as such and this misrecognition is a significant object of analysis). The Democrat is both a creature of the shortcomings of democracy in Turkey's political sphere and civil society, and acts and socializes through these shortcomings, and leaves his impressions in the public sphere with his opinions.

The usage of "intellectuals" implies that they are almost treated as an occupational group that responds to political events like the Turkish Medical Association does. Whereas the operationalization of the social type of the Democrat enables us the following: It helps reveal how certain characteristics, political attitudes, opinionated dispositions, reactions to authority, etc. coming from different individuals with comparable trajectories form recognizable social and political patterns, patterns that inspire or antagonize others and gain causal power over political and even mental structures. In the remainder of the dissertation, I will qualify this claim.

CHAPTER III

SOCIAL TYPE ANALYSIS

3.1. Introduction

In the previous chapter, I have dwelt upon the most common academic discussions on political opinion producers, revolving around the much-exploited category of the "intellectual." As I have justified at the end of that discussion, coming up with another explication on the category will not be the task of this study. Theorizing on the "intellectual" might as well appear attractive on paper, but as I hope to demonstrate in this chapter through the discussion of a theoretical and methodological framework, such rhetoric usually is poorly grounded in actual social relations.

The main problem with most analyses based on the category of the intellectual is a problem of operationalization rather than one of poor conceptualization. Usually, the category is much pervasive and creates difficulties for making political, cultural, habitual distinctions between various people empirically occupying the category. Since it fails to distinguish different agents, it is also unable to *explain* what kind of agents they are: Are "intellectuals" merely people who use their intellect more than others? Is the category ascribed to them

because they earn their lives through the production of ideas? It is my contention that regardless of what we call a group of people – "intellectuals" or "Robinsons" – the true political-scientific issue is about *grounding.* A well-constructed theoretical framework helps the scholar generate knowledge by allowing him or her to comfortably move between levels of abstraction; such a framework enables the investigator to constructively move between the facts and their analytical interpretation and explanation.

This study's theoretical basis offers such an alternative framework. Here, George Simmel's "social type analysis" will be deployed for the study of a particular type of political opinion producers which emerged in Turkey through the 1980s. It might well be claimed that, "social type analysis," originally developed through the works of Simmel, has been an understudied and unheard social-scientific approach. Yet, certain significant researchers have made unpretentious effort to expand on the concept of social type or to develop empirical and theoretical tools with which to analyze it (Strong, 1943; Strong, 1946; Klapp, 1958; Burgess, 1968; Coser 1974; Arditi 1982; Arditi, 1987).

Before entering into a discussion on the differing analytical usages of the "social type," let me shed light on the fundamental difference between the conventional and social scientific interpretations of the concept of "type." As Almog suggests, in everday usage, the concept of "type" usually retains two alternative meanings (1998). The first meaning implies that the person exposed to our personal observation is a unique person with specific traits (Almog, 1998). The second meaning, on the other hand, suggests that the person under observation connotes to a typical example of a recognizable social category identified with similar values, behavior, style, and habits. This second usage of the

“type,” appears to be the analytical focus of this dissertation purporting to suggest deeper knowledge on the political-scientific understanding of a specific group of persons.

When we see an individual person as exemplary of a “kind,” or “mold,” a familiar intuitive process is at play. Our understanding processes a plethora of markers, like the person’s clothing, the words (especially certain socio-politically loaded keywords, like “democracy,” “our nation,” etc.) the person’s uses of his/her posture, etc. We then relate what we perceive to our memories and judgments of similar traits and place that set of traits into a social type. Accordingly, a fundamental analytical guideline I subscribe to in this dissertation is that this process can be fine-tuned in order to study social groups. For one thing, the category of “intellectuals” depends on the identification of a set of such impersonalized traits, which can later be paired with specific individuals. When we encounter (in a book, on TV, in a newspaper column, etc.) a political opinion producer of a certain brand, we utilize epithets like “nationalist,” “liberal,” “Islamist,” “leftist” too easily. Yet we usually take such categorical descriptive for granted and seldom reflect upon how we agree to associate people with certain characteristics to social types. We spontaneously recognize social types such as the Islamist without being reflexive about what justifies that person being an Islamist. My starting point is the consideration of this question of “what justifies” when it comes to analyzing intellectual producers of political opinions. If we attempt to delve deeper into the puzzle of why a group of scholars, academics, writers and journalists would be labeled as “liberal” and how come this labeling makes sense, we have to start historicizing. The spatial, social, cultural elements of a complex socialization process need to be addressed (Almog, 1998). Then, in

this chapter, two things will be accomplished: First, the meaning of the concept "social type" will be scrutinized. Second, the concept's significance for the purposes of this dissertation will be clarified and a methodology for "social type analysis" of liberal and democratic opinion producers will be discussed.

3.2. Social Types: Definitional Dilemmas

In the social science literature, the concept of social type is employed in varying and at times unclear ways. Parts of the methodological puzzle are common: Many researchers dealt with the question of finding and operationalizing a principle of categorizing groups of people with shared traits. According to Orrin Klapp (1949; 1954; 1956; 1958; 1964) who has published on social type analysis more than other researchers, two different understandings of the concept might be utilized (Almog, 1998). The first interpretation conceives the social types of legendary characters built upon a collective imagination process (Klapp, 1949; 1956).[10] The second use of the concept found in Klapp, removing the approach further from Georg Simmel's (1971) original formulation, associates social types with existing individuals (Almog, 1998). Here, social types are defined as

> consensual concepts of roles that have not been fully codified and rationalized, which help us find our way about in the social system (Klapp, 1958: 674).

This second definition, has been constructed upon a utilization of the concept defined beyond the historically-informed categorical analysis. Here, the concept merely connotes to a spontaneous, commonsensical means of labeling

[10] This interpretation is manifest in Klapp's famous essay, "The Fool as a Social-Type." See: Klapp, 1949:157.

used by ordinary people (Almog, 1998). Not suprisingly, in the second definition, the concept has been stripped of its analytical content and is yielded to the subjective interpretations of the certain individuals.

Deriving inspiration from Klapp's social - scientific enterprise, Taub and Leger (1984), have also offered a definition of the social type as a spontaneous social classification rejecting to perceive it as the formulation of a researcher (Almog, 1998). They observed specific small groups within the society and preferred to attribute identification of social types to these certain groups. For instance, in their study of a young gay community, they have employed the term social type to identify the features attributed by the gay group itself to its own members. Yet, it should be noted that, Samuel Strong's (1943; 1946) utilization of the social type in his investigation of the race relations in Chicago was forerunner to the conceptualization coined by Taub and Leger (Almog, 1998). Several social scientists have contributed to the literature on social type defined from within (by society) rather than by an outside observer, specifically by a social-scientist: Wirth (1968), Glick (1955) and Kinloch (1972) have all added more to Strong's handling of social types (Almond, 1998).

The conceptualization of the social type offered by Reading (1977) markly contrasted with the former conceptualizations. Reading (1977) embraced the epistemological roots of social type analysis and understood social types as ascribed by social scientists for analytical purposes, rather than identified by individuals in everyday life. While a majority of (mainly US-based) social scientists who wrote about social types focused on how society stigmatizes "unruly" elements using social types, Reading thought that the concept is "an objectively derived summary description of the characteristics of a category of

persons" (Reading, 1977: 196). The same framing of social types as an analytical tool for social-scientific typology can be found in Howard S. Becker's classification of artists into four social types (Becker, 1976; Almog, 1998).

The significance of social type analysis in macro social understanding was underlined by Georg Simmel. However, instead of offering a clear definition of the concept, he provided case studies of social type analysis that gives us clues about his methodology (Almog, 1998). His classic essays on "the stranger" (Simmel, 1950), "the poor" (Simmel, 1965), "the miser" (Simmel, 1971), and "the metropolitan type" (Simmel, 1964) have been read as the blueprints of social type analysis in the 20th century. Simmel uses the concept analytically, as the construct of the social scientist: the social type emerges out of complex relations, delimited by social structures. It is a conglomeration of personality traits, socio-political convictions, mannerisms and mentalities that can be observed when we analyze what differentiates people inside a social space. The following quotation is revealing in this respect:

> When we look at human life from a certain distance, we see each individual in his precise differentiation from all others. But if we increase our distance, the single individual disappears, and there emerges, instead, the picture of a "society" with its own forms and colors – a picture which has its own possibilities of being recognized or missed. It is certainly no less justified than is the other in which the parts, the individuals, are seen in their differentiation. Nor is it by any means a mere preliminary of it. The difference between the two merely consists in the difference between purposes of cognition; and this difference, in turn, corresponds to a difference in distance (Simmel, 1950: 8).

In light of these definitions of the concept, it can be argued that epistemologically, there are two main ways of operationalizing social type:

(1) Social type has been used in social-scientific studies through the recognition of its everyday usage by individuals – as a "folk notion." This leads to

at best subjectivist, descriptive analyses of how people categorize other people. The approach provides little analytical room to explain emergent properties of social interaction that acquire a causal power of their own.

(2) Yet the concept has also been applied as an analytical construct of the social scientist. Here, a social type does not refer to everyday epithets to categorize real individuals. It is used to explain certain *tendencies* and *potentials* which conglomerate and create the effect through which certain characteristics in individuals are recognized as belonging to a common "kind". The point is not to empirically identify "personality patterns" across real individuals, but to reveal social-type-forming relations and explain how those relations interact with other social and political relations.[11]

In this dissertation, especially when the discussion focuses on particular figures like Etyen Mahçupyan, my goal is not to submit a biography of an empirical individual. Rather, the point is to construct an epistemic individual in order to demonstrate the emergence and influence of the social type of 'the democrat' in Turkish politics.

It shouıld not be overlooked that the emergence and social recognition of a social type is dependent on "folk notions" as well. All in all, social type can be more soundly defined as a social-scientific summary of the shared and observed properties of a particular group of persons that might occasionally be given a commonsensical nickname. "Liberal," for example, in Turkish social and political debates, has emerged as both a category of insult and gratification, thus earning a

[11] According a researcher, the second, more analytical approach is in line with Pierre Bourdieu's distinction between "empirical individuals" and "epistemic individuals" (Bourdieu, 1988). According to him, a less analytical, more commonsensical approach would be to point out merely that there are certain characteristics ("indicators") between individuals which create differences among them. This emphasis on "empirical individuals" is incapable of explaining what really differentiates certain individuals and at the same time creates similarities between certain others (Almog, 1998).

“folk notion” or “public nickname” status. Yet “liberal” also denotes a social space occupied by relations and differences, which has real and identifiable effects. The group or category signified by a social type may be a community, a profession, a subculture, a status group, or a class that is characterized by its outward appearances (physical, fashionable or both), life style, and pattern of interaction (particularly linguistic), attitudes or certain political opinions.

Following the guidelines offered by Almog, we can emphasize three points out of this definitional discussion (1998). First of all, social type analysis calls for detecting similarities within the group or category characterized by the social type, not perfect homogeneity. It entails to reveal the dominant social features common to certain types of human beings. Therefore, my social scientific ambition falls outside the investigation of characteristics that define a complete unique mold of personality. In subscribing to social type analysis, I take for granted that, the social mark of an individual’s category is recognizable in certain forms of social relations, certain ways of position-takings and also the ways of expressing opinions and convictions. It is these positions and dispositions that make the members of a group or category resemble one another and distinguish them as a whole from others. Needless to say, this model of social type distinguishes the majority of group members, not the exceptions or the marginal cases.

The second point in the proposed operationalization is about what construes as “signals,” “traits,” “characteristics” that are shared and/or ascribed (Almog, 1998). Each individual representative of the social type does not possess all the typical features displayed by it. The social type I will be investigating (that of the Democrat) will serve only as a model for analyzing the characteristic

features of a particular type of individual. The concept I use is analytical, an abstract[12] depiction constructed from a number of real cases in order to reveal their essential features and causal powers. While it might be possible to identify an individual who closely approximates the analytical model of his or her social type, this is not a condition for the theoretical portrayal of the social type model. Nevertheless, this dissertation is not a purely theoretical one, and I will make use of individuals' cases to illustrate the social type I aim to analyze.

Thirdly, the essential difference between the concept of social type and that of stereotype should be underlined. For instance, the characters portrayed by Nuri Alço in the Turkish cinema of the 1980s as the image of a wealthy and corrupt villain (kept still alive in contemporary popular culture) is an example of streotyping. Alço's characters are commonly used as a basis for portraying real-life "evil womanizers." In order avoid streotyping, the social type model must be constructed only on the observed features and relations as guided by the research question (Almog, 1998; Lyons 1989). An unquestioning acceptance of stereotypical descriptions of group characteristics would diminish the value of the analysis.

3.3. Methodological Guidelines for Social Type Analysis

Many commentators agree upon the absence of a specified valid empirical method in social type analysis (Almog, 1998; Lyons 1989). Yet above all, social type analysis is largely a qualitative enterprise, and the ultimate aim is not to

[12] "Abstract" here does not refer to an idealistic dimension entirely delinked from empirical observations. In this dissertation, the practice of abstracting the social type of the "liberal-democratic opinion producer" is grounded in social relations. By attempting to link the properties of this group of persons to socio-political developments, I "abstract" from the level of empirical individuals.

construct quantitative data on individuals members identified as representative of the social type in focus. Some general steps can be outlined.

3.3.1. Identifying a Social Type

Following the social type analysis originally derived from Simmel's theoretical enterprise, I start with the conviction that the categorization of a social type is not illusory and that the category can reasonably be abstracted (Almog, 1998).

In detecting the features of the social type, the method of nickname investigation, may provide certain methodological advantages. This method draws its logic from Klapp's assumption that for a social type perceived as significant, people would create names or give newer meanings to existing names (Klapp, 1958; Almog 1998). In the context of Turkey, we can think of condemned nicknames that are politically loaded, like *dinci* [13] or *laikçi*. [14] These two widespread categories give us clues about the emergence of an axis of contention between religiously-oriented and Kemalist politics in Turkey; and the dispositions and attitudes critically associated with these two social types, while caricaturized, point towards real convictions and political relations.

3.3.2. Building a Data Framework

As Almog emphasizes, the nature of the data base used for social type analysis depends on the nature of the social type itself (1998). For instance, if the investigation centers on a historical social type that no longer exists, such as the *Jöntürk* of the Ottoman era, historical data will be required. Such data could be

[13] A rough translation would be "religious zealot," originally coined to talk about Islamist hardliners inside and around the Welfare Party, but later came to be associated by most politically outspoken conservative and religious people.
[14] A "secular/laicist zealot" coined originally in the Islamist movement to counter the *dinci* insult.

provided by newspapers, photo albums, or personal and formal correspondence, diaries, and collections of personal effects. Needles to say, following the cultural hints, the researcher operates with interrelated and contextually bounded social actors resembling the matryoskha dolls often designed to follow a particular theme. Certainly, when dealing with modern-age social types, screening and analyzing the written and visual media, written and visual material could be useful in investigating the salient aspects of the social type.

The study of contemporary social types calls for two basic data collecting methods (Almog, 1998). The first method, "reflective participation," combines participant observation with face-to-face in-depth interviews.[15] The second method, known as "life history," resembles much as a detective's task and therfore neccessitates deriving as much information as possible on the behavior and way of thinking of the social type:

> The sociologist can be likened to a detective who collects and records trivial evidence, such as eating habits, aesthetic taste and linguistic conduct. Just as in crime solving, such trivia could be highly significant clues to the full socio-historical "story" of the emergent social type (Almog, 1998).

3.3.3. Analysis of Data

In social type analysis, the evidence gathered about the type needs to be processed. Such processing requires identification of qualitative codes within the discursive material being analyzed (Almog, 1998). The researcher might use semiology (Barthes, 1967; 1977) in order to decode cultural symbols embodied in

[15] The usage of this method has been generally associated with Anderson's (1923) study of the hobo type (Almog, 1998). The other researchers who generally resort to this method are Forsyth and Bankston (1983) who participated in the lives of merchant seamen and conducted in-depth interviews with retired and currently employed seamen to obtain more detailed and general social biographical knowledge regarding their lifestyle (Almog, 1998).

material objects (such as clothes, accessories) and in parts of the ethos (such as music, art, and rhetoric) by producing a gamut of connotations derived from the symbols or signs (Almog, 1998).

Alternatively, the researcher can also use content analysis in order to explain the emergence of a social type from within real events (analyzing media reports) and political discourse (analyzing books, articles written by either representative of the social type or written *about* it). Certain themes or codes need to be decided by the researcher, which would, when discovered within the content analyzed, serve as evidence of the existence of the social type (Nalbantoğlu, 2003).

3.3.4. Bringing the Components of the Social Type Together

At some point, the researcher has to name and justify the basic components of the social type. These cultural, political, ideological, etc. components *in toto* characterize the emergent social type and are found in accord (but spread over a socio-spatial distance) in various sources / locales the researcher is digging in (Almog, 1998). For example, Sway (1981: 42) lists eleven basic "distinguishing characteristics" for the gypsy type, including "strangeness of origin", "landlessness", and "wandering." Then, for methodological precision, it is important to attach a *mnemonic nam*e to each feature defining the type in order to be able to sum up its various components (Sway, 1981).

3.3.5. Socio-Historical Analysis

For the purposes of this dissertation, this is perhaps the most important methodological step for the explanation of the social type. The researcher needs to account for what historical conditions lead to the emergence of the social type.

The defined components of the social type may separately or collectively be in touch with near-historical events or have entrenched cultural roots. These need to be uncovered to situate the social type. The researcher must develop working assumptions about historical conditionings that create the social space in which the type matures.[16]

Almog contends that, the socio-historical roots of the features of a social type can be traced by clarifying the processes by which the social type has been developed (1998). He offers an understanding of the nature of the type's socialization agents and agencies as a very useful tool to this end (Almog, 1998).

3.4. Application of Social Type Analysis in the Study of the Democrat

This dissertation subscribes to the approach in social type analysis where the social type under investigation is a construct of the researcher. I will argue that within Turkey's political and cultural fields, an opinion-producer social type of the 'liberal democrat' has emerged as conditioned by the various moments of democratic consolidation process in the 20 years following the 1980 coup. As already discussed, construction and exploration of this object of analysis partly draws upon Turkish "folk notions" about intellectuals, writers, journalists in general and about liberal ideas in particular. Subjective perceptions of who a 'liberal democrat' is condition the constitution and functions of the social type. Nevertheless, our fundamental analysis will attempt to reveal the relational aspects of the social-type formation that do not readily appear in everyday perceptions or media discourses.

[16] This method has been traditionally assocciated with Smith's analysis of the dandy (1974) (Almog, 1998).

The formation of the Democrat as a social type will be treated more in the lines of analyses drawing particularly upon Simmel's (1950) original treatment of types like "the stranger," as a crystallization, or, an "emergent property" of interactions in times and places. The 'democrat' social type is a product of political and social relations, but perhaps most significantly, its "credit," so to speak, was accumulated because of the systemic deficiencies of democratization in Turkey. Principally the political establishment's questionable performance in the area of civil liberties, in responding to the challenges of the Kurdish and Islamist movements and the accountability problems with civil-military relations have "selected" the emergence of a social space: in this space, liberal-democratic political opinions that were structurally excluded from state affairs offered discursive checks and balances to Turkish politics.

As in Simmel, our social type is a mediating concept between the general democratization dynamics of Turkey and the specific responses given to these dynamics in the political culture (Morris-Reich, 2003: 136; Pyythinen, 2010: 148). It does not refer to a "metaphor" or "transcendent essence". At the same time, while accomplishing the real abstraction of the social type, our analysis is derived from empirical examples. As Pyythinen puts it:

> From the perspective of the individual, the type is thus never identical to the individual in its singularity. Therefore the individual exemplifies the type rather than instantiating it (2010: 148).

Therefore, our point is not to discuss that political opinion producers are nothing but the instances of a type (a nonsensical idea) – individuals may embody various social types at the same time:

> Only the combination and fusion of several traits in one focal point forms a personality which then in its turn imparts to each individual trait a personal-subjective character. It is not that it is this or that trait that makes

> a unique personality of man, but that he is this and that trait (Simmel, 2004: 296)

As we shall discuss later in Chapter 4, the debates around intellectuals and political opinions in Turkey tend to reduce individuals holding ideological positions to singular forms of relations. By introducing social type analysis to political science, our basic epistemological aim is to underline to Simmelian dictum that relations involving human agents engaging in politics are always multi-faceted: "Human nature does not allow the individual to be tied to another by one thread alone" (Simmel, 1971: 77). More specifically, the state of being a liberal and democrat includes but cannot be reduced to class positions, strategies of cultural distinction, political criticism or patterns of socialization.

In this dissertation, the analysis of the liberaland democratic social type is developed through the following methodological steps:

1) Socio-historical analysis: In order to identify the components of the social type, an analysis of the political history of Turkey is completed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.

2) Data framework and data collection: Three individual representatives (Ali Bayramoğlu, Etyen Mahçupyan, Kürşat Bumin) of the social type are chosen and are analyzed as cases, in order to provide details for the social type. Writings of these figures are used as discursive data, and in-depth interviews have been completed with each of them. The discussion is covered in Chapter 7.

3) Bringing the components of the social type together: After the first two steps, an overall discussion about the social type and its positioning in Turkish politics is done in Chapter 8.

CHAPTER IV

THE BASIC POSITIONS CONCERNING "LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC OPINION PRODUCERS" IN TURKEY

4.1. Introduction

Moving on from the general academic positions on 'intellectuals' outlined in Chapter I this chapter will explore the Turkish side of the debate. Similar (if not less advanced) to the Western academic debates, the basic shortcomings of the Turkish literature on 'intellectuals' are related to the inability to come up with 'socialized' and 'historicized' categories which can provide in-depth explanations of why and how a group of individuals specialized in political opinion production emerge.

This chapter discusses two basic positions that can be encountered in the related Turkish literature on 'liberal democratic opinion producers.' Of course, this specific category/concept is not used in the debates. More commonsensical terms like "liberals," "liberal left" are utilized.

Marxist criticism considers this group in class terms, believing that "liberal democrats" are nothing but the "organic intellectuals" (the term used in the Gramscian sense) of the capitalist class. According to this criticism, "liberal democrats" do not concern themselves with political economic questions, but are

interested in "revisionist," "culturalist" questions concerning democratization. According to this Marxist criticism, the emergence of the liberal democratic discourse is nothing but a superstructural epiphenomenon reflecting the neo-liberal transformations beginning in the 1980s.

The nationalist scapegoating approach, which tends to label this group with negative characteristics, antagonizes them through slanders/accusations like "Americanists," "traitors," "children of George Soros," and so on. This approach stems from conspiracy thinking and is derived from the ideology of the Turkish state.

4.2. Marxist Criticism

4.2.1. Leading Journals Representing Marxist Posture against Civil Society

The roots of the critiques that arose from this kind of view date back to early 80s. With the emergence of the early versions of the liberal and democratic opinion producers in Turkey in the 1980s as the "voice of civil society," Marxists responded to this development. It can be stated that the Marxist critiques appeared as a reaction to the civil society argument, specifically with reference to the arguments in *Yeni Gündem*.[17] According to commentators adopting a Marxist perspective, left liberalism in Turkey, or using the more common term, 'proponents of civil society' (*sivil toplumculuk*), was represented most concretely by the *Yeni Gündem* circle. The figures who gathered around *Yeni Gündem* circle presented themselves as socialists. Nevertheless, according to the Marxists, the leading figures of *Yeni Gündem* were responsible of contaminating Turkish socialism with neo-liberal ideas. Besides, those who see themselves as "Second Republicans" were regarded by definition outside of the left, and by the all

[17] For a detailed discussion on *Yeni Gündem*, see: Chapter 5.

meanings of the word as liberals. Thus, initially, "liberals" did not much appear in Marxist criticisms.

The reactions of the Marxists can be followed through three political journals: The journal *Saçak* published by the Maoist *Aydınlık* circle (Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık – PDA); *Gelenek* (Tradition) published by a group of radicals who left the Turkish Workers' Party (TİP); and the journal *11. Tez* (Eleventh Thesis) published by a group of critical Marxist scholars and Trotskyite political figures.

Though Uğur Cankoçak, a writer in *Zemin* and Mehmet Ali Aybar, the former leader of the Workers Party of Turkey (TİP), were occasionally selected as targets of orthodox Marxist criticism, the occasional target of the debates was weekly *Yeni Gündem* and Murat Belge, as the leading figure of this journal. *Saçak, Gelenek* and *11.Tez* addressed the issue of civil society and its proponents mainly through the writings of Murat Belge.[18] As exemplified in Murat Belge, the discourse exalting civil society was considered as praising bourgeois democracy in Turkey.[19] Other than Belge, the term "proponent of civil society" was used mainly to point at Kürşat Bumin[20], Asaf Savaş Akat and Seyfettin Gürsel.

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[18] See: *Gelenek* (anonymous), "Murat Belge: Entelektüel Rantiyelik," *Gelenek,* Vol:19, January 1989; Salih Ural, "Murat Belge'nin Geçmiş Arayışı," *Saçak,* Vol. 3, April 1984; Mehmet Gündüz (Gün Zileli), "Uzatılan Elma Şekeri ya da 'Avrupa Komünizmi," *Saçak,* Vol.7, August 1984. The periodic *Sınıf Bilinci,* which followed 11.Tez in content then published articles on the same issue. See: Tarık Ali Diyar, "Murat Belge'nin Cephesi," *Sınıf Bilinci,* Vol:18, Summer 1997. For other articles including debates over Murat Belge's stance, see: Cemal Hekimoğlu, "Kundera'nın Ağırlıksız Varlıkları," *Gelenek,* Vol:1, January 1986; *Gelenek* (anonymous), "Bir Saçak Yazısı Üzerine," *Gelenek,* Vol:7, May 1987.

[19] See: *Gelenek* (anonymous), "Murat Belge: Entelektüel Rantiyelik," *Gelenek,* Vol:19, January 1989

[20] Kürşat Bumin, who was awarded 1982 Yazko Prize for his book *Sivil Toplum ve Devlet*, was often the target of criticisms though as not frequently as Belge. See: *Gelenek* (anonymous), "Bir Saçak Yazısı Üzerine," *Gelenek,* Vol:7, May 1987; Aydın Giritli, "Türkiye'de Sivil Toplumculuk (1981-1986)," *Gelenek,* Vol:3, January 1987; Editorial, "Tarih, Devrim, 'Sivil Toplumculuk," *Saçak,* Vol.3, April 1984; Anonymous, "Kürşat Bumin'in İlerlemeye Karşı Tutumu," *Saçak,* Vol.2, March 1984; Reader's Letter, *Saçak,* Vol.13, February 1985. For a more recent study see, Ali Doğan Güneşli, "Sivil Toplum: Ne, Nerede, Ne Zaman, Kim?" *Gelenek,* Vol: 68, October 2001.

The journal *Saçak* stood as the most influential journal echoing arguments against civil society ("*sivil toplumculuk*"). The journal was designed as a legal instrument of post-coup era belonging to Aydınlık[21] movement. *Saçak* defined its primary mission as responding to the needs of those who did not want to surrender to liberalism, looking for an intellectual revival.[22] In its first issue, the journal set its target as being on the side of progress and "using every opportunity to criticize pseudo-leftism which is bourgeois in essence."[23] An important part of this proposal was to reinstate the concept of "being pro-progress," a term believed to be being excluded from the leftist jargon.[24]

Ironically, a significant group from this circle, in later years, adopted a liberal-democratic position.[25] In fact, the split in *Saçak* manifested the beginnings in *Aydınlık* of earlier left-liberal, liberal-democrat and democrat political

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[21]*Aydınlık Movement:* It takes its name by the monthly periodical which started to be published on November 1968. This early version of the journal was published under the editorial leadership of Doğu Perinçek and Vahap Erdoğdu. The journal covered the articles of a wide range of political figures including Hikmet Kıvılcımlı and Mihri Belli. In the shaping process of National Democratic Revolution strategy in Turkey it played significant role. By the January 1970 volume 15, the journal was divided into two opposing groups namely "Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık-PDA" ve "Aydınlık Sosyalist Dergi." The former one, PDA, just before March 12 coup, evolved into a weekly periodical advocating the views of Maoist TİİKP (Turkey's Workers' and Peasants' Party). Banned several times, it appeared as daily Aydınlık newspaper by March 1978. Upon 1980 coup detat it was once again banned. (For further information, see: *Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi – STMA*, Vol.7, pp:2186-2187, İstanbul:İletişim, 1990; Oral Çalışlar, "Türkiye İhtilalci İşçi Köylü Partisi (TİİKP)," *STMA*, Vol.7, pp.2194-2195). Today, it represents Kemalist/nationalist wing in Turkish socialist movement and is being published via internet.

[22] See, Editorial, "Okurlarla", Vol.1, February 1984, p.2.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Prominent among these were Halil Berktay, Oral Çalışlar, Alper Görmüş, Şahin Alpay. Prof. Halil Berktay who is one of the outstanding historians of Turkey took part in the Maoist Aydınlık movement until early 1990s. Between1989-93 he was the history consultant of AnaBritanica Encylopedia. Currently he holds an academic position in Sabancı University and is one of the founding members of TESEV (Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı). Oral Çalışlar Journalist, writer was the editor of daily *Aydınlık* published in 1978. He was in the presidential board of the Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Party of Turkey (TİİKP). He was arrested again upon the military coup of September 12th, 1980. After days as fugitive or prisoner, he was released in August 1988. He worked for the daily *Cumhuriyet* in the period of 1992-2008. He was involved in the development of various TV programmes. He then became a columnist in daily *Radikal* starting from 15 June 2008. Şahin Alpay: One of the leaders of the Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Party of Turkey (TİİKP). Starting from 1982, he wrote for the daily *Cumhuriyet* and then was a columnist in the daily papers *Sabah* and *Milliyet*. Having his doctorate in political sciences, Alpay is presently a columnist in the daily *Zaman*.

orientations: Just before the launching of *Saçak,* a small group within this Marxist-Maoist movement broke away, considering themselves as opposed to the centre of the movement. Called "Kaleciler", this group included the following leading figures: Metin and Gülay Göktürk, Dilek Yılmaz, Veysel Yılmaz, Erdoğan Kahyaoğlu, Cem Kızılgeç, Alper Görmüş, Hüseyin İmik (Zileli, 2003: 20). Some of the figures in the group would later show up as the leading liberals and/or democrats of Turkish political life including, for example, Metin Göktürk, Gülay Göktürk[26] and Alper Görmüş[27]. The reason behind their coinage as "Kaleciler" is as follows: In response to a polemic essay by Gün Zileli defending Leninist party model, the group with liberal tendency prepared a text titled "The Fortress to be Destroyed," pledging other signatories. The term "fortress" ("kale") in this text was a metaphor for Leninist/oppressive/bureaucratic party model

[26] Gülay Göktürk (b. 1949, Istanbul): Graduating from Fatih Girls' High School, she was in the US for a year upon AFS scholarship. Returning to Turkey, she attended the Middle East Technical University (METU) and became a member of the Socialist Thinking Club of the school. Shortly after she joined the Aydınlık movement and became a leading figure there. She was the editor of the workers' page in *Aydınlık,* writing articles in her column titled "Anvil and Hammer". Shortly before the closure of *Aydınlık* by the military coup of September 12th 1980, she worked for the daily *Güneş* and then for the weekly *Nokta*. In 1990, together with her husband Metin Göktürk she joined the team to launch the periodic *Aktüel.* She was a columnist in the daily *Yeni Yüzyıl* starting from the late 1994 before transferring to the daily *Güneş.* Presently she is writing for *Bugün*. Göktürk is one of the prominent figures of liberal line in Turkey. She explained her political stance as follows: "I have always been the target of those readers who think with the concepts and political confrontations belonging to 30 years ago. But looking at the process since 1994, we are on a liberal line. That is a new line; it was once there but made forgotten. There is no liberal line in the near past of Turkey, it was covered. My writings followed a line which applied liberal thinking to all spheres of life, from private life to the state, from politics to love and marriage and to mother-child relations." See: Cemal A. Kalyoncu, "Fadime Dillerde, Fadime Gönüllerde," *Aksiyon,* March 10, 2001, Vol. 327.

[27] Alper Görmüş (b. 21 November 1952, Kars):Journalist, editor of now closed weekly *Nokta*. He worked in *Aydınlık* from 1977 to 1980. When the journal was closed after the military coup in 1980, Görmüş did various jobs until 1986. He was among the editors of the encyclopaedia AnaBritannica and transferred to *Nokta* in 1986 and then to *Aktüel* 3-4 years after. In 1995 he spent 3 months in jail on a sentence given for news feature in the journal which was considered as "propagating for the terrorist organization." He had a short experience in the daily *Güneş* during Ahmet Altan's editorship. Later he prepared the column "Medyakronik" in *Yeni Şafak* together with Kürşat Bumin. In July 2006, he accepted the invitation and became the editor of weekly *Nokta.* On 11 April 2008 he was acquitted from a defamation case brought by retired admiral Özden Örnek for the news feature "Coup Chronicles" published in *Nokta*. Görmüş is presently writing media critiques in daily *Taraf.*

(Zileli, 2003:20).[28] Ironically, such figures as Gün Zileli, Oral Çalışlar and Halil Berktay who then defended the "fortress", that is, the Leninist party model and directed harsh criticisms towards its liberal critics, much later became leading opinion producers supporting an anti-Marxist, democratic perspective in Turkish politics.

The journal *Saçak* was launched in 1984. Since the September 12th military regime had introduced a series of legal constraints and procedures that made publishing journals more difficult, it seemed reasonable to take over a journal that was already being published. *Saçak* was a literary journal and its non-political title was thought to provide camouflage against government scrutiny (Zileli, 2003: 16). The core writers' team in the journal was as follows: Gün Zileli, Oral Çalışlar, Halil Berktay, Aydoğan Büyüközden and Feyza Zileli. The bulk of articles in the journal consisted of essays and book critiques written by Gün Zileli mostly under the pseudonym "Mehmet Gündüz" as well as some other names. Other important articles in the journal were by Halil Berktay on "the temptation of civil society" and by Aydoğan Büyüközden on the "Enlightment" thinkers in the history of Turkey as well as other articles criticizing such figures as Murat Belge and Yalçın Küçük. Articles by Zileli mostly targeted the neo-liberal orientations of intellectuals, the influence of Erich Fromm and the pro-civil society discourse (Zileli, 2003: 15). Berktay, on his part, preferred to criticize civil society proponents from a more theoretical perspective.

[28] In his memoirs Zileli mentions: "Looking back, they were right. Indeed, this bureaucratic institution should be destroyed like all other bourgeois institutions. However, many of these friends who wanted to demolish the "fortress" had no intention to destroy all other bourgeois institutions as proven today by their salaried employment by these very institutions." (See: Zileli, 2003: 20).

Published by the core team for a period of longer than one year, the journal was left to Doğu Perinçek in 1985 after issue 15, who was just released from prison (Zileli, 2003: 23).[29] According to Zileli, the first 15 issues of the journal stood for a serious reckoning with civil society proponents and "neo-liberalism, which constituted one of the main currents of the post-1980 period" – and thus, albeit for a short time, *Saçak* brought the Aydınlık movement closer to Marxist and revolutionary sources, which was otherwise getting more and more closer to Kemalism (2003: 32). Analyses in *Saçak* largely bore the imprint of a progressive, Kemalist perspective. Zileli states that articles in the journal, including those written by him, "could not avoid falling prey to the progressive perspective." (2003: 34).

Another circle who defined settling accounts with left-liberalism or "proponents of civil society" as a priority item in their agenda consisted of Marxists gathering around the journal *Gelenek*. Launched in 1986, *Gelenek* brought together figures originated from *Sosyalist İktidar*, an oppositional group within the Workers Party of Turkey (TİP). This group advocated "socialist revolution" during the debate against the proponents of "national democratic revolution" in the 1970s.[30] Starting from its early issues, *Gelenek* allocated a rather large space to the criticism of civil society arguments. Just like *Saçak, Gelenek* too regarded civil society arguments as a kind of deviation that had "bad" influences the socialist left.

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[29] While in prison, Perinçek's articles were published in the journal under the name "Emre Adıgüzel" See: Zileli, 2003:24.

[30] The political circle *Gelenek* established the *Party for Socialist Turkey (STP)* in 1992. The party was closed down by the Constitutional Court in 1993 for "targeting the voluntary togetherness of Turkish and Kurdish peoples" as stated in its programme and re-established in the same years as *Party for Socialist Power (SİP).* During an extraordinary congress held on 11 November 2001, the SİP took the name "Communist Party of Turkey (TKP)." The journal *Gelenek* is the official organ of the party. See: *http://www.tkp.org.tr/tkp-programi.*

The third circle that applied a rather comprehensive Marxist criticism to the left-liberal approach consisted of Marxist academics and political figures gathering around the journal *11. Tez.* The journal was published in regular intervals from its first issue dated November 1985 to the twelfth issue in January 1992. It was a journal of theory and politics with articles focusing on topics like anti-capitalism, real socialism, democracy, nationalism, unionism, organization of workers, and so on. The main purpose of the journal was defined as theoretical intervention from a Marxist point of view to against the neo-liberal tendencies that had started to influence the socialist left. As stated by Savran, one of the leading figures of the publication, "it was the struggle against civil society arguments and left-liberalism that determined the main course of the journal" (Savran, 2008: 19).

4.2.2. Major Criticisms by Leading Marxist Journals

The criticism of orthodox Marxists had a common ground despite some political-ideological differences. The common themes in the criticism of pro-civil society positions are still used today in Marxist circles in analyzing liberal and democratic opinions.

4.2.2.1. "Rejection of Historical Materialism"

The first main position that orthodox Marxists share in their contention against civil society arguments holds that such arguments fail to utilize the methodological arsenal of historical materialism. Stating more plainly, pro-civil society / left-liberal arguments are not "class-based." Looking at history and society from the prism of civil society, it is argued, is tantamount to refuting class analysis from the very beginning. Civil society arguments move away from historical materialism by replacing class analysis with such dualisms like "people

vs elites" or "civil society vs political society." The orthodox Marxist criticism stated that class-based cleavages experienced in Turkey since the 1920s were ignored by such dualisms. Civil society arguments were said to focus exclusively on such phenomena as institutional continuity and persistence of an oppressive state apparatus.[31] Looking at the recent history of Turkey from the lens of such phenomena led to the mistake of attempting to derive a "democratic" and "progressive" core from the internal struggles of propertied classes (*Gelenek*, 1989).

It was further argued that civil society arguments were trapped in imagining a democracy above classes which could exist on paper. According to *Gelenek* writer Aydemir Güler, Kürşat Bumin, as a civil society proponent, is exemplary of a liberal, replacing class formations with institutions and forms: Bumin depicted a Turkish bourgeois class that "fell short" in democratization, and by doing that, he completely ignored the role of the State in the transition to capitalism in Turkey (1987).

According to Marxists, the abandonment of a "historical materialist analysis" leads to conceiving concepts and models as idealistic, deprived of their historicity. This is the very reason why civil society based analyses could only remain superficial (Güler, 1987). The pattern of "western type" democracy that civil society proponents wished to see in Turkey, according to Marxists, was merely a speculation separated from historicity.[32] The "pattern" mentioned by civil society proponents consists merely of motifs that could find existence only in the ideological discourse of a specific period in the history of capitalism: "The

[31] See, for instance: Aydın Giritli, "Türkiye'de Sivil Toplumculuk (1981-1986)," *Gelenek*, Vol.3, January 1987; Halil Berktay, "Türkiye Tarihinin Liberal-Burjuva Yorumu," *Saçak,* Vol.1, February 1984.
[32] See, for instance: Oğuz Ertem, "ATÜT," *Saçak*, Vol.21, October 1985.

civil society that they find missing in Turkey is nothing more than a portrait of happiness drawn by the ideologists of free-competition liberalism" (Güler, 1987).

An example of the abandonment of historical materialist analysis is also given with reference to Murat Belge. In his article on the emergence of democratic traditions in historical process, Belge mentions the cases of the Soviet Union and China while arguing that socialism cannot find ground in societies where democratic traditions are not well-established.[33] This analysis by Belge is criticized for abandoning "class" and "relations of production" as the main concepts of historical materialism. According to this criticism, Belge ignores such issues as change in political power and changes in the systems of ownership and production relations and prefers to define social change in terms of changes in personal lives and habits as well as in cultural formation itself (Giritli, 1987).

In his article addressing civil society arguments comprehensively from a "historical materialist" standpoint, Sungur Savran reminds that "class struggle" appears nowhere in this theoretical model (1986). Ignoring social classes in these analyses brings along some question marks about the nature of the domain called "civil society." Class struggles, which are attributed central role in historical materialism as the driving force of history, are exchanged with struggles between civil society and state (Savran, 1986: 23).

In the 1990s, it can be said that Marxist criticisms of "proponents of civil society" become relatively more sophisticated. This can be partly attributed to the Turkish translation of the book *Civil Society and the State: New European Perspectives* (1993), edited by John Keane.[34] Thanks to the translation of this

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[33] See: Murat Belge, "Muhalefetten İktidara Demokrasi," *Zemin,* Vol.3, p.6.

[34] Editor: Tuncay Birkan. Translated by: Ahmet Çiğdem, Aksu Bora, Ayşe Nur Menekşe, Erkan Akın, Levent Köker, Mehmet Küçük. Ayrıntı: İstanbul, 1993 (Original name: *Civil Society and the State: New European Perspectives*, John Keane (ed.), Verso, 1988). Shortly after, another book by

book, Turkish readers could access the most competent examples of civil society arguments, and thus more rigorous defenses and criticisms had to be formulated. Again, beginning with the 1990s, many books in Turkish published particularly by İletişim and Ayrıntı publishing houses, contributed to the enrichment of debates over civil society-state relations. Nonetheless, the edited volume by Keane remained a primary source of reference.[35] Consequently, orthodox Marxists considered it as their major task to "settle the score" with Keane in their criticisms of civil society arguments.[36]

Specifically in the case of Keane, the major criticism raised against the civil society perspective is that he does not use the term civil society in the sense Marx did. While the term "civil society" is not unique to Marx, it was given a new content and used as such by him (Çulhaoğlu and Soyer, 2000: 10). In Marx, civil society directly corresponds to the domain of production and constitutes a level at which individuals seek their personal interests including property ownership. In short, Marx defines civil society as the domain of activities carried out in order to respond to material needs. In this sense, civil society is the foundation of the State rather than its adversary.[37] Hence, arguing for a conflict between civil society and

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Keane was translated into Turkish and published again by Ayrıntı in 1994: *Demokrasi ve Sivil Toplum: Avrupa Sosyalizminin Açmazları, Toplumsal ve Siyasal İktidarın Denetlenmesi Sorunu ve Demokrasi Beklentileri Üzerine,* translated by: Necmi Erdoğan, İstanbul, Ayrıntı, 1994 (*Democracy and Civil Society on the Predicaments of Democracy, and the Problem of Controlling Social and Political Power,* Verso, 1988)

[35] In this regard, the article of Savran may be referred as exception in terms of the most comprehensive first analysis of civil society (1986). He mentions about John Keane and David Held as European representatives of "left liberalism" in the article he had written in 1986 and develops his analysis referring these two social scientists. For the passage Savran based, see: David Held and John Keane, "In a Fit State," *New Socialist,* March-April 1984 (Savran, 1986:16).

[36] See: Metin Çulhaoğlu, "Devlet, Sivil Toplum ve Demokratikleşme," in *Sivil Toplum: Devletin Büyümesi,* İlker Maga (ed.), İstanbul:YGS Yayınları, 2001, pp.44-45; Metin Çulhaoğlu,"Devlete Yıkılan Siyaset," *Sosyalist Politika,* Vol.2, September 1994. (The journal, *Sosyalist Politika,* was established by a group of socialists who left SİP/Gelenek in 1993, therefore shared the same political assumptions with the former).

[37] These comments are based on Marx's statements about civil society found in "On the Jewish Question" and "German Ideology." See, Marx, "On the Jewish Question," Marx-Engels, *Collected*

state, as many civil society proponents do, runs counter to the methodology of Marx. Furthermore, in civil society approach, while this domain is considered as a realm for social relations, the State is considered merely as an apparatus. Since the class nature of the State is not included in the analysis, it is conceptualized superficially and the nature of the State as a social totality comprising class relations is not examined (Savran, 1986: 16, 24). Hence proponents of civil society conceptualize the State as an independent and supra-class apparatus that oppresses all social groups (Savran, 1986: 24).

The same ambiguity can be observed when it comes to the nature and essence of civil society as well. Savran explains the case as follows:

> Since Hegel, the concept has been used to express a society which has been founded on commodity (market) relations and established between the individuals who are free to pursue their own interests and have private property. Left liberals, however, coming from a historical materialist background, cannot explain civil society as such without feeling uneasy but they still falter about the necessity of such an alternative definition (1986: 16).

According to Savran, there are representatives in Turkey as well of an approach that is free from ambiguities in relation to the nature of civil society (1986: 17). Contrary to the stance of these representatives who define civil society directly on the basis of market relations, opinion producers sharing the left-liberal framework fail to come up with a clear definition as is the case with the traditional political thought.[38] Analyses launched without any reference to the concept of class are based merely on the opposition of the concepts of civil society and state,

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Works, Progress Moscow, 1975, Vol.3, p.163; Marx and Engels, "The German Ideology," *Collected Works*, Vol.5, p.50, 53, 89, 90.

[38] Savran lists the following names as the representatives of this line: Asaf Savaş Akat, Şafak Alpay, Seyfettin Gürsel. For Asaf Savaş Akat's statement on this issue see, A.S. Akat, in panel discussion "İktisat Politikaları, Büyüme ve Demokrasi" (Economic Policies, Growth and Democracy), *Yeni Gündem,* Vol.13, 3-15 January 1985, p.14 (Savran, 1986: 17).

whose definitions remain unclear. Then, this dichotomized opposition leads to the attribution of some absolute properties to each of these two (Çulhaoğlu, 2001: 37). Absence of any reference to the concept of class which is the fundamental category of the historical materialist approach leads to the omission of deep social differences and divisions within civil society as well as resultant contradictions and struggles (Savran, 1986: 23). It is because the State is conceptualized only with reference to its oppressive nature while civil society is exalted as a realm where individual freedoms can materialize without any reference to demarcations and divides within (Savran, 1986: 25). Eventually, placing civil society and the State at dichotomized ends means neglecting major processes that bring along mutual interaction and transactions between these two.

Göran Therborn's methodological criticism of the civil society paradigm from a Marxist perspective was also inspirational for Marxist circles in Turkey within the last decade.[39] Based on Therborn, it is stressed that the paradigm mentioned, running counter to Marxist analysis, addressed the two realms in a dichotomized opposition. The paradigm is said to be lamed with a culturalist aspect by building social and political analysis on religious or other value systems (Therborn, 1997; Çulhaoğlu, 2001). Moreover, by placing the citizen against the State, the civil society paradigm does more than missing class divisions, it actually conceals them (Güneşli, 2001). Adding up all these dimensions, the civil society paradigm is deemed as an anti-Marxist orientation, not an approach based on Marxism and historical materialism.

[39] See, Göran Therborn, "Beyond Civil Society: Democratic Experiences and Their Relevance to the Middle East," in *Civil Society, Democracy and the Muslim World*, Elisabeth Özdalga and Sune Persson (eds.), İstanbul: Swedish Research Institute and Curzon Press, 1997. For Metin Çulhaoğlu's analysis developed on the basis of Therborn's ideas, see: Çulhaoğlu, "Devlet, Sivil Toplum ve Demokratikleşme," 2001: 36-37.

4.2.2.2. "Reducing class struggle to struggle for democracy and refutation of the perspective of political power"

The meaning attributed to democracy by the approach which sees the development of civil society as the prerequisite of democracy has been the main target of attack by Marxist circles. Leaving the content of civil society vague, the civil society paradigm seems to have a consensus on the point that the proper operation of market economy is a *sine qua non* for democracy. Moving ahead from this point, the concept of "democracy" they focus on is "bourgeois democracy" which has emerged as the dominant form of State in many capitalist societies (Savran, 1986: 27). The bourgeoisie, once waging a democratic-oriented struggle against absolutist states in the era of classical bourgeois revolutions, today tended to abandon this democratic orientation once it has consolidated its political power (Savran, 1986: 27). The civil society paradigm refers to a historical experience while making market the absolute precondition for democracy. This proposition, which can be defended only on the basis of an empiricist theory of knowledge, excludes the possibility of democratic experiences other than those already given. When "democracy is taken not as a static model but a domain of social relations developing and unfolding in historical process" the earlier empiricist proposition will lose its full value (Savran, 1986: 28).

According to Marxists, seeing the "democrat" and "socialist" as identical is one of the major mistakes attributable to the socialist left in Turkey. After all, it is argued, democracy is important for socialists in a tactical context rather than being a goal in itself. What socialists actually need is to separate the socialist and the democrat, contrary to the efforts of such periodicals as *Yeni Gündem* and *Zemin* seeking provide a ground for unrefined unity of democrats and socialists

(Giritli, 1987).[40] Democracy would but turn into an empty category when freed from its class foundations. Democracy is ultimately a historical category whose essence and form is determined by existing class relations. Socialist democracy and bourgeois democracy have their respective forms and contents. Any universal definition of democracy can be made only when all classes have disappeared (Giritli, 1987). It is in this sense possible to talk about a contradiction between socialism and democracy:

> The changing importance of democracy as a category is the proof that it is mainly conjectural and tactical, that it can never be the primary target. The primary objective of socialism is not to build democracy. (…) The essential element is socialism's own social project and political power that paves the way for this project (Giritli, 1987).

It is argued that the focus of the civil society paradigm on democracy shows its being devoid of any perspective for political power. What is meant by "power perspective" here is the change in political power through revolution. Hence, the idealistic insistence of the proponents of civil society / left-liberals in democracy is interpreted by Marxists as the abandonment of any claim for revolution. While it is recognized that emphasis on democracy can be found at the historical roots of the socialist movement and that democratic ideals took shape in early socialist struggles as a response to the bourgeoisie's abandonment of its revolutionary character, it is also added that socialism gradually demarcated itself from democracy to fulfill its own course (Giritli, 1987).[41] Hence, Murat Belge, who says "there was civil society first" and Mehmet Ali Aybar, who emphasizes the prominence of "democracy", represent the false perspective that fails to see the historical relation between socialism and democracy (Giritli, 1987).

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[40] See, Aydın Giritli, "Demokrasicilik Tutkusu ve Zemin Dergisi," *Gelenek*, Vol:4, February 1987.
[41] The European Left and New Left Movements are referred to as cases where this separation is yet not complete. See, Giritli, 1987.

The theme of democracy has brought along a debate on methodology as well. The point made by Murat Belge that reducing democracy to a secondary issue would not be "Marxist"[42] is explained, by orthodox Marxists, in reference to Belge's failure to grasp the foundations of Marxism. According to the journal *Gelenek*, Belge authorizes himself with the right to reduce the criteria for "being a Marxist" to "being a democrat" (Giritli, 1987). The explanation why this reduction is wrong is given by referring to Marxist classics: *Class Struggles in France* and *Critique of the Gotha Programme*. Based on these texts that present the most realistic analyses of the political picture emerging as a result of the revolutions of 1848, it is argued that the bourgeoisie loses its democratic character and turns reactionary once the working classes actively appear in the political arena (Hekimoğlu, 1987). This point is read out as a warning against any intention of prioritizing the task of "improving bourgeois democracy" (Hekimoğlu, 1987).[43]

According to Marxists, while *Yeni Gündem* is engaged in the "civil society paradigm", the journal *Zemin* is out for representing a political line which may be called "extensive democracy." Criticisms of bureaucratic dictatorship, leadership and Leninism bring both journals together in the same political position. Such platforms criticized for "injecting" liberalism to the socialist movement in Turkey are also blamed for undermining revolutionary thinking – as these journals are considered to abandon a vision for political power.

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[42] For Murat Belge's article on this, see: Belge, Murat, "Muhalefetten İktidara Demokrasi," *Zemin,* Vol.3, p.6.

[43] Cemal Hekimoğlu refers to an interview with former Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel by Haluk Gerger, Aziz Nesin and Uğur Mumcu published in weekly *Yeni Gündem*. According to Hekimoğlu, response given by Demirel to Mumcu, Nesin and Gerger who tried to "squeeze" him on the issues of freedom of expression and organization is much more realistic since he said the left could not, by definition, suffice with bourgeois values and institutions and would target greater upheavals, without which it cannot be described as "left." (Cited by Hekimoğlu, Cemal, "Burjuva Demokrasisi: Nereye Kadar?" *Gelenek,* Vol:5, March 1987.

Another theme that Marxists in Turkey more or less share is the idea that those stressing the importance of struggle for "democracy" are actually giving up Jacobinism. In fact, any unreserved refutation of Jacobinism is one of the most palpable indicators of giving up the cause of revolution. For civil society proponents, Jacobinism is a "devil."[44] According to the orthodox Marxist criticism, civil society proponents stand on a kind of populism that identifies Jacobinism with elitism and hostility to masses. According to Marxist perspective, on the other hand, Jacobinism is exactly what is defined as perspective for political power. Accordingly, Jacobinism meant transcending beyond the horizons and status quo tendencies of bourgeoisie:

> Jacobinism tells about a type of man, the psychology of a revolutionary. Each revolutionary process embodies this type and psychology, but not each and every revolutionary leader can be a Jacobin. Not in each and every bourgeois revolution can democrat leaders transcend beyond bourgeois horizons by catching the wave created by equalitarian and humanistic ideas and agitated radical social sections of population (Giritli, 1987).

It must be added that there is some divergence of opinion about Jacobinism among Marxists. According to Marxists around *Gelenek*, Jacobinism should, by definition, go beyond the outlook of the bourgeoisie as a class. As such, Jacobinism would be a spiritual mood, a form of action attributable to a socialist revolutionary. *Saçak* considered Kemalism as a kind of Jacobinism unique to circumstances in Turkey.[45] According to *Saçak,* Jacobinism is a revolutionary movement emerging in the ascending phase of bourgeois

[44] See, Giritli, 1987; Halil Berktay, "Yeni Gündem'e İlişkin Bazı Gözlem ve Düşünceler," *Saçak,* Vol.9, October 1984, p.11; Editorial, "Tarih, Devrim, 'Sivil Toplum'culuk," *Saçak,* Vol.3, April 1984, pp.3-7; Salih Ural, "Murat Belge'nin Geçmiş Arayışı," *Saçak,* Vol.3, April 1984, p. 29; Emre Adıgüzel (Doğu Perinçek), "Politik Toplum ve Sivil Toplum," *Saçak*, Vol.8, September 1984, p.15.

