



**THE REPUBLIC OF TÜRKİYE
SOCIAL SCIENCES UNIVERSITY OF ANKARA
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**

**DIGITAL DIPLOMACY AS A TOOL OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS ON PRACTICES IN TÜRKİYE
AND GERMANY**

Ph.D. Dissertation

G lnihan C HANO LU G LEN

Ph.D. Program in International Relations

December 2023



**THE REPUBLIC OF TÜRKİYE
SOCIAL SCIENCES UNIVERSITY OF ANKARA
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**

**DIGITAL DIPLOMACY AS A TOOL OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS ON PRACTICES IN TÜRKİYE
AND GERMANY**

Ph.D. Dissertation

**Student
G lnihan C HANO LU G LEN**

**Advisor
Prof. Dr. İdris DEMİR**

Ph.D. Program in International Relations

December 2023

DEDICATION

Dedicated to my beloved daughter Göksu



ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First of all, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my esteemed supervisor Prof. Dr. İdris DEMİR, who supported my ideas during the entire Ph.D. program including my research for this dissertation. I truly appreciate his support and guidance, despite his busy schedule as the Rector of Batman University. I would also like to express my heartfelt thanks to Assoc. Prof. Dr. Resul YALÇIN who helped me to develop a rational perspective based on scientific foundations regarding Politics and Society in Central Asia and provided valuable feedback as a Thesis Monitoring Committee member. Assoc. Prof. Dr. Erman AKILLI, with whom I had the opportunity to become acquainted with thanks to Prof. Dr. İdris DEMİR, has also been an exceptional Thesis Monitoring Committee member since his area of expertise also includes my dissertation topic. Thanks to his up-to-date publications and guidance, this dissertation became more refined. As competent and leading academics in their field, these professors broadened my horizons, supported and encouraged me for several publications to whom I will remain grateful throughout my life.

Moreover, I would like to thank the esteemed professors of Ankara Social Sciences University Prof. Dr. Muhittin ATAMAN, Prof. Dr. Gürol BABA, Prof. Dr. Murat YEŞİLTAS, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Meryem HAKİM and Assist. Prof. Kadir Onur UNUTULMAZ as well, from whom I learned a lot during my period of study in this Ph.D. program. I also would like to thank Prof. Dr. Hüseyin BAĞCI for agreeing to be the chair in my thesis defense, whose comments enhanced this research.

But none of this would have been possible without the love, support and encouragement of my family. This dissertation was realized with their support, because their presence is the source of my power to overcome all difficulties in life.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	iii
ÖZET	vi
ABSTRACT	viii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.....	1
LIST OF FIGURES	4
LIST OF TABLES	5
INTRODUCTION.....	1
CHAPTER 1: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY- AN INTERDISCIPLINARY OUTLOOK	7
1.1. Public Diplomacy as a Concept	7
1.2. Public Diplomacy Literature- Perceptions and Theories	9
1.2.1. Public Diplomacy in International Relations Literature	10
1.2.2. Public Diplomacy in the Communication and Public Relations Literature	12
1.2.3. Multidisciplinary and Integrative Approaches to Public Diplomacy	16
1.2.4. Adopted Theoretical Framework	19
1.3. Actors of Public Diplomacy	20
1.4. Measuring the Influence of Public Diplomacy	21
CHAPTER 2: THE PROGRESS AND EXERCISE OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY	24
2.1. Digital Diplomacy as a Concept and a Public Diplomacy Tool	24
2.2. The Emergence and Current State of Digital Diplomacy	28
2.3. Opportunities and Threats of Digital Diplomacy	33
2.4. Measurement and Efficiency of Digital Diplomacy	42
2.5. Significant Practices of Digital Diplomacy around the World	44

2.6. The Future of Digital Diplomacy	46
CHAPTER 3: DIGITAL DIPLOMACY PRACTICES IN GERMANY	51
3.1. German Public Diplomacy Approach	51
3.2. The Institutional Structure of German Public Diplomacy	54
3.2.1. The Goethe Institute	55
3.2.2. German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD)	57
3.2.3. Alexander von Humboldt Foundation	57
3.2.4. Central Agency for Schools Abroad (ZfA)	58
3.2.5. German Archaeological Institute (DAI)	59
3.2.6. Deutsche Welle (DW).....	60
3.2.7. Haus der Kulturen der Welt (HKW)	60
3.2.8. German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ).....	61
3.3. German Digital Diplomacy Approach	61
3.4. German Digital Diplomacy Practices	67
CHAPTER 4: DIGITAL DIPLOMACY PRACTICES IN TÜRKİYE	75
4.1. Turkish Public Diplomacy Approach- An Overview	75
4.2. Institutional Structure of Turkish Public Diplomacy	78
4.2.1. Directorate of Communications (DoC)	79
4.2.2. Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA).....	80
4.2.3. Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB)	81
4.2.4. Yunus Emre Institute (YEI).....	81
4.2.5. Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT).....	82
4.2.6. Turkish Maarif Foundation (TMF)	84
4.2.7. Türkiye Diyanet Foundation (TDV).....	84
4.3. Turkish Digital Diplomacy Approach	85
4.4. Turkish Digital Diplomacy Practices	88

CHAPTER 5: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF GERMAN AND TURKISH DIGITAL DIPLOMACY POLICIES AND PRACTICES	94
5.1. Comparison of ICT Usage, E-Government Systems and Consular Services	94
5.2. Comparison of Rankings in Indexes and Studies	102
5.3. Comparison of National Images and Nation Branding Attempts	106
5.4. Comparison of Social Media	110
5.5. Financial Comparison	118
5.6. Other Factors	119
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION.....	122
BIBLIOGRAPHY	129
CURRICULUM VITAE	Hata! Yer işareti tanımlanmamış.

ÖZET

KAMU DİPLOMASİ ARACI OLARAK DİJİTAL DİPLOMASİ: TÜRKİYE VE ALMANYA UYGULAMALARI ÜZERİNE KARŞILAŞTIRMALI BİR ANALİZ

Kamu Diplomasisi literatüründe çok sayıda kaynak bulunmasına ve dijital teknolojilerin Diplomaside de yaygın olarak kullanılmasına rağmen, Dijital Diplomasi ihmal edilmiştir. Üstelik dijital araçlar ve sosyal medya, günümüzde uluslararası nüfuz mücadelesinde en sık kullanılan araçlar arasında yer almaktadır. Bu tez, Dijital Diplomasi hususunda literatürdeki boşluğa dikkat çekmeyi ve Dijital Diplomasinin önemini vurgulamayı hedeflemektedir. Çalışmada Dijital Diplomasinin Kamu Diplomasisinin ayrılmaz bir parçası olduğu ortaya koyulmakta ve Kamu Diplomasisinin birçok disiplini ilgilendirdiği, bu nedenle Kamu Diplomasisine ilişkin çok disiplinli ve disiplinler arası çalışmalar yapılması gerektiği savunulmaktadır. Bu tezde, Uluslararası İlişkiler disiplindeki Kamu Diplomasisi literatürü diğer ilgili disiplinlerle birleştirilerek, kapsamlı bir çerçeve sunma girişiminde bulunmaktadır. Ayrıca Dijital Diplomasi literatürü değerlendirilmekte, Dijital Diplomasinin güçlü ve zayıf yönleri irdelenmekte, dünya genelinde önemli uygulamalara değinilmekte ve gelecek hakkında öngörüler sunulmaktadır. Bunun yanı sıra Türkiye'nin Dijital Diplomasi yaklaşımı şimdiye kadar başka bir ülke ile kapsamlı olarak karşılaştırılmamıştır. Bu tezde Almanya ve Türkiye'nin Kamu Diplomasisi yaklaşımları, Dijital Diplomasi stratejileri ve somut Dijital Diplomasi uygulamaları incelenerek, karşılaştırmalı bir analiz sunulmaktadır. Böylece Almanya ve Türkiye'nin ulusal imajlarını Kamu Diplomasisi ve Dijital Diplomasi aracılığıyla nasıl yönettiklerini anlamak ve iyi uygulama örneklerini tespit etmek amaçlanmaktadır. Bu karşılaştırmanın Almanya ile yapılmasının nedeni, ülkenin Kamu Diplomasisi alanındaki köklü geçmişi, kısa sürede yeniden imaj oluşturmadaki başarısı ve yumuşak gücü değerlendiren çalışmalarda üst sıralarda yer almasıdır. Çalışmanın ağırlıklı olarak yorumlayıcı olması nedeniyle kullanılan yöntemler çoğunlukla niteldir, ancak kapsamlı bir karşılaştırma sunmak amacıyla nicel yöntemler de kullanılmaktadır. Çalışma, Dijital Diplomasinin yakın gelecekteki etkilerini tartışan ve Dijital Diplomasi aktörleri için politika önerileri sunan bir sonuç bölümünü de içermektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kamu Diplomasisi, Dijitalleşme, Dijital Diplomasi, Yumuşak Güç, Karşılaştırmalı Analiz



ABSTRACT

DIGITAL DIPLOMACY AS A TOOL OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS ON PRACTICES IN TÜRKİYE AND GERMANY

Despite abundant resources in the Public Diplomacy literature and the widespread use of digital technologies in Diplomacy, Digital Diplomacy remained neglected. Besides, digital tools and social media are among the most frequently used means for international influence today. This dissertation intends to highlight the gap in the literature on Digital Diplomacy and to emphasize its significance. The study reveals that Digital Diplomacy is an integral part of Public Diplomacy and argues that Public Diplomacy is related to several disciplines, therefore a multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary studies regarding Public Diplomacy should be pursued. This dissertation attempts to present a broad framework by combining literature about Public Diplomacy in the International Relations discipline with other relevant disciplines. Also Digital Diplomacy literature is evaluated, the strengths and weaknesses of Digital Diplomacy are examined, significant practices around the world are mentioned and predictions on the future are presented. Moreover, Türkiye's Digital Diplomacy approach has not been comprehensively compared with any other country so far. In this dissertation, a comparative analysis is presented by examining the Public Diplomacy approaches, Digital Diplomacy strategies and concrete Digital Diplomacy practices of Germany and Türkiye. It is aimed to understand how Türkiye and Germany manage their national images via Public Diplomacy and Digital Diplomacy and to determine best practice examples. The reason for making this comparison with Germany was its deep-rooted history in Public Diplomacy, success in the reconstruction of its national image in short time and high rankings in studies assessing soft power. Due to the fact that this study is mainly interpretive the methods used are mostly qualitative, but quantitative methods are also used in order to present a comprehensive comparison. The study also includes a concluding

chapter that discusses the implications of Digital Diplomacy in near future and provides policy recommendations for Digital Diplomacy actors.

Keywords: Public Diplomacy, Digitalization, Digital Diplomacy, Soft Power, Comparative Analysis



LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AA: Anadolu Agency

ADF: Antalya Diplomacy Forum

AI: Artificial intelligence

AKBP: Foreign Cultural and Educational Policy of Germany

BMZ: Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development

COVID-19: Coronavirus Disease

DAAD: German Academic Exchange Service

DAI: German Archeological Institute

DDB: Deutsche Digitale Bibliothek

DDI: Digital Diplomacy Index

DESI: Digital Economy and Society Index

DoC: Directorate of Communications of the Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye

DW: Deutsche Welle

EGDI: E-Government Development Index

EFTA: European Free Trade Association

EU: European Union

G20: The Group of Twenty

GDI: Global Diplomacy Index

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

GIZ: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit

GNI: Gross National Income

GNTB: German National Tourist Board

GPAI: Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence

HKW: Haus der Kulturen der Welt

ICT: Information and Communication Technology

IR: International Relations

ISSF: Indian Strategic Studies Forum

ITU: International Telecommunication Union

LEC: Listening and Evaluation Compass MFA: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NBI: Anholt-Ipsos Nation Brands Index

NGO: Non-Governmental Organization

OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

PASCH: Schools- Partners for the Future

SIM: Strategic Issue Management

SWP: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik

TDV: Türkiye Diyanet Foundation

TIKA: Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency

TIM: Turkish Exporters Assembly

TMF: Turkish Maarif Foundation

TUENA: Turkish National Information Infrastructure Master Plan

TRNC: Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

TRT: Turkish Radio and Television Corporation

TTG: Turkish Promotion Group

UK: United Kingdom

UN: The United Nations

UN DESA: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs

UNESCO: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

U.S.: The United States

USC: University of Southern California

USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

YEI: Yunus Emre Institute

YTB: Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities ZfA: Central Agency for Schools Abroad



LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 Pillars of Soft Power	11
Figure 2 Zhang's Public Diplomacy Map	18
Figure 3 Golan's Model of Public Diplomacy.....	19
Figure 4 The Listening and Evaluation Compass (LEC)	23
Figure 5 Individuals Using the Internet	31
Figure 6 Absolute Largest Unconnected Populations.....	32
Figure 7 Zhang's SIM Process for Social Media Use in Public Diplomacy	42
Figure 8 Most Downloaded Mobile Applications Globally (2022).....	48
Figure 9 Daily Time Spent Using the Internet (January 2023).....	95
Figure 10 Overall eGovernment Performance of European Countries (biennial average 2021 and 2022)	96
Figure 11 Germany's eGovernment Benchmark 2023 Scoring in Detail.....	98
Figure 12 Türkiye's eGovernment Benchmark 2023 Scoring in Detail	99
Figure 13 Evolution of DDI Index Scores of Türkiye and Germany.....	105
Figure 14 Social Media Users in Comparison (in millions)	111
Figure 15 Comparison of Social Media Accounts of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs.	112
Figure 16 Comparison of Social Media Accounts of the Goethe Institute and Yunus Emre Institute.....	113
Figure 17 Comparison of Social Media Accounts of GIZ and TIKA.....	113
Figure 18 Comparison of Social Media Accounts of TRT World and DW News	114
Figure 19 Comparison of Social Media Accounts of TMF and ZfA.....	114

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 Similarities and Distinctions between Public Diplomacy and Government Public Relations	14
Table 2 Four Models of Public Relations by Grunig and Hunt	15
Table 3 Dimensions of the eGovernment Benchmark 2023- Germany and Türkiye in Comparison.....	100
Table 4 Global Diplomacy Index Indicators.....	102
Table 5 Digital Diplomacy Index- Key Indicators and Metadata.....	104

INTRODUCTION

Technological progress created new environments in which states can look out for their interests, such as the cyberspace. With advances in communication technologies and the attention of media, public opinion became more prominent in Diplomacy and a greater need to include foreign publics in foreign policy goals emerged. This transformation in traditional Diplomacy inspired great interest in Public Diplomacy research. Surprisingly, although the concept Public Diplomacy was coined in 1960 (USC Center on Public Diplomacy, 2023), there is still no agreed definition in the literature. Nevertheless, its' importance is certain. As Vickers underlines, states are not able to conduct foreign policy individually as self-determining units and try to secure their security interests with the help of international organizations and coalitions (Vickers, 2004, p. 185). Therefore, Vickers argues that Public Diplomacy and the coordination of the mechanisms and apparatuses for dealing with the media and domestic and foreign public opinion should be considered a significant aspect of foreign policy (Vickers, 2004, p. 185). Public opinion is even considered the new superpower (Terranova, 2004, p. 131), which is different than traditional power sources, because it corresponds to the hearts and wills of the majority of the world's people (Schell, 2003). Moreover, since media gained an enormous power in the political life, some scholars such as Terranova argue that media has become the new public sphere (Terranova, 2004, p. 132).

But despite these developments and the growing interest in Public Diplomacy, no International Relations (IR) scholar has yet seriously examined this concept in a comprehensive theoretical framework. However, the concept soft power is relatively functional for analyzing Public Diplomacy in IR. But Public Diplomacy has an interdisciplinary nature and can be related to several other disciplines such as Communication Sciences and Public Relations. Examining existing literature regarding Public Diplomacy, it was found out that Communication Sciences and Public Relations scholars ignore related literature in the IR discipline and vice versa, because IR scholars often ignore related literature in Communication Sciences and Public Relations. By taking into account the potential contributions to Public Diplomacy by other disciplines, a new integrated or multidisciplinary research agenda is certainly needed. Therefore, it was assumed that providing an interdisciplinary theoretical

framework would prove beneficial. With this dissertation, it was intended to provide a multidisciplinary outlook about Public Diplomacy as much as possible, by incorporating the contributions of other relevant disciplines and provide a holistic view.

Since most information disseminated nowadays is in digital format, the main argument of this study is that ICT (Information and communication technology) and the digital space are key instruments for contemporary Public Diplomacy. Therefore, it is asserted that Digital Diplomacy should be regarded as a crucial component of Public Diplomacy and incorporated in strategy documents.

Problem Statement and Significance of the Research:

Digital Diplomacy is crucial a component of Public Diplomacy, which in turn is essential for the achievement of foreign policy goals. However, existing literature is limited and ignores the theoretical aspect of Digital Diplomacy. As a matter of fact, Digital Diplomacy has gained attention and popularity especially after the COVID-19 pandemic. Moreover, there is the tendency of regarding Digital Diplomacy as merely the interaction of public institutions with foreign publics via social media. However, this study adopts the broader definition of the concept Digital Diplomacy, arguing that is an umbrella concept expressing the relation between Diplomacy and digital technologies. Besides, there is no extensive comparative analysis of Türkiye that can be a reference point for improvement of Digital Diplomacy practices. Therefore, this study is anticipated to contribute to the Digital Diplomacy literature, which is an emerging topic requiring further research, and provide a comparative framework for the improvement of Digital Diplomacy practices.

Research Questions:

This study seeks to shed light on four main research questions: 1) How are Public Diplomacy discourses developed and conveyed via Digital Diplomacy? 2) How does Digital Diplomacy affect Public Diplomacy and soft power capabilities of a state? 3) How does the Digital Diplomacy practice of Germany differ from Türkiye? 4) How can Digital Diplomacy practices be more effective?

Regarding the first question, this dissertation is based on the assumption that Public Diplomacy discourses are based on national interests, which can be realized when Public Diplomacy initiatives succeed and soft power is obtained and maintained as suggested by Nye. Regarding the second question, this study hypothesizes that Digital Diplomacy is a means to

obtain and maintain soft power. With research conducted under this dissertation, it is intended to demonstrate the difference between practices of Türkiye and Germany, which will provide answers to the third question. Ultimately, recommendations for a more result oriented Digital Diplomacy will be voiced to answer the fourth research question.

Research Objectives:

This study, aims to create awareness about the importance of Digital Diplomacy for Public Diplomacy and IR in general and encourage scholars for future research. Especially the multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary aspect of Public Diplomacy is emphasized to promote a broader framework for future studies and contribute to an interdisciplinary academic debate regarding Digital Diplomacy. The need of proper theoretical framework and measurement methods for Digital Diplomacy are highlighted. It is evident that every country in the world has different dynamics, thus their practice of Public Diplomacy also differs. Based on their motivations for conducting Public Diplomacy, the tools are expected to be different as well. By performing a comparative analysis between Germany and Türkiye, it was destined to contribute to the analysis of these differences and to present policy suggestions for a more effective Digital Diplomacy by determining best practice examples.

Methodological Approach and Methods:

This study is mostly descriptive, however since Türkiye and Germany were compared it has an analytical dimension as well. The methods of comparison were both qualitative and quantitative. Therefore a mixed methodology has been applied by conducting literature review, analyzing critical cases, policy papers, reports and web based content regarding German and Turkish Public Diplomacy and Digital Diplomacy. Moreover, data has been collected utilizing statistics, survey studies, comparative indexes and social media. In brief, descriptive content analysis, statistical and analytical research methods were applied.

Limitations and Delimitations:

The primary challenge of this analysis was the lack of theoretical framework elaborating neither Public Diplomacy nor Digital Diplomacy. In addition, as the concept Digital Diplomacy can be considered quite new in IR, there is only limited number of academic studies. Moreover, comprehensive tools for the measurement of the effectiveness of Digital Diplomacy were missing as well. To overcome this challenge, rankings and field research from several disciplines were utilized such as soft power indexes, nation brand indexes etc.

Since this study argues that Digital Diplomacy is an umbrella concept, a broad definition has been adopted. Thus, a comprehensive research area was determined; ranging from digitalization of public services provided by Public Diplomacy actors, such as consular services, websites, mobile applications, AI generated chatbots etc. Consequently, this study not only includes Public Diplomacy conducted via social media as Digital Diplomacy. However, social media is also considered of vital importance for study, since scholars such as Sevin and Ingenhoff argue that Public Diplomacy practices via social media may profoundly influence perceptions regarding a nation (Sevin and Ingenhoff, 2018, pp. 3665-3666). Moreover, data shows that almost one third of the time people around the world spend online is for social media as of January 2023 (Datareportal, 2023). Therefore, social media accounts of Digital Diplomacy actors and influential politicians on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and YouTube were examined. However, TikTok, Snapchat and other platforms were omitted since those social networks are not commonly used for Public Diplomacy or Digital Diplomacy purposes. Although the social network Twitter was rebranded and changed its name to X in July 2023, the website's domain name still remains twitter.com and the concept tweets is still used. To avoid confusion, the social media platform X was still referred as Twitter in this study.

Although the contribution of the activities and funds of the political parties' own foundations (*Stiftungen*) to German Public Diplomacy cannot be denied, their role were not discussed in this study. Since their nature is political and their activities are ideological, their activities cannot be considered as Public Diplomacy activities conducted on behalf of the Federal Republic of Germany. Despite valuable contributions of those foundations to the promotion of Germany and German culture, these institutions serve their own values and interests rather than the German Government's policies because their political opinion might be either on the same line with the existing administration or the opposition. Moreover, independent organizations and academies that are not funded by the German Government which carry out their own activities, such as the Academy for Islam in Science and Society (*Akademie für Islam in Wissenschaft und Gesellschaft-AIWG*), were not included among German Public Diplomacy Actors, because it is argued that these institutions deliver valuable but indirect contribution to German Public Diplomacy (Wood, 2017).

Why Germany?

Germany was chosen as a comparison, for having a deep-rooted history in Public Diplomacy considering that the institutional structure of German Public Diplomacy began to

be formed in the 1800s. For instance, the Archaeological Institute in Rome was founded in 1829 and began to be financed by the Prussian state after 1859, and from 1878 onwards the Foreign Office founded by Chancellor Bismarck began to support German schools abroad (Grolig and Schlageter, 2007, p. 548). Moreover, Germany is usually ranked in the top three of the comparative indexes regarding soft power. Soft power indexes are considered important indicators to measure the efficiency of Public Diplomacy. Being located at the junction of different continents, Türkiye should benefit from the advantages offered by this geographic location. However, it was observed that Turkish Public Diplomacy is not fulfilling its soft power potential based on the fact that Türkiye was never ranked in the top 10 of soft power indexes. Since Germany managed to erase its negative national image due to its Nazi past in less than 50 years and has an extraordinarily complex structure of Public Diplomacy involving many non-state actors, it was assumed that a comparative study with Germany can provide a valuable insight on how to empower Turkish Public Diplomacy, specifically Digital Diplomacy.

Hypotheses:

This study is based on the following two arguments:

- 1) Digital Diplomacy positively contributes to Public Diplomacy practices and secondarily to foreign policy goals.
- 2) Digital Diplomacy enhances a country's soft power by influencing foreign public opinion.

Structure of Research:

The dissertation is organized in five chapters. The first chapter presents an interdisciplinary outlook regarding Public Diplomacy. Thus, perceptions and theories from several disciplines regarding the concept are discussed along with the controversial ideas that led to conceptual confusion in the literature. Then, actors involved in Public Diplomacy generation and execution are presented in general. Moreover, difficulties about the measurement and efficiency of Public Diplomacy is debated.

The second chapter unfolds the concept Digital Diplomacy and seeks to provide a brief summary about the emergence and current state of Digital Diplomacy. The opportunities and threats of Digital Diplomacy are discussed in the light of significant cases. Moreover, the measurement methods and efficiency of Digital Diplomacy are elaborated. After the elaboration

of some significant practices of Digital Diplomacy around the world, future predictions regarding Digital Diplomacy are presented by taking into consideration recent developments.

In the third chapter, initially the general Public Diplomacy approach of Germany and the actors involved in making and conducting German Public Diplomacy are briefly reviewed. Subsequently, Germany's Digital Diplomacy approach and practices so far are presented.

Similarly in the fourth chapter, the general Public Diplomacy approach of Türkiye and the actors involved in making and conducting Turkish Public Diplomacy are briefly reviewed. Then, Türkiye's Digital Diplomacy approach and practices so far are presented.

In the fifth chapter, a comparative analysis of Germany and Türkiye is presented based on several dimensions. First of all Türkiye and Germany are compared in terms of ICT usage, e-government systems and consular services. Then comparisons are done with the help of recent studies and indexes. Moreover, national image building and nation branding attempts have been examined. Social media presence of important political figures and Public Diplomacy actors has been analyzed. Finally, the financial resources allocated for Public Diplomacy and other factors are compared in line with available present data.

Finally, a concluding section was added to summarize the main findings of the comparative study including policy recommendations for decision takers and key Digital Diplomacy actors. It is envisaged that these recommendations may help public officials and diplomats to improve their capacity regarding Digital Diplomacy and contribute to the accumulation of soft power of their country in the long run.

CHAPTER 1: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY- AN INTERDISCIPLINARY OUTLOOK

Traditional diplomacy indicates the communication between governments, but during the course of the time traditional diplomacy shifted towards Public Diplomacy (Signitzer and Coombs, 1992). Despite fundamental changes in traditional diplomacy and increased interest in Public Diplomacy, no consensus has been reached about the definition or understanding of the concept in IR research. In this chapter, it was sought to provide an interdisciplinary outlook to the concept. To present a conceptual clarification, the term Public Diplomacy is unfolded and analyzed by examining its different components and different perspectives in the literature. However, the review of theoretical approaches to Public Diplomacy constitutes a challenge, since the theoretical aspect of the concept has been not been sufficiently dealt with in IR literature. Moreover, the relationship between IR and other disciplines such as Public Relations and Communication Sciences will be analyzed, because in the most basic sense Public Diplomacy can be considered contacting the public via political communication methods and tools. Finally, actors involved in making and conducting Public Diplomacy are discussed and the influence of Public Diplomacy initiatives are discussed.

1.1. Public Diplomacy as a Concept

Although the concept was invented by Edmund Gullion in 1965 (Cull, 2009), it's use became prevalent during the Cold War because information and persuasion campaigns were also utilized as weapons by the two super powers in their ideological war (Gilboa, 2008, p. 59). But in fact, the activities that may be assumed as a part of Public Diplomacy like image cultivation and propaganda can be traced back to the ancient times, because public opinion in foreign lands has been considered important since the beginning of Diplomacy (Melissen, 2005, p. 4).

Cull describes Public Diplomacy as the interaction of international actors with foreign publics for the acquisition of foreign policy interests (Cull, 2009). While this definition provides a general opinion about the concept, literature research conducted by Pajtinka reveals that the concept has several meanings. According to Pajtinka, Public Diplomacy indicates open

diplomacy in the public eye, national image building activities of various actors abroad, the promotion of a country's soft power, and the influence of foreign public opinion via non-traditional diplomatic means to reach foreign policy objectives (Pajtinka, 2019, pp. 22-23).

But referring to Public Diplomacy, especially when Germany is involved, there is a tendency to label all efforts as just propaganda. However, the concept Public Diplomacy should not be confused with propaganda. As noted by Cull, propaganda is dictating a message to an audience and persuading them of one's rightfulness, while Public Diplomacy is not only about conveying a message but also listening to the other side (Cull, 2019, p. 1). While propaganda may be defined as a joint effort to disseminate a certain belief or doctrine, Public Diplomacy is a more complex phenomenon including the dissemination of values and ideas without manipulation. Nevertheless, there are still some scholars who argue that Public Diplomacy is a cover-up concept for propaganda or a form of propaganda. But it has to be kept in mind that governments are not always able to manipulate information, because today's technology is so advanced that the internet enables the dissemination of accurate information in a short span of time. Therefore, it can be argued that propaganda is not a rational option because propaganda would not produce favorable outcomes for Public Diplomacy in the 21st century. Yet, some governments still use a form of propaganda by creating a state backed "troll army", which refers to a group of people with fake social media accounts in order to influence public disputes on digital platforms (Portland, 2015, p. 12).

Moreover, Public Diplomacy is applied using a variety of tools and thus has many components. According to Cull's categorization, the practices of Public Diplomacy can be examined in five components (Cull, 2009, p. 32). These components are determined as listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange diplomacy and international broadcasting (Cull, 2009, p. 32). Listening indicates the endeavor to gather and classify information about foreign publics and their opinions in order to redirect a policy accordingly. Advocacy can be understood as the endeavor to promote a strategy to the foreign public through international communication, such as the relations of diplomatic embassies with the press. Cultural Diplomacy indicates the endeavor to use cultural resources and promote cultural values abroad, such as the activities of the Goethe Institute. Exchange Diplomacy can be understood as the endeavor to encourage the exchange of individual persons to promote interaction, for instance via student exchange programs. Finally, international broadcasting refers to the use of media to interact with foreign publics (Cull, 2009, p. 32).

Although there is no agreed definition regarding the concept Public Diplomacy, there is some kind of consensus regarding its central objective. The central objective of Public Diplomacy is generally considered to be the promotion of foreign policy interests via activities to earn the sympathy of foreign publics. However, Leonard asserts that Public Diplomacy can accomplish a wider range of objectives (Leonard, 2002, pp. 50-51). The first objective defined by Leonard is to increase familiarity about the respective country by preoccupying the minds of the publics and updating their images of the respective country. The second objective is defined as to increase appreciation, which is considered crucial to create positive opinions of a country and to develop empathy. The third objective is defined as engaging with people. This engagement can be by encouraging people for tourism and to study in a country or for buying a country's products and embracing a country's values. The fourth objective is defined as to influence people's behavior. Some examples of this influence are encouraging people for foreign investments or obtaining public support for a country's position and persuade other states to turn into allies. After drawing a general framework for the expected achievements of Public Diplomacy, Leonard argues that governments should develop a three dimensional Public Diplomacy in order to achieve the above mentioned objectives (Leonard, 2002, pp. 50-51). These three dimensions are defined as communication on day-to day issues, strategic communication and the development of lasting relationships through scholarships (Leonard, 2002, pp. 50-51). Leonard's analysis gives researchers an idea about the operation and goals of Public Diplomacy and offers a clearer picture for Public Diplomacy practitioners.

1.2. Public Diplomacy Literature- Perceptions and Theories

The lack of an agreed definition regarding Public Diplomacy stems from different perspectives regarding its conduct and goals, which causes debates in the literature. The exceptional case concerning Public Diplomacy is that, there are also debates about its categorization. Although Public Diplomacy is considered to be a part of the IR discipline and Diplomacy, it is also related to other disciplines. Even though Public Diplomacy is not seen as part of Public Relations or Communication disciplines, those disciplines are related as well. The following sections are presenting the literature regarding Public Diplomacy in several disciplines and some alternative approaches.

1.2.1. Public Diplomacy in International Relations Literature


As Gilboa finds out in his research carried out in 2008, scholars have neither developed a theoretical framework exploring Public Diplomacy nor encouraged systematic theoretical research even though there was growing interest about the concept in IR literature (Gilboa, 2008, p. 73). It can be argued that not much has changed since 2008, because most studies in the Public Diplomacy literature still disregard the theoretical analysis of the concept.

Research in existing literature showed that several reasons can be voiced about the negligence of diplomacy in general or particularly Public Diplomacy in IR theories. The main reason why IR theorists did not attach importance to the practice of diplomacy is that they focused more on primary actors and the platforms they are interacting in. For example Waltz views diplomacy and its practices as nothing more than the distribution of power (Waltz, 1979). These kind of reductionist attitudes resulted in the disconnection of IR theory with diplomatic practices. Bjola argues that this dualism and separation between the theory and practice of diplomacy has been problematized and reexamined, because there has been growing awareness about the fact that structural theories alone are insufficient to predict or explain changes in the international system. Moreover, it has been more and more recognized that diplomatic practice between state leaders may influence the course of events and possibly transform conflicts (Bjola, 2015, p. 17).

The absence of a proper theoretical framework complicates the assessment of a state's Public Diplomacy efforts (Ingenhoff and Chariatte, 2020, p. 5). Even so, there were some formulation attempts by IR scholars. According to popular wisdom, the most known motivation behind Public Diplomacy is widely recognized as the attainment of soft power. For this reason, many Public Diplomacy studies are influenced by Joseph S. Nye, who created this analytical concept in 1990 (Nye, 2017). However, there are also scholars such as Szondi, who regard the correlation of those two concepts as inexplicit (Szondi, 2008). Moreover, Nye himself underlines that soft power is not a theory (Nye, 2010, p. 219). According to Nye, a state's soft power consists of three assets which are determined as its culture, political values and foreign policies (Nye, 2008, p. 96.). Nye's perspective can largely be related to Realism, since Nye sees the primary actor in conducting Public Diplomacy as the state, despite emphasizing the need to abandon traditional diplomacy between states and adapting a state-citizen engagement based on mutual interaction.

But the concept soft power can be exercised in a variety of ways and associated with other IR theories as well. For example Brand Finance, which is an independent brand valuation consultancy company that publishes the Global Soft Power Index, argues that there are seven key pillars of soft power as seen in Figure 1 (Brand Finance, 2020).

Figure 1 Pillars of Soft Power



Note. From “Global Soft Power Index 2020” by Brand Finance, 2020.

According to this approach, the concept soft power can also be related to Liberalism due to “business and trade” or the “people and values” pillars. However, no liberal approach to Public Diplomacy has been encountered during this research. On the other hand, there are several scholars who adopt the realist perspective. For instance Yun and Toth argue that Realism proves useful to describe the starting point and evolution of Public Diplomacy, based on the realist notions that states are the most important actors of international relations that seek to provide security with the increase of their powers (Yun and Toth, 2009). Similarly Kim also employs a realist perspective, since she regards the government as the primary actor by defining contemporary Public Diplomacy as a foreign policy means of governments generating soft power via bilateral communication with foreign publics (Kim, 2017, pp. 300-302).

In addition to Realism, the Gramscian approach is used for analyzing Public Diplomacy. Especially Cultural Diplomacy, which can be interpreted as a type of Public Diplomacy is often based on Gramsci's hegemony approach. Izadi for example adopts a Gramscian perspective and regards soft power as essentially complementary to hard power by considering Public Diplomacy as a means to achieve political hegemony (Izadi, 2016, pp. 14-19). Similarly, Alexander also utilizes Gramsci's concepts for the analysis of Public Diplomacy. Although Alexander admits that Public Diplomacy may be helpful to avoid potential conflicts by reducing misunderstandings, xenophobia etc., he also claims that only those foreign publics are deemed important and engaged when they are considered beneficial for the interests of the powerful (Alexander, 2021, pp. 12-13). Examining indexes that rank countries according to their soft power, it can clearly be seen that economically and politically powerful states take place near the top. For instance almost all indexes rank the U.S. in the first place, which is currently regarded as the only hegemonic power in the neoliberal economic system. However as Alexander also underlines, Gramsci's concepts are not used to analyze Public Diplomacy despite being commonly used in analyzing cultural hegemony and cultural imperialism. Therefore, Alexander puts forward that it is very surprising why a Gramscian perspective was hardly ever used for analyzing Public Diplomacy, although it might provide a useful framework (Alexander, 2021, p. 23).

1.2.2. Public Diplomacy in the Communication and Public Relations Literature

Communication is a sine qua non for Public Diplomacy. Thus, it is expectable that Communication Science is a related field and contributes to Public Diplomacy studies. One of the contributing Communication Science scholars is Pamment, who argues that Development Communication and Public Diplomacy are separated siblings, born out of communication theories dominating US Political Science during the 1950s (Pamment, 2015, p. 189). Fitzpatrick also sees the relevance between the two fields and argues that Development Communication can offer useful perspectives for developing models for Public Diplomacy; because public interest communications could promote social change, which is among the ultimate objectives of Public Diplomacy (Fitzpatrick, 2017, p. 87). However, Fitzpatrick asserts that future research is needed to identify conceptual and practical connections between both fields (Fitzpatrick, 2017, p. 87). But to the knowledge of the author, no further research connecting Development Communication and Public Diplomacy has been conducted so far. Nevertheless studies using

models from the Communication Sciences were done to analyze Public Diplomacy. For instance Saliu used Lasswell's Communication Model to examine the concept Public Diplomacy. Based on Lasswell's Communication Model, Saliu examined the distinctions between Public Diplomacy and related concepts, including concepts from other disciplines such as International Public Relations and Nation Branding, which are related to Public Relations and Marketing disciplines. Saliu argues that examining similar but different concepts is much clearer by using Lasswell's model, compared to other interdisciplinary studies (Saliu, 2020, p. 372). However, Saliu's contribution is only at the conceptual level and does not provide a theoretical contribution or a comprehensive and integrated framework.

Since Public Diplomacy can also be considered political communication, subfields such as Public Relations are also pretty relevant. In fact a literature review regarding Public Diplomacy studies in Türkiye showed that an important share of the studies and scholars are related with Media, Communication and Public Relations fields (Köksoy, 2021, p. 651). Research in the same study has shown that not only conceptual but also theoretical contributions have been done from Communication and Public Relations fields.

Some scholars such as Fitzpatrick and Wasmer argue that the Public Relations perspective may prove valuable for the study of Public Diplomacy, because governments aim to engage with foreign publics via global and social media. Signitzer and Coombs also assert that Public Relations and Public Diplomacy are connected fields, because their goals and tools are nearly the same (Signitzer and Coombs, 1992). Gilboa claims that even the definition of Public Diplomacy formulated by Signitzer and Coombs proves the resemblance between the two fields (Gilboa, 2008, p. 57), which interprets Public Diplomacy as a means where government and private actors affect foreign publics either openly or implicitly to ultimately influence other government's judgments concerning foreign policy (Signitzer and Coombs, 1992, p. 138)

Pajtinka argues that there are two common features of government Public Relations activities with Public Diplomacy, which are their focal point and their instruments (Pajtinka, 2019, p. 26). Despite both disciplines focus on the public via means of mass communication, there are also distinct features of Public Diplomacy and Government Public Relations as summarized in Table 1 (Pajtinka, 2019, p. 27).

Table 1 Similarities and Distinctions between Public Diplomacy and Government Public Relations

	Public diplomacy	Government Public Relations
Purpose	to influence public opinion in order to achieve foreign policy goals	to inform the public in order to maintain government accountability to citizens
Target group	foreign public	domestic public
Method	communication of information by means of dialogue	communication of information by means of dialogue
Instruments	mainly means of mass communication	mainly means of mass communication

Note. From “Public Diplomacy as a Theoretical Problem: Searching for a Definition” by E. Pajtinka, *EJTS European Journal of Transformation Studies*, 7(2), 2019, p.27.

Based on this analysis of Pajtinka, it can be argued that the ultimate goal and target group of the two disciplines differ, since Public Diplomacy targets foreign publics to accomplish foreign policy goals and Government Public Relations targets the domestic public in order to ensure the transparency of government (Pajtinka, 2019, p. 27). Examining Public Relations literature, four models for conducting Public Relations become prominent, which were developed by Grunig and Hunt. These models are “the press/agent publicity model”, “the public-information model”, “the two-way asymmetric model” and “the two-way symmetric model” (Grunig and Hunt, 1984, pp. 13-14). Grunig and Hunt argue that each model has different objectives and also requires different means for evaluating their success. In Table 2 (Grunig and Hunt, 1984, p. 22), the characteristics of the four models have been summarized.

