

**THE IMPACTS OF ALTERNATIVE WELTANSCHAUUNGS
ON POLITICAL THEORIES : A COMPARISON OF
TAWHID AND ONTOLOGICAL PROXIMITY**

by

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
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To My Father, whom I owe more than I can say.

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ABBREVIATIONS

acc. to : according to
ar. : Arabic
co. : company
ed. : edited
edt. : edition
int. : international
intr. : introduction
intr. ch. : introductory chapter
n.d. : not dated
per. : Persian
pub. : publications
publ. : publishers
repr. : reproduction; reprinted
t. : original text
tr. : translated
tur. : turkish
uni. : university
vols. : volumes
yay. : yayınları

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PART I

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

1-THE FOCUS OF THE PROBLEM:

Many scientists and politicians were convinced that the existing western style of life, thought and political institutions could easily be adapted to Muslim societies through bringing into line with Islamic belief systems and rules. But after some experiences they began to surprise when they saw that even the intellectuals who had a western academic training, remained deeply attached to Islamic belief system, doctrine, civilization, history and culture. Therefore, a spate of books have appeared in 1980's on Islamic revivalism.¹ In many of these books, there is a feeling of grief related to the rise of these movements. The widespread prejudice that Islamic revivalism might become an international threat, originated from such a feeling, is the basic factor for the lack of the originality, of the comprehensiveness and of the objectivity of many of the researches on Islam. Thus, Islamic studies became merely a subject of the international politics in 1980's. It should be noted that pragmatic political centers provoked this tendency among academic circles, in order to benefit from this phenomenon. The pragmatic questions how these movements effect the internal political structures of Muslim societies and which consequences might come out from these changes related to international politics, became the core points of many of these researches. Hence, they produced prejudicial denominations, categorizations and oversimplifications which prevented a comprehensive analysis on the internal dynamics of Islamic civilization.

¹Esposito's editions *Islam and Development* (1980) and *Voice of Resurgent Islam* (1983), E.Mortimer's *Faith and Power* (1982), D.Pipes' *In the Path of God: Islam and Political Power* (1983), M.Ruthven's *Islam in the World* (1984), E.Sivan's *Radical Islam* (1985) and R. Dekmejian's *Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World* might be mentioned among many others. A spate of books on Iranian revolution should be added to this list.

The categorizations of Islamic responses to western civilizational challenge might become a methodological trap to understand the real origins of this phenomenon. Therefore, the categorizations of these responses -such as fundamentalist Islam, non-fundamentalist Islam, radical Islam, traditional Islam and secular Islam-¹ might lead to subjectivist generalizations. The terms *fundamentalist* or *radical* used by orientalists to isolate the groups aiming to establish an Islamic way of life with an all-inclusive socio-political system, from the ordinary Muslim population, can not explain the increasing Islamic response to western way of thought and life. The obscurity of these terms conceals the comprehensive character of the problem omitting the roots of the background of the conflicting issues.

Furthermore, the fact that these responses began to be spread among the most industrialized and modernized Muslim masses proves that sociological and economic analysis related to the theories of modernization are also not sufficient to understand and evaluate this response. Today, nobody can claim that after a certain stage of industrialization and modernization, Muslim masses, as a whole, will adopt to western style of thought and life due to the reality that it is beyond of being a problem of stage. This response should be searched from the perspective of the reality that Islam is conceived as an alternative *Weltanschauung* against western philosophico-political tradition; rather than as the "ideological intransigence of Islam *vis-a-vis* the western world today" (Crone & Hinds, 1986:110) because Muslims might equally well accuse the West of being an "ideological intransigence" as a response.

On the other hand, some oversimplifications related to the reason of the Islamic revival has lost their values because of increasing of the Islamic revival in spite of the decreasing of the importances of these reasons. Pipes' (1983:331) argument that Islamic revival is a temporary fact based on the oil boom, is an interesting example for these arguments: "To the extent that the Islamic revival is based on the oil boom, it is a mirage. Legalist and autonomist impulses strengthened and proliferated during the 1970s in large part because some

¹Pipes' (1983:340-1) following definitions are interesting examples for such a categorization:
 Fundamentalist Islam: Radical legalism. In modern times, a response to the west which holds that Islam holds all the answers.

Non-fundamentalist Islam: In modern times, a traditionalist, a reformist or a secularist.

Reformist Islam: The view that, if properly understood, Islam and western ideologies are compatible.

Secularist Islam: The view that Muslim can respond successfully to modern life only by withdrawing public affairs.

activist Muslim regimes had huge amounts of discretionary revenues and others were able to exploit oil's disruptive effects to agitate for power; but neither of these can endure for long." His simulation between the Muslims in modern age and Jews after the destruction of the Temple in 586 B.C. is another interesting but not-descriptive interpretation related to the Islamic revival: "The legalist impulse in general and fundamentalism in particular present great difficulties to Muslims trying to modernize, but the Islamicite legacy presents no less of an impediment. Muslims need to confront the assumption of success in worldly affairs, then must try to eliminate it. The destruction of the Temple in 586 B.C. created a dilemma which parallels that of the Muslim today; what Ezekiel and second Isaiah did to disengage faith from mundane matters must be imitated by Muslims, for God's will is inscrutable to humans and misfortune may serve His intent. Islamicite expectations of nearly fourteen centuries cannot be undone instantly, but progress in this direction is essential if the umma is to modernize." (1983:335) It seems that Muslim do not act according to Pipes' suggestions. Rather, the wide-spreading Islamic revival verifies Voll's (1982:347) argument that Islamdom at the beginning of the fifteenth century hijra (which started in November 1980) is "in the midst of major transformations in all dimensions of its experience" and "that the Islamic revival has altered the umma by providing it with new temptations and new opportunities."

The aim of this thesis is to develop a comparative analysis between Western and Islamic political theories and images from the perspective of their philosophical and theoretical background. The fundamental argument of the thesis is that the conflicts and contrasts between Islamic and Western political thought originate mainly from their philosophical, methodological and theoretical background rather than from only institutional and historical differences. In fact, historical and institutional differences are counterparts of these philosophico-political bases and images. The questions of how and through which processes these alternative *imago mundis* affect, political ideas via a set of axiological presuppositions are the crux of the thesis.

The interconnection between Islamic all-embracing jurisprudence (*Fiqh*) and Islamic political thought related to the problems such as the qualification of political rulers, political institutionalization e.t.c. has been deeply searched. But, the relationship between *Aqaid*, as the origin of the doctrinal antecedents and *Fiqh*, as the origin of the axiological normativeness and of the political formal structuralism, is comparatively less handled. This thesis will concentrate mainly

on the intellectual and doctrinal mechanisms of the Muslim Mind's consciousness rather than the practical application and the institutional adaptations of the rules of Islamic jurisprudence.

The same method will be used for the subjects of western political tradition. The intellectual and theoretical link between philosophical and political images will be discussed through analyzing the direction of the impacts of the philosophical leanings on the political theories. The process of the political institutionalization will be searched from the perspective of the actualization and realization of the philosophical images and leanings, rather than only being historico-political facts.

Thus, the direction of the interconnected impacts of of western **philosophia** and **theologia** on western political theories together with its theoretical links will be compared with the transcendental supremacy of the Islamic doctrinal science, **Aqaid** over the political thought through an all-inclusive jurisprudential scheme, **Fiqh**. My focus will not be the comparison of the prescriptivist characteristics and their consequences but the sources and essences of their prescriptivism within the context of the alternative axiological presuppositions. Why their axiological presuppositions differ and how this difference effects political theories are the fundamental questions of the thesis. The essential relationship between normativism and prescriptivism which shapes an interesting link between axiology and politics will be discussed to specify the axiologico-political differences of these two alternative *weltanschauungs*.

2- THE PROBLEM OF NOMENCLATURE AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK:

At the center of a comparative study between Islam and Western civilization, we are facing a problem of nomenclature. Becker's (1916:s.) argument that "Das Islamproblem wird meist als religiöses Problem gewertet, doch ist der Islam nicht nur eine Religion, sondern eine Zivilisation und ein Staatsgedanke. Ursprünglich eine semitische Religion auf Christlich-jüdischer Basis, ist der Islam als Weltanschauung im weitesten Sinne des Wortes der Erbe des christlichen Hellenismus geworden" is a very interesting example for this problem of nomenclature. He tries to define Islam within the semantic context of the western conceptual framework. For example *Religion* as a critical concept in this sentence does not correspond to *Dyn* -which is the literal translation of religion- and its semantic characteristics within the semantic links in Qur'an since Allah says in Qur'an: " This day have I perfected your religion (dyn) for you and completed my favour unto you, and have chosen for you as religion (dyn) Al-Islam" (5/3). Such a conception of *Dyn* is much more ample comparing with the *Religion*.. So, it is not alternative to *Zivilisation* and *Staatsgedanke*, but embraces *Zivilisation* and *Staatsgedanke* too. From Islamic point of view, *Staatsgedanke* is a very natural imaginative and theoretical consequence of *Dyn* while *Zivilisation* is a cumulative material formation of it. Therefore, it is beyond the western conceptions and definitions of religion. For example Schleiermacher's definition of religion as "the feeling of absolute dependence", or Tillich's definition of religion as "the all-embracing function of man's spiritual life" (Tillich,1967:15) are meaningful within the semantic environment of a certain process of conceptualization which is strictly bound to a specific set of images. Tillich's critique to Schleiermacher's successors arguing that they located religion in the realm of feeling as one psychological function among others and his reference of spirit to "the dynamic-creative nature of man's personal and communal life" might be accepted as one of the broadest definition of religion. But, even such a definition does not annul the semantic gap between *dyn* and religion. The compound expression *Muslim Church* used by some orientallists,¹ is an interesting example for the reflection of this semantic gap which creates a comprehensive vagueness of meaning. Nicholson's following statement (1985:182) shows how such a semantic gap may lead to a misimagination although the purpose of the usage of the key-concept aim to picture the same phenomena : "Since the *Muslim Church* and State are

¹For example Macdonald (1909:39,159) uses this compound expression frequently.

essentially one, it is impossible to treat of politics apart from religion, nor can religious phenomena be understood without continual reference to political events."

Due to the fact that the essential issue of a semantic analysis of a key-concept is its process of gaining a conceptual meaning, we have to concentrate both on the historico-theoretical and on the semantic basis of the key-concepts. The problem of semantic fields is valid especially for some critical key-concepts, such as *'adâlah* and *sa'âdah*. Although for example happiness might be chosen for *sa'âdah*, it is an unsatisfactory equivalent; as Ansari (1963:319-20) asserts: "Literally *happiness* means a state of feeling, differing from pleasure by its suggestion of permanence, depth and serenity, whereas *Sa'âdah* is a comprehensive concept, including in it happiness, prosperity, success, perfection, blessedness and beatitude. Similarly, as compared with its Greek original, which in ordinary usage meant happiness often with special reference to external prosperity. *Sa'âdah* has a fullness and completeness of meaning that is not found in the original. Well-being is another possible equivalent but that too falls short of its plenitude and sublimity. *Sa'âdah* primarily means the attainment of some desirable end or good, involving happiness or pleasure as a necessary concomitant. But in the widest sense the end or good expands to embrace the whole life and becomes the ideal or the end of all the activities of the soul."

We have to clarify even some modern concepts to differentiate the corresponding imaginations of them for the historical experiences of these civilizations. For example, von Grünebaum's definition of pluralism as "the coexistence within a political, religious, cultural unit of smaller bodies, whose recognized differences from the dominant group and/or from one another will yet not exclude them" might be an anchor point for the analysis of Islamic religious-cultural pluralism. But it does not necessarily implies western socio-economic pluralism where the coexistence occurs between several socio-economic groups which might have parts of the same political, religious or cultural unit.

Hence, Becker's assertion is right within the western semantic and conceptual framework; but it is meaningless within the context of Islamic semantic set of links. This dilemma is very significant especially for a comparative analysis. Therefore, I preferred to use original concepts for the inter-

theoretical analysis while I tried to develop some new concepts like *ontological proximity* or *epistemological differentiation* for the intra-theoretical analysis. *Weltanschauung* seems to me as the most available concept for such a global comparative analysis because of its vast and deep dimensions of meaning. Additionally, it embraces philosophical as well as religious tendencies. That is very significant especially for finding out the basic and common features of the pyramidal-historical continuity and horizontal consistency in western intellectual history. On the other hand it facilitates to underline the starting point of this comparative analysis. We can show this facility with the help of a comparison of two descriptions. Using the descriptions like "the incompatibility of the Western and Islamic religious trends" or "the incompatibility of the Western and Islamic philosophical trends", it is not only impossible to show the internal consistency of these trends, but also to show the comparative basis of them. From this perspective, "the incompatibility of the Western and Islamic Weltanschauungs" is much more descriptive for the extension of the comparison. It is also more available for the refrainment from the semantic gap mentioned above.

Thus, I will try to find out the imaginative and theoretical contrasts between Islamic belief of Tawhid and western ontological proximity as two alternative weltanschauungs which specify socio-political imaginations, theories and cultures. The most significant questions to be clarified at this stage is why I have selected ontology as the anchor issue for such a comparative analysis and why I derived a new compound expression *-ontological proximity-* to denominate western paradigm. I think, a new base beyond theology, should be framed to explain this contrast, due to the fact that the modern western challenge to Islam does not carry merely Christian theological characteristics. Thus, Islamic belief of Tawhid is not a contrasting principle only to the Christian Trinity; rather its consequences offers imaginative alternatives to the modern philosophical leanings. Therefore, ontology and ontological consciousness seems to be a more meaningful anchor point both to show the philosophico-theological continuity of the western paradigm and to underline its paradigmatic contrasting feature compared to Islamic principle of Tawhid. I prefer to develop a new key-concept for this purpose; namely ontological proximity. The focus of Chapter 2 will be to show the continual characteristics of several different forms of this specific ontological consciousness from the early ages of the human history to modern age. Fraser's following description of the ancient beliefs in early ages of human history might be accepted as a primitive

form of the ontological consciousness what I called ontological proximity:"By primitive peoples the supernatural agents are not regarded as greatly, if at all, superior to man, for they may be frightened and coerced by him into doing his will. At this stage of thought *the world is viewed as a great democracy; all beings in it, whether natural or supernatural, are supposed to stand on a footing of tolerable equity.* but with the growth of his knowledge man learns to realize more clearly the vastness of nature and his own littleness and feebleness in presence of it". (Frazer, 1925:91) The imaginative, intellectual and theoretical adventure from this primitive feeling to Spinoza's pantheism and Mill's limited theism will be analyzed to underline this continual feature and its historico-cultural origins in western civilization.

I think Tawhld and ontological proximity -as two alternative paradigmatic base- reflects two alternative ways of ontological consciousness. Such a reduction during the process of the conceptualization in the sense of ontological proximity as a specific way of ontological consciousness might be accepted as a version of the Husserlian phenomenological reduction in the sense of the performance of an *epoché*¹ which assumes a specific relationship between *cogitationes*, *cogitatum* and *cogitata*: "The stream of my cogitationes is immediately and apodictically given; and the world is there as a cogitatum, or as the corresponding object of experience. The objects of experience are not then limited to the factual world, but include all possible objects (as cogitata), such as ideal objects, so called impossible objects etc. That is the gain, since this attitude is then directly useful for epistemology, logic and metaphysics."(Farber,1967:526)

Hence, when I use ontological proximity, I intend an extensive phenomenological consciousness related to the relationship between God, nature and man. Using Husserl's conceptions, it might be said that I aim to show the theologico-philosophical continuity in western intellectual history through the denomination of the paradigmatic base of this continuity as ontological proximity in the process of the imagination of *Selbstverständnis*² (self-

¹"A Greek term for "suspense of judgement."The term was used both by Skeptics and members of the academy as the appropriate response to the problem of knowledge"Suspense of judgement was regarded as leading to ataraxia, or pleasure in tranquility. Husserl has adopted the term, insisting upon epoché, or suspense of judgment, as a stage in the phenomenological reduction."(Reese, 1980:152-3)

² Husserl's interpretation of this concept might be found in his masterpiece *Die Krisen der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie* (1954:275-80).

perception) and *Lebenswelt*¹ (the world of common experience) as ontological entities. Thus, my essential purpose is to analyze the emergence and continuity of a feeling of consciousness and its relation to the perception and experience on God, ego and nature.² Husserl insists that "the *Lebenswelt* does intervene in the elaboration of science; the *Lebenswelt* is given to us, and we experience ourselves as existing within it"(Gurwitsch, 1966:423). I want to extend my investigations beyond this interpretation of *Lebenswelt* which has been developed by Husserl to define historico-cultural reality of the modern western man. Rather, I will concentrate on the imaginative relationship between western man to the *Lebenswelt* and its origin; as a type of a specific *Selbstverständnis*. The continuity on the idea of the Perfectibility of Man³ throughout the ages of the western civilization might be accepted as reflection of such a *Selbstverständnis*. The fundamental assumption of my thesis related to this consciousness is that one of the significant elements of this *Selbstverständnis* is the ontological imagination of man related to his place in the relationship between his Ego, *Lebenswelt* and the origin of them; namely God or the identification of God to these elements in the sense of pantheism or materialism which I interpret as two ultimate cases of ontological proximity.

Husserl's approach assigns this special mission to modern western man. But, members of every civilizations have such a feeling of consciousness in the sense of *Selbstverständnis* and perhaps the most important aspect of civilizational challenge is the challenge of these alternative *Selbstverständnisse*. Therefore, modernization attempts in Muslim societies aim to change the traditional *Selbstverständnis* of Islamic civilization in the direction of the western man's

1As Gurwitsch (1966:422-3) mentions, Husserl set up a connection between ontology and epistemology via this fundamental concept especially related to the scientific achievements of modern western man: "Like every other cultural activity, the pursuit of scientific knowledge is carried on in the *Lebenswelt*. Scientific problems arise within the *Lebenswelt* and concern special aspects of its singled out by abstraction, as, for example, the spatio-temporal or corporeal aspect.(...) As Husserl puts it, in this way we come to replace "knowledge" in the sense of the familiarity which we have with the *Lebenswelt* in our every day life, and which suffices for our practical needs and our orientation in the *Lebenswelt*, by knowledge in the strict sense, conceived of with reference to the ideas of "objective truth" and "being as it really is in itself." Again, as in the case of all cultural activities, the results and products of scientific endeavors are superadded to the *Lebenswelt*. It hardly needs mentioning that the existence of science and scientific theories form an integral part of the historico-cultural reality of modern western man; *Lebenswelt*.(...)"

²In fact Husserl's purpose to develop phenomenology as a methodology is to reach a perfect perception: "Die Phänomenologie der logischen Erlebnisse hat also den Zweck, uns ein so weitreichendes deskriptives (nicht etwa ein genetisch-psychologisches) Verständnis dieser psychischen Erlebnisse zu verschaffen."(1901:II/8)

³Passmore's (1972) work *The Perfectibility of Man* provides significant accounts on the continual process of this idea of the perfectibility of man.

Selbstverständnis formulated by Husserl as the basic reason for the supremacy of the western civilization.¹ The basic phenomenon of contrast occurs between the Muslim's *Selbstverständnis* attached to ontological presuppositions and conjectural/material *Selbstverständnis* of modernizers in an age of the supremacy of the western civilization. Such a clash results in divided personalities in Muslim societies which might be denominated as an official/secular *takliyyah*. Turkish society might be evaluated as a model for such an extensive clash. Grünebaum (1962:104) exemplifies this aim to form a new *Selbstverständnis* in the direction of western images, through quoting a speech from Atatürk: "We shall take science and knowledge from wherever they may be, and put them in the mind of every member of the nation. For science and for knowledge, there are no restriction and no conditions. For a nation that insists on preserving a host of traditions and beliefs that rest on no logical proof, progress is very difficult, perhaps even impossible." Mardin (1983:108-113) analyzes these attempts for the transformation of *Selbstverständnis* through analyzing the transformation of value system and argues that the impact of kemalist education in Turkey became superficial in the process of the transformation of the traditional values of the children inherited from their families.

The fundamental difference of this clash between two *Selbstverständnisse* is that the modernizers' new self-image depends on an epistemological renovation like in the speech of Atatürk; while Islamic self-image offers a very strong ontological consciousness. The modernizers did not manage to set up a substitute for this strong feeling except some poems in early Republican period on the divine qualities of Atatürk, written by Aka Gündüz, Behçet Kemal and Kemalettin Kamu. Therefore after a certain dominant period of the modernizers, the ontological consciousness began to specify the every day life of an ordinary person due to the fact that state "was not interested in elaborating a map of every-day relations" (Mardin,1989:227)².

¹Grünebaum's (1962:97-127) analysis on this subject carries significant elements to clarify the changes on self-perception of modernization attempts and their epistemological dimension.

²Mardin shows this clash between state and religion in the case of the movement of Said Nursi: "Bediüzzaman's new order was a paradigm for the solution of the every-day problems of life. The Turkish Republic was not interested in elaborating a map of every day relations. In a society where persons defined their own stand in life and power against the State through a religious idiom which served as such a map, this was a grave oversight. Said Nursi, by reviving the religious idiom, was revitalizing a total language for social life."(1989:227)

On the other hand, Muslim scholars aimed to re-build epistemological and methodological structure of Islamic intellectual accumulation to overcome the challenge of the epistemologically formulated *selbstverständnis* of the westernization-oriented elite. The spread of periodicals and books for the verification of the religious truths via scientific innovations might be explained through this necessity. The origin of this clash is not a local feature of Turkish society; rather it is a contrast between Western *selbstverständnis* based epistemologically defined ontology and Islamic *selbstverständnis* based on ontologically defined epistemology. We have to be aware of these two alternative self-perceptions to analyze the increasing tendency in Islamic revivalism.

Although ontology has been viewed as a secondary branch of modern philosophy compared to epistemology in our age, I suppose that ontological consciousness might be the most appropriate anchor point for a comparative study between Islam and West. On the other hand, as it will be shown in the following chapters, it is very difficult to isolate the evolutions related to these branches. I will try to prove in Chapter 2, that there is a continuity in western theologico-philosophical history as a paradigmatic feature related to the transformations on the idea of God and their links to the imaginations of these ontological entities in the sense of ontological proximity and the epistemological and axiological consequences of this consciousness.

Chapter 3 will be concentrated on the Islamic paradigm of *Tawhid* as an imagination of the ontological hierarchy and differentiation, and its consequences on the Islamic epistemology and axiology which specified Muslim's *Selbstverständnis*. At this stage, as it has been mentioned we are facing a problem of finding out the most appropriate equivalences of the Islamic concepts. Therefore, the reader should be aware for some essential differences when the most suitable equivalent concept in English is used for an Arabic concept. For example, we should not forget the essential difference between *Wujud* and *Mawjudat* in Islamic theologico-philosophical tradition, when we speak on ontology and ontological differences in English. Therefore, *Seinschicte* in German might be a better correspondence for *maratib al-wujud*. I intend this meaning when I mention ontological hierarchy or ontological differentiation. It also means the stratum of reality (*Wirklichkeit*) as well as the stratum of being.

In Part II which will be composed of Chapter 4,5,6 and 7 the impacts of these alternative weltanschauungs on political imaginations, cultures and theories will be held. The origins of the processes of justification of state as a socio-political unity as a reflection of the cosmologico-ontological imaginations of these paradigms, will be discussed from this perspective in Chapter 4; while the processes of legitimacy of an established political authority will be shown within the context of epistemologico-axiological consequences of these alternative approaches, will be compared in Chapter 5. The same methodology will be applied to two very significant political phenomena in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7; namely the alternative ways of pluralism based on the alternative interpretations of political power and socio-political unity as the basis of the universal political system.

A short concluding summary will be developed in Chapter 8.

PART II

THEORETICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRIES

The interconnected relationship between ontology, epistemology, axiology and politics might be a meaningful anchor point to understand the irreconcilability of the philosophical and theoretical bases of Islamic and Western political theories, images and cultures. As Horten signifies "penetration of a foreign intellectual culture is especially facilitated by absorption in the basic ideas underlying the world images of that culture".^(1973: 1) The principal difference between Islamic and Western Weltanschauungs is related to the contrast between the "ontologically determined epistemology" of Islam and the "epistemologically defined ontology" of the western philosophical traditions. This difference is especially significant in understanding the axiological basis of political legitimacy and the process of justification. Even several different approaches within these weltanschauungs are based on a paradigmatic unity from this perspective.

CHAPTER 2

WESTERN PARADIGM: ONTOLOGICAL PROXIMITY

(i) Ontological Proximity and Particularization of Divinity:

The fundamental characteristic of Western intellectual trends in the modern era after the Renaissance is the formation of a specific 'epistemologically defined ontology' through the centripetal tendencies of 'humanized knowledge'. So epistemology became the center of philosophy as a determining factor, having the role of the systematization of knowledge. The humanization of epistemology around 'knowledge' whether through empiricism, or through materialism, or through logical forms after the reemergence of ancient philosophy, created a relationship of dependency between ontology and epistemology in the western philosophical tradition. From the perspective of ontological question, Christianity formed a preparatory stage for this development after the Renaissance. Therefore, in contrast to the common idea, the epistemologically defined ontology which emerged after the Renaissance took its sources from Christian theology. the idea of the particularization of Divinity was taken from the eclectic belief-structure of Pax Romana and was reformed within a gnostic Christian theology. It included the incarnation and fatherhood of God as the legacy from the mystery religions to Christianity, the deification of Jesus within the dogma of the 'Trinity' and similar complex ontological problems in Christian theology. This particularization led ultimately to a proximity or identification between ontological levels of God, man and nature.

From the perspective of this 'ontological proximity' there is an essential continual link between ancient mythology, ancient philosophy, Christian theology and modern philosophy. The idea of the deification of man¹, as in the

¹ Hume (1907:327) explains the psychological and ceremonial origins of the deification of man in ancient time in his *The Natural History of Religion*, as following: "The deities of the vulgar are so little superior to human creatures, that, where men are affected with strong sentiments of veneration or gratitude for any hero or public benefactor, nothing can be more natural than to convert him into god, and fill the heavens; after this manner, with continual recruits from among mankind. Most of the divinities from ancient world are supposed to have once been man, and to have been beholden for their *apotheosis* the the admiration and affection of the people. The real history of their adventures, corrupted by tradition, and elevated by the marvellous, became a

imperial cult of ancient Rome, or the incarnation of God as in Docetism similar to the belief of *avatar* in Hinduism was based on polytheist and pantheist elements. This was maintained in the Christian ontology within a new form which facilitated the proximity of ontological levels through preventing the ideating of an ontological hierarchy as in the Islamic principle of *Tanzih*.

Feibleman's (1953:352) definition of theology as 'mythologized metaphysics' is very appropriate especially for the relationship of the mythology, metaphysics and theology in Ancient Greek. The doctrine based on the principles of *Chronos* (time) and *Adrasteia* (or Necessity) in the Orphic theogony before the pre-Socratic period provided the theological bases for a dyadic ontology which might be accepted as a specific particularization on ontological level.

As More (1921:41) specifies, the word *theos* (God), in accordance with the genius of the Greek language, has a fluidity of meaning¹ because "it is applied quite freely by the Hellenistic Fathers, after the manner of the philosophers, to men, and, in general, is equivalent loosely to the divine quality, more specifically to the immortal, wherever it occurs". This fluidity is very evident in Plato's cosmology and ontology. Although there are several discussions related to the question of whether Platonic argumentative theism or Aristotelian empirical and logical evaluations were based on a monotheistic framework or not, it might be argued that their cosmological and ontological speculations have been influenced by pantheistic and polytheistic elements.

The understanding of ontological proximity in Plato's philosophy bases on three fundamental premises: (i) The image of God as craftsman(or maker) and as father, (ii) The existence of gods -as an intermediary ontological category- who participated to the process of creation after a certain stage, (iii) The possibility for human being to be like a god. these premises necessitates three ontological levels, at least, concerning the relationship between God and human being. but the existence of these ontological levels does not mean an ontological hierarchy like in Islam. First of all, the vagueness and fluidity of the description of *Demiurge*

plentiful source of fable; especially in passing through the hands of poets, allegorists, and priests, who successively improved upon the wonder and astonishment of the ignorant multitude."

¹ Although it has been argued that Xenophanes reached to a more absolute and supreme concept of God, his image of God should not be confused with the highly concentrated monotheism of Islam. His belief that "there is one God, supreme among Gods and men, resembling neither mortals neither in body nor in mind" (Inermy:1963:29; Fragment 23) is really very close to a monotheistic approach comparing with the mythologized theology of his ancestors; but the plurality of gods as intermediary ontological beings is also very evident from his definition itself. On the other hand, his theory carries significant pantheistic elements.

prevent the development of the image of God possessing all absoluteness.¹ Demiurge as the divine craftsman who framed the universe, is not in the normal sense of the word a creator at all, f.i. he did not create the world of Ideas. His conclusion that "the maker and father of the universe, it is a hard task to find, and having found him it would be impossible to declare him to all mankind" (Timaeus 28c; Cornford,1937:22) is, in fact, a declaration of the vagueness and relativity of his imago dei.

Secondly, the relationship between *Demiurge* and other gods is not clear in his dialogues. The divine qualities of other gods and their differences from the divine qualities of *Demiurge* is completely merged. The distinction between God and gods is rather artificial than essential in Plato's philosophy. His classification of ontological levels² is an attempt to systematize this relationship and the process of creation. Demiurge, himself, only creates the first category namely 'the heavenly race of gods' or 'gods within the heaven' which are the fixed stars, the planets and the earth. But, at the same time, he was aware of the difficulty of the explanation of the term 'created gods'. Therefore, he (Timaeus 40D-E; Cornford,1937:138) adds that "as concerning the other divinities (gods), to know and to declare their generation is too high a task for us; we must trust those who have declared it in former times: being, as they said, descendants of gods, they must no doubt have had certain knowledge of their ancestors".³ Agnostic, polytheistic and pantheistic characteristics have been blended in Plato's ontology with a form of mystery and mythology. Although he lays emphasis on the divinity of the visible celestial gods together with the invisible spirits in the air and in the water in *Epinomis*, like in *Timaeus*, their ontological status is not clear in the dialogues. Socrates' argument in *Cratylus* (400d; Plato;1937:1/190)-repeating Protagoras' saying- that "we know nothing about the gods-neither about the gods themselves nor about the names they may call one another by"

¹ Such a concept of God might be accepted as the correspondence of only the name of *al-Musawwir* in Islamic belief system around a very clear image of Allah basing on ninety-nine names each of which indicates an absoluteness.

² "He [Demiurges] thought that this world must possess all the different forms that intelligence discerns contained in the Living Creature that truly is. And there are four: one, the heavenly race of gods; second, winged things whose path is in the air; third all that dwells in the water; and fourth, all that goes on foot on the dry land." (Timaeus 39E-40; Cornford,1937:117-118)

³ He uses mythological background for this explanation: "We can not, then, mistrust the children of gods though they speak without probable or necessary proofs; when they profess to report their family history, we must follow established usage and accept what they say. Let us, then, take on their word this account of generation of these gods. As children of Earth and Heaven were born Oceanus and Tethys; and of these Poros and Kronos and Rhea and all their company and of Kronos and Rhea, Zeus and Hera and all their brothers and sisters whose names we know; and of these yet offsprings." (Timaeus 40D-E; Cornford,1937:138)

speculations in the *Phaedrus* (246c; Plato, 1917:231) are agnostic evaluations to evade this vagueness on ontological status of these inferior gods.

The address (Timaeus 41A) in which Demiurge delegates the task of making inferior living creatures is a very significant evidence not only for the understanding of the ontological proximity, but also for the metaphysical attitude of the particularization of Divinity.¹ The polytheistic characteristics of Platonic ontology basing on such a particularization of divinity has been systematized via the intermediary status of these 'inferior deities'.² Demiurge, as a personal 'creator' and regulating power rather than an 'Absolute Creator' together with the image of inferior deities who share the role of this supreme power (Statesman 273; Plato, 1937:300) shapes Platonic pantheism around the idea of the divinity of the 'visible universe'. 'The heavenly tribe of the gods', namely earth, moon, stars and sun, are 'the visible and created gods' within this divine universe. In *Phaedrus* (246d) they have been identified with Olympic gods, f.e. *Zeus* was the equivalent of the heaven of the fixed stars, *Hestia* was the earth. The divinity of the world as a blessed God (Timaeus 34B; Cornford, 1937:58) and the composition of the World-Soul out of three elements -Existence, Sameness and Difference- is not only the essence of Platonic pantheism, but it became also a significant contribution to the Christian theology in the form of Trinity.³

¹"Be that as it may, when all the gods had come to birth (...) the author of this universe addressed them in these words: 'Gods, of gods whereof I am the maker and of works the *father*, those which are my own handiwork are indissoluble, save with my consent. now, although whatsoever bond has been fastened may be unloosed, yet only an evil will could consent to dissolve what has been well fitted together and is in a good state; therefore, although you, having come into being, are not immortal nor indissoluble altogether, nevertheless you shall not be dissolved nor taste of death, finding my will a bound yet stronger and more sovereign than those wherewith you were bound together when you came to be. now, therefore take heed to this that I declare to you. There are yet left mortal creatures of three kinds that have not been brought into being. If these be not born, the Heaven will be imperfect; for it will not contain all the kinds of living being, as it must if it is to be perfect and complete. But if I myself gave them birth and life, they would be equal to gods. In order, then, that mortal things may exist and these All may be truly all, turn according to your own nature to the making of living creatures, imitating my power in generating you. In so far as it is fitting that something in them should share the name of the immortals, being called divine and ruling over those among them who at any time are willing to follow after righteousness and after you-that part having sown it as seed and made a beginning I will hand over to you. For the rest, do you, weaving mortal to immortal make living beings; bring them to birth, feed them, and cause them to grow, and when they fail, receive them became again" (Timaeus 41A-D; Cornford, 1937:139-140)

²"and the several parts of the universe were distributed under the rule of certain inferior deities, as is the way in some places still. There were demigods, who were the shepherds of the various species and herds of the animals" (Statesman 271-272; Plato, 1937:299)

³"All this, then, was the plan of the God who is for ever for the god who was sometime to be (world) According to this plan he made it smooth and uniform, everywhere equidistant from its center, a body whole and complete, with complete bodies for its parts. And in the center he set a soul and caused it to extend throughout the whole and further wrapped its body round with soul on the

Raven (1965:236) clarifies this pantheistic element arguing that "the Demiurge represents the orderly, predictable and therefore fully intelligible element in the world order". Therefore, it might be summarized that Demiurge, as a mythical figure, symbolizes the rational element immanent in the universe. It is very important to understand the systematization of such an *imago dei* to follow the continuity from the ancient philosophy to the modern mentality of natural teleology depending on the pantheistic elements. From this perspective, the similarity between the Godhood of Plato and of Spinoza gives us interesting clue.

Thirdly, the possibility of becoming like a god in *Theaetetus* (176B) is another significant indication for the characteristic of the ontological proximity in Plato's ontology and ethics. That is a proximity from the level of human being rather than from the level of the gods, like mentioned above, especially in the cases of the proximity between the levels of gods and nature. The image of *homoiosis* -becoming like to God- which permeates the whole Platonic system and which was one of the fundamental issue discussed in the Council of Nicea on the nature of the Son, is one of the fundamental continual links between mythology, theology and philosophy. The parallelism between the images of Olympic gods in Homer, 'like-God' interpretations of Plato in *Theaetetus*, the belief of *homoiosis* in early Christian theology and Thomistic assumption of 'God-like' perfection in *Summa contra gentiles* shows this continual link basing on the *deiform* perfection of the human being. The origins of the deification of 'the technological man' and his ontological crisis leading to discuss the existential value of human being might be searched within this context. This type of ontological proximity creates very significant axiological consequences related to the subject of the perfectibility of man.

The point of departure between Aristotelian philosophy and the popular religion originated from Greek mythology might be seen in the philosophical and theoretical investigation of the existence of God. Nevertheless, Aristotelian theology shares significant common characteristics with his ancestors, especially

outside, and so established one world alone.(...) On all these accounts the world which he brought into being was a blessed god.(Timaeus 34A-B; Cornford,1937:58) "The things of which he composed soul and the manner of its composition were as follows: (1) Between the indivisible Existence that is ever in the same state and the divisible Existence that becomes in bodies, he compounded a third form of Existence composed of both. (2) Again, in the case of Sameness and in that of Difference, he also on the same principle made a compound intermediate between that kind of them which is indivisible and the kind that is divisible in bodies. (3) Then, taking the three, he blended them all into a unity, forcing the nature of Difference, hard as it was to mingle, into union with Sameness, and mixing them together with Existence,"(Timaeus 3A; Cornford,1937:59-60)

from the perspective of the ontological proximity and particularization of the divinity. First, the fluidity on the image of God continues in Aristotelian ontology and theology. There are several discussions among the interpretations of Aristotle on the question of whether Aristotle aims to reach a monistic system or not.¹ But, it is very difficult to find a unique and clear concept of God in his philosophical works. The descriptions of the First Mover in *Physics* and *Metaphysics* differ to a significant extent.² The image of the First Mover as 'perfectly unmoved, unique and eternal, at the origin of all movement found in the universe', is a common feature of both works. In the *Physics*, additionally, he defines the First Mover as immanent within the corporeal world, even though it itself is immaterial. His description of the First Mover in *Physics* as the soul of the first thing that is movable which encircles all the other heavenly spheres, is a significant pantheistic element in Aristotelian ontology. Such a description as the soul of the first sphere or as the efficient cause of its movement, is not consistent with the arguments in Book XII of the *Metaphysics* where the First Mover has been described as absolutely separate from anything sensible whatsoever.

Although Aristotle's cosmological evaluations³ ascend to an idea of God⁴, the status of God and the style of relationship between God and moved things (the universe) is not clear. Therefore it is very difficult to prove that Aristotle intended to reach a concentrated monotheistic system. The Unity of things is a problem of teleology in Aristotle's philosophy rather than a problem of ontology because he dealt with the problem of order, not of derivation. His analogy related to the image of God as an army commander in *Metaphysics*⁵

¹ The discussion between Brentano who interprets Aristotelian philosophy from the theistic point of view and Zeller who rejects such an approach is one of the interesting example for these discussion. The details of this discussion might be found in Elser's work (1893). On the other hand, Owens (1963:445-50) avers strongly that Aristotle does not wish to reach a monistic system.

² Steenberghen ((1974:556-57) summarizes this difference very well.

³ If we analyze Aristotelian cosmological and ontological arguments, we can discover the following steps to reach an idea of the "Unmoved Mover": (i) there is an eternal motion in the world, (ii) everything in motion is being moved by something actual, (iii) things in motion are either self-moved or being moved by another, (iv) the series of things being moved by another must come to an end in either a self-mover or an unmoved mover, (v) self-movers reduce to unmoved movers, and (vi) there must be an unmoved mover that is the cause of eternal motion. A detailed schematization of these cosmological evaluations might be found in Craig's work (1980:37-40).

⁴ Some parts of the *Metaphysics* seems closer to the comparatively clear image of God : "And God is in a better state. And life also belongs to God; for the actuality of thought is life, and God is that actuality; and God's self-dependent actuality is life most good and eternal. We say therefore that God is a living being, eternal, most good, so that life and duration continuous and eternal belong to God; for this is God." (Aristotle, *Metaphysics*; 1941:880)

⁵ "We must consider also in which of two ways the nature of the universe contains the good and the highest good, whether as something separate and by itself, or as the order of the parts. Probably in both ways, as an army does; for its good is found both in its order and in its leader, and more in the

should be evaluated from this perspective of theology rather than as an evidence for the image of an absolute-sovereign and active God. His fundamental division of potentiality and actuality might be understood within this context. His philosophical inquiries related to potentialities depends on the actuality of the teleology. his question is mainly attached to the mechanism of this teleological order, rather than its origin. Therefore his image of God is a part of this cosmological complexity, not an ontologically transcendent active Creator. Hence, he might be accepted as the ancestor of the modern philosophers, like Mill and James, who argue 'limited theism' assuming a finite God. Defining God as '*noesis noeseos*' -thinking on thinking- in *Metaphysics* (1074b33-35; 1941:885), he limits God's activity with contemplation in *Nicomachean Ethics* (1178b10; 1980:268)., while he argues in *Politics* (1325b28-30; 1941:1282) that God and universe "have no external actions over and above their own energies".

There are interesting indications of pantheistic and polytheistic elements in Aristotle's philosophy. Defining time, motion and some heavenly bodies as eternal substances, it can be argued that he has an image of God co-eternal with some other substances. As a very clear evidence for his understanding of ontological proximity, this limited God and co-eternal substances are on the same ontological level. His argument in *On The Heavens* (271a-33; 1941:404) that "God and Nature create nothing that has not its use" and his mention of God and universe together for some judgements, f.e. in *Politics* (1325b28-30), originates from a veiled assumption of the ontological proximity (even identification) between God and nature (or universe). On the other hand, his assumption of the plurality of 'Unmoved Movers' in *Physics* (258b11,259a6-13,259b28-31 e.t.c.) and in *Metaphysics* (I/8) might be interpreted as a polytheistic element, if we accept his conception of the 'First Unmoved Mover' as God.¹ Additionally, he mentions in some places on gods.² Such an assumption of the plurality of 'unmoved movers' is an intermediary ontological status, at least. Therefore it is very difficult to answer the question clearly as to whether Aristotle believed there to be one God or not. Nevertheless, we can say that although some indications might be found in his writings on the idea of God, this cosmological and

latter; for he does not depend on the order but it depends on him. And all things are ordered together somehow, but not all alike-both fishes and fowls and plants; and the world is not such that one thing has nothing to do with another, but they are connected. For all ordered together to one end, but it is as in a house, where the freemen are at least at liberty to act at random, but all things or most things are already ordained for them(...)"(Aristotle, 1941:885-86)

¹ Aristotle uses different names for God in his works; f.e. he uses 'First Unmoved Mover' in *Physics* and in some parts of *Metaphysics*, while he prefers 'Teos' in *Metaphysics* (I/7) and 'Teoi' in *Nicomachean Ethics*.

² f.e. "And this is most manifest in the case of the gods " (Nic. Eth.,1159a11; 1980:204)

ontological approach, together with pantheistic and polytheistic elements such as his interpretations on the eternity, on the plurality of unmoved movers and on the limited activity of God, give us significant clues to deny the argument that Aristotle has a monotheistic philosophical framework depending on a highly concentrated ontological transcendency.

When we combine Aristotle's ontology with his empiric epistemology, we can say that Aristotle was one of the founders of the tradition of making ontology dependent on epistemology. This is the fundamental Aristotelian legacy to modern philosophy which strictly affects all spheres of thought, including political thought. The dependency of ontology on epistemology might be accepted as the philosophical foundation of the secularization of knowledge and thought, due to the fact that this dependency resulted in the mentality of 'the relativity of ontology' and 'the relativity of the ontological transcendency'. The centrality of the empiric-realistic knowledge in the Aristotelian epistemology has been used against the scholastic type of Aristotelianism depending on the logical forms. This is the dilemma of the Aristotelian impact both on Christianity and on the culture of the Renaissance.¹ but from another perspective it shows the continuity of the western philosophical and theological background.

The transformation of Christianity² from a Messianic religion of Semitic origin to an all-inclusive mixture of belief systems within a syncretic atmosphere of Pax Romana should be understood in order to follow this continuity of the western philosophical background from the ancient culture to the modern era. Being a bridge between the Graeco-Oriental culture of Alexander to the Graeco-Roman culture, Pax Romana was a period of fusion for several cultures, beliefs and philosophies. The highly complex Theologia of Christianity was formed

¹ This judgement does not mean that the mediaeval scholars and philosophers of Renaissance approved Aristotelian conclusions without any reservations. As Grant (1987) shows, there are significant departures from the Aristotelian system even in its period of dominance -between 13th and 17th centuries- especially in the fields of cosmology, astronomy and physics.

² Because of this transformation and because of the lack of the resources on the original Jesus' teaching,, several thinkers and theologians criticized the historicity even the historicity of Jesus. Bruno Bauer asserted in 1840 that Jesus was a myth, the personified form of a cult evolved in the second century from a fusion of Jewish, Greek and Roman theology. Some other theologians like A. Drews in Germany, W.B. Smith and J.M. Robertson in England denied the historical reality of Jesus. (Robertson,1914) We have to differentiate the Historical Jesus from the mystical Christ. the historical Jesus and his teachings can not be denied because of the reliable sources on his life (some of them were written by pagan and jewish writers in early period) while the mystical Christ is only a myth of a syncretic cultural and theological atmosphere.

within this syncretic geographical-cultural atmosphere.¹ The interconnected impact of the ancient Roman polytheist and paganist tradition, Greek philosophy, mystery religions (ancient Syrian and Babylonian religions and Mithraism), Teutonic culture and Hebrew origins is posited as the basic reason for the ontological vagueness in Christian theology compared with Islamic ontological hierarchy which is based on a comprehensively systematized monotheism.

The Greek influence on Christianity is mainly related to the theoretical and ethical side, especially philosophy, theology, ethics, exegesis, rhetoric and metaphysics, whereas the Roman influence concentrated on cults, ceremonies and institutions of organized power.² But, it should be underlined that Roman era became a bridge between Greek philosophies and Christianity especially concerning with the transmission of Stoicism. Greek Stoicism under the leadership of **Zeno** has been manipulated in Roman understanding of life to compromise with ancient polytheism. Therefore, Roman Stoics argued that gods could be worshipped as the manifestation of Divine Reason which is the source of Peace and Wisdom. These ideas led to the process of humanization of Roman life and law beyond its deep theoretical and intellectual impacts. Especially Seneca and emperor Marcus Aurelius were in the key positions of this marriage of Greek philosophies especially Stoicism with Roman polytheism and paganism. Stoic philosophy affected Christian way of thought via this marriage.

The dualistic character of Christianity in theology, philosophy and politics has its origins in Stoic world picture based on the assumption that the world is a product of two interacting principles, the one active and determinant, the other passive and determined. One of the significant Stoic thinkers, **Posidonius of Syria**, became effective for the spread of the dualistic Stoic philosophy through re-emphasizing the duality of matter and spirit, and, body and soul. **Cicero** in Rome,

¹ It is very difficult to find out the original creeds, ceremonies and rites of Jesus' teachings because of the absence of any document written during the life of Jesus. The Gospels which have been written afterwards, have some significant contradictions which have been analyzed very deeply. Herder's work (1796; Durant, 1972:553) is especially significant on this subject. The differential characteristics of fourth Gospel and letters of Paul give us some important clues for the leadership of St. Paul on the transformation of the Christianity from a Semitic origin to a new complex belief-system: "In Christ and Peter Christianity was Jewish, in Paul it became half-Greek and in Catholicism it became half-Roman; in Protestantism the Judaic elements were restored". (Durant, 1972:579) The essential doctrines of the institutionalized Christianity, like the notion of original sin, redemption and grace, were formulated by St. Paul.

² Therefore Hatch (1957:127) defines Christianity as "misunderstood Platonism" while Durant (1972:611) calls the last great pagan philosophers like Plotinus, Epictetus and Aurelius as "Christians without Christ".

where Posidonius of Syria spent his later life, was influenced by this doctrine. The blending of this way of thought with the thoroughgoing dualism of Ptolemaean Gnosis depending on the acknowledgement of two worlds¹ -divine (Pleroma) and material- affected medieaval cosmological and ontological speculations to a great extent. This cosmological dualism created axiological and political dualisms survived throughout the western civilizational tradition which will be discussed in the following pages.

Polytheistic elements based on the particularization of the Divinity in ancient Roman religions² might be accepted as one of the sources of the ontological proximity of God and man in Christian theology. Before Christianity, the Roman religious atmosphere had a tendency towards the divinity and deification of man as man-god through the process of the personification of God. At this stage, pantheistic and polytheistic elements acted together to form an ontological proximity and identification. Christianity, itself, adapted to the previous religious-cultural atmosphere through the deification of Jesus and through matching the miracle works of the pagans with wonder-working saints.³ The term 'Divus' acquired its special connotation through the deification of emperors as it was applied to Christian saints. The transformation of Divus Ianuarius to St. Gennaro, of Divus Iosephus to St. Giuseppe and of Diva Agatha to St. Agatha are some examples for this application.⁴ The particularization of

¹"The first -the original and noblest world- was the immortal realm of what he [Irenaeus] called "the Pleroma"- 'th Fullness'. this was a society of Divine Beings, or 'Eons' at whose apex stood the unknown and unknowable Ultimate- 'the Abyss'. It was the divine world of which spirit was held to be a displaced native. Outside and beneath the Pleroma was the material world, which was regarded as including within itself the very principle of evil. between these two realms, the spiritual and material, there was a connection, but a connection only indirect and tenuous. As the Gnostic saw it, the existence of the material world was the unintended product of a temporary disorder within the life of Pleroma." (Norris, 1965:76)

² The native religion of Rome was depending on animism. The adventure of the Roman native animism to the late complex polytheistic state religion might be analyzed in following stages: "(i) primitive animism and magic, (ii) the beginning of the personification of the spirits and powers of nature during the late regal period, (iii) the humanizing of these spirits following contacts with Latins, Etruscans, and Greeks during the Republic, (iv) a process completed after the Hannibalic War in the identification of Roman with corresponding Greek deities, (v) the corruption of orthodoxy as a result of the increasing skepticism ushered in by Rome's foreign wars, (vi) the revival of ancient faith under Augustus, (vii) and lastly the long decline during the empire when Caesarism, later Greek philosophies, oriental mystery cults and Christianity held sway" (Weiss, 1959:1)

³ Laing (1963) shows interesting indications of the survival of Roman theological elements, creeds, cults and rites within Christianity; f.e. the idea of Deity, gods of the family, serpent-worship, gods of marriage, gods of agriculture, river spirits, the worship of the spirits of the dead, man-god, the mother of the gods, baptism of blood e.t.c.

⁴ "Like the deified heroes and emperors of pagan times the Saints were honored with altars, sacred edifices, incense, lights, hymns, ex-veto offerings, festival with illuminations and highly hilarity prayers and invocations" (Laing, 1963:121)

Divinity among several gods was transformed to the specialization of functions among saints in Christianity. This prevented the evolution of an image of concentrated ontological transcendency.

The native Roman idea of pandemonism and the particularization of divinities was transformed to a new eclectic faith which was originally monotheistic.¹ Some theological elements in the Old Testament² and in Hebraic tradition facilitated the process of the imaginative internalization of these theologically pluralistic particularization of divinity. This transformation brought about two fundamental consequences. One theoretical, was that the ontological proximity and identification between the ontological levels of God and the universe was developed. Second, organizational, was that an intermediary spiritual organization emerged- the Catholic Church- for the solution of ontological problems.³

The status of Jesus in Christianity is one of the anchor points of ontological proximity and identification which created its own epistemological and axiological counterparts. Additionally, the ontological characteristics of Christianity and Jesus' status show the continual process from the ancient to the mediaeval Christian era. Pagans and members of mystery religions within the syncretic atmosphere of the *Pax Romana* believed in gods -Osiris, Attis, Dionysus- who died to redeem mankind with such titles as Soter [Savior] and Eleutheriom [Deliverer]. The theological name of Jesus as Christ is originally a name given in Syrian-Greek cults to the dying and redeeming Dionysus as Kyrios [Lord] (Guignebert, 1927:88). The creed of the redeeming blood of Christ formulated by St. Paul has no literal justification in the Gospels. It is also very similar to the mithraic idea of the sacrifice of the God (Walker, 1939:103) and to the avatar of Hinduism for the salvation of the human being.⁴ Tillich (1963:II/93) defines the

¹ There are some verses in the New Testament for the Unity and Omnipotence of God: f.e. "And Jesus answered him, the first of all the commandments is, Hear, O Israel; The Lord, our God is one Lord." (St. Mark, 12:29) "Saying, We give thee thanks, O Lord God Almighty, which art, and wast, and art to come; because thou hast taken to the thy great power and hast reigned" (Revelation, 11:17)

² "God standeth in the congregation of the mighty; he judgeth among the gods; I have said, Ye are gods, and all of you are children of the Most High; But ye shall die like men and fall like one of the princes; Arise, O God, judge the earth, for thou shalt inherit all nations" (Psalms, 82:1,6-8)

³ Hume (1907,II/360) explains this practical necessity for Church as following: "The more tremendous the divinity is represented, the more tame and submissive do men become to his ministers: And the more unaccountable the measures of acceptance required by him, the more necessary does it become to abandon our natural reason, and yield to their ghostly guidance and direction"

⁴ Greeks were, at that time, also familiar with the idea of Incarnation because when Paul and Barnabas performed a miracle in Lystra, the Lycaonian people cried out 'the gods have come down

ontological status of Christ as *the Mediator* and *the Savior* who represents God to man. But, his explanation for the ontological difference between the ontological status of Christ and mediator gods who appear in the history of religion at the moment in which the highest God becomes increasingly abstract and removed is not clear enough to show the ontological transcendency in Christianity because in the following pages he argues, on the concept of Incarnation, that "It is preferable to speak of a divine being which has become man and to refer to the terms *Son of God* or the *Spiritual Man* or the *Man from Above*, as they are used in biblical language" (Tillich, 1963: II/94).

The transformation of the historical Jesus to mythical Christ as a very significant indication for ontological proximity; might be seen in the transformation of the imagination of him. Although Jesus never saw a painting nor a statue, ancient statues have been adopted to Christian worship. Not only the statues of some saints like St. Helena, Sannazaro taken from ancient gods as Juno, Neptun, but also the images of Christ.¹ Even the name Christianity came, etymologically, from a pagan origin.²

The adaptation of the Greek Logos of Neo-Platonism and the Stoic legacy,³ together with these factors, restructured all the basic creeds of Jesus' religion and formed a new ontological foundation. This idea of Christ created a new concept of God in the Christian theology confused with the image of the fatherhood of God which had its sources in ancient philosophies and religions. Hence, Wolfson (1956:362) calls the orthodox Christian notion of God as "a combination of Jewish monotheism and pagan polytheism". This image of the belief of the fatherhood of God (gods) has been used as a significant tool for the justification of the political authority in ancient Egyptian and Mesopotamian traditions, although

to us in the likeness of men' and Barnabas was called Jupiter and Paul Mercurius, according to the New Testament.(Acts.:14:8-12)

¹ "While the early type of Christ, without beard, is thought by some to show reminiscence of the Graeco-Roman Apollo, there is a much clearer case of pagan influence in the representation of Christ as the Good Shepherd with a lamb on his shoulders. Going back as it does to the statue of Hermes carrying a ram,(...) this figure constitutes an unusual good example of the relation of Christian to pagan art." (Laing, 1963:244)

² First time St. Paul and Barnabas has called themselves as Christianoi, a word received from the paganism meaning followers of the Messiah or Anointed One. (Durant, 1972:582)

³ This adaptation began in time of St. Paul who wrote in Greek and read the Old Testament in Greek (Grant, 1961:66); f.e. he used the mystical conception of Philo's 'Book of Wisdom' in Corinthians for the description of Jesus: "But, unto them which are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God, and the wisdom of God" (Corinthians, I/1:24)

there were some differences in usage of this term.¹ The relationship of parentage of Pharaoh, Hammurabi and Assurbanipal with gods and goddess are very indicative examples for the pre-Christian imagination. As Hyde (1946:134) underlines, the Fatherhood of God was an elementary concept expressed for the early Greeks a millenium before by Homer in the Iliad where Zeus is called 'father of gods and men' and after Socrates, especially in the writings of Plato² and the Stoics, this idea of the fatherhood was embodied in the concept of God as the Creator and Director of the universe. This image of fatherhood is also very evident in the Jewish tradition³ together with the idea that Jahweh is father to the Jews alone. Hence, the concept of brotherhood of men and fatherhood of God as two cardinal principles of Christianity originated from Hebrew and mysterious religious⁴ traditions and philosophized by Stoic influence.

The dogma of Trinity as one of the significant elements of the ontological proximity in Christian theology has imaginative and theoretical sources in pre-Christian legacy. In fact, many ancient religious and philosophical traditions have had some sort of Trinity. Therefore, the dogma of Trinity, which is not found in the Bible literally, might be accepted as a continuation of Hindu (Brahma-Shiva-Vishnu), Egyptian Hermetic (Osiris-Isis-Horus), Zoroastrian

¹ "When we refer back to Egypt, we find Pharaoh could appear as the son of any god or goddess but that he counted specifically as the child (in the literal sense) of certain deities. As far as physical existence was concerned, Pharaoh had been begotten by *Amon-Re* upon the queenmother. As regards his divine potency, he was *Horus*, the son of *Hathor*. As the legitimate successor to the throne (a notion with cosmic implications) he was *Horus* the son of *Ostris* and *Isis*, the grandson of *Geb*, the earth. In Mesopotamia we do not find equivalents for the unchanging, precisely defined relationship which connected Pharaoh with *Amon-Re* and *Osiris*, with *Hathor*, and with *Isis*. Only the general formula which makes it possible for Pharaoh to appear as the son of any god or goddess recurs in Mesopotamia. In both countries, moreover, we find that the king can appear as the child of a number of gods at one and the same time. *Gudea* calls himself the son of *Ninsun*, *Nanshe* or *Baba*- three goddesses who, though similar in essentials, had become so much differentiated in the course of time that we can not assume that *Gudea* used their names as synonyms. The same ruler is also the son of the goddess *Gatumdug*. (...) In Mesopotamia, as elsewhere, the terms of parentage are used in connection with the deity to express both intimacy and dependence. Hence it is possible for *Hammurabi*, in the preamble to his code, to call himself 'son of *Sin*' (II,13-14), 'son of *Dagan*' (IV,27-28) and 'brother of the god of *Zamama*' while in yet another text he is the son of *Marduk*. (...) he [Assurbanipal] names as his mother sometimes *Ninlil*, sometimes *Belit of Nineveh*, and sometimes *Ishtar of Arbela*." (Frankfort, 1948:299-300)

² f.e. "the maker and father of this universe..." (Timaeus 28C; Cornford, 1937:22)

³ f.e. "When the morning stars sang together, and all the sons of God shouted for joy" (Job,38:7)

⁴ Hebrew impact was also effective through the indirect impact of interacting relationships of mysterious religions and Greek philosophy. It is very difficult to distinguish these influences. For example, it has been argued that they obtained the concept of Yahweh from the Egyptian culture and religion systematized in the period of Amenhathep IV. (Larson, 1959:197) The Babylonian impact on the image of Hebrew Yahweh shows the very complex intra-belief structure of these belief-systems, because, Merodach, a Babylonian god, accompanied the kings in wars and fought for the nation like Yahweh. (Bogardus, 1955:31) this image of partial and serviceable god is a common element of these belief-systems and a common legacy to Christianity.

(Ahura Mazda-Spenta Mainyush- Armaiti Intelligence and Mind, Orphic Greek (Being-Life-Intellect) and Neo-Platonic (Good-Intelligence-World Soul) concepts of the Trinity.¹ The theological sophisticated interpretations of the dogma of Trinity necessitated the usage of the pre-Christian legacy. Even, Greek drama has been used for some explanations.²

Hence, the theoretical transformation towards ontological proximity is a counterpart of the adaptability of the Christianity to the syncretic pre-Christian atmosphere. It has been justified by St. Paul's doctrine that Jesus was not only the Messiah of the Jews but also the Savior of the gentile world. This process of the gentilization of Christianity might be accepted as the dynamics of the process of the universalization of this belief-system. This process has been supported by St. Paul's method of training.³ Rand (1928:35) stresses the same argument when he says that he sees something Greek in St. Paul's temperament and his method of winning his audiences.⁴

There are some significant classical works as cornerstones for the intellectual, philosophical and theological transmission from ancient to medieval ages specifying the continual process of a specific ontological color on the sphere of weltanschauung. Among them *De Mundo*⁵ and *Albinus' Epitome of the Teachings of Plato* are very interesting and evident examples. The

¹ Tanner summarizes these several types of Trinity and argues (1973:68) that "Christianity quickly absorbed most of the mystery schools of that day because the 'Christian mysteries' were essentially the same teachings.

² "The 'persons' of the Trinity are not strictly speaking persons at all, but different manifestations and impersonations of one and the same God. The word person (Latin persona, Greek prosopon) originally meant a mask, such as was used in Greek drama, where the same actor might play several roles, changing masks whenever he changed roles. One of the Greek Christian fathers, Sabellius, took this original meaning of the word so literally that he divided history into three acts, in each of which God played a different role: the Age of Father (B.C.); the Age of the Son (When Christ was on earth) and the Age of the Spirit (since Pentecost). The Council of Nicea agreed with Sabellius that the Father, Son and Spirit were 'masks' or 'impersonations' of one and the same God." (Horton, 1940:25)

³ "For though I be free from all men, yet have I made myself servant unto all, that I might gain the more. And unto the Jews I became as a Jew, that I might gain the Jews; to them that are under the law, as under the law, that I might gain them that are under the law." (I Corinthians, 9:19-20)

⁴ "I wonder, when we consider his voyages and his mind, that nobody has given him the title of a Christian Odysseus, a man of subtle twists and turns, all things to all men, with of course a difference. St. Paul became all things to all men in the hope that he might save some. (...) When he talks to the Athenians he is Greek. He is just as fittingly Jewish in his defence before King Agrippa, whom he knew to be 'expert in all customs and questions which are among the Jews'. I doubt not that, if St. Paul alive today and preached to a Boston audience, he would, in the fashion of our most liberal divines, choose a text from the Swami Vivikanda or Rabindranath Tagore, preaching the quotation with the words 'as certain also of your own prophets have said'." (Rand, 1928:35-36)

⁵ This treatise which was probably written in the first and second Christian century, was traditionally, though falsely, attributed to Aristotle.

unknown writer of *De Mundo* was probably a member of Stoicism because as in Stoicism, "the God of the *De Mundo* is an immanent cohesive force as well as a directing Reason. He is within the world, not outside it or above it. Nevertheless he is localized within it. The writer does not agree with the saying that 'All things are full of God' ".(De Mundo 397b16; Norris, 1965:31) Albinus, an influential student of the Platonic tradition, describes the *First God* as a "divine Intelligence who is the ultimate , unchanging source of all motion and order, the apex of ingenerate existence". (Norris,1965:35) He interprets Platonic cosmology within a new formulation defining the World Soul of the Timaeus as an inferior secondary deity who mediates between the First God and the world. He tries to synthesize alternative approaches arguing that the Supreme God is not a particular force within the world, like the God of *De Mundo*, neither is he reality separable from it. These attempts facilitated the comprehensive transformation and fusion in these centuries.

The adaptability of Christianity to the pre-Christian syncretic atmosphere has been accelerated as a process of impact-response-transformation after St. Paul, by the attempts of Christian fathers and thinkers (especially by Apologists) as Athanasius, Basil, Gregory of Naziansus, Gregory of Nyssa, Cyril of Jerusalem, Justin Martyr, Clement, Origen, Hippolytus, Irenaeus, Tertullian, Ambrose and Augustine, although some others like Vigilantius and Faustus opposed to internalization of some pagan traditions within the Christianity. The impacts of Platonism on Martyr's and Origen's theology, Tertullian's challenge to Latin background and Irenaeus' approach to Gnosticism are especially interesting to find out the challenge and continual links between ancient legacy and Christian reformulation of theology. ¹ The discussion on the nature of the Logos is an evident example for the blending of the philosophies and belief-systems. Justin Martyr's argument that when Plato talks about the World Soul, he is talking about the Son of God, who is the Logos, shows the origins of the sovereign ontological color as the basic dimension of the Mediaeval Mind. The consensus

¹ Taylor (1949:5) summarizes this process of the dogmatic formulation of the Christianity as following: "For in the fourth and fifth centuries, the influence of pagan Greece on pagan Rome tended to repeat itself in the relations between the Greek and Latin Fathers of the Church. The dogmatic formulation of Christianity was mainly the work of the former. Tertullian, a Latin, had indeed been in early and important contributor to the process. But, in general, the Latin fathers were to approve and confirm the work of Athanasius and of his coadjutors and predecessors, who thought and wrote in Greek. nevertheless, Augustine and other Latin Fathers ordered and made anew what had come from their elder brethren in the East, latinizing it in form and temper as well as language. At the same time, they supplemented it with matter drawn from their own thinking. It was thus that patristic theology and the entire mass of Christianized knowledge and opinion came to the Middle Ages in a Latin medium."

of Apologists on the description of the *Logos* ¹ as the visible God and their argument that Logos is not himself the world, but he is its creator and in a certain fashion its archetype, together with the sophisticated theological discussions resulted in a proximity of ontological levels via a fusion of Semitic and Greek traditions.² Wolfson's description (1956:vi) of the recasting of Christian beliefs in the form of a philosophy - which took place between about 100 A.D. and the Sixth Ecumenical Council in 681- as a 'Christian version of Greek philosophy' is very meaningful to clarify this fusion.

The theological discussions after St. Augustine and councils between fourth and sixth centuries (like Nicea, Ephesus, Constantinople, Chalcedon) dogmatized these transformed Christian characteristics and strengthened the tendency towards ontological proximity especially around the debates on the divine natures of Christ and Mary.

The Christian notion of God around the dogma of Trinity and the fatherhood of God as a very significant symbol of ontological proximity, shaped all other theoretical evaluations of transformed Christianity. First, it created an *imago dei* depending on the particularization of Divinity which prevented the formation of an image of absolute ontological transcendency and a differentiation of ontological levels based on ontological hierarchy such as the 'Allah-man-nature' in Islam. Secondly, the complexities and vagueness of Christian ontology depending on the concept of the 'Trinity' led to a complex epistemological problem parallel to the question of the epistemological channel between *Deus Revelatus* and man. Thirdly, ontological and epistemological proximities became intrinsic elements in the idea of religious subjectivism and historical relativism, together with the humanization and secularization of knowledge. Fourthly, as another intrinsic character, axiology has potentially been

¹ "The inner essence of the Logos is identical with the essence of God himself; for it is the product of self-separation in God, willed and brought by himself. The Logos is the revelation of God, and the visible God. Consequently the Logos is really God and Lord, (...) The Logos has an origin, the Father has not; hence it follows that in relation to God the Logos is a creature, (...) With the issuing of the Logos from God began the realization of the idea of the world. The world is contained in the Logos. But the world is material and manifold, the Logos is spiritual and one. Therefore, Logos is not himself the world, but he is its creator and in a certain fashion its archetype." (Harnack, 11961:209-211)

² This fusion has its origin in the period of Hellenistic Civilization especially in the cultural centers where several ancient belief systems and philosophies were effective: "The fact that many Jews lost Hebrew and spoke Aramaic rendered it easier to adopt yet another language, and many Jews began to speak Greek and take Greek names, preferably those compounded with *Theos*, God, like *Theodotus*, *Theophilus*, *dorot'hea*; even in the third century the Hebrew Scriptures were useless to many Alexandrian Jews. (...) In Asia Minor *Yahweh* himself took a Greek name as *Theos Hypsistos*, God the Highest, a name used later even by Philo" (Tarn, 1974:225)

differentiated from its ontological antecedents through the equalization of epistemological spheres and the application of common and objective criteria both for the principles of revelation and reason. All of these characteristics have directly and deeply affected Christian political images and theories.

Obviously these characteristics did not come into the picture spontaneously, but Christianity harbored these intrinsic elements as the nucleus of its antithesis and became a bridge from antique to modern culture. There were several attempts to balance these characteristics within a systematic framework like **Scotus Erigena's** *On the Divisions of Nature*¹ to conciliate Platonic assumption of idea, Aristotelian ontological categorization, pantheistic imagination and Christian theology; like **St. Anselm's** *Proslogion*, *Monologion*, and *Cur Deus homo?*/*Why the God-Man* to formulate an ontological argument for the existence of God; and like **St. Thomas Aquinas's** *Summa Contra Gentiles* and *Summa Theologiae* to synthesize reason and faith for a logical scholastic formulation of Christian complex theology. That is one of the most significant characteristics of the age of Scholasticism which began with Anselm and reached its zenith with Aquinas, though there were contrasting tendencies within this period; as the dispute between Anselm and Aquinas and Aquinas and Duns Scotus. This attempt of reconciliation between dogma and thought/faith and reason leads **Durant** (1950:982) to an analogy between Scholasticism and Greek tragedy whose nemesis lurked in its essence, because "the attempt to establish the faith by reason implicitly acknowledged the authority of reason".² The attacks and criticisms of **William of Ockham**, **Duns Scotus** and others that the faith could not be established by reason opened a new phase on the paradigmatic base of the 'epistemologically defined ontology'. From another perspective, scholastic attempts like the Thomistic Synthesis between *Philosophia* and

¹ Scotus Erigena's division of nature is very interesting from the perspective of the attempt of conciliation. He divides nature into four parts: (i) nature which creates and is not created, (ii) nature which is created and creates, (iii) nature which is created and does not create, (iv) nature which neither creates nor is created. This ontological categorization resembles to the Aristotelian formulation of motion, while the second category includes Platonic eternal ideas. Since God is first and fourth category, God is to be thought as a part of nature (pantheistic element); yet this must be in a very special sense. Scotus Erigena thinks of God also as above nature. His principle of Logos as a channel between one and many and his interpretation of Trinity are Christian elements in his theoretical system. Cusanus borrowed this terminology of the ontological division of Scotus Erigena.

² His conclusion that Aristotle's philosophy was a Greek gift to Latin Christendom, a Trojan horse concealing a thousand hostile elements, approves my argument mentioned above that Christianity harbored the intrinsic elements of its antithesis and clarifies also my assumption for the ways of impact of Aristotelianism, both on scholasticism and Renaissance. But, additionally, I argue that it shows at the same time the continual links and paradigmatic base of these tendencies within the same philosophico-theoretical environment.

Theologia of Thomas Aquinas, brought *Philosophia* and *Theologia* closer to each other and a new transition was created within the western intellectual tradition on a re-formed paradigm that developed after the rediscovery of ancient philosophy.

The whole *Quattrocento* was a transitional period under the hegemony of the transitional figures such as Jean de Montreuil, Marsilio Ficino (1433-1499), Nicholas Cusanus (1401-1464), and Erasmus (1467-1536) whose fundamental aims were the redlscovery of ancient philosophy and the reconciliation and unification of these ancient classics with Christian theology. As early as 1409, Jean de Montreuil, an admirer of Francesco Petrarca (1304-1374) who is regarded as the earliest representative of Renaissance Humanism because of his attention of Latin and Greek sources, defended Cicero and Virgil. Florentine Academy became the most significant center for these attempts of unification. As Cassirer (1963:3) clarifies, "in such attempts of unification, the great philosophical systems lose their own distinctive features; they dissolve in the mist for a primordial Christian-philosphical revelation, as witnesses to which Ficino cites Moses and Plato, Zoroaster and Hermes Trismegistos, Orpheus and and Pythagoras, Virgil and Plotinus". Hence, this process might be accepted as the beginning of the second great fusion of the basic intellectual elements of the western civilization. From our perspective, the cosmological and ontological speculations of Nicholas Cusanus is a typical example of this new form of the ontological proximity between God, man and nature which aims to systematize the proximity (and union) between God and man and God and all creation, within the Christian theological framework.¹ This rediscovery of pagan sources has been justified depending on the argument of the strength of the Christianity in an age of the

¹ "Just as Christ is the expression of all humanity, just as He signifies nothing but its simple idea and essence, so does man, too, viewed in his essence, include within himself all things. In man as a microcosm all lines of the macrocosm run together. One sees how the microcosm motif, which Cusanus explicitly called an ancient motif, intertwines in a peculiar way with the basic religious idea of Christianity. In Medieval thought, redemption signified above all liberation from the world, i.e., the uplifting of men above their sensible, earthly existence. But Cusanus no longer recognizes such a separation between man and nature. If man as a microcosm includes the natures of all things within himself, then is redemption, his rising up to the divinity, must include the Ascension of all things. Nothing is isolated, cut off, or in any way rejected; nothing falls outside this fundamental religious process of redemption. Not only man rises up to God through Christ; the universe is redeemed within man and through him. The *regnum gratiae* and the *regnum naturae* no longer stand opposed to to each other, strangers and enemies; now they are related to each other and to their common, divine goal. the union has been completed not only between God and man, but between God and all creation. The gap between them is closed; between the creative principle and the created, between God and creature, stands the spirit of humanity, humanitas, as something at once creator and created." (Cassirer, 1963:40)

fall of the Scholasticism.¹ Erasmus' assertion that "the study of classical antiquity assisted the rediscovery of the literal text of the Scriptures and the return of the values of the primitive Church, obscured and lost through the aridities of scholastic and the abuses and corruption which had crept into the Church" (Green V.,1967) was not only another way of justification, but also a final blow against Scholasticism and an implicitly opened door for Protestantism.

The cornerstone of the 'epistemologically defined ontology' is Descartes' philosophy. But, the origins of the intellectual transformation should be searched within the phases of the transition from the period of Scholasticism to the formation of the new philosophical elan parallel to the new scientific approach which encouraged the central place of epistemology in modern philosophy.² The development of the nature-centered cosmology and antropocentric epistemology accelerated the process of the formation of a new paradigm through the intrinsic ontological characteristics of Christianity and the impact of the ancient philosophies. Step by step, God-centered ontology vacated the stage for the nature-centered cosmology and antropocentric epistemology. The heliocentric conception of the universe with the famous sequence of the new astronomy - Copernicus, Tycho Brahe, Kepler and Galileo- ontologically pushed God and man from the center of the thought to the periphery. This means a radical departure from the medieval physics depending on the assumption that man is in every sense the center of the universe and that the whole word of nature is teleologically subordinated to him. With Burt's (1980:24) formulation "just as it was thoroughly natural for medieval thinkers to view nature as subservient to man's knowledge, purpose and destiny; so now it has become natural to view her as existing and operating in her own self-contained independence, and so far as man's ultimate relation to her is clear at all, to consider his knowledge and purpose somehow produced by her, and his destiny wholly dependent on her". But, this reality does not mean that they were consciously against Christian background and its metaphysics; f.i. as Russell (1962:513) underlines that Copernicus whose orthodoxy was sincere, protested against the view that his theory contradicted the Bible.

¹"Now -praised be Jesus Christ- true religion was strengthened, paganism destroyed, and the victorious Church in possession of the hostile camp. It was now possible to touch and study paganism almost (free) without danger. This is the argument invariably used in later times to defend the Renaissance."(Burckhardt,1981:123)

² Whitehead's (1982:3) conception of nature as " that which we observe in perception through the senses " is an evident terminological extension of this characteristic of modern philosophy.

