

T.C.
UNIVERSITY OF GAZİANTEP
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE

AN ANALYSIS OF IAN MCEWAN'S *THE CHILD IN TIME*, TOM MCCARTHY'S *REMAINDER* AND JULIAN BARNES' *THE ONLY STORY* AS NARRATIVES OF MEMORY AND MELANCHOLY

MASTER OF ARTS THESIS

M. MİRAC CEYLAN

GAZİANTEP
JUNE 2021

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Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Zekiye ANTAKYALIOĞLU

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DEDICATION

To everything I have ever loved and lost, everything I have ever remembered and forgotten...



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ABSTRACT

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June 2021, 109 pages

The concept of melancholy has been discussed, defined, and analysed throughout history by philosophers, thinkers, and psychoanalysts. In Sigmund Freud's seminal essay titled "Mourning and Melancholia" (1917), melancholia is attached to the concept of loss, and gained a different layer when compared with how it was perceived and defined in the past. At this point, the presence of loss is provided and tested by memory. In this respect, melancholia became interrelated with memory. These two concepts carry various layers within, such as love, death, mourning and time, and including these layers in the analysis vastly contributes to the discussions of melancholy and memory. In the contemporary era, melancholy and memory occupy a significant place both in the contemporary condition of human beings and in the reflection of that condition in the literature of the era. Thus, melancholy and memory have been two of the main focuses of contemporary British fiction. This study will attempt to demonstrate the relationship between melancholy and memory in Ian McEwan's *The Child in Time* (1987), Tom McCarthy's *Remainder* (2005), and Julian Barnes' *The Only Story* (2018) respectively. With their distinct ways of representing melancholy and memory, novels that will be analysed in this thesis shed different amount of light into different aspects of the concepts.

Key words: Memory, melancholy, Ian McEwan, Tom McCarthy, Julian Barnes.

ÖZET

IAN MCEWAN'IN *ZAMANIN İZLERİNDE*, TOM MCCARTHY'NİN *KALAN*, VE JULIAN BARNES'İN *BİRİCİK HİKAYE* ROMANLARININ BELLEK VE MELANKOLİ ANLATILARI OLARAK İNCELENMESİ

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Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Zekiye ANTAKYALIOĞLU

Haziran 2021, 109 sayfa

Melankoli kavramı tarih boyunca filozoflar, düşünürler ve psikanalistler tarafından tartışılmış, tanımlanmış ve analiz edilmiştir. Sigmund Freud'un "Yas ve Melankoli" (1917) başlıklı makalesinde, melankoli kayıp kavramıyla ilişkilendirilir ve kavramın geçmişte algılandığı ve tanımladığı haliyle karşılaştırıldığında, farklı bir katman kazanır. Bu noktada, kaybın varlığı bellek tarafından sağlanır ve test edilir. Bu bakımdan melankoli, bellek ile ilişkili hale gelmiştir. Bu iki kavram, içinde aşk, ölüm, yas ve zaman gibi çeşitli katmanlar taşır ve bu katmanları analize dahil etmek melankoli ve bellek tartışmalarına büyük ölçüde katkıda bulunur. Çağdaş dönemde melankoli ve bellek, hem insanın güncel durumunda, hem de bu durumun çağın edebiyatına yansımada önemli bir yer tutar. Bu nedenle, melankoli ve bellek çağdaş İngiliz kurgusunun ana odak noktalarından olmuştur. Bu çalışma, melankoli ve bellek arasındaki ilişkiyi sırasıyla Ian McEwan'ın *Zamanın İzlerinde*, Tom McCarthy'nin *Kalan*, ve Julian Barnes'ın *Biricik Hikaye* romanlarında göstermeye çalışacaktır. Melankoli ve belleği temsil etmedeki özgün yöntemleriyle bu tezde analiz edilen romanlar, kavramların farklı yönlerine farklı miktarlarda ışık tutmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Bellek, melankoli, Ian McEwan, Tom McCarthy, Julian Barnes.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to express my deepest gratitude and appreciation to my supervisor Prof. Dr. Zekiye Antakyalıoğlu for always being my lighthouse, illuminating the darkness both in my academic and in my social life. I would like to thank her for making me a better person, as well as a better academic.

I wish to thank Dr. Gamze Almacıoğlu who had directly witnessed all the ups and downs in the creation process of this thesis, and who always devotedly supported me.

I am also extremely grateful for the unconditional love and support my mother Muazzez Ceylan, and my godmother Asiye Ulu have given me. I would like to thank them for always providing a shoulder for me to lean my head on. Without their presence, this study would not be completed.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page no</u>
ABSTRACT.....	i
ÖZET.....	ii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	iv

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Memory.....	6
1.2. Melancholy.....	14

CHAPTER II

***THE CHILD IN TIME* (1987) BY IAN MCEWAN**

2.1. <i>The Child in Time</i>	28
2.2. Elaboration of Memory in <i>The Child in Time</i>	32
2.3. Elaboration of Melancholy in <i>The Child in Time</i>	37
2.4. Conclusion.....	44

CHAPTER III

***REMAINDER* (2005) BY TOM MCCARTHY**

3.1. <i>Remainder</i>	50
3.1.1. Elaboration of Memory in <i>Remainder</i>	56
3.1.2. Elaboration of Melancholy in <i>Remainder</i>	62
3.1.3. Conclusion.....	72

CHAPTER IV

***THE ONLY STORY* (2018) BY JULIAN BARNES**

4.1. <i>The Only Story</i>	77
4.1.1. Elaboration of Memory in <i>The Only Story</i>	79
4.1.2. Elaboration of Melancholy in <i>The Only Story</i>	87
4.1.3. Conclusion.....	95
CONCLUSION.....	97
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	104
CURRICULUM VITAE.....	110

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

We live, we die, we are remembered, we are forgotten.

Julian Barnes

For St. Augustine, time is separated into three tenses: “the present time of things past is memory, the present time of things present is sight, the present time of things future is expectation” (1963, p. 273). St. Augustine’s definition of time can be used to illuminate time’s relationship with memory and melancholy¹. The past of a melancholic person encapsulates his/her loss, and the post-effect of that loss is lived in the ‘present time of things present’ which disturbs the subject’s expected future. Thus, the melancholics have a problem with their expectations, which lie in the present time of things future, positioned ahead of the first two tenses. In the hands of different writers, melancholy and memory have been analysed, processed, and depicted variously in fiction. The present study will aim at analysing the various representations of memory and melancholy through three contemporary British novels: Ian McEwan’s *The Child in Time* (1987), Tom McCarthy’s *Remainder* (2005), and Julian Barnes’ *The Only Story* (2018). In these selected novels, novelists beautifully mingle the feeling of loss with the burden of remembering and forgetting. In all three of these novels, the common point of the characters is that they all experience a sense of loss, the loss of a child (*The Child in Time*), of memory (*The Remainder*) and of a lover (*The Only Story*) respectively, and they reflect upon these losses in their own individual way. With their unique capturing of the sense of loss and the remembrance in the narration, these novels demonstrate different approaches to the representation of memory and melancholy. In each novel, memory and melancholy are depicted through some concepts: the concepts are demonstrated through time and hope in *The Child in Time*, simulation and affect in *Remainder*, and concurrent love and loss along with

¹ The terms ‘melancholia’ and ‘melancholy’ will be used interchangeably throughout the thesis.

recollections in *The Only Story*. All three uniquely demonstrate elegy as a mood in their narration. Their characters' identities change as their memories are evoked and enlarged. The selected novels provide a bridge between melancholia, as a state, and memory, as a human faculty that serves for this state of melancholia to occur. Past memories greatly influence the melancholic present of the characters, which demonstrates the importance of studying melancholia in relation to memory. While analysing the novels as the narratives of memory and melancholy, this thesis will attempt to further evaluate how relevant concepts such as love, death, mourning, and time are portrayed in the narratives.

The definition of melancholia has been enriched by different perspectives since the times of Ancient Greek philosophers. Throughout history, many thinkers and philosophers have contributed to the process of defining and understanding what melancholy is by creating somewhat different analyses of melancholia, both as a concept and as a state. As melancholia's portrayals in visual arts are reckoned, Albrecht Dürer's engraving titled *Melencolia I* (1514) stands as an influential figure for the melancholy definitions that came after it. Dürer's personification of melancholia is made up of a woman with wings, sitting with her hands on her cheek in a very bleak environment, having various objects around. The melancholy presented in this engraving is found totally distinct from Freudian melancholy (Palencia-Roth, 1980, p. 364). Likewise, after almost four hundred years, Edvard Munch's painting titled *Melancholy* (1891) carries common elements with that of Dürer's: both represented melancholy with a thoughtful figure whose hand is on his cheek, and both figures are pictured in loneliness. The portrayals of melancholy have gained layers over time. "Until the late nineteenth century, melancholia was the term usually used to refer to the depressive syndrome" (as quoted in Radden, 2000, p. 3). After the late nineteenth century, the definition of melancholia, which was basically referring to a 'depressive syndrome,' was enriched with the concept of loss being attached to the term. For Sigmund Freud, melancholia is "the reaction to the loss of a loved object" and it is evaluated along with mourning (1981, p. 245). The source of melancholia, which derived from the existence of an excessive amount of black bile in Ancient Greece, turned out to be a clinical and pathological issue for the psychoanalysts in the modern era.

Being related to a sense of loss, melancholia is also a function of memory, enabling human beings to remember their losses. Memory is an essential human faculty that plays a huge role in the formation of identity. It is a field in which both philosophy and psychology are interested (Bloch, 2007, p. 56). The French philosopher Henri Bergson points out that the function of memory,

[...] is to evoke all those past perceptions which are analogous to the present perception, to recall to us what preceded and followed them, and so to suggest to us that decision which is the most useful. But this is not all. By allowing us to grasp in a single intuition multiple moments of duration, it frees us from the movement of the flow of things, that is to say, from the rhythm of necessity. The more of these moments memory can contract into one, the firmer is the hold which it gives to us on matter: so the memory of a living being appears indeed to measure, above all, its powers of action upon things and to be only the intellectual reverberations of this power (qtd in McNamara, 1996, p. 221).

Here, what Bergson contends is that as memory's primary function is to blend past perceptions with the present ones, memory's unique flow separates human beings from the regular flow of things. In a way, there is a line that divides memory and present consciousness, which can explain the reason why human beings are not in control of what to remember and what to forget.

With the layer of loss attached to the symptoms of melancholia, the concept of memory plays even a greater role in the discussions of melancholia. As a loss is an essential factor for melancholia to occur, memory is the faculty that enables the loss to be remembered, which determines the length of the state of melancholia, and assures its presence. In other words, melancholy is a memory embedded feeling or state. After the occurrence of loss and melancholia, the sufferer is dependent on his memory, willingly or unwillingly, to sustain the state of melancholia. In this sense, studying melancholia with memory would enrich both fields simultaneously. Melancholia and memory have connections with different feelings and concepts such as love, death, mourning, and time, therefore examining melancholia and memory as mutually functioning phenomena would enrich our ways of understanding one and/or the other.

The subjects of memory and melancholy have never been disregarded by the writers and poets of earlier periods, both in England and all around the world. Regarding the representation of memory, some noteworthy examples are Marcel Proust's *In Search of Lost Time* (1913) in which memory perfectly serves for Proust's narrative. Regarding the representation of melancholy, John Keats' "Ode on Melancholy" stands as a solid reference point. Keats defines melancholy as a condition

that suddenly falls upon human beings, and it drains all the beauties around. Yet, he advises the reader not to drink Lethe's water, believing that melancholy resides in the same habitat with Beauty. In this sense, Keats does not approach melancholy as a pathological condition.

As literature tends to reflect human feelings and states in given periods of time, it is of no surprise to see that in contemporary fiction, concepts of melancholia and memory are frequently used, especially in collaboration with the states of depression and amnesia. For Pieter Vermeulen, "any understanding of the place of melancholia in contemporary culture must take into account the increasing currency of the notions of trauma and depression in the last quarter century" (2011, p. 254). For the psychoanalyst Darian Leader, "today everyone talks about depression," whereas beneath the term 'depression' lies either melancholia or mourning (Leader, 2008, p. 5). Leader also points out that the lack of sufficient study related with mourning and melancholia was substituted by the innumerable works of fiction that are built on these subject matters, which makes literature an appropriate source to study melancholia and mourning (2008, p. 6).

Vermeulen further elaborates on the impact of loss for the novel as a genre:

Indeed, not only are trauma and loss important themes in the contemporary novel but also the evocation of these notions contributes to strategies to assess the politics of the novel form as such and to redesign the novel as a vehicle for a productive and resolutely post-melancholic linkage of loss and identity (2011, p. 255).

Thus, for Vermeulen, the novel as a genre is developed and re-shaped through the themes of trauma and loss which turn fiction into a productive source to study melancholia, and its impact on the character's identity.

Memory, on the other hand, is a crucial term in an age where amnesia and Alzheimer's disease are highly common. Regarding the memory for the losses, Leader points out that "a vast industry of remembering has emerged in our time" (2008, p. 118). For Francis O'Gorman, technology has a role in the wide-spread position of amnesia which "generates patches of what can only be called a peculiarly Lethan experience on a frequent or even daily basis" (2017, p. 110).

In *Living in the End Times*, Slavoj Žižek puts forward his analysis of the world in its last stages, as well as the newly formed human identity within that specific World. Žižek points out that in the twenty-first century, the consciousness of human beings is very similar to that of Alzheimer's patients (2010, p. 292). The center of

Žižek's claim is situated into the discussions of trauma. Benefiting from Freud, Žižek claims that trauma is "the violent intrusion of something radically unexpected, something the subject was absolutely not ready for, and which it cannot integrate in any way" (2010, p. 292). Furthermore, he indicates that these unexpected intrusions have connections with already existing "traumatic 'psychic reality'" (p. 292). However, in the contemporary socio-political reality, as defined by Žižek, human beings are living a permanent state of trauma, which requires no contact with a pre-existing trauma.

The human beings who are in a constant state of trauma are called 'post-traumatic' subjects by Žižek (p. 294). He implies that these subjects are the sufferers of Alzheimer's and other brain disorders. However, he is not only referring to the Alzheimer's disease literally. What he points out is that in the new socio-political reality, all human beings live in a permanent state of Alzheimer's where they are alienated from their own identities, selves, and to the time and space they belong. Their conscious is numb, as a result, they gradually lose touch with every object that makes them themselves. For Žižek, these subjects live "death as a form of life" (p. 294). For Milan Kundera, the reason why it is an age of Alzheimer's is that the contemporary ages are the ages of swiftness, not slowness (Antakyalıoğlu, 2017, p. 138). As human beings' daily activities are totally engaged with everything that is faster, their memories gradually weaken. Hence, how fast one forgets is dependent on how fast s/he lives, resulting in the increase in the number of Alzheimer's patients (Antakyalıoğlu, 2017, p. 139). The argument of Alzheimer's being the new ontology of human beings guarantees the problematic position of memory for the late twentieth and twenty-first century.

In his book titled *The Ethics and Aesthetics of Vulnerability in Contemporary British Fiction* (2015), Jean-Michel Ganteau discusses the common traits of contemporary British fiction. While stating these elements, Ganteau observes that starting with the mid-2000's the human disposition began to be attached to a term: 'vulnerability.' For Ganteau, as the very term is used in the context of "'care' and 'caring,' 'responsibility,' 'ethics,' 'the Other,'" (Ganteau, 2015, p. 3) the term is also attached to 'trauma' and 'traumatized,' which is the point where Ganteau defines the vulnerable and traumatized human beings with the mode of 'precariousness' which is defined as the parallel of vulnerability. Therefore, vulnerability, as an umbrella term

that encapsulates precariousness, trauma, and elegy underneath, is the paradigm in the contemporary condition of the twenty-first century human beings.

Regarding the common traits of the contemporary novel, after classifying the current position of romance, Ganteau defines ‘elegy’ as the second common element that he observes in contemporary fiction. For him, in the essence of romance, the subject is “forever unattainable,” which brings an incomplete content (p. 69). Whereas in elegy, the object is lost: “With romance, the separation may be remedied. With elegy it is lamented” (p. 69). The ever-lasting hope does not exist in elegiac forms. “The elegiac subject, in his/her grief, and the elegiac text, in its paroxysmally affected form, are emblematic of the extreme frailty of human experience and aspirations in their unlimited probing at the limits of life” (p. 69). The elegy of the subject, and the elegy of the text represent the vulnerability. Hence, the vulnerable human beings would inevitably include elegy in their fiction. In other words, their texts are the texts of lamentation. Elegy, as mourning and melancholy, is co-related with memory. The elegiac subject, and the text, is built around remembering. In this sense, elegy is generated by remembering the loss.

With the advancement of technology, human beings are less dependent on their memories to remember things, and more dependent on their technological devices, which results in the decaying of memory. Studies of memory,

as a newly-born field of study, aims to understand the condition of the human being by inspecting its relationship with the past. Literature provides the necessary tools and working environment for memory studies in its attempts to understand and give a meaning to life (Kalkan, 2019, p. 2).

As scientists study what memory is, how it functions, and how human beings conduct the act of remembering, on the other side of the coin, Amnesia, as a spreading disease is being discussed as well. Furthermore, forms of memories such as collective and individual memory, and memory’s relation to time are among the important topics that can feed the relation between memory and melancholy, as well as mourning.

1.1 Memory

This part will discuss and evaluate the concept of memory in a form that serves for the synthesizing of memory with melancholy, mourning and loss. Memory is a “term used for a variety of systems in the brain with different characteristics. In all cases, however, it implies the ability to reinvoke or repeat a specific mental image or a physical act” (Edelman, 2005, p. 166). Memory is a brain faculty where one’s

experiences and moments of past are restored, and where the knowledge related with future is kept.

Henri Bergson, a twentieth century French philosopher, is one of the most prominent figures of the theory of memory. In his groundbreaking book *Matter and Memory* (1896), Bergson demonstrated his theory on memory and his selectionist model of understanding memory. Selectionist model, as its very name indicates, is a reductionist attitude developed to better define how memory works. “Selection involves a reduction in number of states, traits, entities, or elements from an initial plentitude of possible alternatives” (McNamara, 2011, p. 217). This model basically claims that while functioning, memory sorts, selects and preserves some elements and traits, and eliminates others (2011, p. 217).

For Bergson, memory is “the conservation and preservation of the past in the present” (as quoted in Deleuze, 1991, p. 51). Memory is a tricky concept that both connects and disunites past from the present, since it independently functions regarding what to remember and what to forget. It is both the bridge and the barrier between the two tenses. For Bergson, past is recollection, and present is perception, or in other words, past is memory, while present is matter (Deleuze, 1991, p. 55). Regarding the significance of the concept, Beata Piatek states that in Ancient Greece, Mnemosyne, being the goddess of memory and the mother of all the muses, was the source of all forms of arts and sciences, which metaphorically supports the significance of memory within cultural sphere (2014, p. 23). For Peter Childs, “Memory is both universal and culturally specific. Everyone has a memory but all humans understand memory in relation to their time and culture” (2016, p. 269). Childs’ attitude towards defining memory can be related with the discussions of collective and individual memory.

Collective memory is a term used to refer to “a form of memory that is shared by a group and of central importance to the social identity of the group’s members” (Roediger and Abel, 2015, p. 359). In *The Collective Memory*, Maurice Halbwachs, a French sociologist who was the student of Henri Bergson, states that when human beings remember, they tend to recall the events collectively. That is, “our memories remain collective, however, and are recalled to us through others even though only we were participants in the events or saw the things concerned” (Halbwachs, 1980, p. 23). The core idea beneath the theories on memory being a collective entity is that human

beings remember events through the existence of the interventions of third parties. In case of losing a specific memory from the past, if the witnesses are present, their function become “wholly incidental and complementary, doubtlessly useful...in specifying and supplementing my remembrances, but only if these have already reappeared and therefore been preserved in my mind” (Halbwachs, 1980, p. 25). Therefore, if the owner of that specific memory is able to recall the event only with the support of the third parties, or in other words, if the owner is clueless about the event until an input is given by others, for Halbwachs, an “artificial construction suddenly takes place and becomes transformed into a remembrance” (p. 25).

Halbwachs further explains that such artificial remembrances can never become real ones if the rememberer is “entirely incapable of reconstructing any portion of it in the absence of this external evidence” (p. 25). The external evidence stated here can only depict a scene that will never become a solid memory. On Halbwachs’ theories on memory being a collective entity, Jan Assmann, in his book titled *Cultural Memory and Early Civilization*, indicates that “Despite the fact that it is always the individual who ‘has’ memory, it is created collectively” (2011, p. 22). Others play a significant role in the process of formation and fictionalization of memories. As Zekiye Antakyalıoğlu puts it, “one does not possess his/her memory and remembrances all by himself/herself. Even if s/he manages to forget that past, others will not”² (2017, p. 129). The people around who construct the collectivity serve as mirrors for the one who wants to remember, or to forget, and as a result, all mirrors act in identity formation process of the person (Antakyalıoğlu, 2017, p. 126). Assmann evaluates and supports Halbwachs’ ideas on collective memory, and he further explains the figures of memory by stating that memories are dependent on some certain times and places (2011, p. 24). When a genuine remembrance takes place in memory, it is always, as memory requires, situated within a specific time and place. “Memory needs places and tends towards spatialization” (p. 25). In this sense, any case of memory loss is both the loss of individual and the collective memory of that person, since s/he not only losses his individual characteristics that builds up his/her identity, but also losses touch with the time and place s/he shared with others collectively.

² The excerpt given was translated from Turkish by the writer of the thesis.

As a result, there is a difference between remembering something individually or remembering with(in) a group. For Halbwachs, as the more people remember an event, the more durable that memory gets (Green, 2004, p. 38). That is, a memory shared with no one, or a memory remembered individually, is always in fight with the whips of time to be a permanent and a true memory. This fact indicates that individual memory tends to be more deceptive than a memory created and remembered collectively, since collectively constructed memories have their witnesses.

Melancholia and mourning are related with first the individual, and then the collective memory. These psychological states are first experienced within the circle of individual consciousness. When the concept of loss occurs, the mourner is alone by himself/herself. However, to mourn for the loss, the person needs memories, basically shared with others. As a result, both melancholia and mourning entail the use of both types of memories. For Darian Leader, after the loss of a beloved “each memory and expectation linked to the person we have lost must be revived and met with the judgement that they are gone forever” (2008, p. 26). For Leader, memory is a tool for the mourner to recall, and revive, the moments lived with the lost one, so as to completely accept the absence of the person.

It should be noted that every attempt to understand how memory functions and works is also an attempt of figuring how remembering occurs. Regarding how remembrance happens, by benefiting from Aristotle, Ricoeur identifies two kinds of memory, “1- Mneme which is simple evocation; memory as appearing; ultimately, passively popping into mind, as a stocked image spontaneously remembered, and 2- Anamnesis which is an effort to recall; memory as an object of a search ordinarily named as laborious recollection” (Antakyaloğlu, 2015, p. 331). According to Ricoeur, memories are either remembered in sudden forms without an effort or in the form of active and conscious recalling.

The discussions of memory cannot be separated from the discussions of time. Time is, and has been, a controversial concept since the time of St. Augustine. Augustine can be accepted as the pioneer of the discussions about this fluid concept of time, its roots and its perception by human beings. In *The Confessions*, Augustine examines how he perceives time:

It is now, however, perfectly clear that neither the future nor the past are in existence, and that it is incorrect to say that there are three times – past, present, and future. Though one might perhaps say: “There are three times – a present of things past, a present of things present, and a present of things future. For these three do exist in the mind, and I do not see them anywhere else: the present time of things past is memory; the present time of things present is sight; the present time of things future is expectation (1963, p. 273).

Although St. Augustine names the past, present and future separately, he combines them with ‘present’ time, attributing an abstract element to the past and future. That is, the past only resides in our memory, and the future resides in our expectations. In accordance with one’s direct experience in the present time, his past memories and future expectations are altered, which indicates that only the present exists. As Martin Heidegger underlines in his masterpiece titled *Being and Time*, “‘In every ‘now’ is now; in every ‘now’ it is already vanishing.’ In every ‘now’ the ‘now’ is now and therefore it constantly has presence *as something selfsame*, even though in every ‘now’ another may be vanishing as it comes along” (2001, p. 475). Within the present time, “every ‘now’, moreover, is already either a ‘just-now’ or a ‘forthwith’” (p. 476). In *About Time*, Mark Currie draws highly similar lines with that of St. Augustine and Heidegger: “The past has been, and so is not, and the future is to be, and so is not yet. That only leaves the present” (2007, p. 8). Although, in human perception, time is generally divided into three, both Augustine and Currie believe that human time is composed of only one dominating tense, which is the present. The past and future are determined, changed or erased by the events taking place at the moment. Currie goes on with the problematic condition of the sole dominating existence of the present:

But as long as the present has duration, any duration at all, it can be divided into the bits of it that have been, and so are not, and the bits of it that are to be, and so are not yet, so that the very duration of its existence consigns it to non-existence (2007, p. 8).

According to Currie, time is infinitely dividable into various pasts, presents and futures as it is not a fixed entity, which brings the destruction of the existence of time present. As a result, in case of a memory loss, the sufferer not only loses his/her past, but also his/her present and future as well. About the relationship between the past and present, Assmann states that

The past does not just emerge of its own accord; it is the result of a cultural process of construction and representation. This process is always guided by particular motives, expectations, hopes, and aims, each of which takes its form from the referential frame of the present” (2011, pp. 71-72).

The past, which is where memory partly dwells, is a concept culturally and collectively produced by always carrying the influence of the present. In this sense, not only the ontology of the present, but also the ontology of the past becomes fluid. The present

time, which lacks any duration, is the determiner of the past, in other words, the memories. As a result, any moment of recall is doomed to be fluid, deceptive, and always within the frame of the time present.

About the on-going relation between time and memory, in “On Memory and Reminiscence,” Aristotle similarly points out that the nature of the past, present and future is related with the concept of memory:

Memory is, therefore, neither perception nor conception, but a state or affection of one of these, conditioned by a lapse of time. As already observed, there is no such thing as memory of the present while present, for the present is the object only of perception, and the future, of expectation, but the object of memory is the past (1941, p. 607).

Memory is related with past, while the rememberer remembers in the present. Like Augustine, Aristotle defines memory as past, present as the perception which is at the moment, and future as the expectation. Thus, memory is a thing of the past, and it is not a perception but a state in which time is the pre-condition of existence.

About the loss of memory, Jacques Derrida states that “if there were an experience of loss at the heart of all this, the only loss for which I could never be consoled and that brings together all the others, I would call it loss of memory” (as quoted in Richter, 2010, p. 151). For Derrida, loss of memory is at the center of all the sorrows, and it is the most pitiful one. Furthermore, about the nature of memory, he indicates that,

If there is a finitude of memory, it is because there is something of the other, and of memory as a memory of the other, which comes from the other and comes back to the other...to tropologies of mourning: to the memory of mourning and to the mourning for memory. This is why there can be no true mourning... (Derrida, 1988, p. 29)

Here Derrida underlines the circular nature of memory and claims that no memory is, or can be, the first memory of the individual. It is always related with other(s') memories. This, for Derrida, results in a state in which true mourning is impossible.

The lives of the modern man have been interrupted by a cruel illness as for the last hundred years, human beings have been suffering from Alzheimer's disease and amnesia. According to the recent research, Alzheimer's disease is “now the most common neurodegenerative disease, with more than 20 million cases worldwide” (Goedert and Spillantini, 2006, p. 777). The patients of Alzheimer's do not only suffer from memory loss, “these patients suffer from dementia, which is memory loss plus impaired functioning in at least one other psychological domain, such as language, visuospatial function, judgement, abstract thought or personality” (Wingfield and Golomb, 2003, p. 1). Amnesia, on the other hand, refers to loss, or the weakening, of

memory that is divergent from the Alzheimer's disease. The term *amnesia* "is derived from Greek *a-* (without) *-mnesis* (memory)" (Allen, 2018, p. 3). As a disease, amnesia occurs out of some various reasons: "(a) disorders of immediate memory, (b) disorders of previously well-established, primarily semantic memory, (c) memory disorders caused by damage to the prefrontal association neocortex, (d) the amnesic syndrome (Mayes, 1995, p. 29). These causes of amnesia, for Mayes, are related with implicit memory, which are "demonstrated by changes in behavior and/or processing efficiency in relation either to previously experienced specific items or situations, or to items similar to previously experienced items, without an accompanying awareness that these things have been previously encountered" (Mayes, 1995, p. 29).

