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
**SEÇİLİ ŞİİR (NAZIM) VE DÜZYAZIDA (NESİR) TARTIŞMAYA
DAYALI BİR MODEL: WILDE, MAUGHAM VE ROSENBERG**

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**AN ARGUMENT-BASED MODEL IN SELECTED
POETRY AND PROSE: WILDE, MAUGHAM AND ROSENBERG**

İlker ÖZÇELİK

PhD Thesis

**SUPERVISOR
Prof. Dr. Huseynaga RZAYEV**

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Doktora tezi olarak sunduğum “**AN ARGUMENT-BASED MODEL IN SELECTED POETRY AND PROSE: WILDE, MAUGHAM AND ROSENBERG**” adlı çalışmanın, tezin proje safhasından sonuçlanmasına kadarki bütün süreçlerde bilimsel ahlak ve geleneklere aykırı düşecek bir yardıma başvurulmaksızın yazıldığını ve yararlandığım eserlerin Bibliyografya’da gösterilenlerden oluştuğunu, bunlara atıf yapılarak yararlanılmış olduğunu belirtir ve onurumla beyan ederim.

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ÖZET
SEÇİLİ ŞİİR (NAZIM) VE DÜZYAZIDA (NESİR) TARTIŞMAYA DAYALI BİR
MODEL: WILDE, MAUGHAM VE ROSENBERG

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Bu doktora çalışması, farklı argümantasyon (Tartışma) modellerinin temel anlayışlarını şiir (nazım) ve düzyazı (nesir) ile bütünleştirerek bahsi geçen türlerin analizinde kullanılacak birleşik bir yaklaşım sunar. Dil kullanımının farklı katmanlarını yorumlamak için önemli etkiler sunar. Argümantasyon (tartışma) analizinin ve değerlendirmesinin edebi analizin teorik ve metodolojik araç setine sistematik bir şekilde uygulanması farklı edebi türlerin ampirik açıdan yeterli bir şekilde yorumlanmasına ve eleştirilmesine imkan sağlamıştır. Seçili edebi metinlerin anlaşılmasında ve değerlendirilmesinde farklı tartışma model ve yöntemlerinin uygulanması bu çalışmanın temel dayanağını oluşturmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, araştırmamız farklı işlevsel türlerin analizine yeni bir yönelim ve yaklaşımı benimsemektedir ve edebi anlatıların yorumlanmasında hayati öneme sahip olan tartışma teorisinin araştırılmasını vurgulamaya çalışmaktadır. Tartışma teorisinin tarihsel gelişimi ve günlük hayatın bir çok katmanına ve çeşitli disiplinlere uygulanması tartışılmış ve ayrıntılı olarak ele alınmıştır. Argümantasyonun özellikle şiir ve düzyazı olmak üzere farklı edebi metinlerde nasıl işlev gördüğünü göstermeye çalıştık. Çalışma, esas olarak, Isaac Rosenberg'in *Break of the Day in the Trenches*, W. S. Maugham'ın *The Unconquered* (1943) ve O. Wilde'in *A Woman of No Importance* (1893) adlı eserlerinden alıntıları ve gazetelerden örnekleri tartışmacı açıdan analiz etmektedir. Aristotelesçi tasım ve Toulmin tartışma modeli seçili edebi alıntıların analizinde en önemli araçlarımız olmuştur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: tartışma teorisi, nesir, nazım, edebi anlatı, tartışma modelleri

ABSTRACT
AN ARGUMENT-BASED MODEL IN SELECTED POETRY AND PROSE:
WILDE, MAUGHAM AND ROSENBERG

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Advisor: Prof. Dr. Huseynaga RZAYEV

This dissertation aims at providing a comprehensive approach to the analysis of different functional styles by integrating the main insights of different argumentative models into poetry and prose. It provides significant implications for interpreting different spheres of language use. Systematic introduction of argumentation analysis and evaluation into the theoretical and methodological toolkit of literary analysis allows for an empirically adequate understanding and critiquing of various literary genres. The application of different argumentation models and methods to interpret and evaluate the selected literary texts are the major premises of the study at hand. In this respect, our study takes a new orientation and approach to the analysis of different functional styles, and tries to emphasize the study of argumentation theory which is essential to interpret literary narratives. The historical development of the argumentation theory and its application to the many spheres of daily life and various disciplines have been discussed and dealt with in detail. We have tried to demonstrate how the argumentation functions and work in literary texts in particular poetry and prose. The study analyses the *Break of the Day in the Trenches* by Isaac Rosenberg, excerpts from W.S. Maugham's *The Unconquered* (1943) and O. Wilde's *A Woman of No Importance* (1893) as well as examples from newspapers in terms of argumentative perspective. Aristotelian syllogism and Toulmin model of argumentation have been our major tools to analyse the selected literary narratives.

Key words: argumentation theory, poetry, prose, literary narrative, models of argumentation

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- **DA** Discourse Analysis
- **DHA** The Discourse-Historical Approach
- **IRT** Interpretation Research and Theory
- **LWS** Lvov–Warsaw School
- **NR** New Rhetoric
- **RT** Relevance Theory
- **SAT** Speech Act Theory
- **SL** Source Language
- **ST** Source Text
- **TL** Target Language

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Introduction

“What a piece of work is a man! How noble in reason, how infinite in faculty! In form and moving how express and admirable! In action how like an angel, in apprehension how like a god! The beauty of the world. The paragon of animals.”

(Hamlet, Act 2, Scene 2, Page 13, Shakespeare)

The present study examines the argumentation in different functional styles of language where participants' reasoning may acquire a more positive light. In this respect, a variety of definitions of the notion argumentation have been proposed, and we aim at providing a functional and more comprehensive definition of argumentation.

The heightened interest in the argumentation research starts with the publication of *Le Traité de l'argumentation: La nouvelle rhétorique* by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958) and its translation into English as *The New Rhetoric* (1969). Since then, as some scholars point out (cf: Fischer and Gottweis 2012; Brambilla 2013), there has been an ever growing amount of attention in argumentation, with researches flowering in many contentions and directions, both on theoretical and practical basis. Various disciplines, therefore, have contributed to the study of argumentation, initially stemming from classical rhetoric, logic and dialectic and tending towards a condition of complete autonomy. The past six decades have seen increasingly rapid advances in the field of argumentation, emphasizing its structure as an international phenomenon, which leads to a deep-rooted, full-fledged, and a flourishing field of research. Due to its multi-disciplinary and interdisciplinary matrix, argumentation research provides important theoretical and methodological insights into various related disciplines such as anthropology, education, historical studies, information technology, journalism, language and linguistics, law, literary studies, mathematical sciences, logic, politics, philosophy, psychology, rhetoric, communication studies, and sociology (Van Eemeren et al 1996: ix). Many scholars now draw attention to the interdisciplinary nature of argumentation. Feteris and Kloosterhuis (2009), for example, argues that “the study of legal argumentation draws its data, assumptions and methods from disciplines such as legal theory, legal philosophy, logic, argumentation theory, rhetoric, linguistics, literary

theory, philosophy, sociology, and artificial intelligence” (p. 1). Or, an argumentative approach can be used to create effective public health campaigns in health communication with an attempt to raise awareness. These, in turn, make it necessary to re-emphasize the key role played by argumentation study as an interdisciplinary field of inquiry.

If we now turn to argumentation studies from a theoretical aspect, we stand quite amazed at the superabundance of the types of definitions given to the concept of argumentation which have been thoroughly expounded by Perelman and Toulmin, the two towering figures in modern argumentation research. Their seminal works, *Le Traité de l'argumentation* (with Lucie Olbrechts-Tytesa) and *Uses of Argument*, both published respectively in 1958, emphasize a remarkable state of interest in argumentation studies. The similarity ends with the year of publication since neither of the two scholars approach the argumentation from the same perspective: Perelman's argumentation theory builds on the rejection of Cartesian logic, while in Toulmin's thinking argumentation encompasses logic. Marzocchi, in his cutting edge papers, (1994, 1997, 1998) calls for a standardized integration of argumentation into Interpretation Research and Theory (IRT in furtherance). Concerning the interpretation research, Brambilla (2013) puts it in the following way:

First, going beyond the definitional controversy revolving around the term “argumentation” and only focusing on interpreting implications, argumentation is “a mode of discourse that is so often the input of an interpreting process”) Marzocchi 1997: 182). In other words, interpreters are often called upon to interpret “argumentative situations” (Plantin 2005: 53), i.e. communicative events whose purpose is the discursive “solution” of a conflict between different standpoints regarding one specific question. In this respect, the study of argumentation here merely appears as a theoretical framework for analysing a specific mode of discourse that is frequently adopted by source language (SL) speakers (Marzocchi 1997: 182). (p. 14)

Rather than abstract model-dependent processes, the approach attempts to interpret what representatives of different functional styles do when they do it, to find out in the way their intentionalized and contextualized information is communicated and such information is interpreted and used by those receiving it. This, in turn, requires a close examination of the social formation of the normative aspects of information suggested/produced by those who struggle for supremacy, what often compounds problem solving and becomes a source of uncertainty and ambiguity (Fischer and

Gottweis 2012). This, therefore, gives rise to complexity rather than consensus/help in its resolution, and a chaotic world of communication accentuates the non-linear and often contradictory nature of contemporary transformation of social life due to which communication process (in terms of its being a success) needs emphasizing/strengthening practical argumentation, judgments in different genres, poetry, prose, narrative and rhetorical analysis, to name a few (Gottweis 2006). Starting with the early 1990s, as some leading theorists put it, argumentative approach and research have become more sophisticated and developed as a major strand in the study of communication theory today (Fischer and Gottweiss 2012; Peters 2004). Looking at the argumentation research in different genres, Brambilla (2013) states:

The potential of the argumentative approach to interpreting any genre lies in the identification of patterns (Marzocchi 1997: 181), providing information on recurrent lexico-syntagmatic choices determining the pragmatic force and argumentative orientation of a given discourse. Therefore, the study of, for instance, political argumentation is particularly suitable, in the light of its predictable (Zarefsky 2009: 115) and recurrent character (Reisigl 2010: 243). The application of the argumentation theory to interpreting research raises serious relevance issues (Marzocchi 1998: 3). Basically, there are two approaches in argumentation studies, the normative or formal and the descriptive or content related. While the former aims at defining rules for effective ways to argue in a rational, sound way the latter investigates “how discourse is used” and mainly relates to discourse analysis practices (Marzocchi 1997: 181). Given that interpreters are not required to argue in a specific way, as their task is to reproduce the argumentation of others, interpreting research can only benefit from studies looking for descriptivity rather than normativity (Crevatin 1998: xv-xvi). (p. 15-16)

This research has gone some way towards enhancing our understanding of these developments and it makes several contributions to the current literature. With this in mind, it also attempts to further advance the argumentative direction in different functional styles of language-in-use.

The dissertation consists of three chapters, as well as an introduction, conclusion, pedagogical implications, perspectives and references. The introduction concisely introduces the problem and the required theoretical starting points. It also identifies the scope and methodology of the research, establishes the so-called “Labour Division” among the chapters and gives adequate information about the data collection from different sources.

The Aim of the Study

This dissertation aims at providing a comprehensive approach to the analysis of different functional styles by integrating the main insights of different argumentative models into poetry and prose. It provides significant implications for interpreting different spheres of language use. Systematic introduction of argumentation analysis and evaluation into the theoretical and methodological toolkit of literary analysis allows for an empirically adequate understanding and critiquing of various literary genres.

The application of different argumentation models and methods to interpret and evaluate the selected literary texts are the major premises of the study at hand. This research offers some possible ways and models to apply argumentation theory to analysis of prose and poetry. For this purpose, we attempt to shed light to the following aspects of the use of argumentation in different forms of literature (poetry and prose) and editorials by applying models of argumentation and analysing arguments found in them.

The Scope of the Study

When we look at a study of argumentation or set of related studies, we stand amazed at the superabundance of definitions given to the notion argumentation, which are hardly acceptable not only in deciphering its multi-disciplinary and interdisciplinary matrix but also in identifying its use in a wide variety of fields such as prose, poetry and newspaper style (editorial).

While a variety of definitions of the notion argumentation have been given, we will start with the most general definition suggested by Van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Kruiger (1987) who view it as “a social, intellectual and verbal activity.” A further definition is given by Willard (1990) who describes it as a “form of interaction.”

As an important yet an understudied domain of human communication, argumentation examines how people seek to warrant their own beliefs, acts, ideas, attitudes and values with attempts to influence the thought or actions of others (Zarefsky 2005). It is, accordingly, interested in communication that aims at persuading others through models of reasoned judgment. Because all of us practice argumentation (and can hardly do without it) in all aspects of our everyday life, the research is sophisticated in that it provides a methodical investigation of this activity, which we conduct intuitively and unconsciously. It's for this purpose the first pages of the dissertation provide the necessary intellectual background: they define argumentation through analysing available opinions and places it on the border of a family of terms where logic, dialectic, and rhetoric meet. What makes the problem more debatable is that these notions either have led to the formation of negative stereotyping in today's culture or they have been used less and less; it is thus reasonable to accept them in their classical context.

For this purpose, we find it necessary here to clarify exactly what is meant by each term, which is defined in the context of the other related terms. Then, this research identifies premises that uphold the use of argumentation such as the significance of an audience, the uncertainty (and its organization), justification and proof (in terms of their difference), the cooperative character of an argumentation-based communication, and the risk (its possibility, acceptance and solution). The variations between formal and

informal reasoning (as an integrating part of any argument) are also among the major concerns of the research, which leads us to the recognition of the main types of deductive reasoning; categorical syllogisms, conditional syllogisms, and disjunctive syllogisms. Although the research in informal reasoning may (to a definite extent) seem new, the first studies were actually conducted as long ago as classical times, and the discipline evolves in rather serious fashion from classical antiquity to the present.



The Significance of the Study

The present study examines the argumentation found in different functional styles in terms of efficiency of arguments and the relationship of the viewpoints in them. And for this purpose, we begin by offering an operational and more technical definition. This research tries to break new ground, as no other prior studies have exhaustively examined different genres. Few studies have so far attempted to examine the topics in editorials (Hynds 1990), and argumentation related to them (Rystrom 1990). Boeyring (1993) has focused on editorial argumentation to study the political coherency from a global perspective. Concerning the argumentation aspect, Sproule (1980), Kahane (1988), Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1997), and A. Bedu (2016) have offered many examples of arguments found in editorials, with no argumentation analysis on their own accord.

Our study tries to explore how argumentation functions and works in literary texts, in particular in poetry and some narratives. As we have already mentioned below the types argumentation applied to many realms of social life, but we have tried to narrow down it to the selected texts, so this study mainly focuses on how argumentation plays a significant role in exploring and interpreting deep and surface structures of literary texts to help the readers broaden their horizons. The present study does not claim to be final in representing a systematic examination of argumentation in different genres—but rather it functions as a humble beginning in this direction. It is worth mentioning, though there is a large volume of studies on argumentation applied to many fields, only few studies deal with argumentation and its application to different forms of literary texts. Our literature survey has shown us that there is no study done on argumentation and its application to literature, most particularly to English literature, in Turkey. The study, therefore, is the first of its kind done in Turkey so far.

The Method of the Study

In this dissertation, we have favored to make use of the argumentative model and eclectic research method (by specializing on qualitative analysis) in an attempt to better identify the arguments in the excerpts and examples given in Chapter II and Chapter III. We have also used textual analysis where necessary.

Having examined the aspects of argumentation strategies and tactics, the research, in turn, sheds light on how/why controversies spark and why/how the most essential component of argument is the claim (in terms of defining the general components of an argument (claim, reason, supporting points, and warrant) and shifts from simple arguments (having one premise and one conclusion) to examine more complex/extended arguments (having several premises and one or more conclusions). The answer to “How the parts of complex arguments are brought together” becomes possible due to identification of the so-called multiple, coordinative, and subordinative structures, which, in turn, as Amossy (2009) states, are viewed “as the use of verbal means ensuring an agreement on what can be considered reason by a given group, on a more or less controversial matter (Perelman 1958)” (p. 1). But as some scholars argue, it is not enough to simply rebuild reasoning models by offering logically valid arguments giving rise to truth. The dynamism of the exchange of these patterns can hardly be ignored, since *logos* can be defined as both reason (involving also the cultural framework) and language which necessitates to examine those patterns in a particular set of discourse. For Amossy (2009), “such an approach to arguments allows for a thick description taking into account their discursive and communicational aspects, as well as argumentation’s constitutive dialogism and its inscription in a set of common representations, opinions and beliefs” (p. 1). This method, illustrated by analyses of texts from prose, poetry and newspaper (editorials) aims to create an interdisciplinary dialogue where domains like argumentation, rhetoric and discourse analysis are integrated. In his review of argumentation as a constitutive aspect of discourse, Amossy (2009)¹ claims that:

¹ How this generalized argumentativity is woven into the texture of discourses from different functional styles is the concern of Chapter 3 (The author)

Discourse as the use of language by a speaking subject is explored in its multiple manifestations: enunciation, modalities, inscription or effacement of subjectivity, the use of connectives as well as of semantic presuppositions and implicit elements, discursive heterogeneity and reported discourse, etc. However, these features cannot be isolated from their frameworks: they are activated in a specific genre, institutional frame, and situation of discourse. From this perspective, verbal organization and socio-institutional components are closely intertwined, meaning that context appears as an integral part of the text. Such an approach has the advantage of combining the study of both the formal and the socio-institutional constituents of discourse. Thus defined, discourse analysis is a branch of what is broadly called “linguistics of discourse”, focusing on the regularities to be found not in the system of language (Saussure’s “la langue”), but in its use by individual speakers (“la parole”). (p. 314-315)

Any multidisciplinary method in communication stresses the interface of relations among cognition, discourse and society. We, therefore, set out to examine the function of these components in argumentation and meta-discourse. This critical examination will serve as a base for understanding (a) the way(s) arguments are constructed, and (b) the function of meta-discursive mechanisms in this procedure. The first chapter begins with briefly discussing the general notions of argumentation and meta-discourse (historical evolution) with an attempt to demonstrate the ways the socio-cognitive approach (SCA) can shed light on our perception of the two concepts. Based on the socio-cognitive approach to discourse analysis, we recognize different related tracks pursued by speakers as they form arguments. The results confirm the equal importance and relevance of different stages of meta-discourse (intratextual, intertextual and contextual) for argumentative communication. For Guillem (2009), “through meta-discourse, speakers invoke knowledge about both the ongoing interaction and other past or future communicative events. These other discourses, however, are not only constituted by the actual words uttered, but they encompass the context and situation models (Van Dijk and Kintsch, 1983) that allow participants to make sense of them” (p. 742).

Various scholars from several disciplines have approached the argumentation from different perspectives, and they have repeatedly emphasized the necessity of examining the interplay among knowledge, discourse and society (cf. De Beaugrande 1997; Van Dijk 2001; Billig 2003). However, interestingly, this is contrary to a study conducted by Guillem. She (2009: 727-728) argues that:

Communication scholars are still reticent to acknowledge the importance of taking cognition into account when examining all kinds of communicative practices. It seems

relevant, therefore, to offer possibilities for the advancement of a multidisciplinary theoretical framework that helps research in communication and in other disciplines establish this necessary link between cognitive aspects of discourse and the contexts to which they relate. The present study is an attempt to contribute to this goal by proposing a socio-cognitive, discursive approach to argumentation and meta-discourse in parliamentary debates. I believe that this perspective can help scholars go beyond the examination of the external aspects of arguments, to also start an important discussion about the processes that lead to the formulation of specific claims, the functions that meta-discourse serves in these processes and the role that knowledge plays in arguments' (in)effectiveness.

With this in mind, we will be analyzing excerpts from prose and poetry of contemporary English Literature as well as politics and newspaper editorials. In the second section of Chapter 3, we broaden the conceptualization of meta-discourse to better account for how arguments are constructed between the communicants. With an attempt to demonstrate how speakers engage in these moves, we then explore the particular argumentative moves recognized in different types of genres categorized as metadiscursive moves, taking into account socio-cognitive wing of discourse. This examination, in turn, aims to provide a convincing argument for our analyzing and understanding together many aspects (i.e. social or cognitive) of discourse processes.

The Limitations of the Study

The present study neither gives a full picture of the argumentation in different genres nor offers a criticism of modern trends in argumentation. It is a humble attempt to invite a special form of attention to certain aspects of argumentation in different functional styles such as poetry, prose and editorials.

Another important point that should be emphasized is that this dissertation does not claim to explain the fundamentals of argumentation theory nor it does provide conditions for argumentative practice. Yet, it is focused on the richness and complexity of arguments in different functional styles. In accord with our aim to inspire ourselves by a full-fledged study of argumentation, we are not so much interested in theories analysing rhetorical arguments, but in those offering instructions for successfully constructing rhetorical argument, accounting for the different contexts in which an argument is/could be used.

The dissertation is limited to the analyses of the *Break of the Day in the Trenches* by Isaac Rosenberg, excerpts from W.S. Maugham's *The Unconquered* and O. Wilde's *A Woman of No Importance* as well as examples from newspapers in terms of argumentative elements in them—using Aristotelian syllogism and Toulmin model of argumentation.

The Outline of the Thesis

The dissertation consists of three chapters, as well as an introduction, conclusion, pedagogical implications, perspectives and references. The introduction concisely introduces the problem and the required theoretical starting points. It also identifies the scope and methodology of the research, establishes the so-called “Labour Division” among the chapters and gives adequate information about the data collection from different sources.

Chapter I looks at the status of argumentation, presenting a brief history of argumentation approaches and touching on its origins in both Western and Eastern thoughts. It also enlightens how this notion has been understood in the past.

Chapter II analyses the general notion of argumentation, with a special focus on modern approaches to argumentation, and the way it has developed over the years, and describes the angle from which it has been seen in the work presented here.

Finally, Chapter III begins the investigation towards a possible analysis of argumentation, which, in turn, shows how the adopted argumentation models help us in analyzing texts and dialogues and modelling knowledge and belief.

CHAPTER I

ARGUMENT: HISTORICAL NECESSITY

1.1. The Need for Argument

Verbal (as well as visual) messages all contain arguments. Lunsford et al (2007) claim in their book *Everything's an Argument* that:

From the clothes you wear to the foods you choose to eat to the groups you decide to join—all of these everyday activities make nuanced, sometimes implicit arguments about who you are and what you value. Thus an argument can be any text—whether written, spoken or visual—that expresses a point of view... Sometimes arguments can be aggressive composed deliberately to change what people believe, think, or do. At other times your goals may be more subtle, and your writing may be designed to convince yourself or others that specific facts are reliable or that certain views should be considered or at least tolerated. (p. 4)

Accordingly, such questions of complexity (and controversial aspects) of argument, some of them as old as humankind, haven't been settled nor will they vanish despite the energy we devote to solve them. We can debate topics such as overpopulation, climate change, global terrorism, to name a few. Whatever issues, as Rottenberg and Winchell (2009) state, “are most immediate or most long-lasting concern, we value the argumentative process because it is indispensable to any reasonable use of language in the process of communication” (p. 4). Yet, we need to argue. In a similar vein, they (2009) also claim “if all of us agreed about everything, if harmony prevailed everywhere, the need for argument would disappear. But given what we know about the contentious nature of human beings and their conflicting interests, we should not be surprised to find ourselves drawn into the controversies that swirl around us daily” (p. 4). Accordingly, any argumentative process, being an implicit dialogue, is inherently dramatic and can create the kinds of tensions generated, for example, at sporting events or political debates: Who will be the winner? It is not always possible for one party or another to be victorious in terms of arguments; sometimes a consensus between two or more different viewpoints may be the only plausible solution to a vexing problem. However, some compromises will not be morally defensible so that in seeking a middle ground, the thoughtful party must determine that the consequences of a negotiated solution will contribute to a good ground.

In the arguments, as some scholars argue (Rottenberg and Winchell 2009), human beings aim to demonstrate and justify their own actions, beliefs, attitudes and opinions and resist and/or compromise those of others. They do so with attempts to (a): to seek to warrant their actions, beliefs and opinions (both themselves their opponents), and (b) to offer solutions to problems and make decisions, especially those dependent on a consensus among conflicting views.

If any use of language is an argument of a dialogic form (i.e., if we've engaged in some form of the argumentative process all our life), is there anything to be learned that experience hasn't taught us? We think there is. Those who ever attempted to construct their arguments to persuade a specific audience and failed to do so might have possibly wondered if there were any systematic set of rules that can be used for the analysis. While good arguers are quite successful in constructing arguments, justifying their cases and thereby persuading people, poor arguers fail to do so. The former type, in fact, follows a set of rules yet the latter type falls short of this. They, in fact, follow a set of rules. Studying and systematizing how to practise these rules can provide everybody with (at least) some of the same skills, which s/he will/can use in a variety of situations, not only in arguing important issues in sporting, educational public or political settings. These skills can also be used in any academic setting (teaching students, writing an article, reading a work of literature, etc.). Whatever your major field of specialization is you will be asked to defend views about or make deductions from materials you have been given. e.g. the answers to the questions below concerning different fields will differ essentially:

Humanities: Why have some of the greatest literary works ever written (e.g. “Anna Karenina” by L. Tolstoy, “Hamlet” by W. Shakespeare) were made into movies than once while others resisted?

Social Sciences: What is the evidence that upward military capacity of the USA continues to be a negative force in the whole world?

Physical Sciences: In what ways the effects of climate change will threaten the giant pandas?

Education: How can distance learning be systematized and integrated into the current education system in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

The conventions used in an attempt to provide answers to the questions above might vary according to the field of study in question. But as Rottenberg and Winchell state (2009) “the conventions for defining terms and finding conclusions cross disciplinary lines” (p.11).

