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LİSANSÜSTÜ EĞİTİM ENSTİTÜSÜ

ARE ALL NEGOTIATED PEACE AGREEMENTS FINAL? RECONSTRUCTING AND MAINTAINING PEACE IN RWANDA AND BURUNDI

DOKTORA TEZİ

Öncel SENÇERMAN

Enstitü Anabilim Dalı: ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER
Enstitü Bilim Dalı: ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER

Tez Danışmanı: Dr. Öğr. Üy. Mehmet Ali UĞUR

ŞUBAT 2021

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Bu tez aşağıdaki jüri tarafından 26/02/2021 tarihinde oybirliği ile kabul edilmiştir.

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Institute Discipline : International Relations
Type : ( ) Project ( ) Master Thesis (✓) Doctoral Thesis

Advisor
(Assistant Prof. Mehmet Ali UGUR, PhD, Signature, 15.01.2021)

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Doctoral students point out similarities between writing the dissertation and running a marathon. I am no different than other students to put the same cliché here even though I am not a marathon runner. I just do running and cycling for personal work-out depending on my mood. Whichever I go for, I know that keeping the same rhythm is not an easy job. Self-discipline is a must to keep myself on the track. Writing the dissertation is a long process that can only be managed by self-discipline, yet alone it is not enough. The more, I borrowed from so many special people and during this long process I have incurred so many debts from them.

My very special thanks go to my mother and father, who were also my primary school teachers at a small village school in late 1980s. Their introduction of empirical knowledge and the importance of data obtained by observation and trial paved the way for further empirical studies in my life based on research. It is unlikely I would have ventured into this intellectual journey without the pursuit of happiness my parents taught me to look for in my life.

My wife and son from whom I stole many precious moments waited for so long for me to finish my dissertation without me at home as a normal husband and dad – I had to choose a monk-like experience to finish the dissertation for some time in our family life. My son considered me as a weekend-daddy for some time in his early life. But I believe that as winning a degree I did my best to open new gates to win his life, too. Without their support I could not finish this dissertation.

This dissertation owes a particular debt to Professor Göksel Armağan, PhD, who tried his best to show me how best use the statistical methods using SPSS etc. for regression analysis. Armağan took my hands to an upper level of research for a normal social science researcher.

I would like to extend my special thanks to Assoc. Professor Murat N. Arman, PhD, who always supported me for my research and studies by opening the gates of conflict studies since when I was one of his graduate students, for his great help during the writing process.

I am particularly indebted to Assoc. Professor Yüksel Yalova, PhD, Vice-President of African Diplomatic Academy - Former Minister of State and Vice-Chairman of the National Assembly of Turkey, who have always trusted in my academic work and always motivated me to finish my dissertation and encouraged me to continue my research in the field of African studies.

I would like to express my final thanks to my supervisor Assist. Professor Mehmel A. Uğur, PhD and the esteemed screening committee members, Professor Metin Çancı, PhD, Professor Hüsamettin İnaç, PhD, Professor Nezir Akyeşilmen, PhD and Assoc. Professor Zelha Altınkaya, PhD for their invaluable support during this long process. I am especially indebted to my advisor Assist. Professor Mehmet A. Uğur, PhD, who introduced me the field of negotiation studies.

Öncel SENCERMAN 26/02/2021

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PART II
CHAPTER TWO: RWANDA AND BURUNDI, MACRO ANALYSIS

ABBREVIATIONS

ABASA : Salvation Burundian African Alliance
AMIB : African Mission in Burundi
ANADDE : National Alliance for Rights and Development
ANC : African National Congress
ASEAN : Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AV-INTWARI : *Alliance des Vaillants*
BATNA : Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement
BBTG : Broad Based Transitional Government
BNDF : Burundian National Defense Force
CAFOB : *Collectif des Associations et ONGs Feminines du Burundi* / Collective of Women's Associations and NGOs of Burundi
CDR : *Convention pour la Défense de la République* / Committee for the Defense of the Revolution
CEAO : West African Economic Community
CENI : Independent National Electoral Commission
CEPGL : *Communauté Economique de Pays des Grands Lacs* / Economic Community of the Countries of the Great Lakes
CETA : *Conference des Eglises de Toute l'Afrique* / All Africa Conference of Churches
CMSN : Military Committee for National Salvation
CNDD : *Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie* / National Council for the Defense of Democracy
CSAA : Commission for the Application of the Accord
CSCE **:** Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
DDR : Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration
DRC : Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOWAS : Economic Community of West African States
EU : European Union
FAB : National Army of Burundi
FALINA : *Forces de liberation nationale* / National Liberation Forces
FAP : *Forces armees du peoples* / People's Armed Forces
FAR : *Forces Armees Rwandaises* / National Army of Rwanda
FARC : *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* / Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
FDD : *Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie* / Forces for the Defense of Democracy
FNL : *Front National de Libération* / National Liberation Front
FRODEBU : *Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi* / Front for Democracy in Burundi
FROLINA : *Front pour la Liberation Nationale* / National Liberation Front
GCA : Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus
GOR : Government of Rwanda

IIASA : International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
ICG : International Crisis Group
ICJ : International Court of Justice
ICRC : International Committee of the Red Cross
IMC : Implementation Monitoring Commission
IMF : International Money Fund
INKINZO : Guarantor of the Freedom of Speech
IRA : Irish Republican Army
JCC : Joint Ceasefire Commission
MEO : Mutually Enticing Opportunity
MEPROBA : Movement of Progressive Students of Burundi
MHS : Mutually Hurt Stalemate
MILF : Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MPLA : Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
MRC : *Mouvement pour la Réhabilitation du Citoyen* / Movement for the Rehabilitation of Citizens
MRD : *Mouvement Democratique Republicain* / Republican Democratic Movement
MRND : *Mouvement Revolutionnaire National pour le Developpement* / National Revolutionary Movement for Development
NATO : North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEC : National Electoral Commission
NMOG : Neutral Military Observer Group
NRA : Ugandan National Resistance Army
OAS : Organization of African States
OAU : Organization of African Unity
ONUB : United Nations Operation in Burundi (French Acronym)
OSCE : Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PALIPEHUTU : *Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu* / Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People
PAM : Peace Accords Matrix of the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies of the University of Notre Dame
PARENA : *Parti pour le Redressement National* / Party for National Recovery
PARMEHUTU : Party of the Hutu Emancipation Movement
PCA : Permanent Court of Arbitration
PDC : *Parti démocrate chrétien* / Christian Democratic Party
PDD : Policy Decision Directive
PIN : Processes of International Negotiations Program
PIT : Independent Workers' Party
PL : *Parti Liberal* / Liberal Party
PP : *Parti du Peuple* / People's Party
PSD : *Parti Social Democrate* / Social Democratic Party
PRIO : Peace Research Institute Oslo

PRP : *Parti pour la Reconciliation du Peuple* / People's Reconciliation Party
PT : Labor Party
PTC : Post Transition Constitution
QCA : Qualitative Comparative Analysis
RADDES : Rally for Democracy and Economic and Social Development
RPB **:** Burundian People's Rally (French Acronym)
RPF : Rwandan Patriotic Front
RTLM : Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines - Radio Thousand Hills
SALT : Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SAPSD : South African Protection Support Detachment
SOJODEM : *Solidarite Jeunnesse pour le Defense Des Droits des Minorites*
SRSG : Special Representative to the Secretary General of the United Nations
SSR : Security Sector Reform
TA : Transitional Arrangements
TABARA : Political Action based on Movements of Progressive Burundian Students.
TGoB : Transitional Government of Burundi
TRC : Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UBU : Burundi Workers' Party
UK : United Kingdom
ULINA : *Union pour la Liberation Nationale*
UN : United Nations
UNAR : *Union Nationale Rwandaise* / Rwandese National Union
UNAMIR : United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNAMIR : II Second United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNCLOS : United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea
UNHCR : United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNITA : Union for Total Independence of Angola
UNOB : United Nations Office in Burundi
US : United States
USA : United States of America
UPRONA : *Union Pour le Progrès National* / Union for National Progress
ZOPA : Zone of Possible Agreement

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Tezin Başlığı: Are all negotiated peace agreements final? Reconstructing and Maintaining Peace in Rwanda and Burundi.	
Tezin Yazarı: Öncel SENÇERMAN	**Danışman:** Dr. Öğr. Üyesi. Mehmet Ali UĞUR
Kabul Tarihi: 26.02.2021	**Sayfa Sayısı:** xii (ön kısım) + 227 (tez)
Anabilim Dalı: Uluslararası İlişkiler	**Bilim Dalı:** Uluslararası İlişkiler

Ülke içi çatışmalar İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nın sona ermesinden itibaren artışa geçmiştir. Özellikle iç savaşları da kapsayan ülke içi çatışmaların sayısı Soğuk Savaş'ın son bulmasının ardından artmaya başlamıştır. Bu tür çatışmalar, özellikle Afrika, Asya ve Orta Doğu'da yoğun bir şekilde görülmektedir. Bu çatışmaları çözmek ve barışı yeniden tesis etmek, çatışan tarafların ve müzakere edilmiş, kapsamlı bir barış anlaşması üzerinde fikir birliğine varmak için tarafların müzakere masasına oturmasını sağlayan üçüncü tarafların önemli gayretlerini gerektirmektedir. Bununla beraber, müzakere edilmiş kapsamlı bir barış anlaşması, başarılı bir müzakere süreci anlamına gelmez. Bu tezin ana amacı; müzakere sürecinin, ülke içi bir çatışmaya hızlı çözüm getiren tek seferlik bir pazarlık olmadığını ve uzun soluklu, yıllar sürebilecek beş aşamalı – müzakere öncesi müzakereler, hazırlık, resmi müzakere, uygulama ve müzakere sonrası müzakereler – bir süreç olduğunu ortaya koymaktır. Bu çalışma, şu iki soruya yanıt vermeyi hedeflemektedir: Müzakere edilmiş tüm barış anlaşmaları nihai anlaşmalar mıdır? Ülke içi çatışmalara ilişkin başarılı müzakere süreçlerini etkileyen etmenler nelerdir? Bu sorulara yanıt verirken çalışma, özellikle 1990'larda önemli bir gelişme kaydetmiş olan müzakere kuramının kuramsal perspektifinden istifade etmektedir.

Bu çalışmada üç farklı araştırma yöntemi kullanılmıştır: vaka incelemesi, süreç analizi ve keskin-set Nitel Karşılaştırmalı Analiz (csQCA). Ruanda ve Burundi, vaka incelemesi ve süreç analizlerine tutulan iki ana vakayı teşkil etmektedir. Buna ilaveten, Sahra-Altı Afrika'dan Burundi, Ruanda, Liberya, Sudan, Fildişi Sahili, Sierra Leone, Mozambik, Gine Bissau gibi sekiz farklı ülke csQCA analizi için kullanılmaktadır. Notre Dame Üniversitesi Uluslararası Barış Çalışmaları Kroc Enstitüsü, Uppsala Üniversitesi Barış ve Çatışma Araştırmaları Bölümü (UCDP) ve Edinburgh Üniversitesi gibi saygın araştırma kuruluşlarınca üretilen Barış Anlaşmaları Matrisi (PAM), UCDP Barış Anlaşmaları Veri Seti 19.1. Versiyon ve Barış Anlaşmaları Veri tabanı (PA-X) gibi veri setleri analiz için kullanılmıştır. Müzakere süresi, çatışma tırmanması, siyasi ve askeri iktidar paylaşımı, kadın/cinsiyet meseleleri hakkında hükümlerin anlaşmalara ilave edilmesi, müzakere öncesi anlaşmalar ve komşu ülkelerin sürece dahil olması gibi altı farklı bağımsız değişkenlerle ana ve alt hipotezler kurulmuş ve bunlar ampirik yöntemlerle test edilmiştir.

Bu çalışmanın en önemli sonucu, müzakere süresinin, başarılı bir müzakere süreci için gerekli ve yeterli bir koşul olmasıdır. Müzakere süreci ne kadar uzun olursa müzakere sürecinin başarısı o derece artar. Ana değişkenlerin yanı sıra bu çalışma, uluslararası topluluğun ve kuruluşların müzakere süreçlerine tanıklığının, bölge dışından bir arabulucunun, arabulucunun ününün, müzakere sürecine sivil toplumun katılımının önemli olduğunu ileri sürmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Müzakere kuramı, ülke içi çatışmalar, Ruanda, Burundi, QCA analizi.

ABSTRACT

Thesis Title: Are all negotiated peace agreements final? Reconstructing and Maintaining Peace in Rwanda and Burundi.	
Thesis Author: Öncel SENÇERMAN	**Advisor:** Assistant Prof. Mehmet Ali UĞUR, PhD
Date of Acceptance: 26.02.2021	**Total Number of Pages:** xiii (pre-text) + 227 (main body)
Department: International Relations	**Field of Study:** International Relations

Intra-state conflicts have been on the rise since the end of the Second World War. The number of intra-state conflicts, especially including civil wars has been increasing since the end of the Cold War. These conflicts have been very intense especially in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. Resolving these conflicts and settling the peace again need great efforts by the conflicting parties and third parties trying to help them to sit at a negotiation desk to agree on a negotiated, comprehensive agreement. However, a negotiated, comprehensive peace agreement does not necessarily mean a successful negotiation process. The main aim of this dissertation is to put forward that negotiation process is not a one-time deal bringing a fast solution for an intra-state conflict, yet it is a long process that could take years consisting of five main phases such as pre-negotiation, preparation, negotiation proper, implementation and post-negotiation. This study mainly aims to answer these two questions: Are all negotiated peace agreements are final? What are the factors influencing a successful negotiation process for intra-state conflicts? While answering these questions this study enjoys the theoretical perspective of negotiation theory that especially flourished in the 1990s.

This study enjoys three different research methods for triangulation: case study, process tracing and crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (csQCA). Rwanda and Burundi are main cases subjected to case study and process tracing analyses. In addition, eight different countries like Burundi, Rwanda, Liberia, Sudan, Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau from Sub-Saharan Africa are used as cases for csQCA analysis. The datasets produced by the esteemed research institutes like the Peace Accords Matrix prepared by the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies of the University of Notre Dame, UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset Version 19.1 of the Department of Peace and Conflict Research of Uppsala University and Peace Agreements Database (PA-X) of the University of Edinburgh were used for analysis. Six main independent variables such as duration, conflict escalation, political and military power-sharing, inclusion of woman/gender related provisions, pre-negotiation agreements, and neighboring countries' involvement have been operationalized into main and sub-hypotheses and tested through empirical means in this study.

The most significant outcome of this study is that duration is a necessary and sufficient condition for a successful negotiation process. The longer the process the more successful it is. Apart from main variables, this dissertation claims that witnessing of international community and institutions, mediator out of the region, the fame of the mediator, civil society's participation into the negotiation process are also important conditions for successful negotiation processes.

Keywords: Negotiation theory, intra-state conflicts, Rwanda, Burundi, QCA.

INTRODUCTION

Rwanda and Burundi have gone through similar peace negotiations in Arusha in Tanzania by the beginning of the 1990s. However, one seemingly succeeded and the other did not. The peace negotiations failed for Rwanda, yet in Burundi succeeded into a power-sharing regime after more than a decade of negotiations among the warring parties.

This study will focus on different phases of negotiation process and will emphasize that a proper implementation of these phases can help a better settlement in countries suffering from intra-state violent conflicts as recent developments at the beginning of the 1990s in two sister countries have demonstrated that even the parties of the conflict agreed for a negotiated agreement, the negotiated peace agreements should not be considered as final agreements resolving the whole conflict at once, which increases the importance of post-negotiation/post-implementation periods including follow-up negotiations, re-negotiations and agreements for implementations.

The main aim of this study is to underline that negotiations are not 'one-time deals' bringing an 'immediate peace' terminating the conflict, but a longer process covering five different phases like pre-negotiation, preparation, proper negotiation, implementation and post-negotiation (follow-up/post-settlement settlement/re-negotiation). Peace agreements are made to end conflicts, yet a peace agreement considered as the 'prima facie' of a successful negotiation process is not a 'knife-cut' action. On the contrary it is a process open for any breaks in peace-time bearing new conflict zones or fields.

This study also shows that there are several cross-cutting concerns such as positions, interests, power, confidence and trust, third-party involvement, which determine the overall tone of the process and may render all good-will efforts to an impasse, if not a total failure. For this reason, the negotiation processes that two similar countries, Rwanda and Burundi, have gone through during the early years of post-Cold War period will be analyzed here in a comparative way to put forward the significance of a longer negotiation process including all of the five important steps.

Rwanda and Burundi, the two small states of the Great Lakes Region in the eastern Africa, exhibit some identical features in terms of colonial past, population distribution, intra-state conflict and civil war. They both share the same geographical, ethnic, linguistic and cultural characteristics. These two small African countries are mentioned as 'sister countries' in the literature owing to the similarities and common history. Rwanda and Burundi, once were called under one name as 'Ruanda-Urundi' during the colonial era under German colonial order and Belgian mandate, have common steps in their historical inheritance.

These two countries have gone through similar colonial periods, post-independence ethnopolitics and violent intra-state conflicts that especially escalated after the independence and became chronic until the start of 1990s like most of the Sub-Saharan countries. They both experienced animosity between the elites based on ethnic rivalry, ethnic groups competing for political power, constant violent conflicts, military coups, authoritarian regimes following them and civil wars that started during the post-Cold War period. The Figure 1 below shows that mostly African states including Rwanda and

Burundi witness the intra-state conflicts on the world after the collapse of the bi-polarity and the emergence of violence in the frozen zones of conflicts on the world.

Figure 1. Armed Conflict by Region, 1946-2018.



Source: Pettersson et. al. (2019).

Figure 2. Peace agreements worldwide.

Source: Peace Agreements Database https://www.peaceagreements.org/, Access Date: 13/06/2020.



As intra-state conflicts increased around the globe especially after 1990, the number of the peace agreements also increased and as the Figure 2 shows above, 72.3% of these agreements were intra-state conflict related ones between 1990 and 2018. This percentage of peace agreements looking for resolutions to intra-state conflicts is also compatible with the increasing number of intra-state conflicts especially after the Cold War ended. In addition, most of the peace agreements were made for the African states and the Middle-Eastern states as Figure 3 displays below.

Figure 3. Peace agreement intensity by regions.



Source: Peace Agreements Database https://www.peaceagreements.org/, Access Date: 13/06/2020.

Rwanda and Burundi have identical characteristics, yet the history is different despite some common milestones. Reasons for conflict are different. However, the main reason behind the conflicts in these countries is not only the ethnicity problem as widely discussed and claimed, but the reasons behind could also include power politics and fight for the resources. The limited resources in post-colonial regimes have been mostly reachable for the ones who have the power and strong enough to maintain their power and to reach for these sources by enjoying their political and military power.

In addition to these similarities, Rwanda faced a horrible genocide in 1994, which is considered as the second biggest organized genocide after the Jewish Holocaust, after a failed negotiation process following the civil war which began with the invasion of the Rwandan soil by an insurgent group militarily supported by a neighboring country, Uganda. Burundi, quite similarly, witnessed massacres and organized killings for almost a decade sparkled by the assassination of the first democratically elected president in 1993 and the violent conflict did not terminate even after the negotiations started. But relatively successful negotiation process gave fruit to a negotiated peace settlement in Burundi followed by other implementation related and post-negotiation protocols and agreements signed again after a negotiation process.

Tutsi dominated rebel movement the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) toppled the Hutu-dominated regime that had been in power almost for four decades and forced Hutu regime into exile as the winner of the civil war and victorious saver of the Tutsis from the genocide in Rwanda. The RPF stayed in power during the transitional period and strengthened its regime to provide reconciliation within the society with different social and judicial mechanisms like the *Gacaca*[1] courts and economic development in Rwanda. On the other

[1] *Gacaca* means 'justice on the grass' in Kinyarwanda language (Jesee, 2017). *Gacaca* courts were established in Rwanda after the Rwandan genocide to assure accountability for the genocide, to support rule of law and to speed up the prosecution for genocide crimes. It was an innovative system launched by the

side, the Hutu-dominated National Council for the Defense of Democracy – Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) in Burundi succeeded in establishing a consociational regime after the peace negotiations in Arusha, Tanzania forcing the Tutsi-controlled army to negotiate.

Despite some identical characteristics in the historical path, Rwanda and Burundi followed a rather different path in peace negotiations. Late 1990s and parallel negotiation processes followed two completely different trajectories in both countries. The peace negotiations were cut short in Rwanda because of the invasion by the RPF and the Tutsi genocide. The negotiations between the Rwandan government and the rebel movement, the RPF failed after three years of negotiating in 1993. Almost one million Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed during the genocide. Rwanda, under the triumphant regime of the RPF could only start integrative activities within the country between different ethnic groups for rebuilding state institutions by reconstructing domestic peace and welfare within the society.

Burundi, on the other hand, started peace negotiations in 1993 with an initiative for peace talks of the regional players like Zaire (former Democratic Republic of Congo, the DRC), Uganda and Tanzania. Third-party involvement as a method of facilitation and mediation for the start of peace negotiations mostly played an important role in Burundi. Tanzania and the South Africa with the mediation efforts of first Julius Nyerere and then Nelson Mandela and Zuma contributed into the negotiation process reaching seemingly successful outcomes in the end. The negotiation period took almost a decade and the Arusha Peace Accord was signed in September 2000 resulting in a power-sharing regime between the two competing ethnic groups, Tutsi and Hutu, in Burundi. The transition period started about one year later than signing the Arusha Accord and lasted until the democratic elections were held in 2005. The peace was finally settled in Burundi after a decade-long negotiation process. However, it was only a negotiated peace agreement paving the way for further negotiations and re-negotiations for the implementation of the peace agreement and other following cease-fire agreements like the Pretoria Protocols and Dar-es-Salaam Agreement in 2003 and 2006, respectively.

Despite their similarities, what might have caused such a bifurcated track in these countries requires a deeper analysis. Rwanda and Burundi have witnessed violent and constant conflicts after achieving their independence in the 1960s. The root causes of these conflicts and the genocide in Rwanda and Burundi are mostly considered as ethnic. The ethnic structure and segregation of ethnic identities during the colonial period may have played an important role on the violent conflicts. A closer look can reveal the real causes of the violent conflicts in these two small countries. The second chapter on macro analysis of these two cases focuses on these root causes. Nevertheless, rather than simply paying attention to the events unfolding in the 1990s and the historical background, scientific

government developing a new system of court that is based on a traditional way of resolving disputes in Rwanda by the participation of the local community. Further information can be obtained from the esteemed works of Longman (2009), Clark (2010), Schabas (2005) and Brounéus (2008).

analysis reveals that the true story lies behind the way how they negotiated for ending the ongoing conflict – negotiation as a one-time deal or on a longer basis.

Rwanda and Burundi cases show that even though the parties mutually agree on a negotiated agreement, there would still be some gaps between the intended results and actual content of negotiations to be resolved. Rwanda failed after the negotiations in Arusha. Burundi, on the other hand, experienced a longer negotiation process resulted in a power-sharing regime including the integration of the warring parties into the military and political system. Though, the peace achieved at the end of peace negotiations with the participation of almost nineteen parties continued for more than a decade. The experience in Burundi gives us some clues regarding the intricate relationship between a pre-negotiation phase and post-settlement arrangements. Despite considerable success compared to the Rwandan example, there should have been more emphasis on a viable and sustained regime.

Thesis Statement

Negotiation process itself does matter, just like Rwanda and Burundi examples show. The main research objective of this study is to explore the influence of duration of a negotiation process supported with a good pre-negotiation phase on its success: a peace accord in effect that has ended the ongoing conflicts.

Another research objective of this study is to explore the influence of ongoing intra-state violence – including constant violence, actions of rebel movements, civil war, coups etc. – on different phases of negotiation process and its impact on the preferences whether the sides to a conflict are pre-occupied with their pre-determined positions leading to a distributive bargaining or if they will embark on creative long-term solutions by employing integrative techniques. These violent intra-state conflicts occupy important steps in the historical course of Rwanda and Burundi and in their negotiation process.

The number of intra-state conflicts increased especially after the end of the Cold War as the Figure 4 shows below and the root causes of these conflicts put forward some important questions for a better understanding of these conflicts. In order to prevent and resolve violent intra-state conflicts the root causes of them need being clearly stated and analyzed even they pose complex structures. Nonetheless, one of the factors that makes peace negotiations successful is a well-designed conflict analysis. In particular, violent conflicts based on ethnic differences influence pre-negotiation process in a way they can play a role in causing escalation. Ironically, when ethnic clashes gain intensity and pass certain threshold, then, it is the 'ripe' time for a negotiation to start. If ethnic based violent conflicts escalate, then this contributes into the ripeness of the situation for negotiation talks to get started. Similarly, third parties, usually regional organizations like the African Union (AU) or regional countries as well as global actors and international organizations like the United Nations (UN) can use their influence and the information they have as leverage for escalation and de-escalation.

Figure 4. Armed Conflict by Type 1946-2018.



Souce: Pettersson et. al. (2019).

This study also aims to demonstrate the influence of pre-negotiation on the success of a negotiation. This study asserts that a successful negotiation consists of five important steps: Pre-negotiation, preparation, proper negotiation, implementation and post-negotiation. Therefore, focusing only at the middle of these stages, namely the official negotiation step is not enough to see the broader picture and we should also be paying more attention to pre-negotiation stage, which can be enlarged to include preparational steps. For this reason, a well-designed pre-negotiation process when intra-state violence is having its peak, if it touches to the issues of interests of the conflicting groups rather than their positions considering the root causes of conflicts might have successful negotiation outcomes. A well-prepared pre-negotiation period in intra-state violent conflicts can have significant influence on post-negotiation period when the factors affecting pre-negotiation period clearly analyzed.

The main research question is about the effect of duration of a negotiation process on its success. This study tries to give answer to this question. This question is also the backbone of the research.

Apart from the main research question, this study has five other research questions. The first one is about the influence of escalation on the parties' eagerness and willingness to sit on a negotiation desk. Does escalation create a ripe time for the start of negotiations? This question is also related with the question of how a negotiation starts. How escalation is effective in creating a mutually hurting stalemate?

The second one is more related to the pre-negotiation phase of a negotiation process. What is the effect of power-sharing provisions, especially the military and political ones in an intra-state conflict, on satisfying the rebel movements to keep them on the track? This main question also deals with other related questions: How effective are these provisions in

preventing the spoiler problem? Is it enough to make military and political provisions in a negotiated peace agreement to prevent the future conflicts?

The third question is about the women and gender related issues in a negotiation. How successfully does a negotiation process include women or other groups related to gender issues? Does the negotiation process have results in creating integrative provisions for women? The significance of inclusion of women and gender related issues into negotiation processes especially when seeking for a resolution to an intra-state conflict has been increasing in the recent years in terms of a successful negotiation process, hence this study also asks the question about the level they are included in a negotiation process.

The fourth question is the backbone of the research questions here. It is about how effective is the pre-negotiation phase on the whole negotiation process and on its success. Does a good planned and detailed pre-negotiation phase bear a successful peace negotiation with a longer duration? What is the effect of pre-negotiation phase on a durable negotiated peace agreement?

The fifth question deals with any involvement of a neighboring country in a negotiation process. What is the influence of a neighboring country in a negotiation process as a third-party from the same region – as a facilitator, a mediator or a signatory? Regional states and institutions have already their place in the pacific settlement of international disputes in terms of basic conventions, charters and agreements of the Hague Convention (1899 and 1907) and the UN. Their role is already acknowledged by the international community, but this research question tries to find out a neighboring country's influence over a negotiation process to peacefully settle the intra-state conflict.

These research questions are transformed into main hypothesis and sub-hypotheses as follows:

Main Hypothesis - Longer negotiation processes including pre-negotiation and post-negotiation/implementation agreements result in durable and successful peace accords. (duration) (H6).

The hypothesis of the study consists of five sub-hypotheses as follows:

H1 Escalation during peace negotiation processes helps the warring parties to feel the ripe moment and to sit on the negotiation desk to come to a peaceful solution to the ongoing conflict by signing a peace accord. (escalation)

H2 Power-sharing provisions (political and military power-sharing provisions) helps to keep rebels/insurgents within the peace negotiation process and satisfies their political and military demands by keeping them on the track for a successful process. (power-sharing)

H3 Women/gender inclusion into the negotiation processes and provisions related to their inclusion into the process facilitates reaching peaceful solution to the conflict. (women/gender)

H4 Pre-negotiation agreements that come before a peace accord results in durable and successful peace accords. (pre-negotiation)

H5 Neighboring countries' involvement into negotiation processes as facilitators and/or mediators or signatories results in durable and successful peace accords. (neighboring countries)

Operationalization of these hypotheses is important in an empirical study and how they were operationalized will be discussed on Chapter Four, the Analysis.

Another, yet broader outcome of this study may be raising a question about negotiation theory itself. What should be the function of negotiation theory? Should it be practical, normative or purely scientific? Which function of negotiation theory best defines the whole negotiation process and which function supports the main argument of this study? As it will be discussed below a special negotiation theory will be needed to explain peace negotiations held in violence torn countries, yet this kind of explanation will not go further than being prescriptive. However, it will help to develop a practical function demonstrating the ways for better peace negotiations in the future setting the required dynamics as it will benefit from cases. Normative function will define the theory itself.

Methodology

This study first of all employs a qualitative text-based research. It employs a rich and varied body of sources on negotiation theory, on the one side Rwanda and, Burundi on the other. The language of sources, however, is mostly limited to English. There are also sufficient sources on the historical background and peace negotiations of Rwanda and Burundi in French. These sources were used for the research. However, the sources and literature on negotiation theory and about the case study countries in Turkish are very limited. Therefore, the researcher is aware that some sources are published materials in national languages of the case countries, which are unfortunately out of reach.

Catalogue search, online books and the libraries of some reputable universities in Turkey together like Boğaziçi University and Bilkent University, which are rich in published material compared to other university libraries, will be useful for reaching documentary sources. Apart from these two reputable universities that enjoy the biggest numbers of published materials in Turkey, some of the books were obtained from various universities that pay attention to the importance of collecting material especially in peace studies either for their departments of international relations or centers for peace and conflict studies. In addition, in terms of data gathering a variety of sources will be employed such as research of the existing works of prominent scholars, archival documents, data about the cases, public and legal records, the issues of regional and international organizations like the African Union and the United Nations, policy and vision papers of governments.

This dissertation enjoys two different analysis methods. One is case study analysis with process tracing method and the other one is Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) method. For this reason, apart from the books, articles, documents etc. needed for case study analysis, this study also needed data regarding the selected cases for QCA analysis. Dataset for QCA analysis is derived from data produced by the reputable peace research centers like Peace Accords Matrix prepared by the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies of the University of Notre Dame, UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset Version 19.1 of

the Department of Peace and Conflict Research of Uppsala University and Peace Agreements Database (PA-X) of the University of Edinburgh.

At the beginning of the study, it was an opinion that elite interviews would contribute a lot into the dissertation in terms of acquiring information regarding the peace processes in Burundi and Rwanda by visiting these two case countries as a researcher for a sabbatical leave, however, scheduling an appropriate research was a problem with the heavy professional workload at the university.

In addition, the empirical analysis in this study is based on the case studies of Rwanda and Burundi since this research study is a kind of study aiming to test the theory of negotiation especially in violent-torn countries. For this reason, as the basic analysis method it enjoys the case study method as a method for qualitative research to test the theory in general and the hypothesis proposed here in particular. Case study method is considered as one of the most conductive methods to acquire inferences about causal paths in explaining political phenomena (King et. al., 1994: 85). The case study used in this dissertation shows that negotiation process must be understood as a lengthy process and should contain 'inner loops' to go back and revisit certain sticky points in order to present another spiral of violence.

Case studies provide causal links explaining processes and the path taking us to the results. As Zartman asserts regarding the comparative case studies they "lie at the crossroads of reality and theory; they present their evidence through the eyes of a knowledgeable specialist and they test it against the hypothetical constructs of a creative conceptualist" (Zartman, 2006: 165). The case study method is a strong method for testing since predictions tested with this method are quite unique (Van Evera, 1997: 54).

Since one of the aims of this study is to test the theory, case study method will be suitable for this aim as it offers three formats for testing theories as controlled comparison, congruence procedure and process tracing (55). One of the aims is to do process tracing using the cases so that process analysis can contribute to this study.

The specific outcome this dissertation tries to explain here is the success or failure of the negotiated peace settlements signed in Sub-Saharan Africa after 1990. Why some negotiated peace settlements are successful when some are not? This variable this dissertation tries to explain is also the outcome of the analysis in QCA analysis.

Figure 5. Triangulated Analysis.



QCA, which is a well-established research method blending qualitative and quantitative approaches in social sciences, is used in this study because it is capable of observing combinations of causal conditions that results in the outcome – successful peace settlements. For this study crisp-set version of the QCA method has been chosen instead of using another sophisticated version of the QCA, which is called fuzzy-set QCA, since this study enjoys binary coding for the data. QCA method is used in this study after in-depth qualitative studies benefiting from case study method and process tracing method. The main aim to use crisp-set QCA analysis method for the dissertation is to achieve triangulation as illustrated on Figure 5 above.

Process tracing aims to investigate mid-steps within a process to make assumptions regarding the supposition about the emergence of the outcome and its process (Bennett and Checkel, 2012: 5). Process tracing is useful for following the traces of causalities in a certain situation (Checkel, 2008: 116). It is asserted that this method is considered as the only method for a good study on causal mechanisms since it helps researchers to make strong inferences from the cases to put forward causal process (Beach and Pedersen, 2013).

Beach and Pedersen consider this method as an ordinary social research method owing to its weak and powerful sides in comparison, however, it can create powerful causal inferences out of the cases regarding causal mechanisms under convenient conditions, which is not so possible with other research methods in single-case studies (2013). Process tracing has three basic research objectives: (1) theory-testing over a casual mechanism, (2) theory-building over a causal mechanism and (3) explaining a historical outcome, which is the mostly used one and does not aim theory-building or theory-testing (Beach and Pedersen, 2013 and Beach, 2017). One of these objectives in the hand, a researcher "explores the chain of events or the decision-making process by which initial case conditions are translated into case outcomes" in a process tracing analysis (Van Evera, 1997: 64).

Process tracing is a method that could be used in case studies aiming to understand the causal links producing the outcome out of a certain event from the history and make judgements considering the similarity of the outcomes of identical events (Beach, 2017: 2). It requires "(1) good knowledge of the history of the case, (2) good knowledge of relevant preexisting theories and generalizations, and (3) a strong capacity to carry out sound logical reasoning by combining facts about the case with more general knowledge" (Mahoney, 2015: 202). Process tracing method is similar to QCA in its search for equifinality since it tries to shed light on the causal process by requiring researchers to consider equifinality in order to see alternate ways for reaching out the outcome (Bennett and George, 2005: 206-207).

Before using the crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) analysis method, a case study was conducted and process tracing method was used to find out the causal conditions. Historical background of the case countries was helpful in forming the conditions depending on the theory. Conditions were defined in the light of the theoretical framework, namely the negotiation theory. To test the conditions eight different countries were taken as cases. Peace Accords Matrix (PAM) prepared by the Kroc Institute for International

Peace Studies of the University of Notre Dame was used to define the cases. The cases were selected among Sub-Saharan African counties that had a peace settlement process and signed a peace accord as listed on the Peace Accords Matrix. The accords signed between the government and the insurgents following a civil war or a violent intra-state conflict were taken into consideration.

UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset Version 19.1 of the Department of Peace and Conflict Research of Uppsala University was used to check out if these peace accords have terminated or not. Plus, data on peace agreements produced by the Peace Agreements Database (PA-X) of the University of Edinburgh was used to compare the details of the data available on PAM and UCDP. If terminated, it was understood that the peace accord was not successful and failed. If not terminated, it was understood that the peace accord was successful.

When the case countries were determined half of the case countries were selected among the ones with a failed peace accord and another half was selected among the ones with a successful one. In the end eight countries were determined as making two groups to form the truth table of the QCA analysis – that is explained in detail below. The first group of case countries with a successful peace accord consists of Burundi, Ivory Coast, Liberia and Sudan. The second group of case countries with a failed peace accord consists of Rwanda, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Sierra Leone.

Basics of the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)

Charles C. Ragin introduced a new research analysis method called as Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) for social sciences in 1987 when his work *The Comparative Method* was published that puts forward an approach based on traditional comparative method in social sciences first studied by John Stuart Mill (Marx et. al. 2014: 115). Marx et. al. define QCA as "a comparative case-oriented research approach and collection of techniques based on set theory and Boolean algebra, which aims to combine some of the strengths of qualitative and quantitative research methods" (2014: 115). Since its launch by Ragin different types of the QCA analysis method have been used in different disciplines (Rihoux et. al. 2013: 175). Marx et. al. claim that the introduction of the QCA method came after some methodological hardships Ragin met in the 1970s and 1980s as he had a training as a sociologist to use quantitative methods for his studies, yet he confronted with the limits of these methods (2014: 116). According to Jordan et. al., Ragin introduced the QCA method when he noticed the lack of a comparative analysis method that can help researchers to make a generalization over the findings out of a rather limited case number (2011: 1159). As is understood above, what Ragin launched in 1987 filled in a blank in comparative social sciences research.

Despite its introduction by Charles C. Ragin in 1987, Berg-Schlosser et. al. assert that the esteemed works by Hume and J.S. Mill lay the basis of this method (2009: 2). The method of agreement and the method of difference stand forward as significant methods on the logical basis of this analysis method (2). As Schneider and Wagemann stress QCA has its roots in Mill's methods of agreement and difference that are very compatible with the analysis for determining necessary and sufficient condition (2012).

Regarding Mill's methods of agreement and difference, Stokke puts forward that while both of Mill's methods could be significant in catching connections between cases, the method of difference is successful in confirming causality as only with the help of the method of agreement a researcher is not able to make a difference between a cause and action (2007: 502). As is seen in the literature, Ragin's method of analysis was a sophisticated version of Mill's comparative method that tries to find out similarities and differences between different cases.

QCA method could be positioned somewhere between the qualitative and quantitative research methods (see Figure 6 below). It seems more qualitative in nature, however, the Boolean algorithm used for analysis avoids subjectivity because the algorithm has constantly the same result and hence the results are recurrent (Duşa, 2010: 100). According to Duşa, QCA concentrates on the availability of causal conditions benefitting from binary coding of the related data while other quantitative research analysis methods benefit from big data to draw conclusions out of conclusions, yet they only take into consideration the different levels of causal presence (2010: 100). However, absence of some conditions is also important as they have the potential to make the outcome like anarchy happens when a powerful legal structure is absent (100).

Figure 6. Spectrum of research methods.



Source: Jordan et. al. (2011).

Comparing it to other statistical tools that require researchers to put the data and display the solutions, Berg-Schlosser et. al. states that "using QCA, researchers must be engaged in the analytic process, for it is not mechanical or 'push-button'" (2009: 13). Rihoux states that "far from being a push-button-type technique, the use of QCA is an iterative and creative process" that puts the responsibility of getting familiar with the cases under study and of formulating a truth table of good quality on the shoulders of the researcher (2006:683).

QCA analysis offers solutions that are displayed as minimized combinations showing presence or absence of conditions that cause the outcome and that are necessary and/or sufficient in making the outcome (Duşa, 2010: 100). As to Misangyi and Fiss, "QCA affords researchers with the formal analytical tools and procedures to capture the diversity of causal combinations that constitute cases, to both map this diversity of cases and to

systematically analyze combinations of causal conditions that are linked to an outcome of interest under study" (2013: 51).

Since its launch in 1987 by Ragin, QCA analysis method has been used in several disciplines for various reasons for the last three decades in social sciences. Its broad usage in social science brought along its development and evolution in different phases as shown in the following sentences. Rihoux et. al. categorizes the evolution and usage of QCA method in different disciplines between 1984 and 2011 into five different periods in the study they conducted in 2013. The first period symbolizes the quiet development with crisp-set QCA practices between 1984-2000. The second period between 2001 and 2002 stands for the decrease in QCA applications. The third period has the increase in the number of QCA practices between 2003 and 2005 with the introduction of fuzzy-set QCA. The fourth period between 2005 and 2007 witnesses another stage of decline owing to sudden decrease in fuzzy-set QCA practices. The final period stands for the years after 2007 that again witnesses a sudden increase with the introduction of multivariate QCA applications (2013: 176). According to the same study, political science, sociology, anthropology, economics and management related studies benefitted from the QCA applications between 1984 and 2011 (177). As Jordan et. al. mention even though the QCA method was developed for comparative politics and historical sociology at the very beginning, other fields of sociology and political science have largely benefited from it (2011: 1159).

Its evolution throughout three decades brought along introduction of different types of this method. QCA method has evolved into three different variants: crisp-set QCA (csQCA), fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA) and multi-value (mvQCA) and researchers can choose among these three different types considering the research problem and the data in the hand (see Table 1 below for the variants of QCA and their uses). csQCA method is mostly preferred when using the small number of data and working with variables that could be coded as to binary logic as present (1) or absent (0). Other two methods of QCA are preferred when working with variables that could be coded in various degrees (Jordan et. al. 2011: 1161).

Table 1. Variants of QCA.

Variant of QCA	Name	Variable Range	Useful
csQCA	Crisp-set	Dichotomous	When variables can be defined or approximated into binary categories of present (1) or absent (0)
mvQCA	Multi-value	Multichotomous	When attribute values under study can reasonably be summarized into a small number of discrete options
fsQCA	Fuzzy-set	Continuous	When finer gradations in the dataset are significant and each variable can be assigned a value along a continuous range

Source: Jordan et. al. (2011).

Among these three variants of QCA analysis, the basic one is csQCA and it is easy to apply if the variables (conditions) could be defined as 1s or 0s in Boolean terms. csQCA was more suitable for this study since the data regarding the conditions could be coded as 1 or 0 depending on its presence or absence. Therefore, it was used as the analysis method in this study.

Below the figure shows the usage of QCA variants:

Figure 7. Best use of QCA, MVQCA and Fuzzy Sets.



Source: Jordan et. al. (2011).

QCA is also a new research method for social scientists in Turkey. QCA has not been a popular analysis method for research in the field of international relations in Turkey. Negotiation as a research topic is a complex one. Understanding the necessary steps for a successful negotiation process ending with a mutually agreed and negotiated agreement requires figuring out multiple conditions within the process. QCA operates well to analyze these causal mechanisms consisting of a mix of several conditions.

This dissertation attempts to make a good deal of contribution into the negotiation literature providing findings to be obtained from a new analytical method – Qualitative Comparative Analysis, QCA. The results of QCA analysis can put forward specific configurations of conditions. These conditions define which negotiated peace settlements are more probable to become successful or unsuccessful (get failed). There QCA analysis not only show the conditions to be considered but also the ones to be avoided. QCA analysis will help testing the conditions or configurations of the conditions to find out necessary and sufficient conditions to explain the steps to be considered for a successful negotiated peace settlement using the cases from Sub-Saharan Africa like Burundi, Guinea Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Sudan.

The number of articles authored by Turkish scholars and found as a result of a search on DergiPark Akademik[2] is very small (Kök and Lukyanov, 2019; Akgün and Dülger, 2020; Çelikdin, 2017). This shows that the usage of this analysis method is quite new in Turkey that has only been launched a couple of years ago. Together with the limited number of articles, only a few Master's and PhD dissertations are seen to use this method in business administration and political science in 2014 and 2019 out of a search done on the website of the Turkish Higher Education Council *(Yükseköğretim Kurulu Başkanlığı Tez Merkezi*) displaying all graduate dissertations[3]. Two of them are from the field of political science and one of them is from business administration, whose author also has an article using QCA method. This also shows that this method is not known largely among social scientists and it should be promoted with the help of its use in new research articles and doctoral dissertations. For this reason, this dissertation will play an important role in contributing into the development of QCA analysis usage in Turkish academia.

Even though this method is known among researchers especially in the field of sociology and economics, it is obvious that unfortunately it is not so often used in practice. When the database of the Higher Education Council in Turkey for doctoral dissertations is under consideration, the fact that it has been only used in very few number of dissertations could be signaling that this analysis is not sufficiently known among young researchers. Therefore, using this analysis method in this dissertation will pave the way for further research to be conducted by using QCA analysis by contributing into the comparative social science research in Turkey.

QCA method has been used for different purposes in social sciences since its introduction in 1987. Marx et. al. state that it is generally used for five reasons: (1) researchers aim to make a summary of the data to provide a descriptive explanation of the cases by forming a truth table and using this table for data study, data making and its systematic classification, (2) researchers use it to study analytical consistency in a set of cases considering the causality by observing contradictions, "logically problematic configurations" that helps them find the inconsistency in the models, (3) researchers can benefit from the QCA method to test existing theories, (4) they use it to evaluate propositions, ideas and suggestions they produced that are not part of an existing theory yet and (5) finally researchers use it to clarify these new theories with the help of formulas obtained by the QCA and this method pushes them to make in-depth examination of the cases studied (2014: 116).

[2] DergiPark Akademik (https://dergipark.org.tr) web site was accessed on 22 August 2020 and the search items "QCA/QCA method/Qualitative Comparative Analysis/Nitel Karşılaştırmalı Analiz" were used for finding the articles benefited from QCA method for their related studies. At the end of the search, only three related articles were found which are given on the references part.

[3] Database (Yükseköğretim Kurulu Başkanlığı Tez Merkezi, https://tez.yok.gov.tr/UlusalTezMerkezi) for graduate dissertations was accessed on 22 August 2020 and the same search items mentioned above were used to find related graduate dissertations from different years. At the end of the search only three dissertations were found, two of which are doctoral dissertations.

Wagemann and Schneider think that a common objective in using QCA analysis is to reach considerable grounds to interpret the samples that the cases under study demonstrated. It also offers a technical way to examine set-theoretic relationships between causal conditions and outcome of interest. Interpretation of sufficient and necessary conditions follows this examination (2010).

Like Marx et. al., Berg-Schlosser et. al. mention that there are five reasons behind using QCA techniques. These reasons include data summary, data coherency test, hypothesis or existing theories test, conjecture test and making out new theoretical assertions (2009: 14). As Jordan et. al. mention in their esteemed work, the attractiveness of the QCA method to researchers is another reason for using it since this method is a mixture of the characteristics of the small-N and large-N studies and is also useful for making causal bridges between causal conditions and outcomes of interest (2011: 1160). Here in this study the aim of using QCA analysis method is to test hypotheses, so this method will be used to confirm or not to confirm the operationalized hypotheses. For this reason, the hypotheses will be clearly operationalized first by describing the conditions that result in specific outcomes.

Thanks to its position between qualitative and quantitative research methods used for social science research, it became a popular analysis method among researchers who want to make a comparative analysis benefitting from the tools of these two research methods. In addition to its popularity in social science research, it has a strong side that makes it attractive among researchers. Regarding the powerful side of the QCA method, Jordan et. al. state that "a key strength of QCA is that its techniques allow investigating 'multiple conjectural causation' across cases, a conception where: a combination of conditions generates an outcome, several different combinations of conditions may produce the same outcome and a condition may be sufficient but not necessary to produce an outcome" (2011: 1160).

As every other analysis method, QCA analysis method has important stages for application like data collection, case selection, analysis, interpretation etc. Ragin stresses that there are three basic stages of a QCA analysis, which consists of (1) case selection and forming configurations depending on defining the cases, (2) sufficiency test of conditions and finally (3) assessment and explanation of the analysis results (1998: 121). However, Ragin emphasizes the hardness of the first phase and he explains the importance and difficulty of the first phase when choosing the cases for study regarding their harmony with the outcome (1998: 122).

QCA analysis helps researchers to make a comparative analysis that offers a medium "between complexity and generality", hence allowing "for causal complexity and case specificity while examining general patterns" (Ragin, 1998: 122). QCA is also useful for assessing different paths of the cases when making interpretations on the results (122).

Crisp Set QCA (csQCA)

Marx and Duşa define crisp-set QCA as a comparative analysis method based on cases and Boolean expressions (2011: 104). Not so different from what Marx and Duşa mention, Stokke asserts csQCA Boolean expressions – also a mathematical basis for computer

science – first introduced by George Boole in the 19th century (2007: 502). Crisp-set QCA method aims to analyze necessary and sufficient causal conditions that result in outcomes of interest and display resemblances and discrepancies between causal configurations and cases, hence assisting researchers to make comparisons among a small number of cases (Marx and Duşa, 2011: 104-105).

Marx and Duşa discuss that csQCA method has three main characteristics. First of all, it has a case approach that regards each one of the cases as an individual one to be included into the research analysis cycle and not to be left behind as not touched (2011: 105). Secondly, it is a comparative method aiming to put forward the resemblances and discrepancies between configurations and cases and to show that different causal configurations produce result in different outcomes allowing equifinality. Thirdly, it can be considered as a systematic method because it enjoys binary logic to make comparisons among cases and to find causal links helping to curtail the abundance of information regarding all the cases (Marx and Duşa, 2011: 105).

The first step of a crisp-set QCA is to make a truth table by grouping similar cases considering the values of their conditions into one configuration. However, sometimes a contradiction happens when some of the cases have different outcomes while belonging to a same configuration (Skaaning, 2011: 396).

Misangyi and Fiss emphasize the relationship between the case number in a research and researchers as it is expected that researchers do preferably know the cases somehow in detail in small-N QCA applications. However, when dealing with large-N QCA applications with about 50 or hundreds of cases this kind of relationship between them is not so possible. Misangyi and Fiss state that this kind of large-N QCA applications resemble regression analysis that is commonly used for large number of cases (2013: 57). However, this method offers a medium between large-N statistical analysis that could be lack of finding out causal links and cases study analysis that has the ability to generalize on the findings (Jordan et. al., 2011: 1161). Despite large-N QCA applications' resemblance to statistical methods, Misangyi and Fiss underlines that the nature of the QCA with small number of data allows researchers to build close relationship with the data (2013: 58).

Jordan et. al. emphasize the feature of the QCA method in keeping the sensitivity toward the interactions between the conditions and its explicit estimation on how the conditions can have various links to identical outcomes (2011: 1161). QCA method aims to show how these combinations of conditions can have an outcome depending on a special test on the relationship between independent variables and dependent variables, hence it integrates some characteristics of quantitative research analysis methods for empowering its accuracy, clearness and repeatability (1161).

Jordan et. al. stress that before selecting the cases that display outcomes with different results and determining the causal conditions the outcome of interest in the study has to be defined in a crisp-set QCA analysis (2011: 1162). Selecting causal conditions is also another important step in a QCA application as the conditions are like independent variables in a statistical analysis effecting the outcome (1162). Conditions like variables

help researcher to distinguish cases and selecting conditions is also an iterative process (Kaminsky and Jordan, 2017: 199). However, the number of the conditions regarding the number of the cases is an important question in QCA analysis. Therefore, Berg-Schlosser et. al. recommends to select from four to seven conditions for an intermediate number of cases about ten to forty (2009: 28).

Case selection for a QCA analysis should contain a diversity of configurations (Jordan et. al. 2011: 1163). Getting diversity in configurations is an important step. To have this diversity Kaminsky and Jordan emphasize the necessity of intentionally selecting cases that can display a variety of outcomes of interest (2017: 199). Nevertheless, despite the fact that intentionally selecting cases with specific conditions and outcomes could be interpreted as inappropriate use of the dataset, this way of handling of the dataset is not inappropriate for a QCA analysis since it does not deal with the number of cases with specific aspects (Berg-Schlosser, 2009).

In fact, what determines the number of the cases is "the possible combinations of causal condition values" and the data table of a csQCA application "involves 2^n configurations, where n is the number of conditions, since csQCA variables can assume only two binary values of 0 (not present) or 1 (present)" (Jordan et. al., 2011: 1163). Therefore, if there are four conditions, for example, then the truth table (data table) will have $2^4 = 16$ rows. Four present or absent conditions will have each one row on that table. Another factor determining the number of case number is the research questions (1163).

Forming the Truth Table

After completing the stages of determination of outcome(s) and selection of conditions and cases, the researcher collects the raw data on multiple cases and then calibrates and put them on the table for each one of the conditions and outcomes under study. This raw data is used for the data table of the analysis, which will form the truth table (Jordan et. al. 2011). Using Boolean algebra as a part of qualitative comparative analysis requires creating "a raw data matrix as a truth table" and producing this table is not a difficult process since "once the data have been recoded into nominal-scale variables and represented in binary form (as 1's and 0's), it is necessary only to sort the data into their different combinations of values on the independent variables" (Ragin, 1987: 87).

Each one of these combinations are displayed on a row on the truth table and when the truth table is fully produced each of these rows has an outcome value summing up different causal combinations and outcome values on the table (Ragin, 1987: 87). Truth table is a table of configurations that includes configurations, namely the combinations of conditions with a certain outcome of interest (Rihoux and De Meur, 2009: 44). Quantitative calibrations in a truth table represent in-depth qualitative and quantitative information on the cases (Kaminsky and Jordan, 2017: 197). A sample csQCA truth table is given below on Figure 8. Table 2 also shows how a hypothetical truth table is built. Jordan et. al. stress that researchers should pay attention to the diversity of the conditions and outcomes on the truth table to test its quality (2011: 1164). Truth table is used to check out necessary and sufficient conditions for the cases (Stokke, 2007: 503).

Ragin states that truth tables provide with a successful process of understanding cases and generalization of them (2008: 126).

Figure 8. Sample QCA truth table.



	A	B	C	D	objective
Project 1	1	1	1	1	1
Project 2	1	0	1	0	0
Project 3	0	1	0	1	0
Project N	1	0	1	1	1

Source: Adapted from Jordan et. al. (2011).

Upon formulating the truth table, it is very important to make internal tests. Jordan et. al. put emphasis on maintaining transparency in QCA applications to make an accurate and recurrent analysis and they underline the importance of making an internal validity test by dealing with conditions, outcomes, logical remainders, consistency and coverage scores (2011: 1164).

Table 2. Sample Hypothetical truth table.

Row	Condition A	Condition B	Condition C	Outcome	Distribution of cases
1	1	1	1	1	1
2	1	1	0	1	1
3	0	0	1	0	0
4	0	0	0	0	0
5	1	0	0	0	0
6-12	Logical Remainders				

Source: Adapted from Verweij and Gerrits (2012).

As Jordan et. al. mention above, two other important steps necessary for internal validity testing are case diversity and contradictory configurations. They recommend that researchers check out the variety of the cases once the truth table is done since if there are too many similar configurations with same cases, it is highly advisable to reconsider the case selection process and conditions, which will bear an iterative process again, but QCA method is accepted as an iterative process by itself. Resolving contradictory configurations in a truth table is also as important as case diversity (2011: 1165). Nevertheless, as Kaminsky and Jordan state creating a truth table without contradictory configurations is a time-consuming activity and involves in-depth information on the cases under study (2017: 201). Rihoux and De Meur offers 8 methods as follows:

1. Adding one or several conditions to the model,
2. Removing one or several conditions and adding new ones,
3. Re-evaluating how the conditions are operationalized,
4. Reconsidering the outcome,
5. Re-evaluating the cases to see their differences,

6. Checking out if the cases belong to the same population,
7. Coding contradictory configurations as 0 to consider them "unclear",
8. Coding the outcome with contradictory configuration as 1 when it is coded as 0 if all the other cases are coded as 1 (2009: 48-49).

Removing the contradictory configurations from the truth table is suggested when none of the methods above help to resolve contradictions (Jordan et. al., 2011: 1165). One of the steps making a good truth table is to dispose the contradictory configurations by resolving them before getting into the analysis step (Rihoux, 2006: 683).

Minimization of Truth Tables

Upon refining the truth table by resolving the contradictory configurations, minimization of the truth table is a necessary step to show the designs of conditions that bear the outcome of interest. Actually, minimization is a process when researchers reduce complex expressions into smaller formula using Boolean expressions method and get equations of causal conditions producing an outcome by hand or by using a software package like Tosmana and Kirq etc. (Jordan et. al., 2011: 1165). Minimization process helps researchers to understand which causal conditions are necessary or sufficient to bear the outcome under study (1166).

Minimization process that is conducted by Boolean minimization is regarded as the essential step of a csQCA application because the analysis made using Boolean algebra, also can be called as Boolean analysis, assists researchers in identifying prudent causal links that could associate less probable conditions with the conditions taken into consideration within the analysis (Marx and Duşa, 2011: 106). Boolean algebra is a tool and it is not required to learn it in detail to understand how it is used in comparative studies. It is easy to understand since it is compatible with "simple logical principles common to many types of social scientific investigation" (Ragin, 1987: 85).

Schneider and Wagemann call this procedure as logical minimization and state that "if two truth table rows, which are both linked to the outcome, differ in only one condition – with that condition being present in one row and absent in the other – then this condition can be considered logically redundant and irrelevant for producing the outcome in the presence of the remaining conditions involved in these rows" (2012: 105). The procedure helps researchers reduce longer Boolean expression in a truth table to shorter versions also called as minimal formulas that display the predictability in the data and it is the researcher's duty to make interpretations of these minimal formulas considering causality (Rihoux, 2006: 683). Second phase of the minimization process comes with the rule of combining rows different from others on only one condition, which aims to get prime implicants. Normally, a prime implicant can imply certain primitive expressions on a truth table. Yet, creating a prime implicant table is regarded as an optional stage of Boolean minimization (Ragin, 1987: 96-97).

Below is the diagram of a Boolean minimization procedure:

Figure 9. Boolean Minimization.



Source: Adapted from Verweij and Gerrits (2012).

Rihoux and De Meur recommends applying "the minimization process twice, first for the (1) configurations and then for (0) configurations, however, the application sequence does not make a difference with the results (2009: 57). It is not recommended to "deduce the minimal formula for the (0) outcome from that of the (1) outcome, or vice versa, although it would be technically feasible in some circumstances to do so by applying the De Morgan's law" (57). De Morgan's law helps researchers to obtain a timesaving method for the minimization of negative examples (Ragin, 1987: 99).

The final step following the minimization procedure is interpretation of minimal formulas obtained at the end of minimization. Researchers interpret minimal formulas on this final stage and they maybe need to go back to the cases benefitting from these formulas since QCA application urges researchers to shoot more causal questions regarding reasons producing the outcome of interest under study (Rihoux and De Meur, 2009: 65-66). This step is re-interrogation of the cases by the researcher and the researcher goes back to the cases and qualitative/quantitative data after finishing the analysis with the minimal formula (Rihoux, 2006: 683).

Nine basic steps in performing a csQCA analysis can be summed up as shown on the diagram below:

Figure 10. Basic Steps in Performing csQCA.



Source: Derived from Marx and Duşa (2011: 106).

Apart from the basic steps in csQCA analysis the diagram below sums up the procedure of a QCA analysis in a bit more detail emphasizing three different stages including steps. The diagram below shows the relations between selecting cases and selecting conditions and between truth table and internal validity testing.

Figure 11. QCA Research Process.



Source: Jordan et. al. (2011).

Assessment in QCA Analysis

Assessment comes after producing truth table with the related data and the minimization process. It includes interpretation of the results. Interpretation is mostly based on the necessity, sufficiency, consistency and coverage analysis. Below these terms will be explained.

Consistency

There are two basic usages of consistency scores: one is for coding the outcomes in a truth table, which could be done by hand by entering 1 or 0 on the outcome column and other one is for guiding extra analysis by providing the possibility of pointing out certain conditions that could be added on the truth table to resolve a contradictory configuration (Ragin, 2008: 27-28).

As to Marx and Duşa, consistency is "the proportion of cases with a given cause or combination of causes that also display the outcome" and it is computed on a row's level on a truth table (2011: 110-112). Kaminsky and Jordan define consistency as "a measure of the degree to which cases sharing the same combination of conditions have the same outcome" and "a measure of the extent to which the observed cases align with each other" (2017). The formula for calculating consistency is simple. Consistency is calculated dividing the number of cases where X=1 by cases where X=1 (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012).

A consistency score of 1.0 (or a level closer to 1.0) shows high level of consistency, which means that the cases with high consistency have the outcome, while a consistency score of 0.0 (or a level closer to 0.0) shows low level of consistency, which means that the cases with low consistency do not have the outcome (Ragin, 2008: 27). Cases with a consistency score between 0.30 and 0.70 show that they are torn out between the outcome's presence

or absence (27). Kaminsky and Jordan emphasize the difference between the high and low consistency. They mention that when the consistency is high the pathway results in a certain outcome, yet when the consistency is low the pathway can only sometimes result in the outcome (2017).

Sufficiency and Necessity

Kaminsky and Jordan define sufficiency as "a measure of the degree to which an individual causal condition is a subset of the outcome" (2017: 202). In other words, if a certain condition has all the time (or almost every time) a positive outcome, then it is considered a sufficient condition (202).

Necessity is a measure of "the degree to which the outcome is a subset of individual causal conditions, meaning that, if all (or nearly all) cases where the outcome is present have a particular condition present" it is considered as a necessary condition (Kaminsky and Jordan, 2017: 202). Schneider and Wagemann put it simpler "a condition X is necessary if whenever the outcome Y is present, the condition is also present" and it is not possible to produce the outcome without the existence of the condition X. This logic implies that as long as the outcome is present, the necessary condition is available (2012: 69).

Regarding necessity and sufficiency Ragin makes the following statements:

> A cause is defined as necessary if it must be present for a certain outcome to occur. A cause is defined sufficient if by itself it can produce a certain outcome. This distinction is meaningful only in the context of theoretical perspectives. No cause is necessary, for example, independent of a theory that specifies it as a relevant cause. Neither necessity nor sufficiency exists independently of theories that propose causes.
>
> Necessity and sufficiency are usually considered jointly because all combinations of the two are meaningful. A cause is both necessary and sufficient if it is the only cause that produces an outcome and it is singular (that is, not a combination of causes). A cause is sufficient but not necessary if it is capable of producing the outcome but is not the only cause with this capability. A cause is necessary but not sufficient if it I capable of producing an outcome in combination with other causes and appears in all such combinations. Finally, a cause is neither necessary nor sufficient if it appears only in a subset of the combinations of conditions that produce an outcome (Ragin, 1987: 99).

Below the diagram displays necessary and sufficient conditions in terms of cases:

Figure 12. Necessity and sufficiency.



Source: Kaminsky and Jordan, (2017).

When analyzing necessity and sufficiency Wagemann and Schneider underlines the importance of separately analyzing them by including and not including the logical remainders (2010). They suggest using two solution formulas: one with simplifying assumptions based on logical remainders and the other one without simplifying assumptions. The former results in the most parsimonious solution while the latter results in a complex solution term (2010: 24). As Rihoux and De Meur assert it is required to include these logical remainders, also called as non-observed cases, to obtain the most parsimonious solution (2009: 59).

Coverage

Coverage shows the proportion of cases having causal configuration (Ragin, 2008). It shows how much a condition can explain the outcome of interest (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 139). Kaminsky and Jordan define coverage as an estimation regarding the extent of the outcome explained by a certain configuration of conditions (2017). Like high and low level of consistency, high coverage shows that a given pathway is representing most of the cases while lower coverage level does not indicate the related pathways are insignificant since "QCA is not probabilistic" and the high coverage help researchers to know which pathways are seen most usually (2017).

Regarding different types of coverage, Schneider and Wagemann state the following expressions:

> Raw coverage indicates how much of the membership in the outcome is covered by the membership in a single path, the unique coverage instead indicates how much a single path uniquely covers. The solution coverage expresses how much is covered by the entire solution term. The empirical importance expressed by coverage is not the same as the theoretical or substantive relevance of a sufficient condition. Thus, low-coverage paths might still be of great substantive interest. Uniquely covered cases are those that hold a membership value higher than 0.5 in only one sufficient path. When substantively interpreting sufficient paths and assessing their importance, researchers should make reference to these uniquely covered cases. Unlike the case with consistency there is no lower threshold for coverage (2012: 139).

Misangyi and Fiss find out that csQCA is an analysis method that could efficiently transfer the notion of coverage since it can make calculations about the coverage by dividing the number of cases backed up with a certain configuration by the total number of outcomes (2013: 65).

Theoretical Framework and Literature Review

The main argument of this study is that the peace negotiations held between the conflicting parties in violence torn countries need a longer period including five important steps of negotiation process to provide long-term and successful solutions. For this reason, this study research focuses on the literature on negotiation theory in the field of international relations and on two countries, Rwanda and Burundi, for a case study. This study research enjoys literature in three main groups. The first group is about the negotiation theory itself and the second group is about the historical background of constant conflicts and civil wars in two case countries. Finally, the third group deals with the peacebuilding trajectories of these countries for further analysis.

The literature about negotiation theory can be a useful tool when employed with different disciplines like economics, sociology, psychology, law, business studies, politics and international relations. This huge field appears so complex at the beginning putting the researcher in a hard situation to cover all the main studies of these areas within the field.

Apart from the authors producing literature on negotiation theory it is invaluable for the literature to mention the main players in forming the literature. These players are important in contributing into the literature on negotiation theory in different disciplines. The most significant one is the Program on Negotiation (PON)[4] at the Harvard Law School established in 1983, which is a consortium program consisting of Harvard University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Tufts University. The PON contributes into the literature on negotiation with its publications, projects, courses, conferences and seminars. The publication organ of the PON is *Negotiation Journal*, which has been actively providing literature since 1985 in the field of negotiation and peace studies.

Another important player in the literature is the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA)[5], which is an independent international research organization with member organizations in Africa, Europe, Asia and the Americas. It was established in 1972 to promote scientific cooperation between the East and West during the Cold War Era. The scope of research projects under the organization is not limited to several disciplines but it focuses on issues concerning the humanity like climate change, energy security, sustainable development etc.

The first director of the IIASA, Howard Raiffa, who has reputable works on negotiation and negotiation analysis introduced the topic of international negotiations into the agenda of the organization, which resulted in the introduction of the Processes of International Negotiation (PIN) Program[6] and its newsletter the *PIN Points* was first published in 1991. Later the PIN Program introduced esteemed works of the leaders of negotiation literature such as Avenhaus, Faure, Hampson, Kremenyuk, Meerts and Zartman.

However, since this study deals with the negotiations which constitute the topic for international relations studies it will be focusing on the basic literature written about negotiation theory first and then the specific literature on international negotiations and other negotiation issues discussed under the discipline of international relations especially in terms of peacebuilding for civil-war torn countries like Burundi and Rwanda.

There are different approaches in negotiation theory. Literature has basic works dealing with the historical development of negotiation to provide a general perspective about the theory itself (Breslin and Rubin, 1993; Fisher and Ury, 1997; Korobkin, 2002; Avenhaus and Zartman, 2002; Zartman and Faure, 2005; Iklé, 1964). Among them, Iklé's book is one of the basics of the literature that also helped the development of the literature on

[4] Further information on the Program on Negotiation (PON) can be accessed on the website of the program: https://www.pon.harvard.edu Access Date: 02/09/2020

[5] Further information on IIASA can be accessed on its official website: https://iiasa.ac.at Access Date: 02/09/2020

[6] Further information on the PIN Program can be accessed on its official website: https://www.pin-negotiation.org Access Date: 02/09/2020

negotiation theory in the field of international relations as a separate field other than 'diplomacy'.

Iklé's book, *How Nations Negotiate*, as a milestone in negotiation studies is mostly about the negotiations with the Soviets in a bipolar world after WWII and deals with negotiations related to east-west relations and disarmament negotiations. It includes negotiations during the Korean armistice, Egypt-Israel negotiations and negotiations in Europe with a perspective of innovation in agreements that creates new relationships and understandings between the parties like Common Market, Euratom and International Atomic Energy Agency (1964). Despite the negotiated issues limited to the needs of the bipolar world, Iklé's book is considered as a pioneer in negotiation studies that paved the way for further interest and research in the field of international relations hand in hand with the development of the field of international relations as a separate social science research field.

After the introduction of negotiation into the field of international relations by Iklé, game-theory related studies became very popular in the literature following Nash's game theory in the mid-century. Underlining this mode of research, Houba and Bolt urge that bargaining-related game-theoretic modelling of negotiations has been an important research field for the last five decades starting from the works of John Nash on game theory (2002). Kremenyuk also argued that game theory was used very creatively (also this usage can be called as 'prescriptively') to provide conflict resolution mechanisms like binding systems or dynamic processes for the allocation of limited resources and adds that these cases do not offer descriptive approaches (Kremenyuk, 2002). Like game theory's multi-disciplinary approach, according to Korobkin, negotiation is an interdisciplinary field related with economy, psychology, sociology and international relations (2002).

The Social Psychology of Bargaining and Negotiation authored by Rubin and Brown with the contribution of Morton Deutsch (1975) is still a leading book in the negotiation literature. In addition, this book helped the development of analytical research on negotiation theory in the 1970s after the topic of research became an interest of research especially in the 1960s owing to new developments in international relations after the end of the WWII and with the rise of conflicting issues between the two superpowers of the bi-polarized world.

The esteemed work, *Negotiation Theory and Practice*, edited by Breslin and Rubin, covers most of the significant issues of the theory and includes chapters regarding important topics such as the nature of conflict and negotiation, team building, preparations before getting to the negotiation desk, proper negotiations, implementation and third-party involvement (1993). The book offers different reflections of various scholars and practitioners from a diverse field of studies like international relations, labor-management issues, familial mediation, law, psychology, anthropology, business and public management. Most of the articles published in this book had also been published in one of the reputable journals in negotiation theory, *Negotiation Journal,* which is the publishing body of the Program on Negotiation centered at Harvard Law School – other two partners of the program are the Fletcher School of the Tufts University and Massachusetts Institution of Technology.

Fisher points out the importance of these seven elements of negotiation in his chapter "Negotiating Inside Out" in this esteemed work: interests of the parties, legitimacy of the mutual outcomes, relationship between the parties, BATNAs (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement), options the parties have agreed on, parties' commitment and finally communication between the parties (Breslin and Rubin, 1993). Zartman's chapter on "Common Elements in the Analysis of the Negotiation Process" in this esteemed work proposes five different analysis methods for negotiations: structural, strategic, process, behavioral and integrative (1993).

Getting to Yes by Fisher and Ury (1997) is another famous book – also helped the topic of negotiation became popular in 1990s – in negotiation studies. It is also one of the distinguishing works in the field of practical negotiation stressing the importance of people involved in a negotiation, their interests and positions. Fisher and Ury emphasize the importance of separating the problem from people, focusing on the interests rather than the positions, creating options for a mutually accepted solution and urging objective criteria for a successful negotiation (1997: 12).

Fisher and Ury introduced the term BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement), which became one of the basic term of negotiation theory. Their book underlines the importance of separating positions and interests while insisting that there should be other options like the BATNA. Lewicki et. al. (2016) also stress the importance of BATNA in their book titled *Negotiation* for different stages of negotiation planning such as defining the issues, interests, framing the limits and describing the objectives while describing the limits for a BATNA and alternative solutions as BATNA as setting these limits. Raiffa et. al. (2002) also deal with the BATNA issue, which is a very famous topic in negotiation literature in the early 1990s and they assert that finding out other alternatives to a mutual agreement (the BATNA as an alternative) is among the main steps for reaching a negotiated agreement such as describing the interests, planning the future for longer mutual benefits, sorting out resources, creating options for an agreement, collecting information regarding the adversary, preparing the setting and environment for the meetings, exchanging interests, agreeing on a mutual process and preparing a draft for an agreement.

The esteemed book, *Escalation and Negotiation in International Conflicts* by Zartman and Faure looks for an answer to the question of how an escalation results in a negotiation and asserts that the terms readiness, ripeness, deadlocks, critical points, interests, frameworks might point out where escalation and negotiation come together (2005). Zartman and Faure's edited book contributes into literature on ripeness, readiness, conflict, escalation, de-escalation, pre-negotiation, third-party involvement and their relationship negotiation.

Diplomacy Games edited by Avenhaus and Zartman (2007) is the fruit of Processes of International Negotiations (PIN) Program of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Austria and it draws great attention to the formal models of international negotiations first introduced by Howard Raiffa (1994) and tries to make a distinction between the "models of negotiation, for negotiation and in negotiations." The book is a contribution of significant professionals in formal models and international negotiations (Avenhaus and Zartman, 2007).

