


YEDITEPE UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES



THE REVOLT OF SHEIKH UBEYDULLAH (1880-1881):
AN INSTRUMENTALIST STUDY OF A NATIONALIST MOVEMENT

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Istanbul 2024

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In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in Political Science
and International Relations of Department

Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Ilkim Buke Okyar

Istanbul 2024

DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

I state that I wrote this thesis, which I submitted as a master's thesis, without resorting to any method or assistance that would be contrary to scientific morality and traditions, that the works I used consist of those shown in the bibliography, and that I quote these works every time I use them; I confirm this with honor. I declare that I will bear all the moral and legal consequences that may arise if the Institute detects a situation that is contrary to this statement I have made regarding my thesis, regardless of a certain time.

Ali Sadiq Bayraq

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ABSTRACT

At the end of the 19th century, between 1880-1881, Sheikh Ubeydullah, the leader of the Naqshbandi sect, attacked the cities and villages of the border regions of Iran and the Ottoman Empire and caused many killings and loots in the Qajar Empire's Azerbaijan state. The reason for the beginning of this rebellion was the jeopardy of the Sheikh's personal interests. The sheikh lost the right to own several villages, which were actually a gift from Shah Qajar to his father. In the following, the signing of the Berlin Treaty and the Sheikh's fear of creating an Armenian state in his claimed territory were added for this reason. Sheikh needed supporters and followers to maintain his power and wealth. By creating ethnic and religious symbols and distorting the existing symbols, he provoked the people and mobilized supporters. Therefore, it can be said that Sheikh as an elite, by creating ethnic symbols and abusing them, was able to bring the heads of Kurdish tribes and their citizens with him and try to protect his interests under the title of Kurdish nationalism. In this thesis, the method of discourse analysis with inductive approach is used. In the historical study of the movement, it has been tried to use more first-hand sources and government archives.

Key Words: Sheikh Ubeydullah, Ottoman, Qajar, Iran

ŞEYH UBEYDULLAH İSYANI (1880-1881):

MİLLİYETÇİ BİR HAREKETİN ENSTRÜMENTALİST BİR ÇALIŞMASI

ÖZET

19. yüzyılın sonlarında, 1880-1881 yılları arasında Nakşibendi tarikatı lideri Şeyh Ubeydullah, İran ve Osmanlı Devleti'nin sınır bölgelerindeki şehir ve köylere saldırarak Kaçar İmparatorluğu'nun Azerbaycan eyaletinde çok sayıda cinayet ve yağma yapılmasına neden oldu. Bu isyanın başlamasının nedeni Şeyh'in kişisel çıkarlarının tehlikeye girmesiydi. Şeyh, aslında Kaçar şahının babasına bir hediyesi olan birkaç köye sahip olma hakkını kaybetti. Devamında Berlin Antlaşması'nın imzalanması ve Şeyh'in iddia ettiği topraklarda bir Ermeni devleti kurma korkusu da bu nedenle eklenmiştir. Şeyh'in gücünü ve zenginliğini korumak için destekçilere ve takipçilere ihtiyacı vardı. Etnik ve dini semboller yaratıp mevcut sembolleri çarpıtarak halkı kışkırttı ve taraftarlarını harekete geçirdi. Dolayısıyla Şeyh'in bir elit olarak etnik semboller yaratarak ve bunları istismar ederek Kürt aşiret reislerini ve vatandaşlarını yanında getirebildiği ve Kürt milliyetçiliği adı altında kendi çıkarlarını korumaya çalıştığı söylenebilir. Bu tezde tümevarımsal yaklaşımla anlatı analizi yöntemi kullanılmıştır. Hareketin tarihsel incelemesinde daha çok birinci elden kaynaklardan ve devlet arşivlerinden yararlanılmaya çalışıldı.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Şeyh Ubeydullah, Osmanlı, Kaçar, İran

DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to my dear wife. Thank you sincerely for always being by my side.



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I am grateful to the professor who always supported me with both his constructive attitudes and knowledge in completing this study.

I'm glad I had the chance to know you and work with you Prof. Ilkim Buke Okyar



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INTRODUCTION

When I was a child, my grandmother, to calm us down, used to shout that (sheikh geldi). We did not know what this meant, but as soon as we heard it, we knew very well that we had to sit quietly in a corner. Because we were afraid even to imagine what he would do to us if we misbehaved and that sheikh came. Later, when I was a university student, I came across the word (sheikh geldi) by chance in a book (Alizade, 1379), and I understood what my grandmother was talking about. Seyyed Hasan Taghizade, one of the politicians and intellectuals of Iran, who lived in Tabriz as a child in those years, wrote in his memoirs: “My mother always left some bread in the well in the garden. So that if the Kurds attack the city, we can hide in the well” (Alizade, 1379, p. 365).

Between 1880 and 1881, the sheikh of the Naqshbandi sect called Sheikh Ubeydullah, attacked Iranian lands and in this attack, he also massacred the local population and plundered their assets. These terrible events were called the (sheikh geldi) incident among the people of the region and remained in people's memories for years.

An analysis of the Sheikh Ubeydullah movement in 1880 is attempted in this study. His movement seems to be a result of religious disputes between the Ottoman and Qajar empires. He is a prominent Naqshbandi-Khalidi sheikh in the sect. By now, both states were attempting to negotiate their borders. As the Kurdish issue has garnered more attention recently, his movement has become the most frequently cited example of the first Kurdish movement with national aspirations. This is Sheikh Ubeydullah's letter, which is most famously reported by Dr. Cochran, addressed to William Abbott, the British Consul General in Tabriz:

“The Kurdish nation, consisting of more than 500,000 families, is a people apart. Their religion is different [from that of others], and their laws and customs are distinct The Chiefs and Rulers of Kurdistan, whether Turkish or Persian subjects, and the inhabitants of Kurdistan, one and all are united and agreed that matters cannot be carried on in this way with the two Governments [Ottoman and Qajar], and that necessarily something must be done, so that European Governments having understood the matter, shall inquire into our state. We also are a nation apart. We want our affairs to be in our own hands....” (John, 1961, pp. 109-110).

The central Ottoman authority was also disturbed by these remarks. The Ottoman government actually took a long time to verify the letter's validity. Based only on the letter, the authorities did not discover any evidence of a conspiracy; however, the sheikh was banished when they started to suspect that he was unable to use his power to support the Ottoman authority. There did not seem to be any political goals behind his movement. It was a movement that came out of nowhere at such a delicate moment and garnered a lot of attention.

The idea that the sultan was attempting to instigate a Kurdish issue against the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire arose from the Armenian question following the Treaty of Berlin. In view of this, the Sheikh's nationalism needs to be reexamined. The Sheikh was not hesitant to pursue other matters on behalf of the Kurds, even if he stated that he had his own land dispute with the Qajar Empire. Opponents of his claimed he was planning something else besides reclaiming his property.

AIM OF THE THESIS

This master's thesis focus on imperial transformations in the 19th century. By turning its gaze to the Qajar Dynasty of Iran, it deconstructs the ideology of nationalism as an autonomous force for change. The study brings forward Sheikh Ubeydullah movement of 1880s' Iran, with a specific focus on assessing its potential classification as an ethnic nationalist movement. To achieve this, the study will delve into the historical political and social context surrounding the movement, employing an instrumentalist approach to analyze its characteristics and underlying motivations.

Discourse analysis will be my research method in this study. This thesis will use this method with the inductive approach. So, first, it investigate the sheikh's action and the reasons behind it. To do this, the state archives will be used, especially the disclosed archives of the states of Iran and Türkiye. This thesis will also benefit from history books written on this subject, especially the books and memories written by people living in that period, and theses written on the subject.

In the next chapter, the thesis will discuss the issue of nationality and nationalism. It will endeavor to explain mainstream theories of nationalism. In this chapter, a theory will be chosen that is compatible with and can explain the movement of the sheikh that was researched in the first chapter. In the next chapter, the thesis will try to explain in detail the theory and approach it chose. In the following chapter, it will answer the question of our thesis and fill the basis of our claim with this theory and approach. In the last chapter, the conclusion of the thesis will be written.

1. THEORETICAL AND HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

The Nationalism Project is a prominent online archive that was founded by the Association for Research on Ethnicity and Nationalism in the Americas. It highlights three primary discussions that surround the study of nationalism: first, the issue of defining terms such as nation, nationality, nationalism, nationhood, ethnicity and ethnic group; second, the discussion of the historical context of the formation of nations; and third, the reason for and mechanisms behind historical changes in nationalism and nations (Zuelow, 2017). These three key concerns have united nationalism experts, who differ in their premises, in an attempt to make sense of what is certainly the most highly discussed phenomena of the post-modern era.

Do nations exist as eternal occurrences that coexisted with the genesis of humanity? Or are these items from the modern era? Stated differently, do we believe that nations are something that humans socially constructed, imagined, or have they always existed, as some Primordialists argue? Who makes them or imagines them if they are not established or natural? What boundaries do they have? Who is a member of the nation and who is not? If nation-states are imagined, as modernism and ethno-symbolism claim, then how are nationalist ideologies spread? Why do people have nationalistic inclinations and why do states have nationalistic mindsets? Why are they too strong and ingrained in our cultural immune systems to be easily disregarded or countered, and why are they so unquestionably untouchable in our mental nature to be called into question?

This chapter has three major purposes. It starts by attempting to give a succinct summary of the main theoretical arguments for these topics. It is important to emphasize that the selection of notable academics in this chapter is subject to time and space constraints within the research and does not claim to be unbiased or ideal. Ethnosymbolism, modernism, and primordialism are the three basic streams of thought that comprise current nationalism ideologies. As P. Brass notes, the distinction between the three is due to “the conceptual differences among scholars concerning the very nature of the groups involved, namely, whether they are 'natural', 'primordial', 'given' communities or whether they are creations of elite groups, interested leaders, or the political system in which they are included” (Brass, 1991, p. 69).

The latter two place more emphasis on a political conception of the nation and the nation-making process, whereas the primordialists view the nation as a cultural and socio-biological phenomena (Bacova, 1998).

Primordialists often hold that nations are inherent, eternal, and natural entities. Every individual within the community has innate feelings derived from their birthplace, spoken language, race, and blood type. These feelings are deeply rooted in people's emotions and constitute the given of humanity (Brass, 1991). The modernists, on the other hand, contend that nations were not primordial nor the result of certain, deeply ingrained historical processes. Rather, nations were the result of “recent historical developments and of the rational, planned activity made possible and necessary by the conditions of the modern era” (Smith, 1998, p. 19). The creation of nations was primarily influenced by industrialization, urbanization, secularism, and the emergence of centralized states (Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 1983).

Lastly, ethno-symbolism acknowledges the modern nature of nations while highlighting the importance of myths, symbols, memories, values, rituals, and traditions in the formation of modern nations (Anderson, 2006; Smith A. D., *Nationalism and Modernism: a critical survey of recent theories of nation*, 1998). It is widely regarded as a middle ground between the two opposing poles of the debate (Kennedy, 2011).

The second goal of this chapter is to critically examine the fundamental assumptions made by modernist and ethno-symbolist approaches—which belong to the instrumentalism school of thought—about the state's and elites' roles in the formation of ethnic identity. In summary, prominent modernist intellectuals have understood nations as discursive formations, created, shaped, and even produces by states and their leaders to seize power, maintain their standing, and generate political and/or socioeconomic gain (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983).

According to modernists, elites have a significant influence on how ethnic identity is formed because they employ “invented traditions” (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983, p. 2; Smith, 2009). However, ethno-symbolists do not regard nations as purely elite constructs, even as they acknowledge the significance of elites and political institutions in the creation of contemporary states. Ethno-symbolists argue that this kind of thinking ignores the significance of ethnicity and the reasons underlying people's nationalistic inclinations (Smith, 2009). They see it as vital

to understand the complex interactions that exist between elites and ethnies (ethnic groups) in terms of the symbols, myths, values, and customs that speak to them (Smith, 2009).

This chapter's ultimate goal is to present an overview of Paul Brass' nationalism theory as it is presented in his 1991 study *Ethnicity and Nationalism*. His views on the formation of ethnic identities and nations may be summed up in two basic ways: first, “ethnicity and nationalism are not 'givens,' but are social and political constructions”. They are the products of elites who, in order to preserve their existence or well-being or to secure political and economic benefits for both their groups and themselves, appropriate, misappropriate, and occasionally even fabricate elements of the cultures of the groups they seek to represent; second, “ethnicity and nationalism are modern phenomena inseparably connected with the activities of the modern centralizing state” (Brass, 1991, p. 8).

1.1.Primordialism

Among the main narratives of nationalism primordialism is the first that aimed to explain the character of nations and origins and vigor (strength) of ethnic ties in the study of nationalism. It is usually agreed that the word, used “in reference to relationships within the family”, was originally defined by E. Shills in 1957 and developed by C. Geertz in 1973 (Eller & Coughlan, 1993, p. 183). Primordialist theory generally sees nations as a type of extended kinship and considers nationality, like race, to be a natural attribute of humans deriving from strong, indescribable, and yet coercive primordial attachments (Smith, 1998; Özkırımlı, 2000; Llobera, 2004; Smith, 2009). Although the primordialist method is based on these facts, it is important to note that the premises of the proponents of primordialism have changed throughout time, making it impossible for scholars to find them in a single body of work. In the following, I will assess primordialists using three subcategories: organic/naturalist, socio-biological, and cultural views, using on Smith (1998) as a source.

The naturalist perspective, which is perhaps the most radical variation of the primordialist perspective, argues that ethnic identity is inherent to humans and that everyone has a nationality, just as everyone has sense organs. In a comparable vein, naturalists assert that a man's assigned nation is preset; to put it another way, belonging to a nation is essentially the same as being born

into a family. Consequently, the natural division of humans into distinct ethnic groups is a part of the natural order (Özkırmılı, 2000).

According to the socio-biological approach, the fundamental attachments that form the basis of ethnic identities are essentially biological or genetic (Brass, 1991). Sociobiological primordialists hold that ethnicity, spoken language, religious affiliation, and homeland are the essential bases and ties that have bound human association since the beginning of time. They believe that nations, ethnic groups, and races are extensions of kin selection (Smith, 1998; Özkırmılı, 2000). In this sense, nations and ethnic identities are primordial—that is, they exist before more recent and contemporary forms, and they also serve as the basis for the development of the modern notion of nationalism. Very little less important, these first bonds have divided humans throughout history along with sex and skin color, and they will continue to do so. Nationalism, ethnicity, and nations are therefore neither contemporary nor imagined (Smith, 1986).

Lastly, the cultural primordialist approach, which is closely linked to the writings of E. Shils and C. Geertz, focuses on human understandings and beliefs. It is based on the idea that, as Özkırmılı (2000) notes, “what generates the strong attachments people feel for the ‘givens of the social existence’ is a belief in their existence” (p. 74). The main tenets of the cultural primordialist approach, drawing on Eller and Coughlan, can be summed up as follows: first, innate attachments are innate; they exist before all human experiences. Primordial identities have always existed and are not in the slightest social; rather, they are natural and even spiritual. Second, primordial attachments have undefined, dominating, and coercive characteristics. Finally, Primordialist theory is essentially an emotional matter (Ellen & Coughlan, 1993, p. 187).

1.2.Modernism

The primordialist view, which holds that nations existed before nationalism, was challenged by the modernist approach, which has become the mainstream orthodoxy in nationalism studies. It also arose as a result of the devastation caused by extreme nationalist, racist, and fascist ideologies, as well as the tragedy of two total wars. The modernist method did not become the dominant paradigm in the study of nationalism until the 1970s, despite the fact that many researchers had highlighted the modern nature of nations before the turn of the century. Even after ethno-symbolists have been criticizing nationalism for a long time—since the late 20th century—the modernist school of thought continues to dominate the subject.

Though the modernists and primordialists do not form a monolithic group, they do share certain commonalities that are indicative of the modernist school of thought: the notion that nations are new and recent; that nationalism is too recent and novel as an ideology and movement; and that both emerged from the process of modernization (Smith, 2009). Put differently, modernists believed that nations and nationalism, which arose in the 19th and early 20th centuries, were products of more recent developments like industrialization, modernization, and state centralization; these factors collectively made the idea of nationalism necessary, which gave rise to the nations (Gellner, 1983; Smith, 1998; Llobera, 1999; Özkırımlı, 2000). Thus, in their attempts to explain the genesis of nations and nationalism, eminent modernist scholars have found three things in common: (1) nations and nationalism are modern constructs; (2) both emerged as a result of the transition from traditional to modern society; and (3) nationalism exists before nations.

Aside from these three shared characteristics, modernist paradigm proponents have little in common; they each focused on a different set of factors as the primary cause of the rise of nationalistic ideas, and they differed in how they interpreted the role of elites and the state in the formation of ethnic identities. Because of this, and drawing on Özkırımlı (2000), the modernists will be analyzed in the sections that follow under three broad headings related to the key elements they have highlighted in relation to the emergence of nationalism: economic, political, and social/cultural.

1.2.1. Economic Transformation

The primary premise of researchers who understand nations in economic terms is that national awareness is largely a “false consciousness”. Stated differently, the concept of nation is subordinate to economic concerns. This understanding of the “national question” via economic lenses has been adopted by many researchers, both Marxist and non-Marxist. This explanatory framework appears in modern literature in a variety of forms, but it consistently rejects “the specific character of the national fact” (Llobera, 1999, p. 13).

Marxist theorists that view nationalism as a byproduct of the modern age and assume a causal link between the rise of the nation-state and nationalism and the spread of industrial capitalism are among the most well-known efforts (Smith, 1998; Llobera, 1999). Marx believed that the nation state served as a crucial foundation for the implementation of market capitalism. That is to say, according to Marxist theory, a nation-state was the only place where the money, goods, and labor needed for extensive production and commerce could circulate freely and securely. Thus, industrial capitalism placed great significance on the creation of homogenous nations, and as a result, “the political and cultural development of the leading nations” was a necessary condition for the success of the capitalist system (Smith, 1998, p. 47).

It is crucial to remember that, according to Marx, the nation was only a transient structure created by the capitalist class to support the expansion of industrial capitalism, not a basic category of social existence (Llobera, 1999).

The classical Marxists were largely devoted to economic analyses that either clarified or reduced nationalist movements to the workings of the capitalist system, with the exception of neo-Marxist scholars, particularly those of the Austro-Marxian tradition, whose proponents emphasized the role of culture and society as independent variables in the development of nations (Smith, 1998).

Marxist scholars have often emphasized the following topics, notwithstanding the difficulties of speaking of an accord over the national question: The petit-bourgeois character of nationalism, its origin in an intelligentsia that is progressively squeezed between major proletariat movements and huge capital; the triumphant bourgeoisie's employment of nationalist ideology to create false consciousness and divide and distract the masses that endangered their position ;

the progressive character of nationalisms, or anti-colonial liberation movements, spearheaded by a young colonial bourgeoisie in opposition to imperialist capitalists' exploitation (Smith, 1998).

According to Tom Nairn, “the theory of nationalism represents Marxism's great historical failure” (p. 317), in his 2003 book *The Break-up of Britain*. Many attempts were made in the 1970s to interpret nationalism along updated Marxist lines in the wake of the nationalist movements in Europe and North America, as well as the failure of classical Marxism to explain these events. Among the most prominent were the ideas of Michael Hechter's *Internal Colonialism* (1975) and Tom Nairn's *Uneven Development* (1977), which tried to find the origins of nationalism in “the rational workings of the world economy and the social and economic interests of individuals” (Smith, 1998, p. 5).

Tom Nairn argued that, from the turn of the nineteenth century, the roots of nationalism must be “sought in the general process of historical development” notwithstanding Marxist thought's incapacity to address the national question. As a result, comprehending the concept of nationalism requires an understanding of “world history” (as cited in Özkırımlı, 2000, p. 89). Nationalistic ideals were, in this sense, brought about by certain features of the global economy during the modern era, starting with the French Revolution and continuing to the present. Nevertheless, Nairn believed that nationalism had origins in the “uneven development” of history in the contemporary age rather than being solely an inevitable byproduct of industrialization. To put it more clearly, industrial civilization was supposed to evolve steadily and evenly, according to a consensus among Western thinkers. The peripheral would ultimately catch up with the core as long as it correctly followed the growth of capitalism and the creation of the required institutions. But as the world saw, the “even development” theory's proponents were incorrect, and capitalism development did not occur “evenly”. On the other hand, the center predominated over the edges (as cited in Özkırımlı, 2000, p. 89).

According to Nairn, this unequal growth and the widening distance between the core and the periphery meant that the leaders of the peripheral governments had to take responsibility for their own fate. These elites had to take a different route in order to catch up with the core; there was no room for direct involvement from the core, and their only choice was to appeal to the

populace (as quoted in Smith, 2000). He defined it as “the deliberate creation of a militant, inter-class community that was acutely aware of its unique identity in relation to external forces of dominance” (as cited in Özkırımlı, 2000, p. 90).