Fahnestock and Secor (2004) are even more categorical in stating that “...an argument can address, helping students build their writing projects around the need to develop answers to significant questions concerning facts, definitions, causes, values and actions. These questions form a logical progression—questions of fact and definition must be settled before questions of cause...” (p. vii-viii). And as they argue (being the proponents of the approach to argument through question), by executing this sequence of assignments, students can acquire and build on skills that they will use in their writing. The question or stasis approach to argument(ation) is uniquely productive because it begins by examining the actual arguments that develop around particular issues through the lens of general types, sorting out and identifying the kinds of questions that are considered, thus economizing both a space and mental energy in case we can consciously extract the central point and the major structural elements of an argument when reading (for comprehension process) which would help our students to become stronger critical thinkers. It’s for this reason that Lunsford et al (2007) claim that “language itself is inherently persuasive” and “hence every text is also an argument, designed to influence readers” (p.4). They (2007) also argue, “Even humor makes an argument when it causes readers to recognize-through bursts of laughter or just a faint smile-how things are and how they might be different” (p.5). Understanding of arguments in different genres as well as functional styles then, needs a careful consideration and revisiting of various perspectives arriving at a judgement. And, in fact, as we mentioned above, all language is in some way argumentative, convincing or persuasive that steers us in a direction and asks for response. We also aim to provide a balanced focus on the discussion and interpretation of arguments (analysis) in terms of writing of arguments (production). For this purpose (how the argumentation occurs at perceptive and productive levels) we aim to demonstrate both activities (reading and

writing) with examples based on real life, assuming that the most useful tool to make sense of any argument may be to see it in action. And by means of enhancing the power of examples, we expand the range of texts we present (e.g., conversation, poetry, drama, etc.), and include works from these genres towards the concerns of EFL students in all their diversity. In our research, the essential scene of the final part of O. Wilde's play *A Woman of No Importance*, a sample from the Georgian Literature depicting the tragic World War I in terms of the contrasting arguments of spring and the death of young lives and loves and finally, analysing the features of reorganization and sequencing of arguments in W.S. Maugham's *The Unconquered* also focusing more clearly and emphatically on pathos, ethos and logos, giving students a firmer grounding in these central Aristotelian concerns before they begin to study and practice specific kinds of arguments. Based on the gains of both the theoretical and practical results, we have added the so-called "Pedagogical Implications" and "Perspectives" parts to the body of the dissertation, the former part helping the students how to model the skills of analysis and close reading of arguments also providing them with detailed (to a definite extent, of course) instructions for carrying out argumentative analyses (both from the points of reasoning and rhetorical [effectiveness] components of the argument) as well as how they complement each other while the latter guides to investigating the other possibilities concerning the resolution of difference of opinion in communication.

But most of the situations in which arguments occur do not resemble that model. We still do not assume that there are only two sides to every issue. There may be, as Fahnestock and Secor (2004) state, "multiple positions on a subject for which one could develop a convincing argument to resolve a difference of opinion" (p. xxvi). For some other scholars, argumentation also offers one an individual dividend. As Rottenberg and Winchell (2009) claim in the *Structure of Argument*:

It can help you to cope with the bewildering confusion of voices in the world around you. It can give you tools for distinguishing between what is true and what is false, what is valid and what is invalid, in the claims of politicians, promoters of causes, newscasters, advertisers, salespeople, teachers, parents and siblings . . . any of whom may be engaged at some time in attempting to persuade you to accept a belief or adopt a course of action. It can even offer strategies for arguing with yourself about a personal dilemma." Most of us are painfully aware of opportunities we lost because we were uncertain of how to proceed, even in matters that affected us deeply (p.12).

We can have a closer look at one more essential component of arguments with a focus on their wealth and variety in terms of the key role they play for our understanding and (even) reshaping of the worlds we live.

For example, we see a number of reports about the prevalence of hunger and undernourishment (% of population) in Africa: The UN Food and Agriculture Organization estimates around 30 percent of the population is undernourished; while some other reports estimate it higher. As readers, we hardly question such reports or information; we even take them granted as an absolute truth, as Rottenberg and Winchell (2009) claim, “the sources who deliver these stories (rates/promises, etc.) have no intent to deceive us” (p. 13). However, the rates given by these reports may not be the ultimate truth. It is, in fact, a highly complicated indicator since authors/producers can change such a figure. The figure might fail to include the people in some parts where no official census has been held. Or there might be people who have moved to better countries or who have achieved higher living standards. Therefore, figures might fail to indicate those who have not been recorded, or who have had better life index, which, in turn, may lead to an increase or decrease in the rates provided by the reports.

The pragma-dialectic, i.e., social use of language requires/asks to identify how our own specific discourse groups function and how this affects the way in which the representatives of that community use language. In this process, students/researchers have a closer look at the relationships between different readers and writers, and, in doing so, our primary data will be the texts themselves in terms of the view that students need a strong grasp of the most highly generalizable accounts of the text organization. Such an intellectual/rhetorical method offers many advantages, which can be countered by two arguments: first, students are encouraged to analyse texts, and the skills they develop in dealing with texts typical of one genre can be transferred to other genres²; second, students, for this purpose, pick and choose from the range of interpretations and models that might be on offer (cf.: Swales 1990: 29-31). These ways of argumentative working require students to do the things that they have to do in everyday situations, and also provide them with strategies for self-editing and peer editing, which, finally,

² This is the main concern of Chapter 3, which will demonstrate the enrichment of our knowledge of different genres benefit from one another

gives rise to an interplay between the level of argumentation and the higher level of text organization in different functional styles.

Our approach, being broader and as complementary to the existing hypotheses on argument(ation), suggests that any communicant being a cognitive agent³, derives major benefits from his intellectual and cultural capacities/potential (which can be identical, similar or considerably different from the “shared knowledge optimization”) in adjusting the wealth of language to his different intentions in different contexts (informing, defining, evaluating, making proposals, appreciating, convincing, justification, information seeking, proving, blaming, reasoning etc.). These metacognitive capabilities in turn, confer flexibility to a linguistically-oriented approach to argumentative discourse, since every case/form of language use has an argumentative nature (Anscombe and Ducrot 1986). In this light, Eemeren and Grootendorst (1999) argue:

Ducrot and Anscombe's basic idea is that every piece of discourse contains an explicit or implicit dialogue. They describe how 'argumentative connectors' (such as but, even, and at least) and 'argumentative operators' (such as only, no less than, and very) give specific 'argumentative power' and 'argumentative direction' to the discourse by activating a certain topos. According to Ducrot and Anscombe's theory of 'many-voicedness' or 'polyphony', argumentative connectors such as “but” can be responsible for a conflicting argumentative direction since they create a silent second voice which reveals the structural presence of two incompatible conclusions. (p. 16)

The last few years, has witnessed the powerful revaluation of rhetoric that goes together with a general acknowledgement that rhetoric and dialectic are two autonomous paths, however they share some common values (Reboul 1990), while Braet (1984) emphasizes the essential function of the classical theory of status for contemporary argumentation studies.

1.2. The History of Argument

Chapter I looks at the status of argumentation, presenting a brief history of argumentation approaches and touching on its origins in both Western and Eastern thoughts. It also enlightens how this notion has been understood in the past. More details on the pre-classical, classical and post-Aristotelian views on this phenomenon will be outlined, which, in the 2nd part of Chapter I, will be followed by the influential

³ The term “a cognitive agent” has been borrowed from Fox (2011: 78)

modern views on argumentation advanced by different trends. By considering the relationship between logical and linguistic approaches to argumentation, this section will situate argument close to present-day discussions that erase this distinction, and will state the consequences for a literary analysis from the Pragma-Cognitive perspective. This approach will be compared and contrasted with the previous analyses of argumentation in order to rigorously assess the strengths and weaknesses of how this notion has been examined in the past with regard to its contribution to/role in building different functional areas of language use.

Current theories on argumentation are rooted mainly in philosophical traditions dating back to ancient Greek and Roman theories that situate the origins of thought in Antiquity. The methodology used in the study of rhetorical potential/aspects of argument had their beginnings in the thinking of Plato and Aristotle. Their approaches have been regarded as the foundation that inspired much of the current literature on argumentation. (Lopez 2010). This resulted in the formation of different trends in argumentation theory that, as in the ancient rhetoric, originate from what questions are posed within different disciplines, and how the answers are interpreted.

This section will explore the most essential traits of argumentation theory in order to provide a historical evolution of this notion from the past until now. Starting with the (pre)-classical view of argumentation, Aristotle's and other classical theories will be considered here to show how those preliminary reflections on argumentation underwent constant radical changes throughout the human history (the Roman times, the Medieval Period, the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, the Modern Period, the Contemporary History, and finally the Information Age encompassing the Social Age and the Big Data Age) culminating in the first signs of a modern theory of argumentation by the "over the years, the study of argumentation has undergone periods of decadence, alternating with periods of renaissance" (p. 6).

1.2.1. The Classical View

A survey on relevant works in argumentation theory can hardly ignore the roles of classical works in its foundation, since in ancient Greek society, as Lopez (2010) claims, "the art of oratory prompted by Homer led to the prominence of dialectic and

rhetoric, which set the basis where rhetoric is founded and from which it evolved. A natural interest in human understanding characterized the age of Homer and Hesiod” (p. 18).

As an industrialized country with a well-established democratic system and strong naval force, Athens, opted for the advance in the formulation and systematization of approaches that accounted for cultural phenomena. In course of time, rhetoric deteriorated since it shifted its focus from persuasion through logical reasoning to persuasion by any rhetorical tools.

The other need for a theory that explains argumentation emerges in a society that is driven by the need to organize its knowledge. Together with what is known as the Presocratic thought, Socrates (c. 470- 399 BC) had seeded the intellectual transformation of Greek philosophy, a process of changing which was later to be fulfilled by Plato, a disciple of Socrates, and Aristotle, Plato’s own disciple. Looking at the philosophical estate of the argumentation, Bermejo-Luque (2011) assumes that:

Argumentation Theory is devoted to the normative study of natural language argumentation. The philosophical interest of such discipline can hardly be exaggerated. By arguing, we do not only coordinate beliefs and actions with others, but also acquire and transmit knowledge: after all, argumentation is a means to justify our claims and beliefs and to persuade others of them. For this reason, this discipline can be seen as a certain form of methodological inquiry particularly related to those areas of philosophy concerned with the conditions that turn mere beliefs into knowledge and with the conditions of legitimacy that sanction certain communicative interactions among individuals. (p. 273)

As our goal in this chapter is to construct the classical roots of argument that would be optimally usable for contemporary teachers of argument, and in fulfilling this task, we have attempted to arrive at economy and usefulness rather than thoroughness and novelty. In the first part (as mentioned above) we present the two perennial subjects (two recurrent tensions) of the pre-modern rhetoric which points the flowering of the theory of argumentation. These tensions, also present in our age, in fact, continue to animate current day controversies. Ramage et al (2009) provides an in-depth analysis of these tensions:

The first tension centers on the ancient enmity between philosophy and rhetoric while the second focuses on rhetoric’s not always successful resistance to ossification. After reviewing these tensions and stressing their applicability to current choices teachers of argument(ative writing) still face, we will proceed to the second part of the Chapter, to

offer a more in-depth discussion of several modern theories of argument which have either altered—or have the potential to alter—the way in which the argument is taught. Because there has been a sharp break of argument, and over the past fifty years in our approach to teaching argument, we spend more time on argument's recent history than on its storied past. In so doing, we in no way mean to scant the accomplishments of the Sophists, Aristotle, Cicero, Erasmus, Augustine, Campbell, et al; insofar our goal in this chapter is to create a usable past by indicating the sources of our approach to argument. (p. 49)

Bermejo-Luque (2011) echoes the traditional view. He presents an overview of the historical evolution of argumentation as follows:

Besides, philosophical practice itself is conducted, mostly, by arguments and, because of this, suitable normative models for argumentation would also seem to be necessary if philosophy is to achieve self-understanding and self-regulation. Indeed, these three factors ground the considerable interest that Plato and, specially, Aristotle had in the study of the relationships between Dialectics, Rhetoric and Logic. The remote origins of Argumentation Theory go back to that fruitful period of ancient Greek philosophy. Paradoxically, though, since then, philosophers had paid scant attention to the study of natural language argumentation as a subject matter, neglecting its characterization as a theoretical object and the provision of specific normative models for it. Somehow, there was the assumption that Logic, understood as a formal theory of valid inference, would suffice to do the work. (p. 273-274)

Accordingly, only those arguments which were “good” in their premises and inferences, were considered real arguments.

In recent years, a large and growing body of literature has investigated the general picture of the account of argumentation and its historical evolution (Nuchelmans 1993; Van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1993; Hintikka 1993; Chichi 2002; Walton 2004, et al). Chichi (2002) gives a more detailed account of the ancient roots of argumentation. He takes a new look at the modern literature and also revisits the ancient commentators on Aristotle. His inquiry plays a critical role not only from a historical perspective but also in terms of its relation to modern cross-disciplinary studies in argumentation theory.

When we look at the historical evolution of argumentation theory in Islamic thought, we see that many classical Islamic texts are heavily argumentative (cf.: Lumer and Ince 2014: 896). And as we move to the post-Islamic intellectual history, as Karabela (2010) claims, we can see that “it was distinguished into five communities (theologians, poets, grammarians, philosophers and jurists), although these local dialectics fused into a single system to form a general argumentation theory (Ādāb al-bahth) applicable to all

fields” (p. iii). Concentrating mainly on the linguistic perspective in Argumentation Theory, Karabela (Ibid) also assumes that:

After a centuries-long run, the jadal-based dialectic of the classical period came to be displaced by a new argumentation theory which was dominantly linguistic in character. I argue that this linguistic turn in argumentation dates from the final quarter of the fourteenth century in I’s impressively prescient work on ‘ilm al-wad’. This new idea, that argumentation is about definition and that therefore, defining is the business of language (and perhaps even that language is the only available medium for understanding the speaker and being understood by the listener), affected the way that argumentation theory was processed throughout most of the period in question. (p. iii)

For Karabela (2010), “the argumentative discourse started with Ibn al-Rawandi in the third/ninth century and left a permanent imprint on Islamic intellectual history”, which was then developed by Shams al-Din Samarrandi (d. 968/1561), Saçaklızade (d. 1150/1737) and Gelenbevi, who transformed the argumentative discourse, and later, intellectuals in the post-classical Islamic world responded to that discourse bequeathed by their predecessors. With this in mind, Karabela (ibid) views the intellectual history of the Islamic world as a form of “tension between two languages—the language of dialectic (Jadal) and the language of demonstration (Burhān)—each of which refers not only to a significant feature of that history, but also to a feature that could dramatically alter the interpretation of that history” (p. iv).

1.2.2 Aristotle

Considered one of the greatest thinkers of all time, Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), also as much a scientist as a philosopher, made some pivotal contributions that are still reflected today in logic, anatomy, biology, mathematics, ethics, politics and aesthetics. A towering figure in ancient philosophy, he truly earns the honor of being named as the “Father of Western Philosophy”.

His *The Topics*, a truly seminal treatise on dialectics, mainly investigates how to identify arguments. The most powerful tool for this process is a topic, by which Aristotle claims primarily an argument strategy. With regards to the topics, Stump (1997) claims that, “Their official function, on Boethius’s account, is to aid in the discovery of arguments; but in practice, Boethius tends to use them to confirm arguments” (p. 274). Stump (1997) summarizes the situation in the following way:

Much more important, however, is the role *Differentiae*⁴ play in Boethius's method for the discovery of dialectical arguments. For the most part, Boethius thinks of dialectical arguments as having categorical rather than conditional conclusions, and he conceives of the discovery of an argument as the discovery of a middle term capable of linking the two terms of the desired conclusion. Boethian *Differentiae* are, for the most part, the genera of such middle terms. (In those cases where the arguments are hypothetical rather than categorical, Boethius generally but not invariably thinks of *Topics* as validating the conditional proposition in the argument.) To find an argument using Boethius's method, one first chooses an appropriate *Differentia* (criteria for appropriateness are left to the arguer's intuition). The genus of middle terms, determined by the *Differentia* chosen, and the two terms of the desired conclusion then indicate the specific middle term of the argument and so indicate a dialectical argument supporting the conclusion. (p. 274)

1.2.3. Stoics

The Stoics, philosophers who followed the teachings of the thinker Zeno of Citium, describe argument (*logos*) and apply the term to refer to a “system composed of premises and a conclusion”. (Diogenes Laertius, LP vii.45). Obviously, premises and conclusion must be propositions. Yet, as Van Eemeren et al (2014) state:

Arguments are not complex propositions, since the propositions out of which they are composed are not connected by connectives. It is not excluded that the conclusion is identical to a premise, but it is generally excluded that there is only one premise (or none).¹¹⁴ An argument is valid (*sunaktikos*, *perantikos*) if and only if the contradictory of its conclusion conflicts with the conjunction of its premises (Diogenes Laertius, LP VII.77). Given the most common Stoic semantics for conditional propositions, this led the Stoics to the following principle of conditionalization: an argument will be valid precisely when the conditional proposition whose antecedent is a conjunction composed of all the argument's premises and whose consequent is equal to the argument's conclusion (the so-called associated conditional) will be true (Sextus Empiricus, PH II.137). Some of the valid arguments were called syllogistic. These were the so-called undemonstrated arguments (*anapodeiktoi*) and those arguments that were reduced to the undemonstrated arguments (Diogenes Laertius, LP VII.78). (p.111-112)

With an attempt to demonstrate the argument forms, Van Eemeren et al (2014) present different types of arguments. They approach them as short descriptions and distinguish them into five types:

- (1) “A first undemonstrated argument is an argument that is composed of a conditional and its antecedent (as its premises), having the consequent of the conditional as conclusion” (Sextus Empiricus, AM viii: 224; Diogenes Laertius, LP vii: 80).

⁴ In logic, definitions by genus and difference are given by stating a general class which contains as a subclass the class to be defined, and then stating the specific manner in which members of the subclasses differ from other members of the general class. The general class is called “the genus”, its subclasses are called “species”

Argument Scheme: If A, then B; A/B.

- (2) “A second undemonstrated argument is an argument that is composed of a conditional and the contradictory of its consequent as premises, having the contradictory of its antecedent as conclusion”. (Empiricus *ibid*: 225; Laertius *ibid*: 80).

Argument Scheme: if A, then B; not-B/not-A.

- (3) “A third undemonstrated argument is an argument that is composed of a negated conjunction and one of its conjuncts (as premises), having the contradictory of the remaining conjunct as conclusion.” (Sextus Empiricus, AM VIII.226, Diogenes Laertius, LP VII.80)

Argument scheme: Not both A and B, A/Not-B.

- (4) “A fourth undemonstrated argument is an argument that is composed of a disjunction and one of its disjuncts (as premises), having the contradictory of the remaining disjunct as conclusion” (Laertius *ibid*: 81).

Argument Scheme: Either A or B; A/not-B.

- (5) “A fifth undemonstrated argument is an argument that is composed of a disjunction and the contradictory one of its disjuncts (as premises), having the remaining disjunct as conclusion” (Laertius *ibid*: 81).

Argument scheme: Either A or B, Not-A/B. (p. 113-114)

(The argument schemes above have been taken from Van Eemeren et al (2014:113-114).

We can here close off our examination of the Stoic approach to argumentation by offering models of the first and third *thema*. We can then demonstrate examples of reductions where these *themata* are employed.

According to Van Eemeren et al (2012), the first *thema* (which is also called the positive means of the hypothetical syllogism) “allows one to reduce a given argument with a premise P and a conclusion C to another argument, with as conclusion the contradictory of P (cP) and with the same premises, except that P has to be replaced by the contradictory of C (cC)” (p. 114):

Thema 1: Argument X, P/C reduces to argument X,

cC/cP

Here “X” stands for the other premises.

e.g.: If the temperature decreases, then the weather will worsen.

The temperature decreases

The weather will worsen (Kondakov 1975: 361)

The version of the third thema, as Van Eemeren et al (2014) claims, “allows one to reduce a given argument to two other arguments in the following way”:

“Thema 3: Argument X, P/C reduces to arguments X/Q and Q, P/C” (p. 114).

Being a subtype of disjunctive-categorical argument, its first premise functions as a disjunctive argument, while the second premise affirms one of the members of the disjunctive statement/argument.

e.g.: Sciences are either humanitarian or natural

This science is humanitarian

This science is not a natural science.

This mode is otherwise called “affirming-denying”, the symbolic writing of which is as follows:

A is either B, or C

A is B

A is not C (Kondakov 1975: 361)

1.2.4. Classical Roots of Argumentation Studies

The research in argumentation, like studies in various different fields, first took root in classical antiquity. In their *A Systematic Theory of Argumentation: The pragma-dialectical approach*, Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004) argue:

Certain theoretical insights formulated by classical authors, such as Aristotle and Cicero, still belong to the core of argumentation theory. They are an integral part of the foundations of the hermeneutic and critical tools that are currently available for the analysis and evaluation of argumentative discourse and texts.¹ (cf.: Van Eemeren and Houtlosser 1999, 2000, 2002; Schiappa 2002; Goodwin 2002; Kauffeld 2002; Jacobs 2002). After the Sophists had for a long time taught all kinds of argumentative skills, the theoretical interest in argumentation crystallized in Greek antiquity in syllogistic logic (which was then called *analytica*), dialectic (*dialectica*), and rhetoric (*rhethorica*). For Aristotle, logic was concerned with analytical arguments in which the truth of the premises is evident. Dialectic represented the art of regulated debate, and was treated in the *Topica* (Topics) and *De sophisticis elenchis* (On Sophistical Refutations) (cf.: Aristotle 1928; Krabbe 2002). Rhetoric, the art of persuading an audience, is discussed by Aristotle in the *Rhetorica* (On Rhetoric). (See Aristotle [1928a, b, c, d, 1991]. See also Hohmann [2002]). In his logic, Aristotle distinguishes between two kinds of arguments: deductive syllogisms and inductive syllogisms⁵. Both kinds of syllogisms are also used in dialectical arguments, but the premises of the argument are in dialectic always statements that are not evidently true but are generally accepted – as Aristotle says, statements that are acceptable to “the wise or at least the majority of them.” In rhetorical arguments, the premises need only be plausible for the audience that is to be convinced. Deductive and inductive syllogisms are among the means one can use to confer the plausibility of the premises on the conclusion that is to be drawn. (p. 42)

Being among his earliest and most controversial writings, the main focus of the *Topics* is the investigation of dialectics, a practice as old as human language. In *the Topics*, Aristotle outlines complementary traits of an approach of strong arguments that are considered as the most powerful tools of persuasion. He presents a model with an attempt to enable his students to participate in dialectical arguments and debates, a form of “game-competition played out and probably institutionalised in the Academy founded by Plato” (Rubinelli 2009: 6). Aristotle has also systematized the classification of arguments which is formulated through the presence of certain “common” concepts (*koina*). This, as suggested by Robin (2018), can typically be listed as follows:

- I. Opposites (*antikeimena, antitheseis*)
 1. Contraries (*enantia*)
 2. Contradictories (*apophaseis*)
 3. Possession and Privation (*hexis kai sterêsis*)
 4. Relatives (*pros ti*)
- II. Cases (*ptôseis*)

⁵ Classical logic deals primarily with deductive syllogisms with categorical propositions while in an inductive syllogism, a general conclusion is drawn from specific cases.

1.3. Modern Developments

The modern developments in argumentation theory are a combined effort of scholars and researchers from wide ranging fields such as communication, law, linguistics, sociology, philosophy, politics, psychology, and rhetoric. These studies go hand in hand and create a multidisciplinary nature for the study of argumentation. This multidisciplinary (and cross-disciplinary as well) nature is not a new concept. Since its origins, the research in argumentation has called for the existence and contribution of various disciplines (both in theory and practice), emphasizing the necessity of a multidisciplinary approach. The theory of argumentation has its modern roots in the thinking of the philosophers like Perelman and Toulmin and its modern philosophical form was heavily influenced by their works. They truly deserve the title of being called the “Founding Fathers of Modern Argumentation Theory”. As Bermejo-Luque (2011) puts it:

The development of Argumentation Theory as a discipline is, surprisingly, quite recent. It is only since the second half of last century that authors like Perelman and Toulmin pointed to the need of developing normative models for natural language argumentation. From two very different perspectives—namely, logical and rhetorical, respectively—Toulmin and Perelman tried to provide a framework for the assessment of real, everyday argumentation, under the assumption that Formal Logic was, at its best, insufficient for it. Toulmin and Perelman shared a philosophical interest in argumentation as an instrument and expression of practical and theoretical rationality. They showed the scantiness of previous accounts and provided guidelines for the development of Argumentation Theory proper. Nowadays, their works still reveal themselves as fruitful and alive approaches in many ways. (p. 274)

The current opinions within Argumentation Theory are based on a pragmatic perspective. As a discipline, the argumentation theory has shifted from abstraction mechanisms of logic to taking the pragmatic perspective as its focus of attention. This, in turn, leads to an ever growing interest in language pragmatics. Bermejo-Luque (2011: 274) goes on to argue the pragmatic-based approach to argumentation research:

Current proposals within Argumentation Theory have adopted a pragmatic perspective that has been displayed at two levels. The first one has been articulated through a conception of argumentation as a particular form of communication. In this sense, the interest in interpreting and analyzing real argumentative discourses and conversational exchanges would manifest most authors’ concern with the pragmatic intricacies of argumentation as a certain kind of communicative activity. This concern amounted to a shift in perspective from arguments as merely abstract objects with solely logical

properties, to argumentation as an activity also having a dialectical and a rhetorical dimension. However, in many cases, this pragmatic approach also gave rise to a new conception of argumentative value, namely, a conception replacing criteria to decide on the justificatory power of arguments for criteria to decide on the value of acts of arguing as means to achieve certain goals, like persuading a universal audience (the New Rhetoric approach by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958) or resolving a difference of opinion (the Pragma-dialectical Approach by van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984).

Toulmin’s classical
example how the schema
works is:

- Bihter was born in Turkey (Datum),
- A person born in Turkey is a Turkish citizen (Warrant).
- On account of the following statuses... (Backing),
- So, most likely (Qualifier),
- Bihter is a Turkish citizen (Claim),
- Unless she was born to foreign parents... (Rebuttal).




Figure 1: Toulmin’s argument structure

Although Toulmin’s argumentation model has been subjected to considerable criticism (see van Eemeren et al. (1996) for a discussion), it still stands as a landmark in the philosophy of argumentation. And due to its all-embracing approach and simple

integration, it has been employed by different fields of science ranging from law to artificial intelligence. Grasso (2003) claims:

In addition to logical characterization of arguments, Toulmin also actively tries to stress the rhetorical aspects of the argumentation process, as opposed to the demonstrative ones. The work by Toulmin was, as Van Eemeren et al (1996) put it, one of the causes for the rejuvenating interest in Argumentation Theory in the second half of the twentieth century, and was, as admitted by Johnson and Blair (1994b), one of the inspirations for the already mentioned movement called informal logic, began in North America in the early seventies. Informal logicians set themselves three main tasks: to ascertain which texts and discourses are actually “arguments”, to analyse those arguments by identifying their subparts, and to evaluate them, particularly by pinpointing fallacious ones. (p. 11-12)

Another important development is the Dutch Pragma-dialectics (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992), a study of argumentation that is applied to examine argument(ation) in actual form of communication. It has been modelled to examine the all aspects of argument(ation) as a form of activity in discourse. Pragma-dialectics offers a comprehensive analysis of argumentative natural language activities. For Grasso (2003), “The pragmadialecticians combine the study on the formalism to represent data, from modern logic, and empirical observations, from descriptive linguistics, for the analysis of argumentative dialogues, modelled by dialectics, seen as sets of linguistic acts, or moves. The model includes ten fundamental principles ruling correct argumentative dialogues, whose violations define ten fundamental fallacies⁶” (p. 12). However, the abovementioned model fails to provide the functional aspect necessary for constructing rhetorical discourse in various contexts.

