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INSTITUTE OF POSTGRADUATE EDUCATION

GLOBAL POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

MASTER'S THESIS

"DARLING OF THE WEST" TO "ROGUE NATION": AN ANALYSIS OF ZIMBABWE-BRITAIN POST-COLONIAL RELATIONS BEFORE AND AFTER THE IMPLEMNATION OF THE FTLRP BETWEEN 1980 AND 2003

Charlotte MUZIMBARANDA

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Ass. Prof. Dr. İhsan Ercan SADİ (Supervisor)

Ass. Prof. Dr. Burak Toygar HALİSTOPRAK

Prof. Dr. Erden Attila AYTEKİN

Director of The Institute

Prof. Dr. Ibrahim Sani MERT

Thesis Submission Date: …. /…../2024

DECLARATION

Msc Thesis of this study named “Darling of the West” to “Rogue nation”: Analysis of Zimbabwe-Britain post-colonial relations before and after the implementation of the FTLRP between 1980 and 2003”, which I presented, I declare that scientific moral principles were followed in the preparation of this study, in case of benefiting from the works of others, reference is made in accordance with scientific norms, no falsification has been made in the data used, and that any part of this study is not presented as another academic study.

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[signature]

Charlotte MUZIMBARANDA

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ABSTRACT

"DARLING OF THE WEST" TO "ROGUE NATION": AN ANALYSIS OF ZIMBABWE-BRITAIN POST-COLONIAL RELATIONS BEFORE AND AFTER THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FTLRP BETWEEN 1980 AND 2003

Charlotte MUZIMBARANDA

MSc Thesis in Global Politics and International Relations

Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Dr. İhsan Ercan SADİ

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When governments create goals, institutions are formed to back these goals which are then implemented through policies. In Zimbabwe, the Land Reform Programme was an institution created as an engine of post-colonial emancipation and development. It was agreed upon by two governments being the Zimbabwean government and the British government. This research investigates the dynamics of the relations between the two governments throughout the implementation of the land policy while focusing on the factors that contributed to the failure of the institution. In chapter one, the background of the Zimbabwe-Britain relations is given as well as the method of investigation which is Within Case Process Tracing. The second chapter provides comprehensive arguments between the research question and the scholarly perspectives on the factors which contribute to the failure of institutions. These factors are personal interest, the path dependence theory and the hypothesis on the behaviour of post-colonial institutions. Thereafter, a chronological historical account of the programme is provided then finally, the theories are tested against the evidence collected through process tracing to establish which factors led to the failure of the Land Reform Program as an institution.

KEYWORDS: Land reform, Institutions, Policy, Resettlement

COMMITTEE: Asst. Prof. Dr. İhsan Ercan SADİ

Asst. Prof. Dr. Burak Toygar HALİSTOPRAK

Prof. Dr. Erden Attila AYTEKİN

ÖZET

“BATI'NIN SEVGİLİSİNDEN” “HARİKA ULUS”A: 1980 VE 2003 ARASI HIZLI TOPRAK REFORMU PROGRAMININ UYGULANMASI ÖNCESİ VE SONRASI ZİMBAVE-BRİTANYA Sömürge Sonrası İLİŞKİLERİNİN ANALİZİ

Charlotte MUZIMBARANDA

Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Küresel Siyaset ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dali

Danışman: Dr. Ögr. Üyesi İhsan Ercan SADİ

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Hükümetler hedefler oluşturduğunda, bu hedefleri destekleyecek kurumlar oluşturulur ve bunlar daha sonra politikalar yoluyla uygulanır. Zimbabve'de Toprak Reformu Programı, sömürgecilik sonrası özgürleşme ve kalkınmanın motoru olarak oluşturulmuş bir kurumdu. Zimbabwe hükümeti ve İngiliz hükümeti olmak üzere iki hükümet tarafından kabul edildi. Bu araştırma, arazi politikasının uygulanması boyunca iki hükümet arasındaki ilişkilerin dinamiklerini araştırırken kurumun başarısızlığına katkıda bulunan faktörlere odaklanmaktadır. Birinci bölümde, Zimbabve-İngiltere ilişkilerinin arka planı ve vaka süreci içi izleme olan soruşturma yöntemi anlatılmaktadır. İkinci bölüm, araştırma sorusu ile kurumların başarısızlığına katkıda bulunan faktörlere ilişkin akademik bakış açıları arasındaki kapsamlı argümanları sunmaktadır. Bu faktörler kişisel çıkar, yol bağımlılığı teorisi ve sömürge sonrası kurumların davranışlarına ilişkin hipotezdir. Daha sonra programın kronolojik bir tarihsel açıklaması yapılıyor ve son olarak teoriler, bir kurum olarak Toprak Reformu Programı'nın başarısızlığına hangi faktörlerin yol açtığını belirlemek için süreç izleme yoluyla toplanan kanıtlarla test ediliyor.

ANAHTAR KELİMELER: Arazi reformu, kurumlar, politika, yeniden yerleşim

JÜRİ: Dr. Ögr. Üyesi İhsan Ercan SADİ

Dr. Ögr. Üyesi Burak Toygar HALİSTOPRAK

Prof. Dr. Erden Attila AYTEKİN

SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS

Symbols

"" : Is used for quoted statements throughout the thesis.

, : Is used to introduce a quoted statement.

, : The decimal separator "," is used consistently throughout the thesis for numerical figures.

Abbreviations

ADB	:African Development Bank
ARDA	:Agricultural And Rural Development Authority
BAP	:British Aid Programme
BBC	:British Broadcasting Corporation
CFU	:Commercial Farmers Union
Etc	:Etcetera
DERUDE	:Department of Rural Development
DFID	:Department For International Development
ESAP	:Economic Structural Adjustment Programme
EU	:European Union
GATT	:General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	:Gross Domestic Product
GWE	:Growth With Equity
IBCD	:International Bank for Construction and Development
IMF	:International Monetary Fund
FTLRP	:Fast Track Land Reform Programme
LAA	:Land Apportionment Act
LAA	:Land Acquisition Act

LRP	:Land Reform Programme
LRRP	:Land Reform And Resettlement Program
MLRRD	:Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Redevelopment
MDC	:Movement For Democratic Change
NDP	:National Development Plan
NLP	:National Land Policy
SACFA	:Southern African Commercial Farmers' Association
SDF	:Social Development Fund
SFYNDP	:Second Five-Year National Development Plan
TNDP	:Transitional National Development Plan
UN	:United Nations
UNCTAD	:United Nations Conference On Trade And Development
UNDP	:United Nations Development Fund
UNFPA	:United Nations Fund for Population Activities
UNICEF	:United Nations Children's Fund
USD	:United States Dollar
USA	:United States of America
WB	:World Bank
WBWS	:Willing Buyer Willing Seller
WFP	:World Food Programme
WHO	:World Health Organization
ZANU PF	:Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front
ZAPU	:Zimbabwe African People's Union
ZDF	:Zimbabwe Development Fund
ZIDERA	:Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act
ZIMCORD	:Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development

ZIMPREST :Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation

ZWD :Zimbabwean Dollar

PREFACE

In my pursuit of knowledge through education, I often wondered how relationships are formed and maintained between political institutions. I have also wondered why some institutions find success and others fail. However, due to my ignorance, I was often judgmental and saw it as incompetence. I was not knowledgeable that an institution could have limitations. My curiosity was directed to a number of institutions from other countries, but in conducting an investigation into this matter, I saw it best to take an example which was more familiar and closest to me. Hence, I ventured into an investigation using my own country as a case study in relation to the Zimbabwe-Britain relationship within the land reform institution. Through this investigation, I have gained more understanding of the internal politics which govern political relations and diplomatic ties that also affect the institutions such relations are based upon.

Firstly, I humbly give thanks to the one who made this all possible, Abba, the Lord God Almighty. Secondly, I extend my most sincere and warmest gratitude to my supervisor, Professor İhsan Ercan SADİ who equipped me with the skills needed to embark on this journey. His guidance, criticisms and opinions provided the push I needed to craft a worthy thesis. Furthermore, I thank my parents Barbara and Charles Muzimbaranda for their loving encouragement, unwavering support and prayers. Lastly, I also want to express my utmost gratitude for my sister Barbie Peters who took the leap to invest in me for my full potential to be realized. Her support and interest in my studies has been constant which gave me the drive to make her proud.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1.Introduction

Policy implementation is a task easier said than done especially for a newly independent country. The puzzle under study in this thesis is to understand why the Land Reform Programme (LRP) in Zimbabwe failed. The research involves an institutional analysis of the challenges, internal and external, faced by the institutions put in place by the government of Zimbabwe to aid and constitutionalise the redistribution of land under the LRP. The investigation focuses on the period between 1980 to 2003, to understand how the LRP became a subject of contention between the Zimbabwean and British government, transforming a once amicable symbiotic relationship into a hostile relationship. Although the LRP was a clause drawn up at the Lancaster House Conference on the 21st of December in 1979 between the British government and nationalistic Zimbabwean leaders seeking the independence of their country, the investigation begins from the 18th of April 1980.[1] This is due to the reason that Zimbabwe became an independent country in April 1980 and that is when the LRP implementation began. To afford cohesion to the research, the details of the Lancaster House Agreement will be presented as historical background.

Although research centred on land reform in Zimbabwe is not new, this research contributes to the existing works as unique and original in its approach to understand the LRP as an institution, not only a policy which I elaborate on in the following section. This allows the investigator to dissect the institution and the different internal or external dynamics which facilitate transformation in institutions. By doing so, this can aid future researchers to make a separation between institution and policy thereby addressing each accordingly for policy and institution are similar but not the same.

Therefore, this research intends to answer the question on what is behind the failure of the LRP. The goal is to provide an analysis of the factors that contributed to the Fast Track Land Reform Program (FTLRP) of 2000, the resistance that came along with it, and how that severed Zimbabwe's diplomatic relations with the West resulting in the forceful implementation of the policy and how that earned Zimbabwe the rogue nation label.[2] Therefore, the research question is directed at uncovering why the LRP failed and how that gradually over twenty years led to the FTLRP by making an institutional enquiry into the relevant institutions responsible for its implementation. The agreement to acquire land from the British minority to the indigenous population commenced after independence in 1980, and amendments to the LRP were then made in 1990, marking the

[1] 1.See Lancaster House Agreement. (1979, December 21). Southern Rhodesia Constitutional Conference Held At Lancaster House, London September - December 1979 Report.
"Following the Meeting of Commonwealth Heads of Government held in Lusaka from 1 to 7 August, Her Majesty's Government issued invitations to Bishop Muzorewa and the leaders of the Patriotic Front to participate in a Constitutional Conference at Lancaster House. The purpose of the Conference was to discuss and reach agreement on the terms of an Independence Constitution, and that elections should be supervised under British authority to enable Rhodesia to proceed to legal independence and the parties to settle their differences by political means."

[2] See Matondi, P. B. (2012). Zimbabwe's fast track land reform. Nordic Africa Institute. Zed Books. London.

second phase of the LRP. An institutional analysis will be made to make sense of this puzzle by analysing the pieces that made up the LRP institution that being the actors and the rules of their institutions.

An in-depth inquiry into this question shall uncover the complexities of the LRP as an institution created by two states to nurture their political relations. A new perspective will be provided to understand the institutional change or transformation, the contribution of actors to the shift, the dilemma of path dependence, and the power dynamics between the relevant states.

The main argument in this investigation is that the reluctance of the British government to adhere to the agreement of land distribution as part of its neo-colonial agenda was the primary factor that led to the failure of the LRP. This in turn led to the emergence of factors such as the pursuit of material interests by different classes in Zimbabwe, the shortcomings of the institutions tasked with overseeing land redistribution and financial constraints which make up the secondary argument in this research (Beach 2016, 469).

When a policy is drawn, a relevant institution is given the responsibility to see to its execution. However, hurdles, both external and internal may emerge. The question therefore is why institutions fail to carry out policies. The LRP is one example of a policy that was to be implemented by an institution but failed. It is evident that institutions are not immune to challenges, be it naturally occurring challenges that affect governance such as funding and performance of personnel or politically motivated challenges such as politicians using the institution to gain political support. An institution is not independent of its actors. The actors may not be above the institution but can use the rules of the institution to pursue their own agendas.

The FTLRP marked a great turning point in the history of Zimbabwe for it altered the economy, politics and society. This program is an example of how institutions evolve overtime to drive an agenda and how that impacts individuals as well as the society. At societal level, the FTLRP led to clashes between the British and the indigenous Zimbabwean farmers. The program was implemented hastily, there was no adequate structure and no support given to the British farmers from whom the land was taken and to the indigenous Zimbabweans to whom the land was given to.

The fast implementation of the policy had negative effects on the economy and the society. Whereas on an international scale, it resulted in the alienation of Zimbabwe from the West through sanctions. The FTLRP provides a good illustration of how an institution can go against its rules by allowing revolutionary action, and showing how the consequences of such actions impact the relationship between the government, local citizens, and the international community (Matondi 2012, 2-3).

To solve the puzzle, I use process tracing as a research method to identify the pivotal events that led to the failure of the LRP. The Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Redevelopment (MLRRD) alone cannot be held accountable for the failure of a successful

implementation of the LRP.[3] Other factors such as limited financial resources, extreme weather conditions like drought, inflation, resistance from British farmers and lack of coordination between the Zimbabwean and British governments, reveal that other problems arose and affected the institution's ability to see to the smooth implementation of the LRP.

The analysis is presented throughout seven chapters with the eighth one being the conclusion. In chapter one, the topic and the research question are introduced. The main components of the investigation are presented and discussed. These are the status of Zimbabwe and Britain's relations before FTLRP, defining the LRP as an institution and the role played by the MLRRD as the institution which developed the frameworks for LRP implementation. The execution of the LRP along with the policies created to aid the programme are reviewed briefly in this chapter.

In chapter two, the literature about the LRP and the Zimbabwe-Britain relations is discussed shedding light on nature of the institutional politics that was taking place in under the LRP. The literature chapter offers a compilation of different academic opinions and arguments related to the research topic. Along with presenting arguments, a historical outlook is provided to give a broad understanding of the LRP and why it is a relevant issue to investigate. The literature is not structured in a chronological manner but according to different themes which emerge from the investigation. This means different time periods overlap depending on the theme under discussion. In this chapter, I present arguments that pose different perspectives on the factors which lead to institutional failure. These are the pursuit of material-interests, path dependence theory and the behaviour of post-colonial institutions.

After that, the different phases of the LRP era are shared amongst three separate chapters for a clearer and more comprehensive process tracing. The first is chapter three, which covers the years 1980 to 1989. In this chapter, a brief history of the Lancaster House proceedings is given to give light to the backdrop which the investigation is conducted against. After that, the progression of the LRP via institutions such as the Growth With Equity plan (GWE) and the National development plans is presented.[4] The successes, challenges and shortcomings of these institutions are assessed in connection with how they contributed to the outcome of the LRP. In addition to that, the relations between the President of Zimbabwe at the time, the British government, the Commercial Farmer's Union (CFU), Zimbabwean politicians and landless peasants are taken account

[3] Kinsey, B. H. (1982). Forever Gained: Resettlement and Land Policy in the Context of National Development in Zimbabwe. *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute*, *52*(3), 92–113. https://doi.org/10.2307/1160527. Due to the size of the task of land acquisition and redistribution, the MLRRD was created as the head institution of eight ministerial departments and committees. The MLRRD was responsible for policy creation and delegating tasks to different ministries. Its role in policy creation makes it a fundamental part of the investigation (96).

[4] See Alexander, J. (1994). State, Peasantry and Resettlement in Zimbabwe. Review of African Political Economy, 21(61), 325–345. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4006144. GWE was a socialist development policy created by the MLRRD in 1981. It was introduced to undo the social and racial inequalities that existed under the former colonial government (96).

of to show how they interacted with each other under the land distribution initiative.[5] The most significant shift in the first decade of the LRP is the Zimbabwean government's transition from socialist ideologies to adopting neo-liberal capitalistic ideologies. This new way set the tone for the second decade of the LRP presented in chapter 4.

Chapter four provides data on the second and final decade of the LRP which started in 1990 up until 1999. In this decade there was institutional transformation through a number of constitutional amendments done to speed up the LRP as well as clashes between the parties involved such as the CFU, government of Zimbabwe, President Mugabe, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, the New Labour government, the war veterans, landowners in Zimbabwe and the landless. Some of the institutions that sprung up in the second decade were created to counter the issues seen in the first decade of the LRP. For instance, the socialist ideology was replaced by the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme 1991 (ESAP) imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB). The Land Acquisition Act was introduced in 1992 and amended in 1997 for the purpose of legally loosening the limitations of the LRP agreement to land acquisition and compensation. The successes and the shortcomings of these institutions is assessed leading up to the FTLRP era. The transition from LRP to FTLRP in 2000 is given in chapter five.

Chapter five focuses only on the period between 2000 and 2003 which marked the first three years of the FTLRP. Chapter three shows a period of optimistic implementation of the LRP as well as cooperation between government and institutions. Chapter four proceeds to show how the Zimbabwean manoeuvred around the constrictive legalities of the LRP as well as the unwillingness of the British to revise the agreement. Finally, chapter five provides the result of two decades of a failed LRP and how that affected the relations between the Zimbabwe and the West. An account of the factors which led to the FTLRP is given and the result of that decision. Although the aftermath of the FTLRP lasted beyond 2003, the investigation concluded in 2003 for it was the year Zimbabwe received sanctions from countries such as United States of America (USA), Britain, Germany and Australia thus marking the end of Zimbabwe's amicable diplomacy with the global north and the beginning of its alienation.

Throughout the investigation, process tracing is applied as the research method of choice. Multiple electronic resources were used to construct empirical evidence to construct a chronological chain of events. These include the use of governmental reports, institutional reports from the United Nations (UN), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB), United Kingdom (UK) Parliament, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Department for International Development (DFID) and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). A review of interviews from sources such as the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) etc and speeches of relevant actors have been

[5] See Fisher, J. L. (2010). Zimbabwe's discourse of national reconciliation. In Pioneers, Settlers, Aliens, Exiles: The decolonisation of white identity in Zimbabwe (pp. 27–54). ANU Press. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt24hd4n.7. The CFU was a farmer's union comprising mostly of British commercial farmers as well as a few Zimbabwean commercial farmers. It communicated the value and expectations of the farmers to the Zimbabwean and British Governments throughout all the phases of the LRP (39).

applied. In addition, parliamentary discussions have been reviewed to show the dynamics of the rhetoric and opinions of relevant political figures towards the land issues. Journals and news articles were also used to provide scholarly and media perspectives to establish a holistic collection of evidence.

The research brings focus to the correlation between the LRP institutions, how they operated and how that led to the failure of the LRP and ultimately, the FTLRP which resulted in the ending of the Zimbabwe Britain relations. Soon after the declaration of independence, Zimbabwe was considered as a "darling of the west" for it had much promise for fulfilling the aspirations of the former colonial power.[6] However, the relations were strained throughout the progression of the LRP for the British had to surrender that which they valued, the land. The land was also of great importance to the Zimbabweans not only culturally but economically as well. The period between 1980 till 2003 was a time when both governments were trying to manoeuvre through the LRP for each party to secure the best deal for itself. Several institutions were created and removed to aid the acquisition of land while rectifying the weaknesses of the previous institutions. However, in the end, the two decades of the LRP ended with a failed LRP together with broken relations between Zimbabwe and Britain.

Throughout the first decade after independence, President Mugabe was revered and referred to as the West's darling (Chan 2019). Woolf (2017) asserts that President Mugabe had a very amicable and agreeable relationship with the British government. In his article, Morken (2019) confirms the status of President Mugabe with regards to his relationship with the west up until the time when the difference in goals strained the relations beyond repair. The western media also portrayed him in a positive way by celebrating his diplomacy and achievements.

Globally, President Mugabe was a celebrated figure, a beacon of freedom, diplomacy and the future of post-colonial governance (Brownell 2004,394). Asuelime (2018,17) refers to the relations as a "romance with the West".[7] However, the love affair did not last long as the intentions of the West became evidently detrimental to Zimbabwe's independence and development. Consequently, this prompted President Mugabe to withdraw from agreements he had signed with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB). One of such agreements was the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) which was a set of neo-liberal policies that advocated for the deregulation of the market in Zimbabwe as well as open trade in exchange for financial assistance for it did more harm than good to the economy of Zimbabwe (Asuelime 2018,13).[8]

[6] Quoted from AfricaNews. (2019). *Highlights of Mugabe's love-hate affair with the West*. Africanews. https://www.africanews.com/2019/09/08/highlights-of-mugabe-s-love-hate-affair-with-the-west//

[7] Quoted from Asuelime, L. E. (2018). Mnangagwa's Foreign Policy Direction: Old Wine in New Skin? Journal of African Foreign Affairs, 5(2), 9–22. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26664060 (17)

[8] See General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs. (1995, December 5). Trade Policy Review Mechanism Zimbabwe. Minutes of Meeting. The ESAP was a set of neo-liberal economic reforms which were imposed by the IMF and WB as terms upon which Zimbabwe could qualify for loans.

The final transition of Zimbabwe from being the darling of the west to a rogue nation is seen between 1998 and 2000 whereby the fast-paced LRP was constitutionalised by President Mugabe. This quick land redistribution model completely disregarded the reservations of the British government for it allowed the compulsory acquisition of land without any compensation to the British farmers.

In the same period funding for the LRP was discontinued and frustrations rose amongst Zimbabwe's political elites as well as the landless citizens. Tensions rose and the British farm owners became targets of rogue groups of war veterans and landless peasants who went on missions to violently evict the farmers and take over the land. The Zimbabwean law enforcement authorities did not act to put an end to the violence.[9] It was alleged that the behaviour of the rouge groups together with the nonchalance of the police was due to instructions from government officials and politicians. The treatment of the British farmers by the rogue violent groups which was a violation of human rights and the unwillingness of the Zimbabwean government to address the issue raised alarm in the western world.[10] These were some of the factors that earned Zimbabwe the title of a rouge nation. This title was confirmed by the imposing of sanctions on Zimbabwe by the global north. Although Zimbabwe was not a war-torn country under a ruthless dictator, which is the typical characteristic of a rouge nation, it became a rogue nation due to the disregard for international human rights amongst other things.

1.2. The Land Reform Programme as an Institution

In this section, the LRP is discussed and presented as an institution. This is done to shed light on what the researcher regards as an institution and why the LRP is an institution. This is conducted with the application of different scholarly perspectives and definitions of institutions and their functions.

Firstly, institutions are made up of purposely created norms of conduct expected to be followed by all the members of the institution (Hodgson 2006,2). Institutions are an integral part of democratic governments for they help to draw the structure and conditions of governance through setting mutually selected goals for the growth and development of a country (Dahl 2005,192). The planning and structuring of developmental paths is important and must be adhered to under the authority of an institution (Shand 2015,6). For instance, the LRP provided a structured developmental path of land redistribution and economic growth in the agricultural sector.

[9] See Binswanger-Mkhize, H.P., Bourguignon, C., Van den Brink, R. (2009). Agricultural land redistribution: toward greater consensuss. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The World Bank. Washington DC. The war veterans were former soldiers who fought in the Liberation struggle known in Zimbabwe as the Second Chimurenga. Their participation was a fight for land, rights and the end of colonial rule. They had also been promised land as a reward for their participation in the war hence they had a voice and little patience with the land redistribution issues (149).