Table 2 Four Models of Public Relations by Grunig and Hunt

	Models			
Characteristic	Press/Agent Publicity	Public- Information	Two-Way Asymmetric	Two-Way Symmetric
Purpose	Propaganda	Dissemination of Information	Scientific Persuasion	Mutual Understanding
Nature of Communication	One-way; Complete truth not essential	One-way; truth important	Two-way; imbalanced effects	Two-way; balanced effects
Communication Model	Source→Recipient	Source→Recipient	Source→Recipient ← Feedback	Group→Group ←

Note. Adapted from *Managing Public Relations* by J. E. Grunig, and T. Hunt, 1984, p. 22, CBS College Publishing.

Sirt and Ergenç argue that two of those models, namely the Public Information Model and the Two-Way Asymmetrical Model can be applied to today's Public Diplomacy practices (Sirt and Ergenç, 2021, p. 272). In the Public Information Model, there is no intention to get feedback from the public and the main goal is to provide them information to gain their trust. For example annual reports published by public institutions can be seen as an example for the Public Information Model, which do not aim to persuade anyone, but provide information and ensure transparency (Sirt and Ergenç, 2021, p. 273). However, today's Public Diplomacy requires two-way communication where the public can interact and voice their opinion. Thus, this model is relevant, but an inadequate to reach foreign policy goals. The Two-Way Asymmetrical Model also involves interaction with the public, but still the feedback received from the public is of secondary importance because governments prefer that the public adapts to their interest. Therefore, this model can also be considered relevant, but not sufficient enough to explain today's conditions.

Suyono and Hanathasia conduct a valuable research to analyze whether the Public Relations' model used by the government is effective to conduct Public Diplomacy activities as well by examining Public Diplomacy activities conducted by the US Embassy's agency via their @america account on Twitter (Suyono and Hanathasia, 2014). The authors find out that all four models of Public Relations are used, but they observed that there is a tendency towards the implementation of Two-Way Asymmetrical and the Two-Way Symmetrical Model to

initiate conversation with followers. Moreover, Suyono and Hanathasia underline that the studies on Public Relations model utilization in Public Diplomacy need further research (Suyono and Hanathasia, 2014).

Not only models, but also concepts of Public Relations are considered useful by Vanc and Fitzpatrick, based on their study examining Public Relations literature between the years 1990 and 2014 (Vanc and Fitzpatrick, 2016). However, they concluded that Public Relations literature about Public Diplomacy still needs further empirical research and considered existing literature as immature (Vanc and Fitzpatrick, 2016).

However, Public Relations scholars are often criticized for their tendency to perceive Public Diplomacy as only a country's efforts for image cultivation. Yet, there are also studies that are more comprehensive. For instance Yang et al. integrate the image building approach and the relationship management in Public Relations with Public Diplomacy (Yang et al., 2012). Their main argument is that states practice multipolar thinking for soft balancing, which is prevalent in Public Diplomacy affecting a nations' image building strategies as well (Yang et al., 2012).

Nation branding is described as the art of influencing and promoting a country's reputation abroad by Manor (Manor, 2016), which is a concept that evolved from Marketing and Branding and closely related with Public Diplomacy. With nation branding, a country can realize its economic potential, implement Public Diplomacy, gain soft power or strengthen its national integrity (Nas, 2021, p. 2). However, Nation branding and Public Diplomacy are not totally overlapping because nation branding can only be considered an important strategic tool for Public Diplomacy. Although both concepts have similarities, there are also major differences. The most important difference between the two concepts is that nation branding is more a nation and national identity building process that mostly focuses on the domestic public, whereas Public Diplomacy mostly focuses on foreign publics.


In consequence, it can be argued that Communication Science proves useful for the practice of Public Diplomacy. Most specifically models of Public Relations are relevant and can further improve Public Diplomacy research. Despite differences, it is clear that a connection between Public Diplomacy and Public Relations exists. This connection is gaining recognition by academic institutions and universities as well. For instance Anadolu University in Türkiye, introduced the course Public Diplomacy and International Public Relations in the Public Relations and Advertising Bachelors Program as compulsory in 2016 (Kılınç, 2016, vii).

1.2.3. Multidisciplinary and Integrative Approaches to Public Diplomacy

Examining existing literature regarding Public Diplomacy, it can be seen that multidisciplinary or integrative approaches gained popularity in the recent years. On this point, Kim argues that Public Diplomacy's theoretical development might be multidisciplinary, but criticizes multidisciplinary approaches for focusing only on public opinion, which results in restricting the studies to only the communicative dimensions of diplomacy (Kim, 2017, p. 296). Kim's dismissive perspective regarding multidisciplinary studies is prejudiced, because these studies tend to be more holistic and inclusive than mono-disciplinary approaches. Sevin also voices some critics for multidisciplinary studies by emphasizing that Public Diplomacy, as its name implies, presents a foreign policy instrument and should only be conceptualized in the IR discipline, despite acknowledging the contributions from other disciplines (Sevin, 2015).

But since Public Diplomacy is related to several disciplines, this study argues that a multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary study regarding Public Diplomacy should be pursued and Public Diplomacy should be regarded as a junction between International Relations, Public Relations, Political Science and Communications. There are many scholars who agree with this argument. The most remarkable contributor is Zhang, who perfectly illustrates the interdependency of the various approaches, which can be seen in Figure 2 (Zhang, 2019).


Figure 2 Zhang's Public Diplomacy Map



Note. From “Compassion versus manipulation; narratives versus rational arguments: a PD radar to chart the terrain of public diplomacy” by J. Zhang, *Place Brand Public Diplomacy* 16, 2019.

With this map, Zhang not only visually illustrates all categories of Public Diplomacy, but also the thin line between ethics and efficiency as well (Zhang, 2019). Another contributor is Golan who suggests an integrated Public Diplomacy approach by identifying three levels of Public Diplomacy, which can be seen in Figure 3 (Golan, 2013). Golan argues that each of those levels has their own targets and states can achieve long term positive results only through the integration of all three (Golan, 2013, p. 1252).

Figure 3 Golan's Model of Public Diplomacy



Note. From “An Integrated Approach to Public Diplomacy” by G. Golan, *American Behavioral Scientist*, 57(9), 2013, p. 1252.

Inspecting the three layers identified, we clearly see that different fields like International Relations; Nation Branding i.e. marketing and Public Relations are combined to adapt a holistic approach. Thus, the integrated model offers a wide range. The basic logic of Golan's approach is that states should underline shared values addressing foreign publics (Golan, 2013, p. 1253). Although Golan's integrative approach offers a comprehensive perspective, there is no single case study that adopts this suggestion. Thus Golan's suggestion cannot move beyond being theoretical and finds no implementation in the literature.

After all, it can be observed that practitioners of Public Diplomacy don't have a holistic approach and don't combine knowledge from relevant disciplines. Academic studies are disconnected as well. While theories of International Relations focus more on power relations and national interests, theories from Public Relations focus more on gaining trust and prestige. On the other hand Communication theories focus more on communication channels and techniques to influence public perception. Therefore scholars such as Zhang stress that a combined research would be required (Zhang, 2019).

1.2.4. Adopted Theoretical Framework

To summarize Public Diplomacy literature in IR, it was discovered that there is no comprehensive framework analyzing Public Diplomacy specifically. Research revealed that

most research about Public Diplomacy in IR took inspiration from the concept soft power. The concept soft power can be attributed to Realism and Neorealism. Other than the realist perspective, some studies in the literature adopt the Gramscian perspective. In fact Yakaruç argues that Nye's soft power notion has similarities with Gramsci's hegemony mentality to a certain extent, because Gramsci also emphasizes that the consent of the public is required to build hegemony along with hard power or force (Yakaruç, 2017, p.497). However, the Gramscian perspective fails to explain Türkiye's motivation for Public Diplomacy and its enterprising and humanitarian foreign policy approach. It can be argued that soft power can provide a meaningful framework for analysis, despite the fact that soft power is only an analytical concept not a theory. Especially soft power indexes can be considered functional tools to measure the efficiency of Public Diplomacy, which is regarded as one of the main challenges of Public Diplomacy research as it is further elaborated in Section 1.4. Therefore this dissertation adopts the realist perspective in IR, building its arguments on the notion of soft power. However, this research also acknowledges the fact that other disciplines can contribute to Public Diplomacy analysis as well. Especially some concepts such as Nation Branding, or models such as the Two-Way Asymmetric Model and the Two-Way Symmetric Model of Public Relations are enriching the perspective of analysis. Therefore, other disciplines such as Communication and Public Relations were considered to be relevant with Public Diplomacy studies and useful. For this reason, it was suggested that future research combining IR with other disciplines would be significant contribution to the Public Diplomacy literature and an integrated perspective should be developed.

1.3. Actors of Public Diplomacy

Circumstances and opportunities of Public Diplomacy changed fundamentally due to ICT and globalization and new actors emerged. Currently, sovereign states do not have the monopoly of Public Diplomacy anymore. Koschwitz, who is a German scholar, shares this view by arguing that the activities of other actors became also influential in Public Diplomacy so that states are no more the monopoly (Koschwitz, 1986). The definition formulated by the European Union (EU) is also emphasizing actors other than states by describing Public Diplomacy as a method of winning the trust of foreign audiences apart from interstate relations (European Union, 2014).

Moreover, some scholars are convinced that actors other than governments will be more effective. For instance Cull assures that peer similarity can be effective and bring change instead of some foreign government and advises governments to empower individuals (Cull, 2013a, p. 136). As a consequence, Cull argues that governments have to give up on the idea of being the most credible source on every subject and empower persons within the target network who are similar to the target audience to bring major impact

Without a doubt, we enjoy a great diversity of actors in today's Public Diplomacy practice and this study will examine if diversity or multitude of actors seems to be the best after all, considering the ultimate goal of Public Diplomacy. In this study, actors in Germany and Türkiye will be examined and compared to find out, if this argument is provable.

1.4. Measuring the Influence of Public Diplomacy

Research conducted by Shapiro and Page in 1988 has demonstrated that the public generally tends to respond sensibly to international realities if leaders explain them clearly and correctly. Moreover, they underlined that public opinion is worth taking into account in policymaking, when information is unbiased (Shapiro and Page, 1988, p. 244). It can be concluded that Shapiro and Paige correlate the correct and unbiased explanation of international incidents by state leaders with the success of Public Diplomacy.


Sharing the truth with the public can raise the popularity of a leader, because people can perceive that leader as sincere. But still the success or efficiency of Public Diplomacy should be measured with a scientific methodology. In fact, the most frequent voiced criticism regarding Public Diplomacy is that it is difficult to evaluate whether it is successful or if positive foreign policy outcomes can be directly related to Public Diplomacy efforts. The same critique was on the agenda for soft power as well. How can soft power be assessed, was one of the main concerns and debates in the literature. However there are some indexes and surveys regarding soft power. For example the Soft Power Survey conducted by the Monocle Magazine (Monocle, 2023), ranks 20 countries regarding soft power biyearly. Their last survey was for the years 2023 and 2024. Another index is the Soft Power 30 index, which is a comparative assessment of 30 countries, developed by Portland including the contributions of Joseph Jr. Nye, who is the eponym of the term soft power. Portland is an independent strategic communications consultancy based in the U.S. with multiple offices abroad and creates the index every year

since 2015. A very similar title has another index developed by Brand Finance, the Global Soft Power Index. The index provides data about world's top 121 soft power nations.

Considering there are a number of comparative indexes assessing soft power, its measurement should not be considered that abstract. However, these indexes don't nominally concentrate on Public Diplomacy. An index regarding Public Diplomacy does not exist yet. A multifaceted index comparing a number of countries worldwide would be very beneficial. The absence of such an index is a great gap in the literature.

There is only one single attempt in the literature to measure Public Diplomacy with an integrated perspective asserted by Ingenhoff and Chariatte in 2020. Ingenhoff and Chariatte identified the shortcomings of the effective measurement of Public Diplomacy, arguing that a comprehensive measurement has not been done so far. By criticizing practitioners for measuring the results of Public Diplomacy efforts by only evaluating the efficiency of communication campaigns in terms of cost-benefit and underline that this type of assessment is only measuring concrete outputs like persons reached etc. Criticizing academicians from several disciplines who developed measurement and evaluation models for Public Diplomacy for failing to see the whole picture, Ingenhoff and Chariatte tried to develop an integrated measurement instrument (Ingenhoff and Chariatte, 2020). Without a doubt, assessing the results of Public Diplomacy initiatives comprehensively and correctly can help to formulate better policies to accomplish foreign policy goals. Therefore the integrated approach suggested by Ingenhoff and Chariatte is a valuable contribution to the Public Diplomacy literature. Figure 4 (Ingenhoff and Chariatte, 2020) illustrates that measurement model, called the Listening and Evaluation Compass (LEC).

Figure 4 The Listening and Evaluation Compass (LEC)



Note. From Solving the Public Diplomacy Puzzle-Developing a 360-degree Listening and Evaluation Approach to Assess Country Images by D. Ingenhoff and J. Chariatte, 2020. Figueroa Press.

The suggested LEC model, looks like a compass where listening guides and helps to reach more effective outcomes. However, Ingenhoff and Chariatte accept that an evaluation using the LEC model might not be feasible for many actors due to the emerging costs (Ingenhoff and Chariatte, 2020). Although this model might prove functional, there is no single attempt in the Public Diplomacy literature using the LEC model so far.

CHAPTER 2: THE PROGRESS AND EXERCISE OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

In this chapter, the concept Digital Diplomacy will be elaborated, which is contended to be an instrument of Public Diplomacy and the center of focus in this study. To this end, several concepts used alongside Digital Diplomacy and current debates regarding the concept will be mentioned. Moreover, the historical development process of Digital Diplomacy will be presented and the advantages and risks of conducting Digital Diplomacy will be discussed.

2.1. Digital Diplomacy as a Concept and a Public Diplomacy Tool

Technologic developments and the prevalence of the Internet in the 2000s enhanced information flow and communication via new platforms like online encyclopedias, video sharing sites and social media. However, in the beginning scholars questioned whether the Internet really makes much difference in Diplomacy and Public Diplomacy. For instance Westcott asserts that the Internet only supports already existing communication and Diplomacy is still conducted between nation states, and besides face to face (Westcott, 2008, p. 16). Sandre is one of the scholars, who agree that the core of Diplomacy hasn't changed much and that technology might not produce innovation. But Sandre distinctly argues that technology has become a facilitator for innovation, including in foreign policy and that Diplomacy has expanded to understand the potential of technology. In addition, Sandre claims that technology helps ideas to circulate and move between spaces and sectors better, complementing traditional diplomacy (Sandre, 2015). Thus, Sandre claims that technology has influenced Diplomacy by having an impact on the way diplomacy is conducted. But his most important contribution to this discussion is that he noticed technology also introduced new players in Diplomacy, such as non-state actors, which can be called less traditional (Sandre, 2015). For that matter, Sandre argues that Diplomacy has not only transformed thanks to technology and digital tools, but also partially democratized to include more voices. Thus, from Sandre's perspective technology makes Diplomacy more inclusive and more participatory, because Digital Diplomacy reaches social media users (Sandre, 2015).

However Westcott also claimed that Internet has implications on Diplomacy regarding foreign policy-making in four fields, which are ideas, information, networks and service delivery (Westcott, 2008, pp. 16-19). Westcott clarified his perspective further by giving examples for each area. Regarding ideas, he asserted that ideas matter in foreign policy and the Internet serves for their dynamic exchange. He exemplified this argument by mentioning that speeches of foreign ministers or state leaders are posted on official websites or blogs and interactive forums are used for online discussions or exchanges. The next area, which is information, is also crucial for foreign policy making, because Westcott argued that the Internet easily conveys secure information (Westcott, 2008). Moreover, the Internet enables people to access multiple sources of information which can be shared within seconds with a wider audience. The third area of influence, which is networks, are also addressed as crucial, because Westcott claimed that networks can easily be found and created online to influence foreign policy debates and decisions (Westcott, 2008). And finally, Westcott asserted that the Internet affected services provided. For instance e-mails and online opportunities ease the workload of foreign policy practitioners and some consular services, such as passports and visas. Moreover the need for physical documents and a physical presence is being minimized wherever possible (Westcott, 2008, pp. 16-19). Thus, it can be concluded that the discussion whether the Internet and technology has had really an impact on foreign policy and diplomacy is actually groundless.

Indeed, the digital transformation of almost everything in life, such as banking, shopping etc., was also affecting Diplomacy. Diplo Foundation suggests that the atmosphere where Diplomacy is conducted changed along with the subjects at hand and the tools used (Diplo, 2023a). Therefore it's a given that digitalization impacted the practice of Diplomacy. This impact was reflected to IR studies as well, as one can see in concepts such as "new Public Diplomacy" or "Public Diplomacy 2.0". Not long after, criticism began to pour on those concepts. For instance, Hemery asserted that Public Diplomacy stands for the engagement with publics, which has a long standing history (Hemery, 2005, p. 196). Sharp also agrees that Public Diplomacy is very old, referring to siege stories from the Bible and Thucydides. Thus, Sharp criticized the conception "New Public Diplomacy", since many agreements are signed and ratified on highly public occasions even though they might be negotiated in private and that diplomats have always tried to build relations with citizens in the countries they were appointed to gain information (Sharp, 2009, pp. 270-271).

Nevertheless, internet technologies transformed the literature regarding Public Diplomacy and debates. Comparisons between traditional Public Diplomacy where the public does not take active part with the “new Public Diplomacy” where multiple actors take part and public diplomacy practitioners also listen to the public via new technological opportunities were done (Hocking and Melissen, 2015, p. 31). In today’s globalized world, it is obvious that a one-way communication cannot satisfy the need of the public, because both the domestic and the foreign public desire dialogue and attention to their opinions. Even if the traditional Public Diplomacy practitioners i.e. the governments don’t wish to take these demands serious, they are obliged to meet those expectations if they aspire to be, influential and convincing (Payne et al., 2011). Therefore, the pattern of Public Diplomacy was altered out of necessity.

However, this new type of Public Diplomacy or “new Public Diplomacy” acquired different names such as “virtual diplomacy”, “electronic diplomacy”, “cyber diplomacy”, “digital diplomacy” etc. Although these concepts are used interchangeably, most of them are not synonyms. Moreover, new Public Diplomacy cannot be oversimplified and regarded as those concepts including Digital Diplomacy. The most accurate description for Digital Diplomacy may be the standpoint, which considers it as a field of application for Public Diplomacy (T.C. Cumhurbaşkanlığı İletişim Başkanlığı, 2022a, p.19). The closest concept to Digital Diplomacy might be Cyber Diplomacy, however Digital Diplomacy not only occurs in the cyberspace and has broader meanings (Riordan, 2021). Thus, there is a conceptual confusion regarding the concept Digital Diplomacy. In fact the Diplo Foundation identifies 25 concepts that can be related to technology and diplomacy (Diplo, 2023a). In addition to this conceptual confusion about Public Diplomacy, totally new concepts such as ‘Twiplomacy’ emerged as well. It has been noticed that Digital Diplomacy is also referred as Diplomacy 3.0 or as “Digiplomacy” in some sources as well. This study considers Digital Diplomacy as a part or component of new Public Diplomacy, but to avoid further confusion and conceptual clearance only the concept Digital Diplomacy will be used.

After shedding light on the terminological confusion regarding Digital Diplomacy, the challenge of defining Digital Diplomacy has to be overcome. Examining existing literature, it was noticed that there are several definitions for Digital Diplomacy and no consensus has been reached among scholars. There are literal and broad interpretations regarding Digital Diplomacy, which also influences its definition. For instance Bjola defines Digital Diplomacy as a tactic of change management via digital means and virtual cooperation (Bjola, 2015, p. 15), which is a very comprehensive but very unclear definition. On the other hand, Kampf et al.

regard Digital Diplomacy simply as the use of social media by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, their missions abroad and diplomats (Kampf et al., 2015, p. 332), which is very superficial because many studies about Digital Diplomacy interpret the concept as an umbrella term. For instance Hedling and Bremberg argue that Digital Diplomacy is a comprehensive concept expressing the change of Diplomacy by digital means and the ICT sector (Hedling and Bremberg, 2021, p. 2). Hocking and Melissen also assert that Digital Diplomacy is a multidimensional conception by identifying four dimensions. These dimensions are the transforming foreign policy atmosphere, subjects regarding cyber space, the use of ICT to obtain information and the provision of and services, and the encouragement of participatory policy making (Hocking and Melissen, 2015, pp. 21-23). But the most radical view comes from Manor, who argues that none of the concepts used so far, including the concept Digital Diplomacy are satisfactory due to the inability of identifying the correlation of ICT and Diplomacy (Manor, 2018). According to Manor, digitalization is a process which is experienced by diplomats, MFAs and their missions abroad and the concepts in use cannot specify the domains of diplomacy influenced by ICT. Moreover, Manor asserts that digitalization encourages new norms and enables new behaviors, which should be regarded as more than just offering new functions (Manor, 2018). Due to this point of view, Manor proposes a new concept that he deems more inclusive, “the digitalization of diplomacy”. According to Manor there are four dimensions of diplomacy that were influenced by digital technologies, which are the audiences of diplomacy, the institutions of diplomacy, the practitioners of diplomacy and the practice of diplomacy (Manor, 2018). He also identifies four fields where the term is used which are normative, behavioral, procedural and conceptual. These four dimensions of diplomacy and four fields used constitute a matrix. Manor argues that this matrix is useful to organize the chaotic study of contemporary diplomacy in the Digital Age (Manor, 2018, pp. 4-16).

To conclude, the conceptual confusion and the fractured terminology in the literature still continues, but it can be inferred that Public Diplomacy and Digital Diplomacy are intertwined and Digital Diplomacy itself is a Public Diplomacy study as Aslan and Göksu underline in their conference paper (Aslan and Göksu, 2016). According to this research, Digital Diplomacy should be interpreted as an umbrella concept that encompasses all elements related to Diplomacy and ICT including videoconferencing, virtual embassies, AI supported software for foreign policy decision-making or Chatbots for online public services, online consular services, engagement with publics via social media, mobile applications and gamelike elements.

2.2. The Emergence and Current State of Digital Diplomacy

Scholars unanimously agree that Digital Diplomacy originates from the United States (U.S.) (Verrekia, 2017, p. 15). It is not a surprise that the U.S. pioneered in the Digital Diplomacy since the related technologies and internet platforms all emerged in the U.S. Hedling and Bremberg claim that Digital Diplomacy became common in the U.S., because the diplomatic corps were instructed to use the digital means by their governments (Hedling and Bremberg, 2021, p. 4).

Although the first international online conference was held by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) in 1963 (Diplo, 2023b), Digital Diplomacy became popular in the 21st century. Cull argues that the 9/11 incident transformed the U.S. diplomacy in general and in terms of Digital Diplomacy (Cull, 2013a, p. 129). It is common knowledge that the U.S. started concentrating more on its Public Diplomacy after the 9/11 incidents in order to combat with its negative global image, especially in the Middle East. Thus, Cull's argument is reasonable. In addition the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy published a report focusing on eDiplomacy and online Public Diplomacy techniques in 2003, including "Virtual Consulates" to handle consulates' workloads (Cull, 2013a, p. 129). Besides, the first Taskforce on eDiplomacy was established in 2002 after the 9/11 attacks which transformed into the Office of eDiplomacy within the State Department in 2003 (Hanson, 2012, p. 3). These developments show that the U.S. started to develop its Digital Diplomacy in the 2000s as a pioneer after the 9/11 attacks. However the first virtual presence post of the U.S. was not in the Middle East, it was in Russia Yekaterinburg.

The first activities of Digital Diplomacy began in 2006, when the Center on Public Diplomacy within the University of Southern California (USC) implemented the "Virtual Worlds Project", in order to observe the potential of online Public Diplomacy by purchasing an island in the online world "Second Life" (USC Center on Public Diplomacy, 2021) established in 2003 (Linden Lab, 2021). A year later in 2007, the Maldives (The Sunday Times, 2021) and Sweden (Spiegel, 2007) opened virtual embassies in Second Life, where users could interact via avatars that represent them online. Today Second Life is still actively used by millions of users from all over the world, but the island and virtual embassies are no longer available. Although this means that the project was not sustainable after the end of funds, the project serves as a model and can be regarded as a simulation of possible future representations of diplomatic actors in cyber space.

While these cases can be considered the first attempts of conducting Digital Diplomacy, some scholars argue that the Arab Spring in 2010 motivated the Ministries of Foreign Affairs to be more active on digital platforms, because this incident helped them to realize how important social media can be in shaping public opinion. The Arab Spring was indeed a game changer, because it showed governments how people can use the social media to come together and revolt against the government. Therefore the Arab Spring was deemed the first evidence demonstrating the power of the digital sphere. Although Facebook was not responsible for starting the Arab Spring, Manor contends that Facebook functioned as a city square, where people met to freely express criticism against their governments and organized, which Manor considers an incident that would be impossible face to face (Manor, 2016). In 2011, social media proved to be very powerful to bring the masses together again and has been effective in the emergence of global protests in the “Occupy” Movement, because social media was influential in the rapid spread of the movement and the organization of the protestors (Kavada, 2015, p. 873).

As social media became so crucial in mass movements and enabled to spread information, leaders also got interested in using social media accounts. In a short time period leaders and important politicians were interested in broadcasting their daily activities and government news to a global audience. Since social media also allowed direct access to the leaders by both domestic and foreign public, their use became more and more important. In 2012, the company Burson-Marsteller conducted the first “Twiplomacy Study” analyzing the use of Twitter by world leaders and since then these studies were traditionalized by being conducted almost every year (Twiplomacy, 2012). In the Twiplomacy Studies, statistics of world leaders are analyzed by using multiple variables and rankings of the world leaders are presented. These studies serve as valuable sources in this study because, not only the most popular or active leaders are listed, but also the most effective leaders are ranked by measuring the effects (mentions, hashtags, retweets, replies etc.) of their posts on Facebook and Twitter.


Ever since the COVID-19 outbreak was declared a global pandemic in March 2020, every country took prevention measures such as travel and border restrictions. Due to this extraordinary situation, traditional diplomatic activities involving face to face meetings mostly occurred on digital platforms. Leaders and diplomats preferred and sometimes even were obliged to participate in virtual meetings and video conferences instead of physical meetings. Quarantine measures or lockdowns forced world leaders and diplomats to adapt to working from home. Thus it can be argued that COVID-19 has been a key catalyst for the digitalization of traditional diplomacy, because leaders and diplomats were had to use digital platforms such

as Google Meet, Skype, Zoom for meetings. Press conferences, which are held after any international meeting, were held and broadcasted online and the traditional family pictures of multilateral meetings after summits like the G20 have been replaced by a mosaic of screens with leaders sitting in front of their respective flags (Twiplomacy, 2021). Even the ceremonies for the presentation and handing over of the letter of credence by the ambassadors were done via video conference, like in the example of the first Lithuanian Ambassador to Bahrain to the Foreign Minister of Bahrain in 2020. For the most part regarding Public Diplomacy, leaders and diplomats continued to engage their followers via Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Periscope etc. but more intensely, addressing the domestic and foreign publics to stay at home and raise awareness about the pandemic.

However, the pandemic not only transformed the mode of administration of routine diplomatic activities. A research conducted with an international sample group consisting of public and private actors involved in Diplomacy revealed that the pandemic altered the way they judge about countries as well (McClory, 2021, p. 17). In this sense the COVID-19 pandemic also affected perceptions about countries based on their skills of managing the problems owing to the pandemic (Akillı and Cihanoğlu Gülen, 2023, p.167). Probably for the first time in the Public Diplomacy history, competencies to overcome problems in crisis situations took precedence over the persuasion and publicity skills of states. Beyond any doubt, the change in the reputation of the countries was affecting their soft power as well, because the pandemic tarnished China's national image profoundly.

As seen in Figure 5, ITU declared that 5.3 billion people used the internet as of 2022, which corresponds to nearly 66% of the global population (ITU, 2023). However, around 2.7 billion people still remain offline and ITU states that only 36% of the population used internet in underdeveloped and landlocked countries in 2022 (ITU, 2023).

Figure 5 Individuals Using the Internet



Note. From “Internet Use” by ITU, 2023.


A more recent data published by Statista in October 2023 is coherent with the numbers published by ITU, since it was declared that 5.3 billion people use internet the across the globe, which is 65.7% of the global population (Statista, 2023a). These numbers may not seem to be much for now, but examining data in the figure it can be observed that these numbers increase very fast, especially after the COVID-19 pandemic. Figure 5 reveals the increase in internet users by years between 2005 and 2022, where it can explicitly be seen that the pandemic accelerated the increase in the rate of users after 2019, compared to the past years (ITU, 2023).

Moreover, not only internet users have increased in time, social media users increased as well. According to data published by Statista, there were 4.95 billion social media users, which equals to 61.4% of the world's total population as of October 2023 (Statista, 2023a). Furthermore, the envisioned purpose of social media networks transformed in the course of time as well. In the initial years, social media was used to connect and socialize with people, whereas nowadays social media also serves as a news source. According to data published by Statista in February 2023, a considerably large number of people acquire news via social media in many countries ranging from Kenya, Malaysia, and Thailand to the U.S., Canada etc.

(Statista, 2023b). While this rate is higher in some countries such as Nigeria with 78%, it is lower in some countries such as Japan with 23% because most social media users have concerns about fake news as well (Statista, 2023b). As a consequent states and leaders are also interested to keep the publics posted about update developments via social media. According to 2020 edition of the Twiplomacy Studies, with the exception of only four countries (Laos, North Korea, Sao Tome and Principe, and Turkmenistan), all UN member states used Twitter as of 2022 (Twiplomacy, 2021).

And yet as of 2023, there are still millions of people without connection to internet, which is estimated by ITU to be around 2.6 billion equaling to 33% of the world population (ITU, 2023). According to data in the Digital 2023 Global Overview Report published by Datareportal, some countries have the largest unconnected populations such as Ethiopia, where 83,3% of the population has no internet connection as of January 2023 (Datareportal, 2023). As seen in Figure 6, some countries clearly need more time to adapt to the digitalization process in the world. Thus, the targets set by the UN institutions to achieve universal and meaningful digital connectivity until 2030 (ITU, 2023) will be very challenging in those countries.

Figure 6 Absolute Largest Unconnected Populations



Note. Adapted from “Digital 2023 Global Overview Report” by Datareportal, 2023.

Nevertheless, the statistics regarding internet and social media use are clear signs of evolution in the human behavior and habits during the Digital Era. Examining the evolution

process of Digital Diplomacy, it can be seen that there was gradually a progress from using digital devices to conduct Diplomacy into a more comprehensive notion, which also involves social media and a range of online services for citizens. Considering that leaders and diplomats still travel to have face to face meetings and talks, it can be argued that the essential structure of Diplomacy has remained unchanged despite new opportunities offered by ICT. As a matter of fact, Digital Diplomacy does not imply the end of Diplomacy, it only affects the way it is understood and practiced (Manfredi, 2019). It can be argued that Digital Diplomacy is crucial for achieving foreign policy goals, because it even affects people who don't have an idea on which continent that respective country is located and people can have empathy or sympathy for countries they never set foot. Therefore, further research and development is definitely needed.

A recent statistical analysis of books, articles, or other publications published in English on the Scopus database regarding Digital Diplomacy conducted by Garakhanova revealed that the first academic study was conducted in 2000 (Garakhanova, 2023, p.1328). Examining authors contributing to Digital Diplomacy studies, the same research concluded that respectively Manor, Bjola, Sevin and Holmes were the authors with the most works on the topic and the most referred authors at the same time (Garakhanova, 2023, p.1333). Examining the countries where the publications are originated, the same study revealed that respectively the U.S., the UK, Australia, the Russian Federation and Sweden are the countries with the most number of studies about Digital Diplomacy (Garakhanova, 2023, p.1334). It was noted that neither Türkiye nor Germany were listed among the countries with the most studies on Digital Diplomacy. Although one of the most cited scholars Sevin is of Turkish origin, it was noted that academic research in the field is dominated by those countries and research in Türkiye should be further encouraged. In this sense, this dissertation can be considered among the important steps in Türkiye about Digital Diplomacy research in English language.

2.3. Opportunities and Threats of Digital Diplomacy

Political leaders may favor social media to conduct Diplomacy, because these networks enable them to reach both domestic and foreign publics simultaneously. Through this two-way dialogical form of engagement, they can interact with their voters and inform all interested parties about pursued policies (Duncombe, 2018, p. 93). So Digital Diplomacy is not only a tool of publicity, it also enables leaders and decision makers to hear the views of their target

audience regarding their political decisions, including foreign policy decisions. But why should diplomats or diplomacy practitioners in general be motivated to use social media networks?

It is considered that diplomats need to function as information-gatherers and analysts besides being negotiators (Fendrick, 2014, pp. 182-183). But it is a difficult task for diplomats to practice traditional public diplomacy, because they are usually isolated in their embassies due to security measures and not able to directly engage with foreign publics due to several other reasons such as language barrier. Politicians such as Ministers of Foreign Affairs, who are influential in terms of international relations, also face similar problems. Working intensively and directly engaging with foreign publics simultaneously does not seem feasible because it requires enormous energy and time. Thanks to the opportunities created by the digital media, they can be more actively engaged with foreign publics and outreach the limited audience they get the chance to interact in formal visits and events. Social media features such as live streams on Facebook or online polls on Twitter, where followers can vote in private enrich the engagement with foreign publics further.

Moreover, diplomats can use social media to monitor events, collect information, and detect influencers in the country they were appointed easily (Rashica, 2019, pp. 29-30). Hanson, argues that social media offers advance notification about developing social and political movements (Bryant, 2012). Taking into consideration that some great political movements in the 21st century such as the Arab Spring became inflamed through social media, Hanson might have a point to perceive social media as an indication for social and political turmoil. Through the control of information flow on social media governments especially Foreign Ministries can correct misinformation quickly without causing great escalation abroad.

Another comfort of Digital Diplomacy is that diplomats can increase their social network and build relationships with their counterparts or enhance their professional network via social media and professional online platforms such as LinkedIn without meeting them in person. This is an advantage, because some states have tense diplomatic relations and do not organize formal visits or negotiations with each other due to past disagreements. Even small countries in remote locations can build networks easily.

Another benefit of conducting Digital Diplomacy is that it is cost-efficient. Since Digital Diplomacy not always requires financial investment, Rashica argues that Digital Diplomacy mostly favors small states that have limited financial resources (Rashica, 2019, pp. 30-31). Moreover, the ability to organize conferences and meetings online profoundly decreases costs of venue, travel, meal, and accommodation expenses because there is no need to participate to those events physically. Most importantly, less travel means, leaders can save time which is of

crucial importance considering their busy working schedule. Bearing in mind that leaders and diplomats have a bad work life balance, the digitalization of diplomacy gives them the opportunity to have a little bit more time for themselves, so they can rest and stay healthy. Remembering Atatürk's famous quote "A healthy mind in a healthy body", this might be an indirect contribution to successful policy formation. By reducing travel, conducting Digital Diplomacy not only saves money and the travel-sore, it also contributes to the decrease of CO2 emissions. Therefore it can be argued that Digital Diplomacy is also environmentally beneficial. In addition, online events require less printed materials such as event schedules and brochures, which can save trees and thus contributes to the protection of the forests and thus the environment.

Erkul argues that especially the use of social media tools in public services would contribute to a more transparent, democratic and more participatory management environment (Erkul, 2009).

In addition, Digital Diplomacy can also be regarded as an opportunity for development, because countries can introduce themselves directly to the world and thus increase their global trade and thereby expand their market. Since trade brings economic interdependence, political dependencies are also expected to occur. Therefore, it can be argued that Digital Diplomacy affects socio-economic and socio-political structures (Köse, 2017, pp. 2361-2362).

Apart from the numerous benefits mentioned above, several critics regarding Digital Diplomacy can be voiced. In fact there is even a whole book covering the risks and benefits of Digital Diplomacy, in which the authors argue that the positive connotations of digitalization was overshadowed due to rising public mistrust and even caused anxiety regarding technology, because people now have the fear that digital technologies might have unintended consequences (Bjola and Pamment, 2019, p. 1). These fears are caused due to the abuse of digital technologies to spread fake news, disinformation and the intentional use of knowledge as a trump card by state and non-state actors (Bjola and Pamment, 2019, p. 1). Thus, social media is criticized to be ineffective and bringing dangers.

Dangers occur because creating and disseminating information can create problems with the public sought to engage (Bjola, 2015, p. 19), the audience on social media is very broad. A tweet intended for the domestic public can be interpreted as provocative by the foreign publics or foreign governments. With a broad audience, it is not possible to draft tailored messages that will be interpreted in the same way by every reader (Williams and Drew, 2020, p. 11). But statesmen and diplomats feel obliged to use social media networks to keep up with the times and be as active as possible, just as their counterparts. However experienced elder diplomats

are not very familiar with ICT and the social media and young diplomats and statesmen that are familiar with emerging technologies and using social media are inexperienced in conducting Diplomacy. Moreover, there is no handbook or guideline describing how to conduct Digital Diplomacy.

It is assumed that it may be sufficient when diplomacy practitioners have digital literacy, but having knowledge about how to convey the right message on digital platforms is also necessary. Not only creating short but effective texts considering that platforms like Twitter allows 280 characters as the maximum Tweet length, expressing oneself well and politically correct is also crucial. In the past, some tweets and images shared on social media have caused diplomatic crises instead of better relations. For instance a tweet sent by Chrystia Freeland on 02.08.2018, who served as the Foreign Minister of Canada then, lead to a diplomatic crisis with Saudi Arabia. In her tweet Freeland demanded the release of human rights activists in the Badawai family who were imprisoned in Saudi Arabia (Freeland, 2018) and the following day a similar tweet was sent from the official account of the Canadian Foreign Ministry (Foreign Policy Can, 2018), demanding the immediate release of those activists. After another tweet by the Embassy of Canada in Saudi Arabia a few days later, that was the translation of those tweets into Arabic language (Canada in KSA, 2018), the Saudi Government took drastic actions against Canada. The Saudi government expelled Canada's ambassador and recalled their ambassador to Canada. Moreover, the Saudi Foreign Ministry announced that all new trade and investment deals were frozen (Reuters, 2018). About 17.000 students studying in Canada with scholarships were also withdrawn and accommodated in other countries. The relations got so tense that even Saudi Arabia's state airline Saudi Arabia suspended flights to and from Toronto shortly after these decisions (CNN, 2018). As a result, these tweets led to a diplomatic crisis, which had major consequences. It was estimated that this incident has cost Canada more than 20 billion US dollars according to initial reports (Anadolu Ajansı, 2018). Based upon this example, it is evident that social media is more than just gaining many followers and being popular among domestic and foreign publics, it is serious business and requires exceptional carefulness.

