THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TURKEY AND RUSSIA

IN THE PERIOD OF STALIN

FROM 1937 TO 1939

CANAN ÖZGEN

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PLAGIARISM

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ÖZET

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin dış politikasını incelediğimizde Sovyetler Birliği temel bir noktada görülmektedir. İki devlet arasında önemli konulardan birisi bu dönemde Montrö Boğazlar Sözleşmesidir. Tez çalışmamızda bu iki devlet arasındaki ilişkilerde özellikle Stalin dönemi'nde denge politikalarının ortaya çıktığını görmekteyiz. Ayrıca bu dönemi seçmemizdeki asıl sebeplerden birisi dalgalanmalı ilişkilerin görülmesidir. Stalin'in ölümünden sonra Sovyetler Birliği'nin Türkiye ile ikili ilişkilerinde Boğazlar'a olan iddiasından vazgeçiyor gibi görünmese de aslında denge politikaları devam etmektedir. Bu tezde, bu iki devletin 1937 ve 1939 yılları incelenecektir.

ABSTRACT

The Soviet Union we examine the foreign policy of the Republic of Turkey was seen as a basic point. With the Montreux Straits Convention, there are important separations between these two states. In our thesis study, it was chosen because of the good and bad relations between these two states together with the Stalin period and a period in which balance policies appeared. After Stalin's death, the Soviet Union's bilateral relations with Turkey seems to give up its claim to the Straits is the most basic problems. In this thesis, this period will be studied based on the years 1937 and 1939.

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1. INTRODUCTION

When we take a look at the relation between Russians and Turks we see that it has a history longer than 5 centuries. Peace and cooperation between the nations is an exception and the more dominant theme is violence, as countless wars, diplomatic rivalry and political issues occur constantly (Büyükakıncı, 2012, p. 779). Despite this, Turks and Russians have lots of things in common. The most important factor of this is the fact that both nations exist in both the West and the East simultaneously because of their geoghraphical location. One other thing these two nations with rich culture and history have in common is that both have created some of the greatest empires of human history. Both of those empires rose and fell in the same time period and they were replaced by 2 great successors. It is widely known that untill the end of the 1st World War the Ottoman Empire and Russia have waged various wars against each other.

The Ottoman Empire's relationship with Russia has been a history of wars and political rivalry from since the 16th century to the start of the 20th century. One of the most important causes of this conflict of interests was the Russian policy to reach warm waters which meant reaching the Mediterranean Sea, and thus expanding southward. Because this policy was in direct opposition to Ottoman interests it caused disruption in the relationship between these nations and gave birth to numerous conflicts.

Tsar Ivan IV. who laid the foundations of the Russian Tsardom turned the idea of Russian dominion over the Black Sea into a national focus. With the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699 he gained control of Crimea and worked towards converting the Black Sea into a Russian lake. (Tayhani, 2007, pp. 144-151). A turning point of Ottoman-Russian relations was the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78. After this war

Russia has adopted a continously more invasive and contentious policy. Through Panslavist propaganda Russia aimed to destabilize the Ottoman Empire by instigating minority movements in order to gain control of the Balkans (Nalçacı, 2012, pp.162-163). In order to succed in these goals Russia continued to wage wars which weakened the Ottomans. Collaborating with western powers such as England and France, and supporting nations of the Balkans against the Ottoman Empire was a preferred method.

While struggle the struggle against Ottomans was ongoing, Russia's societal change, especially the rise of a working class, increased professionalism, increase of bussinessmen, and growth of political opposition caused the 1905 Revolution. This revolution has started with the governments unbelievably repressive acts of violence. In January 22, 1905 (January 9 on Russian calendar) the police opened fire on a huge labourer demonstration that was headed towards the Winter Palace to inform the tzar of their demands. According to offical records 130 people died and hundreds were wounded. This event, which came to be known as the "Bloody Monday" in Russian culture and history, lead to a process of unprecedented political and social change. Between December 22nd and January 1st, 1906 the police and the military forces were involved in huge clashes and then the conflicts came to an end. (Rıasanovsky & Steinberg, 2011, pp. 423-424).

Stalin, the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party in 1912 upon Lenin's order It gathered its 15th Congress. This conference draws a line between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks. And brought everyone together in a united Bolshevik party.

By the first quarter of the 20th century the First World War had started with the assassination of the heir presumptive of Austria-Hungrary, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, by a Serbian nationalist on 28 June 1914. These events caused great excitement in Russia. The Tzardom sought to achieve 2 main goals by participating in the Great War. These goals were, preventing a German dominion in Central Europe and finally eliminating the Ottoman Empire to reach the goals set during the 17th century. Russia has also viewed the Great War as an oppurtunity to take control of Istanbul and the Turkish Straits in order to ensure its own safety (Selçuk, 2009, p.122). Not satisfied with confidential treaties with the Triple Entente, Russia also encouraged minorities like Armenians to rebel against the Ottoman Empire, which as we will see was a policy they succeeded.

Plans to give the Turkish Straits and Istanbul to Russia inspired other confidential agreements among the Allies to share Ottoman lands. According to those deals Russia was to gain lands including Erzurum, Van, Bitlis, the lands between Muş, Siirt, Fırat, and the shores of the Black Sea towards the west of Trabzon in addition to the Straits.

1917 was a turning point for Russian history. In this period while wars between Russians and Turks were going in Russians favor, the Menshevik government was replaced in the 1917 October Revolution which proceeded like a coup. The Russian Revolution had disrupted economic life in such an extensive way that the labourers were unable to obtain basic goods. With the October Revolution the tzardom came to an end in 1917. The Bolshevik Government informed the world of all of the confidential deals and declared them void as they had abandoned former policies aimed at obtaining the Turkish Straits. With the end of the Russian Tzardom a

new and different period in the relations between Russians and Turks was about to start.

Lenin and the other Bolsheviks, considered the October Revolution to be the starting point of a global revolution. Lenin's famous words of propaganda "*Russians have started, the Germans, the French, and the English will follow and socialism will be successful... If the German Revolution fails we will all be doomed."* (Gürün, 1995, p. 67) echoed everywhere in 1918.

1918 is a period when Russia suffers from various economic problems. Such that bread and meat were not enough, hunger workers were crushing. Stalin, commissioned by the party, Organizing the supply of Moscow, Petrograd and the Red Army with provisions. It has commissioned. Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg tried the same in Germany but their movement was unsuccessful. Between 1918 and 1921 Russia went through a phase of external meddling and civil wars (Troçki, 1998, pp. 314-315). Since 1918 Russia's main course of action was based on gaining time and preserving the status-quo. In accordance with this strategy in March 3 1918 the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed with the Ottoman Empire which returned the borders among these countries to the situation before the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78. Russia also promised to stop supporting Armenian gangs and also leave the Eastern Anatolia Region within 6-8 weeks. After this treaty Russia also withdrew from Poland, Lithuania, and Estonia and thus allowed the countries of the Triple Entente to decide the fate of those said countries.

With the birth of a new state which was based on the rule of the people in April 23, 1920 the Grand National Assembly of Turkey was founded and Mustafa Kemal Pasha who wanted the new government to be recognized by its European

counterparts, contacted various European ministries of foreign affairs on April 30th, 1920. The first state he contacted was the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Akarslan, 1995, p. 472).

The Moscow Treaty which is viewed as a turning point in Turkish-Russian relations was signed in March 16th, 1921 and through this treaty the new Republic of Turkey accepted Georgia's ownership over Batum while the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics recognized Misak-ı Milli, and declared it would not recognize any deals unrecognized by the Turkish Government. The matter of ruling the Straits was left for a conference attended by all of the countries that had shores to the Black Sea. Also with this treaty all the preceeding treaties between the countries were declared void (Gürün, 1995, pp. 68-69).

The most important point of Turkish-Soviet relations is the Moscow Treaty, signed on March 16, 1921. This agreement, like Turkey which survive without imposing a heavy Sevres, was going freed from Soviet isolation. Thus, both sides have made the legitimacy of the newly established regimes accepted. In addition, the Turkish-Soviet border was determined and the depression of Batumi was resolved in favor of the Russians. With the Treaty of Moscow, the aid of the Soviets to the Turks became continuous and the Turks' National Struggle movement was revived.

Although the end of the Sakarya War with the victory of the Turks pleased the Soviets, the Ankara Agreement with the French on October 20, 1921, caused the Soviets to worry. The Bolsheviks for their help in Turkey's approach to the West the possibility of referring to Ankara government began disrupting consciously.

In May 1922, Lenin suffered a stroke that prevented his work for weeks. He started working in the autumn and made several speeches. But physically big pressure.

He was under. She had a more severe second stroke in 12 of December. Arriving on 9 March 1923. He also lost his ability to speak because of the third stroke. Although he lived for ten more months. Lenin couldn't work again.

At certain times the friendship and sincerety that started between the Turkish Republic and the USSR strayed from its original goals. By the year 1922 the Turkish Republic, The USSR and Ukraine signed a treaty of friendship and fraternity in January 21st, 1922. As a result of the treaty the Treaty of Paris was signed in December 17th, 1925 which consisted of topics like non-agression, neutrality and refusing to join hostile organizations.

In order to break the capitalist circle that besieged it, the Soviet Union formed its external policies around the idea of disrupting the relations between Germany and other Western Powers, and also forming good relations with other neighbours in order to draw them closer to itself. After 1923 the Turkish-Russian relations were largely affected by the actions other Western Powers took during the process of concluding the issues left unsresolved by the Treaty of Lausanne.

In terms of domestic policy, 1924 appears to be a hard year for the USSR. With the death of Vladimir Lenin on January 21st, 1924, a struggle for power erupted in Moscow. Trotsky, Zinoiev and Kamanev always considered themselves superior to Stalin while Lenin was healthy. The struggle for power that started with Lenin’s death ended with Stalin’s victory over Trotsky, Zinoiev and Kamanev. (Gürün, 1995, p. 108).