Nairn (1996) put it thus way: “is not a reflection, a mirror of ethnic variety. It is a set of levers (which are sometimes weapons) through which ethnos is driven into a new salience in human affairs” (Nairn, 1996, p. 270). It is a result of the capitalism system's unequal development. Nationalism was removed from nationalities by the uneven march toward modernity, as elites controlled, oppressed, and changed others (Nairn, 1996).

In Hechter's Internal Colonialism model, too, the unequal growth between the core and the periphery is located in the center. Hechter contends in his analysis of the national development of the British Isles that capitalist industrialization aggravated the British Isles' underdevelopment and prevailing economic dependency in comparison to England, and that this growing uneven development became apparent in ethno-national actions (as cited in Llobera, 1999, p. 11).

According to Hechter, the Celtic fringe (Wales, Scotland, and Ireland) and England had a different pace of geopolitical union. Although England had always been the largest of the British Isles, the other islands could only become England's internal colonies if political integration was combined with economic exploitation. Industrialization brought about a shift for Scotland, Wales, and Ireland from their heartlands to their peripheries or internal colonies. Capitalist industrialism played a crucial part in this process by making the periphery economically dependent on the center. As a result of intensified and regular interactions between the peripheral states and the core, this dependency gave rise to a new web of social relationships (as cited in Smith, 1998).

The core idea of the internal colonialism theory is that a hierarchical cultural division of labor was established as a result of internal colonization (Hind, 1984). Hechter (1975) defined cultural division of labor as “a stratification system in which class lines are superimposed with objective cultural distinctions” those from urban cultures often hold high-status jobs, whereas those from indigenous cultures are grouped at the bottom of the social hierarchy (Hechter, 1975, p. 30). Ethno-nationalism ultimately arises as a mirror of the subordinates' perceived material

exploitation and political and economic reliance, as capitalist industrialization ultimately strengthens the uneven stratification of social order in favor of the core (Llobera, 1999).

1.2.2. Political Transformation

What has been referred to as political modernism is another theoretical iteration of the modernist methodology. Proponents of this line of modernist thinking often agree that the nation and the state emerged simultaneously in the West. With the advent of the American and French revolutions, a new global order was established in which the nation-state served as the primary unit of collective identity and the main political framework (Smith, 1998).

In what follows, I will examine the theoretical accounts of scholars who have explained the emergence of nations and nationalism by focusing on the contemporary, centralized, bureaucratic state and its political elites.

John Breuilly, one of the leading proponents of political modernism, primarily argues that the concept of nationalism needs to be understood as a form of politics and that that form of politics only becomes meaningful in terms of the particular political context and aim of nationalism. Breuilly focused on political transformation to account for the emergence of nationalism. knowledge those objectives and background requires a knowledge of the evolution of the contemporary state. In addition to regulating nationalist politics, it provides them with their primary tool: state control (Breuilly, 1993).

While nationalism as a political phenomenon only arose in the modern era as an opposition to political modernization, Breuilly acknowledges the existence of ethnic groups and national attachments in medieval Europe. Nationalism can take three forms: separation, reform, and unification (Breuilly, 1996). Because of this, nationalism is defined by Breuilly (1993) as “political movements seeking or exercising state power and justifying such action with nationalist arguments” (Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, 1993, p. 2). He points out that a nationalist argument is therefore a political theory based on the following three tenets: First, there is a nation with a distinct and unusual identity. Second, this notion's interests and values supersede all other interests and values. Finally, the nation has to be as self-sufficient as possible. Usually, achieving political sovereignty is necessary for this (Breuilly, 1993, p. 2).

According to Breuilly, the modern state served as a crucial mechanism in this conflict by providing a framework for the successful operation of nationalisms. According to Smith (1999), it created the conditions for nationalist ideology, elites, symbols, and rituals to inspire the populace to rebel against the government. Breuilly points out that although socioeconomic, cultural, and aristocratic interests play a significant role, they are not sufficient to fully understand nationalism. It would be a delusion to see nationalism as the politics of elites, according to Breuilly, who makes the case that elites have played a crucial role in forming, controlling, and spearheading national uprisings. Rather, it is critical to recognize nationalism as a political ideology; politics is about power, and control of the state is about power. As a result, the primary goal need to be to link nationalism to the desire for and use of state authority (Breuilly, 1993).

Eric Hobsbawm's *The Invention of Traditions* (1983) and *Nations and Nationalism after 1780* (1990) both make substantial contributions to the study of nationalism. One might classify the British Marxist historian Hobsbawm as a supporter of the political modernist school of thought, which holds that political change precedes the rise of nations and nationalism. Hobsbawm considers nationalism as a “invented tradition” created by elites to maintain their standing, which was being threatened by the enormous social change that has occurred since the industrial revolution, while acknowledging the contemporary nature of nations and nationalism (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983, p. 2).

One of the main conclusions drawn from his examination of nationalism is the impact of new traditions that were created by elites on the formation of new nations. Hobsbawm's main contention is that knowledge of the genesis, justification, and purpose of manufactured traditions is necessary to explain the emergence of nations. As he puts it:

“Invented tradition is taken to mean a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past. In fact, where possible, they normally attempt to establish continuity with a suitable historic past...However, insofar as there is such reference to a historic past, the peculiarity of invented traditions is that the continuity with it is largely factitious. In

short, they are responses to novel situations which take the form of reference to old situations, or which establish their own past by quasi-obligatory repetition” (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983, pp. 1-2).

According to Hobsbawm, there are two types of “invention”: adapting old customs to modern circumstances and creating new ones in order to achieve innovative goals. The first creation is universal, but the second is unique to a particular community and is the result of a swiftly changing social landscape that undermines the social structures that older customs were intended to support. Nations and nationalism are the most prevalent examples of these invented traditions in this meaning (Hobsbawm, 1983; as cited in Özkırımlı, 2000, p. 116–117).

According to Hobsbawm, the fundamental cause of this manufactured tradition was the growing participation of hitherto marginalized groups in politics. The resurgence of mass politics presented challenges for the governing class in maintaining the loyalty and obedience of their constituents. The establishment of new practices and rituals was the main strategy used by rulers to mitigate the risks associated with broad democracy. A few of the most important ones were the establishment of historical landmarks like the Neue Wache, national festivals like Bastille Day, and the founding of a secular organization that would mimic the function of the church. As a result, nationalism proved to be a secular religion and a useful tool for maintaining social cohesiveness through the observance of common traditions and rituals (Hobsbawm, 1983).

According to Hobsbawm, these advances corresponded with the time frame from 1870 to the end of the First World War, denoting the early stage of nationalism's emergence and rapid advancement (Hobsbawm E. J., 1990). The second phase, which spans 1918 to 1950, represents the height of nationalism. According to Hobsbawm, the rise of nationalistic beliefs on the left is what caused this time to be the height of nationalism.

With the support of anti-imperial battles, nationalist ideology and the left were closely associated throughout the anti-fascist era. This, according to Hobsbawm, explains why socialist anti-imperial efforts were linked to the period's fights for independence and decolonization (Hobsbawm, 1990; as cited in Özkırımlı, 2000, p. 119-120).

Lastly, the latter half of the 20th century is included in the third stage of nationalism's historical growth. According to Hobsbawm, the goals of this generation's nationalistic movements were

distinct from those of their forebears. Nationalisms of the late 20th century caused division and strife, in contrast to previous versions that were both uniting and emancipatory (as cited in Özkırımlı, 2000, p. 120). Hobsbawm (1990) contends that nationalism is historically less significant in the modern world. It is essentially no longer a global political agenda (Hobsbawm E. J., 1990, p. 191).

Put succinctly, Hobsbawm believed nationalism came before states. Nationalism created new customs, mythologies, symbols, and a suitable history in addition to the state and its ruling class, thereby creating nations. According to Hobsbawm, nationalism and nations are two distinct phenomena that must be investigated from above in order to be understood, even as they are formed from above (Hobsbawm, 1990).

1.2.3. Social/Cultural transformation

The researchers that comprise the third theoretical version of the modernist approach believe that the birth of nations and nationalism is primarily due to social and cultural transformations in society. This section on the modernist school of thinking will close with two of the most notable instances of this methodology: the contributions made by Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson to the study of nationalism.

Gellner's theory of nationalism is regarded by nationalism experts as one of the best attempts to explain the formation of nations and nationalism. In summary, Gellner's insightful analysis, as presented in *Thought and Change* (1964) and *Nations and Nationalism* (1983), noted that the unique structural requirements of industrial society are the source of nationalism's emergence and that interpreting nationalism within the framework of the new industrial order is the only way to understand it (Gellner, 1983; as cited in Llobera, 1999, p. 15).

Gellner defined nationalism as “primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent” (Gellner, 1983, p. 1), and this definition has since become widely recognized and embraced. He believes that because politicians in the premodern era did not employ nationalistic beliefs to establish political institutions, nationalism is likewise a creation of the modern era and the industrial order. Nationalism emerged only in the contemporary age as a “sociological necessity” (as cited in Özkırımlı, 2000, p. 130).

Gellner splits the history of the globe into three periods: the agricultural, industrial, and hunting-gathering. According to Gellner, the first stage's lack of states indicates that nationalisms are not necessary. In contrast, the majority of agro literate civilizations have been state endowed during the second phase. Certain cultures had strong states, while others had weak ones, depending on their forms and regimes. For the most part, states were optional throughout the agricultural period (Gellner, 1983). However, in agrarian civilizations, a significant section of the population was made up of agricultural laborers who were separated into separate, independent social structures and indigenous cultures (Smith, 2000). There were many elites above them who did not interact with the lower classes; they were characterized by an aristocratic culture that set them apart from the peasantry.

Thus, the contrast/conflict between the elite and low cultures characterizes the agricultural civilization. The elites exploited the profound variation among the social strata rather than seeking cultural homogeneity (Özkırımlı, 2000). Thus, the absence of nations and nationalism was also a result of the lack of cultural homogeneity in agricultural communities. On the other hand, in order to maintain economic prosperity, industrial, contemporary, perpetually growth-oriented nations needed a significantly higher proportion of literate, mobile, and homogeneous citizens (Smith, 2000). In this sense, a common literate culture had to be established in order to unite the ruler and the ruled. Thus, in industrial civilizations, nationalism and related phenomena served as a uniting force.

Gellner believes that the modernization's *sui generis* characteristic is what underpins this transition. Modernization traveled the globe unevenly, striking different places at different times and to varying degrees, much like a tidal wave. In turn, the quick spread of modernization produced two remarkable results. Prior to the rise of a literary, multilingual society that required the inhabitants to be literate and mobile, traditional social structures—religion, family, and community—were undercut. Consequently, industrial nations have discovered that the only thing that might force formerly rural farmers to migrate to cities and become citizens is a literate culture. In this sense, the development of a standardized public education system was required of a literate culture. Put differently, education and literacy were the only paths to transforming food producers into engaged citizens and a culturally homogenous workforce (Gellner, 1983;

Smith, 2000). In addition, the centralized state was the one entity fit to maintain and govern such a vast system.

The second result of modernization spreading was a rise in new kinds of disputes between the young and old living in cities over scarce resources like housing and employment. If the newcomers adhere to the customs, language, and religious beliefs of the local population, there will inevitably be social rivalry and possibly class conflict; if the newcomers maintain their traditional social structures and the cultural divide between them cannot be reconciled, there will inevitably be ethnic conflict. In that scenario, ethnic wars are likely to arise when elites on both sides sow discord and demand the creation of their own nation-states through secession, creating new nations in the process that are seeking their own governments (Gellner, 1983; Smith, 2000).

Therefore, nationalism—not the other way around—is what creates nations, as Gellner puts it, and it is this that demands a culturally homogenous society, as the idea of a mobile, literate high culture is a basic component of industrial society. Nationalism is therefore attractive because of the means of contemporary, industrial society (Gellner, 1983; Smith, 2000).

Benedict Anderson, a well-known modernist philosopher who emphasized the social and cultural transformation of society in his explanation of the emergence of nations, nationalism, and nationality, argues that nationalism and nationality are cultural artefacts of a particular kind (Anderson, 2006). In the early 1700s, a complex crossing of distinct historical forces led to the emergence of these artifacts, which were subsequently modular and able to be transplanted to a wide range of social terrains with differing degrees of self-consciousness.

They could also merge and be merged with a correspondingly wide variety of political and ideological constellations. As per Anderson's (2006) assertion on page 6, a nation can be defined as “an imagined political community - and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign”. Imagined in the sense that it is unfeasible for citizens of even the smallest nation to be acquainted with, interact with, or learn about the majority of their fellow citizens. It is viewed as constrained in the sense that even the largest nation has bounded areas that other nations reside inside. No nation aspires to colonize the entire world. Even the most fanatical nationalists do not wish for or anticipate that all people will converge on their nation. Since the idea originated during a time

when the Enlightenment and Revolution were undermining the authority of the hierarchical dynastic realm and nations were vying for independence, it is thought to be sovereign. Last but not least, it is envisioned as a community in that “the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship”—a notion Anderson notes that motivates millions of people to willingly give their lives in defense of their nations, “regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each” (Anderson, 2006, p. 6-7).

The decline of the dynastic realm and the sacred/religious community provided the geographical and historical space needed for nations to emerge, according to Anderson (2006). Then, the pre-modern understanding of time changed from a simultaneity of past and future in an instantaneous present to homogenous, empty time, which allowed for the imagining of the nation. Finally, the convergence of capitalism and print technology on the fatal diversity of human language" laid the groundwork for national consciousness and paved the way for the modern nation.

1.3.Ethno-Symbolism

A number of experts have recently put forth a middle ground or a compromise between the two opposing poles of the debate on nation and nationalism. Their goal is to uncover the symbolic legacy of pre-modern ethnic ties for modern nations, thereby expanding our understanding of nation and its related phenomena. Currently regarded as the third major storyline in the field of nationalism studies, the ethno-symbolist method focuses on the part that pre-existing ethnic ties and attachments play in understanding how modern states were formed. Ethnosymbolists thus opposed modernists who limited the nation to a specific era, a political community, and a fabrication created by elites, as well as primordialists who maintained that nations are eternal.

Ethnosymbolism's primary goal is to understand how nations are formed through ‘longue duree’, with an emphasis on the inner world of ethnicity and nationalism (Smith, 2009). Since many, if not all, of today's nations have their roots in pre-modern identities and heritages, ethno-symbolists believe that the growth of today's nations in this sense should be studied in earlier ethnies. This starting point is the primary distinction between ethno-symbolists and modernists. While modernists downplay their significance, ethnosymbolists believe that ethnic groups and links are essential to the formation and survival of nations. Therefore, in opposition to the

modernist viewpoint, ethno-symbolists assert that there are more degree differences than kind between historical ethnic communities and modern states (Özkırımlı, 2000). Nations are “active, purposive sociological communities” situated in particular historical circumstances, but their creation and survival cannot be exclusively attributed to a particular historical period, the modernization process, or capitalist industrialization (Smith, 2009, p. 20–21).

Stated differently, ethnosymbolists contend that despite modernists' insistence that nations in pre-modern times were impracticable, they discovered notable similarities between pre-modern movements and the modern notion of national identity. They also note that there existed frontier ethnies, diaspora communities, ethnic amphictyonies, and even states ruled by particular ethnic communities during this time (Smith, 1986; Smith, 1998).

Therefore, according to ethno-symbolists, shared experiences across several generations and ethnic bonds are what gave rise to the modern idea of nation. According to Smith (1998), the “defining cultural elements from which ethnic groups emerged” (Smith, 1998, p. 192) are customs, values, memories, myths, and symbols. This nation is defined as “[a nation is] a named and self-defined community whose members cultivate common myths, memories, symbols and values, possess and disseminate a distinctive public culture, reside in and identify with a historic homeland, and create and disseminate common laws and shared customs” (Smith, 2009, p. 29).

The emphasis on the role of elites in the creation and maintenance of states and nationalisms is another way that ethno-symbolists set themselves apart from modernists. Smith contends that elites' crucial role in inventing states is a major problem of modernist initiatives. On the other hand, ethno-symbolists aim to explain the intricate relationship between elites and their national objectives as well as the masses they try to organize in order to explain how nations are formed. Therefore, ethno-symbolists observe that while political elites and institutions may have played a role in the formation of nations, ethnic/cultural ties are necessary for the formation of a single society because they are essential “for a sense of national identity of subjective dimensions” (Smith, 2009, p. 21).

This is the rationale for ethno-symbolists' insistence that we should not view nations as purely elite endeavors. As an alternative, nations were formed on the basis of an ethnic model and around a dominant ethnic core population thanks to the efforts of political institutions and elites

(Smith, 2009). What gives a nation its fundamental basis and a nationalist movement its potent appeal are myths, symbols, memories, customs, and ideals that have been shared for a very long period.

1.4. Paul Brass's Nationalism Theory: How Elites Shape National Identity

The three main narratives of the study of nations and nationalism—Primordialism, modernism, and ethnosymbolism—have been briefly summarized in this chapter thus far. In summary, modernists emphasize the modern nature of nations that arose from modernization and industrialization processes; ethno-symbolists believe that shared experiences (myths, symbols, memories, rituals, values, and traditions) across generations and ethnic ties contributed to the formation of modern nations. Primordialists maintain that nations are natural phenomena that have existed for eons. This chapter will give a brief overview of Paul Brass' nationalism theory as it is provided in his 1991 study *Ethnicity and Nationalism*.

Brass is well-known for his observations that emphasize the instrumental nature of nations and nationalism. As such, his research has been divided into two schools: the instrumentalist approach and the second school of modernist perspective, which focuses on political change as a means of explaining the emergence of nations and nationalism.

According to Smith (1986), the instrumentalist perspective emphasizes that ethnic and national groupings serve as appropriate platforms for elites to win over the people to their cause of securing their position and prestige or acquiring wealth and power. The belief held by instrumentalists is that cultural symbols, beliefs, and practices of ethnic communities are continually redefined and reformed in accordance with the evolving surroundings and goals of governing elites, in contrast to the primordialist view that believes ethnic identities are 'fixed and given'. Nationality and ethnicity have a largely important role in this regard (Smith, 1986; Özkırımlı, 2000).

Paul Brass (1991), a prominent proponent of the instrumentalist approach, contends that the study of ethnicity and nationality is about "the process by which elites and counter-elites within ethnic groups select aspects of the group's culture, attach new value and meaning to them, and use them as symbols to mobilize the group, to defend its interests, and to compete with other groups" (p. 75), regardless of how old or newly-fashioned the group's culture is.

Brass (1991) argues that ethnic identities are created through a process influenced and manipulated by elite rivalry, which stands in stark contrast to the primordialist perspective. Stated differently, Brass argues that the development of nations and nationalism, as well as the framing and leading of national identity, are all products of elite competition. But his stance sets Brass apart from the most radical instrumentalist readings, in which every decision is viewed as an economic one. His argument is that ethnic communities' cultural forms limit the kinds of appeals rulers might use to inspire masses, rather than negating the significance of these customs, practices, and values. A few key elements can be used to summarize Brass's primary remarks on his theory of ethnicity and nationalism.

First and foremost, Brass contends that nationalism is not a given when it comes to the formation of ethnic and national identities. Cultural differences between various ethnic groups, on the other hand, only provide the foundation for political alienation under specific circumstances.

Second, in keeping with the modernist thesis that social realities are constructed and traditions are manufactured, Brass argues that, in some cases, the rivalry between political, economic, and religious elites creates the conditions necessary for the emergence of nationalism and ethnic conflicts, which in turn result from larger political and economic contexts.

The interaction between the state and elites is emphasized in Brass's third argument, which addresses “the roles of collaborators with and opponents of state authority and state intrusion into regions inhabited by distinctive ethnic groups” (Placeholder1p. 14).

Fourth, Brass argues that the definition and survival of the ethnic group in question are impacted by the process of ethnic identity creation that is framed by rivalry between various elites as well as between elites and the state.

The ethnic community's cultural assets, memories, values, and traditions are used as political instruments by elites in a power struggle for influence or financial gain. Cultural markers transform into symbols that are utilized to construct a political identity when needed. The references to and usage of symbols may also vary based on the political climate and policies of state authorities. In the end, Brass (1991) contends that “the process of ethnic identity formation and its transformation into nationalism is reversible” (p. 17).

Brass' theory is relevant to the subject of this study because it is anticipated that its theoretical framework, which primarily focuses on the processes of national identity development and change, will provide some insight into how and why the rebellion of sheikh Ubeydullah started. In light of this, Brass' study of the evolution of ethnic groupings into national identities and the role played by elites in this process will wrap up this chapter. According to Brass,

“the movement from ethnic group to community is a transition that some groups never make, that others make initially in modern times, and that still others undergo repeatedly at different points.” (Brass, 1991, p. 23).