[45]An important point that needs to be stressed is that both the *Saçak* circle and liberal writers agree that Kemalism is Jacobinism with only one difference: "Jacobinism is a devil for civil society proponents and a heritage to be owned for *Sacak."* See: Giritli, 1987.

revolutions.[46] Hence, the "civil society paradigm," defending civil society from Jacobinism, actually represents a reactionary movement. For example, when the domain autonomous from the political domain is always ascribed positive characteristics, then it becomes inevitable to protect dervish lodges and hermitages as well as theocratic teaching from the Jacobin encroachments of Kemalism (Adıgüzel, 1984: 17). Yet, it was only natural that Jacobins (or Kemalists) "sharpened their swords" in their fight against the reactionary Ottoman state since "it was swords that established democracy" (Adıgüzel, 1984: 17).

In conclusion, the concept "Jacobinism," rejected by civil society proponents raising their voices in such journals as *Yeni Gündem* and *Zemin*, is generally praised by Marxist circles though after giving it different connotations. The criticism "being anti-political" used against civil society proponents is formulated mainly on the basis of this point: Civil society proponents identify Jacobinism with political violence, with the tyranny of an organized and voluntarist subject. It is exactly at this point where they start to negate or refute politics (Giritli, 1987). According to Marxism, on the other hand, Jacobinism was nothing else but a passion to change. Anti-Jacobinism and populism has historically been the manifestation of hostility towards organized political force, since the time of Robespierre (Gelenek, 1989). In this sense, Marxists argue, the Jacobin movement acquired a significance that went beyond the limited vision of the bourgeoisie. In fact, the revolutionary character of this class had expired with 1789, and during bourgeois revolutions that ensued they sought the ways of coming to terms with the feudal remnants, seeing working class as their main enemy (Koçak, 1986; Giritli, 1987). Today, in the light of Lenin's warning,

[46] See: Editorial, "Tarih, Devrim, 'Sivil Toplum'culuk," *Saçak,* Vol.3, April 1984.

socialists should see themselves as "genuine heirs of Jacobinism" (Giritli, 1987). After all, such characteristics as "revolution from above" or "substituting the class with the vanguard organization" attributed to Jacobinism are nothing more than 'fictitious' criticisms since, according to *Gelenek* writers, "the Jacobin side of socialists means transcending beyond their own class, the working class" (Giritli, 1987).

4.2.2.3. "Anti-statism and anti-political posture"

One of the major criticisms of civil society proponents by Marxists is that their theses consist merely of a series of reactions. Opposition to the State and state bureaucracy manifests itself in the usage of the dual concept of civil society/political society. According to *Gelenek* authors:

> While progressive forces in history are ascribed to civil society, the State emerges as a mechanism that continuously restrains and impedes the flourishing of many beauties embodied by civil society (Güler, 1987).

While elaborating on the historical development of societies and our present day problems, the civil society perspective attributed key importance to civil society-State relations, assigning all positives to the former and all negatives to the latter. Savran explains the point that is common to all civil society based approaches as follows:

> In history, it has always been civil society that lays the ground for freedoms, democratization, struggle against oppression, economic development, etc; it is the autonomy of civil society against the State, the immense energy and vitality set free by this autonomy. On the other hand, the State has stopped or barred all these developments at the expense of condemning humanity to backwardness (1986: 18).

Perinçek too underlined that civil society proponents described civil society as the "land of God" while political society or the State opposing it was pictured as a "land ruled by the Devil" (Adıgüzel, 1984).

Representatives of Marxist thought argue that this negation of the State by civil society proponents can only have the natural and logical consequence of negating politics itself. Hostility towards the State leads to the reduction of action to change life down to a philosophy of life and to the placement of struggle for political power on the same plane as daily targets. Yet, "spreading everywhere, politics become nowhere, losing its own habitat" (Güler, 1987). Hence, defending civil society against the state is clearly the refutation of politics.[47]

According to Savran, who approaches the issue in a more theoretical context, the distance that civil society discourse keeps with politics is related to the basic theoretical presuppositions of this approach. Defining the State and society as categorically opposed to each other makes the *inherent relationship* in-between invisible. In case this relationship is given an extrinsic character, then political power, which is the manifestation of the irreconcilable contradiction within civil society, loses its importance and politics ceases to be a struggle for power (Savran, 1986: 25).

At the level of *reepolitik*, the civil society paradigm, emerging from the political and cultural environment following the September 12th coup, meant the refutation of all theoretical-practical heritage of socialist left. After all, it is argued, the suggestion made by this stance was nothing less than apoliticism (Giritli, 1987). By criticizing reel socialism (socialist practices in the USSR and in

[47]While formulating his arguments, *Gelenek* writer Aydemir Güler refers to Kürşat Bumin's *Sivil Toplum ve Devlet*. See, Güler, 1987; Kürşat Bumin, *Sivil Toplum ve Devlet,* Istanbul: Yazko, 1981.

Eastern European Countries), dictatorship of the proletariat and Leninism, civil society proponents were actually targeting politics itself.[48]

Marxists have spotted the theoretical linkage between ATÜT (Asiatic Mode of Production) debates and the civil society paradigm. Halil Berktay, one of the writers of *Saçak*, had provided heavy criticisms of "Asiatic theses" in his book titled *Kabileden Feodalizme*.[49] Berktay argues that until the stage of transition to capitalism, the socio-economic evolution in the Ottoman-Turkish society was not different from that of Western Europe (1983). In a debate over ATÜT, Doğu Perinçek draws attention to a specific weakness of the civil society-based understanding of history.[50] According to Perinçek:

> If one face of theses on the 'Asiatic' character of Turkish history is the deification of the State, the other face is to see anything coming from the State as an 'intervention from the land of the Devil to the land of the God' regardless of time and place" (1984: 17).

While also underlying the continuity between the ATÜT debates of the 60s and the more recent civil society paradigm, Marxists around *Gelenek* pointed out to a difference: The 1960s stood for a period of "search" for socialists; the period after 1980 when the civil society paradigm manifested itself was that of demoralization and collapse. Eventually, search projects of this latter period reflected the spirit of the time (Giritli, 1987). Similarly, Sungur Savran stressed

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[48]Savran warns that the environment conducive to the worldwide ground gaining of left liberalism is related to the bureaucratic degeneration occurring in experiences of transition to socialism. According to Savran, this dynamic facilitating the spread of liberal tendencies in the world left needs to be addressed on the basis of historical materialism. (1986:13).

[49] Berktay's argument can be briefly summarized as follows: The role played by the central bureaucracy in the Ottoman society does not make this society different from that in Western Europe in terms of the mode of production. Moreover, the absence of any experience of slave mode of production in Turkish society does not bar passage to feudalism. According to what is stressed by Berktay, slavery is not a universal mode of production. As long as defined on the basis of Marxism, it would be an historical error to claim that feudalism was never experienced in the Ottoman society. See, Halil Berktay, *Kabileden Feodalizme*, Istanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1983.

[50] See, Emre Adıgüzel (Doğu Perinçek), "Politik Toplum ve Sivil Toplum," *Saçak*, Vol.8, September, 1984.

that left liberalism mushrooming in the 1980s was in fact a "defeatist ideology" (2006: 3; 2008: 15). Its very emergence in the vacuum of the 1980s is an evidence of this ideology's fatalist nature. In Savran's opinion, too, the intellectual foundations of the pro-civil society ideological orientation were created in the debates of the 1960s and it was therefore possible to find the origins of this approach in the ATÜT debates (2006: 3). In sum, the ATÜT analysis was one of the intellectual starting points of left liberalism.

4.2.2.4. "Reformism"

Marxists share the view that the proponents of the civil society paradigm come together around a "liberal" reading of Gramsci (Gündüz, 1984: 16-17; Savran 1986; Çulhaoğlu, 1994: 17-18).[51] According to this view, capitalizing on some ambiguities in Gramscian thought, the concept "civil society" was defined as apart from the mode of production and production relations, which led its advocators to a path outside the Marxist framework. While conceding that some vague points in Gramsci's thinking did allow for such reading[52] it is added that it is virtually impossible to derive any "conciliatory" political line from a thinker who upheld Leninism (Berktay, 1984: 7; Gündüz, 1984: 19; Çulhaoğlu and Soyer, 2000: 20). Neither is it a coincidence that the major reference of post-Marxists is Gramsci's ideas. Here, a reference is made to Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe who re-interpreted Gramscian concept of hegemony by drawing attention to

[51]The work of Jacques Textier developing a critical outlook to the liberal reading of Gramsci, which was translated into Turkish in 1985, has been a frequently referred source in related debates. See, Jacques Textier, *Gramsci ve Felsefe*, Kenan Somer (translated by), İstanbul: Birey ve Toplum Yay., 1985.

[52] Gülnur Savran' comments that Gramsci merely "assumes" the structure for the sake of constructing the superstructure is meaningful in this regard. See: Gülnur Savran, "Gramsci'nin Çıkmazları," *Sınıf Bilinci,* Vol.2, October, 1988, pp.161-162.

ideological struggle and non-class nature of ideologies in the process of building counter-hegemony (Çulhaoğlu and Soyer, 2000: 22-23).

The relationship between Gramsci's thinking and Euro-communism is an issue frequently underlined in Marxist literature (Gündüz, 1984: 16). Mehmet Gündüz's criticism of an article by Murat Belge titled "Berlinguer's Questions are Still Valid for Turkey" is significant in that it outlines how Marxists approached the issue at that time.[53] Upon the demise of Enrico Berlinguer, the leader of the Communist Party of Italy, Murat Belge had drawn some political conclusions for Turkey on the basis of Euro-communism.[54] One point addressed by Belge in his article was related to "historical consensus." According to Gramsci, working class and other classes of people should establish their 'historical block' to confront the 'power block' of the hegemonic class and its allies. The Communist Party of Italy had managed to come up with its consensus against the consensus of the ruling classes basing on this idea of Gramsci (Belge, 1984: 24). For instance, the CPI behaved carefully not to hurt the Catholic public opinion (Belge, 1984: 25). Hence, the strategy envisaged by Gramsci was based on a process rather than a moment of rupture as it was the case with the October Revolution in Russia (Belge, 1984: 25). This Italian strategy that Belge tried to adopt for Turkey suggested that socialists could seek a historical consensus with those segments of population standing against the statist, Jacobin circles that maintained themselves by excluding masses throughout the period from the Ottoman era to the Republic (1984: 25). According to Gündüz, on the other hand, Belge was unequivocally suggesting a conciliatory political line with his approach and abandoning the

[53] For another article dealing with Murat Belge's stance and reformism, see: Salih Ural, "Murat Belge'nin Geçmiş Arayışı," *Saçak,* Vol:3, April, 1984.
[54] See: Murat Belge, "Berlinguer'in Soruları Türkiye İçin Geçerliliğini Koruyor," *Yeni Gündem*, Vol.5, July 1984.

vision based on conquering political power through revolution (1984: 18-19). Moreover, Belge's position (and therefore of other civil society proponents) displayed the early indications of the reflection in political arena of a rightward ideological shift which had first started in ideology. Murat Belge "was trying to line up Turkish left behind the traditionalist, á la turca right of the country" (Gündüz, 1984: 19). Civil society proponents represented by *Yeni Gündem* not only accepted all theses put forward by the right, but were also trying recruit forces from the left to that side (Gündüz, 1984: 19). As a system of thinking that excludes radicalism and Leninism, Euro-communism was an approach that invited socialists to "concede" or actually to surrender. By adopting this approach, Murat Belge and other civil society proponents had come up to represent reformism in Turkish left (Gündüz, 1984: 20).

A conciliatory political line and abandonment of the idea of revolution was the underlying tendency of the liberal left as manifested by *Yeni Gündem.* Halil Berktay maintained that the theory of "historical consensus" guided the political approach of this group (1984: 7). According to Berktay, Murat Belge was trying to infer a "compromising" political line from Gramsci by interpreting his ideas from the right and ignoring the fact that an uncompromising struggle against hegemonic ideology is essential in Gramsci's thought (1984: 7). In short, the civil society paradigm envisages a significant compromise with bourgeois ideology and the theory of historical consensus lays the ground for an envisaged consensus between *Yeni Gündem* and the traditional right wing in Turkey (Berktay, 1984: 8).[55]

[55]It is considered as concrete manifestation of this approach that *Yeni Gündem* spared pages for articles of and interviews with the leading representatives of the Turkish right (See, Berktay, 1984: 8-9).

The civil society paradigm as a compromising and reformist tendency adopts a critical position towards the State, but as dictated by its model based on dichotomy, it takes the State as always given and places it at the center of analysis (Çulhaoğlu, 2001; Savran 1986). Hence, this approach suffices with limiting the domain of the State rather than radically transforming or liquidating it. It is in this sense that the civil society discourse is actually reformist, compromising and even anti-revolutionary (Çulhaoğlu, 2001: 37; Savran, 2006, 2008).

As a corollary of historical consensus idea, the specific political manifestation of reformism and compromise seeking is the proposal to cooperate with right wing political entities in so far as they side with parliamentary democratic regime (Berktay, 1986). As a matter of fact, the writers of *Yeni Gündem* regarded the DYP as a partner in the struggle for democracy against the ANAP as the product of extraordinary circumstances created by the 12th September coup.[56] According to *Saçak* writers, this approach of placing the socialist left behind the right was nothing else but submissiveness beyond reformism.[57]

Marxists were engaged in an ardent debate on reformism. In the second half of the 80s, accusations of submissiveness, compromise, etc. had its weight in socialist politics. While *Saçak* accused *Yeni Gündem* of reformism and surrender, the Sovietic journal *Gelenek* maintained that *Saçak* writers were the leading representatives of reformism.[58] Of course, all these debates bore the imprint of

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[56]Especially see: Ahmet İnsel, "Militarizm ve Demokrasi," *Yeni Gündem*, 24-30 March, 1986, Vol.3, pp.40-43; Murat Belge, "Ulusal Konsensüs," *Yeni Gündem,* 24 Ocak-6 February 1986, Vol.39, p.1.

[57]See: Halil Berktay, "Yeni Gündem'e İlişkin Bazı Gözlem ve Düşünceler," p.9; Mehmet Gündüz, "Uzatılan Elma Şekeri ya da 'Avrupa Komünizmi,'" p.17.

[58]For related polemics, see: Berktay, Halil, "Türkiye'nin Özgürlükleri Üzerine Bazı Düşünceler-I," *Saçak,* Vol:41, June 1987. As a reply to Berktay, see: Giritli, Aydın, "Saçak: Bir Yazı ve Bir 'Ahlak'" *Gelenek,* Vol:9, July 1987. See, also: Koçak, Harun, "Perinçek'ten Bir Tarih

discussions concerning the nature of the regime and the ANAP government that *Saçak* had focused on starting from 1986 (Zileli, 2003: 67).[59] Against the *Yeni Gündem* group that envisaged a common front with DYP inspired by the "historical consensus" formula, *Saçak* tended to support ANAP as an "anti junta" force in line with the "national consensus" formula[60] starting from 1986 (Zileli, 2003: 68). The point that both groups share is that the bourgeoisie was clashing with the September 12th regime and thus bearing a potential to play a democratic role.[61] Debates went on around the question whether ANAP or DYP was the real representative of the bourgeoisie.[62] In spite of some hot debates and divergences of opinion, the *Saçak* group eventually adopted the stance of Doğu Perinçek that ANAP was the parliamentary representative of this class. In the final analysis, it was a must to cooperate with the ANAP in order to "confront militarist initiatives with the widest parliamentary alliances possible" (Perinçek, 1987).

Meanwhile, criticizing *Saçak* and *Yeni Gündem* for their compromising and submissive line, *Gelenek* made assessments on the premise that both lines defined the DYP as the "democratic face" of bourgeoisie.[63] According to these assessments, compromising and submissive groups in the left regarded ANAP as

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Karikatürü," *Gelenek*, Vol:1, November 1986; Hekimoğlu, Cemal, "Türkiye'den Dünyaya Berktay'ın Büyük Dönemeci," *Gelenek*, Vol:19, November 1988.

[59] As stated by Gün Zileli, Doğu Perinçek, the leader of Aydınlık movement is one of the attendants of Taksim Meetings that Turgut Özal's team launched upon the initiative of big businessmen. These meetings are considered to be "producing policies so important to determine the destiny of Turkey" See, Zileli, p.67-68.

[60] See: Doğu Perinçek, *Osmanlı'dan Bugüne Toplum ve Devlet*, İstanbul: Kaynak Yay., 1986.

[61] For factors peculiar to the Turkish left and especially to Aydınlık circle that lead to this illusion see: Zileli, 2003:69-70.

[62] There was a divergence of opinion by Gün Zileli and Doğu Perinçek over this issue. Against Perinçek who regarded ANAP as the real representative of the bourgeoisie, Mehmet Gündüz (Gün Zileli) believed that DYP was the "democratic" representative of "democratic" bourgeoisie. On the other hand, Oral Çalışlar, another leading figure in Saçak circles, argued that the task imposed by the time was not to collaborate with parliamentary forces to defend the parliament against a possible coup but to wage a more courageous and radical struggle (Zileli, 2003:70). See also, Mehmet Gündüz, "Bonapartizm, Parlamentarizm ve Partiler," *Saçak,* Vol:24, January 1986; Doğu Perinçek, "Sivil ANAP," *Saçak,* Vol.44, October 25, 1987.

[63] See: Koçak, 1986; see also: Editorial, "Doğu Perinçek: Kemalism, Kitlecilik ve Yorgunluk," *Gelenek*, Vol: 19, December 1988.

the face of the bourgeoisie siding with militarism and DYP as an anti-militarist and parliamentary force (Koçak, 1986). Yet, according to *Gelenek*, the seemingly anti-militarist stance of the cadres of this party (DYP) was not an important dimension of the issue. What really mattered in this context was the relationship with the military of classes and class segments that this party represented. In any case, once these class segments saw their interests guaranteed under a militarist regime, they can do nothing but support such a regime. Given this, it was clear that a party programme including some "anti-militarist" hints could not be taken seriously (Koçak, 1986).

4.2.3. Concluding Remarks for the Early 90s

Commonly coined as "civil society advocacy," the liberal and democratic tendencies within left-wing opinion producers remained as a political and intellectual point of interest for Marxists throughout the 1980s. Although pointing out to some theoretical explorations particularly under the heading "State," the overall mission and vision of this debate remained limited to exposing how a deviation from genuine Marxism this civil society paradigm was. Actually taking place as a kind of theoretical reckoning within Marxism, the eventual point reached was to underline that the adherence to the civil society paradigm was nothing more than an "inconstancy syndrome".

Following the 90s when the translated literature increased in volume, criticisms also gained some depth. The debates were then placed under the heading "left liberalism" and the theme of "imperialism" overlooked the discussions. The liberals and democrats of the left were now described as sometimes naive and sometimes firm defenders of the regional policies of imperialism or, used synonymously with it in Marxist jargon, of globalization.

The civil society paradigm was regarded as one of the system-maintaining tools of the bourgeoisie that was seeking to add a democratic, participatory and transparent "flavor" to the system in the form of civil society organizations and non-governmental organizations (Güneşli, 2001). These CSOs and NGOs were blamed by Marxists to be often funded by agents of imperialism. They were, according to Marxists, serving the creation of a political atmosphere geared to concealing class conflicts by including middle classes in politics (Güneşli, 2001). The claims of these organizations for democratization, anti-globalization or participation consisted of initiatives geared to perfecting the smoother operation of capitalism.

In the 1990s, the start of the process of EU accession added a new dimension to the issue. In the lexicon of Marxists, the term "renegade leftists" of the 1980s was replaced in this period by "EU liberals." These groups were explicitly accused of helping the policies of imperialism and were described as major agents in the process of EU accession that forced the Turkish left to reformism and liquidation.[64]

Sungur Savran (1986; 1992), one of the first orthodox Marxist users of the category "left liberalism" (instead of "civil society proponents" which was the buzzword of the 1980s), construed the production of liberal and democratic opinions in the left as an ideological framework emerging as a reaction to Kemalism and official ideology (1992: 12). According to Savran, this approach that addressed Kemalism from the prism of liberalism spread amongst leftists to the extent that it became a kind of unofficial ideology (1992: 13). Savran reminds that in theoretical terms the basis of this approach consists of a categorical

[64]See, for instance, Ali Doğan Güneşli, "Avrupa Birlikçi Liberalizm ve Solda Reformist Dalga," *Gelenek*, Vol:64, June 2000.

opposition between the state and civil society. Looking at the modern history of Turkey from this perspective, the anti-democratic orientation in the country derives from the State, the military as its oppressive apparatus and Kemalism as their official ideology. This approach placing the bourgeoisie and hence ruling classes against the State, serves to conceal the class ties of bourgeoisie and its organic relations with the State (1992: 14). According to Savran, such a reductionism is based on an idealist ground. Just like the official ideology, left liberalism too interprets the whole historical process in Turkey as a simple reflection of a struggle waged by specific elites having no class ties:

> Here, material interests and social groups shaped up on the basis of these material interests (whether they are called "classes" or not) are merely the products of an intellectual transferring his ideas into practice, never the conditions or causes of it. For example, modern Turkey is the outcome of an intellectual passion to create a state, a nation (1992: 14).

Savran explains the challenge of left liberalism in political domain by three tendencies: peaceful class relations, integration with imperialism and preserving the existing state by democratization (1992: 16). As an example to the search for class peace he points out to the attitude of the publication *Yeni Gündem* supporting Demirel against Özal's ruling party backed up by the military. Integration with imperialism becomes a fact through the process of EU accession. The last point, preserving the state through democratization is addressed as a typical manifestation of reformism (1992: 16).

The main points underlined by Savran are generally shared by Marxists in their stance vis-á-vis the civil society paradigm. Differing from many other Marxist critiques, Savran's approach does not suffice with a mere political and ideological reckoning but also seeks to address the emergence and development of

left liberalism. In fact, Savran himself underlines the need for a historical materialist revelation of left liberalism with its various dimensions rather than merely taking it as an "ideology of inconstancy" (1986). The definition made by Savran indicates that he has no tendency to stick to only one dimension of the issue:

> Left liberalism is of course not only a theory. It is an ideology looking at the world from a specific framework; a current that wants to engage in politics in a specific mode by bringing specific classes and categories together; a cultural orientation having its specific references, and beyond all these, a specific psychological state. But at the roots of all these there is a theory as well, geared to understand the world in a specific way (1986: 15).

According to Savran, first of all, left liberalism must be defined as a "current" since it does not correspond to a specific social dynamism, and instead of crystallizing in a single political movement, it may influence multiple political movements partly or totally (2006).

As a matter of fact, in his more recent articles Savran states that the approach of Marxist or socialist left in Turkey to "liberal left" is weakened in the absence of scrupulous analysis (2006). Savran suggests that the theoretical foundations, ideological framework and political programme of liberal left should be addressed in more detail on the basis of sound and serious arguments (2006). Savran firstly seeks to grasp the evolution and anatomy of left liberalism. According to his argument, the theoretical origins of left liberal theses can be traced back to the ATÜT debates of the 60s and the "center-periphery model" as put forward particularly by Şerif Mardin. Nevertheless, the flourishing of this line is associated more with developments that followed 1980. In other words, the rise of left liberal line in the world and in Turkey as well coincides with some material

developments in a specific historical moment. The wave of crisis that fell upon the world starting from the mid-70s was followed by neo-liberal policies as solution, and mutilation of the welfare state model provided a ground conducive to the rise of left liberal approach. Further, at the end of the 80s and early 90s, the collapse of the USSR and other socialist states facilitated the acceptance of left liberal theses that placed free civil society against the authoritarian state (1986: 12-13). Coming to "domestic" factors, Savran points out to developments taking place following the 1980 military coup and Turkey's experience with neo-liberalism introduced by Özal (1986: 15). After all, just as left wing Kemalism (or "nationalism" as it called towards the end of the 90s) that is at the opposite side, left liberalism too is the ideology of an epoch in which the struggle of oppressed classes has lost momentum (2006).

Still, it is not possible to say that left-liberal or democrat opinion producers are addressed in Savran's analysis by reference to concrete examples. Savran tends to explain this situation by referring to lack of any consistent and stable political attachment on the part of liberal and/or democratic opinion producers (2006). The emergence of this group is explained by a process through which a large part of opinion producers becoming more sensitive to the interests of the market and capital as a result of the transformation that Turkey underwent along with neo-liberal measures. The employment of opinion producers in those sectors that blend together with cultural activities such as the media, advertising, graphic design, publishing etc. is one of the main pillars of this explanation. However, Marxist analysis reserves no space to explaining the working mechanisms of this process. While it may be sufficient to give an account of objective developments

that laid the ground for the rise of the left-liberal ideology, this analysis omits the subjective motives of opinion producers defending this ideology.

The debate around civil society and democratic and liberal opinions that I have summarized above raged on in the 1980s rather as a confined debate among socialists. Again as stated before, in spite of some weaknesses, the parties to the debate could develop their arguments on a specific theoretical and ideological base. Towards the end of the 1990s, however, debates over civil society, democracy and liberalism, despite the initial intellectual refinements supported by newly translated material, devolved into a bunch of reproachful polemics. The heavy rhetoric used in these debates was adopted and reproduced especially by those sections of the left that were never fully detached from the political-ideological influences of Kemalism. Meanwhile, since some Marxists no more regarded those opinion producers who declared their identity as 'democrats' as parties to any debate within the left, they opted for polemic-loaded debates rather than theoretical-philosophical discussions.[65] In this process, the debate over the influence of democratic and liberal opinions gained a new dimension – whether to support or stand against the process of EU accession.[66] Here too, the weakened debates were limited to topics like "collaboration with imperialism" and "reformism".

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[65] For a recent example of a comprehensive assessment running counter to analyses narrowing down the issue to the confines of betrayal or "inconstancy" see, Foti Benlisoy, "Sol liberalizm Bir Komplo mu?" *Birgün,* September 12, 2010.

[66] One can refer to the following among many polemics and debates on the issue: Selim Karlı, "Sol liberalizm Gerçekle Yüzleşebilir mi?" *İşçi Mücadelesi,* November-December, 2004; (Anonymous), "Amerikan Örtüsü Olmadı AB Şapkası Verelim," *Sol Günlük Siyasi Gazete*, No:656, March 4, 2008; Özgür Müftüoğlu, "AB'yi Kim Neden İster?" *Sol Günlük Siyasi Gazete,* 07.07.2009; (Anonymous), "Liberaller, AKP'den Tam Boy AB'cilik İstiyor," *Sol Günlük Siyasi Gazete*, 03.03.2008; Can Semercioğlu, "Liberalizm ve Sosyalizm Sentezi," *Sol Günlük Siyasi Gazete*, 23.09.2009.

The attempts of Marxists to account for liberal and democratic opinion production suffered from bad reductionism. Firstly, the primary motive was to exhibit why opinion producers taking their place at the stage with their "democrat" identities were "out of the left" or "anti-socialist." This impeded an analytical understanding of the relationship between the social type under examination and transformations taking place in Turkey. Secondly, bad reductionism appeared to be explaining the stance of the liberal-democrat social type by referring to "class based" terms which were poorly operational. And "neo-liberalism" was used as a kind of conceptual joker which absorbed all these attempts to bring rather superficial explanations.

4.3. Nationalist Scapegoating Approach

4.3.1. Kemalist-left as an opposition bloc against the September 12 Coup

Leaving those sections of the socialist left with Kemalist leanings aside, the quarrel between those coming to the fore as representatives of left-wing Kemalism and liberal and democratic opinion producers started in the 90s. Left-Kemalist or Kemalist columnists and academics presented their views to the public particularly with reference to debates on the Second Republic. According to their perspective, all proponent of civil society and other anti-Kemalist criticisms were nothing but supporters of the "Second Republic" or, which was the same thing, followers of Özal. Indeed, following 1991, when Mehmet Altan first used the term "Second Republic," debates over this term occupied the political discourse. From the perspective of Kemalists, criticisms of secularist official ideology not sharing Özal's vision and all criticisms displaying sensitivity about ethnic and religious differences were all categorized as exemplary of "Second-Republicanist" ideology.

At the outset, Turgut Özal was considered by some leftist circles as the representative of the democratic fraction of the bourgeoisie.[67] Many opinion producers who thought that Özalist discourse created an opportunity in breaking the long-lasting taboos of the country were associated, by Kemalist observers, with Second Republicanism.

In the eyes of Kemalist opinion producers, Second Republicanism was a pejorative term operative in designating all individual opinion producers sharing a critical attitude towards the official ideology Kemalism, questioning the imposition of laicism and the social engineering practices of the early Republican elite and calling for a critical rethinking over the title of military tutelage. The ideological or political differences among those who emphasized either of the mentioned themes did not matter for the left Kemalist camp. Such that, whether they were raised by Islamist columnists or authors or by the socialist figures, these arguments implied a challenge to the revolutionary character of the Republic and thereby worked to strengthen the Özalist neo-liberal discourse. It was common among the left Kemalist camp to label those stances with the all-embracing notorious term "İkinci Cumhuriyetçilik" or "liboş" which appeared to be a synonym for the former.

Strong criticisms of Second Republicanism came from Uğur Mumcu whose ideological stance remained very influential among the leftist audience of the concerned period of time. For Mumcu, given such themes and orientations as anti-imperialism, revolution and progress that it embodies, Kemalism stands for a system of thinking which should in essence be placed on the left. Notwithstanding his harsh criticism of the line of the USSR and radical socialist groups, Mumcu

[67] This point has been elaborated in the previous section.

considered himself as a Kemalist adhering to "libertarian socialism." The left wing Kemalism as suggested and defended by Mumcu was quite different from "nationalism" (*ulusalcılık*) that influenced Turkish politics in the 2000s. Indeed, as stated by Savran, there are sharp contrasts between the current now referred to as "nationalism" and what was defined in the past as "left wing Kemalism":

> It is necessary to discern the left Kemalism of Doğan Avcıoğlu from the utterly reactionary nationalism of our day. I want to say that the origins of the one can be found in the other to a certain extent, but the reactionary nature is the outcome of a historical process. At least for one reason: One of the underlying dynamics of nationalism today is hostility towards Kurds. Doğan Avcıoğlu had no such hostility. Although there were striking uprisings by the Kurds in the period between the two world wars, the Kurdish issue was not so heavy in the agenda of the Turkish left in the 60s (2008: 19).

The left wing Kemalism that maintained its place in the ideological spectrum of Turkey until the second half of the 90s used to be the ideological armor that was worn particularly by leftists in smaller cities and towns to protect from the authoritarian and fascist practices of the September 12th coup. Having its early political manifestations with the periodicals *Kadro* (1932-1934) and *Yön* (1961-1967), the left wing Kemalism lost its position as a separate circle and rather turned into an ideological line defended by individual authors and columnists mostly in daily *Cumhuriyet* (Alpkaya, 2001: 479).[68] Indeed, those circles of our day which can be coded as "national left" are this or that way the heirs of these two lines that can be considered as a synthesis of Marxism and Kemalism (Savran, 2006). As a matter of fact, Uğur Mumcu and İlhan Selçuk, both the leading figures of left wing Kemalism in *Cumhuriyet* earlier had their ties

[68]No additional information is needed here since the journals Kadro and Yön were addressed in detail in earlier chapters.

with the journals *Yön* and *Devrim* published by Avcıoğlu (Savran, 2006; Alpkaya, 2001).

The milestone of transformation in left wing Kemalism is picked as the "postmodern coup" of February 28th, 1997 (Savran, 2006, 2008). It is possible to read this transformation most vividly on daily *Cumhuriyet.* The shift of *Cumhuriyet* to the left in political spectrum took place in the second half of the 60s that is, the rising period of leftist movements in Turkey (Günal, 2001: 484). While displaying an affirmative attitude towards a possible new coup just before September 12th, 1980, hoping to see the closure of a period of sharp ideological confrontations and violence in the country, the *Cumhuriyet* adopted an ideological line fully opposing to the military regime after the coup.[69] As an intervention targeting to relocate the center of domestic politics to the right, the military regime pushed the *Cumhuriyet* and hence left Kemalists leftward. In this shift, the ever-widening gap between the underlying philosophy of the coup and the values of the Enlightenment had a major share. For the Yön-inspired sections of Kemalism who adopted the values of the Enlightenment as its basic philosophy, interpreted the "Six Arrows" of Mustafa Kemal from a leftist perspective and considered development and industrialization as the core issue in the country, it was impossible to come to terms with the Turkish-Islamic synthesis project and economic liberalism of the September 12th regime. Given this, it is not surprising that it was those sections who considered themselves as real successors of Kemalism who were disturbed and moved most by the attempts of junta generals who had turned to new ideological and political arrangements on the name of "Atatürkism." These circles assessing the ideology presented by the military

[69] An outcome of this sympathetic attitude towards the coup was *Cumhuriyet*'s avoidance of any ban after (Günal, 2001: 484).

regime as "Atatürkism in deep freeze" (Alpkaya, 2001: 479, 498) re-construed Kemalism for defending the values of the Enlightenment against the reactionary stand of the military regime and, as a result of this opposing position, moved leftward in politics whether willingly or not. Starting from this point, the left wing Kemalism deemed Turgut Özal led ANAP that became the ruling party after the elections of 1983 as the successor of the September 12th regime and coined it as the vanguard of neo-liberal assault and hence the collaborator of imperialism.

Summing up, criticisms against the 2nd Republicans were based on two major factors: the fear of Sharia and the fear of separatism. These two fears were associated with anti-imperialism as a theme and consequently all counter comments were tied up with the theme "collaboration with imperialism."[70] It must nevertheless be added that the problems of the labor, trade union rights and right to organize covered a significant space in left-Kemalist critiques starting from the 80s to the mid-90s.

4.3.1.1. Left Kemalism as Defender of Labor Rights against the Neo-liberalism of Second Republicans

Left wing Kemalists whose intellectual world was shaped by the development and etatism discourses of the 60s consolidated their positions on the left by siding with the labor against those articles of the 1982 Constitution restricting trade union activities and right to organize as well as the frontal attack of capital to labor during the ANAP rule. During this period when liberalism was identified with Özal's line with its full connotations, civil society discourses, as well as liberally inspired theses on individualism and liberalization in political domain were all regarded as degenerated outcomes of the earlier coup. The Özal

[70] See, for instance, Emre Kongar, *28 Şubat ve Demokrasi,* Remzi Kitabevi, İstanbul: 2000, p: 19, 35, and 112.

period with its "á la turca capitalism", "arabesque liberalism" and Turkish-Islamic synthesis was construed as a blatant assault on the achievements of the Republic and Enlightenment philosophy and the project for a Second Republic was declared as the manifestation of Özalism in intellectual domain (Günal, 2001: 484). Uğur Mumcu, one of the leading figures of left wing Kemalism tells the following about the case:

> 1982 Constitution was used as an instrument of force against trade union movements. Collective bargaining was prohibited by the new laws of the 1982 Constitution. Collective bargaining system had lost its power and rural union movements had almost vanished (*Cumhuriyet*, September 12, 1992).

According to Mumcu, the Özalism which successfully implemented the anti-union and anti-labour IMF programme of January 24th on the one side and the Project for a Second Republic on the other complemented each other. Hence, the issue is not to give numbers to the republic but to take steps for ensuring the state of law:

> Republic means the sovereignty of the people. Are the people sovereign or not? For example, do workers enjoy their trade union rights? Do government employees have the right to go to strike? Can working people take part in government through their unions and parties? Are freedoms of opinion and assembly guaranteed? Is the judiciary independent and the University is autonomous? These are all important points and if these have not existed, are not existing and will not exist, there will be no solution by giving numbers to the republic as 1st, 2nd, 3rd and so on! (*Cumhuriyet*, June 28, 1992)

Uğur Mumcu underlines that while enhancing the positions of capital, the September 12th coup served a serious blow to working people and he points to the need to rectify this situation along with Western norms that is, ILO standards (1992, November 28). This is absolutely necessary since lifting all bans and

constraints on trade unions and entitling government employees the right to collective bargaining and strike are all *sine qua non* for western democracies. Yet, 2nd Republicans who keep talking about Turkey's need for a western type of democratic system prefer to keep silent on these issues (1992, November 28). Reminding that Mehmet Moğultay, the social democrat Minister of Labor and Social Security from the SHP, has been waging efforts to bring in ILO standards to Turkey, Mumcu interprets the silence of so called "democrats" or "liberals" as the proof of their siding with capital against labor (1992, November 28). According to Mumcu:

> Those who are today accused as Kemalists are the defenders of liberal and pluralist democracy. Look who is for the ILO Convention no. 159 that provides job security to workers. The same as those who once defended the abolishment of article 163 in the Turkish Penal Code: The followers of Atatürk, Kemalists! (*Cumhuriyet*, December 29, 1992)

According to Mumcu, no country with free market economy is completely immune from state intervention and each economic system has its intervention component (1991, October 13).[71] Hence, contrary to the arguments of 2nd Republicans, doing away with interventionism in Turkey would worsen the situation rather than ameliorating it. What actually matters is not to fully abandon intervention but to delineate its domain and set relevant criteria for intervention. (1991, October 13). Those who applaud the Özal period as a transition to free market economy and liberalism were mistaken; the model introduced by Özal was based on IMF recipes applied by the military and it was, as coined by Mumcu, the

[71] "'Free market' exists nowhere in the world, to the contrary 'competition' is restricted in western countries that we take as a model" (Mumcu, 1991, October 13, Cumhuriyet). "There is no single capitalist economy in the world where market is completely left free to operate without any State 'interference' al all. Is Kemalism the opponent of free market economy? No, market economy is fully excluded only in the Leninist system." (Mumcu, "Yeni McCarticilik," *Cumhuriyet,* November 2, 1991).

"militarization of economies" or merely a "junta model" (1991, October 13). Unlike the case in western countries, 'free market' in Turkey was transformed into a crude and primitive mechanism of exploitation through which big business circles get stronger and make more profit with the support of the State whereas wages were pushed down by the oppressive interventions of the State. 'Is this the way civil society will flourish?' 'Is this the way of ensuring industrial peace?' 'Is this how free market is going to work?'" (Mumcu, 1992, April 28, *Milliyet*).[72]

According to Mumcu, workers' rights including trade union rights to which 2nd Republicans, civil society proponents and liberals close their eyes are actually preconditions for plurality. In fact, "Plurality, civil society and pluralist democracy are systems in which trade unions and social democratic parties are interwoven." (1992, May 16, *Cumhuriyet*).

The position of 2nd Republicans defending free market economy against the "Statist fetishism" that they claim to be dominant in the leftist tradition does not seem plausible to Mumcu. First of all, it is quite doubtful to Mumcu whether highly welcomed Özal liberalism is liberalism indeed (*Cumhuriyet,* January 2, 1991). From an elitist perspective which is adopted widely by left wing Kemalists, Mumcu qualifies Özal's liberalism as "á la turca" and argues that "statist fetishism" is actually attributable to the ANAP period (*Cumhuriyet,* January 2, 1991). According to this view, the ANAP liberalism is nothing but the 'militarization of economy', which is the 'most degenerated form of state interventionism' (January 2, 1991). Mumcu gives the following example:

> ANAP phases in courts in working life instead of seeking consensus. While doing this, it invokes 'state fetishism'. The ANAP joining the

[72]See also: Mumcu, "Serbestlik Kime?" *Cumhuriyet,* August 16, 1991; "Aldatmaca," *Cumhuriyet,* October 13, 1991.

> political life from the military regime of September 12th now upholds military barrack methods in industrial relations (Jan 2, 1991).

While introducing "arabesque liberalism", offering the degraded and crude form of state interventionism as "free market economy", the ANAP created a state supported underground capital and some "*lumpenbusinessmen*" (Mumcu, *Cumhuriyet,* May 30, 1991). The reason for calling the model "arabesque" is that it leaves clientelism and corruption free in penetrating the whole society. According to Mumcu, the way Özal perceives free market economy is associated not with "freedom" but favoring of certain privileged companies and capital holdings (*Cumhuriyet*, June 4, 1991).[73]

Mumcu gives hints about his understanding of liberalism while stressing that the model of "militarizing economies" based on 'depressed wages' and 'oppressive government' is a pseudo-liberalism aligned with the 'politicization of religion' (January 8, 1991). He sees liberalism as a stance which should have its reflection not only in economic policies but in political domain as well. Otherwise, ANAP's version of liberalism consisting of profiteering remains as pseudo-liberalism.[74] If Özal's liberals were liberals indeed, they would have tried to stop fundamentalists within the ANAP:

> Islamists, sect people and Nakshis have made their present status with the support of 'volatile' and 'floating' teams within the ANAP. If they could manage to gain ground from laicism, it is with the help of these 'pseudo-liberals.' They are the two faces of a coin! (*Cumhuriyet,* February 22, 1991)

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[73] For similar emphasis, see also: Mumcu, Uğur, "Serbestlik Kime?" *Cumhuriyet,* August 16, 1991.

[74]For similar arguments, see also: Mumcu, Uğur, "Liberal Kongre," *Cumhuriyet,* March 5, 1991; "Şerif Efe Borsada," *Cumhuriyet,* March 10, 1991; "Liboş…Naksoş…Faşoz…" *Cumhuriyet,* March 17, 1991.

By his criticism of "á la turca liberalism", Mumcu has in fact attempted a critique of "new right" without using this term. According to Mumcu, the "strong executive" dimension of the neo-liberal approach based on the formula "strong government, weaker State" is in contrast with liberalism. It can be said that left wing Kemalists, as in the specific case of Mumcu, had difficulty in understanding the fact that in other than advanced capitalist countries, in Turkey for example, the neo-liberal process brings along a series of irregularities and breaches due to its very nature and working.

4.3.1.2. Left Kemalism as Defender of Laicism against the Pluralism of Second Republicans

One of the major grounds of left wing Kemalists as they stand against 2nd Republicans and left liberal opinion producers whom they classify as 'civil society proponents', is the criticism that the latter brings against the way secularism is adopted and applied in Turkey. The stance of Kemalists in this respect bears the imprint of a "fear" that the achievements of the Republic could be lost and Sharia Law would dominate the country. After all, the Second Republicans are convinced that there can be a *modus vivendi* with the followers of religious sects and Islamic fundamentalists. The neo-liberal of the Second Republic, while asserting to welcome multiculturalism, claimed to tolerate ethnic and religious identities (Erdoğan and Üstüner, 2002). Since the criticism of Kemalist laicism occupied a pivotal status in Second Republican understanding, the left-Kemalists tended to see this attitude as an attack directed towards the foundations of the Republic.

It is possible to speak about a series of historical events that further encouraged left-wing Kemalists to falsely see Second Republicanists and civil

society proponents in a kind of alliance with fundamentalists opposing laicism and to be particularly sensitive about the latter. First, the ideology of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis which the military coup cherished particularly as a bulwark against the left led left-wing Kemalists to reinforce their defense of the principles and values of Enlightenment and the Republic, foremost their defense of laicism. The fact that Turgut Özal was connected to the Nakshibendi network and the influence of the members of this sect on government greatly disturbed left Kemalists. Again during the Özal governments, open relations with Saudi capital became another point of concern that what was dear to the Republic was being lost.

However, none of these developments were as shocking as successive assassinations of some leading intellectual figures known for their secular identities. The first target in this series of unresolved murders was Prof. Muammer Aksoy, President of the Association for Promoting Atatürk's Ideas (ADD), who was shot to death on 31 January 1990. This was the first incident placing Islamist violence into the political debates. Then, on 7 March 1990, Çetin Emeç, the Editor in Chief of *Hürriyet*, was killed. It was followed by the assassination of writer Turan Dursun, known for his radical critiques of Islam, on 4 September 1990. A month later, Assistant Professor Bahriye Üçok, an academic in the field of theology, was shot on 6 October 1990. These killings in 1990 caused secular circles to perceive the threat of Islamist violence as the most pressing problem in Turkey.[75] Although no immediate conclusive evidence was collected, the assasinations were publicly credited to the "Islamic Movement Organization"

allegedly supported by Iran. Islamism thriving in the 1980s was now on top of the agenda of left-wing Kemalists as the primary threat, after these murders.

None of the murders of 1990 were able to create an atmosphere of rage, compared to the assassination of the secular (one could say, left-Kemalist) journalist Uğur Mumcu on 24 January 1993. His funeral on 27 January 1993 can be described as one of the biggest demonstrations after 1980. The funeral was marked by slogans praising laicism and blaming Iran and Hizbullah. Including the case of Mumcu in the first place, all unresolved assassinations attributed to Islamist organizations further intensified the laicist concerns of left wing Kemalists and brought this problem above all others. Eventually, individual opinion producers that were labeled as Second Republicanists, liberals or democrats, were accused in the second half of the 1990s for being anti-laicist and for collaborating with Islamists. This reactionary sensitivity about laicism and related charges against Second Republicanists ("being in bed with Islamists") had almost the same weight with other charges related to the liberals' silence in matters like bans and restrictions on the rights of labour, freedom of opinion and assembly. In the period beginning with the killing of Mumcu to the military memorandum of 28 February 1997, the subject of laicism suppressed all other subjects and became the principal theme that characterizes left-wing Kemalists. Starting from this point, criticisms of Second Republicanist opinion producers were locked in a rather unrefined debate over "being laicist / anti-laicist."

In the same year Mumcu was killed, the massacre of 33 left-wing Alevis (among them artists, intellectuals) in Sivas, by a mob chanting Islamist slogans, on 2 July 1993, constituted a landmark in polarizing the society as laic vs anti-laic. After 28 February 1997, as Savran states, it was no more possible to speak

about a left-Kemalism maintaining its earlier leftist concerns. In sum, starting from the turning point mentioned above, Kemalists adopted a narrower position where nationalism was elevated particularly vis-á-vis the Kurdish issue while the emphasis on laicism overshadowed all other themes.

4.3.1.3. Left Kemalism against the Criticism of Military Tutelage

The issue of "military tutelage" is another topic that left wing Kemalists felt the need to settle with the Second Republicanist opinion producers and other "proponents of civil society." The approach adopted by Second Republicanists, or "inconstant Marxists" [76] as coined by Mumcu, in relation to limiting military tutelage and promoting civilianization seems extremely vague. Mumcu is convinced that the issues of "military tutelage" and "becoming civilian" are distorted by Second Republicanists. It is quite ironic, according to Mumcu, that Özal is regarded as a vanguard figure in doing away with military tutelage since Özal himself is the leader of a party that could manage to hold power thanks to the military coup and he actually served as Deputy Prime Minister during the military rule (August 2, 1992, *Cumhuriyet).*[77] Owing the political support he enjoys to the military coup of September 12th, Özal cannot be a political figure that leadership in demilitarization and civil society promotion could possibly be attributed (Mumcu, *Cumhuriyet*, February 17, 1991). Mumcu reminds that during Özal's rule, undersecretaries of MİT (National Intelligence Agency) were selected from among generals and the latest three undersecretaries to this post were personally assigned by Özal while he was the Prime Minister (August 2, 1992).

[76] See: Mumcu, "ANAP Planı," *Cumhuriyet*, October 11, 1991.
[77] See: Mumcu, "Sivilleşme," *Cumhuriyet,* August 2, 1992.

Also, ANAP, which cherishes hopes of demilitarization, is in fact the "extension of the military regime of September 12th disguised as 'civilian'" (Mumcu, 1991, June 11, Cumhuriyet).[78] Furthermore, contrary to the expectations of Second Republicanist or left liberals, the process of "becoming more civilian" cannot be brought about by putting the Armed Forces under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defence. According to Mumcu:

> There are many preconditions for demilitarization. Pluralist democracy, autonomous organizations, trade unions are the key factors in the process of civilianization. It cannot be ensured just by placing the General Staff under the Ministry of Defence. To the contrary, it is probable that this arrangement makes Armed Forces more vulnerable to the influence of political parties (*Cumhuriyet*, June 4, 1992).

The first step in appraising Özal as the "champion of demilitarization" was, according to Mumcu, the appointment of the Deputy Chief of General Staff as the Chief of General Staff instead of Necdet Öztorun, who was then the Army Commander. Though not referred to as "Second Republicanists" at that time, opinion producers siding with Özal applauded this disposal as a step towards "becoming civilian." Yet, for Mumcu, this was a mistaken gesture:

> Prime Minister Özal had offered Üruğ, the Chief of General Staff, to extend his term of duty to avoid Öztorun's rise to this position. Had Ürüğ accepted this suggestion, there would have been no artificial scenarios like 'becoming civilian' (…) (August 2, 1992).

The issue of demilitarization again turned out as a hot debate in the 1990s upon a specific occasion. The episode that was regarded by Second Republicanists as another step towards demilitarization was labeled (in the media) as "MİT becoming more civilian." Regarding this episode, Mumcu tried to reveal the

[78] See also: Mumcu, "Güney," *Cumhuriyet*, May 26, 1991; "Bekleyiş," *Cumhuriyet*, May 30, 1991.

mistakes of Second Republicanist demilitarization claims. In 1992, upon the departure of MİT Undersecretary General Teoman Koman and his Deputy General Ömer Uruk, Doğan Güreş (Chief of General Staff) informed the government that they did not want generals from the army appointed to these vacant posts. In this process, advantages of having a non-military bureaucrat as the Undersecretary of MİT were explained as follows by the Second Republicanists: In case there was a civilian at the head of MİT, the government can be informed about any impending military coup. By citing some historical cases, Mumcu tried to falsify this argument: When the military coup of May 1960 took place, there was a civilian as the head of the National Intelligence and he was of no use in informing the government in advance (Mumcu, August 2, 1992). According to Mumcu:

> In this respect, it does not matter that much whether there is a military or civilian bureaucrat as the Undersecretary of MİT. What is really important is to have MİT doing things as specified in its official mission statement and re-oriented to services 'required by the security of the State'. What really matters is to prevent the emergence of conditions for any coup or take over (August 2, 1992, Cumhuriyet).

Mumcu state that with their discourses on "becoming civilian," Second Republicanists are in fact approving an oppressive and authoritarian working of things (1992, August 2). Yet, real demilitarization can be possible only with the consolidation of democratic rights and freedoms:

> Becoming more civilian must be pursued in freedom of expression and assembly, in trade union rights, rights of public servants to strike, in general strike, in autonomous organizations and the social democratic nature of the state; demilitarization must be pursued through mature and competent civil institutions of pluralist democracy. It must be sought in social groups getting organized in parties, trade unions and associations to have their weight in State mechanisms (August 2, 1992).

It is appropriate to assess the thinking of left-wing Kemalists in regard to military tutelage in the context of what they attribute to the Armed Forces in general. Besides considering the War of Independence as an anti-imperialist struggle, the left-Kemalist position also deems the cadres that waged this war and then founded the republic as "being above all classes." The extension of this thinking is that the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK), as the ideological-political heir of these cadres, should also be regarded as being above all classes (Savran, 2006). Once TSK is regarded this way, then it is also considered as the defender not of a specific class but of "overall interests" in line with the Republican revolution. As such they regard any out-of-line engagement of the Army, as it was the case with the coup of March 1971 and September 1980, as "exceptional deviations." For example, the coup of 1980 is the most extreme of these deviations since the military regime offered masses an artificial "Atatürkism" injected with "Turkish-Islamic Synthesis" instead of keeping true to the achievements of the Republic (Mumcu, 1992, December 29).[79]

The mission of the army as a founder is not something unique to Turkey and in fact such cases can be observed in many other countries. For example, according to Toktamış Ateş,

> Historically, we can observe that all states were established by the military around the world, as was the case in England, France, and United States (August 22, 1991, *Cumhuriyet*).

In this vein, the left Kemalists, believing that the Turkish Republic was not formed by the military but by the will of the people epitomized in the military never attempt to categorically deny the role of the military in the political realm.

[79] See: Mumcu, "Resmi Olmayan," *Cumhuriyet*, December 29, 1992.

Furthermore, the military is also accepted as an agent in accomplishing economic development. A point stressed again by Toktamış Ateş and shared by almost all left Kemalists is that the coup in 1960 was a "progressive intervention" (Ateş, 1991, August 22, Cumhuriyet).

4.3.1.4. 'The Kurdish problem as a manipulation by imperialists'

Criticisms addressed to liberal, democratic and "Second Republicanist" opinion producers also include those associated with the Kurdish issue. As the Kurdish movement gained momentum, left-wing Kemalists became more and more alarmed about issues like national security, which further diminished their "leftist" identities. Meanwhile, the daily *Cumhuriyet*, a focal point where left-Kemalists could make their voices heard, gradually moved closer to the nationalist positions of ruling governments from the early 1990s on, as the Kurdish issue became more problematic. Parallel to this, approaches that were not in line with official ideology regarding the Kurdish were readily associated with imperialism. Most aspects of the issue were reduced to "imperialist games played on Turkey." According to İlhan Selçuk, one of the leading uncompromising upholders of this line, Second Republicanists are "Özalist inconstant Marxists or leftists now aligning with Sharia advocates and Kurdists" (December 6, 1994).[80] Selçuk associates Kurdish and Islamist terror with neo-liberalism. The neo-liberal system based on the hegemony of financial capital over society also laid the ground for transforming terror into an instrument of politics (1994).[81] According to Selçuk, "Özalist" opinion producers were accomplices to this project as its intellectual representatives.

[80] See: İlhan Selçuk, "İkinci Cumhuriyetçi Nasıl Olunur?" *Cumhuriyet*, December 6, 1994.
[81] See: İlhan Selçuk, "Neo-liberalizm Bizi Nereye Getirdi?"*Cumhuriyet*, December 4, 1994.