From our perspective, this assertion shows the continuity between phases of sequence from ancient to modern period. Kepler's (1571-1630) incline to sun-worship, though being a good Protestant, which might be accepted as an opposite transformation of Christianity towards polytheistic antique culture, shows us the intersecting points of these phases; that is ontological proximity or ontological identification in an ultimate sense of proximity. Bruno (1548-1600) was a typical transitional figure for the formation of such an ontological approach based on this new scientific innovations. His conclusion that "since the universe is infinite, and there can not be two infinities, the infinite God and the infinite universe must be one"(Durant,1961:VII/624) might be accepted as a preparatory formulation of Spinoza's *Deus sive substantia sive Natura* -God or Substance or Nature. So, such an image of ultimate ontological proximity within a pantheistic interpretation and nature-centered cosmology developed side by side. That necessitated a new concept of God who is not an external intelligence because "it is more worthy for him to be the internal principle of motion, which is his own nature, his own soul"(Cassirer, 1951:41). Bruno became a channel between Lucretius and Leibniz with his speculation that the world is composed of minute monads as the souls of things, indivisible units of force, of life, of inchoate mind. These views might be evaluated as a systematic and scientific philosophization of the ancient mythological polytheism and pantheism.

The assumption of the Divine Mind in every particle of reality was consistent with the assumption of the centrality of nature in the new developed cosmology. The new physics based on the 'Newtonian world-machine' created a new image of God as a person responsible for planning, building and setting in motion this world-machine. Such an image of God is very close to the Platonic *Demiurges*. Using Brinton's (1963:119) differentiation¹, after Newtonian revolution, deism replaced theism. As he argues, this deistic interpretation proved the existence of God by two very old arguments, the argument from a First Cause and the argument from Design. But once this necessary God had got the world machine to running, he ceased to do anything about it. This deistic interpretation used Newtonian world-machine for their replacement of the Christian theology with a simple acceptance of one God. Such an image of God

¹"Now deism is a fairly definite and concrete belief about the universe and save in some polemics of the time and since, is not a synonym either of atheism or of skepticism. Deism needs to be distinguished from theism, which involves a more personal God, a God not necessarily anthropomorphic, but at least in some senses immanent, capable of being prayed to; from pantheism, which has God penetrate every article of the universe; and from philosophical idealism, which talks of spirit (Geist) rather than God. (...) the deist's belief is the nearest possible reflection of Newton's orderly universe, spinning around according to law."

was not an alternative to Bruno's (later Spinoza's and Leibniz's) pantheistic tendencies. because it assumed, too, a specific identification of God with Nature and her laws. The Newtonian system in *Principia* has provided support of the theologians, too, especially after Bentley's Boyle lectures (1692) "by stressing the apparent unity, order and grandeur of the universe as evidences of the wisdom, power and majesty of God" (Durant,1963:VII/546). The image of God in *Principia*¹ is perhaps literally more monotheistic than medieval complex Christian theology, but Newtonian system harbored evidences and elements for several speculative approaches. The results of Newtonian world-machine has strengthened the tendency towards the understanding of the "self-subsistent and self-adjusting nature" which became the scientific base for the ontological proximity and ontological identification in the modern era. The origins of Mill's and James' limited theism should be searched within the transitional phases of this tendency.

The ontological status of man has been re-shaped within the context of this nature-centered cosmology and scientific elan. Francis Bacon's judgement in the first sentence of his *Novum Organum* as "*Homo, naturae minister et interpres* /Man, the servant and interpreter of nature, can do and understand so much only as he has observed in fact or in thought of the course of nature: beyond this he neither knows anything nor can do anything", is the most pithy expression of this status. This judgement shows, at the same time, the new epistemological dimensions in the modern era. As Berns (1978:2) clarifies, this judgement means that "man is servant of nature in so far as he can do or make nothing except by obeying the hidden chain of causes" while "man is the interpreter of nature in so far as he does not accept what he receives as if it were self-evident, but rather as being results and signs only of the hidden chain of causes". Bacon's third aphorism in *Novum Organum* indicates not only his understanding of the subordination of man to nature, but also contemporary dilemma related to

¹ "This Being governs all things, not as the soul of the world, but as Lord over all; and on account of his dominion he is wont to be called Lord God Universal Ruler; for God is a relative word, and has a respect to servants; and Deity is the dominion of God not over his own body, as those imagine who fancy God to be the soul of the world, but over servants. The Supreme God is a Being eternal, infinite, absolutely perfect, without dominion, can not be said to be Lord God; for we say my God, your God, the God of Israel, the God of Gods and Lord of Lords; but we do not say my Eternal, your Eternal (...) The word God usually signifies Lord; but every Lord is not a God. And from his true dominion it follows that the true God is a living, intelligent and powerful Being. (...) Since every particle of space is always, and every indivisible moment of duration is everywhere, certainly the Maker and Lord of all things can not be never and nowhere. (...) We know him only by his most wise and excellent contrivances of things, and final causes; (...) and a god without dominion, providence and final causes, is nothing but Fate and Nature." (Newton, 1803:II/309-14)

the relationship of man and nature: "For nature is not conquered, except by being obeyed".

Descartes' imagination of nature as a complete scheme, whose principles are linked together as are the axioms and theorems of a mathematical system, declares both the centrality of the deterministic machine-like nature and the epistemological tool to conquer it. Eaton's judgement in his introductory chapter for the selections from Descartes (1927:vii) that "Descartes stands where the streams of European thought meet" is very meaningful from the perspective of the re-formed paradigm and its link to the epistemological centralism. Trialistic cartesianism of Descartes basing on the categorization of the substances as mind, matter and God became the basic point of departure of the philosophical and theological inclinations after him. Eaton gives us trustworthy evidences¹ (1927:xxii) for his assertion that Cartesianism harbors under a single roof the elements of at least three widely different philosophies, pantheism, materialism and idealism although Descartes stoutly resisted all these ways of thinking, which were later to grow out of his premises. Even Fraser's (1899) classification of the philosophical tendencies as Panegoism, Materialism and Pantheism carries traces from this trialistic cartesianism. Each of these inclinations creates ontological proximity, and identification in ultimate sense, through the fusion of two cartesianic elements in the third one; rather than setting up an ontological hierarchy through the specification the ontological and epistemological status of each element. Cartesian dualism between mind and matter as an extension of Platonic and Christian philosophy results in an imagination of "two parallel but independent worlds, that of mind and that of matter, each of which can be studied without reference to the other"(Russell,1962:551). Such a theoretical and imaginative dualism might be evaluated as the ontological ground of the epistemological and axiological secularization in western intellectual tradition. So, it is one of the vital elements of the historico-cultural experience of the western civilization throughout several different phases and ages.

"Epistemologically defined ontology" as another paradigmatic characteristic of western tradition finds its best expression with Descartes' famous formulation as "Cogito ergo sum/I think therefore I am" in *Meditations*.

¹ "Make mind and matter coordinate aspects of God, who becomes the indwelling substance of all things, and you have the pantheism of Spinoza. Abolish the realm of thinking substance and explain thought as a function of the bodily machine, and you have the materialism of Hobbes or La Mettrie. Absorb matter into spirit, as a thought in the Divine Mind, and you have the idealism of Malebranche and Berkeley."

His identification of the self with *res cogitans*/ thinking thing and of *mens* as *substantia cogitans*¹ and his equation as *Mens sive animus, sive Intellectus, sive Ratio* are very fair statements for the dependency of ontology to epistemology. Descartes' proofs of the existence of God in the *Meditations* (two anthropological proofs in the *Third Meditation* and one ontological proof in the *fifth Meditation*) and his theological interpretations give us interesting clues how "he stands where the streams of European thought meet". These proofs, especially his reasoning from the imperfection of the self to the perfection of God² and his analogy between geometrical perfections and God³, are typical examples for the meeting of the philosophical and theological streams for the philosophical systematization of the theological assumptions.

Spinoza's (1930:115) usage of the same analogy in *Ethic* for his pantheistic interpretation of God arguing that things are caused by God "in the same way as it follows from the nature of a triangle (...) that its three angles are equal of two right angles" shows the debts of several different speculations to the Cartesian system. Collingwood (1981:105) tries to show the impact of Descartes' philosophy on Spinoza's pantheism stating that Spinoza took the Descartes' qualification on two-substance doctrine and drew its logical consequences. He argues that through these logical consequences "he (Spinoza) asserted that there was only one substance, God; and that since there could be no other substance neither mind nor matter was a substance created by God. Russell (1962:553) argues that Spinoza's metaphysic is a modification of Descartes and compares the relation of Spinoza to Descartes to the relation of Plato to Plotinus. On the other hand, Wolfson (1934:I/201) shows some parallelities between Descartes and Spinoza on

¹ "Substantia, cui inest immediate cognitio, vocatur Mens"(from the definitions of the Second Replies; Beck, 1965:109)

² "Explicitly we can recognize our own imperfection earlier than the perfection of God, because we give our attention to ourselves before we pay attention to God.... but implicitly the knowledge of God and his perfections must precede the knowledge of ourselves and our imperfections, for, in actual fact, the perfection of God is prior to our imperfection, since our imperfection is a defect and a negation of the perfection of God, and every defect and negation presupposes that thing of which it is the defect and denial.(AT,v.153) ... we could form this idea (of perfection) though we did not know that a supreme being existed, but we could not do so if such a being did not in fact exist.(AT,vii.133)" (Beck,1965:169) Such a reasoning leads him to an idea of an infinite substance, possessing all perfections, that is God.

³ "A man who conceives a triangle as a figure contained by three straight lines has a sufficient idea of the whole triangle. Similarly, it is enough to conceive God as a thing confined by no limits"(AT,vii.368/Beck, 1965:176) "God, who is this Perfect Being, is or exists... and (this) is at least as certain as any demonstration of geometry can possibly be"(AT,vi.36/Beck,1965:217)Thus, just as the idea of a triangle requires the idea that its internal angles will be equal to 180 degrees; so the idea of a perfect being requires the idea that this being exists. Hence, God can not be conceived, except as existing. This reasoning is parallel to the ontological argument.

the proof of the existence of God. Spinoza's assumption of *Deus siva Natura* as the only one substance is an ultimate ontological proximity or ontological identification between God and nature.

The deterministic extension of this ontological identification based on the assumption that there is no such thing as free will in the mental sphere or chance in the physical world, strengthened the tendency towards nature-centered cosmology via the peripherality of God and man as ontological beings and its epistemological counterparts. Humber's conclusions in his article (1972) that Spinoza justifies the existence of substance (God) empirically, namely by perception and that the proofs for God are attempts to show that God belongs to the category of substance and thus exist by nature, is very interesting from this perspective. Spinoza's belief in the self-sufficing, lawful order of Nature on ontological sphere together with his assertion his-assertion that we need only the revelation afforded by the natural powers of reason operative in us because even for our understanding of God's own nature, Divine Revelation is wholly unnecessary, specify two significant characteristic of western paradigm contrasting to the Islamic paradigm, namely 'nature-centric ontological proximity (or identification in ultimate sense) based on self-sufficing nature-machine' and 'the centrality of antropocentric epistemology to conceive the realities of '*Deus siva Natura*'.

Collingwood's interpretation (1981:105) that the main stream moved from Descartes has been directed by Spinoza, Leibniz, Newton and Locke, is completely right when we try to find out the philosophical, scientific and theological components of this re-formed western paradigm. Locke's epistemological contribution which systematized the relationship of dependency of ontology to epistemology, became the crossing point between this stream and modern materialism and empiricism. Locke's philosophy of knowledge resting on two significant assumption that there are no innate ideas and that all our knowledge springs from experience, became point of departure for the coming theories and approaches such as Hume's empiricism, James' radical empiricism and theory of pluralistic universe, because it made all philosophical and theological issues subject to antropocentric epistemology.

As Schwegler (1871:184) signifies, Hume's skepticism was but a more consistent following out of Locke's empiricism. Hume's application of his modified self-consistent empiricism to theological issues leads him to the

argument of the incomprehensibility of the idea of God. His refutation the a priori (ontological) and cosmological arguments and his assertion that the teleological argument at best proves a finite, imperfect deity, might be evaluated as the systematization of the subjectivist interpretation of God and as the forerunner of the idea of relativity and conscientiousness of religion in modern western understanding of religion which cuts the links between ontological assumptions and practical life. Smith's (1947:25) imputation that Hume has reduced the content of the concepts 'God' and 'religion' to a beggarly minimum, is not unjust from this perspective. His pragmatic approach which is very fair in his comparison of polytheism and theism related to their advantages and disadvantages in his *The Natural History of Religions*,¹ shows his interpretation of religion as a subject of epistemological and axiological presuppositions rather than as an objective and inclusive ontological approach. Hume's this contribution affected the followers of the understanding of the limited theism. James' attempt to synthesize epistemological empiricism, axiological pragmatism and ontological pluralism indebted too much to this approach. His argumentation for his preference of a deity who is a little superior to mankind in state of a deity who is infinitely superior of mankind,² is a very clear evidence for our thesis on ontological proximity as a paradigmatic component of western philosophico-theological tradition and on interconnected relationship between ontological proximity, axiological pragmatism and limited theism.

¹ "Polytheism or idolatrous worship, being founded entirely in vulgar traditions, is liable to this great inconvenience, that any practice or opinion however barbarous or corrupted, may be authorized by it; and full scope is given, for knavery to impose on credulity, till morals and humanity be expelled the religious systems of mankind. At the same time, idolatry is attended with this evident advantage, that, by limiting the powers and functions of its deities, is naturally admits the gods of other sects and nations to a share of divinity, and renders all the various deities, as well as rites, ceremonies or traditions, compatible with other. (Verrius Flaccus, cited by Pliny, lib. xxviii. cap. 2. affirmed, that it was usual for the Romans before they laid siege to any town, to invoke deity of the place....bribe him to betray his old friends and votaries) Theism is opposite both in its advantages and disadvantages. As that system supposes one sole deity, the perfection of reason and goodness, it should, if justly prosecuted, banish every thing frivolous, unreasonable, or inhuman from the religious worship, and set before men the most illustrious example; (...) These mighty advantages are not indeed over-balanced, but somewhat diminished, by inconveniences, which arises from the vices and prejudices of mankind. While one sole object of devotion is acknowledged, the worship of other deities is regarded as absurd and impious. (Hume, 1907b:II/336)

² "Where the deity is represented as infinitely superior to mankind, this belief, though altogether just, is apt, when joined with superstitious terrors, to sink the human mind into the lowest submission and abasement, and to represent the monkish virtues of mortification, penance, humility, and passive suffering, as the only qualities which are acceptable to him. But where the gods are conceived to be only a little superior to mankind, and to have been, many of them, advanced from that inferior rank, we are more at our ease in our addresses to them, and may even without profaneness, aspire sometimes at a rivalry and emulation of them. Hence, activity, spirit, courage, magnanimity, love of liberty, and all the virtues which aggrandize a people." (Hume, 1907b:II/339)

Rousseau's romanticism accelerated the inclination to the relativity and conscientiousness of ontological approaches especially in the sense of religious feelings, while Kant's three *Critiques* formed a new set of links between ontology, epistemology and axiology in favor of the pragmatismal evaluation of theism. Rousseau's understanding of natural religion and its epistemological characteristic connected directly to the individual heart¹ which has been explained in the 'Confession of Faith of a Savoyard Vicar' in the fourth book of *Emile* is a very influential interpretation of religious subjectivism. Such a subjectivism has very significant axiological consequences in the direction of the peripherality of religious law. It might be also the first stimulus for the formation of a new ethical base directly connected to the nature and natural religion.

Kant's new set of links between ontology, epistemology and axiology affected almost all significant scientific, religious, philosophical and political tendencies after him, especially in the nineteenth century. Therefore, his philosophy carries some significant characteristics of the paradigmatic components of western civilization. Schwegler's (1871:209) judgement that "Kant is the great restorer of philosophy, again conjoining into unity and totality the one-sided philosophical endeavors of those who proceeded him", is completely right from this point of view. His doctrine that we can know only a phenomenal world which we make in the act of knowing it in the *Critique of Pure Reason* together with his general understanding of nature might be accepted as one of the metaphysical origins of the scientific elan in the nineteenth century. The most significant characteristic of this elan is its assumption of the physical universe as a vast and complicated machine obeying immutable laws which have been substituted for the conception of God in the Newtonian world-machine, who stands behind the physical universe as the author of the invariable laws of nature. As Barnes (1965:III/981) underlines, "cause and effect relationship occupied much the same position among nineteenth century scientists that God, the perfect being, occupied in the perspective of Descartes". Kantian relationship of the phenomenal world and mind created a marriage of the nature-centric cosmology and anthropocentric epistemology. His statement that "the proper object of scientific knowledge is

¹ "Our passions are the chief means of self-preservation; to try to destroy them is therefore as absurd as it is useless; this would be to overcome nature, to reshape God's handiwork. If God bade man annihilate the passions he has given him, God would bid him be and not be; He would contradict Himself. He has never given such a foolish commandment, there is nothing like it written on the heart of man, and what God will have a man do, He does not leave to the words of another man, He speaks Himself; His words are written in the secret heart." (Rousseau, 1948:173)

not God or men or things in themselves, but nature and that the proper method of scientific knowledge is a combination of sensation with understanding ", (Collingwood,1981:119) provided a metaphysical foundation for the scientific leanings in nineteenth century while his demolition all previous arguments for the existence of God -ontological (Kant,1910:364-70), cosmological (Kant,1910:370-81) and physico-theological (Kant,1910:381-87) arguments- in his *Critique of Pure Reason* opened a new era for a new interpretation of theism.

His argument that the ideas of God, freedom and immortality are Postulates in Practical Reason in his *Critique of Practical Reason* leads to an understanding of confinement of religion within the bounds of reason alone. The assertion that there must be a power (God) who rewards the moral and punishes the wicked after this earthly life connects this confinement to an ethical base. Such a theistic conceptualization of God as a moral necessary being rather than an ontologically super natural being, within the context of a new defined connections between ontology, epistemology and axiology, became the anchor point for the leaning of the rational faith, for the presuppositions of limited theism and for the pragmatic interpretations of religion. Even the image of Christ has been modified under the impact of this reasoning. In *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone*, he argues that Christ is not a divine being, but only a symbol of a perfectly moral person who can encourage us to believe that we, too, can obey the moral law perfectly. His axiological presupposition that nothing can replace our duty to obey the moral law, leads him to reject the function of Christ as a Savior. Such an image of Christ which is common among the intellectuals and philosophers of the Enlightenment differs from the image of the classical Christianity because of its dependency to axiological propositions. The direction of impacts has been changed as epistemology-axiology-ontology. The common element between images of Christ in the medieval era and in the age of Enlightenment is their supports for the ontological proximity.

Religious trends in the nineteenth century has been directly influenced by these inclinations. Barnes' assertion (1965:983) that his influence on Protestantism has probably been exceeded only by that of Martin Luther, is enough to clarify his impact on the religions trends in the nineteenth century. His evaluations in the *Critique of Practical Reason* and the attempts of his chief disciples as Schleiermacher, Harnack, Constant, Ritschl, Mc Giffert and Maurice provided a sophisticated philosophical dignity and moral depth to Protestantism. Especially Ritschl's theological speculations in his masterpiece, *The Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation*, might be a typical example for the

interconnection and fusion of these impacts around pragmatic theistic interpretation for moral betterment, for the understanding of religion as a matter of experience of feeling, and for the practical characteristics of the subjectivist conscientiousness of religion.¹

Hegel's definition of religion as the self-consciousness of God (1968:327) who is no longer a being above and beyond this world, an Unknown, for he has told men what He is (1968:328)² but an Absolute Idea, a Spirit (1968:348), as a consequence of a very sophisticated philosophical theism connected to a comprehensive philosophical system comprehending logic and history, was an attempt to provide a philosophical justification for the Christian dogmas³ -the Trinity, Incarnation, Redemption, Resurrection- which presents the Absolute truth in pictorial form. Hegel, as the founder of a very comprehensive philosophical system, has many-sided impacts on the basic trends of philosophy,

¹ "Ritschl sought to render religion independent of the conventional facts of the Christian epic and of the dogmas of the traditional theology. He would make it rest on experience and have it devoted to practical work for moral betterment. Following Kant, he held that we can never obtain any theoretical knowledge of reality. Taking his next cue from Schleiermacher, he maintained that religion must be, so far as the personal aspect is concerned, a matter of experience. We can never know God, but we can feel conscious of him in our experience. In our experience of God he seems to stand to us in the relation of a father, to his children. This gives us the sense of a greater power outside of ourselves, in cooperation with which we can work rationally for moral progress and the betterment of the world. religion must be eminently practical, a sincere devotion to a deep moral purpose. Christ was the supreme example of a religious leader thus devoted to moral progress. If we accept this doctrine of love, we may become one with him and, ultimately with God." (Barnes, 1965:991)

² "We defined religion as being in the stricter sense the self-consciousness of God. Self-consciousness in its character as consciousness has an object, and it is conscious of itself in its object; this object is also consciousness, a consciousness which is distinct from God, from the Absolute. The element of determinateness is present in this form of consciousness, and consequently finitude is present in it; God is self-consciousness, He knows Himself in a consciousness which is distinct from Him, which is potentially the consciousness of God, but is also this actually, since it knows its identity with God, an identity which is however, mediated by the negation of finitude. It is this notion or conception which constitutes the concept of Religion. We define God when we say, that He distinguishes Himself from Himself, and is an object for Himself, but that in this distinction He is purely identical with Himself, is in fact Spirit. (...) Finite consciousness knows God only to the extent to which God knows Himself in it; thus God is Spirit, the Spirit of His Church in fact, i.e. of those who worship Him. This is the perfect Religion, the notion become objective itself. Here is revealed what God is, He is no longer a Being above and beyond this world, an Unknown, for He has told men what He is, and this is not merely in an outward way in history, but in consciousness. We have here, accordingly, the religion of the manifestation of God, since God knows Himself in the finite spirit. This simply means that God is revealed. here this is the essential circumstance. What the transition was we discovered when we saw how this knowledge of God as free spirit was, so far as its substance is concerned, still tinged with finitude and immediacy; this finitude had further to be discarded by the labour of Spirit; it is nothingness, and we saw how nothingness was revealed to consciousness." (1968:327-8)

³ f.e he tries to show the divine quality of Christ arguing that the Infinite God becomes God-human in time and space, dies and rises to show that the finite does not truly exist in independence but is identical with the Infinite, a stage in its life.

theology, and science. These many-sided impacts of Hegelian thought leads the extremes -and sometimes contradicting- of these trends to approach one another. His system might be accepted as the last attempt for the reconciliation of the philosophy and Christian theology. Fraser's (1899:228) conclusion that Hegelian philosophy is Hegelian theology -the two are synonymous; seems fully right; when we analyze the place of religion and philosophy in his system basing on the categorization of the Spirit as subjective, objective and absolute spirits and his evaluation of Christianity within this context.¹

Hegelian systematization for the reconciliation of his philosophy and Christian theology carries some significant characteristics of ontological proximity especially in the sense of particularization of divinity, deification of human being, pantheistic tendencies and imposed logical categories for God, although he also states that there is only one God. His understanding of God in his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion (1968:III/10) as universal Spirit which particularities itself and his re-interpretation of Trinity leads to an understanding of the particularization of Divinity, while his image of Christ as the God-human assumes an ontological proximity and identification between Divine being and humanity.² Pantheistic tendencies in Hegelian system as been discussed in details. Following Collingwood's view, we can say that it "resembles pantheism

1 The absolute Religion is (i) the revealed Religion. Religion is something revealed, it is manifested only when the notion or conception of religion itself exists for itself; or to put differently, religion or the notion of religion has become objective to itself, (328) It is the Christian religion which is the perfect religion which represents the Being of Spirit in a realized form, or for itself, the religion in which religion has itself become objective in relation to itself. In it the Universal Spirit and the particular Spirit, the Infinite Spirit and the finite spirit, are inseparably connected; (Hegel, 1968:II/330) (ii) This religion, which is manifest or revealed to itself, is not only the revealed religion, but the religion which is actually known as a religion which has been revealed; and by this is understood, on the one hand, that it has been revealed by God, and that God has actually communicated the knowledge of Himself to men; and, on the other hand, that being a revealed religion, it is a positive religion in the sense that it has come to men, and has been given to them from the outside. (Hegel, 1968:II/335) (iii) The absolute religion is thus the religion of Truth and Freedom. For Truth means that the mind does not take up such an attitude to the objective as would imply that this is something foreign to it. Freedom brings out the real meaning of truth, and gives it a specific character by means of negation. (Hegel, 1968:II/346) The metaphysical notion of God here means that we have to speak only of the pure notion which is real through its ownself. And thus the determination or definition of God here is that He is the Absolute Idea, i.e. that He is Spirit. (Hegel, 1968:II/348)"

²Allen (1985:236-7) summarizes Hegelian view of Christ as following: "Hegel interprets the work of Christ (his life, death and resurrection) from the perspective that he is the God-human. In the life of Christ we see the divine identifying itself with the human to the fullest extent by living a human life. His death shows an identification with humanity to the ultimate degree, for death is the crucial mark of humanity. Christ thus endures death to show the total identification of the divine with the human. Thus the incarnation (the person of Christ) and his life and death (the work of Christ) bring out the full extent of the bond and essential unity of the Infinite and the finite."

in that the process of the world is conceived as identical with the process of God's self-creative life ; but it differs from pantheism in that God in Himself, as the pure creative concept, is prior to the material world and transcends it as its cause". Using Lauer's (1982:281) concept we can say "pan-logism" of Hegel to take the mystery out of God by making God fit into his logical system is an example for the epistemologically defined ontology of western intellectual tradition within the form of the imposed logical categories for God.

The ontological inclinations in post-Hegelian period might be summarized in four groups: (i) materialistic atheism parallel to the evolutionary critiques of the new scientific elan in nineteenth century against supernaturalism; (ii) existentialist response with new philosophical questions and horizons. (iii) the understanding of limited theism based on a new set of epistemologico-axiological presuppositions; (iv) reformative religious attempts of theologians (especially in Protestantism) for the adaptation to the new philosophico-intellectual environment through setting up a new functional role for religion. Feuerbach's 'anthropological' interpretation of religion leading to the humanization of religion¹ strengthened the epistemologico-axiological grounds of these inclinations through the growing secularization of moral and intellectual life.

Materialism which has been systematized by Hobbes in modern philosophy, reached its zenith especially in nineteenth century. It has been strengthened by the revival of naturalism in science, by the marxist re-interpretation of Hegelian dialectic and by the spread of the theory of evolution to overall intellectual areas. The scientific tendency against supernaturalism in nineteenth century, was the fundamental component of the hegemony of the nature-centric cosmology and of the peripherality of God and human being in philosophy, even though some of these scientists did not deny that God may possibly exist. Alexander's cosmological view that it is space-time which is the Creator and not God and that God is not creator but a creature, (Collingwood,1981:164) is a typical conclusion of this response against supernaturalism. In fact, as Pringle-Pattison (1920:219-220) shows from the perspective of pantheism, such an interpretation of God and nature, has interesting intellectual and philosophical links with pantheism, and even with polytheism.² Alexander's definition of

¹ "Religions are sacred because they are the traditions of the primitive self-consciousness. But that which in religion hold the first place -namely, God- is (...) in itself and according to truth, the second, for it is only the nature of man regarded objectively; and that which to religion is the second -namely, a man- must therefore be constituted and declared the first."(Feuerbach, 1957:270-1)

² "The unity reached is the unity of a mere collection, and everything remains just as it was before. Such a pantheism is indistinguishable from the barest naturalism. 'All in All' said Fichte in

God "as a picture, but a picture eminently worth drawing though nothing actual corresponds to it"(Collingwood,1981:164) or "as the entire space-time world in nisus toward the next emergent" is philosophically very close to the pantheistic definition of God as "a collective name for a *world of things* which simply exist" (Pringle-Pattison,1920:253). Marxist re-interpretation of Hegelian dialectic aims to explain the internal process of becoming in "the self-adjusting nature". This positivistic approach to the self-adjusting nature aimed to set up a Religion of Humanity based on a complete degradation of God's ontological status formulated by Comte (1858:428): "In a word, Humanity definitely occupies the place of God, but she does not forget the services which the idea of God provisionally rendered."

Existentialism, as a way of doing philosophy rather than a body of doctrines, comprehends a wide range of ontological and theological interpretations constituting a protest against traditional philosophizing. The anchor point of this protest was that "the personal commitment of a thinker be incorporated into his definition of truth"(Roberts,1960:5). Therefore, there are different approaches within the context of existentialism from the perspective of ontological proximity. The extremes of these approaches are Sartre's atheistic version of existentialism and Catholic existentialism which has been developed though existentialism was one of the philosophies singled out for unfavorable mention in the encyclical *Humani Generis* of 1950. Jaspers' existentialist approach developed through interpreting Kant in the light of Hegel, parallel to liberal Protestantism represents intermediate position within the limits of these extremes. Although there is a fair distinction between Heidegger and Jaspers,¹ Heidegger's conclusion that even God we can treat only as a being; we must objectify and represent him to ourselves and that we can ask the ontological question about God but there is no hope of an answer, might be accepted as a typical existentialist interpretation which is an extension of Kantian doctrine of the thing-in-itself. Heidegger's (1956:208) presupposition that "Metaphysics thinks about beings as beings" and that "the truth of Being may thus be called the

another reference 'and for that very reason nothing at all'. This lower pantheism, as it may be called, is common in the popular cults of the Est, where the immanently unity of the divine is little more of a teeming nature, and passes easily into a gross polytheism, whose deities represent and consecrate every natural force and tendency. In pantheistic thought on a higher intellectual level, one often meets the same tendency to press the idea of the immanence of the divine in all phenomena equally, and thereby to use the Absolute as an instrument for the obliteration of all distinction of rank and value."

¹Repeating Schrader's (1957:38) comparison, we can say Heidegger "believes that ontology is possible and that he has made a substantial contribution to the subject", while "Jaspers maintains that Being remains mysterious, beyond which inquiry can never reach"

ground in which metaphysics, as the root of the tree of philosophy, is kept and from which it is nourished" effected theologians especially for the demythologizing the New Testament.¹ Bultmann's *Primitive Christianity in Its Historical Setting* (1956) which aims to picture New Testament religion as having marked affinities to modern existentialism, is a masterpiece for this attempt of synthesis.² That impact should be evaluated in the light of the fact that "there is much secularized Christianity in Heidegger's thought" or "that Heidegger's secular thinking does embody elements from Christian thought". ((Jonas,1964:212)

The theoretical links of philosophical and ontological pluralism with polytheistic and pantheistic frameworks provide us very interesting clues for the modification and adaptation of ontological proximity within a modern form of limited theism as the second inclination. As some thinkers (Fries,1969:136) specify, pluralism is a specific type of contemporary form of polytheism because pluralism assumes that nothing but the plural, the many, the variegated, the manifold is true reality, which is constituted by the association of the many.³ James combines this multicentral understanding of philosophical pluralism with a pluralistic conception of God and universe. His pluralistic conception of God and universe based on a comprehensive critique of theistic ontological assumption that God and his creatures are *toto genere* distinct. This theistic interpretation has some collateral consequences in the sense of ontology, eschatology and epistemology. According to James' analysis, the ontological consequence of theism is accepting human being as a mere ontologically outsider subject to God rather than an intimate partner.

James' alternative pluralistic ontology assumes an alternative conception of God which is a very interesting synthesis of polytheism and pantheism, *identitätsphilosophie* : " God as intimate soul and reason of the universe has always seemed to some people a more worthy conception than God as external Creator (James,1909:28) (...) we are indeed internal parts of God and external

¹ "The most famous case has been Bultmann's use of the Heideggerian existentialia for his project of demythologizing the New Testament, but other theologians have worked on similar lines, while Tillich has gone on from existential to ontological analysis in his treatment of theological problems"(Macquarrie, 1978:352)

² For example, he tries to reinterpret the central Gospel message of salvation, '*Kerygma*', in the existentialist language of freedom, *Angst* and authenticity through arguing that authenticity is possible only through the word as revealed in Christ. On the other hand, he argues that "faith involves a new existential understanding of the Self" (1956:102)

³ "Everything you can think of, however vast or inclusive, has on the pluralistic view a genuinely 'external' environment of some sort of amount. Things are 'with' one another in many ways, but nothing includes everything, or dominates over everything." (James, 1909:321)

creations, on any possible reading of the panpsychic system. Yet because God is not the absolute, but is himself a part when the system is conceived pluralistically, his function can be taken as not wholly dissimilar to those of the other smaller parts- as similar to our functions consequently. (James, 1909:318)" This formulation is, in fact, a very interesting synthesis of polytheism and pantheism which shows transitional links between the idea of mythological 'several absolutes' (polytheism), materialistic 'no absolute' (because of accepting infinitely several absolutes at the same time) and pantheistic 'identification with the absolute'. James' pluralistic universe appears as a "congregation of psychic macrocosms, in which all human souls merge"(Chuan,1927:201) This ontological approach leads him to conclude that "because God is limited like other finite beings, therefore his functions are similar to those of men because in other words both God and men are parts of a wider reality, therefore they have the same sort of function to perform"(Chuan,1927:202).

Reformative religious attempts of theologians for the adaptation to the new philosophico-intellectual environment aimed to realize two fundamental object; namely (i) reformulation of the Christian theology to reconcile to the new environment and (ii) to set up a new functional role to religion. The first object which has epistemological extension aimed to be reached through the reformulation of the idea of 'revelation through nature'. The basic presupposition of this reformulation is the argument that "God is the essence of nature". Although it has been argued that such an interpretation is spiritual theism rather than an alliance with pantheism, it carries significant elements of ontological proximity. The analogy that "as our physical organism is moulded and directed by the soul within, so is the whole creation is permeated and vitalized by the immanent God and hence the universe is no soulless, but soulful" (Wood,1892:37-8) is a syncretic interpretation of primitive Aryan pantheistic argument that nature was an inspiration, of Platonic 'World Soul' and Christian idea of Incarnation. The second object which has axiological extensions, has especially been affected by the interpretations of a new moral base through the idea of the relativity of religion and through the spiritual dimensions of pragmatism. Schleiermacher's advice (1958:94) to the theologians against the attacks of 'the despisers of religion' to base the Christian truth not on fact, or critically observable reality, but on subjective experience is the best formulation of the inclination towards the interpretation of religion within a relativistic and subjectivistic framework.

(ii) Epistemological Particularization of Truth : Secularization of Knowledge

We have deeply searched the interconnected relationships between ontological, epistemological and axiological presuppositions especially from the perspective of the ontological proximity. At this stage, I want to concentrate on a specific characteristic of the western philosophico-intellectual tradition which provides the most significant philosophical base for the political theories and images; namely the epistemological particularization of knowledge as the origin of the secularization of knowledge.

Bartley (1964:134) specifies that the authoritarian character of the western philosophical tradition is shown by the fact that the primary philosophical questions have always been: On what grounds do you believe that? How justified is your belief? How do you know that? and so on. All these questions is directly related to the question of the ultimate epistemological source and needs authoritarian answers, that is a specification and defence of the authority on which one believes something or claims to know something, whether it is the reason or the revelation, tradition, experience e.t.c. The argument that "the history of western thought is largely a history of attempts to defend the claims of these alternative authorities" and that "rationalism which is the view that only an appeal to an intersubjective authority is allowable, is not a reaction to this authoritarian tradition, as is often supposed, but part of it" (Brümmer,1981:206) is completely right.

The veiled assumption of these attempts is that these epistemological authorities or sources are alternative to each other, rather than complementary. That assumption is the basis of the particularization of truth in western intellectual history; while secularization of knowledge is the declaration of the supremacy of reason as the ultimate epistemological source against the others, especially against revelation, within the context of the particularization of truth. The dualistic structure of the philosophy and theology in early Christianity was very influential as a pre-Christian legacy in the formation of a specific mediaeval mind based on a dualistic particularization of the epistemology, as well as the formation of the mediaeval educational institutions. The philosophy of the

dualistic knowledge and education formulated by Dio Chrysostom as "there are two kinds of education, the one is divine the other human" (Hatch,1957:34) has been survived in the Christian educational system and has been turned over to the modern secular education. The philosophical base of this continuation from ancient to modern period via Christianity is epistemological dualism in the essence. This pre-Christian educational understanding created a certain habit of mind because "men who before became Christian had been exposed to the normal educational curriculum of the Graeco-roman world"(Laistner,1951:29).¹The dichotomic character of the corresponding challenge between reason and revelation is a dynamic feature of western intellectual tradition. It is an adventure from the idea of the absurdity (or irrationality)² of the revelation to the attempts for the rationalization of beliefs or from a vulgar rationalism to a metaphysically justified reason.

This dichotomy has grown out of the imagination of ontological proximity which enables the philosophers to use common criteria or standards of judgement for the outcomes of both reason and revelation. Thus, ontological proximity leads to an equalization of the epistemological spheres, if we do not limit epistemology as the rational reconstruction of knowledge. In fact, such a standardization of judgement is a declaration of the supremacy of reason from the beginning. The failure of the attempts in the history of medieval philosophy to make the revealed truths of Christianity rationally intelligible³, should be searched within this context. This failure has been followed by the domain of the rational philosophy which has been declared by Martin Luther as following: "What then is contrary to reason is certainly much more contrary to God. For

¹Pre-Christian educational system has influenced Christian educational system in institutional sphere, as well as in theoretical sense. Greek education gave to Christianity something of its own form; f.e. the designation of 'professor' in the classical educational system originated from Greek sophists. 'Chair' was meaning teaching office and 'faculty' was denoting the branch of knowledge, in ancient Greek. On the other hand, Greek rhetorics influenced the development of Christian sermons. Justin Martyr explains the impact of pre-Christian legacy on Christian education saying that " we teach the same as the Greeks, though we alone hated for what we teach" (Hatch,1957:126)

²Some Christian philosophers, f.e. Tertullian, have glorified in the absurdity of revelation, finding in its very irrationality a sign of the dogma's truth.

³ Repeating Burch's (1962:396-7) summary we can briefly exemplify these attempts as following:"As we proceed chronologically from Anselm of Canterbury to Abelard, Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, and William of Occam, we find the domain of intelligibility relentlessly contracting as standards of logical rigor were raised. Anselm could prove all the dogmas of the Church. Abelard could prove the Trinity but not the Incarnation. Aquinas could prove that God is our beatitude but not He is a Trinity. Scotus could prove that God exists, but not that He is our beatitude. William of Occam could not prove even that God exists, for without revelation we know only the immediately obvious and what can be inferred from it, the empirical world.

how should not be against divine truth which is against reason and human truth?" (Beard,1927:154)

Two basic factors might be underlined for this failure; namely the vagueness of the definition of revelation and the highly complex theology in Christianity as the essence of revelation. Both of them has been originated from the imagination of the ontological proximity and particularization of divinity. First of all, the question what revelation is, has not been answered homogeneously in Christian theology from the beginning till the modern era. According to Catholicism, revelation is given continuously in the living Church under the leadership of saints; according to Protestants it is given once for all in the inspired scripture¹; while according to Quakers, God speaks directly to individuals. The challenge of the new scientific elan forced theologians to reinterpret the concept and essence of the revelation to overcome the evident contrasts between the judgements of the classical interpretation of the revelation and the innovations of the reason. Wood's classification of revelation in four groups² as (i) Revelation through nature, (ii) Direct Revelation, (iii) Biblical Revelation, and (iv) Revelation through the Son; might be noted as an interesting example of these reinterpretations. Especially the idea of the Revelation through Nature aimed to reconcile of the assumption of "the self-adjusted mechanism of nature" developed by the rationalistic innovations with Christian understanding of revelation. The argument that "the revelation of God through Nature is in full harmony with that which comes through the Son" because "Christ and nature reveal the same Father, but each on a different side" (Wood,1892:115-6) shows the characteristic of the reasoning for this reconciliation. This interpretation of the Revelation has strengthened, at the

¹ Islamic impact was very influential for the development of this Protestant view of revelation.

² (i) Revelation through Nature: God is the essence of Nature. (Wood,1892:37) (...) In Jesus, the Christ, was the supreme demonstration of the Identity, in man, of the natural and spiritual type.(54) He was the natural, the ideal and the archetypal man. As nature is a continous divine Manifestation, so Christianity is not limited to any age or dispensation. The historic Jesus was a temporary and material manifestation of the spiritual and eternal Christ. (ii) Direct Revelation: The fundamental Law of Trinity or Tri-unity is seen in the zones of man nature. He has three worlds at this disposal, even in the present material form of existence. Through all are related, their distinct boundary lines run through the nature of every human being. The higher domain we denominate the spiritual, the next the intellectual and the third and lower, the animal or material.(p.58) (...) God is Spirit and God is everywhere. God is Spirit and His revealment must be through the medium of Spirit. (p.76) (iii) Biblical Revelation: It is only through the intellectual faculty that there can be only possible danger of confusing the divine and human elements of the Inspired Word.(p.89) (iv) Revelation through the Son: Jesus was the eternal Christ in outward expression. God is Spirit and therefore the Son of God was, and is, Spirit and are also all Sons of God. Paul in one of his letters to the Corinthians says" but we have the mind of Christ"(p.102). (...) Jesus was a perfect man, because he was completely filled by the Christ-mind."(Wood,1892:116)

same time, the tendency of the proximation and equalization of the epistemological spheres of God-human being-nature as an extension of ontological proximity.

Catholic interpretation of Revelation supported by St. Paul's saying that "we have the minds of Christ" resulted in a highly complex theology of Christian Fathers whose doctrines have been accepted as a part of divine Revelation. The formation of such an intermediary source of knowledge between Deus Revelatus and Human being, has transformed Jesus' simple teachings to a contrasting set of dogmas each of which had been referred to a saint or father who has special source of knowledge as a part of revelation. This transformation has been analyzed in details before. Additionally, I want to underline, that the absence of a well-defined concept and essence of revelation in Christianity resulted in a dogmatization of the views of the Christian fathers. This dogmatization has been transformed to a revival between reason and revelation, when rationalistic innovations contrasted with these dogmas. Even Luther admits in his Exposition of the Epistle to Galatians that "all the articles of our Christian faith which God has revealed to us in His Word, are in presence of reason sheerly impossible, absurd, false" (Beard,1927:162)¹. The particularization of truth has reached its zenith when this contrasts became evident after the loss of the prestige of scholasticism. The process of the secularization of knowledge has been accelerated step by step parallel to the victory of reason. The question what the Word of God is, emerged as a result of this process. Protestant reinterpretation of revelation mentioned above, is a response for the necessity to answer this question to omit the dilemma which emerged because of the contrasts between Catholic interpretation of revelation and new rationalistic way of thought.

The fundamental characteristic of Western philosophy in the modern era after the Renaissance is the formation of a specific "epistemologically defined ontology" through the centripetal tendencies of "humanized knowledge". So, epistemology became the center of the philosophy as a determining factor,

¹"What, thinks that cunning little fool, can be more absurd and impossible than Christ should give us in the Supper his body and his blood to eat and to drink? Item, that Baptism should be a bath of regeneration and renewal of the Holy Ghost? (...) It is only Christians who believe what reason cunningly concludes to be such foolish things.(...)For reason will never be able to reconcile itself to this, that there should be one, and one three; that God should be man; that we, when we are dipped in the font, are cleansed from our sins by the blood of Christ, in wine drink his blood, and thus receive forgiveness of sins. Such articles of faith are held by the worldly wise to be pure foolishness. But whoso believes shall be blessed."

having the role of the systematization of the knowledge. The humanization of epistemology around 'cognitio/knowledge' whether through empiricism, or through materialism, or through logical forms after the reemergence of ancient philosophy, created a relationship of dependency between ontology and epistemology in the Western philosophical tradition. From the perspective of ontological questions, Christianity formed a preparatory stage for this development after the Renaissance. Therefore, in contrast to the common idea, the 'epistemologically defined ontology' emerged after the Renaissance took its sources from Christian theology. As has been shown, the idea of the particularization of Divinity was taken from the eclectic belief-structure of Pax Romana and was reformed within a gnostic Christian theology. It included the incarnation and fatherhood of God as the legacy from the mystery religions to Christianity, the deification of Jesus within the dogma of 'Trinity' like to the belief of *avatar* in Hinduism, and similar complex ontological problems in Christian theology. This particularization led ultimately to a proximity and identification between the spheres of God and man. Except for some mystical and gnostic fantasies, a systematic idea of *gayb* (invisibility) as a consequence of a differentiation of epistemological levels between Allah and man did not emerge in Christian epistemology as it did in Islam. The idea of the deification of man, as in the imperial cult of ancient Rome, or the Incarnation of God as in Docetism -the ancient Graeco-Roman legacy- was based on polytheist and pantheist elements. This was maintained in the Christian ontology within a new form which facilitated the proximity of ontological and epistemological levels through preventing the ideating of an ontological hierarchy as in the Islamic principle of *Tanzih*.

Theological complexities around the particularization of divinity and mysterious aspects of Christian ontology have two significant impacts. One is related to the proximity of ontological and epistemological levels which created an epistemologically defined ontology. The other is related to the popularization process of belief through some agents or autonomous organizations which tended to interpret these theological complexities, namely churches. Catholic interpretation of revelation is very meaningful from this perspective. If we concentrate on the first impact, this proximity of ontological levels produced and accelerated the process of the humanization of the epistemology and secularization of knowledge after the Renaissance and Reformation. From this perspective, there is a continual relationship between the ancient philosophy, Christianity and modern philosophy. Christianity has carried the sources of its

antithesis within its theological structure. Therefore a reformation in Christianity was possible developing from a mystery-complex ontology to an epistemologically defined ontology. But this is not the case in Islam. As will be analyzed, all attempts at a reformation in Islam have been easily counteracted by its ontological transparency and by the strong internal consistency between its ontology and its epistemology.

In general, it has been accepted that there are three coordinate sources of ordinary knowledge, namely reason, experience and revelation. The peripherality of revelation as a source of knowledge resulted in the concentration of epistemology on human sources of knowledge; reason and experience. Francis Bacon's equalization of "Knowledge is power" was the first declaration of the anthropocentric epistemology which became the center of the western philosophy in modern era. Locke's definition of knowledge as "nothing but the perception of the connection and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas" (Gibson, 1931:142) which "are derived from two sources, (a) sensation, and (b) perception of the operation of our mind" (Russell, 1962:589) was a new conceptualization of knowledge within the limits of empiricism. Hume's extension of this new epistemological concentration to the metaphysical issues was the final blow against revelation as a source of knowledge. The section "Of Miracles" in his *Concerning Human Understanding* might be accepted as a turning point in western intellectual tradition. His argument that "our evidence for the truth of the Christian religion is less than the evidence for the truth of our senses; because even in the first authors of our religion, it was no greater; and it is evident it must diminish in passing from them to their disciples; nor can any one rest such confidence in their testimony, as in the immediate object of his senses" (Hume, 1907:II/88) was the ultimate declaration of the centrality and supremacy of anthropocentric epistemology. His suggestion that "a wise man proportions his belief to the evidence" might be accepted as the attempt for a new understanding of revelation. As Polanyi (1983:279) underlines, beginning from Hume (till Russell), the belief in the efficacy of doubt as a solvent of error was sustained primarily by skepticism about religious dogma and the dislike of religious bigotry.

The development of nature centered cosmology as Copernican heliocentrism and anthropocentric epistemology especially accelerated the process of the formation of a new paradigm through the intrinsic ontological

characteristics of Christianity and the impact of the ancient philosophies. Step by step God-centered ontology and revelation as a source of knowledge, vacated the stage for the nature-centered and anthropocentric philosophy. Although Kant's anthropocentric approach might be accepted as a response to Copernican heliocentrism, there is a continual link between these philosophies from the perspective of their impacts on social and political theories. Copernican heliocentrism, as a new cosmological interpretation, ontologically pushed God and man from the center of the philosophy to the periphery. This *imago mundi* as an incipient form of nature-centered interpretation, opened a new elan not only from the cosmological, but also the ontological, epistemological, axiological and sociological perspectives.

The principium of the individuationis of this elan is an immanent surreptitious will *in* the universe rather than a transcendental Will *over* the universe as in Islamic ontology. From this perspective, this *imago mundi* has some intrinsic pantheist elements. *Cognitio* (knowledge), autonomous from the revelation, has been interpreted as the dominant epistemological tool to interpret cosmos. The superiority of human knowledge within this *imago mundi* became the core of the anthropocentric epistemology of the Copernican nature-centered ontological approach which in turn became the origin of the secularization of knowledge. Therefore, Copernican heliocentric cosmology and the emergence of the anthropocentric epistemology are complementary philosophical steps.

This anthropocentric epistemology became the center of the modern western philosophy. Beginning with Aristotelian empiricism, Locke's argument that all knowledge comes from our experience, Kant's hypothesis that knowledge is a joint product of mind and external world, Comtean positivism underlying the scientific stage against the theological and metaphysical stages, and James' radical empiricism, are several outgrowths of this epistemological foundation. Parallel to this anthropocentric epistemology, the proximity of ontological levels growing out of the syncretic atmosphere of Pax Romana -which was an intrinsic element within Christianity, has been philosophically systematized step by step. Hume's interpretation of God as the World Soul, Hobbesian materialism in metaphysics, Mills' theory of "finite or limited Deity" and James' "limited theism", are interesting phases of the formation of the 'epistemologically defined ontology' of the western philosophical tradition which rested on a new paradigm.

Thus, particularization of truth led to the process of the secularization of knowledge. A clear-cut mental and institutional segmentation of knowledge has been assumed as the basic feature of the secularization of knowledge. The Christian truths have been confined within the boundaries of churches; while a new definition of the epistemology became the basis of the intellectual and axiological secularization of knowledge and life. This new definition assumes the task of epistemology as the rational reconstruction of knowledge. All modern theories of truth, such as the correspondence theory,¹ the coherence theory (of the great idealistic system builders², and of the logical positivists³), the pragmatic theory⁴ and the performative theory⁵ are outcomes of this understanding of epistemology. All of these theories of truth have significant impacts on the formation of the social imagination and theories in the direction of the secularization of knowledge as an epistemological consequence and secularization of law and life as an axiological phenomenon. Using Ellis' (1979:vi) formulation we can generalize, that all modern epistemologists share "a view of man as a more or less rational agent operating with a priori principles of reasoning upon given data (or in Popper's case upon conjectures and observationally acquired beliefs) to construct the edifice of objective scientific knowledge". As he points out, Popper (1959:31) like the other modern epistemologists, thinks of the body of scientific knowledge as a kind of intellectual superstructure or building erected by us upon more or less firm foundations of items of knowledge or belief acquired directly through sense experience. The fundamental dilemma of this epistemological assumption is that it implies that man, the rational agent, is somehow separate from the physical world which he is trying to understand. That implication is evidently not true. That means, rational agent as a part of the physical world tries to

¹According to this theory, a proposition, a connotative assertion or constative belief is true if it corresponds to the facts or to reality.

²According to these great idealistic system builders, such as Spinoza, Hegel and Bradley, the whole of reality is one great, logically coherent system. They assume that the first principles of their system (axioms) are somehow indubitably true. Hence, mathematics is always the ideal of them.

³According to logical positivists, propositions are true if they are coherent with the system, and the only acceptable system is the current set of scientific theories.

⁴According to the pragmatic theory of truth a proposition is true if it is coherent with a true theory and the theory is true if it serves its purpose of being an instrument with which to control our environment. Thus, a proposition is true if it forms part of a theory which works in practical life.

⁵Attacking the view that 'true' and 'false' are descriptive terms, the representatives of the performative theory, especially Strawson, insist that they are, rather performative or expressive. Thus, to say that a sentence is true is to express agreement with the sentence.

understand the whole which creates a vicious circle from the perspective of the subject-object relationship in anthropocentric epistemology.

(iii) Axiological Positivism: Secularization of Life and Law

Some of the significant interconnections between ontology, epistemology and axiology have been shown in previous pages; while their political implications will be discussed in the following part. At this stage, I want to underline the evolutionary process of axiological positivism as the philosophical base of the secularization of life and law in the western experience. Two significant sources of this evolutionary stage might be mentioned to frame its historico-cultural continuity.

Firstly, it is a clear fact that any type of secularization necessitates a mental, imaginative or practical segmentation (or particularization). It has been already shown, how a mental particularization of truth results in an epistemological secularization. Axiological secularization of life and law has originated from an ultimate particularization of normative/positive or religious/secular spheres. which is a consequence of ontological and epistemological particularization. Secondly, a pure rationalistic framework of value-system or of ethics as an indication of axiological positivism is the essential prerequisite for the secularization of life and law. This prerequisite is theoretically and imaginatively linked directly to the proximation (or equalization) of ontological and epistemological spheres.

The initial forms of the axiological secularization of life and law might be found in Stoicism (especially in the sense of axiological segmentation) and in Epicureanism (especially in the sense of the axiological positivism and ethical rationalism). Stoic doctrine that every man is a member of two commonwealths as city and world-city, transformed to another Stoic assumption that there are for every man two laws, the law of his city and the law of the world city, with another formulation the law of custom and the law of reason. Especially Ulbian's ultimate separation *jus naturale* (the natural law) from *jus gentium* (the law of

nations) might be accepted a cornerstone for the stage of segmentation of the secularization process of law and life. Epicurean contribution to the process of the rationalization of axiology was a substantive one to seek the summum bonum in felicity of life; namely the assumption that happiness consists in nothing but pleasure. That assumption became one of the basic pillars of the process of worldliness of modern western value-system because of being the most efficient and sovereign element of the secular segment of the axiology especially in the form of utility.

Christian Ethics was influenced by these Graeco-Roman legacy, both in the sense of segmentation and in the sense of content. there is a clear relationship of continuation between the ethics of Cicero and Aurelius as pagan philosophers and St. Ambrose as one of the influential founders of Christian ethics. The concept of love used by Aurelius as "love even those who do wrong" has been christianized as "love your enemies"(Matthew:5/44). Taylor (1958:77) shows the pagan character of Ambrose's famous work *De Officiis Ministrorum*, underlying its debts to Cicero's *De Officiis*. Hatch (1957:168-170), too, insists that Ambrose's book is less Christian than Stoical. Milan Ambrose's assumption that the ideal of life is happiness as an extension of Stoic philosophy might be accepted as the axiological and eschatological basis of secularization resting on Stoic ethics which survived in Christian ethics¹. Especially his argument that there can be no conflict between the *honestum* and the *utile*, since nothing can be *honestum* that is not useful, and vice verse, wherein he follows Cicero, has been extended to the modern utilitarian philosophy as a veiled characteristic of Christian ethics in spite of its contrast to the Augustinian "anti-life" irrationalism.

The interiorization of morality in Christian Ethics together with the impacts of the institutionalized exterior Roman law re-formulated the antagonistic segmentation between ideal and actual in philosophical sense, and between Church and Society in the practical life. As Taylor (1949:I/370) stresses rightly, whether or not Christ's Gospel set forth any inherent antagonism between the fulness of mortal life and the sure attainment of heaven, its historical interpretations have never effected a complete reconciliation through presenting always a conflict between the finite and the eternal. Faruqi's (1967:79) assertion that "Jesus' ethic, as a genuine ethic of intent, must abstract or at least de-emphasize, man's community though this may be mankind, and his real

¹"The ethics of the Sermon of the Mount which the earliest Christian communities endeavored to carry into practice, have been transmuted by the slow alchemy of history into the Ethics of Roman Law. The basis of Christian society is not Christian, but Roman and Stoical"(Hatch,1957:170)

relations with that community" might indicate the ethical origin of this antagonism, but it came fourth as a sophisticated axiological re-interpretation of Stoic dualism, in the Apostolic Age especially after the formulation of the opposition between world and the City of God.¹ Augustine's separation of Church and State in his *City of God* has been the doctrine of the Church ever since. The justification of the dichotomy between Church as the structural institutionalization of the Ideal, and Society as the structural institutionalization of the Actual, through the Principle of Two Swords² survived as the philosophical and institutional base of the axiological and political particularization of life and law in western experience. The argument of the traditional theology that the kingdom of God is the Church, not Society, intrinsically carried an assumption of the double-standardization of ethics; one for the members of Church as the kingdom of God and one for the ordinary persons of the Society. Repeating Faruqi's description for St. Augustine, we can say, the "anti-life" irrationalism of Christian dogmas, strengthened the axiological segmentation throughout the medieval ages. This "anti-life" irrationalism became a dominant figure especially after St. Augustine's combat against the member of Pelagianism who were arguing that man has free will and that divine grace merely helps a Christian to accomplish what is in his power without it. The condemnation of Pelagianism at the Councils of Carthage (416-418) and the impacts of Augustinian interpretation of original sin³ shaped Christian ethics as an implication of this fundamental principle throughout the medieval

¹ Faruqi (1967:294) adds this fact in the conclusion related to the issue of anti-societism in Christian tradition: "Unfortunately, Christian doctrine fell under the dogmatism of Tertullian before, and of Athanasius after, the council of Nicea. Later on, it was wedded to the "anti-life" irrationalism of St. Augustine at the Council of Chalcedon. Henceforth the doors were tightly closed. Peccatism, saviourism, milleninaism, and paradox held complete sway. These, not the ethic of Jesus, was the enemies of societism"

² The Emperor is accepted within the Church not above it in this idea of Two Swords because he is also a member of the children of the same Universal Spirit of Stoicism and of the Universal Brotherhood of Christianity. From this perspective of the relationship of Ethics and Politics, Stoic Seneca might be accepted as the master of Christian fathers as Ambrose and Augustine.

³ His understanding of sin in his *Confessions* (1962:27-8) forms a specific philosophy of life: "Who can recall to me the sins I committed as a baby? For in your sight no man is free from sin, not even a child who has lived only one day on earth...if babies are innocent, it is not for lack of will to do harm, but for lack of strength." Russell (1962:362) repeats the impact of this understanding of sin on his philosophy of life in the summary of Augustinian interpretation of original sin: "Since we all inherit Adam's sin, we all deserve eternal damnation. All who die unbaptized, even infants will go to hell and suffer unending torment. We have no reason to complain of this, since we are all wicked. But by God's free grace certain people, among those who have been baptized, are chosen to go to heaven, these are the elect. They do not go heaven because they are good; we are all totally depraved, except in so far as God's grace, which is only bestowed on the elect, enables us to be otherwise. No reason can be given why some are saved and the rest damned; this is due to God's unmotivated choice. (...) The conviction of sin, however, so dominated him that he really believed new-born children to the limbs of Satan."

ages. The necessity for a rational axiology in modern era emerged as a natural antithesis of this "anti-life" irrationalism.

Machiavellian attempt to emphasize rational bases of the state as the institutionalization of the Actual and Hobbesian re-systematization of the philosophy in three parts (geometry-mechanics, physiology-psychology and state-society) to find out rationally defined axiological foundations of the segment of the medieval dualistic structure, were reactions against this irrationalism, as the members of the other side; namely society. Hobbes' philosophy played a role of cornerstone -with its new setting between physics, axiology and politics- for the developments of the modern philosophical inclinations.¹ As Strauss (1961:29) shows, Hobbes developed a new morality based on "experience" rather than natural science: "Hobbes' political philosophy is really, as its originator claims, based on a knowledge of men which is deepened and corroborated by the self-knowledge and self-examination of the individual, and not on a general scientific or metaphysical theory." Hobbes' assumption that human behavior is the result of a reaction towards the attainment of pleasure and the avoidance of pain, might be accepted as the most fundamental Hobbesian contribution to the process of the evolution of a new morality and of the secularization of life, because the axiological standards for the human behavior began to be changed towards the direction of the independence of the morality from the religion. His conclusion that *the object of desire is good, of aversion evil*, was a revolutionary stimulus for the rationalization of the morality which set up the morality within the sphere of the Actuality and Society in state of the Ideal and Church. His second assumption based on the first that self-preservation is the supreme good, death the supreme evil, and that to promote the one and prevent the other is the first law of nature, was related directly to his experiences within the realities of the society. That role of the experience for the formation of the axiological set as a mode of morality strengthened the tendency towards the realistic interpretation of morality on one hand, and towards the understanding of the relativity of morality dependent to the changes of the experiences on the

¹ The place of Hobbesian philosophy as a cornerstone in the history of philosophy might be seen in its commentaries because the commentators interpret Hobbes' works to exemplify almost every inclination and kind of philosophy: In Strauss there is an intellectual interpretation of Hobbes; in Flew's (1964) interpretation there is an image of Hobbes as an egoist; in Taylor's (1965) interpretation there is Hobbes the Kantian, in Warrender's (1951) and Hood's (1964) works there is Hobbes the Christian, in Mintz there is Hobbes the atheist, in Marshall (1983) there is Hobbes the skeptic; in Weinstein (1979) there is Hobbes the Freudian; in Watkins (1965) there is Hobbes the metaphysician. The basic argument of Machperson's (1962) alternative interpretation of Hobbes is that the central structuring element of Hobbes' political theory is sociological and socio-economic rather than philosophical.

other hand. Henceforth, the supremacy of the idealistic and absolute axiology under the governance of Church has been shaken to a great extent.

Thus, the axiological conclusions began to be originated directly from the anthropocentric epistemological origins, rather than from the theologically absolute goodness. Especially rationalist and empiricist epistemological schools affected axiological inclinations. For example, Hume mentions reason and sentiment as two fundamental foundations of philosophical inclinations on moral theory in his famous *Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*.¹ Using Broad(1971:108-110) classification, it might be repeated that Hume's relational and psychological theory of ethics is an example of the phenomenalist analysis, rather than causal and a priori concept analysis of the ethical fact.² Excluding Spinoza whose ethical theory is only a part of an elaborate metaphysical theory of the universe,³ the ethical theories as the axiological bases of the "new secular life" in modern times, in general, go along two directions: one empiric-utilitarian approach, systematization of which began with Locke and continued by utilitarian philosophers and second Kantian causal-a priori systematization.

Locke's fundamental criterion for axiological goodness that pleasure is the good, was the prevalent view among empiricists throughout eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. He tries to preserve the link between the belief of God and morality in his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*; but that aims to form a theological justification for his utilitarian approach because Locke admits at the same time that human being values present pleasure more than future pleasure, and pleasure in the near future more than pleasure in the distant future. That view has been repeated by Mill in nineteenth century.⁴ Such an admission is evidently contradicting with eschatological views of religion. Smith's consideration of God as a utilitarian; probably a rule-utilitarian in his *The Theory of Moral Sentiment*, arguing that "the happiness of mankind, as well

¹ "There has been a controversy started of late, much better worth examination, concerning the general foundation of MORALS; whether they be derived from REASON, or from SENTIMENT; whether we attain the knowledge of them by a chain of argument and induction, or by an immediate feeling and finer internal sense..."(Hume 1907a:II/170)

² "The phenomenalist analysis would be that goodness is the characteristic of being generally approved by men. The causal analysis would be that goodness is the property which causes a thing to be a generally approved by men." (Broad:109)

³ Russell (1962:620) adds that "there are in Spinoza two unreconciled views, one that of Hobbes (valuing power), the other that the good consists in mystic union with God."

⁴ "Men often, from infirmity of character, make their election for the nearer god, though they know it to be the less valuable; and this is no less when the choice is between two bodily pleasures; than when it is between bodily and mental."(Mill,1951:12)

as of all other rational creatures, seems to have been the original purpose intended by the Author of Nature"(Campbell,1971:219)¹, might be accepted as an extension of this attempt of theological justification for the argument of empiricist utilitarianism. J. S. Mill (1951:26) aims to develop such a theological justification asserting that "If it be a true belief that God desires, above all things, the happiness of his creatures and that this was his purpose in their creation, utility is not only a godless doctrine, but more profoundly religious than any other". He adds that "If it be meant that utilitarianism does not recognize the revealed will of God as the supreme law of morals, (...) a utilitarian who believes in the perfect goodness and wisdom of God, necessarily believes that whatever God has thought fit to reveal on the subject of morals, must fulfil the requirements of utility in a supreme degree". These arguments the mental relationship between the understanding of limited theism and utilitarianism as well as the attempts of utilitarians to obtain a theological justification for the rationalization of axiology.

But, Bentham's substitution the human lawgiver in state of God, as the most sophisticated follower of Locke, strengthened the tendency of the secularization of life and law within the context of utilitarianism. His classification of the sanctions or sources of pleasure and pain in four groups as the physical, the moral, the political and the religious in *An Introduction to The Principles of Morals and Legislation*, might be evaluated as a specific segmentation of axiology as well as the isolation of the religious sanction from the others.² His interpretation for the measurement of pleasure and pain was an attempt to objectivize his theory within a scientific framework.³ This objectivization provided a positive base for the absoluteness of the secular axiology and substituted it in state of the absoluteness of the religious axiology. That is

¹ "God considers the general consequences of types of conduct and arranges it so that man habitually act in such a way as to maximize the general happiness. But, of course, God is a utilitarian whose situation is so unlike that of men that it is difficult to compare His utilitarianism with that of man beings For instance, God does not, presumably, have to choose between His own happiness and that of other beings, and therefore many of the problems of justice versus utility, or private versus public utility, do not arise." (Campbell,1971:219)

² "Pleasures or pains which may be expected to issue from the physical, political or moral sanctions, must all of them be expected to be experienced, if ever, in the present life:those which may be expected to issue from the religious sanction, may be expected to be experienced either in the present life or in a future."(Bentham,1965:25)

³ "To a number of persons, with reference to each of whom the value of a pleasure or a pain is considered, it will be greater or less, according to seven circumstances: to wit, the six preceding ones; viz. (i)its intensity, (ii)its duration), (iii)its certainty or uncertainty,(iv)its propinquity or remoteness, (v)its fecundity,(vi)its purity and one other; to wit: (vii)its extent; that is, the number of persons to whom it extends; or (in other words) who are effected by it" (Bentham,1965:30)

especially meaningful, when we accept **Berdyayev's** (1960:16) definition that "Ethics is axiology, the theory of meaning and values". Thus, the Ideal value system of Church has been replaced by the Positive-Actual value system of Society. This is a new process of the dichotomic characteristic of western experience related to the axiology, life and law.

W. James argument that "pragmatism may be a happy harmonizer of empiricist way of thinking with the more religious demands of human beings" (James, 1916:69) seems as an attempt for the reconciliation of these dichotomic sides on a new axiological base. Nevertheless, his axiological pragmatism shapes a total system with his ontological pluralism and epistemological radical empiricism. Pragmatic assumption that an idea is true if possesses some subsequent utility¹ shows the assertion of the sovereignty of the Actual value system, rather than an attempt of reconciliation. He extends this principle even to the imagination of God arguing that "on pragmatic principles, if the hypothesis of God works satisfactorily in the widest sense of the world, it is true" (James, 1916:299). From this perspective, he is a follower of the utilitarian approach mentioned above, while methodologically approaches to the Kantian moral theology with this assumption. On the other hand, the dichotomic characteristic of western experience is very evident in his argument that "though the scientist may individually nourish a religion and be a theist in his irresponsible hours, the days are over when it could be said that for Science herself the heavens declare the glory of God and the firmament showeth the handiwork" (James, 1929:250). This argument is very significant to show modern western mind from several perspectives. Firstly, it offers a mental segmentation within the personality of the scientist. Secondly, it divides life as responsible and irresponsible hours and sees religious feelings-thoughts as matters of irresponsible hours. Thirdly, it assumes a fully individualization of religious feelings-thoughts. All of these characteristics are fundamental indications for the axiological particularization of mental and social structures of human being under the hegemony of rationalistic axiology based on anthropocentric epistemology. These presuppositions developed necessarily parallel to an ontological proximity in the sense of limited theism.

¹The practical value of true ideas is thus primarily derived from the practical importance of their objects to us. (...) You can say of it then either that 'it is useful because it is true' or that 'it is true because it is useful'. Both these phrases mean exactly the same thing, namely that here is an idea that gets fulfilled and can be verified. True is the name for whatever idea starts the verification-process, useful is the name for its completed function in experience." (James, 1916:203-4)

Kantian synthesis provided very significant elements for the hegemony of the rational axiology and for the re-formulation of the dichotomic structure, though it was theoretically alternative to utilitarianism. Kantian replacement of moral theology in state of theological morality was a radical attempt both to refute ontological and cosmological arguments and to solve Euthypro dilemma¹ in favour of the rational objectivization of morality. His argument that the fundamental laws of morality are the same for every rational being, whether man, angel or God, since the ultimate criterion of rightness is deducible from the concept of a rational being as such, was not only a declaration of the autonomy of the morality from the religion, but also an imposition a new axiological base for the religion within a new epistemological framework. His idea of twofold metaphysics as *Metaphysik der Natur* (metaphysic of nature) and *Metaphysik der Sitten* (metaphysic of morals) in his *Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten* (*Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals*) forms the new links between epistemology and axiology.² His understanding of metaphysic of morals which shook the traditional belief that morality without religion was impossible, is a cornerstone for the rationalization process of axiology. Kant's notion of morality as something categorical and a priori aims to eliminate the alternative interpretations of morality, namely that it is a matter of emotions, that it is a matter of practical consequences and that it is a matter of obeying to God's Will. His one of the significant corollaries in his *Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft* (*Critical Examination of Practical Reason*) that "Pure Reason is practical of itself alone and gives (to ma) a universal law which we call the *Moral Law*," (Kant,1909b:120) assumes a common rational criterion set of axiology for all rational beings including Infinite Being,³ which might be accepted as a theoretical justification for the secularization of life and law. He links this

¹ This dilemma originates from the Plato's dialogue, the Euthyphro, where the participants discuss whether piety is what the gods love, or whether the gods love something because it is pious anyway. This discussion led to a fundamental question which has been discussed in the philosophy of ethics throughout the ages, namely: Is something good because God commands it, or does God command it because it is good.

² "In this way there arises the idea of a twofold metaphysic- a metaphysic of nature and a metaphysic of morals. Physics will thus have an empirical and also a rational part. It is the same with Ethics; but here the empirical part might have the special name of practical anthropology, the name morality being appropriated to the rational part"(Kant,1909a:2)

³ "Now this principle of morality, just on account of the universality of the legislation which makes it the formal supreme determining principle of the will, without regard to any subjective differences, is declared by the reason to be a law for all rational beings, in so far as they have a will, that is, a power to determine their causality by the conception of rules; and, therefore, so far as they are capable of acting according to principles, and consequently also according to practical a priori principles. It is, therefore, not limited to men only, but applies to all finite beings that possess reason and being; nay it even includes the Infinite Being as the supreme intelligence." (Kant,1909b:120-1)

justification with a new interpretation of humanism within the context of his fundamental axiom, *summum bonum*.¹ Thus, "this moral law is founded on the autonomy of his will, as a free will which by its universal laws must necessarily be able to agree with that to which it is to submit itself"(Kant,1909b:229).

His reduction of religion to morals gave a new color to the traditional dichotomic mental and institutional particularization through the restoration of the understanding of religion, especially in his *Religion within the Limits of Pure Reason*. This restoration was based on deistic² interpretation of religion leading to a definition of religion as the recognition of all our duties (moral obligations) as commandments of God. Such a recognition necessitates a re-interpretation of the separation between natural³ and revealed religion through harmonizing them: "It is revealed religion when through it I must first of all know that something is a commandment of God before I can also know that it is my duty; it is natural religion when I must first of all know that something is a duty before I can know that it is a commandment of God." (Schwegler,1871:238) His definition of church as an ethical and spiritual community which has for object the fulfillment and the greatest possible realization of the moral prescripts, assumes intrinsically the dichotomy of Matter-Spirit, Ideal-Actual and Church-Society and specifies the role of Church within this dichotomic framework *in so far as mere reason permits..*

The new functional role of Church systematized by modern theologians under the impact of new understanding of morality facilitates both the development of the rationalistic axiology and the preservation of the traditional axiological particularization. Schleiermacher's assumption of subjective

¹ "A man is worthy to possess a thing or a state when his possession of it is in harmony with the *summum bonum*.(...) That in the order of ends, man (and with him every rational being) as an *end in himself*, that is, that he can never be used merely as a means by any (not even by God) without being at the same time an end also himself, that therefore humanity in our person must be holy to ourselves, this follows now of itself because he is the subject of the moral law." (Kant,1909b:227-229)

² Repeating Reese's (1980:121)summary, we can underlie the fundamental beliefs of deism as following: one God who created the world but does not intervene in its present functioning, either by way of miracle or revelation; an objective difference between right and wrong; the duty of life as support of the right; the immortality of the soul; and our condition in the life to come as related to ethical conduct in this life.

³ "The conception of natural religion which developed in the Renaissance period resembled the rationalist doctrine which followed it only in that it asserted a universal element common to all the existing religious attitudes(...) Its manner or method was empirical and psychological." (McCracken, 1950:74)

experience is a good example for this new mentality. Troeltsch's (1865-1923) distinction between the religions of law (Islam and Judaism) and the religions of redemption the religions of redemption (Christianity and Buddhism) to show the relative superiority of Christianity (1972:107-16) because of the lack of division between the natural and transcendent worlds in the religions of law, is an interesting justification for the withdrawal of Christianity from the sphere of law which is not a modern artifact, but a fundamental surviving feature of Christianity based on the Greaco-Roman assumption of two commonwealths. The relationship between his ontological presupposition of redemption through faithful, trusting participation in the person-like character of god and his axiological conclusion as the apathy to law, provides a meaningful evidence for our argument that there is a mental and imaginative relationship between ontological proximity and axiological particularization.

So, the secular element in life and law in western experience has been re-shaped and the functional spheres of the two commonwealths (which survived as a significant imaginative, mental and institutional phenomenon in western tradition from the ancient to the modern periods) has been re-specified. Thus, this secular element is not a new or modern characteristic of western civilization; but a re-formed element which survived throughout the ages within the context of axiological particularization which has direct links to ontological proximity and epistemological particularization of truth. The surviving elements of these links between ontology, epistemology and axiology should be well-analyzed to understand the formation of western mind and to follow the internal continuity and consistency of the evolution of western political images, cultures, theories and institutions.

Chapter 3

ISLAMIC PARADIGM: TAWHID AND ONTOLOGICAL DIFFERENTIATION

The ontologically determined epistemology based on a theo-centric cosmology provides a specific type of political justification and legitimacy in Islam. It is almost impossible to understand Islamic political culture and the Muslim Mind's political consciousness without understanding the Islamic *imago mundi*. The political consequences should be evaluated within this holistic framework of Islam.

The basic principle of Islamic theocentric cosmology is the Belief of *Tawhid* (*La ilahe illa Allah*) and its concept of Allah. The principle of *Tawhid*¹ is the main channel from theory to practice, from belief to life, and from ideal to reality in the holistic Islamic Weltanschauung. This principle implies that Allah is One in His Essence (*zat*), that is, not composed of parts; One in His Attributes (*sifat*), that is not having two powers, two knowledges e.t.c.; One in His Works (*af'âl*), that is no other being besides Allah having any influence on Him. This principle together with the principle of *Tanzih* (no compromise with the transcendent purity of Allah) might be accepted as the paradigmatic base of unity among conflicting schools, sects and traditions in Islamic history.