Apart from the historical and scientific development of the theory considering different approaches to negotiation theory, it is yet logical to mention other works on negotiation theory in different groups. The first group covers studies dealing with situating negotiations with an attempt to define the processes, types of negotiations, negotiation analysis, negotiated agreement durability, actors and their roles in a negotiation (Breslin and Rubin, 1993; Raiffa, 1994; Fisher and Ury 1997; Korobkin, 2002; Crump, 2015; Zartman, 1991).

Kremenyuk contributes into the literature underlining the importance of the dramatic increase in the number of the negotiations since the end of WWII with negotiations within global and regional organizations, transnational corporations by putting an emphasis on the average seven years of negotiations pointing out the significance of longer negotiation periods for successful ones (2002). Kremenyuk states that there exists minimum cooperation between the conflicting parties since the core of negotiations consists of a combination of relations including conflict and cooperation, which results in a negotiation that is considered as a conflict that have been continued, yet this continuation leads to a long period of negotiations that takes years to reach a final agreement. Related with long period of negotiating Kremenyuk draws attention to the issue of durability. He asserts that durability of a negotiated agreement is mostly considered as the best indicator of a successful negotiation because a durable negotiated agreement accepts the uncertainty and for this reason necessary insuring points should be included into the agreement to protect the parties from important unexpected losses (2002).

Regarding negotiation analysis Crump (2015) puts forward a framework to analyze complex negotiations after studying negotiation theory and international negotiations taking the US-Australia Free Trade negotiations as a sample. The analysis framework consists of five points: "(1) identification of negotiation architecture, (2) context analysis, (3) process analysis, (4) structural and relational analysis and (5) decisional analysis" (2015). However, another esteemed book in the literature, *Negotiation Analysis, The Science and Art of Collaborative Decision Making* (2002) by Raiffa et. al. combines four different approaches to decision making: decision analysis, behavioral decision making, game theory and negotiation analysis. It offers analysis for negotiators with an approach of normative, descriptive and prescriptive analysis for individual decision-making instead of a comprehensive analysis of negotiations (Raiffa et. al., 2002).

Another appreciated book by Howard Raiffa, *The Art and Science of Negotiation* (1994) first published in 1982, provides a mix of practical negotiating and mathematical analysis that could be equally benefitted by the conflicting parties and intervenors. The book put forward different dispute types and the ways the researchers in the field deal with them. Normally, the studies on negotiation analysis assert that there are five different analysis methods such as structural analysis, strategic analysis, process analysis, behavioral analysis and integration analysis (Breslin and Rubin, 1993: 148).

The second group of this literature focuses on the negotiation process – the significant stages in negotiation – itself and the factors influencing this process such as the concept of ripeness and/or readiness, escalation, de-escalation, actors, agents, interests, positions, justice, spoiler influence, third-party involvement. This group of studies tries to explain the

negotiation process, the factors influencing this process and decision-making phases (Breslin and Rubin, 1993; Fisher and Ury, 1997; Kriesberg, 1987; Korobkin, 2002; Avenhaus and Zartman, 2002; Pruitt, 2009; Stedman, 1997; Stedman, 2000; Salacuse, 2008; Kremenyuk, 2002; Zartman, 1994; Zartman, 1997; Zartman, 2001; Zartman, 2002; Zartman, 2013; Zartman and Faure, 2005). Besides, as focusing on the process and the factors influencing the process it tries to understand the root causes of the conflicts (Zartman, 1991; Ndikumana, 2005; Coleman and Markus, 2006; Daley; 2006; Avenhaus and Zartman, 2007).

Preparation step is an important step and it is a synthesis of internal and external preparations, which constitutes the start of negotiations in general. Besides, this step contains information exchange – obtaining information and covering information – and agreement proposals that start with first proposals and its following counter offers (Korobkin, 2002). Korobkin's work emphasizes the preparation step's importance. Nevertheless, his work is much more related with law studies and the relationships among the lawyer-negotiator, client and the adversary (2002).

Regarding ripeness and readiness Zartman (1991; 2000; 2001 and 2015) and Pruitt (2015a) have significant contribution into the literature together with the works by Kriesberg (1987), Zartman and Faure (2005) and Hampson (1996). Regarding spoilers and their influence on the peace negotiations, Kriesberg (1987) and Stedman (1997 and 2000) have important works that pave the way for a better understanding of the spoilers in Rwandan and Burundian peace negotiations.

Third-party involvement is the mostly discussed and studied topic of negotiation studies and Raiffa (1994), Hampson (1996), Touval (1999), Zartman (2013), Bercovitch (2002) and Carnevale (2002) have esteemed works regarding the issue. Justice related works are great contributions of Albin-Druckman (2012) and Zartman (1997).

Salacuse (2008) puts forward six basic rules regarding negotiating with the governments: getting goals, forming teams, making a research about the adversary, identifying own options and making estimations about the options of the adversary, defining own interests and estimating the adversary's, describing the issues and finally creating mutual options to be discussed on the negotiation table at the right time.

There are some scholars that have studied negotiations after violent conflicts such as the ones after civil wars or negotiations with terrorists (Kremenyuk, 2002 and Serra, 2004). Some studies on peace negotiations either international or intra-state offer different type of explanations benefiting from other approaches widely used in negotiation theory such as some studies asserting game-theoretic explanation techniques borrowed from mathematics and economics (Houba and Bolt, 2002; Raiffa et. al. 2002; Sebenius, 2009). This group will be useful for this research study because it offers significant information on the processes of a negotiation. It helps to facilitate process tracing during the research.

The literature on the cases is not wider than the first group, yet it demonstrates a huge variety of topics. Nevertheless, it is much easier to make different literature groups out of it for a case study analysis. It is possible to discuss it under three main different groups.

First group of literature provides information on historical backgrounds as well as physical, geographical, linguistic, cultural and ethnic structure of Rwanda and Burundi (Milwood, 1996; Melvern, 2000; Newbury, 2001; Isabirye and Mamdani, 2001; Magnarella, 2005; Melvern, 2006; Morel, 2015; Reyntjens, 2006).

The second group is much more related with the violent conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi including mass and violent killings, massacres and even the genocide and contains literature trying to explain the root causes of conflict (Ndikumana, 1998; Cornwell and de Beer, 1999; Melvern, 2000; Kuperman, 2000; Newbury, 2001; Mamdani, 2002; Magnarella, 2005; Ndikumana, 2005; Melvern, 2006).

The third group of literature is a part of peace studies. The literature under this group critically examines the peace processes and the methods used to re-establish peace in violence-torn Rwanda and Burundi (Scorgie, 2004; Ndikumana, 2005; Reyntjens, 2006; Van Eck, 2007; Daley, 2007; Lemarchand, 2007; Mehler, 2008; Uvin, 2010; Piombo, 2010).

Piombo asserts that the underlying issues behind the conflict have to be handled in Burundi to resolve the conflict and points out that getting late in finding out solutions for these underlying reasons could lead the strong groups to deal with the problems because when regional or international efforts for peacemaking are over, existing conditions do prevail (2010). Piombo criticizes 'quick-fix' or short-term solutions for conflicts created by the international peacemaking bodies, especially the mediators making a distinction between a short-term and long-term solution for a conflict. The former offers a 'quick-fix' for the conflict and handles the immediate effects of this solution, yet the latter tries to deal with the conflict and the problems following the solution with a comprehensive peace process including reconciliation efforts within the society (2010).

One of the esteemed researchers in the field of Burundian history and peace studies regarding Burundian peace processes, Reyntjens's work "A Peaceful Transition After a Decade of War?" is a descriptive one which sums up the actual peace process in Burundi in 2005 and provides a detailed historical background of the peace efforts including the coups, parliamentary and presidential elections (2006). In addition, it offers suggestions about the prospective challenges of the peace process in Burundi such as reaction from privileged people and military of the past, taking an account of the past, convincing the insurgent group, the FNL, to leave arms, need for development in education, health, infrastructure and governance and finally regional environment with conflict in the DRC that is taking Rwanda and Burundi in (2006).

This group tries to explain the peace processes including peace negotiations between the conflicting parties, peacekeeping or peacebuilding military operations of international and regional organizations. However, it seems that the third group normally offers some descriptive studies instead of prescriptive or normative studies about the peace processes once the conflict has been resolved. For this reason, apart from these studies in the literature it is obvious that scholars more on the prescriptive and normative track will also be added along the way. The table below gives the mainstream groups in literature review:

Table 3. Mainstream groups in the Literature Review.

Groups	Focus of the literature	Mainstream literature
1st group	situating negotiations and defining the processes, types of negotiations, actors and their roles in a negotiation	• Iklé, 1964 • Kriesberg, 1987 • Zartman, 1991; 1994; 1997; 2000; 2001; 2002; 2013; 2015 • Breslin and Rubin, 1993 • Raiffa, 1994 • Hampton, 1996 • Fisher and Ury, 1997 • Stedman, 1997; 2000 • Touval, 1999 • Bercovitch, 2002 • Carnevale, 2002 • Korobkin, 2002 • Kremenyuk, 2002 • Avenhaus and Zartman, 2002 • Houba and Bolt, 2002 • Raiffa et. al., 2002 • Zartman and Faure, 2005 • Salacuse, 2008 • Pruitt, 2009; 2015 • Albin and Druckman, 2012 • Crump, 2015 • Lewicki et. al., 2016
2nd group	dealing with violent conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi including mass and violent killings, massacres, genocide and explaining the root causes of conflict	• Ndikumana, 1998 • Cornwell and de Beer, 1999 • Melvern, 2000 • Kuperman, 2000 • Newbury, 2001 • Mamdani, 2002 • Magnarella, 2005 • Ndikumana, 2005 • Melvern, 2006
3rd group	peace processes and the methods used to reestablish peace in violence torn Rwanda and Burundi	• Scorgie, 2004 • Ndikumana, 2005 • Reyntjens, 2006 • Van Eck, 2007 • Daley, 2007 • Lemarchand, 2007 • Mehler, 2008 • Uvin, 2010 • Piombo, 2010

A specific theory of negotiation compatible with intra-state violent conflicts is a need for the field of conflict resolution. The negotiation theory in international relations field emerged first right after the Second World War (WWII). The main aim was to assert descriptive, prescriptive and normative views on the negotiations between the conflicting parties of a bipolar world. However, the world has changed a lot especially after the Cold

War. The world is not bipolar anymore. Instead of interstate conflicts as in the past for the last two decades there have been more intra-state conflicts and internal wars as called civil wars. Wallensteen and Sollenberg have already mentioned in their esteemed study in 1996 that after the WWII conflicts gradually emerged as civil wars and the most dramatic increase in the number of intra-state conflicts was in Africa (Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 1996). Conflict today is more often between the rivaling parties in a country. The intra-state violent conflicts between governments and rebel movements, and ongoing civil wars in the Middle East, Latin America and Africa put forward the importance of a specifically designed negotiation theory for interstate conflicts.

The literature on negotiation theory in the field of international relations studies mostly deals with international negotiations like negotiating the United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS) or submitting old cases from the Cold War era like some well-known negotiation cases of Israel and Egypt, the negotiations between the Soviet Russia and the USA on missiles like the Cuban Missile Crisis or SALT negotiations. However, some researchers are studying on negotiations held after intra-state violence as in the case of Colombia (Serra, 2004). The examples can be enlarged to cover some other negotiations between the UK and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) for the Northern Ireland.

The literature in Turkey, on the other hand, usually offers negotiation cases regarding the negotiations on Cyprus starting from the 1960s as a part in diplomacy books and the studies in Turkey mostly focus on negotiation with the European Union. The term negotiation in English is mostly translated into Turkish as "*müzakere*" and "*uzlaşma*". Mostly the word *müzakere* is used in Turkish as an equal term in the literature or as an equal word for official negotiations made at a desk. *Müzakere* means exchange of opinions regarding a subject according to the mostly used dictionary of the Turkish Language Association (*Türk Dil Kurumu*). *Uzlaşma* has meanings of reconcilement, congruence, consensus and compromise as to the same dictionary. Hence, it is obvious that the term *uzlaşma* has a broader selection for meanings and it could not be understood as negotiation, while the term *müzakere* is an appropriate equal of the English term negotiation in Turkish language for academic articles and research books. However, it is translated as "*pazarlık*" in some cases, which could be the equal term for bargaining and not negotiation. This kind of translation is not incorrect because the term itself has the meaning of bargaining, but there is a difference between negotiation and bargaining which will be explained later on the part regarding the negotiation theory under the title of definition of negotiation.

Negotiation literature in Turkey is limited. The number of the articles containing the keyword '*müzakere'* is 342 and the number with the keyword 'negotiation' is 242 within the last two decades in all social-sciences-related fields. However, the number of the articles with the same keywords is very low in the field of international relations. This number is 4 with the keyword '*müzakere'* while it is 6 when the keyword is 'negotiation'.[7] The articles displayed have been published between the years of 2017 and 2020, which show that the field of negotiation in international relations studies is quite a new research

[7] The numbers were taken from the website of DergiPark Akademik www.dergipark.org.tr Access date: 27/08/2020.

topic in Turkey. On the other hand, the search engine can show other articles from different fields of studies like economics, law, business administration and educational sciences.

In Turkey "negotiation" is mostly used as a technical tool employed specifically by ministry of foreign affairs, not as a scientific field to be taught in an academic program. Diplomats learn it 'after' they are hired by the ministry. It is rather a foreign policy toolbox and only to be used by career diplomats for the country. However, different from the situation in Turkey, in the West the field was developed as a requirement of the Cold War diplomacy between the two power blocs. After the end of the Cold War, it entered the university academic programs. It can be used in any context – public or private does not matter – where human interaction faces a crisis owing to different opinions and conflicting interests.

The works authored by Fulya Köksoy (2018) and Ahmet Ateş (2020) are dealing with conflict resolution, peace negotiations and the approaches in negotiations. Köksoy (2018) handles conflict management, conflict resolution and peace negotiations with a theoretical approach to offer a theoretical framework for peace negotiations. Her article is very significant in Turkish negotiation literature in terms of how she deals with the basic issues of peace negotiations. Her article puts forward the basic stages of peace negotiations like pre-negotiation and official negotiations pointing out that these stages come under the umbrella of conflict resolution studies as a part of peace studies. Ateş (2020) criticizes the ambiguity in the methodological approach for negotiations and tries to deal with a kind of compartmentalization of these approaches into three different approaches such as hard, soft and principled negotiation approaches to fill the gap in the mainstream negotiation literature.

Apart from the contribution by Köksoy and Ateş into Turkish negotiation and peace negotiations literature, Öztürk's article (2017) regarding international relations and the power of negotiation emphasizes the importance of negotiating power in an international negotiation putting forward the characteristics and structure of an international negotiation. Among the other articles in the field of international relations some articles published in the recent years draw attention to the negotiating with terrorist groups (Şen, 2018) and international negotiations on climate change and Turkey's part within the Paris Agreement (Köse, 2018). The rest of the limited number of articles are about negotiations on the historical case of the Cyprus issue and the negotiation process for the membership of the EU.

Beside the literature on negotiation in Turkey regarding the articles and dissertations the literature including books on negotiation especially in the field of international relations is unsatisfactory.[8] The literature is mostly on business negotiation, negotiation techniques for business people and ending conflicts and negotiation in classroom in the fields of business administration and educational sciences.

[8] The books in the field of negotiation were searched on the website of TO-KAT Ulusal Toplu Katalog that provides the list of books and other materials on a topic that are registered in one of the libraries in Turkey. Access Date: 02 September 2020 http://www.toplukatalog.gov.tr/

The book *Müzakere Teknikleri* authored by Çetin and Arslan (2014) seem as the only reference book in the field of negotiation theory. Other books in the field of international relations mostly deal with negotiations with the European Union like Kaya's (2013) book *Türkiye-AB Müzakere Süreci*, which is on the process of negotiation between the EU and Turkey. Another distinctive book in the field of international relations is Oğuz's book (2012) on negotiation regarding the security issues that handles pre-negotiation, basics of negotiation processes and competitive and cooperative negotiations. This shows us that there is a big gap in the field of international relations literature and this dissertation aims to fill in this gap a little bit and pave the way for further studies and publication of books in the field by enriching the literature on negotiation theory in the field of international relations studies.

The literature on negotiation in general is broad for graduate dissertations in Turkey for different fields of social sciences studies. But when it comes to the graduate dissertations in the field of international relations, it is obvious that the number of dissertations including 'peace negotiations' is limited to sixteen (16) while this number is only three (3) when the results for 'peace settlements' displayed.[9] The most striking result was obtained when the keyword 'negotiation theory' was put on the search engine. No results displayed among all the dissertations registered at the database regarding the graduate dissertations in Turkey. For this reason, one of the aims of this study is to fill the gap in the literature regarding peace negotiations and negotiation theory in Turkey.

As a consequence, this generalized theory of international negotiation does not provide case studies and a general theory of negotiation specially designed for peace negotiations held after intra-state violent conflicts. Further case studies regarding intra-state conflicts are needed to set the theory. The number of sample case studies should be increased to cover the violent intra-state conflicts and peace settlement processes in the Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, the Middle East and the Northern Africa like Syrian and Libyan peace processes etc.

This study will pave the way for further analysis on intra-state violent conflict and/or civil war related peace settlement process around the globe. Some conflict studying researchers in the field of international relations like Zartman (2002c) writes on small chapters regarding negotiations for intra-state conflicts or negotiating with terrorists. However, this study contributes into understanding and explaining peace negotiations started after violent conflicts. The aim of this study is not to study the reasons of the conflicts or just to analyze the ongoing conflicts. Yet, the main aim is to analyze the negotiation processes in two cases that will help us to test the basics of negotiation theory in terms of intra-state violent conflicts. This study will fill in this gap since it employs two similar civil war-torn countries for a case study. The outcomes of this study are expected to answer to the questions regarding the importance of a well-designed pre-negotiation process and its follow-up processes for the post-settlement peace period. Therefore, it is possible to divide a negotiation process into five different steps as follows: Step 1. Pre-negotiation, Step 2.

[9] The numbers were taken from the database (Yükseköğretim Kurulu Başkanlığı Tez Merkezi, https://tez.yok.gov.tr/UlusalTezMerkezi) for graduate dissertations was accessed on 27 August 2020.

Preparation, Step 3. Proper negotiation, Step 4. Implementation, 5. Post-negotiation (follow-up, renegotiation, post-settlement etc.).

Another important aim of this dissertation is to make an academic contribution into the research at graduate level in the field of African studies. This field is considered a new one among young researchers at graduate study levels. As is clear from the list on the graduate dissertations in the discipline of international relations, most of the researchers focus on some traditional and cliché research topics like Turkish foreign policy, Turkish-US relations, Middle Eastern studies, and the EU and Turkey. However, the research in the field of African studies is quite new, which needs to be developed with the contribution of more research at graduate level to offer a wide-range of cases from the African continent.

The African opening started in Turkey in 1998 especially with the Sub-Saharan African countries paved the way for further academic research. However, Turkey's membership as an observer of the African Union in 2008 and the following developments including the establishment of the Research and Application Center for African Studies in Ankara University in 2008 and the African policy of the government declared in 2013 encouraged the academic research for the last decade in the field of African studies. The increasing interest in the academia towards African studies resulted in an increase in the number of the doctoral dissertation in international relations discipline in Turkey. The total number of the doctoral dissertations including the keyword 'Africa' in international relations discipline is 37.[10] It is interesting that most of the dissertations were accepted within the last couple of years, which also shows the increasing importance of the research topic among young researchers. Hence, this dissertation will also be contributing into the field of African studies by getting two small countries of the Sub-Saharan Africa as cases, Rwanda and Burundi.

[10] The numbers were taken from the database (Yükseköğretim Kurulu Başkanlığı Tez Merkezi, https://tez.yok.gov.tr/UlusalTezMerkezi) for graduate dissertations was accessed on 30 September 2020.

PART I

CHAPTER ONE

PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES

vs.

NEGOTIATION

1.1. Means of Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes

The literature on peaceful settlements of international disputes has flourished after the end of the WWII and especially after the end of the Cold War – this created a more relaxed atmosphere for the Secretaries-General of the UN to take more active steps to settle conflicts – especially around the framework created by the UN like its famous Article 33 of the Chapter VI (Mani and Ponzio, 2018). As Mani and Ponzio state there is a close connection between dispute settlement and conflict prevention: the latter takes the former one step ahead by dealing with the obvious and not seen causes behind a conflict (2018).

The introduction of a legalized approach in peaceful settlements of international disputes goes back to the end of the 19th century in 1899 when the Hague Convention on the Pacific Settlement of Disputes was adopted after the First Hague Peace Conference in 1899 with the participation of 26 states drafting the basis of peace settlement like good offices, mediation, inquiry and arbitration (see Figure 13 for development of basic texts on peaceful settlement of international disputes). The Convention was a result of "a culmination of the work and aims of international lawyers since the founding of international law, as well as the beginning of a new period of endeavor in the formal study and promotion of means for the peaceful settlement of disputes" (O'Connell, 2016). Apart from the work and objectives of the international lawyers, according to Koroma, there was another reason behind the start of the First Hague Peace Conference: Tsarist Russia was concerned about the start of an arms race in Europe and its bad effects on the world peace (1996).

The Conference was held with the agenda of disarmament and peaceful settlement of international disputes (Koroma, 1996). Before the Conference in the Hague, the beginning of the 19th century had already witnessed the turbulence and conflict together with the conferences and congresses looking for peace like the Congress of Aachen in 1818 to handle relations among the states in peace time and the Congress of Paris in 1856, which was not only terminating the Crimean War and paving the way for Turkey's acceptance into the constitutional law of Europe but also enlarging the system of Congress to form a league based on the constitutional law of Europe (1996).

Figure 13. Basic Texts Framing the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes

The Hague Convention in 1899 and 1907 also paved the way for regional conventions and agreements for peaceful settlement of disputes such as the Pact of the League of Arab States in 1945, the Charter of Organization of American States in 1948, the European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes in 1957, the Charter of the Organization of the African Unity in 1963 and the Treaty of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States in 1981 (Koroma, 1996).

As Sohn mentions the international organizations and mainly the UN behaves like a 'traffic controller' showing the parties the most appropriate method for resolving the dispute between them (1987: 156). When the parties cannot benefit from one of the methods offered to get a successful result, the UN Security Council gets involved to protect the peace depending on the UN Charter (156).

There are diplomatic means and judicial means for settling international disputes, which have evolved over the centuries based on the search for peace by the states. Diplomatic means include negotiation, mediation, good office, inquiry (fact-finding) and conciliation. These means require interaction between the states by getting help from a third party or third parties mostly. On the other side, judicial means include arbitration and judicial settlement. Judicial means depend on the verdict given by the judicial body or organ. Figure 14 below illustrates these two different means in peaceful settlement of international disputes.

Figure 14. Types of Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes.



1.1.1. Diplomatic Means

Negotiation comes first among the diplomatic means for settling international disputes. Others are mediation, good office, inquiry (fact-finding) and conciliation. Tanaka divides diplomatic means of peaceful settlement of international disputes into two sub-categories. The first sub-category includes negotiation only and the second sub-category includes basically the third-party involved diplomatic means like mediation, good office, inquiry, conciliation and settlement through international organizations (2018: 21).

1.1.1.1. Negotiation

Negotiation is one – classical – of the basics of settling disputes (Brownlie, 2009; Tanaka, 2018; Merrils, 1991; Shaw, 2008). Its difference from other methods of peaceful settlements of international disputes is its involvement. It involves only the states as parties that have a conflict and these parties go through the necessary steps of the negotiation process as they consider most suitable. The negotiations between states are organized with the participation of authorized representatives or delegations who meet together at face-to-face meetings or using written correspondence, modern techniques of communication and transportation. Normally, the ministers of foreign affairs act as negotiators, yet head of states mostly attend the negotiation process at the beginning and at the conclusion. Diplomatic missions of each state here play an important role in framing the agreement with the contribution of joint diplomatic commissions' work. During these meetings for negotiation, place is also important and normally the capital cities of each state are used and in some cases between neighboring states a place closer to the border between them maybe an option. When the tension is high between the states another city in an outsider state is chosen. Negotiations organized under the guidance of an international or regional institution are held under the roof of that organization's main headquarters (United Nations, 1992).

The UN General Assembly adopted the resolution on Principles and Guidelines for International Negotiations in January 1999 (United Nations, General Assembly, A/RES/53/101, 1999).

The UN set the principles as follows:

> (a) Sovereign equality of all States, notwithstanding differences of an economic, social, political or other nature;
> (b) States have the duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any State, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;
> (c) States have the duty to fulfil in good faith their obligations under international law;
> (d) States have the duty to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations;
> (e) Any agreement is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter;
> (f) States have the duty to cooperate with one another, irrespective of the differences in their political, economic and social systems, in the various spheres of international relations, in order to maintain international peace and security and to promote international economic stability and progress, the general welfare of nations and international cooperation free from discrimination based on such differences;
> (g) States shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered (United Nations, General Assembly, A/RES/53/101, 1999).

Related with these principles, the guidelines created by the UN are as follows:

> (a) Negotiations should be conducted in good faith;
> (b) States should take due account of the importance of engaging, in an appropriate manner, in international
> negotiations the States whose vital interests are directly affected by the matters in question;
> (c) The purpose and object of all negotiations must be fully compatible with the principles and norms of international law, including the provisions of the Charter;
> (d) States should adhere to the mutually agreed framework for conducting negotiations;
> (e) States should endeavor to maintain a constructive atmosphere during negotiations and to refrain fromany conduct which might undermine the negotiations and their progress;
> (f) States should facilitate the pursuit or conclusion of negotiations by remaining focused throughout on the main objectives of the negotiations;
> (g) States should use their best endeavors to continue to work towards a mutually acceptable and just solution in the event of an impasse in negotiations (United Nations, General Assembly, 53/RES/101, 1999).

According to Mani and Ponzio, negotiation as method for peaceful settlement of international conflicts has a distinctive place among other methods mentioned on the Article 33 of the Chapter VI of the UN Charter because it is a more generally accepted method and it has some advantages such as being a flexible option for the parties to a dispute – it can be political, technical or legal (2018). The flexibility of the negotiation gives the possibility of steering and shaping the process itself to reach a mutually accepted agreement (Mani and Ponzio, 2018). However, as negotiation depends on a compromise between the parties not every time it gives the expected outcome. In addition, the stronger party may impose a solution to the weaker party (Mani and Ponzio, 2018).

Negotiation is only possible when the conflicting parties are eager to come together to settle their disputes on a mutual agreement. However, negotiation is not possible when the parties refuse to come together especially when severe disputes cause states to break off even diplomatic relations (Merrils, 1991: 22) shutting the doors for a negotiation, which results in increased tensions between them and escalations. On the other hand, severing diplomatic relations does not mean cutting every way of contact. As Merrils give examples of relations between the US and Iran during the hostage crisis in 1979 and between the UK and Argentina owing to the invasion of Falkland Islands in 1982, ending diplomatic relations did not mean looking for other ways of contact between the conflicting parties (1991).

Waldock states that “negotiation, as a procedure, has the great advantage of flexibility in that it may be used for any type of dispute, political or legal, and pursued through any channel authorized by the parties” (1972: 36). Beside its flexibility, the UN Handbook on the Peaceful Settlements of Disputes between States mentions that duration of a negotiation process ranges between a couple of days and several decades (United Nations, 1992).

The negotiations are either successful or unsuccessful in the end. A successful negotiation results in a reflection of the terms of a mutual agreement in different forms: a comprehensive agreement, a joint statement, a communiqué, a memorandum and a declaration (United Nations, 1992).

The first paragraph of the Article 33 of the Chapter VI of the UN Charter on the Pacific Settlements of Disputes states that “the parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all,

seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice" (UN Charter). The second paragraph of the same article appoints the Security Council to request the parties to settle the disputes by using the methods mentioned above when it is necessary (UN Charter).

1.1.1.2. Mediation

Mediation is a process where a third-party involves in upon the consent of the disputing parties to offer a mutually accepted solution to the dispute. The involvement of a third-party by offering mediation aims to reconcile "the claims of the contending parties and to advance his own proposals aimed at a mutually acceptable compromise solution" (Tanaka, 2018: 44). When the conflicting parties are not able to reach a mutual solution by negotiating and stuck in deadlock the involvement of a third-party could be an option to take them out of this gridlock. This kind of involvement can offer different options for resolving the conflict between the conflicting parties using different methods like restarting the negotiations between them and providing them a mediated channel for communication (Merrils, 1991). Apart from encouraging them for resuming the negotiation process, a mediator can also offer draft proposals to be mutually accepted by the parties to a dispute (Mani and Ponzio, 2018).

International organizations, mostly the UN and its Secretary-General, regional organizations, non-governmental organization or individuals can perform mediation. Mediation is the complement of a negotiation since a mediator is an officially recognized and authorized one making his or her own proposals to the parties (Merrils, 1991).

Mediation can be performed by third-party – a state, a group of states, non-state actors like the international institutions and agencies, non-governmental organizations and a distinguished individual, but confidence in the mediator is important for a successful mediation process (Tanaka, 2018: 46).

1.1.1.3. Good Office

Good office is offered by a third-party to prevent a deterioration in the situation and to encourage the parties to restart negotiations to reach a peaceful settlement by opening the channels of communication between them when the states in a dispute are not able to find a resolution to it (United Nations, 1992). As Tanaka asserts good office and mediation are supplementary for negotiation because good office and mediation methods help facilitating the negotiations between the disputing parties (2018).

The Hague Conventions signed in 1899 and 1907 include provisions regarding the good offices on the second and eight articles (Hague Convention, 1907). However, the Article 33 of the UN Charter does not include a provision mentioning 'good office'. The 1982 Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes contains in its 5th paragraph 'good office' as one of the other previously mentioned settlement methods in the UN Charter as follows:

> States shall seek in good faith and in a spirit of cooperation an early and equitable settlement of their international disputes by any of the following means: negotiation, inquiry, mediation,

> conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional arrangements or agencies or other peaceful means of their own choice, including good offices. In seeking such a settlement, the parties shall agree on such peaceful means as may be appropriate to the circumstances and the nature of their dispute (United Nations, General Assembly, A/RES/37/10, 1982).

Quite similar to mediation, a state, a group of states, non-state actors, international institutions and agencies and individuals can act as a good office (Brownlie, 2009; Tanaka, 2018: 43). Tanaka claims that normally good office aims to help getting the disputing parties back to the negotiation process, but the role of good offices may change in time and "involvement of the third party may be deepened according to the developments of the events concerning the dispute (Shaw, 2008; Tanaka, 2018: 43).

1.1.1.4. Inquiry (Fact-finding)

The states over a dispute may decide on starting an inquiry to make an investigation on the disputed issue to understand if there is a violation of a treaty or other international commitments the parties claim and to offer a solution with the facts in the hand reached at the end of this investigation (United Nations, 1992). The main aim of this method is to facilitate the settlement of the dispute by enlightening the reasons behind the dispute, which is very important especially in the disputes requiring scientific and technical knowledge as in the international water disputes (Tanaka, 2018: 53). This method can be used at the same time together with other peace settlement methods like negotiation, mediation, good office or conciliation (Mani and Ponzio, 2018). This method was first introduced during the Hague Conventions in 1899 and 1907 and the Article 9 of the 1907 Convention is as follows:

> In disputes of international nature involving neither honour nor essential interests, and arising from a difference of opinion on points of fact, the Contracting Powers deem it expedient and desirable that the parties who have not been able to come to an agreement by means of diplomacy should, as far as circumstances allow, institute an international commission of inquiry, to facilitate a solution of these disputes by elucidating the facts by means of an impartial and conscientious investigation (The Hague Convention, 1907).

Inquiry is "an impartial third-party procedure for fact-finding and investigation" and "may indeed contribute to a reduction of tension and the prevention of an international dispute, as distinct from facilitating the settlement of such a dispute" (United Nations, 1992). Inquiry can be started by the mutual approval of the related states or as a consequence of an agreement in effect already signed by them. Some techniques like clarifying the facts causing dispute, writing a report to be used by the parties or submitting a report offering a solution for the dispute are used by the inquiry commission when conducting this method (United Nations, 1992). However, the findings of the inquiry commission are not legally binding for the parties, so they are free to take any necessary actions considering the recommendations and findings of the commission (Mani and Ponzio, 2018).

1.1.1.5. Conciliation

This process is another settlement method including third-party involvement and it has the similar elements like inquiry and mediation as forming a report as a recommendation – not a binding one like the award of an arbitration (Shaw, 2008). Merrils asserts that on the one hand conciliation is considered as "a kind of institutionalized negotiation" where the duty

of the conciliation commission is to encourage the parties for communication as providing the necessary assistance to them for a successful outcome and on the other hand it is regarded as a method much closer to inquiry arbitration where the commission is expected to offer information and recommendation depending on the parties' positions and to bring forward a resolution that meets what they deserve (1991: 67). Conciliation as a peaceful settlement method was introduced at the beginning of the 20th century in 1928 after several bilateral agreements like the Locarno Agreements in 1925 (O'Connell, 2016).

A conciliation commission normally consists of five or three members and the parties to the dispute have the right to appoint one of the three or two of the five members of this conciliation commission. The last member of the commission is appointed depending on a mutual decision of the conflicting parties, but if there occurs a conflict again over the appointment of the last member of the commission, then a third-party is assigned to appoint the member. Like the procedure in defining the inquiry commission, the conciliation commission is formed upon the joint consent of the conflicting states on an ad hoc basis or upon an agreement signed before by the parties requiring peaceful settlements of disputes (United Nations, 1992). As the formation of this commission is up to the parties they may have difficulty in welcoming the invitation of the other party for the establishment of a conciliation commission and in this kind of a case as mentioned above the UN Secretary-General undertakes the responsibility of forming the commission (Tanaka, 2018: 67).

According to Mani and Ponzio conciliation is somewhere between inquiry and mediation because the conciliation commission not only investigates the disputed issue but also mediates between the two parties to offer a proposal to the parties, which is not binding again over them since each of the parties can declare that it will adopt or not adopt the recommendations of the commission (2018).

1.1.2. Judicial Means

The above-mentioned methods for peaceful settlement of international disputes are based on the mutual decisions of the disputing parties. They decide on settling the dispute over a negotiation or with the help of a third-party like good office, mediation, inquiry (fact-finding commission) and conciliation. They reach a solution by themselves or with the help of a third-party and they do not have to regard the outcomes of these diplomatic means. However, as discussed below the outcomes of judicial means are binding over the decisions and actions of the disputing parties.

1.1.2.1. Arbitration

The Hague Conventions signed in 1899 (Article 15) and in 1907 (Article 37) draw the framework for international arbitration for the settlement of international disputes with the help of judges assigned by the disputing parties. These Conventions also founded the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in the Hague in 1899, which is still active today with 122 contracting parties and three active offices also in Buenos Aires, Mauritius and Singapore (The Hague Conventions 1899 and 1907). As Brownlie states from its foundation till 1931 the PCA dealt with 20 cases and since 1945 the number of arbitrations is rather high and significant as the other cases submitted to the International Court of

Justice (2009). There are two types of arbitration: standing treaty clauses like the Argentina-Chile Frontier Case in 1966 and ad hoc agreements – also called as *compromis* – like Anglo-French Continental Shelf Case in 1977 (2009).

Arbitration, again a third-party involvement, is performed by an arbitrator (also called as an 'umpire' or 'sole arbitrator') whom the disputing parties have assigned or by a group of arbitrators forming an arbitral tribunal. The result of the arbitration is called as 'award' that is binding for the disputing parties (United Nations, 1992). As different from inquiry or conciliation the outcome of arbitration is binding (Mani and Ponzio, 2018).

As to Merrils arbitration is an old method preceding the other methods in pacific settlement of international disputes and it is a system build by the conflicting parties to find a peaceful solution to a conflict (1991: 106). Even though it is an ancient method for resolving disputes, the first modern example is the Jay Treaty signed in 1794 between the US and the UK. Starting with this treaty, the method of arbitration was mostly used for solving Anglo-American disputes in the 19th century: Alabama Claims Award in 1872, Behring Sea Arbitration in 1893, British Guiana arbitration in 1897 and North Atlantic Coast Fisheries arbitration in 1910 (Brownlie, 2009) Arbitration might be confused with judicial settlement, yet as they seem similar the structure of these two methods is different. The states that are parties to a dispute prefer mutually the option of arbitration that give them the possibility of controlling the process by appointing arbitrators they choose. But in a judicial settlement these parties apply to pre-established international tribunals or courts for a peaceful settlement, where they do not have any control over the process as they do in arbitration (United Nations, 1992).

1.1.2.2. Judicial Settlement

When the disputing states want to reach a solution by applying to a pre-established international tribunal or court that consist of "independent judges whose tasks are to settle claims on the basis of international law and render decisions which are binding upon the parties (United Nations, 1992). To offer pacific settlements of international disputes the Permanent Court of International Justice was founded pursuant to the Covenant League of Nations in 1922, which was replaced with the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1946 as one of the basic bodies of the UN (United Nations, 1992). Almost two decades before the Permanent Court of International Justice was founded, the British delegation had offered establishing a court for the settlement of international disputes in 1899 during the First Hague Peace Conference, yet it did not happen but the participating delegates formed a permanent arbitral tribunal that had a list of arbitrators at the same year, which is called as the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) – still active today as mentioned above (O'Connell, 2016). Below Figure 15 shows the related bodies on a diagram.

Figure 15. Adjudicative Bodies for the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes.

The peaceful settlement of the disputes depends on the recognition of the court's jurisdiction and "the recognition may be expressed by way of a special agreement between the States parties to a dispute (*compromis*) conferring jurisdiction upon a court in a particular dispute, or by a compromissory clause providing for agreed or unilateral reference of a dispute to a court, or by other means" (United Nations, 1992). The ICJ is regarded as the last resort after trying other methods of pacific settlement of disputes like negotiation, good office, inquiry and mediation. As the outcome of the ICJ is binding the parties apply for a settlement voluntarily even though they have already endorsed the Statute of the Court (Mani and Ponzio, 2018). The total number of member judges of the ICJ is fifteen. Five permanent members of the UN Security Council have one judge at the court and the rest ten judges are appointed from different regions of the world on rotation – the same system used in the 1920s (O'Connell, 2016).

The Article 33 of the Chapter VI of the UN Charter "leaves scope for the referral of a dispute to 'regional agencies or arrangements,' which refers to both regional treaties and regional organizations. Chapter VIII is devoted to 'regional arrangements,' and their role in dispute settlement is addressed specifically in Article 52" (Mani and Ponzio, 2018). Regional organizations and agencies like the League of Arab States, Organization of American States, African Union (formerly known as the Organization of African Unity – OAU), European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes (Council of Europe), Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, European Union, Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS) involve in peaceful settlement of international and regional disputes (Shaw, 2008; United Nations, 1992).

1.2. Negotiation Explained in Negotiation Theory

International negotiation has been the topic of research since the works of diplomacy practitioners like François de Caliers in 1716 and Fortune Barthelemy de Felice in 1778 (Hopmann, 1995). However, it was not until the 1960s when the topic of negotiation was studied systematically with the pioneering works by Thomas Schelling, *Strategy of Conflict* in 1960; Anatol Rapoport, *Fights, Games and Debates* in 1960 and Fred Charles Iklé, *How Nations Negotiate* in 1964. The first theorizing works on negotiation were mostly influenced by the game theory literature created by John Nash, Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa (1995).

Graham et. al. explains that "negotiation" as a word comes from Latin *negare otium* the motto-motto translation of which is "to deny leisure" having a meaning of 'business' in French and Spanish (2020). According to Iklé, two elements are necessary for negotiations to take part: mutual interests and conflicting issues since if there is not mutual interest there nothing exists for negotiation and if there is no conflict there is again nothing to negotiate (1964: 2).

According to Zartman "negotiation involves an exchange of goods rather than a unilateral victory: negotiation is giving something to get something, so it involves moves by both/all sides, although not necessarily to an equal degree" and Zartman adds that negotiations are made in three ways: "concession, compensation and construction (reframing)" (2009: 324). In Pruitt's words negotiation is a process when "the parties first verbalize contradictory demands and then move toward agreement by a process of concession making or search for new alternatives" (1981: 1). Pruitt also defines negotiation as one type of a conflict because it requires defending own positions (6). Ghosn asserts that negotiations could be useful for states for their short-term policies that do not result in big changes in policy and they give the states the chance to sit on the negotiation desk to discuss a possible resolution of a conflict or to make a reevaluation of their strategies and decisions regarding the way of handling the conflict (2010: 1058).

According to Lewicki et. al. negotiation is an interdependent situation where the parties need one another to reach their objectives and for this reason they have to work together and have coordination among themselves to get the results they favor (2016: 10). Zartman considers negotiation as much more a situation of uncertainty and conflict where conflicting parties are seeking a mutual settlement for their conflict, however each party aims to achieve its needs by transferring their propositions and getting the other party's propositions as well (2008: 106).

Lewicki et. al. mentions that the studies conducted regarding negotiations go back to 60 years ago in different fields of social sciences like "economics, psychology, political science, communications, labor relations, law, sociology and anthropology" (2016: 3). Lewicki et. al. also state that as negotiation issue is handled by several fields of research, each field takes a different method to describe negotiation like the the example they give about the blind people who tries to make descriptions of an elephant by touching its bodily parts (2016: 3). However, it is obvious in the literature on negotiation that negotiations for terminating intra-state armed conflict and bringing peace upon a mutually accepted agreement have not been touched or felt properly, hence this dissertation aims to put forward a different perspective for negotiating peace for this kind of conflicts.

Before bringing along the mainstream definitions for negotiation it is better to tell the difference between 'negotiation' and 'bargain' because it obvious on the literature on negotiation process 'bargain' is mostly used for negotiations between the parties even for the violent conflicts. At this point it is better to refer to the definitions of 'negotiation', 'negotiate' and 'bargain' on two different English dictionaries widely used.

Cambridge Dictionary defines 'negotiation' as "the process of trying to make or change and agreement by discussion". It defines 'negotiate' in verb form as "to try to make or

change an agreement by discussion" and "to successfully move around, through, or past something". The dictionary defines 'bargain' as "to try to make someone agree to something better for you".[11]

Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines 'negotiation' as "the action or process of negotiating or being negotiated". It defines 'negotiate' as "to confer with another so as to arrive at the settlement of some matter" and "to deal with (some matter or affair that requires ability for its successful handling)". This dictionary defines 'bargain' as an intransitive verb as "to negotiate over the terms of a purchase, agreement or contract" and "to come to terms". The same dictionary defines the same verb as a transitive verb as "to bring a desired level by bargaining".[12]

It is obvious that the meanings of the two terms are so close to one another, yet what Rubin and Brown put forward brings along the actual difference in their meaning as it follows "in general usage, the term bargaining often seems to refer to the interaction between individuals over some sale or purchase" however, the term negotiation "seems to be used primarily in connection with interaction involving complex social units (e.g. unions, nations, etc.) and usually multiple issues" (1975: 2). As to Rubin and Brown, while bargaining is mostly about buying a car, something in a flea market or food in a bazaar, negotiation is much more related to talks about labor related conflicts, international peace settling talks or agreements (2). Therefore, here Lewicki et. al. will also help us to put the difference between these two terms since they state the term 'bargaining' is more related with win/lose cases like dealing for a price in the market while the term 'negotiation' is more related with win/win cases that look for a mutually agreed resolution (2016: 3).

Parallel to what Lewicki et. al., and Rubin and Brown mention above it could be understand from the meanings of these two terms negotiation indicates a long process, when the parties sit at a negotiation desk to talk about talks and go through discussions to find a mutual solution for a conflict on a win-win basis while bargaining means one-time deals like buying a car or bargaining in a flea market for an old wrist watch from the 1960s where you pay for the price of that old watch and win that antiquity – where the other party, the seller, loses that object, which pretty symbolizes a win-lose situation. For this reason, bargaining is a narrow concept within the wider meaning of negotiation. Bargaining is a type of negotiation, which is basically a win or lose game.

Iklé defines negotiation as a process unlike implicit bargaining or other actions that adjust the conflict. As for Iklé, this is a plain process, where the parties make obvious offers that include not only the terms of the agreement but also the topics covering technical and legal agendas to settle an ongoing conflict and reach for an agreement based on mutual interests by bargaining over the conflicting interests. (1964: 3-4).

Negotiation is required for new relationships resulting from a clear-cut agreement, yet this agreement is normally a part of the result of a negotiation. Negotiation can change parties'

[11] Definitions are obtained on the website of the Cambridge Dictionary https://dictionary.cambridge.org Access Date: 07/09/2020.
[12] Definitions are obtained on the website of the Merriam-Webster Dictionary https://www.merriam-webster.com. Access Date: 07/09/2020.

positions and their relationships in different ways, resulting in implicit interpretations of the parties, defining points that cause disagreement, changing national aims and new engagements with third parties (1964: 6).

According to Avenhaus and Zartman, negotiation is a course of decision-making, where harmony rules over the decisions bringing along equality that makes each party equal in having a right for a veto (2007: 82) since they have their own reasons "to agree and to disagree, to cooperate and to conflict, to concede and to compel" (Zartman, 1977: 623). This harmonized decision-making process in a negotiation helps reaching to an agreement following the mutual decision of the parties at the end of a direct negotiation or a third-party mediation (Zartman, 2007: 82; Armengol, 2013: 1).

Apart from being a process of mutual decision-making, negotiation is a way of direct or indirect contact between the parties and a main activity in business, international politics, domestic politics, religion, law and familial issues (Young, 1991: 1). As an activity, negotiation covers a wide range from arms control and limitation talks, legislative support groups, interpretation of holy texts to discussions over child custody (1). According to Aurisch, the actual negotiation process goes among the "committees, subcommittees, working groups, contact groups, and in many individual lobbying efforts in and around the conference room" (1999: 394).

Negotiation is one of the steps in a peace-making process aiming terminating violence and armed struggle, for this reason the peace agreement signed at the end of a negotiation process can be considered as the start of the real peace-making process, also called as "post-war rehabilitation" by Armengol (2013: 1). This phase helps the parties to take necessary decisions and policies to terminate the violence and begin to work for achieving peace (1).

Integrative negotiation sets a "bargaining zone" that "creates value for the parties jointly" (Korobkin, 2002: 127). Korobkin calls integrative bargaining as non-zero sum since here the parties mutually enjoy the settlement and calls distributive bargaining as zero sum because one party's benefit is at other's cost (2002: 150). For this reason, another distinction appears between these two different approaches: the former is described as a problem solving one and the latter is portrayed as a competitive one (150). Integrative negotiations allow both the parties to reach their goals, which "are not mutually exclusive" that means "one party's gain is not at the other party's expense" (Lewicki et. al. 2016: 60). However, even though the situation in a negotiation may seem a win-lose situation to the parties, that could be come over by communication and discussion proposing alternatives for both of the parties to win (60).

According to Lewicki et. al. the integrative negotiation process consists of four different stages: "(1) identify and define the problem, (2) surface interests and needs, (3) generate alternative solutions to the problem, and (4) evaluate those alternatives and select among them" (2016: 63). Lewicki et. al. define the first three stages as important stages for creating value and the last one as claiming value, which bears some of the characteristics of distributive negotiation (63). Lewicki et. al. also puts forward seven factors for a successful integrative negotiation: "(1) presence of a common goal, (2) faith in one's own problem-solving ability, (3) a belief in the validity of the other party's position, (4) the motivation

and commitment to work together, (5) trust, (6) clear and accurate communication, and (7) an understanding of the dynamics of integrative negotiation" (2016: 80).

Moore and Woodrow define distributive bargaining as positional negotiation as they believe that the parties think that there will be an equal sharing of the things they are desiring out of a conflict to settle the conflict and sign the agreement in this kind of a negotiation process (2010: 82). They also assert that this kind of positional negotiation is commonly preferred to another one if "the outcome of negotiations is seen by one or more parties as having a potential winner or loser" (82). In comparison to positional negotiations, where one party tries to persuade the other one to accept its solution offer regarding its interests, interest-based negotiations, where the parties focus on the needs, demands and interests of each party, have alternative ways reaching out for an agreement (88-89).

According to Pruitt, parties take advantage of a solution to the problem under two circumstances: availability of high integrative potential and high intentions (1999: 28). This potential offer "strong possibility of expanding the pie, cost cutting, compensation, logrolling or bridging" and high intentions create a competitive environment between the parties taking leading them to the integrative possibility (28).

Dupont and Faure define four different approaches, as they call "avenues" regarding the negotiation activity. The first one defines negotiation as an activity of proposals on mutual strategies, demands, offers, suggestions and counterproposals. The second avenue is related to power issue in negotiations. The third one is more "concerned with processes summarized in terms of 'persuasive debate'" because negotiation is considered to be a channel of communication helping the conflicting parties to "agree to act jointly rather than unilaterally." The last approach is "an effort to use game-theoretical matrix, either in improved standard models, notably the Prisoner's Dilemma or in designs centered on the concept of critical risk" (2002: 40-41). Anyhow negotiation itself has different functions and according to Pruitt it has functions like agreement developing, planning long-term strategies regarding positions, commitments and opportunities and reconciliation for a social change (1981: 6).

Saunders defines the "around-the-table negotiation" as a part of a bigger negotiation process aiming to resolve conflicts peacefully and adds that convincing the conflicting parties for a negotiated peace settlement is more difficult and time-consuming than convincing them for continuing their conflict, therefore he recommends that if the negotiators want to find a resolution for a conflict, they should think of negotiation as a process dealing with the obstacles and hurdles in it (1985: 249). However, negotiation does not always aim resolving a conflict depending on a negotiated agreement and the negotiation process sometimes may pave the way for foreign policy moves and military actions "with an aim of deceiving" the other party (Iklé, 1964 as cited in Ghosn, 2010: 1058).

Salacuse, defines the negotiation as a learning process, which can create an environment for the parties to learn what is behind the interests of the other side and to understand this at the start of their conversation (2000: 261). Learning process is not a free process since it includes extra efforts of the parties to understand one another and learn the hidden sides of

their interests. For this reason, Ghosn defines this process a costly one that does not only have benefits but political and actual costs as well (2010: 1058). Political costs could be heavy for the leaders as they could lose their power and they could be considered as an unwanted person as they sat down with the enemy for negotiations. Apart from political power loss for leaders in the political arena, negotiation brings along the cost of possible cheating by the other parties especially when one of the parties do not want to put the agreement into implementation and the other side gets in a weak situation. In addition to political costs of losing political power or cheating, a negotiation process includes the costs for preparation for negotiations including travel expenses, daily expenditures and other possible costs for necessary preparations (1058).

1.3. Phases of Negotiation

Mostly a negotiation process consists of stages such as pre-negotiation, agenda setting, formulation, negotiation on details and the agreement that follows all the stages. Some negotiations may have pre-negotiation processes that only reaches an agreement setting the issues on the desk. Some others may have a detailed and long process of agenda setting and defining the issues. In some complex processes including the multilateral ones, the pre-negotiation process becomes harder and more complicated, so taking longer time to come to an end (Avenhaus and Zartman, 2007: 5-6).

Saunders offers a five-stage negotiation process depending on his experience with the Middle East peace process and he searches for a useful framework to analyze the obstacles in the negotiation process, for this reason he creates the following five stages of the negotiation process displayed on the diagram below:

Figure 16. Negotiation Stages.

Source: Derived from Saunders (1985).

Definition of the problem comes from the recognition of a “common problem” by the conflicting parties, which also shows their interest in resolving the conflict. On the second stage the parties decide on their determination for a negotiated settlement for the problem before they put the negotiation agenda for talks before their leaders. On the third one the parties come together to set a specific negotiation date and venue to focus on the general topics and the details, yet this can start with a mini-negotiation about how to negotiate, which reminds us one of the important steps of the pre-negotiation process. Saunders here draws the attention to the duration of the actual negotiation and pre-negotiation stages as mostly the duration of the pre-negotiation is longer taking much more time and energy than the actual negotiation process. The last one is the application period for the peace settlement reached at the end of the negotiations (1985: 254-261).

Zartman and Faure brings along a different perspective for the stages of a negotiation process: a three-stage negotiation that consists of a pre-negotiation stage, a potential agreement formula making stage and a detail-setting stage. The first one is about confirming the idea of coming together for a mutual settlement and framing the issue, which is normally required for every other negotiation process even with the ones with the terrorist organizations. The second one deals with forming the agreement itself and the last one comes along with the details required for a settlement (2005: 4).

Apart from this three-staged negotiation approach, Zartman had already proposed three 'turning points' in negotiations in one of his earlier works in the 1970s asserting that there are three turning points in negotiation process that paves the way for a mutual settlement of the conflict (1975: 74). The first turning point is more like a pre-negotiation stage when each party agrees on negotiations and this stage comes before formal negotiations also including sessions of negotiations without any guarantees. The second one more looks like agreement formula making stage when the parties reach a settlement formula creating a framework for conceiving the problem itself and its solution. The last one resembles a detail-setting stage when the parties consider their objectives to finalize a negotiated agreement (1975: 74-75).

Regarding the preparation phases of negotiation Zartman claims that "when best performed, negotiation is a matter of the parties' separately preparing and jointly identifying a formula that defines the problem in a resolvable way, and then translating the principles of the formula into specific details for implementation" and adds that "that process is made possible when the parties are prepared thorough and often cooperative diagnosis or pre-negotiation at the outset" (Zartman, 1992: 115).

Based on the literature, this study asserts that negotiation consists of five main phases: preparation, pre-negotiation, official negotiation, implementation and post-negotiation. Figure 17 below illustrates these five main phases of negotiation.

Figure 17. Negotiation Phases.



1.3.1. Pre-negotiation

Pre-negotiation is the basic step of negotiation and "commonly referred to as 'preliminaries' or 'talks about talks'", which are important to set the agenda for official

negotiations and for this reason they are fragile (Berridge: 2015: 27). As for Winham, "pre-negotiation is a preparatory process, and it is expected to generate wide-ranging discussion as parties attempt to single out those issues to be included in the negotiation" (1989: 288). Pre-negotiation process seems uncertain and expanded when compared to the official negotiation process, which is objective-oriented and formal; however, its expanded characteristics helps a creative environment to develop like preparing the negotiators in complex technical fields (288-302).

Winham describes the pre-negotiation process as a preparatory process that can lead to a debate among the parties to select the issues to be dealt with and asserts that negotiation phase is considered as more certain while pre-negotiation is uncertain and ambiguous (1989: 288). Berridge considers the acceptance of existence of a stalemate by the parties as the "true beginning of pre-negotiations" because the parties are eager to accept that a negotiated resolution could be better than the situation they are actually in (2015: 29). Lilja thinks that pre-negotiation is "a fluid concept, and the pre-negotiation phase could extend as far back as when the parties first considered negotiation as a way out of armed conflict and extend forward into the formal bargaining phase" (2011: 314).

Pre-negotiation step is also important for rebel movements in an intra-state conflict to take their seats at the negotiation desk since if a stronger group is effective during this process then the other groups are less likely to spoil the process (Lilja, 2011: 318).

Gewurz emphasizes the participation of a third party into the pre-negotiation process and states that a third party is often ready at the pre-negotiation processes. Third party here plays the role of keeping the parties on the way (2000: 181). However, he claims that this role is not a fixed one and it is varied depending on the level of involvement and activity within the pre-negotiation. A mediator can be a proactive one and can participate into the discussions and can even put its weight to get concessions from the parties (181). Another type of mediator can be less active and can only behave as the facilitator making logistical arrangements, offering moral support to the parties and becoming more like a consultant during this process (181).

Contrary to the general definitions regarding pre-negotiation and negotiation Gewurz claims that it is hard to tell when pre-negotiation ends and official negotiations start because these two processes overrun and both of the processes may go back and forth (2000: 179-180). Like Gewurz, Avenhaus and Zartman is also discussing whether pre-negotiation step is "a prelude or a part of negotiation" and the sharpness of the boundaries between these two steps (2007: 117). Gewurz also draws attention to one of the characteristics of the pre-negotiation, which helps to define the issues to be discussed during official negotiations and to offer a wide range of topics to prevent the parties to stroll around topics fueling hostilities towards one another (181).

However, as Stein asserts pre-negotiation phase and the process of negotiation itself may overlap because when a pre-negotiation phase is successful the parties go forward for an agreement in direct negotiations, yet even during direct negotiations parties may want to suspend the talks and go back for another pre-negotiation period to overcome the obstacles they encounter (1989c: 232). Since this is the stage when the parties come together to

determine the margins of the real negotiation for making a check list that could be compatible with their demands (Tomlin, 1989: 256). Tomlin thinks that prenegotiation step can be described as an introductory step for the official negotiations apart from integrating this phase into the longstanding relationships between the conflicting parties (256).

Zartman sees the main function of a pre-negotiation as building "a bridge from conflict to conciliation, with the changes in perception, mentality, tactics, definitions; acceptability levels and partners, that have already been discussed" (2008: 125). For this reason, as Hampson et. al. asserts, a negotiation process should start with informal conversations among the members of the party delegations that could make the way for making friendships among them so as they can have discussions about different perspectives related to the problem in a relaxed atmosphere (2007: 41). This kind of relationship among the members of the conflicting parties also helps for trust building for a longer term that could be useful for a sustainable negotiations process (41).

Even though pre-negotiation period is assumed as one of the basic and vital parts of a negotiation process it is under discussion whether it is an introductory or essential part of negotiation (Zartman, 2008: 117). Zartman defines the beginning and end of a pre-negotiation: it starts when even one of the parties choose negotiation as an opportunity and mentions its purpose in negotiating to the other parties and comes to an end when they sit for a formal negotiation (2008: 119). It terminates when the parties approve direct and official negotiations or one of the parties leaves the negotiation process (Stein, 1989c: 232).

Sahadevan puts emphasize on the significance of pre-negotiation in whole negotiation process as it can help for a good start for the start of negotiations while unsuccessful steps in pre-negotiation make it hard for real negotiations start sooner (2006: 259). Sahadevan thinks that prenegotiation step is effective in shaping and organizing the official negotiation step and this step is very vital in defining what makes that negotiation successful or failed (259). Pre-negotiations helps political actors to get ready for further direct negotiations and they start a de-escalation period necessary for less conflict and more settlement situation (Aggestam, 2005: 278). Besides, since pre-negotiations are more informal in their nature, they can help curbing negative effects of pro-conflict domestic groups (278). Pre-negotiation phases are also useful for creating time "to prepare, build, and consolidate domestic support for negotiations and concession making", which also strengthen the hands of political actors to convince the people for further negotiations (279).

According to Sahadevan pre-negotiation process in domestic conflicts consists of five different stages: redefining the behaviors, diagnostic and prognostic stage, building bridges, commitment and setting the task (2006: 259-261). In the first stage the parties start pre-negotiation by changing their behaviors from seeking violence to political strategies and at this stage a hurting stalemate proves the inefficiency of using force and the parties start to seek ways for reconciliation in the face of de-escalation the stalemate creates. At the second stage the conflicting parties start to observe their adversaries and address them, finally making calculations for cost-effective analysis and risk analysis for checking the benefits of getting into negotiation with one another. The stage for building bridges normally helps the parties to come closer and to create an environment for trust building

thanks to confidence building measures used in military and political agents. This stage also helps the parties to get support of the people for further negotiations since this is the step when the parties change their ideas, attitudes and behaviors and turn their faces for a collaboration for peace. The commitment phase determines the decisiveness of the parties for negotiation as they have already started to look for a way-out for the ongoing conflict. This commitment stage also shows the willingness of the parties for peacemaking and this willingness brings the parties together for a mutual settlement for the conflict. At the final phase of pre-negotiation, a framework for negotiation is set and the parties start to shape their negotiation teams and determine their negotiation strategies without a written agreement between the parties (Sahadevan, 2006: 259-261).

Like Sahadevan, when defining the stages of negotiation, Zartman calls the first stage of negotiation as 'diagnostic stage' that is a prelude to formal negotiations when the parties sit for a settlement formula in the shape of a negotiated agreement (2008: 118). However, before sitting on the negotiation desk the parties come together to talk what they want to negotiation most probably by letters and telephone calls etc. before direct negotiations at the desk (Salacuse, 2008: 65).

Saadia Touval defines this phase as an "informal contact among the parties" and adds that "several important aspects of the negotiation are typically addressed during this preliminary stage: A list of participants is agreed upon; initial coalitions emerge; role differentiation takes place among the participants; and substantive and procedural issues are addressed as the parties learn more about the problems, develop an agenda, and search for a formula or general framework within which an agreement can be reached" (1999: 352). However, this informal first contact creates an environment for learning. Stein puts importance on learning during the pre-negotiation and states that getting to the negotiation desk requires very technical criteria but it allows the parties to get into the requirements and probability of a negotiated settlement (1989a: 499).

What happens in negotiations is that normally one of the parties offers a draft agreement or a model and then the parties start to discuss the details taking necessary steps for signing a final one in the end after a serial of negotiations. As Salacuse defines it "in practice negotiators often write first and then talk" (1999: 181). Actually, this draft means a mutual understanding towards a formal agreement and draft agreement stands as the framework for that agreement. After several talking sessions the parties define the roadmap needed for an agreement (Touval, 1999: 354). Salacuse thinks that submitting a draft agreement by one of the parties gives that party "a significant tactical advantage" and adds that "many experienced negotiators believe that the one who controls the draft controls the negotiations" (1999: 182). Salacuse also underlines the importance of submitting a draft first in a negotiation since the party offering the draft has the advantage of setting the schedule of that negotiation (1999: 182). Hence, the party that created the draft agreement has the details of it while the other party could only show its reaction to the language of it instead of making certain suggestions. By doing so, actually this party disregard its own intentions and interests out of a negotiation as it is busy with its reactions and assessments regarding the provisions of the draft (182).

Zartman emphasizes main functions of pre-negotiation like cost and risk analysis, agenda setting, participant selection, support providing and bridge-making. Thanks to pre-negotiation process conflicting parties can evaluate costs and risks of a negotiated agreement, can set the agenda for an official negotiation by considering the features of the conflict, can select the participants to take part in official negotiations and make the deals, can provide support for a target group and can create a suitable environment for making contacts one another and sharing experiences (2012).

Pre-negotiations are also helpful for weighing the domestic support for possible negotiations and for creating an environment at home much more oriented for a conciliation instead of maintaining the conflicting front, however it requires making some changes regarding the image of the opponent party on public opinion and preparing the general mindset of citizens about successfully ending negotiations instead on continuing fighting (Zartman, 2008: 122). The table below shows the different elements of two basic stages:

Table 4. Pre-negotiation and Negotiation.

Pre-negotiation	**Negotiation**
Investigation	Official Respondents
Convincing the Parties	Real Actors
Security of the Negotiators	Comprehensive Approach
Guarantee for Respect	Considering Victims
Methodology and Procedure	Win-Win Situation/No one loses
Setting the Agenda	Discussing the Agenda
Possible Road Map	Sufficient Majority for Wide-ranging Changes
Clarification of Conflict over Tangibles	Attempts for Personal Relationships
Avoiding Deception	Final Agreement
Trust Building	
Getting to Know the Other Party	
Defining the Role of the Third Parties	

Source: Fisas (2012: 24)

Fisas asserts that peace processes take a long time as was seen in Guatemala and Ireland cases in history and normally a peace process requires about ten years or another couple of years more since the parties make investigations about other parties, get in communication, discuss possible armistices and try to strengthen the negotiations depending on joint meetings (2012: 28-29). Pre-negotiation step provides necessary time for preparations, forming a public support for official negotiations, working on possible concessions and help political leaders to reach enough information on the scope and extent of possible comprises that leads to get better positions for de-escalation efforts and negotiations. A well-planned pre-negotiation step requires getting ‘trial balloons’ to check out the media and the public opinion regarding the support of the people for negotiations (Aggestam: 2002: 279).

Normally it is better to start negotiations with lesser numbers of actors, but it is not the case all the time and negotiating with different actors like actors hoping to benefit from the negotiation process and get some share within the government by using arms might be necessary during the course of the negotiation process; for this reason, groupings in a negotiation process are normal (Fisas, 2012: 40).

Zartman thinks that the term pre-negotiation is a vague one because he asserts that without a doubt there is something coming just before the negotiation period, yet it is not possible to draw shard borderlines between them apart from calling it as a prelude or a part to negotiations (1989: 237). According to Zartman, the first function of pre-negotiation is to play the role of a bridge between "conflict and conciliation, with the changes in perception, mentality, tactics, definitions, acceptability levels, and partners" (1989: 249). It starts when a party or the parties start to consider negotiation as an option and express its decision to the other parties and it ends when the parties agree on formal negotiations or when one or more parties leave the process as they no more consider negotiation as an option (240).

Pre-negotiation is a time period in the negotiation process that stands as a gate for further discussions to settle the conflict and it is related to the direct negotiation process. According to Zartman, it is not about handling the search for a resolution of the conflict, yet it is more about persuading the other party to believe that a mutually agreed resolution for the conflict is possible (Zartman, 1989: 240). Pre-negotiation is a step to convince the other parties that their concessions will be rewarded and during this step it is less risky to offer exchanges and guarantees since they are not commitments like the ones in a negotiation (245). This step is important as it prepares the parties for future concessions allowing the parties to find out what would happen when concessions are offered (245).

Another duty of the pre-negotiation step is to make bridges between conflict and resolution "with the changes in perception, mentality, tactics, definitions, acceptability levels, and partners that have already been discussed" (Zartman, 1989: 249). Pre-negotiation not only suspends conflict with the help of ceasefire agreements at this step, but also prepare required mechanisms for transition and provisional changes. Pre-negotiation step changes the trust level between the parties in a positive way as the parties do not trust one another in general and thanks to this step the parties come together and increase trust towards each other and can have mutual trust to sign a formal agreement in the end (Zartman, 1989: 249-250).

Pre-negotiation is the first contact between the conflicting parties that have opted for a way out and a negotiated settlement of the problem. The parties at this stage come closer and it is a phase where they start to get to know one another before real negotiations start. For this reason, according to Movsisyan, pre-negotiation phase is different from other phases in a negotiation process as it does not care about the costs and results of probable mistakes (2008: 47). Since the exit costs are relatively low in pre-negotiation and further engagements are still on the way, the parties feel free to mention their terms and interests openly within this period (Zartman, 1989: 244).

Another use of this period is the exchange of information between the parties that help them get to know the unknown side of one another and to make rational concessions, which

finally results in helping the parties "to come to know what to expect" (Zartman, 1989: 244). During this stage the parties can produce "alternative definitions of the problem" and they agree that the upcoming negotiations will include concessions to be made in the future by themselves (Schiff, 2011: 134). For this reason, the pre-negotiation stage helps the parties to create "mechanisms that facilitate the desired perceptual change from a zero-sum conflict to a win-win mentality" and "such mechanisms may include a temporary suspension of hostilities in order to create a sense of security" (134).

Considering the pre-negotiation stages of different negotiation processes, Stein studied in her article, she draws attention to why pre-negotiation steps are important for the leaders. Pre-negotiation can provide them enough time for risk analysis and it helps the parties to deal with the complications and minimize ambiguities with a low level of risk compared to the formalities a settlement brings along in an official negotiation (Stein, 1989a: 481). A pre-negotiation process also creates a good cover for the leaders to make their assessments and decisions regarding the other parties and calculate their range between compromise and reservations without a public involvement as it is obvious in a formal negotiation, which makes it possible to get ready for reciprocations at low expenses (482). This process is designed for the efficiency of official negotiation process making the details for preparation clear (482). This process reduces this kind of uncertainties.

Stein asserts that pre-negotiation is important for three reasons: Firstly, it influences the other steps of the negotiation process. Secondly, it affects long-term relationships hand in hand with the learning process, where "the relationship can be modified, redefined, weakened, or reinforced". Thirdly, this stage can have significant results indifferent from the improvements on the negotiation desk (1989b: 438).

Stein below makes a good summary about the definition of pre-negotiation dealing with its phases and importance in the whole negotiation process:

> We conceive the process of getting to the table as 'prenegotiation' or negotiation about negotiation. We consider this process important. Most obviously, if prenegotiation does not succeed, negotiation does not occur. If prenegotiation does succeed, we expect that it will have important consequences for negotiation at the table; indeed, we suggest that prenegotiation defines the boundaries, shapes the agenda, and affects the outcome of negotiation. Finally, prenegotiation may have important consequences even if the participants do not get to the table. Significant learning may occur during the process which permits the parties to reconceive their relationship. At times, moreover, parties may enter into a process of prenegotiation with the expectation that they will not get to the table but that participation in the process will bring important political bene- fits independent of the outcome.
>
> The process of prenegotiation begins when one or more parties considers negotiation as a policy option and communicates this intention to other parties. Prenegotiation ends when the parties agree to formal negotiations or when one party abandons the consideration of negotiation as a policy option. This delimitation of the boundaries of the process builds in several important assumptions about a broader theory of negotiation.
>
> By defining prenegotiation as a process, we treat it as analytically distinct and prior to the process of negotiation. At times, the two processes may overlap: if prenegotiation succeeds, the parties may negotiate one set of issues and simultaneously explore the possibility of broadening the agenda and initiating additional negotiations. Parties may also move back and forth from one process to another: they may get to the table, encounter serious obstacles, suspend negotiation, and return to prenegotiation to consider other negotiating formats and options. Even though the two processes may overlap or regress in time, we conceive of the process of getting to the table as distinct, with triggers, stages, functions, and consequences

> that are separable from those found in negotiation. Prenegotiation as a process frames negotiation; the two are linked but analytically distinct (1989c: 232-233).

Not different from Stein explains above, Spector asserts that the pre-negotiation phase has seven main functions: risk analysis, calculation of costs and benefits, requitement that is a period when the parties try to convince one another the concessions will be met with positive reactions, searching for domestic support, defining the problem and looking for solutions for it, coalition building and confidence building that aims building a bridge between conflict and cooperation (1993).

As discussed above, pre-negotiation is a step in a negotiation process consisting of different concerns, functions and issues. The main issues like escalation, de-escalation, ripeness, readiness, mutually hurting stalemate (MHS), mutually enticing opportunity (MEO), best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA), zone of possible agreement (ZOPA), track II diplomacy and back-channel negotiations shaping this process is discussed below.

1.3.1.1. Escalation vs. De-escalation

Zartman and Faure defines escalation as "the mark of conflict in its dynamic form" since a conflict emerges when parties with different interests not open for a mutual ground "are taking action against each other" (Zartman and Faure, 2005: 4). They also go on adding that "conflict actually begins when static incompatibility is turned into dynamic incompatibility" and emphasizing that "escalation is a specific increase in conflict, a tactical step that marks a qualitative difference in conflict relations" (4). However, escalation is a step forward in ending the ongoing conflict, yet this end could come after a victory, a mutually set conditions or a negotiation process (Zartman, 2008: 193). Escalation comes to an end when the conflicting parties can no longer escalate (193).

According to Zartman "escalations and attempted escalations in conflict also have a role in producing a turning point" (1995: 19). Escalation comes with a change in the intensity of conflict and the parties feel the stalemate when they notice that no desired outcome with an escalation going on. However, escalation is useful in determining ripe time for starting negotiations and in making the parties ready for a negotiation desk. Escalation has the potential of either strengthening the stalemates or fostering negotiations (19).

Faure stress that escalation and deadlocks have a causal relation, so while escalation can cause a deadlock, a deadlock can activate escalation plans even though it seems a possible reason to avoid escalation, but it is actually useful in leading a party to have an escalation strategy to move the other party out of the gridlock and to restart the negotiation process (Faure, 2005: 23-24).

Escalation may change the situation in a conflict for a deeper one or may lead to negotiation (Zartman and Faure, 2005: 11). Nevertheless, escalation and negotiation are settled at the very different ends of the same line: "one to increase conflict and the other to decrease it" and "not only are they headed in different directions, but they demand different attitudes and convictions, one to beat the enemies and the other to come to terms with them, sometimes referred to as winning vs a composing mentality" (Zartman, 2008: 193).

Escalation can be a unilateral or bilateral attempt to prevail, so it has the basics of a responsive movement (Zartman, 2005: 165). When it is a unilateral movement of a party, it is a reaction toward that party's former movements or that movement's incompetency and when it is a bilateral movement, it turns out to be a reaction toward the parties' growing attempts to prevail (165).