Memory is also related with an ability and a need of every human being: to narrate things. There is a thin line between memory and narration that both connects and separates the two. For Paul Ricoeur, "stories are told and not lived; life is lived and not told" (2012, p. 187). For the lives both lived and told, memory is the key faculty for the emplotment of stories. For Ricoeur, "the plot has the power to draw a single story out of the multiple incidents...by transforming the manifold incidents into one story" (2012, p. 188). He points out that a story narrated always exceeds the limits of the linear order of events that makes up the whole (p. 188). Memory and narration concurrently generate each other. Whether written or oral, narrations cannot be created without the existence (and power) of memory. Narrative, in turn, both strengthens and weakens memory. As human beings rely on pencils and papers to record their past, they, willingly or unwillingly, remove all the burden of carrying those moments and events within their memories. As a result, human beings become ready to forget. Feeding this discussion, in his book titled *Time and Narrative*, Paul Ricoeur underlines that narrations are metaphors of real events (1990, p. ix). While narrating, narrators go into the process of adding, altering, and eliminating what is put in the narration. In this sense, memories narrated are fictionalized narrations. About narrating on people and events related with them, Derrida touches upon the position of memory while creating narrations: "we preserve our memory and our knowledge of them; we can then speak of them, and do them justice, as long as their image (eidolon) remains legible" (Derrida, 1989, p. 3). Without the existence and the assistance of Mnemosyne, one can never narrate. Benefiting from Socrates who indicated that narrating is a bridge between memory and the things one would like to keep in mind, Derrida indicates that if the person's image is present and visible in the memory, one can create a narration

about him/her (1989, p. 3). It is known that memory, in its nature, is a deceptive faculty, especially since past memories are altered within the frame of the present time.

How memory fails human beings, and in what ways it is deceptive are keenly analysed and discussed in Daniel L. Schacter's book entitled *The Seven Sins of Memory: How the Mind Forgets and Remembers*. Schacter categorizes the failures of memory into seven: transience, absent-mindedness, blocking, misattribution, suggestibility, bias, and persistence. Then he depicts how, and why, human beings forget and remember. The first sin of memory, for Schacter, is The Sin of Transience: "forgetting that occurs with the passage of time" (2001, p. 12). Schacter indicates that

Memory preserves a relatively detailed record, allowing us to reproduce the past with reasonable if not perfect accuracy. But with the passing of time, the particulars fade and opportunities multiply for interference – generated by later, similar experiences – to blur our recollections. We thus rely ever more on our memories for the gist of what happened, or what usually happens, and attempt to reconstruct the details by inference and even sheer guesswork (2001, p. 16).

Schacter states that each newly produced memory, or an information that is newly coded in mind, loses its freshness in the passage of time, resulting in the deficient or inexact remembrances. Schacter also contends the memory's constant fight with time here.

Schacter further explains that the combination of the first sin of memory (Transience) with the sixth one (Bias) create a very puzzling situation (p. 16). By the sin of bias, Schacter refers to the "powerful influences of our current knowledge and beliefs on how we remember our pasts. We often edit or entirely rewrite our previous experiences – unknowingly or unconsciously – in light of what we now know or believe" (2001, p. 5). The sixth sin occurs when the conditions existing in the present time have a strong influence on the recalling, editing, and the altering of one's past memories, resulting in narrating the past improperly. The biased memory fails the narrator, who is also the recaller of a memory.

Having the awareness of the controversial existence and non-existence of the present time, the condition of a mourner becomes puzzling as well. If there is only the present time, and that present time, out of its flowing characteristic, is driven into non-existence, mourner's only tense, in which the sin of bias is the ruling force, falls into a complication. Mourning becomes an act conducted in the present things of the past.

Overall, memory, as a very crucial concept, is both the friend, if the specific memory is wished to be remembered as a happy incident, and the enemy of human

beings, if it is especially something unwanted. Their recollections, either created collectively or individually, become deceptive because of the fact that present consciousness is always within past memories, which are all defined as fluid terms. Both the concept of time and memory have their own distinct flow of things. The sufferers of melancholy or mourning experience their grief within these distinct flows of time and memory. After experiencing the loss of the object, the sufferer either mourns or feels melancholia. Melancholy and mourning have a dependence on memory. These two can be conducted only if one remembers. On a ground where there is no sense of memory, there might not be a sense of melancholy or mourning.

1.2 Melancholy

The term melancholy derives from two Greek words: “*melas* (black) and *khole* (bile)” (Radden, 2000, p. ix). Hippocrates, the Greek physician from the fifth century, put forward a theory that explains the disorders of human body through four humors, blood, yellow bile, phlegm, and the black bile, and relating the cause of melancholy to existence of excessive amount of black bile: “The Aristotelian author assumes that excesses of black bile result in melancholia and more severe states of mental disorder, while a lesser and more stable imbalance of humors with additional black bile produces the melancholic temperament or disposition” (Radden, 2000, p. 56). Thus, it is understood that melancholy resides in each human being in a certain amount. What turns melancholy into a problem, or a disease, is its amount for Hippocrates. The writers from the school of Hippocrates indicated that “fear or depression that is prolonged means melancholia” (as quoted in Lawlor, 2012, p. 25).

Robert Burton, born in 1577 in England, is another very influential scholar who occupied himself with explaining and evaluating the causes and the possible treatments of melancholy in his three-volume book titled *The Anatomy of Melancholy* (1621), where he carried the influence of Hippocrates and followed his theory of four humors. Burton refers himself as Democritus Jr. in *The Anatomy of Melancholy* to show the fact that he is on the same path with his Greek ancestor. Burton himself was a melancholic, and he believed that by keeping oneself busy with reading and writing, one could get rid of the impacts of melancholy, which is obviously one of the reasons why he was writing *The Anatomy of Melancholy* (Bishop, 2016, p. 4). For Burton, melancholy;

goes and comes upon every small occasion of sorrow, need, sickness, trouble, fear, grief, passion, or perturbation of the mind, any manner of care, discontent, or thought, which causeth anguish, pleasure, mirth, joy, delight, causing forwardness in us, or a dislike... and from these melancholy dispositions no man living is free... none so wise, none so happy, none so patient, so generous, so godly, so divine, that can vindicate himselfe, so well composed, but more or less some time or other, he feesles the smart of it. Melancholy in this sense is the Character of Mortalitie (Burton, 1973, p. 164).

Burton's definition of melancholy drives readers to cases of negativities. Melancholy, for him, is a condition that might come out from various saddening occasions which result in happiness or in despair. Burton clearly names it as a 'disposition,' which means that he views it as a disorder in the body of human beings. By calling it the 'character of mortalitie,' Burton points out that no matter how well developed a human being is, he will inevitably experience this disorder in his body and soul as a being who is conscious of his mortality.

As Burton points out, "The Tower of Babel never yielded such confusion of tongues as this Chaos of Melancholy doth variety of symptoms" (as quoted in Radden, 2000, p. 5). It is understood that melancholy was in search of a clear definition, cause and a cure. For Burton, melancholia is "known to few, unknown to fewer" (as quoted in Leader, 2008, p. 24). Thus, throughout history, the term has been defined and discussed by many scientists, philosophers and writers. In Samuel Johnson's *Dictionary of the English Language*, melancholy is defined as "a kind of madness with the mind always fixed on one object" (as quoted in Radden, 2000, p. 5). In "On the Cognitive Faculties (1793)," the eighteenth-century German philosopher Immanuel Kant elaborated on melancholy and mania. In the essay, Kant evaluates mental illnesses that affect cognitive faculty of man, and he categorizes two main illnesses of human soul: melancholy and mental derangement (Kant, 2006, p. 96). For Kant,

A melancholic man is well aware that the train of his thought does not move properly, but he has not sufficient control over himself to direct, restrain, or control the course of his thought. Unjustified joy and grief whimsically change in such a person... (2006, p. 96).

Kant goes on explaining melancholic human beings as people who take "imaginary physical ills for something actual" (2006, p. 106). The cognitive faculties of melancholic people are damaged, resulting in fluctuating emotions and ideas that lead the person into a world of imagination in which the sufferer cannot always detach imagination from reality. "Melancholy (*melancholia*) can also be a mere delusion of misery which the low-spirited self-tormentor (inclined toward feeling wretched)

creates for himself. In itself, it is not yet a mental disorder, but may easily lead to it” (Kant, 2006, p. 107).

For the literary critic Juliana Schiesari, the process of defining melancholy, with its symptoms, causes and treatments, or in other words, identifying the ‘age of melancholy’ was “inaugurated by the Renaissance, refined by the Enlightenment, flaunted by Romanticism, fetishized by the Decadents and theorized by Freud” (as quoted in Radden, 2000, p. 47). Schiesari, here, neatly summarizes the journey of the perception of melancholy throughout history. What is defined as melancholy by Freud was replaced by a new concept called depression by the theoreticians after Freud.

In his seminal essay titled “Mourning and Melancholia (1917),” Freud theorizes the concepts of mourning and melancholia, clearly differentiating the two while also elucidating their causes, and symptoms. Basically, Freud analysed, defined and described how ego acts in cases of loss. While doing it, he also evaluated what types of losses lead to either mourning or melancholia. For Nancy Andreason, “Until the late nineteenth century, melancholia was the term used to refer to the depressive syndrome” (as quoted in Radden, 2000, p. 3). With Freud’s essay, melancholy, as well as mourning, gained their theoretical basis. As for his distinct definition of melancholy, there are three aspects that differentiate Freud from other theoreticians regarding the core of the concept: “the theme of loss, the emphasis on self-accusation and self-loathing in melancholic subjectivity, and the elaborate theory of narcissism” (Radden, 2000, p. 282).

Freud begins his analysis by stating that the definition of melancholia changed in time: “Melancholia, whose definition fluctuates even in descriptive psychiatry, takes on various clinical forms the grouping together of which into a single unity does not seem to be established with certainty” (Freud, 1981, p. 243). The fact that Freud points out the definition of melancholia as something unclear indicates that he agrees with previous thinkers and philosophers of the past about the ambiguity of the term. Freud’s point of the departure is that melancholia is a fluctuating term which shapeshifts in different clinical cases and, as a result, the term does not have a certain definition. Freud starts defining melancholia in comparison with mourning since both terms share things in common. He defines mourning as “regularly the reaction to the loss of a loved person, or to the loss of some abstraction which has taken the place of one, such as one’s country, liberty, an ideal and so on” (1981, p. 243). He, then, applies

this definition of mourning to melancholia, stating that the reasons that cause mourning may sometimes cause melancholia, which is a pathological case (p. 243). Therefore, the process of defining melancholia is achieved through defining mourning. For Freud:

The distinguishing mental features of melancholia are a profoundly painful dejection, cessation of interest in the outside world, a lowering of the self-regarding feelings to a degree that finds utterance in self-reproaches, and self-revilings, and culminates in a delusional expectation of punishment. This picture becomes a little more intelligible when we consider that, with one exception, the same traits are met with in mourning. The disturbance of self-regard is absent in mourning; but otherwise the features are the same (Freud, 1981, p. 244).

Thus, a melancholic ego is doomed to be lowered in degree, resulting in self-reproaches and self-punishments in the person. Freud distinguishes melancholia from mourning with only regards to the lack of self-reproaches in mourners. A melancholic's ego is valueless, and he views himself as a powerless person who should be isolated from society (1981, p. 246). Thus, Freud defines melancholia as pathological, and mourning as a process to overcome. The reason why melancholic ego is pathological is that self-reproach weakens the ego. In this sense, the Freudian mourning does not have such a destructive aspect as in the case of weakened melancholic ego. For Derrida, "there is always in mourning the danger of narcissism, for instance, the 'egotistical' and no doubt 'irrepressible' tendency to bemoan the friend's death in order to take pity upon oneself..." (Brault et al, 2001, p. 7). While pitying for the loss, the mourner pities himself/herself as well. Derrida states that "I mourn therefore I am" (as qtd in Antal, 2017, p. 25). From this very sentence, it is understood that for Derrida, mourning is a healthy process to go through. Although Freud and Derrida approach mourning and melancholy from different standpoints, here, they meet on a common ground. However, as Freud puts forward that mourning ends, Derrida disagrees with this idea. Derrida approaches the "process of mourning not necessarily as a work that starts with the death of the loved one, but as a lifelong work which involves the knowledge that 'one must always go before the other. One must always die first'" (Antakyalıoğlu, 2020, p. 163).

As Freud explains the cause of mourning with the loss of a loved object, he also points out the possibility of the occurrence of melancholia through an abstract loss. Melancholia is a more painful state in which the subject suffers an unknown loss, making melancholia a "loss of a more ideal kind" (Freud, 1981, p. 245). The subject is in search of a loved and lost object which is literally absent. In this sense, Freud perceives melancholia as a loss "which is withdrawn from consciousness" whereas in

mourning, no unconscious loss is present (Freud, 1981, p. 245). The melancholic is unable to detect what he has lost, whereas the mourner's point of loss is clear. Even if the melancholic "knows whom he has lost" he does not know "what he has lost in him" (1981, p. 245). Regarding this, here, Freud proves the fact that melancholia is a pathological case. Thus, "mourning is a depression with a cause...Melancholia, on the other hand, was depression without cause, even though it had similar symptoms to mourning" (Lawlor, 2012, p. 144).

Both in mourning and melancholia, the ego's loss of interest in the outside world is common. Yet, Freud finds melancholic's disinterestedness more puzzling, since the source of loss, which absorbs the ego and deprives it from the interest for the objects around, is unknown (1981, p. 246). "In mourning, it is the world which has become poor and empty; in melancholia it is the ego itself" (1981, p. 246). Thus, Freud's understanding of melancholy is solely based on the problematic condition of one's relation to his own ego. A melancholic "expects to be a cast out and punished" (p. 246). Freud states that such patients represent themselves as worthless beings who are incapable of achieving something (p. 246).

As Freud elaborates on the self-reproaches of melancholic characters, he points out that "dissatisfaction with the ego on moral grounds" is the most distinguished feature of melancholia (p. 248). Bringing a case of a patient where he makes accusations, Freud indicates that almost all the accusations made by the melancholic are directed towards his own ego. Nevertheless, Freud sees that those accusations also fit someone or something that the melancholic loves. In other words, the self-reproaches a melancholic performs are actually, in the first place, reproaches against the loved object. After the abstract loss, the melancholic transmits those accusations into his own ego (p. 248). Both for Freud and for Karl Abraham, a German psychoanalyst who had collaborated with Freud, narcissism is the reason why these self-reproaches occur in the sufferers and, as a result, narcissism is at the center of the ideas related with self-torments (Keogh, 2019, p. 21).

Freud traces the source of this problem to an act one performs in case of love: cathecting³. For mourning or melancholia to occur, one has to be in love with a person

³ Cathecting refers to "the process of investing psychic energy in a part of the body or an instinctual object" (Source: <https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095555226>)

or an object first. In his essay “Being in Love and Hypnosis,” Freud sheds light upon the characteristics of ego when it is in love. According to Freud, the ego in love treats the loved object as it treats himself; “...when we are in love a considerable amount of narcissistic libido overflows on to the object” (Freud, 2001, p. 112). As the love for a specific object increases, the value of lover’s ego diminishes, resulting in a perception of the loved object as a “sublime and precious” being (2001, p. 113). Since the lover’s ego decreases in value, the lover performs self-sacrifice, and the value of his own ego is totally replaced by the ego of the loved one. As a result, the ego loses its value. In this sense, Freud’s descriptions of the ego in love are highly similar to the position of the ego in melancholia. Therefore, the ego goes through almost identical phases in these two cases. The only difference between them is that one is derived from presence (of love or of a lover), whereas the other is from absence. In his *Politics of Friendship*, Jacques Derrida states “one must always go before the other” (Brault and Naas, 2001, p. 1). Although Derrida approaches from the perspective of losing a friend, the same thing is true and applicable for any relationship that involves love. In this sense, for Derrida, human beings always love under the shadow of death. Death, in all cases, is the pre-condition of love.

In any case of loss, the libido that had previously overflowed into the loved object has to be taken back so that the phase of mourning can be achieved. “Reality-testing has shown that the loved object no longer exists, and it proceeds to demand that all libido shall be withdrawn from its attachments to that object” (1981, p. 244). This reverse in the libidinal action produces an opposition, since the action takes place unwillingly. For Freud, in time, “each single one of the memories and expectations in which the libido is bound to the object is brought up and hyper-cathected, and detachment of the libido is accomplished in respect of it” (p. 245). Hence, Freud finds it healthy for the mourner to direct his/her memory towards the lost one by trying to remember moments and objects, related with him/her. “Mourning is a memory work; every memory must be tested, remembered, contemplated, and mediated for the purpose of overcoming the grief” (Antakyalıoğlu, 2020, p. 164) Antakyalıoğlu underlines that Freud’s successful mourning is not valid for Derrida, who states that no mourning is ever possible (2020, p. 165). The reason why any mourning is not possible is that the lost one, which is called ‘the other,’ becomes a part of the mourner. The difference, here, between a melancholic and a mourner is that melancholic is the

one who cannot manage to remember and healthily conduct the detachment. This also derives from the fact that melancholics' loss is an abstract and an ideal kind of loss in which, occasionally, the object of loss is unknown. Therefore, for the healthy detachment process to be managed, he/she should remember things concretely, which is not possible. This is how Freud pictures mourning, the loss and the detachment of the ego from the object, as a process. After the detachment is fully completed, the ego reunites with its freedom (p. 245). For Freud, "the complex of melancholia behaves like an open wound, drawing to itself cathectic energies – which in the transference neuroses we have called 'anticathexes'—from all directions, and emptying the ego until it is totally impoverished" (1981, p. 253). After experiencing melancholia, ego is deprived of its characteristic features.

Kant's and Freud's definitions of melancholia share some similarities. Kant emphasizes the imaginary side of melancholics, pointing out that they tend to believe deceitful things their minds create, since their cognitive abilities are impaired, which results in self-torture. Furthermore, Kant implies that melancholy is not a mental disorder, but it might turn into one very easily. Although Kant does not refer to any kind of loss as a cause for melancholy to occur, his description of impaired mind of melancholics and the fact that it can easily turn into a mental illness are the parts that are similar to Freudian understanding of melancholy.

When it comes to how concepts of melancholia and mourning are perceived and defined in the twenty-first century, Darian Leader, a psychoanalyst, sheds light upon the subject in his book titled *The New Black: Mourning, Melancholia and Depression*. Leader evaluates mourning, melancholia and depression, claiming that in many psychological cases that are diagnosed as 'having a depression' in the contemporary era, there lies either a sense of mourning or a sense of melancholia underneath (2008, p. 5). Leader also contemplates on the differences between grief, mourning and melancholia:

Grief may be our first reaction to loss, but grief and mourning are not exactly the same thing, if we lose someone we love, be it through death or separation, mourning is never an automatic process. For many people, in fact, it never happens...In mourning, we grieve the dead; in melancholia, we die with them (2008, p. 8).

Leader directly focuses on the idea of loss as the sources of melancholia and mourning. In this sense, his definition of the two concepts here are derived from the cause of loss, which is unlike Burton and Kant. Regarding his separation between the terms, Leader

comes close to Freudian understanding of mourning and melancholia. Leader also points out the negative aspect of melancholia and the danger it puts forward for the patient. Melancholy is not a state where the survivor is in a state of mourning. Instead, by degrading his own ego, or in Freud's terms, making it 'poor and empty,' melancholics drive themselves into a chaotic self-accusative situation where the worthless ego is in search of both the loss of the object and the clear definition of it.

For the contemporary Lacanian psychoanalyst and philosopher Slavoj Žižek, "mourning is a kind of betrayal, the second killing of the (lost) object, while the melancholic subject remains faithful to the lost object, refusing to renounce his or her attachment to it" (2000, p. 658). By mourning for the lost one, the person repeats the act of, in Freud's terms, 'grand departure,' whereas melancholic denies the fact that the loved object is lost. Similar to Freud, Žižek also emphasizes that the disorder in the melancholic mind restrains it from the actual detachment. In other words, it can be said that he agrees with Freud's idea of melancholia being a pathological case. Žižek goes on explaining the difference between lack and loss and he directly touches upon what Freud pointed out first:

What melancholy obfuscates is that the object is lacking from the very beginning, that its emergence coincides with its lack, that this object is *nothing but* the positivization of a void or a lack, a purely anamorphic entity that does not exist in itself (Žižek, 2000, p. 660).

The object of love is an object in mind in cases of melancholy. Therefore, for Žižek, there is no binary opposition between the presence and the absence of the love object, since the object was already absent before the phase of loss. In this sense, "melancholy is not simply the attachment to the lost object but the attachment to the very original gesture of its loss" (Žižek, 2000, p. 660). Here, Žižek obviously agrees more with Derrida and less with Freud in his approach to melancholy.

Similar to Žižek's definition of melancholia, the literary critic Pieter Vermeulen, in his article about the contemporary position and condition of melancholy, points out the idealism behind melancholic loss: "melancholy is often seen as a heroic refusal to surrender the lost object to a public space that dishonors its memory, or simply forgets to remember it" (2011, p. 256). The melancholic resists to forget the loss of the object, and he rejects to be a part of a community that ignores memories about that object.

As melancholia is mostly defined and described together with mourning, the theoretical basis of mourning, and its various symptoms and results, inevitably feed the discussions of melancholia, especially when mourning turns into melancholia. When it is accepted that Freud is the one who theorized mourning and melancholia, his definition of mourning must be taken into consideration. Freud stated that the loss of a beloved, or the loss of an abstraction may lead the sufferer to experience mourning, stating that the same reasons might also drive him to melancholia. If the melancholic's current situation derives from a state of mourning in the first place, each and every detail about mourning contributes more knowledge for the theoretical basis of melancholia.

Since both mourning and melancholia stem from a loss, the concept of death, which lies underneath these two psychological states should be analysed as well. In *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, Freud points out that "death is the true result, and to that extent the purpose of life" (2001, p. 51). Here, Freud emphasizes that he agrees with Schopenhauer regarding his philosophical ideas about death. Death, in itself, is a question and all the possible answers for it are nothing but various paradoxical questions. The presence of death approves the presence of meaning in one's lifespan. The French philosopher Paul Ricoeur contemplates human beings' way of living life up to death in his book titled *Living Up to Death*. In this book, Ricoeur elaborates not on after life, but on life after death for survivors, describing the thoughts and feelings of the ones who kept living: "One question comes up obstinately again and again: does he still exist? and where? where else? In what form invisible to our eyes? Visible in another way" (2009, p. 8). Thus, by disappearing from the visible world, one does not cease to exist. At this point, the discussion turns into an existential one in which the mode of existence is questioned.

Ricoeur points out that after facing somebody else's death, human beings do not only mourn for their losses, they also mourn for their own future death that waits to come, which he names "image of tomorrow's dead" (2001, p. 9). In other words, "others still alive survive the death of their own. In the same way, others will survive me" (2009, p. 10). Here, Ricoeur visualizes the future deaths, of others and of his own. In this sense, it is emphasized that while living up to death, human beings struggle with this 'image of tomorrow's death.' According to Ricoeur, "one does not get rid of the dead, one is never finished with them" (p. 9). This proves that the image of death

is always within, and besides human beings. Figuratively, the state of mourning can be experienced with, or without the loss of a loved one. Ricoeur points out that he mourns for his own death, which might also mean that one may mourn for the other's future death.

As it is indicated by Freud, when love falls, a significant amount of libido is transferred into loved object. When the bond between ego and the loved object is lost, in other words, when the departure of these two arrives and mourning occurs, all the libido that had been thrown to the loved object must be withdrawn, since the loved object is gone forever (Freud, 1981, p. 244). At this stage, Freud suggests that no sufferer would willingly withdraw from a libidinal desire, which results in an opposition that prolongs "the existence of the lost object..." (1981, p. 245). For Freud, ego is formed of the left-out pieces of love affairs that had already ended (Leader, 2008, 55). That is, each relationship leaves a mark on the ego of the person, which changes the way it perceives things. As a result, with each love affair, starting, progressing and ending, there are some traits added up to the identity of that person. For Leader, "you are what you have loved" (2008, p. 55). One's identity, then, depends also on his past love affairs.

Additionally, Leader points out another very important aspect of mourning and grief: the presence of the third parties. Leader gives example from a couple who are departed with a tragic accident right after the man in the relationship informed his family about their engagement (p. 57). In this case, the man's family, or friends, did not meet with his fiancée, and he is in a situation where he is supposed to mourn for a person whom only he knows: "He had only mentioned her to them very recently, and so he is faced with the problem of mourning someone who had not existed for those around him" (p. 57). A similar case is when a secret love affair takes place, and one party disappears. The survivor shares nothing in common with the people around him to help him mourn. There is no one around to remind him of the memories they had together. In such cases, "we suddenly become aware of the fact that we need other people not just to share our feelings with, but actually to confirm our own experiences, to make us sure that we have really lived them" (p. 58). One needs the existence of others to confirm his feelings and actions. Otherwise, the process of mourning falls into a problematic situation.

For Timothy Keogh, in cases of mourning, the center of the pain is formed of the lost object, whereas the loss is of one's own self in case of melancholia, since melancholia is related with a "narcissistic identification" (2019, p. 18). Keogh also points out that "couples who lose their children in whom they have been narcissistically invested, often feel that it is impossible to continue as a couple" (2019, p. 18). Although couples share the same loss, and they are the only ones who can fully comprehend the depths of this loss, they eventually break up. Furthermore, Keogh underlines that "as their lost child has previously defined them and they experience a loss that sense of definition with the loss of their child" (2019, p. 18). This means that such parents tend to define their own selves through the selves of their children, and as they lose their children, they also lose their own selves. Any disappearance of the children, in that sense, brings the couples' relationship to an end (p. 18).

In her article titled "Mourning and its Relation to Manic-Depressive States," The British psychoanalyst Melanie Klein makes an original interpretation of Freud's analysis of mourning and melancholia. Klein draws a connecting line between what she calls the 'depressive position' of babies and adult's mourning and melancholia experiences, or in other words, adult's experiences of loss. For Klein, babies associate their mother's breast with "love, goodness and security" (1940, p. 125). When they cease to be fed by their mother's breasts, they lose their love object which provides them security.

Klein created a concept named *the paranoid-schizoid position*, in which she dealt with psychic development. She pointed out that in cases of problems related with psychic development, the infants split themselves into two different representations: one being good, and the other being bad (Keogh, 2019, p. 22). This division in the self cannot be recognized by the infant's mother. Applying this theory to mourning and melancholia, Klein emphasizes that "there are consequently split parts of the self in relation to split parts of the object" (Keogh, 2019, p. 22). Furthermore, according to Klein, in order to pass the stage of 'the depressive position,' the split selves must be one, mingling the good and bad, which illustrates how, for Klein, mourning and melancholia can be overcome.

Another aspect of mourning is about whether it somehow/someday reaches an end. Freud states that mourning is "overcome after a certain lapse of time, and we look upon any interference with it as useless or even harmful" (1981, p. 244). For the

loss of his mother, in *Camera Lucida*, Roland Barthes indicates that “it is said that mourning, by its gradual labor, slowly erases pain; I could not, I cannot believe this; because for me, Time eliminates the emotion of loss (I do not weep), that is all” (1981, p. 75). For Barthes, the state of mourning, or mourning as a process, cannot reach to an end, since the loss is “not the indispensable, but the irreplaceable” (p. 75). In mourning, for Barthes, time only diminishes the intensity of emotions, the state is permanent and is not affected.