[10] Howard-Hassmann, R. E. (2010). Mugabe's Zimbabwe, 2000–2009: Massive Human Rights Violations and the Failure to Protect. Human Rights Quarterly, 32(4), 898–920. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40930339. The government faced allegations of racism due to the negligence of its responsibility in preventing violence against British farmers during the land invasions which were carried out by rogue groups of war veterans (912)

Within institutions, the presence of common goals is assisted by set ways of action for the members to avoid chaos and maintain uniformity (Duffield 2007,4). For example, communication is governed by norms and bureaucracy channels.

Order is maintained and observed as the norm (Shand 2015,6). Communication between members is planned and usually centred on pushing forward a shared agenda. The actions of the members can sustain or destroy an institution. Under an institution, norms and limitations are agreed upon by all members. An overall standard is set for all (Hodgson 2006,2). Members of institutions must not act independently especially against the principles of the institution. Institutions also have the power to induce transformation in their area of focus (Hodgson 2006,7). This can be seen in the diplomatic relations President Mugabe had with the British government as well as the Commercial Farmer's Union (CFU) whereby he maintained civil relationships with both institutions between 1980 and 1989. Positive relations gave room for constructive criticism of the government's execution of the LRP from the CFU and fostering further negotiations concerning funding as well as the independence constitutional amendments with the British government.

Owing to these definitions of institutions, the main institution under investigation in this thesis is the LRP alongside reference to the interconnected institutions that were set up under the LRP such as the MLRRD, to be explored in detail in the next section, for within institutions exists various sets of rules that help in achieving the main agenda (Duffield 2007,4). Due to the significance of these organisations, they will be highlighted throughout the research shedding light on why they were created and the problems they were created to solve and overall, their successes and failures all leading up to the FTLRP. In addition, it is important to acknowledge the role of the MLRRD in the LRP for it was the institution tasked with policy creation and spearheading land redistribution initiatives by delegating tasks to eight ministerial offices (Kinsey1982, 96). The role of the MLRRD is assessed in the following section.

1.3. The Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Redevelopment (MLRRD)

Ministries and other government offices were created under the LRP to execute the redistribution of land in Zimbabwe. Notably, one of the major roles of political institutions is that of the distribution of resources, and in the case of Zimbabwe, it was the redistribution of land to the indigenous majority. Political institutions are also responsible for the distribution of power between classes in society. Institutions are shaped by pivotal events, either historical or current, and how they interact with other institutions. They also respond and react to the demands of their surroundings. contributing to causal connections between processes and outcomes (March and Olsen 1983,739-740). Institutions cannot be viewed separately from the law.

Institutions are created to oversee the rule of law when it comes to governance. By saying that, institutions cannot be separated from law thus leading to the conclusion that institutions move towards a designed ending by enforcing certain laws which are created according to the interests of elite individuals (Peters 2019,8). This section provides a discussion centred around the Zimbabwean and British institutions created to foster the goals of the LRP. Their functions, agendas, as well as internal and external

challenges will be presented to provide an understanding of how policies are put into practice from the top to the bottom. It also presents some of the MLRRD's policies and their criticisms.

After the signing of the Lancaster agreement, the government of Zimbabwe created a new governing body which was to be responsible for the implementation of the LRP. This was the MLRRD, officiated in September 1980. The newfound institution was to oversee the transformation of the Zimbabwean society as well as economy through establishing agrarian reforms. The goal was to create an inclusive agricultural economy where the state, the peasants, and commercial farmers would all be stakeholders contributing to the growth of the economy by producing agricultural exports (Kinsey 1982, 92). In Britain, there was an institution called Department for International Development (DFID) which took up the responsibility to work alongside the Zimbabwean government to ensure that the resettlement programme was carried out smoothly and that the intended beneficiaries, the landless poor, would benefit from it. Their objective was poverty alleviation in rural areas for which they spent up to £44 million on the resettlement project (DFID 2000).

The MLRRD was to oversee the execution of the LRP and delegate different roles to other government departments, smaller teams in different provinces and create committees for different areas. The Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA) was created as a subcommittee of the MLRRD to oversee these activities. On the ground, smaller teams would operate under the leadership of an officer and an assigned assistant who would assist in issuing out permits to peasants for residence and for agricultural activities. After the officers would have completed all their groundwork, they would report back to the MLRRD through the Intensive Resettlement Assistant Secretary (Kinsey 1982, 96).

Furthermore, the redistribution of land was to be executed in levels with the main one being that of making sure the poor attain land for domestic agriculture to sustain their households. The second aim was to usher in the commencement of state led commercial farming by encouraging small scale farmers to engage in commercial farming activities (Kinsey 1982, 92).

Later in 1986, a 5-year National Development Plan (NDP) was introduced to assist the programme, but it was criticised for not having clear structure and foundation.[11] The government was also criticised for lacking maturity in land distribution thus that is why its institutions failed to deliver. The NDP aimed to achieve economic growth, improve

[11] See United Nations. (1986, March 26). Governing Council of the United Nations Development Programme. District General. Programme Planning. Country and inter-country programmes and projects. Second Country Programme For Zimbabwe.

http://web.undp.org/execbrd/archives/sessions/gc/33rd-1986/DP-CP-ZIM-2.pdf. The five-year National Development Plan was implemented from 1986 to 1991. Its goal was to foster industrial, economic and scientific development while also catering to the needs of the poorest communities in Zimbabwe by improving their quality of life for example through ensuring access to clean water (6).

the people's quality of life through job creation initiatives all at the same time introducing new developmental technologies (UN 1986, 6). These goals were criticized for being unrealistic for the magnitude of resources, time and experience needed for it to be a success were beyond the capabilities of the MLRRD (Moyo and Skalness 1990, 211).

Selected officers and a land selection committee would oversee the reacquisition of land and the resettlement of individuals as well as working hand in hand with the officers responsible for evaluating the farms. Their job was to make sure that the willing buyer and willing seller (WBWS) terms were being observed. In addition, they made sure that the land to be sold was not currently being utilised or was not unfit for agricultural purposes as well as the land having to be a considerable size to allow satisfactory agricultural activities including creation of new infrastructure if needed. They checked whether the farms which were in areas that had been previously assessed by the relevant teams for reallocation and resettlement as well as making sure that it had good roads, access to the railway, and water (Kinsey 1982, 96).

In 1981, Britain gave a Land Resettlement Grant of £17 million to the government of Zimbabwe as well as an additional amount of £27 million, separate from the Resettlement Grant, to aid the government's budget deficit for the programme (DFID 2000,2). The British and the Zimbabwean government calculated the funds needed for the programme to be around 60 million Zimbabwean dollars which they agreed would be divided evenly between them. When the programme took off, the main goal was to relieve overcrowded areas which were carrying up to 8,000 families and relocate them within three years onto the reclaimed farms estimated to be 1,1 million hectares (Kinsey 1982, 96).

Nevertheless, as the resettlement mission continued at a slow and effective pace, the landless peasants grew impatient. Some of them illegally moved onto the lands where other families had been resettled onto and as a result, overcrowding became a problem. In September 1981, it was reported that over 60,000 people who had not been given land by the government yet, were squatting on the land allocated to legally reallocated families. However, despite the pressure from the illegal squatting activities, it was declared by Robert Mugabe, who was the Prime Minister at the time, that the reallocation of land was to continue as before, at the correct pace and stressed that people had to be patient for resettlement was a lengthy process. The authorities tried to curb the squatting pandemic by announcing that those who went to squat on land they had not been allocated would not qualify for reallocation in the future, however, this did not solve anything but made the people more restless and anxious (Kinsey 1982,97).

In response to the mounting pressure of squatters overpopulating farms, MLRRD introduced a more fast-paced resettlement scheme. The scheme would overlook some of the processes that were done which took time such as land assessment and infrastructure assessment. Instead, the government would buy as much land as possible and as quickly as possible from British commercial farmers. Prospectively, the disadvantage of trying to buy land quickly would be that most readily available pieces of land would be isolated and lacking infrastructure. This meant that families relocated to those farms would be far

apart from each other and lacking in infrastructure such as roads, water pipelines, schools and health centres (Kinsey 1982,101). In retrospect, for the government to avoid failure to safeguard human rights by failing to ensure these basic resources for resettled families through hastened land acquisition, it was necessary for the government to go back to the drawing board and draft a longer land reform policy which could be implemented over a longer period at a slower pace. The land reform programme of South Africa is an example of how land reform can be a lengthy process when done within the parameters of the law (Shay 2012,168).

By 1999, the urgency for quicker redistribution of land was pressing on the government as it became more apparent that the population of people in communal areas was increasing and yet the people still lacked access to the means of production be it on a large scale or a small scale. Therefore, without adequate funding to for land redistribution as well as poverty alleviation initiatives, the government turned a blind eye to the violent land occupations and land grabbing by citizens and politicians together to allow for the opportunity for the peasantry to gain land which they could not afford to purchase (Moyo and Chambati 2013,9). The government overlooked its declaration of rights which stated that it was illegal for land to be acquired outside the lines drawn by the law which meant that any transaction involving land was to be done under the umbrella of the constitutional property laws (Shay 2012, 153).[12]

The FTLRP diverged sharply from Zimbabwe's declaration of property rights and due processes. According to the declaration of rights, an individual possessing land had the right to protest in the event that their land had been selected for redistribution. Not only that, but it was also lawful to give a notice to the farmer ahead of time that their land was being considered for redistribution. This meant that the landowner had the right to hold onto land if they felt that the selection of their land was unfair and unnecessary. With the FTLRP, all these protocols were not considered. Land was taken outside the law, it was taken overnight without notice and without justification (Shay 2012, 160).

However, redistribution of land was not as simple as taking land from one group of people, giving it to another, then production taking place shortly after, feeding into the economy and leading to economic prosperity. There were challenges which did not make this transition as easy as it may have been intended to be. Firstly, although the goal was to disown British farmers only of underutilised parts of the farms they owned, those British farmers did make contributions to the economy and societies they lived in. They employed locals on their farms and met export demands bringing in foreign currency into the country (Kinsey 1982, 93).

Secondly, small scale farmers who were given land did not produce for economic reasons but mainly for domestic consumption and since crops were grown to feed

[12] See Shay, C. (2012). Fast Track to Collapse: How Zimbabwe's Fast-Track Land Reform Program Violates International Human Rights Protections to Property, Due Process, and Compensation. American University International Law Review. Vol. 27 Issue 1, p133-171. The right of the owner to dispute the acquisition of a farm was overridden by the government's self-endowed authority to declare that land was to be taken even if the owner stated reasonable reasons why the decision was not well assessed before being made (160).

families, the farmers did not use most of their land. Consequently, this meant that their contribution to the agrarian economy was very small. It became apparent that the level of productivity of large-scale farmers could not be compared to that of many small-scale farmers (Moyo and Skalness 1990,208).

Lastly, Kinsey (1982,93) foresaw that not all intended beneficiaries would be able to attain land for access to land was unequal amongst the locals due to the reason that there was not enough arable land to redistribute evenly to the peasants. Notably in 1988, upon the progression of the programme for nine years, it was popular opinion amongst the British that the redistribution of land had not helped to further the development of the country. This claim was confirmed in 1988 after an evaluation was made by the DFID and it was discovered that many people were still living in poverty and that the livelihoods of those living in communal areas had not improved. Nevertheless, there was much visible improvement on the repairing of infrastructure that had been damaged by the war (DFID 2000,1).

Furthermore, one of the errors of the land resettlement was that the permits of residence that were given to resettled individuals had no clear date of expiration and they did not hold as much weight as title deeds. This meant that if a permit was deemed to have expired, the holder could be removed from their land and not receive compensation for any infrastructural developments they would have made on the land. This was unfair to the people who had been reallocated legally. As a result, this gave rise to corrupt dealings by village chiefs who would try to bribe individuals or families into giving them money to gain the right to remain on a piece of land under their chiefdoms (Kinsey 1982,108).

Moreover, according to the DFID (2000,2) redistribution did not benefit the poor much but benefited experienced Zimbabwean farmers more who were given land for their ability to strengthen the agricultural economy. With the National Land Policy of 1990, the government prioritised giving farms to commercial farmers for their ability to contribute to the agriculture economy.[13] Following the National Land Policy, the Land Acquisition Act was introduced in 1992 to make it easier for the government to obtain farms from the British[14].

Another point of argument presented with regards to the LRP between 1980 and 1982 was that the redistribution of land had the potential to make more apparent the social structure that existed in the society. It could create a wider divide between those with easy access to land and those without, that being the ambitious politicians versus rural peasants. If such a divide were to emerge, it would be harder to reconcile than that between Zimbabweans and the British (Kinsey 1982, 93). Shay (2012,152) also added to

[13] See Coldham, S. (2001). Land Acquisition Amendment Act, 2000 (Zimbabwe). Journal of African Law, 45(2), 227–229. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3558958. Section 16 of the constitution prohibited the mandatory acquisition of land therefore it was amended to allow the government to take land on a compulsory basis (227)

[14] See Coldham, S. (2001). Land Acquisition Amendment Act, 2000 (Zimbabwe). Journal of African Law, 45(2), 227–229. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3558958. The Land Acquisition Act was a product of the amendment made to Section 16 which had strong protection land ownership rights (227)

the argument of division due to land issues saying that the FTLRP was racially motivated and discriminatory in nature pointing out that President Robert Mugabe openly stated that he saw the British farmers as the state's enemies. As a result, the government overlooked the rule of law on racial terms. Another argument is that land redistribution was not very much nationalistic but capitalistic in nature however, the peasantry who were involved in the land grabbing were oblivious to these capitalistic ambitions. Consequently, the land grabbers and the squatters did not benefit at the same degree as the capitalists and politicians who took land for themselves. The capitalists and the politicians already had the financial means as well as connections to begin production and make profit from the farms (Moyo and Chambati 2013, 11).

Politicians blamed the slowness of the programme on external factors. The land reform was carried out as a response to political coercion hence the failure to integrate agricultural development and industrial development whilst trying to fulfil political agendas (Moyo and Skalness 1990,213). It is important to observe whether there exists competition between the human agents involved in institutions or if there is cooperation between them. These factors can affect the behaviour of institutions. The relationship within political associations can affect the choices made by the institution (Garceau 1951,81).

Institutions can be described as apparatus created for the legitimation of ideology, power and influence. Institutions therefore achieve this with the backup of the state and political elites. If the interests of the political elites change and the power dynamics between them shift, this will in turn affect the integrity of the institution (Lindergaard 2013,17). Class struggle existed between the British imperialists and the Zimbabwean majority, but it also spilled over to the Zimbabwean capitalists and the Zimbabwean peasants after the FTLRP (Moyo and Chambati 2013,12).

After the declaration of independence redistribution of land was polarised between the political elites of the ruling party and the freedom fighters of the African liberation movement. The political elites pushed for the redistribution of land and they themselves had the choicest picks of land compared to that attained by the freedom fighters (Gwekwerere et al. 2018,9). In a bid to make sure that poverty alleviation was realised, the British government saw it more useful for the beneficiaries to be actively involved in the programme and to be consulted before any progress was made. This decision came in 1996 after the resettlement grant of 1981 had expired (DFID 2000,2).

In 1998, the DFID kept putting emphasis on the importance of openness regarding the land programme. They reached the conclusion that there was need to engage with the poor directly by bypassing the government to work with independent non-governmental organisations. A new budget or £5,000,000 p was promised for this new way. The DFID focus was on the rural dwellers in the communal areas as well as small scale farmers. They provided funds to rural district councils to be used for providing clean water to people, provided the Ministry of Land and Agriculture up to £3.65 million in funds which were to be used to assist small scale farmers. The DFID also extended its assistance to farm employees and small-scale farmers through the Agribusiness Entrepreneur Network

and Training Development Agent and the Farm Community Trust of Zimbabwe (DFID 2000,3).

It is a result of the rogue nature of the FTLRP why Zimbabwe was ostracised by the West. The FTLRP, despite being presented by the Zimbabwean government as morally actuated, was not only a violation of international laws but a violation of Zimbabwe's property laws therefore it was a violation of both human rights and agreements made with the British government (Shay 2012,164). In 1998, the Foreign Minister of Zimbabwe headed the Land Reform and Resettlement Conference where the British government also participated and together, they agreed on set rules for land redistribution. Some of these included making sure land was affordable, abiding to the property laws, poverty alleviation and openness.[15] Despite the agreements made by both governments at this conference the Zimbabwean government made changes to clause 57 of the constitution.[16] These changes were made in the year 2000, and they made it legal for the government to acquire land without providing compensation (DFID 2000,2). Therefore, it can be said that whilst the government approached the matter presenting the Zimbabwean majority as victims of imperialism, it in turn made victims out of the British farmers through deregulating the acquisition of land resulting in farmers being violently evicted from the farms they possessed (Shay 2012,164).

Understandably however, as a post-colonial state, the government of Zimbabwe was more concerned with enforcing nationalism as a reaction to the rigid political structures that existed before independence. In the case of Zimbabwe, the colonial political structures were built on exclusion and discrimination of the black majority when came to access to land. Henceforth, adopting the agenda of national security was a defensive response to pre-independence colonial rule (Spencer 1997,3). The nationalistic reacquisition of land can be viewed as a tool towards satisfying material appetites by prominent Zimbabwean capitalists who had the political power to bypass the rules and laws regarding land distribution and ownership, breeding rent seeking behaviour mainly amongst those belonging to the ruling party (Moyo and Chambati 2013,11).

Finally, another major impediment of the resettlement programme was that of funds. Soon after independence, the rate of inflation of the Zimbabwean dollar kept rising and the weight of funds coming in through institutions such as the British Aid Programme was slow for donations were barely trickling in for some donors were not too avid on how the funds would be used to buy land from British farmers. Hence for the government to

[15] See Department For International Development DFID (2000, March). Background briefing: Resettlement in Zimbabwe http://mokoro.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/zimdfidbrief.pdf The Land Reform and Resettlement Conference of 1998. "A Land Reform and Resettlement Conference involving key domestic stakeholders and international donors was held in September 1998 under the chairmanship of Zimbabwe's Foreign Minister. The UK Government played a full part in the conference which successfully established a set of principles for land reform: transparency, respect for the law, poverty reduction, affordability and consistency with Zimbabwe's wider economic interests" (2).

[16] See Department For International Development DFID (2000, March). Background briefing: Resettlement in Zimbabwe http://mokoro.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/zimdfidbrief.pdf . "In January 2000 the Government proposed an amendment to clause 57 of the draft new constitution, to allow compulsory acquisition of land without compensation. The draft constitution was rejected in a referendum in February 2000. The Government has nevertheless introduced the amendment through Parliament" (2).

manage, adjustments needed to be made with regards to the costs off the programme. This meant that some parts of the chain had to be removed to reduce costs as well as making cuts in terms of infrastructural development in areas where little infrastructure was present. The programme was compromised by the lack of funds which led to lack of development (Kinsey 1982,104). In the long run, the LRP was very costly to implement and did not bear the economic outcome that was desired. The cost of buying land was high and inflation was also high and this together along with the reduction of land tax drained the budget for the programme (Moyo and Skalness 1990,208).

This chapter has reviewed some of the main occurring issues within the LRP framework and implementation. In his works in 1982, Kinsey made criticisms of the potential draw backs of the LRP if the programme was not handled well. Some of those arguments were confirmed later by the DFID for example of the issues of isolated benefits between the rich and poor. On the other hand, it is also argued that the programme did bear the intended or expected results however it is not credited for it meaning there is more focus on the costs of the programme as opposed to the benefits of the programme (Moyo and Skalness 1990,211). Overall, to confirm or debunk these claims, I employ Within Case Process Tracing as research method to uncover why the LRP was an unsuccessful institution and the transitioning of the Zimbabwe-Britain relation. Within case comparison is used for the case under investigation is a single case which is highly dynamic. The application of this method is presented in detain in the following section.

1.4. Research Design: Process Tracing

Process tracing is defined as the structural dissection of selected specific case studies. It is a qualitative research method whereby a specific case study is chosen and explored to map out and understand the causal inferences and relations between cases or within a case. More attention is given to the identified points of change to understand the reason behind the transformation at each stage of the process (Collier 2011, 823).

The use of process tracing in the investigation of the dynamics surrounding the LRP enables the researcher to identify the causal mechanisms at different stages of the process as well as how they affect the unfolding of events in turn allowing the researcher to come up with new perspectives on the issue as well as also contributing by giving suggestions to the challenges observed in the process. Process tracing is to be used in this research for the investigation is a within case comparison of institutions under an agreement between the Zimbabwean and the British governments (Collier 2011, 824).

The case at hand is that of the institutions involved in the land reform programme. This research traces the interactions between the British institutions and the Zimbabwean institutions throughout the period from 1980 to 2003. A comparison is made between both governments and their institutions in relation to the political social and economic agendas. Despite being under one umbrella institution which is the LRP agreed upon in 1980, the governments did not share the same goal as well as the same means to achieve that goal. Therefore, it is imperative to examine the issue using process tracing to observe the periods of cooperation, diversion and the periods of contention to understand how the LRP was a failure not only for Zimbabwe but also for Britain.

According to the hypothesis, on the British front, it was a failure for the extension of neo-colonialism was not achieved whereas for Zimbabwe the goal of economic prosperity remained elusive throughout the two decades of the LRP. I have classified the LRP as the main institution which was to be coordinated and implemented by policy enforcing institutions from the Zimbabwean and British governments. With that, various institutions were created to assist in fulfilling the agenda of each government. The British institutions include the Department For International Development (DFID), New Labour Party, and the Land Reform Grant. The Zimbabwean institutions include the Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Redevelopment (MLRRD), Growth With Equity (GWE), Transitional National Development Plan (TNDP), National Development Plan (NDP), Land Acquisition Act (LAA), the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) etc. The Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) is another institution adopted by the Zimbabwean government which marked a moment of diversion from socialism to neo-liberalism. In addition to these institutions, independent international institutions were also part of the evolution of the LRP for example the World Bank (WB), International Monetary Fund (IMF), United Nations (UN), and United Nations Development Fund (UNDP) etc.

These instruments contributed to the outcome observed in the transitional events between the British and Zimbabwean institutions. In the investigation of the relations between these institutions, the actors involved are also an integral part of the variables. For instance, the leaders of the institutions such as President Robert Mugabe, Margaret Thatcher, Tony Blair and the Lords of the British Parliament. At the lower level are the recipients of the LRP that being the landless peasants in Zimbabwe and the British landowners in Zimbabwe. The inclusion of all these variables enable pattern recognition to make sense of certain behaviours, changes and irregularities. To uncover these patterns and irregularities there is need for a detailed description of events in chronological order (Collier 2011, 824).

1.4.1. Case Selection and Detailed Narrative Approach

In my research I use process tracing which involves the narration of the details of the process to trace the patterns of causality leading to the observed outcome. This involves a historical investigation of past events to identify the different causal mechanisms that contributed to the outcome (George and Bennet 2005, 145).

In process tracing, the selection of the period of the case is of utmost importance. The period must not encompass unnecessary phenomena and at the same time must not exclude issues of importance in the investigation. Hence the case under investigation begins from 1980 for it was a pivotal moment in the history of both Britain and Zimbabwe which signified a new era of self-governance for Zimbabwe and of cooperation with the former colonial government to ensure a smooth transition. The level of cooperation was high as President Mugabe was often heralded in Western media as a great and sensible leader, the ‘darling of the West’. The relations between the two governments were constitutionalised by the LRP which became the main object of contention and the straining of relations. From there the investigation also turn to the question of path dependency including alternative explanations to the outcome. Case selection must cover the whole area of interest when observing historical narratives hence why the case study

stretches through to 2003 when Zimbabwe was sanctioned and alienated from the global north showing a significant contrast from 1980 (Bennet and Chekel 2015, 26).