2. JOSEPH STALIN AND HIS RISE TO POWER

Vissarion Jughashvili, who is more widely known as Joseph Stalin, was born in December 21st, 1879 in a village called Gori in Tbilisi, Georgia (Murphy, 1976, p.11). According to his childhood friend Iremaschvili, Stalin's father Bezo was a stern man who was also an alcoholic. He worked in the Alicanov shoemaking factory and spend majority of his earnings to satisfy his drinking habits. Because of this the rent and other expenses were shouldered by Stalin's mother (Trotsky, 1948, p.15). The harsh environment he was raised in forged Stalin into a stern man like his father. It is said that he didn't feel any shred of sorrow when he heard of his fathers passing, feeling liberated instead (Trotsky, 1948, pp.12-13). When Stalin turned 8 his mother enrolled him to the morning school of the church in Gori. It is known that Stalin attended this school for 6 years. His friend Iremashvili reports he has never seen him cry. He is also said to have faced the sorrow and joy of his friends with only a faint smile (Trotsky, 1948, p. 20). Stalin entered the church school in 1890 and left in 1899. His experiences in this school affected his entire life and especially his attitude, manners and opinions. Stalin only learned Russian in school, thus he was not well versed in the literature of this language. He spoke Russian with a Georgian dialect (Trotsky, 1948, pp. 30-31). Stalin joined a Marxist group secretly and rose to its leadership during his stay in school (BCA, 30 10 0 0., 249.685.1). Thus the first Georgian Social-Democratic Newspaper was published by him. In the night of April 5th, 1901 he was captured in a raid and was imprisoned. He spent 1.5 years in the prison of Batum (BCA, 30 10 0 0., 249.685.1). Stalin attended a Russian conference held by the Bolsheviks in Tammerfors, which is a city in Finland today. In this conference Stalin first met with Lenin and he was surprised by his stature as he always imagined him as a strong and mighty man (Murphy, 1976, pp. 34-35). Stalin was a

delegate in the 4th and the 5th General Assembly of the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party. In these assemblies he sided with Lenin against Mensheviks. The decisions reached at the assemblies were critical of the more liberal tactics of Mensheviks as opposed to the more revolutionary approach employed by the Bolsheviks (BCA, 030. 10, 249.685.1).

Stalin, as per Lenin's orders gathered the 15th General Assembly of Russian Social Democratic Workers Party in 1912. In this assembly the seperation between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks was made clear and everyone was united under the Bolshevik Party. The Party defined Stalin as a great leader, a radical communist who would fight against the enemies of both Bolsheviks and Marxism in general. (BCA, 030. 10, 249.685.1).

The year 1917 was a turning point Russian history, after the October Revolution any possibility for the Romanovs and the Tzardom to hold ground was extinguished. 1917 was also the year when Stalin started to depend on himself more and started to benefit from his courage, stubbornness and cunning. The struggle for power between Stalin and Trotsky also started this year. (Montefiore, 2010, p. 413). Trotsky was fluent in numerous languages, he was a man of culture who also knew more about the world while Stalin could not speak any foreign languages and he was stubborn. Stalin was a patient man, his waiting capacity would stress friend and foe alike. (Ludwig, 1945, p. 40).

Stalin published a newspaper called "the Worker and the Soldier" instead of "Pravda" in a conference organized by the Bolsheviks. In this newspaper he argued the necessary code of action was taking control of the country through destroying the current system (Murphy, 1976, p. 129). 1918 was an economically troubled year for

Russia. Stalin was tasked with overseeing the task of supplying Moscow, Petrograd and the Red Army with food (BCA, 030. 10, 249.685.1).

In May of 1922 Lenin had a stroke which made him unable to work for weeks. In autumn he returned to work and delivered a few speeches. But he was under great physical stress. He lost his ability to speak because of the stroke. Although he survived for 10 more months Lenin could never work again (Carr, 1992, p.118). Lenin did not trust Stalin in his will, written on January 4, 1923.We understand. According to that:

> "Stalin was very rude, and instead of being taken from the general secretariat, he was more patient, loyal, more gentle, more careful towards his companions, less capricious, etc. Someone had to be chosen. "

At the party conference held in April 1923Zinoviev, Kamenev and Stalin, who secretly agreed to prevent Trotsky's progress the trio were successful.

Stalin took advantage of Lenin's situation and hid various kinds of events from him using his position as the party secretary. As the power struggle continued Lenin passed away in January 1924. Many countries in addition to Russia expressed their sorrow over Lenin's passing. This event also had an impact on Turkey and the Turkish press. In addition to offering condolences, the Turkish Press also praised Lenin's involvement with the October Revolution, saying that it started a new age in Russian history. The press also claimed Lenin's single desire after the destruction of tzardom regime was to develop a new order in Russia (Tan, 24 January 1924).

In the year 1928, Stalin had consolidated his power and completely focused on new foundations, new tecniques, new machine factories, chemistry and tractor factories, energy plants, coal mines, and educating new technicians and all kinds of

labourers among the working class. By 1929 Stalin, who focused on agriculture, decided on a slower approach that aimed to win the hearts of poor, semi-poor farmers through gradually and voluntarily uniting farms in collective organizations instead of hastily collectivizing all farmlands. Because of this in the years 1928-1929 Soviet farms were granted 18.000 tractors. The USSR which was an agricultural country was industrialized with the First Five Year Plan. While industrial production was merely %47 in 1913 this number had been raised to %70 by 1932 (Murphy, 1976, pp. 232-234).

After successfuly executing the First Five Year Plan the Soviet people defined the period of 1929-1932 as the years of creative works they succeded with great labour (Murphy, 1976, pp. 235). Stalin had reached his goal and assumed control of the country. Throughout his reign quite a small number of people, even among the Russians, knew Stalin. He was one of the most powerful men in the world who was also the most unreachable one. For majority of Russians Stalin was merely a name, a man who was impossible to see. This was to such a degree that there is not a single shred of proof that Stalin was ever seen by the public. Although Stalin was neither seen nor heard by the public his pictures were hanged throughout every city, town, and village of the country which consisted of 1/6 of the entire world (BCA, 30.10, 249.685.1).

In his 50th birthday in the year 1929 Stalin was congratulated by the upper echelons of the Communist Party, who wished health and longevity to the man whom they claimed to have dedicated his entire life to the rebuilding of the country, communism and the struggle of working class throughout the world. These wishes are enough to see the importance he had in the Russian history. After accepting those wishes he dedicated them to the great party of the working class which gave birth to

him and raised him to be who he was, and especially to Lenin. After that he declared he would sacrifice his entire might, capability, and if necessary blood for the working class, the revolution of proleteriat and global communism (BCA, 30.10, 249.685.1).

3. FROM THE RISE OF STALIN TO 1937

Wıth the death of Vladimir Lenin on January 24th, 1924 the reign of Stalin had begun. In the first few years of his reign the biggest priority of Soviet External Policy was to form relations with western countries and prevent alliances against Russia from being formed. In this context the USSR considered its relations with the Republic of Turkey important and thus on December 17th 1925 the Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality was signed. This treaty was signed by Chicherin in the name of USSR while Tevfik Rüştü Aras signed it in the name of the Turkish Republic (Benhür, 2004, p. 326). The mentioned treaty caused quite the uproar.

> *"... The Soviet Union desired to improve its relations with its eastern neighbours. In this context Turkey was considered especially important as there had been friendship among the two countries for years."*

The three articles of this treaty were basically:

In the event that one of the parties comes under attack the other party will maintain its neutrality. The parties declare they will not join any alliance or treaty against each other. This treaty is to expire in 3 years and unless it is annulled at least 6 months before expiration date it will be prolonged for a year (Gürün, 1995, p.111).

The Protocols are:

> *"Protocol 1): declares the parties are free in all of their relations with third parties except in matters clarified in this treaty.*
>
> *Protocol 2): declares the alliances and treaties against parties include economical treaties as well.*

> *Protocol 3): declares in cases when there are issues that cannot be resolved through regular political means parties will gather and negotiate to decide the method of solution."* (Gürün, 1995, pp.111-112)

In the following part it will be possible to observe these protocols in action throughout Russian-Turkish relations after 1937 which also is the main topic of this paper.

In the period of 1923-1930 although relations between the Republic of Turkey and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics remained friendly, the USSR also lost its status as the sole great country with which Turkey had good relations. In 1928 a treaty of friendship and neutrality was signed with Italy. By the start of 1930s Turkey had concluded its issues with its old enemies like Greece, France, and England and started to develop friendly relations with them as well. In order to strengthen Turkish-Soviet relations again, the Soviet Assistant Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Karahan visited Istanbul in December 12th, 1928 and Ankara the following day (Gönlübol & Sar, 1987, pp. 80-81).

After the world economic crisis in 1929 and 1930, the states revised their foreign trade policies. With the effect of this crisis, the trend of economic nationalism has strengthened in the international arena. The Soviet Union managed to stay out of these groupings with strategic foreign policy at this time.

When 1931 entered into between Turkey and Soviet Russia signed in Paris on December 17, 1925 date of March 7, 1931, the Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality signed an additional protocol into force. The mentioned agreement was extended to 5 years on 30 October 1931 with the addition of a new protocol and 10 years on 7 November 1935 for the last time (Bennür, 2004, p. 326).

Turkey’s active participation with international affairst by the start of 1930s implied it would eventually join the League of Nations. Another important matter with Turkey’s joining was the attitude the Soviet Union had towards the League of Nations. As the countries continued to be on friendly terms since the days of the War of Independence, Turkey had to consider the USSR’s relations with the League as well. Turkey officially joined the League of Nations in 1932 and this event did not please the USSR (Özkan, 1998, p.36).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey on the invitation of the Soviet government in April 1932, Ismet Inonu visited Moscow. This visit has prepared a new ground for reconsidering political and economic relations between the two states. (Atatürk Araştırma Press, 2011 p. 213.)

Prime Minister İsmet İnönü and his delegation's visit to Moscow found a place in the Turkish press. In the Times newspaper, "Hi from Turkey to Russia and conversation" title was discarded. Turkey and the Soviet Union are included in detail the decisions taken in genuine friendship relations between Russia and interviews (Vakit, 25 April 1932).

As the World War II drew closer the treaty of 1925 which is considered as a starting point of the friendly relations between the countries was renewed for last time in 1935 for a decade. After the renewal of the treaty there was a grand celebration in the Soviet Embassy in Ankara (Son Posta, 8 November 1935).

In this period, Stalin was taken up and published a drawing in the Journal of Intellectual Movements published in 1933 and 1940. (Figure I)

Litvinov telegraphed Tevfik Rüştü Aras with the intention to renew the Turkish-Soviet friendship treaty for a decade. It was said that with the signing of this

friendship treaty the friendly relations between the countries were strengthened and the continuity of those relations were assured (Son Posta, 10 November 1935).

The conference that would alter the terms of Lausanne was gathered in Montreux on June 20th, 1936. This conference was attended by Turkey, England, the USSR, France, Japan, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits was signed on July 20th, 1936 (Armaoğlu, 2019, pp. 344-345).

In the issue of Cumhuriyet dated July 18th, 1936, the headline was "*The Victory of Turkish and Soviet Policies in Montreux*" and it was followed by the statement "*The new treaty was formed around the desires of Turkey and the USSR*" (Cumhuriyet, 18 July 1936). The Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits of July 20th, 1936 is still the definitive document that regulates the Straits today. With it the disarmament of the Straits was lifted and the Turkish dominion on the Straits was established. In terms of warships, as long as Turkey is neutral and not in a war, the warships of a side in a war may not pass the Straits. If Turkey is at war or under danger however Turkey has the final say on who can pass the Straits and who can not. The countries without shores in the Black Sea are limited in terms of size, type and weight of ships they may have in the region. This is for the benefit of regional states and the states within the Black Sea region obtained great liberties in terms of their fleet activities in the Straits (Armaoğlu, 2019, p. 345).