The current thesis aims at explaining and evaluating various definitions of melancholia and memory by demonstrating how these two concepts are perceived, approached and portrayed in, respectively Ian McEwan’s *The Child in Time* (1987), Tom McCarthy’s *Remainder* (2005), and Julian Barnes’ *The Only Story* (2018). Each novel by the prominent writers of the contemporary British fiction contributes to the illustration of memory and melancholy from different perspectives.

Chapter II will evaluate the melancholic consequences of a loss (not necessarily death) of a child in Ian McEwan’s *The Child in Time* (1987) by benefiting from other works and interviews of McEwan. According to Ryan Roberts, in his writing career, McEwan “has dealt with a wide range of human experiences, including the effects of losing a child, religious fervour, psychological obsession, the intricacies of relationships, euthanasia, and happiness in a modern world bent on conflict and destruction” (Roberts, 2010, p. x). The novel is about a children’s books writer named Stephen whose daughter suddenly disappears in a supermarket. All through the novel, the character is in search of his lost daughter. As his memories about her are revoked, he is situated in-between melancholia and mourning, which leads Stephen to lose his notion of time as well. For David Malcolm, *The Child in Time* “with its positive, adult ending, does mark a point of change in McEwan’s fiction,” which situates the novel into an important position in his writing career (2002, p. 5). This chapter will also focus on the ambiguous psychological situation of Stephen that demonstrates how a loss changes his relationship with others, and how the process of melancholia is overcome.

Chapter III will be built on Tom McCarthy’s first novel *Remainder* (2005). The novel portrays a nameless character who, in an accident, loses his memory and spends all his life to re-enact the bits and pieces of his past memories. Suddenly, his aim in life becomes to simulate his memories, turning all his life into a simulation in

itself. For Alessandra Violi, McCarthy's *Remainder*, in this sense, portrays a "Borgesian loop" with its re-enactments (2018, p. 93). Through the portrayal of the main character, the novel also sheds light upon the essentiality of memory in the formation of identity. As a result of the accident, the character has also problems with authenticity, which plays a role in how melancholy is handled in the narrative. The character describes himself as an artificial being after losing his memory, which forms the core of his melancholic state that he is disinterested in. This chapter will illustrate a different form of melancholy that totally deviates from traditional melancholic narratives, which makes McCarthy's *Remainder* a unique source to study melancholy and memory simultaneously.

Chapter IV will analyse Julian Barnes' *The Only Story* (2018). In his writing career, Julian Barnes has been integrating stories of love into his novels, in one way or another. After he lost his wife, Barnes' fiction and writing dealt more with the concepts of love, loss, grief and the senses of ends. In an interview he had with Rudolf Freiburg in 1999, Barnes indicates that "there is probably a pervasive melancholy in a lot of what I write" (Freiburg, 2009, p. 35). *The Only Story* is about an uncommon love story between a young boy named Paul (19) and a married woman named Susan Macleod (48), which ends with Macleod's death. Barnes also examines how love and loss take form when one of the partners gradually lose their memory. Given the circumstances of their relationship, it is a story of love and loss at the same time. While narrating the love affair, the narrator, whose guide is his memory, also examines human beings' scheme of remembering and memory's role in the narration. Peculiar to Paul's situation, since in the stage of mourning he has no company to mourn with, he is alone with his memory, which makes his (narration of) mourning very puzzling. This pathetic love story revokes melancholic memories about Mrs. Macleod for the narrator. With this novel, Barnes also brings up unique definitions of love and loss, while depicting how memory works, which cultivate the literature of the terms.

CHAPTER II

THE CHILD IN TIME (1987) BY IAN MCEWAN

Ian Russell McEwan (1948-) has been one of the most prominent writers of contemporary English literature since his first publication of collection of short stories titled *First Love, Last Rites* (1975). As a professional writer, he has produced both in the twentieth and in the twenty-first century. Having started his professional writing career with short stories, he then expanded his genre variety by writing novels, novellas, and screenplays in varying themes and topics. McEwan's works are appreciated by critics "both as a stylist and as a serious thinker about the function and capacities of narrative fiction" (Head, 2007, p. 2). McEwan does not only produce fiction, he also gives shape to its *raison d'être*. About his style, in an interview given in 1978, McEwan underlines that "there's a projected sense of evil in my stories which is of the kind whereby one tries to imagine worst thing possible in order to get hold of the good" (Hamilton, 1978, p. 16). This 'sense of evil' can be described as the menace and suspense elements that McEwan applies in his fiction:

These scenes – the stealing of the child, the black dogs, the fall from a helium balloon, and so on – offered attractive fictional possibilities in themselves. They presented challenges of pace, description, a sort of drumbeat of sentences, cadences you can only get from action scenes (Begley, 2002, p. 97).

Although McEwan implies his novels titled *The Child in Time*, *The Black Dogs*, and *Enduring Love* in the excerpt above, these moments of suspense are not limited only to the novels McEwan stresses: a child who wakes up as an adult one morning in *The Daydreamer* (1995), the sudden and violent break into a neurosurgeon's house in *Saturday* (2005), and a vermin waking up as the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom within the chaotic atmosphere of Brexit in his latest satiric novella *The Cockroach* (2019), which is a revisit to the idea of metamorphosis he adopted from Franz Kafka, are all the various representations of suspense. For this very characteristic of McEwan, Zadie Smith indicates that what McEwan uses in *The Child in Time* under the theme and term "malevolent intervention" has been spread into every corner of his fiction

(Smith, 2005, p. 110). Hence, Smith bravely names “malevolent interventions” as a very specific “McEwanesque incident” (2005, p. 110). In his other novels, even if McEwan does not explicitly interrupt his narrations with any sudden intervention, something abnormal, or something that is either not faced, or not well received when faced in daily life, is always used in his fiction. Because of his repeated use of “grotesque and disturbing themes (such as the breaking of social conventions, codes and taboos, incest, sado-masochism, rape, pornography and the murder of children)” he received his nickname ‘Ian Macabre’ (Groes, 2013, p. 1).

Another characteristic of McEwan’s novels is the use of father figures. While growing up as the child of a sergeant-major in Aldershot, Hampshire, McEwan always had a fear of and distance from his father whom he defines as “a powerful, domineering, slightly bullying man,” and this, eventually brought him closer to his mother (Louvel, Menegaldo, and Fortin, 1995, p. 74). Hence, McEwan admits that fatherhood is a recurrent figure in his fiction. By making a reference to Kafka, McEwan states that “he addressed his father in a long letter. I ended up addressing mine with stories and novels” (Louvel et al. 1995, p. 75).

About the themes and the content McEwan employs in his novels, Head states that

His novels treat issues that are central to our times: politics, and the promotion of vested interests; male violence and the problem of gender relations; science and the limits of rationality; nature and ecology; love and innocence; and the quest for an ethical world-view (2007, p. 2).

In this sense, McEwan stands as a writer whose pen dances with the subject matters in his fiction. His rich, vivid and elevated language meets common and everyday realities and problems in his narratives. In the introduction for the 40th Anniversary edition of *First Love, Last Rites*, McEwan writes: “fiction was synonymous with freedom...to write fiction was to be obliged to take the reader by the hand to the edge – and jump. The business was to find a boundary, then cross it” (McEwan, 2015, p. xi).

2.1. *The Child in Time*

Published in 1987, *The Child in Time* is the third novel of Ian McEwan. The novel is accepted as a milestone by critics for McEwan’s writing career, winning the Whitbread Novel Award in 1987. As McEwan puts it forward, disappearance of children is worse than their eternal loss (Remnick, 2007, p. 165). In a case of eternal

loss of a child, parents can healthily and successfully commence the process of mourning, knowing for certain that their beloved child has a tombstone. In case of abductions or losses of children, because they will always carry the hope of their come back, with inevitably having the idea of their (children's) grand departure, parents can neither mourn for them nor totally forget about the fact that they are gone forever. Hence, the uncertainty that McEwan also states leads the case of loss into a constant state of imagining the worst scenarios, which does not find any closure. In this respect, parents depicted in the novel are in-between mourning and melancholy, which are both stimulated by their memory. About the point of departure for such a narration, in an interview given in 1995, McEwan indicates that

I thought I could find ways of bridging the earlier, small canvases of intense psychological states with a broader public reality – oddly enough, through the idea of child-care manuals. In them, one had an unconscious expression of the spirit of the age, of what people really wanted their children to be – projections of their ideal selves (Louvel et al, 1995, p. 76).

For McEwan, the *zeitgeist* is lying beneath how adults shape their children with regards to who they (adults) really want to be. Margarida Morgado contends that “symbolically, the theme of *The Child in Time* becomes central for the 1980's. A child is no more principally physically concrete, but the discursive production of adults interested mainly in reliving their pasts or using the child to articulate fears and wishes” (2002, p. 247). As McEwan asserts in the excerpt taken from *The Authorized Childcare Handbook*, “childhood is an invention, a social construct, made possible by society as it increased in sophistication and resource” (2016, p. 99). Another aspect that separates the novel from its predecessors is that it was his first novel to be longer than a novella, which, with its concerns presented, stands as a social novel (Head, 2007, p. 70). His earlier novels, *The Cement Garden* (1978) and *The Comfort of Strangers* (1981) were related more with the life of individuals whereas *The Child in Time* bridges the public and private life (Head, 2007, p. 70). About this very point of divergence of *The Child in Time*, McEwan contends that “*The Child in Time* was very much an attempt to write about something quite intimate, like childcare, and something quite public, like childcare manual” (Noakes, 2001, p. 80).

The Child in Time opens with the depiction of the present time of the main character named Stephen Lewis, married with Julie Lewis, whose three-year-old daughter named Kate suddenly disappeared in a supermarket two years ago. Kate's loss happens within a blink of an eye, and Stephen is so shocked that “his fear was too

evident, too forceful, it filled the impersonal, fluorescent space with unignorable human warmth” (McEwan, 2016, p. 13). Stephen is a children’s books writer who is also a member of the Official Commission on Childcare, which is an establishment ruled by the government to regulate and control the concerns related with children where Stephen is a sub-committee member on reading and writing. Julie is a musician who, in the eyes of Stephen, is described as a “devoted mother, passionately attached to her child, a loving parent” (2016, p. 17). In the novel, as a couple, Stephen and Julie put great effort to find their daughter up to a point. As they reach to that climax where they tragically accept the “bitter truth,” their relationship takes a new form, leading for them to get separated (p. 20). Julie leaves Stephen to live in a cottage. The loss as a concept in the narration becomes the couple’s new ontology, an undeniable fact that they have to exist with. Besides the triangle storyline of Stephen, Julie and Kate, there is also the layer divergent from them: Stephen’s close friend Charles Darke and his quantum physicist wife named Thelma. Thelma domineers the discussion of time within the narration. Through the end of the novel, Stephen experiences two different summons that represent life and death: Thelma calls Stephen because Charles has committed suicide. As Stephen arrives, Thelma and Stephen commemorate the memories of Charles. Their conversations about childhood and time, which is formed out of the grief they possess about Charles’ death, is interrupted with the happy phone call of Julie who summons Stephen to inform him that she is pregnant, which builds the closure of the novel.

The Child in Time had a rather long writing phase: McEwan states that he was anticipating his first child when he started composing the narration, and by the end, he was the father of two sons. Given this information, novel’s writing process took place between the years 1983 to 1986 (Noakes, 2001, p. 81). With its form and content, *The Child in Time* cannot be classified as a postmodern novel, which was the trend when the novel was published. It carries almost no elements of postmodern writing form. In this sense, in the time when it was written and published, the novel was outmoded, whereas it fits into the form of contemporary novel in the twenty-first century. This is because *The Child in Time*, as many other contemporary British novels, reflects elegy as a mood which makes it fit to the contemporary writing. McEwan states that the idea of writing *The Child in Time* occurred with a recurrent dream he had in which he is close to a pub or a meeting place where he learns important details about his origins,

which is a scene he included in the novel (Noakes, 2001, p. 79). Another aspect that led McEwan to write the novel was that during those days, he was reading a book titled *Dream Babies: Childcare from Locke to Spock*, and as the book's argument stated, such manuals were very influential about the *zeitgeist* (p. 79).

The novel is formed of nine chapters, each starting with an excerpt taken from the *Authorized Childcare Handbook*. After twenty years of the publication of *The Child in Time*, in 2007, McEwan comments about the book: "I wrote a novel about time itself and all its manifestations, how we experience it subjectively, how it's described in quantum mechanics as against Newtonian physics, how certainties and uncertainties in all this are reflected in our different moments of being" (Remnick, 2007, p. 165).

Throughout the novel, within nine chapters, the narration circles around the times and places Stephen lives through: the readers witness Stephen's insight on Kate, her loss, his tragic marital problems as a result, the committee on Childcare, his relationship with his friends Thelma and Charles Darke, and his memories and recollections about his parents. The time period of some layers of the novel differs from some other parts. As a result, readers witness memories of Stephen about his own daughter Kate, about his own childhood and his parents, his relationship with Julie before and after the loss, etc. Each of these storylines have their own relationship to the concept of childhood, time, and memory.

About child disappearance, Margarida Morgado states that in contemporary era "child disappearance (the disappearance of children from the home and the disappearance of childhood) constitutes a hegemonic social and cultural construction of the late twentieth century and a dominant structure of feeling" (Morgado, 2002, p. 244). Furthermore, Morgado contends that not only in the twentieth century, but also in the periods preceding, the image of an abducted or lost child was used as well. Yet, she claims that as globalization and new technologies alter the definitions of 'the child' and 'the family,' image of child disappearance is evolving into something else (Morgado, 2002, p. 244). "This is a time in which discourses on childhood address simultaneously the absence and the presence of children: their absence in adults' recollections of childhood and their presence as real individuals who either differ from or resemble adults" (p. 245). About this very subject, Ian McEwan asserts that "the loss of a child is perhaps the worst thing that can happen to anybody...the fact that

here is an event that probably will have no closure for these parents, and they will live in a kind of hell of imagining” (Remnick, 2007, p. 165).

Kate’s loss is a turning point for Stephen and Julie, both individually and as a couple. The way they treat each other, as well as the way they treat others, differs after the disappearance. It has been known that mourning is derived from a loss, whether the loss of an abstract or a concrete object. For the case of Kate, the source of loss is abstract, what is lost is concrete. Her physical loss is hardly accepted by the parents. In other words, the ambiguity about Kate, whether one day she might come back or not, puts the parents’ psychology and memory into a puzzling structure. Any time can be either too early or too late to mourn for Kate. This is why Stephen and Julie are stuck in-between melancholy and mourning, which are both led, created, and (negatively or positively) prolonged by memory. To overcome the grief, parents’ memories on the loss should serve for healing, not for lamenting. In other words, memory should work for mourning, not for melancholy. At the end, the couple manages to overcome the grief, with the promise of the next child that they beget when Julie informs Stephen about the news of her pregnancy.

2.1.1. Elaboration of Memory in *The Child in Time*

Memory is the bridge builder between the past and the present. Regarding the theory that memory functions collectively, the separation of Stephen and Julie is a damage given to all their common memories related with their daughter. Even if they had different and individual memories about Kate, their memories about her as parents are created collectively. Although the couple was not aware of it, Kate was the solid ground for their relationship. After her loss, the ground was inevitably shaken, and was doomed to be shattered into pieces (for a certain period of time). Furthermore, the fact that Kate is not found deforms their marriage day by day: “Being together heightened their sense of loss. When they sat down to a meal, Kate’s absence was a fact they could neither mention nor ignore. They could not give or receive comfort, therefore there was no desire” (McEwan, 2016, p. 54). After the absence of Kate, the presence of each other as a couple did nothing but to remind them about their daughter. The narrator describes their separation as “it was not a divorce, of course, nor a separation, but a ‘time apart’” (McEwan, 2016, p. 55). As others play a role in the process of remembering and forgetting, Stephen loses the main mirror which was forming his collective memory about Kate.

Both in cases of melancholy, and cases of mourning, memory is pre-occupied with what is lost. This pre-occupation is a combination of an act of Anamnesis where the sufferer tries to recall each and every detail about the object of loss, and an act of Mneme in which the moments related with the loss are spontaneously remembered. In *The Child in Time*, many times, narration is interrupted by the Mneme moments within the linear course of time. While Stephen is living his life in its ordinariness, at some moments, the regular stream of time stops, and hangs in the air. On such occasions, something, either an object, an event or a person, reminds Stephen of Kate. As past is recollection, and present is perception for Bergson, Stephen's present perception is influenced by his recollected past. Morgado underlines,

Unable to let go of Kate as spirit, as existence by his side, Stephen plays with scientific theories and education policies of the child and with notions of non-linear time, of parallel dimensions of time and space where past and present possibilities of being unfold (2002, p. 247).

To distance himself from the loss, Stephen lingers with scientific theories, which is a general motif that McEwan uses in almost all his novels. By doing so, Stephen tries to trick his memory. Stephen's memory demonstrates the 'sin of bias,' put forward by Daniel Schacter, meaning that his present time is influenced by his past memories. Furthermore, the narrator indicates that for Stephen, "it was getting harder to recall. She was fading, and all the time his useless love was swelling, encumbering and disfiguring him like a goitre" (2016, p. 141). This brings up the first sin that Schacter underlines, which is 'the sin of transience.' "With the passing of time, the particulars fade and opportunities multiply for interference...to blur our recollections" (Schacter, 2001, p. 16). The more Stephen tries to remember Kate, the more it gets harder for him to remember. In addition, the reason why Stephen suffers to remember is that he lacks the support of collective memory that he built with Julie. As the collectivity is absent, time fights with the memories remembered individually. As a result, memories are damaged, and they tend to be deceptive. Therefore, time is an important factor both for the memory and for the rememberer. The couple's memories about Kate is stabilized, meaning that within their perception, Kate is three years old, and every image about her growth is pure imagination and nothing else. If Kate was still getting older after the loss, Stephen and Julie have no memories about it. In this sense, the distance between the remembered and the imagined time expands.

The ability to narrate about the past is also related with the power of memory. As the presence of the 'sin of transience' becomes more visible, or in other words, as

memory is damaged by the passage of time, the narration changes. As Stephen forgets about Kate, it becomes harder for him to talk about her. However, the passage of time does not stop Stephen's mind to create multiple narrations. While contemplating on where she is, and whom she is with, many scenarios pass through Stephen's mind. Stephen mistakenly assumes a girl in a school to be his daughter, although that girl's parents are well-known by the principal of the school. The future time related to the growing up of Kate is fictive. Kate's future is an imaginative one created in the mind of her parents. After making Stephen sure that the girl is somebody else's daughter, the principal of the school states that "the mind plays its tricks, after all" (p.165). In this scene, the trick is played by memory: Stephen's memory is damaged, and the passing of time and the fact that he is lacking his companion to collectively remember his daughter negatively influence the image Stephen has in his memory. The future time related with the growing up of Kate is fictive, and it results in Stephen's wrong assumption about the girl in the school. Stephen's future becomes an imaginative/fictive one, as Kate becomes a fictive character. As a result, that image decays and tricks his perception. Kate becomes a memory he individually possesses, which makes it harder for him to remember correctly. Hence, Stephen's past is influenced by what is going on in the present, which is the time when his perception is puzzled.

Throughout the novel, the third person narrator travels in time; within the narration, there is the present time of Stephen, which is after the loss of Kate, there is the past time before Kate's loss, and the time when Stephen was a child. In this sense, narration is folded into three different time periods. Hence, the child who is in time changes in the narration: while sometimes it is Kate, at some parts of the novel, it is Stephen, and sometimes it's Charles. However, basically, the narration is aimed at demonstrating how Stephen lives his child's loss in time. As McEwan asserts, "time does a curious thing to human sorrow – it weathers it, the way water might weather rock" (Gormley, 2005, p. 140). In fact, as it has been known since St. Augustine, only the present time exists, having the presence of past and future within. Benefiting from St. Augustine's definitions of past, present and future, then, for Stephen, metaphorically, past and memory are Kate, the present and sight are his ceaseless endeavor to find Kate, and future is always the expectation of Kate's reappearance. Each event taking place at the moment can determine how Stephen's past is

remembered (with Kate), and how his future is expected. The reference made to ‘the child’ is not only the lost daughter of Stephen who forms the fundamental basis of the novel, but also the childhood of Stephen himself, which, as stated above, was the content of McEwan’s dream. As Kate is the child in time, the couple is out of time, and as Kate is the child out of time, the couple is in time. The reciprocal relationship of the characters with time situates them in and out of time. The fact that Kate’s time fell out of the course of the time of Stephen and Julie switches the characters’ position in time and out of time. The couple’s identities should be reformed with the acceptance of the loss. Between the depiction of these time periods, the narrator describes the sorrowful situation that Stephen goes through after the loss of his daughter. For Morgado,

The child in time is in fact a child out of time, unable to represent the future in the present, caught the webs of adult projections which imagine her/him at the margins of time flow, as if the child were an impossible presence in adult representation strategies (2002, p. 246).

As Kate was lost, Stephen was placed out of time. With the undeniable absence of Kate, it is as if Stephen is situated into a different dimension of time, which has no longer a connection with the time of Kate that flows separately anymore. The narrator underlines at the very beginning that “Kate’s growing up had become the essence of time itself” (McEwan, 2016, p. 2). In this sense, in Stephen’s mind, Kate resumes her growth in a time that is divergent from others. “She is the mirage that Stephen pursues through town, she is the child that grows in her father’s imagination” (Morgado, 2002, p. 247). The narrator states that:

Her phantom growth, the product of an obsessive sorrow, was not only inevitable – nothing could stop the sinewy clock – but necessary. Without the fantasy of her continued existence he was lost, time would stop. He was the father of an invisible child (McEwan, 2016, p. 2).

Two things can be derived from the excerpt above: the first thing is that if Kate does not exist in somewhere else where she is subjected to a different flow of time, Stephen’s inner time stops. Time, for Stephen, is interrupted with the loss, and he feels stuck in the stability of it. The second thing is that Kate was the time itself for Stephen. Her importance was equal to the importance of time. Kate is absent, and her growing up is an abstract notion, just like the concept of time is. As it is captured in Elisabeth Kübler-Ross’ and David Kessler’s book titled *On Grief & Grieving: Finding the Meaning of Grief Through the Five Stages of Loss*, when one loses a loved one, “your

world takes on a slowness, a surrealness. It seems strange that the clocks in the world continue when your inner clock does not” (2014, p. 29).

As the narration further unfolds, while Stephen and Thelma discuss time and its basics, Thelma states,

But whatever time is, the common-sense, everyday version of it as linear, regular, absolute, marching from left to right, from the past through the present to the future, is either nonsense or a tiny fraction of the truth. We know this from our own experience. An hour can seem like five minutes or a week. Time is variable. We know it from Einstein who is still our bedrock here. In relativity theory time is dependent on the speed of the observer. What are simultaneous events to one person can appear in sequence to another. There’s no absolute, generally recognised “now” – but you know all this (2016, p. 127).

What is contended as the ‘common-sense’ version of time is the time of clocks. The everyday version of time is described as *ticks* and *tocks*. Similar to meridians, clock time is a metaphor, a human attribution for something abstract. For Frank Kermode, “it is we who provide the fictional difference between two sounds; *tick* is our word for a physical beginning, *tock* our word for an end” (2000, pp. 44-45). The linearity of time is given by human beings, and *tick-tock* is the audible, and concrete representation of it. This is also underlined by the narrator:

But time – not necessarily as it is, for who knows that, but as thought has constituted it – monomaniacally forbids second chances. There is no absolute time, his friend Thelma had told him on occasions, no independent entity. Only our particular and weak understanding (McEwan, 2016, p. 9).

“*Tick* is a humble genesis, *tock* a feeble apocalypse” (Kermode, 2000, p. 45). However, the time as understood by Stephen is a time when a *tick* is heard without a *tock*, or a time when *tock* might be heard first. It is also a time in which there are multiple sounds of *ticks* and *tocks*, heard simultaneously. To depict this, Stephen remembers T.S. Eliot’s “Four Quartets:” “Time present and time past/ Are both perhaps present in time future/ And time future contained in time past” (McEwan, 2016, p. 128). This modernist approach to time is the same with the approach taken by St. Augustine, Martin Heidegger and Mark Currie who were stated earlier. Hence, in each time present, or in each *tick*, there is always a *tock* within, which is not supposed to proceed the *tick*. This understanding of time is similar to how children perceive time for the narrator: “For children, childhood is timeless. It’s always the present. Everything is in the present tense. Of course they have memories. Of course, time shifts a little for them and Christmas comes round in the end. But they don’t feel it” (McEwan, 2016, pp. 30-31).

Childhood is an important concept concurrently touched upon in the novel. The childhood memories of Stephen, his child Kate (and memories about her), and Stephen's politician friend Charles Darke's regression into childhood as an adult are all demonstrations of 'the child in time.' As the narrator states, "once a businessman and a politician, now he was a successful pre-pubescent" (2016, p. 117). For adults, childhood is something of past, or in other words, something of memory. After the loss, Kate's presence shifted a dimension: by being absent, everything about her turned into mere remembrances. Thus, as she was 'the child in time,' she was also captivated to be 'the child in memory.'

2.1.2. Elaboration of Melancholy in *The Child in Time*

As stated earlier, some cases of mourning may turn into pathological cases of melancholy, if the condition of the sufferer is unhealthy. In this sense, melancholy and mourning are inter-twined. Stephen's case always has the potential of switching sides between mourning and melancholy, which makes him a vulnerable character. Up to the point where Stephen and Julie quit searching for Kate, they experience melancholy where the source of loss is unknown, and where there is still (a weak) hope for a come-back. At this phase, for Stephen and Julie, the loss is not a 'grand departure' in Freud's terms. As a result, what happens to their consciousness and ego is related with the symptoms of melancholy. After they accept the 'bitter truth,' the truth that she is gone forever, their process of mourning starts. However, the case of Stephen and Julie is not a regular mourning, or melancholy, where the process has a clear beginning and an end. It would be wrong, and not very easy, to pinpoint a specific time for the end of Stephen's mourning, since there is hope, even after the 'bitter truth' is accepted, for Kate's return. To put it in different stages, Stephen first expects and hopes for Kate's return, then he acknowledges the fact and becomes hopeless, he accepts his condition, and he reconciles with the idea of loss. The peculiar point here is that in each of these stages, trauma is always present. Even when he anticipates Kate's return, or when he expects his second child, the trauma is active. This is how elegy is built as a mood in the novel. Thus, on such occasions like Stephen and Julie's, the mourning or melancholy might never end. Instead, the whole experience becomes a trauma for the couple which, even with the re-appearance of Kate, will not reach to an end. As Freud defines melancholia as an 'open wound,' the condition of Stephen and Julie perfectly

fits this description. As they accept the bitter truth, they lose their interest towards each other as a couple:

There was no room for anger, no openings. They moved like figures in a quagmire, with no strength for confrontation. Suddenly their sorrows were separate, insular, incommunicable. They went their different ways, he with his lists and daily trudging, she in her armchair, lost to deep, private grief. Now there was no mutual consolation, no touching, no love. Their old intimacy, their habitual assumption that they were on the same side, was dead. They remained huddled over their separate losses, and unspoken resentments began to grow (pp. 20-21).

Their common grief turns into a subjective one, which results in separate sufferings. “The loss had driven them to the extremes of their personalities” (p. 21). Kate’s loss opened up a new sphere in their identity where they can no longer tolerate each other. The narrator underlines that

It came to the point where Stephen could not bring himself to look at Julie. It was not only that he saw haggard traces of Kate or himself mirrored in her face. It was the inertia, the collapse of will, the near ecstatic suffering which disgusted him and threatened to undermine his efforts (p. 21).