The principle of *Tanzih*, with the term of *Subhanehu*, which is used to indicate the purity of Allah from all defects, is the keynote in the discrimination of the "Absolute" from the "relative" through the belief of the transcendence and sovereignty of the "Creator Absolute" over the "created" relatives" (*'âlam*). The negative aspect of the sentence of *Tawhid* (*La ilahe- there is no god*) is the rejection of the recognition of other sources of transcendence and sovereignty while the positive aspect (*illa Allah -but Allah*) is the obedience of all relative beings to the focus of Absoluteness, namely Allah. This obedience is also the name of the religion, *Islam*.²

¹The root of this word is *wahhada* which means to declare to be one or in terminological usage the action of declaring God to be one.

²The root of *Islam* is *salima* which means to resign, surrender, submit oneself. Hence, the meaning of *Islam* is the act of resigning, submitting oneself. The professor of *Islam* is a Muslim.

Zarkashi (d:794/1391) mentions several arguments on the comparative priorities of the negative (*nafy*) and positive (*ithbat*) aspects of the sentence of Tawhid in his epistle *M'ana La ilahe illa Allah*. The argument that this sentence of Tawhid begins with the negative aspect (La ilahe) for the cleaning of the hearts/li tatthir al-qulub (Zarkashi,1986:82) is especially significant in showing the fact that the first stage of the imagination of a real monotheistic framework is the rejection of any type of relationship of ontological proximity and identification between the Absolute (Allah) and relative sphere (created beings) which is the source of the attribution (*shirk*) - a partner to the Absoluteness of Allah in Islamic belief system. Such an attribution may occur in two ways; either through the deification of any part of the relative beings or through the incarnation of the Absolute in the form of relative beings. Such a relationship of ontological proximity or identification is the rejection of the negative aspect of the sentence of Tawhid leading to a misimagination and misinterpretation of the relationship between the Absolute and relatives. The direct intervention of Elohim -being Absolute- to the relative beings in Judaism (f.e. marriage with the daughters of men in Genesis 6:2-4; beholding and wrestling with Jacob in Genesis 32:24-30; e.t.c.) the idea of incarnation in the concept of Trinity in Christianity, the principle of *Avatar* in Hinduism and *Oneness with Tao* in Taoism might be evaluated as some types of the relationship of ontological proximity and identification from this perspective of the negative aspect of the sentence of Tawhid. Although some sort of relationship between Islam and pre-Islamic monotheistic religions in the Middle East, especially Judaism, has been mentioned (Schimmel,1976:12) in several studies, the original characteristics of Islamic theology around the principle of Tawhid are undeniable. As Hegel (1902:451) specifies, the subjectivist approach on God-man (Jewish community) relationship in Judaism was done away with in Islamic theology because "Allah has not affirmative, limited aim of the Judaic God" (Hegel,1902:452).

Significant consequences for Islamic theoretical tradition and for the popular belief of the masses have developed out of this transparently defined concept of Allah in Islam. First of all, it produces an ontological hierarchy between Allah and man preventing the relationship of identification or proximity between the Absolute (Allah) and the relative beings (created beings). Together with the cosmological understanding of Islam, this ontological hierarchy might be formulated as "Allah-man-nature".

It is a common hypothesis that Islamic theology and philosophy owe a significant debt to the Greek legacy. It is impossible to deny that Islamic philosophy especially has developed within a cultural-geographical milieu that has been influenced by Greek philosophy. But this reality should not be overestimated. When it appeared, Islam gave a special ontological color to this pre-Islamic legacy. Although there have been several discussions and contradictions among Islamic schools of thought such as Kalam and Falsafah (Islamic philosophy), the idea that Islamic philosophy was a simple continuation of Neo-Platonic and Aristotelian ways of thinking and therefore, it is impossible to find a common paradigmatic base among these Islamic schools and traditions, is a superficial oversimplification. It is based on the misconception that these traditions did not only lack a common base, they also lacked an originality.

In contrast to this superficial oversimplification, it can be argued that the accumulated bulk of Islamic theory has a paradigmatic unity with ontologically absolute transcendency. This unity originates from the idea of the Unity of Divinity and its consequence is related to Islamic epistemology and axiology. All the Islamic schools of thought tried to show different aspects and proofs of this fundamental ontological argument using different methodologies, techniques and nomenclatures.¹ Their contradictions are only on a methodological sphere, but they possess this paradigmatic unity.

Although Islamic intellectual tradition used some pre-Islamic sources such as Greek philosophy, it has developed an original Weltanschauung around the belief that the ontological transcendence and "the Unity of Allah" are the prime and only cause of all that take place. Almost all analyses by the Kalam and Falsafah aim to prove the mentioned ontological transcendency and unity.

The belief that the *Qur'an*, as *Kalamullah* and *Kitab-ı Mubin* (Clear Book) is also *Furqan* (discriminator) which specifies and distinguishes between *Haqq* (True) and *Batıl* (Untrue), sets up a very strong link between ontology, epistemology and axiology in the Islamic way of thought. This specifies the impact of ontological antecedents over axiological criteria via epistemological differentiation originating from the belief in Ontological Transcendence. Now, we can analyze these imaginative and theoretical links between ontology, epistemology and axiology in depth.

¹ Al-Ashari's judgement of his death bed that "I do not call any of this kılba an unbeliever, they point to one God, there is only a difference of terms" (Tritton, 1947:167) aims to show this fact.

(i) Cosmologico-Ontological Unity and Transcendancy :

(a) Qur'anic Base:

The origin of the ontological color in Islamic history of thought is the original and unique imagination and specification of the relationship between Allah, man and nature in Qur'an. This imagination depends on a very clear ontological hierarchy based on a cosmologico-ontological Unity and Transcendancy in contrast to the western ontological proximity¹ based on a cosmologico-ontological particularization and fusion. Allah's Self-definition through His names in the Qur'an is the first essential source for this understanding of the highly concentrated ontological transcendancy and absoluteness. "Allah", as the center of the semantic system within the Qur'an, shapes all ontological, epistemological and axiological links. Therefore it is not only impossible to understand Qur'anic internal mechanism of meaning, but also the fundamental characteristic of Islamic theoretical accumulation throughout the ages, without understanding the place of the imagination of the belief of Allah in the process of the formation of the Muslim Mind's consciousness.²

Allah's attribute of being the source of all Absoluteness is the core of His Self-definition as shown by His Names (asma' Allah al-Husna) in the Qur'an³: f.e. "He is Allah, than whom there is no other God, the Knower (*Alim*) of the invisible and the visible. He is the Beneficent (*Rahman*), the Merciful (*Rahim*).

¹ This concept of ontological proximity should not be confused with the Islamic ethical concept of qurbiyyah which means ethical feeling of nearness to Allah. Ontological proximity harbored the meaning of the origin of the ontological beings, while the other intends to demonstrate a mode of feeling and action in Ethics to become nearer to the Ontological Transcendent Being.

² Therefore Wensinck's argument that "the Kuran does not proclaim a compendium of faith that could serve as a characteristic description of Islam, either in contrast with other religions, or as a means of distinction from the peculiar doctrines of the sects" (1932:3) lacks the essential role of Qur'an in the process of mental formation as a specific way of imagination. He generalizes a characteristic of Qur'anic rhetoric to the essence of the Qur'anic theocentric system. Qur'anic rhetoric should not correspond to the modern rhetoric. From the perspective of the essence of the Qur'anic theocentric system, it really gives a very well-defined compendium of faith. The analogy in his following sentence that "in the same way the creeds of the Christian Church could not be directly taken from the New Testament" (1932:3) is an oversimplification because of the essential differences between Christian and Islamic ways of understanding of revelation.

³ "Allah's are the fairest names. Invoke Him by them. And leave the company of those who blaspheme His names. They will be requited what they do." (Qur'an, VII/180, P.)

He is Allah than whom there is no other God, the Sovereign Lord (*Malik*), the Holy One (*Quddus*), Peace (*Salam*), the Keeper of Faith (*Mu'min*), the Guardian (*Muhaimin*), the Majestic (*Aziz*), the Compeller (*Jabbar*), the Superb (*Mutakkabbir*). Glorified be Allah from all that they ascribe as partner (unto him). He is Allah, the Creator (*Khalīq*), the Shaper out of naught (*Bari*), the Fashioner (*Musawwir*). His are the most beautiful Names. All that is in the heavens and the earth glorifieth Him, and He is the Mighty, the Wise (*Hakim*)"" (Qur'an, 59:22-24; P.) There are several classifications of the Names of Allah mentioned in Qur'an and Hadith, made by Muslim scholars. Although there are some hadiths that there are ninety-nine Names of Allah¹, it does not mean a limitation, as Ghazali (1971:182) and Bayhaki (Khatib; 1988:16) argue. All of these names of Allah have been imagined and understood by several Muslim schools and scholars as the ultimate-absolute attributes which are impenetrable by the limited intellectual capacity of human being. Several commentaries were written for these names by Muslim scholars to interpret the Absoluteness of Allah within the context of these names.²

The name "Allah" was used for a "high god" in Mecca in pre-Islamic period. That fact is evident in the Qur'anic verses³ and in pre-Islamic poetry. But, the imagination of this high god by Meccan polytheists was completely different from the Qur'anic description of Allah. Meccan polytheists in pre-Islamic period were acknowledging lesser deities together with this high god. This acknowledgement prevented the development of a highly concentrated monotheistic imagination among the Arabs, although *hunafa* (followers of Abrahamic monotheism in pre-Islamic period) were trying to follow Abrahamic monotheistic tradition. Eliad's conceptualization as *deus otiosus* for the belief of Allah among pre-Islamic Arabs because of the fact that "his cult had been reduced

¹ f.e Bukhari (1981:III/185; in Kitab aṣ-Ṣūrat), and Muslim (1981; III/2063, in Kitab az-Zikr) narrate from Abu Hurayrah the number of the names; while Tirmizi (1981; V/530-1, in Kitab ad-Da'wat) adds the list of the names in the hadith.

² Among many others, F.Razi's *Levami' ul-Beyyināt Sharh Asma Allah Teala va Siffat* (1984), Ghazzali's (1971) *Al-Maqṣad al-asna fi Sharh Ma'ani asma' Allah al-Husna*, Qushayri's *Sharh Asma Allah al-Husna* (1986) might be mentioned as examples.

³ "And if thou wert ask them: Who created the heavens and the earth, and constrained the sun and the moon? they would say : Allah. How then are they turned away.(Qur'an,29:62,P.) And if thou wert to ask them: Who causeth water to come down from the sky, and therewith reviveth the earth after its death? they verily would say: Allah. Say: Praise be to Allah. This life of the world is but a pastime and a game. Lo! the home of the Hereafter- that is Life, if they but know. And they mount upon the ships they pray to Allah, making their faith pure for Him only, but when he bringeth them safe to land, behold! they ascribe partners (unto Him)." (Qur'an,29:63-5, P.) "And if a wave enshroudeth them like awnings, they cry unto Allah, making their faith pure for Him only. But when He bringeth them safe to land, some of them compromise."(Qur'an,31:32,P.)

to certain offerings of firstfruits (grains and animals), which were brought to him conjointly with various local divinities" (1985: III/64) is right from the perspective of the existence of the intermediary deified ontological beings between Allah (in Qur'anic sense) and man. These lesser deities have been regarded sometimes as the "daughters of Allah" (*banat Allah*, Ibn al-Kalbi, 1969:13), and sometimes as angels who could help (*yashf'ana ileyhi*, Ibn al-Kalbi, 1969:13) to the worshippers through intercession (*shuf'aa'*) and mediation (*wasait*) between men and the high god. Thus, such an imagination of divinity was carrying the characteristics of ontological proximity and particularization of divinity similar to the western experience.

Islamic ontological color as the central dynamic of the historical accumulation from the theoretical and practical perspectives, originates from a semantic and imaginative revolution in the understanding of Allah realized by the Qur'anic description. The highly concentrated ontological hierarchy based on the theocentric system of Qur'an is the basic point of departure between Islam and the alternative religions and philosophies. Thus, Islamic ontological hierarchy and differentiation between the Absolute and the relative(s), or between Allah and the creatures shapes an original *weltanschauung* based on a new set of links between Allah-man-nature completely alternative to the understanding of ontological proximity. From this perspective, "Islam is the religion of certitude and equilibrium", as Schuon¹ (1963:16) underlines. Eliad's assertion that "from the viewpoint of religious morphology, Muhammed's message, such as it is formulated in the Qur'an, represent the purest expression of absolute monotheism" (1985:III/78) marks the difference between Islam and other religions, especially western religious traditions, namely Christianity and Judaism.

We can show this fundamental difference through a hermeneutical analysis of Surah CXII (Surah Ikhlas): "Say He is Allah, the One! Allah, the Eternally Besought of All (Samad)! He begetteth not nor was begotten. And there is none comparable unto Him". As Yıldırım (1987:302-3) mentions, there is a continual relationship between Surah CIX² (al-Kafirun, 18. surah in the

¹Schuon touches this differentiation as following: "Here we are in the presence of two assertions, two certitudes, two levels of reality: the Absolute and the relative, Cause and effect, God and the world. Islam is the religion of certitude and equilibrium, as Christianity is the religion of love and sacrifice." (1963:16)

²"Say: O Disbelievers! I worship not that which ye worship; nor worship ye that which I worship. And I shall not worship that which ye worship. Nor will ye worship that which I worship. Unto you your religion, and unto me my religion"

chronological list) and Surah CIX (Surah Ikhlās, 22. surah in the chronological list). *Al-Kafirun* separates ultimately Islamic understanding of Divinity from the pre-Islamic traditions; while *al-Ikhlās* challenges to all types of ontological proximities through the Self-description of Allah. That is especially significant from two perspectives; firstly it shows the original ontological color of Islam opposing to the pre-Islamic understanding of divinities and secondly it might be a good example for the semantic revolution of the Qur'anic system through setting up new semantic environments around the re-defined key-concepts.

The traditions of *asbab-ı nuzul* (the reasons for the revelation of the verses) related to this surah shows its comprehensive challenge to the pre-Islamic religions. According to the traditions, this surah was revealed in response to the questions of Arab polytheists¹, Jews and Christians (Yazır,1971:IX/6271-2) who were arguing some sort of ontological proximity between God and creatures. The relationship of lineage between high god and other deified entities as a significant characteristic of ontological proximity was a common feature of the pre-Islamic religious traditions in the Near East. Such a relationship was extensively believed in Greek mythology and Syrian-Egyptian religious cults, as it has been shown. Arab polytheists were assuming that the lesser deities - such as *Lat*, *Manat* and *Uzza* - are connected to high god with such a relation of kinship (f.e. as daughters), while Jews were asserting that *Uzayr* (Ezra) was God's son, just as the Christians were believing that Jesus was the Son of God.² This short surah was an argumentation of the absolute ontological hierarchy against this traditional background. The inclinations of the polytheistic particularism on the sphere of Divinity has been rejected in the first verse of this surah saying that "Say: He is Allah, the One", while the ontological spheres of the Divinity and creatures has been completely separated around a description of a highly concentrated monotheistic framework opposing to any kind of relation of kinship between God and creatures in the following verses. Therefore this surah might be accepted as a short summary of the Qur'anic theocentric structure against the ideas of the particularization of Divinity and ontological proximity, which is a characteristic of the whole Qur'anic system.

¹ The question of Arab polytheists -narrated with the tradition recorded on the authority of Ibn Ka'b- on the lineage of god (Ibn Kathir,1986:565) is especially significant for our purpose to show Qur'anic challenge against ontologically proximity because of its parallelity with the understanding of the lineage of god in ancient Greek (f.e. in Plato's *Timaeus*) which has been shown in the previous chapter.

² "And the Jews say :Ezra is the son of Allah, and the Christians say: The Messiah is the son of Allah. That is their saying with their mouths. They imitate the sallying of those who disbelieved of old. Allah (Himself) fighteth against them. How perverse are they" (Qur'an,IX/30)

From hermeneutical perspective, the first impact of Qur'an was a semantic re-formulation and re-systematization using the same semantic tools (concepts and words) of the same language. This led to a comprehensive imaginative revolution setting up a new set of links between linguistics and mental imagination. The characteristics of Islamic *weltanschauung* and its highly flexible and dynamic process of popularization should be searched within this context. The concept of Qur'anic *i'caz* (miracle) on its capacity of linguistic and semantic is especially meaningful concerning to this re-systematization and re-valuation of the words. This re-valuation follows a process in some cases (f.e. the concept of *Kufr*¹); while occurs with a new using of the word in a single verse in some other cases (f.e. *Es-samad* as the name of Allah). For example, in this short surah 'Allah' and 'Samad' re-valuated within a new semantic system as the name of the Absolute Ontological Being. The first verse "Say: He is Allah, the One", rejects the old usage of "Allah" as the name of the divine deity among the pre-Islamic Arabs, which created an imagination of a divine being as a "high god" co-exists with other lesser deities², arguing that He is not only High god, but only the One and Absolute. This semantic re-valuation of "Allah" is dominant within the Qur'anic semantic system as a whole. Therefore, Rubin's assertion that "Muhammed shared with the pre-Islamic Arabs the same deity" (1984:199) might lead to a misinterpretation if the fact that the attributes of two understandings of Divinity corresponds to completely contrasting imaginations, is overlooked.³ The similarity between Qur'anic and pre-Islamic conceptualization of divinity is related to their common base of Abrahamic tradition; but they differ to a great extent concerning to the qualitative attributes

¹ Waldman's article (1968) on the chronological development of the concept of *Kufr* is an interesting example for this purpose.

² This re-valuation from "high god" to "One God" should be interpreted through an evaluation of the Qur'anic holistic system. From this perspective, Watt's argument (1979:209-210) that Qur'an did not deny at first the existence of the lesser deities because of its emphasis on the powerlessness of the deities rather than on the rejection of their existence and that "therefore the Qur'an sometimes speaks of the deities as angels", is not correct. In these cases Qur'an aims to remind to Meccan people the true Abrahamic monotheism. On the other hand, in his examples from the Quranic verses (f.e. "they serve apart from God what neither harms nor benefits them" 10:18; "On the day when the hour [of judgement] rises the evildoers will despair, there being no intercessors for them among their partner-gods [shuraka'] while they disbelieve in their partner-gods, 30:12-13) denies the existence of divine qualities of these lesser deities arguing their powerlessness which means a total rejection of lesser deities.

³ His interpretation that "the difference of opinion between Muhammed and his Arab contemporaries did not relate to the identity of the god who had to be worshipped, but rather to the position of this god among other objects of veneration" (1984:199) lacks the qualitative difference of imagination between ontological particularization of divinity and unity of divinity on metaphysical sphere. From this point of view, 'the identity of the god' could not be separated from 'the position of a god among other objects of veneration'.

of Divine Being and His ontological position compared with other beings. From this perspective Qur'anic theo-centric ontological system strictly denies intermediary deified ontological beings as an ontological category between Creator and creatures, such as in pre-Islamic Arab polytheism.

This semantic re-valuation is valid also for the epithet *Samad* which occurs only once in the Qur'an in the second verse of this surah. This epithet is an interesting example for the process of this semantic re-valuation from a daily meaning to a metaphysical imagination. Although Ibn Munzur (n.d.:IV/2496) gives a long list for the meaning of this word in *Lisan al-Arab* ; two of them are especially significant from our perspective, as Razi (1984:317) summarizes: Firstly, it is *f'aalun bi m'ana mefu'lun* from its verb form *samada* (in the meaning of *qasada* -to direct, to turn), and in this sense means *as-sayyid al-masmud ilayhi fi al-hawaij* - a leader towards whom one turns in cases of emergency and exigency. Secondly, it means a being to which penetration is impossible (*Es-Samad huwa allazi la jawfa lahu*) or a being nothing can penetrate to and nothing can come out from (*wa la yadkhluhu shay'un wa la yakhruju minhu shay'un*) (Razi,1984:318).¹

After the Qur'anic re-valuation, this word, as the epithet of Allah, underwent a radical change towards a comprehensive metaphysical meaning. That new meaning is extremely beyond Watt's explanation that "Allah is thought of as the powerful sayyid of a tribe and the lesser deities as other men who are prepared to use their influence with the sayyid on behalf of the suppliants of whom they have become the *awliya'* or patrons"(1979:207), when we evaluate it within the context of the places of the epithets of Allah in the Qur'anic system of semantic. Therefore, Rubin's assertion that Muslim theologians could no longer tolerate the original meaning of al-Samad, as being the High God towards whom the worshippers turn in devotion in cases of emergency, carries the same deficiency because of the isolation of a re-valued term from the holistic semantic system of Qur'an.

The extensive diversification and metaphysical sophistication of the interpretations developed by *mufasssirun* (commentators) on this epithet verify our argument on the re-valuation. Razi (1984:318) analyzes these comments in two groups as an extension of the literal meaning. The first group contains the

¹ Rubin (1984: 200-2) gives detailed information for the alternative usages of this word in pre-Qur'anic period.

meaning of the Ultimate Absoluteness of Allah's sovereignty¹ (ar-Razi mentions fourteen different interpretations within this group such as Absolute Knower, Absolute Sovereign, e.t.c.), while the second group based on the principle of Tanzih through the meaning of the rejection of penetration (ar-Razi mentions eighteen different interpretations in this group)². This extensive diversification might be seen also in the English translations of the Qur'an.³

This hermeneutical example on this short surah⁴ might be extended to the whole Qur'anic semantic system which shaped (or re-shaped considering the old Abrahamic tradition) a new set of links between linguistic and ontological imagination. The essential characteristics of the Islamic weltanschauung should be understood within the context of the highly concentrated ontological transcendency around the concept of Tawhid which has been clarified by the Self-definition of Allah in the Qur'an. The relationship between Allah and man based on this ontological centrality and supremacy of Allah. I want to underline this fundamental characteristic of Islamic ontology, when I mention ontological differentiation. Horten's term as "God's aloofness from the world"⁵ does not correspond this ontological differentiation, because my usage of ontological differentiation implies an ultimate differentiation of ontological spheres; rather than an aloofness on the same ontological sphere. Therefore "as-Samad" as an Absolute Ontological Being in Surah Ikhlas analyzed in the previous lines does not contrast with other Quranic verses in which Allah says that He breathed

¹ Lisan al-Arab (n.d.:IV/2596) shows the transformation of meaning from as-samad as-sayyid allazi yantahi ilayhi as-su'dad (the leader in whom the leadership ends) to Allah Taala fela nihayet li su'dadihi li enne sudadahū gayru mahdudin. (there is not any limit for the sovereignty of Allah). Ibn Mes'ud and ad-Dahhak accept this meaning. (Razi,1984:318)

² Especially Sa'id b. Jabir's interpretation of al-Kamil bizatihil, Hasan Basri's interpretation lam yazal va la yaza'l, al-Muqatil's interpretation of al-munazzah an kulli ayb, should be mentioned as some significant examples.

³ Pickthall translates it as "Allah, the eternally Besought of All", Yusuf Ali (1983) as "God, the Eternal, the Absolute", Zayid (1980) as "the Eternal God", Shakir (1986) as "Allah is He on Whom all depend"

⁴ Ringgren's linguistic analysis on the name of this surah (Ikhlas) verifies this argument of re-valuation:"The Lisan says that ikhlas is the same as tawhid, or professing the one God, while axlasahu llahu means "He made him elected and pure (xalis) from impurity.(1962:93) (...) The context indicates that making one's religion xalis to God is contrary to choosing patrons apart from Him.(1962:94) (...) To sum up the Quranic usage can be understood against the background of the figurative use of the word in poetry. The purity, or sincerity of religion in most cases seems to imply the exclusive worship of God as the opposite of shirk or polytheism.(1962:96)"

⁵ "The cosmos is an indirect expression of God's concealment. For screens separate from the lower world,- 'veils of light' light-oceans; these are numbered according to seven motif:70,700 to 70000. Thus God's aloofness from the world is immeasurably great, and God is 'inaccessible' to men; i.e.'concealed'. Beneath the light oceans, the seven planetary tiers, the so-called seven heavens, further isolate God from men." (Horten, 1973:5)

into human being of His Spirit¹ and that He is "nearer to him (human being) than his jugular vein"(50:16)². This subtle distinction might explain the internal dynamic of Islamic thought which compromise the understanding of the highly ontological differentiation between Allah and man with the imagination of the nearness (*qurbiyyah*) between Allah and man through a specific type of relationship. It clarifies also the intersecting sphere of imagination and thought among several Islamic schools; while it shows how exoteric and esoteric interpretations of Qur'an forms a consistent totality of theocentric *weltanschauung*.³

Thus, the relationship between Allah and man in this *weltanschauung* is completely alternative to an ontological proximity which assumes a penetration among ontological spheres. Therefore, Qur'anic *weltanschauung* tended towards ontological supremacy; while western intellectual history shifted towards an ontological identification step by step. Izutsu's (n.d.,70-72) analysis of the complex relationship between Allah and man as two ontological poles in four types and Schuon's (1965:13) definition of Islam⁴ in terms of the definitions of God and man, are two meaningful interpretations of the Islamic original and new ontological relationship between Allah and man. Nieuwenhuijze's (1985) categorization of this relationship as "God-man relationship: revelation as a form; man-God relationship: faith as a lifestyle and man-man relationship: Islam as a socio-cultural system", is also very interesting because of showing its socio-cultural implication.

Revelation and socio-cultural system as two specific types of the ontological relationship will be analyzed in the following parts. At this stage we can concentrate on *iman* (faith) as a positive way of man-God relationship and *kufr* as a negative way of man-God relationship. Faith, as a specific type of man-God relationship might be seen as a recognition and consciousness of this ontological

¹ "So, when I have made hem and have breathed into him of my Spirit, do ye fall down, prostrating yourselves into him" (xv:29). ""And when I have fashioned him and breathed into him of my Spirit, then fall dawn before him prostrate" (xxxviii:73)

²In another verse Allah says: "And We are nearer unto him than ye are, but ye see not." (56:85)

³Hence, Nasr (1964b) is fully right in his argument that "it must not be forgotten that the view that the world is totally other than God and the belief that the finite can not be absolutely other than the Infinite express different aspects of the same truth".

⁴ "Islam is the meeting between God as such and man as such. God as such: that is to say God envisaged, not as He manifested Himself in a particular way at a particular time, but independently of history and inasmuch as He is what He is and also as by His Nature He creates and reveals. Man as such: that is to say man envisaged, not as a fallen being needing a miracle to save him, but as man, a theomorphic being endowed with an intelligence capable of conceiving of the Absolute and with a will capable of choosing what leads to the Absolute."(Schuon,1965:13)

supremacy of Allah. Islam defines two alternative ontological approaches in terms of the dichotomy of *Iman* and *Kufr* (and *Shirk*). This dichotomy has significant epistemological, axiological, socio-cultural consequences.

Although it has been argued that the root of *iman*, *amana*, has been originated from Hebrew (Horovitz,1916:55; Ahrens,1930:36) or Aramaic (Ahrens,1930:36) languages; it, too, has been re-valuated within the semantic system of Qur'an. Bravman's argument that "*amana* was formed in the usual way from *amn* and that it meant 'to seek safety' and 'to be safe' in God for fate and death" (Ringren,1951:1) is more trustworthy, although this key-term carries additional meanings. Ringgren's analysis (1951) on the evolution of this Qur'anic term is especially important from this perspective. Although he differentiates (1951:9) the meanings of *amana* as *amn* (security) and as belief (the opposite of *kafara* 'to deny' or *ajrama* 'to sin'), the real etymological and imaginative meaning of this word comes out in the interconnected semantic sphere of these two meanings. From this perspective, *al-mu'minun* (believers), as used in the second meaning such as in 2:3-5, 2:283, 3:179, 9:71 e.t.c., are the persons who recognizes the ontological security and protection of *al-Mu'min al-Muhaimin* in the sense of the first meaning (the names of Allah as Faithful,Protector) in 59:23, because "Allah is the Protecting Friend of those who believe, He bringeth them out of darkness into light. As for those who disbelieve their patrons are false deities (*tağut*), they bring them out of light into darkness" (2:257,P.). This interconnected semantic sphere creates a psycho-ontological dimension of meaning in the sense of *itma'anna* in Qur'an: "Who have believed and whose hearts have rest (*itma'anna*) in the remembrance of Allah. Verily in the remembrance of Allah do hearts find rest" (13:28). This psycho-ontological dimension gives a spiritually limitless comprehensive meaning to this word, "*amana*", beyond Ahrens' interpretation of faith as *Fürwahrhalten* (1930:60). Therefore Baidawi's declaration that faith is "*Fürwahrhalten* combined with the peace of the heart (*tasdiq ma'a tuma'ninat qalb*)" (Ringgren, 1951:15) which has been accepted by almost all Muslim schools, shows the very strong relationship between ontological consciousness and epistemology in Islamic imagination of *weltanschauung*.

This imagination of *weltanschauung* specifies the basic characteristics of the ontological differentiation of Islamic man-God relationship through a specific understanding of faith directed by a fulfillment of ontological security. Remembrance of Allah results a *qurbiyyah* in man-god relationship through the

resting of hearts, but it does not mean an ontological penetration in this relationship which destroys ontological security in the ultimate sense. The ontological status in Islamic man-God relationship is very definite. Therefore, a person might reject such a relationship and might prefer a negative way in man-God relationship (*kafir*). Nevertheless, it is not only impossible but also inconsistent to impose upon a conscious Muslim who accepts such a relationship between him and Allah, an epistemologico-axiological framework which denies the spirit of this ontological relationship. As it will be shown in the parts of epistemological and axiological consequences; *iman* (faith-ontology), *ilm* (knowledge-epistemology) and *amal as-salih* (good work-ethics) are three interconnected key-concepts in Qur'an which set up the relationship of dependency between ontology, epistemology and axiology.¹

Nature composes of the material environment within which this man-God relationship occurs. Therefore its *raison d'etre* is directly combined to the purpose of man. Hence, man shares on the same ontological sphere with nature because of being a creature, but has an ultimate supremacy on nature because of being vicegerent of Allah. Thus, an ontological hierarchy of Allah-man-nature in the intellectual accumulation in the Islamic history of thought around the principle of Tawhid.

(b) Systematization of Paradigm:

This absolute ontological hierarchy and transcendency flourished from the Qur'anic theocentric system became the essence of the paradigmatic unity among several Muslim schools in the Islamic history of thought. In a very general sense, the members of *Kalam*, *Falsafah* and *Tasawwuf* -as fundamental divisions of Islamic thought- aimed to show and systematize several aspects of this fundamental truth using different methodologies and nomenclatures. The detailed discussions on the subject of the attributes of Allah came out as a result of their attempts to preserve this fundamental characteristic of Qur'anic creed during the process of the encounter with the pre-Islamic system of beliefs after the Islamic expansion to the centers of ancient civilizations. Four are of great importance among the pre-Islamic intellectual centers: 'The School of

¹This relationship has been explained by al-Ghazali through an analogy in *Ayyuha al-Walad*(1933:55/58): "Knowledge (*ilm*) is the tree, and working (*amal*) is its fruit; and though you studied a hundred years and collected a thousand books, you would not be prepared for the mercy of Allah the Exalted, except, by working.(...) O Youth, knowledge without work is insanity and work without knowledge is vanity."

Alexandria¹, 'the Nestorian School of the East'², 'the School of Harran'³ and 'the School of Iranian Jundishapur'⁴. Although some scientists (Toll,1976:31) argue that the history of the transmission of ancient Greek classics to Islamic civilization has not been searched in details till nowadays, the role of these schools during the process of this transmission is undeniable.

The history of Islamic intellectual accumulation might be evaluated as a history of challenge of the Qur'anic ontological, epistemological and axiological system to this pre-Islamic centers of ancient civilizations around which syncretic geo-cultural atmospheres emerged. Some extremist factions of *Hawarij* and *Shia* tended to the understanding of ontological proximity and identification in contrast to the Qur'anic ontological hierarchy and transcendency. These tendencies have been concentrated in two extreme imaginations of the divinity: *Tajsim/tashbih* (physicalistic or anthropomorphistic view) and *t'atil* (negation). Al-Baghdadi (1935:31-32) analyzes the followers of *Mushabbihah* (anthropomorphists) in two categories; one of which likens the essence of the Creator to the essence of the others, and another which draws a similarity between His Attributes and the attributes of the others. He gives a long list of the anthropomorphistic factions and mentions that the rise of the doctrine of anthropomorphism is linked with several groups among the *Ghulat Rawafid* ⁵. He argues that all of these groups are excluded from Islam although they

¹The school of Alexandria was a very important intellectual center as the meeting place of the Hellenic, Jewish, Babylonian and Egyptian civilizations. As O'Leary (1948:20) describes, "it was not local, nor even national, but a cosmopolitan" center.

²This school came out especially after the separation of the Christian Church into three main divisions: the Monophysite Church, Orthodox State-church and Nestorian Church. Transferring the center of philosophical study first to Antioch, then to Edessa and Nisibis, the members of Nestorian school became a bridge between Greek, Christian and Iranian geo-cultural environments. They translated Greek thought into Syriac.

³ This school is especially significant for the transmission of the Hermetic tradition. It was the center of Sabaeans who considered themselves as the esoteric followers of the prophet Idris or Hermes.

⁴This school played a role of transferring the cultural elements of Greek, Christian, Indian and Zoroastrian traditions. As De Boer (1967:14) mentions, it was an institution for medical and philosophical studies established by Khosrau Anosharwan (521-579) and developed by the supports of Nestorian Christians.

⁵"One of them is the Sabbabiya who called Ali God and identified him with the essence of god. (...) Another is the Bayaniyya, adherents of Bayan Ibn Sam'an who believed that his Worshipped One is a person of light and possesses limbs which have a human form; (...) Still another is the Mughiriyya, followers of Mughira Ibn Sa'id al-Ijli who believed that the Object of his Worship possesses limbs and that they are shaped like the letters of alphabet. (...) Among them are also the Khattabiyya who profess the divine character of the Imams (...) They include the Hululiyya who believed that God Inheres in the person of Imams, (...) Among them are the Mukanna'iyya Mubayyida situated in Mawaraunnahr, who assert that al-mukanna was a god and that he assumes a particular form in every age. There are also the Azakira who believe in the divinity of Ibn Abu-l Azakir who was executed in Baghdad."(al-Baghdadi,1935:31-32)

externally claim relationship with it. Shahrastani's (1934:43/104) argument that these anthropomorphistic factions have been affected by Incarnationism (*Hululiyah*) and Christianity, shows the impacts of these syncretic geo-cultural atmospheres.¹ The analogies between Ali and Jesus argued by some of the followers of the extremist Shia (gulat rawafid) is especially interesting from this perspective.² This argument transformed to a full ontological identification of divinity by the members of *Dhammiyah* and *Ulyaniyyah* who were believing that Ali is god and were reviling Muhammed claiming that Ali sent him to enlighten the world about him, but that he employed the charge in his own interest. (Baghdadi, 1935:68-9) The belief of the followers of *Mufawwidah* on the divine characters of God, Muhammed and Ali is a specific formulation of the understanding of the ontological particularization. It carries the mixed characteristics of the Platonic image of God as *Demiurge* and christianized ontological particularization in western experience.³

The second extreme, *t'atil*, was having a potential imagination of God to develop an inactive and limited idea of God in its most ultimate case in Islamic history of thought. As Shahrastani (1934:50/123) summarizes, "*T'atil* can be divorcing (a) the work (of creation) from the Maker, (b) the Maker from the world, (c) the Creator from the Eternal Attributes which subsists in His essence; (d) the Creator from the Attributes and Names in eternity; and (e) the plain texts of Quran and Sunnah from the meanings to which they witness". Such an imagination might lead to an abstract and inactive idea of god as a specific

¹"The Shi'ite Ghaliyya liken the Creator to the created. The Mughiriyya, the Bayaniyya, and the Sabaiyya and the Hashimiyya and their followers said that God has a form like the form of men; (...) The Ghaliyya said that a certain person was God; or that a part of God was incarnate in him, slavishly following the Nazarenes [Christians] and Incarnationists [Hululiyah] of every community." (Shahrastani, 1934:43/103-104)

² "When Ali was killed, Ibn Saba held that the slain one was not Ali but a devil who appeared to the people in the likeness of Ali. Ali himself ascended to heaven just as Isa Ibn Mariam had ascended there. He said: Just as the Jews and Christians lie in affirming in execution of Isa, so the Nasibs and Khawarij lie in alleging Ali's assassination. However, the Jews and Christians saw a crucified person whom they confused with Isa. Similarly those who affirm the killing of Ali saw a slain person who resembled him, so that they were of the opinion it was Ali. But Ali, in truth, ascended to heaven, and he will surely come down to earth and take revenge of his foes. (Baghdadi, 1935:42)

³"Concerning the Mufawwida among the Rawafid: It is made up of a group which maintains that God created Muhammed, then He committed to him the management of the world and the disposal of its affairs. It is he, and not God, who brought the universe into existence. Then Muhammed entrusted the rule of the universe to Ali Ibn Abu Talib. He is thus the third ruler. this sect is more ignominious than the Magians who think that God created Satan and that Satan created all evil things; more shameful indeed than the Christians who call Isa the second ruler. Whoever reckons the Rafidite Mufawwida among the Islamic sects is on one level with those who count the Magians and Christians as Muslims." (Baghdadi, 1935:68)

interpretation of soul. His connection of the imagination of Muslim materialists (*Dahriyyun*) to this imagination of *t'atil*, is very interesting to show the links between the idea of an abstract/inactive god and the assumption of the self-adjusted nature.¹ Therefore, in a general sense, it might be argued that *tashbih* and *hululiyyah* was corresponding to an ontological proximity within a christianized form, while *t'atil* was corresponding to the imagination of the ontological proximity of the modern philosophy especially after Newtonian mechanics.

The originality of Islamic thought is its specific ontological color which is originated from Qur'an and systematized during the process of this challenge. The great founders of several Muslim schools aimed to interpret and preserve Qur'anic ontological color within a new context of methodology indebted from the pre-Islamic accumulation of these intellectual centers of ancient civilizations. It should be underlined that this theory and imagination of the Ontological Unity and Transcendancy has been shared by great Muslim schools and by the overwhelming majority of the Muslim masses throughout the ages, although some synthesis emerged especially in the syncretic geo-cultural atmospheres mentioned above. The fundamental reason of this consistency and continuity might be found in the transparency of Qur'an on the definition of Allah as the source of all absoluteness. Such a transparency is valid also for the definition of Allah developed by Muslim scholars. For example, Taftazani's definition of Allah as the Originator of the World (1950:36)², Kindi's definition of Allah through the method of *via negativa* (1974:112)³, Farabi's definition of Allah as *al-*

¹ "As to (b) the Materialists (Dahriyya), who hold that the world pre-existed, say that the pre-existence of the world in eternity implies the divorce of the Maker from His work. This has already been refuted in the discussion of production (*ijad*). Causation is just as impossible as the separation of the Maker from His work. You call your God, cause and principle and necessitator which implies two absurd things: (a) the validity of the relation between cause and effect, and (b) the cause necessitating its perfect per se. The first intention is the existence of the world... through first intention... The higher does not will a thing for the sake of the lower; therefore causation is refuted." (Shahrastani, 1934:51/126)

² "The Originator of the world is Allah, the One, the Eternal, the Living, the Powerful, the Knowing, the Hearing, the Seeing, the Desiring, and the Willing. He is not an accident, nor a body, nor an atom; nor is He something formed, nor a thing limited, nor a thing numbered, nor a thing partitioned or divided, nor a thing compounded; nor does He come to an end in Himself. He is not described by quiddity, nor by quality, nor is He placed in place. Time does not affect Him and nothing resembles Him, and nothing is outside of His knowledge and Power."

³ "The True One has neither matter, form, quantity, quality or relation, is not described by any of the remaining intelligible things, and has neither genus, specific difference, individual, property, common accident or movement; and it is not described by any of the things which are denied to be one in truth. It is, accordingly, pure and simple unity, while every other one is multiple."

Mavcud al-Awwal (1985:37-40)¹, and and Kalabadhi's (d.380/990) definition of Allah within a sufistic framework (1935:14)², do not show only this transparency but also the paradigmatic base among Muslim schools of thought around Ontological Unity and Transcendancy based on the principles of *Tawhid* and *Tanzih*.

The systematization of Islamic paradigm on this ontological color occurred during the process of the challenge to the pre-Islamic legacy of ancient civilizations. The formation of *Aqaid* and *Usul ad-diyn* as the codification of Islamic creed and the development of *Kalam* as the systematization of theology are the results of the attempts to re-produce Qur'anic ontological color within a new holistic consistency as a response to this civilizational challenge. Therefore *Ilm al-Kalam* is not only "an elaborated polemics of apology without true and primary concern for the rational understanding of the totality of being" or "a kind of sophistry as an art of making contradictions"(Frank,1968:295), but also and especially a way of explanation of a theological truth. It emerged as a result of the necessity related to philosophical reasoning on the nature and attributes of God and His relation to man and the universe. Therefore as Frank underlines, in contrast "to a number of writers have suggested that the earlier kalam is not really a speculative theology, and -in contrast- to others that is in the final analysis, unsophisticated, simplistic and primitive; the language of the kalam, from the earliest time that we can know it in any detail, is extremely precise and its thesis and arguments carefully delimited and refined in their conception and formulation".

¹ "Al-Mavcud al-Awwal huwa as-Sabab al-Awwal li wujud sair al-mawjudat kulluha; wa huwa bariyyun min jami' anha an-naqs. wa kulli ma savahu fa laysa yakhlu min an yakuna fihi sayun min anha an-naqs, (...) fa wujuduhu afdal al-wujud wa aqdam al-wujud; wa la yumkin an yakuna wujud afdal wa la aqdam min wujuduhi.(...) fa izan huwa munfarid al-wujud wahdah. fa huwa wahir min hazihi al-jihat."

²"The Sufis are agreed that Gis One, Alone, Single, Eternal, Everlasting, Knowing, Powerful, Living, Hearing, Seeing, Strong, Mighty, Majestic, Great, Generous, Clement, Proud, Awful, Enduring, First, God, Lord, Ruler, Master, Merciful, Compassionate, Desirous, Speaking, Creating, Sustaining; that He is qualified with all the attributes wherewith He has qualified Himself, and named with all the Names whereby He has named Himself; that since eternity He has not ceased to continue with His Names and Attributes, without resembling creation in any respect; that His essence does not resemble the essences, nor His attributes the attributes; that not one of the terms applied to created beings, and indicating their creation in time, has currency over Him; that He has not ceased to be Leader, foremost before all things born in time, Existent before everything; that there is no Eternal but He, and no God beside Him; that He is neither body, nor shape, nor form, nor person, nor element, nor accident; that with Him neither junction nor separation, neither movement nor rest, neither augmentation nor decrease; that He has neither parts nor particles nor members nor limbs nor aspects nor places; that He has not affected by faults" (Kalabadhi, 1937:14)

So, it is not an art of contradiction-making, but a specific way of explanation of Qur'anic ontological color with a specific methodology and rhetoric. In fact, all Islamic sciences have a very interdependent and interconnected structure from this perspective. All of them are like several streets meeting on a crossing point. This crossing point is the ontological imagination of *Allah* and '*alam*' which is *ism li masiva Allah Taala* (the name of all beings other than Allah). The semantic link between the etymological origin of '*alam*' "as a mark or sign by which a thing is known" and its meaning of "a class of beings/universe" shows the cosmological imagination of universe as a sign by which Allah is known. This imaginative link has been underlined by several Muslim scholars in the beginning parts of their books on Muslim theology. For example as-Sabuni (d.606/1210) begins his book *al-Bidayah fi Usul ad-Diyn* (1980:19) with the definition of *alam* and says *al-'alam ism li masiva Allah Taala, li annahu 'alamun 'ala wujud as-san'i* /the universe is the name of all beings other than Allah because it is a sign for the existence of the Maker (Allah). Therefore, *Ilm usul ad-diyn* places a central role for the formation of Islamic mentality and Muslim mind. Hence, Tahawi (d/h.321; 1987:9) argues that *Ilm Usul al-diyn* is *ashraf al-ulum* (the most noblest science) and that the necessity of human being to this science is beyond all the necessities because knowing Allah is only possible through this science.¹ Another name of this science is *Ilm al-Tawhid*..

Knowing man's ontological relationship with Allah is the fundamental essence of the Islamic way of belief, thought and life. Therefore, almost every book in Islamic intellectual history begins with a passage of a specific systematization of the knowledge on Allah. This characteristic gives us a very interesting clue for the stages of the formation of Muslim mind's mental formation and consciousness. And, therefore it is impossible to isolate any sphere of thought and life from this ontological consciousness which is the basic obstacle for any type of secular differentiation. The classification of *Ilm al-Fiqh* in three groups as *Fiqh-ı Itiqadi* ², *Fiqh-ı Ilmi* ³ and *Fiqh-ı Wijdani* ⁴ (İzmirli İsmail Hakkı, 1981:45) from the time of Abu Hanifah to the later periods shows this interconnected links between belief, thought, ethics and law in Islamic

¹ "Ilm usul al-diyn ashraf al-ulum wa hajat al-ubbad ilayhi fawqa külli hajat, liannahü la hayat lil qulub illa bi anna ta'rif rabbaha wa ma'budaha wa fatiraha, bi asmaihi, wa sifatihî wa afa'lihî."

² The other names of this science are *Fiqh al-Akbar*, *Ilm al-Tawhid* and *Ilm al-Kalam*

³ The other name of this science is *Fiqh al-Sharai'* wa al-ahqam. That is the most common used meaning of *fiqh*.

⁴ The other name of this science is *Ilm al-Akhlaq* wa at-Tasawwuf.

cumulative system. These sciences embrace respectively the sphere of belief, the sphere of law and the sphere of ethics.

Tawhid and Tanzih are two fundamental principles of this ontological consciousness and of the formation of the systematic Islamic creed. That is the basic characteristic of *Ilm al-Aqaid* and *Kalam* beginning from *Fiqh al-Akbar* (1981:58; eng. trans. Wensinck, 1932:188) of Abu Hanifah as the first document of the systemic Islamic creed. The first passage of this epistle defines what the essence of Tawhid is, while the second passage aims to underline the principle of Tanzih: "The heart of the confession of the unity of Allah (Tawhid) and the true foundation of faith consist in this obligatory creed: I believe in Allah, His Angels, His books, His Apostles, the resurrection after death, the decree of Allah the good and the devil thereof, computation of sins, the balance, Paradise and Hell; and that all these are real. Allah the exalted is one, not in the sense of number, but in the sense that He has no partner; He begetteth not and He is not begotten and there is none like unto Him. (surah, cxii.) He resembles none of the created things; nor do any created things resemble Him. He has been from eternity with His Names and Qualities; those which belong to His essence, as well as those which belong to His action."

These passages did not only affect the following members of this school, but also the popular belief of the masses throughout the ages. The transparency of these principles closed the gap between systematic theology of the scholars and popular belief of the masses. That is the reason why a church as an institutionalized belief did not emerge in Islamic history and why the socialization process of the belief in Islam -comparing with the other religions- so speedy is. Hegel's (1902:451-452) interpretation for the relationship of the belief of Allah, spiritual universality and human personality in Islam compared with Judaic Jehovah is very interesting to show the impacts of the transparency on the universalization and socialization process of the belief.¹

¹"Jehovah was only the God of that one people- the God of Abraham, of Isaac and Jacob: only with the Jews had this God made a covenant; only to this people had He revealed Himself. That speciality of relation was done away with in Muhammadanism. In this spiritual universality, in this unlimited and indefinite purity and simplicity of conception, human personality has no other aim than the realization of this universality and simplicity. Allah has not the affirmative, limited aim of the Judaic God. The worship of the One is the only final aim of Muhammadanism." (Hegel, 1902:451-2)

The principles of Tawhid and Tanzih prevented any type of ontological proximity and strengthened the understanding of ontological differentiation¹ and hierarchy. That is especially true for the followers of Ahl al-Sunnah, but it is also valid for the members of other sects except the imaginations of extreme tashbih and t'atil mentioned above. In fact, the formation of Islamic Kalam is a result of the responses against these revisions from the original Islamic ontological approach in favor of the pre-Islamic geo-cultural syncretic atmospheres.² Their discussion concentrate on the subject of finding the most effective way for the preservation of these principles in the process of the challenge to the pre-Islamic legacy. Therefore, an imagination of ontological proximity as a general and common phenomenon like we have searched in the previous chapter related to the western experience did not emerge in Islamic intellectual history.

Mu'tazilah, as the first school to have effective contact with Greek philosophy, might be a good example from the perspective of the Islamic ontological approach that transcended its pre-islamic legacy. The fundamental arguments of this school might be summarized as following: (i) God Almighty's justice necessitates that man should be the author of his own acts; (ii) The justice of God makes it incumbent upon Him not to do anything contrary to justice and equity; (iii) God makes the distinction good and evil on account of their being good and evil; (iv) As God is exempt from place and direction, a vision of Him is possible neither in this world, nor in the hereafter; (v) Qur'an is a created speech of God; (vi) Reason demands that an Imam should necessarily be appointed over the Ummah; (vii) God's pleasure and anger, are not attributes, but states.³ The

¹ Following sentences from Fiqh al-Akbar show this highly differentiated ontological hierarchy around the principle of Tanzih: "All His qualities are different from those of the creatures. He knoweth, but not in the way of our knowledge; He is mighty but not in the way of our power; He seeth, but not in the way of our seeing; He speaketh, but not in the way of our speaking; He heareth, but not in the way of our hearing. We speak by means of organs and letters. Letters are created, but the speech of Allah is uncreated. Allah is thing, not as other things but in the sense of positive existence, without body, without substance, without accidents. He has no limit, neither has He a counterpart, nor a partner, nor an equal." (1981:59; eng. trans. Wensinck, 1932:189)

² Even after the beginning of the process of formation of Kalam, some tendencies towards the ontological proximity has been survived under the impact of the pre-Islamic belief systems: "Some of the exponents of the young theology fell under the attraction of foreign ideas and strange mixtures resulted. Two disciples of al-Nazzam broke away from monotheism under the influence of the dualist and Christian ideas; they were Ahmad b. Hait and al-Fadl al-Hadathi. (...) Dualism and transmigration are the root ideas in this system. The universe has two lords, one eternal who is God, and one created who is Jesus. Jesus is the son of God by adoption not by birth and may cease to be. They are both creators, but it was Jesus who created Adam in His image and will hold the judgement at the last day." (Tritton, 1947:137)

³ I have profited by Valluddin's article (1963:201-3) on Mu'tazilism for this summary. As he mentions, Ibn Hazm adds in his Milal wa al-Nihal the condition of regarding the perpetrator of a grave sin as an unbeliever, for being a member of Mutazilah.

Mu'tazilah's debt to Greek philosophy is best seen in its assumption of "the autonomy of human reason" and in metaphysical atomism. Superficially, it might be argued that the assumption of "the autonomy of human reason" could be transformed to the equalization of the ontological and epistemological levels of Allah versus that of man. But the members of the Mu'tazilah school who argued in favor of "the autonomy of human reason" never transformed this idea to an understanding of "ultimate conflict between reason and revelation" as did the epistemological sources which created the secularization of knowledge in the western philosophical tradition.¹ In contrast, their interpretation of tawhid led them to a highly concentrated ontological transcendence, depending on the Belief in Allah, not only as the Creator of the world, but also as its constant ground of being. They acted the separate qualities of God arguing that such qualities would be separate Beings and that such an assumption is against the belief of the Unity of God. Wasil b. Ata's argument of eternal oneness on this subject has been systematized by Abu Hudhayl Muhammed al-Allaf (d.226) who taught that "the Qualities were not in His essence, and thus separable from it, thinkable apart from it, but that they were His essence"²(Mac Donald,1903:1376). According to them, this was an attempt against the possibility to the approximation to the Christian Trinity as a specific type of particularization of Divinity; because for them "the persons of the Trinity have always been personified qualities, and such seems really to have been the view of John of Damascus" (Mac Donald,1903:137). Therefore they called themselves the People of Unity and Justice (*Ahl at-Tawhid wa al-Adl*). It is very difficult to support the speculation that a secular way of thinking in Islamic intellectual history would be realized by using Mu'tazilah tradition,³ when we evaluate its epistemological consequences within these ontological premises.

¹In fact, the interest of Muslim scholars, and also the members of Mu'tazilah, in the problem of "the autonomy of human reason" is related to an axiological question, namely whether a person who was not informed by revelation, would be responsible to believe in God or not. This question and its epistemological bases have significant consequences, but these consequences might be interpreted within the mentioned Islamic paradigmatic unity based on ontological justification rather than in epistemological differentiation.

²"Thus, God was omnipotent by His omnipotence, but it *was* His essence and not *in* His essence. He was omniscient by His Omniscience and it *was* His essence. Further, he held that these qualities must be either negations or relations. Nothing positive can be asserted of them, for that would mean that there was in God the complexity of subject and predicate, being and quality; and God is absolute Unity."(Mac Donald,1903:136-7)

³ f.e.The name "Freidenker im Islam" has been used for Mu'tazilah by Heinrich Steiner who has written the first monography on this school to isolate them from the other Islamic sects. (Goldziher,1910:100)

There is a very spread variation among the arguments of the followers of Mutazilah and it is unnecessary to discuss all of them within such a framework; but it should be underlined that their general theoretical and imaginative attitude concentrated between the followers of T'atil (Mu'attila) and Ahl al-Sunnah from the perspective of ontological unity and transcendency especially on the subject of Divine Qualities. Their later followers approximated towards the ideas of Ahl al-Sunnah. As Tritton (1947:166-7) argues "the Mu'tazilah had been drawing nearer to the traditional beliefs and al-Ashari made the whole turn". This approximation of Mu'tazilah is very evident especially in fifth century of Hijrah after famous leader of this tradition, Qadī Abd al-Jabbar. For example as Tritton (1947:193) notes the argument of his student Muhammed b. Ali al-Basri that the existence of God is His essence (quiddity); He is different from all else and this difference is due to His essence and is not something added to it, is an approximate repetition of Asharite doctrine on this issue. This argument might be accepted at the same time as a sophisticated interpretation of the principle of Tanzih without deviating towards the doctrine of t'atil. Hence, their methodological borrowing from the pre-Islamic legacy did not prevent the development of an understanding of highly concentrated ontological transcendency.

After the reactions of Shafi, Ibn Hanbel, al-Muhasibi (d.213/857) and Ibn Kullab (d.240/854) against Mutazilah's rejection of Divine Attributes and rationalization of Islamic belief, a new rational re-systematization of Islamic belief system as opposed to the extremes of t'atil and tashbih began to be emerged especially in the beginning of the 4./10. century. That is the formation of the philosophico-religious school of *Ahl al-Sunnah*¹. The leading figures of this movement are al-Ashari (d.330 or 334/941 or 945) in Mesopotamia, al-Maturidi (333/944) in Samarqand and al-Tahawi (d.331/942) in Egypt. These three leading scholars aimed to fulfil the need for reconciliation on theological sphere through solving the crisis of the process of the civilizational challenge by adopting a middle course and a tolerant attitude among different approaches. That was a search for a new theoretical and methodological system which aim to set up a balanced epistemology between reason and revelation. The theological

¹ There is an approximate consensus among the writers on the classifications of Muslim sects to differentiate Ahl al-Sunnah from the other sects in Islamic history. As Seele (1920:1/5) notes, Shahrastani groups the unorthodox (other than Ahl al-Sunnah) factions under the four main headings: Qadariyyah, Sifatiyyah, Khawarij and Shiite; Ibn Hazm: Mu'tazilah (much the same as Qadariyyah), Murji'ah, Khawarij and Shiite; Baghdadi: Qadariyyah, Khawarij, Murji'ah and Shiite. There are subdivisions of these groups.

arguments of this school became the most popular both among the masses and scholars.

Ibn Asakir (d.571/1176) calls these groups as *Muthbitun* (affirmers) in his *Tabayin Kadhīb al-Muftari fī ma Nusiba ila al-Imam Abu al-Hasan al-Ashari* (1953:147-8), arguing that the most redoubtable champion of the *Muthbitun* was al-Ashari who avoided the extremes of *t'atil* and *tashbih*.¹ They have been called as *Muthbitun* because they "affirmed of God what God affirmed of Himself, and denied of God that which is unworthy of Him". The rational re-systematization of Qur'anic belief system as Kalam of Ahl al-Sunnah differs from the other reactions against *Mu'tazilah* (like the Zahirites, the Hanbalites, the Muhaddithin) because of relying on the use of reason or Kalam in defending and explaining religious creeds. Al-Ashari strictly rejects in his *Risalah fī Istihsan al-Khawd fī Ilm al-Kalam* (A Vindication of The Science of Kalam) the condemnation of these groups that such a rational methodology for the discussions on these issues and Kalam as a whole are innovations (*bid'a*) which did not occur during the period of Prophet.²

The fundamental argument of the followers of *Muthbitun* might be summarized as that when God describes Himself as being of capable of seeing, hearing e.t.c., He is using these words in a real sense, because God really sees and hears; but since "nothing is like Him", His attributes, though real, are not like the attributes of human beings or any other created things. That idea strengthened the imagination of ontological differentiation which is immanent in the Qur'anic ontological color. *Mu'tazilah* was aiming to reach such an ontological differentiation through an idea of "absolute unity"; while al-Ashari developed

¹"The ulama of the Muthbitun, harried by the heretics just mentioned, held fast to the Sunnah and restrained men from wading in the perilous waters. (...) Inspired by God to defend the Sunnah by rational arguments, he (al-Ashari) became the rallying point and mainstay of the Muthbitun. He divided created existing things into accidents, atoms and bodies." (Ibn Asakir, 1953:148)

²"A certain group of men have made ignorance their capital. Finding reasoning and inquiry into religious belief too burdensome, they incline towards the easy way of servile sectarianism [taqlid: unquestioning acceptance of the authority of another]. They calumniate him who scrutinizes the basic dogmas of religion and accuse him of deviation, they claim, to engage in kalam about motion and rest, body and accident, accidental modes and states [Ar: al-alwan wa al-akwan], the atom and the leap [Ar: al-tafrā] and the Attributes of the Creator.. They assert that if that were a matter of guidance and rectitude, the prophet and the caliphs and his Companions would have discussed it. For, they say, the Prophet did not die until he had discussed and amply explained all needful religious matters (1953:120-1/Ar.87-8) (...) "All the verses which we have mentioned, as well as many which we have not mentioned, are a basis and argument for us in our kalam on what we mention in detail. It is true that no question was particularized in the Book and the Sunnah. But that was because the particularization of questions involving rational principles did not take place in the days of the Prophet. However, (he and) the Companions did engage in kalam of the sort which we have mentioned." (1953b:t.94/129)

the doctrine of *Mukhalafah* or "absolute difference" for a rational systematization of ontological differentiation without denying Divine Attributes. This doctrine of *mukhalafah* means that if any quality, attribute or term is applied to God, it must be understood in a unique sense and never taken in the sense in which it is normally used when applied to created beings.¹ This doctrine has been expanded to the problem of existence in Ashari's formulation; thus, the existence of God is not the same as that of the world; this difference is due to His peculiar essence, not to something added to it.² The logical consequence of this doctrine that God's attributes differ from those of the creatures, not in degree but in kind and in their whole nature, specifies the qualitative characteristics of ontological differentiation which strengthens the imagination of ontological transcendency.

Thus, *Asharite Kalam* differs from *Mu'attila* (negators) because of accepting the existence of Divine attributes, from *Mujassima* (anthropomorphists) because of the doctrine of *mukhalafah*. The interpretations on the principles of *Tawhid*³ and *Tanzih*⁴ in the beginning chapters of Ashari's *Kitab al-Luma* show his meticulousness on any type of avoiding to these extremes. Therefore, he analyzed Divine Attributes in two categories: (i) *sifat-i wujudiyyah* which means

¹ There are basically two different interpretations on this difference, as Shehadi (1964:15) mentions: (i) One interpretation of this difference is that God's attributes are different from those of other things, specially man's in degree only- God's attributes are to some extent like man's only they are greater and more perfect; (ii) the other interpretation is that God's uniqueness is an expression of the utter difference of His Nature from all other things.

² One of the later members of Asharite school, al-Baqqalani, rejected this conclusion.

³ This interpretation is also a response to the eclectic beliefs between Islam and pre-Islamic Iranian dualistic philosophies: "Q. Why do you say that the Makers of things is one? A. The government of two will be neither harmonious nor consistently effective, but impotence will inevitably attach to one or to both of them. For if one of the two wills a man's life and the other wills his death, one of three things must ensue: the will of both together will be accomplished, or the will of neither will be accomplished; or the will of only one will be accomplished. Now it is impossible that the will of both together be accomplished, for the body cannot be simultaneously living and dead. So if the will of both together be not accomplished one must conclude to the impotence of both - and the impotent can be neither God nor eternal. And if the will of only one be accomplished, impotence necessarily attaches to the one whose will is not accomplished- and the impotent can be neither God nor eternal. Thus what we have said proves that the Maker of the things is one. And God Most High has said: 'Were there gods other than Allah in them, the heavens and the earth would be in disorder.' [21.22]" (Al-Ashari, 1953a: t.8/9-10)

⁴ "Q. Why do you claim that the Creator is unlike creatures? A. If He were like them, His relation to temporal production would be the same as theirs. And if He were like them, He would have to be like them either in all respects or in some one respect. So if He were like them in all respects, He would be temporally produced, as they are, in all respects. And if He were like them in some one respect, He would be temporally produced in that respect in which He was like them. But it is impossible for the temporally produced to have preexisted eternally. And Allah Most High has said: 'There is nothing like unto Him.' [42.11/9]; and 'No one is His equal.' [112.4] (Al-Ashari, 1953a: t.8/9/)

existential or positive attributes and (ii) *sifat-i salbiyyah* which means negative attributes. The acceptance of *sifat-i wujudiyyah* was a hindrance for the extreme *t'atil* which might lead to an inactive/abstract God. Additionally, he opposes to the extreme *Sifatis* who asserted that even those attributes of God implying His bodily existence are also to be taken in their true literal sense which might lead to an imagination of ontological proximity and argues that these attributes are to be believed in *bila kaifa*¹ (without asking 'how') and *bila tashbih* (without drawing any comparison). His interpretation of Tawhid mentioned above, is an attempt to hinder any type of ontological particularization of Divinity.

The Asharite's metaphysics based on a specific interpretation of metaphysical atomism carries the characteristics of Islamic theo-centric ontological color. As Macdonald (1903:203) signifies, they link their theology to their ontology as "thoroughgoing metaphysicians" and as "thoroughgoing theologians". Asharite atomism shows at the same time how they differ from the ancient and modern types of atomisms because of being affected by Qur'anic ontological system. As Hye (1963:240) mentions, the Asharite atoms are fundamentally different from those of Democritus and Lucretius because "they are not material; they are not permanent; they have only a momentary existence; they are not eternal but every moment brought into being, and then allowed to go out of existence by the Supreme Being, God, the only cause of everything in the universe". They differ also from Leibniz's system of monadology because "Leibniz had to bring in, in his monadology, a Monad of monads or God, and fall back upon the theory of Pre-Established harmony to bring his monads into harmonious and orderly relations with one another, and this he could do only at the cost of his monadology, and by abandoning his pluralistic and individualistic metaphysic; but the Asharites, consistently with their ontology, fall straight back upon God, and found in His will the ground of orderliness and harmony in the universe. They were, thus, more thorough and consistent than Leibniz in their theory of monads."² This difference is very interesting to show how a

¹ He shares this principle of *bila kaifa* with the followers of Ibn Hanbal who believe in the existence of some characteristics of God (f.e. hand; al-Ashari, 1980:290) *bila kaifa*.

² Some of the propositions of the Mutakallim atomists summarized by Maimonides (1928:120) might be mentioned as following to show its original position in the history of thought: "The universe is composed of individual atoms (*jawhar fard*) which are all exactly alike. They do not have quantity but when combined the bodies thus compounded do. A vacuum in which nothing exists provides for the combination, separation, and movement of the atoms. Time is also made up of atoms which can not be further subdivided. There are accidents which are elements in the sense of non-permanent qualities. (...) Accidents do not continue through two atoms of time. There is thus no inherent nature in things. Allah creates a substance and simultaneously its accidents. Immediately after its creation it is destroyed and another takes its place. That which is called natural law is

methodological approach and tool in metaphysics has been interpreted in two alternative ways of ontological imagination: Asharites way of atomism led to a highly concentrated ontological hierarchy while a specific ontological proximity has been survived in the form of Leibniz's monadology.

The forerunner of the Sunnite Kalam in the eastern provinces, al Maturidi, has systematized the theological views of Abu Hanifah around the basic principle of freedom from tashbih and tajsim without denying divine attributes (t'atil). His masterpiece Kitab al-Tawhid might be accepted as a challenge to the extremist eclecticism of some Muslim schools as well as an attempt to build up a rational systematization for the defense of the Qur'anic ontological color. He shares this common feature with al-Ashari and Tahawi although he also disagreed with al-Ashari on certain detailed points. I do not want to repeat some common features among them which shaped the basic principles of Sunnite Kalam, but the impacts of the ideas al-Maturidi on both the following scholars and masses (especially Hanefiyyah) should not be underestimated. Being the follower of Abu Hanifah's school of *ashab al-rai wa al-qiyas* (The People of Reason and Opinion) in methodology of Law, his works and arguments might be accepted as the cornerstones of the rational systematization of Islamic creed. His refutation (1981:363-8) the absolute determinism of the Jabriyyah (compulsionism) arguing that the relation between God and man should not be considered to be the same as that between God and physical world, is a confirmation of the ontological hierarchy between Allah, man and nature.

This moderate approach of Sunnite Kalam opposing to mu'attila and mushabbiha has been strengthen throughout the ages by he followers of these leading figures and become the dominant way of belief and imagination among the masses. Al-Baqillani (d.403/1013), Ibn Furaq (d.406/1015), al-Isferaini (d.419/1027) and al-Juwaini (d.478/1085) were the leading scholars of the process of systematization and popularization process of Asharite school, while al-Nasafi's (d.508/1114) epistle, *Aqaid an-Nasafi*, became the most essential source of the school of Maturidi. The fundamental characteristics of the Sunnite Kalam has been shaped during these ages. Al-Baghdadi gives a long list of these characteristics.¹ The second phase of the formation of Kalam after al-Ghazali,

only Allah's customary way of acting. (...) There is an unlimited possibility in the world, with the exception of the logical contradictions, because the divine will is not limited by natural laws.

¹"The generality of Orthodox Muslims are agreed about certain principles of the essentials of religion (...) The first essential which they regard as one of the fundamentals of the faith is the confirmation of the realities and of knowledge, particularly and generally. The second essential is

kalam al-müteakhhirin , will be analyzed in coming pages; but it should be underlined that the members of these two phases share the fundamental characteristics on the ontological unity and hierarchy. They strongly resisted against any type of eclectic syncreticism related to the relationship of God-man-universe under the impact of the pre-Islamic belief systems and philosophies leading to the imagination of ontological proximity. Al-Juwaini's critics against Judaism and Christianity in his *Shifa al-Ġalil* (1968) and as-Sabuni's (1980:21/65) accuse related to the idea of God of *Thenaviyyah* (dualistic theology/Zoroastrianism), *Majussiyyah* (fire worshipper/Magianism), *Nasara* (Christianity), *Tabi'iyah* (Naturalism), and *Aflakiyyah* (Worshippers of the spheres as ruling all events) might be mentioned as two examples of the meticulousness of this school on the prevention of syncreticism as a way towards ontological proximity and particularization of Divinity.

The mid-way position between extremes of *t'atil* (divesting) and *tashbih* (similitude) around the basic principles of ontological differentiation (*mukhalafa*) and the unknowability of His Nature has been shared also by the followers of *Falsafah* and *Tasawwuf*. Their differences lies in their methodological approaches and tools. The problems of the philosophers are almost the same of those of the theologians. Hence, Arnaldez's argument in *Encyclopedia of Islam* (1965/II: 772) that "the first *falsafah* is quite distinct from the *kalam* which preceded it; although it takes pleasure in the rediscovery of Qur'anic texts or ideas, it does not make them a starting point, but follows a method of research independent of dogma, without, however, rejecting the dogma or ignoring it in its sources" underlies this reality although it should be added that both of them begin from and reach to the same ontological reality of monism. Al-Kindi's assertion that revelation and philosophy attain identical truths, albeit in different ways which has been repeated by the following

knowledge concerning the creation of the universe including its parts, both accidents and bodies. The third is a cognizance of the Maker of the universe and His essential attributes. The fourth is to know His eternal attributes; the fifth is to know His names and qualities. The sixth essential is the knowledge of His justice and wisdom. The seventh is the knowledge of His messengers and Prophets. The eighth concerns itself with the knowledge of the miracles of the Prophets and the wonders of the Saints. The ninth is the knowledge of the bases of Islamic Law on which the community is agreed. The tenth is the knowledge of the laws of bidding and forbidding and charging. The eleventh is the knowledge of the inevitable end of every being and his status in the future world. The twelfth is the knowledge concerning the Caliphate and the Imamate and the requirements of the leadership. The thirteenth consists of the principles of Faith and Islam in general. The fourteenth is knowledge of the status of saints and the grades of the pious Imams. The fifteenth is knowledge of the laws bearing on the enemies among the non-believers and the people of erring fancies.(...) They agree on their fundamentals but generally differ regarding some of their derived principles to an extent which does not compel mutual accusations of erring and sinning."(Al-Baghdadi,1935:172)

philosophers too (such as by Ibn Rushd in *Fasl al-Maqal*) is a very significant indication for the fact that their differences are on the methodological sphere rather than on the ontological one.¹ The *falasifah* are in agreement with the *mutakallimun* by theological issues. Therefore a complete break and an ultimate contrast between *Kalam* and *Falsafah* was never occurred.

We can show this fact in details through analyzing the ontological conclusions of the leading members of *Falsafah* and their relations to the Qur'anic antecedents of the Ontological Unity, Transcendancy and Hierarchy. The parallelity among the definitions of Allah of Taftazani, Kindi and Farabi has been mentioned before as an example. When we search in details, the aim of their philosophical analysis is to reach and prove the ultimate reality of the ontological cause. Hence, like the definition of *Ilm ad-Diyn* developed by the theologians as *ashraf al-ulum*, Kindi defines *al-falsafah al-ula* (The First Philosophy) as *Ilm al-Haq al-Awwal allazi huwa illat kulli haq* (1950:98) using the same description, *ilm al-ashraf* (1950:101) for this attempt because the final objective of philosophy is the adequate and sure knowledge of God according to him. Although he has indebted some methodological and theoretical tools from Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic metaphysics, his metaphysics differ from these origins to a great extent. For example, though he benefited from the First Unmoved Mover of Aristotle for the definition of Allah in his treatise *al-Sinaat al-Uzma*², his interpretation of creation based on the theory of *creatio ex nihilo*, *ibda*³ with his own term, opposes radically to these pre-Islamic cosmological evaluations. As Walzer (1957:215) signifies, "al-Kindi the philosopher is in full agreement with the religious view on this issue and differs from all the later Islamic philosophers". The argumentation for the unity of Allah in his treatise *Risala fi Wahdaniyyah*

¹ Craig's (1980:60) summary for the differences between *kalam* and *falasifah* shows this fact in details: "As for the philosophers themselves, they may be distinguished from their theological counterparts, the *mutakallimun*, in several ways : (1) their more systematic use of more technical terms derived from Greek philosophy, (2) their wholehearted endorsement of Aristotelian logic, (3) their study of natural sciences, such as astronomy, physics, chemistry, and medicine, (4) their metaphysical system as a theory of necessary and possible being, (5) their doctrine that God knows particulars insofar as He is the source of their essence and existence and, (6) their insistence that the ethical life can be attained by the guidance of the reason."

²"For God, great is His praise, is the reason and agent of this motion, being eternal (*qadim*), He can not be seen and does not move, but in fact causes motion without moving Himself? This is His description for those who understand Him in plain words: He is simple in that He can not be dissolved into something simpler; and He is indivisible because He is not composed and composition has no hold on Him, but in fact He is separate from the visible bodies, since He... is the reason of the motion of the visible bodies." (Ehwany, 1963:428)

³He defines *ibda* in his treatise *Al-Fail al-Haq al-Awwal* (1950:183), as *t'esis al-aysiyat min laysa* /to produce real things from nothing.

*Allah*¹, is an indicative example both for his meticulousness on the paradigmatic base of Islam, namely the belief of Tawhid and for the parallelity between Kalam and Falsafah especially on the issues related to the ultimate ontological Supreme Being.

Thus, beginning from the first treatises of Islamic philosophy written by Kindi, the members of this school re-evaluated pre-Islamic sources especially Platonic and Aristotelian classics within a new ontological context. This re-valuation is completely different from their transmitted forms in the medieval and modern intellectual traditions of Western history. Even a terminological transformation of pre-Islamic Greek sources has been realized by Muslim philosophers parallel to this imaginative and theoretical re-valuation. For example, following the Qur'anic language, Kindi uses the term "Haqq" meaning Truth for God as the ultimate end of philosophy via substituting Aristo's Prime Unmoved Mover for the Islamic concept of God. That evidence is especially valid in the commentaries of Muslim philosophers to the classics of the pre-Islamic legacy. We can mention at this stage Ibn Rushd's transformation of concepts in his Commentary to Plato's Republic as another example which will be shown in details in the coming lines. It might be argued that such a change has been made by their translators rather than by Ibn Rushd; but it does not change our conclusion that Muslim philosophers understood these sources in accordance with Qur'anic ontological antecedents. Therefore, it might be argued that there are three different types of Platonic and Aristotelian classics: (i) their real and authentic forms; (ii) their re-valuated Islamic forms without deviating towards ontological proximity;² and (iii) their re-invented western forms within the context of the philosophical continuity between christianized and modern versions.

The centrality of the ontological consciousness on beings and its relationship to other spheres of thought and life in Islamic philosophy is one of the most significant characteristics of Islamic philosophy. Farabi is the leading figure of this approach. The internal structures of his famous works are

¹"If it [i.e. the agent of agents] be one, then it must be the Ultimate Agent. If they be many, then the agents of numerous things must always be numerous, and this would involve a regressus ad infinitum, the falsity whereof has become evident [from the proof that nothing can be infinite in actu]. Therefore, the Agent has no agent. If so, there can not be many agents [of creation]. On the contrary, the agent must be One and Non-Multiple, and may He be far above and beyond the imputations of the non-believers." (1950:207; eng. trans. from Shamsi, 1978:194)

²It should not be forgotten either that "the writings of Aristotle entered this new cultural ground via the translation route, and were to some degree colored by the interpretations attached to them in their earlier career" (Peters, 1968:7)

adequate examples for his argument on the dependency of epistemology, axiology and politics to the ontological premises. His two most famous treatises on political philosophy, *Ara Ahl al-Madinah al-Fadilah* (1985:37) and *As-Siyasah al-Madaniyyah* (1964:31) begin with the analysis of the ontological beings within a hierarchical order. The knowledge on *As-Sabab al-Awwal* as the Ultimate Supreme Ontological Being within this hierarchical order¹ (maratib al-wujud) has been presented in the first lines. The epistemological, axiological and political consequences occupy the following parts of these books. As Madkour (1963: I/467) mentions, "al-Farabi's doctrine is so fully harmonious and consistent that its parts are completely inter-related". His classification of virtue is directly attached to this priority of the analysis on the ontological status of beings in his *Tahsil as-Saadah* (1983:49) because "theoretical virtues consist in the sciences whose ultimate purpose is only to make the beings and what they contain intelligible with certainty"(eng. trans. from M.Mahdi; 1962:13). Therefore he argues in *The Scope of Aristotle in the Book of Metaphysics* that "particular sciences restrict themselves to one or several departments of being" while "metaphysics, however, know no such restrictions" because "its field is all reality, namely Being" (Hammond,1947:10).

