EVALUATING THE UNITED NATIONS' SUCCESS IN ETHNIC CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

by
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EVALUATING THE UNITED NATIONS' SUCCESS IN ETHNIC CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

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ABSTRACT

EVALUATING THE UNITED NATIONS' SUCCESS IN ETHNIC CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

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CONFLICT ANALYSIS AND RESOLUTION M.A. THESIS, JULY 2021

Thesis Supervisor: Prof. Ayşe Betül Çelik

Keywords: Conflict Management, Peacekeeping, United Nations, Burundi, Central African Republic

This thesis analyzes the determinants of the success of UN involvement in ethnic conflicts. The research on ethnic conflicts and the UN's conflict management efforts primarily focuses either on the UN's failures or some specific successes. Therefore, to contribute to the literature, this thesis examines the cases of Burundi and the Central African Republic, with the peacekeeping missions deployed being the in-case variants. To investigate the determinants of success, the four peacekeeping missions that have been deployed in these two countries (ONUB, MINURCA, MINURCAT, and MINUSCA) were put through a three-fold analysis. The findings show that three determinants need to be fulfilled in order for a mission to be successful: mandate fulfillment, the establishment of order, and a better situation in the post-mission period. Moreover, the research showed that, although three criteria determine the success, several other factors contribute to the success of a peacekeeping mission.

ÖZET

BIRLEŞMIŞ MILLETLER'IN ETNIK ÇATIŞMA YÖNETIMI BAŞARISININ DEĞERLENDIRILMESI

EGE SÜREK

UYUŞMAZLIK ANALİZİ VE ÇÖZÜMÜ YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ, TEMMUZ 2021

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Anahtar Kelimeler: Çatışma Yönetimi, Barış Koruma, Birleşmiş Milletler, Orta Afrika Cumhuriyeti, Burundi

Bu tez, etnik çatışmalarda BM müdahalelerinin başarısını nelerin belirlediğini araştırmaktadır. Etnik çatışmalar ve BM'lerin çatışma yönetimi çabaları üstüne olan araştırmalar öncelikle ya BM'lerin başarısızlıklarına ya da çok belirli başarılarına odaklanmaktadır. Bu sebeple, literatüre katkıda bulunmak amacıyla, bu tez Burundi ve Orta Afrika Cumhuriyeti vakalarını, bu ülkelere gönderilmiş dört barış koruma harekatları vaka içi değişkenleri olarak, başarının belirleyici faktörlerini anlamak amacıyla incelemektedir. Başarının belirleyici faktörlerini bulmak için, bu iki ülkede bulunan dört barış koruma harekatı (ONUB, MINURCA, MINURCAT ve MINUSCA) üç bölümden oluşan bir analizden geçirilmiştir. Bulgular bir harekatın başarılı olması için üç faktörün bulunması gerektiğini göstermiştir: emirnameleri tamamlamak, düzenin kurulması ve harekat sonrası dönemdeki durumun iyileşmiş olması. Ayrıca, bu üç kriter başarının belirleyici faktörleri olsa da bu araştırma barış koruma harekatlarının başarısına katkı sağlayan başka faktörler de olduğunu göstermiştir.

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To CONF class of 2021

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACP Action for Peacekeeping 9

AMIB African Union Mission in Burundi 37

APRD People's Army for the Restoration of Democracy 46

AU African Union 36, 37, 48, 49

BINUB United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi 40, 41

BINUCA United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in CAR 53, 54

BNUB United Nations Office in Burundi 41

BONUCA United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic 51, 53

CAR Central African Republic 28, 43

CCAR Council of the Central African Revolution 44

CEMAC Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa 45, 46, 52

CEN-SAD Community of Sahel-Saharan States 45

CMRN Military Committee of National Restoration 44

CNDD–FDD National Council for the Defense of Democracy – Forces for the Defense of Democracy 34, 35, 36, 42

DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration . 16, 17, 36, 38, 39, 47, 48, 64, 72, 73, 74, 75

DDRR Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration, and Repatriation 48, 49, 55

ECCAS Economic Community of Central African States 48, 50, 54

ECOSOC Economic and Social Council 6

EU European Union 45, 49, 53

EUFOR-CAR/Chad European Union military force in Chad and the Central African Republic 45, 53

FACA Central African Armed Forces 52

FDPC Democratic Front of the Central African People 45, 47, 48

FNL National Forces of Liberation 38, 40

FOMUC Force Multinationale en Centrafrique 45, 52

FRODEBU Front for Democracy in Burundi 34, 35, 36

GDP Gross Domestic Product 43

GNI Gross National Income 32

HDI Human Development Index 67, 72

ICC International Criminal Court 42

ICGLR International Conference on the Great Lakes Region 50

ICJ International Court of Justice 11

ICM International Conflict Management Dataset 10

IDP Internally Displaced People 39, 55, 56, 60

JCR Journal of Conflict Resolution 10

JPR Journal of Peace Research 10

JVMM Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism 40

MDSD Most Different Systems Design 25

MEPV Major Episodes of Political Violence 26, 28

MESAN Movement for the Social Evolution of Black Africa 43

MICOPAX Mission for the consolidation of peace in the Central African Republic 54

MINURCA United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic . 50, 51, 52, 59, 60, 61, 64, 66, 67, 68, 69, 72

MINURCAT United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad 12, 45, 52, 53, 54, 59, 60, 61, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 72, 73, 74

MINUSCA United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic 12, 47, 49, 54, 55, 56, 57, 59, 60, 61, 64, 65, 69, 73, 74

MISAB Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements 45, 50, 51

MISCA International Support Mission for the CAR 46, 47, 54

MLPC Movement for the Liberation of the Central African People 44

MONUSCO United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo 39

MSSD Most Similar Systems Design 25, 26

NDF National Defence Force 36

NGO Non-Govermental Organization 9

OAU Organization of African Unity 51

OHCHR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights . 40

ONUB United Nations Operation in Burundi ix, 37, 38, 39, 40, 59, 60, 61, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 71, 72, 73, 74

P5 Permanent 5 . . . . . 6, 7, 46

PALIPEHUTU Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People 34, 40

PALIPEHUTU-FNL PALIPEHUTU-National Forces of Liberation . . 34, 35, 36

PBC United Nations Peacebuilding Commission 27, 30, 40, 71

PDC Christian Democratic Party 33

R2P Responsibility to Protect 7, 15

SSR Security Sector Reform 16, 17, 36, 38, 55, 67, 72, 73, 74, 75

UCDP Uppsala Conflict Data Program 10

UDC Central African Democratic Union 44

UFDR Union of Democratic Forces for Unity 45, 47

UN United Nations 1

UNAMIR United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda 9, 18

UNC United Nations Command 6, 70

UNGA United Nations General Assembly 6, 15

UNHRC United Nations Human Rights Council 41

UNOCI United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire 3

UNOSOM United Nations Operation in Somalia 3

UNOSOM II United Nations Operation in Somalia II 9

UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force 9, 19

UNSC United Nations Security Council . . 6, 13, 15, 21, 28, 30, 31, 37, 49, 52, 53, 54, 55, 69, 75

UPC Unity for Peace in Central Africa 57

UPRONA Union for National Progress 33, 34, 36

US United States 49

1. INTRODUCTION

Both international organizations and governments encounter considerable challenges in a world that undergoes rapid changes. From the end of the Second World War to this day, the context in which the conflicts existed has evolved, bringing a need for a change in the mechanisms created to solve these conflicts. The need for stability is more significant than ever, not only for the states that are merely observing ongoing conflicts, albeit apprehensively but also for the states affected by them. Ethnic conflicts, which make up a considerable percentage of the overall ongoing conflicts in the world (Regan 1996), present a recurring challenge to prevention, management, and resolution policies and theories (Carment and James 1997). Ethnic diversity is prevalent among developing countries. This diversity, in most of the cases, increases the chance of a civil strife occurring (Osinubi and Osinubi 2006). Ethnic conflicts are one of the most serious challenges that the world has faced in the last decades.

Traditional conflict management measures of non-military means (including mediation, good offices, and pre-emptive diplomatic measures) were not commonly used nor garnered significant attention from policymakers during the Cold War. Although the concept of nuclear deterrence brought diplomacy and use of force together, management of conflicts was more related to the bipolarity of the system, which needed the conflicts "managed" in order to prevent them from getting out of control (Wohlforth 1998). During these times, conflicts showed themselves as proxy wars. Even though instruments of collective security, such as the United Nations (UN), were somewhat involved in conflict resolution processes, it was evident that the ones who could manage conflicts were the powerful states rather than the international or regional organizations (Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2011). The UN's involvement was limited to the cases where both Western and Eastern blocks were in consensus on the action, even though the consensus was reached only in traditional peacekeeping missions (such as Cyprus), electoral support, and providing good offices.

While the focus of the policymakers was not on conflict management during the Cold

War, scholars, activists, and sources outside governments started to show interest in the topic to find a new discourse about security (Kriesberg 2007). This discourse focused on preventing nuclear annihilation, and the management of conflicts was mainly concentrated on pressuring governments for nuclear disarmament (Meyer 1995).

After the end of the Cold War, the world faced a different kind of threat than the tensions between superpowers: nearly every continent outbreak of civil wars was imminent. Not only these civil wars wrecked the countries that they started within, but they also spilled over their borders with their neighbors. Among these the conflicts in Africa gained notice since "more than half of all African countries have experienced at least a year of armed conflict during the past three decades" (Venkatasawmy 2015, 26). Due to this, the discourse on security needed to be redefined again. This time, focusing on regional and local terms, conflict management started to include protecting civilians being massacred by their states and supporting weak states facing militia uprisings (Hampson 2008).

Conflict management became more fragmented as the powerful governments and the smaller states, institutions, organizations, and individuals became involved in the process. Powerful actors undertook managing conflicts as third parties, and the UN was involved in many conflict management efforts worldwide. Several studies noted that the lethality and outbreak of the conflicts decreased with powerful actors' involvement (Gleditsch et al. 2002). Some connected this trend to the UN's involvement, while others focused on the concept of responsibility to protect (Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2011).

After 9/11 and the terrorist attacks in Europe in the 2000s, powerful states became the main focus of conflict management, and the UN was somewhat pushed aside to take a more passive role. The decline in the number of conflicts stopped, and the trends show that the number has increased in recent years (UCDP 2019). Although the "war on terror" that gained strength in the early 2000s lost its prominence, the Syrian Civil War outbreak in 2011 and the events that followed showed the world that conflicts can spill over to different continents in the shape of a refugee crisis. The humanitarian needs following such a crisis showed the importance of the involvement of other actors rather than states in conflict management, one of these core organizations being the United Nations.

The creation of the UN and the drafting of its Charter started during the Second World War. From then on, the international arena faced many crises, and the context that the UN operated evolved during these crises. Beginning with the cooperation after World War 2 to the Cold War's bipolarity to a unipolar system and a global

pandemic, the UN faced many challenges in its 75 years, but it still endures.

However, the UN had to evolve its conflict management approaches to be still relevant after all these years. The concept of peacekeeping is as old as the UN went under many structural changes to be more efficient and answer the needs of the international community better. This study aims to understand this new peacekeeping structure and see what determines the success of UN involvement in ethnic conflicts. As the most well-known cases of UN involvement in ethnic conflicts are the ones where the UN miserably failed in the 90s, it is essential to look at the other side of the coin where the UN successfully managed ethnic conflicts. Considering that the past failures led to critical changes in peacekeeping, the new operations must be examined with new lenses without being stuck in the past events. I hypothesize that the UN peacekeeping missions are successful if they fulfill three criteria, which will be outlined later in the methodology section.

By examining the UN peacekeeping operations in Burundi and the Central African Republic, this study aims to understand why some UN missions succeed while others fail. This study examines the peacekeeping mission rather than the countries themselves, which yields a comparative analysis of four different missions. Although evaluating the success/effectiveness of UN peace operations is a popular topic, this study makes two significant contributions to the literature. First, it merges different success measurement approaches in the literature and creates a new three-fold analysis tool to measure the success of UN peacekeeping operations. Secondly, while examining peace operations, scholars overlook Burundi as a success and the Central African Republic as failure. Other operations with more international interest or more clear-cut outcomes such as UNOSOM in Somalia or UNOCI in Côte D'Ivoire are more favored. By examining these understudied countries, I aim to bring a new perspective to the literature where we can see the effects of the peacekeeping reforms and learn something new from these countries.

To study the determinants of success of the peace operations of the UN, this thesis is composed of eight chapters. The literature review is presented in Chapter 2, which includes the literature on the UN, ethnic conflict management, peacekeeping, and peacekeeping success evaluation. Afterwards, the study's methodology is outlined in Chapter 3, where I present the data collection resources and analysis methods. The methodology is followed by the case studies of Burundi and the Central African Republic in Chapters 4 and 5, where I present the history of the countries, the background of the conflicts, and the conflict management efforts undertaken. I conclude both chapters by mentioning the current situation the countries are in. Chapter 6 presents the three-fold analysis, and the relevant information given in the

cases is summarized and structured to derive the answers to the thesis. Chapter 7 discusses the findings outlined by Chapter 6, and arguments on the determinants of success are given. Finally, the findings are summarized, and contributions and further research are discussed.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

Although ethnic conflicts preceded the Cold War, the structural changes in the international arena brought a new perspective in the literature. This was seen in literature and in the acts of international organizations, specifically the UN, who went under a comprehensive review and transformation of principles of peacekeeping after the failures of the late 90s. This review process yielded several documents, some of which also redefined the concept of success for peace operations and how the UN sees it.

To examine the evolution of the literature, this chapter is separated into several subsections. First, a brief history of the UN and how/why it came into existence to understand better the contexts mentioned. After that, the changing context after the Cold War and the increase of the ethnic conflicts, and what was expected from the UN, is noted. It is followed by the literature on conflict management and peacekeeping. Furthermore, the UN's conflict management capabilities are outlined. Finally, the literature on how to measure the success of peacekeeping operations is discussed.

2.2 A Brief History of the UN

The United Nations was founded immediately after the Second World War in 1945 by 51 states. Article I of the UN Charter states the purposes of the organization:

"To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take

> effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace" (United Nations 1945).

To achieve its purposes, the UN is governed by several bodies that work together, the most notable of these being the General Assembly (UNGA), the Security Council (UNSC), and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). The UN Charter allows its 193 members to discuss and take action on a wide range of topics, from environmental issues to counter-terrorism. Although the UN works on a broad range of topics, it is best known for humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, and conflict prevention.

The Charter puts us in a conundrum while trying to understand how the UN can be involved in threats to peace. On the one hand, Chapter VII of the Charter focuses on stopping aggression by intervening if necessary. On the other hand, it gives five states[1] the right to block any initiatives without explanation. UN condemns abuse of human rights, while according to the organization's Charter, the UN is "based on the principle of the sovereign equality" (United Nations 1945). Unless several conditions are fulfilled, the organization cannot intervene with its members' internal affairs (United Nations 1945). UN's strength lies in the cooperation of its member states and the actions that it is allowed to take. Fetherston (1994) argues that, even though the UN Charter did not work in the way that its creators envisioned (such as great powers agreeing on joint action over international affairs) due to the deadlocks created by the veto power given to the P5 members of the UNSC, it has set standards through precedents which in the long term affected how states behave. A stellar example of this is the development of the concept of human rights and how it became a standard set of norms for many states worldwide.

A brief look to see what the UN has accomplished since its foundation shows that it had some concrete actions for high-stake peace and security situations (Lyon et al. 2020). UN was involved in both the Korean War with the deployment of United Nations Command (UNC), the main army that fought in the war, and the Suez Canal Crisis with the deployment of the first peacekeeping mission of the UN. Gulf War in 1991 showed the UN's functional capacity if the Security Council members could agree on an action. The UN was and is involved in several ethnic conflicts

[1] These states, namely France, People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, are also as known as the Permanent 5 or P5 of the Security Council, and have veto powers.

by operating the peacekeeping operations in Lebanon and Cyprus, where the aim is to keep the conflicting parties apart (Ryan 1990). Aside from peacekeeping, the UN intervenes in ethnic conflicts through mediation, resolutions, appointing special representatives and envoys, fact-finding missions, good offices, and peacebuilding activities (Sobotka 2011).

Furthermore, even though in the UN Charter there is no clause on the protection of the minority rights, there is the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities and the Genocide Convention, which sets the rights of minorities. UN earned several Nobel Peace Prizes after the invention of peacekeeping and the introduction of peacebuilding and peace maintenance concepts. It expanded its peacekeeping concept into a broader area, and the most recent (and highly contested) addition became the Responsibility to Protect (R2P).

Of course, the parts that can be considered successes should not overshadow the other side of the coin. After all, the concept of the R2P became a norm only after the genocides committed in Rwanda and the Balkans in the 1990s. UN could not prevent the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, nor could it take any explicit action (aside from humanitarian aid) in Syria, Myanmar, or Yemen. This clearly shows that when one or more of the "great powers" are involved, the UN cannot respond to the humanitarian situations that it needs to intervene in according to its Charter and norm of R2P. UN works best when the P5 members agree to comply with the norms of the Charter. This is a massive issue that created the debate on the organization's legitimacy (Ayoob 2020; Donini 2020; Lyon et al. 2020).

2.3 Changing Context after the Cold War

The end of the Cold War had a massive effect on not only the types of conflicts that erupted afterward but also the response of how such conflicts should be managed. During the Cold War, scholars expected that ethnic identities would be traded for the loyalty of a larger community due to modernization (Gurr 1998). However, this expectation proved to be false as ethnic conflicts dominated the international system after the Cold War.

Domestic conflicts have been considered a threat to peace and security since before the Cold War (Ellingsen 2000). One cannot say that ethnic nationalism or conflicts did not exist during this period; however, the bipolarity and the system's volatility

repressed the possibility of a severe conflict erupting (Ellingsen 2000). Conflicts were mainly the playground of superpowers, divided between East and West, and the focus was on the military gains (Wimmer et al. 2010). After the Cold War, ethnic conflicts became the dominant form of conflict in the international system. Ethnonational independence or autonomy was behind most civil wars that erupted during this time (Denny and Walter 2014).

The end of the Cold War also coincided with the emergence of new states, some separating from the Soviet Union and some from the rapid decolonization efforts. Eruption of the conflicts in international arena showed itself strongly in Africa, where newly decolonized states with a long colonial past, perceived injustices and artificially created borders experienced endless cycles of violence. According to Picciotto (2010), "African casualties of conflict exceed those of all other regions combined. About one fifth of the African population lives in areas severely disrupted by conflict" (2). Furthermore, with this changing context, African states which were already underdeveloped had a hard time to handle the strains of the conflict erupting everywhere in the continent. The conflicts, once they started in Africa, tended to last long and restoring peace usually required involvement of outside efforts.

The international system shaped itself accordingly and adopted new policies according to this new reality. One significant evolution was the change in the feasibility of an intervention to the developing countries since the tense environment that was feared to trigger a new world war during the Cold War ceased to exist due to the collapse of the bipolar system. The West's triumph caused another change: western ideology and economic norms became the primary way of doing things. The West felt "responsible" for developing countries to reach Western democratic and political standards (Wimmer et al. 2010). Since helping them achieving stability was connected to ending the ethnic conflicts that existed in many of them, Western powers began to involve themselves in ethnic conflicts.