Stephen’s gaze towards his wife is spoiled by the gap that Kate left behind. In other words, as a couple, seeing each other turns to be the reminder of the loss, which is not only Kate’s but also the traces of their own identities lost with her. In case of mourning, one party’s presence is beneficial for other’s healing process, as they share the grief. Whereas in melancholy, the person, whose interest in the outside world is highly decreased, whose ego is poor and empty, and whose self-reproaches and self-revilings had begun, wants to be isolated from the society around, to become an outcast willingly. Therefore, what separates Stephen and Julie is not only the loss of a child, but also their individually suffered melancholy. As they step into their phase of mourning, they can get back together. In this sense, it can be understood that melancholy requires solitude, whereas mourning requires a common ground. This gives melancholy its pathological aspect and makes mourning a healthy process. After Julie leaves Stephen, he feels that “everything before had been fantasy, a routine and frenetic mimicry of sorrow. Just before dawn he began to cry, and it was from this moment in the semi-darkness that he was to date his time of mourning” (p. 23). Although the narrator pinpoints the certain time for the beginning of Stephen’s phase of mourning with a cry, as there is always hope for Kate’s return and that return can suddenly end their mourning, melancholy always secures its existence in the novel. This sets the traumatic, elegiac and melancholic mood in the narration. In other words, although the narrator situates Stephen’s mourning at the very beginning of the novel,

throughout the narration, both Stephen and Julie keep showing the symptoms of melancholy.

In the beginning, in Stephen's thoughts, "if she was to be found, then they would find her because he was prepared to do nothing else but search; if she was not to be found, then, in time, that would have to be faced in a sensible, rational manner. But not now" (2016, p. 14). What is implied here is that in case of an eternal loss, the phase of mourning should be started, but Stephen's current condition is not suitable for it. Out of his melancholic spirit about his loss, he cannot commence his mourning, which requires a certain amount of time and sensibility.

Darian Leader underlines that "mourning for Freud involves the movement of reshuffling and rearranging. We think of our lost loved one time and time again, in different situations, different poses, different moods; different places and different contexts" (2008, p. 30). The mourner recalls the past (and passed) times and places lived with the lost one, and the future that is lost with the passing of the loved one. Throughout the time Stephen tried to find Kate, he kept putting her into different places, times and situations. As the psychiatrist Gordon Livingstone contends, "perhaps that's how it is with a permanent loss: you examine it from every angle you can think of and then just carry it like a weight" (as qtd. in Leader, 2008, p. 30).

For Jean-Michel Ganteau, contemporary British novels carry some common elements such as romance and elegy. While Ganteau defines McEwan's *Saturday* as a narrative of elegy, he implies its "sense of anxiety" as a reason (2015, p. 71). By departing from this point that Ganteau stands, the same sense of anxiety is also present in *The Child in Time*. The sense of anxiety here is directed towards the loss of Stephen's daughter. Ganteau defines the texts of elegy by asserting that subjects of these narratives are 'vulnerable to loss' (p. 71). However, *The Child in Time* is situated in between romance and elegy, as Ganteau underlines that "In romance, the object, even if situated in the past, remains a horizon of possibility" (2015, p. 69). At the end of the novel, the narrator of *The Child in Time* asserts that "they would love her through their new child, and never close their minds to the possibility of her return" (2016, p. 239). In this respect, *The Child in Time* strongly carries an element of romance within. Nevertheless, Ganteau also states that "With romance, the separation may be remedied. With elegy, it is lamented" (p. 69). It is not possible to deny that lamentation was absent for the case of Stephen and Julie. Therefore, the novel represents both romance

and elegiac traits through its characters. Although the elegy in the novel is triggered by Kate's abduction, the idea that Kate may come back one day provides romance.

In the foreword of Peter A. Levine's book titled *Trauma and Memory: Brain and Body in Search for the Living Past*, Bessel A. van der Kolk underlines an important aspect of trauma: "traumatized people get stuck in the past: they become obsessed with the horror they consciously want to leave behind, but they keep behaving and feeling as if it is still going on" (2015, p. 18). Kolk indicates that for Levine, "in order to heal one needs to create a sheltered trance state from which one can safely observe the horrific past" (p. 22). This means that one has to be in a place where s/he is able to remember the past properly, so as to get over the trauma. There occurs a highly similar line of recovery that crosses both mourning and trauma, which are both related with memory.

Kolk underlines that for Freud, the traumas are due to patients' "inability to fully remember what has happened" (p. 23). It is understood that to overcome traumas, one has to remember thoroughly, or has to have the ability to go back to the time and place in which his traumatic experience dwells upon, which are both inter-connected with memory. Freud asserts that the traumatic subject "is obliged to repeat the repressed material as a contemporary experience, instead of ... remembering it as something belonging to the past" (as qtd in Levine, 2015, p. 23). In this sense, repetition becomes the mode of remembering of the patient, which leads him/her to pretend as if what is in the past moment, or in memory, is a current experience, turning this incident into a vicious circle.

Unlike Stephen, Julie has managed to find the 'sheltered trance state' to isolate herself and to safely recall her past in order to overcome the trauma, whereas Stephen was stuck in the 'horrific past,' a past that he was losing his grasp on. In many parts of the novel, it is underlined that Stephen's memories on Kate became blurry, and as a result, he could not pass one of the steps of trauma, as Julie could. This is the signifier of the point that divides Stephen's case from Julie's. Julie accepted the loss earlier, so that she could start mourning for Kate, whereas for Stephen, being one of the subjects who was present when the loss took place, the river of melancholy and mourning flows indifferent. Stephen was stuck in time, in memory, and in trauma. Thus, his act of remembering fell into the circle of repetition where he strongly felt the burden of losing his daughter within his present time although it was an event from the past. Stephen's

way of mourning is unsuccessful for Freud, as it reaches no closure, which brings Stephen closer to Derrida's approach to mourning. His mourning was a faithful grief in which he kept his loyalty towards his daughter. Whereas Julie's mourning reaches a closure and becomes a successful one.

In melancholy, the loss might be abstract, unknown or not very clear. Stephen's melancholy stems from the lack of information about his daughter's current state: how she was lost, where she is, and how she looks are unknown to Stephen. The peculiarity of Stephen's case is that if he had known that Kate is dead, his state of mourning could start ordinarily, or if he had had a clear knowledge about how she was lost, his state of mind could be very different than that of his current one. The unknowns drive Stephen into melancholy. Although the lost object is not an abstract notion in this case, the loss itself, and its wheres and whys are abstract. The time spent after the loss of his daughter is a time full of unknowns. The child is lost in time and stuck in there.

Stephen does not only suffer the loss of her daughter, he also suffers the loss of a beloved friend, Charles Darke. Hence, both the course of time, and the course of mourning and melancholy in the novel get dispersed. After Charles' suicide, through Thelma, readers learn that in his disposition, Charles had an escapist attitude towards adulthood. Thus, in his consciousness, childhood and adulthood was always in battle:

But it had a more important emotional side which he found harder to understand in himself or talk about. He wanted the security of childhood, the powerlessness, the obedience, and also the freedom that goes with it, freedom from money, decisions, plans, demands. He used to say he wanted to escape from time, from appointments, schedules, deadlines. Childhood to him was timelessness, he talked about it as though it were a mystical state. He longed for all this, talked to me about it endlessly, got depressed... (McEwan, 2016, p. 222).

Charles was suffering melancholy as a pathological case. As an adult, he wanted to be free of all the charges adulthood brings. Charles was longing for the timelessness of childhood that narrator repeatedly touches upon in the narration. If melancholy is accepted as "a kind of madness with the mind always fixed on one object" (as qtd in Radden, 2000, p. 5) as Samuel Johnson puts it, Charles' mind was fixed on his childhood, a stage in his life in which he can never literally turn back, and the timelessness childhood brings with itself. The narrator also dwells upon why Charles had an obsession about childhood, which is a part that mingles his melancholy with his memory. It is indicated that the fact that Charles was a neglected child in his childhood might be the reason why he always wanted to go back in time (2016, p. 224). In this sense, although the readers do not witness Kate in time, in another

storyline within the novel, Charles becomes a child in time. Kate was a lost child, Charles' childhood was a lost childhood. Charles, as an adult, mourns for his lost childhood. In essence, Charles has a Romantic spirit which is very reminiscent of William Wordsworth's poem titled "My Heart Leaps Up" in which Wordsworth announces children as superior beings than adults while the speaker of the poem contemplates on an image of rainbow: "The Child is father of the man/And I could wish my days to be/Bound each to each by natural piety" (Wordsworth, 2005, p. 306).

The malevolent intervention of Kate's loss is an event used as a symbol in multiple layers. With this symbolic loss, the narration leads the reader into other different storylines about children and times that belong to Stephen and Charles. Within the novel, in this sense, there are three children in time. Kate is lost in time and with time. Her growth, if she is alive, becomes abstract and unknown. With the loss, Stephen's childhood memories are triggered. His grief directs his perception towards his own childhood years. In a way, while searching for his lost daughter, he also searches for his own childhood and tries to recall his own memories from the past. To be able to do this, Stephen visits his parents, who are the most reliable mirrors to reflect his childhood memories. The peculiar thing about childhood is that children always have an anticipation to grow old, to go forward. Charles, on the other hand, as an adult, wants to grow young, to go backward. In this sense, Kate as the child in time included the time which goes forward. Her presence was being searched within the time ahead of her loss. Thus, as she was progressing in an unknown time and place, Charles was regressing backwards in the narration. He was searching his lost identity in the past. Stephen loses Kate to time, and Charles to childhood.

Many theoreticians contend that mourning is an act of narcissism. As parents show a narcissistic love to their children, in case of their loss, narcissism is there again in their phase of mourning. As they mourn for their loss, they also mourn for themselves. Additionally, as Darian Leader underlines, "you are what you've loved" (2008, p. 55). Each time ego directs love to an object and as that direction is blocked by a detachment, lover's ego experiences a change. In Stephen's case, while searching for Kate, he was not only trying to find his daughter, he was also endeavoring to find a part of himself that was lost with Kate. Therefore, narcissism is involved both in case of love and in case of loss. As Stephen narcissistically loved his daughter, he also narcissistically mourned for her, which means that he mourned for himself as well. As

McEwan underlines that childhood, as a subject matter, is the projection of parent's ideal selves, Stephen's ideal self was within Kate, and he lost it.

The moment when Stephen was mistaken about a schoolgirl to be his own daughter was not only deriving from his deceitful memory, it was also the end result of how melancholy was dwelling upon his memory. For Kant, the melancholic's cognitive faculties are damaged. The course of thought is puzzled in the melancholic person (Kant, 2006, p. 96). Thus, the sufferers of melancholy cannot always differentiate between imagination and reality. The drain of Stephen's thought is highly influenced by the gap that loss of Kate left behind. Hence, his consciousness is puzzled and tricked when it is pre-occupied with separating reality from imagination. Additionally, Kant underlines that the melancholic is unable to "direct, restrain or control the course of his thought" (2006, p. 96). No matter how many times the manager of the school insists on the fact that the child is someone else's, the puzzled and tricked mind of Stephen believes the opposite, even when the girl is summoned and made sure that she is not Kate. Right after he left the school,

Stephen was thinking about Kate's spirit, how it might hover high above London, how it might resemble some kind of brilliantly coloured dragonfly, capable of unimaginable speeds, and yet remaining perfectly still as it waited to descend to a playground or street corner to inhabit the body of a young girl, infuse it with its own particular essence to demonstrate to him its enduring existence before moving on, leaving the empty shell, the host, behind (p. 167).

Only after this incident, he started to admit that "Kate was no longer a living presence" (p. 168).

Through the closure of the novel, as Stephen arrives to Julie's house and learns that she is pregnant, the narrator underlines that Stephen was "charged with more love than he thought he could bear. Light and warmth radiated from his stomach. He felt weightless and mad" (p. 237). In this scene, it might be understood that although they were separated after Kate's loss, the only healing power is within no one but themselves. The time lived separately between the couple was a time when Julie was pre-occupied with accepting Kate's 'grand departure.' Julie states that "It was my task, my work, if you like, more important to me than our marriage...It was more important than the new baby" (pp. 237-238). This part proves that without fully facing the reality that Kate is gone forever, Julie could not think of having a new baby. In other words, she had to kill the idea of Kate's death in her mind to give birth to another life. For this very process, Julie states that

There were some bad, bad days when I wanted to die. Each time that came back it was stronger and more attractive. I knew what I had to do. I had to stop running after her in my mind. I had to stop aching for her, expecting her at the front door, seeing her in the woods, or hearing her voice whenever I boiled the kettle. I had to go on loving her, but I had to stop desiring her. For that I needed time, and if it took longer than the pregnancy, that would have to be how it was. I haven't been completely successful ... (p. 238)

As Roland Barthes indicates, the significance of time, when it comes to cases of grief, only eliminates emotions (1981, p. 75). The sufferers behind cease to weep. The loss is always irreplaceable. While Julie was at the center of pain, suffering both melancholy and mourning, the fact that Kate was irreplaceable was an overwhelming fact for her, which brought her marital problems and her suicidal thoughts. As time passes, and she becomes eligible to positively accept that Kate's loss cannot be replaced, she decides to stop chasing her. At this scene, Stephen contemplates on this very issue:

He nodded, stunned. It was then, three years late, that they began to cry together at last for the lost, irreplaceable child who would not grow older for them, whose characteristic look and movement could never be dispelled by time. They held on to each other, and as it became easier and less bitter, they started to talk through their crying as best they could, to promise their love through it, to the baby, to one another, to their parents, to Thelma. In the wild expansiveness of their sorrow they undertook to heal everyone and everything, the Government, the country, the planet, but they would start with themselves; and while they could never redeem the loss of their daughter, they would love her through their new child, and never close their minds to the possibility of her return. (p. 239)

The coming of a new baby does not mean that Stephen and Julie stopped waiting for Kate's re-appearance. On the contrary, it means that whenever they will love their new baby, they will also be loving Kate. However, as Timothy Keogh asserts, "such couples make an unwise decision to rush into becoming pregnant again as a solution to their psychic pain" (2019, p. 18). Stephen and Julie accept the new baby as a gift that will serve as a band aid for their loss. Yet, their scar will always be there. The new baby cannot bring a total healing, as the trauma will always stay within.

2.1.3. Conclusion

For Freud, in order for mourning to be successfully achieved, the mourner should recall each memory and expectation he has about the lost object so that after being hyper-cathetized, the detachment from the object can be managed (1981, p. 245). One of the most peculiar traits of Stephen is that he directed his mind and energy to contemplate and imagine the time passed after the loss of Kate, instead of remembering moments and memories about her. In other words, Stephen's consciousness was only focused on expectations, not on memories, as Stephen believes that Kate keeps her process of growing-up in a different time and place than that of Stephen dwells upon.

He even, when Kate's sixth birthday arrives, decides to visit a toyshop and buy a birthday gift for her. The narrator depicts this scene as "a parody of bereavement" (p. 136). Out of his misery, Stephen pretends the presence of Kate:

To buy a present would demonstrate that he was not yet beaten, that he could do the surprising, lively thing. He would purchase his gift in joy rather than sorrow, in the spirit of loving extravagance, and in bringing it home and wrapping it up he would be making an offering to fate, or a challenge – Look, I've brought the present, now you bring back the girl. If the purchase cost him pain, then the pain would constitute a necessary sacrifice (p. 137).

All these prevent him from focusing on the past memories he had with Kate, to be able to accomplish the disengagement. "Joy is replaced on those days now by the feeling of loss" (Kübler-Ross et al., 2014, p. 115). For Pieter Vermeulen, a common trait of melancholics is that they reject to be a part of a community in which their loss is forgotten (2011, p. 256). In this case, the difference between the melancholic Stephen and the mourner Stephen is that the melancholic character does not want to forget the loss, which turns his case into a vicious circle. Whereas, the mourner self willingly remembers, so that he can hyper-cathect and detach himself from the loss. The same thing is valid for the psychology of Julie. In their case, melancholy turns into mourning.

For Kübler-Ross, "grief must be externalized. Our pain and sadness can be fully realized only when we release them" (2014, p. 143). It is not a coincidence that Stephen is a children's book writer. He externalized his grief by writing books for children. Charles, on the other hand, externalized his grief with a suicide. By doing so, he both expressed his melancholy to the outside world, and he brought an end to his recurrent longing for (his) childhood.

Thus, the ground for Stephen's mourning was missing. This is the fact that puts Stephen in-between mourning and melancholy. As he leaves melancholy behind, he can start the process of mourning. As a couple, they have managed to overcome melancholy, however, they can never overcome the trauma. About the chapter in which McEwan depicted his dream through Stephen standing outside a pub called 'The Bell', critics as Dominic Head asserts that this 'timeslip,' as he calls, bears an important position for the novel: the scene "appears to allow the central protagonist to intervene in the past and secure his own future" (Head, 2007, p. 74). Stephen visits Julie after he stood outside the pub, and for Head, the timeslip and the idea of having a new baby are linked with each other. As Stephen's mother was pregnant to him and

in that specific pub, she had decided not to have abortion, the repetition of the place influences the mind and psyche of Stephen as well: “the two moments were undeniably bound, they held in common the innocent longing they provoked, the desire to belong” (McEwan, 2016, p. 67). The episode of ‘The Bell’ is also interpreted as a telepathic communication between Stephen as a child in time and his mother, which serves for the closure of the novel, and the closure of couple’s melancholy. However, the traumatic aspect of the experience can never reach to any kind of closure: even if Kate will be found someday, after all these years, she will not be the daughter they used to know. Therefore, the on-going trauma, sustained by memory, leads the couple into a constant state of precariousness in which they are always afraid of, and vulnerable to, losing their second child, which forms the most elegiac aspect of the novel.

The novel’s distinct way of representing memory and melancholy enriches the perception of the readers. The novel elaborates on memory not only as a thing of the past that is based on factual experiences, but also as an imaginary thing that can also be related to the future. The novel deals with mourning and melancholy through the examination of a state of limbo between the two. It also shows how time in relation to memory and melancholy can be one’s best friend and arch enemy at the same time. It is a multi-layered and complex elaboration of memory and melancholy that exceeds the theoretical hypotheses of thinkers such as Freud, Derrida, or Bergson.

CHAPTER III

REMAINDER (2005) BY TOM MCCARTHY

Tom McCarthy (1969-) is a British novelist and an artist who, although being not as senior as McEwan or Barnes regarding his professional writing career, lacks no sophistication, richness in language use and solid philosophical standpoints when compared with other two novelists being discussed in the thesis. His first published novel, *Remainder*, brought him a reputation as a successful writer in 2005. *Remainder* was his first published novel, but it is not the first he wrote. *Men in Space* was written before *Remainder* but was published as his second novel after being re-edited (Hart, Jaffe, and Eburne, 2013, p. 661). About McCarthy's fiction, Frederic Tuten contends that "to read McCarthy is to be in contact with, for starters, James Joyce, the Futurists and Surrealists with their manifestos, Freud, Derrida, Hergé, Levi-Strauss" (2015, p. 102). The works of McCarthy might be perceived as indebted to his readings of these names. Tuten further underlines that "Tom's novels are not novels of ideas, but novels that generate them" (p. 102). In 2010, McCarthy published *C*, which he described as a novel on "technology and mourning" (Hart et al, 2013, p. 659) and then *Satin Island* in 2015, which was shortlisted for Booker Prize. Aside from his fictional narratives, he also produced non-fictional works such as *Tintin and the Secret of Literature* (2006) and *Typewriters, Bombs, Jellyfish* (2017) which is a collection of his essays varying from the subjects of literature, media to visual arts.

About his characters McCarthy points out: "in all my books, there are all these characters in search of an absolute present tense that they can never quite find. They are always in the space of deferral" (Huber, 2018, p. 180). This means that the characters of McCarthy are always in search of something that they lack. In other words, his characters embody the feeling of loss in different time periods and plots. About the common elements McCarthy uses in his fiction, David Marcus asserts that "sex for him is despair, an act of mourning and melancholia. It is an effort to recover

the past, as in the case of *Remainder*, or a lost sibling, as in the case of *C*, or more generally, rehearse the touch and feel of human contact” (2015, p. 74). Knowing these traits about his fiction, it can be deduced that McCarthy creates characters and figures who had experienced a problem in the past that occupies their present. About the novel as a genre, McCarthy asserts that “the novel is and has always been dead, and this is the very precondition of its perpetual regeneration” (Tuten, 2015, p. 107).

In his essay titled “Get Real, or What Jellyfish Have to Tell Us About Literature,” McCarthy explains *the real, reality and realism* by benefiting from J. G. Ballard’s first novel *Crash*. Ballard’s novel is built on a re-enactor named Vaughan who simulates car crashes of people. The novel ends with Vaughan’s failed plan of his own car crashing into Elizabeth Taylor’s car at the very moment of Vaughan’s orgasm, yet he misses Taylor’s car and dies (McCarthy, 2017, p. 69). *Crash* carries the elements of ‘symphorophilia’ which means “sexual interest and arousal derived from stage-managing the occurrence of a disaster and then watching it. The person may masturbate during the disaster or do so afterward while looking at pictures of the event or thinking about it” (American Psychological Association, 2015). In this sense, McCarthy is influenced by Ballard, as the idea of re-enactment is a Ballardian motif. Ballard claims that “we live inside an enormous novel. It is now less and less necessary for the writer to invent the fictional content of his novel. The fiction is already there. The writer’s task is to invent the reality” (as qtd in McCarthy, 2017, p. 57). Departing from this point, McCarthy focuses on the concept of inventing reality: “Ballard does not tell us that a novelist should ‘discover’ or ‘intuit’ or ‘reveal’ reality: they must *invent* it” (2017, p. 58). Regarding the line between reality and fiction, when the life of human beings turns out to be a fiction in itself, the reality should be invented within fictional narratives. Ballard does not use the terms McCarthy underlines (to discover, to intuit, and to reveal) because things are already discovered, intuited and revealed. In this sense, the age is the age of ‘already,’ not the age of ‘not yet.’ A writer, then, can and should only invent reality within what is fiction: which is life. Thus, what is called the work of fiction replaces the reality, as reality has already been replaced by fiction.

McCarthy defines his own works as ironic in the sense that Paul de Man put forward in his essay titled “The Rhetoric of Temporality” (Huber, 2018, p. 179). The idea of irony McCarthy adopts from de Man is a kind of irony which brings “an

unfixable split between action and consciousness, the subject and the world” (Huber, 2018, p. 179). Tom McCarthy, with his philosopher friend Prof. Simon Critchley, founded a society named “The International Necronautical Society” (which will be further referred to as the INS) in the year 1999 by publishing a manifesto. The first argument of the founding manifesto is that “death is a type of space, which we intend to map, enter, colonize, and eventually inhabit” (First Manifesto, 1999). This, and other three arguments of the manifesto demonstrate how McCarthy views life and death, in a way that enriches and enlightens the analysis of his works.

In the year 2007, McCarthy and Critchley delivered a declaration titled “New York Declaration of Inauthenticity” where they manifested their philosophy on death, art, matter, idea, repetition and inauthenticity as the founders of the INS. The declaration begins by admitting that ‘being’ is a “failed transcendence” whose essence is formed of a permanent feeling of lack (p. 4). For McCarthy and Critchley, “art is the consequence and the experience of failed transcendence” and “art is not about originality, but about the repetition of the copy” (p. 4). In this sense, art as a form of expression that is repeated, not originated, has this sense of ‘failed transcendence’ in essence, which is also related with McCarthy’s characters’ being always in the ‘space of deferral.’ For McCarthy and Critchley, “Art is governed by...the three R’s: repetition, repetition and repetition. As a consequence, we think artists should continue to do what they have always done: *steal*. Art is a repetitive mechanism that functions through theft, forgery, copying and embedding” (2007, p. 18). This connotes T.S. Eliot’s expression about poets: “Immature poets imitate, mature poets steal” (Eliot, 1957, p. 125).

In the declaration, McCarthy and Critchley openly indicate that “what is most real for us is not form, or God, but matter, the brute materiality of the external world” (p. 6). The answer to how they deal with matter lies in ‘inauthenticity.’ Inauthenticity, which is also a motif that McCarthy uses in his fiction, is “the core to the self, to what it means to be human, which means that the self has no core, but is an experience of division, of splitting” (p. 9). McCarthy and Critchley further underline that they “choose to abandon the idea of people and individual subject. On the contrary, the necronaut is a dividual” (2007, p. 9). The split and inauthentic person, for the INS, forms the core of human beings, in their terms ‘dividuals.’ Benefiting from Heidegger, McCarthy and Critchley declare that “any attempt at authenticity slips back into

inauthenticity from which it cannot escape, but which it would like to evade” (p. 10). Thus, human beings are inauthentic, and human existence is defined by inauthenticity in which each tendency to become authentic is doomed to fall into the circle of inauthenticity. In this sense, the existence repeats.

3.1. *Remainder*

When the concept of memory and melancholy are reckoned, *Remainder* demonstrates a unique representation of these two concepts, drawing highly dissimilar lines with that of McEwan’s *The Child in Time*. While *The Child in Time* was a novel in which memory was a faculty used for melancholy to be overcome through a self-conscious narrator, McCarthy’s *Remainder* intentionally avoids such fictional character formations or techniques. As *Remainder* is such a highly suggestive narrative, it is hard to diminish its boundaries into two concepts. Yet, as McCarthy’s illustration is the reversed interpretation of memory and melancholy when compared with *The Child in Time*, this chapter will benefit the discussions of these concepts in fiction from a different standpoint. Published in 2005, *Remainder* is the first novel of McCarthy, published in Paris by an art press called Metronome after being rejected many times by other publishing houses. For the point of departure of the novel, McCarthy contends:

I was kind of stoned at this party one day and had a moment of déjà vu while staring at the wall, and I thought it would be great to re-enact this moment. Then I thought, where do you stop? Can you re-enact everything?... If you’re immersed in literature you would straight away recognize Hamlet, who re-enacts his father’s death in front of the court, or Tristram Shandy’s Uncle Toby, who re-enacts the battle in which he got castrated... (52 Insights)

The scene McCarthy visualizes here is a scene he embedded in the novel. *Remainder*, in this sense, is a work which functions as a *mise en abyme*. In another interview, McCarthy defines the feeling he had before writing *Remainder*: “Wouldn’t it be fun if you could reconstruct the street and its events, but then continue scaling that upward, even to the point of everyone dying?” (Huber, 2018, p. 181). In its essence, then, for the point of departure for *Remainder*, McCarthy had a Borgesian attitude of embeddedness and a Ballardian treatment of space. About the novel and its laboring process, McCarthy states that “with *Remainder*, I was reading Pierre Janet and Bergson on duration, and some positivist psychologists on trauma” (Tuten, 2015, p. 103). McCarthy is a writer who is “into repetition...not into the idea of change or progress

at all” (Armesto, 2011, p. 11). Thus, *Remainder* is a novel not of actions, but of ‘re-enactions.’

Remainder opens with the nameless narrator’s description of an accident that caused him mental and physical damage, and trauma which he is unable to tell. The novel starts with vague statements that are influenced from the title of Critchley’s book *Very Little...Almost Nothing: Death, Philosophy, Literature* (Drag, 2015, p. 389): “About the accident itself, I can say very little. Almost nothing. It involved something falling from the sky. Technology. Parts, bits. That’s it, really: all I can divulge. Not much, I know” (McCarthy, 2016, p. 5). In this sense, the narration starts *in medias res*. The character narrates the events directly to the readers, as in *skaz*, as if he is talking with them. After the accident, the speaker’s memory and body gets damaged: he has to consciously learn and practice each body movement that ordinary people conduct without noticing. “After I’d come out of my coma and my memory had come back and my broken bones had set – I had to learn how to move...so the physiotherapist had to do something called ‘rerouting’” (p. 18). As if he was not a human being, but a machine, his body had to be re-calibrated after the accident, causing him to be aware of, or to be conscious of, every single movement he makes. With the accident, he is estranged to his natural, inborn mimics and gestures and he has to learn them artificially. About the hero of the novel, few information is given: McCarthy contends that “He’s not an intellectual: he’s a bloke, an Everyman” (Thwaite, 2005). The character was a thirty-year-old man living in London, working in a market-research outfit, having friends named Greg and Catharine with whom he spent time before and after the accident. Whereas, if it is unnecessary, he avoids any human contact (including sexual ones) after the accident: his friendships weaken, he loses physical and mental connection with the outside world, becomes less interested in the ordinary social life.

