ATILIM UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS MASTER'S PROGRAMME

IN THE MIDDLE OF GREAT AND SMALL: TURKEY'S STRUGGLE DURING WORLD WAR II

Master's Thesis

Mehmet Ali Şengil

Ankara-2017

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Mehmet Ali Şengil

Thesis Supervisor
Prof. Dr. Hasan Ünal

Ankara-2017

ACCEPTION AND APPROVAL

This is to certify that this thesis titled "In the Middle of Great and Small: Turkey's Struggle During the World War II" and prepared by Mehmet Ali Şengil meets with the committee's approval unanimous/ by a majority vote as Master's Thesis in the field of International Relations following the successful defense of the thesis conducted in January 9, 2018.

Prof. Dr. Dilaver Tengilimoğlu
Signature of the Director

Prof. Dr. Hasan Ünal
Signature of the Supervisor

Yrd. Doç. Dr. Duygu Dersan Orhan
Signature of the Member

Prof. Dr. Hasan Ali Karasar
Signature of the Member

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Mehmet Ali Şengil

ÖZ

[ŞENGİL, Mehmet Ali]. [Büyük Güç ile Küçük Devlet Arasında: Türkiye'nin II. Dünya Savaşı'ndaki Mücadelesi], [Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ankara, [2017].

Küçük devletlerin büyük güçler karşısında etkisiz kalması bir kader midir? Veya büyük güçlerin mücadelelerinde arada kalmamak için bir yol var mıdır? Ya da küçük devlet görüntüsünde olup, aslında büyük güçlerle küçük devletler arasında konumlanan ülkeler olabilir mi? Türkiye'nin İkinci Dünya Savaşı boyunca sergilediği duruş, bu anlamda bir model oluşturuyor. Diğer küçük devletler arasında Türkiye, denge politikasına dayanan becerikli diplomasisiyle öne çıktı. Bu tez, askeri ve iktisadi olarak zayıf bir ülkenin, hassas, karmaşık ve değişken dengeler içerisinde, sırtını jeopolitik konumuna ve diplomasi becerisine dayayarak hayatta kalma mücadelesine dikkat çekmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Savaşın tam ortasında, savaş dışı kalmış bir ülkenin verdiği mücadele, teorik bakış açısı da dahil edilerek göz ele alınacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Güç Dengesi, Orta Büyüklükte Devlet, Savaş Dışılık, Coğrafya, Diplomasi, Dengeleme, Peşine Takılma, Jeopolitik

ABSTRACT

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Is this the fate that the small states would remain passive against the great powers? Or is there a way not be the meat in the sandwich between the great powers' struggle? Or are there states which are looking small, but actually somewhere between great and small? Turkey's stance throughout World War II serves as a model for this type of state. Among other small powers, throughout the war, Turkey came to the fore because of her skillful diplomacy based on policy of balancing. This thesis aims to point out a militarily and economically vulnerable state's survival based on geopolitical position and diplomatic skills within a delicate, complex, ambivalent balance-in other words, this thesis is going to handle the struggle a non belligerent state in the middle of the war by including theoretical outlook.

Key Words

Balance of Power, Middle Power, Non-Belligerence, Geography, Diplomacy, Balancing, Bandwagoning, Geopolitics

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

APEC: Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asia Nations

GNP: Gross National Product

TFP: Turkish Foreign Policy

USA: United States of America

US: United States

INTRODUCTION

There has been a huge academic accumulation of knowledge with respect to Turkish foreign policy throughout World War II and the general tendency has accordingly been to explain the sequence of the events within that specific period of time. However, in this thesis, we tried to merge the historical events with the international relations theories. Theoretical studies sometimes do not exactly match with the historical facts in the social sciences and so we encounter far-fetched results. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the people who are interested in international relations should isolate the theories. International relations theories would bring a new perspective on the topic we study, when we use them in an appropriate context. Therefore, we will try to do so. Let us go a bit deeper. At the macro level, we will appeal to realism when we describe Turkish foreign policy. At the micro, level we will address the issue by using the balance of power theory in general terms and Stephen Walt's balance of threat. In addition, we will try to utilize (and partially challenge) the concept of middle power. By using these means, we tried to highlight what factors made Turkey different from those that are tangibly close to her. In addition, we did not try to fit Turkey into an exact definition within the international relations theories, but to make a definition by considering the historical facts.

Post World War I brought about inevitable changes in the world balance of power and in Turkey as well. This resulted in the fall of Ottoman Empire which signaled the new regime and policy configuration derived from a realist standpoint. From then on, Turkey, which embraced nation statehood converted her foreign policy from imperial stimuli to a more humble and pro-status quo perspective in which the main target was to carry her survival on determined territory and in order to do this, Turks fell back on a policy of balancing which actually had constituted their traditional manner since the late Ottoman period excluding that of World War I. The policy of balancing, roughly stated, corresponded to the way of survival by which Turkey had curtailed a threatening great power with another great power by forming an alliance. Therefore, this form of alliance did not include bandwagoning, as is evident from its name. All in all, considering this driving force we are going to handle Turkish foreign policy maneuvers between the years 1939 and 1945.

Prior to the war, one of the most significant strategic principles was to avert from being belligerent on which the adverse experiences of the World War I had an effect. In order to carry this out, Turkey tactically utilized a traditional policy of balancing. Within the context of Turkey's configuration of balancing, the Soviet Union had always been a fixed component, whereas the rest had varied as we will see. In other words, for instance, when Germany would pose a threat to Turkey, Britain would automatically appear as a balancing component, but in any case, the Soviets' attitude would be taken into consideration. This is what roughly the policy of balancing corresponds to. As for the reason why the Soviet Union had such an importance within the configuration of Turkish foreign policy, geographical proximity comes into prominence, which was counted among one of the most notable criteria in alliance building by Kenneth Waltz and Stephen Walt. In brief, Turkey calculated the Soviet Union's aims in every single step she took. Furthermore, one of the most significant aims was to protect the European balance of power in which no great state should have dominated Europe. Therefore, it was the reason that Turks had opted for war-ravaged Germany and the Soviet Union.

The first attempt to an build alliance began in the inter-war period. After Germany and Italy had gradually become threatening powers, Turks took action against potential expansionism of those states across the Balkans and the Mediterranean. Therefore, unlike Britain which adopted the appeasement policy, Turkey had looked for coalition building to take measures by initiating the Balkan Pact in 1934 and the Mediterranean Pact in 1936.

In 1939, Italian expansionism across the Mediterranean presented a convenient basis for coalition building between Turkey and the Allies. Therefore, by doing this, Turkey managed to secure herself on the eve of the World War II. But on the other hand, it should be indicated that Turkey did not become a belligerent, although it seems like Turkey took a side. Instead, Turkey added such clauses by which she hampered the probability of her belligerence. On the other hand, through her classical subtle diplomacy, she managed to annex territory. In sum, by the Tripartite Treaty, Turkey constituted the first pillar of her chain of treaties.

In 1941, when German expansionism knocked at her door, Turkey managed to ease the danger by the non-aggression pact with Germans, which constituted the second pillar of her chain of treaties. Therefore, Turkey was indirectly involved in the war, despite the fact that she did not take part militarily. The new situation was called active neutrality, that is to say she closed Germany out of her geo-strategically vital territories. Moreover, Turks managed to gain favor, as they did in the previous treaty. This time, the non-aggression pact brought about economic advantages.

Towards the end of the war, the Soviet Union was gradually prevailing in the European balance of power. Britain was, on the other hand, war-ravaged. But the United States, by the end of the war, filled the deficiency of balancer against the Soviet Union. Therefore, the new status quo necessitated Turkey to take the United States' side. In brief, it can be inferred that Turkey would need a balancer so long as she would remain in the same location.

All in all, considering all these events, we have something to depict Turkey's identity in the international realm. First of all, Turkey situated between great powers and small states, can be categorised according to the way she behaved. Therefore, such a state should have these features;

- Geographical vitality. (which strengthens her diplomatic maneuverability and accordingly lets her curtail the great powers in some cases)
- Calculating character. (should calculate every single detail)
- Diplomatic ability. (by which she can compensate her economic and military weakness)
- Pro-status quo.
- Proneness to the policy of balancing. (main pillar of her survival)
- Nonbelligerent (but on the other hand, she declares her intention to protect her territories, if required)

CHAPTER 1

THEORETICAL AND HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

1. THEORETICAL AND HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

1.1. Balance of Power

Balance of power occupies a remarkable place in the realist school of international relations. This concept, as do the rest, also differentiates one from another by international relation's (more generally by social science's) very nature. In order to understand what balance of power refers to, it is essential to state some assumptions that are peculiar to realism. First of all, for realism, the international system is anarchic, in which states are the main subject. Secondly, within such an atmosphere, states tend to be in search of power. Starting from these points of view, let us make a common definition that balance of power in the realist school refers to the striving for power in the anarchic international system. However, as it is mentioned above, there are several definitions put forward by various realist scholars. Here in the theoretical and historical stage, those different perspectives towards balance of power will be explained regardless of their direct relevance to the context, in order to make a comprehensive analysis to make the issue more intelligible.

To begin with, there are some major definitions voiced through various scholars expert at international relations theory, such as Thucydides, Niccolo Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, Kenneth Waltz, John Mearsheimer, Stephen Walt, of whom studies, in a general manner, can be attached to the realist school of thought. Balance of power, as a general acceptance, is measure taken by a weaker component (state) against a rising, more precisely, threatening component to maintain her existence, that is to say, a status quo that serves her purpose.

It would be helpful to trace the concept's root back to the Peloponnesian War that occurred in ancient Greece. The famous Greek historian Thucydides, who was involved in the war, depicts and defines the balance of power politics in the light of

the Peloponnesian War that lasted twenty one years. What makes Thucydides a pioneer in the realist school is that he draws a behavioral pattern of certain states. In addition to this, his observations lead to bring out some fundamental concepts, such as anarchy, balance of power and security dilemma. To him, the system was anarchic, in which there is no sole external element to cease the increasing ambition of a threatening state. Therefore, there is always a security dilemma in the eye of a weaker state that a stronger one may pose a threat to her survival. As a consequence of these, the increasing ambition of a strong state can oblige a small state to take some measures for her survival, namely balance of power, the target of which is to keep the status-quo. In the case of Peloponnesian War, there is the same situation between Athens and Sparta. Athens as a strong element of which power was ever-mounting and aspired to expand its territory (revisionist), on the other side, Spartans, which perceived a threat by Athens, got into a security dilemma, thereby situated at status quo. Whilst Athens was expanding its military capacity, Spartans looked for alliances along with the small city-states. As a result of the Peloponnesian War Sparta won against Athens. To sum up, Athens as an increasing power triggered Spartans to take measures and thereby she formed an alliance with another small state to protect the status-quo, that is to say, the balance of power. More generally, he highlights that the balance of power is a compulsory case to appeal. He declares that the bipolar status among Athens and Spartans will ultimately compel the other Hellenes to make an alliance.[1] As a result, Thucydides' analysis on the Peloponnesian War became inspirational for future studies on realism. In this sense, he has a pioneering role in the realist school.

There is another fundamental political thinker and diplomat that is regarded as a fundamental figure in the realist school of international relations theory, Niccolo Machiavelli. It would be better to indicate that Machiavelli has not only an essential place in the realist school, but is also important in political philosophy. Nonetheless, his convictions will be handled within the context of the balance of power. It should be initially stated that Machiavelli associates internal politics with foreign relations. He underlines the importance of internal stability within social and economic matters. Therefore, such a stability within a domestic policy will accordingly reflect

[1] Robert Strassler, *The Landmark Thucydides*, (New York: Free Press, 1996), p. 14.

credit on foreign affairs. In other words, a stable condition in internal politics constitutes a sort of draft for external affairs. Thereupon, the balance of power in international relations would easily be generated. For this, according to Machiavelli, good rulers should be in power.[2] Otherwise, if there is no good ruler, then the international system would correspondingly remain catastrophic. Machiavelli's thought on making alliances is also essential. To him, alliances are inevitable for rulers so they must get in touch with other states to keep their authority within internal affairs. On the other hand, these alliances are limited due to clashing interests. Therefore, to him, there is no way to make permanent alliances among states. In brief, benefits are always prevailing.

Apart from Thucydides's and Machiavelli's studies on the balance of power, Thomas Hobbes plays an important role in the analysis of the balance of power. Initially, it should be indicated that Hobbes is also regarded in the realm of realism as a pioneer or the father of this theory. Actually, it can be indicated that Hobbes was inspired by the Thucydides's work on inter-state relations. However, Hobbes's focal point is a more macro level, in that he tries to concentrate on the nature of the state, which reflects her behavior. Initially, Hobbes appeals to analyze human nature to explain state behavior. To him, human nature is selfish, self-seeking and composed of concerns that make it suspicious towards others to survive, thus a friendship is out of the question.[3] In other words, survival makes humans fight. Hobbes ascribes the same situation to states' behavior as well. The system is anarchic and chaotic, so such a distrustful condition prompts states to resort to some measures such as making alliances to survive. However, despite Hobbes implies in order to maintain the balance of power, he firmly insists that states remain in a constant state of war. In other words, states would wage war on their allies, even after they prevailed over a common enemy, due to their nature. Briefly stated, according to Hobbes, balance of power is not an instrument to constitute an international peace or for multilateral purposes, but a means of national interest through armaments.[4]

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[2] Janice Leung, "Machiavelli and International Relations Theory" *Glendon Journal of International Studies*, vol. 1, 2000, p.4.
[3] Dominika Klej, "Hobbes' Theory of International Society" *Glendon Journal of International Studies* vol.3, 2003,pp. 9-14.
[4] Ibid., 11-14

As to the more contemporary views on balance of power, we confront some scholars which play an essential role in the realist school of international relations theory. Balance of power is one of the core topics which includes a lot of definitions. In this part, there will be a compilation of these various thoughts on balance of power.

In modern international relations theories, Hans Morgenthau, frequently focuses on balance of power. When he underlines the prominence of the balance of power, he traces it back to the beginning of political history. He portrays the balance of power that on one hand, in an international system in which states are on equal footing, namely an even structure or that is to say, there is such a balance that includes no room for struggle among parties. On the other hand, there is a non-proportional international system wherein a state prevails over another, which brings about unrest. It is important to indicate that balance of power is a policy by which a prevailing, hegemon state may carry on the status-quo, which is for the benefit of itself. For that very reason, balance of power can bring out tension and create disequilibrium. Moreover, according to Morgenthau, to create a balance of power, a state should estimate the power of neighboring states. However, he indicates that this estimation is not that possible, thereby the state must turn to power maximizing. Briefly stated, the state must be vigilant in any action of her opponents. In other words, regardless of being hostile, she must be as powerful as her neighbor in order to keep the balance. To conclude, from Morgenthau's point of view, the balance of power is a competition between those who seek to keep the existing situation (status-quo) and those who endeavors to alter it (revisionist).

Furthermore, with respect to methodology, Morgenthau divides balance of power into four strands; divide and rule, compensations, armaments, and alliances.[5] In the first instance, what he means by divide and rule is a method by which a state endeavors to disrupt territorial integrity of her rival to make it weak and open to attack. Secondly, compensation, namely territorial compensation, refers to a

[5] Chatterjee Aneek, *International Relations Today: Concepts and Applications*, (Delhi: Pearson Education India, 2010), p. 65.

consensus over a territory between states to carry on the balance of power. Thirdly, armament means competition between two states with respect to increasing armaments to maintain the balance of power. Finally, alliances which is one of the most frequent means to achieve balance of power signifies aggregation of two states to balance another.

As for the other realist scholar, besides Morgenthau, Stephen Walt also occupies an important place in the analysis of balance of power. Initially, as a neo-realist scholar, Walt indicates that states would tend to balance threat rather than power, namely balance of threat. Therefore, states would make alliances within the context of this origin. According to Walt, alliances would be made on the basis of either balancing or bandwagoning and states would decide to use either balancing or bandwagoning based upon the threat. In other words, the threat is the determinant, rather than power. Moreover, Walt indicates the factors that create the threat perception, such as proximity, aggressive intention, and armament. Let us turn back to the previous strand, namely balancing. To make balancing clear, it refers to making alliances against the one which goes from strength to strength and becomes dominant, in order to evade the threat she poses. Walt, at this juncture, comes up with two justifications to respond as to why states tend to prefer balancing. First of all, he proposes that a state should make an alliance with a weaker state, as it is much safer than making alliances with a stronger one. Meanwhile, he expands his proposal by giving the British case, that she had always been in alliance with the weaker side to overcome rising powers within continental Europe.[6] As to the second justification put forward by Walt, he promotes alliances with weaker states, as it is much more controllable than being in an alliance with a stronger one.[7] In other words, those weaker states enforcedly tend to make concessions, since their survival is at risk. Therefore, within such alliances, it is much more possible to voice. Secondly, as oppose to balancing, bandwagoning refers to a kind of alliance which is valid for a weaker state, but which is not able to curtail the strong and aggressive one. In addition to this, bandwagoning occurs when there is no possibility to make an alliance against the strong one. Therefore, the state is constrained to make

[6] Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliance*, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1990),p. 18.
[7] Ibid., 19.

concessions to the stronger to survive, and what is more, if the stronger state is geographically close to her, this makes the situation more inevitable. In short, according to Walt, stronger states are willing to choose balancing, while bandwagoning is preferable for relatively weaker state.

Kenneth Waltz occupies an important position in neo-classical realism as a founder of it. Waltz is inspired by Hobbes idea that the international system is anarchic, thus the main concern of states is their security. Moreover, as opposed to Stephen Walt, he claims that states would balance the power.[8] According to Waltz, states would want to achieve balance of power, when the international system is anarchic. In addition to this, there must be states that need to survive. These are two preconditions of emerging balancing.[9] While doing so, states would appeal to internal balancing in which they endeavor to boost economic, military and strategic ability or external balancing by which it makes alliances to secure themselves. Besides balancing, Waltz argues that within a regular and unambiguous international system, states are willing to choose bandwagoning.

Within the realist school of international relations theories, John Mearsheimer also occupies an essential position. From a realist point of view, he initially comes up with the concept of power as the rest of the realists do. States must be aware of the power of each other for the sake of balance of power within the system. Therefore, we can say that power, in the realist perspective, is at the core. However, there is a nuance that makes Mearsheimer different from the fellow scholars. Mearsheimer would like to respond to what extent states want to increase their power by. He argues that power is the ultimate target, and thus they are always willing to focus on power maximizing rather than security maximizing. Hence, this view makes him an offensive realist. States within an anarchic international system are not able to predict what the others indend. Therefore, the main concern is survival. According to these presumptions, Mearsheimer puts forward some behavioral patterns. Initially, as states cannot predict what the others intend, they are afraid of each other. Because of this

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[8] Jason W. Davidson, *The Origins of Revisionist and Status-quo States,* (New York: Springer, 2016), p. 7.
[9] Jack Donnelly, *Realism and International Relations,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,2000), pp. 17-18.

reason, it is quite risky to be based on another state, with respect to security, namely self-help is predominant. As a result of this, states would be aware that they must be the strongest one. As an offensive realist Mearsheimer indicates that states always have an aggressive stimulation, due to the anarchic structure of the international system. In other words, states that are revisionist, unlike defensive realism, claim that they are willing to keep the balance of power as a supporter of the status quo. To sum up, according to Mearsheimer, states are able to survive by constantly increasing their power and their aggression in order to be a regional power, which is the ultimate goal.

Additionally, buck-passing is another brand under the title of balance of power as well as the previous ones in Mearsheimer's analysis. It is useful to state that, Mearsheimer handles buck-passing along with balancing, namely, he compares each with respect to which one is more advantageous. First of all, let us look at how Mearsheimer defines buck-passing. It is a kind of strategy in which a state would like to leave another state holding the bag in order to curtail another state which poses a threat. On the other hand, Mearsheimer does not totally stand away from balancing, which refers to making alliances to share costs whilst fighting against the intimidating state. Therefore, the alliances would be formed when the need arises.[10] However, to him, alliances may constitute some problems among allies, like a concordance. In other words, it can be ascribed to mainstream understanding of realism, namely the problem is derived from the unreliable environment of the anarchic international atmosphere.

The other aspects underlined by Mearsheimer are bait and bleed and bloodletting. In the first instance, bait and bleed refers to a situation when a state convinces two opponents to wage war against each other. In addition to this, the state is willing to foster the tension among her rivals to turn the event into an everlasting war, by which the state may increase her capacity (i.e. economic and military), whereas these two rival states would bleed out due to the cost of the long-standing

[10] John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, (New York and London: W W Norton & Company, 2001), p. 33.

war.[11] Secondly, bloodletting is similar, except for the nuance that the state adopting the policy is not in the position of being the persuader. Besides this, the state would trigger her rivals to maintain conflict as well. As an example of bloodletting, during World War II, Britain and France were looking with indifference towards an offer that came from the Soviets to make an alliance against Nazi Germany which demonstrates that Britain and France were intending bloodletting between the Soviets and Germany.[12] To sum up, it is claimed by the strategies of bloodletting and bait and bleed, a state would be advantageous against two opponents of her in the event of war. Therefore, in addition to the rest of the strategies with respect to the balance of power policies, these are two alternative strategies that can be used as a trump card.

Apart from these approaches within the realist school of thought, some other variants should be mentioned with respect to balance of power or balancing. In the first instance, chain ganging, which means that if a state's survival is up to another state, then there is no way out of the conflict for the first state. In other words, the second state is in such a danger that the first state can never withhold herself to keep the balance that is in favor of her. These states are, as the name implies, chained, as one's geopolitical position is crucially important for the other. According to Stephen Walt, chain ganging was the major reason behind World War I. As an illustration, he emphasizes the clash between Serbia and Austria-Hungary. Additionally, he makes a remark for the European balance of power that if France would be in trouble, then Russia feels compelled to pursue her and Germany would do the same action for Austria-Hungary as well for the sake of their own perception of the balance of power.[13] In a nutshell, as an aspect of the balance of power, chain ganging is a crucial foreign policy instrument for those states for which survival nearly rely upon the other.