Escalation is an action of power planned for terminating the conflict, which is also aiming to change the other party's actions in the end, and it may either result in the escalator's victory or in a negotiation (Zartman, 2005: 165). Escalation ends when the escalators do not escalate any more for several reasons: The parties are run out of the necessary resources to continue the escalation or one of the parties prevails or the parties agree on a mutual solution that clears away the problem of incompatible positions (166). Zartman asserts that escalation and negotiation are two opposite processes, and while escalation aims to defeat the other party and fuels the conflict, negotiation aims to end the conflict depending on mutual terms; for this reason, the two processes may seem "mutually incompatible"; however, this incompatibility seems conditional because escalation process either pushes the other party to a negotiation process or helps one of the parties to prevail (166).

Zartman and Faure states that there are several mechanisms in an escalation process that helps for an opening for negotiation process. These mechanisms are (1) fear and fatigue, (2) mutually hurting stalemates, (3) changes in stakes, (4) changes in parties, (5) changes in attitudes, (6) disengagements and breathing space, (7) confidence and security building measures, (8) learning processes (9) reaffirmed relationships, (10) mutually enticing opportunity, (11) cultural values. Fatigue and fear wear out the parties resulting in a slowdown in escalation process; and like this factor mutually hurting stalemate – as explained above – creates deadlocks that hurts both of the parties and so helps ripe moment for negotiation to mature. Changes in stakes, parties and attitudes are mostly internal changes in the assessments of a party in terms new terms, new decision-making structures and willingness to negotiate. Ceasefire agreements and pauses even stemming from climatic conditions like snow and rain seasons create possible time for the parties for a fresh breath to cool down their interactions and reevaluate their positions. Transparency measures together with dynamic info flow and learning processes help to remove fear and ignorance fueling the conflict and to give right decisions by facilitating internal assessments. Community is also an important factor in dealing with conflicts with the help of relationships with established institutions and regimes. The parties can also benefit from the situation for future gains that could be achieved with the help of a mutual decision process. Finally, cultural values can be effective in an escalation process to take the next step for negotiations since morality and accepted norms, notions can cause to accelerate or slow down the escalation; some cultures can be reluctant to trigger an escalation while some others do not step back easily from conflict and violence (Zartman and Faure, 2005: 12-13).

Regarding the conflict escalation and de-escalation Ramsbotham et. al. point out that escalation is a complex issue and it is not possible to make predictions regarding an escalation (2011). Escalation can lead to the arise of new problems and parties, different

strategies for achieving power and resultant conflicts creating more complex situations. De-escalation has similar results like escalation as it may lead to unforeseen changes within the process (Ramsbotham et. al., 2011: 13). The figure below points out different steps of escalation and de-escalation processes.

Figure 18. Conflict escalation and de-escalation.



Source: Adapted from Ramsbotham et. al. (2011).

1.3.1.2. Ripeness vs. Readiness

As to Hampson, a conflict is ripe when it reaches a hurting stalemate or when the parties are worn enough after fighting in the battlefield to think about political options (1996: 209). Ripeness is one of the key factors to maintain the peace negotiations since peace agreements may fail if the conditions that emerged with ripeness are not met (209). However, the parties do not want to start negotiations with one another as they think that they cannot calculate the potential mostly politically feasible mutually accepted agreements that would be better than the uncertainty of a no-solution and no-agreement environment (Kremenyuk, 2002).

A ripe time is a gridlock preventing the parties from attaining their objectives and this gridlock is necessary for the stalemate that is one of the factors opening the gates for negotiations, yet alone it is not enough since it must hurt both of the parties and make them uncomfortable with the current situation. However, a mutually hurting stalemate - MHS - is not enough since "it generally needs to be riveted to the parties' perception through a recent or looming catastrophe that acts as a deadline or is remembered as a warning and that threatens to impose additional and unacceptable costs of a higher magnitude" (Zartman, 1991: 16). Apart from stalemate, another necessary factor for ripeness is the way out, which is a sense and willingness of the parties to search for a negotiated solution (Zartman, 2001: 9). As for Zartman, without this sense for a way out "the push associated with the MHS would leave the parties with nowhere to go (9).

A starting point of a mutually hurting stalemate is the step when one of the parties understand that it is not possible to accomplish its objectives or become victorious over the other party and win the game to end the conflict, yet a mutually hurting stalemate is only complete when the other party confers the same idea and each of the parties start to feel an uncomfortable situation in a costly unending conflict (Zartman, 2007: 164). According to

Hampson, as Zartman asserts above, mutually hurting stalemate is not sufficient for a conflict to be considered as a ripe one and here below Hampson lists additional requirements for ripeness:

> (1) the parties have redefined their interests – because of changes in leadership or constituency pressures, for example – and are no longer content with the status quo (2) old norms and patterns of behavior have been replaced with new norms facilitating the possibilities for compromise and the achievement of a durable settlement (3) the parties share perceptions about the desirability of an accord (4) the parties have agreed on a common bridging process to settle differences and (5) a formula allowing for compromise and a negotiated end to hostilities is available (1996: 14).

Before the launch of concepts of ripeness and readiness by Zartman and Pruitt, Kriesberg emphasized the importance of timing for de-escalation of interstate conflicts. As to Kriesberg, timing means recognition of the right time for ending escalation and stalemate and one of the conflicting parties' conciliatory movement or an involvement of a third party as a mediating party could be regarded as a recognition. However, Kriesberg underlines the significance of finding out the right time for these conciliatory or mediating actions because they can have unfavorable results like rejection or blocking of this kind of movements in the future (1987: 375). Kriesberg also uses the word 'fertile' for the right time for escalation as a metaphor urging that there should be something added for a birth (375).

Ripeness is a condition that the parties reach by themselves or with the help of a mediator in the negotiation process, yet it is not a self-generated condition and it does not have to end with a negotiation process (Zartman and Rubin, 2000: 227). According to Zartman, "ripeness is necessarily a perceptual event, and as with any subjective perception, there are likely to be objective referents to be perceived" and he adds that "these can be highlighted by a mediator or an opposing party when they are not immediately recognized by the party itself, and resisted so long as the conflicting party refuses or is otherwise able to block out their perception" (2001: 9). In addition, as Berridge asserts "even if there is widespread agreement that the time is ripe for a negotiated settlement, it is also an unusual situation in which all are equally prepared to acknowledge this – suing for peace, after all, is usually a sign of weakness – or, if they are so prepared, equally able to devote the time and resources needed to launch a negotiation" (2015: 28).

As mostly discussed above, even though the conditions are ripe in a conflict for peace negotiations, a mediator is regarded as a necessary actor to bring an end to negotiations before the conditions are exposed to change. For this reason, the mediator has to consider the time pressure "to reach an agreement when the moment is ripe to settle against the quality of the agreement that would be enhanced by broader deliberations, the design of more robust post-conflict institutional arrangements, and by bringing up and sorting out more questions on the negotiation table" (Svensson, 2019: 203). Time pressure is set against inaction that yields a big-time waste and cost of prolonging talks like time loss for useless efforts and expenses for negotiations (Pruitt, 1999: 40).

Ripeness is a very gentle moment. It needs a special care to understand. Sometimes it is a fading opportunity and sometimes a longer time. Hence, as Zartman states a failure to catch the right time can cause the parties to miss this opportunity and seek for new ways of escalation owing to lack of hopes for a negotiated settlement and mediators are very

important players during this time to seize the right time to lead the parties to a negotiation process (2008: 234).

As to Zartman and Faure, "ripe moments for negotiation (mediated or direct) are provided by double escalations to the point where no more escalation is deemed worthwhile and the ensuing deadlock hurts both sides, the necessary if insufficient condition for negotiation" (2005: 12). However, this kind of deadlock can help mediators to offer a deadline so time pressure might result in a mutual interest for coordination (Pruitt, 1981: 205). For example, President Carter, as mediator for negotiations between Israel and Egypt, warned the parties that he would withdraw if they did not reach an agreement until a deadline (205) as Mandela did the same in Arusha talks for Burundian negotiations.

Ripeness is an important status before the negotiation process actually starts. As Fisas claims readiness of a party is important since if one of the parties is not convinced for the negotiations, the negotiation process is at stake as the other party can notice that one of the parties is not ready for the negotiation and can blame the other party for not being sincere about the process (2012: 38). Fisas asserts that it is much better to start for negotiations when both of the parties are ready and convinced of the process. (38). Negotiation also needs a ripe time for a break for gaining time just for a break or for armament and for putting off outside pressure but it is not an easy game to call a negotiation as a serious or a sincere one because a negotiation process could have true or false intentions of the negotiating actors (Zartman and Rubin, 2000: 227).

Zartman defines ripeness as a necessary condition for the start of negotiations and asserts that it is not spontaneously self-produced, which means that it needs to be achieved by the fruitful efforts of the parties or a mediator (2001: 9). However, spending efforts to seize the ripe moment does not mean that negotiation process will start since "although ripeness theory is not predictive in the sense that it can tell when a given situation will become ripe, it is predictive in the sense of identifying the elements necessary (even if not sufficient) for the productive inauguration of negotiations" (9).

Ripeness is also called as a phase of conflict when the conflicting parties are ready to take serious steps and to do what is considered as necessary to resolve the conflict. Actually, it is the right time for a negotiation phase to start. However, this right time is not something fixed because it can be created by the parties. Using threat is one of the ways for creating the right time. Nevertheless, this kind of creation can increase escalation that could turn into a 'chicken game'. Another way of creating a right time is introducing opportunities for mutual gains as the conflicting parties believe that they can collect the rewards of working together in a harmony for mutual gains (Rubin, 1999: 10).

Zartman proposes six propositions regarding the idea of ripeness these are listed below and displayed on the Figure 19 below:

1. Ripeness is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the initiation of negotiations, bilateral or mediated.
2. If two parties to a conflict (a) perceive themselves to be in a hurting stalemate and (b) perceive the possibility of a negotiated solution (a way out), the conflict is ripe for resolution (i.e. for negotiations toward resolution to begin.

3. An MHS contains objective and subjective elements, of which only the latter are necessary and sufficient to its existence.
4. If the parties' subjective expressions of pain, impass, and inability to bear the costs of further escalation, related to objective evidence of stalemate, data on numbers and nature of casualties and material costs, and/or other such indicators of an MHS can be found, along with expressions of a sense of a way out, ripeness exists.
5. (a) once ripeness has been established, specific tactics by mediators can seize the ripe moment and turn it into negotiations, (b) If only objective elements of ripeness exist, specific tactics by mediators can bring the conflicting parties to feel/understand the pain of their mutual stalemate and turn to negotiations.
6. The perception of a mutually enticing opportunity is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the continuation of negotiations to the successful conclusion of a conflict (2000: 226-232).

Figure 19. Evolution of ripeness.



Source: Derived from Zartman (2000).

In Pruitt's words readiness theory is a "modification of Zartman's ripeness theory" and Pruitt goes on explaining that "readiness for conflict resolution is viewed as a variable, rather than a state as in Zartman's theory, and it pertains to a single party, rather than to the situation between two parties as in Zartman's theory", so "the greater a party's readiness, the more likely it is to enter and stay in negotiation (or mediation), put human resources into the negotiation, make concessions, and take risks for peace" (2005: 255). According to Pruitt, readiness is an encouraging factor because it encourages parties for getting into

the negotiation desk and it encourages taking steps in pre-negotiation and it also encourages parties for concessions (2015a: 126).

Compared to the term ripeness, readiness can be considered as a motive of a party that will take it to agree for a negotiation and if the party's readiness is high then it is more probable that this motive will take it to a negotiation (2015b: 61). Readiness symbolizes the first step into a pre-negotiation process preceding the official negotiations. Pruitt asserts that three main sources lie behind readiness situation: (1) motivation for terminating the conflict, (2) optimist ideas about reaching an agreement and finally (3) pressure to terminate the conflict that comes by the involvement of a third party (61).

Two of these underlying sources symbolizes two different mental states of a negotiating party: motivation and optimism. Motivation is for ending the conflict and it is based on the perception that conflict is a defecting and damaging situation. A party finds itself in a stalemate bearing various costs and looks for a way out with the cooperation with another party. Optimism is an understanding that a party can take steps for a mutually accepted settlement and when this kind of understanding is missing under the circumstances of a conflict, parties to a conflict are unwilling to take necessary risks and bear the probable costs for a mutual settlement even their motivation to terminate the conflict is high (Pruitt: 2005: 255).

1.3.1.3. Mutually Hurting Stalemate (MHS) or Mutually Enticing Opportunity (MEO)

Zartman mentions that a perception of a need to join in a mutual settlement is necessary for the parties to come to an idea of a bilateral solution for the conflict (Zartman, 2013: 16). Zartman calls this perception as 'way out' (WO) and defines it as a "complement to the MHS, which pushes the parties into negotiations; the WO pulls them toward a joint solution" (16). However, ripeness is not "self-implementing" but it creates a suitable environment for negotiations in the end (16).

Regarding the role of MEO in a negotiation process and a comparison between MHS and MEO in that process, Zartman states that MEO is considered as a prescription for a settlement that meets the parties' demands and interests, which is seen as a necessary condition (but again not a sufficient one like ripeness) for negotiations to continue to end the conflict (2008: 237). As different from MHS, MEO is a way out and succeeds Mutually Hurting Stalemate. Zartman calls MEO as a pulling factor starting with a search for a way out by the parties in their perception of first stages of ripeness that needs to be evolved into a tool for a mutual agreement (2008: 236).

Figure 20. Conflict-negotiation cycle.



Like what Zartman is saying about the MEO above, Vukovic states that the MEOs "are designed and delivered during the negotiation process in order to encourage enthusiasm in the post-negotiated reality that will be characterized by interdependence" (Vukovic, 2019: 187). All-in-all, the MEOs are not offering a kind of solution, yet encouraging the parties "to develop trust and confidence in each other, promote interdependence and regulate their future relations" (194). According to Zartman, when the conflicting parties do not reach a stalemate or do not feel the pain of the conflict, they go on living with the problem or the conflict (2012: 307). Since the parties know that in a stalemate both of them have the right to veto what other party offers and once they reach that situation they know that negotiation is only one step ahead (Berridge, 2015: 28). Figure 20 above tries to show the places of MHS and MEO on the conflict negotiation cycle to offer a better understanding.

Vukovic asserts that MEO is a formulated outcome that does not favor one party over another one and "the notion of acceptability or mutuality implies that the parties are driven to accept a solution that serves not only their interests, but also the interests of their counterparts" (Vukovic, 2019: 193). According to Zartman, even though a previously established bargaining zone is not a must for negotiations, the negotiators themselves creates a bargaining zone if no bargaining zone is already out there and they try to get the parties into that zone to resolve the conflict or reach for a mutually enticing opportunity (2012: 314).

Stalemate is a gridlock felt by the conflicting parties, which prevents them from obtaining their objectives with optimum expenses in a conflict. However, it is not enough for the conflicting parties to feel it. A stalemate should be hurting the parties and making them feel weary and unwilling for a costly escalation for a way out. Nevertheless, sometimes a mutually hurting stalemate - MHS - is not enough for the parties to sit on a negotiation desk

and an impending catastrophe is regarded as a time limit and harbinger of undesirable expenses, hence composing one of the necessary conditions (2002: 353).

Even though an MHS is a necessary condition for the start of negotiations, alone it is not sufficient for the start since the negotiators should find a way out of the ongoing conflict (Zartman and Rubin, 2000: 242). However, as ripeness is related to perception of the parties, in some cases mediators take an important role for the facilitation of communication between the parties and for helping the parties to understand that they are actually in a mutually hurting stalemate; yet in some cases they could let the conflict ripen to have a stalemate "by affecting the actual objective conditions on the ground" (Vukovic, 2019:186). For this reason, mediators have the power to manipulate the parties' perceptions on the mutually hurting stalemate (186).

1.3.1.4. BATNA vs. ZOPA

Fisher and Ury call it as a BATNA, which stands for the best alternative to a negotiated agreement. As Crump puts it "a negotiator may benefit from several alternatives, but it is actually the best alternative that will most influence his or her decision to reach agreement or walk away" (1991: 134). Fisher and Ertel suggest setting the BATNA is necessary to decide on staying at the desk for negotiation or walking away without any result (1995: 75).

BATNA helps increasing a negotiator's bargaining power in a negotiation on contrary to the traditional consideration regarding power as something "determined by resources like wealth, political connections, physical strength, friends, and military might", yet there is always another option of not getting to an agreement in a negotiation (Fisher and Ury, 1991: 52). Developing possible BATNA needs "(1) inventing a list of actions you might conceivably take if no agreement is reached; (2) improving some of the more promising ideas and converting them into practical alternatives; and (3) selecting, tentatively, the one option that seems best" (53). Developing a better BATNA helps also developing better terms for an agreement and knowing the options in the hand if the negotiation does not end with an agreement gives negotiators an increased confidence during the negotiation process (53).

In addition, it is important to know the other parties' alternative options to a negotiated agreement, so it helps making better estimations (Fisher and Ury, 1991: 53). A better BATNA also helps converting resources into an efficient negotiation power (54). A well-prepared BATNA helps to decide when to walk away or when to stay at the negotiation desk (Ury, 1995: 75). There is a line between walking away or staying and continuing the negotiations. Ury calls it a "bottom-line", which is the line a negotiator could turn to the alternative options, namely the BATNA, so the BATNA should be a better option than the one served at the negotiation desk (75). However, as to McCarthy, BATNA is "a more flexible notion than bottom line and can be changed without invoking the same feelings of guilt" and it is a step where the parties can decide on their second step when they see the agreement will fail (1999: 116)

BATNA is a flexible bottom line also drawing the frame of the zone of a possible agreement since as Sebenius mentions if the two parties prefer own BATNA to a mutual end then there is no way out for a mutual agreement (Sebenius, 2017: 90). BATNA is an alternative agreement that can meet the needs of a negotiator and having a better alternative gives more power as it gives an option to the negotiator to walk away (Lewicki et. al. 2016: 101). BATNA and ZOPA are interrelated. They are like different sides of a medallion. If the negotiating party chooses BATNA and walks away from the negotiation desk, it means that there is no possible zone of agreement, which is also called as NOPA. However, if the parties' bottom lines coincide in some points, there exist the zone of possible agreement. ZOPA was first introduced by Howard Raiffa (1994) as 'zone of agreement'. ZOPA is also called as 'bargaining range' or 'agreement zone' to point out the zone where "the respective minimum targets of the parties overlap" (Jung and Krebs, 2019). The availability of ZOPA does not assure an agreement and it is "a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a successful negotiation" (Mnookin, 2015: 216). The Figure 21 below shows the ZOPA.

Figure 21. Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA)



ZOPA indicates an agreement and if there is no ZOPA – this situation is called as NOPA – it means that there is no possible agreement (Jung and Krebs, 2019) since the bottom lines of the parties are not even close to one another. If there is no available ZOPA then "it means that no matter how hard the parties try – even if neither side engaged in strategic behavior and was completely open about its underlying interests and alternatives – there could be no deal" (Mnookin, 2015: 216). The Figure 22 shows the NOPA in a diagram. When the parties do not believe that the advantageous outcomes of a possible agreement will overcome their losses there is no possibility of an agreement. That means their interests are totally different that could make them leave their positions and it is not something acceptable for them to give up all or most of their positions, so they cannot reach an agreement (Merrils, 1991).

Figure 22. No Zone of Possible Agreement (NOPA)

Lewicki et. al. urge that "the availability of a BATNA offers a negotiator significant power because he or she now has a choice between accepting the other party's proposed deal, but

not on absolute terms – only whether it is comparable to some alternative deal that is also available" and add that "any viable BATNA gives the negotiator the choice to walk away from the current deal or to use the BATNA as leverage to strike a better agreement in the current conversation" (2016: 198). Besides, Lewicki et. al. warns the negotiators to be careful about their BATNAs since they have to know the relationship between their BATNA and a possible agreement and they need to work to improve their BATNA to strengthen their power (2016: 275).

1.3.1.5. Track II Diplomacy vs. Back-Channel Negotiations

Track II diplomacy is another form of pre-negotiation, "a process designed to assist official leaders to resolve or, in the first instance, to manage conflicts by exploring possible solutions out of public view and without requirements to formally negotiate or bargain for advantage (Aggestam, 2005: 279). Civil society groups sometimes support Track I negotiations with their contribution into Track II negotiations (Wanis-St. John and Kew, 2008: 18-19).

Track II negotiation, also called as back-channel negotiation, contributes into a peace process not only by facilitating the cooperation and relationship building, but also by keeping the secrecy of the meetings and taking the spoilers out of the process (Dochartaigh, 2011: 777). Parties can sometimes use a third party, an unofficial person, who acts like a messenger between these parties for back-channel negotiations and these messengers have been mostly journalists as was for negotiations during the Cuban missile crisis and Iran hostage crisis and at sometimes parties use back-channel negotiations when they do not want the interference from a third party as was in negotiations between the Azeri and Armenian negotiators who do not want a US-Russian mediation initiative called as Minsk Group (Wanis-St.John, 2006: 121).

Track II diplomacy has an important advantage over direct negotiations and it helps negotiators to get away from formal characteristics of an official negotiation, which are preventing them from taking risks and their own initiatives. Track II diplomacy gives the negotiators the freedom of movement, a broader place for their actions and a better environment for communication and creativity, which results in creation of more effective solutions to take the negotiations out of gridlocks where official discussions brought along (Faure, 2005: 43). Official discussions also do not let the negotiators to confess their objectives, hence track II diplomacy aims to make improved relations among the parties letting them to express their ideas and feelings with the help of the unofficial environment, which the official one cannot afford (Jeong, 2017: 130).

As opposed to the Track I negotiations that symbolize the official talks between the parties Track II talks or negotiations are informal or unofficial preliminary contacts between the parties that normally begin before the official start of the negotiations and play an important role within the whole negotiation process since they help the parties increase their contacts and informal negotiations with the other parties thanks to social events (Dupont and Faure, 2002: 42).

Depending on an extensive literature review Benziman thinks that three different kinds of tracks in diplomacy literature: track one negotiation, which is the traditional one between the official representatives of the conflicting parties; track II negotiation, which is held between unofficial but influential representatives and lastly track three negotiation, which involves people from both parties that come together for grassroots meetings (2016: 51). Track II, back-channel, negotiations offer an opportunity for the negotiating parties to keep the secrecy of the talks and eliminate the spoilers' activities by keeping them out of the negotiation process (Wanis-St. John, 2006: 127).

Track II diplomacy or back-channel negotiations, as also called, is advantageous for maintaining the secrecy of some meetings during a negotiation process and for building confidence among the conflicting parties.

1.3.2. Preparation

Preparation is one of the important steps determining the result of a negotiation: a successful negotiation or failed one. Salacuse emphasizes its importance for a successful negotiation and states that "the difference between a successful and unsuccessful negotiation lies all too often in the quality of the parties' preparation" and adds that "negotiators often fail to make an agreement or to derive maximum benefit from their negotiation because one or both sides did not prepare effectively for the encounter" (2008: 46-47).

For this reason, Salacuse puts an emphasis on a well-prepared pre-negotiation phase and proposes a seven-step preparation method: (1) determining goals, (2) organizing the team, (3) making a research about the other party, (4) determining options, (5) defining the interests and considering the other parties' interests, (6) identifying the issues, (7) formulating mutually beneficial proposals in advance (2008: 47-64). As is understood from these steps Salacuse offered for a good preparation the first step is setting a clear strategy for the interests and later comes the second one for forming a good team with required skills and abilities - here the team divides into two: negotiators at the desk and the team behind the ones at the desk assisting them (46-53). The third one is about collecting information about the other party or parties to decide on the necessary steps to be taken during the negotiations. For the fourth one Salacuse stress the importance of the BATNA and states that information on the best alternative helps confidence building and improving the best alternative that might help increasing trust and negotiation power (53-58). The fifth step draws attention to interests to be satisfied when negotiating and to the importance of considering the other parties' interests instead of taking the positions into consideration (58-62). The sixth step needs clarification of the issues to be discussed at the negotiation desk and preparation to answer the issues to come up during the negotiations (62-63). The last step requires the negotiators to draft proposals meeting the interests of the parties that could turn into a draft agreement (63-64).

Like the preparation steps set forward by Salacuse above, Tomlin proposes a four-step preparation process: problem identification, search for options, commitment to negotiation and agreement to negotiate (1989: 258-260). The first step is about understanding and assessing the problem that came out as a consequence of "changing events or conditions

and a preliminary evaluation of alternative responses that may or may not add negotiation to the range of policy options" (258-259). The second step is about choosing negotiation as an alternative for the problem defined at the first step and normally the parties feel the need for a negotiation (259). The third one is the definitive one taking the parties from the "whether to negotiate to what will be negotiated" and here the parties start to discuss how to address the problem when negotiating (259). The final step is the final decision of the parties for a negotiated solution for their problem and it is the commitment of the parties for this direction (260).

According to Salacuse, preparation plays an important role in determining the success of a negotiation. The quality of preparation of the parties defines the success or fail of a negotiation because generally one of the parties or both of the parties have not well prepared for the negotiations (2013:133).

Regarding preparations choosing the venue for negotiations is another deal. Mostly a venue in a third party's country is chosen for negotiations. Switzerland and Nordic countries like Norway and Sweden are more often preferred by the conflicting parties for negotiations owing to these countries hundred-years long neutrality (e.g. Switzerland, Austria and the Hague) or their contribution into global peace efforts for the last six decades with their esteemed organizations like the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). Their neutrality comes from conventions or laws like the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and UN Conferences on Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities in 1961. Different from the neutral position of Switzerland and Austria, the position of the Hague in the Netherlands as a negotiation venue comes from its position to host the International Court of Justice and the Permanent Court of Arbitration despite its membership at the NATO (Berridge: 2015: 37). The parties leave the decision to set the venue to their diplomatic missions or the commission within these missions in considerably more friendly relationships if the issue is not a big issue. They normally choose the main foreign embassy for meetings like London in the UK or Ankara in Turkey (36).

1.3.3. Negotiation Proper

This phase is the one when the official and public negotiations start. After the preparation and pre-negotiation stages, the official negotiations start with the participation of the negotiators and delegations into the negotiation process at the negotiation venue, mostly with the facilitation or mediation of the third parties. During this stage, the parties make it public and the negotiation process is no more secrecy between the negotiating parties and the mediators. The process itself determines the result: a mutually accepted and negotiated agreement. Depending on the result of the agreement, the negotiation process could be called as successful or failed.

Mediation and power-sharing are important issues in proper negotiations. Below these issues will be handled in detail.

1.3.3.1. Mediation

Third-party involvement is one of the ways for taking conflict resolution further steps ahead and mediation efforts mostly constitute the basics of it. Bercovitch defines mediation as

one of the oldest conflict resolution methods throughout the history when some provisions on third party mediation were found in 'Amarna letters' narrating the rule of the King Amenhotep IV around 3500 years ago and mentions some others in the Bible and in Homer's Iliad (2002: 4). Mediation is also considered as one of third-party involvement methods, yet this kind of an involvement does not include a usage of force or supporting one of the conflicting parties to win (Zartman, 2008: 155). Here the mediator can only try to convince the conflicting parties for an agreement, but cannot force them to sign an agreement because any decision to reach an agreement is taken by the parties in charge (Korobkin, 2002: 344). Korobkin states that when taking this decision, the parties in charge and their associates prefer to get assistance from an impartial party (344). Korobkin also calls mediation as "facilitated negotiation" since as different from "adjudication and arbitration" mediation is more like negotiation (344).

Figure 23. Mediator at a negotiation desk for a resolution of intra-state conflict.



Mediators benefit from three different actions to take the parties' interest to a mutually agreeable settlement of the conflict: communication, formulation and manipulation especially when direct negotiation is not possible owing to the conflict (Zartman, 2013: 17).

Figure 24. Negotiation desk of negotiations for resolving intra-state conflicts.



Mediators are neutral outsiders helping negotiators to reach a mutually-accepted agreement and what is expected from them is their facilitation for the negotiation process, but not a mandate for a solution (Raiffa, 1994: 23). Unlike arbitrators, they do not dictate solutions to the negotiations; however, sometimes stronger mediators might propose solutions and use their power to urge the negotiators to go ahead with it (218). A mediator may show the parties an optional way for a compromise agreement instead of a no-agreement end at the end (23). Apart from offering new bargains for the parties in their search of a solution, mediators help their best for face-saving mechanisms and to keep the communication channel open (109). The Figures 23 and 24 tries to give the picture of a mediator in negotiations for resolving an intra-state conflict.

According to Raiffa, there are two types of mediators: weak and strong mediators. Weak mediators might not do more than convening the messages between the parties to keep the communication on as an impartial leader for discussions and acting like a moderator for a sophisticated debate; however, strong mediators are more active in complicated negotiations like contributing into the implementation of an agreement "by preparing well-written public relations documents that explain the necessity for compromise, by giving a stamp of approval to compromise agreements, by attesting that both sides negotiated in good faith and that no hidden agreements were secretly arrived at, by helping with the verification of agreements, by helping with grievances that might arise in the future because of ambiguities in the contract" (1994: 218-219).

A mediator is an important figure in a negotiation process who highlights the fact that the conflict at the negotiation desk is not a competition to win but to resolve (Raiffa, 1994: 219). In addition to the efforts to mediate among the parties, a mediator can also create a draft agreement text and open it for modifications of the negotiators and help the parties in separate sessions to define their adjustments (219).

Various actors play interconnected roles in a mediation process, but the central figure of this process is the mediator also called as the facilitator, who is not alone in making decisions and needs the support of others (Armengol, 2013: 4). The main objective of a mediator is to offer a satisfactory solution to the conflicting parties for their problems, but

a mediator will not give them the key but show them how to find out the related methods to find the solution by themselves (4). Mediation is needed in three basic phases of negotiation: pre-negotiation, official negotiation and implementation of the agreement and different mediators or facilitators like individuals, organizations or agencies can join the process with different roles in each step (4).

Negotiations can start without a help by an outside intervener when the conflicting parties think that it is the right time to start, yet most of the time a mediator is needed during the course of negotiations since a mediator is very important in finding out the readiness and willingness of the parties for a pre-negotiation process (Armengol, 2013: 4). For this reason, Armengol sees the mediators as explorers who are playing a significant role in determining if it is the right time to start for pre-negotiations after meeting the parties (2013: 4).

As Armengol asserts it is not efficient for the members of the armed groups to sit on a negotiation desk after fighting some years in the battlefield and states that how the armed groups took a strategy for official negotiations like taking official courses and trainings on democratization, military army, governance, procedures regarding democratic national and provincial institutions at different countries (2013: 4-5).

A mediator can be an internationally reputable person, yet even so a team consisting of professionals and technical accompanies him or her in mediation process. The mediator is the person who chairs the discussions, plays out the visible roles, makes the process public, hence he or she get the most of the credit when the process is successfully finished, but a mediator's work alone is not achievable without the assistance and help of the team, an important part of a mediation course (Armengol, 2013: 5).

Apart from the international or regional organizations, institutions, internationally recognized individual and agencies, civil society can act as a mediator as was in the case of Assam in India where the People's Consultative Group played that role to witness the discussions with the rebel movement of the United Liberation Front of Assam and like the Columbian civil society representatives observing the peace process between the government and the rebel movement during the Caracas and Tlaxcala negotiations (Armengol, 2013: 6). Some other time, like the civil society, the Church or a professional politician or the technical staff can join the process to witness or confirm it as the Church witnessed the talks between the Philippine government and the MILF (Moro Islamic Liberation Front) members and like Bill Clinton who witnessed the peace talks between the Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and the Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat (6-7). Civil and military technical specialists are needed especially for ceasefire agreement and normally UN staff are involved (7).

Kovach says that mediation is "a flexible process defined and re-defined by the disputants and the mediator in each case" and considers that this flexibility gives strength to the mediation process itself (2005: 304). Kovach also describes the basic roles of a mediator as organizer, communication director, intervenor and guide, encourager of settlement, and listener (2005: 308-309).

Mediator has several different roles as mentioned above, but a mediator's role does not end with a negotiated agreement, but it includes assistance for the implementation of that agreement in political, social and economic fields (Hampson, 1996: 207). Since peacebuilding is a very delicate process that needs re-interpretation, nurturing and improvement under skillful hands mediators play a significant role during this stage to help agreements become established (Hampson, 1996: 234).

Facilitation is one of the basics of a mediation process and it helps the parties to rearrange their positions and reinterpret their interest with the information flow from the mediators (Vukovic, 2019: 188). Vukovic associates mediators with drivers as they go between the parties to facilitate and maintain the communication (2019: 200). Besides, they help the parties to have workable alternatives to end the conflict and they encourage them to get a mutually accepted solution. A third-party involvement creates a perception among the conflicting parties that the conflict has developed into an intolerable one and started to disturb their own interests, hence the mediator plays an important role in convincing them for a mutually enticing solution that is not possible for them with fighting and bilateral talks (200).

Mediators offers solutions to the parties and emphasize their commonality, interdependence, collaboration and individuality for each of the parties that seem to them as enticing opportunities. Mutually enticing opportunities also aim to build trust among the parties and so rearrange their relationships (Vukovic, 2019: 200).

According to Vukovic, mediators are the main players in the negotiation process leading the parties from deceitful actions to an efficient end and "as the mediators become aware that the solution is within reach, in the final stages of the process they may opt to keep the parties mindful of an imminent catastrophe if they decide to defect from the process, they may use procedural tools to expedite the process and foster a sense of urgency to accept the deal, and they may project various incentives that they are ready to grant to the parties if they promptly and constructively end the conflict" (2019: 200). For this reason, when the parties are not capable enough to terminate the conflict in peace, then the mediators take charge to put an peaceful end to the conflict and lead the parties to this end (200).

Horowitz define mediation as "the intervention of a third party unfamiliar to the conflict, trustable, unbiased and intending to be neutral" (2007: 51). Mediator definition comes along as "a facilitator, educator or communicator who helps to clarify issues, identify and manage emotions, and create options, thus making it possible to reach an agreement avoiding an adversarial battle in court" (51). The aim of mediation is to stop ongoing conflict and replace it with a peace settlement regarding the interests of the third party handling the mediation process, for this reason mediation is also different from arbitration that requires a verdict that the parties have already agreed on its acceptance and here with mediation the parties are free to accept the ideas and proposals set forth by the mediating third party (155).

Svensson asserts that a mediators' biased position stems from his or her "special relationships" coming from the past like supplying resources to one of the parties during the conflict (2009: 448-449). These biased mediators "can manipulate this special

relationship – for instance, by withholding or increasing the resources that they give to 'their' side" (449). This kind of relationship between a biased mediator and the parties result in a power of leverage that the mediator could enjoy.

Mediators in a negotiation help the parties to get into communication, show their cards to each other and they also make some recommendation for the parties trying to set a framework for a mutual agreement that could make each of the parties satisfied with the process. Mediators normally are external to the conflict between the parties and they "often must use leverage to gain acceptance" and "their intervention transforms the bargaining structure from a dyad to a triad" (Touval, 1999: 359). Mediator's leverage comes from the needs of the parties and "mediator's ability to exert pressure and offer inducements and side-payments in order to persuade the parties to agree" (359). Apart from mediator's skills in leverage the method of single negotiating text can be good help in negotiation process since this text can help the mediator to become a go-between among the conflicting parties for adding or omitting some parts in or out of the draft (359). Nevertheless, leverage does not have to come from mediators only and outside actors can have leverage on the conflicting parties especially in a civil war thanks to economic intervention. As Lounsbery and DeRouen states outside actors "may offer financial incentives, such as foreign aid or investment opportunities, in an effort to entice reluctant civil war governments to compromise, or they may threaten those states with pushing sanctions or economic embargoes" (2016: 316).

As Zartman puts it even though leverage can be a ticket for mediation "mediators tend to remain relatively powerless throughout the exercise" and the extent of the mediator's power depends entirely on the parties, whose acceptance of a mediator depends on its likelihood (potential power) of producing an outcome agreeable to both sides" (2013: 19). Here mediator executes this leverage power in six ways: "persuasion, extraction, termination, limitation, deprivation and gratification" (19). In persuasion the mediator persuades the parties for an option which is more convenient then getting in a conflict. In extraction the mediator achieves a proposal from one of the parties, which looks favorable for another one. The mediator leaves the conflicting parties on their own by terminating in mediating between them in termination. In limitation the mediator would like to be the only one without welcoming other mediators into the game. The mediator takes resources from one party and gives them to another one in deprivation and "adds resources to the outcome" in gratification (Zartman, 2013: 19-20). Zartman here stresses that the mediator normally benefits from the power of leverage both in deprivation and gratification since these ways of leverage are about the resources and outcomes, the mediator can play between these two methods to persuade the parties in his or her efforts for mutual settlement (20).

The concept of power in mediation is considered as 'leverage' and even though leverage is regarded as the first step of mediation, mediators prefer to stay powerless during the mediation process (Zartman, 2007: 167). If leverage is not the power of a mediator, then where does its power come from? Zartman asserts that the power of a mediator comes from the acceptance of the possibility of a mutually-accepted solution to be offered by the mediator, but adds that this expectation haunts the mediation process (167). The parties

want to benefit from the practicality and success of the outcome assisted by a mediator, hence a mediator's leverage power is under the control of the conflicting parties, who consider the whole mediation process as an interference apart from a possible workable solution (167). Interestingly, Zartman asserts that they want the mediators to use leverage over the other party and they do not welcome when the mediators use the same on them (167). According to Zartman, a mediator has six ways of using leverage: "first, persuasion, the ability to portray an alternative future as more favorable than the continuing conflict; second, extraction, the ability to produce an attractive position from each party; third, termination, the ability to withdraw from the mediation; fourth, limitation, the ability to block other alternatives; fifth, deprivation, the ability to withhold resources from one side or to shift them to the other; and sixth, gratification, the ability to add resources to the outcome" (167).

Sahadevan asserts that the objective of the third party to change the attitude, interpretation and preferences of the conflicting parties for a settlement is key for a successful mediation process (2006: 259). Even though the mediator plays an important part on this process, as Sahadevan adds, its role is not fixed for every other internal conflict and its nature, power and relationship with the conflicting parties also changes its role and defines it (259). Nevertheless, it is clear that third parties as guarantors of negotiated peace agreements can facilitate the implementation of the agreement and the communication between the parties because they can also make a safe haven for its implementation (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2007: 104).

Zartman calls the Mutually Hurting Stalemate as a way out in the previous chapter. Now, regarding mediation, he emphasizes that conflicting parties welcomes the mediation as a way out since not different from the mediators they think that this kind of a way-out solution will get more favorable outcomes than maintaining the conflict. According to Zartman, welcoming any attempts for mediation the parties to the ongoing conflict think that mediation will stop the conflict and pave the way for a peaceful settlement that all the way comes as negotiation (Zartman, 2013: 17).

Zartman proposes three different modes of mediation: communication, formulation and manipulation. In the first mode, the mediator behaves as a communicator opening the channels for communication between the parties by enabling the contact and transferring the messages in between. In this way, the mediator helps them interpret the messages when the conflict still continues. In the second mode, the mediator steps in negotiation between the conflicting parties both to keep the communication channels open and to formulate a solution for the ongoing conflict. In the third mode the mediator behaves as a manipulator getting involved to find a solution for the conflict and "uses its power to bring the parties to an agreement, pushing and pulling them away from conflict and into resolution" (Zartman, 2013: 18).

Zartman also describes mediation as a triangular relationship (see Figure 25) because a mediator behaves like a communicator allowing the correspondence between the parties and a formulator conveying the messages and pressures and a manipulator challenging the validity of the relationship between the parties and itself (2013: 18).

Figure 25. Mediator in a triangulated process of mediation.



Source: Derived from Zartman, (2013).

Bercovitch puts forward the relationship between the commitment to mediation and the source of the demand for a conflict resolution. According to Bercovitch, on condition that only one of the conflicting parties demands for a mediation, a successful result for that mediation is quite low because mediation only offers successful results when both of the parties demand "rewarding opportunities" instead of a request coming from one party or a mediator (2002: 19).

Figure 26. Characteristics of mediation.



Source: Derived from Bercovitch, (2002).

In line with what Bercovitch lists above on the figure regarding the characteristics of the mediation, Pruitt below lists some implications on the practice of mediation depending on a number of research findings:

- Mediators should discourage direct interaction between disputants whose relationship is heavily strained.

- The greater the danger of escalation, the earlier a mediator should become involved in a case.
- Starting with easier issues encourages a problem-solving approach.
- Mediator optimism about finding a settlement is more important the greater the divergence of interest between the disputants.
- When mediators have the power to arbitrate, disputants tend to shy away from hostile displays and to embrace problem-solving approaches.
- Mediators are more motivated in med-arb when they have the power to arbitrate than when someone else will do the arbitrating.
- When there is a large divergence of interest, third parties should refrain from announcing an intention to intercede; but such an intention should be announced when there is a small divergence of interest.
- Mediators will be more successful in encouraging concessions and problem solving to the extent that they put disputants into a good mood (Pruitt, 1986).

According to Touval, mediation brings to the negotiation process another perspective transforming it into a trilateral process instead of the bilateral one with the inclusion of the mediator into the talks (170). Together with this change in the characteristics of the negotiation process the negotiations are held between the parties and the mediator. As to Touval, this situation also changes the power characteristics of the negotiation because it also makes changes in the power relations. Now, the mediator takes its mediating role depending its strong and weak position, which creates another channel for communication between the conflicting parties. Touval thinks that this process of mediating resembles the negotiation process between conflicting parties since "the mediator, like any negotiator, bargains with the other parties, using its sources as sticks and carrots" (170).

Touval defines the essence of mediation as a voluntary action, so the parties are free to welcome or reject mediators and their recommendations for a conflict resolution (2002: 170). Other than being a voluntary action mediation is used by the states "as a foreign policy instrument" and "the desire to make peace, however, is intertwined with other motives best described within the context of power politics" (Zartman, 2008: 156). Since, as Zartman asserts mediators are just within the game itself, so they have their own interests in involving as mediators (2008: 156).

Salacuse emphasizes that building relationships with powerful outsiders that are not involved with the negotiation desk is one of the efficient ways for a weak party to enhance its strength and he underlines that in most of the cases this powerful outsider is a powerful third party that can have influence on the other party (2000: 258). He also tries to find a right answer for the question of appropriate third party. He warns that this choice for a third party should be carefully made. Salacuse recommends the weaker parties to ask these questions regarding a right third-party choice: "What interests does the third party have in becoming involved? How might those interest affect the weaker party's interests? How might the third party influence the decisions of the other side in the negotiation?" (258). Salacuse also adds that normally third parties go behind their interests and sometimes their focus on their own interests may conflict with or block the negotiation process itself (258). Under normal circumstances a party inclines to choose a third party, a mediator among the friends of the other party on condition that the friend does not have an intention to give the weaker party to the other one. According to Salacuse, "getting the adversary's friend involved in the process harnesses the friend's interest in an agreement, which can then be

used to extract concessions from the adversary as the price of the agreement" (259). However, another choice for a right third party is to find an independent one "which can also be helpful as a friend of the weaker party if the latter feels that its cause can be furthered by impartiality and justice because power often serves as a 'corrective' to justice, a neutral third party is often useful but its sense of justice, out of many possible interpretations, must fit the notions of the weaker party" (259).

Pruitt states that third parties normally act in a communication chain mediating between the parties and emphasizes that they behave like go-between if the parties are not in direct communication as mostly seen in violent conflicts and they also behave like political covers since the negotiation principals do not want to be considered within the process and they want to make use of the intermediaries (2005: 258). They also help creating solutions for the problems because they share some common values and develop trust among them within the same chain. They also help developing trust during the negotiation process since as "adjacent chain members are likely to be more trusting and have more influence over each other than those who are farther apart" and "in addition, principals are more likely to accept a proposal from an intermediary than from their adversary, because they trust the intermediary more and can more easily justify such concessions to their constituents", which paves the way for an agreement (258).

Like Salacuse, Smith draws attention to the impartiality of the mediator and he states that mediator's relationship with one of the parties is linked with leverage problem and "in many cases, the stronger the mediator's relationship with the other party, the greater its leverage; hence, the more desirable it is as a mediator" and Smith adds that "the mediator's relationship with one adversary may be seen by the other as representing possible leverage for wresting concessions" (1999: 422-424).

Regarding the right third-party choice Brett et. al recommends choosing an artist whom they can trust and whose renowned past they know since mediators are like artists owing to the skills they have that are hard to acquire through trainings (1986: 278).

Third party mediating roles are not only limited to some people and states having interest in the outcome of the settlement of the ongoing conflict. Apart from regional states and powerful states, small and medium-sized states like Australia, New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland and non-state organizations like international nongovernmental organizations like the Community of Sant'Egidio are actively taking part in conflict resolution and negotiation processes for the countries in the Middle East, Africa and Asia Pacific (Hampson et. al. 2007: 39). These states and bodies not only offer their services for proper negotiations, but also they follow the peace process coming after a negotiated peace agreement (39).

International or regional players like international and regional organizations together with transnational organizations such as the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the UN and Sant Egidio, the Amnesty International play an important role as mediators in conflict resolution since they behave like the representatives of the member countries bound with formal treaties and their members can come together on regular basis to have meetings for setting their objectives and defining their interests (Bercovitch, 2002: 13). As Bercovitch

emphasizes no other international organization than the UN has been taking an effective and significant role in conflict resolution and peacemaking since its foundation after the WWII War especially during the conflicts emerged right after the Cold War (2002: 13).

The UN, as a huge international organ turned out to be the right place to find solutions for the ongoing conflicts on the world, to deal with the peace processes and to find peaceful solutions for them and despite many criticism after its way of handling intractable conflicts like the ones in Rwanda, Somalia, Bosnia, Angola, Cambodia, Yugoslavia and Afghanistan it proved its determination for different types of hard and intractable conflicts and their peaceful resolution (Bercovitch, 2002: 13). Beside the contribution of the international organizations the significance of the regional organizations has recently increased especially during the post-Cold War period. As Bercovitch states the regional ones like the EU, OAS, the OAU and Arab League preferred negotiation or mediation methods for resolving conflicts in their region (2002: 13).

Dunn and Kriesberg deal with the role and contribution of transnational organizations in mediation for conflict resolution. They note different stages of the mediating activities held by the transnational organizations such as preparation and mediation, initiation and mediation, implementation and mediation. Dunn and Kriesberg also mentions the contribution of these organizations especially into the preparation for negotiations and their aids for initiation in mediation and negotiation processes including implementation and coordination helps (2002: 196-210).

Dunn and Kriesberg also asserts that transnational organizations can be more effective for conflict resolution in large-scale conflicts because as they "function at all levels, but tend to have relatively more linkages at the grass-roots, middle-rank, and sub-elite levels compared to governmental actors" and for this reason, "while official mediators are working with the leading officials of the antagonistic sides, various transnational organizations may be working with grass-roots or middle-rank level". Hence, Dunn and Kriesberg claims that their activities in all levels could help an increase of awareness regarding the "relevance of cultural factors and their salience for the conflict" (2002: 210).

Pruitt stresses the importance of mediators in shuttle diplomacy especially when the conflicting parties are not eager or able to come together like US State Secretary Henry Kissinger mediated between the capitals of Israel and Egypt in 1973 since it requires several mediators instead of one to reach both of the parties and understand their interests and demands. When the adversary is not around during the meetings with the mediator negotiators assume they are more comfortable and they share information with mediators that could pave the way for an integrative solution and they hold more open discussions regarding the concessions and/or compromises without softening their position (Bercovitch, 2002).

Regarding the shuttle diplomacy Brett et. al. name it as a proactive one in which mediators separate the conflicting parties and try to find a tangible solution for the conflict by moving forth and back between the parties. However, they also mention the other mediating style called as "dealmaking" style that help mediators to keep the conflicting parties together, instead of separating them, to facilitate the compromise between them. In the shuttle

diplomacy the mediator acts like a go-between, yet in the dealmaking style the mediator is much more active in formulating a reasonable settlement and selling it to the conflicting parties (1986: 280).

As to the shuttle diplomacy of Kissinger, Saunders draws attention to the Middle East peace process in the 1970s and adds that US activities trying to convince the Saudi government to lift the embargo and to start the relations with the Arab states thanks to some mutual economic commissions made Egypt to reconsider its orientation from the Soviet bloc to the West, which created a complicated process including negotiations that is "an inseparable part of a larger diplomatic process designed in part to help build a political environment that would make the next round of negotiation more possible" (1985: 251). Susskind and Ozawa states that depending on the US interest in "protecting or enhancing the power and reputation of the United States in the Middle East, particularly in relation to the perceived interests and objectives of the Soviet Union" Kissinger did more than what his 'facilitator' and 'mediator' role required by controlling the communication channels between the parties, convincing them for concessions, covering the real bargaining powers of the parties, offering his own resolution methods, organizing the negotiation talks and sometimes acting "as a scapegoat and deflector of the parties' anger and frustration, rather than allowing the parties to express their emotions to one another" (1999: 413).

Pruitt makes important explanations about the mediator's power indicating that mediator's power comes from the affiliated organization. He points out that strong mediator's main tool is manipulation while the weaker one's main tool is "communication and formulation rather than manipulation" since "they include the capacity to transmit and interpret messages, to bring realism into the parties' conceptions of each other, to frame the issues, and to make suggestions for settlement" (Bercovitch, 2002: 51).

Pruitt also mentions that the status of the mediator, which stems from the organization or state the mediator belongs to and mediator's position in that organization or state, is an important factor contributing into the mediator's effectiveness (Bercovitch, 2002: 51). The mediator's status changes according to the power or weakness of the related organization or state, for example "having a high-status position in a powerful organization contributes to the credibility of threats and promises made by a mediator" (51).

Mediation is one of the methods of a third-party involvement and it is different from the other forms of involvement in its style that does not include using force and helping one of the parties to become victorious in the end. The main objective of a mediation as a third-party involvement form is to bring an end to the ongoing conflict with a settlement, which is mutually acceptable for the parties and compatible with their interests (Avenhaus and Zartman, 2007: 155). Mediation, for example, is different from arbitration that needs a judicial process resulting in a verdict, which the parties have already accepted to commit at the beginning before taking it to arbitration. However, mediation is a part of negotiation process that basically assists the parties to find a solution for the conflict that they are not able to find by themselves (155). Unlike arbitration, a mediation process also needs the consent of the conflicting parties at the beginning, but as Zartman points out it normally

meets the rejection of the parties, so a mediator give effort to convince the parties before the mediation process begin (156).

Avenhaus and Zartman claim that states benefit from mediation as a foreign policy tool and their involvement is legitimate when the main objective is to terminate the conflict, so they involve in the conflict when they have an interest at the end of the process (2007: 156). Mediators pay attention to the issues under negotiation and they do not show an interest in issues that are not related with their own concerns "even though mediators' interests usually allow for a wider range of acceptable outcomes than the interests of the parties" (156). When the conflict escalates and the parties start to continue the conflict, mediators think about their own interest and take actions carefully to terminate it since the conflict spoil the relationships of the parties with the mediator (156). Zartman asserts that mediators' efforts for mediation are reflections of a self-interested action, for this reason, the resolution of the conflict is only considered as a way of improving relationships with one or all of the parties involved (157). Involvement as a third-party helps the mediators increase their reputation, and influence by mediating and finalizing a negotiated agreement; however, this needs further taking risk and responsibilities (157). Mediator assists the parties to terminate the conflict and to find-out a mutually acceptable solution, which otherwise they are not able to reach, and this assistance brings along the recognition of the parties. However, since the mediator is not supposed to give its full-support to one of the parties, it can contribute into success of the negotiation process with its involvement and show the parties how to get concessions from the other parties with this negotiation process (157).

International mediation is an effective factor in diminishing the conflict and it may happen with the facilitation and mediation of one mediator or it could be a joint action of a group of states alone or under the umbrella of an international organization like the EU, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the UN or some other informal contact groups (Zartman, 2007: 157).

According to Zartman, most of the time the main interest of small or medium sized powers as mediators is to stay away from conflict with the fear that it can spill over their own territory and it can draw in outsiders as the case when India conducted a military intervention in Sri Lanka after contributing into the peace-building process there as a mediator (2007: 158-159). Another interest behind their mediation efforts is to increase their influence and reputation with the help of mediation as when Egypt and Algeria mediated between Iraq and Iran in 1975 to show their practicality to the warring parties and reduce the conflict in Islamic world (159). Zartman gives another example regarding Algeria's mediating efforts during the hostage problem between the USA and Iran with an objective of building good relations with the USA by getting prestige in the eyes of the US public because Algeria was seeking for the US support for their policy in the Western Sahara war against the other player in the region, Morocco (159).

International organizations and the NGOs are other big players in the mediation process and mostly the basic reason behind the existence of the international organizations is to settle the peace and this aim takes its part in the related articles of their charters (Avenhaus

and Zartman, 2007: 160). Avenhaus and Zartman draw attention to the mediation efforts of the international organizations during the post-Cold War era as the they had to interfere most of the armed conflicts of the world with an end of the bipolarity in world order (2007: 159-160).

Mediation is seen as a way out, a more agreeable result than a continuous conflict, hence, the parties believe that mediation will help achieve what direct negotiations cannot provide, an agreeable settlement (Avenhaus and Zartman, 2007: 161). Zartman alleges that even though one of the parties do not want to accept a third-party involvement, the other party could accept mediation since it believes that turning down a mediation may ruin the relations with the mediator and the chances of reaching a common settlement, thus causing the costly conflict to continue (161). Another reason for the parties to accept a mediation is the hope of getting lower the risks emerging after concessions made and the costs of the ongoing conflict. They also think that the mediation process is considered as a warrantee for an ultimate agreement (161).

Compared to the concept of the impartiality of the mediator, Zartman stresses that the mediator's good relationship with one of the parties could be useful for communication, producing original proposals and merging the positions of the parties and this close relationship can trigger the other party's cooperation because it "implies the possibility of delivering" (Zartman, 2007: 161).

According to Zartman, mediators do not intervene into a conflict automatically, but they wait for the time when they think that the conflict is harming its interests or when they see in it an opportunity to promote their interests. Normally, a mediator is not able to notice these harms and opportunities when the controversy between the parties is mild and it can only notice them when the conflict escalates (Zartman, 2007: 164).

1.3.3.2. Power-Sharing

Mezzera et. al. claim that power-sharing provisions are especially found in the agreements that terminated conflicts in societies suffering from ethnic segregation and violence compared to the full-agreements (2009: 11). Hartzell and Hoodie assert that negotiated peace settlements including power-sharing institutions – they also call these settlements as institutionalized settlements – are more likely to result in a durable peace since the conflicting parties show their commitment to the peace process as the efforts and time they give for the process is something they cannot use for something else like continuing the conflict (2007: 41). Building power-sharing institutions is therefore a costly process for the parties and the parties stick to the commitments they give for a successful peace process.

As Fisas asserts almost half of the number of total negotiations include power-sharing and another half is a consequence of demands for autonomy and identity claims, hence it is the very nature of the conflicts and constitutes the basis of negotiation processes (2012: 88). For this reason, he claims that it is important to know the positions of the parties at the beginning as the parties get into the conflict because of their real needs and secret interests (88).

Mezzera et. al. state that power-sharing issue was one of the most difficult one during the implementation stage of the Arusha Accord because the Tutsis were reluctant to end their traditional domination over the Hutus in governmental bodies and the Hutu rebel movements did not want to accept the primary terms of the Accord (2009: 25). Therefore, the implementation period had to include renegotiations regarding power balances in important governmental agencies (26).

Besides being a difficult part, power-sharing provisions are also very fragile part within the peace agreements and their success depend on the power balance between the conflicting parties which is important before and after the agreement process because any movements to change this balance like an incautious international involvement that could change the circumstances can trigger the conflicts again (Mezzera et. al. 2009: 31). The Figure 27 below shows four main elements of power-sharing provisions:

Figure 27. Power-sharing solutions of peace agreements.



Source: Peace Agreements Database, https://www.peaceagreements.org/, Access Date: 13/06/2020.

Hoddie and Hartzell state that the main reason behind creating power-sharing and power-dividing is to reduce the capabilities of any one of the parties to prevail the post-conflict period and exploit its power to damage the interests of other parties (2003: 306). Most of the time, power-sharing and power-dividing agreements that are expected to terminate the violent conflict or war end with a fiasco and one of the parties gain the control of the government (Hoddie and Hartzell, 2003: 306). Apart from facing the risk of a fiasco and thus conceding the power to the other party, signing a power-sharing agreement might result in losing reliability among the group the negotiating party represents and marginal groups with belligerent interests might emerge when their interests are not compatible with the provisions of the power-sharing settlement (306).

When the parties join the implementation stage of a peace agreement, it is regarded as the willingness to burden the costs of the settlement (Hoddie and Hartzell, 2003: 307). Derouen et. al. considers military power-sharing as less costly because the government integrates

the rebel groups into the army, yet it results in a power-loss by the rebel groups side (2009: 370). Despite its risks and costs, Derouen et. al. assert that when the peace agreements include more power-sharing provisions, the possibility of peace is higher and they emphasize that the life-time of a peace agreement is low when these provisions are costly and difficult to fulfill for the government because in this case governments tend to renegotiate and rebel groups look for the right time for a defensive strike before the government moves into action (2009: 367). In these unhealthy cases stemming from inefficient power-sharing provisions, governments tend to quit the peace process since they think they have given too much concessions and the rebels leave the process owing to the delays in implementation and to make a precautionary move (367).

Sriram points out that normally a power-sharing agreement can consist at least one of the four main parts related to the issues of security, territory, politics and economics, yet it is asserted that peace agreements are more successful when they include all of the parts because these parts are strengthening commitment to the peace agreement (Sriram, 2008: 19-20). A power-sharing agreement ensures that "no group comes to dominate the political arena, has exclusive control over the military or territory, or receives a disproportionate share of economic resources" (Mattes and Savun, 2010: 512). The military, political, territorial and economic provisions of a power-sharing agreement address the security needs of rebel groups so as that they should not be harmed by the government's exploitation and under safe circumstances brought by these provisions the parties can come to a mutual agreement and terminate the armed violence (512).

Institutions are formed to share and divide political, military, territorial and economic powers of the government and the parties can benefit from one or a combination of these state powers to reinforce their compelling capabilities, which in the end creates a competitive environment for the parties (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2007: 28) (see Figure 28 below). However, this competitional environment for sharing or dividing the government's power is not free of charge. To integrate the rebel groups into the state army, include other parties to the state bureaucracy and allocate resources for the disadvantaged parties needs extra governmental funds which normally a civil war-torn state cannot afford, for example the Italian government assisted Mozambique to collect the necessary funds about 402 million US Dollars for the General Peace Agreement in 1992 to fulfill military and political provisions (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2007: 53). Hartzell and Hoddie argue that since creating power-sharing or power-dividing institutions require extra funds for a state, while the wealthy states can establish necessary institutions the poorer ones have trouble in creating them as it is far beyond their capabilities and capacities (2007: 53).

Figure 28. Four provisional dimensions of power-sharing.



Mostly power-sharing agreements comes after civil war circumstances and the more powerful side make concessions to have the consent of the less powerful side for the sake of peace agreement and a power-sharing agreement is based on "'competitive', even adversarial relations, a power-sharing regime is 'coalescent' and involves rules to ensure the inclusion of the main parties in a government of national reconciliation" (Rothchild, 2005: 249). Based on a power-sharing agreement following an internal violence or a civil war, which paves the way for the actors to influence decisions to be made in the future, some institutions are introduced to encourage social integration and to provide security and guarantees for all the groups that can later come up as spoilers (Falch and Becker, 2008: 10). These institutions are considered as a fair peacemaking model because they outweigh the necessity for an international involvement by guaranteeing the groups that they will share the power and they also reveal the intentions of the conflicting parties for conciliation. Nevertheless, especially concessions given after establishing these institutions may lead to insecure and dangerous feelings among hardliners as was during the Rwandan Genocide in 1994 when the Hutu extremists showed reaction against the power-sharing agreement with the RPF (Martin, 2013: 335-336).

Rothchild claims that the provisions the power-sharing agreements bring along pose a dilemma for a conflict. Even though they may have short-term advantages like bringing an end to the conflict and violence after getting weaker parties to sign the agreement, they may turn out to be a potential reason for instability depending on ineffective governance and conflict between different groups in long term (2005: 251). Rothchild asserts that even though power-sharing is not considered as a durable solution for most of African civil war-torn states, it makes important contribution into guaranteeing security and welfare for minorities and enlarging representation (2005: 261).

1.3.4. Implementation

Negotiation parties come together to compromise on a mutual solution and this is generally embodied as the mutually accepted and negotiated agreement. However, the agreements are not final. They are not just fruits of one-time-deals. The agreement needs implementation and it has to include necessary clauses and implications for proper implementation. Implementation of a negotiated agreement has two results: a successful implementation or a failed one like the whole negotiation process. Below, first of all, it is discussed why an implementation of an agreement fails and then how an implementation of an agreement succeeds.

Salacuse asserts that the implementation of an agreement fails generally owing to five reasons: flawed agreements, changing circumstances, parties' distrust and deception, lack of resources, failure by the parties to plan the implementation of an agreement (2013: 204). The ill-nature of an agreement brings along failure since the agreements itself has some vague and open ends. The unpredictability of the future also hardens the successful implementation of an agreement as it makes it necessary to foresee possible issues and place the hints into the agreement for a successful and a valid one paving the way for possible amendments on it. Trust again plays an important role in the successful implementation of a negotiated agreement as it plays an important role before and during negotiations, especially during the pre-negotiation phase. Hence, if the parties do not trust one another after they sign the agreement, the agreement results in failure. It is also the same for deception as lack of trust. The parties can use the negotiation process and the agreement they reach in the end as an excuse to achieve their objectives – most of the time to gain time. The successful implementation of negotiated agreements also needs resources like human power, funds, time and related technological aid, but in some cases, it is hard to get these and the agreement fails for this reason. The negotiated agreements reached to end ethnic violence or a civil war most of the time encounter the problem of getting resources, most often the funds needed for implementing the agreement, which has been promised by the third parties to keep the conflicting parties on the track for a mutual peace agreement. The last reason for a failure is the lack of systematic planning of an implementation (Salacuse, 2013: 204-206).

To prevent an implementation of a negotiated agreement from failing and to get effective implementation it is necessary to deal with problems related to implementation in a methodical way; to build relationship between the parties to establish trust among them by forming mutual knowledge, a two-way communication, strong commitment to the agreement and by ensuring reliability and mutual respect; to take the leaders into the implementation process; to make a detailed plan and foresee initial joint activities; to involve a third party or parties for the implementation and finally to leave the door open for future renegotiations (Salacuse, 2013: 206-210).

The implementation phase of a negotiation process mostly includes the establishment of commissions or committees responsible for supervising the fulfillment of the negotiated peace accord in such matters as power-sharing and monetary issues, and refugee problems etc. and in some cases deployment of peace-keeping forces to provide security for both of

the conflicting parties – most of the time these forces are formed by the UN or the regional organizations the African Union.

1.3.4. Post-Negotiation

Post-negotiation is also called as renegotiation. Renegotiation mostly comes in three different types: post-deal renegotiation, intra-deal renegotiation and extra-deal renegotiation (Salacuse, 2008: 163). Post-deal renegotiations are made when an agreement expires and the parties come together to start a negotiation. Intra-deal renegotiation is the one made when the agreement is still in effect and the parties come together at regular basis or depending on the need to negotiate. Extra-deal renegotiations are made when an agreement has been violated or no clause is mentioned on the actual agreement for a renegotiation (163-164).

Apart from being called as renegotiation this phase is called as "talks after talks" as it includes official talks held following the negotiation proper phase. The parties need to come together to discuss further interests that they both have not mentioned during the official negotiations partly because their interests have changed depending on the circumstances and partly because they just wanted to hide some matters to be discussed later. Beside these changing interests and concerns, the parties may need to come together for further negotiations if that was stated in the previously negotiated agreement or as a result of a loop back.

1.4. Factors Influencing Negotiation Process

Negotiation process as all other processes is open to changes and influence of some other factors. The factors influencing the negotiation process will be handled in detail below. These are entrenched positions in comparison with interests, power and power asymmetry, justice and other intangibles, confidence and trust building and spoiler problem.

1.4.1. Entrenched Positions vs. Interests

At first, defining the common interests is not an easy part of the negotiations for the parties as interests symbolize some small and partial interests that may have opposing factors. For this reason, when an outcome agreement is not the result of an internal negotiation it might not be welcomed by some internal groups and can also cause crisis with the other negotiating party since legitimacy is important for right negotiations and without internal consent for the decisions this legitimacy is at stake (Meerts, 2015: 62). This kind of lack of internal consensus and legitimacy can also bear spoilers as the process itself would make some groups or internal parties dissatisfied with the outcome agreement.

Parties have demands and their own style of action to handle with a problem. This is called as position. Interest is a why question behind it and is a concern of the parties triggering them to action for some specific solutions. Positions are solutions satisfying the parties' concealed interests (Shmueli et. al. 2008: 360).

At the beginning of a negotiation cycle parties take positions and they only change their positions depending on the information flow from another party and depending its attitude within the process (Lewicki et. al. 2016: 42). And during the course of negotiation process

other party's position also changes and "changes in position are usually accompanied by new information concerning the other's intentions, the value of outcomes, and likely zones for settlement" (42). Fisher and Ertel define position as "simply one way to satisfy interests" since "interests are different from positions: those assertations, demands and offers that parties make during a negotiation" (1995: 41). Regarding satisfying interests instead of focusing on positions Fisher and Ury gives the library example below, which is mostly used in the literature:

> Consider the story of two men quarreling in a library. One wants the window open and the other wants it closed. They bicker back and forth about how much to leave it open: a crack, halfway, three quarters of the way. No solution satisfies them both. Enter the librarian. She asks one why he wants the window open: "To get some fresh air." She asks the other why he wants it closed: "To avoid the draft." After thinking a minute, she opens wide a window in the next room, bringing in fresh air without a draft. This story is typical of many negotiations. Since the parties' problem appears to be a conflict of positions, and since their goal is to agree on a position, they naturally tend to think and talk about positions and in the process often reach an impasse. The librarian could not have invented the solution she did if she had focused only on the two men's stated positions of wanting the window open or closed. Instead she looked to their underlying interests of fresh air and no draft. This difference between positions and interests is crucial (1991: 23).

Similar to the library sample, orange example is the most used sample for showing the importance of interest than positions in a negotiation. There is only one orange but two sisters each would like to get the whole orange for different reasons behind. One wants to eat it and the other one wants to peel it and use the peel for her cake. In the end they split the orange into two and share it 50-50. One is happy with her half eating it and the other one is also happy in the end using her share of 50% of orange for her cake. Hence, they can come from an extreme situation to a 50-50 split of the orange. They understood what they really want – their real interest in having the orange (Fisher and Ury, 1991).

Ramsbotham et. al. gives the famous sample regarding Egypt and Israel's positions and interests over Sinai – one's interest is territorial integrity and the other one's is security – to make it clear that "interests are often easier to reconcile than positions, since there are usually several positions that may satisfy them" (2011: 21). Korobkin below gives the example of Israel's intention to keep Sinai to show the relationship between the interests and positions:

> Reconciling interests rather than positions works for two reasons. First, for every interest there usually exists several possible positions that could satisfy it. All too often people simply adopt the most obvious position, as Israel did, for example, in announcing that they intended to keep part of the Sinai. When you do look behind opposed positions for the motivating interests, you can often find an alternative position which meets not only your interests but theirs as well. In the Sinai, demilitarization was one such alternative. Reconciling interests rather than compromising between positions also works because behind opposed positions lie many more interests than conflicting ones (2002: 136).

Lewicki et. al. assert that "at the beginning of negotiations each party takes a position; typically one party will then change his or her position in response to information from the other party or in response to other party's behavior" and add that "the other party's position will also typically change during bargaining; changes in position are usually accompanied by new information concerning the other's intentions, the value of outcomes, and likely zones for settlement" (2016: 42). Since the parties have their own positions when their

positions conflict with one another, getting to an agreement also becomes hard for the parties, which results in taking actions to make the most possible gain (Jeong, 2017: 117).

Patton states that what is mostly understood from interests of a party is what it wants or demands or something motivating it and also adds that "people negotiate because they are hoping to satisfy their interests better through an agreement than they could otherwise" (2005: 279). Patton thinks that negotiation comes out of 'conflicting interests' since similar interests escalate conflicts especially when two of the conflicting parties want a fair treatment (2005: 281).

1.4.2. Power and Power Asymmetry

Power in negotiation is termed as the ability of a negotiator to persuade the other party to make some concessions despite its interests (Korobkin, 2002: 151). In Korobkin's words "power is the ability to bend the opponent to your will" (151).

According to Meerts, negotiation process is a question of power especially in negotiations held for inter-state conflicts and negotiation processes between the equals are not efficient as is supposed since a power asymmetry is needed for a better course of a negotiation process (2015: 28). He thinks that power has three different formats: negotiator's power, structural power stemming from the power of the state and comparative power of a state in terms of the issues under negotiation (28).

Zartman defines negotiator's dilemma in a negotiation as 'toughness dilemma' stating that the tougher a negotiator, the bigger the possibility of reaching a favorable agreement with lesser possibility of getting a whole agreement, however the possibility of getting an agreement is bigger when the negotiator is weaker with a less possibility of reaching a favorable one (2002).

According to Lewicki et. al. negotiators seek power for two reasons. First, if one party is less powerful than the other one, then it automatically thinks that the other party has an advantage to be used or that could be used and hence it tries to outweigh its advantage. Second, if one party thinks that it requires more power than the other one has to obtain the result, then it thinks extra power is good to have in forthcoming negotiations (2016: 182).

A negotiator wants either to increase her/his power or diminish the other party's power and so wishes for a power equality or power difference. There are also two reasons behind these motives: a negotiator either wants to have power difference to get advantage over the other party or prevent other party's movements to get power or to have power equality to level the field to prevent both of the parties to dominate the process, but the main objective here is to take the discussions to an integrative agreement (Lewicki et. al. 2016: 183). According to Lewicki et. al. a negotiator who is less worried about her/his power and who have equal power with the other party are closer to a mutually accepted agreement and a negotiator who is worried about the power and trying to increase the power to match with the other party is looking for a solution that do not let any parties to break off or dominate the negotiation process (183).

Negotiation power is different from the normally accepted power perception related with resources like strong military and powerful economy. Negotiation power is the ability to

convince the other party to do something, which is suitable for the interests followed during a negotiation process (Fisher and Ury, 1991: 85). Fisher and Ury here gives the example of the US as one of the richest states of the world and nuclear super power, but these are meaningless when they confront with the demands of the terrorists in Beirut, so the resources can only provide negotiation power depending on the context of the negotiation and the other party to be persuaded (85). Apart from resources, there are different sources of negotiation power like the BATNA and a good assessment of the relationship with the other party like trying to understand the other party and its interests, concerns, alternative options, good communication and trust (85-86).

Rubin and Zartman mentions two different schools regarding the power issue in negotiations. The first one resembles the negotiation process levelling the playground since the process itself has a balancing effect on power differences between the conflicting parties. However, the other school thinks that power differences also create differences in how the negotiation process goes on and, in its results (1995: 349). Besides, Zartman asserts that "common wisdom holds that perceptions of equal power among negotiators tend to result in more effective negotiation and more satisfactory outcomes than perceptions of unequal power" (2008: 107).

According to Aurisch, power could stem from the preference of the venue for negotiations because the venue could be related to the power values of the parties and this could be used as a leverage during the negotiations creating advantageous and disadvantageous situations (1999: 393). Historical examples can also prove this situation like the meeting between the German Emperor Henry IV and Pope Gregory VII in Canossa in 1077 when the German Emperor's bargaining power was at stake in the hands of the Pope. However, other examples from the history like the meetings between Napoleon and Czar Alexander I on the Neman River, Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in Iceland show that the parties met in geographically equal places (393). Nevertheless, as Aurisch mentions that the Potsdam meetings among the Allies after the WWII were held in the Soviet zone in occupied Germany and Stalin benefitted from the venue taking an advantage out of it "with strong negative effects on the bargaining position of the western allies" (393).

Regarding the imbalance in power, as to Zartman, a 'perceived' power asymmetry in negotiations also creates a fruitful condition for a successful negotiation and he asserts that when negotiations with power asymmetry considered, related cases prove a smoother negotiation process and "more mutually satisfactory outcomes" (2008: 109). Zartman also asserts that a power symmetry in negotiations normally results in a deadlock in negotiations since "the behaviors associated with the particular power status produce impasse rather than an effective process to satisfying results" (109). On the other hand, there exist a power asymmetry in intra-state conflict negotiations because the state has the power, so the rebels in intra-state conflicts opposes what the other side – government – proposes for the settlement and they want to put themselves in equal positions with the state (2009: 334).