According to Brass, in civilizations where modernization and industrialization sparked profound social transformation, those communities are created and shaped by specific elites. Whatever the situation, this transition involves competition between competing elites for economic and/or political advantages. The unequal progress of industrialization and the march toward modernity, according to certain nationalism scholars, benefited certain ethnic communities or ethnically distinct regions more than others, ultimately fostering the growth of national consciousness.

However, Brass notes that unequal development between culturally distinct communities or areas does not in and of itself result in a rise in demands that are grounded in ethics or in the transition of ethnic distinctions into ethnic/national consciousness. The emergence of nationalist movements is contingent upon the occurrence of ethnic conflict, self-consciousness, and demands resulting from a struggle between elites belonging to distinct ethnic groupings.

According to Brass, there are four different kinds of elite conflict that can set the stage for the emergence of such ethnic/national consciousness: local aristocracy against foreign conquerors, inter-ethnic rivalry between religious elites, intra-ethnic rivalry between native aristocracies and religious elites, and lastly rivalry between indigenous religious elites and alien aristocracies. When foreign invaders enter preindustrial cultures, they strive to establish a direct line of communication between the peasantry and the state, replace the existing ruling class, or gain the support of the landowners. This is when the first kind of elite competition arises.

The local population's development of a sense of national identity may be delayed if such an attempt is successful until the industrialization process gives rise to new socioeconomic strata. In order to protect their interests and position, the local aristocracy may try to instill an ethnic

consciousness in the populace if the foreign invader is unable to maintain control over the land and landowners and the ruling class is unable to maintain the territorial integrity. If the dominating outside group tries to convert the locals to its religion, the second type of elite rivalry is probably going to develop. In order to maintain their status, the indigenous religious leaders will take action in such a situation by inciting ethnic consciousness among the adherents of the current religion and organizing them against the dominating outside group.

According to Brass, if a local ruling class joins forces with an outside authority, there may be a third type of elite struggle. The authority of the local religious elites is thus threatened since, even though they do not accept the foreign authority's religion, those local elites accept and promote the foreign culture.

One of the most frequent splits that fuel ethnic communalism, according to Brass, is this kind of dispute between the local nobility and religious authorities. Local religious elites and foreign aristocracies engage in the ultimate type of elite competition. Parish priests and the native lower clergy encouraged ethnic identities and the nascent stages of nationalism under such circumstances.

According to Brass' hypothesis, these four types of elite disputes are ultimately responsible for triggering the initial phases of ethnic identity formation (Brass, 1991). Major ethnic conflicts in multiethnic modernizing societies are centered on class, language, or tribe in other circumstances where religious affiliations do not constitute a major influence in elites' quest to achieve political/economic benefits. According to Brass, whether or not local aristocracy are collaborationists in these situations determines how ethnic and national awareness develops. If not, well-known individuals of the community might support the language and customs of the concerned ethnic group. The establishment of ethnic/national consciousness will be determined by the emergence of new social classes and elites as a result of modernization, provided that the local aristocracy is collaborationist (Brass, 1991).

Brass contends that the provision of government jobs and elite competition play a critical role in the emergence of ethnic conflicts because they allow the ruling class to reward the collaborationist ruling class and create new ones by creating an unequal opportunity for

employment. But in modernizing societies, there isn't enough job competitiveness or elite rivalry to provoke ethnic conflicts between culturally dissimilar tribes.

A significant unevenness among distinct ethnic communities may be created by industrialization and modernization processes, leading to some of them becoming integrated into the language and culture of others. But for this to happen, governments need to give preference to one group over another. When socially and religiously active groups and indigenous religious leaders are absent, the subordinate group progressively absorbs the language and culture of the dominant group. New elites arise to organize the underprivileged communities as long as urbanization and industrialization begin to have a significant impact on these areas. However, these groupings' limits will always be shaped by the integration period that came before (Brass, 1991).

2. THREE PHASES OF AUTHORITY TRANSFORMATION IN THE KURDISH TRIBES

Kurdish social, economic, and political landscape saw significant upheaval throughout the 1800s. It was already split into two states at the start of the century: the Qajar and the Ottoman Empire. When the two states attempted to draw a border, this split became more apparent. Lake Urmia in northwest Iran and the Zagros Mountains between modern-day Iran and Iraq served as the primary borders between Iran and the Ottoman Empire. Drawing a clear boundary between the two empires was difficult since there were Kurdish Emirates (Kurdish: sing. *mîratî*, plu. *mîratîyan*) on both sides of this geographical boundaries. Iran, the Ottoman Empire, the British, and the Russians really spent more than half of the 19th century trying, however unsuccessfully, to draw a border on these areas. (Ateş, 2013).

In addition to the rifts caused by the periodic conflicts due to Kurd problem between the two governments, the arrival of the Russian and British empires in the area further widened these differences. Russia began to move from the Caucuses to northeastern Anatolia from the 1820s. Russia's influence became permanent during this century due to the battles it fought against Iran and the Ottomans, particularly the conflict with the Ottomans in 1828–1829. The Russians' first goal was to maintain the Kurds' neutrality by ensuring that they remained apolitical. They then sought to win over sympathizers within their tribes and broadened their stance toward the Kurds. But after a while, the tribes in the southern part of the region discovered a third party in the area for the first time, and the same Kurdish tribes in northern began to adjust to this development by seeing Russians as a rival to the Ottomans and Qajar Empires (Lazare et al., 2015, pp. 106-107).

Southeast's transition intensified as the nations administrative and political fissures grew. Therefore, starting from the 19th century, religious leaders and tribal leaders began to replace these Kurdish emirates. After accounting for this shift, Kurdish history may be divided into three stages: There are three main periods in history: the classical period, when secular leaders such as the emirates ruled; the period of religious leaders, when the emirates were destroyed and

replaced by Sufi leaders; and the third and final period, when tribal leaders took power after Sultan Abdulhamid II established the Cavalry Regiments in 1890.

2.1. Secular phase : Emir

The structure of authority and hierarchy between Kurdish tribes and nomads was mostly unchanged from the start of the Ottoman Empire until the middle of the 19th century. During this time, Bitlis, Hakkari, Bohtan, Bahdinan, Soran, and Baban were the principal Kurdish Emirates that formed up the region. Diyarbekir, Mardin, and Bayezid were home to a number of other minor emirates and vassal regions. In the Qajar Empire, the emirates of Ardalan and Mukri were mostly governed by Iranian powers. But sometimes, the borders of these two emirates were occupied by the Baban Emirate and the Ottoman Empire.

2.1.2 Abdurrahman Pasha Movement

The most powerful emirate at the start of the century was the Babans, who had its capital in Sulaimaniya in what is now northeastern Iraq. Babans's stronghold led to its city being regarded as the hub of the region, and its ruler was titled Pasha and mir-i miran, or Beglerbegi, the emir of all emirs. Abdurrahman Pasha distinguished out as the most powerful of all the Baban pashas. He struggled with the Baghdadi valis, or governors, but in the end he managed to hold onto power for twenty-four years (Nieuwenhuis, 1981, p. 42).

His 1806 uprising is often regarded by Kurdish history as the first uprising characterized by nationalist ideas. A careful examination of original materials casts doubt on the veracity of such assertions. Abdurrahman Pasha really attempted to use his economic and military might, as well as the sultan's blessing, to extend his domain at the cost of Baghdad's governor and establish himself as the only authority in the province. Even though Abdurrahman Pasha of the Baban Emirate led the first Kurdish rebellion in the Ottoman Empire during the 19th century, and many academics acknowledge its significance in local history, it was mistakenly perceived as a nationalist movement that sought to establish an independent Kurdistan. In other words, Abdurrahman Pasha simply wanted “to render his country tributary to the Porte, but independent of any neighboring Pasha,” as his close friend and British resident J.C. Rich puts it (Rich, 1836, p. 96).

The conflict between Abdurrahman Pasha and the local authorities in Kermanshah and Baghdad, as well as the discussions with Istanbul and Tehran, took place between 1805 and 1811. Yet as a result of his activism, the Ottomans, the Qajar, and European powers brought up 'the Kurd question' for the first time. The British and French consuls in Baghdad and Basra were compelled to write to their sovereign on a daily basis over this matter, in addition to the Ottomans and Qajar. The Ottomans and Qajar Turks were the main ethnic groups in the area, while there have also been British, French, and subsequently Russian settlers in the area.

The boundary disputes between the Ottomans and the Iranians arose during the uprisings of Abdurrahman Pasha. With the intervention of the British and Russians, the 'Kurd question' became more global. As the states attempted to subjugate them under a more centralized government, the Baban leaders, following Abdurrahman Pasha, persisted in their fight for more autonomy and personal interests. That's why, after 1820, there was another struggle that lasted for three years. The consequence was the signing of the first Treaty of Erzurum in 1823. Although the pact did not end the dispute between two governments over the areas, it did assist in making Iranian people feel like outsiders and treating them on par with Europeans, as well as treating Shah and the Sultan like equal and sovereign Muslim leaders (Masters, 1991).

Though they had little success, the Ottomans used Kurdish Sunnism against Shi'i Iran throughout these conflicts¹². When the Kurds grabbed the chance, they did not see much of a difference in the religion of either force. In his Kurdish report that he wrote According to Russian military commander Avyarov, the Kurds were not particularly concerned with maintaining religious unity, and many Kurdish sheikhs did not recognize the Sultan as the rightful caliph since he was not a direct descendant of the Prophet. Even if he exaggerates a bit, there have been several instances throughout the century that demonstrate the Kurds were unmoved by the caliph's appeals for jihad. Avyarov cites the fact that many Kurds rejected Sheikh Ubeydullah when he called for jihad under the banner of the prophet as evidence for his claim. Furthermore, he continues, the Kurds were very fond of their freedom and had less of a sense of national unity because they were more bonded to their tribes. He asserts that similar to Bedirhan, Yezdanşir, and Ubeydullah, the Kurds were unimpressed with their demand for national unification (Ayvarov, 1995, s. 147).

2.1.3. Towards Centralization

Although Tanzimat (reorganization, restructuring) produced a central bureaucratic elite class, very few individuals of Kurdish or Arab descent were among them. Tanzimat did not have much of an impression on the Arab and Kurdish regions until after the second half of the 19th century; therefore one wonders whether this was the reason for their delayed arrival. But under the Ottoman Empire's legal system, both ethnic groups had a greater prominence. An example of this is the large number of Kurdish ulama among all the religious academics in the empire. Even Nevertheless, those educated in Istanbul continued to occupy the highest positions on the religious hierarchy. Additionally, the Kurdish ulema lost greater influence as a result of Tanzimat's introduction of new secular legislation (Kayali, 1997, s. 20).

Following the imposition of new laws and centralization policies on the Kurdish notables, their emirates began to be gradually erased from the territory between 1834 and 1847. Prior to addressing the Kurdish emirs, Mahmud II had to deal with Ibrahim Pasha, the famed Egyptian Muhammad Ali Pasha's son. After seizing control of Syria in 1831–1832, Ibrahim Pasha crossed Anatolia and arrived at Kütahya. The European countries convinced him to leave the area they had taken over. Having seen how an Egyptian local notable with great might could destroy the Ottoman army, the Sublime Porte was now resolved to overthrow the local rulers in Anatolia.

The Porte soon organized an offensive against all of the Kurdish emirates in the area. The first thing Istanbul did was send new governors with new regulations to the area. A number of emirs fought hard to maintain their autonomy from the Ottoman and local troops because their interests and power were on the decline. Eventually, the emirs were routed one by one and sent to places like Albania, Crete, Mecca, Tunisia, and Egypt together with their families. The Babans were the final prominent Kurdish group to be destroyed in this centralization fight, along with the emirates of Soran, Botan, and Hakkari.

The border that the Kurdish community resided around had never been a rigid line between two nations; instead, it had shifted for centuries due to wars and disputes. The border region's tribes utilized territory in both states for their winter and summer camps. Through the Erzurum Treaties of 1823 and 1847, the state tried to control the limits where the Babans and other Kurdish emirates were situated throughout the first part of the 19th century. While the Ottomans,

Iranians, Russians, and British accomplished little in the first treaty, they accomplished much more with the treaty of 1847, when they abolished the Kurdish emirates and replaced local rulers with officers chosen by the Sublime Porte. The state took its time bringing these areas under the comprehensive authority of the national government. Before the central state controlled these border areas and became apparent in daily life, another fifty years passed. According to Van Bruinessen, “officially, Kurdistan was from then on ruled directly by Ottoman governors – in practice, however, direct Ottoman rule was to prove very ineffective indeed. Near cities, the governors had some power; nowhere did they have authority” (Bruinessen, 1992, s. 176).

The governors had some jurisdiction in the vicinity of cities, but not in any other place. All the same, the empire progressively subjugated the eastern boundary. By defining and fortifying the border regions, the empire was able to enhance its ability to monitor its own boundaries, which in turn contributed to the establishment of a contemporary state that enforced uniform laws across its whole. The empire planned to bring more revenue and labor from the undeveloped resources of the area home while leaving its possessions in the Balkans by exercising direct administration over the boundaries in the second half of the 19th century (Rogan, 1999, s. 11-12).

2.1.3. Restructuring the state and the Kurds

The formal endorsement of this process of modernization and centralization on the periphery was the Declaration of Tanzimat, not its beginning. While these policies were planned and initiated in the early 1800s, Tanzimat demonstrated that they were a continuous endeavor that would need time to complete. This was an "Ottoman citizenship project," in the words of Sabri Ateş, which involved “the making of the boundaries, the forceful replacement of local notables and interest groups with salaried appointees, the reorganization of regional administrative divisions, the reform of landholding patterns, the forced settlement of itinerant populations, the introduction of new taxes, and the conscription of hitherto unconscribed locals” (Ateş, 2013, pp. 735-798). The introduction of travel papers, passports, new customhouses, and border patrols were all part of the new norms that the center implemented to control the perimeter.

In southeast of Anatolia and rural regions, not much changed in spite of the state's increased centralization and organization. The Ottomans were unable to overcome their topographical

obstacles because the mountains to the regions prevented the development of a system for communication and transportation. The majority of the western and central provinces were under the control of the Ottoman Kadis and Muftis, while certain urban and rural southeast regions were beyond their authority (Natali, 2005, p. 6).

The Western invasion of the area with its commercial and political domination caused the economic and social life to alter much more quickly than the legal system, which developed gradually in the regions. Before the new laws were declared in Gülhane, the residents had already experienced the shift and Tanzimat. After the 1840s, the Ottomans chose to rebuild the state by creating Tanzimat, changing the traditional structure and installing administrators from the center. The last Kurdish tribal leader in Sinnah was overthrown by the Qajarans twenty years later, following in the Ottomans footsteps. The Qadiri and Naqshbandi-Khalidi sheikhs filled the power vacuum that resulted from this beginning and restored order in the regions.

2.2. Religious Phase : Sheikhs

As the Empire weakened and Westerners gained political and religious dominance in the 19th century, religion became increasingly significant and fundamental. While government officials underlined the dangers that Eastern Shi'is and Western Christians posed to Sunni Islam and urged individuals to exercise more caution when dealing with opponents beyond their boundaries, certain Sufi groups had already taken action in response. Among these orders was Naqshbandiyya, which became even more powerful when Sheikh Mawlana Khalid al-Baghdadi arrived from Shahrizor. He went to India to seek guidance from a Naqshbandi Sheikh. Both the Mamluk rulers of Baghdad and the Baban pashas gave Mawlana warm reception and financial assistance. He quickly began to expand his sphere of influence among the town's nobility upon arriving in Sulaimaniya, which infuriated the traditional institutions such as the Qadiri Sufi order since it undermined their dominance. Mawlana demonstrated that, if temporarily with limited success, the established equilibrium among the prominent local figures could be penetrated and upset. The Babans, who had previously backed him, withdrew their political backing, however, and the transition did not occur immediately. Therefore, he made the decision to go in search of something greater than the town that could change not only his home country but the whole empire. For this reason, he chose to abandon his lands in 1820 and go to Baghdad, then Damascus, where he passed away in 1827, much like all the other Sufis who abandoned their

homes for their beliefs. Through this forced voyage, the sheikh would become a transcontinental figure, well-known from North Africa to South East Asia, rather than just a local notable.

Since the sultan felt uncomfortable endorsing a religious organization that he suspected of infiltrating the ranks of the Janissaries and the bureaucracy, it would be difficult for the sheikh to get support outside of his own nation. While he was alive, his order accomplished little in terms of influence outside of Iraq and Syria; nonetheless, it was successful in producing a sizable number of mullahs, who were then dispersed across the empire and beyond. Subsequent to his passing, the sultan altered his course of action and provided financial assistance to Mawlana Khalid's followers. The sultan constructed a mausoleum for himself and Sufi lodges for his adherents in addition to giving his successor and family members stipends. Consequently, the order was dubbed Khalidiyya-Mujaddidiyya (or simply Khalidi) and gained more clout than any other order in the Ottoman bureaucracy's upper echelons.

Following Mawlana Khalid Seyyid Taha-i Hakkari, often referred to as Nehri or Shamdhinani, who assumed leadership of the Khalidi order. The core of the Sufi order moved from Sorani-speaking southern region to Kurmanji-speaking northern region during this crucial time. Subsequently, a new divide emerged, with the north being dominated by Khalidis, and the south by Qadiris.

Beginning in early 1828, barely one year after his master's death, Seyyid Taha became involved in local politics. We see that Seyyid Taha gathered the Kurdish tribes on the Iranian border to stave off a potential Russian invasion in a letter sent by the governor of Van to the governor of Erzurum. Seyyid Taha served as a mediator between the Kurdish emirs and the Ottoman and Iranian authorities after this point. He attempted, for example, in vain (Roohani, 1390) to rescue Nurullah Beg of Hakkari from the Ottoman authorities. He then began to take over the role that these emirs had held. He got along well with the Iranian Shah. Seyyid Taha was the sect sheikh of the mother of Abbas Mirza, one of the children of Qajar Shah. The Shah gave him the profits of several villages of Azerbaijan province on the Iranian side as a consequence of these relationships (Roohani, 1390, p. 430).

The teaching of sufi ideas was carried on in the family after Seyyid Taha's death in 1853 by his brother, Seyyid Salih. Salih had little interest in politics and stayed out of the public eye till his

death. Seyyid Taha's son Sheikh Ubeydullah succeeded his father after Salih's death in 1873. He made a name for himself as the monarch of Kurdish tribes and their territories, particularly when he rebels against the states in the border regions and made an unsuccessful effort to occupy northwest Iran (Ateş, 2013, pp. 735-798). Thousands of Thousands of rebels from Iran and the Ottoman Empire came together in October 1880 under the leadership of Sheikh Ubeydullah to occupation and plunder various towns in northwest Iran. In a short period the uprising was put down as the Iranian army marched on the seized districts.

Consequently, thousands of households experienced displacement. Following his incarceration and banishment to Istanbul and then Mecca, Sheikh Ubeydullah passed away in Mecca in 1883.

Sheikh Ubeydullah had a vision of self-governance in a particular kind of autonomy under the banner of a caliphate, according to official communications from several governments and missionaries' memoirs in the area. In an interview with William Abbott, the British consul in Tabriz, a year after the uprising, the sheikh expressed his desire to reorganize Kurdistan and impose an iron hand because the moment had arrived when something ought to be done in the area. Sorely in need of reforms, he said, adding that he was anxious to place his people in the position to which human beings they were entitled, as the Ottoman and Qajar empires were, and that the Kurdish people belonged to (Granville, 1881).

2.3.Tribal phase : Agha

This area went through another period of political vacuum after the expulsion of Sheikh Ubeydullah and his family from Nehri in 1883. In an attempt to further include Kurdish territories into the empire, Sublime Porte searched for substitute measures. In an effort to unite the tribes and form light cavalry battalions, Sultan Abdulhamid II brought a number of influential Kurdish tribal chiefs to Istanbul in 1890 as part of this hunt. To carry out this assignment were marshal Zeki Pasha and Shakir Pasha, two of his most loyal confidantes. These Sunni Kurdish tribesmen, known as Hamidiye Light Cavalry Regiments (Hamidiye Hafif Süvari Alayları), were mostly composed of people who had shown their loyalty to the sultan's government. Typically, the regiments consisted of around 600 warriors, led by a chief from the same tribe, and were ideally chosen from a single tribe²⁹. Zeki Pasha commanded the regiments as part of the Forth Army. The Eastern Provinces from Erzincan to Mountain Agri and from

Hakkari to Cizre were under the protection of the Forth Army. Because of this, certain regiments were exclusively established among the Kurdish tribes in Northern of the area. The majority of Armenians lived in this region, where Russia's treaty was about to be signed.