In this period, the Turkish Gazette gave this news on 22 July 1936. "The Straits are ours." (Kurum, 22 July 1936). (Figure III)

With Montreux Turkey has reestablished its dominion over the Straits and thus regained its respected status in international affairs. Turkish and Russian Ministers of

External Affairs met in the October of 1936 during the General Assembly of the League of Nations. Litvinov informed Aras of his pleasure upon hearing the relations between Turkey and England getting better but also warned him that this should not get in the way of relations between their countries, and thus offered him a treaty of general cooperation. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in a speech he delivered the Grand National Assembly insisted on the absolute necessity of Turkish independence on the Straits while also pointing out that he wishes the continuity of Turkish-Russian friendship (Yüceer, 2011, pp. 101-103).

The fact that these relations also had cultural effects is visible in the following examples. In May 1st, 1936 May 1st was celebrated as the Spring Holiday officially while unofficially it was celebrated as the Workers Day for the first time (Tacibayev, 2004, p.246). In the summer of 1936 Turkish composers Cemal Reşit Rey, Ahmet Adnan Saygın and Ulmi Cemal Erkin, pianist Ferhunde Erkin, and the manager of Ankara Halkevi Korosu Halil Bedi attented a music festival in Moscow as guests (Sverçevskaya, 1983, p. 49). The young Turkish Ballerinas educated by Lydia Arzumanova performed on August 8-9, 1936 in a fair organised for the Türkiye Kızılay Cemiyeti in Eminönü (Jak Deleon, 1990, p.66). As we can see Arzumanova who is of Russian descent not only supported Turkish ballet but also the relations between these countries. A play called “Ayak Takımı Arasında” which is based on works of Maxim Gorky was performed for the first time in November 3rd, 1936 and was performed 21 times in total. Cases like these show us how the cultural relations between Turkey and the USSR were constantly progressing (Ertuğrul, 1941, p.7).

4. THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUPLICS AND THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY FROM 1937 TO THE DEATH OF ATATÜRK

The relations between the USSR and Turkey during the period between the signing of the Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits to the start of the World War II can be seperated into two parts as; the period until the death of Atatürk and the period from his death to the start of the war. During 1936-1939 the Turkish-Soviet relations were not as close as they were before Montreux Conference. Despite this these two countries continued to cooperate in their external affairs when faced with changes and new conditions in Europe.

In the General Assembly of the League of Nations held on October 1936, Litvinov expressed the concerns of the Soviet Union regarding the activities of Germany in Eastern Europe as these activities made them cautious of a potential German attack on the Union through Romania. The Russians tried to prevent such an attack through Romania while trying to gain favors regarding the defense Straits from Turkey. Turkey at first asked guarantee of Russian aid in the event of a potential attack through the Mediterranean Sea to Turkey. But after taking economical ties with Germany into consideration the idea of such an alliance was abandoned. A deal with the Soviet Union would not only disrupt Turkey's relations with Germany, but also tie Turkey into a side before the war even began. This was an undesirable situation as Turkey did not even have any goals it wanted to achieve through this war and thus was unprepared for it (Bilge, 1992, pp. 121–124).

When Soviet diplomats failed despite all the pressure they put on Turkey, they concluded that it was impossible to reach a common ground. According to them the most important reason of this impossibility was Britain. On this topic Litvinov is

known to have said "*You do not want to to anything with us. It appears you wait for the approval of a certain country."* (Bilge, 1992, p.124).

The fact that the Soviet Union was the sole supporter of Turkish external affairs had a negative effect on Turkey's relations with other Western powers. With Montreux Conference the Soviet Union realized it was impossible to hold dominion over Turkey and prevent development of its relations with the West. And because of this there were certain changes in the USSR's policy towards Turkey. The Turkish side of the events tells a different story. In the Montreux Conference Turkey realized it could not trust its old friend while also starting to doubt the policies of other anti-revisionist states with whom it was getting closer. İsmet İnönü explains this situation this way:

> *"The most important, maybe the only problem Turkey faces today is the safety of the Mediterranean Sea and the Italian ambitions. In a potential World War which maybe close the side Italy will pick is already determined. If Italy remains neutral then so should we. On the event of Italy joining the war it would still be more beneficial for us to remain neutral and thus preserve our forces. If a guarantee of safety was granted by Russia or England facing the risks they plan to face in the potential war might have been possible. But the French and the Russians shy away from even a simple treaty in order not to offend the Italians while the British wants to keep this as a bargaining tool and thus wish to evade such a responsibility for now."* (Montrö ve Savaş Öncesi, 1973, p. 54)

In this telegraph dated July 12th, 1936, İsmet İnönü saw Italy as the sole danger to Turkish interests and complained about the difficulty of reaching to an

agreement with other countries like France, Britain or the the USSR against this danger. He would be proven right about Italians in 1937.

1937 has been a year of increased tensions in Europe and the preparations of war had been underway. There was a distance growing between the Soviet Union and the Turkish Republic because of Montreux. This caused Turkey to drift towards Germany and Italy instead. But despite this Turkey did not desire to completely break ties with the Soviet Union. Thus on April 25th, 1937 the Soviet ambassador was received in Ankara and during his stay the friendship between the countries was frequently referenced (SSSR i Turtsiya, 1981 p. 142).

With the development of relations between Turkey and other Western powers, the Soviet Union started worry about the possibility of Turkey siding with them. This worry went public in the international news. For example on the issue dated April 29th, 1937 of a newspaper published in Paris called Le Temps it was reported; “The close ties developed with the UK after Montreux, treaties made with Rome, the Asian Pact with Afganistan, Iraq and Iran cooled off relations with the Soviet Union instead. But Atatürk is a reasonable man who would not break off a friendship that went on for years.” The same article went on to say; “Just like in 1914 the importance of Turkey lies in its rule over the Straits in 1937 as well. The Soviet Union tried earnestly to join in the process of ruling the Straits but failed because Turkey elected to use other sources of capital and technical expertise instead. The period where the Soviet ambassador could succesfuly manipulate Turkey came to an end.” The article would deduce from those events that the Soviet influence over Turkey was gradually decreasing (BCA, Fon No: 030 10, Kutu No: 248, Dosya No:682, Sıra No:13) .

Until the start of the Second World War economical relations between Turkey and the USSR developed in a satisfactory manner for both sides. The Treaty of Trade and Seafaring signed on October 1937 was especially important and beneficial in this context.

On October 9th, 1937 the Nazilli Dokuma Fabrikası, the construction of which was helped by Soviet speicalists since the planning phase, was openend. The opening ceremony which Atatürk personally attended also hosted certain Soviet specialists as guests as well (Perinçek, 2005, p.204).

An important point we should not miss is the fact that throughout Atatürk's carreer both during his leadership of the War of Independence and during his terms as the President of the Repuplic of Turkey, Turkey and the USSR were always on friendly terms. Because of Turkey's desire for peace, close relations with the Soviet Union could develop. Grand Leader Mustafa Kemal Atatürk would also point out the importance of friendly relations witht the Soviet Union in the speech he delivered during the opening ceremony of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey by saying:

> *"I would like remind this to all of you, our friendship with the USSR, our great continental and naval neighbour, continues to develop with the same strength and importance it had from the starting years while also proving to us its importance for the past 15 years."*

External help when Turkey does what needs to be done is deemed natural And the rise of such a responsibility was not even an option. The letter of Chicherin and its interpretaiton was left to Soviets. A promise to the USSR was made by Atatürk on November 1st in his opening speech of the Grand National Assembly. In this speech he said thar

> *"... the friendship we have developed through 15 years with Soviet Russia which is our continental and naval neighbour has went through many experiences. I am also proud to proclaim that it still maintains the strength and sincerity it had since the first days."* (Atatürk'ün Milli Dış Politikası, 1981, p. 11).

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk maintained close ties of friendship with the Soviet Union, also opposed the partition of the world and defended a policy of collective security. He would share his thoughts regarding this issue in his speech in 1937 which he delivered on the occasion of the Romanian Minister of External Affairs' visit to Ankara:

> *''All global events clearly prove this. We can not know for certain whether an even which we deem far away will not affect us one day. Because of this humanity must be considered one body, and every nation is a limb of this said body. The pain felt by the fingertips of the body affects the rest of it as well. We cannot say 'A case of disorder or a problem on some far away part of the world is none of my bussiness.' If such a case exists we should care about it as if it occured among our people."* (Ağayev, 2010, p. 152).

On the 3rd May of 1937 in Russian calendar, Mihail Andreyeviç Karski was appointed as the ambassador of the Soviet Union in Turkey as this date was the anniversary of the October Revolution. He was granted an audience with Atatürk on June 1st 1937. He would publish his impressions in Documents of Soviet External Affairs (Dokumentı Vneşney Politiki SSSR, 1971 p.284). According to Karski's report Atatürk assured him that cooperation with the USSR was the basis of Turkish

External Affairs policy and Turkey would not abandon this cooperation under any circumstances.

On 13th-14th May, 1937 İsmet İnönü and Litvinov met in London and discussed certain topics. After the end of the meeting it was decided that the ties between the two nations would not easily fall apart and their relations with third parties would not disrupt those ties (Dokumentı Vneşney Politiki SSSR, 1971 p.284).

As mentioned above, Atatürk accepted the Soviet Ambassador on 1st June 1937 and told him he expected the distance between the two nations close in the foreseeable future (SSSR i Turtsiya, 1981 p. 143).

Zekai Apaydın, who was the Turksih ambassador in Moscow, sent a report on July 1st 1937 which included his own drawings of a basic watering system he observed and also of another machine he thought would be beneficial to Turkey as it can be used to feed animals during winter. He concluded these technologies would be an asset in Turkish rural life and included his notes to drawings (BCA, 030.10., 248.682.17).

Another development that concerns Turkish-Soviet relations, the USSR's ambitions in the region, its open and secret activities was the Sadabat Pact, signed on July 8, 1937 (Koçsoy, 2002 p.158). On July 8th, 1937, Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan, has signed the treaty in Tehran’s Sadabat Palace which gave the pact its name (Armaoğlu, 2019, pp. 346-347). With the Sadabat Pact, which was considered to be valid for five years, the parties have committed to not interfere with each other's internal affairs, to consult in common interests and problems, not to attack each other and to solve the problems between them in the League of Nations (Gönlübol & Sar, 1987, pp. 107–108). Soviet Russia considered Britain was the organizer behind the

scenes. The signing of the pact by Iraq, whose independence was limited, justifies this opinion of the Russians (Esmer, 1944 p. 248).