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[11] Bernd Kaussler and Glenn P. Hastedt, *US Foreign Policy Towards the Middle East: The Realpolitik of Deceit*, (New York: Routledge, 2017), p. 24.

[12] Joseph R. Conlin, *The American Past: A Survey of American History*, (Wadsworth :Cengage Learning, 2013), p. 704.

[13] Thomas J. Christensen & Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity" *International Organization*, vol.44, no.2, 1990, pp. 138-139-141.

1.2. Middle Power

As with all theories in the discipline of international relations, the concept of middle power varies from one school of thought to another. As for the origin of the concept, it can be dated back to the fifteenth century Mayor of Milan, who classifies state power as small, middle and empire. He defines middle power as an adequately strong state that is able to keep her survival regardless of external assistance.[14] On the other hand, despite the variety of approaches, in this chapter, the concept will be compiled from the two main approaches. In other words, broadly speaking, there is a tendency to explain the concept over the difference between realist and liberal approaches, but before all, what the power refers to in international relations is a reasonable question to ask while evaluating middle power.

1.2.1. Middle Power in Realist School of Thought

After we comprehensively cover the concept of power and its types, let us begin to define a general framework for the concept of middle power in terms of the realist school of thought. In the first place, as a main presumption of the realist school, middle power is measured with respect to material elements such as economy, military, population and geographical location[15]. Moreover, GNP is considered as another indicator that places a state as a middle power. In this school of thought, the rank between states, that is to say hierarchy, is estimated in accordance with these items. In other words, the realist point of view tends to define a state's position via her situation between a great power and a small state. For Carsten Holbraad, a middle power has sufficient material resources to place her ahead of small states, whereas those resources make her lag behind great powers.[16]Accordingly, a middle power has more room for maneuver in competing with a great power than a small power does. Putting it differently, a middle power is able to pursue her interests in proportion to her relative capability. Therefore, it can

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[14] Hasan Basri Yalçın, "The Concept of “Middle Power”and the Recent Turkish Foreign Policy Activism" *Afro Eurasian Studies,* vol.1, no.1, 2012, p. 197.
[15] David A. Cooper, "Somewhere Between Great and Small: Disentangling the Conceptual Jumble of Middle, Regional, and ‘Niche’ Powers" *The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations,* vol.14, no.2, 2013, p. 25.
[16] Michael I. Handel, *Weak States in the International System,* (New York: Routledge, 2016), pp. 28-29.

be deduced that her gain is limited. However, what the realist view highlights is a middle power's ability to have room for negotiation against great powers. In short, a middle power is a state which has a relative impact on the events around her.[17] Furthermore, it can be inferred from all this, the realist school of thought leans to elaborate the concept of middle power over tangible data. In addition to this, the school rather focuses on whether a state can be characterized as a middle power.[18]

Let us initially review a variety of thoughts based on the realist school. First of all, there is no doubt that states would get changed over time under the influence of international events and one of the significant attributions of the international relations discipline is that theory would be established with regard to practice. Accordingly, it should be stated that these thoughts derive from cyclical events of international relations. Nevertheless, it does not mean that the literature on the concept of middle power is fully irrelevant. In other words, we can detect some points in common, based on what we study on. Therefore, after describing a general framework, as we did in the previous paragraph, we are going to compile some remarkable definitions of middle power from the viewpoint of realism.

In the realist school of thought, Carsten Holbraad occupies a remarkable position in defining the concept of middle power. He, therefore, would explain the middle power from an hierarchy-based perspective. To him, middle power is a state which situates at the middle of the rank with respect to power, namely material resources. More clearly, he depicts the middle state as more powerful than a weaker state, but weaker than major states within the hierarchy of the international system. In addition to this, he argues that the GNP of a state should be taken into consideration for it to be labeled as a middle power. Yet, he does not tend to find GNP sufficient to define middle power. He additionally stresses regional criteria, that is to say, the geopolitics of a state in order to be classified as a middle power[19]. In other words, he emphasizes a state's relative influence on a given location. To corroborate his argument, he gives some such specific states as India, Japan, China

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[17] David Scott, "Australia as a Middle Power: Ambiguities of Role and Identity" *Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations,* vol.14, no.2, 2013, p. 112.
[18] Yalçın, 196.
[19] Ian Taylor, *Stuck in Middle GEAR: South Africa's Post-apartheid Foreign Relations,* (Westport: Greenwood, 2001), p. 19.

and Iran in Asia, Nigeria and South Africa in Africa, Brazil, and Argentina in South America and Indonesia and Australia in Indonesia and Oceania.

Furthermore, Holbraad indicates that the multi-polar structure of the international system is much advantageous in terms of middle states' maneuverability than unipolarity. In other words, he mentions that middle powers gain leverage in the case of rivalry or increase in balance of power politics[20]. Thus, according to Holbraad, middle powers would play the role of mediator in case of competition between superpowers. Moreover, in such complicated circumstances, middle powers take the opportunity to be influential regionally, that is to say, they behave in some way as a local representative of superpowers[21] and also position themselves in accordance with the superpower. All in all, Holbraad takes such criteria into consideration as "geographical position, political tradition, the nature of the issue and norms of the states system"[22] whilst a middle power implements either balancing or bandwagoning policy.

Beside Holbraad, as another considerable scholar, Bernard Wood, who also stands for material resources, insists heavily on the gross national product as a mere factor that makes a state middle power. He claims that the other factors like military capacity, economy, demography derive their significance from that core element, namely GNP.[23] In addition to this, Joshua Goldstein tends to put the gross domestic production in the center of power.

Another realist-oriented description comes from Martin Wight. Initially, he tends to classify two different states as a regional great power and middle power. According to him, regional great powers are those which have an influence on her regional affairs/politics. On the other hand, he interestingly regards regional great powers as a potential middle power on the international level.[24] As for how exactly he defines the concept of middle power, Wight drives military power forward as the

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[20] Carsten Holbraad, *The Role of Middle Powers* (Ottawa, Carleton University, 1972), p. 88.
[21] For further discussion see, Carsten Holbraad, *Middle Powers in International Politics* (London: Macmillan, 1984)
[22] Ibid., 121.
[23]Bernard Wood, “Middle Powers in the International System: A Preliminary Assessment of Potential,” *Wider Working Papers*, The North-South Institute, Ottawa, 1987, p. 5.
[24] Martin Wight, *Power Politics*, (London: A & C Black, 2002), p. 63.

main pillar of being a middle power. In other words, as he postulates in his book that "a middle power is a power with such military strength, resources and strategic position that in peacetime the great powers bid for its support, and in wartime, while it has no hope of winning a war against a great power, it can hope to inflict costs on a great power out of proportion to what the great power can hope to gain by attacking it."[25] In this respect, he illustrates his argument using Sweden's nuclear weapon initiative.

1.2.2. Middle Power in Liberal School of Thought

Apart from the realist school of thought on the concept of middle power, liberal-leaning definitions capture a significant place within international relations. First of all, it should be indicated that this school of thought takes its source from the politics of Canada and Australia during the Cold War era. Canada and Australia are regarded in the academic realm, and also by themselves, as the pioneers of the middle power concept. As a matter of fact, the concept of middle power is rather ascribed by these countries to themselves than by scholars. For instance, Canada's self-perception of being a middle power referred to being a relatively small power amongst the great coalitions, but an efficient participant in international problems. To do it, Canada put forth her non-colonial background to enhance one of her middle power policies, that is to say, remaining neutral.[26] In addition to this, Canada was a willing actor in international issues since the foundation of the United Nations which corresponds to 1945.[27] Moreover, Canadians were quite concerned with respect to humanitarian and peacekeeping matters on a global scale.[28] The way they position themselves is going to be comprehensively addressed in the following parts.

First of all, scholars in the liberal approach held the issue with respect to states' behavior. In other words, they endeavor to depict middle power based upon how states behave. In this sense, unlike the realist point of view in which middle power is characterized by such tangible elements as military power, economic

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[25] Wight, 65
[26] Yalçın, p. 198
[27] Andrew Fenton Cooper, Richard A. Higgott, Kim Richard Nossal, *Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order*, (Vancouver: UBC, 1993), p. 27.
[28] Yalçın, 198

capacity, and the geopolitics of a state, Cooper, Higgott and Nossal describe the middle power from a different point of view. They put Canada and Australia in the center of their behavioral description of middle power. Roughly speaking, middle power, from their point of view, refers to the capability of taking initiative, which in other words is identified as an alternative way of leadership that contribute to solving specific issues within international relations.[29]

More clearly, middle power, according to their behavioral approach, is a state which assumes some tasks like catalyst, facilitator, and manager. They are catalyst as a diplomatically proficient state, which is able to bring others together, namely initiator. They are facilitator, since middle powers are capable of agenda-setting. Similar to her identity of catalyst, being a facilitator would provide middle powers to gather other states on specific matters. More specifically, being facilitator refers to a middle powers' capability of "the planning, convening, and hosting of formative meetings, setting priorities for future activity and drawing up rhetorical declarations and manifestos."[30] Finally, they are managers with respect to their ability to set up institutions. In other words, the emphasis, in this sense, is their organizational handiness. It is not only their managerial ability to establish institutions, but also the distribution of tasks, surveillance of operations and creation of some subsidiaries. Furthermore, it is indicated that a middle power should endeavor to provide confidence in order to have a voice in controversial matters.[31] Therefore, being trustworthy is another feature that can be attributed to a middle power. To put it differently, the credibility of such states contributes to their role of arbitration while there is a necessity for settlement.

In this respect, as is indicated by Cooper et al., the role of Canada and Australia is noteworthy. Both they, and more importantly these states, regard themselves as "good international citizenship"[32] by making reference to their capability of mediation in case of international disputes. In this sense, what makes significant middle powers is to consider stability, namely status-quo within the international

[29] Cooper et al. 7
[30] Cooper et al. 24
[31] Cooper et al. 25
[32] Cooper et al. 19

realm. A typical example, at this juncture, is Canada's efforts during the Suez Crisis in 1956 to initiate United Nations involvement with intent to terminate the dispute, for which Canadian politician Lester Pearson won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957.[33] In addition to this peacekeeping role, Canada was active in Kashmir and Congo.[34]

In summary, we can deduce from all these, the behavioral approach tends to explain the concept by highlighting their eagerness and ability to solve international disputes that can damage stability and peace. Moreover, the emphasis in this point of view is their role of mediation, namely diplomatic skill, unlike the realist perspective in which material or tangible elements come to the fore. However, more importantly, despite middle powers being able to take initiative to bring together others, namely coalition-building, they are not those that can take precedence over major states. In other words, they are such states that can contribute to solutions in some issue-specific events based on international affairs and play along with policies of major states.

After we put forward the core elements of the behavioral approach of the liberal-leaning outlook of middle power, it will be useful to tackle various approaches that try to elaborate the concept. In the context of attribution to the leadership of middle powers, John Ravenhill's remarks are worth considering. But before that, it would be useful to briefly mention types of leadership put forward by Oran Young. He classifies leadership into three strands: structural leadership, entrepreneurial leadership, and intellectual leadership. Structural leadership would highlight tangible capabilities of state and is rather attributed to great powers. However, the last two types of leadership are much more relevant to the behavioral approach. Initially, entrepreneurial leadership corresponds to the capability of negotiation and mediatory role of a middle power in order to reach an agreement.[35] In other words, the emphasis is persuasiveness of middle power. Secondly,

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[33] "The Canadian Contribution to United Nations Peacekeeping." *United Nations Association in Canada*, n.d., http://unac.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/CdnUNPkpgBooklet_e.pdf. Accessed 7 April 2017. p. 5.

[34] Joseph Levitt, *Pearson and Canada's Role in Nuclear Disarmament and Arms Control Negotiations, 1945-1957,* (Quebec: McGill-Queen's University, 1993), p. 4.

[35] Oran R. Young, *International Governance: Protecting the Environment in a Stateless Society,* (New York: Cornell University, 1994), p. 45.

intellectual leadership refers to creativity, namely ability to produce attractive thought intended to solve international disputes.[36]

In conjunction with the ideational basis indicated in the previous paragraph, as for Ravenhill, from his point of view, states who can be labeled as middle power should possess five features in their diplomatic actions: capacity, creativity, credibility, concentration, and coalition-building. This is actually an elaboration of the postulation put forth by Gareth Evans and Bruce Grant which underlines the capacity of a middle power for creativity namely, influence the others by her ideas in order to establish unity.[37] In other words, middle powers, in this sense, appeal to intangible instruments like ideas rather than the use of force in their policy-making. Because they are less capable of equipped with respect to material resources, unlike great powers. Therefore, it would not wrong to say that this is the way they express themselves within international politics. Accordingly, they tend to strengthen their diplomatic handiness. From this point forth, Ravenhill states that middle powers are skillful brokers, namely mediators. Australia's leadership and contribution to ASEAN and APEC in the late 1980s constitute one of the typical examples of his ascription[38]. In the 1980s, crisis in world trade had triggered Australia to take initiative with respect to protecting her interest. Therefore, in this sense, it can be indicated that middle powers are not only mediators in the case of international instability, but also eager to benefit from a mediatory role to take care of general interest or indirectly their own interest.

Apart from that, as an alternative point of view, Eduard Jordaan tries to approach the concept of middle power by distinguishing two types of middle power. Unlike the other scholars, he puts forward a comparison between traditional middle powers such as Canada and Australia and emerging middle powers such as Brazil and South Africa. But, he differentiates both with respect to constitution and behavior. As he indicates "Constitutively, traditional middle powers are wealthy,

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[36] Evan Berman and M. Shamsul Haque, *Asian Leadership in Policy and Governance,* (Bingley: Emerald, 2015), p. 135.
[37] Berman et al. 135
[38] John Ravenhill, *APEC and the Construction of Pacific Rim Regionalism,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2001), p. 89.

stable, egalitarian, social democratic and not regionally influential."[39] whereas "Behaviourally, they exhibit a weak and ambivalent regional orientation, constructing identities distinct from powerful states in their regions and offer appeasing concessions to pressures for global reform."[40] On the other hand, emerging middle powers are those which entered into the process of democratization in more recent times, eager to be regionally influential, semi-peripheral and materially non-egalitarian. With regards to behavior, they oppose the status-quo, and endeavor to engage in regional issues.[41] In summary, on one hand, we have traditional middle powers who are on good terms with the existing order, namely status-quo and beneficiary of the ongoing process. On the other hand, emerging middle powers are those who possess ambition to change the status-quo.

As for how Jordaan, in general, defines middle power, he argues that middle powers differ from great and small powers which play the role of equalizer/stabilizer and have specific power, influence, and caliber at the international level. Therefore, it can be inferred that he is apt to combine such tangible elements, as we previously mentioned in the realist school, with the behavioral approach. In other words, he is not indifferent towards material capabilities whilst trying to explain the way middle powers behave.

Moreover, he compiles various attributions from both realist and liberal perspectives such as: "considerations of state capacity, position in the world order, the normative composition of the middle power state-societal complex, domestic class interests, and the role and influence of foreign policy-makers."[42] and he concludes that both traditional and emerging middle powers are stabilizer and internationalist, as to which of those given characteristics are relevant, he argues that it is up to their constitution.

There are also so many definitions in the liberal-leaning literature. One of them is by Robert Cox who considers both material capabilities and behavior. To say more

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[39] Eduard Jordaan. "The Concept of Middle Power in International Relations: Distinguishing between Emerging and Traditional Middle Powers" *Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies*, vol. 30, no.1, 2003, pp. 165-181.
[40] Ibid., 165-181
[41] Ibid., 165-181
[42] Jordaan, 165-181

clearly, middle powers are mediocre with respect to their tangible capacity and thus wants to find living space in order to stay partially away from devastating conflicts. In other words, their insufficient material resources compel them to avoid dangers. In this sense, Cox puts forth some roles, namely course of action. For Cox, middle powers tend to pursue existing system, namely the status-quo, and security in international relations as well. In addition to this, they seek to facilitate regular changes in the mechanism of the world.[43]

Another definition comes from Laura Neack who similarly indicates that middle powers struggle for the maintenance of established order by which they can be influential and ideally protect their interests. However, for Neack, this mindset is valid for Western middle powers. As for the non-Western middle powers are able to behave disassociated with the great powers. More importantly, such middle powers can be beneficiary of a clash between giants, that is to say, great powers.[44]

In the liberal school of thought, besides the behavioral definitions of the concept of middle power, some scholars tend to handle it in terms of its functional attribution. This functional approach can be traced back to the Canadian diplomat Hume Wrong, who characterized the foreign policy of Canada on the basis of three components: extent, interest, and ability.[45] Within the context of the function of middle power, Adam Chapnick delimitates capability of a middle power in terms of time and scope. Put it differently, according to him, middle powers' capacity is not able to manifest itself at anytime and anywhere.[46] What makes influential middle powers is her availability in specific issues of international relations. More clearly, as Gareth Evans indicates, this functional approach corresponds to niche diplomacy which postulates middle powers should take part in specific issues in line with their

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[43] Robert Cox, *Approaches to World Order,* (New York: Cambridge University, 1996), p. 244.
[44] Laura Neack, *The New Foreign Policy: Complex Interactions, Competing Interests,* (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), pp. 184-188
[45] Adam Chapnick, "The Middle Power"*Canadian Foreign Policy,* vol. 7, no.2, 1999, p. 74
[46] Chapnick, p. 74

restricted means.[47] Therefore, involvement in every problem would lead middle powers to depart from their distinguishing characteristic.

To sum up, after addressing the concept of middle power, we can infer from all we try to cover that it is one of the controversial topics in international relations theories. Before we put forth definitions, it should be indicated that all scholars from each one are not in the same line. There are some nuances, but something in common as well. There are roughly two trends about the concept: realist and liberal, and their subcategories as well. The realist school of thought tends to put forward such material resources as GNP, military, economy, population and geographic indicators. Therefore, it can be deduced that this point of view puts account concrete, quantitative and realist criteria, as the name implies, while defining a state as a middle power. As for the liberal-leaning definition, there are two subcategories. One of them is the behavioral approach, in which middle powers, in general terms, should possess the ability of coalition-building, an internationalist character and in addition to this, should pursue human rights, peacekeeping, established order and play the role of good international citizen. On the other hand, those who underline the functional aspect of the concepts claim that middle powers' activism is limited to a specific time and scope, whereby they can best express themselves. In this sense, this functional perspective, in a way takes the capability of a state into account.

1.3. Middle Power Discussion Over Turkey

States cannot always be characterized under the same title. Middle power definitions in international relations' theories, along the same line, cannot entirely overlap every state. Historical facts demonstrate that the power of states would not be unchanging, namely states' power differs from time to time. For instance, while being a great power in the 15th century, a state can turn into a middle power or perhaps small power in the 20th century due to their lack of accommodation of existing paradigms. Therefore, as we just mentioned, denomination belongs to conditions of a specific episode of history. In the case of Turkey, despite she had been regarded as one of the significant powers within the European balance of

[47] Gareth Evans and Bruce Grant, "Australia's Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990s", in Andrew F. Cooper, *Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War* (London:Macmillan, 1997), p. 5

power, in the 20th century, Turkey took to the stage as a more humble state in terms of power. Then, to what title can we fit Turkey in the early 20th century? William Hale whose starting point is realism with considering material capabilities, indicates that Turkey was a medium or small power. The reason is that Turkey largely demonstrates the characteristics of a middle power, but yet, middle powerness is not the only way to describe Turkey, according to Hale.[48] In a similar manner, Baskın Oran regards Turkey as a middle power with regard to her politics during World War II. On the other hand, Dilek Barlas regards Turkey during the inter-war periods as a middle power within the context of her capability of coalition-building.[49] In this sense, this reflects the liberal-leaning definition of middle power. In contrast with these opinions, Annette Baker Fox regards Turkey as a small state but praises her successful efforts during World War II.[50] As a result, the variety of opinions draw the attention while defining Turkey's status in the early 20th century and World War II. In addition to this, there are several approaches as we covered before. One the one hand, the liberal school which points out diplomatic capability derives from the cyclical politics of states like Canada and Australia which also attributed middle powerness to themselves. On the other hand, realists describe middle powers based upon periodic events, but rather consider tangible resources that lead us to define a state as a middle power.

Considering all approaches, Turkey's middle power definition seems to be a combination of both liberal and realist schools of thought. However, to tell the truth, the realist point of view is much more overlapping than the other, as the liberal middle power definition rather contains behaviors of Canada and Australia during the Cold War period. Therefore, the liberal middle power definition would lead to anachronism. Let us depict Turkey in World War II. To begin with, in World War II, Turkey was economically and militarily inadequate compared to the great powers. Nevertheless, Turkey's geographic location or geopolitics constitutes the source of her power. In the meantime, this geographic location can be regarded as a handicap

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[48] William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, (Oxon: Routledge, 2013), p. 1.
[49] Dilek Barlas, "Turkish Diplomacy in the Balkans and the Mediterranean. Opportunities and Limits for Middle-power Activism in the 1930s" *Journal of Contemporary History,* vol. 40, no. 3, 2005, p. 443.
[50] Annette Baker Fox, *The Power of Small States, Diplomacy in World War II*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago, 1959), p. vii.

which makes her open to attack. On the other hand, although she failed to mediate between Britain and Russia, Turkey pursued quite successful diplomacy in order to stay out of the war. This is because her geographic location was one of the significant factors that led Turkey and was a source of her diplomatic triumph. Furthermore, Turkey was the beneficiary of disputes between the great powers that created space for diplomatic maneuver.