In addition, evidence retrieved from other agents is critically analysed to avoid conveying the picture intended by the agent who has presented the data. In this research, interviews conducted by other parties have been used and often interviewers may ask the interviewee leading questions to create a source of evidence for their own explanations. Therefore, the data from the interviews is analysed independently according to the purpose of the study (Bennet and Chekel 2015, 24).

1.4.2. Causal Mechanisms

Careful identification of causal mechanisms is an integral part of process tracing. Causal mechanisms can be defined as the connectors between the circumstances and the results. When investigating path dependency, these casual mechanisms can be identified as the variables which disrupt or maintain the chain of events. These variables interact with each other each contribution to the outcome. However, on the other hand, the predicted connections may at times be non-existent (Beach 2016, 465-466).

The primary argument is that the causal mechanism which contributed to the failure of the LRP is that of the unwillingness of the British government of adhere to the agreement of land redistribution. The assumption is that after relinquishing its authority to rule in Zimbabwe, there was an attempt to maintain a hold on the agricultural economy of the country by delaying the total redistribution of land to the majority. Through this, Britain was to usher in a neo-colonialism which President Mugabe detected and resisted. Beach argues that in some cases, the casual mechanism does not always lead to the outcome (Beach 2016, 469). To find the evidence for this argument, the investigation of micro-processes is imperative. These micro processes includes the policy changes under the LRP framework, and the role played by actors such as the Commercial Farmer's Union (CFU) and the war veterans. This brings about the concept of equifinality whereby different variables can interact with each other to bring about the observed outcome.

Process tracing involves different methods which are specifically applied according to each case. In this investigation, I use the approach of observing interacting causal variables within a single case. This is due to the existence of different variables existing throughout the process at different intensities with all contributing to the failure of the LRP. For example, these variables vary from political actors, Bretton Woods institutions, Zimbabwean institutions as well as the rogue groups that were active in the FTLRP (George and Bennet 2005, 149).

1.4.3. Within Case Comparative Method

Process tracing involves the explanation of causal phenomena against the background of a hypothesis. The proposed causal mechanisms are used to make sense of the causal process at the same time seeking more empirical evidence of causation (Bennet and Chekel 2015, 3). The LRP is the selected historical case study for it shows a linear progression of events over a period of 13 years. Within case is therefore defined as the

existence of other vital causal mechanisms in a case which bear a large contribution to the outcome of the main case under investigation (Bennet and Chekel 2015, 8).

The within case comparative method is applied to this case study for it involves the investigation of a single case and the other micro-cases that are found within the case in order to bring about a broader understanding and empirical analysis of the case under study. With this method, new hypothesis can be found as well as the identification of the causal mechanisms that contribute to the different periods of transition, irregularities and cooperation between institutions (George and Bennet 2005, 40).

In the investigation of a historical narrative, there is usually the emergence of macro and micro correlations within the case. The macro corelations are broader and general as compared to micro correlations which can be discovered with the use of process tracing. The generalized assumptions of the LRP lean towards the belief that the LRP failed due to the Zimbabwean government's poor leadership however the micro-correlations will bring attention to the less common causal mechanisms that exist in this case (Bennet and Chekel 2015, 8-9).

I focus on the institutions within the LRP framework to understand the factors behind the changes in decisions and how they affected the functionality of the institutions. To dissect the reasons behind the irregularities, process tracing will allow for the researcher to pinpoint the pivotal events that led to a change in ideology and implementation of the LRP (George and Bennet 2005, 108).

With within case comparison, the goal is to observe and understand the relationship as well as produce empirical evidence of the causal mechanisms behind the relationship between the dependent variable which in this case is the LRP versus the independent variables which are the British and Zimbabwean governments (George and Bennet 2005, 142). Unlike the congruence method, process tracing will allow for a theory to be created measured against the background of the different causal evidence that will emerge (George and Bennet 2005, 141). The identification of the dependent and independent variables is important for it makes it clear the limits of the investigation. The researcher is therefore able to narrow down and focus on causal mechanisms specific to the case by observing the responses or reactions by each variable to the changes (George and Bennet 2005, 68).

Within case process tracing include the observation of macro and micro causalities within the process. In contrast, with controlled comparison whereby the researcher must select two cases that are alike in many ways and compare them with each other. This method allows the researcher to use a single case given that there is not another case that is similar enough to compare to the case under investigation (George and Bennet 2005, 150).

Another advantage of process tracing in within case comparison is that it allows for a more empirical examination of the hypothesis against the identified of the existing variables in the process. This is made possible by that through this method various patterns of causality which may be different from each other can be detected (2005, 102). The existence of equifinality is made observable and provable through process tracing.

1.4.4. Research Questions

A structured method for collecting the necessary data is needed to avoid derailing from the aim of the research so different questions are posed in relation to the investigation in question. In the case of the LRP, to achieve a structural collection of data and detailed observation of that data several issues are presented in the research (George and Bennet 2005, 181).

These issues are a necessary part of the investigation for they provide different angles to the main argument of the research which is centred on the role played by the British government in contributing to the failure of the LRP. Some of these issues led to the emergence of other possible arguments which enriched the investigation. Some of the issues identified look at whether the Zimbabwean government was well equipped to embark on a countrywide land reallocation programme and how the power dynamics between the British and Zimbabwean governments contributed to the lack of productive coordination within the LRP. The existence of divided national, elite and class interests also point to whether or not the LRP was a failed programme for both Zimbabwe and Britain. With that the investigation looks further into the state of Zimbabwe's economic and political issues during the LRP. To make sense of the puzzle, issues surrounding the factors that led to the disintegration of the amicable relations that existed between Zimbabwe and Britain in the first decade of the LRP are brough to light along with the role played by external pressures from international institutions and other countries which had material-interests in Zimbabwe.

While the researcher aims to discover more empirical evidence of causal mechanisms, there are some assumptions that have been made to answer some of these questions. One of these assumptions is that the LRP was never intended by the British to be a transitional institution allowing the Zimbabwean government full authority and power over its land and resources. On the contrary, it was a form of neo-colonialism which was to be backed by various institutions and agendas such as the alleviation of poverty by the DFID and the New Labour party's villainization of President Mugabe. Therefore, throughout the lifespan of the programme there was a tug of power between the British government and the Zimbabwean government where one was seeking to retain control and one was seeking to regain control. However, in such a case there must be a winner and a loser but neither government wanted to accept defeat. In the end however, both governments lost. With that being said, the question is asked which government suffered a greater loss compared to the other? The power dynamics between different actors shall also be investigated to confirm or debunk this assumption (George and Bennet 2005, 73).

1.4.5. Path Dependence

In the case whereby there is a linear progression of events as in the case of the LRP, the question of the existence of path dependence also arises (George and Bennet 2005, 149). With the LRP, there was a path that was agreed upon in 1980 whereby the LRP agreement was to be valid for 10 years and to be renegotiated at the end of the 10 years. In addition to that the Zimbabwean government shifted from socialism,

neoliberalism to radical revolution in the LRP decades. So, process tracing investigates the possibility of path dependence versus the diversion from the path. This involves the identification of the pivotal decisions or circumstances that influenced or discouraged path dependency. By observing the linear progression of the unfolding of events, the researcher can weigh to what extent particular decisions and circumstances contributed to the outcome (George and Bennet 2005, 102).

1.4.6. Theory Development and Testing

In process tracing, a theory is developed after the analysis of the process however the process can be observed against an existing hypothesis (George and Bennet 2005, 101). At the end of the investigation of the linear progression of events through process tracing, one can test the identified variables against the proposed hypothesis at the beginning of the research. Due to the reason that a theory is not given to generalise the causal mechanisms behind the outcome, the outcome is used to show to what extent a particular theory can be applicable to this case. Therefore, with process tracing in theory is not used to make generalisations but it is used to weigh the applicability of a theory against a case which in turn adds to its validity as a research method (George and Bennet 2005, 102).

1.4.7. Limitations of Process Tracing

A limitation of process tracing is that there needs to be an undisturbed progression of events which can be observed closely. However, if the sequence of events is disturbed at some point and information is missing or unclear, the researcher will not be able to establish empirical connections. Considering this, the reliance on a linear sequence of events can compromise the results because of the unobserved phenomena or the missing links (George and Bennet 2005, 157).

Sometimes information may not be accessible in the case that it is protected or made private. This leaves very little room for testing the hypothesis for there is nothing to measure is against. In this research, parliamentary discussions on the LRP were only accessible from the British parliament and not on the Zimbabwean parliament. The absence of this variable hinders the comparison of the parliamentary discussions and rhetoric between the two governments. (Bennet and Chekel 2015, 19).

There may be intervals or missing pieces of information that could not be attained by the researcher. In such cases if the hypothesis does not match the narrative, transparency will be required of the investigator to be honest and not impose explanations where they do not belong (Bennet and Chekel 2015, 31).

The following chapter contains a more detailed compilation of the different opinions and perspectives of the LRP. The literature also contains a brief historical overview to provide relevant information to be known in relation to the varied opinions. More importantly, I engage with different theories and scholarly arguments which I later test against the evidence collected through process tracing. These arguments help me to enrich my investigation with varied input from different sources thereby broadening the possible causal mechanisms behind the failed LRP.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Introduction

In this chapter, the literature concerning the Land Reform Programme (LRP), relevant institutions, and the Zimbabwe-British relations shall be assessed and synthesized to give a clear understanding of the research question while giving the different perspectives of other scholars. The aim of the research is to uncover what led to the failure of the LRP as an institution and how the failure led to the deterioration of the Zimbabwe-British relations leading to Zimbabwe's rouge nation status. The literature shall be arranged according to themes which revolves around the existing main arguments to give a better overview of the key debates and reoccurring issues in the LRP. These themes are, pursuit of material-interests by the actors of the LRP, the behaviour of post-colonial institutions and path dependence.

An analysis of the LRP, with focus on the Zimbabwe-British relations and the gradual failure of the programme, is of importance because in present day, the actions of both governments are still questioned. For example, Zimbabwe was still under economic sanctions imposed on it by the Western powers over human rights violations, among other things. Therefore, each year since 2021, demonstrations around the illegal sanctions were held to raise awareness of their restrictiveness to the Zimbabwean population as well as the international community until the removal of the Executive Order 13288 sanctions by the USA on the 4th of March 2024[17]. However, the diplomatic relations between Zimbabwe and Britain are still not in harmony and the current Zimbabwean government is currently seeking to pay reparations to the displaced farmers so as to pacify the global community from which it has been alienated from. Therefore, the literature review shall provide adequate insight into the events as well as the opinions surrounding the LRP and its institutional shortcomings. This shall assist in understanding the broader scope of the issue as the literature shall present different arguments and scholarly perspectives by theme, setting the foundation for the thesis.

2.2. Background of the Land Question

The land inequalities in Zimbabwe were perpetuated by the colonial government in 1969 when the Land Tenure Act was introduced. The Land Tenure Act was responsible for the large land ownership gap between the British and the Zimbabweans. Up to 6,000 British farmers were given about 15,5 million hectares of land, whereas Zimbabwean families numbering up to 700,000 were given only 16,4 million hectares of land. The indigenous population of Zimbabwe and was driven off what was known as the Tribal

[17] See Treasury Sanctions Zimbabwe's President and Key Actors for Corruption and Serious Human Rights Abuse. (2024, March 4). U.S. Department of the Treasury. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2154#:~:text=tools%20of%20statecraft.%E2%80%9D- . The United States government officially removed the sanctions on Zimbabwe which had been placed due to corruption and human rights violations. The sanctions were removed after being contested by Zimbabweans as well as other allies for causing suffering to the civilians.

Trust Lands which were lands that had been handed down from the ancestors within the family lineages. These lands had good soils and received good rains. With the Land Tenure Act the British farmers took ownership of the Tribal Trust Lands forcing the indigenous population to live on highly populated non-arable land. This led to an increase in the levels of poverty, a rise in poor living standards as well as hunger for the land was not enough to sustain good agricultural production that could cater to large populations (Naldi 1998, 79).

With this backdrop in mind and the mission is to understand why the LRP failed to bring development to Zimbabwe and how the various challenges built up to the ostracizing of the country by the West. Various scholars have presented different arguments regarding this issue. I explore those arguments under broad themes to give cohesion to the literature review. First, I search into the role of material-interests by the involved parties in the failure of the LRP. Secondly, I review the discussion on the issue of path dependence by institutions. Then, finally, a critical discussion on the nature of post-colonial institutions. These discussions shall enrich the investigation with different perspectives broadening my understanding of the question.

2.3. The Pursuit of Material-Interests within the LRP Framework

In my understanding, when two powers come together to make a settlement, the expectation is that one must make a larger compromise than the other. In the case of Zimbabwe and Britain at Lancaster House, the British had tried to avoid bringing up the land question, however the Zimbabwean delegation put the issue on the negotiating table. As Britain had lost a colony, they were not willing to surrender all the economic or material benefits immediately. So, both parties had opposing agendas. For Zimbabwe, the agenda was to regain its sovereignty but on the other hand, for Britain, the agenda was not to release all power of self-governance to the Zimbabwean government. Not doing so, meant that they would manage to retain the economic liberties they had in Zimbabwe. Hence the issue of the pursuit of material-interests within the LRP arises. Furthermore, the material-interests can be divided into three groups. These are national interests, class interests, and elite interests. The pursuit of national interests is predominantly observed on the British front. The pursuit of class and elite interests is mostly present on the Zimbabwean front together with the national interests as well. In this section, I shall review the literature on the interests of the main actors in the LRP to evaluate to what extent the self-satisfying attitudes each group contributed to the failure of the LRP. First, I shall assess the role of the Zimbabwean government and Zimbabwean political figures. Then secondly, the pursuit of material-interests by the British government.

For Zimbabwe, the LRP was a just and long overdue cause. In its original goal, it was a matter of national interest. However, the goals of the cause were muddled by individuals' pursuit of material-interests. These material interests differed according to class. What began as a nationalistic movement ended up being used as a tool of political coercion by the elites. This contributed to the failure of the LRP for the reacquisition of land was not for all but for those seen to be of value to the leading political figures. When pursuit of material-interests is mentioned within the Zimbabwean context, corruption, politics and state ownership of land comes to mind. Largely, most scholars agree that these three factors contributed to the failure of the LRP in the long run. These factors

contributed to class divisions amongst Zimbabweans and the government earning an unsavoury reputation on the global platform.

The roots for the reallocation of land were laid down at the Lancaster House Conference in 1979 but implementation began in 1980 after the independence of Zimbabwe. At the conference, the British did not present the land issue themselves, but when the question was posed by the nationalistic Zimbabwean leaders, they agreed with Zimbabwean delegation that the land inequalities had to be addressed. There seemed be cooperation between the governments in trying to find the best means possible in addressing the land question which would benefit both parties. However, the agreements reached still saw most of the indigenous land in Zimbabwe remaining under British ownership for two decades (Matondi 2012, 1).

With this, Madhuku (2004, 128) questions why the delegation that went to Lancaster agreed to the conditions stipulated by the British government regarding the redistribution of land since the agreement clearly favoured British interests over Zimbabwe's interests. It was clear that the British government wanted to maintain its economic and imperialistic interests in Zimbabwe by handing over political power whilst withholding a large portion of the economic power which came from the agricultural sector in Zimbabwe. Madhuku's main point of investigation is to determine whether a line can be drawn between the law and the interests of the law makers which in this case the LRP being the law. He states that, "law merely reflects, or is a mere record of, the political wishes of its authors. It cannot stand in the way of political choices because, according to this view, ruling politicians simply transform their choices into law" and that "politicians do not have an unlimited power to make law: they may only decree as law, those rules which are in line with certain fundamental principles of justice and fairness". However, he debunks both arguments by saying that laws are not always self-serving for politicians nor are laws always fair and just. The two arguments reflect the differences between those with the power to pass laws desiring to purse their interest through legislation versus the recipients of the law who expect "justice and fairness" to be instilled through law thus showing the divide between elite and class interests (Madhuku 2004, 124). I agree with the first argument on law cannot be used to realise material-interests to a lesser extent due to the reason that when the LRP was agreed upon and constitutionalised, it reflected the interests of the British. In this regard it was serving the more powerful political entity, which also validates to the second argument that laws can be unfair to those who will be impacted by them the most which in this case was Zimbabwe.

However, the Zimbabwean delegation claimed that it was coerced into accepting the Lancaster House agreement. Although it has been suggested by other scholars that the delegation could have opted for more economically favourable terms by being persistent and negotiating further. Moyo and Skalness (1990, 213) state that the ability to influence decisions depends on the bargaining power of parties involved. Zimbabwe was the lesser power with not much to offer and in need of financial assistance to implement land redistribution. Hence due to Britain's advantageous position, the British set their preferred terms.

Madhuku does not agree with the argument on the lack of bargaining power by asserting that the delegation that was at the Lancaster House negotiations was more concerned with attaining political freedom that they overlooked the importance of the need to strategically restructure the economic power dynamics in the country. The main political leaders who were present at Lancaster were Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo, both leaders of their own political parties, Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) and Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) (Madhuku 2004,129). Madhuku (2004,129) contends that they wanted to attain some form of political elitism to drive their own political ambitions. The land question should have been the starting point of the negotiations and failure to reach a reasonable agreement should have marked the end of any negotiations with the British government. Once again, from my observation, the issue of power dynamics is observed, however now between the Zimbabwean nationalist leaders and the citizens of Zimbabwe. This is due to the reason that the delegation accepted terms that would benefit their political ambitions, at the expense of the land question which was the main concern for Zimbabweans took secondary priority (Moyo and Chambati 2013, 2). Madhuku (2004,129) gives reference to Astrow who called the Lancaster delegation a "petit bourgeoisie". Moore (1988, 99) refers to them as a "state class". He explains that they saw before them an opportunity to model a newly independent country according to their "class's ideology" Moore (1988, 101).

Masilela and Rankin (1998, 11-12) add to the claim by stating that "land reform was intended to be used as a political tool to achieve political and sometimes private goals". They argue that the LRP, for ZANU, was not about morals, giving land to the landless or majority rule but it was a mechanism to cement its own political power within the country. As a result, it was detached from the realities of the internal issues as well as external issues that could arise from a poorly planned LRP. Furthermore, they reason that LRP was negotiated by academics and political elites who defined it according to their own understanding without considering that the land question carried a different meaning to the peasants and the fighters of the liberation struggle. Hence the reallocation of land was not equal, and it only served to protect the interests of the elites (Masilela and Rankin 1998, 19). The notion or rationality within institutions comes into the puzzle. It is argued that rational actors may find themselves in a dilemma of morals whereby they recognize the need for more concise rules in an institution. Nevertheless, this is affected by the lack of coordination and cooperation between members due to game activities of personal utility maximization (Ostrom 1998, 6).

Notably, it is considered the norm for humans to gravitate towards things that would benefit them on a short term even when those goals can be achieved within the constraints and rules of an institution (Ostrom 1998, 2). The Zimbabwean government was aware of the financial and legal limitations of the LRP (Palmer 1990, 173). The main one was that Britain would only provide funds if land was surrendered willingly and would withhold funds if land was taken forcefully. Despite that, they went ahead to sign knowing they could use this agreement as an excuse if they fail to redistribute land equally. They would simply put the blame on Britain. Another important factor that should be taken note of is that they were not forced to sign, it was a voluntary decision (Masilela and Rankin 1998, 18).

Hence it is observed that political agendas of the elite class obscured the goals for equal distribution of land. Adding to this frame of thought, the actions of President Mugabe can be used as an example. For instance, President Mugabe favoured his own region of origin which was the northeastern part of Zimbabwe where they showed a great deal of political support for him. A lot of incentives were channelled to that region in contrast with the Southlands and the Midlands which did not support his political leadership. As punishment for this lack of support, for six years, the South and the Midlands were excluded from the benefits of the resettlement programme. The exclusion of this region, which constitutes one third of the country, from the resettlement programme was a stumbling block to achieving effective agrarian reforms for social and economic growth (Masilela and Rankin 1998, 20).

On the other hand, Joshua Nkomo, was also trying his best to manoeuvre diplomatically to get land from the British commercial farmers and making statements to wind up the citizens to gain their support. Joshua Nkomo was the development minister and leader of the opposition party Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU). He was part of the delegation that went to Britain for the Lancaster House Conference. His approach was that of negotiating with the British farmers to release land but at the same time he expressed that if the farmers were not willing to negotiate, other ways would be employed to take back land. The need for resettlement was dire for there were 400,000 people displaced mainly because of the war and drought. The CFU challenged Joshua concerning his statement, but he argued that the LRP was destabilizing the economy of Zimbabwe. He called it immoral and unjust (Palmer 1990, 175-176). Both leaders used the LRP and the issues surrounding to gain political mileage. They did not move with one mind and one voice, but each to secure his own interests. I agree that the LRP was affected by certain behaviours and procedures that took place within the institution. These include land grabbing by politicians, the top-down approach to decision making, lack of a defined structure to achieve long term goals, politically motivated decisions and the withholding of property rights to Zimbabweans. Such issues sped up the failure of the LRP.

According to Streater (2018, 157) "land hunger, technocrats, neo-liberals, white farmers, and constitutional constraints all stood as barriers to successful Land Reform". The procedures of the LRP were drawn up by technocrats who were more concerned with the functionality of the LRP while neglecting the civilian land issues which needed to be addressed. With independence granted, the main desire for the locals and the war veterans was to acquire land that had been unjustly taken from them, however the neo-liberal technocrats placed development and profits on as the main agenda. This lack of cohesion between the elite's goals and the majority's goals contributed to the failure of the programme.

Matondi (2012,4) made an inquiry into the centralisation of decision making in the LRP framework. The main argument was that decisions were made "with little direct local input or perspective". This resulted in the creation of policies which perpetuated more suffering than prosperity for the locals while benefiting the technocrats and politicians. As well, all the decisions regarding the FTLRP were centralized amongst the politicians and technocrats. They did not put into consideration the views of the citizens of Zimbabwe concerning the issue. Instead, it created an image of us versus them therefore there was no other alternative or going back on the decision to implement the

FTLRP. They demanded support for policies from the citizens. Local officials were to implement them on a local level without question (Matondi 2012, 4).

Land grabbing started from within the institution with the policy enforcers sourcing land for themselves through corruption, the war veterans took by force what was left for they lacked the advantage of the discreet means the politicians possessed. Redistribution of land became very corrupt. It was no longer society centred for parliament members used corrupt means to acquire farms for their own gain (Palmer 1990, 174). Corruption was rampant amongst the political elites who acquired funds through devious ways to buy multiple farms for themselves (Masilela and Rankin 1998, 19).

Alexander (1994, 324) investigated the limitations of what he coined "negotiated independence". She also brings into question the impact of politics and greed on the success of the LRP. In her investigation she brough to light the issue of irrational behaviour within institutions. The Land Acquisition Act (LAA) of 1992, which was an amendment of the LAA of 1985, gave way to the acquisition of land by ZANU PF elites through corrupt means. They used state policy to fulfil their own agendas. Alexander (1994,344) saw this as problem that would create a divide between the landless civilians and the upper-class politicians. I agree that the use of state policy to drive personal agendas obscured the goals of the LRP for this also added onto the tensions which led to the land invasions.

