THE PROBLEM OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND RECOGNITION IN HEGEL'S *PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT*

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ABSTRACT

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The problem of self-consciousness and recognition is one of the most crucial and central issues in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*. The purpose of this study is to expose and investigate this problem in accordance with the unity of *Phenomenology* through which Hegel examines the experience of consciousness in terms of its own criterion. The emergence of self-consciousness as an explicit issue becomes the truth of movement of consciousness, and self-consciousness essentially takes the form of desire. In this process, self-consciousness evolves from the natural desire to desire for recognition, and recognition by the other arises as the condition of self-consciousness. Besides, the only form of recognition that makes the satisfaction of self-consciousness or desire possible is the reciprocal recognition. Hegel exposes consciousness' experience of recognition as the struggle for recognition and the dialectic of master and slave. On the other hand, the process of recognition in the *Phenomenology* does not culminate in the master-slave dialectic or in the liberation of slave. Rather, the servile consciousness takes another shape that emerges from its contradictory nature and it changes into the freedom of thought. That is, Hegel's concept of recognition cannot be reduced to the master-slave dialectic; the process of recognition persists in the subsequent movement of consciousness and it evolves into certain recognitive relations in the 'Spirit'. For this reason, the problem of self-consciousness and recognition has a determining or constitutive role through the

whole movement of consciousness in the *Phenomenology*.

Keywords: Consciousness, Self-consciousness, Hegel, Desire, Recognition

ÖZ

HEGEL'İN *TİNİN FENOMENOLOJİSİ*'İNDE
ÖZ-BİLİNÇ VE TANINMA PROBLEMİ

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Öz-bilinç ve tanınma problemi Hegel'in *Tinin Fenomenolojisi*'ndeki en önemli ve merkezi sorunlardan biridir. Bu çalışmanın amacı söz konusu problemin, Hegel'in bilincin deneyimini onun kendi ölçütüyle sınadığı *Fenomenoloji*'nin bütünlüğü içinde ortaya koymak ve incelemektir. Öz-bilinç belirgin bir sorun biçiminde bilincin hareketinin hakikati olarak ortaya çıkar ve özsel olarak arzu formunu alır. Bu süreçte, öz-bilinç doğal arzudan tanınma arzusuna evrilir ve öteki tarafından tanınma öz-bilincin koşulu olarak ortaya çıkar. Dahası, öz-bilinç ya da arzunun tatminini sağlayacak olan tanınma biçimi yalnızca karşılıklı tanınmadır. Hegel bilincin tanınma deneyimini tanınma mücadelesi ve efendi-köle diyalektiği süreci olarak ortaya koyar. Öte yandan, *Fenomenoloji*'deki tanınma süreci efendi-köle diyalektiği veya kölenin özgürleşmesiyle son bulmaz. Köle bilinci kendi çelişik yapısından kaynaklanan başka bir bilinç formuna, düşüncenin özgürlüğü biçimine evrilir. Yani, Hegel'in tanınma kavramı efendi-köle diyalektiğine indirgenemez; tanınma süreci bilincin sonraki hareketinde de devam eder ve 'Tin'de çeşitli tanınma ilişkileri olarak ortaya çıkar. Bu nedenle, öz-bilinç ve tanınma problemi *Fenomenoloji*'de bilincin

bütün hareketi için belirleyici ya da kurucu bir role sahiptir.

Anahtar Kelimeler**:** Bilinç, Öz-bilinç, Hegel, Arzu, Tanınma

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* has been one of the most influential and greatest works in the history of philosophy. At the same time, it has always remained as an extremely difficult work to understand. The difficulty or obscurity of *Phenomenology* resides both in its style, language or method, and in its radically different approach to the traditional problems of philosophy. As the simplest definition, *Phenomenology* is Hegel's project in which he examines the experience of 'natural' or 'ordinary' consciousness to demonstrate the standpoint of his 'philosophy'. But this consciousness is not only the one that is described through the work. As far as any reader of the *Phenomenology* is not already at the standpoint of the Hegelian philosophy, what is examined is also its own consciousness. In this sense, as Judith Butler states, "*Phenomenology* is not only a narrative about a journeying consciousness, but it is the journey itself" (1987: 21). Therefore, to take this journey is also an issue of one's questioning its own claims, presuppositions or beliefs.

The purpose of this study is to expose and investigate the problem of 'self-consciousness and recognition' in the *Phenomenology*. Certainly, self-knowledge or self-consciousness has been one of the central problems in philosophy. Descartes' '*cogito*', Kant's 'transcendental unity of apperception' or Fichte's 'absolute self' are just some of the major formulations that deal with this central issue. Thus, the necessity of such a study specifically on the *Phenomenology* may be suspicious. However, I think, Hegel's theory of self-consciousness has a distinct, peculiar way of positing and understanding the problem. Through the examination of consciousness,

Hegel not only defines the emergence of self-consciousness as ‘desire’, but he also posits ‘recognition’ as the ‘satisfaction’ of self-consciousness. That is, the self-knowledge or self-consciousness is held to be depending on the recognition; intersubjectivity or sociality becomes the very condition of subjectivity. On the other hand, with the themes of ‘desire’, ‘struggle for recognition’, ‘dialectic of master-slave’ or ‘labor’, ‘Self-consciousness’ is probably the most well known part of the work. It is undeniable that even just this part of the work can be read in many ways, as it has been interpreted from very different perspectives such as existentialism, Marxism or ‘politics of identity’. The main concern of this study, however, will be to trace the issue of ‘self-consciousness and recognition’ in accordance with the unity of *Phenomenology*. In other words, the main interest will be to scrutinize Hegel’s account of self-consciousness and recognition, with a view of the unity of its seemingly discrete themes, as well as its unity with the work. For to my conviction, it is more crucial to think on such a unity, rather than to focus on the varying themes as the discrete philosophical issues. On this ground, for instance, the emergence of self-consciousness as an explicit issue in the *Phenomenology* will be understood through the previous movement of consciousness. Similarly, such an approach will necessitate an understanding of what the *Phenomenology* is or aims to be. Again, when Hegel defines self-consciousness as ‘desire’, I will try to understand the meaning and implications of this definition in terms of the movement of consciousness. My question thus will be there as follows: What Hegel in fact means by defining self-consciousness as nothing but ‘desire’? When the topics of ‘another self-consciousness’ and ‘recognition’ arise, I will try to comprehend them again in their relevance to Hegel’s examination of the knowledge of consciousness, rather than, for instance, to take the ‘recognition’ merely as a crucial social or political issue. Because, I believe, the greatness of *Phenomenology* lies first in its attempt to show that what is political or social determines the way we ‘know’ the world and ourselves. Lastly, as Leo Rauch states, when we focus on a specific part and issue in the *Phenomenology*, “we are indeed doing something un-Hegelian” since, for Hegel, ‘the true is whole’ (1999: 71). That is, the *Phenomenology* makes sense and reveals its ‘truth’ only as a ‘whole’. However, I think, the problem of ‘self-consciousness

and recognition' seems not only to be a specific issue; as I shall claim, it has rather a constitutive role in the *Phenomenology*. That is why, as it will be explored, Hegel himself emphasizes that with self-consciousness and recognition, we reach to the 'turning point' of *Phenomenology* (1977: 110). The process of recognition, which begins with the encounter between the self and the other, does not end in the dialectic of master and slave. That is, it does not culminate in the 'liberation' of slave through its 'work', as it is mostly interpreted. Rather, in the *Phenomenology*, the process of recognition persists through the subsequent movement of consciousness and it evolves into the certain recognitive relations in the 'Spirit'.

The second chapter of this study firstly intends to be a general introduction to Hegel's philosophy. Hence, the first section will be an attempt to enter into Hegel's thought in the context of his logic. After then, in the second section, I shall try to expose the purpose and structure of *Phenomenology* in Hegel's philosophy, in addition to the 'need' for the phenomenological study. For doing so, the section will generally be dedicated to an understanding of 'Preface'. Here, Hegel's view of 'truth', his concepts of 'absolute' and 'absolute knowledge' will be explored as far as possible. In the third section, I shall focus on the 'method' of *Phenomenology*, which is essential for the whole of process in the work. Hegel's 'immanent criticism' of the experience of consciousness will be here the main theme. Besides, the concepts of 'dialectic', 'determinate negation' or 'sublation' will be explored.

The third chapter begins with a section which aims to trace the first chapter of *Phenomenology*, namely the chapter of 'Consciousness'. There are three shapes that consciousness takes in this chapter: 'Sense-Certainty', 'Perception' and 'Understanding'. Through describing the main characteristics of each shape and their change, I will intend to analyze Hegel's transition from 'Consciousness' to 'Self-consciousness' at the end. This transition will shed light on the rise of 'self-consciousness' as a main issue in the *Phenomenology*; thus, it will contribute to a proper understanding of what self-consciousness is. In the second section, I will try to give a comprehensive analysis of self-consciousness in terms of the concept of

‘desire’. To reveal the meaning of Hegel’s formulation will be my basic concern, which will also take into account some crucial interpretations. After then, in the third section, the point will be Hegel’s examination of self-consciousness in its opposition to life. Though Hegel’s conception of ‘Life’ is one of the most obscure parts of *Phenomenology*, I will try to explore the relation and opposition of self-consciousness to the ‘Life’ through the mediation of ‘desire’. Finally, in the last section, I will make the analysis of Hegel’s transition to the ‘recognition’. With the emergence of the concept of ‘recognition’ as the condition of self-knowledge, Hegel’s original approach to self-consciousness will become more explicit. This chapter finally culminates in the analysis of Hegel’s exposition of ‘recognition’ from the perspective of the ‘philosopher’.

In the first section of chapter four, the point will be consciousness’ experience of recognition, which begins with the ‘life and death struggle’ and evolves then into the ‘dialectic of master and slave’. The main characteristics of this one-sided and unequal recognition between the master and slave will be explored through the section. And another critical issue will be Hegel’s ambiguous view of the transformation of servile consciousness into the independent self-consciousness. On this ground, the ‘work’ or the ‘labor’ of servile consciousness will become a crucial issue. Thus, I will try to give an account of the Hegel’s approach to the ‘work’ in terms of his view of ‘recognition’. In this context, the second section of this chapter will be a reading of the shapes of self-consciousness into which the servile consciousness changes: ‘Stoicism, Skepticism and Unhappy Consciousness’.

In chapter five, I shall try to trace the process of recognition in the subsequent movement of consciousness. Before this attempt, in the first section, the three main approaches to Hegel’s concept of recognition will be introduced. Then, in the second section, by following the ‘recognitive approach’, I will try to understand the role of recognition in the transition from ‘Reason’ to ‘Spirit’. Another concern of this section will be to explicate Hegel’s concept of ‘Spirit’ in terms of the concept of recognition. In this regard, the logic of the development of ‘Spirit’ in the

Phenomenology will be explored. Finally, I shall make an attempt to understand the relevance of recognition to Hegel's conception of 'absolute knowing'.

CHAPTER 2

THE AIM, STRUCTURE AND METHOD

2.1 Hegel's Speculative Philosophy

The best way to introduce Hegel's speculative philosophy seems to reside in understanding the basic problems inherent in the tradition from which his thought arises. In this sense, the Kantian revolution, which initiates the rise of German Idealism, becomes crucial to begin. On the fundamental problem of the possibility of the agreement between our concepts and objects or things, Kant's revolutionary thought consists in claiming that the only solution to this problem is to prove that it is our concepts that make the objects of any experience possible. In other words, he shows that our concepts do not conform to objects, but objects necessarily conform to concepts. What makes the objective knowledge possible is such a constitutive role of our concepts. The categories of understanding, together with the pure forms of sensibility, are the necessary conditions of the objects of any possible experience. As Kant states: ''Conditions of the possibility of experience in general are likewise the conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience'' (2007: 194). Therefore, universal and necessary conditions, namely the categories of thought, are what is objective in things qua their conceptual form.[1] However, Kant also distinguishes the things as they appear to us from what they are in themselves. The categories are constitutive only for the realm of appearance, and so, the thing-in-itself cannot be known; that is, it cannot be an object of any theoretical claim.

[1] Houlgate emphasizes this point as follows: "That which is objective, in Kant's view, is not simply what exists 'outside' us or 'over against' us, but that which is conceived to be universal and necessary. What is universal in our experience is the structure and unity comprehended in thought by the pure concepts of thought. That which is truly objective, for Kant, is thus the *conceptual* form that is in both the things we experience *and* our own understanding" (2001: 281).

Although Hegel affirms Kant's approach to 'objectivity' by taking it to be the universal and necessary conceptual form, he rejects the Kant's conception of thing-in-itself. For Hegel, the concept of thing-in-itself, like any other conceptualization of 'independent object', is merely a presupposition, an abstraction based on the 'natural assumption' in philosophy. In the first sentence of the 'Introduction' of *Phenomenology*, Hegel refers to this natural presupposition when he says:

> It is a natural assumption that in philosophy, before we start to deal with its proper, viz. the actual cognition of what truly is, one must first of all come to an understanding about cognition, which is regarded either an instrument to get hold of the Absolute, or as the medium through which one discovers it (1977: 46).

Regarding cognition as either an instrument or a medium, this natural assumption of philosophy mainly claims that there is a fundamental distinction between the knowledge and being or 'Absolute' which here means simply what the truth is. For this reason, although Kant's transcendental idealism has radically changed the meaning of objectivity, he was not critical enough to this traditional assumption due to concept of thing-in-itself. The categories of thought are held to be only the conditions of the realm of appearance, not of thing-in-itself; hence "the critical determination of the function of cognition consists merely in taking these very forms away again from the "thing-in-itself", as mere subjective appendages" (Marx, 1988: 10). As Houlgate rightly emphasizes, Hegel's denial of the thing-in-itself while affirming the objectivity of the conceptual form is the basis of his philosophy:

> To hold these views together, Hegel must subtly revise Kant's idea of objectivity. He must understand objective conceptual form to have its source not merely in human understanding but in the very fabric of being itself, so to be an absolute, ontological conceptual order- "*logos*, the reason of that which is"- that informs both human understanding and existing things. For Hegel, the legacy of Kant's critical philosophy is thus not merely a transcendental account of the conditions of human experience. It is a new, revised metaphysics in which the truth to be known is no longer simply the world "out there", but the universality and logical form immanent in being and thought (2001: 281).

Hegel's emphasis on the logical form immanent both in being and thought should not be read as a reduction of being or reality to thoughts or perceptions; rather, the claim

is that being has same structure, logical form with thought. Indeed, the crucial point in Hegel's claim is that we are wrong if we presuppose a separation between thought and reality or being. Therefore, science of logic, which aims to articulate the determinations of thought, is also ontology; the determinations of being have to be articulated within thought. "The mode of consciousness which recognizes this is what Hegel calls 'absolute knowing' or philosophy" (Houlgate, 2005: 45).

Hegel's presuppositionless logic aims to determine the necessary categories of thought without taking for granted anything, including the rules of formal logic. However, it is important to state that his claim is not that these rules can be rejected at the outset; his point is rather that these rules cannot be presupposed before the articulation of the categories of thought. Besides, such a science cannot also presuppose any method external to the immanent development of the thought itself; the logician has only to think through the movement of thought (Houlgate, 2005: 26-43). Certainly, even the beginning of such a presuppositionless thought becomes a crucial issue, as well as its development:

> But if logic can take nothing whatsoever for granted about the thought and its concepts and rules, how can it ever begin? What is logic to consider? Hegel's answer is clear: logic may start with nothing more concrete than the utterly indeterminate thought of thought's own simple being - the bare thought of that thought itself *is* (Houlgate, 2001: 283).

As Houlgate explains, the sheer, simple being with which the logic begins is totally indeterminate and empty; as pure being without any determination, it is the thought that thought simply 'is'. It does not refer to a concrete existence or actuality. Therefore, such an abstract immediacy, the indeterminate thought of being cannot be distinguished from the thought of nothing. But the thought of nothing has the same immediacy and indeterminateness as pure lack of being. Just as the former, the thought of nothing also vanishes into its opposite, into pure thought of being. This movement, the vanishing of each into the other is 'becoming'; the pure being with which the logic begins now turns into becoming (2001: 284-285). In this way, the self-determination of the presuppositionless thought develops. There is certainly a

dialectical method in the logical development of thought from one concept to another, but this method is not externally applied by the logician. What makes this movement of determination possible is nothing other than the inner contradictions of thought itself. As Mueller emphasizes, dialectic is not the application of the abstract 'thesis-antithesis-synthesis' schema to movement of philosophical thought, it is the inner movement of thought itself (1958: 413). Since the problem of method is also related to *Phenomenology*, returning to this point will be necessary while discussing its main structure and method.

In addition to the presuppositionless and immanent development of thought, there is a further dimension which must be pointed for making more comprehensible both the logic and the study of *Phenomenology*: the meaning of speculative proposition. Hegel states this issue in the 'Preface' to *Phenomenology of Spirit*, probably the most difficult and complicated part of the book for the main reason that it is not only a preface, but also a general description of his whole system, which cannot be wholly intelligible without understanding the system itself. The speculative propositions are simply those propositions which can express the nature of the logical categories and make their inner movement possible. According to the clear outline which Houlgate gives, the first characteristic of such a proposition is that both the subject and predicate are the logical categories or universal concepts; they differ from concepts which have the representational content like 'rose', 'table'. Secondly, a speculative proposition is a statement of identity between its terms, namely the subject and predicate (1986: 146). But it is neither a tautology since two terms are neither different categories, nor an ordinary judgement like 'Human-being is mortal' whose terms are distinct concepts. There is no clear distinction between subject and predicate in the speculative proposition. Therefore, "the general nature of the judgement or proposition […] is destroyed by the speculative proposition, and the proposition of identity which the former becomes contains the counter-thrust against that subject-predicate relationship'' (Hegel, 1977: 38).

In an ordinary judgement, there is a distinction between the subject and predicate for the main reason that subject is given and fixed; the predicate functions as an attribute to this given subject. In the example of 'Human-being is mortal', for instance, the mortality is merely an attribute predicated, so that many different attributes can also be predicated to the same subject. But in a speculative proposition like 'The actual is universal', which Hegel gives as an example, there is not such a relation between two concepts (1977: 39). What the predicate expresses is thus not a quality of a fixed or given subject, "but rather the substance, the essence and the concept of what is under discussion […]. It is the predicate, therefore, which states what the subject intrinsically *is*" (Houlgate, 1986: 147). On the other hand, if it is the predicate that what the subject in fact is, this also means that we lose our understanding of the subject; we are forced to have a new understanding of it, that is, a new understanding which has to take into account the movement of subject into the predicate and then returning to itself.

> What we initially take to be the total disappearance of the subject into the predicate is in fact the dynamic transformation of the subject into the unity of subject and predicate. It is the emergence of a determinate grasp of the actual as exhibiting the logical structure of actuality *and* universality- a determinate grasp that comes about through the recognition that one category is inherent into the other, through the dialectical transformation of one category is inherent into the other, through the redefinition of both terms in their identity with the other. In this way, speculative sentences do not talk 'about' a fixed, given subject; they continually generate a new conception of the subject by redefining the terms in the sentence in the light of one another (Houlgate, 1986: 149).

Although the speculative proposition initiates a new understanding of its concepts, this understanding is possible only through a further exposition. Therefore, the meaning of a speculative proposition depends on the whole dynamic movement of concepts. But the intelligibility of such propositions depends also on how they are read. If we read them with an expectation of our ordinary understanding of a proposition, they make no sense; what is needed is also a speculative reading. As Butler states:

> If we refuse to give up the expectation that univocal meanings linearly arranged will unfold from the words at hand, we will find Hegel confused, unwieldy, unnecessarily dense. But if we question the presumptions of the Understanding that prose asks us to, we will experience the incessant movement of the sentence that constitutes its meaning (1987: 19).

Hegel's view of speculative proposition is crucial not only for understanding his speculative philosophy or logic, but, I think, also for a proper reading of *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Although what is described through *Phenomenology* is not the logical development of concepts but the experience of consciousness, this experience is described after all by the 'philosopher'. So, when the philosopher says, for instance, that 'Self-consciousness is desire', this proposition cannot be taken as an ordinary proposition. On the contrary, the speculative reading is indispensable for understanding the implications of this proposition. 'Self-consciousness', as it will be more clear, cannot be comprehended if it is taken as the fixed subject of proposition to which the 'desire' may be externally predicated. It emerges as the result of the initial movement of consciousness itself. Besides, the concept of desire functions here as the essence of self-consciousness, that is, it express mainly what the self-consciousness essentially is. Therefore, the meaning of such a proposition necessitates further exposition like any other proposition which demands a speculative reading.

2.2 *Phenomenology of Spirit*

Phenomenology of Spirit, as the 'science of the experience which consciousness goes through' is defined as the introduction to Hegel's system. But even this definition raises some questions to be answered for understanding the meaning of *Phenomenology*: If philosophy begins at the presuppositionless point which is the standpoint of 'absolute knowing' as the identity of thought and being, then what is the need for a preliminary study, an 'introduction' to such a philosophy? What is the meaning and aim of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* in the context of philosophy? The need for phenomenological study lies in the fact that there is a fundamental opposition between the standpoints of science or philosophy and of natural

consciousness. The natural consciousness is simply the ordinary consciousness which takes for granted a basic distinction or opposition between the object and itself. Taking such distinction for granted is the basic characteristic of this consciousness; so, it shares the 'natural assumption of philosophy' that Hegel questions, which is stated in the previous section. After all, the standpoint of natural consciousness is not of the Hegel's philosophy or absolute knowing that 'the true structure of being can be found within the structure of thought itself'. Therefore, *Phenomenology of Spirit* is mainly the 'pathway' or 'education' of natural consciousness by which the absolute knowing shows or demonstrates the truth of its own standpoint (Houlgate, 2005: 50).