Another example can be the tension due to statements of Ankara ambassadors of the US, Germany, Denmark, Finland, France, Netherlands, Sweden, Canada, Norway and New Zealand in 2021. In that case, the ambassadors shared on their social media accounts statements about the ongoing case against the Turkish businessman and human rights activist Osman Kavala, and claimed that the case would cast a shadow over democracy and the supremacy of law in Türkiye and called for Kavala's release. After these statements, the ambassadors were

summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Türkiye for their statements regarding Kavala. The Ministry released a statement that these statements and calls on social media violate the independence of the Turkish judiciary because it politicizes the legal processes and attempts to put pressure on the independent judiciary. Thus, the ambassadors were reminded that these statements were unacceptable and were warned to remain within the responsibilities and duties defined in the Vienna Convention (Hürriyet, 2021), since article 41 of the convention explicitly requires diplomats to respect the laws and regulations in the states appointed and to abstain from interference to internal affairs

Williams and Drew argue that Twitter should be avoided during crisis to limit its negative impacts, because tweets may increase misperception and create escalation based on their study of escalations due to tweets (Williams and Drew, 2020). People make mistakes, including diplomats who are actually trained to minimize their mistakes. But the messages on social media are shared instantly and the texts are not reviewed by communication experts. Thus, the contents are not carefully redacted like it is the case with press releases regarding diplomatic issues. Once shared posts on social media like polemic tweets continue to exist online forever, even when deleted (Williams and Drew, 2020, pp. 5-10). After all, it is evident that courses for diplomats will be necessary, which means spending valuable resources like time and money for their training.

However causing crisis by mistake is not the only problem, because in some cases politicians and state leaders deliberately cause tension by sharing provocative posts on social media. In 2018, former US President Donald Trump shared a tweet that provoked North Korean Leader Kim Jong-Un about sending nuclear missiles, which was under no circumstance diplomatic and might have caused a great catastrophe. Or in 2020, former president of Iran Ali Khamenei tweeted a photomontage image of the former U.S. president Trump with a slap in the face (Matei, 2020). These examples show that officials can be dangerous on social media and thus undermine the importance and advantages of Digital Diplomacy.

Moreover, the digitization of diplomacy brings some burdens on foreign policy actors. The incredible increase in the information transfer between foreign policy actors such as embassies abroad and foreign ministries, limits the time for decision-making. Moreover actors such as large corporations or civil society organizations who are challenging governments in some areas are more active on social media and tend to react to events much faster than governments (Stanzel, 2018, p. 9). This haste places an increasing burden on decision-makers and on persons who are in positions where proposals for decisions are prepared so that the decision-makers can

predict possible outcomes. As a result, there is a greater risk of taking wrong decisions, due to a restricted time for the processing of data and possible courses of action (Stanzel, 2018, p. 8).

Another burden on foreign policy actors is “Zoom fatigue” or “Zoom exhaustion” due to attendance to conferences, businesses, education etc. online via Zoom. Bailenson, argues that there are four possible explanations for Zoom Fatigue based on academic research; too much gazing, mental burden, amplified self-assessment after watching at oneself in the videos and limitation of movement (Bailenson, 2021). Scholars from Stanford University including Bailenson even developed the “Zoom Exhaustion and Fatigue Scale” along with a scholar from the University of Gothenburg, in order to measure how much fatigue is caused and the psychological effects of increased videoconferencing (Fauville et al., 2021).

When great organizations like summits are being organized online, opportunities of interaction during the breaks, or informal access to other leaders are no more possible in a digital format (McClory, 2021, p. 27). Moreover, face-to face interaction is considered vital for earning trust and developing empathy especially regarding controversial and political issues (Diplo, 2023b), however online meetings and online platforms do not enable this physical connection and thus might not be as effective as desired.

Not only the difficulty of trust building but also having trust in general is a genuine problem, because social media accounts may be run by impersonates and fans. Thus, there is the risk to accidentally follow an account and these accounts cannot be trusted since they might disseminate false information. Rashica also identifies this problem among the threats of Digital Diplomacy, because it is difficult to distinguish which information is right or wrong (Rashica, 2019, p. 27). Facebook and Instagram tried to overcome this problem with the verified badge, a blue checkmark meaning that the given account is the genuine presence of a public figure, celebrity or brand based on several verification criteria before verifying the given account (Facebook, 2021). Acquired by Facebook in 2012, Instagram also has a similar verified badge policy. The difference is that once verified, Instagram does not allow changing the username of that account and verification cannot be transferred to a different account (Instagram, 2021). Twitter also followed a similar policy for the verification of identity and evaluated the authenticity of a given account's followers and engagement as well (X, 2022). But in November 2022, this policy was changed and the blue checkmark became available for all users who paid a certain fee. A multicolored verification program was introduced, categorizing blue for persons, gold for companies and grey for governments (New York Post, 2022). However, the new profile labels and checkmarks caused many problems since users purchased checkmarks to impersonate famous people such as Donald Trump, Kobe Bryant etc. (Fung, 2022).

Moreover, as of April 2023, accounts that previously obtained the blue checkmark lost their checkmark if they had no premium subscription (X, 2023). Later in July 2023, Twitter was rebranded and changed its name to X. The blue, gold and grey checkmarks stayed and still continue confusing users.

Therefore, it is obvious that there are still some trust problems despite some precautions and efforts regarding verification. Not all public figures have verified badges and social media accounts may be hacked, including the ones with verified badges and checkmarks. Therefore ordinary citizens may not distinguish if a post is written by the real owner of the account or impostors. Posts that get too much reaction from the publics are mostly denied and statements to the press and public are usually involve explanations like being hacked. But the publics can never be sure if being hacked was used as an excuse because pretending to be hacked is an easy escape from conflict. Excuse or not hackers are a real threat, as it was the case in 2020 when dozens of verified Twitter accounts were breached; among them were the accounts of Barack Obama, Kanye West, Bill Gates and Elon Musk as well. The hackers used those accounts to post messages regarding Bitcoins and collected \$118.000 by cheating followers to send them money in only three hours (Frenkel et al., 2020). Twitter attempted to stop the hackers by locking down all verified accounts, but this move also hindered the real-time information flow. For instance weather warnings about an approaching tornado could not be announced, because their verified account of the relevant institution was shut down (The Washington Post, 2020).

As it is seen in the case mentioned above, hackers can cause serious problems. The possibility of hackers to spread disinformation through digital platforms is a major problem. But there might be also ordinary people spreading disinformation. The public can choose to believe them right away or verify the source first. In any case disinformation causes unrests and can even influence states' domestic and international stability. As a matter of fact, this argument has been proved in the 2016 US presidential elections when it came out that the Russian Government was influencing the electoral decisions of the American public. It was found out that Russia lead a cyber-campaign before the elections to manipulate the people for voting in favor of Trump (Matei, 2020). And what is worse in this era is that disinformation on social media is not only spread in the written format, it is also done visually via Deepfake technology. Videos produced using Deepfake technology can be shared on social media platforms, which can be pretty dangerous because the masses will tend to believe what they see without knowing that it was created with the help of artificial intelligence (AI). Until it is proved that the published videos are fake, it can already cause enough damage to the national image of the concerned country or alleviate great public reactions and protests. For example the video of a

public address allegedly belonging to the Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenski asking Ukrainian soldiers to lay down their weapons, had a great impact on social media. However, it was stated that the video was a provocative Deepfake product created by Russia and removed from social media platforms in a short time (Akıllı, 2022). Therefore, disinformation is regarded as the biggest challenge of contemporary Public Diplomacy. This new era of Public Diplomacy, is often regarded as post-truth politics. In fact, the concept post-truth became so popular with the rise of the social media news, so that the Oxford Dictionaries chose it as the word of the year in 2016 (Oxford Languages, 2023).

On the other hand, the German Federal Government argues that Public Diplomacy contributes to rational discussions through fact-based communication when disinformation is widespread and a narrative competition becomes more open. Therefore, it is argued that Public Diplomacy contributes to stability and ultimately peace in the world. Moreover, it is stated that communication is a particularly effective foreign policy instrument that every foreign policy actor must use to realize foreign policy goals because communication has massively shifted to digital communication and social media nowadays (Bundesregierung, 2020, pp. 4-5).

In addition to the risks elaborated above, features of social media that were considered an advantage at first glance might also be disadvantages or even risks. For instance, the social media grants easy access of leaders and diplomats to both the domestic and foreign publics, but it's not one way because the publics can easily access them too. Thus, being active on social media promotes dialogue with domestic and foreign publics, but at the same time produces vulnerabilities for leaders and diplomats since they become more accessible and open to public criticism. Leaders and diplomats may get belittling and humiliating comments publicly. Although there are laws and regulations regarding insults on social media or digital platforms, not everyone is deterred by short term imprisonment or judicial fines. Moreover, not only ordinary people, but also bot accounts controlled by computer algorithms can spread disinformation and manipulate news on social media. In a recent study conducted in September 2023, Twitter was considered as a breeding ground for the spread of misinformation, disinformation, bot and spam networks (Graham and Fitzgerald, 2023). For instance the Minister of Interior of the Republic of Türkiye, declared in October 2023 that 30% of tweets shared on Twitter in the last three months was shared by bot accounts of which 41% had negative and speculative content (TRT Haber, 2023). In fact, the trolls on social media and bot accounts are a serious problem. It is known that some states use fake accounts to shape narratives on social media and influence topics under discussion with a targeted attitude. It might seem harmless or as an endeavor for image management on first glance, however it's a

serious problem considering that people who are aware of this battle of narratives via fake accounts on social media might end up like the journalist Jamal Khashoggi, who was murdered in 2018. It was speculated that Khashoggi might be the first victim of a digital war in Saudi Arabia, due to his exposure of fake accounts on social media supporting the Saudi regime (Independent, 2018). In addition, leaders may also provoke or humiliate each other publicly and create great tension.

The second risky advantage is that Digital Diplomacy practitioners aim to influence foreign publics, but there is also the risk that their judgments and policies might be influenced by the public's opinions about foreign policy matters. Considering that 21st century Public Diplomacy is a two-way communication, not only leaders and diplomats are influential but also NGOs and individuals.


The issues raised above can be considered as challenges that can be overcome with time, but there is one challenge that constitutes the greatest risk. Obviously the most important risk to conduct Digital Diplomacy might be cyber security. Not only because confidential information and documents of the government are shared via digital platforms, but also the information of its companies and citizens. And states have to cope with difficult situations to protect their intelligence. The most known example to this risk is the prominent WikiLeaks disclosures. The publication of more than 250,000 diplomatic cables in 2010 is considered the 9/11 of US Diplomacy and is the largest unauthorized release of contemporary classified information in history, which showed the public that supposedly private communications can be released to the whole world (Calabresi, 2021). Thus, online communication about delicate issues and the transmission of messages, documents and confidential information is regarded as risky. The possibility of information leakage repulsed leaders and diplomats from social media and other online platforms. Most diplomats don't have personal accounts on social media and only use official accounts opened in the name of the embassies or consulates they are appointed.

Finally, the study of Lemke and Habegger approach the challenges regarding Digital Diplomacy from a more technical perspective, by arguing that the using social media for Diplomacy does more harm than good, which they identify as a structural problem (Lemke and Habegger, 2021, pp. 230-231). Their justification is the fact that diplomacy has a formalized and consensus-oriented communicative style, whereas social media platforms have a radically open and attention-oriented communication style (Lemke and Habegger, 2021, pp. 230-231).

Zhang also argues that there is a need to consider social media as an issue questions whether engaging in a two way communication is a an optimum choice to maintain relationships via

social media and worries about the method to use social media strategically (Zhang, 2013, p. 1313). As a solution to these three concerns, Zhang proposes that social media use for Public Diplomacy purposes can be approached as a Strategic Issue Management (SIM) process and divides this process into four phases as seen in Figure 7 (Zhang, 2013, p. 1325).

Figure 7 Zhang’s SIM Process for Social Media Use in Public Diplomacy



Note. From “A Strategic Issue Management (SIM) Approach to Social Media Use in Public Diplomacy” by J. Zhang, 2013, *American Behavioral Scientist*, 57(9), p.1326.

Zhang advises diplomats to follow this SIM process in order to be successful conducting Public Diplomacy on social media.

As a conclusion, it can be argued that digitalization affects the practice of diplomacy and their correlation is inevitable. Despite the challenges indicated above, it is obvious that leaders and diplomats need to pay attention to the social media and adapt to the digital transformation while conducting their daily work. The warning given by Lemke and Habegger about the possible unintended consequences digital technology should be taken seriously (Lemke and Habegger, 2021, p. 259). Otherwise, the emergent challenges and crises might outweigh the profits of Digital Diplomacy.

2.4. Measurement and Efficiency of Digital Diplomacy

After indicating the benefits of conducting Digital Diplomacy in the previous section, it should be underlined that the efficiency of Digital Diplomacy is actually pretty debatable. As it was already revealed in the previous chapter, the measurement of Public Diplomacy influence is challenging and existing indexes and frameworks are insufficient. Moreover, the only attempt in the literature that suggests an integrated framework is not yet applied by scholars other than their creators Ingenhoff and Chariatte.

Despite the lack of tools for proper measurement, there are two indexes that can contribute to this analysis. These are the Global Diplomacy Index (GDI), created by the Lowy Institute and the Digital Diplomacy Index (DDI) created by Reputation Squad. The GDI visualizes the diplomatic networks of several countries since 2016, which provides users data to make comparative analysis. The last index was done for the year 2019, comparing 61 G20, OECD and Asian countries and territories (Lowy Institute, 2022). The DDI on the other hand, measures and ranks only the online influence of G20 countries via Twitter (Reputation Squad, 2023). Thus the index is not comprehensive in terms of countries included and does not include all social media platforms. Moreover, the index is not updated daily as it was claimed since the latest data provided is from the 12th of August 2023, accessed on 30th of October 2023.

Bradshaw, also argues that there is no proper framework to assess the success of Digital Diplomacy initiatives and underlines that it is even hard to set targets for measuring the success of those initiatives (Bradshaw, 2015). Bradshaw has a point in her critic, because existing literature also confirms that there is no comprehensive evaluation model for measuring the efficiency of Digital Diplomacy. Bradshaw criticizes existing analysis about the success of Digital Diplomacy, because they mostly focus on indicators such as the number of followers or shares an individual or organization receives. Furthermore, Bradshaw argues that much of the world's population is still not online, and even though the numbers of internet users are rapidly increasing, she asserts that the Internet is still disproportionately rich and Western (Bradshaw, 2015). Considering that the only index measuring Digital Diplomacy is DDI and it only uses limited data to make a cross national comparison between 20 countries, proves Bradshaw's argument. However, it has to be underlined that the indicators used are not as simple as Bradshaw claimed. According to DDI's description, the scores and rankings in the index are calculated according to nine indicators, which will be presented in detail in the fourth chapter (Reputation Squad, 2023).

Despite the lack of proper frameworks to analyze the efficiency of Digital Diplomacy, there are suggestions in the existing literature for the conduction of effective Digital Diplomacy. For example Rashica argues that digital diplomats should pay attention to six elements to conduct

efficient Digital Diplomacy (Rashica, 2019, p. 34). Rashica defines these elements as “organization and management”, “security”, “time”, “content”, “context and failures”, “maximizing knowledge”, and “training and support”(Rashica, 2019, p. 34). But the efficiency of Digital Diplomacy cannot be measured and when it cannot be determined how influential Digital Diplomacy was for achieving foreign policy objectives, governments would not see a reason to invest in Digital Diplomacy initiatives. Therefore, a comprehensive framework to evaluate the efficiency of Digital Diplomacy is very crucial. This study aims to put a spotlight on this need in the literature about the measurement of efficiency for Digital Diplomacy initiatives. There is a great need for developing comprehensive indexes, since the only related index DDI is a small scaled study covering G20 countries’ activities on Twitter. Therefore, this study calls upon future studies to analyze the efficiency of Digital Diplomacy practices to create a more holistic comparative framework on a global scale.

2.5. Significant Practices of Digital Diplomacy around the World

As mentioned in the previous subsection regarding the measurement and efficiency of Digital Diplomacy, there are two indexes to rank countries conducting Digital Diplomacy. Both indexes rank the U.S. always in the first place. In fact, almost all indexes rank the U.S. in the first place, which is currently the only hegemonic power in the neoliberal economic system. Repeating the facts mentioned in the section about the emergence and current state of Digital Diplomacy, Digital Diplomacy originates from the U.S. and the related technologies and internet platforms all emerged in the U.S. Despite being on the top in almost every related index, the U.S. may not be a best practice country at all, bearing in mind a recent study published in the OPUS Journal of Society Research. The study evaluated Donald Trump’s role of digital diplomacy on Twitter, who was the 45th President of the U.S. and showed that this tweets push the boundaries of diplomatic language by sometimes being sarcastic and insulting. Therefore, the researchers argued that Donald Trump can be called a Digital Diplomacy irony (Değirmenci and Terzioğlu, 2022, p. 503).

When researched in detail, it can be observed that countries other than the U.S. have taken innovative steps regarding Digital Diplomacy. Interestingly these countries are not even ranked in the top ten of the indexes. One of the best justifications for this claim is the fact that the first Digital Diplomacy activities in Second Life were also realized by the Maldives and Sweden when they became the first countries to open virtual embassies. Thus, the straightforward logic

that countries ranking high on indexes should also be the ones that have best practices is not working. Getting rid of this assumption and examining current implementations regarding Digital Diplomacy, it is apparent that no one-size-fits-all methodology can be applied. Therefore every state should develop unique policies and pursue their own national strategies.

The Israeli Foreign Ministry's efforts can be considered an interesting case. Due to the ongoing Israel-Palestinian conflict, Israel tries to normalize and re-establish their relations with its neighbors in the Middle East. Since they are mostly Arabic speaking countries, Israel tries to cultivate a positive image in its neighboring geography by implementing digital diplomacy via social media accounts in Arabic. An important proof that Israel puts much emphasis on Digital Diplomacy is that the first international conference regarding Digital Diplomacy was hosted by the Tel Aviv University in 2016, long before other countries even heard about the concept (Tel Aviv University, 2016). It is also known that the Israeli Foreign Ministry has a department that is solely responsible for Digital Diplomacy (Egash, 2019). Some studies even take Israel as a case study and observe how successful Israel will be using Digital Diplomacy as a public diplomacy tool. Noteworthy is that Israel also does not rank high in indexes evaluating the success of Digital Diplomacy or soft power. However, the result of these implementations and activities cannot be observed at the present time. Moreover, Israel does not rank close to Türkiye in the indexes and demographic data does not resemble Türkiye. Thus, Israel was not chosen for this comparative study.

Estonia is another good example regarding Digital Diplomacy. First of all, it has to be underlined that 99% of public services are offered online, except for marriages and divorces. According to the statement of the e-Estonia Briefing Centre, which is promoting the country's know-how and expertise in digital services, it is claimed that Estonia has the world's most advanced digital society and saves over 1400 years of working time annually thanks to this digital infrastructure (e-Estonia, 2022), which ensures an exceptional level of transparency regarding governance as well. This is an incredible success considering that Estonia has just claimed its independence after the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, and was able to build such a great IT infrastructure from scratch. Another impressive achievement is that Estonia is the first state to grant e-Residency to foreign citizens, who are able use the digital services of Estonia since 2014. The efforts of digital transformation in Estonia's government services begin in the 2000s. In 2019 while the pandemic has challenged even the world's most advanced economies in terms of digital infrastructure, Estonia created a state-approved automated Chatbot to provide reliable and accurate information during the COVID-19 pandemic which operated on public websites such as the Ministry of Health etc. According to the Nation Brands

2021 study, Estonia was evaluated as the world's fastest-growing nation brand owing to its digital infrastructure in (Brand Finance, 2021). Therefore, Estonia may serve as a best practice for countries that are still struggling to adjust to the digital sphere.

Switzerland may be considered a good example too, since the Digital Foreign Policy Strategy 2021–2024 was adopted in November 2020 acknowledging digitalization as a thematic priority of Swiss Foreign Policy (Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 2020). With this strategy paper, it was underlined that Switzerland also has interests and values in the digital space, which were defined in this policy document. Four action areas were identified for Switzerland's digital foreign policy which not only includes digital governance but also cybersecurity and digital sovereignty. Under each action some thematic areas were elaborated, highlighting opportunities for Switzerland in the digital sphere (Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 2020). The prominent feature of this policy strategy is the targets, which are based on high expectations. The Digital Foreign Policy Strategy predicts that there is an increasing need for mediators. Based on its current mediator role as a neutral state, it has been aimed to play a key role regarding digital governance and maintain its position as a traditional neutral mediator in digital space as well. According to this goal, it is envisaged that Geneva might become the global center for digital governance. This ambitious target may seem unrealistic at first glance; however Switzerland is one of the countries with the most start-ups in the field of AI. In this sense, Switzerland may be exemplary.

Certainly, U.S., Israel, Estonia and Switzerland are not the only best practice and/or innovative countries. However, these are the most outstanding ones considering their IT infrastructure and their government's emphasis on digital policies, including diplomacy.

2.6. The Future of Digital Diplomacy

As already mentioned the number of internet users is constantly rising. Statistics show that the widespread use of internet changed the people's source of news as well. Especially during and after the years of the COVID-19 pandemic, people shifted away from traditional media sources towards social media. Despite these recent tendencies, there is the problem of the digital divide, which is broadly the problem of inequality accessing the internet. However, this simple definition does not exactly demonstrate the complexity of the term, thus the definition of the OECD seems to be more comprehensive. In OECD's Glossary regarding Statistical Terms, the digital divide is defined as "the gap between individuals, households, businesses and

geographic areas at different socio-economic levels with regard to both their opportunities to access ICTs and to their use of the Internet for a wide variety of activities” (OECD, 2022). Accordingly, it cannot be argued that social media has replaced traditional media for everyone in the world and thus digitalization of all spheres of life is not yet realized. With the solution to the digital divide problem, the orientation towards social media may accelerate even more, which seems to be one of the biggest obstacles getting into the way of Digital Diplomacy. However, the solution may not be as easy as providing internet infrastructure and granting physical access to ICT devices. A study conducted in 2012 revealed that the digital divide has actually shifted from the unequal physical access to computers/ICT devices and the Internet, to inequalities of skills and usage, which is referred as in the Second Level Divide or the Deepening Divide in the literature. The study even argued that the gradual close of the physical access did not solve but only deepened the digital divide problem (Dijk, 2012, p. 71). In the course of time, it is clear that basic level digital skills will be minimum requirement for almost every job and in almost every daily routine. Therefore it is an expected outcome that individuals lacking the chance or resisting to keep pace with the technology will be disadvantaged and excluded from the society.


Despite being a crucial burning issue, the digital divide problem could not be solved up to the present. Unless this gap is closed, it is evident that no rearrangement for the total digitalization of the current world system will be achieved. Some countries seem to be aware of this problem long before and the COVID-19 pandemic have established ministries responsible for digital transformation. For instance Poland has established the Ministry of Digital Affairs in 2015, the Russian Federation established the Ministry of Digital Development, Communications and Mass Media in 2018 and Luxembourg has established the Ministry for Digitalization in December 2018. In near future, remote areas may access to internet via Starlink satellites, owned by the company SpaceX. For instance in 2022, parts of Ukraine was provided free internet by Starlink satellites enabling people, especially the Ukrainian military, to stay connected after Russia's invasion (Kleinman, 2022).

It is beyond dispute that the digital transformation will bring many challenges to governments and shortcomings in this transformation will bring new inequalities instead of well-being. To this end efforts were made by some international organizations too. For example the OECD has started the Going Digital Project in 2017 regarding digital transformation, which continues until today. In 2018, the Secretary-General of the UN assembled a high-level panel about digital cooperation to lay emphasis on cooperation in the digital space among various

public and private actors. Within the scope of the Going Digital Project, an integrated approach for policy making in the digital era called “The Going Digital Integrated Policy Framework” was developed for governments so that resilient policies can be formed. This framework was introduced in March 2019 along with a comprehensive report on going digital. In the report it is argued that a smooth digital transformation that will lead to growth and well-being for governments requires careful policies in seven dimensions. These seven policy dimensions are access, use, innovation, jobs, society, trust and market openness (OECD, 2019, p. 7). However, the digitalization progress has its own pace in every country. Without doubt, the COVID-19 pandemic accelerated the digitalization. Consequently, some countries such as Ukraine and the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago have established Ministries regarding the Digital Transformation. But then again, whether the framework developed by the OECD can be adapted by governments and how smooth the transformation will take place, is not predictable.

Nonetheless, disregarding obstacles about the digital divide and digital transformation, it can be observed that the digitalization continues in every sphere of life with an incredible speed. Insomuch that a digital world referred as the Metaverse is being created. As known, the company Facebook bought Instagram in 2012 and WhatsApp in 2014, which made Facebook own the four most downloaded apps of the decade as seen in Figure 8 (Statista, 2023c).

Figure 8 Most Downloaded Mobile Applications Globally (2022)



Note. From “Most downloaded mobile apps worldwide in 2022” by Statista, 2022.

Later in 2021, Mark Zuckerberg, who is the CEO of the company Facebook, announced that Facebook's company name was changed to Meta and revealed his plans about building a Metaverse. According to Zuckerberg's statement, the company Meta plans to focus on the Metaverse which he described as a computer-generated world where people can carry out daily activities such as shopping online and attending meetings via their avatars (Dwoskin, 2021).

Although the Metaverse is currently in its early stages and its evolution will take time, people show great interest in it. Meetings, events and many organizations are held in Metaverse, including serious ones like a defense industry fair. SAHA Expo will be the world's first defense industry 'Metaverse' Fair, which will be organized after the physical fair at the Istanbul Expo Center in 25-28 October 2022. In the Metaverse version of the Fair, visitors from all over the world can visit the fair with their avatars and examine the projects. (TRT Haber, 2022a) Organized by the company BITES, which meets the software-based needs of different sectors, especially the Turkish defense industry, Metaverse is not a new concept. Having organized a virtual fair in 2020 and a hybrid fair in 2021 for the defense industry, the company even introduced a virtual and hybrid exhibition system called "MiliVerse" in a NATO conference held an online and physical (TRT Haber, 2022b). As a company leading the way in Türkiye for the Metaverse, BITES is also conducting pioneering research and development studies. Moreover, the Directorate of Communications (DoC) affiliated to the Presidency of Türkiye became the first public institution in the Metaverse, by launching a Meta Office as of May, 9 2023 (T.C. Cumhurbaşkanlığı İletişim Başkanlığı, 2023). In this sense, it can be argued that Türkiye will take active role in the future developments regarding the Metaverse since first time events and organizations are pioneered by Türkiye. In fact Akıllı argues that Metaverse may become a virtual world where the Turkic States might achieve a digital integration by forming a unique world Turkoverse (Akıllı, 2022b). Whether these or new technological breakthroughs will have an effect on Türkiye's conduct of Digital Diplomacy will become clear in time.

Other than organizing and participating in events, people even invest in the Metaverse by purchasing land or NFT's with crypto currencies, which are means of digital payment outside of conventional financial institutions (Merriam-Webster, 2022b). At present, purchasing digital goods on a digital platform via digital payment may seem a bit futuristic or science fiction because some businesses still only accept cash payments. However, it has to be mentioned that there were some news about the famous global coffee chain Starbucks, that their shops in the UK will become cashless as of October 2022. This news spread on social media so fast, that a great reaction started against the coffee chain with the hashtag #BoycottStarbucks on Twitter.

Soon, Starbucks had to make a statement on Twitter to deny to rumors (National World, 2022). The transformation towards a digital world is taking place without a break, but it will still take some time and won't be easy in view of the fact that there will be some challenges and resistance by some groups in the societies. Thus living and conducting Diplomacy in the digital world seems only possible in the remote future.

Another future expectation is the involvement of AI in the diplomatic practices, because AI can provide relevant data faster and more reliable than humans. In the present day, it is possible to use AI systems to evaluate the information in diplomatic negotiations as well. Actually, it is known that China already uses an AI system for diplomatic purposes for several years (AIM, 2018). A study conducted in 2021 by two scientists at the SWP, showed that AI can be used for the purposes of diplomatic negotiations especially for predicting the behavior of states. Yet the research underlines that today's AI systems are still in their earliest stages, because AI systems can provide information faster but the final assessment of that information still requires more extensive practical experience. The study concludes that AI is still often error-prone but can prove useful as a supporting tool during the preparation and conduct of diplomatic negotiations (Stanzel and Voelsen, 2021). According to Manor, AI systems like ChatGPT will be big challenge for diplomats in the future. While ChatGPT might prove useful for gathering and analyzing information for negotiations, it might also be dangerous because the information provided might not be always reliable since ChatGPT also generates false content (Manor, 2023). In the future, it can be expected that AI systems can serve as a practical tool to analyze personality profiles of leaders or negotiators, or generate different scenarios for different decisions. But today's AI systems are not developed enough to replace the judgment of experienced diplomats in the foreseeable future. In conclusion, depending on the pace of this transformation, Digital Diplomacy has to adapt itself so that other means or other platforms will be utilized to access foreign publics.

CHAPTER 3: DIGITAL DIPLOMACY PRACTICES IN GERMANY

This chapter will focus on Digital Diplomacy practices in Germany. But since the main assumption of this dissertation is that Digital Diplomacy is a component of Public Diplomacy, Germany's Public Diplomacy approach will be elaborated in the first place. To this end, the institutional structure in Germany will be examined, so that the role of all institutions involved in Public Diplomacy can be understood. Thus, key actors formulating and exercising German Public Diplomacy will be presented. Lastly, Germany's Digital Diplomacy approach and the involvement of all actors involved in German Digital Diplomacy will be elaborated.

3.1. German Public Diplomacy Approach - An Overview

Germany has a very long history of Public Diplomacy, but the term Public Diplomacy was included to the German political language rather recently (Zöllner, 2020, p. 255). The verbatim translation of Public Diplomacy to German is "*Öffentliche Diplomatie*". However, this concept is not commonly used because Foreign Culture and Education Policy (*Auswärtige Kultur- und Bildungspolitik*) is preferred. Although the Federal Foreign Office occasionally uses the English concept Public Diplomacy as well, it is not commonly used (Zöllner, 2020, p. 255). Initially, Public Diplomacy was called Foreign Cultural Policy (*Auswärtige Kulturpolitik*) in the German literature, because cultural enlargement was accepted as the first stage of political enlargement. Thus, the German Empire began to compete to spread its national culture internationally. In addition, efforts were made to strengthen the ties of Germans living abroad with their fatherland. These efforts were not only strategic but also institutional which started in the 1800s, at a time that can be considered quite early compared to other countries. For example the forerunner institution of today's German Archaeological Institute called "Istituto di corrispondenza archeologica" was established in Rome in 1829 (DAI, 2019). The institute's activities were financially supported by the Prussian state from 1859 onwards and ultimately moved to Berlin in 1932 (Bahar, 2020, p. 228). In fact, Germany's Foreign Cultural Policy activities were largely financed by private actors until the 1870s, but with the establishment of the Federal Foreign Office in 1871, the government began to finance them as well (Auer and

Srugies, 2013, p. 19). However, although the source of funding became predominantly public, private actors have not disappeared and have maintained their importance in supporting cultural and political activities. Public Diplomacy activities abroad were coordinated by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, i.e. the Federal Foreign Office.

There was an increase in efforts to use soft power during the First World War, as most governments set up offices to propagate their cause. For example, the U.S. not only established its own office, but also became a target for other countries. For instance Britain and Germany competed to make a positive impression and influence the public in the U.S. positively before entering the war.

After the First World War, Germany lost one-seventh of its territory and one-tenth of its population and became thus an isolated state. Therefore Foreign Cultural Policy activities targeting Germans abroad became even more important. The most important goal for the Department of Cultural within the Federal Foreign Office, which was established in 1920, was to provide cultural support to the German minority abroad (Grolig and Schlageter, 2007, p. 549). In this period, propaganda used during the wartimes was replaced by a more refined and open foreign policy approach under the leadership of Gustav Stresemann, who was the Chancellor and the Minister of Foreign Affairs during that period. Stresemann accomplished his goal to reintegrate Germany into the international community when Germany has been granted membership of the League of Nations in 1926 (Auer and Srugies, 2013, p. 20). Most of the actors playing a key role in German Public Diplomacy today were also established in this period. These institutions, which are referred as cultural intermediary institutions (*Mittlerorganisationen*) in the German literature, will be discussed in detail in this chapter.

It is known that German Diplomacy approach was based on civilian means to secure peace after the Second World War. In fact it can be argued that Germany had to adopt some principles after several foreign policy decisions which had consequences. Some of those foreign policy principles can be identified as never being alone again (*niemals wieder allein*), using civil power (*Zivilmacht*), never genocide again (*nie wieder Auschwitz*) and definitive preference for peaceful means (*unbedingte Bevorzugung friedlicher Mittel*) (Beck et al, 2008). Another claim is asserted by Ischinger and Bunde, who argue that German politicians tried to broaden the range of instruments and invested in crisis prevention after the experiences with the Balkan Wars in the 1990s (Ischinger and Bunde, 2015, p.321). In any case, it can be inferred that Germany regarded Public Diplomacy more significant since the 1940s.

But some scholars argue that Germany's Foreign Cultural Policy of transformed fundamentally with the strategy paper "Konzeption 2000" in the year 2000, because, Foreign Cultural Policy was linked with several other foreign policy objectives such as peacekeeping for the first time (Magdowski, 2005, p. 59). Grolig and Schlageter argue that Germany finally bid farewell to the logic of the Cold War and took its present form with the publication of this strategy (Grolig and Schlageter, 2007, p. 550). Based on the new strategic vision accepted with the strategy paper "Konzeption 2000", the structure of German Public Diplomacy changed as well when the Federal Foreign Office renamed its Department of Culture as the Department for Foreign Culture and Education Policy in order to make it visible that the education sector is also included in its cultural policy budget (Deutscher Bundestag, 2007, p.3). After 2001, the concept Foreign Cultural Policy became widely used as Foreign Culture and Education Policy (*Auswärtige Kultur- und Bildungspolitik*). While some sources have translated this concept as Public Diplomacy, others have interpreted it as Cultural Diplomacy. To avoid confusion and ensure consistency, this study will refer to the German concept "Foreign Culture and Education Policy" as German Public Diplomacy.

The enlargement of the scope of the concept can also be considered a turning point in German Public Diplomacy. However, the most fundamental change happened in 2003, when the Foreign Department of the Press and the Information Office within the German Federal Government were merged. This decision enabled the institutionalization of German Public Diplomacy as well, because the new Federal Press Office could provide coherent and frequent information to both domestic and foreign publics in a more professional manner. Since 2003, the Federal Press Office provides daily information about the policies of the Federal Government, which is responsible for formulating German Public Diplomacy (Bundesregierung, 2022).

But according to Auer and Srugies, German Public Diplomacy actually transformed after the attacks of 9/11 in 2001 and in 2004 after the EU had its greatest enlargement. The main reasons of this argument are based on the fact that Muslim countries were added to the center of focus after 2001, and European integration became more crucial after 2004 (Auer and Srugies, 2013, pp. 24-30). Moreover, Auer and Srugies claim that Germany discovered that messages and cultures can only be transferred to the foreign public only if they also show an interest in them based on previous experiences when Germany found itself in isolation due to aggressive foreign policy approaches in the past (Auer and Srugies, 2013, p. 25). This argument can be accepted, considering the transformation in today's German Public Diplomacy.

Especially new topics involved in German Public Diplomacy such as human rights support this argument.

Weigel describes current German Public Diplomacy as regulatory and based on fundamental rights-oriented principles, thus it is argued that other concepts such as soft power originating from Cold War period do not reconcile with the German concept Foreign Culture and Education Policy (Weigel, 2019, p. 23). Today, the Federal Foreign Office considers Public Diplomacy as one of the three pillars of German Foreign Policy defining it as the basis for good international relations and creation of mutual understanding via culture and education (Auswärtiges Amt, 2021). In fact, former Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier stated in a speech held in 2016 that “Foreign Culture and Education Policy, is not a nice add-on but an indispensable part of German Foreign Policy” (Federal Foreign Office, 2016). Moreover, the Federal Foreign Office perceives Public Diplomacy as a part of the German peace policy as well (Auswärtiges Amt, 2021). Wood argues that German Public Diplomacy assumes that people would increasingly have favorable opinions about Germany when they are more informed and get interested (Wood, 2017).

However, an overall Public Diplomacy approach or strategy in Germany has not been determined yet. Auer and Srugies argue that the network for German Public Diplomacy is loose and the center is the Federal Foreign Office which coordinates the activities of the actors based on the law of the Foreign Service (Auer and Srugies, 2013, p. 28).

3.2. The Institutional Structure of German Public Diplomacy

The strategic framework for Public Diplomacy is set out by the German Federal Government (Auswärtiges Amt, 2021). Regular annual reports about Public Diplomacy activities are presented by the Federal Government since 1994, based on the call of the German National Parliament called *Bundestag* to the Federal Government to submit annual status reports in its resolution of 15 June 1994. These reports present an overview of the Public Diplomacy activities in Germany, which also prove themselves as very valuable resources for this study. The *Bundestag* also coordinates Public Diplomacy activities since the set-up of an inquiry commission in 1973. This task is pretty important because there are many and diverse actors operating in this policy area, thus their coordination is especially important. Moreover, there is a sub-committee operating under the Foreign Affairs Committee within the German *Bundestag*, issues related to those policies are regularly negotiated. This sub-committee has

currently 9 members, who represent different political parties in the German Bundestag (Deutscher Bundestag, 2022).

Public Diplomacy is conducted by the Federal Foreign Office with the help of partner or intermediary organizations. It is usually argued that the institutions of government are no longer credible in the eye of the public because of their propaganda and the relationships they build. Germany seems to be aware of this prejudgment, because independent private organizations supported by government funds assume responsibility for many of German Public Diplomacy initiatives.

According to the statement of the Federal Foreign Office, the significant intermediary institutions are the Goethe-Institute, the German Academic Exchange Service, the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, the Institute for Foreign Cultural Relations, the Federal Office of Administration – Central Agency for Schools Abroad, the Educational Exchange Service, the German Commission for UNESCO, the German Archaeological Institute, the Federal Institute for Vocational Education and Training and the Haus der Kulturen der Welt (Auswärtiges Amt, 2021). These intermediary institutions execute the strategic decisions regarding Public Diplomacy.

Considering that the Federal Government is responsible for formulating German Public Diplomacy, this section will not include the role of political parties' own foundations abroad and focus only on the historical background, structure and actions of the intermediary organizations. One exception to this limitation is however the SWP, which is a research-oriented think-tank organization funded by under the budget of the German Federal Chancellery (SWP, 2023).

Moreover it has to be mentioned that annual reports about German Public Diplomacy presented by the German Federal Government include a comprehensive list of intermediary and partner organizations. This list is updated in each annual report.