The increase in corrupt land acquisitions and illegal land grabbing was a result of a weak LRP structure. It is argued that although ZANU often attributed the failure of the LRP to the conditions of the WBWS, the actual reason behind the failure is that the government itself had not laid down the necessary foundations to facilitate a successful reallocation of land. There was need for a policy to be drafted and put into action by the party to address the land issue whilst at the same time acknowledging issues such as regionalism, racial issues, and class structures (Masilela and Rankin 1998, 11-12). Masilela and Rankin (1998, 14) argue there was no clear vision of political action beyond attaining independence apart from the nationalization of farms. They argue that ZANU allowed the British to continue to enjoy property rights for 10 years without considering the impact it would have on social classes. The middle class was able to acquire some property rights were as the poor were sidelined throughout this process which contributed to the frustrations that led to the violent land occupations of FTLRP.

On the other hand, Thomas (2003, 691) contests the claim that the LRP was a self-centred pursuit meant to benefit a small group of elites at the detriment of the majority. He states that material-interests of Zimbabwean politicians alone did not lead to the failure of the LRP but that the LRP was "a legacy of colonialism, and of emergent neo-colonial relations". This perpetuation of imperialistic ambitions hampered the ability of the LRP to bring about economic development.

Richardson asked the question why there was a large difference in land ownership when it came to hectarage and fertility of the land between large scale commercial farmers and small-scale farmers. He found that the reasons for these problems was the issue of property rights. The state pursued material -interests by limiting private ownership of

land. Due to the denial of legally documented ownership of land to relocated families, conflicts arose amongst the people. Although land was redistributed, the quality of life in communal areas did not improve as much as it would have had the government headed more programmes to give assistance to the new small-scale farmers. It was imperative to do so for these new farmers did not have the financial capital and knowhow to operate as commercial farmers. The spirit behind the fight of independence, which was to take back land, was not realised for the peasants merely became custodians of the land and not owners of the land which they previously owned before colonisation (Richardson 2006, 75-76).

On the British end, the pursuit of national material-interests is seen in the imposing of neo-liberalism on Zimbabwe by the British, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB). Mushimbo conducted an investigation to uncover whether the failure of the LRP was a result of the British' pursuit of self-will. Mushimbo (2005,1) argues that the British government insisted on the adoption of policies that protected the British interests in Zimbabwe at the expense of Zimbabwe's sovereignty. For instance, Britain exported neo-liberalism to Zimbabwe, and this hindered the progression of the LRP.

At the beginning, after independence the Zimbabwean government put in place nationalistic policies which were meant to boost the morale, cultural identity as well as foster distribution of the state's resources equally to all people. Such policies included the Growth With Equity (GWE) of 1981 and the National Development Plans (NDP) of 1983 to 1989. These policies were highly nationalistic and sought to bring about social and economic development through socialism. In this era, the government regulated the economy. However, the protectionist socialist outlook of the Zimbabwean government did not align with the neo-liberal movement that had started in Britain. Therefore, there was need to export neo-liberalism to Zimbabwe for the economy to be receptive to British interests. In the 1980's, neo-liberalism was introduced in Britain to stabilise the British economy. Since Zimbabwe and Britain were connected through the LRP, the economic model of neo-liberalisation had to be adopted by the Zimbabwean government as well if Britain was to retain some influence in the former colony. Therefore, in 1991, neo-liberalism was introduced in Zimbabwe through the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP). The idea of a liberalized economy which is controlled by the market forces was supported by Margaret Thatcher who at the time was the Prime Minister of Britain when the LRP came into play (Mushimbo 2005, 83).

The aim of the ESAP was to, "attract foreign investment through trade liberalization, privatization, and currency devaluation; create employment; deregulate working conditions; and reduce government expenditure by reducing spending on all social services" (Mushimbo 2005, 91). Mushimbo (2005, 91) says that the ESAP was "incompatible" with the land question. I agree with his claim because the policy did not address land issues and neither did it put into consideration the wellbeing of the poorest in Zimbabwe. It was a policy that was to be of benefit to the politicians and technocrats who resided at the top of the production chain. The ESAP was not too terrible of a policy, however it was a policy that was not suitable for a newly independent nation which was still trying to provide the basic needs for its population. Mushimbo solidifies his argument by outlining that the negative effects of the ESAP started to manifest in 1992, only one

year after its adoption. There was a great loss of jobs, inflation and food shortages made worse by the lack of rainfall which affected the harvests (Mushimbo 2005, 91). One of the goals of the LRP was hunger and poverty alleviation especially in the rural areas. However, the ESAP worsened the overall quality of life. Thomas (2003, 710) agrees with Mushimbo mentioning the point that the ESAP could not have been of any help to the Zimbabwean situation. Land redistribution was the right path to follow. He points to the ESAP as the origin of the unravelling failure of the LRP. Machemedze (n.d., 1-2) also alludes to neo-liberalism as a stumbling block to Zimbabwe's economic success and a diversion from the goals of the LRP. He suggests that it was more suitable for Zimbabwe to adopt "people centred developmental alternatives" as opposed to neo-liberal reforms which benefited a small elite minority.

Palmer (1990,163 -164) provides a historical account of the LRP and in it, he reveals another protectionist element in the British' conduct. This was that they were not forthcoming with funds and were not eager to renegotiate the terms of the WBWS clause which they had agreed to review after a decade. The year 1990 marked 10 years since the LRP was introduced at the Lancaster House and this marked a point for Zimbabwe to loosen itself from the rules of the agreement. However, not long after, it became apparent that the British government was not willing to comply to a new constitution of land acquisition. This argument can be viewed through the lenses of material-interest as well as path dependence, which shall be discussed in the following section.

The reluctance of the British to fund the LRP was an exercise of material-interest. In my understanding it seems that the pursuit of material-interests overrides morality. Thomas (2003, 697) outlines that in 1979, British government had agreed to cater for half of the budget allocated for the redistribution of farms as well as compensate the farmers who sold their land. However, in the future, the British government did not fulfil these pledges. In his investigation of the LRP, his argument is that the LRP is "a legacy of colonialism, and of emergent neo-colonial relations between Zimbabwe and a coalition of rich countries and the international institutions that they dominate". He further states that the failure of the LRP could have been avoided had the British remained true to its moral obligation to fund the LRP (Thomas 2003, 692). He says that this was "morally correct" considering the role Britain had played in the loss of land by the indigenous people (Thomas 2003, 710). From Mugabe's point of view, Britain was cunningly trying to avoid the moral obligation it owed to Zimbabwe by refusing to be held accountable for the historical events that led to the liberation wars and as well as the constitution agreed upon in 1979. The need to protect its national identity superseded adhering to the Lancaster agreement. The result of this was that the government took matters into its own hands through the FTLRP (Cliffe et al. 2011, 912).

The refusal to adhere to its promise is also seen by Thomas as an extension of colonial interests or national interests. This would have ushered Zimbabwe into a neo-colonial era whereby the interest of the British were not being projected directly through direct colonial governance but through a local government bound by old agreements (Thomas 2003, 710). This notion can be validated by considering that the ESAP was insisted upon as a way to divert the Zimbabwean government's focus from the issue of funding to implementing economic reforms. It was a diversion form the land question.

Furthermore, the refusal to aid the LRP is understood to be a defensive mechanism by Britain against its colonial history. Chigora (2006, 67) argues that Britain might had never intended to fund the LRP knowing that by doing so the rest of its former colonies would also claim reparations for colonisation. He states that, "colonial injustice will be corrected by giving land not only to Zimbabweans whose land was alienated for 110 years, but also to the rest of countries in Africa and the Third World who went through the gruelling colonial process". This would have affected the economy of Britain as billions would be largely spent on paying reparations to former colonies. There was the danger that former colonies such as Australia, Namibia, New Zealand, and Kenya were threatening to demand reparations as well (Chigora 2006,68-69). Britain's reluctance was due to the reason that, "her commitment to fund land reform in Zimbabwe will spark a series of demands from former colonies, thus leading to loss of support both at home and externally from other allies who have basically the same obligation as Britain in their former colonies". On the contrary, Britain was supposed to honour the Lancaster agreement as much as Zimbabwe did even with more zeal given its role in creating the land issues Zimbabwe was trying to rectify (Chigora 2006, 67).

To say that the British government wanted to embark on a new era of neo colonialism can also be understood through Streater's investigation whose main question was to uncover how the "British-imposed limits on Zimbabwe state sovereignty and autonomy; the land hungry exercising their human rights to self-determination and autonomy through their state; the impact of neo-colonialism by Britain and the West has had on Zimbabwe's maturation as a state". He also coins the term "neo-colonialism" with reference to the British conduct (Streater 2018, 119). One common conception was that the Zimbabwean government broke the law by initiating the FTLRP, but Streater heavily argues against that by providing evidence that Britain had broken the international laws which held former imperialist powers to a moral duty towards their former colonies. The example set by the British set the tone for how Zimbabwe was to react (Streater 2018, 124).

The way the Zimbabwean government as well as the elites in the society handled independence can be attributed to the lack of decorum shown by the British government. Streater's arguments support this claim by showing how this shaped the post-colonial institutions in Zimbabwe as the British government itself neither had respect for the law nor the agreement made between the two. The British government's conduct of the LRP was criticised on the global stage by the U.N. General Assembly. The British had not acted according to the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (GICCP Resolution)[18]. This is due to the conditions set by the British at Lancaster House (Streater 2018,145).

The willing buyer willing seller (WBWS) agreement was an extension of British

[18] See United Nations. (1960, December 14). *Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples*. OHCHR. https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/declaration-granting-independence-colonial-countries-and-peoples The declaration was passed by the United Nations so as to ensure freedom of all former colonies by making sure the people are not exploited nor excluded from their rights to independence by former colonial countries.

material-interest, it was neo-colonial in nature. The WBWS clause of the LRP was presented by the British as a conditional factor for their participation in land redistribution. They demanded that they only would only assist financially if the British farmers were to sell their land willingly to the Zimbabwean government (Palmer 1990,166). This meant that the British farmers had the power to stall land redistribution if they were not willing to sell. It undermined the right of the Zimbabwean government to fully govern the country as an independent nation and make decisions based on what was best for the nation outside the interests of the former colonial power. On the contrary, the GICCP Resolution valued self-governance of former colonies. A former colonial power was obligated to,

"in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories or all other territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, without any distinction as to race, creed or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom….to bring about decolonization with the consent of the colonial powers and without prejudice to each state's sovereignty." (Streater 2018,146).

Therefore, according to these declarations, with the WBWS clause of the LRP, Britain gave Zimbabwe limited sovereignty and conditional independence. The GICCP Resolution called for "equal rights" for formerly colonised people, however the LRP perpetuated inequalities by protecting the rights of the British farmers at the expense of the needs of the Zimbabwean people (Streater 2018,146).

Furthermore, the Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (PSNR Resolution) was introduced on the 14th of December in 1962. According the PSNR Resolution,

"[t]he right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources must be exercised in the interest of their national development and of the well-being of the people of the State concerned." (Streater 2018,148).

The WBWS clause went against these principles for it denied Zimbabweans access to their land. On the other hand, it is also argued that the FTLRP violated these principles when land was acquired without any payments forwarded to the owners. This is defended by a section in the PSNR Resolution which states that,

"Nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning shall be based on grounds or reasons of public utility, security or the national interest which are recognized as overriding purely individual or private interests, both domestic and foreign. In such cases the owner shall be paid appropriate compensation, in accordance with the rules in force in the State taking such measures in the exercise of its sovereignty and in accordance with international law" (Streater 2018,148).

Another hinderance to Zimbabwe's authority within its borders is recognised by the international law's Indigenous and Tribal Peoples (ITP Convention) Convention

Number 169[19]. In article 14 of the ITP Convention, it is stated that indigenous people had the "rights of ownership and possession" over their customary lands as well as "rights . . . to the natural resources pertaining to their lands." Interestingly, the British government refused to acknowledge the ITP Convention knowing well that they were operating outside the rules of the ITP (Streater 2018,148). The British government did not forfeit colonial land rights to the Zimbabwean government. However, it supported the role of the state in taking ownership of the land knowing that the state's actions towards land policy were limited due to the Lancaster constitution (Streater 2018, 150).

The first illegal action of the LRP was not done by the FTLRP but was done by Britain for it violated the vow to renegotiate the terms after 10 years. The pact to provide financial assistance to the LRP was "a legally binding international agreement between Great Britain and Zimbabwe". Furthermore,

"Article 2(1)(a) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) defines a treaty as "an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation" (Streater 2018, 156).

The agreement was meant to be respected and honoured by both parties to ensure order and decorum in the distribution of land. The constitution was designed by the British to uphold private property rights with the WBWS clause while denying the Zimbabwean government the right to access and distribute land to the majority. Although these terms were not drafted on paper together with the other demands in the report from the Lancaster meeting, the agreement was still valid (Streater 2018, 157).

After the assessment the Zimbabwean government was still in need of assistance in financing the LRP, a decision was made by the British in 1996 to draft a new agreement inline the principle of the VCLT. However, just as with the original constitution, the WBWS clause remained on the negotiation table as conditions for Britain's financial input. The Zimbabwean people were not amused by this new agreement made by the government for the British had already failed once before to honour the pact provide finding for LRP. The New Labour government claimed that the promises of the Conservative party, which was the party which signed the Lancaster Agreement with the Zimbabwean delegation, were not their mandatory for them to fulfil (Streater 2018, 160). However, Streater (2018,160) points out that, "International agreements are made amongst sovereign states—not amongst political parties for an individual party's sake." Therefore, making the New Labour government's argument invalid.

This declaration as well as the letter written by Claire Short are therefore illegal manoeuvres which must see Britain reimbursing the Zimbabwean government for

[19] See International Labour Organisation. (n.d.). *C169 - Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169)*. Retrieved April 27, 2024, from https://webapps.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:55:0::NO::P55_TYPE,P55_LANG,P55_DOCUMENT,P55_NODE:REV,en,C169,/Document The aim was to ensure that indigenous people would be able to take full control of their resources, governance and institutions after gaining independence.

breaking an international treaty. Instead, the Zimbabwean government would be, "no longer bound by an obligation to compensate white farmers—as was the object and purpose of this agreement—and may, therefore, act consistently with supporting human dignity amongst its Black African populace" (Streater 2018, 161).

Zimbabwe was then accused of practicing "reverse racism" due to the initiative of taking land from white farmers and giving it back to the black Zimbabweans. This was done to draw the focus from Britain's own illegal decisions against the country by raising alarm in the international community labelling Zimbabwe as a racist country. These accusations of racism were ignorant of the colonial history of the country and of racially discriminatory policies introduced by the British for example the Land and Hut Tax. it was out of such policies that the spirit of revolution against colonial rule and land frustration was born (Streater 2018, 163). The British created racial divisions through discriminatory policies by making themselves landlords over the indigenous people's lands and reducing the indigenous people to peasants. They were stripped of their self-respect and self-worth for the possession of land was significant part of the people's culture (Streater 2018, 164).

As a result, the FTLRP was a reaction to the unwillingness of the British to give adequate assistance in the LRP which was beacon of hope for the people to have a renewal of their cultural identity and ancestral inheritances. However, the 1979 and 1996 agreement still protected private property ownership in favour of the British population. Consequently, since Britain was not forthcoming with "reparations", Zimbabwe introduced revolutionary measures that is the mandatory land acquisitions without payment. It is argued that this was unlawful for according to the law, damages should be given by the former colonial state not to be taken by force as in the case of the FTLRP (Streater 2018, 165).

The arguments on the pursuit of material-interests leans mostly towards the argument that the British government may have attempted to initiate a form of neo-colonialism through disregarding international laws and its moral obligation to the former colony. In the following section, I engage with the arguments on the reasons being institutional change with the reference to the path dependence theory.

2.4. Path Dependence Theory

In addition to the pursuit of material-interests as a contribution to the potential causes of the failure of the LRP, the question of path dependence comes into the discussion as well. The theory of path dependence is of importance in this investigation for it provides an in-depth understanding as to why and how institutional transformation takes place or does not take place. It also encompasses the political nature of institutions, and the role actors play in provoking change within institutions. I analyse the factors on how path dependence occurs as a phenomenon, why institutions adhere to certain decisions and finally, I look inspect the factors that can lead to institutional change. Path dependence assists in understanding the role of history in decision making and how that affects the observed outcomes. This research provides a historical account of the LRP and uses within-case comparison process tracing to understand the historical events.

One of the main perceptions of path dependence is that of the effect of history on institutional transformation or fixedness. Greener (2005, 62) asserts that the past and the present as well as the future cannot be separated when it comes to policy and institutions. Decisions made in the past have the power to limit decisions in the future. Beyer also refers to path dependence as a "legacy" (Beyer 2010,5). This means that past decisions result in inherited consequences. Thelen (1999, 388) adds that institutions are seen as "legacies of political struggles". This view is from the historical perspective.

Sydow et al. (2009, 690) assert that choices made by institutions or actors within institutions are "historically conditioned". However, they seek to debunk this claim to a certain extent by investigating how institutions can avoid being an extension of past experiences. They breakdown path dependence into three categories. The first one being a pivotal incident take place in the past, which then leads to change which persists over a period of time which finally results into the "lock-in" effect. This process is set of by a historical event that determines the course of the events which follow.

Sydow et al. (2009, 691) make two arguments that are relevant to my research question. One is that there is a degree if "inflexibility" in path dependence. They contend that the notion that once actors have locked-in, there is a great risk that comes with making different decisions. The second one is that locking-in can lead to "inefficiency" particularly if actors adhere to a path which will produce loss for them. A path is created by an occurrence of "reactive sequences" (Sydow et.al 2009, 697). This means that a significant occurrence creates a "critical juncture", which then sets a chain of positive reactions. The positive reactions may accumulate and continue for a prolonged time leading to the lock-in which can result in what Sydow refers to as "future inefficiency". By this the main point of argument is that a series of positive reactions can bear negative results in the future. This makes path dependence an unpredictable endeavour (Sydow et.al 2009, 696).

Another opinion of the path dependence theory is that changes occurring from time to time during the process and in a sequential fashion, can affect path dependence by causing alterations in one way or another (Page 2006,87). Such "shocks" can be observed in the history of the LRP. They range from constitutional amendments, unpredictable weather patterns, adoption of neo-liberalism, the initial land invasions and Clare Short's letter. Such ever changing factors can affect the result making it unrecognisable when compared to the initial goal, which in this regard is the LRP versus the FTLRP (Sage 2006, 91). This magnifies the role of history in institutional development and evolution. Pierson asserts that "history matters". He elaborates by stating that all the processes experienced at different levels can contribute to the results at the end (Pierson 1997,3).

Contrasting with Pierson who claims that "history matters" (Pierson 1997,3), Greener (2005,64) seeks to undermine the impact of history and begs the question how the future can be separated from the past. He debunks the idea that when history holds such power over the future, transformation can only be realised through "critical junctures". On the other hand, Torfing (2009,73) contends that the role played by history can "lock-in" certain decisions and policies. Individuals responsible for making decisions

may find themselves locked-in due to past events thereby history directing the institution's path in present and in future.

On the contrary, transformation can be birthed out of constant motion leading to a prearranged conclusion (David 2007, 2). David is also of the opinion that there is a moment in history where paths may diverge and after that there will be no possibility to go back to the original path. He calls these "branching processes". From one critical juncture where diversion takes place, change can occur, and this change can become permanent. Thus, institutions and policy must adhere to the newly formed paths (David 2007,9).

Page (2006, 88) identifies four factors which lie behind path dependence. He identifies these factors as "increasing returns, self-reinforcement, positive feedbacks, and lock-in". The notion of "increasing returns" implies that when a decision is made repeatedly, it will bear more favourable results along the way. The "increasing returns" then mean, that the more a decision is made, eventually a state of permanency is created which will help to validate those decisions through the formation of a structure or an institution. With this, the decisions become "self-reinforced" through the institutions and the structure they form. Page explains "positive feedbacks" as a flow of rewards which are presented when particular decisions are made. This encourages the parties involved to continue on a path due to the gradual rewards met in the process. As more parties or individuals implement certain decisions, and are experiencing the rewards, that leads to the "lock-in" whereby they fix their decisions into a specific direction. The more others adhere to this, the, more they become fixed onto the decisions (Page 2006, 88). Thus, path dependence involves continued motion along one path (Pierson 1997,4).

Positive feedback can solidify the existence of an institution (Torfing 2009, 71). This can be seen the constitutionalising of the FTLRP in 2000 whereby positive feedback legitimised the FTLRP whereas it bore the opposite effect on the LRP which became weakened. Torfing (2009, 71) refers to this phenomenon as "a gradual sedimentation of rules, norms and values". Institutions are consequently displays of the impact of such phenomena.

In relation to positive returns, Greener is of the view that for positive returns to be realised fully, there should be a balance between the "structural and cultural systems" existing in the same bracket as the institution. However, there may be some differences that may arise between the two. Such diversions are not always meant to bring destruction and chaos but may balance each other (Greener 2005, 67).

When a balance is created, historical continuousness is established. Once locked-in, individuals can perpetuate "a logic of protection". This involves maintaining favourable rewarding decisions by defending institutions against threats of change. However, this can contribute to change due to in-ward looking actors seeking to preserve the state of things leading to internal disputes within an institution. Externally, transformation can come through changes in the relationship between the society and political structures. The influence from the society can instigate structural change within institutions (Greener 2005, 67). To preserve the structure of an institution, actors can

focus on the self-reinforcing of an institution to make it appear as if reconsideration of certain decisions is not an option or is impossible (Pierson 1997,18).

On the other hand, Page then argues that "increasing returns" can also be met with decreasing returns which are the disadvantages to making certain choices (Page 2006, 90). With this possibility, I add that the existence of decreasing returns does not always deter the decision makers from their choices but can encourage them to take a more radical path by making more aggressive choices until the initial goal is achieved. This applies to the several constitutional amendments made by the Zimbabwean government to aid the LRP, however the redistribution of land ended with the revolutionary FTLRP.

Therefore, "collective action" is a "highly path dependent" process. This means that decisions made in the present by actors are dependent on the result of similar choices in the past (Torfing 2009,75). Constraints are created and embedded into the structure of an institution locking it onto a particular path. Where political institutions are concerned, "collective action" has a greater impact as compared to individual action. To encourage group action, the "increasing returns" are embellished with greater benefits such as power and authority (Pierson 1997,21).

The notion of "collective action" and "increasing returns" give the impression that institutions can become rigid. This rigidity is called structural inertia. Structural inertia is defined as the unwillingness of organisations to transform once they have locked in. The resistance to change can come about despite the evidence of negative feedback or responses. However, structural inertia is disputed due to the reason that institutions have the ability to adjust where they see fit. Therefore, transformation can take place causing divergence from the previously collectively chosen path (Hannan and Freeman 1984, 149-150).

Secondly, institutions can adjust according to their needs as a self-preservation mechanism against threatening forces. However, the challenge for institutions is to match the speed of their changes according to the external forces (Hannan and Freeman 1984, 151). Sydow et al. (2009, 697) is of the view that structural inertia can also become a mechanism for institutions to maintain the permanence of policies and opinions in the face of challenges. Consistency therefore is an integral part of institutions and the actors involved, especially in a volatile system thereby making structural inertia a deliberate choice. Beyer adds that this is due to unpredictability. The unpredictability of the effects of change can deter actors from diverging from a familiar path (Beyer 2010,5).

Beyer (2010, 4) asserts that actors are responsible for maintaining the structure of an institution. They do this by making "rational" choices. These choices are then replicated thereby creating stability. Path dependency and structural inertia can be byproducts of actors' pursuit of authority and influence. Hence, continuity of decisions is established and validated through law. President Mugabe had to legitimise the FTLRP to maintain his hold on power.