When we look at the cognitive science aspect of argumentation, we are obliged to touch on the Cognitive Rhetoric (Turner 1991). Lakoff and Johnson (1980) and Fauconnier (1985) have been a source of inspiration for this model, which calls for the interplay among cognition, language and literature.

In accord with our aim to inspire ourselves by a full-fledged study of argumentation, we are not so much interested in theories analysing rhetorical arguments as such, but in those offering instructions for successfully constructing rhetorical

⁶ A more detailed information about these cases will be provided in Chapter 2 (briefly) and Chapter 3 (experimentally) in different types of conversational dialogues (The author)

argument, accounting for the different circumstances in which an argument is/could be used.

In the rest of this chapter we will concentrate on some more argumentation models while in Chapter III we also show how the adopted argumentation model helps us in building dialogues and modelling knowledge and belief. We will start, however, with a description of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's approach in somewhat more detail, to enable the reader to understand the subsequent parts of the research.

The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation, by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, as an encyclopaedic compendium, is an interdisciplinary approach that attempts to broaden classical rhetorical canon. It maintains a highly flexible system on the one hand, and exceedingly complicated, on the other. For Ramage et al (2009), "above all, NR's usefulness lies in the fact that it is a book of wisdom, of practical reasoning or phronesis" (p. 74). We will approach Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's new rhetoric in two steps. Ramage et al (2009) put it:

In the first step, we will offer a brief overview of their approach and its place in the realm of modern argument theory. Then, by way of presenting their ideas in a more coherent, if less orthodox, manner, we will adapt some of their insights to a considerably less cumbersome approach to argument, stasis theory. Like most philosophers who broke ranks and turned to rhetoric in the mid-twentieth century, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca based their dissent on the rejection of the formal logical model of argument traditionally favored by philosophers, particularly the regnant logical positivists of the period. (p. 74-75)

With a focus on reviving and enriching the classical view of argumentation, *New Rhetorics*, in an interdisciplinary nature, presents a new approach to study argumentation in light of modern theory and practice. It aims at moving rhetoric from its marginal status (e.g. its being considered as political lies) to the level of other fields of today such as education, law, psychology, sociology etc. The publication of *The New Rhetoric* by Chaïm Perelman and Lucille Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) marks the development of the approach as an autonomous path.

The last of our present-day rhetorical figures is Stephen Toulmin, an influential British philosopher and author. He made wide-ranging inquiries into ethics, science and moral reasoning. He developed his own argument analysis model (an informal model of

reasoning), also known as Toulmin Model of Argument. He aimed at interrelating philosophical issues to practical experience and his approach is quite confusing. With regards to his model, Ramage et al (2009) claim:

Some teachers describe the approach as too limiting, others complain that it's just flat confusing. Like NR, it works well in combination with a stasis approach, partly because both emphasize the claim. That said, let us review the origins of his approach and its major terms. The Toulmin Schema: The Un-Syllogism. Like Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's NR, the point of departure for Toulmin's *The Uses of Argument* (UA) is formal logical demonstration. What distinguishes Toulmin's approach is the fact that he stays closer to the logical model, inventing a variation of the categorical syllogism to address the deficiencies of syllogistic reasoning—in particular its inattention to circumstances and its indifference to substantive as opposed to analytical truth— while retaining some of its strengths, in particular its ability to render arguments more transparent. Toulmin's approach, while narrower than the other approaches treated in this chapter, makes up for its lack of richness in its capacity to render arguments more coherent and more transparent. (p. 86-87)

The traditional categorical syllogism calls for three essential terms (major premise, minor premise and conclusion), while Toulmin's model postulates the six following terms: data, warrant, claim, backing, rebuttal, and qualifier. To demonstrate a typical Toulmin model of argumentation, we will adapt his scheme to an example.

For example, "Osman is a Bosniak. It can almost certainly be taken for granted that he is a Muslim and not a Christian. We can identify the four terms suggested by his model as follows:

- 1) "Osman is a Bosniak" → Datum-Grounds
- 2) "It can almost certainly be taken for granted that he is a Muslim" → Warrant
- 3) "and not a Christian" → Claim
- 4) "almost certainly" → qualifier

This argument falls short of rebuttal and backing. In this case, the rebuttal would be modelled such as "Osman falls in love with a Christian and converts into Christianity in order to marry in the church". And backing would be: "there is a very small number of Bosniaks who happen to be Christians.

Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1999) summarize the survey of these two most significant approaches to Argumentation Theory (Toulmin's un-syllogism model and Perelman's new rhetoric) as follows:

Their approaches are in both cases characterized by the attempt to provide an alternative to formal logic that is more suitable for dealing with everyday argumentation in ordinary language. Toulmin's *The uses of argument* (1958) presents a model of the various elements constituting an argumentation ('claim', 'data', 'warrant', etc.).⁶ Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's *La nouvelle rhétorique* (1958/1969) provides an inventory of effective argumentation techniques ('quasi-logical argumentation', 'argumentation based on the structure of reality', 'argumentation establishing the structure of reality', etc.). In Toulmin's model as well as in Perelman's new rhetoric the rational procedures of judicial reasoning are taken as the starting point. In neither case, however, the aim the authors set out to tackle has been truly achieved. This may, at least partly, be due to Toulmin's and Perelman's limited views of logic. They conveniently identify logic with traditional syllogistic logic. Modern developments are largely ignored, or could--as in the case of dialogue logic--not yet be taken into account. (p. 11)

The Polish School of Argumentation (Budzynska et al. 2014) is a research movement that builds on diverse research traditions and institutions across Poland, the members/representatives of which are particularly focused on understanding the force of argument(ation) with a special interest in the issues of reason, trust, and cognition. The research in argumentation in Poland makes wide-ranging inquiries into philosophy, logic, linguistics, rhetoric, social science, psychology, cognitive science, AI, and law (cf.: Van Eemeren et al. 2014)⁷. One of the reasons for such diversity as Budzynska et al. (2014) claim, "might be found in our strong tradition of studying the phenomena of reasoning, language and communication. This is particularly well reflected in the research of the Lvov-Warsaw School, and then its successors in Artificial Intelligence and legal theory, as well as in the studies of Polish rhetoricians (see also (Groarke 2013))" (p. 8), on the one hand and linking pragmatics and dialectics with argument studies has always been an important part of the program of the Polish School of Argumentation, on the other (see Koszowy 2013; Koszowy and Araszkiewicz 2014). Among the remarkable developments of the LWS that that are linked with pragmatics and dialectics of argument there are: (i) a well-supplied set of tools which allows dealing with the complicated nature of natural language and (ii) the means which gives green light for the examination and assessment of arguments (cf. Simons 2014).

⁷ For a more detailed information about some of these features see in the analysis of "A Systematic Theory of Argumentation" presented by Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (31-45).

Ajdukiewicz's model of pragmatism and formulation of science (1974) integrates pragmatic understanding with language and argumentation (e.g. Koszowy 2010). Koszowy (2013) applies the notion of pragmatic logic to refer to an approach that attempts to apply logic for the examination of the processes in obtaining knowledge, and she further argues:

The program of pragmatic logic is also based on the idea that general (logical and methodological) rules of scientific investigation should be applied in everyday communication. The 'pragmatic dimension' of this approach relies on moving from the practice of researchers towards formulating methodological standards (rules, norms) of performing various knowledge-gaining procedures: The standards of correctness of research procedures, as formulated in methodology, are not dictated by it to researchers in advance. Such standards are derived from practical activities of competent researchers, who approve of some procedures in research, they disapprove of others. [...] (p. 6-7)

The dialogical (and pragmatic) motivation for Jaśkowski's discussive logic (1948; 1949) lies in his interest in the study of arguments, "not in the formal logical sense of drawing conclusions from premises, but in the ordinary sense of discussions and in particular of disagreements" (Griffin 2013: 4). In this respect, Jaśkowski's method is in full consonance with modern endeavors to create a unified model of argumentation including formal and informal aspects.

Budzynska et al (2014) describe the Polish School of Argumentation as "the common motif of our approach can be best described as the force of argument—the logical force of validity, the rhetorical force of persuasiveness, the pragmatic force of communicative intentions" (p. 268).

1.3.1 A Systematic Theory of Argumentation

Frans H. van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst, two towering figures in argumentation research, present a complete picture of argumentation theory. It combines the theoretical aspect with a special focus on the full account of its practical estate. They (2004) write:

In order to get a clear idea of the different components of argumentative discourse, it is useful to have a closer look at the realm of the study of argumentation and offer a bird's eye view of its various estates, since only depicting these estates and explaining their mutual relations, we can provide a systematic characterization of the crucial subdivision of the study of argumentation (Van Eemeren 1987a). It is, in our view, the task of argumentation theorists to establish a well-considered link between, on the one hand,

insights as they are expressed in normative models such as those of formal logic, and, on the other hand, insights derived from empirical descriptions as provided by discourse analysts that are primarily socially or linguistically oriented. (p. 9)

In their presentation (2004), argumentation is viewed as a complex speech act “aimed at justifying or refuting on proposition and getting a reasonable critic to accept the standpoint involved as a result” (p. 18). The descriptive nature of this definition is built on the concept of argumentation as a speech act that has similar pragmatic properties as other speech acts. And the combination of the insights derived from normative and descriptive aspects, as the authors claim (2004), “should enable us to transcend the limitations of a purely normative or a purely descriptive approach to argumentation” (p. 10). Although these two approaches start from different premises, a full-fledged theory of argumentation integrates them and they, in fact, function as complementary aspects of one and the same phenomenon. The normative and descriptive approaches to argumentation should be fine-tuned to one another. Such a systematic integration, in turn, calls for a research program that promotes an interdisciplinary cooperation uniting the two approaches. By creating a well-motivated theoretical framework for argumentative discourse, Van Eemeren and Grootendorst comply constructively with the demands of those philosophers of science who assign argumentation a decisive role in scientific practice (cf. De Groot 1984). Against this background, the authors distinguish between five different constituents of the theory of argumentation, each of which forms an essential component of a complete “view” of an argumentation process.

1.4. Immediate constituents

Fahnestock and Secor (2004: 46) state that when people speak directly to us, we respond to more than just the claims they make and the support they offer for them. Human beings are much more than data-processing machines. We often react emotionally to the words a speaker uses and the pictures those words create in our minds, and at the same time we assess the speaker’s credibility. For this purpose, we bring our previous knowledge, values and attitudes to the situation, and we respond to the clues the speaker presents to us as we react to what is said and the person saying it. In other words, we respond to the ethos, or character of the writer or speaker, and we respond to appeals of our own feelings and identity, to the pathos projected in argument.

As ethos and pathos are intertwined with logos in every argument, in this research, we used the concept argument to identify discourse that aims at to convincing the audience (readers/listeners) to agree with a certain point of view. Proceeding from the Rottenberg and Winchell's (2009) assumption that "argument is a statement or statements offering support for a claim" (p. 13), we think it reasonable to look through the compositional aspect of an argument.

For Toulmin (1958), "an argument is composed of at least three parts: the claim, the support and the warrant".

1.4.1. The Claim

It seeks to address the question "What are you trying to prove?", and distinguishes into three types: claims of fact, claims of value, and claims of policy.

Claims of fact are built and based on objectively verifiable facts. They are intended for delivering factual and true information. Claims of value (i.e., the rhetoric level of an argument) are used to convince a specific target group towards a certain goal or actions e.g., a seismologist may be requested to tell the Istanbulers why s/he considers that more strict measures should be taken, or an R&D specialist may feel obliged to tell his/her CEO why they need to invest more on research than advertisement.

The rhetorical aspect of an argument should provide answers to the questions below:

- 1) Why, e.g., did the R&D specialist try to persuade his/her CEO to invest more in research than in advertisement?
- 2) If they both reach an agreement on the issue, why?
- 3) How are they emotionally taking part of in terms of the acceptance/rejection of the suggestion proposed by the specialist?
- 4) Are they truly aware of the real state of the problem?

The specialist's giving necessary evidence and providing logical connections between the various elements of an argument (i.e., claims of fact and claims of value or

the informative and persuasive aspects) may fail the specialist to get an agreement from the CEO. In fact, his achieving to convince his CEO almost always inseparably lies in specialist's credibility or the CEO's perception of/belief in the specialist's trustworthiness (Rottenberg and Winchell 2009). This view was also echoed by Aristotle. He views trustworthiness—as he calls it *ethos*—the most essential component in the arguer's capability to convince the reader/listener to agree with a certain standpoint. Considering rhetoric as the counterpart of dialectic (CWA 1995, v.2: 2152), Aristotle states that “the technical study of rhetoric is concerned with the modes of persuasion” (CWA *ibid*: 2153), which, in turn, as a sort of the orator's demonstration, is an enthymeme, and this, for Aristotle, is, in general, the most effective of the modes of persuasion. Accordingly, “the enthymeme is a sort of deduction” (CWA 1995, v.2: 2153). Speaking about the modes of persuasion furnished by the spoken word, Aristotle distinguishes three kinds: the first type of this typology is based on speaker's/writer's character (the CEO, in our example). The second on putting the audience (superior, in our example) into a certain frame of mind and in this case, persuasion may come through the audience, when the speech stirs their emotions. And as Aristotle (CWA *ibid*) remarks in his *The Rhetoric*: “Our judgements when we are pleased and friendly are not the same as when we are pained and hostile. And thirdly, persuasion is effected through the speech itself when we have proved a truth or an apparent truth by means of the persuasive arguments suitable to the case in question. As for the persuasion achieved by proof or apparent proof, there is induction, on the one hand and deduction or apparent deduction, on the other, so is in rhetoric” (p. 2155). Further Aristotle (*ibid*) adds: “the example is an induction, the enthymeme is a deduction. And the speeches that rely on examples are as persuasive as the other kind, but those that rely on enthymemes excite the louder applause. Something is persuasive either because it is directly self-evident or because it appears to be proved from other statements that are so” (p. 2156).

Today we might describe these qualities (i.e., the attributes that produce credibility) somewhat differently (cf. Rottenberg and Winchell 2009), but the rules for evaluating a writer's (in our case, the specialist's) credibility are almost the same. As Rottenberg and Winchell 2009) claims, “First, the writer must convince the audience that he is knowledgeable, that he is as well informed as possible about the subject.

Second, he must persuade his audience that he is not only truthful in the presentation of his evidence but also morally upright and dependable. Third, he must show that, as an arguer with good intentions, he has considered the interests and needs of others as well as his own” (p. 18).

Aristotle also pointed out in his *Rhetoric* (CWA 1995, v.2: 2152-2269), that all three basic parts of an argument are rarely expressed in informal or public situations. Traditionally, a reason plus a claim forms Aristotle’s typical enthymeme; warrants (suggested by Toulmin 1985) can often, as some scholars argue, be left out because they often seem redundant or obvious. Readers or listeners can supply the missing warrant from their own stock of knowledge or values (Fahnestock and Secor 2004: 22).

As seen from Stephen Toulmin’s model, the basic three-part model of Aristotle can be expanded to adjust to the audience you are trying to convince.

Claims of policy, in this sense, assert that specific plans or courses of action should be instituted as solutions to problems.

A simple argument, then, in Toulmin’s model, actually involves three elements. We, to rearrange them with the claim last (i.e., the claims of policy), add the word “therefore” to show how our claim is drawn from the warrant and the reason together:

Warrant: Any movie directed by Francis Ford Coppola should be seen.

Reason: “The Godfather” was directed by Francis Ford Coppola.

Claim: [Therefore] Let’s see “The Godfather”.

In Aristotelian logic, such a three-part argument is called a syllogism, and its parts carry different labels. The warrant is called the “major premise”, the reason is called the “minor premise”, and the claim is called the “conclusion”. So, we have been introduced to the system of Aristotelian syllogism as follows:

Major premise (Warrant): All trees are green

Minor premise (Reason): A plane is a tree

Conclusion (Claim): Therefore, a plane is green

As the comparison of the two approaches shows, in a Toulmin diagram of a three-part argument, reasons are on the left, claims are on the right, and linking warrants, which make the connection between the claim and reason possible, are placed below.

[Reason] “The Godfather” was directed →[claim] Let’s see “The Godfather” by Francis Ford Coppola

↑

[Warrant] Any movie directed by Francis Ford Coppola should be seen.

But in ordinary speaking and writing, the order of the elements can vary greatly. When all the three parts of an argument are present, the reason and the warrant can come before, after, or on both sides of the claim.

1. “The Godfather” was directed by Francis Ford Coppola and his movies are always worth seeing. Let’s see “The Godfather”.
2. Let’s see “The Godfather”. It was directed by Francis Ford Coppola, and all his movies are worth seeing.
3. “The Godfather” was directed by Francis Ford Coppola. Let’s see it. Any movie of his should be seen.

In any order, all the three parts make up the basic elements of a simple argument.

When we look back at the model suggested by Toulmin (including a claim, support, warrants, backing for the warrants, and possibly also a rebuttal and a qualifier for the claim) we can hardly remain blind to the fact that the Toulmin model only identifies parts and does not specify the order in which they should appear, so, in fact, we dare share the opinion of Wood (2004: 409) stating that it is not a model for structuring an argument. When you begin to think about the claim, the subclaims that represent the major sections of a paper, and the facts, examples, and opinions that support them, however, you begin to imagine various possibilities for ordering these parts of your paper/composition/text. One can hardly ignore the traditional “introduction-body-conclusion” format that frequently is used to organize modern

essays and speeches. Taking their origin from classical rhetoric, the usual functions mentioned for a modern introduction are to focus and introduce the topic, to provide some background, to get the attention of the audience, and sometimes, to present the claim. The conclusion either restates the claim or refocuses it through restatement and final, compelling reasons.

The organizational patterns of argumentation represent the parts of your paper, the order in which you will place them, and the relationships among the parts.

Now, also considering the organizational patterns (introduced earlier) that are particularly useful for the argumentation process, we aim at identifying patterns appropriate for different types of claims. This part of Chapter 2 provides additional information about these same patterns which can shape our research as the dominant pattern or can be combined as minor patterns within the dominant pattern to organize some of the sections.

Accompanied by an introduction and a conclusion, we can imagine them alone or in combinations in terms of organizing (and distributing) our ideas for specific types of claims.

1.4.2. Claim with reasons (or reasons followed by claim)

This pattern, for Wood (2004), takes the following form:

Statement of claim

Reason 1

Reason 2

Reason 3, and so forth (p. 410)

As Fahnestock and Secor (2004) state, “not in all cases your audience will immediately accept a claim. If so, you will naturally offer at least one supporting point or reason for it, by means of which you are aiming to persuade your audience (readers/listeners) to accept your claim while demonstrating that you have a reason for your claim in the first place” (p. 21-22). The “claim+reason” unit is very common in

everyday arguments and people usually provide only these two parts, drawing on shared knowledge or values to connect them.

In the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle clearly emphasizes that sometimes all the three elements of an argument may be left out. Echoing the traditional view, a reason plus a claim create the typical enthymeme. Warrants are not always expressed since they may be regarded as redundant. The fact that audience members can supply the missing warrant from their own stock of knowledge and thus participate in completing a two-part argument by supplying the 3rd part is an advantage to this form. Fahnestock and Secor (2004) argue:

Arguments expand not only when you add new reasons and invoke new warrant, but also when you support the ones you have already supplied. Let's look again at the core three-part argument above: "Let's go to the library because in a few days our final exams start and to pass them successfully we must work harder". In case a sceptical friend questions either your reason or your warrant, each has to be treated as a claim requiring its own further support. Whether a reason or a warrant or both of them need further support depends, as usual, on your friend. Suppose in response to your reason, that "to pass our exams successfully we must work harder", your doubting friend asks "How do you know that?". You point to the results of the midterm exams and answer, "The results of the midterm exams say that we did not work hard enough for them". Here, your new "claim-reason" pair ("We did not work hard enough because the results of the midterm exams say so") depends of course on its own warrant, "The results of the midterm exams are a reliable source of factual state of things about what we should do now to be a success at the final exams." The warrant in this case (i.e., "We must work harder") is a basic belief about the credibility of a source of evidence. (p. 23)

Now suppose that your friend (who is becoming rather persistent in rejecting your suggestion) challenges your warrant that "If we want to be a success, we must work harder". That warrant, in turn, becomes a claim. You might offer as support that "The midterm exam results of all the hard-working students are the most striking example to that". This new claim-reason pair, in turn, requires its own warrant that might be phrased as follows: "The results of different exam results are reliable indicators of what is worth doing".

What it means is that to satisfy a more demanding audience, our argument grows like a chain to be supported by a reason and warrant which in turn become claims supported/justified by further reasons and warrants.

This expanding structure of our argument can be diagrammed by adding on to the basic Toulmin scheme used above:

Reason: Harder work will improve our final exam results → Claim: Let's go to the library

The midterm exam results of hard-working students verify it

Warrant: Working harder is necessary (in order) to improve our final exam results.

The results of the previous exams have always justified the principle: No pain, no gain.

If we were to fill out this structure with the warrants that link all the “claim-reason” pairs, we could produce a diagram like the following where both the reason and the warrant in our main argument become claims in the subsidiary arguments:

Reason: The previous exam results show that “the harder you work, the better your grades”. → Reason: All hard working students successfully passed their exams → Claim: We should work hard(er) [Let's go to the library!].

Warrant: The results of the midterm exams are reliable sources showing the necessity of our working hard(er).

Reason: The results “mirror” your attitude to your exams → Warrant: Working harder is an imperative for improving our exam results

Warrant: The exam results are reliable indicators on what is necessary to pass our exams successfully.

Wood (2004) argues that:

You can set this pattern up by writing the claim, following it with the word “because”, and listing some valid reasons. Or, you can list some reasons and follow them with the word “therefore”, and write the claim. For example, you may present the claim that “we should work harder”, which is followed by reasons (answering the question “why?”): the harder you work, the better your exam results will be or those students who prefer entertaining to preparing for their exams are almost always unsuccessful. Alternatively, we may create a chain of related reasons by asking “Why” and answering “because” five or six times. (p. 44)

Habernas et al (2017) put forward:

Reasoning is a crucial part of natural language argumentation, and in order to comprehend an argument, one has to reconstruct and analyse its reasoning. As arguments are highly contextualized, most reasoning-related content is left implicit and usually presupposed. Thus, argument comprehension requires not only language understanding and logic skills, but it also heavily depends on common sense. Given a natural language with a reason and claim, the goal is also to choose the correct implicit reasoning from two options. The challenging factor is that both options are plausible and lexically/semantically very close while leading to contradicting claims. (p. 1)

To provide an empirical common ground for the task, consider the example “Russia has the opposite objectives of the US in Syria”. What does the given proposition have from the point of the realized (explicit) and non-realized (implicit) information? As Habernas et al (2007: 1) argue:

Presuppositions are a fundamental pragmatic instrument of natural language argumentation in which a part of an argument is left unstated. This phenomenon is also referred to as common knowledge (Macagno and Walton 2014, p. 218), enthymemes (Walton 2007b, p. 12), implicit or tacit major premises (Amossy 2009, p. 319), or implicit warrants (Newman and Marshall 1991, p. 8). Wilson and Sperber (2004) suggest that, when we comprehend an argument, we reconstruct the implicit warrants driven by the cognitive principle of relevance. In other words, we go straight for the interpretation that seems to be the most relevant and most logical within the given context (Hobbs et al. 1993). Although any incomplete argument can be completed in a number of different ways (Plumer 2016), it is assumed that certain common knowledge is shared between the arguing parties (Macagno and Walton 2014, p. 180). (p. 1)

Habernal et al (2017) argue that “In principle, the chain Reason→Warrant→Claim is applicable to deductive arguments and syllogisms, which allows us to validate arguments properly formalized in propositional logic. However, most natural language arguments are in fact inductive (Govier 2010: 255) or defeasible (Walton 2007b: 29)” (p. 1). And some other scholars conclude that it is extremely rare that a reasoning is explicitly laid out in a deductively valid format (Walker, Vazirova and Sanford 2014). However the drift to informal logic in the 20th century makes a strong case that natural language argumentation is more than a modus ponens⁸ (cf: Van Eemeren et al 2014). In their early work, Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992a: 148-156) are quite critique of Govier’s approach (in 1992: 147) for not doing justice to the contextual nature of judgements of relevance. They present the following case (p. 148) for setting an example to the problematic aspect:

Case 3.22. Amsterdam is the capital of the Netherlands.

If Amsterdam is the capital of the Netherlands,

Paul will pass his driving test.

Therefore: Paul will pass his driving test.

(the Case 3.22 has been taken from Walton 2004: 79)

Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992a) claim that “if the premises of an argument deductively entail the conclusion, they are relevant to the conclusion”. But their comment on the argument in Case 3.22 is the following remark:

This is perfect modus ponens, but the truth of the first premise does not contribute to the truth or falsity of the conclusion (nor does it detract from it). No wonder: for this conclusion, this premise is irrelevant (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992a: 148).

⁸ “Modus ponens”—the Latin name of the first form of the hypothetical syllogism (Kondakov 1975: 361).

CHAPTER 2

MODERN APPROACHES AND MODELS

2.1 Modern Approaches (Review)

This chapter begins with briefly presenting the most influential modern approaches to argumentation in the contemporary era, surveying the state-of-the-art in argumentation research. The contemporary approaches in argumentation theory are deep-rooted in classical times. Due to its complex and diverse nature, we also feel obliged to present the distinctive features of these approaches. In this light, Brambilla (2013) writes:

The theoretical underpinnings laid down by Marzocchi (1998: 8) enable us to tap into the hermeneutical and contrastive functions of argumentation analysis to study and compare argumentation specific organization of information in different functional styles focusing on the detection and description of “argument schemes” for specific reasons: such a study is not interested in the formal structure of arguments, but their general content (Gerritsen 2001: 72), thus it provides textual and contextual information (Van Eemeren 2001: 20), thereby catering for the descriptive and content-related need of interpreting research. Moreover, the study of argument schemes is particularly promising in a multilingual perspective, because it is a contrastive analysis, in that “the choice of argument schemes is context-specific and culturally bound” (Marzocchi 1997: 182). (p. 16)

Enunciated in the Netherlands in 1970s by F. van Eemeren and R. Grootendorst, Pragma-dialectics, or pragma-dialectical theory, is probably the most influential argumentation theory. It is an approach used to study and analyze arguments in actual and natural practice. As Van Eemeren (2010) states “it builds on the assumption that argumentation is basically aimed at resolving a difference of opinion about the acceptability of a standpoint” (p. 1). Brambilla (2014) notes:

Pragma-dialectics, significantly influencing any study of argumentation and attracting scholars from every corner of the world, draws mainly on normative pragmatics (Van Eemeren 2010: 4) and formal dialectics, in the attempts to provide a comprehensive frame work enabling normative and descriptive studies alike. The present section of the research will now limit itself to a brief outlining of the “pros” and “cons” of Pragma-dialectics for interpreting purposes. First of all, it has the unquestionable merit of high lighting the pragmatic and social character of argumentation (Van Eemeren et al. 1996: 5), thereby enabling comprehensive analysis. (p. 18-19)

When we look at the argumentation studies in different corners of the world, it can be seen that argumentation is getting a growing attention. The research in

argumentation theory in France has started in 1970s with the influence of the studies of Anscombre and Ducrot (1983) as well as Grize (1982) who have integrated argumentative approach with humanities and discourse analysis, and revived the interest in argumentation research (Plantin 2007).