As to Zartman "structurally internal conflict is marked by asymmetry, a characteristic generally considered unconductive to negotiation, and attempts to redress asymmetry only further complicate negotiation dynamics" (1995: 3-4). Zartman emphasizes this asymmetry

here below "the most striking characteristic of internal conflict is its asymmetry: one party (government) is strong and the other (insurgent) is weak" (1995: 7). However, Zartman calls this kind of negotiations as a 'paradox' since he asserts that a negotiation process gives best result under the equal conditions providing equal veto rights to the parties (8). This paradox creates a difficult situation for the resolution of the conflict especially in intra-state conflicts. This kind of a paradox also cause the weaker party in an asymmetrical negotiation to find ways to reduce the inequality to obtain a better outcome of a negotiation (8).

Under such an asymmetrical circumstance both of the parties – the government and the insurgent group – try to use the stalemate to make the other party to change its policy "but the stakes remain unequal: insurgents seek to make the government negotiate (implying, first, recognition) whereas the government seeks to make the insurgents surrender" (Zartman, 1995: 11). In this case this asymmetry creates an obstacle preventing the parties to get a mutual result out of the negotiations (11). Power asymmetry between the government and the insurgent group mostly results in two cases: the government creates escalation to use violence over the insurgent group to make them ask for peace and the insurgent group tries to find a way out to end the asymmetrical situation by looking for third party states or neighboring countries to internationalize the conflict (11).

Regarding the internal negotiations for the resolution of an intra-state conflict between the government and an insurgent group, Zartman asserts that a different perspective of a negotiation theory is needed and he adds that "negotiation theory must be further developed, tested against situations of internal conflict, and refined accordingly, so that deductive guides to potentialities for negotiation can be established" (1995: 4). In such an intra-state conflict "three elements in the conflict affect its dynamics and govern the possibilities of successful negotiation: the insurgents' needs and the phases of rebellion, the government's agendas, and structural relations between the two sides." (1995: 13).

Rubin and Zartman proposes seven hypotheses regarding the power asymmetry depending on their former studies as follows:

1. Perceptions of equal power among negotiators tend to result in more effective negotiation than unequal power.
2. Under conditions of perceived power inequality among negotiators, the party with high power tends to behave exploitatively, while the less powerful party tends to behave submissively – unless certain special conditions prevail.
3. The smaller the perceived difference in negotiators' power, the more effective their negotiations are likely to be.
4. The smaller the total amount of power in the system, the more effectively negotiators are likely to function.
5. If the parties perceive themselves to be of equal power, the more negotiators share a cooperative motivational orientation, the more effectively they are likely to function; and the more they share a competitive motivational orientation, the less effectively they are likely to function.
6. When the parties are high in interpersonal orientation, they negotiate more effectively if they perceive themselves to be equal in power, and least effectively if they perceive themselves to be unequal in power.
7. Negotiators tend to function the most effectively when they are perceived to be equal in power, high in interpersonal orientation, and share a cooperative motivational orientation (1995: 351-354).

The Figure 29 below transforms the seven hypotheses proposed by Rubin and Zartman regarding the efficiency of negotiator in terms of power.

Figure 29. How negotiators function effectively.



Source: Derived from Zartman (1995).

The power the parties have has an influence on the negotiation process because the powerful party can use what it has in terms of power as a leverage for the process and on the other party mostly using carrots and stick game to bring the other party to the negotiation desk for a mutual agreement (Touval, 1999: 358). The power difference between the parties is called as "power asymmetry" and as Touval points out this asymmetry could also be called as "resource asymmetry" since while some parties are rich in capabilities in some aspects especially when compared with the others (1999: 358). As Touval draws attention power asymmetry "in interests and priorities tend to create opportunities for exchange and linkage, and thus carry the potential for constructing package agreements" however, "the opposite condition of power symmetry would eliminate the possibility of using sticks and carrots in this way". For this reason, equality among the parties can result in less possibilities for creative solutions that can end with a mutual agreement (1999: 358).

Like the hypotheses Rubin and Zartman proposed the results of their study is important to cite here correlated with the hypotheses above. The results consist of five different lessons as demonstrated below:

- Lesson One: Stronger parties typically attempt to dominate the exchange with their less powerful counterparts. Perceived asymmetries – based on such things as gross national product, military strength, physical size, and other objective indices – do indeed produce different attitudes and strategies in the exercise of power by the strong.
- Lesson Two: Weaker parties typically respond not by acting submissive, but by adopting appropriate countering strategies of their own. Rather than remain in their submissive role, as the asymmetry (and buttressing data from laboratory experiments) would have predicted, the weaker parties tried a variety of strategies: They blustered, dawdled, appealed, borrowed power, exercised their veto temporarily.

- Lesson Three: Negotiating parties are effective to the extent that they adjust their behavior in relation to the relative power of the other side.
- Lesson Four: Equal power (or perceptions thereof) does not lead to more effective negotiation than unequal power. Symmetry produces deadlock because the behaviors associated with the particular power status produce impasse rather than an effective process to satisfying results.
- Lesson Five: Parties do not function more effectively when there is a small, rather than larger, total amount of power in the system (1995: 355-360).

Among the lessons Rubin and Zartman reached out of their studies the most outstanding one is the lesson four that emphasizes the importance of asymmetry in a negotiation with the parties with unequal powers as in domestic conflicts, where the government and the rebel movements sit at the negotiation desk with unequal powers.

1.4.3. Justice and Other Intangibles

Justice most of the time has a significant role for the start of intra-state and civil wars, therefore it needs to be dealt with when peace is restored. For this reason, justice related topics have an important share within the content of peace settlements like sharing of power, territory, and other resources, and provisions for democratization and human rights (Albin and Druckman, 2012: 2). According to Albin and Druckman, justice has two different forms in a peace process: one is the procedural justice that is about the way of conduct of a negotiation process including parties' relationships with each other and modes of representation and structure of decision-making; and the other one is distributive justice that is about the justice which an agreement tries to offer with the apportionment of benefits and troublesome issues (2012: 2).

Distributive justice is supposed to have a crucial role in the durability of negotiated peace agreements since it is asserted that when justice and equality has a critical role in an agreement, then the possibility of the durability of that agreement is higher (Albin and Druckman, 2012: 2). Procedural justice improves a negotiation process with "(1) positive attitudes such as trust and confidence in those deciding on the outcome, (2) cooperative behavior, (3) opportunities for parties to participate, (4) integrative (problem solving) rather than distributive (competitive) bargaining, and (5) a reduction in conflict" (Albin and Druckman, 2012: 4).

Albin and Druckman compares two different peace settlements to show the importance of procedural justice in a peace negotiation. One is the Sun City Agreement signed in 2002 and the other one is the Arusha Peace Accords signed in 2000. While the first one has relatively adhered to the basic principles of procedural justice like involving all the fighting parties, opposition and civil society groups, and equality had a significant part within the agreement which has its reflections in the power-sharing agreement with an equal treatment of integrating the parties to armed and police forces. However, the other one excluded two main Hutu groups – the CNDD-FDD and the FNL – from the peace process and implemented a very strict deadline with ready-made agreement texts forced on the parties, yet it included equal treatments and opportunities for the parties (2012:13).

According to Avenhaus and Zartman, there are three principles of justice: (l) priority justice in which some external nonquantitative rule or precedent indicates a winner, (2) equal (or parity) justice in which all parties have an equal share, or equal access to or chances at a

share, and (3) unequal (or proportional) justice in which outcomes are allocated unequally in proportion to some criterion, generally either by equity (or merit), according to which they who have or contribute most get most, or by compensation (or need) in which they who have least get the most. (2007: 71).

Procedural justice and distributive justice are the main characteristics of justice in a negotiation process. Procedural justice is about how the parties are dealing with the issue of justice during the course of the negotiation like the concerns about fair treatments among the parties, equal chances of representation and respectful treatment. On the other hand, distributive justice is about the final distribution – the equal provisions in an agreement – which shows how the parties will share the resources (Lewicki et. al. 2016: 214).

As to Zartman, negotiation is "an exchange of goods rather than a unilateral victory: negotiation is giving something to get something, so it involves moves by both/all sides, although not necessarily to an equal degree" (1999: 324). However, negotiations start with a formal equality among the parties that gives each one the same right to accept or veto an agreement, hence the parties accept or veto the proposals by the other parties with equal standing (324). Zartman calls this as "ethos of equality", which involves the whole negotiation process bearing expectations that the concessions will be requited and mentions that the ethos of equality can influence a negotiation process in a way that the process may result in a peaceful handling or a disruption of it (324).

Apart from what Albin and Druckman defines justice forms in a negotiation process, Lewicki et. al. emphasizes the importance of transitional justice together with procedural and distributive justice (2016). Transitional justice is related to justice during a transition period especially after a civil war to democratization and can strengthen the principles of procedural and distributive justice. For this reason, it is considered as a restorative one dealing with the post-settlement period and highlights concepts on compensations and apologies and this is what reconciliation commissions draw their attentions on (Lewicki et. al., 2016).

Justice is an important issue in a negotiation process that requires all the parties' endorsement for an agreement on a topic since when they do not reach an agreement on justice issues a necessary step for concluding the negotiations and reaching an agreement would not be possible (Zartman, 1997: 123). As Zartman emphasizes the most important notion of justice is "equality or impartiality" and he goes on explaining that "equality in its many forms is a common point of agreement for combining competing claims, forming a floor (and hence, bilaterally, a ceiling) on relative gains and providing an acceptable formula for agreement as split-the-difference in the end when other criteria have run out" (1997: 123).

1.4.4. Confidence and Trust Building

Trust is a crucial factor in negotiating. Since the absence of trust is considered as an obstacle in a negotiation process. Its absence can be a greater problem when more than one party is included within the negotiation process (Touval, 1999: 359). However, as Zartman puts "it is wrong to insist on trust between the parties as a precondition to negotiation or to an

agreement; trust is built during the negotiation and its implementation and trust cannot be built during the process, direct negotiation becomes impossible and mediation becomes necessary" (18). Therefore, developing trust requires interaction between the parties that can make dialogue, discussion and finally negotiations possible (Hampson et. al. 2007: 40).

One of the hardest parts of a peace negotiation process is trust-building among the warring parties because they have fears about their security and they do not trust each other whom they have fought against and who they left the negotiation desk or cheated on their promises (Sriram, 2008: 20). Besides, violent human right abuses and long-term grief on injustice in gaining access to power or resources make trust-building hard and it can take a longer time because the combatant parties have profound suspicions over one another and they have difficulty in convincing internal groups who have also doubts about their enemies (20).

Saunders states that "every human exchange is a negotiation of sorts and that the elements of negotiation are involved even when people are not sitting around the table with each other" (1985: 252). As Saunders points out a table or a desk gives a formal kick for the negotiations, but for trust building these tables and desks are not needed because the negotiators also needs socializing with the members of the other parties (252). This out of the room or no-table sessions can pave the way for trust building among the party members or negotiators including informal coffee, drink or meal sessions like the informal sessions in academic settings for sharing knowledge.

According to Pruitt, "when trust is high, it is possible to engage in joint problem solving rather than individual problem solving or problem solving with a mediator" (2002: 93). This is what trust makes in a negotiation allowing the parties to "talk frankly about their interests and the constituents they represent, to float tentative proposals without fear that the other will construe them as concessions, and to comment favorably on the other's tentative proposals without fear that these comments will be taken as a final endorsement" (93). Pruitt adds that "when trust is low, problem solving is less likely to occur and, if it occurs, takes place on each side separately or in interaction with a mediator" (93).

Trust building is an important step in making relationship in negotiation. Regarding building a relationship in negotiation, Rubin gives the example of carpet sellers in the Grand Bazaar in Istanbul mentioning their style in making new relationships by offering Turkish tea, coffee, delight and taffy before making the financial deal and spending time for knowing one another including the family members and the occupation etc. Only then can the dealers have confidence in the customers even so to tell them to become partners for a carpet store in the USA (1999: 7). Besides, Fisher and Ury state that "most negotiations take place in the context of an ongoing relationship where it is important to carry on each negotiation in a way that will help rather than hinder future relations and future negotiations" (1991: 14). This kind of relationship that paves the way for "trust, understanding, respect and friendship" helps another negotiation step to cause less problems and to be more effective (Fisher and Ury, 1991: 14).

As to McCarthy, "trust is important partly because it fosters informal contacts and a readiness to expose one's hand" so "to gain trust a mediator may have no alternative but to offer confidences – although only personal thoughts should be offered, and then in a way

that is fair to both sides" (1999: 118). Aggestam looks through a different perspective and put emphasis on the risk of transition from escalation to de-escalation and the role of the third parties regarding this risk. Aggestam continues to add that third parties as risk managers help the conflicting parties to develop trust in the negotiation process and they convince the parties for the right time for the negotiations to start (2005: 280).

Pruitt says that "trust contributes to the perceived feasibility of problem solving by making it seem more likely that mutually beneficial alternatives can be found" and adds that "this is because a trusted other can be expected to help search for good solutions" (1999: 38). Trust is so considered as a factor contributing into negotiations. However, Hampson et. al. look into trust through another perspective and put forward that "the negotiation process therefore should be viewed as a trust building activity that taps into the deeply rooted needs of the parties and elicits emphatic responses in the way they view the needs of their negotiating partners" (2007: 40).

However, in an armed conflict it is difficult to build trust between the parties especially when one of the parties denies the legitimacy of the other one and does not make any movements toward building a relationship (Dochartaigh, 2011: 773). For this reason, back-channel negotiation gains importance as this way of negotiating paves the way for contact between the parties for setting the basis of negotiations and diminishing uncertainties (773).

1.4.5. Spoiler Problem

Elman asserts that peacemaking process includes another process of handling possible spoilers because when one group thinks that it could have done a better deal than the real negotiators, it is possible to encounter a spoiling activity (2015: 32). Spoilers can be inside or outside the process and they can either resort to violence or try other ways to derail the process considering their own interests and objectives (Newman and Richmond, 2006: 102). According to Newman and Richmond spoilers do not have to be parties to a peace process, yet any parties that were within the process but left the process and then undermined the process are also called as spoilers. Some spoilers benefit from the process for several reasons like getting recognition, ensuring legitimacy, gaining time and some other tangible benefits and avoiding international sanctions (102). Other spoilers like "ethnic or national diaspora groups, states, political allies, multinational corporations or any others who might benefit from violent conflict or holding-out" could be physically out of the conflict zone, yet they can support inside spoilers (102).

In a domestic conflict, even though the rebels and governments are either following their objectives to reach for a victorious end or caring for justice more than the peace to be settled in the country, they can easily be or turn out to be spoilers within the negotiation process (Zartman, 2012: 316). Wanis-St. John defines spoilers in an international negotiation as "a kind of particularly sophisticated audience that can have a significant impact on peace processes" (2006: 125). Even though spoilers do not take their part on the negotiation desk they try their best to undermine possibility of getting and implementing an agreement (125). The literature here gets intensified around the works of Kriesberg and Stedman.

For Stedman this spoiling action was very normal since as he states that "peace processes create spoilers" (2000: 180). Stedman goes on explaining spoilers in a peace process as follows:

> Spoilers exist only when there is a peace process to undermine, that is, after at least two warring parties have committed themselves publicly to a pact or have signed a comprehensive peace agreement. Peace creates spoilers because it is rare in civil wars for all leaders and factions to see peace as beneficial. Even if all parties come to value peace, they rarely do so simultaneously, and they often strongly disagree over the terms of an acceptable peace. A negotiated peace often has losers: leaders and factions that do not achieve their war aims. Nor can every war find a compromise solution that addresses the demands of all the warring parties. (. . .) Spoilers can be inside or outside a peace process. An inside spoiler signs a peace agreement and signals a willingness to implement a settlement, yet fails to fulfill key obligations to the agreement. Examples include President Juvenal Habyarimana of Rwanda, who failed to implement Arusha Accords to end his country's internal war. (. . .) Inside spoilers tend to use strategies of stealth; outside spoilers often use strategies of overt violence. Spoilers who have signed peace agreements for tactical reasons have an incentive to keep their threat hidden and to minimize the amount of violence they use; they want the peace process to continue as long as it promises to strengthen them against their adversary. Inside spoilers need to comply enough to convince others of their goodwill but not so much that it weakens their offensive military capability. Outside spoilers, on the other hand, tend to use overt violence as a strategy toward undermining peace. Favorite tactics include the assassination of moderates who stand for a negotiated peace, massacres that coincide with any progress in reaching a negotiated settlement, and the creation of alliances with conservative members in the armed forces and police to sabotage any agreement. (2000: 180-181).

Stedman points Habyarimana and the Committee for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR) as spoilers in the Rwandan peace process stating that Habyarimana, who was an inside spoiler during the peace process, was so late in implementing the Arusha Accords after the international pressure coming from France and the United States in his last meeting in Arusha before his assassination. The extremist political party the CDR was an outside spoiler since it was excluded from the Rwandan peace process even though France and the United States wanted to have the CDR within the process (2000: 181-195).

The MRND, the CDR and other small parties closer to the government were against the Arusha Accords and they were considering it as "a plan for treason" and for this reason the MRND and CDR organized street protests to spoil the peace process (Human Rights Watch HRW, 1999).

Regarding spoilers in a negotiation process, Stedman asserts that "leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it" (1997: 5). Sriram adds that "spoilers may also undermine implementation of agreements once reached, accepting incentives but reneging on their own concessions and returning to armed conflict" (2008: 38). Bearing a great risk for the peacemaking processes and negotiations in particular, spoilers can cause escalation and great numbers of casualties as it did in Angola in 1992 and in Rwanda 1994 (Stedman, 1997: 5).

Conflicts and divisions among the groups participating into the negotiation stand as a risk for the process and stem from the groups that are used to war economy and conflicts and have relative power over the others owing to the armed struggle they conduct. These groups start to undermine the peace process and create violence (Fisas, 2012: 39). Fisas asserts

that fear over the process lead these undisciplined groups in a negotiation process to create violent actions (43-44).

Spoilers do exist in a peace process when there is one to undermine especially after the negotiating parties have declared their commitment for a peace settlement or have signed a peace agreement because peace is not generally seen as something useful for all of the leaders or groups in a civil war in particular (1997: 7). As Stedman asserts not all the parties esteem peace and most of the time they are not agree with the provisions of a respectable agreement because losers of a negotiated peace settlement are leaders and groups that have not achieved their objectives out of a conflict (7).

Sriram also divides spoilers into three different groups: the first one is limited spoilers that has limited power and objectives including power-sharing and handling the problems, the second one is total spoilers that aims to gain the whole power and the last one is greedy spoilers whose objectives are more based on the opportunities and risks they can have or take (2008: 39). The first option puts emphasis on the power-sharing as it can put an end on the ongoing violent conflicts. However, just ending the violent conflict is not a resolution. As Licklider points out the case in a civil war, just ending the conflict and the killings is not the main problem and here comes the problem of creating a healthy environment for the people to live peacefully together with their enemies (1995: 684). The problem of creating a peaceful environment for the former enemies emphasizes the importance of power-sharing. For this reason, most of the negotiated agreements include power-sharing "which seems a promising way to begin the formation of a state that can handle the underlying problems that caused the violence in the first place" (684).

However, having spoilers at one side this kind of signed peace agreement may not bring along peace at all when some of the parties to the conflict are not happy with the outcome of an exclusionist negotiation process. For this reason, as Hampson et. al. suggests "the best defense against spoilers who have more limited political goals and can be 'bought off' is to bring them into the negotiations process but to lay clear ground rules for their participation that include penalties for intransigent behavior and rewards for cooperation" (2007: 44). On the hand, according to Zartman, "inside they may wreck the talks, and outside they may torpedo the results, the critical variable being the weight that they command within the rebellion" (2009: 330).

Hence, the question about spoilers' position comes to the minds and they can be either within the peace process or out of the process as discussed above. Therefore, inside spoilers are the ones within the peace processes and negotiations by signing the peace agreements, showing great interest in implementing the conditions set by the peace agreements but they do no fail in taking necessary steps (Stedman, 1997: 8). One of the typical examples regarding the inside spoilers is President Juvenal Habyarimana of Rwanda. Habyarimana first put his signature on the Arusha Accords to end the civil war but later on did not start the implementation of the Accord (8). Stedman gives other examples as the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia that signed the Paris Peace Treaty yet did not welcome the elections and the Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) that signed the Bicesse Accords in 1991, yet resumed the war (8).

On the other hand, outside spoilers are the ones that are excluded from the peace processes or negotiations and they use violent methods to undermine the peace processes as the Committee for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR) in Rwanda that allegedly triggered and organized the genocide in 1994 (1997: 8). The methods these two types of spoilers enjoyed differs. Inside spoilers operates in confidentiality and outside spoilers use violence because while inside spoilers want to stay within the process to keep it longer to make advantage of it, outside spoilers apply apparent violence to undermine the process by applying some methods like assassinating moderates who are negotiating for peace and killing innocent people when the negotiation process is on its way and finally cooperating with members of security forces to destroy any steps taken ahead for an agreement (8).

Like Stedman, Reiter states that rebel movements are among termination spoilers and these movements like militia and paramilitaries are normally not invited to the negotiation desk, which cause them lose political power and financial support and he gives two examples from Latin America, El Salvador and Guatemala, where they took important part during the civil war and turned out to be termination spoilers after the peace-making agreements (2015: 98).

As Touval points out there are two types of participants in a negotiation process: first type of participants are the ones who are needed for their crucial contribution to resolve the conflict and the second type of participants are the ones who are just included into the process so as they do not spoil the process when they are not included (1999: 352). Not different from Touval, Sriram thinks that when not all conflicting parties are included into a peace negotiation process, some of them can find it useful for their objectives to continue using violence even though other parties enjoy a so-called peace after a negotiated peace agreement endorsed by some of the parties (2008: 42).

PART II

CHAPTER TWO

RWANDA AND BURUNDI, MACRO ANALYSIS

This part of the dissertation is a descriptive one about the case countries. It offers a macro analysis regarding the two countries' different trajectories for peace negotiation processes, mostly dealing with the historical background to understand the structural causes of the conflict. This chapter focuses barely on the historical course of events before negotiation processes in two case countries start to help us to understand reasons behind the conflict the negotiation processes trying to find a solution for and to comprehend the interests and positions of the negotiating parties, their power relationships, spoiler problems, mutually hurting stalemates as discussed on the former chapter.

2.1. Rwanda

2.1.1. Physical and Historical Environment

Physical characteristics and a brief history of Rwanda helps us to better understand the settings in Rwanda for a better macro-analysis regarding the peace process for a better comparison between Rwanda and the sister country Burundi.

Here below this chapter aims to give very brief information on geographical and physical characteristics along with the historical background of Rwanda starting from the pre-historical ages to the end of the 1990s.

2.1.1.1. Rwanda – Geography

Rwanda, a tiny country in the Great Lakes Region in the eastern Africa, did not hold an important place among other countries apart from coffee cultivation in late 1980s and at the beginning of the 1990s, but recently a developing country bearing better opportunities in economic stability. The Figure 30 shows this tiny state in the huge African continent below.

Rwanda is one of the smallest countries in Africa and its surface area is almost like Belgium (26.340km^2). It is a landlocked country and its neighbors are Uganda in the north, Burundi in the south, the DRC in the west and Tanzania in the east. The land mostly consists of grassy uplands and small hills mostly inhabited by villagers. Rwanda's climate is mild and there can be frost and snow on the mountains and it has two rainy seasons, one in February and one in April (Shaw, 2014). The Figure 30 and Figure 31 below shows its landlocked position in the Great Lakes Region

Its population was around 5.5 million in 1983 and rose to 7.7 million one year before the genocide in 1994 (Magnarella, 2005: 802). Rwanda's population is 12.626.950 million today and its population consists of mainly three different ethnicities: the Hutus make 84% of the total population and the Tutsis 15% and the Twas 1% (World Bank, 2020; CIA, 2012). Rwanda is mostly mentioned as the Switzerland of Africa regarding its geographical nature and the forests it has in the literature.

Figure 30. Map of Great Lakes Region in Africa.

Source: UN Geospatial Information Section, https://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/english/htmain.htm, Access Date: 10/05/2020

Figure 31. Political Map of Rwanda.



Source: UN Geospatial Information Section, https://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/english/htmain.htm, Access Date: 10/05/2020.

Figure 32. African Political Map.

Source: UN Geospatial Information Section, https://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/english/htmain.htm, Access Date: 10/05/2020

2.1.2. Historical Background

This section focuses on the early and modern history of Rwanda including the colonial era to better understand the main reasons behind the constant violent conflicts that emerged especially after the independence in the 1960s and longed for about more than three decades ending with the second-biggest-known genocide in world history. These historical facts detailed below will also help to better understand the main cultural and historical patterns that would be effective in negotiations between the fighting groups (the Rwandan

government and the Tutsi rebel movement) in the first years of the 1990s before the genocide.

2.1.2.1. Early Rwandan History

The literature on the history of this tiny African country is not a rich one. As the topic is Rwanda, the literature on the conflicts, genocide – these two topics are mostly related to ethnic segregation – and peacemaking in Rwanda mostly also deal with the historical development of different ethnicities and the powerful ethnic monarchy. For this reason, below the early Rwandan history is given under two different titles: Founding Ethnicities in Rwanda and Rwandan Monarchy.

2.1.2.1.1. Founding Ethnicities of Rwanda

Rwandan history before the German colony is not very well-known. According to the historians, early residents of Rwanda were the pygmies like today's Twas and agriculturalist Hutus who were speaking the Bantu language came to Rwandan territory around 1000 AD from the east settling down on the hills. The Tutsis that drew attention of the European explorers are thought to enter into Rwanda most probably from the southern Ethiopia around the 11th and 15th centuries until then the Hutus were outnumbering the Twas and were the only dominant ethnic group (Magnarella, 2005: 802). Pottier points out that the first residents of Rwanda were Twas, whom the Hutus followed and after these two groups the Tutsi pastoralists who had been ruling the Ugandan kingdoms of Bunyoro and Buha and they integrated with the Hutus, adopted their language and culture while they were establishing their hegemony (Pottier, 2002: 12). As asserted, Tutsis who were breeding cattle moved to Rwanda from the north at different times because of famine and draught (Uvin, 1997: 92). They were more aggressive than the Hutu farmers and militarily more well-organized and well-trained than the Hutus. Consequently, they easily occupied most of the Rwandan territory even though they only constituted 10-14% of the total population (Magnarella, 2005: 802).

Thus, as James asserts the Tutsis who had most probably come from the Nile region somehow had a colonial power and quasi-colonial administration over the local Hutus (2008: 90). According to Pearn, as well, the Tutsi people came down from the Nile Delta and brought along their hereditary monarchical traditions (1999: 204). Conventionally, it was believed that the Tutsis were taller than the Hutus and they were genetically different from one another and that the Tutsis came to the country from the north, probably from Kenya or Ethiopia representing a different tribe compared to local Bantu Hutus (Loft and Loft, 1988: 88).

However, the Tutsis, Hutus and Twas integrated with each other on such an extent that they had a similar language, they had faith in the same God and were part of a similar culture (Uvin, 1997: 92). On the other hand, Des Forges asserts that the Tutsis and Hutus had both racist attitudes towards the Twas and looked down on them; they also refused intermarriage and even sharing food with them (1995:44). Nevertheless, Morrock mentions intermarriage was normal between the Hutus and the Tutsis, but since women and children had taken the ethnic identity of the husband and father respectively mixed marriages were not easy to

detect on census. In addition, being a tall and slim Tutsi was a result of selective breeding among the aristocracy and its descendants, but the Tutsis without aristocratic ancestors were usually bearing the same physical characteristics with the Hutus (Morrock, 2010: 64). The Hutus and Tutsis had similar languages, faiths and social practices and even though the cattle ownership was affiliated with the Tutsis it was not easy to draw a difference between the Hutus and Tutsis as a consequence of intermarriages among three ethnic groups (White, 2009: 473).

Shaw also points out the term 'Tutsi' symbolizes a person who is wealthy in cattle ownership and the term 'Hutu' connotates something inferior and adds that the term Hutu later on evolved to have the meaning of subordinate and a person who goes after a powerful person (Shaw, 2014). In addition, all the Tutsis did not belong to the aristocracy as all the Hutus were not poor farmers and even though these categories were not fixed, a Hutu could be called as a Tutsi after getting enough amount of cattle (Straus, 2008: 20). Because, cattle and cattle ownership had a significant role in the social environment in Rwanda by symbolizing life and fertility, for this reason, cattle ownership meant more than being wealth but it was also a symbol of a social rank that displayed the superiority (Morel, 2015: 17), which will be the basis of the elite system the colonial administration enjoyed until creating another elite group consisting of Hutus.

Despite the close similarities between the ethnicities in Rwanda, the European explorers easily noticed that the population was divided into three different ethnic groups as Tutsis, Hutus and Twas when they stepped into the Rwandan soil (Melvern, 2000: 7). The difference in the appearance of these ethnic groups that was easily noticed made it simple for the European colonizers to make use of this difference. As Straus points out the European colonizers were fascinated by the hierarchy and sophisticated order of the ruling system in Rwanda and they believed that they came across with an exceptional race that had the characteristics of a ruling clan (2008: 20) which would create the Hamitic theory in Rwanda among the colonizers in late 1930s. The Hamitic theory is considered as one of the factors causing ethnic segregation, which is also seen as the reasons of civil and constant violent conflicts in Rwanda that started with the independence in the 1960s.

2.1.2.1.2. Rwandan Monarchy

There existed a powerful dynasty in Rwanda afore the German and Belgian colonial administration (Öztürk, 2011: 67). This kingdom belonged to the Tutsis who had been dominating over the Hutus. As mentioned above, the Tutsis were politically, militarily and economically superior to the Hutus and Twas and a Tutsi king was a sacred entity symbolizing the absolute power (Magnarella, 2005: 803). The Tutsi king called as *mwami*[13] possessed everything including the land, animals and people in Rwanda (Melvern, 2000: 7). The Tutsi aristocracy was ruling by force and it was dependent on a strong army, for this reason, only the Tutsi males were getting military training excluding the Hutus and Twas whom were considered only for auxiliary work for supplies to the army (Magnarella, 2005: 803).

[13] *Mwami* means 'king' (plural version is *abami*) in Kinyarwanda language (Jesee, 2017).

The monarchial body in Rwanda consisted of *mwami,* the council of advisors, queen and the council. The land was divided into provinces and military chiefs representing the king were governing those provinces (Öztürk, 2011: 67). This hierarchical structure among these ethnic groups helped the monarchy take control of today's Rwandan territory between the 17th and 19th century (Jean-Pierre Chrétien, 2003). It took about a century for a monarchial state to emerge in Rwanda, but when it was done, it took the control in near abroad.

The *mwami* Rwabugiri founded and strengthened a monarchial state in Rwanda between the 18th and 19th century (Verwimp, 2006: 9). During the reign of Rwabugiri (1860-1895) the monarchy regime was so suppressive on semi-autonomous Tutsis and Hutus that it terminated their political power and even confiscated their territory. His regime made an important change in social classes and he brought along ethnic segregation between the Hutus and Tutsis, therefore, as Eriksson asserts the ethnic segregation started even before the European colonizers arrived and started to use it (Eriksson, 1996).

The Hutus lived in freedom under small Hutu kingdoms in the northwestern region of Rwanda until the Tutsi monarchy dominated them with the help of the Germans at the end of the 19th century, yet maintained their struggle with the Tutsis (Uvin, 1997: 94). The Germans also helped the Tutsi monarchy to suppress Hutu revolts in 1911 in the north empowering the Tutsi monarchy (Houérou, 2014: 86).

2.1.2.2. Modern Rwandan History

This section provides a historical look at the modern era including the late 19th century and the 20th century till the end of the 1990s in Rwanda. It focuses on the history of colonization in Rwanda and the colonial practices of the German and Belgian colonies. In addition, it offers a deep historical information on Rwanda's independent period including the constant violence and finally the genocide.

2.1.2.2.1. The Arrival of the Europeans and the German and Belgian Colonial Practices

African continent had been the source of slave trade for centuries when it transformed into a continent for European colonies and dominions starting from the 19th century. Germany that became a nation-state after the Prussian War in 1871 under the leadership of Bismarck took its late place in the race for colonies in the African continent and had colonies in southwestern Africa, eastern Africa – today's Kenya, Tanzania, Burundi and Rwanda – and western Africa – Togo and Cameroon (Connaughton, 2001).

The eastern coast of Africa was only known to the Arab tradesmen before the 1850s and Arab tradesmen could only reach the Lake Tanganyika for slave and ivory trade. After the Arab tradesmen, the missionaries of the Church Missionary Society in London became interested in the eastern Africa and the explorers who were aiming at finding the source of the Nile River were also interested in the region and they reached the Lake Victoria (Sandrock, 2002). As the European explorers were looking for the source of the Nile River, the Scottish explorer James Bruce came to Ethiopia and further southwards in 1770 and almost a century later after him another Scottish explorer Dr. David Livingstone under the patronage of British Royal Geographical Society went to today's Zimbabwe between 1852

and 1856. Even though Sir Richard Burton was not successful in finding the source of the Nile River, an Englishman John Hanning Speke was the first European explorer to find the Lake Tanganyika in 1857. Eventually in 1857 Speke together with another Scottish explorer also found the source of the Nile River in the Lake Victoria Nyanza. Despite the discovery of the British and Scottish explorers in the middle of the 19th century, the German explorers went much further interior in the region and starting from the late 19th century, they established a strong zone of influence within the region including today's Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania (Pearn, 1999: 204-205; Gourevitch, 1998: 50).

Germany stepped into the eastern African territory in 1884 when Karl Peters arrived in the region and after a year Peters drew attention to the region's wealth and the profits of an African colony in the eastern Africa such as slavery and other tropical goods like sugar, rice, tobacco, and spices (Parpart and Rostgaard; 2006: 22; East, 1987). Peters, who wanted to have a German presence in the region demanded from the government to support their claims on the lands in the region and to establish a German East Africa Company like the British East Africa Company and some other European companies that had just started exploitation around the globe (Parpart and Rostgaard, 2006: 23).

After Peters' travel to the eastern Africa in search of finding an appropriate colony for Germany, German government declared that Germany had taken the eastern Africa under her protection in 1885 and the German East Africa Company was established for the administration of this new German colony (Sandrock, 2002). At the beginning, the border between the German East Africa and the Congo Free State was not fixed and for this reason the German troops together with the Belgian ones were deployed around *Shangi* about 1898, yet these troops never demanded anything from the royal court in Rwanda, and instead they had supplies from the people in the region as they only wanted to claim land in the region. Ruling over the people in Rwanda was out of question at that time. German dwellers like the physician Richard Kandt was the first German to build relationship with the local Rwandans (Des Forges, 2011: 24).

As it is obvious from the establishment of a company in the eastern Africa, Germany's intention was commercial, yet apart from getting raw materials another objective to have a colony in the eastern Africa was to take one more step ahead for the world's leadership by founding new sea bases (Gray, 1919: 25). As Parpart and Rostgaard states, the German government gave permission to this company to build railways, manage mineral sources, establish banks, print money and most importantly to enlarge the German sphere of influence for tax collection and plantation over the lands they had just acquired (2006: 23).

Despite the successful attempts of the German East Africa Company, Bismarck objected the colonization until 1884 when the foundations for the German African Empire were laid in order to compete with the British Empire. Karl Peters had launched expeditions to the vast lands of the eastern Africa and he had offered the protection of Germany to local leaders and chiefs, which helped Germany to obtain most of the eastern Africa. However, the German East Africa Company did not succeed and went into bankruptcy owing to the policy that caused opposition by the native Africans (Connaughton, 2001). The German Empire acquired the colonial administration in 1891 and the region was considered as a

suitable place for the Europeans to settle down and to build railroads for transportation (East, 1987). The railroad network was expanded in 1906 when the German Colonial Office was founded and there was an increase in agricultural activity. The Germans also started to settle the colonies (East, 1987).

2.1.2.2.2. German Colony 1894-1914

Count von Götzen, who was a German explorer, came to Rwanda in 1894 and Götzen's arrival in Rwanda was a milestone in transforming Rwanda into a colony of Germany. Germany started to colonize Rwanda and Burundi under the name of Ruanda-Urundi (Öztürk, 2011: 68) and the west of Tanzania starting from 1894. Götzen became the governor and facilitated the conquest of the Rwandan Tutsi monarchy of the Hutu principalities in the north of Rwanda (Kinzer, 2008). The Germans kept the Rwandan monarchy – the Tutsi ruler, the *mwami* – and the local administration system preferring an indirect way of governing its colony (Magnarella, 2005: 806).

Germany kept Rwanda, Burundi and some parts of Tanzania in eastern Africa under the name of German East Africa until the First World War (WWI) and did not make any changes in the social and administrative sphere in Rwanda, yet strengthened the power of monarchy in Rwanda (Öztürk, 2011: 68). While strengthening the monarchy in Rwanda, German colonial administration benefited from the monarchy to establish its military posts throughout the region (Chussodovsky, 2017: 938). However, as the Germans preferred to work through the existing monarchy, they somehow contributed to the monarchy to enlarge their territory (Plaut, 1994: 150).

The WWI had some results on the colonial Africa. One of them was a change of colonial power in Ruanda-Urundi. Germany lost the war. It was the end of German Colonial Era in Ruanda-Urundi. One of its colonies in Africa, Ruanda-Urundi was given to Belgium as a Mandate by the League of Nations in 1916. Ruanda-Urundi was not only considered as a new colony but also a province of Belgian Congo (Byanafashe and Rutayisire, 2011: 237).

2.1.2.2.3. Belgian Colony 1914-1945

Germany lost the war and its colonies in Africa as well, yet the new colonial administration in Rwanda maintained the indirect style of governing at the beginning (Plaut, 1994: 150). However, the new colonial power in Rwanda, Belgium, changed the style of colonial administration later on wearing down the authority of the monarchy, therefore appointing Belgian counsellors to the *mwami* in 1922 (Melvern, 2000: 9).

Germany did not make big changes in Rwanda, however, Belgian colonial administration made great changes in Rwanda's economy, agriculture and social structure (Öztürk, 2011: 68). Belgium changed its style of colonial administration starting from the 1920s and introduced a direct style of government in Rwanda. The new colonial administration also introduced cash crop cultivation together with the compulsory labor and hardened the taxation system (Adelman and Suhrke, 1996: 5). The compulsory labor was useful in introducing fear, distrust and collapse of social solidarity in Rwanda (Chussodovsky, 2017: 938).

Some colonial practices like ethnic identity cards, compulsory labor and creating a Tutsi elite with social and political privileges enhanced the segregation between the Hutus and Tutsis who had been speaking the same language (Newbury, 1995: 12). These practices of the Belgian colonial administration and therefore the reinterpretation of the colonized inhabitants, depending on the recommendations of the missionary White Fathers, which played an important role both in German and Belgian colonial administration in creating Tutsi and Hutu identities, helped to reorganize the Rwandan political authority in order to create a Tutsi elite. However, the Belgian colonial administration took the control of appointments to different positions of the monarchical system like chiefs and sub-chiefs and the *mwami*'s choices for these positions had to be approved first by the colonial administration (Langford, 2005: 3).

The activities of the missionaries were late in Rwanda comparing to the missionaries in Uganda but they enlarged their activities at the first half of the twentieth century (Carney, 2014: 22) and were mostly successful in spreading Christianity among the Hutus, who welcomed the Catholic Church as their new patron and the Tutsis, who were enjoying the privileges of the monarchy and aristocracy were reluctant in converting into Christianity by the 1930s when they realized that they had to accept Christianity to secure their parts in the Belgian colonial administration (Magnarella, 2005).

Together with the European colonialism, the Catholic Church, thanks to the missionaries, the White Fathers in particular, shaped the political and social life in Rwanda and education became a central part of the mission in Rwanda, and regarding the agreement between the Catholic Church and the Belgian colonial administration the Church acquired an exclusive control over the educational system in Rwanda. Most of the schools were serving the Tutsi elites and it was necessary for the Tutsis to study at these schools to enter into the colonial elite (Kinzer, 2008).

The rivalry within the Belgian colonizers that was between the Walloons and the Flemish in Belgium reflected upon the relationship between the colonizers and the Rwandan people. (Kinzer, 2008). As Gourevitch puts forward Walloons were the minority and the Flemish were the majority in Belgium for many years and it took a long time for Belgium to have equal basis for these two ethnic lines after the social revolution (1998: 58).

It is asserted that this might have created the rivalry between the Hutus and Tutsis and a change of power in the elites of Rwanda. As Kinzer points out most of the Belgian clergy during the beginning of the Belgian colonial rule in Rwanda were conservative and belonged to upper-class Walloons, who thought that a perfect colonial order needed local elites, therefore they supported the Tutsis. However, most of the Flemish clergy were favoring socialist ideas and felt themselves victimized and under pressure in Belgium especially after they had been excluded by the Church in Belgium in collaboration with the Nazis during the WWII. For this reason, starting from the 1950s the Belgian clergy dominated by the Flemish priests identified themselves with the poor and excluded Hutu and as a consequence, most of the schools and seminaries under the control of the Catholic Church in Rwanda, which had been used for promoting the Tutsi elites for decades, now changed their position and started to support the Hutus (Kinzer, 2008). Like Kinzer,

Hintjens also states that the rivalry between the Flemish and Walloons in Belgium influenced Tutsi-Hutu relations in Rwanda (1999: 254).

The colonial administration in Rwanda assertedly caused marginalization among ethnic identities by opposing one to another and ethnic violence started to emerge during this time owing to segregation of ethnic identities (Fearson and Laitin, 2000: 850). The ethnic identity construction in Rwanda planted the seeds of violent and hostile relations between the Hutus and Tutsis (851). The European colonial powers together with the help of the local political authorities are claimed to have created the difference between the ethnic groups for an economic development (851) and this difference was hardened by political rivalry (858). The practices by the Belgian colonial administration following the German one contributed into strengthening the ethnic identities in Rwanda destroying the social structure in the 1930s and the ethnic identities were considered as conflicting ones (Hintjens, 2001: 49-50). Tutsi identity was the dominant identity defining the national identity during the colonial era.

Reyntjens claims that the Belgian administration together with the Catholic Church in Rwanda increased the segregation between the Hutus and Tutsis destroying Rwanda's economic and political independence and the unity within the society (2016: 63). Therefore, the Belgian administration sparkled ethnic concerns and eventually managed to make political identities out of ethnic groups in Rwanda (Reyntjens, 1996: 243). The colonial administration introduced Tutsification policy and the Catholic Church supported this policy in the 1920s that benefitted from the Hamitic Hypothesis. This hypothesis was claiming that nomadic cattle shepherds were from the Nile region and related to the Hami race and could rule over others (243-244). This Hamitic Hypothesis helped the colonial administrations in Rwanda to radicalize the three different ethnic groups into a hierarchy placing the European colonizers onto the top, the Tutsis on the middle level and the Hutus onto the lowest level (White, 2009: 473).

The fascist movements in the world at the beginning of the 20th century provided a different perspective for the colonial administration. The waves of fascism and racism were so powerful in Europe in the 1920s and 1930s that they influenced the politics followed in the European colonies. Therefore, the colonial administration in Rwanda recorded measurements of people's skulls, noses and eye shapes to reach the racial roots of the people strengthening the Hamitic Hypothesis formerly set forward. The Belgian colonial administration classified the Rwandan population as Hutus, Tutsis and Twas after a census in 1933 and gave them ethnic identity cards (Melvern, 2000: 10-11). These ethnic identity cards were revealing the ethnic identity of people and a record of ethnic roots (2005: 829).

The Belgian colonial administration took two different ways in determining the ethnicity of the people as it was not possible to determine the ethnic group of the people: Either by the ethnicity of the card holders' fathers or the size of the cattle the person owned – normally those who owned ten or more cattle were defined as Tutsi since it is asserted that the Belgian administrators were too confused about the ethnic group and they made up "a means-tested system" for its identification and a citizen with more than ten cattle was considered as a Tutsi. The Tutsi were almost seen equals with white colonizers and offered

education – mostly in missionary schools – and privileges for various resources, which resulted in a racial elitism and superiority of one ethnic group in minority (Tutsis) over the other one in majority (Hutus) (Hintjens, 1999: 253 and Manchester, 2010).

Nevertheless, ten-cattle-rule was not the only rule to identify the Tutsis and Hutus as Mamdani points out, therefore the colonial administration was dependent on the information provided by the Church thanks to its local servants (2002: 99). By this way the Belgian colonial administration strengthened the Tutsi dominance and increased the repression of the local rule and as Straus points out race was number one factor in defining the power (2008: 21). The educational system was based on a quota rule that required the majority of the students be the Tutsis, therefore creating a local administrative elite consisting of only the Tutsis for the Belgian colonial administration (Langford, 2005: 3).

The Tutsis monopolized all transactions excluding the Hutus and Twas from political, administrative and judicial fields thanks to the Tutsification policy of the colonial administration. The colonial administration did not give any political responsibility to the Hutus in the 1930s and the Catholic Church endorsed this policy, which introduced the idea that the Hutus were faithful to the administration (Reyntjens, 1996: 244). For this reason, the Belgian colonial administration replaced the Hutu chiefs with the Tutsis supporting the Tutsis more than the former German colonial administration (Magnarella, 2005: 807).

Tutsification policy of the colonial administration was favored by the Tutsi monarchy and this contributed a lot into the construction of Tutsi identity. The superiority of the Tutsis in the Rwandan monarchy also helped the Tutsi ethnic group to convert into an ethnic identity worsening the ethnic difference between the Hutus and Tutsis. The transformation of Tutsi elitism into Tutsi fascism with the help of fallacious anthropology drew a line between the Tutsis and Hutus (Forges, 1995: 45). Compulsory labor excluded the Hutus from all political steps and the Tutsis became the holder and ruler of Rwanda that resulted in deepening the ethnic segregation (Buckley-Zistel, 2006: 104). The Tutsi elites reconstructed their history to give legitimacy to their historical superiority and the colonial administration benefited from the fruit of modern science to classify the ethnic groups in Rwanda (Uvin, 1997: 95).

It is asserted that the Belgian colonial administration, the Catholic Church and the social structure in Rwanda may have had a significant role in ethnic segregation. The Catholic Church and the missionaries in Rwanda implemented discriminatory policies at the beginning towards the Hutus and promoted the Hamitic Hypothesis until the 1950s when they quit this policy and started to support the Hutus (James, 2008: 100) on the eve of a new era in the colonies following the changing international atmosphere after the WWII.

2.1.2.2.4. Belgian UN Mandate 1945-1962

The United Nations (UN) promised for independence and justice for the colonial countries after the WWII in its Chart in 1945 and Belgium was hold responsible for a UN mandate in Rwanda (Melvern, 2000: 9). However, it was a temporary period for making Rwanda as an independent state, but the Belgian colonial administration and the White Fathers benefitted from this reinterpretation after the war and they considered it as a way of

preventing anti-colonial independence movements in the Ruanda-Urundi unit of the Belgian Congo as it was the primary aim of the colonial administration to keep the existing colonial system with the help of elected consultative councils (Langford, 2005: 3).

The increasing demand for democracy after the WWII influenced the Belgians' mind (Plaut, 1994: 150). The Belgian mandate in Rwanda started to support the Hutus who were discriminated by the Tutsi rule to comply with the international requirements for independence and democracy, which opened the doors for the Hutus to have their voice in the parliament. The Catholic Church revised its policy towards the Hutus and the schools administered by the Catholic Church began to welcome Hutu students and played a significant role in encouraging democracy in Rwanda. The White Fathers, in particular, worked with the Hutus to assure that the Hutu movement would not be anti-colonial and in collaboration with the ex-Hutu seminarians like Kayibanda, who was born into a Hutu farmer family and had studied at a Catholic seminary before working as a secretary of a Belgian bishop and who would become the President of Rwanda in the future. Nevertheless, the Tutsis, who experienced the change of politics in colonial administration, turned their face to Pan-Africanism and they even tried to establish relationship with the Communist China (Langford, 2005:3; Plaut, 1994: 150; Magnarella, 2005: 809).

Marxist ideas were on the rise in Africa and former European colonizers were afraid of an evolution of future communist countries after colonial era in Africa (Kinzer, 2008). In particular, the *Union Nationale Rwandaise* (Rwandese National Union – UNAR) founded in 1959 as a traditional monarchist party was receiving financial and diplomatic support from the Communist states (Mamdani, 2002: 120). Since the Tutsis were already trying to make contacts with the communist countries they were not seen as reliable partners by the colonial administration and a small number of educated Hutus were seen as reliable partners and they were also much closer to the Catholic Church (Kinzer, 2008). The Tutsification policy was no more favored and supported by the colonial administration. A new policy to support the Hutus was put into effect.

2.1.2.2.5. Rwandan Social Revolution

Democratic demands of the people in Rwanda and the support by the Belgians to the Hutus started to draw a sharp line between the Hutus and Tutsis. The relations between these two ethnic groups much more deteriorated after the *Bahutu* Manifest of the Hutus. The support given by the Belgians and the Catholic Church politically empowered the Hutus, which resulted in a political revolution of the Hutus in 1959. The *Bahutu* Manifest and the social revolution stand as significant landmarks in Rwandan history symbolizing the change in the political power in Rwanda from the Tutsis to the Hutus. This milestone also stands for the end of a Tutsi rule (Newbury and Newbury, 1999: 314).

This kind of a shift of support from the Tutsi minority to the Hutu majority facilitated the revolution of the Hutu peasants between 1959 and 1961, which resulted in a great political and social change in Rwanda after the political power transferred from the Tutsis to the Hutus terminating the Tutsi monarchy and founding a new republic within three years (Eriksson, 1996). Thanks to the military help by the Belgian colonial administration and support of the Catholic Church in Rwanda, the Hutus acquired the political power and

during the revolution the Hutus assaulted not only the aristocratic Tutsis but also all the Tutsi people (Kimonyo et. al., 2004: 2). However, this immediate change of political and social order created an appropriate environment for the ethnic conflict between the Tutsis and Hutus in the very near future since it was mostly related with the elitism and power of the elites. The *mwami* asked Belgium to re-establish the order in Rwanda after the revolution, however Belgian administrators rejected his demand and it is asserted that they intervened to topple down the *mwami* with the help of the Hutus (Plaut, 1994: 150).

The Belgians began to change the Tutsi chiefs with the Hutus at the beginning of the 1960s, which paved the way for the Hutu chiefs to make discriminations against the Tutsis (Magnarella, 2005: 809). Mukimbri claims that the Belgian administration in Rwanda created an advantageous environment for Belgian racists to pursuit their interests in Rwanda (2005: 830). The Tutsi people faced with an increasing discrimination against themselves before the termination of the mandate regime and they were excluded from social and political life in Rwanda. This created a marginalization this time among the Tutsi people and the Belgian administration endorsed the discrimination against the Tutsis.

Belgium and the Catholic Church in Rwanda played an important role in creating ethnic awareness and discrimination, thus helping ethnic groups to obtain ethnic identities. Two different national identities were created in Rwanda in the colonial era. One during the Belgian colony with the Tutsis and the other during the Belgian mandate with the Hutus. The national identity in Rwanda was shaped on two different ethnic identities, yet the colonial administration looked after its interests in Rwanda in creating the national identity. The Belgian administration in Rwanda wanted to benefit from this small country and paid great importance on infrastructure and economic development. Therefore, it helped a creation of national identity in Rwanda that would be beneficial for its interests. Rwanda's national identity was also influenced by the domestic politics after the *Bahutu* Manifest and was transformed into a national identity based on Hutu ethnic identity depending on the interests of Belgian colonial administration.

2.1.2.3. Independence and Start of Constant Violent Conflicts

Rwanda gained independence after the mandate regimes were over after the WWII and stepped into international politics in the 1960s. However, Rwanda witnessed domestic ethnic violence starting from the Social Revolution in 1959 until the Civil War in the 1990s and experienced economic development and instability during this post-colonial period.

The Belgian colonial administration supported and strengthened the Tutsi elite's place in Rwanda with the help of racial thesis like Hamitic Hypothesis, yet it started to support the Hutus, who were humiliated by the colonizers and the Tutsis and were not even given the right for primary education and to create a new group of elites out of the Hutus starting from the 1950s with a sharp turn in its policies. One of the main reasons of such a sharp change in colonial politics was that Belgium wanted to maintain its prestige in the international community and to keep its promises. The Hutus first aimed the Tutsi monarchy because of ethnic hatred created by the ethnic segregation in the 1920s and 1930s, so the Hutus were able to get the political power from the Tutsis owing to the Social

Revolution between 1959 and 1962 with a covered support from Belgium (Verwimp, 2006: 9).

Facing the social revolution flamed by the Hutus, Tutsi *mwami* asked the Belgian colonial administration for permission to maintain order. However, the Belgian colonial administration together with the Hutus stepped into action to topple down the king in 1961 (Newbury and Newbury, 1999: 297). The king's demand was rejected and the Belgian colonial administration acted together with the Hutus because the Belgians planned to give independence to Rwanda in 1962 and they saw the Hutu majority as the unavoidable power in Rwanda. The Belgian colonial administration had already started to change the local colonial Tutsi chiefs with the Hutu ones starting from 1960. The new Hutu chiefs ran a campaign against the Tutsis living on the hills under their control (Magnarella, 2005: 809). The discrimination against the Tutsis increased at the end of the colonial period and they were excluded from several social and political fields. The power equilibrium became reversed starting from 1957 and the Hutus gained the majority in the elections and got the control of the country (Plaut, 1994: 150).

A new period started in Rwanda with a replacement of political power at the end of the colonial era. The Hutus who had been living under a Tutsi rule for ages became the dominant power and started to hold the power in their hands. The *Bahutu* Manifest and Social Revolution became the milestones for the start of constant violent conflict in Rwanda. The relationship between the Hutus and Tutsis started to deteriorate after the *Bahutu* Manifest as a consequence of demands for democracy of the international community. The political power the Hutus had gained during the decolonization process paved the way for the social revolution.

The change of power equilibrium resulted in violence against the Tutsis and small scaled massacres against the Tutsis in some of the provinces at the end of 1959. The Party of the Hutu Emancipation Movement (PARMEHUTU) succeeded the parliamentary elections held in 1960 and 1961 resulting in a big number of Tutsis who held the power before the elections in Rwanda to leave the country. Those Tutsi refugees organized guerilla attacks from Burundi and Uganda between 1961 and 1964 to come back with the help of military power, however, these attacks caused many innocent Tutsis to become victims of systematic killings in Rwanda (Uvin, 1999: 256).

Facing the guerilla attacks the Hutus organized several attacks on the Tutsi government and the Tutsi ethnic people. As a consequence of these attacks almost 130.000 Tutsi fled from Rwanda to look for asylum in the neighboring countries as Zaire, Uganda and Burundi, which resulted in a rise in the number of ethnic Tutsis in Burundi that paved the way for a more monolithic Tutsi state in Burundi (Manchester, 2010: 5). Nonetheless, the Tutsi population in Rwanda continued to decrease and while the Tutsi population in Rwanda was 17.5% in 1952 by 1991 it was almost 8.4% because the Tutsi population left the country on the face of attacks of the Hutus. The Hutus, on the other hand, finally achieved the power in Rwanda thanks to their continuous attacks on the Tutsis (Shaw, 2014). These violent conflicts were the seeds of constant violence in Rwanda that would exist until the end of the Tutsi genocide in 1994.

2.1.2.3.1. The first republic

The democratic elections were held in 1962 in Rwanda for the first time after the declaration of independence. Kayibanda's party won the elections and he became the president despite his strict policies towards the Tutsis. After the elections the Hutus finally came to power in Rwanda and the Hutus became the ruling elite. However, Rwanda experienced violent conflicts under Kayibanda's rule in 1962, 1963 and 1973 (Öztürk, 2011: 71). After achieving the political power in Rwanda, the Hutus expelled the Tutsis from political and civic arena and the Hutus in power also excluded other Hutus depending on the regional differences from political arena (Kimonyo et al., 2004).

The Tutsi refugees called '*inyenzi*' organized an attack from Burundi and invaded the south-east of the country, which resulted in a repression against the Tutsis and a death toll about 10.000 including children and women in December 1963 and January 1964 in the *Gikongoro* prefecture. After this incident the PARMEHUTU became the only party in Rwanda (Kimonyo et al., 2004: 2; Chretien, 1994). The Tutsis who left Rwanda after the Social Revolution kept on launching attacks on the Hutus. The *inyenzi* used Uganda as a base, where they were living as refugees and their leaders were Tutsi elites trying to make allies with the other Tutsis in the Great Lakes Region (Rwengabo, in Sahoo et al. 2014; 292; Öztürk, 2011: 72).

The ethnic segregation and political intensification around it went on during the First Republic. The political authority of the Hutu majority did not make any changes in the policies and practices that were inherited from the European colonizers and it even kept the ethnic identity cards, therefore it helped also to maintain a discriminatory system going on but now as reversed for the Tutsis, which was used for preventing the Tutsis from gaining positions in the army and the government (White, 2009: 474).

The PARMEHUTU that had enjoyed the privilege of a single-party supremacy for almost a decade strengthened its political power, however, exclusionist and regionalist attempt by the Kayibanda administration caused the Hutus of the north to criticize Kayibanda's regionalist politics and his soft and tolerated politics against the Tutsis (Newbury and Newbury, 1999: 298). Political and economic problems along with the ethnic problems arose in the 1970s also had a significant role in preparations for a pending coup by the army (Öztürk, 2011: 72).

The ethnic violence in Burundi in 1972 also fired up violence against the Tutsis in Rwanda (Plaut, 1994: 150). Another factor that increased the tension between the Hutus and the Tutsis in Rwanda was the Hutus who came to Rwanda from Burundi as refugees because of ethnic violence in Burundi. The atrocities against the Hutus in Burundi increased violence against the Tutsis in Rwanda and the Tutsis were discharged from social life and were attacked by Hutus in rural parts of the country. They were also excluded from all commercial activities (Öztürk, 2011: 72).

The people in Rwanda were also angry with the politics of the Kayibanda government since they thought that Kayibanda had not been such supporting the Hutus in education and business (Newbury and Newbury, 1999: 298). Therefore, ethnic hate and hatred that

emerged at the end of the colonial era in Rwanda became stronger with the ethnic hatred against the Hutus in Burundi. The Hutus who had to migrate from Burundi to Rwanda acted together with the opponent groups against the Kayibanda government. The military coup put an end to the social incidents and ethnic hatred owing to economic problems in 1972 and 1973 in Rwanda opening a new period. However, even though the Habyarimana regime stopped defining the Tutsis as a different race, the discrimination against them did not end for a couple of years and even intermarriage between these two major ethnic groups was banned. The PARMEHUTU turned out to be a new party, National Revolutionary Movement for Development (MRND) for all Rwandans even including the elderly and infants popularizing obedience to authorities (Morrock, 2010: 67).

2.1.2.3.2. The second republic

The Rwandan army under Juvenal Habyarimana – leader and minister of the National Guard, the Rwandan army and the police – benefited from the chaotic situation within the country and obtained the power after a successful military coup on 5 July 1973. As a result of the coup, army commanders from the north replaced the leaders from the south (Newbury and Newbury, 1999: 299). After the coup approximately 50 members of the parliament were murdered and Kayibanda was imprisoned and later on in 1976 died owing to ill-treatment (Morel, 2015: 32).

Habyarimana gave great importance to economic development and growth since Rwanda had also experienced harsh economic conditions and problems after the independence as most of the newly independent African states. Habyarimana succeeded in having a close contact with France to cope with the economic problems and to provide economic development. Habyarimana also applied for the support of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. However, despite the economic development, Rwanda transformed into a single-party regime and the MRND gained the full support of the people (Magnarella, 2005: 811).

Habyarimana in power made some people to think that the discrimination against the Tutsi minority would terminate soon (Magnarella, 2005: 810), yet the situation did not change and the Tutsis were continued to be excluded from political positions and a quota system against the Tutsis went on without any changes and with only a small number of Tutsis accepted to the schools and governmental positions (Öztürk, 2011: 73). The Rwandan government continued to issue the same identity cards displaying the ethnic roots of the people, which were introduced by the Belgian colonial authorities (Uvin, 1997: 100). The quota system and the identity cards helped the Rwandan government to maintain the social control in all parts of Rwanda (101).

The Rwandan government went on implementing its discriminative policies for the sake of economic development. The administrative control and power were so strong that all Rwandan citizens had to work on Saturdays for collective compulsory labor and the government did not allow anyone to change residence without its approval (White, 2009: 474). Contrary to what is mentioned above, Prunier sums up the general situation towards the Tutsis during the first decade of Habyarimana regime emphasizing the principle of not messing around politics (1997: 76).

Habyarimana created a successful relationship with France and Belgium in spite of his single-party regime and discrimination against the Tutsis, thus he achieved the political support of France. (Heusch, 1995: 5). Habyarimana also followed a Francophone foreign policy and Rwanda could get France's political support and military-technical assistance in the 1970s and 1980s (Melvern, 2000: 6-9). It was not difficult for the Habyarimana regime to set close relationship with France. As Rwanda acquired independence in 1962 and the Belgians started to leave the country starting from 1962 and they only wanted to maintain the economic ties, France gradually became active in setting political and military links with Rwanda. France benefitted from the cultural and linguistic heritage of the Belgians and gradually included Rwanda into the Francophonic zone and *Françafrique*, hence the relations between France and Rwanda improved in the 1970s with the start of military cooperation between the two countries depending on an agreement that paved the way for a French military existence in Rwanda (Cameron, 2015: 100).

During that time France had military agreements with Francophone states in Africa and it had signed eight defense protocols and 24 different agreements for military-technical support between 1960 and 1993 and the military relationship between France and Francophone states were mostly depending on the personal relationship between the French and African leaders that formed a strong network of businessmen, officials and intelligence units (Staunton, 2016: 305). In fact, the relationship between France and Rwanda dates back to the early period after independence when French President Charles de Gaulle signed a cooperation agreement with the Rwandan President Kayibanda and the relationship between the two countries continued to flourish during the Pompidou, Giscard d'Estating and Mitterrand eras (Kinzer, 2008).

The military both complaining and benefiting from the chaos in Rwanda acquired the power after a successful coup attempt under the leadership of General Juvenal Habyarimana on 5th of July 1973. This changed the roots of the elites one more time and the power shifted from the southern Hutus to the northern Hutus. Habyarimana leaded several changes in Rwanda including further emphasis given for economic development and growth since the economic problems may have increased the hate against the Tutsis. Economic problems emerged quickly in Rwanda right after the independence in 1962 as it was in most of the African states. In order to overcome the economic problems Habyarimana preferred to manage a close cooperation with France together with the financial help by the IMF and the World Bank.

2.1.2.3.3. Zero Network and Power Consolidation

Habyarimana centralized political institutions to increase the power of security forces, his presidency and the single party MRND, so the army and the radical Hutus of the north supported Habyarimana regime (Newbury and Newbury, 1999: 299). However, behind the Habyarimana government a special elite network emerged. This network was called as *Akazu*[14] or Zero Network and the members consisted of president's wife, four brothers-in-law, a son-in-law and very important people form the government, army and secret service

[14] *Akazu* means 'little house' in Kinyarwanda language (Jesee, 2017).

and the business sector were all from the same the Gisenyi prefecture in the northwest, which was Habyarimana's home region and the last Hutu region to go under the control of the Tutsi kingdom (Morrock, 2010: 67). Since this network was formed around the wife of Habyarimana, Agathe Habyarimana, who was coming from a Hutu family that had control over a principality in the 1800s in Rwanda, and her brothers and cousins, it was also called as '*Le Clan de Madame'* (Shaw, 2014).

As Morrock asserts the Zero Network was similar to a network of queens and queen mothers in Rwandan monarchy and the activities of this network were not all the time align with the wishes of the President Habyarimana. Morrock also asserts that one of the key figures in the Zero Network, Colonel Theoneste Bagosora had a significant role in planning the Rwandan genocide and the post-Habyarimana period in Rwanda in the following years (Morrock, 2010). The members of Zero Network were holding the key positions in the government and army and among its prominent members were ministers from the cabinet, the army chief of staff, leaders of most of the political parties, outstanding businessmen, owners of critical enterprises like the radio (Shaw, 2014). As asserted, Habyarimana almost played a moderate role, however, his wife, brothers in law and subordinate members of the network paved the way for extremism in Rwanda until Habyarimana's assassination (Morrock, 2010).

As Shattuck points out Habyarimana "declared an end to the killing of the Tutsis" after getting into the power and "he consolidated his power by strengthening the racial identity system, blocking the appointment of Tutsis to political or administrative positions, and successfully courting European and American 'development donors'" (2005: 29-30). This change of domestic policy not only created a stronger Rwanda in the mid-1980s but also resulted in "a huge refugee problem: nearly a million Tutsis had been driven out of the country" (Shattuck, 2005: 30). Starting from the first years in his presidency Habyarimana mentioned giving an end to the discrimination against the Tutsis, yet nothing was done to improve their situation and they were not let to come back to the schools. However, some Tutsis were allowed to do only some jobs at a minimum level (Magnarella, 2005: 810 and Öztürk, 2011: 73) if they were not messing around politics as mentioned above.

For this reason, a quota policy against the Tutsis were then followed by the Habyarimana government, but the government promoted economic development together with the quota policy in order to diminish the ethnic discrepancies (Newbury and Newbury, 1999: 298). However, the new Hutu elite promoted a systematic discrimination against the Tutsis in education, education abroad, bureaucracy as well as in the army, government and the single party in politics at the same line with the ideology of the social revolution. The Hutus had normally acquired positions in the army, diplomatic missions and in the parliament with some rare exceptions. A quota system determined the number of the Tutsis to receive higher education and to get positions in the government (Uvin, 1997: 100).

At first it seems that the Hutus forgot about their hatred against the Tutsis with the attempts of the government for economic development, but in fact the only change was a power change between different Hutu power groups. The power center shifted from the south to the north. Habyarimana managed to have a partial political and economic stability till the

end of the 1980s and economic growth, infrastructure activities, the increase in coffee cultivation, diplomatic openings and international economic supports played an important role in this partial stability (Öztürk, 2011: 73).

Habyarimana's discourse on nation building was relying on economic development and his main aim was to draw the attention of international actors to economic growth and development instead of political differences between different social groups (Buckley-Zistel, 2006: 106). However, in late 1980s the economy started to deteriorate, and corruption and rent-seeking political authorities accelerated the deterioration as the divide between the wealthy and poor grew a lot (Newbury and Newbury, 1999: 300). All-in-all the Zero Network and the efforts to minimize Tutsi activity in political and economic sectors despite the quota system helped the Second Republic regime to consolidate its political and economic power thanks to economic growth, investments in coffee production and infrastructure and diplomatic openings.

2.1.2.4. Civil War

The partial political and economic stability obtained by the Habyarimana regime in the late 1980s gradually yielded social unrest owing to increasing economic problems. Domestic violence and social unrest in neighboring states, Burundi and Uganda, increased unrest in Rwanda. Ethnic hatred strengthened animosity against the Tutsis in Burundi, however, it increased hostility of the Tutsis in Uganda against the Hutus in Rwanda.

Habyarimana regime started to mention sending the surplus population in Rwanda, where 90% of the population relied on agriculture to live on, to Zaire (former name of the Democratic Republic of Congo - DRC today) and Tanzania and even some farther countries like Gabon when it faced with the economic problems (Newbury, 1995: 13). Habyarimana government at first seemed to tolerate the Rwandan refugees coming back to their home country, yet it did not support the refugees' return and introduced strict conditions for the refugees (Plaut, 1994: 150). The children of the Tutsi refugees repeatedly stated their willingness to go back to Rwanda, but the Rwandan government denied their demands declaring that the country was overpopulated and its natural resources were not enough to meet the population increase (Heusch, 1995: 6).

On contrary to the exclusion of Tutsis, at the beginning of the 1990s with the wave of changes all around the world, opposition media groups emerged in Rwanda as well and the government started to get criticized. Demands for democracy increased (Öztürk, 2011: 73). Democratization movements paved the way for new parties like the *Parti Social-Démocrate* (PSD) on the center-left, the *Parti Liberal* on the center-right and the *Parti Démocrate-Chrétien* (PDC). Nevertheless, Habyarimana facilitated the establishment of two organs, the CDR (a right-wing party) and the *Interhamwe*[15] militia (a paramilitary body) to legitimize the radicals and strengthen his own regime (Kuperman, 1996). However, this period did not last so long and was interrupted by the invasion of the RPF. Benefitting from the political and economic situation in Rwanda, the Rwandan Patriotic

[15] *Interhamwe* means 'those who fight/work together' in Kinyarwanda language (Jesee, 2017).

Front (RPF) founded by the Tutsi refugees in Uganda started to invade Rwanda in the northeast on 1st of October 1990 (Öztürk, 2011: 73).

The RPF had been active since 1979 and in 1990 the Tutsis in Rwanda informed the RPF that Rwandan government was weak in economics and had a corrupt system with increased segregation between the ethnic groups and the Rwandan refugees in Uganda were afraid of being under attack of the Ugandan people owing to a discussion for a new land legislation. Therefore, the RPF started preparations for the invasion and logistic support was received from Uganda and finally ordered its members to leave the Ugandan army on 29 September 1990 and two days after this order, the RPF army of 4.000 troops mainly consisting of the Tutsis in exile crossed the border and invaded the territory closer to Uganda. As a reaction to the invasion in the north of the country, the Rwandan government together with French and Zairean help tried to stop the attacks of the RPF (Plaut, 1994: 151; Klinghoffer, 1998: 15).

In addition to the preparations in Uganda before the invasion, as Prunier asserts "Fred Rwigyema set out on a fund-raising mission among Tutsi *émigré* communities in Europe and North America" and "Paul Kagame had been sidetracked by being sent to the United States for further training in June and he had accepted in order not to attract attention" (1997: 92). Kagame had been sent to Fort Leavenworth in the USA as a Ugandan officer and had to take a hard journey back through Ethiopia when the RPF started its attacks (Mills, 2008: 73). The RPF started its attack on Rwanda under the command of Fred Rwigyema and after his death the RPF chairman Alexis Kanyarengwe leaded the army. About 7.000 men were forming the RPF army and they were mostly wearing Ugandan uniforms or similar ones (Klinghoffer, 1998: 15). In 1991 the RPF had 15.000 troops and at the end of 1991 it invaded the territory along the border between Uganda and Rwanda (Mamdani, 2002: 186).

The Belgian Prime Minister went to Kigali together with foreign minister and defense minister to meet Habyarimana, Museveni, Mobutu and Mwinyi of Tanzania on 14 October 1990. As Jones drew attention, this mission by the Belgian government reflects the involvement attempts by the former colonial power and adds that even though the Belgian government wanted to react the invasion by sending troops to Rwanda, the Belgian Parliament rejected the mission and only gave approval for an evacuation and protection plan for Belgian nationals in Rwanda (Jones, 1999: 61).

The invaders, the RPF, was a political organization mainly consisting of Tutsi elements in exile in Uganda and it also had military affiliate called as the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), which was serving the Ugandan President Museveni and commanded by Paul Kagame who was claimed to have leftist attitudes and was trained in the US Army General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth (Morrock, 2010: 68). The origins of the RPF go back to 1979 when the Rwandan refugees in Uganda including Paul Kagame and Fred Rwigyema founded the Rwandan Refugee Welfare Foundation in Nairobi, which was covering its political objectives under the excuse of charity, yet later on the foundation changed its name as Rwandan Alliance for National Unity (RANU) and announced that it was fighting for the rights of the Rwandan refugees to go back home. Although most of its members were

old and ordinary monarchist and conservative Rwandans, the new generation who was born at the refugee camps were taking Fidel Castro, Che Guevara, and Vietnamese leaders Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nyugen Giap as revolutionary models (Rwengabo, 2014: 294; Kinzer, 2008).