All in all, considering all information so far, Turkey can be regarded as a weaker state compared to great powers although strong enough not to be easily occupied. Therefore, does this make Turkey a middle power? As we pointed out that the existing liberal-leaning literature on middle power analysis was based on the politics of Canada and Australia, which concentrated on global peacekeeping and human rights issues through their diplomatic initiatives during the Cold War era. But on the other hand, Turkey, during World War II was particularly concerned with her national-interest, namely survival, not on global concerns. On the other side, the realist point of view presents more valid options as it considers material elements such as military, economy, population and geographic location while measuring a state's caliber, which is much more relevant to Turkey's politics during World War II. However, among these components realists put forward, one of them specifically explains the main pillar of Turkish foreign policy, namely her geographical vitality. Morgenthau highlights geographical location as one of the most remarkable factors that constitutes national power.[51] As Robert Kaplan indicates while he remarks on the importance of the geography of a state, "Geography does not disappear in this scenario, it just becomes even more critical." [52] We will comprehensively cover this issue in the subsequent part. As a consequence of these propositions, it can be put forth that Turkey positions, from a realist hierarchal aspect, between great powers and desperately small states. More clearly, Turkey was weaker than such great powers as Britain and the Soviet Union, whereas stronger than states like Czechoslovakia and Poland. Therefore, a comparative outlook makes much more sense to explain Turkey's rank, and from this level of analysis, Turkey was in the

[51] Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations The Struggle for Power and Peace*, (New York:Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), p. 107.
[52] Robert D. Kaplan, *The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and the Battle Against Fate*, (New York, Random House, 2012), p. 47.

middle of those two states. On the other hand, we can alternatively indicate that Turkey was a relatively small power compared to great powers with respect to her military and economic capacity, but geopolitically vital and more importantly was able to capitalize on her geographic importance through subtle diplomacy**.** Therefore, the following stages of this paper will evaluate Turkish foreign policy based upon this way.

A foreign policy based on the realities of a state would always make it secure. Otherwise, thoughtless policymaking can lead to catastrophic consequences. Today, Turkey is locating on the same geographical vitality. In other words, it is possible to claim that similar threats exist. Therefore, it would endanger the survival of Turkey by providing such a role as leadership to her former territories. Especially, departing from her policy of peaceful relations with her neighbors and engaging in these sorts of ideological motives would jeopardize her territorial integrity. It does not mean that Turkey should isolate herself from the international realm, but the priority should be her territorial integrity and survival as long as she positions on her current geographic position.

1.4. Balance of Power Politics in History

1.4.1. 19th Century Balance of Power Notion

After all these theoretical approaches mentioned above, it would be useful to cover the balance of power politics with respect to its practice in the international politics. In this sense, the nineteenth century's international relations presents us vast observation opportunities to analyze the issue. Initially, we should trace the nineteenth century back to the results of the phenomenon of the French Revolution. The revolution over time evolved into an international identity from a domestic issue and became the means for the French to propagate the principles of it. Therefore, France led by Napoleon Bonaparte along with his intimidating army constituted a threat for the survival of the rest of the European balance of power and its constituted status quo. Following such a given circumstance, European great powers Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia envisaged to create a coalition, namely alliances against French expansionism as a matter of course. As a result, a series of wars called the

Napoleonic Wars were ceased by this political coalition which is called the Concert of Europe. In 1815, those states convene in Vienna and a new doctrine which shaped relations was revealed, in other words, the Concert of Europe. Along with the concert, European states came up with some principles such as promoting monarchies as opposed to revolutionary ideas like nationalism, liberalism, and self-determination, which is derived from these two previous thoughts, as these were two major elements which posed a threat to the survival of existing regimes - in other words, the status quo.

Let us analyze the European concert on the basis of states' approaches. First of all, Britain, despite the fact that she was not situated in continental Europe, it was inevitable for her not to become involved in the causes of European affairs. What is interesting is the fact that Britain's regime was parliamentary and prone to consider individual rights and freedoms as well. However, Britain could not remain neutral towards the rising threat derived from France due to the old foreign policy principle that Britain could not tolerate any hegemonic power within continental Europe for the sake of its self-interest. While doing this, however, despite the fact that preventing French expansionism to the extent that it tampered Britain's transoceanic colonies and the preclusion of a rising hegemon within continent was adequate, Britain decided to get in touch with Austria in constructing continental equilibrium to prevent the potential rise of Russia.[53]

On the other side, one of the pioneering states in making such a coalition was Austria. Although there had been a long-standing dispute between Prussia and Austria, the Napoleonic Wars constituted a sufficient reason that brought these two states together within a coalition. However, the probability of a new dispute was always high among these. Such a dispute could be one of the factors that led to the rise of Russia within the continent. Because, whether Austria and Britain were persistent in France, then it would have led to a rising Russia.[54] However, as was mentioned before, Britain's standpoint towards the issue played a key role in constituting a harmony within the continent. Let us set aside this case and mention the main sentiment that Austrian leader Metternich sought to propagate. To him,

[53] Oral Sander, *Siyasi Tarih İlkçağlardan 1918'e*, (Ankara: İmge, 2016), p.176.
[54] H. G. Schenk, *The Aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars*, (New York: Howard Fertig, 1967), p.46.

empires in which a great variety of subjects were inhabited could be dissolved by the evil effects of liberal and national ideas derived from the French Revolution. Therefore, the main principle with respect to regimes of the European states should have been the promotion of monarchies. It can be indicated that one of the main pillars of the Concert of Europe was this conservative view of fostering monarchies in order to keep territorial integrity, namely, it can be deduced that states, as a matter of principle, should be respectful for the territorial integrity of each other. This, actually, was the essence of the balance of power incidental to the Congress of Vienna. Moreover, it is essential to underline that preponderant states appeal to balancing France rather than punishment by which potential disputes could be averted for quite a while and with a few exceptions, throughout most of the 19th century, there had been a peaceful tendency among European states.[55] From this aspect, the Congress of Vienna would be regarded as exceptional. In brief, all participants of the Congress had come to a mutual understanding on a new European order, despite the fact that they all have a diverse sense about the equilibrium.[56]

It is the fact that the Congress of Vienna and concomitant Concert of Europe brought about peace and gave rise to diplomatic relations instead of war.[57] However, as was mentioned at the end of the last paragraph, European states comprised various perceptions of equilibrium, which was the major obstacle to maintaining peace. Eventually, both some social developments and self-interests of states became prevalent. More clearly, towards the end of the 1840s, nationalism and territorial disputes arose in the continent. To begin with, the 1848 revolutions demonstrated that nationalism was not an ignorable factor to which monarchy promoted after the Congress of Vienna could not prevail. Therefore, in this sense, it is appropriate to indicate that the Concert of Europe, namely equilibrium, lost one of its pillars. In short, the 1848 Revolutions led to disintegrations of multinational states such as Austria and Ottoman Empire, new states under the influence of nationalism. In addition to this, it paved the way for the unified Germany and Italy. This was the sparking of the new order after upheavals of 1848.

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[55] Henry Kissinger, *World Order*, (New York: Penguin, 2014), p. 61.
[56] Ibid., 63.
[57] Ibid., 61.

Besides this, the Crimean War between 1853 and 1856 was another indicator that demonstrates the balance of power, in other words, the Concert of Europe. In this case, the threatening state was Russia, which aspired to expand into the East, West and South West (which refers to the Mediterranean). First of all, as was mentioned before, Britain, could by no means tolerate a hegemonic state within continental Europe. Therefore this was what Britain could not approve, as her colonies could be imperiled. Russian expansionist behavior approximated the other European states such as France, which also sought Russia to stay out of the Mediterranean and also got rid of being isolated[58], Austria was also concerned about Russian expansionism in Balkans.[59] The long and the short of it was, the Crimean War became another turning point that distorted the principles derived from 1815.[60] In other words, the war demonstrated that concerts could ultimately be destroyed, in the case of danger. Hereby, European interstate struggles turned back to their former character, namely war got on the stage of Europe for the first time after 1815.

In addition to the Crimean War, the unification of Germany, led by Otto von Bismarck, and Italy were crucial events that shook European equilibrium in the 19th century. However, the German case was more dramatic with respect to European equilibrium. Despite the fact that, the unification of Germany is the result of several reasons, we are going to tackle its impact on the European balance of power. The unification of Germany led to successive events. Initially, it should be underlined that Germany came out of it as a rising power that upset the existing balance within the continent. Accordingly, France as a defeated state that resulted in the emergence of Germany, became less powerful in continental affairs and deflected her field of interest into overseas colonies. As to Austria, which was another beaten state, she turned her attention to the Balkans, by which there emerged a long-lasting dispute between Russia and Austria. In addition to this, the Russian imperial approach

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[58] Kissinger, p. 72.
[59] John Breuilly, *Austria, Prussia and The Making of Germany: 1806-1871,* (Oxon:Routledge, 2014), p. 56.

[60] J. P. T. Bury, *The New Cambridge Modern History: Volume 10, The Zenith of European Power, 1830-70,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1960), p.267.

towards the Balkans, namely Pan-Slavism, was promoted.[61] Therefore, the clash of interest via Balkan territories became the major issue within the foreign policy of continental Europe. In sum, the unification of Germany directly affected the balance of power and put a firm stamp on the late 19th century European equilibrium.

After the 1870s, the European balance of power or order within the continent evolved into a different form than the Concert of Europe. This form manifested itself in various alliances. The basis of these alliances was colony dispute. In other words, interstate relations were derived from colony dispute.[62] As was mentioned before, unification of Germany changed the status quo. Briefly stated, the balance of power, from 1870 onward, was colony disputes based upon alliances, which made the late 19th century distinctive. Accordingly, in addition to Britain and France, there emerged new states such as Germany, Russia, Italy, the United States of America and Japan in the contention for colonies. However, in the grand scheme of things, it should be indicated that the animosity between France and Germany was at the center of the issue. To sum up, the late 19th century was an epoch which wrecked the relative peace derived from the Concert of Europe and foreshadowed destructive relations, which is going to be mentioned in the next paragraph, namely wars.

Within the context of making alliances, Bismarck's series of treaties shaped the balance of power policies in the late 19th century. Initially, it should be helpful to indicate the logic behind these treaties. Bismarck was not willing to be involved with colony disputes but rather aspired to protect newly founded unified Germany. Moreover, Bismarck's main concern was fighting concurrently against both Russia and France, because such a case would have put Germany in an awkward position, which could lead to disaster for her. In this sense, Germany initiated the formation of the Three Emperor's League to keep the status quo[63], including Austria and Russia. Bismarck, in doing so, ensured Russia and Austria remain close and envisaged preventing them from making alliances with France. However, by the outbreak of the

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[61] Hugh Ragsdale (ed.), *Imperial Russian Foreign Policy*, (New York: Cambridge University, 1993), p. 227.
[62] Michael W. Doyle, *Empires*, (New York: Cornell University, 1986), p.146.
[63] Norman Rich, *Friedrich Von Holstein: Politics and Diplomacy in the Era of Bismarck and Wilhelm II, volume II*, (New York: Cambridge University, 1965), pp. 104-105.

crisis in the Balkans, which led to a dispute between Austria and Russia, the league was interrupted. From this date forward, Germany sought Austria to remain close to herself. Nevertheless, because of the fact that such a rapprochement would have triggered Russian hostility towards Germany, Bismarck managed to reunite the Three Emperor's League. In addition to this, Bismarck attached Italy to the bilateral alliance with Austria in order to prevent Italy collaborating with France and Britain. To conclude, Bismarck's wise foreign policy ensured the territorial integrity of Germany and protected her against all kinds of risks. However, when Bismarck endeavored to run his policy, France, and Britain, therefore, felt obliged to be vigilant.

After Wilhelm II ascended to the throne and held the reins of power, the rise of Germany within the continent was getting more and more threatening to Britain, of which the longstanding concern was not to tolerate any hegemonic state in the equilibrium of the continent. In addition to this, Germany, under Wilhelm II, was keen on investing her naval force, which was the most threatening one, more than anything. As opposed to Bismarck's foreign policy, Wilhelm II was willing to be involved in the colony disputes. Furthermore, he was reluctant to have rapprochement between Germany and Russia. On the other hand, France was isolated and looking for alliances against Germany. Therefore, considering all these reasons, forming an entente was inevitable. The first step in relation to the entente was Franco-Russo treaty arising from fear of change in German foreign policy.[64] The second stage of the entente was the Anglo-Franco treaty, *Entente Cordiale* involved perhaps the most complicated series of reasons, which also included Japan and Russia. If it needs to be outlined, we can trace this agreement back to the Japan-Britain treaty with respect to struggle for the balance of power in the Far East against Russia, along with France. However, this rapprochement could lead Britain to encounter with France, which was preferable to Britain as the foreign policy of Germany was more threatening than anything else. As for France, whether a war between Russia and Japan would have broken out, then she could be defenseless on the continent. Therefore, Entente Cordiale was a necessity for both of them, by which they agreed upon longstanding Egypt and Morocco disputes, namely territorial

[64] Hajo Holborn, *A History of Modern Germany: 1840-1945*, (New Jersey: Princeton University, 1982), p. 304.

compensation.[65] The final stage of the Entente was formed between Britain and Russia. First of all, the prospective war between Russia and Japan broke out in 1904. Despite the fact that Russia was signed to a treaty with France, the United States' mediation solved the issue between Russia and Japan. Thus, it made Russia awake to the fact that she should have developed an intimacy with Britain for the equilibrium in the Far East. Moreover, undoubtedly, rapprochement between Germany and the Ottoman Empire was unacceptable, as in the face of such a situation, Russia could be contained by Germany from the south.[66] From the point of Britain, engaging with Russia could be a useful means for their struggle with Germany. In this sense, these two states had reached an agreement in 1907[67] on colony disputes, namely territorial compensation over Asia.[68] Therefore, by the year of 1907, there emerged two military blocks that paved the way for the first stage of two great wars in the early 20th century.

1.4.2. 20th Century Balance of Power Notion

As was mentioned in the previous part, the events in the late 19th century constituted the positioning of the great powers in the early 20th century. Some breaking points, which took place in the 19th century, deteriorated the concert and pertained to the first stage of the era, and colony disputes therewith led to a kind of changeable alliance, which was up to states' interests. Additionally, increasing armament triggered the potential clash as well.[69] Balance of power politics after the second half of the 19th century could roughly be expressed like this. Under these conditions, equilibrium within the early 20th century eventually manifested itself via two power blocks. On the one hand, Triple Entente in which Britain, France, and Russia took place, on the other hand, Triple Alliance which included Germany, Austria, and Italy.

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[65] Norman Rich, p. 682.
[66] R. J. W. Evans & Hartmut Pogge Von Strandmann, *The Coming of the First World War*,(New York, Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 83.
[67] Elena Andreeva, *Russia and Iran in the Great Game: Travelogues and Orientalism*, (Oxon: Routledge, 2007), p. 20.
[68] Willian Mulligan, *The Origins of the First World War*, (New York: Cambridge University Press), p.40.
[69] Hans Morgenthau, pp. 155-157.

In 1914, every single major state had their own reason to raise concern about the balance of power. In other words, the multipolar environment of international relations inherently brought about various reasons.[70] Initially, since after the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine in the late 19th century, France had felt revanchist against Germany. Germany, on the other hand, envisaged to get rid of being trapped by France and Russia, and more importantly sought to be a dominant power in the world. Thirdly, Britain, as a matter of principle, was opposed to rising power within the continent that deteriorated her interest, to which rising Germany overlapped.[71] Besides these, Eastern Europe, namely former Ottoman territories, was a focal point of Russia and Austria.[72] In addition to this, some scholars from the realist school of thought argue that the clash between Austria and Serbia pulled the major powers into the war, that is to say, chain ganging was the approach that prepared the way for war.[73]

To make a brief overview of World War I, the first stage started with the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria by a Serbian man. Austria, thereupon, attacked Serbia and this compelled Germany to support Austria as an only ally. Subsequently, Germany waged war on France in line with the Schlieffen Plan by which Germany envisaged to get rid of the encirclement by Russia and France.[74] In order to fight France, Germany offered Belgium to cross over her territory, whereas Belgium turned it down. In response, Germany attacked Belgium, and that triggered Britain to join the war. Britain, which up to that time, had been cautious with participation in the war despite the fact that they were in the Triple Entente, was compelled to wage war over Germany. Because, to Britain, Belgium constituted sort of a stronghold that protected her from Germany. This behavior pattern illustrated the policy of buck-passing.[75] In sum, by August 1914, the configuration of the war appeared in both Western and Eastern Europe.

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[70] Colin Elman & Michael Jensen, *The Realism Reader*, (Oxon: Routledge, 2014), p. 263.
[71] Henry Kissinger, *World Order*, p. 81.
[72] Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1983), p. 194.
[73] Thomas J. Christensen & Jack Snyder, p. 138.
[74] R. J. W. Evans & Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann,, pp. 119-120.
[75] Charles A. Kupchan & Clifford A. Kupchan, "The Promise of Collective Security" *International Security*, vol. 20, no. 1, 1995, p. 56.

Despite the war was proceeding too bloodily, the existing status quo was the same in 1916. In other words, there was no dramatic change that affected the course of the war. However, within the context of the balance of power, Italy's participation in the Entente was a notable event. Although Italy was involved in the Triple Alliance along with Germany and Austria, she decided to participate in the war alongside of the Triple Entente. Italy was in search of a colony to become much stronger, but she was disappointed with the states within Triple Alliance. On the other hand, Britain and France were willing to bring Italy to the Entente in order to restrain Germany in Balkan territories by the policy of territorial compensation, which was formalized by the Treaty of London in 1915. Therefore, Italy became a member of the Entente and declared war against Austria, and soon after against Germany. From a different viewpoint, Italy's participation in the Entente can be associated with the policy of bandwagoning, by which Italy could benefit from gains of the war.[76] Nevertheless, it can be indicated that Italy's entity did not dramatically alter the existing situation.

In 1914, according to the Schlieffen Plan, Germany should have already been victorious over French territory in order to launch an expedition to Russia. However, from the perspective of Germany, things had not been going well. French and Belgian resistance turned the German plan upside down. Nonetheless, Germany was persistent on the plan and dispatched her units to the eastern front against Russia. Eventually, these two powers encountered in the eastern front and the war resulted in German triumph. Defeated Russia was looking for an assistance from Britain and France. On the other side, the assistance pragmatically was a good idea as Britain and France could, therefore, assign the burden of the western front, that is to say, they appealed to the policy of buck-passing.

Hence, Britain and France decided to extend the theatre of war towards the straits of the Ottoman Empire to dispatch help to Russia. Actually, the plan comprised multiple purposes. First of all, as was mentioned before, the burden would have been undertaken by Russia. In the second place, the Balkans would have been controlled by the Entente, and that could lighten the French burden as well. Thirdly,

[76] Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power" *International Security,* vol.9, no. 4, 1985, p. 8.

whether the Entente would have proved its majority, then they could convince Italy and Romania to attend the war, by which Balkans would have been more consolidated. This was also an illustration of buck-passing policy from the point of Britain and France. On the other side, the motivation of Italy and Romania behind participation in the war alongside the Entente can be described as a policy of bandwagoning, by which they could benefit from the acquisition of victory. However, to tell the truth, both Italy and Romania could not make a profit. To sum up, the international relations during 1914 and 1915 present remarkable practices with respect to the balance of power politics. Therefore, it can be deduced that strong states (in this incident Britain and France) would tend to appeal to the policy of buck-passing, whereas the weaker side is prone to implement the policy of bandwagoning.

Besides these, it is important to handle secret treaties between the Entente states exemplary in territorial compensation politics. One of the treaties on the Ottoman straits was between Britain and Russia, signed in 1915.[77] Despite the fact that Britain has always been opposed to a Russian entity on the straits, decision makers felt compelled to grant it to Russia as Russian involvement within the Entente was quite crucial for the maintenance of the war. Moreover, Britain's priority, at this stage, was to balance Germany in the near east. Secondly, the Treaty of London[78] , signed in 1915, was another illustration of territorial compensation by which the Entente persuaded Italy to join the war. Thirdly, the Sykes-Picot Agreement between Britain and France on Middle Eastern territory was a partition treaty as well.[79] In addition to this, British envisagement to take Arabs into her service to capture Ottoman territory[80] can be an example of the buck-passing policy.

World War I resulted in the triumph of the Triple Entente. Accordingly, there emerged a post-war international order along with some essential arrangements. To begin with, fourteen principles of Woodrow Wilson, president of the United States, was one of the essential components that moulded the post-war international order.

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[77] Martin Polley, *An A-Z of Modern Europe Since 1789*, (New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 30.
[78]Ibid., 46.
[79] Gabor Agoston & Bruce Masters, *Encyclopedia of The Ottoman Empire*, (New York: Infobase, 2010), p. 46.
[80] P. R. Kumaraswamy, *Historical Dictionary of Arab-Israeli Conflict*, (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), p. 233.

Wilson as an objector to the balance of power politics, proposed some idealist values such as self-determination and democracy in the hope of peace and unity in international relations, but in the long term, it did not work. In other words,

Wilson's principles paved the way for the post-war convention, but due to its liberal principles, increased the tension rather than building the peace.[81]

On the other side, the Paris Peace Treaty as the other post-war arrangement played a key role in shaping the European balance of power. The Conference brought about a set of oppressive treaties, respectively the Treaty of Versailles with Germany, the Treaty of Saint-Germain with Austria, the Treaty of Neuilly with Bulgaria, the Treaty of Trianon with Hungary and the Treaty of Sevres with the Ottoman Empire. All of these comprised quite rigid articles that in fact interned payers. For instance, by the Treaty of Versailles, Germany was forced to conduct disarmament and make reparations. Moreover, her colonies came under the domination of the League of Nations. Therefore, these treaties were afterward a reason that increased aggression in Germany and paved way for World War II. In other words, unlike the Paris Peace Treaty and its concomitants which represented the idea of collective security, it could be regarded as a failure to build a concert within the continent.[82]

From the perspective of the international balance of power, it should be indicated that European states could not manage to establish a concert and its hegemonic identity, since the United States' participation in the war became determinant. On the other hand, Japan's fighting with Germany in the Far East[83] tipped the balance as well. Russia, after the Bolshevik Revolution, came to the fore. Therefore, the states out of the European continent started to become more influential, that is to say, Europe stopped being a focal point.