3.2.1. The Goethe Institute

After the Department of Culture was established at the Federal Foreign Office in Munich in 1919, German Academy was founded in 1925 as an independent institution with the task of preserving the language and transmitting culture of Germany abroad. In 1932, an institution dedicated to the further education of foreign German Linguists in Germany was established under the name of the Goethe Institute. Later, the German Academy was banned in 1945 due

to its instrumentalization by National Socialism (Denscheilmann, 2013, p. 119). The current Goethe Institute was actually (re)established in 1951, independently of the government as a non-profit association in Munich as the successor to the German Academy. The Goethe Institute initially offered German language courses in Germany to foreign German teachers, but its scope has expanded over time. In 1952 the first branch of the institute was established abroad in Athens, which is the first institute established outside of Germany and also among the oldest foreign foundations in the world. In 1953 the first German language courses for foreign teachers started in Bad Reichenhall, Murnau and Kochel (Goethe Institut, 2023a), which were intentionally chosen cities for being small and quiet, to convey a positive image regarding post-war Germany.

The Federal Foreign Office also established cultural institutes abroad from 1955 onwards, but these institutions were gradually transferred to the Goethe Institute from 1959. In 1969, the first framework agreement on cooperation between the Goethe Institute and the Federal Foreign Office was signed. In the following years the framework agreements were renewed. In fact, these framework agreements can be regarded as the primary difference from other actors, which gives the Goethe Institute to the authority to carry out Public Diplomacy activities as an intermediary institution.

Today, the Goethe Institute is the largest intermediary institution carrying out Public Diplomacy with its huge worldwide network. Although the branches are mainly concentrated in European countries, the Goethe Institute is present in all continents except Antarctica. As of 2020, there are 158 branches in total, out of which only 12 are located in Germany. The other branches are located in 98 different countries (Goethe Institut, 2022a). Considering that the Federal Foreign Office has 227 German missions abroad, the number of Goethe Institutes all over the world is very remarkable. Moreover, The Goethe-Institute works closely with numerous other institutions in Germany and abroad. The institute has cooperation-agreements with similar institutions of other countries namely, the British Council, Instituto Camões and Instituto Cervantes which additionally enhances the Institutes network.

The Goethe Institute is largely funded by annual contributions from the Federal Foreign Office. About a third of Goethe Institute's revenue is financed by the income from language courses and examination fees. But the institute also receives funds from the EU, some Ministries in the Federal States, private German or foreign companies and foundations (Goethe Institut, 2023b). The main task of the Goethe Institute today can be summarized as being responsible for promoting the German language abroad, maintaining international cultural cooperation and

conveying a contemporary and comprehensive image of Germany. The institute carries out its tasks on its own responsibility, which are regularly reported to the Federal Foreign Office.

3.2.2. German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD)

The German Academic Exchange Service, which is shortly referred and known as DAAD, is the association of higher education institutions and their student bodies founded in 1925 (DAAD, 2023a). DAAD grants scholarships, promotes German universities and research organizations abroad, with the objective to reinforce studies about Germany. Moreover DAAD serves as a National Agency for EU Higher Education Cooperation and regularly awards prizes for outstanding achievements (DAAD, 2023b). On its website DAAD describes itself as the world's largest organization that provides funds for international students and researcher exchange (DAAD, 2023a). The main difference of this institution from regular institutions awarding grants is that it is internationally funded by several distinct institutions. Among those institutions are the Federal Foreign Office, other federal ministries, the EU, enterprises, organizations and foreign governments (DAAD, 2023b). Thus, although it is a German institute, DAAD not only promotes German interests but also European interests throughout the world.

According to country statistics published by DAAD has supported 69.822 grantees were supported from other countries and 71.051 grantees from Germany so far (DAAD, 2023c). According a research conducted by DAAD evaluating the number of reenrollments of international students, Germany is the 4th most popular country to study as of 2023, right after the U.S., the United Kingdom (UK) and Australia (DAAD, 2023d, p. 7). Beyond any doubt, scholarships provided by DAAD have an influence on this result, because the popularity of German education institutions abroad has also a positive impact on the overall reputation of Germany.

3.2.3. Alexander von Humboldt Foundation

Although the current Alexander von Humboldt Foundation was founded in 1945, its history dates back to the 1800s, because its predecessor institutions were founded in 1860 and 1925

(Impekoven, 2013). The foundation was named after the German nature researcher and explorer Alexander von Humboldt, who was such an influential public figure in the world that some natural science disciplines regard him as their founder. The main mission of the foundation is to support qualified academic researchers with scholarships and create a global network to promote Germany's science system abroad. It is aimed to strengthen Germany's international cooperation through academic relations and science. Therefore, the foundations mission and strategy is closely related to German Public Diplomacy (Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung, 2023a).

Different than other foundations which provide scholarship, Alexander von Humboldt Foundation supports their scholarship holders for their entire lifetime. Therefore, slogans such as "Once a Humboldtian, always a Humboldtian" exist (Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung, 2023a) and being a part of this foundation, is regarded as prestigious among scholars. It is stated that more than 30.000 researchers worldwide are registered in the network of the foundation. Examining the current sponsorship recipients and alumni, it can be noted that they are from all over the world about 140 countries, including 61 Nobel Laureates (Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung, 2023b). Another distinct feature of this foundation is the fact that there are Ambassador Scientists working for the foundation abroad, which function as a contact person.

3.2.4. Central Agency for Schools Abroad (ZfA)

The Central Agency for Schools Abroad (*Die Zentralstelle für das Auslandsschulwesen*), shortly referred as ZfA, is an institution which manages and supports schools abroad in the name of the Federal Foreign Office and has a significant role in foreign education policies. Although German schools abroad were initially intended to provide education to German children living abroad, the schools are also open to pupils of non-German origin from host countries as well. The ZfA also not only manages schools abroad financially and organizationally, but also provides teachers. According to data provided by the Federal Foreign Office in 2020, 140 German schools are providing education in 72 countries to approximate 85.000 students, out of which only 25.000 are German (Federal Foreign Office, 2020). In addition, it is stated that 1100 local schools across the globe offer German as a foreign language and can award language certificates as well(Federal Foreign Office, 2020). However, neither

the Federal Foreign Office nor the ZfA did publish updated data about these schools since 2020 (ZfA, 2022).

In 2008, "Schools: Partners for the Future" shortly known as PASCH was built by the Federal Foreign Office to connect these schools and ease their coordination. PASCH is a great network incorporating the ZfA, Goethe-Institute, the DAAD and the Educational Exchange Service (Federal Foreign Office, 2020). And the main goals of the PASCH initiative was set as arousing worldwide interest for Germany and the German language targeting especially young people (Federal Foreign Office, 2020). With the law titled German Schools Abroad Act which came into force in January 2014, these schools were enabled to receive funds from Germany enabling the ZfA to support those schools not only in administrative and educational subjects, but also financially (Federal Foreign Office, 2020). With this strengthened network, the Federal Foreign Office has reached a great potential to attract young prodigies and a chance to encourage them to study in Germany and eventually migrate to Germany.

3.2.5. German Archaeological Institute (DAI)

The German Archaeological Institute (Deutsches Archäologisches Institut, DAI) is an exceptional institution playing its role for Public Diplomacy. The institute has a deep- rooted past dating back to the year 1829, when it was founded in Rome under the name “Istituto di corrispondenza archeologica” (Institute for Archaeological Correspondence) as a privately founded institute under the patronage of the Crown Prince of Prussia. Considering that the founders of scientific archaeology were German historians and archaeologists such as Johann Winckelmann and Heinrich Schliemann, the interest of Germans for archaeology and other cultures is beyond dispute. Daniel argues that archaeology begins in the 18th century with the excavation of archeological sites in Italy, therefore it is not a surprise that the institution was founded in Rome (Daniel, 2022). As early as 1874, the Institute for Archaeological Correspondence, which is the predecessor of the current DAI, became a part of the Foreign Ministry changing its status to a public institute. Currently DAI is an l institution funded mainly by the Federal Foreign Office and has a global presence with its headquarters in Berlin (DAI, 2023a).

The tasks and goals of the DAI are worldwide related to archaeological research, protection of cultural heritage and identity in the host and partner countries, provision of appropriate infrastructures that are available to international science such as libraries, promotion and development of international scientific relationships and promotion of young talent. Through

these tasks, DAI contributes to German Public Diplomacy over the centuries. DAI is a unique Public Diplomacy actor, which has not many counterparts in other countries. Cull, argues that the relation between archeology and international relations is actually unfamiliar in IR (Cull, 2013b). Yet, Germans knew the importance of this link as early as the 1800s, which is noteworthy.

3.2.6. Deutsche Welle (DW)

Deutsche Welle (DW) was founded in 1953 as a radio channel, in order to erase Germany's deteriorating reputation due to Adolf Hitler and to inform its citizens correctly. Later in 1992 television channels were added to its radio broadcast. Today, DW is Germany's international broadcaster and has broadcast on several languages. DW has an interesting legal status; it is organized independently of the state and is independent in its programming. However, Deutsche Welle is has a hybrid status because it is a non-profit institution under public law and belongs to the family of public broadcasters. Together with the state broadcasters and Deutschlandradio, it forms the ARD, which is one of the state televisions of Germany. Unlike ARD stations and ZDF, it is not financed from broadcasting contributions, but from taxes. The financing comes primarily from the budget of the Commissioner for Culture and the Media, but also to a lesser extent from grants from the Federal Foreign Office and the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. Moreover, DW has an academy named the DW Akademie, which is a centre of excellence for education and communication of knowledge.

3.2.7. Haus der Kulturen der Welt (HKW)

Haus der Kulturen der Welt (HKW), that can be translated as the House of Cultures of the World was founded in 1989. Its building is the Congress Hall, which was intended as an icon of liberty in Berlin serves as a venue for international meetings such as exhibitions festivals etc. (HKW, 2023). On first sight, the HKW may not seem to be a Public Diplomacy actor, because it does not resemble other partner institutions that develop policies or studies. But, since HKW is an institution that promotes Germany's cultural and art related values, it is understandable

how it contributes to Germany's overall image abroad. Thus, the Federal Foreign Office lists HKW among its partner institutions for Public Diplomacy. HKW offers reading materials in simplified language and guided tours for visitors, especially students.

3.2.8. German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ)

The German Agency for International Cooperation (*Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH*), shortly known as the GIZ, was founded in 2011 with the merge of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit GmbH founded in 1975, the Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst GmbH founded in 1963 and the Internationale Weiterbildung und Entwicklung GmbH founded in 2002. Accordingly, although the GIZ legally exists since 2011, it can be argued that the company has experience for over 50 years due to the know-how of the predecessor institutions. GIZ is a private company owned by the German Federal State, which offers service in several issues for not only governments, but also private companies, foundations and international organizations. In addition, the GIZ supports the German Federal Government in achieving development goals in line with German Development Policy. Moreover, GIZ promotes international cooperation for sustainable development and international educational work (GIZ, 2023). Therefore, GIZ works mostly for the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), but is also working in close cooperation with other government institutions such as the Federal Foreign Office. At the local level, GIZ is also working with federal states and local authorities. As of 2023, GIZ is working in around 120 countries worldwide. The GIZ not only promotes Germany internationally, it also conducts studies assessing Germany's image by conducting interviews to find out how perceptions about Germany are in cooperation with DAAD and the Goethe Institute.

3.3. German Digital Diplomacy Approach

Since Germany is a federal republic with sixteen states (*Bundesländer*), the governance system is too much fragmented. At the local level, the states have their own state governments which execute their own state duties. Each federal state has its own parliament and the right to independently determine some issues such as education among those e-government services as well. Similarly, municipalities also have the right of independent administration in local issues,

based on the Article 28 II of the German constitutional law (Wittkemper and Kleindiek, 2003, p. 125). Considering there are approximately 14.000 municipalities in Germany in total, the coordination of the sixteen federal states and the municipalities at national level is formidable. Bartholomae et al. also confirm that the federal political structure of Germany can be regarded as a significant feature negatively affecting the coordination for the development of an e-government system, because it requires additional effort to achieve a comprehensive success (Bartholomae et al., 2023).

Even so, the German state was able to coordinate digitalization efforts at the national level quite early. Germany began its digitalization in 1997, with the ratification of the law on electronic signatures, which was actually a part of the Information and Communication Services Act, which provided the legal basis for different types of online services and transactions. Following this Act, a Memorandum on e-government, was published in the year 2000 (Winkel, 2007). Subsequently in March 2001, www.bund.de was launched, offering online services provided by the Federal Ministry of the Interior and Homeland. In May 2001, the Federal Office for Information Security published a Handbook for eGovernment, as a reference book about on information regarding eGovernment developments. The eGovernment services and digitalization in the public sector began this way.

Shortly after in November 2001, the initiative “BundOnline 2005” was accepted by the German Cabinet to build an integrated legal framework, preventing the enforcement of an e-government system to local administrations and federal states (Wittkemper and Kleindiek, 2003). After setting set goals to be reached until the year 2005 with “BundOnline 2005” initiative, the Inter-Länder Agreement entered into force in April 2010, providing a legal foundation for the utilization of ICT in federal and state administrations (European Commission, 2016, p.19).

In 2013 an act to promote electronic government was published on Federal Law Gazette, which enabled federal, state and local authorities to provide online administrative services (The Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community, 2023). In August 2014, the Federal Government adopted the "Digital Agenda 2014-2017", which defined the milestones regarding Germany's Digital Policy based on three core goals. These goals were growth and employment, access and participation, and trust and security (Bundesregierung, 2014). On 26 April 2017, the Federal Government presented a report regarding the implementation of the Digital Agenda, outlining the progress achieved on digital policy in the last three years. According to the findings of the report it was concluded that Germany is well-prepared for the digital future in most areas (Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action, 2023). In addition to

the Digital Agenda, the Federal Ministry of Economics and Energy presented the “Digital Strategy 2025” in 2016, which described important measures and instruments in order to successfully shape the digital transformation in Germany (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Klimaschutz, 2016).

Moreover, the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy which was later renamed as the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action has published a green paper online to encourage a wide scaled consultation process. As a result, a white paper was published which defines a digital policy, emphasizing fair competition in the digital world, protecting people’s personal rights and protecting data sovereignty (Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action, 2023).

Besides, during the G20 presidency of Germany, the first Digital Ministers’ Meeting between G20 countries was organized in Düsseldorf on 6–7 April 2017 discussing a roadmap regarding policies for a digital future (Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action, 2017). Later in October 2017, the G20 member states, OECD, the ITU, the World Bank, the IMF and UNCTAD convened in Hamburg to debate the implementation of the Roadmap (Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action, 2017).

After a while, not only the transformation of government services but also the design of AI systems became the center of focus. In 2017, the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) launched an online platform for the designing of self-learning systems for the benefit of society. The platform was created based on the suggestion of Acatech, which is the German National Academy of Science and Engineering funded by the Federal Government and the Länder. This attempt was of critical importance since Germany clearly expressed their ambition to pioneer its role in the field of development of AI systems along with China and U.S. (KI Strategie Deutschland, 2023). Based on this mentality, Germany launched its National Artificial Intelligence Strategy in 2018, which was jointly developed by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research, the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, and the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. In March 2020, an AI Observatory was launched as a project of the think tank Digitale Arbeitsgesellschaft and has since initiated and implemented a large number of projects throughout Germany and internationally (KI-Observatorium, 2023).

Soon after, the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic revealed that there is still the need for further transformation. Today the digital infrastructure, transformation and policies regarding those issues in Germany are under the responsibility of the Federal Ministry for Digital and Transport. However, digitalization is regarded as a horizontal task on which all federal ministries should be working together.

The Digital Strategy of the German Federal Government, which was approved on 31 August 2022, forms the current common framework for digital policy priorities and goals for all ministries. The digital strategy contains 24 fields of action in three major fields: "Networked society", "Innovative economy" and "Digital state". In this Digital Strategy, the Federal Government has formulated a digital progress with measurable goals up to the year 2030. Also the website <https://digitalstrategie-deutschland.de> has been created to illustrate goals and fields of action. Each federal ministry is responsible for the digitalization in its own areas, but the progress is monitored by a joint committee chaired by the Federal Ministry for Digital and Transport (Digitalstrategie Deutschland, 2022).

As expected, the Federal Foreign Office is the main actor developing policies and conducting Digital Diplomacy on behalf of the German state. In the Digital Strategy document, it is stated that Germany is pursuing an active digital foreign policy and that it is targeted to present a strategy for international digital policy by the year 2025 (Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, 2016, p. 50). But specifically the term Digital Diplomacy has not been mentioned in the document. However, the Federal Foreign Office set 17 strategic goals that will until 2027, categorized under the headings "Data and knowledge", "Staff", "Processes and organization" and "Tools and infrastructure". Moreover, since every Federal Ministry has contributed at least one lighthouse project to the Digital Strategy, the Federal Foreign Office also has some projects involved. One of them is a platform that was developed for classified inter-ministerial communication with a highly secure digital data exchange system called the R-VSK. It is planned that this platform will also be used to exchange information with international organizations called I-VSK and private companies with severe data protection requirements called F-VSK. Moreover, it is planned to set up a Data Embassy outside Germany, protected by a treaty under international law in case any emergency situations will be faced. In addition, the platform PLAIN which was developed by the Federal Foreign Office to securely process and analyze large quantities of data was announced with the Digital Strategy. It is planned to be put into service to the entire federal administration by the year 2025. Lastly, the Consular Services Portal was announced as a part of the Digital Strategy. The main goal of offering online consular services is defined as enabling the application of skilled workers from abroad for visas online by the year 2025 (Auswärtiges Amt, 2022).

With regard to diplomatic services, Germany began to issue biometric passports called "ePass" since November 2005, and second-generation ePassports chip since November 2007 (European Commission, 2015, pp. 15-16). Although these developments show that the Federal Foreign Office began the transformation electronic passports quite early, it can be argued that

Germany has been late regarding online consular services. As of July 2022, the pilot phase of the German Consular Services Portal was activated to submit online applications and upload supporting documents for the EU Blue Card. However, only the applications at Germany's missions in Belgrade, Kolkata and São Paulo are being accepted online. Although the online application option will save a lot of time, the confirmation of identity, the taking of photographs and fingerprints and the payment of the processing fee has to be accomplished at the mission in person for legal reasons. It is planned that the pilot phase for online passport applications for German citizens will also begin at the end of 2022. As a result, it can be seen that the Digital Strategy of the German Federal Government contains important goals for the Federal Foreign Office regarding digitalization, including the digitalization of Diplomacy.

Although the online consular services are very limited, the Federal Foreign Office has developed in 2023 a free mobile application "Sicher Reisen" meaning travel safely to offer online information German citizens might need for a safe trip abroad. Besides providing general information about customs, health etc. in the country of destination, users who allow the application to track their location, can automatically receive push notifications if the travel and safety advisory changes in that country. Moreover, some sections of the application can be used offline, which is very advantageous for people who don't have access to internet abroad while travelling (Federal Foreign Office, 2023).

But other than Germany's own policies regarding digital strategy and digital diplomacy, EU's policies and decisions are also influential. For instance in February 2015, Council Conclusions on Cyber Diplomacy were adopted by the Council of the European Union stressing the need for developing a common EU approach for Cyber Diplomacy and the emphasizing importance of internet governance (Council of the European Union, 2015). In October 2018, European Parliament and of the Council of the European Union adopted the Regulation (EU) 2018/1724 to establish a common digital gateway comprised of a network of national portals, facilitating the comprehension of rules and procedures regarding business, for EU citizens and businesses especially for those operating in another EU member country (European Commission, 2022). The main aim was expressed as saving companies' time, over € 11 billion per year and boosting cross-border activity which would eventually enable to establish a digital single market. The gateway has been established with the name Your Europe enabling the access to some of the 21 services articulated in the above mentioned regulation since December 2020. However, it is envisaged that all 21 services will be available by the end of 2023 (European Commission, 2022).

So since the EU seemed to focus on the economic dimension of digitalization and no further action was taken regarding Digital or Cyber Diplomacy, Germany has developed and presented a Non-paper during its term Presidency in the Council of the European Union between 01.07.2020 and 01.01.2021, containing suggestions about EU Cyber Diplomacy along with Estonia, France, Poland, Portugal and Slovenia. Despite this non-paper only includes suggestions about the digital sovereignty of the EU and proposes some measures against possible cyber-attacks to the EU (Auswärtiges Amt, 2020), it is an important indicator to demonstrate that Germany takes action on an individual basis and collective basis as a founding member of the EU. Another similar action was taken in October 2023, when Germany launched an initiative called “Innovation Club” in cooperation with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to formulate new proposals for a common European digitalization policy (Federal Ministry for Digital and Transport, 2023).

Regarding EU’s own efforts on Digital Diplomacy specifically, the Council of the European Union later approved conclusions about EU’s Digital Diplomacy in July 2022, which will be influential on EU member countries to adopt a more concerted approach. The approved conclusions are an indication of commitment by the EU members that Digital Diplomacy will become an essential part of the EU’s foreign policy (Council of the European Union, 2022, pp. 1-2). This means that it is agreed that future Digital Diplomacy actions of EU Member countries will be more harmonic.

The German Government states in its Digital Strategy that Germany is taking part in EU’s digitalization projects, for example the EU Global Gateway Initiative (Digitalstrategie Deutschland, 2022, p. 50). Even though common efforts and joint documents regarding Digital Policy and Digital Diplomacy, the EU has also agreed several other issues that still need to be taken action such as the joint policies about security or foreign policy. Besides, the final decision-making institution for a foreign policy decision is the European Council and these require the consensus of every EU member. For this reason, it can clearly be observed that EU member countries can’t always agree on foreign policy decisions. Thus, the course of events for a common Digital Diplomacy approach does not seem very feasible.

Barker asserts that Europe needs a common digital foreign policy. Barker argues that the EU should draft a "Digital Grand Strategy", similar to the EU's Global Strategy to analyze its existing capacities and goals. In addition Barker suggests that the EU should set up a Digital Diplomacy Network. However, he also admits that it is not easy to bring into practice, because member States still treat new technologies as a national matter because they fight against European control when they see their own industrial base under attack (Barker, 2020).

Regarding the fight against disinformation in the digital space, the Federal Foreign Office states that Germany is coordinating efforts with its partners in the EU, referring to the Communication released by the European Commission on 26 April 2018 (EUR-Lex, 2018), however since the action plan against disinformation was adopted in December 2018 and the Rapid Alert System provides alerts on disinformation campaigns and facilitates coordinated response as of March 2019, not much progress has been achieved. Thus, the Federal Foreign Office seems to rely more on its own strategic communication and network.

3.4. German Digital Diplomacy Practices

The first step of digitalization regarding Diplomacy in Germany can be regarded as the establishment of the official website of the Federal Foreign Office, which is available in seven languages as of October 2023. Besides the official website, the Federal Foreign Office owns a website <https://rumoursaboutgermany.info/>, since 2015 to counter rumors and disinformation regarding potential and current migrants. This is a very crucial measure, because there are attempts to damage the national image of countries by deliberately disseminating false information. To overcome this challenge, the Federal Foreign Office uses strategic communication since mid-2016 and defines the objective of this approach as the regular delivery of trustworthy news which articulates foreign policy interests of Germany far and wide, including the digital sphere. This work is done by the global network of the representations of Germany abroad, and five Regional centers that communicate German foreign policy on social media in Dakar, Cairo, Mexico, Pretoria and Singapore (Auswärtiges Amt, 2023a). In addition, the Federal Foreign Office cooperates with Deutsche Welle and various other media partners and civil society organizations (Auswärtiges Amt, 2023a).

In Germany, the Public Diplomacy activities in general are being reported each year by the Federal Government. The report of the German Federal Government on German Public Diplomacy for the year 2020 includes important information on the digitization of German Public Diplomacy and the catalyst for digital change in German Public Diplomacy was defined as the pandemic, which further accelerated the already largely digitized structures well (Bundesregierung, 2021). Moreover, digitization was defined as an integral part of culture and education, which was stated as the justification of its promotion in other areas as well (Bundesregierung, 2021, pp. 93,94). Thus, it would not be false to claim that the emphasis on digitization of German Public Diplomacy shows up in the year 2020. Another motive of this

claim is Germany's membership to the Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence (GPAI) within the OECD as a founding member along with 13 countries and the EU in June 2020. Being one of the founding members of the world's first multilateral multi-stakeholder forum that has a permanent focus on AI can be considered an important step for German Digital Diplomacy (Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action, 2020).

Examining the Public Diplomacy activities conducted in 2021, published in the latest in December 2022, it is prominent that activities were still influenced by the COVID-19 pandemic to a large extent, similar to the year 2020. The report underlined that the Russo-Ukrainian War has influenced German foreign cultural and educational policy, i.e. Public Diplomacy too much, insofar that the focus will be changed in accordance with the new geopolitical changes (Deutscher Bundestag, 2022). Therefore, an increase in digital diplomacy initiatives can be expected in the upcoming years in the affected regions.

With the strategies and policies mentioned in the previous sections, Germany conducts Digital Diplomacy through social media, internet websites, portals and other online services. The Federal Foreign Office has presence on almost all social media platforms, especially active are their official Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube and Telegram accounts. But users can also access Podcasts via SoundCloud, Spotify, iTunes and RSS-Feed. On Twitter, the Federal Foreign Office manages two accounts. The account @GermanyDiplo is available in English and the account @AuswaertigesAmt is available in German language. On Facebook, only one page is active in German language titled "Auswärtiges Amt". Similarly the Instagram account is also only available in German language titled "auswaertigesamt". But the YouTube account titled "GermanyDiplo" is only available in English language, where the clips shared are supported with subtitles in the related languages. Moreover, the Federal Foreign Office has an account on Mastodon, which is a German social network similar to Twitter founded in 2016 (Mastodon, 2023) and Bluesky, which is a new social network founded by a former Twitter CEO in 2023. Although Mastodon is not very popular compared to other social networks and Bluesky is in its Beta version as of October 2023, the Federal Foreign Office has obtained accounts. This is an important indicator showing the importance attached to new developments regarding social networks.

Along with the multiple official social media accounts of the Federal Foreign Office, most of the units within the Ministry and officials have Twitter, Instagram and LinkedIn accounts. Also all German missions abroad have their own social media accounts, mostly mentioning or reposting news from the official social media accounts of the Federal Foreign Office and informing about local matters. The social media accounts of German missions abroad is

published as a list on the website of the Federal Foreign Office where it can be observed that some missions are more actively engaged on social media while others have only one account either on Twitter or Facebook (Federal Foreign Office, 2022). There is no clear pattern why this is the case, but it can be presumed that smaller countries where not many missions are located have only one account, whereas in countries where more missions are present such as the U.S., the social media accounts are multiple on almost every platform. However, the reason why the mission in Uganda has preferred to manage only a Facebook account, whereas the mission in Sudan only manages a Twitter account is unknown. The variance may be related to the personal preference of a decision maker or the common usage of the related social media platform in the respective country. But this shows that there is no uniform policy about social media accounts.

The Federal Foreign Office also conducts Public Diplomacy within its initiative “Außenpolitik Live” meaning Foreign Policy Live. With diverse formats, the Federal Foreign Office tries to attract the interest of the public to foreign policy matters and enables them to interact by giving people the chance to ask questions and discuss about foreign policy. By offer various dialogue formats for interaction, the Federal Foreign Office gives ordinary people the chance to get involved in foreign policy and voice their opinions.

One of those formats is “Diplomacy in Dialogue”, which involves meetings to answer questions of the public whether on YouTube, on Twitch or in a town face to face. The Federal Foreign Office states that these meetings are being organized since October 2016, which have taken place more than 150 times whether online or face to face nationwide (Auswärtiges Amt, 2023b). Another format is the Diplomacy Meets School program, which offers young pupils the opportunity to discuss current foreign policy issues and challenges with employees of the Federal Foreign Office. The events can take place both face to face or hybrid via a video conferencing platform (Auswärtiges Amt, 2023c). By meeting diplomats, young pupils can get to know the job description of a diplomat better and maybe organize their career paths within this direction. It is an excellent way to motivate children to create awareness regarding foreign policy matters Especially after the COVID-19 pandemic most of these formats take place online, thus these efforts can be included to Digital Diplomacy activities of the Federal Foreign Office.

Another format is the podcast titled "podcast from the post", which is accessible on the platforms SoundCloud, Spotify, iTunes, RSS feed. In these podcasts, hosts are talking to guests about up-to-date topics and challenges for German foreign policy and the Federal Foreign Office.

The most interesting and innovative format within the Foreign Policy Live initiative is the free mobile game “Pathways – Europe at Your Fingertips” available since July 2020, created on the occasion of the German EU Council Presidency. The mobile game’s main theme is about following the stories of five persons from Germany, France, Poland, Greece and Bulgaria. While their stories are taking place across Europe they are also intertwined by coincidence. Through following the stories of these persons, topics such as climate change, EU research projects, freedom of movement, the social and cultural diversity of Europe and social and economic change in Eastern Europe are also touched upon. The game is available in English, German, French, Italian, Spanish, Polish, Romanian, Hungarian, Greek and Bulgarian. Moreover, additional material was uploaded to the website of the Federal Foreign Office for teachers lecturing about the EU to enable them using the game in school lessons. The material is aimed at ages 14 to 18 and can be used in politics, history, social studies and English classes (Auswärtiges Amt, 2023d). The release of a free mobile game by the Federal Foreign Office is an indicator that shows the youth is the most important target audience in its Public Diplomacy. Because there are certain studies, which found out that gamification is an effective tool for teaching. Especially Grand Strategy games were regarded as effective alternative to traditional learning tools to learn about Diplomacy and the IR discipline (Loban, 2017). Cercel’s study, which involved the design of a role play game to practically test the effectiveness of games in IR and Diplomacy issues demonstrated that students can better grasp and use concepts with this empirical learning method (Cercel, 2022). Thus, the decision of the Federal Foreign Office to bring game elements into serious international relations matters was correct for attracting the attention of young people. According to data published in June 2022 by the German Games Industry Association, six out of every ten Germans equaling to 59% between the ages 6 to 69, are playing PC, console or mobile games (The German Games Industry Association, 2022). Considering that more than half of Germans play games regularly or occasionally, games can be reasonable tools to convey messages or values. The Federal Foreign Office organized in 2021, their first international "Gamejam", in cooperation with the Federal Agency for Civic Education. At the Gamejam organization, over 60 participants from over 30 countries met digitally to develop ideas together to incorporate the 17 sustainability goals of the UN into a computer game form. During the event, participants also had the opportunity to discuss their ideas with the German Deputy Ambassador to the UN and with other representatives of the UN (Auswärtiges Amt, 2023d). These activities are unique examples of Digital Diplomacy, which we cannot see in any other European state

Besides, the Federal Press Office also shares information every day with the public via their social media accounts. Moreover the website www.bundesregierung.de available in German, English and French and the website www.bundeskanzler.de available in German and in English also shares current affairs with the international and national audience.

In addition, some internet portals have been created to promote Germany abroad. The official internet portal created for Germany www.deutschland.de, was developed in 2002 as a project, initiated by the Press and Information Office of the Federal Government. The website was re-launched in 2012 and is managed by a private company in cooperation with the Federal Foreign Office so that Germany's has an international presence online (Wissen.de, 2022). While official country websites in other EU member states such as France or Italy are offering information for touristic purposes, the website www.deutschland.de has been designed to offer information in a wide spectrum ranging from politics and energy policy in 10 languages, namely German, English, French, Spanish, Portuguese, Polish, Turkish, Russian, Chinese, and Arabic (Deutschland.de, 2023). A similar website is www.tatsachen-ueber-deutschland.de, which also offers wide range of information on several topics in Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Portuguese, Russian and Spanish, provided by a private company in cooperation with the Federal Foreign Office (Facts about Germany, 2023). Additionally Germany's image in the world is further improved by other government initiatives. For example the German National Tourist Board (GNTB), which is an association supported by the Federal Ministry of Economics and Climate Action, operates internationally in the name of the German Federal Government to promote Germany as a travel destination since its foundation on 1948 (Die Deutsche Zentrale für Tourismus, 2022). The GNTB's duty to promote Germany, also takes place online via some websites. While the website www.germany.travel promotes Germany by informing about tourism opportunities, the website <https://open-data-germany.org/> provides tourism data to secure Germany as a tourism location and help digitalization in the tourism industry.

To attract skilled labour from abroad by informing about immigration to Germany and offering help and consultancy regarding visa, living and working in Germany, the multilingual website www.make-it-in-germany.com was developed by the Federal German Government in 2012 (Make it in Germany, 2022). Since the main purpose is to appeal qualified workers from all around the world to Germany, the website also tries to demonstrate a positive image of Germany.

In addition, Germany took other steps regarding digitalization under the guidance of the EU. For instance an online library was established to digitalize German cultural heritage, pioneered by the European Digital Library project called Europeana. After the launch of the prototype of

Europeana online on 20 November 2008, Germany took concrete steps to digitize German cultural heritage as well. In 2009, the German Federal Government, the Federal States and municipal authorities signed an administrative and financial agreement in order to establish a digital library. As a result, a beta version of the Deutsche Digitale Bibliothek (DDB) was launched in 2012 and switched to its full version after some improvements in 2014 (Deutsche Digitale Bibliothek, 2023). In 2018, the Federal Government and the Federal States decided to finance the DDB on a permanent basis and as of July 2023, the DDB offers about 50 million digitized cultural works such as books, films and documents along with three additional portals for newspapers, archive records and collections from colonial contexts (Deutsche Digitale Bibliothek, 2023).

In addition to the Europeana project, another incentive of the EU is the Digital Decade Policy Programme 2030 which defines several goals to be reached until the year 2030. One of those goals is to digitalize key public services in EU member countries by 100% (European Commission, 2023a). In the Digital Decade Country Report for the year 2023, Germany's overall performance regarding those targets was evaluated and it was revealed that results of the indicators about digital skills, digital transformation of businesses, public services and infrastructure in Germany are mostly slightly above the EU average and still need further improvement (European Commission, 2023b). The main reason for this outcome was Germany's performance in the Digital Economy and Society Index (DESI), which is an index prepared by the European Commission that measures the progress of digitalization in EU members since 2014 (European Commission, 2023c). In this sense, either by projects or by its indexes, the EU can be considered an important catalyzer for the digital transformation of its members including Germany.

Besides Digital Diplomacy efforts of German government agencies mentioned above, also some intermediary organizations presented in the previous sections are also very influential. Not all Public Diplomacy actors are involved in Digital Diplomacy; however most of them contribute to the overall positive outcome.

One of the most key actors in German Public Diplomacy is without a doubt the Goethe Institute, because learning a new language is not only limited to learning vocabulary and grammar, but also includes values, behavioral norms and cultural knowledge as argued by Lehmann, former president of the Goethe Institute (Lehmann, 2017). Examining the Annual Report 2021/22 of the Goethe Institute, it can clearly be seen that around 80% of events took place either online or with a digital share. This means that almost all Public Diplomacy activities conducted by the Goethe Institute were organized in a digital environment. Although this can

be seen as an increase in Digital Diplomacy practices of the institute, it is mostly related with the restrictions and lockdown precautions due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Because providing language training, which is the main activity of the Institute, was also realized mostly online. The annual report states that there was 45 % increase in visits to the Institute's digital learning platform compared to the previous year. With 13 million visits, the Moodle platform became the Goethe-Institutes most frequently visited website (Goethe Institute, 2022, p. 33). The Goethe Institute has official Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, Twitter and even a TikTok account. Each of those accounts has significant amount of followers. Moreover, each of the 158 branches has their own social media accounts as well. Thus, the Institute is actively contributing to Digital Diplomacy efforts.

DAI is another important actor which actively contributes to both Public Diplomacy and Digital Diplomacy. The distinct feature of DAI is that they offer multiple digital services promoting digital research. DAI began to digitize its photo archives in the 1990s, which was followed by a systemic digitization and a digitization strategy developed in 2017 upon the recommendation of the Science Council of Germany (DAI, 2023b). Today, the iDAI.world became a digital platform that provides a research environment in archaeology and other related academic fields thanks to its digitized archive and publications. For instance photographic and excavation archives on most excavations undertaken since the 19th century can be accessed online. These archives contribute profoundly to the preservation of world heritage, considering that these data may not be accessible even in the countries where the excavations had been done. For instance the ancient city Palmyra in Syria has been damaged by the ISIS, but the photo archive of the DAI preserved at least some the Syrian cultural heritage. Another example may be project for the digitalization of Sudan's cultural heritage, funded under the Cultural Preservation Programme of the Federal Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt, 2019). Within the scope of this project DAI has digitalized the archive of the German architect and building researcher Friedrich W. Hinkel, which contains valuable information about more than 14.000 archaeological and historical sites in Sudan making it one of the greatest digital cultural collections in the world (DAI, 2023c).

Although DAAD, the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation and the ZfA are important intermediary institutions that positively promote Germany in terms of education, higher education and science, they are not directly involved in Digital Diplomacy. Among the important Public Diplomacy actors mentioned above, only those which have online resources and are active on social media can be deemed active contributors to Digital Diplomacy. For instance DIA offers several digital publications and e-research reports about latest excavation

results. Moreover, a magazine titled “Archaeology Worldwide” addressing the general public is published. The HKW also offers online resources and information on its website in the section Mediathek. Since 2007, videos, audios, documents and pictures can be accessed online which can be browsed by year, project or tag.



CHAPTER 4: DIGITAL DIPLOMACY PRACTICES IN TÜRKİYE

This chapter will focus on Digital Diplomacy practices in Türkiye. But since the main argument of this study is that Digital Diplomacy is a tool of Public Diplomacy, Türkiye's Public Diplomacy approach will be elaborated in the first place. Moreover, actors involved in Turkish Public Diplomacy will be presented, so that their contributions to Digital Diplomacy can become clear.

4.1. Turkish Public Diplomacy Approach- An Overview

Türkiye has a great legacy of statecraft and Diplomacy, considering the Asian Hun State is established around 200 BC or the Göktürk State was founded in 552 (T.C. Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı, 2023). Against popular wisdom, Turkish history begins not with the Ottoman Empire in 1299 or the Republic of Türkiye in 1923. However in the modern sense of Diplomacy, we can argue that Turkish Diplomacy has its roots on the traditions of the Ottoman Empire dating back to the 1700s.

However, this thesis is comparing the Digital Diplomacy practices of the modern day Germany and Türkiye, therefore this section only focuses on the Public Diplomacy practices of the Republic of Türkiye and begins with the year 1920. The main reason why the commencement year was chosen as 1920 is that even committees named “İrşad Encümeni” were established to inform and persuade the public about the course of events right after the foundation of the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye in 1920. To found institutions like İrşad Encümeni even in the years of National Struggle is proof that Türkiye puts emphasis on Public Diplomacy since its very beginning. These institutions existed even 3 years before the sovereignty of Republic of Türkiye was internationally recognized as the successor of the Ottoman Empire. However, there are some scholars who argue that Türkiye focused on Public Diplomacy in the modern sense and as a state policy for the first time in the 2000s. For instance Ekşi criticizes Türkiye for not having a rooted Public Diplomacy culture and argues that Türkiye still needs time for to have a culture of Public Diplomacy (Ekşi, 2016). But historical evidence shows that both the intellectual roots and the institutional structure of Turkish Public

Diplomacy go back much earlier. Examining the course Public Diplomacy in Türkiye, it is obvious that soft power activities of Türkiye including Public Diplomacy were intensified after the Cold War. Especially the independence of Turkic countries which were part of the former USSR was the main focus. Thus institutionalization and coordination of the Public Diplomacy activities was required. The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA) established in 1992, due to this necessity (TİKA, 2023).