This Supreme Being is the Absolute One which transcends everything. Hence, his philosophy is entirely theocentric based on ontological hierarchy and differentiation. Although he follows Aristo on many methodological and theoretical issues; he never reached to an understanding of the epistemologically defined ontology such as the modern followers of Aristo in western philosophical tradition. On the contrary his argument on the limitation of human intellect in *The Gems of Wisdom* that "God is knowable and unknowable, evident and hidden, and the best knowledge of Him is to know that He is something the human mind cannot thoroughly understand"(Hammond,1947:19) declares the weakness of the human epistemological sources on the ultimate reality of ontology.

On the other hand, as Hammond (1947:21) underlines, "the proof of an immovable mover by Aristotle, which leads to the conclusion that God is a designer and not a Creator, was improved and corrected by al-Farabi nearly three hundred years before St. Thomas was born. Starting out from the Aristotelian idea of change, al-Farabi was able to arrive at an *Ens Primum* to whom that change is due, while He Himself does not change, because He is pure act". But, his

¹He writes in *As-Siyasah al-Madaniyyah* : "As-Sabab al-Awwal fi al-martaba el-ula" (1964:31)

description of *Al-Awwal* in *Siyasah al-Madaniyyah* reaches to a highly concentrated ontological unity¹, differentiation² and hierarchy.³ Although he has benefited from the Neo-platonic legacy especially related to his idea on the process of creation around the emanationist cosmology (Galston,1977:17), it should be noted that he does not expand this issue of process to the issue of ontological origin; and therefore it did not create any type of ontological proximity in his metaphysical system. His argumentation against the dualistic system of Neo-platonism on the principles of good and evil in *The Sources of Question* ⁴ originated from the dualism of spirit and matter, shows his selective approach to the pre-Islamic sources for the preservation of the principle of Unity. Hence, Hammond (1947:55) is fully right arguing that "there is a unity of thought throughout the philosophy of Alfarabi, who spared no efforts to make the various parts of his philosophical vision converge towards one living God, on Whom the one and the many, being and becoming, are essentially dependent".

The ontological differentiation in the metaphysical system of Ibn Sina has been systematized through the definition of ontological status of "possible beings" as dependent to the "Necessary Being"⁵. His Necessary Being is God, the Creator; and the possible beings are other beings of the world. Ultimately, he reaches to an idea of God who is Eternal as being anterior to the universe and transcendent with respect to it. His concentration on the principle of the Unity of God who is One devoid of all multiplicity together with this idea of

¹"God is only one. For, if there were two gods, they would have to be partly alike and partly different: in which case, however, the simplicity of each would be destroyed.(...) God is one, because He is free from all quantitative divisions. One means undivided. He who is indivisible in substance is one in essence."(eng. trans. from Hammond,1947:26)

²"If there was anything equal to God, then he would cease to be the fullness of being, for fullness implies impossibility of finding anything of its kind. For instance, the fullness of power means inability of finding identical power anywhere else; the fullness of beauty means inability of finding identical beauty. Likewise if the first being possesses the fullness of being, this means that it is impossible to find anyone or anything identical with Him. Therefore, there is one Infinite Being, only One God."(eng. trans. from Hammond,1947:26)

³ "wa amma al-Awwal fa laysa fihi naqs aslan wa la bi wajhi min al-wujuh; wa la yumkin an yakuna wujud akmal wa afdal min wujudihi; wa la yumkin an yakuna wujud aqdam minhu." (1964:42)

⁴"God's providence is exercised over all things. Hence, whatever happens in the world is not to be attributed to chance. Evil is under divine control and is united to corruptible things. That evil exists in the world is good accidentally, because if it did not exist, a great deal of good in the world would never come about."(eng. trans. from Hammond, 1947: 32)

⁵ He defines Necessary Being in his *Ilahiyyat* in *Danish Nama-i Alai* (1973:48) as following: "In Itself, the Necessary Existent can not be united (paiwand) with any cause (sabab). Since its being is necessary in Itself without being caused, Its being can not be due to a cause. Thus, it is not united with any cause. If its being were not necessary without a cause, It would not be Necessary Existent in Itself. The Necessary Existent can not be united with something (bachizi) in a reciprocal union (yak digar)."

transcendancy might be accepted as a re-formulated exegesis of the Qur'anic teaching. His definition of God in his *al-Risalat al-Arshiyyah* verifies this argument.¹

His metaphysical conclusion that the Necessary Being is a being whose essence is identical with His necessary existence as opposed to the distinction between the essence and the existence of the contingent beings aim to show the ultimate unity of God². Hence, Fazlurrahman (1963:I/503) argues that Ibn Sina's attempt is a rejection of atheistic and pantheistic way of thought "because unlike atheism, it requires God who should bestow being upon existents; and in order to avoid pantheism, it further requires that the being of God should be radically differentiated from the being of the world". This idea of God has been interpreted within the context of the connection between metaphysics and ontology because as Nasr (1964a:25) underlines, "everything in the universe, by the very fact that it exists, is plunged in Being; yet, God, or Pure Being, who is the Origin and Creator of all things, is not the first term in a continuous chain and therefore does not have a substantial and horizontal continuity with the beings of the world". The relationship between the transcendancy of God and contingency of the universe as a specific type of ontological differentiation effected Ibn Sina's cosmology and cosmogony.³

The essential teachings of eastern Islamic philosophy that God is a necessary being *per se*, has no associates, and is the creator of everything; that everything besides Him comprises contingent ontological sphere and has emanated from His perfect essence; and that His knowledge of objects is the cause of their coming into being; has been shared by the western Islamic philosophy in Andalusia where the leading figures are Ibn Bajja, Ibn Tufail and Ibn Rushd. We can analyze the fundamental characteristics of this tradition on the subject of the ontological

¹"God is pure actuality. God must have all perfection, since all perfections in the universe come from His essence, and all imperfections must be negated of Him. Since He is perfect, He can have no potentiality to receive anything; His perfection exists in full actuality. He can not have matter, therefore, since matter involves potentiality. Moreover, He must be absolutely one and simple." (Craig, 1980:97)

² For a detailed discussion on Ibn Sina's Essence-Existence distinction might be searched Morewedge's article, "Philosophical Analysis and Ibn Sina's Essence-Existence Distinction".

³ "It is with full consideration of the fundamental ontological distinction between the universe and God that Avicenna turns to a study of cosmology and cosmogony and undertakes to show how the many is brought fourth from the One, who is at the same time transcendent with respect to all multiplicity. But whereas in metaphysics Avicenna's aim is essentially to demonstrate the contingent character of the universe, in cosmology and cosmogony his aim is to delineate the continuity that exists between the Principle and It manifestation." (Nasr, 1964a:29)

unity, differentiation and hierarchy as the paradigmatic base of Islamic intellectual accumulation through outlining Ibn Rushd's arguments.

The fundamental characteristics of Ibn Rushd's theoretical approach and conclusions show us his meticulousness for understanding and defending of the Islamic ontological presuppositions mentioned above. First of all, he always avers the ontological hierarchy basing on the absolute sovereignty of Allah and refrains from any type of the ontological proximity. His definition of metaphysics as "the science which studies the relationship of the different existents as regards their hierarchical order of causes up to the Supreme Cause"¹ (Ibn Rushd,1958:34) is a reflection of his approach within the context of conceptualization. His classification of beings within three categories, like the followers of Kalam, in Fasl (1973:41) and answers to Ghazali on the subject of the eternity are very interesting to show the common paradigmatic base among these schools around the understanding of ontological hierarchy. In this treatise, he argues that their conflict against *mutakallimin* (the followers of Kalam) is a problem of denomination (*tasmiyyah*), rather than an essential one.

His refrainment from any type of ontological proximity and of the particularization of divinity is very clear especially in his commentaries to Plato and Aristotle. The transformation of some concepts in his Commentary to Plato's Republic² does not show only his personal meticulousness for the basis of the Islamic system of belief, but also shows the ontological color given by Muslim philosophers to the pre-Islamic materials. There are two possibilities for such a transformation: (i) these transformation has been made by the first translators and therefore these sources has reached to Ibn Rushd as being transformed; (ii) Ibn Rushd, he himself has changed these concepts. But both of the possibilities do not away with the sensibility of Muslim philosophers on the transmission of the pre-Islamic sources within the framework of the basic Islamic tenets. His sensibility for the purification of Allah might be seen also in his discussion on Good and Evil. He, strictly, rejects the Zoroastrian solution for the argument that evil is caused not by God but by other persons, a devil or demons, underlying that

¹English version is quoted from Sharif,M.M. (1963:I/560)

²f.e., Plato's pure spirits' are replaced by 'angels' in I/xxviii,5 p.174; Plato's 'gods' , 380B and 381B are replaced by 'demons' and 'angels' in I/xi.4, p.260; 'The Delphic Apollo', in 427 B-C, is replaced by 'what the Most High commanded through prophecy', I/xxii.10, p.155, 'gods',in 573 C, is replaced by 'angels' in III/xvii.7,p.240. This transformation emerged perhaps due to the fact that Muslim philosophers were knowing that Arabs in jahilliyyah deified angels and therefore these philosophers has evaluated Greek "gods" as angels because of this traditional experience in the Near East. But these "gods" might be interpreted in Rome as purely polytheistic elements and passed to the western theological and philosophical tradition within such a framework.

such a dualism implies a shortcoming (taqsir) in the Supreme Agent which leads to a specific type of polytheism.¹ When we combine his theoretical explanations for the unicity (I am preferring al-Ahwany's translation for the Arabic term 'wahdaniyyah', 1963: I/549) of Allah in his famous treatise, *al-Kashf* (1964), with this attitude in his commentaries, we can easily say that he tries to refine pre-Islamic sources basing on a new interpretation grounded on the fundamental criterion of the Islamic ontological color. This approach is true, generally, for the members of Islamic falasifah as a whole.

Thus, the paradigmatic base among Islamic schools and sects carries an ontological character, while they differ from methodological and terminological point of view. Ibn Rushd's argument in *Fasl* that the existence of three alternative methodological approach in Islamic intellectual history² does not prevent the ultimate consensus on three fundamental creeds of Islam, (1973:40) namely the Belief in the Unity of Allah (Ontological Principle), the belief in the Prophecy (Epistemological Principle) and the belief in Hereafter (Eschatological Principle), is an illuminating example for our argument. This formulation of the basic creeds of Islam clarifies at the same time the ontological, epistemological and eschatological dimensions and characteristics of this paradigm. These dimensions specify also the axiological framework of the Islamic social thought.

The role of the different methodologies as burhaniyyah, jadaliyyah and khatabiyyah to define of the same ontological reality is a way of the universalization, popularization and generalization process of the same "Divine Truth" ³ according to Ibn Rushd (1973:34). His classification of the alternative methodologies is a very indicating evidence for my argument that the ultimate contrast among Muslim schools and sects is methodological rather than

¹ Ibn Rushd, *Tafsir ma ba'd at-Tabi'ah* - Great Commentary (Tafsir) on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, ed. by M. Bouyges, Beirut: 1938-51, 4 vols./1715; ment. in Hourani G. *Reason and Tradition in Islamic Ethics*, Cambridge:Cambridge Uni. Press; 1985,p.255

² Thus, jadaliyyah (dialectical), khatabiyyah (rhetorical) and burhaniyyah (demonstrative) (Ibn Rushd,1973:41)

³"For every Muslim the Law has provided a way to truth suitable to his nature, through demonstrative, dialectical and rhetorical methods. Since all this is established, and since we, the Muslim community, hold that this division of ours is true, and that it is this religion which incites and summons us to the happiness that consists in the knowledge of God, Mighty and Majestic, and of His creation, that (end) is appointed for every Muslim by the method of assent which his temperament and nature require. For the natures of men are on different levels with respect to (their paths to) assent. One of them comes to assent through demonstration; another comes to assent through dialectical arguments, just as firmly as the demonstrative man through demonstration, since his nature does not contain any greater capacity; while another comes to assent through rhetorical arguments, again just as firmly as the demonstrative man through demonstrative arguments." (English translation from Hourani,1976:49)

ontological or essential. Ibn Rushd's understanding of prophecy within this context is that prophecy embraces of these methodologies¹ for the fulfillment of the Holy Message for the whole humanity from different races, capacity, age, e.t.c. (1973:35).

The metaphysical and mystical parallelity between Falsafahh and Tasawwuf lies in the dialectic of the ontological differentiation and mystical nearness between Allah and man (as a contingent being). Ibn Bajjah, like the followers of Tasawwuf, advises three things to achieve nearness to God: "(i) charge our tongues to remember God and glorify Him, (ii) charge our organs to act in accordance with the insight of the heart, and (iii) avoid what makes us indifferent to the remembrance of God or turns our hearts away from Him"(al-Masumi, 1963:522). Qushairi's (d.465/1072) following statements in connection with the Sufi's relation to God in his very famous classical work, *al-Risalat al-Qushairiyyah*, indicates this psychological and imaginative balance between ontological differentiation and mystical nearness: (i)The first and foremost thing is that one's belief in God should contain no element of doubt; ² (ii) A person's relation to God should be so thorough, comprehensive, and intimate that it would lead him to feel as if he lives and does everything not because he is doing it all, but because God is doing it all; (iii) The Sufi's relation to God is a pure relation in the sense that it is a relation just between him and His God without any material link; (iv) This relation rids man of all occupation with affairs worldly and mundane; (v) The Sufi must regard himself as having been created for nobody and nothing except God"(Hamudiddin,1963:317).

The meticulousness related to ontological differentiation is a common characteristic beginning from the time of Al-Muhasibi (d.243/857) who was one of the significant forerunners of Tasawwuf. His tri-level cosmology in *Kitab al-Ilm* (1983:141) as *hadhihi al-dar*/this world (*dunya*); *dar al-baqa*/the hereafter (*al akhirah*) and Allah/God himself might be a good example on this issue.

¹"Thus since this divine religion of ours has summoned people by these three methods, assent to it has extended to everyone, except him who stubbornly denies it with his tongue or him for whom no method of summons to God the Exalted has been appointed in religion owing to his own neglect of such matters. It was for this purpose that the Prophet, Peace upon Him, was sent with a special mission to 'the white man and the black man alike; I mean because his religion embraces all the methods of summons to God the Exalted. this is clearly expressed in the saying of God the Exalted, 'Summon to the way of your Lord by wisdom [al-hikmah] and by good preaching [al-mawiza al-hasana meaning al-khitab], and debate [al-jadal] with them in the most effective manner'." [Qur'an,xvi:125] (English translation from Hourani,1973:49)

²"Doubt in this context means vagueness about the attributes of God and skepticism regarding His existence. Obviously for the Sufi to avoid this vagueness and skepticism is possible only if he relies on whatever has come down to him by way of the Qur'an and Sunnah." (1963:317)

According to Kalabadhi's (d.380/990) report in his masterpiece *Kitab al-T'aruf li-madhab ahl al-Tasawwuf* (1935:16) on the fundamental doctrines of the followers of Tasawwuf in his time, their doctrine of the Attributes of God¹ was very familiar to the centralist doctrine of Kalam based on the principle of *mukhalafah*. Hence, "the relation between the 'Creator' and the 'Created' is not one of 'Identity', but is definitely that of 'Otherness'" (Valiuddin, 1974:13) in Tasawwuf.² Therefore, it is very difficult to analyze Asharite's transcendency and Sufi immanence in the relationship between God and man within a categorical differentiation because of the fact that Sufis strictly believe on the absolute transcendence of God. In both views God is the Only Absolute Reality whereas universe and soul are dependent and subordinate realities. This point has been expressed in Jami's (d.898/1492) *Lawaih* (1914:21) which is a later treatise on Sufism as following: "When one says that the 'Truth' most glorious comprehends all beings, the meaning is that He comprehends them as a cause comprehends its consequences, not that He is a whole containing them as His parts". As Nasr (1972:146) mentions, "the doctrine of unity, or Tawhid forms the axis of all Sufi metaphysics, and it is in fact the misunderstanding of this cardinal doctrine that has caused so many orientalists to accuse Sufism of pantheism"³. Thus, it differs completely from pantheism within which the ontological relationship based on a relationship of 'identity' and such an interpretation of Tawhid strengthens the imaginative feeling of ontological transcendency and absoluteness because its doctrine claims that there is only One Ontological source and that the universe has no existence of its own apart from the Reality of God.

Al-Ghazali is the person who set up a new balance among Kalam, Falsafahh and Tasawwuf. His works affected the directions and tendencies within these fundamental Islamic schools to a great extent. The process of the

¹"They are agreed that God has real qualities, and that He is qualified by them, these being: knowledge, strength, power, might, mercy, wisdom, majesty, omnipotence, eternity, life, desire, will and speech. These are neither bodies nor accidents nor elements, even as His essences neither body nor accident nor element. They also agree that He has hearing, sight, face, and hand, and reality, unlike hearing, sight, and faces. They agree that these attributes of God, not members or limbs or parts; that they are neither He nor other than He; and that the assertion of their being does not imply that He is in need of them, or that He does things with them."

² Valiuddin expresses this "otherness" as the relationship of The One/The Many; Khaliq (Creator)/Makhluk (Created beings); Rabb (Lord)/Marbub (Slaves); Ilah (The Worshipped)/Maluh (Worshipper); Malik (The Master)/ Mamluk (servants). As he argues, Islamic mysticism solves the problem of the One and Many with the assumption that in existence there is unity but in Essences there is multiplicity.

³"Sufi doctrine does not assert that God is the world but that the world to the degree that it is real can not be completely other than God; were it to be so it would become a totally independent reality, a deity of its own, and would destroy the absoluteness and the Oneness that belong to God alone." (Nasr, 1972:146)

systematization of the paradigm in the sense of the intellectual movement towards the central gravity on the basis of ontological transcendency has almost be completed after him. His critics against Falasifah in his famous *Tahafut al-Falasifah* (1927) has strengthened the feeling of deliberateness in relation with pre-Islamic philosophical background even within this school. From this point of view, Ibn Rushd who lived after Ghazali, is nearer to the center compared with Ibn Sina. The new tendency in Kalam after him, *mutaakhhirin*, became much more nearer to *falasifah* especially in benefiting from the terminological and methodological tools to express theological realities compared with pre-Ghazali Kalam, *mutakaddimin*. His works on *Tasawwuf* had two significant impacts on this school: First they specified the supremacy of sharia upon mystical experience in the sense of the limits of the mystical contemplation¹ and secondly they accelerated the process of popularization of tasawwuf among the masses.

These interconnected impacts are the fundamental origins for his surnames given to him in Islamic intellectual history such as *Hujjat al-Islam* (Proof of Islam), *Zayn ad-Din* (The Ornament of Religion), and *Mujaddid* (The Renewer of Religion). Sharif's (1963) title for the chapters on Ghazali as "The Middle-Roaders" and Obermann's (1921:197) description for his works as "eine Regeneration des Religiösen Gedankens" are fully correct when we think on his critical place in the process of the re-systematization of Islamic paradigm. Repeating Eaton's (1927:vii) judgement for Descartes' place in western thought, we can say Ghazali stands where the streams of Islamic thought meet. The composition of his works is a very clear evidence for this judgment.²

The central characteristics of Islamic paradigm based on the ultimate ontological unity, differentiation and hierarchy has been strengthen as the factors of gravity of mental, ideological and imaginative formation which has social, economic and political reflections, after Ghazali's re-systematization. As

¹ Macdonald's (1899:123) argument that "it fell to al-Ghazali to give tasawwuf a place in the system of Islam" draws attention to this fact.

² His critics to various schools of thought in *Tahafut al-Falasifa* (The Incoherence of the Philosophers; 1927), in *Kitab Fadaih al-Batiniyyah wa Fadail al-Mustazhiriyyah* (The Ignominy of Batiniyyah; 1916), in *Faysal al-Tafrika bayn al-Islam wa az-Zındıqa* (The Decree of the Separation between Islam and heretics; 1986) and in *al-Munqidh min al-Dalal* (The Deliverer from Error) might be accepted as a challenge to the intellectual environment; while he tries to show his own system especially in *Al-Iqtisad fi al-Itqad* (The Moderation in Belief; 1971) and *Ihya al-Ulum ad-Din* (The Revival of the Religious Sciences). *Al Mi'yar al-Ilm* (The Proof of Science; n.d.) and *al-Qistas al-Mustaqim* (The Balance of the Honest; 1983) show his methodological reasoning on theoretical issues. *Mishkat al-Anwar* (The Niche for Lights; 1924) and *Kimya al-Saadah* (The Alchemy of Happiness, 1910) might be mentioned as his two significant books on Tasawwuf.

Shehadi (1964:20-1) clarifies, the classical doctrine of mukhalafah (uniqueness, utter difference) of God in Islamic way of thought has been interpreted by Ghazali in four senses: (i) Absolutely the Only One¹; (ii) Necessarily Unique²; (iii) Absolutely Unlike³; and (iv) Unique in Total Nature⁴. This interpretation depends on the assumption that "God belongs to a unique category of Being"⁵. His differentiation of the stratum of reality as al-wujud al-haqiqi, al wujud al-ilmi and al-wujud al-lisani is attached to this assumption.⁶ That means an ultimate and total rejection of any type of ontological proximity.

Using Watt's analogy it might be said that "in passing from al-Ghazali to the immediately following period there is a sense of passing from bright sunshine to murky obscurity" (1972:125) because of the lack of detailed works on the theological and philosophical leanings and their forerunners apart from Ibn Taymiyyah (d.1328) and Abduh(d.1905). That is perhaps a natural result of the fixed idea that Islamic intellectual history has a significance only because of being a transmitter between ancient classical sources and modern era. Nevertheless, three significant characteristics might be mentioned for post-Ghazali period. First, as I have mentioned earlier, a tendency of synthesis between Kalam, Falsafahh and Tasawwuf has been emerged. Razi's synthesis between Kalam and Falsafahh,⁷ Ibn al-Arabi's great synthesis between Falsafahh and Tasawwuf

¹"If uniqueness is in respect of some particular attribute, then for God to be utterly unique with regard to that attribute means that *of all things only He has that attribute* God is absolutely the Only One who has specified" (1964:20)

²"God is utterly unique in in this second sense could mean that it is *logically impossible* for God not to be unique in the specified respect." (1964:20)

³"God is absolutely unlike anything in any particular respect.(...) God is completely (utterly) different in that the difference is complete. There is not the slightest similarity between Him and other things." (1964:20-1)

⁴"God is unique in all respects pertaining to His Nature. (...) He is different not only in a few respects but in all respects. His total nature is absolutely unlike anything." (1964:21)

⁵This interpretation is very clear in the introductory parts of his *Kawa'id al-Aqaid fi at-Tawhid* : "wa huwa annahu fi zatihi wahid la sharika lahu, fard la mislu lahu, samad la did lahu, wa annahu wahid qadim la awwala lahu, azali la bidayah lahu e.t.c." (1986:123)

⁶Gatje gives a brief summary in his article (1974:161-6) on Ghazali's differentiation of reality (*Seinschichten*) through naming them as *die reale*, *gnoseologische* and *sprachliche Wirklichkeiten*..

⁷ Peters (1968:204) shows this new tendency in comparing the pre-and post-Ghazalian masterpieces of Kalam as following: "If the Mawaqif [of al-Iji] is compared to a work of "middle" kalam like the *Iqtisad* of al-Ghazali or the *Irshad* of al-Juwayni, and then with a relatively primitive document like the *Ibanah* of al-Ashari, the immense distance traversed in the course of those five centuries is immediately apparent. Al-Ashari's work is a thinly disguised credo developing in the direction of the Mu'tazilite problematic. In al-Juwayni and al-Ghazali there are still creedal affinities and the adversarii are still principally the Mu'tazilites. But the hand of Ibn Sina is visible in the new sections devoted to epistemological and metaphysical problems. The Mawaqif is unabashedly a work of metaphysics and natural theology constructed on a Razian (i.e. Avicennan) framework. In al-Iji the triumph of falsafah is completed" But, it should be added to

might be mentioned as two significant attempts within these framework. Ibn Taymiyyah's vitalization of salafiyyah was a reaction against these attempts of synthesis. His critics to mutaakhirin¹ based on a methodological ground because he argued that it is impossible to attain the knowledge of God by rational methods, whether those of philosophy or of philosophical theology. His argument that God should be characterized as He characterizes Himself and as His Prophet characterized Him without similitude, figurization and divesting (bi la tashbih bila tamsil wa bila t'atil)² is a repetition of the centralist approach opposing to the followers of the extremes on the attributes of Allah, namely Muattila and Mushabbihah. I do not want to go in details related to these discussion; but it should be underlined that these discussions did not prevent the process of strengthening and stabilization of the paradigm around the basic principle of the ontological unity, differentiation and hierarchy. On the contrary, they accelerated this process through moving towards the center avoiding from any type of ontological proximity in the sense of t'atil (divesting), tashbih (similitude) and tamsil (figurization).

Thus, the second characteristic is the stabilization of the paradigm on the basis of the Qur'anic ontological color around the fundamental principles of the Ontological Unity, Absoluteness and Hierarchy of Allah. This stabilization created the third characteristic of this period: the concentration of the chief effort of theologians on the the commentaries, super-commentaries and glosses on earlier books and treatises.³ The fundamental thinkers from this period till the modern era aimed to preserve this stabilization. Among them, al-Iji⁴ (d.756/1355), at-Taftazani⁵ (d.1390), As-Sanusi, at-Talamsani⁶ (d.895/1490), Ad-

Peters' judgment that is rather an evolutionary process of a synthesis between Kalam and Falsafah than only a triumph of falsafah.

¹His critics are concentrated especially against ar-Razi. Some of his critics might be found in Kitab al-Asma' wa as-Sifat (1988:169-79).

² A brief summary of his arguments on the Unity and Perfectness of Allah ((1983:21,40 e.t.c.) together with the critics against the followers of Ta'til (1983:19) might be found in his Ar-Risalah al-Akmaliiyyah (1983).

³For example, Brockelmann lists about a dozen commentaries, about thirty glosses and about twenty super-glosses on Aqaid an-Nasafi. (Watt,1972:149)

⁴His famous works are Al-Aqaid al-Adudiiyyah (1984) and Mawaqif. He summarizes Islamic creed in Aqaid while he deals with some philosophical questions in Mawaqif which is a work of metaphysics and natural theology constructed on a Razian (i.e. Avicennan) framework" (Peters,1968:204)

⁵ His commentary on Aqaid an-Nasafi (1950) has been used as the basic textbook in madrasas.

⁶His most famous work is al-Aqaid as-Suġra (1984). This short treatise is a good example for the blending between Falsafah and Kalam in the sense of philosophical theology. As Watt (1972:155) argues,by asserting in his treatise that every believer must know, twenty attributes necessary in respect of God and twenty attributes impossible for Him, even the the average believer is expected to have philosophical sophistication.

Dawwani¹ (d.1501), Muhammad Birgivi² (d.981/1573), Hasan al-Bosnawi³ (d.1025/1016), Al-Laqani⁴ (d.1078/1667), al-Fadali⁵ (1821), al-Gümüshanawi⁶ (1310/1893) might be mentioned as some of the characteristic personalities. Ibn Khaldun, too, as the most sophisticated and productive scholar of post-Ghazali period, preserved this stability of the systematization of the paradigm rather than to discuss it. Hence, M. Fakhri's (1987:257) argument that he followed al-Ghazali rather than Ibn Rushd on theoretical ground, is completely correct.

The ontological relationship between God, man and nature based on the principle of Tawhid is the central issue also for the Muslim scholars and intellectuals of this age, whom faces the second challenge of western civilization. Beginning from al-Afgani's (d.1315/1897) *Answer to Renan and Refutation of Materialists*, all counteractions against this challenge carries the characteristics of a clash between two alternative weltanschauungs, rather than of a pure political competition. As Mahdi (1972:106) mentions, Afgani's basic propositions in these attempts are following: "(i) religion is that which constitutes a nation, a culture, or a civilization, forms its basis and foundation, and provides the most secure bond that holds it together; (ii) The conflict and tension between science or philosophy and religion is embedded in human nature". These propositions has been defended by Afgani in an age of the absolute sovereignty of rationalism over religion. It should not be forgotten that Afgani has Islam in his mind when he speaks on religion. The famous modernist of Egypt, Abduh (d.1323/1905), too, tried to counteract against this challenge through rationalization on methodological sphere without deviating from the principle of Tawhid. His *Risalah al-Tawhid* carries the basic characteristics of the traditional paradigm

¹ He has written philosophical, theological and mystical works as well as commentaries on al-Ijī's and al-Jurjani's books.

² His famous work is *Tariqat al-Muhammadiyah*. He was very influential in socio-political life in his time.

³ He has written a commentary on *Aqidat-Tahawi*.

⁴ His famous work is *Jawhar at-Tawhid* (1984) which has almost the same characteristics of the preceding works.

⁵ His exposition of the Islamic faith of medium length has been translated into English by D.B. Macdonald (1903:315-351). He gives fifty articles in this work related to the belief of God and Prophecy: Twenty of them are necessary in God Most High, twenty are impossible in Him, and one is possible; four qualities are necessary, four impossible and one possible in the case of the Apostles. It is one of the most sophisticated works in later period showing the continuity from the time of al-Ghazali to the modern era.

⁶ His *Jami al-Mutun* (1984) is especially significant to see how this paradigmatic characteristics of Islamic creed has been interpreted by a Sufi leader of *Naqshibandiyah*. It shows also the convergency between *Kalam* and *Tasawwuf* throughout the ages.

mentioned above. His definitions of theology¹ and unity² might be mentioned for the verification of this judgment. These definitions are reflections of his assertion that "Qur'an describes the attributes of God, by and large, with a far surer accent of transcendence than the earlier religions"(1966:31). But, it should be underlined that the methodological rationalization of modernists is time-dependent reflecting the characteristics of their periods.

Iqbal's (d.1357/1938)*The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* is a masterpiece from the perspective of a sophisticated response to the civilizational challenge based on an alternative weltanschauung. Its originality originates from his theocentric interpretation of Absolute Unity in the sense of combination of ontological differentiation, transcendency and nearness (qurbiyyah). From this perspective, it is a modern version of attempts to to compromise the understanding of highly concentrated ontological transcendency and nearness mentioned before. Hence, although Hegelian impact on Iqbal has been mentioned frequently (Raschid,1981:8), but it should not be forgotten that such a way of approach might be found also in the history of Islamic thought especially related to the synthesis of the theological and mystical imaginations. His critics to the cosmological, teleological and ontological arguments³ to the the scholastic philosophy together with his original interpretations on the Spirit of Muslim Culture as an analysis of the *tradition*, are the attempts to open the way for the reconstruction of religious thought in Islam. Therefore, the intellectual and imaginative link between belief, thought and life has ben set up by a dynamic interpretation of Tawhid: "The new culture finds the foundation of world-unity in the principle of Tawhid. Islam, as a polity, is only a practical means of making this principle a living factor in the intellectual and emotional life of mankind. It demands loyalty to God, not to thrones. And since God is the ultimate spiritual basis of all life, loyalty to God virtually amounts to his own ideal nature." (1934:140)

¹"the science that studies the being and attributes of God, the essential and possible affirmations about Him, as well as the negations that are necessary to make relating to Him"(1966:29).

²His definition of Unity is parallel to this understanding of transcendence: "The Necessary Being is One, in His essence, His attributes, His existence and His acts. His essential Unity we have established in the foregoing denial of compositeness in Him, whether in reality or conceptually. That He is unique in His attributes means that no existent is equal to Him therein. (...) Neither do they equal him in the attributes which belong with existence. By His Unity of existence and action we mean His uniqueness in necessity of being and in His consequent giving of being to contingents" (1966:51)

³"Logically speaking, hen the movement from the finite to the infinite as embodied in the Cosmological argument is quite illegitimate; and the argument fails in toto. The teleological argument is no better. (...) the ontological and teleological arguments carry us nowhere." (1934:28-9)

The other efficient Muslim scholars and thinkers of this age such as Said Nursi, Sayyid Qutub and Mawdudi, too, try to set up a direct link between ontological and social imaginations through preserving the traditional paradigm around the Belief of Tawhid. S.Nursi's basic assumption that the fundamental problem of Muslims in this age is the issue of belief; Qutub's identification of Kalimah at-Tawhid with the way of life of Islam in his famous *Milestones* (1978:97); Mawdudi's description of the Holy Names of Allah to underline the link between the Belief of Tawhid and Life in his works -especially in *Four Terms According to Qur'an* (1979); might be mentioned some examples for the continuation of the paradigmatic base around the Belief of Tawhid in our age.

Thus, the conflict and irreconcilability between Islamic and Western civilizations originates from the reality of being based on alternative weltanschauungs. In fact, socio-political resistance among Muslim masses and elites against western way of life and political structures is a social reflection of this clash. Islamic theoretical and imaginative tradition based on Qur'anic ontological color which has been systematized throughout the ages as a very consistent paradigm provides both an internal consistency among methodologically competing Muslim schools and an effective potentiality for the reproduction of social and political imaginations and theories as reflections of this consistent weltanschauung within any new framework of natural and social environment.

(ii) Epistemological Unity of Truth : Harmonization of Knowledge

Three most significant characteristics should be mentioned related to Islamic epistemology: (i) the relationship of dependency between ontology and epistemology which creates an "ontologically determined epistemology"; (ii) differentiation of epistemological levels; (iii) harmonization of epistemological sources to attain the Unity of Truth. In fact, all of these characteristics have theoretically and imaginatively interconnected relationships which form a totalist web of weltanschauung.

The origin of the "ontologically determined epistemology" in Islam should be search in the Qur'anic system of semantics. Even the numbers of the most occurred terms in Qur'an provides us significant indications for this specific link between ontological and epistemological imaginations. The most

occurred six terms -in all their derivations- in Qur'an are *Allah* (2800 times), *qwl* (to say/1700 times) *kwn* (to be/1300 times), *Rabb* (950 times), *amn* (888 times) and *'ilm* (to know/750 times). Following four terms from within the 450-550 occurrences are *aty* (to come), *kfr* (to deny), *rsl* (to send messenger) and *'ar'd* (earth).¹ These terms form a web of meaning which specifies the ontological differentiation between Allah and the other beings in the sense of *kawn* as well as the origins and types of relationship between Allah and human being as a specific communication of *qwl-rsl-'ilm* [Allah-man]/*amn-kfr* [man-Allah]. The etymological kinship among *'ilm* (knowledge), *'alam* (sign,mark) and *'âlam* (world) is another interesting clue for this dependency between ontological and epistemological imaginations.² Al-Baghdadi's³ definition of *'âlam* as "as everything that has knowledge and sense perception", az-Zamakhshari's definition of *'âlam* as "the totality of bodies (substances) and accidents of which the Creator has knowledge" are examples of the kinship between *'ilm* and *'âlam*; while al-Juwayni's sets up a semantic link between *'alam* and *'âlam* through defining *'âlam* as "an indication set up to indicate the existence of the owner of the *'âlam*" who is Allah.⁴ It should not be forgotten that one of the Beautiful Names of Allah is *'Alim*.⁵ Thus, within the framework of this semantic system, it is impossible to separate the context of knowledge from the context of being. Therefore, the definition, origin and categorization of knowledge in Islamic intellectual history has directly been attached to the ontological antecedents.

The highly differentiated ontological hierarchy mentioned above necessitates a differentiation on epistemological levels, so that the *al-'ilm min Allah* (the knowledge from Allah) can not be interpreted on the same epistemological level as the knowledge of man. Such a differentiation of epistemological levels forms a strong internal consistency with the principles of Tawhid and Tanzih as the bases of *Aqaid* (tenets of faith) because Allah as the Absolute Knower (*'Alim*) is the origin of knowledge. This differentiation of epistemological levels has been supported by a doctrine of *gayb* (Invisible, Unseen) in Qur'anic system, because it has been revealed that "with Him are the keys of

¹I have taken the numbers from F.Rosenthal (1970:19-20) except *amn* which I have counted from Abdulbaqiy (1984:81-93) *al-M'ujam al-Mufahras li alfa'z al-Quran al-Karim*.

²look to Isfahani's *Müfredat* (1921: 344-345) for this etymological kinship.

³al-Baghdadi gives in his *Usul ad-Din* (1981:34) other definitions supporting especially to those of setting up semantic link between *'alam* and *'âlam*, like al-Juwayni.

⁴F. Rosenthal (1970:19) gives a brief summary on the discussions on this kinship.

⁵f.e. "Say: Our Lord brings us all together, then He will judge between us with Truth, He is the All-knowing Judge." (34:26); "And with Him are the keys of the invisible. None but He knoweth them. And He knoweth what is in the land and in the sea. Not a leaf falleth but He knoweth it, not a grain aid the darkness of the earth, naught of wet or dry but (it is noted) in a clear record." (6:59)

the invisible and none but He knoweth them"(6:59). Therefore, a relationship of co-penetration among these levels is impossible. The application of different sets of criteria for each epistemological level prevents the development of common criteria which could be applied for both levels so that a secular base for anthropocentric epistemology could emerge. Al-Muhasibi's correlation between ontological and epistemological levels to systematize the categorization of knowledge is a very indicative example for the relationship of the dependency between ontological and epistemological differentiation.¹ In his system, each kind of knowledge is oriented to one of the three levels of reality in his tri-level cosmology. Al-Baghdadi's categorization of knowledge as divine and animal knowledge within a hierarchical framework, might be mentioned as another example of the systematization of this principle of epistemological differentiation on behalf of theologians.²

Ibn Rushd's interpretation on the interconnection between ontological and epistemological differentiation is clear enough to exemplify our argument of "the ontologically determined epistemology" in Islam. His argument that human knowledge must not be confused with divine knowledge because of their essential differences and that "true knowledge is the knowledge of God"(Ibn Rushd,1973:49) shows the epistemological differentiation and hierarchy as a result of strict ontological hierarchy in Islamic way of thought. This understanding prevents the formation of the common criterion for, both, the human and divine

¹"He (Muhasibi) relates three kinds of knowledge to a tri-level cosmology: *hadhihi al-dar* or this world (*dunya*); *dar al-baqa* or the hereafter (*al-akhirah*); and Allah or God Himself. (...) The first knowledge is external in nature, appropriate to this world, and related to the law and its application. On this basis the first kind of knowledge is external. The second kind is an inner knowledge which results in *ibadah al-qulub* or *ibadah al-batiniyyah*. (...) The third knowledge, relative to God Himself, is *al ilm bi-Allah wa ahkamihi* (or *tadbirihi*) *fi khalqihi fi al-darain*. This final kind of knowledge is scarcely mentioned since it is ultimately impenetrable." (1983:132,Librande's intr.)

²"There are two kinds of knowledge: (a) divine knowledge, which is absolute, and (b) animal knowledge, which is of two kinds: natural, primary ('*daruri*'), and acquired, secondary (*muktasab*). Natural knowledge again is of two kinds: direct and sensual. The former is again two kinds: positive such as self-consciousness of feelings of pain, delight, hunger etc.; and negative, such as the knowledge that the absurd is absurd, that one thing cannot be eternal and temporal, that one person cannot be dead and alive at the same time. Sensual knowledge is that which is supplied by the senses. Acquired knowledge (also called *na'zari*, i.e. based on discursive reason) is also two kinds: the first is based on reason ('*ql*') the second on the law (*shari'a*). It might be shown as a table as following. (Wensinck,1932:253).

A. Divine Knowledge			
B. Animal Knowledge			
B1. Natural		B2. Acquired	
B11. Direct	B12. Sensual	B21. Reason	B22. Law
B111. Consciousness	B112. Logic		

knowledge, which might be the first stage for the secularization of knowledge. Islamic way of thought depends on this specific link between ontology and epistemology through the understanding of prophecy (*nubuwwah*): "What the religious laws in our time think of this matter is what God wills. The only way to know what it is that God wills in respect of them is [through] prophecy. If you investigate the laws, this knowledge is divided into abstract knowledge alone - such as our religious laws commands regarding the perception of God- and into practice, such as the ethical virtues it enjoins". (Ibn Rushd, 1966:185) This understanding of *nubuwwah* is his one of the characteristic differences from Plato in his Commentary to Republic. Rosenthal's evaluation that "the difference in religious thought between a Muslim and a Greek is the difference between Revelation and Myth" (Rosenthal, E., 1951:274) is an exact conclusion from this perspective. Ibn Rushd's criticism of Plato because of being confused through the tales of the mythology and exclusion some parts of Republic from his commentary (Ibn Rushd, 1966:251) is an evident example for this contrast between Islamic revelation and Greek myth.

The principal difference between *nas* (incontrovertible proof) and *ijtihad* (intense exertion to arrive at a rule of law) on axiological sphere can only be understood from the perspective of the differentiation of the epistemological levels in the Islamic prescriptivist methodology of *Fiqh* (jurisprudence). The attempts at reforming Islam through transforming the rules of Islamic jurisprudence can not be successful in the long run due to the fact that the internal consistency of Islam which is based on this differentiation of ontological and epistemological levels could very easily eliminate those *ijtihad*s which conflict with *nas* as the ultimate source of *fiqh*. The strong resistance of Muslims to pyramidal and superstructural reformation attempts should be evaluated within the context of the ontological-epistemological dimension of Islam.

This internal consistency between Islamic ontology and epistemology has been brought to completion with the ideas of the revelation and mission of prophecy. The classifications on the causes of knowledge in Islamic theology¹ assumes an absolute priority to wahy (revelation) which is "the narrative of the Messenger aided by an evident miracle, and it brings about deductive knowledge, and the knowledge established by it resembles the knowledge established by

¹"The causes of knowledge for all creation are three: the sound senses, true narrative and Reason." (Taftazani, 1950:15).

necessity in certainty and in fixity" (Taftazani,1950:15). The collections of the true knowledges of this specific cause are the books of Allah: "Allah has books (kutub) which He has sent down by His prophets, and in them He has shown His positive commands and His prohibitions, His promise (wa'd) and His threat (wa'id)"(Taftazani,1950:135). Qur'an as the last and most complete source of revelation originated from the Divine Knowledge of the Absolute Alim, constitutes the top of the epistemological hierarchy. As Nieuwenhuijze (1985:41) mentions, to Islam revelation is an ongoing, in the sense of repetitive, proposition. It accompanies mankind throughout its existence, from Adam to Muhammed (S.A.V.). Thus, the prophets form a spiritual brotherhood. Therefore, in many traditions Muhammed (S.A.V.) talks about other prophets as his brothers. Qur'an insists on the continuity and consistency of revelation arguing that "every scriptural revelation in its pristine purity was in essence Islam"(3:66,78-9; 4:64;27:25-9;42:13) and "we make no distinction between any of them"(2:136,285;3:33,83).The victory by the supporters of the argument that the *Qur'an* is the *Kalamullah* (Word of Allah) against the members of the *Mutazilah* who were arguing that the Qur'an is a creation of Allah, strengthened the link between ontology and epistemology in preserving this epistemological differentiation.

The concept of the Prophet as a messenger -not as a hero, a semi-divine being, an avatar or Son of God- together with this interpretation of the *Qur'an* as *Kalamullah* has strengthened the tendency towards a differentiation of ontological and epistemological levels. In comparisons between Islam and Christianity, it should not be forgotten that in Islam Kalamullah is scriptural revelation in the form of Qur'an while in Christianity Jesus himself. This fundamental difference effected both ontological and epistemological consequences in these religious traditions. The place of Prophet in the channel of communication through revelation has been specified very clearly by Qur'an : "Say: The knowledge is with Allah only, and I am but a plain warner."(67:26) This Qur'anic specification has been repeated by the followers of Kalam as "in sending of messengers there is a wisdom, and Allah has sent Messengers of mankind to mankind announcing good tidings, and warning, and explaining to people what they need (to know) of the matters of this world and of the judgement" (Taftazani,1950:127).

Another significant assumption related to this issue is the rejection of ultimate conflict between these epistemological levels. All Muslim scholars and

philosophers try to show and keep the balance between revelation as the source of Absolute Truth and the reason as the means of the interpretation of the revelation. From this perspective, scriptural revelation delineates the scope, function, and limitations of different sources of knowledge. As a natural result of this fundamental principle of the harmonization of knowledge, it has been accepted that "false consciousness and unfair rationalizations are not the product of pure reason and pseudo-religions alone"(Husaini,1980:7). As an extension of Ontological Unity, the possibility of an ultimate contradiction between revelation and pure reason has been denied by almost all Muslim schools, through assuming that the Unity of Truth originated from the Absolute Unity of Divinity. They have insisted strongly on a complementary, rather than competitive, relationship between revelation and pure reason. Kindi, as the founder of falsafah¹, is the champion of this understanding of the harmonization of the sources of knowledge arguing that "knowledge produced by the true prophet is identical with that produced by the competent philosopher" (Hitti,1968:192). Ibn Tufayl's masterpiece Hayy Ibn Yaqzan (1905) is one of the best examples of the attempts to show complementary relationship between revelation and reason.¹ He concludes this treatise asking from God the true and certain knowledge of Himself.² Such a conclusion implicitly assumes the epistemological hierarchy which presupposes the supremacy of Divine Knowledge like the classification of Baghdadi as the leading figure of Kalam. On the other hand, Ibn Hazm's argument in his Al-Milal wa al-Nihal that "that the Qur'an is true is known from true premises founded on reason and sensation, the only true bases of knowledge. When God gives a revelation, He creates in the recipient knowledge of its truth" (Tritton,1965:620) shows the place of reason as a means to prove the truth of revelation as well as the harmonization of these sources. Al-Ashari's following judgement (1953b: 95t.,131) tries to guarantee the preservation of this fundamental principle of the harmonization of the epistemological sources in the cases of the difficulty on the intellectual harmonization of the epistemological sources : "When new and specific questions pertaining to the basic dogmas arise, every Muslim ought to refer judgement on them to the sum of principles accepted on the ground of reason, sense experience, intuition, etc. , not confounding the rational with the traditional (revealed), or the traditional (revealed) with the rational."

¹"And when he understood the condition of mankind, and that the greatest part of them were like brute beasts, he knew that all wisdom, direction and good success, consisted in what the messengers of God had spoken, and the Law delivered; and that there was no other way besides this, and there could be nothing added to it (...)" (1905:68)

²"And I beg of God pardon and forgiveness, and that He would please us the true and certain knowledge of Himself, for he is gracious and liberal of His favors." (1905:69)

Thus, epistemology has been limited and determined by ontological antecedents in the Islamic way of thought. Such a relationship between ontological and epistemological presuppositions necessitates an understanding of the Unity of Truth via harmonization of the sources of knowledge. This theocentric ontology and this epistemology are the bases of the paradigmatic unity in the accumulated bulk on Islamic theory. Even conflicting theological and philosophical schools agree on this principle of ontological transcendency and on the evaluation of Islamic epistemology based on this fundamental principle. The specification of the places of reason and sensation together with revelation¹ in Islamic intellectual history to attain the ultimate truth prevented the segmentation of epistemological sources based on the assumption of the ultimate contrast, such as in the history of western epistemological tradition.

(iii) Axiological Normativeness: Unity of Life and Law

The genuine core of the comprehensive totalist system of Islam is the interconnected relationship among ontological, epistemological and axiological imaginations. Islamic value system is directly attached to the ontological and epistemological premises mentioned above. Therefore, the fundamental key concept of Qur'anic value system, *amal as-salih* (good work-ethics) constitutes an indivisible unity with the other key-concepts of *iman* (faith,ontology) and *'ilm* (knowledge-epistemology).

The fundamental characteristic of Islamic axiological normativeness is its interpretation of man's responsibility on earth which forms the imagination of the unity of life and law through preventing any type of the compartmentalization of different sections of life. Islamic new morality has been directly attached to the ontological antecedents via specification of man's place in the universe as the basic element for the divine responsibility. Man who had not been created except to serve Allah (51:56) has a specific responsibility

¹ The supremacy of reason as an epistemological source in certain specific cases has been accepted even in religious issues. Al-Iji's argument in *Mawaqif* that "to put revelation above reasoning is to abolish a general rule for a special case", that "if reason and revelation conflict, reason is to be preferred; and revelation, if it is *mutashabih*, must be allegorized" and that "knowledge based on a report must be confirmed by reason" (Tritton,1965:628) must be mentioned as some examples on this issue.

(amanah) on earth according to Qur'an: "Lo, we offered the thrust unto the heaven and the earth and the hills, but they shrunk from bearing and were afraid of it. And man assume it..."(33:72) Born with innocence, human being is capable to fulfill this responsibility because "Allah does not charge a person with more than he can bear"(2:286). As von Grünebaum (1970:11) clarifies in comparison with Christianity "Obedience to the Lord, fulfillment of His order justified the individual existence, the more so that no inner rent called for atonement and redemption- the Muslim was a man without original sin, in need of guidance, but not of reparation".

Hence, Islamic understanding on man's moral responsibility has been connected directly to his ontological place in the universe. Therefore, for example Fakhraddin al-Razi begins to his treatise on moral philosophy, *Kitab an-Nafs wa ar-Ruh* with clarification of man's degree (martaba) in the maratib al-mawjudat (hierarchy of ontological beings). He divides ontological beings in four groups according to their possessions and tendencies.¹ Man as a distinctive being compared with others (angels, animals and plants) because of possessing *aql* (reason) and *hikmah* (wisdom) and of having tendencies of *tabi'ah* (nature, disposition) and shahwah (desire), has moral responsibility.

This understanding of divinely based moral responsibility results in an ultimate unity of life. This indivisibility of life into competing sectors has been supported by a vision of eschatology which assumes a relationship of continuity between this and next worlds. Ghazali's (1910:43-4) analogy and statement makes this point evident: "this world is a stage or market-place passed by pilgrims on their own way to the next. (...) While man is in this world, two things are necessary for him: first, the protection and nurture of his soul; secondly, the care and nurture of his body. The proper nourishment of the soul is the knowledge and love of God, and to be absorbed in the love of anything but God is the ruin of the soul. The body, so to speak, is simply the riding -animal of the soul, and perishes while the soul endures." This way of approach is fully consistent with Qur'anic eschatology which assumes this world as a place for preparation to the hereafter : "Whoso desireth the life of this world and its pomp, we shall repay them their deeds herein. and therein they will not be wronged.

¹He divides (1978:178) beings into four groups: (i) those possessing *aql* and *hikmah* but not having *tabi'ah* and shahwah : angels; (ii) those not possessing *aql* and *hikmah*, but having *tabi'ah* and shahwah: animals; (iii) those not possessing *aql* and *hikmah* and not having *tabi'ah* and shahwah: plants; (iv) those possessing *aql* and *hikmah* and having *tabi'ah* and shahwah: human being.

Those are they for whom is naught in the Hereafter save the Fire. All that they contrive here is vain and (all) that they are wont to do is fruitless."(11:15-16) Such an imagination of the unity of life together with such an eschatological perspective is absolutely alternative to the imaginative bases of secularization of life and law.

This imagination of the unity of life as opposed to the secular divisibility of the sectors of life and this divinely based moral responsibility provides theoretical and imaginative bases for the highly concentrated axiological normativeness in Islamic intellectual and social history. Political and economics mechanisms, applications and institutions could be justified only through their role in the process of the realization of this axiological normativeness. Therefore, they never has been imagined as independent sectors of life existing on their own. That fundamental difference compared with the secularization of life in western experience, will be held in the following chapters, but it should be underlined at this stage that axiological normativeness in Islam plays the role of channel between ontological-epistemological antecedents and socio-political and socio-political mechanisms. The superiority of the Islamic all-embracing jurisprudence (Fiqh) could not be understood omitting the role this imaginative channel. Hence, prescriptivism has been supported by a very consistent normativism and this is the characteristic which provides strong resistance among Muslim elites and masses against the process of westernization based on a counter-prescriptivism of western way of life emerged from an understanding of the divisibility of the sectors of life.

The interpretations on the aim of life developed by *faqih*s (jurists), *falasifah* (philosophers) and *mutakallimun* (theologians) intersect on this fundamental issue. Quranic norm-centric structure is the prerequisite of the prescriptivistic parts of the supreme law. Law is directly attached to this value system, while social mechanism and institutionalization is expected to be determined by the interconnected sphere of this axiological normativeness and prescriptivism. The aim of life is the realization of these values in whole parts of life. Law, itself, and the institutional mechanisms as the social consequences of the application of this law are only the means for the realization of the sovereignty of this value system. Even very detailed mechanisms has been attached to this value system and its ontological antecedents. Al-Khazini's *Kitab Mizân al-'Hikmah* (Book of the Balance of Wisdom) is an excellent example to show these imaginative and theoretical channels. The essential aim of this book

is to explain how the mechanism of the water-balance works.¹ But it begins with a very sophisticated part on the philosophy of justice and its relationship to the the cosmic balance under the control of the absolute sovereignty of Allah together with its ontological and epistemological reflections: "Justice is the stay of all virtues, and the support of all excellencies. For perfect virtue, which is wisdom in its two parts, knowledge and action, and in its two aspects, religion and the course of the world, consists of perfect knowledge and assured action; and justice brings the two (requisites) together. It is the confluence of the two perfections of that virtue, the means of reaching the limits of all greatness and the cause of securing the prize in all excellence. In order to place justice on the pinnacle of perfection, the Supreme Creator made Himself known to the Choicest of His servants under the name of the Just; and it was by the light of justice that the world became complete and perfected, and was brought to perfect order -to which there is allusion in the words of the Blessed: « by justice were the heavens and the earth established » "(1860:3-4). His connection this understanding of justice to the power of 'self-government' as an ethical quality² and to the Holy Book as a supreme canon³ shows the intersected channels among ontological, epistemological and axiological premises and how a specific weltanschauung leads to a totalistic unity of life and law via a specific prescriptivism directed by normativism. The veiled assumption of such an approach is that all mechanisms might be controlled only by a very well defined morality based on an axiological normativism. Thus, «the value of a norm» cannot be determined by the mechanism itself; on the contrary the mechanism might be controlled only by a supreme normativism based on a specific ontologico-epistemological source. Al-Khazini's work is only a typical example of this approach on a comparatively detailed issue. It might be extended to whole Islamic intellectual tradition. As it will be discussed in following chapters, this characteristic has significant reflections on socio-political imagination, theory and culture.

¹This book is also very significant from the perspective of the history of science in Islamic civilization because of its importance on the subjects of static and hydrostatic.

²"Justice in action is two-fold: 1.self-government, which is the harmonizing of the natural endowments, the maintenance of equilibrium between the powers of the soul, and the bringing of them under beautiful control- agreeably to the saying : "the most just of men is he who lets his reason arbitrate for his desire" and it is a part of the perfection of such a man dispenses justice among those inferior to himself, and wards off from others any injury which he has experienced, so that men are secure as to his doing evil. 2. control over others(...)"(1860:5)

³"... the Glorious Book of God, which , from the beginning to end, is without any admixture of error, is the supreme canon, to which both legal rules and doctrinal principles refer back, the arbiter between the Suprememinent and the subject creature, to which the tradition of the Blessed Prophet is the sequel"(1860:6)

Qur'anic ethical structure based on opposed categories as the classes of positive and negative moral properties (Izutsu,1966:105) and their connections to the basic dichotomy of believer and unbeliever, forms an imagination of human life as a dynamic circle between being of the best stature (a'hsani taqwm) and the lowest of the low (asfala sâfilin) (95:4-5). Thus, Qur'an offers an ethical set of norms for the perfection of human being who was created by Allah of the best stature. The attainment of happiness in Islamic theory of ethics constitutes a consistent totality with Islamic law from this perspective: The perfection of human being might be attained through the attainment of sa'âdah¹ which is directly dependent to the realization of Qur'anic positive moral properties under the protection of a comprehensive law. Therefore, the Islamic Divine Law has unique characteristics compared with other systems of law as legal codifications. It is a theoretical and imaginative consequence of the specific ontological, epistemological and axiological framework.² The 'Hanafi definition of Fiqh as "the science of law is the knowledge of the rights and duties whereby man is enabled to observe right conduct in this life, and to prepare himself for the world to come" connotes the dependency of law to the unity of life within this consistency. Hence, its legal codes are only meaningful within this framework and a total particularization of this structure such as in the case of the process secularization of law in western experience is impossible. As Santillana (1965:288) mentions, "submission to this law is at the same time a social duty and a precept of faith; whosoever violates it, not only infringes the legal order, but commits a sin, because there is no right in which God has not share. Judicial order and religion, law and morals, are the two aspects of that same will, from which the Muslim community derives its existence and its direction; every legal question is in itself a case of conscience, and jurisprudence points to theology as its ultimate base." The prescriptivistic dimensions and sources of Islamic law have been determined by Muslim jurists according to this fundamental characteristic.³ Schacht's (1964:1) description of Islamic law as the epitome of Islamic thought and as the most typical manifestation of the Islamic way of life is correct from this perspective.

¹ As I have clarified in second chapter, I intend its widest sense in Islamic philosophico-theological tradition, when I use Sa'âdah; rather than happiness only.

²"The nature of this (Islamic) brotherhood grouped round the symbol of faith and governed by God, determines the conception of law. Law, according to the ancients and ourselves, is the legal norm approved by the people, directly or through the organs that represent them, and drives its authority from the reason and will of man, and his moral nature. The Muslim conception is quite different. "(De Santillana,1965:288)

³Look Shafi'i's al-Risalah (1961) for this systematization.

The interpretations on the objective of Shari'a reflects this comprehensive axiomatic base of Islamic Law. We might analyze Ibn Rushd's explanation as a typical example. The objective of *Shari'a* (Religion) has been defined by Ibn Rushd as to obtain *al-'ilm al-haq w-al-'amal al-haq*.¹ As Al-Ahwany (1963:I/545) mentions, this judgement "reminds us the definition of philosophy given by al-Kindi, which remained current all through Islamic philosophy". This definition embraces the theoretical and imaginative channels between ontology, epistemology, and axiology. *Al-'ilm al-haq* directed by *nubuwwah* as the fundamental epistemological source specifies *al-amal al-haq* guaranteed by *Shari'a* through a specific axiological normativeness. The contrast between Islamic *Shari'a* and Platonic *Nomos* in his *Commentary to Republic* is especially meaningful within this context. *Shari'a* as the expression of the will of God shows the Highest Good of man and his end as rational being because He alone knows the obstacles that prevent man from attaining happiness. Its supremacy and perfection over man-made laws consists in its epistemologically divine character, according to Ibn Rushd. This is another dimension of Islamic paradigm accepted by several Muslim sects and schools. As Rosenthal (1953:261) mentions, "Ibn Rushd should give the same definition of prophecy and prophets and make the same assertion about the *Shari'a* in an admittedly philosophical treatise², written in defence of the falasifah against al-Ghazzali's attack upon them"

His presupposition that the philosopher aims at knowledge identical with that which God demands in the *Shari'a* shows 'parting of the ways' between Islamic *hikmah* and Greek philosophy. But, this parting on ontological ground does not prevent the attempts of the members of Islamic *hikmah* to find out methodological, terminological and axiological reconciliation without distorting this ontological color. Rosenthal's argument (1953:261) that the aim of the *Shari'a* is identical with that of Political Science as defined by Aristotle in the *Nicomachean Ethics* and repeated by Al-Farabi in his *Kitab Tahsil al-Sa'adah* and by Ibn Rushd in his *Commentary on Plato's Republic*, should be evaluated within this context. The essence of the happiness as the purpose of *Shari'a* and philosophy should not be confused with the technique applied for the analysis of this aim. As Leaman (1980:170) concludes, "Ibn Rushd used the same technique

¹ The true knowledge (theory) and the true practice. FasI, p.49

² "...Ghazali himself has drawn attention in another place, namely the act which proceeds from that quality through which the prophet is called prophet, that is the act of making known the mysterious and establishing religious laws which are in accordance with the truth and which bring about acts that will determine the happiness of the totality of mankind." (Ibn Rushd, 1978:316)

which Aristotle employed to combine social with intellectual virtues in his account of happiness, but in the case of Islamic philosopher, happiness was discussed in relation to religious and intellectual virtues".

The contrast the elitist interpretation of happiness formulated by *falasifah* and the general validity of *Shari'a*¹ has been eliminated by Ibn Rushd through popularization of happiness based on his thesis that the *Shari'a* is required by everyone, but philosophy is not. He defines happiness² as an action belonging to the rational soul <performed> with virtue. (Ibn Rushd, 1966:188) His classification of the perfections³ aims to show that the human perfections are more than one.

Thus, the holistic structure of Islamic law around the basic principle of the unity of life and its general validity originates from the highly sophisticated axiological normativeness which has been supported by ontological and epistemological antecedents as a comprehensive *weltanschauung* based on the belief of Tawhid. Axiological Normativeness constitutes the third fundamental dimension of Islamic paradigm shared by almost all Muslim schools and sects, in addition to Ontological Unity and Epistemological Harmonization.

¹"Ibn Rushd's discussion of the relationship between happiness and philosophy solved a problem in Islamic social philosophy which bedeviled the *falasifah*. (...) The problem originates with Plato and his assertion that theoretical reason *sophia*, is the highest activity of man, and man's happiness lies in the exercise of reason. (...) This Platonic doctrine created the problem with which Ibn Rushd was confronted, which is that it seems at the very least arguable that one has to be a philosopher to know how to do good, or to achieve happiness. This difficulty in Plato's ethics struck the *falasifah* particularly clearly, since they held that the Qur'an contains the whole of the knowledge of the content of morality." (Leaman, 1980:167)

²The definition of happiness is a critical issue among the members of the *falasifah*. "Cf. Nic. E. 1.7. 11098a with Averroes' Commentary, 5a. Alfarabi, on the other hand, defines happiness as the perception of the *Intelligibilia* with the help of the Active Intellect in his k. al-siyasa, 43.11ff, 44.19ff, 45.8-15 he discusses the highest purpose of man. Cf. also k. tahsil al-sa'ada, 38.12ff on philosophy and utmost happiness. Ibn Bajja follows him in his *tadbir al-mutawahhid*, *risalat al-wada'* and *ittisal al-aql bi-l-insan* in his treatment of happiness. For our passage cf. further Nic. E. x.6 1176 to 1177a and 7.1178a with Averroes' Commentary, 74b-75a and 75b" Rosenthal's note (Ibn Rushd, 1966:275)

³"The perfections are thus fourfold: speculative virtues, practical arts, intellectual and ethical virtues (Ibn Rushd, 1966:189)

PART III
POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES

Chapter 4

THE PROBLEM OF JUSTIFICATION OF THE SOCIO-POLITICAL SYSTEM: COSMOLOGICO-ONTOLOGICAL FOUNDATION

Political ideas and theories, like all other ideals, can be justified only through appealing to some sort of norm as comprehensive set of intrinsic values -a part of a complete way of thought, a *weltanschauung* comprising cosmological, ontological, epistemological and eschatological presuppositions. The attempts to justify the state as a socio-political institution in contrasting Islamic and Western political theories give us significant clues for our argument.

We can analyze and compare these attempts in two groups; namely justification through the argument on the origin of the state as a socio-political system and justification through the arguments on the aims of the state as a socio-political institution. The interesting link between ontology, axiology and politics is clearly related to the problem of justification. From this perspective, "God-centered" Islamic political justification and "nature-centered" Western political justification are two alternative ways of justification, depending on different theoretical and philosophical backgrounds.

I- WESTERN WAY OF JUSTIFICATION :

Two ancient bases of Western attempts at the justification of the state as a socio-political system are the Aristotelian methodology and the Stoic ethics. Aristotle, as the founder of the "realistic Justification" depending on empiricism, might be accepted as the forerunner of the modern "state of nature" and "social contract" theories for the justification of the state through speculations on its origin. Aristotle's political philosophy has been directly related to his epistemological approach which is parallel to his cosmological-ontological arguments. In the epistemological sense, his empiric methodology was aimed at understanding the mechanism of the actuality of the cosmological teleology rather than at developing speculations on the ontological origins of potentialities. Therefore he defines the concept of an "unmoved mover" as a part of cosmological actualities, not as a transcendental Creator of all cosmological

substances. This central position of empiric epistemology became one of the fundamental characteristic of the way of justifications throughout the ages, not only for the political justification but all types of justifications. The central idea of modern empiricism that "if there is to be such a thing as justification at all, empirical knowledge must be seen as resting on experiential "foundations" (Williams, 1980:243) is the modern version of such a historical legacy.

Aristotle's empiricism in political theory might be accepted as a continuation of this epistemological attitude to ontology. His affinity to the actualities of the cosmos on an ontological level and to the political actualities on a social level have the same epistemological tool, namely empiricism. This empiric epistemology is a delicate channel from an ontological to a political sphere. He ascended to an unmoved mover by observing moved and perishable substances and depended on motion as a fundamental cosmological reality. Using the same methodology in his political analysis, he reached an understanding of the "best practicable state" through observing several political structures and constitutions based on political actualities. Therefore we can say that the understanding of the "first unmoved mover" and the "best practicable state" are two reflections on the ontological and political spheres both using the same epistemological and methodological tool.

1-The origin of the socio-political system:

Bluntschli (1901:283-302) classifies the speculative theories on the theory of state in five categories: (i) the state of nature; (ii) the state as a divine institution; (iii) the theory of force; (iv) the theory of contract and (v) the natural sociability and political consciousness of man. These speculative approaches are, at the same time, the foundations for the justification of the socio-political system from the perspective of its origin. Especially the theories on the state of nature and on the social contract are the most significant ways for the modern versions of the justification because the others might be reduced to these interpretations. On the other hand, as it will be held, the justification of the state through the arguments of being a divine institution, should not be confused with the Islamic paradigm of the unitarianism between ontological and political spheres due to the fact that western divine justification presupposes the categoric differentiation of the authority those of state and of church. On the contrary to the Islamic case which strictly unifies ontological and religious imaginations; the argument of the justification of the state through the assumption of a divine

institution has been developed and used by the secular authorities to attain their independence from the supreme authority of the Church. This process will be analyzed in Chapter 7, to show its impact on the formation of the nation-state system as a radically opposed way of political to the Islamic case of ummah.

The theories on the state of nature to justify the existence of the state as a socio-political system, are very indicative to express the political consequences of the western paradigm analyzed in Chapter 2. As Bluntschli (1901:283) summarizes, this philosophical speculation is fond of imagining a primitive condition in which men lived without government, and then asking how from that condition mankind has arrived at the State. This state of nature has been imagined by some of the philosophers as a state of war and as a golden age of Paradise by some of the others. The leading figure of the first argumentation is Hobbes whose *nouva scienza* of man and State is "the first peculiarly modern attempt to give a coherent and exhaustive answer to the question of man's right life, which is at the same time the question of the right order of society"(Strauss,1961:1). Hobbes reaches to the conclusion of the state of war through the analysis of the nature of man, in his masterpiece, Leviathan (n.d.:64): "so that in the nature of man, we find three principal causes of quarrel. First, Competition; Secondly, Diffidence; thirdly, Glory. The first, maketh men invade for Gain; the second, for Safety; and third for Reputation. The first use Violence, to make themselves Masters of other men's, persons, wives, children, and cattle; the second, to defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other signe of undervalue, either direct in their Persons, or by reflexion in their Kindred, their Friends, their Nation, their Profession, or their Name. Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common Power to teep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; and such a warre as is of every man, against every man. (...) "¹

Hobbes' interpretation on the state of nature through the analysis of the mechanistic psychology carries the indications of the new method by which Galileo's understanding of the supremacy of physics in the hierarchy of sciences and the emergence of the modern naturalistic cosmology became possible, as

¹The steps of intellectual reasoning of Hobbes related to the emergence of natural state and its moral basis depending on the postulates of "natural appetite" and "natural reason" may be shown as following: naturalistic reasoning > self-preservation > avoiding death > agreement with companions against enemies > the dominion of the master (the victor who has safe guarded his honor) over servants > natural state.

well as of the ancient and Christian way of thoughts. A sophisticated analysis on the material sources of Hobbesian political philosophy might provide us significant clues for the survival of the basic theoretical and imaginative elements to verify our argument of the continuity, rather than the revolutionary attempts, of the western paradigm throughout the ages as the basic parameter of the western civilization. Blunthschli's simile between the state of war and Christian idea of fallen humanity¹, Dilthey's assertion on the Stoic impact on Hobbes' political philosophy and Strauss' stress for the indebtedness of the Hobbesian analysis to the new method² are the explanations of the several faces of the same reality. Therefore, the facts that "nearly half of the *Leviathan* is devoted to an exposition of the theological and ecclesiastical principles that supplement its moral and political theory" (Dunning, 1916:297) and that almost all modern secular ideologies might be philosophically reduced to Hobbes' political philosophy are not contradicting.

Nevertheless, there is a very evident impact of the re-formed western paradigm based on the centrality of epistemology on Hobbesian understanding of the state of nature. The re-emergence of the epistemologically defined ontology together with the new *resolutive-compositive* method provided the epistemological and methodological tools for Hobbes' *nouva scienza*. His new morality reflects the process of the centralization of epistemology because it absolutely depends on his own experience as the basic epistemological source. His analysis on human nature and on state of nature is a consequence of his empiricism in an age of civil war: "Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of Warre, where every man is Enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without other security, than what their own strength, and their own intention shall furnish them withall..." Although he argues, that the only example for his state of nature is the conditions of life among the American Indians (p.65); even his life is a clear witness for the impact of the anarchic conditions of English civil war when the hypothetical

¹"This (the state of war) philosophical idea found a welcome confirmation in the theological speculation which regarded the State not as the organization of Paradise, but of fallen humanity." (Bluntschli, 1901:284)

² "It would thus seem that the characteristic contents of Hobbes' political philosophy -the absolute priority of the individual to the State, the conceptions of the individual as asocial, of the relation between the state of nature and the State as an absolute antithesis, and finally of the State itself as Leviathan- is determined by and, as it were, implied in the method. As this method, however, was applied only subsequently, only in imitation of Galileo's founding of the new physics, Hobbes's achievements, from this point of view, however great it may be, is nevertheless of the second order- secondary in comparison with the founding of modern science by Galileo and Descartes" (Strauss, 1961:2)

model of *homo homini lupus* (man the wolf of man) was a real fact. Macpearson's interpretation of Hobbes to show the congruency between the environmental conditions and Hobbes' theory of the state of nature might be more meaningful within the framework of this epistemological-methodological transformation of the re-formed paradigm.

Spinoza, too, agree on this hypothetical model of the state of war. But, he imagines a more ethical case of the state of war in his *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* and *Tractatus Politicus*. The fundamental differences between Hobbes and Spinoza on this issue are their views on the existence of sin and liberty in the state of nature. Unlike Hobbes, who argues that nothing can be unjust in the state of nature, he insists that men cannot break the laws of nature, for these laws are inviolable.¹ This difference is a natural consequence of his metaphysical pantheism formulated as *Deus siva Natura* because in his argumentation men can not sin against God, for God is not a king who lays down laws which men can break,² which means natural laws have been identified with the divine teleology. This characteristic is very significant to indicate the critical position of Spinoza in the history of western philosophy where theology and natural cosmology intersect; as well as to show the impacts of ontologico-cosmological presuppositions on the socio-political imaginations and theories. Thus, Spinoza's opened the ways from divine teleology to natural teleology and from divine laws/rights to natural laws/rights through identifying divine with nature, *Deus siva Natura* "By the right and law of nature I simply mean the rules of each individual thing's nature, the rules whereby we conceive it as naturally determined to exist and act in a definite way. (...) For there is no doubt that nature in the absolute sense has a perfect right to do everything in its power, i.e. that the right of nature extends as far as its power; the power of nature being nothing but the power of God, who has perfect right to do everything. (...) for nature is not bounded by the laws of human reason, which aim only at men's true interest and preservation, but by other laws of infinite scope governing the

¹ "there is no sin in the state of nature; or rather, that if anyone sins, it is against himself, and not against others. For the law of nature obliges nobody to do the will of another unless he so desires; it obliges nobody to count anything good or bade save what he himself decides to be such in accordance with his own nature and judgement; and it forbids absolutely nothing that is within human power.(...) It follows that sin is inconceivable except in a state, where what is good and bad is determined by civil laws which are common to all....like sin and obedience in the strict sense, justice and injustice are inconceivable except in a state...."(1965:279,283)

²"I conclude then that the stupidity of the masses, and their failure to think, is the only reason why God God is described as a legislator, and called just, merciful, and so on; that in fact God acts and directs everything by the necessity of his own nature and perfection alone; and finally, that his decrees and volitions are eternal truths, and always involve necessity."

eternal order of the whole of nature, in which man is a tiny part: and it is by the necessity of this order alone that all individual things are determined to exist and act in a definite way. Hence if anything in nature seems to us ridiculous, absurd, or bad, this is because we know things only in part, being almost entirely ignorant of how they are linked together in the universal system of nature;" (1965a:125,127)

Spinoza argues that the state of nature is prior to religion both in nature and in time:"And so the state of nature is certainly not to be confused with a condition where religion exists, but must be conceived as without religion or law."(1965a:143) It is impossible to imagine such a state of nature within an Islamic framework because it absolutely contradicts with the Islamic concept of dyn (religion) based on the Absolute Sovereignty of Allah. But, it is a counterpart of the naturalistic interpretation of cosmology and forms a consistent integrity with the secularization of the epistemology and of the socio-political life.