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[81] Anne Rice Pierce, *Woodrow Wilson and Harry Truman: Mission and Power in American Foreign Policy*,(Connecticut, Greenwood, 2003), p. 64.
[82] John Meirsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions" *International Security*, vol. 19, no. 3, 1994-1995, p. 33.
[83] Antony Best & Oliviero Frattolillo, *Japan and The Great War*, (New York: Macmillan, 2015), pp. 36-39.

World War II occupies a remarkable position in the 20th century balance of power politics, as well as World War I. Let us estimate the situation in the inter-war period. Firstly, France was concerned about Germany's post war status quo, namely she sought Germany to remain curbed.[84] Therefore, she firmly advocated pursuing the Treaty of Versailles. Britain, on the other hand, decided to pursue the policy of appeasement, as the League of Nations' failed to establish peace within the context of collective security. Moreover, the emergence of fascist regimes in Germany and Italy corroborated this view.[85] Furthermore, the League of Nations could not manage to precluded the Spanish Civil War at the end of which another fascist regime was established by means of Germany. On the other side, in the case of Czechoslovakia, the League remained passive, which bolstered German expansionism as well. Thirdly, Germany, as was mentioned before, was restrained specifically by France. Despite this, the Locarno Treaty signed in 1925 brought short-lived peace, Germany, led by Adolf Hitler and his Nazi Party, turned into a revanchist and revisionist state, which terminated the status quo arising from the Treaty of Versailles. As for Italy, she was discontented and resentful as the Entente disappointed at the colonies. Accordingly, nationalism and a sense of revenge increased in Italy as well. As a result, in the wake of the invasion of Abyssinia, Italy got closer to Germany.

Let us estimate the war from the perspective of the balance of power politics. Britain and France remained unwilling to collaborate with the Soviet Union against German expansion in Eastern Europe. The reason behind this attitude was ambiguous. Initially, despite the fact that they were victorious in World War I, it was a costly and bloody war. In fact, this approach also was pursued by Britain against France, occupied by Germany. However, the Soviet Union case was more critical in the course of events. Therefore, these states endeavored to remain cautious as much as possible. On the other hand, they were not sure about the Soviet Union's intention. Therefore, they pursue the policy of buck-passing by which the clash could have

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[84] Manfred B. Boemeke, Gerald D. Feldman & Elisabeth Glaser, *The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment After 75 Years*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 96-97.
[85] Frank McDonough, *Neville Chamberlain, Appeasement, and the British Road to War*, (Manchester, Manchester University, 1998), p. 3.

become distanced from the Western front.[86] The Soviet Union, in response to this passiveness, pursued the policy of bandwagoning by defensive reason and signed a nonaggression treaty with Germany to redirect the expansion into the Western front.[87] It can, on the other hand, be regarded as the policy of buck-passing. Because, after the treaty, Germany occupied Poland, and that led Britain and France to declare war against Germany. In short, it can be inferred that the policy of buck-passing pursued against the Soviet Union resulted in relief from the German threat and exposed Britain and France to it.[88]

However, these three states, in the next phase of the war, could manage to come together. Another example in this manner is an alliance between the United States, the Soviet Union, and China which later on constituted the bipolar international order. In short, it is understood that alliances are not completely able to guarantee a state's security as multiple interests of its members would most of time be prevailing. It can be inferred that states' behavior may differ from case to case.

As for the United States, during the inter-war period, she was persisting on the policy of isolationism. For this, the Congress took several preventative measures like the prohibition of arms exports. However, after a while in the war, the United States could not remain passive anymore, as Britain, by which she could avoid dangers. Therefore, the United States was obliged to change her mind. In addition, she provided financial assistance by lend and lease policy.[89] In short, it can be indicated that involvement of the United States and the Soviet Union became a breaking point that rescued Europe from desperation. Therefore, this paved the way for the emergence of the two dominant states in the international equilibrium which had prevailed quite a while after the end of the war. In other words, these two states afterward led to two organizations represented their hegemony, namely the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact, and until the end of the 1980s,

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[86] Sandra Halperin, *War and Social Change in Modern Europe: The Great Transformation Revisited*,(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 222.
[87] Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of Power", p. 8.
[88] Thomas J. Christensen & Jack Snyder, p. 159.
[89] "Lend-Lease and Military Aid to the Allies in the Early Years of World War II", *Office of the Historian*, < https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/lend-lease>(Accessed: 07.05.2017).

the international balance of power had proceeded via the competition between these two.

CHAPTER 2

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY 1923-1939

2. TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY 1923-1939

In the previous chapter, we established the main pillars of Turkish foreign policy. In this part, we are going to handle some historical facts that occured throughout the period 1923-1939 correspondingly. There were three prominent categories of states that occupied in Turkish foreign policy calculation; Britain-France, Germany-Italy and the Soviet Union.[90]

2.1. Main Pillars of Turkish Foreign Policy: Diplomatic Continuity

In the 19th century, imperial Turkey, namely the Ottoman Empire, exhibited the archetype of this policy. In order to understand Turkey's foreign policy philosophy, we should consider the series of events from the late 19th century to the early 20th century that had considerable influence on changing the mindset of Turkish foreign policy. The change in the international structure, rising nationalism inevitably led the Ottomans to encounter with dramatic consequences. Along with the rapid resolution of the empire in the late 19th century, the empire indispensably transformed into a nation-state, which later on resulted in the Turkish Republic, of which the main concern was to protect territories on hand. In other words, new international conditions restrained Turkey to keep the status-quo, as opposed to conquering new lands as her predecessor did. More clearly, to sum up, as Mustafa Aydın implies, three main pillars that constituted the philosophy of Turkish foreign policy: Ottoman heritage, geopolitical continuity and the new foreign policy projection put forward by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.[91]

As for the Ottoman inheritance, the new republic was still located in the straits thus she maintained to assume similar geo-strategic handicaps which in turn can be regarded as an advantage. To begin with, the Ottoman remnant was a significant

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[90] Baskın Oran (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikası Cilt I: 1919-1980,* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2001), p. 253.
[91] Mustafa Aydın, *Turkish Foreign Policy Framework and Analysis,* (Ankara: Sam Papers, 2004)

matter that should be underlined. Despite the fact that the new republic leading class was prone to remove the old regime's traces specifically with respect to domestic policy, there was no sharp or total disengagement from the previous regime in terms of foreign affairs. First and foremost, the ruling class of the new Turkish republic derived from the education system of the empire. In other words, they were the products of the modernization/westernization movement of the late Ottoman Empire. In addition to this, the late period of the empire moulded their mentality as well. Therefore, the foreign policy of the new secular nation-state was constructed in relation to adverse experiences of the late Ottoman period.[92]

Accordingly, geographic vitality was another remainder. By the early 20th century, the Ottoman Empire lost her vast periphery and consequently, the new republic assumed central the territories of the empire, namely Anatolia, and also included the Straits. In such a geographic position, while the Straits had become more of an issue with respect to sea routes, Anatolia, all by itself, functioned as a bridge between east and west. Hence, under these circumstances, considering material inadequacy led decision makers to maintain a typical balance of power policy. In other words, despite the fact that Turkey was not good enough to protect her security, she succeeded to cope with the crisis by her capable diplomacy. As for the essence of this balance of power policy, both the empire and the republic were struggling for their survival based upon conflicting interests of great powers on geopolitical and geostrategic regions of Turkey. In this sense, the new Turkish republic bore a resemblance to her predecessor. As a result, regarding the territory that the empire left behind, the new Turkish republic built her foreign policy on available territories for the sake of her perpetuation.

As we mentioned before, the policymakers of the new republic derived lessons from mistakes of the late Ottoman period. The most remarkable experience, in this sense, was World War I, where Turkey took side with Germany. The question is that Germany was quite influential on the decision-making process that endangered Turkey's security. The Central Power led by Germany was defeated, as a result of which Turkey was occupied by the Allies. This was one of the most important

[92] Aydın.

milestones that shaped future foreign policymaking. As Deringil indicates that Turkey, after the painful memory of World War I, became determined to stay away from any military pact as much as possible throughout the 1920s and 1930s.[93] However, due to the circumstances of the 1930s, Turkey was constrained to be involved in regional pacts considering her security, but yet tried to avoid risky alliances which include a superior-subordinate relationship.[94]

In the light of all the facts mentioned above, Deringil deduces that Turkey's geopolitical position is so crucial that it constitutes both advantage and disadvantage. The geopolitical position is advantageous since it provides an opportunity for negotiation compared to other small states. Thus, she can compensate her military incapability. On the other hand, it can pose a threat as its strategic vitality would attract great powers' attention. Therefore, it creates vulnerability as well. Secondly, as a small state Turkey should stay away from polarization and the multilateral international system would help her to survive. Thirdly, such small states as Turkey can survive to the extent that they are able to use their resources efficiently. Moreover, he points out the realist perspective that postulates the anarchic atmosphere of international relations and power politics as an ultimate target of states. In this sense, despite the defensive reasons, Turkey should show determination on protecting her territorial integrity.[95]

2.2. Configuration of Turkish Foreign Policy Prior to the War

Before historical events that we will mention, it would be useful to identify Turkish foreign policy, namely her driving points. Balance of power is perhaps the core term that explains the nature of the interstate relations. From a conventional framework, the balance of power can be constituted between two states of which material resources should be close. In other words, their military capacity, economy, and technologic development should be at a close scale that both can curtail each other. However, as well as the fact that balance of power occurs when there are two approximate states, it can also be possible between a state or a group of states which is/are deprived of advanced capabilities and a powerful state. In such circumstances,

[93] Selim Deringil, *Denge Oyunu,* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2015), p. 61.
[94] Ibid., 62.
[95] Ibid., 3-4.

the geography that a state is placed can keep a state alive depending upon its skillful policy makers. Turkish foreign policy struggle was, in this sense, a prominent example of a state who was lacking in tangible resources.

On the other hand, geopolitics had been one of the undeniable elements while we are assessing TFP. Contriving foreign policy on the basis of geographical facts is named as geopolitics. Let us enlarge on this a bit more. According to Colin Flint, "The manner in which a country orientates itself toward the world is called geopolitics." [96] In addition to this he remarks the term "geopolitical code"[97] by states calculates;

- Current and potential allies.
- Current and potential enemies.
- The way she carries on allies and expands prospective allies.
- The way she reacts to existing enemies and averts potential enemies.
- The way she legitimates all these four calculations at home and abroad.[98]

Positioning on such a geographical location had compelled Turkey to be vigilant against her neighbors. Moreover, as Turkey's being a crossroads, her attractiveness in the eyes of great powers had never been out of the question. Then what were the main pillars of this attractiveness? Turkey was on such a geography that crosses the Middle East, the Caucasus, Asia, the Mediterranean and the Balkans by herself. Last, but not least, Turkey is positioned on the quite critical straits that link the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.[99] This means that Turkey, one way or the other, was attached to great powers foreign policy affairs and thus could not remain indifferent towards their actions. Because those regions we indicated as a periphery of Turkey constituted great powers' field of interest. Therefore, in this geopolitical fragile region, Turkey must have paid attention to both their bi-lateral relations with her neighbors and the great powers which gave close attention to this periphery for their self-interests. This refers to many stimuli and suspicions which were inherited

[96] Colin Flint, *Introduction to Geopolitics*, (New York: Routledge, 2011), p. 43.
[97] Ibid., 43.
[98] Ibid., 44.
[99] Aydın.

from her predecessor.[100] Even if her neighbors could not constitute a threat by themselves, they might have been provoked and manipulated by the great powers. Therefore, Turkish foreign policy should have been envisaged as both cautious and skeptical too.

Accordingly, before in the pre-war period, under the leadership of İsmet İnönü, Turkish foreign policy elites determined three major targets with respect to her security and territorial integrity. The Soviet Union, as one of the most permanent factors on the security of Turkey, would have always been a non-negligible factor in Turkish foreign policy envisioning, as a result of her proximity. This means a permanent great power placing in the north-east frontier. By having positive relations with Russians, Turkey had usually availed to keep alive the balance of power between the great powers. The Relationship between these two states during the Turkish War of Independence being the latter instance of this argument. Therefore, with regards to underlining continuity in Turkish foreign policy, one of the main pillars of Turkish foreign Policy from the 1930s and onward had been trying to think of ways to keep positive relations with the Soviet Union.

Besides the Soviet Union, from a geopolitical point of view, the Balkans and the Mediterranean constituted vital importance for Turkish survival. What makes the Balkans remarkable was her strategic location over which a European power could attack Turkey. Thus, stability was a keyword that precisely explains the Balkans' envisagement of the new Turkey. In this sense, within the heated atmosphere of the 1930s, Turks had endeavored to provide stability in the Balkans. On the other hand, the Mediterranean was a transit point that facilitated access to the colonies of the great powers.

Another crucial point relating with the security of Turkey was the great powers' positioning towards Turkey. It was an exogenous factor that could be devastating for Turkey's survival, in a case where two or more great powers would have agreed on her. For this reason, Turkey played upon adverse interests of the great powers which had constituted one of the main pillars of Turkish foreign policy. There were various great powers that Turkey had to deal from time to time such as Britain, Germany,

[100] Aydın.

Italy and last but not least, Russia, due to her proximity. As a traditional foreign policy, Turkey had endeavored to prevent them from building consensus to the detriment of her survival throughout World War II.

Regardless of their power, rational states would act based on strategy. In other words, they would calculate such factors as geographical position, military's condition, and economy in order to find out a way that ensures them to stay away from a combat in case of escalation. Therefore, they accordingly put forward some tactics. In this sense, Turkey, which was aware of her shortages gave weight to diplomatic maneuvers, that is to say, forming alliances as from the 1930s when the indication of escalation had become visible. As we will briefly cover later, Turkey had signed series of pacts throughout the 1930s. In that vein, Turkey's foreign policy administration, between the years 1939-1945, intensely paid attention to diplomatic struggle for staying out of the devastating war.

2.3. Threat Perceptions and Preemptive Peace

In the inter-war period, Turkey's focal point was to create pacts together with her neighbors in line with the main principle of her policy of protecting territories on hand. Before anything else, it should be indicated that the remaining territories were one of the prominent factors that led the Turkish policy makers to act more confidently than their predecessors. It was the fact that the new republic was not able to deal with such vast territories of the Ottoman Empire due to her weakness. Therefore, the existing territories, that is to say, Anatolia and Thrace were much more compact, controllable but yet geopolitically fragile.

First of all, Turkey had had intimate relations with the Soviet Union throughout the 1920s and the first half of the 1930s, which was guaranteed by the non-aggression pact, signed in 1925. Thus, Turkey cemented her security through friendly relations with the closest great power. Secondly, the long-lasting Mosul question between Britain and Turkey was solved, even though the result did not fully satisfy Turks, along with the treaty signed in 1926.

In the early 1930s, Turkey had developed a pleasant relationship with Greece, and hence signed the Entente Cordiale in 1930. These were considerable steps for a

state who had aspired to have stability around her. Having good relationships with the Soviet Union, her constant great neighbor, would have always provided advantage. It was quite important for the security of Turkey's territorial integrity, since Russians had always been an inevitable actor in Turks' balance of power calculations. Therefore, the peace treaty signed in 1925 (extended in 1929) purported to provide security for Turkey's northeast territories. Nevertheless, it would be better to indicate that prudence was one of the main principles that TFP decision makers could never renounce. With reference to a similar mindset, promoting relations with Greeks was one of the significant steps that led to guaranteeing Turkey's northwest borders. Furthermore, the invitation that came from the League of Nations in 1932 was a substantial opportunity to strengthen her connection with the Western realm. This chain of treaties along with the League of Nations could bring about two prominent advantages. Initially, Turkey could achieve sort of a combination of relations, that is to say, both her neighboring states and western great powers, which had been one of the ultimate goals of TFP since her foundation. Secondly, she was able to have the right to speak within such a comprehensive organization, which could allow her to protect stability, namely status-quo. In sum, Turkey as a war-ravaged state must have stabilized her frontiers in order to recover herself. Therefore, these treaties, along with the international ambiance between the 1920s and the first half of 1930s, paved the way for a reformist movement in Turkey.

In other words, in conformity with the mainstream of the post World War I era Turkey had tried to consolidate her security through regional and comprehensive treaties.[101]

2.3.1. Balkan Pact

As we mentioned shortly before, the 1930s constrained Turkey to become much more active in her foreign policy. Moreover, as we will address, the 1930s was some sort of a sketch like that of following world war. Equilibrium after the Versailles gradually brought about revisionist states. Germany and Italy were those states that came to the forefront by their revisionism. However, the Italian case was different. Italy was one of the victorious states of World War I, yet unsatisfied with

[101] Oran, p. 350.

the consequences. This unsatisfied state had become threatening when the mid-1930s came. With respect to Turkey's security, Benito Mussolini's aspiration for control of the Mediterranean led Italy to reveal itself as a disruptive factor of the balance of power after 1933. After 1938, Germany, on the other hand, was also an aggressive revisionist in conjunction with the reign of Adolf Hitler.[102] In other words, the main obstacles, namely threat perception, that Turkey should have focused on in effort to keep the status-quo that she envisaged were Italy and Germany. Italian and German expansionism had constituted a threat on two regions related to security of Turkey. Nonetheless, during the 1930s, Italy was mostly at the center of Turkey's threat perception. The first one was the Balkans and the second one was the Mediterranean. On the one hand, the Balkans were a sort of transit point by which Turkey could get in touch with Europe. But on the other hand, with respect to the security of Turkey, it should have had a feature of being a buffer zone by which Turkey could prevent the great powers from invasion of the Balkans. Therefore, if the status quo within the Balkans would have broken down, Turkey could be contained by a great power from her northwest that was intolerable to her given principles. Thus, the idea that the Balkans should have been stable, pro-status quo led Turkey to take initiative to constitute the Balkan Pact[103] including Greece, Romania, Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria. According to Barlas, Turkey's attempt to initiate such organization derived from her diplomatic ability, which pertains to middle power.[104] In addition to this, unlike hegemonic stability, Turkey's attempt to establish such a pact relied on being well-intentioned and stabilizing. However, the pact was yet unsatisfactory, as Bulgaria failed to cooperate. Despite all Turkey's endeavoring, Bulgaria could not be convinced to participate in the pact, as a result of her revisionist status. On the other side, Albania was another state that did not join the pact, since she was under the influence of Italy. Nevertheless, the pact was signed among the rest of the four states in 1934. Actually, if we go over the articles of the pact, it seems that there is no

[102] Hale, p. 48.
[103] Ibid., 46.
[104] Dilek Barlas, "Turkish Diplomacy in the Balkans and the Mediterranean. Opportunities and Limits for Middle-power Activism in the 1930s", p. 443.

direct emphasis on Italy, but it alluded to Italian attack through Bulgaria.[105] As a result, the pact could not precisely reach its goal.

2.3.2. Mediterranean Pact

In the meantime, the Mediterranean equilibrium was about to crumble. However, the Mediterranean was a more complicated region around which Turkey could not easily take initiative to build consensus as she had done in the Balkans.[106]The balance of power in this region ranged from the great powers like Britain, France, and Italy to the weaker powers by comparison, such as Turkey, Greece, Spain, and Yugoslavia.[107]

In the Mediterranean case, Italy was the main reason that spoiled the equilibrium. Italy gradually escalated by explicitly declaring her aims on the Mediterranean and by fortification of the Dodecanese. This refers to direct threat more than threat perception. Moreover, Italian officials attributed such action to acquiring freedom of movement on the straits.[108] Turkey, along with her middle power impulse, endeavored to contribute to forming a coalition against instability on the Mediterranean as well as in the Balkan Pact, but it failed since the great powers came to a conclusion that bilateral treaties were more profitable than building a multilateral treaty. Despite the fact that the first offer on the Mediterranean Pact came from France, she appealed to bi-lateral agreements with Italy. On the other hand, Britain was of the opinion that she could detach from Germany, thus she kept away from an alliance which could antagonize Italy.[109]Meanwhile, Italy invaded Abyssinia by taking advantage of Britain's and France's unresponsiveness. The Sequence of events immediately after this event explicitly proved that treaties aimed at international peace and stability were flimsy against states' national interests. In pursuit of this incident Germany, contrary to the terms of the Locarno Treaty, invaded Rennes. Consequently, in reference to these incidents, Turkey felt compelled

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[105] Türk Dış Politikası, Baskın Oran, p. 351
[106] Dilek Barlas, p. 450
[107] Ibid., 450.
[108] Ibid., 451.
[109] Oran, p. 273.

to offer rearmament in the straits and the Montreux Treaty manifested itself under these circumstances.

2.3.3. Saadabad Pact

Turkey ensured security of her eastern frontier through the Saadabad Pact signed with Iran, Afghanistan, and Iraq in 1937. Unlike military commitment and mutual assistance, each state had to abide by common frontiers. As a result, the 1930s political target of Turkish foreign policy was to act in line with her realpolitik calculations, that is to say, Turks had tried to secure their territorial integrity through bilateral treaties (i.e. the Turkish-Soviet Pact) and multilateral regional treaties too. However, perhaps the most important shift in Turkish foreign policy was willingness for rapprochement with the West, namely Britain and France against Italian and German expansionism.[110]

All in all, expansionism corresponded to armament, hence the Italian invasion of Abyssinia demonstrated that the post World War I equilibrium had ceased to be valid. This resulted in withdrawal of Italy from the League of Nations. On the other hand, it should be indicated that the League of Nations did not approach the issue that aggressively, which therefore encouraged German armament in Rennes. As a consequence of that conjunction, Turkey as a promoter of mutual cooperation, was startled, and hence offered a new convention with regard to the straits by which she could protect her borders from any potential attack over the Balkans. Therefore, the Montreux Treaty came to exist as a result of such mentality.

2.3.4. Montreux Convention

The straits have constituted a crucial geopolitical importance in terms of Turkish national security and have made Turkey subject to international issues as well. In other words, Turkey must inevitably have position almost in compliance with her geopolitical destiny. In this sense, the status of the straits has always been one of the key factors that determines relations between Turkey and great powers.

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[110] Oral Sander, *Siyasi Tarih 1918-1994*, (Ankara: İmge, 2015), p.105.