For Uğur Mumcu, the Kurdish issue is a case manipulated and aggravated by imperialists. Nevertheless, the State is also blamed for its oppressive policies which make the situation even worse:

> For years, the Kurdish problem was kept within a circle of oppressive measures. As a result, the issue could not be addressed with its root causes (…) Is it not this oppressive mentality one of the many reasons that made this issue so complicated? (*Milliyet*, March 1, 1992).[82]

Citing some historical documents, Mumcu addresses the relationship between the Kurdish problem and imperialist policies. He reminds Article 21 in the 1921 Constitution which envisaged autonomy for local governments. According to Mumcu, this constitutional approach which envisioned a democratic model, albeit still within the confines of a unitary state, was abandoned later after the Sheikh Sait Uprising instigated by the British.[83] As for the Second Republicanist or left-liberal opinion producers, they line up, Mumcu thinks, with religious reactionaries and Kurdish nationalists in the name of democracy and multi-culturalism. Hence, they play into the hands of those wishing to be ruled by the foreign powers (Mumcu, 1992).[84] In Mumcu's words:

> Those who today back up imperialism's Middle East strategy to the extent that they make White House speakers jealous, are all but renegade Marxists who once agitated the youth out to the streets for fighting against 'American imperialism and its domestic collaborators'! (1992)[85]

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[82] See: Uğur Mumcu, "Kürtlere Özerklik!" *Milliyet*, March 1, 1992; "Lübnanlaşma," *Cumhuriyet*, August 26, 1992; "Terör ve Gazetecilik," *Cumhuriyet*, August 27, 1992.
[83] For similar remarks, see also: Uğur Mumcu, "Kürtlere Özerklik!" *Milliyet*, March 1, 1992; "Olağandışı," *Milliyet*, March 18, 1992; "Tersine," *Cumhuriyet*, August 22, 1992.
[84] See: Uğur Mumcu, "CHP ve Sol," *Cumhuriyet*, August 13, 1992.
[85] See: Uğur Mumcu, "CHP ve Sol," *Cumhuriyet*, August 13, 1992.

On the other hand, Mumcu underlines that the Kurdish problem is far too complex to be reduced to terrorism and maintains that the problem can be resolved through democracy:

> Kurds must be entitled to all rights and freedoms necessary to promote their cultural identity. It is one of the obligations introduced by the 'Paris Charter' that Turkey is a party to. The Government of the Republic of Turkey can have no other choice in the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) process. In our age, no problem can be solved by denying such rights (August 22, 1992, *Cumhuriyet*).[86]

Mumcu blames imperialist countries and Kurds who collaborated with them for Kemalist regime's denial of democratic rights and autonomy of Kurds.[87] Had Kurds not risen up as manipulated by the British, Mustafa Kemal and his circle would not have any concern about a split and the provision about autonomy which had existed in the 1921 constitution would have remained in the 1924 constitution as well.[88] Given these historical facts, as understood by Mumcu, the recent interest of the US and the west in the Kurdish problem is related with the interests of imperialists, not with any desire for democratization as left-liberal and Second Republicanist figures think. As a matter of fact, those who provide guns to the PKK are "NATO countries that make money from the terror market" (Mumcu, 1992).[89]

4.3.2. The Second Failed Attempt to "Explain" the Social Type

Consistent with their mindset, left-Kemalists tended to regard other opinion producers labeled as "Second Republicanists" as domestic collaborators

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[86]See: Uğur Mumcu, "Tersine," *Cumhuriyet,* August 22, 1992.
[87] See: Uğur Mumcu, "ABD ve HEP," *Cumhuriyet,* August 23, 1992; "Hangisi Caş?" *Cumhuriyet,* October 1992.
[88] See: Uğur Mumcu, "ABD ve HEP," *Cumhuriyet,* August 23, 1992.
[89] See: Uğur Mumcu, "Lübnanlaşma," *Cumhur,yet,* August 26, 1992; "PKK Terörü ve Silah," *Milliyet,* March 1, 1992; "Yeni Değil," *Milliyet,* March 28, 1992; "Kürt Kadastrosu," *Cumhuriyet,* October 6, 1992.

of imperialism and preferred to call them "liboş" as a sexist/discriminatory slur for "liberal." As stated earlier, this theme of "collaborating with imperialism" accompanied almost every single intellectual debate against Second Republicanists. "Anti-imperialism," regarded as a core principle of Kemalism, has been a point of reference in the approaches of left-Kemalists to all kinds of political-ideological perspectives. For the left-Kemalist opinion producers of the time, Kemalism was a melting pot for Enlightenment and nationalism. Nationalism was claimed to be re-defined on the basis of laicism and anti-imperialism, and they used this blend, particularly its anti-imperialist component, to justify their claim for "socialism." According to these writers, almost all criticisms of the present Republic were attempts that could lead to the resurrection of the Sevres Treaty which had envisaged the division of the country.[90]

Earlier, I have stated that the left-Kemalist approach grew even more apart from the socialist left especially after February 2007, and shifted to the right of the political axis. The determining dynamic in this process was the Kurdish movement that made its political impact strongly after 1988-1989. The issue of laicism, which had never been a matter of dispute between the Kemalist and socialist left (and even served as a common cause), did not necessitate an entirely different political stance in the face of rising political Islam. However, this was not the case with the rise of the Kurdish movement and dividing lines were drawn. The military memorandum of 28 February 1997 should be regarded as a milestone for left-Kemalism in terms of losing its leftist characteristics and moving deeper into nationalism.

[90] For debates on this issue see: Mustafa Altıntaş, "Numaracı Cumhuriyetçilerin İçyüzü Ortaya Çıkmıyor mu?" in *Misâk-ı Milli, Ulusal Birlik, Tam Bağımsızlık İçin 2.Cumhuriyet'e Hayır,* Türk Devrim Kurumu Sam Yayınları, Ankara:1996, pp.40-41; Bahri Savcı, "Savulun İkinci Cumhuriyet Geliyor," ibid. pp.75-78.

In understanding the evolution of left-Kemalism, the funeral of Uğur Mumcu, the leading figure of this ideological-political line, could be seen as a symbolic turning point, a turn politically completed by the February 1997 intervention. Paradoxically, the funeral, which in appearance was a manifestation of public support for Kemalism, was in fact heralding the demise of this ideology. Representing the pillar left-Kemalism, Mumcu defended a position which was unequivocally on the left, defined as "libertarian" or "democratic" socialism. According to Mumcu, these terms stood for a socialism which was not guided by the USSR and kept a critical distance from Leninism. Yet between 1993-1997, left-Kemalism quickly moved to the right of the political spectrum and eventually assumed the form of nationalist chauvinism. It is possible to find telling signs of this shift in İlhan Selçuk, the lead writer of daily *Cumhuriyet*. Exalted by his followers as the "wise man of enlightenment," İlhan Selçuk, especially in his writings after 1995, reduced 'being on the left" to a moralistic position defined by laicism and nationalism. In this latter period, the discourse of accusing Arabs and the peoples of Middle East with "backwardness" and "fanaticism" became more pronounced in his writings.[91] The aggressive style used against liberal and democratic opinions is another feature of his discourse in the same period. Besides the sexist term "liboş intellectual", "mandacı" (favouring mandate) and "turncoat" are frequently used in his polemical writings:

> Once they were wearing Moscow-made uniforms, now they use garments from Washington. Those rogues whom we call *turncoats* get mad when leftists say "the wheel of history does not turn backwards.[92]

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[91] In his writings İlhan Selçuk frequently places Anatolian Islam against "reactionary", "bigot" and "Arabian" Islam. For an article exhibiting this stance neatly, see: İlhan Selçuk, "Yobazın En Büyük Düşmanı," *Cumhuriyet*, June 28, 1996.

[92] See: İlhan Selçuk, "Tarihin Tekerleği," *Cumhuriyet*, May 6, 1996. It may be remembered that the same sexist expression can be found in Uğur Mumcu's articles. See: Mumcu, "Liberal

In short, as left-Kemalism assumed a nationalist and reactionary character, criticisms against Second Republicanist, liberal and democratic opinion producers gradually lost intellectual integrity. Criticisms that had once been developed from a more leftist perspective were replaced by a chauvinistic discourse of slandering.[93] Another manifestation of the superficial nature of polemics in this period is conspiracy-theorizing with some blend of anti-Semitism.[94] Such approaches where the Kurdish issue is reduced to a game that imperialism plays to divide the country, also have traces of an implicit hostility towards Kurds. From the scornful and excluding attitude towards Arabs and other Middle Eastern peoples, Kurds too get their share of slander, described as a people "devoid of the values of civilization and Enlightenment." According to this point of view, using alternative lenses to analyze the Kurdish issue, political Islam, forced migration of Armenians and the Cyprus question, succumbs to being a collaborator of imperialism or serving the interests of the US and Israel.

Upon Turkey's entry into the Customs Union (1996) and acceleration of the process of EU membership, criticisms against liberal and democratic opinion producers started to make more frequent references to the EU accession and the term "EU-loving intellectual" came to the fore as a pejorative. Those opinion producers who supported Turkey's EU membership and believed that Turkey's accession would help the democratization in the country were said to be wishful

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Kongre," *Cumhuriyet*, March 5, 1991; "Şerif Efe Borsada," *Cumhuriyet,* March 10, 1991; "Liboş…Naksoş…Faşoz…" *Cumhuriyet,* March 17, 1991.

[93] In this context, an article by İlhan Selçuk published in the 2000s, saying he has forgiven his torturers is quite meaningful. See, İlhan Selçuk, *Cumhuriyet*, June 26, 2007. Also see, Özdemir İnce, "Otuz Sekiz İmzalı Bildiri," *Hürriyet,* August 8, 2006.

[94] As an example in the context of anti-Semitism see: Talât Turhan, *Çeteleşme, Kontrgerilla, Gladio, Susurluk-Telekulak,* Akyüz Yay., İstanbul: 1999, p.15. With its introduction written by İlhan Selçuk, this book about author's suffering of torture in Ziverbey Manor during the March 12th regime in 1971, is dedicated to 'Saturday Mothers' in a manner reflecting the contradictory worlds of left-Kemalists besides rather conspiracy approach it has.

thinkers "consoling themselves with such concepts as globalization, market reforms, democratization and human rights." [95] The "liberal intelligentsia," blindfolded by wishes of EU membership, liberal democracy and individual freedoms tends to wage its struggle for democracy against the "oppressive State" by ignoring neo-liberalism and imperialism (Yıldızoğlu, 2008:416).

The publications of *Aydınlık,* which drifted apart from Marxism in the 1990s and fully engaged in a nationalistic discourse,[96] gives blatant examples of the slandering discourse directed to those who support the EU accession process and who adopt a critical stance against the memorandum of February 1997. [97] In these publications, democratic and liberal opinions are declared as belonging to "traitors serving the US."[98] Furthermore, with their attitude regarding the question of veiling and regarding the ethnic rights of Kurds, these "cosmopolitan intellectuals" are thought to be working to revitalize the Sevres Treaty (Perinçek, August 31, 1997; Zileli Ümit, 2003:19-20). From this perspective, all who work for foundations and organizations known to be supported by EU funds or George Soros' Open Society Institute are seen as "collaborators."[99] Soros is seen as one of the leading advocates of imperialism's New World Order and the architect of the project geared to mobilize opinion producers in underdeveloped or developing countries for the interests of imperialism through foundations, institutes and organizations.[100] With this conspiratorial connection, liberals and democrats are

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[95] See: Ergin Yıldızoğlu, *Emperyalizmle Siyasal İslam Arasında Türkiye,* Siyah Beyaz Yay., İstanbul: 2008, p.12, 24, 25; see also: Emre Kongar, *28 Şubat ve Demokrasi,* Remzi Kitabevi, İstanbul: 2000 p.34, 35.
[96] In existence today as "Workers' Party"
[97] See, for instance: Hasan Yalçın, *Dönekler,* Kaynak Yay., İstanbul: 2003; *Neoliberal Sol,* Kaynak Yay., İstanbul: 2005; *Aydın Rantı,* Kaynak Yay., İstanbul: 2004.
[98] See: Doğu Perinçek, "Küreselci ile Tarikatçı İttifakı," *Aydınlık,* February 9, 1997.
[99]For some foundations and institutions mentioned, see: TESEV, Open Radio, Bianet, Helsinki Citizens Association, European Foundation.
[100] For a relevant article, see İlhan Selçuk, "Soros Neden Bağırıyor?" *Cumhuriyet,* September 18, 1998.

believed to constitute a group supported by the US and EU imperialism, global finance capital, and religious sects.[101]

In summary, liberal and/or democratic opinion producers stereotyped by Kemalist and nationalist circles as "Second Republicanists," or "Children of Soros" represent, in very broad terms, a group that adopts a libertarian stance in political issues and a critical approach to the Kemalist tradition. This group is heterogeneous, includes figures with a socialist background and also with right-wing backgrounds. The Kemalist and nationalist reaction to this group points at a common ground, that of anti-Kemalism. The reactionary discourse against them regards concerns like "democratization" and "individual freedoms" as cover stories of a conspiring group who really serves "imperialism, the new world order and international capitalism." While the aggressiveness and discriminatory nature of this discourse is not the subject matter of this study, the way this discourse attempts to locate and explain liberal and democratic opinions and to categorize "bad" and "good" intellectuals is noteworthy. The emergence, beginning with the 1980s, a social type of democratic opinion producers that are distinguished from traditional socialist, Kemalist or conservative positions has created an impact – thus Kemalists, like socialists, have attempted to assimilate this social type into their interpretations, albeit in a hostile manner.

The reactionary opinion production of nationalist rhetoricians is thus exemplary of an attempt to properly "understand" and "respond to" the emerging social type. However, since this attempt does not intend to produce political-scientific knowledge, and is not even a fair portrayal, it fails to explain the

[101] For a relevant article, see Özdemir İnce, "Avrupa Birliği'nin Vesayeti Altında," *Hürriyet,* October 3, 2007.

phenomenon of the Democrat and its prevailing characteristics as an opinion producer.

CHAPTER V

THE *FIRST MOMENT* IN THE EMERGENCE OF LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC OPINION PRODUCERS IN TURKEY

5.1. Introduction

During the early 1980s, a specific circle of political opinion producers gathered around the journal *Yeni Gündem*, determined to give a central place to the critique of official ideology and to problematize the democracy within the Turkish context. It would be correct to claim that it was the left-oriented opinion producers who for the first time constructed the conceptual framework and theoretical tools of the debates revolving around the topics of democracy and the state. The journal *Yeni Gündem* deserves to be analyzed since it provided some early theoretical reflections about the theme of democracy and a call for a systematic thinking practice over the critique of the regime's ideology.

The first journal which carried the debates around the issues of democracy and democratization into the agenda of Turkey's socialist and left-leaning figures was *Birikim*, which stood as a theoretical and political source that introduced the fashionable scholars of Western Marxism, like Althusser, Poulantzas and Laclau. The history of the journal might be examined in two phases. The first phase covered the period of March 1975 and April 1980, when the junta put an end to its

publication. The second phase of *Birikim* started in March 1989 and the journal is being published interruptedly since then. The journal, when it first came out, can be regarded as providing novel theoretical contributions to the mostly barren intellectual soil of the Turkish socialist left. It had a clearly defined socialist identity and the discussions presented within the journal were confined to a socialist outlook.

In contrast, *Yeni Gündem* (first issue in 1984) never claimed to be theoretical but instead emerged as a weekly magazine focusing on issues concerned with democracy and democratization. It sought to construct a leftist perspective in the analysis of the existing course of politics. Therefore, it is difficult to mention about any sort of complete overlap between *Birikim* and this journal. Despite the fact that *Yeni Gündem* was published between the years during which *Birikim* had to leave the scene, it never claimed to substitute the place left empty by the former. Still, it might be argued that *Yeni Gündem* served as a platform for socialists who were formerly associated with *Birikim*. Perhaps the foremost figure of *Birikim*, Murat Belge, was also one of the chief editorials of *Yeni Gündem.*

The most important factor preparing the ground for the emergence of a left-wing discourse on democratization and on the critique of the regime's ideology was the 1980 Coup. The coup paved the way towards a total process of political and ideological restructuring. The Turkish version of the new right ideology, which is called Özalizm (named after the former prime minister and President Turgut Özal), was one consequence of this restructuring process which then contributed to the change within the conceptual framework of the left-leaning political opinion producers in Turkey.

5.2. An Overview of September 12 Coup

With the 1980 coup, the contours of the ideological climate and the political realm have been sharply re-drawn. This transformation and restructuring within the ideological and political realms were built on the export-oriented capital accumulation model adopted at the outset of the 1980s. In contrast to the state-led character of the import-substitution strategy that reigned during the sixties and seventies, the new model celebrated free market forces and thereby necessitated an ideological and political restructuring. Without question, this ideological and political atmosphere shaped the frames of references of Turkish political opinion suppliers, such that, they either raised their voices as opponents to the newly established ideological framework or adopted the new agenda partially or totally.

The primary task of the September coup was stated as suppressing terror and anarchy. Chief of General Staff General Kenan Evren defined the purpose of the coup as

> to preserve the integrity of the country, to restore national unity and togetherness, to avert a possible civil war and fratricide, to reestablish the authority and existence of the State and to eliminate all factors that prevent the normal functioning of the democratic order.[102]

Nevzat Bölügiray, an active-duty general during the coup, states in his memoirs that after the coup, terror within the country was suppressed at the expense of democracy (1991).[103] The "determined combat against anarchy and terror" prevented violent incidents to a certain degree. Still, in contrast to its

[102] For the original version of the speech, see: *Towards A Sound Democracy*, (Ankara: Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, Date Unknown).

[103] Nevzat Bölügiray was commander of the 6th Army Corps before the coup. After the coup he commanded the state of emergency areas of Adana, Kahramanmaraş, Mersin, Gaziantep, Hatay and Adıyaman. Between 1981-1983 he served as the Chief Director of the State of Emergency Co-ordinate. For detailed information, see: *Sokaktaki Askerin Dönüşü, 12 Eylül Yönetimi Dönemi*, (Ankara: Tekin Yay., 1991).

ambition the coup was unable to eradicate "anarchy and terror": "By establishing a huge system of suppression and security, the coup reduced terror for only a certain period of time."[104] The primary justification of the coup was "to combat terror in order to create the grounds for the normal functioning of democratic order." Still, Belge argues that, paradoxically, its major target appeared as democracy itself and the reduction of the terror provided the basis for the legitimation of an authoritarian state structure (1992:37).

In many speeches, public addresses and commentaries of the Chief of General Staff General Kenan Evren, democracy was presented as a basis facilitating the growth of anarchy and terror.[105]

One explanation for the loss of democracy as a vision for the September 12 regime was the fact that the coup-makers accepted a perception of society which was conservative in its essence. Evren's speeches explicitly addressed such kind of a conservative construct. Evren frequently focused on the issues of thriftiness, prudence, traditional values of family, morality and religion.[106]

Moreover, with the coup, the center in Turkish politics has shifted rightwards. The architects of the military regime partially adopted a version of Turkish nationalism supported by radical nationalist National Action Party (NAC,

[104] Ibid. 5. The numbers are as follows:

Incidents	**1980**	**1981**	**1982**	**1983**
Total No	23.841	5.789	1.170	555
Armed Conflict	7.010	610	132	27
Usurpation and robbery	2.209	1.084	426	102
Murders	2.921	456	125	33

[105] Press Conference held on September 16, 1980 is a perfect exemplary of this attitude. See, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devlet Başkanı Orgeneral Kenan Evren'in Söylev ve Demeçleri (12 Eylül 1980-12 Eylül 1981,* (Ankara: Başbakanlık Basımevi, 1981), 29-36.

[106] For instance, see *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devlet Başkanı Orgeneral Kenan Evren'in Söylev ve Demeçleri (12 Eylül 1980-12 Eylül 1981,* (Ankara: Başbakanlık Basımevi, 1981), 73, 74, 99, 100. Particularly the stress on 'tightening the belts' gave the hints that the economic stabilization programme launched by Demirel's government on 24 January, just before the coup, would impose severe burdens for the laboring classes, see, pages 99 and 100.

henceforth in its Turkish acronym MHP). The regime shared, with the likes of MHP, a primordialist, ethnocentric understanding of the nation, as well as an organic integration between the state and society, engrafted in the infamous concept of "army- nation"*(ordu-millet)*. This understanding of nationalism was articulated to the official ideology and determined its content to a large extent. In the words of deputy-chairman of the MHP, Agâh Oktay Güner, there was a visible overlap between the ideology of MHP and the ideology of the state during post-coup period: "We are in prison but our thoughts are in power" (Bora and Can, 1991:88). Yet, National Security Council (NSC) [107] that took over the administration on behalf of the Turkish Armed Forced (TAF), frequently declared that it was above politics and stood at equal distance either to left and to the right.[108] Nevertheless, it was clear that the coup symbolized a rightward turn in Turkish politics: Indeed, the composition of the Council proved the ideological preferences of the architects of the coup. The majority of members of the Council had conservative-nationalist ideological orientations,[109] which reflects the anti-communist core of the ideology and the institutions of the coup (Çalışlar,

[107] NSC is the unconstitutional ruling junta between 1980 and 1983. NSC is also the abbreviation of *Millî Güvenlik Kurulu,* a constitutional council, formed in 1962, composed of the Prime Minister, Chief of the General Staff, Deputy Prime Minister, Ministers of National Defense, Internal Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Finance, Transportation and Labor as well as Chief of Staff and Commanders of the Army, Navy, Air Forces and Gendarmerie under the chairmanship of the President of the Republic.

[108] General Kenan Evren declared that, the general conviction that the coup particularly targeted the left was a result of the fact that when compared with the right, the left had involved in terrorism to a large extent. See, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devlet Başkanı Orgeneral Kenan Evren'in Söylev ve Demeçleri (12 Eylül 1980-12 Eylül 1981,* (Ankara: Başbakanlık Basımevi, 1981), 237.

[109] Besides, Bölügiray mentions about a number of reasons while explaining the rightward tendency adopted by the architects of the coup. For him, the harsh criticisms of the left-leaning intelligentsia towards the coup, led the generals to regard the terrorists and the critics of the coup regime on the same basis and this reactionism, in consequence, made it easy for the members of Council to adopt a rightwards tendency (Bölügiray, 1991:49). Secondly, Bölügiray asserts that NSC was under the pressure of the powerful foreign and national circles which were sharing a rightist ideology in common. For Bölügiray, the third reason behind the rightist preferences of the members of the Council stemmed from the contention that Turkey's electorate in the main always preferred to vote for rightist political parties (Bölügiray, 1991: 49). Bölügiray also gives very specific examples concerning those arguments (1991: 49-52). Nevertheless, it should be added that, Bölügiray does not attach particular significance to structural factors and thereby fails to analyze the real dynamics behind the coup.

1989:118). Since the complete reorganization of the state apparatus necessitated the pruning of the extended branches of radical right, the generals did not hesitate to attack radical rightists, and particularly the MHP. In order to gain the full support of the society, the generals had to present a neutral image in the eyes of the public. As Çalışlar argues, the attack on the members of MHP and the *Ülkücüler*[110] was a means to achieve this end: the generals made sure that the military courts gave sentences against the members of MHP (who were responsible of murders, assassinations, and massacres just before the coup), which ensured public support for the junta (1989:118).

The ambivalent attitudes of the architects of the coup towards MHP were unable to change the fact that there stood a radical affinity between the ideologies of both (Çalışlar, 1989:119). During the rule of the junta, the attitude of the state towards the right differed considerably from the attitude towards the left. The balance sheet of the regime was full of abolition of human rights: about 500 people, majority of whom were leftists, lost their lives in custody, thousands of people were left disabled, subjected to torture and 6,353 people were tried with capital punishment. In Ahmad's account,

> Around the country, there were about 8,000 in detention and thousands more if one counted those taken in custody for the 90-day period, beaten, intimidated, and released without being charged. In January 1981, an EEC committee estimated that 30,000 were in detention. The use of torture, never uncommon, now became widespread and systematic, with a number of suspects and prisoners dying in suspicious circumstances. The regime never denied the existence of torture; it merely claimed that it was the work of rogue policemen and not policy, and that all charges were investigated and the guilty punished (1993:184-185).

[110] Literally,' Idealists'. They were more commonly known as the Grey Wolves which was the paramilitary branch of the MHP.

Yet, unfair treatment against the left was evident once the numbers of the executed capital punishments were compared: among the executions held during the years of 1980 and 1985, eighteen were from the revolutionary left, and only nine were from the radical right (Bora and Can, 1991:123; Tuşalp, 1985:254).

Leaving aside the issue of unfair treatment against the left, there have existed several structural factors that gave the coup its rightist character.[111] First and foremost, with the coup, trade unions and democratic rights were abolished and this came to mean a severe assault against the working class and the left. As stated previously, in accordance with the new policies of the multilateral lending agencies and developed capitalist nations and the consensual accumulation strategies of big capital inside the country, Turkey adopted free market capitalism that necessitated a reversal of the state-led import-substitution capital accumulation model and the re-integration through liberalized foreign trade (Gülalp, 1994:159). To this end, export-oriented capital accumulation model was put into practice by the government led by Süleyman Demirel with the "January 24 Decisions" in 1980, in alliance with the capitalist class, just six months before the coup. The major architect of the Decisions was Turgut Özal, who was then appointed as the vice prime minister and minister of economy and finance by the September 12 regime.

In its most simplified version, export-oriented capital accumulation model might be defined with one sole principal: liberalization of foreign trade and integration with the foreign markets. The model assumes that, the principal means to reach to that end is to increase the exports. In practice that means, lifting the

[111] Needless to say, those structural factors should not be seen the sole reason behind the coup. The peculiarities of Turkish historical context have shaped the nature of the coups within the country. Therefore, without falling into the trap of reductionism, those structural factors need to be elaborated in order to reveal the dynamics constituting the rightist core of the September 12.

legal sanctions and quotas on foreign trade in order to freely integrate with world capitalist system. As it is well known, any increase in exports necessitates the reduction in domestic consumption that requires a general cut in the level of national income and therefore involves privatization of state run industries, devaluating the currency, removing price controls and reducing the budget deficit by plummeting the role of government in the economy (Boratav, 1995: 119-138; Aren, 1989:85-88). Thus, in order to operate perfectly, export-led model necessitates a politically inactive and a docile society. In Turkish context, the basis for such vision of society was ensured with September 12 coup (2004: 66-68). As Keyder notes, "under the military NSC regime, a radical makeover of the economy could be embarked upon with minimum resistance" (2004: 68). The representatives of the capital within the country welcomed the coup with great enthusiasm since the channels for the opposition of the working classes were unconditionally closed with the decrees that suspended the workers' right to strike and bargain and that guaranteed the freeze in the wages and salaries. For instance,

> On 14 September, strikes were proscribed and striking workers were ordered back to work. This measure was welcomed by Halit Narin, the president of the Confederation of Employers' Unions of Turkey, who noted that the end of strikes would be an important step forward in the development of Turkey's economy (Ahmad, 1993: 182).

To recapitulate, the coup was a rightwards onslaught on Turkish democracy with all its institutions and practices. In Belge's words, it was the most gruesome oppression that the Turkish society experienced in its history (1992: 9). For the first time, democracy, with all of institutions, was the main target. The constitution was suspended, the parliament was dissolved, the political parties were closed down and their leaders were detained. The leaders of the coup

proposed an inversely defined relationship with the democracy on the one hand, and the discipline and order on the other, and they did not hesitate to sacrifice the former for the sake of the latter. This rightwards and anti-democratic turn within politics was also a turning point for the intellectual life within the country.

5.3. Özalizm: Turkish Version of the New Right

It would not be an exaggeration to claim that the first stage of the changing nature of Turkish democratic opinion producers was opened up by the September 12, 1980 military coup. The coup was equated with outright oppression, censorship, and consequently with "state repression." This led to a paradoxical development in terms of the trajectory of political opinions in Turkey. On the one hand, politically engaged figures, majority of whom were located on the left of political spectrum, were either sent to prison or at least pacified by other means. On the other hand, the oppressive environment of the post-coup years caused topics like "state-society relations", "democratization", "demilitarization" to be prioritized in the intellectual agenda.

As I have emphasized before, the coup was decisive in terms of the changing agenda of the Turkish political opinion producers who took stance either on the left or right of the political spectrum. It provided the solid grounds for the debates centering on the topics of state repression and democratization. Yet, the effort of problematizing the state and attributing foremost importance to the theme of democracy was not specific to Turkish conjuncture. The operating ideology during the eighties, that of the "New Right," was one major factor that contributed to the debates around the state and offered even a hostile attitude to every specific

issue related with that topic. The New Right[112] might be defined as the ideological/political dimension of the global restructuring process of capitalism via the practice of neo-liberal policies. More precisely, it is the ideological base that supported the enforcement of the neo-liberal policies and the solutions offered for overcoming the crisis that the capitalism experienced in the late-70s. This ideological project rests on one core premise: superiority of the market. Since the enlargement of the area for the market pre-conditions a significant reduction in the area of the activity of the state, state intervention is completely disapproved and condemned as collectivist and socialist. This inevitably led to a strong anti-statist impulse.

Such anti-statist impulse found its expression in the Turkish version of New Right ideology, namely Özalizm. This was a new hegemonic project put into practice under the leadership of Turgut Özal, during his role as the leader of ANAP and prime minister of two consecutive ANAP cabinets. Parallel to the developments throughout the advanced capitalist countries, Turkey's route to new right project was drawn by the necessities imposed by the newly adopted capital accumulation model, that of export-oriented capital accumulation, as an alternative to the import-substitution strategy. With the 24th January decisions the cornerstones of the new route was laid down. As discussed earlier, in contrast to the state-led development strategy of import-substitution model, export-oriented capital accumulation required the reduction of state intervention and the limitation

[112]'Neo-liberalism' and 'New Right' are frequently used interchangeably to refer to the similar processes and developments. For instance, while offering a definition, Held proposes that, "The New Right (or neo-liberalism, or neo-conservatism, as it is sometimes called) is, in general committed to the view that political life, like economic life, is (or ought to be) a matter of individual freedom and initiative" (Held, 1991: 243). Still, for our part, some sort of demarcation line might well be drawn between the two. Despite the risk of simplification, the policies and economic reform packages offered as the solutions for the second great crisis of capitalism that manifested itself during the seventies might be described under the heading of 'neo-liberalism'. Besides, the ideological backbone of these policies might be characterized as the 'New Right'.

of state power. Needless to say, this new strategy would bring about severe burdens for the life standards of the masses and thereby would lead to severe legitimization problems. Therefore, the restructuring of the economy and the politics in line with the imperatives of the newly adopted capital accumulation strategy signaled the need for an effectively functioning ideological model. The remedy was the Turkish version of the new right ideology, that of Özalizm, which presented an amalgam of the elements of liberalism, conservatism, nationalism and social justice within its own body. Obviously, as a new right ideology, Özalizm, echoed the rhetoric of free market and open economy and emphasized the instrumentality of market ideology. While doing this, it contributed to the overall erosion within the statist discourse and thereby appeared to be a perfect anti-statist impulse.

The state repression of the 1980 coup and the anti-statist impulse of Özalizm together paved the way towards the attempts of problematizing the "state" on theoretical and ideological levels and reflection upon the theme of "democracy" as a counterpart of that critical endeavor. Certainly, the official and long-lasting ideology of the Turkish Republic, Kemalism, was not immune to such lines of questioning. From that moment on, Kemalism suffered a severe crisis of legitimacy and began to lose its once pivotal role.

Kemalism, has always served as the basis that provided the legitimacy of the coups in Turkish history. In each coup, the military has referred to the official ideology as the legitimate ground of its intervention. Turkish Armed Forces (TAF), as the main agent of the official and founding ideology of the regime, has ensured its 'neutral' and 'over-politics' image with its reference, Kemalism (Cizre, 2002: 156). Nevertheless, in each and every coup, the content of the

official ideology has been re-defined while its core has been left untouched (Cizre, 2002). New ideological elements and aspects have been articulated to this core, delineated as "modernization, secularism and the goal of reaching to the level of modern civilization" (Cizre, 2002: 158). To put it differently, the requirements and impositions of each conjuncture have brought about a revision of the official ideology and that task has been performed under the supervision of the military. The existing ideological elements of the official ideology has been revised, reconsidered, or substituted by new ideological elements. Needless to say, September 12 coup was not an exception in this route. The official ideology pointed out as the main reference point and utilized as the sole justification mechanism by the military, was defined with a conservative content (Taşkın, 2002:570). In accordance with the conservative social design of the architects of the coup, conservative ideological elements were either injected to the official ideology, or the conservative components of the official ideology were given priority. In this context, it was not a coincidence that religion as a mechanism of social control was re-discovered by the agents of the coup.[113] This ideological design was transmitted to the whole tissue of the social fabric via the educational system and other means and became increasingly successful in the process of creating a docile society. In its earlier phase, the opposition against the official ideology was not immune to the ideological motifs of the ruling ideology. They either combined or articulated the elements of the official ideology to their own body and raised their opposition on this basis. In other words, Kemalism remained

[113] The implications of re-discovery of the function of religion as a social control mechanism is manifest in Kenan Evren's speeches. See, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devlet Başkanı Orgeneral Kenn Evren'in Söylev ve Demeçleri (12 Eylül 1980-12 Elül 1981),* (Ankara: Başbakanlık Basımevi, 1981). It should also be noted that, the formulation of *Turkish Islamic Synthesis* served as the ideological basis exemplifying the societal vision adopted by the architects of the coup. This topic will be elaborated in the subsequent sections.

to be the major reference point of the opposition as well. Attempts of questioning the essentials of the ruling ideology were relatively weak in this earlier phase and therefore were underestimated by the architects of the military regime. Yet, after a short period of time, the official ideology lost its once sacred status in the eyes of certain segments of the intelligentsia and opened to severe criticisms. In that respect, not only the September 12 version of Kemalism, namely Atatürkçülük, but also the main pillars of this ideological construct were challenged on ideological and political grounds. Several developments contributed to the erosion of the official ideology.

Foremost among the factors that contributed to the legitimacy crisis of the official ideology was the Kurdish issue that gradually occupied the agenda of Turkish politics since the beginnings of the eighties. The Kurdish issue presented a litmus test to analyze the weak points of the official ideology. It challenged the core assumption of the official nationalist doctrine that took for granted the Turkish nationality as the sole marker of the national identity within the borders of the country.

Another major factor that contributed to the erosion of the official ideology was of course the increasing public visibility of Islam within the country. After the coup, Islam found fertile grounds to flourish since the generals of the coup tended to use religion as a strategic tool in their struggle against the left, accepting Islam as an effective antidote against communism. In addition to the political considerations and strategic preferences of the political elite, the increased integration of the country with the world opened the space for the flourishing of new demands. Parallel to the developments throughout the world, ideas and arguments in favor of identity politics began to occupy the intellectual

baggage of the differing segments of political spectrum. Unfortunately, this scenario left Turkish politics with a dilemma. On the one hand, dissemination and the flourishing of the new ideas extended the scope of political realm. On the other, since the political class and institutions were unable to meet the requirements of the ongoing process and tended to work against the dynamics of the mentioned process (Cizre, 1998: 75). In that vein, the rise of Islam appeared as a challenge against the self-evident supremacy of the official ideology. In the words of Cizre,

> Kemalism, as a strategy of controlled modernization, failed to cope with the newly emerging politico-social complexity and to provide as meaningful framework as it did in the past (1998:118).

To recapitulate, as the outset of a long-lasting period of oppression and state violence, September 12 coup determined its mission as proposing an entirely different identity for the society. For the architects of the coup, the ideal model for the new identity was a disciplined and hierarchical order inspired from the military (Belge, 1989: 9). However the process yielded its own handicaps. As a result of the combined effects of the inner and external dynamics, during the post-September 12 coup period, the minds of the Turkish political opinion producers either from the left or right of the political spectrum were engaged with the headings of 'democracy,' 'democratization' and 'state oppression.' Without ignoring the impact of external dynamics that contributed to the process, it might be claimed that the distinctive character of the military regime was decisive in terms of the emergence and flourishing of the 'democratization' issue on the intellectual and political agenda.

I should once again emphasize that for the first time in Turkish intellectual history, the issue of "democracy" overshadowed other political and ideological issues and determined the content and essence of political opinions. The question of democratization replaced ideological priorities that existed in the intellectual and political landscape of the sixties and seventies, when debates were predominantly shaped by issues like "strategies of revolution," "independence" or "economic development." This shift of conceptual axis was bound to the distinctive character of the September 12 coup that rendered its outcomes entirely different from the former military interventions. In contrast to the coups of 1960 and 1971, 1980 coup did not put the blame on any specific political actor or institution but targeted the entire political structure. The architects of the 1980 coup accused the whole democratic system with its political parties, legislation, social and political organizations and elections. Needless to say, the outcomes of such lines of developments were prone to generate different implications for the intellectual agendas of the right-wing opinion-producers and the left-oriented 'intellectuals.' For the first time in its history, Turkish radical right[114] experienced state oppression. When compared with the coup of 1971, the violence and oppression of the September 12 regime was considerably severe.[115] Yet, as Çalışlar notes, Turkish left, in the main, was not exposed to a devastating surprise since it had the experience of the former coup (1989). It was immune to state oppression at least to some certain degree. On the contrary, in the eyes of the radical right, the coup came to mean a complete frustration. Up to that moment, activists of radical right had defined themselves as the 'main owners and the

[114] Here, the phrase 'Turkish radical right' connotes to *Ülkücü* Movement.
[115] For a detailed analysis comparing the extent of the oppression and violence practiced within the coups of 1971 and 1980, see, Çalışlar, 1989. Çalışlar argues that, one distinctive feature of the 1980 coup was the existence of harder conditions and a severe violence against the women (1989: 112).

guardians of the Turkish state'. Once they realized that the state sacrificed them, they were extremely shocked and discouraged (Bora and Can, 1991: 87). Needless to say, when compared with the radical left, state oppression, either in the sense of physical or ideological means, they faced was milder. But still, the outcomes and effects of this experience was devastating and demoralizing (Bora and Can, 1991: 91). In that respect, due to the identity crisis it experienced within the conditions of the coup and the reaction against the oppression of the September 12 regime, there emerged the seeds of questioning the existing system within its discourse and their self-claimed mission of 'guardianship of the state' eroded to a certain degree and even challenged by its some most radical sections (Bora and Can, 1991: 39).

In these circumstances, the traditional right wing intelligentsia began to question its once unchallengeable and sacred relation to the 'state' and the heading of 'democracy' occupied their agenda. The leftist political opinion producers, who had once appropriated most of the aspects of the official ideology, took pains to define the basis upon which they legitimized their reason of existence. The love/hatred metaphor which might be utilized to understand the relation between the left and the state took the form of a definite hatred relation. The state violence of the September 12 coup did not only intend to gather information about the illegal and marginal activities but it also aimed a total destruction and extermination of the Turkish left. In that respect, compared to the

oppressive practices of the other coups, it displayed an incredible cruelty towards the left.[116]

5.4. Changing Agenda of the Turkish Left: Rethinking the Left under the Heading of 'Democracy' and the Foundation of the Yeni Gündem Journal

Throughout the period beginning with September 12, coup Turkish left experienced a shift of emphasis in terms of its theoretical and ideological priorities. The debates around the strategies of revolution that defined the period before the coup left its place to the discussions focused upon the headings of fundamental rights and freedoms. More fundamentally, different fractions of Turkish left located the issues concerned with the heading of fundamental rights and freedoms to the top of their political agenda. In this manner, 'democracy' entered into the lexicon of the left and became the chief marker to identify differing fractions. In other words, it replaced the prominent place once occupied by the theme of strategies of revolution.

The period just after the September 12 coup connoted to a process within which the entire political system of the country was exposed to a tremendous change in favor of authoritarian practices and policies (Alkan, 1986: 11-12, 33; Arcayürek, 1990: 198; Cemal, 2000; Tuşalp, 1988). In this atmosphere, the most urgent task of Turkish left was to capture the distinctive features of this new conjuncture and develop new strategies to cope with the impositions and pressures it brought about.

[116] The existence of the practice of torture was firstly officially admitted by the state authorities in a declaration given to the Belgium RTBF TV. The declaration was given by Nevzat Bölügiray. Within the declaration, Turkish authorities confirmed that the practice of torture was a fact in the country; they nevertheless claimed that this was not a state policy. Figures were also given concerning some particular cases (Bölügiray, 1991: 150-151). For the oppression and violence practiced against the leftist activists in the prisons, see, Çalışlar, 1991: 20-32; 36-39, 55-56, 66-71. See also: (Kutlu, 1989: 20-30, 48-54, 69-73, 102).

The leftist and/or socialist circles which were able to survive during the authoritarian climate that started with the coup manifested three major reactions to this political atmosphere.

The first reaction might be defined as a defense strategy. In order to protect their own well-being from the violence and the oppressive policies of the military junta, some fractions of Turkish socialist-left adopting a classical orthodox interpretation of Marxism, pursued a strategy of withdrawal and removal from the realm of real politics.[117] They tended to strengthen the organizational bonds of their cadres and suspended any sort of open political activity and confined themselves with a process of ideological consolidation. For those groups, within the extraordinary environment that the coup brought about, adopting a politically active strategy would retain the danger of destroying the whole web of their political organizations that had been already rendered powerless by the authoritarian practices of the military junta. Those groups devoted themselves to their own organizational recovery and built their whole project to a deliberate strategy of retreat. Within the conditions of the period, this strategy, without doubt, made it impossible to involve into the risky enterprises that aimed to redefine the relationship between the Turkish left and the democracy. Many of those political groups completed their self-recovery and restructuring processes

[117] The strategy of withdrawal was particularly adopted by a political circle that left Workers' Party of Turkey (Türkiye İşçi Partisi – TİP/refounded in 1974) in 1978 and began to publish a monthly journal *Socialist Power* (Sosyalist İktidar). This political circle defined their mission as the ideological and theoretical reproduction of Leninism in Turkish context and attached due significance to the topic of 'socialist power.' During the conditions of military regime, after a short period of recovery, some former cadres of *Socialist Power* began to publish the theoretical journal *Gelenek* (Tradition) in 1986. In 1992, the cadres gathered around the theoretical journal *Gelenek* founded *Party for Socialist Turkey* (Sosyalist Türkiye Partisi – STP). STP was banned by the Constitutional Court upon an article in its program regarding the Kurdish issue and was reestablished in 1993 with the name of Party for Socialist Power (Sosyalist İktidar Partisi – SİP). In 2001, the name 'Party for Socialist Power' changed to 'Communist Party of Turkey' (TKP). For additional information, see: Chapter 4.

and located the theme of socialist revolution at the heart of their political programmes.[118]

The second sort of reaction, which was adopted by the socialist cadres gathered around the journal *Aydınlık,*[119] included the efforts of building the grounds for political legitimacy for their activities. In that respect, the whole strategy was based on pragmatism to a large extent and defined its major aim as creating the available grounds for viable political activity. In the early days of the coup, *Aydınlık* group tended to explain the military regime of September 12, as a progressive step of vigorous and nationalist forces towards independence (Zileli, 2003a: 500-504). In the same vein, in the following years, as they thought that the specific conditions that gave rise to the coup disappeared, the cadres of *Aydınlık* defined ANAP government as an agent retaining the mission of restructuring of the status quo towards democratic means (Zileli, 2003b: 71). Gün Zileli, who was one of the central cadres of the Aydınlık group, and who had a reputation as the 'second man' of the organization after the leader Doğu Perinçek, expresses the political perspectives of the group as such,

> (According to us), ANAP was a parliamentary force and within the struggle of defending the parliamentary democracy, it was a part to collaborate with. Cooperation with ANAP was essential in order to cope with militarism of the junta with the widest parliamentary alliances, that is, in order to defend today's prevailing parliamentary system (2003b: 71).

This pragmatist strategy pioneered by Aydınlık circle was an outcome of the attempts to re-include Turkish left to the realm of reel politics within the

[118] Bölügiray mentions about the change in the strategies and tactics of the radical activist groups after the coup. He states that, "(These groups), in order to overcome the outcomes of the unexpected attack of the coup with the minimum damage, adopted a deliberate policy of dispersion and retreat. In this end, they veiled and disguised themselves, dispersed into the rural areas or left the country and became refugees. Therefore, just after the coup, there emerged the belief that terror within the country was absolutely terminated. In fact, this belief was only the result of the change in the strategies and tactics of the political organizations" (1991: 20).
[119] For detailed information, see: Chapter 4.

conditions of post-September 12 period. Nevertheless, those efforts were hard to indicate that this pragmatist strategy brought about a conscious and systematic thinking about the issues of democracy and freedom within the ranks of Turkish left. The strategy was based on the ambition of deriving temporary allies and forms of legitimacy from the prevailing conjuncture. In that respect, its scope was not broad enough to shoulder the mission of redefining the content and agenda of Turkish left on philosophical, theoretical and ethical grounds.

The third version of the reaction that emerged within the political atmosphere of the coup purported a reconsideration and reassessment of the traditional premises of the Turkish left and emphasized the need for a rethinking over the relationship between the ideas of 'the left' and the 'democracy.' The supporters of this approach analyzed the September coup and the defeat of Turkish left in the light of problem of democratization and maintained that in order to act as the agents of the new conjuncture, Turkish socialists should inject the premises of freedom and liberty into their projects and analyses. Undoubtedly, the call for a rethinking over the theme of democracy and freedom denoted to an exception within the general amount of Turkish left. This exceptional voice was represented by the weekly and later bimonthly journal *Yeni Gündem* published under the intellectual leadership of socialist political opinion producers such as Murat Belge and Aydın Köymen.

The problem of how to reconcile Turkish left with democracy and the problematic concerning the articulation of liberty/freedom to the major premises of socialism were the leading theoretical concerns of the socialist political opinion producers gathered around *Yeni Gündem* journal. The chief rationale of the journal and the mission it purported to shoulder were formulated under the

headings encapsulating the major theoretical ambition: freedom and democracy. Undoubtedly, such sort of maneuver calling for a rethinking over the relationship between Turkish left and democracy could not be reduced to a temporary strategical move. It rather envisaged a much more comprehensive change within the agenda of the left-leaning political opinion producers. *Yeni Gündem* circle hold that any attempt suggesting a redefinition of Turkish left under the problematic of freedom would bring about a transformation within the established political culture and categorically acknowledged practices and commonly adopted language of Turkish left. According to the political opinion producers around the journal the failure of Turkish left in maintaining the support of the masses and its inability to act as a major agent within the realm of Turkish politics was not simply an outcome of the anti-democratic practices of the state instrument that limited the activities of the left to a considerable extent. Beside this and even much more important than that was the failure of the Turkish left to incorporate the principles of democracy and rights and freedoms to its lexicon. Therefore, Turkish left generated a culture that conveyed the shortcomings and deficiencies that arose as a result of this lack of incorporation and recognition. Furthermore, this lack of recognition was not only a failure characterizing the Turkish left. It also stood as a major factor behind the weaknesses of already existing socialist practices throughout the world (Belge, 1985). It was an urgent and considerably vital task to locate the problematic of democracy into the first rank of the intellectual agenda in order to create a leftist culture that adopted the virtues of rights and freedoms and in order to transform the existing oppressive political atmosphere. The socialist movement of the country destined to a process of marginalization could embrace the masses and retain a prominent role in Turkish

politics only if it rescued itself from its hierarchical autocracy and conservative orthodoxy (Belge, 1985). Thus, it had to give initiative to the root dynamics and consider the maneuver in favor of a libertarian approach as an indispensable component of the organizational activity of socialism. In the words of Belge,

> Now, the left, in the main, has to reconsider its doctrine as a whole and reconstruct the theory that will enable it to capture the changing (realities of the) world. Besides, it has to think over and constitute the organizational units that will keep pace with the imperatives of this new order. Unless this has been accomplished, the left will not only rescue itself from a conservative self-evaluation but will fall behind the affairs and events prevailing throughout the world (1987a).

To conclude, for the opinion producers gathered around the journal Yeni Gündem, the political culture and vernacular which would associate Turkish left with the masses could only be constructed through such an understanding that locates the freedom at its center. The political agent that internalized the norms of at least the bourgeois democracy would be able to transmit this vernacular to the Turkish society. It was indispensable to locate the issue of democracy at the top of the agenda for both the progressive transformation of the political atmosphere of Turkey and the Turkish left itself. In this way, both the socialist agent and the structure upon which it acted would be exposed to a radical transformation.

Resting upon those premises, *Yeni Gündem* undertook the role of acting as an intellectual source injecting the issue of democracy into the agenda of Turkish politics. The journal did not confine its mission with this limited ambition but it also called for a systematical and thorough thinking activity on democracy. In accordance with this, within the articles that took place in the journal, even most of the popular events that occupied Turkey's agenda within the concerned period of time were associated with the issue of democracy or elaborated through the

lenses of a democratic outlook that assigned foremost significance to the principle of liberty.[120] The finest expression of this tendency might be found in Köymen's words:

> In my opinion, the primary problem of the Turkey's agenda in all spheres is democracy. Doubtlessly, the primary problem of politics is democracy. The primary problem of economic, cultural and social spheres is democracy. Of course, you should not get the impression that I regard democracy as a panacea or cure-all. It certainly is not. What I want to say is that, democracy is the necessary but certainly not the sufficient condition for the solution of all of the problems that Turkey and Turkish people have been experiencing (1985:10).

5.4.1. İdris Küçükömer's Theses on State-Society Relations and Their Adoption by Yeni Gündem

The conceptions of democracy and freedom/liberty offered by the opinion producers gathered around Yeni Gündem were constructed upon two interrelated tenets. The former one echoed the classical liberal postulation that state intervention would undermine individual initiative and offend against basic liberty.[121] It argued that the realization of freedom necessitated a realm fully independent and autonomous from the state. The latter stood as a central argument claiming that the realm which was defined as independent and autonomous from the state should be set aside for the components of civil society. To put it more clearly, the question of democracy and freedom were constructed upon the tenets which contended that state power should be confined to a certain extent allowing free space for individual initiative and freedom.

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[120] For instance, *Yeni Gündem*, regarded the ban on the transsexual singer Bülent Ersoy as a problem of democracy and as an assault on the rights and freedoms of the individual.

[121] The conception of liberty constitutes the heart of liberal thought. In its classical formulation, liberty implies being free from something and therefore it retains a negative content. In that sense, the freedom of the individual implies the situation of being neither under coercion or restraint. See, among others,Gray:1995, Vincent: 1992.

The theoretical attempt of the opinion producers gathered around *Yeni Gündem* signaled a fresh voice within the choir of Turkish left. Until the 1980s, the general trend was to analyze Turkish capitalism through the lenses of the conceptual tools of capital/labor and imperialism/patriotism. In contrast, the fresh voice symbolized by the *Yeni Gündem* circle preferred to construct their analysis upon the axes of the relations of the state/society and state/individual. Doubtless, such lines of reading determined the nature and character of the political project and strategy that they proposed. For instance, before the 1980 coup, Turkish socialist left, in the main, tended to define its political adversary as 'bourgeoisie', 'imperialism' and/or 'USA.' Yet, for the *Yeni Gündem,* the counter-front was constituted by the state and by the forces operating in favor of its anti-democratic preferences and maneuvers. In accordance with that ideological and political perspective, it was emphasized that, Turkish left-leaning and socialist opinion producers should raise their voices even to the oppressive practices and violence of the state that did not directly target the leftists and/or socialists. As Belge clearly proposed, without considering the questions of 'for whom' and 'for what,' the enlargement and improvement of the democratic rights and freedoms was a *sine qua non* of the struggle of building the material bases of socialism (Belge, 1985: 1).[122]

On the theoretical level, the analysis of democracy through the lenses of conceptual pairs of the relations of state/society and state/individual necessitated the definition of a new transformative agent. This new agent was discovered within the terrain that which was beyond the control of state power. Put another way, the agent was the organized society from below. Since the state was posited

[122] For similar emphasis, see also, Belge, "Muhalif Bir Dergi," *Yeni Gündem*; Aydın Köymen, "Radikal Solun Gerekliliği," *Yeni Gündem,* September 15, 1985, No:29, 7-8; Belge, "Yine Demokrasi," *Yeni Gündem,* No:84, March 18-25, 1987.

as the sole enemy, it was no longer sufficient to design the political strategy with reference to one specific segment of society. For instance, working-class could no longer be defined as the sole privileged agent of socialism. The new agent was the society itself as a whole which was simply defined as the antithetical of the state (Köymen, 1985b: 7-8).

It might well be claimed that, via the publication of *Yeni Gündem,* the notion of civil society could disseminate within the ideological and cultural atmosphere of Turkish left. Such theoretical and ideological move was inspired from the theoretical model whose parameters were set by İdris Küçükömer. It could also be maintained that, the ideological enterprise of *Yeni Gündem* was an extension of the specific understanding of politics bearing the mark of Küçükömer's original and influential analysis. This specific understanding was rested upon a basis that called for the reversal of the traditionally accepted definitions of the categories of political left and political right within the country. It maintained that, it was a mistake to regard the pro-Westernization elite, secular and bureaucratic intelligentsia within the category of left and the social forces resting upon ages-long Islamic tradition within the category of right but the reverse.

The early formulation of this idiosyncratic analysis of Prof. Küçükömer made a remarkable entry into the Turkish intellectual realm with the publication of his influential book *Düzenin Yabancılaşması* (The Alienation of the Status Quo, AS for short) in 1969[123]. Although he was a Professor of Economics, Küçükömer became well-known in the late-1960s when he published several

political articles in the *Yön*[124] (*Direction*) journal. Still he achieved substantial fame with the articles he regularly wrote in *Ant,*[125] the semi-official weekly journal of Turkish Worker's Party (TWP) during the late 1960s, which were the early seeds of his *opus magnum,* AS. The book sparked fierce debates among Turkish left-leaning academics and political circles and served to challenge the major parameters of the Turkish left.

It should be noted that one particular source of inspiration behind Küçükömer's work was the newly formulated rhetoric of the Republican People's Party (RPP) about being "left-of-centre." The new ideological inclination was designed by two leading figures of RPP, Bülent Ecevit and Turhan Feyzioğlu, seemingly as a response to the opposition of WPT from a socialist basis. Indeed, it was İsmet İnönü, former president of Turkish Republic and leader of the RPP, who for the first time pronounced the maxim "left of center" in a speech on 28 July (Zürcher, 1998: 265). In the hands of the two leading ideologues of the Party, the maxim was utilized in order to promote a rather milder alternative for the

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[124]*Yön* was a weekly periodical founded in December, 1961 with a publication of a declaration signed by over prominent figures. The chief editor of the periodical and the leading figure of Yön movement was Doğan Avcıoğlu, an influential columnist of the period, who also contributed to the 1961 Constitution as a member of the constitutional parliament. Calling for a synthesis of Third World socialism and Kemalist nationalism Yön had deep impact on the political and ideological climate of the post-1960s. It had extremely high circulation figures in a short time which were almost inconceivable for a leftist publication in Turkey (Samim, 1981:68). Alongside Avcıoğlu, Mümtaz Soysal, İlhan Selçuk and İlhami Soysal appeared as the major writers of Yön. The periodical was financed by Cemal Eyüboğlu. Since it also served as an open platform for the whole left within the country, throughout the pages of Yön, not only the defenders of Kemalist-socialism but also the figures associated with different versions of socialism could find place. Küçükömer was one of them. The journal was discontinued in 1967.