Due to this involvement, both national governments and, subsequently, the organizations that they were a member of tried to develop ways to settle ethnic conflicts more effectively. Ethnic conflict management measures will be discussed in detail in the next section; however, it is prudent to mention them here to understand why they were put on both the governments' and international institutions' agendas.

The first of these was the conflict prevention approaches (Wimmer et al. 2010). From permanent field missions to preventative diplomacy, several techniques were applied in the pre-conflict phase. The second way that gained importance was negotiation techniques (Wimmer et al. 2010). Combining negotiation techniques with interventions and/or peace-enforcing operations, the international community sought to

settle the conflict between ethnonational factions. Negotiations took many shapes, from negotiations under heavy political pressure (such as Dayton) to behind-the-scene negotiations (such as Oslo), as well as including multitrack diplomacy, which combines both official and unofficial efforts. Thirdly, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) spearheaded new activities to mediate the conflicts through peaceful dialogue (Wimmer et al. 2010). These techniques of conflict transformation became another way that sought to deal with ethnic conflicts. Finally, after the horrors of the crimes committed in the ethnic wars, the UN established supranational judicial institutions and war tribunals (Wimmer et al. 2010).

The end of the Cold War saw a rapid increase in UN interventions to the ongoing conflicts. Between 1989 and 1994, the UN doubled its operations (Stiles and Macdonald 1992), and the number of peacekeepers increased from 11,000 to 75,000 (United Nations 2021*d*). However, this rapid increase in the numbers did not correspond to successes in the field since this period also saw some of the UN's biggest failures, namely; UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Yugoslavia, UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) in Rwanda and UN Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) in Somalia.

In their peacekeeping objectives, the UN states that, after the challenges the organization faced during the 1990s, at the start of the 21st century, it started to reform its concept of peacekeeping (United Nations 2021*d*). Brahimi Report in 2000, New Horizon Initiative in 2009, and most recently, Action for Peacekeeping (ACP) in 2018 outlined how the reform in peacekeeping would work and how it could become more useful. Currently, 12 ongoing peacekeeping operations[2] have over 100,000 active personnel from 121 countries (United Nations 2020*a*).

2.4 Conflict Management

Scholars that concentrate on conflict studies proposed a myriad of ways to define the methods of dealing with conflicts. Conflict resolution, maybe the most popular of these methods, has been criticized by scholars due to the belief that not all conflicts can be resolved (Kriesberg 2007). The authors proposed conflict transformation, dispute settlement, and conflict management as alternatives (Burton and Dukes 1990; Lederach 1995). Conflict transformation aims to transform the conflicting parties'

[2]Current operations are MINURSO in Western Sahara, MINUSCA in the Central African Republic, MINUSMA in Mali, MONUSCO in DR of the Congo, UNDOF in Golan, UNMOGIP in India and Pakistan, UNFICYP in Cyprus, UNIFIL in Lebanon, UNISFA in Abyei, UNMIK in Kosovo, UNMISS in South Sudan and UNTSO in the Middle East.

perceptions to change the destructive consequences (Spangler 2003). Dispute settlement is the process of "working out of a mutually satisfactory agreement between the parties involved" (Spangler 2003). In this section, conflict management will be examined further to see how literature defines the concept.

Conflict management is now a well-known concept in the literature. The first mention of conflict management was in the Journal of Conflict Resolution (JCR) in 1957; however, it was not until the 1970's the concept gained popularity when the JCR in 1977[3] devoted their special issue to the research on negotiation (Mitchell and Regan 2010). The third turning point in conflict management literature was in 1991 when a large N dataset was introduced in the Journal of Peace Research (JPR) by Jacob Bercovitch and his colleagues[4]. The 1990s and 2000s were the decades that the number of qualitative and quantitative studies peaked, with deploying several data collection initiatives such as International Conflict Management Dataset (ICM), SHERFACS International Conflict Dataset, Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) (Bercovitch and Fretter 2004; Kreutz 2010; Sherman 1994).

Conflict management is a complex concept which involves many aspects of the mechanisms of the international system: decision-making, deploying field operations, creating consensus, passing resolutions, and many more (Haas 1983). Both the definition and the scope of conflict management is a debated issue. Burton and Dukes (1990) define conflict management as an attempt to either control or contain a conflict that usually involves a third party. Butler (2009)) builds on this definition and says that management of conflicts focuses on making the conflict less harmful for the actors involved. This focus usually stems from a third party whose concern is to prevent horizontal and/or vertical escalation of the conflict. Lyons and Khadiagala (2010) support the argument that conflict management aims to prevent the escalation of violence; however, they argue that it should be done in a way that is consistent with human dignity.von Hippel and Clarke (1999) state that conflict management is used when the ongoing conflict needs containment, but conflict resolution does not seem achievable. Butler (2009) argues that defining trait of conflict management recognizes the already existing power structures (such as the connection between state, power and their interests' relation to security landscape) while focusing on trimming the edges of the intersection these concepts overlap. Although the UN does not define conflict management, it is referred to as the concept in which peacekeeping is a tool is used by it (United Nations 2008*b*).

Bercovitch (1986) categorizes conflict management methods into three groups: by

[3]Journal of Conflict Resolution, Volume 21 Issue 4, December 1977

[4]Journal of Peace Research, Volume 28 No 1, February 1991

forms of negotiation and bargaining, violence and coercion, and involving a third party. Later, Bercovitch and Regan (2004) amends this method, in which they categorize the main approaches to conflict management into four groups: threat-based, deterrence-based, adjudicatory, and accommodationist. Threat-based approaches focus on the hard power, such as the use of force, the threat of force, and any other ways that can be used to compel conflicting parties. Deterrence-based approaches are similar to threat-based ones because they also correlate with hard power. However, aside from the use/threat of force, they also include coercive diplomacy instruments to deter conflicting parties. Adjudicatory approaches are directly connected to international rules and norms and require them to be recognized by states in order for them to work. These approaches include legal settlements and legal and/or normative institutions' involvement in the conflict management process. Finally, accommodationist approaches focus on soft power and use diplomacy (both traditional and non-traditional) to reach an agreement between conflicting parties.

In another book (2004), Bercovitch, this time with Fretter, divides conflict management approaches into three. The first approach is a state-centric approach that focuses on managing conflicts through bilateral negotiations, mediations, and inquiries. The second approach focuses on international law as a focus point while managing conflicts in which states should refer their conflicts to existing international courts or tribunals. This approach is not a very popular one since the International Court of Justice (ICJ) adjudicated only a handful of cases since its establishment. One problem with this approach that even international courts can decide on an outcome, states can choose to ignore them. The third and final approach is the functionalist one, in which the management of conflicts should fall under the authority of an international organization (such as the UN). This approach is also not very popular since executing this properly would require relinquishing part of the state's sovereignty to the organization. Merrills (1991) connects these three approaches to three ways of managing conflicts: diplomatic, legal, and political.

Table 2.1 Ways of conflict management by Merrils (1991)

DIPLOMATIC	LEGAL	POLITICAL
- traditional diplomacy - bargaining and negotiation - mediation - observation - fact-finding missions - peacekeeping - good offices - shuttle diplomacy - referrals - international forums - conciliation - inquiry	- arbitration - adjudication - judicial settlement	- United Nations - European Union - African Union

Out of all conflict management techniques mentioned above, sometimes ethnic conflicts need a more nuanced approach. Therefore in the next section, conflict management in ethnic conflicts will be discussed.

2.4.1 Ethnic Conflict Management

Ethnic conflict management, although similar to techniques mentioned in the previous sections, brings another layer of complexity to the nature of conflict management due to the underlying reasons and dynamics of the ethnic conflicts. (Lake and Rothchild 1996, 42) argue that "managing ethnic conflicts, whether by local elites and governments or concerned members of the international community, is a continuing process with no endpoint or final resolution" and ethnic conflicts "can be contained, but it cannot be entirely resolved". According to them, the process is imperfect because even the best-managed ethnic conflicts leave behind a potential for ethnic violence. To quote (Sobotka 2011, 89), "the United Nations is designed to serve as both first and last resort in dealing with threats to peace". UN might not be the first entity that comes into mind when we think about ethnic conflicts. In the

[2] Adapted from Franke and Warnacke (2009). Originally titled: "INVENTORY OF UN PEACE MISSIONS SINCE THE END OF THE COLD WAR".

[3] See Howard (2008) for the original table: "Multidimensionality of mandates of all post-Cold War UN peacekeeping operations in civil wars". MINURCAT and MINUSCA was added to the table by this study.

[4] (* denotes categories that do not fully fit the criteria yet coded as yes or no for research purposes)

end, the United Nations is composed of states, and according to the organization's Charter, the UN is "based on the principle of the sovereign equality", and unless several conditions are fulfilled, the organization cannot intervene with the internal affairs of its members (United Nations 1945). Since mostly it is the states that set the agenda and be the deciding factor in the mechanism of the organization, it is in the interest of the states who are experiencing ethnic instability in their country to keep the issue away from the agenda of the UN. There are many examples of ethnic conflicts that the UN did not get involved in. However, ethnic conflicts cannot be kept away from the agenda of the organization entirely. UN's involvement in ethnic conflicts is shaped by its Charter, previous declarations, and resolutions that the organization has passed.

The Charter defines the role of the UN in conflict management. Article 2 states that all members must settle their disputes by avoiding threat or the use of force and by peaceful means. Article 24 gives the responsibility of maintaining peace and security to the Security Council. Chapter VI outlines how the UNSC can maintain peace and security by "negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means" (United Nations 1945). Chapter VII outlines how the UN can act against the threats to peace and acts of aggression in which the UNSC plays a significant role. UNSC has the authority to identify aggressors, decide on an enforcement measure and call on member states to make their military forces available if needed.

Aside from the Charter, few international legal documents can be used when dealing with ethnic conflicts. However, most of these documents are controversial and poorly developed. 1992 UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities is one of these documents that outline the rights of ethnic groups; however, enforcement of these rights is an issue. The concepts of self-determination and autonomy are poorly developed as well (Gaer 1994). UN Resolution 1514 that was passed in 1960, is another of these documents which states that

> "(1) A people has the right to political autonomy or to establish its own state. (2) A nation-state has the right to exclude other people from its territory. (3) A people without a state has the right to fight to get one and in some cases to break the law to do so. (4) Other states should assist the struggle and recognize the state that might be the outcome of the fighting" (Ellingsen 2000, 231).

This resolution is usually cited by the minority groups who are struggling for self-determination. However, the resolution also creates a dilemma because its sixth article states that "any attempt at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations" (Carment 1994, 570). Thus, according to this document, the people are allowed the right of self-determination but only in specific cases. The document's timing implies that it was drafted to assist the decolonization efforts, but it did not consider the following ethnic struggles.

Therefore, studying the United Nations' involvement in ethnic conflict management is complex, considering that the organization is both looking out for the implementation of human rights and self-determination principles. Still, at the same time, it tries to maintain the territorial integrity of the states (Carment and James 1998). Ryan (1990) states that the UN consists of member states rather than ethnic groups, and the problems relating to sub-state actors are hard to comprehend for the organization. However, even though it is a complex process, the UN has managed ethnic conflicts in many ways.

Carment and James (1998) state that Esman (1995) defines the ethnic conflict management measures of the UN "include(s) good offices, mediation, peacemaking, peacekeeping, protection of human rights, humanitarian assistance and stigmatization of rogue governments" (64). Carment and James (1998) argue that this typology is too broad and attempt to define UN involvement more modestly as "(1) indirect involvement (through resolutions passed by the General Assembly); or (2) direct involvement (mediation, good offices techniques, negotiation, observation, sanctions, peacekeeping and peace enforcement)"(64). Mingst and Karns (2007) argue that the UN's involvement evolved during the decades since its foundation. During the Cold War, preventive diplomacy, mediation, and peacekeeping were on focus. Through the 1990s, use of force and sanctions were started to be used while managing ethnic conflicts. UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali published his An Agenda for Peace in 1992, in which preventive diplomacy was emphasized as one of the critical parts of conflict management (Piiparinen 2009). Peacekeeping operations evolved in a sense that personnel was not only there to implement a ceasefire (after a conflict occurred) but also for a variety of reasons such as: protecting the civilians, especially from ethnic cleansing or genocide, organizing peacebuilding activities to stabilize the state, endorsing sanctions in order to monitor states, creating tribunals for crimes against humanity and war crimes and adding counter-terrorism measures to operations. Especially after the Cold War, it was requested that the UN take more roles in peace and security activities (Mingst and Karns 2007).

Another part of the UN's changing nature in conflict management was establishing Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in 2005. R2P outlined the conditions in which the international community could intervene in the conflicts on behalf of the populations at risk, and these interventions could use force if necessary. R2P principle states that the "international community has an obligation to protect vulnerable groups from extreme human rights violations such as war crimes, genocide, or politicide" (Medzihorsky, Popovic, and Jenne 2017, 2). Although UN General Assembly (UNGA) approved that states are responsible for protecting civilians if their state fails to do so in 2005, many states disagreed with the principle's third pillar, responding through force, stating that it could be used to justify interventions with purposes other than humanitarian needs and it would increase the number of military interventions in the future (Goodman 2006). However, in the end, R2P was approved by both UNGA and UNSC in 2009.

For this study, out of all conflict management ways outlined above, the focus will be on peacekeeping while examining the cases. Therefore, in the next section, the literature and terminology of peacekeeping will be further explained.

2.5 Peacekeeping

The UN released extensive documents in order to conceptualize peacekeeping. Capstone Doctrine that was published in 2008, outlined the principles and guidelines for the UN peace operations (United Nations 2008*b*). According to the document, peacekeeping is defined as:

> "a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers. Over the years, peacekeeping has evolved from a primarily military model of observing cease-fires and the separation of forces after inter-state wars, to incorporate a complex model of many elements (military, police and civilian) working together to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace." (United Nations 2008*b*, 18).

When a peacekeeping mission is deployed, it may conduct a range of activities. This is particularly true for the multidimensional peacekeeping operations, which are "a mix of military, police and civilian components working together to lay the foundations of a sustainable peace" (United Nations 2008*b*, 97). The Under-Secretary for

Peacekeeping Operations Guehenno states that

> "beyond simply monitoring cease-fires, today's multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations are called upon to facilitate the political process through the promotion of national dialogue and reconciliation, protect civilians, assist in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants, support the organization of elections, protect and promote human rights, and assist in restoring the rule of law (United Nations 2008*b*, 6)."

Howard (2008) categorizes the activities of the multidimensional peacekeeping missions into ten: "military operations, refugee assistance, humanitarian assistance, civilian policing, electoral assistance, information/ education, gender affairs, legal affairs, transitional authority, and a miscellaneous category including such tasks as economic development programs, assistance for the state's administration, and confidence-building measures" (352). She subcategories these into thirty-three activities to include all activities the UN conducts in different missions. Howard's (2008) categorization of activities into thirty-three will be used in the mandate analysis since it is one of the most comprehensive literature. On the other hand, Franke and Warnecke (2009)separate the activities of multidimensional peacekeeping missions into four areas, which will be how the analysis of this thesis will categorize the activities:

> "security and public order (e.g. security sector governance, law enforcement, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants, mine action); justice and reconciliation (e.g. transitional justice, judicial and legal reform, human rights); governance and participation (e.g. good offices, constitution-making, local governance, political parties, civil society, media); social and economic well-being (e.g. protection of vulnerable groups, basic needs, gender, physical infrastructure, employment, economic development) (408)".

These four categories were derived from the Capstone Doctrine, and the UN argues that to achieve sustainable peace, peacekeeping operations must be involved in these four critical areas (United Nations 2008*b*). Under these categories, several activities are commonly conducted in multidimensional peacekeeping operations "disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of combatants; mine action; security sector reform (SSR) and other rule of law-related activities; protection and promotion of human rights; electoral assistance; support to the restoration and extension

of state authority" (United Nations 2008*b*, 26).

DDR is a crucial component of peacekeeping missions. The DDR programs, depending on the needs of the state, may entail "the provision of technical advice; the securing of disarmament and cantonment sites; and/or the collection and destruction of weapons, ammunition and other material surrendered by the former combatants (...) and provision demobilized former combatants with sustainable livelihoods" (United Nations 2008*b*, 26).

Mine action is another activity provided by peacekeeping missions in states with landmines and/or any other explosive devices that might threaten civilians' security. UN provides emergency mine action assistance in order to provide a safe environment in the country and support post-conflict recovery (United Nations 2008*b*).

SSR is another essential component in strengthening the rule of law within the countries. It aims to enhance "the ability of national security actors and institutions to function effectively" and is usually integrated into the UN's exit strategy (United Nations 2008*b*, 27). Depending on the need of the state, SSR activities may include "assisting in the restructuring, reform and training of the national police and/or armed forces, (...) strengthening of national judiciary and corrections systems and (...) to promote legal and judicial reform or support the development of essential legislation" (United Nations 2008*b*, 27).

Multidimensional peacekeeping missions may also assist the states in the protection and promotion of human rights and mandated to "promote and protect human rights by monitoring and helping to investigate human rights violations and/or developing the capacity of national actors and institutions to do so on their own" (United Nations 2008*b*, 27).

Restoration and extension of state authority is another area that the mandates touch upon. In the cases where the states do not have enough control over their territory, the mission may aid the states by "creating an enabling security environment, providing political leadership or coordinating the efforts of other international actors" and it also could include "efforts to develop political participation, as well as operational support to the immediate activities of state institutions. Where relevant, it may also include small-scale capacity building or support to larger processes of constitutional or institutional restructuring" (United Nations 2008*b*, 27-28).

Multidimensional peacekeeping operations also offer electoral assistance, which is a vital step in establishing a legitimate state. The missions are usually mandated to "organize, monitor and carry out free and fair elections through the provision of security, technical advice, logistical support and other forms of electoral assistance"

(United Nations 2008*b*, 28).

There are two other critical areas where the UN multidimensional peacekeeping mission can offer assistance if requested, however within a limited capacity. These are the "promotion of socio-economic recovery and development and the provision of humanitarian assistance" (United Nations 2008*b*, 29). While the operations can support these areas, their capacity is focused on more quick impact activities rather than those requiring a more extended period. However, the UN states that both areas are critical for sustainable peace (United Nations 2008*b*).

The literature on peacekeeping can be divided into three waves: literature during the Cold War, post-Cold War literature, and literature after the UN peacekeeping reforms. Although the classic literature on peacekeeping written during the Cold War cannot be "literature" by itself due to the low number of works, they are no less important. During this first wave of peacekeeping studies, scholars primarily focused on presenting peacekeeping missions with case studies and detailed descriptions of the mission within focused cases (Burns and Heathcote 1963; Mackinlay 1989; Pelcovits 1984; Rikhye 1984). Other scholars focused on the peacekeeping's role on conflict resolution and the ways to improve or develop the practices (Cox 1967; Wiseman 1983). While there are some intra-state conflicts in the cases examined during this era, most tend to focus on interstate conflicts and peacekeeping attempts to resolve them. This is in line with the evolution of peacekeeping, where from its foundation to the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping was used as a tool to diffuse the conflicts between the states. Some scholars in this era also attempted to test the effect of peacekeeping on conflict management empirically (Haas 1986; Haas, Butterworth, and Nye 1972; Wilkenfeld and Brecher 1984). Haas (1986) found that military operations of the UN were generally successful.Wilkenfeld and Brecher (1984) argued that reaching an agreement between the conflicting parties was more likely when the UN is involved; however, the UN's involvement did not affect the recurrence of the conflicts.