As a result, the Soviet Union did not react against the Sadabat Pact. The pact's acting together with the League of Nations and the Soviet Union being a member of the League of Nations at the time, as well as the possibility of Italy's advance in the Middle East to threaten the south of the Soviet Union, caused the Soviet Union to approach neutrally to this pact. By isolating Syria, Turkey gained the upper hand in the issue of Hatay as well. The Pact also pleased Soviet Union which had extensive relations with countries like the UK, USA, Afganistan who also had interests regarding oil (Köni, 1991, p. 8). Turkey and the USSR took certain precautions regarding their own safety. These precautions sometimes caused them to work together as in the case of their joining the League of Nations while also included rather independent affairs as in the case of the Sadabat Pact. Turkish statesmen considered Italy which held the 12 Islands at that time a potential threat to Turkish safety and sought a way out of this threat through such alliances. Thus Turkey had successfully protected its borders from a potential attack from Middle East through a smart use of diplomacy.

Another event that brought together Russia and Turkey was the Nyon Conference which was held in 1937. Britain and France, were invited to cooperate with Turkey to ensure the security of the Mediterranean. After the signing of the Nyon agreement, the copy of the Son Posta newspaper dated September 15, 1937 included president Atatürk’s notification to the Grand Assembly which invited it to a meeting. This notification went as "I invite the Grand National Assembly to attendance on Saturday, September 18, 1937 at 14 o'clock in order to test and certify the contract we have made with the states in Nyon" (Son Posta, 15 September 1937). In the copy of

Tan newspaper dated September 19, 1937, the article titled “The Assembly approved the Nyon agreement”, included these words “İnönü said: *We are obliged to do our best to prevent the war*” (Tan, 19 September 1937; Son Posta, 19 September 1937).

Nyon Conference was held in order to ensure security of Mediterranean and ended with the signing of a treaty on September 14th 1937. This conference was attended by both Turkey and the USSR and both sides also signed the treaty. The agreement with the measures to be taken against submarine attacks was signed on September 14, 1937. (Gönlübol & Sar, 1987, pp. 124).

There were domestical changes in Turkey after the Montreux Conference. There was a reshuffle on October 5th, 1937 and Celal Bayar became prime minister instead of İnönü. The effect of this cabinet change on Turkish-Soviet relations was that İnönü was more symphatetic to the Soviet system while Celal Bayar was closer to Europe. İsmet Pasha liked the statist structure and economic development in the Soviets, this was known by the Soviets. But Celal Bayar, on the other hand, was in favor of a European-style economic structure. This was apparent in the treaties signed. Right after the change in administration Turkey signed a Treaty of Trade and Seafaring with the USSR on October 8th, 1937 which included a trade payment deal. The attitude of this new government to the Soviets has not been as good as before.

In order to protect Turkish-Soviet relations certain cencorship acts like confiscations on publications and anti-Soviet propaganda material continued. In this regard, the Caucasus Almanac Magazine published in İstanbul was banned on April 26, 1937 (BCA, 030.18.1.2, 74.33.17), and Kafdağı magazine published in Istanbul on 1 December 1937 (BCA, 030.18.1.2, 80.98.2).

In January 1938, we see a telegram sent by German Ambassador Schulenburg in Moscow to Berlin. In his telegram Schulenburg conveys the developments and comments on Turkish-Soviet relations.

In early April 1938 the Soviet Embassy in Ankara filed complaints to Turkish authorities regarding some Soviet films shown in Turkey with the claim that Stalin's image has been removed from the movies. After investigations it was found to be the case of a short-film about how children were raised in the USSR. There were certain scenes related to propaganda which were cut and those deleted scenes included children waving flags with Stalin's picture in a room with his picture. On April 8th, 1938 the Turkish Ministry of Internal Affairs ensured the Soviet Embassy that the act was unrelated to Stalin himself and those scenes were cut because of the propaganda included (BCA, 030.10., 84.557.7).

On July 8th, 1938 Minister of Foreign Affairs Tevfik Rüştü Aras, met with the Soviet Ambassador Terentyev and listened to his complaints regarding certain publications in Turkey that were critical of the Soviet Union. (Dokumentı Vneşney Politiki SSSR, 1977, p.351). They also met at the end of July to evaluate Turkish-Japanese relations and its effects on Soviets this time. According to reports this exchange developed along these lines:

> *"There were articles claiming that they would organize a conference in Istanbul and that they would conduct anti-Soviet activities, the Soviet Ambassador expressed their discomfort in this matter and he was assured by Aras that such an organization would not be allowed on the Turkish territory."* (Vneşney Political SSSR, 1977, p.420).

As can be seen from here, the Russian and Turkish governments were in close relations with each other. In Rasih Nuri İleri's book Atatürk and Communism, it is reported that Atatürk said to people close him: *"The basis of our foreign affairs policy is Soviet friendship. A treaty with England would be beneficial unless it harms our friendship with the USSR."* (İleri, 1999, p.385).

On 29 August 1938, the Military Court affiliated to the Naval Command sentenced Nazım Hikmet to 28 years and 4 months in prison on the grounds of spreading communist propaganda. The effect of this on Soviet-Turkish relationship was seen in forms of critical articles against Turkey in Soviet press.

With the Munich Conference held on 30 September 1938, leaving Czechoslovakia alone against the German occupation and leaving Germany at the table were interpreted as follows from the perspective of Soviet Russia.

> *"German progress can happen in all directions except the west. Even if possible, get to the east on Soviet Russia. "*

Soviet Russia interpreted the Munich settlement as the main factor causing the collapse of the security block attempted to be established in Europe and the emergence of the Second World War. Soviet Russia stated that it was unacceptable and unacceptable.

Due to Atatürk's disease the traditional speech during the opening ceremony of the Grand National Assembly on November 1st was delivered by Celal Bayar in his stead. On the same day, Atatürk sent a thank you telegram to Stalin, who celebrated the 15th anniversary of the Republic. (RGASPI, 444, 26.3, 14).

A month before Celal Bayar delivered the opening speech instead of Atatürk, a telegraph dated October 6th 1938 from governor of Kars to Ministry of Internal

Affairs shows us how the relations between the USSR and Turkey occured on so many different levels and ways. Apparently, 350 workers were employed by the Russians in order to transform Arpaçay into its former medium and the necessary measures were taken by the Kars Governorship during the continuation of the excavation. The mentioned work was carried out within the framework of the protocol signed on the common use of the Aras river by the two countries.

The Soviet Union, like many countries of the world, immediately took action due to the death of Atatürk. Kalinin shared the sorrow of the Turkish nation and offered his condolences with the telegram he sent on November 10, 1938. The text is included below.

> *"We deeply regret the loss of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, president of the friendly republic, which symbolizes the entire period of the heroic struggle for the independence and success of the great Turkish Nation"*
> (Dokumentı Vneşney Political SSSR, 1977 p.627).

The Soviet delegation attending the funeral ceremony consisted of 4 Soviet officers and 100 Soviet soldiers led by Deputy Foreign Minister General Potemkin, Black Sea Fleet Commander Admiral Yufoevev and USSR Ambassador to Ankara Terentyev (Perinçek, 2005, pp. 234-235).

The relaitons of Turkey with the USSR which was founded with the Bolshevik Revolution started during the process of Turkish War of Independence. The Soviets were especially important in matters regarding the Eastern Frontier. Afterwards the Soviet Union took the side of Turkey during the Lausanne Peace Talks. In general, relations with the Soviets in the period of Ataturk progressed positively.On November

10, 1938 with the death of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and İsmet İnönü's rise to power a new age dawned on the Turkish political sphere.

5. RELATIONS WITH THE USSR AFTER ATATÜRK

As mentioned above the Soviet Union sided with Turkey even after the death of Grand Leader Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. An article titled *"The Creator of New Turkey"* was published in a newspaper called Izvestiya which praised Atatürk. This article mentioned how the Soviet Union did not abandon the young Turkish Republic in its fight against imperialism and the aids made by the USSR were reminded to everyone. Atatürk's telegraph to the Soviet government dated November 29th, 1920 was considered as the starting point of friendly relations between the countries.

Until the year 1939 in which the Second World War started, in its external affairs Turkey made decisions after consulting the Soviets on matters related to the USSR. This was a code of action based on good neighbourly relations initiated by Lenin and Atatürk. After Celal Bayar, who resigned in January 1939, Refik Saydam was appointed Prime Minister. A new era started in Turkish foreign policy with the arrival of İsmet İnönü, and Şükrü Saraçoğlu after the Saydam Government, which would remain in office until July 1942. But this change was not a personal change. The issue here was the change of the foreign policy concept for the broad security system laid by Atatürk, in accordance with the changing conditions of the period.

As is known, the Soviet Ambassador in Ankara, Terentyev, who attended the funeral of Atatürk, returned to Moscow after the funeral and stayed there for about two months. Terentyev's second coming to Turkey and activities here were carefully monitored by the Germans. According to the Germans, positive developments in Turkish-German relations would create anxiety in Moscow. İnönü was a newly elected leader and his perspective on Turkish-Soviet relations was still uncertain in the eyes of the Soviet Government.

For the Soviets, Turkish-German relations were important enough to directly affect Turkish-Soviet relations and were to be carefully monitored. According to Germans, Terentyev brought with him an extensive program to ensure the tight and close cooperation between Turkey and the USSR (Koçak, 2013, p.132).

When the tensions between Germany and the USSR is viewed from the Turkish perspective, the most logical code of action appears to be temporizing. As we shall see below Turkey continued its trade activities with Germany while also getting closer to Britain. While Russian demands on the Straits caused tensions to rise, both countries reiterated their frienships continuity numerous times. On the other hand, the Russians were always concerned about a German offensive, and the British shared those concerns. On March 10, 1939, in his speech at the 18th Congress of the Communist Party Stalin declared he did not trust the West by saying:

> *"Despite commitments to protect its independence, Austria was abandoned to Germany. The territory of the Sudetenland was abandoned. Czechoslovakia was left alone by violating all kinds of commitments. After that, lies began to be told about the weakness of the Russian Army, weakness of the Russian air force, and confusion in the Soviet Union with great noises in the press. In this way, the Germans were provoked to move towards the East. They were shown a prey, and it was said that it would be good to start a war with the Bolsheviks."* (Nadir, 1991, p. 25).

On the year 1939 pamphlets published in the USSR which contained propaganda and publicity of the Communist Party were deemed harmful by Turkish authorities and their distribution was banned by a decision taken on March 14th, 1939 (BCA, 030.18.1.2., 86.23.4).

Italy's attacking Albania in 1939 has caused unease in Turkey. Britain and France guaranteed Greece and Romania after this attack by Italy. It's almost guaranteed to start negotiations on Turkey told it could be given to Turkey. The Turkish-British Declaration was signed on 12 May 1939.