On the other hand, although structural inertia is an observed and well documented phenomenon in institutions, change is not always impossible nor undesired. Outside forces can have ample impact to shift the direction upon which an institution may have

been fixed on prior. This means that, policy formation and implementation by an institution can shift according to the current external challenges. Such outward factors can manifest as agents of institutional transformation within institutions. Thus, if an institution is highly sensitive to the external stimuli and if the stimuli occur more frequently, an institution and its policies may also go through frequent transformation especially if the institution's structure is compromised as was with the Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Redevelopment (MLRRD) (Torfing 2009, 71).

Sorensen (2014, 20) alludes to the point that institutional transformation can be realised in four ways. These are "layering", "drift", "displacement" and "conversion". "Layering" is explained by Sorensen as the introduction of newfound strategies to override the old ones. With this, old ways are not discarded but are covered with new ways or policies. "Drift" is defined as transformation that is influenced by external changes. The environment of an institution can trigger changes in the institution. Sorensen explains that "displacement" involves the substitution of ineffective policies for more effective ones. This is a typical approach to transformation in institutions. Then "conversion" is when the existing policies are maintained but are applied differently. With "conversion" change is minimal and subtle (Sorensen 2014, 21-22).

The role of history is inevitable as Torfing (2009, 71) elaborates that decisions made in the past can affect the decisions that are made in the present. Meaning, the performance or impact of a policy in the past can affect how that policy will be either maintained or modified to suit best the present needs. These decisions come after careful the consideration of other alternative opportunities, profits and complications that may arise. Thus "conversion", "layering", "drift" and "displacement" can be manifestations of these considerations.

Institutional change can set off a domino effect of transformation withing other entities connected to it. Thelen argues that although institutions are rooted in stability and consistency, the existence of clashes, delays and points of divergence can inspire the need for change (Thelen 1999, 396-397). Change can be brought about by the assumption of a high level of influence by a previously powerless party. Once a party or group of people gather enough momentum to cause a shift in the path, actors may be forced to adhere to these forces. Therefore, there is an interaction between "continuity and discontinuity" of decisions. Change can also take place through the introduction of complimentary decision or polices. These complimentary decisions are introduced when an actor does not have the authority to radically remove or change an already functioning institution. This is called "institutional layering" (Beyer 2010,8).

Institutions are dependent on the actors' replication of them. However, in a situation whereby the authority of the actors is not equal, change can be imposed. Thelen states that institutions are used to validate inequalities between parties. The less advantaged therefore do not succumb to the demands of the institutions but instead they devise ways to cope within the institution. As a result, they set their own agendas which may not be in line with the main institution thereby making institutions political in nature (Thelen 1999, 385). With this Thelen debunks the notion that institutions can be locked in. According to Thelen this is unlikely because political agendas and opinions are ever changing (Thelen 1999, 386).

Critical junctures have the potential to yield positive institutions or destructive institutions. The results of critical junctures are affected by the point in time which the critical junctures occur as well as how they affect the current political environment (Thelen 1999, 392). I believe path dependence is not only influenced by a single critical juncture. Critical junctures can occur while institutions have locked onto a path. For instance, when the government of Zimbabwe was focusing on socialism within the LRP framework, the introduction of the ESAP in 1991 which was a set of neo-liberal economic reforms altered the course of the LRP. This can be interpreted as a critical juncture.

Path dependence is a holistic theory to use in the pursuit to understand the LRP in Zimbabwe for it encompasses the aspect of history, the process and the results of a phenomenon. It also looks into the role of actors and politics in institutional change. I have reviewed the arguments surrounding the importance of history in decision making, why institutions adhere to certain policies despite the nature of the feedback received and to what extent change can occur in previously locked in institutions. In the following section, I explore the literature on the nature of post-colonial institutions so as to understand which characteristics of such institutions bring about success of failure in policy implementation after independence.

2.5. Post Colonial Institutions

The LRP was a post-colonial institution that was created by a former colony and its former colonial state. There are arguments that observe institutions created in post-colonial countries as entities which have unique characteristics that stem from years of colonial rule and oppression. These characteristics were also observed in the case of the LRP and how it was conducted. So, to understand how institutions in post-colonial states operate and behave, it is necessary to have a discussion around them with differing opinions to decipher and understand them. The LRP, MLRRD, and NDPs are some of the post-colonial institutions erected after independence to drive forward the land question in Zimbabwe. The creation of these post-colonial political structures was influenced by the political structures that existed before independence. Post-colonial independent governments will almost naturally have certain prejudices towards the actors of the colonial governments, and this affects their relationship in the post-colonial era (Spencer 1997,2).

The type of governance adopted by post-colonial states is typically a form of radical nationalism. By this the state tries to ensure that it legitimises its power and protect its power through policies and institutions, the MLRRD, that work towards fulfilling the agenda of nationalism (Ahmad 1980, 352). History plays a part in the shaping of political structures and policies. The idea of nationalisation is highly politicised and legitimised by strategic ideologies. Therefore, political elites win the support of the masses by emphasising that they are working to achieve national security which they say is in the best interest of the people. National security is the ultimate agenda of a post-colonial state and its institutions. Development policies are structured in such a way that they can push further the agenda of national security (Ikome 2007,20).

The behaviour of post-colonial states of establishing national security as a main agenda can be regarded as a reaction to colonialism in that the state recognises that for a long time it did not have control over its resources and now it functions to make sure that all threats to nationalisation are not left unchecked. These threats to national security may be former colonial authorities, as well as human agents who seek to protect the interests of the former colonial powers. Developmental policies, such as the NDP, become nationalistic channels that legitimize the rules that ensure national security. The military is used to destroy all threats, in particular internal threats, to national security. Institutions function to determine both internal and external threats to national security (Ikome 2007,21). The state then pairs the use of the military together with creation of institutions to make sure that it does not lose hold of the power that it fought to acquire. The institutions put in place are there to ensure that the agreement made at independence is honoured and completed. Reluctance by a former colonial power to honour an agreement is seen as a threat to the freedom of the post-colonial state in turn triggering the move towards radical nationalisation (Ahmad 1980,354). This can be seen in the tensions that rose between the Zimbabwean and British governments after the agreed 10-year LRP had expired, whereby the former was pushing for reforms as previously agreed at Lancaster House, and the latter wanted continuation of the expired agreement.

An element of criminality in the state may start to brew in a bid to push and protect the agendas of individuals. This has been understood to be a reaction to colonial independence from political and economic colonial power previously imposed on a state for a long time such that after independence is acquired, the possession of power by the state can give rise to selfish agendas that do not necessarily benefit the state is a whole. In simpler terms, in the colonial state, there were no opportunities to exert and express power to acquire things but after independence the acquisition of power opened pathways to fulfil the desire for influence and wealth by individuals in certain state offices or institutions (Alatas 1997, 288). By the mid 90's, land grabbing by Zimbabwe's political elites was spreading. Those in power took land for themselves simply because they could and would not be held accountable for it. However, it can also be argued that human agency does not dominate the function or behaviour of an institution but instead the structure within the institution is what determines the functional output of an institution. The argument implies that, human agency cannot overpower the structure or the political hierarchy within political institutions (Peters 2019,9).

When development policies are put in place, as well as the guidelines they are supposed to follow, an institution is needed as a channel for those goals to be realised within the rules of the institution which will in turn guide the actions of the individuals meaning that material-interests may not supersede the power the institution holds over the human agents (Koelble 1995, 233). During Mugabe's presidential campaign, land was used as an incentive to gain votes. His supporters were promised farms and those who did not support him were deprived of it. In this light, human agency is believed to be of great influence within institutions because an institution can mirror their own individual goals. Therefore, decisions can be made within the institution by individuals to achieve their own goals (Peters 2019,17).

Post colonial states have the tendency to be kleptocratic due to the agenda of utility maximisation by human agents. Corruption grows to feed into personal rewards and the

corrupt habits evolve to protect the assets acquired through kleptocratic means. The kleptocratic means are aided by institutions put in place by the post-colonial state because through these institutions, political elites well impose and pursue their interests (Alatas 1997, 300). As a result, inefficient post-colonial institutions bring about an underdeveloped independent state, lacking economic growth, also failing to accumulate revenue (Ahmad 1980,350). Kleptocracy leads to slowed economic growth, makes policies for development less efficient, concentrates wealth in a small group of people and lowers the general revenue of the state. Revenue deficit is a typical sign of kleptocracy in post-colonial states (Alatas 1997,302).

In post-colonial states, inequality between the power of the state and the power of the society has been observed. The power of the society is seen by the state as a danger to its legitimacy. Therefore, the state becomes an organ that works to secure in the interests of state officials through institutions with state officials using the rules of those institutions to secure their interests (Alatas 1997, 287). For the society, the establishment of an independent post-colonial government means political representation. In this respect, they believe that the government is made-up of agents who are there to cater to their interests. However, in post-colonial institutions it has been observed that there exists a push and pull dynamic between the post-colonial state and the people in terms of political interests. This push and pull also exists between the newly independent state and the former colonial power. Between all three entities, there is no sense of harmony. When it comes to interests each group wants to protect its own interests. With that, the institutions created are also made-up of individuals who are concerned with utility maximisation at the expense of the overall population. It can also be argued that the sudden position of power by a premature post-colonial government is detrimental to the state (Spencer 1997,13). Post-colonial states suddenly find themselves with the power to command the military and they use military power to extinguish every threat to national security hence it is not uncommon to see post-colonial states frequently use the military as an extension of the role played by institutions to legitimize nationalistic ideologies (Ikome,21).

History has a role in the evolution of political institutions. As political institutions evolve, they evolve to fit into the current social, economic and cultural conditions they are created to govern (Peters 2019,12). The post-colonial state provides a template of how a modern state is created. Mainly, this is seen by how the state and its institutions operate to protect the interests of the political elites at the expense of the working class in the peasants. However, the state does try to cater to the interests of the people and the groups that represent them, however, they cannot meet all the demands presented to them. As a result, there is polarisation in the society and within the state itself (Alatas 1997,290).

2.6. Conclusion

The arguments given in this chapter all work to provide an explanation on how the failure of the LRP came about. The first one on the pursuit of material-interests points to the lack of shared vision between Britain and Zimbabwe. Then path dependence theory suggests that change and transformation was inevitable and finally, the post-colonial argument states the cause to be corruption. The following chapter gives a historical

account of the LRP from the point of agreement to the end of the first ten years of the policy being in practice.

3. LRP FIRST DECADE (1980-1989)

3.1. Introduction

This chapter provides a chronological historical presentation of the events that took place after the Lancaster House agreement up until 1989. The period marks the first decade of the redistribution programme. The various policies introduced in this era are given as well as their contribution to the land reform initiative.

3.2. Lancaster House Conference and Actors

There were three main groups of actors involved at the Lancaster House assembly of December 1979. The first, was a pair of two African Nationalist parties; Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) led by Dr Joshua Nkomo and Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) led by Robert Mugabe. The second was the Salisbury government led by Ian Smith and Bishop Muzorerwa, who had won the 1979 elections making him the first indigenous Prime minister of Zimbabwe. Lastly, was the British government represented by Lord Carrington (Gregory 1980, 11-12).

In the opening address by Lord Carrington at Lancaster House, Lord Carrington conveyed to the assembly a list of concerns to be addressed in the form of questions the from the British government. Noticeably, the last question he posed pertained to the land that is what will happen to the land (Lancaster House Conference 1979, 12). As observed in the original document, no mention of land reallocation was mentioned. However, it was stated that Zimbabwe was to remain under the rule of the Queen but will be given its independence as it had requested. Furthermore, the government had the authority to enforce their goal of equity and majority rule as well as implement and oversee the necessary policies for it (Lancaster House Conference 1979, 298).

At Lancaster House, there were complaints that Lord Carrington was reluctant to have productive discussions (Gregory 1980, 15). For the Zimbabwean political elites, the leaders of ZANU PF and ZAPU, the LRP was a mechanism needed to correct the wrongs of colonial rule and the inequalities it perpetuated. Hence, the LRP was a representation of true independence and an end to inequalities. These nationalist parties saw socialism as the main solution for the transformation of the country (Sachikonye 2003, 228). The opinions about land were very polarized to a point that the ZANU PF leader Robert Mugabe indicated that he would walk out if a favourable agreement was not made. Ian Smith, who was part of the Salisbury government, sought to protect the interests of the British farmers therefore he maintained a capitalistic stance of the willing buyer willing seller (WBWS). The divide was resolved when the American and British governments at length pledged to provide funds for the WBWS initiative (Todd 2007, 20).

The nationalist parties stressed the need for a land reform because of the land inequality gap. Only 16.4 million hectares of less fertile land was shared out amongst 700,000 Zimbabwean communal farmers, whereas 15.5 million hectares of the most fertile land was owned by only 6,000 British farmers (Todd 2007, 21). At the conference,

the American and British governments agreed to assist the Zimbabwean government in buying land to help shrink the land inequality gap. This is when it was indicated that assistance will be provided as long as land was bought from willing sellers by willing buyers, that is the WBWS clause. However, this agreement limited the execution of a full scale nationalistic LRP as desired by the Zimbabwean government (Sachikonye 2003, 229).

Margaret Thatcher's government made a provision of 40 million pounds towards the LRP under the Land Resettlement Grant. This money was provided on the grounds that the Zimbabwean government would also put forward the equivalent of 40 million pounds. However, due to Zimbabwe's inability to continue funding the LRP, the grant was discontinued in 1996 (Todd 2007, 21). It was evident that the clauses agreed upon at Lancaster still favoured British colonial interests over the nationalist interests of ZANU and ZAPU. As a way to counter the impact of these constitutional restrictions, when land reform commenced, many ministries were erected to help drive the majority rule and LRP agenda (Sylvester 1985, 37). Technocrats devised policies that would help aid an organised pattern or structure for development in the country (Sachikonye 2003, 228). However, most of the ministries lacked experience and relied on pre-independence structures in their functions. The expansion of the number of institutions also demanded a large number of civil workers to be engaged in them. Over 30,000 people were recruited further stretching the government's LRP budget with salary allocations (Sylvester 1985, 37).

3.3. The Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development (ZIMCORD)

Nevertheless, an agreement had been reached so reacquisition of land commenced soon after April 1980 when Zimbabwe officially became independent and inaugurated its first Prime Minister, Robert Mugabe, as an independent country. For the land purchases to begin, there was need for financial assistance. The Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development (ZIMCORD) was in initiated by the Zimbabwean government as the first step towards land purchasing and reallocation. ZIMCORD was held to provide a platform for interacting with potential donors willing to assist in funding the LRP specifically the WBWS initiative as the newly independent government needed financial assistance. The conference was held in March of 1981 in the capital Harare from the 23th to the 27th (Sibanda and Makwata 2017, 2).

At ZIMCORD, Robert Mugabe alluded to the land question when he addressed the assembly saying,

"The task before my Government in the post-war era of independence and peace is ... to lay the foundation on the basis of which our people can regain their history and, as active participants, make their lives go forward in prosperity and happiness. The task facing us in Government is in-deed challenging and daunting. It involves rehabilitating our economy, particularly.in the rural areas, resettling thousands of our people, as well as making sure that vital social services are restored or introduced for their benefit" (Republic of Zimbabwe TNDP 1982, 1).

At the forum, Sydney Sekeramayi the Minister of the MLRRD also spoke about the importance of the LRP and its role in restoring the national identity of the people of Zimbabwe. He stressed the point that if the government of Zimbabwe were to fail to provide land to the people, it would destroy the identity of the nation and of the people for Zimbabweans are a people who place high value on land. He appealed to the potential donors saying,

"A failure on the part of government to meet these expectations could well degenerate into a cancer relentlessly eating away the promising foundation upon which all of us are trying to build a genuinely democratic, non-racial and egalitarian society in Zimbabwe" (Alexander 1994, 331).

The ZIMCORD was a success for the government of Zimbabwe was able to receive assistance from international organizations. The main organization to assist Zimbabwe in its development plans was the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). A total of Z$286,666 million was promised to aid development initiatives. Donors together with international organisations managed to raise US$2.3 billion towards transport, agriculture, and mining sectors. Less than half the amount was given as loans, and by the end of the year in 1984, the government had received 57% of the donations (UN 1986, 4).

3.4. The Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Redevelopment

Between 1980 and 1983, the cost of land was favourable; a hectare cost ZW$15.76. The cheap cost of land allowed the Zimbabwean government to acquire over 900,000 hectares of farms (Binswanger-Mkhize et al. 2009, 145). Two months after the Lancaster Agreement, Zimbabwe became a member of the IMF in 1980 on the 29th of September so as to qualify the country for financial assistance if needed for the LRP (IMF Press Centre 1998).

In the early stages of the implementation of the LRP, two commissions were carried out investigations on how to effectively implement agrarian transformation. The first was the Riddell commission of 1981 which reported that it would be more progressive if a fixed system was created to maintain a situation whereby both farmers as well as workers fixed to a certain piece of land meaning that there would be no migration of labour between farms. The Commission also discovered that it was important for lands to be separated, that is land for grazing and land for agriculture would not be put in the same area. The Chavhunduka Commission of 1982 discovered that there were poor management practises in the communal lands, and this was affecting agricultural production. One of those issues was that workers were moving between farms irregularly seeking work. The Commission also suggested a separation of lands for grazing and agriculture and for communal living. However, due to politically motives, these commissions were not incorporated in the MLRRD decision making process (Alexander 1994, 332).

Nevertheless, the communal lands development plan introduced by the Ministry of Land in June of 1985 did not put into consideration the Riddell and Chavhunduka commissions, but instead depended on the information from investigations made in the

1970s. This plan did not favour the idea of dividing land for different uses. The Ministry of Lands also did not want to get rid of the system of leasing land. In this regard it is seen that the redistribution of land was politicised in that the ministry of lands did not want to establish a system of permanency when came to land ownership hence why it disregarded the commissions of 1981 and 1982. This was done to ensure that the state had sole ownership and control over all land (Alexander 1994, 332).

At the time, in 1981, the country's inflation rate of average consumer prices was at 5.6% (IMF World Economic Outlook 2022). The recipients of the redistribution levels of income and productivity rose during this period. In the early 1980s, the resettlement programme was a success because resettled households had a higher level of income compared to those who were not resettled. They had increased levels of production, ownership of livestock and farming equipment was higher than those who did not receive land (Binswanger-Mkhize et al. 2009, 143 -144).

Nonetheless, the funds the government possessed could not match the supply of land being offered for sale. The lack of funds was the direct effect of the failure of the American together with the British governments to provide the support which they had pledged to give to the LRP. The Zimbabwean government stated that the MLRRD could not function effectively for it was overwhelmed financially due to the LRP (Bratton 1981, 456).

3.5. Growth With Equity 1981

The MLRRD placed emphasis on the need for a carefully structured implementation process of redistribution. This meant that there was need for an intentionally planned and structured socialist developmental plan for the economy to grow (Alexander 1994, 333-334). Culturally, the communal ownership of land was a traditional norm in the Zimbabwean society which is why there was a dire need to replace the Rhodesian capitalistic regime with socialist values. To achieve this, the government introduced GWE in 1981. The main aim of this policy was to eradicate social inequalities especially in the rural areas (Fisher 2010, 30).

In 1981, a reporter named George Negus from 60 Minutes Australia interviewed Mugabe soon after he became the first Prime Minister of Zimbabwe. Negus inquired on Mugabe's socialist goals in relation to programmes such as GWE. In the interview Prime Minister Mugabe confirmed and supported his socialist ideology saying,

"certainly we are driving towards that goal of socialism but you don't arrive at socialism in one day" (60 Minutes Australia 2017, 3:49)

GWE was geared towards social, economic, political, and investment inequalities in the country. Its focus was more on industrial inequalities than on land related inequalities. This initiative was seen as the first step in finalizing the country's independence (Sylvester 1985, 31-32). The WBWS land purchases were also carried out under the GWE since they were geared towards removing inequalities (Sibanda and Makwata 2017, 4).

GWE was a success for it was introduced in a period when the country was experiencing bountiful rains which resulted in an increase in agricultural trade which was on high demand. By 1982 and 1983, the country was swept by a drought which lasted two years. This was worsened by the effects the global recession had on the economy (UN 1986, 4). It is argued that the success of the GWE was accredited to the colonial governmental blueprint left by the British. Between 1980 and 1982, Zimbabwe experienced an increase of 10% in its GDP. On the other hand, the GWE was criticised for being over ambitious in its expectations of economic growth as a result of the 11% and 10% GDP increases of 1980 and 1981 respectively (Sibanda and Makwata 2017, 5-6).

3.6. The Three-Year Transitional Development Plan (TNDP) 1982-83/1983-84

GWE paved the way for the Three-Year Transitional Development Plan (TNDP) (Sibanda and Makwata 2017, 4). Both were not long-term plans for the government intended on setting short term targets that would be more sustainable for them to keep up with (Sylvester 1985, 30). The Three-Year Transitional Development Plan (TNDP) was introduced in 1982 to 1985 in an effort to maintain a steady pace of development initiated by GWE. The TNDP was to be conducted in two phases. The first one from 1982 to 1983, and the second from 1984 to 1985. In the TNDP document by the Government of Zimbabwe, Mugabe stated that the main objective was to create a structured and carefully designed socialist economy. He also placed emphasis on the role of the government in controlling and directing this development. Furthermore, the government would introduce different institutions and ministries in order to facilitate a planned socialist economy (Republic of Zimbabwe TNDP 1982,1).

The TNDP was not created to expel the British minority but to promote equality (Sibanda and Makwata 2017, 5). The TNDP comprised of short term transformational sustainable planned economy strategies. Under the TNDP, the government created a structure on how to achieve success in the education system, employment, wages, improve the contrary GDP, industrial productivity and foreign trade. The TNDP did not place land issues on the forefront of its agenda (Republic of Zimbabwe TNDP 1982, 2).

The main achievements of the TNDP were in the provision of social services (Sibanda and Makwata 2017, 7). In addition to social transformation successes, in 1984, the country's agricultural yield rose to 13%. The GDP also grew by 3% in 1985, and by 5% in 1986 (UN 1986, 5). However, despite achieving social transformation, the TNDP was not successful in assisting in development issues related to the LRP. Between 1980 and 1985, the GDP failed to grow past 5%. This was 3% lower than the desired figure. As a way to rectify the failures of the TNDP, the Five-Year National Development Plan was created to run from 1986 to 1990 (Sibanda and Makwata 2017, 7).

The failure of the TNDP was attributed to a lack in trained and qualified staff to help in the implementation of the programme. For this reason, the plan did not immediately take off to its full intended effect for a lot of time was spent on training and seeking assistance (UN 1986, 4). Due to the lack of qualified personnel and development policy implementation experience, the government invited UN volunteers to offer their expertise and assistance in different sector of the economy. Up to 19 professionals had

been received by the government by 1986, working in different department such as training and planning. As a result, all the development projects, including the five-year NDP received assistance from the Commonwealth Secretariat, Norway, USA, Switzerland, and Sweden (UN 1986, 9).

The global recession also impeded the success of the TNDP. In 1983, 20% of the MLRRD's budget was reduced. The limited finances as well as the recession stalled much of the progress of the TNDP. The Minister of Finance shed light on the budget issue saying,

"For the second year running, the allocations that have been made, fall far short of the levels required to meet our development target as originally envisaged in the Transitional National Development Plan; indeed, it has not been possible to admit any expansion, even where essentiality and economic justification have been established beyond question. These belt-tightening policies may be needed as emergency measures carried out over a period of years, however, they could aggravate unemployment, cut into the physical quality of life of those with the fewest resources, narrow the internal market, and increase the country's debt burden-outcomes which undercut national development" (Sylvester 1985, 37).