The number of works dramatically increased in the post-Cold War era. This is not surprising as it went hand in hand with the dramatic increase in peacekeeping missions. Between 1948 and 1973, the UN launched only 13 missions. However, between 1988 and 1993, in a short time of five years, the UN launched 20 peacekeeping missions. This was due to the change in the international arena and the UN itself, with Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali releasing the *An Agenda for Peace*, which developed the UN's intervention styles in conflicts which later included peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peacebuilding (Boutros-Ghali 1992). However, after several failed missions, most prominently known ones being UNAMIR in Rwanda

and UNPROFOR in Srebrenica, the second wave of peacekeeping literature mainly focused on these cases of failure and was pessimistic about the future of peacekeeping (Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2005; Hillen 1998; Jett 1999; Weiss 1994). Only a few scholars examined the cases of the successes of peacekeeping (Krasno, Daniel, and Hayes 2003). This pessimism was reflected in the UN itself with a dramatic decrease in new peacekeeping missions between 1993 and 1998.

The final turning point of the literature coincided with the UN's attempt to reform its peacekeeping missions. After the genocides in Bosnia and Rwanda, the UN went into a self-review process and released comprehensive reports criticizing its own failures (Annan 1999). Furthermore, the Brahimi Report was released in 2000, where the UN's peacekeeping structure was comprehensively reviewed, and strategic suggestions were offered. Several changes were made in the UN headquarters, and the once pessimistic outlook was turned positive again with the belief that the new reforms could achieve better outcomes. Peace enforcement gained more importance during the third wave. Usually a part of military activities, peace enforcement is:

> "the application, with the authorization of the Security Council, of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force. Such actions are authorized to restore international peace and security in situations where the Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression" (United Nations 2008*b*, 18).

Although the UN did not prefer coercive measures in the early periods of peacekeeping missions, the changing context of civil wars and the UN's failures in the late 90s showed the need for more comprehensive mandates. More and more peace enforcement measures are added to the mandates of the peacekeeping missions.

While the UN restructured the peacekeeping and the headquarters were feeling optimistic about the future, the literature also started to become more optimistic of the potential of peacekeeping. The third wave studies concentrated on the questions of "whether peacekeeping makes peace more durable, and why some missions are more successful than others" (Fortna and Howard 2008, 289). Scholars examined these questions both with quantitative and qualitative data.

The quantitative studies on peacekeeping during the third wave can be separated into three: ones focusing on interstate conflict, ones focusing on interstate conflicts and civil wars, and the ones that only studies civil wars. Diehl, Reifschneider, and Hensel (1996) find that there is no discernable relationship between the recurrence

of conflict and UN involvement in the first category. On the other hand, Fortna (2004) argues that international personnel deployment, compared to states being left to their own devices, increases the duration of peace.

From the second category, Diehl (1994) argues that peacekeeping during civil wars is more complicated than interstate conflicts, and it will be less successful. On the other hand, others say that there is no difference in peacekeeping effectiveness between civil and inter-state wars (Fortna 2003; Heldt 2002).

The third category is the most popular among the scholars studying peacekeeping during the third wave, which can be explained with the fact that peacekeeping during this time was also focused on intra-state conflicts. Although some studies showcase peacekeeping in a more pessimistic light, most of the quantitative literature during this wave focuses on an optimistic outcome of peacekeeping missions in which they argue that the duration of the peace after civil wars lengthens when peacekeeping is present (Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 2006; Fortna and Howard 2008; Walter 2002).

The literature on peacekeeping also has essential contributions from the qualitative studies. Doyle and Sambanis (2006) combine their quantitative works with case studies of successes and failures of peacekeeping and confirm their argument that peacekeeping affects the outcome of civil wars positively. Howard (2008) examines the conditions behind the failure and success of UN peacekeeping missions and compares the completed, "most similar" cases of peacekeeping missions. She defines success with two criteria: first, she checks whether the mission achieved its mandate or not, and secondly, she checks whether the institutions of the state could function after the departure of peacekeepers. She finds that for a mission to be successful, three conditions need to be satisfied. Firstly, "organizational learning" during the peacekeeping mission must be ongoing. Secondly, conflicting parties must consent to the UN operation in the state. Finally, the Security Council must not have an interest that is above moderate levels on the conflict. Thakur (2012)) argues that peacekeeping missions evolved into a key tool of conflict management because of the environments where they are deployed and the needs of the governments of the deployed countries. According to him, the operations are deployed in fragile environments where the peace process has started but not been concluded. In most of these cases, the UN peacekeeping missions have been the stronghold that prevents the collapse of the governments.

2.6 Measuring the Success of Peacekeeping Operations

Evaluating the success of the peacekeeping mission is a well-studied topic in the current literature. There are many ways the authors propose to measure success. Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens (2002) suggest that a mission is successful if the violence in the state ends, and the ceasefire or peace is self-enforcing after the exit of the mission. They do not believe that mandates are a way of measuring success because they can be interpreted differently. However, Howard (2008) argues that mandates usually comprise similar wording so the basic understanding of the tasks may be understood from there, even though the implementation methods may vary. Therefore, she evaluates the success in a two-fold analysis. First, she checks whether the mandate implementation of the operation is successful or not. Secondly, she assessed the state of the country after the exit of the UN operation. The second measure also considers that the "UN might fulfill its mandate, even though the conflict has not ended in a positive peace" (Howard 2008, 7). In order to assess this, she asks a number of questions and derives her analysis from there. She finds out that if there is the consent of the warring parties for the UN peace operation, UNSC interest in the case is not very intense and field operation achieves "first-level organizational learning", peacekeeping missions are successful.

Another famous framework to evaluate the peacekeeping mission was created by Diehl and Druckman (2010). They argue that peace operations have three types of goals: violence abatement, conflict containment, and conflict settlement. These three goals exist in all peace operations, and they must measure the success of operations. To evaluate, they first identify the tasks and expected outcomes related to those tasks. Then, they ask several questions, depending on the task and goal involved in order to see to what extent those goals were achieved (Diehl and Druckman 2010).

Martin-Brûlé (2012) similarly considers two dimensions while assessing the outcomes of the peace operations: "a) accomplishment of the mandate; and b) establishment of order within and by the state" (235). The establishment of order means whether the state is institutionally capable of ensuring the rules and peace after the withdrawal of the peace operations. On accomplishing the mandate, the author takes the context, duration, and resources of the peace operation to make a more thorough analysis.

The UN also sets its own criteria for the evaluation of success. First of all, it states that for a mission to be successful, core principles of peacekeeping (impartiality, consent, and non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate)

must be maintained to be legitimate (United Nations 2008*b*). In addition, legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of the local populations is an important criterion that contributes to mission success. UN also mentions that the promotion of national and local ownership in the peace processes is vital (United Nations 2008*b*). Other factors UN outlines that contribute to the success of the mission are:

- "Genuine commitment to a political process by the parties in working towards peace (there must be a peace to keep);"
- "Clear, credible and achievable mandates, with matching personnel, logistic and financial resources;"
- "Unity of purpose within the Security Council, with active support to UN operations in the field;"
- "Host country commitment to unhindered UN operations and freedom of movement;"
- "Supportive engagement by neighbouring countries and regional actors;"
- "An integrated UN approach, effective coordination with other actors on the ground and good communication with host country authorities and population;"
- "The utmost sensitivity towards the local population and upholding the highest standards of professionalism and good conduct (peacekeepers must avoid becoming part of the problem)" (United Nations 2021*b*).

These extensive criteria are also the guideline in which the organization aims to implement its peace operations. However, while the UN's criterion is to measure its own success, it is more of an internal evaluation of UN procedures rather than an external evaluation to see what has been achieved in the country. That's why using the evaluation criteria in the literature rather than the one the UN uses is more beneficial.

2.7 Conclusion

To conclude, in this chapter, first, the literature on the United Nations and its foundation was introduced. Then, the changing context after the Cold War and the increase in ethnic conflicts were highlighted in order for the reader to understand why ethnic conflict management is relevant and essential. After that section, the

literature on conflict management and peacekeeping was discussed. Later, the UN's ethnic conflict management efforts were examined. The chapter is concluded with the literature on the evaluation of peacekeeping missions.

The literature on ethnic conflict management is vast. It is also a literature that includes contributions from renowned conflict studies scholars. However, many of these studies are concentrated in the late 1990s to early 2000s, when researching ethnic conflicts was at its peak in academia. The end of the 20th century brought essential changes to the field. The bloody conflicts and failure to manage them caused a shift in understanding and executing conflict management activities. This study aims to contribute to the literature by using the latest insights of conflict management literature and examining the cases via these lenses to understand the UN's involvement in ethnic conflict management.

3. METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

Qualitative studies aim to explain outcomes in individual cases. To elaborate, what a qualitative researcher does is that for all the cases under the scope of the theory being examined, the researcher looks for the cause of the specific outcomes (Mahoney and Goertz 2006). The approach to explanation in qualitative research is a "cases-of-effects" in which the researcher starts with a case and an outcome and tries to understand the causes by moving backward (Mahoney and Goertz 2006).

In this thesis, the aim is to test whether the three determinants of success in fact results in successful missions and to find out what might increase the odds of success. Firstly, to answer this question, the independent and the dependent variables were conceptualized and operationalized to reduce the number of possible cases, which will be discussed in detail later in the chapter. Since this research aims to look at peacekeeping missions deployed in order to manage ethnic conflicts, a comparative case analysis looking at in case variants was conducted in which process tracing was used.

In the following sections, the methodology used to answer the research question will be discussed in detail. Firstly, the data collection methodology will be explained. Secondly, the independent, dependent and control variables will be examined. Thirdly, case selection will be explained with regards to control variables. Finally, limitations of the study will be mentioned.

3.2 Data Collection

According to George and Bennett (2005), a case study is the "detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events." (5). Although examining a single case to achieve outcomes is possible, Levy (2008) argues that bringing additional cases into a study has some advantages. Comparative case studies "involve the analysis and synthesis of the similarities, differences, and patterns across two or more cases that share a common focus or goal" (Goodrick 2014, 1).

In this thesis, where I aim to determine success in UN involvement in ethnic conflicts, I need to have at least two cases to see what kind of changes it brings. A structured, focused comparison between the cases was made in which the question asked was repeated for both cases to guide the data collection, which made the systematic comparison of the findings possible. Furthermore, the comparison was focused because only certain aspects of the case were examined (George and Bennett 2005).

When doing a comparative case analysis, one of the most common methods applied is Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD) and Most Different Systems Design (MDSD), which originates from Mill's (1843) *method of agreement* and *method of difference* (Peters 1998). While using MDSD, one needs to choose cases with different explanatory variables but similar dependent variables. On the other hand, if one chooses to use MSSD, the cases' explanatory variables need to be similar. In contrast, the value of the dependent variables needs to be different (Levy 2008). In other words, two similar cases produce different outcomes. A benefit of this strategy is that it allows the researcher to control the factors that are not causal and separate the explanatory variable that explains the dependent variable (Steinmetz 2019). Furthermore, it keeps irrelevant or confusing variables out of the research. In this thesis, MSSD was chosen to examine two countries in similar conditions. In the two cases selected, the UN involvement achieved different results, allowing the researcher to understand better the determinants of success and why and how they differ.

3.3 Research Design

In analyzing the UN involvement of ethnic conflicts through MSSD, several control variables lead us to our cases. First of all, the cases must have experienced or currently experiencing an ethnic conflict (ethnic conflict experience) that stems from similar reasons and categorically must belong to the same group of ethnic conflicts (reasons for ethnic conflict). Secondly, the years that these countries experiencing conflicts must be as close as possible (years when conflicts are experienced). Furthermore, geographical location is another variable to control since different regions or areas have very different experiences. Also, since we are looking for UN involvement in these cases, the countries must be on the Peacebuilding Commission's agenda (ongoing peace process). Control variables are explained more in detail in the following subsections.

Controlling for the type and cause of the conflict is important because although there can be many cases accepted as ethnic conflicts, rarely the force driving the conflict's pace has been similar. First of all, the ethnic conflict was operationalized with the Major Episodes of Violence dataset's episode types. The cases that fall under the category of "(E): Ethnic-intrastate involving the state agent and a distinct ethnic group" were selected. Furthermore, ethnic conflicts can be categorized as ethnic wars or ethnic violence according to the Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) dataset (Marshall 2018). For instance, the ethnic conflict in Uganda headed by the Lord's Resistance Army is considered ethnic violence. In contrast, the ethnic conflict that involved Pashtuns in Federally Administrated Tribal Areas in Pakistan is considered ethnic warfare. Therefore, the cases selected must belong to the same category while caused by similar reasons to control the confounding variables.

Another variable to control is the year of the conflict. Because the international arena is always evolving, new decades bring new experiences and entities that change the world's mechanisms. For instance, it would not be right to examine two cases in which one happened before the Arab Uprisings and one that happened after. So the timing of the cases is another factor that can be confounding if not controlled.

Geographical location is another critical variable to control that is frequently used in conflict studies. From history to culture, religion to regional organization memberships, countries in the same region shares many elements. Although two countries in different regions might experience the same type of conflicts, it is very far-fetched to expect the conflicts' experiences to be the same for many reasons. In this thesis, regions are categorized according to UN guidelines, which are based on continental

regions and further subdivided into sub-regions (United Nations 2021*f*).

The final variable to control is whether the countries are on the agenda of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). Created in 2005, PBC is tasked with supporting peace efforts in conflict areas (United Nations 2021*c*). Being on the PBC agenda is included as a control variable because the Commission operates in the context that there is an ongoing peace process. To effectively trace a process, one needs to have all elements from start to finish. Including this control ensures that the cases reached a similar position during the ethnic conflicts. Furthermore, a country being on the PBC agenda shows a considerable interest in the conflict by the international community, which would bring an amount of support in resolving the conflict.

The independent variable, which is similar across the two cases examined, is the United Nations' involvement during an ethnic conflict. This thesis uses the UN peacekeeping missions deployed in ethnic conflicts as the UN involvement. The reason for this is that peacekeeping is one of the most fundamental ways that the UN gets involved in conflicts, as it is usually the one that brings the most change into a conflict situation.

The dependent variable, which is the determinants of success, was measured in a threefold analysis. The threefold analysis was derived from the literature on evaluating the success of the peace operations. First, a mandate analysis was done to evaluate the comprehensiveness of the mandates. The mandate analysis was divided into ten categories (military, displaced peoples, humanitarian assistance, civil policing, electoral assistance, information/education, gender affairs, legal affairs, transitional authority, and good offices) and thirty-three activities which were previously outlined by Howard (2008). Howard's (2008) categorization of activities were selected since they show the variety of activities UN conducts the best. Secondly, an implementation/activities analysis was conducted to see the level of implementation of the missions' mandates. The missions' activities were divided into four areas that Franke and Warnecke (2009) outlined: security and public order, socio-economic well-being, governance and participation, and justice and reconciliation. Finally, an exit situation analysis was conducted in order to understand the changes the UN brought to the host country. The exit situation analysis was based on Howard's (2008) "questions for evaluating the duration of success after the UN multidimensional peacekeeping mission's departure from the host country" (353) which can be found in Appendix A. The reason why a three-fold analysis was picked was the frequency of these three factors in the literature of peace operations success.

I hypothesize that, the missions that fulfills the three criteria; which are mandate ful-

fillment, establishment of order and better situation in the post-mission period, are the determinants of success which results in a successful UN peacekeeping mission.

After the threefold analysis, the selected cases' peacekeeping missions were evaluated according to the hypothesis and were determined either as "success" or "failure". This was followed by a discussion on the factors that contributes to the success of peacekeeping missions.

The dependent variable, which is the success of peacekeeping operations in ethnic conflicts, was measured using the process-tracing method. Process tracing is "the systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected and analyzed in light of research questions and hypotheses posed by the investigator" (Collier 2011, 823). In this thesis, this was done by examining secondary sources to see how the conflict is attempted to be managed. In general, this thesis utilized primary and secondary sources such as books, articles, newspaper articles, Secretary-General reports, UNSC resolutions, press releases, and reviews to collect data and trace the ethnic conflict within the case selected. The reports of the Secretary-General and the UNSC resolutions were the main and sometimes only source of accessing mission mandates and activities. Books and articles, and in the places needed, newspaper articles were utilized to understand the cases' background better.

3.4 Case Selection

Concerning the case selection, Burundi and the Central African Republic (CAR) were selected as the most similar cases to compare and trace the process of the UN involvement. In this section, the case selection will be justified and explained to understand the effect of UN involvement on ethnic conflicts. In the section above, four control variables were mentioned that created the case selection process basis. They will be examined one by one to explain why Burundi and CAR fit the requirements.

3.4.1 Type/Background of the Conflict

First of all, if one examines the MEPV dataset's codebook, both the Burundi and CAR conflicts are categorized as "ethnic" by Marshall's (2018) definition. Furthermore, they are both classified as a "war" instead of "violence". Therefore, both cases experience a similar type of conflict according to the dataset.

Secondly, the background of both conflicts is somewhat similar, too. Both countries were affected by the colonial rule intensely with the colonial powers' treatment of different ethnic groups created hierarchies that did not exist before. This treatment and created hierarchies became one of the root causes of the conflicts. Although both countries tried to establish a democratic system, both failed to achieve long-lasting political stability due to several military coups. Struggle for power is the driving force of these cases.

In Burundi, first by German then Belgian rule, Tutsis became the favored ethnic group over all other ethnicities in the country, which started the tension between two main ethnic groups: Hutus and Tutsis. Although Tutsi's were favored, it is essential to note that they only make up 10 to 14% of Burundi's overall inhabitants while the Hutu's make up 85 to 90%. Until the early sixties, Burundi remained under Belgian rule; however, the independence did not bring sustainable stability to the country with a brutal civil war based on the ethnic identities that broke out at the start of the nineties. Aside from history, there were some political causes for the conflict to break out in Burundi. According to Lund, Rubin, and Hara (1998), ethnic-based political parties and the government's unclear power distribution led to authoritarian tendencies, which led to instability.

Furthermore, divisive leaders who use demagogic rhetoric to fulfill their interests also expanded this instability. The grievances were interconnected with historical and political ones in the economic sphere, specifically the structure inherited from the colonial powers. Discriminatory treatment that remained from colonial times combined with a lack of strong state instructions and scarcity of resources was another factor that contributes to the conflict.

In CAR, the situation is similar but a bit more complicated. CAR was a part of French Equatorial Africa. Although the colony was not on top of France's priorities, some groups, such as Yakoma and Ngbaka, benefitted from the colonial rule more than the others. It is important to note that both ethnic groups can be considered a minority among the other larger ethnic groups. The country's history is riddled with military coups, and although it became independent in the sixties, the first democratic election was held in 1993, nearly three decades later. Economically, CAR is one of the world's poorest countries even though it has considerable natural resources (UNDP 2020*c*). This situation connects to the historical experiences as the country was connected to the Arab slave trade in the early 20th century which led to a population decrease as many worked elsewhere in French Equatorial Africa on infrastructure projects. Aside from the population decrease, since the French focus was also not in the area, the area that belongs to CAR currently never benefited

from such infrastructure projects. This had ramifications on the long-term economic underdevelopment.