Hegel emphasizes on the necessity of phenomenological study impressively in the 'Introduction' of *Phenomenology of Spirit*. He states that when Science confronted with a knowledge that is without truth, it cannot reject that knowledge only by declaring its own being and difference (1977: 48). This emphasis expresses both the necessity of *Phenomenology* and of the justification of philosophy or science. Philosophy or 'absolute knowing' cannot only declare that its standpoint is without any presupposition and be indifferent to the natural consciousness. Nor it can be indifferent to any other philosophical approach. By contrast, it must also justify its presuppositionless standpoint. For this reason, *Phenomenology of Spirit* is not only the education of natural consciousness; it is also intended to be the justification of speculative philosophy or science:

> It aims to provide such justification by demonstrating that, paradoxically, the seemingly perverse standpoint of philosophy is actually made necessary by the certainties of ordinary consciousness itself. For ordinary consciousness (and those philosophers who are wedded to the ordinary view of things) the *Phenomenology* is, therefore, the indispensable *presupposition* of presuppositionless logic (Houlgate, 2005: 51).

If *Phenomenology* as 'the science of the experience of consciousness' can justify the 'standpoint of philosophy' by examining the own certainties of natural consciousness, the presuppositionless philosophy will not only have its own 'being',

but it will also demonstrate its truth both to the natural consciousness and to the other philosophical positions. As Lauer puts it, before the elaboration of knowing through the system, what the knowing is must be clear; and "this means eliminating a number of positions which have become so habitual as to constitute 'an obstacle for philosophical knowledge'" (1993: 308). Before an attempt to explicate the structure and method of *Phenomenology*, it seems necessary to make a further exposition of Hegel's view of truth or Absolute. What is Absolute or truth that the standpoint of philosophy have as 'absolute knowing', which has been defined hitherto as the 'identity of being and thought'? Hegel's answer to this question concerns the understanding of *Phenomenology of Spirit* not only for the reason that the absolute knowing is the standpoint of philosophy which must be justified, but it also coincides with the inner structure of *Phenomenology*. That is, the meaning and structure of the work makes further sense only by the exposition of Hegel's view of Absolute as truth. The meaning of the concept of Spirit, for instance, can be intelligible only in the light of the view of Absolute.

Against the Kantian idealism which is based on the separation of the phenomenal world and the thing-in-itself, Hegel declares as a "fact that the Absolute alone is the truth, or the truth alone is Absolute" (1977: 47). Kantian subjective idealism, as stated above, mainly claims that the categories of thought are constitutive only for the phenomenal world and so, the thing-in-itself necessarily remains unknowable. This separation means that knowledge is limited, conditioned, that is, it remains always as partial. As Werner Marx emphasizes, although the identity of subjectivity and objectivity, or thought and being is perceived by Kant, this identity does not signify an absolute truth (1988: 8). In this sense, it has to be stated that, for Hegel, knowing cannot be partial, limited; it must be complete as Absolute knowing which is the truth of the whole, the complete identity of thought and being. Therefore, Absolute knowing basically differs from any partial knowing qualitatively. As such, Absolute knowing does not mean to know everything; "it means having an adequate

conception of knowledge and the Absolute, and understanding that there is no separation or 'epistemological gap' between them" (Solomon, 1983: 274).[2]

At the very beginning of the 'Preface', Hegel declares his view of the way in which the truth to be exposed: "The true shape in which truth exist can only be the scientific system of such a truth" (1977: 3). The first implication of this statement is that truth cannot be immediately known without a systematic exposition of it. It is not something which can be presupposed or be the beginning of a scientific system, that is, the 'existence' of truth depends on its exposition. Any declaration or definition of truth makes no sense without its systematic demonstration. Secondly, Hegel aims to state the difference of his standpoint by emphasizing on the terms of 'science' and 'system'. Accordingly, this standpoint differs mainly from those approaches which try to grasp the truth in terms of feeling or intuition. Such attempts cannot comprehend or grasp truth for the main reason that "the truth has only the Notion as the element of its existence" (1977: 4). That is, the truth can only be comprehended conceptually or rationally, not by appealing to the irrationality of intuition, feeling or belief. Further, the necessity of systematic and conceptual exposition of truth is bound to the Hegel's criticism of the standpoint that he defines as the 'monochromatic formalism' (1977: 16). This standpoint takes the truth or Absolute as an abstract, static principle of unity without showing its articulations through the manifold of experiences.[3] As Verene points out:

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[2] In his '*Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*', Heidegger states that Hegel's concept of absolute knowledge should not be understood as quantitatively absolute, such as 'knowing everything that there is to know'. Rather, the absolute knowledge refers to a qualitative difference: "For Hegel the concepts of relative and absolute, as the characters of knowledge, are to be understood not quantitatively but qualitatively. It is possible that a quantitatively absolute knowledge, which knows everything so far as range concerned, could nevertheless be relative in accordance with the *character* (*quale, qualitas*) of knowing involved (1988: 14).

[3] Beiser states that Hegel is here concerned especially with to Schelling's approach to 'absolute': "Schelling sometimes spoke of the absolute as if it were nothing more than 'subject-object identity', the single infinite substance or 'the point of indifference' between the subjective and objective. But this limited way of speaking about the absolute suffers from a serious difficulty. If we conceive of the absolute as only subject-object identity apart from the apparent dualism between the subject and object in our ordinary experience – if we see it as only the infinite substance without its finite modes – then we seem to exclude the realm of the finite and appearance from it […]. Hence, in the preface to

> It is a static form of speculation because there is no principle of self-development whereby the particular determinations of things are comprehended as transforming themselves into larger and larger wholes so that the whole itself is articulated in terms of the particular determinations it encompasses (2007: 5).

It is admitted by almost all commentators that Hegel gives in the 'Preface' one of the most important formulations which characterizes his view of truth: "In my view, which can be justified only by exposition of the system itself, everything turns on grasping and expressing the True, not only as Substance, but equally as Subject" (1977: 10). Unfortunately, there is no agreement not also on the way of interpreting it, but also on what degree of clarity it can be interpreted. While Stern, for instance, says that it is notoriously one of the Hegel's most dark statements (2002: 33), Werner Marx regards it as the key statement in which Hegel sets forth the program that governs his own philosophy (1988: 44). Nevertheless, it seems possible to make an attempt for understanding this formulation in the context of the Hegel's subsequent expressions. As Marx states, Hegel here refers to Spinoza according to whom the substance is absolute or truth (1988: 44). The substance is the thing which is immediately in-itself, independent of anything, *causa sui* and thus, the ground of everything as reality or being. Now, while Hegel on the one hand retains the term of substantiality for defining the true, he also states that the true is also subject. On retaining substantiality, it can be argued that Hegel aims to differ his position from the idealism of Fichte, according to whom the true is the absolute subject as pure activity in contrast to any existence or thinghood. Now, the Truth is also subject means that it has the main characteristics of subjectivity: reflection, othering, activity and thus, the process of its own becoming.

> Further, the living Substance is being which is in truth Subject, or, what the is the same time, is in truth actual only in so far as it is the movement of positing itself, or is the mediation of its self-othering with itself. This Substance is, as Subject, pure, simple negativity, and is for this very reason the bifurcation of the simple; it is doubling which sets up opposition, and then again the negation of this indifferent

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his *Phenomenology*, Hegel felt that it was necessary to correct Schelling's restricted formulation of the absolute" (1993: 6-7).

> diversity and of its antithesis (the immediate simplicity). Only this self-restoring sameness or this reflection in otherness within itself- not an original or immediate unity as such- is the True. It is the process of its own becoming, the circle that presupposes its end as its goal, having its end also as its beginning; and only by being worked out to this end, is it actual (Hegel, 1977: 10).

Accordingly, the True or Absolute as Subject is its own becoming or the process in which it comes out of its simplicity or immediacy by negating it and then returning again to itself. This process and becoming is its self-actualization and knowing itself. As Lauer puts it, "The affinity of being and thought, without which knowledge makes no sense at all, consists not in a correspondence of thought with the static being of 'substance', but in a correspondence of being with the dynamic thought of 'subject' (1993: 38). Hegel's emphasis on the mediation and self-othering is related not only with the self-actualization and becoming, but also with the conceptuality of the self-determination of Absolute. Against the view that the Truth or Absolute is only a principle or beginning, he states that "whatever is more than such a word, even the transition to a mere proposition, contains a *becoming-other* that has to be taken back, or is a mediation'' (1977: 11). Since the Truth can only be understood conceptually and conceptuality is the mediation of the subject, the self-othering of Absolute is a necessity for its becoming or self-determination. In this context, namely in the conceptual self-actualization of Absolute, "it must be said that it is essentially a *result*, that only in the *end* is it what it truly is'' (Hegel, 1977: 11).

It seems that the Absolute as subject, becoming, result and reflection can be more clearly understood when Hegel gives its connection to *Phenomenology of Spirit*. The key term for this connection is Spirit; although the meaning of the term varies through *Phenomenology*, Hegel defines it fundamentally as the Absolute: "That the true is actual only as system, or that Substance is essentially Subject, is expressed in the representation of the Absolute as *Spirit*" (1977: 24). Accordingly, Spirit is the Absolute, the dynamic unity of subject and object, but it is so only implicitly and potentially as 'in-itself' in so far as it does not know itself. As mere in-itself, the Spirit is only Substance. Therefore, in order to make itself explicit or to be 'for itself', Spirit must know itself, that is, be the Subject. On the other hand, it must be

an object to itself by reflecting into itself for such a knowing, and this refers its own development and becoming. "The Spirit that, so developed, knows itself as Spirit, is *Science*" (1977: 14). Hegel then declares that *Phenomenology of Spirit* describes this 'coming-to-be of Science' in which the aim is 'Spirit's insight into what knowing is' (1977: 27-29). The movement of Spirit makes more sense when Hegel states that consciousness is the element of Spirit through which it develops itself. The experience of consciousness, in which there are two constitutive moments as knowing and objectivity opposed the knowing, is indeed the movement of Spirit's becoming other to itself and suspending this otherness (1977: 21). In this sense, the activities such as negation and reflection, which seems to belong merely to the subject or self that is opposed to objectivity, are indeed the Spirit's self-negation and reflection into itself. The experience of consciousness is the movement of Spirit in which it turns from Substance or in-itself into the Subject or for-itself. That is, the movement of consciousness towards knowing the truth is the same process with the movement of Spirit's self-actualization or knowing itself. It is by this movement that that Spirit knows itself and becomes Science. As Lauer explicates:

> Since the absolute is 'subject' (*Spirit*), what is 'in-itself', indeterminately, is not adequately true. It will be true only by *becoming* true, in a process of self-determination which is identical with the process of consciousness coming to *know* it; only as the result of this process is the absolute truly absolute (1993: 309).

One of the most crucial points Hegel emphasizes is that the opposition or 'disparity' between 'the I and substance', as the opposition between consciousness and its object or knowing and known, is the moving force of the experience of consciousness, which is also, as stated above, the movement of the Spirit (1977: 21). The experience of consciousness begins and proceeds for the main reason that there is such an opposition, and this experience would not reach its end unless this opposition is reconciled. On the other hand, the reconciliation of this opposition or disparity through the movement of consciousness means that consciousness becomes the consciousness of identity of thought and being, or knowing and known. And therefore, Substance becomes Subject; Spirit, which has reflected into itself, becomes

the knowledge of itself and so, becomes 'absolute knowing' as the standpoint of philosophy or Science:

> […] Substance shows itself to be essentially Subject. When it has shown this completely, Spirit has made its existence identical with its essence; it has itself for its object just as it is, and the abstract element of immediacy, and of the separation of knowing and truth, is overcome. Being is then absolutely mediated; its substantial content, it is a substantial content which is just as immediately the property of the 'I', it is self-like or the Notion (Hegel, 1977: 21).

As Hegel states, the separation of knowing and truth, the disparity of consciousness and objectivity is removed in the element of notion or concept, that is, in the consciousness that knows what determines both the its knowing and the known or objectivity is its conceptual activity. Therefore, "the process of identification is the 'concept'" (Lauer, 1993: 317). And this process of identification, this whole movement of consciousness is the movement by which the Spirit as mere Substance becomes the Spirit as also Subject. The Absolute or truth now is not the static, immediate unity of being and thought but the dynamic, mediated, self-conscious unity of being and thought, of Substance and Subject.

From now on, I think, Hegel's aim in the study of *Phenomenology* makes more sense in the light of his view of truth. The Absolute or truth, the unity of being and thought, can only be exposed through a systematic study which is nothing other than 'the science of the experience which consciousness goes through'. Indeed, Hegel emphasizes this crucial point, namely that it is nothing but the nature of 'truth' that necessitates the study of *Phenomenology*, when he asks about the need for such study:

> Now, because the system of experience of Spirit embraces only the *appearance* of Spirit, the advance from this system to the Science of the *True* in its *true shape* seems to merely negative, and one might wish to be spared the negative as something false, and the demand to be led to the truth without more ado. Why bother with false? (1977: 22).

If the *Phenomenology of Spirit* as the 'appearance' is only a movement, a process towards truth, then each stage of this movement except its end is 'false', not the truth. How can this process of 'the false' be the necessary way to truth? This is so, according to Hegel, for the main reason that the 'true' and 'false' are not isolated and distinct from each other. If the truth is mainly the identity of the knowledge and what is known, and if this identity only comes out of their opposition or disparity, then this disparity or opposition as a 'negative moment' is essential in the truth. And 'false' or knowing falsely indicates nothing other than that there is such a disparity which has to be sublated, and so, is present as a 'moment' in the 'true' (1977: 22-23). Therefore, the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, which is the movement of 'false' moments, is the only way to reach the 'true'. As Lauer claims, "If it is necessary to introduce distinction (negativity) in order to get the truth, it is necessary to introduce falsity to get the truth" (1993: 318). On the other hand, it seems that this point is internally connected to what Hegel calls as the 'determinate negation', which will also be one of the matters of the next subsection of this study.

2.3 The Method of *Phenomenology*: Immanent Criticism

As stated before, the *Phenomenology of Spirit* mainly aims to demonstrate the standpoint of science or philosophy, namely the identity of being and thought, to natural or ordinary consciousness which is characterized by taking the opposition between itself and objectivity. But the most important point is that this demonstration has to be made by examining the certainties, contradictions and implications of the natural consciousness. In other words, the philosopher or phenomenologist must show that his standpoint "is necessarily entailed by the perspective of natural consciousness itself" (Houlgate, 2005: 51). And indeed what makes possible this study to be nothing but a 'phenomenology' is this way of demonstration by examining consciousness. But how can such a demonstration be possible? Hegel's response to this question unfolds the method and structure of the whole phenomenological study. In this context, Hegel firstly emphasizes the possibility of regarding standpoint of philosophy as the criterion for making this inquiry, namely

the inquiry of the truth of knowing: "If this exposition is viewed as a way of relating Science to phenomenal knowledge, and as an investigation examination of the reality of cognition, it would seem that it cannot take place without some presupposition which can serve as its underlying criterion" (1977: 52). Now, the problem is that even though the philosopher or phenomenologist is at the standpoint of science or philosophy, this standpoint has not been justified for natural consciousness, and so, it cannot be the criterion for this inquiry. Since the aim of this examination is already to justify the science, it cannot be the criterion of its justification and be the standard for the examination of consciousness.

Furthermore, Hegel states, when examining consciousness, the inquiry into the truth of knowledge appears as though it would show what the knowledge is only for us, not what the knowledge really is or in itself (1977: 53). That is, it seems we have to apply a criterion within us, as a standard for examining the consciousness. Therefore, even if a criterion can be found, the existence of such criterion will cast doubt on the truth of knowledge. But, according to Hegel, the problems of criterion and so, of the possibility of making such an examination, are initially solved by the nature of consciousness which is going to be examined:

> Consciousness simultaneously *distinguishes* itself from something, and at the same time *relates* itself to it, or, as it is said, this something exist for consciousness; and the determinate aspect of this *relating*, or of being of something for a consciousness, is *knowing*. But we distinguish this being-for- another from *being-in-itself*; whatever is related to knowledge or knowing is also distinguished from it, and as posited as existing outside of this relationship; this *being-in-itself* is called *truth* (1977: 52).

Accordingly, when consciousness distinguishes itself from what it takes the object or in-itself, it also relates to itself to this in-itself, and this relation is the moment of knowing. Or to put it more simply, consciousness itself makes a distinction between the object it posits and its knowledge of this object. These two moments, the moments of truth and knowing, gives consciousness its own criterion. "Consciousness provides its own criterion from within itself, so that the investigation becomes a comparison of consciousness with itself" (Hegel, 1977: 53). For this

reason, the investigation is nothing other than to compare these two moments of being-for-itself and being-in-itself, knowledge and its object. On the other hand, there is no need for phenomenologist also to participate actively in this comparison since consciousness is itself capable of comparing its own moments:

> For consciousness is, on the one hand, consciousness of the object, and on the other, consciousness of itself; consciousness of what for it is the True, and consciousness of its knowledge of the truth. Since both are the same consciousness, this consciousness is itself their comparison; it is for this same consciousness to know whether its knowledge corresponds to object or not (1977: 54).

The basic role of the phenomenologist or philosopher is to observe and describe the movement of consciousness, its own comparison of the knowledge and object. Since, through this comparison, the correspondence between knowledge and object is itself the criterion for consciousness, the phenomenological study becomes the 'immanent' criticism of consciousness. The examination of consciousness does not rest upon an external standard of knowledge; on the contrary, consciousness is criticized in terms of its own criterion. As Houlgate states, "the analysis of consciousness undertaken in the *Phenomenology* is wholly immanent: it makes reference to no standard of judgement other than one that is set up by consciousness itself'' (2005: 53).

When consciousness, in a certain shape, experiences that its object is not what it initially takes to be, that is, its knowledge does not correspond to the object, both the knowledge and its object change into a further shape. Although it seems that what has to be changed is only the moment of knowledge when the two moments of consciousness do not correspond, the other moment, the object, also changes. This is so, for the main reason that the moment of object or truth is not independent from the knowledge of consciousness. As Hegel explicates, "for the knowledge, that was present was essentially a knowledge of the object: as knowledge changes, so too does the object, for it essentially belongs to this knowledge'' (1977: 54). In other words, since the object of consciousness is its criterion as the moment of truth, when consciousness fails to know it, the criterion itself changes. As the result of this process, a further shape of consciousness emerges, that is, a new shape which also

consists of the two moments of knowledge and object. Consciousness now takes the truth to be different from the previous one, and so, a new object arises from the experience of consciousness. Hegel defines this experience as 'dialectical movement' of consciousness: "*In as much as the new true object issues from it*; this *dialectical* movement which consciousness exercises on itself and which affects both its knowledge and its object, is precisely what is called experience'' (1977: 55.) It seems now clear that, for Hegel, 'dialectic' is not the method of philosopher, which is applied to any subject matter like the experience of consciousness. Rather, 'dialectic' refers to the experience of consciousness, the process of its own movement. In this sense, to mention 'Hegel's dialectical method' is proper only if it is reminded that dialectic is not an external criterion or principle. As Kenly Dove emphasizes, "Hegel's method is radically *un*dialectical. It is the experience of consciousness itself which is dialectical and Hegel's *Phenomenology* is a viable philosophical enterprise precisely to the extent that it merely *describes* this dialectical process" (1970: 622).

Apart from the immanent criticism and the dialectical movement, there is another point that must be stated for a proper understanding of *Phenomenology*. This point is the connection of the logical shapes through which consciousness passes during its whole movement, and it is related with what Hegel calls as the determinate negation and 'sublation'. Accordingly, each logical shape of consciousness differs from the others in terms of the way consciousness takes its object or truth to be. But these shapes of consciousness are not distinct from each other; by contrast, there is a necessary connection, an internal progression through these shapes. As stated above, consciousness mainly experiences that its knowledge does not correspond to the object, that is, it understands that it does not know the object as initially posited; and the new object emerges as the result of this experience. Hegel indicates this point mainly as follows:

> The first object, in being known, is altered for consciousness; it ceases to be the in-itself; and becomes something that is the in-itself only for consciousness. And this then is the True; the being-for-consciousness of this in-itself. Or, in other words, this is the essence, or the object of consciousness. This new object contains the nothingness of the first; it is what experience made of it (1977: 55).

Consciousness acquires a new sense of object and truth by experiencing the 'nothingness' of the previous one, that is, consciousness can pass into a next shape only because it has experienced the previous one. Therefore, the nothingness or negation of a shape of consciousness is not simply nothingness; it is a "determinate nothingness, one which has a content" (Hegel, 1977: 51). The transitions of consciousness through the different shapes is possible by means of this 'determinate nothingness' or 'determinate negation'. On the other hand, it seems that the determinate negation must be read also in its relation to Hegel's conception of 'sublation' which he mostly uses. As Verene states, the 'sublation' have two meanings which are 'to cancel or transcend' and 'to preserve', and Hegel uses the term with its both meanings (2007: 19). In the context of the experience of consciousness, it can be said that a previous shape of consciousness is sublated in the next one; while its truth or in-itself is cancelled by a new conception of truth, what consciousness has experienced in the previous shape is preserved in the next one. On the other hand, consciousness, which is observed by the phenomenologist or philosopher, does not know the necessary progression in the movement of its experience. It does not know, for instance, how its new object originates from the previous one. It is only the philosopher or phenomenologist as the observing consciousness, which Hegel defines as the perspective of 'for us' that sees the necessity and progression in the whole movement of consciousness. Consequently, Hegel emphasizes, since there is such a necessity in the movement of consciousness towards the standpoint of Science or philosophy in which the knowledge corresponds to the object, the exposition of this movement is also 'Science' as the science of the experience of consciousness (1977: 56).