Anscombre and Ducrot (1983), systematized the semantic-pragmatic approach to argumentation (Crevatin 1998: xi), and called into question the traditional understanding of rhetoric by defining argumentation as “weak or loose [...] and extensive” (Amossy 2005: 87:88). They, in turn, can be considered to devise an argumentative approach rather than a theory of argumentation.

The Swiss logician Grize (1982) has also introduced a model of natural reasoning. In a similar vein to the research of Anscombre and Ducrot, his works are mainly interested in looking at the philosophical aspect of the argumentative discourse rather than analyzing certain texts.

On the other hand, the studies of Micheal Meyer (1982, 1986), Professor of Rhetoric and Argumentation at Université Libre de Bruxelles, are based on the normative insights and call for an instructional perspective. His works, combining various different fields such as linguistics, philosophy and politics, gives an account of the historical approaches to and contemporary developments in argumentation.

Amossy also refers to discourse analysis in its French contemporary version as demonstrated by the *Dictionnaire d'Analyse du Discours*. He (2009: 314-315) further argues:

Discourse as the use of language by a speaking subject is explored in its multiple manifestations: enunciation, modalities, inscription or effacement of subjectivity, the use of connectives as well as of semantic presuppositions and implicit elements, discursive heterogeneity and reported discourse, etc. the other important point is that these features cannot be isolated from their framework: they are activated in a specific genre, institutional components are closely intertwined and context functions as an integral part of the text. Thus defined, discourse analysis is a branch of what is broadly called “linguistics of discourse”, focusing on the regularities to be found not in the system of language (Saussure’s “la langue”), but in its use by individual speakers (“La parole”) (Amossy 2009: 314). In this framework, a few dimensions can be viewed as constitutive: performativity assuming that to speak is to act (pragmatics), subjectivity, a study launched by Benveniste’s linguistics of enunciation (Benveniste 1974); dialogism, drawing on Bakhtin’s principle that every utterance is necessarily a reaction to a previous one (Bakhtin 1986); interaction, emphasizing the primacy of dialogue mainly

explored by conversational analysis; genres of discourse, implying that utterances are always framed by formal and institutional models, a principle that lies at the heart of discourse analysis. For Amossy, the contention that “argumentativity is one of discourse’s constitutive dimensions” means: even discourses that do not participate in any formal debate or disclose a manifest persuasive purpose have an underlying argumentative dimension (Amossy 2005)⁹.

Manfred Kienpointner, Professor of General Linguistics at the University of Innsbruck, Austria, is an influential scholar in modern argumentation. In a similar vein to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, he provides a comprehensive typology of argument models (van Eemeren et al., 1996: 348). He also offers (1996: 75) a reduced Toulmin model. With an aim at analyzing his approach, Brambilla (2014) writes:

In this respect, his overarching approach links the formal (normative) and content-related (descriptive) aspects of argumentation. His studies range across a variety of subjects, including theoretical issues (1993), fallacies (2009), figurative analogy in political argumentation (Garssen & Kienpointner, 2011) and racist manipulation in rightwing populism (2005). The success of Kienpointner’s approach has been partially hampered by the fact that most of his papers and monographs, especially the less recent ones, are only published in German. However, the author is increasingly adopting English and moving towards descriptive analyses, showing a marked interest in streamlining the theoretical features of the content-related study of argumentation. (p. 21)

The current decade has witnessed the development of a branch of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) with a particular reference to argumentation theory. This new argument-based approach to CDA was developed by Isabela Fairclough (University of Central Lancashire, UK) and Norman Fairclough (University of Lancaster, UK). Their Works are centred on political communication, dealing with practical aspect of argumentation. Looking at their work *Political Discourse Analysis: A Method for Advanced Students* (2012), Brambilla (2014: 22) notes:

In their recent work *Political Discourse Analysis: A Method for Advanced Students* (2012), the authors put forward an original proposal for the structure of practical arguments (2012: 45) and lay down specific guidelines for discourse analysis before presenting the findings of their research on the discursive political response to the economic crisis in Great Britain. However insightful and descriptive, the method appears to rely heavily on Toulmin’s formal and logical reconstruction of arguments, which inevitably involves a reduction of the actual linguistic implementation of the argument to a schematic logical standard form, “requiring more often than not the

⁹ Examining of how the new Rhetoric revisits the role of language in its attempt to elicit an adherence of minds, i.e., how the generalized argumentativity is woven into the texture of discourse is the central concern of Chapter 3.

reordering of elements in the text, the addition of implicit elements, or many other transformations” (van Eemeren et al., 1996: 323). (p. 22)

2.2. Pragma-dialectical approach

In the pragma-dialectical understanding, the notion of a critical discussion plays a crucial role. Unlike, for instance, formal dialectics, Van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s approach to argumentation is not only dialectical, but also pragmatic. As Otilia Huțiu (2011) claims, “the pragmatic dimension manifests itself in the fact that the moves, made in a discussion to resolve a difference of opinion, are conceived as verbal activities (“Speech Acts”), carried out within the framework of a specific form of oral or written language use (“speech event”), in a context of interaction that takes place against a specific cultural-historical background” (p. 57). Van Eemeren (2004) argues that “the dialectical approach to argumentation is part of the study of verbal communication also known as Discourse Analysis” (p. 54). And it is in accordance with the tradition that has developed in linguistics to refer to the study of language use in its broadest sense by means of the label of “pragmatics”, Van Eemeren and Grootendorst have expressed their theoretical position in naming their approach to argumentation “pragma-dialectics”.

2.3. Methodological problems

The arguments in the suggested dialog are used to highlight the interpersonal arguing, the kind that occurs in spontaneous situations. Brambilla (2014: 22) argues:

Discourse Analysis: A Method for Advanced Students (2012), the authors put forward an original proposal for the structure of practical arguments (2012: 45) and lay down specific guidelines for discourse analysis before presenting the findings of their research on the discursive political response to the economic crisis in Great Britain. However insightful and descriptive, the method appears to rely heavily on Toulmin’s formal and logical reconstruction of arguments, which inevitably involves a reduction of the actual linguistic implementation of the argument to a schematic logical standard form, “requiring more often than not the reordering of elements in the text, the addition of implicit elements, or many other transformations” (van Eemeren et al., 1996: 323). In other words, insistence on argument reconstruction, albeit descriptive, reduces the method’s potential applicability to interpreting research, basically owing to the lack of an intuitive methodology for content-related presentation of results.

Brambilla (2014) summarizes the main approaches to argumentation and gives a complete picture of them in terms of their normative and descriptive focus. (+) symbol shows that the relevant scholar has paid much attention to the above stance, while (-)

symbol indicates that there is no focus. If both (+/-) symbols are present, it demonstrates a limited focus. (++) symbols show a marked focus. The table provides a summary of these accounts:

ARGUMENTATION THEORIES		NORMATIVITY	DESCRIPTIVITY
Perelman Olbrechts-Tyteca		+/-	+/-
Toulmin		+	-
Pragma-Dialectics		++	+
Walton		+	-
The Francophone “landscape”			
	Anscombre Ducrot	+	-
	Grize	+	-
	Meyer	+	-
	Plantin	+/-	+/-
	Reboul	+/-	+/-
	Charaudeau	+/-	+/-
	Amossy	-	+/-
Kienpointner		+	+
Fairclough Fairclough		+/-	+
Discourse-Historical Approach		-	++

Table 1. (Taken from Brambilla (2014). Relevance of argumentation theories to interpreting research based on the yardsticks of normativity and descriptivity

Brambilla (2014) further argues:

The study of the most influential argumentation theories, led under the auspices of the seminal methodological guidelines laid out by Marzocchi (1994, 1997, 1998), provides specific indications regarding the suitable contributions to interpreting research on political STs. The findings are briefly summarised in Table 1, showing the descriptive and/or normative focuses of the main theories. The plus symbol (+) indicates that there is a decisive focus on the above yardstick, while the minus symbol (-) indicates that there is no emphasis. The plus/minus symbol (+/-) shows that the respective focus is limited. Consecutive symbols (++) appear to indicate marked descriptive or normative stances. The main contributions all provide instrumental theoretical frameworks for

understanding the complex notion of argumentation and its manifold interdisciplinary applications. Yet, as to the interpreting scholar's practical aim to conduct discourse analyses for interpreting purposes, Pragma-dialectics, the Fairclough & Fairclough Approach and the DHA (hinging on Kienpointner) are the only theories showing a marked bent towards descriptivity. (p. 24)

Accordingly, the rationale lying behind the present approach is justified (and strengthened) by dispelling the methodological fog and assessing the reliability of the Pragma-Dialectic principle, to prevent researchers from losing their bearings in the intricate wood of argumentation studies.

For Holmes (2005: 6), “contrary to the justification whose existence depends on a proposition (as by definition, a justification exists only when related to a proposition), the latter operates independently of the justification. When a proposition is presented with no justification, there is no argument but an opinion” (p. 6), which, in itself, is an isolated proposition, or a truncated argument. Thus, Holmes argues that his “definition of argument consequentially possesses a definition of opinion, namely, that an opinion consists of a proposition without justification” (ibid: 6) and a logical form of representation of the opinion pertains to the following definition

$$\frac{P}{\sqrt{}}$$

where “ $\sqrt{}$ ” stands for the lack of justification (Holmes ibid: 7).

He also argues:

It is my belief that the distinction between argument and opinion is not normative. Despite the fact that the argument and the opinion are both acceptable forms of taking a stand, it is nevertheless important to differentiate and not confuse the simple expression of a judgment and its link to a basic premise. Equally important is assessing the argumentative pretension of a speech that, like the editorial, is expressed as being fundamentally argumentative. Definitions of argument and opinion facilitate this assessment. The definitions are operational, thereby ensuring the identification of arguments and opinions in an editorial. A two-step identification process may be established using the argument/opinion definitions: to identify them, we first locate the propositions in the editorial and examine each one to determine whether it is supported or not by a justification. Each pair consisting of a proposition and a justification forms an argument and each isolated proposition is labelled an opinion. (p. 7)

In an effort to locate arguments to provide a fully-fledged account of the identification procedure, we present the examples below:

Arg-1

Russian athletes will not be allowed to march behind their national flag at the closing ceremony of the Pyeongchang Winter Games after two tested positive for doping, “IOC bans Russian athletes from marching behind flag at closing ceremony”. *CNN*, 25 February 2018.

P

[Russian athletes will not be allowed to march behind their national flag at the closing ceremony of the Pyeongchang Winter Games]

J

[After two tested positive for doping]

Arg-2

Turkey announced that it had launched "Operation Olive Branch" on January 20 to clear Syria's Afrin region of the YPG/PKK and Daesh, which Turkey considers to be a threat to its national security, “Turkey's Afrin operation: The latest updates”, *TRT World*, 27 February 2018.

P

[Turkey announced that it had launched "Operation Olive Branch" on January 20 to clear Syria's Afrin region of the YPG/PKK and Daesh]

J

[Turkey considers these terrorist organizations to be a threat to its national security]

Arg-3

Flights in and out of Glasgow airport were stopped for about 30 minutes due to staff shortages, “Flights delayed at Glasgow Airport”, *BBC*, 23 November 2017.

P (Proposition)

[Flights in and out of Glasgow airport were stopped for about 30 minutes]

J (Justification)

[Due to staff shortages]

Op-1

Time passes and people become more and more aware that remaining in Spain harms us, “Catalan independence rally: Thousands gather in Barcelona”, BBC, 12 September 2017.

P(roposition)

[Time passes and people become more and more aware
that remaining in Spain harms us]

J (ustification)

[√]

Op-2

Shakespeare knew us all, “It's in playing we become ourselves: Ian McKellen charms Istanbul”, TRT World, 14 April 2017

P(roposition)

[Shakespeare knew us all]

J(ustification)

[√]

Op-3

Turkish Airlines is set to transfer operations from Atatürk Airport to Istanbul's currently under-construction third airport with 600 trucks within the first 18 hours of the new airport opening. “Turkish Airlines to transfer operations to Istanbul's new airport ‘within 18 hours’”, Hürriyet Daily News, 27 February 2018.

P(roposition)

[Turkish Airlines is set to transfer operations from Atatürk Airport to
Istanbul's currently under – construction third airport with
600 trucks within the first 18 hours of the new airport opening]

J(ustification)

[√]

The first three editorials above provide a basis and all of the six editorials provide a judgment. Holmes (Ibid: 12) writes:

Spotting the arguments and opinions results from the process of identifying the propositions and locating eventual justifications. The identification of propositions is ensured by what I have referred to as “the proposition test” (Gauthier, 2004a, 2004b), which consists of assessing whether or not a statement refutes a contrasting statement. If such is the case, we have a proposition. Indeed, by definition, a proposition does not exist unless it relates to at least one other proposition and serves to express a judgment of a controversial issue which may be open to one or more points of view. As stated earlier, this is why the argument and the opinion are deployed in a debate situation. A proposition therefore always emerges from an alternative; it is retained with at least one other proposition or is never more than a counter-proposition. Consequently, a proposition is expressed when the matter is somehow an effective or virtual objection. (p. 12)

We do not find it difficult to identify if a proposition builds on a proposition as long as it is located. Let’s take the first argument as an example; it is quite obvious that “after two tested positive for doping” functions as the primary premise for the proposition “Russian athletes will not be allowed to march behind their national flag at the closing ceremony of the Pyeongchang Winter Games”. On the other hand, the proposition “Shakespeare knew us all” provided in Op-2 has no foundation.

As Holmes (2014) points out, “locating the propositions and justifications and identifying the arguments and opinions is not always as obvious as in the examples shown here”. (p. 13) Employing the opposition model and indicating the claims and opinion may be a laborious endeavour.

Arg-4

Blair said he had wanted to set the Iraqi people free and secure them from the “evil” of Saddam Hussein, but instead they had become victims of sectarian violence, Tony Blair: ‘I express more sorrow, regret and apology than you can ever believe’, The Guardian, 6 July 2016

Arg-5

The refugees are fleeing a military operation that has seen security forces and Buddhist mobs kill men, women and children, loot homes and torch Rohingya villages, “Turkey builds hospital for Rohingya in Bangladesh”, Anadolu Agency, 19 12 2017.

To understand the real meanings of these examples, the two arguments must be displayed in the generally acknowledged form of an argument:

Arg-4

P(roposition)

[but instead they had become victims of sectarian violence]

J(ustification)

[Blair said he had wanted to set the Iraqi people free and secure them from the “evil” of Saddam Hussein]

Arg-5

P(roposition)

[The refugees are fleeing a military operation]

J(ustification)

[that has seen security forces and Buddhist mobs kill men, women and children, loot homes and torch Rohingya villages]

To properly analyze the given examples, we are to answer the questions in terms of the fact that sentences are the only acceptable elements for this purpose:

- 1) In what way can arguments and opinions be identified?
- 2) When sentences in themselves do not provide arguments, is it possible to know if they still have arguments and/or opinions? If sentences in themselves are not arguments and opinions, how do we know if they express arguments or opinions?
- 3) In what way can we analyze the sentences to hunt for the arguments and opinions?
- 4) How can we use the opposition test (in accord with the identification process presented here) in order to determine propositions?

From a heuristic approach, the identification of arguments is realized (as stated above) by the so-called “interpretability principle” developed by Gauthier (2003 and 2002) which is based on the assumption that “it is theoretically always possible to determine if sentences contain arguments and opinions or, more specifically, if they are used to express them” (Holmes *ibid*: 15). The other advantage of the “interpretability principle is that even in the absence of argumentative indicators, it is still possible to determine whether sentences express an argument or opinion by considering the semantics of the sentences, the enunciation used and the author’s intent”. Often,

paraphrasing of the discourse can also “make” the interpretability principle be workable. Ex. By paraphrasing Arg-2, we were able to easily form it as an argument, although its statement was not grammatically convenient. Consider a few more examples to demonstrate the applicability of the interpretability principle in detecting the arguments and opinions in different functional styles:

Arg-6

In spite of his fame and his impressive political status, he was suspected of high treason, stripped of his honors, subjected to long imprisonment, and in 524, finally executed (S.E. Stumpf 1994: 151-152 (Philosophy))

Arg-7

Elinor had always thought it would be more prudent for them to settle at some distance from Norland... (Austen 1993: 22 (Literature))

Arg-8

Lord Illingworth: “Thoroughly sensible woman, your mother, Gerald. I know she would come round in the end”.

Gerald: “My mother is awfully conscientious, Lord Illingworth and I know she doesn’t think I am educated enough to be your secretary. She is perfectly right, too. I was fearfully idle when I was at the school, and I couldn’t pass an examination now to save my life” (Wilde 2011: 109) (Play).

In Arg-6, the opinion “in spite of his fame and his impressive political status” precedes the proposition “he was suspected..., ..., and in 524, finally executed”, and getting its “strength” from the preceding part of the text, can be verbalized and become more effective. The other interesting point is that the verbalized opinion can function both as a proposition and a claim (“He was a man of fame and impressive political status” functioning as the claim of the preceding part, has been assimilated within the frame of the following part to its opinion element).

More than that, the claim of the preceding part is not effective from the point of persuasive power, what is justified by the 2nd part of Arg-6; “in spite of...” also

functions as an indicator of “irrelevancy” of his being a man of fame and impressive political status. And it is because of that reason that Arg-6 has no justification element and it can be schematized as follows:

Arg-6

$\frac{O(\textit{pinion})}{P(\textit{roposition})}$ <i>[He was a man of fame and impressive ... status]</i> <i>[He was suspected ... and ... finally executed]</i>
--

Arg-7, according to its structure, is of literal or prescriptive, i.e., of indicative mode. From the stand point of the sequential principle, the proposition “Elinor had always thought” precedes the opinion part “that it would be more prudent...”. Both in Arg-6 and Arg-7 the sentences appropriately and literally express an argument and an opinion. But in Arg-6, there is a definite contextual gap between them and the preceding part(s) employed for the detection of the “opinion” part, Arg-7 demonstrates a different fluctuation between the expressions of the argument and the opinion parts. Being a linguistic performance, argumentation in Arg-7, in turn, gives rise to the adequate assessing opinion “it would be more prudent for them...”.

Accordingly, Arg-7 can be depicted as below:

$\frac{P(\textit{roposition})}{O(\textit{pinion})}$

As for Arg-8¹⁰, the case differs from all the preceding examples in many ways. First, the people here, as Fahnestock and Secor (2004) state, “speak directly to each other and respond to more than just the claims they make and the support they offer for them” (p. 46). More than that, human beings are much more than data processing machines. They often react emotionally to the words and suggestions of a speaker and at the same time they assess the speaker’s credibility. They, to be a success in persuading the communicant, uses his world view, previous knowledge, values and attitudes to the situation (ally expressed information of the speaker), and they respond to the clues the

¹⁰ A relatively relevant interpretation of variability of argumentative structure(s) will be dealt with in Chapter 3.

speaker presents to them as they react to what is said and the person saying it. In other words, they respond to the ethos (i.e., the character of the speaker), and they respond to appeals of their own feelings and identity, to the pathos (the audience's emotions, pity, indignation, hopeful/less/ness, fear, anger, disappointment and other powerful incentives) projected in an argument. Although ethos and pathos are intertwined with logos in every argument (since no type of communication can exist without its argumentative basis) the people choose an appropriate example to appeal to each other also demonstrating how these communicants shift from logos to ethos and from the latter to pathos as well as the both people (the father and his son) reveal about themselves in their dialogic speech.

The arguments in the suggested dialog are used to highlight the interpersonal arguing, the kind that occurs in spontaneous situations. Lord Illingworth's words "Thoroughly sensible woman, your mother, Gerald" in no way means to persuade Gerald on his mother's being a sensible woman, and this little speech exhibits many of Lord Illingworth's view of the world-scale values of widely acknowledged arguments (as "your mother is a very sensible woman, not a wise one") and the example introduced here is meant to tack you through the process of building even the non-verbalized arguments and by learning how arguments are constructed and how they appeal to their audience, we come to understand that argument-use in all cases is unavoidable since arguments create our beliefs and our understanding of everything we come to know about, from the most trivial subjects to the most profound.

Our arguments, therefore, want something very specific from its readers. It wants them to read the whole play *A Woman of No Importance* since the goal of the play itself is obvious in the title and in the ending with its rather antagonistic argument "A Man of No Importance". These arguments differ in what they want from readers: Some want to introduce the once dominant/neglected, whereas; some want to correct "misconceptions"; some want to shape attitudes and beliefs; some want to change the social values; and some want all of these results at once. And each "some" give its audience reasons for what they want.

From the point of ethos, the characters (the father and the son) are established internally, by the play at hand. For our purposes, we will concentrate on what Lord

Illingworth and Gerald reveal about themselves in the play. From the beginning of the play, it is clear that Gerald is passionate about his future career/promotion while to the end of the play he is completely upset about his being Lord Illingworth's son who had left his mother so many years ago and disappointed-very disappointed, and angry, with the person without whose protection he could hardly imagine his bright future. These emotions are established as he unexpectedly learns the story of his mother's being so ungracefully, dishonestly and mercilessly left by his newly appeared father, whom he admired immensely. So, he dismisses all the argument of his father who has hardly ever favoured social values (including "marriage legalizations" with withering and mockery irony). O. Wilde, in these situations, is direct and reasonably moves for the final decision together with both the characters of the play and his readers, by means of which he reveals his own social principles and thus wants everybody to do the same and even instructing them how to do it. He wants his readers to "rethink the possible consequences" of understanding (and believing) that life is not meant for only the youth (going against Lord Illingworth's interpretation "you've got on your side the most wonderful thing in the world youth! There is nothing like youth. The middle-aged are mortgaged to life. The old are in life's lumber-room. But youth is the lord of life. Youth has a kingdom waiting for it. Everyone is born a king, and most people die in exile, like most kings. To win back my youth, Gerald, there is nothing I wouldn't do- except take exercise, get up early or be useful member of the community"- Wilde 2011: 110).

But if Lord Illingworth were only selfish and could understand that he will be asked to account for his unjustifiably unreasonable "deeds" one day! Lord Illingworth also appears to be out of control from the point of the people's attitudes to the socially acknowledged values. He wants Gerald to realize that his mother (Lord Illingworth's former beloved) is not always going to church She is also not modern, and for him, to be modern is the only thing worth being nowadays. He thinks that he "knows perfectly well what life really is" and behaves like a teacher checking-up the home assignment of his student and advising him what to do saying "You want to be modern, don't you, Gerald? You want to know life as it really is. Not to be put off with any old-fashioned theories about life. Well, what you have to do at present is simply to fit yourself for the best society. A man can dominate a London dinner-table can dominate the world. The future belongs to the dandy. It is the exquisites who are going to rule" (ibid: 111).

He tells Gerald directly that “sentiment is all very well for the buttonhole. But the essential thing for a necktie is style. A well-tied tie is the first serious step in life” (111) and assures him that the advice he is giving is “the most valuable one” to know, as he has personally experienced and been a success due to following definite standards, as for example, “talk to every woman as if you loved her, and to every man as if he bored the reputation of possessing the most perfect social tact”.

And when Gerald complains saying that “but it is very difficult to get into society, isn’t it?”, he, in contrast to Gerald’s cool and hopeless language, dares present himself as a well-informed person to make strong appeals to the emotions of Gerald saying “to get into the best society, nowadays, one has either to feed people, amuse people or shock people-that’s all!” And interpreting the importance of being a man of society, he declares: “to be in it is merely a bore. But to be out of it has any real success in this world unless he has got women to back him, and women rule society. If you have not got women on your side you are quite over. You might just as well be a barrister or a stock broker, or a journalist at once” (111-12).

O. Wilde presents himself as a passionate crusader against such kind of unbearable social ruins and he wants us to share his attitudes in the hope that we (as his audience/readers) will become passionately committed to his position. Thus he makes strong appeals to the emotions of his readers, to pathos. The end of the story (beginning with its title) of Gerald’s mother who suffered from the ignorance and high ambitions of Lord Illingworth more than enough introduces a new emotional appeal by describing how Rachel took courage to decline Lord Illingworth’s proposal “I will marry you as soon as you choose. I give you my word of honour” saying that “You made that promise to me once before and broke it”. Here O. Wilde describes Rachel’s emotional state, quoting selectively from the “lessons” of her tragic life which is best illustrated by the dialog below:

Mrs. Arbuthnot: I have already explained them (i.e., the reasons) to my son.

Lord Illingworth: I suppose they were entirely sentimental, weren’t they? You women live by your emotions and for them. You have no philosophy of life.

Mrs. A.: You are right. We women live by our emotions and for them. By our passions, and for them, if you will, I have two passions, Lord Illingworth: My love of him, my hate of you. You cannot kill those. They feed each other.

Lord I.: What sort of love is that which needs to have hate as its brother?

Mrs. A.: It is the sort of love I have for Gerald. Do you think that terrible? Well, it is terrible. All love is terrible. All love is a tragedy. I loved you once, Lord Illingworth. Oh, what a tragedy for a woman to have loved you!

O. Wilde's slangy language shocks us into agreement, in the final part of the play, in particular, persuading all his readers by using arguments repeatedly expressing that "No brutal reality can break our belief, faith and dignity. Instead, it can make them stronger, even" what we understand from the last dialogs of the play:

Hester (Gerald's beloved girl) (coming over: But you have two children now. You'll let me be your daughter?

Mrs. A. (looking up): Would you choose me for a mother?

Hester: You of all women I have ever known.

They move towards the door...On turning round Gerald picks up Lord Illingworth's glove.

Gerald: Hallo, mother, whose glove is this? You have had a visitor. Who was it?

Mrs. A. (turning round): Oh, no one. No one in particular, a man of no importance.

A Woman of No Importance, being one of O. Wilde's Victorian melodramas, introduces the "dandy" character (finally labelled as "a man of no importance), a man obsessed with his own appearance and behaviour who speaks in paradoxes and is self-mocking, whilst at the same time casting criticisms and witty, insightful asides on the dubious morals of those around him. And for some authors, the "dandy" was almost entirely autobiographical and frequently used in Wilde's plays as a stand-in for himself (Wilde 2011: vii)

The paradox between the title (“A Woman of No Importance”) and the very last argument of the very same woman of no importance “A Man of No Importance” best reflects the psychological shift (fall and rise) of social dignity in the Victorian age. As Aristotle points out, Rachel exhibits “good sense, good moral character, and good will” (Fahnestock and Secor 2004: 49) thus strengthening the persuasiveness of her argument as she does not trust Lord Illingworth—that is, she does not believe that he will not deceive her again and in his promise has no ulterior motive—we are favourably disposed that whatever she says is to be convinced.¹¹

Each case of Rachel’s declining his proposal can be defined as an appeal that incites our emotions, also rousing our appropriate pity, indignation as well as hopelessness for Lord Illingworth’s future. These powerful incentives to belief and action in Rachel’s answer concerning the interrelationship of children and parents recreates the scene that would in “real” circumstances arouse the emotion: “Don’t be deceived, George. Children begin by loving their parents. After a time they judge them. Rarely if ever do they forgive them” (141).