According to the last amendment in the Lausanne Conference, control over the straits was assigned to international commission. Despite the fact that the convention to some extent prevented total sovereignty of Turkey, Turkish policymakers relied heavily on collectivity of the international system derived from post World War I agreements.[111] However, after the mid 1930s, as was indicated before, this collectivist understanding of international relations ceased to be valid, as a result of rearmament by revisionist states like Germany and Italy.

Aggression derived from those revisionist states actually became a basis for amendment to the convenience of the straits for such states as Turkey and the Soviet Union, which were not really pleased with it. Turkey was willing to limit transition of those states who had no coast on the Black Sea. In addition to this, Turkey wanted the Straits quartered with her own soldiers. Besides Turkey, the Soviet Union had laid claim to amendments for the benefit of those states which had a coast on the Black Sea. Britain, on the contrary, was looking for concessions in favor of those which had no coast on the Black Sea.[112]

It was the fact that Italian expansionism across the Mediterranean must have been suppressed before the situation could become graver. Therefore, the status of the straits was inevitably amended under the title of the Montreux Convention on July 20, 1936. As a result of all negotiations, Turkey acquired the right to militarize both İstanbul and the Dardanelles straits. Moreover, Turkey got control over the straits. As for the regulation on transit of the strait, in peacetime, passage for warships of a certain amount and tonnage would be permitted. In wartime, if Turkey would be belligerent, she has a free hand, but if Turkey would be neutral, then no warship would be permitted to pass through the straits.[113]

As for the results of the Montreux Convention, Turkey obtained full sovereignty over the straits and could take measures against Italian expansionism across the Mediterranean. Thus, Turkey inevitably became more strategically important than usual in the eyes of those who were belligerent. On the other side, Britain, as the promoter of the previous convention in Lausanne, felt obliged to

[111] Oran, 370.
[112] Oran, 373-374.
[113] İlhan Tekeli &Selim İlkin, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiyesi I. cilt*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2013), p. 53.

amend the current status of the straits in the face of the Italian threat and reinforced Turkey.[114] In addition to this, the Montreux Treaty can be regarded as a pioneering factor that brought about British-Turkish rapprochement, which paved the way for the treaty signed in 1939. As for the Soviet Union, she was unpleased with the result of British-Turkish rapprochement and the new status of the straits as well, so relations between the Soviet Union and Turkey became deteriorated. Except for this, the Montreux Treaty is a typical demonstration that a relatively small state can be a beneficiary at critical moments of international relations as well as of conflicting interests. In other words, Turkey literally played upon equilibrium between two great powers in favor of her national security. Therefore, Turkey in a way started to hold a mediatory role over such strategic straits, which would later be one of the determinants of World War II.

[114] Oran, 372.

CHAPTER 3

SUBTLE DIPLOMACY: TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING WORLD WAR II

3. SUBTLE DIPLOMACY: TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING WORLD WAR II

3.1. The First Chain of Treaty System: Tripartite Treaty in 1939

As we handled the events until 1939, Turkey had encouraged Britain to constitute an alliance against Italian and German expansionism. The predictions of the Turks were about to happen. But she had always encountered the reluctance of Britain. Actually, Britain was also aware of potential danger derived from those two aggressors, but the manner in which Turkey and Britain approached the case was different.

Actually, the main reason behind the failure of forming an alliance before 1939 was Britain's policy of appeasement. The policy was derived from the liberal mindset of post-World War I (self-determination) by which Britain envisaged to relieve potential German aggression due to the Versailles Treaty. For this reason, Britain avoided alliances with the states of continental Europe throughout the 1930s. In addition to this, she remained silent on the rearmament of Rennes, the annexation of Austria and the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia (by Treaty of Munich) in which Germans predominated.[115] Actually, the Sudetenland case meant infringement of the Locarno Treaty, which aimed at protecting France's eastern frontiers, namely Germany's western frontier from any German invasion. However, the treaty did not guarantee the eastern frontiers of Germany. According to Neville Chamberlain, the Prime Minister of Britain, Germany would have concentrated on her eastern borders by which she could deal with the Soviet Union. However, invasion of the rest of Czechoslovakia led to radical change in her policy and from this incident onward she faced the fact that Britain should have averted Germany through an alliance. This British attitude can also be explained by Walt's balance of threat. German

[115] Oral Sander, *Siyasi Tarih 1918-1994*, p. 50.

rearmament was not a secret, but whenever it turned into a threatening character, then Britain became willing to an alliance.

In the meantime development in the Mediterranean was the main factor that paved the way to alliance between Turkey and Britain. In 1939, Italy's invasion of Albania startled Turkey. In response, negotiations between Turkey, Britain, and France had begun related with the security of the Mediterranean. Therefore, the first stage of the tripartite treaty had emerged based on the Mediterranean and the Balkans. With regard to the security of Turkey, a rapprochement was inevitable since she was not able to resist by herself in case of any invasion derived from Germany and Italy. Turkish diplomat Cevat Açıkalın indicates, by referring to his conversation with the President İnönü,that Turkey could not ensure her security by herself in such a geographical position due to lack of tangible resources, hence she must have made an alliance for her survival.[116] Britain, in the first phase of the Italian invasion of Albania, offered a guarantee of security as she had done to Greece and Romania. On the other hand, what actually Britain sought was for Turkey to join military intervention in case of an attack to Greece and Romania. Because of this, Britain's goal was to take advantage of Turkish influence across the Balkans.[117] In the meantime, Turkish military power was regarded as a reference point by which the Mediterranean security could be provided.[118] But the past experiences had ruled that Turkish policymakers should have been cautious. In other words, one of the main principles in TFP was to stay out of any engagement that endangered the national interest of Turkey. Therefore, in every stage of the negotiations, Turkey acted quite meticulously.[119] Accordingly, when the Prime Minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu addressed the Grand National Assembly, he underlined Turkish national interest. He roughly said that Turkey could not remain neutral after adverse developments in the Mediterranean and Balkans. Therefore, those who reinforced the peace should have come together.

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[116] Cevat Açıkalın, "Cevat Açıkalın'ın Anıları: 2. Dünya Savaşının İlk Yılları" *Belleten*, vol. 56, no. 217, 1992, p. 1000.
[117] Selim Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, p. 77.
[118] Ibid., 78.
[119] Ibid., 77.

Another important issue was the difference between Britain and Turkey with respect to German and Italian actions. Britain, on the one hand, appeared to be convinced that Italian fortification in the Dodecanese was not a big deal and it could be easily overcome. Actually, the British attitude relied on the alliance with France, which, according to them, would have been frustrating for Germany. In response, Turkey was still startled about the actions of Germany and Italy. However, from Turkey's point of view, the organization of such an alliance must have been precise, since past experiences demonstrated that imprudent engagement in an alliance in World War I nearly resulted in catastrophe. Therefore, for Turks, there were two fundamental items for constituting an alliance with Britain and France: They should have been insistently negotiated and averted anything that could distort relations with the Soviet Union.[120] In addition to this, prudence was one of the main pillars of TFP. Turkey hence had always come up with the demand including military and civil materials by which Turkey could guarantee herself.[121] This was one of the main tactics that Turks would have appealed by which Turkey could keep her nonbelligerent status and we will coincide with this in the next phases of World War II. On the other hand, the ideal one could be an articulation of all states within a security treaty. However, there were reasons that Turkey, as a middle power, was not able to solve, as we will see later. All in all, the first stage of the Anglo-Turkish rapprochement resulted on 12 May 1939 in the context of Mediterranean security.

France was also essential to shape a strong alliance. However, before that the Hatay issue must have been resolved between Turkey and France. The problem traced back to the Ankara Treaty in 1921. The treaty concluded that Hatay province could not remain in the Turkish borders, but in Syria with a special status. However, according to a bilateral treaty between France and Syria in 1936, the French mandate was removed in Syria and in the meantime she delegated her authority to Syria on Hatay province, which was by no means unacceptable for Turkey. In the end, Turkey and France came to an agreement which included two stages. Initially, independent Hatay state was established in 1938. In the second place, the Hatay legislature ratified participation to Turkey in April 1939, and on June 1939 it was confirmed by

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[120] Zehra Önder, *II. Dünya Savaşı'nda Türk Dış Politikası*, (Ankara: Bilgi, 2010), p. 29.
[121] Denge Oyunu, Selim Deringil, p. 78

the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.[122] It is worth noting that, this incident demonstrates that a middle power or a state somewhere in the middle like Turkey can have an influence on a great power like France in such vital conditions. The agreement became the precondition of the ultimate tripartite treaty between Britain, France, and Turkey. If the negotiations had dragged on, then events would have become worse. Because Germany had penetrated into Poland by which World War II began. Therefore, the Allies were seeking stability in the south as immediately as possible.[123] Turkey hereby annexed a strategically vital province by making use of deteriorative equilibrium. As a result, the treaty paved way for the French-Turkish phase of the Allied-Turkish rapprochement and the common declaration between Turkey and France published on June 1939 in the same context with the British-Turkish declaration.[124]

As we indicated, any Anglo-Turkish agreement should not have poisoned Turkish-Soviet relations. Actually, in the first phase, the Soviet response was positive. Accordingly, the ultimate phase of this rapprochement depended upon the Soviets' attitude. However, the relation between Britain and the Soviet Union was a quite crucial dimension that should be taken into consideration. The main issue between these two great powers was lack of mutual trust. For Britain, the Soviet Union posed a threat both ideologically and through her expansionist ambition that could ruin European balance of power. To be honest, in terms of core British European foreign policy, a single hegemonic power within the continent would have distorted the European balance of power and Britain's domination as well. Accordingly, Britain's concessionary attitude towards German aggression was perceived as a kind of buck passing policy by the Soviet Union, thus even though each state on the surface seemed to try to think of ways to curtail Germany after probability of a war loomed on the horizon, there was a sneaky unrest among them. After Germany became threatening to Poland, negotiations had geared up between the Allies and the Soviet Union. However, the Soviets were always concerned about

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[122] Mustafa Yahya Metintaş & Mehmet Kayıran, "Refik Saydam Hükümetleri Döneminde Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası (1939-1942)", *Fırat University Journal of Social Science*, vol.21, no.1, 2011, p. 295-296.,
[123] Selim Deringil, p. 87.
[124] Mustafa Yahya Metintaş & Mehmet Kayıran, p. 296.

Britain's approach to the Soviets role against Germany. Throughout the negotiations, the main theme of Britain's proposals seemed to impel Soviets to Germany. In response to this, what Soviets did set the tone of both the Allies' and Turkey's foreign policy vision.

3.2. Ribbentrop-Molotov Meeting

The Soviets' participation in the rapprochement between Britain, France, and Turkey against Germany would have been the ideal one for Turkey, which wanted to run good relations with both the Allies and Soviets. Meanwhile, Britain was a champion of the Soviets' involvement as well. In addition to this, Britain conceived that Turkey could have been a means of rapprochement with the Soviets.[125] For Turkey, as we indicated before, good relations with the Soviets was one of the main principles that constituted TFP. Accordingly, the Soviets should have participated in the Alliance against Germany. However, there was another reason (maybe the main reason) that İnönü put his convictions forward to Atatürk after the Soviet visit in 1930. He indicated that the Soviets had been looking for security within her western frontiers. Therefore, while strengthening her western frontiers, she had aspired to get on well with Turkey. But on the other hand, if the reverse happened, then she would have followed an aggressive policy against her eastern frontiers including Turkey. Nine years later, Turkey hence was insistent on the Soviets attendance to the Allies. Actually, the first reaction that came from the Soviets was positive. However, a feeling of insecurity was prevailing in the relationship between the Allies and the Soviets. In the end, the Nazi-Soviet Union Pact came into being, which signified the new balance of power. The Soviets' rapprochement with Germany could bring about serious hazard with regards to the Mediterranean vision of Britain and France, as it became visible that Turks could go towards the German side. This potential obviously constituted one of the leverages of the Turks against the Allies.[126] Moreover, such a non-aggression pact between the Soviets and Germany could lead

[125] Türkkaya Ataöv, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1939-1945*, (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi, 1965), p. 11.
[126] Selim Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, p. 82.

the Allies to assume Germany in Western Europe.[127] In other words, the Soviets in a sense compelled the Allies to buck passing as they had sought for the Soviets.

As for Turkey, the Soviet-Germany rapprochement was not welcomed because of the reason that we underlined above. The Soviets, by this pact, would have achieved the goal of securing her western frontier. On the other hand, although events were going worse, because of German pressure, the saying 'every cloud has a silver lining' explains best Turkey's situation after the Soviet-Germany pact. Hence the new situation in a way made Turkey stronger at the negotiation table against the Allies. Because the Soviet-German pact brought about fear for whether Turkey could affiliate with the Soviet-German side, and that encouraged the Allies to finalize the treaty with Turkey. However, Turks principally fell behind intentionally and put bargaining at the forefront. In other words, the way Turkish politicians had acted was a policy of wait and see.[128] Therefore, the situation made Turkey in a way outmaneuvering against the Allies. In this sense, Turkey had laid 15 million sterling along with some material (military) resources down as a condition. In addition to this, Turkey had insisted on an additional suspensive clause, without which she was not willing to finalize the treaty, to ensure the financial aid. The reason behind the Turks' insistence was based upon what had happened in Poland. What had been done in Poland was the result of the Allies' breach of faith, and so it served as a model for Turkey. Therefore, Turkey should have been waiting patiently for the aid by the Alliance to overcome her deficiencies in the field of the military.[129]

When Turkey had put forward German pressure on the negotiation table, Britain in response had come up with Italy in order to make Turkey side with the Allies. Italy was still a neutral state which kept Turkey in suspense. Britain had obtained information that Italy would have kept her nonbelligerent status but on the other hand, it would have been better to keep Turkey in the dark to increase her fear. In the meantime, Turkey was maintaining her bargaining skills. More importantly, World War II meanwhile had broken out after the German invasion of Poland. Therefore, the Allies became more demanding than Turkey. The amount that Turkey

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[127] Cevat Açıkalın, "Cevat Açıkalın'ın Anıları", p. 997.
[128] Selim Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, pp. 87-88.
[129] Selim Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, p. 90.

had demanded was a bit challenging, but in all reason, Britain had decided that losing Turkey entirely was more detrimental in the long term than giving 15 million sterling.[130] Besides all this, the nonaggression pact between Germany and the Soviet Union had put pressure on the Allies and herein Turkey could be a catalyst in order to convince the Soviets of involvement alongside the Allies. As we indicated before, Turkey at the beginning endeavored to constitute a sort of alliance system that could ensure her western and eastern frontiers, but it seemed to be collapsed vis-a-vis the new circumstances. From this point on, Turkey tried to observe whether the Soviets would have been a threat or willing to cooperate with Turkey. All in all, Britain, France and Turkey in the last instance seemed to sign the Tripartite Treaty, but before that Turkey was in need of the Soviets' ambition.

3.2.1. The Last-Ditch Attempt: 1939 Soviet Union-Turkey Meeting

After a mutual treaty with the Allies, Turkey was inevitably looking for rapprochement with the Soviet Union. According to Turkey, if the Soviets could not be convinced to become involved in the Tripartite Alliance, a bilateral treaty at least was plausible. In this sense, Şükrü Saraçoğlu, foreign minister of Turkey, moved to Moscow to handle the Turkish offer with Joseph Stalin and Vyacheslav Molotov, foreign minister of the Soviet Union. Before the Turkish delegation arrived at Moscow, they prepared for presenting an offer including three articles: in case of an attack on the straits and the Black Sea, Turkey and the Soviet Union will cooperate and help each other, for the treaty based upon the previous article, both sides will come together and similar terms to the Soviet reservation in the Tripartite Treaty will be added to the Turkish-Soviet treaty.[131]

As a matter of fact, Soviet demands were totally different and troubling. Stalin initially put forward two conditions about the bilateral treaty to make it compatible with the Tripartite Treaty:

- The third article by which Turkey guarantees Greece and Romania along with Britain and France should be amended. Beside guarantee, Turkey should consult with Britain and France.

[130] Selim Deringil, p. 90.
[131] Cevat Açıkalın, "Cevat Açıkalın'ın Anıları", p. 1007.

- The second Protocol that includes the Soviet reservation should be amended. Accordingly, in any case of war between the Allies and the Soviet Union, Turkey cannot be compelled to be involved in a such war. Therefore, the Tripartite Treaty would remain unavailing throughout the war.

In addition to this, Stalin proposed an additional clause that Soviets would not take side with Turkey, in case of a German attack on Turkish territories.[132]

Apart from these demands, the Soviets proposed a series of unexpected amendments related to the Montreux Treaty. Roughly stated, Molotov postulated that those states which do not have a coast on the Black Sea would not pass their warships from the Black Sea, namely common defence of the Straits.[133] All in all, although the Soviets were quite insistent on their demands throughout a series of sessions, the Turkish delegation led by Saraçoğlu had demonstrated Turkey's intolerance to any amendment to the Montreux Convention. In addition to this, Turkey refused the request for amendment with respect to the Tripartite Alliance treaty. Therefore, the meeting resulted in a disagreement. If Turkey would have approved the Soviet demands, then it would have led to bandwagoning of Turkey from which she had insistently refrained as we indicated in the previous part. In other words, sharing sovereignty of the straits corresponded to sharing national sovereignty. Nevertheless, Turkey had acquired an opportunity for balancing through the Tripartite Alliance that made her a middle power.

After all these, it can be inferred that Soviet requests on the Montreux Convention indicate that the straits were a key point that shaped the following equilibrium in the war. It was a competition for acquiring a sphere of influence in the straits. In other words, those which had control over the straits would have had the upper hand. Proposals about Romania actually demonstrated their intentions over the straits. For that matter, before the meeting, Germany especially requested for Turkey's neutrality with regard to Romania.[134]

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[132] Cevat Açıkalın, pp. 1011-1012.
[133] Baskın Oran, p. 420.
[134] Oran, p. 419.

All these demands demonstrated that Turkey was going to lose her neighbor with which she had had good relations since 1925. Moreover, this new circumstance indicated that the eastern frontier of Turkey was imperiled as well. When the Poland case was unveiled, Turkey, right after the miscarried negotiations in Moscow, must have formalized the Tripartite Alliance Treaty in order to ensure her western frontiers. All in all, Turkey added the Soviets to her threat perception after Italy. As a result, the Tripartite Alliance was formed including those articles:

- In case of attack derived from a European state on Turkey, Britain, and France are going to help Turkey.
- If an attack derived from a European state on Britain and France spreads to the Mediterranean, then Turkey would help Britain and France. However, if the war would remain in Europe, then Turkey follows benevolent neutrality for Britain and France.
- If Britain and France would wage war due to their guarantee on Greece and Romania, then Turkey is going to join and help them.

In addition to these articles, the protocol II was perhaps the most critical condition that constitutes the key point of the treaty by which Turkey in a way achieved to stay out of the war. The protocol II remarks that those commitments derive from the treaty would not lead Turkey to wage war with the Soviet Union.[135] Meanwhile, the article six indicates that Turkey's commitments can only be activated as long as the Allies fulfill their responsibilities.[136] In other words, through this article, Turkey could ensure her noncombatant status.

Towards the end of 1939, there was an equilibrium that took shape as follows: the Allies-Turkey and Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union. Britain has been considering Turkey as a military support element in any case of a clash within the Balkans and the Mediterranean, whereas Turkey was going to look for conditions in order not be dragged into any dispute. Italy was still a noncombatant, but if Italians were involved in the war, then this would have compelled Turkey to wage war against Italy alongside the Alliance. This also meant that Turkey would have taken

[135] Mustafa Yahya Metintaş & Mehmet Kayıran, p. 299.
[136] Oran, p. 424.

on Germany. In the meantime, the Soviet Union was the most threatening factor on the agenda of Turkish foreign policy. Turks specifically informed the Soviets and Germany in this respect. In other words, besides all, Turkey's being noncombatant was one of the most crucial assets that she could have**.** Moreover, the Soviet fear was one of the important factors that Turkey should have considered in the balance of power configuration. Therefore, Turkey could have handled the situation for a while. But in fact, according to Turkish policymakers, the ideal solution would have been a Soviet-German dispute.

3.3. Significant Events in 1940

3.3.1. Italian Entering the War and Turkey

After Germany occupied France, Italy ultimately waged war on France in June 10, 1940, which had compelled Turkey to be involved in the war. This new condition was really binding for Turkey with respect to the Tripartite Treaty. However, the sudden collapse of the Maginot line of France presented a conspicuous opportunity for Turkey to allege an excuse. Right after the occupation of France by Germany, these two states had signed a disarmament agreement on June 22, 1940. Therefore, Turkey justifiably came up with the excuse that France, as a defeated state, could not have a right to compel Turkey to wage war. Secondly, she could not have sufficient ammunition, which was ensured along with the Tripartite Treaty, to cope with Italy. Moreover, Turkish administrators claimed that Turkey could indirectly take the Soviet Union on herself in case of being belligerent, which takes place as the second protocol within the Tripartite Treaty. It was indirect as Italy was allied with Germany, which had signed a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union. Actually, it is worth mentioning that the Soviet Union, from Turkish foreign policy's point of view, had always been a factor namely, a fixed factor, without which Turkish foreign policy prediction could be lacking. As we witnessed in this case, Turkish administrators gave the Soviet Union as an excuse for being non-belligerent. As a result, although this logic seems strained, Turkey had convinced Britain and France.[137] As a matter of fact, Britain was in a state of defense after France's unpredictable defeat. Therefore, she had to assume the burden of the war. In addition

[137] Oral Sander, *Siyasi Tarih 1918-1994*, p. 150.

to this, before the Italian belligerence, in the Haifa Conference on May 1940, British military officials confessed to their Turkish counterparts that Britain could not help Turkey within such a negative course of the war, so Turkey should have taken care of herself at this stage.[138] Therefore, although French and British ambassadors to Turkey demanded belligerence from Turkey, after a while, considering the circumstances, they could not be insistent on this. Because, by forcing Turkey to be involved in the war without adequate fortification, the Middle East could be imperiled. In other words, Turkey's non-belligerence may have constituted a stronghold by which the Middle East could be preserved. In the end, Turkey declared her state of non-combatant on June 26, 1940. In other words, Turkey had remained in every aspect non-combatant (neither territorial waters nor airspace was allowed to any belligerent state).[139]

3.3.2. Diffusion of the War Across Balkans

Along with German domination within Western Europe, the Balkan region had become the focal point of the belligerent states, by which Turkey became the object of the war. As in this case we have just indicated, Britain had carried on forcing Turkey to be belligerent in case of the Italian invasion of Greece. The events that startled Turkey began with the German invasion of Romania on October 7, 1940. However, before that, the deliberate approach of Turkey to the potential expansionism in the Balkans led Turkey to take measures against Germany. Right after Italian belligerence, Turkey had signed a commercial treaty with Germany on June 20, 1940. In addition to this, Italy invaded Greece on October 28, 1940. In these two cases, Turkey had to be belligerent in accordance with the third article of the treaty. Initially, Turkey came up with the justification that she could not obtain sufficient equipment in response to Britain's pressure corresponding to the German invasion of Romania. Secondly, in response to the Italian case, Turkey sent a diplomatic note to Bulgaria in case she attacks Greece. Turkey, by doing so, led Greece to focus on Italy regardless of any potential Bulgarian attack and consequently she contributed to Greek victory against Italy. On the other hand, Turkey had an impact on British politics. Therefore, Britain recognized that it would

[138] Açıkalın, p. 1050.
[139] Deringil,, p. 120.

have been rational within such a hard circumstances that Turkey should remain non-belligerent for the sake of the Middle East and India. In addition to this, Britain could not back Greece up adequately which in turn impressed Turkey's attitude.