On March 15, 1939, German armies entered Prague and occupied Czechoslovakia, and on April 7, 1939, Italy began to occupy Albania. These developments were followed with anxiety on the Turkish and Soviet front. Turkey was concerned with Italy's operations in the Mediterranean and this caused Turkey to get closer to Britain. But Turkey refused Britain's one sided guarantee and desired a mutual assistance pact instead (Burçak, 1983, p. 31).

After the invasion of Albania by Italy, Turkey and the Soviet Union, acted together to strengthen peace in the Balkans. Russians felt that they were under the threat of Japan in the East and Germany in the West and wanted to create an environment of peace in the Balkans, at least to prevent the German threat. To this end, Deputy Commissioner for Foreign Affairs Vlademir Potemkin came to Ankara and held negotiations. As a result of the negotiations, the notion of acting jointly between the two countries was adopted by both of them (Nadir, 1991, pp. 38-40; Açıkalın, 1992, p.25).

During this period, Litvinov-Molotov and Aras-Saraçoğlu change also played an important role in Turkish-Soviet relations. The pro-Soviet stance of Aras period came to an end while Molotov did not exhibit an amicable approach towards Turkey like Litvinov. The rapprochement with Germany had an effect on Kremlin's decision to remove Litvinov and appoint Molotov instead. The fact that Molotov was the Soviet Foreign Affairs Commissioner instead of Litvinov who was of Jewish origin

was a negative development in terms of Turkish-Soviet relations. Aras stated that after the Second World War, Russian demands regarding the Straits originated from Molotov and Molotov was responsible for the bilateral relations becoming miserable (Aras, 2003, p. 132).

Meanwhile on March 21st, 1939 the USSR offered Turkey to hold a conference in Romania in onder to evaluate the aggressive stance of Germany, but due to the conditions of the period this conference did not occur. (SSSR i Turtsiya, 1981, p. 150).

German expansionism, which is not known where the West started and ended in order to prevent or delay the war, caused the emergence of all the facts with the signing of the Steel Pact signed on May 22, 1939. Western countries had to face another reality with Germany's termination of England-German Sea Treaty and the Aggression Treaty signed with Poland. To stop Germany, more should be done than waiting for the Germans to be satisfied. This can be possible by implementing an alliance in the partnership of British-French-Turkish and Soviet.

These developments are a fact of which he wanted to complete Turkey. On the one hand, it will continue its partnership with the Soviet Union, with which it has been doing very good relations for years, and on the other hand, it will resist the German-Italian threat in an integrated manner with the West through an alliance involving France and Britain. But developments are important in terms of showing how deep the gap between the West and Soviet Russia is actually. It is also an important consideration for the British distrust in the Soviet Union during this period. While the Moscow negotiations between the British-French and the Soviet Union were continuing, the Arita-Kraygi Treaty was signed between Britain and revisionist Japan.

This initiative by the Soviet authorities could be called a new "Munich Accord". With this treaty, Japan's aggressive policies towards China and Soviet Russia were evaluated.

Russia had given importance to peace because of the danger of Japan in the east and Germany in the west. Therefore, the USSR continued its friendship with Turkey and tried to strengthen the Balkan Pact. The statement published at the end of the visit of Potemkin was printed in the copy of Tan on 7 May 1939:

> *"The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Deputy Commissioner Assistant B.V. Potemkin, has come to Ankara in April 28, 1939 in order exchange public opinion with the government of Turkey and stayed until May 5, 1939. B.V. Potemkin, has been accepted by the President and remained until the Prime Minister Refik Saydam and the Minister of External Affairs Şükrü Saraçoğlu has made successive meetings with him. It was once again observed and agreed that, during this contact of the Turkish and Soviet statesmen, there was an agreement between the governments of the two friendly countries on the international issues and the particular issues affecting the Turkish-Soviet relations. The two neighboring and friendly nations have committed to reinforce the system that made their struggle for peace possible. The Turkish and Soviet governments will continue their mutual and conscientious efforts to maintain peace and security, and will be in constant contact to exchange all the political benefits that have been taken into account, as during B. Potemkin's visit to Ankara. " (Tan, 7 May 1939).*

Turkish-British Declaration was declared on 12 May 1939, and after Hatay became a part of Turkey 1939, the Turkish-French Declaration was made on 23rd June 1939 (Açıkalın, 1992, pp. 1003-1004). While Turkish diplomacy was successful in its strategy of keeping its relations with Germany and England equal, it did not show the same success against the USSR. The basis of this failure lies in the actions of the Soviet Union which followed the "ideological spread" approach.

In a document that we deem it appropriate to give at this point of our study in order not to disturb the flow of our chronology, the Soviet interpretation about İsmet İnönü, who succeeded Atatürk, is remarkable. The words of one of the employees of the Soviet embassy in the period were reflected in the records of the Turkish Police Headquarters with the entry date of July 2, 1939. According to the document, Soviet official said this about İnönü:

> *"Your national chief İsmet İnönü, whom the Soviets were honored to know of, has a great reputation in Soviet Russia. Stalin and the other leaders of the Union deeply respect him. Soviets love your National Chief. And they will always be loyal to the him."* (BCA, 490.01., 609.111.9).

Soviet Ambassador Terentyev visited Saraçoğlu in Ankara on August 4, 1939, to give information about the ongoing Soviet-British and Soviet-French negotiations and he also conveyed his own opinions. In those days it was decided in Turkey, that if it was necessary the Minister of Foreign Affairs would visit Moscow to discuss and with the Soviets the topic of the narrowed pact.

Calling Terentyev to his office on August 10, 1939, Saraçoğlu stated that he expects Molotov to send him a preliminary project. Saraçoğlu also told Terentyev that he could go to Moscow after the preliminary project was examined. At the end of his

contact with Moscow on August 13, 1939, the Soviet Ambassador who might have contacted Moscow asked for more time for the preliminary project and verbally asked a series of 5 questions (SSSR i Turtsiya, 1981, p. 155). We convey these questions and answers, which we think are important for the course of Turkish-Soviet relations.

> ***''1-*** *How does the Turkish Government view the bilateral assistance pact. A mere defense agreement against attacks or as something more?*
>
> ***Answer:*** *As we have explained to Potemkin and Ambassador Terentieff, the Turkish-Soviet agreement must show its effects in a restricted area and therefore have limited liability. The defense agreement to be made can be based on a broad understanding of the attack.*
>
> ***2-*** *Should the Turkish Soviet agreement be made on the basis of a British, French-Soviet agreement or completely independently?*
>
> ***Answer:*** *The agreement can be independent of both tripartite agreements, and related to them, the important point is that the Turkish-Soviet agreement should be in harmony with tripartite agreements.*
>
> ***3-*** *Will the agreement be exclusive to the sea only or will it cover the land?*
>
> ***Answer:*** *Provided that the field and liability limitation specified in the first paragraph are taken into consideration, the agreement may envisage sea and land battles.*
>
> ***4-*** *Will the agreement only provide for an attack directly on one of the parties, or will it envisage either party to attack the attacker as a result of aid to a neighboring state in accordance with its existing commitments?*

Answer: *Again within the same restrictions, the agreement may also include wars arising from the commitments of the parties.*

5- *If the agreement will envisage aid to neighbouring states, which states will Turkey bring in to the discussion?*

Answer: *Currently Turkey is committed to declarations made with Britain, and France, and the Balkan Pact. Again, with the reservation in paragraph 1, these commitments should activate the Turkish-Soviet alliance. This will be the case for the same commitments of the Soviets."*

In the period we discuss publications printed abroad that include anti-Soviet material were banned in Turkey as well. Because these publications do not directly reflect the Turkish-Soviet relations and some of them were banned because of Turkey's internal dynamics they will not be discussed in detail in the scope of this paper (Tacibayev, 2004, pp. 259-271). For the sake of an example Hasan Ali's book called Stalin Says which is also related to our subject was banned on August 14, 1936 as it was deemed problematic (BCA, 030.18.1.2., 68.75.19).

The main purpose of Turkish foreign policy before the Second World War was based on not taking part in the war to come. However, Turkey's close relations with Germany, had led to encountering various difficulties while trying to follow this policy. Turkey had good economical relations with Germany and did not want to change this situation. In 1939, Turkey, sold 50% of its exports to Germany. Likewise, the country with the largest share in Turkey's imports was Germany (Deringil, 2003, p. 22)

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics seemed to be the country that could have had the greatest impact on war in 1939, after Germany. But which side the

Russians would go to war with was not exactly certain. Russians who were stuck between the Western powers who perceived Russian ideology and power as a threat to themselves, and neighboring countries that pursued a policy of avoiding it and its ideology. Thus they did not wait much to cooperate with Germany. While there was hesitation and indecision on the one hand, and selfishness and excessive appetite on the other, the Russians signed a non-aggression treaty with Germany, pushing aside the West, the next step of which they could not calculate and doubt that they would help them in difficult moments. (Erkin, 1968, p. 134).

The Second World War officially began with the German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939. The German forces that attacked Poland consisted of five armies. Germany, which was in military terms vastly superior to Poland, soon reached the border of Warsaw. The Second World War, which started with the German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, ended with the unconditional surrender of Japan on August 15, 1945, it had lasted for 5 years, 11 months and 14 days. The war would gradually affect all of Europe, then Africa, America and Asia (Gologlu, 1974, pp.36-37).

During this period, these events were the subject of Akbaba Magazine in the Turkish press. (Akbaba, September 1939). (Figure IV)

On the morning September 17th Soviet Russia started its own invasion of areas of Poland that were deemed necessary for the Union. As a result of the operations lead by Germany and Soviet Russia on Poland, the parties aimed to eliminate Poland by sharing them among themselves in accordance with the German-Russian Treaty of 23 August 1939. August 23, 1939 in the Soviet non-aggression pact signed between the Germans has caused unease in Turkey and Europe. The Germans attacked the Soviet

Union until Turkey have taken to the Soviet background. Soviet relations and Turkey at the end of the war has not been the same.

The USSR, which turned its route to the northern Baltic countries after the division of Poland, proposed an alliance agreement to Estonia on September 25, 1939. According to the agreement, it wanted to set up a sea base at the Baltischport Harbor and an air base in the Estonian Islands in the Finnish Gulf. On the 25th and 26th September, the Russian air force flew over the Estonian territory, demonstrating the seriousness of the demand. When the Estonian Government faced the threat of being invaded immediately, it agreed to sign a military cooperation agreement with Russia. Accordingly, the German-Soviet Border and Friendship Treaty, signed on 28 September 1939, consisted of 5 articles and 3 secret protocols. The articles of this agreement are as follows:

Article 1: The German-Soviet border on Poland is determined according to the map attached to the document.

Article 2: This arrangement indicated that third states would not be allowed to interfere.