CHAPTER 3

SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS: DESIRE AND RECOGNITION

3.1 The Truth of the Movement of 'Consciousness'

Phenomenology begins with the chapter of 'Consciousness', the first section of which is 'Sense-Certainty: Or the 'This' and 'Meaning''. The reason for this beginning lies in the fact that sense-certainty, according to Hegel, is the most immediate and simplest form of knowing which pretends to directly receive or 'apprehend' its object without the mediation of any concept. Accordingly, consciousness intends to know its truth in coming to know its object in its pure, immediate being: "Consciousness is '*I*', nothing more, a pure 'This'; the singular consciousness knows a pure 'This', or the single item" (Hegel, 1977: 59). Consciousness claims that it knows its object in its pure particularity or mere individuality, and the experience of consciousness must demonstrate whether it really knows its object as it claims. In other words, this experience must show whether the object reveals itself as the way it is anticipated by consciousness. First of all, in such a knowing, the pure being or the 'This' must have two moments that either the one or the other is essential; that is, either the 'I' or the object must be essential in this knowing. If the object is regarded as essential, the 'This' of objectivity takes the shapes of 'Now' and 'Here'. However, when consciousness tries to answer the question of 'What is the This?' by applying to 'Now' and 'Here', it sees that it cannot preserve the truth of singularity or specificity of the intended object since the Now and Here may equally refer to different times and places. Therefore, in both forms, "the This shows itself to be a *mediated simplicity*, or a *universality*" (Hegel, 1977: 61). If consciousness changes its view by asserting that the essential moment in sense-certainty is not the This as object but as the 'I', it faces with the same

problem. By emphasizing on the 'I' of the immediate intuitions, consciousness now thinks that it is the intuiting of 'I' that provides the immediate knowledge of its object. But the truth of this moment also vanishes in the face of other I's because the 'I' is also a mediated universal just like the Now and Here. In spite of these failures of uttering the immediacy of its object, consciousness nevertheless insists on its claim by ignoring any object other than the one it means and any perspective different from its point of view. What is essential for consciousness now is the 'immediate relation' which does not make a distinction between the object and the I. In this case, for Hegel, consciousness must be able 'to point out' what it takes to be true. In every attempt of such a pointing-out, however, consciousness learns that what it means to be its truth, namely the simple and pure Now, cannot be pointed out. Whenever it tries to point out the Now that it means, it points out this as a Now that '*has been*'; that is, it points out a Now that has different moments as 'Nows' within itself. "The pointing-out of the Now is thus itself the movement which expresses what the Now is in truth, viz. a result, or a plurality of Nows all taken together; and the pointing-out is the experience of learning that Now is a universal (Hegel, 1977: 64). Similarly, what it attempts to point out as simple and pure 'Here' has within itself a plurality of 'Here's. As a result, this experience of consciousness shows that its knowledge does not correspond to its object; the object has revealed itself as different from what consciousness took it to be. The object is not the pure and particular being that can be apprehended immediately; rather, it is the universal which occurs as the truth of sense-certainty. Thus, a new shape of consciousness arises out of this experience. The shape of consciousness that takes over truth of Sense-Certainty by taking its object as involving universal is 'Perception'.

In the form of 'Perception', consciousness initially attempts to know the particular objects or individuals in terms of the universals, namely, the qualities or properties that they have. "Consciousness here conceives of objects as combinations of sensible properties, and so treats each individual as a bundle of universals" (Stern, 2002: 51). What constitutes an individual thing is nothing other than its properties which are sensed by consciousness. For this reason, Hegel states, that in 'Perception' the

‘thinghood’ is viewed as the mere ‘medium’ or place which holds the properties together (1977: 69). But now the main problem for consciousness arises: How the object as an individual thing or ‘One’ can be identified with its many and different properties? The individual object or the ‘One’, as distinct from other individuals, can be identified neither with one of its properties nor with all. Therefore, to overcome this problem, consciousness now conceives its object as a unity or One that exists beyond its properties; that is, it views the object something like ‘substance’ that cannot be reduced to properties which are now considered as its ‘attributes’. However, even if consciousness arrives at such a view of the unity of thing beyond its properties, it cannot know anything about this unity for the main reason that consciousness merely knows the properties which are sensible. At the perception level, what is not sensible cannot be known. As Robert Stern emphasizes, what Hegel here aims to show is that:

> Consciousness oscillates between the one conception and the other, sometimes treating the object as a bundle of properties which then undermines its sense that the object is really a unified individual distinct from other individuals, and sometimes treating the object as a unity over and above its plurality of properties, which then leads to the idea of a characterless substratum and back to the ‘This’ of sense-certainty. Perception cannot decide which conception is the correct characterization of how things are, and which conception merely results from the delusive influence on us of how things appear us to be (2002: 57).

Oscillating between the two conceptions of object as one and many, consciousness lastly attempts to overcome this problem by making a distinction of the essential and unessential aspects of the object. It conceives the unity of the object as essential while approaching the diversity of its properties as unessential or secondary. But this distinction also fails to give a true account of the object. The diverse properties of the individual thing are as necessary as its unity for the main reason that what makes an individual different from the others is nothing but its properties; without its properties, it is only a ‘bare particular’ like any other individual. Therefore, this distinction “is still only nominal; the unessential, which is none the less supposed to be necessary, cancels itself out’’ (Hegel, 1977: 76). Consequently, consciousness cannot avoid its inner contradictions in the form of ‘Perception’ which tries to know

its object in terms of universals as sensible properties. In the section of 'Force and Understanding', consciousness gives up its attempt to know the object in terms of mere sensible aspects. Now, as Stern emphasizes, it tries to know the object and to avoid the revealed contradictions "by setting aside common-sense ontology, and moving to a metaphysical picture that replaces the objects of ordinary sense experience with the very different conception of the world presented to us by the natural sciences" (2002: 59-60).

In the 'Force and Understanding', consciousness no longer tries to know the object by committing itself to mere sense experience; instead, it makes a basic distinction between the appearance and the reality that cannot be perceived. In other words, consciousness claims that it has the representations of an object or world which is mere 'appearance'; what lies behind appearance is the 'supersensible world'. As Pinkard states, this claim is based on the idea that "the unity of the representations of the universals and particulars is to be explained by something non-perceptible, an underlying supersensible metaphysical essence" (1994: 34). Consciousness, in the form of Understanding, takes the notion of 'Force' as this non-perceptible essence. Accordingly, what exists beyond the realm of appearances is nothing but the play of forces which constitutes the supersensible world. At this point, the main problem for consciousness becomes the relation between the appearance and supersensible reality, which means that consciousness, must explain the supersensible by taking into account the sense experience:

> If we can be said to *know* the underlying supersensible essence by means of the reflective "understanding" (that is, if we can be said to know the essence without having direct acquaintance with it), then we must have some way of linking that underlying essence with the appearances themselves such that the essence would be knowable *in* the appearances themselves. The appearance, therefore, must be the *expression* (*Ausserung*) of the underlying essence (Pinkard, 1994: 35).

For this reason, understanding considers 'forces' not as 'beyond' the appearances, but as 'laws' which express themselves 'in' the appearances. The forces are "laws that govern the natural phenomena, which both stand above the phenomena and are

instantiated in them" (Stern, 2002: 62). Understanding, in this manner, attempts to explain any aspect of the appearance or phenomenal world by means of a particular law. On the other hand, since the multiplicity of laws must be consistently unified in a theory, understanding seeks to a general and unitary law so that all particular laws can be derived from it. However, the unification of particular laws is possible only when they lose their particular characters which provide their explanation of the aspects of phenomenal world: "When the laws thus coincide, they lose their specific character. The law becomes more and more superficial, and as a result what is found is, in fact, not the unity of *these specific* laws, but a law which leaves out their specific character" (Hegel, 1977: 91). Consciousness therefore fails to demonstrate the necessity of the laws by means of which it has attempted to explain or 'know' its object. As Stern emphasizes, the laws as such merely 'describe' a realm which remains as an unknown 'beyond' rather than properly explain the appearance; hence the understanding cannot reach beyond the realm of appearance (2002: 63). Moreover, what arises out of the failure of Understanding is the possibility of an 'inverted world'. If consciousness cannot give an account of its distinction between the apparent and supersensible realms, then it is impossible for it to know what the supersensible world really is. All that can be said of this realm is that it is not the realm of appearance that we perceive. Therefore, the supersensible world may be just the opposite or 'inverse' of the phenomenal world. By presenting the idea of 'inverted world', Hegel aims to show not only the perplexing result of the inner contradictions of Understanding, but also the 'truth' arising out of them. The truth of the Understanding's failing attempts to know the supersensible is indeed its own activity. "What is truly going on in the 'understanding's claims about the nature of this metaphysical supersensible world is that "understanding" is making claims only about its own activities of construing the world" (Pinkard, 1994: 42). To put it more clearly, if the Understanding describes a supersensible world without explaining its truth, then what is revealed in its failure is indeed its own structure or describing

activity.[4] Thus, consciousness in the form of Understanding can find nothing but 'itself' beyond the appearance in its attempt to know supersensible world. It is this 'truth' of consciousness that Hegel declares at the end of the 'Understanding' section:

> This curtain [of appearance] hanging before the inner world is therefore drawn away, and we have the inner being [the 'I'] gazing into the inner world -the vision of the undifferentiated self-same being, which repels itself from itself, posits an inner being containing different moments, but for which equally these moments are immediately not different- self-consciousness. It is manifest that behind the so-called curtain which is supposed to conceal the inner world, there is nothing to be seen unless *we* go behind it ourselves, as much in order that we may see, as that there may be something behind there which can be seen (1977: 103).

The truth that revealed at the end, namely the activity of consciousness or self, is indeed the truth of the whole movement of consciousness in the first chapter of *Phenomenology*, and so, it also provides the transition to the chapter of 'Self-Consciousness'. For this reason, this transition must be carefully considered in order to prepare the stage of 'Self-Consciousness'.[5] For doing so, I think, it is necessary to look at the first paragraph of the 'Self-consciousness' chapter while thinking of what has revealed so far in this brief reading of the first chapter. All the three forms of consciousness in the first chapter[6] attempt to know the truth of an object which they take to be independent of them. In these shapes of consciousness, Hegel states, "what is true for consciousness is something other than itself" (1977: 104). Consciousness

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4 In this describing activity which consciousness takes to be the 'explaining' its object, Hegel states, consciousness is "communing directly with itself, enjoying only with itself; although it seems to be busy with something else, it is in fact occupied only with itself" (1977: 101).

5 As Robert Pippin states, the transition from 'Consciousness' to 'Self-consciousness' is one of the most serious transition problems in the *Phenomenology*; it is "so serious that even those with a minimalist reading of the real or original core of the *Phenomenology* have no satisfactory account of it" (1993: 58).

6 Although, all the forms of knowing in the *Phenomenology* are the forms of consciousness, Hegel takes only the three shapes of the first chapter under the title of 'Consciousness'. As Stephen Houlgate rightly explains, these three shapes are the shapes of consciousness in the 'narrow sense' since each takes what is true for them as something strictly other, independent of itself, unlike the next shapes that consciousness will take (2005: 68). That is also why I have given to this section the title of 'The Truth of the movement of 'Consciousness''.

takes the so-called independent object as 'in itself' or 'truth'. But through the experience of knowing the object, it sees that the object is other than what it takes to be; "instead, this in-itself turns out to be a mode in which the object is only for another" (1977: 104). That is, what consciousness takes as 'in itself' turns out to be the 'in-itself' only 'for consciousness', which means that it must change its conception of 'in itself' or truth. Now, it seems crucial to see that what consciousness changes in its transitions through its first three shapes is only a peculiar mode of independent object as 'in-itself'. When passing from 'Sense-Certainty' to 'Perception' or from 'Perception' to 'Force and Understanding', it preserves its claim that the truth is something other than itself. But, at the end of the 'Consciousness' chapter, it is the 'independent object as in itself', "the Notion of this truth that vanishes in the experience of it" (1977: 104). This truth vanishes when consciousness sees itself behind the 'curtain', which means that the truth of its object cannot be independent of its own activity.[7] As Robert Pippin explains, Hegel, by disclosing the intentional activity of consciousness which is implicit in its any relation to object, shows at the end that 'what *makes* knowledge-claims true or false' is not something other than itself:

> Any relation to objects, even nonsensory objects, is, it is argued, inexplicable, or at least radically undetermined, by any direct apprehension or causal influence of the object itself. Such a possibility is said to presuppose a way of *comporting oneself toward* the world, some active attending and discriminating that cannot be a simple encounter with the world…such a consciousness is not simply directly attending to some "other than consciousness", but at least indirectly and implicitly, to itself, its

[7] If consciousness as Understanding sees nothing but itself behind the 'curtain' or appearance, this means that consciousness becomes aware that it has a 'constitutive role' for the objectivity in a Kantian sense. That is, the 'appearances' are constituted by the form-giving activity of consciousness itself. On the other hand, as Paul Redding states, since consciousness now gives up the idea of 'supersensible beyond' or thing-in-itself, its present attitude now becomes a 'radicalized Kantianism': "[…] consciousness has arrived at the position that what is presented to it (Kant's 'appearance') is the real, but has now equated with *itself* as that which constitutes it as known. That is, what it had originally taken to be an independent thing 'in-itself', is now grasped as something *entirely* of its own making, an 'appearance' wholly dependent upon *it*" (2008: 99).

> own mode of comportment, a mode at least relatively empirically independent (1993: 62).[8]

When consciousness explicitly affirms its implicit activity which reveals as the 'truth' of knowing the object, it now takes the shape of self-consciousness. In other words, if consciousness takes itself as independent and essential in its relation to 'other', then the relation of consciousness to itself or 'self-consciousness' should become the main issue.

3.2 Self-Consciousness and Desire

In the same paragraph of the first section of the 'Self-Consciousness' chapter, which is the 'Truth of Self-Certainty', Hegel now states the difference of self-consciousness from the previous shapes by focusing on its 'certainty'. The certainty of previous shapes of consciousness, which consists in 'taking the true as something other than itself', vanishes in the experience (1977: 104). But this certainty, according to Hegel, now gives place to not only another certainty but 'truth', and the reason for such a seemingly pretentious claim is indeed the 'difference' of the new certainty of consciousness: "For the certainty is to itself its object, and consciousness is to itself the truth" (1977: 104). So, unlike the previous moments, the certainty or the object as 'in-itself' and the 'truth' or knowledge of this object as 'for-another', are not distinct. By returning to itself, the object of consciousness, which was something other than itself before, now becomes itself. That is, what consciousness as 'knowing' distinguishes from itself and makes the object of its knowing is the knowing itself. Therefore, the object of consciousness immediately 'corresponds' to its knowledge or concept. "It is *for* consciousness that the in-itself of the object and, and the being of the object for an other, are one and the same; the 'I' is the *content* of connection

[8] Why does the activity of consciousness necessarily entail a self-relation? In one of other works, Pippin explains this point by reminding us the Kantian background of the problem, which is that all consciousness must be necessarily self-consciousness: 'the 'I think' must be able to accompany all my representations'. Accordingly, if any consciousness of an object involves the activity of consciousness or its 'taking the object to be such', then such an activity cannot be 'sustained' without the consciousness of this activity, without 'apperceptively' taking the object to be such (2011: 8-9).

and the connecting itself" (1977: 104). Becoming both the subject and the object of knowing activity, consciousness now takes the form of self-consciousness by which, Hegel states, "we have entered to the native realm of truth" (1977: 104). Self-consciousness is the realm of truth since consciousness is now looking into itself for truth, taking itself as the one that provides the objective knowledge. As self-consciousness, therefore, the self-relation or self-knowledge of consciousness now becomes its main concern.

In the paragraph 167, Hegel begins to expose how the self-relating of consciousness occurs in its relation to other; that is, he gives the immediate self-knowledge of consciousness in its knowing the other: "Though this other has vanished, its moments has at the same time no less been preserved" (1977: 105). In the previous experience of consciousness, what has vanished is 'truth' of the other; that is, it has revealed to consciousness that the 'object' as 'other' does not have any 'truth' independent of its own activity. But since the 'other' is still present, its 'moments' are preserved in the self-consciousness, though in a different manner. These moments, which are the pure being of 'sensation', universality and particularity of 'perception', the inner being of 'understanding', are now taken by self-consciousness not as the features or essences of other. Instead, it takes these moments as the 'abstractions or distinctions' of its own activity. But the crucial point is that, Hegel states, consciousness indeed returns to itself 'from' the being or the world of these moments and it so becomes self-consciousness: "Self-consciousness is the reflection out of the being of the world of sense and perception, and is essentially the return from otherness" (1977: 105). Without this initial return to itself from otherness, self-consciousness cannot emerge. However, even though this immediate returning is necessary for the emergence of self-consciousness, it is not sufficient. Such a return, for Hegel, is no more than the self's positing of itself.

> As self-consciousness, it is movement; but since what it distinguishes itself is *only itself as* itself, the difference, as an otherness, is *immediately superseded* for it; the difference *is not*, and it [self-consciousness] is only the motionless tautology of: 'I am

> I'[9]; but since for it the difference does not have the form of *being*, it is *not* self consciousness (1977: 105).

In its immediate return, consciousness distinguishes itself from itself; that is, it becomes both the subject and the object. But since this distinction or difference is not a real distinction, consciousness cannot be the object of itself in a sense that the being of the world of sense and perception can be. Consciousness, for instance, cannot be the object of its own observation; or, it cannot know itself by any sort of 'introspection'[10]. Consciousness merely posits itself through its return or movement but it does not 'know' what it is.[11] Therefore, this initial return or the tautology of 'I am I', to which consciousness cannot give any content, is not the truth of 'self-consciousness'.

Failing to find itself by returning from otherness, consciousness hereafter has two moments. On the one hand, there is still the otherness, the world of sense and perception, which is in the 'form of being' as the object of consciousness. But consciousness takes itself as the truth of this world in the sense that this world is not independent of its own activity. The other moment of consciousness is, therefore, nothing but the consciousness of itself or self-consciousness.

> With that first moment, self-consciousness is in the form of *consciousness*, and the whole expanse of the sensuous world is preserved for it, but at the same time only as

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[9] Here, Hegel probably refers also to the Fichte's formulation of 'absolute self', the pure activity of self-positing which is expressed by the principle of identity: 'I=I' or 'I am I'. On the other hand, there is a crucial difference of Hegel's approach to the self-positing of consciousness, as Jean Hyppolite points out: "Unlike Fichte, we don't pose the *Ich bin Ich* in the absoluteness of a thetic act in relation to which antithesis and synthesis would be secondary. The reflection of the I, which makes the sensuous world , the being-other, as its starting point, is the essence of self-consciousness, which, therefore, exists only through this return, only through this movement" (1974: 158).

[10] As Pippin makes explicit, Hegel aims to emphasize that consciousness cannot know itself and become 'self-consciousness' "by observing an object, nor by conceptualizing an inner intuition, nor by any immediate self-certainty or direct presence of the self to itself […]. It [self-consciousness] is nothing like turning the mind's eye inward to inspect itself" (2011: 15-16).

[11] The mere self-positing is not self-knowledge or self consciousness for the main reason that "it has no determinate content; the I does not know what it is knowing when it knows 'I', and from that nothing is derivable" (Lauer, 1993: 99).

> connected with the second moment, the unity of self-consciousness with itself; and hence the sensuous world is for it an enduring existence which, however, is only *appearance*, or a difference which, *in itself*, is no difference (1977: 105).

Taking the sensuous world as 'appearance' simply means that this world, for consciousness, is not a reality 'independent' of itself. At the same time, it also means that consciousness, as self-consciousness, asserts itself as the truth of this appearance; that is, it takes itself as essential and independent in its relation to otherness. Now, if consciousness cannot become self-consciousness by mere returning from otherness, then it must demonstrate to itself that it has a determining role in its relation to object or otherness.[12] Only by presenting to itself in this relation that consciousness can 'know' itself and become self-consciousness. This is the reason, I would like to state, why Hegel describes self-consciousness in terms of the 'two moments' of consciousness, and defines it as 'desire' and 'movement':

> This antithesis of its appearance and its truth has, however, for its essence only the truth, viz. the unity of self-consciousness with itself; this; this unity must become essential to self-consciousness, i.e. self-consciousness is *Desire* in general. Consciousness, as self-consciousness, henceforth has a double object: one is the immediate object, that of the sense-certainty and perception, which however *for self-consciousness* has the character of *negative*; and the second, viz., *itself*, which is the true essence, and is present in the first instance only opposed to the second object. In this sphere, self-consciousness exhibits itself as the movement in which this antithesis is removed, and the identity of itself with itself becomes explicit for it (1977: 105).

Accordingly, self-consciousness, in order to realize its independence or to demonstrate that it is the truth or the essence of the otherness, aims to remove the opposition or 'antithesis' between the sensuous world and itself. That is, it wants to eliminate the independence of this world by taking a 'negative' attitude towards the otherness or 'immediate object'. With this, then, the theoretical relation of consciousness to its object, which has so far become the only one through

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[12] That is, consciousness cannot know itself and become self-consciousness without taking into account its necessary relation to other; as Frederick Neuhouser points out: "If at the end of 'Consciousness' the subject regards itself as true (as the sole source of the norms that bind it in its knowing the world) but at the same time recognizes its necessary relation to something other, then the subject must find a way of maintaining its relation to its other that is consistent with its conception of itself as self-sufficient" (2009: 38).