Hemery argues that Türkiye has taken important steps with the adoption of some laws and regulations which are inspiring greater transparency in all ministries, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Hemery, 2005, p. 198). The most important legal basis for this argument is the Public Financial Management and Control Law numbered 5018 adopted on 10.12.2003, which obliges all public institutions to provide accountability and transparency to citizens (Kırılmaz and Atak, 2015, p. 200). The new approach, which is more sensitive to the demands of the public, has indeed placed trust among the domestic and foreign public.

Institutionally, it was noted that new public institutions for Public Diplomacy were established after 2010. For instance in January 2010, the Coordinating Office of Public Diplomacy operating under the Prime Ministry was established along with the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB) in April 2010 (YTB, 2023a). With the establishment of the Presidential Government System in Türkiye in 2018, all communication activities were consolidated under the DoC, which is among the newest institutions of Türkiye.

To identify the current Public Diplomacy Approach of Türkiye, several policy documents that reveal policy preferences of the Turkish public administration like government programs, development plans, annual programs, strategic plans of public institutions and thematic strategy and action plans have been examined. Especially Development Plans prepared for five year periods in collaboration with public institutions and organizations provide a set of policies that will guide all institutions in determining their priorities in the preparation of other policy documents and strategic plans.

In the Eleventh Development Plan, covering the years 2019 to 2023, it is indicated that Public and Cultural Diplomacy activities will be intensified in order to increase Türkiye's international visibility and strengthen its image, and the theses and policy preferences of Türkiye in the national and international arena will be effectively conveyed to the foreign public within the framework of strategic communication (T.C. Cumhurbaşkanlığı Strateji ve Bütçe Başkanlığı, 2019). Thus, it can be argued that Public Diplomacy is of vital importance for Turkish Foreign Policy. Another key indicator is the strategic objective to increase the visibility and effectiveness of Türkiye in the field of Public Diplomacy defined in the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs' first strategic plan covering the period of 2019-2023 (T. C. Dışışleri Bakanlığı, 2019, p. 2). It is stated that the strategic objectives have been determined according to results of a situation analysis conducted in line with the mission and vision of the Ministry, which set 16 targets and 29 performance indicators under those strategic objectives (T. C. Dışışleri Bakanlığı, 2019, p. 2). Furthermore, in accordance with the Eleventh Development Plan "The National Public Diplomacy Strategy Document and Action Plan" was introduced in July 2021, which is the first policy document regarding Public Diplomacy in Türkiye (T. C. Cumhurbaşkanlığı İletişim Başkanlığı, 2022b). The Strategy and Action Plan comprised of 22 strategy documents and action plans, was prepared under the coordination of the DoC after several committee meetings with 61 different institutions and organizations. In line with the set objectives, a Public Diplomacy Coordination System (KADIS) was established ensuring the efficiency of Public Diplomacy activities carried out by different ministries, institutions and organizations and 26 Public Diplomacy committees categorized according to topics (T. C. Cumhurbaşkanlığı İletişim Başkanlığı, 2022b).

In terms of nation branding, several attempts have been done so far. Although nation branding activities of Türkiye date back to the 2000s, the principal focus was on tourism, investment and export (Balçiner, 2019, p. 76). The most important nation branding initiatives were "Turkey Home" campaign launched in 2014 and the "Turkey: discover the potential" campaign launched in 2015. Nevertheless, the promotion of both campaigns was not as successful as expected due to lack of strategic approach and coordination. In 2017, The Turkish Promotion Group (TTG) was established operating under the umbrella of the Turkish Exporters Assembly (TIM) to implement a comprehensive and regular communication strategy. However, the activities of the TTG only concentrated on the increase of exports by enhancing the image of the Türkiye in world markets and achieving a positive perception for Turkish goods, based on a regulation published on 12.08.2017 in the Official Gazette.

Thus, an integrated campaign that will ensure the successful and adequate promotion of Türkiye especially on digital platforms was still needed. Moreover the negative connotation of the word "Turkey" in English, which brings to mind failure or the bird species, has been considered an important obstacle to reflect Türkiye's positive values on its country brand. In this context, the Presidential Circular dated 4 December 2021 and numbered 31679 regarding the use of "Türkiye" instead of Turkey in the international arena and in the correspondence with states and international institutions, organizations and as well as on exported products was an important first step. To further strengthen Türkiye's new national brand attempt and reputation, the DoC has launched the communication campaign in January 2022 called "Hello Türkiye"

and established the Türkiye Brand Office to coordinate all efforts in May 2022 (Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye Directorate of Communications, 2023). In addition, a guide has been published by the DoC and shared with all public institutions in Türkiye to ensure coordination and the unity of discourse. All websites and social media accounts of public institutions were updated accordingly. Internet and Social media played a particular important role for this campaign, because all promotional videos were shared online and influential social media users sloganizing Hello Türkiye supported the campaign. As of June 2022, Turkey's country name has been officially changed to Türkiye at the UN as well (Birleşmiş Milletler Türkiye, 2022).

Most recently in the end of 2022, a new vision was developed by the presidency of Türkiye titled “the Century of Türkiye”. Due to the 100th anniversary of the Republic of Türkiye in 2023, and the 500th anniversary of the foundation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, new targets have been set for the new century of the Turkish Republic. To promote the Türkiye century vision, the website <https://turkiyeyuzyili.com> has been launched where projects have been described in detail. This vision is also supported by the new Türkiye brand, which was also referred in the paragraph above.

4.2. Institutional Structure of Turkish Public Diplomacy

The main actor developing and conducting Public Diplomacy in Türkiye is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs established in 1923. According to the Presidential Decree No.1 published in the official gazette in 2018, the planning and the execution of Public Diplomacy activities in cooperation with other institutions is mentioned among the duties of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (T.C. Cumhurbaşkanlığı Mevzuat Bilgi Sistemi, 2018). In addition to the central organization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its missions abroad, the Diplomacy Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, contributes greatly to Public Diplomacy and the correct promotion of Türkiye because training programs are organized for foreign diplomats invited from all around the world to Türkiye since 1992. These multinational and multicultural programs arouse great interest and contribute to the visibility and prestige of Türkiye.

Another important actor is the DoC operating under the Presidency of Türkiye established in 2018. In addition, TİKA and YTB mentioned in the previous section profoundly contribute to the Public Diplomacy efforts in Türkiye. Beside these public institutions, there are also other actors that are contributing to Türkiye’s Public Diplomacy efforts either directly or indirectly.

For instance Kalın, identifies Kızılay, TRT, the Yunus Emre Foundation and the Agency for Investment and Support¹ among those institutions (Kalın, 2011, p. 21). Although the institutional structure in Türkiye changed after the adoption of the presidential government system in 2018, the institutions involved in Public Diplomacy are still more or less the same. Each of them contribute to the foreign policy objectives of Türkiye through political, diplomatic, economic and cultural activities.

Other than these public institutions, there is also the Institute of Public Diplomacy founded in 2010, within the Turkish Asian Center for Strategic Studies (TASAM) which is a think-tank founded in 2003. Being the only NGO operating in the field of Public Diplomacy, the institute aims to realize Türkiye's soft power and Public Diplomacy potential (Kamu Diplomasisi Enstitüsü, 2022). However, this study does not include the Institute of Public Diplomacy in the research since it is not involved in the policy formation and the conduct of Public Diplomacy directly. In the next section, the actors directly involved in Turkish Public Diplomacy will be presented.

4.2.1. Directorate of Communications (DoC)

The DoC, was founded in 2018 and began to serve according to the Presidential Decree No.14 published on the official gazette dated 24 July 2018 and numbered 30488 (T.C. Cumhurbaşkanlığı İletişim Başkanlığı, 2023a). However, its history dates back to the “Matbuat ve İstihbarat Müdüriyeti Umumisi” founded by the founder of Türkiye, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1920, which was renamed and affiliated to different Ministries during the course of the time several times.² Eventually it was renamed as the Directorate General of Press and Information operating under the Prime Ministry in 1984, which transformed into the DoC with the transition to the presidential government system in 2018. Based on the Presidential Decree No.14 there is a Department of Public Diplomacy operating under the DoC. With the establishment of the DoC, it was aimed to ensure coordination among all institutions and organizations operating independently in the field of Public Diplomacy in Turkey (Çetin, 2022). Considering that the efficiency of Public Diplomacy is also dependent on effective coordination and harmonization

¹After the transition to the Presidential Government System in 2018, the Agency for Investment and Support's name was changed as the Investment Office of the Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye.

²Previously named as "Matbuat Umum Müdürlüğü" in 1933, "Basın Yayın Müdürlüğü" in 1943 and "Basın Yayın ve Turizm Müdürlüğü" in 1949.

of all Public Diplomacy efforts, the task of the DoC is quite critical. The DoC aims to convey a correct image of Türkiye to the foreign public by making use of all the opportunities of communication and using the tools and methods of Public Diplomacy.

Apart from its own tasks, the DoC is also responsible from several other institutions. Anadolu Agency (AA) and the Press Advertisement Institution are affiliated institutions of the DoC, while the Turkish Radio and Television Company (TRT) is a related body. These institutions are also significant Public Diplomacy actors, especially TRT, which will be mentioned in section 4.2.5. The Press Advertisement Institution³ tries to ensure the independency of the press, by regularly inspecting newspapers, news websites and magazines that have the right to publish official announcements and/or advertisements, physically and digitally. In addition the institution enables that official announcements and advertisements reach a larger audience. On the other hand AA was founded as a news agency in 1920 and acquired an autonomous status in 1925, which was even exemplary for Western countries in those years. In the course of the time, AA became a global news agency which globally delivers news in 13 languages with its news centers in more than a hundred countries (Anadolu Ajansı, 2023).

4.2.2. Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA)

Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) was founded in 1992, with the aim of developing strong collaborative ties with especially the Turkic Speaking Republics who gained their independence after the dissolution of the USSR (TIKA, 2023). Since then, the organizational structure and policies of TIKA have undergone several changes. The agency was initially established under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but in 1999 it was attached to the Prime Ministry. In 2011, TIKA's institutional structure was updated and its geographical scope was expanded. After the adoption of the presidential government system in 2018, TIKA was restructured and attached to the Ministry of Culture and Tourism. Today TIKA operates as a public legal entity in 150 countries and has 62 offices in 60 countries (TIKA, 2023). Therefore it can be argued that TIKA transformed into a more extensive institution that undertakes important tasks contributing to Türkiye's Public Diplomacy.

³In Turkish Basın İlan Kurumu.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states on its website that development cooperation is among new priorities in Turkish Foreign Policy because Türkiye has efforts to play a constructive role both in its own region and globally (T.C. Dışışleri Bakanlıđı, 2023a). Thus, the activities of TİKA contribute directly to Turkish Public Diplomacy.

4.2.3. Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB)

It is considered that the power of countries in Public Diplomacy is directly associated with the effectiveness of their Diasporas. Based on this belief, Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB) was founded in 2010 (YTB, 2023a). YTB is among the most significant actors in Türkiye to strengthen the interaction with the Turkish diaspora because it directly targets Turks residing and related communities abroad. To strengthen the ties of Turkish citizens living abroad, several activities are conducted. These activities aim to increase the academic, social and cultural capacities of Turkish citizens living abroad via programs and projects. The most important and most known program of YTB is beyond any doubt, the Türkiye Scholarship Program.

Within the scope of Türkiye Scholarship Program, scholarships are provided to many students every year. Examining the numbers, it can be observed that the number of scholarships provided and the countries of origin profoundly increased over time. While between 1992 and 2011 scholarship students from 136 countries were supported, this number increased to 171 countries in 2022. According to the Annual Report for the year 2022, 165.918 candidates from 171 countries applied for the Türkiye Scholarship Program in 2022 and 4.316 applicants received short or long-term scholarships. Within the scope of the Merit Scholarship Program, 320 scholars received scholarship and 936 Türkiye Scholarship students benefited from the Academic Support Program in 2022 (YTB, 2023b, p. 5). In addition to those scholarship programs, YTB also contributes to institutional cooperation efforts of Türkiye with intergovernmental organizations, such as the Turkic Council and Türksoy.

4.2.4. Yunus Emre Institute (YEI)

Yunus Emre Institute (YEI) was established in 2009, as an affiliated institution of the Yunus Emre Foundation, which is a public foundation established in 2007 (Yunus Emre Enstitüsü,

2023a). The Institute was named after the important Turkish Sufi and poet Yunus Emre, who is a symbol for peace due to his aspiration for humans and humanitarian values. His words are regarded as a common call for peace that brings together the different nations living in Anatolia (Aycil, 2021, p. 167). Thus, Yunus Emre's call for peace and philanthropy matches with the vision of the Institute stated as increasing the number of people who are friendly to Türkiye all over the world. Contrary to popular belief Yunus Emre was not only a Sufi poet filled with love for humanity, his contributions to the Turkish language and literature are profound, considering that the official language in literature, science and foreign correspondence were mainly Persian and Arabic during the Great Seljuk Empire. Until the ruler of the Karamids Mehmet Bey gave an order in 1277 to adopt the Turkish language, Turkish was only used in spoken language. Thus, Yunus Emre's works in Turkish are important so that the use of Turkish in written language became prevalent (Korkmaz, 1973, pp. 16-19). Therefore the choice of Yunus Emre's name was right on target, for an institution operating as a center for teaching Turkish language as well. The YEI, which has currently 85 cultural centers abroad, is giving support to scientific researches, and promoting Türkiye by conducting culture and art activities in addition to teaching Turkish (Yunus Emre Enstitüsü, 2023a). The mission of the institute is defined as enhancing Türkiye's recognition, reliability and reputation in the international arena. To promote Turkish culture and art, the YEI organize various events in its' the cultural centers across the world (Yunus Emre Enstitüsü, 2023b).

4.2.5. Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT)

The Turkish Radio and Television Corporation was established in May 1964 as an autonomous public economic enterprise with legal personality, in order to perform radio and television broadcasts on behalf of the state. However, its history actually dates back to 1920s, when the first radio broadcasts were established in Türkiye. Because when TRT was founded in 1964, all radio broadcast were gathered under the roof of TRT (TRT, 2022). The first TV broadcast of TRT started in 1968. Until 1989, three more TV channels were established, called TRT-2 (1986), TRT-3 (1989) and GAP-TV (1989). In 1990, TRT took a groundbreaking step by establishing the channel TRT 4, which was a formal education channel establishing Türkiye's first distance education system. TRT's first cross-border television channel called TRT-INT began its broadcasting life also in 1990, aiming to strengthen ties with Turkish citizens living in European countries. In line with the developments in the world after the fall

of the iron curtain, the channel TRT-AVRASYA was established in 1993 broadcasting programs for the Caucasus and Central Asian Turkic Republics. In 1999, the official website of TRT <http://www.trt.net.tr> was online giving the chance to access live radio and television broadcasts globally (TRT, 2022).

Over the years TRT expanded abroad not only by establishing channels broadcasting cross border but also establishing offices abroad as well. But the most important expansion happened in January 2010, when TRT bought 15.7 % of the leading news channel Euronews' shares and became its fourth main partner. By becoming one of the shareholders and joining Euronews' supervisory board, TRT aimed to help the EU accession process and contribute to the international promotion of Türkiye. After that agreement, Euronews started broadcasting in Turkish as well along with 8 other languages (Dünya Gazetesi, 2009).

TRT's role became especially crucial during the COVID-19 pandemic, when disinformation became widespread and trustworthy information was of critical importance. In addition to being a reliable news source, TRT became one of the most important actors for remote education in schools as well. The channel TRT Okul, which started broadcasting in 2011, transformed in 2020 into TRT EBA Channels which broadcasted the National Education curriculums of primary, secondary and high schools to students on TV (TRT, 2022).

Today TRT owns 18 TV channels, 17 national, local and international radio channels in total. Moreover, TRT manages four digital news platforms, several mobile applications, the websites trt.net.tr and trt.world.com can be accessed in 41 different languages and publishes five magazines are published both printed and online (TRT, 2022)

Examining the brief history and development process of TRT, it can be concluded that the initial target group broadcasts abroad were Turkish citizens and people with Turkish origins. Later with the establishment of additional channels broadcasting in foreign languages, it is noticed that the Turkic states were prioritized and the global expansion occurred later after 2010. Until today, TRT remains one of the most extensive and trustworthy news sources in Türkiye. Moreover, TRT produces TV series translated into many languages and broadcasted in numerous countries. In addition, events to promote the Turkish cinema industry in the world market are organized. Thus, TRT is a vital partner in terms of Public Diplomacy and Digital Diplomacy. The contributions of TRT to Turkish Digital Diplomacy are of vital importance because broadcasts in multiple languages on several platforms enable to spread of Türkiye's

standpoint and mindset to the world. The wide media network of TRT offers a great opportunity to tackle disinformation and smear campaigns.

4.2.6. Turkish Maarif Foundation (TMF)

Turkish Maarif Foundation (TMF) is a non-profit organization which carries out educational activities abroad on behalf of the Republic of Türkiye in its educational institutions established in June 2016 (Türkiye Maarif Vakfı, 2022). Other than the Ministry of National Education, the TMF is the single institution that is entitled to directly establish an educational institution abroad on behalf of the Republic of Türkiye. These education institutions can be in all levels, ranging from pre-school, primary, secondary and higher education. Moreover, education given in those institutions can be formal and non-formal. Therefore, the foundation owns education institutions at every level and can carry out education activities with the desired method.

Although the establishment of the TMF can be considered very late, TMF is conducting education and trainings in 52 countries with 465 education institutions and 37 student dormitories as of October 2023 (Türkiye Maarif Vakfı, 2023). Despite the institutions of the TMF abroad are conducting education and training activities in 52 countries, the foundation is and is cooperating with 67 countries owing to cooperation protocols (Türkiye Maarif Vakfı, 2023). The foundation aims to deliver training in all over the world, based on shared values of humanity and the ancient Anatolian wisdom tradition. (Türkiye Maarif Vakfı, 2022).

Other than carrying out educational activities, the foundation also publishes Bulletins and Journals, which are also digitally uploaded to its website. All digital publications are free of charge and available on the website of TMF.

4.2.7. Türkiye Diyanet Foundation (TDV)

Founded in March 1975, the Türkiye Diyanet Foundation (TDV) is a private legal entity which supports the activities of the Presidency of Religious Affairs regarding the delivery of religious services to a wider audience at national and international level. The TDV was granted

a tax exemption in 1978 and is entitled to raise donations without permission since 2005 (Türkiye Diyanet Foundation, 2023a). Moreover, the TDV has a cooperation protocol with the Ministry of National Education and therefore is authorized to provide religious education as well. Currently, TDV manages 31 education projects in 15 countries, educating 10.600 students (Türkiye Diyanet Foundation, 2023b). Only with the Ramadan Program 2022, 1.246.436 people from Türkiye and 895.027 people from abroad received aid and 2.15 million people were reached through various donations amounting to 139 million TL (Türkiye Diyanet Foundation, 2023b). Moreover, International Kindness Awards are given to raise awareness about good deeds in the world. Scholarships are offered for national and international students regarding religious education as well. Therefore, the activities of TDV abroad positively contribute to the Public Diplomacy efforts of Türkiye especially in the Muslim populations.

4.3. Turkish Digital Diplomacy Approach

It can be argued that Türkiye has started its digital transformation quite early, compared to other developing countries. The search for policies and strategies regarding the developments in ICT and their effect on life has been on the agenda since the 1990s (T.C. Kalkınma Bakanlığı, 2015, p. 10). The significance of the national information infrastructure was emphasized in 1995, within the scope of the “Breakthrough in Science and Technology Project”. The first steps regarding digitalization have been taken in 1999, with the “Turkish National Information Infrastructure Master Plan” (TUENA) and the “e-Türkiye Initiative Action Plan” prepared in 2000. However, TUENA and e-Türkiye Initiative Action Plan could not be implemented. Nevertheless efforts continued with the “e-Transformation Türkiye” Project, “Short Term Action Plan (2003-2004)”, the “2005 Action Plan” and the “Information Society Strategy and Action Plan (2006-2010)” (T.C. Kalkınma Bakanlığı, 2015, p. 11). These policy documents aimed the modernization in Türkiye’s public administration via ICT.

Moreover the e-Devlet Gateway, which is the portal for e-government services, has been available as of 2008. Since 2008, more public institutions and services were integrated to the portal, so that the system offers thousands of public services. In addition to citizens, foreigners who have a valid residence permit can also to benefit from e-government services. Since the portal has also an English language option, foreigners who do not speak Turkish can also easily access public services (e-Devlet Kapısı, 2023b).

In 2015, the Information Society Strategy and Action Plan covering the years 2015 and 2018 was adopted to further accelerate the digitalization process. In 2018, Türkiye took a step towards institutionalizing its digital transformation by establishing the Digital Transformation Office under the Presidency of Republic of Türkiye, which deals with digital transformation, cyber security, big data and AI issues (T.C. Cumhurbaşkanlığı Dijital Dönüşüm Ofisi, 2023). Thus, it can be argued that efforts regarding digital transformation were gathered under a single roof, solving the problem of coordination of efforts by various institutions. As of 2018, of the Presidency of Republic regularly shares information with via its social media accounts on various networks. In 2019, the management of the e-Government Portal to the Digital Transformation Office, which is developed and operated by Türksat A.Ş., a private entity completely owned by the state (e-Devlet Kapısı, 2023b).

In the Eleventh Development Plan covering the years 2019-2023, digital transformation has been identified among horizontal policy fields (T.C. Cumhurbaşkanlığı Strateji ve Bütçe Başkanlığı, 2019). However, the topic digital transformation was rather considered within industrial policies to support competitive production and efficiency.

Shortly after in September 2019, the Ministry of Industry and Technology adopted the “2023 Industry and Technology Strategy”, which has five main components: "High Technology and Innovation", "Digital Transformation and Industry Move", "Entrepreneurship", "Human Capital" and "Infrastructure" (T.C. Sanayi ve Teknoloji Bakanlığı, 2019, pp. 23-24). Within this strategy paper, the "National Technology Move" approach was introduced, which includes guidelines that aim to improve Türkiye's competitiveness across the globe and safeguard its economic and technological independence. The National Technology Move is based on six main priorities taken into account in all processes from planning to implementation. The first priority is inclusive, holistic and “stakeholder-oriented” approach, which enables the collaboration among industrialists, entrepreneurs, technology-developing scientists and R&D people, as well as public institutions. The second priority is having data-driven, impact-driven and accountable goals so that the results will be made available to the monitoring of the relevant stakeholders and a natural control mechanism will be established. Third priority is developing policies that direct pioneering breakthroughs by closely monitoring the world, so that Türkiye can achieve a leading position in the world. The fourth priority is developing agile, change-oriented and adaptive policies by regularly reviewing and updating strategies through mechanisms where developments in the global arena are closely followed. The fifth priority is the development of policies prioritizing the development of human capital, such as project-oriented early age education in order to create a social structure that will ensure sustainable

development. The sixth and final priority is independence and global competition, where it is emphasized that economic and political independence is only possible with technological independence (T.C. Sanayi ve Teknoloji Bakanlığı, 2019, pp. 23-24).

In line with the “National Technology Move” elaborated above and the “Digital Türkiye” vision, also high-level national policy documents have been published. For instance “National Artificial Intelligence Strategy 2021-2025” has been adopted in August 2021 and the “National Technology Entrepreneurship Strategy” in October 2022. In the National Technology Entrepreneurship Strategy Paper, it has been stated that emerging ecosystems with which Türkiye has good cultural relations are also seen as an important development channel in addition to advanced technology markets. It has been underlined that Public Diplomacy will be used effectively to establish deep cooperation in the geography of influence (T.C. Sanayi ve Teknoloji Bakanlığı, 2022, p. 93). This means that the Ministry of Industry and Technology attaches importance to Public Diplomacy and Digital Diplomacy as well, since it promises hope of advancing technology markets further. In the National Technology Entrepreneurship Strategy Paper, it was also declared that platforms and organizations like TEKNOFEST, which is an Aviation, Space and Technology Festival organized since 2018, will be made more visible in the international arena as a suitable ground for the development of these partnerships (T.C. Sanayi ve Teknoloji Bakanlığı, 2022, p. 93). The significance of TEKNOFEST is that almost all relevant public institutions, private institutions and universities are involved as stakeholders. Another interesting announcement in the strategy paper was the TEKNOVISA Program, which is designed as a special visa application procedure for talents with critical expertise in the field of technology, innovative business models and entrepreneurs with deep technology-based initiatives. It can be argued that with these special visa programs, will be a mechanism that enabling the easier emigration of entrepreneurs to Türkiye. The TEKNOVISA Program can be considered another area of cooperation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Industry and Technology.

The above mentioned developments can be considered enough indication to demonstrate the value given to the digital transformation of Türkiye. But the Digital Transformation Office’s efforts to negotiate with mobile operator companies to implement zero-rating for accessing services given by e-Government Gateway is a whole new incentive. In August 2022, the Head of the Digital Transformation Office made an announcement about e-Government Gateway services, which are going to be data charge-free for mobile users (Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye Digital Transformation Office, 2022a). Thus, it can be concluded that Türkiye places a great value on the digitalization of government services and the easily access of its citizens.

Having briefly presented the general framework regarding digitalization and digital transformation in Türkiye, the Digital Diplomacy dimension will be touched upon. In the Eleventh Development Plan, covering the years 2019 to 2023, it is indicated that Public and Cultural Diplomacy activities will be intensified in order to increase Türkiye's international visibility and strengthen its image, and the theses and policy preferences of Türkiye in the national and international arena will be effectively conveyed to the foreign publics via strategic communication (T.C. Cumhurbaşkanlığı Strateji ve Bütçe Başkanlığı, 2019). Also it is clearly stated that Public Diplomacy activities will be continued to be carried out with traditional and new media tools will be sustained via events such as seminars, conferences and forums. Moreover, it is also mentioned that participation in international events which will have an impact on the international community and contribute to the promotion of Türkiye will be ensured and the effect will be increased by expanding Digital Diplomacy channels (T.C. Cumhurbaşkanlığı Strateji ve Bütçe Başkanlığı, 2019, p. 190).

In the Türkiye Century vision, goals regarding the digitalization and the utilization of digital tools for communications were defined as well. It was emphasized that digital transformation will ensure the equal access of every service provided by the ministries to all citizens, including citizens living abroad. Moreover, the role of communication was emphasized since it was recognized as vital for the success of the ministries by accomplishing their duties. Therefore the importance of domestic and national communication technologies were attributed great importance.

However, despite great interest on digital transformation and Digital Diplomacy, a strategy paper for Digital Diplomacy has not been created yet. For this reason, some scholars criticize Turkish Digital Diplomacy practices as only news sharing on social media rather than conducting Diplomacy (Ekşi, 2015, p. 89). Therefore, there is the urgent need to draft a policy or strategy paper regarding Digital Diplomacy.

4.4. Turkish Digital Diplomacy Practices

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the main actor implementing Digital Diplomacy. The General Directorate of Information Technologies within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is in charge for following the developments in the world regarding digital technologies, digital diplomacy, AI, big data and to carry out infrastructure, software and hardware studies regarding the subjects falling within the scope of the Ministry's duty. However the General Directorate of Information is in charge for the planning and execution of Public Diplomacy activities with the

collaboration of related institutions. Thus, the department in charge of Digital Diplomacy is coordinating with this department in the Ministry.

In addition to the central organization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the missions of the Ministry abroad contribute to the Public Diplomacy activities especially in the field of lobbying and public relations. In addition, interviews given by mission chiefs and officials to the written and visual media are regarded as important opportunities to deliver convenient and reliable message to the foreign public about important issues in Türkiye's foreign policy. These Public Diplomacy activities are conducted in accordance with foreign policy objectives by means of the traditional media, social media and digital communication technologies.

In line with the policies and strategies mentioned in the previous section, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs conducts Digital Diplomacy on several social media networks as well. On Twitter, the Ministry has four official Twitter accounts managed in Arabic, English, French and Turkish which are @TCDisisleri, @MFATurkiye, @MFATurkiyeFR and @MFATurkiyeAR. There are two official Facebook pages of the Ministry, one available in Turkish titled "T.C. Dışışleri Bakanlıđı" and the other available in English titled "Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs". On Instagram, only one account with the user name "tcdisisleri" is available in Turkish. In addition, an official YouTube channel is also (<http://www.youtube.com/user/TCDisisleri>) active where videos in multiple languages particularly in Turkish are posted and live broadcasts are done. Also all Turkish missions abroad have their own social media accounts as well. However, there is no uniform pattern regarding social media accounts. While some missions have created only Facebook accounts, others are active on several other platforms. Thus, it can be inferred that there are no social media guidelines for the missions of the Ministry abroad.

Regarding the provision of information and services, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been benefiting from digital opportunities since 1989, when the consular services provided to Turkish citizens abroad was transferred to the electronic environment with Consular Automation Project. Within the scope of this project the software konsolosluk.net was created, which initially was tested in three pilot Consulate Generals in Europe until it was used in all foreign missions of Türkiye. Examining the activity report of the Ministry for the year 2022, it is seen that more than 3 million transactions were carried out over the "konsolosluk.net" infrastructure in 2022 (T.C. Dışışleri Bakanlıđı, 2023b).

In 1995, the official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was launched (TCDisisleri, 2013). As of October 2023, the official website of the Ministry is available in 10 languages; therefore it can be argued that website has a wide target group. The official websites of other

Ministries of Foreign Affairs are available in five or six languages at the most. Thus, compared with its counterparts the website of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs can be considered more inclusive. According to the activity report of the Ministry for the year 2022, the number of people visiting the website of the Ministry was more than 8 million and the website has been viewed 17.5 million times throughout the year (T.C. Dışışleri Bakanlığı, 2023b, p. 93). The Ministry has been using the document management system BelgeArsiv since 2001, to prepare and send official letters electronically.

Moreover, the Consular Call Center offers consular service to citizens and non-citizens since 2005. In 2022, the Consular Call Center was selected as the world's best call center in the "Best Public Service" category in a competition organized by Contact Center World and won a gold medal (Çetinkaya, 2022). Today, the Consular Call Center provides service in Turkish and seven other languages (English, German, French, Flemish, Italian, Russian and Arabic) 24/7 (T.C. Dışışleri Bakanlığı, 2021, p. 70). In addition, the website www.e-konsolosluk.net has been created in 2006, which transformed later to www.konsolosluk.gov.tr, to offer citizens consular services and enabling them to apply for appointments in the chosen consulate or embassy. The website even provides a list of certified translator and interpreters in the chosen region, videos about consular processes and live support for users having troubles.

In June 2010, second generation e-passports with biometric data began to be used in Türkiye, which eased and shortened passport control durations. And as of April 2013, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs started to use electronic visa (e-Visa) replacing sticker visas which were issued at the border crossings for touristic or commercial visits as of. Since that date, the website www.evisa.gov.tr enables the application and payment for a visa, including its download. E-visa saves a lot of time and money, since application and download of a visa from anywhere with internet connection is possible. The e-visa system received the “eTR Award” in the Government to Citizen e-Service Category in 2013, from the Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSİAD, 2014).

Besides digitalizing its own infrastructure and services, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Türkiye signed Memorandums of Understanding with its counterparts regarding information technologies. For instance in 2013, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed with Afghanistan (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013a), and Somalia (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013b) and in 2014 with Yemen (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014)

In 2014, the Ministry started the Diplomatic Archive Automation Project for digitizing all documents and agreements from 1919 onwards. Since the documents between the years 1919

and 1928 were written in Ottoman Turkish, these documents were not only digitized but also adapted to the Turkish alphabet. A total of 51 million pages of documents were digitized in three stages between the years 2014 and 2018. The fourth stage of the project began in 2019 and is still ongoing. In August 2019 the website <http://www.diad.mfa.gov.tr/> for the digital archive of the Ministry became active. New publications are uploaded to this website as e-books regularly and researchers can examine archive documents and publications by connecting to the State Archives system from this website (T.C. Dışışleri Bakanlıđı, 2022). In 2019, an agreement with Niger was signed for the collaboration regarding information technologies and diplomatic archives (Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye Directorate of Communications, 2022).

Most importantly, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs launched the Digital Diplomacy Initiative in 2019, which can be considered a foresighted step, because most of the other states had to consider Digital Diplomacy options after March 2020 when the COVID-19 was declared a pandemic. The main aim of the Digital Diplomacy initiative was stated as the development of organizational capacity building with the utilization of technologies in all aspects of foreign policy including consular services, Public Diplomacy, and analysis (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2022). This initiative prepared the substructure of a variety of services utilized during the COVID-19 pandemic. Not only the digitalization of services, but also taking advantage of AI and ensuring cyber security was among the objectives. For instance AI was utilized to create a chatbot named “Hızır” that functions with the Web Chat created on the website www.konsolosluk.gov.tr since August 2022. Providing online services with a chatbot functioning with AI is notably innovative, because to this day only a few Ministries of Foreign Affairs have utilized chatbots on their websites such as the Kingdom of Bahrain and Singapore.

In 2021, the first Antalya Diplomacy Forum (ADF) was organized, which can be considered one of the most essential platforms for Türkiye’s Public Diplomacy, because international and local issues are debated with the participation of important figures such as statesmen, diplomats and academicians. In the first organizations some sessions were broadcasted live on the website of the ADF and on social media. Examining the activity report of the Ministry for the year 2021, it can be seen that Public Diplomacy activities have been conducted despite the conditions and restrictions due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Some of those activities had to be organized online or hybrid. For instance the Diplomacy Academy of the Ministry has trained 2901 foreign diplomats in both face-to-face and online (T.C. Dışışleri Bakanlıđı, 2021). Within the scope of the Digital Diplomacy Initiative of the Ministry, a training curriculum has been created and

included in the training programs in 2021. Examining the activity report, it can be noticed that even important events and meetings such as mediation consultations were held online such as the online mediation consultations with the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs held on 28 May 2021 (T.C. Dışışleri Bakanlığı, 2021).

The Digital Diplomacy activities conducted in the 2021 may be seen as necessity related to COVID-19 restrictions and precautions but in the year 2022 the online organizations and frequent posts on social media continued. In fact, even a Memorandum of Understanding was signed with Serbia on cooperation in the field of digital government in September 2022 (Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye Digital Transformation Office, 2022b). Based upon this example, it can be seen that digitization and digital government services can be considered important fields of cooperation in Diplomacy. In 2022, Türkiye became a member of GPAI. As of October 2023, the GPAI has 29 members, including Türkiye (The Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence, 2023).

In addition, a free mobile phone application was developed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2022 as well. The application offers access to recent travel announcements, news and online consular services.

Other than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the DoC is an important actor implementing Digital Diplomacy. In 2020, the DoC prepared the “Social Media User Guide”, with the aim to enable users understand the internet, social media and relevant terms (T.C. Cumhurbaşkanlığı İletişim Başkanlığı, 2020). However sections of the guide not include information about the correct use of social media, but also information regarding perception management and disinformation on social media and relevant legislation. Other than this guide, the DoC has several publication printed and digitally shared on its official website. Moreover, weekly disinformation newsletters are being published to reveal fake news. DoC became the first public institution in the Metaverse, by launching a Meta Office, which is accessible via mobile devices from anywhere in the world, as of May, 9 2023. You will be able to access the Presidency Communications Presidency Meta Office by creating an avatar via the mobile device application. Director of Communications Altun stated that the DoC closely monitors the new information channels that have emerged with the digital transformation and aims to strengthen representation in these channels, and said that the Metaverse, whose steps are being taken today, will undoubtedly be an inseparable part of the lifestyle of the future (T. C. Cumhurbaşkanlığı İletişim Başkanlığı, 2023).

Additionally Türkiye’s image in the world is further improved via other online platforms. For instance the Culture Portal, which is a website active since 2015, offers rich, diverse and

difficult to find information about Türkiye in text, photo, video and audio file formats to its users in an integrated way under a wide range of titles. However the Culture Portal is only available in Turkish. Thus for foreigners who don't know Turkish, another website was created. The website GoTürkiye.com is currently Türkiye's only digital global promotion platform where information highlighting Türkiye's tourism potential. The website is available in 13 languages and social media accounts on Instagram, Facebook, Twitter and YouTube have been created where information is shared constantly.

Besides, the Ministry and the DoC, YTB is also contributing to Digital Diplomacy via its Digital Culture Platform (<https://ytb.gov.tr/dijikup>). The Digital Culture Platform offers a diversity of contents ranging from culture, art, news, videos, podcasts, magazines and infographics since 2022. However, the platform is only available in Turkish language.

The YEI has also a variety of online services that promotes Turkish language and Turkish culture. Besides the online Turkish Learning Portal, several free training materials such as course books, books, guides and videos are uploaded to its website for those who are interested in learning Turkish. In addition, issues of the institute's magazine named ".tr" are published online since 2015.

Although there are many efforts like these, the lack of a systematic strategy for Digital Diplomacy in Türkiye, is a great problem. A study, analyzing official posts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Türkiye on Twitter and the posts against Türkiye during the 44-Day War in Karabakh (2020) showed that the press statements of high-level officials on social media are generally ineffective against smear campaigns and black propaganda (Öztemel, 2021). Thus, a strategic communication policy or digital diplomacy policy paper should be drafted without delay.

CHAPTER 5: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF GERMAN AND TURKISH DIGITAL DIPLOMACY POLICIES AND PRACTICES


This chapter seeks to provide a quantitative comparison between the two countries and analyze the similarities and differences. By this means, it is intended to improve the Digital Diplomacy policies and practices of Türkiye. To this end, the ICT usage in the two countries and the digitalization progress of their governments will be examined. Subsequently, rankings in indexes such as DDI and Soft Power Index and other studies will be presented. Moreover, the national images of the two countries will be compared with the help of relevant indexes and the nation branding attempts will be examined. After this comparison, statistics regarding social media in both countries will be examined in detail, including accounts of relevant institutions and political leaders on social networks. Right after that, the financial comparison of both countries is presented to speculate on the resources allocated to Public Diplomacy. After a general financial comparison of Germany and Türkiye using main economic indicators, the budgets of the relevant Ministries and institutions conducting Digital Diplomacy will be presented. Finally an overall comparison is provided regarding issues that are not categorized in the subtitles of this chapter.

5.1. Comparison of ICT Usage, E-Government Systems and Consular Services

Statista ranks Germany in the 13th place with 77.53 million internet users and Türkiye in the 14th place with 71.38 million internet users in the world, based on their digital population as of January 2023 (Statista, 2023d). Remarkably, while the households with internet access tend to rise in Türkiye, they tend to decrease in Germany. Data for the year 2022 reveals that 94.1% of households had internet access in Türkiye (Statista, 2023e), while this rate was only 91.41 % in Germany (Statista, 2023f).

Regarding time spent using the internet, the Digital 2023: Global Overview Report published by Datareportal states that daily time spent using the internet is above the global average in both countries as seen in Figure 9 (Datareportal, 2023).

Figure 9 Daily Time Spent Using the Internet (January 2023)



Note. Adapted from “Digital 2023: Global Overview Report” by Datareportal, 2023.


Nevertheless, based on these statistics, it can be assumed that the internet access and usage of internet is quite close in Germany and in Türkiye. Similar data is published by the countries’ own statistics offices as well. However, users in Türkiye spent more time using the internet.