The physical aspects of the hero are not given in any part of the novel in order not to picture the character “visualizable as a three-dimensional person” (Attridge, 2012, 12). The character, from all the aspects, is a depthless one, and the lack of depth is not viewed as a lack in this narration. The narrative progresses with/through the compensation payment of 8,5 million that the bodies called ‘the Settlement’ grants to the hero, as the Settlement is officially in charge of the requirements and responsibilities that the accident left behind. Experiencing an epiphanic moment upon

seeing a crack on the wall of a friend's bathroom, the narrator feels a sense of *deja-vu* and decides to spend an outrageous amount of money for setting up re-enactments of some specific scenes, "the sound of liver sizzling and spitting, piano music wafting up the staircase, birds and milk floats, black cats on red roofs" (p. 65) that either belong to his specific memory and recollections, or to his imagination, within hired buildings with hired actors and actresses, or in his words, "re-enactors." He transforms reality into fiction, and fiction into reality. His mind works through materialization of abstract notions. The plan is facilitated by Naz who is in charge of every detail related with the re-enactments, whom the narrator calls as "my executor" (p. 69). For the purpose behind the re-enactments, the narrator indicates: "I wanted to reconstruct that space and enter it so I could feel real again. I wanted to; I had to; I would. Nothing else mattered" (McCarthy, 2016, p. 60). With such a Ballardian approach, the narrator wants to become authentic within something inauthentic.

Within the narrative, the memory of the character is not only depicted through the technique of narrating, but also through re-enacting. Thus, the whole narrative is what remains from the accident, and the character's mind is focused on the remainders of things, as "everything must leave some kind of mark" (McCarthy, 2016, p. 11). For McCarthy and Critchley, "Being is...an ellipsis, an absence, an incomprehensibly vast lack scattered with debris and detritus" (McCarthy and Critchley, 2007, p. 4) and the hero of *Remainder* runs after these 'debris and detritus.' The narrator's love of repetition and re-enactment ends up in an extreme mode that his re-enactment of a bank robbery turns into a real robbery, thus, a re-enactment (then a pre-enactment) this time turns into an enactment where the re-enactors literally get injured and die. As many other objects and symbols in the novel, re-enactments are also illustrated in a circle: what is called as a re-enactment becomes a form of pre-enactment, and then enactment: in the beginning, while they only re-enact his (so-called) past repeatedly, they start to pre-enact what is going to be enacted and re-enact the events happening in the present time (a black man being shot, windscreen water splashing everywhere etc.). In this sense, re-enactment becomes his new ontology. Life is transformed into re-enactments (or pre-enactments) of the the events preceding or succeeding the present time. In the end, after the bank heist, as the officials command them to land, the character hijacks the private jet that he rented, and orders the pilot to draw the figure of eight in the air. Thus, the narrative of *Remainder* starts and ends *in medias*

res, between a fall and an ascend, and within the circular paths of the number eight, as McCarthy underlines that “we are always not just (to use a dramatic term) *in medias res*, i.e. in the middle of events, but also simply in media” (McCarthy, 2012).

The plot structure of the novel is spirally built: each motif depicted becomes a leitmotif or a refrain that is repeated in through and through. The ‘Seattle themed coffee shop’ that the speaker visits uses a stamping technique where the customers get a free coffee as they reach to tenth stamp on their card. The narrator says, “I remembered that I had a loyalty card...The idea excited me: clocking the counter, going right round through the zero, starting again” (p. 47). In this sense, the prefix ‘re’ is positioned in every corner of the novel. The speaker’s obsession in this Seattle themed coffee shop (which is most probably what he refers to Starbucks) is not only because the shop has a repetitive coffee selling technique, but also because the whole idea of franchise is built upon repetition, and re-enactment in itself. Each coffee store belonging to that franchise is the re-enactment/copy of their first store in Seattle. By pushing our daily habits/realities to extreme, McCarthy wants to defamiliarize the readers, and to demonstrate it as a grotesque image.

Claude Monet’s series of Waterloo Bridge (painted between the years 1899-1905) is a significant example of repetition in art. Travelling from France to England, Monet painted the famous Waterloo Bridge in London repeatedly, in 41 different canvases, in various times, depicting totally different atmospheres with different colors, keeping the bridge stable in the composition. In each attempt of painting the bridge, Monet recreated ‘the matter’ while imitating the real. His mind was so obsessed with the image of the bridge that while painting, he re-enacted the scenery, each always leaving a remainder behind. In his essay “Repetition: An Essay in Experimental Psychology,” by writing under the pseudonym Constantine Constantius, Soren Kierkegaard compares repetition and recollection: “repetition and recollection are the same movement, just in opposite directions, because what is recollected has already been and is thus repeated backwards, whereas genuine repetition is recollected forwards” (2009, p. 3). Recollection, for Kierkegaard, is an act of repetition directed towards the past, whereas repetition enables a recollection directed towards the future. Thus, Kierkegaard asserts that “repetition, if it is possible, thus makes a person happy, while recollection makes him unhappy” (2009, p. 3).

In his *Difference and Repetition*, Gilles Deleuze asserts that “to repeat is to behave in a certain manner, but in relation to something unique or singular which has no equal or equivalent” (1994, p. 1). Repetition, in this sense, has a mimetic aspect where it is based and built on an original ground. The repetition in *Remainder* lacks this unique ground that it is supposed to be dependent on. It is, in Baudrillard’s terms, “the generation by models of a real without origin or reality: a hyperreal” (Baudrillard, 1994, p. 1). For Deleuze, “things acquire an actual identity through repetition...this means that things acquire fixity...parts and hence boundaries through repetition. These parts and boundaries then allow us to see the individual as a member of a class or species” (Williams, 2003, p. 11). The character in the novel tries to re-gain his lost identity through repetitions. In an interview on *Remainder*, McCarthy states:

Trauma is intimately tied in with re-enactment: it brings about a compulsion to repeat. But I never thought of *Remainder* as just a psychological drama. What excited me right from the crack-moment onwards was that the premise clearly had much wider implications: it was about history and time, simulation, questions of authenticity and, by extension, of our whole state of being-in-the-world. And it was about the world's state of being-in-the-universe as well: the world, matter, this shard left over from some unnameably violent disaster - a remainder (Thwaite, 2005).

About the title of the book, in this sense, McCarthy is inspired by the idea that the world itself is a remainder of the whole universe. He asserts that “as Blanchot points out, the word 'disaster' comes from *des astre*, 'from the stars'. It's fate, it's gravity, it's time and, of course, death. I used 'Desastre' as a working title for the novel, until *Remainder* suggested itself” (Thwaite, 2005).

Baudrillard’s *Simulacra and Simulation* plays a significant role in the novel. Baudrillard names Borges’s short story titled “On Exactitude in Science” as “the most beautiful allegory of simulation” in which an Empire’s map ends up being as vast as the real territory of the country (1994, p. 1). Baudrillard emphasizes that in the age of hyperreal, the real has lost its origin, and the separation between a territory and its map is not visible (1994, p. 2). In McCarthy’s *Remainder*, enactments, pre-enactments, and re-enactments are molded and the difference between these concepts are blurred. For Baudrillard, the real can be “reproduced an infinite number of times” (p. 2). The character in *Remainder* lives in the age of hyperreality where real has lost its origin, and what is called as ‘real’ can be simulated for multiple times, meaning that in essence, real lost its reality. It is very ordinary for the character in the novel to re-enact memories and events in an age where hyperreality forms the rules people live by, but the way the novel presents it is extra-ordinary.

For Zadie Smith, “*Remainder* is not filled with pretty quotes; it works by accumulation and repetition, closing in on its subject in ever-decreasing revolutions, like a trauma victim circling the blank horror of the traumatic event” (2008, p. 9-10). In her article titled “Two Paths for the Novel,” Smith classifies *Remainder* as a work against Lyrical Realism, which she defines as “the transcendent importance of form, the incantatory power of language to reveal truth, the essential fullness and continuity of the self” (p. 2). *Remainder* unapologetically celebrates the lack of these elements in its narrative form. Smith indicates that “*Remainder*’s way turns out to be an extreme form of dialectical materialism – it’s a book about a man who builds in order to feel” (p. 12). Smith situates *Remainder* into a distinct place in the history of novel, as it deviates from the conventional modes of fiction and criticizes what Smith names as ‘lyrical realism.’ The hero, in *Remainder*, feels a sense of ‘tingling’ at the moments when his re-enactments are being conducted and, as Smith clarifies, it is the motif that the character builds on his re-enactments. Thus, she claims that the novel is fundamentally on feelings.

In the preface of *Remainder*, McKenzie Wark puts forward that the novel might be built on these two questions: “Who gets to create? And when something is created, what remains?” (2016, p. vii). Wark contends that art is all about *mimesis*, and the mimetic act lacks what remains from the thing imitated, the idea of God. He clarifies that Modernist art form attempted to be in touch directly with God’s effect, or with “Godlike creative powers” (p. viii). Regarding *Remainder*, Wark indicates that *Remainder* “imitates the once new, now old, methods of Modernism” (p. x). In this sense, *Remainder* lays out a mimesis out of mimesis: McCarthy’s mimesis is combined with that of the narrator’s who imitates real events of creation within the narrative. Wark remarkably asserts that

In *Remainder*, our hero is one of the accidental “Gods” of this world, one with too much money and time on his hands. He uses money and time not to create but to recreate. He is a God of noise. He does not make the world out of nothing, but out of the debris of long-lost creation. Perhaps that is why he can never quite get it right. The simulation is never perfect, always in excess of the thing itself. It always leaves a remainder. The most troubling remainder is himself. He is a leftover God, a God as debris of creation. He is trying to be a master of a universe that needs no master (2016, p. xi).

Within a modernist narrative form, the hero of *Remainder* becomes a parasite Postmodern God whose creations bring nothing but copies without origin, and whose identity is totally inauthentic, artificial and plastic. The modernist aspect of the novel is that the narration is similar to a Woolf narrative where the consciousness of the

character is spreaded into every corner of the narrative. The speaker recreates events out of his flawed memory, and out of his melancholic state of mind that he willingly ignores.

3.1.1. Elaboration of Memory in *Remainder*

After the accident, the memory of the narrator is temporarily damaged and it comes back partially: “most of my past had eventually returned, in installments, like back episodes of some mundane soap opera...it had been quite mundane. I’d lain in bed and watched the episodes as they arrived. I’d had no control over what happened” (2016, p. 6, 21). By using a rich language and a perfect analogy, the narrator asserts that “after the accident, I forgot everything. It was as though my memories were pigeons and the accident a big noise that had scared them off. They fluttered back eventually – but when they did, their hierarchy had changed” (p. 82). While his memory was being re-installed, the temporality and the permanence of some moments happened to switch sides: that is, some events, concepts or subjects which had occupied a significant amount of place in his memory before the accident became insignificant, or vice versa.

To take the pigeons metaphor further, and to visualize it from a different perspective, after the big noise was heard in the area, the hero of *Remainder* was the only pigeon left on the ground, losing all the other pigeons who were forming his collective memory. The accident was a damage given to the memory he created collectively, and for Halbwachs “our memories remain collective, however, and are recalled to us through others even though only we are participants in the events or saw the things concerned” (1980, p. 23). Halbwachs asserts that if a subject is unable to recall an event without having the support of third parties, “an artificial construction suddenly takes place and becomes transformed into a remembrance” which, for Halbwachs, can never become an authentic memory (1980, p. 25). Although the character was reenacting to feel authentic again, his attempts of recreating memories and moments made nothing but to make him more estranged to being a human being, as he wanted to repeat, not to recollect.

With the accident, the character lost contact with both his individual and his collective memory, as well as his own characteristic traits and the time and place he shared with others. He lost all his mirrors that used to facilitate his remembering, as

well as his formation of identity. The post-traumatic character that the novel demonstrates keeps avoiding interaction with his friends as much as possible. At one point in the narration, the character states that “Catherine had already begun to annoy me. I preferred her absence, her spectre” (p. 36). Although Catherine was a character whom he could use in order to re-build his memory, the hero of the novel is not interested in her, as his aim in life is not to re-gain any sense of collectivity.

The re-enactors in the novel have a temporary value and function for the hero. He needs them in order to repeat, not to recollect. In other words, they are functioning like living-props for his re-enactments. This collectivity demonstrates a one-sided connection with the re-enactors: the character is not interested in forming memories in the minds of the re-enactors, as they gain none. The narrator states that

What was lacking, if anything, was comprehension: making them understand exactly what it was that was required of them...I didn't need to make them share my vision, and I didn't want them to. Why should they? It was my vision, and I was the one with the money (p. 101).

As it is known that Hamlet's re-enactment of his father's death has an impact in the formation of the leitmotif of McCarthy's *Remainder*, it can be said that in Hamlet's case, the actors had a temporary and artificial memory about the staging of the event. Whereas the main aim of Hamlet was directed towards the audiences, as they were the ones being impacted and informed. Here, McCarthy adopts the technique used by Hamlet in order to leave a mark, not on the re-enactors' memory, but on the reader's memory. In this respect, McCarthy puzzles collective memory of the character in the novel, as collectivity is situated into an unconventional sphere, which is outside the narrative.

With the epiphanic moment he experiences upon beholding the crack, the character is reminded of a different dimension of time and space in which he felt natural: “in these spaces, all my movements had been fluent and unforced. Not awkward, acquired, second-hand, but natural” (McCarthy, 2016, p. 60). About this space he cannot clearly situate in his memory, the character indicates that “I don't think this was a straight memory. It was more complex. Maybe it was various things all rolled together: memories, imaginings, films, I don't know. But that bit's not important. What's important is that I remembered it” (p. 72). All he knows is that he recalled some fragments, and he is supposed to re-enact them. Readers witness the repetition of his re-enactments reflecting his vague and limited memories from the

past: a crack on the wall of a bathroom, a pianist, a lady cooking liver, cats walking on the roof. For Jim Byatt, “memory, in this case, is not just a product of the past, but also a singular, defining narrative of the present” (2012, p. 255). It is not clear that the character really lived in, through or within these moments, times and places himself, yet he would like to spend all his money for the re-enactments of them, which forms the absurd and disturbing aspect for the readers. This moment of epiphany is a moment of Mneme in which a memory suddenly arrives, in the form of a “stocked image spontaneously remembered” (Antakyalıoğlu, 2015, p. 331). This means that the moments after the accident can be named as Mneme moments in which he did not endeavor for his memories to come. Instead, they arrived by themselves.

For Henri Bergson, memory is the source that enables human beings to preserve their past in the present (Deleuze, 1991, p. 51). Past represents memory (recollection) and present represents matter (perception) (1991, p. 55). In his *Matter and Memory*, Bergson separates memory into two types that benefits McCarthy’s demonstration: the first type of memory is habit memory in which Bergson explains through an analogy of studying a lesson. “I study a lesson, and in order to learn it by heart I read it a first time...I then repeat it a certain number of times. At each repetition there is progress; the words are more and more linked together and at last make a continuous whole” (2005, p. 79). Bergson underlines that like picking up a habit, such memories are earned through repetition and they require “first a decomposition and then a recomposition of the whole action” (p. 80). For the second type of memory, Bergson focuses on each repetitive and individual step separated from the learned whole. The second type, then, is contrary to the habitual paradigm of memory as each repetition “form, by their very definition, other recollections” (p. 80), in other words, remainders. Bergson argues that

We become conscious of these mechanisms as they come into play; this consciousness of a whole past of efforts stored up in the present is indeed also a memory, but a memory profoundly different from the first, always bent upon action, seated in the present and looking only to the future. It has retained from the past only the intelligently coordinated movements which represent the accumulated efforts of the past; it recovers those past efforts, not in the memory images which recall them, but in the definite order and systematic character with which the actual movements take place. In truth it no longer represents our past to us, it acts it; and if it still deserves the name of memory, it is not because it conserves bygone images, but because it prolongs their useful effect into the present moment (Bergson, 2005, p. 82).

Memory, for the hero of *Remainder*, does not function habitually after the accident. The character’s memory is situated in the present and it is directed towards an oblique future. He does not represent his past to the reader. Rather he acts parts of it and

prolongs its impact in the present time. Readers only hear the echoes of the character's equivocal past.

As Kierkegaard pointed out, repetition can make one happy, whereas recollection can make someone unhappy, and one is an action towards forwards and the other is an action towards backwards. Bessel A. van der Kolk asserts that "traumatized people get stuck in the past: they become obsessed with the horror they consciously want to leave behind, but they keep behaving and feeling as if it is still going on" (2015, p. 18). Kolk underlines that "in order to heal one needs to create a sheltered trance state from which one can safely observe the horrific past" (p. 22). In contradiction, by creating the re-enactment scene, *Remainder*'s hero prepares himself the space in order not to get recovered from his trauma, but to be reminded of it. In the conventional trauma narratives, the protagonist is haunted by his horrific past (Vermeulen, 2012, p. 554). In *Remainder*, unlike *The Child in Time*, there is no horrific past to haunt the character. *Remainder*'s hero willingly captivates himself *in medias res*. To be able to recover from trauma in the Freudian sense, there has to occur the repetition of the memories related with the loss. What is treated as an initiator of healing in McEwan's narrative is exactly what makes the character of *Remainder* get deeper into his trauma. At this point, McCarthy reverses Kierkegaard's theory by creating a character who gets more and more traumatic through repetitions.

If one loses his/her memory, s/he also loses the sense of time. The past, present and future co-exist. The character could become aware of this simultaneity only after the accident. The pigeons flew away and fluttered back in a nonchronological mode, molding the past, present and the future in the same pot. By repeating the same re-enactments, the character fights with the whips of the time. The tragic accident took place in the recent past had a sharp impact on the character's present and future. Daniel L. Schacter contends that after a traumatic event, the survivors' notion of time changes: "some survivors reported disturbances in their sense of orientation in time: they felt that time had stopped or that the present was no longer continuous with past or the future" (2001, p. 175). For St. Augustine, "the present time of things past is memory, the present time of things present is sight, the present time of things future is expectation" (1963, p. 273). With the accident, the character's present time of things past became artificial memories, his present time of things present became the act of repetition, and his present time of things future became his expectation of repetitive

re-enactments. In the first manifesto of the INS, McCarthy and Critchley claim that “we are all necronauts, always, already” (1999). Departing from this very sentence, Dennis Duncan implies that for McCarthy, the concept of time is hand in hand with what is beautifully stated in T.S. Eliot’s “Burnt Norton:” “time past and time future are both perhaps contained in time present” (Duncan, 2016, p. 9). In this sense, time, for McCarthy, is molded by multiple variations of ‘always’ and ‘already,’ each existing simultaneously.

The character points out a specific time and place when and where he felt authentic, real, and in-time before the accident (which creates another irony as he never attempted to re-enact this very scene): “in Paris hanging out with Catherine I felt less self-conscious than I had at any other period of my life – more natural, more in-the-moment. Inside, not outside – as though we’d penetrated something’s skin: the city, perhaps, or maybe life itself” (p. 24). The excerpt proves that before the accident, the hero could be able to feel himself natural, within time, and at the moment. Whereas after the accident, he was awakened to an undeniable fact that human beings are always and already out of time, unnatural and not at the moment. Only through experiencing such a trauma, the character became aware that he was in the ‘space of deferral,’ a zone in which he searches for an exact present time, as he postpones real life by artificial stagings. The linear time is divided by a vertical fall.

For Ricoeur, narrations are metaphors of real events (1990, p. ix). In this case, the character is in a time and place where the real is ambiguous, and the origin(al) is lost. Re-enactments, then, are both a form of narrative and a form of metaphor. “The re-enactments and the character formation that is presented is anti-*bildung*” (Kiguradze, 2017, p. 6). The character attains no beneficial impact out of the re-enactments he repeats, as he does not progress. It should be noted that the novel is formed of the narrator’s own voice, narrating to the reader a series of past events. Thus, the narration itself is solely dependent on memory, which is a concept puzzled and tested within the narration. The narrator of the novel walks on the thin line between memory and narrative. The very first sentence of the novel is “about the accident itself I can say very little” (p. 5). As he says so, the narrator does not center his focus on the accident, but what came after it, or what remained from it. He directs his traumatized mind and memory to the post-effects of the bitter accident, and the inauthenticity that

should be gotten rid of. While the re-enactment building was being prepared, the character enjoys the moment saying:

I let my mind flow over it, floating above it – sinking into it too, being absorbed by it as though by a worn, patterned sponge. I fell asleep into the building, its surfaces, into the sound of liver sizzling and spitting, piano music wafting up the staircase, birds and milk floats, black cats on red roofs (p. 65).

It is as if the character tries to collect feelings, not memories and moments after the accident. His mind is focused on how he feels, rather than what he remembers, since the list of what is re-enacted repeatedly is very short. His post-traumatic mind finds actors in movies more authentic than himself:

You know in films, when people do things – characters, the heroes, like Robert De Niro, say – when they do things, it's always perfect. Anything at all. It could be opening a fridge, or...picking up a napkin, for example. The hero would pick it up, and give it a simple little flick, and tuck it in his collar or just fold it on his lap, and then it wouldn't bother him again for the whole scene. And then his dialogue will be just too perfect too (p. 53).

From the perspective of the character, actors in movies are perfect, not plastic, inauthentic interlopers as he is. About the movie of De Niro, the character indicates that “he's natural when he does things. Not artificial, like me. He's flaccid. I'm plastic” (p. 22). This aspect of the character reminds Andy Warhol's approach to life:

I always suspected that I was watching TV instead of living life. People sometimes say that the way things happen in the movies is unreal. But actually, it's the way things happen to you in life that's unreal. The movies make emotions look strong and real, whereas things really do happen to you, it's like you're watching television – you don't feel anything (Warhol, 2007, p. 91).

Daniel L. Schacter explains memory's relationship with post-traumatic stress disorder (referred to as PTSD hereafter), which is a term coined after World War II. In the seventh chapter titled “The Sin of Persistence,” Schacter traces the link between trauma and memory, as well as how a post-traumatic subject tries to forget the reminders of the source of the trauma. Schacter defines people who have PTSD as who “continue to experience intrusive memories long after a traumatic event, and who as a result cannot return to normal functioning in their everyday lives, are likely to receive a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder” (p. 174-175). In this sense, what the character in *Remainder* experiences can be explained as a PTSD case since the accident turns into a milestone in his life, a breakthrough that changes the way he integrates with the world outside. The PTSD changes the ontology of the character in the novel. Schacter asserts that “traumatized patients, however, reported more unusual dissociative experiences, in which they felt as though they were observers watching an event happen to someone else” (p. 174). While the re-enactments were taking place,

the character was there as an outsider, wandering around the site of the re-enactment, or sleeping inside his fake apartment, knowing that the actions prescribed to the actors were being played as he laid down.

The difference here is that the character is not supposed to be limited with the assumed feeling of observation of the event happening to somebody else. Instead, he really can (re)create the scenes and be an insider or an outsider as he wishes. The character in the novel is given what makes everything possible in the twenty-first century: money. Schacter further points out that “repeated reexperiencing of a traumatic memory in a safe setting can dampen the initial psychological response to the trauma” (p. 177). The character of the novel devotes all his life into re-enactments, while he could do many other things with eight and a half million pounds. Each attempt of re-enactment would inevitably and indirectly remind him of the traumatic accident that he barely remembers.

Remainder illustrates memory within a puzzling composition that acts concurrently through melancholy and trauma as the character’s mind cannot properly function after the accident. Memory becomes the space that the character would like to colonize and inhabit to reach the idea and the sense of death which provides melancholy in the form of the narrative.

3.1.2. Elaboration of Melancholy in *Remainder*

While melancholy was a theme in McEwan’s *The Child in Time* in which melancholy was demonstrated through the psychology of the characters, *Remainder*, in its entirety, is melancholic through its form, and melancholy is processed through a character who is carrying its symptoms yet not suffering it. In this sense, *Remainder* breaks all ties with the conventional narratives of melancholy. Pieter Vermeulen argues that novel genre contradicts the politics of melancholy, yet contemporary novels show a resistance to this contradiction which creates post-melancholic politics (2011, p. 255). Vermeulen indicates that “when the novel becomes a vehicle for melancholia, in other words, realism turns against itself” (2011, p. 259). *Remainder*, in this sense, stops illustrating the dilemmas and problems of individuals. Rather, it positions a “dividual necronaut” at the center of its narrative. Instead of making the character suffer melancholy, the narrative celebrates this pathological condition and aims at transmitting those symptoms into readers. *Remainder* also problematizes what

Jean-Michel Ganteau underlines about contemporary novels and their characters: “vulnerability, in the wake of – or alongside, trauma, has become a paradigm of the contemporary condition and of contemporary culture” (2015, p. 4) where the common aspects of the characters are that they lose and lament. This part will attempt to explain how *Remainder* treats melancholy in an unusual form, and how the novel plays with the basic characteristics of vulnerability in fiction.

In his article titled “The Rise of the Neuronovel,” Marco Roth proposes that the previous decade has witnessed a new trend in Anglo-American novel, which he names as ‘Neuronovel.’ Neuronovel is a name given to “what has been variously referred to as the novel of consciousness or the psychological or confessional novel – the novel at any rate about the workings of a mind – has transformed itself into the neuronological novel, wherein the mind becomes the brain” (2009, p. 3). The name is given to the novels which are built on how consciousness and brain function. “An outstanding common feature of these novels is the presence of a character suffering from an injury or illness affecting his or her sense of personhood or self, such as autism, Alzheimer’s and dementia, or trauma” (Brosch, 2018, p. 178). For Roth, the inclination towards neuronovel derives from the tendency of authors to observe and study human brain, which plays a significant role in the identity formation, rather than writing on “environmental and relational theories of personality” (2009, p. 3). Brosch contends that while traditional narratives are centered on the event, neuronovels “concern themselves more narrowly with the after-effects of such traumatic events” (2018, p. 178). Regarding the aesthetic element that readers can take from such narratives, Roth states that

the aesthetic sensation a reader gets from the neuronovel is not the pleasure of finding the general in the particular, but a frustration born of the defeat of the metaphoric impulse. We want to make the metaphor work, to say, ‘Yes, we are all a bit like a paranoid schizophrenic sometimes’... (2009, p. 13).

Neuronovels, in this sense, leave a sour taste that frustrates the readers who are reminded of the fact that they are not very different from the character depicted. “In other words, the neuronovel in its present form presents the experience of a cognitive defeat” (p. 13). For *Remainder* in specific, the first-person narrator (and his narrative in general) fits the description of a character from a neuronovel whose past encapsulates injury, trauma, and their traces both in his and readers’ current constructed selves and consciousness.

The estranged attitude in the character coincides with inauthenticity and they are both originated by the accident. The accident itself has an epiphanic impact on the character as he is awakened to the fact that “I’d always been inauthentic, even before the accident” (p. 23). The character’s thought here is the application of McCarthy’s and Critchley’s declaration, as they asserted that “any attempt at authenticity slips back into inauthenticity from which it cannot escape, but which it would like to evade” (p. 10). As his memory is installed in episodes, the result of his epiphany occurs gradually as well, leading him to think that “Other people really were like me; they just didn’t know they were. And they didn’t have eight and a half million pounds” (p. 26).