Article 3: It ruled that they would reorganize civilian administration in the west of Germany, and Russia in the east of the border.

Article 4: It noted that this arrangement was the basis for friendly development between the peoples of the two countries.

Article 5: The signature of the Agreement came into effect instantly.

With the signing of the Agreement Poland was divided between the USSR and Germany.

With the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Treaty, Germany received confirmation that the Soviet Union would not participate in any formation against Germany, while Poland was divided between the two countries and the Baltic countries were left under the influence of Soviet Russia. Indeed, as a result of this treaty, Germany started to occupy Poland from the west and Soviet Russia from the east, Britain and France declared war on Germany after this development and the Second World War officially started on 3 October 1939.

The Soviet Union would supply the war and warfare material to Latvia while Latvia would grant the Union the right to construct air and naval bases. On the other hand, neither side would participate in any pact against the other party. Then, the Soviet Union made an agreement with Lithuania on October 10, 1939, and had the right to establish sea and air bases and send troops. This situation of the three Baltic States continued until June 1940, when they were annexed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Only Lithuania from these Baltic countries was able to make a concession in exchange of what they had provided. The German-Soviet agreement of 28 September 1939 handed over the Vilna region of Poland to Lithuania. But through Lithuania, the Vilna region was also under the sovereignty of the Soviets (Armaoğlu, 2019, p.445).

While the Soviet Union was undergoing these developments, Turkey's situation, especially after the Soviet-German pact, entered a critical phase. On the one hand there was the case of Italy with its eyes set on Southern Anatolia, while on the other hand Germany had conquered Czechoslavakia and was headed towards the Balkans, while the Russians have revived their centuries old desire to dominate the

Straits. Under these circumstances Turkey proceeded according to the principle best summarized by Atatürk with the phrase "Peace at home, peace in the World." Through this mindset Turkey made great use of diplomacy in order to evade entering a war in which it had no national interests. Thus Turkey employed a policy of equilibrium. When the Soviet Union signed a Non-agression Pact with Germany, it became harder for Turkey to sign mutual assistance pacts with England, France and Germany. Turkey's intention was signing a pact that allowed countries like England, France, and the Soviet Union meet in a common ground. But the Russians acted according to German wishes in matters regarding Turkish-Soviet relations and this made Turkey's plan became harder to achieve. Stalin is known to have asked Ribbentrop Germany's opinion on Turkey and the answer he received ensured both sides were dissatisfied with Turkey's flexible policies. This dissatisfaction constantly increased as Russians started to claim Turkey made secret agreements with England and France. (Bilge, 1992, p. 191).

The ambassador of the USSR Terenteyev invited Saraçoğlu to Moscow on September 15th, 1939 which made Turkey realize it had no more time to spare. After this realization the Minister of Foreign Affairs Şükrü Saraçoğlu was sent with a group of diplomats to Russia. On 21 September 1939, Churchill made the following statement in a report he prepared (Bilge, 1992, p. 148).

> *"…When the public goal is considered negotiations with Turkey are easy to develop. When Hitler's intention of invading Romania with 28 divisions became clear, the case of Turkey quickly rose in importance. Today this does not seem to be the case. Hitler may shy away from his intentions to expand eastward. But the possibility of him renewing the threat also exists. Our main interest lies in forcing Germany into enmity with the*

Balkans and the entire Eastern Front. In this context a treaty with Turkey holds immense value…"

The delegation arrived in Moscow on September 25, 1939. The first goal that the Turkish Delegation wanted to achieve in Moscow was to sign an agreement between the Soviet Union and the West, where it could take the role of a bridge. 2 months before Saraçoğlu's visit to Moscow, on July 1939, Turkey prepared a project that would not cause animosity between England, France, and the Soviet Union and then informed Moscow of it. With this project Turkey wanted to establish cooperation in the event of an attack on Black Sea or the Straits and a military agreement between Turkey and the Soviet Union was offered. Turkey also wanted imitate the Soviet reservation in the Triple Alliance by adding an English-French reservation (Açıkalın, 1992, p.1007). But faced with the changes that occured in Europe Turkey's project lost its meaning. With the German-Russian Non-Agression Pact Russians had a change in attitude towards Turkey. While Turkish diplomats considered this change of attitude as a result of the German-Russian pact, their Russian counterparts soon made it clear that their intention was pulling of certain concessions (Burçak, 1983, pp. 71–72).

Saraçoğlu's visit to Moscow raised some concerns in France as some considered this visit signalled a change in Turkish policies in favor of Germany. Even in Turkey there were some misconceptions regarding the visit. Certain circles thought Saraçoğlu's goal was securing Moscow's guarantee against Germans. But Saraçoğlu's goals maybe summarised as; Responding to invitations that were constantly made, learning the opinion of the Soviet Union on Turkey in light of the new events, looking for a possible common ground where the Russians and the West may meet or at the

very least inform his Russian counterparts of Turkey's desire to prolong the friendly relations.

Şükrü Saraçoğlu was invited to Moscow both the return Potemkin's visit and also discuss matters related to both of the countries. Together with Şükrü Saraçoğlu, the Soviet Ambassador Terentief participated in this trip. Although they were occasionally interrupted, interviews between Saraçoğlu and Molotof had occured. In this process, Saraçoğlu also held talks with the British Ambassador to Moscow and the French chargé d'affaires . The issue of Son Telgraf newspaper dated September 25, 1939, reported these events in an article titled "Saracoglu is in Moscow" and said that this journey will increase the friendship between the two countries (Son Telgraf, 25 September 1939).

President İsmet İnönü delivered a speech on September 28, 1939 regarding the Soviet-German Non-Agression Pact and the changes it would cause for Turkey. In this speech he said:

> *"We expected to face this war on the same side with Britain, France and Russia... but a shocking surprise came in the form of German-Russian alliance and it erupted with the most severe accusations against Turkey and other allies. In other words, the front where we would join the war with was divided into two. Because of this, I realized that our entering the war at the first moment has become a subject of distraction."*(Arcayürek, 2010, p. 159).

These words of İsmet İnönü make it clear that his first intentions regarding the Second World War was towards actively participating in it. But he was concerned about Germany getting weaker or defeated while Soviet Russia could spread towards

Middle-East, Europe and completely dominate the Straits. Because of this he firmly believed that staying out of the war and remaining neutral was in Turkey's best interests.

The news delivered under the headline *"Turkish-Soviet negotiations continued yesterday in Moscow"* in the 2 October 1939 dated issue of the Cumhuriyet, continued as *"Negotiations between Turkish Foreign Ministry Deputy Şükrü Saraçoğlu and his Soviet counterparts restarted again today at 18 pm in Kremlin."* (Cumhuriyet, 2 October 1939). The October 5th 1939 issue of the same newspaper included the news *"The answer of the Turkish government to Soviet offers reached Saraçoğlu today. It is reported that the Turkish Foreign Ministry Deputy will immediately contact Molotof..."* (Cumhuriyet, 5 October 1939).

The event that left the mark of the visit of the Turkish Foreign Minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu to Moscow occurred when Stalin requested the Turkish Delegation to make some concessions. The first demand of Joseph Stalin was the change in the situation which gave Turkey the responsibility to act on the event of an attack on Romania and Greece as these countries received guarantees from Britain and France on April 13th 1939. Stalin's true intentions lied in annulling Turkey's alliance with England and France. In order to do this he also asked the Turkish Delegation to change Protocol 2 of the Triple Alliance Agreement which could turn Turkey and the Soviet Union into enemies. The Protocol 2 went as "Due to the responsibilities undertaken by Turkey this country shall not be forced into an act that may cause or necessiate an armed conflict with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." (Erkin, 1968, p. 413).

With the Second Protocol of the Triple Alliance Treaty Turkey sought to guarantee it would avoid entering into an armed conflict with the Soviet Union. But

Stlain wanted to ensure Turkey would not participate with a hostile faction in the event Russia came under attack of the Britain or France (Burçak, 1983, pp. 84–85). One other demand made by Stalin was altering the Turkish-Soviet Non-agression and neutrality treaty. In order to protect their relations with Germans, the Russians sought to include an article that would absolve them of their responsibility to aid Turkey in the case of a German invasion. Stalin's main desire was actually making changes in the Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits. On October 1st, 1939 the Russian officials informed Saraçoğlu of the necessity of making changes in the Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits in order to ensure Turkish-Soviet assistance treaty. They prepared a protocol that consisted of 11 articles. These articles are included below (Oran, 2001, p. 421).

> *"1. In peace or wartimes regardless of whether Turkey is in the war or not on matters regarding the passage of warships belonging to countries without shores in the Black Sea, Turkey should on every occasion consult the Soviet Union and these two countries should decide on matters like these together.*
>
> *2.Turkey will prevent the passage of all of the warships that belong to countries without shores in the Black Sea if these ships exeed the 1/5 of the weight stated on the Article 18 of the Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits.*
>
> *3.Turkey will prevent passage of the warships sent with humanitarian intentions through the Straits into the Black Sea by countries without shores in the Black Sea.*
>
> *4.The ships belonging to warring countries that have the right to pass through the Straits as according to the Articles 19 and 25 of Montreux Convention*

Regarding the Regime of the Straits will only be granted passage after the Soviet Union approves as it is a member of the Council of the League of Nations.

5. As accordance with the Article 4 of the Convention, ships that carry arms, soldiers or are themselves armed trade ships of third parties will be considered and treated as supplemantary warships. These ships will be treated accordingly based on the articles 10-18 and 20-21 of the Convention.

6.In cases when it is deemed necessary to either put the Turkish-Soviet Pact into action or protect Soviet or Turkish interests, submarines belonging to the Soviet Union will be authorized to pass through the Straits even under conditions outside those that are defined and limited by the Article 12 of the Convention.

7. In order to ensure that the mutual responsibilities of the parties are enacted in a flexible and efficient way the necessity to inform passage through the Straits 8 days before will be reduced to only 2 days for warships belonging to the Soviet Union.

8. The Article 23 of the same Convention that sets the rule of informing passage 3 days before on airplanes will also be reduced to a single day for planes of the USSR.

9. Within the understanding of mutual assistance governments of the Republic of Turkey and Union of Soviet Socialist Repuplics will inform each other of the weights of their fleets within the Black Sea and the Straits every year on January 1st and July 1st.

10. Both Turkey and the Soviet Union assume the responsibility of not changing the regime over the Straits without consulting each other and also assume the responsibility of not signing treaties without the signature of both parties.

11. This secret protocol completes the Turkish-Soviet Union Mutual Assistance Pact and is an unseperable part of it." (Oran, 2001, p. 421).