Although there were a variety of factors that led to the formation of these regiments, it seems that the main one was the growing Russian threat originating from the Eastern Anatolian boundary of the Ottoman Empire. According to Janet Klein, these regiments were formed with a “manifold mission” in mind that went beyond protecting the Eastern boundary. Together with these goals, the Sultan and his pashas also sought to weaken and disperse Armenian activity, fortify Islamic unity by forging unique ties between the Sultan and the Kurds, convert the tribes into “peaceful agriculturalists” and Ottoman citizens, and, above all, “ Bringing peace to the region and ensuring its permanence” (Klein, 2011, pp. 5-6). The Tribal Light Cavalry Regiments were the new name for the Hamidiye Cavalry regiments that continued to exist following Abdulhamid's removal in 1909.

3. HISTORICAL RESEARCH OF SHEIKH UBEYDULLAH'S MOVEMENT

After the Battle of Çaldıran in 1514, Yavuz Sultan Selim annexed the provinces in the East and Southeast with the agreement he made with İdris-i Bitlisi. With the administrative regulations made after this date, the Eastern and Southeastern regions were organized as Classical Ottoman Sanjaks, Yurtluk- Ocaklık and Government Sanjaks. According to this administrative order, Kurdish emirs in the Yurtluk-Ocaklık sanjaks would maintain their autonomy against the Ottoman administration, the administration would pass from father to son, they would pay their taxes and provide soldiers to the Ottoman Empire in wars. (Unal, 2010, pp. 215-223). Thanks to this management style, while the Ottoman Empire was securing its borders in the east, traditional local rulers were consolidating their power. This enabled the formation of a strong Kurdish leadership under state protection (Özoğlu, 2005, p. 85).

This formation also affected the social layers within the tribes. Military forces formed the uppermost layer within the tribe. The lower class consisted of non-Muslims and non-tribal peasant and urban Kurds, who were subordinate to the tribes and constituted the main source of income. The political and administrative boundaries of these tribes were drawn with the system implemented by the Ottoman Empire. In the 16th and 17th centuries, the Ottoman Empire was able to keep the Kurdish emirs under control with this system it implemented in the region. However, as the Ottoman Empire lost its power and its central authority weakened in the 18th and 19th centuries, the emirs were replaced by Mahmud II. They began to regain their diminished authority and act semi-independently until Mahmud came to the throne. With Mahmud's accession to the throne and the declaration of Tanzimat in 1839, a more centralist policy was followed (Özoğlu, 2005, pp. 87-90).

After the Tanzimat, state, sanjak and district borders were rearranged. A commander to manage the regional forces and a treasurer for financial affairs were appointed to each governor. New practices were introduced, such as the establishment of local councils in provinces and sanjaks, the election of representatives according to the Muslim and non-Muslim population, the collection of tithe tax by finance officers, and the collection of jizya by the Patriarchates (Çadırcı, 2007, pp. 231-236). This system was against the traditional structure in the region.

Because Kurdish emirs used traditional borders, except for civil divisions, collected all taxes, including jizya, and were the commanders of their own region (Hakan, 2011, s. 12).

The regulations brought by the Tanzimat edict declared in 1839 in this context were tried to be implemented over time. In particular, attempts to pay salaries to tribal leaders, assign duties to district administrators, and accustom tribes to the obligation of paying taxes and being soldiers failed despite all efforts. Since government authority could not be established in the region for many years and the Kurdish emirs were liquidated in this context, a vacuum of authority was created in the region. Tribal leaders, who had been kept under control by powerful emirs until this time, were released and intervened in all kinds of lawlessness (Jwaideh, 2012, pp. 157-158).

This authority gap was also filled by sheikhs (Özoğlu, 2005, p. 97). Since the state was in economic difficulties, it started to collect more taxes from the people. At the same time, the tribal lords brought about by the social structure of the region were brutally exploiting the people in proportion to their power (Celil, 1998, p. 19). Sheikhs, who were the religious leaders of the region, took advantage of this difficult situation of the people. They began to seize people's property and saying that disobedience to them was against God (Celil, 1998, p. 23). In addition, religious leaders and tribal lords fueled national and religious differences among the people in order to increase their incomes (Celil, 1998, p. 24).

The Ottoman Empire's dominance over the Kurdish people living in the region gradually decreased. The state faced serious rebellions as it had to use armed force against Kurdish lords acting independently (Ayvarov, 1995, pp. 47-48). One of these rebellions was the Bedir Khan rebellion of the Hakkari Kurds in 1843-46. He attacked the Nestorian Tiyyari and Tihubi tribes and the Kurdish Yazidis in the Yakubi and Garzan regions, and the rebellion spread to larger areas (Hakan, 2011, pp. 157-158). Thereupon, European States warned the Ottoman Empire to suppress this rebellion. Kurds in Istanbul, Mosul, Diyarbakir, Erzurum, Sivas and Van regions were severely punished. This incident caused the people in the region to feel great anger against the state. They showed their reaction by not participating in the war on the side of the Ottoman Empire when it declared war against Russia in 1853. They joined as a militia only in places bordering Russia, upon the promise of war spoils and under pressure from the Ottoman Army. (Ayvarov, 1995, p. 49).

Russia also entered into close communication with the Kurds of the Ottoman Empire starting from 1853, and one hundred thousand yellow liras were sent to the region by Prince Vorunsov to increase their loyalty to Russia. Fourteen presidents from Cemedanli, Milanli and Bezik Kurds went to Gyumri and declared their loyalty to Russia. In addition, Zilanli Tribe leaders Kasım and Ahmet Agha also declared their loyalty to Russia by letter (Ayvarov, 1995, p. 53). On the other hand, some Kurdish groups declared their loyalty to Selim Pasha and joined Bayezid's forces. (Ayvarov, 1995, p. 56).

The Ottoman Empire faced a rebellion again at the end of 1854, while it was in the Crimean War. Yezdanşir (İzzeddin Şir) Bey revolted by occupying the cities of Mosul and Bitlis. The Ottoman Empire was not successful in suppressing this rebellion. In March 1855, the British Consul in Mosul met with Yazdanshir and other rebels and tried to make peace with the Ottoman Empire (Öğün, 2010, pp. 193-232). With the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the war, Russia's influence began to appear in this region, and in the next twenty years, the Ottoman Empire tried to establish dominance over the Kurds by using violence. This attitude of the state caused the Kurds to secretly feel anger towards the Ottomans. (Ayvarov, 1995, p. 90).

These rebellions were suppressed by the Ottoman Empire, albeit with difficulty. The state's ability to suppress these rebellions was due to the Kurds' inability to form a unity within the tribal structure, Russia's failure to support the Kurds due to the Crimean War, and Britain and France's failure to support the Kurds, who would act under Russia's guidance, rather than its own power.

It should also be said here that the rebellions in this period were not a national uprising, but rather an effort not to give up previously given rights. Moreover, when we look at the dates of the rebellions in this period, we will see that they always coincided with the periods when the Ottoman Empire was in a difficult situation.

3.1. 1873-1876 Sheikh Ubeydullah Problem Between Ottomans and Iran

Kurdish tribes, taking advantage of the loss of power of the Ottoman and Iranian states since the first quarter of the 19th century, were causing unrest in the region. As state dominance in the region was weakening, powerful tribes were attacking villages in particular. They demanded tribute from the villagers, and if they did not pay, they confiscated all the animals and grain.

Thus, they were forcing the villagers to pay tribute. Or, since there was not enough control at the border, they would go to the neighboring state, plunder the villages there and come back. Both states complained about each other on this issue.

Sheikh Ubeydullah was one of the people that the Iranian side complained about and wanted precautions to be taken by the Ottoman Empire. Iran requested a meeting from the Ottoman Empire on January 3, 1874, to talk about the damage caused by the Hertus tribe, one of the Ottoman tribes, on the subjects and real estate of the Iranian State and the Milan Tribe. Iran thought that the Sheikh was directing these tribes. (Araqi, 1989-1996, p. 604). Thereupon, the Ottoman Empire reminded the Iranian side that the research activities of the commission established by the two states on March 7, 1874 to investigate these issues were stopped by Shuja al-Dawla during this period (Araqi, 1989-1996, pp. 602-606). In the letter sent from the Tehran Ottoman Embassy to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran on the same date, it was also stated that the research report made so far had been investigated by the officer Alicah Agha Mir Sadık and presented to Shuja al-Dawla. In this presented report, it was explained that the region where the incident took place consisted of difficult mountains and narrow roads, and that the investigation was completed at the entrance of Urumiye customs and that the meetings were held between Sheikh Selma and Shecaü'd-Devle. It was reported that the incident was not as it seemed, and that Shuja al-Dawla gathered soldiers and prominent Kurds and attacked the villages, plundered them, and killed a few people. However, as a result of the investigation, it was revealed that all of the villages were usurped. As a result, it was stated that this incident was not what it seemed and needed investigation. (Araqi, 1989-1996, p. 609).

While such a report was available, as a sign of goodwill of the Ottoman Empire, the Ottoman Embassy in Tehran notified the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran on 15 May 1874 that it would be appropriate for the issue regarding Sheikh Ubeydullah to be investigated by a new commission to be formed by the two states (Araqi, 1989-1996, p. 611). In its response dated 21 May 1874, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran stated that it accepted this proposal of the Ottoman Empire and stated that if the Ottoman Empire specified the time of departure, the Iranian side would move from Tehran accordingly (Araqi, 1989-1996, p. 613). Although the states had good intentions, no results were obtained from the commissions established between

the two states. Since each state announced the reports of its own representatives, the issue regarding Sheikh Ubeydullah remained inconclusive (Araqi, 1989-1996, pp. 617-620).

Meanwhile, the news of Sheikh's arrest spread. Thereupon, the Ottoman Empire requested information about this issue from the Iranian State. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran stated on April 10, 1875 that the arrest of Sheikh Ubeydullah was his own claim, because the taxes of this region belonged to the Huvi government and they had not been able to collect their taxes for 3 years. The people do not obey the state because Sheikh Ubeydullah is influential in this region. Despite this, the State treated the Sheikh with tolerance and said that it would investigate these three years (Araqi, 1989-1996, p. 615).

According to the Ottoman Empire, the allegations regarding Sheikh Ubeydullah are suspicious. Because when Shuja al-Dawle came to Urumiye, he had hostility towards the Sheikh and did not allow him to prove his innocence by not hearing his case properly (Araqi, 1989-1996, pp. 617-620). The Iranian side stated that on August 17, 1876, some of the Ottoman tribes, with the instigation of Sheikh Ubeydullah, committed extortion, plunder and massacres in Ushnu and other villages in Iranian territory, and that bandits from the Hertus clan also attacked the border, extorted, plundered, injured and massacred and burned the houses.

They found it astonishing that the commission established to investigate the Sheikh Ubeydullah issue claimed 'we were attacked', while approximately 50-60 thousand divisions of damage were caused to the Iranian side in these events. They stated that when there was no response from the Ottoman Embassy against these claims of Iran, the attacks on the border increased, especially that Sheikh Ubeydullah provoked these latest events.

They stated that Sheikh Ubeydullah continued to provoke the tribes and that the Sheikh sent seven thousand soldiers to Ushnu and plundered this place, even that this community attacked a new place every day and that these were cavalry, not infantry. Iran also sent a telegraph to the Ottoman Empire saying, "What would you think if seven thousand cavalymen came from Iran and plundered the Ottoman country? Would you not file a lawsuit against such an event?" (Araqi, 1989-1996, pp. 625-630).

Another mixed commission was established in September 1876. Before this newly established commission began to investigate the previous events of Sheikh Ubeydullah, upon hearing that

the Sheikh was in Iranian territory, Iqbalu'd-Dawla entered the town of Margavar with his forces consisting of artillery, cavalry and military units and started a conflict with the Sheikh and his followers. Thereupon, the Sheikh and his supporters fled from the region. The Ottoman Empire initiated an investigation into these events (Araqi, 1989-1996, pp. 625-630).

Meanwhile, the Ottoman Empire and Russia started a war, and Iran declared its neutrality. Naturally, Iran intended to use this incident to its advantage. In this turmoil and war, they thought that Russia would fully support Iran in the matter of Sheikh. Russia requested information from the Ottoman Empire about Sheikh Ubeydullah's involvement in the plunder of Margavar and Kale-i Zive in July-August 1878 and (Araqi, 1989-1996, pp. 632-636).

The reason why the Ottoman Empire treated the Sheikh tolerantly, despite Iran's claims about him, was that they wanted him to remain loyal to them against Russia, and that the Sheikh was loved and respected in his region. Ottoman Empire thought that as long as the Sheikh remained loyal to the empire, the people in that region would also remain loyal to empire. The correctness of this policy of the Ottoman Empire will be seen when the Sheikh sided with the Ottomans in the Ottoman-Russian war of 1877-78.

3.2.1877-1878 Ottoman-Russian War

The Ottoman Empire faced Balkan Revolts starting from 1875. European states also intervened in these events with their own interests, ensuring that the event gained an international character. These events in the west brought the Ottoman Empire and Russia face to face. (Uçarol, 2000, p. 322). While the Ottoman Empire was busy with these events in the west, it was also dealing with uprisings in the eastern region. He was trying to draw the Kurdish tribes and chiefs to his side against the approaching Russian danger and form military units from them. While some of the Kurdish tribes resisted this, some went further and met with the Russian commanders and supported them (Celil, 1998, pp. 36-37).

On the other hand, since England did not want Russia to be influential in this region, it wanted the influential Kurdish lords in the region to be removed from here in order to prevent the Kurds from revolting against the Ottoman empire. Accordingly, the British Consul in Erzurum collected information about Kurdish notables who could pose a danger to the Ottoman Empire

in this region and reported it to Istanbul. He also used the method of attracting the people and gentlemen with money and gifts, which was a policy that England followed in other states.

However, the Ottoman Empire was not keen on Britain's idea of removing the Kurdish leaders from the region. England's monetary and gift policy was not successful in this region either. The reason why the Ottoman Empire did not take kindly to this proposal of the British was that they thought that such extreme measures would further tense the environment. Russia, on the other hand, was trying to establish close relations with the Kurds and win them over to their side in order to be successful in the region (Celil, 1998, p. 40).

When the Ottoman Empire entered the war with Russia in 1877, it was very weak in terms of soldiers and equipment. Army commander Faik Pasha reported to the headquarters that instead of an army of 6000 men, he found only 370 half-dressed soldiers, an artillery cavalry company, most of which were horseless, and a mountain battery (Celil, 1998, p. 40; Ayvarov, 1995, pp. 100-101). Although the Ottoman Empire gathered the Kurdish lords and asked for help, they did not receive a positive response due to the hatred the Kurds had towards the government (Ayvarov, 1995, p. 92).

Following this, the Ottoman Empire began to pursue a policy based on belief in gaza in order to stop the Kurds in the region from drifting towards Russia. Sheikh Ubeydullah responded favorably to this request (Celil, 1998, p. 41; Ayvarov, 1995, pp. 93-94). Sheikh Ubeydullah enabled the formation of Kurdish militia forces and the participation of Hakkari and Bohtan Kurds, who were causing problems, in the Van Forces (Ayvarov, 1995, pp. 95-123). Irregular units formed from Kurds were used to raid the Russian flank and forward detachments. But the Kurds were not very enthusiastic about participating in military movements. They demonstrated this by disobeying their Sheikhs in the early days of the war and leaving the battlefield with the equipment they had. One thousand five hundred people escaped in Bayezid alone. In addition, Kurdish militias began to pass over to the Russian army, which had superiority in the region. The Ottoman Empire completely lost its dominance over the Kurdish groups (Önal, 2000). Dersim Kurds revolted, and the Ottoman Empire suffered a great defeat by having to fight both this uprising and Russia (Celil, 1998, pp. 46-47).

In October 1878, an uprising started between the Motki and Reshkotan tribes and the uprising spread from Van, Mush, Bitlis to Hakkari, Bohtan and Behdinan (Ayvarov, 1995, p. 122; Celil, 1998, pp. 59-61). At the head of this rebellion were Bedirhan's sons, Huseyin and Osman (Minorsky et al., 2004, p. 100). The Ottoman Empire sent seventeen battalions under the command of Ferik Shaban Pasha against the rioters in the cities of Siirt, Diyarbakır, Erzincan and Erzurum. Bedirhan's son Huseyin achieved success against the Ottoman Army in the Siirt region. They seized weapons and grain reserves as spoils of war. After the success of the uprising, new troops joined Huseyin (Ayvarov, 1995, p. 122; Celil, 1998, pp. 59-61).

Thereupon, the Ottoman Empire began to take more serious measures. It transferred military forces from nearby regions to Mush and appointed people with extraordinary powers as responsible. The measures taken showed their benefits and the Kurdish groups were first defeated in Şirnak. Osman had to retreat to Cizre. Huseyin, who was unsuccessful in Bitlis, also came to Cizre. The Ottoman Empire captured Huseyin and kept him in exile in Istanbul. Osman, on the other hand, had to recognize the authority of the Ottoman Empire. However, this uprising became the footsteps of the rebellion in 1880 (Celil, 1998, pp. 61-62).

After the 1877-78 Ottoman-Russian War, the state was in great depression both politically and economically (Uçarol, 2000, p. 398). The war caused economic and social collapse in the region as a result of the great destruction inflicted on the northeastern states of the empire (Jwaideh, 2012, p. 159). The people of the region were harmed that occurred as a result of this chaos. Ottoman empire was inadequate and failed to prevent these events (Jwaideh, 2012, p. 167).

Like every state, the Ottoman Empire increased tax rates in order to recover. But collecting taxes created a serious problem. The government sent soldiers to places that did not want to pay taxes. The state was in such a difficult situation that it asked the public to pay grain for the next year. The lords in the region determined the amount of taxes as they wished. The tyranny shown by these lords in determining and collecting taxes either led the peasants to flee or to work alongside them as farmhands (Önal, 2000, p. 31). Some of them left the country and went to Tbilisi, Baku and other cities. The Ottoman administration had lost its dominance in the region (Celil, 1998, p. 50).

Russian Vice Consul Yakimanski wrote in his report that the official administration in the region had collapsed and that although the regional governor, General Izzet Pasha, was a military man, he had no education, lacked administrative experience, and was a corrupt person. When the chief administrator was like this, lower-ranking administrators committed crimes more easily. Criminals could easily escape their punishments thanks to large bribes. The arbitrary behavior of the military units disturbed the public. This was due to the soldiers' lack of barracks and equipment, and their salaries not being paid regularly (Celil, 1998, p. 51).

On the other hand, Western states were putting pressure on Istanbul to make reforms in the eastern regions. Upon these pressures, the Ottoman Empire sent Commanders Abidin Pasha and Menas Efendi to Erzurum and Harput, and Bekir Pasha and Iskender Bey to the Diyarbakır region. The expenses of these people sent to the region were collected from the people in the region since there was no money in the treasury. This caused even more distress to the people who were already in distress. According to the impressions of the Russian Vice Consul Yakimanski, England was very involved in the Ottoman internal affairs and even appointed their own commander Norton to Bitlis and Colonel Kup as the Gendarmerie General Inspector to Erzurum (Celil, 1998, pp. 51-52).

In 1878-1880, the eastern region also experienced a serious drought. Due to this drought, bread prices increased and wheat fell into the black market. Due to drought, epidemic diseases, especially dysentery, spread in the region (Jwaideh, 2012, p. 159). Hunger negatively affected the nomadic-semi-nomadic life of the Kurds, and they walked north towards the Russian border in the hope of finding food. The drought and hunger situation was also valid for Iran. There was serious hunger, especially in the Khoy and Savjubilak and Urumiye regions. According to Mshak newspaper, people were raiding and looting wheat warehouses (Önal, 2000, p. 31).

Both states were aware of the increasing incidents of plunder and extortion on the border during this period and were disturbed by this (BOA.Y.PRK.UM.6/117). In order to prevent these incidents, they sent soldiers to the region as a first step. These soldiers would prevent the bandits from the other side from crossing over to their side. Moreover, they would prevent plunder by crossing from their side to the other side (BOA.İ.DH.816/65899). In addition, the Ottoman

Empire and Iran sometimes went beyond their usual behavior and acted together in the usurpation and plunder of the Kurdish tribes.

3.3.1880 rebellion of Sheikh Ubeydullah in Iranian Lands

The negativities brought about by the weakening of the dominance of the Ottoman and Iranian states in the region appeared against the states as rebellions. After the rebellions in Botan and Cizre, the Kurds in the Ottoman-Iran border also started to rebellion. Kurds were organized by sheikhs who became stronger due to the configuration implemented by the Ottoman Empire in this region.

The Naqshbandi sect came to the fore in the region, especially because the Kurds in this region were Sunni. After the middle of the 19th century, the Naqshbandi order had a great authority among the Kurds, and during this period, the head of the Naqshbandi sect was Sheikh Ubeydullah. The family traces its origins to Abdulkadir Geylani, who lived in the 12th century, and to the Prophet through Fatima, the Prophet's daughter (Özoğlu, 2005, p. 115; Nikitine, 1994, pp. 387-388).