[125] *Ant* was published during the years of 1967 and 1971. The founders of the weekly were: the novelist Yaşar Kemal, literary critic Fethi Naci and Doğan Özgüden. Editorial board included Aziz Nesin, Nadir Nadi, Abidin Dino, Selahattin Hilâv, Çetin Altan, Mehmet Kemal and many prominent figures of Turkish Workers Party. Within a short time, *Ant* appeared to be the semi-official journal of TWP and represented the ideological disposition retained by Mehmet Ali Aybar and Behice Boran within the party. In that respect, within the pages of the journal, the strategy of National Democratic Revolution (Turkish acronym, MDD), was sharply criticized and the argument that the military and progressive in accordance with the Marxist premises it was argued that the working class was the transformative agent within the course of socialist revolution. Küçükömer's AS was published by Ant publications, which was established by the Ant journal circle.

working classes. To this end, the left-of-center strategy called for an agrarian reform, opening of credit lines for small producers and the improvement of the social and economic situation of the workers in order to compete with its main rival, TWP, in the struggle for left-leaning voters (Lipovsky, 1992: 42). Therefore, Küçükömer's AS was a political response to RPP's "left-of-center" rhetoric. The main argument of the book asserted the following: the socialist movement in Turkey has to oppose the RPP-Turkish Armed Forces-Kemalism trinity in order to develop and establish a mass support base. With this opposition, according to the argument, the socialist left would become a viable political alternative.

Needless to say, Küçükömer's arguments were positioned as the radical criticism of the style of politics adopted by left-leaning and socialist political actors of Turkey. In that respect, Küçükömer proposed a brand new definition for the categories of "political left" and "political right" and proposed the concept of "cultural alienation" as the major criterion for understanding those categories. For Küçükömer, the political tradition represented and adopted by the Westernizing-secular-bureaucratic elite would be located towards the right of the political spectrum, since the figures within this tradition were deemed as "culturally alienated" from the people, that is, they were far from representing people's interests.

The progenitor of the political tradition now calling itself "left-of-center" was the group that emerged as a "modernizing bureaucracy" throughout the Ottoman Modernization process. These elites, proponents of modernization and Westernization, were culturally alienated from the society. Küçükömer observed that the historical, social and political problems haunting the Republic were all caused by this "modernizing tradition." By arguing this, Küçükömer, in a way,

repeated the criticisms of the religious-conservative right against modernization; however, he tried to integrate his approach into a form of Marxian historical and structural criticism. In that respect, he analyzed the historical role of the Western/modernizer bureaucrats using a Marxist framework and argued that the Westernizing/laicist tradition was an impediment to the development of means of production in the overall course of Ottoman/Turkish history. The aim of their modernizing efforts was to 'save the state.' However, according to Küçükömer, the outcome this effort was to modernize/Westernize most of the superstructural forms in the country while failing to create a similar developmental effect on the means and forces of production (i.e., the "infrastructure"). This failure created a vast chasm between the modernizing elite and the masses. Since the true advancement of capitalism in Turkey would jeopardize the power positions of the bureaucratic elite, according the Küçükömer, they effectively hindered the historical development of the means of production. Furthermore, Küçükömer claimed that the adoption of Western superstructural institutions actually made imperialism easier to penetrate Turkish society. It was for this reason that the populist-Islamist circles felt more at home in supporting political groups that were perceived as embracing and protecting authentic Ottoman values (Mert, 2000). Since it was "cultural politics" which distanced the people from the bureaucratic elite, most political conflicts in Turkey were determined by "superstructural, ideological" institutions rather than by class struggle. As an outcome of this effect, the society, since the beginning of the Ottoman modernization process, was pushed towards political alliances which were against its interests. Küçükömer claimed that the masses, in order to defend against the threat posed by the state's "cultural politics," tended to embrace the pre-modern, conservative value system.

Therefore, the tradition wrongly associated with the political left, which was actually more rooted in the political right, was represented by the Jacobin, elitist line of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) and RPP. This CUP-RPP tradition that could never culturally identify itself with the masses was opposed by the long line of "people's front" represented by figures like Prince Sabahattin and organizations like Freedom and Unity Party, Democratic Party and Justice Party. Küçükömer accepted this opposition as part of the political left because it was populist and represented the "pre-modern" values of the people, even though it might not actually further the interests of the people.

Within the framework suggested by Küçükömer, the conceptions of left and right were reduced to a question of representation. This approach was methodologically problematic and its claimed "Marxist" content was questionable. However, Küçükömer's original and creative critique encouraged the socialist movement in Turkey to reevaluate the problem of mass support and introduced the concept of "civil society" to the political vocabulary of the movement.

Küçükömer utilized the concept of civil society more frequently in his writings during the 1980s. Especially in his *Yeni Gündem* articles there were many references to the concept. The crux of the argument concerning the utilization of the concept of civil society was the following: In the Ottoman-Turkish history, where the state tradition was deeply rooted and all-embracing, civil society was not autonomous compared to its Western counterparts. Nevertheless, in order to strengthen the democratic tradition in Turkey, civil society had to be empowered and gain its full autonomy from the state.

This analysis centered on the explanatory concept of civil society was inspired by what Marx called "Asiatic Mode of Production" (AMP) in his explanation of the uniqueness of Oriental societies. According to Küçükömer's adaptation of Marx's half-developed conception, the AMP could explain the Ottoman social structure where there was no private property and landownership was concentrated in the hands of the state. For Küçükömer, the Ottoman regime was a different form of feudalism than its Western counterparts, where the state owned all land and the military and religious elite managed the land in the name of the state. Therefore, according to Küçükömer, there was no feudal class which appropriated the social surplus independent of the state. State officials who did appropriate the surplus continued to exist in Republican Turkey under different titles but the same function. In this picture of state-society relations it was difficult to talk about advanced individuality and autonomy. Furthermore, the strengthening of civil society in Turkey was desired neither by the laicist-bureaucratic-modernizing elite nor by the capitalists. Both groups preferred to rule over a pacified society.

This conceptual framework utilized by Küçükömer in order to explain Ottoman-Turkish society turned out to be the main reference of *Yeni Gündem* contributors. They continued to expand Küçükömer's theses and moved on to redefine the relationship between political left and democracy following his footsteps. Küçükömer's critique of the modernizing bureaucratic elite was repeated by *Yeni Gündem* and opposition to the Westernizing cultural policies of the Kemalist rank-and-file was associated with a pro-civil society and pro-democratic position.[126]

[126]From this moment on, Yeni Gündem's association, within the field of left-leaning political opinion production was denunciated with the negative label "Sivil Toplumculuk" in Turkish.

Following the 1980 coup, Küçükömer's framework served as a new source of political criticism within the *Yeni Gündem* circle. His critique of modernizing-Westernizing bureaucratic elite was re-contextualized as the critique of the military junta and became a new reference for left-leaning democratic politics.

5.4.2. Yeni Gündem's Utilization of Küçükömer's Theses to Analyze the Coup and its Aftermath

This original political position on the relationship between the left and democracy adopted by *Yeni Gündem* had directly influenced their way of interpreting the contemporary political dynamics and agents of the Turkish society. Doubtlessly, in line with the oppositional socialist politics, the journal had a certain distance towards the dominant political figures of the post-coup era. Still, rather than rejecting the possible contributions of these figures to the strengthening of rights and liberties they accepted such limited initiatives as part of the democratization process of Turkey.

For instance, the journal's assessment of the governing party ANAP conceived the party as an outcome of the extraordinary conditions created by the coup. Accordingly, the journal continuously questioned the legitimacy of ANAP considering the number of banned politicians (Belge, 1985c: 16). On the one hand, ANAP's political victory against the junta-backed MDP (Milli Demokrasi Partisi- National Democracy Party) was celebrated as a sign of the demilitarization of society and politics. On the other hand, ANAP's power meant that the party owed its existence and hegemony to the extraordinary conditions prepared by the coup. In the words of Murat Belge, Prime Minister Turgut Özal ruled in a political atmosphere within which all meaningful opposition was

silenced (1985d: 21). Thus, *Yeni Gündem* emphasized that ANAP did not much of a "real" political party:

> In order to assess the results of November 6 elections, I think above all, we have to remember that the society clearly entered an era of demilitarization. Within the limited framework of that time, it is a fact that only ANAP could give a satisfactory response. Moreover, it is also a fact that ANAP was not a political synthesis that Özal never really meant to have such a synthesis. He thought that gathering a technocratic cadre composed of different ideologies and a liberal economic programme were enough to consolidate the party and make it a success (Köymen, 1985c: 3).

Hence *Yeni Gündem* was quite skeptical of the direction that ANAP's politics would take. Despite the party's liberal discourse the journal perceived ANAP as an actor allied with the army, as a technocratic agent of the political demilitarization and economic liberalization process. Since ANAP was not a product of ordinary democratic politics and was not a party which legitimately prevailed against its political opponents, its power of popular representation was questionable. In this respect, the RPP of early Republican era and the ANAP of the post-coup era were similar in terms of imagining a Jacobin "model of society without politics" (in Murat Belge's words):

> In this model of depoliticized society, Özal's position was close to that of his allies. The difference was the following: In Özal's model, the "economic-technocratic" discourse was prioritized, whereas in the other model "administrative commands" were prioritized. These two models had different rhetorical styles. In Özal's model the ideology is rationalized faith and religion (adapted to capitalism; in the other model the ideology is Kemalism made into a religion (1985c: 17).

Yeni Gündem defined ANAP, within the logic described, as a political party which continued the show of the Army in civilian clothes (1987: 10). On the other hand, the journal did not hesitate to see DYP, whose leader Süleyman Demirel was a "victim" of the September 12 prohibitions, as a party which can potentially disrupt this show. Assuming that ANAP's ties with the masses were

weak, DYP was defined as the only political player which could represent society's demands (İnsel, 1986a: 40-43; Belge, 1986a: 1). According to *Yeni Gündem* authors, DYP was the inheritor of DP as the "representative of the periphery;" it carried the limited, but genuine tradition of democracy. DYP was seen in a very different position than ANAP in terms of its relation to the military and the September 12 regime; it was taken to be a potential representative of the groups excluded from the political field. According to *Yeni Gündem*, this special position of DYP could help expose ANAP's militarism masked in civilian clothes and discredit its apolitical technocratic identity.

Of course *Yeni Gündem* did not treat DYP as the constitutive agent of democratic rights and liberties. The journal's authors claimed that DYP's political advances did not prove that the party defended freedoms in principle, but it was forced to be "democratic" in order to get rid of its victimized status in front of the September 12 regime (1987: 10). In short, defending democracy was a necessity for DYP's existence and strengthening. The journal's authors often accepted that there is not a single right-liberal party in Turkey which could go beyond the oppressive state tradition. It was clear that despite its stress on liberty and democracy, DYP was not such a party either.

5.4.3. Limits of Yeni Gündem's Positions

The conception of democracy and liberties advanced by *Yeni Gündem* carried two central problems from the perspective of socialism. First, this conception of freedom blurred the concept of equality in a classless society free from exploitation, a project which the journal claimed to support. Second, the

adoption of such a conception of democracy in Turkey is ridden with an orientalist core.

Yeni Gündem's call for autonomy from state and the strengthening of civil society is in tension with the principle of public equality which is central motto of socialist politics. On the one hand, their analysis on the "de-statization of society" was positive and meaningful in terms of opening up political channels for socialist politics. However, this "de-statization" was also problematic for socialist politics as far as it supported the removal of a number of public responsibilities of the state. Hence the real problem was to realize the principle of equality while implementing a conception of freedom that was "ree from the state."[127]

In order to better understand this tension, it is necessary to focus on practical political implications. More concretely, the call for "freeing the society and the individual from the state", on the one hand, may mean the autonomization of workers' unions and political parties from the interventions of the state. Yet on the other hand, it could also mean that through policies like privatization, workers' rights could be denied. Hence, in order to keep true to the principle of "democracy which is autonomous from the state", supporting privatization policies went against the principle of equality, a principle which was a distinctive property of socialist politics. Moreover, this kind of support would also weaken the links between left-wing politics and the working classes, who the Left claims to authentically represent. Thus *Yeni Gündem*, making the emphasis on "reaching and organizing society" central to its publishing policy, faced with political-practical aporias.

[127]The theoretical implications of this tension between equality and liberty still haunt the left. For some philosophical discussions, see: Bobbio,1999; Turner, 1997: 92-94; *Birikim*, Vol. 239, 2000. On the integrity between equality and liberty, see: Callinicos, 2000:22-26.

The second problem with *Yeni Gündem*'s position concerning the Left and liberties is related with the journal's orientalist assumptions (and policy proposals based on these assumptions) on the historical reasons of the rejection of democratic norms in Turkish politics. Most the authors of the journal explained the autocratic structure of the post-1980 regime in terms of the "oppressive state tradition" and political culture reminiscent of the late-Ottoman and early-Republican era. Murat Belge's statement below is exemplary of this position:

> Because the same top-down hierarchical mentality showed itself in Turkey's government in certain periods again and again, our history is indeed in "repetition". Thus nowadays we are in a new struggle for the throne (1987a: 15).

In some of the texts, this state mentality which "undermines the individual" is analyzed as a cultural characteristic of Eastern societies (Belge, 1987b: 17), contrasted by the European (Western) culture which is deemed to be more individualistic and libertarian. İdris Küçükömer's analysis is another example of this approach which understands the East as a "collection of lacks" in Turner's terminology (2001: 129-130):

> In the Greco-Roman world and the Western world born from it, power was always divided, was always open for division (*segmanter*)... This division is embedded in the deep structure, despite historical changes, this structure remains. In the East, the opposite is true, division of power is not structural but temporary, and the fundamental tendency is singularity in power! There is no symmetry, but the organic totality; all ideological and mental levels are embedded in this context. In short, the political society is either very narrow or made up of one person; there is no opening for civil initiatives. The ideology of this situation heavily leans on culture (Küçükömer, 1985a: 34-35).

This approach is in line with a dominant paradigm in Turkish social sciences, which is about the duality between an oppressive and strong "center" and an oppressed and passive "periphery".[128] This essentialist approach moved *Yeni Gündem* authors towards the idea that Turkey, in order to be free from its oppressive political culture, should follow Western libertarian values and practices (Küçükömer, 1985a: 35). According to his logic, Turkey's democratization according to Western norms would help the development of civil society through which society or the "periphery" could organize and express its demands, resulting with the dissolution of the oppressive state tradition.

This conclusion, reached through a number of orientalist arguments, defined the true medium in which the social order could be progressively transformed as the classless "civil society". In that sense this approach defines a move away from class-centered Marxist analysis and raised the tension between the journal and socialist theory and practice. Moreover, this approach intersected with the modernizing, civilizing Kemalist paradigm as far as it moved towards affirming ideal bourgeois-democratic processes of European societies.

[128] See, for instance: Belge 1986: 1. The theoretical forerunners of the center-periphery perspective and Küçükömer's approach have many commonalities. In that sense, Turner has also emphasized the similarities between this approach which explains Ottoman society in a Weberian framework using the concept of "patrimonial society" and the Marxist concept of Asian Mode of Production. See: Turner: 2001: 9-10.

CHAPTER VI

THE SECOND MOMENT: RESURGENCE OF POLITICAL ISLAM AND RE-EMERGENCE OF KURDISH QUESTION

6.1. Introduction

The historical context which might be stated as the second constitutive moment of the suppliers of democratic opinions connotes the resurgence of *political Islam* and *Kurdish activism* during the 1980s. As the topic of 'democracy' has dominated the agenda for those that are cast in the mold of the Democrat as a social type, in the previous section we have discussed the relation of the issue of democracy with the post-1980 coup context. As we have underlined, the title of democracy and democratization, were paradoxically the outcomes of the post-coup authoritarian and antidemocratic implementations and practices. At that moment, İdris Küçükömer's civil society/state opposition as an analytical tool in analyzing Turkish context was adopted as the main theoretical model in understanding the socio-political dynamics of Turkey. Then, the adoption of this analytical tool which then became the chief marker of the liberal-democratic opinion makers was bound to the specific conditions of a specific socio-historical context. Similarly, two major developments led to the adoption of

another significant analytical perspective that became one of the major defining characteristics of the liberal-democratic opinion makers. It might well be argued that, the *center/periphery analysis* rose to the status of a classical paradigm parallel to the two significant developments: resurgence of political Islam and the rising Kurdish activism during the post-coup period.

In the words of a social scientist, "political climate that prevailed in the 1980s and early 1990s opened up the Kemalist Pandora's box out of which have emerged multiple identities making reference to the different sects of Islam and the Kurds" (Çetinsaya, 1999: 350). Many prominent scholars have underlined that Republican Turkey was to experience an 'identity crisis' which manifested itself with the Islamic revivalism and Kurdish resurgence.[129]

The late-1980s and early-1990s implied the beginning of a new period not only for Turkey but for almost every nation throughout the world. The demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the bipolar system had given rise to new regional and ethnic conflicts and thereby created new national security problems. In the words of Cizre,

> The Kurdish problem and the tide of political Islam have raised fundamental questions about the basic assumptions of the Turkish national state and its identity. Confronted with the post cold war forces of fragmentation threatening to undermine her unity and Western-oriented national identity, Turkish elites have been propelled toward securing a place within Europe (Cizre, 1998a:3).

6.2. Return of the Repressed: Revival of Political Islam and Kurdish Activism in Contemporary Turkey

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[129]See for example: S. Bozdoğan and R. Kasaba eds., *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey* (Seattle, 1997); M. Hakan Yavuz, "Turkish Identity and Foreign Policy in Flux: The rise of Neo-Ottomanism," *Critique,* 12 (Spring 1998), 19-41; Ümit Cizre Sakalloğlu, "Rethinking the connections between Turkey's 'Western' Identity versus Islam, *ibid.,* 3-18.

6.2.1. Overview of Political Islam in Post-Coup Turkey: Nationalism Blended with Islamism or vice versa

Beginning with its proclamation, the Turkish Republic had to cope with two fragile spheres of conflict: *political Islam* and the *Kurdish issue*. Within the conditions of the post-1980 period these two emerged as the top two security issues. They have also prepared the grounds in which the political opinion producers exemplary of the Democrat have socialized.

Shortly after the 1980 coup, Islamism in Turkey began to be perceived as a 'threat' to the unity and integrity of the nation (Mert, 2008).[130] Initially, the coup marked a turning point in the change of state policy toward Islam and assigned a significant role for Sunni Islam within the functioning of the system in general. In that respect, the official ideology of the regime, that of Kemalism, was revised and reorganized in order to incorporate the Islamic elements that were dismissed before the coup (Cizre, 1996a). For the architects of the post-coup regime, the revolutionary aspects of the existing version of the official ideology were to be weeded out and religious elements had to be reintegrated into its body in order to detach Kemalism from revolutionary sentiments. The restructuring of the state/society interaction during the 1980 coup necessitated a reorganization of the official ideology and thereby a redefinition of the 'modern' Turkish identity. Accordingly, the ethno-centric aspect within this national identity definition was strengthened and its Sunni Islam aspect was articulated into the definition (Cizre, 1998a:14). In that respect, Islam, defined on the basis of national culture by the

[130]The coup makers denounced the radical Islamism within the discourse of Necmettin Erbakan's National Salvation Party (NSP) as one of the major reasons behind their military intervention. The secretary general of the National Security Council (NSC), General Haydar Saltık, stated at a press conference held in October 29, 1980 that the Kudüs Meeting organized by National Salvation Party in Konya, on 6th of September was the final event which forced the coup decision (Hale, 1994:244).

conservative elites of the Intellectuals' Hearth (Aydınlar Ocağı)[131] was seen by the generals as a means to undermine ideological confrontation and provide the necessary basis for consensus and unification (Yavuz, 2003:50). Indeed, the Intellectuals' Hearth was established in 1970 with the aim of uniting Islamists and nationalists in the war waged against communism (Çetinsaya, 1999: 374; Bora and Can, 1991: 147; Atacan, 2006: 45-59). Still, it was just after the September coup that the ideas articulated by the influential figures of the Hearth could more easily be disseminated.[132] The reason for this was that the coup makers regarded Turkish-Islamic Synthesis as the best alternative ideology that would justify the imperatives of the regime they aspired to construct. That is, the Synthesis could be more effectively politicized and established itself as a popular-hegemonic ideology within the historical context shaped by the conditions of the coup (Çetinsaya, 1999:374; Yavuz 1990: 10-15). In the minds of the coup makers, the new strategy would also eradicate the oppositional and revolutionary voices among the Kurdish population by appealing to the traditional and conservative attitude of the Kurdish tribes (Yavuz, 2003:50):

> By encouraging the fusing of Sunni Islamic ideas with national goals, the military government planned to foster a co-opted and less political Islam to confront a much exaggerated "leftist threat." Military leaders believed that this officially determined "Turkish-Islamic Synthesis" potentially could diffuse the growing conflict between Sunnis and Alevis on the one hand and Kurdish nationalists and the Turkish State on the other (Yavuz, 2003: 69-70).

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[131]Intellectuals' Hearth (Aydınlar Ocağı) was established by Prof. İbrahim Kafesoğlu who then became the first President of the Hearth. Prominent members were Prof. Muharrem Ergin and Prof. Nevzat Yalçıntaş (Bora and Can, 1991: 128, 132, 137, 147; Atacan, 2006: 45-59). For some of the works of Intellectuals' Hearth members, see: İbrahim Kafesoğlu (1985), *Türk İslam Sentezi,* İstanbul: Aydınlar Ocağı Yayınları,; Muharrem Ergin (1975), *Türkiye'nin Bugünkü Mesleleri,* Güryay Matbaası: İstanbul.

[132] Çetinsaya notes that, "This new emphasis on Islam has remained a key component of nationalist ideology in the 1980s" (1999:373).

Since the generals regarded religiosity as the best instrument to control society, under the rule of National Security Committee Islam gained a considerable influence in Turkish politics (Ahmad, 1993: 149). To this end, in the 1982 constitution, prepared under the by the junta led by the Chief of the General Staff Kenan Evren, the courses on religion was made mandatory in primary and secondary schools and the religious orders were allowed to open unofficial Qur'an courses (Cizre, 1996a; Yavuz 2003: 69). Many more mosques were built; the number of State Directorate of Religious Affairs employees had dramatically increased; and parallel to these developments, the influence of "tarikat-controlled communities" expanded, both politically and economically (Ayata, 1997: 69). Through these policies, the state tried to increase the level of religiosity in Turkish society. In line with such policies, in order to control and suppress the rising Kurdish movement in southeastern Anatolia, a new Department of Propagation (İrşad Dairesi) within the body of the State Directorate of Religious Affairs was established in 1981. The department utilized a religious terminology while combating the radical Kurdish sentiments and organized conferences and lectures to 'protect' the people in the region from the indoctrination of the "Marxist, nationalist and separatist" organization, PKK (Yavuz, 2003: 70).

In addition to these dynamics, the conservative tendencies in international politics merged with the neo-liberal restructuring of capitalist economies provided a fertile ground for the practical implementations of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis (Cizre, 1998a: 14). Some commentators drew attention to the convergence between this process of rearrangement of the official ideology and the ideological dictates of the 'Green Belt Strategy' launched by USA within the mentioned period of time. For instance, according to Elly Karmon,

> On the foreign front, the Turkish Islamic Synthesis was supposed to help contain southward Soviet expansion and combat Iran's radical Islam by constructing a coalition of Us-backed moderate Islamic states. Closer relations with Saudi Arabia were favored in order to gain big loans for the weak Turkish economy (2003: 42).

The strategy was originally formulated by US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, to create an Islamic bulwark by making use of Islamic countries against the expanding influence of Soviet Union specifically around its southern borders.[133] Towards this end, the growing Islamic movements within the countries surrounding Soviet Union were supported financially and by military means in order to help the development of Islamic, but of course pro-US, regimes throughout the region. The US and their European allies aided Islamic fundamentalists in Afghanistan in the 1980s, and the rising Shiite opposition in Iran. According to 'Green Belt Strategy', Islamism appeared to be an alternative ideological framework countering Marxism and the growing influence of left-leaning socialist ideas in Muslim dominated countries.[134] With its second largest standing army within NATO and with Incirlik, Adana, as an extremely strategic military base, Turkey was an inexpendable player in the southern border of NATO. In that respect, in the eyes of the US officials, the 1980 coup in Turkey offered an alternative to the growing left-leaning and socialist revolutionary opposition in Turkey and thereby it would secure the NATO-friendly status of the

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[133]Within the phrase 'green belt,' green connoted to Islam.

[134] It should be reminded that at the outset of the Islamic revolution in Iran, Carter administration interpreted this sudden development as providing an alternative to a left-leaning and pro-Sovietic movement and in order to show its affinity to Ayetullah Khomeni's rising opposition within the country, lifted a 1978 ban on arms sales to Tehran. Furthermore, President Carter's rejection of exiled Shah's visa application to US for medical treatment was also a manifestation of the US sympathy for the *mullahs* as a strategic ally to USA. It was believed that, Iran's Islamic regime would continue the strategic relationship with US against Soviet threat (Blanchard, 1996: 31-32).

Turkish state.[135] The phrase used in regard to the 1980 coup, by the US National Security Council adviser and head of the CIA Turkish desk, Paul Henze was the clearest manifestation of US support for the intervention in Turkey: "Our boys have done it" (Birand, 1987: 124, 185; Mallinson and Mallinson, 2005: 137). Finally, as a secular Muslim country within the region, once Islam as an ideology replaced and countered competing leftist and Marxist ideologies, Turkey could play a major role in establishing the alliance of NATO-friendly Muslim states. Besides, since secularism was to be defined as the fundamental character of the Turkish state, the state would also be able to confine the definition of Islam and offer its own version and thereby control and manipulate fundamentalist Islam within its own jurisdiction. Then, within this framework, Turkish-Islamic Synthesis appeared as the best alternative in concordance with the policy priorities of 'Green Belt Strategy.'

It should also be noted that the unexpected hostility of the Islamic Republic of Iran proclaimed after the 1979 revolution, pushed US authorities to strengthen the relations with other allies in the region. In contrast to the expectations of the USA administration, newly established Islamist Iran appeared as an anti-American and anti-Western state, with its potential to export its revolutionary Islamic ideology throughout the region. Having lost its once utmost ally in the Middle Eastern region, USA administration sought to strengthen the loyal regimes in the already existent allies and proceed with its policy of encircling the Soviet Union, and ensuring the stability in terms of the oil-rich Persian Gulf. Hence, facing the threats posed by the Islamic regime in Iran against the Western interests in the region, the USA-backed moderate Islamic and/or

[135] Along with Turkey, as a strongly anti-communist state, Pakistan was a natural ally of the West in the struggle to contain communism.

conservative governments would definitely be preferable. Such "friendly" regimes would secure the construction of a bulwark alliance against potential Soviet southward expansion and against the theocracy ruling in Iran.[136] USA, while trying to penetrate Middle Asian Republics using Islam, attempted to develop 'the green antidote' against the 'red menace.' Unfortunately, this initiative to support radical Islam for the destabilization of the Soviet Union backfired: USA's political, logistical, financial support for extremist Islamist groups prepared the way for these groups' far more radicalization in the region.

As mentioned in the previous paragraphs, the Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979 was, until the CIA recognized it was too late, also considered to be part of the Green Belt Strategy: US foreign policy-makers at that time (in the early days of the regime change) thought that the new Islamic government was primarily anti-Sovietic and at least sympathetic to the West. However, not only that the mullahs quickly steered Iran towards radical anti-Americanism but also, from the perspective of the development of political Islam in Turkey, the Iranian Revolution led to disagreements among groups close to the 'Turkish-Islamic Synthesis' position.

The Islamic Revolution in Iran raised sympathies in certain Islamic circles in Turkey and gave rise to a radical-critical Islamic discourse that emphasized anti-imperialism, unification of Islamic sects and rejected nationalism (Mert, 2004:415). Through this discourse, some Islamic groups detached themselves from the center-right interpretations of Islam (in line with the official Turkish-Islamic Synthesis ideology) and thus part of the Islamic movement gained a unique, independent political character (Bora, 1999). As Çetinsaya also notes,

[136] The basis of such an approach were laid out in *1983 Heritage Foundation Report* which saw merit in preserving a "protective Islamic belt" in the countries facing "the danger of communism."

> While all groups among the Turkists came closer to Islam in varying degrees, some groups in the Islamic movement distanced themselves from those in the main and criticized nationalism as being contrary to Islam. These were not conservative 'ulama' of the 1910s, but were 'new Islamic intellectuals.' The new Islamic intellectuals' once powerful influence among the Islamist youth in the 1980s, however, has been marginalized in the '90s. (1999: 375)

The roots of this mentioned trend were to be found at the beginning of the 70s. Those were the years when nationalism for the first time began to be transformed into the umma. The Islamist movements in Egypt (particularly the Muslim Brotherhood), Pakistan and later in Iran were influential on this transformation. The translation of the works by prominent Islamists from these foreign movements into Turkish led some Turkish Islamists to think about Islam in an internationalist rather than nationalist way (Çaha, 2004: 477).[137] Especially the writings of Ali Şeriati had a crucial impact on Turkish Islamist youth that tended to develop a critical stance against the official Islam of the state. These young Islamist figures also aspired to develop authentic answers to questions of "Westernization, independence, sovereignty, women's rights, and the distribution of power within the state" (Cizre, 1996a: 283).

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[137] Among those translations works of Hasan El Benna, Seyyid Kutup and Ali Sheriati were prominent: Hasan El Benna, *Risaleler,* Hasan Karakaya and H. İbrahim Kutlay (trans.), Hikmet Neşriyat, İstanbul, 1984; Seyyid Kutub, *İslam'da Sosyal Adalet,* Yaşar Tunagür and Dr. M. Adnan Mansur (trans.), Cağaloğlu Yayınları, İstanbul, 1962; Seyyid Kutub, *İslam'da Sosyal Adalet,* Bir Yayınları, İstanbul, 1986; Seyyid Kutub, *Kur'an Işığında Kültür ve Medeniyet,* İsmail Hakkı Şengüler (Ed.), Hikmet Neşriyat, İstanbul, 1988; Seyyid Kutub, *Yoldaki İşaretler,* İsmail Nuri (trans.), İhya Yayınları, İstanbul, 1980; Seyyid Kutub, *İslam ve Emperyalizm,*Ramazan Nazlı (trans.), Şelale Yayınları, İstanbul, 1983 (Second edition); Seyyid Kutub, *İslam ve Kapitalizm Çatışması,*Yaşar Nuri Öztürk (trans.), Düşünce Yayınları, İstanbul, 1981 (Second edition); Ali Şeriati, *Aşk ve Tevhid,* Ali Rehavi (trans.), Tebliğ Yayınları, İstanbul, 1986; Ali Şeriati, *Biz ve İkbal,* Ergin Kılıçtutan (trans.), Bir Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 1988; Ali Şeriati, *Fatma Fatma'dır,* İsmail Babacan (trans.), Dünya Yayıncılık, İstanbul,1990 ; Ali Şeriati, *Yarının Tarihine Bakış,* Orhan Bekin (trans.), Akabe Yayınları, İstanbul, 1988; Ali Şeriati, *Toplum Bilim Üzerine,* Kenan Sökmen (trans.), Bir Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 1988; Ali Şeriati, *Ne Yapmalı?,* Muhammed Hizbullah (trans.), Bir Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 1990; Ali Şeriati, *İnsanın Dört Zindanı,* Hüseyin Hatemi (trans.), Bir Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 1984; Ali Şeriati, *Muhammed'i Tanıyalım,* Fecr Yayınları, Ankara, 1988; Ali Şeriati, *Hacc,* Düşünce Yayınları, İstanbul, 1980; Ali Şeriati, *Aydın,* Dünya Yayınları, İstanbul, 1990.

Moreover, in this move from Turkish nationalism to the Islamic idea of internationalism, NSP (National Salvation Party) had also a significant role (Sarıbay, 1985). While the party emphasized a "national" outlook, it also pushed the discourse of an "Islamic common market" and thus reinforced the idea of a unified Islamic world (Çaha, 2004: 477).[138]

The impact of the Iranian Revolution on Turkish Islamist groups was limited. The 'new Muslim intellectuals'[139] of Turkey inspired by the regime change in Iran were not much influential. Although their ideas were respected, these ideas were not powerful enough to change the general trajectory of the Islamist movement in Turkey. As Çetinsaya also reminds us (1999: 375), Islamists who rejected Turkish nationalism (which was intrinsic both to the official Turkish-Islamic Synthesis and to the mainstream Islamism of the National Outlook (*Milli Görüş*) Movement) were marginalized in the 1990s and remained so until today. The largest and strongest Sunni communities in Turkey never supported Iran and their politics had always been predominantly Turkish-nationalist and statist (Mert, 2004: 415).

Consequently, during the 1980s and 1990s, Islamism in Turkey, despite its political gains, unsuccessfully tried to resolve its inner conflicts emanating from its relation to Turkish nationalism. The Islamist movement was influenced from global trends that have increased the power of center-right parties especially in

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[138] The Turkish word "millî" used by NSP actually is meant to stand for "religious" (dinî) according to the early Arabic uses of the word. The word in Arabic also means "related to religious law, shari'a" (Doğan, Mehmet, 2001, Büyük Türkçe Sözlük, Vadi Yay.) For a similar emphasis, see, Hakan Yavuz, "Political Islam and the Welfare (Refah) Party in Turkey," Comparative Politics, Vol.30, No.1, (Oct., 1997), p:74.

[139] "There is a growing literature in English on the "new Islamic intellectuals". For instance, see: Michael Meeker, "The Muslim Intellectual and his Audience: A new configuration of Writer and Reader among Believers in the Republic of Turkey," *Cultural Transitions in the Middle East,* Şerif Mardin (ed.), Leiden: Brill, 1994. Meeker argues that, the Muslim intellectuals appeared on the scene during the 1980 which also signaled the "wake of a period of ideological exhaustion precisely because Islam is perceived as an alternative to the conflicting constructions of modernity" (Meeker, 1994: 216).

Europe and Latin America. Turkish center-right parties started to borrow the topics and themes that were highly fashionable within the policy debates of 1980s in the West. Foremost among these was the topic of 'civil society,' conceived within the confines of 'minimal state' bias of the neo-liberal policy agenda (Howell and Pearce, 2002: 63-64).

Islamism of the 1980s shared some core motifs with mainstream center-right political parties in Turkey. Yet, it retained one distinctive characteristic: It was critical of the official ideology. As it has been mentioned in the previous paragraphs, the "new Islamist intellectuals" or the "Muslim intellectuals" shaped the cultural aura of the period to a certain extent and "attracted a considerable audience among Turkish believers" (Meeker, 1994: 189). However, they became marginalized during the 1990s and Islamism of this period began to lose its radical critical and reflective character gradually.

By the 1990s, nationalism once again took its once privileged status within Turkish Islamism. This development might also be observed in the political discourse of the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP in its Turkish acronym). As Çetinsaya notes, "in the 1990s, partly after the emergence of independent Turkish states in the former Soviet south and partly after becoming a mass party in Turkish politics, the RP began to put more emphasis on the presence of nationalism" (1999: 374).

All in all, as Cizre aptly states, the post-coup period might be called as the "Islamization of secularism" in Turkey, that with that period, "the form, substance and power base and more importantly, state policy toward it have changed radically" (1996a: 245). In order to secure its popular support, the regime had abandoned "the radical secularism of the early republic" (Birtek and Toprak,

1993: 197). However, this new strategy was in conformity with the overall tendency of the establishment in terms of controlling and setting the limits of the religious realm. The "Islamization of secularism" meant also the opening up of the domestic market to Islamic capital (Cizre, 1996a). However, the political priorities of the post-1980 military regime had unintended consequences. In the 1983 general elections, the military-backed MDP (Nationalist Democracy Party) lost to Turgut Özal's Motherland Party, ANAP (Keyman, 1995: 112).

The era of the Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi*, ANAP) governments (1983-1989) gave an impetus to the development of political Islam in Turkey. Economic liberalism and Özal's version of new right encouraged the foundation of Islamic financial institutions. ANAP was based on a hybrid ideology combining the elements of liberalism, nationalism and conservatism with strong Islamist emphasis (Öniş, 2004: 113–134). The opening up of the domestic market to the Islamist capital was a reflection of the Islamist emphasis found in the hybrid ideology of ANAP. The Islamic financial institutions flourished in time and they opened vakıfs (foundations) in order to disseminate their ideology (Cizre, 1996a: 246). These foundations organized meetings to celebrate religious holidays, organized Koran courses, gave scholarships for poor students having religious education and built dormitories for the young students coming to the big cities in order to have education.[140] In time, those religious orders and communities turned out to be powerful networks in business, media and education and they facilitated the social mobility of their members (Jung and Piccoli, 2001: 120). It was through those Islamic financial institutions and companies that Arabic (chiefly Saudi-Gulf) capital could flow into the domestic market (Cizre 1996a). For instance, the

[140] For a detailed analysis of the connections between the political Islam and Islamic sub-economy in Turkey, see: Clement and Wilson, 2004: 224-225.

first-interest free banks of Turkey were founded by Saudi Arabian businesses in 1985 (Clement and Wilson, 2004: 224). According to Birtek and Toprak, opening up of the domestic market to Islamic capital and the abandonment of the "radical secularism of the early republic" implied the weakening of the conditions of Kemalist nationalism and the republican state (1983: 197).

As a result of these developments, as the mainstream Sunni interpretation of Islam began to emerge as a source of politicization, the connection between religion and politics also began to be introduced into discussions of democratization.

6.2.2. 1990s: Re-emergence of Political Islam in the Political and Social Scene

As stated earlier, during the MP (ANAP) governments (1983-1991) Islam has gained gross momentum in Turkish politics. Nevertheless, it was by the late-1990s that its magnitude and strength have been regarded as crucial threat to the operation of the secular system. The perception of threat against political Islam was strengthened by two crucial developments: the electoral successes of the pro-Islamic Welfare Party in the mayoral elections of 1994 and general elections of 1995; and the increasing visibility of veiled Islamist women on the public sphere. By the early-1990s, the issue of women's head covering has put its mark on Turkey's political agenda which quickly acquired a politicized character and led to a polarization between secular groups acting on Kemalist lines and the Islamists (Kadıoğlu, 1994: 645). The reactions and protests of religious female students against the regulation of Higher Education Council issued in 1987, that forbade entrance into universities with headscarves, did not only provoke political debates concerning the role of religion in public life, but also underlined the urban

character of the Islamism which was to be a new shock for the secular elite of the country. This contentious episode, which began to be called the 'Headscarf Issue' in Turkey, was crucial since highly educated, urban, religiously pious women were involved – in contrast to the generally held laicist misconception political Islam was linked to ignorance, illiteracy and rural orientations. The demonstrations of young Muslim student women against the headscarf ban have also challenged the mainstream patriarchal convictions that women were to be defined as docile, dominated humanbeings within the sphere of religion.

In addition to the 'Headscarf controversy,' a major incident that alarmed the Turkish secular establishment was the results of the municipal elections held in 1994. Welfare Party, founded in 1983, had won 19.7 percent of the national vote in the local elections and took control of the twenty-nine big cities, including İstanbul and the capital city of the Republic, Ankara (Yavuz, 1997: 72). Furthermore, national elections of December 24, 1995 indicated a landslide electoral victory for the Welfare Party. With the 21.38 percent of the general vote, it gathered 158 parliamentary seats and emerged as the largest party in the Turkish parliament (Yavuz, 1997: 72). Unlike its predecessor in the 1970s, National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi, MSP)[141], Welfare Party had huge popularity especially in the metropolitan regions of Turkey. Furthermore, the party, with its "official" ideology of the "Just Order System," aimed to appeal not only to a conservative constituency, but also to the laboring classes living in big cities under the deteriorating conditions of neo-liberal practices.

[141]National Salvation Party, (MSP-Milli Selamet Partisi) was founded on October 11, 1972 as a successor of the National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi, MNP), which had been established on January 26, 1970 as the first pro-Islamist political party of Turkey. After the closure of MNP with the March 12 memorandum in 1971, some cadres of the MNP founded MSP. Necmettin Erbakan became the official leader of the party on October 20, 1973. MSP was banned with the military coup of September 12, 1980 (Çakır, 1994).

Alarmed with the results of the 1994 and 1995 elections, the secular establishment of Turkey tended to interpret the rising electoral support for political Islam as a revolt against Kemalism – as a "counter-revolution" against the secular basis of the regime (Yavuz, 1997: 76).

Needless to say, the visibility of Islam in the public sphere and the electoral successes of Welfare Party gave a special impetus to political opinions produced in academic and journalistic spheres. On the secular camp, the threat posed by political Islam against the secular state appeared as a constant theme of political works. Much of the literature by the radical secularists concentrated on the reasons behind the rise of the political Islam and began to put more emphasis on the power base of the Islamic movement. However, some figures that define their political posture as liberal-democrat, or democrat tended to question the state policy toward Islam, the commonly held definition of secularism practiced since the proclamation of the Republic, and state's general attitude towards the parts of the society seen as threatening its power. In general, this intellectual and political effort have led to a questioning of the state/society relations in Turkish history which in turn further shaped the circumstances that helped the emergence of the Democrat as a social type.

The 'revival' or 'resurgence' of political Islam during the nineties rested upon the socio-economic heritage inherited from the post-coup political environment and Turgut Özal's neo-liberal project. Özal's liberal reforms were not only confined within the economic realm. The neo-liberal policies introduced by Özal and pursued by ANAP governments were responsible for the social discontent among the laboring classes due to increasing social inequalities. Yet, Özal's liberal agenda towards religion also rested upon a relaxation of the

Kemalist dogmas of the state (Zubadia, 1996). The deregulation of broadcasting and the legalization of private broadcasting have also opened the channels for the Islamists to disseminate and expand their ideas. Still, neither the questioning of the Kemalist official ideology nor the inspirations of the Iran Islamic Revolution in 1979 were sufficient to weaken the nationalist tone in the Turkish Islamic movement.

Despite the fact that political Islam, after the early 1990s, was unable (or unwilling) to break ties with ethnic Turkish nationalist ideology,[142] the significance of the (still unfolding) contentious episode summarized in this section should be reiterated: The politicization of Sunni Islam provided another major source of problematization and criticism of, from a democratic point of view, the state's (especially the military's) control over politics. The tendency represented by Welfare Party, despite its own problems of reactionary politics and lack of internal democracy, gave an opportunity to the liberal-democratic opinion producers to discuss the emergence of an autonomous movement which gained momentum despite the Kemalist state's policies to contain and control the representations of Islam in Turkey. Furthermore, the politicization of Islam also brought forward "democratic public sphere" debates, problematizing the official interpretations of secularism concerning issues like veiling, the use of religious symbols, freedom of religious expression and education, and so on.

[142] As Keyman states, nationalism "has become the dominant ideology of the reorganization of civil society in the 1990s" (1995: 116).

6.2.3. The Kurdish Question

6.2.3.1.Introduction

As it has been mentioned in the previous section, the re-emergence of the Kurdish issue on political field determined the general assumptions of the liberal democratic opinion makers. This significant conjuncture has also been vital for the political dispositions adopted by the actors defining their dispositions in liberal-democratic lines.

Although its roots date back to late-Ottoman period, Kurdish problem has become a significant aspect of the political and intellectual agenda as for 1980s. At the outset, Kurdish insurrection was seen as a work of "a bunch of bandits" but in a short time it lasted for over thirty five years with mass support. The official discourse has reduced the issue to simply a question of terrorism. Sharing the central tenets of the official lines of explanation, the mainstream political analyses regarded the issue through the lenses of economic backwardness or underdevelopment. The topic, especially for liberal democratic opinion holders, has prompted many other crucial topics besides the ethnic dimension and has retained multidimensional character which calls for a multidimensional analysis. In fact, the definition of the question and the solutions offered has become catalyst in categorizing the general dispositions within the political arena. For instance, the appearance of the topics such as 'rule of law,' 'state based on rule of law and human rights,' on political agenda has been the outcome of the significant attempts to analyze the underlying dynamics and multidimensional character of the Kurdish problem.

At the academic level, the great majority of scholars, in their efforts of finding out the theoretical tools to conceptualize and contextualize the Kurdish issue, have assigned a central role to the center-periphery approach. The works which claimed to challenge the mainstream thinking on the topic have relied extensively on the methodological advantages provided by the theoretical claims of the center/periphery model. Benefiting from this re-discovered explanatory framework, a significant portion of the social scientists and opinion-holders constructed the theoretical basis underlying their assumptions critical of the ongoing dominant Kemalist view. The analytical tools derived from center/periphery model have been perfectly utilized in the course of an intense questioning of the central tenets of Turkish modernization project. The social scientists and/or opinion holders using the sociologically based center/periphery model suggested that, the roots of the contemporary challenges faced by the Turkish Republic, were to be found in the authoritarian, ethno-nationalist and top-down nature of Turkish modernization experiment. At the core of this analysis, there was the assumption that, the modernizing/Westernizing secularist Kemalist elite comprising the 'center' of the society, resorted to an authoritarian 'civilizing' strategy, which in turn, brought about a further alienation on the side of the religious rural masses of the 'periphery.' In this vein, the wide series of ethnic and religious rebellions during the early periods of the Republic were considered to be the responses of the masses which had become increasingly resentful of the top-down practices of the ruling elite.

Most of the social scientists sharing this perspective maintained that, the re-emergence of the two 'repressed' dynamics (that of political Islam and the Kurdish challenge) throughout the 1990s were to be the manifest indicators of the

operational weakness of the official ideology to serve as a dominant paradigm in the concerned period of time. Given the challenges posed by the process of globalization, the statist and nationalist pillars of Kemalism, as the official ideology of the Republic, could no longer stand as viable policy alternatives. Implicitly or explicitly, the rises of the Islamist movement and the Kurdish insurgency have been explained with the demise of the enduring strength of Kemalism as an inherently authoritarian and ethno-nationalist modernizing strategy.[143] As Bozdoğan and Kasaba put, during the late-eighties, people started to "publicly debate and criticize the Kemalist doctrine as a patriarchal and antidemocratic imposition from above that has negated the historical and cultural experience of the people in Turkey" (1997:4).

On the theoretical level, the relativist push of postmodernist assumptions, prioritizing difference and diversity over homogenization and unity, at least to some extent, shaped the content of the debates over Kemalist modernizing strategy. Post-structuralist emphasis on pluralism and difference contributed to a critical rethinking of Kemalism claiming to represent the sole truth. Some prominent scholars (though they did not share the postmodernist approach), while on the one hand insisting on the emancipating dimension of modernity, agreed upon the fact that during 1980s and 1990s since "all the institutions, values and ideals of modernity have come under siege" indicating "a time of momentous change for Turkish society" (Kasaba, 1997: 15). It is ironical that, in that conjuncture, questioning of Turkish modernization was based on a specific branch of the modernization paradigm that of center/periphery approach. Within a short period time, the center/periphery model has acquired unexpected popularity that it

[143] For a presentation of this kind of reasoning, see: (Gülalp, 2001: 433-448).

has become, in the words of Tanıl Bora, the 'classical' paradigm of the political science throughout the country (2006).

Some major international events that occurred in the first half of the 1990s in diverse places such as former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, former Soviet Union and East Timor, have also contributed to the newly emerging political and academic interest in the questions of ethnicity, nationalism, ethnic conflicts and ethnic rights. Especially after the mid-1990s, in order devise systematic approaches for the understanding of the rise of ethno-nationalist contentious politics all around the world, research topics like ethnicity and migration studies became important. Ethnicity and nationalism have not only attracted scholarly attention, but these topics have also remained as the constant themes of political debates within leftist circles.[144]

In contrast to the expectations related to the democratic potentials of globalization, the resurgence of ethnic conflicts resulting in civil wars, conflicts and even large-scale massacres, generated gross disappointment. It was generally assumed that the "democratizing nature" of globalization would exert significant pressure upon nationalists, thereby leading to a weakening of the national forms of identity and belonging (Held, 1995).

In that respect, not only the dynamics of the domestic political landscape, but also the events taking place in the international scale have permanently introduced the topic of 'ethnicity' into the lexicon of Turkish scholars and other producers of political opinions. As it has been previously mentioned, in political and academic circles, particularly in those with Kemalist/nationalist convictions, the Kurdish Question was basically framed as an issue of economic backwardness

[144]See for instance: Öngider, 1994.

and terrorism. Those explanations stemming from modernist premises not only ignored the "ethnic rights" character of the problem but also failed to problematize the state's relation to the issue. Not surprisingly, the ideological and theoretical challenges against the modernization theory have also reduced the strength of the modernization-based Kemalist accounts.

The fact that the Turkish Left, historically speaking, underemphasized (if not ignored) the recognition demands of Turkey's Kurds can be explained by two concomitant political processes: First, the positions of the official ideology with regard to the Kurdish question appears to have hegemonized the discourses of the left on this affair. Secondly, classical Marxism has always been weak in terms of having a coherent politics of oppressed ethnicities: Marxism's political-practical priority was "class," that is, the liquidation of capitalism's class structures and inequalities, rather than ethnic emancipation (Stavenhagen, 1996: 7). Although official Marxism-Leninism recognized, at least on paper, the right of nations to self-determination, in general, Marxist inspired movements in Turkey were unable to settle their accounts with Kemalist nationalism. Thus, they could not develop a political vision which would negate the oppression of Turkey's Kurds. Despite this political shortcoming of the Turkish Left, minor nationalisms and ethnic rights were imposed upon Turkey's agenda in close connection to the post-1980 developments all over the world. Especially the breakdown of the Soviet regime after 1989 led to a long term rise of anti-systemic nationalist movements. The already-mobilized PKK, in a period where Marxist movements were delegitimized, used this global dynamic to its advantage by reinforcing its nationalist discourse. In light of all these developments, the Kurdish insurgency could neither be consistently integrated into the politics of the Turkish Left, nor,

obviously, Kemalist politics could ever be its ally. For that reason, framing the insurgency within "terrorism" remained the only politically viable option for mainstream actors.

All in all, according to the strategy analysts and mainstream political scientists sharing the official paradigm of Turkish state that defined the Kurdish issue within the parameters of terrorism, the 'problem' starts with the first military attack of the separatist Kurdish organization PKK on military guardhouses in Eruh and Şemdinli, in 1984. Yet, a thorough analysis of the Kurdish issue necessitates a multidimensional approach which delineates all facets of the problem that does not simply perceive the 1984 attack as a landmark.

6.2.3.2.Historical Dimension

The historical roots of the Kurdish issue, dating back to the pre-Republican years, gained a new impetus with the intense military campaign initiated by PKK in 1984. When PKK began its organized attacks in August 1984, the representatives of the Turkish political establishment tended to call the incident as the work of "a bunch of bandits" (Özcan, 2006).

In the multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire period, the traditional approach in handling the destabilizing effects of the Kurdish tribes was to benefit from the potential conflicts among the prominent rival tribal groups and thus maintain the balance of power (Bruinessen, 1992: 164-5). With the early modernization efforts, the last period of the Empire witnessed series of Kurdish uprisings. These early movements did hardly display any sign of organized ethnic challenges, but they rather retained religious and/or tribal features (Bruinessen, 1992; Romano, 2006; Jwaideh, 2006). The sporadic revolts during the early decades of the nineteenth century were more or less the manifestations of resentment and discontent arising

from the modernizing reforms imposed by the Ottoman elite.[145] The insurrections of 1826, 1834, 1853-55 and 1880, were struggles against the centralization efforts of the state aiming to ensure the complete control over its domains (Chaliand, 1993: 5). The uprising of 1880 led by Sheik Ubeydullah indicated an exception in the sense that it embodied national sentiments. With the Sheik Ubeydullah revolt, following the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877-78, Kurds raised ethnic-national demands in favor of an autonomous Kurdish region under the authority of the Ottoman Empire (Jwaideh, 2006: 16; 78). The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 was a major turning point in the Empire's political history promising constitutional reform and representative government. The 1908 episode not only planted the seeds of a more liberal environment conducive to the flourishing of relatively free intellectual debate, but also paved the way for the development of the Kurdish press.[146] The newly born Kurdish press played an increasingly crucial role in bringing into ground the question of national independence for the Kurds.[147] Yet, the Young Turks' radical positivist attitude towards the caliphate and Islam emerged as one of the serious causes of resentment in the face of pious Sunni Muslim Kurds.[148] Besides, the two essential aspects of the Young Turk regime, that of administrative centralization and Turkification, led to aggravation

[145]For a detailed account of the 19th century Kurdish uprisings, see, Chailand (eds.), 1993.

[146]"The Kurdish press first emerged in 1898. Following the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, this pres began to develop and contributed to the debate on national problems" (Chaliand, 1993: 5).

[147]Kurdish intellectuals began to gather around journals and society clubs after the Young Turk Revolution of 1908. *Kürt Teavün ve Terakki Cemiyeti* (Society for Support and Progress of the Kurds) was founded in 1909, and a society with more definite nationalist ambitions, *Hevi* (Hope) was founded in 1912 (Zurher, 2003: 169).

[148]In this regard it should be reminded that Kurds occupied prestigious positions in *Hamdiye* Regiments, established under Sultan Abdülhamid II in 1891.The duty of the regiments were stated as guarding the Eastern Anatolian frontiers of the Empire against foreign incursions, representing a parallel system of the outside the command structure of the regular army. By integrating Kurdish tribes to military regiments, Abdülhamid II thought to contain the political opposition of the Kurdish tribal elite. Although the majority of the regiments were composed of Sunni Kurds, Circassians and some Arab tribes also took part within the body of the organization. For a detailed account, see, Martin van Bruinessen, *Agha, Sheikh and State: the Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan*, London: Zed Books, 1992.

and thereby contributed to the emergence of national reaction as an expression of general discontent by the Kurds (Jwaideh, 2006: 108). The Treaty of Sévres[149] (1920) signed between the Ottoman Empire and the Allies at the end of World War I, allowing proclamation of an independent Kurdistan provided favorable circumstances for the Kurdish nationalist elite (Romano, 2006: 28). Unfortunately, for the majority of Kurdish nationalists the Treaty has indicated a missed opportunity for the creation of an independent Kurdish state or an autonomous region. Some Kurdish groups aiming to take advantage of this opportunity broke into revolt in the Dersim (Tunceli) region of eastern Turkey. The uprising, organized by the *Koçgiri* Kurdish tribe in March 1921, consisting of Alevi Kurds, raised demands all in Kurdish nationalist nature (Romano, 2006: 29).[150] The Kemalist government in Ankara already waging Independence War on many fronts, tried to prevent the rebellion from spreading to other Kurdish tribes playing the card of Alevi-Sunni sect division hostility.[151] Mustafa Kemal, defining the national independence war "as a contest between the infidel Western powers who support the Armenians and Greeks, and Muslim-Ottoman Turks and Kurds fighting to save the Sultan, Caliph, and homeland"(Romano, 2006:29), stigmatized the rebels as the traitors to the Muslim lands.