The followers of the second version of the idea of the state of nature "dreamed of a golden age of Paradise, in which there were as yet no evils and no injustice, while all enjoyed themselves in the unlimited freedom and happiness of their peaceful existence. In this primeval condition there was supposed to be no property, since the superabundance of nature gave to every one in sufficiency all that his unsophisticated and uncorrupted tastes could require. As yet there was no difference of ranks, nor even of callings. Every one was like another. Then too there was neither ruler nor subject, nor magistrate, nor judge, nor army, nor taxes." (Bluntschli,1901:283) The leading figures of this speculative hypothetical model are Locke, Rousseau and Marx. Locke's *Two Treatises of Government* reflects this way of justification not only through its content but also through its structure. Locke combines the understanding of political power and natural law to each other after a description of this hypothetical model: "To understand Political Power right, and derive it from its Original, we must consider what State all Men are naturally in, and that is, a State of Perfect Freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their Possessions, and Persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the Law of Nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the Will of any other Man. A State also of Equality, wherein all the power and Jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another (...)And here we have the plain difference between the State of Nature and the State of war, which however some Men have confounded, are

as far distant, as a State of Peace, Good Will, Mutual Assistance, and Preservation, and a State of Enmity, Malice, Violence, and Mutual Destruction one from another. Men living together according to reason, without a common Superior on Earth, with Authority to judge between them, is properly the State of Nature. But force, or a declared design of force upon the Person of another, where there is no common superior on earth to appeal to for relief, is the State of War."(1965:319-21)

Thus, the state of nature as conceived by Locke is a pre-political rather than pre-social condition, as Dunning (1916:345) mentions; because rejecting the incisive distinction made by Hobbes between the law of nature and real law, Locke follows the Grotian doctrine and declares the law of nature to be a determining body of rules for the conduct of men in their natural condition. Locke's interpretation of the state of law based on the assumption of natural law and reason might be accepted as a very indicative example for the continuity in the western paradigm; as well as for the impact of the new epistemological tendencies around the transformed cosmologico-ontological framework, during the process of the justification of the state. The idea of natural law as a way of justification is one of the basic indications of the continual imagination of western mind from the ancient, to medieval and modern period, related to the impacts of the ontological and epistemological presuppositions on the socio-political philosophy and culture. Stoic postulation of human reason as the revealer of the laws of nature, and as thus the judge of right conduct, Thomistic argument that "every law framed by man bears the character of a law exactly to that extent to which it is derived from the law of nature"-thus, "if on any point it is in conflict with the law of nature, it at once ceases to be a law; it is a mere perversion of law"(Tawney,1950:41) and Locke's following sentences might be accepted as several reflections of the same imagination: But though this be a State of Liberty, yet it is not a State of Licence, though Man in that state have an uncontrollable Liberty, to dispose of His Person or Possessions, yet he has not Liberty to destroy himself, or so much as any Creature in his Possession, but where some nobler use, than its bare Preservation calls for it. The State of Nature has a Law of Nature to govern it, which obliges every one: And Reason, which is that Law, teaches all Mankind, who will but consult it, that being an equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty or Possessions."(1963:309-11) Therefore, Russell's argument that Locke's political theory was not original, might be seem true. But, it should be added that the increasing tendency of ontological proximity within the framework of the

naturalistic cosmology and the strengthening of the centralistic position of the epistemology just before Locke, the stress of the weltanschauung shifted towards nature and reason.

This idea of natural law is the basis of the assumption of natural right which led to the second way of justification for the existence of the state; namely social contract theories¹: *"Men, being, as has been said, by Nature, all free, equal and independent, no one can be put out of the Estate, and subjected to the Political Power of another, without his own Consent . The only way whereby any one devests himself of his Natural Liberty, and puts on the bonds of Civil Society is by agreeing with other Men to joyn and unite into a Community, for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst another, in a secure Enjoyment of their Properties, and a greater Security against any that are not of it. This any number of Men may do, because it injures not the Freedom of the rest; they are left as they were in the Liberty of the State of Nature. When any number of Men have so consented to make one Community or Government, they are thereby presently incorporated, and make one Body Politick , wherein the Majority have a right to act and conclude the rest."* (1965:375) As Jones argues, such a justification of the state through the idea of the natural right is purely utilitarian: the state is justified because it is to men's advantage that it should exist. Thus, it embraces the justification of state through the specification of its aims.

Rousseau agreed with Locke's imagination of pre-political state of nature; but insisted on that its base was emotions of self-interest rather than reason because reason was the outgrowth of the artificial life of men in organized society. As Gettell (1959:254) specifies, his justification of state through the idea of social contract carries the marks of the influences of the theories of Hobbes and Locke: "The method of Hobbes and the conclusions of Locke being curiously combined." For him, the state is a necessary evil emerged from the rise of the inequalities among men. Therefore, he aims to explain how such a mechanism came out. The justification of state through a social contract seems him a solution for this purpose: "To find a form of association which may defend and protect with the whole force of the community the person and property of every associate, and by means of which each, coalescing with all, may nevertheless obey only himself, and remain as free as before. Such is the fundamental problem of

¹It. too. provided the axiological/juristic dimensions of the legitimacy of an existing state, which will be searched in the following chapter.

which the social contract furnishes the solution. In short, each giving himself to all, gives himself to nobody; and as there is not one associate over whom we do not acquire the same rights which we concede to him ourselves, we gain the equivalent of all that we lose, and more power to preserve what we have" (Social Contract, ch.6; Gettell, 1959:254)

In short, all of these attempts for the justification through setting up a speculative theory on the origin of the state reflect the transformation of the western paradigm within a new formulation of the ontological proximity. A *natural current situation* rather than a *transcendental ontological Will* is the center of this "realistic justification" which depends on the empiricist epistemology. This led Western political philosophers to *understand* the natural mechanism of the current situation rather than to *direct* it for the fulfillment of some politically substantive ideals. Hypothetical models related to the state of nature for the justification of state and socio-political systems are the applications of this nature-centered justification through empiricist epistemology. This way of justification intrinsically assumes a natural teleology which is a consequence of the cosmological-ontological interpretation searched in Chapter 2.

This understanding of natural teleology without being directed by and ontological transcendency, as in Diderot's assumption of self-adjusting nature in place of God, could not coexist with the idea of a transcendental sovereign God as in Islam. The understanding of God as an abstract idea -not as the Living Being (Hayy in Qur'anic terminology)- of Descartes, Hume and Kant, has the same consequences as the atheism of Holbach, from the perspective of a self-adjusting natural teleology due to the common sense that our world is a closed material system with a specific causality independent of the impact of the Will of a transcendental sovereign God. We find that polytheism, pantheism and atheism meet in this understanding of a self-adjusting teleology. On the contrary to this western philosophical experience, Islamic understanding of teleology is always directly linked to the belief of Allah via the key-terms of *adatullah* and *sunnatullah* to show the ontological origin of causality.

This assumption of a self-adjusting natural teleology, together with the Aristotelian empiricist epistemology for the understanding of the "real World" became two significant bases for the justification of the state and the socio-political system. The Hobbesian interpretation of the "state of nature" depending on a psychological analysis of human nature is a very typical example of this type

of justification. Because of this accommodation to the common philosophical base of Western tradition for the problem of justification, Hobbes became the theoretical origin for several, even conflicting, political theories and ideologies in Western political history such as individualism and totalitarianism.

Adam Smith's *invisible hand* theory for the justification of liberalism is based on the same nature-centered paradigmatic assumption assuming a self-adjusting market mechanism. Western humanism should be evaluated within this assumption of nature. The humanization of epistemology and the secularization of knowledge developed parallel to the "naturalization" of cosmology and ontology. In fact, both of the processes strengthened each other. The humanization of epistemology could only be meaningful through assuming an intrinsic will for the teleology in nature (pantheist element). Otherwise using human epistemological sources to understand the "real world" could not be justified. Western humanism developed through the dialectic between man and nature based on the ideal of "understanding" and "inventing" the realities of nature to be sovereign over nature. This ideal could not coexist within a centripetal theoretical framework which has an idea of transcendental God at the center. The justification of the state and the state and the socio-political system in Western political thought was based on this paradigmatic assumption related to its origin.

(ii) The aim of the socio-political system :

The justification of the state through the arguments related to its aims originated mainly from Stoic, neo-Epicurean and Christian ethics. The Stoic influence should be emphasized for this type of justification. The axiological continuity leading to a secular justification could be followed within the continuity from the Roman legacy, influenced by Greek philosophy, to Christianity and through to the modern era.

The influence of the Greek legacy on Roman religion through Stoicism and Epicureanism was fundamentally practical rather than theoretical. An original ethics emerged in Rome through the effects of Stoicism, while Epicureanism dealt directly with the problem of happiness rather than cosmological speculations. Greek Stoicism under the leadership of Zeno had been manipulated in the Roman understanding of life to comprise ancient polytheism and a particularization of divinity. Therefore Roman Stoics argued that gods

could be worshipped as the manifestation of Divine Reason which was the source of Peace and Wisdom. These ideals led to a humanizing process of life and law beyond their deep theoretical and intellectual consequences.

In particular **Seneca** and Emperor **Marcus Aurelius** hold the key position of this marriage of Greek philosophies with Roman polytheism and paganism. The Stoic Emperor **Marcus Aurelius** (n.d.:IX/23), who tried to use Stoicism for the reformation of Roman polytheism through a cooperation based on a specific ethics, argued that since the Intelligence of the Universe (God) is social, human society functions as a phase of cosmic coordination. This is interesting especially from the perspective of being an example of the cosmologico-ontological justification of the socio-political system.

Stoic concentration on the theoretical foundation of the achievement of virtue as the aim of life, and the idea of living in conformity with nature through dealing with the ontological and theological problems to answer the question of man's place in the universe, extended also to Christian ethics and theology as its basic principles. Its cosmopolitan character opened the way for the triumph of Christianity in the Roman Empire with a new syncretic form.

The Stoic doctrine that every man is a member of two commonwealths - the civil state of which he is a subject and the greater state composed of all rational beings to which he belongs - because of his human character, was systematized by Seneca whose fundamental assumption on this subject was that the greater commonwealth is a society, rather than a state, and its bases are moral and religious rather than legal and political. This philosophical political pluralism (dualism) became the principium individuationis of the justification process of the city and the law of the world city or, as the law of custom and the law of reason of the Middle Ages, was based on this Stoic transformation of Christianity which formed the superstructure of feudalism as well as a socio-political and socio-economic system.

The secular interpretation of individual happiness in the modern era to justify actual political systems has its origin in the amalgam of a neo-Epicurean understanding of Life and of Stoical-Christian ethics. Ambrose's assumption that the ideal of life is happiness as an extension of Stoic philosophy might be accepted as the axiological and eschatological bases of the secularization resting on Stoic ethics which survived in the form of Christian ethics. A process of

materialization has been experienced in modern era related to this concept of happiness. It should be underlined as a fundamental difference, such a process of materialization did not emerge in Islamic imagination and thought both at its first stage when these ancient concept were internalized by Muslim philosophers and at its extension to other spheres as a general Islamic concept of *saadah*. The very strong eschatological dimension of Islamic *weltanschauung* and its understanding of *gayb* might be mentioned as two basic hindrances which prevent such a process of materialization.

The philosophical speculations on natural law as the theoretical and imaginative origin of the idea of natural right provided a new framework for this process of the materialization of happiness. The details of this framework will be discussed in the following chapter on the process of the political legitimacy. Nevertheless, I want to underline its vital role to specify the end of the state as a way of justification of the socio-political system. This relationship is very apparent in American Declaration of Independence in 1776; and in Declaration of the Rights of Man made by the National Assembly of France in August 1791: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights, that among these are Life, liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness, that to secure these rights, Governments are instituted, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed." (ADI, 1776) and "Men are born and continue equal in respect of their rights. The end of the political society is the preservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man. These rights are liberty, property, security and resistance to oppression." (Dec. of the Rights of man by Nat. Ass. of France, 1791)

Secular systematization of these continuing elements as an amalgam has been clarified by Hobbesian materialist methodology and Kantian disengagement of morality from theology. This worldly individual happiness-only -as the basic criterion of the secularization of life- became one of the significant bases of justification of the socio-political system through assigning a mission to the state for the fulfillment of this aim. Modern individualism, liberalism, utilitarianism and pragmatism are several attempts of this type of justification. This amalgam could be traced back to Grotius' liberalism based on the idea of natural rights, from Hobbes' individualism motivated by the psychological stimulus of self-preservation, from Bentham's utilitarian psychological assumption that men actually seek pleasure and happiness in life, from Mills' understanding of

morality grounded on happiness and from James' pragmatism assuming that an idea is true if it possesses some subsequent utility. This assumption of this-worldly individual happiness implies a specific ontological approach leading to indifference in eschatological problems. The segmentation of life in the Western philosophical tradition against the Islamic understanding of unity of life should be evaluated within these ontological-eschatological consideration which lead to an alternative type of justification of state and socio-political systems.

II-ISLAMIC WAY OF JUSTIFICATION:

In contrast to the case in western philosophical-political justification, the process of justification in Islamic political theories is a reflection of the basic paradigm analyzed before, namely the <Allah-centered> ontological transcendency. This is true for almost all sects and schools in Islamic history. It is almost impossible to find a political justification without reference to the absolute sovereignty of Allah.

The ontological hierarchy as *<Allah-human being-nature>* implies a socio-political hierarchy as *<Allah-human being-political system >* in the Islamic way of political thinking. Therefore the justification of the political system is directly referred to the understanding of the *Trusteeship of Man* given to him by Allah- as the origin of axiology and absolute normativeness. The fundamental tools for the justification of the state as a socio-political institution are the meta-historical covenant for its origin and the fulfillment of the mentioned divine responsibility on earth for the aim of the state.

1-The origin of the socio-political system:

The justification of state as a socio-political institution through interpretations on the origin of the socio-political system in Islamic political imagination and theorization is directly attached to the Qur'anic terms of 'ahd, 'aqd and mithâq.¹ A social contract to establish a socio-political system has been, and could only be, justified through the meta-historical covenant between Allah and man. This meta-historical covenant was a declaration of obedience by man to Allah. The establishment of political authority on earth, and obedience to it, has been accepted as an extension of this meta-historical covenant for the realization of the norms, as a set of axiological presuppositions revealed by Allah through the mission of prophecy.

The usage of the concept of khalifa both for man as vicegerent of Allah and as a political authority on earth is an interesting indication of this holistic link between the ontological and political spheres. The Belief of Absolute Truth, originating from the Divine Being coming through one chain of prophecy, implies a certain divinely responsible man who had not been created in vain, but with serious end(44:38) determined by the meta-historical covenant; according to Qur'an. As being the vicegerent of Allah on earth, the human being has taken a divine responsibility of Trusteeship (amanah) on earth that must be fulfilled (33:72).

Thus, *ahd, aqd, mithaq, amanah, wilayah, ummah, khalifah* and *wali al-amr* constitute a semantic, imaginative and theoretical set for the link of the ontological and political spheres to justify a necessary socio-political organization. As Ahmed (1971:84) summarizes, "interpreted in terms of social contract theory, a covenant between a prophet and his followers created a millah, and a covenant between God and His devotees laid the foundation-stone of a moral order (din) among human beings, but a social contract among different religious communities gave birth to the ummah". Although Ahmed's systematization might be discussed; it is right that the concepts of millah, din, and ummah in Qur'an are fundamentally based on the idea of covenant. State as an organization of man-man relationship in the form of covenant is a reflection of the man-Allah relationship in the form of primordial meta-historical covenant. The basic principle on cosmologico-ontological sphere that all

¹There are several verses in Qur'an underlying the importance of fulfilling these undertakings. f.e. "O ye who believe! Fulfil your undertakings ('uqûd)" (5:1)

authority in the universe lies with Allah because He alone created it, results in a socio-political consequence that only Allah is to be obeyed. Thus, the primordial covenant between Allah and man should be extended to the social life as a covenant between man and man. The vice versa of this logical conclusion is also valid and true: A social contract between man and man should be consistent to the primordial contract between Allah and man.

The term *khalifah* plays a very significant role both for the justification of socio-political system and for the imaginative links between ontological and political spheres. Margoliouth (1922:322) mentions the pre-Islamic forms of this word in Assyrian, Hebrew, Aethiopic and Greek languages, but it gained a new semantic field together with other political key-terms in the Qur'an. It continued to have the meanings in pre-Islamic Arab sources¹; but within a new context. It occurs in the Qur'an twice in its singular form *khalifah* ²; and seven times in the plural form -four of them in the form *khalâ'if* ³ and three in the form *khulafâ'* ⁴-. There are a rich diversity of commentaries on the meaning of this term to clarify its philological and political meanings. As Watt (1968:32) argues, the difficulty experienced by the commentators arises from the fact that the root of *khalifah* has had a rich and varied semantic development in Arabic. Al-Qadi (1988:398-402) sums up its meanings in five main groups: (i) to succeed, to follow, to come after another; (ii) to replace, to substitute, to take the place of another; (iii) to substitute, to replace, to take the place of another, but normally after this other is gone (destroyed, dead, etc.); and (iv) to inhabit, to cultivate (*sakana*, 'amara); (v) to govern, to rule, to be king. The commentators

¹"In the inscription Glaser 618 of the year 543 A.D. *khalifah* occurs (line 11) meaning "viceroys" with the verb *istakhlafa* "appoint as such"; (line 36) in the plural *khalâ'if* meaning "lieutenants." (Margoliouth, 1922:322)

²"And when the Lord said unto the angels: Lo, I am about to place a viceroy (*khalifah*) in the earth..." (2:30) and "O, David! Lo! We have set thee as a viceroy (*khalifah*) in the earth; therefore judge aright between mankind, and follow not desire that it beguile thee from the way of Allah. Lo! those who wander from the way of Allah have an awful doom, forasmuch as they forgot the Day of Reckoning." (38:27).

³"He it is who hath placed you as viceroys of the earth and hath exalted some of you in rank above others..." (6:166); "Then We appointed you viceroys in the earth after them, that We might see how ye behave." (10:15); "But they denied him (Noah), so We saved him and those with him in the ship, and made them viceroys (in the earth), while We drowned those who denied Our revelations..." (10:74); "He it is who hath made you regents (*khalâ'if*) in the earth so he who disbelieveth, his disbelief be on his own head...." (35:39).

⁴"Marvel ye that there should come unto you a Reminder from your Lord by means of a man among you, that he may warn you? Remember how He made you viceroys after Noah and gave you growth of stature..." (7:69); "And remember how He made you viceroys after 'Ad and gave you station in the earth..." (7:74); "Is not He (best) Who answereth the wronged one when he crieth unto Him and removeth the evil, and hath made viceroys of the earth? Is there any God beside Allah? Little do they reflect!" (27:62).

(mufasssiran) tend to interpret this key-term as a title for the whole humanity, rather than only for Adam, to clarify their comprehensive mission on earth. Ibn Kathir's (1986:I/60-71) quotations from earlier commentators, especially from Ibn Jarir, are very evident indications for this common theoretical and imaginative base for the understanding of this term. Modern commentators such as Rashid Ri'da (1954:I/257-9), Yazır (1971:I/299-300;3/2116)¹, and Qutb (n.d:I/14-5) while M.Wahbi assigns this mission especially to the prophets in the personality of Adam (1966:I/90-1) and to the Ummah of Hz. Muhammed after the following the other ummahs of previous prophets (1967:IV/1574).

There are discussion on the origin of the khalifah as a political title which began to be used after the election of Abu Bakr who is generally held to have taken the title of *khalifah rasul Allah* (the caliph of the messenger of Allah). It is very difficult to prove or disprove that Abu Bakr's political title must come from the ordinary secular use of the word rather than from its Qur'anic origin. But, it is impossible to deny the fact that these Qur'anic usages effected the process of the transformation of the political imagination and culture in the direction of the development of the political justification of socio-political system through ontological relationship between Allah and man. The first usage of this word in Qur'an related to Adam's creation specifies the ontological status of man in the earth; while second usage related to Davud connects this concept to a socio-political responsibility; namely judging (fa'hukm) justly between people. This second usage, clearly connotes a socio-political status for being khalifah in the personality of Davud. Suddi interpretation of this verse "we have made you a khalifah" as "He made him king (mallakahu) on earth (Al-Qadi,1988:404) is related to this imagination. The fact that "the early exegetes in the Umayyad period did not equate the Qur'anic *khalifah* with the head of the Islamic state"(Al-Qadi,1988:409), does not mean the rejection of such an imagination of political authority within the context of ontological antecedents. It might be related to the meticulousness of ulama related to the avoidance in usage of the title of *Khalifat Allah* (Caliph of God) for the Umayyads who tried to exploit such an imagination to legitimize their political authority.² As Bartold

¹"Ben mutlaka yeryüzünde bir halife yapacağım demiş ti ki meali: Kendi irademden, kudret ve sıfatımdan ona bazı selahiyetler vereceğim, o bana izafeten, baan niyabeten mahlukatım üzerinde bir takım tasarrufata sahip olacak, benim namıma ahkamımı icrave tenfiz eyleyecek, o bu hususta asıl olmayacak, kendi zatı ve şahsı namına bilasale icdrayı ahkam edecek değil, ancak benim bir naibim, bir kalfam olacak, iradesi ile benim iradelerimi, benim emirlerimi, benim kanunlarımı tatbika memur bulunacak, sonra onun arkasından gelenler ve ona halef olarak aynı vazifeyi icra edecek olanlar bulunacak..."(I/299)

² Mawardi qoutes in his Kit. Adab ad-Dünya wa ad-Din a poem from the Umayyad poet Farazdaq within which the title Caliph of God has been used for the Caliph Sulayman (715-17). The title of

(1963:124) underlines, such a title is completely foreign to early Islam. This avoidance begins from the time of Abu Bakr who used the title *Khalifah al-Rasul Allah* and especially from the time of Omar who strictly rejected such a title and prefer to use Caliph of the Caliph of the Apostle of Allah and Amr al-Mu'minin, as Badi az-Zaman Hamadhani mentions in his *Rasa'il*.¹

On the other hand the usage of the plural forms of khalifah in Qur'an strengthens this imagination of setting up a very strong relationship between divine responsibility of man grounded on his ontological status of being vicegerent of Allah in the earth and socio-political responsibility to form a just socio-political community; because almost all of them are related to the succession of the nations (of 'Ad, of Noah etc.) who have been destroyed because of not fulfilling their divine responsibility, by new nations. Qur'anic verse, "He it is who hath placed you as viceroys of the earth and hath exalted some of you in rank above others, that He may try to you by (the test of) that which hath given you" (6:166) hints at a hierarchy between man and man within the imaginative framework constituted by being viceroy of the earth and fulfilling divine responsibility. This term has been understood within such a framework especially in the later works on political theory: "This makes it clear what the caliphate means. (To exercise) natural royal authority means to cause the masses to act as required by purpose and desire. (To exercise) political (royal authority) means to cause the masses to act as required by intellectual (rational) insight into the means of furthering their worldly interests and avoiding anything that is harmful in that respect. (To exercise) the caliphate means to cause the masses to act as required by religious insight into their interests in the other world as well as in this world. (Worldly interests) have bearing upon (the interests in the other world), since according to Muhammad all worldly conditions are to be considered in their relation to their value for the other

Caliph of God came into use as early as the Umayyad period. This title appears on coins in the second half of seventh century (670-90). (Walker, 1956:30) "In Abd al-Malik's currency reform, only quotations of a religious nature were put on the gold and silver coins, and no attempt was made to put the name of the Caliph next to the names of Allah and Muhammad. This clearly shows that the rulers had still not decided to transfer the concept 'Caliph of God' from the sphere of court flattery and rhetorical salutation into the sphere of law." (Bartold, 1963:125)

¹ "When the Apostolate came to an end, and the Sovereignty (Imamate) came in, the honor fell to the latter. Abu Bakr was addressed: Caliph of the Apostle of God.; God made the Caliphate the badge of Abu Quhafah's family, and no one except the representative of that family received the title; than Abu Bakr appointed as his Caliph (successor) 'Umar. A man addressed him as Caliph of God. He said: God confound you! That is God's prophet David. The man then addressed him as Caliph of the Apostle of God. 'Umar said: That is your departed master (Abu Bakr). Then the man addressed him as Caliph of the Caliph of the Apostle of God. 'Umar said: That is my right title, only this is too long. 'Umar proceeded to style himself Prince of the Believers" ((Margoliouth, 1922:323-4)

world. Thus, (the caliphate) in reality is a substitute for Muhammad inasmuch as it serves, like him, to protect the religion and to exercise leadership of the world." (Ibn Khaldun, 1978:155)

Thus, Qur'anic conceptual structure forms an ontologico-political semantic field constituted by the concepts such as khalifah, mithaq, ahd, aqd, wilayah, amanah etc. and their derivatives. All of these concepts have been used both for the relationship of Allah-man as the determinant of the ontological position of man and for the relationship of man-man as the determinant of socio-political position of man. There is the concept of khalifah at the center of this semantic field. This ontologico-political semantic field of Qur'an created the most strong imaginative link in human history between ontological and social beings and their positions to each other. The secret of the extraordinary development of Islamic civilization within a very short period of time after 7. century -both in the sense of theoretical richness and in the sense of political expansion parallel to a highly complex institutionalization- should be searched in this unique characteristic of it in human history. This strong imaginative link between ontological and political spheres has effected all dimensions of the theoretical and practical dimensions of Islamic civilization. This characteristic accelerates the process of reproduction of political theory and culture even after the periods of crisis. This reproduction of political culture provides both a feeling of resistance to foreign elements and a dynamic element for the attempts to achieve the crisis through the re-adjustments of the institutions for the realization the value system based on ontologico-epistemological characteristics mentioned above.

Thus, this ontologico-political semantic field and its imaginative consequences provides the basic elements for the justification of the existence of a socio-political system. This way of justification of political system is very evident also in the writings of Muslim scholars and philosophers on political theory. The ways of justification of the socio-political system from the perspective of its origin in these political writings, might be summarized into three groups: (i) meta-historical argument: the origin of socio-political system has been attached to the meta-historical covenant between Allah and man; (ii) the logical argument: the origin of the socio-political system has been explained in this argument through syllogistically analysis on teleological structure of the macrocosmos, microcosmos and socio-political system; (iii) the historical argument: the origin of the socio-political system has been explained depending

on the characteristics of human nature, especially on the man's natural disposition to be in need of others. We explained the first way within the framework of the Qur'anic ontologico-political conceptual structure. Now, we exemplify the second and third ways of justification in the political writings of the fundamental Muslim schools.

The political theory of *falasifah* assumes a clear-cut differentiation between ideal state and others. The justification of ideal state in this tradition is directly attached to ontological antecedents especially through a channel of teleological arguments. Farabi's masterpiece *Al-Madinah al-Fa'dilah* comprises the most evident examples for the second and third ways of justification. Its structure, itself, is the best indication for the second way of justification through syllogistically analysis on the teleological structure. He develops an analogy between cosmic teleology, human body and Ideal State. He specifies (1985:37), at the very beginning of his treatise, the origin of the teleology in the cosmic system; namely *As-Sabab Al-Awwal* and explains the cooperation of the elements of cosmos according to the direction of this First Cause. Then he applies the same method to the teleology in human body (1985:78-100) and shows that 'heart' has the same function for the cooperation of the elements of the human body. His logical conclusions on the teleological structure of the universe as macrocosmos and human body as microcosmos became the basis for his theorization of the structure of the Ideal State. Platonic legacy might be effective to develop such a theorization as Walzer assert¹; but it should not be forgotten that Islamic *falafah* emerged within an intersected intellectual sphere where the accumulation of pre-Islamic legacy reconciled with the basic Islamic system of creed. Hence, this theorization shows the veiled assumption of the process of internalization of pre-Islamic sources during the formation of the Muslim schools.

Farabi differentiates the origin of the Ideal State from the causes of the formation of ignorant and imperfect states. He mentions realistic causes such as force, patriarchal and material relations for the formation of the states other than Ideal State which is thought as an ideal form of the extension of the absolute

¹But no Platonist could consider politics in isolation, without referring the universe, the individual man and society to the same principle, and it goes without saying that al-Farabi conforms to that rule. The same order which prevails in the universe, where centuries of unquestioned tradition have given to the postulate of the rule of the divine mind the appearance of self-evidence, must apply to man who should organize himself on the same pattern, and to society which should be ruled and organized by the perfect man living in conformity with the divine order which guarantees the eternal existence of the whole world." (1962:246)

teleology of macrocosmos and microcosmos. The analogy between macrocosmos and political structures might be found also in the political writings of other representatives of *falsafah*. For example, Ibn Rushd applies his ontological presuppositions on ontological beings to political beings. His specification on the permanence of the Ideal State is a typical example for this type of application.¹ The impact of teleological argument led Muslim scholars to argue that "The Imamate can rightly belong to only one person throughout the entire land of Islam, unless a barrier lies between the provinces, such an ocean, an enemy that cannot be coped with, when the people of the two districts are not able to lend each other aid"(Baghdadi, 1935:213).

The third way of justification has been applied both for the explanation of the origin and of the aim of the state. The necessity of political association as the origin of the socio-political system might be found in all political writings of *falasifah*, of *fuqaha*, of *mutakallimun* and of the writers of *siyasatname*. Farabi underlines man's need for mutual help and cooperation in the part of *al-Qawl fi I'htiyaj al-Insan ila al-Ijtim'a wa at-Ta'awwun* (1985:117) of his masterpiece, before analyzing the Ideal State, and argues that they organize different societies by uniting their individual efforts for different objects. The same point has been explained in *Ta'hsil as-Sa'adah* (1983:61-62; eng. tr. from Mahdi, 1969:23) as following: "It is the innate disposition of every man to join another human being or other men in the labor he ought to perform: This is the condition of every single man. Therefore, to achieve what he can of that perfection, every man needs to stay in the neighborhood of others and associate with them. It is also the innate nature of this animal to seek shelter and to dwell in the neighborhood of those who belong to the same species, which is why he is called the social and political animal." Na'sir ad-Din Tû'sî (1964:190) uses almost the same reasoning for the necessity of the "civilized life": "Now, since it is impossible to conceive the species to exist without cooperation is an absurdity, while co-operation without combination is an absurdity, therefore the human species is naturally in need of combination. This type of combination, of which we have already given an account, is called "civilized life" (...) This is what the Philosophers mean when they say that man is naturally a city dweller, i.e. he is naturally in need of the combination called "civilized life" (*tamaddun*)."

¹"We say again: though this State, that is, the Ideal one, once it exists, does not easily perish, it undoubtedly perishes of necessity, since every being perishes. This has been explained in '*Physics*' and becomes evident upon investigation" (Ibn Rushd, 1966:219).

This necessity of human being to cooperation has been explained through an attachment to the virtue of love (*Mahabbat* ;per.) by which the connection of societies is effected. The bound of love as the basic force of the communal/political life is stressed by Muslim philosophers and thinkers. Thus, the necessity of cooperation has been explained by the virtue of love rather than by the natural feeling of competition as the basic psychological stimulus such as in Machiavellian or Hobbesian theory. Tûsî's following attachment of Justice to Love is very interesting to mark this intrinsic characteristic: "Again, since Man has been created with a natural direction towards perfection, he has a natural yearning for the synthesis in question. This yearning for the synthesis is called love. We have already alluded to the preference to Love above Justice. The reason for this idea is that Justice requires artificial union; at the same time, the artificial in relation to the natural is like an outer skin, the artificial imitating the natural."(1964:198) His differentiation between Love and friendship and his argument that the reason for the friendship between young men is the quest of Pleasure while the reason for the friendship of the old men and persons of like nature is the quest of Profit, marks the one of the essential differences of such a political culture compared to the utilitarian philosophy. Due to the fact that at the top of the hierarchy of Love is the Divine Love, the explanation, too, embraces a teleological element based on the core of love: "In man, however, there is to be found a simple, divine substance having no affinity with other natures, and he can enjoy thereby a class of pleasure having no similarity to other pleasures. The love producing this pleasure is excessive in the extreme, being like to distraction, and it is known as Utter Passion and Divine Love. Certain of those who assimilate themselves to God lay claim to this love. (...) Thus, where the love to God is concerned, to associate any other therewith is sheer polytheism."(Tûsî,1964:198,205)

This love-centered social imagination has effected Ottoman political thought and culture to a great extent. A detailed comparison between Kınalızade's *Akhlaq-ı Alâ'î* and Machiavelli's *Prince* or Hobbes' *Leviathan* might provide significant clues for the impacts of alternative weltanschauungs on political theories and cultures. Kınalızade (1510-1572) represents the stability of the classical Ottoman political culture and therefore aim to preserve the social balance of the system around the principles of Love and Justice; whereas Machiavelli aims to provoke the dynamic element of the political culture of his society in order to radically change the existent status. Kınalızade attaches his political philosophy to a very well-defined understanding of love and

strengthens the dependency of politics to ethics in the sense of an ultimate degree through defining the basis of socio-political system is love. As absolutely opposed to this case, Machiavelli who lived almost in the same century, concentrates his energy on the ultimate separation of politics from ethics.

Mutakallimun and *fuqaha* use both religious and rational arguments for the justification of socio-political system under the authority of an imam. As Taftazani (1950:145) concludes: "The position of Agreement is that it is necessary to appoint an imam. The difference of opinion is on the question whether the appointment must be by Allah or by His creatures, and whether the basis [for appointment] is authority or Reason. The correct position is that the creatures must appoint a Khalifah on the basis of authority because of the statement of the Prophet, *"whoever dies not having known the Imam of his time, dies the death of the days of Ignorance (al-jahiliyyah)"*¹. Shahrastani (1934:151) and Ibn Khaldun (1967:157) report that except the M'utazilah al-A'samm and certain Khârijites,² all Muslim schools agree on the necessity of a political authority. The argument of these schools that the imamate is a command (far'd) from God is a juristic reflection of the ontologico-political imagination mentioned before. The Sunnis extended this judgement that "it (imamate) was a duty (far'd) which all Muslims must carry out" (Shahrastani,1934:151). It has also been discussed whether the imamate is one of the pillars of the faith. Ibn Khaldun's conclusion on this subject aim to support Sunni argument that the election of the political leader is a subject of free choice of Muslims; rather than being divinely ordained (Shiite argument): "Some wrongly assume the Imamate to be one of the pillars of the faith. It is one of the general (public) interests. The people are delegated to take care of it. If it were one of the pillars of the faith, it would be something like prayer, and Muhammed would have appoint a representative, exactly as he appointed Abu Bakr to represent him at prayer."(1967:169)

¹ Several versions of this hadiths has been used for the justification of the necessary existence of the socio-political authority. It has been mentioned in Ibn Hanbal's *Mūsneḍ* (1982:IV/96) as "man mate bi ḡayri imam mate mayyitah jahilliyah." Look for other versions of the same hadiths and others to *Sahih-Muslim* (1981:II/1475-1480)

² The logical reasoning of these groups has been summarized by Shahrastani as following: "The Najdite section of the Khawarij, and the Qadarites like Abu Bakr al-Asamm, and Hisham al-Futawi hold that the Imamate is not obligatory in law so that sin is incurred if it is not established. On the contrary it rests on the conventions of society. If men behaved justly and did their duty there would be no necessity for an imam. One man is as good as another in religion, in Islam, in knowledge, and in private judgement (ijtihad). They are like the teeth in a comb - a hundred camels but no good mount. There is no necessity to obey a man like oneself."

Ibn Khaldun (1967:156) prefers the religious justification of the socio-political system together with a historical proof taken from *Asr as-Saadah* : "The position of imam is a necessary one. The consensus of the men around Muhammad and the men of the second generation shows that [the imamate] is necessary according to the religious law. At the death of the Prophet, the men around him proceeded to render the oath of allegiance to Abu Bakr and to entrust him with the supervision of their affairs. And so it was at all subsequent periods. In no period were the people left in a state of anarchy. This was so by general consensus, which proves that the position of imam is a necessary one. (...) the necessity of (an imam) is indicated by the religious law, that is, by the consensus". The same way of justification of socio-political system and hierarchy was used by Shahrastani before Ibn Khaldun via following statement: "The institution of the Imamate is attested by catholic consent from the first generation to our day in the words; «The earth can never be without an imam wielding authority». (...) ¹ Such a consensus of opinion is decisive proof of the necessity of the office." (1934:151-2)

Thus, there is an idea of an Ideal State at the basis of justification in several Islamic political theories, in contrast to the hypothetical models of the 'state of nature' developed through empirical and actual facts of the western philosophical tradition. Even the historical way of justification developed by Shahrastani and Ibn Khaldun has been directly attached to the existence of the socio-political system and hierarchy as a historical realization in an Ideal Period (*Asr as-Saadah*). The logical and rational justifications of theologians and jurists are linked to ontological interpretations. This reality created a contrast between the idea of a secular state justified through historical facts in western political theories and the idea of a substantive state justified through ontological antecedents based on a meta-historical covenant between Allah and man in Islamic theories.

¹ "...When Muhammad died none contested Abu Bakr's statement that a successor must be appointed, and all know the story of Umar's homage to Abu Bakr. When the latter died it never occurred to any one that an imam was not indispensable. 'Uthman and 'Ali were next chosen. All this goes to prove that the first generation unanimously agreed that there must be an imam. The office has gone on from then till now either general consent of the people, or by agreement and testament, or by both. such a consensus of opinion is decisive proof of the necessity of the office." (1934:151-2)

2- The aim of the socio-political system:

The justification of the socio-political system via the explanation on its aim is directly related to the ontological, epistemological and axiological framework analyzed in the fourth chapter. The aim of the socio-political system is directly attached to the aim of the human life. The belief that man is chosen by Allah as the vicegerent on earth (6:166) with a special mission implies the principle of the unity or indivisibility of human life. The mono-centric conception of man in the Qur'an and the centripetal tendencies of Islamic theological structure lead to a comprehensive style of life rejecting separation of "the sacred from the profane", "the religious from the secular" and "the temporal from the moral" branches of human life. There is no clear-cut distinction between spiritual and material lives in Islam.

So, there are two aspects of the unity of the responsibility of man on earth: the first is related to the quality of this responsibility of man which is unique, having both spiritual and material parts, while the other is related to the fact that every man is charged with the fulfillment of this responsibility. These two aspects of the unity and objectivity of the responsibility of man are the bases of the two distinctive characteristics of Islamic political understanding. The first aspect is the Islamic view of the "Unity of Life" which rejects the separation of spiritual and material parts. The rhythm of the "Islamic life" is specified directly by religious responsibilities which unify the quantitative parts of life in the sense of time (day, month, year e.t.c.) to remind man qualitative mission of life; as opposed to such a qualitative compartmentalization of spiritual and material parts in the secular sense: "The rhythm of the daily round is determined by the five prayers which the Muslim is enjoined to perform at set hours in a set fashion and preferably with his fellows behind a prayer-leader in a mosque. The rhythm of the year is determined by Ramadan, the month of fasting, with the reduced living of its strained and edgy days, and the religious exercises of the nights. And the rhythm of the believer's life is determined by the pilgrimage to Mecca which, circumstances permitting, he is to undertake at least once" (von Grünebaum, 1962:52). This rhythm of life provides a psychological re-production of the feeling the self-consciousness and of the meaning of life as a unity together with its eschatological dimension.

The second is the essence of the socio-political community in Islam which is formed by human beings who accept this responsibility without any discrimination among themselves and who reject special responsibilities related

to one group of scholars (theocracy), or to one class (capitalism and socialism), or to nation (nationalism). The understanding of the "Unity of Life" is a logical consequence of the ontological belief of the "Unity of Allah" and the epistemological assumption of the "Unity of Truth".

Islamic "Allah-centered" humanism -opposed to the "nature-centered" Western humanism- could be evaluated within this way of justification, grounded on the responsibility of man which at the same time assumes a relative free will and sovereignty on earth. This has been limited only by the Absolute Will and Sovereignty of Allah, as a Living Being (Hayy) contrasted to the abstract and inactive image of God in the western philosophical tradition developed by Descartes, Hume and Kant. Islamic humanism has been supported by an understanding of liberty. As De Santillana (1965:292) argues and Von Grünebaum (1946:144) repeats, in Islam, the original state of man is liberty and it is the exigencies of social life that compel the abridgment of this liberty: "Allah wishes to make it easy for you, and does not wish to make it difficult for you" (2:181). The Prophet's common sense discouraged exaggeration of any kind. Law is intended as the complement of faith regulating man's actions even as faith regulates his beliefs. Happiness and its transcendental counterpart, salvation, reward the believer." (Von Grünebaum, 1946:144)

Political structure is a consequence of the usage of this combination of relative will and liberty. Thus, sovereignty based on a given right, and responsibility originating from the Covenant between Allah and man creates a political covenant between man and man for the fulfillment of the Divine Responsibility, or in other words a political covenant has been justified by an ontological covenant. Therefore, it should have a substantive character. This substantive character is the basis of the justification of the socio-political system through the evaluations on its aim. At this point intersect an imagination of life with a specific understanding of law and politics. The parallelism between Hanafi definition of Fiqh as "the science of law is the knowledge of the rights and duties whereby man is enabled to observe right conduct in this life, and to prepare himself for the world to come" and Ghazali's definition of politics in his *Maqasid al-Falasifa*, as aiming at "man's welfare in this world and bliss in the next, only attainable if government is rooted in the legal and completed by the political sciences ('ulum shar'iyah, 'ulum siyasiyyah)"¹ shows the impact of the imagination of life on law and politics. This is also a very clear indication for the

¹The English translations of these definitions has been borrowed from E. Rosenthal (1973:1-2).

dependency of politics to axiology which is always accepted as a determinant of ontological consciousness and of its epistemological consequences in the process of justification.

This intersected imaginative and theoretical relationships is valid also for the members of *falasifah*. For example, **Ibn Rushd** connects justification of the state directly to the ontological antecedents and their axiological consequences. His following analysis is a typical example of this trend in Islamic political thought : "We say: since man is one of the natural existing things, he must needs have a purpose for the sake of which he is existing. For every natural existing thing has a purpose in accordance with the explanation in "*Physics* " ; all the more so man, who is the most distinguished of them. Since man can only exist in the State, he can attain this his end only in so far as he is a part of the State" (Ibn Rushd, 1966:183-4). The most critical question at this stage is what the human end is. **Ibn Rushd** concludes that "what the religious laws in our time think of this matter is what God wills" (Ibn Rushd, 1966:185) after his evaluations related to several opinions¹ on the human end mentioned by Plato in his *Republic* . His assumption that even the philosopher can attain highest perfection and ultimate happiness as the purpose of the human being within the society, is another way for the justification of the state as a socio-political entity, from the perspective of its aim.

Adalâh (Justice), as a key term, clearly symbolizes this substantive mission of the Islamic state. "Justice" has a very deep imagination in the formation of Muslim mind beyond its importance as an ethical virtue. **Al-Khazini** (1860:6) extends its importance to all branches of life because "justice is the support of both religion and the course of the world, and the stay of future as well s present felicity; so that whoever takes hold of it, or one of its branches, takes hold of a strong handle to which there is no breaking". He connects this idea of justice to the mercy of Allah.² His classification of sources answering to

¹f.i. "some people are of the opinion that the human end is merely to guard and preserve the body and to protect the senses. Then their association is solely one of necessity and the end for which they are striving is a necessary end. others are of the opinion that it would not be proper for man to restrict himself in his existence to the necessities <of life>, but rather <that> he has an end which has in it something higher than stopping at what is necessary.(...) Those who hold this opinion on the end of man are divided into various groups. Some think it is wealth, some honor and others pleasure....(Ibn Rushd, 1966:185)

² "Furthermore, because the mercy of the Supreme God intended to secure the rewards of virtue to His servants, and to establish them in the open way of His rectitude, He willed that justice should abide among them to the last day, uninterrupted, and unimpaired by the lapse of times and ages. Knowing that men would injure one another by compliance with the requirements of their natural impulses, He gave them self-common, as an inherent prerogative of their being -which they are

the several divisions of justice as (i) the Glorious Book of Allah; (ii) the guided leaders and established doctors; and (iii) the balance;¹ signifies the critical position of this idea of justice on the intersectionary sphere of ontological, epistemological and axiological imaginations.

This way of justification makes "justice" a channel between axiological pre-suppositions justified by ontological antecedents and the prescriptivist character of Islamic political theories, cultures and structures. So, the interconnected relationship between Law and Politics is meaningful through this fulfillment of substantive mission. Thus, Islamic ontologically justified political power created a political culture which is suitable for the justification of the transcendental substantive state. The aim of the state is the fulfillment of justice on behalf of Allah on earth. Justice is more significant for a state, for some Muslim scholars, than for the state to be composed of Muslims. Ibn Taymiyyah's argument that Allah come to help a just state though it may be composed of non-Muslims while He would not help a tyrannical state which might happen to be composed of Muslims only, is a clear example of the central character of this mission for the justification of political authority. This is also true for *Ibn Abi ar-Rabi*, *Mawardi*, *Farabi*, *Ibn Bajja*, *Ghazali*, *Ibn Rushd*, *Kinalizade* as the members of several Islamic schools.

Mawardi, the writer of one of the significant documents of Islamic political thought, specifies that the real motive of the state is the rule of Justice and Truth; while *Nizam al-Mulk*, as a scholar and active politician argues that Allah the Almighty, is pleased with a governor only when he treats his people with justice and kindness. *Ghazali* underlines justice and law as two bases for the legitimacy of a political authority; while the mission of justice imposes a system of rights in *Ibn Abu ar-Rabi*'s political theory dependent upon three fundamental rights, namely (i) *rights due to Allah*; (ii) *rights due to the living*, and (iii) *rights due to the dead*.

This idea of the "ideal state" with an ontologically defined substantive mission is another paradigmatic assumption in the history of Islamic political theory. The perfection of the individual is connected to the fulfillment of this mission by an ideal state in the writings of several Muslim scholars and

naturally capable of and fitted for- and in the amplitude of His mercy, and the breadth of His compassion, has provided for them, with constant goodness by raising up among them just judges, their never-failing securities for justice. Of these there are three, answering to the several divisions of justice: 1. the Glorious Book of God (...) 2. the guided leaders and established doctors (...) and 3. the balance, which is the tongue of justice (...)." (1860:6-7)

¹ Especially his evaluations on balance is very interesting and will be discussed in seventh chapter.

philosophers. Their fundamental assumption is the necessity of a political community as an extension of *Allah-centered* teleology on earth. From Ghazali to Ibn Rushd almost all Muslim scholars agree on this assumption. Farabi, Ghazali, Ibn Bajja and Ibn Rushd strictly rejected the possibility of the isolation of the individual from the community due to the assumption that there is an interaction between man's perfection and that of the state.

Farabi and Ghazali, although being members of different Islamic schools, argued in a completely parallel manner that the individual needs the assistance of other men within a political community. As Afnan (1958:178) mentions, Ibn Sina sets up a direct link between the human being's need for a socio-political structure to attain the perfection and the divine law with an ultimate end to realize justice as a substantive mission. The theoretical link between *Tadbir al-Mutawahhid* and *Madinah al-Fa'dilah* in Ibn Bajja's political philosophy is meaningful in showing this interconnected relationship between the perfection of the individual as Allah's vicegerent and the socio-political life. This is at the same time a way of justifying the socio-political system. Ibn Rushd extends this relationship to a specific understanding of citizenship through arguing that man is a part of the state; therefore he can not live without it and he must contribute his share to its maintenance and functioning.

The intellectual and social virtue has been combined in Ibn Rushd's approach for an ideal socio-political system. That leads him to a material and spiritual identification of man and state. His assertion that "the man endowed with the nature of this State [ideal State] will be of utmost virtue, just as this State is of the utmost virtue" (Ibn Rushd, 1966:163) does not illuminate only this spiritual identification of man and state, but also one of the characteristics of the way of justification of Muslim philosophers for the socio-political system within the context of the aim of the state.

Like Plato, he uses these axiological conclusions on "virtue" as an evidence for the argument of the oneness of the Ideal State. The correspondence of the axiological and political categorization is another significant feature of the Islamic socio-political thought. "Virtue is thus a kind of health and beauty, and vice is a kind of sickness. Just as health is one, so is virtue one. Therefore the Ideal State is one. The vices, however, are many and varied, just as diseases are many and varied. The ignorant States are also many and varied; but they can be summarized in four classes..." (Ibn Rushd, 1966:164). The same correspondence

might be seen also in Abu an-Najib Suhrawardi's *Nahj as-Suluk fi Siyasah al-Muluq* (1974).

In some other treatises of scholars the justification of setting up a political authority has been connected to the specification of the functions of this authority. Taftazani's explanation might be quoted as an example: "The Muslims must have an Imam, who will carry out the administration of their decisions, the maintaining of their restrictive ordinances, the guarding of their frontiers, the equipping of their armies, the receiving of their alms, the subjugation of those who get the upper hand and robbers and highwaymen, the performance of worship on Fridays and Festivals, the settlement of disputes which take place among creatures, the receiving of evidence based on legal rights, the giving in marriage of the young men and maidens who have no guardians, and the division of the booty." (1950:145) The same issue has been underlined by Baghdadi (1935:210) in *al-Farq bayn al-Firqah*¹, by Shahrastani in *Nihayah al-Iqdam*² and by Abu al-M'uîn an-Nasafi (1962:441) in *Ba'hr al-Kalâm*³.

III- CONCLUDING COMPARATIVE REMARKS :

So, the fundamental differential characteristic of the Islamic way of justification is its cosmological-ontological orientation in the Belief of the Absolute Unity and Sovereignty of Allah compared with realistic justification dependent upon the empiricist epistemology of the Western way of justification. This substantial difference has another two significant consequences. First, although this way of justification imposes an image of an "ideal state" with a substantive mission based on a meta-historical covenant, one of the original characteristic of the Islamic way of justification - contrasting with the Platonic

¹ "the Imamate is a duty incumbent on the community, because the appointment of an Imam establishes judges and executives. He guards their frontiers, leads their armies in raids, apportions the booty among them, and vindicates the one wronged against the wrong-doer."

² "There must be a leader to administer their laws, protect their country, see to their armies, divide their spoil and alms, arbitrate in disputes, punish wrong-doers, appoint officials. The Imam must warn sinners and bring them back to the right path, and take steps to cleanse the land of error with the sword." (1934:151)

³ "Another indication is the fact that when the Prophet died, the Companions assembled in the portico of the Banu Saïd and said: whosoever dies seeing not an Imam (ruling) over him, is dying the death of the times of Ignorance, (...) the reason why this is so (i.e. why they are in unbelief) is because there are some among the regulations (laid upon all believers) whose being put into operation is bound up with Imam, e.g. the Friday service, the two feasts and the marriage of orphans...."

"ideal state" and the Kantian and Hegelian ideal models- is the idea of a historical realization of this ideal state during the period of the Prophet and *Khulafâ' Rashidin* (the period of the first caliphs). Therefore, some scholars differentiate this ideal period from the historically following caliphate in the form of sultanate through using the denomination of "Perfect Caliphate".¹ This not only becomes a model both for the process of justification and legitimacy in Islamic political thought throughout Islamic history, but also is a factor for the popularization of this way of justification through strengthening the hope among Muslim masses to establish it again.

Secondly, the way of justification through theological transparency, around the belief of Tawhid in Islam on a cosmologico-ontological sphere, accelerated the process of the popularization of belief through setting up a direct link between ontology and axiology via epistemological preciseness. This horizontal popularization of belief created an integration of ontological and political images even for the illiterate Muslim masses, without any need for a vertical religious organization such as Church in Christianity. This accelerated the process of popular justification of an Islamic state within a framework of a strong internal consistency based on ontological hierarchy.

In contrast to this situation, both of theology and mystery complexities around the proximity of ontological levels and the particularization of divinity in Christianity created a hermeneutical scattering among a theocratic elite within the organization of the Church and a depopularization of justification through a systematic ontological belief. This led to an epistemological softening between Theologia and Philosophia resulting in the secularization of knowledge and life. The process in the modern era cut the ambiguous line between ontological and political spheres in Christianity and formed a theoretical ground independent from belief for the justification of the political system.

¹"If objection is made that since the period of the Khalifate was thirty years, then the time subsequent to the rightly guided Khalifas (al-Khulafa al-Rashidin) is devoid of the Imam and the whole of the Muslim people are thus disobedient and when they die, they die as in the days of Ignorance, we reply that it has already pointed out that the perfect Khalifate is what is meant." (Taftazani, 1950:146)

Chapter 5

THE PROBLEM OF THE LEGITIMACY OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY ON EPISTEMOLOGICAL-AXIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS

The principal difference in the development of legitimacy between Islamic and Western political theories might be analyzed from three perspectives: (i) epistemologico-axiological, (ii) prescriptivist, and (iii) institutional and procedural differences. The basis of all these differences is an epistemologico-axiological dimension which is bound directly to the ontologico-cosmological evaluations mentioned above.

The most effective and permanent dimension of the legitimacy of an established political authority is the fitting of the basic "norms" of the persons in the political mechanism to those of the people. Due to the fact that every norm originates from a specific approach to the epistemological sources, the basic issue in the process of legitimacy is this epistemologico-axiological dimension. A prescriptivist or procedural means of legitimacy may be valid and has a real value if it fits to this dimension. A voluntary obedience to a socio-political system in the sense of legitimacy might occur only through appropriate prescriptivist and procedural means to this basic parameter and origin of the legitimacy. A prescriptivist or procedural means for a political legitimacy could not survive in the long term unless it originates from such an origin; while an epistemologico-axiological legitimacy can overcome all institutionally supported ways of legitimacy.

The ultimate epistemological authority for the legitimacy of political authority is the principal question related to political legitimacy. The source and essence of political legitimacy can not be understood without appealing to the ultimate epistemological authority. That is the main conflict between the principle of Shura in Islam and the mission of parliament in western political tradition, as the basic procedural means for the legitimacy of political authority.

The functional similarity of these two means of political legitimacy is very deceptive and superficial if we omit the philosophical and epistemological dimensions of the problem. The principle of shura has been interpreted in Islamic political theories as appealing to the cosmological and ontological integrity, and its epistemological consequences as contrasting to the ontological apathy of the western trend related to this issue. That is the main reason for the inadaptability of the western democratic philosophy to Muslim societies, in spite of the structural similarity. Muslims do not resist democracy, if we limit democracy to a political structure which aims to create political participation, but to the ontological apathy of western democratic philosophy.

The source of the ultimate epistemological authority and its relationship with the axiological-political framework is the anchor topic of these conflicting issues. The origin of this conflict is, in fact, the disagreement between the meaning of truth in western epistemology based on compartmentalization of truth creating secularization of knowledge and the "Unity of Truth" in Islamic epistemology, together with its sources appealing to *Haqq* and *Alim*, as Names of *Allah* in the *Qur'an*.

I- WESTERN WAY OF LEGITIMACY :

1-Epistemologico-Axiological Dimension :

Talcott Parsons (1958:204) defines "legitimation" as "the the appraisal of action in terms of shared or common values in the context of the involvement of the action in the social system"(D'entreves,1963:688). Such a definition seems to be adequate to underline the place of *common value* in the process of the legitimacy. But, the question of the legitimacy is correlated to the the essence and the origin of this *common value*. Therefore, this definition necessitates the clarification of this key-concept. The basic question from the perspective of the problem of the political legitimacy is the following: "Which characteristics of a *value* make it *common* ?" I think, a sophisticated deliberation on this question leads us to discuss the validity of some traditionalist assumptions that the question of legitimacy is a question of fitting of an action to the sovereign law and therefore, the approval of this law by the majority of a society makes it common as the basic standard of value. The delicate difference between legitimacy and legality should not be forgotten when we attempt to search the real basis of the legitimacy. Rather, I insist on

that the real base of the legitimacy is fitting of a value to the epistemologico-axiological imagination of a society and that the process of the legitimacy is the process of the harmonization between them. Therefore, western paradigm described in Chapter 2 might provide a theoretical framework for the question of the legitimacy.¹

The modern artifact of the identification between legitimacy and legality assumes the norms of the current law as the basic criterion for the legitimacy. It does not explain how this current law gained such a superior position. In fact, this identification carries the indications of the re-formed epistemologico-axiological paradigm of the western civilization and therefore, it is inevitable to make the distinction between legitimacy and legality especially related to the comparative researches between western and non-western phenomena.

Weber's specification that legality is the prevailing type of legitimacy in modern society, underlines this phenomenon. But, if we accept it as the anchor point for our analysis of the political legitimacy in non-western societies, we may lead two significant misconclusions: (i) there was not any legitimate base of the political authorities in non-western societies and (ii) there was not any legal framework as the prescriptivist base for the legitimacy in non-western societies. But, the historical experiences, at least in Islamic history, shows that these conclusions are not true. Hence, the real anchor point for such a comparative analysis on the issue of legitimacy between Islamic and Western experiences might be their epistemologico-axiological base.

Such misconclusions might occur when we assume Weberian clasification of legitimacy as inevitable stages of a historical proces. But, as Mardin (1983:19) clarifies rightly, all Weberian categories on legitimacy might be found in every society at any stage. They only aim to underline the dominant way of legitimacy. Therefore, these categories should be held merely as ideal types rather than inevitable stages of a natural historical process to avoid such misconclusions in comparative studies. I do not want discuss this issue in details because we aim to explain the place of Weberian categories on the legitimacy in western way of political legitiamcy; rather to discuss their validity as a sociological methodology. In short, it should be stressed that this methodology

¹I do not want to repeat the fundamental characteristics of this paradigm. Please, refer to the second (epistemological particularization of truth: secularization of knowledge) and to the third (axiological positivism: Secularization of life and law) parts of Chapter 2.

might led the researchers to misgeneralizations in the case of the misapplication of them.

In fact, the priority of the legal forms in the process of the legitimacy indicates an imaginative transformation in the western epistemologico-axiological presuppositions around the basic paradigm. Weber's classification of the legitimacy as the charismatic¹, traditional² and rational³, implicitly, marks such a transformation. His identification of the rational legitimacy with legality, answers two critical questions related to the problem of legitimacy; namely what is the ultimate epistemological source? and what is the critical role of axiological norms between this epistemological source and the institutional mechanism? The answers of these questions show the common base of the rationalistic and deterministic ways of the political theorization which have been accepted by Friderich (1941:593,167) as alternative approaches to the political theory.⁴ Rationalism specified the ultimate epistemological source within the context of the humanization and secularization of the epistemology; while deterministic metaphysics of the new political science assigned a new role to this ultimate epistemological source, especially under the impact of the *corpuscular* perspective of science in the Newtonian and post-Newtonian period [using Kuhnian terms,1962:24]: to understand the natural mechanism of the social life which is independent from any supreme will of God or of human being. The scientism of the political theory might be accepted as an intellectual consequence of this new role together with the empiric methodology.⁵ Thus, the

¹Charismatic legitimacy, where the authority of a single individual is ascribed to the special gifts with which he is endowed, or believed to be endowed, as in the case of a hero.

²Traditional legitimacy, where authority is derived from the sacredness of precedent or from dynastic succession.

³Rational legitimacy, where authority is based on "a system of consciously made rational rules (which may be agreed upon or imposed from above), which meet with obedience as generally binding norms whenever such obedience is claimed by him whom the rule designates.

⁴"At about the same time, Carl J. Friderich was cataloguing the consequences of this disillusionment with classical theory:"The dragon of early nineteenth-century rationalism" he wrote, "has been slain quite a few times before; but now he is surely dead." In its place was arising a new political science, whose "metaphysic is deterministic;... the human being is seen motivated largely by drives beyond his control." It was this new and non-rationalist political science which imported into the field the tools and assumptions of such older non-rationalist disciplines as sociology and psychology; Freud and pareto in the 1930's and 1940's, Weber in the 1950's and 1960's."(Rogowski,1974:27)

⁵The following fundamental assumptions of the supporters of the social sciences-as-science in our age is an evident indication for the description of this new role: "(i) there exists a knowable order in the universe or society; (ii)the uniformities of society or the order of society is observable; (iii) through observation and other methods of the physical sciences, laws of social behavior can be verified and codified;(iv) social sciences can in time develop the same level of sophistication and reliability."(Denisoff, 1972:7)

ways of the empiricists and the theorists of order during the early modern period intersected in our age.

This new role is the answer for the second question. Thus, a political action is legitimate only if it originates from a rational reasoning/choice which is consistent with the natural mechanism of the social life. There is not any place for any eternal value which originates from a super-human epistemological source, within this framework. The mechanism-based legitimacy of the western experience originates from such an epistemologico-axiological base, as a veiled imagination. Legality means, within this context, having legal corollary consistent to the natural mechanism of the socio-political life. Thus, identification of the legitimacy with the legality as the prevailing type of the legalism, is a counterpart of the supremacy of mechanism-based legal forms over the value-system which becomes dependent variable in the process of the legitimacy. The post-Kantian theological inclinations towards the subjectivization and individualization based on the idea of the subjectivist conscientiousness of religion after the replacement of moral theology in state of the theological morality, might be accepted as the declaration of this axiological secularization by the theologians.

Rogowski's (1974:27) assertion that Weber is the leading figure -in the 1950's and 1960's- of the new political science whose metaphysics is deterministic and Beetham's (1974:55) denomination of Weber as protagonist of bourgeois values¹, are meaningful from this perspective of the mechanism-based legitimacy. In fact, Weber is not a vulgar protagonist of any system of values; but rather such an attitude is a counterpart of the assumption of the internal dynamics of the abstract self-adjusting mechanisms to produce their value-systems.

Such a mechanism-based legitimacy is a modern artifact; but its origins might be traced back to the Aristotelian methodology underlying the central position of the epistemology and to the particularization of truth as an ancient and medieval phenomenon. The epistemological secularization of knowledge as well as the axiological secularization of life and law are the basic prerequisites of this modern way of legitimacy. At this stage, we have to repeat one of our statements mentioned in second chapter before searching the ancient and

¹"To call Weber in the context of his political writings a bourgeois theorist, a theorist of bourgeois politics, is both to characterize a political position, and to define a problem. Weber, was, as he himself frequently asserted, a 'self-conscious' or 'class-conscious' bourgeois." (Beetham, 1974:55)

medieval sources of the process of the political legitimacy in western experience: "First, it is a clear fact that any type of secularization necessitates a mental, imaginative or practical segmentation (or particularization). It has been already shown, how a mental particularization of truth results in an epistemological secularization. Axiological secularization of life and law has originated from an ultimate particularization of normative/positive or religious/secular spheres. which is a consequence of ontological and epistemological particularization. Secondly, a pure rationalistic framework of value-system or of ethics as an indication of axiological positivism is the essential prerequisite for the secularization of life and law. This prerequisite is theoretically and imaginatively linked directly to the proximation (or equalization) of ontological and epistemological spheres."

The origins of the epistemological-axiological legitimacy in Western political philosophies might be found in the Aristotelian legacy. The relativity of ontology through empiric-realistic epistemology in Aristotle's philosophy resulted in an axiological classification of potentialities and actualities which might be accepted as a primary form of the categorization of the "normative-positive" or "ideal-real." These categorizations could be regarded as the axiological ground of secular differentiation of intellectual levels. The Aristotelian legitimation process of a political system through the assumption of the "best practicable" state based on empiric epistemology, leading to observe existing states around the axiom of "political actuality," is a good example of epistemological-axiological legitimacy. This ontologically impenetrable way of legitimacy became the fundamental type of legitimacy via historical relativism and evolutionism in modern political philosophy after the modern interpretation of the Aristotelian legacy.

The Christian way of legitimacy contributed to this legacy an institutional dimension, supported by a specific bicompartmentalization of life based on the idea of the divisibility of life into the spiritual and the material. So, the process of legitimacy has been determined through institutional relationships between the state and church or between an earthly city on the one hand and a celestial on the other in Augustinian terminology. Celestial authority as the perfect image of the divine ideal has the right to legitimate, or not, the imperfect earthly city created by sinful man. This dualistic structure formulated as "Two Swords" has philosophical origins in Stoicism.

There are several philosophical leanings as the origins of this dualistic structure. Stoic duality of matter/spirit and body/soul has been extended to Roman eclectic geo-cultural atmosphere by Posidonius of Syria and Cicero. Together with the effect of neo-Pythagoreanism under the impact of Nigidius Figulus, which merged with oriental ideas, ethical dualism became the essential feature of the pre-Christian period. On the other hand this dualistic process has been strengthened by neo-Platonism which was the last ancient attempt to explain the dualism of appearance and reality. So, the influence of Greek philosophy through neo-Epicureanism, neo-Pythagoreanism, neo-Platonism and Stoicism, of oriental mystery cults especially through Iranian Mytraism and Egyptian Isis, and polytheistic Roman paganism shaped an eclectic theoretical base around dualism and multi-central cosmologism before the spread institutionalization.

This dualistic philosophy was translated to the political understanding of the Middle Ages through the Augustinian system. So, the state had been accepted as a natural and legitimate institution and therefore every subject owed obedience and loyalty to the earthly state which began to be responsible to the leaders of the greater society, namely the Church. This process of legitimacy of current political structure led to an ethical base for the legitimacy of feudalism, because of the aristocratic elements within the Church.

This bicompartmentalization of life opened the way for the secularization of life. The lack of a comprehensive law in Christianity forced the leaders of the Church to leave the sphere of the earthly life to that of secular authority, step by step. With Martin Luther's argument that the rule of the secular authorities can never, in any circumstances, be legitimately resisted, came the declaration of the legitimacy of the final step of this divorce. The belief that final authority belongs to the Church became a symbolic slogan in the course of time because kings, as the representatives of the secular authority, began to declare not only their absolute sovereignty but also their divine quality. James I stated that the monarchy was supreme on earth; that kings were not only God's lieutenants upon earth and sat upon God's throne, but even by God Himself they were called gods.

Dynastic legitimacy was overturned by a re-formed epistemological-axiological legitimacy around "reason." Reendorsement theories, especially relativism and evolutionism, set up a bridge between actual political structure

and this new epistemology, assuming the centrality of rational knowledge in the whole life. A new axiology and ethics emerged depending on this epistemology or the process of political legitimacy. The Age of the Supremacy of Human Reason isolated religion within the Church and transformed the idea of the divisibility of life in a new form, cutting up the links between ontological transcendency and socio-political life in the process of the legitimacy. Hobbes' assumption of "self-preservation," Locke's axiom of the "natural rights of the individual," Kant's rational morality, Mill's and Bentham's utilitarianism, and James' pragmatism became the axiological basis of the political legitimacy. All of these different political philosophies have the same epistemological anchor point. A re-definition of the terms of *knowledge* and *truth* around the principles of Enlightenment, *reason*, *experience* and *nature* within the framework of *relativism* and *evolutionism* divorced the process of legitimacy from the divinely normative axiology through denying the idea of *eternal norms*. The institutional procedures for the political legitimacy in Western political systems as political participation, the mission of parliament and constitutionalism should be evaluated within this political-philosophical framework based on the humanization of ultimate epistemological-axiological sources. This epistemologico-axiological re-formulation of the western paradigm together with the mechanistic cosmology opened ways for a new imagination of the socio-political legitimacy as a synthesis of the rationalism, empiricism and determinism. The priority of the legality as a prescriptivist dimension and its mechanism-based origins during the process of legitimacy is a natural consequence of such an imaginative and theoretical background.

In short, Weber's classification of the legitimacy and his assertion that legality is the prevailing type of legitimacy of the modern society is absolutely correct from the perspective of the internal consistency and historical continuity of western civilization. But if we try to apply the same tools to Islamic legacy, we are facing a very essential problem due to the fact the problem of legality is a sub-subject of the process of the legitimacy which assumes direct control of the epistemologico-axiological dimension over prescriptivist/legal and mechanistic/institutional dimensions in Islamic tradition.

2-Prescriptivist Dimension :

The prescriptivist dimension of western political legitimacy might be attached directly to the essential characteristic of the western paradigm; namely secularization of knowledge, of life and of law as a result of the particularization in the epistemological and axiological sphere. The axiological categorization of normative/positive or ideal/positive and its epistemological sources are the theoretical and imaginative bases of the practical prescriptivist legitimacy which might be understood as legality in a narrower sense. Hobbes' statement that "law created morality, not morality created law" is a reflection of the axiological secularization in the sense of the formation of the positive law. Sidgwick's (1929:200,208) following explanation underlines this categoric differentiation, as well as its role as a factor of the prescriptivist legitimacy: "I incidentally noticed the distinction between Ideal Morality or the true moral code -by many conceived and spoken of as the "Law of God"- and positive Morality, or the rules of duty supported by the sanctions of public opinion in any given age and country (...) the moral opinions and sentiments prevalent in any community form so important a consideration in practically determining how its government ought to act, that it is desirable to survey the general relations of Positive morality to Positive Law in a modern State. (...) I, following Bentham and Austin, regarded as "legal" those rules of which the violation is repressed, directly or indirectly, by the action of Government or its subordinates; whereas the violation of a rule of positive morality is only punished by general disapprobation and its social consequences.(...)positive morality, in a well-ordered State, does not only support the action of Government: it has , of course, the further important function of regulating conduct in matters beyond the range of governmental coercion." Such a categorization of ideal and positive morality and its extensions in the legal structure as a code of law, marks one of the basic difference between this tradition and Islamic tradition which assumes an identification of ideal and positive axiological sets. Therefore, it is almost impossible to develop a prescriptivist legitimacy based on absolute imagination of a secular axiological set independent from the divinely revealed ideal morality within an Islamic framework which did not have such a categoric differentiation in its historico-cultural legacy.

Thus, such a secularization of law, as a basement for the political legitimacy, emerged from the mediaeval categorization of law as *jus divinum*

(*divine law*), *jus naturale* (natural law), *jus gentium* (law of nations) and *jus civile* (civil law). St. Isidor's categorization of law as human and divine based on the assumption that divine law established by nature and human law by custom (mores) became the legal foundation of the Idea of Two Swords throughout the ages. Gratian's twofold division "of divine or natural law on the one side and human law, which is founded on custom, on the other" (Carlyle, 1950:II/98) in following ages is very significant from the perspective of the identification of divine and natural laws within this framework of categorization. The modern version of the ontological proximity -the extreme formulation of which was *Deus siva Natura* of Spinoza- provided the imaginative base for the political legitimacy through the idea of natural law as the ultimate criteria for the formation of human law which became the legal code to specify the legitimate and illegitimate political actions.

The modern version of the prescriptivist dimension based on the idea of the positive law came out in the process of the re-emergence of the natural law within this framework of modern version. One of the first formulation of the basic principle of this modern version was developed by Hobbes; while its philosophically most consistent interpretation was achieved by Spinoza. The basic principles of his Laws of Nature might be extracted from Leviathan as following: "(i) *To seek Peace and follow it*;¹ (ii) *By all means we can, to defend ourselves*;² (iii) *That men perform their Covenants made*;³ (iv) *That a man which receiveth Benefit from another of meer Grace, Endeavour that he which giveth it, have no reasonable cause to repent him of his good will*;⁴ (v) *Compleasance: That every man strive to accommodate himselfe to the rest*;⁵ (vi)

¹"That every man ought to endeavor Peace, as farre as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of Warre. The first branch of which Rule, containeth the first and Fundamentall Law of Nature; which is to seek Peace, and follow it."(n.d.:67)

²"The second, the summe of the Right of Nature, which is by all means we can, to defend our selves. From this Fundamentall Law of Nature, by which men are commanded to endeavour Peace, is derived this second law; That a man be willing, when others are so too, as farre forth, as for Peace and defence of himselfe shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himselfe."(n.d.:67)

³"From that law of Nature, by which we are obliged to transferre to another, such Rights, as being retained, hinder the peace of Mankind, there followeth a Third; which is this, that men performe their Covenants made: without which, Covenants are in vain, and but Empty words; and the Right of all men to all things remaining, we are still in the condition of Warre."(n.d.:74)

⁴"The breach of this Law, is called Ingratitude; and hath the same relation to Grace, that Injustice hath to Obligation by Covenant."(n.d.:78)

⁵The observers of this Law, may be called Sociable (the Latines call them *Commodi*) the contrary Stubborn, Isociable, Froward, Intractable."(n.d.:79)

That upon caution of the future time, a man ought to pardon the offences past of them that repenting, desire it;¹ (vii) That in Revenges, Men look not at the greatnesse of the evill past, but the greatnesse of the good to follow;² (viii) that no man by deed, word, countenance or gesture, declare Hatred, or Contempt of another;³ (ix) That every man acknowledge other for his Equall by Nature;⁴ (x) That at the entrance into conditions of Peace, no man require to reserve to himselfe any Right, which he is not content should be reserved to every one of the rest;⁵ (xi) if a man be trusted to judge between man and man, it is a precept fo the law of Nature, that he deale Equally between them;⁶ (xii) That such things as cannot be divided, be enjoyed in Common, if it can be; and if the quantity of thi thing permit, without Stint; otherwise Proportionably to the number of them that have Right;⁷ (xiii) That all men that mediate Peace, be allowed safe Conduct;⁸"

Hobbes accepts these *Lawes of Nature* which are "Immutable and Eternall", as the basic criteria for the formation of legal code "For Injustice, Ingratitude, Arrogance, Pride, Iniquity, Acception of persons, and the rest can never be made lawfull" and "For it can never be that Warre shall preserve life, and Peace destroy it." (n.d.:82) Thus, the prescriptivist regulations as a legal code should be consistent with these natural laws.

Spinoza's ontological statement, *Deus siva Natura*, as the ultimate case of ontological proximity provided a consistent theory for the theologico-philosophical base of the secularization of the idea of natural law as the set of criteria of the prescriptivist political legitimacy. His presupposition that "God is not a legislator or king who lays down laws for men"⁹ led him to a very

¹"For pardon is nothing but granting of Peace." (n.d.:79)

²"For this law is consequent to the next before it, that commandeth pardon, upon security of the Future time." (n.d.:79)

³The breach of which Law, is commonly called Contumely." (n.d.:79)

⁴"The breach of this precept is Pride." (n.d.:80)

⁵"The observers of this law, are those we call Modest, and the breakers Arrogant men." (n.d.:80)

⁶"For without that, the Controversies of men cannot be determined but by Warre." (n.d.:80)

⁷"For otherwise the distribution is Unequall, and contrary to Equitie." (n.d.:80)

⁸"For the Law that commandeth Peace, as the End, commandeth Intercession, as the Means; and to Intercession the Means is safe Conduct." (n.d.:81)

⁹"I conclude then that the stupidity of the masses, and their failure to think, is the only reason why God is described as a legislator or king, and called just, merciful, and so on; that in fact God acts and directs everything by the necessity of his own nature and perfection alone; and finally, that his decrees and volitions are eternal truths, and always involve necessity." (1965a,83)

important conclusion: The laws of God or nature are scientific laws,¹ not commands or prescriptions; they operate whether men apprehend them or not; and they are inviolable. Thus, laws of nature are ultimate truths beyond all religious laws: "No doubt when we disregard the unknown ways in which things are connected in the system of nature, and, confining our attention to the dictates of reason which concern religion, regard them as revealed to us by the voice of God in our own hearts, or, indeed, as revealed to the prophets in the form of laws; then, speaking in the manner of men, we say that a man obeys God when he loves him with a sound mind, and sins when he is led by blind desire. But we must always remember that we are in the power of God like clay in the power of the potter, who from the same lump make some vessels for honorable, and others for dishonorable use; and hence that, although a man can *transgress* the decrees of God which have written as laws upon *our* minds or the minds of the Prophets, he *can* in no wise transgress the eternal decree of God which is written upon universal nature, and which has regard to the system of nature as a whole."(1965b:281-3) Thus, no obligation can stand against a law of nature.