The Sheikh was a serious landowner in the region, especially around Hakkari (Jwaideh, 2012, p. 158), and the main tobacco fields in Hakkari belong to the Sheikh. Therefore, the security of commercial routes and the fight against usurpation are also important for the sheikh. The Sheikh also expanded his borders considerably by taking land from the Iranian State. After the half of the 19th century, the Sheikh reached a very influential power in Southeastern Anatolia and Northwest Iran as the political and military leader of the Kurds (Özoğlu, 2005, pp. 95-96).

While the 1877-78 Ottoman-Russian war reduced the Ottoman influence in the region, Sheikh Ubeydullah's influence increased in these wars. Thus, Sheikh Ubeydullah, who increased his military and political power, decided to uprising (Ayvarov, 1995, p. 123). This uprising was especially supported by the Revanduz, Bohtan and Bitlis tribes, whose rebellions had been suppressed in the recent period. Other sheikhs also supported this movement to eliminate the influence of the Ottoman Empire in this region. The Ottoman Empire was aware of these works of the Sheikh. For this reason, he sent the mufti of Van to meet with the Sheikh. The negotiations ended negatively for the Ottomans. Russian General Zeleniy wrote in the report he sent about the Sheikh to the Caucasus Sanjak General Staff dated February 15, 1880, "Based on Turkey's

weakness, the Sheikh, who is of the opinion that Turkey will collapse completely, wants to leave Turkey and become fully independent” (Celil, 1998, p. 65).

Unable to convince the Sheikh, the Ottoman Empire began to take precautions against the uprising in the region. In 1879, he appointed Mushir Semih Pasha to the Fourth Anatolian Command with extraordinary powers. Pasha, who came to Van, was supported by infantry units and two battalions from Erzurum. In addition, Pasha returned the batteries in Erzurum, Erzincan, Mosul, Diyarbakır and Van to Hakkari. He concentrated soldiers on the passages connecting Hakkari and its surroundings (BOA.Y.PRK.ASK 7/55).

The Sheikh ordered the Kurds under his rule not to pay the tax that was collected. In August 1879, Herakli Kurds refused to pay taxes. The district governor of Hever marched against this tribe with a military unit of four hundred people. The Governor of Mosul sent two hundred soldiers to Palga to collect taxes. Hearing this, Sheikh's son Abdulkadir opposed this unit and was defeated. The District Governor of Bashkale asked the Sheikh to obey and pay the taxes. The Sheikh stated that the reason why they took such a move was because the villages of Diyarbakir were plundered and destroyed by the soldiers (Celil, 1998, p. 71).

Kurdish tribes in Iran were also affected by these events that took place on the border and they started to support this move of the Sheikh. The cities of Hoy, Savjubulak , Urumiye and Ushnu were providing weapons and ammunition to the Sheikh's army. Armed groups from the Shikak Tribe crossed the border and joined the Sheikh (Jwaideh, 2012, pp. 180-181). The rebellion in Hakkari and its surroundings was spreading more and more.

This situation disturbed England as much as it damaged the Ottoman Empire. They even stated that Semih Pasha was not aware of the seriousness of these developments. They passed on information from their agents to assist him and enable him to intervene immediately. The Sheikh's rebellion failed because he could not unite the Kurds during this period. He preferred to retreat and become stronger rather than disappear (Celil, 1998, p. 73). This armed attack of the Sheikh in 1879 was the forerunner of the rebellions to come (Jwaideh, 2012, p. 179).

In this first conflict with the Ottoman Empire, the Sheikh measured the reaction of the government and learned the situation of his own troops and the opposing side. After this

incident, the Sheikh changed tactics and wrote a letter to the governor of Van denying these actions and stating that he is completely loyal to the Sultan (Abdulla, 2010, p. 265).

Contrary to expectations, the Ottoman Empire was friendly to the Sheikh. The reason why the empire acted like this was that it did not want to attract the reaction of the people by punishing the holy and powerful person who had won the public's appreciation, and that it thought that could benefit from his services and see him as a possible ally (Jwaideh, 2012, p. 184).

Why did the Sheikh rebel against the Ottoman Empire in 1879, while he sided with the Ottoman Empire in the 1877-78 Ottoman-Russian war? As a result, the economic and social situation of the region, while good, did not suddenly deteriorate. While it was already bad, it got a little worse. What distinguishes the Sheikh's sudden decision to move from previous Kurdish rebellions is his idea of establishing a fully independent Kurdish state. The reason for this is that it brought radical reforms to the Armenians according to Article 61 of the Berlin Agreement.

Britain sent five soldiers to the region where Armenians lived in Anatolia to report on the actions of the Christian subjects, the Ottoman administration and the Kurdish tribal leaders. This event was perceived by the Kurds as the eastern provinces coming under the protection of the British. When the British Consul came to Van in 1879, rumors spread that an Armenian state would be established under the auspices of Britain. The Kurds also took action to prevent reforms in favor of the Armenians after the Berlin Agreement, thinking that the Armenian state to be established in Eastern Anatolia would weaken their power in the region. Abdulhamid II saw this uprising as an event that would balance the Armenian movement in the region (Sinno, 2011, p. 131).

The Sheikh's supporters and representatives spread throughout the region and attempted to find supporters. The Sheikh himself held a meeting with sheikhs and Kurdish leaders in the Shamdinan district of Hakkari in July 1880 to ensure Kurdish unity (Celil, 1998, p. 84). The spread of Armenian claims over the eastern provinces in the region created an unexpected unity among the Kurds (Jwaideh, 2012, p. 184).

He persuaded them to side with him. Based on the previous events, Sheikh Ubeydullah deemed it appropriate to establish a Kurdish Government on Iranian lands, thinking that they might fall into disagreements among themselves and that he did not have enough power to fight with the

Ottoman Empire. Regarding this issue, Sheikh Ubeydullah, in his speech at the meeting held in Nehir village of Shamdinan district, said,

“The Ottoman Empire was founded 550 years ago. The Ottomans illegally seized the caliphate and caused rebellions. Sharia is the caliph's Hz. It requires him to be a descendant of Muhammad. Therefore, the Ottoman presidency over the Islamic world is illegal.” (Ayvarov, 1995, p. 124).

Moreover, the Sheikh said,

“...Not only we, the Kurds in Ottoman Turkey, but also the Kurds in Iran, must get rid of these two cruel and shackle states. Our ancestors commanded us to sacrifice for the sake of religion and the independence of the country.” (Sinno, 2011, p. 147).

During this period, the Iranians concentrated most of their forces in the east due to the Herat issue and the conflict between Afghanistan and Britain. It was the best time to attack Iran while the army was divided. The Sheikh thought that after owning fertile lands like Azerbaijan, it would be easier to become economically stronger and fight the Ottomans, and that the Ottoman empire would not raise a voice on this issue. (Ayvarov, 1995, p. 125). What was meant by the attack on Iran was only the Azerbaijan region. Later, when it became stronger, it was to establish Kurdistan by taking nearby places under the Ottoman empire (Celil, 1998, p. 65).

The Sheikh was also trying to attract Russia, which is influential and powerful in the region, to his side. For this reason, he explained to Van's Russian Deputy Consul Kamsarakan and in October 1878, through one of his successors, Seyit Muhammed, that the problems in the region were that the people in the region had started to commit extortion because the people in the ranks, from the lowest to the highest levels, were tyrants and robbed the people. He also emphasized that he preferred Russia's protection in his fight against the Ottoman Empire. The vice consul also emphasized that if Russia had to fight with Britain or the Ottomans, the fact that the passes in the Diyarbakır and Van regions were in the hands of the Kurds could change the outcome of the war (Celil, 1998, p. 67).

The Nestorians in the region supported the Kurds, albeit partially, because they did not want either the Americans or the British to come to Urmia and Mosul (Celil, 1998, p. 71). Another

reason why the Nestorians supported the Kurdish movement was that the Sheikh was tolerant towards them and intervened in the plunder and tyranny committed against them (Celil, 1998, p. 72; Jwaideh, 2012, p. 174).

The Sheikh wanted to see the Armenian population on his side in order to ensure complete unity in the region. For this purpose, he contacted local Armenian church representatives and Armenian local religious leader Archimandrit Ognos Vartapet (Celil, 1998, p. 81). The Sheikh warned that the Kurds would be harmed in a conflict between the Kurds and the Armenians, and that if the Kurds destroyed the Armenians, the Ottoman Empire would no longer need the Kurds (Sinno, 2011, p. 147).

Russia did not support Sheikh's action because it did not want to lose the ground it gained in the region with the Berlin Agreement. In addition, he saw a state to be established under the leadership of the Sheikh as dangerous for itself. Because he saw what religious leaders could do because of Sheikh Shamil. Britain was also worried about the establishment of an Armenian state that would be under the influence of Russia (Sinno, 2011, pp. 141-142).

The Sheikh took action, thinking that the conditions were ripe for rebellion. In the letter he wrote to Dr.Cochran on September 25, 1880, he began by explaining why it was necessary to attack Iran. Sheikh stated that Kurds in Iran were massacred, money was extorted from some tribes, they were oppressed under extremely high taxes, Kurdish women were kidnapped by Iranian officials, and lawlessness against Kurds was widespread (Jwaideh, 2012, p. 185; Tori, 2006, p. 43).

He rebelled, using the excuse that the hostility between the Iranian Shikak Tribe and the Ottoman Hereki Tribe was not eliminated by the two states. Although Sheikh Ubeydullah mentioned the above-mentioned issues as the reason for the rebellion, one of the main reasons for the rebellion, which he did not mention much, was the Ottoman Empire's acceptance in Article 61 of the Berlin Agreement signed in 1878 that it would protect the Armenians and take precautions against the Kurds and Circassians. In fact, the Sheikh expressed how disturbed he was about this issue in the letter he sent to the Governor of Bashkale in July 1880, saying:

“What is this I hear; Armenians would establish an independent state in Van, while Nestorians would raise the British flag and declare themselves British citizens? I will definitely not allow this, even if I have to arm women.”

The idea of Armenian sovereignty in the southeast of the Ottoman Empire was one of the main reasons for uniting the Kurds and encouraging them to uprise (Özoğlu, 2005, pp. 95-98; Jwaideh, 2012, pp. 167-171).

In July 1880, the Iranian administration asked the Urumiye Governor, Sheikh's son Abdulkadir, for the taxes of the Soma region. Abdulkadir denied this. The governor then asked Ali Khan, who had a strong population in the Soma region, to collect taxes. Hearing this, the Sheikh sent additional forces to his son. When Ali Khan learned about the measures taken, he stopped obeying the Governor's order and reported the situation to the governor. Iranian Kurds started preparations to comply with the decisions taken in the Shamdinan talks. Hamza Agha from the Mangur Tribe was at the forefront of those who made these preparations. Iran had to prepare in Savjbulak against Hamza Agha's preparations. In August, Sheikh and his son Abdulkadir sent a unit of one thousand people to support the Mangur Tribe. Barzani Kurdish Tribes, located in Iran and affiliated with the Sheikh, joined this union. As the uprising progressed, new tribes joined the union (Celil, 1998, pp. 89-90; Tori, 2006, pp. 43-44).

According to the information given by Tabriz Karperdar (Consul) in September/October 1880, Sheikh Ubeydullah incited and plundered with external and internal Kurdish tribes from Urumiye to the border of Baku province. The Ottoman ambassador reported this situation to Iran. According to the information coming from the Huvi border, the Kurdish groups in the Ottoman lands are gathering as cavalry and attacking the Iranian side and passing into the Ottoman lands.

Sheikh Ubeydullah also receives support from his external friends regarding this attack. There was no Iranian army in this region. In this regard, the Iranian Ambassador to Istanbul met with the Ottoman Sultan on September 25, 1880 and gave him a detailed letter and warned him about Sheikh Ubeydullah (Araqi, 1989-1996, p. 657). However, the Sheikh had already taken action. The army formed by Sheikh Ubeydullah consisted of three parts. At the head of the first force were Sheikh Abdulkadir, the son of Sheikh Ubeydullah, and Hamza Agha, the leader of the

Mangur Tribe, one of the Iranian Kurds. Their goal was to capture Savjubulak and Tabriz. The second force was led by the Sheikh's other son, Muhammed Sadık, whose aim was to take Urumiye. Muhammed Seyit from the Beradust Tribe was at the head of the third force, and his aim was to take the areas west of Lake Salmas, Hoy and Urumiye (Ayvarov, 1995, p. 125). Sheikh Ubeydullah will be the leader of the forces attacking Urumiye (BOA.Y.PRK.ASK. 4/43).

In September 1880, a group of a thousand people from Hakkari Kurds entered Erdelan under the leadership of Sheikh Ubeydullah and Hamza Agha. With the ongoing Kurdish reinforcements, Sheikh occupied and plundered Savjubulak-Urumiye. The number of soldiers of this force reached seven thousand (BOA.Y.PRK.ASK, 7/34). The forces led by Sheikh Abdulkadir and Hamza Agha arrived in the Margavar region without encountering any resistance from the Iranian border troops. Five to six hundred Kurds from the local tribes participated here, under the leadership of Mahmud Agha. They headed towards Ushnu. Four hundred people attended from there. When they reached Lahijan, the Piran Tribe joined them (Celil, 1998, p. 91).

A temporary government was established to administer the captured places. The first Friday sermon was read in Savjubulak. Vizier Hasan Ali Khan was sent to investigate the attacks on Savjubulak, Lahijan, Sulduz and Sayinkala. And seeing that the people on the border were surrounded, he saw that if no precautions were taken, the people would not be able to remain on this border (Araqi, 1989-1996, p. 678).

According to Savjubulak governor, who reported to the center during this advance of Sheikh Abdulkadir and Hamza Agha, the massacre they committed in Savjubulak and its surroundings in three days had reached twelve thousand. People were burned, include Christians, Jews and children. Mosques were set on fire. Without making any distinction between fifteen-year-old women and five-year-old virgin girls, all of them were raped. The region from Savjubulak to Tabriz was completely plundered. Especially from Savjubulak, both high-ranking dignitaries and common people were indiscriminately massacred and trampled underfoot. Without exaggeration, one hundred million Tumans had been plundered and usurped. Mangur, Piran, Zûdi, Memish and Reraza groups affiliated with Sheikh Ubeydullah participated in this plunder.

Iran stated that the Ottoman Empire was around the border and did not intervene. This community, numbering forty thousand, continued looting and robbery from 13 October to 23 October (Araqi, 1989-1996, p. 675).

The news officers of the Iranian government official Itimad Al-Saltanat were caught and murdered in the Binab and Sengir regions. Sheikh Abdulkadir and his entourage went to Binab on 23 October and plundered this region and its surroundings until 1 November. What they boasted about was that they completed their plunder before the Iranian army arrived (Araqi, 1989-1996, p. 676).

The people in this region took their families and children in anxiety and fear and fled to the desert, plains and mountains. Within two hours on November 9, the people in Savjubulak were forced to migrate by Sheikh Abdulkadir, approximately one hundred and fifty families began to migrate, and the sounds of cannons, rifles, screams of women and children were heard from the places they went. By the end of the day, about three hundred families out of fourteen hundred had survived. The governor of Savjubulak concluded his report by saying that the Ottoman empire should have prevented these events on its territory and the incidents of usurpation, plunder and murder should have been punished (Araqi, 1989-1996, p. 677).

Hamza Agha captured the cities of Zevar (Zuvar), Miyandoab, Melik-Kandi despite the Iranian State soldiers and committed massacres there. Soon Kurdish forces headed towards Tabriz. The destruction of Miyandoab harmed the Sheikh's cause. Because most of the warriors scattered with their loot, and the looting and massacre made the Iranians sad and strengthened their resistance (Jwaideh, 2012, pp. 188-189; Araqi, 1989-1996, p. 663). When they approached Tabriz, their forces dispersed and started plundering the surrounding area (Araqi, 1989-1996, p. 663).

Meanwhile, Sheikh Ubeydullah blockaded Urumiye with twelve thousand soldiers. (Jwaideh, 2012, p. 189). Iqbalu'd-Dawla strengthened the defense of the city with the time he gained, and also gave up surrendering the city because he received the news that the support forces were setting out from Tabriz. The attacks of the Sheikh's forces were repelled and the dispersed forces retreated (Araqi, 1989-1996, pp. 663-664). Meanwhile, Semih Pasha, the border officer appointed by the Ottoman Empire, and the Governor of Urumiye held meetings and a consensus

was reached on urgently ensuring safety and security (BOA.Y.PRK.ASK, 4/79). However, during this period, safety was not yet ensured around the villages and on the roads (Araqi, 1989-1996, pp. 663-664).

The Ottoman Empire was following the events carefully, and on the other hand, it was trying to keep the events in Iran by supporting the uprising. On the other hand, the successes of the Kurds worried them (Celil, 1998, p. 99). During the uprising, the Ottoman Army sent sixteen battalions from Van, Mush, Bitlis and Erzincan, and twenty-eight large-scale fortress cannons from Erzincan and Mamahatun to Erzurum. The Fourth Corps Command was transferred from Erzincan to Erzurum. In addition, the Ottoman Empire was spreading various rumors to destroy the sense of trust that the Sheikh had created in the people (Celil, 1998, p. 100).

Meanwhile, Iran had instructed its ambassador in Istanbul to meet with the Sultan on this issue. On October 4, 1880, the Ambassador informed his Ministry of Foreign Affairs in writing that he had received a verbal assurance from the Sultan about Sheikh Ubeydullah, and they reported it to Prince Iltisham al-Saltanat on October 9, 1880. In the telegraph, the ambassador warned that the Ottoman Empire sent soldiers to the region and the border due to these events on the border, but that no such precautions were taken by them yet (Araqi, 1989-1996, p. 642).

In the negotiations between the two states on October 15, 1880, which lasted for more than a year, the decrease in income due to plunder on the border, the murdered people, and the summoning of the sheikh and his son were discussed. In addition, the Ottoman Kurds went to the border and asked for help from the soldiers and stated that there was a foreign hand in this fight, that the two states were Islamic and Muslim, that there would be peace between the two states with God's permission, and that they wanted to make peace without bloodshed. In their telegraph dated October 24, 1880, Iranian border guards emphasized that an army should be sent to this region urgently (Araqi, 1989-1996, p. 643). Regarding this issue, Iran's Ambassador to Istanbul informed the center on 4 November 1880 that he would meet with the Sultan more easily if he had more definitive evidence and documents. On this issue, the Ambassador again stated that he met with the Sublime Porte regarding the Sheikh and the Ottoman Kurds on 9 November 1880, and that the information he received was controversial and insufficient, and that he requested daily information from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran. In his meeting

with the Sultan on November 15, 1880, the Iranian Ambassador talked about how the bad consequences of the uprising would harm the Ottoman Empire. One of the defenses of the Ottoman empire on this issue was that the Sheikh was provoked and protected by the British, and that the Sheikh did not rebellion because of the Anatolian and Armenian issues, as was said (Araqi, 1989-1996, p. 645).

Iran mobilized the military from Tabriz under the command of Itimad Al-Saltanat in order to suppress the uprising. Military units from Hemadan and Qazvin also participated. An Austrian-backed military unit under the command of Hamza Mirza Hashmedu'd-Dawle set out from Tehran. As a third force, Timur Khan moved from Khoy (Araqi, 1989-1996, p. 664). While Iran was preparing for military action, the movements of the Kurds in Tabriz and its surroundings decreased. There were incidents of robbery and plunder on the Azerbaijani side.

The groups that participated in the attacks to meet their needs began to leave the units after meeting their needs. This situation weakened the rebels. Iran also applied to Britain and Russia and put pressure on the Ottoman empire to take the necessary measures (Celil, 1998, p. 101). Some forces of the Ottoman Army also helped the Iranian Army by blocking the path of the retreating Kurdish forces (Jwaideh, 2012, p. 190). Muhammed Sadik was not successful in stopping the Iranian forces under the command of Itimad Al-Saltanat on the Urumiye road. Timur, the Maku governor of Iran, attacked by Salmas. Thereupon, Sheikh Ubeydullah sent a relief force of two thousand people to Muhammed Sadik (Ayvarov, 1995, p. 126). However, these forces did not fight against Timur Khan because they dispersed into the villages and plundered (BOA.Y.PRK.ASK, 4/43).

Thereupon, although Sheikh Ubeydullah himself fought against Timur Khan, he retreated to Beradust, within the borders of the Ottoman Empire, with great losses. Afterwards, Muhammed Sadik and Seyit Muhammed, near Tabriz, retreated to Erdelan and Hakkari.(Ayvarov, 1995, p. 127). In the telegraph written by Mushir Sami Pasha, who was affiliated with the Fourth Army in Van, to the Ministry of War on 5 November 1880, he reported that Maku governor Timur Khan had gone to the aid of Urumiye with a few cannons and seven to eight companies of cavalry and infantry. Based on this information, one can easily comment on the situation of the Sheikh's troops.