Yet, the initiative was not without criticism. According to the Zimbabwean government, it was important for resettled individuals to contribute to agricultural productivity on a national level. On the contrary, the Department of Rural Development (DERUDE) in 1983 argued that the emphasis on transforming civilians into full-time productive farmers limited innovation in the agricultural sector and also threatened the maintaining of cultural techniques of agricultural production. Most of these legislations introduced by the MLRRD were deducted from the methods that were used by the Ministry of Agriculture before independence (Alexander 1994, 334). The DERUDE argued that thorough land evaluations, which government was overlooking, were essential before land reallocations (Alexander 1994, 341).

The DERUDE contested against a socialist LRP arguing that introducing new systems would disrupt traditional governing systems that existed in the communal areas as well as the traditional farming practices. The DERUDE held the view that this was a politically motivated legislation to strip traditional custodians of certain areas such as chiefs and other traditional leaders of any substantial authority (Alexander 1994, 331-333).

3.7. First Five-Year National Development Plan 1986-1991

After the TNDP in 1985, the Five-Year National Development Plan (NDP) of 1986 ushered in further development plans for the country. The goal was to make use of a small amount of resources to bring about a maintainable path of development (UN 1986, 5). The First Five Year National Development Plan was drafted and put into action under the authority of the MLRRD, the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, and the Riddell Commission (Bratton 1981, 464).

The Governing Council of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) on 26 March 1986 indicated the targets of the Five-Year NDP as follows,

"to (a) create a national economy and economic expansion; (b) raise the standard of living of the entire population and, particular of the peasant population; (c) increase employment opportunities and manpower development; (d) maintain a correct balance between the environment and development; (e) develop science and technology" (quoted from UN 1986, 6).

Comparatively, there was shift in the second half of the decade. From 1986, the government drew focus from equal growth to achieving maximum improvement and development without keying in the need for equity as the main objective. When GWE and TNDP were introduced, socialist development strategies were on the forefront, however, the socialist agenda was no longer on the main agenda by the five-year NDP era for it had failed to provide the desired economic prosperity which had been anticipated (Dashwood 1996, 35).

One of the reasons for the shift was that the government now acknowledged that agricultural sector was a major contributor to the economy hence it was important to limit the disturbance of the commercial farmers productivity with land reallocation activities. As a result, the rate at which land for reallocation was being bought and sold slowed down in order to focus on development rather than equity. This decision was made by the government to refocus its targets as a response to the prevailing economic factors the country was facing in addition to the limitations of the Lancaster agreement (Dashwood 1996, 37). With this new perspective of the Five Year NDP, the expectation was that the GDP would increase by at least 5% on yearly basis (UN 1986, 8).

The UNDP played a larger role in helping the government of Zimbabwe compared to the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and World Health Organization (WHO) who also played a part, although smaller, in aiding the development initiatives. Between 1987 and 1991, the UNDP gave assistance to the five-year NDP in the form of training the in experienced workforce, planning, giving advice to new ministries and institutions, research and helping the government to make budgets from the donations received. The Zimbabwean government cooperated well with all the international organizations. A permanent consultation committee was created to maintain bilateral relations between these organizations and the government. Part of the committee included the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA), UNICEF, the World Food Programme (WFP) and UNDP (UN 1986, 12-13).

Much of the success of the development programmes was credited to the UNDP's assistance and the role it played in advising on policies. On the other hand, the UNDP report highlighted a number of issues when it came to policy implementation. Firstly, the government was not able to fully start on the planned programme as assistance from volunteers was needed but the volunteers in many cases took long to arrive in the country hence most initiatives were delayed (UN 1986, 10-11).

3.8. The Commercial Farmers Union (CFU)

The CFU played a vital role in the politics of the LRP as seen by the impact of its support and disapproval of certain policies. Before Robert Mugabe was elected as Zimbabwe's first Prime Minister in April 1980, he addressed the nation in March 1980 as a Prime Minister elect. In his address, he expressed his desire for cooperation saying,

"I urge you, whether you are black or white, to join me in a pledge to forget our grim past, forgive others and forget, join hands in a new amity, and together as Zimbabweans, trample upon racialism, tribalism and regionalism, and work hard to reconstruct and rehabilitate our society…Let us deepen our sense of belonging and engender a common interest that knows no race, colour or creed. Let us truly become Zimbabweans with a single loyalty" (quoted from Mandaza 1986, 28).

From the very beginning, government encouraged cooperation and equality between the races so as to achieve a unified and prosperous post-colonial country. Mugabe often emphasised that the new government did not seek to expel the British farmers but instead was calling for a reconciliation and oneness for the future of the country (Fisher 2010, 30).

After independence, political figures stressed again that they did not intend on excluding the British farmers and that they acknowledged that their expertise was more valuable in the country. Now inaugurated as the Prime Minister, Mugabe gave a speech at a rotary club comprised of British commercial farmers in Harare maintaining his rhetoric of reconciliation saying,

"Those of you with skills will continue to be in great demand…What surprises us in Government is why…some of you should feel either too frightened or too dismayed to remain in the country and play your noble part [in national development]…Of course, if one cannot reconcile oneself to the new political order by adjusting one's mind and heart to the reality of majority rule and the reality of a ZANU Government, then in those circumstances, we certainly would be happier without him and he, I suppose would be happier without us. My concern, however, is not for the negative man…No sane political leaders…can…fail to recognise and appreciate the existence and worth of a community so sizeable and so culturally and economically strong as our white community" (quoted from Fisher 2010, 31).

The CFU, being the voice of the commercial farmers, was in support of this approach and encouraged the British farmers that they were of value in the development of the nation and in the new independent country, business for them would continue as usual (Fisher 2010, 32). During this period of Zimbabwe's development, the CFU and the government had a symbiotic relationship. This relationship was maintained until 1990 when Mugabe's government no longer sought recommendations from the CFU, instead, decisions were made without its knowing. This could be attributed to the rising pressures and frustrations of the LRP from economic factors, failed policies, and the constraints of the LRP agreement (Fisher 2010, 39).

Although it was reported that the British farmers were not willing to let go of more arable pieces of land, the government, on many occasions could not afford to buy land. This was because of the failing economy and rising prices of land despite the reason that land was available including land which was up to the standard the government wanted (Alexander 1994, 335). The rate of farm acquisitions slowed down drastically from 1984 to 1988. This was due to the reason that between 1980 and 1984, the prices of land were much lower but then increased in the second half of the decade. There was a sharp increase in land prices between 1984 and 1986 which dropped temporarily in 1986 but then rose again to the maximum level from the year 1987 to 1988 (Binswanger-Mkhize et al. 2009, 145). This affected the government's ability to buy land. Land could not be bought in large hectares and get redistributed to the peasants. The increasing prices of land strained the government's funds, and it needed the financial assistance promised by the British government to effectively continue with the LRP agenda.

Affected by these mounting frustrations, the government and the CFU failed to effectively collaborate their activities as the decade progressed. As a result, cooperative relationship between the two institutions turned into a dictator relationship. Relations between Mugabe's government and the CFU grew sourer for the government was adamant on implementing socialist LRP policies which did not favour the commercial farmers. Their socialist goals of cooperative agricultural productivity were contested by the CFU, together with some of the rural peasants and most importantly were illegal according to the constitution (ZInyama 1982, 58).

Accordingly, the socialist LRP was criticised, and a more capitalistic approach was encouraged. The CFU contested that a capitalist approach meant a longer LRP which paid attention to development of the communal and the redistributed land. They were very vocal in agricultural issues such as workers' wages, prices of agricultural produce and policies. The CFU was in favour of a capitalistic LRP for it would allow farmers to adjust and continue to be productive. The socialist LRP was seen as highly disruptive. They managed to gain membership of black farmers due to the support they gave them in their transition from small scale to large scale to large scale farming in comparison with the government which did not offer much support (Sachikonye 2003, 230).

The Ministry of Public Construction was keen on constructing more carefully planned settlements that did not mirror the pre- independence village design. The ministry clashed with the Ministry of Local Government which was not in support of the dismantling of traditional ways of communal living (Alexander 1994, 341). Hence, the CFU received support from rural dwellers who were concerned over the loss of their ancestral lands due to planned settlements under the LRP (Bratton 1981, 456). With the diverse support from peasants and commercial farmers, the union was able to push their agenda by advocating for the slowing down of the LRP. Therefore, a clash of interests about productivity versus equity emerged between the government, the CFU influenced by elite commercial farmers and the landless peasants. As a result, the five-year NDP was reformed ushering in the second Five Year NDP of 1991 -1995 (Dashwood 1996, 37).

ZANU became the nation's ruling party after the elections of April 1980. The party was criticised for its immaturity and lack of foresight. The party wanted to implement radical socialist reforms with no experience and disregarding the fact that the

country was in a very delicate period of transition hence caution was needed (ZInyama 1982, 58). The party's economic, political and social agendas were not clear, and the institutions were not competent. For example, the newly formed the MLRRD depended to a greater extent on the direction of the Ministry of Agriculture which operated on pre-independence ideologies. An employee at the MLRRD shed light on the inefficiency of the ministry saying,

"When the Ministry was first established we had no files, no phones. Everything was new... We had no idea what to do in the beginning ... Everyone asked, 'What are we supposed to do?' It took us six months just to learn the issues" (Alexander 1994, 334).

The MLRRD was an amateur governing body and introduced legislation that was politically motivated. It is documented that one of the officials of this institution made a statement saying that none of the members were informed on what their duties were, and they had to educate themselves on all the pending problems related to land. This took them six months and six months alone was not enough to plan how a countrywide land resettlement project was to be implemented. The MLRRD was built from the ground with no basic necessities for normal functions such as phones or documents. Hence the MLRRD continued to use information provided in pre-independence reports as well as the Ministry of Agriculture which was in operation before independence. As noted before, institutions can clash with each other, and this happened between the MLRRD and the Ministry of Local Government whereby the MLRRD was introducing legislation that threatened or that crossed over into the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Local Government (Alexander 1994, 334).

Furthermore, the socialist ambitions of the nationalistic government did not go without criticism for were a lot of risks in dismantling large commercial farms for redistribution. In conjunction with the WB argument, a rapid reallocation could potentially lead to high unemployment rates for the people working on the farms would be affected. Agricultural productivity would also be affected by the stalling of agricultural activities on the farms. These were the main criticisms of the first phase of the LRP. Alternatively, in order to avoid such an ordeal, there was need for a more lengthy and less hasty land reallocation (Sachikonye 2003, 229). The Riddell Commission criticised the pace of the LRP saying that if the speed is not checked, it could compromise the country's food supply and agricultural exports (Dashwood 1996, 37).

According to the Zimbabwean government, the terms and conditions of the Lancaster Agreement impeded the expected progress and results of the LRP (Mwalubunju and Otitodun 2011, 19). The Zimbabwean leaders signed the Lancaster agreement, but they were not entirely satisfied for the deal still protected British imperialist interests. After the signing, Robert Mugabe said,

"Yes, even as I signed the document I was not a happy man at all. I felt we had been cheated to some extent…that we had agreed to a deal that would to some extent rob us of the victory that we had hoped to have achieved in the field" (quoted from Mandaza 1986, 38).

For this reason, an unsuccessful LRP was often blamed on the WBWS clause of the Lancaster agreement (Bratton 1981, 450). In addition to that, the non-nonchalant approach of the British government towards LRP support posed as a major stumbling block as well. Adding to the argument, the Zimbabwean government stated that the LRP failed due to the prices of land, the drought, inflation and debt. Another issue was that most of the land on which farmers were resettled onto was not favourable for agricultural activities therefore they could not produce effectively an contribute to the economy. The government also faced a challenge when it came to the lack of qualified individuals who were trained in resettlement planning (Alexander 1994, 335).

The British government was withholding funds to support the redistribution of land, and this meant that the farmers were not going to receive adequate financial compensation in exchange for their farms. No farmer was willing to take such risk considering they had invested in their land. In response to this, the government increased pressure on the British farmers to surrender their land. As for the British government, their argument was that funds would be made available only if the Zimbabwean government acquires land on the WBWS agreement. However, this was to the disadvantage of the Zimbabwean government for the prices of land in Zimbabwe were high as seen in 1988, whereby a hectare of land was ZW$92,24 as compared to the price of a hectare in 1980 which was ZW$15,76. Consequently, the government could not afford land and farmers were not willing to sell for less. This trend continued up until 1997 when the British government completely ceased the provision of funds to be used to compensate farmers (Binswanger-Mkhize et.al 2009, 148).

Moreover, the situation was worsened by the rising rate of inflation in Zimbabwe. The inflation rate had previously dropped to -16% in 1985, but it made a recovery in 1987 rising to 12.8%. Although in 1990 it dropped to 1.3%, the unstable currency made it difficult to make large purchases of land for money was losing value quickly. In such an economy, anyone would be wary about selling something of value such as land, hence the farmers' unwillingness to cooperate with the Zimbabwean government (IMF World Economic Outlook 2022).

There is a lot of criticism given as to why or how the first phase of the LRP was unsuccessful. The World Bank (WB) issued a report in 1985 indicating that agrarian reforms were not the solution to Zimbabwe's communal challenges. This was deduced from the observation that the number of people in communal areas was increasing, but land redistribution was not keeping the same pace. The WB suggested that instead of focusing on land redistribution, the government should focus on making adjustments in these areas so that people could be accommodated in more comfortable ways (Alexander 1994, 335).

The first decade of the LRP began with the land redistribution agreement through which the government intended to uplift the majority in Zimbabwe. It started with attending to the need for financial assistance through ZIMCORD whereby Zimbabwe appealed to donors who would be willing to assist in funding the LRP. Within the country, the MLRRD was created to oversee the redistribution of land. The ministry had issues such as lack of experience and structure which made it rely on the pre-independence format of land allocation which later became politically motivated as argued by

DERUDE. DERUDE accused the MLRRD of destroying traditional custom of land allocation as well as disrupting the smooth production processes commercial framers needed in order to maximise outputs. The CFU was in agreement with this for it advocated for the rights of the British farmers, as well as indigenous Zimbabwean commercial farmers who were being affected by the land redistribution.

3.9. Conclusion

The most significant characteristic of the first decade was President Mugabe's socialist policies. GWE policy was introduced to provide indigenous Zimbabweans with the same opportunities the British enjoyed. GWE was successful in bringing about social transformation, but the policy did not result in any significant economic growth. After GWE followed the TNDP of 1982 to 1984 which also continued the socialist agenda of GWE but paying more attention to economic development. Zimbabwe's GDP grew however it was below the set target. Unfortunately, the TNDP had the same structural and operational weaknesses as the MLRRD and that hindered it from realising its full potential as a tool for economic development. It was also the lack of experience which attributed to the TNDP being put in place as a short-term policy each two ears long and spanning over four years in total. After seeing the weaknesses of the TNDP, a five-year plan, was put in place which focused solely on ensuring the economic success of Zimbabwe. The five-year NDP started in 1986 till 1989. By the end of the decade, socialism was no longer at the top of the agenda but the maximisation of Zimbabwe's economic potential through focusing on development strategies and opening the country to the international market.

With the TNDP, trade was protected by the government, and it offered subsides and favourable foreign exchange rates to the commercial farmers. However, as the budget for the LRP decreased and the prices of land increasing, the government could no longer give as much support to the farmers. The economy was collapsing and the international community through the Brettonwoods institutions urged the Zimbabwean government to liberalise their markets. As a result, the Zimbabwean market went from being protected by the state to being open to the market forces. Trade liberalisation was part of the conditions upon which Zimbabwe would be able to receive loans from the IMF and WB (Peters 2016). Hence in the second decade of the LRP, Zimbabwe abandoned its socialist policies and adopted neo-liberal market and trade reforms known as the Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP).

4.LRP SECOND DECADE (1990 – 1999)

4.1. Introduction

The second decade of the LRP was a period of major policy revisions and reforms. The main policies of the second decade were the 1990 Land Policy, Second Five Year NDP of 1991, the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme 1991, and Land Tenure Commission (Kinsey 1999, 179). The main difference between the first and second phase of the LRP was that between 1980 to 1989, home grown socialist reforms were the focus. Whereas from 1990 to 1999, neo-liberal economic reforms centred on open trade, with the influence of the WB and IMF, were the focus (Sachikonye 2003, 231).

4.2. Second Five Year National Development Plan (SFYNDP)

The Second Five-Year National Development Plan (SFYNDP) 1991-1995 was introduced by the government as a policy revision of the first NDP. The main comparison with the First Five Year NDP was that the SFYNDP had reforms that were more market oriented and capitalistic as compared to the former policy (Dashwood 1996, 37). The Zimbabwean government made a new reformed SFYNDP due to international concerns and domestic concerns regarding the success of the LRP whether it had brought about some economic success for the country. Some of the domestic factors that led to the creation of the SFYNDP were as follows,

"(1)the emergence of a consensus among senior members of the ruling elite that market-based reforms were necessary; (2) the embourgeoisement of the ruling elite, leading to a weakening in the priority attached to the absolute welfare of the poor; and (3) the consolidation of the support of the agrarian and entrepreneurial elites for market-based reforms" (quoted from Dashwood 1996, 39).

On the other hand, one of the identified weaknesses of the SYFNDP was that the policy statement did not include the component of ensuring development in areas outside the main cities. The policy statement did not discuss any motives to improve the livelihoods of the poor. This meant that under SYFNDP, rural areas would be found lagging behind the larger cities in development (Dashwood 1996, 39).

Correspondingly, the new policy procedure excluded those without any small-scale farming experience. Hence, when it came to land reallocation, new inequalities were created. The top bottom policy excluded the poorest meaning that those who were of middle class who already had access to land and having experience, gained more economic power whereas the poor became poorer. To lessen this problem, the Social Development Fund (SDF) was created to help bridge the gap between the classes but it was not as effective for it did not receive enough funding for it to function effectively (Dashwood 1996, 44).

4.3. The Economic Structural Adjustment Programme

When Zimbabwe gained independence in 1980, the government took control of the market and trade by limiting imports to encourage local production and industry. On the contrary, the expected growth from such measures was not accomplished (GATT 1995, 6). From the time Zimbabwe joined the WB, the WB encouraged capitalistic market-oriented development policies as opposed to the socialist development centred policies. When the government finally made market-based policies after the first failed decade of the LRP, the international institutions consequently had more say in the country's internal issues (Dashwood 1996, 29).

In 1991, in an effort to get external funding, a conference was held in Paris were donors from the World Bank and other aligned countries pledged to provide US$690 million to Zimbabwe for the implementation of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP). The ESAP was a conditional clause presented by the IMF and the World Bank in order for Zimbabwe to receive loans (Machemedze (n.d.), 1-2).

Accordingly, the ESAP was adopted as a measure to counter the economic downward spiral Zimbabwe was experiencing because of failed socialist policies (Alwang et al. 2002, 4). The main aim of these economic reforms was the reduction of Zimbabwe's debt to 5.5% of the country's GDP (IMF Press Centre 1998). The focus of the ESAP were as follows,

"fiscal monetary policy reform; trade liberalization; deregulation and removal of controls on commerce and the labour market; public sector reform and cost recovery programmes; improvement of investment climate".

With ESAP, the Zimbabwean government removed licenses on imports. This was done as a means to grow investment opportunities for investors outside Zimbabwe (GATT 1995, 1).

It is noteworthy to acknowledge that the Zimbabwean economy was not on the verge of collapsing but it was not performing up to the standard the government had hoped for. In addition to the opening of the market, removal of import licenses, the government removed the laws that limited the remittance of profits by foreign investors to their respective home countries (GATT 1995, 5). The new policy gave less power to the government to control the economy and allowed the market forces to modulate the rate of economic development. The official framework of the ESAP, titled Zimbabwe: A Framework For Economic Reform listed "macroeconomic policies, trade liberalisation, and deregulation" as the main points of focus for the new policy (Dashwood 1996, 38).

Between 1991 and 1994, the ESAP managed to improve Zimbabwe's market and trade relations with the global market. Price controls and subsides were removed boosting multilateral trade as a lot of investment capital flowed into the country (GATT 1995, 9). Nevertheless, the ESAP was mostly economy focused and as result the social welfare of the country suffered as the government had to make drastic budget adjustments to facilitate these economic reforms (Todd 2007, 21). Moreover, the policy did not focus on

the poor due to the perception that the overall growth of the economy would be of benefit to all classes as wealth would flow from the top to the bottom (Dashwood 1996, 38).

Furthermore, according to the United Nations Conference On Trade And Development (UNCTAD) and UNDP, the lack of clear policy direction and initiation was one of the factors that led to the failure of the ESAP. The lack of clear and accurate policy implementation led to the increase of corruption and the increase of poverty. As the government came to the realisation that the poor were being left behind, it introduced a policy to bring focus to societal issues and resettlement. The new policy was called Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation (ZIMPREST) which was to get into effect from 1996-2000 (Bhalla et. al 1999, 2-3).

After 5 years of ESAP, the country's industrial and agricultural production fell by 40% (Todd 2007, 21). Farmers were more productive in the first decade of the LRP as compared to the second decade of ESAPs which ironically were meant to open up the farmers' produce to the global market. The influx of imported goods affected the local farming industry and caused the country's GDP to fall. Only an average of 5% GDP growth was recorded between 1991 and 1996 (Bhalla et. al 1999, 4-5).

Although the LRP needed some adjustments in the form of additional policies, it is contested that the ESAP worsened the economic and social conditions in the country. The British government was of the opinion that the LRP failed due to Zimbabwe's policies on protecting its trade. Therefore, when loans were granted, they were coupled with conditions mainly on trade openness and the removal of restrictions on imports (Machemedze (n.d.), 1-2). Another argument posed in relation to the ESAP is that a domestic economic policy would have benefited the economy to a larger extent compared to one drawn from a global perspective especially for a country that did not have the economic muscle to compete globally. The ESAP was an extreme measure best suited for an already destroyed economy as opposed to an economy which required more subtle measure (Bhalla et. al 1999, 21).

Western powers pushed for the ESAP implementation whereby the Zimbabwean government had to make sure that farmers focused more on cash crops instead of traditional crops which were mostly consumed by the local population and undesirable for trade. This change affected food security especially in the rural areas where people depended greatly on growing their own food (Machemedze(n.d.), 1-2). It is important to note that these forced reforms were coming from external pressure which did not regard the ongoing drought as well as rising inflation in the country, problems whose effects were felt more severely by the civilian population. This can be observed as the disadvantage of top-down decision-making processes.

4.4. Land Acquisition Act (LAA)

By 1990, only 20% of British owned land had been redistributed meaning 80% was still British owned. Hence, when the 10year WBWS agreement officially ended, despite the insistence of the British government for it to be continued, a more rigorous Land Acquisition Act (LAA) was drafted. The LAA gave the government right to purchase land, when necessary, without paying the full amount for the land. Payment

would be made only for improvements made on the land. According to the LAA, the government had the power to cease farms located on traditional lands, farms with owners residing in other countries and farms from owners who owned land elsewhere in the country. Some of the farms in Zimbabwe were owned by the members of the British House Of Lords for example Lord Vivian (Todd 2007, 21).