3.3.3. A Breaking Point: Hitler-Molotov Meeting in 1940

As we previously indicated, German-Soviet rapprochement, which evoked Turkey, the thing that happened in Poland should be fractured in order not to be contained by these two giants. As the war spread out into the Balkans, conflicting interests of these two states became evident. Both states did not want any entity except them.

Before going into detail, we are going to mention what Germany had been envisaging at this stage of the war. To begin with, Germany had played both sides. On one hand, she had endeavored to sign a pact including some guarantees with Turkey. On the other hand, she was looking for inclusion of the Soviet Union to the Axis powers by putting Turkey forward as a matter of negotiation. In other words, the purpose of Germany was to detach Turkey from Britain and make her closer to the Axis by doing this.[140]

On November 12, 1940, Hitler, Ribbentrop, and Molotov met in Berlin to discuss the partition of the world between the Soviet Union and the Axis powers. One of the most important parts that concerned Turkey was the passage through the straits which had been determined by the Montreux Convention in 1936. The Soviet Union had traditionally demanded some concessions in terms of passage and a military base on the straits for her security. Molotov proposed that the Soviet Union should gain a military base in Bulgaria by giving a guarantee. In other words, Molotov laid down having a military base on Bulgaria as a condition. Hitler seemed to agree on an amendment of the Montreux Convention which limits the free passage of warships, but with respect to the Soviet demand on building up a military base in Bulgaria was an unacceptable proposal for him who had by no means sought any external entity except Germany in Balkans. Another important topic that was discussed in the meeting related to Turkey was the issue that Turkey should have

[140] Oran, 431.

built a close relationship with the Axis powers. In this respect, both decided on taking military and diplomatic measures, if Turkey would have been unwilling to do so.[141]

At the end of the meeting, both states had agreed on an amendment of the Montreux Convention and persuasion of Turkey. However, Germany totally disagreed with the Soviet military base on the straits, which in the long run could lead to Soviet control over Turkey.[142] Therefore, this meeting became a breaking point which resulted in the combat readiness, Operation Barbarossa, of Germany against the Soviet Union.

All in all, the meeting became a sign of Soviet-German non-aggression as Turkey had always desired since the beginning. However, deterioration of Soviet-German relations did not mean that Turkey disposed of the danger of the war. Rather, it was the time that Turkey should have focused on German expansionism across the Balkans.

3.3.4. Evaluation of the Events in 1940

After consecutive victories of Germany in the western front and defeat of France as well, the Balkans became the new battlefield. Britain hence assumed a great deal of responsibility and probably it was the reason that she put intensive pressure on Turkey based on this. But actually, the situation was that she had required Turkey to be nonbelligerent. Despite the fact that Britain was a great power, it did not mean that she could be victorious on every single front and every time as well. From the point of Britain, Turkey was a strategically and geopolitically crucial state over which she was able to reach the Near and the Middle East. If Turkey would have been belligerent, she could immediately be wasted, which would bring about irrecoverable consequences for both sides. Therefore, Britain chose the non-belligerence of Turkey instead of the emancipation of Greece.[143]

With regards to Turkey, the question should be raised as to whether her geographical position is an advantage or a disadvantage. If a state locating on such a

[141] Oran, p. 432.
[142] Ibid., 433.
[143] Deringil, p. 134.

crucial place is deprived of foreign policy configuration, the answer is yes. However, if a state is able to calculate every single detail and make her geopolitical location irreplaceable, the answer is the opposite. The latter is what Turkey exactly did at this stage of the war. Therefore, it can be inferred that Turkey, as a relatively weak state, managed to turn her geographical disadvantage to an advantage by holding it against Britain. Based on this inference, another question should be raised that which of them (great or weaker state) has control over the other. As one can see, within such extraordinary times, weaker states can have an influence on great powers. All in all, Turkey's decisive stance led her to stay out of the war, at least for a while, otherwise she could be in the position of bandwagoning as she had been in World War I. Turkish foreign policy administrators, on the other hand, who have always kept the bitter experiences of the past in their mind, did not want to make the same mistake.

3.4. Impending Danger: Turkey-Germany Relations in 1941

As was indicated in the previous chapter, the war had diffused into the Balkans, which shows that Turkey and Germany were meant to be neighbors. Therefore, Germany intensely centered on the threat perception of Turkish foreign policy by the year of 1941, despite the fact that Turks had been envisaging German expansion. Actually, one of the foreign policy concepts of Hitler, "one nation, one state" was not reacted to by Turkey until March 15, 1939, when Germany invaded Czechoslovakia, by which the concept of "living space" came to the fore. Because the concept of "living space" corresponded to the global expansionism of Germany and the limits of it could not be foreseen.[144] It is for this reason that Germany had begun to alarm Turkey and become the primary threat to be balanced. In the meantime, at this stage of the war, Turkey had witnessed German pressure several times, in addition to Britain. In summary, 1941 was the year in which the relations between revisionist Germany and Turkey, a supporter of the status quo, had been intense.

As we indicated that Germany appealed to the same tactical maneuver with what she had done in continental Europe, which in other words was ensuring her southern part before Operation Barbarossa. Based on this, she began with the

[144] Sander, *Siyasi Tarih 1918-1994*, p. 149.

occupation of the Balkan states. Meanwhile, it should be indicated that there was a dichotomy between German administrators with regard to the priority of Germany. One party was insisting that Germany should have initially occupied the Middle East by hurdling Turkey, whereas the other party was claiming that it would be better to prioritize the Soviet Union. In the end, Hitler decided that Germany should have initially overcome the Soviet Union, which was a more plausible choice. In other words, until the end of Operation Barbarossa, Turkey should have remained neutral, and then she must have been alongside Germany.[145]

As for German expansionism across the Balkans, it was a precise victory for Germany. Within a short period, Germany captured Romania, Bulgaria, Greece and Yugoslavia. More particularly, after the participation of Bulgaria to the Axis on March 1, 1941, the German threat was at its peak. Turkish administrators, meanwhile, had been revealing their apprehension for a while. It was obvious that Turkey could be the next target of Germany. However, soon after Bulgarian participation, Hitler sent a letter to İnönü which paved the way for a sort of rapprochement between the two states. In his letter, Hitler underlined that German troops had not posed a threat to Turkey and would not be distanced within 60 km from Turkish territory.[146] Moreover, Hitler addressed the developing of economic relations between Turkey and Germany. In return, Turkey should have been nonbelligerent while Germany was moving on, which in other words actually indicated Hitler's intention that Turkey should remain neutral till the end of Operation Barbarossa. İnönü's response demonstrated Turkey's willingness not to be a sitting target for great powers. İnönü indicated Turkey's intention that she would be neutral if no state dares to attack Turkish territory. In addition to this, he emphasized that security of Turkish territories cannot be based on the will of any victorious state.[147]

On the other side, by going a step further, Hitler revealed Molotov's demands on the Turkish straits, by which Germany attempted to spread Soviet fear on Turkey in order to make her converge on Germany. A few days later, when von Papen

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[145] Deringil, pp. 135-137.
[146] Hale, p. 63.
[147]Tekeli & İlkin, p. 190.

remarked Hitler's refusal of Soviet demands for the sake of Turkish-German friendship, Numan Menemencioğlu, the secretary general of the Turkish foreign ministry, stated that this was not a German favor but the outcome of realism. Moreover, he indicated that granting the Soviet Union the straits did not overlap with German national interest, hence the decision was rational.[148] Therefore, this conversation demonstrates that Turkey was quite rigid in keeping her distance with great powers and in this sense, she had tried to avoid bandwagoning. In other words, specific to this German case, Turkey wanted to show that she would not easily surrender, unlike the Balkan states. Nonetheless, the acute expansion of Germany in the Balkans compelled Turkey to negotiate with this state, and the mutual letters of the presidents of the two states led to more comprehensive negotiations between them.

3.4.1. Constrained Rapprochement

After German hegemony was established across the Balkans, the next target was to keep Turkey to be non-belligerent before Operation Barbarossa. The non-belligerence of Turkey was an important issue for German, as Turks had the right of initiative to control the straits over which Russia could be reinforced by the Allies. Therefore, perhaps the most preferable status of Turkey would have been her non-belligerence from the point of Germany, if not Turkey could be invaded.

Germany appealed to a typical tactic when she wanted to have a state in her pocket. Within this framework, Germany offered some territories over the Aegean to Turkey. In other words, Germany used the same means, incitement to revisionist sentiment, as she had done before in the Balkans.[149] After Greece had surrendered, Germany unavoidably appeared to be directing the object of Turkish foreign policy and accordingly the ambassador, von Papen, came up with the proposal of including a guarantee of Turkish territorial integrity, extra territories across Edirne and the Aegean, improving economic relations and transportation of ammunition. In addition

[148] Oran, p. 434.
[149] Ibid., 440.

to this, Germany was willing to supply ammunition, on condition that Turkey would not use it against Germany.[150]

3.5. Balance of Power: Case Study of Iraq and Syria

In the meantime, the pursuit of the agreement was not only for Operation Barbarossa, but also the reinforcement of Iraq. Turkey once again came to the fore in terms of her geopolitical vitality. In this sense, Germany regarded Turkish territory as a transit point to support the coup eventuated in Iraq led by pro-German Rashid Ali al-Gaylani. In addition to this, there was an upheaval of the pro-German Vichy government in Syria. These incidents signified a serious threat to Turkey, that in case of German sovereignty over both Iraq and Syria, would have resulted in containment of Turkey by Germany.[151] At this stage of the war, Turkey managed to get rid of the issue by making tiny distinctions. The negotiations we just mentioned concentrated on this issue. Germany, on the one hand, had been demanding a transit pass through Turkey in order to reinforce Iraq and Syria.

British forces, on the other hand, had been endeavoring to hold a strong position in Iraq and Syria against pro-German upheavals. In this sense, Turkey should have been a stronghold, because of which Germany could not pass ammunition through it. Therefore, the resistance of Turkey was crucial for Britain to gain time.

As to the way Turkey treated the issue, the first thing we should say is that she was under pressure from two states and had to balance each. On one hand, she did not totally ignore German transition demands, although she was totally opposed to German penetration. On the other hand, Britain had been generating pressure on Turkey in order not to allow Germany to fortify Iraq through Turkey. Therefore, Turkey in this sense had to find a compromise, which should not have paved the way for the sovereignty of a single state. Incidentally, despite the fact that Britain was an ally of Turkey and also the fact that Turkey could have been destitute of British aid, in case of German sovereignty in Iraq and Syria, Turkey in a general manner did not

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[150] Oran, p.441.
[151] Deringil, p. 152.

want British sovereignty on her southern frontiers as well.[152] Therefore, when Britain wanted to draw information about whether Germany demanded transit passage through Turkish territory, Turkey indicated that there was nothing relating to it. However, Turkey, on the other hand, did not totally refuse Germany to gain time.[153] As can be inferred from this case, Turkey had pursued a quite sensitive politics. In the end, the emerging developments were the Vichy government in Syria that demanded Turkey to allow transit passage, in return Turkey put forward the reason that she could not permit an ally (Vichy France) on paper to attack another ally (Britain). Therefore, Turkey managed to put off German demands for a while. In the same period, German officers offered regulations across her southern frontiers in favor of Turkey, in case of Turkey letting Germany pass through her territories.[154] In return, Turkey once again demonstrated her anti-revisionist intention in that she failed to cooperate in this case. In addition to this, Turkey stated that she could not act contradictorily to the treaty she engaged, and finally the best she could do was to assure her non-belligerence in case Germany was belligerent.[155] In the same way, Britain had offered Turkey some portions of Syria to drag Turkey into the war. But the answer was similar to the previous one. Turkey, one more time underlined that she did not have designs on an extra territory.[156]

As a consequence, while Turkey was implementing delaying tactics, Britain took control of Iraq. Therefore, in the Iraq case, Turkey implemented a successful balancing. On the one hand, she permitted petty German material transition through her territory, but on the other hand, she facilitated Britain in Iraq. Let us think of the contrary situation. Whether Turkey could easily surrender to German demands, then Germany would probably have concentrated on the Middle East rather than the Soviet Union. Under these circumstances, Turkey could possibly be dragged into a situation like her Balkan bordering. Therefore, this consequence demonstrated that Turkey, by resisting, led Germany to focus on the Soviet Union, which had constituted one of the most primary intentions of Turkish foreign policy.

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[152] Deringil, p. 154.
[153] Ibid., 153.
[154] Oran, p.442.
[155] Ibid., p.442.
[156] Tekeli & İlkin, p. 196.

3.6. The Second Chain of the Treaty System: Non-Aggression Pact Between Turkey and Germany

The ongoing process with regards to the Middle East led Germany to focus on Turkey's non-belligerence before the German campaign moved towards the Soviet Union. In this sense, the scope of Turkish-German negotiations from then on had proceeded in this direction.[157] For Turkey, it was time to ensure her security through a treaty with Germany.

Beside the most common proposals, Germany came up with the new proposal which offered territorial regulation over the Balkans and the Aegean in favor of Turkey, in return Turkey should provide convenience to Germany in the Turkish Straits. It would be better to indicate that German officers (i.e. Ribbentrop) were a bit greek to Turkey's attitude towards kind of carrot policy, except von Papen.[158] Von Papen was one of those who were aware of the Turkish attitude that she would not have come around by such methods like Balkan states which were prone to do. Yet, Ribbentrop was insisting on these demands and moreover, he became more threatening, although Turkey had already refused.[159]

At this stage of negotiations, Turkey had been implementing her subtle balance of power policy. While Turkey was making a stance for German pressure, she showed herself as if she was vulnerable to German pressure. By doing so, Turkey was trying to restrain pressure derived from the Allies. Because the Allies, mostly the United States, did not welcome a rapprochement between Turkey and Germany. Furthermore, despite the fact that Turkey had been playing both sides and preparing for rapprochement with Germany, the main target was to ensure her survival through balancing each of Britain and Germany. Turkey was still an ally with Britain, but friendly with Germany would be the best of explaining Turkish balance of power politics at this time.[160] In this sense, Britain did not seem so repressive with respect to the potential Turkish-German pact and as long as Turkey would not act

[157] Oran, p. 442.
[158] Deringil, p. 145.
[159] Oran, p. 444.
[160] Deringil, p. 148.

contradictorily to her existing treaty with Britain, this rapprochement could be found reasonable.

Under these circumstances, the nonaggression pact between Turkey and Germany was finally signed on June 18, 1941. According to the pact, both guaranteed that they would be respectful of their territorial integrity. In addition to this, considering British apprehension, the pact was signed on condition that both states would adhere to their previous agreements.[161]

All in all, Turkey managed to secure herself in return for her rigorous balancing politics. In other words, Turkey successfully merged the two treaty by which she strengthened her position. By the treaty with Britain, Turkey would keep safe her territories from German transition to attack Britain. On the other hand, by the nonaggression pact with Germany, Turkey would get rid of the passage of Britain through the Turkish Straits in order to reinforce the Soviet Union. Therefore, with her subtle politics, Turkey was going to stay out of the war, which was on the other hand for the benefit of Britain, considering Turkey's military vulnerability.[162] In brief, it can be deduced that although Turkey was not actually involved in the ongoing war, she was the victor of the diplomatic war so far.

3.6.1. Chrome Factor in Turkish Balance of Power Politics

One the most significant components that led Turkey to cope with the great powers during the war was chrome, which had an importance on arms production. In other words, both Britain and Germany wanted to possess this raw material, but on the other hand, prevent each other from possessing it too.[163] Therefore, this situation would strengthen Turkey's non-belligerence as well as her economy.

When Germany came up with the chrome trade, Turkey pursued a subtle diplomacy. Turkey was willing to show that she was the only state by which Germany could obtain chrome. On the one hand, Turkey demanded war materials in return for chrome sales. On the other hand, considering the previous chrome treaty

[161] Oran, p. 444.
[162] Annette Baker Fox, p. 28.
[163] Deringil, p.161.

with Britain signed in 1939, she stipulated that the chrome sale would only begin after 1943, in accordance with the termination of the treaty with Britain.[164]

Although the treaty was not welcomed by the United States, Britain seemed content with the treaty, since she was noticing the potential German threat to Turkey which would impair the Allies' interests in the subsequent phases.

All in all, it can be deduced that Turkey, by doing so, could manage well both Germany and Britain. Germany, on the other hand, could find space for advance of her sphere of influence over Turkey, despite not being totally satisfied. For Britain, the situation could be described as 'nothing so bad but might have been worse', so to speak. Turkey did not lie heavily on one side. Therefore, Britain would be at least satisfied with Turkey's adherence to the previous chrome treaty.

3.7. Turkey-Britain Relations in 1941

In 1941, the war was being predominated by the Axis powers, especially the unstoppable expansionism of Germany throughout Europe led Britain, which had already lost her strongest ally, to be on the defensive stance. Therefore, she was looking for assistance in order to reduce her burden, since Germany had been penetrating in the Balkans.

As we indicated before, Italy was rebuffed by Greece in 1940. Now it was the time for potential German invasion of Greece. For Britain, Germany could be prevented in the Balkans by the cohesion between Balkan states including Turkey. According to Britain's vision, Turkey could be a pioneering state in the revival of the Balkan Pact. On the other side, Turkey sought to take measures to curtail German expansionism by a Turkish-Bulgarian non-aggression pact. By doing this, Turks envisaged that participation of Bulgaria in the Axis powers could be deferred.[165] Yet, it did not work, and soon after Bulgaria was captured by Germany and the next target was Greece. From this point on, the British expedited her attempt to revive the Balkan pact by means of Turkey. But actually the situation for Britain was underwhelming. Britain was not able to send full-fledged aid to Greece, since she

[164] Ibid., 162.
[165] Oran, p. 436.

had mostly been involved in the Middle East. Therefore, what Britain wanted was to assign those Balkan states that had not been invaded yet to be led by Turkey to unite against Germany.

On the other hand, Turkey was certainly aware of the impracticability of the revival of the Balkan pact when looking at the situations within those states. Yet, Britain had taken several steps to do so. To do this, Britain had been insisting on Turkey to consult with Yugoslavia. Although Turkey was realizing the infeasibility of this, she tried to get in touch with Yugoslavia. However, what Turkey had already envisaged came true. Yugoslavia had already been drawn to German illusory territorial offers.[166] In the sequel to this event, Germany seized whole Balkan states.

Britain miscalculated Yugoslavia's maneuver. Actually, what she miscalculated was chronic political and ethnic disintegration of the Balkans.[167] This actually explains the situation, why a steady unity had failed in the Balkans. Therefore, it can be inferred from this case that Turkey diverged from the Balkan states, despite she possessed approximate resources with them. Turkey, first and foremost, was politically and nationally an integrated state. This was the reason that she was resilient and thus was not vulnerable to manipulation derived from the great powers, unlike that of the Balkans. Secondly, Turkey differed from them since she was able to negotiate unflaggingly with the great powers. In this sense, it is difficult to equate Turkey with the Balkan states. Therefore, in terms of practices of Turkish foreign policy, it would be better to put Turkey somewhere else compared to the Balkan states.

As for British-Turkish relations, the fall of Greece led to the loss of credibility in Turkey's eyes, as Britain could not send a substantial military support. Therefore, it was understood by the Turkish decision-makers that they should have stood on their own two feet and as a result of which the rapprochement between Turkey and Germany became inevitable. Nevertheless, it should be underlined that all these cases did not mean that Turkey came over from the Allies to the Axis, since such an action would have prevented Turkey from balancing great powers.

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[166] Açıkalın, p.1076.
[167] Ibid., 1077.

3.8. Turkey-Soviet Union Relations in 1941

As we indicated before, Turkish-Soviet relations had been deteriorating since the nonaggression pact between Germany and the Soviet Union. Turkey was concerned about being contained by two great powers as happened with Poland. Therefore, the Soviet Union as a proximately great power had taken considerable place in any phase of her foreign policy activity.