Their main objective was to return to Rwanda since the Ugandan government that had welcomed the refugees before did not offer citizenship to them and their children because the people in Uganda did not want to share their soil with the refugees owing to economic and political problems (Magnarella, 2005: 812). The RPF consisted of two sections: one was representing the high-level political positions and the other one was representing the ones excluded by the Ugandans. Yet for Ugandan people these two groups of RPF people were the same and they were not happy with them since they were occupying the influential positions in the government (Newbury, 1995: 13).

The second Obote government in Uganda had deported thousands of Rwandan refugees because of the increasing problems at the end of 1982, yet the Rwandan government did not accept the Rwandan refugees for the camps on the northeastern border and sent the refugees back to Uganda. Therefore, the Rwandan refugees found the solution to support the National Resistance Movement led by Museveni, who was trying to topple down the Obote regime in Uganda (Newbury, 1995: 13). Since both of the Rwandan and Ugandan governments did not want the Tutsi refugees on their soil, the refugees had to live on in a region between the two countries, which did not belong to any one and for this reason lots of young Rwandans joined Museveni's guerilla organization to defend themselves (Kimonyo et al., 2004).

Uganda had been a safe haven for thousands of Rwandans before the incidents in 1959 since most of the Rwandans had come to Uganda for economic reasons and they were constituting the sixth largest ethnic group in Uganda (Plaut, 1994: 150). The Rwandan refugees supporting the struggle of Museveni turned to experienced fighters and decided to enter into Rwanda by force of arms (Heusch, 1995: 6). The Rwandan refugees mostly made up the commanding units of Museveni's National Resistance Army (NRA) and approximately 4.000 Rwandan refugees were fighting for the NRA that consisted of about 13.000 guerillas. Most of the Rwandan Tutsi refugees joined the NRA in 1982 and 1983 and climbed through the commanding ranks (Mills, 2008: 72).

The RPF came 45 miles near to the capital city of Rwanda, Kigali, yet the invasion was not welcomed by the local population. It also resulted in 300.000 people to move into the refugee camps. The invasion and afterwards was a failure for Habyarimana, who was not able to reinforce his troops at the border and had to ask for help from France, Belgium and Zaire. However, Morrock states that the RPF invasion could have been a failure without a popular support and the invasion strengthened Kagame's leadership and the RPF and other opposition parties met in Brussels to condemn Habyarimana government and anti-Tutsi racism in Rwanda (2010: 69).

The invasion coincided with a new wave of political liberalization that had been very popular in Africa since the end of the Cold War and the Western states that had supported the Habyarimana regime revised their policies towards the Rwandan government and they

started to urge the Habyarimana regime for a liberal democracy in Rwanda (Kimonyo et al., 2004). After the *La Baule* Conference in July 1990 President Habyarimana declared that Rwanda had entered into a democratization process. One week before the RPF started its invasion in the northeastern part of the country 'National Unity Commission for Political Reform' (*Commission nationale de synthèse* - CNS) was formed on 24th of September 1990 (Reyntjens, 1996: 245).

Habyarimana had attended the *Franco-Afrique* Summit at La Baule in France in April 1990 and there he was recommended by the French President Mitterrand to allow multiparty system in Rwanda as France like the other Western countries were supporting democratic regimes around the world after the Cold War was over and persuading its partners to have democratic reforms. The French President Mitterrand even declared that France was willing to provide military protection for democratization process. During this democratization process quite more radical parties than the MRND emerged (Magnarella, 2005: 812; Collins, 2014: 54). Besides, Habyarimana's failure upon "political and military confrontation" urged him "to try his hand at promise" and after realizing that using force would not help to solve the political problems within the country he had to welcome the changes in the constitution for the foundation of multiple political parties in June 1991 (Valentino, 2013: 180).

This movement, though, was not favored by Habyarimana himself after ruling Rwanda for seventeen years, but he had to welcome the birth of new political parties since he had noticed the depth of the economic crisis (Kinzer, 2008). The emerging opposition parties were not interested in the future of the Tutsis and they were in the pursuit of getting their shares (Heusch, 1995: 6). However, these new-born political parties and this process of multipartyism in Rwanda were not only a result of this recommendation from outside but also a result of the invasion by the RPF in the north of the country. During this time Habyarimana – despite the opposition by the hardliners from the MRND on the account of his soft approach on the RPF – announced that he wanted to enlarge the political landscape to have a multiparty system in Rwanda. After his announcement regarding the introduction of a multiparty political system eleven minor political parties also called as 'The Eleven Pygmies' were established in Rwanda, however, they were not politically active until Habyarimana benefited from them for undermining the ongoing peace process in Rwanda (Shaw, 2014). As Mamdani puts forward main political parties part of the coalition ran several demonstrations, first one was held in November 1991 with 13.000 demonstrators and it asked for a national conference. A second demonstration with the participation of almost 50.000 people was held one month later as a reaction to the appointments at the ministerial level (2002: 208).

However, when the Habyarimana regime defined the Tutsis as enemy of the state and supposed that the opposition would not make a cooperation with the RPF, it was wrong as the main parties in Rwanda started cooperation with the RPF starting from 1992. In fact, despite of the fact that the cooperation was not a stable one, it had an influence on the government to go for a negotiation period with the RPF (Human Rights Watch, 2006). This democratization process was also helping the donor countries as they were using it as a

condition for aid or bilateral and multilateral loans and western donor countries support for democracy became conditional for the government to sign an agreement with the IMF (Chossudovsky, 2017: 938).

Faced with the raids by Tutsi exiles in the north, Habyarimana government invested in arms and Rwanda turned into one of the biggest arms importing countries in Africa and military expenditures almost covered 70% of the total budget of the country (Morrock, 2010: 68). France was very interested in supplying and selling arms to the Rwandan government since as one of the major powers dependent on foreign trade for arms trade (69). Apart from arms trade France, under the leadership of Mitterrand, sent a commando unit to Rwanda to reinforce the Rwandan army and during the Civil War between the Rwandan government and the RPF after the invasion in the north, Mitterrand continued to send French troops to Rwanda for technical assistance and advisers. It has not been proved that the French troops technically attended the war, but it is claimed that the French troops were seen helping the Rwandan army for artillery and helicopter surveillance including supporting troops for check points (White, 2007: 132). Cameron as well asserts that France provided the Rwandan army with armored cars, heavy artillery and some helicopters and states that especially after the Operation *Noroit*, French soldiers stayed in Rwanda and continued military training for the Rwandan army before and during the genocide (Cameron, 2015: 102).

The RPF continued its attacks between 1990 and 1993. The Tutsis were the most badly influenced groups at the end of these attacks. The Rwandan police arrested many Tutsis accusing them to be in connection with the RPF just after the attacks on October 1990 (Newbury and Newbury, 1999: 304). The threat against the Tutsis gradually increased and the people, especially the Hutus doubted that the Tutsis were terrorists invading their country (Heusch, 1995: 6). As Kuperman states the RPF had organized successful and important attacks on the Hutu dominated Rwandan Army and their military success played a very important role in Habyarimana's double policy (Kuperman, 2000: 95) that will be discussed below.

After the invasion started by the RPF in October the Habyarimana government followed a double policy and he let a gradual political liberalization as a consequence of the pressure especially from the Western donor countries though he conducted repression on domestic politics and was turning a blind eye towards the human right abuses (Newbury, 1995: 14). As a result of this double track policy by the Rwandan government the Tutsis became the main target and according to Newbury approximately 2.000 Tutsis were killed in different parts of Rwanda between 1990 and 1993 including massacres in Kibilira in 1990, the retaliation of the RPF attacks in 1991 and killing of hundreds of Tutsi in Bugesera region when the Rwandan government scattered the rumor that the RPF and their collaborators would kill the Hutus (Lemarchand, 1995: 10; Newbury, 1995: 14).

However, in the meantime after the invasion negotiations began between the government of Rwanda and the RPF – the negotiation process is dealt with on the third chapter of this dissertation in detail – together with the democratization process and pressure coming from the neighboring countries and the international community for peace negotiations. Hence,

during this period, the people criticizing the government and promoting the human rights became targets of the government no matter which ethnic origin they had (Lemarchand, 1995: 10; Newbury, 1995: 14). The violence in the country did not have an end and after the violent protests organized by the MRND and CDR between 21-25 January 1993 following the signing of the second protocol requiring that the President would be from the governing party and the Prime Minister from the MDR and the Vice-Prime Minister from the RPF, the Tutsis again were killed in several massacres in Gisenyi and Kibuye (Desrosiers, 2007: 81).

The RPF organized a sudden attack on 8 February 1993 and it could reach closer to Kigali and had more territory under its control (Melvern, 2004: 40). As Melvern puts forward the RPF invasion demonstrated how it was effective in benefitting from the armistice to give more training to its troops and make the territory under its domain double and adds that this move of the RPF made Habyarimana to come back to the negotiation desk in Arusha (40). The RPF organized an attack over Kigali environs and cut the main roads to the city, which helped the RPF to prove that they had the capability to take the capital city, Kigali (Mills, 2008: 74).

This second invasion of the RPF started in February, 1993 as asserted by Peterson was violating the cease-fire and strengthening the extremist Hutus since the RPF was the first time seen as the responsible for the atrocities, therefore the Tutsis were demonstrated as devils and the killings of the RPF only contributed into confirmation of the general opinion that the Hutus were surrounded by these devils (Scott, 2000: 271). This second attack of the RPF resulted in an institutionalized power-sharing between the warring parties, yet it facilitated an increase in radical Hutu numbers (Mills, 2008: 74). However, the RPF was claiming that they were fighting for the Tutsis, who were then killed by the Hutus, yet the French intervention gave an end to the fighting. It resulted in a displacement of about one million people (Barnett, 2002: 57).

The civil war triggered by the attacks of the RPF put an end to the single party system in Rwanda (Plaut, 1994: 150). The international community demanded Habyarimana to take steps towards democratization and to share the power with the RPF. Habyarimana then allowed the foundation of political parties in 1991 and the so-called coalition government had the power in 1992 (Uvin, 1999: 259-260). Habyarimana started to follow two-way politics starting from the civil war. He supported liberalization and democratization with the pressure from his Western supports and at the same time he tolerated human rights abuses and followed a repressive politics as part of his fighting strategy. About 2000 Tutsis lost their life because of the politics aiming the Tutsis between 1990-1993 (Newbury, 1995: 14).

2.1.2.5. The Negotiations and the UNAMIR

The negotiations that began between the Government of Rwanda and the RPF to terminate the civil war started in 1990 with the invasion of the northern Rwanda by the RPF. Next chapter will be dealing with the negotiation process in Rwanda in detail, so the result of the negotiations, the UNAMIR, will be discussed here.

The UNAMIR, which was formed after the mutual consents from the Rwandan government and the RPF as a peacekeeping operation under the 6th Chapter of the UN Charter, was a watchdog responsible for securing the implementation of the Arusha Accords and lacked the mandate for enforcement (Othman, 2005: 16). It was actually designed as a neutral military observation group, whose main responsibility was to provide "security of Kigali; to monitor the cease-fire agreement which called for the establishment of cantonment and assembly zones; to monitor the security situation during the final period of the transitional Government's mandate leading up to the elections, and to investigate non-compliance with the Peace Agreement" (16).

The Rwandan government and the RPF signed the Arusha Peace Accord and both of the parties welcomed a peacekeeping mission by the UN to secure the peace agreement (Howard, 2007: 29). As to the Arusha Peace Accord, a UN peacekeeping force later on called as UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was to deploy in Rwanda in 37 days after the peace accord was signed in order for a transition government to be made and a transition parliament to assemble. However, delayed deployment of the peace force caused delay in making the government and assembling the parliament (Newbury and Newbury, 1999: 307).

Finally, the UN Security Council decided to start the UN mission UNAMIR on October 5, 1993 (Howard; 2007: 29). The UN Security Council Resolution No. 872 launched the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) and mandated its duties and responsibilities as follows:

> (a) To contribute to the security of the city of Kigali inter alia within a weapons-secure area established by the parties in and around the city,
> (b) To monitor observance of the cease-fire agreement, which calls for the establishment of cantonment and assembly zones and the demarcation of the new demilitarized zone and other demilitarization procedures,
> (c) To monitor the security situation during the final period of the transitional government's mandate, leading up to the elections,
> (d) To assist with mine clearance, primarily through training programs,
> (e) To investigate at the request of the parties or on its own initiative instances of alleged noncompliance with the provisions of the Arusha Peace Agreement relating to the integration of the armed forces, and pursue any such instances with the parties responsible and report thereon as appropriate to the Secretary General
> (f) To monitor the process of repatriation of Rwandese refugees and resettlement of displaced persons to verify that it is carried out in a safe and orderly manner,
> (g) To assist in the coordination of humanitarian assistance activities in conjunction with relief operations,
> (h) To investigate and report on incidents regarding the activities of the gendarmeries and police (United Nations, Security Council, S/RES/872, 2).

In addition, the UN was not able to keep its commitment to deploy a peacekeeping force in Rwanda in due time and the Security Council cut the number of troops to 2548 from the planned number of 4260 since its mandate was limiting the peacekeeping operations under the Chapter VI requiring that the military operations could only be conducted together with the Rwandan government (Kolodziej, 2000: 133). The mission was put under the command of a Canadian general Romeo Dallaire in charge of 937 Bangladeshi, 841 Ghanaian and 428 Belgian troops (Guichaoua, 2015: 66). The UNAMIR mostly consisted of Belgian, Ghanaian, Bangladeshi and Tunisian soldiers together with a small participation from

twenty countries, yet the Belgian contingent was the best equipped one and even though it was unusual for former colonial powers to send troops to their colonies in the past, the Rwandan government and the RPF especially demanded the Belgian contingent. Belgium sent about 400 troops for the UNAMIR to show its support for the Arusha Peace Accords (Smith, 2010: 147).

However, even though Dallaire kept the UN informed about the ongoing situation in Rwanda, as alleged, the UN Secretariat did not pay a serious attention to the incidents and Dallaire's warnings "never reached the Security Council" (Shattuck, 2005: 35). In addition, as Shattuck argues "paralyzed by the failure of the Somalia mission three months earlier, limited by the tight leash imposed by the United States on post-Somalia peace-keeping activities, and overwhelmed by the seventeen other peacekeeping missions it was then managing the United Nations' grossly understaffed peacekeeping office, then headed by Kofi Annan, did not give Dallaire the tools he was asking for" (2005: 35). The United Nations could only send instructions to Dallaire to warn Habyarimana that the militia's activities were threatening the ongoing peace process and violating the arms free zone in the capital city, Kigali instead of giving him the authority to seize the weapons probably to be used by these militias (Shattuck, 2005: 35).

2.1.2.6. Deteriorating Economy and Militia Formation

The invasion happened at the same time with some structural changes in Rwanda when the government accepted economic measure set forth by the World Bank and IMF and coincided with the famine in the south and an increase in malaria cases together with food shortage and a rise in the number of Burundian refugees (Hintjens, 1999: 257). Rwanda was facing a harsh economic crisis and had to devaluate its currency and had to welcome the stabilization program offered by the IMF (Newbury and Newbury, 1999: 301) and as a consequence of devaluation people faced with a harsh increase in prices and in particular fuel for transportation became more expensive having a negative influence on the trade and food prices, which also affected coffee producers together with the disease in coffee trees (Newbury, 1995: 14). Since the Rwandan economy was mostly depending on coffee production and its revenue even after the independence period and agricultural production was the leading sector financing the government the government had to pay the debts by the revenue from coffee and tea production, which put the small-scale producers into a hard situation (Chossudovsky, 2017: 939).

In line with the recommendations by the international organs like the IMF and World Bank the Rwandan government implemented a structural program between 1990 and 1992 but starting with the Civil War from October 1990 the economic crisis contributed into the instability in Rwandan politics together with the demographic pressure stemming from less arable lands for people (Erikkson, 1996).

Before the invasion by the RPF, Rwanda became one of the most densely populated country owing to high birth rates, but despite the increase in the birth rate and young population Rwandan economy had to continue relying on rural production like coffee cultivation and the population growth caused the expansion of the cultivated areas also increasing the mixed cropping or almost-continuous cropping (Verpoorten, 2012: 549). Despite the

increase in cropping in Rwandan fields, because of excessive land usage for agricultural production it became almost impossible to keep cattle for manure and agricultural techniques for more production reached their limits, yet still the modern agricultural methods for intensifying like using improved seeds and fertilizers kept Rwanda under the Sub-Saharan average (549).

In addition, because of the measures imposed by the IMF the state institutions had to go for bankruptcy resulting a collapse even in health and education services (939). Nevertheless, the IMF demanded a second devaluation in June 1992 when the civil war was continuing and as the farmers were mostly cultivating coffee there was the problem of finding available land for producing food. Even though the economic situation was bad the government increased the number of the troops from 5.000 to 40.000 that meant the necessity of an extra budget for their salaries since the government recruited mostly the unemployed men for the army and even for the militia, which would have a significant role in the genocide later on (938-939).

In addition to the Rwandan Army troops the government also had the national police and presidential guard of 1500 troops and approximately 15.000-30.000 Hutu militia were everywhere in Rwanda but the militia was lack of firearms and ammunition (Kuperman, 2000: 104). The militias first appeared in Rwanda at the start of 1990s as a consequence of multipartyism Habyarimana started and Habyarimana's party, together with the others, started to establish youth wings that were involved in violence. The militia organizations then changed its nature and were involved in the genocide (Kuperman, 2001: 39). The Rwandan government, between 1992 and 1993 provided military training for the militia at the army garrisons and approximately 300 militia could get training for three weeks at these bases. Most of the militia were members of *interhamwe*, the youth wing of the MRND, which would play an important role in Rwandan genocide in killing the Tutsis and leading most of the attacks (Straus, 2008: 26-27; Plaut, 1994: 151).

As Rwengabo states the radical Hutu movements were not happy with the moderate policies of Habyarimana and they went on forming their own militiamen called as *Interhamwe, Impuzamugambi*, *Inkuba* and *Abokombozi* under the umbrella of the political parties as the MRND, the CDR, the MDR (2014: 296). These armed militias in Rwanda were generally called as Interhamwe even though each of them was chasing after different interests and probably because the MRND had the largest militia known in Rwanda (296).

2.1.2.7. Rwandan Genocide

Rwanda was divided around ethnic and political lines by 1994. On one side President Habyarimana was standing with his supporters and on the other side the RPF and opponents acting together with the rebels were standing (Plaut, 1994: 151). The hatred against the Tutsis increased a lot and small sized massacres and killings by the militia called as *interhamwe* created a chaotic environment. The plane carrying the Rwandan President Habyarimana who was coming from the negotiations in Arusha was fallen down on 6th of April 1994. The violence and atrocities started on the same day at night and the militia and presidential guard took part in the violent actions towards the Tutsis and the moderate Hutus (Plaut, 1994: 151; Uvin, 1999: 261). As Collins claims the plane crush was the start

signal for the genocide and after the crush the extremists formed an interim government that came into power after a coup to benefit from the power of the state to start for a genocide (2014: 3).

The fall-down of Habyarimana's plane triggered the violence and final solution. The radical Hutus and Hutu militia systematically killed about 500.000-1.000.000 civilians, most of whom were Tutsis. The RPF leader Kagame sent an ultimatum to the commander of the UNAMIR, Dallaire, stating that he would consider the Arusha Accords as terminated if the killings continued and order his army to attack Kigali, yet before getting a reply from Dallaire, Kagame sent another message stating that the RPF army could join the UNAMIR and some units of the Rwandan Army against the actions of the Presidential Guard and the militia, interhamwe (Kinzer, 2008).

Newbury asserts that the genocide was carefully planned and the genociders were mostly the 'militia' organizations, the *interhamwe* and other extremist groups even though it was plotted at the state level (1995: 12). The militia under the two names of *interhamwe* and *impuzamugambe* were generally recruited from local soccer clubs and most of these young people were unemployed and jealous of other people's achievements (Morrock, 2010: 72).

The unemployment problem of the young in Rwanda resulted in an increase in the number of the young people joining the militia and according to Rothe et. al. it helped the stage to be ready for the upcoming genocide (Rothe et al., 2008: 78). The genociders mostly organized small-scale killings not to draw the attention of the international community and they took slow but secret steps to kill the Tutsis, for this reason Hutu leaders usually went to different locations every day with a list of names searching for the Tutsi elite and they took them under the excuse of interrogation to different places and execute them. As Kuperman emphasized this happened before the eyes of the Red Cross workers in Kigali where UN troops were present to guard and at some of the churches in Kigali (Kuperman, 2000: 98).

Starting from the 7th of April the Presidential Guard and the genociders started to kill the moderate Hutus including the former ministers like the deposed ministers of agriculture and information, who was against the radical activities of the RTLM and other media organs controlled by the Zero Network and former minister of foreign affairs, who took part in the delegation for Arusha peace negotiations (Kinzer, 2008). However, during this period Bagosora from the Zero Network called for peace and full implementation of the Arusha Peace Accords while taking the control of the government and giving full support for the organization of the genocide and he chose an old physician as the president of Rwanda on 8 April 1994. As Morrock mentions, Bagosora's coup against the Habyarimana regime was also a coup against the Zero Network and after Habyarimana's death, members of the Zero Network, First Lady and her relatives and in-laws were no longer active in Rwandan politics and they all fled away to France leaving the scene for Bagosora (2010: 71).

2.1.2.7.1. Organization of Genocide

Radical Hutus considered the fall-down of Habyarimana's plane as an excuse to turn Rwanda into hell and they killed about more than half a million Tutsis together with opponent and moderate Hutus within just one hundred days (Verwimp, 2006: 10). The assassination against Habyarimana was also a legitimate excuse to act in hatred against the Tutsis. The militia that was controlled by the government and that acted in fear, the army units and the Presidential Guard executed a program to kill all the Tutsis and the moderate Hutus. They also defined the Tutsis as potential targets (Newbury and Newbury, 1999: 317).

However, as Peterson asserts it was obvious that the plane crash was not the last and only excuse for the killings since the confidential intelligence and military documents found by a Swiss journalist "made clear that the inferno was not inevitable and on 23 March 1994, two weeks before the president's plane crashed, the chief of civilian intelligence wrote urgently to the prime minister warning 'The persistent tension is due to. . . the psychological fatigue of the population . . . . If the highest authorities of this country don't do anything to stop the gears of violence, this country risks falling into chaos'" (2000: 272).

The violence scattered on every corner in Rwanda from Kigali. The RTLM supporting the government and the radicals encouraged the Hutus to take the president Habyarimana's revenge on the Tutsis. The Hutus oriented by the militia started to kill, usurp and rape the Tutsis (Kuperman, 2000: 96). As Keller mentions "programming at the radio station was a mixture of inflammatory oratory and popular Hutu music designed to make listeners feel that hating and killing the Tutsis was their sacred duty" (2014: 139). Some members of the Zero Network were organizing hate-speeches and propaganda against the Tutsis and some others were dealing with the import of the machetes and other agricultural tools such as axes, hoes, scythes and knives mostly from China (Kinzer, 2008).

The genociders blocked the roads before the national radio station broadcasted the news and checkpoints were installed to check the identities of the people in order to find the Tutsis and opponents on the list. Once found at the checkpoints they were immediately killed (Heusch, 1995: 6). The distance between the barricades were not more than a hundred meters, for this reason and owing to the new of barricades of the militia it was not so possible for the victims to escape from death (Plaut, 1994: 151). As Peterson asserts the militiamen organized well-planned attacks on the people and during the killings telephone service was cut so that the genociders could continue the massacre in isolation (2000: 271). Even though the violence spread so fast two factors are claimed to have slowed down the speed of the genocide. The Hutu militia avoided from big massacres and the genociders again avoided big size massacres in ten different provinces (Kuperman, 2000: 98-99).

Order for killing came from the top, so the ones who rejected killing people even suicided themselves that ended in a devaluation of social relations and collective trust. Even the teachers killed their students and husbands killed their wives for saving them from a dreadful death. No one could escape from the genociders and even the little children were used for finding the 'enemies' and people were even killed by surprise attacks in schools, churches and governmental offices where they sought for a shelter (Hintjens, 1999: 269-

270). Between April and July 1994, 10% of the population was killed by knives and machetes, plus guns and grenades and the killings started in Kigali and expanded to the whole country (Newbury, 1998: 78).

During the genocide, physical characteristics like a long nose, long fingers and height were taken into consideration in deciding whom to kill and when these characteristics were not enough in a society where racial characteristics had been blurred the identity cards were used to determine whom to kill and the genociders check the identity cards at the checkpoints. Furthermore, Tutsi-Hutu infants and children were even massacred in order to avoid a kind of revenge in the future (Hintjens, 1999: 272).

A transitional government was formed under the control of the Hutus till the 8th of April and the armed militia under the command of this transitional government set out to wipe out all of its enemies. The Presidential Guard, local police, gendarmerie and officials killed people and hunted their enemies with the help of private radio stations controlled by the Hutus. The genociders did not only kill the Tutsis, opponents of the regime, moderate Hutus or the Hutus trying to save the Tutsis, but they also killed the Prime Minister Madame Agathe Uwilingiyimana and ten Belgian soldiers who were protecting her. After this incident the citizens and politicians of Belgium wanted their troops back home and as a consequence, Belgium withdrew its 420 soldiers from the UN peace force in Rwanda, however, the commander of the UN peace force Dallaire, thought that it would harm the UNAMIR and demanded more troops to strengthen the UNAMIR (Plaut, 1994: 151; Kinzer, 2008).

2.1.2.7.2. International Response to the Genocide

The chaos in Kigali and the killing of these ten Belgian soldiers alarmed the Western countries and they started an evacuation plan for their nationals living in Rwanda, for this reason, about 190 French troops came to Kigali to take control of the Kigali airport and France strengthened these troops with more troops to start the Operation Amaryllis. This was the first reaction of the international community to the genocide in Rwanda. But the reaction did not help terminating the genocide. It only helped to save international people in Rwanda with an evacuation plan. Following the French troops about 80 Italian troops came to Rwanda for Operation Silverback. However, after successfully organizing the evacuation plan between 9 and 13 April all the Western nationals except those working for the International Committee of the Red Cross and *Médecins Sans Frontier* left the country as well as these troops (Kuperman, 2001: 42).

Considering the increasing violence in Rwanda and the death of ten Belgian peacekeeping soldiers, the Clinton administration in the US considered Rwanda as a second Somali case since almost a year ago 18 US soldiers in Somali as a part of UN mission were murdered by Somali people. The US government had a tendency in looking the civil war in Rwanda through 'Somali lens' as White calls in his article and for this reason the US government decided that the UNAMIR should be withdrawn from Rwandan territory immediately (White, 2007: 132-133). The Security Council of the UN, in line with the US government's decision, reduced the UN forces from 2.500 to 270 on 21 April 1994 and as Tatum claimed

the US and the UN accepted the violence and killings in Rwanda, but did nothing to prevent them, leaving the Rwandan people to their fate and genocide (Tatum, 2010: 45).

Apart from the Somali effect, apparently the US administration under Bill Clinton did not have any strategic interests in Rwanda, therefore the US did not get into action or did not do anything to stop the genocide. The US administration later on after the genocide faced with some criticizations that it did not use genocide word not to draw attention of the international community and did not accept the proposal of the UN for jamming the broadcast of the RTLM, which was an effective organ of the radicals during the genocide, because this would be so costly and a violation of the Rwandan sovereignty to jam the broadcast of a national radio (Moghalu, 2005: 19-21).

In addition, Clinton signed the Policy Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25) in 1994 requiring "the US had to be more cautious in understanding peacekeeping missions and that attention had to be paid to the cost of the missions" (Tatum, 2010: 46). The US was following a "new non-interventionist policy" after issuing the Presidential Decision Directive 25 (Howard, 2007: 34-35).

Tatum points out that the US was also not ready for the political challenges and demands that had emerged right after the end of the Cold War and he adds that as Americans do not relate themselves culturally with other peoples around the world the US was slow in responding to the genocide in Rwanda. Therefore, the US media demonstrated the genocide in Rwanda as a tribal war, which the US did not find necessary to intervene with (Tatum, 2010: 37). For this reason, the US was not only on the side of a weaker mission in Rwanda, but also prevented the necessary military supply for the mission (Esses and Vernon, 2008: 212-213).

However, France did not hesitate in sending its 2.500 troops deployed at *Bukavu* and *Goma* in Zaire (former name of the DRC) to Rwanda for 'Operation Turquoise' to conduct humanitarian intervention and to make a safe zone in the south-west depending on an approval by the UN in June 1994 since France was planning to terminate its operation in Rwanda when the supposed UN troops would arrive in the region (Plaut, 1994: 151). The French troops were deployed six miles from the advancing RPF army and they kept positions with the Foreign Legionnaires and protected a region included the Rwandan government's army (Tatum, 2010: 49). However, as Kagame mentions in François Soudan's book the Tutsis were mostly living outside the "safe zone occupied by the French troops" and for this reason it was impossible to save the lives of the Tutsis as the majority of the Tutsi population in Rwanda was living outside that zone and they were massacred (Soudan, 2015: 59).

As Kolodziej mentions regarding the death toll of the genocide, the UN Security Council went for authorizing the UNAMIR II consisting of 5500 troops on 17 May 1994, however, after two months later less than a thousand troops could only be assembled by the support of some African countries (2000: 134). France proposed keeping the number of the troops of the mission at a low level. In addition, Rwanda was a temporary member of the Security Council starting from December 1994 and rejected the UNAMIR II and an arms embargo based on the Chapter VII (Howard, 2007: 34-35). In the end, the UN Security Council had

to pave the way for the Operation Turquoise, which would be carried out by French troops in the region under Chapter VII mandate – that later on created a safe humanitarian zone and allegedly turned out to be also a safe haven for Hutu genociders and extremists (Howard, 2007: 35). Operation Turquoise consisted of 2.500 French troops together with a limited number of Senegalese troops to make it to be seen a more multilateral operation (Macqueen, 2014: 79).

2.1.2.7.3. Reasons Behind the Genocide

The genocide in Rwanda might be considered as ethnic, however, the genociders not only killed the ethnic Tutsi people but also the political figures like the Prime Minister, international soldiers, political opponents and Hutu moderates. There could be more reasons than the mostly presumed ethnic reason behind the Rwandan genocide. These reasons are related to the regime survival (this comes in the form of destroying the enemy – the Tutsis – and maintaining the political regime of the same elite group facing the rivalry between the Hutus of the north and south – the Zero Network, ethnic segregation created during the colonial era, colonial practices especially during the Belgian one, constant violent conflicts between the two main ethnic groups starting from the 1960s, the recent economic problems in the 1980s and early 1990s like less coffee production and harsh economic measures by the IMF, the incidents in the neighboring sister country Burundi, democratization and liberalization efforts, peace negotiations and the Arusha Peace Accord signed between the government and the RPF, obedient culture and the influence of the radio RTLM. The details of these political, economic, sociological and cultural reasons are given below

Before the genocide started, Rwanda was already in an ongoing civil war for a couple of years and was having some economic problems started in the late 1980s since its economy was heavily relying on coffee cultivation. Harsh economic conditions welcomed the people during the civil war paving the way for preparations toward genocide. Hintjens also asserts that the Rwandan economy that heavily relied on coffee production and its export was facing a hard time owing to a harsh drop in coffee prices after the second half of the 1980s and the economic crisis in Rwanda facilitated the racial ideologies to serve as a tool to maintain the regime (1999: 241-242).

As Newbury and Newbury draws attention, the changes in coffee prices and especially the sharp decrease in coffee prices in 1989 hit the coffee cultivators in rural Rwanda and together with the serious famine in the southern part of the country could not even buy food owing to the decrease in coffee prices (1999: 300). Because of the changes and sharp decrease in coffee prices in 1989, the budget shrank by 40% resulting in a limitation in social services, overtaxation and mandatory labor for the Rwandan government. These changes in economic and social life together with the famine caused Rwandan people to seek refuge in Tanzania to find food (Rothe et al., 2008). According to Newbury and Newbury, the harsh economic measures offered by the IMF deteriorated the conditions for the youth in Rwanda as in some parts of the country the population density was so big that it created problems for land distribution especially for young people together with the big amounts of land by the wealthy (1999: 302). The fluctuation in coffee market prices

undermined the fragile Rwandan economy. The IMF and World Bank started to follow an austerity policy.

Hintjens asserts that the main aim of the genocide was the 'regime survival' that also meant the destruction of the enemy, the Tutsis. He also adds that the 1994 genocide brought along a new goal for the region to extend the control of the Bantu in the Great Lakes Region and it was the most annoying result of the genocide in the region since it created a racist political discourse after the European colonization (1999: 249). However, some other researchers like Verpoorten claims that there is a strong correlation between the genocide and the failure to keep the food production at its limits for a growing population and that land is a very important asset since it is immobile and could only be shared between the genociders after the all Tutsis were killed (Verpoorten, 2012).

Uvin mentions that there are three main factors that caused genocide in Rwanda. These are elite control, scarcity of resources and socio-psychological characteristics of the genociders. As for the elite control, Uvin asserts that the desire of the Rwandan elite to keep the power almost comes at first when explaining the reasons behind the genocide and that the factors like economic crisis, increase in population, less land for cultivation, harsh economic solutions to the economic crisis by the international institutions like the IMF and World Bank and the invasion of the RPF were considered as threats to the power and privileges of the Hutu elite and as a consequence of it the elites around the president – the so-called *Akazu* – used all means to ward off these threats for their survival. Regarding the scarcity of resources, Uvin states that this was regarded as the main cause of the genocide since Rwanda became a very densely populated country in Africa with a high rate of population growth. As to the socio-psychological characteristics of the genociders, Uvin claims that the very obedient nature of conventional Rwandan mindset triggered the people to take orders and obey them to kill others (Uvin, 2001). As Straus mentions in his book as Rwanda has a history of *corvée* system it might have not been difficult for an obedient civil mobilization for a genocide (2008: 8).

Kagame explains the reasons behind the genocide with the colonial past of the country and states that

> When you dig deeper into our history you realize that what happened is a result of Belgium's colonizing politics and policies. Belgium and Catholic Church divided society into ethnic groups. In fact they "ethnicized" the people and the politics of our country, dividing and categorizing people where before there was no divide. They issued identity cards establishing Bahutu, Batutsi or Batwa identities from the father's side. Whether in school, church or business, they told one group they were more privileged than the other, and they granted specific privileges and rights to one group but not to the others. This logic, these divisions, played a large role leading up to the reasoning that resulted in the 1994 events. (. . .) Once again, when looking at history, when you have an ideology called Hutu power, when there is a history identifying people by their physical traits, and then basing politics and ideology on ethnicity, you are planting the seeds that will allow you to later reap views serving certain politics – politics of hatred (Soudan, 2015: 54-55).

As Makinda asserts another reason for the genocide was the Hutu propaganda that showed the Tutsis as a threat for Hutus in political, social and economic matters and that already convinced the Hutus that the Tutsis would get back their land and reconstitute the monarchial system. Thanks to the Hutu propaganda Rwandan Hutu elites managed to

manipulate the ethnic card to reach their political and economic objectives (Makinda, 1996: 125). The MRND, especially, funded a racist propaganda on the brutality of the RPF, ethnic nationalism together with chauvinism and ethnic stereotyping demonstrating the Tutsis as the collaborators of the RPF and labeling the Tutsis as Hamitic foreigners, a threat for the Hutu majority (Straus, 2008: 29).

The sister country Burundi was also another factor in increasing the violence and paving the way for genocide in Rwanda. Burundi was almost identical with Rwanda in terms of economics and the interrelations between ethnic groups, yet as opposed to the situation in Rwanda the Tutsi minority was in power in Burundi owing to preferences of the colonial administration and they were on the verge of losing their power after the incidents started with the killing of the elected Hutu president, Ndadaye, whose election was considered as a victory of the Hutus by the Tutsis in Burundi and the Tutsi minority saw Ndadaye's decision to give ethnic participation in army, schools and government as a threat. He was killed during the coup in 1993 and this situation created a deeper reaction against the Tutsis in Rwanda (Rothe et al., 2008: 79; Öztürk; 2011: 73).

Events in October 1993 in Burundi had a great influence on Rwandan domestic affairs. The first democratically elected President of Burundi, Ndadaye was assassinated on 21 October 1993 by the Tutsi controlled Burundian army after he returned from Francophone summit in Mauritius, which resulted in a killing of thousands of Hutus with the involvement of the army again (Othman, 2005: 18). What happened in Burundi after the elections implicitly contributed into the genocide in Rwanda. About 400.000 refugees, most of them were Tutsis, entered into the refugee camps in the southern Rwanda in April, 1994 deepening the political crisis in Rwanda and helping a big portion of politicized population to get to Rwanda from Burundi (Newbury and Newbury, 1999: 310). The chaos and atrocities in Burundi strengthened the claims by the Hutu extremists in Rwanda who were objecting to a power-sharing with the Tutsis and created a great mistrust in the society among the ethnic groups that in the end brought along a negative effect on the idea of a peaceful life with the RPF holding some portion of the power (Othman, 2005: 18).

Ndadaye was an important and popular figure for the Rwandan Hutus since he took refuge in Rwanda between 1972-1983 and completed his secondary and university educations in Rwanda. Another reason for his popularity among the Rwandan Hutus was that they were considering him as "the triumph of a 'Rwandan'" in a Tutsi-dominated country, Burundi as the victorious election result in 1993 was favored by many Hutus back in Rwanda (Klinghoffer, 1998: 34; Guichaoua, 2015: 97).

Jones argues that the incidents in Burundi had harmful results for the peace process in Rwanda in two ways. First, some of the UN peacekeeping troops had to be deployed at the border between Rwanda and Burundi to "ensure the refugees from the killings in Burundi did not, as had often happened in the past, destabilize Rwanda" and second the hardliners benefitted from the killings in Burundi to claim that the Tutsis were coming back to Rwanda to regain their dominance over the Hutus (1999: 73).

The international community did not show the necessary reaction to the killings of 100.000 people in Burundi and this allegedly reassured the extremists in Rwanda Ndadaye's

assassination undermined the path to the democracy in Burundi since he was the first elected Hutu president after a long Tutsi rule (Melvern, 2004: 71-72). The assassination of Ndadaye by Tutsi military officers in Burundi shocked the Hutus in Rwanda and some of the propagandists and the Radio Thousand Hills (*Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines* – RTLM) even claimed that the Tutsi soldiers of the RPF went to Burundi to join the coup and they could even kill any Hutu president in Burundi in the future (Human Rights Watch, 2006).

The RTLM was an extremist media organ of the Hutu power that was trying to fuel the hatred against the Tutsis among the Hutus and mostly broadcasted music and radio shows letting listeners to join these shows and make their opinions public (Keller, 2014: 138). The RTLM broadcast news mentioning that Ndadaye's assassination was even a part of a plan of the Tutsis to get rid of the Hutus to take control of the whole region (Melvern, 2004: 72). This also resulted in a flux of about 200.000 Hutu refugees who fled from Burundi and as Lemarchand puts an emphasis on the role RTLM played by announcing the assassination of Ndadaye with a hatred announce regarding the Tutsis (Lemarchand, 1995: 10).

The Hutu militia in Burundi benefitted from these Hutu refugees for more recruitment and Burundi's former minister of Public Health Jean Minani even formed a government in exile under the auspices of Rwandan government (Klignhoffer, 1998: 34). These incidents in Burundi created a shock-wave effect in Rwanda since the first Hutu president was murdered by the Tutsi controlled army and the people opposing the political liberalization in Rwanda and the Arusha Peace Accords had a chance to display the case within Burundi as an example that could happen in Rwanda if the Tutsis were allowed to gain the power (Newbury, 1995: 16). For this reason, the Hutu power and the Habyarimana government rejected implementing the Arusha Peace Accord and inviting the Tutsi refugees in Rwanda (Magnarella, 2005: 814). However, after the killing of the Ndadaye and the incidents in Burundi some of the important Hutu leaders who had been opposing the Habyarimana regime changed their position and started to support Habyarimana although some other small number of opponents continued supporting the RPF (Human Rights Watch, 2006).

Makinda also asserts that the rivalry between the northern and southern Hutus for power also shows that the domestic conflict in Rwanda was not only a result of the ethnicity but of political ambitions. Starting from the 1970s top officers of the Rwandan army consisted of northern Hutus, yet Kayibanda had concentrated the political power around the Hutus from the south, but the military coup by Habyarimana put an end to the dominance of southern Hutus and benefited from the ethnic card in curtaining the political ambition to keep the power around the northern Hutus. Therefore, Makinda claims that the political rivalry between the northern and southern Hutus were ignored since the attention was given to the conflict between the Hutus and Tutsis (Makinda, 1996: 125-126).

Barnett states that domestic conflict, economic problems, liberal movements in state politics, radical movements, ethnic segregation and support of an international actor were the factors behind the genocide (2002: 57). The report of the Human Rights Watch numbered 1 states that there are several reasons behind the genocide such as economic forces, demographics and history, politics and regionalism. This report mentions that

Rwandan economy was very poor and became poorer before the genocide owing to land scarcity and a deteriorated economy stemming from a harsh decrease in coffee and tea prices on the globe as Uvin asserts above. The demographical structure – Hutus the majority and Tutsis the minority – played a significant role in the ethnic segregation and the fight between the Hutus and Tutsis. The change of power in Rwanda transferring the elitist power from the minority to the majority deepened the differentiation between the two ethnic groups. Domestic politics right after the independence and the rivalry for political power between the Hutus from two different regions in Rwanda – Hutus from southern and northwestern provinces – emerged as the regional factor behind the genocide (Human Rights Watch, 2006).

Filip Reyntjens states that there are actually five main reasons behind the violence in Rwanda and points out two different groups for reasoning. The first group of factors are also very common ones in African politics, however, the second group of factors pushing the country into violence and genocide is indigenous to Rwandan politics. The first group includes the democratization process and the control of the state. Reyntjens asserts that democratization process is also the replacement of one elite group by another one and this creates instability in politics for almost all African states and violence is used as a mode of political action. The second factor within this group is the state and getting the control of the state. Reyntjens claims that state was the biggest corporation in the country that distributes prosperity and it was the owner of the exclusive privileges as well. For this reason, he asserts that the struggle over controlling the state plays a very important role in different types of violence, which had shown itself as genocide in Rwanda (1996).

The second group includes ethnic structure, powerful state, conformist people, and finally the Civil War. He thinks that the ethnic structure of Rwanda and ethnic segregation over the years in Rwanda by different policies like Tutsification were one of the reasons behind the violence since it was easy to mobilize the people along these ethnic lines and ethnic segregation was also another obstacle on the way for starting peace negotiations. Another reason is the strong state mechanism in Rwanda that has a pyramid-like shape which makes transferring orders fast from top to bottom and this mechanism also created a powerful centralization, which was very effective during the development movements in Rwanda. Social conformism was another factor in Rwanda because people in Rwanda were used to develop a socially conformist behavior and many of them are used to do what their neighbors do or any of the authorities tell them to do. The last factor was the invasion of the RPF and the civil war between the government and the RPF (Reyntjents, 1996).

2.2. Burundi

2.2.1. Physical and Historical Environment

Physical characteristics and a brief history of Burundi helps us to better understand the settings in Burundi for a better macro-analysis regarding the peace process for a better comparison between Burundi and the sister country Rwanda.

Here below this chapter aims to give very brief information on geographical and physical characteristics along with the historical background of Burundi starting from the pre-historical ages to the end of the 1990s.

2.2.1.1. Burundi – Geography

Burundi, just like its neighboring sister country Rwanda, together which it shares a common colonial history, is a landlocked country in the Great Lakes Region in Africa (The Figure 30 shows Burundi's position in the Great Lakes Region and the Figure 32 shows Burundi's place in the African continent) and bears similar characteristics like Rwanda. The Figure 33 below shows the Burundian political map displaying the main provinces. The neighboring states are the DRC in the west, Tanzania in the east and Rwanda in the north. It is located just in the south of the equatorial line and big lakes, broad plain fields and hills reaching about 4000 meters in height can easily draw attention in Burundi (Newbury, 2001: 259).

Its capital city Bujumbura is located on the northern shores of the Lake Tanganyika (Krueger and Krueger, 2007: 23). Burundi's population is 11.530.580 million with almost the same percentages of ethnicities in Rwanda: 85-90% Hutu, 10-14% Tutsi and 1% Twa (World Bank, 2020; Uvin, 1999). The population has to live in a tiny country of 27.834km^2, which makes Burundi one of the most densely populated states in the world (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza, 2000: 370-371).

Burundi is the second densely populated country in Africa after Rwanda. Burundi is heavily dependent on the neighboring countries for transit routes because Dar es Salaam and Mombasa in the east are about 1500-2000km away and the Atlantic Ocean is also approximately 2000km away (Reyntjens and Minority Rights Group., 2000: 5). However, this geographical position of Burundi in the Central Africa located it on the transfer routes of illegal exports like ivory and valuable minerals like gold, diamonds and coltan especially from the eastern DRC (Daley, 2006: 673).

Figure 33. Political Map of Burundi.

Source: UN Geospatial Information Section, https://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/english/htmain.htm, Access Date: 10/05/2020

The national economy in Burundi largely depends on agriculture and in particular coffee and cotton cultivation that have commercial value for foreign trade. The US is the biggest buyer of coffee beans. Belgium and Luxembourg are also the biggest buyers of cotton (Eggers, 2006).

Agriculture is the basis of all economic activities in Burundi and it consists of 36.4% of Burundi's GDP. Burundi cultivates coffee and tea. Burundi was ranked as the 184th country out of 188 according to Human Development Index in 2015 (Human Development Report, 2016). However, thanks to development efforts started in 2010 and the improvement in climate, coffee and tea production increased (African Economic Outlook, 2012). Over 90% of the population works in agriculture sector, but owing to land pressure and high density of population farmers do not have sufficient land for agricultural activities and the land itself is deteriorating because of over-exploitation. Apart from the agricultural sector the industrial sector is small and weak, only consisting of enterprises for processing agricultural products, brewing, match production and textiles, yet this sector only constitutes 20% of the GNP (Reyntjens and Minority Rights Group., 2000: 5).

Burundi and Rwanda are also similar countries in terms of climate, topographical characteristics, population density, agriculture-based economy, language, religion and history (Uvin, 1999). Burundi set the 2025 Vision in 2011 and this vision defines the steps to be taken for good governance, work force, economic development, struggle with

poverty, integration into the region, social unity, planning and urban development (Vision Burundi 2025, 2011).

2.2.2. Historical Background

This section focuses on the early and modern history of Burundi including the colonial era to better understand the main reasons behind the constant violent conflicts that emerged especially after the independence in the 1960s and longed for about more than four decades ending with a successful negotiated peace agreement. These historical facts detailed below will also help to better understand the main cultural and historical patterns that would be effective in negotiations between the two conflicting groups (the Burundian government and the rebel movements) in the first years of the 2000s.

2.2.2.1. Early Burundian History

Like Rwanda it is not much known about the precolonial period of Burundi before the German East Africa annexed Burundi and Rwanda together as Ruanda-Urundi in 1885. However, as Newbury states the first human beings came to the region from the west especially by the Lake Victoria about 2500 years ago (2001). It is known that Burundi had been ruled by a kingdom for centuries until the colonial powers arrived and the society was consisting of four ethnic groups: the Twas, who were hunters, potters and entertainers, the Hutus, who were farmers cultivating the land, the Tutsis, who were animal breeders and finally the *Ganwa*, who were the ruling elites. There was a hierarchical relationship between these ethnic groups and the *Ganwa* as the ruling class was standing at the top and the Twas were at the bottom of this hierarchical pyramid. The link between the Hutus and Tutsis was not so clear (Ndayizigiye, 2005). The *Ganwa* was a princely oligarchy and it was seen as a different ethnic group in Burundi standing as a unifying pot for Hutu and Tutsi Burundians (Wolpe, 2011).

The Tutsis were the ones benefitting from the patron and client system when compared to the Hutus, but the two different groups were living over the same land and sharing the same language, culture and intermarriage between them were normal (Weissman, 1998). Regarding the historical background of these ethnic groups in Burundi, Eggers in her book titled '*Historical Dictionary of Burundi*' states that around the 9th and 10th centuries Hutu farmers that belong to Bantu ethnic group came to the region that would later be called as Ruanda-Urundi and then between 14th and 17th centuries the Tutsi, who are thought to come from the north, come to the region and thanks to their feudal traditions they could achieve political and economic dominance (2006).

As Uvin urges most probably local people of Burundi consisted of the Twas and Hutus, who previously migrated from the central Africa. The Tutsis who were dealing with husbandry came to Burundi from the north in the 15th and 16th century and integrated with the local indigenous people in Burundi (1999). It is alleged that the monarchy in Burundi started to have its present territory in the 17th century when Hima pastoralists came to Burundi from the south of Ethiopia and they dominated over the indigenous Bantu people (Cornwell and Beer, 1999: 84). In addition, it is asserted that the Tutsis who were coming from the East African regions defeated the local people and conquered the territory, yet

they accepted the local language. The Tutsis also introduced cattle to the region (Krueger and Krueger, 2007: 24).

2.2.2.1.1. Burundian Monarchy

Burundi was governed by a monarchy before the colonial era and a sociopolitical hierarchy was dominant in this monarchy. This hierarchical structure consisted of a king and his princes on the top and then the Tutsis and Hutus representing the middle class, yet the Twas were representing the lower class. However, people of the lower classes could actively indulge in the political arena. Hutus were usually among the local nobilities (Uvin, 1999). Tutsis owned cattle and Hutus were dealing with agriculture, which was symbolizing the superiority of the Tutsis and that could be interpreted as traditional cast among these groups more than strict ethnical hierarchy (Wilén, 2012: 64).

The Tutsis dominated the monarchy in precolonial Burundi even though the Hutus outnumbered the Tutsis. During this period, everything including the human population belonged to the king (Cornwell and Beer, 1999: 84). However, unlike the situation in Rwanda the existence of the *ganwa* stood as a containment for the Tutsis as it was a noble class between the *mwami* and people. The *mwami* and *ganwa* were different from the Tutsis since these positions belonged to two main groups: Hima and Banyaruguru. For this reason, the relationship between the Hutus and Tutsis depended on equality and the two groups allowed intermarriage (Reyntjens and Minority Rights Group., 2000). Tutsi-Banyaruguru (that means those from the north) was the higher caste and Tutsi-Hima was the lower caste (Lemarchand, 1975: 51). Everything belonged to *mwami* including land and people, therefore the mwami was not only the ruler of the country but also the owner of the land and its people. This created rents for the ones who belonged to the clan of the leaders (Ndikumana, 2005: 7).

Burundi monarchy enlarged its territory starting from the 17th century and nomadic Hima shepherds came down from the southern region of today's Ethiopia and dominated the local people in Burundi. The princes of the Burundian monarchy were called as '*ganwa*' and considered as a different ethnic group even though they descended from the Tutsis. The *ganwa* as a different ethnicity contributed in softening the Tutsi hegemony and helped Hutu peasants to stay loyal to the kings and monarchy as it was in Rwanda (Cornwell and Beer, 1999: 84). The *ganwa* and the Tutsis held the leadership positions and on the contrary the Hutus held fewer positions in leadership and only some of the Hutus could become religious and political leaders in the society (Krueger and Krueger, 2007: 26).

2.2.2.2. Modern Burundian History

This section provides a historical look at the modern era including the late 19th century and the 20th century till the end of the 1990s in Burundi. It focuses on the history of colonization in Burundi and the colonial practices of the German and Belgian colonies. In addition, it offers a deep historical information on Burundi's independent period including the constant violence and the long-lasting civil war.

2.2.2.2.1. The Arrival of the Europeans and the German and Belgian Colonial Practices

Burundi was one of the last countries in Africa to be colonized like Rwanda and before the German explorers reached the country from the east, King Leopold II of Belgium claimed the western parts of Burundi as personal property under the name of Congo Free State (Krueger and Krueger, 2007: 25). Nevertheless, before the colonizers came to Burundi, Richard Burton and John H. Speke had arrived to the Lake Tanganyika to find the source of the Nile River in 1858. In addition to these explorers, the White Fathers and White Sisters (missionaries of the Roman Catholic Church) came to Burundi at the end the 19th century and they set up missionary schools at the beginning of the 20th century (Eggers, 2006).

The colonial era in its proper term starts in Burundi with the colonial move in Africa in late 18th century when the German colonial administration in German East Africa was founded in Burundi and Rwanda. Then the two countries were called together as one country under the name of Ruanda-Urundi, yet it does not terminate after two world wars, only the name of the administration changes from colony to mandate or tutelage. After the WWI the colonial administration passed to Belgium from Germany and Burundi was given as a mandate country to Belgium. Belgium stayed as the colonial authority in Burundi between 1918 and 1962 (Wilén, 2012: 62). The people in Rwanda-Urundi were sharing the same culture, language, traditions and even the same ethnic dispersion; however, the historical structure caused Rwanda and Urundi to be considered as two separate colonies since these two countries were not "separated by the stroke of a colonial pen; well before the Germans arrived the two countries existed with individual identities – as twins, though not identical twins" (Krueger and Krueger, 2007: 25).

German and Belgian colonial authorities benefitted from the social hierarchical structure to approve and confirm the superiority of the Tutsis over the Hutus, which strengthened the Tutsi rule in Burundi. This policy of supporting one ethnic group against the others in Burundi both facilitated the local support for the colonial institutions and created elites out of the royal family and the Tutsis which resulted in ethnic segregation in politics and economics (Ndikumana, 1998: 32-33).

Both of the German and Belgian colonial administrations in Burundi did not make any changes in unequal distribution of wealth and as Eggers mentioned that "ruling through the Tutsi was natural for Europeans because of the Europeans' racist beliefs that the Tutsi, who were, on average, taller and lighter skinned, were also more intelligent" (Eggers, 2006). The colonial period in Burundi that lasted over six decades also influenced the relationships between the four ethnic groups since both of the German and Belgian colonial powers adopted an indirect rule system and prefered the *ganwa* and Tutsi, who had better education (Ndayizigiye, 2005).

The colonial administration in Burundi enjoyed the popular mythology to show that the patron had always been the Tutsi and the client the Hutu by writing the history that maintained the myth to show that the Tutsi were "divine rulers and rightful colonial intermediaries" (Daley, 2006: 665). However, as Weissman asserts the colonial

administration caused ethnic roots to become more notable, and modernization and centralization efforts that came together with the colonial era made significant changes on the definition of identities based on local and royal characteristics (1998). Besides, the Belgian mandate after the WWI created a rigid *ganwa* system that was favoring the Tutsis and ignoring the needs and demands of the Hutus (1998).

2.2.2.2.2. German Colony 1899-1914

Germany was late in establishing colonies in Africa, yet thanks to the German East Africa Company, it could reach the inner regions of the Eastern Africa and established dominance over the territories of today's Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania. After the Berlin Conference in 1885, Burundi was included among the German interests in Africa and the first military contingents arrived in Usumbura (today's Bujumbura), which had been the administrative center for Rwandan and Burundian kingdoms, in Burundi in 1886. The region including today's Rwanda and Burundi called as Ruanda-Urundi took its place in the German East African Empire as a military unit in 1899 (Cornwell and Beer, 1999; Eggers, 2006 and Connaughton, 2001). The Germans, as well, relied on missionaries like the White Fathers in particular to have a control over the region and helped the Tutsi king to rule over the Hutu ones (Morel, 2015: 18).

The German colonial policy was at first stuck in between supporting or limiting the monarchy. Germany later on decided to have an indirect rule policy everywhere in Ruanda-Urundi with the help of local chiefs. For this reason, Germany could not have a lasting colonial administration in Burundi (Cornwell and Beer, 1999: 84). The German colonial administration could only control Usumbura and its periphery. The existence of the administration shrank in places other than the military post in Usumbura, so the colonial administration decided to move the headquarters to Gitega in 1912 (Eggers, 2006).

The German colonial administration provided education for the children of local chiefs to train them to take part in the colonial administration. According to Eggers, there were approximately 190 Germans in Rwanda and Burundi and almost 130 of them were missionaries. "There were just 40 soldiers and six civilian officers" (2006). The colonial experience of Germany, maybe for this reason again, did not take so long time and after the end of the WWI, Germany lost its colonies to other Western powers in Africa. Germany left not so many colonial traces behind except a post for commerce, Usumbura (today's Bujumbura) and some buildings and bridges (Krueger and Krueger, 2007: 25).

2.2.2.2.3. Belgian Colony and Belgian UN Mandate 1914-1962

Germany after the defeat in the war had to sign the Versailles Treaty under heavy circumstances and lost all its colonies including Ruanda-Urundi in the German East Africa. Ruanda-Urundi was lost to the Entente Powers during the WWI and Belgium created a military administration in Ruanda-Urundi in 1916 to benefit from its position during the peace negotiations (Cornwell and Beer, 1999: 84). Belgium occupied Ruanda-Urundi (Rwanda and Burundi) in 1916 as a consequence of the League of Nations decision as a mandate country and Belgium did not make any changes in indirect rule in colonial territory

started by the Germans since the ethnic group Tutsis in Burundi had long been dominant (Reyntjens and Minority Rights Group, 2000: 7).

However, territorial claims by Belgium needed to be approved first by the Council of Entente Powers like US, UK, France and Italy. Therefore, the council approved these claims in August 1919 and the League of Nations decided to give the mandate over Ruanda-Urundi to Belgium. The capital was still Usumbura (today's Bujumbura) and like the Germans the Belgians maintained the style of indirect rule with the Tutsi monarchy and benefited from their dignities without forgetting the missionaries. The Belgian Parliament issued a law that integrated the administrative unit in Ruanda-Urundi with the Belgian Congo in 1925. The headquarters of Belgian colonial administration was in Brussels and the governor of Ruanda-Urundi was receiving commands from the governor general in Leopoldville (Kinshasa), for this reason most of the officers in Brussels went on considering Ruanda-Urundi as a province of the Belgian Congo (Eggers, 2006).

Burundi and Rwanda have similar colonial backgrounds, yet the colonial administration style of Belgium was different in both of them. Belgium changed the elite structure that it had already created out of the Tutsis and supported the Hutus at the end of the colonial era while promoting the end of the Tutsi monarchy in Rwanda. Belgium supported the Tutsi-Hima dominated monarchy in Burundi. The Belgian colonial administration in Burundi followed a *Tutsification* policy as it did in Rwanda at the same period, which also created ethnic segregation in the Burundian society (Uvin, 1999: 255).

Tutsification policy in Burundi was put into effect together with the racist movements in Europe, which deepened ethnic segregation. As a result of Tutsification policy in administration ethnicity emerged as an important factor to obtain the political power. The colonial administration reorganized the civil administration in Burundi in 1929. Starting from this administrative change ethnicity in Burundi gained a political importance and the Hutus started to marginalize in politics. After this change in civil administration the number of Tutsi chiefs gradually increased. The Hutu chiefs were making the 20% of the local chiefs in Burundi, yet there were no Hutu chiefs among the local chiefs in 1945 (Ndikumana, 2005: 415).

The Catholic Church in Burundi provided the Hutus education at the missionary schools. As a result, the Hutus could take part in the colonial administration like the Tutsis. This weakened the economic supremacy of the Tutsis and money economy paved the way for cattle ownership of the Hutus (Ndayizigiye, 2005). Therefore, Belgian administration extended limited educational opportunities to the Hutus and student number enrolled in Astrida (at the *Écolé des Frères de la Charité* or the school known as the *Groupe Scolaire* of Astrida) between 1946 and 1954 shows that there is a big gap between Tutsi and Hutu students, the Tutsi student number dominating the other (Lemarchand, 1975: 53). This school in Astrida helped the colonial administration to make out inflexible ethnic boundaries and to strengthen power in the hands of the Tutsi (Daley, 2006: 665).

The Belgian colonial administration introduced coffee as a cash crop, which was very suitable for the topographical structure of Burundi and in a very short time under the circumstances of compulsory production coffee became number one export item for

Burundi (Eggers, 2006). The Belgian colonial authority simplified the already existing body in Burundian society in order to strengthen its colonial administration and this method left two ethnic groups for a preference. As the Hutus were peasants and Tutsis were cattlemen as an aristocratic power, Belgium made use of this division between the two ethnic groups for political reasons (Wilén, 2012: 62).

Belgian colonial administration benefited from the current ethnic differences in Burundi and increased the difference with divide and rule policy. This ethnic segregation is assumed to be one of the factors behind the violence started in mid-1960s after the colonial era (Ndikumana, 1998: 30-31). However, these changes were not welcomed by the Burundian society and together with the start of the mandate administration in Burundi, the peasants who were facing with heavy taxation, forced labor and conciliation meetings organized a few uprisings in the 1920s and 1930s (Morel, 2015: 19 and Cornwell and Beer, 1999: 84).

The political and administrative model applied by Germany and Belgium created an authoritarian state governed by oppressive and military methods (Laely, 1997: 706). Belgium also adopted indirect rule in Burundi like Germany and preferred to rule the country over the king and his Tutsi assistants. Belgian administrators in Burundi benefited from the current social hierarchy in Burundi in order to institutionalize the hegemony of the Tutsis over the Hutus and the Twas (Ndikumana, 1998; 32). Belgium offered opportunities in professional life and education only to the Tutsis. Tutsis were comprising 90% of the members of the supreme court and nearly all the local chiefs were Tutsis in the 1950s (Uvin, 1999). These colonial policies followed by Belgium in its mandate country Ruanda-Urundi were criticized by the international community (Cornwell and Beer, 1999: 84). During the colonial era ethnic segregation increased and the Hutus were considered as second-class citizens in Burundi.

The former political structure settled around the monarchy was protected in Burundi and the prejudice over the Hutus increased and the power of the Tutsis increased. The political environment of the Burundian state was modified to adopt the demands of the colonial administration even though the former political structure was kept intact (Uvin, 1999: 255). However, Belgium only started the reformation period in November in 1959 (Cornwell and Beer, 1999: 85). Belgium, with a program of reform in the hand, transferred the legislative authority to a council with the *mwami*, which was the start of constitutional monarchy in Burundi (Boshoff et. al., 2010: 3). The army that was first established as a territorial guard, which gives equal chance to the Hutus and Tutsis for recruitment, in 1960 turned into a national army, yet in 1963 the structure of the army was deteriorated with the commando units under the command of a Tutsi officer Captain Michel Micombero. After 1963 the army started to divide along ethnic groups (3).

2.2.2.3. Independence and Start of Constant Violent Conflicts

After the WWII, Belgium could not notice that the independence for her colonies was inevitable and even a Belgian professor offered a long-term plan to offer self-government to the Belgian colonies till 1985 (Krueger and Krueger, 2007: 27). Yet, Belgium introduced a ten-year development plan for Burundi, together with Rwanda (1952-1961) for economic development. Together with this plan the Belgian colonial administration also issued a

decree that resulted in sub-chieftaincy, chieftaincy, territorial and country councils making new political bodies (Eggers, 2006).

Lemarchand states that after the introduction of voting in Burundi in 1956, six years ahead the independence, political mobilization gradually started to proliferate the society and so sparkled the seeds of the first conflicts between the princes, monarchists and republicans, army men and civilians, people from south and north and even between the Hutus and Tutsis for the first time (Lemarchand, 1975: 52). Starting with this period the eldest son of the king, *mwami* Prince Rwagasore founded the first political party, the Union for National Progress (UPRONA), in Burundi in 1958 and a few local political parties followed the UPRONA. The UPRONA was founded to keep the traditional institutions around the monarchy, yet when the Tutsi hegemony terminated after a bloody revolution in Rwanda, Rwagasore tried to make the UPRONA a unifying national party (Cornwell and Beer, 1999: 85). The UPRONA has an important place in Burundian history and since it was a unifying and pro-independence party it helped the Burundians to stay unified and not to yield to the problems and provocations created by the colonial administration even till the murder of Rwagasore (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza, 2000; 374).

However, Belgium found Rwagasore and his party too radical and backed the other one, the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) (Krueger and Krueger, 2007: 28), which was established at the end of the 1950s following a bit more moderate program – the UPRONA was following a much more nationalistic path and was considered as anti-Belgian and pro-communist – as an opposition party to the UPRONA. Therefore, the PDC could get the support of Belgium (Cornwell and Beer, 1999: 85).

Nevertheless, the UPRONA was dragged into an in-party rivalry and conflict after the Prime Minister Rwagasore was killed resulting in a struggle for power among the elites of Tutsi-Hima, Tutsi Banyaruguru and Hutu (Uvin, 1999: 256). Despite the support of Belgium for the PDC, the UPRONA won the elections in September 1961, yet the partisans of the opposition party, which was oriented by the aristocrats close to the Belgian colonial administration, killed the Prime Minister Rwagasore (Chretien, 1996: 116). After the elected Prime Minister was killed "thus political assassination was present at the creation of the newly independent Burundi" (Krueger and Krueger, 2007: 28) and Burundi entered into a chaotic period that would be the scene for massacres, coups, murders and a civil war in the end despite the independence it acquired in 1962.

Rwagasore had been a charismatic leader who was trying to provide peace and justice for all groups in Burundi, yet after two years following his assassination the division among these groups in Burundi became deeper and gained an ethnic characteristic, where each group tried to maximize its own power and achieve the power (Rwantabagu, 2001: 47). The colonial power in Burundi, Belgium, "left behind an entrenched feudal political and social structure. Under their system in Burundi the minority Tutsis became rulers. The majority Hutus and few remaining Twa tilled the soil and looked after the Tutsis' cattle" (Krueger and Krueger, 2007: 26). It is also asserted that the killing of Prince Rwagasore might have been encouraged by the Belgian colonial administration that was supporting the Christian Democratic Party. After the assassination of Rwagasore ethnic conflict between

the Hutus and Tutsis were worsened and the Social Revolution by the Hutus in Rwanda also contributed into the worsening of the relations between these ethnic groups (Wilén, 2012: 65).

After the assassination of the Prime Minister Rwagasore, Burundi confronted with the danger of a continuous domestic disturbances. As the Tutsis had dominated the Hutus for decades, the competition for gaining the political power in Burundi created an ethnic polarization among the Tutsis and Hutus. This polarization created a sociopolitical environment where the ethnic exclusion was seemingly in effect in the army and government and caused oppression of the government, coups and interventions by the military (Ndikumana, 2000; 433).

Independence paved the way for a new period in Burundi after the assassination of Rwagasore as it did in Rwanda together with the Social Revolution by the Hutus. However, behind closed doors this new period was not so bright and was to be the scene for a years-long instability and a civil war. Rwagasore, is an important figure in Burundian history like his party the UPRONA since he was the leader of a royalist and unifying party. His assassination is the milestone defining the termination of the unity between the Tutsis and Hutus. Ndikumana, describes Rwagasore's assassination as the "first false start of post-colonial Burundi" (1998: 35). Rwagasore's assassination was a hard strike for the national unity in Burundi since the colonial administration and royal family including the king were not happy with Rwagasore, the prince, because he was a big supporter of the national sovereignty and participatory democracy (35).

2.2.2.3.1. Rivalry of the Ethnic Groups for Power

The murder of the prime minister Rwagasore in 1961, the killing of Hutu unionists and Hutu prime minister, *mwami*'s support to the ethnic based politics, coup attempts, the massacre of the Hutus after the coups, the killing of about 500 Tutsis by the Rwanda-supported Hutus dragged Burundi into a long-term political instability. Burundi could not balance between the Hutus and Tutsis after the independence and faced with heavy violence within the country (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza, 2000: 374-375). Both the Hutus and Tutsis killed one another and this deteriorated the relationship between the two ethnic groups. Burundi lost the chance to enjoy a democratic environment one more time it experienced just after the independence.

Two years after his assassination, different divisions emerged among the ruing elites and these divisions gained an ethnic characteristic resulting in each ethnic group's attempt to gain political power at the expense of the other ethnic group (Rwantabagu, 2001: 47). According to Rwantabagu "radicalization of political life among power hungry elites plunged the country into a succession of crises marked by political assassinations, killings and counter retaliations" (2001: 48). In addition, what happened in Rwanda in 1959 had a negative impact on Burundi resulting in more and more ethnic segregation and a harsh reaction over sharing the power with the Hutus. Therefore, the incidents in the neighboring sister country were used by the Burundian Tutsi authority to strengthen the ethnic domination by the Tutsis in Burundi for the sake of ethnic Tutsis' security (Ndikumana,

1998: 34-35). There was an interaction regarding their domestic conflict cycles between these two sister counties.

The rebellions called as "*Kamenge* rebellions" sparkled right after the declaration of independence in January 1962 in Burundi symbolize the start of ethnic violence and civil war. Domestic disturbances also started in Burundi three years following the end of the Belgian colonial era when the Hutu officers in the army tried to obtain the power and topple the king (Bundervoet, 2009: 360). The rebellions that were organized by the Hutu peasants and supported by the urban gendarmerie were repressed by the army led by the National Defense Secretary, Captain Michel Micombero (ICG African Briefing Report, 2002).

During these *Kamenge* rebellions the Tutsi militants of the youth branches of the UPRONA attacked the Hutu unionists and the proponents of the People's Party (PP), which badly influenced the unifying role of the UPRONA. After these incidents a competition for the party leadership in the UPRONA started among the Tutsi and Hutu party members and the party was divided into two among both ethnic groups. This situation created a stalemate in the government (Cornwell and Beer, 1999: 85).

The *mwami* wanted to benefit from this chaotic situation and fill in the power vacuum, yet he had to replace the Tutsi prime minister with a Hutu in 1965. However, this time, the new prime minister was killed by a Tutsi refugee came from Rwanda and the *mwami* called for new elections to overcome the crisis. The Hutus won the election by getting 23 chairs out of 33 in the parliament (Cornwell and Beer, 1999: 85-86). However, the election did not help to end the crisis and after the coup attempt by the Hutu army officers the first ethnic crisis broke out in October 1965; after the coup attempt the Hutu prime minister was killed (Ndikumana, 2000: 433) by the Burundian gendarmerie officers and this attempt was repelled by Captain Michel Micombero, hence the coup attempt failed. What happened at the end of 1965 means the termination of Hutu participation into politics (Ngaruko and Nkurunzia, 2000: 375). The UPRONA that transferred into a single party starting from 1965 became a tool for power for the Tutsis and Tutsi-Himas with the support of the army (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza, 2000: 375).

The incidents occurred in 1965 resulted in a radical change within the Burundian army and the Tutsi elites from the south started to take the control of the army, which resulted in a monolithic Tutsi army (Ndikumana, 2005: 420). The army and gendarmerie were cleared of Hutu army officers, the Hutu political leaders were killed, thus the Tutsis obtained the power thanks to the Tutsi army officers who took control of the government. It was the turning point for destroying the Hutu elites in Burundi. This monolithic army also provided the Tutsi elites from the south with positions, benefits and power (Ndikumana, 2005: 420).

After the failed coup attempt, the *mwami* Mwambutsa attempted to maintain the monarchy by sending Ndizeye to Burundi and Ndizeye declared himself as the king taking the name of Ntare V and he assigned Micombero as Prime Minister, yet the relationship between Ntare and Micombero did not last long and Micombero gave an end to the monarchy and deposed *Mwami* Ntare V in November 1966 after a peaceful coup declaring a republic in Burundi. He became the first president of Burundi and he was also holding the leadership of the UPRONA. He was also the prime minister and the minister of defense (Eggers, 2006;

Cornwell and Beer, 1999: 86). Therefore, the democratic movements that started with the Prince Rwagasore came to an end with the military take-over by Micombero resulting in a political system that favored military dictatorships and ethnic segregation in Burundi (Ndikumana, 1998: 36).

After the Tutsi minority gained the power and declared the First Republic in 1966 under the leadership of Micombero, the power turned out to be under the control of Tutsi-Himas from Bururi (Bundervoet, 2009: 360). The Tutsi-Himas from Bururi ruled the country starting from the 1960s for almost 40 years and the leaders of the military regimes in Burundi like Micombero, Bagaza and Buyoya were all from Bururi and they were also cousins (Daley, 2006: 667). As Bundervoet and et. al. stated the French historian Chretien calls this ethno-regional group as 'the Bururi mafia' (Bundervoet et. al., 2009 538) like the Zero Network in Rwanda, but in a different style.