Meanwhile, the Ottoman Empire sent an envoy to the Sheikh and asked him to stop fighting against Iran (Ayvarov, 1995, p. 127). In this regard, Nasereddin Shah stated that two Ottoman government officials blocked the way of the Sheikh's son, but since no one from the public helped, the Sheikh's son would have already reached his own house. He wanted the Russian ambassador to be informed personally that two Ottoman officials would not be able to do this. He even described it as surprising how the huge state army and its two officers could not prevent a person from crossing the border. The Shah said that if there had been a few forces from the Ottoman empire on the border and Iranian soldiers had been allowed to cross the border, Sheikh Ubeydullah would have been captured long ago, and then he wanted the Russian ambassador to personally convey that the Iranian army could return to its border (Araqi, 1989-1996, p. 587).

At the same time, Iran sent Mirza Reza Khan to Van and negotiated whether they should hand over the Sheikh to them or be punished accordingly. Meanwhile, the pressure of the European States on the Ottoman Empire was increasing (Ayvarov, 1995, p. 127).

Although the rebellion was suppressed, Mangur Tribe Sheikh Hamza Agha continued to resist and damaged the Iranian army with sudden raids. The Shah's army pursued the rebels. Thereupon, the Kurds began to move to the Ottoman Empire en masse. Iran sent the Kurds in the cities of Kermanshah, Maku and Sine, where Kurds are concentrated, to the deserted places of Iran with the thought that they might rebel again (Celil, 1998, p. 107; Nikitine, 1994, p. 350).

Due to the increase in immigration to the Ottoman side, Iran's Ambassador to Istanbul informed the Sublime Porte on December 1, 1880 that granting favors to the rebellious Kurds instead of pressuring them would rehabilitate them (Araqi, 1989-1996, p. 646). Miralay. At the same time, although the Iranian State declared a general amnesty after the Sheikh withdrew from the region, there was no harm that Timur Khan and Iqbalu'd-Dawla did to the lives and property of the people. (BOA.Y.PRK.MYD. 1/91). With the withdrawal of Sheikh Ubeydullah and his son Abdulkadir from Iranian lands, Iranian Kurdish tribes declared their loyalty to the Shah (Celil, 1998, p. 106).

The Shah was trying to take the necessary precautions to avoid encountering a rebellion again in his own country. At the same time, the Shah thought that this situation would not end without the capture of Sheikh Ubeydullah, the leader of the uprising (Tori, 2006, p. 51).

In the letter the Shah wrote to Emir Nizam,

“Our work is not over before these two cursed men - the Sheikh and his son - are exiled and Hamza Agha falls into our hands. In order to finish this job, it is necessary to force the Russian ambassador and finish the job.” (Araqi, 1989-1996, p. 589).

The reason why Nasereddin Shah insisted on this issue and intervened with Russia was that the Sheikh and his son requested amnesty from the Sultan (Araqi, 1989-1996, p. 589). For this reason, he asked the Ottoman empire to capture the Sheikh as soon as possible. He continued to put pressure on the Ottoman Empire by informing the European states that the Sheikh's sons and Hamza Agha were in Ottoman territory and that the Iranian state was disturbed about this issue. Meanwhile, negotiations were continuing between the Ottoman and Qajar empires regarding the punishment of the Sheikh (Araqi, 1989-1996, p. 647).

It was obvious that if the Sheikh fell into Iran's hands, he would either be arrested or expelled. The Sheikh himself knew this. The Sheikh was damaging the relations between the two states. This problem between the two states had to be resolved definitively, for better or worse (Araqi, 1989-1996, p. 648).

The Sheikh began to reorganize, taking lessons from the unsuccessful 1880 rebellion in Iran. He told the Kurdish tribal leaders to treat the Armenians in the region well, and that doing otherwise would harm this movement (Celil, 1998, p. 109). The Sheikh continued his preparations for the uprising. In January 1881, nearly five thousand Arabs from Baghdad and Mosul provinces came to visit the Sheikh and expressed their loyalty. The Sheikh wanted to take the Nestorians with him again. For this reason, he had been in talks with their Archbishop Mar-Shimun for a long time. He also attached great importance to the training of his units (Celil, 1998, pp. 110-111). He was trying to achieve unity, which he could not achieve in his previous rebellion. Following the developments, the Ottoman Empire began to take the necessary precautions.

The events on the Azerbaijan border came to an end only in August 1881 (Araqi, 1989-1996, p. 670). The decisions taken in the negotiations between the Ottoman Empire and Iran required the exile of the Sheikh and his son, the inspection of the regions where they were located, and the location of Hamza Agha and his other son should be reported (Araqi, 1989-1996, p. 668). The Iranian side emphasized that if the Sheikh's son and Hamza Agha were not

caught, this job would not be completed. With the order from Istanbul, Mushir Pasha sent the Sheikh to Istanbul.

Meanwhile, the Iranian side was trying to find out whether the Sheikh was sent alone or with his son. There were reports that the Sheikh's other son, Sadık, was in Iran with Shikak Ali Khan, and that Hamza Agha's whereabouts in Iran were unknown. The Ottoman Empire also stated that if these people were located and deported to the border, they would capture them and that they were not heedless in this regard (Araqi, 1989-1996, pp. 559-560).

Iran's interpretation of the Ottoman Empire's attitude was that it believed the Sheikh's lies and did not see that he was causing discord between the two sides, and that no results were achieved due to external states (Araqi, 1989-1996, p. 670). Iran warned Istanbul that the Sheikh would take action against Iran again in the spring. Thereupon, the Sublime Porte requested information from the Fourth Army Commander Mushir Nafiz Pasha, who was in Van. Regarding this issue, Pasha stated on February 11, 1881 that the Sheikh continued to make supplies to go to Iran in the spring, but that he could not provide what he wanted because he did not have more than three thousand soldiers on the Van and Hakkari borders, and in the meantime, the Sheikh was not punished. He stated that otherwise, he would somehow take advantage of Russia and Britain and put the Ottoman empire in a difficult situation. He also added that there are enough soldiers in this region and there is no security problem (BOA.Y.PRK.ASK, 7/34).

Iran was right in its concerns about Sheikh Ubeydullah. The Sheikh wanted to recover in Ottoman lands and take action against Iran again. The proof of this was the letter that the Sheikh wrote to the people of the Ercish district in the Van province on February 21, 1881, but was captured by the Ottoman Empire (BOA.Y.PRK.ASK, 6/25).

On this issue, the report of the Fourth Army Commander Mushir Nafiz Pasha, who was in Van, dated 13 March 1881, is parallel to the Sheikh's letter. The Pasha declared that the Muslim people who allied with Sheikh Ubeydullah to attack Iran were present and that the ideas of the Supreme State and the European States were in accordance with their own wishes, and that he did not renounce the idea of raping Iran with the assurance given by him. He wrote that as a precaution in this regard, the Ottoman tribes were discussed and a promissory note was taken

not to lean towards the Sheikh and not to attack Iran, but despite these developments, the Sheikh did not give up this idea.

In the telegraphs dated 19 March and 12 April 1881, Mushir Nafiz Pasha informed his state that Russia would use this issue to enter Azerbaijan and perhaps use the Sheikh's soldiers against the Ottomans. He also shared his views with Istanbul that Iranian soldiers would cross the border if such an attack took place (BOA.Y.PRK.ASK, 7/34). Mushir Nafiz Pasha reported from Van that the Sheikh had assured them that there would be no attack on them on April 22, 1881, but naturally they did not trust this assurance and continued to take the necessary precautions at the border. The reason why the Sheikh gave such an assurance was that he did not want to confront the Ottoman empire (BOA.Y.PRK.ASK, 7/34).

In his telegraphs dated 6 and 8 June 1881, Mushir Nafiz Pasha announced that his negotiations with the Sheikh were continuing and that as a result of these negotiations, the Sheikh agreed to come to Istanbul and that they would set out from Hakkari by taking all security measures (BOA.Y.PRK.ASK, 7/34).

In the spring of 1881, the Sheikh could not stand the pressure from the center and set out for Istanbul (Araqi, 1989-1996, p. 670). Abdulhamid II welcomed his guest with an honor ceremony. Artillery shots were fired upon the Sheikh's entry into Istanbul. It was later revealed that the Sheikh was not a guest in Istanbul, but a prisoner. In November 1881, the Sheikh asked the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs to support his request to compensate for the damage caused by the Iranian Army. He also stated that the rebellion in 1880 was caused by the Shah's oppressive policy. Thereupon, the Tehran Ambassador of the Ottoman Empire, Fahri Bey, stated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran on 24 November 1881 that he was disturbed by the practices of the Iranian Army and that if the situation at the border continued in this way, the Ottoman subjects would be provoked (Celil, 1998, p. 113). The Iranian State announced that what the Sheikh said did not reflect the truth and that such requests would harm the relations between the two states (Celil, 1998, p. 114).

In the meantime, the Sheikh was getting in touch with his son Abdulkadir to arrange his escape from Istanbul. The Sheikh claimed he wanted to be by himself and pray during Eid al-Fitr, so he asked no one to come into his room (BOA.Y.PRK.KOM, 3/65). Meanwhile, the Sheikh was

making plans to escape from Istanbul by contacting his son Abdulkadir. (Araqi, 1989-1996, pp. 718-760). Naturally, the Iranian side also heard about this incident (Araqi, 1989-1996, pp. 718-760).

The Qacar empire repaired the city walls of Urumiye. Iran thought that the Sheikh was left by the Ottoman empire rather than escaped. The reason why he thought so was that in the telegraph written by the Iranian Baghdad Consul to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 21 August 1882, it would be announced that the Sheikh had escaped, even though he was sent from Istanbul to Baghdad (Araqi, 1989-1996, p. 707).

On the other hand, in the news coming from Istanbul, there were conflicting news among the public, such as that the Sheikh had escaped, and that the Iranian and British Embassies in Istanbul, with the alliance of the Russian Consul, had made the Sheikh escape. The reason for these rumors was shown to be the desire of the Ottoman subjects and the Iranian subjects to form an alliance. Rumors spread among the people that the Ottoman empire would declare war when the Sheikh encountered the Qajar empire army for once. Although the Baghdad Consul informed the center that such news was false in his telegraph dated 21 August 1882, the rumors spread far enough (Araqi, 1989-1996, p. 710). Nasir al-Din Shah also thought that the Sheikh was pardoned and released by Istanbul (Araqi, 1989-1996, p. 714).

In the telegraph from Istanbul, it was stated that it was true that the Sheikh had escaped, and in the name of Allah and the Prophet, the Sultan was not aware of this escape. Because the Ottoman empire was dealing with the Egyptian problem during this period. On the other hand, some bandits and enemies were waiting for the Ottoman empire to withdraw its soldiers from the border and send them to the West (Araqi, 1989-1996, p. 727).

In the telegraph sent from the Iranian Embassy in Moscow to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran, it was stated that Russia was on Iran's side and that if the Sheikh was to be punished, it should be given by Iran, but the Sheikh had not made any attempt at the moment, adding that the Russians had also stated that Russia was on Iran's side (Araqi, 1989-1996, pp. 735-736).

Meanwhile, Van Consul of Iran, Mirza Aga Khan announced that negotiations on issues related to the Sheikh were continuing and that the Sultan's offer was to send the Sheikh to Mecca. In addition, according to Iran's claim, Tehran was informed that although Musa and Mustafa Pasha,

Liva and Miralay Yusuf Bey were at the head of the cavalry, they did not take any precautions against mischief and plunder. When the Russian Consul was asked if the Sultan was thinking of sending the Sheikh to Mecca, he stated that he had met with the Sheikh and wanted to go to Mosul (Araqi, 1989-1996, p. 736).

The Sheikh knew that he did not have the strength to rebel against the Ottoman empire, and winter was coming. He stated that the reason for the gathering was his son's wedding. The Sheikh's aim was to strengthen his position and gain time by drawing the Kurdish groups closer. Being aware of the situation, Istanbul sent Colonel Yusuf Bey to the Sheikh in order to deter the Sheikh from the idea of rebellion. This meeting failed. In August, Istanbul sent Kamil Bey as a new intermediary. Istanbul's offer to the Sheikh was a monthly pension of one hundred and fifty liras and other privileges, provided that he migrated to a city considered holy by Islam. The Sheikh did not accept this offer and started preparations against the Ottoman army in Oramar Castle. As a result of the Ottoman army's siege of Oramar Castle, the Sheikh agreed to settle in Mosul, but delayed surrender. Thereupon, the Ottoman Army attacked, captured the castle and took the Sheikh to Mosul.

The Sheikh's other son, Muhammed Sadık, was also captured and sent to Istanbul (BOA.Y.PRK.UM, 5/40). The Sheikh declared his successor as Abdulkadir (BOA.Y.PRK.BŞK, 7/92). The Ottoman Empire's taking the Sheikh to Mosul disturbed Iran. Iran did not see this as a sufficient precaution. Because, in the Mosul province, with a small call to arms by the Sheikh, the Arabs and Kurds here would come to this call. Istanbul Iranian Ambassador Muhsin Han requested Istanbul to take the Sheikh to a place away from the Iranian border. Abdulhamid II announced that the Sheikh could easily be sent to the farthest places of Arabia from now on, and that his stay in Mosul was temporary.

The Sheikh reached Mosul in December 1882. Towards the end of December, the order came to take the Sheikh from here to Mecca. Another concern of Iran was Abdulkadir, who was a follower of his father. Iran's fears turned out to be true, Abdulkadir kidnapped his father near the village of Sheptan. Kamil Bey, who was responsible for the Sheikh's migration, asked for help from the Governors of Mosul and Baghdad. Four battalions in the river took action towards sheptan Village. In the mountainous part of theregion, the soldiers and Abdulkadir's men met

and were defeated. The forces that came to Kamil Bey's aid surrounded Sheptan Village and after a six-hour battle, the Sheikh surrendered (Araqi, 1989-1996, pp. 746-765). The Sheikh and his son were exiled to Mecca and the Sheikh died in 1883. (Minorsky et al., 2004, p. 101) The Ottoman empire declared that these lands were cleared by punishing the Sheikh (Araqi, 1989-1996, p. 762).



4. PAUL BRASS IN LITERATURE ON NATIONALISM AND ETHNIC STUDIES

It can be said that Paul Brass was quite late in taking his place alongside thinkers such as Smith, Gellner or Hobsbawm in the literature of nationalism and ethnic studies. Although Brass seems not to have come to the fore as much as other thinkers with the ideas he put forward, he did not refrain from making significant works of his own. In this respect, while there will be many important points that Brass will contribute to ethnic-based studies, it can be said that studies on Brass are insufficient in the literature. Brass did not come up with a new and groundbreaking theory, as he claimed; But this should not mean that the views put forward by Brass should not be evaluated. According to Brass's view, a group of people becoming a nation can be attributed to a process. This process first talks about the transformation of this group of people from a group of people into an ethnic community, and then from an ethnic community to becoming a nation. It should not be thought that this process is one-way; on the contrary, there are various examples of human groups falling back from being a nation and becoming an ethnic community again. The ideas put forward by Brass regarding ethnic communities and nations are discussed critically in the rest of the chapter.

4.1. Paul Brass and Nationalism

Paul Brass mentions that there are three different ways to define ethnic groups. The first of these is in terms of objective characteristics, the second is in terms of references to subjective feelings, and the last is in terms of behaviors. (Brass, 1991, p. 18).

The identification made by looking at objective characteristics is based on clear evidence (or markers—differences in language, region, religion, color, types of food, and ways of dressing) that distinguish one ethnic group from another (Govers & Vermeulen, 1997, p. 5). Even though ethnic groups are similar to each other, it is not difficult to find an absolute difference between them that will enable this distinction. However, with this definition, some difficulties are encountered in drawing the precise boundaries required to determine ethnic groups and ethnic affiliations. Because there is no certain stability or continuity in the emergence of the mentioned evidence in social groups. For example, it is possible for a person to have clothing characteristics that are considered to belong to a certain ethnic group, but also to have language characteristics

that belong to another group. In this case, the situation of which ethnic group the individual and the groups belong to becomes complicated. The difficulty faced by subjective definition is that it cannot answer the question of how social groups come to feel belonging to a certain ethnic group. It is very difficult to find an answer to the question of what the feeling of belonging to nationality and ethnic groups is. The first ideas on this subject were put forward by primordialists, who claimed that nationalism consists of the innate feelings of individuals. (Bacova et al., 2003, pp. 117-118; Smith A. D., 1987, p. 29). With this put forward, linking the motives of being a nation to the feelings of the individuals who make up the nation brings up the questions of when and how these feelings were born or how they can be measured and compared.

However, it is certain that they are inadequate to answer these questions. In behavioral definition, emphasis is placed on the lifestyles of ethnic groups and their unique behavioral patterns when interacting with other ethnic groups. Therefore, it is quite possible to classify this type as a different type of objective definition. According to this definition, there are always cultural features/differences between ethnic groups that distinguish one from the other. However, these only emerge through the interactive interaction of a certain ethnic group with other ethnic groups and allow this group to be defined separately from the other.

However, what should be noted here, or the point that distinguishes the behavioral definition from the objective definition, is that the differences in the objective definition are more noticeable and concrete than those in the behavioral definition. In other words, while behavioral differences arise from and are nourished by interpersonal relationships, they have a more complex and intertwined structure. On the other hand, objective differences are concrete and self-existing differences, they exhibit a simpler and more monolithic structure. Among these definitions, the ones preferred by Brass are objective ones; Because it claims that objective ones have superiority and general validity over subjective ones in terms of analysis and precision. (Brass, 1991, p. 18).

Claiming that ethnic competition in modern societies differs from pre-modern societies through language, religion, education, employment and division of labor, Brass attempted to make sense of ethnic competition in modern societies under these headings.(Brass, 1991). For this reason, a

classification has been made in the following headings, even though they are all interrelated and complement each other. In this way, it will be tried to help the theories put forward by Brass to be understood more easily.

4.2.Awareness of Being an Ethnic Community

The transition from ethnic group to ethnic community is a process that some groups never achieved, some achieved in early modern times, and some did repeatedly at different points in time. Those in the first group have generally lost their identities within the ethnic structures that have managed to become other communities. Examples of this are the Cornish people in England and the Frisians in the Netherlands. These groups speak their own dialects.

The second group includes nations such as Wales and Ireland, Austria and Hungary, which completed their ethnic grouping and nationhood processes in the 19th and 20th centuries. In the last group, there are ancient communities such as Jews, Chinese and Egyptians, which are the ancient nations of the earth (Brass, 1991, p. 24). At this point, the question of what are the conditions that decide whether a group should unite with another group, or enable the establishment (or re-establishment) of an ethnic group, or cause the group to redefine itself, is important.

The richness of the cultural heritage to which the group is affiliated, the development stage of the language or the distinctiveness of its religious beliefs do not mean that one group is tighter than another group or will exist longer than others. Just as the fact that the Blacks in America have lost their own (distinctive) language does not prevent them from re-emerging as an ethnic group, the fact that the Jews have lost their language for many years but now live as a nation with a state proves this.

In addition, it is obvious that language structures (such as Latin, Provencal, Church Slavonic) that were formerly widely used and developed in large regions in Europe are now being suppressed by other languages of Europe, and new languages have replaced them or been absorbed by them. To add, the existence of German, French and English languages, which are used intensively and dominantly in Europe, did not provide historical continuity in the decline of the remaining languages in Europe; On the contrary, the number of different languages recorded as 16 in the 1800s was counted as 30 in the 1900s and 53 in 1937 (Brass, 1991, p. 24).

However, if we need to clarify at this point, the reason for the increase in these numbers can be attributed to the fact that groups defined as nations or ethnic groups were recognized for the first time in these times, together with the languages that previously belonged to them.

The languages recorded in the 1800s and the reluctance not to officially register them do not change the fact that the British destroyed Celtic or the French destroyed Gaulish languages during the assimilation period. The recording of different language dialects in different parts of Europe is not a data that directly shows the increase in the number of people speaking it or the political power of the groups speaking this language. It is necessary to examine which of the languages recorded at this time are dead languages or the number of people speaking these languages and their status in the political arena. It would be unfounded to make this claim before these investigations are completed.

Religious groups can also be seen evolving into ethnically conscious communities in modern times. In these groups, religion is used to create a barrier between those who do not believe in the group's religion and those who do, by prioritizing religious foundations, and to ensure group tightness by emphasizing the religious differences between them. (Brubaker, 2012, p. 3). For example, the Bulgarian Church, which broke away from Eastern Orthodoxy, developed its own hierarchical structure over time, and this has come to support the fact that Bulgarians have a separate ethnic structure from the Greeks (Brass, 1991, p. 24).