Phenomenology, gives way to a practical relation. Consciousness, as self-consciousness, no more tries to know the object or itself merely in a passive manner; instead, self-consciousness is now a practical involvement which aims to actively negate the otherness of the object for overcoming its independence. But, this practical attitude characterizes not only the 'relation' of self-consciousness to the otherness, but also the meaning that Hegel gives to the 'nature' of self-consciousness itself. According to Robert Pippin, who exposes the meaning of self-consciousness in an impressive manner, when Hegel defines the self-consciousness as '*desire* itself'[13], he means that the problem of self-consciousness is a problem of 'practical achievement': "Such a relation must be understood as the *result of an attempt*, never, as it certainly seems to be, as an immediate presence of the self to itself; and it often requires some sort of striving, even struggle" (2011: 15-16). In other words, if self-consciousness takes to be independent and essential, it can know that it is actually so only with its realization of such a 'taking'. Therefore, self-consciousness as desire primarily means that it is a 'projection', "a way of projecting oneself forward into the world" (1993: 67). Without the realization or achievement of this 'project', self-consciousness cannot establish the 'unity with itself'[14]; it cannot know what it really is.

Still, there is an ambiguity in Hegel's definition of self-consciousness as 'desire itself'. On the one hand, self-consciousness takes the form of desire in the sense that it negates the object to overcome its independence. As such, it is mainly this 'movement' of negation. Appetite, which can also be called natural or animal desire, is the immediate or direct form of desire as negation. On the other hand, self-

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[13] Stating that '*Begierde überhaupt*' can be translated as 'desire itself', as 'desire in general', or 'desire, generally', or 'mere desire', Pippin follows the Terry Pinkard's translation and chooses the first one (2011: 20). I am also taking this translation of the statement as appropriate for my reading.

[14] Pippin also explains Hegel's emphasis on the 'unity of self-consciousness with itself' in terms of the 'practical achievement' of the 'unity': there is a 'self-estrangement' of self-consciousness unless it cannot know that 'what *it* takes to be the case *is* the case'. Self-consciousness is mainly a 'unity' to be achieved' (2011: 28).

consciousness is desire in a more profound sense for the main reason that in taking the form of desire, self-consciousness is a desire for itself. That is, as Hyppolite points out, self-consciousness desires the 'unity with itself' in desiring the sensuous object (1974: 160).[15] In the movement of negating the objects, self-consciousness indeed aims to achieve its own independence through overcoming the independence of the sensuous world. Therefore, these two senses of the statement that 'self-consciousness is desire' must be taken into consideration for a proper understanding of the problem. This is crucial, I think, not only for a proper reading of self-consciousness' transition from natural desire to 'recognition', but also for avoiding any misinterpretation. Alexandre Kojevè's famous interpretation of Hegelian self-consciousness, for instance, does not take into account the meaning of 'desire' in the context of the self-consciousness' 'unity with itself'. According to Kojevè, any 'cognitive' or 'contemplative' relation to object cannot provide subject to an awareness of itself. In such relations, the subject is always in a passive position and the awareness of object entirely suppresses an awareness of the 'self'. The sense of 'self' and self-consciousness arise, therefore, only when the subject desires something and satisfies its desire through the negating activity: "The man who is 'absorbed' by the object that he is contemplating can be 'brought back to himself' only by a Desire" (Kojève, 1969: 3). The subject of desire, for him, is mainly an 'emptiness' that can have content only by the satisfaction of desire or negation of the object which it desires. Apart from the difference of this subject from the Hegelian one,[16] it seems that Kojevè's reading of the statement that 'self-consciousness is desire' cannot reveal its whole meaning. Certainly, self-consciousness is desire in a sense that it desires the object and negates it, and this movement has a revelatory function for self-consciousness; but this does not mean that self-consciousness

[15] Hyppolite emphasizes that this is why the '*Begierde*' should be translated not as 'appetite', but as 'desire'. Desire involves appetite, but "it carries a much wider meaning. Self-consciousness seeks itself in this desire, and it seeks itself in the other" (1974: 160).

[16] Houlgate criticizes Kojevè's reading in terms of its 'distortion' of Hegelian subject: "*Pace* Kojevè, the desiring self in the *Phenomenology* does not lack a sense of its own being. If anything, it is rather too full of itself, for it regards everything around it as there for it alone" (2003: 13).

occurs only by means of such a desire.[17] Self-consciousness, which occurs as the truth of the consciousness of the object, attempts to overcome the independence of otherness in order to realize its own independence as the source of truth. It conceives overcoming the independence of sensuous world as a way of realizing its projection and it is essentially in this sense that self consciousness is desire. That is, it takes the form of desire which desires the 'achievement' of its self-conception; as such, it is essentially a desire for itself or a desire for its 'unity'. Therefore, a proper reading of 'self-consciousness as desire' must take into account the whole movement of consciousness from its beginning, which may be defined as a speculative reading. Hence, as I have stated in the previous chapter, it seems that Hegel's statement of 'Self-consciousness is desire' can be taken as a 'speculative proposition'. Since the concepts of 'self-consciousness' and 'desire' cannot be identified, it is certainly not a tautology. But it is not also an ordinary statement for the reason that the concept of 'desire' cannot be predicated as an attribute or quality to 'self-consciousness' which is not a fixed subject. It cannot be understood in the way, for instance, we understand the statements like 'the rose is red' or 'human-being is mortal'. This is why any ordinary reading fails to reveal the meaning of the statement: it is not merely that the self becomes conscious of itself to the extent that it 'desires'; or not simply that self-conscious being is a living thing that have 'desires'. Instead, desire refers in this statement to the claim that self-consciousness is the 'unity of self with itself' that must be achieved or accomplished. As such, the concept of 'desire' expresses what 'self-consciousness' intrinsically or essentially is.

[17] Leo Rauch also states this point by denying the 'analytical' reading of the statement: "On a number of occasions, Hegel does state that self-consciousness *is* desire. Yet I do not think he intends this statement to be taken as *analytically* true. He does not say we *are* self-conscious by virtue of our desiring something. Nor does he say (as Kojevè does) that we *become* self-conscious (and therefore human) by desiring something" (1999: 127). But, I think, Hegel's statement does not necessarily falsify the reading of Kojevè since the self-consciousness takes 'also' the form of desire in Kojevian sense.

3.3 Self-Consciousness and Life

In the paragraph 168, Hegel now makes a transition to expose what the object, to which self-consciousness takes a negative attitude, really is; and he begins an analysis of Life[18] as this negative object. As mentioned above, self-consciousness is now in the form of natural or animal desire and it attempts to practically negate or destroy the object; the negative object is for it not an essential being that have independence. But this object, Hegel states, is not simply the one that can be negated; although self-consciousness is not aware of this fact at this stage, its negative object is indeed Life: "It is being that is reflected into itself, and the object of immediate desire is a living thing" (1977: 106). Therefore, self-consciousness, which posits its independence against the otherness, is indeed opposes itself to Life. The crucial point is that, in this main opposition between self-consciousness and Life, while self-consciousness attempts to realize its independence by negation, it discovers the independence of Life. "Self-consciousness which is simply for itself and directly characterizes its object as a negative element, or is primarily *desire*, will, therefore, on the contrary, learn through experience that the object is independent" (1977: 106). Life is revealed to self-consciousness as independent for the main reason that self-consciousness, as a living thing, is already a part or a moment in it. Through the experience of desiring and destroying objects for satisfaction, self-consciousness is indeed merely sustains its own natural life.[19] And this individual life, according to Hegel, is nothing other than an individual shape in the universal Life which he defines mainly as the "simple fluid substance of pure movement itself" (1977: 107). That is to say, as far as self-consciousness remains in the form of natural or animal

[18] Hegel's analysis of Life in this section continues until the end of paragraph 175 and it is, for almost all commentators, one of the most difficult parts of *Phenomenology* to understand. I will try to give an account of this topic only in the context of its relevance to self-consciousness in the form of desire.

[19] "From the subjective or first-person point of view, desire might be experienced as immediately as the desire to negate some object; but from an external, objective point of view (that of 'we' phenomenological observers), desire is the sort of thing that is expressed in the teleological action of an organism interacting with others in order to preserve itself or take for itself, as it were, *the life* that they possess" (Redding, 2008: 100).

desire, it is merely living;[20] as such, it encounters with the independence of Life instead of establishing its own independence. Self-consciousness learns this when it becomes aware that it cannot attain the satisfaction which it seeks by destroying the object. Even if it destroys the objects and attains a satisfaction of natural desires, such a satisfaction cannot provide its independence:

> In this satisfaction, however, experience makes it aware that the object has its own independence. Desire and self-certainty obtained in its gratification, are conditioned by the object, for self-certainty comes from superseding this other: in order that this supersession takes place, there must be this other. Thus self-consciousness, by its negative relation to the object, is unable to supersede it; it is really because of this relation that it produces the object again, and the desire as well. It is in fact something other than self-consciousness that is the essence of Desire; and through this experience self-consciousness has itself realized this truth (1977: 37).

There are two main implications of this experience stated here, which are related to each other. First, self-consciousness becomes aware that the object has its own independence for the reason that in order to negate or supersede, even to desire, this object must 'be'. In other words, self-consciousness realizes that it depends on the object which it claims that has not an essential being. Secondly, self-consciousness attains a satisfaction, or its 'self-certainty' only by negating, destroying this independent object. That is, there is a paradoxical relation between self-consciousness and its object: self consciousness mainly aims to realize its independence in the external world, but through destroying the object, it also abolishes the object which would 'reflect' its independence.[21] Therefore, its negative attitude produces endlessly both the object and desire, which means that self–

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[20] "I am just an exemplar of the species requirements of my species, playing them out within the infinite totality of life itself as genus. Just by living I am nothing but a moment in the universal process of life […]" (Pippin, 2011: 31).

[21] Neuhouser explains this paradoxical relation by reminding the satisfaction of desire as 'temporary' and 'fleeting': "Hegel's claim is that once desire completely negates, or destroys, its object, the very being that was to provide a reflection of its self-sufficient status no longer exists, and with the objects disappearance all worldly evidence of the subject's exalted status has disappeared as well. Due to its purely negative relation to its object, then, the very moment at which Desire satisfies itself is also the moment at which it loses what it sought" (2009 :44).

consciousness remains in the infinite recurrence of the animal or natural desires in Life.[22] And the self-certainty that self-consciousness attains through this process is not the knowledge of itself, it is only a 'sentiment of self'[23] or self-feeling; that is, there is not a true or concrete self-consciousness yet, it is still a 'projection', a desire that must be satisfied. At this point, Hegel makes one of the most important transitions by changing the issue into the problem of 'another self-consciousness' and 'recognition'; self-consciousness now takes another form of desire and enters into a different experience.

3.4 Recognition: The Satisfaction of Desire

It has been proven that self-consciousness cannot achieve its satisfaction by taking the form of natural or animal desire. Instead of realizing its own independence, self-consciousness encounters with the independence of its object which it has previously taken as a mere 'appearance'. At this stage, according to Hegel, although self-consciousness is now aware of the independence of its object, which is Life, it is still for itself independent and essential, 'no less absolutely *for itself*''. In order to achieve its satisfaction, however, it must negate the object in a way that provides an objective expression of its independence.[24] In the middle of the paragraph 175, Hegel exposes the possibility of such a negation:

> On the account of the independence of object, therefore, it can achieve satisfaction only when the object itself effects the negation within itself; and it must carry out this negation of itself in itself, for it is *in itself* the negative, and must be *for* the other what it is. Since the object is in its own self negation, and in being so is at the same time

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[22] Gadamer gives the best description of such a self-consciousness: "All it 'knows' is that as something alive its identity consists only in the constant annulment of the other and dissolution of the self in the other, that is, in participation in the infinity of the cycle of life" (1996: 155).

[23] Kojève states this feeling by emphasizing that "the Animal attains only Selbst-*gefühl*, *Sentiment* of self, but not Selbst-*bewusstsein*, Self-*Consciousness*" (1980: 39). Also, Pippin defines such a self-certainty or self-relation as the "mere immediate self-sentiment of life" (1989: 151).

[24] The criterion of its satisfaction, as Neuhouser emphasizes, is whether self-consciousness "can find a stable reflection of itself in the world that corresponds to its conception of itself as free" (2009: 40).

> independent, it is consciousness […]. *Self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness* (1977: 109-110).

Accordingly, the object must 'negate' itself for the sake of self-consciousness in its very independence, and this object can be nothing but 'another' self-consciousness; only through such a negation self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction. Here, both the 'form' and 'object' of desire changes, together with the meaning of 'negation'. The object of self-consciousness is no more an object of animal desire since it must be capable of negating itself, and be independent even if it is negated. A mere 'natural' object can only be negated in the sense of being destroyed or abolished. So, the object of self-consciousness is necessarily another self-consciousness which is capable of self-negation. But the act of 'negation' has also changed its meaning. The negation of other self-consciousness, as the self-negation of other in its independence, cannot be the same with the negation of a natural object. Therefore, Hegel aims to show that the 'negation of other' evolves from the natural negation into the issue of 'recognition by other'; self-consciousness can achieve its satisfaction only in being 'recognized' by the other self-consciousness. Only in being recognized by another self-consciousness that it can 'reflects' to itself from otherness and realize its independence. Due to this condition, the form of desire that self-consciousness now takes is not the animal or natural desire but the 'desire for recognition'.[25] To make it more explicit, it is not that self-consciousness simply desires to be recognized; self-consciousness is still desire in the essential sense of being a 'projection', the 'unity' which must be 'achieved'. Failing to achieve its satisfaction in the form of natural desire, it has revealed that self-consciousness can achieve its satisfaction only by the recognition of other self-consciousness and so, it necessarily takes the form of 'desire for recognition'. Thus, self-consciousness is 'possible' only if the other recognizes it; without being recognized, its self-certainty

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[25] The term 'desire for recognition' is used by Kojève in his anthropological reading of *Phenomenology* (1980: 9). The important point, I think, is to see that self-consciousness retains its characteristics of 'desire' in the recognition problem, as Judith Butler emphasizes: "In the turn to another self-consciousness as a possible object of satisfaction, we can see that it is not desire itself that is superseded, but a *peculiar form* of desire, and that aim of self-consciousness, even as it leaves the section on self-certainty, is still the satisfaction of desire" (1987: 44-45).

cannot become 'truth' and it cannot 'know' itself. As Pippin states, "A self-consciousness can *actually* be self-conscious only in 'being recognized'" (2011: 60). That is why Hegel posits the condition of another self-consciousness for the very being or 'existence' of self-consciousness: "A self-consciousness exists *for a self-consciousness*. Only so is it in fact self-consciousness; for only in this way does the unity of itself in its otherness become explicit for it" (1977: 110). Moreover, there is a further implication in the condition of recognition which is hidden for now. It is that self-consciousness, which takes itself as independent from Life, will be able to achieve or 'prove' such independence only in its relation to another self-consciousness. Only in this relation, namely through its experience of recognition, it will be able to posit itself as independent from natural life. This point will be explicit when the life and death struggle for recognition takes place between two self-consciousnesses.[26]

Before exposing the meaning or logic of recognition in the next section of 'Self-Consciousness' chapter, Hegel declares that we are now on a critical point for the whole movement of consciousnesses in the *Phenomenology*. Taking the recognition by other as the condition of self-consciousness, he states, "we have already before us the Notion of Spirit" (1977: 110). Although consciousness, as self-consciousness, has not yet entered into the experience of recognition, it has been explicit that self-consciousness can find its 'unity' only through this experience. The independence of self-consciousness depends on the recognition by the other self-consciousness which is also independent. And what Hegel defines as 'Spirit' is this 'unity' of the different self-consciousnesses, which becomes possible with their recognition of each other: "the 'I' that is 'We' and 'We' that is 'I'" (1977: 110). Furthermore, consciousness, which enters into the realm of recognition and Spirit as self-consciousness, reaches its 'turning point' here; it is here that consciousness "leaves behind it the colourful

[26] Defining the independence of sell-consciousness from life as the 'normative autonomy' of an agent, Pippin states that self-consciousness can achieve its normative status or autonomy only in its relation to others. What self-consciousness has to achieve is "a kind of independence from the species-specific requirements of 'life', and he [Hegel] claims that such an achievement is only possible in relation to others […]" (2011: 75).

show of the sensuous here-and-now and nigthlike void of the supersensible beyond and steps out into the spiritual daylight of present" (1977: 110-111). This emphasis on 'Spirit' as turning point of the consciousness implies, first of all, that the truth of any knowledge claim by consciousness is connected to the relation of consciousness to other subjects.[27] Consciousness initially has become self-consciousness with its return from 'otherness'; self-consciousness appeared as the truth of any consciousness of the 'object'. But it has also become explicit that consciousness' knowing of itself or self-consciousness, accordingly, is a problem of recognition by other self-consciousness. That is, for Hegel, through the mediation of self-consciousness, the problem of knowledge, of any relation between consciousness and its object, turns now into the problem of 'Spirit' which can be constituted intersubjectively.[28] Secondly, if the 'turning point' of consciousness is read just in the context of the problem of self-consciousness, then it becomes remarkable that Hegel's positing of recognition by other as the condition of the formation of self-consciousness is the expression of his peculiar and original understanding of the problem.[29] Self-consciousness, accordingly, is not merely an issue of the self's

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[27] According to Findly, here Hegel means that "the understanding of the other minds, far from being more obscure than the understanding of things, is the model and paradigm in terms of which intercourse of things can assume a limited clarity" (1977: 520). I think, this analysis must be completed with the further meaning that any account of the understanding of things can be given 'only' through the understanding of other minds.

[28] Pippin states that with 'turning point' of *Phenomenology* Hegel begins to make a 'social analysis' of epistemological problems: "Hegel now suggests that the way in which a subject can be 'determine itself' in the relevant Notional sense is necessarily a social experience, and that it is in such social experience that the basic skepticism problem of *PhG*, suitably transformed, is resolved" (1989: 152).

[29] According to some interpreters, Hegel's account of self-consciousness represents a shift in the history of philosophy. Solomon, for instance, thinks that Hegel denies what the previous philosophers takes for granted, even by questioning the conditions of the formation of self-consciousness: "The notion that self-consciousness has preconditions or presuppositions at all, of course, is just Descartes, Fichte and others deny. Even for Kant, who makes some effort to deduce the transcendental ego, the precondition of self-consciousness seems to be only the existence of experience as such, not the experience of any particular kind, and in particular, not *interpersonal* experience. Thus even Hegel's *question* is a rejection of tradition […]" (1983: 436). Similarly, for Pippin, the turning point of the *Phenomenology* is the turning point of modern philosophy since it has been the source of the "post-Hegelian insistence on the relevance of human sociality and the historicity of that sociality in accounting for claims of cognitive success […]" (2011: 4).

awareness of itself. Hegel not only makes a distinction between such an immediate self-certainty from self-consciousness, he also demonstrates that the self's relation to another self is the very condition of self-consciousness. Without the experience of recognition, for him, there is no self-consciousness; that is, the subjectivity depends on the condition of intersubjectivity.[30] Lastly, since the concept of Spirit has a central role through *Phenomenology*, Hegel indeed anticipates the importance of the experience of recognition for the whole movement of consciousness. If consciousness enters also into the realm of Spirit by means of the experience of recognition as mentioned above, then this means that the concept of recognition is crucial for the whole process. As Robert Williams states, the concept of Spirit has its roots in the recognition: "The concept of recognition is the phenomenological genesis of spirit (*Geist*) […]. To unpack and expound recognition is to inquire into the phenomenological origins of *Geist* […]" (1992: 143).

The section on experience of recognition begins with Hegel's exposition of this experience from the perspective of 'for us'; that is, Hegel first intends to show the phenomenological meaning of recognition before exposing the actual experience of consciousness.[31] And the first sentence of the section is indeed the key statement of the 'for us' perspective: "Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged" (1977:

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[30] Of course, this does not mean that recognition or intersubjectivity does not emerge in the philosophy before Hegel. As Robert Williams shows, the recognition is first introduced by Fichte as the condition of freedom, right and law. The crucial point, I think, lies in Hegel's proceeding or radicalizing the claim which posits the recognition as the condition of the constitution or formation of self-consciousness: "Hegel's break from Cartesian transcendentalism is the discovery that self is dependent on other for recognition […]. To be sure, Fichte had anticipated this in his account of recognition as a transcendental condition of natural law. Hegel proceeds further: Human self-consciousness is accomplished in and through community, and is intersubjectively mediated. Hence self-consciousness is essentially an intersubjective accomplishment" (1987: 8).

[31] The section has the title of "A. Independence and Dependence of Self-consciousness: Lordship and Bondage". Hegel's analysis of recognition from the 'for us' perspective is between the paragraphs 178-184; the rest of section is dedicated to consciousness own experience of recognition. With regard to this difference, Robert Williams makes a basic distinction between the 'eidetics' and 'empirics' of recognition; the first is the pure conceptual analysis of recognition, 'bracketing the existence or fact' whereas the second is the exposition of the actual experience of recognition by consciousness itself (1992: 147).

111). The being 'for-itself' and 'for another' of the self-consciousness, accordingly, cannot be separated since they are indeed the conditions of each other. Consciousness can know itself and becomes 'for itself' only on the condition that another consciousness knows it as such. It is independent, for instance, only if it is known or acknowledged as independent by another. Conversely, it is independent for another as far as it takes itself to be such. Hence, the self-relation and self-knowledge depends on the mediation of the relation to the other.