The second coup attempt by the Hutus happened in 1969 and after a second failed attempt, Hutu politicians, army officers behind the coup attempt were arrested and executed. This second failed coup attempt by the Hutus gave the Tutsi government a second chance to get rid of the Hutus in the army and political arena (Ndikumana, 2000: 433), which resulted in a Tutsi hegemony in Burundi. Thus, the Tutsi-Himas from the south benefited from their ethnic identities to obtain the power and the politicians who had interests in the government aimed to change the regime. Ethnic diversity became a tool of political struggle to grab economic and political opportunities. For this reason, apart from ethnic based conflicts because of the inequality in the sharing of sources and power struggle Burundi witnessed violent conflicts (Ndikumana, 2005: 415).

One of the reasons behind these conflicts was the power that gathered around one identifiable ethnic sub-group which was different from other ethnic sub-groups (Lemarchand, 1989: 23). Ndikumana also asserts that the post-independence regimes formed a 'predatory bureaucracy' that were aiming to transfer the wealth to the Tutsi-Hima elite. The Tutsi-Hima from the south benefitted from various methods to control the economy in Burundi and one of these methods was the excessive regulation that facilitated the leaders to get their rents through bribes (Ndikumana, 2005b; 10). This predatory bureaucracy turned into an instrument under the hands of rent-seeking ethnic elites hence giving the army a prominent role in collecting the rent and its distribution among the ruling elites (Daley, 2006: 672). Burundi politics witnessed as well the animosity between the Tutsis and Hutus in the 1960s, yet it also saw hard endeavor between the monarchist Tutsis and the Tutsis from Bururi. The Tutsi-Himas from the south tried to erase the influence of the monarchist Tutsis in power politics in the early period of independence (Ndikumana, 2005: 418).

Tutsi-Himas controlled the power during three different military governments – Micombero 1966-1982, Bagaza 1982-1987 and Buyoya 1987-1993 – between 1966 and 1993 excluding the other Tutsi ethnic groups and Hutus. It is remarkable that the leaders of all three military regimes about three decades are from the same village in Bururi province. These military regimes emerged after gaining the independence centralized single party system, army, police and the judiciary system under one roof (Uvin, 1999: 256-257). Ethnic

segregation gained importance in obtaining power after the independence and small ethnic groups could control the power by getting the support of the army (Uvin, 1999: 257).

2.2.2.3.2. Ethnic Segregation and Ethnic Violence

Facing with a hardened Tutsi domination, the Hutus who considered themselves as oppressed found the solution in the violence and tensions in 1972 (Wilén, 2012: 65). Micombero wanted to kill all the educated Hutus in order to keep the Tutsi regime safe for the upcoming generations (Krueger and Krueger, 2007: 28). The second coup attempt by the Hutus in September 1969 failed and the Tutsis used the failed coup attempt as an excuse to get rid of the Hutus in the government and army. During the rebellion of the Hutus that broke out in 1972, former army member Hutus massacred the southern Tutsis (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza, 2000: 375) and the army under the control of Micombero asked for troops and ammunition from Zaire and Tanzania and massacred about 200.000 educated Hutus. It is estimated that about 10-15% of the total Hutu population and 75% of Burundi's educated Hutus were eliminated (Krueger and Krueger, 2007: 29). Lemarchand defines these incidents in Burundi in 1972 as a "selective" genocide with killings thousands of people as a reaction to the threat by the Hutus to the survival of the Tutsis in power (2009: 160).

The incidents in 1972 had a deep impact on Burundian politics because as a reaction to the killing of the Tutsis by the Hutu rebels, the Tutsi dominated army started a 'selective genocide' that systematically killed all the educated Hutus in Burundi (Uvin, 2009: 10). This was the second trauma for the Hutus and the survivors of the genocide in 1972 became refugees in Rwanda, where they formed two political groups: The Burundi Workers' Party (UBU) and TABARA. The UBU had a Marxist tendency, yet it was supporting non-violence. The other one, TABARA had also Marxist tendency claiming that the Tutsi had been exploiting the Hutus and it was supporting armed struggle (ICG African Briefing Report, 2002).

About 150.000 Hutus also left the country after the incidents in 1972. These Hutus who had to leave their country and formed political groups like the UBU and TABARA laid the foundations of the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People (PALIPEHUTU) in refugee camps (Cornwell and Beer, 1999: 86). TABARA, whose members mostly took refuge in Tanzania, became the PALIPEHUTU and the armed wing of it was getting training in the forests of Western Tanzania (ICG African Briefing Report, 2002). The Hutu camps in Tanzania became the cradle of Hutu extremism (Mthembu-Salter, 2015: 51). However, the PALIPEHUTU was not active in Burundi until 1992 and it had split into two groups later in 1989 as Frolina (*Front pour la Libération Nationale*) under the leadership of Joseph Karumba following a moderate path and PALIPEHUTU-FNL (*Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie*). PALIPEHUTU-FNL was also divided into two as one political wing, PALIPEHUTU and another armed wing, the FNL (Podszun, 2011: 192).

The incidents in 1972 were considered as the first genocide in the Central Africa, but it did not draw enough attention of the international community as the Hutus were excluded and segregated in the Burundian society for some decades. The genocide started with the killings of the rebelling Hutus by the Burundian Tutsi dominated army and lasted from April to November in 1972. The genocide also influenced the politics in Rwanda where

anti-Tutsi reaction helped Juvenal Habyarimana to win the elections in 1973 (Wilén, 2012: 65).

The incidents in Rwanda may also have influenced the massacres of the Tutsis by the Hutus in Burundi. Besides, the Tutsis in Burundi who did not want to share the same fate with the Tutsis in Rwanda retaliated and massacred the Hutus in order to make them give up their demands. Thus, the intervention of the Tutsi army did not only suppress the revolt in only one province, but the intervention spread to all over Burundi and the Hutus working in the government and army together with Hutu businessmen were killed (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza, 2000: 375). The violent suppression of the revolts helped the regime to keep control of the Hutus about two more decades. The incidents occurred in Burundi created a sharp segregation between the Hutus and Tutsis that caused fear among the two ethnic groups to prevail (Uvin, 1999: 258).

The Hutus were excluded from all administrative positions for security reasons after the genocide in 1972 and the Tutsis went on oppressing the Hutus (Wilén, 2012: 66). The Hutus were cleansed from the army after the incidents in 1965, 1969 and 1972 and the army became a monolithic one. It was extremely difficult for the Hutus to join the army and even if they managed they faced with harsh treatments at the barracks (Ndikumana, 1998: 37).

Micombero offered a new constitution after the massacres in 1972 and he was elected as the President of Burundi as the leader of the UPRONA. However, he was toppled by his cousin Bagaza a couple of years later in 1976. Bagaza, this time, talked about national solidarity, prohibited referring to ethnic identities and started a land reform in Burundi, yet he could not hide his real intentions and strengthened Tutsi hegemony during the second republic (Cornwell and Beer, 1999: 86-87).

Colonel Jean Baptiste Bagaza, like his predecessor, was also a Tutsi-Hima from Bururi and came into power following a coup. During Bagaza years the army was still holding its dominant position within the country, yet Bagaza developed civilian institutions as well and for this reason a new constitution was written and it was adopted by a referendum in 1981 that resulted in elections in 1982. After the elections, as the head of UPRONA, Bagaza was elected as the president (Reyntjens and Minority Rights Group., 2000: 8).

The Hutus were not allowed to be represented in the parliament even though they constituted the 85% of the Burundian population and the Hutus were holding only seven of sixty-five seats in the parliament and two of fifty-two positions in the Central Committee (Kreguer, 2007: 30). The Hutu population became gradually uneducated and unqualified and the Tutsis were recruited for well-paid jobs and government positions during the rule of Bagaza between 1976 and 1987. Business network under the protection of the government excluded the Hutus and the Tutsis got wealthier than before, which caused the gap between the two ethnic groups to deepen (Piombo, 2010: 246-247).

In addition to the rule of minority under Bagaza, he considered all the Christian churches in Burundi as representing challenges to his authoritarian regime and as enemies, therefore Bagaza regime confiscated the properties of the Church, expelled the missionaries and introduced strict controls for religious practices (Krueger and Krueger, 2007: 29). In

addition, the human rights record of Bagaza government gradually deteriorated between 1984 and 1987 and the government went on conflicting with the Church in Burundi as it doubted that the Church was organizing the Hutus. During the Bagaza years the number of prisoners including suspected people in Hutu opposition groups and members of Christian churches that criticized governments negative attitude on religious activities increased and it was asserted that the number of the people who were subjected to torture also increased. The anti-church campaign of the UPRONA annoyed Burundi's two major supporters, Belgium and France. Bagaza wanted to implement some economic restrictions and retired some of the army officers in 1987, which resulted in a bloodless coup of Major Pierre Buyoya in 3 September 1987, who was a close associate of Bagaza, when he was in Canada for the Francophone meeting and Buyoya became the president of the Third Republic in Burundi (Cornwell and Beer, 1999: 87; Reyntjens and Minority Rights Group, 2000: 8).

2.2.2.3.3. Normalization Process under Buyoya

The bloodless coup helped Buyoya to become the natural leader of the country since he had already been the chief of operations and training in the defense ministry central committee member of the UPRONA (Eggers, 2006). Buyoya, accusing the Bagaza regime for corruption established the Military Committee for National Salvation (CMSN) that consisted of military officers and suspended the Constitution put in force in 1981 and he became the President on 2 October 1987 heading a cabinet of 20 members including four army officers (Reyntjens and Minority Rights Group, 2000: 8).

Buyoya government launched a normalization process with the Church in Burundi, therefore, the schools that belonged to the Church were re-opened and some of the missionaries were allowed to come back (Lemarchand, 1989: 24). In addition, he started a normalization process for freeing Hutu political prisoners and softening political pressures (Southall, 2006: 204). This change in administration met a warm welcome by the people and the Roman Catholic Church. Hence, Buyoya government released political prisoners whom Bagaza regime had jailed without any trials and renewed the government's relations with the Catholic Church (Eggers, 2006).

Following the normalization process with the Church in Burundi, Buyoya at first launched some reforms including forming a national army that could recruit the Hutus, appointing a Hutu Prime Minister, Adrien Sibomana in October 1988 and establishing a cabinet with equal representation of the Hutus and Tutsis (Eggers, 2006 and Boshoff et al., 2010: 5). As Call states in his book Tutsis dominated the Cabinet, provincial administration and the army with high level of representation in 1988 (2012: 155). Even these numbers in the powerful organizations of the Burundian state demonstrate that how the power was conglomerated around a small number of Tutsis. However, the President Buyoya tried at his best to give this an end as explained below.

Buyoya also increased the number of Hutu ministers from 6 to 12, which resulted in a majority of Hutu ministers (Eggers, 2006). He also formed a commission with equal number of Hutu and Tutsi members that was in charge of investigating the reasons behind the violence and helping re-settle the national unity (Call, 2012: 155). This commission was not a result of a power-sharing between Hutus and Tutsis, instead it was a signal of

Burundian government's enthusiasm for a greater political and administrative participation of Hutus (155). However, according to Call, what Buyoya tried to do in Burundi with integrating the Hutus into power was not power-sharing, yet it resulted in a greater integration of the Hutus in the state organizations and institutions signaling the Burundian government's eagerness and willingness to fulfill what is needed for this greater participation (2012: 155).

On contrary to these improvements, the Tutsis rejected tolerating the state regime against the Hutus and the Hutus revolted again in the north in August 1988 killing civilian Tutsi families. The retaliation of the government was harsh and about 20.000 Hutus lost their lives and approximately 60.000 Hutus left Burundi and sought asylum in Rwanda (Bundervoet, 2009: 360; Cornwell and Beer, 1999: 87). In fact, the reason behind the killing of the civilian Tutsis by their Hutu neighbors in the northern Burundi in 1988 was assertedly fear and distrust (Ndikumana, 2000: 434). As Call claims, the violence came up when "Hutu farmers, resentful of corrupt Tutsi local rule, killed up to 3.000 Tutsi in two northern villages of Burundi" and when the Tutsi-dominated army showed an immediate reaction to kill about 20.000 Hutus (2012: 155).

The Hutu refugee camps radicalized and became the center for Hutu uprisings. These rebel groups in the refugee camps laid the foundations of two organizations: The National Council for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD) and PALIPEHUTU (Rodt, 2012: 377). However, different from the incidents in 1972, upon the massacres the international community condemned the massacre by the Tutsis in 1988, and the US Congress, Belgium, the EU (without France) and the World Bank threatened the Burundian government that they hold the financial assistance if no reconciliation with the Hutus, which forced Buyoya regime to liberalize the political system in Burundi (Weissman, 1998 and Bundervoet, 2009: 360). Together with the demands from the international and domestic actors for political openings, the government started the progress for transition to the multi-party system in 1992. Upon the pressure by France and Belgium, Buyoya government had to launch a new constitution (Boshoff et al., 2010, 5).

The government had already created an environment for discussing the ethnicity taboo and founded the National Commission to Study the Question of National Unity in 1989 and National Council for Unity in 1992 (Nidukumana, 2000: 434). The commission consisted of 12 Tutsi and 12 Hutu members who were supposed to investigate the massacres (Eggers, 2006). The aim of establishing such a national commission in 1989 was to find the causes of ethnic conflicts and offer solutions for stability in domestic politics. The Commission issued an official report that pointed out the conflict between the Hutus and Tutsis for the first time and tried to end it, yet it failed in the end in confirming the influence of the post-colonial administrations on the ethnic segregation and in missing the opportunity to face with the previous tragic events in 1965, 1969, 1972 and 1988 (Ndikumana, 1998: 339).

However, according to Reyntjens, while the report was inadequate in various points it helped to create the draft of the 'Charter of National Unity', which resulted in an environment in Burundi that paid importance for the freedom of expression and 'symposia on unity' were rallied in different locations within the country. The Charter of National

Unity was approved in February 1991 (Reyntjens and Minority Rights Group, 2000: 8). However, the Charter was criticized by the opposition especially by the Hutu party, the PALIPEHUTU since it was written under the control of the ruling party, the UPRONA (Eggers, 2006).

Both the Commission and the Council aimed to integrate the Hutus into the government bodies and the Council issued a report about the comprehensive changes, a new constitution and formation of a new elected government (Piombo, 2010: 248). After the legalization of a multiparty system in Burundi a few political parties started their political life either as new parties or as the (Bundervoet, 2009) continuation of former political parties (Nidukumana, 2000: 434). Buyoya gave equal representation for the Hutus and Tutsis in government ministries by appointing Hutus to important posts and even appointing a Hutu Prime Minister (Sullivan, 2005: 83). However, Buyoya kept the leadership of the UPRONA, the presidency, the ministries of defense, justice and domestic affairs, the army and police under Tutsi control (Uvin, 1999: 261).

2.2.2.3.4. Democratization Attempts vs. Coups

This political opening in Burundi was a result of the geopolitical changes in international relations in the 1990s after the end of the Cold War with the collapse of the Berlin Wall and French President's speech at the 'La Baule Conference'. France required the African military regimes to have democratic institutions at this conference in 1990. The collapse of the Berlin Wall was also symbolizing the end of Soviet support for these African military regimes. For this reason, as the African states had no other option than to welcome democracy, Burundi started a democratization policy as well. Besides, the political democratization in Burundi occurred with Buyoya between 1988 and 1993 was considered as a sample for other African states by the international community, however, it did not take a long time for the democratization process to be destroyed after a failed coup by the army and killing of the first democratically elected president Ndadaye (Bundervoet et. al., 2009: 357 and Ndayizigiye, 2005).

It is asserted that Burundi made a progress under Buyoya regime between 1988 and early 1991. The regime let many Hutus to get positions within the state and half of the cabinet, some of the provincial administrators, head administrator of UPRONA were Hutu and the Hutus were equivalently represented with the Tutsis in politics. Buyoya regime also managed to improve the social conditions of the Hutus with a rise in the number of Hutus who had entry for secondary and higher education. The government also took measures to make the recruitment procedures more transparent. However, despite the progress in civil service the army and security services resisted to these changes in Burundi and did not want to recruit the Hutus. Buyoya regime faced with coup attempts in 1989 and 1992 and the army misbehaved during the disturbances in November 1991 that demonstrated the resistance of the army against the reconciliation process of the Buyoya regime (Reyntjens and Minority Rights Group., 2000: 8).

On contrary to what is mentioned above regarding the Buyoya's efforts for normalization and democratization, according to Call, Buyoya's efforts at the beginning of the 1990s for Hutu participation into governance failed since efforts for democratization and Hutu

inclusion were not successful at the end of the day to prevent the conflict because it was much more a power-dividing than a power-sharing what was drawn in the Constitution of 1992 (2012: 157).

Upon these developments in the political arena, three presidential candidates ran for the presidential elections in July 1993. The President Buyoya supported by UPRONA and the *Rassemblement Démocratique pour la Développement Économique et Social* (RADDES), Melchior Ndadaye a candidate of the Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU) also supported by the *Rassemblement du Peuple Burundais* (RPB) and the *Parti du Peuple* (PP), the *Parti Liberal* (PL) and an outsider Pierre-Claver Sendegeya supported by the royalist party *Parti pour la Réconciliation du Peuple* (PRP), therefore Buyoya had two Hutu rivals for the elections. The election was held in a calm environment under the observation of 100 international and 1000 national observers with only a few technical problems. 97.3% of the voters voted for the presidential election and the result surprised the observers. Ndadaye won the election with 64.75% of the votes and Buyoya had 32.39% of the votes (Reyntjens and Minority Rights Group, 2000: 11). Before the elections the head of the FRODEBU, Ndadaye and the President, Buyoya tried to reduce the number of the extremists in their parties, however they were not successful in preventing extremists in PALIPEHUTU from violent actions (Lemarchand, 1994: 595).

The FRODEBU's victory in elections surprised most of the Tutsis (Wilén, 2012: 66) as it was considered as "a virtual political earthquake" (Reyntjens, 1993: 573). Melchior Ndadaye, who was the candidate of the FRODEBU, was elected as the first civilian president of Burundi in the elections held on 10th of July 1993 thanks to the multiparty political life (Ngarunko and Nkurunziza, 2000: 376). The FRODEBU was carrying the political heritage of the Burundi Workers' Party, UBU and the Movement of Progressive Students of Burundi, MEPROBA, which were supporting democratic values in comparison with the PALIPEHUTU, which was planning to come back to Burundi by armed struggle (Nindorera, 2012: 13).

Ndadaye believed that the Burundians had the capacity for self-government and dreamt of a democratic Burundi like the Burundian refugees that came from Rwanda (Krueger and Krueger, 2007: 33). He was the president in Burundi, who was elected out of democratic elections (Wilén, 2012: 66) and when he was asked at a press conference in October 1993 what he wanted to accomplish as a president he replied that he wanted to build an equal society where everybody could get liberty and justice (Krueger and Krueger, 2007: 36).

Ndadaye took careful steps at the beginning and tried to build a confidence (Reyntjens and Minority Rights Group, 2000: 12). Ndadaye appointed Kinigi, a well-recognized Tutsi politician of the former administration, as the prime minister (Cornwell and Beer, 1999: 87-88). Buyoya welcomed the results of the elections in peace and Ndadaye, after taking the office, launched some reforms like plans addressing the economic inequalities and Hutu refugee problems, yet the first steps of his office for reforms confronted reaction of the Tutsis (Sullivan, 2005: 77-78) since Ndadaye and his cabinet took some measures threatening some of the traditional interest groups, especially the privileges of the army

right after they came into power, so the positive atmosphere stemming from the liberalization movements did not take so long (Ngarunko and Nkurunziza, 2000: 376).

Tutsi elite saw the result of the election as a threat for themselves since they thought that the Hutus who were holding the demographic majority now gained political majority and they were afraid that they would be the victims. Therefore, at first students started to organize protests and the army was not happy with the election results. A group of soldiers attempted a coup and another group of soldiers attempted to capture the president, yet they failed (Reyntjens and Minority Rights Group, 2000: 12). As Sullivan mentions the lack of political security behind these threats together with the 'Frodebisation' – appointing FRODEBU party member Hutus to governmental lower posts – at lower governmental positions paved the way for another military coup in November 1993 (2005: 89). In addition, the Frodebisation process started with Ndadaye's election provoked anger among the Tutsis as well as creating a loss of competence, experience and know-how at state institutions since the new cadres consisting of Hutu officials were not sufficiently educated and were mostly not qualified for the positions they occupied (Podszun, 2011: 187).

Ndadaye mentioned his intention to make reforms in the army as a part of his plans to rebuild Burundi and he replaced former government officials with new ones to gain the control over political power. Ndadaye's government wanted to implement power-sharing for public service assignments as well as providing an ethnic parity in the Burundian army (Piombo, 2010: 247). Nevertheless, the government officials who lost their positions and their supporters in the private sector saw these reforms as a new source of unearned income. The relationship between the business sector and the former government officials explains the support of the civilian Tutsi elite to the military coup in Burundi (Ndikumana, 2005: 423). In addition, the demands for land and job of the Hutu refugees who came back to Burundi were considered as a vital menace to the Tutsis who seized the properties of the Hutus. The close relationship between the business sector and the authoritarian regime put another obstacle before the Tutsi businessmen (Ndikumana, 2005: 423).

Actually, the policy of Frodebisation made great changes in state sector and most of the Tutsis holding the governmental positions were replaced mostly by the Hutus who were affiliated with the Hutu party FRODEBU (Vandeginste, 2009). Neither Ndadaye nor Buyoya was not able to prevent extremist forces and four months after the elections the Tutsi dominated army staged a coup against the elected president (Wilén, 2012: 66).

Low-ranking Tutsi army officers attacked the presidential palace on 20th October 1993 to regain the political power in Burundi and Ndadaye was killed, yet the coup attempt failed (Bundervoet, 2009: 361). Even though the coup failed, the murder of Ndadaye by the Burundian army members became the sparkle that fired the Hutu peasants and the militants of the FRODEBU to kill the Tutsis. (Wilén, 2012: 66). As Peter Uvin asserts the coup was regarded as a reaction to Frodebisation since the Tutsis started to lose their positions within the state and they also began to think the Tutsis would lose their positions in the army as well (2009: 13).

However, Vandeginste sees the coup as "one of the most successful of the failed coups in history" since the coup already terminated the democratic atmosphere in Burundi (2009).

The international community condemned the coup and the killings. Two days after the coup the US, Belgium, France, Germany and the European Community declared that they suspended their cooperative activities with the Burundian government. Facing with this kind of an unexpected respond by the international community the Burundian army had to state that some fractions within the army organized the coup (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza, 2005: 46).

Two days after the failed coup attempt the chief of the general staff called the troops back to the barracks, however, the UPRONA that lost the elections and other political parties supported the coup attempt and objected to the international peace force demanded by the Hutu government (Wilén, 2012: 67). Even though the coup was not a successful one, it created a turmoil in Burundi, and the members of the FRODEBU first had to take refuge at the French Embassy and later on at a hotel in Bujumbura under the protection of 20 French soldiers (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza, 2005: 47).

As Reyntjens puts forward Kigobe talks started in 1994 but it did not help lowering the tensions apart from discussing the sharing of bureaucratic offices and their features (Reyntjens and Minority Rights Group, 2000: 15). After the 'Kigobe negotiations' nine parties signed the 'Kigobe Accord' on 19 January 1994 and they agreed that the National Assembly was the only organ to elect the successor of Ndadaye and they decided that the president should be coming from Ndadaye's party, FRODEBU, and Cyprien Ntaryamira should be elected as the president. The parties to the Kigobe talks also decided that the prime minister should be appointed upon a consultation with all the political parties and should also be coming from the opposite party or ethnic group of the president (Reyntjens and Minority Rights Group, 2000: 15).

However, the Kigobe Accord's fulfillment was undermined because of the disturbance by opposition powers in Bujumbura and next round of negotiation talks were held in Kajaga, which brought along new arrangements for appointing president and prime minister considering the sensitive sectors like intelligence, information and police. The participants reached an agreement called as Kajaga Agreement on 4 February 1994 allowing the inauguration of Ntaryamira as a president. However, the violence especially on the streets of the cities did not end and radical parties rejected the agreement calling it as a coup d'état (Reyntjens and Minority Rights Group, 2000: 15).

Following these preliminary negotiations to set the order after the coup in order to have political stability, the military coup that resulted in killing the president was not successful in the end and the FRODEBU stayed in power, yet it could not help to calm down the tensions (Wilén, 2012: 67). After the coup the FRODEBU lost power upon impeachments by the Tutsi parties and had to comply with the opposition to form a pluralist government representing most of the Tutsi parties. The weakening FRODEBU also had to negotiate with the army since it was attacking the governmental offices (Nindorera, 2012: 12). During this 'creeping coup' the Tutsi forces and the Tutsi dominated army seized the power. According to Boshoff and et. al the creeping coup had five elements as follows:

- The army and local youths were employed to perpetrate urban and rural violence to intimidate members of FRODEBU, which prevented the government from fulfilling its duties

- The opposition seized the initiative in a propaganda campaign in which the government, more particularly FRODEBU, was accused of Tutsi genocide
- State institutions were undermined by the manipulation of the Constitutional Court
- The enforcement upon FRODEBU of Tutsi ethnic constraints. The government was forced into conceding more and more power to Tutsi extremists
- In effect, the creeping coup restored the Tutsi elite to power under a Hutu president. The situation was worsened by the death of President Ntaryamira in a plane crash over Kigali in April 1994 (Boshoff et al., 2010: 6).

The failed coup dragged Burundi into a civil war that would last about a decade. In June 1994 some of the FRODEBU members established the National Council for the Defense of Democracy – CNDD and its armed wing, the Forces for the Defense of Democracy – FDD (Reyntjens and Minority Rights Group, 2000: 16). The failed coup and the murder of the president caused chaos in Burundi resulting in conflicts among different groups that paved the way for civil war. The civil war and violent armed conflicts in Burundi did not end till January 2009 despite the repeated peace efforts and a civil government formed in 2005 (Piombo, 2010: 248).

2.2.2.4. The Burundian Civil War

The murder of the president Ndadaye sparkled the civil war in Burundi that would last almost two decades. The murder of Ndadaye by the army annoyed the Hutus and they started to attack the Tutsis all over the country, but the reaction of the ordinary Hutu irritated the armed forces, in which the Tutsis had a dominant position (Rodt, 2012: 377). After the death of Ndadaye, the Hutu population in Burundi, being afraid of massacres as in the past in 1965 and 1972 rebelled against the Tutsi dominated army to 'defend the democracy' and they started to kill even their Tutsi neighbors (Burundi's Search for Peace, 2000). However, the incidents that took one week before the inauguration of Ndadaye between 2 and 3 July 1993 Ndadaye had escaped death in an attempted coup by the Burundian army (Krueger and Krueger, 2007: 2).

After September 1993 Burundi was dragged into violent conflicts. Most of the Hutus feared that the army and Tutsi militia would attack them and several Tutsi militia groups started to kill the Hutu population. Unlike in Rwanda the Tutsis organized a hate propaganda and encouraged people for violence and issued the list of Hutu administrators to be killed. The Hutu residents of Bujumbura were expelled from the city. In return, FRODEBU was divided into two factions: a radical armed faction CNDD and political faction FDD (Uvin, 1999: 262). In addition, the president called for the army to restore the order in the presence of provocative actions of the Hutu militia together with Hutu refugees came from the camps in Zaire and Tanzania and the Hutus left the Rwandan army, so the Tutsi dominated army was benefitting from the situation that contributed into the start of the civil war (Cornwell and Beer, 1999: 89).

Burundi had not been a stable country since its independence in 1962 and experienced several governments between 1962 and 1966, the end of the Burundian monarchy in 1966 and four successful coups in 1965, 1976, 1987 and 1994 before the first democratically elected President Ndadaye was killed (Daley, 2007: 333). FRODEBU militants who had heard about the coup attempt before Ndadaye was killed blocked the roads and destroyed the bridges. They started to kill the Tutsi men and Hutus that were members of the

UPRONA whom they arrested and held as hostages, which triggered the violence everywhere in Burundi (Bundervoet, 2009: 361).

After the assassination of the president Ndadaye, Burundi witnessed another episode of genocidal violence since about 200.000 people had died in 1972 and 20.000 in 1988 (Daley, 2007: 334). The Hutus fired the Tutsis' homes and killed even the intermarried families, and the political leaders who wanted to take a revenge encouraged them (Krueger and Krueger, 2007: 40). 116.059 people lost their lives between 21-31 October 1993 and 100.000 of them were killed at the final week of October 1993 according to the estimations of the Burundian government and UN Population Fund. In addition, not only the Tutsis lost their lives, but also the Hutus were targeted no matter they participated into the killings of the Tutsis as the Tutsi dominated army swiftly suppressed the violence in the country (Bundervoet, 2009: 361). The army gradually took the control back in the countryside and cleared away the blockades on the roads and launched a pacification campaign that resulted in 600.000 Hutu leaving Burundi (Cornwell and Beer, 1999: 88).

It is estimated that a few thousands of people sought refuge in Tanzania, Rwanda and Zaire and the number of the uprooted people was around 1.2 million (Anonymous, 2000). However, the international community paid little attention to the domestic conflict in Burundi since Burundi was a small and poor country and neither its economy nor culture drew attention (Krueger and Krueger, 2007). The international community took some temporary measures to stop the violence, yet Burundi was considered as one of the forgotten nations on the world (Krueger and Krueger, 2007: 22). The report of the UN fact-finding mission in Burundi announced that the atrocities happened right after the coup and killing of the president Ndadaye were not out of a plan by the Hutus, yet a reaction against the consequences of the coup (Bundervoet, 2009: 358). The international media and the international community showed the violent conflicts in Burundi as ethnic conflict between the Hutus and Tutsis (Daley, 2007: 338) as they would reflect the Rwandan genocide one year later as a tribal war. Burundi hardly meant anything for the other states. The US, for example, had almost zero economic and military interest in Burundi since the total trade between the two countries was about seven million dollars and Burundi had nothing to threaten the US as a small nation (Krueger and Krueger, 2007: 36).

The death of president Ndadaye created a power vacuum and both of the successors of Ndadaye, Ntaryamira and Ntibantunganya, could not take the security forces under their control as FRODEBU had never fully obtained the power. Besides, some other FRODEBU leaders started to organize their own militia apart from the army after Ndadaye's death and created resistance movements like Forces for the Defense of Democracy (FDD) and the existing movements like PALIPEHUTU revised their activities. The FDD was in fact a guerilla organization and it consisted of peasants and a few numbers of Hutus within the army. Together with these Hutu militia group, elites in power sponsored their own militiamen and Tutsi political parties sponsored Tutsi militia groups like *Sans Échec*, *Sans Défaite*, and SOJODEM (*Solidarité Jeunesse pour le Défense des Droits des Minorités*) (Ndikumana, 2000: 435; Krueger and Krueger, 2007: 40; Daley, 2006: 66).

During this turmoil after the killing of Ndadaye in 1993, the UN Security Council issued a resolution mentioning the violations of international humanitarian law in Burundi and asked for an international commission to make investigations regarding the assassination of Ndadaye (Eggers, 2006). As Wolpe mentioned, at first the UN attempted to facilitate the peace negotiations with power-sharing agreements that could set the stability in Burundi and end the ongoing conflict right after the killing of the President Ndadaye in October, 1993. However, Wolpe thinks that the UN intervention in the situation in Burundi could only reduce the conflict for a short time (Wolpe, 2011: 8).

After the death of the president, three months passed to appoint a new president and UPRONA and other opposition parties could get the 40% of the administrative offices in the government. FRODEBU accepted the new arrangements to assure the Tutsi minority and Ntaryamira, who was the minister of agriculture, was elected as the president (Cornwell and Beer, 1999: 88). Nevertheless, UPRONA benefitting from the power vacuum tried to obtain the government and a slow-going negotiation process started when the newly elected president Ntaryamira also died on a plane crash together with the Rwandan President Habyarimana on 6th of April 1994 (Uvin, 1999: 262).

Ntaryamira's sudden death caused another institutional vacuum in Burundi, yet paved the way for new negotiations to start. The negotiations this time called as 'Novotel Negotiations' started and a new agreement was reached in the end on 10 September 1994 allowing the appointment of Sylvestre Ntibantunganya of FRODEBU as a president (Reyntjens and Minority Rights Group, 2000: 15).

Ntibantunganya was the Speaker of the Parliament when he was appointed as the new president in October 1994. This meant that FRODEBU was still controlling the government since the elections in 1993. However, FRODEBU holding the presidency had to share the power with UPRONA and other opposition parties for the fear of coup attempts and civil war, yet UPRONA left the parliament, which caused another violence in Burundi. The RPF gained the power in neighboring Rwanda encouraging UPRONA and Burundian Tutsi dominated army. For this reason, the FRODEBU government in Burundi had to continue sharing the power with them (Podszun, 2011: 188; Rodt, 2012: 377; Cornwell and Beer, 1999: 87).

In 1995 Burundi was under the control of a coalition of the Burundian army, UPRONA conservatives, the Tutsi militia and small-scale Tutsi parties with a FRODEBU President and UPRONA Prime Minister (Weissman, 1998). However, this chaotic situation in Burundi fueled up the arms race between the Burundian government (arms transfer from Russia, China, Eastern Europe) and the CNDD (arms transfer from former Soviet countries, Eastern Europe, Angola and South Africa) (1998).

After the assassinations against the leaders of FRODEBU, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) sent troops to Burundi to assure stability and mediated an agreement stipulating that half of the ministries including the prime ministry should be left to the opposition parties, the ministries of justice and defense to be given to the independent deputies, 45% of the administrative offices in local administrations to be left to the opposition on 11th of September 1994. At the end of this agreement it was decided that a

Reconciliation Government equally dividing the power between the Hutus and Tutsis should be formed. Therefore, the victory the Hutus won at the elections in 1993 under the leadership of FRODEBU was almost over (Piombo, 2010: 250; Cornwell and Beer, 1999: 87).

The CNDD and PALIPEHUTU objected to sharing power with the Tutsis and were transformed into two big militia groups. These militia groups objected to the reconciliation government as well since they thought that the Hutus were prevented from politics in Burundi (Piombo, 2010: 250). Yet, despite the struggle of the Burundian army against the rebel movements and the opponents, the reconciliation government in Burundi spent efforts to govern the country in a chaotic environment between September 1994 and July 1996. When it became impotent in providing stability any more, the army attempted a new coup that turned out to be a successful one to restore the former president Buyoya to power 25 July 1996. Burundi came under a military regime once more and violence continued to increase within the country, the refugees were sent back to the neighboring countries (Piombo, 2010: 250; Reyntjens and Minority Rights Group, 2000: 16).

Burundi almost turned to a failed state before the coup in 1996. Starting from the end of 1995 coffee production and average daily income had decreased. Besides, European expatriates also continued leaving Burundi but taking back their expertise as well. What is more, economic development programs directed by other states were finalized and Germany, for example, shut down its embassy after finishing the programs it was responsible for. The International Red Cross also left Burundi after some of its workers were killed. *Médecins Sans Frontier* also ended its aid operations in Burundi when the government did not allow this organization to provide treatments to the patients in the regroupment camps. In addition, some other organizations ended working in Burundi owing to thievery, threats and hostility of the government (Krueger and Krueger, 2007: 274-275).

It is estimated that during the chaotic situation between 1993 and 1996 approximately 150.000 people died. After the coup, Buyoya appointed a Hutu from the UPRONA as a prime minister to tone down the civil war, however the cabinet maintained its Tutsi dominance. The international community again condemned the coup (Cornwell and Beer, 1999: 89) and the regional leaders objected to the military coup and put economic sanctions into effect in order to force the military regime to rebuild the constitutional order. At the end Buyoya regime accepted to come to the negotiation desk with the opposition in the face of regional and international pressure (Ndikumana, 2000: 435).

A new period aiming at ending the conflicts and building the peace in the country began with the negotiations. Nevertheless, Buyoya thought that to have a successful peace process it was necessary to have strong security at home and for this reason he started to increase the number of the troops. Yet, Hutu leaders thought that Buyoya was trying to secure the armed victory after the coup instead of taking a step towards peace negotiations again (Wolpe, 2011: 19). During the first years of Buyoya's second term, the ongoing conflict in the eastern Zaire helped Burundi to destroy the CNDD bases and to increase domestic security by September 1997 (Weissman, 1998).

2.2.2.4.1. Reasons Behind the Civil War

The Burundian history witnessed almost a regular intra-state violent conflict cycle as was also in Rwanda. Violent conflicts between the two different ethnic groups, the Tutsis and Hutus have a chronical characteristic. The regular conflicts between these groups that started just before Burundi's gaining independence had their peak after the assassination of Ndadaye resulting in a long-lasting civil war. There were several significant reasons behind the civil war. These reasons are related to ethnic segregation – also called as chronic exclusion and extreme social discrimination – created during the colonial era, colonial practices especially during the Belgian one, weak state structure, constant violent conflicts between the two main ethnic groups starting from the 1950s, distribution of resources, ethnic rivalry for obtaining power and the turmoil that occurred after Ndadaye's assassination. The details of these political, economic, sociological and cultural reasons are given below.

According to Daley, Tutsi dominated army and gendarmerie had an important role in Burundian conflict and the militia and rebel movements benefited from the unemployed young (Daley, 2006: 306). Bundervoet urges that chronic shortage of land was one of the most important factors explaining the high level of population participation into killings in Burundi (Bundervoet, 2009: 359). In addition to dense population between the ethnic clashes in 1962 and 1993 the population in Burundi almost tripled reaching up to seven million people. However, during the same period farmed areas shrunk from 1.5 hectares to 0.8 hectare and arable land per capita drastically diminished (Bundervoet, 2009: 371).

Regarding the conflict in Rwanda and Burundi, Call thinks that one of the reasons behind the conflict is "chronic exclusion", yet he makes a comparison between the styles of exclusion in some other case countries like Liberia, East Timor, Tibet and South Ossetia. In the end, Call finds out that the exclusion in these case countries are more about the state policy, but the ones in Burundi and Rwanda stems from "extreme social discrimination coupled with persistent state structures and policies that rested on excluding the other" (2012: 153).

Rwantabagu states that weak state structure in Africa is vulnerable to domestic violent conflict owing to their lack of providing security for individuals and groups and ethnic minority problems. When the state organization cannot offer security for its citizens then the citizens themselves individually or as groups try to provide their own security and the existence of ethnic minorities or the availability of different ethnic geographies are more likely to cause internal conflicts when compared with the states with ethnic homogeneity, yet ethnic homogeneity does not mean an assured internal harmony (2001: 43).

Park points out that the conflict in Burundi stems from its colonial legacy and states that Belgian colonial administration brought along a new government style empowering ethnic Tutsi chiefs (Park, 2010: 188-189). Park adds that the conflict in Burundi stemmed also from the interests of pro-Hutu and pro-Tutsi groups located in Rwanda emphasizing the influence of external ethnic groups (190). The colonial administration in Burundi tried to contribute into the organization of ethnic relations, but as Patricia Daley points out the colonial and post-colonial order in Burundi keep the Hutus out of the benefits of political

sponsorship (2006: 665). Nevertheless, the colonial administration succeeded in creating conflict not only between the Hutus and Tutsis, but also among the same ethnic groups competing one another (665).

Ndikumana considers ethnicity as one of the reasons behind the conflict since ethnicity was started to be seen as the key to the political and economic power beginning from the colonial time. He asserts that the radical change in the territorial administration by the Belgian colonial administration in Burundi in 1929 was a milestone in Burundian history in terms of the role of ethnicity in politics and a gradual marginalization of the Hutus in politics. After this radical change the administration in 1945 did not have any Hutu chiefs even though 25% of the local chiefs were Hutus in 1929. The Tutsis dominated political power and this domination continued without a break after the independence and the incidents and the reaction of the Burundian government in 1972 during the genocide in Burundi consolidated a Tutsi regime then on (2005: 415).

Uvin states five reasons for killings in Rwanda and Burundi. The first reason is fear and both ethnic groups performed a defensive attack to protect themselves against the fate they think waiting for them. The second reason is prejudice encouraging people to mass killings to protect their power and the privileges they enjoy. The third one is revenge and the fourth one is opportunism including personal gains and looting. The last one is obedience especially in Rwanda which stems from the obedience culture necessitating obeying authorities (1999, 263-264).

Conflict cycles in Burundi can be categorized into four historical eras: the pre-colonial and colonial eras, the reign of the monolithic military republics (1966-1993) that includes the post-independence era with the 1965 killings, 1972 massacres, the 1988 uprising and killings, the rebel invasion of 1991 and the post 1993 period that includes the conflict sparkled after the killing of Ndadaye (Ndikumana, 2005: 4). After the colonial era terminated Burundi witnessed instability in politics (Daley, 2006: 658).

Ndikumana states that the civil war in Burundi was mostly the result of distributional conflict (2005: 413). He also argues that the different ethnic groups have been existing throughout the history, but the ethnic segregation was a consequence of unequal distribution of power in politics and economic resources. For this reason, he sees distribution rather than ethnic segregation and ethnic hatred as the main cause of civil war in Burundi (2005: 414). Similar to what Ndikumana claims for the reasons of civil war in Burundi, Hajayandi asserts that the civil war was a result of struggle over political representation and scarcity in resources with a sauce of regional differences and militarization (2015: 142).

Ndikumana also thinks that the civil war which began in 1993 right after the murder of the President Ndadaye is the outcome of distributional conflict. He counts four key reasons to explain it. First, Ndadaye wanted a reform in the army to make it more representative of ethnic groups in Burundi, yet starting from the democratic transition started in 1989 the army had showed its opposition. Second, Ndadaye also started right after the elections to replace the officials in the government sector to keep the promises he gave before the elections, which meant lots of officials, mainly the Tutsis, to lose their positions, jobs and

the rents and privileges they enjoyed. This also caused the Tutsi people to give full support to the military coup. Third, huge numbers of Hutu refugees came back to Burundi and they needed professional positions and land. This was also a major threat to the Tutsis who had obtained the properties of the Hutus after they had left. Fourth, the Tutsi businessmen regarded Ndadaye government as a threat since the relationship with the government was a *sin a qua non* factor to get the success in the private sector in Burundi (2005: 423).

PART II

CHAPTER THREE

DIFFERENT PATHS TO NEGOTIATION, MICRO ANALYSIS

3.1. Rwandan Peace Settlement and the Arusha Peace Accord

Rwandan and Burundian peace negotiation processes followed different paths. This part will try to display this difference in the paths taken for peace and the Rwandan one here.

3.1.1. Before the Arusha Peace Accord

Rwanda witnessed constant conflict cycles since her independence between the Tutsis and Hutus. The invasion of the northern part of the country by the RPF transformed the regular conflict between the two ethnic groups into a civil war. Hence, the conflict in Rwanda could only encourage the mediation efforts after the RPF invasion in October 1990 and the former colonial power Belgium's delegation of prime minister, foreign affairs minister and defense minister went to Kigali to meet Habyarimana, Museveni from Uganda, Mobutu from Zaire and Mwinyi from Tanzania (Jones, 1999b: 61) and asked for an African mission for keeping the peace (Clapham, 1998: 200-201).

The Belgian peace mission organized some meetings in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania and met the representatives of the OAU. This mission paved the way for a regional move in Mwanza in Tanzania that would later turn into negotiations under the auspices of the Organization for African Unity resulting in the approval of the Mwanza Communique on 17 October 1990 (Adelman and Suhrke, 1999: 132). This was a diplomatic visit, but actually it implied that Belgium wanted to send troops to Rwanda as a reaction to the invasion, which did never achieve the consent of the parliament and it was only limited to protect and evacuate Belgian nationals in Rwanda (Jones, 1999b: 61).

As is mentioned above the Belgian Prime Minister's visit to Kigali together with foreign minister and defense minister in 1990 introduced a peaceful resolution of the fight by "sub-regional diplomatic missions" like the executive assembly of the Economic Community of the Countries of the Great Lakes (CEPGL) that opened its doors for several regional meetings since the countries within the close region like Zaire, Uganda and Tanzania had a different point of interest in the conflict in Rwanda (Jones, 1999: 61).

The summits organized by the CEPGL in 1990 brought tangible results and Museveni, Mwinyi and Habyarimana came together for a meeting and announced the Dar-es-Salaam Declaration in the presence of representatives of Mobutu, the OAU, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) that agrees on the basic need for an armistice and start of negotiations (Jones, 1999b: 62). It showed the willingness of Rwandan government to agree on a cease-fire and it triggered the peacemaking efforts by the regional actors like the OAU and CEPGL, later on resulted in a cease-fire agreement between the combatants in N'Sele, Zaire. Basically, this declaration was also describing a solution for the refugee problem. The OAU intervened the peace process after staying hesitant for several years in the recent past (62).

The regional conference on the refugees that was held between Rwanda and the regional states plays an important role *en route* to official peace negotiations for Rwanda. Adelman and Suhrke emphasize the importance of the conference in creating two significant peace documents for resolving the conflict in Rwanda: the Zanzibar Communique on 17 February 1991 for an armistice and Dar-es-Salaam Declaration on the Rwandese Refugee Problem on 19 February 1991 (Adelman and Suhrke, 1999: 133).

Before getting to the formal peace negotiations in Arusha in 1992 and following the Dar-es-Salaam Declaration, the N'Sele cease-fire agreement actually started the peace process in Rwanda in March 1991 (Kimonyo et al., 2004). The N'Sele Cease-fire Agreement signed between the Rwandan government and the RPF was the first "formal" cease-fire agreement that paved the way for further talks for conflict resolution forming the Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) that aimed to control the results of the agreement and report its violations to the OAU (Adelman and Suhrke, 1999: 134). NMOG, consisting of officers from Nigeria, Senegal, Zimbabwe, the Rwandan Government, the RPF and an African state to be selected by the OAU and the facilitating country Tanzania was deployed under the control of the Secretary General of the OAU to verify and control the implementation of the cease-fire (Arusha Peace Accord, 1993), however, the cease-fire conditions lasted for a very short time because the violations from both of the parties caused the combat to restart in April 1991 (Jones, 1999b: 63). The armed conflict went on for a couple of months until the renewed talks in Gbadolite, Zaire on 16 September 1991(63).

Mpungwe also puts forward that the agreement for suspension of the fight failed in a very short time because Habyarimana thought military victory would resolve the problem resulting in a loss of support from neighboring countries and international actors – which was necessary for the achievement of the armistice (1999). When the peace talks started two different fractions emerged in the political elite in Rwanda: one was supporting the peace talks and the other one was considering the talks as a 'deal' with the RPF (Desrosiers, 2007: 80). NMOG was not in effect and both of the parties violated the cease-fire and fighting continued for several months till the talks resumed again in Gbadolite, Zaire as mentioned below (Jones, 1999: 63). Actually, these two cease-fire agreements were considered as preliminary ones before the Arusha cease-fire agreements, yet both were violated without a successful end (Adelman et. al. 1996; 23).

The regional powers were actively trying to build peace in the region and the OAU took the subject into its agenda in its yearly meeting in Nigeria in 1991 by leading a regional meeting aimed for official meetings between the conflicting parties to be organized in Gbadolite, Zaire in September of 1991 under its supervision (Clapham, 1998: 201). During its annual summit in Abuja, Nigeria, the OAU paved the way for a regional meeting that aimed to settle the issue in the region in Gbadolite, Zaire in September 1991, which is considered as the first official meeting and start of direct talks between the conflicting parties (Clapham, 1998: 201).

The pressure put by the regional states followed a two-track route and the first one consisted of a several meetings among Rwandan, Burundian and Zairean leaders that were members of the CEPGL and another one was based on the contact between the CEPGL member

states and Uganda, Tanzania, the OAU and the UN. The meetings among these actors were held in Gbadolite, Zaire – Gbadolite Communique, 20 November 1991 – under the leadership of the Zairean President Mobutu Sese Seko. The meetings resulted in a demand for a regional conference on the refugees upon meetings between Uganda and the RPF (Adelman and Suhrke, 1999: 132-133). However, "the elements of the new agreement were not dramatically different than those of N'Sele but did restructure the NMOG, calling for a Nigerian chief officer with a Zairian deputy" and "the switch from a Zairian chief officer to a Nigerian reflected a lack of trust, certainly among the RPF, in the neutrality of Zairian troops, who fought alongside the FAR in Kigali in October 1990" (Jones, 1999: 63).

However, the basic provisions of the agreement were not so different from the former one, yet it was reorganizing the NMOG to be headed by a Nigerian chief officer together with a Zairian aide and sending approximately eighty troops to the north of Rwanda under the NMOG (Jones, 1999b: 63). Jones asserts that the peace process started for Rwanda by regional and international efforts like the talks at the US State Department, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Dar-es-Salaam Declaration, the N'Sele Cease-fire Agreement and Gbadolite Cease-fire agreement all in retrospect made up the pre-negotiation texts of the peace process on its way to Arusha negotiations (1999b: 64).

The peace initiatives were not only taken by the regional and international actors, a couple of religious organizations were also actively working for settling the conflict in Rwanda. As Guichaoua states on 3 January 1992, before the start of the peace negotiations in Arusha, Tanzania, the Protestant bishops had a meeting with the representatives of the political parties in Rwanda and a secret meeting was held in London between the representatives of "*the Conférence des églises de toute l'Afrique* (CETA), a broad array of ecumenical churches of the continent based in Nairobi, and the RPF" and another meeting was held between the CETA and the Rwandan government to draw an outline for the mediation on 22 January 1992 (2015: 63).

As Carney points out in his book the Catholic Church in Rwanda, which had supported democratic movements, Rwanda's efforts for a multiparty system and political reconciliation during the Civil War also played an active role for the mediation at the start of the 1990s and they publicly demanded the peaceful return and reintegration of the Tutsi refugees. In addition, the clergy under the leadership of a group called as "*le comite du contacts*" did not give up its mediating role between the MRND and the RPF until both of the parties signed the Arusha Peace Accords. Carney also mentions that "Mgr. Giuseppe Bertello, the Vatican's apostolic nuncio or ambassador in Rwanda, was especially notable for his efforts to reach out to the RPF in northern Rwanda in late 1992" (2014: 197).

Together with these efforts mentioned above for settling peace in Rwanda efforts by the US and French involvements in 1991 and 1992 could finally bring the two warring parties together for political negotiations for several meetings under the aegis of the OAU, of which the final one was held in Paris in 1992 (Jones, 1999b: 66). These negotiations were facilitated by Tanzania (66). France – the Quai d'Orsay's Director for Africa, Paul Dijoud – and the US – the Africa Bureau of the State Department, Carol Fuller and Herman Cohen – also organized meetings between the government of Rwanda and the RPF. The efforts of

France and the US accelerated the process for peace negotiations, yet they were out of the formal negotiating cycle (Adelman and Suhrke, 1999: 134).

Herman Cohen also demanded a meeting between the RPF and the opposition parties in Rwanda in Brussels between 29 May and 3 June 1992 (Philpot, 2013: 53). However, Cohen's role during the peace process was reflecting the US "concept of technical support" offered to both of the parties as aiding negotiations since as it claimed the US did not have a political interest in Rwanda (Jones, 1999: 64). Clapham argues the RPF presence in talks with Herman Cohen and Salim Salim in Kampala and kick-start talks in Paris show that the former rebel movement RPF was accepted as legitimate party for settling the conflict in Rwanda (1998: 201-202).

France was active before and during the Arusha peace negotiations. France held several meetings and joined several conferences in order to encourage the Rwandan government for an armistice agreement and a peace settlement (Adelman and Suhrke, 1999: 161). As Jones puts forward even though the peace efforts of France and its American counterpart were not official negotiations between the conflicting parties they were considered as the kick-start for the official negotiations for Rwanda under a mediator (Adelman and Suhrke, 1999: 136).

Scorgie points out that the first steps for a peace negotiation for Rwanda were taken by the Tanzanian facilitating team in France just as the impasse created the right situation for the parties to come together for talks to look for a mutual resolution of the conflict in Arusha (2004: 68). Taking the peace talks to Arusha was also a beginning of a change in the style of meetings – replacing the regional meetings with a more integrative and inclusive peace negotiations (Scorgie, 2004: 68).

As Mpungwe points out, the Tanzanian facilitating team supervised the negotiations from February to June in 1992 to understand the background of the ongoing fight in Rwanda (1999). Mpungwe also puts an emphasis on the success of this facilitating team in their contact with the representatives of the parties and in their efforts for merging what they have learnt from the regional summit style and other examples of peace negotiations held for different countries in Africa like Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia and the South Africa (1999).

To sum up the efforts of the regional countries, regional organizations, international religious organizations and foreign diplomatic missions for the Rwandan peace, it can be stated that high-level meetings were held at Mwanza, United Republic of Tanzania, on 17th October, 1990, in Gbadolite, Republic Zaire, on 26th October, 1990, in Goma, Republic of Zaire, on 20th November, 1990, in Zanzibar, United Republic of Tanzania, on 17th February, 1991, in Dar-es-Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania, on 19th February, 1991 and from 5th to 7th March, 1993 (Arusha Peace Accord, 1993). Before the Arusha Peace Accord, the stages of pre-negotiation below for Rwandan peace as Morel listed on the Table 5 were held:

Table 5. Negotiations and Agreements for Rwandan Peace.

Date	Place	Negotiation or Agreement
29 March 1991	N'Sele	Ceasefire agreement
16 September 1991	Gbadolite	Modification to the ceasefire agreement
14-15 January 1992	Paris	Meeting between the RPF and the Rwandan government
29 May 1992	Brussels	Start of Peace Talks RPF/MDR-PSD-PL
30 June 1992	Dakar	Meeting between the RPF and the Rwandan government
12 July 1992	Arusha	Amendment of the ceasefire agreement
26 July 1992	Addis Ababa	Government negotiation – the RPF
1 August 1992	N/A	Effective cease-fire
11 August 1992	Arusha	Government negotiation – the RPF
18 August 1992	Arusha	Signature of the rule of law protocol
30 October 1992	Arusha	Signature of the protocol on "Power-sharing in a broad-based transitional government"
9 January 1993	Arusha	Signing of the power-sharing agreement
25 February 1993	Bujumbura	Negotiations between the RPF and non-MRND parties of the government coalition
7 March 1993	Dar es Salaam	Government cease-fire agreement – the RPF
9 June 1993	Arusha	Memorandum of Understanding on refugees and displaced persons
3 August 1993	Arusha	Signing of the Memorandum of Understanding on the integration of the Armed Forces
4 August 1993	Arusha	Signature of the Peace Agreement between the RPF and the Rwandan government

Source: Morel (2015).

As Scorgie puts forward, the invasion of the RPF both started a war and regional efforts for mediating peace by organizing meetings including regional powers and neighboring countries to understand what the parties wanted. In addition, the peace efforts held before Arusha Accords were not successful in stopping the conflict and urging the Rwandan president for urgent political changes, yet they were constituting the pre-negotiation phases on the way for the official peace negotiations in Arusha (2004: 68).

3.1.2. Arusha Peace Accord

By the year 1992 the Civil War between the Rwandan government and the RPF weakened the Rwandan government's hand and depending on the regional – since regional leaders who were afraid that the domestic conflict in Rwanda might spread on their soil – and international pressure Rwandan President Habyarimana had to accept a coalition with the opposition and to sit on the official negotiation desk together with the RPF (Plaut, 1994: 151; Verpoorten, 2012: 550).

The Rwandan opposition was putting pressure on Habyarimana government to establish a multi-party transitional government and to start official peace negotiations with the RPF, so the opposition was using the RPF issue as a leverage tool in domestic negotiations with the MRND, which facilitated the transformation of the RPF from a rebel movement into a legitimate player in domestic politics and its transformation was also internationally recognized when the RPF was invited for negotiations held by the US Assistant Secretary

of State Herman Cohen and Salim Salim in Kampala in May 1992 (Clapham, 1998: 201). Hence, Habyarimana government started democratization process upon the demand from the domestic actors and international community on 14 March 1992, which resulted in the RPF's inclusion to the peace negotiations as a legitimate actor after the demands of the domestic opposition (Clapham, 1998: 201).

Before the Arusha peace negotiations officially started in July 1992 with the Tanzanian President Ali Hassan Mwinyi as the mediator and Zairean President Mobutu Sese Seko as the facilitator, the Foreign Affairs Minister of the Rwandan government, Boniface Ngulinzira and the RPF delegation met in Kampala and Paris (Melvern, 2004: 38 and Guichaoua, 2015: 63). The negotiations initiated by a mediator and a facilitator from the same region was highly supported by the OAU, some other regional actors like Uganda and Burundi, and by the US, Belgian, German and French Embassies together with the regional and international organizations (Guichaoua, 2015: 63). Belgium, the US, France and the OAU put pressure for an immediate settlement of the domestic conflict in Rwanda and "it was hoped that protracted negotiations would give the two sides a chance to understand each other and allow for changing perceptions", which resulted in a mutual decision of the negotiating parties for power-sharing and a democratic system based on power-sharing (38).

Arusha peace negotiations involved Belgium and Germany depending on their historical and colonial ties and interests, the USA, France, Zaire, Uganda and Burundi together with the regional and international organizations such as the OAU, the UN, the UNHCR (Jones, 1999b: 66). Jones claims that Tanzania as a mediator played an important role during Arusha peace negotiations for a couple of reasons: first it could appoint a talented delegation for the talks, which resulted in a successful mediation process, second apart from regional and humanitarian concerns, worries regarding the refugee problem urged Tanzania to take part because the conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi would result in a large number of refugee movements into Tanzania, third it was the only neighboring state regarded as a neutral one during the civil war (1999b: 67).

The first negotiation meeting between the opponents and the delegation of the Rwandan government had been held in Brussels in 1992 before the official peace negotiations started. After this first negotiation meeting, Rwanda had stepped on democratization and the MRND had accepted sharing the power with the RPF before signing the Arusha Peace Accord. Parallel to the democratization efforts, the first conference was held within two weeks after the invasion of the RPF, and the delegations and representatives of the Rwandan Government, the RPF, Uganda, Tanzania, Zaire and Burundi were represented in Arusha, Tanzania (Desrosiers, 2007: 80; Kimonyo et. al., 2004; Plaut, 1994: 151; Morel, 2015: 38; Heusch, 1995: 6).

The first step of the negotiations in Arusha was to sign the first protocol on the Rule of Law in August 1992 that included very important provisions such as democracy, national unity, pluralism in politics and human rights. The second protocol that was signed in January 1993 came with a power-sharing agreement between the Rwandan government and the RPF. As a consequence of this second protocol, the MRND and the RPF had each five

ministries and the MRD received four including the Prime Ministry and three other smaller parties shared the other seven ministerial posts, which still kept Habyarimana in power, but these changes in the ministries reduced his power. The government of Agatha Uwilingiyamana was set up in 18 July 1993. However, the second protocol on power-sharing annoyed the MRND that was thinking about too much was given to the RPF and other political parties. Therefore, as it asserted the MRND organized the mass-killings of the Tutsis and moderate-opponent Hutus in Rwanda after receiving this result in Arusha and intentionally fueled the tension to spoil the peace process (Desrosiers, 2007; Kimonyo et. al., 2004; Plaut, 1994: 151; Morel, 2015: 38; Heusch, 1995).

On the other hand, upon these killings, the RPF violated the cease-fire agreement and advanced further inside Rwanda, yet after getting a heavy pressure from the international community it had to withdraw. The donor countries like France warned Habyarimana that the international aid would be suspended if he did not sign the Arusha peace agreement. After an official peace negotiation process about 14 months under the supervision of the OAU, the UN, France, Belgium, Germany, the USA and Tanzania as the facilitator between the RPF and the government, the peace accord was signed in Arusha in Tanzania on 4th of August 1993 (Desrosiers, 2007: 80; Kimonyo et. al., 2004; Plaut, 1994: 151; Morel, 2015: 38; Heusch, 1995: 6).

The OAU organized the peace negotiations in "three phases, the first in Arusha, the second in Addis Ababa and the third again in Arusha" and negotiations gave their fruit for a practical armistice on the 1st of August and for the approval of the first protocol on the rule of law on the 18th of August (Guichaoua, 2015: 64). Habyarimana had to sign the Arusha Peace Accord under a military pressure by the RPF and a financial pressure from France and the World Bank (Doyle, et. al. 2006). The peace negotiation talks at Arusha for Rwandan peace lasted almost about fourteen months with a cycle of 'agreement-deadlock-agreement' and had discussions about the cease-fire, principles of law, power-sharing, army integration and the return of the refugees (Adelman and Suhrke, 1999: 137). Clapham adds that negotiations were held in an African environment with the support and engagement of the regional and neighboring countries as compared to the implications that the peace agreement was already forced by the Western powers (1998: 202).

The military gains by the RPF together with the pressure and threats from the international actors to cancel the economic assistance to the Rwandan government – the US and international organizations as the IMF and World Bank postponed the economic assistance and the Parliamentary Assembly of the European Union demanded its members to suspend the loans to Rwandan government and Belgium menaced to stop its yearly assistance – helped to keep the negotiations on the track and as Kuperman points out these were perceived as ripeness and leverage for the negotiations (1996).

The international influence and menaces by the international community were used a part of carrots and sticks diplomacy – leverage for negotiations – during the peace negotiations to accelerate the process and the USA for example put forward the condition that the economic assistance of 20 million US Dollars would only be offered to the government of Rwanda if they stayed in track for democratic movements in the country for resolving the

conflict like the IMF, the World Bank and Belgium put forward similar conditions before the government (Kuperman, 1996).

The Arusha Peace Accord included two protocols: one was about the integration of the troops of the both sides into one army and the other one was about issues on human rights and exclusion of ethnic references from official documents (Barnett, 2002: 62). The Accord also had a peace agreement consisting of eleven articles mostly on "the rule of law, power sharing, transitional institutions, repatriation of refugees and resettlement of displaced peoples" and it also had a schedule for a twenty-two-month transition period (62).

Arusha Peace Accord consisted of the protocols below:

1. Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Rule of Law (signed on 18 August 1992)
2. Protocol of Agreement on Power-Sharing within the Framework of a Broad-Based Transitional Government between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (18 September 1992)
3. Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on Power-Sharing within the Framework of a Broad-Based Transitional Government Continuation of the Protocol of Agreement signed on 30th October, 1992 and 9 January 1993)
4. Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Repatriation of Rwandese Refugees and the Resettlement of Displaced Persons (9 June 1993)
5. Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Integration of the Armed Forces of the Two Parties (3 August 1993)
6. Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on Miscellaneous Issues and Final Provisions (3 August 1993) (Arusha Peace Accord, 1993).

Together with these protocols on different matters, the N'Sele Ceasefire Agreement signed on 29 March 1991 between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the RPF, as changed in Gbadolite on 16 September 1991 and at Arusha on 12 July 1992 constitute the basic texts of the Arusha Peace Accord.

The 54th Article of the Accord of the Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on Power-Sharing within the Framework of a Broad-Based Transitional Government was organizing the distribution of the posts at ministerial levels among the parties in Rwanda (equal distribution for the MRND and the RPF – five each) and distribution of the seats at the Transitional National Assembly (equal distribution for the MRND and the RPF – eleven each) (Arusha Peace Accord, 1993).

Another important issue of the Accord was the integration of the Armed Forces and the size, structure and organization of the National Army that is organized under the Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Integration of the Armed Forces of the Two Parties (Arusha Peace Accord, 1993). The 74th Article of this protocol is important in setting the distribution of commanding posts at the National army between parties as 60% for the government and 40% for the RPF and 50% representation for each of the parties in the command chain (1993).

Thanks to the Arusha Peace Accord and the pressure from the Western countries and the OAU, reconciliation was reached despite the opposition by the radical racist of the 'Hutu Power' and the Rwandan government accepted to sign several agreements with the RPF. These agreements as mentioned above were related to power-sharing, return of the Rwandan refugees and integration of the RPF into the Rwandan army. The Hutu Power considered the negotiations in Arusha as negotiations between the RPF and its Hutu collaborators and the negotiations in Arusha meant for them that the Hutu power, including the Zero Network, would lose their privileges and positions that they had enjoyed for the last two decades (Magnarella, 2005: 813).

During the negotiations, the RPF well-aware of its military superiority was well-prepared to bargain its positions and demands and benefited from its superiority over the government, yet the RPF's using its military power ruined its credibility for dedication and the other parties were thinking that it can go back to the battlefields if a satisfactory settlement was not made (Traniello, 2007: 38). On the contrary, the government of Rwanda was not organized and integrated beside Habyarimana's failure to unite his party and his position as a go-between during the negotiations between the moderates and extremists (38). This portrait of the situation during the negotiations in Arusha resulted in the Arusha Accord's recognition as a win-lose situation and "the Arusha Accords had the unintended consequences of pushing power-sharing to a winner-takes-all game, which is potentially violent" (40).

The Arusha Accord designed a power-sharing among the MRND, the RPF and other moderate opposition parties avoiding extremism, and the power was divided between the MRND and the RPF with the other opposition parties in important positions; however, this situation in the cabinet was perceived as a change of balance of power for the advantage of the RPF and other opposition parties, which later on resulted in Habyarimana to stand against the protocols and seek for the support of the militia (Rothchild, 2005: 253).

3.1.3. After the Arusha Peace Accord

Since starting from 1973 till 1990 the Hutus in power kept their dominance thanks to their efforts for favoritism, therefore the Northern Hutus, the governing minority, would be the ones who would lose much at the end of a defeat by the RPF (Kuperman, 1996). Like the prominent actors within the Hutu Power and the *Akazu* and soldiers even some lord mayors and governors were concerned about giving up their positions if the Arusha Peace Accords were implemented because these administrators would be taken into a review process with the start of the broad-based transitional government and the ones that were clear to in former human right abuses or were considered as inadequate would be replaced (Human Rights Watch, 1999).

The democratization process in Rwandan politics along with the peace talks between the Habyarimana government and the RPF escalated the tensions between Habyarimana and political parties like the MRND and the CDR. These parties were concerned about sharing power with the RPF and in addition to their concerns the *Akazu*, the Zero Network, was in between bearing a reconciliatory position or being hostile towards the RPF at the beginning (Barnett, 2002: 57). However, the Zero Network decided to be with the extremist since it

was cautious about the movements of the President Habyarimana and the rhetoric of the extremist groups was including violence against people, especially the Tutsis (57).

The CDR and other extremist groups that were in collaboration with the Habyarimana regime started to severely criticize him for not taking hard actions to deal with the Tutsi problem and blamed him even for treason against the country (Valentino, 2013: 182). On the other hand, as Desrosiers asserted that Habyarimana had uncertain movements when the peace talks were held and he acted differently even from his own political party in Arusha peace process (2007: 81). Related to the Habyarimana's position, Desrosiers also states that Habyarimana tried to undermine the peace process and so gain some time to empower his presidency when considering himself in a poor political situation (81).

As Mamdani states the Arusha negotiations did not involve the extremist party, the CDR and the Arusha Peace Accords did not include the CDR for the transitional government, therefore it lost its power facing with the opposition and the RPF (2002: 211). After the peace negotiations, however, other main parties together with the Tanzanian, American and Ugandan peace supporters informed the RPF not to rely on its military victories at the negotiation desk and not to rule out the CDR from the transitional government and finally not to change the demographic structure of the army in its favor (211). Mamdani also adds that "the Tanzanians and the Americans even said to share a metaphor: 'If the hardliners weren't brought into the tent, they would burn the tent down'" (212). The exclusion of the CDR and other extremist elements from the negotiation process also contributed into "Hutu perceptions of the Tutsi threat" (Valentino, 2013: 182).

The Accord also brought along some changes for the army to ensure its integration and it envisaged an army of 19.000 strong men consisting of 60% from the Rwandan Army and 40% from the RPF (Melvern, 2004: 60). In addition, the Accords required that senior officers be equally divided between the *Forces Armées Rwandaises,* National Army of Rwanda (FAR) and the RPF. For this reason, more than 20.000 soldiers in the Rwandan army were to be demobilized and a battalion of the RPF was to be stationed in Kigali, which as Doyle et. al. mentions "was perceived by the FAR as a symbol of defeat for the government" (2006). However, the integration that was a necessary step during the transition was never fully implemented, and the extremists who were against the peace process started to stockpile arms and machetes and to increase the number of the militia (Doyle et. al., 2006).

According to Newbury and Newbury, internal pressure on Habyarimana and external pressure from Tanzania, the OAU and the US together with the negotiation skills of the RPF helped for a political solution on the way for signing the Arusha Peace Accord (1999: 306). International pressure was heavy on the shoulders of the Rwandan government and Rwandans for signing the Arusha Peace Accords in contrast with their demands (62). However, as Kinzer points out when the Arusha Accords were on the verge of being signed there were some doubts about its implementation and Habyarimana could not hide his intention when he did not want to meet the RPF leaders in Uganda during his visit to Ugandan President Museveni (2008).

After the signing of the Arusha Peace Accords the power was transferred from Habyarimana to the Prime Minister Faustin Twagiramungu from the MRD and since the Accord allowed the investigation of the past crimes the Hutu extremist and corrupt leaders of the MRND were not happy with this (Morrock, 2010: 70). Yet, the Accord required for a transitional government including the RPF, but even after some months the transitional government was not established owing to some delays by the two parties since it was not easy for the parties to conceive the rapid changes in political configurations (Human Rights Watch, 2006). However, by 8 of April a transitional government was established, yet it was under the control of the radical Hutus and during the term of this transitional government the militia together with the Rwandan army – dominated by the Hutus – Presidential Guard and the national police started to kill their enemies, the Tutsis, which was the beginning of a large-scale genocide in Rwanda (Plaut, 1994: 151).

During this time the opposition coalition divided into two factions, one extremist and the other moderate, and owing to the conflict between these two factions over the seats in the government that was outlined in Arusha the establishment of the transitional government was behind the schedule (Thomson, 2013: 91). Yet, the beginning of the UN mission coincided with the military coup in Burundi on 21 October 1993 when the democratically elected Hutu president Ndadaye was killed and the RTLM that was banned from broadcasting in particular exploited the situation. In the meantime, one of the members of the steering committee of the MRND, a rich businessman Frodouald Karamira organized a political rally on 23 October 1993 in Kigali launching out the slogan "Hutu Power", which was the start of extremism in Rwanda (Morel, 2015: 38). In addition, these activities allowed the opponents of peace agreements to delay the establishment of the transitional government and the parliament. Habyarimana had to swear as the President of Rwanda with reduced powers by the Arusha Peace Accord on 5 January 1994, however, the *interhamwe* prevented the assembly of the parliament and only the candidates of the MRND were present at the parliament (38).

In fact, the economic collapse that emerged right after the Arusha Peace Accord, which had created a division in political power between the rebels and the government, manipulation of ethnic animosities and civil war resulted in disintegration in Rwandan society between 1990 and 1993 (Verwimp, 2006: 10). The broadcasting by the *Radio Mille Collines* (Radio Thousand Hills) starting from the summer of 1993 made killing the Tutsis attractive and assumed the duty of mobilizing the people for this aim (Heusch, 1995: 6). The radio channel surprisingly started broadcasting during the same time with the signature of the Arusha Peace Accord. Accordingly, it could make the Tutsis the target of the hate propaganda right after the Accord was signed and it promoted verbal assault against the Tutsis and murdering them in an open and regular way (Uvin, 1999: 260).

Similarly, Catharine Newbury and David Newbury allege that three issues in the Arusha Peace Accord helped to fuel the tension in Rwanda: First of all, the hawks in the government criticized Habyarimana that he yielded a lot to the RPF and secondly after the integration of the rebel army (RPF) into the Rwandan army, the RPF had more officers than the Rwandan army. Thirdly, the issue of the return of all the Rwandan refugees increased

the tension and even if this issue was one of the important topics in the accord it brought along a class problem (Newbury and Newbury; 1999: 308-309). According to Chussodovsky, the Arusha Peace Accord that was supposed to bring along a democratic model facilitating inter-ethnic solidarity was not successful in the end since the deterioration of the prosperity of the Rwandan people after the civil war and IMF reforms undermined a real democratization process (2017: 938).

The Arusha Peace Accord in fact raised the segregation between the two ethnic groups and increased the hostility as it created different interpretations both in the government and the RPF. The Arusha Peace Accord fueled the ethnic hatred after the RPF attacks in 1990 and made Rwanda one step closer to the genocide. On the other hand, as Kimonyo et. al. argues the Arusha Peace Accord attempted to create an equilibrium between the MRND, the RPF and the MRD, yet the influences of the genocide and the triumph of the RPF gave the RPF a powerful position in the period after genocide in Rwanda and as if proving the imbalance, the RPF undertook the responsibility of remaking the country since it stopped the genocide in Rwanda (2004).