In 1941, the crucial event that supported Turkey's concerns was the revelation of the Soviet demands on the Turkish Straits. Actually, it was a tactic that Germany appealed to in order to strengthen her hand against Turkey and to be more influenced in the negotiations. Moreover, after the failed negotiations in Berlin, and before Germany went too far, the Soviet Union wanted to increase her sphere of influence across the Balkans, and hence the straits by attempting to make an agreement with Bulgaria, which she could not obtain in the Berlin meeting. By doing this, the Soviet Union aimed to generate pressure on Turkey as to the straits, and curtail German progression across the Balkans as well. However, Bulgaria turned the Soviet proposal down as she could not dare to provoke Germany, and consequently Bulgaria was folded into the Axis power. From this point on, it became more rational for the Soviet Union to come close to Turkey.[168] As for Turkey, she wanted to find the way to avert containment by Germany via Bulgaria and the Soviet Union from her eastern frontier at the same time. At this juncture, Turkey once again appealed to politics of balancing by playing upon British concern about the Balkans. Britain had demanded Turkey to wage war on Germany in case Germany would have waged war to Yugoslavia. In return, Turkey wanted to make sure of any Soviet invasion. Turkey hereby signed a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union on March 25, 1941, through Britain's mediatory.[169]

To sum up, Turkey had already been unwilling to be belligerent and known that she would not wage war to Germany. The reason was that Turkey was deprived of military support and according to the inserted clause in the Tripartite Treaty, Turkey could not have been belligerent without sufficient military support and

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[168] Oran, pp. 435-437.
[169] Ibid., 437.

indeed, Britain failed to satisfy that.[170] Therefore, Turkey remained non-belligerent and signed a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union as well.

From the point of the Soviet-German war, there had been a fundamental strand that made Turkey concerned. The beginning of Operation Barbarossa led to a rapprochement between the Soviet Union and Britain. Even after the beginning of Operation Barbarossa, Britain pronounced that she would give support to the Soviet Union.[171] This time, the Soviet Union, similar to what she had done before with Germany, could negotiate with Britain to the detriment of Turkey. Therefore, Turkey encountered with her traditional fear of containment by two great powers. However, Turkey once more appealed to politics of balancing and managed to pull it off by taking advantage of the Soviet Union and by means of her strategic location. To prevent German passage, closing down the straits was necessary for the sake of the Soviet Union and hence the neutrality of Turkey was vital as well.[172] As a result, on August 1941, the Soviet Union and Britain mutually declared that they would obey the Montreux Convention, by which it can be inferred that Turkey managed to get rid of Soviet demands on the straits at least for a while. Moreover, it is significant to indicate that Turks were actually active in the war, despite her non-belligerence.

3.9. General Framework of 1942

By the end of 1941, Turkey managed to a large extent to convince Britain of her neutrality and assured herself by the chain of treaties. In other words, she seemed to rebuff impending Germany. Meanwhile, Germany was advancing towards the Soviet Union. It was actually what Turkey had desired since the Soviet-German rapprochement. As Italian ambassador Ottavio de Peppo expressed: "The Turkish ideal is that the last German soldier should fall upon the last Russian corpse."[173] reflects Turks' attitude towards the Soviet-German war. However, it does not exactly explain TFP's attitude towards the balance of power. For Turkey, equilibrium on the European continent constituted one of the most crucial cornerstones of her foreign policy. Therefore, she did not want either of the great powers to dominate Europe.

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[170] Ibid., 438.
[171] Deringil, p. 150.
[172] Oran, p. 446.
[173] Hale, p. 65.

Germany was the best candidate for this, but as the Soviet Union gained the upper hand in the war, Turkey must have to deal with the Soviet Union as the next threat perception, and as a consequence Turkey would hereafter design her balance of power politics based on the apprehension of the Soviet Union as usual.

Let us very briefly depict the situation in early 1942 with regards to the balance of power. The Axis power, on the one hand, had been surpassing in many fronts across the world, on the other hand, the Allies had been losing weight and reputation specifically in the eyes of Turkey. In accordance with this, Turkey had been endeavoring to keep her (active) neutrality through a prudent balance of power politics.

3.9.1. Turkey-Germany Relations in 1942

A state of war presents some advantages as well as disadvantages to those states which are located in strategically vital geography like Turkey. As we covered before, Turkey had already secured herself by the treaties with both camps. However, to be frank, states cannot abide by treaties signed during a war due to changing conditions. As for Turkey, there was nothing wrong with her adherence to the treaties. Nevertheless, Germany had some doubts about whether Turkey would be manipulated by the Allies to open a new front in the Balkans against her. Because since after mid-1942, the situation on the Russian front had seemed to be gloomy for Germany. Therefore, the two options would both have been suitable for Germany. The first one was to create fear of the Soviet Union which Turkey had always contained in herself to compel her to join the Axis powers. The second option was sustaining the neutrality of Turkey.

Turkey had already embraced the latter. Therefore, the main goal was in her negotiations with Germany to emphasize on her neutrality. In accordance with this, Germans planned to give ammunition aid to Turkey in mid-1942.[174] This aid contributed Turkey to act more comfortable with regards to the balance of power politics among the Allies and the Axis. In other words, Turkey availed the weakness of either party.

[174]Deringil, p. 177.

In the meantime, Germany was nevertheless aiming that Turkey should have stood with her, namely bandwagoning. In this sense, she tried to foster Pan-Turanism to match the interests of Germany and Turkey. In other words, by fostering Pan-Turanism, Germany was aiming to tempt Turkey with the regions in which the majority of the population was composed of Turkic people.[175] Turkey had been determined to avoid revisionist aspirations as a founding principle. Despite the fact that there had been a circle that was supporting this Pan-Turkist wave, Turkey must have continued to be in a balanced manner. Turkey had already gained what she wanted by obtaining ammunition from Germany, hence the greatest thing Turkey could do in return was to pledge her neutrality. As we will see later, by the end of 1942, the relations nevertheless showed alternation to the degree that the Allies had the upper hand.

3.9.2. Turkey-Britain Relations in 1942

The rapprochement between Turkey and Germany was not welcomed by the Allies, especially the United States. After Turkey signed a nonaggression treaty and trade agreement with Germany, the United States halted to give aid to Turkey within the scope of lend-lease assistance.[176] However, according to their national interests, the Allies should be estimated on an individual basis. In this sense, Britain approach was more balanced, although she seemed to complain about it. Because Britain had fallen short of Turkey's expectations in terms of ammunition assistance. In addition to this, Turkey was still an important stronghold while Britain was fighting against Germany within Egypt. Therefore, within such a troublesome situation of Britain, Turkey managed to gain material assistance from Britain, in addition to that from Germany. In other words, Turkey was balancing the rising German threat and received assistance as well.[177] In sum, Turkey became once again beneficiary of the balance of power politics.

Turkish foreign policy, in general terms, was based on balancing the rising power during the war. Turks managed to become entangled with Germany, as a

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[175] Christian Leitz, *Nazi Germany and Neutral Europe During the Second World War*, (Manchester: Manchester University, 2000), p. 97.
[176] Oran, p. 445.
[177] Fox, p. 31.

threat perception, by balancing in 1941. Since the end of 1942, as we will cover, Turkey would endeavor to balance a rising Soviet Union. Britain, in the meantime, had always played an important role as a significant ally in Turkey's balancing politics.

In early 1942, the relations between Turkey and Britain were mutually cloudy. Britain was doubtful about Turkey's adherence to the Allies, whereas Turkey was apprehensive about Britain's intention. It should be specifically indicated that Turkish policymakers were quite calculative as to the great powers' next move. With regard to Britain's potential act, Turkey was concerned about German-British reconciliation to the detriment of her national security.[178]

In the early period of 1942, considering Britain's defeats on various fronts of the war, led Turkey to offer Britain a mediation between Germany and Britain to pave the way for reconciliatory peace.[179] Because, there had been a conviction among Turks that whether the situation stayed as it had been, then Germany and the Soviet Union would look for reconciliation, which constituted another apprehension of Turkey. Yet, Britain refused the offer as she was determined to beat Germany.

Nevertheless, British officials were aware of the Turkish balance of power politics, despite mutual apprehension. As British ambassador Hugessen indicated that Turks were realistic and endeavoring to benefit from both camps with respect to her security.[180] In other words, Turkey was just seeking to look for an ideal position between Britain and Germany. For Turkey, it would be better if Britain took control over her southern frontiers since the probable containment of Germany after the invasion of Caucasus.[181] On the other hand, Britain was realizing the truth that Turkey was fundamentally worried about the Soviet revival. Therefore, the mutual interests of both states necessitated balanced relations and in early 1942, despite disputed topics, Britain did not make a significant noise about Turkish-German rapprochement as Turkey was still a stronghold for Britain's interests across Egypt. However, by the end of the year, when the Allies had begun to have the upper hand,

[178] Deringil, p. 181.
[179] Ibid., 180.
[180] Ibid., 183.
[181] Ibid., 184.

Turkey had to encounter with Britain's pressure on her belligerence. As we will see in the next chapters, Britain would regularly pursue a policy aimed at escalating Turkey's fear of the Soviet Union.

3.10. Deterioration in Equilibrium: Rising Allies and The Soviet Factor

Alliances can show flexibility, especially in case of emergency. States' interests would bring them together regardless of their ideological stance. In this sense, the rapprochement of Britain and the Soviet Union from late 1941 onwards against Germany constitutes one of the most remarkable examples of this proposition. This automatically set alarm bells ringing among Turkish policy makers. It would be better to indicate that beside all great powers, Turkey's focal point had been the Soviet Union, since her geographical proximity and since the United States had been belligerent, the Soviet Union was consistently reinforced by the Allies. A stronger Soviet Union would have drastically deteriorated the balance of power within Europe and Turkey would then be one of those that suffered from this. In other words, Turkey would be more independent in a situation in which there was no single dominant power. In summary, the Soviet Union was comprising more vitality than the others in the TFP envisioning. The main reason behind Turkey's proposal to Britain was the apprehension of the Soviet Union and it became intense by the end of the year. Because, as long as Britain gained the upper hand in Egypt, Turkey would gradually lose her power of being a stronghold. In other words, by remaining non-belligerent, Turkey would be an obstacle to the containment of Germany in her southern front.[182] Taking into account all of these, Britain obtained a good reason for belligerence of Turkey. Along with a new front in the Balkans, Turkey could be an effective factor to curtail the war. To make Turks belligerent, Britain tried to lure them by offering some territories. Such a revisionist provocation would not make sense to Turkey, which had principally abstained from it since the beginning, and thus they appealed to delaying tactics by emphasizing the existing danger of Germany. When it did not work, Turks drew attention to the Soviet Union, of which interests did not overlap with Britain. Whenever she could not find what she expected, Turkey offered that she could play an important role in preventing the

[182] Oran, p. 451.

consolidation of Slavs in the north and south. It was actually a false bandwagoning to amuse and abate Britain's persistence.

Besides the Soviet Union, Turkey had worried about the rapprochement of Britain and the Soviet Union for a long time to the detriment of herself, but more importantly, Britain was aware of Turkey's apprehension of the Soviet Union. Therefore, by late 1942, it became a means of pressure on Turkey which was not willing to be belligerent. This method in a way was appealed to counterbalance Turkey's persistence. As it can be inferred from this case that whenever the balance of power deteriorated, Turkey would get in trouble. Therefore, from now onward, Turkey would endeavor to cope with the pressure and to do this, as we will see she would play upon controversies of the Allies.

3.11. 1943: The Year of Conferences

In late 1942 was the beginning of the pre-eminence of the Allied powers. In other words, the balance of power between the two camps had become advantageous to the Allies. Therefore, starting with 1943, relations between the Allies and Turkey was at the core of TFP's balance of power politics. Turkey had encountered Britain's pressure on her belligerence. In return, Turkey endeavored to remain non-belligerent as much as possible. The underlying reason behind all these efforts was her long-standing rival, the Soviet Union.

3.11.1. Adana Conference

After the conference in Casablanca in January 1943, the Allied powers seemed to reach the general consensus on Turkey's belligerence, despite some disputed points derived from the US. Churchill decided to perform on this issue. Accordingly, Churchill and İnönü met in Adana. As for Britain's main theme for the conference in Adana, Churchill came up with fortification of Turkish armed forces by which she would gradually (in other words, whenever she felt ready) be involved in the war in the event that Germany would reach oil resources through Turkey.[183] The other option was to utilize Turkish air bases for the Allies' warplanes. The second proposal was to make Turkey active in case the Balkans would be in chaos. Yet, Churchill was

[183] Tekeli & İlkin, p. 265.

not that persistent on Turkey's immediate belligerence, since Germany had still posed a threat to her. On the other hand, İnönü underlined that Turkey had always been keen on being non-belligerent so long as she would not be compelled to do so, and his main objective was to convince Churchill of the potential Soviet threat.[184] In this sense, İnönü expressed his opinion on the Soviet Union. To be more explicit, Turkey was afraid of being occupied by the Soviet Union for security reasons, whether Turkey would encounter with Germany in case of her hurried belligerence.[185] Considering the Soviets previous actions, the Turkish president was skeptical of Soviet Union intentions that could be contrary to the Allied vision of post-war status.[186] In response, Churchill underlined that rapprochement between the Allies and the Soviet Union had served the purpose of facilitating the victory against Germany. Actually, before Churchill arrived in Adana, he had been aiming to play upon Turkey's Soviet apprehension, but throughout the conference, he contrarily had applied to appease Turkey's threat perception.[187]

Besides the Soviet Union, one of the most serious issues in Adana was about Germany's fate, that occupied an important place in the post-war status of the balance of power in Europe. When İnönü asked about Britain's intention on Germany's status in case she would be defeated, Churchill decisively indicated unconditional surrender[188] , which was completely contrary to Turkey's European balance of power vision. On the other hand, the German threat was one of the key reasons which Turkey relied upon. Churchill was also aware of Turkey's insufficient military capacity vis-à-vis Germany, so he was not persistent on Turkey's instant belligerence. Therefore, Turkey's non-belligerence was still in favor of the Allies. In this sense, Britain and Turkey agreed primarily on one-year military aid in case of German attack.[189] As a result, Churchill was thinking that he managed to lure Turks,

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[184] Oran, p. 452.
[185] Tekeli & İlkin, pp. 265-266.
[186] Mehmet Arif Demirer, *İnönü'den İkinci Dünya Savaşı,* (Ankara: Bilgi, 2016), p. 63.
[187] Deringil, pp. 195-196.
[188] Mehmet Arif Demirer, p. 65.
[189] Oran, p. 452.

but as we will see later, the situation would thoroughly unveil discord between Turkey and Britain.[190]

Britain was conceiving that Turkey would gradually become belligerent so long as she would be equipped. To negotiate on this, it was determined that military officials of the two states would come together at a later date. However, Turkey was still situated at the same position and when the military officials met in Ankara, Britain encounter tough negotiations. As Edward Weisband indicates that Turks appealed to foot dragging.[191]

In the meeting on April 1943, Turks showed their diplomatic skills in order to hamper the military negotiations. They put forward several excuses ranging from red tape to the technical insufficiencies of the Turkish army.[192] It was a bypassing of the main issue. As Weisband indicates that when the British mission came up with political matters, Turks were in the tendency to swerve and mention tactical issues.[193] Moreover, Turks, on the one hand, were complaining about their vulnerability to an air strike, on the other hand, she strove for slowing the military airport construction down.[194] In Adana, the belligerence of Turkey was conditional upon her readiness. However, for Turkey, she should have never been ready. Therefore, this was the reason behind this calculating characteristic of Turkish policy makers throughout the military negotiations.

All in all, Britain recognized that Turkey could not be convinced if she would not reach tangible achievement against Germany. On the other hand, although Turks were not willing to be belligerent, she should not have been that negative considering the Allies' advance in the balance of power, otherwise, she could be isolated.

When Britain was trying to think of ways to lure Turkey, the fall of Italy on July created an opportunity for Churchill. According to Churchill's plan, if Britain managed to seize control over the Aegean Sea, Turkey would change her mind with

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[190] Deringil, p. 197-198.
[191] Edward Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1943-1945: Small State Diplomacy and Great Power Politics*, (New Jersey: Princeton University, 2015), p. 159.
[192] Deringil, p. 202.
[193] Weisband, p. 156.
[194] Deringil, p. 205.

respect to non-belligerence. Despite Churchill was quite confident that Britain would take Rhodes against Italian forces, Germany did not let her. The failure of Britain demonstrated that Germany was still strong, despite her defeats on the other fronts. Therefore, the result confirmed Turkey and prevented Britain's plan of Turkey's belligerence from succeeding as well.[195] Besides Britain's failure in the Aegean sea, this incident allowed Turkey to show her goodwill by aiding British soldiers on the Aegean islands[196] in order to resist in Britain's pressure[197], namely to create partial living space.

3.11.2. Quebec Conference: The Soviets as a New Threat Perception

During the ongoing process, the year 1943 had witnessed a series of conferences that inevitably concerned Turkey. The first one was the Quebec Conference with the participation of the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union. Regarding the Aegean issue, Turks undoubtedly needed more than showing goodwill to keep her non-belligerence. In this sense, diversity of views between the United States and Britain were the next focal point of the war. In the conference on August held in Quebec, two diversified opinions were put forward by the United States and Britain. On the one hand, the United States laid emphasis on landing in the English Channel. On the other hand, Britain proposed the Balkan front in order to strike against German bases deployed in Romania via Turkey.[198]

The Soviet Union was also opposed to the Balkan front. It is worth noting that the Quebec Conference was one of the indicators that gave some clues on the post-war intentions of both Britain and the Soviet Union. From a historical perspective, the Soviet Union would regard the Balkans as her sphere of influence. On the other hand, although she recognized the German threat to Turkey, Britain's persistence on Turkey's belligerence leaves an impression that she wanted her to bandwagon. In this sense, the Soviets' objection to the Balkan front derived from her intention to prevent

[195] Deringil, p. 207.
[196] Fox, p. 35.
[197] Deringil, p. 209-210.
[198] Oran, p. 454.

the deployment of the Allies after the war. Therefore, in order to prevent the Balkan front, the Soviet Union wanted Turkey to be involved in the war.[199]

Nonetheless, each of them agreed with the opinion that Turkey should have been involved in the war. But at the same time, they recognized that it was early to attach her. The difference between these three states derived from specific issues as we mentioned above. As a result of the negotiations, it was determined that Turkey should have been tangibly reinforced and asked for opening her airports for the Balkan front.[200]

3.11.3. Moscow Conference

After Quebec, the Allies and the Soviet Union decided to meet at ministerial level. Although Turkey's being active had brought all three states together, there were three standpoints about the way she should have been involved in the war. First of all, the United States proposed that Turkey should just allow the Allies to utilize their air bases, otherwise any belligerence of Turkey would restrain them from the struggle in western Europe.

In the Second place, the Soviets were taking a different approach to Turkey. As long as the Soviet Union gained the upper hand over Germany, she began to assume an offensive attitude against Turkey during the negotiations with the Allies. In the Moscow Conference, the Soviet Union expressed Turkey's belligerence more clearly by claiming that Turkey's existing status facilitated Germany. However, there were different reasons behind the Soviets' attitude. According to the Soviet Union, Turkey's belligerence was necessary for curtailment of the war. On the other hand, Turkey was forecasting that Soviets wanted a war-ravaged Turkey by which she would be vulnerable to the Soviet intervention. Turks in this sense had reasonable grounds as the Soviets dissented from military aid to Turkey, which had not been willing to be belligerent. In brief, when we consider all this information, the conference held in Moscow was important for two reasons. On the one hand, it was the beginning of explicit Soviet threat that Turkish foreign policy must hereafter take

[199] Oran, p. 455.
[200] Ibid., 455.

into consideration. On the other hand, the conference showed the indications of the post-war status.

Besides the Soviets' demands, Britain saw the conference as an opportunity to realize Churchill's envisaging of Turkey's belligerence by seizing the opportunity that the Soviets threw her way. Therefore, throughout the conference, Britain had played upon this approach to associate her plan with the Soviets. For sure, Britain's proposal for the Balkan front would be turned down by the Soviets, but yet Britain should not have isolated the Soviets since there were serious rumors on reconciliation between Germany and the Soviets.[201] With respect to the Balkan front, Britain did not specifically address the issue, but rather tried to focus on the belligerence of Turkey. For the latter, Britain tried to appease the Soviets in that she would arm Turkey against Germany. In accordance with overlapping Britain and the Soviet Union, Churchill put forward that Turkey should be belligerent by herself under the influence of either the German threat or by the Allies' pressure. By doing so, Turkey would not be allowed to complain about her insufficient military resources.[202] As a consequence of these consultations, Britain and the Soviet Union signed a protocol on Turkey. Briefly stated, the two states agreed upon the belligerence of Turkey before the end of 1943 alongside the Allies. In addition to this, the belligerence of Turkey would be recommended (namely be forced) in this respect. Moreover, Turkey should have allocated her air bases as soon as possible.

All in all, the conference can be evaluated in many aspects. Initially, it was an indicator of a stressful stage that Turkey would enter. In addition to the Soviet Union, Britain acted in a certain way that could endanger Turkey's national security by taking advantage of the Soviet's attitude towards Turkey. In other words, Britain wanted Turkey's belligerence no matter to what extent she was ready, although Churchill expressed that he understood Turkey's active neutrality right after Adana Conference. Yet, in a realist oriented structure in which self-interest of a state is prevailing, it was difficult to be exactly sure about states' intentions. Therefore, alliances, within such an atmosphere, would not be reliable and alliances would in this sense show alteration on a case-by-case basis. From this point of view, despite

[201] Tekeli and İlkin, p.293.
[202] Deringil, p. 212-213.

Britain endeavoring to overlap her views with the Soviets', there was a potential dispute between them about the sphere of influence in the Balkans and Turkey was right at the center of this issue. Therefore, to the extent that the disputes intensified, Turkey would take advantage.