When self-consciousness immediately encounters with another self-consciousness, however, it 'loses' itself in the other instead of knowing itself. This immediate confrontation, which is the most elementary form of encounter between two, means for self-consciousness to lose the unique status of itself. Self-consciousness thus finds itself as an 'other', something out of itself; but at the same time it cannot know the other as a distinct self-consciousness since what it sees in the other is only itself (Hegel, 1977: 111).[32] Now, in order to overcome its estrangement, self-consciousness must 'supersede' the otherness; it must supersede the other, independent self-consciousness. But since self-consciousness finds nothing other than itself in this otherness, such supersession will equally be the supersession of itself (Hegel, 1977: 111). Therefore, self-consciousness must supersede the otherness in a way that provides its 'returning' from other self-consciousness. To do so, it must both to recognize the other as a self-consciousness independent from itself and be recognized as such by the other. Only in this way the moments of for-itself and for-another coincide; the true supersession or 'sublation' of otherness thus can be nothing but the mutual or reciprocal recognition.[33] This still vague point becomes

[32] As Williams explains, the 'other' as an ambiguous term here has a twofold meaning: "On the one hand, other means an other independent being; on the other hand, 'other' means self-othering, or a relation of the self to itself, or self as other […]. The self becomes other to itself in confrontation with other, and this double significations (other as other v. self as other) are inseparable" (1992: 153).

[33] "The other whose presence initially alienated the self, and which the self sought to eliminate, turns out to be that on which the self depends, and with whom the self exist in solidarity. Conversely, the self that undergoes loss and alienation before the other, cannot overcome this alienation by itself. Rather such alienation is overcome only in *mutual reciprocal releasement*" (Williams, 1992: 154-155).

more clear when Hegel reminds us that the movement or action of self-consciousness is also the action of other self-consciousness:

> The movement is simply the double movement of the two self-consciousnesses. Each sees the other do the same as it does; each does itself what it demands of the other, and therefore also does what it does only insofar as the other does the same. Action by one side only would be useless because what is to happen can only be brought about by both. Thus the action has a double significance not only because it is directed against itself as well as against the other, but also because it is indivisibly the action of one as well as the other (1977: 112).

Here, it is crucial to see the 'double significance' of action in both sense or in terms of the 'duplication' of self-consciousness. First of all, the action of self-consciousness on its other is also its action on itself because its self-relation depends on its relation to the other self-consciousness. But since the object of self-consciousness is also an independent self-consciousness, the movement of self-consciousness is necessarily carried out by both. That is, in its self-relation in relation to the object, self-consciousness cannot do something "if that object does not of its own accord do what the first does to it" (Hegel, 1977: 112). It cannot act on the other if the other does not act on itself in the same way; and the act of recognition is thus the movement of two self-consciousnesses. On the other hand, this action, which is directed to both itself and to the other, is also the action of other in the sense that the other self-consciousness also aims to be recognized. Both self-consciousnesses therefore relates to themselves through relating to the other. "Each is for the other the middle term, through which each mediates itself with itself and unites with itself […]. They recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another" (1977: 112). Therefore, Hegel's exposition of the recognition from the perspective of the philosopher, that is, 'for us', concludes with the main idea that self-consciousness' knowing or recognizing itself through the mediation of other depends on the condition of the 'mutuality' of recognition. Without recognizing the other, self-consciousness cannot recognize itself even if it is recognized by the other. And it is indeed this point that will come to light through the one-sided recognition that self-consciousness will experience. Consequently, self-consciousness can achieve its satisfaction only on the condition of its being both recognized and recognizing.

CHAPTER 4

THE EXPERIENCE OF RECOGNITION

4.1 The Struggle for Recognition: Master and Slave

Having exposed the implications of the concept of recognition, what remains as the main problem, for Hegel, is to show how self-consciousness itself experiences this process. Instead of experiencing the mutual recognition, self-consciousness, as 'duplicated', initially enters into a process of unequal and one-sided recognition. And the reason for the 'necessity' of such a form of recognition lies mainly in the appearance of each self-consciousness to the other. In confronting with the other, each self-consciousness is 'for-itself' on its own terms, independent by its negative attitude towards anything outside itself. But they are 'for each other' just an individual which is a part of the natural life like any individual; they appear to each other as mere natural objects. In other words, they are not self-consciousness in the view of the each other: "Each is certain of its own self but not of the other, and therefore its own self-certainty is still has no truth" (1977: 113). Therefore, they must present themselves to each other as being-for-itself in order to change the mere self-certainty into the truth; that is, both self-consciousnesses must make the other to recognize itself as self-consciousness and find itself in its object as such. On the other hand, since it is for the other only an individual that have a natural life or natural existence, self-consciousness can present itself to the other only in showing that it is not dependent on this life. It must show that nothing can determine its own existence; there is nothing that cannot be negated by its independent activity. And the independence from life, accordingly, means for self-consciousness both risking its own life and seeking the other's death. This point indeed removes a contradiction which seems to characterize initial encounter of self-consciousness with the other.

On the one hand, as noted in the previous section, in this encounter self-consciousness 'loses' itself in the other or finds itself as the other; and this means that the other is not an ordinary or mere natural object. On the other hand, the other appears to self-consciousness as a mere individual in the natural life. To elucidate this seemingly contradictory point, I think, it must be stated that self-consciousness is aware of the fact that the other is not an ordinary object; if the other was such, there would be no struggle between them. But the other is at same time an ordinary or natural object for self-consciousness in the sense that self-consciousness attempts to abolish its being by staking its death, just as it destructs a natural object. Hegel's last sentences in the paragraph 187 confirms this interpretation: "Its [self-consciousness'] essential being is present to it in the form of an 'other', it is outside of itself and must rid itself of its self-externality, […] and it must regard its otherness as a pure being for-self or absolute negation" (1977: 114).

Self-consciousness can prove its independence to other and make the other to prove its own independence only in the twofold action of risking its own life and staking the other's death. "Thus the relation of the two self-conscious individuals is such that they prove themselves and each other through a life-and-death struggle" (1977: 113-114). Each individual self must therefore enter into the life-and-death struggle by risking its life in order to prove its independence or 'pure being-for-self'; risking the life is the condition of becoming self-consciousness. As I have mentioned before, self-consciousness can achieve its independence from natural life only if it risks its life in the struggle with other. It is obvious that risking the life cannot be a 'natural' action to which all living things may attempt. And so, it is the only way of realizing the independence from life, which becomes possible for self-consciousness only in its relation to another self.[34] However, even if the struggle is necessary for both, the consequence of struggle should not be 'death' for the main reason that death does not

[34] Defining the theme of risking life as the 'key element' of the process, Pippin emphasizes this point in his reading: "[…] attributing a normative significance to myself or acknowledging someone's entitlement to claim authority cannot be merely expressions of sentiment or preference if what is at

provide what self-consciousness mainly desires, namely, the recognition by the self. Self-consciousness cannot prove its independence in its relation to the other if the result of struggle becomes death of one or both. In this sense, killing the other indeed would be for self-consciousness to fall back again in the cycle of natural desires in which the object cannot be preserved; death is likewise merely the natural negation of the other self. Hegel defines death or natural negation also as the act of 'abstract' negation and he distinguishes from this the negation by consciousness "which supersedes in a way as to preserve and maintain what is superseded, and consequently survives its own supersession" (1977: 114-115). Therefore, self-consciousness must negate or supersede the other while preserving it, which is nothing but the recognition of self-consciousness by the other. But this supersession becomes possible only when one of the self-consciousnesses understands the importance of life and clings to it instead of being recognized. And the 'duplication' of self-consciousness results in an asymmetrical relation and one-sided recognition of the two types of consciousness:

> […] through this there is posited a pure self-consciousness; and a consciousness which is not purely for itself but for another, i.e. is a merely *immediate* consciousness, or consciousness in the form of *thinghood*. […] They exists as two opposed shapes of consciousness; one is the independent consciousness whose essential nature is to be for itself, the other is the dependent consciousness whose essential nature is simply to live or to be for another. The former is lord, the other is bondsman (1977: 115).

The life-and-death struggle, accordingly, gives rise to the bondsman or slave who recognizes the lord or master, without being recognized by him.[35] The crucial point is that both the master and slave arise out of their two distinct attitudes towards natural

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stake and can be risked is *all* attachments to life […]. It [risking the life] illustrates the possibility of an independence from all dependence on life itself (2011: 76-79).

[35] There is no agreement on the translation of Hegel's concepts of '*Herrshaft*' and '*Knechtshaft*'. The terms 'lordship' and 'bondage' are used as well as the 'mastery' and 'slavery'. Leo Rauch, for instance, states that since the former terms 'carry a feudal connotation', the latter ones should be used (1999: 87). According to Verene, on the other hand, the best translation should be 'masterhood' and 'servitude' for the reason that Hegel is concerned with 'servitude' rather than the institution of 'slavery': "The relationship to the master is different for each. The slave has the status of property. The servant has the status of a self, although a self whose being is externally determined. The servant is dominated but not owned" (2007: 57). In this study, I use generally the terms 'mastery' and 'slavery'.

life or ‘thinghood’. G. A. Kelly, in his famous article of “Notes on Hegel’s ‘Lordship and Bondage’”, takes this point as having a great importance for the proper reading of ‘master and slave’. According to Kelly, a mere ‘social interpretation’ of master and slave, which is made by Kojève, cannot give us the whole meaning of the section; what we need is a more ‘phenomenological interpretation’. To do so, it must be understood that the life-and-death struggle is not only a struggle between two consciousnesses; it is also the struggle ‘within’ each consciousness: “In the interior of consciousness, each man possesses the faculties of slavery and mastery in his own regard that he struggles to bring into harmony” (1998: 75). This emphasis by Kelly, I think, sheds light on the fact that the master and slave are not only the results of struggle between two consciousness, they occur also as the result of the struggle between ‘natural life’ and ‘desire for recognition’ in each consciousness. Furthermore, it seems that this point has its crucial role also in the following experience of both master and slave, in which their positions change into the opposite.

What characterizes the relation between master and slave is their relation to the thinghood. In contrast to the master, the existence of slave remains as dependent on the thinghood because of its attachment to mere life, rather than risking its life in order to be recognized. Conversely, the master is recognized by the slave since the master is independent from thinghood as the result of its insistence on risking the life for the sake of recognition. The master relates itself to slave through the mediation of the thinghood: “[…] since he is the power over this thing and this again is the power over the other; it follows that he holds the other in subjection” (1977: 115). But the master is related to thinghood also through the mediation of the slave; the slave works on the thinghood or nature for the consumption or ‘enjoyment’ by the master. Therefore, the master’s independence from thinghood is indeed realized through the mediation of work done by the slave. This same work, however, means for the slave to remain as dependent on the thinghood; even if it partially negates the things by working on them, such a partial negation could not provide the slave with the total or ‘absolute’ negation of thinghood like in the situation of the master.

The master-slave relation is obviously a one-sided and unequal recognition between the two consciousnesses. As such, although it is a form of recognition that has been achieved, this relation is also a perversion of Hegel's concept of recognition in which the mutuality is a necessary condition. Far from being a mere disparity between the experience and concept, Hegel aims to show that this one-sided recognition becomes the very reason of master's dissatisfaction. The master has now achieved its independence and 'being for-itself' through the mediation of recognition by the slave; the slave is not being-for-self but only 'for-an-other'. Here, for Hegel, there are two moments which makes the master-slave relation a form of recognition. The slave does to himself what master does to him; it acts on himself in the same way as the master acts on him. In addition to this moment, there is also the unity of the actions of master and slave in the sense that the action of slave indeed belongs to the master; "for what the bondsman does is really the action of the lord" (1977: 116). But for a proper or mutual recognition, there must be a further moment; both the master and slave must do to the other what they do to themselves. Their actions on themselves must reflect the actions on each other. The master cannot achieve its satisfaction in being recognized by the slave for the main reason that the slave is its 'object' in which it must see its own independence:

> In this recognition the unessential consciousness is for the lord the object, which constitutes the *truth* of his certainty. But it is clear that this object does not correspond to its Notion, but rather that the object in which the lord has his lordship has in reality turned out to be something quite different from an independent consciousness. What now confronts him is not an independent consciousness, but a dependent one. He is, therefore, not certain of *being-for-self* as the truth of himself. On the contrary, his truth is in reality the unessential consciousness and its unessential action (Hegel, 1977: 192-193).

The problem for the master is not simply to be 'dependent' on the servile consciousness for being master or sustaining its mastery; rather, the main problem is that the master is dependent on a 'dependent consciousness' which does not

correspond to its self-certainty.[36] As the object or 'truth' for the master, the slave cannot provide for the master a 'reflection from the other' as independent consciousness. In other words, the master cannot know itself in the other as the independent self-consciousness; as the result of its reducing the other to a dependent consciousness, it sees in the other only an unessential servile consciousness.[37] Consequently, the master is not the independent self-consciousness even in its recognition by the other. Therefore, Hegel concludes, the truth of independent self-consciousness must be found not in the consciousness of the master but in the consciousness of the slave, and the further movement of consciousness will become that of the slave. In this movement, the servile consciousness will paradoxically transform into an independent consciousness. Furthermore, what makes this transformation of slave possible is indeed nothing other than its own experience up to this point. Servile consciousness takes the master as an independent consciousness and truth which exists out of itself as the essential being. But this independence, Hegel states, indeed also exists in the consciousness of the slave 'implicitly' as a result of the 'fear of death':

> […] this consciousness has been fearful, not of this or that particular thing or just odd moments, but its whole being has been seized with dread; for it has experienced the fear of death, the absolute Lord. This pure universal moment, the absolute melting away of everything solid and stable, is the simple, essential nature of self-consciousness, absolute negativity, pure being-for-self, which is consequently implicit in this consciousness (1977: 117).

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[36] Gadamer emphasizes this point impressively: "Of what value to the master, to his self-consciousness, is the existence of such a servant? Here is Hegel's argument. The most august master, whom the servant never allows to have even the slightest sense of dependency –precisely this 'master-only'- must recognize that he is thereby not certain of his being-for-self as the truth […]. Thus Hegel is able to find the dialectical reversal within consciousness itself- in its claim, not in its factual vulnerability" (1996: 162).

[37] In the context of the principle that 'each must do to the other what it does to itself', the failure of master can be read in two ways: Firstly, the master fails because it violates the principle; it does not to the other what it does to itself. On the other hand, we can take the principle as necessarily obtaining in the master-slave relation, as Williams points out: "[…] eidetic reciprocity obtains whether consciously acknowledged or not, so each winds up doing to itself what it does to the other. Thus the master cannot avoid doing to himself what it does to the slave, namely, rendering himself a dependent being. The point is that the master cannot escape relation and qualification" (1992: 187).

Having experienced the fear of death through the life-and-death struggle, accordingly, the slave has in fact experienced its independence from everything, its negativity or being for-self. It has implicitly experienced that its own self is not dependent on anything, including the natural life of its own. Hence, the fear of death has provided the slave a sense of independence although it is not aware of the meaning of this explicitly. The implicit consciousness of itself as independent would become explicit and actual through the service and work of the slave. In its service to master, the slave distinguishes itself from the natural life of mere animal desires. In this sense, the service expresses slave's being for-self and independence from nature. At the same time, the service functions also as a process of self-discipline for the slave. As such, it is the objective expression of slave's fear and its being for-other. But the service, together with the fear of death, makes the slave conscious of itself only through its work. It is through work that the slave "becomes conscious of what he truly is" (1977: 118). Unlike the master, who merely negates or consumes the objects, the slave works on them. That is, it does not simply destroy objects or things but 'forms' or shapes them through its work. And through this form-giving activity, the slave discovers its own self and independence in the form that it gives to the objects:

> In fashioning the thing, he becomes aware that the being-for-self belongs to *him*, that he himself exists essentially and actually in his own right. The shape does not become something other than himself through being made external to him; for it is precisely this shape that his pure being-for-self, which in this externality is seen by him to be truth. Through this rediscovery of himself by himself, the bondsman realizes that it is precisely in his work wherein he seemed to have only an alienated existence that he acquires a mind of his own (1977: 118-119).

Here, it seems that there is an ambiguity in the movement of the slave's 'rediscovering' of itself through work in the context of the original problem of self-consciousness posited by Hegel. The slave, on the one hand, becomes conscious of itself in its 'work' or 'formative activity', which must be together with the service

and fear of death.[38] The servile consciousness, which is initially for another and dependent on the nature or thinghood, becomes 'for itself' and independent through its work. That is, self-consciousness seems now essentially the result of the 'work' since it is only in the work that consciousness can have a sense of its independence. On the other hand, the main problem, namely, the problem of recognition remains as unresolved for the slave. In other words, even if the slave discovers its independence in the work, it cannot become 'self-consciousness' as far as it is not recognized by another self-consciousness. If 'self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness' or in being recognized, then the servile consciousness cannot become an independent self-consciousness only through work. This point is crucial, I think, also for differentiating again the Kojèvian reading from Hegel's own project. Kojève's reading, which takes the master-slave relation as essential for the whole movement in *Phenomenology*, mainly attributes to the 'work' of slave a 'liberating' role.[39] But it is indeed suspicious whether what Hegel means is this in exposing the movement of servile consciousness. Although Hegel states the role of work in the slave's 'rediscovering' of its independence as mentioned above, this does not mean that the slave becomes a wholly independent self-consciousness only by means of work. Work is still the work of servile consciousness; the slave discovers its independence in its very dependence or slavery.[40] Consequently, the original problem of recognition remains unresolved in spite of the development of servile

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[38] According to Hegel, fear of death and service are as necessary as the work of slave for its 'reflection' to itself from the objects that are formed by him. These three moments are essential and complementary for the slave to be conscious of itself: "Without the discipline of service and obedience, fear remains at the formal stage, and does not extend to the real world of existence. Without the formative activity, fear remains inward and mute, and consciousness does not become explicitly *for itself*" (1977: 119). Furthermore, if the slave works without the experience of fear, such a work cannot be the expression of his independence or 'negativity'; "and therefore its formative activity cannot give it a consciousness of itself as essential being" (1977: 119).

[39] In fact, Kojève does not state that the work of slave is a direct liberation or having independence for him. Nevertheless, he takes this work as the sole source of liberation: "To be sure, this work by itself does not free him. But in transforming the World by this work, the Slave transforms himself, too, and thus creates the new objective conditions that permit him to take up once more the liberating Fight for recognition that he refused in the beginning for the fear of death" (1980: 29-30).

[40] Leo Rauch claims that Hegel himself is wrong while emphasizing on the work of servile consciousness in discovering its independence. Although his interpretation is not also unproblematic

consciousness.[41] And what proves this view is nothing other than the subsequent movement of consciousness, in which consciousness takes over the truth that revealed in the master-slave relation and makes the transition to a new shape.[42] Consciousness mainly takes over the contradictory nature of slave who has now a sense of its independence through its work while remaining dependent on the master; and the new shape of consciousness thus becomes 'thought'.[43]

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in the sense of the ambiguity in Hegel's exposition, Rauch has a crucial view of slave' work: "Labor frees and dignifies when it *is* free and dignify […]. Note that when we speak of work here, it is not the fulfilling work of the independent and creative craftsman; on the contrary, the work of the slave can be expected to be anything but the creative 'shaping' Hegel speaks of, and rather the simple and repetitive work that is soul-destroying to the slave, and only accentuates his enslavement" (1999: 99-100).

[41] Jürgen Habermas, with his affirmation of Terry Pinkard's reading, approaches to 'master-slave' relation in a quite different manner. Accordingly, the master-slave relation is indeed the clash of the individual or partial points of view; "the dialectic of recognition between master and slave reflects the social construction of what claims to be an impartial view of the world. The main argument of this section is to prove that this impartial point of view is the necessary cognitive condition for the social constitution of self-consciousness" (1999: 143). And Habermas mainly states that the function of slave's work is indeed to provide such an impartial point of view through transforming the object or 'world' and make it the same both for master and slave: "although the slave first makes the master's view of his own, the master, in course of his interaction with the slave, comes in turn to recognize and acknowledge the elaborations and extensions of their common perspective that, step by step, result from the slave's intelligent interaction with what is thus becoming the same world for both of them" (1999: 143).

[42] As G.E. Kelly states against the Kojèvian reading, "the master-slave dialectic is appropriate only to a certain stage of consciousness for Hegel, even though it is still cancelled and retained (*aufgehoben*); the succeeding history will be a record of the more subtle and comprehensive forms estrangement" (1998: 185).

[43] The best explanation of this transition, I think, is given by Pippin: "[…] since Hegel thinks he has shown that the Slave cannot count his position as thinking laborer as a resolution of the struggle for recognition, that the Slave's growing independence contradicts his position of dependence, and since he thinks he has shown the Slave's growing independence, his direction of his own labor, is tied to the development of the Slave's self-consciousness, his thought, he begins to explore the possible forms of such an independent level of thought" (1989: 164).

4.2 Freedom without recognition: 'Thought'

The second section of 'Self-Consciousness' chapter, which has the title of 'Freedom of Self-Consciousness', includes the three subsections: Stoicism, Skepticism and Unhappy Consciousness. Before exposing specifically these three modes self-consciousness, Hegel aims to make explicit the transition to 'thought' as what they have in common under the name of 'freedom'. As stated in the previous section, the servile consciousness forms or shapes the things through its work. This formative activity is the expression of its independence of slave on the thing that it forms. In other words, consciousness finds itself in this 'form'; so the 'form' identifies consciousness with the formed object. And finding itself in this form, accordingly, self-consciousness now takes a different shape which is mainly the 'thought' or 'thinking':

> We are in the presence of self-consciousness in a new shape, a consciousness which, as the infinitude of consciousness or as its own pure movement, is aware of itself as essential being, a being which *thinks* or is a free consciousness. For *to think* does not mean to be an *abstract* 'I', but an 'I' which has at the same time the significance of *intrinsic* being, of having itself for object, or of relating itself to objective being in such a way that its significance is the *being-for-self* of the consciousness for which it is an [object] (Hegel, 1977: 120).