During the transitional period the RPF received the presidency and Pasteur Bizimungu became the president and the Commander of the RPF, General Paul Kagame was appointed as the Vice-President and the Minister of Defense. Faustin Twagiramungu from the MDR was appointed as the Prime Minister and in the parliament the seats were shared equally among the main parties, yet six seats were allocated for the army, which was showing the dominance of the victorious RPF in governmental bodies and the importance of the armed forces (Kimonyo et al., 2004). As a consequence, the MRND turned out to be a minority party after the Arusha Peace Accords (Melvern, 2004: 59).

Because of the reasons mentioned above the Arusha Peace Accord was far from bringing a durable peace to Rwanda. The Accord failed in satisfying the spoilers and the possible losers – the extremists and the government. As no other efforts were useful in bringing the two parties for a post-negotiation or further negotiations for implementation and follow-up of the Arusha Peace Accord, Rwanda stumbled into the turmoil after the plane crash of Habyarimana and the genocide.

3.2. Burundian Peace Settlement and the Arusha Peace Accord

As Peter Uvin points out the peace negotiations for Rwanda started in Arusha in 1990 and about ten years later the negotiations started at the same city, yet after these negotiations were finalized with two Peace Accords (Arusha Peace Accords) one failed (Rwanda) and the other one (Burundi) succeeded (2010). However, the peace process after the Arusha Peace Accord in Burundi was not an easy path since the conflict continued almost ten years after the peace agreement and the rebel movements were integrated with the army.

The violence sparkled right after the independence in 1962 did not stop till the beginning of the 1990s with killings and massacres happened in almost a regular ten-year cycle. The violence came up after the coup in 1993 drew the attention of first the regional countries and then the international community. The regional demand for peace and successful efforts by the regional African leaders started Burundian peace negotiations (Daley, 2007:

334). However, the regional countries that were worried about the war in Burundi and its destabilizing effect in the region followed a path for conflict resolution funded by other western countries and only later on together with the mediation activities by Tanzania and South Africa, the peace negotiations in Burundi gained a regional character as the mediators transferred their regional experience to the negotiations (Daley, 2007: 311).

Ntaryamira, who succeeded Ndadaye after his death, died owing to a plane crush with the Rwandan President and a coalition for power-sharing was already installed in September 1994 to put an end to the violent intra-state conflicts, yet the army plotted a coup, selecting the former Burundian president Buyoya as the new president, when the Burundian government desperately demanded foreign military intervention to stop the ongoing violence (Anonymous, 2000). Their involvement for peace and efforts for ending the violence and conflict resolution in Burundi continued about more than ten years till 2005. International, regional and domestic actors like the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were taking part in negotiations at different levels and both the UN and European Union (EU) had already took part in mediation process, yet without any success when the regional leaders of Tanzania, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda, Zambia, Ethiopia and Zaire imposed sanctions and asked for an immediate restoration of the parliament (Wilén, 2012: 68).

All in all, conflict resolution, peace and security took part in the agenda of international community, Western states, international development agencies and NGOs in particular. Beside regional states as mentioned above the EU, the USA, Canada, European countries, the Catholic Church, and international and regional NGOs started to take active roles in peace negotiations in Burundi. Most of the time the NGOs took the role of mediators between the state and civil society (2006: 310).

3.2.1. Regional and International Initiatives for Burundian Peace

The struggle of the Hutu combatants in the late 1995-1996 could draw the attention of the world thanks to their effective combat with the Burundian army and international pressure for negotiation between the warring parties (Krueger and Krueger, 2007: 276). The neighboring regional states offered two methods for the peace process in Burundi: One was the deployment of a peace-keeping force and the other was regional sanctions to put the Burundian government under pressure, however, the first method was rejected by the military and Tutsi parties (Daley, 2007 338-339). The second method also did not help as we will see below the efficiency of regional sanctions on the peace process.

The OAU and UN intervened to end the violence after the leader of the FRODEBU was killed. The UN started a mediation process between the FRODEBU and UPRONA and UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali appointed Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah as the Special Representative to the Secretary General (SRSG) for the mediation post in Burundi. Ould-Abdallah mediated for a power sharing agreement between the FRODEBU and UPRONA that was called as the “Convention of Government”, which had no contribution into the restoration of the FRODEBU – offering 55% of the cabinet to the Hutus and 45% to the Tutsis – and was a replacement of the 1992 Constitution, and it made a coalition possible with a FRODEBU president and UPRONA Prime Minister (Khadiagala in

Boulden, 2003: 221; Boshoff et al., 2010: 6), yet shared the power equally between the two political parties and it was assertedly only an additional text to the Constitution dated 13 March 1992 offering provisions for a transitional government with a FRODEBU President and UPRONA Prime Minister, hence it was a mere draft definition of a mutually agreed governance (Boshoff et. al. 2010: 6 and Vandeginste, 2009: 69).

This Convention of Government paved the way for an integrative decision-making process with the representations of major parties (Falch and Becker, 2008: 12). The Convention also required the foundation of a consultative body – National Security Council – that is aimed to adjust the political system and consist of ten members consisting of representatives of government, political parties and civil society organizations (12). However, the Convention was not effective in terminating the conflict and killings did not stop and political arena was still divided in 1994 (Curtis, 2003). It was expected to launch a nationwide discussion on a peaceful settlement of the ongoing conflict and to draft a new constitution that could equally deal with the rights of both the Hutus and Tutsis (Khadiagala in Boulden, 2003: 221).

This Convention failed and as a consequence some Hutu politicians rejoined the rebel groups as the CNDD, PALIPEHUTU, and the FROLINA. Ould-Abdallah tried to put an end to the political turmoil and ongoing conflict. In addition, the main negotiating parties, the UPRONA and FRODEBU could not satisfy either the Tutsis or Hutus, which resulted in an increase of the activities of the armed Hutu rebellion in the countryside (Wolpe, 2011: 10). However, the first steps of the peacemaking process started by Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, the Special Representative assigned by the UN Secretary to deal with the peace problem were taken under the auspices of the UN offices (Barltrop, 2008: 16).

The United Nations mediated a power-sharing agreement between the FRODEBU and UPRONA, which is also named as the Kigobe and Kajaga Convention of Government in 1994 and following this Convention a new government was established, but it could not perform its commitments under the presidency of Ntibantunganya, which ended in violence and chaos in Burundi that increased killings, lootings, the number of armed groups and finally a military coup by former president and army commander Buyoya (Hajayandi, 2015: 144).

Even though the Burundian peace negotiations started with the initiatives of the regional neighboring states that were concerned about the ongoing civil wars around them and the destabilizing effect of these domestic conflicts in the region, the negotiations mostly followed the conflict resolution path at present and enjoyed the Western financial support. The mediators from Tanzania and later on from South Africa tried to share their experience in peace negotiations trying to facilitate the process. However, as Daley points out some observers of Western donor countries and mediators tried to shape the negotiations for their objectives and adds that Ould-Abdallah was asserting that the high number of mediators taking part in the peace negotiations were actually undermining the process itself (Daley, 2006: 311).

However, the mediation process sparkled and leaded by the Special Representative Ould-Abdallah had four objectives: “To restore the democratic institutions overthrown by the

abortive coup; to facilitate dialogue between the parties; to establish a commission of inquiry about the events of October and the ensuing massacres, and to work in close collaboration with the OAU" (Khadiagala, 2007: 53). Ould-Abdallah managed to persuade the parties to sign an agreement in January 1994 that resulted in selecting Ntaryamira as president for a cabinet in which Tutsis could only occupy 40 percent of the seats. However, this agreement was not successful in the end and it did not help to put an end to the conflict between the Hutus and Tutsis yet made the political situation much worse. The situation much worsened when the President Ntaryamira died together with the Rwandan President Habyarimana in a plane crash. Yet, this time the attention of the international community directed towards the genocide in Rwanda (53).

Despite the symbolic peace keeping force and the agreement recommended by the UN, the violence continued to escalate. In fact, the regional intervention to rebuild the peace in Burundi started with the former president of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere with peace negotiations between the FRODEBU and UPRONA in 1996. The first negotiation meeting failed in a very short time even though the main aim was to get two groups together to work for peace because of the ongoing war between the Burundian army and the Hutu militia (Boshoff, et. al. 2010: 6; Piombo, 2010: 250-251).

Considering the somehow unsuccessful attempts by the special UN envoy Ould-Abdallah, the worrying neighboring countries like the Tanzanian President Nyerere, and the leaders of Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and Zaire introduced the 'Regional Peace Initiative on Burundi' in November 1995 and the Tanzanian President Nyerere was appointed as the facilitator for the peace talks within this initiative steered by Uganda (Barltrop, 2008: 17). This Regional Initiative held meetings with the two major political parties of Burundi in Mwanza, Tanzania between April and June 1996, yet in addition to the lack of sufficient authority for negotiation within the parties, the so-called 'creeping coup' in July 1996 undermined the process that had just begun with the efforts of the neighboring states (17).

In addition, certain Eastern and Central African countries were coming closer to form a peace initiative around the OAU and Tanzania, Rwanda, Uganda, Zaire, Kenya, Ethiopia and Zambia came together to start peace negotiations for Burundi between 1996 and 1998 and for this aim these countries organized five different Presidential Summit Meetings on Burundi and they assigned Nyerere, former Tanzanian President as the facilitating person. Apart from assigning a facilitator for the peace negotiations this group led the missions for peacekeeping, economic embargoes, integrative negotiations and coordination with other governmental institutions and the NGOs (Weissman, 1998).

3.2.2. The Involvement of the Sant'Egidio

The negotiations for the peace in Burundi gained also the financial and verbal support of the Western powers. The US appointed an ambassador and a congressman to the region as special envoys and the religious organization, Sant'Egidio, which had close links to the Vatican, invited warring parties to Rome for secret meetings. However, negotiations that had started before the coup gained an impetus (Krueger and Krueger, 2007: 276). The Sant'Egidio talks in Rome started secret negotiations between the Burundian government and the CNDD in 1996 when both of the parties found it politically critical to meet with

the “enemy” in an open way, hence four meetings were hold in Rome between 1996 and 1997 (Weissman, 1998). As Weissman states, the talks in Rome had a purpose to prepare the parties for an official and open negotiations under the control of a mediator, Nyerere and emphasizes the importance of Rome talks for showing the support of the EU and the USA together with their indirect participation into the process (1998).

The involvement of the Sant’Egidio started almost at the same time around when Nyerere was considering about taking the mediator role in Burundi. As Wolpe asserts, the involvement of the Sant’Egidio actually started in 1995 with Don Matteo Zuppi’s contact with and cooperation proposal to Nyerere. However, Nyerere did not give a reply for the cooperation offer from Zuppi. Zuppi was also thinking that the ongoing conflict was between the two warring parties, the government and the CNDD, so the negotiation talks should be set between them (Wolpe, 2011: 26). Zuppi, an African expert at the Sant’Egidio played an important role for back-channel negotiations before Burundian government set at the same table with the CNDD and created the right medium for the conflicting parties to establish trust-based relations among them (McClintock and Nahimana, 2008: 81).

The secret meetings in Rome produced a introductory agreement between Burundian government and the CNDD on 10 March 1997. Both of the parties agreed on an agenda for negotiations for the following issues: “1) return of institutional and constitutional order, 2) the question of the security and defense forces, 3) the suspension of hostilities, 4) the implementation of justice, 5) the setting up of an international court to deal with acts of genocide, 6) methods of the other political parties’ participation and 7) the cease-fire” (International Crisis Group Report, 1998). However, Buyoya government’s participation into the talks in Rome on the one hand was seen as a way to lift the sanctions on Burundi and on the other hand was considered as a genuine intention of Buyoya showing his commitment. Buyoya, who had tried to establish communication with the political part of PALIPEHUTU in 1991, showed his trust in secret peace talks in Rome at the expense of losing the support of his political supporters, yet Buyoya’s participation into the talks strengthened his hands for the future and he could show his proponents that the international movement led by the Sant’Egidio with the US and EU backing was not isolating him (ICG Crisis Group Report, 1998).

According to Wolpe, the secret meetings for negotiation in Rome also contributed into the coordination between the Sant’Egidio and Nyerere since even though these meetings in Rome were considered as a different initiative, it was actually a part of the negotiations in Arusha that were mediated by Nyerere because Nyerere was sending his official representative to join the talks as a diplomatic observer (2011: 29). The Rome talks initiated by the Sant’Egidio, which was also called as the ‘Rome Accords’ encouraged Buyoya to organize fifteen meetings all around Burundi to express the willingness of the Burundian people for negotiations and to come together with the representatives of political parties, parliament members, army, police and civilians in 1997 and 1998 for forming the basis for further peace negotiations (International Crisis Group Report, 1998).

3.2.3. Nyerere's Mediation and the Regional Peace Initiative

The escalating conflict in Burundi made it necessary for another round of conflict resolution. Considering the consequences of the Rwandan genocide, which happened in 1994, the chairman of the Organization of Africa Unity (OAU), Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, and the OAU Secretary-General Salim-Salim started talks with the President of Tanzania, Julius Mwalimu Nyerere to get involved in the Burundian peace negotiations to terminate the political crisis and conflict in Burundi (Wolpe, 2011: 11). Military intervention was in demand and the peace initiative started by the Carter Center that included Malian President, South African Archbishop, Desmond Tutu and the former President of Tanzania, Nyerere offered a new way of diplomacy. As a consequence of these initiatives the regional leaders at a summit in Tunis in March 1996 appointed Nyerere as the mediator for Burundian crises (Khadiagala, 2007: 53-54).

International leaders like the former US President Jimmy Carter and former Tanzanian President, mediator, Julius Nyerere were helpful for this process in bringing the conflicting parties to the peace negotiations (Eggers, 2006). Burundian President Ntibantunganya had got in contact with the Carter Center, founded by Jimmy Carter in late 1995, to start the peace process and two meetings, one in Cairo and another one in Tunis in 1995 and 1996 were held under the chairmanship of Salim Ahmed Salim, Secretary-General of the OAU (Mthembu-Salter, 2015: 58). Carter, organized meetings with the regional heads of states like Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere and after several meetings of these regional states, the UN and the OAU demanded Nyerere to mediate the peace process for the Burundian conflict as mentioned above (Rubin, 1999: 45). Under Nyerere's mediation the first negotiation meeting was held in Mwanza, Tanzania in April 1996 and the mediation team tried to start an integrative communication between the conflicting parties (Khadiagala in Boulden, 2003: 225).

Nyerere had trained most of the leaders in the region and he was seen as one of the pioneers of African liberation. Nyerere had won a world-wide reputation for being a pan-Africanist and anti-colonialist. He continued his support for the sanctions on the South African apartheid regime and welcomed liberation movements in Dar-es-Salaam, hence providing them diplomatic and political support. For example, Nyerere helped Museveni in Uganda, the RPF in Rwanda and the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL), therefore new leaders of these countries felt indebted to him for his support in the past. Nyerere also defined the situation in Burundi as a black apartheid referring the past situation in South Africa (International Crisis Group Report, 1998). This international reputation Nyerere enjoyed brought international attention to the peace process, yet Burundian party of the peace talks was careful about Tanzania's mediator role since Tanzania was a safe haven for Burundian Hutu extremists and refugees (Rubin, 1999: 45).

Nyerere invited the regional leaders to Arusha for a summit about the situation in Burundi. Both the UPRONA and FRODEBU were represented during the summit (Rodt, 2012: 377). Burundi peace negotiations held under the leadership of Tanzania emerged as a regional initiative for peace of the neighboring countries that worried about the violence to penetrate into the region and the bad effects of the violence in Burundi to the regional stability. In

addition, the efforts of the Carter Center in the United States that provided financial support for the peace negotiations in Burundi and in the region contributed into the regional initiative for peace (Daley, 2007: 338).

In addition to the mediation efforts by Nyerere, the Western diplomats also took part in coordinating international policy on Burundian peace negotiations and they played an important role in putting pressure on Nyerere and the regional actors to terminate the sanctions against Burundi. The activities of the Western diplomats made a change in the form of the Burundian negotiation talks and mediation. Nyerere and the diplomats decided to establish five different commissions carrying out different aspects of the conflict. Another change in the mediation efforts for Burundian peace was the appointment of Ayite Jean-Claude Kpakpo from Benin as a senior advisor by the UN Secretary-General. According to Khadiagala, their participation helped the mediation process to get more professional and neutral (2003: 233-234).

Actually, the peace negotiations initiated at the end of the 1990s by the regional and international facilitators went hand in hand during the peace negotiations for Burundi there were three different venues. The first one was Arusha, where Nyerere invited the warring parties for negotiation. Arusha, in Tanzania, was the principal arena for Burundian peace negotiations and informal consultations. The second one was Rome, where secret bilateral negotiations were organized between the Burundian government and the main armed rebel group, CNDD. Finally, the third one was Bujumbura, the capital city of Burundi. The main Tutsi and Hutu parties, the UPRONA and FRODEBU, met in Bujumbura to give an end to the political chaos and set the political ground for power-sharing agreements (Wolpe, 2011: 9).

As Park states, the Tutsi delegations were questioning Nyerere's impartiality, yet he tried his best to take the Hutu rebel groups to the negotiation desk for signing the Arusha Accords, however in the end he was not able to take them to the desk since they were not content with the negotiations in progress (2010: 192). In addition, the communication between the conflicting parties in Burundi and even with the mediator was not satisfying since after the coup, Nyerere himself did not pay any visits to Bujumbura not to give a message of approval of the Buyoya's taking over the power and for security reasons. Even the two countries, Tanzania and Uganda that have directly involved in the negotiation process could not receive information about what was happening in Burundi despite their diplomatic representation (Wolpe, 2011: 21).

However, Tanzania's mediation efforts were assertedly reflecting a search for a fast resolution to the conflict. The International Crisis Group (ICG) Africa Report No. 33 points out Tanzania's three important strategic interests for this kind of a fast solution to the conflict included Buyoya's leaving presidency, refugee problem and FRODEBU in government and Burundi's participation into the East African Community (2001: 5).

Together with the mediation efforts by the former Tanzanian President Nyerere, the regional countries made another intervention for peace after the coup organized by the former president Buyoya in 1996. The nine regional countries laid an economic embargo on Burundi, but this initiative also failed as the embargo was not strictly implemented and

freight shipments to Burundi continued to be made using other routes (Anonymous, 2000: 6). The heads of states in Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Zaire and Ethiopia decided to enforce sanctions on Burundi and required that Burundian government give full support to the mediator, the former Tanzanian President Nyerere (International Crisis Group Report, 1998).

The mediation efforts by Nyerere was supported by the regional countries and these countries wanted to back the mediation process by using economic embargo as a measure to keep Burundian government within the peace negotiation process. However, the coup in Burundi while the peace negotiations were on the way to settle the conflict, created impatience among these states. According to Wolpe, this coup was a pinnacle of happenings started with the murder of Ndadaye (2011: 13). After the coup the regional countries wanted to show their impatience with the Tutsi regime in Burundi and started to back the Hutu struggle for a change in Burundi by imposing sanctions (Wolpe, 2011: 13).

The OAU also warned Burundian government about the sanctions before the coup and made it clear that any illegal attempts to take the power would be condemned (Wilén, 2012: 85). The sanctions were also the harbinger of a fundamental change in the relations among African states since before the sanctions imposed on Burundi after the coup by Buyoya African states were advocating non-interference policy into domestic affairs (Wilén, 2012: 76). Facing with the regional embargo and sanctions the Buyoya government launched a campaign against these sanctions and objected them asserting that sanctions could only be imposed by the United Nations and emphasizing the humanitarian influence of these sanctions especially on the poor regarding the shortage of food and medicine. The Buyoya government also increased the number of the officials in international organizations in Geneva, New York and Brussels to defend their rightful movement against these sanctions (Wodrig and Grauvogel, 2016).

Nonetheless, the embargo put by the neighboring countries were not effective in the end. One of the reasons why the economic embargo between 1996 and 1999 was not effectively implemented is the difficulty in controlling the motorways, railroads and air traffic to Burundi and the ongoing freight and arms shipment by the western countries like France, Belgium and some other EU countries (Daley, 2007: 339). Yet, Nyerere had thought that it would be costly for the Tutsi elite to maintain their hegemony and it would be a good message to the Hutu rebels. Nyerere had his confidence in the economic sanctions since he thought that the international community and the regional powers like Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya were supporting the aims of the sanctions (Wolpe, 2011: 14).

However, the economic embargo and other sanctions by the regional countries were of great importance for Africa as these sanctions and economic embargo were the first steps of African states to find a solution for regional problems and at the end of the day they were useful in getting Burundi on the peace negotiations (Daley, 2007: 340). Despite the embargo and reluctance of Buyoya for peace negotiations at the beginning ‘reflection seminars’ were held in Burundi, secret talks were organized in Rome with the CNDD-FDD and Buyoya appointed a minister in charge of peace process in August 1997 (Reyntjens and Minority Rights Group., 2000: 16). The Burundian government, in line with the Rome

talks, held round table meetings with local stakeholders like members of political parties, the Parliament, military, police, public officials and civilian groups that laid the ground for further negotiations (International Crisis Group Report, 1998).

The regional countries' impatience and the economic embargo had a negative effect on the Burundian government's side to maintain the negotiations. Despite the embargo by these regional countries, Buyoya was not eager for any negotiations and he took slow and careful steps towards a negotiation process (Reyntjens and Minority Rights Group., 2000: 16). The negotiations had been going on at different levels when the coup happened in 1996 (Wilén, 2012: 70). Facing with this kind of leverage – impatience and economic sanctions – Burundian government decided to withdraw from the negotiation process (Rodt, 2012: 377).

The embargo by regional powers resulted in Burundi's disengagement with the Arusha peace negotiations in the end and assured the Tutsis that the mediator Nyerere was not impartial in this case (Rodt, 2012: 377). Because, the people in Tanzania have been identifying themselves with the disadvantaged Hutus since 1972 massacre. Moreover, Tanzania has been welcoming and hosting thousands of Burundian refugees in the camps since then, for this reason Tanzania was seen by Burundi as a base for recruitment for the Hutu rebel groups. However, the Hutus in Burundi were promoting the appointment of Nyerere as the mediator and Arusha, in Tanzania as the location for negotiation. But the Tutsis, were not so supportive about it owing to the reasons mentioned above even though Nyerere supported the establishment of the UPRONA as a multiethnic party in the past and seriously condemned the Rwandan genocide in 1994. This situation was also negatively influencing the peace negotiations started in Arusha and the relationship between Tanzania and Burundi (Wolpe, 2011: 12).

As the domestic violence continued between 1996 and 1997 the parties to the violence could not be involved in a real negotiation process. The violence even did not stop after the third Presidential Summit in Arusha in April 1997 and the regional actors decided to ease sanctions against Burundi since the economic embargo deteriorated the relationship between Burundi and other regional actors. The relationship between Burundi and Tanzania also deteriorated at this period and Nyerere wanted to resign owing to negative opinion of the Tutsis, yet the regional actors did not accept his resignation (Piombo, 2010: 253). Finally, Tanzanian leader Nyerere announced that Burundi had met the criteria in order for the regional leaders to lift the economic embargo (Anonymous, 2000). The Burundian government accepted the start of a negotiation process, yet objected to have the negotiation meetings in Tanzania because of the protection of Burundian refugees by Tanzanian government and Nyerere's mediating role (Wilén, 2012: 78).

Considering the effects of the regional embargo and Buyoya's willingness for peace talks, the Regional Peace Initiative started the peace talks in June 1998 in Arusha inviting all the parties, yet excluding the armed rebel movements like the CNDD-FDD and PALIPEHUTU-FNL and as a consequence five different commissions were formed regarding the reasons for conflict, genocide problem, democratization, reconciliation, reconstruction and implementation (Barltrop, 2008: 17).

The government and opposition agreed on starting talks for an act for a constitution during the transition period (*Acte Constitutionnel de Transition*) in June 1998, which formed a transitional government that was in charge till a newer constitution was made. This transitional period started with the election of Buyoya as president and negotiations among the parties followed it (Falsch and Becker, 2008: 15). During this transitional period, Buyoya government formed a power-sharing agreement – also called as *partneriat* – with former FRODEBU members who left Burundi after the coup in May 1998, which later on paved the way for the start of Arusha peace negotiations in June 1998 (Mthembu-Salter, 2015: 59-60).

3.2.4. Arusha Peace Negotiations

The first round of the peace talks began in June 1998 when the parties in the end came back to the negotiation table. Nineteen delegations except the fighting ones attended the peace negotiations in Arusha including the representatives of the UN, US, EU, Canada, OAU, Switzerland and Sant'Egidio and most of the delegations were representatives of the political parties in Burundi. However, since the CNDD and PALIPEHUTU were divided into political and military branches just before the negotiations, the negotiations were again ineffective (Daley, 2007: 343 and Piombo, 2010: 253).

Two rebel groups were acting as spoilers and refusing to participate into the negotiation process. As Nindorera asserts, even at the start of the Arusha peace negotiations the CNDD-FDD was not keeping its integrity to negotiate as it was not ready for talks (2012: 21). And now that the CNDD was only one of the 17 parties in Arusha while it was one of the two parties during the peace talks in Rome, so for this reason for a short time the CNDD had a break and withdrew from the negotiation process in Arusha, yet later on when there was no other option other than Arusha, it had to come back and take its seat at the negotiation desk in Arusha (McClintock and Nahimana, 2008: 83).

Filip Reyntjens states that seventeen different delegations came for the talks between 15 and 21 June 1998 and most of them were Tutsi groupings (Reyntjens & Minority Rights Group., 2000: 16). The parties represented in the Burundian Arusha Peace Negotiations are listed below:

- The Government of the Republic of Burundi,
- The National Assembly,
- Alliance Burundi-Africaine pour le Salut (ABASA),
- Alliance Nationale pour le Droit et le Développement (ANADDE),
- Alliance des Vaillants (AV-INTWARI),
- Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD),
- Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi (FRODEBU),
- Front pour la Libération Nationale (FROLINA),
- Parti Socialiste et Panafricaniste (INKINZO),
- Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu (PALIPEHUTU),
- Parti pour le Redressement National (PARENA),
- Parti Indépendant des Travailleurs (PIT),
- Parti Libéral (PL),
- Parti du Peuple (PP),
- Parti pour la Réconciliation du Peuple (PRP),
- Parti Social-Démocrate (PSD),
- Ralliement pour la Démocratie et le Développement Économique et Social (RADDES),

- Rassemblement du Peuple Burundais (RPB) and
- Union pour le Progrès National (UPRONA) (Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, 2000)

Ethnic identity was one of the determining factors in political groupings of the parties mentioned above in the negotiation process and the groups were organized under two different groups. One was the Group 7 (G-7) which was consisting of Hutu dominated groups and the other one was the Group 10 (G-10) that consisted of Tutsi dominated groups and the Burundian Government along with the National Assembly (Daley, 2007: 341). Apart from these two divided parties smaller Hutu and Tutsi parties attended the negotiations in Arusha. As Krueger and Krueger mentioned "one temptation that attracted even some extremists to attend was a per diem payment for attendance, which being based on Western standards of living, made each day's stipend equal to six months' income for the average Burundian" (Krueger and Krueger, 2007: 278).

Beside these groups and others seeking for saving their daily lives Burundian civil society showed reaction against these two main blocks and backed Buyoya's search for reconciliation and demanded a change in the political system (McClintock and Nahimana, 2008: 78). As McClintock and Nahimana state this way of forming blocks during the negotiations for peace was good for the result of the talks since it was much more easy to administer the negotiation process with two different groups instead of seventeen different delegations (2008: 78).

Nyerere intentionally did not include the armed wings of the Hutu groups into these groups for negotiation and he rejected the demands of the FDD and National Liberation Forces (FNL) to involve in the negotiation process stating that he did not want more divisions during the meetings (Anonymous, 2000: 6). Nyerere's decision excluded armed groups who wanted to go on armed struggle and the CNDD-FDD and PALIPEHUTU-FNL were excluded from peace negotiations until 1999 when Nyerere died and the mediation mission was replaced by the former South African President Nelson Mandela (Piombo, 2010: 254).

However, the political wings of these groups remained within the process and were represented in Arusha. The CNDD led by Nyangoma participated into peace talks and its armed wing the CNDD-FDD struggled for a military solution. Like the CNDD-FDD, during the peace talks in Arusha, PALIPEHUTU also split into two wings: military and political. PALIPEHUTU-FNL was the one that chose to stay out of the process and fight for military gains (McClintock and Nahimana, 2008: 77).

3.2.4.1. Mandela's Mediation during Arusha Peace Negotiations

Mandela is said to have unwillingly accepted to become a mediator for the Burundian peace process when Nyerere died in October 1999, and since he wanted a swift resolution for the conflict, he changed the style of mediation compared to his predecessor Nyerere for a more direct interrelation with the parties and used international pressure as a leverage for both of the parties (Falch and Becker, 2008: 16).

The Burundian government, other international advisers and the US supported Mandela, the former president of the South Africa, for the mediator role in Burundian peace process (Daley, 2007: 340). Mandela was nominated as the new mediator for the Burundian peace

process after the eight Great Lakes summit on Burundi by the presidents of Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, South Africa, and the Prime Ministers of Rwanda and Ethiopia, the Secretary General of the OAU, a representative from Algeria and the Foreign Minister of Zambia on 1 December 1999. Rwanda supported the mediation of South Africa since it saw South Africa as a counterweight for the region and its priority was to set stability in its neighboring ally, Burundi (ICG Central Africa Report, No. 13, 2000).

Buyoya's government also supported Mandela's mediator role in the Burundian peace process since South Africa was a player out of the region, so was not carrying "the baggage of perceived bias, as did Tanzania" (Wolpe, 2011: 52) and Mandela was believed to use the regional power of the South Africa to persuade Zimbabwe and Tanzania, the countries which were asserted to covertly support the rebel movements in Burundi (Anonymous, 2000). Regional actors preferred Mandela since he had strong relationships with the region and international community. What is more, Mandela who had strong international relations could bring the attention of the international community to Burundi (Khadiagala, 2007: 56).

Together with Mandela, "the involvement of donors and the simultaneous use of the carrot and stick policy represent a major change from the isolation from the sanctions and the total suspension of development aid since 1996" (ICG Central Africa Report, No. 13, 2000). The other countries attend to the summit promised support for the Burundian peace process. For example, the US helped creating economic environment for the agreement, Belgium promised to take the case to the EU and France showed its interest to give financial support to the Burundian government to take it out of the economic crisis. The US also put its pressure on the South African involvement to give a chance for the South African diplomacy to prove itself in the region and thought that the agreement to be reached in the end would be a sample for the region (ICG Central Africa Report, No. 13, 2000).

Mandela believed that the pressure and assistance of the international and regional actors would be helpful in convincing the rebel groups to participate into the negotiation talks (ACCORD, 2007: 18). For this reason, he organized a donor conference in Paris in 2000 to financially support the process and asked for South African President Mbeki's help for sending troops to provide protection for the returning politicians (18).

Mandela was enjoying a good reputation after his efforts in South Africa and he had already proved himself in South African negotiations ending the apartheid regime where all parties and groups in South Africa were given representation between 1990 and 1994 (Park, 2010: 191). As Lieberfeld points out, unlike his colleagues like Tambo and Walter Sisulu, he had a different view on negotiation for obtaining the objectives set forth by the African National Congress (ANC) (2003).

Together with Mandela's good reputation and mostly criticized mediation efforts in Burundi, South Africa has also its her own interests in Burundi over Mandela's mediation for Burundian peace. According to Park, the interest of the South Africa in Burundian peace talks was mainly for assuring political stability in the region and reconstitute peace for economic matters and in this way South African intervention into the conflict resolution in

Burundi was thought to contribute into peace and stability in the region creating an environment suitable for South African trade and investment (2010: 191).

Consequently, the South African government wanted Mandela to accept the duty for mediation since one of the main objectives of the South African foreign policy was to "promote South African diplomacy and its agenda of an African renaissance" and considered this mediation duty for Burundi as a test case (ICG Central Africa Report, No. 13, 2000). Mbeki's vision for an African revival and South Africa's eagerness in solving conflict in the Great Lakes Region were the main impetus behind South Africa's dedication to a peace settlement for Burundi (Southall, 2006: 218). South African President Mbeki was aiming to combine political and economic targets for national security interests and in line with this aim Mbeki stated that South Africa was interested in any developments in the rest of the African continent since he believed that South Africa would not have successful development if other countries in Africa were in trouble (ACCORD, 2007: 23).

Mandela was successful in bringing some issues that the parties had hesitated to discuss beforehand onto the negotiation desk and he even used his influence on the Burundian government to evacuate the regroupment camps and allow political expression. Mandela repeatedly criticized the minority rule in Burundi, yet mentioned an assurance by the majority Hutus to the minority Tutsis for a democratic Burundi and for this reason he recommended the army be composed of equal numbers of Hutus and Tutsis (Wolpe, 2011: 54).

Compared to his predecessor Nyerere, Mandela's style was totally different and he was impatient and preferred a direct communication style. For this reason, he included the rebel movements in the peace process and he seriously criticized Burundian politicians and even condemned Burundian politicians for still keeping the regroupment camps with hundreds of thousands of civilians. Mandela warned the Burundian politicians that the peace process would fail if the Tutsi domination in politics, army and economy continued (Reyntjens and Minority Rights Group, 2000: 17).

Mandela was lucky to draw the attention of the Western powers and their assistance for the negotiation process compared to the attention offered to the negotiations under Nyerere's mediation, and Mandela's consecutive efforts to integrate the Hutu rebel groups into the negotiation process gave its fruit to weaken the position and reputation of the rebel groups (Park, 2010: 193). Mandela gave efforts to revive the peace process after he was appointed as the mediator for the peace negotiations in Burundi. Mandela at first tried to involve the leaders of international community in the peace negotiations like US President Bill Clinton, ministers from France, the UK and Belgium to increase the visibility of the peace process. For this reason, the US President Bill Clinton had a teleconference interview with the delegations in Arusha. Mandela also tried to have strong links with the UN Security Council to pay more attention to Burundian case and changed the negotiation style of the former mediator Nyerere and he included the rebel movements into the peace negotiations (Khadiagala, 2007: 57; Anonymous, 2000:6; ICG Central Africa Report, No. 13, 2000).

As the ICG Central Africa Report points out, Mandela began his efforts for mediation at the UN Security Council and the teleconference interview of the US President Bill Clinton

when it was not possible for Clinton to travel on that day, which helped him to address the Burundians at the negotiation desk, showed that Mandela had the full support of the US. Mandela also organized other meetings with other leaders from the African Continent like Gaddafi from Libya and Obosanjo from Nigeria, therefore he created an international environment for the peace process that prevented the conflicting parties in Burundi to play off international actors one another (Wolpe, 2011: 55 and ICG Central Africa Report, No. 13, 2000).

Before that teleconference interview between the negotiating delegations and US President Bill Clinton, Mandela requested Clinton to address the Burundian negotiators to put pressure on them to sign the draft agreement and according to Wolpe that was really useful to convince some of the Tutsi delegation to sign the agreement (2011: 58). However, the US preferred to play an active, but a secondary role during the peace process in Burundi and took the supportive role like the Sant'Egidio and the other European countries like France, Belgium, the UK and the EU (Wolpe, 2011: 5).

Mandela's mediating role also diminished the influence of Tanzania on Burundi as he excluded the Tanzanian delegation from the peace talks held between the Burundian army and rebel movements in South Africa (Anonymous, 2000). Mandela was so firm about the ethnic problem and the domination of the Tutsi minority and expressed that peace would never come to Burundi if the minority rule of the Tutsi would continue in economy, politics and the army (ICG Central Africa Report, No. 13, 2000). His tone was also so firm and he often lectured the negotiating parties on their duties and responsibilities (Wolpe, 2011: 54). Mandela was insisting in integrating the rebel Hutu groups that were excluded before into the negotiation process and for this reason, as mentioned above, he started talks with these rebel groups (Southall, 2006: 207).

The FDD and FNL were invited for the negotiations by Mandela, which also provided recognition for both of the movements and the Hutus with the weaponry at the negotiation table since Mandela, depending on his own guerilla movement experience, was aware of the importance of integrating the guerilla movements into the talks because he knew that guerilla movements relied on the support of the people (Krueger and Krueger, 2007: 278). He organized closed door sessions with the delegations of rebel groups and Burundian government in the South Africa in June 2000 and paving the way for the Pretoria Agreement to be signed in 2003 – mentioned below – to provide security for the Tutsis in Burundi in the end.

However, Mandela did not use the same road map that had been used for the South African negotiations because he found the peace process in Burundi lacking this kind of a road map (Eck, 2012: 119). Mandela changed the method for mediation and instead of working with the committees he worked on the draft for the peace agreement that was distributed among the heads of delegations on 27 March 2000 (ICG Central Africa Report, No. 13, 2000). Even though the negotiating parties were concerned about meeting the deadline proposed by Mandela, the negotiating parties considered the draft as a significant phase within the peace process and emphasized the importance of a deadline for initiating talks between warring parties (Wolpe, 2011: 57).

The peace negotiations commenced in mid-June and Mandela created five different committees for special issues and with different topics. The first one of these committees were responsible for a document explaining the structure of the conflict, the second one for developing strategies for democratization, third one for setting the strategies for building the peace and security for the citizens, fourth one for making the measures for economic growth and development and the fifth one for securing a peace agreement (Piombo, 2010: 254).

3.2.4.2. Arusha Peace Accord

Peter Uvin puts an emphasis on the pressure from the international community and mentions that the USA, the EU, the OAU, Tanzania and South Africa took important steps for the peace negotiations in Burundi. Uvin also states that ten summits for peace were held between 1996 and 2000 and thanks to "the last minute arm-twisting by South Africa" the Arusha Accord was finally signed on 28 August 2000 (2009). The efforts of the international community, the mediation team, the donors and the support of the regional Burundian peace initiative gave its fruit. The Arusha Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation was signed after a four-decade ethnic conflict in Burundi by the nineteen parties to the conflict in the presence of heads of state in the region and the US President Bill Clinton without signing an agreement for armistice. However, the leaders of rebel movements did not participate into the peace process and the process was accelerated to meet the US President's schedule, for this reason some of the signatories did not see the final version of the peace accord before they signed it (ICG Africa Report No 29, 2001: 1; ICG Africa Report No. 33, 2001: 1; Daley, 2007: 345; Daley, 2006: 311; Lemarchand, 2009: 165).

The Arusha Agreement required that a transition government for a three-year period be formed and this three-year period be divided into two periods of 18 months and legislative power be given to a parliament consisting of one hundred deputies and a senate with two senators each from every province. The first phase of the transition period was to have a government headed by a Tutsi president (Pierre Buyoya) and a Hutu vice-president and the second phase would have a Hutu (Domitien Ndayizeze) and a Tutsi vice-president. The last phase of the transition period envisaged a referendum for a new constitution and elections for a new government. This agreement also included provisions on writing a new constitution during the transition period, forming independent election commissions and integrating the refugees into the society. Mandela decided to start direct negotiations with UPRONA and FRODEBU giving each the responsibility to become a driving force for the peace negotiations (ICG Africa Report No 29, 2001: 1; ICG Africa Report No. 33, 2001: 1; Daley, 2007: 345; Daley, 2006: 311; Lemarchand, 2009: 165).

The Arusha Accord was signed in front of many African leaders and the Accord shared one portion of the political power for the FRODEBU and other Hutu parties (the group known as G-7), but the CNDD-FDD opposed to sign the Accord (Krueger and Krueger, 2007: 279).

The Arusha Peace Accord included five protocols, five annexes and two appendices. Below are the protocols:

Protocol I: Nature of the conflict, problems of genocide and exclusion and their solutions;

Protocol II: Democracy and good governance;

Protocol III: Peace and security for all;

Protocol IV: Reconstruction and development;

Protocol V: Guarantees on the implementation of the Agreement (Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, 2000)

The five characteristics of the Arusha Peace Accord are as follows:

(1) An undertaking by the parties to lead Burundians towards reconciliation by determining the truth about the origin and nature of the conflict
(2) A proposed institutional framework for the transition which will bring about conditions for a democratic renewal by fair power sharing
(3) The end of hostilities and the establishment of security guarantees for all citizens, principally through a reform of the army
(4) A blueprint of the country's economic and social revival and its stabilization based on the return of refugees who have fled since the beginning of the seventies
(5) It formulates international guarantees ensuring the Arusha resolutions are credible and can be implemented (ICG Africa Report No 25, 2000: 3).

Second Chapter of the Second Protocol of the Accord was setting the duration of the transition period with the formation of a transitional government that would end with the elections for the parliament and presidency within 30 months after the start of this transitional period (Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, 2000) The Accord brings along a limitation of 50-50 representation by ethnic groups in the national army and national police force. The last protocol brings along the foundation of the Implementation Monitoring Committee to monitor, control and conduct the implementation of the provisions of the agreement with representatives from the parties, government, UN, OUA and the Regional Initiative for Burundi, and the demand of peacekeeping force by the Burundian government from the UN for "(a) ensuring respect for the ceasefire, (b) supervising integration; (c) providing technical support for demobilization aid and training; (d) ensuring protection of the institutions and of any public figure who so wishes; (e) assisting in the establishment and training of an ethnically balanced special unit for the protection of the institutions (Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, 2000). The Accord is also drawing attention to the significance of the role and inclusion of the international community for the implementation of the Accord (Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, 2000).

Third Protocol on Peace and Security for all is summarizing the reasons for violence and insecurity in Burundi. It stresses that the colonial period has an important influence on the violence and insecurity as it created a discriminatory system, which was not offering equal education rights to all ethnic groups and it destroyed basic traditional norms and institutions and cultural bonds supporting the unity in the Burundian society (Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, 2000) The factors below also helped the creation of political instability in Burundi after the colonial period:

(a) The poor conception of power; lack of good leadership, lack of respect for the law and demonization of political opponents;

(b) The assassination of great Burundian leaders (Rwagasore, Ngendandumwe, Ndadaye);

(c) Impunity of those committing political crimes and human rights violations and practising regionalism, patronage, cronyism and corruption;

(d) The struggle for influence by the great powers, foreign interference in Burundi's internal affairs and the proliferation of arms in the region;

(e) Failure to satisfy the basic needs of the citizens as a result of economic underdevelopment and lack of a sound economic policy that led to disillusionment and an erosion of support for the political system;

(f) The distortion of Burundi's history;

(g) The ideology and practice of genocide and exclusion (Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, 2000: 55)

The third protocol also continues listing the reasons of the violence as follows:

1. The aftermath of the colonial system, the inadequacy of the basic reforms of the institutional arrangements inherited from colonization for governance, administration and the maintenance of order and security for all.

2. The unbridled struggle for power which, following the principle that «the end justifies the means», resulted in recourse to violence and the deliberate manipulation of ethnic sentiments as legitimate methods of access to and retention of power.

3. Lack of respect by certain political actors for the basic normative rules and principles of good governance, particularly those concerning separation of the legislature, the executive and the judiciary, independence of the magistracy, satisfaction of basic human needs and the maintenance of order and security for all.

4. Lack of respect for the traditions, norms and cardinal principles of the democratic system, including tolerance and respect for the inalienable rights of the human person, especially the right to life.

5. Non-acceptance of peaceful co-existence, diversity and pluralism as guiding principles of life and the basis of national cohesion, unity and solidarity.

6. Lack of appropriate action by the United Nations to rule on the acts of genocide perpetrated in Burundi since independence (Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, 2000: 55)

Civil society groups introduce large public representation to a negotiation process, hence, keeping them out of this process may have negative results during the peacebuilding process owing to lack of proper representation at the negotiation desk allowing their voices and interests (Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008: 13). The civil society organizations did not have a warm welcome by the other parties during the peace negotiations for two reasons. One reason was that the participants thought that these organizations were not recognized as independent members and the other reason was that most of these organizations were dominated by the Tutsis and had links with the Burundian government, so they were not regarded as independent organizations (Daley, 2007: 342).

The civil society groups were excluded from the Burundian talks for peace, yet Nyerere and Mandela met the representatives of civil society groups in Bujumbura and Pretoria. Nyerere, for example, met the women's delegation, but considered that their conncections with the party was undermining an alternative gender specific opinion for the negotiations. Therefore, the exclusion of these groups from the peace talks emphasized that peacemaking was the right of political parties, rebel movement and men (Daley, 2006: 314).

As Mthembu-Salter states "civil society organizations observed the Arusha talks, but could not negotiate" and adds that "some became adept at lobbying, including Association

Dushirehamwe, which brings together a range of women's groups and helped secure a clause in the Arusha accord requiring a minimum of 30% women's representation in the government and National Assembly" (2015: 60).

The role of the women during the Burundian peace negotiations was appreciated by the academics and NGOs, however, even though there had been a women's organization for peace under the name of 'Women for Peace' the activities of the women increased when it was taken under an umbrella organization CAFOB (*Collectif des Associations et ONGs Féminines du Burundi*) and when the international community started to pay attention to. Nevertheless, it was reported that the decision of the women participating into the peace process were not very different from the other male members of the delegations since most of the women were spouses to the army colonels within the delegations (Daley, 2007: 343).

However, Curtis asserts that the peace process in Burundi was among the elites excluding the Burundian civilians and he adds that even though the Arusha peace process had regional and international support and achieved legitimacy, it could not acquire legitimacy at home (2003). Like Curtis, Lieberfeld criticizes the Arusha Accord being an accord of the elites not including the civil society resembling it to the South African peace settlements. Lieberfeld, despite calling the Arusha Accord as an elite pact also urges that Mandela's efforts for army demobilization and rebel movements' integration into the Burundian national army and an amnesty for the rebel fighters can show his pragmatic side rather than "an elitist orientation" (2003: 245).

Right after signing the Arusha Peace Accord, the two parties, Buyoya representing the Burundian government and Jean Minani representing the FRODEBU and the G7 (a representation of the Hutu parties) came together for some important amendments "that provided for 'a transitional Senate with reinforced powers (nominations to senior posts in the civil service, in the judicial system and in the army), the indefinite extension of the 50/50 rule in the armed forces (Hutu-Tutsi parity) and a change in the qualified voting (from a 3/5 to a 2/3 majority), requested to amend organic laws (which determine the organization of the army and Supreme Court, both important guarantors for protection of the minority Tutsi)" (Mezzera et. al. 2009: 79). Mezzera et. al. claims that these amendments were in favor of securing the Tutsi interests and political influence and representation in governmental agencies despite the imbalance in the demographic weight (79).

However, as McClintock and Nahimana mention the Accords did not help to end the conflict since the fighting parties were not represented during the peace negotiations in Arusha and they went on their armed struggle with the transitional government of Burundi asserting that the accord was not related with them (2008: 79). It was incomplete and lack of full-implementation even though it acquired some achievements for settling the conflicts like earning the backing of regional actors and forming the efforts of African states "to secure peace which were carried on through a succession of over twenty major meetings in five different capitals over the three years" (Southall, 2006: 218).

Despite the Arusha Accord, the violence did not stop, yet increased since the main Hutu rebel movements were not included in the peace process and it took some more years till

the Compromise of Pretoria was accepted by the main Hutu rebel group, the CNDD-FDD (Uvin, 2009). As Curtis and Nibigirwe assert the Arusha Accord also resulted in disintegration within the CNDD-FDD and the PALIPEHUTU-FNL, and these groups kept on their military struggle while the peace talks were on the go. Besides, these groups believed that armed struggle was the only way for democracy and a military reform in Burundi (2010: 114). However, no progress was acquired for the foundation of a transitional government till the negotiations in Pretoria, also called as 'The Compromise of Pretoria' (Daley, 2006: 311) and after signing the Arusha Accord the facilitators went on their attempts to bring the armed rebel movements to the negotiation desk since these armed rebel movements continued organizing attacks when the negotiators signed another peace agreement (Eck, 2012: 117).

The FDD and FNL rebel groups that did not take part in the peace process during Arusha negotiations demanded the Arusha Peace Accord to be amended and they criticized the legitimacy of the parties to the agreement (ICG Africa Report No. 46, 2002: 2). On the other hand, these rebel groups were unwilling to participate into the negotiations for peace and Mandela had to organize consecutive meetings with these rebel groups to convince them for joining the process (Park, 2010: 193). Mandela tried to weaken the global prestige of the rebel groups while increasing his efforts to persuade them to contribute into the peace process (193). Mandela also followed an integrative process and he invited the heads of states of the US, Middle East and Africa to join the Arusha negotiations (193).

The monitoring commission for the application of the accord (CSAA) was supposed to play a leading role after the signature of the accord, yet as the commission avoided political debates and some procedural problems, it did not prove as useful for the peace process (ICG Africa Report No. 46, 2002: 8). Berhau Dinka, a special representative of the UN Secretary-General was heading the commission consisting of 29 members, yet even it consisted of the signatories of the peace accord and gathered regularly "it did have the leadership or leverage necessary to ensure that the agreement was implemented" (Curtis and Nibigirwe, 2010: 115; Campbell and Uvin, 2015: 285). However, as Curtis and Nibigirwe claim, Dinka needed almost a year to move his office to Bujumbura since "the OAU was not in a position to assume a leadership role, since it was preoccupied with its internal organizational dynamics and its transformation into the African Union (AU), which was ongoing at the time" (2010: 115).

Southall thinks that despite the imperfection of the Arusha Accord, it created a reference point emphasizing the backing of the regional actors and the parties (2007: 218). Besides, the Accord became the symbol of African efforts for the peacebuilding efforts in the continent holding more than twenty large meetings in different capital cities in more than three years (218).

Despite the signed peace agreement, few steps were taken for peace between 2000 and 2002 when the South African mediating team asked for the rebels in Tanzania on the negotiation table and during this period the Burundian army and transition government went on fighting with the rebels in Burundi (Piombo, 2010: 260). Even though the Arusha Accords required a peacekeeping force be deployed in Burundi, the UN rejected this

decision until a ceasefire was signed between the warring parties and as a consequence, South African President Mbeki provided the needed troops to prevent the peace process from cracking down in order to show South Africa's dedication and capability for peace processes in the region (ACCORD, 2007: 25). However, two and half years later the negotiations started with Mandela the peace process did not immediately take a long way ahead since it was signed owing to the pressure of the regional states and international community. "It was supposed to be the Bible of the Burundian peace process, it is only Old Testament" (ICG Africa Report No. 46, 2002: 19).

The Arusha Peace Accord was signed with the witness of international community and regional states yet there did exist some problems with the implementation. One of the problems was establishing a team only responsible for negotiations as neither President Mbeki or Former South African Vice President Zuma who have taken the post from Mandela in January 2001 to negotiate an armistice between the rebel groups, could not have time to make a team that would fully focus on the negotiation process. Even though their personnel and advisors as well as staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs indulged in the process they were busy with their daily works and could not pay the necessary and sufficient attention to the Burundian peace process. This was also attracting the attention of the rebel groups in a negative way since they were thinking about they were not being taken seriously. Apart from the logistical problems the medium of language was another obstacle as the FNL for example showed interest to operate preferably in French working with Gabon and this French/English rivalry was a potential problem for the whole peace process (ICG Africa Report No. 46, 2002: 20; Khadiagala, 2007: 58).

In the meantime, Mandela demanded South African government to deploy South African troops in Burundi and his demand was met and South African troops were deployed in Burundi on 26 October 2001. The main objective of the South African troops was to protect the former Hutu politicians in the transition process since they did not trust in the Tutsi dominated Burundian army (Park, 2010: 194). Thanks to Mandela's efforts during the negotiations South African President Thabo Mbeki considering that the peace negotiations in Burundi could be an important example for peace process in the DRC and an important step for the political stability in the Great Lakes Region, decided that South Africa would send troops to Burundi to support the peacemaking process, which as claimed prevented the termination of the peace negotiations (ACCORD, 2007: 25-26).

Following the Memorandum of Understanding signed between the South African and Burundian governments South Africa sent about 700 troops under the name of South African Protection Support Detachment (SAPSD) and kept its troops in Burundi and increased the number of the troops till the cease-fire agreement was signed between the CNDD-FDD and the Burundian government in December 2002 to give support to the implementation of the Arusha Accords (ACCORD, 2007: 27 and Curtis, 2003). The SAPSD was deployed in Bujumbura and it was not able to conduct a peacekeeping operation or protect the civilians in Burundi apart from providing a very limited protection especially as was planned before for the returning politicians (Badmus, 2017: 7).

In addition, it took one year to found the transition government and five years for the government to take the power after democratic elections. In the meantime, two coup attempts occurred in April and July in 2001 (Daley, 2007: 346) and the OAU took concrete steps after the genocide in Rwanda and established the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) consisting of multinational forces including 1600 South African, 980 Ethiopian, 280 Mozambican troops against the objection of the Tutsi minority. This mission was later transformed into UN Burundi Mission in June 2004 depending on the decision of the UN Security Council numbered 1554 and the number of troops were increased to 5650 with the troops from Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal. The Arusha Accord also included a provision regarding an international peace keeping force and the agreement for armistice in October 2002 between the Transitional Government and the Armed Parties and Movements emphasized that the peace keeping force mandated by the UN and African Union (AU) would check the cease fire (Park, 2010 and Rodt, 2012). However, an international peace keeping force demanded by the FRODEBU for a long time ago during the second round of negotiations with the participation of the presidents of Tanzania and Uganda and the delegations of the FRODEBU, UPRONA and other parties, but the Burundian army had objected to an international peace keeping force in Burundi (Piombo, 2010: 251).

3.2.4.3. African Mission in Burundi – AMIB for the Implementation of Arusha Peace Accord

AMIB mission was not different from other UN peacekeeping missions because its mandate was similar to other peacekeeping mandates of the UN (Curtis and Nibigirwe, 2010: 117). Actually, even though the troops from Ethiopia and Mozambique were supported by the US and the UK, South Africa was leading the mission in terms of financial support and resources, and its objective was to create a suitable and secure environment for disarmament efforts and forming the transitional government (ACCORD, 2007: 29). AMIB replaced the SAPSD. AMIB was planned to be multinational, but the troops promised by Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal were not deployed because of the security situation in Burundi. The main objectives of the AMIB were related with the supervision of the armistice conditions, disarmament efforts, creating suitable environment for a UN mission and maintaining the political and military stability (Rodt, 2012: 379).

Nevertheless, at the end of the day, AMIB was not a successful mission. According to Badmus, financial and logistic obstacles prevented it from fully implementing its mandate since the AU member countries were not eager to provide the necessary financial support for the mission. Plus, the AU's own capacity was ready to respond these financial necessities. The UN was also not willing to fund the mission as the AU was a new institution and its future was considered as uncertain (Badmus, 2017: 13). As Curtis and Nibigirwe state the total budget of AMIB was less than 200 million US Dollars together with an amount of 50 million US Dollars from the donors (2010: 121). In addition, AMIB was not successful in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) owing to its limited capacity and the ongoing armed struggle and violence – some factions of the warring rebel groups did not want to participate into the DDR program (Curtis and Nibigirwe, 2010: 119-120). Depending on the cease-fire agreement signed on 7 October

2002, an African Union mission of 3335 troops was deployed in Burundi as a UN force with the objectives of observation of the implementations under the cease-fire agreement, assisting disarmament and demobilization process, securing the returning politicians and main gathering areas (Omorogbe, 2011: 46). Actually, AMIB was the manifestation of the capability of the African Union in providing stability for war-torn states before a UN deployment, but it had difficulty in accessing fundamental resources for deployment of troops, maintaining and fulfilling the missions (48).

The former African Union mission AMIB, which was launched in April 2003 was transferred into the UN Mission in Burundi under the name of the ONUB (ACCORD; 2007: 19). For this reason, UN Security Council decided to send a peacekeeping mission to Burundi consisting of 5.650 troops, 200 observers, 125 staff officers and 120 civilian police depending on the Chapter VII of the UN Charters (Podszun, 2011: 195). ONUB, headed by the UN Secretary General's Special Representative for Burundi, was deployed in June 2004 to support the transitional period and provide security during the elections in 2005 (Barltrop, 2008: 21). ONUB helped the election period to be relatively safe and sound despite some provocations by the FNL (Curtis and Nibigirwe, 2010: 119). As Curtis and Nibigirwe put forward the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) replaced the ONUB in 2007 and among its main objectives were "peace consolidation and democratic governance, disarmament, demobilization, reinsertion and reform of the security sector, promotion and protection of human rights and communications and development" in order to support the Burundian government during the peace negotiations (2010: 118). The UN Burundi Mission helped to obtain stability when implementing the principles of the Arusha Peace Accord, but it could not prevent the human rights violations and violent conflicts in Burundi (Daley, 2007: 346).

3.2.5. Negotiations after the Arusha Peace Accord – Post-Negotiations

The Arusha Accord did not involve the CNDD-FDD and PALIPEHUTU-FNL. Nevertheless, they could benefit from the circumstances of the civil war in the DRC where they had military bases in the eastern part and received financial support of the Kabila government in, which put the negotiations in a very difficult situation (Falch and Becker, 2008: 20). Different from these two rebel movements, FRODEBU followed a different track for a quick integration with the state and army and other signatory parties tried to find alliances with the rebel groups to get power for negotiations over the distribution of political posts (20). In such a situation the rebel groups were inclined for a negotiated solution as they were not included in the negotiation process for the Arusha Accord, so they were aware of the fact that a peace agreement with the government would restart the power-sharing efforts to achieve more power within the government (20).

Mandela's successor Zuma was finally able to make a ceasefire agreement between the transitional government and the armed rebel groups like the faction of the CNDD-FDD under Jean Bosco Ndayikengurukiye and FNL under Alain Mugabarabona in October 2002. Thanks to Zuma's different approach in mediation for the Burundian case, he could involve the UN and the African Union (AU) into the peace talks as well as launching a technical committee that included intelligence people from Uganda, Tanzania and South

Africa to get information on the parties' motivation for negotiation and the regional developments in terms of security, which played an important role during the peace talks. Following this cease fire agreement, the transitional government could also manage to sign an armistice with the CNDD-FDD led by Pierre Nkurunziza, yet this was undermined (Ayebare, 2010: :83 and Barltrop, 2008: 20).

Former South African Vice President Zuma was in charge of negotiations in Burundi after Mandela's term and Zuma's main objective was to make the rebel groups to sign a ceasefire agreement and his term brought willingness and energy for this aim. However, his term confronted with a French speaking competitor, the President of Gabon, Omar Bongo, whom the rebel group CNDD-FDD was backing as a French speaking mediator instead of an English speaking one (Khadiagala, 2007 58). Omar Bongo hosted CNDD-FDD and Burundian government for two meetings in Libreville, where the parties tried to draft an agenda for peace negotiations (ICG Africa Briefing Paper, 2002).

Despite the demands of the CNDD-FDD for a French speaking mediator, Mandela's successor Zuma was successful in mediating the Pretoria Protocol in 2003.

3.2.6. Pretoria Protocols 2003 and Dar-es-Salaam Agreement 2006

Pretoria Protocol on Political, Defense and Security Power Sharing in Burundi was signed between the transitional government of Burundi represented by Ndayizeye and the CNDD-FDD represented by the legal representative Pierre Nkurunziza on 8 October 2003 in the presence of the facilitator Jacob Zuma, Deputy President of the Republic of South Africa. This Protocol aimed to encourage the integrative dialogue between the conflicting parties and political participation of all groups including CNDD-FDD, which was staying out of the process from the start of the negotiations. The Protocol consisted of two main fields: (a) political power issues, which includes topics on legislature, governors of provinces, diplomatic corps, local government and public enterprises and (b) defense and security issues, which cover the topics like the Burundi National Defense Force, Burundi Police Force, gendarmerie, intelligence, PALIPEHUTU-FNL and other various matters (UN Security Council, 2003).

The Protocol opened the door for the CNDD-FDD to its integration into the political system giving four ministries including a Minister of State representation and participation at the National Assembly – with 15 members – and the Senate. Besides, it was decided that the CNDD-FDD would have three governors, five advisors at provincial level, 30 administrators in local governments and would lead 20% of the public enterprises. The CNDD-FDD would also be represented in diplomatic corps with two ambassadors and six secretaries and/or advisors. The Protocol was also arranging the share of the CNDD-FDD in Burundian National Forces, Burundian Police, Gendarmerie and Intelligence Service with different representation ratios like 40% in the Burundian National Defense Force (BNDF), 35% in Burundi Police Force and Intelligence Service with the principle of 50-50 ethnic balance rule in these institutions as agreed on in the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement. The Protocol also decided that the militia be disarmed as to the Ceasefire Agreement signed in December 2002 under the control of the African Mission (UN Security Council, 2003).

The Pretoria Protocol on Outstanding Political, Defense and Security Power-sharing Issues in Burundi (also called as the Pretoria Protocol II) was signed on 2 November 2003 between the transitional Burundian government and the CNDD-FDD movement (signed by the legal representative of the CNDD-FDD, Pierre Nkurunziza). This second protocol signed almost two months later than the first protocol was to complement the first one on political, defense and security in Burundi signed on 8 October 2003 and to arrange the power-sharing issues and the Cease-fire Agreement signed in 2002. This protocol included terms stating the transformation of the CNDD-FDD into a political party and arranged temporary immunity for the leaders and combatants of the CNDD-FDD. It also put forward some arrangements regarding the CNDD-FDD's participation into the Senate, hence organizing the reconstruction of the transitional government of Burundi to include members of the CNDD-FDD (Pretoria Protocol I, 2003 and Pretoria Protocol II, 2003).

The Tutsi minority would consist the 50% of the senate, 60% of the government and 50% of the army. The first changes came up within the army and the army started to recruit the Hutus for lower ranks (Daley, 2007: 345). Depending on the Arusha Peace Accord signed in 2000 and the Pretoria Protocol that introduced power-sharing for the Burundian peace process, therefore, in 2004 a new constitution was submitted for approval by a referendum on 28 February 2005. This new constitution brought along ethnic based equal distribution of state posts in government, parliament, senate, military and police. This constitution also required the ministerial positions at the parliament to be 60% Hutu and 40%Tutsi and three Twa members were included. The Hutus and Tutsis had equal number of seats in the Senate as the two ethnic groups had equal representation in Defense and Security Forces. The constitution also provided that 30% of the government members be women (Schraml, 2012: 52-53).

The Pretoria Protocols signed in October (Pretoria Protocol I) and November 2003 (Pretoria Protocol II) were covering power-sharing, defense and security and also included a technical agreement for the forces and another cease fire agreement that was signed in November 2003 in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (Barltrop, 2008: 20). All in all the Dar-es-Salaam cease fire agreement between the CNDD-FDD leader Nkurunziza and the Burundian President Ndayizeye in November 2003 paved the way for further integration of the CNDD-FDD into the transitional government, which resulted in reduction in the intensity of the civil war in Burundi (Barltrop, 2008: 20 and Clover, 2004: 70). Following these two protocols, the CNDD-FDD stopped its armed struggle and took its place within the transitional government obtaining significant positions within the government like the Ministry of Good Governance and the operations for demobilization started on the following year in 2004 (Hajayandi, 2015: 151).

According to Kalron, the FNL that had launched a large-scale attack on Bujumbura before the ceasefire agreement was getting logistical support of the CNDD-FDD and when the negotiations started after the ceasefire the CNDD-FDD achieved a position within the Burundian government and the Pretoria Protocol that was signed after the negotiations helped the CNDD-FDD to achieve a *de facto* recognition and cleared the way for its leader Nkurunziza to become the new Burundian president (2010: 29).

Burundi could only have democratic elections in 2005 after the draft for a new constitution was accepted at the end of a referendum with 91% positive votes. The CNDD-FDD won the elections with 58.55% of the votes and Pierre Nkurunziza, the leader of the CNDD-FDD was elected as the President of Burundi by the parliament and senate. The Tutsi minority was represented in the parliament and senate with the ration of 60/40 as a requirement of the Arusha Peace Accord (Daley, 2007: 347).

Both the political negotiation and military intervention did not help in Burundi despite the regional and international steps taken for rebuilding the peace in Burundi since 1994. One of the reasons why they did not help was the negative attitude of the regional powers towards the government under Tutsi control and the second reason was the fact that the rebel movements in Burundi like the CNDD-FDD and PALIPEHUTU-FNL were not involved into the negotiation meetings by the mediator Nyerere at the beginning of the peace process. The third one was that the Arusha Peace Accord was signed before an armistice had been signed between the fighting parties and the implementation of the peace agreement were extended on a longer period. Consequently, the ongoing fighting between the government and the rebel movements between 1993 and 2006 resulted in a decline in life standards and caused the public services not to work efficiently in Burundi (Piombo, 2010: 262).

The negotiations for an armistice between the Hutu rebels and the Tutsi Transition Government after the Peace Agreement could only be signed in 2006 apart from power sharing agreements like the Pretoria Protocol (Daley, 2007: 346). Dar-es-Salaam Agreement of Principles Towards Lasting Peace, Security and Stability in Burundi was signed between the government of Burundi and the PALIPEHUTU-FNL on 18 June 2006. The agreement was drawing attention to the historical background of Burundi and the ethnic problem as the reason of constant conflicts in Burundi and especially setting the conditions for immunity for the PALIPEHUTU-FNL members and its conversion into a political party including the release of political prisoners and prisoners of war, yet first separation of the political and military branches was necessary for the PALIPEHUTU-FNL to get accredited as a political party. The agreement also put forward the conditions regarding the rehabilitation of refugees and arrival of the displaced thanks to the Regional Initiative for Peace in Burundi, the AU and the UN, while keeping the Regional Initiative as the guarantor of the process. The fourth article of the agreement mentions the defense and security forces and states that they should be subject to the national agenda for democracy, peace, justice, reconciliation, security, stability, development and prosperity (Dar-es-Salaam Agreement, 2006)

The negotiations for an armistice took a long time since several mediators participated into negotiations and the rebel movements had experienced separations (The CNDD-FDD was divided into two fractions under Pierre Nkurunziza and Jean-Bosco Ndaikengurukiye, and the PALIPEHUTU-FNL was divided into two fractions as well under Alain Mugabarabona and Agathon Rwasa) (Daley, 2007: 346). After the signature of a ceasefire agreement between the Burundian government and PALIPEHUTU-FNL in September 2006 the rebel movement did not terminate its violent activities until 2009 and the armed conflict between

the government forces and rebel movements became regular at the beginning of 2007. When the rebel movement saw the defeat was on the doorstep, the FNL declared that it stopped its violent activities on 26 May 2008 (Schraml, 2012: 55).

PART III

CHAPTER FOUR

THE ANALYSIS

As mentioned in the introduction part, this study enjoys the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) method to find out the significant condition for a successful negotiated peace agreement. The analysis has been made using the QCA software package, Kirq and the related results are given below.

4.1. Analytical Requirements

4.1.1. Research Data and Cases

Before starting the analysis, the dataset providing information on escalation, power-sharing issues, woman/gender issues, pre-negotiation, the involvement of neighboring countries into peace-making efforts and duration of peace accords were obtained from two different reputable databases mostly used in peace and negotiation studies. These databases were derived from peace research centers like Peace Accords Matrix prepared by the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies of the University of Notre Dame, UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset Version 19.1 of the Department of Peace and Conflict Research of Uppsala University and Peace Agreements Database (PA-X) of the University of Edinburgh.

The cases to be used for the analysis were chosen among Sub-Saharan African countries that suffered from intra-state conflict especially after the end of the Cold War and entered a peace process including peace negotiations. All the case countries participated into a peace negotiation ending with a peace accord. However, the case countries were divided into two groups to form two different groups with two different outcomes. The outcome of interest was the successful peace negotiation (it was coded as 1 on the truth table) depending on the dataset on peace accords taken from Peace Agreements Database (PA-X). The outcome was coded as 0 if the peace accord was terminated regarding the database.

The two different groups of countries were selected among Sub-Saharan African countries that had experienced peace negotiations following an intra-state conflict – that could be a violent armed conflict or a civil war – and signed a peace accord in the end. The data on negotiated peace accords were taken from the Peace Accords Matrix (PAM) of the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies of the University of Notre Dame in the USA. The PAM has 34 different peace accords from all over the world, most of them were signed in the 1990s and at the beginning of the 21st century. The accords also mostly belong to Sub-Saharan African countries where experienced intra-state violence including civil war especially after the end of the Cold War. There are also accords that belong to Bangladesh, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, Croatia, El Salvador, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Lebanon and Macedonia.

The data on Sub-Saharan African peace accords were compared with the data on peace agreements including their results (ended or not ended) and according to the results of these peace accords the groups were formed. Burundi, Liberia, Sudan and Ivory Coast formed the first group of countries with successful peace negotiations with not-terminated peace

agreements. However, Sierra Leone, Mozambique, Rwanda and Guinea Bissau formed the second group of countries with failed peace negotiations with terminated peace agreements.

After conditions (independent variables) were dichotomized (using Boolean expressions, 1 or 0) eight different cases were grouped in rows to form the truth table displaying the combinations of conditions with definite outcomes (dependent variable) as the first step.

The second step of the analysis after forming the truth table is analysis for determining necessity and sufficiency. This analysis is conducted by using the software package Kirq [16]. There are other software packages other than Kirq used for conducting csQCA and fsQCA analysis like TOSMANA, QCA-add-in-for-Excel, fs/QCA, fuzzy (provided by Stata statistical program) and QCA (provided by R statistical program) etc.[17] The trick in these software packages is the use of Boolean minimization, which could also be conducted by hand. The Boolean minimization helps reduce causal combinations to mini-expressions.

If a definite outcome occurs with always existing conditions, then these conditions are regarded as necessary conditions. If a definite outcome occurs in some of the cases with these conditions, then the conditions are considered as sufficient conditions.

4.1.2. Research Variables and Hypothesis

Before conducting the analysis, the outcome of interest (dependent variable) and the conditions (independent variables) are identified. The outcome of interest is the success of a negotiated peace settlement. This dissertation aims to study if some conditions are necessary or sufficient in describing the success of a negotiated peace settlement by benefiting from the dataset on eight case countries.

Conditions are operationalized as follows:

H1 *Escalation during peace negotiation processes helps the warring parties to feel the ripe moment and to sit on the negotiation desk to come to a peaceful solution to the ongoing conflict by signing a peace accord. (escalation)*

H2 *Power-sharing provisions (political and military power-sharing provisions) helps to keep rebels/insurgents within the peace negotiation process and satisfies their political and military demands by keeping them on the track for a successful process. (power-sharing)*

H3 *Women/gender inclusion into the negotiation processes and provisions related to their inclusion into the process facilitates reaching peaceful solution to the conflict. (women/gender)*

H4 *Pre-negotiation agreements that come before a peace accord results in durable and successful peace accords. (pre-negotiation)*

[16] Further information on Kirq software, which is a user-friendly software package for conducting csQCA and fsQCA analysis as defined by Ragin (1987 and 2008) can be accessed on the website http://grundrisse.org/qca/kirq/ Access Date: 03/09/2020

[17] Further information on other software packages and statistical programs used for csQCA and fsQCA analysis can be accessed on the website https://compasss.org/software/ Access Date: 03/09/2020

H5 *Neighboring countries' involvement into negotiation processes as facilitators and/or mediators or signatories results in durable and successful peace accords. (neighboring countries)*

H6 *Longer negotiation processes including pre-negotiation and post-negotiation/implementation agreements result in durable and successful peace accords. (duration)* (main hypothesis).

The table below displays the research variables.

Table 6. Qualitative Comparative Analysis Research Variables.

Dependent Variable	OUTCOME/outcome - Successful/failed negotiated peace settlements
Conditions (Independent variables)	E (conflict escalation) PSH (political and military power-sharing) W (woman/gender related provisions and integration of women) PR (pre-negotiation agreements) NB (neighboring countries' involvement) D (duration of total peace process)

4.2. QCA Data Analysis and Findings

4.2.1. QCA analysis data table

The raw data obtained from the datasets mentioned above were dichotomized since as pointed out above QCA uses Boolean algebra that needs the data to be coded as binary, either as 1 or 0. This dissertation does not use raw data that need calibration. Hence, the raw data did not present any problems in coding because most of the data were binary by nature depending on the conditions' presence or absence.