Regarding e-government services Türkiye seems to be more advanced and multiple data is available for researchers such as number of services provided or users of the e-government portal. As of October 2023, Türkiye’s e-government portal has 63.995.519 users, who can access 7.419 online services which are provided by public institutions, universities, municipalities, water and sewage administrations and private companies (e-Devlet Kapısı, 2023a). Moreover, the portal has also an English language option so that foreign citizens who have a valid residence permit can also to benefit from e-government services in Türkiye. On the other hand Germany only has the Bundesportal (www.bund.de), which is the federal administration portal offering online services regarding the Federal Ministry of the Interior and Homeland (BMI). Additionally, the website www.behördenfinder.de, which is a central internet platform, directs users to the connected local authorities’ online services. Although the Bundesportal has an English language option, the Authority Finder website is only available in German.

While this is the case regarding e-government services, the results of rankings and indexes are contradictory. For instance the “eGovernment Benchmark”, published by the European

Commission is worth to consider. The index compares governments of 35 states in Europe⁴ regarding the delivery of digital public services on four dimensions and 48 underlying survey questions. Based on this analysis, countries receive an overall eGovernment maturity score between 0 to 100 points (European Comission, 2023a). Thus, the study offers researchers the chance for a detailed and comprehensive comparison. As seen in Figure 10 (European Comission, 2023c), the eGovernment Benchmark for the year 2023 scored the overall eGovernment maturity of Türkiye 81, ranking her in the 10th position; while Germany's overall eGovernment maturity has been scored 65 which is even below the average score 70 and thus positioned in the 21st place among 35 countries evaluated (European Comission, 2023b).

Figure 10 Overall eGovernment Performance of European Countries (biennial average 2021 and 2022)




Note. From “eGovernment Benchmark 2023-Insight Report” by European Comission, 2023.

⁴ These 35 states are comprised of 27 EU member states, 5 candidate states (Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia and Türkiye), and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries (Iceland, Norway and Switzerland), referred shortly as EU27+.


This assessment shows that Türkiye can be deemed more capable in terms of digital infrastructure and services provided in comparison with most European countries. Thus, Digital Diplomacy may also be a field, where Türkiye has a chance to outrival Germany and other countries ranking higher in the soft power indexes. As seen in the Figure 11 (European Comission, 2023d), Figure 12 (European Comission, 2023d) and the Table 3 (European Comission, 2023e) in the following pages, Türkiye's score is higher in three dimensions except the fourth dimension cross-border services where Germany's score is slightly ahead. While the overall score for cross-border services in Germany is 60, Türkiye's overall score for cross-border services is 55. The cross-border services dimension of the eGovernment Benchmark might be interpreted as the most relevant dimension to Digital Diplomacy. Because this dimension assesses countries' capacities regarding the possibility of citizens and entrepreneurs from other European countries accessing and using online information and services. However, considering that EU-citizenship and free movement agreements exist between the EU member countries it is not a surprise that Germany receives a higher score. Türkiye is not part of these agreements as a candidate country and the EU citizenship has no privileged status in Türkiye, since it is considered under the general category foreign or non-Turkish citizens.

Figure 11 Germany's eGovernment Benchmark 2023 Scoring in Detail



Note. From “eGovernment Benchmark 2023-Factsheets”, European Commission, 2023.

Figure 12 Türkiye's eGovernment Benchmark 2023 Scoring in Detail



Note. From “eGovernment Benchmark 2023-Factsheets” by European Commission, 2023.

Table 3 Dimensions of the eGovernment Benchmark 2023- Germany and Türkiye in Comparison

		EU27+ Average [% , 2020 2021]	Germany	Türkiye
User Centricity	Overall Scores	90	91	99
	Online Availability		90	98
	Mobile Friendliness		96	98
	User Support		92	100
Transparency	Overall Scores	62	49	78
	Service Delivery		46	75
	Personal Data		65	78
	Service Design		36	81
Key Enablers	Overall Scores	71	60	93
	eID		53	90
	eDocuments		74	86
	Authentic Sources		43	97
	Digital Post		67	100
Cross-Border Services	Overall Scores	57	60	55
	Online Availability		68	50
	User Support		70	100
	eID		15	4
	eDocuments		56	44
Overall Ranking in the eGovernment Benchmark 2023			21 st Rank	10 th Rank

Note. Adapted from “eGovernment Benchmark 2023-Insight Report” by European Commission, 2023.

Similarly, the Digital Riser Report 2021 prepared by the European Center for Digital Competitiveness, which is a German research center founded at ESCP Europe Business School in Berlin, indicates that Türkiye is more advanced in terms of digitalization, comparing 137 governments’ digital transformation between 2018 and 2020 (European Center for Digital Competitiveness, 2021). The study proves valuable not only for assessment purposes but also to analyze the policy dimension as well, because the countries were ranked according to their digital competitiveness and policies followed. According to the Digital Riser Report 2021,

Türkiye ranks in the 5th position, while Germany is ranked in the 17th position among G20 countries (European Center for Digital Competitiveness, 2021).

Conversely, the “E-Government Development Index (EGDI)” for the year 2022 published by the UN has ranked Germany in the 22nd position, while Türkiye was ranked in the 48th position among 193 UN members (UN, 2022). Within the framework of this analysis four subgroups were identified: low, middle, high and very high. 31% of the UN member states were categorized in the very high EGDI status, 38% were categorized in the high EGDI status, 27% were categorized in the middle EGDI status and 4% were categorized in the low EGDI status (UN DESA, 2022). According to this global evaluation, despite having a great difference in the ranking, Germany and Türkiye are both categorized under the subgroup very high. Moreover, the report of the index especially underlines that the EGDI is only tool for the comparison of e-government progress and minor differences in EGDI scores do not necessarily mean that countries with lower scores were performing worse (UN DESA, 2022).

Considering a more comprehensive ranking that includes business, government and wider society in the compared countries, the situation changes once more. According to the World Digital Competitiveness Ranking for the year 2022 published by the IMD World Competitiveness Center based in Switzerland, Türkiye is ranked in the 54th position, while Germany was ranked in the 19th position out of 64 countries evaluated (IMD World Competitiveness Center, 2023). The ranking is based on the main factors knowledge, technology and future readiness, which are divided in nine sub factors with 54 criteria (IMD World Competitiveness Center, 2023). Examining the reasons for this ranking, it draws the attention that Germany is more advanced on all three main factors. Therefore it can be argued that Germany is more advanced in terms of digital competitiveness and Türkiye has to improve its knowledge, technology and future readiness to receive a higher score.

Consequently, it can be concluded that Türkiye and Germany share similar features regarding internet usage and social media users. Based on the above mentioned international studies and rankings, it was concluded that Türkiye is more developed than Germany in terms of e-government systems, while Germany seems to be ahead in terms of digital competitiveness.

Comparing the digitalization of consular services in both countries, it is evident that Türkiye is clearly more advanced than Germany. The website of the Ministry with ten language options, the Consular Call Center, the website www.konsolosluk.gov.tr offering online consular services, the e-visa system and other innovative methods such as AI generated Chatbots are the justifications for this argument. Because as of October 2023, the Federal Foreign Office’s website offers seven language options, the German Consular Services Portal is in pilot phase,

the application for e-visa is not possible and AI systems are not used for consular services. Moreover, according to the Digital Strategy of the German Federal Government, the main goal of offering online consular services is defined as enabling the online application for visas of skilled workers from abroad by the year 2025. However, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Türkiye has only one mobile phone application, German Federal Foreign Office has two mobile phone applications, one for safe travelling and the other for gamification purposes.

5.2. Comparison of Rankings in Indexes and Studies

As examined in the second chapter in the measurement and efficiency section in detail, there are only two related indexes measuring diplomatic capacities even though not evaluating directly Digital Diplomacy on the large scale. Since these indexes will be insufficient for a thorough comparison, this part will include other indexes and studies to examine German and Turkish practices in detail.

According to the GDI for the year 2021, which is the most recent study, Türkiye ranks in the 5th position while Germany ranks in the 8th position out of 65 evaluated countries and territories (Lowy Institute, 2022).

Table 4 Global Diplomacy Index Indicators

	Global Diplomacy Index Ranking	Embassies/ High Commissions	Consulates/ Consulates General	Permanent Missions	Other Representations	Total Posts
Türkiye	5 th	142	91	11	2	246
Germany	8 th	147	60	11	2	220

Note. Adapted from “Global Diplomacy Index 2021” by Lowy Institute, 2022.

Table 4 (Lowy Institute, 2022) generated using data from the study, illustrates that both countries are quite similar in terms of diplomatic network capacity, but Türkiye has a greater diplomatic network outscoring Germany due to 26 more posts abroad. Since the recent study

for the GDI was conducted for the year 2021, individual research showed that the total posts abroad of Türkiye are 258, and Germany 226 as of October 2023.

On the other hand the Digital Diplomacy Index (DDI) ranks Germany in the 17th position, while ranking Türkiye in the 8th position as of 11.08.2023 (Digital Diplomacy Index, 2023). Since the index is not updated daily as it was claimed, the latest data accessed on 13.10.2023 was from 11.08.2023, therefore this recent data was taken as a reference. Examining the indicators of the index further as shown in Table 5, it can be observed that Türkiye is more advanced in six indicators and on the same level with Germany in one indicator. Germany has only received more score for the diplomatic weight and diplomatic centrality indicators. Getting into detail of the determinants for the diplomatic weight indicator, it can be seen that the score is derived from the number of mentions of Germany by other G20 countries' diplomatic networks. This basically means that Germany was mentioned more often than Germany during the time of the evaluation and does not necessarily mean that Germany has more diplomatic weight. Getting into detail of the determinants for the diplomatic centrality indicator, it can be seen that this indicator is derived from the intersection of the followers of Germany's diplomatic network with other G20 countries' diplomatic networks. This basically means that the followers of Germany's diplomatic network and those of other G20 countries' diplomatic networks overlap more than Türkiye's followers. However, these indicators do not directly demonstrate that Germany has more diplomatic weight and diplomatic centrality. Of course, these facts can also be accepted as indicators, but it seems that they were chosen only to find measurable criteria and don't seem adequate for measuring overall diplomatic weight and centrality. These indicators only prove that Germany is more popular among G20 countries and has a similar target audience with other G20 countries. This is understandable, because the rankings of this index are very up-to-date and since 2022, Türkiye is no longer included in the G20 countries because it dropped to the 21st place among the top 20 economies in 2021 according to IMF data. Instead of Türkiye, Saudi Arabia which was not in the list in 2020 was added to the list of the 20 largest economies in 2021. So it is seems reasonable that the actual status of Türkiye, which is outside of the G20, has also its reflections on Twitter.


Table 5 Digital Diplomacy Index- Key Indicators and Metadata

	Germany	Türkiye	Indicators
Diplomatic Network Reach	7.9	9.35	This indicator is based on the total followers of the diplomatic accounts of each country.
Diplomatic Weight	0	6.06	This indicator is based on the total mentions of a country by other G20 countries' diplomatic networks.
Vocality	6.78	6.78	This Indicator is based on the average daily number of tweets published by a country's diplomatic network.
Message Efficiency	3.52	10	This indicator is based on the average number of likes and retweets per tweet published by a country's diplomatic network.
Global Country Visibility	8.83	8.97	This indicator is based on the total mentions of a country in worldwide Twitter conversations.
Format Proficiency	7.06	9.62	This indicator is based on the ratio of tweets containing visuals or videos in the total number of tweets published by a country's diplomatic network.
Momentum	0	7.07	This indicator is based on the total number of new followers gained by a country's diplomatic network over the last 30 days.
Diplomatic Centrality	9.04	2.5	This indicator is based on the level of overlap between the followers of a country's diplomatic network and those of other G20 countries' diplomatic networks.
Language Diversity	8.37	5.58	This indicator is based on the number of languages used by a country among the 13 main languages of G20 countries.
Total DDI Score	5.34	7.35	
DDI Ranking	17th	8th	

Note. Adapted from “Digital Diplomacy Index” by Reputation Squad, as of 11.08.2023.

While the Table 5 (Digital Diplomacy Index, 2023) illustrates the most recent status of Türkiye and Germany regarding Digital Diplomacy, Figure 13 (Digital Diplomacy Index, 2023) demonstrates the evolution of Türkiye's and Germany's scores between August 2022 and August 2023. Since the DDI starts being conducted in August 2022, data from earlier dates was not available. Trend in the Figure 13 shows that, Germany's DDI scores were higher in the beginning which decreased during the course of the time. On the other hand, Türkiye's trend seems to steadily increase during the course of the time.

Figure 13 Evolution of DDI Index Scores of Türkiye and Germany



Note. Adapted from “Digital Diplomacy Index” by Reputation Squad, as of 11.08.2023.

Despite the DDI's indicators seem flawed, there is no alternative measuring Digital Diplomacy capacity therefore at the same time helpful for comparative studies. To conclude, it can be seen that the rankings in the GDI are very close and the DDI does not necessarily use adequate indicators to measure the Digital Diplomacy success. Moreover, the DDI is limited with G20 countries and cannot provide a global framework. Although these indexes are not comprehensive enough to make a detailed analysis and comparison regarding Turkish and German Digital Diplomacy practices, they are reference points and indicators of the overall performance of both countries. For this reason, although the result do not exactly mean that Türkiye is more successful regarding Digital Diplomacy, data shows that Türkiye's practices are more efficient with regard to outcomes.

However, other studies and indexes can also give clues about the Digital Diplomacy success of Germany and Türkiye. Since there is no index measuring Public Diplomacy, indexes and studies regarding soft power will be utilized as reference points for this comparative study.

Beginning with the “Global Soft Power Index” created by Brand Finance, which is the most comprehensive one comparing 121 countries, Türkiye is ranked in the 23rd position while Germany is ranked in the 3rd position for the year 2023 based on eight dimensions (Brand Finance, 2023a). The “Soft Power 30 Index” developed by Portland presents a similar picture. The report for the year 2019, which is the very latest, ranked Türkiye in the 29th position while Germany is ranked in the 3rd position based on six dimensions (Portland, 2019). Although the reports are published online, the details for the scoring in each category are not revealed. Thus, detailed critique cannot be voiced what global respondents voiced about the countries evaluated. Therefore, the capabilities of Türkiye and Germany cannot be analyzed in detail. Another study called the Soft Power Survey conducted by the Monocle Magazine, ranked Germany in the 3rd position for the years 2023-2024, while Türkiye was ranked among the top 20 for the first time on the 20th position (Monocle, 2023). Given that these indexes are all from a Western viewpoint, the study conducted by the Indian Strategic Studies Forum (ISSF), which is a non-profit Think Tank, may offer another perspective. According to ISSF’s World Soft Power Index for the year 2022, countries were ranked based on ten criteria and Türkiye is not in the top 15. On the other hand Germany is ranked in the 3rd position (Indian Strategic Studies Forum, 2022).

5.3. Comparison of National Images and Nation Branding Attempts

Coming up with an explanation for the huge score gaps between Germany and Türkiye in the soft power indexes is surely not simple. Since an Indocentric Think Tank released a soft power analysis report with a similar outcome, interpretations regarding ranking Türkiye in the lower positions due to being Ethnocentric or Eurocentric does not seem relevant. In that case, another reason has to exist. But Türkiye’s position in the indexes may not be directly be related with inefficient practice of Public Diplomacy, it may also be related with its image, because some scholars argue that Public Diplomacy in its essence image politics (Wood, 2017).

Since the overall image, popularity or prestige of a country may be related with the success of its Public Diplomacy as well indexes regarding nation brands can also give some clues for

this study. Nation branding can be regarded as an important instrument to accumulate soft power. The most important study regarding nation brands is the Anholt-Ipsos Nation Brands Index (NBI), because Anholt also who coined the term “nation brand”. The NBI is generated since 2008 and evaluates each country’s brand image every year based on several dimensions. According to the latest data published for the year 2023, Germany is ranked in the 2nd place out of 60 evaluated countries, while Türkiye is ranked in the 37th place (Ipsos, 2023). According to the NBI, Germany preserved the first position for the eighth time overall and for the sixth year in a row until 2023 (Ipsos, 2022). Examining data that lead this result, it can be observed that global respondents of the study voiced positive opinions about German products, the employability of German people, German sports, and the appeal of investing in German businesses (Ipsos, 2022). However, this result changed in 2023, when Japan took the lead and Germany became second on the index. Based on the fact that Türkiye was ranked in the 37th position, it is clear that Türkiye needs to improve its global status of reputation. But, since the metadata of the global respondents or the scoring in the defined six subcategories is not available for researchers, an analysis regarding the causes of this result cannot be accomplished.

Another study related with countries’ image, namely the “Nation Brands 2023” ranking of the company Brand Finance. While Germany is in the 3rd place among 121 evaluated countries, Türkiye is ranked in the 34th place (Brand Finance, 2023b). Again a detailed report about the reasons of this result is not available for researchers either.

Nevertheless, facts and data about Türkiye’s Public Diplomacy and Humanitarian aid activities abroad show that the results of Nation Brand and Soft Power indexes should be different. Türkiye is one of the largest hosting countries for displaced people and is among the world’s top three of international humanitarian assistance donors (Development Initiatives, 2022, p. 52). Moreover, its rich cultural and historical background is enough reason to attract attention since Türkiye has 18 sites in UNESCO’s World Heritage List. In addition to those sites, 77 more sites from Türkiye are in the Tentative List (UNESCO Türkiye Millî Komisyonu, 2022). Further to that, Türkiye also has good relations with populous related communities abroad. Therefore the reason why Türkiye is not able to reflect these characteristics in the indexes is very fascinating.

In this sense, the efficiency of Public Diplomacy seems to be related with a country’s image much more than its practices. In this context, Germany’s method to erase its negative image from being associated with war crimes and holocaust to be remembered as a well-organized and well-disciplined country that produces high quality products is very exemplary. Furthermore, this was achieved only after 70 years. In this sense, Germany can serve as a best

practice for countries that need to work on their national image, including Türkiye that still cannot display a positive image to the foreign publics despite numerous good causes and no history of colonialism.

It is argued that Germany could succeed in using nation branding to gain soft power due to the effective collaboration among the public and the private sector (Balçınar, 2019, p. 75). The image making attempts of Germany began in 1996, shortly after its reunification. At that time National Socialism was the first thing coming to mind thinking of Germany. German public institutions tried to overcome the negative image of this period by displaying a reunified and vibrant society that is focusing on economic goals to diminish the tension in the neighboring countries (Wood, 2017). The shift of focus from political to economic aims seems to have worked, as we can observe in the indexes regarding national image. For instance the Good Country Index, which compares impression of countries in the world by using several data, ranks Germany in the 3rd place out of 169 countries evaluated while Türkiye is ranked in the 53rd place (The Good Country Index, 2023). In an interview Anholt states that he considers the case of Germany a miracle, because it transformed from probably one of the most despised nations to the one of the most admired nations since 1945 (Anholt, 2021).

Despite having changed its image profoundly into a country attracting great interest, a study conducted in 2020 by the DAAD, GIZ and Goethe Institute shows that events in the German history are still imprinted on the memories. The research worded this incident as follows: “When Germany is thinking about its future, the neighbors are thinking about its past” (DAAD, GIZ, Goethe-Institut e.V., 2021). Despite these negative memories in the foreign public and its shady past, Germany is ranked in the 3rd place. On the other hand, the same index ranks Türkiye in the 53rd position. To get to the bottom of this assessment, the indicators of this index should be elaborated. There are seven categories of evaluation for the index. These are the global contributions of the subject country regarding science and technology, culture, international peace and security, world order, planet and climate, prosperity and equality, and finally health and wellbeing. Within these categories, it draws the attention that Türkiye has scored very low in terms of international peace and security being ranked in the 124th position among 169 countries evaluated. If examined further, it can be seen that this score is low due to arms exports and international violent conflict.

Considering the fact that the location of Turkey is surrounded with active conflict zones, this condition is not surprising. Türkiye has borders with Greece, Bulgaria, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq and Syria. Unfortunately all these countries are either active or frozen

and potential conflict zones. Thus, the circumstances in the region affect the overall peace and security in Türkiye. This situation can be connected to the phrase “geography is destiny”. But instead of desperately accepting this destiny and giving up, Türkiye actively plays role in the peaceful resolution of those conflicts and is pioneering mediation initiatives across the world. For instance in 2010, Türkiye and Finland initiated the “Mediation for Peace” move at the UN (Arkan and Kınacıoğlu, 2016, p.395) in order to emphasize the importance of preventive diplomacy in conflict resolution and to increase the resources allocated for mediation (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2023a). In line with this initiation, the “Group of Friends of Mediation” was founded in 2010 which meets annually co-chaired by Türkiye and Finland. Türkiye continued the efforts initiated at the UN in other platforms such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation as well (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2023a). Moreover, Türkiye also began to host “İstanbul Mediation Conferences”, which are being organized since 2012. Today the Group of Friends of Mediation has reached 52 Member States in addition to the UN and 8 regional organizations and other international organizations (UN Peacemaker, 2023). Therefore, it can be argued that Türkiye is actively contributing to the peaceful settlements for international conflicts (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2023b).

Despite all these efforts, the fact that the majority of conflicts worldwide occur in the Islamic geography, is one of the reasons behind the negative perceptions and stereotypes against Türkiye. The rise of Islamophobia in the last decade especially in the European continent is a concerning situation. In addition to this image problem, peace and security within the borders of Türkiye is challenged by terrorism. Türkiye has been the main target of terrorist organizations such as ASALA, PKK, DEASH, DHKP-C and FETÖ nearly since the 1970s. Because of this condition, thousands of people lost their lives and the national image of Türkiye was repeatedly tarnished. Without the achievement of trust and safety the achievement of a positive national image and reputation is a seemingly impossible task. Therefore, Türkiye tries to be the forefront about combatting all kinds of terrorism since many years. However trans-boundary terrorist activities necessitate international cooperation and solidarity. Information published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on its official website shows that, Türkiye has signed 170 Treaties with 93 countries and 957 legal documents with 114 countries regarding security cooperation (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2023b). Therefore only terrorism and Islamophobia seem to be the major obstacles hindering a positive national image.

The literature is consistent with the current situation of Türkiye, because scholars argue that nation brands are profoundly influenced by events such as wars, crises and financial upheavals

which cannot be controlled by marketers and diplomats. In this case, the nation branding activities become rather irrelevant. Moreover, it is argued that even the image of the national leader is influential in a nation's image, which is referred as a "Halo Effect" (Manor, 2019, p. 261). Therefore, the process of nation branding becomes complicated and the outcomes in the nation brand indexes do not necessarily mean that the nation branding activities were insufficient.

Germany's better developed economy and its secure neighborhood were important factors in the achievement of a positive national image. Therefore it is plausible that Germany has high rankings in the nation brand indexes compared with Türkiye. However, research shows that not only actions and policies of the countries play a role in the national image. For instance Rhee et al. conducted a study, which revealed that not only actions of countries but also the perception of the foreign public regarding those actions is a decisive factor whether a certain public diplomacy action is producing desirable foreign policy outcomes, based on the case of the medical donations by Russia to the U.S. during the pandemic (Rhee et al., 2023). Examining divergent media frames, Rhee et al. concluded that positive impacts of actions decrease when they are suspected to have possible hidden motives (Rhee et al., 2023). Therefore countries should consider that their actions will only generate positive outcomes when the perception in the target audience is also positive. For this reason the nation branding attempts and establishing effective communication are important factors determining the success of Public Diplomacy to generate soft power and ultimately positive foreign policy outcomes.


5.4. Comparison of Social Media

Thinking about Digital Diplomacy, it evokes the practices of Public Diplomacy actors on social media and the outcomes of those practices. Since the principle Digital Diplomacy actors are the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, their activities on social media will be compared. In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, the specific Digital Diplomacy practices of the Ministries in Germany and Türkiye have already been mentioned. In this section, statistics regarding the social media accounts of the ministries and some key politicians will be examined. But first of all, the number of social media users in both countries will be compared.

Examining data released by Statista regarding the number of social media users in 2022 illustrated in Figure 14, Türkiye has 67.11 million users, while Germany has 60.88 million users (Statista, 2023g). But examining the percentage of social network users of the total population,

it can be seen that active social media users in Türkiye are 73.1 % of the total population, while this rate is 85.1% in Germany as of January 2023 (Statista, 2023h).

Figure 14 Social Media Users in Comparison (in millions)




Note. Adapted from "Number of social network users in selected countries in 2022 and 2027" by Statista, 2023.

Examining future projections by Statista for the year 2027, it can be noticed that the number of social network users will increase until 2027. As seen in Figure 14, the number of social network users in 2022 is 67.11 million in Türkiye and 60.88 million in Germany (Statista, 2023g). While the difference in 2022 is about 6.2 million, it is predicted that the difference in the number of social media users in both countries will decrease and the difference will be around 3 million in 2027 (Statista, 2023g). Accordingly, it can be inferred that social media is currently a bit more popular in Türkiye compared with Germany in terms of user number but the rate of social network users according to total population is higher in Germany. In any event, it is evident that data regarding internet and social media users are quite close in both countries.

This study only includes the social media analysis of Digital Diplomacy actors and influential politicians on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and YouTube. Thus, only the accounts on those social networks were examined.

As seen in the Figure 15, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye has about 2.2 million total followers and subscribers on social media platforms. Although the Federal Foreign Office of the Republic of Germany has more followers on Instagram and Facebook, cumulatively evaluated the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye has more followers and subscribers on social media.

Figure 15 Comparison of Social Media Accounts of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs




Note. Adapted from the official Instagram, YouTube, Twitter and Facebook accounts of the two Ministries as of 16.10.2023.

However, data regarding the popularity of the two Ministries on social media networks is only the paired comparison. Comparing both countries globally, data published by Lüfkens in 2022 showed that Türkiye's Ministry of Foreign Affairs' official Twitter account was also among the most followed foreign ministries in the world (Lüfkens, 2022). Meanwhile German Federal Foreign Office was amongst the most followed foreign ministries on Instagram (Lüfkens, 2022), which is also consistent with the data illustrated in Figure 15.


Examining the social media accounts of other relevant institutions, a similar trend can be observed. Some Public Diplomacy actors in Germany are similar to those in Türkiye. Although these institutions are not exactly the same, they can be regarded as counterparts. For instance the Goethe Institute can be compared with the Yunus Emre Institute, or DW News can be compared with TRT World, etc. Therefore, the social media popularity of those similar institutions was also compared.

Figure 16 Comparison of Social Media Accounts of the Goethe Institute and Yunus Emre Institute



Note. Adapted from official social media accounts of Goethe Institute and Yunus Emre Institute as of 16.10.2023.


Figure 17 Comparison of Social Media Accounts of GIZ and TİKA



Note. Adapted from official social media accounts of GIZ and TİKA as of 16.10.2023.


As seen in the Figure 16, Goethe Institute is clearly more popular on social media compared with Yunus Emre Institute. Despite the fact that Yunus Emre Institute has established 85 centers in 65 countries since its foundation in 2009 (Yunus Emre Enstitüsü, 2023a) and the Goethe Institute exists since 1951 and has 158 institutes in 98 countries as of October 2023 (Goethe Institut, 2022a). Comparing TİKA with GIZ on social media, Figure 17 clearly demonstrates that TİKA has almost 4 times more followers and subscribers than GIZ. This difference might stem from the fact that GIZ has no official Facebook and Instagram accounts. However, this might not be the only cause because, TİKA has presence in 150 countries and GIZ has presence in 120 countries as of October 2023. Moreover, TİKA was founded in 1992 and GIZ was founded in 2011, despite there is an institutional experience of more than 50 years due to its predecessor institutions.

Figure 18 Comparison of Social Media Accounts of TRT World and DW News



Note. Adapted from official social media accounts of TRT World and DW News as of 16.10.2023.

Figure 19 Comparison of Social Media Accounts of TMF and ZfA



Note. Adapted from official social media accounts of TMF and ZfA as of 16.10.2023.

Examining the social media popularity of the news channels of TRT and DW illustrated in Figure 18, it can be seen that Türkiye's TRT World is slightly ahead of DW News. Since both institutions are well-established, it can be claimed that this situation is entirely related to the content produced. Figure 19 comparing the social media accounts of TMF and ZfA illustrates a profound difference, because ZfA has no Twitter or Instagram account. Nevertheless, the Facebook and YouTube accounts are not popular either. Examining content in those accounts, it can be seen that most posts are only available in German in ZfA's accounts and in Turkish in TMF's accounts. Thus, the difference of total followers and subscriber can only be related with interest or disinterest.

That being the case for the social media accounts of the relevant institutions involved in Public Diplomacy, the situation for Political Leaders is also very interesting. According to Twiplomacy's Top 50 Power Ranking for the year 2022, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the President of the Republic of Türkiye, is ranked in the 3rd position among world's top 50 most influential leaders on Twitter following Narendra Modi, the President of India and Joe Biden, The President of the U.S. (Twiplomacy, 2023). This ranking is based on the number of followers on Twitter. An important feature of this study is that Twiplomacy also took into account that the number of followers may be related with the population of the respective country. However, it was concluded that many leaders' positioning would not change even if the population would be taken out of the equation except Narendra Modi, who would otherwise be ranked not in the 1st but in the 126th position. Considering the population factor, the real ranking for Recep Tayyip Erdoğan would actually be the 2nd in the world following Joe Biden (Twiplomacy, 2023). Data shows that Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is among the 10 most followed world leaders on Twitter, as well as on Facebook, Instagram, LinkedIn and YouTube (Lüfkens, 2022). As of June 2023, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has around 20.99 million followers on Twitter, around 10 million followers on Facebook and around 11.7 million followers on Instagram.⁵ Compared to the ranking for the year 2020 it draws the attention that, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's ranking is improved from the 5th position to the 3rd position or even to the 2nd position, depending on how the number of followers are evaluated (Twiplomacy, 2021).

Examining the counterpart of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, it is striking that Frank-Walter Steinmeier does not appeal to such a wide audience on social media. Although the president of Germany is in office since 2017, he has rather few followers on social media. As of October 2023, Steinmeier only has 186.337 followers on his Facebook account and 309.411 followers on his Instagram account, which is only active since 2019.⁶ He has no active Twitter account, which is considered the most common used social media platform for Digital Diplomacy according to Twiplomacy and the DDI. Instead the Spokeswomen of the Federal President Cerstin Gammelin, has an official Twitter account. Steinmeier also has no personal YouTube channel.

However, the results of the Twiplomacy rankings do not necessarily mean that German leaders were not among the most popular world leaders on Twitter. The main reason for this

⁵ Follower numbers were retrieved from the official accounts <https://twitter.com/RT Erdogan>, <https://www.facebook.com/RT Erdogan>, <https://www.instagram.com/rterdogan> on 12.10.2023.

⁶ Follower numbers were retrieved from the official accounts <https://www.facebook.com/Bundespraesident.Steinmeier/> and <https://www.instagram.com/bundespraesident.steinmeier/> on 12.10.2023.

argument is the fact that the Twiplomacy Studies neither in 2022 nor in 2020 did include the Steinmeier because he has no active Twitter account. Similarly, the previous Chancellor Angela Merkel, who has been on duty between the years 2005 and 2021, was also not included in the Twiplomacy studies because she never used a Twitter account. Nonetheless, considering that there are other studies taking into account other social media platforms as well, it can be inferred that Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has currently the potential to appeal to millions of peoples around the world as well as his own people and no German leader has the same popularity on social media.

Similarly, Olaf Scholz who is the Federal Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany has only 777.916 followers on Twitter, 1.942.574 followers on Instagram as of October 2023.⁷ He has no official Facebook or YouTube account, but the Federal Government has an official Facebook account with around 1 million followers and a YouTube channel with around 57 billion followers as of October 2023.⁸

It is argued that Foreign ministers and foreign ministries are likely to have fewer followers than heads of state and governments. But according to data published by Lüfkens regarding Most Followed Foreign Ministers on Social Media for the year 2022, the former Foreign Minister of Türkiye Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu (2015-2023), was among the Top 10 followed Foreign Ministers on Twitter, Facebook and Instagram (Lüfkens, 2022). On the other hand, Germany's Minister of Foreign Affairs Annalena Baerbock was only among the most followed foreign Ministers only in Instagram (Lüfkens, 2022).

As a matter of fact, a more up-to-date and just comparison regarding the political figures of Germany and Türkiye cannot be done, because the Chancellor Angela Merkel has recently been replaced with Olaf Scholz and the Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs Heiko Maas has been replaced with Annalena Baerbock as of 8 December 2021. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Türkiye Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu has also been replaced with Hakan Fidan as of 4 June 2023. Thus, the number of followers and retweets of the recently appointed Chancellor or Ministers of Foreign Affairs may not be the same as their counterparts. Yet, it is still worth to mention that the new German Minister of Foreign Affairs Baerbock already has around 119 billion followers on Facebook, 577.137 followers on Instagram 624.930 followers on Twitter⁹, whereas previous

⁷ Follower numbers were retrieved from the official accounts <https://twitter.com/bundeskanzler> and <https://www.instagram.com/bundeskanzler/> on 12.10.2023.


⁸ Follower numbers were retrieved from the official accounts <https://www.facebook.com/Bundesregierung> and <https://www.youtube.com/@bundesregierung> on 12.10.2023.

⁹ Follower numbers were retrieved from the official accounts <https://www.facebook.com/abaerbock>, <https://www.instagram.com/abaerbock/> and <https://twitter.com/ABaerbock> on 12.10.2023.

Minister of Foreign Affairs Heiko Maas, who had been on duty between the years 2018 and 2021, has 437.361 followers on Twitter and 66.797 followers on Instagram as of October 2023.¹⁰ Likewise Hakan Fidan has 634.960 followers on Twitter as of October 2023, although his Twitter account was created recently in June 2023.¹¹ However, Fidan has no official Facebook or Instagram account.

Generally speaking, these figures show that Turkish political leaders have more followers on social media compared with their counterparts. Considering that Germany and Türkiye are almost matching up with each other regarding population, the comparison regarding follower numbers seems to be fair. According to the latest data, Germany has a total of 84.5 million population as of December 2022 (Destatis, 2023), while Türkiye has 85.3 million total population (TÜİK, 2023). But although the total population seems almost equal, the share of young people among the total population plays an important role regarding social media usage. Examining Figure 20 (ITU, 2021, p.5), which shows the percentage of individuals using the internet categorized according to age, it can clearly be seen that the share of youth among the total users was very high in 2020.

Figure 20 Percentage of Individuals Using Internet in 2020



Note. From “Measuring Digital Development- Facts and figures 2021” by ITU, 2021, p. 5.

¹⁰ Follower numbers were retrieved from the official accounts <https://twitter.com/HeikoMaas> and <https://www.instagram.com/maas.heiko/> on 12.10.2023.

¹¹ Follower numbers were retrieved from the official accounts <https://twitter.com/HakanFidan> on 12.10.2023.

Figure 20 shows that 71% of the young people between 15 and 24, were using the Internet, while only 57% of the other age groups used Internet in the year 2020 (ITU, 2021). Comparing data published by the statistics institutes of both countries in 2021 shows that young population in the 15-24 years age group in Germany was 10 % of the total population which equals to 8.3 million people (Destatis, 2022), and 15.3% of the total population in Türkiye which corresponds to 12,9 million about (TÜİK, 2022). This means that there is around 4 million difference in the young population. This difference may lead to the feeling that the comparison is unfair. Even so, the difference of young people in Türkiye and Germany cannot be the only explanation why German political leaders have fewer followers on social media. Besides, Public Diplomacy not only targets internal audience and targets the external audience even more. Thus, it is surprising why German political leaders who are very influential on today's international system are not that popular on social media, where Digital Diplomacy is practiced at large.

5.5. Financial Comparison

According to the World Bank's categorization of countries in terms of income based on Gross National Income (GNI) per capita in US \$, (The World Bank, 2019), Türkiye is an upper-middle income country, while Germany is a high-income country for the years 2022-2023 (Hamadeh et al. 2022). Comparing Germany and Türkiye economically in the broadest sense, it can be argued that they are not in the same category in terms of income. Data provided by the World Bank for the year 2021 indicated that the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (current \$) of Germany was 4260 billion \$, while Türkiye's GDP was 819 billion \$ (The World Bank, 2023a). The data regarding the GNI is also similar. While the GNI (current \$) of Germany was 4411 billion \$, Türkiye's GNI was 807 billion \$ in 2021 (The World Bank, 2023b). In terms of economic there is a substantial difference in the GDP and GNI of the two countries since many years.

In parallel with the income, government expenditures and the budgets allocated for the Ministries of Foreign Affairs are also different. According to the approved federal budget for 2023, 7.475.797.000 € were allocated to the Federal Foreign Office, which amounts to 1.57 % of the total federal government's budget. The total allocated budget of the Federal Foreign Office for the year 2022 was 7.107.584.000 €, which amounted to 1.43 % of the total federal government's budget. The breakdown of this budget is categorized in seven subcategories. For the year 2023, 1.072.142.000 € were allocated for the foreign cultural and educational policy,

i.e. Public Diplomacy of the Federal Foreign Office. Considering that this budget item was 1.027.573.000 € for the year 2022, and 1.077.490.000 € for the year 2021, it can be argued that there is no radical change in the budget allocation in the recent years.

On the other hand, the approved budget for the year 2023 in Türkiye budget was 4.469.570.000.000 Turkish Liras, which is around 159.627.500.000 €. ¹² The total budget allocated for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Türkiye for the year 2023 was 4.450.964.000 Turkish Liras (T.C. Dışışleri Bakanlığı, 2023c), which is around 158.963.000 €. ¹³ Based on the latest activity report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 164.469.000 Turkish liras were allocated for the year 2023 for the budget item “Activities for the Development of International Cooperation and Public Diplomacy”, which is around 5.873.893 € (T.C. Dışışleri Bakanlığı, 2023c). ¹⁴ However, the net amount allocated for Public Diplomacy is not clear, since several other budget components contribute to Public Diplomacy. A cumulative data is not published by the Ministry, which is not the only actor conducting Public Diplomacy. Thus, the total financial resources allocated to Public Diplomacy in Türkiye cannot be determined.

In this sense, a sound comparison regarding the financial resources allocated to Public Diplomacy can’t be done. However, comparing the total budgets of the two Ministries, it can be seen that Germany has roughly 47 times more resources available than Türkiye for the year 2023. Moreover, Germany is conducting its Public Diplomacy via intermediary institutions which also have their own budget apart from contributions by the Federal Foreign Office. Therefore, it can be argued that Germany has the great advantage of having more financial resources available. Since no data was released by neither country regarding the resources allocated to Digital Diplomacy, it has to be assumed that Germany has to have more resources available for this issue as well.

According to long-term economic scenarios of the OECD, the potential real GDP per capita, is expected to close up between Türkiye and Germany around the 2050s (Guillemette and Turner, 2021). Until then, it has to be accepted that Germany will always have more financial resources available for Public Diplomacy and Digital Diplomacy compared with Türkiye.

5.6. Other Factors

¹² Euro exchange rate was taken as 1€ = 28 TL.

¹³ Euro exchange rate was taken as 1€ = 28 TL.