These demands which were against the national sovereignty of the Republic of Turkey but also were against the interests of every country that signed the Montreux Treaty were naturally refused by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Şükrü Saraçoğlu. After the negotiations between Turkey and the Soviet Union came to a halt, the Prime Minister Refik Saydam made a statement. In the issue of Cumhuriyet newspaper dated 18 October 1939, titled "Turkish-Soviet Negotiations", it was said that *"The negotiations which took place in Moscow for 23 days could not be concluded with the agreement"*. The statement of Prime Minister Refik Saydam was included in the continuation of the said news. He stated in this statement that "*the proposals proposed by the Soviets and the guarantees given to us for our safety do not correspond to the commitments requested from us"*. It is also reported in that the same issue that the Foreign Acting Deputy Şükrü Saraçoğlu would return to Ankara (Cumhuriyet, 18 October 1939). In the issue of Son Telgraf dated October 18th 1939, the communiqué published by the Soviet Government after Şükrü Saraçoğlu left Moscow was included in an article titled *"Official Communiqué Emitted in Moscow"*. This official notification went as:

"During his travel to the Soviet Union to return the visits Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Saraçoğlu had an oppurtunity to indulge in an

> *exchange of ideas with the high ranking members of the government of the Soviet Union. This exchange which proceeded in a sincere athmoshphere once again reassured the desire of both governments for peace and the permanent nature of the friendship between them. Both governments have declared that on issues regarding the Soviet Union and the Republic of Turkey the countries should continue to act in cooperation."* (Son Telgraf, 18 October, 1939).

The return of Şükrü Saraçoğlu to Turkey was discussed on the issue of the Son Telgraf newspaper dated October 18th, 1939 in the article of Etem İzzet Benice titled "*The wasted 23 Days!"*. In this article Etem İzzet Benice claims *"Maybe some hesitations exist in certain circles. However despite this we are convinced that in terms of the service we provided and the roles we enacted nothing was lost and in fact many things were gained."* (Son Telgraf, 18 October 1939). After this there was a sudden and dramatic change in Soviet attitude towards Turkey. They made some offers which would change the agreement reached with Turkey in its entirety. These offers can be summarised as:

1. Signing a pact about mutually defending the Straits.

2. An article to be added that would ensure the treaty that was to be signed with Turkey would not force the Soviet Union under any circumstances into an armed conflict with Germany.

3. A change to the Montreux Conventions that would permanently prevent passage under every circumstances to any warship belonging to any country that did not have a shore in the Black Sea.

4. Turkish neutrality regarding the Soviet invasion of Bessarabia, and the Bulgarian invasion of Dobruca. Other than these requests the Soviet Union also made it perfectly clear during the negotiations that it was not pleased with the foreign affairs of the Turkish government. Because Turkey was in league with England and France who were enemies of Germany, the Soviet ally.

This offer made to Turkey by the Soviet government was rejected immediately by Minister of Foreign Affairs Şükrü Saraçoğlu. these demands were contrary to both Turkey's sovereignty and the wishes of other signatories to the Montreaux Convention, and thus they were naturally unacceptable to Saraçoğlu. When faced with Saraçoğlu's irreconcilable attitude Stalin was forced to a change of tactics. He even implied the possibility of returning the Greek Islands and the the 12 Islands held by Greece and Italy. He would get enourmous benefits out of this Turkish-Soviet Mutual Assistance Pact while on the other hand the lands he promised were nothing but vague ideas (Şen, 2006, p. 123).

Although Saraçoğlu's visit to Moscow essentially ended in failure there was no negative press. On October 21st 1939 Yunus Nadi would write this about the trip: *"...Now the entire world has seen that the Moscow negotiations only served to reaffirm and reinforce the Turkish-Russian friendship."* This article implies Turkey sought to lower the tensions with Russians (Şen, 2006, p. 121).

Following Saraçoğlu's visit to Moscow both countries issued declarations. These declarations stated that the Turkish-Soviet friendship continued and any problems these countries faced, they act to solve together. (Son Telgraf, 28 September 1939). As the relations between Turkey and the USSR started to enter a dead end, Turkey realized that it was impossible to include the Soviet Union to the alliance it

planned to form with Western powers. Russians connected their interests to geoghraphical conditions and they then sought to place a defensive line outside the motherland which would extend from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. The only weakness of this defensive circle the Soviet Union created was the Straits. Even though Saraçoğlu struggled to conclude this issue during his visit to Moscow he could not succeed. Turkey learned the true intentions its neighbour had regarding the Straits during this visit (Şen, 2006, p. 124-125).

The friendly athmosphere which dominated Turkish-Soviet relations was long gone. In the speech he delievered during the extraordinary session of Soviet High Council held on October 31st, 1939, Molotov would even say: *"Turkey has put itself under grave danger through its alliance treaties with Western Countries and the foreign policy of Turkey is incompatible with Soviet foreign policy."* (Burçak, 1983, pp. 116-117).

But in 1939 Turkish statesmen recognized the source of all problems they experienced with the Soviet Union. This best became apparent on November 1st, 1939, when İnönü in the speech he made on the session of the Grand National Assembly called the Soviet Union "old friend". The friendship between Turkey and the Soviet Union was heavily damaged with Montreux. But the actual damage was done in 1939 when the Russians made their intentions regarding the Straits known to their counterparts.

Germany was not the only country which wished the disruption of Turkish-Soviet relations. War, as Erkin says was going through a strange phase when the English press started reporting news about a secret military stash of Russians in Caucasia. While it was completely false, this piece of news aimed to sow dissension

between Russia and Turkey. This shows us that just like Germans the British saw the Soviet Union as a tool to pull Turkey over to their side as well (Erkin, 1968, pp. 159–160).

The Non-Aggression Treaty the Soviet Union signed with Germany greatly surprised Turkey. The event caused a new era to dawn in the Turkish foreign affairs. This unexpected shift in the balance of powers caused confusion and nervousness. While hoping the Soviet Union would join them, Turkey was now practically alone in the Peace Front with 2 other Western Powers. Both Hitler and Mussolini believed Turkey would change its policies in light of these events, as the deal completely had it surrounded, and this situation would definitively disrupt French and British plans regarding Eastern Mediterranean. Under these circumstances Turkey would either side with the Soviet Union which was its old friend and neighbour and thus walk out of the British-French declaration, or Turkey would abandon the USSR. But Turkey chose a third option. It sought to develop alliance treaties with both sides in order to bring those two sides together.

By choosing the third option Turkey aimed to stay out of the war until the very end. As mentioned above the Nazi-Soviet Non-Agression Pact was quite shocking news and because it was a source of confusion the Turkish press discussed this pact extensively. The general opinion regarding this pact was that it was considered to symbolize that Stalin lit the green-lights for Hitler. Falih Rıfkı Atay who was one of the more prominent journalists of the period authored an article published on a newspaper named Ulus in which he shared his opinions regarding this development with the public (Deringil, 2003, p. 77-78).

The Triple Alliance Treaty pulled Turkey into a legal perplexity. There were some contradictions between the Triple Alliance Treaty and some other treaties Turkey had previously signed. For example: if Britain wants to help Romania, Turkey is forced to allow British ships passage through the Straits, while at the same time the article on the alliance treaty made with the Soviet Union and the Article 19 of the Montreux Convention recognizes Turkey's right to refuse such demands (Seydi, 2005, p. 101).

After the treaties it signed with the 3 Baltic states, Soviet Russia made a move on Finland which was yet another Baltic state. Unlike Poland and the smaller Baltic states Finland proved harder to conquer. During the negotiations between the 2 countries the Soviet Union had made some demands on Finland. The USSR wanted Finland to cede the islands of Hongland, Seiskari, Lavanskari, Tytarskari and Lovisto while asking rent the Hangö Port for 30 years with the intentions of turning it into a naval base. Some other demands were related to border issues like the one made in order remove Leningrad from heavy artillery range by asking Finland to withdraw for 20-25 kms and like the one made to fix the borders of the Petsamo district in the north. Finland accepted the demands regarding the Hogland Island and the Hangö Port. When Finland claimed the naval base on the part would contradict Finland's policy of neutrality the Union offered to buy off the land instead. The government of Finland rejected that offer and started to mobilize the county. The capital Helsinki was evacuated before any attacks hit it and able bodied men were conscripted in accordance with the mobilization efforts.

The negotiations between the Finnish government and the Soviet Union were inconclusive and the offers made by the USSR were rejected. Then Russia annulled

the 1934 Non-Agression Pact on November 28th and declared war on Finland on November 30, 1939.

The Soviet Army marched from three different sides. The first city they bombarded was the city of Taryoki. Following the bombardment the Soviet government sent an ultimatom and demanded the resignation of the Finnish cabinet. When the negotiations between the two sides were again inconclusive Helsinki was bombarded 16 times. After the attacks the Finnish government encouraged its people to retreat to rural areas as the assaults focused on urban Finland. Faced with the Soviet assaults, Finnish resistance lasted for months (Haber Akşam Postası, 4 December 1939).

With a declaration of the government all Finnish women were called to serve in the war as well. On December 2, 1939 the Finnish government petitioned to the League of Nations in order to inform the world of what was happening and also obtain the support of other Eruopean powers.

Turkey had always consulted its great neighbour the Soviet Union in matters of foreign affairs and avoided conflict with it. Just like Turkey never joined a pact against Russia it also took great care not to sign treaties without informing Russia. While Russia on the other hand prioritised Soviet interests with paying little to no regard to the Turkish interests. The German-Russian Non-Agression Pact just before the start of the war was a good example of this. Russia's relentless assault on Finland caused great reactions in many countries. Volunteers from many nations came to help Finland and Finland was supported in its war efforts as well, especially in terms of firepower.

Britain and France have decided to send large numbers of troops and aircraft to Finland. After the Finnish soldiers got closer to the Soviet border, the Russian press started publishing against Finland. The newspapers published very harsh and accusatory news against the Finnish army, stating that the Finnish Government was playing with fire. The Russian - Finnish war had also found wide coverage in the Turkish press. Zekeriya Sertel, one of the most prominent authors of the period, stated that Russia's goal was not to interfere with the World War, and that it had declared the neutrality of the Soviet Union with an agreement with Germany. He also added that this attack by the Soviet Union on Finland should be considered as the imperialist war (Tan, 30 November, 1939).

On various days the Russian-Finnish war and its phases were talked about in newspapers and the successful resistance of the Finnish army was praised. In opposition to the aid Finland received from various European sources Germany took the side of its ally in Russia’s pursuit of its interests and sent a note to Sweeden while stating that it would cooperate with the USSR. Meanwhile the German press was advising the Russians about how it would be wiser to advance towards the Near East instead of Norway (Tan, 9 December 1939).

Because Norway and Sweeden had adopted a neutral stance towards Finnish-Russian War the aids to Finland were not sufficent as these countries did not allow passage. The shores of Finland had been blockaded and after a being besieged for 4 months the Soviet Union succeded to occupy Finland (Gürün, 1995, pp. 31-32).