3.4.2 Conflict Year

Although the roots of the conflicts connected to colonial rule, the outbreak of ethnic conflicts is close. In Burundi, the war erupted after the first multi-party elections in 1993 in which the country's first Hutu president, Melchior Ndadaye, was elected. His election was not accepted by the Tutsi extremist groups, which eventually murdered Ndadaye during a coup that marked the start of the conflict. Similarly, CAR had its first democratically elected leader, Patasse, in 1993. However, Patasse used his position to fill the military's top positions with his ethnic group and crated his own presidential guard, police force, and later on the militia, citing security reasons. In 1996, there were three military mutinies against Patasse, which was the conflict's unofficial start. In 2004, when Bozize replaced Patasse after a coup, the Bush War started, marking the conflict's official start.

3.4.3 Geographical Location

Geographical location was another critical factor to check for to do a comparative analysis between two cases. Burundi and CAR, although not neighbors, are close to each other. According to the UN categorization of geographic regions, both countries are part of the Africa continental and Sub-Saharan Africa subregions.

3.4.4 United Nations Peacebuilding Commission Agenda

As mentioned in the section above, being on the PBC agenda is considered another factor to be checked. This assures us of a similar international interest in the conflicts, which focuses more on the conflict and smoother UNSC involvement.

Burundi was placed on the Commission's agenda on 13 July 2006, with Sierra Leone becoming the first two countries to do so. Funds from the Peacebuilding Fund were allocated to the government to bolster the government's interventions in the peacebuilding plans (United Nations 2006*a*). Similarly, CAR was placed on the Commission's agenda on 12 June 2008, becoming the fourth country. UN allocated funds from the Peacebuilding Fund to the country while committing to assist CAR

with the organization of an inclusive political dialogue (United Nations 2008*a*).

3.5 Limitations

There are several limitations to this study that needs to be mentioned before progressing further. In this section, the limitations caused by the research design will be further explored.

First of all, most of the information on the implementation of the activities and the situation in the country during peacekeeping missions were taken from either UNSC Resolutions or Secretary-General Reports, both sources directly connected to the UN. In most of the cases, it was not possible to cross-check the information with other resources because they were also written citing UN documents. So there is a limitation on the neutrality of the implementation.

Another limitation that concerns this study is the generalizability. In qualitative studies, generalization is more fragile than quantitative studies since the measurement, concepts, and model pose a significant issue (Mahoney and Goertz 2006). In this study, the generalizability is also limited. Although it is possible to test a theory this way, it is not possible to argue that findings would be applicable for all cases. Furthermore, although there are several control variables, this study is not able to control all the internal actors that play a part in the success of a peacekeeping mission.

Finally, another limitation to note is selection bias. It is long argued that qualitative researchers pick their cases according to the dependent variable and, therefore, are inherently biased (Mahoney and Goertz 2006). To combat this, two cases were examined; one case was selected as a positive and one case as a negative case to provide causal contrast and inference.

Furthermore, the case selection and reasoning behind it were explained in detail in the previous section. However, it needs to be noted that although the two main cases are similar, out of the four missions analyzed, one is still ongoing, which will require an additional evaluation after it is finished.

4. CASE STUDY: BURUNDI

4.1 Historical Background of the Conflict

Burundi is a small country in Sub-Saharan Africa that has a population of 11 million. Out of this 11 million, 85% are Hutus, 14% are Tutsis, and 1% are Twa (Gall and Hobby 2009). The country has the lowest gross national income (GNI) per capita globally and scored 185th out of 189 in the Human Development Index (UNDP 2020*c*).

Although the history of Burundi is marked by European colonial rule, unlike most of the region, Burundi is not an artificial state created by the colonial powers (Reyntjens 2000). Burundi had been an organized kingdom (joint with Rwanda) for centuries until its absorption into German East Africa in 1899 . Pre-colonial Burundi was not marked by the dichotomous relationship between Hutus and Tutsis. This was both caused by the non-rigid heterogeneity of the Tutsis and the fact that Hutus had more power in the kingdom (Takeuchi 2013). Furthermore, the existing cleavages between the Tutsi ruling elites contributed to the relationship between the two main ethnic groups. The ruling family in Burundi was known as Ganwa, a sub-group within Tutsis, and only those who belonged to Ganwa could rule in the pre-colonial era. The other Tutsi sub-groups, Bezi and Batare, were always in conflict with Ganwas during these times (Takeuchi 2013). However, after World War I, with the Belgian colonial rule, this changed.

Ruanda-Urundi became occupied by Belgium in 1916 as a League of Nations mandate territory. The mandate was controlled with indirect rule principles in which Tutsis were given more power in the day-to-day administration of the country. Some argue that Belgians favored Tutsis over Hutus because of the Eurocentric ideology of the Hamitic hypothesis (Takeuchi 2013). The Hamitic hypothesis argues that Tutsis are descendants of Europeans, therefore superior to Hutus originating from Africa. In the end, there was a clear division against the policies regarding Tutsis

and Hutus, in which Hutus were blocked from administration and had issues accessing education. This caused Hutus to fall behind Tutsis both economically and in terms of education which woke the previously dormant ethnic tensions within Burundi.

After World War II, the country became a United Nations Trust Territory under the administrative authority of Belgium. Under the guideline of the UN trust territories, administrative authorities were required to prepare the territories for independence and majority rule . During this preparation phase, many new actors emerged in the political sphere. Two main parties emerged during this time were the Union for National Progress (UPRONA), which was a nationalist group led by Prince Rwagasore (who was the son of King Mwambutsa), and the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), which was a conservative pro-Belgian Batare group led by Brayanka and Ntidendereza. After Burundi's first election in 1961, UPRONA emerged victorious with over 80% of the votes; however, its leader Rwagasore was assassinated just two weeks after the elections. Months after the assassination, Burundi declared its independence from Belgium and adopted a constitutional monarchy as its rule. Mwambutsa IV became the first post-colonial king of the Kingdom of Burundi.

After the independence of the kingdom, especially following the assassination of Prince Rwagasore, the rule of the country started to move into an absolute monarchy led by Tutsi domination which led to the deterioration in the treatment of Hutus. Although the Hutus won the 1965 legislative elections, King Mwambutsa appointed a Ganwa as a prime minister to appease the Tutsi minorities. This was followed by a Hutu-led coup attempt that was violently suppressed by the Tutsi groups in the army, who seized power and overthrew the monarchy.

Michel Micombero became the first president of Burundi. The establishment of the new republic saw some changes in the power structure: the Ganwas, who were the main actors in politics and administration, was replaced with non-Ganwa Tutsis. This period of political change was filled with violence and mass killings. Many Hutus were slaughtered after the failed coup attempt in 1965 and the following one in 1969. Hutus followed these killings with a shot at insurrection, which killed around 3000 Tutsis. Tutsis retaliated violently and killed about 200.000 Hutus in what is known as the 1972 genocide. Over a million Hutus escaped the violence and fled to neighboring countries.

1972 genocide is a turning point in the history of Burundi since most of the arguments of the ethnic tensions which led to the civil war later on are based on the perceptions stemmed from it. Hutus argue that the genocide is a proof of an ongoing genocidal plan that aims to destroy all Hutus. On the other hand, Tutsis were

afraid of *"le peril Hutu"* (the Hutu peril) in which they believe the minority will be exterminated by the majority (Reyntjens 2000). Another reason for the 1972 genocide's importance is that it exacerbated the division between the ethnic groups. It was shown that anything could be done to Hutus without the fear of prosecution domestically and internationally. Another critical point to note down is the existence of the displaced Burundians in the neighboring countries, whose mobilization played a vital role in the civil war.

Micombero was ousted from power in 1976 by a bloodless coup by Jean-Baptise Bagaza. Bagaza's rule was known for its intense repression, both against the Hutu and Tutsi populations. 1981 constitution he declared made the country an officially one-party state, and he declared himself as the official head of state in 1984. Bagaza did not stay in power for long. He was ousted from power as well in 1987 by Pierre Buyoya, who was the leader of UPRONA during that time. Buyoya and his party aimed at national reconciliation, where they suspended the constitution and established military rule. To achieve national reconciliation, Buyoya's cabinet consisted of the same number of Tutsis and Hutus, and His prime minister, Simbana, was also a Hutu.

While this was happening, a group of exiled Hutus in Tanzania organized themselves into the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People (PALIPEHUTU) to respond to the worsening situation against the Hutu people in Burundi. PALIPEHUTU's military wing, PALIPEHUTU-National Forces of Liberation (PALIPEHUTU-FNL), was founded in 1985, which attacked several northern provinces in 1988, killing several Tutsis. This contributed to the Tutsi belief of a Hutu conspiracy that aimed to exterminate Tutsis. To reduce the ethnic tensions, Buyoya and his government passed a new constitution in 1992, changing the state into a multi-party system. In the following year, the Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU), a Hutu-led party, won the elections, and Melchior Ndayaye became the first Hutu president of the country. Although Buyoya attempted to reduce the ethnic tensions, he was not successful. four months after Ndayaye was elected, he was assassinated by Tutsi rebels, which marked the start of the civil war.

4.2 Burundian Civil War (1993-2005)

The largest Hutu rebel group, the National Council for the Defense of Democracy – Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD–FDD), was founded in 1994. CNND was the political and FDD was the military wing of the organization. CNDD–FDD

and PALIPEHUTU-FNL were the main opposition groups against the Tutsi military forces during the civil war. After Ndayaye's assassination, ethnic tensions came to a blowing point in which Hutu insurgents began to attack Tutsis, which retributed brutally to these attacks. Thousands of Hutus were killed during these Tutsi army attacks.

Cyprien Ntaryamira, who was the successor of president Ndayaye, was killed in 1994 in the same plane crash that also killed the Rwandan president Habyarimana. Ntaryamira's death and the resulting Rwandan genocide of 1994 further destabilized the country and increased the conflict between ethnic groups. This sparked organized attacks by insurgent Hutu groups against Tutsis, followed by brutal retribution by the Tutsi army. An estimated 300,000 civilians were killed, and another 1.2 million civilians were displaced during the civil war (Political Economy Research Institute 2006).

1998 saw Buyoya's return to power via a military coup. He organized negotiations with FRODEBU, who was still the majority group in the parliament, to decrease inter-ethnic tensions and create a transitional government to start peace talks with the Hutu rebels. Peace talks began in 1998 in Arusha with the former president of Tanzania Nyerere's mediation. After he passed away in 1999, Nelson Mandela, the president of South Africa, took over. Peace talks were concluded with the Arusha Agreement.

4.3 Peace Agreements

Arusha Accords (2000)

Signed after the successful Arusha peace talks, the Arusha Accords, or as officially known Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, was signed by all parties involved in the conflict except for PALIPEHUTU-FNL and CNDD–FDD[1]. Article I of the agreement states that Protocol I on the nature of the conflict, problems of genocide and exclusion and their solutions, Protocol II on democracy and good governance, Protocol III on peace and security for all, Protocol IV on reconstruction and development, and Protocol V on the guarantees on the implementation of the agreement will be binding for all signatories (Burundi 2000). Under these protocols, a new power-sharing formula was created in which the minority Tutsis could

[1]Their political factions, PALIPEHUTU and CNDD, were signatories of the agreement. However, at this point, the movements were deeply fractured and did not act together.

be overrepresented, and positions in the three branches of government and national institutions were equally divided. It also included provisions on integrating former rebel military groups into the military and stated that the national forces (both military and civil police) would be rearranged to have both of the ethnic groups in the same percentage.

At the end, only 13 out of 19 ethnic groups signed the agreement . All non-signatories were Tutsi groups. Regional pressures resulted in these groups signing the agreement in September 2000.

Ceasefire Agreement (2002)

After the transitional government was concluded, Hutu president Ndayizeye took office. With the support of Mandela, he started talks with CNDD–FDD which led to the signing of the Ceasefire Agreement (or officially: Ceasefire Agreement between the Transitional Government of Burundi and CNDD–FDD).

The agreement outlined the stages of the ceasefire, including provisions on DDR and SSR. Also, the agreement stated that "verification and control of the ceasefire may be conducted by an UN-mandated mission, or an African Union (AU) [mission]" (Badmus 2017, 8).

Pretoria Protocol (2003)

Per the agreement's requirements, CNDD–FDD agreed to cease all armed fighting and integrate into the army. In response to this, they were allocated positions in the power-sharing structure. The agreement outlines the National Defence Force (NDF) formation and the DDR process of CNDD–FDD.

Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement (2006)

After the 2005 general elections, the former rebel group CNDD–FDD won the office as a political party, Nkuruziza becoming the president. This opened up the opportunity to reenter peace talks with PALIPEHUTU-FNL, who disagreed with the politics of UPRONA and FRODEBU. After lengthy negotiations, PALIPEHUTU-FNL signed the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement, agreeing to the cessation of hostilities and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of the PALIPEHUTU-FNL forces (Burundi 07/09/2006).

4.4 Conflict Management

4.4.1 United Nations Operation in Burundi (2004-2006)

The African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) was the first peacekeeping mission that the African Union (AU) deployed. Arusha agreement stated that the government would request a United Nations peacekeeping force in Burundi. However, at the time Arusha was signed, no ceasefire agreement was signed with the insurgent groups. The United Nations was unwilling to deploy a peacekeeping force until a complete ceasefire was in effect (Svensson 2008). Due to this, in the initial ceasefire agreements signed in 2002, it was agreed that a peacekeeping force deployed by the African Union would initially enter the country to ensure the implementation of the agreements. After a year of operation, AMIB laid out a good foundation for a UN mission to enter the country where all ceasefire signatories were committed to the agreement.

United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) took over the responsibility of supporting the peace process from AMIB in 2004 under the authorization of UNSC, which unanimously accepted Resolution 1545. Initially, the mission was given a six-month operation time. The deployment of the mission and its extensive mandate was formulated according to the requests issued to the UN by the government of Burundi and the mediation team responsible for the agreements. ONUB is referred to as a "fully-fledged multifunctional mission" whose mandate "transcends traditional peacekeeping missions" (Boshoff 2004). ONUB's mandate can be found in Appendix B.

As can be seen from the mandate, ONUB was given an extensive mandate and the authority to use any means necessary to ensure the implementation of its mandate (Boshoff 2004). Regarding the deployment strength, 5665 military personnel (including 5,400 troops, 168 military observers, and 97 police), 316 international civilian staff, 383 local civilian staff and, 156 United Nations Volunteers were authorized (United Nations 2007*a*). Additionally, "aviation transport capability, a transport element, an engineering element, a maritime element, a special forces component, a level 3 hospital and, finally, a military police unit." (Boshoff 2004, 58) was included in the ONUB force.

4.4.1.1 Activities

Security and public order

The primary task of ONUB was to ensure the implementation of the Arusha Agreement. At the time the mission was deployed, not all conflicting parties signed the agreement. During the deployment of the mission, "the prospects for ending the armed conflict through a negotiated settlement between the Government and FNL gained significant momentum" (United Nations 2006*d*, 4). Although FNL did not sign the agreement during the mission, essential steps towards the negotiations were taken. Three months after ONUB was finalized, the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement was signed between the government and FNL.

Another important task, and according to Adebajo (2011) ONUB's most significant success was the DDR of the ex-combatants.

Figure 4.1 Overview of DDR Activities (Boshoff and Vray 2006)



As shown in Figure 4.1, ONUB led a comprehensive DDR process that resulted in the demobilization of 21,769 fighters (Adebajo 2011). Furthermore, according to a report in March 2006, 5640 weapons were recovered (Boshoff and Vrey 2006). The SSR process agreed in the Arusha agreement was supported by ONUB, which

resulted in the police reform that restructured the existing national police force with the integration of ex-combatants while completing training programs (CIGI 2009).

Aside from the DDR process, ONUB trained the integrated national police of Burundi, provided security for the returning refugees by deploying close to refugee camps and escorting humanitarian convoys, protected the civilian population on the areas they were deployed, monitored and reported ceasefire agreement violations and monitored (with MONUSCO in DR Congo) cross-border illegal arms trade (Adebajo 2011).

Socio-economic well-being

ONUB provided support for the socio-economic well-being of the country via providing security for the humanitarian assistance to reach necessary places, helped voluntary refugee and IDP returns. Furthermore, the operation protected the civilians under threat of physical violence (Franke and Warnecke 2009). ONUB military personnel also carried out infrastructure projects such as constructing orphanages, hospitals, and community buildings.

Governance and participation

ONUB provided support for governance and participation by contributing to the creation of security for the elections to take place and aiding the government in the electoral process. Due to the "extensive political, military, technical and logistical support" provided by ONUB, a referendum, and five elections were successfully conducted in 2005 (United Nations 2006*a*, 13). ONUB also had a vital role in the conclusion of the transitional period and was an effective actor in the transfer of power to the newly elected government. Finally, ONUB both advocated and helped "mobilize women's participation, both as voters and as candidates, in the electoral process, including revising the Constitution and the electoral laws to include gender concerns" (United Nations 2006*a*, 13).

Justice and reconciliation

One of the most important events happened during ONUB's deployment was that a constitution that was in line with the power-sharing formula outlined in the Arusha agreement was approved by a constitutional referendum (Jackson 2006). The promotion and protection of human rights was another area where ONUB has contributed. First of all, during its deployment time, ONUB closely monitored the human rights situation in the country. Furthermore, the mission raised awareness on human rights issues via distributing monthly reports and establishing national institutions that promote human rights. Finally, the Office of the United Nations High Commis-

sioner for Human Rights (**ohchr**) was invited to Burundi to work on transitional justice. OHCHR supported Burundian experts to revise the national criminal code and proposed significant changes on "the abolition of the death penalty and the criminalization of torture, as well as new provisions for the protection of women against sexual violence, the protection of children, (...) the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes" (United Nations 2006*a*, 9).

4.5 Burundi since ONUB

Following the withdrawal of ONUB and the signing of the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement, United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) replaced the peacekeeping operations in Burundi in December 2006. BINUB was tasked with assisting the government efforts on peace and stability, promote and protect women's rights (United Nations 2006*c*). Furthermore, the office's mandate consisted of four main areas: "peace consolidation and democratic governance, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and reform of the security sector, promotion and protection of human rights and measures to end impunity (and) donor and United Nations agency coordination" (United Nations 2006*c*, 2-3).

Burundi was put on the agenda of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) in 2007. The commission, in cooperation with the government of Burundi, created a strategic framework to

> "bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery, to focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict and to support the development of integrated strategies to lay the foundation for sustainable development" (United Nations 2007*c*, 4).

Guided by the framework, the Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JVMM) was established in November 2007 (Center on International Cooperation 2009). The need for JVMM showed itself shortly, since the security situation started to deteriorate between FNL and the government. JVMM monitored the situation closely, and an agreement between the government and FNL was reached in 2009. FNL dropped the PALIPEHUTU acronym from its name, eliminating the ethnic reference, and became a political party.