In order to distinguish this new shape of consciousness from the previous ones, Hegel makes a basic difference between representational and conceptual thought. So far, consciousness has been a representational thought which deals only with the 'picture-thoughts'. The content of these representations indeed belong not to consciousness but to the object that it represents. "What is pictured or figuratively conceived, what immediately is, has, as such, the form of being something other than consciousness" (Hegel, 1977: 120). But the concept, which Hegel calls also 'notion', differs from a representation for the main reason that it belongs to consciousness itself; that is, a concept is the product of consciousness' own activity while at the same time it 'is' or exists in the object. Therefore, "since the content [content of the concept] is at the same time a content grasped in *thought*, consciousness remains immediately aware of its unity with this determinate and distinct being" (1977: 20).

On the basis of this distinction between representation and concept,[44] Hegel takes the conceptual thought as the new shape of self-consciousness. Furthermore, in transition to 'thought', self-consciousness attains the 'freedom' of thinking since it is not determined by anything other than itself in this movement:

> The notion is for me straightway *my* notion. In thinking, I *am free*, because I am not in an *other*, but remain simply and solely in communion with myself, and the object, which is for me the *essential* being, is in undivided unity my being-for-myself; and my activity in conceptual thinking is a movement within myself (1977: 20).

This new shape of self-consciousness, which has the freedom of thought by finding itself in its object,[45] for Hegel, is 'Stoicism' that "holds something to be essentially important, or true or good only in so far as it *thinks* it to be such" (1977: 121). On the other hand, Stoicism has this principle of thought by 'withdrawing' from the existence outside of itself and returning into its thought; it does not take anything beyond its thought as essential. Stoical thought aims to find the essence of things or objects only within its own thought. Since it is 'indifferent' to the natural existence of things, Hegel states, the freedom of thought in Stoicism is "only the Notion of freedom, not the living reality of freedom itself" (1977: 122). The abstractness of

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[44] Franco Chiereghin gives an explicit analysis of the Hegelian distinction between concept (*Begriff*) and representation (*Vorstellung*): "Consciousness is aware of the content of a representation as 'placed before' it (*Vor-gestellt*), as something other than itself, something found and external […]. Having a representation requires connecting the internal image of something to the memory of the external, sensory intuition that occasioned its manifestation […]. Completely different from this is the way in which a concept is present in consciousness. A concept is pure thought, not mixed with representations or sensory images; it has a determinate content which constitutes its 'being' distinct from consciousness. In as much as the content is grasped as a concept (and not as a representation), it is not distinct from consciousness and is immediately unified with it" (2009: 57-58).

[45] There is a problem in the conceptual thought that consciousness finds itself. If consciousness finds itself in its object by mere 'thinking', is there still an opposition between subject and object? Houlgate asks this question in the context of the 'aim' of *Phenomenology*: "Yet does this not mean that the *Phenomenology* has now reached its goal: a shape of consciousness in which the opposition between subject and object has been overcome and in which thought and being are known to be completely identical in form?" (2005: 72). Indeed, Hegel aims to point out this problem at the end of the paragraph 197 where he emphasizes the 'immediacy' of thinking that consciousness has reached: "It is *thinking* consciousness *in general*, […] its object is an *immediate* unity of being-in-itself and being-for itself" (1977: 120). This point is going to be explicit when Hegel exposes such thinking in the context of Stoicism.

Stoicism becomes explicit when it fails to give content to its thought as wholly independent from the existence individual things.

> […] here the Notion as an abstraction cuts itself from the multiplicity of things, and thus has no content *in its own self* but one that is *given* to it. […] Stoicism, therefore, was perplexed when it was asked for what was called 'a criterion of truth as such', i.e. strictly speaking, for a *content* of thought itself. To the question, what is good and true, it again gave for the answer the contentless thought. The true and the Good shall consist is the reasonableness. But this self-identity of thought is again only the pure form in which nothing is determined (Hegel, 1977: 122).

The problem for Stoicism is that although it claims that the essence of things can be reached only through its own thought, it necessarily remains dependent on things for giving any content to its thought.[46] Without the 'given content', Stoicism can provide a mere abstract thought of rationality which cannot give satisfactory answers to the basic epistemological and ethical questions. 'Indifference of thought to the natural existence' can answer these questions only with its own circular claims.[47] From the indifference and withdrawal of thought in Stoicism, self-consciousness necessarily makes transition to Scepticism since the Scepticism realizes the abstract freedom of thought. In Scepticism, thought does not withdraw into itself from otherness but actively negates the existence of anything other than itself; so it becomes a 'concrete' thinking:

> In Scepticism, now, the wholly unessential and non-independent character of this 'other' becomes explicit *for consciousness*; the [abstract] thought becomes the concrete thinking which annihilates the being of the world in all its manifold

[46] As Houlgate emphasizes, "thought's intrinsic abstractness, and its resultant dependence on *given* determinacies, is the direct consequence of its looking away from the immediate individuality of things and withdrawing into *itself*" (2005: 72).

[47] Hence the problem of similarity between 'Stoicism' and 'Absolute knowing', which is mentioned in the footnote 46, is removed when it is seen that Stoicism is only an abstract claim of identity between subject and object. "Stoical thought prefigures absolute knowing in so far as it understands thought and being to be identical in structure. It insists on such an identity, however, not because it discovers through its experience that its object is independently and immanently logical, but because it 'withdraws' (sich…zurückzieht) into its *own* thought and finds therein the categories that it then discerns in the object. Its understanding of the identity of thought and being is, therefore, one-sided, since it comes to recognize that identity by looking first to *itself* and then through itself and its own concepts at things" (Houlgate, 2005: 72).

> determinateness, and the negativity of free self-consciousness comes to know itself in the many and varied forms of life as a real negativity (Hegel, 1977: 123).

Sceptical thought brings any independent thing into question; it shows that every determinate thing can be doubted and that there is nothing to rationally believe in the world or life. In sum, Scepticism 'negates' the being of the world through its 'thinking' and it achieves the 'freedom of thought' in this negation: "Through this self-conscious negation it procures for its own self the certainty of its freedom, and thereby raises it to truth" (1977: 124). In contrast to anything it negates, Sceptic self-consciousness hence takes initially itself to be unchangeable and self-identical. However, Sceptic consciousness here suffers from its own contradiction since it becomes aware also of its changeable character and 'contingency' in the process of negative thinking. Through discovering that it is also dependent on the being of the world, the Sceptic admits the changeable aspect of its consciousness. It cannot ignore the fact that there must be something 'unessential' to be negated even for claiming the 'essentiality' of thought.[48] Therefore, as Hegel states, "it owns to being a wholly contingent, single, and separate self-consciousness - a consciousness which is empirical, which takes its guidance from what has no reality for it" (1977: 125). Nevertheless, for Hegel, Sceptical thought does not explicitly recognize its contradictory state and duplication. Instead, it takes apart the two views of itself as self-identical, unchangeable and as contingent; so, the Scepticism oscillates between these two poles:

> This consciousness is therefore the unconscious, thoughtless rambling which passes back and forth from one extreme of the self-identical self-consciousness to the other extreme of the contingent consciousness that is both bewildering and bewildered, […], it has itself the doubly contradictory consciousness of unchangeableness and sameness, and of utter contingency and non-identity with itself (1977: 125).

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[48] Hegel emphasizes the contingency of Sceptic consciousness and its dependence on what it negates where he also states its contradictory nature: "It lets the unessential content in its thinking vanish; but just doing so it is the consciousness of something unessential. It pronounces an absolute vanishing; but the pronouncement *is*, and this consciousness is the vanishing of that is pronounced. It affirms the nullity of seeing, hearing etc., yet it is itself seeing, hearing etc." (1977: 125).

When the Sceptic self-consciousness explicitly 'knows' its internal contradiction and becomes aware of this self-duplication; self-consciousness now takes a new form and becomes Unhappy Consciousness: "the consciousness of self as a dual-natured,[49] merely contradictory being" (Hegel, 1977: 126). Now, for Unhappy Consciousness, even if it is aware of its dual nature, the changeable, individual aspect of its consciousness remains in an opposition to the Unchangeable, universal one. And since it is itself aware of this contradictory state, Hegel says, "it identifies itself with the changeable and takes itself to be unessential Being" (1977: 127). But it also takes the Unchangeable as its own essence from which it is detached;[50] so, the Unhappy Consciousness projects the Unchangeable outside of itself as a 'beyond' in a religious attitude. On the other hand, since it cannot be 'indifferent towards the Unchangeable' as its essence, the Unhappy consciousness should be "freeing itself from the unessential, i.e. from itself" (Hegel, 1977: 127). In order to unite itself with the Unchangeable, it tries to get rid of its changeable, contingent individuality. There are mainly three ways, for Hegel, in which the Unhappy Consciousness attempts to do so. At first, consciousness attempts to unite with the Unchangeable through feeling or 'devotion' which is "only a movement towards thinking" (1977: 131). However, through devotion and feeling, consciousness fails to be one with the Unchangeable essence; it experiences again its separateness from the essence: "[…] instead of laying hold of the essence, it only *feels* it, and has fallen back into itself"

[49] With its duplication, Hegel states, consciousness experiences the relation of lordship-bondsman in itself: "[…] the duplication which formerly was divided between two individuals, the lord and the bondsman, is now lodged in one" (1977: 126). In her reading of Unhappy Consciousness, Judith Butler refers especially to this point since she takes this section mainly as the internalization of lordship-bondage relation and 'the production of self-enslavement' : […] the bondsman becomes lord over himself, more specifically, lord over his own body; this form of reflexivity signals the passage from bondage to unhappy consciousness. It involves splitting the psyche into two parts, a lordship and a bondage internal to a single consciousness, whereby the body is again dissimulated as an alterity, but where this alterity is now interior to the psyche itself" (1997: 42).

[50] As Houlgate states, this separation or detachment from the essence, "this alienation from its own freedom is what makes this self-consciousness 'unhappy'" (2005: 75).

(1977: 131).[51] Secondly, the Unhappy consciousness seeks the same unity through work, in which it aims to be merely in the service of the Unchangeable.[52] Again, Hegel states, although consciousness can have a sense of its unity with Unchangeable, "this unity is at the same time affected with division, is again broken within itself, and from it there emerges once more the antithesis of universal and individual" (1977: 134).[53] Finally, self-consciousness finds the way of uniting itself with Unchangeable in renouncing its individual 'will' through the 'mediation'; it renounces its independence and follows the will of a 'mediator': "it rejects the essence of its will, and casts upon the mediator or minister [priest] its own freedom of decision, and herewith the responsibility for its own action" (Hegel, 1977: 136). Now, for Hegel, there are two basic implications of this renunciation and self-surrender. At first, the Unhappy Consciousness at the end succeeds in 'freeing itself from itself' since it is now wholly determined by the 'mediator' or priest who represents the Unchangeable. That is, it has got rid of its individuality and contingency in favor of what it takes to be universal. But the immediate result of this success, Hegel states, is the transformation of self into a 'thing' which has not its own 'will': "It has the certainty of having truly divested itself of its '*I*', and having turned its immediate self-consciousness in a *Thing*, into an *objective* existence" (1977: 137). This is the negative implication of self-surrender.[54] The second and positive implication is that in this renunciation and surrender, the individual or

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[51] As Butler states, "Devotion turns out to be pure self-feeling […], so is unable to furnish knowledge of anything other than itself" (1997: 47).

[52] The Unhappy Consciousness takes its work as serving to the Unchangeable because it views the being of world in which he also lives as the 'embodied form' of the Unchangeable that it 'surrenders' and 'renounces'. Through work, "the particular individual consciousness gives thanks [for the gift]" (Hegel, 1977: 134).

[53] Consciousness understands that it cannot be wholly in the service of Unchangeable through work because it "does not let itself deceived by its own seeming renunciation, for the truth of the matter is that it has *not* renounced itself" (Hegel, 1977: 134). As Houlgate emphasizes, "the problem is that self-consciousness cannot turn a blind eye to the fact that the very activity through which it seeks to unite itself with the Unchangeable is its *own* activity" (2005: 75).

[54] As Stern mentions, "although the individual can take a step towards universality by putting itself under the sway of the priest, this is merely a *negative* loss of the self, and so does not really signal the synthesis of the universal and individual, as the latter is seen as negated by the former" (2002: 95).

particular will of self-consciousness unites with the Unchangeable; that is, even if self-consciousness is not aware of what it has done, it indeed becomes the 'universal will' through its own activity:

> For the surrender of one's own will, is only from one aspect negative; in principle, however, or in itself, it is at the same time positive, viz. the positing of the will as the will of an 'other', and specifically of will, not as a particular, but as a universal willHence, for consciousness, its will does indeed become universal and essential will, but consciousness itself does not take itself to be this essential will (Hegel, 1977: 138).[55]

When this positive implication becomes explicit for self-consciousness, it is not anymore the Unhappy Consciousness; consciousness now takes a new shape and becomes 'Reason'. As such, it takes its individuality as what is at the same time 'universal'. But the Reason is characterized not only by the mere universality of itself, but also by its new approach towards the otherness or being of the world. For it has now, Hegel states, an idea of "the certainty that, in its particular individuality, it has being the absolutely *in itself*, or is all reality" (1977: 138). Indeed, to give a comprehensive account of this new attitude of self-consciousness towards the reality or being, as an immediate result of the reconciliation of its individuality and universality, seems to be a difficult issue.[56] Nevertheless, what Hegel means by this abrupt transition may be interpreted in its relation to the previous movement of consciousness. As it is analyzed above, the Skeptic discovers its own individuality and contingency while negating the sensuous, contingent world. And the Unhappy consciousness takes this 'truth' explicitly and becomes dual-natured. Here, the crucial point is that individuality and contingency of self-consciousness is the result of its dependence on the sensuous world. For this reason, when the Unhappy

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[55] "That is to say, the unhappy consciousness does not recognize that its own individual will has in fact become one with the universal will of the Unchangeable, and that this has occured precisely because that individual will, by renouncing itself, opened itself to the universal will" (Houlgate, 2005: 76).

[56] Stern states this difficulty, for instance, as follows: "Hegel makes a transition to the next part of the *Phenomenology*, to 'Reason', where the mood is suddenly changes, from gloomy religiosity to rationalistic optimism. Hegel makes this transition very quickly, in one paragraph, and it is hard to see how it is meant to work" (2002: 95).

consciousness reconciles its individuality and universality and so becomes 'Reason', this reconciliation necessarily extends to the sensuous world whose existence was previously taken as irrational.[57] That is, self-consciousness, which now takes its own individuality and contingency to be universal and rational, has also an 'an affirmative attitude' to the 'contingency, individuality and otherness' of the world (Houlgate, 2005: 77). As Houlgate makes more explicit:

> Indeed, reason extends this judgement [that 'individuality is itself *implicitly* rational'] to cover the whole world of given, individual objects – nature that surrounds it: it is happy to let the world of individuality stand and be what it is, because it regards all of it as implicitly rational […]. With the emergence of reason, therefore, 'the [continuing] existence [*Bestehen*] of the world becomes for self-consciousness its own truth and presence; it is certain of experiencing only itself therein' (2005: 77).

Consequently, Reason, as the new shape of consciousness, seeks to find 'itself' in the world; it mainly tries to find 'rational' satisfaction in its relation to being or reality. On the other hand, this also means that at the beginning of 'Reason' chapter, "what is yet a mere 'certainty' by self-conscious Reason that it 'is' reality" (Pippin, 1989: 168). So, the movement of consciousness will proceed both through and beyond 'Reason'.

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[57] An alternative interpretation is made by Jon Stewart. In his analysis of the structure of *Phenomenology*, Stewart views the transition from Unhappy Consciousness to Reason as the level at which the universality of self-consciousness begins to be investigated in the context of objectivity. According to Stewart, Reason at first turns again to the sphere of objectivity like 'Consciousness', but it does such in a 'higher conceptual level': "[…] an account of the interaction of one self-consciousness with other self-conscious subjects must be given in a way that demonstrates how the social whole serves to shape the determination of objectivity in the course of this dialectical interaction among self-conscious subjects. This is the task of the 'Reason' chapter (1995: 758).

CHAPTER 5

THE PROCESS OF RECOGNITION THROUGH *PHENOMENOLOGY*

5.1 Three Approaches to Recognition

Since it is not possible in this study to give an account of the subsequent movement of consciousness,[58] this chapter is dedicated to focus on the process of recognition through *Phenomenology* by means of some crucial secondary literature. There are a few important reasons for undertaking this task: first, the persistence of the issue of recognition is directly related to the problem of self-consciousness. For self-consciousness, as analyzed in chapter three, is essentially 'desire' in the sense that it is something that must be achieved or accomplished. And the necessary condition for this accomplishment is the mutual and reciprocal recognition. Self-consciousness or self-knowledge, according to Hegel, depends on consciousness reflecting to itself from another self-consciousness. In other words, the satisfaction of self-consciousness as desire brings us to the concept of 'Spirit' which is formulated as an 'I that is We'. As Michael Quante states, "the adequate instantiation of self-consciousness in fact already has the structure of spirit, of being with itself in other"; and what connects the concept of self-consciousness to the concept of spirit is nothing other than the process of recognition (2010: 96). Therefore, approaching to the process of recognition seems also to elucidate the concept of 'Spirit', which is one of the most controversial concepts in *Phenomenology*. Furthermore, in the second chapter of this study, it is stated that the role of *Phenomenology*, for Hegel, is to take the natural consciousness to the standpoint of philosophy or 'absolute

[58] Beyond 'Self-Consciousness', there are four main shapes that consciousness takes: 'Reason', 'Spirit', 'Religion' and 'Absolute Knowing'.

knowing'; and the 'absolute knowing' is held to be the 'identity of thought and being' in the sense that they have the same logical form. Another crucial point for this study hence becomes the relevance of recognition, as the condition of self-consciousness, to such a 'knowing'. If consciousness becomes at the end the 'absolute knowing' through its own experience, then what is the necessity of recognition for this process? Why is the accomplishment of self-consciousness through 'spirit' necessary for 'absolute knowing'? Thinking on these questions, I believe, may prevent us from misunderstandings the concepts of 'spirit' and 'absolute knowing', and could make a proper understanding of *Phenomenology* possible.

According to Paul Redding, there are mainly three different approaches to Hegel's concept of recognition. The first one is the Kojève's account, which takes the dialectic of 'master and slave' as central in his famous reading of *Phenomenology*. However, this reading, Redding properly states, cannot be reconciled with what Hegel says in *Phenomenology* (2011: 1). In fact, through our reading of Hegel's own account of self-consciousness in this study, Kojève's distortion of Hegel has been explicated without paying attention to its internal problems.[59] Detaching the theme of self-consciousness from the previous movement of consciousness, interpreting desire from an anthropological perspective and attributing an overestimated emancipatory role to the work of slave are some of the main Kojèvian distortions. But the most important problem in Kojève's reading is his reduction of the process of recognition in *Phenomenology* to the dialectic of master-slave. As Williams elucidates:

> The distortion lies in Kojève's identification of recognition with master and slave. However, for Hegel, recognition is a general concept of intersubjectivity, wider than

[59] In his another work, for instance, Redding states the problem of 'circularity' in Kojève's arguments: "Read as the most basic *context* within which recognition can occur, the struggle provides within which human intentionality can emerge. And yet for Kojève the struggle itself is motivated by a distinctly human motive-the desire for the 'essentially non-vital' end of 'pure prestige'. That is, while the struggle is conceived as brought about by, born from, human desire-the desire for recognition-it is also seen as providing a necessary condition for emergence or *birth of* the only sort of being capable of having that motive" (1996: 119-120).

> master and slave. For Hegel, master and slave are a determinate shape of recognition, in which the possibilities are inherent in the concept are deficiently actualized…In contrast to Kojève, Hegel's master and slave is but an important first phase of unequal recognition that must and can be transcended. It is not the final, but merely transitional, inherently unstable, configuration of intersubjectivity. Genuine recognition is fundamentally reciprocal and involves the mutual mediation of freedom. For this to occur, both parties must renounce coercion. Reciprocal recognition involves freedom and liberation. Hence it is a gross interpretive error to equate, as Kojève does, recognition with the struggle between master and slave (1997: 10).

To my mind, it is exactly this reduction of Hegelian recognition or intersubjectivity to the master-slave dialectic that makes Kojève to think the successive movement of consciousness only in terms of mastery and servitude. Kojève defines, for instance, 'Stoicism, Skepticism and Unhappy Consciousness' as the 'ideologies' of slave, "by which he seeks to justify himself, to justify his slavery, to reconcile the *ideal* of freedom with the *fact* of Slavery" (1980: 53). But it can be argued against this view that any shape of consciousness in the *Phenomenology*, except 'absolute knowing', is an 'ideology' in the sense of being a 'false consciousness'. For the 'knowledge' of any shape of consciousness does not correspond to its object; and each shape is therefore 'false' and must be 'determinately negated'. In addition, it seems to me that the Kojèvian emphasis on the role of work in the liberation of slave, which is discussed in chapter four, is also related to his distortion of Hegel's concept of recognition. Since Kojève identifies the process of recognition with the master-slave dialectic, his reading is based merely on the liberation of slave through work. However, the role of work for the independence of self-consciousness cannot be separated from the process of recognition. If the work means for self-consciousness to free itself from mere natural life and give an objective expression of its independence, then it should become essentially an 'action' that serves to 'self-determination'.[60] In order to become such an action or self-determination, the work

[60] In 'Hegel and the Politics of Recognition', Saul Tobias gives a crucial account of the relation between recognition and work. Although his aim is essentially to disclose the one-sidedness of 'identity politics' approach to Hegel's theory of recognition, the interpretation of Tobias sheds light on this relation by exposing the meaning of 'work' as the 'self-determination' and 'self-transformation' through 'agent's actions' which, he thinks, complete and actualize the recognitive relations: "Recognition, for Hegel, designates an act of consciousness brought about through the perception and acknowledgment of an identity between self and other, resulting in a shift in

must be necessarily preceded by recognitive relations other than the dialectic of master and slave. For the independence of self-consciousness, as explained in the third chapter, already assumes the interaction or intersubjectivity.