Given the general support by the majority of the Kurdish tribes to the national independence struggle led by the Kemalists, Koçgiri uprising stood as an

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[149]Treaty of Sévres, signed in August 10, 1920 between the Ottoman Empire and the victorious Allied Powers, was rejected by the nationalist government of Mustafa Kemal and never adopted. The treaty was replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 after the nationalists' victory in the National Independence War (1919-1923). (Zurcher, 2003: 170).

[150] Some researchers regard the Koçgiri Uprising as the first formal Kurdish uprising against the early signs of Turkification by the Kemalists. See, for example, Hari S. Vasudevan, Shri Prakash, Mujib Alam (eds.), *The Global Politics of the Iraq Crisis and India's Options*, Akaar Books:Delhi, 2004, pp.184-186.

[151]The rebellion was quickly suppressed. However, the role played by the Alevite/Sunnite cleavage in this insurgency would later have implications for future Kurdish rebellions: "Koçgiris didn't support the later Kurdish uprisings (most notably the Sheikh Said uprising in 1925, even Dersim in 1937-1938)" (Romano, 2006: 29-30).

exception. Kemalists, portraying their struggle as a holy war against the infidels, easily gained the support of the Kurds at large (Zurcher, 2003: 177). The Treaty of Lausanne and the foundation of the Turkish Republic implied a total disappointment for the Kurdish population: Leaving aside the promises of autonomy, in the Lausanne Treaty Kurds were not even mentioned (Zurcher, 2003: 170). Furthermore, the pillars of the newly established regime were secularism and nationalism. In that respect,

> Those Kurds who thought they had been fighting to save the sultanate, caliphate, and the Ottoman-Muslim legacy were rudely awakened. Those who aspired to Kurdish autonomy or independence came to face to face with a state that would deny the very existence of a Kurdish people, language, and culture. The newly instutionalized political system would only accept those who, in public, set aside their Kurdishness. Kurds had to become Turks (Romano, 2006: 32).

Inheriting the vision of the Young Turk movement, the Kemalist government pursued a policy based on the denial and suppression of the Kurdish identity. In the official parlance, any demands regarding any identity other than Turkishness indicated a threat to national identity constructed via the Turkification policies. In contrast to the provisions of 1920 Constitution asserting the common citizenship for Turks and Kurds under law, the proclamation of the 1923 Republican regime indicated disappointment for the Kurdish population. The War of National Independence which was declared to be fought for the salvation of the umma against the infidels did hardly retain any sign of nationalistic claims defined solely on Turkish ethnic identity. For the Kurdish tribes willingly took part in the Independence War, the abolition of the Sultanate in 1922 and the Caliphate in 1924 by the newly established Republican state, symbolized the beginning of a regime which an explicitly Turkish identity

defined along European lines stood at its core (McDowall, 2000: 18). The combined effect of disappointment arising out of the Lausanne Treaty and the secularization and Turkification policies of the Kemalist government, a large-scale rebellion bearing a nationalist mark was organized in 1925. Organized by the nationalist circle Kurdish Independent Society, *Azadi*,[152] and led by the Sheikh Said of Piran, the rebellion appealed to religious symbols and propaganda and thereby mentioned with regards to its religious character (Olson, 1989: 39-40, van Bruinessen 1978: 447). Although the motivations for joining the revolt included religious or at least anti-secular and tribal elements, the rebellion was definitely Kurdish and nationalist (White, 2000).

The suppression of the Sheikh Said rebellion with bloodshed provided the Kemalist ruling elite with ample opportunity to adopt stronger authoritarian mechanisms for silencing all sorts of oppositional voices and to consolidate their power (White, 2000; van Bruinessen, 1992: 281).[153] As van Bruinessen suggests, "Due to the government's dictatorial powers, Kemalist reforms could be carried through with increasing speed and ever less regard for the opposition" (1992: 282).

The oppressive measures adopted by the government during and after the Sheikh Said rebellion offers significant clues about the future (assimilationist, exclusionary, politically violent) policies of the Turkish state regarding the containment of the Kurdish population. As Olson contends,

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[152]Azadi was a clandestine nationalist organization of educated Kurds. The organization was found in 1923 by the former militia officers of the Hamidian regiments (Zurcher, 2003: 181; Romano, 2006: 34).

[153]Similar emphasis might also be found in Metin Toker, *Şeyh Sait ve İsyanı*, Second Edition, Bilgi Yayınları, Ankara, Temmuz 1994. For a detailed analysis of the consequences of the rebellion, see, Olson, 1989.

> The struggle against Kurdish nationalism, in which certain patterns of policies were implemented and against which certain nationalist, ideological, and psychological premises and attitudes were initially adopted in 1925, continued to play an important role in Turkey's policy decisions more than fifty years after the Sheikh Said rebellion (1989: 97).

The Turkification campaign of the governing elite proceeded throughout the 1930s during which the Republican regime entered into a phase of political consolidation. In June 1930 the Kurdish rebellion of Mount Ararat, *(Ağrı Dağı)* involving the Kurds in Turkey, Iran and Iraq broke out.[154]The rebellion was initiated by the Khoyboun[155] (Independence) organization, formed by a group of Kurdish tribal leaders and intellectuals under the leadership of General İhsan Nuri Pasha of Bitlis (Gunter, 2008: 5; Yavuz, 2005: 237-238).[156] The uprising was completely crushed with a massive military campaign organized in cooperation with Iranian forces.

The last largest Kurdish uprising of the early republican period took place in 1937 in Dersim (Tunceli province).[157] The rebellion was led by the local traditional elites under the leadership of Seyyit Rıza (Bozarslan, 1986:104). In fact, in the eyes of the Turkish authorities Dersim was always a source of nuisance. Thus the Kemalist government decided to "resolve" this problem by any means necessary. A 1926 report prepared by the Interior Ministry and presented to the parliament openly declared as follows: "Dersim is an abscess on the Turkish

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[154]The dates during which the actual fighting took place cover the period between the Spring 1929 to September of 1930. For further information, see, Robert W. Olson, *Imperial Meanderings and Republican By-Ways: Essays on Eighteenth Century Ottoman and Twentieth Century History of Turkey*, Isis Press, 1996, 336 pages. (p.142).

[155]*Khoyboun* (Independence) was formed by the Kurdish émigrés in Syria in 1927. The primary aim of the organization was declared to promote the Kurdish national cause. For further information, see: David McDowall, 2000: 145.

[156]For a detailed examination of the Ararat Rebellion, see, White, Paul, J. *Primitive Rebels or Revolutionary Modernizers?The Kurdish National …*pp.77-79; van Bruinessen, 1978, p. 393.

[157]The phrase 'Dersim uprising' denotes two separate uprisings that took place in the Dersim area. The first contentious event covered the episode between March 1937 and November 1937. The latter sparked in April 1938 and lasted until December 1938 (White, 2000: 80).

Republic and it must be removed, for the sake of the country's well-being" (Beşikçi, 1991: 29). According to this text, the people living in Dersim could not be won through ordinary socio-economic measures, like developing the city's infrastructure or investing in its local economy – the Ministry thought that Dersim would understand only the language of violence (Beşikçi, 1991: 29).

Therefore, the Kemalist government's policy towards the Kurdish rebels was once again comprised of "naked violence," just like the cases of the previous two Kurdish uprisings prior to the Dersim event. The consequent massacres of the rebels in Dersim in 1937[158] can be interpreted as consolidating an institutionalized policy of absolute violence against Kurds, which would also guide future state policy towards the region. As the suppression of the Sheikh Said rebellion left a traumatic scar on Sunnite Kurds, the suppression of the Dersim rebellion had a similar permanent effect on the perception of the Turkish state by Alevite Kurds. That is to say, these Kurdish defeats were framed solely as "absolute state tyranny" in Kurdish historiography throughout the following decades.

One of the turning points of the historical Kurdish movement has been the period following the 1960 coup. In Bozarslan's view, the coup refers to a "dualistic development" in terms of the movement. The actors of the coup went on denying the Kurdish reality in accordance with the nationalistic logic of the Republic. One of the best manifestations of this oppressive attitude of the military regime was the arrest of the 55 Kurdish tribal leaders and their exile (Bozarslan, 2008a: 853). Again, the arrest of 23 Kurdish nationalist opinion leaders exemplifies the approach of the coup makers on the issue. Yet, the democratic content of the 1961 Constitution opened up newer avenues before freedom of

[158]For the historical details of these massacres performed by the Turkish army, see: White, 2000: 82; Beşikçi, 1991; Dersimi, 1988: 287; Romano, 2006: 38; McDowall, 2000: 198.

expression and of organization. In that respect, like Turkish socialist movement, the Kurdish movement found widened space for politics and organizations. The problematization of the Kurdish issue under the name 'Eastern Question' (Doğu Sorunu) on the pages of one prominent journal of the period, *Barış Dünyası* (World of Peace), and of the bi-monthly periodical *Yön* (Direction) were significant developments: One of the major taboos of the Republican public sphere was being broken (Bozarslan, 2008a: 853).[159] In the final years of 1960s, the Kurdish issue became a topic intensively discussed in the pages of other widely-circulated left-wing political periodicals such as *Ant*, *Türk Solu*, and *Aydınlık*.

The Kurdish youth in Turkey in the 1960s became highly political, encouraged by the Kurdish insurgency in Northern Iraq and the rise of leftist movements in the rest of the world. Thus this new Kurdish politics was channelized into the new Turkish Workers Party (TİP) and found a political voice there. The socialist Kurds active in TİP tended to identify the Kurdish question as a social problem (Bozarslan, 2008a: 854). With the help of the leftist discourse of the period, this political issue could be placed beyond an "ethnic question." According to this approach, the issue was foremost based on socio-economic inequalities in Eastern and Southeastern Turkey; political tensions with an "ethnic" face were actually rooted in the underdevelopment of the Kurdish provinces. That is to say, the politics of ethnic inequality was integrated into class politics: Kurdish and Turkish workers would together organize and liberate themselves, thus also erasing ethnic hierarchies (Bruinessen, 1984: 9). Nevertheless, the socialist discourse recognized that the problems were also

[159]Doğan Avcıoğlu, "Kürt Meselesi," in *Yön* (Direction), 16 December 1966; "Doğu Davamız. Doğunun Kalkınması Türkiye'nin Kalkınması Demektir. *Barış Dünyası*, (The World of Peace), May 1962.

related to cultural rights issues. Kurds' right to speak their own language was not recognized as a constitutional liberty and this was problematized within the socialist discourse of the period.[160] To put it briefly, the politics of Turkish socialists understood the Kurdish question in terms of revolutionary strategies (Ekinci, 2004: 290-291).

The practical integration of Kurdish politics with the general Turkish leftist politics occurred with the 1967 Eastern Meetings organized in 7 Kurdish provinces.[161] This series of demonstrations were organized inside TWP, in collaboration with clandestine socialist and nationalist Kurdish groups, chiefly with the participation of the Democratic Party of Turkish Kurdistan.[162]

As Bozarslan also mentions, an important focus for the Kurdish movement in Turkey was the Barzani revolt in Iraqi which began in 1959. A lot of politicized Kurds in Turkey have identified themselves with that insurgency. Along with the influence and "patronage" of the Turkish socialist movement, it was not until the beginning of the 1970s that the Kurdish movement started to become autonomous from these two dynamics (Bozarslan, 2008a: 348). The movement gained a new momentum as the Cultural Hearths of Revolutionary East (DDKO) was established in 1970, and many Kurdish political groups began to sympathize with the strategies of armed struggle (Bozarslan, 2008a: 856).[163]

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[160] See for instance: Sadun Aren, *TİP Olayı, 1961-1971*, (İstanbul: Cem, 1993), p.70.

[161] For an excellent account of the Eastern Meetings, see: Azat Zana Gündoğan, "The Kurdish Political Mobilization in the 1960s: the Case of the 'Eastern Meetings'" *Master Thesis Submitted to the Graduate School of Social Sciences of Middle East Technical University*, July 2005, Ankara. For a comprehensive analysis, see also: İsmail Beşikçi, *Doğu Mitinglerinin Analizi,* (Ankara, Yurt Yayınları, 1992).

[162] For a comprehensive account of the Democratic Party of Turkish Kurdistan, see: Şakir Epözdemir, *Türkiye Kürdistan Demokrat Partisi (TKDP),1908/235 Antalya Davası Savunması* (İstanbul: Pêrî Yayınları, 2005).

[163] For further information on DDKO, see, Ümit Fırat, "Devrimci Doğu Kültür Ocakları," in *Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi,* Ertuğrul Kürkçü (ed). vol.7 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1988), p.2119.

The military intervention of March 1971 caused fragmentation of the Kurdish movement: Repressive measures were implemented in the Southeast against Kurdish political groups (McDowall, 2008: 20). On the other hand, in Iraq, Barzani decided to cease his faction's struggle and the Kurdish movement in Turkey lost an important reference. Yet, the most important impact of the coup was the estrangement of Kurdish political groups that had previously decided to struggle within legal boundaries: As a result of the campaign of oppression after the coup, most of these groups were convinced that legal party politics was unable to provide the necessary ground for their goals. Many Kurdish intellectuals and politically active figures were detained and sent to prison, a process which was interpreted as the end of mainstream politics and the necessity of continuing the struggle in the "underground". Illegal means of political struggle thus began to be placed in the center of Kurdish politics (Bozarslan, 2008b: 347). The seventies also witnessed the emergence of pro-Kurdish political organizations that refrain from resorting to violence but supported civil activities instead. For instance, Kurdish Socialist Party-Turkey (KSP-T)[164] supported the leading Kurdish public figure Mehdi Zana in local elections of 1977. Zana was elected as the Mayor of Diyarbakır, the largest urban center in the Kurdish populated region, and remained at this post until his arrest by the military junta twelve days after the 1980 coup (Bozarslan, 2008b: 348).

The 1980 coup caught the Turkish Left unawares and resulted with its near-destruction and demobilization. But radical Kurdish groups had a relatively advantageous position: Many of them had already fled to Syria just before and after the coup (McDowall, 2000:414; Romano, 2006:49). Thus, leading cadres of

[164]KSP-T (Partiya Sosyalista Kurdistan Tirkiye / Kurdistan Socialist Party –Turkey) was founded by Kemal Burkay. For further information, see Bozarslan, (2008b: 348).

Kurdish political groups, unlike those of Turkish groups whose leaders were either in Europe or in prison, had the opportunity to organize in Syria and Lebanon, within PKK (Romano, 2006:50). Several factors contributed to the emergence of PKK, a founded in 1974 by a group of university students,[165] as the major leading organization of the Kurdish insurgency. External support, particularly the Syrian support to a significant extent contributed to the success of PKK's armed struggle (Bozarslan, 2008b:351). On the other hand, the suffering of the Kurdish population, the systematic torture and abuse against Kurds under the junta rule contributed to PKK's empowerment after 1980 (Romano, 2006:51; Bozarslan, 2008b:351; Laçiner, 1991). The coup was revengeful against everything Kurdish: As Bozarslan emphasized the harsh measures implemented by the junta against the cultural and political representations of Kurdishness played crucial role in the radicalization and massification of the Kurdish population (2001:46-47). In that respect, the notorious Act No. 2932, imposed by the junta in 1983, prohibiting the use of Kurdish in public and private spheres, in reverse, contributed to the ethno-nationalist politicization.

PKK, in a short period of time, united and politicized Kurds on a much more ethno-nationalist platform (non-tribal, non-religious) compared to the Kurdish politics of the 1970s. This new episode of the PKK in Kurdish radical politics opens with the 1984 Eruh attack. As Sohrab comments, "The general trend of identity in Kurdish society has thereby been a move from one with strong religious components in the 1920s-30s, to one with strong class components in the

[165]The seeds of the organization can be traced back to 1974 meeting by a group of university students. Nevertheless, the exact date of the foundation of the organization with the name PKK is taken to be the first congress that took place between 21-27 November 1978 in the Fis village of Diyarbakır. In the congress, Abdullah Öcalan was declared to be the general secretary of PKK. For detailed information, see, Aliza Marcus, *Blood and Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence*, 2007, Newyork University Press, NY and London, pp. 27-49; Ali Kemal Özcan, *Turkey's Kurds: A Theoretical Analysis of the PKK and Abdullah Öcalan*, Routledge: London and New York, 2006, especially, pp.77-84.

1960s -70s to one with ethnicity as the core layer in the 1990s" (2004: 184). PKK adapted guerrilla warfare as its chief political strategy, and the armed conflict initiated in 1984 still continues today. The human cost of the conflict between PKK and the Turkish state as of 2010 is almost 40,000 deaths and the internal displacement of more than 3 million people.

PKK's "threat" was initially framed as coming from "a bunch of bandits", but soon as the daily events of armed clashes and the death toll increased the problem became one of "low intensity warfare". The state's non-recognition of rights demands by the Kurds (which were at the root of the PKK insurgency), for many years throughout the conflict; along with the alienating impact of the oppressive "state of emergency regime" established in the Southeast can be said to have made the issue inseparable from Turkey's "problem of democratization". It should be reminded that following the coup, "Kurds" had almost no presence in mainstream politics, being totally excluded (Beşikçi, 1990a, 1990b).

Thus the rise of PKK with a radical program aiming too purge feudal elements from Kurdish society and establish a separate socialist state resulted with further oppression of all elements of Kurdish popular culture and the association of the ordinary Kurd with terrorism (Berkey-Fuller, 1998: 133-156). As the "state of emergency" regime began with full force and special legislative, judiciary and security powers in the region by 1987 (which lasted until 1999), Kurdish villagers began to be forced out of their homes, in order to "starve" PKK. Organized state violence in the region also gave the Turkish Army a perfect opportunity to consolidate its own authoritarian version of nationalism in the region. Along with issues of democratic rights of Kurdish citizens, the impact of military tutelage and Army's control over civilian politics would also be problematized by the liberal-

democratic discourse of the 1990s. That is to say, as the Kurdish conflict strengthened the hold of the Army over politics, discussing the "Kurdish Problem" naturally became a proxy for criticizing the autonomous nature of the military and its negative impact on democracy in Turkey.

6.2.3.3.Concluding Remarks on the Kurdish Question

The first "opportunity" for the consolidation of the political discourse in which the social type of the Democrat flourished (especially in terms of the criticism of Kemalism) emerged during the "Turgut Özal years" of late 1980s and early 1990s. Özal's version of conservative-liberal politics was somewhat distanced from the militarist discourse framing the Kurdish issue. Although his approach never aimed to be hegemonic over the hold of the Army over the civilian politics, he was one of the few influential politicians of the time who talked about "re-integration" of Turks and Kurds, about non-military solutions and about "rights". His rise to presidency further encouraged, however marginal, the reinforcement of liberal-democratic positions with regard to the resolution of the Kurdish problem (Erdoğan and Üstüner, 2002).

As the official discourse framed, "the struggle against PKK terrorism" raged on even more violently after early 1990s. The military's implementation of counter-guerrilla strategies (comparable to South American examples) against PKK incursions, along with the increasing numbers of political murders by "death squads" financed by the state, pushed the "Kurdish Question" more towards a question of security to be resolved through military measures. Throughout the 1990s, up until the arrest of Abdullah Öcalan in 1999, the negative impact of the "State of Emergency" regime in the social life of the residents of eastern and southeastern regions continued. This and the problematization of counter-guerrilla

activities with the controversial "Susurluk Accident" of November 1996 together held the liberal-democratic debates around the issue on the intellectual agenda. The criticism of the so-called "deep state, state within state", orchestrated by the military as part of the operations against PKK got even more intense after 1999, as the violent clashes relatively diminished and there were more public debates (especially on TV) on the failures of the state in resolving the issue.

6.3. Şerif Mardin's Center-Periphery Analysis: Major Theoretical Inspiration

6.3.1. 1990s: Re-emergence of Political Islam on the Political and Social Scene

These two subjects, re-emergence of Islam during the late-1980s and the Kurdish issue, have been analyzed from different theoretical positions and political perspectives. Foremost among them were the perspectives relying extensively upon the premises of the Modernization Theory. Nevertheless, by the 1990s, the center/periphery analysis of Şerif Mardin (1973), emerged as the 'dominant paradigm' (Bora, 2006) that has been employed to better understand the major dynamics of Turkish society and polity.[166] Center-periphery analysis of Mardin has been the source of majority of works that appeared on the academic terrain during the late-1980s and thereby much of the literature on political Islam and Kurdish problem utilized or at least referred to this unique analysis.[167] In addition to its scientific value in offering a plausible perspective for understanding the operation of the state/society mechanism in Turkey, this theoretical attempt

[166] For a similar account, among others see Sabri Sayari and Yılmaz R. Esmer (eds.) (2002), *Politics, Parties and Elections in Turkey*, Boulder:Lynne Rienner Publishers, p.4; Menderes Çınar, "Kültürel Yabancılaşma Tezi Üzerine," *Toplum ve Bilim*,no:105, 2006, 153-165.

[167] For some works based on this approach or drawing upon it, see: Nilüfer Göle (1998), *Mühendisler ve İdeoloji*,İstanbul: Metis Yayınları; Taha Parla (1989), *Ziya Gökalp, Kemalizm ve Türkiye'de Korporatizm,* İstanbul: İletişim; Ayşe Kadıoğlu (1998), *Cumhuriyet İradesi, Demokrasi Muhakemesi*, İstanbul: Metis.

owed its popularity to the political and sociological developments within the country. As liberalism appeared to be the most favorable ideology of the late-1980s in Turkey, this specific development naturally found its reflections in the Turkish academia. All in all, the figures who most effectively utilize the center/periphery approach are the liberal-democratic opinion holders (the main subject of this dissertation) and Islamist writers (Bozdoğan and Kasaba, 1997: 4).[168] According to these observers who have raised substantial criticisms against Mustafa Kemal and his modernization project in the post-1980 period, Kemalist doctrine, "as a patriarchal and antidemocratic imposition from above that has negated the historical and cultural experience of the people in Turkey" (1997: 4).

In closer look, the process through which the center-periphery analysis, after 1980s, assumed a paradigmatic position can be evaluated under four main headings (Açıkel, 2006:34). The first development behind the popularization and widespread application of the paradigm was the process of democratization, which made way for new opportunities of mobilization and participation. For example, Açıkel claims that the inclusion of new actors in the public sphere enabled by democratization and the rise of the center-periphery paradigm are related (2006:34). Another factor preparing the grounds for the proliferation of the usage of the paradigm was the discrediting of Marxism as a source of social-scientific explanation in the 1990s and the relative dissipation of the "leftist" dominance, which continued until 1980s, within the intellectual and academic world. For Açıkel, this "decline" corresponds to the "rise" of right-wing intelligentsia, which has always been closer to Weberian frameworks:

[168] For Islamist critiques, see: Ali Bulaç (1995), *Din ve Modernizm*, İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık.

> Since Mardin's scheme enabled the criticism of radical modernization strategies and, based on a Shilsian notion of 'central value system' the imagination of Islamic traditions as an excluded, but nevetheless constitutive element; (...) [and since that scheme] could present an alternative to Marxism's base-superstructure distinction and class struggle emphasis, it was (by the right-wing intelligentsia) embraced as a tool for culturel struggle (2006: 35).

Moreover, the center-periphery model made it theoretically and politically possible, for the right-wing (conservative) opinion holders, to criticize anti-religious state elites who were seen as alienated from religion, whereas religion was taken to be central to society's culture and values (Yaşlı, 2009: 96).

Another contributing factor to the rise of the center-periphery paradigm was the popularization of criticisms of positivism in academic circles, beginning with mid-to-late 1980s.[169] Such criticisms included the problematization of classical Marxist assumptions as being a direct extension of Enlightenment, and this critical discourse can be referenced as the main contrinution of post-structuralist and post-Marxist approaches. By late 1980s, these academic discourses made their impact on social scientists in Turkey. For example, some Gramscian left-wing intellectuals were engaged in the adaptation of the post-Marxist framework suggested by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985) criticizing the more "authoritarian" or "orthodox" positions within the Left, and actively utilizing the concept of "civil society" for discussions of Turkey's democratization (and the necessity for de-militarization). The criticism of positivism as a vital element of Kemalism also corresponds to this period, being another reason for preferring to explain the dynamics of modern Turkish politics with the centre-periphert model (Açıkel, 2006: 35).

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[169] See for instance, Thomas Kuhn (1962), *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,* Chicago:University of Chicago Press; Levent Köker (1990a), *İki Farklı Siyaset: Bilgi Teorisi-Siyaset Bilimi İlişkileri Açısından Pozitivizm ve Eleştirel Teori,* İstanbul: Ayrıntı Yayınları.

While this model became the prominent analytical tool for right-wing opinion leaders, as mentioned before, it was also embraced by scholars on the left and became almost the "trademark" of left-liberal opinion holders. These intellectuals on the left, deeply questioning their positions vis-à-vis the state, adopted the center-periphery approach especially for the criticism of the Kemalist-corporatist imagination of society and of the Jacobin top-down modernization practices (Açıkel, 2006: 35).[170]

The rise of the academic and intellectual interest towards the center-periphery approch as an alternative model to understand the major dynamics of Turkish politics indicated an ironical situation. It was ironical because the newly adopted fashionable theoretical model was a classical variant of the modernization theory which sought to explain the major dynamics of Turkish politics with the conceptual opportunities provided by the dichotomy asserted to have existed between center and the periphery. Within this alternative approach, the central premise of classical modernization theory that of the dichotomy between Islam and modernity, was replaced with the dichotomy between the ruling modernizing elite (center) and the masses (periphery). Due their methodological priorities, neither of these approaches has failed to grasp "the contingent nature of the relationship between identity and politics of integration with the West that is a part of a larger pattern of state and societal relationships" (Cizre, 1998a:7).

Modernization literature, to a large extent, have taken for granted that, the primary causes of the rise of Islamism in Turkey included structural factors, such as poverty and the uneducated masses due to the socioeconomic factors. This

[170] As Açıkel notes, the works of following scholars and opinion producers might be considered in this context: Murat Belge (1992), *12 Yıl Sonra 12 Eylül,* İstanbul: Birikim Yayınları; Taha Parla (1989), *Ziya Gökalp, Kemalizm ve Türkiye'de Korporatizm,* İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları; Levent Köker (1990b), *Modernleşme, Kemalizm ve Demokrasi,* İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

literature has focused on the migration of the masses from rural areas to the large cities and the economic deprivation they have practiced. The studies that contributed to the Modernization literature in Turkish academia have emphasized the *varoş* ("slums"), as the main support base of political Islam in Turkey. Resurgence of political Islam, in their view, was a defensive response to the economic and social deprivation which became harsher as the outcome of the neo-liberal policies. According to Binnaz Toprak, similar to the 1970s, during which religious groups emerged in the political and social scene in Turkey, the political Islam of late-1980s could be regarded as "a response to the life in the metropolis" (1989)[171]. In contrast to the 1970s, during which Islam represented a marginalized portion of the society, during the late-1990s and early-1990s it emerged with a growing electoral strength and popularity and thereby conceived as a threat to the functioning of the secularism within the country. Toprak stated that the change in the capital accumulation model of Turkey from import-substitution to export-orientation was largely responsible for the growing popular strength of Islam (2005: 180-181). The neo-liberal policies pursued in accordance with the dictates of the new capital accumulation model gave rise to further impoverishing of the urban poor and stimulated discontent among the poor. Within the political environment the Left was incapable of promoting alternative policies; this discontent was to find expression in the support for the Islamist Welfare Party. Against the anti-statist rhetoric and policies of the neo-liberal agenda, the Islamist

[171]Toprak's analysis cannot be simply reduced to the argument that the emergence of political Islam in the late-1980s could be examined with regards to the deprivation experienced by the immigrant rural masses in the large cities of Turkey. Toprak has also underlined the policy preferences by the military junta in the 1980s, and argued that, the military led NSC abandoned the "radical secularism" of the former decades and adopted a Turkish Islamism that found expression in the famous Turkish-Islamic Synthesis. Therefore, according to Toprak, the military government of the coup was also responsible for the emergence of the Islam during the concerned period time. (See, "Religion as State Ideology in a Secular Setting: The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis," Malcolm Wagstaff (ed.) *Aspects of Religion in Secular Turkey*, University of Durham, Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, Occasional Paper Series, No 40, 1990, 10-15).

political party Refah could provide highly organized support facilities and networks (Toprak, 2005:181). Through this perspective, the discontent among the lower segments of the population due to the increasing discrepancy among social classes was translated into electoral success by the pro-Islamist Welfare Party (Ayata, 1997).[172]

Rise of the 'identity politics' by the 1990s have also been underlined as a crucial factor contributing to the re-emergence of Islam in Turkish context. Most commentators agreed on the fact that, for significant portions of the social fabric, identity politics have constituted the means of expressing their demands, reactions and discontent due to the exclusion they were exposed to (Ayata, 1997:60). Some social scientists interpreted the emergence of Islamism as a part of a broad picture consisting of anti-systemic movements, such as feminism, environmentalism, and with "new 'isms'" and regarded the rise of contemporary Islamism,

> (as) both an outcome and a criticism of endogenous forms of modernity that engender new class divisions on cultural cleavages between those who acquire access to Westernized forms of education, speaking and living and those who remain alien to this cultural setting (Göle, Nilüfer, 1989:61).

A common attitude shared by most of the theoretical attempts articulated to understand the rise and nature of political Islam in Turkey was to pinpoint an indirectly proportional equation between the foundational ethos of Turkish Republic, that of Kemalism, and the rise of Islam. It has been argued that, the crisis of Kemalism has led to the increasing strength of political Islam. In this vein, one prominent social scientist has contended that, political Islam was a

[172]Ayata also underlines that, by the 1980 coup, "religiosity among the people increased parallel to institutionalized religion." See, Ayşe Ayata, "The Emergence of Identity Politics in Turkey," *New Perspectives on Turkey,* Fall 1997, no: 17, pp. 59-73.

postmodern reaction to Turkish modernization.[173] Nevertheless, the postmodern reaction argument which was built upon the binary opposition between the rise of political Islam and the fall of the official ideology, shared the common methodological basis with the classical modernization approach and its center-periphery variant. That is, rather than seeing the contingent nature of the relationship between the dynamics it tended to regard the entire picture through the lenses of a dichotomous relationship asserted to exist between the two.

Kurdish issue has long been examined solely as an outcome of structural deficiencies arising from the uneven economic development or underdevelopment. According to this perspective, the enhancement of the social and economic development has been underlined to provide peaceful solution to the problem.[174] The alternative approach adopted in the early nineties claiming to overcome the reductionism of the former approach, tended to analyze the Kurdish problem as a reaction to the Ottoman/Turkish modernization that brought about a cultural cleavage between the traditional masses and the modernizing elite.

6.3.2. The Main Arguments of the Center-Periphery Model

As it has been previously mentioned, the center-periphery perspective was introduced to the Turkish context by Şerif Mardin in his classic "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics," an article published in Daedalus (1973). Mardin basically borrowed the model from Edward Shils[175]and operationalized it for explaining Ottoman-Turkish modernization and the relations between the

[173]See Haldun Gülalp, 1999. "The Rise and Fall of Refah Party," *Muslim World*. Vol. 89, Issue: 1, pp. 22-41.
[174] For a critique of this line of reasoning, see, (Cizre, 1996b).
[175]See Edward Shils (1975), *Center and Periphery: Essays in Macro sociology,* Chicago: The Chicago University Press. The early publication of Shils' work was in 1961. Mardin himself acknowledges that he borrowed the model from Shils: "My initial formulation is derived from Edward Shils, "Centre and Periphery," in *The Logic of Personal Knowledge: Essays Presented to Michael Polanyi on His Seventieth Birthday,* 11 March 1961 (Glencoe: Free Press, 1961), pp. 117-130" (See, 1973:187).

(central) rulers and their (peripheral) adversaries. According to Mardin, the fundamental polarization within modern Turkish society rages between modernizing elites and religious-conservative masses resisting modernization. At the roots of this polarization lies the early historical process by which a minority of elites dictated a top-down Ottoman-Turkish modernization to the whole society. Mardin basically assumes the following: In the West, a centralization process was initiated as a result of the establishment of the modern state. This process brought forward a number of encounters, confrontations and integrations between the center and the periphery and ultimately a commond ground was reached as the periphery was integrated into the center. In his own words,

> The forces that shaped the state in the West seem to vary significantly from those that shaped the Ottoman state before modernization set in. Because of its feudal antcedents, the process of centralization that created the modern state included a series of confrontations leading to compromises with what may be called the forces of the preiphery: the feudal nobility, the cities, the burghers, and later, industrial labor. The consequence of these compromises was that Leviathan and the nation-state were relatively well articulated structures.Each time a compromise –or even a one-sided victory- was obtained, some integration of the peripheral force into the center was achieved. Thus the feudal estates, or the "privilégies," or the workers become integrated into the poltiy while, at the same time, obtaining some recognition of their autonomous status (Mardin, 1973:170).

In contrast with the West, in the Ottoman society the encounter between the center and periphery was not in the form of deliberation and integration, but in the form of conflict and confontation:

> In the Ottoman Empire before the nineteenth century these characteristics of multiple confrontation and integration seem to be missing. Rather, the *major* confrontation was unidimensional, always a clash between the center and the periphery. In addition, the autonomy of peripheral forces was more than anything *de facto,* an important difference from the institutional recognition accorded, for example, to estates in Western Europe, which were "dependent corporations (Mardin, 1973:170).

As Mardin states, the principal axis of tension in Ottoman society are expressed in the form of divisions such as urban/rural, urban native/migrant, state official/merchant, soldier/civilian. In every confrontation between the center and periphery this conflict axis is reproduced.

Mardin adds that as the center and the periphery confont each other, they develop certain states of mind. For example, the definitive characteristic of the worldview of the center is "suspicion towards the peripheral elements" (1973:171). Whereas the periphery's characteristic worldview, in connection to its heterogeneity, is devoid of being compact (1973: 173). Mardin explains this cultural separation between the center and periphery as follows:

> Rulers and officials were heavily influenced in the cities by the culture of earlier, succesful, urban cultures such as the Iranian. Iranian bureaucratic culture in particular was diffused into Ottoman institutions. For example, the rulers adopted languages –Persian and Arabc- that were foreign to the lower classes and worked these into the official culture. The periphery only benefited from one of the educational institutions. Not suprisingly, the periphery developed its own extremely varied counter-culture, but it was well aware of its secondary cultural status, an awareness best ilustrated by its clumsy imitation of the styles of elite culture (1973: 173).

As the Empire entered a path of Westernization and the modernization of Ottoman institutions was initiated, the distance and estrangement between the center and periphery was deepened. For this, Mardin gives the example of the Patrona Revolt which ended the "Tulip Period." The revolt was different than those before in the sense that it created a new pattern. With the Patrona Revolt, peripheral elements with discontents about the center's performance and who believe that the center has become distant to them, began to express their disgruntlements with uprisings. In this respect, the Patrona Revolt is a precursor to the March 31st Revolt and the Menement Incident;

> was the first to show a syndrome that was thereafter often repeated: an effort to Westernize military and administrative organization propounded by a section of the official elite, accompanied by some aping of Western manners, and used by another interest group to mobilize the masses against Westernization (1973: 175).

One of the most central tenets of the center-periphery model is the "continuity" relation between the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Turkey. The modernization/Westernization initiatives of the late Ottoman period were continued in a similar mindset during the early Republican era, and the center's skepticism, distrutfulness towards the periphery, its perception of the periphery as a space to be controlled, was further exacerbated.

It is obvious that there is high level of correspondence between this model and İdris Küçükömer's perspective developed around the notion of "cultural alieanation".[176] According to Küçükömer, the anti-Kemalist "Second Group" of the early TGNA, the later Progressive Republican Party (TCF) and the Free Republican Party (SCF), being positioned in opposition to the modernizing elites who were alienated from their social base, were representing the periphery in confrontation with the center (1973: 181). The center, represented by the Palace during the Ottoman Empire era, was occupied by the Kemalists in the new Republican era. Most concretely, CHP, the state bureaucracy and the military constituted the center and these actors insisted the elimination of potential "intermediate" groups between the center and periphery. For example, the banning of TCF was related to the state's perception of the existence of two main "dangerous" elements against the center, namely Islam and Kurdishness (the latter, along with the fresh threat of the Sheikh Said Revolt, was seen as a challenge against the top-down ethno-national identity). According to Mardin,

[176] The framework suggested by İdris Küçükömer was thoroughly evaluated in the previous section.

> When an opposition aprty was formed whose activities coincided with a Kurdish revolt in 1925, a Law for the Maintenance of Order was passed giving the government wide powers for the new opposition did represent decentralist aspirations. It was suppressed the same year because of what were said to be its links wit "religious reaction," and indeed this, more than "Kurdsihness," had been the central theme of the revolt (1973: 182).

The confrontation between the positivist, Jacobin and elitist center with the periphery constituted by small businessmen, ordinary citizens and religious leaders was carried to a new level after the transition to the multi-party system in 1946. The center represented by CHP was chiefly opposed by DP (Democrat Party), seen as a threat against secularization and anti-reformist, emerging from the countryside. DP was on the rise as the principal agent of the integreation between the small town and the village. By many people, DP was seen as an alternative to the state bureaucracy which was disliked for its clumsiness and harshness. Many thought that their interests could more freely be expressed within DP. Above all, DP

> promised it would bring services to the peasants, take his daily problems as a legitimate concern of politics, debureaucratize Turkey and liberalize religious practices. Finally, private enterprise, equally hampered by bureaucratic controls and angered by its dependence on political influence, was also promised greater freedom (1973: 184).

Among DP's founders were former CHP members and bureaucrats and despite that, ironically, the party could become a political platform representing the periphery and the culture associated with the periphery. As the party moved against the power of the central bureaucracy, the periphery embraced it even more strongly, and in time, the party came to identify itself with the periphery (1973: 185).

One of the problematics that the model promises to explain is how Republican elites positioned themselves in the new political configuration of the multi-party system, their divisions and conflicts (Açıkel, 2006: 35). The model, which is built upon the interpretation of government-opposition relations, from the Ottoman to the Republican era, within the process of modernization, posits the continuation of fundamental impasses of Turkish modernization. Mardin suggests that Turkish modernization should be explained within the context of this "continuity", as against the Kemalist history-writing which claims that a "dislocation" occurs with the dissolution of the Empire (Çiğdem, 2005).

6.3.3. The Model's Strengths and Weaknesses

One basic assumption of the center-periphery model casts light on its relation with democracy and democratization: Different from the Western European experience, the center-periphery relation in the Ottoman era is practised as a dichotomy, polarization, confrontation. And because of the dominance and control of the center, the development of private property, market economy and civil society was impossible. Here a weakness can be observed: The Eurocentric attempt to identify similar Western processes in a non-Western geography, and than the judgment of the non-Western geography based on the absence of such processes. The center-periphery model compares the West and the East based on Western assumptions of development and modernization, which accept that democratization unfolds through deliberation and consensus between center and periphery. According to this story, the Eastern democratization process is suppressed as a result of the control exercised over the periphery. The East is framed as the West's "other," which invites criticisms of Orientalism (Aydın, 2006). Since democracy could "more easily" be instituted in the West, with its

“deliberating” center and periphery, this was impossible in the East, as the “home” of the periphery, “civil society”, was unable to develop. Then, a Western-style democracy in the East comes to be seen as improbable to develop (Aydın, 2006; Yaşlı, 2009). Most analyses which place the model at the core of their frameworks can be observed to abide by this assumption.

Another social scientist using the model, Metin Heper, also describes Ottoman Empire as “patrimonial,” using the Weberian terminology: The Empire is a bureucratic state and the center is strong enough to reject sharing its power with rival forces. For this reason, Heper states that in the Ottoman Empire the relation between the center and the periphery is never open to dialogue but is defined by conflict (Heper, 1985; 2000). On the other hand, historians like Halil İnalcık and Ömer Lütfi Barkan discuss the Empire in terms of multi-level systems where many centers are in contact with the dominant power, rather than a simple center-periphery model (Aydın, 2006: 80). The Empire was a vast geography and the channels of communication and transportation were weak. This resulted with the emergence of more than one center, in connection to the distance of the local powers from Istanbul. The advantages of the system of foundations reinforced the hegemony of local powers and helped them benefit from tax exemptions (Aydın, 2006: 80-81). In this historical context, the classical center-periphery model’s story of “separation” becomes problematic.

Another problem with the model is its explanatory power. It can be said to be capable of explaining Turkish politics up until 1950s; but as politics became largely socialized and the “distance” between the center and periphery diminished, the model’s explanatory power in analyzing more recent periods of

Turkish politics is put to question.[177] It can be argued that this model assumes that the institutions and political processes which shaped Turkey from 1920s to 1950s continue their unchanging existence. This, then, portrays Turkish modernization as frozen, static, close to changes of other forms outisde the "center-periphery" framework (Açıkel, 2006: 33). The assumption that the conflict between the state and society is almost beyond history; that the culture codes and values of conflicting political actors are unchanging is problematic. In this model, the elitist "center" remain the center whether it is the ruling government or not; and the "periphery," even if it comes to power, continues to be the "periphery" (Açıkel, 2006: 31-32).

Şerif Mardin presents a culture-centered analysis of Turkish political history with his model. The cultural codes of the state elites and popular masses are in constant conflict (Yaşlı, 2009: 106). To recall, the center is basically defined in terms of values and beliefs, around which the society is to be integrated. However, the two spheres described ahistorically (e.g., Kemalism as the center and Islam as the periphery), actually resemble each other rather than be separate (Çınar, 2006). The model's "cultural alienation" thesis rather lumps the complex dynamic of Turkish politics into the axis of culture and creates problems of cultural reductionism. According to Çınar, such an approach does not present a full picture of the problems of democratization in Turkey; and if the analysis is flawed and misleading, it might even aggravate the problems and hinder possibilities of opening in the political opportunity structure (2006: 153).[178] The

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[177]According to Şerif Mardin, this problem can be overcome by enriching the model empirically (Mardin, 2006:19-10).

[178]Menderes Çınar has also criticized a more recent work centered upon the cultural alienation thesis: Menders Çınar, "Modified Orientalism: The Case of Hakan Yavuz's *Islamic Poltical Identitiy in Turkey*," New Perspectives on Turkey, 30i 2004, 155-168.

“flaw” here is to ascribe an almost homogeneous, “Islamic essence” to society in Turkey and argue that the source of the democratic deficit is the suppression of that essence by the center.

As Çınar also argues, if Turkish politics is seen only from the lens of the cultural alienation thesis, the history of the Republican era is reduced to the power struggle between “secular” and “Islamist” ideologies (Çınar, 2006; Açıkel, 2006). In such a case, Turkish political life can only be portrayed as a sphere under the monopoly of an exclusionist elite. However, as discussed above, some Ottoman historians focusing on local powers argued that Ottoman rulers have developed diverse strategies, trying to address the sensitivities of different localities, when they dealt with local rulers (Aydın, 2006). Moreover, “politics” is something much more than the thing defined by the culture-centric model. Cultural reductionism tends to de-emphasize international dynamics:

> Especially when modernization is the issue, this deficiency is more expressed. Both the development of state apparatuses (from the army to the bureaucracy, from education to communication and transportation networks) and how such apparatuses relate to people are directly dependent on what kind of a position these local-national units have inside the world system (Açıkel, 2006: 43).

It is quite possible to assess Turkish political life through a framework which makes politics itself its center. For example, it can be argued that dualisms and tensions created by modernization initiatives essentially lead to political reactions, and when such reactions cannot be properly expressed within the political sphere, they can be channelized into the field of culture. Considering that in Turkish politics, superstructural factors are highly influential, it is acceptable to claim that cultural and identity-based dualities are essentially shaped by politics.

Recast in this alternative manner, the culture-centered approach of the center-periphery model can be problematized.

6.3.4. Conclusions and Political Implications

The center-periphery approach, as it carried the themes of the strong state, modernization from above, Jacobin and positivist Kemalism to the agenda, contributed to the shaping of a certain political position. According to this posture we can call "liberal-democrat," the following needed to be done in order to accomplish the democratization of Turkey: The authoritarian state had to be transformed, the official Kemalist ideology needed to be dismantled, civil society needed to be strengthened and the heavy hand of bureacracy was to be removed. For such political targets, from the perspective of the left-wing liberals, the center-periphery model provided important theoretical tools.[179] For the conservative-democratic observers using the model, it provided a good analytical tool to challenge the Kemalist ideology (Yaşlı, 2009:97).

Politically speaking, the following observation of scholars applying the model to Turkish politics is critical: Because of the dominance of the center, it is commonly argued that "civil society" in Turkey was underdeveloped. With its emphasis on the analytical and essentialist separation between the state and society, the model implied heavy political investment in civil society initiative and organizations. For example, Heper (1985) observes that central bureaucracy in Republican Turkey prevented the full maturing of local social and economic forces and thus limited individiual and economic liberties.[180] Intermediary

[179] For a similar remark, see Açıkel, 2006:36.
[180] As Demet Dinler (2009: 33) states, scholars like Ayşe Buğra, Ahmet İnsel, Ziya Öniş heavily rely on Heper's "strong state" approach. Also see: Metin Heper, "Center and Periphery in the Ottoman Empire with Special Reference to the Nineteenth Century," *International Political*

structures that would integrate the center and the periphery (estates, local councils, urban management structures etc.) did not develop autonomously (Mardin, 1988; İnsel, 1996: 73). In relation to this analysis, another political implication of the center-periphery assumptions concerns the organization of the economy. Observers utilizing the model also make a political investment in the proper (i.e., autonomous) development of free market relations in the process of Turkey's democratization. According to the analysis, the hold of the state over society also constrains, culturally speaking, the maturing of the bourgeoisie and capital accumulation. The Turkish capitalists are thought to be unable to internalize the same values as their Western ("universal") counterparts. It can be argued that this analysis takes the subscribers of the center-periphery model to seek an "idealized bourgeoisie" and explain Turkey's democratic deficits using the argument of a "dominated, underdeveloped" bourgeoisie (Dinler, 2009: 25). This stance almost brings the left-wing or right-wing subscribers to the model close to a classical "economic liberal" understanding.

Along with the moments of "civil society" and "autonomous economic development", the third emphasis with political implications is the analysis of the relations between politics and the military. The liberal-democratic criticism of the "relative autonomy" and "unaccountability" of the military owes a lot to the center-periphery approach. The Turkish Armed Forces, as the chief representative of the bureaucratic, dominant "center", is described as an obstacle before the deepening of democracy in Turkey, because of its overt and covert interventions in parliamentary politics throughout the Republican era. When unchallenged, the liberal-democratic discourse states, these interventions (successful and attempted

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Science Review 1 (1980): 81-105; "The Strong State as a Problem for the Consolidation of Democracy: Turkey and Germany Compared," *Comparative Political Studies*, 25(2), 169-194.

coups, threats, covert operations, etc.) debilitate the civil society. The 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997 coups, through the lens of the center-periphery model, are all explained as attempts of the militaristic "center" to reassert itself upon society and consolidate its hold.

A fourth moment which shapes the political opinions of liberal and democratic observers through the lens of the center-periphery model concerns the "rule of law" in Turkey. Logically, if the analysis of a "strong state" constraining the development of "society" holds, this also would have negative implications for the properly democratic legal design and implementation of laws. The sphere of rights and liberties then, as criticized commonly, would remain underdevelop as the Turkish state would rather protect its bureaucratic interests rather than reinforce "open society".

According to the center-periphery analysis, the location of the resolution of social problems has always been the state. The state hindered the development of peripheral mechanisms for social and political maturity, as it has historically been suspicious of social groups (like the Kurds or Islamists) which had the potential to challenge its authoritarian rule. As the center was suspicious and fearful of the periphery, it used any means necessary to maintain its power, usually acting outside the boundaries of the rule of law. On this note, the proliferation of the critical literature against the "deep state," against clandestine operations of the military and of the Ministry of the Interior can be reminded. In regard to both the "Kurdish Question" and "political Islam" the violation of rule of law for the sake of "containing" unruly elements of the periphery, was commonly problematized. Therefore, within this moment, the political call was clear: Let the social and political problems of the country be resolved through

multi-party deliberation, including civil society. Remove the influence of the military on political, juridical and economic decisions. Render the military accountable on all fields, in service of the parliament.[181]

Consequently, the center-periphery approach, in the sense that it inspired the formulation of political opinions on topics related to the four main "moments" summarized above, contributed a lot to the emergence of the liberal and democratic opinion producer as a social type.

[181] See: Ümit Kardaş, "Uzlaşma ya da Gerilim," *Radikal 2,* 25/06/2006; "Devletçi Seçkinler Çevreyi Hep Dışladı," *Zaman,* 17/11/2006; "Demokraside Hükümet Askere Hesap Vermez," *Yeni Şafak,* 11/12/2006.

CHAPTER VII

THE DEMOCRAT AS A SOCIAL TYPE

7.1. Introduction

Reminding once more the definition of 'liberal democrat' that we use throughout this thesis, the point which has to be emphasized firstly is that the conceptualization 'liberal democrat' denotes specific differences from such concepts as left-liberal or liberal-left. These stances which have some commons in genealogical terms differ at specific historical moments and in some key issues. As stated in earlier chapters, the term "liberal" in the conceptualization 'liberal democrat' denotes the priority given by liberal thinking to the protection of individual rights and freedoms rather than adherence to liberalism as a doctrine or ideology. Hence the emphasis in the definition of liberal-democrat on individual liberties defines the category 'liberal' and the emphasis on an ethical approach to democracy, that is, an understanding of democracy based on the dismantling of military tutelage, reinforcement of civilian rule, of rule of law and on a strong civil society define the category 'democratic.'

In fact it is quite difficult to say that qualifications such as 'left liberal', 'liberal left' or even 'civil society advocate' correspond to specific stances which

have serious differences in-between. In the political culture of Turkey, the qualification 'liberal' has been frequently used for slandering by both the left and right, particularly by nationalist and/or Kemalist circles.[182] Given this, the portrayal 'liberal left' or 'left liberal,' for instance, is an attribution made by others rather than being a qualification preferred by some sections.[183] For example, those who adopt an understanding of socialism that places emphasis on individual rights and freedoms rather prefer to define their stances with such qualifications as "libertarian socialism," "libertarian left" and "democratic socialism." Such opinion producers like Murat Belge, Ahmet İnsel, Fuat Keyman, Baskın Oran and Roni Margulies (described within the "liberal left"), on the other hand, mostly refute this qualification.[184] For instance, in a newspaper article written as a reply to Sungur Savran, Fuat Keyman accepts the relationship between his frame of thinking and political liberalism, but underlines that understanding and changing Turkey is not possible through a liberal-left stance which symbolizes an articulation of free market (liberal) and social justice (left).[185] According to Keyman "we need politically liberal principles as much as we need the ghosts of Marx, and these two political theories and discourses can be matched."[186] This position signifies the desire to build a bridge between "equality" which has its dominant place in socialist political thinking and "freedom" which classical liberalism emphasizes at the level of individuals. The difficulty inherent in the labeling of this position with such categories as "left

[182] For a comprehensive work on this issue see: Tanıl Bora, "Sol, Liberalizm ve Sinizm," *Birikim*, No:234, November 2008.
[183] E.g. see: Ümit Kurt, "AKP ve Sol-Liberal Entelektüeller," *Radikal*, 15.02.2008; Sungur Savran, "Marksizmle Tartışma Çağrısı," *Radikal 2*, May 11, 2008; Sungur Savran, "Baskın Oran, Roni Margulies ve Mahmut Mutman'a Yanıt," *Radikal 2*, June 15, 2008.
[184] For a discussion on "left-liberal" in Turkey, See: Sungur Savran, "Marksizmle Tartışma Çağrısı," *Radikal 2*, May 11, 2008; Sungur Savran, "Baskın Oran, Roni Margulies ve Mahmut Mutman'a Yanıt," *Radikal 2*, June 15, 2008.
[185] Fuat Keyman, "Marx'ın Hayaletleri ve Türkiye," *Radikal 2*, May 25, 2008.
[186] Ibid.

liberal" can be reconsidered just in the context of practical troubles and dead-ends of this association. The demands for equality and freedom unsupported by strong social movements for a long period of time after 1980 have therefore been addressed *on paper* by opinion producers who were disconnected from political activism.

Hence, the qualification "left-liberal" (or "liberal left") describes those who are related to Marxism in some way and insist on defending certain socialist principles albeit with some reservations whether they themselves adopt the term or just face it as an attribution by others. This approach based on the premise that the importance attributed by Marxism to class relations has lost its validity in our day was justified by interpretations of the writings of Poulantzas, who was thought to argue that class relations were superseded by political power relations.[187] According to Ahmet İnsel, one of the leading representatives of this stance, transformations taking place in the 19th and 20th centuries caused the working class to lose its status as "emancipating class embodying the germs of a promising future." Hence, class based discourses must be dropped and an understanding of a non-sexist socialism based on "libertarianism, de-centralization, internationalism, democratic planning and anti-militarism, redefining human-nature relations" must be insistently defended.[188] According to İnsel, it is absolutely necessary to go beyond that classical left-socialist analysis

[187] While discussing the relative autonomy of many specific state policies from class interests, Poulantzas' structural Marxism did not reduce analysis to the contention between "state and society". Nevertheless, it was Murat Belge, Ahmet İnsel and others around the journal *Birikim* who first introduced to Turkish readers their interpretation of the leading figures of structural Marxism including Louis Althusser and Nikos Poulantzas and used their theoretical framework to explain the case of Turkey. They later placed this "state-society opposition" at the centre of their political opinion building efforts. (Poulantzas' *Fascism and Dictatorship* was translated into Turkish by Ahmet İnsel in 2004). The theme "relative autonomy of the State" was then stripped off from its more rigid class content and frequently used to discuss the State in Turkey which is said to encroach upon the domain of individual liberties while isolating itself from social demands. For a detailed analysis, see: Savran, 1987.