As for Lord Illingworth, he tries/does his best to work on the natural “triggers” of the past sweet emotions. As he is well aware that Rachel has suffered undeserved hardship, then to “smoothen” the atmosphere he portray the old sweet days that they shared saying: “How curious! At this moment you look exactly as you looked the night you left me twenty years ago. You have just the same expression in your mouth. Upon my word, Rachel, no woman ever loved me as you did. Why, you gave yourself to me like a flower, to do anything I liked with. You were the prettiest of playthings, the most fascinating of small romances....” (142).

But all his trials/arguments to persuade her in his innocence remain useless. Repeatedly “telling” her who they were for each other consciously did he try to create in her a sense of their being parents of one and the same person, their son Gerald. He starts from the opinion (which, in fact, is widely spread I the scientific world) that humans give in conditioning that works against their conscious will; they respond to sounds images without thinking (Fahnestock and Secor 2004: 54). Although scholarly

¹¹ The types of the ethos and its three qualities will be the immediate concern of Chapter 2

arguments presumably do not depend on emotional appeals to their readers or when people make these claims about the irrelevance of emotions, such as hate or fear. But not all emotions are so intense. Milder emotions such as commitment, dedication, curiosity and allegiance to a school of thought all play a part in scholarly arguments.

2.4. The pragmatic roles of speech acts

For Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004: 62), the theory of Speech Acts by Searle (1979), in many cases, ideally suits to provide both theoretical and empirical tools for dealing with argumentative properties of verbal communication in terms of the resolution of a clash of opinion in harmony with the pragma-dialectical research program. The various moves in the different points of a critical discussion in the resolution a clash of opinion may be pragmatically represented as speech acts, which, in turn, make it possible to establish the criteria the different pragmatic moves must satisfy. Following the typology of speech acts that is still dominant in the theory of speech acts, Van Eemeren and Grootendorst(1984) try to demonstrate the types of speech acts that may ultimately contribute to the resolution of a clash of opinion in different aspects of a critical discussion¹². Some of the five types of speech acts distinguished by Searle (1979) are directly relevant to a critical discussion, while others are not.

The first type is usually known for short as “assertives”, by which the speaker or writer “asserts” a proposition, and commits himself/herself more-or less strongly to the acceptability of a particular proposition. Any assertion, as acknowledged, guarantees a fact e.g. “I assert that Kemal Atatürk and Churchill never met”. Various other assertives, however, do not pronounce the truth of a proposition, yet they express a judgement on its credibility in a wider aspect. In this type of assertives, for example, the opinion of the speaker or writer is usually given on the event or state of affairs that is stated in the proposition: “In my opinion, no exceptions/divergences of opinions are possible between the Government and the opposing political parties in terms of uniting

¹² Complications arising in practice (e.g. many speech acts are only performed indirectly and all the types of speech acts—the assertives being an exception—can function indirectly as a standpoint or argument) are the concern of Chapter 3.

all possible efforts to secure the independence and wholeness of the Turkish Republic”, or “I think that Messi is the best football player of all times”.

The fact that they do not merely denote the judgment in dispute, but may also form a part of the argumentation advanced to defend that standpoint, or even can be used to establish the result of the discussion, allows Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984) to claim that in principle, all assertives can occur in a critical discussion, since argumentation can be defined as communicative (“illocutionary”) speech acts at the sentence level that are brought together at a higher textual level. And it is characteristic of argumentation at this higher textual level connected with a speech act that bespeaks a viewpoint, or standpoint.

In accord with the established fact that, as Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004) claim, “the communicative force of a (complex) speech act does not depend exclusively on the formal properties of the verbal forms of expression that are used, but on their function in the context and situation concerned, speech acts only form an argumentation if they are put forward in the context of a discussion of an issue that causes disagreement” (p. 63). In case when the standpoint is upheld, it can be repeated (“I uphold my standpoint”). It can also happen that the standpoint is to be retracted. Standpoints or arguments can be advanced by assertions but by other assertives such as statements, claims, assurances, suppositions, and denials. For Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004), “the belief in a proposition and the degree of commitment to the proposition expressed in a standpoint or argument can vary from exceptionally strong, as in the case of a firm assertion, to considerably weaker, as in the case of a supposition”.

The directives as the 2nd type of speech act enable the writer or speaker to get the reader or hearer to do something or to refrain from doing something, such as the speech acts of requesting and prohibiting. e.g. an order as the prototype of a directive stands in need of a particular standpoint of the speaker or writer: “Come here” can only be regarded as a form of order when the speaker enjoys a position of authority over the listener. If the speaker does not occupy such a superior position, it may be viewed as a request. As for a question, it is a directive that is actually a specific type of request: a request to perform a verbal act—namely, to reply. For Van Eemeren (2015), “Other

examples of directives are forbidding, recommending, begging, and challenging” (p. 75).

All directives do not necessarily have a practical function in the resolution of disagreement and clash of opinion. E.g. in a critical discussion, directives may serve to challenge the party who has developed a certain point of view simply to contend that point of view, or to request this party to provide argumentation in an attempt to support that particular standpoint. The use of directives (i.e. orders and prohibitions), if they are not intended literally, are taboo in a critical discussion.

The commissives are the 3rd type of speech act. In this type of speech act, for Van Eemeren et al (2013), “the speaker or writer undertakes vis-à-vis the listener or reader to do something or refrain from doing something” (p. 24). Unlike in the case of a directive, in performing a commissive speech act, it is the speaker or writer, not the listener or reader, who is supposed to act. e.g. a promise sets an example of a commissive type of speech act, in which the speaker/writer acts or refrains from doing something: “I promise I won’t disappoint you again”. Accepting and agreeing are also commissives.

Commissives can have different functions in a critical discussion:

(i) accepting or refuting a viewpoint. As Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984: 101, 152) state, the negative variants of the commissives are regarded as assertives rather than commissives; (ii) accepting the task to contend a viewpoint; (iii) deciding to making an argument; (iv) agreeing to assume the role of protagonist/antagonist; (v) agreeing to the argument schemes; (vi) accepting or refuting argumentation, and—when relevant—(vii) deciding to make a new argument. Some types of commissives (i.e. agreeing on argument schemes) can merely be used in collaboration with the other party involved.

In the expressives, which are the fourth type of speech act, the speaker or writer expresses his emotions by congratulating somebody on something or thanking someone for something, regretting something, and so on: “My sincere congratulations on your 40-year birthday!”, “Thanks for everything you’ve done for me”, “What a pity we couldn’t catch the 8 o’clock bus to Barcelona”. An expressive of admiration and joy might be “Isn’t she cute!” or “I’m so glad to see you back again”. Some expressives

echo a hope or irritation/disappointment, etc. as in “I wish I could see my university friend once again” or “I’m tired of/disappointed with your endless complaints/losing you so soon”.

As the mere and/or echoic expressions of emotion form any commitments neither for the speaker nor writer that are pertinent in being useful in resolving a disagreement or a clash of opinion, expressiveness do not have a direct role in a critical discussion. This, in turn, does not mean that expressives cannot have any positive or negative effect on the course of the resolution process. A person, for instance, who signs that the argument will not go anywhere or that she is not all happy with the argument, expresses a feeling that, contrary to contributing directly to the resolving the disagreement or clash of opinion, threatens to draw the attention away from the resolution process, and this may in practice strongly affect the further course of events (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004: Ch. 5).

The fifth type of speech act consists of the declarations through which the speaker/writer creates a certain state of affairs, such as when the chairperson declares “I open the meeting”. The very performance of a declarative taking place in the right circumstances creates a certain reality. With, for example, “You are fired”, an employer, addressing one of his employees, is not describing any particular state of affairs, but his words bring this state of affairs into being. Generally linked to definite official gatherings, conferences, and religious rituals, in declarations there is no doubt who is authorized to operate the speech act in question (since, as stated a few lines before, they usually take place in right circumstances). (cf.: Van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984: 109-112).

Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004) claims that “the purpose of usage declaratives, such as definitions, specifications, amplifications, and explanations is to enlarge or facilitate the listener’s or reader’s understanding of other speech acts” (p. 66). More than that, performing them in a critical discussion, the speaker/writer makes clear how a certain type of speech act is to be interpreted. Depending on the position of authority enjoyed by the speaker/writer in a certain institutional setting, declarations (with the exception of the usage declarations), do not directly contribute to the handling of a disagreement or a clash of opinion. At best, the performance of a declaration may

result in a settlement of a disagreement or clash of opinion. Usage declaratives, however, can further advance the understanding of other relevant speech acts, accordingly, they can be used at any point of the discussion, and in every point of confrontation, for example, a usage declarative may serve to unmask a spurious difference of opinion; in the opening stage, a usage declarative may clarify a discussion role or some vague part of a premise; in the argumentation stage, a usage declarative may work against premature acceptance or non-acceptance of an argument or a standpoint; and in the conclusion stage, a usage declarative may prevent arriving at a specious resolution. Usage declaratives, as Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004: 66-7) state, can be a helpful tool against the occurrence of a great variety of unnecessary or unjustified discussion moves.

After this brief overview of the types of speech acts from the various categories and the constructive roles they have in a critical discussion, Van Eemeren and Grootendorst classify them as follows:

Stage Type of speech act and its role in the resolution

ASSERTIVES

- I** Expressing a standpoint
- II** Advancing argumentation
- IV** Upholding or retracting a standpoint
- IV** Establishing the result

COMMISSIVES

- I** Acceptance or non-acceptance, upholding non-acceptance of a standpoint
- II** Acceptance of the challenge to defend a standpoint
- II** Decision to start a discussion; agreement or premises and discussion rules
- III** Acceptance or non-acceptance of argumentation
- IV** Acceptance or non-acceptance of a standpoint

DIRECTIVES

- II** Challenging to defend a standpoint
- III** Requesting argumentation
- I-IV** Requesting a usage declarative

USAGE DECLARATIVES

- I-IV** Definition, specification, amplification, and so on.

Described in the model of a critical discussion, the distribution of the different types of speech acts over the different stages of the resolution process, clearly indicates which representative of a particular type of speech act plays a specific constructive role in this or that stage of the discussion. This distribution is summarized in the following table from Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004: 68):

Table 3.1 Distribution of speech acts in a critical discussion

I	Confrontation
Assertive	Expressing a standpoint
Commissive	Acceptance or non-acceptance of a standpoint, upholding non-acceptance of a standpoint
[Directive	Requesting a usage declarative]
[Usage declarative]	Definition, specification, amplification, etc.]
II	Opening
Directive	Challenging to defend a standpoint
Commissive	Acceptance of the challenged to defend a standpoint
	Agreement on premises and discussion rules
	Decision to start a discussion
[Directive	Requesting a usage declarative]
[Usage declarative]	Definition, specification, amplification, etc.]

III

Directive

Assertive

Commissive

[Directive

[Usage declarative]

Argumentation

Requesting argumentation

Advancing argumentation

Acceptance or non-acceptance of argumentation

Requesting a usage declarative]

Definition, specification, amplification, etc.]

IV

Commissive

Assertive

[Directive

[Usage declarative]

Concluding

Acceptance or non-acceptance of a standpoint

Upholding or retracting a standpoint

Establishing the result of the discussion

Requesting a usage declarative]

Definition, specification, amplification, etc.]

CHAPTER 3

ARGUMENTATION IN PROSE AND POETRY

This chapter provides some models and strategies in terms of applying argumentation theory to the analysis of prose and poetry.

For this purpose, we should shed light to the following aspects of the use of argumentation in different genres in terms of:

- 1) Applying argumentation theory to literary works
- 2) Analyzing arguments in:
 - A. Prose, and
 - B. Poetry.

3.1. Argumentation in the narrative

As Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004) point out, “argumentative discourse and texts generally contain not only parts whose function is not immediately obvious, but also parts that are clearly irrelevant or not directly relevant to the resolution of a difference of opinion” (p. 97). Some components of higher importance for a well-organized critical discussion are almost always left out. Neither the canons of the argumentative process nor its outset are always obvious. Readers or listeners may be required to presuppose the parts that are left out or disguised within the text/discourse. Then the reconstruction has to bring them (by means of transformational procedures) to the surface. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004) writes:

In general, speakers and writers will generally not explicitly indicate what the communicative and interactional purposes of their speech acts are. Neither is the start of a new stage in the discussion often announced explicitly. A discussion stage that is almost never fully represented, is the opening stage. The fact, for example, that the rules necessary for the resolution process are often not explicitly stated is without doubt to some extent due to the fact that they are deemed obvious, but their suppression may also be a ploy to create the impression that the parties are in agreement on the rules while that is not actually the case. Or, due to previous agreements, made concerning the starting points and discussion rules, the opening stage can to a large extent be left out of the text. In a similar way, agreement may have been reached on other speech acts that belong to the opening stage (p. 98-99).

Another complexity in argumentative reality is that it is often not obvious who exactly has to be persuaded to accept the protagonist's viewpoint, among others. This can be exemplified through a case when the protagonist addresses others over the head of the antagonist who has invited him to defend a standpoint. For Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004), "a letter to the editor may well, of course, be aimed at other readers of the newspaper than solely at the author of the article that is at issue. In such cases there are, in fact, two antagonists: the official antagonist and the listeners or readers who are the real target group" (p 99). For example, The Turkish Ambassador of Turkey to the United Kingdom has responded to an article published in The Guardian:



Ms Katharine Viner
Editor in Chief
The Guardian
Kings Place 90 York Way
London N1 9GU

London, 26 February 2018

Dear Ms. Viner,

Your article entitled "Why are world leaders backing this brutal attack against Kurdish Afrin?" dated 23 February 2018 is almost entirely full of misrepresentations.

The threat posed by the PKK/KCK/PYD-YPG terrorist elements in the Afrin region, to the lives of the region as well as our citizens living close to the border area, is crystal clear. Since the beginning of 2017, the Hatay and Kilis provinces of Turkey as well as Turkish military posts and bases in the region, along with military observation posts in Idlib, have been targeted from Afrin with almost 700 harassment fires and similar attacks. Our border posts are constantly under the attack from terrorist organisations in Afrin. One only has to visit Kilis, for example, to see the signs of such attacks.

Operation Olive Branch (OOB), which was launched on 20 January 2018, aims to ensure Turkey's border security, provide security and stabilization in the region, and eliminate terrorist groups, including PKK/PYD/YPG and DAESH. As recognised by the international community, the operation is being carried out on the basis of the international law, in accordance with our right to self-defence as outlined in Article 51 of the UN Charter and the relevant Security Council resolutions, and in full respect of Syria's territorial integrity.

There should be no doubt on PYD/YPG's link with the PKK, which is designated as a terrorist organisation by the EU and many NATO Allies. PKK and PYD/YPG share the same leadership cadres organizational and military structure, modus operandi, strategies and tactics. For instance, the perpetrators of PKK terrorist attacks in Ankara of 17 February 2016 and of 13 March 2016; in Bursa of 27 April 2016; in Adana of 24 November 2016 and in Istanbul of 10 December 2016 were trained in YPG camps in Syria. Yet your article never mentions these terrorist camps or the almost daily rocket attacks against Turkey.

Moreover, despite the false heaven created in your article, PKK/PYD-YPG presence poses a serious threat not only to Turkey but also to the territorial integrity and the political vision of a democratic united Syria. In 2013 PKK-PYD/YPG began changing the demographics of the region as recorded by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. Contrary to misleading efforts and rosy pictures that certain circles try to paint, PYD/YPG is neither a democratic entity as it claims to be, nor is it interested in women's right or ecology. It is just another terrorist organisation.

I would be glad if you could bring our response to the attention of your readers.

Yours sincerely,


Abdurrahman Bilgiç
Ambassador

(Ambassador Bilgiç's response to an article published in *The Guardian*. (2018, February 27). <https://www.facebook.com/turkishembassyinlondon> [Facebook update] Retrieved from <https://www.facebook.com/turkishembassyinlondon/photos>)

Our example suggests that the ambassador's decision to writing this letter lies in his aim to clarify the issue raised in the article. In writing this letter, he does not only intend to attract the attention of the author of the article/editor of the newspaper– rather he, in a direct fashion, wants to bring his point of view to the attention of the readers of the newspaper. As Van Eemeren and Grotendorst (2004) put it:

In this case, the reporter is not making an attempt to resolve a difference of opinion by convincing someone of something. Most newspapers, for example, contain reports in which certain parts of a discourse just provide information to the readers. Especially if no explicit standpoints are formulated and no explicit conclusions are drawn, it is most likely that it concerns just a report, but sometimes it can be difficult to distinguish between a report and an argumentative discourse or text. (p. 99)

To analyse and evaluate any argumentative discourse or text makes it (first of all) necessary to reconstruct (the implicitly expressed and/or missing relevant parts) the required “image” of the speech event analytically for a (further objective) critical discussion (Van Eemeren 1986; Van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004: Ch.5).

On the basis of an extract from S. Maugham's *The Unconquered* (which is rich in argumentative elements), we shall try to explain how and to what extent a pragma-dialectical reconstruction can portray the events of the opening part of the story.

In *The Unconquered* W. Somerset gives himself a chance to lead his readers to a village of France (which was occupied by the German fascists during the Second World War) to “exam” several eternal values such as “love”, “hatred”, “patriotism”, “pitiness”, etc.

The opening part of the story suggests, from a brief note, not only the background information of the events. One of the most difficult things that a reader has to deal with when he wants to understand what has happened around is to reconstruct the psychological state of the central images after what s/he can decide in what order should the happiness be placed. It is fairly simple when this or that event given in the story is placed in its adequate order and place.

But S. Maugham has arranged his material in such a way that the story he offers to his readers has a pattern completely different from what we are accustomed to although we, as readers, do not notice it; and if not to exaggerate it, we don't have time to notice it because the events, from the very beginning, "enslave" us and we become "the prisoners" of so many implicit questions. Reading the suggested extract will give rise to many more questions as well as emotions.

Much more can be said about the "structure-content" interrelationship of this story and now let's consider the opening part (both from the point of its argumentative structure and its role in the whole text) together:

3.1.1. The Unconquered (by S. Maugham)

He came back into the kitchen. The man was still on the floor, lying where he had hit him, and his face was bloody. He was moaning. The woman had backed against the wall and was staring with terrified eyes at Willi, his friend, and when he came in she gave a gasp and broke into loud sobbing. Willi was sitting at the table, his revolver in his hand, with a half empty glass of wine beside him. Hans went up to the table, filled his glass and emptied it at a gulp.

"You look as though you'd had trouble, young fellow", said Willi with a grin.

Hans's face was blood-stained and you could see the gashes of five sharp finger-nails. He put his hand gingerly to his cheek.

"She'd have scratched my eyes out if she could, the bitch. I shall have to put some iodine on. But she's all right now. You go along".

"I don't know. Shall I? It's getting late".

"Don't be a fool. You're a man, aren't you? What if it is getting late? We lost our way".

It was still light and the westering sun streamed into the kitchen windows of the farmhouse. Willi hesitated a moment. He was a little fellow, dark and thin-faced, a dress designer in civil life, and he didn't want Hans to think him a cissy. He got up and went towards the door through which Hans had come. When the woman saw what he was going to do she gave a shriek and sprang forwards.

“Non, non”, she cried.

With one step Hans was in front of her. He seized her by the shoulders and flung her violently back. She tottered and fell. He took Willi’s revolver.

“Stop still, both of you”, he rasped in French, but with his guttural German accent. He nodded his head towards the door.

“Go on. I’ll look after them”.

Willi went out, but in a moment was back again.

“She’s unconscious”.

“Well, what of it?”

“I can’t. It’s no good”.

“Stupid, that’s what you are. Ein Weibchen. A woman”.

Willi flushed

“We’d better be getting on our way”.

Hans shrugged a scornful shoulder.

“I’ll just finish the bottle of wine and then we’ll go”...

(Taken from The Complete Short Stories by W. Somerset Maugham in four volumes. 1964 [Penguin Books]: 284-85).

What this kind of opening suggests is: Argumentation (in accord with Aristotle’s definition of argument stating that “an argument is a connected speech/text” but not restricting it with “arguing” or “predicate calculus” function of the semantic participants of the verb [denoting an action or a process]) here takes place under conditions of uncertainty and the events that seem uncertain are potentially controversial, these controversies, in turn, involving genuine differences of opinion that matter to the participants and which they wish to see resolved. Controversies, depending on their explicitness (recognized by both participants and readers) or implicitness (recognized only by the analyst), or their being single (relating only to one claim) or multiple

(relating to more than one claim) imply that things could be otherwise; the outcome is not known for sure. Therefore, there is an inferential leap in the argument, from the known to the unknown. But one thing is also certain: For Zarefsky (2005), “despite its seemingly adversarial character, argumentation is a cooperative enterprise” (p. 10) in terms of the fact that each arguer shares (or at least tries to share) a common goal of making the best decision. The rationale, offered by the arguers for accepting an uncertain claim, represents reasons for making the inferential leap and the reasons are only acceptable if they are successful in convincing someone with critical judgement skills. And if so, we can take it for granted that the claim is justified. The adversarial components of argument are tools that will enable the arguers to arrive at the common goal (i.e., resolving a disagreement and/or clash of opinion).

The repetition of the assumption that claims provide answers to the question “What are you trying to prove?” while claims of fact affirm the existence of a condition in the past, present and future and their support involves factual information (Rottenberg and Winchell 2009: 157) allows us to characterize the background part of the extract in the following way.

The first step in any critical reading process is comprehension of the facts which can be defined as answers to the basic question about reality involving who, what, where, when, why, how many, how and so on. We also label as facts any answers to such questions that we believe should meet with unanimous agreement, whether that agreement is given immediately or after verification. So strong is our assumption that “facts” should command everyone’s agreement that when we encounter someone whose recognition of facts is radically different from our own, we tend to consider that person not just ill informed but abnormal (Fahnestock and Secor 2004: 33).

As a priori condition we should accept that facts are usually considered from two different angles. First, there are certain facts that readers accept immediately, which can be verified by our own senses. For example, we can all come to an agreement that there were a few people in the street at night, that Mountain Everest is higher than Mountain Ağrı, and that a cheetah is faster than a turtle.

Second, arguers often need to use sources to verify their facts and to discover them in the first place. Such sources can include personal experience, the testimony of others, and authoritative sources in print or on the internet. A new data in medicine, or history may give rise to the re-examination of our knowledge/viewpoint about a certain case. For example, the unearthed ruins from the 19th and 20th centuries during the subway construction excavations in Beşiktaş offer brand-new clues, and fills the gap in the history of İstanbul.

Let's look back at the extract. Reading the pre-conversation part of the extract, although you have never heard that fact before, you probably will not doubt it because this new fact lines up with your existing knowledge of the 2nd World War and France's being occupied by the German fascists. The new fact fits, so every reader accepts it readily. But if someone told you France was occupied by the Soviet army, your reaction would be quite different.

As for the second case, i.e., "verifying" a fact, it usually requires citing the source where you found it in the first place. This story has got neither an illustration, nor a photo to capture the attention of page turners and reinforce its message. Browsing readers who took in only the title, *The Unconquered*, probably gained a sense that the story is about some impending "threat" from the one who is superior, with the deadly resistance and even a revenge of the sufferer. And this negative impression certainly supports Maugham's point. But in addition to conveying a negative attitude, does the extract (of the story) also communicate the points in the argument, its logos?

The actual arguments in the first four sentences of the opening part of the story predict a coming "crisis" and "contradiction" of the behaviour of the French family members (as sufferers) and the German officer, an occupant. The results of this "crisis" have been reflected in the claims and reasons of sentences/propositions 2, 3 and four, which briefly can be illustrated as follows:

Reason (sentence 2): He (Hans, the German officer) had hit him

Claims (sentences 2, 3 and 4): (Therefore) the man was still on the floor. His face was bloody. He was moaning. The woman

had backed against the wall and was staring with terrified eyes at Willi.

Sentence four has one more implicitly stated argument “Willi, his friend” which, being reconstructed, can be transformed into the complete argument “Willi was Hans’s friend”. And as a fact, this argument answers the question “Who was Willi?”. This fact passes without any challenge since it has been worded explicitly as “his friend” and such a qualification shows that the woman (Annette’s mother) already knew their relationship and looking at him with terrified eyes, in fact, pleaded him to stop his friend (i.e., Hans) from further aggressive actions. She is convinced of the fact from the first-hand (Hans had hit her husband and daughter in front of her eyes). The results of this merciless punishment were her husband’s lying on the floor with still bleeding face and the unconscious state of her daughter. And the 2nd part of sentence 4 contains its own claim and reason which can be schematized as follows:

Reason: He (Hans) came in.

Claim: She gave a gasp and broke into loud sobbing.

Sentence 5 forecasts the changes over the dramatic tension of the preceding sentences notably, because the “fearful” dynamism of the scene disappears with the description of the situation (the Grammar of the text also showing to such a shift—the use of the Past Continuous as well as the noun phrases standing for the appropriate incomplete arguments of claims—“his revolver in his hand” and “with a half empty glass of wine beside him”). But this temporary “peace” proves wrong and soon gives rise to another dramatic tension in the psychological state of the situation. Sentence 6, consisting of only the claims of facts, also communicates Hans’s nervousness.

With his “You look as though you’d had trouble, young fellow”, Willi, in fact, aims: (a) to predict what Hans’s next step will be and (b) to calm him down. And saying this with a grin, therefore bears the stamp of reality in terms of the uncertainty of Hans’s future behaviour. It looks like the kind of scene that had regularly occurred and could occur on any given day, and they needn’t imagine any solid reason for faking it. It represents an event or circumstance that actually happened, just as Willi’s prediction is based on the assumption “What is done cannot be undone”.

These words also reflect Willi's attitude to the gashes of Annette's five sharp finger nails on Hans's blood-stained face, bringing his attitude to the situation and Hans responds to the "clues" Willi presented as follows: "She's have scratched my eyes out if she could, the bitch. I shall have to put some iodine on. But she's all right now. You go along".

In other words, Hans responds to the ethos, or attitude of Willi, and Hans responds to his own feelings and identity, to the pathos presented in the argument.