¹⁴ Euro exchange rate was taken as 1€ = 28 TL.

It was noticed that both countries attach importance to higher education abroad as a component of their Public Diplomacy. Other than the schools for primary and secondary education affiliated with TMF or ZfA, there are higher education institutions abroad as well. Türkiye has established state universities abroad based on agreements signed between the governments of two countries, such as International Hoca Ahmet Yesevi Turkish-Kazakh University in Türkistan founded in 1991 and Kyrgyz-Turkish Manas University founded in 1995. Moreover there are universities established in Türkiye which have campuses abroad. For instance Middle East Technical University and Ankara Social Sciences University based in Ankara, İstanbul Technical University based in İstanbul and Anadolu University based in Eskişehir have campuses in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Other than campi in TRNC, there are also some campuses in Africa. For instance the University of Health Sciences based in İstanbul has a campus in Somali, Uzbekistan, Sudan, Syria and the Philippines. In addition the Anadolu University in Türkiye has an Open Education System that provides education on a digital platform in 28 countries from Baku to Toronto, from Dubai to Copenhagen, crossing national borders with a total of 19 undergraduate and 41 associate degree programs, and also has an exam center. These are all state universities.

Similarly Germany has also established state universities abroad based on bilateral agreements with the respective countries, for instance the German-Jordanian University in Mushaqa founded in 2005, the German University of Technology in Muscat founded in 2007, the Vietnamese - German University in Binh Duong founded in 2008, the German-Mongolian Institute for Resources and Technology in Ulaanbaatar founded in 2013 and the Turkish-German University in Istanbul founded in 2013. In addition to standard state or private universities that offer online study programs, there is one university that is offering the opportunity to study 100% online. At the IU International University of Applied Sciences in Germany, it is possible study online from anywhere in the world and take the exams in more than 130 Goethe-Institutes worldwide.

Of course the universities mentioned above are only some examples of the universities established abroad. Comparing Germany with Türkiye, it can clearly be observed that Türkiye pioneered the efforts to establish universities abroad since Türkiye's attempts are right after the collapse of the USSR. However, at the present time Germany has more universities abroad and present in a wider geography. While Germany was initially concentrating more on the African continent, it can be observed that also universities in the Asian continent were founded over time. On the other hand, Türkiye was concentrating on Turkic speaking states and the TRNC

with the exception of some campuses established in the Middle East and Africa in the recent years.

Examining statistics regarding number of universities worldwide by country, Germany is ranked in the 11th position as of July 2021, while Türkiye is ranked in the 24th position (Statista, 2023i). Moreover, it is also worth to mention that German universities rank usually higher than Turkish universities in global rankings. Therefore, Germany seems to be in advance regarding higher education initiatives abroad in terms of quantity and quality.



FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION

Within the scope of this study, existing literature regarding Public Diplomacy was examined. Analysis revealed that Public Diplomacy was neglected in International Relations especially in terms of theoretical research. Since IR scholars did not develop a theoretical framework in this field, there is also no comprehensive and integrated framework for Public Diplomacy combining research from other disciplines. Thus, it was concluded that a substantial theoretical gap exists in the IR literature, although some models in other disciplines were developed. This study tried to show that Public Diplomacy has an interdisciplinary and/or multidisciplinary nature, thus the need for a comprehensive interdisciplinary study regarding Public Diplomacy was emphasized. It was noticed that potential contributions of other disciplines to each other would prove beneficial for future research. Therefore, this study calls upon future studies to analyze Public Diplomacy from a multidisciplinary perspective. Moreover, the most frequent voiced criticism regarding Public Diplomacy regarding the measurement of its efficiency was reiterated. The fact that there are no indexes or surveys that prove the efficiency of Public Diplomacy is an important deficiency. As a result, it is extremely challenging to evaluate whether positive foreign policy outcomes can be directly related to Public Diplomacy efforts.

This study showed that digital transformation is affecting all spheres of life including the conduct of Public Diplomacy and Diplomacy. Apparently, Diplomacy today has become more complex with digital transformation. Research illustrated that states cannot monopolize Public Diplomacy, since the key players in the current digital space are usually private companies such as Google, Meta etc. Thus, the occurrence of new actors, elements and concepts has influenced the conduct of Diplomacy. It was argued that state structures still maintain their importance in the new/digital Public Diplomacy structure, however all state institutions and organizations, non-state actors, civil society elements should act as a whole. The progress of the concept Digital Diplomacy, was discussed from a historical perspective. It was concluded that Digital Diplomacy, should be interpreted broadly and not regarded as simply using ICT and social media for Public Diplomacy activities. According to research, the concept Digital Diplomacy covers a multitude of meanings and has multiple dimensions, including interaction via social

media networks and the use of ICT for better services and policy making. Due to the lack of unified perception of Digital Diplomacy, exactly like Public Diplomacy, it was noted that there is no agreed definition as well. Moreover, different concepts are used to refer to Digital Diplomacy such as “e-Diplomacy”, “Cyber Diplomacy” or “Twiplomacy”, which do not totally overlap with each other. In this research, Digital Diplomacy was interpreted and defined as an umbrella concept that encompasses all elements related to Diplomacy and ICT including videoconferencing, virtual embassies, AI supported software for foreign policy decision-making or Chatbots for online public services, online consular services, engagement with publics via social media, mobile applications and gamelike elements. Despite conceptual confusion and fractured terminology in the literature, it was concluded that Public Diplomacy and Digital Diplomacy cannot be isolated from each other and that Digital Diplomacy should be regarded as a must. The most essential cause for this argument is that digital platforms, especially social media can be crucial in shaping public opinion as seen in the cases of the Arab Spring, COVID-19 pandemic, the Russo-Ukrainian War etc.

This study emphasized that the digital sphere has become a battlefield, long since the use of the internet, because a competition regarding narratives emerged. It was noted that, the battle of narratives is important for the solution of international conflicts and concluded that public institutions such as Ministries of Foreign Affairs need to be more active on digital platforms. However it was underlined that Digital Diplomacy has to be conducted with diligence, because it brings along opportunities as well as problems. As elaborated in detail in the second chapter, benefits and risks of Digital Diplomacy should be considered. Since Digital Diplomacy offers the chance to reach millions of people in real time, the benefits and risks should be carefully reviewed and the focus should be kept on the achievement of concrete results outside of the virtual world as well.

Moreover, it was underlined that urgent focus on academic studies regarding Digital Diplomacy is also needed. This study tried to put a spotlight on the fact that there is a huge gap in the literature about Digital Diplomacy in general terms. Especially a comprehensive framework to evaluate the efficiency of Digital Diplomacy was regarded very crucial, since the only related index is the DDI limited to G20 countries’ interaction on Twitter/X. Moreover, the data released has been ceased since 11.08.2023. Nevertheless, since Digital Diplomacy is linked with the concept soft power, indexes and surveys regarding soft power also provide some insight for the measurement of the efficiency of Digital Diplomacy as well. However, there is still the need for a global index, specifically developed for Digital Diplomacy because a comparative evaluation would prove beneficial for policymakers and diplomats to improve their

Digital Diplomacy strategies. Smart indicators for the creation of a global index should be defined, which would enable comparative analysis and form a great baseline for setting concrete goals for Digital Diplomacy and for the improvement of Digital Diplomacy capacity.

Despite being neglected in the literature especially in the theoretical sense, research for this study showed that there are significant practices regarding Digital Diplomacy all around the world. It was revealed that there is a global trend in conducting Digital Diplomacy. In order to identify areas for improvement for Digital Diplomacy, significant practices in U.S., Israel, Estonia and Switzerland were presented. It was concluded that digital transformation will bring many challenges for governments and states which cannot keep up with the current developments regarding digital transformation in the long run. Although recent developments show that the digital divide problem might be solved in near future via Starlink satellites etc., it was anticipated that the long term outcomes won't be positive if Digital Diplomacy is neglected. Therefore it was determined that shortcomings in the digital transformation will bring new inequalities instead of well-being and Digital Diplomacy should be prioritized in the foreign policy agenda of all governments.

Having presented a comprehensive multidisciplinary literature review and discussed the concept Digital Diplomacy beginning from its emergence to its estimated route in the future, a comparative analysis has been presented. Primordially, Digital Diplomacy in Germany has been examined. To provide a comprehensive overview and an insight into German Digital Diplomacy, the German Public Diplomacy approach has been analyzed in the first place. Since the concept Public Diplomacy is not quite used by German practitioners and the concept foreign cultural and educational policy is preferred, analysis had to be very extensive. To understand the institutional structure of German Public Diplomacy, all actors involved were researched and their role in Digital Diplomacy has been assessed. It was concluded that Germany is employing a strategy which involves a public-private partnership and the Federal Foreign Office has assigned private institutions such as the Goethe Institute which have expertise in their own field of work. Having signed special agreements and allocated special budget for those institutions, the Federal Foreign Office subcontracts the Public Diplomacy activities to those institutions, which are called partner institutions. In terms of strategy papers and policies, it can be argued that Germany has recently adopted critical policies concerning Digital Diplomacy. For instance the Digital Strategy adopted in August 2022, forms the current common framework for digital policy priorities and goals for all ministries including the Federal Foreign Office. In addition, the Council conclusions about EU's Digital Diplomacy approved in July 2022, are influential on Germany as a founding EU member as well (Council of the European Union, 2022).

However, there is no specific strategy paper or policy adopted specifically for Digital Diplomacy in Germany.

Subsequently, Digital Diplomacy in Türkiye has been examined. As it was the case in Germany's analysis, the Turkish Public Diplomacy approach has been analyzed in the first place. To understand the institutional structure of Turkish Public Diplomacy, all actors involved were researched and their role in Digital Diplomacy has been assessed. It was concluded that Türkiye is conducting Public Diplomacy and Digital Diplomacy mainly by means of public institutions, led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Although private institutions such as the Diyanet Foundation or the Yunus Emre Institution exist as well, their presidents or the board members are ministers, deputy ministers or executives of some public institutions too. Therefore, the domination of public institutions was observed examining Turkish Public Diplomacy actors. In terms of strategy papers and policies, it can be argued that Türkiye has adopted critical policies and strategy papers concerning digitalization since 1990s, but the first policy document regarding Public Diplomacy was adopted in July 2021. However, a strategy paper or policy specifically for Digital Diplomacy has not been adopted yet.

Comparing the digitalization progress of the governments in Germany and Türkiye, it was concluded that Türkiye is more advanced in terms of e-government services based on index and benchmark studies. Likewise, GDI and the DDI rank Türkiye in better positions. However, there is room for improvement regarding Digital Competitiveness. Moreover indexes regarding soft power usually rank Germany in better positions. Furthermore, these indexes not only rank Germany in better positions, but there is also a huge score gap with Türkiye. This research showed that Türkiye's lower position in the soft power indexes can be related with its national image. Despite providing huge amount of humanitarian aid and having no colonial background, Türkiye's national image in the Nation Brand Index and other related indexes is lower than Germany. Comparing the national images and nation branding attempts, it was noticed that Germany became one of the countries that communicated its culture and messages to foreign audiences without imposing, which is the total opposite of the aggressive foreign policy approaches pursued until the Second World War. Studies showed that Germany is currently one of the few countries that ranks high in the Good Country Index and the Nation Brands Index at the same time. The positive perception of Germany is also affecting its Public Diplomacy. Due to its positive national image, Germany's Public Diplomacy actions are regarded as favorable by foreign audiences. Germany's method to erase its negative image from being associated with war crimes and holocaust to be remembered as a well-organized and well-disciplined country that produces high quality products is very exemplary. Even this observation validates the

necessity of a multidisciplinary framework, because the concept Nation Brand related with another discipline proves beneficial to analyze outcomes of soft power indexes.

This study showed that Germany can serve as a best practice for countries that need to work on their national image, including Türkiye. Given the fact that Türkiye's digital governance is advanced and its diplomatic network is wide, it is anticipated that Digital Diplomacy may be a field, where Türkiye has a chance to outrival Germany and other developed countries ranking higher in the soft power indexes. Comparative analysis of Public Diplomacy practices showed that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the leading actor conducting Public Diplomacy in Türkiye, while it was the intermediary organizations and private partners in Germany rather than the Ministry. In terms of strategy and approach, it was noticed that both countries do not have a Digital Diplomacy Policy. However, Türkiye has at least adopted a strategy paper and action plan for Public Diplomacy, while Germany did not. Regarding the exercise of Digital Diplomacy, online consular services, initiatives of the Ministries, and the social media activities of the public diplomacy institutions, ministries and key politicians were compared. Research showed that Türkiye is more advanced in online consular services, and has more interaction with domestic and foreign publics via social media channels. Analysis showed that Public Diplomacy actors of both Germany and Türkiye have presence on almost all social media networks. Yet, it was found out that the social media interaction of Türkiye is more efficient than Germany both with domestic and with foreign publics. Especially public institutions and political leaders in Türkiye had more followers on social media, while their German counterparts could not reach a satisfactory number. Since not all Public Diplomacy actors had counterparts such as DAI or TDV, only similar institutions could be compared directly regarding popularity on social media. Cumulatively, it was concluded that Public Diplomacy actors of Türkiye have more followers and subscribers on social media. However, it was noticed that Germany has more innovative dialogue formats such as mobile games, mobile applications, podcasts or online meetings to strengthen German Digital Diplomacy.

Financially compared, the resources allocated to Digital Diplomacy could not be isolated from Public Diplomacy. Moreover, exact data regarding the financial resources used for Public Diplomacy could not be retrieved either. But comparing the financial resources of both Ministries of Foreign Affairs in general terms, it was concluded that Germany has more financial resources available for Public Diplomacy.

Finally an overall comparison is provided regarding issues that are not categorized in the subtitles of this chapter, which showed that both countries are interested in the provision of education in countries abroad. Especially universities which were established abroad or

campuses abroad were existent in both countries. However, it was concluded that Germany seems to be in advance regarding higher education initiatives abroad both regarding quantity and quality.

As a consequence, it was assessed that countries are becoming increasingly aware about a battle of narratives in the digital space. Which stories and images will prevail depends on successful implementation of Digital Diplomacy. Although the complete digitalization of Diplomacy, including Public Diplomacy won't take place in the near future, Digital Diplomacy should be considered an indispensable component Foreign Policy development. Especially social media should be instrumentalized for political goals, have long been used by some countries. Türkiye has to seize this opportunity and use its valuable potential to succeed in Public Diplomacy by using Digital Diplomacy. Moreover, the public-private partnership should be strengthened and NGO's should be more active in the Public Diplomacy practices of Türkiye so that they can be more convincing. Türkiye's foreign policy should not be limited to the physical space and, Türkiye's national interests should be encouraged and defended in the digital space as well. Gamification could be used to strengthen Digital Diplomacy efforts, because data published by Statista shows that as of the third quarter of 2022, 81.9 % of global internet users between 16 and 64 identified themselves as gamers (Statista, 2023j). This rate is declared as 92.3% in Türkiye and 74.6% in Germany (Statista, 2023j).

However, if argued in general and not only for Türkiye, it is clear that the future will be puzzling for Public Diplomacy, because human society constantly faces great transformation after the introduction digital technologies. Human society is expected to be closely connected with robotics and AI beginning from the 2030s onwards according to the 5G Infrastructure Association based in Germany (The 5G Infrastructure Association, 2021). In an environment where everything is connected via internet, the transformation of Diplomacy is inevitable. Therefore, five policy recommendations should be voiced regarding Digital Diplomacy:

1. The first and most important policy recommendation would be for Ministries of Foreign Affairs, which should raise their awareness about Digital Diplomacy and attach due importance to Digital Diplomacy.
2. There is the urgent need to draft a policy or strategy paper regarding Digital Diplomacy for every country.
3. As Public Diplomacy is increasingly conducted in the digital space, diplomats should also be important actors competent regarding social media, software and AI. Ministries of Foreign Affairs should invest in capacity building programs for diplomats, to multiply the effect of their message.

4. Countries should create software for diplomatic purposes including AI algorithms to improve foreign policy decision making Digital technologies should be used to contribute to the achievement of political and diplomatic interests.
5. Public Diplomacy actors should hire Social Media Experts and should have a Social Media Strategy/ Manual for staff.
6. Innovative formats such as Gamification should be used for increasing the efficiency of Digital Diplomacy efforts.

By paying regard to the above mentioned issues, countries should be able to draft effective Digital Diplomacy strategies. In this way, it is envisaged that a positive international image can be promoted.



BIBLIOGRAPHY

- AIM. (2018). *How AI Is Running China's Foreign Policy*, <https://analyticsindiamag.com/how-ai-is-running-chinas-foreign-policy/>
- Akıllı, E. (2022a). *Diplomaside Dijital Dönüşüm: Deepfake, Dezenformasyon ve 'Hakikat Ötesi' Üzerine*. Sabah <https://www.sabah.com.tr/yazarlar/perspektif/erman-akilli/2022/03/26/diplomaside-dijital-donusum-deepfake-dezenformasyon-ve-hakikat-otesi-uzerine>
- Akıllı, E. (2022b). *Türk Dünyasında Dijital Bütünleşme: "Turcoverse"*. Kriter. Mart 2022 / Yıl 6, Sayı 66. <https://kriterdergi.com/dis-politika/turk-dunyasinda-dijital-butunlesme-turkoverse>
- Akıllı, E., and Cihanoğlu Gülen, G. (2023). *Public Diplomacy During the Covid-19 Pandemic*, In E. Akıllı, B. Güneş (Eds.), *World Politics in the Age of Uncertainty: The Covid-19 Pandemic, Volume 1* (pp. 157 – 170), Cham: Palgrave Macmillan
- Akıllı, E. and Cihanoğlu Gülen, G. (2024). *Diplomacy 3.0 in the Pandemic: Digital Diplomacy and Beyond*. In E. Akıllı, B. Güneş, A. Gökbel (Ed.). *Diplomacy, Society and the COVID-19 Challenge* (pp.47-55). Abingdon and New York: Routledge.
- Alexander, C. R. (2021). *Hegemony, Morality and Power: A Gramscian Theoretical Framework for Public Diplomacy*. In C. R. Alexander, *The Frontiers of Public Diplomacy-Hegemony, Morality and Power in the International Sphere* (pp. 9-24). New York, Abingdon: Routledge.
- Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung. (2023a). *Strategy of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation*. <https://www.humboldt-foundation.de/en/explore/about-the-humboldt-foundation/strategy-of-the-alexander-von-humboldt-foundation>
- Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung. (2023b). *About the Humboldt Foundation*. <https://www.humboldt-foundation.de/en/explore/about-the-humboldt-foundation>
- Anadolu Ajansı. (2018). *Kanada Dışişleri Bakanı'ndan '20 milyar dolarlık tweet'*. <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/kanada-disisleri-bakanindan-20-milyar-dolarlik-tweet/1225246>

- Anadolu Ajansı. (2022). *Anadolu Agency at a glance*. (2022, September 11). <https://www.aa.com.tr/uploads/userFilesShared/pazarlama%2Ffoy-04-2020%2F3%2FAA-GLOBAL-2022-EN.pdf>
- Anadolu Ajansı. (2023). *History*. (2023, September 11). <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/p/history>
- Arkan, Z. and Kınacıoğlu, M. (2016). Enabling ‘ambitious activism’: Davutoğlu’s vision of a new foreign policy identity for Turkey, *Turkish Studies*, 17:3, 381-405, DOI: 10.1080/14683849.2016.1185943
- Aslan, P., and Göksu, O. (2016). Dijital Diplomasi, Küresel Algı ve Türkiye. *14th International Symposium Communication in the Millennium*, (pp. 573-590). İstanbul.
- Auer, C., and Srugies, A. (2013). *Public Diplomacy in Germany*. Fuguoeara Press: Los Angeles.
- Auswärtiges Amt. (2019). *Sudan: Entwicklung eines digitalen Denkmalregisters*. <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/aussenpolitik/kultur-und-gesellschaft/09-kulturerhalt/kulturerhalt-sudan/1796148>
- Auswaertiges Amt. (2020). *Non-Paper on EU Cyber Diplomacy by Estonia, France, Germany, Poland, Portugal and Slovenia*. <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/blob/2418986/206b3bf9aa4ef45a2887399231840d23/201119-non-paper-pdf-data.pdf>
- Auswärtiges Amt. (2021). *Auswärtige Kultur- und Bildungspolitik: Basis für starke internationale Beziehungen*. <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/aussenpolitik/kultur-und-gesellschaft/01-ziele-und-aufgaben>
- Auswaertiges Amt. (2022). *The Federal Government’s new Digital Strategy*. (2022, September 13). <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/digital-strategy/2551972>
- Auswärtiges Amt. (2023a). *Geheimdiplomatie? Nein, Strategische Kommunikation!*. <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/aussenpolitik/kultur-und-gesellschaft/-/2238958>
- Auswärtiges Amt. (2023b). *Diplomatie im Dialog*. (2023, October 4). <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/aamt/aussenpolitiklive/03-diplomaten-im-dialog>
- Auswärtiges Amt. (2023c). *Diplomatie macht Schule – Diplomatinen und Diplomaten in Eurem Klassenzimmer*. (2023, June 3). <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/aamt/-/2485516>

- Auswärtiges Amt. (2023d). *Außenpolitik zum Mitspielen*. https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/aamt/aussenpolitiklive/06_gaming
- Aycil, S. (2021). Yunus Emre Kimdir? Bizim Yunus'un Sevgi ve Hoşgörü Anlayışının Posta Pulları Üzerinden Değerlendirilmesi. *Afyon Kocatepe Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, 155-168.
- Bahar, H. (2020). The German Archeologists' Studies in Turkey. In C. Schönig, H. Bayraktar, & R. Calik, *Türkisch-Deutsche Beziehungen: Perspektiven aus Vergangenheit und Gegenwart* (pp. 227-233). Berlin; Boston: De Gruyter.
- Bailenson, J. N. (2021). Nonverbal Overload: A Theoretical Argument for the Causes of Zoom Fatigue. *Technology, Mind and Behavior*, 2(1).
- Balçiner, O. (2019). Bir Yumuşak Güç Aracı Olarak Ulus Markalama: Almanya ve Türkiye Ulus Markalarının Değerlendirilmesi. *Academic Review of Humanities and Social Sciences*, 2(2), 65-87.
- Barker, T. (2020, November 16). *Die EU braucht eine digitale Außenpolitik*. <https://dgap.org/de/forschung/publikationen/die-eu-braucht-eine-digitale-aussenpolitik>
- Bartholomae, F. et al. (2023). *Does Federalism Affect E-Government in Germany?*. CESifo Working Papers, https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp10260.pdf
- Beck, M. et al. (2008). Herausforderungen deutscher Außenpolitik im Nahen Osten. (GIGA Focus Nahost, 6). Hamburg: GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies - Leibniz-Institut für Globale und Regionale Studien, Institut für Nahost-Studien. <https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ss0ar-274125>
- Birleşmiş Milletler Türkiye. (2022). Türkiye'nin adı BM'de yabancı dillerde de artık Türkiye. <https://turkiye.un.org/tr/184798-t%C3%BCrkiyenin-ad%C4%B1-bmde-yabanc%C4%B1-dillerde-de-art%C4%B1k-t%C3%BCrkiye>
- Bjola, C. (2015). Introduction- Making Sense of Digital Diplomacy. In C. Bjola, M. Holmes, C. Bjola, & M. Holmez (Eds.), *Digital Diplomacy- Theory and Practice* (pp. 1-9). Abingdon; New York: Routledge.
- Bjola, C., and Pamment, J. (2019). *Countering Online Propaganda and Extremism: The dark side of digital diplomacy*. New York; Abingdon: Routledge.

- Blumenreich, U. (2022). *Country Profile Germany*. Bonn: Association of the Compendium of Cultural Policies and Trends. https://www.culturalpolicies.net/wp-content/uploads/pdf_full/germany/Full-Country-Profile_Germany2022.pdf
- Bradshaw, S. (2015, April 7). *Digital diplomacy - #notdiplomacy*. Centre for International Governance Innovation. <https://www.cigionline.org/articles/digital-diplomacy-notdiplomacy/>
- Brand Finance. (2020). *Global Soft Power Index 2020*. London: Brand Finance.
- Brand Finance. (2021). *Nation Brands 2021*. <https://brandirectory.com/rankings/nation-brands/2021>
- Brand Finance. (2022). *Global Soft Power Index 2022*. London: Brand Finance.
- Brand Finance. (2023a) *Global Soft Power Index 2023*. <https://brandirectory.com/softpower/>
- Brand Finance. (2023b). *Nation Brands 121-2023 Ranking*. <https://brandirectory.com/rankings/nation-brands/>
- Bryant, N. (2012). *E-diplomacy: Foreign policy in 140 characters*. BBC News. <https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-18856295>
- Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Klimaschutz. (2016). *Digitale Strategie 2025*. https://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/DE/Publikationen/Digitale-Welt/digitale-strategie-2025.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=8
- Bundesregierung. (2014). *Digitale Agenda 2014 - 2017*. https://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/DE/Publikationen/Digitale-Welt/digitale-agenda.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3
- Bundesregierung. (2020). *23. Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Auswärtigen Kultur- und Bildungspolitik für das Jahr 2019*. Berlin: Bundestag.
- Bundesregierung. (2021). *Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Auswärtigen Kultur- und Bildungspolitik für das Jahr 2020*. Berlin: Bundestag.
- Bundesregierung. (2022). *Geschichte und Aufgaben*. <https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/bundesregierung/bundespresseamt/geschichte-und-aufgaben-454036>
- Byrne, C. (2016). Public diplomacy. In S. Smith, A. Hadfield, & T. Dunne, *Foreign Policy - Theories, Actors, Cases* (pp. 168-185). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Canada in KSA [@CanEmbSA]. (2018, August, 5). لنشطاء الإضافية الاعتقالات إزاء بالغ بقلق كندا تشعر. [Tweet].
 نحت . بدوي_سمر # ذلك في بما ، السعودية# في المرأة حقوق ونشطاء المدني المجتمع
 Twitter. <https://twitter.com/CanEmbSA/status/1026049114088333313>
- Calabresi, M. (2021). *WikiLeaks' War on Secrecy: Truth's Consequences*. Time.
<https://time.com/5568727/wikileaks-war-on-secrecy/>
- Cercel, M. O. (2022). Gamification in Diplomacy Studies as an Effective Tool for Knowledge Transfer: Questionnaire Study. *JMIR Serious Games*, 10(2).
- CNN. (2018). *Saudis expel Canadian envoy, vow to relocate students over tweets about rights activist*.
<https://edition.cnn.com/2018/08/06/middleeast/saudi-arabia-canada-intl/index.html>
- Council of the European Union. (2015). *Council Conclusions on Cyber Diplomacy*. (2015, February 11).
<https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6122-2015-INIT/en/pdf>
- Council of the European Union. (2022). *Council Conclusions on EU Digital Diplomacy*. Brussels: Council of the European Union.
<https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11406-2022-INIT/en/pdf>
- Cull, N. J. (2009). Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 616(Public Diplomacy in a Changing World), 31-54.
- Cull, N. J. (2013a). The Long Road to Public Diplomacy 2.0: The Internet in US Public Diplomacy. *International Studies Review*(15), 123-139.
- Cull, N. J. (2013b). U.S. Cultural Diplomacy and Archeology: Soft Power, Hard Heritage, *International Dialogue*, 223-227.
- Cull, N. J. (2019). *Public Diplomacy: Foundations for Global Engagement in the Digital Age*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Çetin, O. M. (2022). Bir Kamu Diplomasisi Aktörü Olarak Cumhurbaşkanlığı İletişim Başkanlığı. *İletişim Çalışmaları Dergisi*. Cilt: 8 Sayı: 2, 233 – 255.
<https://dergipark.org.tr/en/download/article-file/2358116>

- Çetinkaya, B. (2022, February 11). *Konsolosluk Çağrı Merkezi 2005'ten bu yana 7,5 milyon çağrıya yanıt verdi*. Anadolu Ajansı. <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/gundem/konsolosluk-cagri-merkezi-2005ten-bu-yana-7-5-milyon-cagriya-yanit-verdi/2499783>
- DAAD. (2023a). *Who we are*. <https://www.daad.de/en/the-daad/who-we-are/>
- DAAD. (2023b). *What we do*. <https://www.daad.de/en/the-daad/what-we-do/>
- DAAD. (2023c). *Länderstatistik* 2022. https://static.daad.de/media/daad_de/pdfs_nicht_barrierefrei/der-daad/zahlen-fakten/daad-laenderstatistik_w.pdf
- DAAD. (2023d). *Wissenschaft weltoffen 2023*. Bonn: DAAD. https://www.wissenschaft-weltoffen.de/content/uploads/2023/09/WWO_2023_web_en_bf.pdf
- DAAD, GIZ, Goethe-Institut e.V. (2021). *Außenblick*. <https://www.giz.de/en/downloads/giz2021-en-studie-aussenblick-zusammenfassung.pdf>
- DAI. (2019). *190 Jahre DAI*, <https://www.dainst.blog/190JahreDAI/en/day-82-institute-history-on-romes-capitoline-hill/>
- DAI. (2023a). *Our History*. <https://www.dainst.org/en/who-we-are/history>
- DAI. (2023b). *Strategies for Digitization*. <https://idai.world/how/strategies-for-digitization>
- DAI. (2023c). *The Digital of Friedrich W. Hinkel*. <https://arachne.dainst.org/project/hinkel>
- Daniel, G. E. (2022, September 4). *Archaeology*. Encyclopedia Britannica: <https://www.britannica.com/science/archaeology>
- Datareportal. (2023). *Digital 2023: Global Overview Report*, <https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2023-global-overview-report>
- Değirmenci, F., and Terzioğlu, E. (2022). A Digital Diplomacy Irony: Donald Trump. *OPUS Journal of Society Research*, 19(47), 490-505. <https://doi.org/10.26466/opusjr.1096048>
- Denscheilmann, H. (2013). *Deutschlandbilder - Ausstellungen im Auftrag Auswärtiger Kulturpolitik*. Wiesbaden: Springer VS.

- Destatis. (2022). *Number and proportion of young people aged between 15 and 24 years at all-time low.* (2022, July 25). https://www.destatis.de/EN/Press/2022/07/PE22_N046_122.html
- Destatis. (2023). *Germany's population grew by 1.3% in 2022.* https://www.destatis.de/EN/Press/2023/06/PE23_235_12411.html
- Deutsche Digitale Bibliothek. (2023). *Die Geschichte der Deutschen Digitalen Bibliothek.* <https://www.deutsche-digitale-bibliothek.de/content/die-geschichte-der-deutschen-digitalen-bibliothek>
- Deutscher Bundestag. (2007). *Auswärtige Kulturpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,* <https://www.bundestag.de/resource/blob/414764/985e4f193867cc676bdc8dffb6480f1d/WD-10-053-07-pdf-data.pdf>
- Deutscher Bundestag. (2022). *25. Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Auswärtigen Kultur- und Bildungspolitik für das Jahr 2021.* (2022, July 5). <https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/20/051/2005140.pdf>
- Deutschland.de. (2023). *Impressum.* <https://www.deutschland.de/de/impressum>
- Development Initiatives. (2022). *Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2022.* Bristol: Development Initiatives.
- Die Deutsche Zentrale für Tourismus. (2022). *Über uns .* (2022, September 20). <https://www.germany.travel/de/ueber-uns/uebersicht.html>
- Digital Diplomacy Index. (2022, March 23). *About this website.* <https://digital-diplomacy-index.com/about>
- Digital Diplomacy Index. (2023). <https://digital-diplomacy-index.com/index/>
- Digitalstrategie Deutschland. (2022). *Über die Digitalstrategie.* (2022, October 23). <https://digitalstrategie-deutschland.de/ueber-die-digitalstrategie/>
- Dijk, J. A. (2012). *The Evolution of the Digital Divide.* In J. Bus et al. (Eds.), *Digital Enlightenment Yearbook 2012* (pp. 57-75). IOS Press. doi:10.3233/978-1-61499-057-4-57
- Diplo. (2023a). *Digital Diplomacy.* <https://www.diplomacy.edu/topics/digital-diplomacy/>.

- Diplo. (2023b). *Internet and social media: A focus on diplomacy*. (2021, December 19). Retrieved from Diplo: <https://www.diplomacy.edu/histories/internet-and-social-media-a-focus-on-diplomacy/>
- Duncombe, C. (2018). Twitter and the Challenges of Digital Diplomacy. *SAIS Review of International Affairs*, 38(2), 91-100.
- Dünya Gazetesi. (2009). *TRT becomes shareholder in Euronews*. <https://www.dunya.com/gundem/trt-becomes-shareholder-in-euronews-haberi-90202>
- Dwoskin, E. (2021). *Facebook is changing its name to Meta as it focuses on the virtual world*. The Washington Post. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/10/28/facebook-meta-name-change/>
- e-Devlet Kapısı. (2023a). *e-Devlet Kapısı İstatistikleri*. <https://www.turkiye.gov.tr/edevlet-istatistikleri>
- e-Devlet Kapısı. (2023b). *Hakkımızda*. <https://www.turkiye.gov.tr/bilgilendirme?konu=siteHakkinda>
- e-Estonia. (2022). *e-Governance*. (2022, September 24). <https://e-estonia.com/solutions/e-governance/government-cloud/>
- Eg lash, R. (2019). *With no formal ties, Israel is using digital diplomacy to reach out to the Arab world*. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/with-no-formal-ties-israel-is-using-
- Ekşi, M. (2015). Türk Dış Politikasında Diplomasinin Yeni İletişimsel Boyutları ve Mekanizmaları: Dijital Diplomasi. In B. S. Cankurtaran, *Uluslararası İlişkilerde Disiplinlerarası Bir Yaklaşım: Uluslararası İletişim Perspektifi* (pp. 75-92). İstanbul: Röle Akademik Yayıncılık.
- Ekşi, M. (2016). Türkiye'nin Kamu Diplomasisi Yaklaşımı, ANKASAM, <https://www.ankasam.org/turkiyenin-kamu-diplomasisi-yaklasimi/>
- Erkul, E. R. (2009). "Sosyal Medya Araçlarının (Web 2.0) Kamu Hizmetleri ve Uygulamalarında Kullanılabilirliği", *Türkiye Bilişim Derneği Bilişim Dergisi*, Sayı 116: 96-101.

- EUR-Lex. (2006). *Commission Recommendation of 24.08.2006 (2006/585/EC)*. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32006H0585>
- EUR-Lex. (2018). *COM/2018/236 final*. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52018DC0236>
- European Center for Digital Competitiveness. (2021). *Digital Riser Report 2021*. Berlin: European Center for Digital Competitiveness.
- European Commission. (2016). *eGovernment in Germany*. Brussels: European Commission. https://joinup.ec.europa.eu/sites/default/files/inline-files/eGovernment%20in%20Germany%20-%20February%202016%20-%2018_00%20-%20v2_00.pdf
- European Commission. (2022, November 15). *The single digital gateway and Your Europe*. https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/single-market/single-digital-gateway_en
- European Commission. (2023a). *Europe's Digital Decade: digital targets for 2030*. https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/europe-fit-digital-age/europes-digital-decade-digital-targets-2030_en
- European Commission. (2023b). *Digital Decade Country Report 2023 Germany*. <https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/redirection/document/98620>.
- European Commission. (2023c). *The Digital Economy and Society Index (DESI)*. <https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/desi>.
- European Commission. (2023d). *eGovernment Benchmark 2023 - Factsheets*. Brussels: European Union. <https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/redirection/document/98711>
- European Commission. (2023e). *eGovernment Benchmark 2023 – Insight Report*. Brussels: European Union. <https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/redirection/document/98708>
- European Parliament. (2022). *Members of the European Parliament*. (2022, September 3). <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meps/en/home>
- European Union. (2014). *Preparatory Action- Culture in External EU Relations*. http://www.cultureinexternalrelations.eu/cier-data/uploads/2016/12/Engaging-The-World-Towards-Global-Cultural-Citizenship-eBook-1.5_13.06.2014.pdf

- Facebook. (2021). *How do I request a verified badge on Facebook?* (2021, December 20). <https://www.facebook.com/help/1288173394636262>
- Facts about Germany. (2023). *Imprint*. <https://www.tatsachen-ueber-deutschland.de/en/imprint>
- Fauville, G., et al. (2021). Zoom Exhaustion & Fatigue Scale. *Computers in Human Behavior Reports*, Volume 4. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chbr.2021.100119>
- Federal Foreign Office. (2016). *Statement by Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier in the debate on the 19th Federal Government Report on Cultural Relations and Education Policy in the German Bundestag*, <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/160929-bm-bt-akbp/283882>.
- Federal Foreign Office. (2020). *German schools abroad – where children from different cultures meet*. <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/themen/-/227654>
- Federal Foreign Office. (2022). *German Missions abroad on social media*. (2022, July 15). <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/about-us/auslandsvertretungen/social-media-en/2198846>
- Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community. (2023). *E-government*. <https://www.bmi.bund.de/EN/topics/administrative-reform/e-government/e-government.html>
- Federal Ministry for Digital and Transport. (2023). *Innovation Club: Germany and Baltic States join forces to drive digitalization in Europe*. <https://bmdv.bund.de/SharedDocs/EN/PressRelease/2023/113-wissing-innovation-club.html>
- Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy. (2016). *Digital Strategy 2025*. https://www.de.digital/DIGITAL/Redaktion/EN/Publikation/digital-strategy-2025.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=9
- Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action. (2017). *Minister Zypries: "German G20 Presidency has triggered global digital dialogue"*. <https://www.de.digital/DIGITAL/Redaktion/EN/Meldungen/2017/2017-11-27-zypries-german-g20-presidency-has-triggered-global-digital-dialogue.html>
- Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action. (2020). *Germany is a founding member of the Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence*.

<https://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2020/20200615-germany-is-a-founding-member-of-the-global-partnership-on-artificial-intelligence.html>

Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action. (2023). *Digital Agenda*. <https://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/EN/Artikel/Digital-World/digital-agenda.html>

Fendrick, R. J. (2014). *Diplomacy as an Instrument of National Power*. Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College.

Fitzpatrick, K. R. (2017). Public Diplomacy in the Public Interest. *The Journal of Public Interest Communications*, 1(1), 78-93.