To prepare for the 2010 elections, an independent national electoral commission was created. Nkurunziza was re-elected for his second term in the next elections. After the elections, BINUB was replaced by the United Nations Office in Burundi (BNUB) in December 2010. BNUB was tasked with:

> "strengthening the independence, capacities and legal frameworks of key national institutions (...), promoting and facilitating dialogue between national actors and supporting mechanisms for broad-based participation in political life, (...) supporting efforts to fight impunity, particularly through the establishment of transitional justice mechanisms to strengthen national unity, (...) promote justice and promote reconciliation within Burundi's society" and "(...) promoting and protecting human rights, including strengthening national capacities in that area, as well as national civil society" (United Nations 2010*b*, 13).

BNUB completed its mandate in 2014 and withdrew from the country. The remaining responsibilities of the organization were transferred to specific UN agencies, funds, and programmes.

Burundi is an excellent example of the evolution of conflict management strategies of the United Nations since there has been a clear shift from traditional peacekeeping to peacebuilding measures.

4.6 Current Situation

The security situation deteriorated again in 2015, in time for the elections, after Nkurunziza states his intent to run for the presidency for the third time. Whether this move was constitutional or not became an argument between the opposition and the government. Some groups opposing Nkurunziza's rule clashed with the police in the protests. A coup attempt was initiated in May 2015, though the government rebuffed it. However, violent clashes and deaths have been reported by the news channels (BBC 12.12.2015). Nkurunziza was re-elected in June 2015.

United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) adopted Resolution 33/24 on the situation of human rights in Burundi in September 2016 and condemned "all violations and abuses of human rights in Burundi" (UNHCR 2006, 2) and created an inquiry commission to investigate human right violations. The commission found the possibility that both groups might have committed crimes against humanity and

called on the International Criminal Court (ICC) to investigate the case (OHCHR 2017).

In 2018, a constitutional referendum aiming to amend the constitution to allow for Nkurunziza's re-election for another term was approved by the Burundians. However, Nkurunziza announced his retirement. Ndayshimiye from CNDD–FDD won the 2020 elections and became the new president.

5. CASE STUDY: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

5.1 Historical Background

Central African Republic (CAR) is a relatively small country with a population of 4.7 million (World Bank 2019*b*). Out of this population, 50% is Christian while 35% practice indigenous beliefs, and 15% is Muslim[1] (Minority Rights Group 2020). CAR is very ethnically diverse, with over 80 different ethnic groups living in the country. The most prominent ethnic groups are Gbaya with 3%, Banda with 27%, Mandjia with 13%, Sara with 10%, Mboum with 7%, M'Baka with 4%, and Yakoma with 4% (Minority Rights Group 2020). Ranked 188 out of 189 in the Human Development Index, CAR also has one of the world's lowest GDP per capita (UNDP 2020*a*; World Bank 2019*a*). Surrounded by Chad, Sudan, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Republic of Congo, CAR is located in a region characterized by instability (Kane 2014).

Like most of the countries in the region, CAR also has an extensive colonial past. Colonized by first France in 1894, the territory CAR was named Ubangi-Shari and was later administered under French Equatorial Africa. As a state whose borders were determined by colonial powers, CAR was a weak state when it became independent in 1960 and soon descended into violence. The country became a place where the political authority was determined by personal power rather than institutional leadership (Isaacs-Martin 2016).

After CAR became independent in 1960, David Dacko from the Movement for the Social Evolution of Black Africa (MESAN), the Prime Minister during the French administration, became the country's first president. He was strongly supported by both the French government and the CAR military. In 1962, Dacko introduced a one-party system and suspended the constitution that was drafted after the inde-

[1] Due to the ongoing civil war, the current number of Muslims is unknown but expected to be considerably lower.

pendence. He was re-elected, with no opposition, in 1964. A collapsing economy and widespread corruption characterized his time in power (McFarlane and Malan 1998).

In 1965, with a military coup led by Jean-Bédel Bokassa, Dacko was overthrown. The Revolutionary Council, led by Bokassa, suspended the constitution and dissolved the parliament in 1966. After Bokassa declared himself the "President for Life", French troops were deployed to the capital city to suppress the military rebellion that aimed to overthrow Bokassa. In 1976, Bokassa dissolved the government and created the Council of the Central African Revolution (CCAR). Just months after that, he also dissolved the CCAR and declared himself the emperor of the Central African Empire. In 1979, students protested against Bokassa's rule which the police retaliated and were suspected of killing at least 100 children (NY Times 24.09.1979). In September 1979, with the support of the French military, former president Dacko overthrew Bokassa (McFarlane and Malan 1998).

New elections followed a new constitution in 1981, in which Dacko, this time with the Central African Democratic Union (UDC), was re-elected as the president. Just six months after he took office, he was overthrown in a military coup led by André-Dieudonné Kolingba. Kolingba established the Military Committee of National Restoration (CMRN) and suspended the constitution while limiting political activity. Kolingba's rule sowed the first seeds of ethnic tension in the country since he filled the top layers of the military with people from his ethnic group, Yakoma. In 1992 the constitution was amended and allowed multi-party elections. In 1993, Ange-Félix Patassé of the Movement for the Liberation of the Central African People (MLPC) was elected as the president (McFarlane and Malan 1998).

5.2 Conflicts

5.2.1 Unrest During Patassé Government (1996-1997)

Patassé , a member of Sara-Kaba ethnic groups, aware that the top military positions were filled with Yakomas, created his security force citing presidential protection., Patassé also formed his militias, comprised of Gbaya, Kaba, and Sara ethnic groups. Opposing groups did not welcome Patassé's obsession with his security. In 1996, three mutinies against Patassé's government occurred. French troops were deployed to support the government. First mediation attempts were headed by the Archbishop of Bangui and tried to find a solution to the increasing

ethnic cleavages within the military; however, he was unsuccessful (McFarlane and Malan 1998). Attacks on Yakomas increased the intensity of the conflict. After several military clashes, Inter-African Conciliation Commission, led by Burkina Faso, Chad, Gabon, and Mali, started mediation between the government and eleven rebel groups, which resulted in Bangui Agreements. For the agreement's implementation, mediator states established a peacekeeping mission named as Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements (MISAB).

5.2.2 Bush War (2004-2008)

President Patassé, who was suspicious of the military since the start of his rule, dismissed the Army Chief of Staff General François Bozizé with allegations of plotting against the government in 2001 (UCA 2021). Clashes between rebel groups in support of Bozizé and government forces started to clash. The Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) deployed a peacekeeping mission to protect President Patassé in February 2002. The continuing violent clashes worried the international actors, and the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) also deployed a peacekeeping mission named *Force Multinationale en Centrafrique* (FOMUC). The French government also deployed additional forces to support FOMUC. CEN-SAD troops were withdrawn with the deployment of new peacekeeping forces. Even though there were many international troops within the country, Patassé was overthrown by the rebel troops commanded by Bozizé in March 2003. He passed a new constitution in 2004 and was elected as the president in the 2005 presidential elections (UCA 2021).

The actual fighting of the Bush War started around 2004, where rebel groups opposing Bozizé started doing raids in the northeast of the country. Although there were a considerable number of rebel groups varying in size, the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR) and the Democratic Front of the Central African People (FDPC) were the most prominent ones. Clashes between government forces and rebels continued through ears. It is estimated that around 150.000 people were displaced between 2003 and 2006 due to these violent clashes (UCA 2021). Libya and CEMAC mediated talks between the government, FDPC, and UFDR led to the signing of Syrte and Birao Agreements in 2007. United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) was deployed after the agreements' signature to protect the civilians, displaced persons, and refugees in the northeast of CAR. In 2008, the EU also deployed a peacekeeping force named EU military force in Chad and the Central African Republic (EUFOR-CAR/Chad). Clashes between

the remaining rebel groups and the government continued. CEMAC mediated another round of peace talks, which led to signing a peace agreement between the government and the People's Army for the Restoration of Democracy (APRD) in 2008 (UCA 2021).

Although several peace agreements were signed, they were signed with singular rebel groups instead of all at once, which caused discontent with the agreements, and not all of the rebel groups accepted them.

5.2.3 Civil War (2013-ongoing)

The country enjoyed a sense of relative peace until 2012, when the violence resurged due to the accusations by the rebel groups that the government was not complying with the peace agreements (Baptiste 2014). The government started peace talks with Séléka, a rebel group with predominantly Muslim members, to have a power-sharing agreement which resulted in Libreville Agreement. However, the truce broke down, and in March 2013, Séléka successfully organized a coup and overthrew Bozizé, seized the capital, and Michel Djotodia became the president. This was a significant move since the first time in CAR's history, a Muslim group that originated from the northeast of the country held power. In response to the brutal attacks of Séléka, a coalition of Christian fighters, Anti-Balaka, was formed. With the formation of Anti-Balaka, a religious dimension to the previously ethnic conflict was added.

The cycle of violence became worse after the retaliatory attacks started to spread to civilian Muslim groups (Kane 2014). The international community moved its focus to CAR, in which the UN warned that timely action must be taken to prevent the escalation of the conflict into a genocide (Welz 2016). Two large operations, Operation Sangaris by France and International Support Mission for the CAR (MISCA) by African Union, were deployed to prevent further violence. However, the UN did not deploy a peacekeeping mission since the "P5 members, in particular the United States, remained sceptical of the likely scale and velocity at which mass violence could unfold" (Smith 2014, 179).

Although Djotodia attempted to integrate Séléka into the regular forces, some did not accept and became what is currently known as ex-Séléka. The continuous cycle of violence and political violence in the country caused Djotodia to resign. Catherine Samba-Panza headed the transitional government. After a period of mediation efforts, Brazzaville Agreement was signed in 2014. UN deployed a peacekeeping mission, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the

Central African Republic (MINUSCA), to take over peacekeeping activities from MISCA in September 2014.

5.3 Peace Agreements

Bangui Accords & National Reconciliation Pact (1997-1998)

Declaration on the End of the Rebellious Action, Bangui, and the following National Reconciliation Pact were signed in 1997 and 1998, respectively. The declaration was composed of the requests made by the rebels and started a ceasefire effective immediately. The National Reconciliation Pact was signed by the Patassé government, and the rebel groups committed to democracy and reconciliation. The agreement states that it aims to "put an end to political, economic and social practices characterized by nepotism, tribalism, exclusion and poor governance" (Central African Republic 05/03/1998, 2) and further states that the implementation will be assisted by "the international community to assist the national and international forces of order in their sensitive mission to collect the weapons spread throughout the country and to restore order" (Central African Republic 05/03/1998, 2).

Syrte & Birao Agreements (2007)

With the Syrte agreement, FDPC and UFDR agreed to cease the hostilities and decided to establish a committee to monitor the agreement's implementation. Birao agreement was focused on more the activities of UFDR and focused on reintegration, rehabilitation of the former combatants. Like the Syrte agreement, Birao also gave the option to withdraw from the agreement in case of a deliberate violation. The monitoring commission for implementation was re-stated in the agreement.

Libreville Agreement (2013)

Libreville Agreement was signed between the government, democratic opposition, politico-military combatant movements (which includes FDPC), and Seleka Coalition (which included UFDR) in 2013, after the re-emergence of violence in the country. It provided a ceasefire effective in 72 hours. It also defined the power-sharing structures between the government and the opposition group. Bozizé would remain the President, but the Prime Minister would be selected from the opposition groups. Dissolution of the militia and DDR processes was also included in the agreement.

Brazzaville Agreement (2014)

The Brazzaville agreement was signed between the government, anti-Balaka collation, and ex-Séléka in 2014. Ex-Séléka did not join the first two days of the negotiations but eventually signed the agreement “to mark a first step towards a national reconciliation” (The New Humanitarian 2014). The cessation of hostilities against civil and military populations was agreed upon. However, the agreement failed to agree to a clause on the political commitment to transition towards the next election and DDR elements. Furthermore, negotiated and signed in DR Congo, the agreement faced backlash from the public facing violence in their daily lives (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2014).

DDRR Agreement (2015)

Only a week after the Brazzaville Agreement, clashes between ex-Séléka and anti-Balaka resulted in the displacement of over 20.000 people. Seeing the necessity of an agreement with DDR elements and an implementation plan, the government (presided over by UN, AU, and ECCAS) held the 7-day long Bangui Forum. The forum aimed to bring people from all over CAR, from different walks of life, ethnicities, and religions, to achieve sustainable peace and had 600 participants. At the end of the forum, the "Agreement between the Transitional Government and the armed groups on the principles of disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and repatriation and integration into the uniformed State forces of the Central African Republic" (DDRR Agreement) has been signed with 9 out of 10 armed groups . FDPC, the only non-signatory of the agreement, accused the government of “playing politics to maintain its power” (Marima 2015). The agreement specified the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and repatriation (DDRR) process for the armed groups in CAR. A monitoring and evaluation committee to ensure the implementation of the agreement was also agreed upon.

Political Agreement for Peace (2017)

With the successful presidential elections at the end of 2015, which resulted in the election of Faustin-Archange Touadéra, the morale was high in CAR in 2016. However, with the withdrawal of the French Operation Sangaris, the violence started to flare up in almost all provinces of CAR. In the northeast, violence showed itself as violence committed by armed groups and conflicts revolving around livestock. In the center and east of the country, the upsurge of the conflict showed itself as guerrilla warfare over resources and influence.

At the end of 2016, many international actors, including the UN, AU, and some of CAR’s neighbors, initiated mediation efforts to prevent increasing violence. These

attempts resulted in the Political Agreement for Peace in the Central African Republic, signed in 2017. The agreement focused on resolving critical political, economic, humanitarian, social, and security issues. Aside from the immediate ceasefire, the signatories agreed that at the end of the DDRR process, all militias would be dissolved, and the security of the country would be provided by the country's own security forces and MINUSCA. The agreement also included clauses on reconciliation, reparation, and establishment of Truth, Justice, Reconciliation, and Reparation Commission. African Union was called upon in the agreement to assist with the implementation.

Khartoum Accord (2019)

The peace after the agreement in 2017 did not hold for long. The officials, who realized shortly that the agreement was not adequate to curb the violence, gathered in Brussels to create a strategic work plan to solve the issue. It was decided that African Union would lead the final round of peace talks with the support of the European Union and the United Nations. The AU-led mediation process started directly in 2017. In August 2018, these new mediation efforts yielded over a hundred demands from the fourteen armed groups that were then transmitted to the Touadéra government. Furthermore, AU officials had a meeting with the president of Chad (who holds some sway over some ex-Séléka leaders), Francois Bozizé (who is a former president of CAR and holds some power over anti-Balaka), and Michel Djotodia (who is the former president of CAR and Séléka).

At the same time, Russia began to support CAR by providing security training to its military and signing a military cooperation agreement. Furthermore, Russia initiated a mediation process parallel to the AU-led one. Although this caused some tension in the international community and UNSC, two efforts were merged in 2019, leading to the AU-led talks in Khartoum in January 2019.

The CAR government, 14 rebel groups, and African Union officials led the talks while the US, EU, Russia, and the UN joined as observers. After extensive discussions, the agreement was signed on 5 February.

The provisions of the agreement are primarily similar to the agreements before. However, there are three elements of the agreement that makes it different from the previous ones. Firstly, the agreement states that the president commits to an inclusive government. Although power-sharing practices are not clarified in the agreement, it is the first time it is mentioned. Secondly, legal sanctions against violators of the agreement are included. This is important because it is considered a win against the previous demands of amnesty by the rebel groups. Finally, the

agreement establishes "Mixed Special Security Units", which consists of rebel groups and national armed forces.

The enforcement of the agreement was given to several bodies. African Union, the regional subgroups (ECCAS and ICGLR), Angola, Republic of Congo, Chad, and Gabon were tasked to verify the agreement's implementation. Furthermore, the agreement established an Executive Monitoring Committee chaired by AU and the government. Also, the National Implementation committee was to be led by government officials and representatives of armed groups.

5.4 Conflict Management

During the series of conflicts that CAR has been experiencing over the past decades, many peace operations were deployed in order to combat the situation. Although this study is focused on the UN missions, all operations are outlined below to provide an easier understanding of the situation on the ground.

Figure 5.1 Timeline of the peace operations in CAR (Welz 2016)



5.4.1 United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (1998-2000)

United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) took over from the African-led MISAB in 1998 per Resolution 1159. Prior to the establishment of the mission, Secretary-General Annan wrote in his report that out of the seven provisions of the agreements, three remained as outstanding issues. These include:

"special security services and the downsizing and restructuring of the

> Presidential Guard; the abandonment of the judicial enforcement of the parliamentary audit in respect of persons presumed to have misappropriated funds under the previous regime; and the holding of a National Reconciliation Conference. (. . .) In addition, the delicate issue of compensation to the victims of the rebellions still needs to be addressed. Furthermore, (...) the recently drafted electoral code needs to be adopted and an independent electoral commission established" (United Nations 1998*a*, 3-4).

The report further states that although MISAB has stabilized the security situation in the country's capital, the country's overall security situation is still a matter of concern with common cases of banditry and robberies occurring in the interior of the country. Arguing that MISAB was not logistically and militarily strong enough to support a peacekeeping mission in CAR after French withdrawal, MINURCA entered the country on 15 April 1998 for an initial period of three months. The mission's mandate can be found in Appendix B.

The mission consisted of "1,350 troops and military support personnel and 24 civilian police, supported by international and local civilian staff with the given mandate. There was also a provision for 114 international civilian staff, 111 local staff, and 13 United Nations Volunteers." (United Nations 2000*a*). After its mandate finished, MINURCA was replaced with the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA).

5.4.1.1 Activities

Security and public order

MINURCA assisted in maintaining security and stability in the country's capital, Bangui. This was done by training the national police and forces to provide security in the country after withdrawal and policing via patrols with the national police/forces. Furthermore, MINURCA assisted the disarmament process by controlling the storage and disposal of the previously collected weapons. It was also responsible for protecting the UN personnel and property. However, in the last report of the Secretary-General, it is mentioned that the government of CAR, the President of Algeria, and the chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) requested that the mandate of the mission be extended. The chairman of OAU warned the UN on "the possible consequences of MINURCA's withdrawal on the security and stability" (United Nations 2000*b*, 8). Although the Secretary-General stated that a great deal had been accomplished, he also agreed that there was still

much to do, especially on restructuring the security and armed forces, providing necessary resources and equipment to trained police and gendarmes (United Nations 2000*b*).

Socio-economic well-being

No assistance was provided on socio-economic well-being by MINURCA.

Governance and participation

MINURCA assisted the government by providing advice and giving technical support for them to hold the elections. CAR held two elections in 1998 and 1999, respectively. 1999 elections were contested by all opposition parties, saying Patassé cheated; however, the UN declared that there was no proof of tampering with the elections (Reuters 3.10.1999).

Justice and reconciliation

MINURCA assisted the CAR government in creating the Family Code and ensuring the independence of the judiciary (United Nations 2000*b*). However, constitutional amendments and the Penal Code modifications agreed in the Bangui Agreement were not implemented during the mission's withdrawal (United Nations 2000*b*).