Ethos and pathos are intertwined with logos in every argument, and each element of the argument in terms of their intertwining (the claims of fact, value and policy as well as support [i.e., reason to convince the audience] and warrant [i.e., a belief or opinion that is guaranteed in the argument] shows how this or that principle work in the selection of the attitudinal or evaluative measures. For example, as stated above, the warrant, being a more general element of an argument, in Willi's statement functions as an assumption or belief that underlies a claim about the "Laws of war" with meaning "the winner is always right".¹³

Ethos, the character of the writer, is usually established externally in terms of the event that he brings to the situation, and internally, by the text at hand. If a reader knows W. S. Maugham from his writings (novels and stories), that accumulated knowledge will affect the reader's sense of his (Maugham's) character. For our purposes, we will concentrate on what W. S. Maugham reveals about himself in his writing. From the title of the story as well as the beginning sentences of the extract, it is clear that he is passionate about the happening, upset about the father lying on the floor with bloody face, moaning and the mother, backing against the wall, staring with terrified eyes at Hans's friend Willi as well as giving a gasp and breaking into loud sobbing at seeing Hans's entering the kitchen, and angry—very angry, with Hans allowing himself such wildness. These emotions are established as Maugham starkly recounts the story of Hans's severe hitting the members of the French family and dismisses the argument (the purpose of which to justify Hans's cruelty) of Willi who tries to soften the case with withering irony (using the expression "young fellow") and

¹³ For purposes of discussion, we will separate the appeals to ethos and those to pathos in Chapter 3 and demonstrate how they work together in a more detailed way.

showing pitiness not for the victim (i.e., the raped French girl Annette) but for his friend. Maugham is direct from the very title, announcing to his readers what he wants them to do (although the story and the chosen extract do not contain a word or expression displaying Maugham's attitude to what had happened). He wants his readers to "rethink the consequences" of believing that "the winner is always right", thus revealing his sincere commitment by "applauding" the decision of Annette's to evenge Hans' humiliating her and her family in such a way (although during the period she also had felt the rising of some internal "mild" feelings towards Hans).

In accord with the assumption "since arguments are human events, not diagrams, the dimensions of speaker and listener, writer and reader, are always present" (Fahnestock and Secor 2004: 55), Maugham represents himself (in the story) as a person who is speaking/acting for his reader. It is just due to this way of combining of the characters of the writer and the reader that an arguer is /has become so persuasive. Reading the story of such an author, we find ourselves looking into a mirror reflecting all these cruelties in front of our eyes, enabling us to hear the moaning of the father and mother's gasp, her breaking into loud sobbing; all these, expressed so powerfully, want us, in turn, to identify ourselves with their positions.

The extract (with Hans's words) also exhibits the qualities of Hans's mind in the context of the assumption which states that "the greatest intellectual virtue in argument is reasonableness, a moderation of the mind that occupies the middle ground between the extremes of stubbornness and spinelessness" (Fahnestock and Secor *ibid*: 57).

Analysing the "deeds" of Hans, we can infer that Hans is not open to reason and it clearly shows itself in his unmasked cruelty. We, as normal people and readers (not like the soldiers of Hitler's army) tend to shun and blame extremism and like to think of ourselves as moderate, sane and balanced. Having established Hans's position as too extreme and too strained, Maugham locates Willi's position between the two extreme ones; and his implicit argument (their belonging to the same notion, army and psychology of the world outlook) is rather convincing still to point out his unsteadiness, since, he, unlike Hans, seems to suffer from sudden and extreme changes in his mental and emotional state; although he cannot say "no" to Hans's proposal "You go along", his negative attitude (he dares not reject his friend's proposal) is obvious from his

hesitating answer which also contains an element of excuse “I don’t know. Shall I? It’s getting late”. His answer, competing the positions without giving them any credit at all, still means, “I know my opposition and I consider Hans is wrong”.

And understanding the existence of this other position, Hans can hardly be sympathetic toward it. “Complimenting” Willi’s implicit opposition “reasonably” (i.e., ironically), and “appreciating” its perspective, he sees the merit in the more concrete position and coldly rebuts it saying, “Don’t be a fool. You are a man, aren’t you? What if it is getting late? We lost our way”.

Rarely is a situation so clear that one side is dominant and the other totally obedient. And it is the only possible position for Willi to take since his opposition is much stronger. And for Willi, to approve these points is certainly to see (whether you like it or not!) merit in them, though Hans’s offering such a “compliment” does in no way mean that Willi agrees with them.

The arguments are mixed on Willi’s friend’s side while the indispensable gesture from Willi’s side is a “silent” concession, which contributes to an ethos of fairness, moderation and hesitation (Hence, “Willi hesitated a moment). But on the other hand, “he didn’t want Hans to think him a cissy” and with the argument “He got up and went towards the door through which Hans had come”, the author defines Willi’s action/character as “favouring one’s kin in the appointment of power” which was/has always been widespread/acknowledged in many walks of life. Willi surrenders to Hans’s proposal because he does not want Hans to think ill of him (“don’t be a fool”), to slap a label on him (“You are a man, aren’t you?”), or to attribute a position to him that he does not hold/deserve (“What if it is getting late?”).

Willi, understanding the seriousness of Hans’s possible reactions, prefers acting as suggested to being accused and “moves to the door”.

As the pattern of argumentative organization of this story is primarily a defense of the main idea—that although Annette, being raped by the German soldier, then becomes pregnant and the very German soldier offers to marry her and even agrees to stay in France with her family; more than that, “she realized with rage that some of the things he said had aroused in her heart a feeling that she had never felt for him before”

(Maugham 1974: 306), she is firmly sure that she only lives to see the deliverance of France and she claims that “I will never come to terms with the invaders of my country. I hate you and I hate this child that you’ve given me... Now go. My mind’s made up and nothing on God’s earth can change it” (Maugham *ibid*: 305).

And this devotion to her country and to her love, and hatred to the invaders gave her strength to do what is unimaginable and her answer to the question “What have you done, Annette?” is “I’ve done what I had to do. I took it (i.e., her newly born child) down to the brook and held it under water till it was dead” (Maugham 308).

The final paragraph of the story effectively pictures the psychological state of Annette and Hans:

Hans gave a great cry, the cry of an animal wounded to death; he covered his face with his hands, and staggering like a drunken man flung out of the door. Annette sank into a chair, and leaning her forehead on her two fists burst into passionate weeping.

Because the author knows that the people of the occupied countries (especially, if they are well-treated by the occupants) usually obey the newly established rules, the author must also try to refute the opposing view—that this rule does not hold for everybody. In understanding this paradox, Maugham manages to make clear distinctions between the behaviour of Annette, a French girl, raped by a German occupant soldier, and Hans, a German soldier who dared violently rape Annette, on the one hand, and between Hans, who, finding out, that Annette was pregnant, promised to marry her and even stay to live with Annette’s family in her village and Annette’s parents, on the other.

The extract of the story does not directly give the reasons of the events described in it. The emphasis is overwhelmingly on the claims of facts from the point of Hans:

Claim: The winners/occupants can treat the people of the occupied country as they wish;

Support: Doing whatever the winner asks/orders the people of the occupied country to do is better than dying/being killed or punished so severely;

Warrant: Obeying (whatever the winner wishes) and remaining alive is worth a “small loss” of dignity.

The title of the story and Annette’s behaviour, in turn, show how strong she feels about her own warrant “Better to die than kneeling” which, in fact, has become the central idea and vehicle of the story/this fight.

The divergence of the warrants of the opposing sides has provided an excellent illustration of varied attitudes/“responses” to the same social value (honor, dignity). Not every citizen of the occupied country (even within the same family members—compare Annette’s and her parents’ attitude to Hans) will value the situation in the same way. More than that, not every reader will “read” the picture in the same way. Accordingly, not every viewer/reader will see Annette’s warrant as support for the same argument. These are only some of the responses that the bloody events of the extract/story have produced: Annette’s father, though alive, was still lying on the floor and his face was still bloody; mother, backing against the wall, gave a gasp and scared broke into sobbing and finally, Annette, still unconscious, lying in the other room, near death.

The wildness/mercilessness of Hans shows itself repeatedly when Annette’s mother, crying “Non, non” makes an effort to stop Willi from performing Hans’s order: “with one step Hans was in front of her. He seized her by the shoulders and flung her violently back. She tottered and fell. He took Willi’s revolver” (Maugham 1964: 284).

All these claims of fact, being a “black spot” in the history of the German fascism clearly assert that the behavior of German soldiers in the 2nd World War was based on the assumption: the world will accept this behavior as being objectively verifiable and justifiable.

Willi’s behavior (i.e., claim of value—“She’s unconscious”) process that some things in their attitudes are more or less different. And these differences assert acceptance or non-acceptance of moral, emotional and ethical standards of these two German soldiers. For Rottenberg and Winchell (2009), “one more important characteristic of the warrant deserves mention. In many cases, the warrant is a more general statement of belief than the claim. It can, therefore, support many claims, not only the one in a particular argument” (p. 15). In this sense, Willi’s refusing to enter

Annette's place because of her being unconscious evidences that his excuse ("She's unconscious... I can't. It's no good") rests on another belief/opinion that we consider as a fact, which, in turn, can emphasize claims about various different circumstances of their behaviours.

Having reversed cause-and-effect pattern, Maugham has described effects first, which works better requiring an answer to the question "What are the causes of the events described?" The pattern (effect-cause) establishes criteria for evaluation and judgement and then shows how the claim meets them. For example, the mother's psychological state you might explain with her husband's lying on the floor (he was hit by Hans) and the daughter's being wildly raped by the German soldier, who, in turn, ordered his friend to go along and enjoy himself. Then might also claim that the applied pattern (effect-cause) is obviously useful for value arguments, which proposes the situation (effect) first and then describe the problems (causes) that motivated it.

The writer's next arrangement is to state other problems followed by several solutions, one (in fact, the most important one) of which is finally selected and represented as the best (opposition of Annette's and Hans's values as well as warrants). As the solution or claim is stated at the very end of the paper, the pattern is called the "delayed warrant". For the hostile Hans, it is effective (no matter how painful it is for herself) for Annette to show why just this solution works and why this claim is favoured by her. She resolves the difference of opinion (in fact, the values and warrants) in such an unexpected way and in vivid detail so that the solution meets the requirements of both the writer (in terms of the title "The Unconquered") and the readers. And with this, the author shows how hostility of the values and warrants of the occupants and the people of the occupied countries are secured by the latter.

3.2. Argumentation in literature: (a) theory

This section attempts to apply argumentation theory to analysis of prose and poetry.

For this purpose, we feel obliged to illuminate the following aspects in using argumentation in different genres in terms of:

1) Applying argumentation theory to literary works

2) Analyzing arguments in:

A. Prose, and

B. Poetry.

As mentioned earlier, this part aims at extending applications of argumentation theory as one of possible theories in comprehension of literary works. This theory (with its notions and tools) can give a new and deeper insight into literary characters. This, in turn, allows us to enjoy a closer examination of the ways they argue and interact in terms of the resolution of difference of opinion.

Dealing with the undeniable potential of argumentation in text organization we proceed from the assumption stating that argument is everywhere—especially where people communicate with one another/each other. We accordingly share Wood’s (2009) viewpoint that “argument is as pervasive in literature as it is in real life” (p. 482). Giving an overview of literature, particularly in literary narrative, in terms of argumentative approach, Wood (2009) states that:

In fact, literature often raises issues, takes positions on them, and even changes people's views about them. Literature can be convincing because it invites readers to identify with the characters, which creates empathy and common ground, and because it almost always employs effective emotional tone, vivid language, and emotional examples. Literature has high interest appeal as well. Argument achieved through literary narrative can be one of the most convincing forms of argument. (p. 428)

Therefore, this section, providing you with examples from the two types of conversational dialogues and poetry, will focus on the ways to apply argumentation theory to literature and examine its productivity and effectiveness in different genres of literature. The other point which can hardly be neglected while revealing the specific features of argumentation is: when we analyse the “behavior” of argumentation theory both in constructing and comprehending of literary works, we will feel ourselves “inside the text”, to understand fully what is there and how it should be interpreted. We focus our attention on the main argument provided by the text (poetry, in particular). We may also focus on one or more of the characters, their interrelationships and the arguments they make (as in the above analysed story “The Unconquered” by W. S. Maugham). To

handle the problem/the task successfully, let's consider first how to hunt for the main argument in literature.

3.2.1. "Hunting" for the main argument

Using argumentation theory in comprehending a literary text and analyzing its main argument requires that we focus on the issues, the points of view, and the claims; during this process we will also need to infer the claims which (unlike the explicit ones) may be implicit or merely suggested. As Wood (2009) claims "there may also be conflicting claims in a single work that seem at times to contradict each other" (p. 483).

As stated above, the first step in discovering the role of argumentation in text organization is comprehension in terms of interpreting what an author is trying to prove.

Comprehending literary arguments is not an easy task since they are often, by nature, controversial and often challenge traditionally accepted notions. For P. J. Slattery (1991), the other reason of this complexity is also due to the fact that "readers sometimes fail to comprehend a text they disagree with or that is new to them, especially in dealing with literary works making controversial or value-laden arguments. Some research even shows that readers will sometimes remember only those parts of texts that match their points of view" (p. 199). With this in mind, to comprehend literary texts we should understand and highlight parts of the text that are of particular significance in the context of the author's essential idea(s) in order to answer the questions such as: Does the text in any way have a linkage/reference with historical data or is it based on the voice of the images? Do any of the emotional appeals strive to persuade the readers/hearers or is it based on the natural (everyday/socially accepted) evidence? Does the writer/speaker combine any of these tactics and schemes?

Answering these questions as a method for argumentation can make the most complex arguments understandable.

Consider the following hierarchy of strategies (designing their step-by-step sequence) for comprehending the main argument of a literary work:

- 1) Read through the literary work quickly to understand the main idea, without studying it in detail. Therefore, at this stage you should avoid concentrating on details as the specification below shows:
 - a) Make an outline of the text to find out the relationship between the beginning, middle and end of the argument. How has the author divided these sections? Are there subheadings in the body of the text? If yes, what are they for? If no, what does it mean? How are the chapters broken up? What is the logic of the author's organization?
 - b) What is the main argument of the text? How has the author/text realized it?
- 2) The beginning of the main argument can have other purposes (in accord with the "labour division" of the idea of the main argument between/among the subarguments). It may also describe the position that the author or the central image will oppose or provide background for the whole argument;
- 3) Constantly pay attention to the interrelationship between the title of the literary work, i.e., the way the latter has been adjusted to the "needs" of the former.
- 4) Pay attention to the transitional words and phrases that state (in an explicit way) whether the writer/poet will change direction or offer support for a previous point.
- 5) Consider the original/historical context the text was written in to answer the question: Why did the author write it and for whom?

(These strategies have been adopted from Rottenberg and Winchell (2009: 36-37))

Before taking to realization of these steps/requirements within the frame of a literary work, we think it reasonable to reconsider the potential of the syllogism (suggested by the Greek philosopher Aristotle) and the Toulmin model of argumentation, which, although share some similarities (both models are based on three-member argument structure), the differences between the formal reasoning and the informal model of argumentation by Toulmin are significant in terms of effectiveness in developing their arguments.

In trying to shed light on the components of argument above, we examined not only the classical deductive syllogism suggested by Aristotle; we also, comparing its structure with Toulmin's informal model, pointed out the similarities as well as

differences of these approaches. We noticed that both of them consist of three parts but the hierarchy of those parts is essentially different. Now, there is every reason that Aristotle's "major premise-minor premise-conclusion ("therefore...")" three-part model differs from Toulmin's "claim-support-(evidence-) warrant" three-part model in several ways.

The deductive syllogism is a very effective model in order to outline the components of an argument, and it especially realizes itself in dealing with simple arguments. Consider the following syllogism:

Major premise: Fish live in water

Minor premise: Carp is a fish

Conclusion: Therefore, carp lives in water

If to cast the same argument in accord with Toulmin's model, it will suggest itself as follows:

Claim: Carp lives in water

Support (Evidence): (Because) Carp is a fish

Warrant: (Therefore) Fish live in water

As seen from the comparison of the two models, in both of them the main components of the argument are provided in three expressions. But it is evident, that the claim/argument suggested by Toulmin's scheme is the conclusion in the syllogism. The proposition to be proved is done deductively in Aristotle's syllogism, while in Toulmin's model we observe the reverse direction, i.e., we move from concrete to general, which is effective for deducing general or deductive rules. The minor premise in the reasoning of Aristotle resembles the evidence (support) in the Toulmin scheme of argumentation. The warrant in the second scheme corresponds to the major premise of the Aristotelian model. Accordingly, the variations are quite important, especially from the way how we use language.

The reasoning is the representative an argument “in which the validity of the assumption underlying the inference ‘leap’ is uncontested” (Brockenreide and Ethninger 1971: 245).

If there are only two elements of the reasoning, it results in the formation of an enthymeme. Consider the example below which employs only two parts in the argument:

Ted: Did you hear about the theft at grocery store?

Lily: That’s too bad. But I’m not surprised. They didn’t have any surveillance equipment.

Lily has used an implicit major premise “If they have installed surveillance technology, they could prevent theft”. Ted notices the unexpressed warrant (according to Toulmin’s model)/major premise (according to Aristotelian syllogistic argument model) and may agree with it. Or Ted is capable of providing further evidence from trustworthy sources a generalization of this sort can in no way be considered as specifically true, in which condition the conclusion (according to Syllogistic model)/minor premise (according to the Toulmin model) of Lily is suspect. As Rottenberg and Winchell (2009) further argue:

The deductive process, helping guide us toward an evaluation of the soundness of our reasoning (as the minor premise) in an argument we are constructing, the syllogism is often clearer than an outline in establishing the relations between the different parts of an argument. The conclusion, in turn, represents something that you don’t have to observe, since you can deduce it with certainty (from the relationship of the major and minor premises) that it is true if both the mentioned premises are true. (p. 415)

In the Toulmin model, the concept “warrant” signifies that the proposition must be arranged in an attempt to take for granted the claim (i.e., an evidenced fact) to claim (i.e., universally recognized fact).

It is made quite clear that the arguer must ask “Why does carp live in water? (it is just this property that allows to bring both the Aristotelian and the Toulmin’s models under the same umbrella labelled as “syllogism” with the meaning [from Greek] “reasoning”). One more credibility of “reasoning” for both models can hardly be ignored: as a middle term, “reasoning” (called “minor premise” in the Aristotelian

model and “support (evidence)” in Toulmin model of argumentation) is present in the two premises of both models but not in the conclusion, which may be invalid (Concise Oxford Dictionary 2001: 1450). The arguer’s “support” (“minor premise” in the syllogistic model) leads the arguer to take steps to provide the claim with factual evidence or an appeal to values (in terms of “reasoning”). McCroskey (1965) further puts it in the following way:

In addition to the three elements essential to all argument, the Toulmin construct recognizes the existence of three supporting elements which may or may not be present depending on the demands of the particular argument. These supporting elements are: 1. Support for Warrant--materials designed to certify the assumption expressed in the warrant. 2. Reservations--statements appended to the claim which recognize certain conditions under which the claim may not be completely acceptable. 3. Qualifier--a term which registers the degree of force the speaker deems a claim to possess. (p. 3)

3.2.2. Argumentation in literature: (b) In *A Woman of No Importance*

Both the amount and kind of the suggested literary materials for our research have been chosen in accord with the richness, significance and entanglement of the subject. In the arguments about complex issues portrayed in “A Woman of No Importance” (Act Four, Part Two, pages 137-143) by O. Wilde, we will hunt for evidence from various standpoints/authorities/sources, although there will be circumstances where only the attitudes of the “two experts” of the discussed problem + the socio-historical factors will be sufficient.

ALICE. A gentleman to see you,
ma'am. MRS. ARBUTHNOT. Say I
am not at home. Show me the card.
[Takes card from salver and looks at
it.] Say I will not see him.

[LORD ILLINGWORTH enters.
MRS. ARBUTHNOT sees him
in the glass and starts, but does not
turn round. Exit ALICE.]

What can you have to say
to me to-day, George Harford? You

can have nothing to say to
me. You must leave this house.

LORD ILLINGWORTH. Rachel,
Gerald knows everything about
you and me now,
so some arrangement must
be come to that will suit us all three.
I assure you, he will find in
me the most charming and generous
of fathers.

MRS. ARBUTHNOT. My son may come in at any moment. I saved you last night. I may not be able to save you again. My son feels my dishonour strongly, terribly strongly. I beg you to go.

LORD ILLINGWORTH.
[Sitting down.] Last night was excessively unfortunate. That silly Puritan girl making a scene merely because I wanted to kiss her. What harm is there in a kiss?

MRS. ARBUTHNOT.
[Turning round.] A kiss may ruin a human life, George Harford.

I know that. I know that too well.

LORD ILLINGWORTH. We won't discuss that at present. What is of importance to-day, as yesterday, is still our son. I am extremely fond of him, as you know, and odd though it may seem to you, I admired his conduct last night immensely. He took up the cudgels for that pretty prude with wonderful promptitude. He is just what I should have liked a son of mine to be. Except that no son of mine should ever take the side of

the Puritans: that is always an error. Now, what I propose is this.

MRS. ARBUTHNOT. Lord Illingworth, no proposition of yours interests me.

LORD ILLINGWORTH.
According to our ridiculous English laws, I can't legitimise Gerald. But I can leave him my property. Illingworth is entailed, of course, but it is a tedious barrack of a place. He can have Ashby, which is much prettier, Harborough, which has the best shooting in the north of England, and the house in St. James Square. What more can a gentleman require in this world?

MRS. ARBUTHNOT.
Nothing more, I am quite sure.

LORD ILLINGWORTH. As for a title, a title is really rather a nuisance in these democratic days. As George Harford I had everything I wanted. Now I have merely everything that other people want, which isn't nearly so pleasant. Well, my proposal is this. MRS.

ARBUTHNOT. I told you I was not interested, and I beg you to go.

LORD ILLINGWORTH. The boy is to be with you for six months in the year, and with me for the other six. That is perfectly fair, is it not? You can have whatever allowance you like, and live where you choose. As for your past, no one knows anything about it except myself and Gerald. There is the Puritan, of course, the Puritan in white muslin, but she doesn't count. She couldn't tell the story without explaining that she objected to being kissed, could she? And all the women would think her a fool and the men think her a bore. And you need not be afraid that Gerald won't be my heir. I needn't tell you I have not the slightest intention of marrying.

MRS. ARBUTHNOT.
You come too late. My son has no need of you. You are not necessary.

LORD ILLINGWORTH. What do you mean, Rachel?

MRS. ARBUTHNOT.
That you are not necessary to Gerald's career. He does not require you.

LORD ILLINGWORTH. I do not understand you.

MRS. ARBUTHNOT. Look into the garden.

[LORD ILLINGWORTH rises and goes towards window.]

You had better not let them see you: you bring unpleasant memories.

[LORD ILLINGWORTH looks out and starts.] She loves him. They love each other. We are safe from you, and we are going away.

LORD ILLINGWORTH. Where?

MRS. ARBUTHNOT. We will not tell you, and if you find us we will not know you. You seem surprised. What welcome would you get from the girl whose lips you tried to soil, from the boy whose life you have shamed, from the mother whose dishonour comes from you?

LORD ILLINGWORTH.

You have grown hard, Rachel.

MRS. ARBUTHNOT. I was too weak once. It is well for me that I have changed.

LORD ILLINGWORTH. I was very young at the time. We men know life too early.

MRS. ARBUTHNOT.

And we women know life too late. That is the difference between men and women. [A pause.]

LORD ILLINGWORTH. Rachel, I want my son. My money may be of no use to him now. I may be of no use to him, but I want my son. Bring us together, Rachel. You can do it if you choose. [Sees letter on table.]

MRS. ARBUTHNOT. There is no room in my boy's life for you. He is not interested in YOU.

LORD ILLINGWORTH. Then why does he write to me?

MRS. ARBUTHNOT. What do you mean?

LORD ILLINGWORTH. What letter is this? [Takes up letter.]

MRS. ARBUTHNOT. That - is nothing. Give it to me.

LORD ILLINGWORTH. It is addressed to ME. MRS.

ARBUTHNOT. You are not to open it. I forbid you to open it.

LORD ILLINGWORTH. And in Gerald's handwriting.

MRS. ARBUTHNOT. It was not to have been sent. It is a letter he wrote to you this morning, before he saw me. But he is sorry now he wrote it, very sorry. You are not to open it. Give it to me.

LORD ILLINGWORTH. It belongs to me. [Opens it, sits down and reads it slowly. MRS. ARBUTHNOT watches him all the time.] You have read this letter, I suppose, Rachel?

MRS. ARBUTHNOT. No.

LORD ILLINGWORTH. You know what is in it?

MRS. ARBUTHNOT. Yes!

LORD ILLINGWORTH. I don't admit for a moment that the boy is right in what he says. I don't admit that it is any duty of mine to marry you. I deny it entirely. But to get my son back I am ready - yes, I am ready to marry you, Rachel - and to treat you always with the deference and respect due to my

wife. I will marry you as soon as you choose. I give you my word of honour.

MRS. ARBUTHNOT. You made that promise to me once before and broke it.

LORD ILLINGWORTH. I will keep it now. And that will show you that I love my son, at least as much as you love him. For when I marry you, Rachel, there are some ambitions I shall have to surrender. High ambitions, too, if any ambition is high. MRS. ARBUTHNOT. I decline to marry you, Lord Illingworth.

LORD ILLINGWORTH.
Are you serious?

MRS. ARBUTHNOT. Yes.

LORD ILLINGWORTH. Do tell me your reasons. They would interest me enormously.

MRS. ARBUTHNOT. I have already explained them to my son.

LORD ILLINGWORTH. I suppose they were intensely sentimental, weren't they? You women live by your emotions

and for them. You have no philosophy of life.

MRS. ARBUTHNOT. You are right. We women live by our emotions and for them. By our passions, and for them, if you will. I have two passions, Lord Illingworth: my love of him, my hate of you. You cannot kill those. They feed each other.

LORD ILLINGWORTH. What sort of love is that which needs to have hate as its brother?

MRS. ARBUTHNOT. It is the sort of love I have for Gerald. Do you think that terrible? Well it is terrible. All love is terrible. All love is a tragedy. I loved you once, Lord Illingworth. Oh, what a tragedy for a woman to have loved you!

LORD ILLINGWORTH.
So you really refuse to marry me?

MRS. ARBUTHNOT. Yes.

LORD ILLINGWORTH.
Because you hate me?

MRS. ARBUTHNOT. Yes.

LORD ILLINGWORTH. And does my son hate me as you do?

MRS. ARBUTHNOT. No.

LORD ILLINGWORTH. I am glad of that, Rachel. MRS.

ARBUTHNOT. He merely despises you.

LORD ILLINGWORTH. What a pity! What a pity for him, I mean.

MRS. ARBUTHNOT. Don't be deceived, George. Children begin by loving their parents. After a time they judge them. Rarely if ever do they forgive them.

LORD ILLINGWORTH. [Reads letter over again, very slowly.] May I ask by what arguments you made the boy who wrote this letter, this beautiful, passionate letter, believe that you should not marry his father, the father of your own child?

MRS. ARBUTHNOT. It was not I who made him see it. It was another.

LORD ILLINGWORTH. What FIN-DE-SIECLE person?