Whenever he tries to be real and authentic, not plastic or second-hand, he inevitably falls into the pit of inauthenticity. The irony, here, dwells upon in the very symbolic action of trying to be authentic through artificial (inauthentic in essence) re-enactments. This turns the re-enactments into Sisyphean actions, and the character into Sisyphus, who was doomed to repeatedly carry a rock over a hill after it rolls down on the ground again and again. The character, here, is doomed to re-enact without reaching a sense of fulfilment. In each attempt of re-enacting a memory, things always remain behind, or outside the re-enactment, which results in the repetition of that very scene. Unlike Sisyphus, the hero of the novel did not betray or wronged any Greek god. Rather, his tragic fall comes out of another fall, the fall of an object, indirectly, and anachronically bringing his flaw. As a result of the accident, the character becomes so obsessed with the re-enactments that it leads him into real robberies and murders. In this sense, the flaw comes after the fall. At the end, the narrator hijacks the plane he is in and orders the pilot to draw circles in the air. Thus, the character’s flaw does not accompany a fall, a landing, or a crash. Readers are not informed about what happens to the ‘enactor’ at the end. In other words, any consequence that would befall on him is not staged in the novel. Brosch states that “*Remainder* remains suspended between two unnarratable events – the initial accident as catalyst and the final crash that must bring the fictional situation to an end” (2018, p. 199). McCarthy maintains suspense both in the narration and in the readers. In this sense, the whole novel is between a descension and an ascension, destructing also the chronology of things.

As the character is informed about a black man being shot, he immediately desires to re-enact the murder:

Why was I so obsessed with the death of this man I’d never met? I didn’t stop to ask myself. I knew we had things in common, of course. He’d been hit by something, hurt,

laid prostrate and lost consciousness; so had I. We'd both slipped into a place of total blackness, silence, nothing, without memory and without anticipation, a place unreached by stimuli of any kind... The truth is that, for me, this man had become a symbol of perfection...he'd done what I wanted to do: merged with the space around him, sunk and flowed into it until there was no distance between it and him – and merged, too, with his actions, merged to the extent of having no more consciousness of them (p. 178).

As he finds it similar to his own case, he underlines that the man experienced what he has been desiring to live: to be mingled with space, and to be a unified one with matter around to the extent that no gap is left, as he is always disturbed by the remainders of things. The only difference between the character and the black man is that the man died as a result, yet the character could not. This is why he becomes the symbol of perfection for the hero of the novel. The excerpt above gives the first hint of the character being a necronaut who does not avoid the image and the idea of death; rather, he cheerfully embraces it. As he wants to become the re-enactor of the man, in each re-enactment, he enters into trances at the moment of shooting. At this point in the novel, Naz eventually brings a doctor called Trevellian. The doctor diagnoses the character by saying:

response to trauma is often mediated by endogenous opioids. That is to say, the body administers its own painkillers – hefty ones. The problem is, these can be rather pleasant – so pleasant, in fact, that the system goes looking for more of them. The stronger the trauma, the stronger the dose, and hence the stronger the compulsion to trigger new releases (p. 196).

The presence of the doctor Trevellian in the narration proves the pathological aspect of the character's condition, yet he is not interested in such diagnoses as well.

The voice of the narrative is unreliable. The reader has to be alert in situations' verifiability time to time. For example, while narrating the events, at one point, the character positions himself inside a café, observing the streets and the homeless people living on them. Then, the character describes taking one of the homeless people to a dinner and talking with him implicitly about being inauthentic. With the spilling of wine on the table, the narrator suspends the narrative and states that what he was telling was the product of his imagination: "the waiter leant across me as he took the tablecloth away. She took the tablecloth away too. There wasn't any table. The truth is, I've been making all this up – the stuff about the homeless person" (p. 54). Therefore, in the first half of the novel, the reader loses all sense of trust for the narrator. As reality and imagination blur, readers are highly disturbed about what is going to come in the rest of the narrative. Here, what McCarthy does is the literal expression of René Magritte's *The Treachery of Images* in which a figure of pipe is accompanied by an explanation provided beneath the figure: *Ceci n'est pas une pipe* (in English 'this is not a pipe').

With a similar aim and method, the narrative of *Remainder* betrays itself and its readers. For *Remainder*, Magritte's words could be re-phrased as *Ce n'est pas réel*, and the title could be 'The Treachery of Narratives' to symbolize the form that the novel is built on.

Jean-Michel Ganteau underlined that elegy is one of the common elements in contemporary British novels, as their characters are "vulnerable to loss" (2015, p. 71). For Ganteau, the 'sense of anxiety' in a narrative is an element that makes it a narrative of elegy, as Ganteau describes vulnerable character by attaching vulnerability to trauma (2015, p. 71). Ganteau asserts that

With romance, the separation may be remedied. With elegy, it is lamented. The elegiac subject, in his/her grief, and the elegiac text, in its paroxysmally affected form, are emblematic of the extreme frailty of human experience and aspirations in their unlimited probing at the limits of life. They help circumscribe the essentials of humanity as dependence on the lost other (Ganteau, 2015, p. 69).

On the surface level, *Remainder*'s hero fits into the descriptions of an elegiac subject. The fact that he had an accident and became amnesic and traumatic as a result would traditionally set the elegiac mood in the novel. Yet, the novel itself, through its 'paroxysmally affected form' directs the vulnerability, not towards its character, but towards the reader, as the character, a devoted necronaut, does not lament for things. Instead, the character repeatedly feels a sense of neutrality. He is a character who is "bored – by people, ideas, the world: everything" (McCarthy, 2016, p. 56) and he re-creates as a result. He is not a being, but a becoming (of a less human and a more dividual necronaut). In this sense, "to be or not to be" is a question which is out of context. The narrator disturbs the readers when, for example, he spends millions of pounds for re-enacting trivial and insignificant moments that even he cannot situate in his own memory, or when, for the sake of re-enacting, he wastes hundreds of cats, as they keep falling from the roof. Such motifs of *Remainder* constantly annoy the readers, as they search for a judicious reason all throughout the narration and the fact that, at the end, they get none, transmits the character's trauma into the readers. Furthermore, while readers condemn the futility of the character's actions within a loop, they are also reminded of the fact that they tend to forget that each one of them is always and already inside a vicious circle. Through something absurd, in this sense, *Remainder* holds a mirror against the readers to show how they are doomed to repeat things of their own as well.

The narrator clearly states how his mind is damaged: “who’s to say that these are genuine memories? Who’s to say my traumatized mind didn’t just make them up...Minds are versatile and wily things” (p. 5). In this sense, melancholy and trauma in the narration concurrently generate each other through the deceptive narrative voice. Pieter Vermeulen suggests that *Remainder* is a novel in which the conventions of trauma fiction are altered and reversed: the trauma demonstrated in the narration of McCarthy moves away from the works of ‘psychological realism,’ as for Vermeulen, *Remainder* creates a “dysphoric, subjectless affect” that is directed towards the reader (2012, p. 550). This dysphoric affect is one of the elements that forms “the novel’s debunking of the habituated routines of trauma fiction” (2012, p. 550). Through the refusal of psychological realism, Vermeulen states that “for the novel to overcome its melancholic affliction, such realism has to go” (2011, p. 261). McCarthy disregards psychological depth in the character in order to establish a rather cold tone in the narrative. *Remainder* does not assume the tone of lament for the tragic event that falls upon its protagonist. Vermeulen clearly underlines that “the novel adopts the grammar and not the psychology of post-trauma” (2012, p. 551) which is unlike the narrative technique of *The Child in Time* in which the psychology of trauma was scrutinized and the character himself was experiencing melancholy. In *Remainder*, not the characteristics of the subjects’ it illustrates, but the novel itself is melancholic. In this sense, melancholy is not in the content, but in the form, embedded not in the protagonist but in the reader.

Unlike McEwan’s *The Child in Time*, *Remainder* does not attempt to illustrate any kind of psychological depth. For Vermeulen, lyrical realism is dedicated to such psychological depths that McCarthy abolishes and criticizes through his fiction (2012, p. 552). The character in the novel is unable to feel empathy, which, in readers, creates no sympathy towards him. His lack of psychological depth is seen when he is on the edge of deciding what to do with 8.5 million pounds as Catherine suggests him to help Africans:

I felt a kind of vertigo. I knew what I meant but I couldn't say it right. I wanted to feel some connection with these Africans. I tried to picture them putting up houses from her housing kits, or sitting around in schools, or generally doing African things, like maybe riding bicycles or singing. . . I tried to visualize a grid around the earth, a kind of ribbed wire cage like on the champagne bottle, with lines of latitude and longitude that ran all over, linking one place to another, weaving the whole terrain into one smooth, articulated network, but I lost this image among disjointed escalator parts... I wanted to feel genuinely warm towards these Africans, but I couldn't. Not that I felt cold or hostile. I just felt neutral (2016, p. 35).

The character's lack of empathy is accompanied by his feeling of neutrality, which Vermeulen names as "McCarthy's programmatic antipsychologism" (2012, p. 556). This neutrality proves McCarthy's "intent to replace 'plot, depth, or content' with 'angles, arcs, and intervals'" (2012, p. 556). McCarthy puzzles the mind of the reader by creating such a character whose ability of empathy, which might be accepted as one of the most vital humane traits, is absent. The character's obsession in the re-enactment of trivial moments, and his keen attention to detail destructs the feeling of empathy in the reader. Thus, the distance that McCarthy puts between the character and the readers becomes visible, and it creates the sense of disturbance in the readers.

Although the narrative deviates from traditional narratives of melancholy, the hero of the novel carries some of the traces of melancholy. Freud indicates that mourning and melancholy can also occur after the loss of an abstraction (1981, p. 243). He contends that melancholic's loss is the "loss of a more ideal kind" (p. 245). The tragedy of the character in *Remainder* derives from the fact that he is acknowledged about his eternal, and unattainable authenticity. His loss, in this context, is the knowledge that he was never an authentic being, and that he will never become one. While clearly marking the line that separates mourning from melancholy, Freud claims that "the disturbance of self-regard is absent in mourning" (1981, p. 244). Melancholic's self-regard is disturbed, and self-reproaches are visible in his character. With the attained awareness after the accident, the character's approach towards both his and other's egos changes. In his perception, all egos diminish in value. In this sense, everything that defines human beings are "plastic, imperfect, unreal" (McCarthy, 2016, p. 25). Through this fact as well, McCarthy breaks his narrative's ties with psychological realism. By creating a character who is disinterested in his ego, and who lacks a psychological depth, McCarthy goes against the paradigm of the narratives of psychological realism. For Vermeulen, "*Remainder* raises the question: to what extent have received accounts of the relation between literature and trauma unwittingly adopted elements of traditional psychological realism – to what extent...are these accounts implicitly novelistic" (2012, p. 554). *Remainder*, in this sense, de-naturalizes the relation between trauma and literature. Vermeulen further contends that

Interestingly, the novel itself presents a different linkage between literature and trauma – a connection that does not depend on the mimesis of a traumatized psyche, but rather on the liberation of a dysphoric affect that confronts the reader with an evacuated subjectivity

that, precisely because it does not offer a position to identify with, leaves the reader affected (2012, p. 555).

Vermeulen argues that *Remainder* is not interested in creating the mimesis of the psychology of the traumatized, but it creates this dysphoric affect in the reader. Vermeulen separates this affect from emotion, an element that traditional narratives tend to transmit. For Vermeulen, emotions are related with “cognition and meaning and are structured narratively, affects are intractable intensities that escape from cognitive or semantic determination” (2012, p. 557).

In Slavoj Žižek’s *Living in the End Times*, it is argued that human beings are in a permanent state of Alzheimer’s and trauma. Žižek contends that the twenty-first century is the era where human beings are post-traumatic entities who are alienated to their own selves, and to the time and place they are occupying. Such entities, Žižek claims, are derived from the concept of trauma which he defines as “the violent intrusion of something radically unexpected, something the subject was absolutely not ready for, and which it cannot integrate in any way” (2010, p. 292). The hero of *Remainder* suffers from a ‘violent intrusion,’ or in terms of Ian McEwan, ‘malevolent interventions.’ This unexpected intervention falls upon the character and turns him into a post-traumatic subject whose contact with reality is shaken, and whose relationship with time and space is disturbed. The character’s identity is solely defined by his traumatic experience, and the Settlement’s payment as a result.

For Žižek, melancholics resist breaking the ties with the lost object, in order to accomplish the attachment (2000, p. 658). The character’s loyalty to the re-enactments and the repetitions can be explained with a feeling of melancholy that he is unaware of, or not disturbed by. Žižek further claims that “melancholy is not simply the attachment to the lost object but the attachment to the very original gesture of its loss” (2000, p. 660). The character is attached to the idea of loss in itself. As Vermeulen states, “melancholy is often seen as a heroic refusal to surrender the lost object to a public space that dishonors its memory, or simply forgets to remember it” (2011, p. 256). The character in the novel (re)creates his own public space that repeatedly honors his memory with hired staff members, and punishes the ones who does not properly conduct the job. From these aspects, *Remainder*’s hero carries the symptoms of melancholy with a reckless attitude.

Radden clarifies that for Freud, melancholy is “a narcissistic disorder of loss intrinsically directed toward the self” (p. 44). Regarding the character in *Remainder*, the ‘narcissistic disorder of loss,’ which is all about the character’s loss of memory, is totally directed towards himself. The character is self-centered and narcissistically in search of his lost memories through re-enactments, and he runs after the pleasure he individually gets from the re-enactments. The hero of the novel acts like Pinocchio, demanding to be real and authentic. As the re-enactments are being repeated, the character narrates an enactment where a boy fills his car’s windscreen washer container, but two liters of water mysteriously disappear in the reservoir, which shows that the character lives nihilism on the extreme: “They’d vaporized, evaporated. And do you know what? It felt wonderful. Don’t ask me why: it just did. It was as though I’d just witnessed a miracle: matter – these two liters of liquid – becoming un-matter...Transubstantiated” (2016, p. 153). As he starts the engine and the windshield works, the whole windscreen water gets squirted on the dashboard and every part of the character’s body, which he curiously enjoys and wants immediately to include the incident in his re-enactments. When the re-enacted moments are reckoned, it is visible that each includes, in McEwan’s terms, a ‘malevolent intervention’ inside: a black man getting shot, windscreen water suddenly splashing every corner of the car, bank robbery, and the event that caused all these re-enactments (the accident) can be all listed under the title of malevolent interventions.

Darian Leader asserts that “in mourning, we grieve the dead; in melancholia, we die with them” (2008, p. 8). The hero of *Remainder* metaphorically died in the accident, which makes him a pure necronaut. The character that remains from the accident keeps dying with his lost authentic self in each attempt of remembering the incident, and what came after it, which disturbs reader in the unconscious level. Death, as a theme, plays a huge role in this disturbance, as the narrator asserts that “no beauty without violence, without death” (p. 171). Freud contends that “death is the true result, and to that extent the purpose of life” (2001, p. 51). The line that Freud draws here is surpassed and aestheticized when McCarthy and Critchley declared in their manifesto that: “there is no beauty without death, its immanence. We shall sing death’s beauty – that is, beauty” (Second Manifesto, 1999). The moment when the character epiphanically decided to re-enact his memories is the moment when the character wants to re-create the space and invade it, which draws a similar line with what the

INS declared in its first manifesto about death: “death is a type of space which we intend to map, enter, colonise and, eventually inhabit” (1999). His re-created, and re-enacted memory becomes a space where authenticity meets with inauthenticity, and where unreal is mingled with the real, as there occur some points in the re-enactments where it is not possible to divide enactment from a re-enactment, or real action from pretention. As indicated in the manifesto, the character’s memory, functioning as the metaphor of death here, becomes a space where he first maps, then enters, colonizes, and inhabits. Furthermore, memory is the tool that enables him to conduct the re-enactments which make him reach the pleasure he gets from death.

In “Mourning and its Relation to Manic-Depressive States” Melanie Klein brings her own analysis of mourning, melancholy, and depression. For Klein, as a baby is separated from his/her mother’s breast, the story of mourning for him/her begins (1940, p. 125). In Klein’s concept of paranoid-schizoid position, it is demonstrated that between the mourner and the lost object, there occurs a split self: “there are consequently split parts of the self in relation to split parts of the object” (Keogh, 2019, p. 22). In order for mourning and melancholy to reach an end, the split selves, which are described as one being bad and the other good, must be mingled and reach a unity. As McCarthy indicates that he employs Paul de Man’s approach to irony, bringing an “unfixable split between action and consciousness, the subject and the world,” he also asserts split as a motif in the declaration of the INS. Hence, the idea of split identity is also used in *Remainder* in the sense that Melanie Klein pointed out: the character in the novel is split with the accident, with what comes out of “Technology. Parts, bits” (McCarthy, 2016, p. 5). All throughout the narration, instead of trying to blend his split parts, the character would like to multiply them through re-enacting. In this sense, re-enactments are the objects that his split identity is related with. As in McCarthy’s interpretation of Paul de Man’s irony, the connecting line between his action and consciousness, and between the subject and the world is experiencing an incurable split that the character of the novel is content with. The moment of *déjà vu* is initiated by a crack which symbolically refers to being split. Lacan’s mirror, in this sense, is broken in *Remainder* and the character’s identity is shattered into bits and pieces.

The kind of melancholy that McCarthy’s *Remainder* possess is neither similar to Dürer’s nor to Munch’s capturing of the concept. Rather, it is closer to Diego Velazquez’s *mise en abyme* painting *Las Meninas* where the creator of the art is within

the artwork, staring directly to its audience. In this sense, the melancholy in *Remainder* is the dysphoric affect that the narrative creates in the minds of the readers. A necronaut is fully aware of the fact that being authentic is a long-lost characteristic. The character of the novel became aware of it only through “something falling from the sky. Technology. Parts, bits” (p. 5) as the readers acknowledge it after reading *Remainder*. In this sense, the novel acts like those parts and bits, and they fall on the heads of the readers. *Remainder* is the funeral of the novel genre where McCarthy burdens the grief of its death on his readers’ shoulders, while the genre itself embraces its death (and its potentials) with a laughter.

3.1.3. Conclusion

By benefiting from Roland Barthes on realism, McCarthy contends that “realism consists not in copying the real but in copying a (depicted) copy of the real...through secondary mimesis, [it] copies what is already a copy” (McCarthy, 2017, p. 63). McCarthy uses J. G. Ballard’s *Crash* (1973) to better illustrate the condition of real, which he calls as “catastrophic real” (2017, p. 68). Regarding *Remainder*, it is obvious that McCarthy adopted some of the elements from Ballard’s *Crash*, and the concept of symphorophilia from a different perspective: the plastic interloper hero of *Remainder* enjoys one of the re-enactor’s death in the bank robbery scene by saying “‘Beautiful’ I whispered” (McCarthy, 2016, p. 260). The character is cathected to the re-enactments and his ego does not want to be detached from them. Within the chaotic atmosphere of the robbery, the character enjoys the feeling of tingling and the weightlessness: “I felt I was being elevated, that my body had become unbearably light and unbearably dense at the same time” (p. 262). In this sense, this might be like the feeling of orgasm (“le petite mort” small death) that a second-hand and inauthentic character can feel the most.

As McCarthy quotes from Ballard about inventing reality within fiction, his *Remainder* includes a character who invents his own reality within the narration, in which the invented reality is a total simulacrum. The character is the embodiment of the philosophy that no reality can be attained, as the whole universe is in a circle of repetition. For the Ballard’s character’s real, McCarthy states that it is “a traumatic real; a real that’s linked to repetition; a real whose framework of comprehension is ultimately neither literary nor philosophical but psychoanalytic” (2017, p. 69).

Ballard's protagonist dies on the mission, McCarthy's one causes deaths for the sake of simulation. In this sense, McCarthy invents his own reality within *Remainder*.

Before (re)enacting the bank robbery, the narrator comments about the fact that they repeatedly rehearsed the robbery many times before (re)enacting it:

In one sense, the actions we'd decided to perform had all happened already...In another sense, though, it never happened – and, this being not a real event but a staged one, albeit one staged in a real venue, it never would. It would always be to come, held in a future hovering just beyond our reach. I and the other re-enactors were like a set of devotees to a religion not yet founded: patient, waiting for our deity to appear, to manifest himself to us, redeem us; and our gestures were all votive ones, acts of anticipation" (p. 251).

The turning of the robbery scene into a real theft where people got killed, pictures a hyperreal shifting onto (not back to) a 'real.' Hence, the real that comes out of the bank is not the version of real before it had turned into a hyperreal, but it is a new form of real that McCarthy invents through his fiction. It is a real invented albeit the atmosphere in which neither the territory nor the map is accessible, or a condition in which the map exceeds the boundaries of the territory (and its concept of real), yet a sort of real can be invented. The bank heist scene goes wrong out of a fallacy that existed in the pre-enactments yet absent in the real bank: a kink on the carpet. Once again, all the events in the novel are knotted into a remainder which brought joy for the character but despair for others. For this scene, Attridge asserts that "Repetition – one of the most insistent leitmotifs of the book – proves impossible" (2016, 19). Deleuze contends that maximum repetition would bring maximum difference (Deleuze, 1994, p. 13). The hero of *Remainder* tries to create maximum repetition to bring maximum sameness, yet the kink at the end disproves his theory. When the narrator is asked about the moment when he feels the most authentic and real, he answers:

A moment that had come about not through an orchestrated re-enactment, but by chance -without backup people, two-way radios, architects, police moles and forensic reports, without piano loops and licenses and demarcated zones. I'd been alone: alone and yet surrounded by people...I'd turned the palms of my hands outwards, felt the tingling begin – and been struck by the thought that my posture was like the posture of a beggar...asking passers-by for change. The tingling had grown; after a while I decided that I would ask them for change... 'Spare change...spare change... spare change'... (p. 215-216).

The moment he felt the least inauthentic is a moment when he, as a survivor of an accident which caused him to have eight and a half million pounds in his bank account, imitated a beggar. Therefore, it is emphasized that one can be real as much as the narrator of *Remainder* is. In the end, McCarthy's real is a real that can never be, or that one can never become. *Remainder* is an attempt to find a "realism that is more true to

the materiality of the world” (Vermeulen, 2011, p. 261). Filling the narrative with suspension and despair, the narrator underlines that the whole universe is like a mechanical Fisher Price toy whose functionality is due to a point:

Eventually the sun would set for ever – burn out, *pop*, extinguish – and the universe would run down like a Fisher Price toy whose spring has unwound to its very end. Then there’d be no more music, no more loops. Or maybe, before that, we’d just run out of fuel. For now, though, the clouds tilted and the weightlessness set in once more as we banked, turning, heading back, again (p. 275).

What remains from the (re)creation is the three R’s again: repetition, repetition, and repetition, as each repetition leaves remainders behind. However, the repetition that remains is not similar to Monet’s way of repeating, but it is similar to Andy Warhol’s repetitions, which are re-captured in a more obscure and a depressing form in Tom McCarthy’s fiction. The contribution of the novel to our understanding of memory is its examination not through time, but through space, and melancholy is not the idea or content but what the novel generates.

CHAPTER IV

***THE ONLY STORY* (2018) BY JULIAN BARNES**

Born in 1946 in Leicester, Julian Barnes occupies an influential and significant position for the contemporary British fiction, being the writer of over twenty books, including novels, short stories and collections of essays. Under the pseudonym of Dan Kavanagh (Kavanagh being the surname of his wife Pat whom he was married for 29 years until the death in 2008) Barnes wrote four detective novels as a result of a bet he made with one of his friends, proving his mastery over writing as a profession. Starting with *Metroland* (1980), Barnes has produced various novels over the years: *Before She Met Me* (1982), *Flaubert's Parrot* (1984), *Talking it Over* (1991), *Love, etc* (2000), 2011 Man Booker Prize winner, *The Sense of an Ending* (2011), *The Noise of Time* (2016), and *The Only Story* (2018) are only some of them. Regarding the narrative techniques and the plot sequences of his novels, each narrative is a new and distinct example, which gives Barnes his polyphonic tone as a writer. His narrative strategies vary in each novel: while in *Flaubert's Parrot*, the protagonist, like a journalist writing in a postmodernist narrative form, puzzles the position of truth and demonstrates how it is multiplied, in *Talking it Over* a triangular love affair is depicted by three different narrators narrating the events. For Peter Childs, "Barnes is sometimes considered a postmodernist writer because his fiction rarely either conforms to the model of the realist novel or concerns itself with a scrutiny of consciousness in the manner of modernist writing" (2011, pp. 14-15). In an interview made by Robert Birnbaum, Barnes states: "Everybody's autobiography is a fiction but not the supreme fiction. I work as a novelist, and I also work as a journalist. And I am very conscious of the essential difference of the two skills" (as qtd in Guignery and Roberts, 2009, p. xi). However, with the death of his wife whom he had been devotedly attached, the fiction of Barnes experienced a shift:

recently his work has been more lyrical and elegiac, and less humorous and playful in tone, albeit maintaining irony as the Barnesian trait. He has assumed a more intimate and direct voice

while concentrating on concepts such as aging, memory, time, friendship and love. As a mature writer, he sounds more contemplative and melancholic in his books which stand as meditative studies on certain emotions (Antakyalıoğlu, 2020, p. 159).

In this sense, the effects of the loss of Pat Kavanagh is visible in his narratives, which makes Barnesian fiction a form of fiction that is highly under the influence of mourning, melancholy, elegy and death. His memoir titled *Levels of Life* (2013) shows how Barnes was damaged by the loss of his wife, as he pictures his life before the death of Kavanagh as a life ‘on the level’ and after it as a life that fell from the level (2013, p. 75). When asked about loss as an element in his fiction, Barnes states that “there is probably a pervasive melancholy in a lot of what I write. I think that this partly comes from the objective assessment of the human condition, the inevitability of extinction” (Freiburg, 1999, p. 35).

For Matthew Pateman, “often regarded as witty and clever, Barnes’ novels are also subdued melancholic meditations” (as qtd in Childs, 2011, p. 5). Literature, for Barnes is “the best way of telling the truth” (Guppy, 2000, p. 64). Although it sounds paradoxical first, Barnes states that “of course fiction is untrue but it’s untrue in a way that ends up telling greater truth than any other information system...that exists” (Freiburg, 1999, p. 39). The truth that comes out of his fiction ends up being a more important truth than what is accepted as true outside fiction. Similar to the J. G. Ballard’s idea indicating that “we live inside an enormous novel. It is now less and less necessary for the writer to invent the fictional content of his novel. The fiction is already there. The writer’s task is to invent the reality” (as qtd in McCarthy, 2017, p. 57). The truth, in Barnesian novels, are told through, or invented out of fiction. This, in Barnes’ fiction, coincides with the concept of fabulation that Robert Scholes pointed out in his *Fabulation and Metafiction* (1979): “Fabulation, then, means not a turning away from reality, but an attempt to find more subtle correspondences between the reality which is fiction and the fiction which is reality” (as qtd in Childs, 2011, p. 8).

The concepts of love, loss and death can define the works of Barnes. If his writings are accepted as palimpsest texts, these notions are under different layers. In *Nothing to be Frightened of*, Barnes contemplates on his views on religion, life and death, which are narrated through the anecdotes about his family, as the book is opened with the following statement: “I don’t believe in God, but I miss Him” (2008b, p. 1). When asked about the recurring theme of death in his fiction and non-fiction, Barnes answers: “this obsession...comes from not wanting to be dead and not liking the idea

of being dead, and being frightened by the idea of not existing anymore for eternity” (Guignery and Roberts, 2007, p. 161). His view on death is shaped by his approach towards religion and God, whose existence is denied by Barnes. On love, which is another repeated concept in his novels, Barnes indicates that “all novelists ought to write about love because it’s what most people are most intensely interested in for at least some part of their lives” (Guignery et al., 2007, p. 167). While speculating on love, Barnes also elaborates on the epigraph of *Talking it Over*: “He lies like and eye-witness” refers to a puzzling aspect of love: “love is such a rich subject is that it is where, more than any other area of life, the participants’ memories differ” (Guignery et al, 2007, p. 167).

4.1. *The Only Story*

Published in 2018, *The Only Story* is the 13th novel of Julian Barnes. In her archival study of Julian Barnes, Vanessa Guignery commences her book with the cover designs of *The Only Story* on which statements about love are first written then crossed out:

Heidegger perceived the benefit of crossing out a word and leaving both the deletion and the (still legible) word in place to suggest the difficulty of conveying meaning within the constraints of language. The process of placing terms under erasure allows one to read the discarded words and therefore be aware of not only what has been deemed inadequate but also what has been retained among a set of possibilities (Guignery, 2020, p. 1).