5.4.2 United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (2007-2010)

Although not directly connected to the inner conflict happening in CAR, the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) was deployed to the country in 2007. The fear of a spillover of the conflict in Darfur would affect the neighboring Chad and CAR was the main reason why the UNSC authorized the mission. Before the deployment of the MINURCAT, the only peacekeeping mission in the country was the CEMAC Multinational Force in the Central African Republic (FOMUC), which was deployed in 2002 after the increasing violence in the country. In the Secretary-General's report, before deployment of MINURCAT, it is stated that the Central African Armed Forces (FACA) cannot provide security and stability through the country and its operations are highly dependent on FOMUC and France (United Nations 2006*b*). Furthermore, it is stated that three provinces in the northeast have been abandoned by gendarmerie and police. With their numbers during that time, security forces could not address the current crisis with the rebels in the northeast. President Bozizé "welcomed the possible establishment of a United Nations peacekeeping presence in the north-east and stressed the need for

its deployment as soon as possible while asserting that the rebels in the northeast were supported by Sudan"(United Nations 2006*b*, 6).

With these developments in mind, UNSC approved Resolution 1778 in 2007 to deploy MINURCAT in eastern Chad and north-east CAR. The mandate of MINURCAT that is related to the activities in CAR can be found in Appendix B.

With the mandate in mind, MINURCAT was authorized to have "a maximum of 300 police and 50 military liaison officers and an appropriate number of civilian personnel" (United Nations 2007*b*, 3). The resolution also called European Union to establish an operation in Chad and CAR to perform peacekeeping activities. EUFOR-CAR/Chad was deployed in 2008 with 3700 troops. UN took over from the EU in 2009 when the UNSC adopted Resolution 1861, which approved adding 5200 peacekeepers to MINURCAT. The mandate of the mission was extended (which can be found in Appendix B).

The mission completed its mandate in 2010 and withdrew from the country, while UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in CAR (BINUCA), established in 2010 to succeed BONUCA, remained in the country. In the report of the Secretary-General prior to the withdrawal of the mission, Secretary-General states that he is:

> "concerned by the limited capacity of the security forces in Birao to fend off potential attacks on their positions now that MINURCAT has departed, as borne out by the recent attack by an armed opposition group, which resulted in the withdrawal of national security forces from Birao. I therefore again urge bilateral partners to respond positively to the request by the Government of the Central African Republic for assistance" (United Nations 2010*a*, 15).

5.4.2.1 Activities

Security and public order

The military component of the peacekeeping mission based in Birao provided security for the refugee camps via patrolling the area. It also fixed the main road between the airstrip and Birao to help humanitarian aid reach the city. Furthermore, the military liaised with the national security forces and international forces to create a secure environment.

Socio-economic well-being

MINURCAT did not have any activities on socio-economic well-being.[2]

Governance and participation

MINURCAT did not have any activities on governance and participation.[3]

Justice and reconciliation

The mission assisted the government in promoting the rule of law, which included support for an independent judiciary and strengthening the legal system. Furthermore, it contributed to the promotion and protection of human rights, with a particular focus on gender-based violence and children's protection.

5.4.3 United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (2014-ongoing)

Between the withdrawal of MINURCAT and the deployment of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), violence in CAR continued. ECCAS's peacekeeping mission, the Mission for the consolidation of peace in the Central African Republic (MICOPAX), was deployed in 2008 to protect civilians and secure the territory (European Commission 2012). Keeping the deteriorating situation in the country and the violence between Seleka and anti-Balaka factions in mind, the African Union also deployed an UN-backed peacekeeping mission named African-led International Support Mission in Central Africa (MISCA) in 2013. The operation was authorized to deploy 6000 troops. France also deployed Operation Sangaris to contribute to the security of civilians.

Finally, after extensive discussions in the UNSC on the involvement of the UN in the conflict in CAR, Resolution 2149 was passed, and MINUSCA was established for an initial period of one year and took over from MICOPAX, MISCA, and BINUCA. MINUSCA was initially authorized with "10,000 military personnel, including 240 military observers and 200 staff officers and 1,800 police personnel, including 1,400 formed police unit personnel and 400 individual police officers, and 20 corrections officers" (United Nations 2014, 7). In 2015, with Resolution 2212, an additional "750 military personnel, 280 police personnel, and 20 corrections officers" (United Nations 2015*a*, 1) were authorized, and with Resolution 2217, the mandate of the operation was extended for one year. Every year until now, the UN has extended

[2]Provisions related to CAR. Provisions involving Chad did include these activities.

[3]Provisions related to CAR. Provisions involving Chad did include these activities.

the mandate of the mission for another year. In the latest Resolution adopted by the UNSC in March 2021, authorized personnel were increased to 14440 military personnel and 3020 police personnel (United Nations 2021*e*).

The current mandate of the operation is one of the most extensive ones in the UN's history. It was renewed in 2020, and the mission was tasked the peacekeeping mission with "the strategic objective of creating the political, security and institutional conditions conducive to sustainably reducing the presence of, and threat posed by, armed groups" (UNDP 2020*c*). The full mandate can be found in Appendix B.

5.4.3.1 Activities

Security and public order

The military component of MINUSCA was involved in the protection of civilians with deterring and stopping all armed groups from inflicting violence, monitoring violations of abuses of human rights and humanitarian law, conducting active patrolling with a particular focus on high-risk areas, collaborating with CAR authorities to implement prevention and response plans to the threats and attacks against civilians, enforced the conditions for the full implementation of the peace agreement and peace processes, combatted trafficking, removed illegal checkpoints and provided specific protection to women and children that were affected by the conflict. Furthermore, MINUSCA took part in the ongoing efforts to advance the DDRR and SSR processes. Another part that the personnel took part in was the protection of UN personnel. MINUSCA acted to extend the state authority all over CAR; the mission conducted operations and retook several illegally occupied buildings by armed groups and arrested armed criminals. The mission contributed to road safety via the escorted convoy plan. It also conducted operations to facilitate the release of hostages and aided them in returning to their original communities.

The police component of the MINUSCA was deployed in several cities. It maintained law and order, protected the camps for the IDPs, and helped the military personnel protect UN personnel. Furthermore, police component supported the internal security forces by "improving police monitoring, mentoring and advisory capabilities, including community-oriented policing" (United Nations 2021*a*, 2). The police component was also involved with updating the normative framework of CAR on security, recruiting a new generation of police and gendarmeries, training the existing force, and providing equipment to the national security forces.

Before and during the elections in 2021, due to the failure of the national forces

to deploy the necessary number of personnel, MINUSCA was compelled to assume most security activities.

Socio-economic well-being

The mission assisted in facilitating humanitarian access via providing armed escorts to commercial and humanitarian convoys in the main supply roads. Also, the engineering unit of the mission worked in the rehabilitation of the road infrastructures.

Awareness-raising sessions were organized, especially on protecting human rights among the child protection activities.

Due to the COVID-19 outbreak, the mission also supported the efforts to contain the spread of the virus through projects to build or rehabilitate water points.

Governance and participation

MINUSCA supported the National Electoral Authority in the electoral process, focusing on voter registration, polling operations, civic education, and communication and capacity building. MINUSCA was also involved with the preparation of 2020/2021 elections through the distribution/transportation of electoral material, provision of security, logistics, technical assistance, facilitation of access to remote areas, and ensuring the protection of the polls.

Justice and reconciliation

MINUSCA monitored violations of violations and abuses of human rights via visiting prisons and IDP camps, preparing daily, weekly, and monthly internal and bi-annual external reports and fact-finding missions. Furthermore, it advocated for the ratification of human rights instruments that the government has not ratified. MINUSCA also provided good offices and supported the political dialogue among national stakeholders.

MINUSCA provided technical assistance and advocacy to the newly inaugurated truth, justice, reparation, and reconciliation commission and the headquarters of the Special Criminal Court.

MINUSCA supported the government in holding a peace conference between thirteen ethnic groups and eight armed groups, resulting in a reconciliation pact to end violence.

5.5 Current Situation

It is estimated that currently, 2.9 million people require humanitarian assistance while more than 500.000 are internally displaced (CFR 2021). As of March 2021, the total number of deployed personnel passes 15.000 (United Nations 2021*e*). After the mandate renewal in 2020, although the violence did not stop, the situation seems to be going better. The elections in December 2020 were riddled with violence and attacks from rebel groups. In January, rebels launched attacks on the borders of the capital city. However, they were defeated by the government forces supported by MINUSCA, Russian paramilitaries, and Rwandan troops. Since January, the government, with the support of international forces, recaptured many towns held by rebels. The second round of elections, held in March 2021, saw the re-election of President Touadéra for a second five-year term. It was reported that with the MINUSCA providing security for the elections, "almost all polling stations in Central African Republic were able to open for a second round of parliamentary elections" (Rolland and Yongo 15.03.2021). In an unexpected turn, after Touadéra's re-election, The Unity for Peace in Central Africa (UPC) announced that they were leaving one of the largest armed rebel coalitions and that they reiterate their commitment to the Khartoum Accord process (France 24 6.04.2021).

5.6 Conclusion

As can be seen from the chapter, CAR has a long and violent history of conflict. Many operations by different international actors have been deployed in order to resolve the situation, however a concrete solution has not been reached yet. UN's last peacekeeping operation in the country, MINUSCA looks the most promising among all of the previous mission due to its extensive mandate. In the next section, mandates, activities and exit situations of both Burundi and CAR will be examined to understand why the UN peacekeeping missions in CAR could not provide the same stability it achieved in Burundi.

6. ANALYSIS

In order to determine what makes a peace operation successful, I will conduct a three-fold analysis on the four peacekeeping missions that have been deployed in Burundi and CAR by the UN. Firstly, I will compare the mandates of the mission. Secondly, I will analyze the implementation of the mandates to see whether the missions accomplished what they have set out to do. Finally, I will examine the country's situation after the mission's exit to see whether or not the mission left a sustainable legacy. Before starting the analysis, the peacekeeping missions in Burundi and CAR will be summarized to provide a better understanding while reading the analysis.

Table 6.1 Inventory of UN peace operations in CAR and Burundi[1]

Acronym (Mission Name)	**Country**	**Duration**	**Type of mission**	**UNSC resolution**	**Maximum or currently deployed personnel**
ONUB (UN Operation in Burundi)	Burundi	2004 -06	Multidimensional peacekeeping and peace enforcement	1545, 1577, 1602, 1606, 1641, 1650, 1692, 1719	6520 total (5400 military personnel, 168 military observers, 97 police, 679 civilian personnel, 156 UN Volunteers)
MINURCA (UN Mission on the Central African Republic)	Central African Republic	1998 -2000	Multidimensional peacekeeping	1159, 1182, 1201, 1230, 1271	1612 total (1350 military personnel, 24 police, 225 civilian personnel, 13 UN Volunteers)
MINURCAT (UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad)	Central African Republic and Chad	2007 -10	Multidimensional peacekeeping	1778, 1834, 1861	5525 total (5200 military personnel, 300 police, 25 military liaison officers, "appropriate number of" civilian personnel)
MINUSCA (UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic)	Central African Republic	2014- ongoing	Multidimensional peacekeeping and peace enforcement	2134, 2149, 2181, 2212, 2217, 2262, 2281, 2301, 2339, 2387, 2448, 2454, 2488, 2499, 2507, 2536, 2552, 2566	14996 total (11,016 troops, 137 military observers, 302 staff officer, 2056 police, 1231 civilian personnel, 254 UN Volunteers)

[1] Adapted from Franke and Warnacke (2009). Originally titled: "INVENTORY OF UN PEACE MISSIONS SINCE THE END OF THE COLD WAR".

6.1 Mandate Analysis

First of all, the missions' mandates will be examined to understand how comprehensive they were. Please see Appendix B for the full peacekeeping mission mandates.

Table 6.2 Multidimensionality of the mandates[2]

Type	Peacekeeping Activities	Burundi	CAR		
		ONUB	MINURCA	MINURCAT[3]	MINUSCA
Military	Monitor ceasefire	X			X
	Confine to base				
	Peace enforcement	X			X
	Disarmament	X	X		X
	Demobilization, reintegration & retraining	X			X
	Observe withdrawal				
	De-mine	X			
	Safe areas	X			
	Weapons collection	X			X
	Protect civilians			X	X
Displaced peoples	Refugee return	X			
	Political prisoner return				
	IDP return	X			
	Protect refugees			X	X
Humanitarian Assistance	Humanitarian corridor				X
	Assist civilians				X
	Protect international workers		X	X	X
	Protect children	X			X
Civil policing	General monitoring	X	X		X
	Electoral monitoring				X
	Police retraining	X	X		X
Electoral assistance	Conduct elections				
	Monitor elections				X
	Oversee elections	X			X
	Technical assistance	X	X		X
Information / education				X	X
Gender affairs					X
Legal affairs	Constitutional/judicial reform	X	X	X	X
	National reconciliation				X
	War criminals' tribunals				X
	Human rights oversight	X		X	X
Transitional authority					
Good offices					X

As can be seen from Table 6.1, mandates of the peace operations have been separated into ten components. On the military provisions of the mandates, ONUB has the most comprehensive, with seven out of ten components being included. MINUSCA, with six components, follows it. MINURCA and MINURCAT are the weakest at

[2]See Howard (2008) for the original table: "Multidimensionality of mandates of all post-Cold War UN peacekeeping operations in civil wars". MINURCAT and MINUSCA was added to the table by this study.

[3]Only provisions related to CAR were included in this table.

this point, with only one military component in their mandate. The difference between ONUB and MINUSCA is that ONUB's mandate included provisions on demining and safe areas while MINUSCA had a provision for the protection of civilians. Both missions were tasked with peace enforcement which the other missions lacked. MINURCA and MINURCAT were not mandated with military activities other than disarmament in the first case and protection of civilians in the second case. Protection of civilians was added to the mandate of MINURCAT later on with a different resolution after the country's worsening situation.

ONUB again has the most comprehensive mandate on the topic of displaced peoples, with the operation being tasked with assisting both refugees and IDP return. MINURCAT, whose main objective was to protect the refugees in CAR and Chad fleeing from the situation in Darfur, did not have any provisions other than the protection of the mentioned refugees. MINUSCA continued MINURCAT's mandate on protecting the refugees inside the country but did not attempt to solve the issue of the IDPs within the country or the country's refugees in the neighboring countries. MINURCA was not tasked with anything involved with displaced peoples, even though there were several thousand displaced people at that point of the conflict in CAR. On humanitarian assistance, MINUSCA was tasked with the most comprehensive mandate in which the mission was expected to provide humanitarian corridor, civilian aid, protection of international workers and children. On the other hand, ONUB was only tasked with protecting children, while MINURCA and MINURCAT focused on protecting international workers.

Most comprehensive civil policing tasks were also given to MINUSCA, in which they were expected to assist both general and electoral monitoring and provide training to the national police forces. MINURCA and ONUB also were expected to assist general monitoring and provide training to the national forces, while MINURCAT was not tasked with any civil policing activities.

MINUSCA had the most comprehensive mandate on electoral assistance to the CAR government by conducting, monitoring, and overseeing elections, and providing technical assistance. ONUB also was tasked to oversee the elections and provide technical assistance, while MINURCA was only tasked with providing technical assistance. MINURCAT was not involved in the electoral process of CAR. Out of the four operations, only MINURCAT and MINUSCA have tasks related to information or education, while only MINUSCA's mandate included provisions on gender affairs. This is somewhat surprising because three out of four missions were deployed in the post-Resolution 1325 era and would be expected to incorporate the ideas outlined in the document.

MINUSCA was tasked with assisting judicial reform, national reconciliation, and war criminals' tribunals and overseeing human rights within the country on legal affairs. ONUB and MINURCAT were also tasked with assisting the judicial reform and overseeing human rights, while MINURCA was only tasked with judicial reform. No transitional authority tasks were given to any of the missions while MINURCA and MINUSCA were tasked with providing their good offices.

Overall, on the comprehensiveness of the mandates, MINUSCA has the most comprehensive, with its mandate covering twenty-five different tasks. ONUB follows this by sixteen different tasks while MINURCA has seven and MINURCAT has six.

6.2 Implementation/Activities Analysis

The second analysis will be done by examining the activities conducted by the peacekeeping operations in the field. Considering that there is a possibility of some provisions not being implemented, I outline all activities the missions have conducted, which later will be compared with the mandates to see whether they achieved full implementation or not.

Table 6.3 Activities of peace operations per activity area

Mission	Security and public order	Socio-economic well-being	Governance and participation	Justice and reconciliation
ONUB	Monitor ceasefire agreement and the implementation of the security provisions; collect and dispose of weapons; assist in dismantling militias; carry out disarmament and demobilization and assist the government with demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration; monitor illegal arms flow across borders in cooperation with MONUC; contribute to creating security for humanitarian assistance, voluntary return of refugees, internally displaced persons (IDP), elections; protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence; conduct de-mining; assist the government in border monitoring and democratic security sector reform (integrated army/police)	Contribute to creating security for humanitarian assistance, voluntary refugee, IDP return; protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence	Contribute to creating security for elections; assist the government in the electoral process and extending state authority and utilities throughout the territory	Assist the government in investigating human rights violations to end impunity and in promoting and protecting human rights with particular attention to women, children, and vulnerable persons; assist the government in reforming the judiciary and correction system
MINURCA	Assist in maintaining and enhancing security and stability in Bangui and vicinity/in capacity-building of national police/national forces in maintaining law and order in Bangui; control storage and monitor the disposal of weapons during disarmament; destroy collected weapons; ensure security and freedom of movement of UN personnel and safety and security of UN property; limited reconnaissance missions outside Bangui;		Provide advice and technical support for holding elections, support the conduct of elections	

Table 6.3 continued from previous page

Mission	Security and public order	Socio-economic well-being	Governance and participation	Justice and reconciliation
MINURCAT	Create security conditions conducive to a voluntary, secure, and sustainable return of refugees and internally displaced persons, contribute to the creation of a more secure environment			Contribute to the monitoring of human rights; support efforts to strengthen the capacity of the governments of Chad and the CAR,
MINUSCA	Protect civilians, contribute to maintaining and enhancing security and stability, monitor violations of human rights, contribute to the creation of a more secure environment by patrolling high-risk areas and combating illegal trafficking, assist the government in the creation of response plans to attacks, enforce the implementation of peace agreements, assist the government in DDRR and SSR processes, ensure the security of the UN personnel, contribute to the protection of IDP camps, assisting national police forces	Contribute to the facilitation of humanitarian aid and enhancement of infrastructure, assist in raising awareness, support COVID-19 containment efforts	Contribute to creating security for elections; assist the government in the electoral process and extending state authority and utilities throughout the territory, provide advice and technical support for holding elections, support the conduct of elections, facilitate access to remote areas, protect the polls	Contribute to the monitoring, promotion, and protection of human rights, assist the government in promoting the rule of law, including support for an independent judiciary and a strengthened legal system; liaise with judicial authorities and prison officials, provide good offices, support the national dialogue, provide technical assistance to the government

(Adapted from Franke and Warnacke (2009). Originally titled: "INVENTORY OF UN PEACE MISSIONS SINCE THE END OF THE COLD WAR". MINUSCA was added to the table by this study.)

The activities of the peace operations are divided into four categories according to their contribution to security and public order, socio-economic well-being, governance and participation, and justice and reconciliation.