As a measure to counter the effects of the droughts, the LAA stated all land in the rural areas was eligible for redistribution and resettlement. This meant that land would not be assessed whether it was suitable for resettlement or not but was deemed eligible due to its location. For the government, the LAA was necessary for resettlement because it legalised the acquisition of vast areas of land which was ideal for creating visible resettlement plans of large groups of people (Coldham 2001, 228). The Zimbabwean government was under pressure internally from its people who had become restless and desperate due to drought, and externally from the West which was insisting on withholding funds (Chigora and Ziso 2011, 108).

The government explained that the WBWS system was expensive to implement and the amount of land available did not equate to the population. This was because small pieces of land, which were very expensive, were bought far from each other in different locations which meant that each location acquired its own development plan, team and budget making the cost of development rise. As a way to resolve this problem, the LAA and its amendment were adopted in the second phase (Sachikonye 2003, 231).

The WBWS clause of the LRP had kept the British farmers insulated from radical land reacquisition exercises by the government of Zimbabwe until 1990 when the clause reached its expiry. Shortly after, the Land Acquisition Act was introduced in 1992 (Taylor and Williams 2002, 549). The voluntary transference of land was moved to compulsory acquisition of land by the state itself. This led to a number of challenges. The British commercial farmers who had previously voluntarily made their land available for the programme sought to withdraw from the initiative and in doing so they went to court to repeal their offers coupled with the support of the CFU (Binswanger-Mkhize et al. 2009, 148).

Up until 1990, the year in which the National Land Policy was introduced, the constitution agreed upon at Lancaster made it illegal for land to be acquired on a compulsory basis. Therefore, the government had to make a constitutional amendment specifically which stated that reacquisition of land on a compulsory basis was lawful. So, the National Land Policy was put in place in 1990 in order to make for a faster reacquisition of land under the Land Acquisition Act without any legal constraints. The constitutional amendments also outlined that the British government would be responsible for all compensation required for the acquired farms (Coldham 2001, 227).

As expected, the Land Acquisition Act was not without errors. Before the Land Acquisition Act of 1992, it was part of the constitution that there must be a committee responsible for evaluating how much compensation a farmer was to get after they had willingly surrendered their land. This was called the compensation committee. Some of the requirements for compensation were not clear for it was stated that only modifications in infrastructure amongst other things done to the land were to be valued and compensated

for and not the actual land. However, there was no system to be used to clearly and fairly assess the value these improvements in a uniform way across all the farms. Subsequently, there was a degree of unfairness when it came to compensation assessment due to lack of clear processes to be followed when assessing farms (Coldham 2001, 228).

One other thing is that at the time of the initiation of the second decade of the LRP, Zimbabwe's government had a major difference between its spending and its revenue. The total share of government expenditure in the agriculture sector dropped sharply from 0.13% in 1993 to 0.6% in 1994 to 1995. In addition to a failing economy, between 1992 and 1995, Zimbabwe experienced two droughts. The first drought was in 1992, and the second drought was in 1994. These droughts took place during the ESAP era with the ESAP being introduced for the first time in 1991 and revised in 1993 as a response measure to the drought (Alwang et al. 2002, 6-7). During this drought period, the levels of poverty increased by 1.2% between 1990 and 1995. According to the distribution of poverty index, poverty was prevalent by 25.8% in 1990 and increased to 34.9% in 1995 (Alwang et.al 2002, 14). By 1995, the inflation rate of average consumer prices was at 15.2% (IMF World Economic Outlook 2022).

4.5. Land Resettlement Grant Discontinuation

The total share of government expenditure dropped once again to 0.01 in 1996 (Alwang et al. 2002, 7). Economically, the country was on a downward spiral. There was a huge debt and inflation was rising. These issues coupled with the lack of financial power to purchase land affected the LRP initiative for there was no money to buy land with and attention had to be diverted from the LRP to tackling the pressing economic problems. A report by the WB indicated that in 1996, 11.26 million hectares of land was owned by British farmers and yet half of it was underutilised or was not being used at all (Todd 2007, 21).

In addition to poor economic performance, in 1996, the Land Resettlement Grant was discontinued. Despite the need for further assistance as reported by an observation committee sent to Zimbabwe by the British government, for the Zimbabwean government could no longer afford to support the LRP. The grant had been created under Margaret Thatcher's government and had provided the Zimbabwean government with 40 million pounds on the condition that the government would also inject an equal amount (Todd 2007, 21). The British government shut down the provision of funds due to the growing kleptocracy and the use of land by Mugabe as an incentive to gain political support.

Towards the end of the second decade of the LRP, it was recorded that by 1997, in contrast to the target of resettling 162,000 families, the LRP had only managed to settle 71,000 (Sachikonye 2003, 231). In addition, inflation had reached -1%, the economy was crumbling (IMF World Economic Outlook 2022). Hence in 1997, the government faced more pressure to acquire land. This pressure was coming from the landless disgruntled war veterans who demanded compensation for their role in the liberation war, community leaders as well as low profile, and high-profile politicians. As pressure mounted, the World Bank suggested that the government introduces land taxes in order to help to raise enough funds for compensation (Binswanger-Mkhize et al. 2009, 149).

As a result of mounting frustrations from the leaders and the people, the rhetoric from Mugabe had changed from that of cooperative development to that of expulsion. In 1997, he made a very alarming statement declaring that land was going to be take land by any means saying:

"It is not the intention of the government to drive white commercial farmers off the land, No farmer will be without land in Zimbabwe, Even those farmers whose properties are designated by reason of their proximity to communal areas will still be invited to select from properties elsewhere" (quoted from Todd 2007, 21).

Another shift occurred when the Land Acquisition Act was revised in 1998 after the British Government halted the Land Resettlement Grant, when it still had 3 million pounds remaining to be used, due claims of kleptocracy, misuse of funds and corruption by the political elites. The UNDP stood in the gap as a mediator between the parties at the Land Donors Conference reassuring the donors that funding would not be misused but used solely for the eradication of poverty and economic development under the LRP initiative. For the sake of progress and reconciliation, they agreed on a short-term land programme that would span over two years, however, this did not bear much results as by the end of the two years no significant change could be observed (Taylor and Williams 2002, 550).

The land acquired between 1997 and 1990 under the short-term land programme was much less than that acquired between 1980 and 1983. The government had only managed to purchase 800,000 hectares of farmland between 1990 and 1997 (Binswanger-Mkhize et al. 2009, 149). In response to pressure and in an effort to also raise funds, the government introduced the Land Reform and Resettlement programme (LRRP) in 1998 which was anchored in more nationalistic agrarian reforms to help in the development of the economy. Some of the objectives of the LRRP were to boost the agriculture sector's contribution to the country's GDP, increase commercial farming in smaller communities, creation of sustainable farming methods, eradication of poverty, and depopulation of highly populated areas as well as to remove racial barriers when it came to land acquisition and ownership (Binswanger-Mkhize et al. 2009, 149-150).

4.6. The New Labour Government

Within the same year, the New Labour Government and President Mugabe clashed because this new government came with a different set of ideologies compared to the ones which prevailed when the LRP was signed in 1980. After witnessing the politicisation of the LRP and the kleptocratic tendencies of the elite, the New Labour Government ceased all funding. They emphasised that they will not fund the LRP but would continue to help the government in poverty eradication programmes and help make certain that the rule of law and democracy was maintained in Zimbabwe. They insisted that Zimbabwe's main problem was not land but was poverty, disease and democracy (Taylor and Williams 2002, 552).

From the start, the New Labour Government stated that the British government was not obligated to assist Zimbabwe in the LRP. This is what sparked the disputes between Tony Blair, Robert Mugabe, and Margaret Thatcher over the land question in

Zimbabwe (Binswanger-Mkhize et.al 2009, 149). The New Labour Government under Tony Blair withdrew from funding the LRP in 1997. It was suspected that the British were supporting the main opposition party MDC. The British government was playing both sides of the conflict by trying to push for regime change by removing or weakening Mugabe's government which was very adamant about the LRP (Landale 2017). It seemed as if Britain wanted to separate itself from its former colonial obligations by focusing on the new image of Britain it wanted to create which was that of a government which was focused on poverty eradication in Zimbabwe neglecting its promise to assist in the economic transformation of the country (Tendi 2014, 1255).

Mugabe expressed his preference for Margaret Thatcher's government which had originally agreed to take on the responsibility of assisting in the funding of the LRP from the Lancaster House agreement. It was Thatcher's government which facilitated the willing buyer willing seller agreement offering to assist the Zimbabwean government with funds to compensate the British farmers. However, Blair decided to divert focus from the LRP to introducing projects that focused on the eradication of poverty in rural Zimbabwe. This was of no benefit to the Zimbabwean government because it overlooked the main issue which was the land redistribution and not poverty alleviation (Norfield 2017). The New Labour Party turned the role of the British government in the LRP into a moral endeavour. Meaning that in the process the New Labour party would not focus on the politics of the LRP but on the moral responsibility of poverty alleviation. This went against the original agreement which caused tensions between the two governments whereby the British government demonised Mugabe's government. This led to the straining of Zimbabwe's and Britain's relations (Tendi 2014, 1253).

Clare Short, who was the head of Department For International Development (DFID) under the New Labour government, wrote a letter to the Zimbabwean Government on the 5th of November in 1997. It was the letter which ZANU PF claimed to be responsible for the deterioration of the relationship between Zimbabwe in Britain. In the letter, Short stated that it was no longer the responsibility of the British government to finance the buying of land from British farmers in Zimbabwe. She also acknowledged that the British government had given assistance to the LRP soon after the Lancaster agreement and that there were current negotiations going on throughout the process on how the British government could continue to support the LRP. However, from there forth, all assistance was to be discontinued (Tendi 2014, 1255). President Mugabe used Short's letter for political mileage and as proof of Britain's refusal to give Zimbabwe full independence and control of its land (Tendi 2014, 1257).

In 1997, President Mugabe gave insight on how he viewed the constant policy reforms in relation to the LRP and the targets his government had still not yet reached. In an interview with BBC's (British Broadcasting Corporation) Nik Gowing on Hard Talk, when asked about the reforms and goals of his government, President Mugabe said,

"the successive droughts which have had a new effects and a very serious impact on our programs and we had to reverse some of our programs but many others were allowed to continue were facilitated and I want to say that there has been a greater achievement than failure really but they having said that I must admit that we have not been able to create the levels of employment that we set out to create and that's why we came up with the

economic reform program which is now beginning to work" (BBC HARDtalk 1997, 8:37).

On the issue of his socialist ideology and his goal to build a socialist nation, President Mugabe admitted that himself and his government had to accept that their Marxist ideology was more in theory than in practice. He added that in the socialism aspect, they has been successful in ensuring education and healthcare for all but had not been successful in promoting industries and the private sector. As result, they resolved to maintaining a socialist approach within the social services sector while they adopted a capitalistic approach in the industrial sector (BBC HARDtalk 1997).

Additionally, one factor pointing to the failure of the LRP was that the plan to transform ordinary domestic farmers into commercial farmers after they received land was a failure was that out of the 71,000 resettled households, only 500 went into productive commercial farming. Of that 500, 20% used land leased by the government and the remaining 80% used their own personal funds to acquire farms. Also, the government explained that the WBWS system was expensive to implement and the amount of land available did not equate to the population. This was because small pieces of land, which were very expensive, were bought far from each other in different locations which meant that each location acquired its own development plan, team and budget making the cost of development rise. As a way to resolve this problem, the LAA and its amendment were adopted in the second phase (Sachikonye 2003, 231).

In 1998, the IMF made the decision to give Zimbabwe a financial loan. In a press release, the IMF announced that an unsuccessful LRP contributed to Zimbabwe's financial problems. Since the LRP was mainly for agrarian reforms as well as redistributing land to rural dwellers particularly the war veterans, it could be seen that on both fronts the government had not been successful. It is also highlighted that the government was facing financial challenges due to large amounts of money being given to war veterans. The war veterans compensation programme had not been budgeted for by the government which meant that the government had to take away financial resources from other projects in order to ease the restless war veterans through compensation (IMF Press Centre 1998).

The neo-liberal economic reforms were of greater benefit to ruling elites as well as the British farmers. As a result, kleptocracy and corruption rose especially amongst the politicians, ruling elites and their supporters. The state accumulated a lot of land which it then leased to selected people such as government workers, high ranking individuals in the army, judges, members of the cabinet as well as members of the parliament. The inequality gap grew as the poor landless became poorer and the upper class together with the connected middle class became richer. Due to this, when the donor conference of 1998 was held, donors from the European Union (EU) and the DFID insisted that there be clarity and openness around all the LRP procedures (Sachikonye 2003, 232).

By the end of the decade, the resettled communal areas were few and the ones existing experienced a great deal of overpopulation. The DFID and the EU (European Union) argued that the government had failed to organise the people and create clear lines between land for farming and land for communal living. In the end, the livelihoods of the

poor were not improved but worsened. Thereafter, the Land Reform and Resettlement Programme Phase 2 (LRRP) was introduced to effectively address these issues (Sachikonye 2003, 233).

Between 1980 and 1998, Zimbabwe used about US$361 million received from the IMF (IMF Press Centre 1998). As a result, the inflation rate dove lower to -28% (IMF World Economic Outlook 2022). Fortunately, the donor conference of 1998 was successful for the government received support from a total of 48 countries who share the same vision of growth (Todd 2007, 21).

Despite the argument that the LRP had no successes in the second decade, the World Bank argues that the programme was a success for people who were displaced by the war and refugees constituted more than a total of 80% of the people who received land under the programme. The WB reported that necessary infrastructure was put in place in the resettled areas such as schools and hospitals. It also highlights that the resettlement programme was carried out well with good planning involving assessment of land that was to be taken from the British farmers and given to the locals. Large commercial farms were broken down in a planned manner to give the excess land to smaller scale commercial farmers. It does not imply, however, that the transference of land did not affect the level of production of the commercial farmers but instead in 1990 their level of productivity had increased (Binswanger-Mkhize et al. 2009, 143). In a study conducted by the World Bank, they observed that farmers who were resettled in allocated land from the redistribution programme were more engaged in farming activities and earning considerably from farming compared to those who were not given land. The study was made to assess the economic benefits for those who were given land comparing it to those who were not given land. They discovered that the farmers who did not receive land had a gross income of ZW$2,050 as compared to those were given land involved in crop production who are earning ZW$5,200. Conclusively, they were able to establish that families who participated in the land reform were able to use the land to support their livelihoods and create a steady income for their survival (Deininger et al. 2004, 1703).

The LRP was also successful in growing the community of indigenous farmers in Zimbabwe. With the transference of 12.3 million hectares of land, these farms contributed to the growth and development of Zimbabwean commercial farmers who were counted up to 30,000 in total (Binswanger-Mkhize et al. 2009, 137). For resettled families, up to 65% of their income came from agricultural activities. Those who were not resettled only had 5.4% of their income coming from agricultural activities. Also, women in resettled communities earned 1.5% more in income than those in residing communal areas that were not resettled (Deininger et al. 2004, 1705).

However, according to the IMF, the drought which was affecting Zimbabwe at that time affected the agricultural projects which the government was supporting so as to boost the country's agricultural trade. The major crop for trade which was tobacco did not perform well because of the drought season in turn affecting the country's trade. The price of gold dropped, and the Zimbabwean dollar was hit by inflation and its value was reduced by almost 50% from its original value (IMF Press Centre 1998).

Due to these financial economic and climatic challenges, the government had to create fiscal measures and introduce economic reforms through new policies to aid recovery. It was in 1998 when the IMF gave Zimbabwe close to US$175 million which was to be provided over a period of 13 months to the Zimbabwean government to aid the implementation of its economic reforms. Upon this decision being made, the government was also given US$52 million which was made readily available for usage. In this period, the IMF would review its financial assistance to Zimbabwe based on how the government performed with the provided funds, and how it was willing to make adjustments to its corrective economic reforms (IMF Press Centre 1998).

Poverty alleviation and food security were on the agenda when LRP was agreed upon in 1980. The policy was revised in 1990, however, by 1998 inflation resulted in the rising of prices of food. The government had to make use of maize reserves to help curb hunger by subsidising maize meal. These budget adjustments were made in other departments but were not made in the social services provision. According to a press release, the IMF stated that the land reform programme was not successful in its goal of poverty eradication and there was need for the policy to be revised (IMF Press Centre 1998).

The LAA fell under the criticism of the members of the British Parliament. At the parliamentary discussions held on January 27th 1998, Lord Vivian, who also owned land in Zimbabwe, revealed that when he went to visit Zimbabwe concerning the land policies, he was informed of some of the weaknesses of the programme. He made this visit soon after President Mugabe had put into action the compulsory acquisition of land. On the 28th of November 1997, and announcement was made in the Zimbabwean Gazette that the government was going to take land from the listed 1 503 farmers and would only pay them for the modifications they made on the land and not the land itself. The absence of compensation for the acquired land was seen by the CFU and other British farmers as a politically motivated decision I order for the ruling party to win support and appease the restless war veterans. He met with the leaders of the CFU, and they showed him the land acquired by the government for framing and communal dwelling was not being used due to the lack development and agricultural equipment (UK Parliament 1998).

Lord Vivian said that the CFU advocated against this by pointing out that due to the fact the agricultural sector contributed a considerable 44% to the economy, if it were to be disturbed it would affect the rest of the economy. This would affect Zimbabwe trade relations with other countries as well as affect its agenda of poverty eradication. The CFU did acknowledge that a land reform was necessary however it should be done on the basis of improving productivity, employment and overall growth of the economy as opposed to meeting a quota to satisfy political appetites (UK Parliament 1998).

Lord Vivian also discovered that despite some of the land being given to trained individuals who had graduated from the Farmers' Development Trust Agricultural Colleges, however they could not make use of the land to its full potential. This was due to the reason the government wanted sole ownership of the land therefore did not award the new landowners title deeds with limited the extent of the farming activities they could do on the land. This was a major stumbling block to progress for the lack of title deeds prohibited the new landowners from accessing lands and receiving agricultural assistance

with machinery and chemicals. As a result, the acquired land lay dormant (UK Parliament 1998).

At 9:51 p.m., Lord Acton also narrated his views to the parliament. In 1998, there were about 15 000 documented citizens of Britain in Zimbabwe with only 3 000 of them having Zimbabwean citizenship. The CFU itself had a membership of British farmers of up to 4 000. The General Agricultural and Plantation Workers' Union of Zimbabwe recognised the tasks of the rapid acquisition of land without compensation. Together with the CFU, they acknowledged that the program would affect over one million Zimbabwean as well as leading to the loss of 147,000 jobs across the country (UK Parliament 1998).

Lord Acton further contributed to the discussion by pointing out that Zimbabwean farmers were also affected by the compulsory acquisition act. The list published on 28 November 1997 included 200 indigenous Zimbabwean farmers. These were the members of the Indigenous Commercial Farmers' Union (Hansard 1998). The CFU was the biggest advocate for a more just and transparent land acquisition. It took its stance through a paper it presented to the LRP ministers. In the paper the CFU highlighted alternative methods to land acquisition and how it would be able to assist the government if they were willing to pursue the alternative. The CFU suggested more carefully drafted reallocation of land the the war veterans, free training for the new indigenous landowners, and loans. The CFU also marketed its ability to foster relations on a global scale to get external support and assistance for the LRP. Henceforth, the CFU suggested that the government should not employ a top-down approach to land reacquisition but must include the CFU, Indigenous Farmers' Union as well as the African farmer's Union in the drafting of the land policy (UK Parliament 1998).

Lord Plunket, at 10:08 p.m. also provided his own input criticising the poor planned land acquisition and the displacement of British farmers. He saw the belief amongst the indigenous people that their land was unjustly taken as folklore. Lord Plunket, a landowner himself, said,

"The war, our war, as we call the senseless fighting in the late 70s, was about land inequitably distributed between black and white. Much has already been redressed. Where 100 white families lived between Chimanimani on the borders of Mozambique, where I grow trees, and Mutare, our nearest town 100 miles away, there is not one single white farmer left. No trouble, no fuss, my Lords. Then there are areas where thousands of hectares have been bought for resettlement which are lying derelict for lack of infrastructure, know-how and wherewithal. That causes frustration and fosters the myth that the land was stolen and the people have the right to take it back. But it is not like that" (quoted from UK Parliament 1998).

At 10:35 p.m. Lord Astor spoke in support of Lord Vivian and Lord Plunket saying that as they had observed in Zimbabwe, there was a dire and true need for land reallocation for half of the good farmlands were owned by the British minority in the country. He pointed out there was need to relocate the poor Zimbabweans into better suitable areas. Thus, the British government assisted a lot of poor Zimbabwean families to acquire land. They provided up to 30 million pounds in order to facilitate this. Although

much had already been given to aid the LRP, assistance was still required (UK Parliament 1998).

In the same year 1998, Jonathan Holmes interviewed the former president of the CFU, Jim Sinclair. Sinclair owned two farms which he inherited from his father-in-law who purchased the farm from another farmer in 1933. In the interview, he mentioned that things had changed as he compared with the days he had a cordial relationship with President Mugabe as opposed to the current situation whereby he too had received a notice form the court that his farm will be redistributed on a compulsory basis. From his understanding the government was acting against the law. At the time a lot of land was still in the hands of the British farmers who also recognised the need for the redistribution for 9 million Zimbabweans had to share small pieces of land while 4 000 British farmers enjoyed large expanses of land. Despite the necessity, the redistribution of land should be done in a legal and fair manner. The farmer also confirmed the issue of disparities in access to financial aid. Large scale commercial farmers had easy access to loans whereas the resettled Zimbabweans did not have total rights to the land they were given for it was state owned meaning they could not have access to loans for improving their farming activities (ABC News In-Depth 1998).

A young Zimbabwean farm worker who was interviewed, also represented one side of the people who were at risk of losing their livelihoods if the British farms were taken. As the foreman of the piggery at Sinclair's farm where he had a house and a small piece of land to grow his own maize for his family. However, if Sinclair was to lose his farm, that meant that farm workers would be left jobless, landless and homeless (ABC News In-Depth 1998).

Holmes also interviewed the Minister of Information, Chen Chimutengewnde on the issues of the compulsory acquisition of farms with the lack of adequate compensation. Minister Chimutengwende said,

“in all constitutions can be amended any-time by Parliament the law can be changed any time by parliamentarians the principle of acquiring land is the overriding principle we want to follow the law but whose law is it…” (ABC News In-Depth 1998, 6:16).

He said in was imperative for the government to acquire farm on a compulsory basis for it would be worse if the disgruntled citizens take upon the matter themselves leading to more problems. He also contested the question of human rights violations saying,

“when they do it the question of Human Rights is not raised when we do it the question of human rights is raised it's a question of justice the question of land is justice it's an honour all is an old unresolved political problem it's a time bomb” (ABC News In-Depth 1998, 6:40).

To shed more light on the unjust land inequalities, Jonathan Holmes interviewed Tendai Masiyiwa who at the time was living with his family on a farm that had been given to his grandfather by the British settlers after their ancestral lands had been taken. The quality of soil on these farms was much lower and less productive compared to that of the

soil of the ancestral lands they had been evicted from. In addition to that, the land that was given to the indigenous families was small and did not have any room for expansion which led to overcrowding. As a result, farms had to be subdivided continuously to accommodate the growth of families. In such cases, e desire to relocate, lawfully or unlawfully, to British farms grew (ABC News In-Depth 1998).