The design of crossing-out specific sentences is an important clue about how love is experienced, approached, and perceived within one’s lifetime in general, and how it is captured in Barnes’ narration specifically. This design is also a hint for how the narration of *The Only Story*, and love in itself, will be illustrated in the novel.

The Only Story opens with an epigraph taken from Samuel Johnson: “Novel: A small tale, generally of love” (1755). Asserting the aim in writing this novel by also referring to the ontology of the genre as a whole, Barnes starts the narration with a question coming from the first-person narrator on the only real question in life: “Would you rather love the more, and suffer the more; or love the less, and suffer the less? That is, I think, finally, the only real question” (2018, p. 3). Divided into three chapters, *The Only Story* is a novel on love and loss narrated from three different voices. As in *The Sense of an Ending*, the old narrator, again, outlooks into one story out of millions of others in his life as he reaches a certain point in life, a point where he can sort out his ‘only story.’ In the first chapter, the first-person narrator Casey Paul (19) tells how his life in the south of London crosses with the life of Susan Macleod (48), who is married

and have two daughters. This chapter encapsulates how Paul met with Susan in the tennis club, how he fell in love with her and how their unusual love affair continued as a result: “The fact that she was ‘old enough to be my mother’ did not go down well with my mother. Nor my father; nor her husband; nor her daughters; nor the Archbishop of Canterbury” (2018, p. 50). Throughout the narration, Susan keeps repeating the same definition saying that their generation is “a played-out generation” (p. 27) and someday, she will inevitably do her “disappearing act” (p. 49). Susan advises Paul to have a ‘running-away fund,’ and she gives him a £500 worth check, as Susan believes that all men should have a reputation and a running-away fund. Regarding their characteristic differences, Paul has “the cynicism, and the purported understanding of life” whereas Susan “is neither cynical nor idealistic” (p. 72). The first-person narrator pictures how he perceived life, love, sex, marriage, memory, reputation and truth at the age of 19, as he ends the chapter with the information that Susan died and “this is how I would remember it all, if I could. But I can’t” (p. 83). In the second chapter, the narrative voice turns from ‘I’ to ‘you’ as Paul and Susan leave their hometown to live together. Paul becomes a lawyer to benefit his finances as Susan becomes depressed because of her recent alcohol addiction. Their secret love affair is only shared with Joan, a friend of Susan, and a few friends of Paul. Their love loses its taste that it had when they were getting to know each other for the first time. From the perspective of Paul, the junior love of the first part turns into a more senior, more mature form of love. The third chapter opens with a question coming from the third-person narrative voice: “He sometimes asked himself a question about life. Which are truer, the happy memories, or the unhappy ones? He decided, eventually, that the question was unanswerable” (p. 161). Paul is detached from Susan, as she is hospitalized because of Alzheimer’s. It is the chapter in which Paul has to conduct his last duty to his lover whom he is about to lose: “one of the last tasks of his life was to remember her correctly” (p. 163). He comes to a point in his life in which he is better at comprehending and evaluating his life and his past: “So his life consisted mainly of observation and memory” (p. 203). The novel ends with Susan’s death, as Paul leaves the hospital and decides to continue the rest of his life.

Viewing *Levels of Life* as the sub-text of *The Only Story* (both matching in form and in content), Antakyalıoğlu contends that the first chapter of *The Only Story* is the chapter of ‘the sin of height’ in which the lovers live love and life in the height of sins,

in the second chapter, “from the ‘sin of height,’ they fall ‘on the level,’ of reality” and the third as the ‘loss of depth’” (Antakyalioğlu, 2020, pp. 161-162). *The Only Story*, in this sense, acts as a palimpsest, carrying *Levels of Life* underneath. Barnes, with the death of Pat, and Paul with the death of Susan, lost their depth “because every love story is a potential grief story” (Barnes, 2013, p. 67). Now, their lives are depthless and off the level. Here, Barnes underlines the permanent scar that love and loss leave behind.

The narrative structure of *The Only Story* is built around the melancholic memory of the old narrator who gradually steps away from his own (the only) story. Paul Ricoeur asserts that “stories are told and not lived; life is lived and not told” (2012, p. 187). *The Only Story* mingles these two by being a story that is lived and a life which is told. The first-person narrator of the novel states that

Most of us have only one story to tell. I don’t mean that only one thing happens to us in our lives: there are countless events, which we turn into countless stories. But there’s only one that matters, only one finally worth telling. This is mine (2018, p. 3).

4.1.1. Elaboration of Memory in *The Only Story*

Regarding memory, *The Only Story* is an important work, as it can be taken as a case study about how memory functions, and what is the paradigm of its process of selection and elimination. Antakyalioğlu contends that both Paul, and Barnes (in *Levels of Life*) endeavor to soften the damages of their past through visiting their memories (2020, p. 164). Like in McEwan’s *The Child in Time*, in *The Only Story*, the character who suffers a loss expands his memory in the narration. Whereas in McCarthy’s *Remainder*, memory was represented as a very limited sphere, as the whole narrative was built on the repetition of a few recollections remembered vaguely. In *Nothing to be Frightened of*, Barnes asserts that

Memory is identity. I have believed this since – oh, since I can remember. You are what you remember. You are what you have done; what you have done is in your memory; what you remember defines who you are; when you forget life you cease to be, even before your death (2008b, p. 140).

The excerpt provided above plays a huge role both in understanding how Barnes perceives the borders between memory and identity, and how he employs his approach to the concepts in *The Only Story*. In *Nothing to be Frightened of*, Barnes further states that he “once spent many years failing to save a friend from a long alcoholic decline...watched her, from close at hand, lose her short-term memory, and then her long-term, and with them most of everything in between” (2008b, pp. 140-141). The

characteristics of the friend he does not name in *Nothing to be Frightened of* draws highly similar lines with the condition of Susan in *The Only Story*: “Susan’s mind has slipped a little more each time you see her. Short-term memory disappeared a while ago, and long-term memory is a shifting, blurry palimpsest from which clear but unconnected phrases will occasionally be picked out by her fading brain” (2018, p. 187). As Susan gradually lost her memory, she also gradually lost her identity. Thus, she ceased to be as she forgot her life even before her physical death.

Speculating on memory, while some things are clearly marked in Paul’s memory, he underlines some moments, objects, or situations that he never remembers, such as the weather, the clothes he wore and the food he ate (p. 32). About these forgotten topics, Paul states: “Who cares? My memory certainly doesn’t, and it’s memory which is my guide here” (p. 32). This also derives from Barnes’ characteristics as a writer, as he underlines that “When I first started writing fiction, I laid down two rules for myself: no dreams, and no weather” (2008b, p. 148). Similar to *The Only Story*, Barnes’ 1996 novel *England, England* begins with a question: “‘What’s your first memory?’ someone would ask. And she would reply, ‘I don’t remember’” (Barnes, 2008a, p. 3). He opens his narration by picturing the chain-like form of memory in which each moment one defines as the very first memory turns out to be in relation with the one preceding it: “‘there is always a memory just behind your first memory, and you can’t quite get at it’... Your first memory wasn’t something like your first bra, or your first friend, or your first kiss...” (2008a, p. 3). Yet, in *The Only Story*, Paul states that he does not remember his first kiss with Susan:

I don’t remember when we first kissed. Isn’t that odd? I can remember 6–2; 7–5; 2–6. I can remember that old driver’s ears in foul detail. But I can’t remember when or where we first kissed, or who made the first move, or whether it was both of us at the same time (2018, p. 24).

By contradicting himself, Barnes would like to demonstrate how memory functions autonomously by emphasizing that novelties are not always prioritized in memory. Barnes’ approach to memory’s nature is the application of the ideas of Derrida. In his *Memoires for Paul de Man*, Derrida states that

If there is a finitude of memory, it is because there is something of the other, and of memory as a memory of the other, which comes from the other and comes back to the other...to topologies of mourning: to the memory of mourning and to the mourning for memory. This is why there can be no true mourning... (Derrida, 1988, p. 29)

The Only Story, in this sense, represents both kinds of mourning that is related with memory by Derrida: while Paul's narrative is his 'memory of mourning,' Susan's position in the story provides 'mourning for memory.'

Susan suffers from what Derrida explains as the one loss which is impossible to replace and to be assuaged: the loss of memory (Richter, 2010, p. 151). In the narrative of *The Only Story*, Paul and Susan experience different falls. In *Nothing to be Frightened of*, for the amnesia of his female friend, Barnes states that it is "the mind's fall from grace" (2008b, p. 141). He further states that "there was a comparable fall for those who knew and loved her" (p. 141). Barnes speculates on how he fooled himself about the amnesic person's being still the same underneath, yet tragically finding out that "the 'underneath' was being – had been – destroyed at the same rate as the visible surface...Identity is memory, I told myself, memory is identity" (p. 141). Paul expresses highly similar sentences with that of what Barnes states in *Nothing to be Frightened of*: "You no longer believe that she is still the same underneath. You believe that being 'not herself' is her new self. You fear that she is finally doing her disappearing act" (2018, p. 144). It is the part when Paul tragically realizes the keen relation between memory and identity. Susan's mind fell from grace and Paul could not help her. This might bring up a recurring scene Paul narrates in different parts of the narrative:

An image comes into your head one day, an image of your relationship to one another. You are at an upstairs window of the house on Henry Road. She has somehow climbed out, and you are hanging on to her. By the wrists, of course. And her weight makes it impossible for you to pull her back inside. It is all you can do to stop yourself being pulled out with her, by her. At one point she opens her mouth to scream, but no sound emerges. Instead, her dental plate comes loose; you hear it hit the ground with a plasticky clatter. You are stuck there, the two of you, locked together, and will remain so until your strength gives out, and she falls (p. 143).

The excerpt above is taken from the second part of the novel, and Paul refers to the same imagery in the third part of the novel, making a significant difference in the closure of this imagined position: "Perhaps what had happened was not that he had lost strength and let her fall. Perhaps the truth was that she had pulled him out with her weight. And he had fallen too. And been grievously damaged in the process" (p. 211). Paul fell in love and Susan fell from love, and with that fall, Susan dragged down Paul with her as well. Only with the present – third person – consciousness of the narrator, or in other words, only after facing his recollections at his old age, he realizes that

Susan's fall from grace also made Paul fall, and he was "damaged in the process" (p. 211).

Barnes is a writer who believes that "We talk about our memories, but should perhaps talk more about our forgettings, even if that is a more difficult – or logically impossible – feat" (2008b, p. 38). As Paul underlines that his memory is his guide in the narration and it does not care about some specific aspects of his past, how his memory functions in the narration sheds light upon the rather darker sides of his past. Paul asserts that

You understand, I hope, that I'm telling you everything as I remember it? I never kept a diary, and most of the participants in my story – my story! my life! – are either dead or far dispersed. So I'm not necessarily putting it down in the order that it happened. I think there's a different authenticity to memory, and not an inferior one. Memory sorts and sifts according to the demands made on it by the rememberer. Do we have access to the algorithm of its priorities? Probably not. But I would guess that memory prioritises whatever is most useful to help keep the bearer of those memories going. So there would be a self-interest in bringing happier memories to the surface first. But again, I'm only guessing (2018, p. 16).

Paul contends that with the death of the participants in his life story, he lost the collective ground that he could base his narrative while trying to recall things. Halbwachs claims that "our memories remain collective, however, and are recalled to us through others even though only we were participants in the events, or saw the things concerned" (1980, p. 23). The fact that Paul and Susan's relationship was a secret affair, and it was shared with a few people (with Joan in detail, and with Paul's friends on the surface), damages the collective memory Paul possesses. Thus, Paul was in need of others to form a collective memory, in a way to approve his unapprovable love affair. This is why when they are expelled from the tennis club, Paul enjoys the bad news: "part of me finds the news exhilarating. I – we – are a cause of scandal...the moral and social condemnation implicit in the phrase 'due to the circumstances' act, to my mind, as an authentication of our love" (p. 65).

Paul created a common memory with Susan, and as Paul gradually lost Susan, his memories created with her faded gradually as well. As Barnes asserts, "Binocular memory has become monocular" (2014, p. 109). This may be the reason why he cannot remember his first kiss with Susan. The third person narrator also states that

At this distance, he realized, he no longer had a memory of Susan's body. Of course, he remembered her face, and her eyes and her mouth and her elegant ears, and what she looked like in her tennis dress; there were photographs to confirm all this. But a sexual memory of her body: that had gone. He couldn't remember her breasts, their shape, their fall, their firmness or otherwise. He couldn't remember her legs, what form they took, and how she parted them and what she did with them when they made love. He couldn't

remember her undressing. It was as if she'd undressed as women did on the beach, with lots of prim ingenuity beneath a capacious towel, but emerging in a nightdress rather than a swimming costume. Had they always made love with the lights out? (2018, pp. 198-199).

Such intimate moments he experienced were only shared by Paul and Susan. Thus, the disappearing, either mentally or physically or both, of one of the participants of those memories creates a loss in the remaining person's memory as well. As Zekiye Antakyalıoğlu puts forward about memory: "Even if s/he manages to forget that past, others will not" (2017, p. 129). Paul cannot remember some moments lived with Susan and as a result, he suffers from the absence of those others who would not forget that past, although he sadly did. At the end of the first part, Paul states that "this is how I would remember it all, if I could. But I can't (p. 83).

Paul's reference to "a different authenticity to memory" (p. 16) is that memory works beyond some humane boundaries, such as consciousness. Memory functions independently from such limits, and human beings are not in control of the mechanism that goes into sorting, preserving and/or eliminating memories. In Bergson's terms, memory frees human beings "from the rhythm of necessity" (Bergson, 2005, p. 228). Memory's flow is independent from the ordinary 'flow of things,' and this is why Paul's story is not built on a linear line. However, what Paul guesses is that human beings tend to remember positive recollections more, as memory does a favor to human beings. About remembering positive and/or negative memories, Daniel L. Schacter asserts that "If we tend to remember negative events in greater detail than positive ones, then we may be at special risk for persistently retrieving painful particulars of those experiences we would like most to forget" (2002, p. 165). In the third part, Paul contends that

So, that familiar question of memory. He recognized that memory was unreliable and biased, but in which direction? Towards optimism? That made initial sense. You remembered your past in cheerful terms because this validated your existence. You didn't have to see your life as any kind of triumph – his own had hardly been that – but you did need to tell yourself that it had been interesting, enjoyable, purposeful. Purposeful? That would be pitching it a bit high. Still, an optimistic memory might make it easier to part from life, might soften the pain of extinction (2018, pp. 162-163).

After thoroughly examining his memory, Paul decides that memory functions towards optimism, which, nevertheless, proves the fact that it is a biased faculty. Schacter underlines that bias is one of the deficiencies of memory "which says more about how we feel *now* than about what happened *then*" (2002, p. 5). In the beginning of the narration, Paul asks "The question then is: do all these retellings bring you closer to

the truth of what happened, or move you further away? I'm not sure" (p. 3). It is an undeniable fact that Paul would narrate the position of Susan in his life differently while he was still in his youths, in a time when it was not his 'the only story' yet. The repetition of a specific narrative turns that chain of memories into a habit, as Bergson contends in *Matter and Memory*. Bergson states that habitual memory is "acquired by the repetition of the same effort. Like a habit, it demands first a decomposition and then a recomposition of the whole action" (2005, p. 80). As such narratives are repeated in advance, some details are included while some others are extracted. Thus, retellings do not bring Paul closer to the truth, as his current narration is built on what he feels, rather than what happened. On the contrary, retellings distance Paul from the truth, which might be referred to as 'the only truth.' In an interview, Barnes claims that "the nature of grief does change, not just because of time, but because of the repetitiveness of the memories" (Whitread, 2020).

Although memory works autonomously, it is interrelated with time. In this context, St. Augustine's definition of time is related with Paul's circumstance. For Augustine, "the present time of things past is memory; the present time of things present is sight; the present time of things future is expectation" (1963, p. 273). Similarly, about his relationship with Susan, Paul asserts that

I have no previous experience, and am quite unprepared for the full engagement of heart and soul and body that being with Susan involves – the intensity of the present, the thrill of the unknown future, the discarding of all the mingy preoccupations of the past (2018, p. 80).

Paul breaks the chronology of Augustine's definition as he first utters present, then future and past. Paul's present is filled with intensity of his love, his future is unknown, and his past is full of 'mingy preoccupations.' The peculiar aspect of Paul is that he lacks a future in his relationship with Susan, even at the very first day of his falling in love. Zekiye Antakyalıoğlu states that "The love, for which Susan sacrificed her long past, and Paul his long future, always stood outside of time, yet time somehow played a greater role in it than expected" (2020, p. 162). In this sense, their love, in its present form, promised no expectation for their future. This is a fact Paul comprehends only after he falls from 'the sin of height.' Paul asserts that "Strange how, when you are young, you owe no duty to the future; but when you are old, you owe a duty to the past. To the one thing you can't change" (2018, p. 168). This statement echoes the narrator of *The Sense of an Ending*: "It strikes me that this may be one of the differences between youth and age: when we are young, we invent different futures

for ourselves; when we are old, we invent different pasts for others” (Barnes, 2012, p. 80). As Bergson underlines, “To call up the past in the form of an image, we must be able to withdraw ourselves from the action of the moment” (2005, p. 83). Only after arriving at the unknown future, one becomes able to be in touch with his past that he can never alter. This is why, while he was breaking the chronology of Augustine, Paul named his past after his future. About forgetting memories lived with Pat, Barnes states that “it feels as if she is slipping away from me a second time: first I lose her in the present, then I lose her in the past. Memory – the mind’s photographic archive – is failing” (2014, p. 98).

On the other hand, Susan’s perception of time is also problematized out of her amnesic condition she is suffering in the narration. While Paul endeavors to recall some memories about Susan, he asserts that

You remember her saying that she wasn’t afraid of death, and that her only regret would be over not knowing what happened afterwards. But now she has very little past and – literally – no thought for the future. She has only a ghostplay on some frayed screen of memory, which she takes to be the present (p. 188).

Here, Barnes emphasizes the keen relationship between time, memory, and identity. As Susan loses her past and future, she becomes captivated in an ambiguous present where her characteristic traits are faded. Thus, the boundaries of Susan’s identity are drawn by Paul as he narrates his recollections. In this respect, not only the mourner, but also the mourned for is driven into a puzzling concept of time.

About memory’s relation with loss, Darian Leader underlines that “each memory and expectation linked to the person we have lost must be revived and met with the judgment that they are gone forever” (2008, p. 26). Paul clearly contends that

As he saw it, one of the last tasks of his life was to remember her correctly. By which he didn’t mean: accurately, day by day, year by year, from beginning to middle to end. The end had been terrible, and far too much middle had overhung the beginning. No, what he meant was this: it was his final duty, to both of them, to remember and hold her as she had been when they were first together. To remember her back to what he still thought of as her innocence: an innocence of soul. Before such innocence became defaced...To see, to recall what she had been like before he lost her, lost sight of her, before she disappeared...Lost sight of the first person – the only person – he had loved (2018, pp. 163-164).

The whole narrative of *The Only Story* is written to commemorate the loss of Susan, and it functions as a tribute. The narrative is Paul’s last duty for his love that he defines as his first and foremost love affair. As he divides his love’s duration into three different phases as beginning, middle and end, he also divides the voice of his narrative

into three points of views. Paul's story including Susan is his "only one that matters, only one finally worth telling" (p. 3).

The narrative structure of the novel demonstrates a peculiarity in itself: each part of the novel is narrated by respectively first, second, and third-person narrative voices, and in chapters after the first one, the voice of the narrative changes in accordance with Paul's mood. Paul asserts that "first love always happens in the overwhelming first person. How can it not? Also, in the overwhelming present tense. It takes us time to realize that there are other persons, and other tenses?" (p. 71). *The Only Story* is a unique example for the representation of narration's keen relation with memory. Derrida contends that "we preserve our memory and our knowledge of them; we can then speak of them, and do them justice, as long as their image (eidolon) remains legible" (1989, p. 3). Yet, Paul is gradually estranged to his 'only story' as he gradually lost his lover, as well as her image. For the condition of memory of the alcoholic Susan, Paul underlines that "Now she is doing another disappearing act. Her body is still there, but what lies inside – her mind, her memory, her heart – is slipping away. Her memory is obscured by darkness and untruth, and persuades itself towards coherence only by fabulation" (2018, p. 143). Susan gradually ceases to be before her death, as her memory is withered.

In the third part, the third-person narrative voice states that "nowadays, the raucousness of the first person within him was stilled. It was as if he viewed, and lived, his life in the third person. Which allowed him to assess it more accurately, he believed" (p. 162). Barnes builds Paul's story on a dramatic arc: his story encapsulates an exposition and a rising action in the first-person, climax in the second, and the fall in the third-person narrative voices. The more his story gets sadder, the farther he moves away from his own memories and his inner voice, which might prove Paul's theory on memory's paradigm of prioritizing happier memories "to help keep the bearer of those memories going" (2018, p. 16). In this respect, Barnes states that "For the older writer, memory and imagination seem less and less distinguishable...memory itself comes to seem much closer to an act of the imagination than ever before" (2008, p. 244). In time, memory tends to act more like fiction and less like history, which is a trait of memory Barnes captures in *Love, etc*: "The story of our life is never an autobiography, always a novel – that's the first mistake people make. Our memories are just another artifice" (2009, p. 13).

In *Levels of Life*, Barnes speculates on the question of suicide after the death of his beloved wife: “The question of suicide arrives early, and quite logically” (2014, p. 80). Yet, he renounces the idea of suicide only because he possesses the memories of Pat. Barnes states that “I realized that, insofar as she was alive at all, she was alive in my memory...I was her principal rememberer. If she was anywhere, she was within me, internalised...I could not kill myself because then I would also be killing her” (2014, p. 90). In the end of his narration, while narrating the last moments he had with Susan, Paul’s memories of/with Susan are evoked: “I looked at her profile, and thought back to some moments from my own private cinema. Susan in her green-piped tennis dress, feeding her racket into its press; Susan smiling on an empty beach” (2018, p. 213). Although Paul does not touch upon the question of suicide (to the readers), in his last stare to Susan, he remembers memories which belong to the first part of the novel, the part that is narrated (and remembered) by the first-person voice, and the part in which life was still being lived on ‘the sin of height.’ Even if Paul’s memory weakens in time, he will be the ‘principal rememberer’ of Susan, and therefore he has to keep living as long as possible, as his memory is the only sphere where Susan can be kept alive.

4.1.2. Elaboration of Melancholy in *The Only Story*

Regarding melancholy, *The Only Story* represents melancholy in a form that is more similar to McEwan’s *The Child in Time*, rather than McCarthy’s *Remainder*. Melancholy, in *The Only Story*, is a concept that is simultaneously lived with/through mourning, as love is simultaneously lived with/through loss in the narration. It is a fact that all love stories are doomed to end, either with death or with mutual agreement. Yet, the love between Paul and Susan is a story whose end is sharply determined in its very beginning. Each step forward is a step backward in their relationship. In this sense, Paul’s ‘only story’ turns into a story of concurrent love and loss, making his narration a peculiar one in which the elegiac tone of the narrator is vigorously felt.

As underlined earlier in this chapter, Barnes’ *Levels of Life* is seeded under the narrative of *The Only Story*. Thus, while *Levels of Life* benefits the analysis of *The Only Story*, it also demonstrates how Barnes perceived and reflected love and loss as an author. Barnes underlines that “One grief throws no light upon another” (2014, p. 70). Like fingerprints, each story of grief, and in this sense each story of love, is unique, and one does not benefit the illumination of the others. “Grief is a human, not a

medical, condition, and while there are pills to help us forget it – and everything else – there are no pills to cure it” (Barnes, 2014, p. 71).

In *Levels of Life*, Barnes underlines the differences between grief and mourning:

There is the question of grief versus mourning. You can try to differentiate them by saying that grief is a state while mourning is a process; yet they inevitably overlap. Is the state diminishing? Is the process progressing? How to tell? Perhaps it's easier to think of them metaphorically. Grief is vertical – and vertiginous – while mourning is horizontal (2014, pp. 87-88).

In this respect, for Barnes, neither grief diminishes, nor mourning progresses in time. Grief is tested with its amount, while mourning is viewed with its duration. Barnes emphasizes that “Grief makes your stomach turn, snatches the breath from you, cuts off the blood supply to the brain; mourning blows you in a new direction” (2014, p. 88).

Freud’s “Mourning and Melancholia” is the essay in which he draws a visible line between mourning and melancholy by attributing normality for mourning, and pathology for melancholy. While mourning is “regularly the reaction to the loss of a loved person, or to the loss of some abstraction” (1981, p. 243) melancholy for him is

a profoundly painful dejection, cessation of interest in the outside world, a lowering of the self-regarding feelings to a degree that finds utterance in self-reproaches, and self-revilings, and culminates in a delusional expectation of punishment. This picture becomes a little more intelligible when we consider that, with one exception, the same traits are met with in mourning. The disturbance of self-regard is absent in mourning; but otherwise the features are the same (Freud, 1981, p. 244).

Jennifer Radden underlines that Freud’s perception of melancholy is separated from other definitions and approaches about the concept with its “theme of loss, the emphasis on self-accusation and self-loathing in melancholic subjectivity, and the elaborate theory of narcissism” (2000, p. 282). The melancholic, for Freud, “knows whom he has lost” but sadly unaware of “what he has lost in him” (1981, p. 245).

On the other hand, Derrida approaches mourning from a different standpoint. He approaches mourning with the knowledge that “One friend must always go before the other; one friend must always die first” (Brault and Naas, 2001, p. 1). As Antakyahoğlu states, Derrida perceives “the process of mourning not necessarily as a work that starts with the death of the loved one, but as a lifelong work” (2020, p. 163). Antakyahoğlu further asserts that “In Derrida’s perspective, if mourning aims at killing the dead, melancholy aims at keeping it alive” (2020, p. 165). In this respect, Slavoj Žižek’s approach towards melancholy comes very close with that of Derrida’s, as

Žižek contends that “mourning is a kind of betrayal, the second killing of the (lost) object, while the melancholic subject remains faithful to the lost object, refusing to renounce his or her attachment to it” (Žižek, 2000, p. 658).

Regarding *The Only Story*, mourning and melancholy both exist in different amounts and in different times and conditions. In the narration, mourning is provided through the (mental and physical) loss of Susan, whereas melancholy is provided through the memories lost with Susan. As the novel is told in three different parts with three different narrative voices, melancholy basically dominates the second and the third parts, as Paul falls from ‘the level’ and loses his depth as a result. Paul and Susan’s relationship experiences a distance as Susan becomes addicted to alcohol. This brings loneliness to Paul, who routinely visits Joan to share his sorrow and to get advice. Only in the second part, Paul realizes that he has been watering an already withered flower. Susan’s phase of bloom was left in the long past, and her repeated statement about inevitably playing her ‘disappearing act’ functions as a warning for Paul, and as a foreshadowing for the lack of future in their relationship. For Antakyalıoğlu, “This love was deprived of chronicity, victimized by time, threatened by reality, devoured all possibilities, cauterized the heart, but still remained unique and precious” (2020, p.162). The fact that Paul witnesses Susan’s disappearing act creates grief in him. Paul states that

Her mind oscillates between stunned inertia and hysterical volatility. But it is the disappearing act which her heart is doing, oh, that is the hardest part to bear. It is as if, in her thrashing about, she has stirred up the mud that lies at the bottom of us all. And what is now coming to the surface is unfocused anger, and fear, and frustration, and harshness, and selfishness and mistrust (2018, pp. 143-144).

The theory that ‘memory is identity’ is proven once again by the gradual disappearing of Susan. Freud states that in melancholia, “The object has not perhaps actually died, but has been lost as an object of love” (1981, p. 245). Paul’s case is the direct representation of what Freud underlined as the cause for melancholy to occur. Thus, Paul becomes hopeless for the relationship and decides to spend the 500 pounds that Susan gave him, as she was believing that everyone should keep a running-away fund. With the money, Paul stays in a hotel where he can summon prostitutes as he wishes. In this respect, tragically, Susan becomes the provider of both the fund, and the reason why Paul runs away. Upon beholding a counterfeit Van Gogh painting in the hotel room, Paul considers expectations and disappointments in life:

For instance, if you were in front of the real Van Gogh, you might get nervous, be full of jacked-up expectations about whether or not you were reacting properly. Whereas no one – you, least of all – cares how you respond to a cheap print on a hotel wall. Perhaps that is how you should live your life. You remember, when you were a student, someone maintaining that if you lowered your expectations in life, then you would never be disappointed. You wonder if there is any truth in this (2018, pp. 157-158).