[188] *Interview with Ahmet İnsel,* Neşe Düzel, *Taraf,* January 18, 2008.

that "reduces the way of imagining society merely as reduced to class struggles, neglecting individualization, regarding the society essentially as a domain of clashing economic interests and reducing human beings to positions taken in these clashes".[189] Hence, while not refuting class-based determinations, left-liberal opinion producers believe that class relations should be seen as at the same level with all other determinations. Contrary to class-based reductionism of classical socialism, this approach envisages the design of an economic order where the principle of freedom is not sacrificed for equality and where equality and freedom are both equally upheld. In İnsel's words:

> In the 20th century we witnessed socialist regimes in which freedoms are withheld for the sake of equality. You can establish equality in poverty, you can introduce equality in some rights, but equality achieved at the expense of freedoms is not a lasting achievement. If you ask the citizens of the former German Democratic Republic old enough to remember the 60s whether they want to go back to those years I think nobody would really want that (2010).

Eventually it is safe to say that left liberalism or liberal left, while inspired by Marxism this or that way, takes "center-periphery" approach as basis in their social analyses and rests on an understanding that conceptualizes civil society and the State as in binary opposition.[190] Left liberalism, reading political developments as outcomes of a clash between the State and civil society, is convinced that a libertarian and democratic socialism is feasible in Turkey in case civil society is accorded a space to flourish and grow. From this perspective it is also argued the process of globalization, believed to be destined to weaken the oppressive state apparatus, will present an opportunity for Turkey to be integrated with the world. And this integration lies, it is believed, in its most concrete form,

[189] *Interview with Ahmet İnsel,* Cihan Erdal, *Turnusol Haber*, January 17, 2010.
[190] Note the comprehensive discussion on theoretical and political approaches concerned in earlier chapters (Chapters 5 and 6).

in Turkey's EU accession.[191] For example, according to Keyman, relations between Turkey and EU are of a kind that requires democratization, transparency and more responsible acts of the State in Turkey (2004). Hence, the process of EU accession will contribute to the transformation of state-society/individual relations in the country in a way favoring the individual. These relations will also ensure the widening of the domain of fundamental rights and freedoms and lay the foundations of a new concept of citizenship (Keyman, 2004). Baskın Oran has similar views: The EU process may contribute to the institutionalization of an understanding of citizenship that is not 'compulsory' but 'voluntary' where citizens are attached to their state not forcefully but for being happy to live in a specific country (2009).[192]

While mostly agreeing with these positions, Tanıl Bora underlines a difference between the concepts "liberal left" and "left liberal" (2008). Bora argues that socialism and liberalism both derive from the same origin and Marx's own understanding of socialism amounts to the sublimation of liberalism (2008).[193] Hence, the critique of liberalism has a foundational value for Marx's socialism, a critique which has/should have continuity (2008). The common denominator for liberalism and socialism is of course the realm of rights and freedoms. However, the demarcation line is drawn with the socialist critique that liberalism's promises of freedom can but remain abstract, without any chance of full materialization. According to Bora,

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[191] For example see: Fuat Keyman, "Niye Avrupa Birliği?" Radikal 2, April 20, 2003. Also see: Ahmet İnsel, "Avrupa Birliği: Nasıl Bir Kurumsallaşma?" Birikim, No:157, May 2002. For an alternative and critical approach on the EU see: Tanıl Bora, "Hangi Avrupa Birliği? Hangi Müktesebat?" Birikim, No:157, May 2002.

[192]For a comprehensive discussion see: Mülkiyeliler Birliği Dergisi, January 5, 2009, *Interview with Baskın Oran.*

[193] For a similar evaluation see: Ömer Laçiner, "Yolun sonu/başlangıcı," *Birikim,* No: 232/233, August 2008.

> Socialism is distinct from liberalism in its questioning of the dictum, 'all are equal but some are more equal' and by its focus on the positive content of rights and freedoms and material-objective conditions of their realization (2008).

Bora stresses that in spite of this distinction socialism still needs to learn from the challenge of liberalism. Indeed,

> The criticism offered by liberalism contains a warning against the risk of the transformation of objectivism and voluntarist intervention to human processes into a positivist attitude – we know from the history of socialism that such a risk does exist (2008).

After pointing to kinship in-between and common denominator of socialism and liberalism, Bora argues that the following demarcation line is necessary between 'left liberal' and 'liberal leftist':

> Left liberals are those liberals who are relatively more sensitive to such issues as equality and social justice. Liberal leftists on the other hand are leftists who are passionately committed to issues related to negative rights and freedoms and whose dedication to socialism and social democracy is coextensive with this commitment (2008).

In this conceptualization suggested by Bora, while "liberal left" corresponds to a position which has more affinity with socialism, the "left liberal" stance has some distance from it, adopting an ideological line closer to liberalism. From the perspective of my main argument in this dissertation, it must be said once more that this classification is not of vital importance. Moreover, the debate concerning such categorizations is over-theorized and destined to remain on paper. For example, when one argues that socialism can be reinforced by political liberalism, one might be referring theoretically to Habermas, Kant or Bobbio. However, whatever label we prefer, whether 'left liberal' or 'liberal left,' in

describing a specific group of opinion producers, the main point is whether we are diligent enough to account for the circumstances that bring about the liberal or democratic opinions that are defended. In other words, the more insightful plain of analysis lies in connecting the dots between individual Democrats (as representative of a social type) and socio-political events (national and international) in which their opinion production is embedded. My basic contention is not to engage in an abstract discussion focusing on concepts but to expose what kinds of meanings concepts assume in relation to political and social developments taking place in Turkey after the 80s. Consequently, it is not much of an interest for me whether "liberal-democrat", "left liberal" or "liberal leftist" is the truest theoretical label.

Social type analysis allows us to analyze the group in focus in the context of their intellectual life-worlds, relations they establish, alliances they join and positions they take before the public as part of the reality they experience. Assuming that the very act of conceptualization is built within this relational network, a reflexive perspective is necessary. One of the reasons why opinion producers who are distracted by theoretical categorizations are hesitant to position themselves in one of these categories is their lack of self-reflexivity: They cannot self-analyze their own work of opinion production as part of the general "game" being played. The Democrat almost always fails to acknowledge and understand the fact that he himself is embedded in the social-political world that enables him to generate opinions.

A fundamental point must be underlined once more: In the usage of the concept 'liberal democrat,' the term 'liberal' mainly refers to the category of individual freedoms, while 'democrat' refers to an ethical approach to democracy,

elimination of military tutelage, “becoming civilian” and the dominance of rule of law. Therefore, t he Democrat, as representative of a social type, occupies a position sensitive to both dimensions. The whole point of my social type analysis is to how these ‘liberal’ and ‘democratic’ plains of opinion production are contextualized as the Democrat connects with Turkish politics.

The Democrat firstly distinguishes himself or herself from socialism and Kemalism as understood in Turkey. The major rationale for this demarcation is the Democrat’s perception that both of these ideologies support an image of a collectivist-authoritarian society. The Democrat argues that that socialism, especially as it is understood in Turkey, is an authoritarian initiative geared to social engineering. Developments taking place in Eastern Europe after 1989, collapse of the Soviet Union and serious loss of prestige suffered by socialism in this period meant to liberal and democrat opinion producers confirmation of their outlook to socialism and as such it contributed to the consolidation of their earlier judgments about socialism.

In this chapter, three figures are examined as cases that exemplify the Democrat as a social type: Kürşat Bumin, Etyen Mahçupyan and Ali Bayramoğlu. To construct each of these case studies, a historical and discursive analysis was completed, reinforced by in-depth interviews with each figure. Their works were analyzed, their biographies were explored and political and social factors building the social type were investigated. The emergence of the social type addressed over these three cases will be shown in two dimensions.

In the first dimension, the evolution of the social type is addressed through the relations of these three opinion producers with intellectual structures. In other words, the relation of the three cases to such politically influential Turkish

discourses as Kemalism, conservatism, post-modernism, political liberalism or social democracy will be examined as the first level in the consolidation of the liberal and democrat social type.

In the second dimension, the formation of the social type as the Democrat will be shown in relation to some Turkey-specific and international key socio-political developments through three cases that will be examined. In other words, assuming that relations that these three opinion producers have established with social structures are common and/or comparable, the formation of the social type examined in this second dimension will be addressed. The liberal and democratic opinion production is, first of all, directly associated with the "criticism of military tutelage" which has experienced various turning points in its course. This relationship can be observed, for example, during the rule of ANAP led by Turgut Özal, liberal stances taken in relation to the Kurdish issue or democratization debates emerging with the "28 February process."

7.2. Crossroads: Second Republicanism and New Democracy Movement (YDH)

The visibility in political arena of liberal and democratic opinion producers essentially began with their engagement with the New Democracy Movement (YDH) launched under the leadership of Cem Boyner,[194] the former president of TÜSİAD (Association of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen). Having its foundations laid in 1992 and being active in 1993 as a civil society organization, the YDH was a kind of institutional focus of the debates around the "Second

[194] Cem Boyner: He was the leader of the New Democracy Movement (YDH) when it organized as a political party on 11 December 1994 and held this position until 23 April 1996. After Boyner, Hüseyin Ergün was the leader of the party which, after getting 0.48% of total ballot in the general elections of 1995, joined the Party for Peace (Barış Partisi) led by Ali Haydar Veziroğlu in 1997 (In-depth interview with Hüseyin Ergün, *August 5, 2011*).

Republic"[195] getting hot in 1991. Indeed, the leading figures of the movement are mostly akin to arguments for a Second Republic. A similar overlapping is also valid for the cadres that constitute the YDH and opinion leaders known as Second Republicans. Including Mehmet Altan in the first place as the leading representative of the Second Republic idea, Cengiz Çandar and Asaf Savaş Akat assumed key positions in the YDH.[196]

The Second Republican opinion producers fuelled by the civil society discourse[197] suggested a far-reaching criticism of the authoritarian, militarist, bureaucratic and top-to-down (Jacobin) characteristics of the Republic with their theoretical approaches with references to Küçükömer and/or Mardin.[198] Their argument is that the Second Republic which is to replace the first one which is alien to pluralism, based not on the sovereignty of people but bureaucracy and the army reflects the desire of change cherished by all layers of society except the allied parties of military-civilian bureaucracy and pseudo-bourgeois making wealth with the support of the former. With the Second Republic, "the oppressive state structure will be destroyed and the power which was once withdrawn from the Ottoman dynasty but not given to people will thus find its real owner" (Altan, 1992). According to Mehmet Altan who first came up with the Second Republic project, this radical project envisages the elimination of military tutelage and bureaucratic character of the regime and making the rule of law operate (1992).

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[195] For a detailed discussion on the topic, see Chapter 4.

[196] Besides his intellectual contributions, Cengiz Çandar was one of the founding members of the YDH in charge of organizational affairs. When he left the YDH in 1995, headlines said "YDH loses a half." See: M. Ali Eren, "YDH Yarısını Kaybetti," *Aksiyon Dergisi*, No.11, February 18, 1995. For Mehmet Altan's engagement in YDH and his views concerning the evolution of the movement also see: Altan, 2008:218-219.

[197] Besides Mehmet Altan, Cengiz Çandar and Asaf Savaş Akat, the following may be cited as the leading figures of Second Republicanism: Hikmet Özdemir, Çetin Altan, Mete Tunçay and Nilüfer Göle.

[198] For a detalied discussion on attributing a central place to the approaches of İdris Küçükömer and Şerif Mardin in academic and political debates starting from the mid-80s, see: Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.

The project for a Second Republic foresees a state structure whose weight in economy is reduced, a transparent state where taxpayers can trace for what purposes taxes they paid are spent. According to this idea, the Kemalist concept of state which consolidates the hegemony of bureaucracy will be abandoned and economy will be allowed to operate fully in line with the rules of free market. Further, tax base will be expanded by reducing tax rates and Kemalist statism which has degenerated into a system of plunder will be terminated through privatizations (Altan, 1992). In fact, the basic motive behind the opposition of the Kemalist elite, military-civilian bureaucracy to the idea of shrinking state is their unwillingness to give up their patronage over the economy (Altan, 1992). The argument follows that the transfer to people of economic power held by the military and civilian bureaucracy will undermine this elite's hegemony over political life and then it will be easier to thwart military tutelage. In any case,

> the mission of the army is not to act as an institution keeping civilian power under threat but to protect the country from external foes and assume duties in line with the foreign policy of the country (Çandar, 1993:109).

The "rule of law" is of course the heading that the project for a Second Republic focuses on in the first place. They say bringing in the rule of law presupposes the termination of military tutelage. In the first republic, this principle was not translated into life as civilian-military bureaucracy was always favored (Altan, 1993: 37). The establishment of the rule of law and ensuring people's sovereignty is possible only when there is no institutional structure over and above the parliament. Yet, as stressed by Altan,

> The National Security Council (MGK) is a constitutional organ above the parliament even today. It directs or even controls people's sovereignty. No

> claim of corruption can be investigated if persons with uniforms are involved. Nothing can be investigated in such cases including secret counter-guerrilla organizations (….) the military who forced villagers to eat faeces was promoted let aside being penalized. Would the case be so if it were villagers who forced the colonel to eat that? Then, the rule of law is not applicable to the state elite, to armed bureaucracy (1993:37).

The immediate demand of Second Republicans for ensuring the sovereignty of people and rule of law is the drafting of a new and civilian constitution. This new constitution would put an end to the position of the MGK over and above the parliament and further enlarge and guarantee the rights and freedoms of citizens.[199] Another heading in envisaged new constitution is related to presidential system. In fact, presidential system is not an issue on which all second republican opinion leaders share the same view. For example, while Cengiz Çandar is an ardent defender of this system, Mehmet Altan raises serious objections to transition to the presidential system (Sever and Dizdar, 1993: 55, 108). According to Çandar who asserts that the society does have tendencies in accord with this system deriving from the tradition of Ottoman Sultans, presidential system may offer a more democratic structure open to mutual checking given that it is maintained at a specific balance (Sever and Dizdar, 1993:108). Contrary to Çandar, Mehmet Altan warns that the very same tradition of the Ottoman era may end up in our day with the suppression of democratic

[199] The campaign "I want my constitution" launched in the early 2000 by a group called "Civilian Constitution Initiative" upheld similar demands. A platform gathering under the lead of Murat Belge aimed at creating a new model on the basis of civil society. Figures in the working group included the following: Ersin Salman, Etyen Mahcupyan, Osman Kavala, Ahmet İnsel, Fatmagül Berktay, Mehmet Altan, Erol Katırcıoğlu, Kürşat Bumin, Ali Bayramoğlu, Mete Tuncay For further information, see: http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/2000/01/30/guncel/2.html.

tendencies and he firmly stands against the idea of transition to presidential system (Sever and Dizdar, 1993: 55).

While presenting their arguments, the heading that Second Republicans frequently make reference to is of course what they call "globalization." This process of globalization which has led to the dissolution of monolithic identities by pressing over the nation-state brought along a rising demand for new identities and made it possible for identities that the Turkish Republic suppressed since its inception to be visible in the public sphere together with new demands related to identity. Hence, in a globalized world it will not be as easy as it once was to suppress and silence Kurdish and Moslem identities that started to be raised more loudly in the 80s. Rising identity claims and emergence of a new area of struggle over this is considered as one of the major indicators that Kemalism cannot operate anymore; it is an ideology built upon a monolithic mentality rejecting all other identities (Altan, 1993: 56). Indeed, the very existence of an official Presidency for Religious Affairs is the most concrete indicator of the State control over religion. While financed by taxes paid also by non-Moslems and Moslems not from the "Sunni" sect, this institution represents only one approach of Sunni Islam, *Hanefilik.* Turkey's integration with the global world or "transition from agricultural to informational society" as Mehmet Altan puts it presupposes state's withdrawal from almost all areas from economy to education (1993: 43). For example, laicism in its true sense can be established when the state no more extends its hands to the domain of faith. According to Altan,

> There is a Kurdish problem in Turkey, which is considered non-existing by the official ideology. There is the problem of Islam in Turkey; that means Islam is rejected culturally. Kemalism is not fond of other ideologies. Now the country is trying to get rid of these tight clothes with Turgut Özal's initiatives, by integrating with free market and radically changing world.

> Turkey is discovering Islam, not as a religion but as a culture, it is discovering the Kurdish problem. This dynamism deriving from our rich pieces of mosaic will make this society much more democratic and productive (1993: 56-57).

The "neo-ottomanism" project is another way that the Second Republican circles find plausible in responding to claims for identity. This project entailing the idea that an approach focusing on the multi-cultural nature of the Ottoman can respond to requests for change emanating from searches for identity can be seen, in essence, as a new foreign policy approach coinciding with Turkey's search for a new position immediately after the Gulf War. The neo-ottomanism which was promoted by Cengiz Çandar,[200] then known as an unofficial advisor to Turgut Özal, in response to a new conjuncture in the region envisages Turkey as a country following an active policy in the region, acting with an "imperial vision." In other words, the project is based on the idea that given the upheaval in the Caucasus and Turkic Republics following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey can gain an upper hand in the process as the successor of the Ottoman Empire. In the same process, the First Gulf War and upheaval in the Balkans further triggered imperial ambitions and consequently it became more plausible that instead of remaining merely as a border post for NATO Turkey could well establish herself as a tutelar in the region. Throughout the period of cold war Turkey enjoyed an important position in NATO mainly for geo-politics. The end of this period meant for Turkey the loss of this advantage and consequently Turkey started to design a new foreign policy based on new ambitions and assertions derived from her earlier imperial experiences in areas facing instability

[200] Çandar served as special adviser to Turkish president Turgut Özal between 1991 and 1993. See: Author biography at İz Publications. For further information, see: http://www.iz.com.tr/?git=yazsab&kod=cengizcandar.

and newly emerging clashes. In short, neo-ottomanism as a project is based on Turkey's potential for raising imperial claims as the heir of an empire that ruled the Middle East and Balkans for centuries and as an actor that can guide her kin in the Caucasus. Çandar describes the situation as follows:

> Circumstances placed Turkey in a position where she can control the most important pathways in a large free trade area of the world. It is because immense areas and markets that had hitherto closed themselves to the outer world suddenly unfolded. Central Asia, Siberia, Ukraine...They have been on trade routes for centuries. Also, upon the dissolution of Socialist Bloc Balkan countries came out with their new identities… In this sense, Turkey caught the chance of representing one of the critical balances altogether forming the balance in a unipolar world indexed to the international free trade regime called as the New World Order (1993: 104).

Then, since it would not be possible to assign a meaning to imperial desires and claims inspired by the neo-ottomanism within the confines of misak-ı milli (national oath), it is a must to consider the former Ottoman geography as a kind of "natural space for moving" (Çandar, 1993: 104). Hence,

> All countries around are heirs to the Ottoman; but Turkey is the only country where the Ottoman estate remains and this geography is her natural space of movement. It can be said that even pre-ottoman geography is now open to her (Çandar, 1993: 104).

Meanwhile, the neo-ottomanism related approaches of other Second Republican opinion leaders manifested themselves as implicit support or acceptance with some reservations. Mehmet Altan, for instance, tends to question the operability of the project addressing the issue in normative terms or from a political ground. Altan thinks that the defensive strength of the Turkish army, Turkey's share in total world trade and the present state of her productive capacity

are the factors that do not allow Turkey to turn out as an imperial power (Altan, 1993: 53). In his words:

> If you are still unable to send to Turkic countries 10,000 typing machines that you promised how will you do what you have been saying? With which army are you going to do it? You can't even catch Russian planes departing from Batumi... (1993: 53)

While agreeing Altan in broad terms, Hikmet Özdemir is convinced that the new-ottomanism will provide a historical opportunity for making it up with history, hence with Islam which is an inseparable part of our culture (1993: 79). According to Özdemir, a neo-ottoman perspective will also facilitate solution in the Kurdish issue; by reviving an Ottoman type of multi-culturalism and through religious communities, civil society can gain life in the Kurdish issue too (Özdemir, 1993: 80).

The most serious objection to the neo-ottoman perspective was raised by Asaf Savaş Akat. Akat stated he was never fond of this perspective which is destined to bring along a new nationalist discourse and the project could be no solution to identity problems in Turkey (1993: 127). According to Akat, the only way that Turkey can get out of this impasse is to develop an identity with reference to 'democracy' instead of Islam, being a Turk or Ottoman (1993: 128). Nevertheless, almost all figures, including Akat, who criticize the neo-ottoman perspective agree that the foreign policy approach of Turkey is shallow, passive and "without vision" as in the well-known expression of Özal. This wide-based agreement indicates that an 'imperial' vision is in fact internalized however implicit it may be.[201]

[201] For Akat's criticism of the trajectory of the foreign policy adopted by Turkey, see: Akat, 1993:128-129.

To wrap up, according to the Second Republican opinion leaders, devoid of democratic essence indispensible for a true people's sovereignty the Republic declared in 1923 ended up not in a 'democratic' but merely 'laic' republic and by refuting class dynamics it eliminated the bases of social development (Altan, 1993: 47-48). This specific republican philosophy consolidated in the course of time by military-tutelary bureaucracy, sweeping away elements of democracy, is the main reason behind the presently ongoing anti-democratic structure (Altan, 1993: 49). Ways leading to a democratic Turkey can be opened by ensuring civilianization and dismantling military-tutelary regime and oppressive state, transferring power to the people which was one taken away from the Ottoman dynasty.

From the angle of economics, it can be stated that the Second Republic project describes civil society on neo-liberal grounds and envisages the shrinking of the State in line with neo-liberal restructuring (Erdoğan and Üstüner, 2002). As a matter of fact, as stated earlier, given the overlapping of Özal's neo-liberal policies and changes envisaged by the Second Republic project, many circles regard Özal as the architect of the Second Republic project (Dizdar and Sever, 1993: 11).[202] Indeed, statements by Özal on Turkey's advent to information age and "jumping a century forward" almost fully coincide, in both content and discourse, with recipes suggested by Second Republican opinion leaders for reaching the "information age."[203] Moreover, almost all Second Republican opinion leaders agree that all obstacles to free market should be removed and

[202] Mehmet Altan regards Turgut Özal as the catalyst of mentality change in Turkey See: Altan, 1993:59.

[203] See: "Turgut Özal's speeches at the 3rd İzmir Economics Congress, June 4, 1992, İzmir," Sever and Dizdar, 1993: 15. According to Mehmet Altan, the pillars of the system of degraded statism include state banks, state economic enterprises, state incentives, customs funds and private foundations enmeshed with Government ministries. No politician or political institution could do away with this system of pillage. Deprived of their economic freedom, the people too are unable to break it down. See: Altan, 1992. For Mehmet Altan's views concerning Özal, see: Altan, 2008: 138.

Turkey should integrate with the liberal free market system. For example, Mehmet Altan summarizes the most fundamental problem in Turkey as failure to realize the transition from political to liberal state (1993: 42). According to this view, as the State becomes liberal and is reduced to a mere technical apparatus, domains such as religion, education, press etc will be transferred to civil society while the State will suffice with such functions as mintage, tax collection and diplomacy.[204] As a result of principles underlying the Second Republic, economy will assume a character allowing for pluralism rather than being the single center of command and Turkey will reach the status of information society leaving behind the dominance of agriculture (Altan, 1993: 43).

In spite of all their political emphases, it seems much sounder to regard Second Republicanism as a current just like left wing liberalism rather than defining it as a political movement (Savran, 2006). Eventually, Second Republicanism, left wing liberalism or civil society advocacy as combining the earlier two have assumed a function of being a point of reference for demarcations and position definitions on both political-ideological plane and in academic domain (Savran, 2006).[205] The representatives of this current maintained their political assertions and suggestions in different political threads rather than getting together in a single political party and made efforts for depicting a liberal-democrat or liberal political line in the longer term.[206] The case where the current

[204] According to this conceptualization the state is, of course, free from ideologies, neutral and an instrument serving the society.

[205] Historians Mete Tunçay and Halil Berktay must be cited as representatives of critical-opposing and civil society approach in academia. With his criticisms of Kemalism, Asaf Savaş Akat is another figure providing significant support to the opposition in intellectual terms. See: Asaf Savaş Akat, "Kemalizm Türk Solunu Muhalefete Mahkum Ediyor," in *Resmi Tarih Sivil Arayış: Sosyal Demokratlarda İdeoloji ve Politika,* Ruşen Çakır and Hıdır Göktaş (editors), Metis, İstanbul:1991.

[206] Cengiz Çandar was for a long time the unofficial foreign policy advisor to Turgut Özal while Mehmet Altan was the advisor to Culture Minister Fikri Sağlar when the 49th Government was in office (Altan, 2008:214). Contributing to *Yeni Gündem* for some time, Asaf Savaş Akat was a member of the DSP (Democratic Left Party) and then SHP (Social-Democrat People's Party). See:

was represented by an independent political party occurred with the emergence of the New Democracy Movement (YDH). Joining the political arena with liberal-democrat political assertions, the YDH took the party form afterwards, but failed to sustain itself in the face of the conservative-liberal blend of Turkish politics.[207]

The YDH first emerged as a discussion group hosted by Cem Boyner. Then, upon increasing number of participants, it evolved into an intellectual discussion platform organized in Çeliktepe. The YDH's intention to directly take part and interfere in political domain led to some differences of opinion among liberal/democrat opinion producers that it had brought together (Altan, 2008: 220, Ergün, 2011). A group of opinion producers had the idea that the YDH should limit its mission to influencing political opinion making mainly through preparing reports on such major problems and issues as the Kurdish problem, military tutelage and political Islam. Upon the decision of others to get organized as a political party, this group distanced itself from the YDH preferring to support it from without.[208]

The composition and member profile of the YDH gives a kind of a map of left wing liberalism/liberal left in Turkey: A group of people, may be called as

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"Bir Portre: Asaf Savaş Akat," *İktisat Dergisi,* October 1992 in Akat:2004. For Akat's criticism of the SHP programme, see: *Sosyal Demokrasi Gündemi,* Armoni Yay., İstanbul: 1991.

[207] One of the founding members of the YDH, Prof. Şerif Mardin makes a similar assessment: "I was one of the founders of the New Democracy Movement. It was a movement bringing together wise persons with good faith, but lacking any understanding of how politics run in Turkey. We moved together with Kemal Derviş, but it soon became clear that it would not be much influential in political terms. There are some people saying that the YDH would be very influential today... I don't agree, liberal intellectualism is one thing and mobilizing voters is another thing completely different." Ruşen Çakır's interview, *Vatan*, May 25, 2007.

[208] Ali Bayramoğlu and Kürşat Bumin are opinion producers who left the YDH upon its decision to get organized as a party with the concern that established anti-democratic habits in Turkey would find their way in the YDH as well. Indeed, when the YDH engaged in talks of alliance with the ANAP before the elections of 1995, they considered this as a deviation from the original mission (*Cited by Kürşat Bumin, in-depth interview on 6 June 2011; Ali Bayramoğlu, in-depth interview on 21 June 2011*). In the organization of the YDH, specific tasks undertaken were as follows: Cem Boyner (speaker), Memduh Hacıoğlu (secretary general), Hüseyin Ergün (political affairs), Prof Asaf Savaş Akat (policy development), Cengiz Çandar (organizational affairs), and Zülfü Dicleli (strategy development). *Cited by Hüseyin Ergün, in-depth interview on 5 August 2011.* Also see: *Milliyet* daily, September 10, 1994.

"brain team" who joined the YDH in discussion process were once involved in socialist movement and even assumed key positions in this movement during their earlier political lives.[209] Besides Cengiz Çandar having his origin in Aydınlık movement, Zülfü Dicleli,[210] one of the leading figures of the Communist Party of Turkey (TKP) and founder of TBKP[211] had a central position in the YDH, shaping its ideological-political orientations. Another major component of the YDH consisted of Kurdish opinion producers and politicians with some distance to socialist left who had their roads crossed with the YDH while trying to organize in a political party. Editor Ümit Fırat, parliamentarians Hüsnü Okçuoğlu and Kamil Ateşoğulları who did not take part in the foundation of HEP together with deputies who resigned or were dispelled from the SHP were the leading figures in YDH's organization especially in Kurdish provinces.[212] Another figure giving hints about the composition of the YDH was Kemal Anadol who was the secretary general when the movement was organized as a political party. A CHP deputy from Zonguldak before the 1980 coup, Anadol was also the deputy

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[209]Examples include the following: Hüseyin Ergün (TİP), Zülfü Dicleli (TKP), Cengiz Çandar (Aydınlık movement).

[210] According to Hüseyin Ergün, Zülfü Dicleli then working in the İstanbul branch of Mülkiyeliler Birliği (Association of the Graduates of the Faculty of Political Sciences) came into contact with the YDH via Ergün and soon became one of the key figures of the movement. Dicleli, together with Ergün, was one of the 10 founding members of the YDH (*In-depth interview with Hüseyin Ergün, August 5, 2011).*

[211] TBKP (United Communist Party of Turkey): It is the legal communist party declared on 4 June 1990 by Nihat Sargın and Nabi Yağcı (Haydar Kutlu) who returned to Turkey in 1987. In broad sense, the TBKP is a political organization composed of the members of the TİP and illegal TKP. On 16 July 1991, the Constitutional Court decided for the closure of the party and this decision was published in the Official Gazette dated 28 January 1992. The TBKP is considered as the predecessor of SBP (Socialist Union Party). For further information, see: Nihat Sargın, *Dönüşten Özgürlüğe 900 Gün: Türkiye Birleşik Komünist Partisi,'TBKP Davası,'* Tüstav İktisadi İşletmesi, İstanbul: 2006.

[212] Hüsnü Okçuoğlu and Kamil Ateşoğulları were two SHP deputies resigning from the party to support SHP deputies who were dispelled from the party on 16 November 1989 for participating to the Kurdish Conference held in Paris in October 1989 and to protest this act of the party. Before joining the YDH they were involved in the founding process of the Socialist Union Party (SBP). Others resigning took part in the process of founding the HEP together with SHP members from Diyarbakır and Urfa who had also resigned to protest the same act. Collaborating with the SHP in 1991 elections, the HEP sent 18 deputies to the parliament and the party was closed down by the Constitutional Court on 14 July 1993.

president of the Peace Association.[213] After the coup, Anadol continued his political career in SHP and later joined those deputies resigning from SHP to protest the expulsion of some deputies for taking part in a Kurdish conference abroad.[214] After resigning from the SHP, Anadol joined the Socialist Union Party (SBP)[215] that brought together socialists from TKP, TİP, TSİP and other socialist groups and was, for a period of time, deputy-chair of the party led by Professor Sadun Aren.[216] To sum up, it is possible to say that the YDH could manage to bring together specific groups inspired by left wing liberalism though at representation level.

Arguing that with its ongoing 'defects' and 'limitations' democracy was not fully established in Turkey, the political assertion of the YDH consisted of defending a series of reforms that would bring a western type democracy to Turkey. The basic assumption behind this assertion was the idea that the defects of the present order could be eliminated only with democratic processes giving depth to and spreading democracy in the country (Boyner, 1994b: 34, 37). While acceding that reforms introduced by Turgut Özal in the 80s constituted an important turning point in Turkey's integration with the rest of the world and making market economy operational, the YDH stresses that still significant lacunae existed in some domains. That is, new values were not created for filling

[213] Kemal Anadol was tried as one of the leaders of the Peace Association and served one year in prison. For his memoirs see: *Kartal Maltepe'den Sağmalcılar'a İnsan Manzaraları,* 1988, İstanbul: Yalçın Yayınları.
[214] Kemal Anadol was SHP's İzmir Deputy in the period 1989-1991.
[215] The SBP was founded on 15 January 1991 by socialist circles from different backgrounds. The party defined its core mission as bringing the socialist left under the same roof. The party ran for the local elections of 24 March 1994 under the name BSA (United Socialist Alternative) with the participation of other socialist groups and had 80,000 votes. While under the threat of closure for its policies on the Kurdish issue, the BSA was transformed into a new party as United Socialist Party (BSP). The BSP is one of the key stepping stones of the ÖDP (Party for Freedom and Solidarity) which was founded in 1996.
[216] Together with Kamil Ateşoğulları and Hüsnü Okçuoğlu, Kemal Anadol left the SBP and took part in the YDP process in 1994. Anadol is presently a CHP deputy from İzmir.

the space of taboos broken by Özal, which resulted in degeneration and abrasion in politics. As such, politics are defined not on the basis of respective interests but values and beliefs and evolve around the axis laicism/faith. According to Cem Boyner, the YDH had the mission of saving politics from this artificial axis of clash and giving it a new frame satisfying universal criteria (1994a: 7). The priority step to be taken along this mission was to minimize the functions of the State and eliminate barriers to the working of free market. In Boyner's words:

> Turkey needs a radical revolution in mentality. This time we have to change the places of the cart and horses (…) we have to change the places of individuals and the state. Our Constitution starts by declaring the state as holy. Not so! It is human beings that are to be exalted. Humans first! (1994: 10).

In short, the YDH is insistent that the function of the state should be limited to maintaining law and order since production is essentially an activity that must be taken up by society (Boyner, 1994b: 38). Putting an end to the idleness of the State requires a radical and rigid programme for privatization; "privatization is such an important concept to justify privatization just for being privatization *per se*" (Boyner, 1994a: 12). Hence, ensuring productivity in Turkey and improving political ethics depends upon the strict implementation of privatizations. Otherwise, statism as well as services and means held by the public sector pave the way for corruption, nepotism and plunder and thus serve to the further degeneration of politics (Boyner, 1994b: 39, Akat, 1994: 54). Meanwhile, the direct relationship between efficiency and market economy loses its validity when it comes to justice. The YDH discourse continuously insists that free market economy alone is not capable of ensuring social justice. Ensuring equal opportunities in education and creating solidarity networks for retirees and the

needy therefore have their important places in the political programme of the party:

> The New Democracy Movement is a solidarity initiative and we attach as much importance to social justice and equality as we attach to the other two (productivity and freedom). These are all complementary and mutually supportive (Boyner, 1994a: 21).

Under the liberal-democratic political project of the YDH, safeguarding religious freedoms too is one of the indispensible elements of the rule of law. The precondition to ensuring this is to build a solid wall between the State and the domain of faith; that is to leave religious affairs entirely to society and communities (Boyner, 1994a: 13, Akat, 1994: 53).

Perhaps the field that the YDH displays its most radical attitude is the Kurdish problem which they describe as the most actual and burning one in the country (Boyner, 1994a: 13). The YDH adopted a discourse that unequivocally rejects the reduction of the problem into an issue of terror and order and insistently advocated for 'political solution' (Akat, 1994: 52). After all, recognition of Kurdish identity and enjoyment by Kurds of their fundamental rights and freedoms without any condition is a principle that the YDH upholds without debate. While stressing that the Kurdish problem does not merely consist of terror, the YDH reminds that in fighting out the PKK as an armed organization security forces should act lawfully in order to curb the popular base of terrorist acts (Akat, 1994: 52). According to the YDH, in case the Kurdish problem remains unsolved, economic problems of Turkey will become much graver and funds shifted from education to security will cause in near future to ever more burning manifestation of social problems (Boyner, 1994a:13). As the speaker for and leader of the YDH, Boyner's criticism of the army in the context of the

Kurdish problem can be considered as a concrete example of YDH's radical stance:

> You cannot show any other country that has been bombing her own land for ten years now. It is not usual at all; generally people bomb other countries. If a mule is decorated in that region there must be a serious mistake somewhere. While fighting out terrorism in a language that it can understand, we say we have to launch our social, economic and democratic reforms that are relevant to the country as a whole. Don't worry, not a reform only for Kurds; non-Kurds need the same reforms and democracy more than Kurds do (1994a: 14).

Obviously, the YDH adopted a critical discourse in such issues as military tutelage and military's intervention to politics and asked for delineation of army's duties and authorities in line with rules and principles upheld in liberal-democratic countries (Boyner, 1994a: 17). That is, while the YDH agrees with the need to have a strong army given the geo-political position of the country, it stresses that the army's obligation is to defend the country against possible threats from without rather than acting with a mission to protect democracy or the regime versus their internal dynamics (Boyner, 1994a: 17).

The YDH argued that the establishment of a liberal-democratic regime in Turkey could be possible only by fully translating the principle of rule of law into life. In this respect, the law of the citizen can take precedence over the law of the state by drafting a civilian, liberal-democratic constitution, not "for people in spite of people," but with actual participation of the people (Boyner, 1994a: 20). According to the YDH leaders, the underlying factor that distinguishes the YDH from other political organizations and parties is the importance it attaches to social consent (Boyner, 1994a: 26; Ergün, indepth interview 2011). The YDH is convinced that popular consent can be obtained without falling into the trap of

populism and that in terms of mentality the people of Turkey are much ahead of politicians. This approach is articulated as follows by Boyner:

> With the YDH, we are not saying something novel; we are just bringing out what people are already thinking. Nothing in what we are saying is alien to this people (…) and we run for being the largest popular movement in Turkey after Democrat Party we run for being the largest civil society movement in this country (Boyner, 1994a: 29).

It is true that democracy is attributed primary importance in YDH's main political texts, in speeches and press releases of Boyner and other leading figures and the party stresses that democratization will bring solution to many social and political problems. Nevertheless, it is possible to say that the YDH regards democracy not as value or virtue by itself but a precondition or vehicle for 'progress' or 'westernization,' which denote the same, and reaching the level of advanced countries of the west. When taken in concrete terms, the genuine political emphasis and assertion of the YDH in such issues as democracy, human rights and protection of fundamental rights and freedoms may turn into an approach indexed to the perfect operation of free market conditions. Especially in the process of getting organized as a party, texts and press released prepared by Boyner and other leading figures include specific cases where the ethic/philosophical dimension of democracy was occasionally overshadowed by economic mindset or even forfeited for that.[217] Even in the Kurdish issue that the YDH intervened with a quite radical discourse, it is not so hard to see the pre-eminence of economic mind:

> You cannot solve problems in economy and education unless you solve the Kurdish problem. Not a single penny would go to education. Can you guess the budget fund allocated to tourism and promotion? 7 million

[217] For a specific example, see: Akat, 1994.

> dollars...As a result of austerity measures, the fund that Turkey could allocate for keeping hotels full is only this" (Boyner, 1994a: 14).

Moreover, on a political ground where economic liberalism can exist by its articulation with a rather deep nationalism or conservatism, the YDH as a political movement defending a kind of political liberalism deprived of its traditional ideological motifs may well be said to concur with Kemalism in terms of basic orientation despite its major criticism to that line of thought. The statements by the YDH with emphasis on 'reaching the level of western democracies' overlaps with the motto of the Kemalism 'reaching the level of contemporary civilization' and, even more, seems to have fallen into the same orientalist framework. The expression "first league countries" that frequently appears in YDH's main texts denotes liberal-democratic western countries that Turkey can catch up with through "democratization." While the expression "first league countries" borrowed from Turgut Özal follows the password "travel from what is primitive to what is contemporary" belonging to Kemalist approach to progress and proposes a trajectory different from Özal's synthesis blended with conservative values, the YDH in fact laid the road leading to its political demise. It appears that sharing this common denominator with Kemalism which was harshly criticized for its Jacobin and anti-democratic orientations made the YDH, seeking itself a place in political arena with the claim of representing a pluralist and democratic political line in relation to Islam and Kurdish issues, incredible for its potential clients. The political discourse in which defects in public sector economy are to be removed "for being at par with the first league countries,"[218] privatizations are to

[218] "The rate of saving in the first league countries of the world is 25 to 30% while it is only 15% in Turkey" (Boyner, 1994a: 11).

be made for "being in the first league,"[219] restructuring of the country is reduced to a struggle for "catching up with the first league countries,"[220] the solution of the Kurdish problem is conceived as a precondition for "having the mode of life prevailing in the first league countries"[221] and the political assertion to do away with military tutelage is given content with reference to the "first league countries"[222] eventually left the abstract ideal for democratization under the shadow of westernization/liberalization dimension. The departure from the YDH of those opinion leaders who initially invested hopes in this movement must have its association with this tension which became crystallized after stepping into the political arena.

The brief narrative above on the YDH movement allows us to introduce our case studies that would corroborate the emergence of the new social type of political opinion producers in Turkey. In the absence of a cohesive and promising left-wing response to the conservative nationalist and Kemalist political mainstream, along with the disliked authoritarianism of Islamists represented by Welfare Party, YDH offered a kind of intellectual sanctuary to our social type. For a brief time, it provided a reasonable platform upon which political opinions supporting the empowerment of a truly democratic political culture could be spread.

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[219] "We need a very serious perestroika of our own. If we want to elevate to the first league then we have to solve our problems with approaches adopted by first league countries" (Boyner, 1994: 20).

[220] "What we need to do is to restructure Turkey. If we fail, we will remain distant to the first league" (Boyner, 1994a: 12).

[221] "If we really want the way of life in the first league countries and if we want to say we are the citizens of a democratic country, then we have to sit and think about it" (Boyner, 1994a: 15).

[222] "We think the place of the army in Turkey should be exactly the same with that in the first league countries, western democracies" (Boyner, 1994a: 17).

Let's now move on to the in-depth discussion of what positions and dispositions have come to be embedded into the social type of the liberal-democratic opinion producer.

7.3. Three Examples of Social Type Formation: Etyen Mahçupyan, Kürşat Bumin, Ali Bayramoğlu

7.3.1. Etyen Mahçupyan as a Democrat

7.3.1.1. First Phase in the Constitution of a Democratic Orientation: Mahçupyan's Political Positions in 'Demokrasi için Toplumcu Düşün'

The core question that guides the political thinking of Etyen Mahçupyan is related to the mentality and position required by a political/social functioning which envisages the coexistence of differences. Mahçupyan elaborates on this position and mentality under the heading "democrat." Starting from the late 1990s, 'democrat' and the 'state of being democrat' constituted the main reference point of Mahçupyan's political and social analyses, and beyond their definitions in the political sphere, Mahçupyan assigned ethical content to these concepts.

Available biographical information is limited for tracing the stages that we assume as constituting the sources of Mahçupyan propositions; nevertheless one can infer some meaningful clues from this limited information: Born in Istanbul, finished Robert College and the Department of Chemical Engineering in Boğaziçi University (Mahçupyan, in-depth interview 2011). The period which can be considered as determinative in his intellectual trajectory is when he was engaged in post-graduate studies in Ankara Faculty of Political Sciences. Having his thesis in the field of international economics (1977-80) Mahçupyan was the assistant of Yahya Sezai Tezel in the Department of Economics of the same faculty. He was recruited to the circle around the journal *Toplumcu Düşün* via Tezel and

undertook the editorial responsibility of the journal. As he tells, Yahya Sezai Tezel, first his instructor and then a friend as well as İlkay Sunar were the leading figures influencing the development and moulding of his basic propositions (Mahçupyan, in-depth interview 2011, 2005: 61). Indeed, Mahçupyan relates his engagement in the subject of epistemology to the courses given by Sunar:

> (After following Sunar's courses) I developed interest in epistemology and I went through whatever existed in literature about epistemology within one or two years. I noticed that issues related to epistemology were at the roots of many other issues that we conceived as politics. I grasped that epistemological stances, assumptions and premises constitute a ground whose meaning in a person's life is not always noticed (in-depth interview 2011).

Indeed, the foundations of the thinking of Mahçupyan, moreover the early traces of his present political/ideological stance can be found in social relations he experienced while he was in the Faculty of Political Sciences.[223] Sharing the same flat with Yahya Sezai Tezel in Ankara, Mahçupyan was quite influenced by Tezel's distant or even reactionary critical attitude to Marxism and built his political and intellectual position upon this critical approach to Marxism and socialist ideas inspired by Marxism. The intellectual focus which manifested this position was of course the journal *Toplumcu Düşün.* Starting as a monthly journal in June 1978, *Toplumcu Düşün* defined CHP, the victorious party of the 1977 elections, as a potential area where 'democrat-socialist' perspective could flourish and imbuing the CHP with a participatory, democratic and civil society based

[223] After having his application for assistantship to the desk of Latif Çakıcı in the Department of Management turned down for inadequacy in English language, Mahçupyan, together with his high school classmate Şevket Pamuk, started his academic career as an assistant in International Economics and Economic Development headed by Necdet Serin (2005: 61). Given his high school background in Robert College, the rejection for "inadequacy in English" was found questionable by Mahçupyan who thought that it was rather associated with his Armenian identity.

approach was adopted as the leading mission of the journal.[224] Mahçupyan explains the mission and major orientation of the journal as follows:

> (*Toplumcu Düşün*) was defending a libertarian understanding of left, which remained out of authoritarian leftist tradition and opted for young Marx. The journal we were running with Yahya Sezai Tezel, Haluk Özdalga and Sinan Mutlu in those years revealing that the Ecevit movement was a typical blend of populism gave me the opportunity to turn to the works of western leftists with democratic mentality." (2005: 62).

According to what Mahçupyan tells *Toplumcu Düşün* started out from the existence of a circle that remained out of classical CHP mentality while engaged in politics in this party and that also kept a distance to any socialism of Marxist origin (in-depth interview 2011). In other words, *Toplumcu Düşün* was envisaged as an intellectual centre which could influence the overall political line of the CHP and channel the party to a democrat socialist line which was apart from Marxism. Mahçupyan goes on to say that while Ali Dinçer was the mayor of Çankaya they were in contact with CHP members in Ankara Municipality who were engaged in vivid debates in search for a truly democrat center; eventually, these contacts revealed there was a need for a journal focusing on these themes (in-depth interview 2011). In short, the journal *Toplumcu Düşün* emerged when the paths of social democrats not considering the political identity of the CHP sufficiently democrat and leftist crossed with young academic sharing similar concerns.[225]

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[224] Having its full title as "*Demokrasi İçin Toplumcu Düşün*", the journal ended its life with its 16th issue dated May-June 1980. The first editorial board of the journal included the following: Türker Alkan, Nilüfer Arıak, M. Kadri Atabaş, Etyen Mahçupyan and Yahya Sezai Tezel (Yılmaz, 2007: 222).

[225] Mahçupyan relates that the search for a wider understanding of left and democracy which goes beyond the political line proposed by the CHP was not limited to the group in Ankara Municipality and a group of young medical doctors from Hacettepe University established contact with his group, looking for a democratic environment of political debate (Mahçupyan, in-depth interview 2001).

Articles in the early issues of the journal give significant hints about its mission and intellectual/political challenge. For instance, criticisms of Leninism and Jacobinism frequently appear on the pages of the journal. Again in accord with the core theses of the journal, issues such as civil society, socialist humanism and roots of totalitarianism were addressed by various authors and assessments by such authors and thinkers as Eric Fromm, Korac and Kolakowski found spaces in the journal.[226] It must be added here that the group around *Toplumcu Düşün* tended to use the term 'communism' with negative content sounding like Cold War terminology in line with the international agenda of the time and moved from the assumption that there was a fundamental difference between socialism and Marxism/Leninism in terms of understandings of humanity, society, politics, knowledge and ethics.[227] According to this idea, any notion of socialism inspired by Marxism embodied the possibility of turning into totalitarianism for its inherent dimensions of mysticism and teleology (Tezel, 1978a: 42). The argument goes on that the totalitarian outcomes of attempts to create the 'new human being' in the USSR and Eastern European countries are closely associated with this mystic and teleological essence (Tezel, 1978a: 43). As one of the central figures of *Toplumsal Düşün*, Yahya S. Tezel argues that Marxism reduces man to a kind of *homo economicus* and thus falls into a fundamental contradiction with the idea of emancipation as its essential assertion. According to Tezel,

> It is of course true that in socialist society human beings will try to realize themselves in processes of individualization and socialization that differ from those in other social formations. But it is ungrounded to expect social institutions and structures in a socialist society to totally change the inner

[226] See, for instance: Eric Fromm, "Sosyalist Hümanizma'ya Giriş," *Toplumcu Düşün,*Vol:1, June 1978; Veliko Korac, "Hümanist Toplumu Ararken," *Toplumcu Düşün,* Vol:1, June 1978; "Kolakowski'yle Söyleşi," *Toplumcu Düşün,* Vol.5, December 1978.
[227] For an assessment in the journal concerning this issue, see: Yahya Sezai Tezel, "Sivil Toplum, Siyasal Toplum ve Sosyalizm," *Toplumcu Düşün,* Vol.1, June 1978.

> world of people and to create a 'new man' free of any inner conflict. It is also a daunting expectation (…) the total disappearance of disaccords that stem from the inner nature of human beings" should neither be expected from nor necessary in a socialist society (Tezel, 1978a: 40).

According to this idea, the issue of democracy precedes the issue of socialism and thus the realization of socialism *per se* does not guarantee democracy. Tezel outlines the case as follows:

> The proposal for a socialist society and the act of founding such a society, socialist thought and practice should not forget that the need for decision making processes and mechanisms for settling disaccord among people will remain a socialist society as well. This need re-introduces the issue of democracy to the socialist worldview that seeks to eliminate obstacles to human being's realization of his individual and social existence as a free creature (1978a: 44).

In addition to his editorial responsibility and many other articles, perhaps the most important contribution of Mahçupyan to *Toplumcu Düşün* is his critical articles on Jacobinism and Bolshevism addressing the political thought and politics in Russia.[228] These articles argue that the Bolshevik approach to knowledge and history constitutes the climax of totalitarian and Jacobin line and that Marxism can be linked in no way whatsoever to the Leninist political line, leaving aside the provision of a legitimate framework for transforming Bolshevism into specific propositions (Mahçupyan 1978a, 1978b). According to Mahçupyan, Bolshevism is based on the assumption that the one who holds the monopoly of using political force also holds the monopoly of 'what is right' and as such Bolshevism in fact has no need for Marx's doctrine (1978c: 217).[229]

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[228] See: Etyen Mahçupyan, "Bolşevizme Doğru Rusya'da Düşünce ve Siyaset (1700-1825): Aydınlanma ve Jakobenizm," *Toplumcu Düşün,* Vol.8, March 1979; "Rusya'da Düşünce ve Siyaset: 1825-1855,"*Toplumcu Düşün,* Vol.9, April 1979; "Rusya'da Düşünce ve Siyaset:1855-1881," *Toplumcu Düşün,* Vol.11, August 1979.

[229] For a discussion on Marxism and Leninism, especially see: Mahçupyan, "Marksist Eleştiri İçin Rehber," *Toplumcu Düşün,* Vol.2, July-August 1978.

Consequently, Leninism has no meaning beyond being the manifestation of a radical-authoritarian quest of a group of Marxists following the Jacobin tradition (Mahçupyan, 1978c). Mahçupyan interprets the transformation of Lenin's radical democratism in the *State and Revolution* into sharp authoritarianism in Russia following the civil war; he adds that a scrupulous examination of Lenin's post civil war speeches suggests that his suggestions for the revitalization of proletarian democracy in the face of retarding Soviets were no more than manoeuvres concerning the party (1978c: 144).

To wrap up, when Mahçupyan's critical and occasionally even hostile stance against Jacobinism and to Leninism as a more authoritarian follower of the former which can be easily traced in his writings starting from the 90s are taken, the roots of this stance can be found by referring back to the times of *Toplumcu Düşün.* In other words, this journal was an early intellectual focus presenting almost all initial propositions that later laid the ground for Mahçupyan's political ideas.

Comparing *Toplumcu Düşün* which had started with the mission of advocating a civil society based, participatory and democrat political line to *Yeni Gündem* which was launched with similar motives after 1980 [230] a very fundamental difference strikes attention. While *Yeni Gündem* was an intellectual focal point defining itself in reference to left and mainly targeting socialist left, *Toplumcu Düşün* limited the range of its discourse to CHP, thus excluding the socialist/Marxist circles of the time on the ground that they were "against democracy." The political perspective suggested by *Toplumcu Düşün* regards the socialist/Marxist groups of the time as vehicles of terror and violence and assumes

[230] For a detailed discussion on *Yeni Gündem,* see: Chapter 5.

that they are the representatives of totalitarianism in their leftist outfit. In one of the articles in the 13th issue of the journal addressed to the CHP, a clear distinction is made between socialist and communist approaches whereby socialist left out of CHP is associated with communist-totalitarian stance:

> As can be guessed, socialist approach is closely associated with democratic interpretation and communist approach with anti-democratic one. If the CHP really wants to be a 'democratic left' party, it should first get rid of conceptual chaos and make its choice clear with all relevant dimensions and extensions (….) And if the party wants sustain itself as a democratic-socialist organization, it should assert its transforming character and name the long-term objective of this transformation as transition from capitalist relations of proprietorship and production to socialized (not gathered under the state) production structures. For the CHP to succeed in turning into a democrat-socialist party, it is as necessary for it to remain distant from tendencies of identifying leftist stance with revolutionarism as declaring that its objective is to establish a de-centralized socialist society (1979: 609).[231]

As can be inferred from the quotation above, totally different from the vision of political circles of the time who define themselves as socialist/Marxist, the 'democrat socialist Turkey' imagination of *Toplumcu Düşün* is built upon a social democrat understanding that totally excludes revolutionarism and remains at a distance to Marxism though partly inspired by it. In the words of Haluk Özdalga, one of the contributors of the journal, Bolshevism is the "rise of dark ages from their graves in Russia" (1979: 393). According to Özdalga, the representatives in Turkey of Bolshevism or Leninism as the same represent a section who wants to replace the democratic-pluralist regime with a totalitarian one and therefore constitute a serious obstacle in the way of democrats in the country (1979: 398).

[231] The article mentioned was published anonymously under the title "CHP Yolunu Seçerken".

It is known that Mehmet Ali Aybar (1908-1995) is an important political and intellectual figure who, though indirectly, has its contribution to the formation of left-liberal opinions with his reaction to the invasion of Czechoslovakia and particularly with his original analyses regarding the social formation in Turkey.[232] His main theses on the social formation of Turkey partly coincides with the ATÜT-centred approaches of İdris Küçükömer and Sencer Divitçioğlu. This original analysis where bureaucracy is defined as the hegemonic class also includes some points calling in the "centre-periphery" approach in some respects.[233]

Aybar's interpretation of Marxism with the themes of alienation and emancipation at its heart and his criticism of exploitation-based Marx reading as reductionist seemed quite close to *Toplumcu Düşün'*s libertarian and democrat conceptualisation of socialism. It was also in compliance with the overall perspective of *Toplumcu Düşün* when Aybar said the Soviet version of socialism signified a totalitarian order and led to the conception of socialism by wide masses as an oppressive and authoritarian regime. Moreover, the approach of libertarian socialism[234] which was the main reference point of Aybar's analyses particularly after 1968 and his sharp criticisms against the USSR [235] was considered by *Toplumcu Düşün* as a challenge against dogmatism.