Upon coding the data as binary for forming a truth table, the QCA analysis starts with the inspection of all probable configurations of conditions. This analysis is conducted by using the software package Kirq as mentioned above. This software program operates the analysis and the inspection of possible configurations to form the truth table. The analysis shows the configurations with positive or negative outcome (presence or absence of the outcome of interest). This display of configurations with the outcome of interest is also called as the 'truth table'.

Truth table shows the pathways of configurations related to the outcome. As mentioned earlier in the Introduction Part of this dissertation regarding the method to be used, truth table demonstrates a list of all possible combinations of conditions and outcomes. Here, while presenting the combinations 2^n formula is used where 'n' symbolizes the number of conditions. The total number of conditions is six (6) used for the dataset. Using the same formula, the number of possible configurations is obtained: $2^6 = 64$. The truth table displays each observation in the dataset in one row making out the configurations including the logical remainders.

Table 7 below shows the hypothetical truth table. It is obvious on the table that the outcomes (presence and absence) are in a balance demonstrating the combinations with empirical data regarding the successful negotiated peace settlements. The truth table that contains the list of all possible configurations (64 possible configurations including the logical remainders) is given in Annex I.

The first column of the table shows the row number of the configurations on the truth table. Number of Cases on the table below indicates the number of empirical cases. OUTCOME column displays the outcome of interest using binary coding (successful negotiated peace settlements are indicated as 1, while the failed ones are indicated as 0).

The names of the case countries are abbreviated for using in QCA software Kirq as follows:

BR	Burundi
LIB	Liberia
SUD	Sudan
IC	Ivory Coast
SL	Sierra Leone
MOZ	Mozambique
RW	Rwanda
GB	Guinea Bissau

Abbreviations for conditions can also be followed on the table that were used in QCA software Kirq as follows:

E	Escalation
PSH	Power-sharing
W	Woman/Gender
PR	Pre-negotiation
NB	Neighbor
D	Duration

Table 7. Hypothetical truth table.

Row	E	PSH	W	PR	NB	D	Number of Cases	OUTCOME	Cases	Consistency
	Escalation	Powershari	Woman/Gender	Prenegotiation	Neighbor	Duration				
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	BR	1
3	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	LIB	1
33	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	SUD	1
61	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	IC	1
8	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	SL	0
44	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	MOZ	0
62	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	RW	0
64	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	GB	0

The columns for conditions are indicated by using binary codes, 1 or 0. The binary code 1 shows the presence of the condition in a combination while the binary code 0 shows the absence of the condition in a combination. For instance, the top configuration for Burundi (BR) displays that Burundi experienced escalation (E) before the negotiations; included power-sharing (PSH) and woman/gender related (W) provisions into the negotiated agreement; experienced a pre-negotiation (PR) phase; witnessed the involvement of neighboring countries (NB) and the duration (D) of the negotiated peace agreement was longer than five years because all the values for the conditions are coded as 1.

Ivory Coast (IC) could be another example regarding the coding of the conditions on a configuration. As is seen above on the table, it is understandable that Ivory Coast (IC) did not experience escalation (E) before the start of negotiations; did not have any power-

sharing (PSH) and woman/gender related (W) provisions in the negotiated agreement; did not experience a pre-negotiation (PR) phase, but witnessed the involvement of neighboring countries (NB) and the duration (D) of the negotiated peace agreement was longer than five years. Not all the values for the conditions are coded as 1. As it can be followed some of the values are coded as 0 because these conditions did not occur and this kind of coding is used to show the absence of that condition in that combination.

The truth table displays that each configuration has one empirical case only. This is quite normal for a QCA analysis, but depending on the number of the cases and the similarities among them any configuration may have more than one empirical case. Normally these empirical cases more than one are taken into a group to show that same configuration results in the same outcome of interest for the same empirical cases. However, the QCA analysis here does not have such a sample.

The same coding method is used for coding the outcomes for the cases. As seen on the truth table above the outcome condition (OUTCOME) is coded as 1 (successful negotiated peace settlement) and is coded as 0 (failed negotiated peace settlement).

Negated version of the truth table is created by coding OUTCOME as 0 (OUTCOME=0) instead of coding it as 1 (OUTCOME=1). After this type of coding, it is seen on the table that OUTCOME=0 and outcome=1. As is mentioned before in the introductory part, lower-case letters are used for conditions to demonstrate the absence of the condition. Apart from lower-case letters, the sign ~ is also used for meaning the absence of the condition. Here lower-case letter usage is preferred to mean the absence of the condition as shown on the tables above and below.

Table 8 shows below the negated version of the truth table. This table was formed using the 'negated' outcome condition (OUTCOME=0 or failed negotiated peace settlement) in QCA software Kirq. The table below looks like the one above, but the consistency values are reversed since the outcomes have been negated. De Morgan's law was used here (Ragin, 1987) to save time for minimizing negative examples. Annex II also gives the 64 configurations in the truth table including the logical remainders.

Table 8. Hypothetical truth table – negated.

Row	E	PSH	W	PR	NB	D	Number of Cases	outcome	Cases	Consistency
	Escalation	Power-sharing	Woman/Gender	Pre-negotiation	Neighbor	Duration				
8	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	SL	1
44	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	MOZ	1
62	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	RW	1
64	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	GB	1
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	BR	0
3	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	LIB	0
33	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	SUD	0
61	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	IC	0

4.2.2. Necessary and sufficient conditions analysis

Consistency and coverage values are significant when analyzing necessity and sufficiency. These values are given between the range of 0 to 1. This helps researchers to understand the consistency value of a configuration in the whole data and to point out the findings explaining the data. Since consistency is defined as "a measure of the degree to which cases sharing the same combination of conditions have the same outcome" and "a measure of the extent to which the observed cases align with each other" (Kaminsky and Jordan, 2017) it helps researchers to see the link between necessary and sufficient conditions related with the outcome of interest.

A consistency score of 1.0 means high level of consistency indicating that the cases with high consistency have the outcome, while a consistency score of 0.0 means low level of consistency indicating that the cases with low consistency do not have the outcome. As cases with a consistency score between 0.30 and 0.70 mean they are somewhere between presence and absence (Ragin, 2008), consistency score above 0.70 indicates high level of consistency. Rihoux and Ragin assert that consistency scores under 0.80 mean that there is neither necessity nor sufficiency relationship between a configuration and the outcome of interest (2009).

4.2.2.1. Analysis of necessary conditions

Following the creation of truth table, QCA analysis continues with the inspection of necessary conditions by testing the conditions that are necessary to obtain the outcome of interest (successful or failed negotiated peace settlements). A necessary condition is always present for the outcome of interest to happen, but its sole presence does not mean that the outcome of interest will happen all the time when it is present (Ragin, 1987; Kaminsky and Jordan, 2017; Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). As mentioned above and in the introductory part for QCA analysis in this dissertation consistency and coverage scores are also important to notice for finding out necessity.

QCA analysis enjoys some logical operators. For example, lower-case letters show the absence of a condition while upper-case letters show the presence of a condition. A condition written in upper-case letters, for example E (escalation) represents the presence of the condition, yet lower-case letters, for instance e (escalation) stands for the absence of the condition. Lower-case and upper-case letters are also used for indicating the negations. For example, upper-case OUTCOME means OUTCOME=1 while lower-case outcome means outcome=0.

A plus sign (+) stands for a logical "or" and the multiplication sign (*) represents a logical "and".

The data analyzed in the QCA software package Kirq provides the following Table 9 after testing the hypothesized conditions (independent variables):

Table 9. Positive Necessary Conditions.

Condition	Consistency	Coverage	Observations
PR+NB*	1	0.67	BR;IC;LIB;SUD
W+NB*	1	0.67	BR;IC;LIB;SUD
W+pr*	1	0.57	BR;IC;LIB;SUD
W+psh*	1	0.57	BR;IC;LIB;SUD
E+NB*	1	0.67	BR;IC;LIB;SUD
PR+w*	1	0.57	BR;IC;LIB;SUD
PSH+pr*	1	0.50	BR;IC;LIB;SUD
PR+e*	1	0.57	BR;IC;LIB;SUD
PSH+NB*	1	0.57	BR;IC;LIB;SUD
D*	1	1	BR;IC;LIB;SUD
PSH+e*	1	0.50	BR;IC;LIB;SUD
PSH+w*	1	0.50	BR;IC;LIB;SUD
PR+psh*	1	0.57	BR;IC;LIB;SUD
W+e	1	0.50	BR;IC;LIB;SUD

Yellow color highlights the most significant configuration/condition.

Consistency measures the strengths of the necessity association, a consistency score of 1 indicates that every time the outcome (successful negotiation process) is present, the necessary condition is also present.

Coverage score shows how much of the outcome is explained by the configuration, a score of 1 indicates that 100% of outcome can be explained by the configuration.

The *conditions* are defined as:

PR indicates presence of pre-negotiation agreements in negotiation process

NB indicates presence of neighboring countries' involvement into peace negotiations as facilitator/mediator/signatory

W indicates presence of women/gender related provisions in peace accords

pr indicates absence of pre-negotiation agreements in negotiation process

psh indicates absence of political and military power-sharing provisions in peace accords

E indicates presence of escalation in conflict between the warring parties

w indicates absence of women/gender related provisions in peace accords

PSH indicates presence of political and military power-sharing provisions in peace accords

e indicates absence of escalation in conflict between the warring parties

D indicates presence of longer duration of peace negotiations

*lowercase letters indicate absence (coded as 0) of the related condition and uppercase letters indicate presence (coded as 1) of the related condition.

All consistency scores on the table are above the limit of 0.70 (all combinations of conditions result in 1) indicating high level of consistency. Nevertheless, the minimum

score of consistency level is accepted as 0.70 in parallel with the literature on consistency levels in a QCA analysis as mentioned above. This consistency scores show that the relationship of necessity between a configuration and the outcome of interest does actually exist.

Table 9 displaying positive necessary conditions above shows that one condition or a combination of two conditions are recognized as necessary conditions for the outcome of interest (dependent variable – success or failure of the negotiated peace settlement, success as coded 1).

Upper-case D (presence of the condition 'duration' regarding 5-year durability of a negotiated peace settlement) has consistency and coverage scores of 1. The consistency score of 1 shows that when the outcome of a successful negotiated peace settlement is present, then the necessary condition D – durability of a negotiated peace settlement which is more than 5 years – is also present. In addition, the coverage score of 1 means that when the necessary condition D is present, the outcome of interest – successful negotiated peace settlement – is also present. Therefore, this necessary condition can explain the outcome (successful negotiated peace settlement).

Table 9 shows other combinations of necessary conditions that have a consistency score of 1. There are thirteen (13) other combinations of necessary conditions, three of which consist of a combination of two present combinations, yet the rest is a combination of present and absent conditions together. It might be convenient to give two examples regarding these two different combinations to better understand the table.

A combination of two present conditions – PR (presence of a pre-negotiation phase) or NB (presence of a neighboring country intervening into negotiations as a third-party) – stand for the first example. This example indicates that the presence of a pre-negotiation phase before the negotiations or the presence of a neighboring country's involvement as a third-party into the negotiation process is necessary for the outcome of achieving a successful negotiated peace settlement. Here the consistency score is 1 as mentioned above, but the coverage score is 0.67, which is low. This implies that there exist situations where this combination of conditions is present but the outcome of interest is not.

A combination of one present and one absent condition – PSH (power-sharing provisions included into the negotiated peace settlement) or e (escalation before the negotiation process) – represent the second example. This example indicates that the presence of power-sharing provisions included into the negotiated peace settlement or the absence of escalation experienced before the negotiation process is necessary for the outcome of achieving a successful negotiated peace settlement. Here the consistency score is 1, but the coverage score is 0.50, which is low. This also implies that there exist situations where this combination of conditions is present but the outcome of interest is not.

Below Table 10 provides the negated necessary conditions to find out a condition or combinations consisting of two or three conditions resulting in the absence of the outcome of interest (dependent variable – success or failure of the negotiated peace settlement, failure as coded 1 owing to the negated conditions).

Table 10. Negated Necessary Conditions.

Condition	Consistency	Coverage	Observations
pr+nb*	1	0.67	GB;MOZ;RW;SL
w+nb*	1	0.67	GB;MOZ;RW;SL
w+pr*	1	0.80	GB;MOZ;RW;SL
W+PR+psh*	1	0.50	GB;MOZ;RW;SL
e+nb*	1	0.57	GB;MOZ;RW;SL
PSH+pr*	1	0.50	GB;MOZ;RW;SL
e+pr*	1	0.67	GB;MOZ;RW;SL
E+PR+psh*	1	0.50	GB;MOZ;RW;SL
psh+nb*	1	0.67	GB;MOZ;RW;SL
d*	1	1	GB;MOZ;RW;SL
PSH+e*	1	0.50	GB;MOZ;RW;SL
PSH+w*	1	0.50	GB;MOZ;RW;SL
E+w*	1	0.57	GB;MOZ;RW;SL
W+e	1	0.50	GB;MOZ;RW;SL

Yellow color highlights the most significant configuration/condition.

Consistency measures the strengths of the necessity association, a consistency score of 1 indicates that every time the outcome (successful negotiation process) is present, the necessary condition is also present.

Coverage score shows how much of the outcome is explained by the configuration, a score of 1 indicates that 100% of outcome can be explained by the configuration.

The *conditions* are defined as:

pr indicates absence of pre-negotiation agreements in negotiation process

nb indicates absence of neighboring countries' involvement into peace negotiations as facilitator/mediator/signatory

w indicates absence of women/gender related provisions in peace accords

W indicates presence of women/gender related provisions in peace accords

PR indicates presence of pre-negotiation agreements in negotiation process

psh indicates absence of political and military power-sharing provisions in peace accords

e indicates absence of escalation in conflict between the warring parties

PSH indicates presence of political and military power-sharing provisions in peace accords

E indicates presence of escalation in conflict between the warring parties

PR indicates presence of pre-negotiation agreements in negotiation process

d indicates absence of longer duration of peace negotiations

*lowercase letters indicate absence (coded as 0) of the related condition and uppercase letters indicate presence (coded as 1) of the related condition.

Here again consistency scores of conditions or combination of configurations are above 0.70. The conditions and combinations of conditions have a consistency score of 1. These conditions and configurations of conditions consisting of two or three conditions are regarded as necessary conditions or configurations for the outcome of interest (failure of a negotiated peace settlement).

There are again thirteen (13) other configurations of necessary conditions, three of which consist of a combination of three different conditions, yet the rest is a combination of present and absent conditions together. It might be convenient to give two examples regarding these two different configurations to better understand the table.

A configuration of three different conditions – E (presence escalation before the negotiation process) or PR (presence of a pre-negotiation phase) or psh (absence of power-sharing provisions included into the negotiated peace settlement) – stand for the first example. This example indicates that the presence of escalation before the negotiation process or presence of a pre-negotiation phase or absence power-sharing provisions included into the negotiated peace settlement is necessary for the outcome of reaching a failed negotiated peace settlement. Here the consistency score is 1 as mentioned above, but the coverage score is 0.50, which is low. This implies that there exist situations where this combination of conditions is present but the outcome of interest is not.

A combination of one present and one absent condition – W (presence of women/gender related provisions included into a negotiated peace settlement) or e (absence of escalation before the negotiation process) – represent the second example. This example indicates that the presence of women/gender related provisions included into a negotiated peace settlement or the absence of escalation experienced before the negotiation process is necessary for the outcome of reaching a negotiated peace settlement. Here the consistency score is 1, but the coverage score is 0.50, which is low. This also implies that there exist situations where this combination of conditions is present but the outcome of interest is not.

Lower-case d (absence of the condition 'duration' regarding 5-year durability of a negotiated peace settlement) has consistency and coverage scores of 1. The consistency score of 1 shows that when the outcome of a failed negotiated peace settlement is present, then the necessary condition d – durability of a negotiated peace settlement which is less than 5 years – is also present. In addition, the coverage score of 1 means that when the necessary condition d is present, the outcome of interest – failed negotiated peace settlement – is also present. Therefore, this necessary condition can explain the outcome (failed negotiated peace settlement) and the condition d is necessary for the negated outcome. However, the condition D is necessary for the outcome of a successful negotiated peace settlement.

One configuration among others on the table is significant to mention. The combination of two absent conditions (w+pr) has the consistency score of 1 and coverage score of 0.80, which tells us that absence of women/gender related provisions or absence of a pre-negotiation phase most probably result in the outcome of interest.

4.2.2.2. Analysis of sufficient conditions

Analysis of sufficient conditions follows the analysis of necessary conditions. This analysis benefits from 'logical minimization' using Boolean algebra to find out configurations of combinations sufficient for the outcome of interest. This analysis also needs the truth table and operates on the same configurations displayed on the table above regarding the analysis of necessary conditions.

This analysis employs logical (Boolean) minimization as a part of QCA analysis to single out combinations of conditions sufficient for the outcome of interest. The Boolean minimization requires that when two configurations (rows) on a truth table have the same outcome, but have only one different condition – one condition is present in one configuration but absent in the other one – then this condition is considered as redundant to produce the outcome of interest (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). Hence, it is not considered for Boolean minimization to make out shorter configurations. For example, a configuration on a row E*PSH*W*PR*NB*D together with another configuration on another row E*PSH*W*PR*nb*D on the truth table is reduced to E*PSH*W*PR*D eliminating the different condition on two similar configurations. This kind of minimization process is operated (can be done by hand but software packages like Kirq give quick and reliable results) until the Boolean minimization process does not let any further reductions on configurations. Figure 9 in the introductory part above reflects this Boolean minimization process based on a larger sample.

Logical remainders are included when conducting Boolean minimization because a logical remainder is a row in a truth table with no observations (also called as non-observed cases) and even though it can be a logically possible combination consisting of conditions, it is short of empirical instances (Ragin, 2008). Truth table including all configurations together with the logical remainders are given in Annex I as mentioned above.

Boolean minimization stage on a QCA analysis by using the software Kirq produces two different solution configurations as displayed on the Table 11: complex solution and parsimonious solution. The software eliminates the redundant conditions. For example, similar to what is mentioned above, when an outcome of interest is related with two configurations "E*PSH*W*PR*NB*D" and "E*PSH*W*PR*nb*D", nb is removed because except nb other conditions are present for all conditions on the same row. Complex solution analysis requires this kind of redundant conditions be eliminated.

The software Kirq also presents parsimonious solution analysis after completing the complex one. The parsimonious solution analysis is also run by using logical remainders to simplest possible solutions as Rihoux and De Meur stresses the importance of including logical remainders to get the most parsimonious solution (2009). The parsimonious solutions help researchers to understand which conditions are affiliated with certain outcomes.

QCA output on the Table 11 below displays parsimonious and complex solutions for the outcome of interest. These results are achieved at the end of the Boolean minimization process conducted by the software package program Kirq. The obtained results also show

the necessary and sufficient conditions for the outcome of interest. The 'configuration' column indicates the pathways to the outcome (dependent variable – success of a negotiated peace settlements) and the columns 'consistency' and 'raw coverage' show the scores of consistency and coverage. Raw coverage shows how much of the outcome (dependent variable - success) can be explained by the related configuration. On the other hand, unique coverage shows how much a single configuration alone can explain the outcome (dependent variable - success) and this kind of coverage is expected to result in a score more than 0.50 in only one sufficient pathway (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). Therefore, higher scores of raw and unique coverages indicates the power of coverage of the related configuration (its power in explaining the outcome).

Table 11. Boolean minimization.

Path	Configuration	Relation	Consistency	Raw Coverage	Unique Coverage	Empirical Observations
Necessary Condition(s)						
	PR+NB*	← OUT	1	0.67	n/a	BR;IC;LIB;SUD
	W+NB*	← OUT	1	0.67	n/a	BR;IC;LIB;SUD
	W+pr*	← OUT	1	0.57	n/a	BR;IC;LIB;SUD
	W+psh*	← OUT	1	0.57	n/a	BR;IC;LIB;SUD
	E+NB*	← OUT	1	0.67	n/a	BR;IC;LIB;SUD
	PR+w*	← OUT	1	0.57	n/a	BR;IC;LIB;SUD
	PSH+pr*	← OUT	1	0.50	n/a	BR;IC;LIB;SUD
	PR+e*	← OUT	1	0.57	n/a	BR;IC;LIB;SUD
	PSH+NB*	← OUT	1	0.57	n/a	BR;IC;LIB;SUD
	D*	← OUT	1	1	n/a	BR;IC;LIB;SUD
	PSH+e*	← OUT	1	0.50	n/a	BR;IC;LIB;SUD
	PSH+w*	← OUT	1	0.50	n/a	BR;IC;LIB;SUD
	PR+psh*	← OUT	1	0.57	n/a	BR;IC;LIB;SUD
	W+e	← OUT	1	0.50	n/a	BR;IC;LIB;SUD
Sufficient Condition(s)						
	Parsimonious solution		1	1	1	
1	D	→ OUT	1	1	1	BR;IC;LIB;SUD
	Complex solution		1	1		
1	e*psh*w*pr*NB*D+	→ OUT	1	0.25	0.25	IC
2	PSH*W*PR*NB*D+	→ OUT	1	0.50	0.25	BR;SUD
3	E*PSH*W*PR*D	→ OUT	1	0.50	0.25	BR;LIB

Note: Uppercase letters mean the condition is present, lower case letters mean the condition is absent, multiplication (*) indicates logical "AND", addition (+) indicates logical "OR", ← indicates a necessary condition and → indicates sufficient configurations. Yellow color highlights the most significant configuration.

The *conditions* are defined as:

PR indicates presence of pre-negotiation agreements in negotiation process

NB indicates presence of neighboring countries' involvement into peace negotiations as facilitator/mediator/signatory

W indicates presence of women/gender related provisions in peace accords

pr indicates absence of pre-negotiation agreements in negotiation process

psh indicates absence of political and military power-sharing provisions in peace accords

E indicates presence of escalation in conflict between the warring parties

w indicates absence of women/gender related provisions in peace accords

PSH indicates presence of political and military power-sharing provisions in peace accords

e indicates absence of escalation in conflict between the warring parties

D indicates presence of longer duration of peace negotiations

*lowercase letters indicate absence (coded as 0) of the related condition and uppercase letters indicate presence (coded as 1) of the related condition.

Table 11 demonstrates three different complex solutions (configurations) for the outcome of interest: (e*psh*w*pr*NB*D)+(PSH*W*PR*NB*D)+(E*PSH*w*PR*D) → OUT. "+" means logical "or" and OUT symbolizes successful outcome in QCA terminology. The table also shows the scores of consistency, raw coverage and unique coverage on the columns as stated above, hence displaying the whole pathways including complex solutions together with the parsimonious solutions on the same table. One complex solution has the raw coverage at 0.25 (e*psh*w*pr*NB*D) while the two others have the raw coverage at 0.50. Even though these coverage scores are not high enough to get to a robust conclusion, the difference shows that two other complex solutions have more powerful coverage than the one with 0.25 raw coverage score.

Regarding the parsimonious solution, the pathway resulting in the outcome of interest (dependent variable – successful negotiated peace settlements) is D with its consistency and coverage scores of 1. As is seen on Table 11 (also can be followed on Table 9) the condition D is also a necessary condition for the outcome of interest. The condition D is also a part of all three complex solutions exampled above. The condition D (parsimonious solution) with consistency and coverage scores of 1 can be considered as necessary and sufficient condition for the outcome of interest.

The analysis above reveals which of the conditions and configurations are related to the outcome of interest. As the outcome of interest in this study is the success of the negotiated peace settlements, the above-analysis shows that the condition D is related to the success of negotiated peace settlements. Whenever the condition D is present, the outcome is present. Here the outcome is success, but to understand if the theoretical findings are supported by the empirical data, the sufficiency analysis of the negated outcome (negated dependent variable) is conducted below. The results of this negated analysis is displayed on Table 12. Unlike Table 11, Table 12 presents the negated outcome as "out" because the negated version of the outcome is the absence of successful negotiated peace settlement. In other words, it stands for failed negotiated peace settlements.

Table 12. Negated Boolean minimization.

Path	Configuration	Relation	Consistency	Raw Coverage	Unique Coverage	Empirical Observations
Necessary Condition(s)						
	pr+nb*	← out	1	0.67	n/a	GB;MOZ;RW;SL
	w+nb*	← out	1	0.67	n/a	GB;MOZ;RW;SL
	w+pr*	← out	1	0.80	n/a	GB;MOZ;RW;SL
	W+PR+psh*	← out	1	0.50	n/a	GB;MOZ;RW;SL
	e+nb*	← out	1	0.57	n/a	GB;MOZ;RW;SL
	PSH+pr*	← out	1	0.50	n/a	GB;MOZ;RW;SL
	e+pr*	← out	1	0.67	n/a	GB;MOZ;RW;SL
	E+PR+psh*	← out	1	0.50	n/a	GB;MOZ;RW;SL
	psh+nb*	← out	1	0.67	n/a	GB;MOZ;RW;SL
	d*	← out	1	1	n/a	GB;MOZ;RW;SL
	PSH+e*	← out	1	0.50	n/a	GB;MOZ;RW;SL
	PSH+w*	← out	1	0.50	n/a	GB;MOZ;RW;SL
	E+w*	← out	1	0.57	n/a	GB;MOZ;RW;SL
	W+e	← out	1	0.50	n/a	GB;MOZ;RW;SL
Sufficient Condition(s)						
	Parsimonious solution		1	1	1	
1	d	→ out	1	1	1	GB;MOZ;RW;SL
	Complex solution		1	1		
1	e*psh*w*pr*d+	→ out	1	0.50	0.50	GB;RW
2	e*PSH*w*PR*nb*d+	→ out	1	0.25	0.25	MOZ
3	E*PSH*W*pr*nb*d	→ out	1	0.25	0.25	SL

Note: Uppercase letters mean the condition is present, lower case letters mean the condition is absent, multiplication (*) indicates logical "AND", addition (+) indicates logical "OR", ← indicates a necessary condition and → indicates sufficient configurations. Yellow color highlights the most significant configuration.

The *conditions* are defined as:

pr indicates absence of pre-negotiation agreements in negotiation process

nb indicates absence of neighboring countries' involvement into peace negotiations as facilitator/mediator/signatory

w indicates absence of women/gender related provisions in peace accords

W indicates presence of women/gender related provisions in peace accords

PR indicates presence of pre-negotiation agreements in negotiation process

psh indicates absence of political and military power-sharing provisions in peace accords

e indicates absence of escalation in conflict between the warring parties

PSH indicates presence of political and military power-sharing provisions in peace accords

E indicates presence of escalation in conflict between the warring parties

PR indicates presence of pre-negotiation agreements in negotiation process

d indicates absence of longer duration of peace negotiations

*lowercase letters indicate absence (coded as 0) of the related condition and uppercase letters indicate presence (coded as 1) of the related condition.

The results of complex solution analysis above on the table show that none of the three complex solutions is able to explain the outcome of interest (failure of negotiated peace settlements) because the scores of raw and unique coverages are low (0.50 and 0.25 respectively) for the last two solutions despite a little bit higher score for the first one (0.50 for two types of coverages). These scores are so low and not significant enough to suggest an explanation. For this reason, the complex solutions listed above on the table do not significantly improve our understanding of reasons behind the failure of a negotiated peace settlement.

Regarding parsimonious solution, the pathway resulting in the outcome of interest (dependent variable – failed negotiated peace settlements) is d with its consistency and coverage scores of 1. As is seen on Table 11 (also can be followed on Table 9) the condition d is also a necessary condition for the outcome of interest. The condition d is also a part of all three complex solutions exampled above. For example, d is present in three different complex solutions. Even though the consistency score is 1 for these complex solutions, the raw and unique coverage scores are low and less than 0.70. The condition d (parsimonious solution) with consistency and coverage scores of 1 can be considered as necessary and sufficient condition for the outcome of interest. That means high consistency and coverage scores indicate a robust explanation by the parsimonious solution. Parsimonious solution explains that duration of negotiation process less than five years results in failure of the negotiated peace settlements.

4.3. Analysis Summary and Interpretations

Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) was used in this study to test how certain conditions (independent variables/operationalized hypotheses) can correlate with the outcome of interest – success or failure of a negotiated peace settlement. As given above the QCA analysis puts forward the correlation between the duration of negotiations and the success of a negotiated peace settlement. The summary of QCA analysis findings below gives the description of hypotheses (conditions/independent variables) and indicates the sufficiency and necessity condition of the conditions (see Table 13 below). It also shows the effect of a condition on the success of a negotiation process and status of a hypothesis (confirmed/not confirmed/partially confirmed).

Table 13. Summary of Qualitative Comparative Analysis findings.

Hypothesis	Hypothesis Description (independent variable)	Sufficient or Necessary Condition	Effect on successful negotiation process	Hypothesis status
H1	Escalation during peace negotiation processes helps the warring parties to feel the ripe moment and to sit on the negotiation desk to come to a peaceful solution to the ongoing conflict by signing a peace accord. (coded E in QCA)	Necessary	Positive	Partially Confirmed
H2	Power-sharing provisions (political and military power-sharing provisions) help to keep rebels/insurgents within the peace negotiation process and satisfy their political and military demands by keeping them on the track for a successful process (coded PSH in QCA)	Necessary	Positive	Partially Confirmed
H3	Women/gender inclusion into the negotiation processes and provisions related to their inclusion into the process facilitates reaching peaceful solution to the conflict (coded W in QCA)	Necessary	Positive	Partially Confirmed
H4	Pre-negotiation agreements that come before a peace accord results in durable and successful peace accords (coded PR in QCA)	Necessary	Positive	Partially Confirmed
H5	Neighboring countries' involvement into negotiation processes as facilitators and/or mediators or signatories results in durable and successful peace accords (coded NB in QCA)	Necessary	Positive	Partially Confirmed
H6 (Main Hypothesis)	Longer negotiation processes including pre-negotiation and post-negotiation/implementation agreements result in durable and successful peace accords (coded D in QCA)	Sufficient and necessary	Positive	Confirmed

The condition E (H1), escalation during peace negotiation processes, is a necessary condition for the success of negotiated peace settlements. This hypothesis is partially confirmed because it contributes into the success of negotiated peace settlements only when combined with other conditions.

The condition PSH (H2), power-sharing provisions (political and military power-sharing provisions) that help to keep rebels/insurgents within the peace negotiation process and satisfy their political and military demands by keeping them on the track for a successful process, is also a necessary condition for the outcome. However, it is a part of complex solutions together with other conditions and this condition alone is not associated with the outcome. For this reason, this hypothesis is partially confirmed because it contributes into the success of negotiated peace settlements only when combined with other conditions.

The condition W (H3), women/gender inclusion into the negotiation processes and provisions related to their inclusion into the process, is again part of complex solutions associated with the outcome of successful negotiated peace settlements together with complex solutions associated with the outcome of failed ones. This hypothesis is partially confirmed, hence, it might be concluded that this condition contributes into the success of a negotiated peace settlements when combined with other conditions.

Regarding the condition PR (H4), pre-negotiation stages before the actual negotiations is a necessary condition for the outcome of interest. This hypothesis is partially confirmed, hence, it might be concluded that this condition contributes into the success of a negotiated peace settlements when combined with other conditions.

The condition NB (H5), neighboring countries' involvement into negotiation processes as facilitators and/or mediators or signatories, is also a necessary condition for the outcome. However, it is a part of complex solutions together with other conditions and this condition alone is not associated with the outcome. For this reason, this hypothesis is partially confirmed because it contributes into the success of negotiated peace settlements only when combined with other conditions.

QCA mostly partially confirmed the above conditions and the related hypotheses, but it strongly stresses the significance of one condition in contributing into the success of negotiated peace settlements. The condition D (H6), longer negotiation processes including pre-negotiation and post-negotiation/implementation agreements, is a necessary and sufficient condition confirmed by the analysis of two outcomes (one is negated – failed peace negotiated settlements). The hypothesis is confirmed.

4.4. Extended Negotiation Process, No Shortcuts

The QCA analysis confirmed the sixth hypothesis (H6 - longer negotiation processes including pre-negotiation and post-negotiation/implementation agreements) proposed in this study. Other hypotheses were also partially confirmed. The analysis showed that other conditions (independent variables) like escalation, power-sharing, women/gender inclusion, pre-negotiation and neighboring countries' involvement for peace-making efforts are also necessary conditions for a successful negotiated peace agreement.

The negotiation process in Rwanda failed at the beginning of the 1990s when it just started, but succeeded in Burundi almost a decade later. Nevertheless, peace negotiations do not always end with a durable agreement even though they are successful in terminating the ongoing military aggressions and violence; however, mostly they fail to prevent armed violence. As Hampson asserts negotiated success is not common, but it is desirable than conflicts ending with destruction and yielding (1996: 6).

Signing an agreement is considered to be the "prima facie" or a sign of a successful negotiation since "it indicates a judgement by the parties that they expect to be better off with the agreement than without it, and they can do no better by either continuing negotiations or choosing an alternative outcome" (Zartman, 1988: 39). However, a negotiation process does rarely end with a successful outcome: a peace agreement. (Jackson, 2000: 325).

Measuring negotiation as a process is problematic. Negotiation is not winning or losing as a process, so the success of it is not related with the parties' gains but with the result. Negotiations have an outcome as a success or failure. A successful negotiation process comes up with a mutually determined agreement, while a failed one is a break-off and the final agreement not to agree (Zartman, 2008: 36). According to Pruitt, failure of a negotiation process happens when the parties break off or agree not to agree and when the parties reach a deadline when the proposals are no more acceptable (1981: 231). Signing an agreement means success since the parties consider it as a way out otherwise they cannot do anything apart from going on negotiations or continuing the conflict (Zartman, 2007: 136). However, this case needs to be verified comparing the parties' conditions before and after signing the agreement and their positions. Some negotiations are made to reorganize power injustice as some others may result power injustice (137).

Hampson thinks that the durability of peace agreements depends on (1) the role of the mediators, (2) structural conflict characteristics, (3) changes in regional and international power relationships and (4) issues opened for discussion during the peace negotiations (1996: 8-9). Hampson states that definition of success for peace settlements normally begins with the termination of armed violence and struggle, yet this kind of a success definition is nothing more than a partial one, so in order for a peace settlement durable it is necessary to establish durable peace-building institutions and support mechanisms that will prevent the parties from starting their armed struggle again (1996: 9-10).

Similarly, as Hampson argues above, Boutros-Ghali also emphasizes the importance of institutions and support mechanisms that will help build up peace and bring along a sense of trust among people to make peace-making operations successful (1992: 824). Trust building measures put in effect in post-settlement and peace-building stages of a peace agreement are associated with a bigger level of success (Hampson, 1996: 10). For Hampson, trust building tasks include "(1) reconstructing civil society at both the national and local level (2) reintegrating displaced populations into the society and economy (3) redefining the role off the military and police forces in the maintenance of law and order (4) building communities and allowing them to survive by bridging the gap between emergency assistance and development and (5) addressing the needs of particularly vulnerable sectors and groups in society such as women and children" (Hampson, 1996: 10).

Early stages of a peace process have the possibility of a restart of armed violence if the parties do not reach their objectives with cooperative actions. The implementation period is no different from these early stages. If the circumstances change the parties' willingness to follow a to-do-list after a negotiated agreement, it is hard to take them back from following their own interests with the help of any other written document (Hampson, 1996: 11).

It is supposed that a successful implementation of an agreement relies on the involvement of a third party that can play carrot and stick game to keep the parties on the right track (Hampson, 1996: 12). Its involvement requires different duties during pre-negotiation, negotiation and implementation stages of a negotiation process, which differs from

"meeting with stakeholders to assess their interests, helping choose spokespeople or team leaders, identifying missing groups or strategies for representing disuse interests, offering guarantees, drafting protocols and setting agendas, suggesting options, identifying and testing possible tradeoffs, writing and ratifying agreements, serving as observers, and monitoring and facilitating implementation of agreements" (Hampson, 1996: 12). Its involvement facilities building trust and changing the parties' perception and attitude regarding one another (12). According to Hampson, peace negotiations that involve involvement and high-level support of a third-party are more successful than the ones that do not (13).

Armengol asserts that most of the conflicts ended with peace agreements while only a little portion of them ended with a military triumph for the last thirty years demonstrating that negotiations could be considered as the most efficient way to resolve a conflict (2013: 1). Armengol asserts that one of the reasons explaining the high number of unsuccessful negotiations is that most of the peace negotiations are missing a third-party facilitation because third-party participation into a negotiation process makes the negotiation processes function much better (2013: 3). There could be some other reasons for the negotiations to fail and Walter asserts that even though the parties want to settle the ongoing conflict the combatants could make reaching the agreement difficult in four ways: "(1) combatants cannot agree on how to divide the stakes; (2) both place an equally high value on winning the war, leaving little room for compromise; (3) each has strong incentives to withhold or misrepresent private information they have regarding their own military strength or staying power; or (4) they commit to demands from which they cannot back down" (1999: 131). Another reason for negotiations to fail in an intra-state conflict is the invisible stakes, which the government and the rebels cannot share in mutually acceptable way (131).

Even though the literature is not rich in studies analyzing negotiation processes and the settlements they lead, some scholars like Zartman and some others like Raiffa have tried to find ways to analyze the negotiation processes to find a correlation between the negotiation and a durable settlement. Zartman introduces the term Mutually Enticing Opportunity (MEO) that is a formula for conflict resolution and he defines it as the "pull factor that draws negotiation to a successful conclusion, corresponding to the push factor supplied by a MHS" (2012: 304). Zartman asserts that negotiations end with a failure when the parties cannot get an MEO to take them out of the conflict (304).

The micro analysis regarding the case study on Rwanda and Burundi also demonstrated that the same conditions could bear a successful result. The peace negotiations ended with a total fiasco and one of the biggest genocides of the world in 1994 in Rwanda. It took only three years to reach for a negotiated peace accord. However, the peace negotiations took a longer time in Burundi. It took almost more than a decade.

The duration here in the cases indicates also the importance given to the negotiation process by the conflicting parties. As the parties are eager to get involved in the negotiation process for a longer time, the process is getting a bigger chance to have a successful result because the parties know that it is a 'process' not a one-time deal as bargaining. The Figure 34 below shows two different trajectories for peace negotiations in Rwanda and Burundi. As

is obvious on the graph, Rwandan peace negotiation cycle looks like a one-time deal, but the Burundian one is full of ups and downs within the cycle indicating the milestones – negotiated protocols, agreements and accords – in the Burundian peace negotiation process.

Figure 34. Rwandan and Burundian peace cycles.



What the two different cases show us in the case study is that the longer the negotiation process the more integrative the negotiated peace process. Rwandan peace negotiation process was not able to manage the time in favor of getting the hardliners, the militia and the spoilers into the process. However, Burundian peace negotiation process was able to – mostly with the efforts of the Regional Initiative for Burundian peace and the mediators like Mandela – get the spoilers, hardliners and rebel movements like the CNDD and the PALIPEHUTU-FNL into the process on a longer period.

As is also clear from the data used for the QCA analysis and Table 14 below shows, Rwandan peace negotiation was poor in efforts to organize implementation oriented and post-negotiation meetings that tried to find out ways to include the hardlines and spoilers into the process. The historical background shows that Rwanda was late in putting efforts to include them into the process. However, Burundian peace negotiation process was rich in this kind of meetings and agreements following the main peace accord signed in 2000.

Table 14. Comparison of Rwandan and Burundian Peace Negotiation Processes with pre/post negotiation cycles.

Country	AGREEMENT NAME	DATE	Stage
Burundi	Déclaration du Directoire Politique du processus de paix au Burundi sur le processus de mise en oeuvre des décisions conjointes prises à Pretoria	2009-04-08	Imp
Burundi	Declaration of the Palipehutu-FNL	2009-01-09	SubPar
Burundi	Déclaration du Sommet des chefs d'Etats et de gouvernements de l'initiative régionale sur le processus de Paix au Burundi	2008-12-04	Imp
Burundi	Magaliesburg Declaration on the Burundi Peace Process	2008-06-10	Imp
Burundi	Dar-es-Salaam Agreement on Principles Towards lasting Peace, Security, and Stability in Burundi	2006-06-18	SubComp
Burundi	Constitution of 18 March 2005	2005-03-18	SubComp
Burundi	Accord de Partage de Pouvoir au Burundi	2004-08-06	SubPar
Burundi	Loi du 21 novembre 2003 portant amendement à la Constitution de Transition du 28 octobre 2001	2003-11-21	SubComp
Burundi	Forces Technical Agreement between the Transitional Government of the Republic of Burundi and the CNDD-FDD	2003-11-02	SubPar
Burundi	The Protocol on Outstanding Issues of Political, Defence and Security Power Sharing in Burundi ('Pretoria II Protocol')	2003-11-02	SubPar
Burundi	The Pretoria Protocol on Political, Defence and Security Power Sharing in Burundi	2003-10-08	Imp
Burundi	Constitution de transition du 28 octobre 2001	2001-10-28	SubComp
Burundi	Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi	2000-08-28	SubComp
Burundi	Declaration by the Participants to the Peace Negotiations in Burundi	1998-06-21	Pre
Burundi	Agreement Embodying a Convention on Governance between the Forces for Democratic Change and the Political Parties of the Opposition	1994-09-10	Pre
Burundi	Déclaration des partis politiques agrées et du gouvernement contre les fauteurs de guerre et en faveur de la paix et de la sécurité	1994-07-06	Pre
Rwanda	Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front ('Arusha Agreement')	1993-08-04	SubComp
Rwanda	Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on Miscellaneous Issues and Final Provisions	1993-08-03	SubPar
Rwanda	Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Integration of the Armed Forces of the Two Parties	1993-08-03	SubPar
Rwanda	Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Repatriation of Rwandese Refugees and the Resettlement of Displaced Persons	1993-06-09	SubPar
Rwanda	The Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on Power-Sharing within the Framework of a Broad-based Transitional Government (Continuation of the Protocol of Agreement Signed on the 30th October, 1992)	1993-01-09	SubPar
Rwanda	Protocol of Agreement on Power-sharing within the Framework of broad-based Transitional Government between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front	1992-10-30	SubPar
Rwanda	Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the RPF on the Rule of Law	1992-08-18	SubPar

Abbreviation of Stages	Explanation
Pre	Pre-negotiation process
SubPar	Framework substantive. Partial agreement dealing with some issues
SubComp	Framework substantive. Comprehensive agreement dealing with resolving the whole conflict.
Imp	Implementation/Renegotiation Agreement aiming to implement an earlier agreement.

Source: Peace Agreements Database (PA-X) of the University of Edinburgh.

As is clear on the table above Rwanda and Burundi almost had the same numbers of agreements for installing peace (7 for Rwanda and 9 for Burundi). The difference between the numbers is not a significant issue, but the time-span and the type of these agreements are necessary. As also mentioned above the duration for peace negotiations is longer in

Burundi case and it is shorter for Rwanda case. Almost all the agreements for Rwandan peace are partial agreements in type dealing with some issues during the process to resolve the conflict apart from the Arusha Peace Accord, which is a comprehensive one. However, Burundian peace negotiations include different types of agreements for installing peace like partial and comprehensive ones together with the pre-negotiation and renegotiation agreements.

The Figure 35 and Figure 36 below show the different trajectories of Rwanda and Burundi in peace negotiations by pointing out the important check-point agreements in a peace negotiation like cease-fire related, pre-negotiation process, partial framework-substantive, comprehensive framework-substantive and implementation, renegotiation and renewal agreements. These figures can help better understand the significance of duration of a negotiation process full of different kind of supportive or complementary steps that come in the form of different types of agreements within the peace negotiations. The figures demonstrate also how active was the negotiation process in two different case countries with ups and downs and different color.

Figure 35. Rwandan peace trajectory.



Source: Peace Agreements Database https://www.peaceagreements.org/, Access Date: 13/06/2020.

Figure 36. Burundian peace trajectory.



Source: Peace Agreements Database https://www.peaceagreements.org/, Access Date: 13/06/2020.

Not so different from the Table 14 above, the time-span chart regarding the peace negotiations in Rwanda and Burundi shown on the Figure 37 below shows the intensity of peace negotiations in a comparison based on years and different color selection. The data on the time-span chart pin-points the peace-making attempts in the two case countries for the last three decades.

Figure 37. Rwandan and Burundian peace timespan chart.



Source: Peace Agreements Database https://www.peaceagreements.org/, Access Date: 13/06/2020.

Along with the literature discussed above and the QCA analysis results, the two case countries bear the results shown on the Table 15 below regarding the successful negotiation process. The data is obtained from two main sources used in this dissertation: the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset Version 19.1 of the Department of Peace and Conflict Research of Uppsala University and Peace Agreements Database (PA-X) of the University of Edinburgh. Similar data was also used for QCA analysis. The table below presents the data using binary codes (1 for presence and 0 for absence of the condition). It is obvious that Burundi that has experienced a successful peace negotiation process has all the conditions present for the outcome like rebel integration, escalation, pre-negotiation, renegotiation, duration etc. Nevertheless, Rwanda has not all the conditions present on the data for a successful negotiation process. As the historical background confirms the data on the table

Rwandan peace negotiations lacked many of the conditions during the process, which resulted in the failure of the process itself.

Table 15. Comparison of Rwandan and Burundian Negotiation Trajectories – Data Based One

	Rwanda	Burundi
SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION PROCESS	0	1
Rebel Integration into the Army	1	1
Rebel Integration into the Government	0	1
Gender related provisions in the Negotiated Agreement	0	1
Escalation	0	1
Powersharing provisions in the Negotiated Agreement	0	1
Women/gender related provisions in the Negotiated Agreement	0	1
Rebel/Opposition issues related provisions in the Negotiated Agreement	0	1
Pre-negotiation	0	1
Further Agreements (Implementation/Renegotiation) following the Negotiated Agreement	0	1
Participation of regional countries/organizations/initiatives	1	1
Participation of international countries/organizations/initiatives	1	1
Participation of a neighboring country (third party/signatory)	1	1
Duration (longer than 5 years of negotiating)	0	1

Source: Created by the author using the data gathered from the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset Version 19.1 of the Department of Peace and Conflict Research of Uppsala University and Peace Agreements Database (PA-X) of the University of Edinburgh.

Like the Table 15 above, the Table 16 below displays the non-statistical-data based conditions for successful negotiation process derived from historical background of peace negotiation processes in two case countries. For this reason, the data presented below is descriptive. The conditions are shown in binary codes (1 for presence and 0 for absence of the condition). The table distinctively shows that Burundi again has all the conditions present while Rwanda does only have one mutual condition except other necessary conditions for a successful negotiation process like a democratic environment, spoilers' integration into the process, unbiased mediator, reputable mediator, civil society attendance – not as a participating and negotiating party, only observation – international witnessing of the negotiation process with the participation of non-regional and international actors like the delegations from the EU and the USA including the presence of US President Bill Clinton.

Table 16. Comparison of Rwandan and Burundian Negotiation Trajectories – Descriptive One

	Rwanda	Burundi
SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION PROCESS	0	1
Conflict based on ethnic issues	1	1
Democratization Efforts before Official Negotiations	0	1
Spoilers' Integration into the Negotiation Process	0	1
Mediator out of the Region	0	1
Mediator's Fame	0	1
International witnessing to the peace negotiations	0	1
Civil society participation (not as a negotiator)	0	1

The findings reached by process tracing can be displayed as on the figure 38 as follows. Duration as the main variable together with other intervening variables like escalation, powersharing provisions, women/gender related issues, pre-negotiation phase, neighboring countries' involvement result in a successful negotiation process.

Figure 38. Process tracing diagram of a successful negotiation process.



The Figure 39 below shows the components of a successful negotiation process depending on the outcome of the QCA analysis and case study results presented above.

Figure 39. Successful Negotiation and its components.



CONCLUSION

The main objective of this dissertation is to propose that duration of a negotiation process determines its success in an intra-state conflict resolution. The longer the negotiation process the more successful it is. The shorter this process the less successful it is. The findings discussed above in the last chapter focusing on especially the QCA analysis and case study results by comparing two case countries also aim to demonstrate how duration is effective in the success of a negotiation process. The literature on peace studies in general and on negotiation theory in particular has also looked for answers for this question, yet there are some points the literature does not pay sufficient attention, hence leaving some gaps behind to be filled in by this dissertation and the other academic works of the future.

The explanations regarding the answers will be given. For this reason, to fill in this gap this dissertation benefits from the basics of negotiation theory, which has been flourishing for the last six decades and especially after the 1990s, and from one of the up-to-date research methods in social sciences widely used in political science and sociology. This study mainly benefits from case study method, which is one of the traditional qualitative methods of research in social sciences and especially in the field of international relations, for the qualitative research on the topic.

In addition, this study employs a quasi-quantitative research method, which has been gaining popularity around the globe also in the field of international relations, the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). The QCA gives flexibility in dealing with a small number of cases less than ten instead of working around the large-N data based statistical research methods like regression analysis. However, different variants of regression analysis like Cox-regression and OLS probit regression analysis could have also been preferred for this study, yet regression analysis was not used here since the research deals with a limited number of cases involved in signing a negotiated peace agreement following an intra-state conflict like a civil war in Sub-Saharan Africa. There are also some reasons behind this kind of preference, yet this will be discussed below regarding the limits of the study.

All-in-all this study brings along a new approach in negotiation theory to handle with intra-state conflict related negotiation process. The literature is not rich in this kind of research, so one of its significance in the literature will be its contribution into the literature. Apart from this, the method of this study enjoyed for making the analysis is something new in the literature, especially in Turkish academia. Since it is important to develop further research on negotiation theory, this study will be an outstanding one dealing with the problem of a successful negotiation by handling the cases and data using a quasi-quantitative method that is displaying the causal relations and their necessity and sufficiency levels for this causality.

To sum up its contribution, there will be three main contributions of this study: negotiation literature in general, negotiation literature in Turkey, African studies in Turkey. This study can trigger further research in the field of negotiation studies and African studies in Turkey. As discussed on the introduction part, the literature on negotiation studies has a gap regarding the studies related with peace negotiations for resolving intra-state conflicts like

civil wars creating failed states as well. Hence, this study is filling this gap by dealing with peace negotiation processes aiming to resolve intra-state conflicts like the ones in Burundi and Rwanda. The findings of this study and the confirmed hypotheses (the findings also partially and fully replied the research questions) will fill in the knowledge gap regarding the intra-state conflicts and the peace negotiations aiming to bring peace for them.

Despite the increase in the number of intra-state conflicts since the 1990s, the negotiation processes aiming to end – some were successful and some were not in terminating these conflicts – these conflicts have not been evaluated satisfactorily under the umbrella of peace studies. This type of negotiation – government versus rebel movements/terrorist organizations/insurgents – has been on the increase for the last three decades, yet it did not get necessary attention by the researchers, so creating a significant gap in international relations studies. This study aims to fill in this gap this study mainly offering a case study based on two cases in Sub-Saharan Africa: Rwanda and Burundi. As mentioned on the introductory part, despite their similar characteristics in historical background like the colonial past, cultural heritage and constant conflict cycles they had since their independence in the 1960s, these two similar – also called as sister countries in the literature – countries followed two different trajectories in resolving the violent conflict and settling the peace following a negotiation process. One failed following a catastrophic genocide and the other succeeded after a long period of negotiating.

Apart from its contribution into the literature on resolving violent intra-state conflicts, this study will especially fill in the gap in African studies in Turkish academia. This field of research is quite new and needs to be flourished. The literature regarding the Sub-Saharan African cases is still not satisfying and is also lack of micro studies dealing with specific regions and countries. This study will so help further micro studies regarding Sub-Saharan African states from the smallest ones like Burundi and the largest ones like the DRC and on specific regions like the Great Lakes Region and the Eastern Africa.

The literature on peace negotiations in general and on peace negotiations for resolving intra-state in particular is weak in Turkey. This study is the first one dealing with the issue of peace negotiation process depending on the theoretical framework of negotiation theory. Turkey has experience in negotiating with the EU, but as discussed in the introduction the literature is mainly about the historical and chronological development of negotiations with the EU. The works related to the negotiations Turkey has had in the recent past are mostly descriptive and are wandering around the field of diplomacy. The literature here again is weak in proposing a theoretical framework to analyze the negotiation process with the EU for membership and the works related to negotiations between Turkey and the EU are not able to avoid the traditional diplomatic approach – considering negotiations under the umbrella of traditional diplomatic studies. However, the future studies based on the theoretical perspective of the core negotiation theory will pave the way for better negotiations with regional and international organizations. For this reason, this study will become one of the pioneers in paving the way for such works based on a theoretical background.

Negotiation has been getting a popular term in Turkey thanks to the negotiations with the EU for the last couple of decades and Turkey's active role in the negotiations in the region and around the globe as a third party. Turkey has been taking part in negotiations in its region in the recent years as a third party – as a facilitator, mediator or a signatory in peace negotiations in intra-state and interstate conflicts in its region. Turkish delegations already participated into peace negotiations in Astana, Kazakhstan – Astana Peace Process – since 2017 for Syrian peace as facilitator together with Russia. In addition to the Syrian peace negotiations, Turkey has been contributing into the peace negotiations for resolving the conflict in Libya. Apart from Turkey's experience in recent years as facilitator or mediator in negotiation processes in the region, Turkey again is participating into the peace negotiations to resolve the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan together with Russia. Besides, Turkey states her willingness for negotiations with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (GCA) for sharing the resources in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea. For this reason, Turkey's active role in peace negotiations will be needing further academic research on negotiation to support Turkey's successful moves in the future and analyze Turkey's role in a peace negotiation.

Along with its contribution into the literature, this study also has its own weaknesses and strong parts. As to the strength of the study, this study is strong in three different fields. First one is methodological, second one is theoretical and the last one is descriptive. Its methodological strength comes from a combination of qualitative and quantitative research methods used for analysis. The QCA analysis is one of the strong parts of the study since the usage of this method is something new in international relations discipline in Turkey and promises further usage in the discipline. Another strong part is again related to the methodology used in this study. As this study enjoys three different analysis methods – the QCA analysis, case study analysis and process tracing analysis – it offers a triangulated result depending on the findings of these analysis methods. This study is strong in theoretical background as it offers detailed knowledge on negotiation theory and its different aspects. At last, the strength of this study comes from its descriptive handling of two different case countries from Sub-Saharan Africa: Rwanda and Burundi. The descriptive parts of this study regarding the historical background of these case countries and the peace processes they had had are detailed.

Despite its methodological, theoretical and descriptive strength, this study has also weaknesses. This study could have enjoyed a field study in Rwanda and Burundi including face-to-face interviews with the people who took part in the negotiation processes in these two case countries as negotiators, observers, attendants. However, it could have been hard to reach these people three decades passed over the first negotiations in Rwanda. This kind of field study also needs extra time and funds. As a part-time student it was not easy to leave for a couple of months to conduct the field study owing to heavy professional work-load and limitations for allocating necessary funds for this kind of field trip.

Despite these limitations regarding time and funds, it was possible to find institutions offering seminars and courses regarding peacebuilding studies in Rwanda and Burundi like the NGOs: the Great Lakes Peacebuilding Initiative in Burundi and Never Again Rwanda

in Rwanda. However, another limitation was that the institutions offering these seminars and course are NGO based and they are lack of academic background. The state universities in these case countries also do not offer this kind of training sessions and they do not have related research institutions welcoming applications. Attempts to contact with the responsible faculty also failed as they did not reply any official emails regarding building cooperation for further research at academic exchange level supported by Turkish government.

The samples – eight different Sub-Saharan African countries from different regions – were selected depending on the data as explained in the introduction part, but they were not selected among others in the data. The samples were selected on a purpose to limit sampling to Sub-Saharan African countries only because of their similarities in the historical background – colonial past, intra-state violence cycles after independence, similar economic problems etc. However, it can be seen as a weakness in sampling in the study, yet when considering the intensity of intra-state conflicts in African continent compared to other parts of the world, this kind of sampling helps dealing with several cases for analysis for comparison. As this study enjoys a triangulated analysis, this kind of sampling also makes it possible to make comparisons between the results of QCA analysis and case study analysis. Nevertheless, further studies can include different samples from different parts of the world that experienced intra-state conflict and a peace negotiation process trying to resolve it and put forward the findings. For this reason, this study can be a pioneer in this kind of research paving the way for further studies.

As discussed in the analysis part above the six hypotheses including the main one (duration) were analyzed in this study. Escalation was partially confirmed as a result of the QCA analysis with eight different sample countries. However, the case study shows that escalation occurred during the negotiation time was effective in bringing the conflicting parties to the negotiation desk in Burundi. But the Rwandan negotiation process did not experience this kind of escalation during the negotiation process.

Powersharing provisions, especially the political and military ones as discussed in this study, are useful in satisfying the needs of one of the parties – mostly the rebel movements/insurgents conflicting with the government in an intra-state conflict – by setting the conditions for sharing the power in political and military fields. The cases show that if the peace agreement has provisions regarding political and military powersharing with stated percentages of positions to be allocated to the new holders the result of the process is much more fruitful in terms of a durable peace. As the Arusha Peace Accord did not include necessary provisions, the rebel movement, the RPF in this case, was not satisfied with the result and this did not terminate the conflict. However, the Arusha Peace Accord for Burundi included provisions for political and military provisions for powersharing. In addition to the provisions mentioned in the Arusha Peace Accord, the Pretoria Protocols I and II, and the Dar-es-Salaam Declaration included provisions regarding the integration of the rebel movements like the CNDD and FNL.

Women and gender related issues in a negotiated peace agreement are of great importance to show the integrative approach of the agreement and the negotiation process, and the

efforts of the conflicting parties to deal with the problems of the society as well not only focusing on the political and military issues. In addition to the provisions related to women and gender related provisions it is important to note that their representation during the negotiations plays a significant role. Beside women representation in a negotiation process, it is important to stress that the attendance of the NGOs and other civil society organizations to the official negotiations at least as observers or attendants is very important again to show the integrative approach taken during a negotiation process.

The findings prove that the integration of women, the NGOs and civil society representatives into the negotiation process has a positive effect on the success of the negotiation process as the case study show us – they were present in the Burundian case, yet they were absent in the Rwandan case. However, the data already used for the QCA analysis and case study analysis does not have the related information as a separate item. The information regarding the participation of these groups were derived from the historical background. Therefore, this study might trigger further studies regarding the participation of civil groups like the NGOs, civil society organizations, and women in peace negotiations designed to resolve intra-state conflicts.

Pre-negotiation agreements constitute the backbone of the negotiation processes. The pre-negotiation process within the negotiation process as a whole consisting of different steps grounds the base necessary for successful official negotiations and post-negotiations. The Table 14 above displays the number and type of pre-negotiation agreements preceding the official negotiations in Burundi and Rwanda. As is clear on the table Burundi experienced more pre-negotiation agreements than Rwanda even though the total number of the agreements preceding the comprehensive peace agreement is almost similar. The descriptive data obtained from historical background and the quantitative data obtained from the dataset used in this study show that pre-negotiation agreements play an important role in the success of the negotiation process. The presence of these agreements within the process shows that the pre-negotiation stage is well planned and created fruitful environment for exchanging information in terms of interests and positions thanks to ice-breaking and trust building characteristics of pre-negotiation agreements.

It is hard to set the exact borders of a pre-negotiation stage within a whole negotiation process as sometimes the borders of the stages are blurred and pre-negotiation stages are mixed up with the official negotiation (negotiation proper) stage depending on a descriptive stage. However, the dataset obtained from three esteemed institutions, the Peace Accords Matrix (PAM) prepared by the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies of the University of Notre Dame, the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset Version 19.1 of the Department of Peace and Conflict Research of Uppsala University and the Peace Agreements Database (PA-X) of the University of Edinburgh, help researchers to set the exact borders between the stages as these institutions have coded them separately as a result of a meticulous work, therefor the data is of great importance here to see the related borders and conduct analysis depending on the data here.

Neighboring country's influence on the negotiation process was also investigated here depending on again the quantitative and descriptive data. The findings of this study put

forward that presence of a neighboring country as a facilitator or mediator or signatory in a negotiation process has a positive effect on the result – successful negotiation process. The presence of a neighboring country as a third party during the process contributes into the success of negotiation process. As a third party, a neighboring country's presence can be evaluated as a facilitator, a mediator or a signatory depending on the data. As the findings regarding the cases show that both of the case study countries enjoy the presence of a neighboring party as a third party – facilitator or mediator or signatory – during the negotiations. However, one succeeded the process and the other one failed.

Nevertheless, apart from attending the negotiation process in different positions, neighboring countries can also use their collective regional power as they did in the Burundian case by using economic sanctions as a leverage to get the Burundian government to the negotiation desk. Neighboring countries want to join the process as they do not want to have the instability going on just behind at their borders. These states normally fear of a domino effect, which is also seen in the historical background of the two case countries, Rwanda and Burundi. The military 'creeping coup' in Burundi in 1993 influenced the domestic politics and stability in Rwanda accelerating the preparations for the Rwandan genocide as claimed in the literature. The Rwandan genocide influenced the domestic politics and stability in Burundi in 1994 as well intensifying the conflict between the Burundian government and the insurgents. The intra-state conflict creates instability because of the violent conflicts or a civil war within the country bearing some other political, economic, military and humanitarian problems like the refugees, proliferation of the conflict over the region, economic problems like stuck transportation etc.

Duration is the variable in this study that helps to evaluate the main hypothesis in this dissertation: the influence of duration on the success of negotiation processes in resolving intra-state conflicts. As mentioned before here several times, peace agreements are not one-time-deals and they need long time for becoming mature including several steps necessary for this maturity. As discussed above on the analysis chapter, the findings point out the high consistency of duration. The findings show that the longer the negotiation process the more successful it is. At least five-years of negotiating is necessary to include all necessary steps in a negotiation and the longer the process the better.

The findings depending on the QCA analysis made with eight different samples display that the negotiation processes lasting longer than five years bear successful results. However, the samples with less than five years of negotiating do not result in successfully negotiated peace processes as they miss the necessary checkpoints to be fulfilled within the process like pre-negotiation, preparation, official negotiations, implementation and renegotiation processes. The findings obtained from descriptive data on the Burundi case demonstrate that the process is long and longer than the Rwandan case, so including every necessary steps for a successful negotiation like secret negotiations and back-channel negotiations for trust building and ice-breaking sessions held during the pre-negotiation phases and well-preparation with a good selection of mediators and international witnessing to the negotiation process, and other steps necessary for post-negotiation stage including further meetings, talks, negotiations and agreements regarding the drafting

sessions of the agreement, implementation of the preceding agreements, especially the comprehensive peace agreement and renegotiations regarding the future agreements for keeping the peace already-set.

Duration is important also to include necessary checkpoints at the implementation and post-negotiation stages. Implementation of the already agreed and negotiated mutual agreement and renegotiations regarding the preceding agreements are comprehensive stages with several sub-sections on-the-go in a negotiation process. It is not enough just to sign the comprehensive peace agreement and not to form the necessary mechanisms for its implementation like power-sharing agreements, neutral committees for following the implementation process and to supervise the security of the political people and military personnel and the refugees in some cases. The implementation stage also normally requires a peacekeeping force established with the support of the regional countries or by the UN with troops from its members to provide the security during the implementation and post-implementation period to prevent possible conflicts and deal with spoiler problems.

Another important issue related to the implementation and post-implementation stages is the funding problem as all related activities by different institutions need to be sufficiently funded by the negotiating parties – the government in intra-state conflicts – and/or the third parties like the regional countries, regional or international institutions, transnational organizations and the NGOs. If the negotiation process is not well funded, the negotiation processes might as well end up in failure. For this reason, funding issue also needs a longer duration in a negotiation process because it should be made clear who is funding and how. This means that the negotiations also cover related negotiations within the process regarding the funding and the allocation mechanisms of the funds.

Among the other variables used in this dissertation to test the hypotheses, the variable 'duration' has the most significant explaining power because the results of the study show that whenever duration variable is present then there exists a successful negotiation process.

Apart from the main hypotheses tested in this study there are some other causal conditions bearing the result of a negotiation process as successful or failed. One of the problems in negotiating to resolve intra-state conflicts is to struggle with the spoiler problem. The case study shows us that taking necessary measures to integrate the spoilers into the peace process has a significant influence on the successful result of the negotiation process. Rwanda was not successful in getting the spoilers in and this resulted in making the spoilers, the CDR and the militia, *interhamwe*, more extremist. Hence, the spoilers burnt down the tent when they understood they were not welcome in there. This extremism is also seen as one of the factors creating the atmosphere for the Rwandan genocide. However, Burundi managed to include them thanks to the efforts of the mediator, Mandela.

Mediator's fame is the other causal condition. Mediator's fame gives her or him the power during negotiations, which can be used as a leverage over the negotiating parties especially in finalizing the draft. Mandela enjoyed his fame to use it as a power during the negotiations because he was a respected personality in the African continent owing to his struggle against the apartheid in the South Africa and his international popularity. His power was

so great that he used it as a leverage for getting the parties to the signing of the Arusha Peace Accord as a ceremony with the participation of regional and international delegations including the US President Bill Clinton.

International witnessing of the official peace process was also found significant when the findings compared regarding the Burundian and Rwandan case. The Rwandan case is away from international witnessing, but the Burundian case included international witnessing thanks to the efforts of the renowned mediator Mandela. He invited US President Bill Clinton and delegations of other international players in world politics to the signing ceremony of the Arusha Peace Accords. This had a positive effect on the signature and success of the negotiation process. In addition, benefitting from the international powers might have a leverage effect on the conflicting parties to mutually agree on the agreement text. However, this could be a research topic of a further study examining the effect of international powers like China, France, Germany, Russia, Turkey, the UK and the USA in negotiation processes.

Finally, together with empirical and conceptual contribution into the literature, this study has also a prescriptive contribution into the literature. The findings this dissertation points out can offer a prescriptive model for further research regarding peace negotiations for resolving intra-state conflicts. The conditions used for empirical analysis (QCA analysis and case study analysis) can be used as a check list for evaluating the success of a negotiation process or implying necessary steps to be taken for the negotiators and mediators. The conditions this study emphasizes can also be used to form a scaling system depending on the core data of reputable institutions to make predictions over the course of a negotiation – not limiting the data with one region but including all intra-state conflicts from all over the globe.

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ANNEXES

ANNEX I

Truth Table displaying 64 configurations.

ESCAL	POWSHARING	WOMAN	PRENEGO	NEIGH	DUREE	N	Consist	Outcome	ObsConsist	ObsInconsist
True	True	True	True	True	True	1	1.00	True	BR	-
True	True	True	True	True	False	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
True	True	True	True	False	True	1	1.00	True	LIB	-
True	True	True	True	False	False	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
True	True	True	False	True	True	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
True	True	True	False	True	False	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
True	True	True	False	False	True	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
True	True	True	False	False	False	1	0.00	False	-	SL
True	True	False	True	True	True	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
True	True	False	True	True	False	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
True	True	False	True	False	True	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
True	True	False	True	False	False	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
True	True	False	False	True	True	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
True	True	False	False	True	False	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
True	True	False	False	False	True	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
True	True	False	False	False	False	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
True	False	True	True	True	True	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
True	False	True	True	True	False	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
True	False	True	True	False	True	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
True	False	True	True	False	False	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
True	False	True	False	True	True	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
True	False	True	False	True	False	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
True	False	True	False	False	True	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
True	False	True	False	False	False	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
True	False	False	True	True	True	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
True	False	False	True	True	False	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
True	False	False	True	False	True	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
True	False	False	True	False	False	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
True	False	False	False	True	True	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
True	False	False	False	True	False	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
True	False	False	False	False	True	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
True	False	False	False	False	False	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
False	True	True	True	True	True	1	1.00	True	SUD	-
False	True	True	True	True	False	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
False	True	True	True	False	True	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
False	True	True	True	False	False	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
False	True	True	False	True	True	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
False	True	True	False	True	False	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
False	True	True	False	False	True	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
False	True	True	False	False	False	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
False	True	False	True	True	True	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
False	True	False	True	True	False	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
False	True	False	True	False	True	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
False	True	False	True	False	False	1	0.00	False	-	MOZ
False	True	False	False	True	True	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
False	True	False	False	True	False	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
False	True	False	False	False	True	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
False	True	False	False	False	False	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
False	False	True	True	True	True	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
False	False	True	True	True	False	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
False	False	True	True	False	True	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
False	False	True	True	False	False	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
False	False	True	False	True	True	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
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False	False	True	False	False	True	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
False	False	True	False	False	False	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
False	False	False	True	True	True	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
False	False	False	True	True	False	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
False	False	False	True	False	True	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
False	False	False	True	False	False	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
False	False	False	False	True	True	1	1.00	True	IC	-
False	False	False	False	True	False	1	0.00	False	-	RW
False	False	False	False	False	True	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
False	False	False	False	False	False	1	0.00	False	-	GB

ANNEX II

Negated Truth Table displaying 64 configurations.

ESCAL	POWSHARING	WOMAN	PRENEGO	NEIGH	DUREE	N	Consist	Outcome	ObsConsist	ObsInconsist
True	True	True	True	True	True	1	0.00	False	-	BR
True	True	True	True	True	False	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
True	True	True	True	False	True	1	0.00	False	-	LIB
True	True	True	True	False	False	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
True	True	True	False	True	True	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
True	True	True	False	True	False	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
True	True	True	False	False	True	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
True	True	True	False	False	False	1	1.00	True	SL	-
True	True	False	True	True	True	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
True	True	False	True	True	False	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
True	True	False	True	False	True	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
True	True	False	True	False	False	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
True	True	False	False	True	True	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
True	True	False	False	True	False	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
True	True	False	False	False	True	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
True	True	False	False	False	False	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
True	False	True	True	True	True	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
True	False	True	True	True	False	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
True	False	True	True	False	True	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
True	False	True	True	False	False	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
True	False	True	False	True	True	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
True	False	True	False	True	False	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
True	False	True	False	False	True	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
True	False	True	False	False	False	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
True	False	False	True	True	True	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
True	False	False	True	True	False	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
True	False	False	True	False	True	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
True	False	False	True	False	False	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
True	False	False	False	True	True	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
True	False	False	False	True	False	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
True	False	False	False	False	True	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
True	False	False	False	False	False	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
False	True	True	True	True	True	1	0.00	False	-	SUD
False	True	True	True	True	False	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
False	True	True	True	False	True	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
False	True	True	True	False	False	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
False	True	True	False	True	True	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
False	True	True	False	True	False	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
False	True	True	False	False	True	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
False	True	True	False	False	False	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
False	True	False	True	True	True	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
False	True	False	True	True	False	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
False	True	False	True	False	True	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
False	True	False	True	False	False	1	1.00	True	MOZ	-
False	True	False	False	True	True	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
False	True	False	False	True	False	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
False	True	False	False	False	True	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
False	True	False	False	False	False	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
False	False	True	True	True	True	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
False	False	True	True	True	False	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
False	False	True	True	False	True	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
False	False	True	True	False	False	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
False	False	True	False	True	True	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
False	False	True	False	True	False	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
False	False	True	False	False	True	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
False	False	True	False	False	False	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
False	False	False	True	True	True	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
False	False	False	True	True	False	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
False	False	False	True	False	True	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
False	False	False	True	False	False	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
False	False	False	False	True	True	1	0.00	False	-	IC
False	False	False	False	True	False	1	1.00	True	RW	-
False	False	False	False	False	True	0	n/a	Rem	-	-
False	False	False	False	False	False	1	1.00	True	GB	-

RESUME

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Publications

Monographs
Çevresel Güvenlik: Ruanda ve Burundi için Çatışma Çözümleme Örnekleri (in Turkish) (Environmental Security: Conflict Resolutions Samples for Rwanda and Burundi). Lambert Academic Publishing, 2017.

Book Chapters
1. "1994 Ruanda Soykırımı: 1948 BM Soykırım Suçunun Önlenmesine ve Cezalandırılmasına Dair Sözleşme Kapsamında Değerlendirilmesi". In *Afrika Politikası 21. Yüzyılda Güvenlik, Refah ve Demokrasi Arayışı* (ed. Hasret Çomak, Caner Sancaktar and Huriye Y. Çinar, İstanbul: BETA, 2017, pp. 91-111).
2. "Demokratik Congo Cumhuriyeti Doğusundaki İç Çtışmalara Çevresel Güvenlik Perspektifinden Bir Bakış". In *Afrika Politikası 21. Yüzyılda Güvenlik, Refah ve Demokrasi Arayışı* (ed. Hasret Çomak, Caner Sancaktar and Huriye Y. Çinar, İstanbul: BETA, 2017, pp. 111-125).
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