In summary, among multiple alternative options in the process of creating ethnic communities from ethnic groups, some examples show that certain language dialects, some religious beliefs, others historical symbols and even clothing styles are chosen as means of difference. According to Brass, choosing these options requires certain social layers, leaders or elites within these groups, but not necessarily a certain segment, to clearly benefit from this choice. With these preferences, it can be emphasized more strongly that the selected human community is different from other human communities (Brass, 1991, p. 25).

In this context, it is necessary to talk about which identity the social elites determine, on what basis and in what way. While addressing this, thoughts on who the elites are, what cultural elements they may prefer, the importance of language and religious differences, and how group self-consciousness is created in these ways will be discussed.

4.3.Identity Formation Process

Nations may arise through the political self-consciousness of different ethnic structures within a multi-ethnic state (ethnic nationalism) or by the mixture of different groups and the creation of a composite or homogeneous national culture among different ethnic groups through the modern state apparatus (state-centered nationalism). Although these two situations arise from different focuses and seem to result in the same result, it is said that the processes taking place in both are actually the same (Brass, 1991, p. 20). This process is based on increasing and deepening the differences between social communities by adding subjective and symbolic meanings to the objective differences between communities.

The increase in the number of different features and the abundance of symbolic references will not only ensure integration within the group, but will also cause group members to live and feel differently from the rest of the society (Kertzel & Arel, 2002, pp. 9-11). For this reason, ethnic nationalism and state-centered nationalism are seen as lower stages of a more general identity formation process, due to the similarities between them.

The identity formation process can be summarized as trying to increase and intensify the subjective meanings of ethnic symbols and bringing people together and keeping them together around different symbols. What is meant by one or more central symbols varies according to ethnic demands and characteristics, but consists of focuses such as language, religion, region or color (Brass, 1991, p. 20).

4.4.Elites, Self-Consciousness, and the Problems of Emphasis on Identity

The elite competition that underpinned nationalist movements, although based on family representation, appears to be distinct from the competition of communities for work in early modern times. This is a challenge by one group to the entire distribution of resources and power in society, rather than simply a struggle for privileged jobs for a few (Brass, 1991, p. 45). So, in other words, elite competition is not a question of who will occupy which jobs and positions; It becomes a question, a problem or a question about deciding who will use and distribute which tasks and resources. In order to achieve greater unity within the ethnic group and to stand out against other competing ethnic groups, ethnic and nationalist elites increasingly emphasize that

ethnic group members are similar to each other and different from others. (Brubaker, 2012, p. 2).

This situation has its own problems. The first is that such an emphasis and the new symbols added cause the loss of people who can be integrated into the group or the group necessarily reshapes its cultural preferences in line with these preferences. Secondly, it causes nationalist leaders to set irredentists goals on their peers based on the characteristics of their ethnic groups, thus causing problems with other states and nations (Brass, 1991, p. 20).

Paul Brass claims that ethnic communities emerged through the deep social changes of modernizing societies after the industrial revolution, with the help of a certain elite. Underlying this view is the idea that while the elites, classes and leaders struggling within and between different ethnic groups engage in their competition and conflict to gain political power, economic benefit and social status, they also engage in the process of ethnic formation in the same process. As a result, it is argued that the process of modernization and industrialization in multi-ethnic societies generally causes some of the ethnic groups or some regions to benefit more from this process. (Brass, 1991, p. 25).

However, it cannot be assumed that inequalities between ethnic groups or the existence of culturally differentiated regions alone will provide sufficient motivation to raise awareness in communities. A community whose local dialect is not standardized in an underdeveloped rural part of a modern state can continue their lives by speaking their language and cultivating their fields (means of production), and while doing this, they cannot argue that their language is excluded and their integrity is ignored. They may not even be aware of what language they speak (Safran, 1999, pp. 81-82).

4.5.Competition of Elites

As Brass argues, it can be argued that competition among elites is necessary for ethnic self-consciousness, ethnic-based demands and ethnic conflicts to emerge. (Brass, 1991: 26). While this competition revolves around the conflict of interests; it is said that the interests of the elites, as mentioned, are to possess social resources and values and to ensure their authority over society by finding stability in their reproduction. At this point, it can be said that the elites confront each other in two situations (Lachmann, 2000). These two situations can be recast as

struggles between a domestic elite group and an external elite group, or between different elite groups within the same society. Although this distinction was inspired by the four different conflict areas listed below, it has been combined with the form Brass prefers.

In this regard, it can be said that the four sources support ethnic collectivization and segregation in societies in the early modernization and pre-industrialization times (Brass, 1991, pp. 26-30). First, between the local aristocracy and the invaders, with the local aristocracy insisting on protecting its privileges against a foreign conqueror/occupier. Second, between local religious elites and foreign aristocracy. Third, between local religious elites and finally between local religious elites and local aristocracy.

4.5.1 Between Local Aristocracy and Foreign Aristocracy

It is known that foreign invaders, in pre-industrial societies, implemented certain policies to control the lands they conquered and the aristocrats in these regions. These are to choose one of the ways to bring a new aristocracy class to that region, to gain the support of the old aristocratic class, or to eliminate the aristocratic class by establishing a direct relationship between the state and the peasant people (Brass, 1991, p. 26).

In cases where foreign invaders are successful, in order for ethnic nationalist movements to occur in the region, one of the following must occur: revolutions and the emergence of new classes, or a loss of power for the aristocrats (Brass, 1991, p. 27). If this does not happen, one can talk about the assimilation of local powers and the dominance of foreign culture (Weatherford, 2008, p. 169). It is also possible that foreign invaders cannot establish dominance in the new lands they occupy. In this case, the local aristocracy is likely to offer resistance. However, the local aristocrats' lack of military power and lack of resources to engage in direct resistance against foreign invaders will force them to organize the people. The local aristocracy will carry out the resistance by drawing the people to its side and thus protect its dominance and interests in the region (Brass, 1991, p. 27).

At this point, it can be seen that the aristocracy is based on ethnic consciousness. However, in order to achieve this, they must prevent foreign invaders from establishing direct contact with the people. Otherwise, in cases where the people's wishes are fulfilled, it may become very difficult to gather the people around resistance. Because in this case, the way for the demands

and needs of the society to be met through these means will be cleared and it will also be easier for the authority to be accepted by the people (Diamond, 1994, p. 8).

4.5.2. Between Local Religious Elites - Foreign Aristocracy

In this type of conflict, the competition of local religious elites and clergy against the invading aristocrats is mentioned. Local religious elites can use religion as a means of separation when the invaders come from different religions, and sectarian differences or at least their local languages when they come from the same religion. In this case, the clergy, which is more prominent than the local aristocrats, is looking for ways to protect their groups and interests by gathering ethnic communities around them (Brass, 1991, p. 29).

In this case, the mainstays of the local religious elites are their religious commonalities with the people and their differences with the foreign invaders. The simplest and most common examples of this are pluralistic societies with a history of exploitation. The reactions of the Hindu and Muslim communities living in India under British rule against British rule can be presented as an example of this (Burki, 2010: 86). Muslims, who later found a place in the political arena as Pakistan, and the religious elite of Hindu societies, who played important leadership roles in India's independence, set an example while gaining their identities and political rights (Brass, 1991, pp. 7-10).

4.5.3. Between Local Religious Elites

The second type of conflict arises between people from the same ethnic group. It is possible for conflicts to arise between elites even though they come from the same ethnic group. Even though the elite groups in society come from the same ethnic group, it can be seen that their interests are concentrated at different points. Diverging interests will sooner or later lead to a conflict between elite groups and a relationship consisting of partnerships. The first type of conflict that arises in this regard occurs when the dominant external group tries to impose its own religion on the local people or tries to spread its own religion among the local people.

In this case, local religious elites quickly gather their believers around their own religious systems in order to defend their own interests and cause the rise of ethnic consciousness (Brass, 1991, p. 27). It is possible to see examples of this in Eastern Europe among Catholic, Orthodox

and Muslim groups, and in South Asia among Hindu, Muslim, Sikh and Christian groups during the years of British rule.

4.5.4. Between Local Religious Elites and Local Aristocracy

The last type of conflict is between the aristocratic class and the religious class, who compete because their interests differ, even though they come from the same ethnic group. In this situation, which occurs when the local aristocracy cooperates with an external authority, the culture of the external authority begins to affect the region. While this influence was transmitted through aristocrats, it can be seen that local religious leaders opposed this transfer (Brass, 1991, p. 28).

The religious class and the aristocrats conflict and separate within the framework of the change of culture. Such separation would lead to ethnic groupings between traditionalist religious elites and local landowners. It is generally seen in nations that have a colonial past or are trying to complete their modernization efforts in the late period. Such nations experience cultural change and transfer in their efforts to Westernize. For example, in Northern India, the ulama class clashed with the local Muslim aristocracy over their demands that the children of the Muslim aristocracy receive a modern English education. According to this example, Muslim Indians reached an agreement with the British administration regarding education; they preferred to benefit from the opportunities that this education would bring, such as employment, recruitment, and holding positions that help distribute social resources. However, the Hindu ulama class rejected this and resisted the British rule (Brass, 1991, p. 10).

4.6. Elite Competition and Ethnic Transformation

Brass argues that once competition begins, whether between landowners and foreign conquerors, or between religious elites, or between religious leaders and local aristocrats, it will initiate ethnic transformation, while the latter two situations will stimulate movements aimed at awakening religious beliefs (Brass, 1991, p. 29). These movements are used to define ethnic boundaries, that is, to purify the mainstream faith from local religious beliefs and “foreign” teachings derived from contacts with other religious groups (Govers & Vermeulen, 1997, p. 10). If the dominant religious elites are collaborators and there is only one foreign external authority or group, local counter-elites manipulate ethnic particularist symbols to challenge the leadership

of the elites they oppose and encourage opposing classes to behave in this way (Brass, 1991, p. 29). Therefore, the religious counter-elites will be on the verge of gaining the support of the masses on the side of modernization and will educate new classes in their own languages to support the overthrow of the old elites (Brass, 1991, p. 29).

On the other hand, in situations where ethnic groups are multiple and in competition, local collaborationist aristocrats themselves try to maintain their dominance over rival counter-elites in different ethnic groups by manipulating ethnic symbols. For example, in Northern India, Muslim aristocrats, in cooperation with British authorities, sought to protect their own interests against Hindu elites and used their own language and religion as tools-symbols to achieve this. As a result, it can be said that two elite groups within the Muslim society, the ulama and the local aristocracy, were in competition with each other and with the Hindus to mobilize the Muslim communities within their ethnic entity (Brass, 1991, p. 30).

4.7.Elite Competition in Modern Societies

Where ethnic differences are primarily based on caste, tribe or language, religious differences are not a factor where competition for new opportunities is at stake, especially in modern multi-ethnic societies. In these cases, if the local aristocracy is not cooperative, the society is expected to restructure and group around language and culture under the leadership of the aristocrats.

However, if the elites are collaborators, under influence or have no influence on society, the formation of ethnic consciousness may be possible with the spontaneous emergence of new elites and social classes as a result of the progress of the modernization process (Brass, 1991, p. 32). In this process, there are completion of stages such as the spread of literacy, the development of urbanization, the beginning of industrialization and the opening of government employment. Examples of such a course of development are the development of Czech ethnic consciousness under the leadership of the Czech middle class in 18th century Bohemia and the struggle between Slovenian and Italian elites in Trieste in the 19th century (Brass, 1991, p. 32).

4.8.Culture, Reproduction of Culture (Cultural Markers) and Division of Labor

Culture is a doctrine consisting of certain ways that teach members of an ethnic group how to behave in certain situations. However, it is argued that the existence of clear codes of behavior and interaction is more characteristic, comprehensive and evident in simple societies than in

complex societies (Brass, 1991, p. 28). Because in complex societies, the emergence of differences between groups can occur even by referring to some different qualities, without complying with a general code of behavior.

Cultural markers that help objectively distinguish human communities from each other are of great importance at this point. It can be argued that such markers may exist between a randomly selected group of people and another group, and therefore these markers will not serve as a litmus distinguishing ethnic groups from each other. However, here the cultural markers are aimed at reproducing ethnic identity (reproduction form an ethnic category) and ensuring complete division of labor within the group; In these aspects, group members must separate their assets from those who are not members of the group over time - by reproducing the culture (Brass, 1991, p. 18).

4.9. Language and Religion, Education and Employment

In early colonial and post-colonial societies, government employment was an important factor in the rise of ethnic rivalry. Because the establishment of these positions causes, knowingly or unknowingly, to be given as rewards to the children of the collaborator aristocratic classes, and to the emergence of new collaborator groups through the unequal distribution of opportunities. In times when government employment is expanding sufficiently rapidly and other employment opportunities are following suit, if literacy and urbanization remain relatively low, it will be possible for such an authority system to continue to exist for some time without serious ethnic conflicts.

However, after a while, the social mobilization of the ethnic groups that have been pushed back will prevent the new job opportunities created. In other words, educated groups will not be able to find suitable employment conditions by emerging from new employment opportunities more quickly. In this case, the classic problem of developing and modernizing societies emerges: the unrest of the educated unemployed (Brass, 1991, p. 33). Caste, tribal and linguistic differences form the basis for distinguishing disadvantaged candidate elite groups within the group from their rivals within the dominant ethnic group. On this basis, groups make requests for jobs and different benefits. These demands are generally compatible with movements in favor of

mobilizing the disadvantaged ethnic group and, in this context, are used to give a new identity (belonging) to the ethnic group and its members.

At this point, additionally, the multiplication and intensification of differences between disadvantaged and dominant groups begins. In these circumstances, the disadvantaged caste group claims that they are culturally different from the dominant ethnic group and that they come from foreign origins; it is common for them to claim that they are the real ethnic representatives and indigenous people. It can be said that a tribe or language group may experience similar paths. It is claimed that as candidate elites find a place for themselves in education levels, they try to reveal the diversity of their native language, try to standardize this language, and try to emphasize the “greatness” of their language over the “lost” or “ignored” values in this language. If all speakers of this language are geographically concentrated in one point, these claims may reveal the claims that education and administration in this region should be carried out in this language (Brass, 1991, p. 33).

Although elite conflict and job competition are common phenomena in modern societies, this does not always lead to a cultural separation that will lead to ethnic differentiation. The process of modernization can produce inequality in which one of many ethnic groups assimilates into the language and culture of another. This is only possible if government policies support the assimilation of one group by another. The most important tool to achieve this is the educational environment. Such a situation may arise when regions with speakers of a non-standardized local language or an ancient language that has not been modernized fall behind other regions in a modernizing society. In such cases, urbanization and industrialization in the region is minimal, but educational opportunities are possible with the official language of the state, which is different from the local language of the region. In regions where there is no local religious elite and relatively few (and insufficient) elites elevated from local language-speaking groups, the process of assimilation of the dominant culture and language begins gradually (Because it cannot be said that there are religious or aristocratic elites locally who will react to this process and encourage this reaction).

As modernization and industrialization heavily influenced this region, new elite groups can be seen emerging to mobilize what remained of the indigenous ethnic group. However, the size

and shape of this group cannot avoid carrying the influences of the early period of assimilation. Examples of this situation can be seen in the relations between Macedonia and Bulgaria and in the relations between Belarus and Russia during the Soviet period (Brass, 1991, p. 34).

An alternative situation that further aids assimilation and may lead to declines in the emergence of ethnic identity is the presence of a minority ethnic group that uses the culture and language of the ruling ethnic group as a means of modernization. An example of this situation is the Jews in Hungary in the 19th century. They cooperated with the Hungarian political elites and aristocrats in the mid-1990s and made serious contributions to the development of industrialization and trade in Hungary (Brass, 1991, p. 34).

However, such an assimilation process does not save the ethnic group from penetrating the rest of society through education and modernization. Assimilated group members may still retain cultural or religious symbols in a way that differentiates them from the rest of society, even if they do not intentionally use these symbols as a representation of ethnic consciousness. However, even these differences will not prevent rival (candidate) ethnic groups from providing social unity for themselves by using these differences as scapegoats.

A similar situation can be found in Hungary, where a new intellectual class emerged among the peasant population and the Christian petty bourgeoisie to fight for government employment and economic benefits against the Jewish middle class. Anti-Semitism emerged in Eastern Europe within the nationalist and ethnic sentiments of the people at different times and under different political regimes. In Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in the 1970s, anti-Semitism recurred again and again to gain the privileges and benefits enjoyed by this ethnic group. It is seen that the newly rising classes and groups within the society use the cultural or religious differences - albeit minimal - that the Jews have in order to occupy these interests and positions. We can say that these tactics were used in many Communist states of Eastern Europe in the 1950s and 60s to remove Jews from their privileged positions in the state and the Communist party (Brass, 1991, p. 35).

When religious and linguistic symbols together have the potential to become ethnic symbols to distinguish one group from another, it is not difficult to guess the reason for the harmony consisting of multiple symbols that include both. However, it would be wrong to make an

assumption that these symbols are in harmony or that they are the precursors to socialization for groups that modernized in the early period and achieved the integrity of society. Instead, the interests of the elite group that carries out the ethnic grouping are in harmony and unity with which symbols; it is more preferable to argue that the preferences of the elite group lead the differentiation of symbols. On the other hand, it is more consistent to argue that religion and language are important in the differentiation of ethnic groups because they are the authorities that determine daily routines (Gellner, 2018, p. 71).

Religious elites generally preferred the group's religion as the dominant symbol and, if possible, the group's language as a secondary supporting symbol in achieving unity. Although language develops abstract and relatively weaker commitments than religion, religion consists of a set of rules that are more authoritative, binding and interpretable than language (Brubaker, 2012, p. 14).

Moreover, religious elites seek to strengthen the bond between language and religion by trying to achieve harmony between language and religion by using the local language as the language of religious education and broadcasting⁶ (Lovin, 2002: 521- 524). For this reason, in the late 17th century, Romani people in Transylvania established their own unified Romani Church. In the mid-18th century, priests in Blaj began publishing in their own language, Romani. In addition, by emphasizing the Latin roots of the Romani language, religious seminars were held in Romani in 1780 and Cyrillic writing was abandoned. Thus, Romani ethnic consciousness was strengthened on the unity of language and religious symbols (Brass, 1991, p. 30).

In contrast, when the clergy are ethnically separate from the society they serve, the lower clergy may adapt the language—the language of the people—instead of the religious language, making the local ethnic language the central symbol. It is also clear that the use of this language will bring demands for the establishment of a different church compatible with the local ethnic language. Examples of this include the resistance of the Bulgarian clergy to the pressures of the Greek Orthodox clergy in the 18th century and the establishment of the Bulgarian Church against the Greek Church by promoting the Bulgarian language. Another example is that Catholic Croats and Orthodox Serbs were forced to use the Croatian alphabet (Latin) and the

Serbian script (Cyrillic) in Yugoslavia, using a mixture of Serbo-Croatian languages (Brass, 1991, p. 30).

In some cases, it is easier to observe the harmony between language and religious symbols. This harmony is completed over time, with religion ceding its instrumental role to language (Govers & Vermeulen, 1997, p. 10). Sometimes in Modern Polish nationalism – centered on language – all Poles are Catholic and are, and should be, separated from other Slavic peoples in language and religion. However, such harmony could not be realized in Albania due to the persistence of religious differences (Brass, 1991, p. 31). To point out, while it may be easier for people to change their language than to change their religion; it is also possible to encounter the opposite situation (Govers & Vermeulen, 1997, p. 10).

In Sri Lanka, under British rule and after independence, Buddhist clergy supported the Sinhalese language and the establishment of a Buddhist-Sinhalese identity. Because the collaborationist elites had already become Anglican in language and Christian in their way of life. Moreover, the most dominant elites opposing them were Hindus and spoke Tamil. The transformation in this example was the revival of an old identity rather than the emergence of a new identity. Previously, those who were Sinhalese were considered Buddhists, but now those who were Buddhists were considered Sinhalese. Although these two symbols are used, there are differences in the use of the two concepts interchangeably. Because some local elite groups have become westernized, it should not be expected that all Sinhalese speakers would become Buddhists. This new identity changed the identity boundaries of the group by pulling the religious symbol into the primary (center) and the language symbol into the secondary (support) level (Placeholder1p. 31).

Apart from this example, it is also possible to encounter unsuccessful examples such as the Muslims of India. Efforts to ensure linguistic unity within the ethnic identity of Indian Muslims have been hampered by the fact that the same religious group uses very different languages. While attempts were made to use the Urdu language as a secondary symbol for the Muslims of India, this coverage was effective only in the north of India and failed for the Muslims of Bengal (Brass, 1991, p. 31).