The second approach to Hegel's concept of recognition is, Redding states, "emanating from the work of Jürgen Habermas" (2011: 1). Habermas explains his view of Hegelian intersubjectivity in his famous work of "Labor and Interaction". In fact, here, the main interest of Habermas is to differentiate Hegel's *Jena* lectures from his mature works, including *Phenomenology*. According to Habermas, in his *Jena* lectures, "Hegel offered a distinctive, systematic basis for the spirit, which he later abandoned" (1996: 123). In contrast to later conceptions, the spirit is here formulated as intersubjectivity which consists in the interconnections of 'labor, interaction, language'.[61] With the *Phenomenology*, for Habermas, Hegel begins to change his view of spirit by positing an 'absolute spirit' as the identity of spirit with nature, which undermines the intersubjective dimension of subjectivity.[62] Therefore,

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understanding of self and other. Such moments of recognition recur throughout the *Phenomenology*, but they don't in themselves amount to moments of self-transformation, for shifts in understanding must be internalized and then actualized in the world if a genuine transformation in self is to occur. Self-determination constitutes this next step in the development of consciousness by actualizing that changed self-conception. It denotes the active transformation of the self through concrete interaction between consciousness and substance, that being-in-itself which at first appears to be consciousness' other but emerges, in the form of Spirit, as its essence. It is this relationship between self and its concrete environment which forms the basis of self-determination, for it is through the medium of external things that self can perform the labor on itself required for its own transformation" (2006: 103).

[61] "A radicalization of my thesis would read: it is not the spirit in the absolute movement of reflecting on itself that manifests itself in, among other things, language, labor, and moral relationships, but rather, it is the dialectical interconnections among linguistic symbolization, labor and interaction that determine the concept of spirit" (Habermas, 1996: 124).

[62] "To be sure, the dialectic of recognizing oneself in other is bound to the relationship of interaction between antagonists who are in principle equal. As soon as nature in its totality is elevated to an antagonist of united subjects, however, this relation of parity no longer holds; there cannot be a dialog between spirit and nature, the suppression of the dialogic situation between two, and a struggle for recognition that results in a constituted moral relationship- absolute spirit is solitary. The unity of absolute spirit with itself and with a nature, from which it differentiates itself as its other, in the end cannot be conceived in terms of the pattern of the intersubjectivity of acting and speaking subjects, by which Hegel initially attained the concept of the I as the identity of the universal and the singular. The dialectical unity of spirit and nature, in which spirit does not recognize itself in nature as an antagonist, but only finds itself again as an in a mirror image (*Gegenbild*), this unity can more readily be constructed from the experience of the self-reflection of consciousness. Therefore, Hegel conceives

the reading of Habermas mainly argues that there is "a *regress* in Hegel's thought, away from a promising intersubjective or dialogical approach to subjectivity to a more 'monologic' or conscious-centered and, ultimately, pre-Kantian 'metaphysical' one" (Redding, 2011: 1).[63] Certainly, to give an account of Habermas' criticism of Hegelian intersubjectivity through his entire works is beyond the scope of this study. The important point therefore lies in Habermas' approach to *Phenomenology* in terms of the process of recognition or intersubjectivity. In other words, whether Hegel's concept of spirit here undermines the recognition in favor of an identity thesis is the crucial point. Hence, the third approach to Hegel's concept of recognition becomes critical in this context. As Redding states, this view takes Hegel's 'recognitive approach to spirit' as central, and "thus tends to see greater continuity within Hegel's use of the theme of 'recognition' throughout his work […]" (2011: 2). Interpreters like Robert Pippin, Terry Pinkard and Robert Williams share this view and read *Phenomenology* in accordance with the 'recognitive approach'. While I am going to follow this approach, I would like to claim that the process of recognition has a constitutive role in the subsequent movement of consciousness through *Phenomenology*.[64]

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of the movement of absolute spirit in terms of the model of self-reflection […]" (Habermas, 1996: 144).

[63] Although, the referents of 'pre-Kantian metaphysics' may be ambiguous, the main problem of Habermas with the concept of spirit seems to be Hegel's the identity thesis, that is, the unity of subject and object or thought and being. For Habermas' criticism coincides with the metaphysical interpretation of *Phenomenology*: "The traditional metaphysical interpretation of the *PhG* has it culminating in the elimination of the opposition between thought and being, subject and object […]. On this reading, Hegel's famous dissatisfaction with the Kantian in-itself is corrected by returning to an essentially pre-Kantian position in which the subject knows the thing-in-itself, and the innovation in absolute knowing is that the thing-in-itself is transformed into subject's own cognitive structures" (Lumsden, 1998: 5).

[64] As Ludwig Siep points out, although, after the dialectic of master and slave, Hegel does not mention the concept of recognition explicitly until to the theme of 'conscience' at the end of 'Spirit', this does not mean that 'recognition' does not play a role through the subsequent movement of consciousness. "It is subordinated to the principle topic of *Phenomenology*, which is overcoming of the ontological and epistemological dualism between consciousness and object as well as between individual and general self-consciousness, or rather spirit" (2010: 111).

5.2 Recognition, Spirit and Absolute Knowing

One of the most crucial point by means of which the role of the recognition and its relation to the concept of spirit can be seen is the problem of transition from 'Reason' to the 'Spirit'. According to Pippin, there are two main transition problems in the *Phenomenology*: from the 'Consciousness' to Self-consciousness and from 'Reason' to 'Spirit'. Furthermore, what these two transitions have in common is Hegel's critique of the 'individualist' positions that consciousness takes. Just as Hegel exposes the failures of "individualist models of mind-world relations" through the first transition, in the second, Hegel now aims to expose the "individualist models of agency, especially self-conscious, rational agency" (1993: 57). In the chapter of 'Self-consciousness', as it is explored in the third chapter of this study, Hegel shows that consciousness' self-knowledge depends on its recognition by another consciousness, that is, on the intersubjectivity or sociality. With the second section of 'Reason',[65] Pippin states, where the subjects begin to be conceived as 'rationally acting', 'self-realizing', 'self-determining' subjects, "Hegel again criticizes an individualist notion of such an agency, again introduces the explicit theme of sociality, or *Geist*" (1993: 73). As the one which Pippin views to be reflecting Hegel's main intention in 'Reason', he discusses the section of 'Spiritual Realm of Animals and Deception; Or, the Real Thing'. At this stage, consciousness "takes itself *to be* real in and for itself" in the sense of determining itself rationally through its own actions or deeds,[66] and conceives the social world as "an arena of mutual self-realization" (Pippin, 1993: 74). However, for Hegel's main argument, in spite of its intentions, reasons or motivations, consciousness cannot determine the real

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[65] This second section is titled "The Actualization of Rational Self-Consciousness through Its Own Activity". And the previous section is 'Observing Reason'. To put it very simply, in the 'Observing Reason', consciousness cannot find a rational satisfaction because such a reason "reduces subjects to observable things". In other words, Observing Reason cannot give an account of "self-relation in relation to other as wholly based on reason" (Pippin, 1993: 72-73).

[66] As Stern emphasizes, here, "the subject evaluates himself in terms of his 'works' (i.e. his deeds and products) which he views as an expression of himself, coming to know what he is through what he can do" (2002: 124).

meaning of its actions by itself. For the meaning or rationality of an action comes to light only through the mediation of sociality, in a 'retrospective' way:

> Of the crucial importance in that argument is what Hegel calls the experience of the 'antithesis of doing (*Tun*) and Being (*Sein*)' that results from my prudential action, my attempt simply to act for, to exhibit, myself. The argument turns this issue, and it appears to refer to the fact that, no matter what I intend and plan, once I act, the results and implications of my action, most of which could not have been foreseen, determine on their own, contingently, what is 'I did', and so *act* 'vanishes' in doing of it, is swallowed up by these implications and consequences. A gap opens between what I *do* and, contingently, what the act *is* […]. I come to experience this 'vanishing' of my work as itself something 'vanishes', or is not real, does not really count, does not affect the true significance of my work, now called 'die Sache selbst', or the real thing I am trying to affect (Pippin, 1993: 75).

The main problem for consciousness as an 'agent' is that its actions exist always for the 'others' as well as for itself. In other words, the rational agency of an individual is necessarily bound up with the intersubjective realm, the society in which the agent tries to determine itself. The account of rationality therefore cannot be given 'individualistically', without taking into consideration the 'community' or the 'essence' that all individuals share.[67] Thus, the failures of the 'individualistic' attempts become Hegel's main concern in the transition from 'Reason' to 'Spirit'. As Pippin emphasizes:

> Action, the reality (*Sache*) of which is now conceived as 'each and everyone', requires an analysis of 'the essence which is the essence of all beings, spiritual essence', or what Hegel earlier introduced as the historical community, the *Volk*, within which reason is sustained and realized. And all of this is said to be necessary even if we assume that reasons can count as reasons only if they can count for me. That 'me' can function no more successfully as the 'real thing' as any other candidate, or at least not without some attempt to locate it within, to see its dependence on, 'spiritual essence' (1993: 77).

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[67] As far as the rational agency, the individual's determining itself is an issue of the freedom, Hegel's approach to the insufficiency of individualistic attempts is also related to his view of 'freedom'. In his a work which aims to show that Hegel's theory of recognition is essentially an answer to the question of freedom, Pippin focuses on this point. He states, according to Hegel, it is "false assumption that there could be anything like an individually free will apart from that social challenge and response. Rather, the latter is the original condition of free agency itself, a social relation without which my relation to my own deeds could not conceived as free, and so a form of dependence in which the independence is achieved, not compromised (2000: 158).

It may seem that while Pippin explores such a crucial transition in *Phenomenology*, his account already presupposes an approach to Hegel's concept of spirit. In this sense, taking the spirit simply as the 'historical community' may not be able to elucidate the relevance of recognition to the concept of spirit. Before disclosing this point, however, I would like to refer briefly another account of the transition to 'Spirit' given by Robert Stern; this crucial account, I believe, will also to make the issue of recognition more explicit in the context of spirit. To explicate the transition to 'Spirit', Stern focuses on the last section of 'Reason': 'Reason as Testing Laws'. In this section, consciousness takes another 'individualistic' position towards its actions by trying to test them in accordance with the principle of ethical 'universalizability'. As Stern states, "that test is the Kantian test of universalizability, where the subject asks himself if the maxim of his action can be conceived of or willed as a universal law on which everyone acted" (2002: 128). In sum, Hegel's main concern becomes the criticism of 'universalizability principle' of Kantian ethics as the "attempt by Reason to provide the individual with a way of determining the content of morality" (Stern, 2002: 128). According to Stern, Hegel's critique of Kantian morality, which focuses on the 'emptiness' or 'formalism' of such a morality, should not be read as if Hegel argues that every maxim can pass the Kantian test. Hegel does not state, for instance, 'obtaining property by stealing' can be universalized and the institution of property can still exist in a world that anyone steals from others. Rather, Hegel's main concern is that, in addition to this test, "we *also* need to be told why it would be wrong to act in such a way as to undermine the institution in question in this manner, and no formal test (of contradiction) can tell us *that*" (Stern, 2002: 129). That is, to become morally significant and determine how an individual must behave or act, the 'universalizability test' already presupposes some moral principles, as in the case of the 'stealing' and the institution of property.[68] But this means that the Kantian standpoint is not 'purely' formal, and it

[68] Or, to become presuppositionless, the Kantian test must also justify the institutions since it is hold that the morally wrong actions cannot be universalized because of undermining these institutions: "[…] otherwise it is not clear that why the contradiction test applied to maxims reveals anything of ethical significance: for, even if making lying promises undermines the institution of promise-keeping

assumes an implicit 'content'. This Kantian 'dilemma', Stern states, is the core of Hegel's critique:

> Either the Kantian treats the universalizability test as purely formal (but then why should passing this test matter from a moral perspective?), or he accepts that the test has some moral content (in which case he has not shown that reason can distinguish between right and wrong action on a purely formal basis). The Kantian can thus either threaten the authority of morality itself by trying to determine what is moral by using a purely formal (morally empty) test, or he can accept the test is not purely formal but itself part of morality, in which case we have not in fact got beyond a kind of moral foundationalism, which takes certain moral principles (concerning the wrongness of free-riding, for example) as given (2002: 132).

Consequently, the failure of Kantian morality, which is the last version of the individualistic attitude of 'Reason', gives rise to Hegel's transition to 'Spirit', and specifically to the Greek ethical life as the first shape of 'Spirit'. In contrast to the 'individualism' of 'Reason', with the ethical life of Greeks, the community as a whole takes priority over the individuals since they simply "accept the foundational nature of moral principles, without any attempt to 'ground' or 'derive' them in some extra-moral test" (Stern, 2002: 132).[69]

As mentioned above, in both of these accounts of transition, there is a certain approach to Hegel's concept of spirit. The concept of spirit, accordingly, mainly refers to the sociality, intersubjectivity or community. That is why the spirit is viewed as to overcome the insufficiencies of the individualistic attempts of rational agency. Spirit, as community, provides individuals with the common reasons, moral principles or laws, and determines the rationality of their intentions, thoughts and actions. To make such an approach to spirit and its relevance to recognition more explicit, I think, Terry Pinkard's definition of Hegelian spirit is helpful and

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(for example), unless promising is shown to be a morally sound institution, then this would not show lying to be wrong" (Stern, 2002: 130).

[69] In this ethical life, consciousness does not see itself as an individual independent of the 'moral world'. Rather, it is "simply immersed in that world, living unreflectively within its teachings and precepts. At this point, therefore, finds itself ready 'to put its merely individual aspect behind it'" (Stern, 2002: 133).

illuminating.[70] According to Pinkard, the concept of spirit has its roots in the "social space", which means the structure of "the basic 'ground rules' for agents to justify their beliefs and to guide their actions" (1994: 8). Any 'social space' has within itself the 'authoritative reasons' and norms that constitute 'what is count truth' for the agents; the 'social space' therefore determines how the agents should 'reason' and act (Pinkard, 1994: 8). Hegel's concept of spirit, for Pinkard, refers to a 'self-conscious form of social space', in which the individuals have a common understanding of themselves in terms of the authoritative reasons that bind them. Since such a common self-understanding is not possible without their 'recognition' of each other, the spirit essentially becomes the result of the 'mutual recognition' of subjects. As Pinkard states:

> Wherever there is mutual recognition among self-conscious subjects that is mediated by such a shared self-conscious understanding of what for them counts in general as an authoritative reason for belief and action – that is, mediated by whom they take themselves to be in light of what they count as being generally authoritative – we have a relation of what Hegel calls *spirit* […]. 'Spirit' therefore denotes for Hegel not a metaphysical entity but a fundamental relation among persons that mediates their self-consciousness, a way in which people reflect on what they have come to take as authoritative for themselves (1994: 8).

What is stated so far about the persistence of recognition issue, I think, coincides with the main thesis of Robert R. Williams, who suggests us reading *Phenomenology* in terms of the process of recognition. According to Williams, recognition is the key concept in Hegel's view of 'Spirit': "The concept of recognition is a subordinate theme in Hegel's *Phenomenology*; in fact, rather than being a discrete theme, it is an

[70] In fact, in his another work, Pippin also refers to Pinkard's definition in order to analyze again Hegel's criticism of individualistic rational agency: "[…] Hegel tries to exhibit phenomenologically the severe limitations of the standard, individualist position (the 'inner' determining the 'other') and proposes instead to look not at several distinct causally initiated phases of an action but to view actions as evolving and changing expressions of a subject's intentions over an extended time, determinate only in extended confrontation and reaction within what Terry Pinkard has called 'social space', and not the causal results of a discrete event" (2010: 412).

operative concept[71] in which and by means of which Hegel sets forth his thematic concept, the concept of Spirit" (2003: 59).[72] Since, for Williams, recognition is the'phenomenological genesis' of Spirit,[73] Spirit or *Geist* is a social-intersubjective conception; so, it exists as the result or achievement of reciprocal recognition. Without paying attention to the role of recognition in its constitution of Spirit, it is very easy either to take Hegel's position as a 'philosophy of subject' like Habermas does; or to misinterpret it as a 'transcendental philosophy' by considering *Geist* to be same with the Kantian 'transcendental self'[74] (Williams, 2003: 59). A proper reading of *Geist*,[75] however, has to see that rather than being the transcendental self which

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[71] An operative concept is, according to Williams, the implicit concept that is used in order to explain the thematic and explicit concept: "An operative concept is a medium through and by means of which another concept is developed as a theme" (2003: 88).

[72] Through discussing the concept of Spirit, Williams also tries to give the account of 'Reason' by means of the concept of recognition. As the shape of consciousness that precedes 'Spirit', Reason's individualistic attempts for rationality needs recognition in order to find the 'truth': "Social mediation is required in order for reason to elevate its certainty to truth […]. Reason must undergo reciprocal intersubjective mediation, and apart from such, it remains abstractly universal […]. Reason's epistemological claims to universality and objectivity, i.e., its certainty of being all reality, are rooted in and inextricably bound up with an intersubjective and social universality. Intersubjective mediation is crucial to the idealist claim that reason is objective in the world" (1992: 196-197).

[73] "Recognition is the existential-phenomenological genesis of *Geist*; conversely, *Geist* is the result, the accomplishment, of reciprocal recognition. My thesis is that recognition is '*aufgehoben*' and therefore be preserved in the concept of *Geist*. Consequently, *Geist* is essentially a holistic social intersubjective conception" (Williams, 1992: 191).

[74] Robert Solomon, for instance, claims that Hegel's concept of *Geist* is indeed the Kantian transcendental self, which overcomes the problem of 'individuating' the transcendental self : "For Hegel, the transcendental ego, as *Geist*, is literally general or universal consciousness, as it *ought to* be have been for Kant. Hegel's *Geist* is Kant's ego without the unwarranted claim that there is one Ego per person. *Geist* is simply the underlying unifying principle of consciousness and, at the same time, the underlying rational will 'behind' all practical reason and action […]. Kant's consciousness in general with its necessary 'I think' is forced to become universal *Geist*, no longer stating the laws necessary for any consciousness but also stating that every consciousness is *transcendentally* indistinguishable from every other" (1970: 660).

[75] Against many mystifications of Hegelian concept of 'Spirit', Marina F. Byokova gives a crucial analysis of the concept, which exposes that the universal or 'cosmic' spirit is not something independent of the individual consciousness. "In connection with Hegel, 'spirit' too often suggests some transcendent, supra-human being or some kind of presence within world of the absolute substance. Hegel himself may be guilty of obscuring the meaning of 'spirit' due to his idealism and the totalizing tendency of his system. Yet despite any expository excesses, Hegel's philosophy of 'cosmic' spirit and its correlation with the development of human consciousness is very realistic and of great importance, especially for understanding Hegel's project of *Phenomenology*. Hegel stresses

conditions any possible experience, *Geist* emerges as a result of the 'experience of recognition'. It is basically, Williams emphasizes, the accomplishment of the 'We' by means of the 'twofold mediation' between the self and the other:

> When the twofold mediation occurs, there emerges a third over above the original two selves, namely the We, or social self. The We is the result of the this process of twofold mediation, and for this reason We must be distinguished from a transcendental consciousness or structure. As the concrete universal which is inclusive of and the result of the joint action of its members, the We is a social infinite […]. *Geist* is not the transcendental ego, but rather the intersubjective-social self resulting from the reciprocal recognition (1987: 10-11).

Consistently, Williams reads the stages or shapes of Spirit in terms of the process of recognition; these shapes are basically the "Greek *Sittlichkeit*, alienated *Geist* and *Geist* certain of itself" (1992: 200). While the main point in the Greek ethical life is the 'tragic recognition' between the 'divine law' and 'human law' expressed in the *Antigone*, it becomes the 'conflict' between the Enlightenment and faith in the alienated Spirit. Finally, in the last shape, through the mediation of 'morality', the crucial theme becomes 'conscience and forgiveness' by means of which the reciprocal recognition actualizes. Instead of reading these shapes in details, however, I would rather trace the movement of Spirit in the context of a fundamental problem. For it seems that an understanding of Spirit as the intersubjective, social self needs to be explained in terms of this question: If any shape of Spirit, as an ethical and political community or 'We', is constituted already by means of recognition, then why Hegel needs to expose Spirit in all its different shapes? Why the process of recognition does not culminate in 'any' form of the 'We', if the 'We' is taken as a result of a reciprocal recognition? To my conviction, the reason is that, for Hegel, the reciprocal recognition in the proper sense is not only the recognition among the individuals or 'I's, but also between the 'We' and 'I's.[76] That is, there

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the interdependence of 'cosmic' spirit and individual self-consciousness and claims that the development of individual consciousness is nothing but the self-development of spirit" (2009: 273).

[76] Ludwig Siep emphasizes this point, I think, when he states: "Self-consciousness demands to recognize oneself in the other by differentiating oneself from the other and this through mutual (cognitive and emotional) affirmation and liberation. This structure not only applies for the 'I-other' but also for the 'I-we' relation" (2010: 109-110).

must be a mutual recognition between the individual self and the intersubjective, social or universal self. Therefore, the recognitive relation between the self and the society, or individual and universal, is the main issue through the movement of Spirit. For reading the 'Spirit' in this manner, I think, it is crucial to follow the analysis by John Russon, where he aims to show why certain social organizations and communities are inadequate for selfhood and recognition. For Russon, in the social situation, the self is recognized to the extent that the 'law' of that society is the expression of self. That is, law becomes in a community the 'phenomenon' in and through which the recognition of each self by the others is mediated:

> The crucial point is that it is *when one chooses to be committed to a law which others likewise recognize as that to which they are committed* that their choices mutually and equally recognizes each other. It is to the extent that each recognizes the judgement made by the law as her/his own judgement that the choices of each are the choices of both, and that that which each wills is sanctioned - recognized- by the other. What this means is that the self which is sanctioned by the other is the self which is identical with an overarching institution of a society, that is, an 'I' is *recognizable* to the precise extent that the 'I' is a we (1991: 536).