The rejection of the absolute authority of the religious law has been followed by a synthesis of the natural and human law as an evident verification of the secularization of law, in Spinoza's system: "Although I fully admit that all things are determined to exist and act in a fixed and definite way by universal laws of nature, I still say the laws of the second type depend on the will of men; and for two reasons. I. Since man is part of nature, he forms part of nature's power. Everything, therefore, which follows from the necessity of human nature, i.e. from nature itself conceived in the determinate form of human nature, follows, albeit necessarily, from human power. Hence the institution of these laws may well be said to depend on the will of men, because they largely depend on the power of the human mind, yet, unlike necessary laws as I have just defined it, need not be contained in an adequate conception of the human mind as perceiving things under the form of truth and falsity. II. My second reason for asserting that these laws depend on the will of men is that we ought to define and explain things through their proximate causes, since general considerations about necessity and causal connexion can give us very little help in forming and arranging our ideas about particular things."(1965a:67)

¹By the right of nature, then, I mean the actual laws or rules of nature in accordance with which all things come to be; that is, the actual power of nature(1965b:267)

These sentences aim to harmonize two rising tendencies of that critical period: anthropocentric epistemology and mechanistic/deterministic interpretation of the ontological proximity. The human base of the natural law is very apparent in Hobbes and Locke, too: Hobbes (n.d.:66) stress that a Law of Nature, is a precept or generall Rule found out by Reason" while Locke (1963:253) identifies the Law of Nature with the Law of Reason. This synthesis might be traced back to the Thomistic understanding of natural law as a mediaeval legacy.¹ Locke deviates from the tradition by denying that the natural law is inscribed in the minds of men and that it can be known from men's natural inclination or from the universal consent of men, to say nothing of the tradition: the only way of knowing the natural law is by ascending from the sensibly perceived things to God's power and wisdom as to what God wills the man to do.(Strauss,1959:198) Locke's emphasis on empiric epistemology to find out the laws of nature as the natural constitution of man, in his *Essay on the Law of Nature*² is a very significant contribution to these attempts of synthesis. Empiric epistemology and naturalistic determinism intersected on this synthesis and co-effected the prescriptivist dimension of the political legitimacy through the formation of the positive law based on the the necessity of the actual social mechanism.

One of the most fundamental consequence of this idea of natural law is the set of precepts of the natural rights which became the theoretical and juristic core for the prescriptivist dimension of political legitimacy till nowadays. Locke's assumption that natural law constitutes the natural constitution of man

¹ Regan's following statements clarifies the relationship between anthropocentric epistemology and natural law: "The absolutely first principle of practical reason is self-evident in its accessibility to human reason: all human assent to the principle on understanding the terms. There is, therefore, no possibility that any human being with the use of reason could fail to recognize that humans should seek what is humanly good and avoid what is humanly bad. Second, with the aid of experience, humans recognize that their specific good includes preservation of one's life, sexual union, family life, search after truth, and life in society with other humans, and they without argument assent to their moral obligation to seek these goods according to rules of reason. There is, therefore, no possibility that any human being with the use of reason and the requisite experiential knowledge can fail to recognize the validity of the primary precepts of the natural law. Third, proximate secondary precepts, like the precept against killing humans without justification, flow so readily from primary precepts; if some do fail to recognize the latter, as Aquinas says, it can only be because passions, bad habits, or customs blind reason."(1986:24)

²Strauss (1959:198) summarizes the main thesis of these essays as following: "There exists a natural law which owes its obligatory power to the fact, known by the natural light, that that law is the will of God; the content of the natural law is known by the natural light which indicates what is conformable to a rational nature or to the natural constitution of man, and hence good."

shows the direct link between the presuppositions of natural law/natural right and prescriptivist dimension of the political legitimacy.

Many of these precepts of the natural law are almost similar to those of the ethical prerequisites of the political legitimacy in Islamic political theories written many centuries before Hobbes. But the fundamental difference among them should not be forgotten which is a direct impact of the alternative weltanschauungs. The axiological foundations of Islamic political legitimacy are eternal values given by a Supreme Divine Being which is sovereign over the human being and nature. Thus, the set of these axiological norms is object itself; rather than a being a subject or dependent variable of a specific imagination of nature. On the contrary, the set of the precepts of the natural laws became the subject of the changes of the imagination of nature throughout the ages. Thus, they have been transformed according to the transformation of the world views related to the natural and social mechanisms. For example, although Hobbes denominates his set of the precepts of natural law as the eternal and immutable; it has been re-formulated by Locke and by following philosophers according to the imagination of nature in their period which directly correlated with the ideas on the social and political mechanisms. Spinoza's ideal form which resulted in the identification of the laws of science with the laws of nature, proved the relativity of these laws as a dependent variable of the scientific achievements. Thus, prescriptivist dimension began to be directed by the necessities of the new socio-political and socio-economic mechanisms and environments especially after the extension of the idea of natural mechanism to the socio-economic and socio-political sphere parallel to the fundamental assumption that social life has an independent internal mechanism beyond a supreme will over it by God or by man. I think, the basic factor for such a transformation is the essential characteristic of western tradition; namely ontological proximity which creates an imagination of the identification between God and nature. The eternity of Hobbesian natural laws were originated from its divine nature; but the changes on the imagination of nature parallel to the new re-formulated central position of epistemology did not only transformed the precepts of the natural law, but also the imagination of God too.

3- Institutional and Procedural Dimension :

The institutional/procedural dimension of political legitimacy might be searched in two sub-groups; namely (i) religious ceremonies as a symbolic declaration of the acceptance of the political authority; (ii) secular procedural means such as bilateral act in feudalism or selection in the sense of political participation in the modern democratic tradition to show the consent of the governed people for the distribution of political authority.

The first type of the institutional/procedural dimension was one of the basic means for the legitimacy of the political authority in mediaeval ages, as well as in secular dynastic legitimacy during the formation of absolutist monarchies after Reformation. It was a part of the particularization of the divine and earthly authorities in mediaeval ages: "Until the time of the Investiture Controversy the general conviction prevailed that kings were essentially different from all other laymen. They had a special mission from God and in them God's ruling will was peculiarly active, ennobling their persons. The origins of this veneration of the sovereign prince are manifold; it is a legacy both of ancient conceptions of divine kingship and of Germanic religious sentiment, but is primarily the result of biblical stories and commands, which were the main directive force in the mediaeval mind. The king's rule is holy, his person sacred; he is set up and put down by God. In pictures of mediaeval rulers God's hand is sometimes seen over the king's head as a symbol of his religious eminence. The Church took account of this in ceremony of royal consecration, which was reckoned among the sacraments in the early middle ages, and so drew kingship into its spiritual territory. In the ceremony of consecration, it was held God gave the king something of His power through His servants the bishops, and as a result the king became "a new man" (...) It is clear that, from the point of view of religion, royal theocracy was only possible if the king was given a place in the hierarchy above the bishops. In Carolingian times the king was commonly regarded as the equal of the pope, sometimes even as his superior. If, in early mediaeval royal portraits, bishops also appear, they are always smaller than the king; they show a respectful mien and a humble bearing, and the very arrangement of the figures indicates their lower rank. In the later middle ages this is entirely changed; from this period we possess paintings of archbishops of Mainz at imperial coronations, and the prelates are larger than the kings who stand beside them, whereas in earlier painting the

only figures which overshadow the king are those of Christ and the saints. On ceremonial occasions the king took the first place, unless the pope himself was present. The glorification of the king reaches at its highest point when, like Christ, he is depicted seated in a mandorla, the symbol of the incarnation, or when the dogmatically impossible assertion is made that the bishop is merely the representative of Christ, the king the vicar of God the Father himself." (Tellenbach, 1970:57-60) The rituals of crowning by Pope were having such a role for the procedural legitimacy. The ritual of crowning of Charlemagne (768-814) by Pope Leo III (795-816) was a typical example from this perspective.

The forerunners of the dynastic legitimacy during the period of Absolutism used the same ceremonial/procedural means provided by religion to legitimize their political authority in the opinion of laymen. The process of the nationalization of the churches after the experiences of the royal councils was an attempt to benefit from religion in the process of the institutional legitimacy. It might be said that Protestant Reformation was provoked by monarchs to use religious symbols and institutional/procedural means for the legitimacy of their political authority.

The origins of this type of institutional/procedural legitimacy as a specific relationship between religion and politics to develop a legitimate base for the supremacy of monarchs as the centers of the secular power might be searched in the reconquest of the Roman political legacy. Especially, Augustinian revival in Rome provided a historical experience to transform the base of legitimacy through using religious reformism. There was a close relationship between religious and political images especially in later Roman imperial period where the imperial-cult was the essential characteristic of the religious life. Religion in Rome was used as a mechanism for the process of the internalization and popularization of the socio-political system. Thus, it has been used as a sub-system providing a base of legitimacy to the super-system of socio-political institutionalization. Therefore, almost all movements to reform and re-strengthen the state, aimed first to revive religious consciousness in the direction of this attempt. The fundamental characteristic of Roman religion that it was directly correlated with the pragmatic aims of the socio-political system rather than with the sophisticated cosmological and ontological question.

Augustinian revival of ancient Roman religion provides indicative clues from this perspective. The revival of Augustus was more a political attempt than religious in aiming to recreate the state-cult through the re-establishing Roman ancient virtues. Through these reforms, he tried to prevent the expansion of oriental mysterious religions in Rome which might be a threat for the state-cult. He took the religious title of Pontifex Maximus which became the sign of the headship of the state-religion after him, both for his pagan and Christian successors. Many temples and a new college (Augustales) of priests were built for his cult after the recognition of his Divinity in Senate, being a God. His successors continued to use Augustus' cult, together with imperial cult, for the same pragmatic aim in political life: He has been declared a god after his death and his worship has been accepted as a religious ceremony. This cult was, in fact, a test of loyalty to Roman political authority. The official religion of the empire became imperial cult of Caesarism from Tiberius to Diocletian. The main reason for the persecution of Christians in Rome was the rejection to take part ceremonies of imperial cult because of their beliefs. But, this religious opposition has been interpreted as a political disobedience by the political authority and Christians began to be suffered.

Roman religion remained as a formal faith of the state rather than a cosmological and ontological belief because of the practical and unimaginative character of Roman culture. The priest organization was a state office composed of priests who were state officers. Roman religion was having a characteristic of class-religion due to its socio-political function. The conflict between patricians and plebeians was originated both from the religious and political sources. Plebeians were largely excluded from the public ceremonies. This was a natural result of the polytheism which assumes a differentiation of gods according to the social status of men. The similarities between the life-styles of aristocrats and pagan epics on gods is very interesting from this perspective.¹

This idea of divine qualities of Roman emperors has been strengthened by Mithraic elements after the Roman expansion towards Asia: "We have record of Roman generals in Asia who were honored with sacred rites and these were merely the forerunners of the long list of deified emperors of Rome." (Laing, 1963:147) Thus, the idea of "sacred majesty" and "divine rights of the kings" as

¹The origin of the modern fact that there are different churches for blacks and whites even in modern Christianity might be found this religious-social stratification in ancient Roman period.

a specific way of the political legitimacy used for the absolute monarchy of Europe originated from the Roman and Mithraic legacy.

The subtle, but essential difference between this legacy which is the origin of the secularization of the legitimacy in western Europe and Islamic religious-political unity should not be confused because of their superficial similarities in the sphere of institutionalization. Superficially, both of them assumes a complete unification of the political and religious authorities. But, the way for the theorization of the justification of the socio-political system and of the political legitimacy of them oppose to each other radically. First of all, Roman version of the centralization of religious and political authorities did not presuppose a very well-defined value base for the epistemologico-axiological legitimacy of the socio-political system; rather it assumes a pragmatic function for religion in the process of the socio-political legitimacy. Therefore, the institutional unification of religious and political authorities did not create a real and objective images in the political culture in the sense of the identification of religious and political values in an autonomous set. Hence, it is very difficult to re-produce this political culture around the same images, if political actualities necessitates another epistemologico-axiological framework for the legitimacy; because the political leaders or posts have divine quality, rather than the value system of the political culture. This case is absolutely different in Islamic case. Islamic value system has absolute priority compared to the political institutionalization due to the fact that its epistemologico-axiological dimension has divine quality rather than corresponding leaders or posts of this dimension. This characteristic provides an internal dynamism for Muslim masses to reproduce their value-based political culture even in the case of being in opposition. Secondly, roman version of religious-political centralism assumes that religion is in the service of politics while Islamic political imagination insists on an absolute identification of these spheres as an extension of its ontological-cosmological justification of the political system around the belief of Tawhid. Hence, the revival of Roman legacy related to the politico-religious centralism has been used by the secular forces against papal authority for the secularization of the legitimacy of political authority in Europe; whereas Muslim masses managed to reproduce the basic parameters of Islamic political culture against secular political culture which pyramidically imposed by the westernization-oriented elites during the process of modernization.

Secular procedural means such as bilateral act in feudalism or selection in the sense of political participation in the modern democratic tradition to show the consent of the governed people for the distribution of political authority, might be attached directly to the idea of the social contract. The procedural legitimacy as the way of showing the consent of the governed people -as it has been written in *American Declaration of Independence*- is intended to moralize and legitimize the act of obedience to the political authority and to law, in that by consenting, an individual gives himself a moral reason to obey the law freely. Thus, obedience to law becomes, by virtue of consent, an act which an individual voluntarily ought to perform if he is to act morally. (Richards, 1971:198)

This consent was carrying traditional elements in the mediaeval experience of the bilateral act as the basis of contractual understanding to specify rights and obligations in the feudal structure because the teutonic tribes¹ had no sense of the state as distant, impersonal continuing source of law. Although, it is an evident historical fact that the mission of parliament indebted to a great extent to this mediaeval experience; the procedural/institutional dimension of political legitimacy gained its real importance after the emergence of the transformed epistemologico-axiological dimension and its prescriptivist extensions in the sense of natural law and natural right. Political participation as a mechanism of this procedural/institutional dimension became central phenomenon as a counterpart of the rising democratic feeling. The basic assumption of this phenomenon is the axiom that "every man is the best judge of his own interest, and therefore best knows what sort of government and what laws will promote that interest and that those laws and that government will presumably be the best for a community as a whole which are desired by the largest number of its members." (Bryce, 1921:44) Thus, the consent as the mark of the declaration of the political legitimacy is manifested in the liberal-democratic electoral process as a procedural/institutional means, where voting means consenting: "The democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions which realizes the common good by making the people itself decide issues through the election of individuals who are to assemble in order to carry out its will" (Schumpeter, 1962:250)

¹"The idea of personal allegiance, emphasized in the Teutonic comitatus, in which a band of young warriors attached themselves to a leader." (Gettell, 1959:104)

The development of such a procedural/institutional legitimacy evolved parallel to the rising of two mechanisms; namely one political on the other economic. The political mechanism is the formation of a new base of sovereignty: national sovereignty or sovereignty of the people. The rising importance of this procedural/institutional legitimacy led to a shift in political theory towards the researches to find out the best way of the fulfillment of this procedural legitimacy. Liberal democratic tradition and socialist/popularistic democracies began to defend the supremacy of their systems due to their appropriateness for the political participation rather than the attachment of them to a value-system. Thus, political participation as a means of the political legitimacy became a value by itself and began to reproduce the norms of the political life. The idea of the positive morality together with the axiom of the moral neutrality of the new political science provided imaginative base for the supremacy of the procedural/institutional type as a mechanism-based form of the political legitimacy.

The economic mechanism which accelerated this process is the market mechanism. Therefore, democratic ways of the political participation as the procedural/institutional way of legitimacy is a counterpart of the capitalistic evolution based on market mechanism. First of all, such a procedural/institutional legitimacy necessitates two significant axiomatic prerequisites ; namely equality and freedom. Positivistic/materialistic interpretations of these prerequisites was emerged as a natural consequence of the market mechanism because it assumes an equalization of the men in the sense of labor as a factor of production, while freedom has been accepted as the most fundamental necessity fro the most productive economy to attain material happiness in market mechanism. The justification of democracy by utility is a theoretical reflection of this phenomenon.

Socialistic solution tried to manage highest political participation in order to show that it is the most perfect way of the procedural/institutional way of legitimacy through setting up a new morality and a new bureaucratic structure to control the evils of the capitalistic tendencies on behalf of the rationalistic prerequisites. But, this bureaucratic mechanism has taken over the role of the market mechanism in the sense of the production of its norms by itself and reproduce them within a consistent and independent mechanistic structure.

The necessities of human being such as freedom and equality were being discussed within a metaphysical rather than in the positivistic/materialistic framework in pre-capitalist period. Thus, such a bicompartamental division of human happiness is a natural result of the dualistic structure of the western paradigm. The fundamental contrast between Islamic and Western ways of legitimacy and the basic reason why transfer of the western procedural/institutional ways of political legitimacy to the Muslim societies did not gain a real base for the political legitimacy might be understood on this point: Western political culture and theories moved towards a mechanism-based legitimacy which is consistent to its historico-cultural legacy while Islamic societies continued to be attached to a political imagination and culture which is highly value-dependent and rejects any type of the compartmentalization related to its epistemologico-axiological foundations.

II- ISLAMIC WAY OF LEGITIMACY :

In contrast to the western experience related to political legitimacy, the epistemologico-axiological basis of political legitimacy in Islam has been directly attached to the ontological antecedents. The belief of the unity of the responsibility of man and understanding of the unity of life originated directly from the belief of the transcendental "Unity of Allah". These are the two basic grounds upon which all processes of legitimacy in the socio-economic and socio-political lives of Islam are based.

1- Epistemologico-Axiological Dimension:

The most distinctive characteristic of Islamic way of legitimacy is its normative character. The highly concentrated ontological and epistemological differentiation created a very persistent set of "eternal values" in Islam which has been firmed throughout the historical experiences. The fundamental problem of Islamic way of legitimacy is whether institutionalization of political authority is fitting to these values or not; while the basic dynamism of Islamic socio-political history is the realization of these eternal values via the best

institutional mechanism. Therefore, the anchor point of Islamic legitimacy is this set of eternal values; while the efficiency or rationality of the political mechanism is a secondary and dependent variable to it. This characteristic is especially important in the periods of civilizational challenge. Islamic basic epistemological sources, the Qur'an and Hadiths, do not offer any definite and tight type of socio-political mechanism. Therefore, Muslims do not hesitate in benefitting from the institutional experiences of other civilizations. This is, in fact a natural result of the Qur'anic fundamental characteristic that the Qur'an is concerned mainly with matters relating to the normative issues such as right/wrong and good/evil, not with matters relating to the mechanisms and planning in details. But, they always tried to adopt this institutions and mechanisms to the mentioned epistemologico-axiological dimension. Such a civilizational challenge resulted in a reproduction of a socio-political culture, so long as they achieve to preserve these eternal values within this process of institutional transformation. The richness of the original productivity of socio-cultural mechanisms in Islamic civilization from Andalusia to India, should be searched in this unique characteristic in the history of civilization.

Ibn Khaldun's following arguments show how a Muslim scholar sees the relationship between this epistemologico-axiological dimension and the process of institutionalization: "The religious law does not censure royal authority as such and does not forbid its existence. It merely censures the evils resulting from it, such as tyranny, injustice, and pleasure-seeking. Here, no doubt we have forbidden evils. They are the concomitants of royal authority. The religious law praises justice, fairness, the fulfillment of religious duties, and the defence of religion. It states that these things will of necessity find their reward [in the other world]. Now, all these things are concomitants of royal authority, too. Thus, censure attaches to royal authority only on account of some of its qualities and conditions, and not others. (The religious law) does not censure royal [political] authority as such, nor does it seek to suppress it entirely. It also censures concupiscence and wrathfulness in responsible persons, but it does not want to see either of these qualities relinquished altogether, because necessity calls for their existence. It merely wants to see that proper use is made of them. David and Solomon possessed royal authority such as no one else ever possessed, yet they were divine prophets and belonged, in God's eyes, among the noblest human beings that ever existed."(1967:157)

But, this hospitality for the internalization of the institutions does not mean that Islamic institutionalization is merely an imitation from the pre-Islamic political structures; rather it stress the priority of the epistemologico-axiological dimension and the dependency of the institutionalization process to this dimension. The originality of the Islamic institutionalization based on this character. For example, the Caliphate as the ultimate religious-political institution is purely an original Islamic socio-political structure. Arnold's (1965:11) correct comparison between The Holy Roman Empire and the Caliphate underlines this fact: "The Holy Roman Empire was consciously and deliberately a revival of a pre-existing political institution that had been in existence before the birth of Christianity and was now revived under a specifically Christian character. Charlemagne assumed a title which had been held by heathen emperors before him, (...) Unlike the Holy Roman Empire, the Caliphate was no deliberately imitation of a pre-existent form of civilization or political organization. It was the outgrowth of conditions that were entirely unfamiliar to the Arabs, and took upon itself a character that was exactly moulded by these conditions. The Caliphate as a political institution was the child of its age, and did not look upon itself as the revival of any political institution of an earlier date." Thus, Islamic expansion towards the geo-cultural and socio-political axis from Nile to Oxus¹ created an original institutionalization based on a specific epistemologico-axiological dimension.

This approach based on the centrality of the epistemologico-axiological dimension during the process of of the institutionalization might be applied for the institutional transformation in modern era; but the fundamental problem of Muslim societies, especially the westernization-oriented elites of these societies, during the modern challenge of western civilization is the fact that modern western socio-political and socio-economic mechanisms, themselves, produce their values. This means that it is impossible to accept any eternal value within such a social organization composed of self-valuing mechanisms. Therefore, Muslim societies faces a twofold pincers; either to deny their eternal values or to resist against imposed foreign institutions. The first period of this civilizational challenge was seeming as a victory of the westernization-oriented elites. But, in the long run, the secret power of the "eternal values" comes into the picture as the origin of the resistance of the traditional socio-political culture. The dimension of this mechanism/value imbalance related to the social change will be discussed in the following chapter; but at this stage I want to underline

¹ look to Hodgson (1974:I/103-146) for the pre-Islamic characteristics of this axis

that the basic dichotomy of the socio-political structure of Muslim societies today is the impossibility of the legitimacy of the institutional political structure via "eternal values". There is not a relationship of correspondence between value base and institutional structure which is the essential condition for a stable process of legitimacy. Throughout the history, Muslim scholars tried to check political mechanism via a very stable and resistant value structure and to re-establish them. Now, Muslim scholars and masses face a new phenomena: the ultimate dependency of value structure to the mechanisms. This new phenomena prevents both checking the institutional mechanisms through the direction of the "eternal values" and preserving a stable value structure. This creates an obscurity related to the process of the legitimacy of socio-political authority and socio-economic mechanisms.

The idea of the responsibility of man is principium individuationis of Muslim society (ummah) as a socio-political unity. This is an open society for any human being, regardless of his origin, race and color, who accepts this responsibility which is the basis of the identification and political socialization process of a Muslim in an Islamic socio-political environment. This political identification and integration process in an Islamic society is the main difference in comparison with the state tradition in western civilization -as nationalist, communist or liberal/democratic- where the basis of political identification and integration occurs through a nation or class consciousness. The achievement of legitimacy in such a socio-political unity is, therefore, directly related to the question of whether the political authority in the society provides the requirements for the fulfillment of this responsibility. From this perspective, "ideal/real" and "positive/normative" socio-political images and structures should be intersected due to a given axiological base through a divine epistemology originating from God's Will.

2- Prescriptivist Dimension :

This epistemologico-axiological base of the political legitimacy in Islam imposes a comprehensive legal order (Law) revealed by Allah to be applied within the framework of the "Unity of Life". This is another distinctive character of Islamic legitimacy. The doctrine which is almost universally accepted by Muslim schools and sects is the rejection of the compartmentalization of life and law. This is another paradigmatic unity among Islamic political theories

originating from their ontological evaluations.¹ This paradigmatic unity has been strengthened by a very strong eschatological dimension.

Ibn Khaldun's following interpretation (1978:154-5) is a clear indication for the holistic consistency between eternal norms, eschatology, law and politics: "Therefore, it is necessary to have reference to ordained political norms, which are accepted by the mass and to whose laws it submits.. (...) If these norms are ordained by the intelligent and leading personalities and minds of the dynasty, the result will be a political (institution) with an intellectual (rational) basis. If they are ordained by God through a lawgiver who establishes them as (religious) laws, the result will be a political (institution) with a religious basis, which is useful for life in both this and the other world. This is because the purpose of human beings is not only their worldly welfare. This entire world is trifling and futile. The purpose (of human beings) is their religion, which leads them to happiness in the other world. Therefore, religious laws have as their purpose to cause (them) to follow such a course in all their dealings with God and their fellow men. This (situation) also applies to royal authority, which is natural in human social organization. (the religious laws) guide it along the path of religion, so that everything will be under the supervision of the religious law. Anything (done by royal authority) that is dictated by force., superiority, or the free play of the power of wrathfulness, is tyranny and injustice and considered reprehensible by (the religious law), as it is also considered reprehensible by the requirements of the political wisdom. Likewise, anything(done by royal authority) that is dictated by considerations of policy or political decisions without supervision of the religious law, is also reprehensible, because it is vision lacking the divine light. At the Resurrection the actions of human beings, whether they had to do with royal authority or anything else, will come back to them. Political laws consider only worldly interests. On the other hand, the intention the Lawgiver has concerning mankind is their welfare in the other world. Therefore, it is necessary, as required by the religious law, to cause the mass to act in accordance with the religious laws in all their affairs touching both this world and the other world. The authority to do so was

¹ Some orientalist tried to show that there were two contrasting laws, shar' and örfi, in Muslim states, especially in the Ottoman socio-political system, and accepted this argument as an anchor point for their speculations on the secularization of law in Muslim societies. But due to the fact that örf (consuetude) is a source of Islamic sharia (Hanifah), except where it contradicts elementary sources, the Qur'an and Hadiths, a regulation based on örf is part of the juridic scheme, fiqh. Therefore, such speculations could not have any meaning without referring them to the methodology of Islamic Law.

possessed by the representatives of the religious law, the prophets then by those who took their place, the caliphs."

Islamic comprehensive law based on "eternal norms" consists of a prescriptivist dimension of political legitimacy. The legitimacy of a political authority can be checked through its attitude related to the application of this law, such as Ibn Khaldun insists. Mawardi argues that the real motive of the political leadership (imamah) is the following of the "straight path", while Ghazali underlines two conditions for the legitimacy of a political authority, Justice and Law.

These idea of "eternal norms" as the fundamental axiological framework have epistemological base for their justification in the process of becoming a conviction. The superiority of divine law as the prescriptivist formulation of these norms depends on this extraordinary origin of knowledge; namely nubuwwah (prophecy). This is basically assumed by falasifah, as well as by scholars and jurists. For example, Ibn Sina attaches his systematic binding between man's happiness/perfection, justice as the basic norm and divine law, to the belief of Allah and nubuwwah.¹ Likewise, Ibn Rushd connects his political theory with the idea of the superiority of *sharia* which is the law of the Muslim state and aims at the happiness of all its citizens, the philosophers as well as the masses. His argument that the perfection and superiority of sharia over man-made laws consists in its divine character shows "the ontologically defined epistemological" dimension of his idea of political legitimacy. Parallel to these scholars, Ibn Taymiyyah, re-defining the key-term *wilayah*, specifies that the object of wilayah is to order what is permissible and to prohibit what is not. aiming at the rule of justice and the well-being of the people.

Obedience to a legitimate authority in maruf (Right and Just) within the legal limitations is a continuation of the obedience to Allah according to the Qur'an: "O ye who believe! Obey Allah, and obey the messenger and those of

¹"Man lives in society, Avicenna (ibn Sina) argues; no one is happy entirely alone. And in a human society men are bound to have constant association with one another. These relations must be governed and directed so that justice may prevail. To dispense justice there must needs be law and to lay down laws there must be a lawgiver. To be a lawgiver, a man must rise to become the leader of man, and devote his life and efforts to the problems of society. And to be chosen for that mission he must possess merits that others either do not have at all or have to a lesser extent than he. By these merits he must win the submission and support of his fellow man. Having gained these, he can attend to their needs and apply the "order of the Good" provided for them by God. Obviously this leader could not be a human being like all the rest; except that he is chosen, authorized and inspired by God who makes his holy spirit descend upon him." (Afnan, 1958:178-9)

you who are in authority; and if you have a dispute concerning any matter, refer it to Allah and the messenger if ye are (in truth) believers in Allah and the Last Day. That is better and more seemly in the end." So, the legitimacy of a political authority is related to its obedience to the legal order of Allah. But no one has the right to command obedience in the service of masiyah (sin).

This is the axiological basis for a legitimate opposition in Islamic political theories. Abu Hanifah's creed in this matter was that the caliphate of an unjust incumbent was basically wrong and insupportable, and deserved to be overthrown; that people not only had the right, but it was their duty to rise in rebellion against it; that such a rebellion was not only allowed but obligatory, provided, however, that it promised to succeed in replacing the tyrant or transgressor by a just and virtuous ruler, and not fizzle out in mere loss of lives and power. (Mawdudi, 1963:688) For some scholars, this common judgement has been extended to the personal affairs -such as evil-doing- of the political leader. For example, according to al-Shafi'i, the Imam may be removed on the grounds of evil-doing and tyranny, and in like any judge (qadī) or commander (Taftazani, 1950:150). This right of the community to depose of the unjust caliph from the leadership has been verified through the words of Abu Bakr at his election to the caliphate: "You have put me in power, though I am not the best among you. If I do well, help me, and if I do wrong, then set me right." Rashid Rī'da connects this idea of the legitimate opposition to the power of community and to the consultation (shura) as a procedural means. He (1988:22) uses the arguments of the scholars of the classical period for the verification of his argument: "In the text of the Mawaqif of 'A'dud we read, "The Community may depose its leader in case of necessity, but if that will lead to a schism (fitna), one should choose the lesser of two evils." In defining the Caliphate, we have already cited the authority of al-Rāzī: "The supreme authority belongs to the Community, which may depose the Imam (the Caliph) if it sees the necessity for doing so."¹ Al-Sa'd says "By Community (*Ummah*) it meant those with power to loose and bind, that is : those who represent the Community by possession of authority and prestige; their authority extends to the others, that is, the individuals in the Community. In his commentary on the verse "Obey God, His Messenger, and those in authority among you" (4:58), he makes it clear that "those in authority" means those who may loose and bind, who represent the power of the Community. He is followed here by al-Nisabūri, and by our teacher and

¹"Inna ar-riāsah al-āmmah hiya haq al-ummaḥ allati laha an t'azil al immah iza raata mujiban li'azlihi."

shaykh (Muhammad Abduh). It is necessarily known that "those in authority" at the Prophet's time were consulted in the general welfare; they were not 'Ulama of the Law, or judges, but men of counsel among the leading Muslims."¹

The prerequisites for being Imam or Caliph and his duties after the election shows the epistemologico-axiological base of the prescriptivistic legitimacy of a political authority in Islam very clearly. Ibn Khaldun's formulation of the prerequisites governing the institution of (the imamate) as (i) knowledge,² (ii) probity,³ (iii) competence⁴ and (iv) freedom of the senses and limbs from any defect that might effect judgement⁵ and action⁶ and his interpretations on these qualifications proves the importance of the epistemologico-axiological dimension as a premise of the political legitimacy.⁷

The systematization of falasifah on the necessary qualifications of the political leader has twofold importance; from the perspective of the relationship of dependency between epistemologico-axiological foundation and its prescriptivistic reflections related to the question the legitimacy; and from the

¹I have borrowed eng. translation of this text from Williams (1971:48)

²"The necessity of knowledge as a pre-requisite is obvious. The imam can execute the divine laws only if he knows them. Those he does not know, he can not properly present. His knowledge is satisfactory only if he is able to make independent decisions. Blind acceptance of tradition is a short-coming, and the imamate requires perfection in all qualities and conditions." (Ibn Khaldun, 1978:158)

³"Probity is required because (the imamate) is a religious institution and supervises all the other institutions that require (this quality). There is no difference of opinion as to the fact that his probity is nullified by the actual commission of forbidden acts and the like. But there is a difference of opinion on the question of whether it is nullified by innovations in dogma." (1978:158)

⁴"Competence means that he is willing to carry out the punishments fixed by law and to go to war. He must understand warfare and be able to assume responsibility for getting the people to fight. He also must know about group feeling and the fine points (of diplomacy). He must be strong enough to take care of political duties. All of which is to enable him to fulfil his functions of protecting religion, leading in the holy war against the enemy, maintaining the (religious) laws and administering the (public) interests." (1978:158)

⁵"Freedom of the senses and limbs from defects or disabilities such as insanity, blindness, muteness or deafness, and from any loss of limbs affecting (the Imams) ability to act (...)" (1978:158-9)

⁶"Lack of freedom of action is connected with loss of limbs. Such a lack may be of two kinds. One is forced (inaction) and complete inability to act through imprisonment or the like. (...) The other kind is in a different category. (This lack of freedom of action implies that) some of the (Imams) men may gain power over him, although no disobedience or disagreement may be involved, and keep him in seclusion. Then the problem is shifted to the person who has gained power. If he acts in accordance with Islam and justice and praiseworthy policies, it is permissible to acknowledge (him). If not, Muslims must look for help from persons who will restrain him and eliminate the wealthy situation created by him, until the caliph's power of action is re-established" (1978:159)

⁷"There is a difference of opinion concerning a fifth prerequisite, that is, Qurashite origin.(...) Among those who deny that Qurashite descent is a condition of the Imamate is judge Abu Bakr al-Baqillani. (...) Scholars, in general, however, retain Qurashite descent as a condition (of the imamate)." (Ibn Khaldun, 1978:159).

perspective of how they internalize pre-Islamic sources in the process of the imagination of the political leadership and its legitimacy. Ibn Rushd enumerates following qualifications in his Commentary on Plato's Republic: "Since it has already been made clear what constitutes the philosopher, and also that such a man can be prince and ruler of this ideal state, it is necessary that we should mention the qualities which these men should possess by nature: (i) One of them, and the most distinguished, is that he should be disposed by nature for the study of the theoretical sciences (...); (ii) The second qualification is that he should preserve <things in his mind> and should not forget <them>. (...); (iii) The third is that he should love study, choose it, and desire to inquire into all parts of science (...); (iv) The fourth is that he should love truth (sidq) and hate falsehood. (...); (v) The fifth is that he should loathe the sensual desires. (...); (vi) The sixth is that he should not love money (...); (vii) The seventh is that he should be high-minded (...); (viii) The eighth is that he should be courageous (...); (ix) The ninth is that he should be so disposed that he moves of his own accord towards everything which he considers good and beautiful, like justice and other such virtues (...); (x) to these is to be added that he should be a good orator. (...)" (Ibn Rushd, 1966:178-179)

These are almost the same qualifications mentioned by Plato in *Republic*. Ibn Rushd formulates these qualifications within a new context in Third Treatise to bring them into line with Islamic premises: "For if there is placed over this administration one in whom five conditions are combined, namely, wisdom, perfect intelligence, good persuasion, good imagination, capacity for <waging> Holy War [jihad] and no physical impediment to the performance of actions in connection with Holy War, then he is absolutely king and his government will be a truly royal government."¹ (Ibn Rushd, 1966:208-209) This classification is a repetition of Farabi's argument in *Fusul al-Madani*: "He is the first chief and it is he in whom are combined six conditions: (a) wisdom; (b) perfect practical wisdom; (c) excellence of persuasion; (iv) excellence in producing an imaginative impression; (e) power to fight the holy war (jihad) in person; (f) that there should be nothing in his body to prevent him attending to the matters which belong to the holy war. He in whom all these are united is the model, the one to be imitated in all his ways and actions, and the one whose words and councils are to be accepted." (1961:50) The epistemological dimension of these classification on the qualifications of the ruler is very evident in *Fusul*

¹ Compare with al-Farabi's systematization on twelve qualifications required in the ruler of the Ideal State in *Madinah al-Fa'dilah* (1985:127-8).

where Farabi argues that "he (ideal ruler) should possess knowledge of the ancient laws and traditions which the first generations of *Imam*s acknowledged and by which they ruled the city" (1961:51).

Borrowing from the *Fusul* of Farabi, he insist on the term of the 'king of the laws'¹, because he gives a vital place for the art of jurisprudence in his political philosophy. He offers division of authority if one person does not possess both of the qualifications: "However, it may not happen that both these <qualifications> are found in one man, the one <capable of> waging Holy War [mujahid] being another than the legal expert [faqih]. Yet of necessity both will share in the rule, as is the case with many of the Muslim kings." (Ibn Rushd, 1966:208-9)

3- Institutional and Procedural Dimension :

The members of Imamiyyah and Ismailiyyah as the fundamental sects of Shi'a argue that the appointment of a socio-political authority is of Allah via a nass (indication); while ahl al-Sunnah assigns the responsibility of appointment to the people. : "They [Ahl al-Sunnah] say that the method of conferring the Imamate on the Imam in this community is selection, by seeking the most qualified person." (Baghdadi, 1935:210)

The historical experiences during the selections of the first four caliphs provide several alternatives for the establishment of a legitimate political authority in the political theory of Ahl al-Sunnah. The election of Abu Bakr was accepted as a model for the participation of the whole community. In this election three competing political groups were formed: The Ansar were supporting S'ad ibn 'Ubadah, the Muhajirin were supporting Abu Bakr and Banu Hashim were supporting Ali. After the discussions on their respective assertions, Omar proposed Abu Bakr and all agreed to accept Abu Bakr. The procedural base of the legitimacy of this election has been approved through a bay'a amma (public confirmation. This application of general consensus has been supported by the idea of ijma and became the first model for the procedural base of the legitimacy of establishing a socio-political authority. This procedural model has been mainly accepted as the best way for establishing a political

¹ "See, *Fusul* 53c and mad. fad. 60.19-61.6 Averroes combines both passages in his own more precise formulation, but leaves out, with *Fusul*, 53c, the first qualification: 'he shall be a philosopher'. The designation 'king of the laws' is borrowed from the *Fusul*. The remark about jurisprudence is added by Averroes" Rosenthal's note (Ibn Rushd, 1966:283)

authority by many of the classical and modern political theorists. It has been supported by the principle of *ijma* during the process of theorization. This historical experience as a way of legitimate election has been used as the basic argumentation especially for the modern theorists whose basic problem of legitimacy is the expansion of political participation. J.Iqbal's description of the election of Abu Bakr as "as a conference which sought to maintain a dialogue for political consensus, realized through mutual consultation" (1986:42) is a well-defined example for these attempts.

The election of the second caliph was a model for the popular approval of a nomination. Omar was suggested for the political leadership by the preceding caliph, Abu Bakr, before his death and this suggestion has been approved by the public. This way has been used for the legitimacy of the dynastic nomination during the periods of Umayyad and Abbasids. But such an analogy has been criticized by some Muslim scholars; because Abu Bakr's nomination was a suggestion while dynastic nomination was a consequence of a political power. Abdurrahman b. Abu Bakr's response to Marwan on the decision of Mu'awiyah related to his nomination of Yazid to caliphate, is an example of this critics.¹ Thus, dynastic nomination was not accepted as an ideal form of the procedural means of the political legitimacy; rather it has been interpreted as an existent political reality. Therefore, the attempts of the scholars for the regulation of the dynastic nomination might be seen as the attempts for the restriction of such a political action through the limitations of the juristic scheme. The anxiety to prevent the abuse of political power is very evident in the political works of the scholars such as Mawardi and Ibn Taymiyyah. They aimed to limit political reality within the framework of the prescriptivistic legitimacy under the patronage of law; rather than diverting law to provide procedural legitimate base for the existent political authority. For example, Ibn Taymiyyah (1988:14-6) strictly rejects the nomination of a close relative to even an ordinary position arguing such a nomination -because of the possibility of a psychological infirmity- is a breach of trust which is strictly condemned in Qur'an: "O ye who believe! Betray not Allah and His messenger, nor knowingly betray your trusts" (8:27).²

¹ "Addressing the people concern, Marwan (governor of Madinah) said: Verily, the commander of the faithful [Mu'awiyah] has seen fit to appoint his son Yazid as the successor over you according to the institutions of Abu Bakr and 'Umar. Abdur Rahman Ibn Abu Bakr interrupted: "Rather according to the institutions of Khusrau and Caesar, for Abu Bakr and 'Umar did not nominate their children, nor any member of their house." (J.Iqbal,1986:44)

² Ibn Taymiyyah narrates an argument from Omar to support his view: "Who nominates any person to any position because of being his close relative, he betrays against Allah and His messenger."

This example shows the importance of the epistemologico-axiological base for the process of the legitimacy beyond its procedural and institutional bases.

The election of the third caliph, 'Othman, through an electoral college of the probable candidates, provided another alternative for the establishment of a legitimate political authority in Islamic political theory. It might be said that the theory of *ahl al-hal wa al-aqd* is inspired from this historical experience. It seems the most available alternative from the perspective of the jurists because the required qualifications of being caliph necessitates qualified electors. For example, Mawardi (1973:6) and Abu Y'alà b. al-Farrà' (d.458/1066) (1983:19) mentions almost the same conditions for being selector; namely in short justice and knowledge on the requirements of being caliph and on the qualifications for an effective public policy.

The election of the fourth caliph contributed a significant principle for the legitimacy of the process of the establishment of a political authority: the openness of *bay'a* (allegiance) as the procedural means of legitimacy. 'Ali refused 'Abbas', his uncle, private *bay'a* and argued that if Muslims wanted to take an oath of allegiance to him as the caliph, it should be openly performed in the Prophet's mosque.

Now, we can analyze the principal institutional/procedural prerequisites and key-concepts for legitimacy in Islam mentioned above: *bay'a amma* (confirmation of the authority of the ruler by the public) ; *ijma* (consensus of the community) and *shura* (the mechanism of consultation between ruler and ruled).

Bay'a amma is a bilateral act through which a political ruler promises to fulfill his duties, determined by Law based on the "straight path" of justice, and through which the people promise to obey the maruf. Without such a bilateral act of *bay'ah*, the political authority and hierarchy could not be legally installed. This prerequisite of the political legitimacy has its origins in historical experience of Muslims beginning from the time of the Prophet. The First and Second pledge of al-Aqabah¹ might be accepted as a socio-political and religious contract before the establishment of the state in Madinah, between Prophet and his followers from Madinah. Some women participated to this bilateral act and

¹ The original forms of narratives on the allegiances might be found in Hamidullah (1987:46-51) taken from Ibn Qudama and Tarikh al-y'aqubî.

Qur'anic verse mentioned above, commanded to accept allegiance from women. This application of bay'ah has been repeated in bay'ah al-Ridwan at Hudaybiyah in the year of 6 A.H. and after the conquest of Mecca in the year of 8 A.H. Thus, it became a Sunnah as a bilateral act. But, it should be noted that these bay'ahs between the prophet and his companions was not a purely political contract due to the ultra-political role of the prophet. This application became a procedural means for the legitimacy of the process of the establishment of a political authority especially during the elections of the first four caliphs after the death of the prophet.

Ibn Khaldun (1978:166) describes this act as following: "It should be known that the bay'ah (oath of allegiance) is a contract to render obedience. It is as though the person who renders the oath of allegiance with his amir, to the effect that he surrenders supervision of his own affairs and those of the Muslims to him and that he will not contest his authority and that he will obey him by (executing) all the duties with which he might be charged, whether agreeable or disagreeable. When people rendered the oath of allegiance to the amir and concluded the contract, they put their hands into his hand to confirm the contract. This was considered to be something like the action of buyer and seller. Therefore, the oath of allegiance was called bay'ah, the infinitive of bâ'a «to sell/buy». The bay'ah was a handshake. Such is its meaning in customary linguistic terminology and the accepted usage of the religious law."

Although the etymological and traditional origin of this bilateral act might be searched in pre-Islamic background, especially in south-semitic development¹; it should be added that such an act has been re-valuated within a semantic and imaginative framework of the ontologico-political semantic field of Qur'an mentioned before. The verses in the Qur'an related to this key-concept reflect the color of this semantic field which set up a direct relationship of meaning between ontological and political spheres. This ontologico-political semantic link is very clear especially in the following Qur'anic verse related to bay'ah : "Lo! those who swear allegiance only unto Allah. The Hand of Allah is above their hands. Those whosoever breaketh his oath, breaketh it only to his soul's hurt; while whosoever keepeth his covenant with Allah, on him He will bestow immense reward."(48:10)² Hence, it is very difficult to find a through correspondent in

¹look to Bravmann's article "Bay'ah «homage»; a Proto-Arab (South-Semitic) Concept" (1972:213-220) for the analysis of the etymological development of this concept.

²The other verses, too, preserve this strong link between ontological and political spheres: "Lo! Allah hath bought from the believers their lives and their wealth because the Garden will be

western medieval experience of its re-valuated meaning within this semantic field.¹

Islamic version of this act carries additional characteristics originated from the epistemologico-axiological base of legitimacy mentioned above and it is, therefore, beyond a reciprocal relationship such as in its pre-Islamic usage or in its mediaeval European corresponding ceremonies. Moreover, pre-Islamic *bay'ah* was life long and it was impossible to dissolve this act from the side of the subject while Islamic *bay'ah* presupposes the supremacy and objectivity of law which gives the right to dissolve this act in any case against epistemologico-axiological and prescriptivist base of political legitimacy. In fact, in Islamic version of *bay'ah*, they (both parties of agreement) are attached to each other for the formation of an ideal substantive state, within which citizens could perform their responsibilities assigned by Allah. Combining the idea of "Unity of Life" with Islamic eschatological presuppositions, we have to underline the condition that rulers in an Islamic political society are not responsible only for the people's worldly happiness, but also their otherworldly happiness through providing a socio-political atmosphere for the fulfillment of *amanah*. This is very different from the western correspondents in the sense of medieval reciprocal relationship between feudal elements and modern utilitarian/individualistic philosophy due to its eschatological dimension and due to its political consequences especially related to this issue of legitimacy.

The other two essential prerequisites and key-concepts of Islamic political legitimacy, *Shura* and *Ijma*, have common imaginative and theoretical base due to the fact that *Ijma* in Islam, as an informal activity, owes its origin to the principle of *shura* (mutual consultation) prescribed by the Qur'an.² Although

theirs: they shall fight in the way of Allah and shall slay and be slain. It is a promise which is binding on Him in the Torah and the Gospel and the Qur'an. Who fulfilleth His covenant better than Allah? Rejoice then in your bargain that ye have made, for that is the supreme triumph." (9:111) "O Prophet! If believing women come unto thee, taking oath of allegiance unto thee they will ascribe nothing as partner unto Allah, and will neither steal nor commit adultery nor kill their children, nor produce any lie that they have devised between their hands and feet, nor disobey thee in what is right, then accept their allegiance and ask Allah to forgive them. Lo! Allah is forgiving, Merciful." (60:12)

¹ Brawmann's argument that "we should also notice the fact that -quasi in a reversal of the south-semitic development of the concept of allegiance into that of man- the word for "man" forms the basis of the medieval Western term corresponding to the Arabic term *bay'ah* "allegiance": we mean the french term *hom(m)mage* < late latin *hominaticum*, an abstract noun based on *homo* (cf. also the corresponding english term *manred*)" (1972:216) might be criticized from the perspective of this re-valuated semantic field of the Qur'an.

² There are five verses including this key-concept and its derivatives in Qur'an. Two of them compromise direct command for the realization of this principle: "... So pardon them and ask

there was a similar institution of consultation in pre-Islamic Arab tradition, *Dar al-Nadwa* ; the origin of this principle as a way of legitimacy is this Qur'anic command and its application during the period of Asr as-Saadah. Therefore, contrary to the origin of the tradition of western parliament, its theoretical origin is not historical experience itself; but historical experience has been legitimated through this Qur'anic command. As A. Hassan mentions, the term shura is an antithesis of *faw'da* (chaotic position, anarchy). Hence, it is "a collective endeavor for seeking an objective truth"(1984:26).

The principle of *shura* , as a very significant procedural prerequisite for the legitimacy of a political authority being ordered by Allah in the Qur'an, is not only accepted as a guarantee for the political participation of the people, but is also interpreted as a mechanism to prevent tyranny in socio-political life; because it has been assumed that this principle might be realized only via freedom of thought in *Majlis ash-shura*.¹ The existence of several different opinions has been supported due to the prophetic tradition that "the difference of opinion in my ummah is the blessing of Allah". As Hassan (1984:27) asserts, it is a historical fact that the council of shura was functioning as a legislative body representing community, though not formally by holding general elections, especially in the period of the first four caliphs.² Modern scholars, such as Rashid Ri'dâ (1988:21), insist on this prerequisite to stress the importance of the collectivity in political life: "God said of the believers,"their affairs are by mutual counsel".(42:36) As we have pointed out in our commentary on the Qur'an, the Qur'an prescribes law for the collectivity of Believers, even o waging war and other matters of the general interest, and apart from that, it orders obedience to

forgiveness for them and consult with them upon the conduct of affairs And when thou art resolved, then put thy trust in Allah. Lo* Allah loveth those who put their trust (in Him)" (3:159); "And those who answer the call of their Lord and establish worship, and whose affairs are a matter of counsel, and who spend of what We have bestowed on them." (42:38)

¹ Abu Yusuf narrates in his *Kitab al-Kharaj* (1973) that second Caliph Omar , have once addressed the meeting of al-Shura as following: "I have called you for nothing but this that you may share with me the burden of the trust that has been reposed in me of managing your affairs. I am but one of you , and today you are the people that bear witness to truth. Whoever of you wishes to differ with me is free to do so, and whoever wishes to agree is free to do that. I will not compel you to follow my desires." (eng. tr. is borrowed from Sharif, 1965:16)

²As an example the period of the second caliph, Omar, might be mentioned. As Dacca mentions, we get a detailed picture of the working of the government by consultation. Great historian al-Tabari reports two important general assemblies convened during his Khilafah, one on the eve of the battle of al-Qadisiyyah to decide whether or not the Khalifah should lead the forces in person and the other to decide if the conquered lands in al-Iraq and Syria should be divided amongst the warriors or not. Look Dacca's article (1955) for a summary of the application of Shura in pre-Islamic and Islamic history.

those in authority -that is to say, the Collectivity (Jamâ'ah) -and those representing them."¹

The principle of ijma as the third legal source, provides an impressive inspiration to modern Muslim thinkers to form a new socio-political mechanism leading to a more comprehensive political participation as an effective way of political legitimacy. Iqbal's (1934:164) following statements are one of the first attempts for this purpose:"The third source of Muhammadan Law is Ijma which is, in my opinion, perhaps the most important legal notion in Islam. It is, however, strange that this important notion, while invoking great academic discussions in early Islam, remained practically a mere idea, and rarely assumed the form of a permanent institution in any Mohammedan country. Possibly its transformation into a legislative institution was contrary to the political interests of the kind of absolute monarchy that grew up immediately after the fourth Caliph. It was, I think, favorable to the interest of the Omayyad and Abbaside Caliphs to leave the power of Ijtihad to individual Mujtahids rather than encourage the formation of a permanent assembly which might become too powerful for them. It is, however, extremely satisfactory to note that the pressure of new world forces and the political experience of European nations are impressing on the mind of modern Islam the value and possibilities of the idea of Ijma. The growth of republican spirit, and the gradual formation of legislative assemblies which, in view of the growth of opposing sects, is the only possible form of Ijma can take in modern times, will secure contributions to legal discussion from laymen who happen to possess a keen insight into affairs. In this way alone we can stir into activity the dormant spirit of life in our legal system, and give it an evolutionary outlook."

For some of the modern scholars who try to reconcile this Islamic way of political thought with the modern political mechanisms, these procedural means for legitimacy are adequate to close the institutional gap between Islamic and western way of political understanding which emerged during the phase of civilizational challenge. But it should be underlined that these procedural conditions, too, have epistemologico-axiological bases directly attached to ontological transcendency and therefore philosophically and methodologically are different from similar procedures in western political institutions. Its legislative function and power is only meaningful within the context of the epistemologico-axiological legitimacy mentioned before. The fundamental

¹I have borrowed english translation of this text from Williams (1971:46)

essence of the issue of political legitimacy is whether this epistemologico-axiological presuppositions has been realized or not. The elitist approach of *falasifah* in the process of the establishment of political authority and respectively more democratic element of jurists through these procedural means intersect on this basic characteristic. Thus, the historical experiences during the election of the first caliphs and their applications provide several alternatives for the richness of the procedural means of the legitimacy of the establishment of a political authority. But, the essential core continued to be on epistemologico-axiological base and these means have had their true meanings as long as they reflect this fundamental base. On the other hand, prescriptivist dimension of the issue of political legitimacy has been used especially by the scholars as a direct and indirect means to check constituted political authority from the perspective of this epistemologico-axiological base.

The contrast between western institutions imposed by westernization-oriented political elites in Muslim societies and the political images of Muslim masses can only not be eliminated but also can not be understood without understanding the significance of the epistemologico-axiological bases of these political images that emerged because of being referred to ontological transcendency.

CHAPTER 6

POWER THEORIES AND PLURALISM

One of the fundamental questions related to structural modernization in Muslim societies is whether a socio-economic functional pluralism might be internalized by these societies or not. This, too, is not only a subject of institutionalization but also of political culture. It is almost impossible to settle and internalize institutions within a society, in the long run, unless these institutions are supported by a socio-political culture.

From this perspective, the subject of power theories and pluralism is an interesting issue to operationalize our theoretical inquiries related to Islamic and Western paradigmatic unities. The contrast between Islamic religious-cultural pluralism based on ontologically justified political power and Western socio-economic functional pluralism based on an ontologically impenetrable justification of political power can give us significant clues not only related to the influences of imposed institutional functionalization within Muslim societies after the application of pyramidal modernization strategy, but also to the interpretation of historical practices such as "the Millet System" in Muslim socio-political structures which could not be set up within a comparative framework of Western experiences. These contrasting interpretations of political power should be compared through relating them to the philosophical and ontological-axiological antecedents to clarify their ultimate impacts on political images, cultures, theories and institutions.

I- ONTOLOGICALLY IMPENETRABLE JUSTIFICATION OF POLITICAL POWER AND WESTERN SOCIO-ECONOMIC PLURALISM :

1-Ontologically impenetrable political power :

The theoretical background of pluralism is as long as the history of political thought from the perspective of being a special interpretation of the notion of power. Therefore the core of pluralist thought is related to the understanding of the notion of power. As Dahl (1957: 201-202), one of the leading figures of the pluralist approach, specifies very clearly, the concept of power and its equivalences in several languages such as *Macht*, *pouvoir*, *puissance*, *Gewalt*, *Herrschaft*, *imperium*, *potestas*, *auctoritas*, *potentia* , e.t.c. are as ancient and ubiquitous as that which any social theory can boast. The word *power* which awkward and has not verb form in English, derives from Latin and French words which mean "to be able" and the German word *Macht* derives from *mögen* which has almost the same meaning.¹ Due to the fact that the essential issue of a semantic analysis of a key-concept is its process of gaining a conceptual meaning, we have to concentrate both on the historico-theoretical and on the semantic basis of the concept of power.

The notion of power in ancient Greece "that every man has power who does that which he wishes at the time when he wishes"(Krieger,1969:3) is a reflection of the idea that power exists only in the realization of the good because of being "a good of the possessor" as it has been defined in Plato's *Gorgias* (1937:I/524-7). Plato's fundamental assumptions on the idea of power might be summarized as the inseparable union of power and the moral purpose of power. His principal conclusion that power is a good was predicated on the assumption that the primary ingredient of power is knowledge.

Aristotle's contribution to the notion of power has theoretical and methodological dimensions. His theoretical contribution, depending on the ethical necessity concerning power in terms of an ideal end, strengthened the substantive and moral idea of power through generalizing the teleological dimension of power. His definition of power "as a source of movement or change, which is another thing than the thing moved or in the same thing qua

¹The etymological analysis of these concepts might be found in Dahl (1957:79-80) and Wagner (1969:3)

other" in *Metaphysics*,¹ shows his analysis related to the potentiality of power. But, his most effective contribution to the interpretation of power which has been extended to the modern era, is related to the methodological dimension in analyzing the actuality of power which implies a neutrality during the process of analysis in the actual dispersion of power.

When we compare the concepts of power in ancient Greek and Roman political thought, we can say that the Greeks accepted the generic notion of power while the Romans evaluated it as a pure political notion. The Greeks had no authentic notion of political power.² The Romans accepted a distinctive conception of political power through emphasizing its neutrality to the ethical and teleological type of power. This created an ontologically impenetrable understanding of power. The origins of this understanding should be searched for in the structure of the Roman Law which strictly separated public from private life. An autonomous sector of the public sphere where power, *potestas*, became an accepted legal category referring to rights and duties, emerged through this separation of public from private life. Power began to be used as an autonomous political concept after this Roman legal usage which transformed the Greek idea of ethical power to the Roman idea of political power. The modern idea of political power may be accepted as a detailed re-emergence of the Roman understanding of political power after a break in the Middle Ages within which the understanding of political power came nearer to the Greek concept rather than the Roman because of the acceptance of an ethical usage of the notion of power, although the medieval theorists took both the Roman notion of political power as defined by its sources, and the Greek notion of power as defined by its end. The theoretical history of Middle Ages related to the notion of political power was a transformatory process in three stages: (i) the unbalanced emphasis on a christianized legitimate power; (ii) the synthesis of legitimate political power with teleological/ethical power; and (iii) the unbalanced emphasis upon christianized ethical power. That is a process from St. Paul's doctrine that "there is no power but of God and the powers that be ordained of God", to St. Augustine's understanding of power that "God as the Creator of all powers", and finally to the synthesis of Thomas Aquinas who interpreted the

¹The speculations on power and movement might be found in *Metaphysics* (1941:764-6, 820-5).

²Hannah Arendt (1958:84-97) explains this lack of the authentic notion of political power in ancient Greece through arguing that the egalitarian polis left the Greeks with no idea of political authority which is essential to the notion of political power because of forcing them to borrow surrogates from the non-political authority of fathers over families, reason over experiences, soul over body.

dignity of the teleological and ethical notion of power within a context of the political sphere.¹

The transformation of the Christian interpretation of power in the Middle Ages provided justification for the power structure that existed in the feudal ages. The coexistence of the doctrines both of papal sovereignty and theocratic kingship asserted the plenitude of powers based on the idea of divine appointment which was being used by these centers of power for the justification of their own political purposes.² This plenitude of power in the Middle Ages has been accepted as a special type of legal pluralism by some political scientists (Chuan, 1927:260); although the political unit was no longer the clan or the people in the epoch of feudalism but district under the control of a seigneur or lord who was the final wielder of legal power (Jenks, 1898:22).

The idea of divine appointment justified this power structure of legal pluralism originating from socio-economic and socio-political differentiation of feudalism, despite the superficial characterization that power was monopolized theoretically in God's sovereignty. This doctrine of the segmentation of power is also relevant to the content of the power in the hands of the monarch. First it had a theocratic power that, it was claimed, originated from the Grace of God. Second, it had a feudal power that was claimed by virtue of contract. In contrast to the Islamic understanding of power, the Christian theory of power aimed to support the coexistence of this plenitude of powers both in an institutional and in a theoretical sense through balancing them rather than reorganizing them in a hierarchical order through an ontological justification. Therefore the Roman understanding of ontologically impenetrable political power could implicitly exist and be effective in the Christian theological interpretation. It easily appeared as a fundamental character of Western political theories when real socio-economic and socio-political forces began to shake papal sovereignty as a symbol of the power structure of the Middle Ages.

The attempts of John of Paris, Philip the Fair, Marsilio of Padua and William of Occam to strengthen the royal authority against the papal authority might be seen as first indications of this process. This conflict between papal and royal authorities seeking to be the source of power demolished the synthesis in

¹The details of this transformation might be found in Krieger (1969:20-2)

²The doctrines both of papal sovereignty and of theocratic kingship asserted the plenitude of powers from divine appointment for their side and conceded the teleological use of the other sword for circumscribed purposes to the inferior opponent." (Ullmann, 1961:34,130; Krieger 1969:22)

the Middle Ages of the notion of power through denying the medieval assumptions that the power of the Church was also political and the political power of the state was divinely instituted. This in fact put an end to the impact of teleological assumptions on the notion of political power, and may be accepted as a rediscovery of the Roman ontologically impenetrable and morally neutral definition of power.

The top figure in this rediscovery was **Machiavelli** who assumed the notion of political power as an autonomous process, categorically divorced from any non-political justification or legitimacy, but related to its origin and purpose. This approach resulted in a completed differentiation of ontological, axiological and political spheres during the process of the interpretation of political power. This Machiavellian trend became the dominant trend in the modern era in the notion of political power and also became the basis of both monist and pluralist interpretations of the secular state, although some others attempted to combine ethics and power. Among these, **Spinoza** and **Rousseau** attached an ethical connotation to the very meaning of political power.

This Machiavellian trend to interpret political power based on the differentiation of these spheres became a common methodological ground for both monist and pluralist approaches in modern political theories; i.e. **Hobbes'** monist argument depending on the interpretation of power as a possession which enables its owner to secure some apparent future Good has the same methodological background as Benthamian utilitarian pluralism which opposes **Hobbes'** notion of power through arguing that the possession of it might become a "national or constitutional evil" due to the reality of the greater quantity of power possessed. In fact, these two conflicting interpretations of power might be accepted as the foundations for the justification and theoretical reasoning of monist and pluralist types of socio-political structures and states. But they conflict with each other in an institutional sphere rather than in philosophical and methodological spheres. These conflicting views on this institutional sphere might be accepted as two different aspects of the same philosophical-methodological tradition that emerged after the rediscovery of Aristotelian methodology and Roman understanding of ontologically impenetrable- political power. Aristotelian methodology led modern power theories to concentrate on the analysis of power, rather than speculating on the essence and mission of it. This methodology has been supported by the theoretical consequence of the divorce of politics from ontology and axiology.

The evaluation of political power developed by Hobbes was another significant attempt to separate the sphere of politics from ethics. Hobbes defined power in *Leviathan* as a possession which enables its owner to secure some apparent future good¹; while Locke accepted it as a right rather than a possession and bound it with public good rather than possessor's good: "Political power, then I take to be a right of making laws with penalties of Death and consequently all less penalties, for the regulating and preserving of property, and of employing the force of the Community, in the execution of such Laws and in the defence of the commonwealth from Foreign Injury, and all this only for the Publick Good".(1963:308)

Bentham, whose philosophy of utilitarianism became one of the significant basis of pluralist political thought, opposed to Hobbes' notion of power through arguing that the possession of it might become a "national or constitutional evil" in his *Leading Principles of a Constitutional Code* (1843:II/269-72) "The national or constitutional evil is that which has place in so far as the subject matter of the distribution is power. It has placed in this way : the greater the quantity of power possessed, the greater the facility and the incitement to the abuse of it. In a direct way this position applies only to power. But, between power and wealth such is the connexion, that each is an instrument for the acquisition of the other, in this way therefore, the position applies to the wealth likewise". In fact, the conflicting interpretations of power might be accepted as the foundations of justification and theoretical reasoning of monist and pluralist type of political structure and state.

These methodological and theoretical characteristics have been systematized since the modern scientific approach in politics through a methodist point of view. Weber's relational interpretation of power is the fundamental contribution of this new approach to the theory of political power.² Weber's (1947:152) formulation that "power (*Macht*) is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite the resistance of the others" is a sophisticated formulation of the

¹"The power of a man, is his present means, to obtain some future apparent Good. And is either Originall, or Instrumentall. Naturall Power, is the eminence of the Faculties of Body, ro Mind: as extraordinary Stregnth, Forme, Prudence, Arts, Eloquence, Liberality, Nobility. Instrumentall are those Powers, which acquired by these, or by fortune, are means and Instruments to acquire more: as Riches, Reputation, Friends, and the secret working of God, which men call Good Luck." (n.d.:43)

² This new approach on the political power has a central position in Weber's understanding of politics which has been defined by him through attaching to political power: "Politics means striving to share power or striving to influence the distribution of power, either among states or among groups within a state"(1948:78).

analytical methodist way of understanding the existing relational power structure through ethical neutrality. This approach is methodologically alternative to Hobbes' traditional possessive interpretation; but it shares the common theoretical background related to the autonomous character of political power from ontological and ethical antecedents. Tawney (1931:229) enlarged this definition arguing that "power may be defined as the capacity of an individual or a group of individuals to modify the conduct of other individuals or group in the manner which he desires and to prevent his own conduct being modified in the manner in which he does not".

The definitions of power of Mills and Dahl follow this trend of Weber's relational notion of power, although they are members of opposite approaches from the perspectives of elitist and pluralist political interpretations. The conflicts between this relational interpretation of power and the possessive interpretation, which has been extended from Hobbes to the present by Lasswell and Kaplan, could not eliminate the paradigmatic unity of the theoretical sphere assuming ontologically impenetrable political power, or the methodological sphere assuming an empiric-positivist analytical framework. They have institutional and sociological dimensions rather than philosophical. There is no contradiction in essence between Mills' (1959:9) argument in *Power Elite* that the powerful are "those who are able to realize their will, even if others resist it" and Dahl's (1957:201) intuitive idea of power that "A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do." Their conflict is related to the characteristics of the existing power structure rather than to the origins and essence of it. This methodist approach leads to technical evaluations to solve the problem of measurement rather than deep theoretical and philosophical interpretations. As Polsby (1971:11) underlines very clearly, power is conceived of by sociologists as one dimension of social life along which people may be stratified while political scientists traditionally concerned themselves with power and with the institutional order specialized to the exercise of political power in social life, the state.¹

In spite of the existence of different interpretations on political power there is a very significant common base among them. All of the interpretations on political power in modern era might be accepted as the reflections of the

¹He shows K. Mayer's *Class and Society* (1955), M. Gordon's *Social Class in American Sociology* (1958) and H. Pfantz's "The Current Literature of Social Stratification" (*American Journal of Sociology*, 1953) as the examples of sociologist approach and Easton's work of political scientists approach.

dominant philosophico-theological inclinations and of the imaginations created by them. Three stages in the post-Machiavelian modern era might be underlined related to the evolution of the theories on the political power. The first stage is the theorization of the ontologically impenetrable power which emerged as a counterpart of the divorce of politics from ontological and ethical antecedents. This stage began with the Machiavelian attempt to set up an autonomous politics under the impact of the rediscovery of the Roman understanding of realistic political power. Hobbes' *nouva scienza* has strengthened the theoretical foundation of this stage; while Locke's interpretation of political power contributed to it a legislative/juristic element. The fundamental characteristic of this period is its rationalistic element although the impact of Locke's empiric epistemology on his interpretation of political power is very evident. As I have shown related to the issue of political legitimacy, a synthesis of empiric and rationalistic elements of the western paradigm related to its epistemological dimension opened the ways for the second stage.

Second stage might be summarized under the title of relational/observational interpretation of the political power. The implicit assumption of this approach is that there is an autonomous social mechanism and political power is an element of this mechanism. The fundamental problem of this approach is to find out the best methodological tool to analyze the dimension of political power of this mechanism; rather than to check it within the framework of a set of value. Such an approach is very consistent with the dominant philosophical tradition of its background, namely mechanistic world-view. Horowitz's following specification is very interesting from this perspective: "Both the empiricists and the theorists viewed the power with awe, as some sort divine lever by means of which the social system become self-regulating. The laissez-faire economic world of Adam Smith became transformed into laissez-faire vision of society as a whole" (intr. ch. of Mills, 1974:9-10) Polsby's definition of power as "a subsidiary aspect of the community's social structure" in his *Community Power and Political Theory* (1971:7) might be accepted as an interesting expression of this phenomenon.

The argument that power is never the property of an individual, rather it belongs to a group and remains in existence only so long as the group keeps together, is also a natural consequence of this mechanistic view. Arendt's assertion that power needs no justification being inherent in the very existence of political communities, what it does needs is legitimacy connects this approach

to the notions of Athen's and Rome's understanding of power. T. Parsons, the leading figure of structural functionalism defines power within the context of legitimization and obligation arguing that "power then is generalized capacity to secure the performance of binding obligations by units in a system of collective organization when the obligations are legitimated with the reference to their bearing on collective goals and where in case of recalcitrance there is a presumption of enforcement by negative sanctions - whatever the actual agency of that enforcement"(1969:252).¹ As Horowitz (intr. ch. of Mills, 1974:9) specifies very interestingly "the dominant wings of American sociology during the period between 1940-1960 tended to translate all claims of conflicting power into a delicately system of pattern-maintenance and tension-management."

Beside this relational interpretation of power, the possessive interpretation of Hobbes has been extended to nowadays by some other thinkers. Russell's definition of power as "production of intended effects"(1938:35) and the definition of Lasswell and Kaplan as "simple property . . . which can belong to a person or group considered in itself"(1950:75) might be mentioned among the others. Bachrach and Baratz (1974:19) criticize this approach from a relational perspective from three perspectives: (i) this argument fails to distinguish between power over people and power over matter; (ii) one can not have power in a vacuum but only in relation to someone else; and (iii) the common conception of phenomenon mistakenly implies the possession of the instruments of power in tantamount possession of power itself. But beside this generalization Lasswell and Mills might be accepted as members of another of trend accepting power as a zero-sum phenomenon "which is to say that there is a fixed quantity of power in any relational system and hence any gain of power on the part of A must by definition occur by diminishing the power at the disposal of other units, B, C, D . . . "(1969:252). This interpretation of zero-sum phenomenon carries the characteristics of the third stage. In spite of these attempts to objectivize and to standardize the notion of political power as a reflection of the mechanistic world-view and empiric-rationalistic scientism, it never reached to a fully illuminating theorization.²

¹This functionalist approach of Parsons leads him to criticize Wrigth Mills for interpreting power "exclusively as a facility for getting what one group, the holders of power wants by preventing another group, "the outs" from getting what it wants, rather than seeing it as a facility for the performance of function in and on behalf of the society as a system"

²The ambiguities in the notion of power led William Riker to argue that we ought to banish the definition of power rather than to redefine it, like the argument of Karl Loewenstein that " we know what power does but we are unable to define its substance and essence". But following Mills' claim we have to say that power as the realization of human will remains the critical axis above which to social commonwealth spins.

The third stage is an extreme extension of this approach; namely the attempts to prove the measurability of political power, systematized especially by the followers of the behavioralism. This stage is a reflection of the movement of the scientism of the social sciences. Some of the definitions are very technical contrary to the theoretical interpretations. The fundamental aim of these technical interpretations is solving the problem of measurement. The definition of Shapley, a mathematician and Shubik (1954:787-92), an economist, relates only to the power resulting from the right to vote in system where voting, and only voting, determines the outcomes.¹ March (1957::222-26), as a political scientist, tries to define the concept of power through measuring comparative amounts of influence, while Cartwright (1959:183-220), as a social psychologist, defines and measures power as an ability to force others to do one's bidding which is very close to the definition of Dahl given above. Karlsson's (1964:341-9) definition of power in terms of utilities depends on the ability to decrease alters utility reversely to the idea of Shapley and Shubik whose definition of power rests on the ability to increase ego's utility.

2-Social Change/Dynamism and the Imagination of Unilinear Progress : Institutionalization of Power :

The one of the most significant imaginative elements of modern western culture is its implicit assertion on the unilinear progress of human being throughout the history which makes social change an inescapable necessity. Thus, a natural dynamism has been assumed in time/space dimension. If justice and movement are two essential concepts of the ancient philosophy, it might be said that the human imaginations shifted towards the side of movement which assumes a dynamic process of change as opposed to the justice as the cosmologico-ontological and social-political harmony and stability. Surely, such a categorization aims to show the general tendency rather than being an absolute generalization.

Two basic origins of this characteristic of modern imagination are the theory of motion during Renaissance especially after the rediscovery of ancient

¹Their definition might be summarized as the following : the power of a voter to determine an outcome in a voting body is the ratio of (a) the number of possible times the voter may be in pivotal position in an ordered sequence, to (b) the number of ordered sequences possible.

idea of movement and the Newtonian mechanistic cosmological imagination which a new set of the necessities. The necessity of movement has been placed in the center both of the cosmological and social imaginations and theories, after the supremacy of the theory of motion and its scientific consequences; whereas it has been transformed to an inescapable natural phenomenon within the framework of the necessities of the Newtonian mechanistic imagination. The idea of the unilinear progress became of the most dogmatic necessity in the age of Enlightenment. Grand theories in 19. century on the history of mankind such as Hegelian and Marxian models based on this fundamental assumption.

A belief in a unilinear progress implies the assumption that a pattern of change exists in the history of mankind, that this pattern is known, that it consists of irreversible changes in one general direction only, and that this direction is towards improvement from a less to a more desirable state of affairs. (Van Doren,1967:4-6; Pollard,1971:9) Such a presupposition of unilinear progress and irreversible change within a mechanistic flow of the history led to an idea of the institutionalization of power specified by the dynamic elements of this flow. That means the justification of the existing power structure as a necessary phenomenon related to the institutionalization of power. The imagination on the links of the determination has been changed parallel to this phenomenon and economics began to be accepted as the most determinative factor in social change due to the fact that it reflects the existing power structure related to the material environment. the rising of the scientism in economics during this period is not a coincidental development. The relativity of moral values as a reflection of the secularization of axiology and the idea of the limited theism as the counterpart of the liberal theories of the forerunners who assigns a determinative role to economics, such as J.S.Mill, are theologico-philosophical reflections of this phenomenon.

As it will be shown in the following lines, the most characteristic contrast between Islamic and western civilizations rest upon this fact of the links of determination from the most determinative factor to the less one. Islamic civilization strictly assumes a determinative link from ontology to epistemology, from epistemology to axiology, from axiology to politics and from politics to economics. In modern western case this scheme is just opposite.

The consequences of this western phenomenon related to the institutionalization of power might be summarized as following: (i) the

assumption of the unilinear progress; (ii) dynamic pluralistic adventure of social change; (iii) the determinative supremacy of economics over politics; (iv) socio-economic pluralism in the sense of economic stratification as the basic parameter of the socio-political differentiation; and (v) institutionalization of power as a reflection of the socio-political autonomous institutional pluralism based on the socio-economic dispersion of material power; namely the formation of interest groups.

3- A Brief Summary on the Phenomenological Background of Pluralism:

Beginning with Greek and Roman period, it should be underlined that these societies were carrying some basic origins of the philosophical and socio-political pluralism although these origins might be traced back to the Indo-European culture in the form of polytheism and pantheism as theologico-philosophical base for the evolution of the philosophical pluralism which will be analyzed in the following lines. Greek political culture was an example of monism in the institutional sense of state organization because of the absence of rival groups and organizations as a natural consequence of being a city-state in which life and politics were simple, although the pluralistic elements both in the sense of socio-economic stratification and in the sense of the philosophical pluralism (cosmologico-ontological particularization of divinity) were implicitly contained.