In the first category of security and public order, ONUB and MINUSCA were the most active operations. ONUB implemented all security and order activities that were outlined in its mandate. Furthermore, the operation was particularly successful in the DDR process, with the demobilization of more than twenty thousand fighters and collection of more than five thousand weapons. The primary mandate of ONUB, monitoring and assisting the implementation of the Arusha agreement, was mainly achieved, with the last rebel group signing the agreement three months after the mission's departure. MINUSCA is still ongoing, so there is a possibility for more activities to be added to the already existing ones. However, in the last seven years, MINUSCA has been working on protecting civilians and has prevented wide-scale killings within the country (United Nations 2020*b*).

On the other hand, although MINURCA implemented the activities outlined in the mandate, the effectiveness of the activities was another question. The peacekeeping mission did conduct some operations in order to disarm former rebels and militias. The mission was mainly tasked with stabilizing the capital, Bangui. Although the rebel attacks during the mission's deployment slowed down, they did not stop. Since the focus was mainly on Bangui, the areas outside of the capital descended into further chaos.

MINURCAT did achieve what it has set out to do regarding security and public order; however, most of the focus of the mission was on refugee protection. The amended mandate included assisting the government in creating a more secure environment; however, just before the mission left, an attack by the rebel groups made the government withdraw its forces from the city of Birao.

Socio-economic well-being was an area that peace operations mainly did not contribute to. UN usually provided these activities by other UN institutions. However, ONUB and MINUSCA were tasked with assisting in this area and delivered what was required. This was done mainly by helping the humanitarian assistance to reach impoverished communities. MINUSCA ran into an unexpected challenge of a global pandemic, which required them to shift their activities to include COVID-19 containment efforts.

On governance and participation, all missions except MINURCAT were involved in assisting the elections within the state. All three achieved successful elections. ONUB was involved in assisting six different elections during its time of deploy-

ment. MINUSCA took the responsibility of conducting the election a step further by providing all security activities for the election.

Justice and reconciliation were an area in which all missions except MINURCAT were very active. Mainly missions observed the human rights situation while aiding the government in reforming their judiciary system. ONUB assisted the government of Burundi in the creation and implementation of a new power-sharing constitution. MINURCAT did not fulfill its mandate on justice and reconciliation activities: it did not provide the mandated judiciary assistance to the government of CAR, nor it provided any pieces of training it promised in CAR. However, these were done in Chad, which may be interpreted as the UN achieving its mandate.

Another point to examine while reviewing the implementation of the mandates is the UN's self-evaluation on whether the mandates have been completed or not. According to web pages of peacekeeping missions, the UN considers all of the peacekeeping missions deployed in Burundi and CAR (except MINUSCA due to its ongoing status) has fulfilled their mandates. However, only ONUB is mentioned as "successfully" fulfilling its mandate.

6.3 Exit Situation Analysis

In order to analyze the situation after the withdrawal of the peace operations, I am going to use the ten questions Howard (2008) created for evaluating the duration of success after the UN peacekeeping missions. In this part, MINUSCA will be excluded due to the fact that the operation is still ongoing. The answers will be summarized in the following table as yes, no, and not tasked (NT).

Table 6.4 Exit situation analysis[4]

	Burundi	**CAR**	
	ONUB	**MINURCA**	**MINURCAT**
After UN withdrawal, was the peace process disrupted in any way?	No	NT	NT
Did the ceasefire hold?	No	No	No
Did troops remain demobilized?	Yes	NT	NT
Did the humanitarian situation improve?	Yes	Yes	Yes
Was civilian policing effective? Were there important policing reforms?	Yes	No	NT
Did a new constitution and/or legal system come into being?	Yes	Yes*	NT
Were the first UN-monitored elections free and fair?	Yes	No	NT
Were subsequent elections considered free and fair according to international and internal assessments?	Yes*	No	NT
Were economic reforms effective?	NT	NT	NT
Overall, did UN intervention appear to help or hinder the country's prospects for peace?	Help	Hinder*	Hinder*

- **After UN withdrawal, was the peace process disrupted in any way, and if so, how?**
  After ONUB's withdrawal, the government and the FNL signed the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement, finalizing the peace process between the government and all armed groups. MINURCA and MINURCAT were not tasked with aiding the peace process between the conflicting parties.

- **Did the ceasefire hold?**
  After ONUB's withdrawal, the security situation deteriorated between the government and the FNL. However, JVMM, a monitoring mechanism created by the UN, intervened, and parties reached an agreement (Center on International Cooperation 2009). The situation deteriorated again nearing the 2015 elections when president Nkurunziza declared his intention to run for president for a third term. The government rebuffed a coup attempt, and several violent clashes were reported (BBC 12.12.2015). However, the situation did not escalate further and was stabilized after Nkurunziza announced his retirement.

[4](* denotes categories that do not fully fit the criteria yet coded as yes or no for research purposes)

After MINURCA's withdrawal in 2000, the situation quickly deteriorated, and armed clashes between the government and opposing groups escalated. The situation came to the point that both CEN-SAD and CEMAC deployed peacekeeping missions contained the situation. However, the situation became even worse, and the Bush War started in 2004.

After MINURCAT's withdrawal in 2010, the country enjoyed a sense of relative peace for two years. However, the ceasefire was broken in 2012 after the rebel groups accused the government of not complying with the peace agreement terms. It escalated into a civil war between the factions, resulting in the deployment of another UN peacekeeping mission.

- **Did troops remain demobilized?**
  In ONUB's case, after demobilizing the majority of the rebel groups' combatants and becoming integrated into national forces, the former rebel group did not mobilize again on a considerable scale. MINURCA and MINURCAT did not implement any demobilization activities.

- **Did the humanitarian situation improve?**
  Although Burundi saw a slight improvement in the humanitarian situation, the country remains one of the lowest-scoring countries in the HDI Index (UNDP 2020*c*). The case is very similar in the CAR, in which there was a slight (even less than Burundi) increase in the HDI score during/after the deployment of the peacekeeping missions. However, CAR is also one of the lowest-scoring countries in the HDI and is in dire need of humanitarian assistance (UNDP 2020*b*).

- **Was civilian policing effective? Were there important policing reforms?**
  The SSR process agreed in the Arusha agreement was supported by ONUB, which resulted in the police reform that restructured the existing national police force with the integration of ex-combatants while completing training programs (CIGI 2009). MINURCA supported the government of CAR in providing training to the police forces (United Nations 2000*a*). However, no police sector reform was supported by the organization. The government's attempts yielded the program of action in 1999 that aimed to restructure the security forces; however, it was not implemented during the peacekeeping mission's operation time. MINURCAT, while tasked with training the Chadian police forces, was not given the same mandate in CAR (United Nations 2007*b*).

- **Did a new constitution and/or legal system come into being?**

During the deployment of ONUB, a constitution that was in line with the power-sharing formula outlined in the Arusha agreement was approved by a constitutional referendum (Jackson 2006). MINURCA assisted the CAR government in creating the Family Code and ensuring the independence of the judiciary. However, constitutional amendments and the Penal Code modifications agreed in the Bangui Agreement were not implemented during the mission's withdrawal (United Nations 2000*a*). MINURCAT did not assist the CAR government in any legal action.

- **Were the first UN-monitored elections free and fair?**
  The 1999 elections MINURCA assisted were disputed by all opposition groups, which they argued was rigged (Reuters 3.10.1999). However, international observers and the UN stated that there was no evidence of tampering with the election. The first voting procedure ONUB assisted was the 2005 constitutional referendum in Burundi, which was not disputed and a peaceful procedure (United Nations 2006*a*). Afterward, Burundians voted to elect their parliament, assisted by ONUB again: the elections were considered free and fair (United Nations 2006*a*). MINURCAT did not monitor any elections.

- **Were subsequent elections considered free and fair according to international and internal assessments?**
  Although the elections during ONUB's deployment and subsequent ones were considered free and fair, the situation changed after the elections in 2015. Both 2015 and 2020 elections were not conducted in an environment "for an inclusive, free and credible electoral process" (Deutsche Welle 20.05.2020; United Nations 2015*b*). In CAR, even with the existing peacekeeping missions, conducting free and fair elections was a challenging task to achieve since rebels controlled the areas outside of the capital. So most of the elections in CAR are not free since many poll stations are not being able to open due to security conditions.

- **Were economic reforms effective?**
  The missions both in Burundi and CAR did not directly intervene in economic matters.

- **Overall, did UN intervention appear to help or hinder the country's prospects for peace?**
  In the case of Burundi, UN intervention seems to help the country's prospects for peace. Even though the country experienced minor clashes from time to time, they could solve them themselves, and the situation did not necessitate the deployment of another peacekeeping mission. In the case of CAR, the UN

was not as helpful as it could be. MINURCA left the country even though the international community and the CAR government requested otherwise (United Nations 2000*a*). As a result, the country never had an extended peaceful period since the time of the first peace operation. Furthermore, since the situation was not fully resolved in the first peacekeeping attempt, it evolved into an even bigger crisis that necessitated the deployment of further peacekeeping missions.

6.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, mandates, implementation of the mandates, peacekeeping operations' activities, and the exit situation of the countries after the withdrawal of the missions were examined. From the analysis, ONUB in Burundi and MINUSCA in CAR seem to be the most comprehensive missions that have achieved the most results. MINURCAT was not necessarily focused on the internal problems of CAR. As a mission that was deployed into two countries at the same time, MINURCAT was more focused on Chad than CAR. Furthermore the reason UNSC agreed to send the mission was the fear of spillover of the conflict in Darfur, rather than the internal conflicts within the countries. MINURCA, being the first of the four missions being deployed, was not effective enough, maybe because it was the only mission among the four being deployed before 2000, where the UN changed its outlook into the peacekeeping missions with the Brahimi Report.

The information outlined here will be further discussed in the next chapter, where I will attempt to see which information mentioned here can become a determinant of success or not.

7. CONCLUSION

Ethnic conflicts, a well-studied topic by scholars, gained even more prominence after the Cold War, where the remnants of the old Soviet Union descended into ethnic strife. Not only the cases of the ethnic conflicts increased but also the location of them became even closer to the "West". United Nations, which have been involved in conflicts around the world since its foundation in 1945, became also involved in these new ethnic conflicts to prevent escalation and protect civilians. Most people remember the failures of the UN, in the cases of Rwanda or Bosnia, but the UN also did have successes that were more under the radar than the failures. The UN was involved both in the Korean War with the deployment of the United Nations Command (UNC), the main army that fought in the war, and the Suez Canal Crisis with the deployment of the first peacekeeping mission of the UN. Gulf War in 1991 showed the UN's functional capacity when the Security Council members could agree on an action. The UN was and is involved in several ethnic conflicts by deploying peacekeeping operations in Lebanon and Cyprus, with the aim of keeping the conflicting parties apart (Ryan 1990).

The research on ethnic conflicts and the UN's conflict management efforts primarily focuses either on the failures or some specific successes of the UN; Rwanda, Bosnia, Somalia, and Angola are highly studied cases for failures, while for the literature on success tends to focus on East Timor, Namibia, and El Salvador. If we specifically look into Africa, the conflicts in DR Congo, Darfur, and South Sudan are studied more in the literature. Depending on the time of the research published, with the change of the international community's perception of UN involvement, the literature also tends to shift towards negative outlooks to positive ones.

In order to analyze the determinants of the success of UN involvement in ethnic conflicts, I utilized qualitative research methodology. A comparative analysis of the two most similar cases was conducted, where the UN peacekeeping missions in Burundi and the Central African Republic were examined. The cases were selected while taking background/type of the conflict, years when conflicts are experienced,

geographical location, and placement in the PBC agenda. Furthermore, out of the two selected cases, one of them was perceived generally as a success and the other as a failure to clearly understand what causes this difference in outcome in two similar cases. Process tracing of the ethnic conflicts and UN involvement in the counties was done to analyze the determinants of success.

This study contributes to the literature on the success measurement of peace operations by examining two understudied countries, Burundi as the successful case and the Central African Republic as the failure, and adding the perspectives gained from there. Furthermore, this study compares one successful and one unsuccessful case. Studies of success measurement of peace operations are usually separated into three: studies of singular cases, small-N comparative studies, and large-N quantitative studies. Typically, in the studies with more than one case, authors tend to cluster either successful or unsuccessful cases.

In this chapter, to answer my research question on what determines the success of UN involvement in ethnic conflicts, first: I will determine whether the four analyzed peacekeeping missions in Burundi and CAR were successful or not. Afterward, I will delve deep into the differences between the successful and non-successful missions in order to understand what increases the chances of success of the UN peacekeeping missions.

7.1 Evaluating the success

Table 7.1 Evaluating the success

Mission	Country	Mandate fulfillment	The situation in post-mission period	Establishment of order	Success or failure
ONUB	Burundi	Yes	Better	Yes	Success
MINURCA	CAR	Yes	Better	No	Failure
MINURCAT	CAR/Chad	No	Better	No	Failure
MINUSCA	CAR	Ongoing	Ongoing	Ongoing	Ongoing

As previously discussed in the literature, there are various ways that one can evaluate a mission as successful or not. For this study, I consider missions either a success or a failure; the in-between "partial success" categorization will not be used here for simplicity. I will consider a mission successful if it fulfills three criteria: mandate implementation, visible improvement of the country during the withdrawal, and order within the state.

I argue that ONUB was a success because it fulfilled all three criteria. ONUB's mandate was fulfilled, and the field operation implemented all tasks mentioned in

the mandate. Furthermore, the UN itself defined the competition of the mandate as successful. Secondly, there is a clear difference in the pre-operation and post-operation Burundi. Although it does not show itself as clearly in the HDI, Burundi went under a comprehensive judicial and security change during the deployment of the mission, which strengthened the country's resilience. The reason that this does not show in the HDI is that the index only covers a part of human development indicators and does not touch upon several ones such as human security or inequalities. This connects us to the last point in which, during the deployment of ONUB, robust mechanisms were founded that aided in establishing order in the country. One of these mechanisms is the new constitution, which allowed a power-sharing government structure between the ethnic groups. Furthermore, the DDR and SSR processes that ONUB headed yielded better-structured military and civilian police. In the end, even though Burundi faced skirmishes and crises time to time, it was able to solve the issues internally, and those situations did not necessitate the deployment of another UN peacekeeping mission.

On the other hand, I argue that MINURCA and MINURCAT were failures. Although MINURCA did implement its mandate fully, the scope of the mandate was not enough to handle the situation in CAR. The inability to stop the violence initially allowed the conflict to get even more complex, and the previously ethnic conflict took an ethnoreligious character. Although one can say that the post-operation situation within the country was better than the pre-operation, it was evident after a short time that this was not sustainable. MINURCA did not leave any established order in the country for the government of CAR to be able to handle the future issues themselves.

Furthermore, the mission was primarily focused on the capital, which allowed the insurgent groups outside the capital (especially in the northeast) to grow stronger. Also, it needs to be noted that both the government of CAR and international actors specifically asked MINURCA to stay longer in the country, arguing that the country was not in shape to handle the security issues by itself. The Secretary-General's last report noted the opposition to withdrawal, but the UN still withdrew from the country on their schedule. Violence soon commenced.

I argue that MINURCAT was a failure because although it can be said that the mission "technically" fulfilled its mandate, I argue that it did not. First of all, MINURCAT was a mission that was deployed to two countries at the same time. The majority of the mandate was focused on the tasks in Chad rather than tasks in CAR. Some of the tasks were mandated for both CAR and Chad. However, implementation of the activities in both countries was not always the case. Therefore,

the mandate of MINURCAT can be interpreted as fulfilled, because, technically, the provisions were implemented in Chad. However, I argue that since the mandate mentions both countries in several tasks, in the cases that those takes were not implemented in CAR means that the mandate was not fulfilled.

Furthermore, MINURCAT was a mission that stemmed from the concern over the conflict in Darfur, even though CAR needed a peacekeeping mission during that period due to its internal conflict. Therefore, the provisions in the mandate mainly concerned themselves with protecting the refugees and preventing the spillover from the Darfur conflict. However, the issue in CAR was already dire, with or without the spillover from Darfur. UN realized that later, when it amended the mandate to provide security assistance. Nevertheless, MINURCAT was not able to achieve a sustainable order in the country.

Although it is not possible to say whether MINUSCA is a success yet, it is possible to say the mission is going successfully. It is clear that the UN realized the previous mission did not achieve sustainable peace, and a more comprehensive approach was needed. For now, MINUSCA seems to handle the challenges it faces in CAR successfully. However, it is also important to note that 2021 is the 7th anniversary of the deployment of the mission, and the crisis does not seem to be close to being solved.

7.2 Contributing factors to success

After determining ONUB was a success, and the others were not, the main determinants of success were outlined in the section above. However, I argue that there might be several other factors that contribute to the odds of success of peacekeeping missions. Why was ONUB able to leave a sustainable peace after it withdrew from the country, but the others were not? After reviewing the countries and peacekeeping operations studied in the research, I found out that several reasons could be attributed to the success or failure of a peacekeeping mission.

First of all, the mandate and the activities that a peacekeeping mission involves have an apparent effect on the success of the missions. I found out that the missions focusing on DDR and SSR activities have been more successful than others. DDR and SSR activities are essential in every kind of conflict but gained further importance in ethnic conflicts where previously conflicting ethnic groups are disarmed, demobilized, and reintegrated into the society. If this measure is not taken, there is

no way to guarantee that another armed crisis will not erupt as soon as there is a disagreement between the groups. SSR is vital to strengthen the effect of the DDR process. I argue that if combined, DDR and SSR processes achieve more sustainable peace. The reason is that the reintegrated ex-combatants and previous government military officers take up new positions and get trained under the SSR reforms, which is helpful to achieve a clean slate to start new interactions between those groups.

Another critical achievement that assists success is the existence of judicial/constitutional reforms within the country. Although the UN does not necessarily need to involve itself with the reforms, I argue that if the missions withdraw from the country after the reforms are implemented, the possibility for success is higher. Especially in ethnic conflicts where the trust between groups is low, and the minorities are generally afraid of losing their lives, legal protection that gives the minorities power/protects them seems to diffuse the tensions between the minority groups and majority group, making another conflict eruption less likely.

Comprehensiveness of the mandates is another crucial factor that contributes to the success of peace operations. As can be seen from the analysis of the mandates, ONUB and MINUSCA have the most comprehensive mandate out of all. Therefore, I argue that the more extensive a peace operation's mandate is, it is more likely to become successful. Furthermore, I argue that the UN needs to be involved in more than one aspect of the country to achieve sustainable peace. Purely military missions might stop the bloodshed in the country; however, without political, social, and economic factors, peace would not be sustainable in the country, and the mission would ultimately fail.

This connects to the importance of the military aspects of the missions. I found out that the missions tasked with peace enforcement were more successful in managing the conflicts than the others. A prominent UN military presence charged with actual enforcement measures creates a massive deterrent for the rebel groups within a country and aids the success of a peacekeeping mission.

Another essential factor to consider is the rapport between the peacekeeping mission and the governments. Although it did not prevent ONUB from becoming successful, the mission was asked to leave before it was expected to withdraw from the country. This was also the case for MINURCAT, where the government asked the mission to leave the country. Building a better relationship based on understanding and transparency could help the UN's efforts in the field.