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[232] The three liberal democratic opinion producers we are investigating in this dissertation as examples of a social type, during the in-depth interviews, have all mentioned the name of Mehmet Ali Aybar as the sole political figure in the socialist left who had the most influence on them. Especially Kürşat Bumin expressed that Aybar's political views had a significant role in the shaping of his own social and political convictions. Bumin recalled that for sometime he participated in the political meetings of a discussion group that followed Aybar's line (Bumin, in-depth interview 2011).

[233] For the influence of Küçükömer's original analysis on liberal-democratic opinion production, see: Chapter 5, pp. 69-78. For the impact of center-periphery analysis of Şerif Mardin as a major theoretical inspiration for liberal-democratic opinion production, see: Chapter 5, pp. 111-127. Concerning the overlap between Aybar's theses and positions of Küçükömer and Diviçioğlu, see: Özman, 2007: 380-381; Belge, 1985: 2127.

[234] For a detailed analysis on the subject, see: Özman, 2002.

[235] See, Aybar, 1988: 144-153.

Nevertheless, it should be underlined that the main point of convergence between Aybar's thinking and the political line suggested by *Toplumcu Düşün* is the critical approach to Leninism and the issue of leadership. Aybar's book published in June 1979 ("Marksizm'de Örgüt Sorunu – Leninist Parti Burjuva Modelinde Bir Örgüttür [The Problem of Organization in Marxism- Leninist Party is an organization of Bourgeois Model]) was addressed in detail in the 12th issue of *Toplumcu Düşün* and Mahçupyan contributed to this discussion with an article. Denying the Leninist type of party organization as bourgeois, this book ran the risk of denigration and condemnation by socialist circles; but it was appreciated by *Toplumcu Düşün* as the manifestation of Aybar's independent and democrat stance and regarded as a stepping stone in struggle against dogmatism. Yet, Aybar's insistence in building his theses upon Marxist propositions and "his ideological stance still attached to the tutelage of Marxism-Leninism" is explained by his failure to break apart totally from dogmatism (Özdalga, 1979: 574). Özdalga reminds the following in this regard:

> It is interesting to note that while standing against the Leninist party model and asserting that it is a bourgeois model of organizing, Aybar employs a methodology that belongs to the Marxist-Leninist conception of history. (…) The only tool that Aybar employs to prove his thesis consists of the most dogmatic 'laws' of Marxist-Leninist understanding of society (1979: 574-575).

As Özdalga, Mahçupyan considers it as a weakness that Aybar could never drop the dogmatism that is inherent in Marxism and approaches the issue from a more philosophical stance, thus giving start to a debate about Marxism itself. According to Mahçupyan:

> A real criticism of Leninism becomes possible only by accepting that socialism is not an inevitable stage but a possibility, one in a set of

> possibilities and therefore it embodies a problematic of preference. (For those who would assert that this very statement runs counter to Marxism, I suffice with saying that it does not run counter Marx as a man of science) (1979: 583).

Toplumcu Düşün is a periodical that in the period 1978-80 frequently visited the "center-periphery model" [236] which unexpectedly spread after 1980 and, in Bora's words, turned out as a classical paradigm in explaining politics in Turkey. As a matter of fact, Şerif Mardin and Metin Heper contributed to various issues of the journal with their articles.[237] Here, *Toplumcu Düşün*'s emphasis on civil society builds its meaning within the framework of the centre-periphery model and civil society is defined without any reference to Marx. According to this view, social injustice created by capitalism is a problem that could be eliminated by through opportunities provided by democracy, though in a longer term (1978: 8). Furthermore, the full operation of democracy with its institutions is regarded as the guarantee of a fairer and more participatory social life although not the full emancipation of humanity. Mahçupyan, as a figure contributing to most of the editorials of *Toplumcu Düşün* underlined the need for translating democrat and communitarian idea into life while warning that options other than democracy (i.e. revolution) would bring in authoritarian regimes in spite of their potential to introduce radical solutions.

The introduction titled "As we start" in the first issue of *Toplumcu Düşün* includes some ideas that Mahçupyan would perhaps articulate similarly in the 90s too:

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[236] See, Chapter 5, p.98 and pp.114-128.

[237] See, for instance: Metin Heper, "Patrimonyalizm ve Osmanlı Türk Toplumu," *Toplumcu Düşün,* Vol. 7, March 1979; Şerif Mardin, "Sınıf, Grup ve Kişilik," *Toplumcu Düşün,* Vol.1, June 1978.

> The soundness of ideas is related to their competitiveness with others. Recognizing the existence of others and considering their criticisms in a healthy and sensitive manner (…) the existence of a democratic environment of debate is possible with the ease that different theses have access to this realm of debate. (…) One of the fundamental principles of *Toplumcu Düşün* is to avoid dogmatism. In both knowledge and methodology, it is highly probable for dogmatism to create vicious circles. All need to be debatable. Otherwise, ready blueprints may condition people in narrow and monolithic channels (…) if history has ever proven something; it is that the truth is only relative (1978: 11, 14).

7.3.1.2.Engagement with More Proactive Political Opinion Production: Mahçupyan's Increasing Public Visibility

Following the military coup of 1980 and the closure of *Toplumcu Düşün,* Mahçupyan ceases his intellectual activities for a period of time. He relates experiencing a great disappointment and desperation in this period. (2007: 124). In this period Mahçupyan took part in business life and engaged in commercial activities. In his words, his "return" to philosophical/intellectual activities takes place starting from 1989 upon his engagement in institutional cultural change programmes with a consultancy firm (Mahçupyan, in-depth interview 2011).[238] This counselling service covering such themes as personal perception as an individual, how it is perceived by others, associated reactions and cultural forms produced while with others, etc encourages Mahçupyan to think about issues in the domain of social psychology. He talks about the process as follows:

> After all, this counselling service targeted to bring about a change in the cultural structure of a group and was therefore closely associated with social psychology. I realized that this social psychological approach and the categorization underlying it perfectly coincided with what I was looking for in epistemology. I started thinking that the connection in-between or its more generalized and expanded form could be told as what we call *'mentality* (in-depth interview 2011).

[238] Mahçupyan was working as a manager in Eczacıbaşı in this period (Mahçupyan, 2005: 63).

The institutional culture programme that Mahçupyan became a part of is a work that is built upon the question what kind of a manager/employee culture should be established in order to increase productivity in companies. During this process Mahçupyan had articles published in commentary pages of various daily papers and being noticed by the YDH he got in touch with this group. With this, he had the opportunity to consolidate his background in social psychology and more recent professional work through political-cultural-social-economic spheres and test it in practice (Mahçupyan, in-depth interview 2011; 2007: 124; 2005: 66).[239] Hence, 'being a democrat' which can be considered as the founding and central element in Mahçupyan's intellectual universe is the outcome of an intellectual process with social psychology and epistemology at its roots.

The conceptualization of 'democrat' and intellectual work on the 'state of being democrat' can be taken as a dimension that made Mahçupyan distinct. Moreover, this intellectual endeavour reinforces our investigation on the social type of the Democrat.[240]

As stated earlier, one of the key concepts in Mahçupyan's system of thinking is "mentality." This conceptualization bears the imprints of the framework suggested by Robert Blake[241] whose approach Mahçupyan got acquainted with during his work focusing on institutional culture/company culture and leadership. As a matter of fact, Mahçupyan's analysis based on four major

[239] Mahçupyan's three articles sent to the page 'Entelektüel Bakış' in *Milliyet* daily led to his invitation to the YDH (2007: 124; 2005: 65-66).

[240] For instance Kürşat Bumin says he does not see contemplating on the state of being a democrat as a part of his intellectual production (Bumin, in-depth interview 2011).

[241] Robert Blake (1918-2004) developed the Managerial Grid Theory together with Dr. Jane S. Mouton in 1964. The Managerial Grid Theory was based on the analysis of business leadership and the conditions that enhance human effectiveness in the given organization. The approach introduced by Blake and Mouton was based on the premise that employees were to be involved in organizational purpose and determining production needs. According to the approach, a business leadership which was able to create a team environment based on mutual trust and respect would in turn lead to higher productivity and satisfaction.

sets of mentality is developed by capitalizing on Blake's assumption that human beings can be defined in reference to seven basic patterns of behavior (Mahçupyan, 2007: 23-34). Mahçupyan follows the trace of Blake who argues that any singular behavior that a person adopts in the face of any singular situation in fact reflects a worldview that has its internal consistency and an adult displays at least two mental behaviors. Mahçupyan borrows the four of Blake's seven mental behavior models (Mahçupyan, 2007 25). For their nature as establishing connection with the outer world, these elements are called "founding modes" by Mahçupyan (Mahçupyan, 2007: 25). Using the terminology of Mahçupyan, these are authoritarian, patriarchal, relativist and democrat mentalities (Mahçupyan, 2007: 26). In this framework, 'mentality' expresses an outlook that can be considered 'paradigmatic' which consists of assumptions and concepts emerging from human relations and adopted by people unconsciously in line with how they perceive outer world (Mahçupyan, 2007: 11, 13, 26, 36). The point which must be underlined here is that mentality, defined over relationalism has a nature transcending such dimensions as mind, intelligence, virtue or ethics. In Mahçupyan's narrative, for example, while a highly authoritarian person may be virtuous, a democrat, on the other hand, may be extremely lazy or deprived of any virtue. (2007: 27).

Blending findings transferred from social psychology with epistemology, Mahçupyan considers authoritarian and relativist mentalities as outcomes of materialistic reflection theory while seeing patriarchal and democrat mentalities as products of idealist methodology (2007: 27-28). According to the table suggested by Mahçupyan, the authoritarian mentality is that of a subject who believes he has reached the knowledge of outer world and who has no doubt about the clarity and

uniqueness of his truths and this is what brings along an authoritarian perception of politics (2007: 28). An extremist example is Leninism which bears the imprints of a totally authoritarian mentality (Mahçupyan, 2007: 28). Just like the hierarchical and homogenous world perception of a single individual with an authoritarian mentality in social psychology terms, political approaches generated by authoritarian mentality too are based on imagination of a hierarchical and homogenous society (Mahçupyan, 2007: 28).

The relativist mentality which can be seen as the outcome of transition from materialist reflection to mutualism, on the other hand, moves from the premise that a single truth has never existed and each may have his different truths (Mahçupyan, 207: 30). Addressing liberalism on the basis of relativist mentality, Mahçupyan argues that the relativist mentality foresees a social structure which is homogenous as well, but without any hierarchy and where nobody is compared to another (2007: 31). As a matter of fact, the imagination of a homogenous society by relativist mentality is a point that Mahçupyan stresses when settling accounts with liberalism and arguing that stances of being liberal and democrat are contradictory. For instance, Mahçupyan maintains that monist identification of citizenship in liberalism is the reflection of the image of a homogenous society deriving from relativist mentality (2007: 31). According to this point of view, the pluralistic tendency in liberalism is also related to objectivity attributed to the opinion of majority (2007:32).[242]

Yet, patriarchal and democratic approaches that are developed on the basis of the assumption that epistemologically the truth is shaped, out of any materially based reflection, as a spiritual and moral essence reaching minds, are based on an

[242] For a critique of the tendency of liberalism to attribute rightness to the decision of the majority as composed by single individuals without recognizing and considering the minority and the "other" see: Mahçupyan, 2007: 107-115; 2005: 64-65.

heterogeneous design (Mahçupyan, 2007: 28). The idealistic stance of patriarchal mentality points out to the domain of religions including polytheism (Mahçupyan, 2007: 29). The domain of religions as a system where none is equal to another has a both heterogeneous and hierarchical imagination (Mahçupyan, 2007: 29). Mahçupyan mentions the Ottoman social system as an example to the dominance of patriarchal mentality:

> The whole Ottoman system is a problematic of ensuring the coexistence of hierarchical, heterogonous, singular, incomparable and unique structures within a just mechanism. It is fully built upon patriarchal mentality since it stems from Islam and the major reference is religion. There is the matter of reflection here too. Here, however, the mind is defined not materially but as a part of what is spiritual. Hence, what is reflected in my mind is still true. Because it is the part of a godly creation (…) if there is reflection, then where do differences come from? Then the answer is 'I understand what God says better than you do (2007: 27-28).

As the key concept in Mahçupyan's original approach, "being democrat" or democratic mentality can be epistemologically traced back to Kant.[243] In fact, Kant assumes that mind is not a *tabula rasa* but has its categories and methodology and argues that each person perceives the outer world differently and hence it is not possible to speak about a single authority in regard to outer reality. Consequently, shortcomings of the perception of a single individual can be overcome only by many subjectivities coming together to produce a common subjectivity (Mahçupyan, 2007: 33). And eventually, the nature of democrat mentality based on common subjectivity and diversity will make it possible to generate a 'democrat' social environment where there is no oppression of the minority by majority and where minority ideas or even non-existing ones are entitled to seek majority. It is because what is meant by 'common subjectivity'

[243] Mahçupyan states that in epistemological terms Hume, as well as Kant has his important place when it comes to the conceptualization 'democrat.' (2007: 32). This suggestion seems quite meaningful given the intellectual exchange and philosophical transitivity between Hume and Kant.

when it is said to ensure principles of coexistence is in fact ‘common’ ethics (Mahçupyan, 2007: 34). According to Mahçupyan, democrat mentality which makes it legitimate and meaningful for people to come together and look for their subjectivity will also make it possible to establish a common ethics (2007: 34). In any case, the basic difference between being democrat and liberalism emerges right at this point: While democrat stance makes it possible to produce common ethics over the coexistence of common subjectivities, liberalism cannot provide a ground conducive to generating common ethics because of its tendency for pluralism (Mahçupyan, 2007: 34). On the other hand, democrat mentality is built upon the assumption that the knowledge is ontologically relative and since it is in need of knowledge possessed by the ‘other’ it has to be in accord with the ‘other’ in the process of establishing a common ethics (Mahçupyan, 2005: 65). As stated earlier, relativism as the set of mentality which liberalism finds its ground reduces democracy to an issue of counting and measuring on the assumption of incomparability and conceptualizes democracy as a system that is defined through majority. The understanding of democracy, as Mahçupyan proposes, which is built on democrat mentality, on the other hand, foresees that “people interfere in decision making mechanisms in every area and issue that is of interest to them” (2005: 65). Hence, instead of being principles that may be of use in the implementation of democracy, participation and persuasion are *sine qua non* for the operability of democracy (Mahçupyan, 2005: 65).

As a perspective based on the belief that human mind is only one of possible minds and that human being is bound by subjectivity, it is quite understandable that it attributes importance to mutualism, listening and understanding one another in the issues of norm, ethics and rule setting. For the

set of ethics or norms produced by democrat mind to be democrat as well, these have to be only temporary (Mahçupyan, in-depth interview 2011). In Mahçupyan's words:

> …it has to be temporary since a step further we may all reach different ideas; we are talking about a unity that has to be reconstructed upon the inclusion of one new person, birth of a child or each adolescent becoming an adult (in-depth interview, 2011).

In this case, the understanding in Mahçupyan's thinking concerning the coexistence of differences can be possible through the morality[244] generated over the democrat mind. This idea purporting that a non-religious ethics defined over the concept of being democrat is the *sine qua non* of living together presupposes mutual listening and understanding. According to Mahçupyan, any ethics not defined on the ground of being democrat is bound to converge with religious grounds and follow a course that is open to oppression (in-depth interview 2011). Yet, the moral ground that makes coexistence possible should be able to gather individuals and the State at the same point and to produce a specific legitimacy in basing on a religious ground (Mahçupyan, 2007: 19, in-depth interview 2011). Social demands which gained visibility recently also point out to the necessity of such an understanding of ethics:

> You should have such a mentality that is capable of producing common ethics while not being religious. You should have such an ethics that is not discriminatory and that makes citizens the interferer to the nation-state with wider rights and more participatory mechanisms (Mahçupyan, 2007: 20).

Politics based on 'democrat mentality' as suggested by Mahçupyan can be defined roughly as the process of operating common decision making mechanisms

[244] Here Mahçupyan, refers to morality rather than ethics in philosophical (Mahçupyan, 2011).

(Mahçupyan, in-depth interview 2011). In other words, politics is an issue of constituting and translating into life of decision making mechanisms of a given society covering momentary and prospective imaginations concerning a given problem (Mahçupyan, 2011). This understanding of politics that becomes operational over a range of mechanisms concerning mutual communication, listening and understanding so long as defined within the framework of 'democratic mentality' can exist through participation and transparency (Mahçupyan, 2011). In reference to this definition, the concept 'conflict' means being conscious of the existence of differences and implies a process of debate whereby parties try to understand each other rather than a confrontation on the basis of the use of naked force or resort violence (Mahçupyan, 2011).

In understanding how Mahçupyan conceptualizes 'politics' and 'the political,' his opinion about and approach to the YDY seems quite illuminating. As stated in earlier chapters, Mahçupyan approached the party formation under the YDH with some reservations and considered politics as too important to be reduced to a political party (2011, 2007: 126). For Mahçupyan, politics is first of all an activity of influencing and changing people intellectually (2007: 126, 127). As a matter of fact, while conveying his views concerning the YDH he gives hints about how he attributes meaning to politics:

> Politics is doing what you have to do to influence people as much as possible. (…) Our thinking was as follows: There is such thing as the Law on Political Parties and once you are a political party you become like others and cannot say what you want to. You have to observe many concerns that would never come to your mind when you are (civil society) movement (Mahçupyan, 2007:126).

As stated earlier, Mahçupyan approaches Jacobinism and reduction of politics to struggle for power with a sharp criticism and basing on the assumption

that the scope and content of politics would be different in a postmodern world he argues that a new understanding of politics need to be developed from an intellectual point of view (Mahçupyan, 2007: 130-131). According to this idea, the political philosophy of Jacobinism, an extension of totalitarian mentality, which excludes ethics and sacralises active force should be replaced by a perception of politics built upon democrat mentality and a perspective in line with present day's postmodern world (2008: 61; 2007: 130-131). To put it in more concrete terms, Mahçupyan stresses that for a country like Turkey, today there is no chance for a truly 'democrat' party to take power and hence the priority mission of political activity should be influencing any representative party in power in line with democrat mentality through civil society organizations or think-tank circles (2007: 132). This line of political activity is suggested and justified on the ground that democrats in Turkey could not manage to come up with a political movement representing their stance[245] and that democrats are presently dispersed to various political parties (1996: 108). In other words, Mahçupyan's suggestion of engagement in politics that cannot transform into a permanent political position envisages demarches that are intended to channelize existing political movement to the grounds of democracy until truly democrat political orientations complete their process of 'fermentation' in political terms (1996: 110). This perception of politics which assigns a central place to the postmodern theme of uncertainty focuses on today instead of utopia based configurations for the future and suggests that change can take place only in the context of mentality-change (Bayramoğlu, 2005: 13).

[245] Excluding his short-lived involvement in the YDH from this assessment, thinks, as mentioned earlier, it is impossible under circumstances prevailing in Turkey to make the YDH functional as a political party.

The fact that Mahçupyan is an opinion producer visible in public sphere should be addressed in connection with issues having a central place in his intellectual activity. In this context we observe two headings coming to the fore in Mahçupyan's thinking: laicism and nationalism. Laicism which is addressed mainly in reference to political Islam and nationalism which is discussed specifically in the context of the Kurdish issue denote the problematic that constitutes the frame of his thinking. According to Mahçupyan, the military tutelage and statist political philosophy should be the major probing points to lead a more genuine debate over laicism and nationalism. Indeed, in his books and articles published in the period 1996-1999, Mahçupyan suggests addressing the issue of political Islam and Kurdish problem with democrat mentality and from a perspective that questions military tutelage.[246] In Mahçupyan, being a democrat is understood as a value, as a virtue rather than an instrument for building a system in which citizens enjoy equal rights and freedoms. This stance of being democrat cannot be translated into life so long as it is reduced to a mere instrument. From the perspective of this ideal, political Islam and Kurdish problem constitute both an opportunity and a hard challenge in ethical building of democrat stance. In fact, Mahçupyan's intellectual systematic that places the stance of being democrat at its center had its core process of development in a time period when, in Bayramoğlu's words, the "most burning and crucial phase" of the Kurdish problem was experienced and when the military tutelage regime of February 28th penetrated everywhere (Bayramoğlu, 2005:13). This phase in which "what is social became the captive of what is political and what is political became the captive of the state" in a sense marked the real dawn of "the democrat' as well

[246] See: *Osmanlı'dan Postmoderniteye (Bir Demokrat Manifestoya Doğru),* Patika Yay., İstanbul; 1996; *Yönetemeyen Cumhuriyet,* Patika Yay., İstanbul, 1999. Mahçupyan wrote a column for the daily *Radikal* during 1997-2000.

(Bayramoğlu, 2005:13). Starting from the mid-90s and until 2001, covering the period of column writing in *Radikal* (1997-2000),[247] Mahçupyan's intellectual products consistently touched upon the military tutelage system and statism as spheres where both issues are interlinked. The point to underline here is that Mahçupyan's perspective of the 'democrat' does not assign priority to some social problems. He assigns weight to these two specific issues since they have their central places in society or politics (Bayramoğlu, 2011; 2005: 14). In other words, social issues relating to historical moments which we can specifically consider as founding contexts of 'the democrat' have their significance in Mahçupyan's perspective as determinants of mentality. Sharing a similar perspective, Bayramoğlu explains the situation as follows:

> Whichever problem was placed at the center of society, whatever issue used the lancet to the core mentality to become a criterion for being a democrat and democracy, Etyen Mahçupyan walked on to that problem; in other words he directed the lens of mentality analysis to that specific problem (Bayramoğlu, 2005: 14).

In Mahçupyan's perspective, the full realization of democracy can be possible only by reflecting social demands to politics in a continuous manner (Mahçupyan, 1998a, 1998b). In Turkey, on the other hand, the army acts as a political actor and makes the functioning of democracy impossible by determining the direction and content of politics (1998b, 1999a, 1999b). In this situation, politics is reduced to an activity under the tutelage of the army and the depoliticised environment which is the inevitable consequence of the former

[247] Between 2000 and 2001, Mahçupyan worked as a columnist in the daily *Yeni Binyıl*. Between May 2001-2007 he wrote for *Zaman*. After the assassination of Hırant Dink, he was made the editor in chief of *Agos* (Armenian Turkish daily) until June 2010. He is currently the advisor and editor of *Agos* and still writes for *Zaman* and *Today's Zaman*.

further strengthens statist approaches (Mahçupyan, 1999d). In Mahçupyan's words:

> Statism is such a disease that it is the same person that inhibits his own possibilities of having a reference other than the State…In this period, both laicism and nationalism turns to their essence and merges within statism (2 May 1999e).

According to Mahçupyan, the Kurdish problem too denotes a major problem area which has emerged as a result of a statist mentality which does not take society as its counterpart and ignores social demands. The State which does not regard Kurdish people as a social entity and conceives having society as its counterpart as wearing off of its rule addresses the issue through an approach that is dominated not by politics but violence and as such it causes the reduction of the Kurdish issue to the problem of terror and terrorism (Mahçupyan, 21 March 1999h). Yet the State is obliged to provide an environment where social demands can be freely raised:

> Demands and choices of a social group can be understood only in dialogue with that group, when there is no explicit or implicit suppression of their freedom of expression (…) If there is ideological pressure on efforts to communicate with this group and if there is no systematic to take the group as a counterpart; if there are deterring sanctions for expressing their opinions freely, then the surrounding atmosphere is totalitarian (6 December 1998).

The statist stance which considers having society as it counterpart as weakness defines political Islam as a source of threat to its power. The codification of Islamic circles as "ignorant", "uneducated" and "primitive" brings along the demeaning and disregard of their social demands. The process of February 28th which represents the most concrete form of statist approach to

Islamic circles is, according to Mahçupyan, a specific moment in the history of the statist tradition.

Mahçupyan's opinions concerning the political Islam have been criticized by other opinion producers who also define themselves on the democrat ground. One of the most significant of these criticisms is that the democrat concerns in Mahçupyan's thought are directed to a specific social section while being withheld from others. Fuat Keyman's criticisms in this regard, for example, provided an occasion for Mahçupyan to express the criteria by which he distinguishes the categories of the liberal and democrat and constituted the main frame of the conceptualization 'post-liberal democrat' (Mahçupyan, 1999: 205).[248] Keyman's criticism asserts that Mahçupyan establishes the stance of the democrat as indexed exclusively to the Moslem identity and ignores the multi-dimensional character of identity (Mahçupyan, 1999:206). According to Keyman, Mahçupyan must re-construct the stance of being democrat by capitalizing on the fact that human rights and freedoms have been acquired as a result of struggles waged by the working class, women and anti-racist civil rights movements. Otherwise, a one-dimensional stance of the democrat constructed without taking into account transitivity and interaction between these identities and religious devotion, for example, will remain flawed and problematic (1999:206-207). In response to this warning, Mahçupyan argues that the debate waged by Keyman is bookish, distant from social reality and of a character that reproduces fears unique to liberalism (1999:204). In more concrete terms, demands raised by the Islamic groups and debate over the ban on head cover do not cover the issue of the legitimacy and lawfulness of demands for being different. Mahçupyan says the warning that in

[248] A polemic that occurred in *Zaman,* joined by Atilla Yayla and Etyen Mahçupyan, *between* September 25, 2005 and May 10, 2006, was one of the most productive debates in recent Turkish political discourse. The main subject of the debate was "being democratic versus being liberal."

case demands for being different are automatically deemed legitimate, they may well articulate with radical political strategies in fact corresponds to a typical liberal fear and argues that the legitimacy of any social demand cannot be decided on by law (1999:205). Mahçupyan's response to the criticism that he builds a democrat stance indexed to Islamic identity is that specific identities may come to the fore in the process of politicization and that the demands by politicized identities may be top items in the agenda of democrats:

> First of all the stance of being a democrat is fully independent of 'multi-dimensionality' on paper. It is because this kind of multi-dimensionality creates a democratic stance that remains only on paper. (….) Politicization always disturbs the balance of identity and each demand for being different assigns weight to one of the identities (Mahçupyan, 1999: 207).

While it is not possible to say that his stance for being democrat is constructed as indexed to Islamic identity, it must still be said that the leading texts by Mahçupyan addressing the issue give more weight to demands raised by Islamic circles compared to others. As stated by him, this situation arises from the fact that the state of being democrat which he conceptualized and adopted as an identity makes it obligatory to defend the rights and freedoms of those sections that politicized in a specific period and suffered oppression. Given this, it is consistent with his specific position that Mahçupyan produced texts that placed political Islam at the center and criticized military tutelage in the process of February 28th.

However, the point that should be born in mind here is that Mahçupyan's outlook to religion in general and to Islam in particular can gain clarity through the mentality analysis that he adopted as an approach. As can be remembered, Mahçupyan thinks that each mentality is associated with a specific

epistemological stance or presupposition (2008: 18). At the basis of the patriarchal mentality that religions rely on too there is the idealist-reflectionist conception (Mahçupyan, 2008). Hence, the idealist-reflectionist conception embodies an assumption that provides ground for the fundamental proposition of the patriarchal mentality (and therefore religion is its bearer): Despite emanating from the same essence, the world has a hierarchical structure that is differentiated, that is, constituting a heterogeneous whole (Mahçupyan, 2008: 19). Heterogeneity and hierarchy as the substantive characters of the Ottoman world of meanings too are based on religion as the bearer of patriarchal mentality (Mahçupyan, 2008: 19). According to Mahçupyan, the legacy of patriarchal mentality is one of the major reasons why the society does not shift to totalitarianism/fascism despite occasionally getting closer to these (2008: 19). Mahçupyan argues that setting totalitarian structures at intellectual level by feeding on religions is not possible for the heterogeneous structure of religions. Religions may get closer to totalitarian approaches only if they are locked in authoritarian structures and their essential nature is disturbed (Mahçupyan, 1999: 212-213). In this narrative summarizing the outlook of Mahçupyan to religion and to Islam in specific, the key role falls upon religious communities. It is because the reflection of patriarchal intellectual acknowledgements on social life takes place via religious communities (1999: 213). By attributing identities to individuals, religious communities differentiate them and thus preclude their mobilization as the mass base of totalitarianism (Mahçupyan, 1999: 212). While acceding that it is not an ideal solution against totalitarianism, Mahçupyan still underlines that the religious

community outlook can serve in the traditions of this land as a safety valve against modern forms of oppression (1999: 213).[249]

Assessing the left through mentality analysis, Mahçupyan does not find in materialist-reflectionist left thinking based on authoritarian mentality the protective shield against totalitarianism that he finds in patriarchal mentality (2008: 21). The materialist outlook which argues that reality perceived as essence is in fact the matter rests on the belief that knowledge are correct but incomplete replicates of reality (Mahçupyan, 2008: 21). This approach which has no doubt about the correctness of its limited knowledge neither feels any need to communicate with others. This is the reason why it has an authoritarian character (Mahçupyan, 2008: 21):

> This understanding makes up the vein that feeds authoritarian mentality. While it is asserted that reality is approached step by step thanks to knowledge, it is clear that this talent is not equally distributed to all. (…) The authoritarian mentality provides a criterion that man can test himself by defining basic knowledge at material level and making it accessible (2008: 21-22).

According to Mahçupyan, the left emerging from within modernity as a composite of relativist and authoritarian mentalities embodied, in its historical process, relativism as well as authoritarianism (2007: 79). The distinguishing feature of left is its universalism (Mahçupyan, 2007: 80). The left that has been in the forefront of struggles for workers' and women's rights in many countries pointed out to a more democrat position in modernity and in this sense it committed itself to democracy (Mahçupyan, 2007: 81). Mahçupyan argues that

[249] An important point needs to be underlined here: While reminding that "community" structure functions as a shield protecting from modern forms of oppression, Mahçupyan never suggests identity construction on the basis of "communities." To the contrary, besides taking a critical stance towards the state, a "genuine intellectual" should also be able to remain out of "communities" that give him his cultural identity (1999: 217).

Marxism is constructed in reference to authoritarian mentality; however covering subjectivity as well as a result of special meaning it attributed to will (2007: 82).

7.3.1.3.The Prioritization of the Cultural over the Political

As it has been mentioned in the previous sections, Erdoğan and Üstüner (2002) employ the term 'post-political' in order to define the discourses that locate democracy into their core and identify politics mainly as a consensus seeking practice. In their view, second republicanism, civil Islamism, and the democratic discourse articulated specifically by Mahçupyan and Bayramoğlu reduce the politics

> to a practice of recognizing the other and of reaching a consensus, reject the friend – enemy relations, regard 'ideological' or antagonistic conceptions of politics as illegitimate, and limit the sphere of the political to a democratic play of differences and a plurality without antagonism (2002: 196).

In Erdoğan and Üstüner's model, the discourse on democracy formulated by Mahçupyan and Bayramoğlu has been categorized as 'post-liberal' since it purports to transcend liberal democracy in favor of developing a democracy defined on the basis of multiculturalism, values of toleration and coexistence of cultural differences (2002: 203). In this respect, Mahçupyan's model of democracy resting upon the principle of recognition of differences in a pluralist manner stands within the confines of liberal democratic model. This model shares the same concerns with the liberal paradigm in terms of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual and therefore it does not offer a radical break with the liberal democratic paradigm.

However, the democratic opinion producers, most specifically Mahçupyan, categorically deny any connection of democratic position to liberalism's

conception of the liberty and the individual (Mahçupyan, 2007). For Mahçupyan, the liberal conception of the individual, endowed with rationality, is preoccupied with maximizing his own interests and therefore, enters into contracts in order to achieve this end (2007: 109). This construction of the atomistic and solitary individual, who never needs to communicate with the others to verify his taken-for-granted rational decisions, ignores different voices and thereby fails to recognize 'the Other' (Mahçupyan, 2007: 109-110). Through the democratic perspective, ignorance about the demands of different sections of the society that fall outside the conception of the liberal order, has certain implications for the realization of the principle of liberty. That is, the self-sufficient, rational liberal individual exercises the right to liberty within his own private realm. Heavily preoccupied with protecting his liberty in his private realm, the liberal individual disregards the plurality and diversity of the demands of others. Yet, in Mahçupyan's formulation, the democratic position, calling for a simultaneous interaction with the Other, takes into consideration the perception and sensitivity of different voices. The liberal understanding of freedom of expression as the foundation of democratic rights draws on the values of the liberal individual who does not need to pay due attention to the values of those with whom he engages (Mahçupyan, 2007: 112). In Mahçupyan's understanding, the democratic position corresponds to establishing relations, negotiating and assimilating power relations into the fabric of interaction (Mahçupyan, 2009). Democrats retaining the belief in the identification of truth through tentative common subjectivities, in contrast to liberals, avoid authoritarian aspects of liberal thought. As mentioned above, those authoritarian aspects stem from liberalism's relativist epistemology (Mahçupyan, 2005, 2007).

Mahçupyan, who is uncomfortable with the label 'liberal-democrat,' has argued that liberal-democrats are people who merely defend free and fair elections as a political mechanism of regulation (2006).[250] Liberals attribute significance to democracy as a sub-set of liberalism (Mahçupyan, 2006). On the contrary, for Mahçupyan, democrats believe that the democratic position is a very functional mechanism in comprehending external reality and they consider liberalism as a sub-set of the democrat mentality (Mahçupyan, 2006a). Furthermore, concepts like participation, transparency, accountability and persuasion are *sine qua non* for democrats. But for liberals, according to Mahçupyan, these concepts do not constitute a vital part of their positions.

Whereas for Yayla, who challenges Mahçupyan from a liberal standpoint, Mahçupyan wrongly treats democracy, which Yayla regards a form of political mechanism, as a moral yardstick (2005a, *December 4*). For Yayla, democracy is meaningful and functional as long as it serves the virtue of liberty – which constitutes the focal point of liberal thought (2005a). That is, Yayla emphasizes that "being democratic" is not an end in itself. Furthermore, drawing upon the theoretical premises of Sartori and Hayek, Yayla suggests that liberalism forms the backbone of modern democracies, because it calls for limiting the government in favor of fundamental rights and liberties of the individual.

It is noteworthy to mention that Yayla has a point: while Mahçupyan argues for a categorical distinction between being democratic and being liberal, and prioritizes the former, he actually works with premises that essentially belong to the liberal tradition (Yayla, 2005a). This criticism shares some common ground with Erdoğan and Üstüner's (2002) conceptualization of 'post-liberal' when they

[250] To illustrate this point see the debate about liberalism and democracy that occurred between Mahçupyan and Atilla Yayla in 2006.

analyze figures like Mahçupyan who represent the social type of the Democrat. Furthermore, Mahçupyan is ambiguous about the procedural mechanisms that would help reinforce the position of being democratic.[251] That is, Mahçupyan's formulation of being democratic does not seem viable without the legal and institutional assurances provided by a liberal democratic order.

Indeed, what Mahçupyan's model envisages is a multicultural society that provides the conditions conducive for free exchange of ideas and that encourages the mutual recognition of identities. According to this model, interaction of different groups and communities would bring about the common values constituting the ethical basis for the peaceful coexistence of differences (Mahçupyan, 1998). Within this perceptive, the antagonisms inherent in the social and political fabric are deliberately overlooked and considered to correspond to totalitarian positions stemming from a conflictual understanding (Mahçupyan, 1998: 231). In this respect, democratic politics deriving from a true deliberation and reflection denies the existence of antagonistic demands and takes for granted the possibility of an everlasting consensus. In the analysis of Erdoğan and Üstüner, consensus-seeking motivation of Mahçupyan's perspective, calling for the removal of conflict-ridden positions that are considered to impede the democratic functioning, serves the depolitization of the social (2002: 206).

Leaving aside Erdoğan and Üstüner's criticism regarding the 'post-political' or 'depoliticized' nature of Mahçupyan's formulation, a crucial point seems to be clear: In Mahçupyan's framework, culture is prioritized over politics. This privileged status of culture is manifest in his analysis trying to map out the

[251] Fuat Keyman raises a similar question in his articles where he defends Mahçupyan's notion of being democratic against Yayla's Hayekian liberalism. See: Fuat Keyman, "Liberallik, Demokratlık ve Türkiye -1," *Zaman*, May 28, 2006; "Liberallik, Demokratlık ve Türkiye - 2," *Zaman*, May 29, 2006.

Turkish political landscape. In this analysis, Mahçupyan utilizes two criteria as the yardsticks with reference to which the identities of the political actors would be detected (1996: 91). The first criterion points out to the principle of legitimacy, understood in terms of the source of political power. In this axis, state and civil society are juxtaposed as main competitors of legitimate power. It should be reminded that, Mahçupyan believes that civil society is the terrain for the flourishing of true democracy. According to his second criterion, values define and determine the identities of the political actors. That is, values signal how the political actors perceive and present themselves and how they are perceived by their adversaries (Mahçupyan, 1996: 92). In this second axis of values, Mahçupyan places "universal" values in one pole, and the "traditional" in the opposite. In his understanding, the innately cultural contention between universal and traditional values in politics pits political actors against each other. In other words, Mahçupyan has a cultural- reductionist reading of Turkey's political scene through his perceived polarization between global and local values:

> The concept of values in itself is very complex. Because, for example, the concept includes both moral and political values and these values might not be congruent with each other. For today, from the perspective of Turkey, cultural-moral values are more emphasized, because since Tanzimat, the debate on Westernization focused essentially on whether cultural values of the West should be adopted or not (1996: 92).

Mahçupyan's reading of Turkey's political map including the tentative location of political parties with respect to legitimacy and values can be traced from the following figure (1996: 99).

Figure 1: Cartesian Coordinates of Turkish Political Landscape, According to Mahçupyan



Etyen Mahçupyan deepened his understanding of the democratic identity throughout the 1990s. In accordance with his conception of being democratic, he continued his political opinion production as a columnist and a TV commentator. After 1999, when he gained increased public visibility with his role as the co-scenarist of the film *Mrs. Salkım's Diamonds (Salkım Hanım'ın Taneleri),*[252] Mahçupyan has become a figure whose Armenian identity (previously much less emphasized) has merged with his identity as a democrat (2005: 16-17). However the more recent episode (since early 2000s) in which Mahçupyan's Armenian identity and his public activism on the Armenian question became more emphasized falls outside the historical scope of this dissertation.

[252] The screenplay of *Mrs. Salkım's Diamonds* was written by Tamer Baran and EtyenMahçupyan.

7.3.2. Ali Bayramoğlu as a Democrat

7.3.2.1.Profile

Born in 1956, Ali Bayramoğlu belongs to a younger generation in comparison to Mahçupyan (born 1950) and Bumin (born 1947). It should still be mentioned that belonging to a younger generation does not seem to generate significant differences in terms of political responses to different cultural and socio-political developments. In this respect, Bayramoğlu shared common concerns and a similar understanding of democracy with the other two prominent opinion producers that exemplify the Democrat as a social type.

While Mahçupyan appears as the major contributor to the philosophical field in developing democratic perspective on ethical basis, Bayramoğlu stands as the sociologist of the perspective. He analyzes the recent developments in Turkey through the lenses of a sociological approach and insists upon the significance of a sociological understanding in social-scientific analysis (Bayramoğlu, in-depth interview 2011). In line with this sociological understanding, rather than defining himself as 'an intellectual aspiring to transform the society' Bayramoğlu has preferred to identify himself just as an opinion producer sociologically inquiring into the roots of the society's culture (Bayramoğlu, in-depth interview 2011). Therefore, in Bayramoğlu's sociological analysis, cultural cleavages have occupied substantial place. That is, retaining close affinity to Weberian perspective, and sharing the central premises of center-periphery analysis developed by Şerif Mardin to understand the history of Ottoman-Turkish modernization, Bayramoğlu has evaluated the major dynamics of Turkey's socio-political landscape through the methodological pillars of center and periphery cleavage. Bayramoğlu, best known as a columnist specifically concerned with the

democratization and civilianization in Turkey, has been regarded as a military-analyst challenging the mainstream explanations of military-civilian relations in the Turkish context.[253]

Brief biographical information might provide fruitful insights in understanding the socio-political basis which helped to shape Bayramoğlu's future intellectual aspirations and positions. Born on 1956 in Gelibolu, Çanakkale, graduated from Iskenderun High School and completed his undergraduate education at Grenoble Institute of Political Studies in France. Bayramoğlu obtained his PhD from İstanbul University and during his academic career in İstanbul University and Marmara University (1981-1999) has focused on military's political role, Islamic movements and the sociology of the state (Bayramoğlu, 2011). He worked as a columnist in dailies Yeni Yüzyıl, Star, Yeni Binyıl and Sabah. He currently works as a columnist in Yeni Şafak and teaches at İstanbul Kültür University. Bayramoğlu has been conducting researches on the tension between religiosity-Islam and laicism in TESEV and together with Prof. Ahmet İnsel, he has been the advisor for TESEV democratization program policy report on security sector in Turkey (Bayramoğlu, in-depth interview 2011).[254]

It is noteworthy here that Bayramoğlu is not satisfied with only being an opinion producer focused on democratic thinking but he is actively involved in pro-democratic activities, which further casts him in the mold of the social type of the Democrat. For instance, Bayramoğlu stood among the initiators of the "Forgive Us, Armenians" campaign launched in 2008 which was thought "to help

[253] Bayramoğlu has devoted his major works on the analysis of political Islam and the military-civilian relations in Turkey. See: *Türkiye'deİslamiHareketeSosyolojikBirBakış, 1994-2000,* Patika Yay., İstanbul: 2001; *28 Şubat/BirMüdahaleninGüncesi,* Bir Yay., İstanbul: 2001.

[254] See: Hale Akay, "Security Sector in Turkey: Questions, Problems, and Solutions," Advisors: Ali Bayramoğlu and Ahmet İnsel, *TESEV Democratization Program Policy Report Series,* Security Sector 1, Sena Ofset, İstanbul, December 2009.

overcome the Genocide related fear prevalent in the Turkish society."[255]Furthermore, he is an intervener in the Dink murder case which has been going on for 4 years since the assassination of Hrant Dink in 2007.

Bayramoğlu believes that his early years in İskenderun have impacts in his intellectual search for a democratic leaning (in-depth interview 2011). In his view, meeting with the heterogeneous and multi-cultural social fabric of İskenderun in rather early ages, he has unintentionally learnt to recognize the social and cultural differences (in-depth interview 2011). Despite the existence of potential limitations associated with its social opportunities for academic intellectual and achievement, the heterogeneous, and in Bayramoğlu's words "pluralistic," (in-depth interview 2011) social characteristics of İskenderun enabled him to develop a sense of awareness about diverse traditions and customs and thereby facilitated the development of a strong sense of respect for "othered" identities.

Nevertheless, the turning point for the development of an intellectual and theoretical awareness for disadvantaged social groups was triggered during his graduate study years in Grenoble Institute in France. When he studied in Grenoble, Bayramoğlu had the chance to read the works of leading post-structuralist thinkers. After this intellectual experience, the basic premises of post-structuralist thought started to guide his thinking. As he states, within a left-leaning academic atmosphere, he recognized that the borders of left-wing critical thought were not confined to Marxism and that he came across with the theoretical positions

[255] The introductory text for the campaign was introduced by Ali Bayramoğlu, Baskın Oran, Ahmet İnsel, and Cengiz Aktar and made publicly available online for signatures for about one year. The petition's signatories included thousands of Turkish citizens. The text simply said: "My conscience does not accept the insensitivity showed to and the denial of the 'Great Catastrophe' that the Ottoman Armenians were subjected to in 1915. I reject this injustice and for my share, I empathize with the feelings and pain of my Armenian brothers, I apologize from them." For further information, see website: http://www.ozurdiliyoruz.com/

offering elegant criticisms of Marxism as well (Bayramoğlu, in-depth interview 2011).

Indeed, the impact of post-structuralism and particularly post-modernism might clearly be seen on Bayramoğlu's emphasis upon anti-essentialism, relativity, recognition of differences and plurality and his insistence on a an anti-Hegelian and anti-dialectical theoretical position (Bayramoğlu, in-depth interview 2011). Bayramoğlu acknowledges that influence of Michel Foucault has been particularly evident in his social scientific investigation and socio-political analyses in-depth interview 2011). Having been a participant of Foucault's public lectures in France, he has been impressed by contemporary French critical theory. Yet, he also admits the heavy influence of a Weberian framework in his methodological priorities (Bayramoğlu, in-depth interview 2011). Not unexpectedly, this methodological preference is in line with Bayramoğlu's insistence on the significance of the culture in social scientific analysis. As mentioned above, he seeks to explain the peculiarities of Turkish political landscape by putting particular emphasis on culture and cultural cleavages.

Bayramoğlu pinpoints the post 1980 coup socio-political atmosphere as the real turning point for the development of democratic thinking he argues for (Bayramoğlu, in-depth interview 2011). As he underlines, the liberal epoch starting with the economic reforms initiated by successive governments under the leadership of Turgut Özal and the accompanying values putting emphasis on individualism has created the basis conducive for the flourishing of a liberal and democratic thought (Bayramoğlu, in-depth interview 2011). At that moment, Bayramoğlu recalls the story of liberal re-constructing in Turkey and its implications for intellectual field: Opinion producers, majority of whom belongs

to left-oriented tradition, adopting the basic premises of post-structuralist or post-modernist thought, interpreted the ongoing socio-political developments as justification of their political and theoretical attachments. For instance the collapse of the Soviet Union, emergence of micro-nationalisms and the proliferation of identity politics have all reinforced the beliefs in the end of class struggle, the death of ideologies and the bankruptcy of conception of politics as a struggle for power. Bayramoğlu argues that, all those developments have implied the call for a trans-historically defined democracy (in-depth interview 2011). In the view of Bayramoğlu, the cumulative effects of the developments mentioned have strongly defined the whole period that began with late-1980s and ended at the end of the century (2007: 11). This episode spanning the two vast decades of the century, according to Bayramoğlu, has left its imprint on Turkish politics in two fundamental axis of contention – the Islamist and Kurdish movements. This point is significant in terms of the consolidation of the characteristics of our social type: as I already discussed, the maturation of the political dispositions that define the Democrat as social type is innately related to the responses given to the Islamist and Kurdish challenges.

7.3.2.2.Bayramoğlu in the 1990s

Bayramoğlu tells that the two primary political dynamics, throughout the 1990s, have increasingly dominated politics: The Kurdish and Islamist movements. These two political challenges have also, according to him, made it easier to think about democracy and being democratic (in-depth interview 2011). Therefore, it can be argued that for Bayramoğlu, understanding the 1990s is key to understanding to conditions of existence of democratic sentimentalities.

According to Bayramoğlu, the sociological tale of the early 1980s and 1990s covers the process of change regarding the socio-economic structures, political alliances, and politicization of cultural identities (2007: 11). Bayramoğlu contends that the most remarkable result of this process of change has been "the closing of the gap between the center and periphery – and this closing has been visible and active" (2007: 11).

Bayramoğlu defines four basic characteristics distinctive of the 1990s (2007: 23). First, social demands changed in character; cultural demands, beginning with early 1990s, has become the carrier of economic demands (2007: 23). Secondly, in this period Turkey had to deal with a crisis of representationthat emerged from the failure of the centre left and right parties in understanding the transformed nature of social demands (2007: 24). Qualitative changes in social demands were exluded by left and right-wing parties as "too localized" and these parties chose to dig deeper into the confines of the state instead of renewing themselves in terms of their representative base (Bayramoğlu, 2007: 24). Since political parties failed to change themselves, the sphere of politics has contracted and the state, principally the Armed Forces, has become the primary political actor.

Thirdly, the crisis of representation experienced in Turkey, along with the newly emerging social demands, has hastened the delinking between the state and the society. During the episodes of contention created in this atmosphere of crisis, the ties holding social groups together has weakened and as a result, social groups have confined themselves within the borders of their own identities (Bayramoğlu, 2007: 25). Fourthly, 1990s signify a period where negotiable interests in inter-group and inter-individual relations became insignificant and communities

became more important (Bayramoğlu, 2007: 25). Not unexpectedly, the weakening of rational negotiations between interests is a consequence of identities closing their boundaries to others. These “enclosures”, according to Bayramoğlu, led to the emergence of belief-based or identity-based claims that are very difficult to co-exist (Bayramoğlu, 2007: 25). Under these circumstances, inevitably, new collectivities and groups have appeared in between the individual and the state, underlining the significance of communities (Bayramoğlu, 2007: 25).

For Bayramoğlu, the transformation of Turkey in the 1990s can be explained by two basic intertwined processes: Differentiation in social stratification and changes in the structure of capital (2007: 26, 27). Differentiation in social stratification refers to the increasing diversification among social actors; and changes in the structure of capital refer to the diversification of economic actors.

According to Bayramoğlu, recent diverse social stratification in Turkey points at the significance of groups emphasizing cultural belonging, primarily Kurdish and Islamist movements (2007: 25, 26). On the other hand, the diversification among entrepreneurs has led to the emergence of new small and medium-sized economic actors working with flexible production schemes (Bayramoğlu, 2007: 26). As a result, two axes of contention, crosscutting and simultaneous, appeared: First, polarization of actors grouping around social ethics and lifestyle choices; second, polarization of actors occupying unequal economic positions (Bayramoğlu, 2007: 27). The unfolding of these two axes of contention had a reflection in politics: In the 1990s, demands voiced by new groups could not find opportunities of representation in a pluralist and non-competitive atmosphere (Bayramoğlu, 2007: 27).

To sum up, Bayramoğlu argues that the socio-political consequences of the changes experienced in the 1990s reduced the chasm between the centre and the periphery in Turkey (2007: 28). Politically speaking, exluded demands shook the system up and in response, the state dominated the political sphere (Bayramoğlu, 2007: 28). Centre left and centre right parties have interpreted changing demands as "conservatism" and throughout the 1990s, focused on statist, protectionism and nationalism (Bayramoğlu, 2007: 35). These responses, though they tried to overcome the crisis of representation by attempting to include misperceived demands, have worsened the crisis and have reinforced ideological inclinations towards nationalism (Bayramoğlu, 2007: 36).

In an article from 1995, Bayramoğlu states that as political parties become more conservative and statist, they cause something bad and something good at the same time: Their reaction to the changes in Turkey helps the deepening of the crisis, but on the other hand, it may lead to the opening up of new opportunities (2007: 37). Individuals may tend to keep to other like themselves and imprison themselves inside identities, thus rendering these identities totalitarian; but they may also transform their identities as a tool for democratic struggle (Bayramoğlu, 2007: 41). In case a politics of denial of different identities becomes dominant, this encourages endangered identities to become even more conservative, and thus, reactionary (Bayramoğlu, 2007: 43). For example, the dominant politics of laicity in Turkey failed to democratically organized relations between citizens, state and society and on the contrary, gained a dysfunction of hindering the democratic constitution of citizenship (Bayramoğlu, 2007: 41). In the words of Bayramoğlu,

> In the name of liberalism or social democracy, in Southeastern Turkey, ignoring Islamically sensitive demands, challenging them and waging war against them damaged the already weakened ties in society. These policies

> hastened the process in which those that challenged identities have strongly embraced alternative identities (2007: 43).

Bayramoğlu underlines the results of the December 1995 elections, hailed as the great success of Political Islam, to justify his point about the consequences of identity politics in Turkey. This episode, for him, demonstrated that the questions of identity, after becoming prominent in the social system, has also dominated the political system (Bayramoğlu, 2007: 42). He claims that after the December 1995 elections, centrist left-wing and right-wing parties focusing on political projects based on atomized individuals have become smaller, while parties claiming to represent reactions againsts centrist have become stronger (2007: 42),

More specifically, in his analysis of the December 1995 elections, Bayramoğlu states that the statist political logic that tried to exclude HADEP (People's Democracy Party, then representative of the political wing of the Kurdish movement) and RP (Welfare Party, leading Islamist party)failed (2007: 51). The political approach that was based on ignoring changing social demands caused the growth of the gap between political and social structures and damaged the channels of communication between disadvantaged social groups (Kurds, Islamists, the poor living in slums, etc.) (Bayramoğlu, 2007: 51). Furthermore, Bayramoğlu notes that the reactionary post-election declaration that RP, despite securing about 40 % of the votes, should be considered a "marginal" party, deepens Turkey's political problems (Bayramoğlu, 2007: 53).

As against this reactionary and exclusionist style of politics, for Bayramoğlu, being democratic necessitates understanding one's adversary and keeping the channels of communication open (in-depth interview 2011; 2007: 43).

The first step towards the consolidation of a politics of co-existence is the mutual understanding of the holders of different (even conflicting) claims. From this democratic perspective, it is a matter of principle to build dialogue with an Islamist party like RP. Fearing RP is irrational and anti-democratic (Bayramoğlu, 2007: 53).[256]

7.3.2.3.Depolitization and Military Tutelage

The political atmosphere created after the 1995 general elections, according to Bayramoğlu, is an episode of increasing military influence where political issues are always-already attempted to be resolved by reducing them to the logic of national interests (Bayramoğlu, 2007: 59). In this time period, the field of politics has shrunk, "civilian" politics has been compromised. For Bayramoğlu, under these circumstances, the "ethics" of being democratic requires emphasizing the problem of military tutelage. His newspaper writings between 1995 and 1998, unlike most columns being written during that time, problematized and challenged the anti-democratic impact of the Armed Forces in politics.[257]

According to Bayramoğlu, the involvement of the military in politics leads to widespread depoliticization (2007: 236, 317). The Armed Forces, when they are involved in the affairs of Turkey politically, defines their activities as "supra-political" and thus render their interventions undebatable, within the discourse of "national interests" (Bayramoğlu, 2007: 236, 317). This "supra-political" position of the military does not mean that their activities are "a-political" – on the contrary, this self-perception of the military points towards the fact that the role

[256] For Bayramoğlu's article on this subject, see: *Yeni Yüzyıl*, February 1996.
[257] With regard to this matter, the compilation of Bayramoğlu's 1995-1998 newspaper columns can be consulted: *28 Şubat: Bir Müdahalenin Güncesi,* İletişim, 2007, İstanbul.

that officers see fit for themselves is a disciplining one, which attempts to rule and regulate the political field (Bayramoğlu, 2007: 241). Bayramoğlu argues that what was witnessed in the February 1997 intervention was just this kind of "operation" that aimed to discipline and "correct" politics: With this intervention, the Armed Forces was trying to "sterilize" prominent political issues and to transform them into question of the "security of the national state" (Bayramoğlu, 2007: 241). This disciplinary role that the military was trying to play does not only include the issues of political Islam and the Kurdish movement, but also covers a wide range of topics on foreign relations (essentially with Iraq and Israel), EU membership, issues on education, economic and social reforms (Bayramoğlu, 2007: 242). The military's apparent posture as being above politics actually leads to its politicization even more strongly (Bayramoğlu, 2007: 317). In a column Bayramoğlu wrote on December 5, 1997, he argued that the most significant negative effect of the February 1997 intervention was the multi-dimensional depoliticization effect it created (2007: 244). Based on data from a study (supervised by Ferhat Kentel) on the profile of Istanbul voters, Bayramoğlu attempted to present evidence about this effect (2007: 244). According to the findings of the study, Bayramoğlu wrote, politics was perceived not in terms of social demands and innovative outlooks but in terms of dangers, threats and technocratic recipes to social problems (2007: 244). Moreover, the voters were expecting permanent solutions to their problems from stronger institutions, mainly the State and the Armed Forces (Bayramoğlu, 2007: 244). Such findings, Bayramoğlu argued, demonstrated the effects of depoliticization in society: the sphere of politics was subsumed under the sphere of the state and political suggestions were assimilated into the jargon of national interests (Bayramoğlu,

2007: 245). But when politics was crippled, social problems were reduced to merely national security matters and this in turn worsened those problems (Bayramoğlu, 2007: 246).