During the Second World War the situation of the Mediterranean was quite terrible for the Turkish side. The main reason of this was the Italian desire and plans to dominate this sea and turn it into an Italian lake. The Turkish policy regarding the

turmoil in Europe had been a policy of neutrality and yet it was also necessary to take certain precautions against the Italian threat.

On December 21st, 1939 England and France sent a note to a group countries including Turkey regarding the German trade ships. In this note they asked these countries to prevent the entry of these ships to British and French ports while also asking the countries to limit their trade with Germany as well. This was a quite undesirable situation for Turkey as it had trade relations with Germany on a large scale. Yet another country unsatisified with this note was the USSR which sent a counter-note declaring these demands against the international law and that trade should not be disturbed. The Soviet Union also stated it plans to reimburse any kinds of loss it would suffer due to this note. The approach of the USSR was supported by Turkey and the two countries defended their interests in a common ground (BCA, f.030.10.,.2.35.583.1).

While these processes were continuing politically, activities were also continuing economically. By 1939, the Soviets were the only country to receive live animals from Eastern Anatolia. The Soviets bought the goods they needed from the Eastern Anatolian markets by following the Istanbul market. At times, it is reflected in the documents that the Istanbul traders have increased the high price in order not to enter the region. However, this was due to the planning figures given to the Soviet institutions. At times, the Soviet customs did not accept the merchants' goods, since the production techniques of the producers in the region were lagging behind. (BCA, 490-01-494-1988-2). On 24 October 1939, the export of live animals was allowed only from Eastern Anatolia to the Soviets. Economic relations between the Soviet Union and Turkey in the period between the two wars has developed quite dynamically.

CONCLUSION

The Republic of Turkey has adopted protecting Turkey's unity, and absolute independence without any concessions, developing friendly relations with other countries, especially neighbours, and protecting the safety and happiness of the Turkish nation as the core principles since the day it was founded. While Turkey went through a harsh phase for 5 years during which the Second World War raged, it managed to come out of this bloody conflict without suffering any lasting damages to its integrity.

With the formation of favorable conditions in Turkey it is thought by the time communist Soviet Union to pass a government. However, Turkish decision makers have always been distant from communism and wanted to keep this movement under control. In 1921, the first friendship was formally established around bilateral relations. In 1925, with the Treaty of Friendship and Impartiality, this was placed on solid foundations and the two countries followed a foreign policy based on mutual approval as the main axis.

The first break in bilateral relations was on the Straits. Lausanne Straits Agreement, Determination Treaty in 1921 and located on the Bosphorus Strait pursuant to the Statute of the Black Sea littoral be determined by the parties in their favor with a statin tarafınca Turkey was not accepted. Turkey, not to lose the gains achieved at the end of the national struggle and the British Straits thesis in order to

avoid conflicts that may arise with the British who controlled based on an agreement made.

The field of the Turkish-Soviet relations which suffered the most was the economy with the start of the Second World War and the inclusion of the Soviet Union to the war in 1941.

Soviet Russia wanted to have a say on the Straits with a policy that was perceived as a continuation of a policy that could be evaluated as a continuation of the Russian ambitions on the Straits, and opposed a full Turkish sovereignty and planted the first suspicion seeds in friendly relations, which caused the Turkish side to distrust. Soviet Russia's pursuit of this policy is again the product of a policy based on realism.

The Soviet Union had quite an important part in the balance strategy Turkey employed before the start of the Second World War. But the USSR started to develop its own expectations on Turkey after getting confident in its strength in 1930s which affected the Turkish-Soviet relations negatively. The Soviet desire to force Turkey into acitons that only fit the Soviet agenda and served Soviet interests, and the fact that the friendship among these countries depended on the success of this plan was a sign of the troubles these relations would suffer in the near future as tensions started to rise.

When we observe the events of the years between 1937-1939 of the Stalin Period we can see that it was a time period with its ups and downs for the Turkish-Soviet relations in which sometimes the problems among the countries would be ignored while sometimes they would be the root cause of a massive crisis. The side that generally defined this period was the Soviet Union. When the Soviet Union was

suffering through some hardships the relations they had with Turkey was friendly and they even made concessions regarding their classical policies. But when the tide turned and the Soviet Union regained its strength the attitude towards Turkey changes as well. In those times the Soviet Union employs a harsh and uncomprimising attitude in its relations.

The year 1939 has been a turning point in the relations between the Republic of Turkey and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Because the plans Turkey made regarding foreign affairs had been shattered by the German-Russian Non-Aggression Pact, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Şükrü Saraçoğlu was sent in a mission to Moscow. The goal of this mission was to test the Soviet reaction regarding the new Turkish strategy about foreign affairs as the new plan included forming alliances with Western powers. Turkey wanted to make sure the deals it would make with the West would not cause any hostility with the Soviet Union which was considered a friend and the new allies it planned to make. But the opposite party was the Soviet diplomats who had revived the policies of the Tzardom Era. When it came to this the relations among the countries could not possibly remain as calm as they were during the reign of Atatürk. One of the main goals the Russians could not abandon regarding Turkey was the issue of the Straits which was also the main reason of all of the problems and conflict of interests.

That followed the Soviet Union's policy towards Turkey are emerging as the imposition by the interests of the timing. One of the most salient features of Turkey frequently exposed to this Soviet policy, it is always wait for you to come by the Soviet Union's first move.

When the Soviet Union was a difficult situation in relations with Turkey conducted in friendship. According to the situation, he gave up his policies. But when the Soviet Union was strong Brilig concessions to Turkey. Russians, can not give up on Turkey, but there are goals to reach patiently waits until the appropriate opportunity. Straits are in the first place among these targets. Negotiating this weakness of Russians in Germany in the first years of the Second World War and Britain in the following period. It did not hesitate to do.

Here is the importance of the Straits for the Soviets with a historically separate footnote. It will become more meaningful with evaluation. For the Soviet Union, the successor of Tsarist Russia, the importance of the Straits was very important in the following three stages. The first is that the alliance states do not cross Çanakkale to prevent the tsarism from collapsing. the request was repelled by the Turks and the Bolsheviks of the civil war caused to be won. The second is the Straits of the German-Soviet Treaty. German-Soviet after the dispute over sharing is to start the war. This war has positioned the Soviets in the ranks of allies. The third and most important stage is the aggressive attitude of the Soviets on the Straits, made the allies realize Soviet imperialism and this aggressive policy caused the world to split into two poles.

Described in bilateral relations because of the wrong political moves Stalin followed impenetrable wounds have been opened. After the death of Stalin, this was the Soviet Union reports that policies have been rejected and a more moderate foreign policy will be followed nevertheless, bilateral relations could not return to the dynamics of the 1925 Treaty. Turkey, which is now based on a non-Soviet and anti-communism it represents accepted the policy as the main axis policy.

According to the Soviet Union; Failure to sign the Turkish-Soviet Treaty Turkey is responsible. In violation of the spirit of bilateral treaties, the Soviets Signed a treaty without approval. Turks are now at the disposal of the imperialist powers is a country to fight. Foreign Commissioner Molotov criticizes this situation made a statement.

> *"Turkey abandoned its cautious foreign policy and the war European order preferred to be included. Soviet Union still maintains neutrality It is. Does Turkey will regret that decision? Time it. It will show. "*

As it can be understood from this declaration, Soviet Russia explicitly accused the Turkish side of making wrong decisions and signed the Friendship Agreement provisions signed in 1925. Stated that they violated.

All of the Soviet Union, under these conditions, Turkey is baseless accusations. To prevent a possible German attack against Western countries because of distrust, without Turkey's approval and the opinion has signed a non-aggression pact. Here's policy in the face of large state in terms of the relative importance of the Soviet Union neglecting Turkey is striving for its own security. changes they deem necessary for Turkey's security concerns knows that carrying Soviet Russian authorities treaty conditions were applying pressure to impose on Turkey. But this edition has been exhibited in Turkey's Soviet-axis allows the execution rather than an alternative foreign policy. turning point between the Soviet Union and Turkey began a process that can be accepted.

Under the autocrat rule of Stalin, in an effort to democratize the Soviet Union and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, major differences in understanding between the Western examples of key management Turkey is concerned.

When the Second World War started in Turkey; Britain hoped to become a bridge between France and the Soviet Union. German - Soviet Pact to make an unexpected change in the balance of power in France in 1940 and entering the territory of the Germans, Turkey is left in the lurch.

The perceptions of both parties about the other are shaped in the shadow of historical anxiety and doubts. However, sharing the same geography that Turkey and Russia, the two major power projects in the future for anxiety and doubt to take the place of the dynamic of cooperation and trust will benefit both. The elimination of ideological distinctions has created a favorable ground for creating an environment of cooperation and trust.

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

Figure 1 Depiction of Stalin, 1935.



- 2 -

T.C. BAŞBAKANLIK CUMHURİYET ARŞİVİ

Yosif Vissarionoviç Stalin (Cugaşvili) 21(9)Birincikânun 1879 tarihinde Gori (Kürcistanda) şehrinde dünyaya gelmiştir. Stalin'in babası Vissarion Cugaşvili ayakkabı ustası olup Tiflis'de Adelhanof'un ayakkabı fabrikasında çalışmıştır. Nufus kaydına göre Tiflis vilâyetinin Didi-Lilo köyü köylülerinden sayılmakta idi.

Y.V.STALİN'İN VALDESİ - Y.G.CUGAŞVİLİ

Y.V.Stalin'in doğduğu ve çocukluğunu geçirdiği Gorî şehrindeki ev.

Y.V.Stalin'in yaşadığı oda.

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4

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Figure 2 A document showing the information about Stalin's family. (BCA, Fon code:30.10, Place code. 249.685.1)



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Figure 3 A Document Showing The Information About Stalin's Family. (BCA, Fon code:30.10, Place code. 249.685.1)


KURUN

Boğazlar bizimdir!

Yurtdaşlara müjde: Mukavelename dün gece imzalandı. Boğazlar tunç yüzlü Mehmetçiklerine kavuştu

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KURUN, bizi yeniz bir zafer daha kazandıran Ulu Önder Atatürk'ü, büyüklerimizi ve kahraman ordumuzu saygı ve sevgiyle selâmlar, bütün yurtdaşlarını sandan kalkar.

Figure 4 The Straits Are Ours! (Kurum, 22 July 1936).

Figure 5 I finally ignited! (Akbaba, 28 September 1939).

Figure 6 Germany After Signing The Russian Pact. (Akbaba, 28 September 1939).

AKBABA

LÂRAHATE FİDDÜNYA!

Yazan: Orhan Seyfi ORHON

Hariciye Vekilimizle Molotof yoldaş Moskovada bulaştılar..

PROPAGANDA

Figure 7: The Star That Brightens World Peace. (Akbaba, 28 September 1939).