MRS. ARBUTHNOT. The Puritan, Lord Illingworth. [A pause.]

LORD ILLINGWORTH. [Winces, then rises slowly and goes over to table where his hat and gloves are. MRS. ARBUTHNOT is standing close to the table. He picks up one of the gloves, and begins pulling it on.] There is not much then for me to do here, Rachel?

MRS. ARBUTHNOT. Nothing.

LORD ILLINGWORTH. It is good-bye, is it?

MRS. ARBUTHNOT. For ever, I hope, this time, Lord Illingworth.

LORD ILLINGWORTH. How curious! At this moment you look exactly as you looked the night you left me twenty years ago. You have just the same expression in your mouth. Upon my word, Rachel, no woman ever loved me as you did. Why, you gave yourself to me like a flower, to do anything I liked with. You were the prettiest of playthings, the most fascinating of small romances . . . [Pulls out watch.] Quarter to two! Must be strolling back to Hunstanton. Don't suppose I shall see

you there again. I'm sorry, I am,
really. It's been an
amusing experience to have met
amongst people of one's own rank,
and treated quite seriously too, one's
mistress, and one's -

[MRS. ARBUTHNOT snatches
up glove and strikes
LORD ILLINGWORTH across
the face with it.

LORD ILLINGWORTH starts.
He is dazed by the insult of his
punishment. Then he controls
himself, and goes to
window and looks out at his son.
Sighs and leaves the room.]

MRS. ARBUTHNOT. [Falls
sobbing on the sofa.]
He would have said it. He would
have said it.

[Enter GERALD and HESTER from
the garden.]

GERALD. Well, dear mother.
You never came out after all.
So we have come in to fetch you.
Mother, you have not been crying?
[Kneels down beside her.]

MRS. ARBUTHNOT. My boy! My
boy! My boy!

[Running her fingers through his
hair.]

HESTER. [Coming over.]
But you have two children now.
You'll let me be your daughter?

MRS. ARBUTHNOT.
[Looking up.]
Would you choose me for
a mother?

HESTER. You of all women I
have ever known.

[They move towards the door
leading into garden with their arms
round each other's waists.

GERALD goes to table L.C. for his
hat. On turning round he sees
LORD ILLINGWORTH'S glove lyi
ng on the floor, and picks it up.]

GERALD. Hallo, mother,
whose glove is this? You
have had a visitor. Who was it?

MRS. ARBUTHNOT.
[Turning round.] Oh! no one.
No one in particular. A man of no
importance.

CURTAIN

But we can never be absolutely certain about the functioning of arguments in *A Woman of No Importance* unless we consider the influence of the Victorian Period on the “behavior” of O. Wilde’s images as well as O. Wilde’s “portraying” the socio-moral values in the context of his own interpretation.

A brilliant classical scholar, Irish dramatist and wit, O. Wilde, was born in Dublin. He studied at Trinity College (Dublin), and at Magdalen College (Oxford), where in 1878 he was awarded the Newdigate’s Prize for his poem *Ravenna*. He moved to London in 1879 and attracted attention, much of it hostile for his flamboyant aesthetes; he affected green velvet knee breeches and silk stockings, and proclaimed himself a disciple of Walter Pater and the cult of “art for art’s sake” mocked in Gilbert and Sullivan’s *Patience* (1881) (D. Birch 2009: 1068). In 1884 he married Constance Lloyd, daughter of a well-connected Dublin family, and in 1888 he published a volume of fairy stories, *The Happy Prince and Other Tales*. In 1891 followed *Lord Arthur Savile’s Crime, and Other Stories* and his only novel *The Picture of Dorian Gray*, a philosophical novel depicting the sensuality and hedonism, and which first his glittering epigrammatic style before a wide public. Theatrical celebrity came in 1898 with the London production of *Lady Windermere’s Fan. A Woman of No Importance* (1893) and *An Ideal Husband* (1895) followed. For Birch (2009: 1068), “all three are mobilizing, social comedies which combine teasing wit with shrewd observation of upper-middle class English manners” typical for the Victorian period. *The Importance of Being Earnest* (1895), regarded by many as his masterpiece, is a farcical comedy. As a representative of a period of prolific activity in literature, O. Wilde mostly dealt with social problems (Cuddon 1999: 970). As Abrams (1999) argues, “writings of the period, whether imaginative or didactic, in verse or in prose, dealt with or reflected the pressing social, economic, religious, and intellectual issues and problems of that era” (p 215).

When we look at the historical and social context of the Victorian era, we see that it can be marked with radical social and economic changes. Abrams and Harpham (2014) argues:

It was a time of rapid and wrenching economic and social changes that made England, in the course of the 19th century, the leading industrial power, with an empire that occupied more than a quarter of the earth’s surface. The pace and depth of such developments, while they fostered a mood of nationalist pride and optimism about

future progress, also produced social stresses, turbulence, and widespread anxiety about the ability of the nation and the individual to cope, socially, politically, and psychologically, with the cumulative problems of the age. Contributing to the social and political unrest was that what was labelled “the woman question”; that is, the early feminist agitation for equal status and rights. (p. 415)

In spite of its conflicts, The Victorian Age witnessed an immense intellectual and literary production. Abrams (1999) gives an outline of this period:

In our time, the term Victorian, is frequently used in a derogatory way, to connote narrow-mindedness, sexual priggishness, the determination to maintain feminine innocence (that is, sexual ignorance), the narrow-mindedness, and an emphasis on social respectability. Such views have a valid basis in attitudes and values expressed (and sometimes exemplified) by many members of the expanding middle class, with its roots in Puritanism and its insecurity about its newly won status. Later criticism of such Victorian attitudes, however, merely echo the vigorous attacks and devastating ridicule mounted by a number of thinkers and literary writers in the Victorian age itself (p. 329)

O. Wilde was also one of those who protested against and criticized the “dominance” of the derogatory rules in the social life of the people of his time. In fact, Wilde’s ethos of reasonableness is not a cold virtue. His good person (Mrs. Arbuthnot, for example) who, in addition to her emotional appeals, feels anger, pity, fear and even warmth and arouses the same in the reader. She follows such feelings and purposefully evokes them in the reader. And O. Wilde masterly reinforces Mrs. Arbuthnot’s emotional judgements conveying them through carefully chosen words and arguments.

At this point, it may be helpful/useful to acknowledge the assumption the point of argument is to discover some version of the truth, using evidence and reasons. Argument of this sort, as Lunsford et al (2007: 8) states, leads audiences toward conviction, an agreement that a claim is true or reasonable, or that a course of action is desirable. The aim of persuasion (by Lord Illingworth) is to change Mrs. Arbuthnot’s point of view which can be schematized as follows:

Argument (discover a truth) → conviction

Persuasion (know a truth) → action

Those and other purposes or goals of argument are worth considering in the suggested part from O. Wilde’s *A Woman of No Importance*, which is rich in various argumentation types.

Our approach is relies on a dialectical point of view postulating that an argument should be evaluated in regard to how it has been used in different types of genres. A dialogue, in this sense, is a conventional goal-oriented conversational framework in which an argument is meant to contribute to the goal of the conversation at some stage of its development. Thus, this framework is an extension of Grice's conversational maxims (in terms of the "relevance" maxim) and of recent theories on how argumentation is used in a context of dialogue, like that of Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992) and Walton (1998; 2003). So conceived, argument is not purely a logical form of a single statement/proposition, isolated from its context in a wider text of discourse. Instead, it is a matter of the conversational context of how an argument was used for some purpose in a given case (Walton 2003: 125).

The theory is also pragmatic in nature (as opposed to being purely semantical), in that it judges the nature and contribution of argument in relation to how it can be used in different types of dialogue.

Many arguments, as Lunsford et al (2007) states, "may not seem especially argumentative because their main purpose is just to inform members of audience about something" (p. 9). Other informative arguments (side by side with their denoting "truthfulness" of some information) are more obviously intended to persuade. Accordingly, Holmes (2013:) writes:

The primary challenge when identifying arguments and opinions is that they are expressed by means of sentences, without being limited to these same sentences. Contrary to what some may think (Sproule, 1980; Michalos, 1969), an argument is not a sentence or any other linguistic entity. Ontologically speaking, arguments and opinions are either abstract or logical entities; they are a representational content (similar to Frege's *gedanke* or Popper's third world proposition). However, if unassimilated within a sentence, the argument and the opinion must be verbalised to be effective. If not expressed in sentences, they remain purely formal or virtual and can neither reach nor focus in on their object of persuasion. As mentioned earlier, argumentation is a performance, or more precisely, a linguistic performance. However, the expression of arguments and opinions by means of sentences is uncertain. (p. 13)

Types of dialogue (conversation) that can be used as normative models to evaluate arguments used in particular cases have been defined in Walton (1989: 9-18; 1995: Ch. 4; 2003: Ch.5), and Walton and Krabbe (1995: 65-85). The behavior of arguments and relevance have been more fully described in Walton (1998) while this section attempts to show how argument should be understood in information-based

persuasion and eristic types of dialogue. The relevance of argumentation in the normative models sets up the dialectical framework necessary to build a theory and methods that can be used to judge relevance of this or that type of argument in an adequate type of dialogical use of language.

3.2.3. Argumentation in an Eristic Dialogue

In a persuasion dialogue (as in all other goal-oriented types), each party has the goal of creating an argument where the conclusion, in accord with the resolution-of-difference-of-opinions-rule, should be the opposite of the information introduced by the other party, i.e., one proposition is the opposite of the other, and each party is trying to prove her or his thesis from premises that are acceptable or non-acceptable to the other side.

Information-boundedness of any argument is important (and even obligatory) because any communicative use of language has the purpose of passing some information from one party to another. However, normally it is not just any information sought (by the questioner) or transferred randomly. At any rate, it seems fair to say that relevance of argument should fit into a context of the dialogic type where information delivery depends on the goal of the language user. An eristic dialogue is a framework of language use which is not restricted to the logical scope of argument (to denote “truth”). Instead, an adversarial verbal exchange of argument (in most cases, as an answer to question asked) is, in fact, an “attack” to the information delivered by the first party. In the extract from Wilde’s *A Woman of No Importance* the most widely used type of eristic dialogue is the quarrel, where both parties are emotionally upset; Mrs. Arbuthnot tries to hit out at the other (i.e. Lord Illingworth), blaming him for a lot of serious character faults which he had exercised so many years ago without holding any responsibility. For Walton (2003), “the quarrel is no friend of logic at generates more heat than light” (p. 139).

The real purpose of the quarrel between Mrs. Arbuthnot (further Mrs. A.) and Lord Illingworth (further L.I.) is to bring grievances, deceptions, negligences and finally, if to put it in a simpler way, an unjustifiable mercilessness and betrayal to the surface that have been part of their relationship for a long time but have remained

unexpressed. And their quarrel, in fact, it is the overlooking of these matters, usually (not often) based on great differences that can hardly be ignored by anyone of us to make collaboration possible, that would allow the dialogue between Mrs. A. and L.I. to go ahead smoothly. As Victorian melodrama was Wilde's favourite genre, he, in fact, in all the nine plays, introduced the "dandy" character, to severely criticise the "privilege" of the period, always a man obsessed with his own appearance (if even to lay aside his social status!) who usually speaks paradoxes and is self-mocking whilst at the same time casting criticisms and witty, insightful asides on the dubious morals of those around him. The "dandies" (Lord Illingworth being one of them), almost entirely autobiographical, were frequently used in Wilde's plays as a stand-in for himself. Satirising the artifice of Victorian society (although freedom, beauty and pleasures were revered and encouraged in it), Wilde's Lord Illingworth in *A Woman of No Importance* appears largely to represent Wilde and his own feelings on the matter in stark contrast to the rigid mind-set of the other "ideal" characters (who prefer to behave in accord with the moral standards established by their ancestors and can in no way adapt themselves to the rules of the Victorian period) in the play.

The quarrel between Mrs. A. and Lord I. comes on suddenly, like a thunderstorm (though not unexpectedly). She at once becomes very emotional and asks him without showing any respect "Whan can you have to say to me to day, George Harford?" The above mentioned "not unexpectedness" shows itself not only in the question structure and vocabulary (... "can have to say... to day?") but also in her presupposed answer-combined claims of fact and value-proving that she knows the reason of his visit which is not desirable and in addition to her rhetorical question which, in fact, needs no answer, she demonstrates her attitude to his proposal expressing her complete disapproval of standards of his morality, not allowing him to say even a word: "You can have nothing to say to me. You must leave this house". This part of the answer consists of two arguments, the first one expressing the claim of value while the secondary argument, as a claim of policy, asserts that he should leave the house at once, since whatever his excuses, they are neither sound nor convincing and nothing can justify his betrayal and his so-called motivated "disappointment" The support and the warrant elements of arguments also show great differences not only in his past actions (which allow her to consider his excuses insincere) but also in their sharp distinctions from the

point of their boundedness to the traditions of family life in the British society: for Lord I., being tied to a family and to only one woman is worth a loss of privacy—an assumption that Victorian period took for granted while for Mrs. A., a family life and faithfulness were the major claims which could well underlie subclaims about many other aspects of family life within this or that social framework. “You must leave this house” argument of Mrs. A.’s, in terms of both support and warrant elements essentially strengthens the effectiveness of her argumentation, since it (as well as the preceding ones) is composed with Lord I. in mind (knowing that the reason of his coming to her was to convince her to forgive him after so many years) who thought that she would easily say “yes” to his proposal, what, in fact, weakened his forthcoming arguments: the first argument, (Rachel Gerald knows everything about you and me now) being in itself a claim of fact, asserts that the present condition exists and none of us can deny it, while the second argument contains both warrant (“so some arrangement must become to”) and support (“that will suit us all three”). His “I assure you, he will find in me the most charming and generous of fathers”, omitting the fact of claim, consists of the “claims of value” and the “support” parts, through which he tries to avoid being blamed by Mrs. A. for his unforgettable fault (still demonstrating inability to appraise the “depth of the wound” he had made and not understanding that his action was nothing but “sprinkling salt on the wound”). But she, instead of blaming him with heavier words, she tends to solve the problem in a peaceful way, saying “My son may come in of any moment. I saved you last night. I may not be able to save you again...” showing, in a mild way, both the seriousness of the situation and the lack of any resolution of difference of opinion. Her arguments, indirectly (covertly) related to the respondent’s counterargument, implicitly leaps to their relationship (love affairs) years earlier, where Lord I. was inconsiderate in public, making Mrs. A. feel not only disgraced but also a fool in front of all her friends. Therefore, the quarrel tends to skip rapidly from one topic as well as tension to another. “My son may come in at any moment” argument expresses a claim of fact while “I saved you last night. I may not be able to save you again” combines in itself (although in a reversed order) effect-cause relationship. “My son feels my dishonour strongly, terribly strongly. I beg you to go” also consists of two arguments: the first one composed of both the claim of fact and claim of value, while the second one consists of only the claim of policy asserting that if he doesn’t want to

make the situation/problem more complicated, he must leave the place. Understanding her anxiety as a step back to possibility of resolution of difference of opinion (especially its “I beg you to go” part), L.I., sits down, and without feeling any shame for his trying to kiss the Puritan girl, uses a rhetorical question “What harm is there in a kiss?”. Turning round Mrs. A. angrily answers: “A kiss may ruin a human life, George Harford. I know that. I know that too well.”

This answer gives a clue not only to what his kiss cost her, how it ruined her life. It also expresses his carelessness about the happiness of the other people. He, acting in accord with the dubious morals of those around him, and behaving as a “dandy” boy, presents his behavior even as an intelligent manner. The other problem here is that the quarrel tends to be an interruption in the sense that a claim of one party anticipates and answers the other party’s negative reaction. Called a “disclaimer”, such kind of claim is a denial, a repudiation of what the other party is likely to think (Fahnestock and Secor 2004: 59).

For Rzayev et al (2007: 214-15), disclaimer (here, instead of fulfilling the request of Mrs. A., L.I.’s sitting down and tries to persuade her that on some points—at least for their son’s future life and happiness—their opinions of the problem does not/should not differ) usually sidesteps the question/request by disputing its relevance and typically involves moving from a “Yes/No” to a “Wh-context”, or vice versa. Understanding that his argument differs in every way from that of Mrs. A., he wants to sidestep this difference although he is not sure whether this difference although he is not sure whether this disclaimer dissociates him from a predictable position or not. But this behavior is in his character. Therefore, without disclaiming an accusation, he states: “We won’t discuss that at present. What is of importance to-day, as yesterday, is still our son.” In this way, he wants to persuade her that his proposal is not unrealistic although she is not likely to think it son. Yet, he is not sure to have an accurate sense of what she (and Gerald—their son) might think of his argument. As seen from the arguments mentioned above, the only glue that holds their quarrel together as a sequence of argumentation is the continual mentioning Gerald’s future.

As any other kind of conversation, the quarrel is (in most cases) a highly negative type of dialogue from a logical point of view, since it is connected with a lot of

logical difficulties. The problem is that, tending to be an interruption, a quarrel may function as a turning point in a discussion that was progressing nicely. And in case it happens (i.e., if it degenerates into a quarrel), this shift might block the possibility that the prior dialogue will resume and come to a successful closure. For example, both the arguments of L.I. and Mrs. A. on page 139 demonstrate the peaceful going of the conversation as in:

L.I.: You have grown hard, Rachel.

Mrs. A.: I was too weak once. It is well for me that I have changed.

These arguments contain the claims of fact and value explicitly while the warrant and support parts, “feeding” from the previous quarrels have been omitted, although they can be inferred easily demonstrating the ethos of reasonableness in rather a cold manner. In spite of the act that L.I.’s words touch her honor (he also is well-aware of her having lived an upright life during all these years), she doesn’t want to complicate the case any more what has been also clearly argued in her answer to L.I.’s excuse—like argument “I was very young at the time. We men know life too early”. But her answer once more illustrates to what extent sensitive she is (with regard to his betrayal and so many lost and tormenting years of her life) with her emotional convictions feeling both anger, pity and disappointment. Her answer (“and we women know life too late. That is the difference between men and women”), followed by a logical pause, conveys such emotions and consciously evoke them in the reader (but not touching the heart of L.I. in any way) as a way of reinforcing the rationality of the traditional family life convictions. The carefully chosen words and rather short simple sentence structures are also helpful in reinforcing her emotions and regrets. We can also see the consequences when each reader realizes that L.I. has been guilty of an unforgivable deception, there are definitely such surprising steps that he takes to convince/ persuade her that not only the proposition, or pleading, but the whole argument is worthy of credence.

L.I., with “Rachel, I want my son... Bring us together, Rachel. You can do it if you choose” hopes to persuade the unconvinced by acquainting (in fact, flattering) her with a good reason (“You can do it if you choose”) for changing her mind. In bringing

his arguments (the claims of value and policy), he assumes that his Rachel can agree with him and throughout the suggested extract, he continues to refer to different ways of persuading. Mrs. A. But providing “abundant” evidence and making “logical” connections between his arguments seems in no way enough to win agreement from his once lovely woman. Due to the context of the main argument, success in convincing Mrs. A. is, in fact, inseparable from the credibility of L.I., i.e., Mrs. A.’s belief in L.I.’s trustworthiness and it is just for the lack of this feature in him that she replies: “There is no room in my boy’s life for you. He is not interested in you.”, “You” in both arguments expressing “an unreliable person like you”, where the underlined “you”s include evidence from her life as well as her motivational appeals.

There is also an evidence in measuring his credibility/being a person who keeps his promise wholly by the degree to which she accepts his arguments in terms of what they demonstrate and to what extent one can rely on him, stating: “You made that promise to me once before and broke it”, to what L.I., feeling no shame answers: “I will keep it now... For when I marry you, Rachel, there are some ambitions I shall have to surrender” (Wilde 2011: 140) and when she answers “I decline to marry you, L.I.”, he wouldn’t like to believe what she meant and surprised, asks, “Are you serious?” and getting an affirmative answer makes him ask her to tell him the reasons. Consider the following part:

Mrs. A.: I have already explained them to my son.

L.I.: I suppose they were intensely sentimental, weren’t they? You women live by your emotions and for them. You have no philosophy of life.

Mrs. A.: You are right. We women live by our emotions and for them. By our passions and for them, if you will. I have two passions, Lord Illingworth: my love of him, my hate of you. You cannot kill those. They feed each other (Wilde *ibid*: 140-141).

If to interpret the characters from the point of their credibility, in accord with its internal components we may assume that L.I. can hardly convince Mrs. A. that he is knowledgeable about the responsibilities of family life and is ready to fulfil them. Second, he can hardly persuade Mrs. A. that he is not only truthful in the representation

of his reasons but also morally upright and dependable. And finally, he can hardly show that, as a person with sincere and good intentions, he has considered the interests and needs of Mrs. A. as well as their future family life.

Considering the reaction and appropriate behaviour of Mrs. A. to the proposal and excuses of L.I., we can assume that the warrant on which her arguments are based is completely different from that of L.I. Her warrant (belief/principle that is taken for granted in her arguments) need not be expressed since it is so widely accepted that one can assume any reasonable member of the society will not need proof of its validity. And she has spent all her years (no matter how difficult it was) without violating that warrant. Second, she is not only truthful in her presentation of her reasons (the so-called “minor premise” in syllogism and “support” in Toulmin’s model) but also, well-brought-up, never afforded herself bad manners. And finally, being a person of good intentions, she, as a loving mother, considers the interests and needs of her son. Seen from this picture, O. Wilde takes time in Chapter 4 to emphasize the magnitude of differences of these two people to explain how serious a threat to society L.I.-like people’s manners are.

Mrs. A., answering the blame by L.I. (“You women live by your emotions and for them. You have no philosophy of life”), supports her claim of value by offering the generally acknowledged assumption in rebuttal of her opponent’s claim of policy in summing up her conservative reservations about the polarization of men’s and women’s life principles which, in turn, being a broad statement, underlies a number of different arguments. Acknowledging, that “Women live by their emotions and for them. By their passions and for them, if you will”, Mrs. A., is addressing primarily those who share L.I.’s concern about the morals of the society. Her is a voice of moderation compared to those who advocate abstention as the only approach to marriage-based family life.

Even in the way she uses language, she widely uses moderation, presenting her behavior as reasonable, at the same time attacking those (L.I. being one of them) with whom she does not agree. Her final arguments in the dialogue above (“I have two passions, Lord Illingworth: my love of him, my hate of you. You cannot kill those. They feed each other”) acknowledge a reality that she believes the English people confront:

the warrant that the youth will not abstain from trustworthy principles in their family lives no matter what they often see and/or what they are often taught in practice.

So far we have looked at definite building blocks of all arguments in the selected extract of Chapter 4 from *A Woman of No Importance* by O. Wilde, at how they are constructed and put together with a basic case (claims, reasons, warrants) and with appeals based on L.I.'s and Mrs. A.'s argumentations in the eristic dialogues where the quarrel skips mainly around the same topic in an apparently/inherently related manner. And this circling around the same topic conceals a close connectedness and coherence that is intrinsic to the eristic dialogue. When a centralized argument with its identical topic "turns" around the same "ax" (although jumping from one expressed grievance to another) it seems that the topic of one grievance is relevant to the topic of the other.

Even so, as some scholars state, the quarrel, by itself, can be a beneficial type of dialogue exchange (Walton 2004: 140). If both participants succeed in articulating hidden grievances that they are very sensitive about, then the quarrel can be positive to the extent that these hidden grudges are brought to the surface and are acknowledged by the other party. This kind of exchange can help to bond people together in a personal relationship and make the relationship function more smoothly. As Walton (ibid: 140) argues, in a good quarrel, at the closing stage, the participants "make up", and agree to be more sensitive to the newly expressed concerns of the other party in the future.

The evident distinction between the title of the play ("A Woman of No Importance") and the last argument used by Mrs. A. ("A Woman of No Importance") displays the presence of a quarrel which has the effect of closing off avenues of critical discussion because neither party can trust the other to obey the Gricean conversational maxims. The danger in such a case is that the quarrelsome exchange may even block any avenue of real critical discussion and thus become extraneous to the resolution of difference of opinion though it is colourful and stimulating (as in the play above).

The play is a claim value in which, as the title (as well as its final argument) suggests, the author claims that the Victorian period moral rules are destructive. In Mrs. A.'s arguments about values, the author suggests an explicit solution to the problem caused by her belief and the emphasis ("A Man of No Importance") will remain on

support for the claim of the last argument. A high degree of irrelevance of this quarrel exhibits one more very serious problem—the attitude of the children to their parents which conceals a connectedness and coherence that is intrinsic to this eristic dialogue, as seen from Mrs. A.’s judgement: “Don’t be deceived, George. Children begin by loving their parents. After a time they judge them. Rarely if ever do they forgive them” (Wilde *ibid*: 141).

A skip from their own interrelationship to the other related topic (what will be the attitude of Gerald to the betrayal of L.I.?) also appears to be an irrelevant step because the motivations behind this case are clear to Gerald, and as a reasonable person he certainly agrees with the decision/opinion of his mother understanding what consequences it could actually have in their future family life. As Fahnestock and Secor state (2004: 81), “where there are disagreements, there are opportunities for argument”.

In our example-arguments so far, we usually wanted to identify the questions that have to be answered. The specific questions and claims that respond to them can concern any subject in the world, the questions being reduced to the following four kinds:

- (1) What is it?
- (2) How did it get that way?
- (3) Is it good or bad?
- (4) What should we do about it?

Each type of question calls for a different type of claim in response. Questions about causes are answered with claims about causes; questions about what to do are answered by claims proposing a course of action, and so on and only thus the overall pattern of these questions provides us with a simple approach to studying argument. They (the questions mentioned above) function as organizing principles and they help us take arguments apart or put them together.

Let’s briefly examine each of the four basic questions and then consider how these questions help us find and refine arguments on complex subjects in prose and poetry.

3.2.3.1. The First Question: What is it?

When this question is asked, we are wanted to answer in the form of a claim of fact denoting whether it happened and what exactly happened. Claims answering such questions always involve facts and definitions, and matters of fact and definition are always related. e.g. whether or not the representatives of the Victorian period are “cynical about marriage” depends on how “cynical” is defined in terms of opinions and assumptions that can be sampled or surveyed. Even apparently simple questions about whether or not something happened can depend on a key terms: the central characters of *A Woman of No Importance*, Mrs. A. and L.I., involved in the eristic dialogue, had different interpretations of “family relations” and/or “love affairs”. Accordingly, there were conflicting opinions about the interrelationship of children and parents. If to summarise, this question deals with revealing of the claim of fact (i.e., the “minor premise” of Aristotle’s syllogism and the warrant” of the Toulmin model).

3.2.3.1. The Second Question: How did it get that way?

As Fahnestock and Secor (2004) state, “to answer questions of this type, we start with situations, events or trends and look for their causes” (p. 85). Why did Mrs. A. became a woman of no importance? Why was the critical discussion between Mrs. A., and L.I. a failure?