The stoic ideal of a universal system under one government carried this institutional monist structure of Greek politics of a city-state to the Roman imperial state structure but the philosophical pluralism continued to be strengthened as an indication of the socio-cultural continuity. The Middle Ages was the period at the end of this institutional monism when Western societies disintegrated into a thoroughly pluralistic order, especially in the legal structure, because of the effect of diverse private laws which created a three-fold division of law: civil, religious and commercial. The civil law also disintegrated because of the territorial decentralization. The feudal structure of the political system with its vast hierarchy of quasi-autonomous kings and lords, the establishment of the Christian Church as a new ethical socio-cultural and socio-political organization, and the nucleus of the emerging socio-economic class perceiving the need of organization after the gradual development of craft industry and sea commerce, created a segmentation of political, economic and religious spheres, each with its

own independent system of law and government and internally autonomous organization.

Beside these nuclei of institutional pluralism, philosophical and ontological bases of political pluralism began to be theorized in the form of the theory of "Two Swords." This legitimated and justified the current pluralistic structure on a reformed philosophical and ethical ground after the transformation of early rebellious Christianity into an institutionalized Church as a new factor of political life. St. Paul's conception of power as "there is no power but of God" and "the powers that be are ordained of God," and St. Augustine's understanding of power that "God is the Creator of all powers," have been interpreted as an ontological justification of the existing power structure rather than as an ontological-political unity as in Islam. Therefore the arguments of the leading figures like Marsiglio of Padua and Philip the Fair on the idea of the absolute authority of secular organizations were fundamentally religious and translegal. The justification of the power structure, changed after social and economic developments, rested on the same philosophical-ethical base as in the Middle Ages.

So, the pluralistic entity of the medieval ages continued to strengthen its position within Western social life until the industrial era although the absolutist sovereign states which began to be formed the 14th century set up a superficial monist structure upon a pluralist philosophical justification and upon a weak, but living, socio-economic pluralism. For example, for Hobbes, the prince of the monistic thinkers, there is a clear demarcation between the sphere of religion and politics; the political state should be absolute in its own sphere. In fact, this is a continuation of the ontological-political pluralism of Western political thought, while almost all social and political issues should be interpreted depending on the ontological political unity according to the Islamic way of political understanding.

The institutional particularization of the political structure in its own sphere occurred parallel to the rise of a new economic class in western Europe which created a transformation from the medieval guild system to the modern labor-industrial organizations. So, pluralism began to be effective as a natural result of the increase in economic associations and organizations, as new structural factors of social life began to be accepted as the central mechanism in favor of freedom, against despotism or misuse of power. Political pluralism in

the sense the division of power began to be accepted as the first condition of liberty. Lamennais's saying "who says liberty, says association" together with Proudhon's formulation of "multiply association and be free" (Nisbet, 1962:268) are examples indicative of political pluralism resting on the increase of association-type economic organizations. The institutional particularization within the state has been theorized by Montesquieu as an extension of the argument that "the only safeguard against power is the rival power." Lord Acton combined political pluralism with liberty saying that "liberty depends upon the division of power" (Nisbet, 1962: 270).¹

This associational and institutional particularization of the political system in Western societies was directly connected to the dispersion of socio-economic power in the hands of some functional interest groups and classes after the industrial societies compared to the pre-industrial societies led to a concept of a pluralistic society made up of various institutionally isolated sectors which emerged with the dispersion of the socio-economic wealth as a realization of material power. The social roles and identities of the individuals began to be defined by these functional groups and classes.

4-Socio-Economic Pluralism: The Basic Parameter of Socio-Political Differentiation:

The systematization of modern political pluralism has been realized mainly by two groups although pluralist approach might be divided into several schools of thought; namely European and American Political Pluralism.

The main representatives of European political pluralism are legal historians as F. W. Maitland in England, Otto von Gierke in Germany and L. Duguit in France, the English economist G. D. H. Cole, the English political scientist H. Laski, the English clergyman J. N. Figgis, a professor H. Krabbe and French statesman J. P. Boncour. These persons rejected "both the Hegalian notion that the modern state as a virtual monopoly on legitimate authority and the 19th century liberal belief that the individual exists in a social

¹This associational and institutional particularization of the socio-political system has been explained by Tannenbaum very clearly: "The balance of institutional power lie the possibilities for a harmonization of personal freedom and associative authority. The road to social peace is the balance of social institutions and a wise statesmen would strengthen those institutions that seemed to be losing ground, for the only way to peace in this world of fallible human nature is to keep all human institutions strong, but none too strong, relatively weak, but not is weak as to despair of their survival." (Nisbet, 1962:270)

vacuum"(Kelso,1978:11). Pluralist theorists such as Maitland, Cole and von Gierke drew their arguments and illustrations from the example of middle ages, a time characterized the inability of the predecessor of the modern state to extend its control over autonomous entities as the church, the universities, the guilds, and the free cities. (Merkel,1972:69-70) Gierke and Maitland tried to transform the idea of the independence of associational structure to consistent theory of political system and state, through assuming associations as real personalities having a collective consciousness and a will independent of the minds and wills of its several members. These associations being and originating agency in the development of law may function as an organ through which common beliefs of a legal character find their way into rules of law (Burns,1960:112), according to them. These ideas have two significant consequences namely, (i) there are other units of which society is composed beside individuals like associations and organizations, (ii) the state has not all-inclusive sovereignty over the interconnections between these units.

Figgis (1914:58), speaking on behalf of Christian Church as an autonomous group, tried to interpret these associational views within a theoretical and religious context and interested in the independence of the church although he also insisted upon other social groups, as trade unions, colleges and families. Assuming that the best structure of the society is that which gives individual the opportunity for self-development, he argues that the real personality of groups must be realized in order not to prevent the self-realization of the individuals. Associational freedom is much more significant comparing with individual freedom in the theory of Figgis because of the assumption that self-realization may be achieved in groups.

Boncour gives great significance to occupational and professional associations because of their characteristics of arising spontaneously in all countries and developing rapidly to a stage in which they impose rules upon their own members and dictate conditions to the rest of the society. He claims that the existence of several sovereign professional associations can prevent the exploitation of majorities in democratic system because of the lack of ability of the majority to perceive the interest of the whole population.

These arguments has been rested on a different base, namely individualism in the theory of British pluralist, Laski, whose theory might be called thereof as individualistic pluralism. Laski's pluralism assumes a different idea of human

society. Contrary to Cole and Figgis who claim that man develops his personality in various associations and the functional organizations of society, Laski argues that man is morally autonomous : "since man morally autonomous, he can determine in what his self-realization consists, that is, each man can choose his own way and ends. The condition that the society has to put up with his one in which different men pursue different ends differently". (Laski,1931:47)

Cole who argues that pluralism should be established in order to safeguard freedom and to ensure justice, was the leading figure of Guild Socialism. Again his notion of pluralism has been systematized around a key concept of human personality which depends in Cole's theory on the assumption that "man in society is a complex being, complex essentially in the interests and the groups with which he associates"(1966:31). Arguing that a democratic society should satisfy men's wants in an orderly system and at the same time to save their freedom, he gives a special significance to the functions of associations as "any group of persons pursuing a common purpose of aggregation of purposes by a course of cooperative action extending beyond a single act and for this purpose laying down in however a rudimentary form" (Cole,1920:37) shows their key position as intermediary mechanisms between individual and society which is made up of a multiplicity of associations of various kinds according to him. Due to the fact that these associations are formed by a common interest, these ideas reflect the organizational structure of the socio-economic pluralism. Although he criticized understanding of state as sovereign body, he contrarily suggests a Democratic Supreme Court of Functional Equity (Cole,1920:135-) which will be a joined body to coordinate all the main function of society.

Another group of pluralists in Europe were interested chiefly in the juristic consequences and characteristics of the theory in the beginning of the century. The leading figure of this group were Leon Duguit and Hugo Krabbe. Duguit's pluralistic views rest on a specific notion of law which has no necessary relation with state. He strictly opposes to the idea of the state has a function of law making arguing that state itself is composed of merely of a group of governors who are themselves limited by law. His rejection of assumption of naturalistic law as a higher law of nature inherent in the order of the universe and embodying the indefeasible rights of the individual led him to refuse the sovereignty of bodies with sacred rights together with the rejection of the special mission of the state. Contrary to Laski, Duguit's pluralism is collectivist rather than individualistic.

Laws with function of providing social solidarity, is not only superior to the state but also to the individual in Duguit's interpretation of pluralism.

In the past three decades American political scientists have interested deeply in pluralist theory and interest group theory although pluralist school of philosophers reached the height of its vogue in the first quarter of this century in Europe, as we analyzed before. The internal consistency and theoretical framework of American pluralism after II. World War was much more stronger comparing with early pluralist movement in Europe which had significant differences and contradicting ideas among the members. The main representatives of this pluralistic intellectual trend in United States are R. Dahl, D. Riesman, V. Key, D. Truman, W. Seyre, H. Kaufman, E. Banfield, C. Lindblom, W. Kornhauser, A. Downs, D. Braybrook, and J. Coleman whereas this group of American pluralists have been effected deeply by the intellectual and theoretical legacy especially taken from Tocqueville, Madison and Arthur Bentley.

Two books, published in fifties, namely David Reisman's *The Lonely Crowd* (1953) and Wright Mills' *Power Elite* (1955) were the typical examples of two dominant rival tendencies in American political thought : elitist and pluralist interpretation of American political system. J. Wright Mills argues in his book that there is a tendency of increasing concentration of power in the hands of a unified power elite which is composed of men whose positions enable to transcend the ordinary environment of ordinary men and women and determines all major policies without being led by unorganized people while Riesman claims that there is a tendency of increasing of dispersion of power in American politics rejecting the existence of power elite arguing that : "there has been in the last fifty years a change in the configuration of power in America in which a single hierarchy with a ruling class at its head has been replaced by a number of veto groups among which power is dispersed." (1953:239)

This tendency of dispersion of power created a diversified and balanced plurality and monopolist competition among organized interest groups according to Riesman, exactly opposing to the ideas of Mills delated with the coincidence of interests among major institutions of economic, political and military order. Mills interprets the pluralistic way of thinking as following : "There are of course other interpretations of the American system of power. The most usual is that it is a moving balance of many competing interests. The image of balance, at least in America, is derived from the idea of the economic market :

in the 19th century the balance was thought to occur between a great scatter of individuals and enterprises in the 20th century it is thought to occur between great interest blocks."(1974:30)

As Richard (1972:35) specifies, American pluralism originated from the assumption that a modern industrial society is differentiated into a wide range of sub-groups the members of which share certain interests in common and they provide the potential for organized, plant and coordinated action. This issue has been explained by Dahl with following sentences: "The fundamental axiom in the theory and practice of American pluralism is, I believe this, instead of single center and sovereign power there must be multitude centers of power, none of which is or can be wholly sovereign. Although the only legitimate sovereign is the people, in the perspective of American pluralism even the people ought never to be an absolute sovereign, consequently no part of the people such as a majority ought to be absolutely sovereign. (. . .) (This dispersion of power) can settle conflicts peacefully : - because one center of power is set against another, power itself will be tamed civilized, controlled and limited to decent human purposes, - because even minorities are provided with opportunities to veto solutions - because constant negotiations among different centers of power are necessary to make decisions. . . not merely to the benefit of one partisan to all the parties to a conflict."(1967:24)

So, *conflict* is a very significant key concept in pluralist theory to show the dynamic element of the understanding of the social change led by socio-economic groups as the centers of the institutionalization of power. The socio-economic pluralism as the basic parameter of the socio-political differentiation in western society has been justified through this argument based on the implicit assumption of the inevitability of social change. The concept of *conflict* is the common element of pluralist and monist interpretations of state. It is very interesting that the concept of conflict in pluralist theory especially in Dahl's interpretation has been affected by Hobbes' understanding of human nature who was the pivot figure of the stratification and sovereignty theories. Dahl, following Hobbes, argues that conflict seems to be an inescapable aspect of community life and hence of human being because men have diverse interests. This idea of diversification of abilities and interests originated from J. Madison who was the leading figure of pluralist approach during the period of establishment of American constitutional system.

According to pluralistic theory man whose existence as a social being is conditioned by a set of contradictory tendencies that make him a member of some political system, is unable to live with others without conflict and therefore communities search for ways of adjusting conflicts so that community life will be possible and tolerable. The assumption that conflict is a natural and inescapable fact of human life leads to a following assumption that fractions, parties and groups are natural facts of social life : when someone says he opposes every fraction and parties what he usually means is that he opposes every fraction every party every interest except his own. This assumption of the naturality of plurality in socio-economic life might be accepted as an intrinsic extension of the philosophical assumption of pluralist universe.

The pluralist theory draws its inspiration from the group-interaction approach to politics and it maintains that policy is the product of group-interactions and conflicts in which a stable, generally salutary balance among group interests is approximated. This argument implies a fairly open, competitive bargaining process. As Kelso (1978:13) specifies very well, the representatives of political pluralism, like their laissez-faire counterparts in economics, view the political arena as a competitive market place in which any entrepreneur can gain entry to merchandise his views. They see the political life as a multiplicity of functionally specialized centers of influence competing for and appealing to several publics and their elected officials. The leaders of this private and public organizations and groups do not constitute a power elite because of lacking the means for communicating among themselves or for coordinating policy outcomes, in the theoretical framework of political pluralism. Lindblom (1977:258), one of the representatives of the political pluralism claims that this functionally specialized centers of influence and groups bound together by Durkheim's organic solidarity, by differences that make them dependent one another. Dahl, also, tries to point out in his book *Who Governs* (1961) that there is a considerable functional specialization by issue areas like education, highways, etc. although small numbers of people still do most of the governing. The competitive situation forces the participating groups to be dependent upon legitimate public officials which have a balancing relationship in his theory : Thus resolution of major conflicts his referred to and frequently guided by men elected in accordance, while this men, in turn, must be sensitive not only to the balance of active group interests, but also to the less articulated interests that can manifest themselves in many responses and election-day consequences.

This group structure creates a self-regulating and self-correcting political system like in the theory of the invisible hand of A. Smith related to economics, according to political pluralism. So that if particular groups do start to accumulate excessive amounts of power, countervailing forces are likely to become active to prevent the abuse of power through checking and limiting their actions. Truman (1951:114) considers this phenomena of "potential groups and coalitions" as the main obstacle against the monopolization of power. This coalition between interest groups should be time bounded to prevent the establishment of a group of elite. Sayre and Kaufman (1970:710) argue that the self-regulating nature of the political system drives from the existence of multiple decision-making points.

This theoretical explanation of political pluralism rests on a specific interpretation of power as we analyzed in the first part of this article. There are two essential presupposition of the pluralist approach related to the interpretation of power. The first basic presupposition of the pluralist approach is that nothing categorical can be assumed about power in any community rejecting the stratification thesis that some group necessarily dominates a community. The second presupposition of pluralistic approach counter to stratification theory's assumption that power distribution is a more or less permanent aspect of social structure. Pluralist believe that power may be tied only to issues and issues can be fleeting or persistent, provoking coalitions among interest groups and citizens ranging in their duration from momentary to semi-permanent. (1971:115)

So, the fundamental cornerstones and properties of the current pluralist theory resting upon the philosophical background discussed before, might be summarized as (i) group interaction approach to politics, (ii) the differences of the pattern of influences and interactions due to issue and scope, (iii) the rejection of the categorical assumptions about power, (iv) different and competing structures of interests, (v) accepting the political life as a multiplicity of functionally specialized centers. (vi) the lack of the means for communicating among the leaders of groups, (vii) the absence of unified, coordinated, mobilized organizational activity, (viii) the semi-permanent characteristics of power distribution, (ix) the human behavior as a result of inertia, (x) time-bounded characteristics of the coalitions, and (xi) the diversification of the leadership roles.

Depending these philosophical background and assumptions the pluralist theory, as being the defender of the pluralist democracy in U.S.A., provides a

rejoinder to the theory of the ruling elites and to those who see the capitalist system "as corrupt and exploitative".

5-The Philosophical Background of Pluralism :

Spinoza wrote, "Ordo idearum est ac ordo rerum" -the order of ideas is the same as the order of things. The philosophical background of pluralism is as long as the history of political thought from the perspective of being a special interpretation of the notion of power (dispersion of power) although many scholars argue that the origin of modern pluralism flourished during the first quarter of twentieth century in the sense of "regarding the state as only one of a number of sovereign agencies to which the members of a modern community render allegiance , went back to the theories of Otto von Gierke and Maitland in the late 19. century"(Burns, 1963:112).

According to the traditional view, the highly segmented and differentiated social structure of industrial society compared to pre-industrial societies led to a concept of "pluralistic society standing for the notion that industrial society is made up of various institutionally isolated sectors which require from the modern individual the ability to play disparate roles, thus imprinting on him disparate identities" (Zijdervald, 1972:127). The current discussion occurs around these sociological and technical interpretations and lacks the philosophical background and origin of the pluralistic approach. But neither this assumption that pluralism is an artifact of industrial society, nor the classical approach that political pluralism is a response or critique to the idea of sovereign state based on abstract monism, can explain the inherent cultural philosophical continuity of Western political thought and pluralism within its context. We can explain the philosophical background of the political pluralism referring to our analysis on the western paradigm in Chapter 2.

Although the historical accounts of pluralism trace its source in various fields back to W. James (philosophy), to the Middle Ages and Otto von Gierke's studies on this theme (law), to the papal encyclical of Leo XXIII, to various church movements in the 19th century and to syndicalism (politics), if we accept the key assumption of pluralist thought as a " multiple center of powers" or a "dispersion of power" the philosophical background of pluralism related to the justification of political power should be searched for a complete analysis of the

methodological and theoretical paradigmatic unity of Western philosophical-political tradition.

From the cosmological and ontological perspective, philosophical pluralism has some significant relationships with polytheistic and pantheistic Weltanschauungs. Pluralism has been accepted as a specific type of contemporary form of polytheism by many thinkers due to the pluralistic assumption that "nothing but the plural, the many, the variegated, is true reality" (Fries, 1969:139). James' approach is interesting from this point of view. He combines this multi-central understanding of philosophical pluralism with a pluralistic conception of God and the universe based on a comprehensive critique of a theistic cosmological and ontological understanding that God and his creatures are *toto genere* distinct. According to James' analysis, the ontological consequence of theism is accepting man as a mere ontological outsider to God rather than as an intimate partner. His alternative pluralistic cosmology, ontology and epistemology, grounded in an alternative conception of God, is an interesting synthesis of polytheism and pantheism as an *identitätsphilosophie*: "God as intimate soul and reason of the universe has always seemed to some people a more worthy conception than God as external creator..." (James, 1909:28) "...we are indeed internal parts of God and external creations,, on any possible reading of the panpsychic system. Yet because God is not absolute, but is himself a part when the system is conceived pluralistically, his functions can be taken as not wholly dissimilar to those of the other smaller parts- as similar to our functions consequently." (James, 1909:318).

The synthesis originated from ancient times and is a transition from the idea of several absolutes (polytheism), or no absolute (because of acceptance of several absolutes at the same time), to the idea of the identification with the Absolute (pantheism). The contradiction of James' philosophical pluralism is that he tries to reject certain qualities which traditionally pertain to an absolute; i.e. he images an absolute which is not all-inclusive but he does not explain clearly how a being will be absolute without being all-inclusive because the lack of all-inclusiveness means, logically, relativity at the same time. James' pluralistic universe appears as 'a congregation of psychic macrocosms, in which all human souls merge' (Chuan, 1927: 201).

There is an evident relationship between this pantheistic concept of God and anti-teleological interpretation of philosophical pluralism: "There is no

really inherent order, but it is we who project order into the world by selecting objects and tracing relations so as to gratify our intellectual interests."(James,1909:10)The axiological and methodological extensions of this ontological pluralism are pragmatism and radical empiricism.

Radical Empiricism is the epistemological dimension of the philosophical pluralism. James argues that empiricism means, the habit of explaining the wholes by parts and rationalism means the habit of explaining parts by wholes and that rationalism, thus, preserves affinities with monism since wholeness goes with union, while empiricism inclines to pluralistic views: "since we actually find many discontinuities in our experience, the hypothesis of a block universe is integrated through and through into one single system is totally untenable."(James, 1909:217-22) On the contrary to this view the members of the opposite side argue that pluralism disrupts the connections and relations which constrain it and brings "the many and manifold into a reciprocally hostile position"(Stahlin,1961:146) These conflicting ideas are extensions of the conflict each-form of pluralism and all-form of monism. James concludes (1909:324) that in the each form, a thing may be connected by intermediary things with a thing with which it has no immediate or essential connexion while the all-form allows of no taking up and dropping of connexions, for in the all, the parts are essentially and eternally co-implicated.

Pragmatism, assuming that an idea is true if it possesses some subsequent utility, is influential over the representatives of political pluralism, while empiricism becomes a methodological tool to discover and justify the existent power structure of "the real world". His pragmatism was, in fact a response to the traditional monistic way of thought in the form of Hegelian and neo-Hegelian idealism.¹ There is a very close theoretical and imaginative link connection between pragmatism and utilitarianism which can be "traced back in modern form at least into seventeenth century and one can include within it on the one hand conservative thinkers such as Paley and on the other hand virtual anarchists such as Goodwin"(Bramsted&Melhuish,1978:13); although it has been systematized by Bentham whose basic psychological assumption was that what men actually seek in life is pleasure and happiness. Bentham's

¹"The central pragmatic objection to the monistic universe is that, being an all-inclusive entity, it permits neither individuality nor freedom (which, the pragmatist thinks, is possible only when relatives are independent and relations between them external) (...) the monist demands unity; but when he integrates everything exposes of divinity, he acquires a stiff unity that spells abstraction" (Hsiao, 1927:177)

essential value-judgement was that pleasure is the only thing which can be reached in itself. The indebtedness of James as pragmatist to J.S.Mill shows the preparatory process for the idea of pragmatism as the axiological base of the modern political pluralism.

All of these basic ontological, epistemological, axiological and methodological characteristics of philosophical-political pluralism, such as philosophical pluralism, pragmatism and radical empiricism, might be accepted as modern extensions of ancient polytheism, Epicureanism and Aristotelian empiricism within the continuity of the Western tradition.

In short, we can say that the philosophical background of modern political pluralism should be analyzed within the context of ontological polytheism and pantheism, axiological pragmatism and utilitarianism, and methodological radical empiricism. The absence of an idea of ontological transcendency as an Absolute and Living Being in polytheistic and pantheistic ontology leads to an interpretation of the powers of God(s) and the power of the other beings as existing on the same ontological sphere. The resemblances between ancient Greek myths which showed a relationship between the gods and the aristocratic way of life have direct theoretical and imaginative links with this *Weltanschauung* based on cosmological-ontological particularization and proximity. This approach forms a way of justification of the existent power structure without appealing to an ontological transcendent within a hierarchical framework creating an ontologically impenetrable justification of political power. The particularization of divinity as a result of polytheistic and pluralistic ontology in a philosophical sphere results in the justification of the pluralistic power on a social sphere through a process of *Weltanschauung*, while the image of an intimate God as a final assumption of pantheism becomes a basis of justification of existing power structures through the understanding of a natural teleology directed by the "invisible hand." The understanding of the ontologically impenetrable power of Western socio-economic pluralism implicitly cuts down the link between ontology and politics, together with these implicit pantheistic and polytheistic elements, and systematizes it through a methodology of radical empiricism.

II- ONTOLOGICALLY JUSTIFIED POLITICAL POWER AND ISLAMIC RELIGIOUS-CULTURAL PLURALISM:

1-Ontologically Justified Political Power :

In contrast to the Western experience, the Islamic tradition has a complete *Allah-centered* theistic interpretation and justification of political power, which becomes the theoretical background of religious-cultural pluralism and institutional monism in Islamic history. The ontological transcendency around the concept of *Allah* as a Living Presence implies an ontologically justified political power in Islamic political culture and images which assumes a very strong and direct link between ontological transcendency and political power. The ontological antecedent that the totality of power and authority belongs to *Allah* and Him only, causes a political consequence that political power could be justified only through an ontological interpretation of power. This understanding of power formed a holistic framework from a philosophical-political way of thought together with the idea of the *Responsibility of Man* and the *Unity of Life* .

The strong and direct link between ontological transcendency and political power has its origin in the Qur'an and the hadiths as the sources of aqaid and fiqh as comprehensive theoretical and juridic schemes. The Qur'anic calling for Muslims to obey God, His Prophet and *Ulul Amr min kum* (those of you who are in authority) became the basis not only of the link between ontology and politics but also of the ontological justification of the political power in the writings of all Muslim political theorists: "O ye who believe! Obey Allah, and obey the messenger and those of you who are in authority; and if ye have a dispute concerning any matter, refer it to *Allah* and the messenger if you are (in truth) believers in Allah and the Last Day... " (Qur'an, 4: 59). This Qur'anic calling has been supported by several hadiths: "He who obeys me, obeys *Allah* and he who obeys the Imam obeys me and he who rebels against me rebels against Allah, and he who rebels against the Imam rebels against me," and "Fear *Allah* and obey Him and if a flat-nosed shrunken-headed Abyssinian slave is invested with power over you, hearten to him and obey him," are two significant samples of the hadiths providing this theoretical link.

There is almost no attempt in the Islamic political accumulation to justify political power without appealing to its ontological dimension. The parallelism between ontological and political approaches in Islam on the issue of political

power is the basic differentiating characteristic compared to the Western philosophical-political tradition.. It implies not only a specific political identity given to individuals, but also the mission of the state as the institutionalization of political power and its limitations. The principle specified by the second hadith mentioned in the notes that even an Arab noble on occasion should obey a flat-nosed shrunken-headed Abyssinian slave should be accepted as a revolutionary political thought related to the socio-political identification in an age of feudalism in Western Europe where socio-political identifications and orientations were determined only through caste-like socio-economic differentiation. This fact could be interpreted only through the dependency of socio-political identification on the ontological identification in confrontation with ontological transcendency. The distinctive character of Islamic socio-political and socio-economic equalitarianism is an axiological result of its ontological dimension that every human being is on the same ontological sphere as every other and therefore does not have any privilege except the fulfillment of his divine responsibility (*taqwa*).

The idea that the totality of power and authority belongs to *Allah* implies at the same time the temporality and relativity of the power in the forms of economic materials or political status on this earth. Therefore the exercise of power could appear only after the justification of it via appealing to the Absolute Power of Allah, The concept of *wilayah* used by Ibn Taymiyyah is a typical key term to show this approach to political power. His argument that all exercises of authority (*wilayah*) as a realization of power are actions of piety by which man, as the vicegerent of *Allah* , approaches *Allah*, and by which those who are invested with authority are the representatives of *Allah*, might be accepted as a good formulation of this parallelism between ontological and political hierarchies. This term is not used for the authority of the caliph as the person at the top of the political hierarchy; but also for the general public authority including all levels of government. This chain of ethico-political responsibility bases on the hadith arguing that "all of you are shepherds, every shepherd is responsible (*masul*) for his flock"(Bukhari,Ahqam,1/Muslim, Amara,20) according to Ibn Taymiyyah (1988:18). Such an interpretation means enlargement of the ethico-political responsibility and socio-political authority throughout the whole society since each man becomes master and servant at the same time, as Farabi argues.

The understanding of ontologically justified political power has two significant consequences, one related to the origin of power and the other to the

exercise of power. The question of the origin of power is an issue of *aqaid*, while the question of the exercise of power is an issue of *fiqh* and the institutionalization of political power. The interconnected relationship of *aqaid* and *fiqh* within the holistic framework makes ontologically justified political power the anchor point of the Islamic political theories and cultures. The antecedents related to the origin of power appealing to the sovereignty of Allah specify the mission of the state as the ultimate institutionalization of political authority. Therefore we can say, using the "ideal types" of the modern state theories, that the Islamic state as the locus of the political authority is ontologically instrumental and institutionally transcendental. It is ontologically instrumental because it is a governmental instrument to form a socio-political atmosphere within which the ontological relationship could be set up best between Allah as the Absolute Sovereign and His creatures. Therefore, in contrast to some types of state-centered Western totalitarianism, the state does not have a meaning in Islamic political theories as an abstract political institution, but its existence can be justified only through its instrumentality for the realization of the ontological relationship.

2- Social Balance / Stability and Imagination of Circular Evolution: Institutionalization of Power

This theoretical instrumentality created transcendental institutionalization in Islamic political history due to the exercise of the ontologically justified political power for the fulfillment of the substantive mission which has been formulated by Ibn Taymiyyah as upholding the authority of Allah to provide the conditions to enlist man in His True Service. Institutional transcendentalism as a result of the concentration of political power to fulfill this substantive mission has been theoretically justified through setting up a correlative relationship between cosmological teleology and political order. Fakhreddin al-Razi's, Farabi's and Ghazali's organismic interpretations of the political order through biological similes arguing that the whole governmental structure is akin to the human body, are typical examples of this relationship.

They used this organismic argument to support their arguments for the qualifications of the imam. Farabi's (1968) *rais ul awwal* and Razi's *sayis-i mutlaq* should be as perfect as humanly possible due to the reality that the qualifications of the political leader became the central question of such concentrated power structure. Al-Jahiz (1969) argued that ideally the imam should possess

outstanding intellectual and moral qualities, while Farabi (1964) likened his Supreme Head to God because of putting everyone and everything in the place best fitted. Farabi's argument is interesting to show the adaptation of cosmological teleology to political order.

This meticulousness in creating a socio-political order as an extension of cosmological teleology has three significant results in the theory and practice of Islamic political history: (i) the subordination of economics to politics (ii) the understanding of the circular evaluation of social stability and order as being centered in justice compared to the dynamic pluralistic adventure of social change, (iii) equalitarian-solidaristic views of social structure (ta'awwun) compared to socio-economic stratification which emerges from the abuse of wealth in the hands of some socio-economic groups, and (iv) concentration of power through institutional centralization of the governmental organs to maintain political order compared to a socio-political autonomous institutional pluralism based on the socio-economic dispersion of material power.

The first and second consequences are important in understanding the Muslim Mind's political consciousness which accepts political activity as a special mission in establishing justice over the whole world. In the political writings of Islamic history, there is a common approach in favor of the subordination of economics to politics. In fact, politics has always been linked directly to axiological presuppositions through a specific understanding of Ethics. The direction of the theoretical and imaginative impact might be formulated as 'from ontology to epistemology, from epistemology to axiology (ethics), from axiology to politics and from politics to economics (material world)'. There was a parallelism between Platonic political analysis and this Islamic mentality from the perspective of the understanding of the subordination of economics to politics. Ibn Rushd's own conclusions in his *Commentary to Republic* are very significant to find out this Islamic mentality together with its relationship with the organismic interpretation of the society¹ and its incompatibility with the socio-economic pluralism in western civilization which is exactly opposite to this direction of impact: "The other states [bad states] are in reality many states, even though their area may be in one locality, because in them the political

¹ We can find out many passages for Ibn Rushd's organismic interpretation from his *Commentary to Republic*; f.i. "In general, there is nothing which brings more evil and confusion to the State than when its citizens say of something 'this is mine' and 'this is not mine'... The whole body feels pain when one finger is in pain, so that through this pain the <state of the> whole body is determined. (Ibn Rushd, 1966:171)

administration is only for the sake of the economy, and not economics for the sake of the politics. So if a state is called one, it is [only] by accident. For the Ideal State with its parts is like the body as a whole; before speaking of the whole body, the hand or the foot, for example, exists only for the sake of the [other] limbs which are parts of it. but with those States the situation is exactly opposite; for their political community exists in general only by a sort of compulsion in order to preserve the economy. This is self-evident for anyone who is even a little versed in this science".(Ibn Rushd,1966:151)

His argument, parallel to Plato, that "Justice consists in every one of its citizens doing only that for which he is destined individually"(Ibn Rushd,1966:160) strengthens the assertion of the subordination of economics to politics for the stability of the social structure and for the permanency of the Ideal State.¹ The hierarchical categorization of arts is another clear evidence for the subordination of economics to politics in Ibn Rushd's political philosophy:"Just as there is an art which is absolute master over all the <other> arts, the art of governing States [or politics] , so there exists a master intellectual faculty, that is the faculty through which the actions of this art come into being in material things" (Ibn Rushd,1966:194). The other practical arts which are parts of the economic life are subordinated to the master art, namely politics.

The idea of unilinear development through the enlargement of material power in Western political consciousness, which developed especially in the Age of Enlightenment, does not have any place in the axiological base of this mentality. The circular interpretation of social stability focused on justice formulated by Fakhreddin al-Razi, Ibn Khaldun and Tursun Beg interestingly demonstrates this fundamental difference.

Fakhreddin al-Razi's formulation as "*the world is a garden, whose waterer (abar) is the dynasty (dawlat), the dynasty is an authority (sultan), whose guardian (hajib) is the shari'a, the shari'a is a policy (siyaset) which preserves the kingdom*

¹"this is civic justice; just as wrongdoing in States, which is the cause of injustice , is simply that every one of its citizens grows up with more than one thing (occupation), and transfers from one thing to another, from one occupation to another and from one grade to another. Although one might think that this is not damaging to the State in the practical arts <and crafts> , its harm is clearly visible when the classes transfer from one to another , as when one who is parsimonious and wealthy is moved, thanks to his parsimony,,so as to enter the order of the warrior class, or even more that of the ruling class [Plato's Guardian class becomes the ruling class]. For this leads to much harm. You can understand this from what happens in <these> states." (Ibn Rushd,1966:160-61) This conclusion might illuminate the process of the deterioration of the seyfiyye (especially yeni-cheris) of the Ottoman State.

(mulk), the kingdom is a city which the army brings into existence, the army is guaranteed by wealth (*lasker-ra mal kafalat kunad*) wealth is acquired from the subjects, the subjects are made servants (*banda*) by justice as the axis of the well-being of the world" is very similar to Ibn Khaldun's adaptation as "the world a garden the fence of which is the dynasty (*al-dawlah*), the dynasty is an authority (*sultan*) through which life is given to proper behavior (*al-sunah*). Proper behavior is a policy (*siyaset*) directed by the ruler (*al-malik*). The ruler is an institution (*nizam*) supported by the soldiers (*al-juhd*). The soldiers are helpers (*a'wan*) who are maintained by money (*al-mal*). Money is sustenance (*rizq*) brought together by the subjects (*al-ra'iyyah*). The subjects are servants (*abid*) who are protected by justice. Justice is something familiar (*ma'luf*) and through it, the world (*al-alam*) persists. The world is a garden (*bustan*)."¹ Tursun Beg, Ottoman statesman and historian of the late 15th century, extended this circular understanding of social stability being dependent upon justice to the Ottoman political philosophy setting up a circular relationship beginning and ending with justice: power for justice, soldiers for power, money for soldiers, well-being for money, and justice for well-being. (Inalcik, 1964:43).

A threat to justice as the basic value of the political teleology through destroying socio-political stability and order could not be justified within such a framework even if such an action could provide a huge material development. Such an understanding of the circular evolution of social stability has been supported by an equalitarian and solidaristic social philosophy (*ta'awwun*) binding all Muslims together throughout history until the final judgment by the concept of brotherhood as specified in the Qur'an. This solidaristic view emerged from the idea of ontological-metaphysical solidarity transformed which was the reality of socio-economic and socio-political solidarity through moral solidarity, determined by a holistic *Weltanschauung* and an all-inclusive law which, for example, imposed *zakat* as a right of poor Muslims over rich Muslims. The function of *hisba* as the conscience of the community, *fard-ı kifayah* for the individual Muslims, and *fard-ı ayn* for *muhtasib* is the socio-psychological dimension of this teleological stability around the unity and equality of society composed of equal beings in the same ontological spheres. Therefore the abuse of power and wealth in certain hands, as a result of the socio-economic stratification of the class formation such as the emergence of the bourgeoisie in Western societies, and tyrannical attitudes have been highly criticized in Islamic political theories and culture in the arguments that the *Pharaoh*, as a symbol of the abuse

¹ I Have borrowed English translation from Lambton (1985:137)

of political power, and *Qarun*, as a symbol of the abuse economic power, have been condemned in the Qur'an.

The necessity of the concentration of power through an institutional centralization of governmental organizations for the fulfillment of the substantive mission of the state, and the setting up of a political system to prevent the abuse of power, is the fundamental dilemma of Islamic political culture and history. Muslim statesmen and political theorists tried to accompany these contradicting aims with a strong ethical base and by protecting the supremacy of the law and the autonomy of the judicial authorities.

Ghazali's ethical prerequisites for political order and Ibn Taymiyyah's argument that wilayah also connotes power which would make everyone respect the law aimed at preventing the abuse of power, while al-Jahiz's idea that the duty of obedience lapses when the sovereign, who is an ordinary human being and may be guilty of some error and sin, is neglecting his duties and abusing his power, might be accepted as the formation of a theoretical base for a legitimate opposition against the tyrannical tendencies during the exercise of political power. Although Ghazali and Ibn Jama'a accepted the theory that the caliphate includes coercive power, according to them such an exercise of power should be legitimate due to the jurisdic scheme. Almost all Muslim scholars argued in favor of the autonomy of the judicial authority to prevent the abuse of political power, through arguing that after the appointment, he should be seen as the deputies of the ummah rather than of the imam, and hence the imam may not dismiss them without some valid reason due to the fact that even the imam does not have immunity from the judicial judgment and process.

Religious-cultural pluralism and institutional monism developed side by side in Islamic socio political history. These superficially contrasting characteristics can be brought together only in reference to the antecedents of this Weltanschauung. Historical factors or material infrastructure can not explain it thoroughly, due to the fact that these characteristics did not appear in other societies with the same infrastructure. The historical reality that several different cultural and religious communities could survive and coexist with their authentic cultures throughout the centuries under the patronage of Muslim states, whereas the tolerant society in Western political history is a modern artifact, shows us that the relationship between these two alternative political structures is not a relationship of different stages, but a relationship originating

from different political cultures and images as extensions of alternative Weltanschauungs.

The substantive missionary character of the state in Islam together with the responsibility to establish an equalitarian philosophy created a socio-political duality of *askerî and ra'yyah* (governors and governed people) in Islamic political history. The group of askerî , wujuh al-nas (with Ibn Jama'a's term consisting of umara, ulama and ruasa) had the responsibility to direct and control the fulfillment of the substantive missionary state. Due to the necessity of a huge political and military power for the establishment of justice all over the world, the concentration of power in the hands of this group as the political center could be logically justified. The duality of the society from the administrative perspective might be seen as a sociological reflection of the ontological hierarchy. The "intra-elite" character of the duality of socio-political life creating intra-elite political power distribution and power conflict could be directly linked to the concentration of power.

Related to the institutional-political monism in Muslim societies through the concentration of political power it should be underlined that Islamic institutional-political monism is philosophically and methodologically very different from Western political monism which is an alternative to pluralism only within the Western philosophical-political tradition mentioned above. Therefore Islamic institutional-political monism in history opposes the approach of the western tradition as well as pluralist approach. Hobbesian monism in the Western tradition is an institutional monism originating from the craving need for order and unity to avoid disorder and anarchy. This is a pragmatically justified monism through an inductive interpretation, and carries a strong secular character. The fundamental differential characteristic of Islamic institutional-political monism is the existence of a strong theoretical link between cosmological-ontological monism in the form of the Belief in Tawhid and political monism. Western monist and pluralist thoughts have been shaped from the same philosophical paradigm and Western monism, therefore, is a "secular monism" systematized by the synthesis of the epistemological segmentation of truth via the secularization of knowledge and institutional integration. The conflicts between the epistemological segmentation of truth and institutional monism have been eliminated through an ontologically impenetrable justification of political power based on ontological

particularization and proximity of divinity. This is in absolute opposition to the concentration of power in Muslim states.

Islamic institutional transcendentalism depends on the fundamental meticulousness to preserve the axiological base of communal life; rather than to control the private and communal life to strengthen the power of state as an abstract institution. Therefore, muhabbat (love) has been mentioned as the basic parameter for the social coherence and stability: "The love of a ruler for a subject should be a paternal love, while that of the subject for the ruler should be filial; the love of subjects for each other should be fraternal, so that the conditions of order may be preserved among them. What is meant by these attributions is as follows: that the ruler, in dealing with the subject, should model himself on the sympathetic father in respect of sympathy and compassion, solicitude and graciousness, nurture and indulgence, and in his quest for best interests, his warding off of unpleasantness, his attraction of good and his prohibition of evil; that the the subject, on the other hand, should follow the example of an intelligent son in giving the father obedience and good counsel, esteem and veneration; and, finally that (the subjects) in their generosity and kindness to each other should behave like brothers in agreement." (Tûsî, 1964:203) The imagination of *Devlet baba* in Turkish political culture has such a deep ethico-political source as a historical factor.

This characteristic is the area of intersection of theoretical instrumentalism, substantive transcendentalism and religious-cultural pluralism of Islamic polity. Therefore, Goitein's statement is not contradicting with our analysis of social order mentioned above: "The Muslim state, in its classical period, conformed to Wilhelm von Humboldt's¹ definition of ideal libertarian state one which is least felt and restricts itself to one task only: protection, protection against attack from outside and oppression from within"(1970:102-3). On the contrary, it indicates the impossibility of the definition of Islamic state tradition within a pure western conceptual framework due to its unique characteristic. From the perspective of some of the characteristics of the Islamic state tradition,

¹Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835) conceived the idea the idea for his book while in Paris in 1789, at the time of the outbreak of the Revolution, and completed it in 1792. He never published it, first because the Prussian censorship did not pass it, and later because we rightly thought that one book could not stand up against the dominant mood of the age represented in Germany by such thinkers as Fichte and Hegel, who, through Marx and others, had such a disastrous on human history. Von Humboldt's «Ideen zu einem Versuch die Gränzen der Wirksamkeit des Staats zu bestimmen» (Ideas for an attempt to define the limits of the tasks of a state) appeared 1851, sixteen years after his death" (from Goetien, 1970:101).

this similitude might be criticized; but from the perspective of some others, it reflects the historical realities: "In short, the Muslim government felt itself obliged mainly to perform one duty: to protect its people. For this purpose, it concerned itself with three objects: the army, the judiciary (including police and market supervision), and above all- and this is a point often misunderstood by modern historians- the court itself, for the power and splendor of the ruler was a safeguard against enemy attack from outside and a guaranty for the upkeep of authority and peace within the state." (Goitein:1970:103) This description underlines the same crucial contrast what we have mentioned above: the axiologically framed institutional transcendentalism of Islamic tradition which does not prevent religious-cultural pluralism and theoretical instrumentalism as opposed to the secular monism through identifying the socio-political system on behalf of a party of the socio-economic pluralism. Using Roszak's description (1971) it might be said, technocracy as a hegemony over the private life of human being might be accepted as the institutional continuation of the absolutist transcendental monism of abstract idea of state in the sense of Hobbesian theory. The substantive mission of the state and its transcendental consequences in Islamic history completely differ from such a hegemonistic monism. From the perspective of the restrictions of the state -especially related to the communal and private life- within an axiological framework, of which state is also a subject like the individuals and autonomous communities, Goitein's statement is completely correct. At this intersection point, we see the contrast between mechanism-dependent and value-dependent socio-political cultures. Roszакian critique against technocracy is a response to the modern artifact that the personal fortunes and wills of the individual citizen are affected, determined and checked by a socio-economic mechanism day in day out. "State" as an abstract entity such as in Hobbesian and Hegelian sense is a supreme socio-political reflection of the supremacy of mechanisms. Today, even welfare states as well as totalitarian states restrict human will by a set of mechanisms. Western institutional transcendentalism -totalitarianism in its extreme form- in socio-political life depends on such mechanistic imagination; whereas institutional transcendentalism in Islamic way of political thought is attached directly to the substantive mission of *ummah* as the socio-political unity within a framework of axiological set. Checking mechanisms in socio-economic life, such as hisba, has only the function to check social life from the perspective of the realization of these values.

(iii) Religious-cultural Pluralism : The Basic Parameter of Socio-Political Differentiation

Therefore, interestingly, the concentration of political power at the center did not form a socio-cultural monism throughout Islamic history. The multiplicity of socio-cultural groups within the territories of Muslim states is in fact a counterpart of the ontologically defined political power structure which assumes a horizontal segmentation of governed people according to their ontological approaches. An Islamic state, from these perspective, is a confederation of several socio-cultural groups (millets) under the patronage of the political center where power is concentrated. These political center gives a socio-political identity to every religious-cultural group according to its ontological approach which is bound to the system with a specific act of citizenship (dhimmiship). This privilege of becoming a protected minority via an act of dhimmiship was only given to the followers of a prophet whom a sacred book has been revealed. Therefore, these communities have been called as ahl al-kitab. This denomination and the rights of these communities have been specified by the Qur'an. At the beginning, Jews and Christians were accepted as ahl-al kitab; while the members of some other religions such as Zoroastrians, Hindus,¹ Buddhists, the gnostics of Harran and pagan berbers of North Africa were accepted as protected minorities after the Islamic expansion.² Even some sources was found from the Qur'an for a comprehensive interpretation of the conception of the monotheistic religion; f.e. the verse beginning with "wa at-tyn/ by the fig" has been accepted as an indication for the prophecy of Buddha due to the fact that the following verses indicate to the other great prophets³: "By the fig and the olive (Jesus), By Mount Sainai (Moses) and by this land made safe (Muhammad)!"(45:1-3). This comprehensive extension of the concept of ahl al-kitab is the basis of the multi-national and multi-cultural Muslim states such as Umayyads, Andalusia, Abbasids and Muslim Empires in India. Ottoman Millet system is the last and most developed version of this religious-cultural pluralism. As Watt mentions (1968:51) "the problem of minorities in the

¹ Al Baladhuri reports in his *Futuh al-Buldan* that when a group of Brahmans approached to Muhammed b. al-Qasim for the protection of their lives and temples after the conquest of Sind, he granted them the status of the dhimmis by declaring "The Hindu temples are just like the Christian churches, jewish synagogues and the Zoroastrian fire-temples." (Ali, 1982:108)

² Abu Yusuf gives brief information on the status of Zoroastrians and Sabiins in his time. Narrating some hadiths he argues that they might be accepted as a protected minority in return for polltax, but it is forbidden to marry with them because of their tradition of consanguineous marriage. (Abu Yusuf, 1973:210-4)

³ look to Hamidullah (1972:459) for this argumentation.

contemporary Middle East is a legacy from the millet system and an indication of the failure so far to find any adequate replacement for it". It should be added to this judgement that it is not a bare problem of institutional replacement but rather a natural result of the challenge of two alternative political cultures. Beginning from the constitution of Madina as the first agreement with another religious group (jews of Madina), Muslims managed to develop and to reproduce a political culture which is suitable for a real co-existence of several cultural groups, till the victory and expansion of western socio-economic pluralism together with a highly provoked national consciousness as the base of the unity of nation-state.

The origin of the application of Millet System goes back to this constitution of Madina, the first written constitution of the human history.¹ This constitution the text of which has come down to us complete, specifies very clearly that everyone was to be not only free in respect of the dogma and practice of religion but also free to comply with the laws of the community to which he belonged; jews were to be judged by Jewish law, Christians by Christians and so on: "25. The jews of Banu Awf are a community along with the believers. to the Jews their religion and to the Muslims their religion. (This applies) both to their clients and to themselves, with the exception of any one who has done wrong or acted treacherously; he brings evil only on himself and on his household. 26. For the jews of Banu an-Najjar the like of what is for the jews of Banu Awf e.t.c." (Hamidullah, 1987:59-64; eng. tr. Watt 1968:130-4). On the other hand, by the agreement with the Christians of Najran during the period of Prophet, these Christians were permitted to practice the rules of their religion and run their own affairs, on condition that they paid a fixed tax, gave hospitality to the Prophet's representatives, provided support in the sense of supplies to the Muslims in the case of war and refrained from usury.²

¹"The prophet was illiterate; and it is an extraordinary thought that the first written constitution to be promulgated by a head of state should have emanated from this illiterate man. Neither the Romans, the Greeks, the Hindus, the Chinese or anyone anywhere in the world before Islam has ever thought of promulgating a written constitution for a state -though there had been laws, such as the code of Hammurabi."(1981:21)

²"wa li najran wa 'hâsiyatiha, jiwâr Allah wa dhimmah Muhammad an-Nabi rasûl Allah 'alâ amwalihim, wa anfusihim, wa millatihim wa gâibihim wa shâhidihim wa ashiratihim wa biy'ahum wa lulli ma tahta aydihim min qalil aw kathir. la yuğayyar usquf min usqufayyitihi wa la râhib min ruhbaniiyyatihi wa la kâhin min kahanatihi. wa laysa alayhim rubbiyyah wa la dum jahilliyyah wa la yu'hsharuna wa la y'usharuna, wa la ya'taa ar'dihim jayshun." (Hamidullah, 1987:176)

The respect for this act of citizenship is a part of the divine responsibility of the substantive missionary state and depends on several verses of the Qur'an and hadiths. Qur'anic famous command *la ikraha fi ad-dyn*/there is no compulsion in religion (2:256) has been clarified by several hadiths such as "God forbid you to enter into the home of the people of the Book without (their) permission; to beat them; to take away their crops when they have fulfilled their obligations;" and, "Behold, he who oppresses a dhimmi (a covenanter, a non-Muslim citizen or an ally), cheats him or imposes upon him (a duty) which is above his capability, or usurps his possessions, I shall be his tormentor in the Day of Judgment." Abu Yusuf specifies following rules related to the relationship with the non-Muslim subjects: "(i). whatever agreement is made with them has to be faithfully observed. (ii) the responsibility for the defence of the State does not lie on them, but on the Muslims alone, (iii) they should not be burdened with excessive poll-tax and land revenue. (iv) the poor, the blind, the old the recluse, workers at the houses of worship, women, and children are exempt from polltax; (v) there is no zakat (prescribed charity) chargeable on the wealth and cattle of the non-Muslims (vi) no one is allowed to resort to beating or inflicting other physical tortures on them for exacting the capitation, as the maximum punishment for its non-payment is only imprisonment; (vii) to realize more than the fixed amount from them is unlawful; (viii) the poor and the cripple among them are to be supported from the State exchequer." (Abu Yusuf 1973:200-6;223-38)¹ Although some commentators such as Zamakhshari interprets the payment of *jizya* as a sign of the sovereignty and of the belittlement of the non-Muslim subjects (Lewis,1984:14), the poll-tax has been accepted by jurists as a special payment in return for the responsibility of protection fulfilled by Muslims. For example, Abu Yusuf mentions as a proof for this argument that Abu Ubaydah returned poll-taxes to the non-Muslim subjects in Hims, when he found himself unable to ensure the protection of them in the face of an enormous army raised by the Roman Emperor, Heraclius.² Abu Ubayd (770-830), the author of *Kitab al-Amwal*, one of the significant classical treatise on taxation, emphasizes that the dhimmis must not be burdened beyond their capacity, nor must they be caused to suffer. (Lewis,1984:15) Shaybani insists that, "as to the

¹ I have borrowed english summary from Mawdudi (1963:700)

² Abu Yusuf narrates Abu Ubaydah's letter to the leaders of the non-Muslim subjects in this situation: "We are returning you poll-taxes which you have paid to us, because we have been informed that the Byzantians prepare a powerful army for war. We were taking poll tax from you in return for the protection of your life, country and property. However, we are not powerful enough to fulfill this responsibility and therefore we are returning them to you. If Allah will help us and we will be victorious in this war, we will be devoted to our previous agreement with you" (1973:224-5)

blind, the crippled, the chronically ill, and the insane, the jizya is not to be levied on them, even if they are rich"(1966:276)and that "if one of them dies and part of his jizya has not been paid, it should not be deducted from his estate nor should it be collected from his heirs, because the jizya is not considered a debt"(1966:275)¹.The argument of Ibn Taymiyyah (1966:219) in his letter to Moghul invaders of that Muslim state shows the most serious obligation (azam al wajibat) of releasing Jewish and Christian prisoners from the hand of the enemy² is another interesting example of the protective obligations of the Muslim state to the religious-cultural groups within its territory. The respect to the non-Muslim subjects has been emphasized by modern Muslim scholars too, as one of the characteristic of the socio-political life of Islamic history.³

Mez mentions in his famous work on the tenth century of Islamic history, *Die Renaissance des Islams* that "relying upon agreements and rights resulting therefrom, churches and synagogues always remained as something foreign to the state and never could form part of it."⁴ (Mez,1922:29/eng.32) On the other hand, there was a free exchange of thoughts among the leaders of these religious-cultural groups. Tabari quotes in *Kitab al-Ihtijaj* that Bishr b.Ghayyat al-Marisi (218/813) took part in disputations in the presence of Ma'mun; and that at one of these debates were present the catholicus, the followers of Zoroaster, the chief

¹"If a portion of the jizya is deferred, the balance should be collected in the following year. (...) If anyone becomes blind or poor and is no longer able to pay the remainder of his jizya, it is waived and he is no longer obliged to pay it. (...) Dhimmi women and children do not have to pay the jizya, nor do those of them who are blind, crippled, helplessly insane, chronically ill, too old to war, or who are too poor to be able to pay. Priests, monks and abbots are to pay if they own property. But dhimmi slave, mudabbars and mukatabs do not have to pay the jizya."(1966:275-6)

²"All Christians know well how I have asked the Tatar to liberate our prisoners. The Tatar, nevertheless, liberated the Muslim prisoners only. Ghazan and Qutlusha will accept; I have informed my prince of it. The Tatar, however, will deliver only the Muslims, and say 'we have only Christians whom we captured in Jerusalem; we refuse to release them.' I have replied, 'all Jews and Christians who are in your hands are our subjects. We must release them. We shall not wait, therefore; nor shall we leave in your hands even one prisoner, be he a Muslim or dhimmi.' we are determined to succeed in liberating a considerable number of Christians. That is our manner of conduct, and such is our generosity. God gives the recompense." (eng. tr. from Makari, 1976:213)

³"When non-Muslim powers conquered a kingdom they used to follow the army of conquest with an army of preachers of their faith, who took up quarters in the houses and occupied their councils, in order to impose the conqueror's religion. Their argument was force and their evidence conquest. It was not so with Muslim victors: such things were quite unknown in all their history. There were no preachers with the official and special duty to undertake propaganda and give their whole energies to urging their creed on non-Muslims. Instead the Muslims contended themselves with mixing among other peoples and treating them kindly. The entire world witnessed that Islam counted the proper treatment of conquered peoples a meritorious and virtuous thing, whereas Europeans regard such behavior as weak and despicable." (Abduh,1964:144)

⁴look to Mez (1922:40) for the legal autonomy.

herbad, the head of the dispersion, the leaders of the Sabians, Anastasius the Greek, the theologians and Ali Rida. (Tritton,1947:73)

Hence, repeating Goitein's conclusion as a consequence of his studies on the on the inner organization of jewish community in Egypt during the tenth through the twelfth centuries, it might be argued that "the Christians and Jews living under Islam formed a state not only within the state, but beyond the state, inasmuch as they owed loyalty to the heads and the central bodies of their respective denominations"(1970:109). He goes further and argues that the Christian and Jewish communities were even stronger than the shapeless, amorphous masses of Muslims because they carried over from Hellenistic and Roman times civic forms of communal organization, which gave the individual member opportunity to be active in public life. His inferences from the historical sources of jewish community related to their application of minority self-rule provides us significant details on the characteristics of this religious-cultural pluralism together with its dimension of the legal autonomy and of the survival of the authentic life-style throughout ages: "The concerns of of the community were manifold. The upkeep of the houses of worship and the seats of religious learning, as well as the appointment and payment of The various community officials required much attention and effort. Secondly, law in those days was personal rather than territorial; an individual was judged according to the law of the denomination to which he belonged. Almost the entire field of family law, and also cases of inheritance and commercial transactions were handled by the courts of the various religious communities. It is natural that individual Christians and jews often applied to the qadi, especially when Muslim law was favorable to their case, as happened especially in litigations over inheritances. In order to forestall such occurrences, the denominational courts would adopt their legal practice to that of the government courts, and a most interesting interplay of law ensued.(...) Finally, the social services, which in our day are the responsibility of state and local authorities, had to be provided in those days by the Church and Synagogue. The education of children whose parents or other relatives were unable to bear the costs e.t.c. " (1970:111) The appointment of the leaders of the community should be occurred through the full participation of the laity.¹"In the good times, the eleventh and twelfth century, the laity has in

¹"The structure an working of jewish community life must be studied on the ecumenical, territorial and local levels. Three factors were involved in it: widest participation of the laity while the ultimate authority rested with the officially appointed religious dignitaries, who were recognized by, and responsible to the Muslim government. The full participation of the laity was needed first in order to give each and every member the opportunity to fulfill his religious duties, including

its hands not only the collection of the fund but also their administration and distribution, to be sure always under the supervision of the communal courts that formed the highest authority. The local officials were chosen by, or under vivid participation of, the laity, a system which we see not only in action. But acknowledged in principle by the highest Jewish councils, both that residing in Jerusalem, and those that had their seat in Baghdad.(...) In practice, a community had plenty of means to get rid of a leader who proved to be unacceptable for one reason or another."(1970: 112) In theory and practice, Muslim government did not interfere to the internal affairs of the community and "acted only, and then very reluctantly when approached by one of the rivalling parties within a non-Muslim community" (1970:109). Therefore, Goitein describes this religious-cultural pluralistic system as a "medieval religious democracy" interpreting it as a successful application of the liberal-instrumentalist type of state theorized by Wilhelm von Humboldt in 19. century. It is very interesting to note that when some Muslim governors (Ma'mun) aimed to extend this democratic principles of minority self-rule for the religious groups composed of at least ten persons, the other great Christian communities did not accept it and tried to prevent the granting of the certificate of installation of new self-ruling minority groups. (Mez,1922:38)

On the contrary to the universalization and monopolization of life style, even dressing of these protected minorities has been preserved as a mark of cultural identity. It is very difficult to accept Cohen's assertion that "the very fact both Christians and Jews in various ways maintained their separate religious identity implies, by definition, a certain degree of estrangement from the society as a whole" (1982:10) because as he argues in the same article "Christians engaged in trade on all levels and of different kinds" and "among Jews we find high officials and physicians, blacksmiths, silversmiths and goldsmiths, butchers and meatsellers, millers and tailors, bankers and moneysellers" during the 16.th century of Ottoman empire (1982:11). This diversification of protected minorities in socio-economic activities necessitates a comprehensive involvement in the sense of social relationships within the society as a whole. If we compare this socio-economic situation with the relationship among the intra-religious sects in Europe in the same period, it marks a highly extended socialization process among the communities without destroying the cultural identity because it is impossible to manage these socio-economic activities

most importantly charity of all descriptions; secondly, because the revenue of the community was exclusively derived from voluntary contributions." (1970:112)

within the limitations of only one community. Therefore, the psychological stimulus for the survival of the millet system should be searched beyond the purposive actions of the political center to estrange the protected minorities from the society as a whole. Rather, it is a natural result of a specific administrative spirit and mechanism to guarantee social balance through keeping alive religious-cultural pluralism as the basic parameter of socio-political differentiation in this socio-political life and institutionalization. We should not interpret this historical fact within the framework of modern parameters of the socio-economic pluralism. The secret forces of this religious-cultural pluralism might be understood within its own mechanism which depends on a specific political culture. Platonic interpretation of justice as "giving to every man his due/preserving every man in his place" and Islamic adaptation of cosmological teleology to the social life might provide us significant indications for the development of such a socio-political imagination and culture which facilitates a suitable atmosphere for the administrative institutionalization of religious-cultural pluralism. The act of dhimmiship as a practice of Islamic history beginning from the time of prophet provided both a prescriptivist legitimacy and of a historical accumulation of experience to form such a comprehensive institutionalization of millet system applicable within a huge territory in Ottoman empire.

This pluralistic character is also valid for several Muslim sects to a great extent. Though there had been some disputes among the members of competing Muslim sects, it should be underlined that a very extensive case of war-like in Europe- among them did not emerge in Islamic history. Additionally, belonging of the governors of a state to a specific Muslim sect does not necessarily mean that the overwhelming majority of the population of this country belong to the same sect. Von Grünebaum's statement that Iranian or Moroccan Islam is not an organic unit but merely a stenographic expression to denote the type or types of beliefs and practices that are prevailing within the territories of somewhat accidental boundaries, is correct due to the fact that "not only do the frontiers of those political entities fail to coincide with the boundaries of one or the other specific modifications of the Muslim faith but within the independent Muslim states, (in some cases) different ethnic or social strata will adhere to different versions of the Prophets message" (1962:42).¹

¹Imami Twelver Shism, for instance, the official religion of Iran reaches into Iraq and the Sunni Muslims are strongly represented on Iranian soil

III-RELIGIOUS-CULTURAL PLURALISM VERSUS SOCIO-ECONOMIC PLURALISM: IS CO-EXISTENCE POSSIBLE ?

The horizontal segmentation of the governed people as religious-cultural groups (like jews, Orthodox Christians, Catholic Christians, etc.) in the form of the millet system and the rejection of the socio-economic pyramidal stratification of classes is the *principium individuationis* of Islamic political society. The rivalry between Islamic and Western political mentalities and structures proves that an religious-cultural pluralism of horizontal segmentation on sectoral bases could not coexist with a socio-economic pluralism of pyramidal stratification.

A religious-cultural pluralism of horizontal segmentation on a sectoral base necessitates a specific economic mentality, eliminating the distinction between normative and positive economics which might be accepted as the axiological ground of the secularization of economics and the direction of positive economics thorough the regulations of normative economics originating from a comprehensive juridic scheme framed by the Weltanschauung, aqaid. It was, and is, almost impossible to realize a capitalist accumulation within such a norm of economic mentality (i.e. zakat, as a right of the poor over the rich, could not be meaningful for a rational homo economicus.)

The survival of several styles of lives of religious cultural groups within the territories of Muslim states could only be achieved in a socio-economic structure where economics has been accepted in the service of politics to establish social stability and justice. The Islamic economic assumption that everything needed should be produced and economic resources should be distributed justly, creating a horizontal sectoral differentiation, provided lebensraum for the authentic local cultural styles of living. Legal pluralism, guaranteed and protected the religious-cultural pluralism, gave the opportunity to minorities with the same socio-political identification based on the ontological approach, to apply their authentic law to internal affairs, securing the survival of the authentic styles of lives.

Western socio-economic pluralism is completely opposite to this economic mentality. The universal character of the uniformity of the Western style of life nowadays, which is destroying all multiplicities of authentic local cultures, is an ultimate consequence of the dependency of culture and politics on economics. The principal assumption of the Western economic mentality that everything produced should be consumed, in contrast to the Islamic assumption that

everything needed should be produced, created a growth of necessities forming a culture of consumption which resulted in the internationalization of the Western style of life through the necessity of discovering ways to absorb the increasing production. The specific economic antecedent behind this socio-economic pluralism, which causes cultural monism, is the divorce of normative and positive economics and the assumption that resources should be distributed productively.

Thus Islamic religious-cultural pluralism based on ontologically justified political power resulted in legal pluralism because of the existence of authentic cultures. The law of the sovereign religio-political group, namely Islamic law, was not imposed on the other communities in the position of "protected minorities". There have been always special inter-communal law, court and judges for the internal affairs of these groups. This decentralization of law and plurality in the sense of judicial mechanisms which have always been a theoretical principle and historical reality in Islam, are both an imaginative consequence and institutional guarantor for the religious-cultural pluralism. On the contrary, "standardization of law" is a counterpart of the "standardization of life style" and of the "monopoly of one cultural identity". From this perspective universalization of the sovereignty of a specific and monopolization of a specific life style as a cultural standard are co-existed and inter-dependent phenomena which have its origin in socio-economic pluralism. But, Muslims did not accept a customary action which is against a most significant human value, such as the preservation of human life or preservation of family. For example the practice of offering up a beautiful girl to the god of the Nile in pre-Islamic Egypt, the widow's committing suicide by jumping on to the funeral pyre where the body of his husband was being burned in pre-Islamic India¹ and the consanguineous marriage in Khuvezvagdas law among the Zoroastrians in pre-Islamic Iran have been prohibited after the conquest of these countries by Muslims.² Other elements of intra-communal law among the members of the pre-Islamic socio-political entities have been preserved throughout the ages under the sovereignty of the Muslim states.

It also resulted in institutional monism because of the substantive mission of the state to establish justice all over the world. At the same time, Western socio-economic pluralism, grounded on an ontologically impenetrable

¹ This ceremony was attached to the belief that marriage is an eternal relationship.

² look to Hamidullah for the details of these prohibitions to Hamidullah (1981:29-30)

justification of political power, resulted in the uniformity of life style protected by the monistic legal structure all over the world, and institutional pluralism supported by the socio-economic pyramidal stratification within the societies.

Therefore, beyond institutional adaptations led by Westernized political elites, a "real" Westernization of a Muslim community could only be achieved through the establishment of a socio-economic functional differentiation. But such a functional differentiation could not be justified within an Islamic framework due to the principle that an Islamic state could not be identified with a socio-economic group in order to support it for the realization of the capitalist accumulation, because of its substantive character, around the basic norms, which could not be accompanied by the pragmatical utilitarian approach. The direct control of the fundamental economic resources for a just distributive structure within a circular evolution can not produce a socio-economic pluralism. A socio-economic pluralism with a dynamic adventurous character aimed at the most productive distribution of economic resources leads to the destruction of the religious-cultural pluralism because of its uniformistic tendency. The destruction of Islamic religious-cultural pluralism or the Indian philosophy of tolerance, are the results of the universalization of Western cultural monism that is aimed at establishing only one style of life all over the world by the impact of a productive interpretation of economic development and of the culture of consumption accelerated by the help of the huge development of the system of telecommunication.

The question of whether Muslim societies will be transformed into a structure of socio-economic pluralism or not, should be evaluated from this perspective of *Weltanschauung* rather than from the imposed institutional transformation strategies directed by a Westernized political elite. Such institutional transformation attempts would produce counter attempts originating from the socio-political culture based on a strong and direct link between ontological and political spheres because of the difficulty of justifying the political power concentrated in imposed Western institutions (which assume an ontologically impenetrable justification of political power), creating a problem of a theoretical accommodation with the ontologically justified political power of the authentic political culture.

CHAPTER 7

POLITICAL UNIT AND UNIVERSAL POLITICAL SYSTEM

The idea of the political unit and its consequences related to the universal political system is another significant aspect of the political extension of the philosophical-doctrinal differences of Islamic and Western traditions. The comparative analysis between the continual philosophical bases of the evolution from the incipient national states, *res publica*, to the formation of the modern nation state as the universal political unit and the doctrinal bases of the bi-compartmentalization of the universal political system into Dar-ul Islam and Dar-ul Harb in Islamic political theories, can provide us with significant indications to show that the Islamic response to the universalization of Western political ideals could only be understood through underlying philosophical doctrinal bases of the historical-cultural factors.

I- WESTERN MULTICOMPARTMENTALIZATION : NATION-STATE

We are facing, first, a conceptual and etymological problem related to such a comparison due to the fact that "nation-state" is a pure Western artifact. Therefore it created a problem of finding corresponding terms in non-Western languages during the challenge and impact of Western institutions over other communities. The problem is apparent especially when related to the Muslim languages. Like that, it is also very difficult to find an adequate corresponding term in Western languages for the term of *ummah* as a socio-political unity because of its uniqueness in Islamic political history and culture.

1- The concept of nation-state: An Etymological Interpretation :

An etymological analysis of the concept of "nation-state" leads us to the semantic fields of the concepts of "nation" and "state." Whereas "people" is a wider term for any aggregation of individuals "nation" used in English has two senses, giving special substance to this aggregation of the individuals. The first usage of the concept of nation is for a conscious aggregation of individuals to compose a socio-political community united under one government, while the other is for a community which has some common characteristics like race,

religion, language, and tradition. The former usage shows the socio-political orientation and identification of a group of individuals. In that sense, it has been used in the intersection of the semantic field of the concept of "state". The latter sense which is not used within this semantic field of the concept of "state", is used for any aggregation of individuals united because of some other characteristics. We will use the concept of 'nation' in the sense of the former usage.

The concepts of *Nation* or *Volk* in German and nation in French have almost the same meaning as in English. However, there have been some semantic changes in the usage of *Nation* and *Volk* in German. *Nation* was formerly used in German in the cultural rather than in the political sense of the word, but *Volk* began to be used for this purpose in the 1930's. *Volk* extends the conception of the family to a wider plane. It is mainly an ethno-centric term denoting a body of men who are physically, and thereof spiritually, of common descent and historical consciousness. In the semantic system of the German language, there is a close relationship between *Volk* as "an organic being" and *Staat* as "a form of organization". The same clear distinction between socio-politically and socio-culturally oriented concepts of nation can be seen in German language as *Kulturnation* ("durch Einheit der Sprache und Kulturüberlieferung bestimmte Gemeinschaft" -from Sprachbrockhaus) indicating culture and language, and *Staatsnation* ("durch gemeinsame staatliche-politische Entwicklung geformte Gemeinschaft") indicating socio-political identification.

In French, the terms of *nation*, *etat* and *peuple* form a similar semantic relationship. *Nation* signifies a community of men linked by the tie of a will to live together in a *patrie* which is the territory inhabited by the nation. The link between the *state* and *nazione* is almost indissoluble in Italian. This was especially so during the period of Mazzini. According to the Encyclopedia Italiana, although a *nazione* either is or tends to become a state, the state tends to create the *nazione* as well as is created by it.

The etymological analysis of the concept of "state" leads us to the expressions of *status* in Latin which has been used in the Emperor Justinian's text as "*statum reipublicae sustentamus*", and *stato*, *etat*, *stat* in Teutonic languages. With Pufendorf, and his translator Baybeyrac, the concept of state (*status*, *etat*) definitely becomes a party of the theory although it has been used before to correspond to several expressions in ancient time as *polis*, *civitas*,

regnum by Plato, Aristotle, Cicero and St. Augustine. The Greeks signified city and state by the same word *polis* which shows that the conception of state in the Greek language was based and limited by the city within a moral context. So, in the Greek language, "*polis* has the meaning of state and church together' (Bluntschli, 1892:23). The Roman view of the universal state that was dependent on a legal element, was very different from the Greek city state. St. Augustine used three terms to show and differentiate the types of state, especially in Italy, while *regnum* was used by him to describe the territorial monarchies. *Res Publica* was reserved in most cases for describing a wider community; i. e. *Res Publica Christiana* united all believers in one sheepfold. (D'entreves, 1967:3). This key-concept has been used first time by Machiavelli in modern sense. He definition of state as the proper object of politics as a collective unit although its shape and form of government may vary, might be accepted as the first formulation of the modern sense of this concept.

When we combine the two concepts, nation-state is a special type of the government of a community or people whose members are bound together by a sense of solidarity through a common culture and national consciousness as a socio-political identification. It presupposes "the existence of a centralized form of government over a large and distinct territory" (Kohn: 1969:4). Therefore the legitimacy of the nation-state as a political unity and the consciousness of nationalism is purely a modern artifact although it has its nuclei and philosophical origins from ancient times in the sense of being a reflection of a specific *weltanschauung* and socio-political imagination.

2-The Historical Legacy of the Idea of State:

The idea of state in ancient Greece was depending on the mentality of city-state which was a moral and political order in which human nature fulfills its end. The idea of state in ancient Greece may be accepted as the first formulation of the organic theory of state. This organic theory of state led to an imagination of state as a human being. That might be traced back to Platonic doctrine that the best state is that which approaches most nearly to the conditions of the individual; thus, if a part of the body suffers, the whole body feels the hurt and sympathizes altogether with the part affected. In the Platonic idea the state is highest revelation of human virtue. Assuming that man is by nature a political animal, Aristotles defined the state as the association of clans and village-communities in a complete and self-sufficing life.

Because of accepting state as the highest virtue, the idea of state in ancient Greece was depending on a pyramidal-hierarchical relationship between state and subjects (citizens). The citizen was nothing except a member of city-state. There was not any moral or legal limit to power of state. Hence, it was almost impossible to develop a national understanding upon which the legitimacy of the state will ground.

The universal empire of Alexander the Great (356-323 B.C.) became a marriage of Greek city-state mentality and Eastern divine kingdom. That created a high mobile cultural and institutional transaction between east and west, which would be taken over and developed by Roman Empire for the same idea of universal empire contradistinction to the limited mentality of city-state.

The Roman idea of state, best expressed Cicero, resembles to the Greek idea of city-state in assuming organic theory of state and in believing that city-state is the highest product of human virtue. But, there were also some significant differences among these two ideas of state which may be accepted as the first indication of the modern national idea of state. First of all, legal organizations became the focus of the idea of state as a natural result of the assumption distinguishing law from morality. Secondly, the strict hierarchical order and identification between citizen and city-state in ancient Greece had been changed in the Roman idea of state. Individual rights as private property were better protected in Roman idea of state against the arbitrary exercises of public authority through the supremacy of law and legal organizations. Individual and family life became more free, although the welfare of the state continued to be accepted as the highest law. (*salus populi supreme lex*) Roman idea of state contributed too much to the modern national idea of state declaring that the will of the people should be the source of all law depending on the assumption that state is nothing but people organized. The Roman State was not a commune contradictory to the city-state, but an incipient national state (*res publica*) aiming *Pax Romana*. So, with this aim the national *jus civile* had been supplemented by *jus gentium*.

The characteristics of the early medieval idea of state was shaped by two significant new elements, the rise of papacy with the spread of Christianity throughout the Roman Empire as the dynamic spiritual vitality and the teutonic-barbarian attacks as the temporal force. These were the leading

elements to force the super-structure of state in the age of feudalism as a new socio-economic system. The rise of papacy in Rome after weakening and destruction of the Western Roman Empire was in fact a re-emergence of Roman idea of universal dominium in spiritual form. This idea of state found a new religious ground after the dominance of papacy. As Bluntschli clarifies very well, with these events "the Roman Empire was renewed in medieval form, but represented in superior form by the Roman Church, and in an inferior by the Holy Roman Empire of the German people under the governance of Teutonic princes"(1901:42). Till the end of the sixth century the christianization of Europe by papacy and segmentation of the old Roman Empire by Teutonic influences had been completed. This completion was in fact a beginning of formation of Europe as nucleus.

The idea of the state was weak in that time because the teutonic tribes had no sense of the state as distant, impersonal continuing source of law. Then had no sense of loyalty to large and general institutions although they had strong loyalty to persons, kings and chiefs as a natural result of nomadic tradition. This tradition was the basis of contractual understanding to specify rights and obligations in the feudal structure. The segmentation and particularism in Europe had been increased with teutonic effects after the destruction of Roman Empire. This particularism prevented the emergence of the idea of nation-state because of the conflicting claims of territories, estates and dynasties.