Foreign Policy CAN. [@CanadaFP]. (2018, August, 3). *Canada is gravely concerned about additional arrests of civil society and women's rights activists in #SaudiArabia, including Samar Badawi. We* [Tweet]. Twitter. <https://twitter.com/CanadaFP/status/1025383326960549889>

Freeland, C. [@cafreeland]. (2018, August,2). *Very alarmed to learn that Samar Badawi, Raif Badawi's sister, has been imprisoned in Saudi Arabia. Canada stands together with* [Tweet]. Twitter. <https://twitter.com/cafreeland/status/1025030172624515072>

Frenkel, S. et al. (2020). *A Brazen Online Attack Targets V.I.P. Twitter Users in a Bitcoin Scam*. *The New York Times*. <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/15/technology/twitter-hack-bill-gates-elon-musk.html>

Fung, B. (2022). Twitter battles wave of impersonators after launching new paid verification system. *CNN Business*. <https://edition.cnn.com/2022/11/09/tech/twitter-impersonators-paid-verification/index.html>

Garakhanova, N. (2023). Bibliometric Analysis on Digital Diplomacy Studies. *Korkut Ata Türkiyat Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 1, 1325-1338. DOI: 10.51531/korkutataturkiyat.1356201

Gaskarth, J., and Oppermann, K. (2019). Clashing Traditions: German Foreign Policy in a New Era. *International Studies Perspectives*, 22 (1), 84-105. <https://doi.org/10.1093/isp/ekz017>

Gilboa, E. (2008). Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 616, 55-77. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25097994>

- GIZ. (2023). *GIZ Profile: sustainable development for a liveable future*. <https://www.giz.de/en/aboutgiz/profile.html>
- Goethe Institut. (2022a). *Standorte*. (2022, July 24). <https://www.goethe.de/de/wwt.html>
- Goethe Institute. (2022). *Annual Report 2021/22*. <https://www.goethe.de/en/uun/pub/jah.html>
- Goethe Institut. (2023a). *1951-1969 Von der Provinz in die Welt*. <https://www.goethe.de/de/uun/org/ges/pe1.html#slide0>
- Goethe Institut. (2023b). *Who We Are*. <https://www.goethe.de/en/uun/org.html>
- Golan, G. (2013). An Integrated Approach to Public Diplomacy. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 57(9), 1251-1255. <https://doi.org/10.1177/000276421348771>
- Graham, T. and Fitzgerald, K. M. (2023). *Bots, Fake News and Election Conspiracies: Disinformation During the Republican Primary Debate and the Trump Interview*. Queensland University of Technology Digital Media Research Centre. [https://eprints.qut.edu.au/242533/13/Disinformation During the Republican Primary Debate and the Trump Interview FINAL with acknowledgements.pdf](https://eprints.qut.edu.au/242533/13/Disinformation%20During%20the%20Republican%20Primary%20Debate%20and%20the%20Trump%20Interview%20FINAL%20with%20acknowledgements.pdf)
- Grolig, W. and Schlageter, R. E. (2007). "Auswärtige Kultur- und Bildungspolitik und Public Diplomacy". In T. Jäger, A. Höse, & K. Oppermann, *Deutsche Außenpolitik* (pp. 547-566). Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
- Grunig, J. E. and Hunt, T. (1984). *Managing Public Relations*. New York: CBS College Publishing.
- Guillemette, Y. and Turner, D. (2021), "The long game: Fiscal outlooks to 2060 underline need for structural reform", *OECD Economic Policy Papers*, No. 29, OECD Publishing, Paris, <https://doi.org/10.1787/a112307e-en>.
- Hamadeh, N. et al. (2022). *New World Bank country classifications by income level: 2022-2023*. World Bank Blogs. <https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/new-world-bank-country-classifications-income-level-2022-2023>
- Hanson, F. (2012). *Baked in and wired: ediplomacy@State*. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/baked-in-hansonf-5.pdf>

- Hedling, E., and Bremberg, N. (2021). Practice Approaches to the Digital Transformations of Diplomacy: Toward a New Research Agenda. *International Studies Review*, 23(4), 1595-1618. <https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viab027>
- Hemery, J. (2005). Training for Public Diplomacy: an Evolutionary Perspective. In J. Melissen, *The New Public Diplomacy-Soft Power in International Relations* (pp. 196-209). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- HKW. (2023). *The Building* <https://www.hkw.de/en/the-house/the-building/the-building#main>
- Hocking, B., and Melissen, J. (2015). *Diplomacy in the Digital Age*. Hague: Clingendael-Netherlands Institute of International Relations.
- Hürriyet. (2021). *Son dakika haberi: Osman Kavala paylaşımı yapan büyükelçiler Dışişleri Bakanlığı'na çağrıldı*. Hürriyet. <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/son-dakika-haberi-osman-kavala-paylasimi-yapan-buyukelciler-disisleri-bakanligina-cagildi-41920031>
- IMD World Competitiveness Center. (2023). *World Digital Competitiveness Ranking 2022*. <https://www.imd.org/centers/wcc/world-competitiveness-center/rankings/world-digital-competitiveness-ranking/>
- Impekoven, H. (2013). *Die Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung und das Ausländerstudium in Deutschland 1925–1945*. Bonn: Bonn University Press. Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung. <https://www.humboldt-foundation.de/entdecken/ueber-die-humboldt-stiftung/geschichte>
- Independent. (2018). *Bee stung: Was Jamal Khashoggi the first casualty in a Saudi cyberwar?* <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/jamal-khashoggi-saudi-arabia-cyberwar-trolls-bee-army-missing-journalist-turkey-us-a8591051.html>
- Indian Strategic Studies Forum. (2022). *World Soft Power Index 2022*. New Delhi: Indian Strategic Studies Forum.
- Ingenhoff, D. and Chariatte, J. (2020). *Solving the Public Diplomacy Puzzle-Developing a 360-degree Listening and Evaluation Approach to Assess Country Images*. Los Angeles: Figueroa Press.
- Instagram. (2021). *What is a verified badge on Instagram?*. <https://help.instagram.com/733907830039577>

- Ipsos. (2022). *Anholt Ipsos Nation Brands Index (NBI)*. (2021, September). <https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/2021-09/Anholt-Ipsos-Place-Branding-09-2021.pdf>
- Ipsos. (2023). *Anholt Ipsos Nation Brands Index (NBI) 2023*. <https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news/documents/2023-10/NBI-2023-Press-Release-Supplemental-Deck-December-23.pdf>
- Ischinger, W., and Bunde, T. (2015). “Neue deutsche Diplomatie?”. *Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik*, 8(1), 313-333. DOI 10.1007/s12399-014-0462-4
- ITU. (2023). *Internet use*. <https://www.itu.int/itu-d/reports/statistics/2022/11/24/ff22-internet-use/>
- TÜİK. (2022). *İstatistiklerle Gençlik 2021*. (2022, May 17). <https://data.tuik.gov.tr/Bulten/Index?p=İstatistiklerle-Gençlik-2021-45634#:~:text=T%C3%9C%C4%B0K%20Kurumsal&text=Adrese%20Dayal%C4%B1%20N%C3%BCfus%20Kay%C4%B1t%20Sistemi,971%20bin%20289%20ki%C5%9Fi%20oldu.>
- Izadi, F. (2016). US Public Diplomacy: A Theoretical Treatise. *The Journal of Arts Management, Law, and Society*, 46(1), 13-21, DOI: [10.1080/10632921.2015.1137093](https://doi.org/10.1080/10632921.2015.1137093).
- Kalın, İ. (2011). Soft Power and Public Diplomacy in Turkey. *PERCEPTIONS*, 16(3), 5-23, <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/816442>.
- Kampf, R., et al. (2015). Digital Diplomacy 2.0? A Cross-national Comparison of Public Engagement in Facebook and Twitter. *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, 10(4), 331-362. DOI:10.1163/1871191X-12341318.
- Kamu Diplomasisi Enstitüsü. (2022). *Amaç ve Hedefler*. <https://kamudiplomasisi.org/amac-hedefler>
- Kavada, A. (2015). Creating the collective: social media, the Occupy Movement and its constitution as a collective actor. *Information, Communication & Society*, 18(8), 872-886. DOI: [10.1080/1369118X.2015.1043318](https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2015.1043318)
- Kılınç, Barış. (Ed.). (2016), *Kamu Diplomasisi ve Uluslararası Halkla İlişkiler*, Eskişehir: Anadolu Üniversitesi Yayınları.

- KI-Observatorium. (2023). *Über das KI-Observatorium*. <https://www.ki-observatorium.de/das-ki-observatorium/ueber-das-ki-observatorium>
- Kırılmaz, M. and Atak, F. (2015). Kamu Mali Yönetiminde Şeffaflık ve Hesap Verebilirlik Araçları: Faaliyet Raporları. *Ombudsman Akademik Dergisi*. Yıl: 2, Sayı: 3 (Temmuz-Aralık). <https://dergipark.org.tr/en/download/issue-file/1441>
- KI Strategie Deutschland. (2023). *Künstliche Intelligenz (KI) ist ein Schlüssel zur Welt von morgen*. <https://www.ki-strategie-deutschland.de/home.html>
- Kim, H. (2017). Bridging the Theoretical Gap between Public Diplomacy and Cultural Diplomacy. *The Korean Journal of International Studies*, 15(2), 293-326. <https://doi.org/10.14731/kjis.2017.08.15.2.293>
- Kleinman, Z. (2022). *Elon Musk's Starlink to help strengthen internet in remote UK places*. BBC News. <https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-63819322>
- Korkmaz, Z. (1973). Yunus Emre ve Anadolu Türkçesinin Kuruluşundaki Yeri. *Türkoloji Dergisi*, 5(1), 13-19.
- Koschwitz, H. (1986). Diplomatie und Öffentlichkeit. *Beiträge zur Konfliktforschung*.
- Köksoy, E. (2021). Türkiye’de Kamu Diplomasisi Akademik Literatürü Üzerine Bir İnceleme: Medya, İletişim ve Halkla İlişkiler Çalışmaları Alanı Olarak Kamu Diplomasisi. *Türkiye Araştırmaları Literatür Dergisi*, 19(38), 631-684. <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/2082683>
- Köse, E. (2017). Dijital Diplomasi'nin Sosyo-Ekonomik Ve Sosyo-Politik Yapıya Etkisi. *Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi*, 22 (Kayfor 15 Özel Sayısı), 2347-2370.
- Lee, S. T., and Lin, J. (2016). An Integrated Approach to Public Diplomacy and Public Relations: A Five-Year Analysis of the Information Subsidies of the United States, China, and Singapore. *International Journal of Strategic Communication*, 11(1), 1-17. DOI: [10.1080/1553118X.2016.1226173](https://doi.org/10.1080/1553118X.2016.1226173)
- Lehmann, K. D. (2018). Mehr als nur Vokabeln: Deutsche Sprache als Integrationsmotor. In O. Zimmermann, T. Geißler , and O. Zimmermann (Ed.), *Die Dritte Säule: Beiträge zur Auswärtiger Kultur- und Bildungspolitik* (pp. 200-203). Berlin: Deutscher Kulturrat e.V.

- Lehmann, K. D. (2018). Ein wichtiger Vermittler: Das Goethe-Institut als Ermöglicher Auswärtiger Kultur- und Bildungspolitik. In O. Zimmermann, T. Geißler, and O. Zimmermann (Ed.), *Die Dritte Säule: Beiträge zur Auswärtiger Kultur- und Bildungspolitik* (pp. 197-199). Berlin: Deutscher Kulturrat e.V.
- Lemke, T. and Habegger, M. (2021). Diplomat or Troll? The Case Against Digital Diplomacy. In C. Bjola, and R. Zaiotti (Ed.), *Digital diplomacy and international organisations: autonomy, legitimacy and contestation* (pp. 229-265). Oxon and New York: Routledge.
- Leonard, M. (2002). Diplomacy by Other Means. *Foreign Policy*(132), 48-56. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3183455>.
- Linden Lab. (2021). *About Linden Lab*. (2021, December 5). <https://www.lindenlab.com/about>
- Loban, R. (2017). Digitising Diplomacy: Grand Strategy Video Games as an Introductory Tool for Learning Diplomacy and International Relations. *Proceedings of DIGRA 2017. 14(1)*. Melbourne: Digital Games Research Association.
- Lowy Institute. (2022, September 26). *Global Diplomacy Index*. https://globaldiplomacyindex.lowyinstitute.org/country_rank.html#
- Lüfkens, M. (2022). *The Most Followed World Leaders on Social Media 2022*. Medium. <https://medium.com/digital-diplomacy/the-most-followed-world-leaders-on-social-media-2022-193bb9d89d8d>
- Magdowski, I. J. (2005). Auswärtige Kulturpolitik als Ziel oder Mittel?. *Kulturpolitische Mitteilungen* (110), 59-60. https://www.kupoge.de/kumi/pdf/kumi110/KuMi110_59-60.pdf
- Make it in Germany. (2022). *Über Uns*. (2022, October 25). <https://www.make-it-in-germany.com/de/ueber-uns/make-it-in-germany>
- Manfredi, J. L. (2019). *Die Rolle der öffentlichen Diplomatie im digitalen Zeitalter*. Barcelona, Diplocat. <https://diplocat.cat/media/upload/arxius/publicacions/AgoraDP/AgDP1-DiplomaciaPublicaEraDigital-DE.pdf>
- Manor, I. (2016). What is Digital Diplomacy, and how is it Practiced around the World? A brief introduction . *The 2016 Annual Review of the Diplomatist Magazine*.

- Manor, I. (2018). *The Digitalization of Diplomacy: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Terminology. Working Paper No 2.* Oxford Digital Diplomacy Research Group Working Paper Series.
- Manor, I. (2019). *The Digitalization of Public Diplomacy.* Oxford: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Manor, I. (2023). The AI Moves In: ChatGPT's Impact on Digital Diplomacy, Digidipblog.com, <https://digidipblog.com/2023/02/21/the-ai-moves-in-chatgpts-impact-on-digital-diplomacy/>.
- Matei, A. (2020). *The age of blunt diplomacy? Twitter can be used to escalate global conflict, study says.* The Guardian. <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/jul/21/twitter-global-conflict-study-technology>
- McClory, J. (2021). *Socially Distanced Diplomacy.* Sanctuary Counsel & USC Center on Public Diplomacy. https://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/sites/default/files/Sanctuary%2BCounsel%2Bx%2BCPD_Socially%2BDistanced%2BDiplomacy%2BReport_May%2B2021.pdf
- Melissen, J. (2005). *The New Public Diplomacy Soft Power in International Relations.* Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Merickova, L. (2014). Alternative Approaches to Public Diplomacy. *Polish Sociological Review*, 187(3), 351-366. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24371634>
- Merriam-Webster. (2022a). *Digital Divide.* <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/digital%20divide>
- Merriam-Webster. (2022b). *Cryptocurrency.* <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cryptocurrency>
- Monocle. (2023). *Soft Power Survey 2023-2024.* <https://monocle.com/magazine/issues/169/persuasive-manoeuvres/?ajax=true>
- Nas, A. (2021). *Ulus Markalama: Dünyadan Örneklerle Kuram ve Uygulama.* İstanbul: Kriter Yayınevi
- National World. (2022). *Starbucks: is coffee chain going cashless in UK, is it legal and why is #BoycottStarbucks trending on Twitter?* (2022, August 30).

<https://www.nationalworld.com/lifestyle/food-and-drink/starbucks-is-coffee-chain-going-cashless-uk-is-it-legal-why-is-boycottstarbucks-trending-twitter-3824346>

New York Post. (2022). *Musk says Twitter to launch gold, grey checks alongside blue verified mark*. (2022, November 25). <https://nypost.com/2022/11/25/musk-says-twitter-to-launch-gold-grey-checks-alongside-blue-verified-mark/>

Nye, J. S. (2008). Public Diplomacy and Soft Power. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Public Diplomacy in a Changing World* (616), 94-109. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716207311699>.

Nye, J. S. (2017). Soft power: the origins and political progress of a concept. *Palgrave Communications*, 3, Article 17008. <https://doi.org/10.1057/palcomms.2017.8>

Nye, J. S. (2010). Responding to my critics and concluding thoughts. In I. Parmar, and M. Cox (Ed.), *Soft Power and US Foreign Policy - Theoretical, historical and contemporary perspectives* (pp. 215-227). Abingdon, New York: Routledge.

OECD. (2019). *Going Digital: Shaping Policies, Improving Lives*. Paris: OECD Publishing. <https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264312012-en>.

OECD. (2021). *Government at a Glance 2021*. Paris: OECD Publishing. <https://doi.org/10.1787/1c258f55-en>

OECD. (2022). *Glossary of the Statistical Terms*. <https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=4719>

Öztemel, İ. Ş. (2021, March 30). Türk Dış Politikası'nda Sosyal Medya ve Dijital Platformların Kullanımı: Karabağ (44 Gün) Savaşı Örneği. *TUIÇ Akademi*. <https://www.tuicakademi.org/turk-dis-politikasinda-sosyal-medya-ve-dijital-platformlarin-kullanimi-karabag-44-gun-savasi-ornegi/>

Pajtinka, E. (2019). Public Diplomacy as a Theoretical Problem: Searching for a Definition. *EJTS European Journal of Transformation Studies*, 7(2), 21-32. <https://czasopisma.bg.ug.edu.pl/index.php/journal-transformation/article/view/5006>.

Pamment, J. (2015). Media Influence, Ontological Transformation, and Social Change: Conceptual Overlaps Between Development Communication and Public Diplomacy. *Communication Theory*, 25(2), 188-207. <https://doi.org/10.1111/comt.12064>

- Payne, G., et al. (2011). Grassroots 2.0: Public Diplomacy in the Digital Age. *Comunicação Pública*, 6(10), 45-70. <https://doi.org/10.4000/cp.422>
- Portland. (2015). *The Soft Power 30 Index - 2015*. https://softpower30.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/The_Soft_Power_30_Report_2015-1.pdf
- Portland. (2019). *The Soft Power 30: A Global Ranking of Soft Power 2019*. <https://softpower30.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/The-Soft-Power-30-Report-2019-1.pdf>
- Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye Digital Transformation Office. (2022a). *Türkiye's e-Government Gateway Services Now Data Charge-Free*. (2022, August 17). <https://cbddo.gov.tr/en/news/6454/kotasiz-e-devlet-donemi-basliyor>
- Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye Digital Transformation Office. (2022b). *Memorandum of Understanding on Digital Government Signed with Serbia*. (2022, September 9). <https://cbddo.gov.tr/en/news/6485/sirbistan-ile-dijital-devlet-alaninda-is-birligine-iliskin-mutabakat-zapti-imzalandi>
- Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye Directorate of Communications. (2022). *Four international agreements published in the Official Gazette*. <https://www.iletisim.gov.tr/english/haberler/detay/four-international-agreements-published-in-the-official-gazette>
- Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye Directorate of Communications. (2023). *About the Türkiye Brand Office*. <https://www.turkiyebrandforum.com/about-the-turkiye-brand-office>
- Rashica, V. (2019). Digital diplomacy: aspects, approaches and practical use. *European Perspectives – International Scientific Journal on European Perspectives*, 10(1), 21-39. https://www.europeanperspectives.org/storage/24/DIGITAL-DIPLOMACY_Rashica.pdf
- Reuters. (2018). *A Canadian tweet in a Saudi king's court crosses a red line*. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-canada-tweet-idUSKBN1KV2FC>
- Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2013a). *Document of understanding on cooperation in the field of information technologies between the Foreign Ministries of Afghanistan and Turkey was signed in Ankara*. <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/document-of->

understanding-on-cooperation-in-the-field-of-information-technologies-between-the-foreign-ministries-of-afghanistan-and-turkey-was-signed-in-ankara.en.mfa

Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2013b). *Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in Information Technologies between The Foreign Ministries of Turkey and Somalia was signed in Ankara*. <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/memorandum-of-understanding-on-cooperation-in-information-technologies-between-the-foreign-ministries-of-turkey-and-somalia-wa.en.mfa>

Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2014). *Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in Information Technologies between The Foreign Ministries of Turkey and Yemen is signed in Ankara*. <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/memorandum-of-understanding-on-cooperation-in-information-technologies-between-the-foreign-ministries.en.mfa>

Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2022). *Türkiye's Enterprising and Humanitarian Foreign Policy*. (2022, October 6). <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/synopsis-of-the-turkish-foreign-policy.en.mfa>

Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2023a). *Peaceful Resolution of Conflicts and Mediation*. (2023, February 9). <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/resolution-of-conflicts-and-mediation.en.mfa>

Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2023b). *Türkiye's Contributions to International Community's Efforts to Fight Terrorism*. (2023, February 9). Retrieved from The Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs: https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye_s-contributions-to-international-community_s-efforts-to-fight-terrorism.en.mfa

Reputation Squad. (2023). *The Digital Diplomacy Index*. <https://digital-diplomacy-index.com/index/>

Rhee, K. et al. (2023). Perceived Motives of Public Diplomacy Influence Foreign Public Opinion. *Political Behavior*, 2, 1–21. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-022-09849-4>

Riordan, S. (2021, December 6). *Cyber Diplomacy vs. Digital Diplomacy: A Terminological Distinction*. USC Center on Public Diplomacy: <https://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/blog/cyber-diplomacy-vs-digital-diplomacy-terminological-distinction>

- Saliu, H. (2020). Public Diplomacy and Related Concepts from the Perspective of Lasswell's Communication Model. *JAHR*, 11/2(22), 357-376. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.21860/j.11.2.2>
- Sandre, A. (2015). Introduction: The Road to Diplomacy 3.0. In A. Sandre, *Digital Diplomacy: Conversations on Innovation in Foreign Policy*. London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing.
- Schell, J. (2003). The Other Superpower, *The Nation*. <https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/other-superpower/>
- Sevin, E. (2015). Pathways of connection: An analytical approach to the impacts of public diplomacy. *Public Relations Review*, 41(4), 562–568. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pubrev.2015.07.003>
- Sevin, E., and Ingenhoff, D. (2018). Public Diplomacy on Social Media. *International Journal of Communication* (12), 3663–3685. <https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/download/8726/2449>
- Shapiro, R. Y., and Page, B. I. (1988). Foreign Policy and the Rational Public. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 32(2), 211-247.
- Sharp, P. (2009). Dumb public diplomacy. In P. Sharp, *Diplomatic Theory of International Relations* (pp. 266 - 292). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Signitzer, B. H., and Coombs, T. (1992). Public Relations and Public Diplomacy: Conceptual Convergences. *Public Relations Review*, 18(2), 137-147.
- Sırt, E., and Ergenç, E. (2021). Kamu Diplomasisinde Halkla İlişkilerin Rolü ve Önemi: Covid-19 Salgını Sonrasında Türkiye'nin Dış Yardımları Örneği. *İletişim Çalışmaları Dergisi*, 7(2), 263-290. <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/1562584>
- Stanzel, V. (2018). *New Realities in Foreign Affairs: Diplomacy in the 21st Century*. Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP).
- Spiegel. (2007). Sweden Opens Virtual Embassy in Second Life. <https://www.spiegel.de/international/cyber-diplomacy-sweden-opens-virtual-embassy-in-second-life-a-463073.html>

- Stanzel, V., and Voelsen, D. (2021). *Diplomatie und Künstliche Intelligenz*. Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. [https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/stu*dien/2021S18 Diplomatie und KI.pdf](https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/stu*dien/2021S18_Diplomatie_und_KI.pdf)
- Statista. (2023a). *Number of internet and social media users worldwide as of October 2023*. <https://www.statista.com/statistics/617136/digital-population-worldwide/>
- Statista. (2023b). *Share of adults who use social media as a source of news in selected countries worldwide as of February 2023*. <https://www.statista.com/statistics/718019/social-media-news-source/>
- Statista. (2023c). *Leading mobile apps worldwide in 2022, by downloads*. <https://www.statista.com/statistics/1285960/top-downloaded-mobile-apps-worldwide/>
- Statista. (2023d). *Countries with the largest digital populations in the world as of January 2023*. <https://www.statista.com/statistics/262966/number-of-internet-users-in-selected-countries/>
- Statista. (2023e). *Share of households with internet access in Turkey from 2012 to 2022*. <https://www.statista.com/statistics/702247/household-internet-access-in-turkey/>
- Statista. (2023f). *Share of households with internet access in Germany from 2009 to 2022*. <https://www.statista.com/statistics/377677/household-internet-access-in-germany/>
- Statista. (2023g). *Number of social network users in selected countries in 2022 and 2027*. <https://www.statista.com/statistics/278341/number-of-social-network-users-in-selected-countries/>
- Statista. (2023h). *Active social network penetration in selected countries and territories as of January 2023*. <https://www.statista.com/statistics/282846/regular-social-networking-usage-penetration-worldwide-by-country/>
- Statista. (2023i). *Estimated number of universities worldwide as of July 2023, by country*. <https://www.statista.com/statistics/918403/number-of-universities-worldwide-by-country/#statisticContainer>
- Statista. (2023j). *Global gaming penetration 2022, by country*. <https://www.statista.com/statistics/195768/global-gaming-reach-by-country/>

- Suyono, R., and Hanathasia, M. (2014). Analysis of Public Relations Model's Utility in Public Diplomacy Activities via Twitter. *Journal Communication Spectrum*, 4(1).
- Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. (2020). *Coherent foreign policy in the digital space*.
<https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/fdfa/fdfa/aktuell/newsuebersicht/2020/11/digitalaussenpolitik-strategie.html>
- SWP. (2023). *Funding of SWP*. SWP. <https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/swp/about-us/fundamentals/funding>
- Szondi, G. (2008). *Public Diplomacy and Nation Branding: Conceptual Similarities and Differences*. The Hague: Netherlands Institution of International Relations 'Clingendael'.
- T.C. Cumhurbaşkanlığı Dijital Dönüşüm Ofisi. (2023). *Hakkımızda*.
<https://cbddo.gov.tr/hakkimizda/>
- T.C. Cumhurbaşkanlığı İletişim Başkanlığı. (2020). *Sosyal Medya Kullanım Kılavuzu*. Ankara: Cumhuriyeti İletişim Başkanlığı Yayınları.
- T.C. Cumhurbaşkanlığı İletişim Başkanlığı. (2022a). *Kamu Diplomasisi Nedir?* İstanbul: Cumhurbaşkanlığı İletişim Başkanlığı Yayınları.
- T.C. Cumhurbaşkanlığı İletişim Başkanlığı. (2022b). “*Ulusal Kamu Diplomasisi Strateji Belgesi ve Eylem Planı*” hazırlandı.
<https://www.iletisim.gov.tr/turkce/haberler/detay/ulusal-kamu-diplomasisi-strateji-belgesi-ve-eylem-plani-hazirlandi>
- T.C. Cumhurbaşkanlığı İletişim Başkanlığı. (2023a). *Hakkımızda*.
<https://www.iletisim.gov.tr/turkce/kurum-hakkinda>
- T.C. Cumhurbaşkanlığı İletişim Başkanlığı. (2023b). *Cumhurbaşkanlığı İletişim Başkanlığı, meta evrende yer alan ilk kamu kurumu*.
<https://www.iletisim.gov.tr/turkce/haberler/detay/cumhurbaskanligi-iletisim-baskanligi-meta-evrende-yer-alan-ilk-kamu-kurumu>
- T.C. Cumhurbaşkanlığı Mevzuat Bilgi Sistemi. (2018). *Cumhurbaşkanlığı Teşkilatı Hakkında Cumhurbaşkanlığı Kararnamesi No.1*.

<https://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/mevzuat?MevzuatNo=1&MevzuatTur=19&MevzuatTertip=5>

- T.C. Cumhurbaşkanlığı Strateji ve Bütçe Başkanlığı. (2019). *On Birinci Kalkınma Planı 2019-2023*. https://www.sbb.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/On_Birinci_Kalkinma_Plani-2019-2023.pdf
- T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı. (2019). *T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı 2019-2023 Stratejik Planı*. <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/BAKANLIK/2019-2023-stratejik-plani.pdf>
- T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı. (2021). *2021 Yılı İdare Faaliyet Raporu*. <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/BAKANLIK/2021-idare-Faaliyet-Raporu.pdf>
- T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı. *2022 Yılı Performans Programı*. <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/BAKANLIK/DB-2022-yili-performans-programi.pdf>
- T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı. (2022, November 21). *Diplomatik Arşiv Dairesi Başkanlığı*. <http://diad.mfa.gov.tr/diad/TDA-sunum2.pdf>
- T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı. (2023a). *Türkiye'nin Kalkınma İşbirliği: Genel Özellikleri Ve En Az Gelişmiş Ülkelere Yönelik Yaklaşımı*. <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiyenin-kalkinma-isbirligi.tr.mfa>
- T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı. (2023b). *2022 Yılı İdare Faaliyet Raporu*. http://www.sp.gov.tr/upload/xSPRapor/files/1jb9M+DISISLERI_BAKANLIGI_2022_IDARE_FAALİYET_RAPORU.pdf
- T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı. (2023c). *2023 Yılı Performans Programı*. <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/BAKANLIK/DB-2023-yili-performans-programi.pdf>
- TCDİSİLERİ. (2013, November 26). *Bilişim Uygulamaları ve Web Sitelerimiz* [Video]. Youtube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bY2Gc9HxkAU&t=131s&ab_channel=TCDİSİLERİ
- T.C. Kalkınma Bakanlığı. (2015). *2015-2018 Bilgi Toplumu Stratejisi ve Eylem Planı*. Ankara: T.C. Kalkınma Bakanlığı.
- T.C. Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı. (2023). *Türk Kültürü*. <https://www.ktb.gov.tr/TR-96255/turk-kulturu.html#:~:text=Asya%20Hun%20Devleti%2C%20tarihte%20bilinen, bulunmamakla%20birlikte%2C%20M.%C3%96>

- T.C. Sanayi ve Teknoloji Bakanlığı. (2019). 2023 Sanayi ve Teknoloji Stratejisi. Ankara.
- T.C. Sanayi ve Teknoloji Bakanlığı. (2022.). Ulusal Teknoloji Girişimciliği Stratejisi. Ankara.
- Tel Aviv University. (2016). *New Frontiers in Digital Diplomacy*.
https://english.tau.ac.il/event/digital_diplomacy
- Terranova, T.(2004). *Network Culture Politics for the Information Age*. London, Ann Arbor: Pluto Press.
- The 5G Infrastructure Association. (2021). *5G IA White Paper- European Vision for the 6G Network Ecosystem*. <https://5g-ppp.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/WhitePaper-6G-Europe.pdf>
- The Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence. (2023). *Community*.
<https://gpai.ai/community/>
- The German Games Industry Association. (2022). *The number of video game players in Germany continues to grow*. (2022, June 16). <https://www.game.de/en/the-number-of-video-game-players-in-germany-continues-to-grow/>
- The Good Country Index. (2023, February 8). *The Good Country Index*.
<https://index.goodcountry.org/>
- The Sunday Times. (2021). *Tiny island nation opens the first real embassy in virtual world*. (2021, December 5). https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/tiny-island-nation-opens-the-first-real-embassy-in-virtual-world-c3phsx2n2r0digital-diplomacy-to-reach-out-to-the-arab-world/2019/12/20/4c8bfeee-20f1-11ea-b034-de7dc2b5199b_story.html
- The Washington Post. (2020). *Twitter outage affected National Weather Service office during a tornado warning*. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/weather/2020/07/16/twitter-outage-affected-national-weather-service-office-during-tornado-warning/>
- The World Bank. (2019). *Classifying countries by income*.
https://datatopics.worldbank.org/world-development-indicators/stories/the-classification-of-countries-by-income.html?cid=ECR_LI_worldbank_EN_EXT
- The World Bank. (2023a). *GDP (current US\$)*.
<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD>

- The World Bank. (2023b). *GNI (current US\$)*.
<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.MKTP.CD>
- TIKA. (2023). *Hakkımızda*. (2023, September 9). <https://www.tika.gov.tr/tr/sayfa/hakkimizda-14649>
- TRT. (2022). *Tarihçe* (2022, September 11). <https://www.trt.net.tr/kurumsal/tarihce>
- TRT Haber. (2022a). *Türk teknoloji şirketinin askeri metaverse uygulaması ilk kez NATO'da tanıtıldı*. <https://www.trthaber.com/haber/bilim-teknoloji/turk-teknoloji-sirketinin-askeri-metaverse-uygulamasi-ilk-kez-natoda-tanitildi-701333.html>
- TRT Haber. (2022b). *Savunma sanayii alanındaki ilk metaverse fuarı düzenlenecek*. <https://www.trthaber.com/haber/bilim-teknoloji/savunma-sanayii-alanindaki-ilk-metaverse-fuari-duzenlenecek-674448.html>
- TRT Haber. (2023). *Bakan Yerlikaya: 4,5 milyar paylaşımın yüzde 30'u bot hesaptan yapıldı*. <https://www.trthaber.com/haber/gundem/bakan-yerlikaya-45-milyar-paylasimin-yuzde-30u-bot-hesaptan-yapildi-802892.html>
- TÜİK. (2022). *Hanehalkı Bilişim Teknolojileri (BT) Kullanım Araştırması 2022*. [https://data.tuik.gov.tr/Bulten/Index?p=Hanehalki-Bilisim-Teknolojileri-\(BT\)-Kullanim-Arastirmasi-2022-45587](https://data.tuik.gov.tr/Bulten/Index?p=Hanehalki-Bilisim-Teknolojileri-(BT)-Kullanim-Arastirmasi-2022-45587)
- TÜİK. (2023). *Adrese Dayalı Nüfus Kayıt Sistemi Sonuçları 2022*. <https://data.tuik.gov.tr/Bulten/Index?p=Adrese-Dayali-Nufus-Kayit-Sistemi-Sonuclari-2022-49685>
- TÜSİAD. (2014). *Çalışma Raporu 2013*. https://tusiad.org/tr/faaliyet-raporlari/item/download/6410_6a916aab5d16e4212b444066396cf6cd
- Türkiye Diyanet Foundation. (2023a). *About Us*. <https://tdv.org/en-EN/about-us/>
- Türkiye Diyanet Foundation. (2023b). *TDV Tanıtım Kataloğu*, <https://indd.adobe.com/view/ef0d8309-89aa-463a-a10c-7c01bc293a34>
- Türkiye Maarif Vakfı. (2022). *Hakkımızda*. <https://turkiyemaarif.org/page/hakkimizda>
- Türkiye Maarif Vakfı. (2023). *Dünyada Maarif*. <https://turkiyemaarif.org/dunyada-maarif>
- Twiplomacy. (2012). *Twiplomacy Study 2012*. (2021, December 14). <https://www.twiplomacy.com/copy-of-twiplomacy-study-2013>

- Twiplomacy. (2021). *Twiplomacy Study 2020*. <https://www.twiplomacy.com/twiplomacy-study-2020>
- Twiplomacy. (2023). *Twiplomacy 2022: World Leader Power Ranking: Top 10*. <https://www.twiplomacy.com/top-10-world-leader-power-ranking>
- UN. (2022). *2022 E-Government Development Index*. <https://publicadministration.un.org/egovkb/Data-Center>
- UN DESA. (2022). *E-Government Survey 2022*. <https://desapublications.un.org/sites/default/files/publications/2022-09/Web%20version%20E-Government%202022.pdf>
- UNESCO Türkiye Milli Komisyonu. (2022). *UNESCO World Heritage List*. (2022, November 1). <https://www.unesco.org.tr/Pages/659/314/UNESCO-World-Heritage-List>
- UN Peacemaker. (2023). *Group of Friends of Mediation*. (2023, February 9). <https://peacemaker.un.org/friendsofmediation>
- USC Center on Public Diplomacy. (2021, December 5). *Public Diplomacy and Virtual Worlds*, https://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/research_project/public-diplomacy-and-virtual-worlds
- USC Center on Public Diplomacy. (2023). *What's PD*. <https://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/page/what-is-pd>
- Vanc, A. M., and Fitzpatrick, K. R. (2016). Scope and status of public diplomacy research by public relations scholars, 1990–2014. *Public Relations Review*, 42(3), 432-440. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pubrev.2015.07.012>
- Verrekia, B. (2017). *Digital Diplomacy and Its Effect on International Relations*. SIT School for International Training: https://digitalcollections.sit.edu/isp_collection/2596
- Vickers, R. (2004). The New Public Diplomacy: Britain and Canada Compared. *BJPIR*, 6, 182-194.
- Waltz, K. (1979). *Theory of International Politics*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Weigel, S. (2019). *Transnationale Auswärtige Kulturpolitik - Jenseits der Nationalkultur: Voraussetzungen und Perspektiven der Verschränkung von Innen und Außen*. Stuttgart: Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen.

- Westcott, N. (2008). *Digital Diplomacy: The Impact of the Internet on International Relations*. London: Oxford Internet Institute.
- Williams, H. and Drew, A. (2020). *Escalation by Tweet: Managing the new nuclear diplomacy*. London: Centre for Science and Security Studies - King's College London.
- Winkel, O. (2007). Electronic Government in Germany- a key future prospect, but expectations are exaggerated. In K. Zapotocsky, & C. Pracher, *Administration Innovative* (pp. 163-186). Linz.
- Wissen.de.(2022). *deutschland.de*. (2022, October 25). <https://www.wissen.de/deutschlandde>
- Wittkemper, G. and Kleindiek, R. (2003). BundOnline 2005 - The EGovernment Initiative of the German Federal Administration. *Journal of Political Marketing*, 2(3-4), 107-126. https://doi.org/10.1300/J199v02n03_07
- Wood, S. (2017). Rebranding the Nation: Germany's Image Politics. *International Politics*, 161-181.
- X.(2021). *About Verified Accounts*. (2021, December 20). <https://help.twitter.com/en/managing-your-account/about-twitter-verified-accounts>
- Yakaruç, U. (2017). A Critical Approach to Soft Power. *Bilis Eren Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, 6(2), 491-502. <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/393488>
- Yang, A., et al. (2012). Beyond a dyadic approach to public diplomacy: Understanding relationships in multipolar world. *Public Relations Review*. 38(5), 652-664. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pubrev.2012.07.005>
- Yazar, F. (2020). Türkiye’de Kamu Diplomasinin Kurumsallaşması. *Kriter*. Yıl 5, Sayı 49, <https://kriterdergi.com/medya-kritik/turkiyede-kamu-diplomasinin-kurumsallasmasi>
- YTB. (2023a). *Başkanlığımız*. <https://ytb.gov.tr/kurumsal/baskanlik>
- YTB. (2023b). *2022 Faaliyet Raporu*. Ankara: YTB. <https://dkp.blob.core.windows.net/kurumsal-multimedia/2022%20Y%C4%B1%C4%B1%20Faaliyet%20Raporu.pdf>

- Yun, S. H., and Toth, E. L. (2009). Future Sociological Public Diplomacy and the Role of Public Relations: Evolution of Public Diplomacy. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 53(4), 493–503.
- Yunus Emre Enstitüsü. (2023a). *Yunus Emre Enstitüsü*. <https://www.yee.org.tr/tr/kurumsal/yunus-emre-enstitusu>.
- Yunus Emre Enstitüsü. (2023b). *Vizyon – Misyon*. <https://www.yee.org.tr/tr/kurumsal/vizyon-misyon>
- Zaharna, R. (2018). *Digital Diplomacy as Diplomatic Sites: Emotion, Identity & Do-it-Yourself Politics*. Berlin: SWP.
- ZfA. (2022). *Auslandsschulwesen in Zahlen*. <https://www.auslandsschulwesen.de/Webz/ZfA/DE/Services/Publikationen/auslandsschulwesen-in-zahlen.html>
- Zhang, J. (2013). A Strategic Issue Management (SIM) Approach to Social Media Use in Public Diplomacy. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 57(9), 1312 - 1331.
- Zhang, J. (2019). Compassion versus manipulation; narratives versus rational arguments: a PD radar to chart the terrain of public diplomacy. *Place Brand Public Diplomacy* 16, 195–211 (2020). <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41254-019-00146-2>
- Zöllner, O. (2020). Germany's Public Diplomacy - Translating Domestic Discourses of Modernity and Culture, Past and Present. In N. Snow and N. J. Cull (Eds.), *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy* (pp. 254–263). Routledge.