Finally, I found out that adaptability to the evolving conflict context is another important aspect that contributes to mission success. In the cases where the UN was

more flexible and open to updating its mandate to evolving situations, it achieved more success. The rigidity of the UNSC could be detrimental in this type of conflict where the problem might evolve faster than the bureaucratic procedure. UN's response time and willingness to be flexible is another aspect that contributes to the success of peace operations.

To summarize, this thesis found out that several factors contribute into the success of the UN peacekeeping missions. First of all, three determinants mentioned in the section above need to be fulfilled in order for a mission to be successful: mandate fulfillment, the establishment of order, and a better situation in the post-mission period. The most vital of these is establishing order where if a mission withdraws, they need to leave the country with the mechanisms that can achieve self-sustained peace.

Moreover, comprehensiveness of the mandates is another point that has a positive effect on the outcome of the missions in the sense that the more comprehensive a mandate is, the more successful that mission tends to be. Likewise, the missions that had DDR and SSR components were found to be more successful. Peace enforcement is another critical point in which the missions that were given the authority to enforce the peace acted as a deterrent against insurgent groups and were more successful. Moreover, the communication between the host governments and the administration of the operation is also essential, and more transparency yields better results. Finally, this study showed that in the cases where the UN was flexible in adapting to rapidly evolving situations on the ground, it was more successful.

A possible topic for future research would be to apply this three-fold analysis into a larger number of cases to see whether the relationship between the determinants of success is similar in every case. This might be achieved by examining inter-regional or cross-regional peacekeeping missions.

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APPENDIX A

A.1 Questions for evaluating the duration of success after the UN multidimensional peacekeeping mission's departure from the host country (Howard 2008)

- After UN withdrawal, was the peace process disrupted in any way, and if so, how?
- Did the cease-fire hold?
- Did troops remain demobilized?
- Did the humanitarian situation improve?
- Was civilian policing effective? Were there important policing reforms?
- Did a new constitution and/or legal system come into being?
- Were the first UN-monitored elections free and fair?
- Were subsequent elections considered free and fair according to international and internal assessments?
- Were economic reforms effective?
- Overall, did UN intervention appear to help or hinder the country's prospects for peace?

APPENDIX B

B.1 MANDATES

B.1.1 ONUB

- "to ensure the respect of ceasefire agreements, through monitoring their implementation and investigating their violations,"
- "to promote the re-establishment of confidence between the Burundian forces present, monitor and provide security at their pre-disarmament assembly sites, collect and secure weapons and military materiel to dispose of it as appropriate, and contribute to the dismantling of militias as called for in the ceasefire agreements,"
- "to carry out the disarmament and demobilization portions of the national programme of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants,"
- "to monitor the quartering of the Armed Forces of Burundi and their heavy weapons, as well as the disarmament and demobilization of the elements that need to be disarmed and demobilized,"
- "to monitor, to the extent possible, the illegal flow of arms across the national borders, including Lake Tanganyika, in cooperation with the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and, as appropriate, with the group of experts referred to in paragraph 10 of resolution 1533,"
- "to contribute to the creation of the necessary security conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance, and facilitate the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons,"
- "to contribute to the successful completion of the electoral process stipulated in the Arusha Agreement, by ensuring a secure environment for free, transparent and peaceful elections to take place,"

- “without prejudice to the responsibility of the transitional Government of Burundi, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence,”
- “to ensure the protection of United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, as well as the security and freedom of movement of ONUB’s personnel, and to coordinate and conduct, as appropriate, mine action activities in support of its mandate;” (United Nations 2004, 4)
- “to monitor Burundi’s borders, with special attention to refugees, as well as to movements of combatants, especially in the Cibitoké province,”
- “to carry out institutional reforms as well as the constitution of the integrated national defence and internal security forces and, in particular, the training and monitoring of the police, while ensuring that they are democratic and fully respect human rights and fundamental freedoms,”
- “to proceed with electoral activities,”
- “to complete implementation of the reform of the judiciary and correction system, in accordance with the Arusha Agreement,”
- “to ensure, in close liaison with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the promotion and protection of human rights, with particular attention to women, children and vulnerable persons, and investigate human rights violations to put an end to impunity;” (United Nations 2004, 4)
- “extending State authority and utilities throughout the territory, including civilian police and judicial institutions,”
- “carrying out the national programme of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants and members of their families, including those coming from the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in liaison with the Government of this country and MONUC, and with particular attention to the specific needs of women and children;” (United Nations 2004, 5)

B.1.2 MINURCA

- "To assist in maintaining and enhancing security and stability, including freedom of movement, in Bangui and the immediate vicinity of the city;"
- "To assist the national security forces in maintaining law and order and in protecting key installations in Bangui;"
- "To supervise, control storage, and monitor the final disposition of all weapons retrieved in the course of the disarmament exercise;"
- "To ensure security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel and the safety and security of United Nations property;"
- "To assist in coordination with other international efforts in a short term police trainers program and in other capacity-building efforts of the national police, and to provide advice on the restructuring of the national police and special police forces;"
- "To provide advice and technical support to the national electoral bodies regarding the electoral code and plans for the conduct of the legislative elections scheduled for August/September 1998;" (United Nations 1998*b*, 3)

B.1.3 MINURCAT

- "To liaise with the national army, the gendarmerie and police forces, the nomad national guard, the judicial authorities and prison officials in Chad and the Central African Republic to contribute to the creation of a more secure environment;"
- "To liaise closely with the Sudanese Government, the African Union, the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS), the African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) which will succeed it, the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA), the Multinational Force of the Central African Economic and Monetary Com-

munity (FOMUC) and the Community of Sahelo-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) to exchange information on emerging threats to humanitarian activities in the region;"

- "To contribute to the monitoring and to the promotion and protection of human rights, with particular attention to sexual and gender-based violence, and to recommend action to the competent authorities, with a view to fighting impunity;"
- "To support, within its capabilities, efforts aimed at strengthening the capacity of the Governments of Chad and the Central African Republic and civil society through training in international human rights standards, and efforts to put an end to recruitment and use of children by armed groups;"
- "To assist the Governments of Chad and, notwithstanding the mandate of BONUCA, the Central African Republic in the promotion of the rule of law, including through support for an independent judiciary and a strengthened legal system, in close coordination with United Nations agencies;" (United Nations 2007*b*, 3).

  Addition: "(b) (...) MINURCAT shall be authorized to take all necessary measures, within its capabilities and its area of operations in the north-eastern Central African Republic, to fulfill the following functions, through establishing a permanent military presence in Birao and in liaison with the Government of the Central African Republic: (i) To contribute to the creation of a more secure environment; (ii) To execute operations of a limited character in order to extract civilians and humanitarian workers in danger; (iii) To protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment and to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its staff and United Nations and associated personnel;" (United Nations 2009, 4)

B.1.4 MINUSCA

"**Protection of civilians**

to protect, in line with S/PRST/2018/18 of 21 September 2018, without prejudice to the primary responsibility of the CAR authorities and the basic principles of peacekeeping, the civilian population under threat of physical violence;

- in support of the CAR authorities, to take active steps to anticipate, deter and effectively respond to serious and credible threats to the civilian population through a comprehensive and integrated approach and, in this regard:
- to ensure effective and dynamic protection of civilians under threat of physical violence through a comprehensive and integrated approach, including by anticipating, deterring, and stopping all armed groups, signatories of the Peace Agreement and non-signatories, and local militias from inflicting violence on the populations, in consultation with local communities, and by supporting and undertaking local mediation efforts to prevent escalation of violence, in line with the basic principles of peacekeeping, including in cases of violations of the Peace Agreement, and outbreaks of violence between ethnic or religious rival groups;
- to enhance its interaction with civilians, to strengthen its early warning mechanism, to increase its efforts to monitor and document violations of international humanitarian law and violations and abuses of human rights and to strengthen local community engagement and empowerment;
- to maintain a proactive deployment and a mobile, flexible and robust posture, including by conducting active patrolling, in particular in high risk areas;
- to mitigate the risk to civilians before, during and after any military or police operation, including by tracking, preventing, minimizing, and addressing civilian harm resulting from the Mission's operations, including in support of national security forces;
- to work with the CAR authorities to identify and report threats to and attacks against civilians and implement existing prevention and response plans and strengthen civil-military cooperation, including joint planning;
- to provide specific protection for women and children affected by

armed conflict, including through the deployment of child protection advisers, women protection advisers and gender advisers and by adopting a gender-sensitive, survivor-centred approach in this regard, especially to provide the best assistance to survivors of sexual violence;

- to fully implement its protection of civilians strategy in coordination with CAR authorities, the United Nations Country Team (UNCT), humanitarian and human right organizations, and other relevant partners;

Good offices and support to the peace process, including the implementation of the Peace Agreement, elections, national reconciliation, social cohesion and transitional justice at national and local levels

- to continue its political role in the peace process, including through political, technical and operational support to the implementation of the Peace Agreement and to take active steps to support the CAR authorities in the creation of the conditions conducive to the full implementation of the Peace Agreement;

- to ensure that the Mission's political and security strategies promote a coherent peace process, particularly in support of the Peace Agreement, that connects local and national peace efforts with the ongoing efforts to advance DDRR process, the SSR process, the fight against impunity, and the restoration of State authority;

- to assist the CAR authorities' efforts, at national and local levels, for an increased participation of political parties, civil society, women, survivors of sexual violence, youth, faith-based organizations, and where and when possible, IDPs and refugees to the peace process, including the Peace Agreement;

- to provide good offices and technical expertise in support of efforts to address the root causes of conflict, including those referred to in paragraph 8 of this resolution, in particular to advance national reconciliation and local conflict resolution, working with relevant regional and local bodies and religious leaders, while ensuring the full, equal and meaningful participation of women, including survivors of sexual violence, in line with the CAR action plan on Women, Peace and Security, including through the support to local dialogue

and community engagement;

- to support efforts of the CAR authorities to address transitional justice as part of the peace and reconciliation process, and marginalization and local grievances, including through dialogue with the armed groups, civil society leaders including women and youth representatives, including survivors of sexual violence, and by assisting national, prefectoral and local authorities to foster confidence among communities;

- to provide technical expertise to the CAR authorities in its engagement with neighbouring countries, the ECCAS, and the AU, in consultation and coordination with the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) to resolve issues of common and bilateral interest and to promote their continued and full support for the Peace Agreement;

- to make more proactive use of strategic communications to support its protection of civilians' strategy, in coordination with the CAR authorities, to help the local population better understand the mandate of the Mission, its activities, the Peace Agreement and the electoral process, and to build trust with the CAR citizens, parties to the conflict, regional and other international actors and partners on the ground;

- to continue to coordinate international support and assistance to the peace process, including through the International Support Group, as appropriate;

2020/2021 elections

- to assist the CAR authorities in the preparation and delivery of peaceful presidential, legislative and local elections of 2020/2021, as outlined in the preamble and in paragraph 9 of this resolution, by providing good offices, including to encourage dialogue among all political stakeholders, in an inclusive manner, to mitigate tensions throughout the electoral period, by also providing security, operational, logistical and, as appropriate, technical support, in particular to facilitate access to remote areas, and by coordinating international electoral assistance; Facilitate the creation of a secure environment for the immediate, full, safe and unhindered delivery of humanitarian assistance

- to improve coordination with all humanitarian actors, including United Nations agencies, and to facilitate the creation of a secure environment for the immediate, full, safe and unhindered, civilian-led delivery of humanitarian assistance, in accordance with relevant provisions of international law and the humanitarian principles, and for the voluntary safe, dignified and sustainable return or local integration or resettlement of internally displaced persons or refugees in close coordination with humanitarian actors, while contributing to alleviate the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic as requested in resolution 2532 (2020);

Protection of the United Nations

- to protect the United Nations personnel, installations, equipment and goods and ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel;

Other tasks

- Further authorizes MINUSCA to pursue the following tasks of its mandate, bearing in mind that these tasks as well as those in paragraph 31 above are mutually reinforcing: Support for the extension of State authority, the deployment of security forces, and the preservation of territorial integrity

- to continue to support the CAR authorities in implementing its strategy for the extension of State authority, including through the implementation of relevant provisions of the Peace Agreement, for the establishment of interim security and administrative arrangements acceptable to the population and under CAR authorities' oversight, and through a prioritized division of labour with the UNCT and relevant partners;

- to support a gradual handover of security of key officials, and static guard duties of national institutions, to the CAR security forces, in coordination with the CAR authorities, based on the risks on the ground and taking into account the electoral context;

- to promote and support the rapid extension of State authority over the entire territory of the CAR, including by supporting the deployment of vetted and trained national police and gendarmerie in priority areas, including through co-location, advising, mentoring

and monitoring, in coordination with other partners, as part of the deployment of the territorial administration and other rule of law authorities;

- to provide enhanced planning and technical assistance and limited logistical support for the progressive redeployment of a limited number of Central African Armed Forces (FACA) units trained or certified by EUTM-RCA, and a limited number of vetted or trained Internal Security Forces (ISF), engaged in joint operations with MINUSCA that include joint planning and tactical cooperation, in order to support the implementation of MINUSCA's current mandated tasks, including to protect civilians, and to support national authorities in the restoration and maintenance of public safety and the rule of law, in accordance with MINUSCA's mandate and the United Nations Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP), without exacerbating the risks to the stabilization of the country, civilians, the political process, to UN peacekeepers, or the impartiality of the Mission, to perform this task by reallocating approved resources, and to review this limited logistical support in one year to ensure its compliance with the benchmarks outlined in the Secretary-General's letter to the President of the Security Council of 15 May 2018 (S/2018/463);

Security Sector Reform (SSR)

- to provide strategic and technical advice to the CAR authorities to implement the National Strategy on SSR and the National Defence Plan, in close coordination with EUTM-RCA, EUAM-RCA, the African Union Observer Mission in the CAR (MOUACA) and CAR's other international partners, including France, the Russian Federation, the United States and the People's Republic of China, with the aim of ensuring coherence of the SSR process, including through a clear delineation of responsibilities between the FACA, the ISF and other uniformed entities, as well as the democratic control of both defence and internal security forces;

- to continue to support the CAR authorities in developing an approach to the vetting of defence and security elements which includes human rights vetting, in particular to fight impunity for violations of international and domestic law and in the context of any integration of demobilized armed groups elements into security

sector institutions;

- to take a leading role in supporting the CAR authorities in enhancing the capacities of the ISF, particularly command and control structures and oversight mechanisms and to coordinate the provision of technical assistance and training between the international partners in the CAR, in particular with EUTM-RCA and EUAM-RCA, in order to ensure a clear distribution of tasks in the field of SSR;

- to continue to support the CAR authorities in the training of police and gendarmerie and in the selection, recruitment, and vetting of police and gendarmerie elements, with the support of donors and the UNCT, taking into account the need to recruit women at all levels, and in full compliance with the United Nations HRDDP;

Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration (DDR) and Repatriation (DDRR)

- to support the CAR authorities in implementing an inclusive and progressive programme for the DDR and, in case of foreign elements, repatriation, of members of armed groups, based on the Principles of DDRR and Integration into the Uniformed Corps, signed at the Bangui Forum in May 2015, while paying specific attention to the needs of children associated with armed forces and groups, the need to ensure the separation of children from these forces and groups, and the need to prevent re-recruitment, and including gender-sensitive programmes;

- to support the CAR authorities and relevant civil society organizations in developing and implementing CVR programmes, including gender-sensitive programmes, for members of armed groups including those not eligible for participation in the national DDRR programme, in cooperation with development partners and together with communities of return in line with the priorities highlighted in the RCPCA;

- to provide technical assistance to the CAR authorities in implementing a national plan for the integration of eligible demobilized members of armed groups into the security and defence forces, in line with the broader SSR process, the need to put in place professional, ethnically representative and regionally balanced national

security and defence, and to provide technical advice to the CAR authorities in accelerating the implementation of the interim security arrangements provided for in the Peace Agreement, such as the special mixed security units following vetting, disarmament, demobilization and training;

- to coordinate the support provided by multilateral and bilateral partners, including the World Bank, to the efforts of the CAR authorities on DDRR programs to reintegrate eligible and vetted members of the armed groups into peaceful civilian life and to help ensure that these efforts will lead to sustainable socio-economic reintegration;

Promotion and protection of human rights

- to monitor, help investigate, and timely report to the Security Council and publicly on violations of international humanitarian law and on violations and abuses of human rights committed throughout the CAR;

- to monitor, help investigate and ensure reporting on violations and abuses committed against children and women, including rape and other forms of sexual violence in armed conflict, in connection with the UMIRR;

- to assist the CAR authorities in their efforts to protect and promote human rights and prevent violations and abuses and to strengthen the capacity of civil society organizations;

Support for national and international justice, the fight against impunity, and the rule of law

- to help reinforce the independence of the judiciary, build the capacities, and enhance the effectiveness of the national judicial system as well as the effectiveness and the accountability of the penitentiary system including through the provision of technical assistance to the CAR authorities to identify, investigate and prosecute those responsible for crimes involving violations of international humanitarian law and of violations and abuses of human rights committed throughout the CAR;

- to help build the capacities of the national human rights institution coordinating with the Independent Expert on human rights in the

CAR as appropriate;

Urgent temporary measures:

- to urgently and actively adopt, within the limits of its capacities and areas of deployment, at the formal request of the CAR authorities and in areas where national security forces are not present or operational, urgent temporary measures on an exceptional basis, without creating a precedent and without prejudice to the agreed principles of peacekeeping operations, which are limited in scope, time-bound and consistent with the objectives set out in paragraphs 31 and 32 (e), to arrest and detain in order to maintain basic law and order and fight impunity and to pay particular attention in this regard to those engaging in or providing support for acts that undermine the peace, stability or security of the CAR;

Special Criminal Court (SCC):

- to provide technical assistance, in partnership with other international partners and the UNCT, and capacity building for the CAR authorities, to facilitate the operationalization and the functioning of the SCC, in particular in the areas of investigations, arrests, detention, criminal and forensic analysis, evidence collection and storage, recruitment and selection of personnel, court management, prosecution strategy and case development and the establishment of a legal aid system, as appropriate, as well as to provide security for magistrates, including at the premises and proceedings of the SCC, and take measures for the protection of victims and witnesses, in line with the CAR's international humanitarian law and international human rights obligations;

- to assist in the coordination and mobilization of increased bilateral and multilateral support to the functioning of the SCC; Rule of law:

- to provide support and to coordinate international assistance to build the capacities and enhance the effectiveness of the criminal justice system, within the framework of the United Nations global focal point on rule of law, as well as the effectiveness and the accountability of police and penitentiary system with the support of the UNCT;

- Without prejudice to the primary responsibility of the CAR author-

ities, to support the restoration and maintenance of public safety and the rule of law, including through apprehending and handing over to the CAR authorities, consistent with international law, those in the country responsible for crimes involving serious human rights violations and abuses and serious violations of international humanitarian law, including sexual violence in conflict, so that they can be brought to justice, and through cooperation with states of the region as well as the ICC in cases of crimes falling within its jurisdiction following the decision made by the Prosecutor of the ICC on 24 September 2014 to open, following the request of national authorities, an investigation into alleged crimes committed since 2012;" (United Nations 2020*c*).