For the reason that self's consciousness of itself, its recognition by others depends on its self-recognition in law or institution of society, for Hegel, the adequate social system is the one in which the self and the law are identified, "such that one sees that it is the social system which acts through the singular agents" (Russon, 1991: 537). However, it is not the simple case that the individuals depends one-sidedly on the social system to become self-conscious. For the law or social system, Russon emphasizes, is 'equally' dependent on the singular agents to become efficient: "*It is the law which acts* through the singular agents, but equally that *the law itself only exists in and through the action of these singular agents*" (1991: 537). Hence, there must be a reciprocal relation between the self and the law, between the 'I' and the 'We'. It is exactly to show the inadequate forms of social systems in which this reciprocity principle could not be satisfied that Hegel exposes the Spirit in and through its untrue shapes. While the 'traditional society' subordinates the individual to the 'We' by treating the law "as something existing in its own right in independence of the singular self-consciousness that obey the law", the modern

society or the 'society of self-creation' posits a "singular self-consciousness which does not exists *precisely* as the representative agent of a social system" (1991: 537-538).[77] In brief, as Russon shows, the crucial thing is that Hegel presents the 'conscience and forgiveness' as the adequate social system for self-consciousness: "the system of institutions which recognizes the individuals who recognize others" (1991: 538).[78] In such a system, not only the individuals recognize the 'law' and their dependence on others, but their individualities are equally recognized as the thing which actualizes that 'law'. Consequently, I think, the reciprocal recognition through 'conscience and forgiveness' refers to the recognition between the 'I' and the 'We', as well as between the 'I' and the 'other'. In such recognition, the self and the society, individuality and universality coincides. That is why Hegel defines this reciprocal recognition as 'reconciliation' and 'Absolute Spirit':

> The word of reconciliation is the *objectively* existent Spirit, which beholds the pure knowledge of itself qua universal essence, in its opposite, in the pure knowledge of itself qua absolutely self-contained and exclusive *individuality* – a reciprocal recognition which is *absolute* Spirit (1977: 408).

As stated at the beginning, the most difficult problem in reading *Phenomenology* in terms of the process of recognition resides in understanding the relation between intersubjectity and 'absolute knowing'. To comprehend this point, it seems that returning to the reading of Williams is significant since he has a unique and original approach to the problem. According to Williams, although Hegelian 'Spirit' mainly refers to the intersubjective-social self, there is also another sense of the spirit, which

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[77] The Greek Ethical life is certainly the traditional society in which the individual selves are totally subsumed to the laws of society. As Williams states, "The classical world had a deficient conception of subjectivity. This deficiency finds expression in the provincial consciousness of Antigone and Creon, and underlies their immediate identification with their respective social roles" (1992: 204). Conversely, the Kantian morality is the expression of the modern society of self-creation since "it posits a self-contained singular self for which is abstracted from the particularities of its existence" (Russon, 1991: 539).

[78] "Conscience posits the need to act morally, and thereby is the *Aufhebung* of the demand of society of self-creation that singularity become objective, but it is equally the *Aufhebung* of traditional society in that it recognizes that objectivity of subjectivity is achieved when its singular judgement is animated by the concrete necessity of ethos rather than the abstract and merely formal necessity of simple reflective reason" (Russon, 1991: 540).

arises especially out of the conceptualization of 'Absolute Spirit'. Admitting Habermas' analysis on different conceptions of Spirit in Hegel's work, he focuses on two models of Spirit in *Phenomenology*, namely the intersubjective and the idealist ones. While the intersubjective model refers to an 'I that is We', "in the idealist model *Geist* is a living identity which divides itself, opposes itself to itself, and returns to itself out of its otherness, alienation, division etc" (1995: 601). In fact, these two conceptions of Spirit have been mentioned also in this study. While reading the 'Preface' in the second chapter, it was the 'idealist model' that given as the definition of Spirit: the 'dynamic unity of subject and object'. In the third chapter, however, the definition of Spirit was given according to the 'intersubjective model' as the unity of different self-consciousnesses. Consequently, from these two conceptions of Spirit, for Williams, the two different views of 'absolute knowing' emerge:

> The central interpretive issue concerning absolute knowledge may be as follows: On the one hand, absolute knowing is the complete and final transformation of substance into subject, the transparency of I=I. On the other hand, Hegel develops and puts forth a social-intersubjective concept of *Geist*. The question is, are these compatible? If not, does he finally override or undermine his social conception at the ultimate level of absolute knowledge? […] If the absolute *Geist* overrides or eliminates the otherness, then it would in the final analysis be life-less, solitary and alone. This is exactly what Hegel denies. Not only is the intersubjective model of spirit retained, in the *Phenomenology* it is the comprehensive formulation of *Geist* (Williams, 1992: 254). [79]

The main problem is, according to Williams, how to interpret and make these two models of Hegelian 'absolute' comprehensible. And the probable solution could be to give the account of one model through the other. In this sense, the intersubjective model must take priority over the idealist model since the idealist model cannot give the account of intersubjectivity, but the intersubjective or social model can 'incorporate' the idealist one (1992: 255). What lie at the basis of such a disparity

[79] In his another work, Williams states this problem as follows: "[…] from the each model of *Geist* a different sense of the concept and its self-identity emerges. In the idealist model the self-identical unity of *Geist* is reflectively achieved in pure self-transparency, I am I. This self-identical unity is pure knowledge, and no intersubjective unity mediation is necessary. Conversely, the intersubjective model of *Geist* requires intersubjective mediation: this is not simply I am I, but rather an I that is a We, a social infinite" (1987: 12).

between the two models is the different positions of the 'other' in each. In the idealist model, the 'other' is eliminated or reduced to the self. "Self-recognition in other, being at home with self in an other, are, on the idealist model, interpreted simply as *self*-recognition" (Williams, 1992: 256). Hence the spirit necessarily becomes a 'solitary' subject which knows only itself in a 'solipsistic' way; and this model certainly undermines the intersubjectivity.[80] Conversely, in the intersubjective model, the other is essential for the self; the otherness or difference is preserved since it is a necessary 'condition' for the self-knowledge. Therefore, Williams states, the intersubjective model, as the 'identity in difference', should be the more proper interpretation of 'absolute knowledge':

> A second possible interpretation is the intersubjective model. By this I mean the concept of substance become subject is not to be interpreted solipsistically, but as social, as involving self-recognition in the other […]. I believe this is the authentically Hegelian interpretation of idealism's I=I, that explodes the latter's abstract undifferentiated identity of solipsism, and transforms it into an identity requires difference (1992: 256).

On the other hand, the priority of intersubjective model, for Williams, should not be understood as the 'derivation' of subjectivity from the intersubjectivity for the main reason that they are 'correlative' or interdependent. Just as the self-identity depends on the other and intersubjectivity, the subjectivity is also equally constitutive of the intersubjective self-identity: "It is not as if self-consciousness is 'created' by intersubjectivity or is a merely small slice of intersubjectivity. […] subjectivity and intersubjectivity are equi-primordial, reciprocal conceptions" (1987: 15). In other words, the priority of intersubjectivity does not mean the priority of 'We' over 'I'; rather, the 'I' and 'We', the self and the other equally 'creates' or conditions each other. Lastly, it may seem that the intersubjective model fails if the 'other' is taken not as another self but, for instance, as 'being'. In such a case, the idealist model seems more to appropriate for the absolute knowledge which refers to the 'identity of thought and being'. However, I believe, Williams' approach has also crucial

[80] "To interpret Geist as a solitary subject is to overlook Hegel's major contribution that Geist is an I that is We, and a We that is I" (Williams, 1992: 256).

implications for absolute knowledge in this regard. The 'absolute knowing', in which we could finally comprehend the identity of subject and object, cannot be absolute if it excludes difference from itself or eliminates the otherness. For the elimination of otherness would become the 'reduction' of object to the self, but not of their 'identity'. Therefore, preservation of difference or self-recognition in 'other' is crucial for a proper understanding of 'identity of thought and being' as the 'identity in difference'. As Williams states:

> When it is said that absolute has no other, does it mean that the absolute eliminates otherness and other? This is the conventional reading that culminates in abstract identity and metaphysics. On the other hand, these assertions may also mean that the absolute allows the other to be. The result is an ontological concept of being as community in which the other loses its alien character, but not its independence. The social reading reflects Hegel's concept of recognition and antifoundational critical of metaphysics (1992: 261).

In the light of Williams' reading that is outlined above, I want to claim that more than 'incorporating' the idealist model, the intersubjective model could be understood as the very condition of idealist model in the *Phenomenology*. And this point depends on the necessary formation or accomplishment of self-consciousness through mutual and reciprocal recognition. The 'absolute knowing', as the identity of thought and being, cannot be achieved without the self-knowledge of consciousness; that is, if consciousness does not become a complete self-consciousness, then it cannot already achieve the standpoint of its identity with being. In this sense, 'absolute knowing' seems to be nothing other than the 'reconciliation of self-consciousness and consciousness'.[81] On the other hand, as we have seen, the

[81] According to Simon Lumsden, Hegel resolves the Kantian distinction of self-consciousness and consciousness in the 'absolute knowing'. "In Kant's account there is an abstract dichotomy between consciousness and self-consciousness: consciousness has a content and self-consciousness is the system of that conditions that allow consciousness have a content […]. By the end of *PhG*, the conditions under that consciousness takes to be the determinations of the object are recognized as the totality of conditions *of its own* cognitive relations and experience. In this way, self-consciousness becomes more like consciousness, as the conditions for consciousness are shown to be immanent in the content of consciousness. In grasping the content as determinate the content does not turn into something purely theoretical; it remains a content but it is a content that is now understood as expressing the form of this determinacy, it is not something other to it but is constitutive of it. The conditions are not therefore nothing abstract, as with Kantian self-consciousness, as they are now

existence of self-consciousness is possible only on the condition of mutual and reciprocal recognition. Without the intersubjective mediation, consciousness cannot have knowledge of itself. And if consciousness in the absolute knowing sees 'itself' in the object, this means that such an identity is necessarily mediated by intersubjectivity. As Lumsden points out:

> Consciousness can only understand itself in the object in an intersubjective context and this intersubjectivity also provides the limitations of and conditions for its thought about itself and any possible object of experience […]. Consciousness sees itself in the object, but what it sees is not only simply its own singular reflection […]. That consciousness now understands itself in terms of the various shapes through which it has passed implies that its self-understanding reflects the spiritual community to which it belongs and by which it is maintained as a constitutive moment. Its engagement with the object is a spiritual relationship, because its understanding of object reflects the dynamic of its self understanding (1998: 18).

Hence the absolute knowing, the identity of consciousness and self-consciousness, depends on the accomplishment of self-consciousness through mutual recognition. In other words, the idealist model presupposes the intersubjective one. And that is why, I think, consciousness necessarily experiences the mutual recognition in 'Absolute Spirit' before achieving the 'Absolute Knowing' at the end. The mutual and reciprocal recognition becomes the necessary condition of the 'Absolute Knowing', which is the standpoint of philosophy.

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shown to be content and this content is the self. This is the reconciliation of consciousness and self-consciousness" (1998: 14).

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

In concluding this study, I would like to focus on the most crucial points that revealed throughout the reading of *Phenomenology* in terms of the problem of 'self-consciousness and recognition'. The emergence of self-consciousness, as an explicit issue in the *Phenomenology*, is not simply Hegel's changing the topic from the object into the subject. Hegel's 'immanent critique' of consciousness reveals that the self-knowledge or self-consciousness arises out of the attempts of consciousness to know the truth, in which it takes the truth to be the object independent of itself. As the result of the failures of these attempts, what reveals as the 'truth' is the 'activity' of consciousness in its relation to object. Thus, the independent activity of consciousness entails its 'self-relation' and 'self-knowledge'.[82] However, the immediate return of consciousness to itself from otherness, or its initial 'self-certainty', cannot provide to consciousness its self-consciousness and self-knowledge. Consciousness cannot be immediately the object to itself. It can become the object of itself and achieve the self-knowledge only in its relation to otherness. In other words, consciousness must 'reflect from otherness' in order to be self-

[82] Hence it would not be a mistake to conclude that Hegel, through his examination of consciousness, begins to make his own philosophical contribution with chapter of 'Self-consciousness', as David Sherman states. According to Sherman, the shapes of consciousness before the 'Self-consciousness' chapter represent the certain philosophical positions of Hegel's predecessors like empiricism, rationalism and Kantian critical philosophy: "Although they inauspiciously arise more than one hundred pages into the *Phenomenology*, the forms of consciousness that correspond to master and slave betoken Hegel's own distinctive philosophical contribution, for the first three chapters of the book, as well as the introductory part of fourth, are basically a recapitulation of the philosophical failures of Hegel's predecessors" (1999: 3-4). However, in contrast to Sherman, I think that Hegel's contribution does not begin with the dialectic of master slave, but with his presentation of 'recognition' as the condition of self-consciousness.

consciousness. It is in this sense that Hegel defines self-consciousness as ‘desire’; self-consciousness is essentially a ‘projection’, a self-conception that must be ‘achieved’ or accomplished. In this regard, self-consciousness is the ‘desire’ that desires its own ‘unity’, the ‘unity with itself in its otherness’.

The natural or animal desire is the first form of desire through which it aims to eliminate the independence of otherness and reflects to itself. On the other hand, to the extent that self-consciousness remains as natural desire, it cannot find the satisfaction since it remains merely as a part of ‘natural life’. As natural desire, self-consciousness discovers the independence of ‘life’ instead of the independence of itself. Therefore, ‘desire’ necessarily takes another form, which is the desire for ‘recognition’. The crucial point is that recognition is the only way of both achieving the independence from life and finding the satisfaction. Self-consciousness can reflect from the otherness and realize its independence only in its recognition by the other self-consciousness. That is to say, since self-consciousness is essentially desire, it is not that there is self-consciousness that desires to be recognized; rather, the recognition is the very condition of self-consciousness and self-knowledge. Without intersubjectivity or sociality, there is no subjectivity and self-consciousness. However, for Hegel’s exposition of the concept of recognition, the reciprocity or mutuality of recognitive relation is also another condition of self-consciousness. While focusing on such reciprocity, Hegel’s concern is not mainly an ethical relation that should be constituted between the self and the other. Rather, the reciprocity of recognition is necessary for self-consciousness’ knowing of itself in the other. A one-sided and unequal recognition cannot reflect the self to itself from the other. And indeed, what Hegel shows in the dialectic of master and slave is such an inadequacy of one-sided recognition that consciousness experiences. The master becomes independent from mere natural life through the life and death struggle by means of risking its own life in favor of recognition; it is recognized by the slave. In spite of this recognition, however, the master cannot find satisfaction for the main reason that the slave does not ‘reflect’ its independence and essentiality; the slavery is the truth of master. Therefore, Hegel continues to examine the experience of consciousness in

terms of the servile consciousness. The truth of the independent consciousness must be found in the servile consciousness since it is capable of both recognizing and being recognized. Though it seems initially only for the other, it is 'implicitly' for-itself and independent. The movement of servile consciousness is thus its rediscovering of its independence in the work or labor, together with the moments of fear and service. The slave, who is initially attached to its natural life, discovers its independence in the work or 'formative activity' on the things or nature. In the forms that it gives to the things, the slave finds its independent self. On the other hand, the slave discovers its independence in its very dependence or slavery. The work or labor, in which the slave rediscovers its independence, is at the same time the expression of slavery. In this sense, rather than being the self-determination of consciousness, the work of slave is may be defined as an 'alienated work'. The slave does not become recognized by the other in spite of its self-development; the problem of recognition, the unity with itself in otherness, remains as unresolved or incomplete also in terms of the slave. Consequently, Hegel's exposition of servile consciousness does not culminate in the independence of slave or in a reciprocal recognition. Instead, consciousness changes into another shape which arises out of the contradiction between independence and dependence of the slave: the 'freedom of thought' that takes place in 'Stoicism, Skepticism and Unhappy consciousness'.

Consistent with the failure of mutual and reciprocal recognition in the dialectic of master and slave, the process of recognition continues through the subsequent movement of consciousness. In other words, the concept of recognition in the *Phenomenology* cannot be reduced to the master-slave dialectic since it has a determining or constitutive role through following the experience of consciousness. As it is explored in the chapter five, Hegel's transition from the individualistic attempts of rational agency in 'Reason' to the 'Spirit' is based mainly on the concept of 'spirit' as the intersubjective, social self. And what constitutes the 'spirit' as the 'intersubjective self' is nothing but the mutual recognition between individuals. Spirit is thus the ethical-political community, the accomplishment of 'We' over the 'I's. However, for Hegel, the mutual and reciprocal recognition in the proper sense

does not only refer to 'any' form of society and intersubjectivity. This recognition must emerge also between the 'I' and the 'We'; the reciprocity principle determines also the recognition between the individual self and the social, universal self. Therefore, Hegel exposes the shapes of spirit or the social systems according to this reciprocity principle. In this regard, 'Absolute spirit' is the community in which there is reciprocal recognition both between the 'self' and the 'other', and between the 'I' and 'We'; so, it is the reconciliation of individual and universal. Lastly, the process of recognition becomes constitutive also for Hegel's concept of 'absolute knowledge'. Recognition or intersubjectivity is the model, even the condition of 'absolute knowing' which is the 'self-recognition in other' and 'identity in difference'.

To my conviction, Hegel's exposition of self-consciousness and recognition through the *Phenomenology* and his concept of 'spirit' refer to a radically different position in the history of philosophy. The *Phenomenology* mainly shows that any relation of consciousness to its object entails not only its self-relation, but also its relation to 'others'. As Pippin states, "once the mind-world problem is linked to the subject-subject problem, and such subjects are understood in the mutually dependent, self-transforming way they are, the problem of consciousness must become the problem of *Geist*" (1993: 79). Certainly, 'self-consciousness and recognition' has a central role in this account. Self-consciousness, as we have seen, is not something like our immediate self-awareness or self-conception; it is essentially 'desire' that must be satisfied.[83] Thus, the way we know ourselves and world depends on how we are recognized by the others. And that is why Hegel thinks that we have a proper self-understanding only within the spiritual community or intersubjective self. As such, think, Hegel's exposition abolishes the traditional distinction between the political-

[83] It may be concluded, I think, that just as there is a process of recognition through the *Phenomenology*, the concept of 'desire' also persists in this process, even if implicitly. For the 'desire' and 'recognition' are interdependent concepts.

ethical and epistemological or ontological.[84] As Sherman rightly points out:

> Spirit, which pertains to the subjectivity of human collective, is the interpersonal medium whose basic character both forms and is formed by our personal self-conceptions, which, in turn, condition our conceptions of the world around us. For Hegel, therefore, the concepts that are brought to bear on epistemological questions are intersubjectively generated, and this suggests that the hard and fast distinction that is usually drawn between ethical and epistemological issues becomes much less distinct (1999: 3).

What is ethical and political, consequently, cannot be thought as separated from the epistemological-ontological. The knowledge of consciousness emerges as interdependent with the sociality or intersubjectivity. Therefore, it may be concluded that the issue of 'self-consciousness and recognition' in the *Phenomenology* is the source by means of which Hegel attempts to unify the realms of philosophy that held to be distinct. Certainly, just as only one study cannot reveal the whole implications of Hegel's thought in the *Phenomenology*, such a thought should be considered also in terms of his whole 'system'. In this sense, Hegel's political philosophy and logic becomes especially crucial for a comprehensive understanding.[85] Nevertheless, I think, for 'entering' into Hegel's thought, to trace the issue of 'self-consciousness and recognition' in the *Phenomenology* seems to be the right way.

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[84] According to Ikäheimo and Laitinen, Hegel's concept of recognition is a 'social ontological' concept in the sense that it has a constitutive role in the reality. It shows how both the persons and their institutions are socially constituted: "For Hegel, the founding father of theories of recognition, recognition is not only merely a phenomenon that has psychological, social and political importance in the lives of more or less fully fledged human persons and societies, but also an *ontologically* important phenomenon in that it is part of what constitutes human persons and their institutional world in the first place. In Hegel's view, recognition is a central element of the psychological, social and institutional structures constitutive of the social world of persons. Thus, according to the original idea, recognition is a social ontological concept" (2011: 5).

[85] Browning, for instance, states that Hegel's mature political philosophy is 'intimately connected' to his account of recognition in the *Phenomenology*: "[…] the rational political community Hegel sketches in the *Philosophy of Spirit*, which is elaborated in the *Philosophy of Right*, is an express response to the problems of misrecognition depicted in the master-slave dialectic" (1997: 145). On the other hand, Williams focuses on the 'equiprimordiality' of logical categories with the pre-categorial realities of experience in Hegel's system: "The central problem in deciphering Hegel is to understand such equiprimordiality and coinherence of the descriptive pre-categorial ontology of the *Phenomenology*, with the categorial ontology of the *Logic*. The logic can treat the problem of the other in terms of negation precisely because it is a reconstruction that presupposes experience […]" (1985: 605).

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APPENDIX

TEZ FOTOKOPİ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü ☐

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü ☐

Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü ☐

Enformatik Enstitüsü ☐

Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü ☐

YAZARIN

Soyadı : .....
Adı : .....
Bölümü : .....

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) : .....
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