The Christianization and particularization of Europe in Middle Ages created a problem of ultimate sovereignty among the ecclesiastical and clerical hierarchy (*sacerdotium*) and temporal kings (*regnum*). This struggle was a very fundamental fact for the formation process of nation-state. In early middle ages the supremacy of sacerdotium could not be discussed. This can be seen in the letter of Pope Gelasius I (492-496) written to Byzantium Emperor Anastasius (491-518) very openly : "There are two powers, August Emperor, by which this world is chiefly ruled, namely the sacred, authority of the priests (*auctoritas*) and temporal power (*potestas*). Of these, that of the priests is the more weighty, since they have to render an account for even the kings of men in the divine judgement. (...) you should be subordinate rather than superior to the religious order, and that in these matters you depend on their judgement rather than wish to force them to follow your will." (Viorst, 1965:20)

This idea of Two Swords had been strengthened after the rituals of crowning of Charlagmagne (768-814) by Pope Leo III (795-816). Charlagmagne was defining his task as "to defend by armed strength the Holy Church of Christ everywhere from the external onslaught of the pagans and the ravages of the infidels and to strengthen within it the knowledge of the Catholic Church". This ritual of crowning by Pope continued during the time of Otto I (936-973) presenting the permanent association of the Christian Roman Empire with teutonic kingdoms.

So till early eleventh century, the idea of state was depending on the belief of Two Swords which was the main obstacle for the formation of the nation-state. But some socio-political, socio-cultural and socio-economic changes emerged in eleventh century, began to destroy this traditional structure in favour of temporal authority which would be the forerunner of the nation-state.

3-The Formation of The Nation-State System in Europe as the Basis of Political Unity and Universal Political System:

The nation itself as an ethnic entity and national feeling can be traced back to a much earlier date in human history. Especially, the feeling of the ethnic discrimination in ancient Aryan culture¹ which has been institutionalized as the caste system in the socio-political sphere and the idea of the missionary supremacy of Jewish community as an ethno-religious entity,² might be mentioned for two significant -even nowadays effective- examples for this fact. Nevertheless, the system of nation-state, the political legitimacy of national sovereignty and the political theory of nationalism developed after the destruction of the traditional feudal order of the Middle Ages. The first stirrings of the development of the nation-state system as an international universal system began to occur in the 11 th century, while the definite entry of the nation-

¹This ancient legacy has been survived throughout the ages. For example barbara which means non-Aryan in Sanskrit has been extended to Greek political thought and culture as barbaros meaning strange-foreign. The usage of this term for the discrimination of other groups which does not take part the same national feeling, is continued to be used in western political culture and thought throughout the ages.

²Kohn's statement that "the purely vegetative group feeling developed for the first time into a national consciousness which received its inspiration from the ancient classics and Old Testament" (1969:120) is absolutely correct from this perspective.

state into the system of Europe was completed in the mid-seventeenth century after the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648.

The political systems before this period, as city-states like *polis* in ancient Greece or the king-state combination in Babylonia, fell short of a nation. The political systems of the Macedonian and the Roman Empires were the representatives of the multinational and universal political mentality combining the political legitimacy of the deification of the Emperors. The Roman state was not a community but an incipient national state (*res publica*) aiming at Pax Romana. The political mentality in the Middle Ages as shaped by Christianity around the idea of the Christian Commonwealth. Christianity, being consecrated the structure of Roman Empire which it found, developed the idea of Two Swords as the divine political legitimacy under the rule of Pope and holy Roman Empire as the representatives of the dual political structure. The imaginative link of continuity between this mediaeval legacy and modern nation-state system is very clear because such a compartmentalization opened way for the concentration of political power in secular and religious centers. The formation of nation-state system is a natural consequence of this compartmentalization on behalf of the secular forces. Such a transformation of political power became possible and legitimate because of the theoretical and imaginative continuity in the sense of ontological-epistemological-axiological foundation.

During the Middle Ages the concept of *natio villa* -etymologically originated from cognate- was used for a group of kinsmen. The first time it was used was by the Baron of Oxford who used the phrase *natio regli Anglia* for the kingdom of England in 1258. Germany began something of an independent state under the Saxon dynasty in 919, whereas the Capetian monarchy started on its long career in France in 987 and William I began to form a new England after 1066. (Barker, 1927:120).

The period of the institutionalization of the nation-states from the 10th to the 15th centuries was a complementary fact in the process of a socio-political transition from towns to national units. After the incipient and transitional period, the traditional order was destroyed and a new socio-cultural, socio-economic and socio-political system appeared in Europe. The ethical-religious base of this new system was Protestantism; the intellectual-scientific base was Galileo's theory of motion; the socio-political base was national royal absolutism within a specified territory; the socio-economic base was mercantilism. The

nation-state system was a complementary artifact of this new order of Western civilization with the same philosophical background and it carries the fundamental characteristic of western paradigm searched in Chapter II. The internal structure of the nation-state, from a theoretical and institutional perspective, has been systematized by Machiavelli, Bodin and Hobbes, while the principle of the international system in which nation-states became political units, was set up by Grotius who used and acknowledged Braun, Vasques, Suarez, and Gentilis.

The development of the nation-state as the basic political unit and the multi-compartmentalization of the universal system has the same characteristics as the Western philosophico-political tradition mentioned above. The autonomy of the political culture and structure which lacked a direct link with the ontological approach, the socio-political identification through the real factors without appealing to an axiological holistic framework, the ultimate authority of humanistic epistemology in the form of national will, all are several aspects of the specific relationship between the philosophical-political tradition as a paradigmatic unity and the system of nation-state as its institutional counterpart.

The internal impact of the nation-state is mainly related to the concept of citizenship according to certain criteria while the external impact is the necessity for an institutional system consisting of several nation-states. The divorce of politics and ontological antecedents is a sine quo non condition for the establishment of such a system which could be easily manipulated according to the existent power structure.

Now, we can analyze briefly the periods of the formation of nation-state system in Europe to show the continuity of the philosophical and imaginative features.

(i) The Incipient Period of Nation-state system:

The cultural, economic and social changes occurred in eleventh and twelfth century might be accepted the first stirrings of the modern phase of the western civilization. From this point of view, this period was the first Renaissance in western history. First of all, great changes in socio-economic life began to shake the old contractual feudal structure. The new agricultural techniques improved

the methods of food cultivation which led to a huge increase in food production, never seen before this period. The population began to increase parallel to this increase in food production which encouraged the process of urbanization and commerce. The developments of towns through this process of urbanization effected socio-cultural and socio-political life of western societies to a great extent. The new monetary connections between lords and peasants necessitated a new type of socio-economic system which would shape mercantilism in further ages.

The socio-political structure of feudalism as small and limited units began to be shaken because of the growing necessity in the direction of centralization and coordination. The new socio-political elements began to emerge in towns which would force the governing elites to set up national units in further steps. But it should be underlined that the philosophical and imaginative backgrounds of these units has been sprang from the same origin of the ancient and feudal accumulation; i.e. not originated from a revolutionary attempt. In other words, the previous theologico-philosophical system provided a continual theoretical and imaginative base for the process of the legitimacy of the new socio-economic and socio-political units.

Parallel to these socio-economic changes, Europe had been brought into existence as political divisions. After the second Barbarian waves in tenth century, the nucleuses of modern European states began to be shaped in eleventh century: Kingdom of France was in being, adjoining with Germany in Holy Roman Empire; the kingdoms of England, Scotland, Denmark, Norway and Sweden had also taken form; the small Christian kingdoms in Northern Spain and Italy had been formed as independent political units; in East Europe the kingdom of Bohemia, Poland and Hungary came into existence through the process of legitimation of crowning rituals by Pope; on the other hand Slavic, Russian and Bulgarian kingdoms became independent members of the Eastern Orthodox Christian Commonwealth.

The rivalry among the sacred and temporal authorities to lead these socio-economic and political changes accelerated the conflict of sovereignty among Church and State. The monarchical structure of Church was also strengthened in these socio-economic processes because of being the greatest landowner of Europe. Therefore the popes at that time tried to strengthen their supremacy. These attempts of ecclesiastical authority was documented by Gregory VII's Dictatus Papae, in 1075 against German monarches: (Viorst,1965:20)

- "1-That the Roman Church was founded by God alone.*
- 8-That he alone may use the imperial insignia.*
- 9-That the Pope is the only person whose feet are kissed by all
princes.*
- 12-That he has the power to depose emperors.*
- 16-That no general synod may be called without his consent.*
- 17-That no action of a synod and no book may be considered
canonical without his authority.*
- 19-That he can be judged by no man.*
- 27-That the pope has the power to absolve the subjects of
unjust rulers from their oath of fidelity. (...)"*

Henry IV's reply in 1076 to this Dictate created an irreparable conflict between papacy and monarches. In this struggle Gregory VII forced Henry IV to oath submission to papacy through the declaration of excommunication. That was the failure of the first national attack against papal supremacy. The leading figures of papal supremacy in this period were Agobard, Bishop of Lyons, Hincmar, Archbishop of Rheims, Pope Nicholas I, Pope Gregory VII, Manegold of Lutterbach, St. Bernard, John of Salisbury, St. Thomas Aquinas and pope Innocent III.

The temporal rulers opposed to these attempts of ecclesiastical supremacy on two grounds: divine and legal. First of all, they argued that political society was of divine origin and that kings, as agents of the divine purpose, were responsible to God alone. Secondly, with the revival of Roman law and corporate organic theory of state, they insisted on the supremacy of monarches because the Roman Law taught that the Emperor governed the whole civilized world.

Although the attempt of German nationalism of Henry IV was defeated by Gregory VII; the Charter of Lorris in 1155 might be accepted as a triumphant of French nationalism to set up centralized nation-state within a specified territory, Ile de France the chief of which was Paris. Interurban was encouraged, the property right was preserved, the taxation was legalized and a set of Bill of Rights was declared with his Charter of Lorris.¹

¹"1-Everyone who has a house in the parish of Lorris as cens sixpence only for his house, and for each acre of land that he possesses in the parish.

2-No inhabitant of the parish of Lorris shall be required to pay a toll or any other tax on his provisions.

4-No burgher shall pay toll on the road to Etampes, to Orleans, to Milly or to Melun.

(ii) The Transitional Period to Nation-State System:

From this incipient period in twelfth century till Machiavelli in late fifteenth century might be accepted as the transitional period in the process of the formation of nation-state system. Charter of Lorris was the first indication of this transitional period. In this period, monarches dealt with the inner organization of their kingdoms through formation judicial, monetary, military and political institutions.

The kings instituted royal courts to attain judicial autonomy. This assertion of legal jurisdiction and military force became the main pillar of the secular/royal power. To obtain money, necessary for his governmental machinery, a system of taxation began to be applied. The taxation was purely a result of the revival of Roman law because it was quite unknown to the Teutonic peoples and feudal tradition.

The royal councils of kings in feudal period transferred to parliamentum and spread all over the Europe in the 13th century. The new assemblies were called *cortes* in Spain, *diets* in Germany, *estates general* or *provinced estates* in France and *parliaments* in British Isles. (Palmer & Colton, 1978:30) The kings called these assemblies as means of strengthening royal rule. Parallel to the urbanization, a burgher class was added to the lords and bishops in parliament. But, parliament as the basic legal/procedural means for the legitimacy of political authority in nation-state system gained its importance after the epistemological transformation in western civilization towards the "epistemologically defined ontology" under the patronage of the centrality of epistemology.

The balance between church and monarches under the theoretical systematization of the compartmentalistic idea of Two Swords, began to be changed in favour of monarches, in this period. The leading figures of the emperors against papal supremacy in this period were Frederick II (1211-1250) of

5-No one who has property in the parish of Lorris shall forfeit it for any offense whatsoever, unless the offense shall have been committed against us.

6- No person while on his way to the fairs and markets of Lorris, or returning shall be arrested or disturbed.

16- No one shall be detained in prison if he can furnish surety that he will present himself for judgement.

17-Any burgher who wishes to sell his property, shall have the privilege to doing so and having received the price of sale, he shall have the right to go from the town freely. (Viorst, 1965:69)

Germany and Philip IV (1285-1314) of France. Frederick II claimed for the superiority of the Empire not only all kings to maintain the independence of empire, even over the Pope aiming to make himself supreme in spiritual as well as temporal affairs. As Kohn underlines, ancient Rome served as a source of inspiration to Frederick II, next to Bible. He coined money like Augustus to show financial independence. The rediscovery of Roman Law by the jurists of the University of Bologna resulted in the growing of the idea that the king could not be called to justice except by God, as being the supreme head of mankind. Before that events, with the revival of Roman Law, jurist Martinus (circ. 1150) ascribed to the Emperor a true ownership of all things and therefore a free power of disposal over the rights of private persons. (Gierke,1958:79)

These ideas on favour of the centralization of political power and their corresponding political theories were the similitudes of the Islamic theories which were assuming the concentration of political power in the hands of caliph as the religio-political leader. This similarity marks a very indicative impact of Islamic political thought and institutionalization on Europe at that time, after the experiences of the secular royal authorities during the Crusades. Kohn (1969:89-90) argues that Frederick II was influenced by Islamic civilization at that period, which he loved and admired for the breadth of its views and greater freedom of its intellectual atmosphere. Furthermore, he signed a treaty on just and equal terms with the Sultan of Egypt and this treaty has been called as an unpardonable crime by the Church. Even Dante who was in favor of his action for the supremacy of the royal power, placed him among the faithless in his *Inferno*. But, these attempts for the centralization of power in the hands of monarches did not create a religio-political unity such as in the Islamic experience because of the paradigmatic differences of two alternative weltanschauungs. Rather, it led to the supremacy of the secularization of political power because Catholic Church did not leave religious authority to any other institution in spite of the theories on the divine rights of the kings and councils. Even the leading figures of the independence of the monarchy, as opposed to papacy, insisted on the preservation of the balance of Two Swords. For example, Ockham insisted on the insisted that the spheres of spiritual and temporal jurisdiction must be kept sharply from each other.¹ Thus, beginning of the shift of political power towards the temporal authorities occurred within the categorization of Two Swords which is a natural result of the ontological-

¹The details of Ockham's political thought might be found in McGrade's (1974) work.

epistemological-axiological imagination and continuity of the western civilization analyzed in the first part of our research.

The conflict between Pope Boniface and Philip IV, the Fair of France, accelerated the growing spirit of national unity and the establishment of centralized nation-states. The dispute began when Philip IV tried to apply taxation to the French Church in order to finance the war against England. Pope Boniface threatened Philip IV with the sentence of excommunication in the bull *clerics laicos* (Viorst, 1965:70), like Gregory VII did against Henry IV of Germany. But, this time, Pope could not be successful because of the growing national feeling: this dispute ended with the supremacy of the monarches. Thus, the supporters of the secular authority, for centuries on the defense, began to show growing self-confidence: Philip IV applied this taxation and even decided to dispose Pope Boniface.

The main supporters of the secular supremacy and of the establishment of nation-state system were Marsiglio of Padua (1270-1340), William of Ockam (1280-1347), Pierre Duboes, Dante Alighieri (1265-1321), J.Wycliff (1320-1384), J. Huss (1369-1415) and J.Gerson (1363-1429). There were a direct influence of Avicenna (Ibn Sina) and Averroes (Ibn Rushd) on these thinkers. Many of them, especially Dante and Padua, have been called as Averroists. Averroism was a very wide spread intellectual movement at that time. Wicktsteed mentions (intr. part of Dante, 1963: 419), the alleged Averroism of Dante's *On Monarchy*¹ is founded in part on his use of the doctrine of the possible intellect in chapter three of Book I². But, it should be added that his depart from the teaching of Aristotle by advocating the establishment of a monarchy or world government as a means of eliminating strife among cities and nations, carries the characteristics of Ibn Rushd's conciliation of Greek political thought with the Islamic theory of the caliphate.

¹Dante deals with three significant questions in this treatise as the key issues of the supremacy of the royal power: "And now it seems to me that I have sufficiently attained the goal that I set for myself. For I have searched out the truth concerning the the three questions that were raised: whether the office of monarch is necessary for the well-being of the world, whether the Roman people rightfully claimed the Empire for itself, and finally whether the authority of the monarch derives immediately from God or from someone else." (Dante, 1963:437)

²"And since that potentiality cannot all be reduced to actuality at the same time by one man or by any of the particular groups distinguished above, there must be a multiplicity in the human race by which precisely the whole of this potentiality may be actualized, just as there must be a multiplicity of generable things in order that the whole potentiality of prime matter may always be in act; otherwise we would have to concede the existence of a separate potentiality, which is impossible. Averroes agrees with this view in his commentary on the treatise *On the Soul*." (Dante, 1963:422)

The main supporters of the secular supremacy and establishment of nation-states were Marsiglio of Padua (1270-1340), William of Ockam (1280-1347), Pierre Duboes, Dante Alighieri (1265-1321), John Wyclif (1320-1384), John Huss (1369-1415) and John Gerson (1363-1429). Many of these thinkers had been affected by Averroes (Ibn Rushd) and Avicenna (Ibn Sina), as Lerner argues. Lerner calls especially Dante and Padua as Averroists. Marsiglio of Padua, who became also rector of the University of Paris in 1313, was willing to push the theocratic influence politics to attain a good government. Marsiglio, in his *Defensor Pacis* (1963), suggested that people with several languages should form separate states and that wars among states were a wise provision of nature. Being a practical thinker he desired internal peace. These ideas opened the way of the nation-state system. His ideas had also some democratic elements, which would be developed in further ages, i.e. he a clear distinction between a ultimate sovereignty in the state, which he located in the people, and the form of government chosen to execute the laws. Therefore he suggested a elected monarchy.

Dante of Alighieri defined temporal monarchy as a unique princedom extending over all persons in his time and stressed that "it is necessary for the best disposition of the human race that there should be a monarch in the world and consequently for the well-being of the world that there should be a monarchy"(1963:435). According to him the role of monarchy is to keep peace as God is the monarch of all creation, so the emperor is the monarch of temporal kings. As In fact, Gierke (1958:30) underlines too, there was a consensus among philosophers at that time on this basic argument. Ockam argued that the emperor is bound to conform to the laws common to all nations. With this argument he became the forerunner of the international law within a system of national states.

John Wyclif in England and John Huss in Bohemia, affected by the arguments of Marsiglio of Padua and William of Ockam, who were the other representatives of the nation, anti-papal and democratic movements in this process of transition to the nation state system. Wyclif argued that state as well as the church was directly authorized by God and that the Pope and clergy had no right to exercise political power. The theory of Wyclif proposed a national state with a national church subordinate to it. That idea became the basis of the establishment of English Church by Henry VIII. As Gettle emphasizes, in his exaltation of the state, Wyclif's theory foreshadowed the doctrines of Bodin and

Hobbes. Together with Huss, Wyclif was one of the significant forerunner of the movement of reformation.¹

With the attempts of these thinkers, the roles of the new elements in western social, economic and political life emerged in eleventh and twelfth century had been legitimated. With these developments the basis of legitimacy began to be changed through the destruction of feudal structure and establishment of a new socio-economic and socio-political structure. The socio-economic structure might be called as pre-industrial mercantilism, while the socio-political structure as centralization of monarchies around the nation-states with increasing supremacy of temporal forces over papal authority.

(iii)-The Period of Maturation of Nation-State System in Europe :

Early period of 15th century might be called as conciliar period referring to various councils which became very effective in the process of maturation of nation-state system. Council of Pisa in 1409, Council of Constance in 1415, Council of Pavia in 1423, Council of Basel in 1431 and Council of Bourges in 1438. These councils created three significant results in Western political history. First of all after these councils the church began to be accepted as a human society rather than an extra-ordinarily organized divine being. For example, John Gerson favored a system of limited monarchy in Church organization while Cardinal Nicholas of Cues (1401-1469) argued that a representative council should be set up on the central organ in both church and state.(Gettell,1959:140) So, the organizational structure of the church began to be discussed and criticized. Secondly, the idea of national church began to be developed as a very significant complementary fact of the process of formation of nation-states. Thirdly, the development of national churches in the period of reformation resulted in the absolute supremacy of the temporal power over the papal authority.

The council of Constance in 1414 asserted its supremacy to the pope while the Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges in 1438 and the papal claims of superiority :

"2- The authority of the general council is superior to that of the pope in all that pertains to the faith and the reform of the church in both head and members.

¹Skinner (1978:II/34-42) gives brief information on the link between these thinkers and Reformation.

- 3- *Election is reestablished for ecclesiastical office but the king, or the princess of his kingdom, may take recommendations when elections are to occur.*
- 4- *The popes shall not have the right to reserve the collation of benefices.*
- 5- *Those who shall have received benefices shall be punished by the secular power. The popes shall not have the rights to interfere by the creation of canonship."*(Viorst,1965:78)

The independence and sovereignty of secular-national monarchies had been declared by several bilateral agreements in 15th and 16th century. The Concordat of 1418 between the reunited papacy under Martin V (1417-1431) and 'nations' present at the council of Constance, Concordat of Vienna at 1448 between Frederick II of Austria (1440-1493) and Pope Nicholas V (1447-1455), and the Concordat of Bologna in 1516 between Francis I of France (1515-1547) and Pope Leo X (1513-1521) were "negotiations between equal sovereign powers rather than arrangements between the head of the church and spiritual sons"(Morrall,1958:133) .

The writers of conciliar period, John Gerson, Nicholas of Cues and Aeneas Sylvius were the bridges from the transition period to the emergence of nation-states. Although they contributed too much to this emergence, especially with the concepts of the state of nature, natural rights, social contract and representative government, the real forerunner of the national state theories was Machiavelli. The most significant contribution of Machiavelli to the western intellectual history and emergence of the national state was his clear-cut definition of state as artifact created by human being. That idea became the intellectual base of secularism and absolute supremacy of the national state over ecclesiastical authority because Machiavelli made safety and success of the state as the paramount issue of political life. From this perspective he was a pragmatic philosopher thinking on the theory of the preservation the state, rather than the theory of the state itself. Therefore the philosophical qualities of his theory may be discussed, but it can not be denied that he was the founder of the realistic approach in the history of political theory. His masterpiece, *Il Principe* , became the cornerstone of the process of the nation state theory dealing with the mechanics of government in absolute national states.

In fact, the time of Machiavelli, and Renaissance in general, was the period during which "the purely vegetative group feeling developed for the first time in to a national consciousness"(Kohn,1969:120). From this point of view the period of Renaissance and reformation swept away the obstacles of the traditional feudal structure to set up the system of nation-state. But the completion of this new political order occurred in early 17th century.

15th century was a century of civil wars. Civil wars of Hundred Years War, Hussite Wars and English Wars of the Roses created an atmosphere of political chaos in this century. These wars led monarches to strengthen their royal powers. At the beginning of the 16th century the nation states in Europe had not been formed completely. Government in England, France, Germany and Spain were partially local and uncentralized. But three issues developed in 15th century which would be effective in the process of formation of nation-states in 17th century. These were the foundation of taxation system, bureaucracy and capital cities as very significant organs of central nation-states.

Royal monarches developed taxation system to finance the wars. A new type of public servants, secretaries and ambassadors had appeared as the first indication of modern bureaucracy of nation-states. Parallel to these developments the most significant indication of the trend to the formation of nation-state was the emergence of recognizable capital cities. Paris, London, Lisbon etc. became the seeds of governments as the centers of economic, cultural, social and political life.

These enormous changes in the idea of state continued and accelerated in 16th century. The intellectual transformation of Renaissance towards a reason-centered mentality, the economic transformation of mercantilism around cities towards a nationwide commercial capitalism and religious transformation of Reformation towards nationalization of churches depending on a clear-cut sphere of religion as a individual matter, were the main dynamics of 16th century for the formation of a new socio-political and international structure depending on nation-state system in early 17th century.

Renaissance questioned the certainties of the assumption of traditional feudal system increasing the idea of worldliness. The invention and spread of printing press accelerated the development of national languages and cultures. Especially Francis I (1515-1547) created a French cultural nationalism as a base of nation state in France. "One of the French authors even went so far in praise of

the monarch as to declare that the name *langue françoise* was derived from the royal name Françoise". After the period of Renaissance the center of intellectual life became "reason" rather than "divinity". This transformation created a philosophical ground for the formation of "nation-state" system.

The main contributions of Reformation to the process of nation-state system was the destruction of the traditional idea of unity in church and empire. This event resulted in the reorganization of Europe territorially into distinct national states. So, the center of the idea of state shifted from world empire to the territorial state and ecclesiastical to civil predominance. The main leader of Reformation were Martin Luther (1483-1546), Melanchton (1497-1560), Zwingli (1484-1531) and Calvin (1509-1564). The main contributions of Luther to the process of nation-state formation were "the clear distinction he made between political and spiritual authority, the emphasis he laid upon the secular as against the ecclesiastical power and the importance he placed upon passive obedience to the established order in state and society"(Gettell,1959:156)

The nationalization of churches as one of the main complementary facts of the maturation of nation-state system in Europe had been successfully completed after the Reformation. The cornerstones of the process of nationalization of churches were England's Act of Supremacy in England (1534) and Religious Peace of Augsburg in Continental Europe (1555). The conflict between Henry VIII and Pope Clement VII related with his desire to marry with his older brother's widow resulted in the break of tie between English Church and Rome. Henry VIII established the Anglican Church with the king as its head through a series of parliamentary statutes in 1534. England's Act of Supremacy in 1534 was very significant to legalize nationalization of the Church to set up a completely independent nation-state:"Albeit the king's majesty justly and rightfully is and ought to be the supreme head of the Church of England, and so is recognized by the clergy of this realm in their convocations, yet nevertheless for corroboration and confirmation thereof. (. . .) by the authority of this present parliament that the king, our sovereign lord, his heirs and successors, king's of the realm shall be taken, accepted, and reputed the only supreme head in earth of the Church of England, called Anglicane Ecclesia."(Viorst,1965:117)

On the other hand The Religious Peace of Augsburg signed after religious wars between Catholic and Protestant countries empowered the idea of national church in Continental Europe through declaring that each prince had the right to

determine the religion of his subjects. Lutheranism had been legalized as the only permissible form of Protestantism in Germany after this agreement which also confirmed all seizures of Catholic property by Protestant Churches prior to 1552.

The document of James I's claim of Divine Right in 1609 may be accepted as the ultimate end of the ecclesiastical supremacy in favour of absolutism of royal powers: "The State of Monarchy is the supremest thing upon earth, for kings are not only God's lieutenants upon the earth, and sit upon God's throne, but even by God himself they are called gods. . . . Kings are also compared the fathers of families, for a king truly *parens patrie* , the politic father of his people."

(iv) The Period of Completion of Nation-State System in Europe :

The ultimate transformation from locally organized feudalism to the nation-state system completed in late 16th century and especially in the first half of 17th century. France was the first consolidated nation-state whereas a French philosopher, Jean Bodin (1530-1596) was the forerunner of modern idea of national sovereignty. In his masterpiece on political theory, *De Republica Libri Sex* (1576), he specified nine true marks of sovereignty-the power to legislate, to make war and peace, appoint higher magistrates, hear final appeals, receive homage, coin money, regulate weights and measures and imposed taxes. He concluded that the concept of sovereignty must be taken to denote just a high and absolute power over the citizens. He formulated the power of government so strong that it transcends the particular interest either of provincial autonomy that perennial obstacle to the policy of French Crown or even of religious belief. According to him the existence of such a type of sovereignty is what distinguishes state from any other kind of human association. Bodin's great work embraces a clear definition of sovereignty through the definition of the state as " a lawful government of many families by means of a high and perpetual power"(Skinner,1978:II/288).

Bodin saw the salvation of France in setting up such a sovereign national and central power. He belonged to the group of *politiques* . This group was desiring the restoration of peace and order and was believing that the success of France demanded the suppression of political factions and religious controversies and the establishment of a strong monarchy depending on the unquestioned

supremacy of the king. The other members of this group were Du Bellay, Seruins, William Barclay and Pierre Gregoire. Bodin defines citizen as "free man, subject to the sovereign power of another within this context of the theory of sovereignty". Like Machiavelli before him and Hobbes after him, Bodin accepted absolutism in governmental affairs and framed the legalization of this absolutism grounding on the theory of sovereignty.

The philosophical basis of absolutist nation-state had been evaluated by Thomas Hobbes. His theory of state based on a rational feeling of self-preservation which led the human-being to set up social contract. His political theory opened a new elan in the history of political science as being the application of Cartesian method to political thought. He constructed an argument for absolute authority of the sovereign claiming that the equal natural rights of man made the state of nature one of war. Natural law which was a rule discovered by reason led man to escape from the condition of war by establishing the state and the sovereign. After this establishment, the will of the sovereign came the only true law according to Hobbes. Absolutism around the centralization of nation-state found its philosophical and rational legalization with these ideas of Thomas Hobbes who was the founder of rational political philosophy and modern idea of state.

So, the internal structure of the nation-state had been formed and legalized mainly by Machiavelli, Bodin and Hobbes. The principles of the structure of international system in which the nation-states became political unities, had been set up by Grotius who used and acknowledged works of Conrad Braun (1491-1563), Ferdinand Vasques (1509-1560), Francisco Suarez (1548-1617) and Alberian Gentilis (1552-1608).

Conrad Braun tried to specify the principles of international system whereas Vasques claimed a composite law of nations governing the relations among independent states. Francisco Suarez developed a complete philosophical theory of international law. A. Gentilis advanced the definition of the respective rights and duties of belligerent and neutral states recognizing the territorial basis of sovereignty. He also discussed the rights and immunities of ambassadors and their relations to the state that sent and received them, in his work *De Legationibus* (1585).

Groutius mainly dealt with three subjects, the law of nature, the law of nation and sovereignty. He claimed that " there might be some law among all or most states, and in fact there are agreed on by common consent which represent the advantage of all in general" like the internal laws of nation-states depend on the benefits of citizens:"Amongst all or most States, there might be, in fact there are, some laws, agreed on by common consent, which represent the advantage of all in general... and this is what is called the Law Of Nations; if those laws be observed all nations will benefit, and aggressors who violate the laws of nature and nations break down the bulwarks of their future happiness and tranquility."(Bowe, 1961:298) He insisted that the justification for war is to win peace. The main contribution of Groutius was the definition of natural law of nations and setting up foundations for international law within a framework of sovereign nation-states.

The process of the formation of nation-state system as a new socio-political inner structure of the independent sovereign states and as a new international system had been completed in the first half of the 17th century depending on these ideas. The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 declared the emergence of European Staatensystem consisting of independent sovereign nation-states as a new elan in the political history of human being.

This system of nation-state has reached to its peak in 19. century through gaining an ideological characteristic as a philosophical, psychological and social phenomenon; namely nationalism. It has found its most sophisticated philosophical dimension in Hegel's personality whose philosophy attached the idea of the general will to the spirit of nation, embodying itself in a national culture. This means the formation of a new unit together with its spirit : "that all the elements of a culture form a unit in which religion, philosophy, art, and morality mutually affect one another, that these several branches of culture all express the *spirit* -the internal intellectual endowment- of the people which creates them, and that the history of a people is the process in which it realizes and unfolds its unique contribution to the whole of human civilization"(Sabine &Thorson,1973:573) His arguments that there could be no morality in the relation which these self-contained units had with each other and that the individual was supposed to uphold and conform to rational political institutions and laws because of his presupposition that ideal morality was the union of the subjective (conscience) with the objective (Law and tradition) marks the cornerstones of the continuity in the political philosophy of western

culture. As Snyder concludes, "just as Machiavelli in the early 16. century excluded morality from politics, so did Hegel in the early 19. century place nation-state above morality"(1968:43).

Hegel's conclusion on the history of civilization that the national mind is a manifestation of the world-mind at a particular stage of its historical development, might be accepted as the foundation stone of the intellectual and imaginative development of nationalism as a secularized form of religion. Nationalism became a firmed secularized religion in its later process of development in the beginning of our age. Kelley describes this situation clearly: "Just as religions personify their gods, so does patriotism or nationalism tend to personify the idea of the nation to which it is directed. (...) The nation is pictured as possessing all the attributes of an ideal person and this imaginative personification..."¹

Thus, Hegel transformed Kant's famous *consciousness in itself* to a specific *state-consciousness* which assumes that there were universally valid moral laws but only a number of different system of morality valid for different states. This phenomenon assumes a state-centered life as the ultimate materialization of the national feeling and consciousness. Silvert's (1963:19) definition of nationalism as "the acceptance of the state as the impersonal and ultimate arbiter of human affairs" underlines its most significant characteristic. This state-centered and nation-oriented life as a modern phenomenon in western civilization carries theoretical and imaginative elements originated from its *weltanschauung* which is absolutely contrasting to the Islamic idea of belief-oriented socio-political unity assuming a unitarian aspect of life.

¹Kohn (1949:21) uses an interesting simile between the nationalistic struggles and religious crusades to underline the religious character of national feeling: "The German and Slav educated classes had, in the eighteenth century, willingly accepted French civilization; now the age of nationalism not only generated and deepened conflict which invested the struggle between nations with the halo of a semireligious crusade." Hayes' definition of nationalism as "the fusion of patriotism with nationality over all the other human loyalties" and Emerson's statement that "nationalism is no more than the assertion that this particular community is arranged against the rest of mankind" (Silvert,16-8) aim to show this characteristic of being a firmed secularized religion.

II- ISLAMIC BI-COMPARTMENTALIZATION: DAR AL-ISLAM VERSUS DAR AL-HARB

1- Ummah as the basis of the socio-political unity :

Von Grünebaum asks a very crucial question in his article on the pluralistic diversification of the Muslim society: "Nations come and go. Empires rise and fall. But Islam persists and continues to include the nomads and the settlers, the builders of civilizations within Islam and those that destroy them. What then are the factors that keep together as one *ummah* those many people that consciously or not inclined to maintain their individuality while cultivating their tie with universal Islam as their most precious spiritual possession?"(1966:50)

The socio-political identification in Islamic political thought and practice, is an extension of the belief of the unity of the responsibility of man and the unity of life. The basic dichotomy between believers (*mumin*) and unbelievers (*kafir*) as two different ontological/religious approaches and radically opposed categories can be defined as the choice between whether or not one wishes to accept this special responsibility on earth. This choice is also a choice of a way of life and a specific socio-political identity. Those who believe in the Unity of Allah and accept to be a member of Muslim socio-political society, does not discard only their old ethnic identity; but also all possible alternative identities. As Oda (1984:102-3) underlines, even if one is still physically determined by ethnicity (color of skin and language in the Quranic phrase) it is no longer one's essential identity, which is as a "Muslim" who is equal before God: "This indicates that believers must entirely change their mode of existence from the ethnic or tribal to the real Islamic mode of existence. These two modes of existence are never compatible." Qur'anic verse specifies this categoric differentiation of two parties belonging two alternative modes of existence and of social identity: "And if there is a party of you which believeth in that wherewith I have been sent, and there is a party which believeth not, then have patience until Allah judge between us. He is the best of all who deal in judgement."(7:87)¹

¹This categoric differentiation is strengthened by some other terms such as 'Hizb Allah (party of Allah) and 'Hizb ash-shaytan in the Qur'an: "The devil hath engrossed them and so hath caused them to forget remembrance of Allah. They are the devil's party. Lo! is it not the devil's party who will be the loser's? Lo !those who oppose Allah and His Messenger, they will be among the lowest. Allah hath decreed: Lo! I verily shall conquer, I and my messenger. Lo! Allah is strong, Almighty. Thou wilt not find folk who believe in Allah and the Last Day loving those who oppose Allah and His messenger, even though they be their fathers or their sons or their brethern or their clan. As for such, He hath written faith upon their hearts and hath strengthened them with a

Ummah, as the Islamic social mode of existence, is the basis of the socio-political unity in Islamic political thought and practice. Like other political key-concept, it has been re-valuated after its usage within the Qur'anic semantic field. Although it has been mentioned by Smith (1903:32) that its etymological origin is Hebrew *ém* which means mother, through Arabic *umm*, there is nothing in the Qur'anic usage of ummah to support this view, as Denny (1975:37) asserts. Ummah as a very significant key-concept has several meanings in the Qur'an to indicate social groupings.¹ But it gained a specific meaning especially to describe the religious-political unity of Muslims, as a leit-motive. The concentration of the verses including ummah, in the third Meccan period (acc. to Nöldeke chronology), and in early Medinan periods, provides us significant clues how the Qur'anic revelation effects socio-political imagination of Muslims at that time due to the fact that these periods mark the

Spirit from Him, and He will bring them into gardens underneath which rivers flow, wherein they will abide. They are Allah's party. Lo! is not Allah's party who are the successful?" (58:19-22)

¹ There are 64 instances of the term of ummah in the Qur'an, in both singular and plural forms. 49 of them are in Meccan verses and 15 of them are in Madinan verses. Oda's (1984:95-6) classification of motifs for the term ummah in the Qur'an provides a suitable framework to imagine semantic field of this concept in the Qur'an:

I. Ummah as the religious community

1. "Oneness" (ummah wahidah)
 - a. existing in the primordial, mythical past: 2/213; 10/19; 43/33.
 - b. "If God willed..." : 5/48; 11/118; 16/93; 42/8.
 - c. to Christian Community: 21/92; 23/52.
2. Ummah explicitly related to the Muslim community: 2/128, 143; 3/104, 110; 16/92, 92.
3. Ummah related to "people of the book" (ahl al-kitab):
 - a. Abraham: 16/120; 2/128.
 - b. Christians: 21/92; 23/52.
4. Ummah and ritual (mansak) which God ordained to each Ummah: 6/108; 22/34, 67.
5. Ummah as religious sub-group or sect which became independent from the larger unit of society: 3/113; 5/66; 7/159, 164, 168, 181.

II. Ummah as a tribe, a folk, a people or a nation, not necessarily a religious community:

1. Ummah as receiving God's messengers: 2/213; 6/42; 10/48; 11/48; 13/30; 16/36, 63; 23/44; 29/18; 35/24, 42; 40/5.
2. Ummah as having its own "appointed time" [ajal]: 7/34; 10/49; 15/5; 23/44.
3. Ummah that perished or will perish:
 - a. in the past: 2/134, 141; 7/38; 13/30; 41/25; 46/18.
 - b. in the future: 11/48.
4. Ummah on the Day of Judgement:
 - a. witness (shahid): 4/41; 16/84, 89; 28/75.
 - b. other descriptions of the ummah on Judgement Day: 7/38; 27/83, 41/25; 45/22, 23.
5. Ummah as a tribe:
 - a. identification of ummah and religion (pre-Islamic sense): 43/22, 23.
 - b. tribe: 7/160, 28/23.

III. Others (miscellaneous meanings):

1. a "group of animals": 6/38.
2. a "set term": 11/8; 12/45.

A more detailed table from the perspective of chronology might be found in Denny's article (1975:46-47).

most significant turning points in the formation of the first model of Islamic ummah. The term *ummah wa'sat* as the ultimate form of this model has been used in Medinan period when Islamic socio-political community has been formed in reality: "Thus We have appointed you a middle nation (*ummah wa'sat*), that ye may be witnesses against mankind, and that the messenger may be a witness against you. And We appointed the qiblah which ye formerly observed only that We might know him who followeth the messenger, from him who turneth on his heels. In truth it was a hard (test) save for those whom Allah guided. But it was not Allah's purpose that your faith should be in vain, for Allah is full of pity, Merciful towards mankind." (2:143). This concept of *wa'sat* (middle) does not mean ordinary; but balanced. On the contrary, according to the commentators, it is an extraordinary model in the sense of *khayr* (*khayr 'adûlan* acc. to *tafsir of Jalalayn*, 1982:29)) and *fâ'dilah* (*khayr al-umam* or *af'dal* in *Tafsir of Ibn Kathir*, 1986:I/190). Hence, Denny's (1975:54-5) following conclusion on this compound expression is absolutely right: "The ummah wa'sat is a Medinan concept formulated by the Qur'an when the concept of ummah as religious community reached its most developed stage. If in the past an ummah could have rejected its messengers (as in, e.g., 40:5, 27:83 and 29:18, all Meccan), the ummah concept in the Medinan period seems to have become more exclusively the term which applies to Muslims as the ummah par excellence, a concept and reality which possess an ontological status, constituted as it had been by the submission (islam) of Muhammad's people and at the same time born from the mercy (rahma) of God in answer to the religious quest uttered in Abraham's prayer (2:127-9). (...) The ummah wa'sat is witness to the rest of mankind, and Muhammad is the witness to the Muslims of God will: from God, to Muhammad, to the Ummah, to the remainder of mankind proceed to message and the Norm. It is not sufficient that a prophet alone should bear the entire message to mankind; rather, the believing community ingrains in itself the message by its obedience, expressed in rites such as the *salat* and the orientation of the worshippers toward the qiblah at Meccah, as in 2:143. Religion in the Qur'an is not essentially a matter of personal piety (although there is certainly much pertaining to individual religion); rather, the emphasis is on the communal aspects of religion. Muhammad's fully matured spiritual life is unthinkable from the Muslims."

The idea of the responsibility of man gives a special responsibility to the Muslim political society, the *ummah*. The Qur'anic definition of this socio-political community as *ummah al-muslimah* (Muslim community) rather than

only as ummah al-muslimin (community composed of Muslims) in 2:128,¹ implies that this socio-political unity has its importance as a totality performing its specific divine responsibility beyond its importance because of being composed of individual Muslims. This mission of ummah specified by the Qur'an as, "And hold fast, all of you together, to the cable of Allah, and do not separate. And remember Allah's favour unto you: how ye were enemies and He made friendship between your hearts so that ye became as brother by His grace; (...) And there may spring from you a nation (ummah) [translated by Pickthall as nation, by Yusuf Ali (1983) as people and by Ismail Faruqi (1982) as society] who invite to goodness, and enjoin right conduct and forbid indecency. Such are they who are successful." (3:103-4) The semantic fields of the expressions of ummah al-muslimah and ummah wa'sat intersect in this verse from the perspective of the divine responsibility. Another verse in the same surah defines the sine qua non condition of the best community (khayr ummah) as the socio-political divine responsibility on the earth: "Ye are the best community that hath been raised up for mankind. Ye enjoin right conduct and forbid indecency; and ye believe in Allah.(...)" (3:110)

The unity of ummah has strictly been emphasized by Muslim political thinkers are jurists. The argument that there should be only one caliph on the earth except extraordinary cases supported by almost all medieval jurists such as Abu Yusuf, Mawardi, Abu Y'ala and Baghdadadi aims to preserve the universal unity of the socio-political community for the realization of the idea of best community mentioned in 3:110. Especially the stimulus of the Mawardi's emphasis on the caliph's authority was basing on this aim in an age when this authority has been distributed to bureaucratic organs in the hands of military leaders.

¹ "Our Lord! And make us submissive unto Thee (muslimah laka) and of our seed a nation submissive unto Thee (ummah muslimah laka), and show us our ways of worship, and relent towards us. Lo! Thou, only Thou, are the Hearer, the Knower." Od's clarification on this nuance is very indicative to show the importance of socio-political unity as divinely responsible community in Islam: "The first part, "make us two Muslims" is concerned with the individual decision of faith. Individual Muslims would establish a religious community according to the pattern by which religions are founded. This community would be called "a religious community of Muslims," or ummah al-Muslimin in Arabic. Abraham's prayer however, continues saying, "make our descendents " a community submissive to God". The term ummah al-muslimah has more implications and significance than the earlier term ummah al-muslimin. The ummah al-muslimah logically includes the ummah al-muslimin, but the latter would not necessarily be the Ummah Muslimah. The Ummah Muslimah signifies that in addition to each member's being a Muslim, and thus submissive to God, the community qua community must be submissive to God." (1984:105)

The ummah is an open society for any human being regardless of his origin, race or color who accepts this responsibility. Such a responsibility is the basis of the identification and the political socialization process of a Muslim within a socio-political environment. This is a logical, theoretical and practical chain with the Qur'anic verse, "the Ummah of yours is one ummah" (21:92) and the Belief in the Unity of Allah (tawhid): Belief in the Unity of Allah implies belief in the epistemological Unity of Truth which implies axiological unity of the divine responsibility of man and his life and socio-political unity of ummah to realize the ideal style of life. The ethical qualities of this ideal style of life and ummah as the socio-political unity aims to realize it has been described in the Qur'an in details such as belief, honor, piety, justice, righteousness e.t.c. The cease of being a member of Muslim community depends on some sort of "feeling"s, as Watt describes it within the framework of ijma, rather than on concrete rules. Some rules for being member of Muslim community might be mentioned such as shahadah, salah and zakat; but "a man ceases to be a member if he does something which the general body of Muslims feel to be incompatible with membership"(Watt,1964:12). The area of compatibility with the membership of Muslim community embraces the ethical qualities consisting a specific way of life originated from a comprehensive weltanschauung. Thus, ummah has been described on an inter-connected approach from the perspective of ontological-epistemological-axiological base rather than from the perspective of an ethnic, of a linguistic or of a territorial base, such as in the case of nation-state. The personalistic character of Islamic law facilitates this characteristic of being beyond territory and physical limitations.

This meta-physical (in the sense of being beyond ethnic and territorial limitations) religious-political bond of ummah is the base of the historical realization of the integration of political life in Islamic history. As Watt underlines , Islam had great success in integrating the political life of its adherents during the process of the formation of the ummah which, while it had a religious basis, was also a political body: "The success was not merely in forming such a body, but in managing to attach to it some of the valuable attitudes which, in the case of the pre-Islamic Arabs, had been attached to the tribe. One such attitude, arising from the feeling of brotherhood between the members of a tribe, led to a strong feeling of brotherhood among the members of the Islamic community, and this feeling contributed to the recognition of the equality of non-Arab and Arab within the community.(...) All this was a great achievement, and integrated the political life of the Muslims to a high degree, in

that it formed a body politic in which were to be found very favorable conditions for the practice of the Islamic religion and the attainment of its end of salvation, that is, of a significance which transcended the historical process."(1970:175)

Thus, the *principium individuationis* of the Islamic political way of thought that there should be a strong and direct link between ontological antecedents, axiological normativism and political unity, can not be accommodated to the *sine quo non* condition of Western tradition on socio-political unity, mentioned before. First of all, contrary to the criterion of the citizenship of a secular political unity as the ethnic origin or the place of birth which could not be determined by the free will of the individual, Islamic political understanding presupposes a voluntary acceptance of a Muslim socio-political community through a socio-political identification dependent on the ontological approach. Secondly, contrary to the admission to Christian Church, an unilateral declaration is enough to participate to the ummah through believing in the Unity of Allah and the prophetic function of Muhammad.¹ As von Grünebaum stresses, "the community cannot and, in the Muslim view, ought not judge what is men's hearts: and it can and ought merely to observe the loyal adherence to those practices which symbolize in its eyes the loyal identification of the individual with the ummah"(1962:44). This easiness to admit the community specifies the voluntariness of the admission from the perspective of the person who aim to participate to the society as well as the openness of the socio-political community from the perspective of the community.

From the perspective of the attachment of socio-political unity to ontological/religious antecedents, it is almost impossible to translate ummah into any other language. It can be understood only within the conceptual structure of the all-inclusive Islamic framework which has been determined through the re-valuation of the classical pre-Islamic Arabic terms by the Qur'anic re-valuation within its semantic field end characteristic. As our etymological and semantic analysis shows, it can not be used correspondingly with nation, people,

¹"The psychological factor is that characteristic attitude of the Muslim community that allows the individual or the group to consider itself Muslim and be so considered on the basis of a unilateral decision to identify itself with the *ummah Muhammadiyyah*. In Christianity, for instance, as you will be aware, admission to the community is contingent not only on the desire of the would-be convert to join, but equally on the readiness of the community to accept him; this acceptance in turn is contingent on the representatives of the community ruling on his fitness to be admitted- he needs to demonstrate a certain measure of doctrinal information; his moral character is scrutinized, and in the end very elaborate formal steps need be taken to make him a member. In Islam, on the other hand, the testimonial before two witnesses to the Unity of God and prophetic function of Muhammad suffices to secure admission." (von Grünebaum, 1966:51)

Volk, state, etat, or status. The Augustinian term *res publica* which was used for the Christian universal community as *res publica christiana* could not be a corresponding term for ummah because of its socio-political character. From the perspective of Augustinian terminology it carries the meanings both of *civitas* which was referring to state and of *res publica*. The Arabic terms of *Sha'b* and *qawm* might be used to correspond to some usages of these Western concepts as nation, but they could not indicate the socio-political identification in the sense of the usage of *ummah* which denotes the universal Muslim political society constituted by *homo Islamicus* with a common ontological approach as a framework of *aqaid* and with a common axiological normativeness as the basis of the comprehensive juridic scheme, *fiqh*. The socio-political orientation and identification of ummah could be evaluated only via this interesting link between *aqaid* as a mode of belief and *fiqh* as a mode of life. The oneness of ummah depends on the common ontological approach of its members rather than their linguistic, geographic, cultural or biological factors and is directly connected to the concept of Allah and to the specific *imago mundi* originating from this belief in *tawhid*.

2- Islamic Bi-compartmentalization as the Universal Political System :

Such a mentality of a socio-political identification specifies a unique type of citizenship consisting of Muslims who decide to live together to perform their divine responsibility through the realization of a life style originating from an axiological norm, and of non-Muslims (*dhimmis*) who accept the political sovereignty and patronage of the Muslim state as the realization of the political power of the ummah and have the autonomy to lead their own life styles within a legal pluralistic structure. This divine responsibility of ummah has been transformed to a universal ideal of *al-amr bi al-m'arûf wa an-nahy 'an al-munkar* / to order people to act properly and to prevent them from acting improperly. The ideal of the universalization of justice around this basic principle became a dynamic force for Islamic expansion.

The idea of political unity creates a bi-compartmentalization of the universal political system between *Dar al-Islam* where the divine responsibility of man could be performed according to the rules of *fiqh*, and *Dar al-harb* where Muslims do not have such an opportunity. Such a bi-compartmentalization has not been determined either in the Qur'an or in the hadiths. It has been systematized by Muslim jurists during the development of *fiqh* and the

enlargement of Muslim territories in order to specify the territories within which, dependent on the realization of political power, this juridic scheme could be applied. As-Sarahsi's judgement that "*la tuqamu al-'hudud fi dar al-'harb* / juristic punishments can not be applied in dar al-'harb" (Özel, 1982:71) in al-Mabsut, marks the fundamental juristic criteria of this bi-compartmentalization; as well as the origin of and necessity for such a bi-compartmentalization to specify the country available to survive a specific way of life and juristic scheme. This meaning of bi-compartmentalization is beyond its importance related to the military affairs. As it will be shown in details, it does not mean that peaceful relationships could not be established with other communities and states.

Some of the scholars define a third division within the world order, *dar al-'ahd* or *dar as-'sulh* (the House of Truce or House of Covenant) to differentiate the states which have peaceful agreements with Islamic state from those which do not have such a treaty of peace. But many Hanifi scholars insist that there are only two divisions within the world order because if the inhabitants of a territory concluded a treaty of peace it became part of the dar al-Islam.

Dar which means country or place in the literal sense, has been applied to Islamic juristic scheme together with its dimension of political authority and power. Ibn Abidin defines *dar* in his *Radd al-Mukhtar* as "the country under the government of a Muslim or non-Muslim" while al-Jassâs connotes it, in *Mukhta'sar at-Tahawi*, through attaching to political power and hegemony (Özel, 1982:69).

As Khadduri (intr.ch. of Shaybani, 1966:10) mentions, the Islamic conception of world order within a bi-compartmental framework is a reflection of the basic assumption that only the members of the ummah are the subjects of the Islamic legal and ethical system; while all other communities are the object of that system, although they are by no means denied certain advantages of the system when they come into contact with Islam. This subject/object relationship is consistent with the understanding of ummah as the political unity of Muslims.

Such a bi-compartmentalization could not be regarded as a declaration of permanent war in the essence of jihad as some orientalist argue, because according to many Muslim sects and jurists the normal and permanent state in international relations is the state of peace. The translation of jihad merely as

the "holy war" in western languages creates a misimagination that Islam assumes a permanent war as opposed to other political units. Jihad, as another very significant key-concept, has a more comprehensive meaning compared to the war in western languages. The exact correspondence of "war" is *'harb* or *qital* in Arabic. The origin of *jihad* is *jahada* which means to endeavor. Thus the meaning of jihad is the exertion or the endeavor. The technical meaning of this term in Islamic thought, law and practice is the act of exerting oneself or endeavoring in the way of Allah to fulfill the divine responsibility. Its usage in the Qur'an marks very clearly to this meaning: "As for those who strive in Us, We surely guide them Our paths, and lo! Allah is with the good."(29:69). A holy war in the cause of Allah is a specific type of jihad; but jihad does not necessarily mean merely an action during the warfare. As Khadduri (intr. ch. of Shaybani, 1966:15) clarifies, "The jihad, in the broad sense of the term, did not necessarily call for violence or fighting, even though a state of war existed between Islamic and non-Islamic territories, since Islam might achieve its ultimate goal by peaceful as well as by violent means". Unlike the other religions, Islam did not deny the reality of war; rather it specified the normative/juristic limitations of this reality.¹ Islam sets up a very sensitive balance between its activist/dynamic element to universalize its normative way of thought/life and the ethical prerequisites during the process of this universalization. From this perspective, Islam accepts war in the way of Allah as a natural means which will be used in the cases of necessity and specifies the right conduct during the war. Therefore it incites Muslims to make war against injustice and tyranny on the earth in order to universalize the norms of Islam on one hand; and reminds the priority of ethical prerequisites even during the war. This characteristic originates from the early periods of Islamic history. Tabari's following report in his *Tarikh* from the time of Abu Bakr is a very interesting example of this balance in Islam: "Abu Bakr went out (with the army) and he is walking, while Usâma (the leader of the army) rode. 'Abd ar-Rahman ibn Awf was leading Abu Bakr's mount. Then Usâama said to him, "Successor of God's Messenger; you will either mount, or I shall dismount." He replied, "By God you shall not dismount, and I will not

¹Hamidullah (1961:204-7) notes following ethical restrictions during the war as a list of forbidden acts: "(i) unnecessarily cruel and tortuous way of killing; (ii) killing non-combatants (women, minors, servants, slaves and the like who have not joined in fighting, the blind, the disabled, very old, insane, non-combatant monks e.t.c.); (iii) mutilation of men as well as beasts; (iv) treachery and perfidy; (v) devastation, destruction of harvest, unnecessary cutting of trees; (vi) slaughtering animals more than what is necessary for food; (vii) excess and wickedness; (viii) adultery and fornication with captives; (ix) killing enemy hostages; (x) severing the heads of some fallen enemy; (xii) massacre after occupation, (xiii) killing the Muslim's parent, even if he or she were non-Muslim; (xiv) Non-combatant traders and merchants are saved; (xv) burning a captured (even animal) to death; (xvi) acts forbidden under general treaties so long as the treaties last."

mount. I must get my feet a little dusty in the path of God, for a ghazi (raider) with every step he takes has seven hundred merits credited to him and he is raised seven hundred degrees, while seven hundred sins are forgiven him!" When he walked enough, he said to Usâma "If you see fit to let 'Umar (stay in Medina and) help me, please do so. And Usâma gave him leave. Then he said: "O ye people! Stand, while I give you ten words of advice, and learn them from me. Do not act treacherously; do not act disloyally; do not act neglectfully. Do not mutilate; do not kill little children or old men, or women; do not cut off the heads of the palm-trees or burn them; do not cut down the fruit trees; do not slaughter a sheep or a cow or a camel except for food. You will pass by people who devote their lives in cloisters; leave them and their devotions alone. You will come upon people who bring you platters in which are various sorts of food; if you eat any of it, mention the name of God over it. You will meet with people who have laid bare the tops of their heads, and left something like strips of cloth around it: smite them a good one with your swords. Go forth now in the name of God, and may He give you death by a wound or an epidemic!"(eng. version from Williams, 1971:262) He did not incite the soldiers for getting more booty from the war; rather for a death in the path of Allah in order to realize the basic Islamic norms.

Nevertheless, such a normative/juristic base does not mean that the principle of jihad assumes a continuous process of warfare in the sense of psychological, political and military relations. Hence, Khadduri's assertion (intr.ch.,1966:16) on this assumption of continuous war does not reflect the ideas of all Muslim scholars because for example Ibn Kadama reports in al-Mughni that Abu Hanifah insists on the argument that peace is more useful for Muslims than war in the process of the expansion of Islam.(Abu Sulayman,1985:35) As it will be discussed related to the principle of '*sulh* , *jumhur fuqaha* accept this second approach on the priority of peace. On the other hand, the historical reality does not confirm such an assumption that Muslims assumes a continuous state of war due to the fact that all Muslim states has signed treaties of peace with non-Muslim states throughout the Islamic history.

When we analyze in details, it should be underlined as the basic characteristic that Islam offers a normative framework in international

relations¹ to define the legitimate action/reaction against the other political actors of the universal system. The basic key-terms of this normative framework are *musawat* (equality), *'adalah* (justice), *muqâbalaḥ bi al-mithl* (retaliation), *hurriyah* (freedom), *'sulh* (peace), *amân* (safe-conduct/security) and *waf'a bi al-'ahd* (pacta sunt servanda). The most significant norm related to international relations is *musawat* which implies that in the sufferings of this world Muslims and non-Muslims are equal and alike. Almost all Muslim scholars agree on this fundamental principle. (Özel, 1984:38, 41; Zaydan, 1967:130, Hamidullah, 1961:70). This principle might be attached to the interpretations on the one of the holy names of Allah, *ar-Rahman*, that this name embraces mercy of Allah both for Muslims and non-muslims on the earth.² Therefore, war aiming to suffer the world better than other nations could not be justified in Islamic theory. The ontological equality of human being before Allah has been applied to the cases of international relations especially through the interpretations of the following verses: "O mankind! We have created you male and female, and have made you nations and tribes that you may know one another. Lo! the noblest of you -in the sight of Allah- is the best in conduct" (49:13)³. There are several significance consequences of this verse mentioned by the commentators. First, it specifies that the *raison d'être* of the diversifications of the human being as nations is *ta'âruf* (recognition of each other) rather than competition to suffer the world. Another verse dictates that the basis of the legitimate competition because of the diversification as nations: "Had Allah willed He could have made you one community. But that He may try you by that which He hath given to you. So vie one with another in good works (*khayrat*)."(5:48)

Secondly, it assumes peaceful relations (*'sulh*) as the state of nature among the human beings. This normative principle of *'sulh* as the state of nature has been supported by another verse: "Allah forbideth you only those who warred not against you on account of religion and drove you not from you homes, that ye should show them kindness and deal justly with them. Lo!Allah loveth the

¹The term "international relations" should be used very carefully due to the fact that Islamic political theory does not assume, at least in its classical theory, national unities as the actors of universal political system. "Interstate relations" might be a more available term for the Islamic case; but I prefer to use the former one because of its common usage as a classical branch of the political theory.

²look for this interpretation of *ar-Rahman* to Yazır (1971:I/36).

³But it should not be forgotten that the nations (*shu'ub*) and tribes (*qabâail*) in this verse are sub-groups in the hierarchy of social groupings compared to *ummah* as the ultimate religio-political unity, analyzed before.

just dealers."(60:8) There are two arguments of Muslim scholars on the reason of war. Many of the scholars, especially Hanifi scholars, argue that the reason of war is the attack of the enemies against Muslims. For example, Dabbûsî asserts in *al-Asrar* on this issue that the reason of lawfulness against ahl al-kitab is their declaration of war against Muslims¹ and connects this principle to the Islamic belief of the natural innocence of human being. Some other scholar, especially from the Shafiî's, argue that the reason of war is kufr (negation) of the unbelievers. But as Özel concludes (1982:55), the jumhur fuqaha (the majority of the scholars) accept the former argument which implies that war is temporary and comes of necessity. Almost all of them agree that war is permitted only to protect right and justice against the attacks of the enemies and of the tyrants. This approach has been supported by other principles such as the fundamental rights of men in the sense of the right of life and 'hurriyah. Ibn Humam in *Fath al-Qadir* and Ibn Taymiyyah in *Fatawa al-Kübra* strictly underline that the natural position of human being is freedom ('hurriyah); while Ibn Kudama stress the natural right of life in *al-Mughni* ². (Özel,1982:29) On the other hand, declaration of war is the ultimate alternative in the case of the impossibility of any agreement with the enemy.³

The denomination of the non-Muslim states as *dar al-harb* (enemy territory or territory of war) does not mean that the natural and permanent relationship between Muslims and non-Muslim states is war. On the contrary, "brief spans of peace may be offered the inhabitants of the dar al-harb, whether by a peace treaty concluded between Muslims and non-muslims or by an amân⁴".

¹"Qâla ulamâuna sababu ibahati al-qital ma'a ahl al-'harb kawnuhum harban lana." (Özel,1982:51)

² "li anna al-asl fi ad-dimâi al-'ha'zru illa bi yaqin al-iba'hah"

³ Shaybani (1966:76) quotes a hadith from the prophet on this issue: "Whenever the Apostle of God sent forth an army or a detachment, he charged its commander personally to fear God, the Most High, and he enjoined the Muslims who were with him to do good [i.e. to conduct themselves properly]. And [the Apostle] said: Fight in the name of God and in "the path of God" [i.e. truth] Combat only those who disbelieve in God. Do not cheat or commit treachery, nor should you mutilate anyone or kill children. Whenever you meet your polytheist enemies, invite them [first] to adopt Islam. If they do so, accept it, and let them alone. You should then invite them to move from their territory to the territory of the emigres (Madinah). If they do so, accept it and let them alone. Otherwise, they should be informed that they would be [treated] like the Muslim nomads (Bedouins) [who take no part in the war] in that they are subject to God's order as [other] Muslims, but that they will receive no share in either the ghanima (spoil of war) or in the fay. If they refuse [to accept Islam], then call upon them to pay the jizya; if they do, accept it and leave them alone. (...)"

⁴"In the absence of a treaty, the 'harbi -a person from the territory of war- may enter the territory of Islam under an amân, obtained beforehand from any Muslim. Such an amân, if granted, transforms the status of the 'harbi from a state of war to one of temporary peace and security, with

Wafâ bi al-a'hd (pacta sunt servanda) is one of the basic norms in international relations according to Muslim scholars unless the other side violate the treaties. *Muqabalah bi al-mithl* (retaliation) is a counterpart of the principle of 'adalah but it can not be applied to the cases for which is it impossible to apply retaliation because of the other norms fo Islamic ethics: Even if the enemy assassinates the hostages, Muslim can not react likewise.

All of these concepts and classifications of the political system are a direct consequence of the Weltanschauung in Islamic political theories which set up a strong relationship between ontological and political images. In contrast, the Western nation-state is a purely secular artifact emerging from a specific imago mundi. Its epistemological axiological consequences sever the links between its ontological approach and its political consciousness.

respect to his own private relations with the inhabitants of the territory of Islam." (Khadduri, intr. ch. Shaybani, 1966:18)

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The uniformistic character of western civilization is its one of the most significant dilemma in our age. Beyond superficial pluralistic slogans, pluralism in the sense of the survival of authentic cultures is merely a subject of Unesco today to establish museums in restricted areas which do not have any relationship with the real life. Toynbee's prediction in the beginning of this century in his *A Study of the History* (1939:IV/1-2) became a nightmare of the authentic civilizations and cultures: He argued that no less than out of twenty-six civilizations are by now dead and buried including the Egyptian, the Andean, the Sinic, the Hellenic, the Babylonion, the Minoan, the Sumeric, the Mayan, the Judic, the Hittite, the Syriac, the Hellenic, the Babylonion, the Mexican, the Arabic, the Yucatec, the Spartan and the Ottoman. He also underlined that of the remaining ten surviving civilizations -the Western, the Christian Near East, the Islamic, the Christian Russian, the Hindu, the Far Eastern Chinese, the Japanese, the Polynesian, the Estimo and the Nomadic- all, are *in their last agonies* under the threat of either annihilation or assimilation by western civilization.

The situation of agony became vitally significant especially after the vertiginous developments in the sphere of the communication links. Very simple activities of human life like drinking cola, wearing jeans began to be interpreted as the victory of the universalization of the humanistic/democratic culture. Beyond huge material and technological supremacy, western civilization, itself, is in a state of acute crisis especially because of the erosion of its ethical base originated from the lack of normativeness. The ethico-material, psycho-ontological and environmental imbalances of the current western civilization,¹ together with its extensive capacity of annihilation, has been

¹These imbalances related to the crisis in western civilizations are well explained by Mumford in *The Myth of the Machine* (1966), by Marcuse in *One Dimensional Man* (1972), by Roszak in *The Making of Counter-culture* (1971) by Toynbee in *The Present-Day Experiment in Western Civilization* and by Camilleri in *Civilization in Crisis* (1976)e.t.c.

transformed to a civilizational crisis all over the world. Hence, contrary to the civilizational crisis in the history, this crisis is not a regional crisis in a corner of the world. Rather, the crisis of the western civilization is also universalized like its life-style.

The co-development of the situation of the agony of authentic civilizations and the acute crisis in western civilization led the leading figures of the civilizations under the threat of the annihilation by western civilization to search their balanced way of thought and way of life. That is especially valid for Muslim scholars and masses which inherited a really very impressive and consistent civilizational experience in the sense of a new balance, both in thought and in life. Islamic all-inclusive *weltanschauung* which is absolutely alternative to the western *weltanschauung* rather than complementary, provides adequate theoretical and imaginative tools for such an attempt.

In the Western paradigm, the particularization in the ontological sphere creates a particularization of epistemological sources (revelation and reason), and of axiological consequences and spheres of life which leads to an internal philosophical dynamism through internal conflicts at the expense of internal consistency. This is the internal mechanism of the secularization of life and thought in the Western philosophical-social tradition. In contrast, the Unity of Allah in an ontological sphere in the Islamic paradigm results in the idea of the Unity of Truth and the Unity of Life which provides a strong internal consistency within a holistic framework through harmonizing epistemology, eschatology, axiology, sociology and politics based on ontology. This internal consistency is the base of the Islamic culture through rejecting the particularization of ontology, epistemology and axiology.

Therefore, every attempt at pyramidal institutional secularization in Muslim societies creates a strong theoretical response to protect the internal consistency through harmonizing ontology, epistemology and axiology in a new balance. This is due to the contrast emerging from the reality of being an alternative *Weltanschauung*, rather than from the historical and institutional conflicts. The scholars and politicians who omit these fundamental differences will continue to be puzzled by the increasing critical response of Muslim societies. This criticism parallels the increase of modernization and Westernization because Islam offers an alternative political culture and alternative images supported by its consistent, holistic framework.

The irreconcilability of the philosophical and theoretical bases of Western and Islamic political theories, images and cultures might be analyzed only within a well-defined framework of the interconnected relationship between ontology, epistemology, axiology and politics. The origins of the problem should be searched for in the root-paradigms of two alternative Weltanschauungs. The originality of the Islamic paradigm is related to its theocentric ontology based on the Belief of Tawhid supported by the principle of tanzih. The differentiation of ontological levels via ontological hierarchy and ontologically defined epistemology are the cornerstones of the process from its imago mundi to the axiological foundations of political images and culture. The Western paradigm around proximity of ontological levels through a particularization of divinity supported by intrinsically polytheist and pantheist elements, is the philosophical origin of the secularization of life via rationalistic axiology. This is a specific character of the Western philosophical tradition based on epistemologically defined ontology which has led to a relativized and subjectivized religion.

The way of justification of a socio-political system based on a cosmological-ontological foundation, the process of legitimizing political authority on epistemological axiological bases, the interpretation of political power and the specification of political unity are significant political theories, images and cultures. Due to the reality that the Western challenge to Islamic civilization is not only a challenge of an alternative institutional and historical background, but also a challenge of Weltanschauung, the oppressive institutional transformation strategies being exercised against Muslim societies, can not overcome this irreconcilability. The very strong internal consistency of the Islamic theoretical framework provides always a potentiality to produce an alternative political culture, setting up a direct link between ontology and politics as long as the ontological approach around the belief in Tawhid survives in the socio-political culture and images.

APPENDIX 1

GLOSSARY FOR ARABIC TERMS

- 'Abd* : Slave
Adalâh : Justice
Af'dal : Most excellent
Aflakiyyah : Worshippers of the spheres as ruling all events
A'hkâm (pl. of *'hukm*) : Ordinances; rules; judgements; decrees
Ahl al-baghi : Rebels
Ahl al-bayt : The family of the prophet
Ahl al-dhimmah : Non-Muslim subjects of the Islamic state
Ahl al-hal wa al-aqd : Those who are qualified to unbind and to bind; i.e. the representatives of the community of Muslims who act on their behalf in appointing and deposing a caliph.
Ahl al-haqq : Followers of the truth; followers of the true religion
Ahl al-harb : Subjects of the enemy territory
Ahl al-Kitab : People of the book; i.e. Jews and Christians, to whom were added later Sabeans and Zoroastrians.
Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamaah : People of the authoritative tradition and the community; especially the sunni sect.
Alam : Mark; sign
'Alim (pl. *'ulama'*) : Scholar; learned man,
'Âlam : World
'Amal : Practice; precedent
Amân : Safe-conduct; security
Amîr : A military commander
Amîr al-m'uminîn : The commander of the faithful
Amir al-umarâ : Commander-in-chief
'âmm, 'âmma : The common people
'Aql : Reason; intellect
Ard : Land; territory
Ard al-harb : Territory of war or enemy territory

As-Sabab Al-Awwal : The First Cause

'A'saba (pl. 'A'sabat) : Clan, agnate

Ashab al-rai wa al-qiyas : The People of Reason and Opinion

Asbab (pl. of sabab) : Roots; sources; reasons

Bâtil : Void

Bay'ah : Homage

Bayt al-Mâl : Public treasury

Bid'a : Innovation

Dar al-'ahd : The Country of Truce or House of Covenant

Dar al-'harb : Enemy territory

Dar al-Islam : Territory of Islam

Dar as-'sulh : The country of peace

D'awa : Claim; ideal

Dhikr : Praise and glorification of God

'Daruri : Natural; primary

Faqih (pl. fuqaha) : Jurist

Far'd : Duty; the performance of which is obligatory

Far'd 'Ayn : Individual duty, the performance of which is obligatory for every individual.

Far'd al-Kifayah : Collective duty; the performance of which is obligatory for the community as a whole: if a sufficient number fulfil the duty, the rest are relieved of it; if the duty is not performed, all the community is liable for punishment.

Fatwa : Legal opinion

Fiqh : Jurisprudence

Furqan : A name of the Holy Qur'an meaning that which distinguishes or separates.

Ganimah : Spoil of war

Gayb : Unvisible; Unseen

'Hadd : Penalty

'Hadith : Tradition

'Halal : Lawful, permitted

'Haqq : Right

Haqiqah : The Truth

'Haram : Prohibited; unlawful

Hikmah : Wisdom

'Hukm (pl. ahkam) : Decision, command, order, rule of law

Hurriyah : Freedom

Ibda	: To produce real things from nothing
Ijaz	: Miracle (of the Qur'anic revelation)
ijtihad	: Intense exertion to arrive at a rule of law
Ijm'a	: Consensus, agreement
Ikhtilaf	: Disagreement or differences among jurists on matters of law
Ilah	: The Worshipped
'Ilm	: Knowledge; Science
Imam	: Caliph; leader of a school of law; prayer leader
Jabriyyah	: Compulsionism
Jaysh	: Army
Jihâd	: Exertion; just war
Jizya	: Poll tax
Khulafâ' Rashidin	: The first four caliphs after the prophet
Kâfir	: Unbeliever
Kalâm	: Islamic Theology
Khalîq	: The Creator
Khutbah	: (Friday) Sermon
Kitab	: Book; Scripture
Madhhab	: School of Law
Mahdiyyah	: Essence
Majlis	: Assembly
Majussiyyah	: Fire worshipper, Magianism
Makhluq	: Created Beings
Mâl	: Property
Masjid	: Mosque
Malik	: The Master
Maluh	: Worshipper
Mamluk	: Servants
Marbub	: Slaves
Mawjud	: Existent
Mujtahid	: The man who exercises personal reasoning to develop new judgements
Mukhalafah	: Difference from the created beings
Muqâbalah bi al-mithl	: Retaliation; reciprocity
Musawat	: equality
Mushrik	: Polytheist; unbeliever
Nabi	: Prophet; Messenger
Nass	: incontrovertible proof; text

<i>Nasara</i>	: Christianity
<i>Na'zari</i>	: acquired knowledge based on discursive reason
<i>Nubuwwah</i>	: Prophecy
<i>Qâdî</i>	: Judge
<i>Qiblah</i>	: Direction toward Mecca in prayer
<i>Qitâl</i>	: Fighting; battle
<i>Qiyas</i>	: Analogical Reasoning
<i>Rabb</i>	: Lord
<i>Rasûl</i>	: Apostle; Messenger
<i>R'ay</i>	: Opinion
<i>'Sa'hi'h</i>	: Authentic (tradition)
<i>Shahadah</i>	: Profession of faith; Testimony
<i>Shari'a</i>	: Islamic Law
<i>Shahwah</i>	: Desire; appetite
<i>'Sulh</i>	: Peace
<i>Sunnah</i>	: Custom; A precedent based on the Prophet's acts or sayings
<i>Sûrah</i>	: A portion or chapter of the Holy Qur'an
<i>Tabi'ah</i>	: Nature, disposition
<i>Tabi'iyah</i>	: Naturalism
<i>Tafsir</i>	: Exegesis; commentary
<i>Tajsim</i>	: Attribution a body or form to God
<i>Tamsil</i>	: Figurization
<i>Tanzih</i>	: Denial of likeness and similitude
<i>Taqlid</i>	: Conformity to the opinion of a leading jurist
<i>Tashbih</i>	: Similitude
<i>T'atil</i>	: Divesting
<i>T'awil</i>	: individual interpretation of a religious or legal doctrine
<i>Thenaviyyah</i>	: Dualism; zoroastrianism
<i>Ummah</i>	: Religio-political Community of the believers
<i>U'sûl</i>	: Roots or sources (of the law)
<i>Waf'a bi al-'ahd</i>	: Pacta sunt servanda
<i>Wajib al-Wujud</i>	: The Necessary Being
<i>Wujud</i>	: Existence

APPENDIX II

GLOSSARY FOR LATIN TERMS

Actus Purus : Meaning pure actuality; God is the One Being without potentiality

Adequatio rei et intellectus : The equivalence of the thought with the thing

Ens Primum : The First Cause

Homo homini lupus : Man the wolf of man

Nouva scienza : New Science

Primus inter pares : The first among the equals

Principium individuationis : Principle of individuation; the intrinsic, real factor in an existing singular thing which causes the individuality of the thing.

Raison d'être : Reason or justification for existence

Regnum : The territorial monarchies in Augustinian political thought

Sine qua non : An absolutely indispensable or essential thing

Status : State

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