At the end of the second part, Paul indirectly revisits the question that he believes to be “finally, the only real question” (p. 3). He comes to the point where he comprehends that he loved the more, and he suffered the more, whereas he could have loved the less and suffered the less.

Barnes asserts that “there is probably a pervasive melancholy in a lot of what I write. I think this partly comes from the objective assessment of the human condition, the inevitability of extinction” (Freiburg, 1999, p. 35). In this respect, the essence of melancholy in Barnesian narrations derive from human beings’ unavoidable extinction. Thus, the sense of an ending is what makes Barnes melancholic, as ‘the end’ for all human beings is anticipated to arrive in an unknown time and place. In *The Only Story*, while speculating on memory, Paul underlines that “an optimistic memory might make it easier to part from life, might soften the pain of extinction” (2018, pp. 162-163). Therefore, for Barnes, the effect of melancholy can be mitigated with optimism in memory. The less one remembers negative events, the less s/he would be melancholic. Yet, Paul does not propose this idea as a solution for the pain that his extinction brings, as it is an incurable subject.

Joan plays a significant role both in the progress of the non-linear plot and in Paul’s melancholy. As Paul decides to leave the responsibility of Susan to her daughter Martha, he thinks that he is now out of the woods, which is an idea refuted by Joan: “‘You’re still in it. You’ll always be in it. No, not literally. But in your heart. Nothing ever ends, not if it’s gone that deep. You’ll always be walking wounded. That’s the only choice, after a while. Walking wounded, or dead’” (2018, p. 177). For Paul, grief and mourning overlap, as the state does not diminish, and the process does not progress. What Joan states here is relatable with both Freud’s and Derrida’s approaches to mourning and melancholy with different perspectives. Freud states that “the complex of melancholia behaves like an open wound, drawing to itself cathectic energies – which in the transference neuroses we have called ‘anticathexes’ – from all directions, and emptying the ego until it is totally impoverished” (1981, p. 253). The fact that Paul narrates all the events after more than fifty years, and the fact that only

after the passing of a half-century, he names this story *The Only Story*, prove that Susan still functions like an open wound. At the end, Paul states that “Death is the only closure I believe in; and the wound will stay open until that final shutting of the doors” (p. 212).

On the other hand, from the perspective of Derrida, mourning cannot be squeezed into specific time periods from one’s life. The grief that accompanies mourning is a life-long journey, and when one starts a relationship, s/he knows that one of them will bring an end to the relationship, either willingly or not. Paul and Susan’s affair, in this respect, is an example in which the perspective of Derrida is lived through and through when compared with other love stories. In the second part, as Paul takes Susan to a hospital, he compares his current condition with his peers: “They (mostly) have girlfriends and (mostly) have peer sex...Yet here you are, in a hospital waiting area, surrounded by mad people, in love with a woman who is being characterized as potentially mad” (p. 130). The love between Paul and Susan was doomed to end up in the hospital waiting area, but young Paul, given the fact that he was 19, could not foresee it coming. In the third part, third-person narrator states that “But he certainly never regretted his love for Susan. What he did regret was that he had been too young, too ignorant, too absolutist, too confident of what he imagined love’s nature and workings to be” (p. 204). In this respect, while living on ‘the sin of height,’ Paul could not comprehend what the future looked like. Only with their fall ‘on the level’ Paul started to realize what kind of a condition he drove himself, which coincides with the second part of the novel. As Paul himself states, “he fell in love like a man committing suicide” (p. 166).

While discussing the sorrowful condition of Susan with Joan, Paul directly shows the symptoms of melancholy, which are underlined by Freud. Freud asserts that melancholics suffer “a lowering of the self-regarding feelings to a degree that finds utterance in self-reproaches, and self-revilings” (1981, p. 244), and it is one of the main aspects that differentiate melancholy from mourning for Freud. Similarly, in the third chapter, Paul states that

What he didn’t – or couldn’t – tell Joan was his terrifying discovery that love, by some ruthless, almost chemical process, could resolve itself into pity and anger. The anger wasn’t at Susan, but at whatever it was that had obliterated her. But even so, anger. And anger in a man caused him disgust. So now, along with pity and anger, he had self-disgust to deal with as well. And this was part of his shame (2018, p. 177).

Paul's self-reproach starts when he realizes that love may switch itself into pity and anger, which also stems from the shameful aspect of the love. The anger that occurs in mourners is generally directed towards the lost one, whereas Paul is not angry at Susan, he is angry at himself. This proves that Paul's case is melancholic in the sense that the value of his ego is diminished, and his self-regard is disturbed. As Freud underlines, "In mourning, it is the world which has become poor and empty; in melancholia it is the ego itself" (1981, p. 246).

If mourning does not necessarily start with the death of the beloved, from the perspective of Derrida, all throughout the time spent with Susan, Paul continuously mourned for her, and the life and youth he has lost with her. The peculiar aspect of Paul is that neither his mourning nor his melancholy is initiated with the death of Susan, but rather commenced with the "pairings...drawn by lot" (2018, p. 7), understood with their running-away, and felt with Susan's disappearing act. Ricoeur asserts that human beings are constantly in a battle with the "image of tomorrow's death" (2001, p. 9), as without the actual death, one may mourn for the future deaths that awaits him, either his or others. In her book titled *On Grief and Grieving*, Elisabeth Kübler-Ross theorizes this circumstance as 'anticipatory grief.' According to Kübler-Ross, anticipatory grief is a type of grief in which mourning begins while the beloved person is still alive. "Anticipatory grief is the 'beginning of the end' in our minds" (2014, p. 1). Kübler-Ross asserts that conditions such as nursing a patient of Alzheimer's create anticipatory grief, and with the actual death, the grief is doubled (2014, p. 5). Paul mourned for Susan long before her physical death. Yet, her physical death marked the start of Paul's regular grief.

Jean-Michel Ganteau argues that elegy is one of the common elements inevitably articulated into contemporary British novel, as human characteristics evolved after mid-2000, and the term 'vulnerable' used to define the current condition of humanity. Ganteau underlines that although elegy is a poetic form, it has become a mood in contemporary fiction. As Antakyalıoğlu asserts, Barnes' works "has been recently more lyrical and elegiac, and less humorous and playful in tone" (2020, p. 159). Elegy is in every part of *The Only Story*, experienced from three different narrative voices, from different levels of life. The only story of Paul, in which love and loss are concurrently experienced, and through and through felt, is the reason why Paul is damaged. Ganteau states that the subjects who belong to elegiac texts are 'vulnerable

to loss' (2015, p. 71). In this respect, Paul is not only vulnerable to loss, he is also simultaneously vulnerable to love, and to be loved.

Barnes openly asserts that he is an atheist, and it is often implied in his writings if he is referring to death or afterlife. Atheism, in this sense, plays an important role on how Barnes mourns for the loved ones, as in *Levels of Life*, while emphasizing the grand departure he experiences for Pat, he states that "I do not believe I shall ever see her again. Never see, hear, touch, embrace, listen to, laugh with...Nor do I believe we shall meet again in some dematerialized form. I believe dead is dead" (2014, p. 78). In this respect, the line that separates the mourning of a believer and a non-believer comes into light. The disbelief in the afterlife does not accompany any hope of meeting with the lost one in any form of being, while a believer would console him/herself with the expected and eternal contact with the lost one(s) in afterlife. For Barnes, what is lost is lost forever. Thus, the 'present time of things future' (expectation) is gone for good for the mourner. Barnes exhibits this philosophy in *The Only Story* through Paul's and Susan's speculations on afterlife. While Susan believes that afterlife "would all cause far too much trouble...like some dreadful bridge party" (p. 30), Paul asserts that "the cure for death is a frail belief in the afterlife" (p. 166). In this sense, both for Barnes and for Paul, death is something cureless.

The Only Story does not only aim to tell the story of Paul and Susan's secret love affair, but it also carries the aim of bringing a definition to love and truth, as the narrator believes that these concepts co-exist. Theirs is a love in which the following principle is accepted and embodied: "in love, everything is false and true: it is the one subject that nothing is absurd" (2018, p. 185). Paul underlines that "I'm not trying to spin you a story; I'm trying to tell you the truth" (2018, p. 33). Although Paul did not keep a diary, he kept a notebook where he wrote various definitions of love he had taken from movies, songs and novels. Paul's notebook functions as a friend whom he can pour out his unraveled feelings such as: "All alcoholics are liars" (p. 133) "All lovers are truth tellers...Therefore the alcoholic is the opposite of lover" (p.134). Yet, the old narrator, then, disagrees with the ideas he has written in his youth, since time proves them wrong. This brings up a similarity between the senior Paul and the senior narrator Tony of *The Sense of an Ending*:

But time ... how time first grounds us and then confounds us. We thought we were being mature when we were only being safe. We imagined we were being responsible but were only being cowardly. What we called realism turned out to be a way of avoiding things

rather than facing them. Time ... give us enough time and our best-supported decisions will seem wobbly, our certainties whimsical (Barnes, 2012, p. 93).

In addition to the sorrow of the loss of Susan, the third-person narrator also suffers from the knowledge that his solid beliefs from his youth are disproven and deconstructed in/through time. Paul finally abandons to search a definition for love, and he decides that “Perhaps he had always been wasting his time. Perhaps love could never be captured in a definition; it could only ever be captured in a story” (2018, p. 206). Instead of bringing a definition to love, Barnes decides to romantically demonstrate the definition of the novel genre as defined by Samuel Johnson in the epigraph, with the aim of capturing love. In this sense, *The Only Story* is a novel on love where there are multiple definitions and multiple refusals about the subject. The only argument proved in Paul’s narrative is Barnes’ statement from *Levels of Life*: “every love story is a potential grief story” (2014, p. 67), which is rephrased in *The Only Story* as follows: ““In my opinion, every love, happy or unhappy, is a real disaster once you give yourself over to it entirely”” (2018, p. 206).

When Freud’s theories on love and melancholy are reckoned, it is obvious that the ego of the lover and the ego of the melancholic carry highly similar traits. Freud contends that “when we are in love a considerable amount of narcissistic libido overflows on to the object” (Freud, 2001, p. 112). As a result, the lover views the object of love as “sublime and precious” (2001, p. 113), which results in the decrease in the value of the lover’s ego and prepares the ground for his/her self-sacrifice. About Susan, Paul states: “she was my life, and the rest wasn’t. Everything else could and must be sacrificed, with or without thought, as and when necessary” (p. 51). Paul’s ego is valueless as he is ready to sacrifice everything for Susan. At this part, when melancholics are considered, the position of the ego is the same. However, melancholic’s sorrow derives from an absence, either known or unknown, whereas lover’s derives from the presence of the object of love. The peculiarity of Paul’s case is that an absence was promised in Susan’s presence, which drove Paul into the simultaneous experiencing of love and melancholy. The lover’s ego is cathected to the object of love, and in any case of love, s/he must withdraw him/herself from the object. The fact that a melancholic does not willingly withdraw him/herself from the object to prolong the “existence of the lost object” (Freud, 1981, p. 244) problematizes his/her situation. No matter what form Susan alters into, Paul does not want to leave her: “But you cannot leave Susan. How could you bear to withdraw your love from her? If you

didn't love her, who would?...It is not just that you love her, but you are addicted to her" (p. 142). Paul is vigorously cathected to Susan and he does not want to detach himself from her. Paul further asserts that "Words once spoken, can't be unsaid. We may go on as if nothing has been lost, nothing done, nothing said; we may claim to forget it all; but our innermost core doesn't forget, because we have been changed forever" (p. 197). What Barnes depicts here is that even if a melancholic achieves the process of detachment, nothing will ever be the same, as everything leaves a mark. Darian Leader argues that for Freud, "Our egos...are made up of all the leftover traces of our abandoned relationships. Each broken relationship leaves its stamp on us, and our identity is a result of the building up over time of these residues... 'You are what you've loved'" (Leader, 2008, p. 55). While Paul's case proves Freud's point, it also demonstrates that the remainders left behind may sometimes get to be named as one's 'the only story.'

In *Levels of Life*, Barnes underlines the timelessness of the griefstruck: "Grief reconfigures time, its length, its texture, its function: one day means no more than the next, so why have they been picked out and given separate names?" (2014, p. 84). In *Camera Lucida*, Roland Barthes elaborates on another aspect and function of time in mourning: "It is said that mourning, by its gradual labor, slowly erases pain; I could not, I cannot believe this; because for me, Time eliminates the emotion of loss (I do not weep), that is all. For the rest, everything has remained motionless" (1981, p. 75). For Barthes, the pain that grief brings is permanent, and only the intensity of emotion is temporary. Although Barnes' and Barthes' ideas about the subject are highly similar, Barnes goes further by stating that "Grief is the negative image of love; and if there can be accumulation of love over the years, then why not of grief" (2013, p. 89). Paul's case demonstrates this idea, as Paul states that "the wound will stay open until that final shutting of the door" (p. 212).

4.1.3. Conclusion

In *Nothing to be Frightened of*, Barnes makes a summary of the human lifespan: "We live, we die, we are remembered, we are forgotten" (2008b, p. 218). In this sense, Susan lived and died, and she was first remembered and then (partly) forgotten by Paul. Human life can be squeezed into two acts: remembering and forgetting. It is, at the end, the only thing that matters, as "Identity is memory... memory is identity" (2008b, p. 141). Benefiting from Albert Camus, Barnes' *The*

Sense of an Ending proposed that “suicide was the only true philosophical question” (2012, p. 13). Whereas in *The Only Story*, Barnes arrives at the point where he underlines “the only real question” (2018, p. 3) which is about the keen relation between the amount of love and the amount of sorrow that love inevitably brings accordingly. In this respect, by creating a character like Paul who “fell in love like a man committing suicide” (p. 166), *The Only Story* combines what *The Sense of an Ending* proposed.

The Only Story poses many questions, and there is one question between the lines that finds its answer in the narration: Does grief ever come to an end? Paul’s grief, although it has similar applications of the Freudian approach to the concept, is closer to Derrida’s and Roland Barthes’ analysis of mourning and melancholy, as Barnes believes that “there are no pills to cure” grief (2014, p. 71). The idea that grief is permanent and is a lifelong journey is supported in *Levels of Life*, as Barnes asserts that

You do come out of it, that’s true. But you don’t come out of it like a train coming out of a tunnel, bursting through the Downs into sunshine and that swift, rattling descent to the Channel; you come out of it as a gull comes out of an oil slick; you are tarred and feathered for life (2014, p. 115).

At the end of the novel, after the death of Susan, Paul comes out of the hospital “as a gull comes out of an oil slick” (p. 115). He knows that he will keep on living with his wounds open, yet he will live on anyway:

But the rest of my life, such as it was, and subsequently would be, was calling me back. So I stood up and looked at Susan one last time; no tear came to my eye. On my way out I stopped at reception and asked where the nearest petrol station might be. The man was very helpful (2018, p. 213).

Paul concludes his ‘only story’ in a mood where he searches for a gas station, as he needs petrol in order to experience “countless events, which we turn into countless stories. But there’s only one that matters, only one finally worth telling” (p. 3).

CONCLUSION

Memory and melancholy hold a significant position for the contemporary novels, as these two concepts occupy large areas in the lives of human beings. Memory is gradually withered in an age where everything is tested with its speed. The faster we live, the faster we forget (Antakyalıoğlu, 2017, p. 139). Regarding melancholy, Darian Leader contemplates on the significance of fiction of mourning when compared with psychological sources about the concept: “perhaps the scientific literature on mourning that I had been searching for was simply all *literature*” (2008, p. 6). For Vermeulen, because of the “increasing currency of the notions of trauma and depression in the last quarter century” melancholy, in contemporary period, is situated on a solid ground than ever before (2011, p. 254). The current condition of human beings regarding their relationship with memory and melancholy can be finalized through the theories of Slavoj Žižek. Žižek puts forward that human life in the twenty-first century is defined by a constant traumatic state (2010, p. 292). What he names as the “post-traumatic” subjects suffer Alzheimer’s disease regarding their distance towards their identities, and the space and time they occupy. This new form of humanity experience “death as a form of life” (p. 294).

As repeatedly discussed in this thesis, memory and melancholy are formed of different layers of concepts such as time, death, love, loss, mourning and elegy. Each concept has a characteristic function in analysing and understanding memory and melancholy, and each is, directly or indirectly, related with the others. In the context discussed in the thesis, melancholy, as a pathological case that differs from mourning, derives initially from love, then a loss. The figure of loss can be variously depicted through disappearance or death, which, with itself, brings up the concept of time, as the sufferers are captivated within the duration of their elegiac condition. The keen relations among all these concepts, with regards to the main concepts of memory and

melancholy thoroughly discussed in the thesis, have been demonstrated in all three novels analysed in this thesis.

In the second chapter, Ian McEwan's *The Child in Time* reflects memory and melancholy with/through a McEwanesque incident, which is the loss of Kate as a malevolent intervention. Through Stephen's memory, McEwan positions melancholy alongside mourning, as for Stephen and Julie, no time is suitable for mourning the loss of Kate. The novel exhibits how a disconnection in the common memory of a couple creates hardships for the two. Future is hollow for Stephen and Kate, and it is nothing but an imagination, as Kate's growing up is an imaginative stage. The novel, in this respect, portrays a clear version of how future tense is problematized in cases of loss. With its closure, *The Child in Time* also captures struggles of healing. The ability of reaching a sheltered state in which melancholy can be recovered is demonstrated first through Julie, then through Stephen in the narration. In this sense, the novel also depicts the required solitude for healing melancholy. *The Child in Time* is a rich source with its different examples of melancholy reflected through different characters. With its peculiar subject matter, *The Child in Time* is both situated between melancholy and mourning, and between romance and elegy. The loss is both lamented and remedied in the narration. Yet, at the end, the readers are assured that the wound will always stay open. Even if they overcome their melancholy, their trauma will always be with them.

In the third chapter, McCarthy's *Remainder* represents memory and melancholy in an unconventional form when compared with McEwan's *The Child in Time*. In Zadie Smith's terms, McCarthy deviates from lyrical realism, which is also named as psychological realism by Vermeulen. *Remainder* avoids creating a hero who has a depth as regards his psychology, history, and character. Instead, the whole narrative is progressed through a few vague memories of the character, repeated for the sake of repetition. In this respect, *Remainder*'s hero is devoid of past as well as future. With *Remainder*, while trying to invent a reality in fiction, McCarthy would like to demonstrate the innate inauthentic nature of human beings as well. The novel can be accepted as an attempt to represent how humanity is stuck *in medias res*. When T.S. Eliot's words are reckoned, the point in which McCarthy wants to depict is "Neither from nor towards; at the still point, there the dance is" (Eliot, 2018, p. 394). To achieve this purpose, McCarthy blends the theories of philosophers and writers

such as Baudrillard, Deleuze, Ballard, Bergson, etc. Through the affect created in the form, not in the content of the novel, melancholy is created in the narrative, for the reader, which is the point in which *Remainder* deviates from conventional narratives of trauma, melancholy, and memory. Through its unique form, and its element of suspense, McCarthy creates a Neuronovel in which the post-traumatic effects of the character are transmitted to the readers, which distinguishes the novel from the followers of lyrical realism. *Remainder* breaks the ties with typical techniques of fiction, as it celebrates the death of the novel while it does not lament for the loss of depth. With all these traits specific to its own, McCarthy's *Remainder* can be situated in a significant position for the contemporary British novel.

In the fourth chapter, in Julian Barnes' *The Only Story*, memory and melancholy are represented in a dissimilar form when compared with Tom McCarthy's *Remainder*, and in a rather similar form to Ian McEwan's *The Child in Time*. Unlike McCarthy, Barnes follows the tradition of lyrical realism. *The Only Story* is formed of multiple layers that theorizes many concepts such as love, loss, memory, truth, and death. In this respect, the novel functions as a palimpsest. The novel gains its significance through its way of dealing with melancholy in three different narrative voices, having distinct and similar memories. While memory is used as a tool to mourn for Susan in the narration, it is also employed as an object of loss, since Paul does not only mourn for Susan, but also mourn for the memories lost with her. Paul's melancholy also derives from the fact that the absence of others in remembering positions him on a wobbling bridge where the validity and truth value of his memories are always questioned. As the voice of the narrative changes, *The Only Story* depicts how Paul realizes the link between memory and identity. The peculiar love affair demonstrated in the novel contributes to the concepts of memory and melancholy as Paul's love is concurrently a story of love and loss, which also puzzles Paul's perception of time, as he lacks a future with Susan. The last duty of Paul to his beloved Susan has to be made through remembering her, which is a problematized action that is reflected through three different points of view in each section of the novel. With its form, *The Only Story* is a perfect example and a metaphor for how one gets alienated both from his memory and from his identity. Regarding melancholy, the narrative of the novel is the demonstration of both Freudian and Derridean approaches towards the concept regarding the duration of grief.

All three novels demonstrate that memory and melancholy consolidate their position in contemporary novel more and more through various concepts: time and hope in *The Child in Time*, simulation, repetition and affect in *Remainder*, and simultaneous love and loss in *The Only Story*. In all three of these novels, the characters experience “death as a form of life” (Žižek, 2010, p. 294). In *The Child in Time*, Kate’s loss brings despair for Stephen, and he learns to live with the fear of an unknown future. In *Remainder*, the post-traumatic character metaphorically dies with the loss of his memory. His life after the accident is his practice of living death as a form of life, which is a condition he is satisfied as a necronaut. In *The Only Story*, the loss of memory is believed to be a metaphorical death, as one ceases to be in the absence of his/her memories. In this respect, Paul gradually learns to live with, and to cope with death while he is still living. In all three of these novels, although in different events, memory and melancholy are demonstrated through what Žižek claimed to be the humanity’s current form of living. Thus, for the characters of these novels, to be in time and to be out of time has become the same thing. Each character, in their own specific ways, experienced shifts regarding how they stood in and out of time. The common aspect of the characters in all three novels is the uncertainty of their future (expectations).

About how the characters in the novels react against melancholy, it can be argued that each has his own distinct manner. In *The Child in Time*, memory is used to travel in-between melancholy and mourning, as the characters of the novel reach a healthy circumstance at the end. Whereas the process of healing represented in *The Child in Time* is used with a totally contradicting purpose in *Remainder*, as the character (ab)uses repetition to get plunged deeper into his trauma, creating melancholy as an affect in the reader. The narrative of *The Only Story* represents the permanent mark that love and loss leave behind by the use of three different narrative voices. In this sense, *The Only Story* is the example of the demonstration of the eternal damage love leaves behind.

Memory and melancholy are formed of various layers of concepts that contemporary fiction is interested in, as the chosen novels depict these concepts with different content, form, and narrative choices. It can be concluded that contemporary British fiction has been aspired to (re)present memory and melancholy by depicting how time, love, loss, mourning, and elegy are blended in the contemporary condition

of human beings. In all three novels, the characters' wound stays open. Only the hero of *Remainder* enjoys the wound being open, while other protagonists lament for the damage. This is an indicative of the paradigm shift in the contemporary novel when compared with postmodern novels.

Regarding the narrative structures, the third-person narrative of *The Child in Time* is positioned in the present time of Stephen for whom periods of time exist figuratively. The loss of his child deprives him of the daily routines and the linear perception of time. The third-person narrator, in this sense, depicts how time is perceived after loss, and how loss is perceived within time. In *Remainder*, there is a first-person narrator who is an anti-person whose consciousness is hollowed out by an accident/trauma in which the past is absent. Time is suspended and/or reproduced in the narration as an artifice by the protagonist who was under the influence of cinematic time. Similar to a film director, he plays God in order to re-construct and to re-create anything, anytime, which disturbs the readers by poking their perception of real(ity), and shaking the solid ground that fiction is conventionally built on. In *The Only Story*, readers witness the ageing of the narrator through the shift of narrative perspective. The narration carries a gradual representation of the growing distance against one's own self, memory, and narrative through first, second and third person narrations. In these novels, the consciousness of all three protagonists, Stephen, anonymous hero, and Paul, and how their memory functions and melancholy that follows it, are presented to the reader from characters' perspective. In each narrative, the protagonists experience falling into accidents related with a child, memory, and love. All three protagonists are different remainders who have experienced and survived an accident that marked a turning point in their lives. For the protagonists, perception of time is corrupted, and the concept of time has become something oblique after the accidents.

To conclude, contemporary British fiction has been in direct relationship with loss, and the endeavor to remember it, as there is a deficiency in remembering in the current age. Due to the technological advancements, the daily agenda shifts so quickly that our memory gets weakened. There is a widespread unhappiness in the contemporary era, as it is an age in which every laugh is accompanied by a sour sadness within. This is how memory and melancholy have become significant matters of concern in the global scene. Memory, traditionally, enables human beings to build identity, to make sense of life, to aid learning, and to find cause and effect relationships

in life. By highlighting memory as a matter of concern, the contemporary novel indirectly touches upon the fact that these areas are now problematized. The novel, as a genre, is built through memory. Memory is the vital element in order for a novel to be produced. The novels discussed in this thesis are novels on memory, about how it functions towards fiction. In this sense, this practice of the use of memory can be named as meta-memory in which fiction turns into a memory about memory. The novels analysed in this thesis are not mainly about what the protagonists remember, they are rather about the act of remembering.

From the contemporary novels discussed in this thesis, it can be deduced that there is a return to modernist consciousness regarding literary conventions. Contemporary fiction, unlike postmodernist, and like modernist fiction, avoids being playful in tone, as the current agenda has serious concerns. It was not a coincidence that Salvador Dali used the imagery of melting clocks to demonstrate *The Persistence of Memory* (1931) in a barren and a bleak environment. Dali's composition proposes a nature where everything including memory decays with the passing of time. Time is depicted as slippery and inaudible, lacking ticks and tocks. This perception of time complies with the conditions of the protagonists of all three of the novels discussed in this thesis. The indistinct face figure in the painting can be used as a metaphor for the contemporary condition of human beings who are withered by time, and whose decay brings constant loss. *The Child in Time*, *Remainder*, and *The Only Story* are all analogous to modernist narratives regarding both form and content. Although *Remainder* carries the postmodern element of simulation, the novel's treatment towards it is modernist. The simulation in the novel is not employed with the aim of depicting it within a playful form and content. In these novels, the use of memory and melancholy form the elements that define contemporary novels while bringing them closer to modernist sensibilities. All three novels center on characters in limbo: between mourning and melancholy, imaginary and factual memory, and love and loss. All three are elegies dedicated to contemporary human beings, their ontological anxieties, sense of being doomed under the global problems and concerns, as well as how their psychology grows to be more and more depressed, hopeless, and disempowered.

For Žižek, humanity is *Living in the End Times*, and post-traumatic subjects, who experience Alzheimer's as an ontology, are "the death drive embodied" (p. 294).

“The new form is less a form of life than a form of death – not an expression of the Freudian death drive, but, more directly, the *death of the drive*” (p. 296). By announcing the death of the drive, Žižek implies that humanity is deprived of the meaning that the sense of endings used to provide in life. With the death of the drive, the binary opposition between life and death is abolished, and this is how living becomes an experience of “death as a form of life” (Žižek, 2010, p. 294) in the contemporary human condition. In this condition, loss has become the *zeitgeist*. The residents of contemporary age suffer amnesia, and lack the feeling of expected future. They are captivated in the mere “present time of things present” (Augustine, 1963, p. 273). This is the reason why melancholy – another condition in which the expected future is cancelled out – is used for the representation and the identification of the contemporary characters within contemporary novels, and these characters are either guided or misguided by their memory.

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