As an example of depoliticization, Bayramoğlu argued that the state has rendered the Kurdish Question a problem of security that was beyond the reach of politics and handed over the "solution" to a platform in which only the military had a voice (Bayramoğlu, 2007: 246). The issue of Political Islam was framed in a similar manner: The dominance of the view that the military was the guardsman of laicism in Turkey made the political negotiation of matters related to the Islamist movement impossible – worse, the shadow cast by the military over this issue worsened the contentious relations between laicists and Islamists in Turkey (Bayramoğlu, 2007: 246). The contraction of the political sphere led to the militarization of the main actors of the system (Bayramoğlu, 2007: 247). By militarization, in addition to getting more nationalistic and aggressive, Bayramoğlu also meant that the playground of political actors in which they can compete, negotiate and conflict has narrowed and thus the overall level of political activity has diminished. With this diminishing came the effect of being politically dependent on the state, particularly, on the Armed Forces (Bayramoğlu, 2007: 248). According to Bayramoğlu, within the context of this militarization, the purpose of the February 1997 intervention was to erase the public visibility of Islam and redesign the political spectrum (2007: 285).

Bayramoğlu clearly drew attention to three pillars of military oppression in contemporary Turkey: (a) The February 1997 intervention, (b) the Susurluk Affair, (c) the Kurdish Question (2007: 234). The Susurluk Affair, for him, was especially important in terms of the usage of unconstitutional means (Bayramoğlu,

2007: 234). The Kurdish Question, on the other hand, represents the issue by which the model of "rendering problems supra-political" was first developed (Bayramoğlu, 2007: 234). The February 1997 intervention, for Bayramoğlu, attempted to legitimize the handling of the other two issues (Susurluk and Kurds). With the Susurluk Affair, the military tutelage over the whole political system was reinforced: The controversy did not weaken the state but the political mechanism (Bayramoğlu, 2007: 97). On the other hand, the whole controversy surrounding the Susurluk event was based fundamentally upon the problem of rule of law: The Affair once again, but more overtly than ever, revealed that not everybody was equal before law, that the judges and prosecutors were not able to act independently (Bayramoğlu, 2007: 91).

All in all, Bayramoğlu's analyses during and after the February 1997 intervention establishes the groundworks of his fundamental dispositions about being democratic. He wrote the following in a column dated May 1, 1997:

> The criterion for democracy and being democratic, under the circumstances we live in Turkey, is to defend not Welfare Party's politics, but its existence.We need to defend the existence of Islamic visibility, not its politicized forms. And above all, the criterion for being democratic is to invite the military to stay in its barracks (2007: 169).

This political stance defended by Bayramoğlu is based upon his conviction that one has to be "civic" in order to be democratic: "Democracy is not a game of rentiers where every means used is legitimate, it is a compilation of rules that minimizes to distribution of rents" (Bayramoğlu, 2007: 144). For Bayramoğlu, democracy is not an issue of content, but of form and style (2007: 303). In other words, he believes that democracy is about how rulers govern, not about who says what or who governs (2007: 303). This perception of democracy is closely related

with his understanding of politics. The activity that is called politics cannot be reduced to a struggle of power in which all means are allowed, it is rather the perfect reflection of social demands and social mobilizations in the mechanisms of decision-making. The achievement of a common ground among social actors can only be possible through this "strong representation" understanding of politics (Bayramoğlu, 2007: 83).

7.3.2.4.The Cultural over the Political according to Bayramoğlu

Bayramoğlu fits the social type of the Democrat basically with his position-takings around the historical episode of the February 1997 intervention. He emphasizes that despite the fact that he problematized the problem of military tutelage around two basic axis of contention, Islamist and Kurdish movement, the topic of Political Islam was more significant in the consolidation of his democratic convictions (in-depth interview 2011). The Kurdish Question, in his own words, "is an issue that defines itself; it has historical, ethnic roots" (Bayramoğlu in-depth interview 2011). Thus for Bayramoğlu, Political Islam has been the main platform through which he found opportunities to expand his democratic views of laicism, modernity and Kemalism (in-depth interview 2011).

As mentioned before, Bayramoğlu was part of the inner circle of the YDH and later distanced himself from the organization once it has become a political party. This political behavior of Bayramoğlu should be explained by his perception of being democratic. According to him, in order to be a democrat, instead of leading people, one should search newer way to help the society transform itself (in-depth interview 2011). Compared to this formulation, YDH, in a short period of time, associated itself with a Jacobin conception of politics and surrendered to positions that wholly contradicted its initial mission (Bayramoğlu,

in-depth interview 2011).[258] Therefore, as an exemplary to the social type of the Democrat, Bayramoğlu prefers to stand on a ground distanced from actual politics and to serve democratization from the outside, using his public opinions.

Perhaps the most significant characteristic that exemplifies Bayramoğlu's distinction as a Democrat is his ethical valuation of democracy without directly referring to the term "morality." He states that he dislikes the concept of "morality" and that he defines himself as a sceptic; this disposition is related to his reluctance to speculate about the future (in-depth interview 2011). Following postmodernist thought, Bayramoğlu's scepticism is based upon his emphasis on "uncertainty", i.e., the unpredictability of tomorrow. According to him, all problems that concern humans, especially the problem of democracy, should be resolved within the confines of the "now," of "today;" solutions should not be postponed (in-depth interview 2011).

For Bayramoğlu, a given society's history, roots and memories are most significant for understanding that particular society's contemporary problems and its socio-political structures (in-depth interview 2011). Especially when it comes to Turkey, all indications point towards the fact that the cultural determines the historical (in-depth interview 2011). Therefore, for Bayramoğlu, democrats cannot come up with realistic and reasonable analyses about the society they live in if they cannot undertsand the significance of cultural determinations and cultural continuities (in-depth interview 2011). Bayramoğlu argues that the fundamental mistake of the Left in Turkey is its lack of understanding this significance (in-depth interview, 2011).

[258] Bayramoğlu submitted this assessment on YDH just before the December 1995 general elections. He claimed that after becoming a political party, YDH had abandoned its ideals and sold out to the owners of those ideals (2007: 38).

In compliance with the characteristics of the social type of the Democrat, Bayramoğlu's conception of politics is built upon the determinism of the cultural. Guided by cultural determinations, Bayramoğlu's definition of the political includes the necessity of being dependent on a hierarchy of problems: at the top of the problems sits the State, below it the political spectrum and next comes state-society and state-politics relations (in-depth interview 2011). Hence, the more a given problem, on a certain scale, occupies a large space, the more it is worth spending time on, for Bayramoğlu. With this understanding of "problem hierarchies," Bayramoğlu tries to justify why he does not much delve upon issues like gender or poverty (in-depth interview 2011).

7.3.3. Kürşat Bumin as a Democrat

7.3.3.1. Bumin as a "Proponent of Civil Society"

Kürşat Bumin, another prominent figure that we investigate through the methodological advantages provided by social type analysis, ironically refuses to be identified under the category of the 'democratic' opinion producer. Although this attitude might be regarded as a reflection of humility, Bumin has a certain explanation for it: In his view, the democrat can only flourish within truly democratic circumstances (in-depth interview 2011). Such that, neither in his journalistic articles nor in more theoretical works, it is possible to find any discussion on democrats. He does not see contemplating on the state of being a democrat as a part of his intellectual production.

Bumin's intellectual popularity dates back to early 80s. The publication of his *Sivil Toplum ve Devlet* (Civil Society and the State) (1981) has sparked a

lively debate within the political and intellectual circles of the time.[259] Bumin was also awarded 1982 Yazko Prize with *Sivil Toplum ve Devlet.* He was often the target of harsh criticisms and somehow a reference point for the discussions revolving around civil society, reformism and left liberalism.[260] Major Marxist circles of the period, *Saçak, Gelenek* and *11.Tez,* addressed the issue of civil society and its proponents mainly over the writings of Murat Belge and to some extent over Bumin's *Sivil Toplum ve Devlet.* Among the Marxist or nationalist circles Bumin's name has been mentioned in a pejorative manner and his early work has been regarded as a theoretical intervention from liberal grounds to socialist and Marxist thinking. In the lexicon of Marxists, Bumin, as a civil society proponent, exemplified the conceptualization of democracy which ignored class inequalities and overlooked the role of the State in transition to capitalism (Güler, 1987). Then, in Marxist circles, Bumin became one of the primary scapegoats representing mainstream liberalism in the Turkish political and intellectual field.

Bumin (b. 1947) received his BA from philosophy department in Faculty of Language, History and Geography Faculty *(Dil Tarih Coğrafya Fakültesi, DTCF)* Ankara. He spent his post-graduate years in France where he stayed with his wife Tülin Bumin. During his years in France (1972-1980), he attended several lectures on political philosophy in Sorbonne-Paris I. Bumin and his wife returned to Turkey in 1980 and taught in the department of philosophy in Ege University for ten years. Mostly known for his media criticism, Bumin's other

[259] The details of this debate have been discussed at length in Chapter 4.

[260] See: *Gelenek* (anonymous), "Bir Saçak Yazısı Üzerine," *Gelenek,* Vol:7, May 1987; Aydın Giritli, "Türkiye'de Sivil Toplumculuk (1981-1986)," *Gelenek,* Vol:3, January 1987; Editorial, "Tarih, Devrim, 'Sivil Toplumculuk," *Saçak,* Vol.3, April 1984; Anonymous, "Kürşat Bumin'in İlerlemeye Karşı Tutumu," *Saçak,* Vol.2, March 1984; Reader's Letter, *Saçak,* Vol.13, February 1985. For a more recent study see, Ali Doğan Güneşli, "Sivil Toplum: Ne, Nerede, Ne Zaman, Kim?" *Gelenek,* Vol: 68, October 2001.

works include books on city planning[261] and criticism of the educational system and the official ideology in Turkey.[262]

7.3.3.2.Sources of Bumin's Social and Political Opinions

When we investigate the intellectual sources and motivations that have shaped the standing of Kürşat Bumin as a social type as 'the Democrat,' we come across some names and social networks that have been mentioned in previous sections. First of all, it should once more be mentioned that, the intellectual trajectories of Bumin, Mahçupyan and Bayramoğlu have intersected at several crossroads. Like Mahçupyan, Bumin contributed to *Toplumcu Düşün*. As he lived in İzmir, he was not a member of the inner circle of this social network. Still, he wrote influential articles for the journal.[263] In accordance with the ideological preferences and political orientation of the journal, Bumin's articles focused on the issues concerned with the authoritarian nature of the Soviet version of socialism and Leninism particularly with reference to Soviet invasion of Prague in 1968. In a similar vein, topics like vulgar materialism, the Jacobin character of Leninism, Soviet-style socialism appeared as recurring themes of Bumin's early writings. Again, displaying a clear parallelism with the theoretical baggage and missions of *Toplumcu Düşün,* totalitarianism was a subject frequently discussed in Bumin's articles.

As mentioned previously, Mehmet Ali Aybar's politics, though indirectly, greatly influenced the formation of left-liberal opinions. In that respect, Aybar's exceptional opposition against dogmatism and his rejection of the Leninist model

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[261] See: *Demokrasi Arayışında Kent,* İz Yay., İstanbul: 1998.
[262] See, for instance: *Batı'da Devlet ve Çocuk*, (State and the Child in the West), Alan Yay., İstanbul: 1983; *Pasifizme Övgü: Okulumuz Resmi İdeolojimiz,* (Eulogy to Passivism: School and Official Ideology), S.O.S Yay., İzmir: 1991; *Democracy Arayışında Kent,* (The City Seeking for Democracy), Ayrıntı Yay., İstanbul: 1990.
[263] See, for instance: "Prag İlkbaharı İşgal Altında," *Toplumcu Düşün,* August 1979, pp. 431-455.

as a socialist organization made him an intellectually attractive figure for a minority of the left leaning youngsters who were uneasy with the authoritarian aspects of Marxism. In that respect, Aybar, notably with his reaction to the invasion of Czechoslovakia and his original theses on the social formation of Turkey, underlying the bureaucracy as the hegemonic class, had a considerable impact in the shaping of Bumin's own social and political convictions. Throughout the in-depth interview, Bumin has emphasized the significance of Aybar as a political figure in his intellectual and political development (in-depth interview 2011). Furthermore, Bumin was a member of the loose discussion group following the teachings of Aybar during his undergraduate years. He participated in several discussion sessions organized by the group adopting Aybar's interpretation of Marxism. From early 70s to his death in 1995, Aybar was a mentor and a close friend of Bumin (in-depth interview 2011). Aybar never hesitated to accuse Soviet socialism as a totalitarian and oppressive regime, at the risk of being excluded by other Marxist circles of his period. In that respect, his position as an independent democrat later on continued to be a symbol of inspiration for Bumin (in-depth interview 2011). Yet, in contrast to the reservations of other opinion producers gathered around Toplumcu Düşün, who welcomed Aybar's oppositional stance but claimed that his theses still drew upon Marxist methodology, Bumin seemed to adopt Aybar's version of socialism. Bumin's difference of opinion (compared the rest of Toplumcu Düşün) in the early 1980s, also indicates how Bumin's positions on democracy in Turkey differ from the other two prominent opinion producers that are being discussed in this chapter. Bumin's distinctive position as a democrat opinion producer does not

only stem from his insistence on the civic rights and freedoms but also his emphasis on social rights.

Kürşat Bumin was one of the central intellectual architects of the YDH project. He assumed key positions in the movement and his name was mentioned as the leader of the YDH (Bumin, in-depth interview 2011; Ergül, in-depth interview 2011). According to Bumin, the YDH implied a courageous attempt arguing for radical political reforms which would bring a western type democracy to Turkey. Asserting for a radical democratization within the country, the YDH could bring about a change in mentality towards democratization, Bumin believed (in-depth interview 2011).

However Bumin was among those who left the YDH after the decision to transform the movement into a political party. The major reason behind Bumin's leaving the movement was related to his conviction that the anti-democratic political culture in Turkey would contaminate YDH as well. Additionally, despite his pivotal position within YDH, Bumin retained certain reservations about the movement. His major objection concerned the movement's ignorance of the social problems of the working people in Turkey (in-depth interview 2011). Bumin thought that the barriers before the free functioning of the market should be eliminated, but also added that this alone would not ensure social justice. In his own words, "the category of 'social' was not only confined to issues concerning secularism, Islam, ethnicity or democracy. It also included the struggle for living, and labor problems" (2011 in-depth interview).

Bumin held that the YDH had to limit its mission to influencing policy makers through preparing reports on critical issues such as the supremacy of law, military tutelage, Kurdish problem and political Islam and operate as a civil

platform encouraging democratic discussion (in-depth interview 2011). He admits that, at least for a short period of time, the YDH provided a reasonable platform upon which ideas supporting the empowerment of a truly democratic political culture could be spread (in-depth interview 2011). Unfortunately, with the decision of becoming a political party, the missions of this democratic platform could no longer be advanced (in-depth interview 2011). Bumin was not involved with the process at the end of which the YDH became a political party. Following his wife, he went to Germany and stayed there until 1997.

Unlike Mahçupyan and Bayramoğlu, Bumin was closer to socialism and therefore he contributed to left-leaning journals that represented the early steps towards a formulation of democratic socialism in Turkey. For instance, he wrote an article for *Yeni Gündem* focusing on the problems of the education system in Turkey and its connections with the official ideology.[264] He also wrote for *Zemin*, a monthly journal covering plurality of critical voices within the socialist left, published by the political circle around Mehmet Ali Aybar.[265] However Bumin never preferred to join any one of the anti-Stalinist socialist circles. For instance, despite his lifelong friendship with and admiration of Aybar, Bumin did not choose to be a member of Aybar's Socialist Revolution Party (SDP).[266] Aybar's interpretation of socialism remained as an intellectual source that inspired Bumin's ideas and was not regarded a political focus offering feasible policies for existing socio-political issues. In addition to his reservations related to the authoritarian features inherent in Marxian socialism, his decision of being

[264] The article published in *Yeni Gündem* was titled "Öğretmenim, canım benim, Oku, öğret, beni 'kahret'" See: Bumin, 1991:44.
[265] *Zemin* was a monthly journal published between October 1986 and March 1987. The owner of the journal was Uğur Cankoçak. For detailed information, see: Chapter 4.
[266] SDP (*Socialist Revolution Party,* founded in 1975) was banned after the 1980 coup in October 1981. In 1992 Aybar reestablished the party. Alongside Aybar, key figures of SDP were Uğur Cankoçak and Cenan Bıçakçı.

distanced to party politics seems to be a deliberate choice revealing his own definition of himself as a *truly independent* opinion producer. Bumin deliberately prefers not to be associated with any political party or ideological circle and even refuses to be identified as a thinker connected to any specific tradition.

A detailed examination of Bumin's articles covering a wide range of topics from problems associated with top-down practices of secularism in Turkey to the issues related to gender or social inequalities reveals an interesting clue about his thought: Hannah Arendt's writings have obviously been a source of inspiration in the formation of his political opinions. Most significantly, Bumin's ideas on Marxian socialism make considerable use of Arendt's famous book, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*.[267] Moreover, Bumin's writings on ideology bear the mark of Arendt's thoughts on totalitarianism to a great extent.[268] Arendt's remarks that both fascism of Nazi Germany and the socialism under Stalinist Russia represented distinctive forms of governments built upon terror and ideological reshaping, and thereby exemplified the modern totalitarian regimes, have provided sound theoretical basis for Bumin's rethinking over issues related to the democracy.[269]

Bumin's intellectual affinity with Arendt's analysis on totalitarianism has certain implications for understanding his political mindset. Most commentators associate Bumin with political right in part because he draws largely upon a canonical text of Cold War liberal anti-communism. It was argued by left wing critics that Arendt's analysis on totalitarianism, drawing parallels between Nazi Germany and Soviet Union, provided intellectual justifications for the anti-

[267] *The Origins of Totalitarianism* published in 1951. An expanded edition of the book was published in 1958, taking into account the Hungarian Revolution of two years earlier (Isaac, 1998: 58).
[268] See, for instance: Bumin, 1998: 34, 88; 1991: 14.
[269] See for instance, Bumin: 1991:16-18; 1998b: 37, 88; 2002: 16.

communist politics of the Cold War (Isaac, 1998: 57). For some on the left of political spectrum, particularly in the United States, Arendt has been read as the theoretician of anti-communism (Isaac, 1998: 56, 57). Even for anti-Stalinist socialists, Arendt's assault against Marxism was regarded as a sign of her political preferences within the Cold War environment (Isaac, 1998: 57). Since Arendt had a bad reputation within socialist circles, Bumin's thoughts in turn, were interpreted as pro-establishment. Indeed, one other factor that seems to contribute to this line of thinking is Bumin's utilization of two keywords of the Cold War terminology: 'totalitarianism' and 'free world.' In several essays, he coined 'free world' as the opposite of totalitarianism. Needless to say, within the post-Cold War era, the term implied functioning democracies of the West.[270] Yet, it should once more be stated that Bumin never fits into the mold of a right wing opinion producer or a conservative establishment figure. For instance, his frequent reference to totalitarianism or his usage of the notion of 'free world' might well be linked to Bumin's dissatisfaction with the popular understanding of the socialist and left leaning circles undermining the value of democracy.

7.3.3.3.Columnist in an Islamist Daily, Yeni Şafak

After his return to Turkey in 1997 during the February 28 process, Bumin started to write for the pro-Islamist daily *Yeni Şafak*. The post-modern coup of February 28, 1997, is undoubtedly the most significant case over which the issue of military tutelage over politics, for the first time since 1980, has been debated on solid grounds. With the episode of February 1997, political Islam and military tutelage were problematized in detail. This problematization and soul-searching has led to the further consolidation of the Democrat as a social type. In line with

[270] See, for instance: Bumin, 1998: 37, 88; 1991: 16.

the definitive characteristics of our social type, Kürşat Bumin wrote articles criticizing media's responses to the February 1997 episode with particular emphasis on the issues of political Islam and military tutelage. In *Yeni Şafak* he and Alper Görmüş prepared a media-critical page (called *Medyakronik*) where they exposed the relations between political power and journalism. Behind Bumin's own journalism effort was his deep belief that in order to be truly democratized, Turkey had to eliminate all forms of lawlessness that haunt the relations between the media, politics and jurisdiction.

It would be incorrect to suggest that the 1997 coup resembled the previous military coups experienced in Turkey. In contrast to the previous coups, the military, in this case, played behind the scenes. The coup was also distinctive in terms of the role played by 'civil' society organizations and the media during its execution. That is, alongside the overt pressure of the NSC over the Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan and the coalition government, certain segments of the secular establishment have played considerable role in delegitimizing the government and thus strengthening the hand of the armed forces. As a result of the combined efforts of the media, the 'civil society' organizations and the military, Refah-Yol coalition government was forced to collapse in June 1997. With reference to the role played by the so-called civil society organizations during the process, some commentators tended to explain February 28, as an outcome of the internal logic of democratic politics in Turkey (Toprak, 2005: 172).[271] These commentators believed that the involvement of the media and civil society in support of the armed forces was "normal," to be expected as part of the operation of the democratic process (Toprak, 2005: 172).

[271] According to Toprak, although the military had an important role in the process, the prominent role of the democratic forces should not be underestimated. She believes that civilian opposition also played significant role in the decline of political Islam during the process (2005: 172).

However the 1997 episode revealed that the military rule did not always have to take over directly. Moreover, using indirect strategies of influence and manipulation may give the military even greater opportunities to influence public policy (Cizre and Çınar, 2003: 310). Contrary to the previous coups, the February 28 intervention demonstrated the military's strategy of redefining Turkey's political landscape by manufacturing consent (Cizre and Çınar, 2003: 322). In that atmosphere, media helped the military by serving fabricated news of "sharia threat" and by appealing to the fears that have been sown the mindset of the secular groups.

Bumin spent a lot of time and energy during this episode to expose the manipulations of the media (Bumin, 1998: 39, 103; 2002a: 130, 2002b: 87, 274, 277). In this respect, his initial task was to question the 'civil' character of the civil society organizations welcomed as the democratic forces that supported the military intervention. He maintained that, despite common perceptions, being "unofficial" was not the only criterion to be "civilian" (1998). Civil society was a platform to oppose power outside the state and thus reinforce democracy (1998). Bumin thought that, as an example, the only civil society organization that operated true to its mission was Mazlumder, because Mazlumder did not discriminate ideologically, religiously or ethnically while it focused on human rights advocacy (2002b: 186).

Throughout his critical readings of the media, he coined the term of "state columnist" in order to criticize the positions adopted by columnists and journalists in favor of prevailing power relations (1998: 62). According to Bumin, these journalists could not write well organized articles that were coherent. Instead their columns were based on short sentences, written sloppily and mostly talked about

how they had been socializing with powerful state figures (1998: 63). These columns almost never questioned political issues seriously and their discourse reflected the dominant positions of the state on issues like national security, political Islam or the Kurdish question (1998: 65). Bumin's observations on the category of the "state columnist" overlapped with the following political analysis: within the conditions of February 28 process, the 'civil' societal actors and the media adopted state-dependent and state-defending roles which in turn brought about the subordination of the political realm to the secular state power (Cizre and Çınar, 2003: 316). According to Bumin, the attempts of some state institutions to define their authority as surpassing politics reinforce the perception that politics is a bad, negative thing (2002a: 34). These institutions, imposing themselves covertly as political actors, try to give the impression that they are a-political as if they try to assert that the political is an evil concept. Yet according to Bumin, these institutions cause the contraction of the political sphere in Turkey (2002a: 35).

Bumin has frequently written about rights violations of organizations and persons that were discriminated against during the February 1997 episode because their Islamist identities. He discussed the issues of rule of law and banning parties after the ban against Felicity Party and argued that justifications of such bans by saying that democracy has to defend itself are incompatible with the principle of rule of law (2002b: 180, 85, 45; 1998: 39). A significant event Bumin has delved upon with regard to the issue of rule of law was the "Merve Kavakçı Affair." Kavakçı, a veiled Deputy of Fazilet Partisi in 1999 elections (Virtue Party) was prevented to take her oath in the swear-in ceremony. Bumin focused on the midnight raid operation launched on the house of Merve Kavakçı, by the Chief

Prosecutor of State Security Courts Nuh Mete Yüksel and pointed to the incompability of this situation with the principle of the supremacy of law.[272] According to Bumin, the very existence of State Security Courts is a problem compromising democracy; these courts give special powers to prosecutors who in turn tend to violate individuals' rights with decisions that appears to be arbitrarily given. (Bumin, 2002b: 226).

Needless to say, one major incident that brought the discussions on the rule of law into Turkey's agenda was the Susurluk Scandal. Just as the February 1997 intervention has led to the discussion of military tutelage in detail, the event at Susurluk opened up debates on the status of the principle of rule of law in Turkey at the end of the 1990s. Before 1996-1997, debates on the rule of law were associated with the Kurdish Question and rights violations related to that issue. But with the scandal that involved a politician, a paramilitary intelligence officer and the director of a Police School, the concept of the "deep state" and Mafioso relations within state institutions has permanently been integrated into the agendas of opinion producers and academics in Turkey. As Bumin discussed the Susurluk event on the grounds of the relation between law and politics, he noted that the media limits its criticisms by arguing that the only "offenders" in this event were the politicians (1998: 115, 222; 2002a: 58).

In accordance with his conception of 'the social,' Bumin has not confined his intellectual investigation with the topics directly related to the broad and interrelated issues of military tutelage, political Islam and the Kurdish Question as he problematized the perception of rule of law in Turkey. Nor did he accept a

[272] Bumin was not alone in his efforts of raising his criticisms against the midnight raid operation on Kavakçı's house. Hasan Cemal from Milliyet's Hasan Cemal and Radikal's Mehmet Yılmaz also raised their criticismis against the operation. See, Hasan Cemal, "External Support for Stability," *Milliyet*, October 20, 1999; Mehmet Yılmaz, "Crisis or Comedy?" *Radikal*, October 20, 1999.

hierarchical order among these constant themes of the Turkish political scene. He rather preferred to discuss different facets of social and political issues in delineating the fundamental shortcomings of Turkish democracy. In that respect, he did not refrain from exposing the hypocritical attitude of Turkish mainstream media with respect to the incidents of torture and maltreatment in Turkish prisons, extrajudicial killings, disappearances in custody and human rights abuses by the security officers. Bumin's articles focused on disputed cases such as: the trial of sixteen youngsters by police officers in 1995, known as the case of "Manisa Children" (1998: 223), the struggle of "Saturday Mothers," siblings of the disappeared persons in custody (2002a: 57), extrajudicial killing of Murat Bektaş in 1999 and the silence shared by both Islamist and secular media in face of this incident (2002b: 99), widespread cases of maltreatment in Turkish prisons (2002a: 81), and the double standards of the juridical system against children who were arrested while stealing baklava (2002a: 58).

Bumin did not confine himself to raising sharp criticisms against the secular establishment and its mouthpieces in the media. He also heavily criticized Islamist media, including his own newspaper *Yeni Şafak*. Most significantly, Bumin condemned the attitudes of the Islamist media with respect to the massacres of Alevis in Sivas in 1993.When, after the court decision sentencing 33 participants of the Sivas events to death, the daily *Akit* ("Is Aziz Nesin the State?") and *Yeni Şafak* ("Death Sentences Are Being Debated") came out with critical headlines, Bumin sharply argued against the Islamist discourse. He criticized the stigmatization off Aziz Nesin as an "atheist writer" (1998: 194, 196). Again, when *Yeni Şafak* chose the frame the issue of Heybeliada School of Theology in anti-

Christian terms, Bumin argued against the paper's denial of the rights violation involved (1998: 103).

Another significant criticism of Bumin against Islamists concerns this group's occasional defenses of the State. Obedience to the State, according to Bumin, was justified from time to time using religious arguments, which in turn hinders the spread of democratic dispositions among Islamists (2002a: 144). As an example, Bumin heavily criticized Yeni Şafak's positive and approving coverage of a protest event organized by 4000 armed policemen in Istanbul on December 12, 2000 (2002a: 115).

Alongside the above mentioned points, what makes Bumin's critical and pro-democratic attitude distinctive is his concern with one major topic, that of gender, which has been largely neglected by most other liberal and democratic opinion producers. One example discussed by Bumin on gender issues can be recalled to give an idea about his sensitivities: After the broadcast of scenes of the female theologian Dr. Hidayet Tuksal where she crossed her legs, the Islamist media attacked her with a sexist, almost pornographic discourse. Bumin took up this issue and problematized how the Islamist media reproduced the general, structural patriarchal discourses dominant in Turkish society (2002a: 156).

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

8.1. On Methodology

In this dissertation it has been argued that within Turkey's political and cultural fields, a social type of opinion producers, namely the Democrat, has emerged. This social type was shaped by the various moments of the democratic consolidation process in the two decades following the 1980 coup. Throughout the dissertation, "social type analysis," an understudied social-scientific paradigm developed through the works of Georg Simmel, has been explicated and deployed for the study of this particular type of political opinion producers that appeared in Turkey throughout the 1980s. In this vein, the Democrat, in this dissertation, has been analyzed as the product of particular political and social relations. Following the theoretical insights offered by Simmel, the Democrat social type is examined as a mediating concept between the general democratization dynamics of Turkey and the specific responses given to these dynamics in the political culture.

The dissertation maintained that the state of "being liberal and democratic" includes but cannot singularly be reduced to class positions, strategies of cultural distinction, political criticism or patterns of socialization. Throughout the

dissertation, the emergence and embodiment of the Democrat has been explored within a process of conglomeration of personality traits, socio-political convictions, mannerisms and mentalities that can be observed inside the social-political space of Turkey during the 1980s and 1990s.

In this dissertation, the analysis of the Democrat as a social type drew upon the following methodological steps: Firstly, in order to identify the components of our social type, a socio-historical analysis has been developed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. Secondly, three individual representatives (Etyen Mahçupyan, Ali Bayramoğlu and Kürşat Bumin) have been chosen to provide the detailed portrait of the social type. Writings of these figures are used as discursive data, and in-depth interviews have been completed with each of them. Finally, in this Chapter, the components of the social type will be brought together to construct an "epistemic individual" in order to demonstrate the presence and influence of the social type in Turkish political discourse.

The major reasoning behind the methodological preferences of the dissertation derives from the shortcomings arising from either over-theorized or over-sociologized accounts on specialist political opinion producers. An analysis built upon the pervasive concept of "intellectual" is constraining for the political-scientific task of studying heterogeneous emergent groups representing political opinions during Turkey's experiences with democratic consolidation since early 1980s. As I aimed to demonstrate throughout the dissertation, despite various well-intentioned attempts to historicize "intellectuals" by drawing upon their relation to politics, the category is always consecrated, surrounded by an aura of good or bad "missions," liked or disliked "functions" or overburdened "tasks." Therefore, it is difficult to retool either the concept of the "intellectual" or that of

the “intelligentsia” by attempting to eliminate the moralistic baggage that comes with it. Then, instead of using a morally burdened catch-all concept that is more fit for philosophical treatises and was not intended for operationalization in specific political studies, I contended that we are better off with a different tool. A concept that can do the job of providing insights on a specific group of individuals with common characteristics embedded into a particular era of Turkish politics is offered – naming and framing a particular “social type”.

The dissertation argues social type analysis delivers more methodological flexibility without the moralism of the “task of intellectuals” debates: The Democrat of the two decades following the 1980 coup is an emergent, distinctive, nevertheless ordinary social type, no superior or sacred or special than the social types of the Hobo, the Stranger or the Loser. To clarify a perhaps obvious point: The Democrat of this era is not the same as the Democrat in 1950s’ Turkey. Nor does he have a trans-historical “responsibility” (although he may misrecognize his “disinterestedness” as such and this misrecognition is a significant object of analysis). Moreover, the Democrat is not a “vocational” category, like the politician or the journalist. The Democrat is both a creature of the shortcomings of democracy in Turkey’s political sphere and civil society, and acts and socializes through these shortcomings, and leaves his impressions in the public sphere with her opinions. Furthermore, the operationalization of the social type of the Democrat enables us the following: It helps reveal how certain characteristics, political attitudes, opinionated dispositions, reactions to authority, etc. coming from different individuals with comparable trajectories form recognizable social and political patterns, patterns that inspire or antagonize others and gain causal power over political and even mental structures.

There are three case studies in the dissertation completed using social type analysis: Opinion producers Ali Bayramoğlu, Etyen Mahçupyan and Kürşat Bumin are studied as representatives of the Democrat. These individuals are part of the heterogeneous group of scholars, journalists, writers, etc. that contributes to the shaping of public opinion on the democratic profile of rights, liberties and rule of law in Turkey. Their political opinions provide direct or indirect consultancy service to the government. They critically comment on the policies of the state and provide insight for policy-makers about what the citizens think of those policies. They function as 'gate-keepers:' through their liberal and/or democratic opinions they draw boundaries between what is properly political and what is outside the boundaries of the political.

8.2. Analysis: Bringing the Components of the Social Type Together

As stated previously, the Democrat, in this dissertation, is not a category of individuals that carry the heavy burden of some consecrated 'mission' or 'function.' The significance of this dissertation is to demonstrate the Democrat's ordinariness and distinctiveness at the same time, in relation to three fundamental turning points in recent Turkish politics: The 1980 coup and its aftermath, the Political-Islamist movement and the Kurdish insurgency.

Three prominent figures, analyzed as representatives of the Democrat as a social type, Mahçupyan, Bayramoğlu and Bumin, socialized and politicized under distinctive historical circumstances (very different, for Turkey, than the positions of political opinion producers of late Ottoman modernization, or of the 1950s and 1960s) have left their political and cultural impression on their era through their columns, TV appearances, books or academic works. Nevertheless, they are still mere creatures of the political developments of their times.

We may begin with Klapp's assumption (1956:37): for a social type to be perceived as significant, people would create names or give newer meanings to existing names. This assumption may serve as a guideline for the identification of our social type. In the political culture of Turkey, the qualification 'liberal' has been frequently used for smearing by both the left and right, particularly by nationalist and/or Kemalist circles. Given this, the portrayal 'liberal left,' 'left liberal' or 'liberal democrat,' for instance, is an attribution made by others rather than being a qualification preferred by some. Even within the nationalist and Kemalist circles, opinion producers emphasizing individual freedoms, developing an ethical approach to democracy and calling for elimination of military tutelage and strengthening of rule of law, have been labeled as "Second Republicanists", "civil society advocators" used synonymously with "the domestic collaborators of imperialism" or the sexist epithet "liboş." Indeed, the dispositions and attitudes critically associated with the social type, while caricaturized, point towards real convictions and political relations. Accordingly, the identification of the Democrat as a social type can also be methodologically justified by the analysis of the way nick names are used (Klapp, 1956).

The next major step of our analysis concerns the processes of naming and justifying the basic components of the Democrat as a social type. In this vein, cultural, political, ideological features that characterize our social type exemplified by three key figures, Mahçupyan, Bayramoğlu and Bumin, will be listed. In order to sum up its various components, a mnemonic name has been attached to each feature defining the type (Sway, 1981; Smith 1974).

It should once more be emphasized that, equipped with social type analysis, we examine our cases in the context of their intellectual worlds, relations

they establish, alliances they join and the positions they take before the public as a part of reality they experience. Accordingly, in order to compile the distinguishing characteristics that form the social type the following mnemonic names are employed: having a beef with classical liberalism, emphasis on the cultural over the political, political disinterestedness, anti-Leninism, gender negligence, and public visibility.

8.2.1. Having a beef with classical liberalism

One basic characteristic that distinguishes the opinion producers that constitute the research subject of this dissertation is their theoretical ambition to transcend the conception of democracy defined within the theoretical and ideological limitations of the liberal thought. Uncomfortable with the label "liberal," they define their own political identities far beyond the ideological borders that define liberal understanding of democratic functioning. In their view, liberal democracy disregards multiculturalist values and ideals concerning the coexistence of cultural differences. They argue for a multi-culturalist model of democracy defined on the basis of multiculturalism, values of toleration and coexistence of cultural differences. For instance, according to Mahçupyan, who categorically denies any connection of democratic position to liberalism's conception of liberty and the individual, the liberal construction of the atomistic and solitary individual who never needs to communicate with the others to verify his taken-for-granted rational decisions, ignores different voices and thereby fails to recognize 'the Other' (Mahçupyan, 2007: 109-110). Put differently, heavily preoccupied with protecting his liberty in his private realm, the liberal individual disregards the plurality and diversity of the demands of others (Mahçupyan, 2007; Bayramoğlu, 2007: 43; Bumin, 2002a). Furthermore, according to these three

figures, philosophically benefited from the methodological framework offered by post-structuralism, democrats retaining the belief in the identification of truth through tentative common subjectivities, in contrast to liberals, avoid authoritarian aspects of liberal thought. Besides, they raise sharp objections to what they regard inherent to liberalism, that of the instrumentalization of democracy. In their view, democracy cannot and should not be reduced to a political mechanism of regulation based upon free and fair elections (Mahçupyan, 2006; Bayramoğlu, 2007a; Bumin, 2002a). Their formulation of democracy envisages a multicultural society that provides the conditions conducive for free exchange of ideas and that encourages the mutual recognition of identities. According to this model, interaction of different groups and communities would bring about the common values constituting the ethical basis for the peaceful coexistence of differences (Mahçupyan, 1998). Within this perceptive, the antagonisms inherent in the social and political fabric are deliberately overlooked and considered to correspond to totalitarian positions stemming from a conflictual understanding (Mahçupyan, 1998: 231). In this respect, democratic politics deriving from a true deliberation and reflection denies the existence of antagonistic demands and takes for granted the possibility of an everlasting consensus.

8.2.2. Emphasis on 'the Cultural' over ' the Political'

Another common denominator of the cases that exemplify the social type of the Democrat is their methodological insistence on the significance of culture in social scientific analysis. They share a common concern in seeking to explain the peculiarities of the Turkish political landscape by putting particular emphasis on culture and cultural cleavages. Each of the figures exemplary of the Democrat

has retained a distanced and critical position towards Marxism and they have employed, to a large extent, a Weberian analytical framework in shaping their arguments. In that vein, they all adopt Mardin's culture-centered analysis of Turkish political history, which presumes that the cultural codes of the state elites and popular masses are in constant conflict. In this respect, the Democrat seems to accept this model's "cultural alienation" thesis, which lumps the complex dynamic of Turkish politics into the axis of culture. This priviledged status of culture is mostly manifest in Mahçupyan's analysis that seeks to map ot the Turkish political landscape (Mahçupyan, 1996: 91). In Mahçupyan's understanding, the innately cultural contention between universal and traditional values in politics pits political actors against each other. In other words, Mahçupyan examines Turkey's political scene through the polarization he perceives between global and local values (1996: 92). Likewise, in Bayramoğlu's sociological analysis, cultural cleavages have occupied substantial place. Retaining close affinity to the Weberian perspective, and sharing the central premises of center-periphery analysis to understand the history of Ottoman-Turkish modernization, Bayramoğlu has also evaluated the major dynamics of Turkey's socio-political landscape through the methodological pillars of center and periphery cleavage (2007). Although he does write extensively on the topics directly related to the cultural alienation thesis, Bumin's corpus of writings has also retained the imprint of the culture-centric approach (2002a). All in all, while prioritizing the cultural over the political, the social type of the Democrat de-emphasizes the wide range of dynamics at play within the realm of politics and merely reads the Turkish political landscape as a sphere under the monopoly of exclusionist elite. Yet, the most important implication of the culture-oriented

inclination concerns the definition of the political. Built upon cultural determinations, the definition of the political presumes a hierarchy of issues within the course of socio-historical analysis. This hierarchy of socio-political issues drawing upon the insights derived from the cultural alienation thesis privileges some specific topics related to rights and liberties (state and the military, for instance) and excludes or overlooks others (gender, for instance).

8.2.3. Disinterestedness towards Party Politics

As mentioned in the previous chapters, a characteristic of the newly emergent social type is a longing for democratic debate, but without cumbersome practical-political chores that come along with it. This characteristic is evident in the social trajectories of each of our case examples whose paths were carefully separated from political activism. Regardless of their own subjective perception of how they are positioned, they were comfortably confined to a space of pure analysis, commentary-making and theorization. Their sole engagement with the realm of *reelpolitik* has been confined to occasional involvement with activities like petitions and protests. All in all, the Democrat hopes that his or her anti-authoritarian opinions on civil liberties and democratic governance would be picked up by effective policy-makers, or at least, convince them.

The YDH experience of our three case figures tells a lot in this respect. The three case examples of our social type had varying degrees of commitment to the YDH movement, but for each of them, this unsuccessful platform became a point of convergence of ideals about individual liberties and democratic governance. At the beginning of YDH all three figures - Mahçupyan, Bumin, and Bayramoğlu - had participated in various political workshops organized by the volunteers of the movement. They contributed to the writing of analytical reports

(in the name of the movement) in which they proposed assessments and possible solutions for the principal political problems in Turkey. Yet, all three figures, keeping reservations about YDH becoming a political party that would compete for power, agreed that YDH should rather remain a civil society organization and perhaps operate like a political think tank. In their view, the YDH had to limit its mission to influencing political opinion making mainly through preparing reports on such major problems and issues as the Kurdish problem, military tutelage and political Islam. Among the three, Mahçupyan, though unwilling, participated actively in the preparations for the establishment and provincial organization of YDH as a political party. Bumin and Bayramoğlu were much more hostile to the idea of a political party and following the episode of workshops and meetings, they distanced themselves from the movement as YDH prepared for the upcoming 1995 parliamentary elections. Hence, all of the three case examples under investigation have preferred to stand on a ground distanced from party politics and sought to serve democratization from outside.

It is possible to explain the disinterestedness in engagement with active politics with the desire of maintaining distance towards particularistic demands and pretending to stand high and above existing political groups and forces. By refusing active involvement in the political realm, the Democrat seems to strengthen his or her privileged and distinctive status, which in turn enables him to patronize over different political actors (Erdoğan and Üstüner, 2002: 207).

8.2.4. Anti-Leninism

The individuals focused in this dissertation as the representatives of the social type of the Democrat agree that socialism, especially as it is understood in Turkey, is an authoritarian initiative geared to social engineering. They share the

similar distant or even reactionary critical attitude to Marxism and socialist ideas inspired by Marxism. They all agree upon the authoritarian nature of the Soviet version of socialism and Leninism. In their early writings, both Mahçupyan and Bumin were preoccupied with topics like vulgar materialism, the Jacobin character of Leninism, and the totalitarianism of Soviet-style socialism.

During the in-depth interviews, all three opinion producers have mentioned the name of Mehmet Ali Aybar as the sole political figure in the socialist left who had the greatest influence upon them. They expressed that Aybar's political views had a significant impacts in the shaping of their social and political convictions. Aybar's exceptional opposition against dogmatism and his rejection of the Leninist model as a socialist organization made him an intellectually attractive figure for the opinion producers who were uneasy with the authoritarian aspects of Marxism. Aybar, notably with his reaction to the invasion of Czechoslovakia and his original theses on the social formation of Turkey, underlying the bureaucracy as the hegemonic class, had a considerable impact in the development of social type of the Democrat. Moreover, Aybar's exceptional status within the socialist left particularly related to his accusations of Soviet socialism as a totalitarian and oppressive regime, made him a symbol of inspiration for liberal and democratic opinion producers. Aybar's interpretation of Marxism with the themes of alienation and emancipation at its heart; his criticism of the interpretation of Marx that is centered on the concept of exploitation as reductionist; these factors made him an intellectually and politically attractive figure for pinion producers working with liberal and democratic premises. Moreover, the approach of libertarian socialism which was the main reference

point of Aybar's analyses particularly after 1968 and his sharp criticisms against the USSR was considered by as a challenge against dogmatism.

One particular point deserves to be mentioned: The language that the three of our case examples prefer to utilize is reminiscent of the Cold War terminology. Oftentimes, they employ the terms like 'totalitarianism' and 'free world.' This is particularly manifest in Bumin's essays, within which he has coined 'free world' as the opposite of totalitarianism. Yet, references to totalitarianism or usage of the notion of 'free world' might well be linked to the dissatisfaction with the popular understanding of the socialist and left leaning circles undermining the value of democracy.

8.2.5. Underemphasizing Gender

One major characteristic shared by the individual figures exemplary of the Democrat is their lack of emphasis on the wide range of gender-related socio-political issues. Indeed, once their political writings are analyzed in detail, it can be argued that the opinion producers that fit in the mold of our social type do not work with gender-sensitive assumptions. Their lack of interest towards this key and highly contentious dimension of social life and culture cannot be regarded as an innocent omission. These opinion producers have raised sharp criticisms against liberalism on the grounds that it falls short of fulfilling the promise of a multiculturalist society that provides the conditions conducive for free exchange of ideas and that encourages the mutual recognition of identities. Despite this critical investment, the Democrat avoids problematizing gender-related demands and issues. All three figures' insistence on building an ethical basis for the peaceful coexistence of differences does not seem to take into consideration different identities defined on the basis of gender.

In their analyses, gender inequality and oppression of women are deliberately overlooked. During the in-depth interviews, each of the opinion producers tended to justify this omission in an over-theorized manner. For instance, Bayramoğlu emphasized that his definition of 'the political' presumed a hierarchical ordering of the problems determined through the prism of culture centered outlook (in-depth interview 2011). At the top of this hierarchy stood problems related to State and its relations with the society. This line of justification, exposing a male-dominant approach which locates the topic of gender outside "real" social and political problems, fails to comprehend the multifaceted nature of gender relations within which practical and theoretical issues of justice, equality and the like operate.

The negligence of gender by the Democrat might be elaborated on theoretical grounds as well. The main theoretical premises upon which the Democrat builds his political positions are derived from the culture-centered approach of Şerif Mardin. As it has been discussed earlier, Mardin's "cultural alienation" thesis is rather reductionistic as it attempts to make culture of the main principle of explanation. Such an approach is far from presenting a full picture of the problems of democratization in Turkey since it overlooks fundamental aspects of societal and political dynamics. Cultural reductionism tends to de-emphasize issues related to poverty, international dynamics and of course the gender. Accordingly, topics like military tutelage, rule of law and intolerance against different ethnic groups are examined in isolation from the basic dynamics and components of the social and political landscape. To illustrate this: the Democrat takes demands raised by Islamic groups into consideration because these demands

are excluded from the cultural realm. But demands raised by feminists are overlooked since they do not fit in the cultural alienation perspective.

Mahçupyan's ideas on feminism are illuminating in this respect. According to him, feminism is a product of modernism and therefore it is confined with the limitations posed by modernism itself, and thereby is far from presenting alternatives within the democratizing context through which modernism has been surpassed (in-depth interview, 2011). More importantly, Mahçupyan does not seem to be uncomfortable with the patriarchal value system. He even point out the legacy of patriarchal mentality as one of the protective barriers that avoid shift to totalitarianism/fascism (2008: 19). In his view, setting totalitarian structures at intellectual level by feeding on religions is not possible for the heterogeneous structure of religions. Religions may get closer to totalitarian approaches only if they are locked in authoritarian structures and their essential nature is disturbed (Mahçupyan, 1999: 212-213). In that respect, while acceding that it is not an ideal solution against totalitarianism, he underlines that the religious community outlook, with its all patriarchal facets, can serve in the traditions of this land as a safety valve against modern forms of oppression (1999: 213).

Bumin's approach towards gender-related issues diverges from the perspectives adopted either by Mahçupyan or Bayramoğlu. Bumin frequently appreciates women's movements in Turkey and emphasizes their significance within the general processes leading to a true democracy (in-depth interview, 2011). For him, feminism materialized in Turkey in the 1980s and contributed to the process of democratization. It exemplified a model of struggle that was capable of going beyond hierarchical and centralized habits. In Bumin's

understanding figures like Duygu Asena were the pioneers of the democratic struggle in that respect (in-depth interview, 2011). In this respect, Bumin has stressed that he has continuously denied a hierarchical order among the constant themes of democracy in Turkey. As it has been mentioned previously, his insistence on the double standards of the Islamic media in the case of Hidayet Tuksal is revealing. He asserted that the Islamist media attacked Tuksal with a sexist and almost pornographic discourse (2002a:156). Unfortunately, a detailed examination of whole body of Bumin's writings reveals that gender is a topic that has a minor place in his corpus of works compared to other topics.

Consequently, it can be argued that the Democrat fails the litmus test of gender, which in turn casts doubt on the "strongly democratic" posture of these opinion producers. At the end of the day, these three individuals exemplary of our social type reproduce the masculine standpoint in their reflection on democracy and democratization.

8.2.6. Public Visibility

Another characteristic of the Democrat, who, as discussed, stays away from the "dirty" game of politics, is his accumulation of reputation through public visibility. Exposure to the public through their newspaper columns, but more importantly, through TV appearances, is their main means to attempt changing or influencing political agendas with their opinions.

The three public figures investigated in this dissertation have all increased their public visibility during their engagement with the New Democracy Movement (YDH), launched under the leadership of Cem Boyner. They have all began their careers as column-writers towards the end of 1990s, around the time the process leading to the February 1997 intervention was unfolding. Their

influence as opinion producers was thus shaped by sharp engagements with the debates on the Kurdish Question and on Political Islam. This episode of hot debates, accompanied by the undermining of rule of law with the 1997 intervention and the Susurluk Affair, reinforced the public visibility of the Democrat.

With their role as the "opinion leaders" of Turkey's main democratic issues, a role that also sustained them economically, these figures representing the Democrat did not need gaining renown through active politics. Regardless of whether their opinions had any actual impact on policy-making, public visibility bestowed respect upon them.

8.3. Embedding the Social Type in its Proper Socio-Historical Context

The social type of the Democrat, as a mediating concept between the general democratization dynamics of Turkey and the specific responses given to those dynamics, is obviously a product of political and social relations. Yet, the Democrat owes his credit to the systemic deficiencies of democratization in Turkey.

The political establishment's questionable performance in the area of civil liberties, in responding to the challenges of the Kurdish and Islamist movements and the accountability problems with civil-military relations have "selected" the emergence of a social space: in this space, political opinions that were derived from liberal and democratic principles and were structurally excluded from state affairs offered discursive checks and balances to Turkish politics. In that respect, the Democrat's opinion production is directly associated with the "criticism of military tutelage", as the impact of the Turkish Armed Forces on politics has experienced various turning points throughout the two decades following the 1980

coup. The relationship between the Democrat and the criticism of the praetorian state is constituted through three episodes: During the rule of Turgut Özal's ANAP; engagement with the Kurdish issue; and the debates on democratization triggered by the 1997 intervention. Therefore, in order to provide a reasonable portrait of the social type, accounting for the historical conditions that create the social space in which the type matures is of great importance. The socio-political atmosphere of the post-coup era should be seen as the hotbed of the development of democratic thinking. The liberal epoch starting with the economic reforms initiated by successive governments under the leadership of Turgut Özal, along with the individualist values becoming widespread in Turkish society, have created the basis conducive to the flourishing of a liberal and democratic criticism. The story of the neoliberal reformation of Turkey had significant implications for the field of cultural and scholarly production as well: Opinion producers, mostly associated with the left-oriented tradition, adopted the basic premises of post-structuralist or post-modernist thought and interpreted the ongoing socio-political developments as justification of their political and theoretical positions. Accordingly, the collapse of the Soviet Union, emergence of micro-nationalisms and the proliferation of identity politics have all reinforced the beliefs in the end of class struggle, the death of ideologies and the bankruptcy of conception of politics as a struggle for power (Bayramoğlu, 2007).

The episode spanning the two final decades of the 20th century has left its imprint on Turkish politics in two fundamental axis of contention – regarding the Islamist and Kurdish demands. The dominion of these two spheres of contentious politics over Turkey has definitively shaped the characteristics of the social type of the Democrat. As I have discussed throughout the dissertation, the maturation

of the political dispositions that characterize the Democrat as social type is innately related to the responses given to the Islamist and Kurdish challenges.

Each of the three figures I have investigated under the category of the social type of the Democrat has maintained that two primary political dynamics of the 1990s, the Kurdish and Islamist challenges made it easier to think about democracy and being democratic. The challenges of political demands coming from these two movements have helped the maturing of thinking on democracy, not through rigidly Western paradigms, but through very concrete and immediate problems about rights and liberties.

Since late 1990s, the Democrat has become a permanent figure of the Turkish political and cultural scene. Today's, his characteristics are immediately recognized when, for example, TV producers have to think about names with opposing political convictions to be invited to their debate programs. Throughout numerous such interactions, the mold into which the Democrat is cast has become even more solid. The Democrat has been politically vilified and glorified, names have been named about him, and he has been referenced to make points about the nature of democracy in Turkey.

In this dissertation, my point about the Democrat is not that he (or she) is a figure that can be homogeneously described. Individuals who are exemplary of the Democrat are not clones: Social type analysis as applied in this dissertation is not about arguing that all opinion producers defending similar political viewpoints are the same. My main contention has been that Turkey's agonizing struggle with rule of law and democratization has produced a semi-abstract, semi-concrete public figure, almost like a familiar face we tend to recognize in different people. The Democrat had an impact on important public debates by keeping nationalists,

conservatives or socialists on their toes and by setting new standards for judging governments in Turkey. This way, the Democrat has become something more than the specific individual opinion producers in which we recognize the social type's presence. Nevertheless, the Democrat, whatever individual figures might think, does not have any historical task and sacred mission.

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