3.11.4. The Chess Game in Cairo

The foreign ministers of Turkey and Britain came together in Cairo. The central issue was again Turkey's belligerence. British foreign minister Eden once again expressed the British demand that Turkey should be involved in the war before the end of the year, and should allocate her air bases to the Allies as well. After his counterpart, Menemencioğlu, refused him on the excuse that Turkey was not materially well-prepared and expressed the German threat in case of opening the air bases, Eden intensified his pressure by putting forward a potential Soviet threat if Turkey would fail to cooperate. Therefore, Menemencioğlu inferred that the main factor behind Britain's attitude was the Soviet Union. Even at the end of the meeting, Menemencioğlu explicitly indicated that Britain had become bogged down in the matter of Turkey's belligerence. In addition to this, he warned Eden not to rely on the Soviet Union to annihilate Germany. In other words, he emphasizes that the Soviets would presume to invade in case Turkey was vulnerable to German threat, which would not bring benefit to Britain. Considering all these reasons, Menemencioğlu revealed a vicious cycle which Britain got into by stating that Britain could not give aid if Turkey would not be belligerent, but on the other hand, Turkey would not be belligerent if not Britain give aid.[203]

After a few days, Menemencioğlu proclaimed maintenance of Turkey's non-belligerence, and a dramatic change came to light in Turkish foreign policy. As opposed to Menemencioğlu's declaration, İnönü decided that Turkey would principally involve herself in the war as he did not want Turkey to be isolated before the Allies' advance. In this sense, by making an impression that Turkey was willing to be belligerent, he aimed to curtail Britain's reaction.[204] Nevertheless, it did not mean that İnönü really wanted Turkey to be belligerent. Rather this attitude signaled

[203] Demirer, p. 243-244.
[204] Oran, p. 459.

a tactical change in Turkish foreign policy. From then on, the main tactical instrument to stay out of the war was gaining time by hampering the Allies' demands.[205] In this sense, Turks imposed various conditions to be belligerent.

3.11.5. Tehran Conference: Transpiring Disputes

As long as the Soviets gained the upper hand over Germany, her attitude showed alteration on new fronts and in Turkey's belligerence as well. Because, as long as the Axis powers were defeated, interdependence between the Allies had crumbled, and so the self-interests of the states stood out accordingly. In this sense, the Tehran Conference was the sparking of this potential conjuncture.

Let us explain the difference between the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union that emerged in the conference. At the macro level, Britain was focusing on the operation within the Mediterranean and the Balkans. On the other hand, the United States and the Soviet Union were supporting Operation Overlord that would be carried out in Europe.[206] At the micro level, as for Turkey's status, Churchill brought forward that Germany would be occupied with Turkey in the Balkans. In addition to this, Turkish units would be useful to seize the Mediterranean islands. By doing this, the Soviets could be reinforced via the Turkish Straits. [207] In response to Turkey's belligerence, Stalin seemed reluctant compared to the previous conference. Besides this, he prioritized Operation Overlord. Actually, the aim here was to prevent the Allies from being situated in the Black Sea.[208] However, when Churchill went further by proposing an amendment to the status of the straits in case Turkey would insist on her non-belligerence, the Soviet Union made a point of asking whether Britain would do so.[209] According to a more pessimistic scenario, the Soviets, by doing this were aiming to make Turkey disconnected with the Allies in order to establish control over Turkey for the sake of their intentions across the Balkans. [210]The United States, on the other hand, was the main promoter of Operation

[205] Deringil, p. 219.
[206] Zehra Önder, p. 257.
[207] Tekeli and İlkin, p. 304.
[208] Ibid., p. 304.
[209] Deringil, p. 225.
[210] Ibid., p. 222.

Overlord. Moreover, Roosevelt indicated that Operation Overlord would be encumbered by Turkey.

As a consequence of the Tehran Conference, it can be deduced that Britain seemed to be prepared to sacrifice Turkey for their self-interest, despite the fact that she found Turkey's status reasonable at the Adana Conference. Nevertheless, Churchill's attitude towards Turkey in Tehran did not mean that Britain would easily renounce Turkey, due to her geographical location, which we will touch upon later. Secondly, the Soviet Union seemed to have a hidden agenda with respect to Turkey's status, which was specifically perceived by the United States. But actually, in the broader sense, the conference allusively gave an idea on the post-war intentions of the three states. As for the United States, her stance throughout the conference was more suitable for Turkey's national security than that of Britain and the Soviets. But, in fact, as long as the Axis lost height, conflicting interests of these three states would become more clear, and by which Turkey could pursue her balance of power politics.

3.11.6. The Second Cairo Conference: A Turning Point in Turkish Foreign Policy

In line with the struggle for Turkey's belligerence, Britain and the United States initiated a summit for the second time in Cairo. The main objective was to determine a specific date after which Turkey was supposed to become involved in the war. Nevertheless, there had been a diversity of views between Britain and the United States on how to make Turkey belligerent. İnönü, on the other hand, was prepared to play upon this dichotomy between them.

As we remember from the previous conferences, Roosevelt frowned upon Turkey's belligerence within the context of the Balkan front, but prone to the Operation Overlord. Therefore, in Cairo, he seemed close to İnönü's argument on Turkey's struggle for non-belligerence, and by which İnönü strengthened his hand

against Britain throughout the negotiations. In brief, Roosevelt preferred talking about the post-war status to talking about the Balkan front.[211]

As for Britain's point of view, Turkey should have been belligerent as soon as possible, otherwise, she could not be an active member of the post-war status quo. In addition to this, Churchill allusively threatened Turkey with the Soviet Union, which would pose a danger in case of Turkey's non-belligerence. After that, Churchill's plan was to convince Turkey to allocate her air bases to the Allies until the 15th of February 1944, by which Turks would not encounter with the German threat. İnönü thereupon indicated that Turkey could not obtain the military aid committed before, thus it would be unjust to force Turkey, which had been unprepared and vulnerable to a potential German invasion. Because, İnönü underlined that even the Allies' preparation would provoke the Germans, despite Britain just demanded allocation of the air bases. Moreover, Germany had been informed of developments for a long time by their spy Cicero.[212]

But beyond that, the apprehension of the Turks was the Soviet Union. Let us go a bit deeper. According to İnönü's estimation, if Turkey was defeated by Germany on the straits, the Soviet Union would initiate to rescue Turkey from them which would bring about the Soviet sphere of influence across Turkey. In fact, the absence of the Soviet Union would remark this probability. According to Menemencioğlu, the Soviet Union was standing behind a curtain which had yet to be iron.[213]

Nevertheless, İnönü would like to have shown his goodwill by putting forward some conditions by which Turkey would involve herself in the war. For sure, as a promoter of Turkey's belligerence, İnönü did not want Turkey to be dragged into the war, but he just wanted to gain time by foot-dragging. İnönü proposed a two-phase plan; preparation and military operation in the Balkans cooperated with the Allies. By doing this, İnönü aimed two things; to show a false willingness and to receive the United States' support.

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[211] Tekeli and İlkin, p. 305.
[212] Deringil, p. 231.
[213] Ibid., p. 228.

Unlike Turkey's concerns, Britain did not regard Germany as a serious threat since Turkey would be ready for the war when British military personnel entered into the Turkish air bases. On the other hand, Turks indicated that even this action would provoke Germany. Therefore, what Turks inferred from readiness was to equip their own army.[214] All in all, Churchill said his final word that Turkey was supposed to be allocating her air bases until the 15th of February 1944. In response, İnönü once again put forward the same reasons as he did before, and as a consequence, he managed to have a preference for an option whether he would allow British personnel or not. Yet, İnönü left the door and indicated that if Britain would realize some preconditions as to what he demanded in the summit, Turkey could principally be belligerent.[215] Moreover, before leaving, Churchill indicated that he would send Turkey a plan to which the Turks were supposed to respond within a few days. However, Turks sought a wide range of military material which was impossible to give. Therefore, by doing this, Turkey demonstrated that she had no intention to involve herself in the war.[216]

As a result, at the end of 1943, the shift in the balance of power had gradually become apparent. The Axis powers had been defeated, and there appeared to be a new status quo. Such transitions, by definition of a realist mindset, would stimulate self-interests of the winning side.

3.12. 1944: Turkey and the Allies Relations in the Changing Balance of Power

The year 1944 should be evaluated within two phases with respect to the relationship between Britain and Turkey. In the first phase, the pressure on Turkey led them to take radical actions whereas Britain, in the second phase, decided to cease pressure considering the post-war status quo. On the other hand, Turkey had been trying to adapt herself to the new situation, as usual. Let us go a bit deeper.

Towards the end of 1943, after the last unfavorable reply, the relations between Turkey and Britain had seriously worsened. Turks would decisively appeal to foot-dragging on all occasions. Especially after the last time British mission went away

[214] Oran, p. 462.
[215] Ibid., 463.
[216] Deringil, p. 234.

empty-handed, the negativity in the relations was at its peak so that both Britain and the United States froze ties with Turkey. Moreover, Britain convinced the United States to act in the same direction.[217] This incident brought about a series of events that forced Turkey to cut off German contact.

First of all, the Allies demanded Turkey to cease the chrome trade with Germany. In addition to this, the Allies threaten to implement a blockade, if not Turkey would cease the chrome trade.[218] As a consequence of this pressure, Turkey stopped selling chrome to Germany. Actually, the chrome trade was a crucial factor in terms of balancing Germany in previous stages of the war. However, as we indicated that this had ceased to be important so long as the Allies gained the upper hand over Germany. Therefore, within these circumstances, Turkey should have played along in order not to be isolated further.

Secondly, the transit passage of the German ships became subject to the pressure of the Allies. Turkey could not allow the transition of any warship, according to the Montreux Convention. Nevertheless, there were some indications that she let German trade ships equipped with ammunition pass through, to which Britain was complaining. However, in 1943, when the British army was in the Aegean Sea to capture the islands, she violated Turkish territorial waters in contravention of the Montreux Convention. Actually, in each case, Turkey presumably had stretched a point in her own interest, -that is to say, it was a part of balancing. As a result, Turkey closed the straits to German ships as well, for the same reason we mentioned above. The change in Turkey's position had been such visible actions that paved the way for the resignation of foreign minister Menemencioğlu who had been a dauntless advocate of Turkey's non-belligerence and at the same time treated with antipathy by Britain.[219] In addition to this, there seemed to be detente in the relationship between Turkey and the Allies.

Nevertheless, the pressure on Turkey had lasted and this time the Allies demanded Turkey cut diplomatic ties with Germany. British officials were envisaging by doing this, Turkey would be attacked by Germany and automatically

[217] Oran, p. 465.
[218] Fox, p. 37.
[219] Deringil, pp. 245-246.

involved in the war. Therefore, in such a circumstance Britain would not be supposed to give military aid. Although Turkey seemed to be making concessions, it did not mean that she would change her general view on non-belligerence, but surprisingly showed her willingness to involve herself in the war with an equipped army across the Balkans alongside the Allies. It was a bluff, and by doing so, Turkey aimed to balance British pressure, as Turkey was sure about the reluctance of the United States, intolerance of the Soviet Union and weakness of Britain.[220]As a result, Britain approved of Turkey's offer and Turkey thereupon cut diplomatic ties with Germany.

In the meantime, the Soviets' attitude towards Turkey was gradually getting worse. As we indicated that the Soviet Union was keeping herself in the background. When Britain mentioned the ongoing process with Turkey, the Soviets did not lean towards the betterment of relations with Turkey.[221] The Soviet plan was to make Turkey disconnected from the Allies in order to dictate her own demand regarding the post-war circumstances.[222]

From this point forth, it would be useful to look at the second phase of the year 1943. By the second half of the year, the Soviet Union became more threatening to Turkey and Britain as well. As a remarkable factor in the defeat of Germany, the Soviet Union envisaged gaining control over the Balkans and so took the action accordingly. In this sense, the new balance of power appeared in the Balkans. While Turkey was anticipating demand for her belligerence, Britain surprisingly remained silent.[223] Because, within the new balance, Britain was convinced that Turkey's being non-belligerent was much more reasonable considering her interests across the Balkans, the Middle East, and the Turkish Straits.[224] In sum, it can be deduced that Turkey's geopolitical vitality would become once again overlapped with Britain's interests. Therefore, Turkey was not a state that could easily be discarded by those who wanted to have a say in the balance of power. On the other hand, this attitude that came from Britain had cast doubt on Turkey as to whether she would be marginalized. However, although Britain seemed to be indifference towards Turkey,

[220] Deringil, p. 248.
[221] Fox, p. 38.
[222] Oran, p. 470.
[223] Ibid., 470.
[224] Deringil, pp. 253-255.

because of the reasons that we underlined above, it would be beneficial to get in touch with her for her British interests.

3.13. 1945: The Search For Balancing Alliance

After Germany was defeated, Turkey must have encountered with her old frontier. In 1945, the Soviet Union appeared to be the next threat perception which substituted for Germany. As we indicated at the beginning, the Soviet Union was always a remarkable factor due to her geographical proximity and thus in order to preserve herself from the Soviet sphere of influence, Turkey should have formed an alliance with another great power or the Soviet Union should not have formed an alliance with another great power to the detriment of Turkey. This had been what constituted one of the main pillars of Turkish foreign policy. In 1945, Turkey had endeavored to resist in the Soviets' demands by rallying support of the Allies.

The Soviets' plan on Turkey could be summarized as follows: Turkey should not be involved in the war by Britain, which would avert a new front in the Balkans. Therefore, a non-belligerent Turkey would make her vulnerable to the Soviet demands in the postwar period.[225] As we indicated that such a scenario had been corresponding to the apprehension of Turkish foreign policy. Therefore, considering this, Turkey had already waged war on Germany and Japan at the beginning of 1945 in order to take place in the United Nations. It was a search for an alliance to balance the Soviet Union. However, Britain seemed to be indifferent. Actually, Britain was also intending to protect Turkey's interests for the sake of her own interests, but after five years of the devastating war, she was not that strong anymore. Therefore, Britain had acted more cautiously in the face of the Soviet demands. On the other hand, the United States had adopted a reconciliatory attitude towards Turkey-Soviet Union relations. Within this framework, let us handle the events in 1945.

The Yalta Conference was the initial platform in which Stalin explicitly reflected the Soviets' ultimate purposes on the post-war era. Stalin raised the straits issue. He stated that the Montreux Convention should have been revised in conformity with the new status quo. In response, Churchill pursued Britain's cautious

[225]Tekeli & İlkin, p. 384.

approached and stated that the straits issue could be re-evaluated. Yet, in the conference, Churchill did not reflect an anti-Turkey attitude.[226] Therefore, it can be inferred that Churchill was not pleased with the Soviets' demand.

About the status on the straits, in Yalta, there was nothing concrete to satisfy the Soviets. In March, the Soviets thereupon explicitly declared to Turkey that they would not renew the treaty of friendship signed in 1925. In June, the Soviets get further and demanded border regulation, by which they meant Kars and Ardahan. In addition to this, the Soviets should have established a base over the straits, on which Turkey showed weakness in World War II.[227] Turkey thereupon looked for the Allies' support in line with her classical balancing policy. However, both Britain and the United States treated this with indifference. Under this circumstance, Turkey seemed abandoned, which had been her worst fear. Actually, the Allies had their own reasons to be tolerant to the Soviets. The United States had cooperated with the Soviets for the defeat of Germany. Therefore, at this stage, the Soviets were sympathized with in the United States. Britain, on the other hand, was a war-ravaged state which was cautious on the Soviets' demand, but in fact, she was aware of Turkey's vitality for the sake of her own interests.

This time, the Soviet Union raised his demands on Turkey in the Potsdam Conference. On the other hand, Churchill did not explicitly refuse the Soviets' demands on the reevaluation of the Montreux Convention, but indirectly reflected his negative approach by indicating that he could not put pressure to convince Turkey.[228] As for the United States, the status of the Turkish Straits should have been handled in a broad scale. In other words, president Truman advocated the free passage of the straits for ships from all over the world. Moreover, it should have been internationally guaranteed for the establishment of peace. But on the other hand, the issue of border regulation should have been resolved by Turkey and the Soviet Union.

In brief, in terms of balancing the Soviets' demands, Turkey could not find what she expected from the United States, whereas Britain's attitude was at least

[226] Deringil, p. 258.
[227] Tekeli & İlkin, p. 385-386.
[228] Deringil, p. 262.

consolatory. At end of the conference, the three states agreed on re-evaluation of the straits.

On the one hand, the Soviet Union had been trying to get her demands through to the Allies in international platforms, but on the other hand, she had been putting pressure on Turkey by fortifying the regions that were in close proximity to her. Throughout this period, Turkey expected support from the Allies for balancing the Soviets as usual. However, as we indicated before, Britain was no longer that strong to cope with the Soviets. In addition to this, Turkey tried to convert the alliance treaty with Britain to the Soviet threat. But this time, Britain surprisingly used foot-dragging tactics as Turkey had done throughout World War II. The United States was still in the mood of mediaton with respect to the relationship between Turkey and the Soviet Union. Under this circumstance, Turkey's status remained ambiguous at the end of 1945 until rapid expansionism of the Soviets within Europe in 1946, by which the United States substituted for Britain. Therefore, the United States became the next factor to balance the Soviet Union.

CONCLUSION

In the years between 1939 and 1945 the world had witnessed the bloodiest war ever. Turkey, which was located in one of the crucial geographical places, managed to escape unharmed from the danger. As for what kept Turkey alive throughout the war, we find roughly three main pillars; traditional balancing policy that had led her to survive since the late Ottoman period, the policy of non-belligerence, and unconditional obedience to the policy of non-belligerence.

The Configuration of Turkish foreign policy derived from a realist standpoint and thus considered tangible resources which Turkey possessed. Her economic and military conditions were not comparable with the great powers. On the other hand, her advantageous sides were their diplomatic accommodation and geographic vitality, but the latter would vary from time to time. Diplomatic accommodation derived from the past experiences of the late Ottoman Empire. This indicated that Turkey should by no means have adopted bandwagoning. Therefore, it was the reason that the policymakers of the early republican period adopted the policy of balancing, as their predecessors had frequently done in the 19th century. Because the course in World War I resulted in the destruction of the empire. As for the geographical location, because Turkey was situated in a transit point, which meets the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East and also possessed the Straits, she was inevitably involved in global issues as was the case with World War II to which she was certainly reluctant to be involved. Therefore, considering all these tangible resources, the policymakers conceived a sort of real politics of Turkey which can be embodied in a defensive approach which promoted the peace.

As for the practice of this approach, Turkey appealed to build up alliances to guarantee her national security throughout the war. Alliances were the main criteria for the policy of balancing. Actually, coalition building was not actually a big deal for Turkey, which was geographically vital although at the beginning she had difficulty to convince Britain against the Italian threat over the Balkans and the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, to some extent, Turkey managed to bring most Balkans states together. As long as the war spread across the Balkans, Turkey and Britain became more affiliated. It would be better to underline that throughout the war,

Turkey did not allow superior-subordinate relations in the alliance between them, but rather pursued a subtle diplomacy. When Britain had forced her to involve herself in the war, she predicated the Tripartite Treaty. In other words, she put forward her military weakness against Germany and promoted the good sides of her non-belligerence. Therefore, Turkey managed to balance both Germany and Britain, with which she made an alliance to balance Germany. Moreover, when Britain tried to lure Turkey by offering territories, she stood firm in accordance with her principle.

Relations with Germany included two phases. Until 1943, Germany had tried to encourage Turkey to ally with her or at least to remain non-belligerent when she advanced on the Soviet Union. In line with this, Germany adopted several methods like promoting Pan-Turanism combining with offering territorial concessions to lure Turkey. Meanwhile, the first phase brought about opportunities for the Turkish economy by chrome trade with Germany. Therefore, by subtle diplomacy, Turkey managed to earn money from Germany, which was situated at the top of her threat perception. From 1943 onwards, she just sought Turkey's non-belligerence as she had been losing height. But before all, Turkey should have taken measure to German expansionism across the Balkans. In this sense, a non-aggression pact signed with Germany in 1941 constituted another cornerstone of the policy of balancing. By doing so, Turkey became a non-belligerent in a real sense. Incidentally, non-belligerence did not exactly explain Turkey's stance, which was in fact an active neutrality as Turkish policy makers described. Because, non-belligerence corresponded with not being involved in the war, but Turkey, in fact, found herself involved at various stages of the war through diplomatic ways, despite not being concretely involved.

Besides all these factors, the Soviet Union had played one of the most important roles in Turkish foreign policy calculation. Throughout the war, Turks had paid specific attention to the Soviet factor. When Turkey signed the treaty with Britain, she included an additional item related to the Soviet Union. On the other hand, Turkey's calculation about the Soviets' intention was on target. The Soviets had always been a potential threat to Turkey's territorial integrity as she had pursued a subtle policy between two sides of the war. Moreover, their intentions over the

Balkans were not a mystery. Besides, the Soviets' attitude towards Turkey was an indication of their intentions. Therefore, in every phase of the war, Turkey should have considered the Soviet factor due to her geographical proximity, which is reckoned among the elements of the threat perception by Stephen Walt.

Let us finally discuss the middle power issue. The purpose of this thesis does not exactly attach to the middle power concept in international relations. To explain what we exactly mean by middle power, making a comparison would help us. For instance, on the western front, both the Netherlands and Belgium adopted the policy of neutrality. However, they easily surrendered by Germany, although their neutralities were recognized by Germany. On the other hand, Turkey left nothing to chance and signed a non-aggression treaty with Germany, in addition to the Tripartite treaty and legally guaranteed her security. Furthermore, by doing this, Turkey prevented German expansionism and thus facilitated the Allies' burden. In comparison to the Balkan states, Turkey varied from them in a lot of ways. Prior to the war, she initiated unity within the Balkans against the Italian threat. On the other hand, the Balkan states were politically disintegrated, which paved the way for the sudden penetration of Germany, whereas Turkey did not let Germany invade her.

All in all, as we initially indicated, this thesis does not aim at one to one matching with the middle power concepts in international relations. The cases throughout the war show us how Turkey managed to secure herself and had an impact on the great powers' policies as a weak factor. Therefore, we should not equate Turkey to the states with similar strength. In a nutshell, considering all this information, Turkey should be positioned somewhere in the middle of the great powers and small states.

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CURRICULUM VITAE

Name and Surname: Mehmet Ali Şengil

Place and Date of Birth: Ankara, 1989

Education:

Degree	**Field**	**University**	**Year**
Undergraduate	Political Science	Bilkent University	2012
Graduate	International Relations	Atılım University	

Foreign Languages: English

E-mail: malisengil@gmail.com

Date: 25.12.2017

mali

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