We can also begin with situations, events, or trends and hunt for their consequences and effects. e.g. What have been the consequences of L.I.’s betrayal on the result of their critical discussion about their “gathering under the same umbrella?” or “What prevented Mrs. A. from saying “Yes” to L.I.’s proposal?

Questions about consequences and effects are basically causal questions, only now we are asking what something causes, not what caused it. We can also add to this category all questions about future consequences.

e.g. When Hester (Gerald’s girl-friend) asks Mrs. A.:

“You’ll let me be your daughter?” both this question and Mrs. A.’s reply “Would you choose me for a mother?” are answered by predictions and so also lead to casual claims and arguments, which finds its reflection in Hester’s

answer to Mrs. A.'s question "You of all women I have ever known" (Wilde ibid: 143).

The main argumentative structure of *A Woman of No Importance* can be schematized as follows:

3.2.6. The Aristotelian Syllogism

Major premise/main argument: It is impossible to forgive a man who, disgracing a young, helpless girl and pregnant from him, left her so many years ago and never got interested/anxious to even know what became not only of her but also the baby from his own blood.

Minor premise: (Because/as) L.I. had disgraced and left Mrs. A., although she was pregnant from him and after so many years, knowing that Gerald, his young assistant, was his own son, made a proposal to Mrs. A.

Conclusion: (Therefore) Mrs. A. did not forgive his betrayal and turned back his proposal (However painful it was).

3.2.7. The Toulmin Model

The claim of:

- (a) Fact: when young, Mrs. A. and L.I. had had a serious love affair and she became pregnant from him
- (b) Value: L.I., although knew that she was pregnant from him, had left her never getting interested in what became of her during those years.
- (c) Policy: He should not have left her in overcoming the difficulties (both moral and material) facing her during these years.

Support: (Because/as) none of L.I.'s excuses was sound since they include neither any worthy reason nor contain any motivational appeal.

Warrant: A man betraying the mother of his future child and never getting interested/anxious in what became of the young girl who had surrendered her virtue to him because of her real love to him, does not deserve to be forgiven.

Provided that the two approaches differ essentially not only from the point of the hierarchy of their internal steps but also due to the scope of the capacity of their internal components, their goals and the way how they move to this or that goal are also rather specific: the Aristotelian deductive syllogism aims at clarifying how this or other general rule extends to concrete cases or is supported by them, while the movement and goal of the Toulmin's model are of reverse nature: being inductive, the Toulmin's model aims to arrive at a conclusion of generalizing power and moves from concrete cases to "embrace the unembracable" and thus to make a long way shorter. But the relevance of these models is in no way based on their mutually exclusive relationship. On the contrary, they are of complementary capacity and in many cases they complete each other, as the inductive and deductive approaches do.

3.3. Argumentation in poetry

In applying argumentation theory to poetry, we focus on the main argument offered by the text/author or we may also focus our attention on one (or more than one) of the characters and the arguments/claims they make. For this purpose, we feel reasonable to focus on the issues, viewpoints, and the arguments.¹⁴ Unlike the prosaic claims (where the claims are mainly (at least to a definite extent) explicit, overt and openly expressed), the elements of arguments in poetry may be more implicit, covert and merely suggested, so we will need to infer them ourselves. There may also be conflicting claims in a single work (e.g. in sonnets where the solution of the problem is not supported by the epigrammatic part) that seem at times to contradict each other. We find both models useful (in complementing each other) for analysing and understanding the main line of argument in poetry. The other differentiating feature of argumentation in poetry is that an appeal of the main character can be evaluated as an implicit (and even unimaginable/unexpected) instance of dialogue exchange of viewpoints where the one person (usually the central character) takes turns looking at (and judging) the pros and cons of two possible but opposed courses of action. Sometimes, such solitary argumentation takes the form of an argument, where the author tries to imagine how his characters would argue for the suggested/opposed view. But as stated above,

¹⁴ We also understand that all these parameters and the procedures can vary in accord with the kind of a poem.

argumentation in poetry is not always with a partner who is another person. The main thread of reasoning (the major power of argumentation in poetry) that holds an argumentation (process/procedure) together is called practical reasoning, a species of goal-oriented reasoning where an agent reasons toward a conclusion that represents a course of action as prudent, based on premises describing goals and the particular circumstances of the agent's situation as known to the agent (Walton 1990: 1; Walton 2004: 142).

The purpose of this kind of poetic dialogue is not just to seek information (as in information-seeking dialogues in prose-conversation or dramatic/comedy plays) although any information is generally required in planning. The purpose is the practical one of finding the means as well as adequate planning in a given situation, to carry out a goal. The problem, therefore, is not one of finding or communicating information, but of solving this or that problem by determining the best way of solution/resolution of difference of opinion in the given situation.

The theory of planning (how to communicate information) in poetry is based on the framework of an agent (the author/his central image) who has a goal and who assesses a situation for a sequence of reason-based actions that could lead to the realization of this goal (Cf.: Wilensky 1983: 5). So conceived, planning is a kind of problem-solving in terms of the assumption that relevance in argumentation is determined by how the sequence of practical reasoning links up to the original issue of the dialogic poem. It is the fitting together or conflicting of the goals that defines their relevance in a given case (Gorayska and Lindsay 1993: 306). Accordingly, an element X of a plan Y is relevant to Y if, and only if, the plan is sufficient to achieve the goal, although some scholars cite definite problems in this definition indicating that it needs to be revised (Cf.: Mey 1995). In such cases, an action is often assessed as relevant although not on the basis of explicitly stated links in the sequence of practical reasoning in nonexplicit premises or conclusions that can be filled in, on a presumptive basis by means of scripts, or normal ways of doing things that are familiar to both the participants and the observers/interpreters of a case. The literature on planning of argumentation in different genres has brought out an important way that its relevance is essentially different in prosaic and poetic literature.

In this section of the dissertation we will briefly analyze argumentative elements in Isaac Rosenberg's *Break of the Day in the Trenches* (ca. 1914, published 1916) which provides crucially specific elements in considering war landscape from the point of view of a representative of the Georgian Poetry. But prior to the analysis of this poem, we would like to briefly touch on the historical context. As Álvarez (2011) states:

The beginning of the twentieth century brought a profound feeling of anxiety among the British. Having reached its apex during the long and changing reign of Queen Victoria, Britain was now waiting expectantly for its turbulent destiny; British people asked themselves if their country will remain the same after such a long period of industrial, political, scientific and military prosperity. Poetry lost much of its vitality in this period; there were no renowned poetic figures, such as Tennyson or Browning, to emerge in this time. As time went by, Edwardian and Georgian poetry found in the former scholarly tradition, as well as in the in vogue Pre-Raphaelite aesthetic values, a way of resurrecting the tireless spirit of progress that had turned British Empire into one of the richest civilisations ever seen in the economic field, as well as, of course, in the cultural and literary one. (p. 53)

Much writing of the period dealt with or reflected the acute social, economic, religious, and even intellectual challenges of the period. The early volumes of the Georgian poetry, published between 1912 and 1922, were widely effective in bringing a renewed and deeper interest in the fatigued poetry of the era.

3.3.1. Rosenberg, Isaac (1890-1918)

Born in Bristol, the poet moved with his family to Whitechapel, London, in 1897. His parents, as Birch states (2009: 861), “were émigrés of Lithuanian origin, and his father, a scholarly Jew, worked as a pedlar and market dealer. In 1912 he published at his own expense a collection of poems, *Night and Day*, and was encouraged by Gordon Bottomley, Ezra Pound and others. He went to South Africa in 1914, but returned in 1915 and published another volume of verse, *Youth*, which passed largely unregarded” (p. 861). Although he was against the war, he joined the army and began serving as a private in the trenches, where he died.

His poetry is forceful, rich in its vocabulary and starkly realistic in its attitudes to war: He greatly disliked Rupert Brooke's “begloried sonnets” although they belonged to the same literary tendency. His poor Jewish urban background gives the poems a note not found in the work of his fellow war poets. It was only after the publication in 1937

of his *Collected Works* that his importance became generally accepted. Vivien Noakes edited *The Poems and plays of Isaac Rosenberg* (2004) (Birch 2009: 861)

Before beginning the poetic analysis of Isaac Rosenberg's poem *Break of the Day in the Trenches* in terms of argumentation, we draw the reader's attention to one more moment concerning his attitude to war: "I never joined the army from patriotic reasons. Nothing can justify war. I suppose we must all fight to get the trouble over..." (Undated letter). It is mainly for this reason that he is not considered a mere Georgian or Edwardian; instead, he was a poet whose "experience he sought to present was not merely a reportage of his personal life but apprehension of the complexity of a wide universe" (Sisson 1981: 89).

The darkness crumbles away.

It is the same old druid Time as ever,

Only a live thing leaps my hand,

A queer sardonic rat,

As I pull the parapet's poppy

To stick behind my ear.

Droll rat, they would shoot you if they knew

Your cosmopolitan sympathies.

Now you have touched this English hand

You will do the same to a German

Soon, no doubt, if it be your pleasure

To cross the sleeping green between.

It seems you inwardly grin as you pass

Strong eyes, fine limbs, haughty athletes,

Less chanced than you for life,

Bonds to the whims of murder,
Sprawled in the bowels of the earth,

The torn fields of France.

What do you see in our eyes
At the shrieking iron and flame

Hurled through still heavens?

What quaver—what heart aghast?

Poppies whose roots are in man's veins

Drop, and are ever dropping;

But mine in my ear is safe—

Just a little white with the dust.

In applying the pragma-dialectical model of argumentation to this poem, we can all agree that a claim of fact is expressed in the first line and expressed again in a different way in the second line, difference reflecting the support constituent of the argument. As for the main argument of the poem, there would not be much disagreement about that claim: “War, which is the reason of death, blood, unhappiness, can in no way be justified. It brings happiness only to such creatures as rats whose pleasure is the richness and variety of the dead/killed/sleeping green”. When we read through the first lines, we can vividly imagine how Rosenberg places us in the trenches, where we can observe with our own eyes “the crumbling away of the darkness”.

Furthermore (Line 2), taken metaphorically, he estimates the time of the first line, as “the same old Druid time as ever”, serving as well to express the subclaim of line 1, while in line 3 he is introducing the notion of pastoral by focusing his attention on a simple rat, i.e., “only a live thing leaping his hand” as a claim of fact. Identifying it as “a queer sardonic rat”, Rosenberg implicitly demonstrates his hatred concerning war

(as a partial indicator of the main argument of the poem) and exposes a sophisticated portrait of life and death: “Droll rat, they would shoot you if they knew/your cosmopolitan sympathies”.

The narrator verifies the idea of the main argument of his poem suggesting that the rats are the real and the only winners of the wars, since it is they who get real profit from both sides by eating the carrion and transmitting diseases: “Now you have touched this English hand/You will do the same to a German”. These lines combine in themselves both fact and value elements of the argument and describing such an unimaginably awkward picture, the poet enhances the idea of cosmopolitanism in two meanings: (i) the troops of the dead soldiers belong to different nations, and (ii) the rat has a chance to choose the best one from amongst of those representatives. Disappointed and unhappy with the situation, Rosenberg “indicates the absurdity of the situation by permitting the rat, a supposedly lesser creature, to do what men dare not” (Silkin 1972: 277). In the poem, we can also find a sort of the metaphorically strengthened view of the sacrifices of the young people to denote which the poet has chosen the word “green” in the lines “soon, no doubt, if it be our pleasure/to cross the sleeping green between”. The other metaphorically expressed notion is “the sleeping green” which, in fact, means: The poet cannot believe his eyes that such young boys are dead. He imagines that they are sleeping, thus, likening death to sleeping, he condemns the war and the calamities it brings. Some researchers (Sisson 1981: 91), misunderstanding the denotative and connotative meanings of “green”, dare wrongly claim that “to cross the sleeping green between” is an idealised view of the war field.

For Sisson (ibid), “obviously there was no green at all, since the battlefield was a complete wasteland. So, this poem, written from the trenches, really shows a concern for the visual aspects of war as well as for the subcutaneous suffering” (p. 91). Rosenberg’s poem, written in the shape (and mood) of a macabre irony, and being a sardonic one (poem) shows (as a result of analysing the situation in the warfield) us that, in a war, there are no winners whatsoever (as a proof justifying the main argument/major premise of the poem). For Alvarez (2011), “The melancholic mood, so typical of much of Victorian poetry, exploded in the English World War Poetry in a myriad of disturbing variations, all of them trying to account for the blatantly absurd

waste of human lives” (p. 61). And Rosenberg’s *Break of Day in the Trenches* is not an exception to this.

The support to the main idea of the poem is supplied in the form of consequences which the poet, as a soldier of the World War 1, could witness with his own eyes: the rat (who is the poet’s addressee), touching this English hand, will do the same to a German. The other warrant that connects the support to the main argument is that the rat, as the only beneficiary from the war, “feels pleasure in making its choice as well as crossing the sleeping green between”, and “seems inwardly grin as it passes strong eyes, fine limbs, haughty athletes”. The people who accept the main argument of the poem as “nothing can justify war...”, should be persuaded to fight to prevent it from happening at all costs/by putting all possible/available difficulties in its way.

In fact, Rosenberg’s hatred to war is immeasurable in the sense that victims of war are not only the humans but also “bonds to the whims of murder, /sprawled in the bowels of the earth, /the torn fields of France”; the arguments/claims in the poem are not always easily identifiable. In many cases, the readers may be required to ask some questions to identify what is in question and to formulate the argument. The following set of questions may be helpful while making the analysis:

1. What is this poem all about? The answer will enable us to uncover the main topic of the poem.
2. What is the main argument of the poem? That is, it would help you discover the poet’s attitude to the subject.
3. Can the subject and the attitude of the poet (in terms of the main argument) be regarded as a form of complexity? This question will enable us identify the issues from the points of both poet and the rat or the possible interpretations of the issue by different layers of the society.
4. What positions on the issue have been emphasized in the poem and how it has been done? The answer will be useful in identifying explicit and implicit arguments as well as who realizes them.
5. If the argument (either in its main or subcategory form) is unexpressed, what further evidence can we use to locate it? This will result in an explicit argument.

6. Will everyone agree that the claim(s) made by the title, the content of the poem and the poet are/is viable? This will help you identify whether these three issues/agents display disagreements over how to state the main argument in this literary work.

Questions 1, 2 and 6 have been answered in the earlier part of the analysis. As for the other questions, one could argue that the suggested aspects of the poem express conflicting claims about an issue. In terms of question 3, the addressor/the narrator and the rat as the addressee are on the extreme edges of the claim of value, at least in the context of the opposition “happy” (winner)-“unhappy” (loser). The literal meaning of the narrator’s “It is the same old druid time as ever” (question 4), can be seen as violation of multiple maxims (quantity, quality) the implications of which evoke that the “crumbling of the darkness” is attributed to the downbreak praying of the religious people in the ancient times. Another relevant information expressed in “Soon, no doubt, if it be your pleasure/ to cross the sleeping green between” implicitly expresses a strong hatred and regret of the narrator without mentioning it; the lines are also implicating that the rat, being overjoyed and inflamed, as well as without feeling any danger, crosses the sleeping green between in the air of “I just like doing it!” and gets all the possible pleasure, what is repeatedly implicating that the only winner of the war is the rat. And as the *Break of the Day in the Trenches* suggests, this war, like any other, aiming at dominance, brought nothing but misery and death to so many nations in the world and the question of the narrator (5) “What do you see in our eyes/ at the shrieking iron and flame/ hurled through still heavens?” requires neither an answer nor an evidence since the preceding lines give “clue” to such claims as “only grievances, horror and despair”. And “The heavens remain still at the shrieking iron and flame”, the contradiction enhancing the terrorizing influence of the war field still more.

The other aspect of the argument in the poem is concerned with its being of traditional type, according to which a person making an argument should find all of the available means of persuasion to convince an audience to change positions and agree with the arguer (Wood 2009: 5). This type of traditional argument, known as “single-perspective argument” used by Rosenberg in the above-mentioned poem, occurs when one person develops a perspective on an issue and argues to convince a mass audience to agree with this single view, which, we, also, encounter as the main argument-vehicle

of all the events in the poem: “There is no winner in the war”. Rosenberg, as the arguer, provides consequences of the war via personal evidence as a soldier and refutes the possible opposing views although it is not clear whether anyone judging so (Rosenberg included) “can win” such an argument. But, Rosenberg, reasoning logically, understands “human characters and excellences, and understands the emotions—that is, knows what they are, their nature, their causes and the way in which they are excited (CWA 1995: 2156).



Conclusion

While communicating, , as Wood (2009) claims, we are engaged in “argument assuming that argument deals with issues, ideas or topics that have not yet been settled, that invite differing opinions, and that are consequently subject to question, debate, or negotiation. Whether they seem remote or close to you, all of these ideas are related to larger ideas that have engaged human mind for centuries. In fact, all of the important ideas/issues—those that address life and death, the quality of life, ways and means, war and peace, the individual and society, the environment, facts, predictions as well as our attitudes, expectations and emotions” caused by what happened/is happening/will happen—are discussed, debated and negotiated via argumentation everywhere in the world.

Since the ancient times, argument theorists have tried to define and describe/interpret argument in different ways. Certain descriptions have focused on giving abundant evidence for a standpoint on a complex issue and convincing readers or listeners to accept that particular viewpoint.

The traditional approach to argumentation is rooted in classical philosophy and rhetoric by Aristotle according to whose opinion a person in an argument setting need to find all of the necessary techniques and strategies of persuasion to change positions of the arguer or agree with the latter’s opinion.

Argumentation is based on the assumption requiring that there must be the potential for the issue to generate at least two or more extreme views, between which people take a variety of positions, including the view that e.g., understanding and rational use of implicatures or presuppositions may be acceptable for certain purposes, such as for enhancing effectiveness as well as economic use of language, if to mention only a few.

Every argument, being of dialogic (overtly or covertly expressed) nature, requires a person who initiates the argument, takes a position on the issue, and considering information, communicates a position to others, while the other party, whether friendly or hostile, should be willing to consider new views or perspectives,

provided that he is capable of understanding, thinking, questioning, discussing, and answering.

The fact that issues often originate in dramatic life situations assumes that things happen all around us—global terrorism, e.g., from the external borders of Turkey threatens its sovereignty and integrity—What should Turkey do to secure its independence and wholeness? (Pay attention to/consider (a) the suggestions made by the USA and other foreign governments, who, in fact, support those terroristic forces providing different supports, to collapse Turkey, and (b) the reaction/attitude and decision of Turkey to prevent these plans). The appropriate decision to overcome this situation can be arrived only as a result of careful consideration/argumenting all pros and cons.

In the adversarial approach to argument, the arguer is intent on changing the other person's mind; he typically approaches issues as though there were only one solution: the arguer presents them as a fight between opposing sides, while the consensual style of argument is an alternative to the win-lose model of argument and suggests other ways for mediating conflicts in an effort to find agreement, and resolving differences, to clear the way to get things done.

The claim, the support and the warrants are the three parts that are present in any argument (Toulmin's model) while the Aristotelian syllogism consists of the major premise also functioning as the basic element/principle of the deductive approach, the minor premise also functioning as the reasoning basis and the conclusion which is drawn from the relationship of the mentioned two premises.

The Aristotelian deductive syllogism aims at clarifying how this or other general rule extends to concrete cases of categorization or is supported by them, while the movement and goal of the Toulmin's model aim to arrive at a conclusion of generalizing power and moves from concrete cases to "embrace the so-called unembracable" and thus make a long way shorter. But the relevance of these models is in no way based on their mutually exclusive relationship. On the contrary, they are of complementary capacity and in many cases they complete each other, as the inductive and deductive approaches do in practice.

The issue/conflict in the eristic dialogue has two sides, and each side, called a point of view (standpoint), is made up of two components: a proposition or the expressed argument, and a negative attitude/argument toward that proposition. In L.I.'s and Mrs. A.'s dialogue, there are two subtypes of critical discussion. In the simple critical discussion, L.I., defends a particular argument known as his thesis, and Mrs. A., as the other party, raises critical questions to cast doubt on that thesis. But in cases of critical complex discussion, each participant has a thesis, and each is obliged to defend that thesis. Thus, in a critical discussion, each party has a positive attitude toward his/her own thesis and a negative attitude toward the thesis of the other side. In the complex critical discussion, each party has a burden of proof/justifying argument, while in the simple critical argumentation (what is more typical for Mrs. A. and L.I.'s eristic dialogue), the one party (Mrs. A., in this case) has a burden of proof, whereas the other party (L.I., in this case) is trying to convince Mrs. A. to successfully resolve the conflict of opinions by raising his additional excuses that aim to throw enough doubt on the arguments of the first side or at least to "soften" the "hostile" atmosphere to lessen the negative power of Mrs. A.'s argumentation, but in vain. The contra-argumentation allows Mrs. A. both to criticize and refute L.I.'s point of view.

The critical and normative evolution of arguments in L.I. and Mrs. A.'s arguments is pragmatic (based mainly on the presupposed nature of proofs): one argumentative element of the dialogue is relevant to another to the extent that both arguments are functional in relation to the purpose of the main argument (of the author).

As with other types of dialogue, relevance in an eristic dialogue depends on the issue and on the stage and nature of the conflict is in. Ideally, an agenda is set in the confrontation stage (when L.I. knows that Gerald is his son because of what he comes to Mrs. A. with his proposal to make a family), where the issue or issues to be resolved are clearly stated. And the critical discussion between L.I. and Mrs. A. becomes problematic in determining whether an argument that arises at this stage really is relevant or not. A hotly disputed, but irrelevant and untimely issue/discussion ends in a degression that distracts both sides (L.I., disappointed, leaves the place and Mrs. A., refusing his marriage proposal, is weeping bitterly), leading to failure of the negotiation to reach a successful conclusion. The failure of the critical discussion is also caused by

the fact that as a negotiation proceeds, new complaints and demands by Mrs. A. (and often objections of L.I. to them) swell the original agenda, enhancing digressive lines of argument that have the effect of preventing any useful discussion of the original issues. The observation that the quarrel exhibits a high degree of argumentative irrelevance needs to be examined more carefully, and to be qualified and clarified.

The movement from one focus space to another in poetry is very important for understanding relevance of the relationship of the main argument and its localised subarguments. The reason is that usually a task might seem clearly relevant in one focus space, but when one shifts to a different focus space, it might not seem relevant at all, what does not hold good for Rosenberg's *Break of the Day in the Trenches*: throughout the poem, the main argument ("There is no winner in the war") never loses its importance. In all focus spaces of the poem, Rosenberg implicitly demonstrates his hatred concerning war and a sophisticated illustration of life and death. The narrator, remaining true to the main argument, verifies the idea that the rats are the real and the only winners of the war, since it is they who get real profit from both sides by eating the carrion and transmitting diseases. All the lines of the poem combine in themselves both fact and value elements of the argument and describing such an unimaginably awkward picture, the poet enhances the idea of cosmopolitanism in two meanings: (a) the troops of the dead soldiers belong to different nations fighting for dominance, and (b) the rat has a chance to choose the best one from amongst of those representatives. Indicating the absurdity of the situation, by permitting the rat, a supposedly lesser creature, to do what men dare not, Rosenberg also metaphorically strengthens view of the sacrifices (i.e., the young) using the word "sleeping green", with the terrifying truth: The poet cannot believe his eyes that so many young boys are dead. What he can afford himself to do is: they are sleeping, but very cautious of the fight to begin, therefore have not closed their eyes. They are sleeping with their eyes wide open. Likening death to sleeping, he condemns, since the calamities it can bring are "exhibited" on the battlefield. This poem, with the argument of each line, written from the trenches, really shows a concern for the visual aspects of war as well as for the subcutaneous suffering, what is a proof justifying the main argument.

The melancholic mood, a characteristic of poetry in Victorian era (Rosenberg's poem being one of them) exploded in the war poetry. That type of poetry dealt with the absurdity of waste of humans for nothing.

The support to the main idea/argument of the poem is supplied in the form of consequences (i.e., claims of facts occurring because of definite reasons) which, the poet, as a soldier of the World War 1, could witness with his own eyes. The addressor and the addressee (i.e., the rat) are on the extreme edges of the claim of value, at least in the context of the opposition "happy" (winner-"unhappy" (loser).

The other aspect of the argument in the poem is concerned with its being of common type. Known as "single-perspective argument", this type is called into being if one person has his/her own standpoint and tries to persuade the reader/listener to agree with this single perspective, which, we, also, consider as the main-argument-vehicle of all the events in the poem.

In terms of the pedagogical implications of the findings, the present study suggests the following:

- 1) The capacity to argue effectively (in writing or verbally) can enhance an individual's/student's participation in expressing himself/composition writing through, for example, direct or indirect communication with people/teachers/group members/representatives in conferences and other discussion activities. It is in this sense that both the process (argumentation) and the product (argument) of putting forward and negotiating ideas in different types of text in varying genres are among the major goals of education.
- 2) The methods/approaches modelled by various theoretical approaches can be successfully applied in a wide range of fields, including writing, grammar, translation, literature, linguistics, semantics, sociolinguistics and philosophy. The results/findings of the research also necessarily involve the reasoning/syllogisms relevant to the strength, soundness and rationale of argumentation in terms of the development of state-of-the-art instructional strategies, techniques, practices and tools.

- 3) The models of argumentation (explored in the analysis of different genres) include both traditional dialogic discussion as well as other written materials (poetry and partially a narrative) to figure out the roles played by argument(ation) in educational/communication settings. Given that the central aim of education is to build and improve critical thinking skills in students, acquiring the above-mentioned potential of argumentation is a goal of crucial importance.
- 4) Examining the major contemporary approaches to argumentation in different functional styles, the instructors (and students) can shed light on and specify how such trends can be productive in giving rise to innovations in research methods and orientations.

And the perspectives are as follows:

- 1) The so-called trend of renewed interest in the dialogic aspect of argumentation in the teaching/learning atmosphere requires that internalization of the social argumentative acts contribute to the development of higher order mental processes such as reasoning, argumentation, critical analysis of information and processing of conceptual change.
- 2) The other intriguing issue that has been ignored in the argumentation theories is what might be termed the “behaviour” of argumentation in different types of communicative acts. This refers to the way in which argumentation can be used to enhance effective communication through the systematic guidance of argumentation.
- 3) The perspective makes a vital contribution to an ever growing role of argumentation in the educational settings in terms of renewing deeper

interest in exploring the dialogical, collaborative and problem-solving aspects of argumentation.

- 4) As the ultimate reasonable potential for successful use of argumentation for debate is still open to further discussion, researching to what extent meta-argumentative skills are productive and can be acquired by students should be the “pleasure” of researchers in specifying how argumentation can help produce a worthwhile educational value.



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- 2) A Comparison between Robinson Crusoe and Hayy ibn Yaqdhan under the Light of Intertextuality, Comparativism Identity Communication Conference Proceedings, 2011, Craiova, Romania.

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