5. ANALYSIS OF THE OVERLAP OF PAUL BRASS THEORY WITH SHEIKH UBEYDULLAH MOVEMENT

As mentioned in the previous chapters about the historical background and movement process of Sheikh Ubeydullah, the Sheikh was known as the religious leader of the Kurdish tribes. At the same time, he was also the leader of the largest clan in his region. That is, he was both a religious leader and the head of the tribe. For this reason, it had a strong position as an elite among the people. In order to understand the political and economic situation of Sheikh before the beginning of his rebellion, I will briefly explain it. Although the topic was written more fully in the previous chapters, this summary will be useful for us to adapt it to Brass's approach to nationalism.

During the reign of Sultan Mahmud II, after the approval of the territorial law, the semi-independent emirates were suppressed and destroyed by the Ottomans. The loss of the power of the Emirs caused increasing confusion and chaos, and the Ottoman government, which was involved with great problems in the European and Arab lands and Western Anatolia, was practically unable to exercise the power of the central government. The power vacuum that was created due to the suppression and exile of Kurdish Emirs in the Kurdish regions of the Ottoman Empire created a new class of leaders in the Kurdish society, which were the sheikhs, the religious leaders. They had a huge influence among the Kurdish masses, which could fill the empty place of the Kurdish Emirs.

From around 1850 onwards, the sheikhs of Shamdinan, Barzanje and Barzan, practically entered the political arena of Kurdish society. In this way, the political and religious situation was completely favorable for the transfer of power to the sheikhs. The absence of a non-religious and influential personality among the Kurds became the basis for the rise to power of Sheikh Ubeydullah. Sheikh Ubeydullah was able to gather a large number of devoted disciples around him. Iskandar Gurians writes in this regard: Sheikh Ubeydullah had complete control over them, even it can be said that he owns their heads and bodies. The Kurds called the sheikh the successor of God and cursed those who do not follow their beliefs and consider them to be infidels. These disciples, both in Ottoman and Iranian lands, travel from their homes to visit the sheikh and

consider him a person with revelation. They thought that obeying his orders is obligatory (Gurians).

The presence of the leader of the Naqshbandi sec covered all areas of the disciple's life, and this presence caused a deep and close relationship between the disciple and the leader. At least once a year, the disciples gave gifts such as property and cash to the Sheikh, and in return, the disciples asked the Sheikh for help in times of trouble and worldly affairs. The Sheikh's influence on the disciples was so strong that they ignored their own will and obeyed the Sheikh's will and considered the Sheikh as God's successor (Jwaideh, 2012).

Sheikh Ubeydullah established kinship ties with many tribal leaders and made them subject to him. The sheikh or his children increased their authority and wealth by marrying the daughters of influential tribal leaders. As the wealth of Sheikh Ubeydullah increased, so did the number of his followers. It was inherited from the father of Sheikh Ubeydullah Tiyl from the border region of Margavar, and he was also the owner of Arpalik in the Ottoman territory. In addition to receiving gifts and offerings from his followers, the sheikh received ownership interest from the residents of all his territories in Iran and Ottoman, so that he became the owner of 200 villages (Jwaideh, 2012).

All the Kurds who lived in the Sheikh's territory considered themselves his subjects, not the citizens of the Qajar and Ottoman governments. Lord Curzon regarding the power and influence of the sheikh among the Kurds points out that the reputation of his sanctity and expertise spread everywhere to such an extent that he was gradually seen as the leader of the Kurdish people. He more or less established a royal presence and used to entertain 500 to 1000 people daily in his courthouse and behaved with authority in the management of affairs. The sheikh was actually a small prince among the Kurds (Curzon, 1357, p. 107).

Therefore, Sheikh Ubeydullah had a lot of political and economic power for the reasons mentioned above and was considered as the elite of his society. Also, according to the analysis we did in the chapter related to the historical study of Sheikh Ubeydullah's rebellion, we saw that the interests of the Sheikh were endangered by some actions of the Ottoman and Qajar governments. According to Brass, the fundamental causes of conflict are the acts made by opposing political elites, so emphasis should be primarily on their actions.

Sheikh's gaining political power as a Kurdish leader and his power to influence the central government of Iran led him to increase his influence and power in the northwestern regions of Iran and strengthen the foundations of the government by organizing the situation in this region. Therefore, in 1872, the Qajar government demanded taxes from the Kurds. The Kurds refused to pay taxes and declared that they paid their taxes to the sheikh. Because Sheikh Ubeydullah's father had received the right to receive taxes from Mohammad Shah Qajar since 1836. When faced with the Kurds' refusal to pay taxes, the Iranian authorities sent a military unit led by Yusuf Khan Shuja al-Dawlah, who was the ruler of Urmia, to the disputed areas. Shuja al-Dawlah took possession of Sheikh Ubeydullah's estates in Margavar. Sheikh, who was thinking of increasing the influence areas under his command, considered this action of the Qajar government as a violation of his rights (Kandal, 1379, p. 64).

Due to this inconvenience, he approached the Ottoman Sultan and requested the intervention of the Sultan in this case. After the Sheikh's request, the Ottoman Embassy in Tehran asked the Iranian Foreign Ministry to handle the Sheikh's complaints as soon as possible. Due to Iran's inattention to this issue, the Ottomans sent a person named Agha Mirsadegh as an agent to clarify this issue. In a part of his report addressed to the Azerbaijan agent, he writes that apparently the origin of this dispute was that Amir al-Mu'azzam Shuja al-Dawla had the idea of getting these few villages out of the hands of the Sheikh by any means. Finally, with the efforts of the Ottoman government, a tripartite meeting was held with the participation of the representatives of the Qajar and Ottoman governments and Sheikh Ubeydullah in order to deal with the Sheikh's complaints. This commission voted in favor of Iran and considered Shuja al-Dawlah to be right in collecting taxes and condemned any military action of the sheikh. Sheikh was very unhappy and angry with the final decision of the commission. For this reason, to take revenge, he started to provoke the nomads to create chaos and sedition. Following these provocations, disciples of the Sheikh attacked the outskirts of Ushnu. The Kurds, who started sedition and rebelling, were severely suppressed by Imam Qolikhan Iqbal al-Dawla, the successor of Shuja al-Dawla, who was the head of the Azerbaijani army (Araqi, 1989-1996, p. 630).

It is known that foreign powers implemented certain policies in pre-industrial societies to control the lands they conquered and the aristocrats in these regions. These are to choose one of the

ways to bring a new aristocracy class to that region, to gain the support of the old aristocratic class, or to eliminate the aristocratic class by establishing a direct relationship between the state and the peasant people (Brass, 1991, p. 26). In cases where foreign invaders are successful, in order for ethnic nationalist movements to occur in the region, one of the following must occur: revolutions and the emergence of new classes, or a loss of power of the aristocrats (Brass, 1991, p. 27). If this does not occur, one can talk about the assimilation of local powers and the dominance of foreign culture.

It is also possible that foreign invaders cannot establish dominance in the new lands they occupy. In this case, the local aristocracy is likely to offer resistance. However, the local aristocrats' lack of military power and lack of resources to engage in direct resistance against foreign invaders will force them to organize the people. The local aristocracy will carry out the resistance by drawing the people to its side and thus protect its dominance and interests in the region (Brass, 1991, p. 27). At this point, it can be seen that the aristocracy is based on ethnic consciousness. However, in order to achieve this, they must prevent foreign invaders from establishing direct contact with the people. Otherwise, in cases where the people's wishes are fulfilled, it may become very difficult to gather the people around resistance. Because in this case, the way for the demands and needs of the society to be met through these means will be cleared and it will also be easier for the authority to be accepted by the public.

Another important issue that caused Sheikh Ubeydullah's fear of jeopardizing his feudal and local sovereignty was the Berlin Treaty. Based on this treaty, the Ottoman government undertook to grant privileges to the Armenian minority living in the southeast of the empire. Also, due to the violence and massacres that the Kurds had committed against the Armenians, the Ottoman government pledged to defend the Armenians against the Kurds. Article 61 of this treaty reads as follows:

“The Sublime Porte undertakes to carry out, without further delay, the improvements and reforms demanded by local requirements in the provinces inhabited by Armenians, and to guarantee their security against the Circassians and Kurds. It will periodically make known the steps taken to this effect to the powers, who will superintend their application.” (Hurewitz, 1956, p. 190).

This rumor spread widely among the people that according to this article of the treaty, Armenians will create their own independent country in Van. In response to these rumors, Sheikh Ubeydullah was very angry and said that he would never allow such a thing even if he had to arm the women. Certainly, the interests of the Sheikh would be jeopardized by the creation of the Armenian state in the territory of the Sheikh.

Nationalist instrumentalist theorists emphasize that the elites of a society abuse the society's identity by creating new traditions or exploiting old traditions (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983). Paul Brass is also one of the theorists of this school of thought, who provides an example of this way of thinking with his research on India. In the case of India, Brass concluded that the political elites of the society used linguistic and cultural symbols to build political coalitions (Brass, 1991). But what distinguishes Brass from other theorists of instrumentalism is that Brass believes that the elites of the society first create the national identity and then use it to mobilize the society to achieve their goals.

According to Paul's approach, elite groups in a society can gain the support of members of that society by manipulating the symbols of that society, such as geography, language, or ethnicity, in order to maintain or expand their interests (Brass, 1991).

Brass believes that elite groups are one of the most influential groups in a society, which are referred to as a group in terms of sets of symbols (Brass, 1991, pp. 99-100).

According to Brass's approach to the theory of nationalism "Nationalism arises in response to objective exploitation of an indigenous group by an alien group, or of one social class by another" (Brass 1991, p. 41), causes the start of nationalist movements by elites. This process starts with the dominance of an elite group and the opposite elite group is placed in a weaker position. Then,

"new elites arise to challenge a system of ethnic stratification in the cities or an existing pattern of distribution of economic resources and political power between ethnically distinct urban and rural groups or ethnically distinctive regions" (Brass, 1991, p. 44).

In fact, the root of nationalism can be found in the distribution of economic benefits and political power between ethnic groups, and this ultimately leads to the manipulation of ethnic symbols by elite groups to use in competition with other ethnic groups.

Probably, the first sparks of rebellion were sparked by Herki tribe, because of the differences they had with the Viceroy of Yuksekova in 1879. Sheikh Ubeydullah sent messengers to the Kurdish leaders of Ilat to start the rebellion and was able to gather a force of 900 people in Diyarbakir, which was commanded by his son named Abdul Qadir . The Ottomans were informed of this incident by other Kurdish leaders who were Obeidullah's rivals and sent their forces to the region. Upon the arrival of the Ottoman forces, the rebellion was quickly suppressed because the Kurdish chiefs were not as trusted as the Sheikh had thought, preferring to increase their personal power by raiding and looting. So Sheikh Ubeydullah changed his opinion and declared his loyalty to the Ottoman king. The Ottomans also welcomed this decision and dismissed the viceroy of Yuksekova and tried to establish an agreement between the sheikh and the local Ottoman authorities (Jwaideh, 2012).

Up to this part of the research, at least three reasons for Sheikh Ubeydullah's movement were said to overlap with Paul Brass's approach to the theory of nationalism: the declaration of Tanzimat, the Qajar government's decision to collect taxes from Sheikh Ubeydullah's villages and the treaty of Berlin.

According to Brass, if these reasons exist, the elites of the society affected by these reasons, whose economic, political or social position is under threat, start to provoke the members of their society by manipulating ethnic symbols or creating new symbols. In this way, these elites gather supporters around them and use them to start moving to maintain their power or to expand their power.

After the signing of the Berlin Treaty and Sheikh Ubeydullah's reactions to it, the supporters of the Sheikh began to gather new supporters for the Sheikh. In Tammuz 1880, the Sheikh himself invited the heads of the Kurdish tribes to a meeting in Shamdinan and talked to them about the necessity of an uprising against the Ottoman and Qajar empires. The heads of the tribes declared their support for the Sheikh. Sheikh Ubeydullah's speech in this meeting is an example of

Brass's approach to the theory of nationalism. In this Sheikh's speech, you can see clear examples of the creation and use of ethnic symbols to move the masses of people.

Sheikh says in part of his speech in this meeting:

“The Ottoman Empire was founded 550 years ago. The Ottomans illegally seized the caliphate and caused rebellions. The condition for becoming a caliph is to be a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad. Therefore, the Ottoman presidency over the Islamic world is illegal.” (Ayvarov, 1995, p. 124).

Moreover, the Sheikh said,

“...Not only we, the Kurds in Ottoman Turkey, but also the Kurds in Iran, must get rid of these two cruel and shackle states. Our ancestors commanded us to sacrifice for the sake of religion and the independence of the country.” (Sinno, 2011, p. 147).

In this meeting, which was the origin of Sheikh Ubeydullah 's move to attack Iran, we can see clear examples of the Sheikh's use of ethnic symbols such as the homeland and the will of the fathers and religious symbols such as the caliphate. As we can see in the ideas of Bras, the sheikh tried to attract the opinion of the heads of the Kurdish tribes by misusing these symbols and to some extent he was successful.

There were differences of opinion in the congress because the Kurdish tribal leaders were loyal to the Sultan and were in favor of the Ottoman administration, and for this reason, Sheikh Ubeydullah changed his plans regarding the uprising and changed his plans for Iran, which was in a difficult situation due to the Turkmen uprising that emerged at that time, instead of the Ottomans (Halfin, 2020, p. 110).

It can be said that one of the most important reasons for the Sheikh's failure was that the Sheikh's companions did not believe in his thoughts. In fact, all the people who gathered around the Sheikh were not because of his nationalist thoughts. Few of them were aware of the Sheikh's goals and intentions. These people with political awareness were with Sheikh from the beginning of his rebellion until the end of his work. On the other hand, most of them were the same opportunists who joined this movement in order to gain benefits and plunder. In a telegraph to the British Foreign Ministry, Lord Tandren, the French consul, writes about Sheikh's nationals

that the son of Sheikh Ubeydullah, who has been a refugee in Iran for several years, is preparing himself at the head of a band of robbers to infiltrate the Ottoman territory. Sheikh's followers, without political awareness and knowledge of his goals, considered the movement to be a continuation of the same looting of the past on a larger scale. The greater number of opportunists took the initiative and started killing and looting and created severe chaos.

Lord Curzon introduces the main motivation and the nature of Sheikh's rebellion only interest in plunder. Minoru is not skiing, considers the foundation of the Sheikh's movement to be looting at the very beginning. Thus, other researchers, following these authors, evaluated the Sheikh's rebellion as a predatory and extortion-based rebellion. For example, Daval writes in his book that the Sheikh's forces were reduced from 20,000 to 1,500 people within two weeks because most of the nomads had gone to their homes with their looted property (Gurians). So, here too, on a smaller scale, the role of tribal chiefs' personal interests can be pointed out in this Sheikh's move, which has another reason for confirming Bras's approach.

On a larger scale, we can refer to the correspondence and writings of reliable people who claim that the sheikh's move was essentially to preserve his personal power. For example, Abbott, the British consul in Tabriz, wrote to the British Foreign Ministry in a report dated 1881. In this report, it is stated that the most important reason for Sheikh Ubeydullah 's rebellion was his failure to return his land in Margavar, and it is recalled that Sheikh promised to return to his home in Ottoman and end the rebellion if his land is returned (Araqi, 1989-1996, p. 630).

6. CONCLUSION

In this thesis, an attempt was made to investigate Sheikh Ubeydullah's rebellion. The purpose of this thesis was to research and analyze the causes and motives of Sheikh Ubeydullah for the rebellion. The attempt of this thesis was to explain this movement by choosing a suitable theory. The results obtained in this thesis will be written in this section.

At the end of the 19th century, Sheikh Ubaidullah, the leader of the Naqshbandi sect, attacked the Iranian and Ottoman border towns and caused many killings and loots in the Qajar Empire's Azerbaijan state. The reason for the beginning of Sheikh Obaidullah's rebellion was the endangering of his privileges and personal interests. He used ethnic and religious symbols as a tool to gather supporters for himself. It can be said that Sheikh, as an elite, gathered supporters for himself by creating ethnic symbols and distorting existing symbols and tried to protect his personal interests under the title of nationalism.

It seems that most historians and political science researchers are unanimous in this matter that Sheikh Ubeydullah's movement was a nationalist movement. We can see the nationalist thought in the Sheikh in the formation of the Shamdinan meeting, as in the Sheikh's statements and correspondence with the British Consul. This issue was discussed in detail in the historical discussion related to the Sheikh's movement. Sheikh Ubeydullah can be called as the first initiator of the Kurdish nationalist movement, but the second and more important question that was tried to be answered in this thesis is how to explain this movement. Which approach to nationalism can be a suitable theory to explain this movement. The conclusion reached by this thesis is that we can explain this movement with an instrumentalist approach to nationalism. Because the factors that instrumentalist approaches put forward in explaining nationalist movements are in accordance with Sheikh Ubeydullah's movement.

Just as Paul Brass considers the start of a nationalist movement conditional on the competition between elites to maintain and expand their interests, Sheikh Ubeydullah also organized and started the Kurdish nationalist movement in order to maintain his power and wealth against external threats.

Instrumentalists believe that the elites of a society try to mobilize people in the form of nationalist movements by abusing ethnic and religious symbols. By using the capacities of mass

movement, they can gain personal benefits or use them to maintain and expand their personal benefits. Also, when the interests of these elites are endangered, the best tool to prevent them from losing their interests is the mobilization of society in the form of nationalist movements.

As Paul Brass says, the competition of elites over interests and resources is the main reason for the creation of nationalism in a society by those elites. In the case of Sheikh Ubeydullah's movement, it is clearly seen that after the interests of Sheikh Ubeydullah were endangered in the Qajar and Ottoman empires, the sparks of this nationalist movement was launched.

After the announcement of the Tanzimat declaration, which created a power vacuum in the southeastern and eastern regions of the Ottoman Empire, there was a very favorable environment for sheikhs to gain power. Sheikh Taha, the father of Sheikh Ubeydullah, who was the leader of the Naqshbandi sect, gained a lot of power and wealth through this terms. Sheikh Ubeydullah became the inheritor of his wealth and power. The attention of the Qajar and Ottoman sultans to him increased his power and wealth, especially Ubeydullah's participation in the Ottoman-Russian war for the benefit of the Ottomans, so that he gained weapons and military power in addition to political power and wealth.

But with the change of conditions in the Ottoman and Qajar governments and the many problems that both governments had encountered during the years of war with their enemies, they started to collect taxes from the villages and people of the areas under their control in their borders. A number of villages and lands in these areas were previously assigned to Sheikh Taha and Sheikh Obeidullah as *Tiyul* and *Arpalik*. Previously, the taxes of these villages were collected by Sheikh Ubeydullah. The action of the Qajar and Ottoman governments to collect taxes from these areas was a clear threat to the interests of the Sheikh. In addition, both governments sent new governors to these areas to exercise their sovereignty over the border areas to prevent the problems that arose, which weakened the authority of the sheikh as a local and unofficial ruler.

Finally, the signing of the Berlin Treaty by Ottoman empire, which can be mentioned as the most important reason for the Sheikh's move. Article 61 of this treaty states that the Ottoman government is obliged to protect the Armenian and Nestorian citizens against the Kurds and Circassians. This treaty created a rumor among the Kurdish people that an independent

Armenian state was to be formed in Van. Van and its surrounding areas were the areas where the sheikh had influence, and there were some village cloths donated by the Ottoman sultan to the sheikh. The year after the signing of the Berlin Treaty, the British Consulate was opened in Van, which fueled the spread of this rumor. It was at this time that Sheikh Ubeydullah entered the practical phase of his definite intention to create a rebellion.

In this brief explanation, it is clearly seen that the interests of Sheikh Ubeydullah as the elite of his society were severely compromised. He had lost the authority to collect taxes from several villages, which was considered as the main source of his wealth. With the arrival of new governors to the areas under his influence, his political power had decreased, and most importantly, the Armenian Christian state was supposed to be formed in the areas he claimed. As Paul Brass says, when the elites of a society lose their interests or their interests are in danger, they create ethnic symbols and abuse these symbols to create nationalist movements. In fact, nationalist movements are a tool in the hands of elites to secure their interests. Sheikh Ubeydullah, who first started the rebellion against Ottomans, was severely suppressed. He negotiated with the chiefs of the Kurdish tribes by forming a meeting in Shamdinan and received their positive opinion to start the rebellion against Iran. As it was announced in this forum, his intention was to form an independent Kurdistan. For the first time in history, Sheikh spoke about the formation of a country called Kurdistan, which can be considered as the creation of new national symbols.

The conclusion reached by this thesis can be clearly seen in the words of Abbott, the British consul in Tabriz. His opinion is very important because he lived in that time and place. In addition, he was a politician and was aware of the issues that were happening. Therefore, as a representative of the British government, he was obliged to send correct reports and analyses. In a letter to the British Foreign Ministry, Abbott writes that the most important reason for Sheikh Ubeydullah's rebellion against Iran is that the Iranian government took away the authority of several villages in the Margavar region from him. Abbott adds that the sheikh promised to stop the rebellion and return to Shamdinan if his lands are recaptured.

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