In addition to all these problems, Zimbabwe's economy was failing. The country's GDP was on a negative decline. According to the IMF data mapper, by 1999, Zimbabwe's GDP growth was at -1.1%. The IMF data mapper shows the trend of Zimbabwe's GDP during the final years of the LRP and the early years of the FTLRP. However, it does not indicate Zimbabwe's GDP between 1980 in 1999. Therefore, this limits the study and scope for comparison in order to trace to which extent the land policy was successful economically (IMF World Economic Outlook 2022).

4.7. Zimbabwe-Britain Relations

Amidst of all these different views and challenges faced by the landless people, the British farmers and their employees, the villainization of Mugabe's government led to tight tensions which were a stumbling block to any efforts for diplomacy and negotiation to reach a more favourable agreement regarding the land question. Thabo Mbeki, the President of South Africa at the time, disapproved Tony Blair's government handling of the land question which his country had agreed upon years before. He urged Tony Blair not to focus on making Mugabe appear as a villain but to help foster an environment whereby he and Mugabe can negotiate towards a better deal. South Africa wanted to play the role of a mediator between Zimbabwe and Britain, however, Britain under the New Labour foreign policy was not willing to engage in diplomatic conversations with Mugabe's government (Tendi 2014, 1254). However, in recent years the former Prime Minister of Britain Boris Johnson also showed his disapproval of how the former Prime Minister Tony Blair addressed the LRP issue (Mhaka 2020).

The repealing of conditions of the Lancaster agreement by the British government caused disgruntlement to all the parties involved. The Zimbabwean government, political leaders, the people specifically the landless poor in Zimbabwe as well as the British farmers were at a disadvantage (Onslow 2017, 864-865). The New Labour party was problematic for the Zimbabwean government as compared to Conservative government which was in power between 1979 and 1997. Although the Conservative government of 1979-1997 often clashed with the Zimbabwean government, they managed to work cooperatively towards fulfilment of the land question. The New Labour Party did not leave room for any cooperation between the governments (Tendi 2014, 1256).

In 1998, the Zimbabwean government initiated a donors' conference in hopes to receive donor funding to provide monetary compensation for acquired farms however, there was resistance from the British government which trickled down to other donors. This was mainly over the issue that land must only be acquired through the willing buyer and willing seller basis not a compulsory acquisition of land under the Land Reform and Resettlement Programme (LRRP) (Binswanger-Mkhize et al. 2009, 150). Lack of funding and accumulated debts crippled the implementation of the LRP. In 1999, Zimbabwe had

a large foreign debt and was behind in payments of up to $20 million. By then, government was owing up to US$190 million (Shaoul 1999).

4.8. Conclusion

The second decade of the LRP was more political than the first. Here, the narrative of the Zimbabwean government versus the British government became more hostile as tensions rose due to broken promises and mutual distrust. It is in this decade where we see the straining of the Zimbabwe and Britain relations, Zimbabwe from being the darling of the British to being a rouge, rebellious nation. Both parties had a role to play in the deterioration of these relations. Once an agreement was made at the Lancaster House, the Zimbabwean government trusted the British government to honour and to be bound by its word. However, as the Zimbabwean government sought to find loopholes in the LRP clause, it created more policies that were not favourable to the British farmers whom the British government were trying to shield from the hard blows of the land programme.

After the Five Year NDP, the government of Zimbabwe seeing the importance of being part of the global economic community, adopted the ESAP. As imposed by the IMF and World Bank, Zimbabwe had to practice open trade for Zimbabwe to receive loans and ensure economic development as well as the ability to pay back loans. The ESAP went hand in hand with the SFYNDP for the focus was on boosting Zimbabwe's international economic ties in the capitalist world. The Second plan as well as the ESAP were very capitalistic. They were top-down policies which only considered the success of the larger economic players without factoring in the ordinary citizens of the country. As a result, the citizens suffered and the prosperity of the industries and large corporations which was expected to be of benefit to the in the long run was not felt. In the beginning the benefits of open trade were realised however after a period of five years the opposite began to manifest as the country's industries began to fail.

Despite the economic reforms the land reform continued with creation of the Land Apportionment Act. With the LAA land was to be acquired on a compulsory basis. This was not met with favour by the British government which immediately cut of the Land Resettlement Grant giving the reason that the LAA was a violation of the WBWS agreement. Due to the decision of the British government, the Zimbabwean government reconsidered the LAA in 1997 however the compulsory acquisition of land continued. The UNDP made effort to mediate between the two governments as it was clear that Zimbabwe was still in need of financial assistance. Meanwhile, a donor's conference was held by the Zimbabwean in an effort to appeal to non-British donors willing to provide money to be given as compensation to the British farmers. Upon corruption allegations, the New Labour government severed its ties and responsibility of Britain to aid the LRP. Tensions between the two countries rose. Couple with the lack of financial assistance and the lack of land for a restless and growing population, the FTLRP was put in place to facilitate a swift and compulsory transference of land. The CFU did its best to dissuade the government from radical land acquisition, but this was to no avail.

Ultimately, in the politics of the LRP there were to be winners and losers, and neither party wanted to be the latter. The Zimbabwean government did not act out of order by introducing compulsory land acquisition laws. This is because it was already the

agreement that the WBWS clause would be renegotiated at the end of the first decade. So in this light, the Zimbabwean government was acting in line with the agreement. The British government however, wanted to maintain control of the LRP by maintaining the agreement that favoured its position. It is noteworthy to point out that in the first decade of the LRP, the Zimbabwean government did not try to disrupt the WBWS agreement even though it was still a stumbling block to its goals. Instead, the focus was on equality and development. This shifted in the second decade. Relations were strained further as both governments accused the other for breaking the agreements. Blair's government hit the final nail to the coffin by cutting off funds meant for the LRP and sighting corruption as the reason behind this decision. To maintain its image, Blair's government shifted its rhetoric and attention to poverty alleviation in the Zimbabwean rural areas. This made it appear as if the Zimbabwean government was neglecting its people and so the British had to step in to assist. Although the poorer Zimbabweans were not benefiting as much as they had anticipated from the LRP, the responsibility to reconcile these issues was to be solely left to the Zimbabwean government.

Political relations were strained, and agreements were discarded, this brought about the last and final decade of the LRP which ushered in the FTLRP whereby the government of Zimbabwe introduced a more extreme LRP policy and at the same time took a step back as the people let out their frustrations on the British farmers.

5.THE FAST TRACK LAND REFORM (2000-2003)

5.1 Introduction

In this chapter an account of the events which unfolded leading up to the fast-track land distribution is given along with the impact it had on the politics of the nation as well as the Zimbabwe-Britain relationship. Data from interviews is provided to show the impact of the programme on the Zimbabwean population. The last section focuses on the consequences of the FTLRP which was the sanctioning of Zimbabwe.

5.2 The Fast Track Land Reform

Despite the land reform being in motion for 2 decades, in 2000, Zimbabwe had a white population of 70,000 who had held half of the land in the country. An estimated 4,500 of them were commercial farmers. This was according to the International Herald Tribune published in March that year (Todd 2007, 21). The set targets of land redistribution had not been fulfilled and the funding for compensation was lacking. Between 199o and 1990 the government of Zimbabwe went from having an amicable relationship with the western counties as well as the Brettonwoods institutions through open trade agreements. However, as complications in the land acquisition agenda accumulated, the Zimbabwean government was forced to take drastic measures and not rely on the cooperation of the New Labour government. By 2000, Zimbabwe no longer adhered to the international standards expected of it to fulfil what remained a major concern which was land redistribution.

Amidst pressure to provide land, the government drafted the new terms of compulsory accusation of land with payment being provided for modifications on the farms. The new constitution was voted against in the parliament due it its political nature and possible aftermath. As a result of the lack of support for the constitution, the ruling party resorted to turning a blind eye to the illegal land occupations. The government stated that the British farmers should try to live in peace with the new land occupiers until land for their reallocation was identified. On the other hand, farms that had been acquired on the compulsory basis were taken and split amongst new farmers who were interested in small scale to medium scale commercial farming (Chitsike 2003, 9).

The land invasions by the war veterans started in 2000 after the government attempted to draft a new constitution on land redistribution in February 2000 (Taylor and Williams 2002, 550). The FTLRP was officially constitutionalised in April of 2000 when the government of Zimbabwe made it legal for land to be taken without compensation being provided. The amendment also pointed out that the British government was going to solely cater to the compensation to the farmers. Soon after this announcement was made, the FTLRP began as large numbers of people flocked to the farms taking possession of the farms through violent means (Fisher 2010, 206). The land invasions of the early 2000s were reaction to the declaration made by the New Labour government to cut funding for the LRP. Not only did it push the Zimbabwean masses, it also forced the hand of the Zimbabwean government to turn a blind eye to the violation of law of the forceful land invasions (Mhaka 2020).

On the 3rd of April in 2000, the EU-Africa summit was held in Egypt to which President Mugabe attended. In a brief interview by an unnamed reporter, President Mugabe amidst the tightening tensions between Britain and Zimbabwe maintained his belief that Britain should not interfere in the domestic affairs of Zimbabwe. He said,

"Well the UK is trying to teach us how to run our country. Naturally we resist that. We do not accept - we are not a British colony any longer" (AP Archive 2015,0:25).

Francis Maude the Foreign Secretary of Britain had put forward the request that Zimbabwe must be expelled from the commonwealth due to its conduct of the land question by turning a blind eye to the human rights violations. President Mugabe said on several occasions that it was as if Britain wanted to keep Zimbabwe as an extension of its kingdom due to their reluctance to support the LRP adequately. President Mugabe mentioned that it was not his country which should be put under sanctions, but it was Britain itself for interfering with the sovereignty of Zimbabwe (AP Archive 2015).

The newly introduced FTLRP constitution stated that the British government would be solely responsible for paying for the land acquired by the Zimbabwean government. This was repealed by parliamentary votes. In response, a new law was added to constitution to override the parliamentary vote to allow the government the legal right to exercise the land purchases as stipulated by the LAA. It was called the Presidential Powers Temporary Measures Land Acquisition Regulations and was introduced by Mugabe himself on the 24th of May 2000 (Taylor and Williams 2002, 550).

As more and more farmers were stripped off their farms, the CFU was overwhelmed worse after decades of trying to negotiate a favourable land reform. As a result, new institutions were created to attend to the aftermath of the land occupations. The last area to be bit by the wave of jambanja, the land occupations was Matebeleland. As a preventive measure the British farmers in Matebeleland created the Southern African Commercial Farmers' Association (SACFA) in 2000 as an institution through which they could all voice their concerns and navigate the politics of the land occupations (Pilossof 2011).

According to the CFU, by June 2000, a large number of their members were reported to have lost their farms to the chaotic land invasions. A total of 1525 farms had been occupied The land invasions were worse than what had been anticipated (Pilossof 2011). In the same year, in September, the first fast land reallocation was drafted and out into action under the new law. President Mugabe intended to relocate 150 000 peasants between September and November on about 2 000 farms which the government had acquired under the LAA. The first fast track programme was seen as an elaborate act by Mugabe to gain political mileage (Taylor and Williams 2002, 550).

By November the following year, in 2001 the government declared that all the work that was being carried out on British farms had to be stopped. This was done to prepare for the redistribution of those farms. The government, after forcefully stopping all agricultural production on the farms, gave the British farmers a window of three months for them to leave their farms. By 2002 June, farmers who refused to evacuate their farms within those three months would be charged with breaking the law. In some cases, the peasants, ruling party supporters, and war veterans went and camped on these

farms waiting for the farmers to evacuate and using violent tactics to make them uncomfortable. Law enforcement authorities did not assist the victims of violence and did not do anything to stop the violence (Fisher 2010, 206).

There were efforts to avert the inevitable misfortune awaiting the farmers. At this time the CFU was presenting itself as an institution that was not aiming to challenge the government but to comply as much as possible. However, with the aim to negotiate a better deal with government, one former member of the CFU created the Zimbabwe Joint Resettlement Initiative (ZJRI) in 2001. The institution sought to appease the government to stop the land occupations by promising to surrender millions of hectares to the government. However, the offer was not met with favour from the other British framers and the government (Pilossof 2011).

In 2001, Steve Kroft, a journalist from 60 Minutes conducted some interviews in Zimbabwe to gain more insight and different perspectives on the land invasions. Through his own research, he concluded that the jambanja initiators of the land invasions in 2000 were not really justified. He pointed out that most of the individuals were not war veterans at all for they would have been too young to have fought n the war at the time of the war. Some of them were retired police officers, landless civilians and supporters of the ruling party. He asked President Mugabe with what authority were the war veterans invading farms and President Mugabe responded to his question alluding to racial tensions. He said,

"they know that the farmer is the most racist of the white citizens in the country and the white farmer has been the crudest of the whites in this country the most backward in terms of the enlightenment and education" (60 Minutes 2017, 3:39).

Steve Kroft also interviewed victims and family members of the victims of the violence of the jambanja land invasions. The widow, Maria Stevens to a British farmer narrated the events of the death of her husband at the hands of the war veterans. During the violent land invasions, there were kidnappings as well as murders of British farmers by the rogue groups. What caused the most controversy and outrage in the international community were reports that all this violence was taking place with the knowledge of the police who intentionally did not exercise their authority to stop it (60 Minutes 2017).

Kroft asked President Mugabe if he felt any responsibility for Maria Stevens' husband death, but President Mugabe deflected saying that he should not be blamed for he did not take part in the violence. He also implied that perhaps the late Stevens should have dealt more carefully with the war veterans instead of provoking them which is why they attacked him (60 Minutes 2017). It were incidents such as this one which earned Zimbabwe the title of a rouge nation and Mugabe's nonchalance and lack of empathy, the title of a ruthless dictator.

Paul Miyata who was a member of parliament for the opposition party was also interviewed by Steve Kroft. When asked about the violent farm invasions he said,

"it's absolutely horrendous is disgusting if land is required let that land be acquired legally unleashing unlawful war veterans to go and intimidate white farmers beat them up it's not what a president of the country does" (60 Minutes 2017,9:33).

Steve Kroft also revealed that 250 farms were taken back from war veterans who had been given land when it, became clear that they did not have the know-how and experience to operate the farms (60 Minutes 2017).

Phanuel Chuga, the leader of the war veteran groups invading farms was briefly interviewed by Kroft and during the interview, he revealed that they were conducting all these invasions under orders from above. Chuga said,

"We are not doing this on our own but we are following the orders from the superior that is the order from the government" (60 Minutes 2017,11:09).

Chuga and his men were circling the parameters of a farm belonging to a farmer of British origin Mr Milbanks to intimidate him to abandon his farm. Mr Milbanks told Kroft that he had not received any legal document telling him that his farm would be seized so he did not know why the war veterans were targeting him. On the other hand, Chuga was determined to take over the farm threatening,

"We are going to take this farm whether he likes it or not….if he is going to argue with us, he is commuting suicide" (60 Minutes 2017, 11:29).

Although legally, Milbanks had not been alerted by the courts that his land would be repossessed, Chuga and his men did not care for they had direct orders form the superiors. According to Kroft, after his observations, on average at least two farmers were facing brutal attacks with whips and machetes from these jambanja groups (60 Minutes 2017). Thereupon, in 2002, an institution called Justice for Agriculture (JAG) was formed to advocate for justice for the displaced and injured framers. There was an urgent need for representation for the farmers because some of the violent land occupations ended with fatalities (Pilossof 2011).

Following that, Tony Blair used the FTLRP to directly attack Mugabe's presidency. Clashes between Mugabe and Tony Blair led to Mugabe's famous statement whereby he told Tony Blair to keep his England and to let him keep his Zimbabwe meaning that Blair should not meddle in the internal affairs of Zimbabwe (Tendi 2014, 1252). When the New Labour government was elected in Britain, the Secretary of International Development made it a point for it to be known that the new government was under no obligation to adhere to the agreement signed at Lancaster house. They declared that they had no connection to colonial ambitions therefore Britain was no longer interested in providing funds promised before for the acquisition of land. However, they would still support transformation of land policies especially concerning the poor (Mhaka 2020).

The way the FTLRP was executed by Mugabe's government resulted in other foreign countries getting involved in the political affairs and Economic Affairs of Zimbabwe. The internal affairs of Zimbabwe became a matter of international affairs in turn challenging its sovereignty. From then on, Zimbabwe was known as a country that was suffering from bad governance (Chigora and Ziso 2011, 106). The state of Zimbabwe's internal affairs were made public and a matter of international concern by Tony Blair's government. He labelled Mugabe's government as oppressive due to the land grabbing and his treatment of the British farmers (Tendi 2014, 1251).

When the forced evictions of British farmers from their farms by war veterans, landless peasants, city dwellers as well as village chiefs began, the media broadcast the plight of the farmers to the world. This time of farmer attacks and evictions was called jambanja which means chaos. The first of the farm occupations took place in Masvingo and it grew country wide to Manicaland, Mashonaland and lastly Matebeleland from there (Pilossof 2011). All efforts to negotiate had failed due to the reason the political advantage outweighed the need for a well-crafted, transparent and legal land reform (Chitsike 2003, 10).

In contrast, there is an argument that although some of the land grabbing missions were violent, a considerable number of them were done peacefully. However, it does not dismiss the evidence that the land occupiers were under the protection of the police and the police turned a blinds eye to the reports and complaints of the British farmers. Political and government elites were involved as hey also sent their own personal directions to the occupiers and gave them information regarding which farms to target. The invaders were given the right to remain on occupied farms as the local leaders of the areas would provoke them food and money as a reward (Pilossof 2011).

President Mugabe gave a speech at the Earth Summit on the 2nd of September 2002. The Earth Summit was held in Johannesburg South Africa. At this time, President Mugabe was at loggerheads with the British Prime Minister Tony Blair over the LRP. According to President Mugabe, Blair and his government were undermining the sovereignty of Zimbabwe. In his speech he, put emphasis on the land question issue by clarifying his own stance saying,

“even as we acquire our land we shall not deprive the white farmers of land completely every one of them is entitled to at least one farm but they would want to continue to have more than one farm more than one farm indeed 15, 20, 35, farms one person these are not figures I am just getting out of my mind they are real figures so no farmer is being left without land” (AP Archive 2015).

After Zimbabwe was sanctioned along with certain key players in the FTLRP, President Mugabe gave a speech and put forward the question of sovereignty as western powers all decided to impose sanctions don Zimbabwe because of the FTLRP. On the issues of sanctions, President Mugabe said,

“we belong to this continent we don't mind having and bearing sanctions banning us from Europe we are not Europeans we have not asked for any inch of Europe any square inch of that territory so Blair keep your England and let me keep my Zimbabwe” (AP Archive 2015, 2:56).

On the 3rd of September 2002 Earth Summit, Tony Blair gave his response to President Mugabe’s speech. He debunked his claim that Britain wanted to place Zimbabwe under a neo-colonial rule as an extension of Britain. According to President Mugabe they were doing this by stalling the provision of money needed for the LRP. On the contrary Tony Blair argued saying,

“this nonsense about somehow we have held up land reform - the money is there for land reform. He could get that money and use it for land reform at any point in time he wanted.

The only demand that is being made is the demand that it is done through the United Nations programme in order to make sure that the money goes to the people, the poor people that actually need it - not into the pockets of him and his henchmen and the other people running the show" (Journeyman Pictures 2019,1:10).

Blair spoke on how Zimbabwe was receiving grain imports from Mozambique, yet it had the capacity to produce its own. He pointed to Claire Short's decision of focusing on poverty alleviation programmes for it was clear that there were food shortages in Zimbabwe. PM dismisses President Mugabe's criticism (AP Archive 2015).

In an interview, a journalist from the SABC, asked President Mugabe why he focused on land so much, yet the country had other resources which could bring economic prosperity. President Mugabe responded saying,

"so to us that entity that resource once it ceased to be ours created a sense of deprivation, deep sense of deprivation and as we you know looked back after colonialism had established itself the greatest loss that was felt was that of land and people talked of the land they had lost to the white man. Shall it ever come back and when we organized our struggle, the first of the grievances was that of the loss of our land, so it was the fight for land it was the main issue…it was the main issue on the agenda at because at the very essence there is that value that it has always had" (Journeyman Pictures 2019, 2:32).

When asked about the Lancaster constitution, President Mugabe articulated that on the agenda were the land issues. They had made up their mind that land needed to be taken back and the British government also acknowledges that. However, the how part was the most vexing, but the Zimbabwean delegation made it clear that it did not want to carry the costs of the reacquisition of land because the land had been taken form the ancestors without any compensation for it. Shortly after, the British government and the Zimbabwean delegation made a gentleman's agreement that the former would take care of the expenses of the land reform. However, in practice, the British government was not eager to release funds for the compensation of land. It was the American government that provided the first lump sum of funds to be used for the LRP. In contrast to the agreement made, the British government now made new demands saying that it would provide funding if the Zimbabwean government would match the amount the British government were offering. Meaning the money was to be provided given that they each shared the responsibility equally. President Mugabe said,

"….this is how the British do it sly and cunning and undependable in the extreme so we had to fight this" (Journeyman Pictures 2019,12:56).

Zimbabwe was able to come up with only 40 million pounds which it had been given by the US. However, the situation changed when President Reagan came into office in the US. According to President Mugabe, President Reagan was not well informed about the LRP issues. Instead, he devised to cut the assistance to the Zimbabwean government because the country had previously shown support to China and the USSR therefore, he saw the Zimbabwean government as a communist government. By this point, the British had halted all funding for the LRP. When Thatcher was succeeded by John Major, Major

was willing to cooperate with the Zimbabwean government regarding the LRP (Journeyman Pictures 2019).

After the letter from Clare Short to the Minister of Agriculture stating that the British government had no intention to pay the compensation needed for the LRP. To that President Mugabe responded,

“they had apparently no rules no principles, so, we said fine, if they're going to behave that way we will also here ignore completely the issue of adhering to principles of compensation of the farmer. So we will take our land they keep their money we keep our land. So take our land by force or whatever means well that's how we said we would proceed. Now we would pay compensation only for improvements anything that one can call developmental on the farm, an irrigation scheme, dam, fencing home, the state will pay compensation for but not for the land itself” (Journeyman Pictures 2019, 21:32).

President Mugabe highlighted that the government did not dissuade the war veterans when they started the land occupations and did not give any orders for them to do so. The interviewer asked why they did not steer the war veterans away from violence but to legal means and the response form the President was that since the British government was sly and avoided legalities, they would also discard legal processes and put political means to play (Journeyman Pictures 2019).

5.3. The Sanctioning Of Zimbabwe

As the LRP entered its third decade as the FTLRP, all previously agreed terms were no longer valid. Emotions and political tensions were high as seen by the rhetoric and indirect exchange between Tony Blair and President Mugabe at international seminars. Zimbabwe was not amused by the efforts of the New Labour government to turn over a new leaf by creating a new narrative for itself isolated from the one of colonialism. The new way was also in the path of the goals the Zimbabwean government had for the future of the country. Consequently, there was a clash of interests which eventually played out in favour of the British government for it gained western validation when the FTLRP was presented as evidence that Zimbabwe had become a rouge nation needing containment. Also considering that the afflicted British farmers had more in common racially with the majority of the western world created a union based on commonality. Consequently, was a collision of ideologies, historical backgrounds as well as future goals (Chingono 2010, 68).

In the heat of the FTLRP, subsequently, Zimbabwe received sanctions from western powers over the disregard of the rule of law, human rights violations, lack of democracy as well as violation of property laws. The European Union, United States of America, Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom all participated in the sanctioning of Zimbabwe (Chingono 2010, 66). As part of the sanctions, Zimbabwe received economic restrictions from the US known as the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA) of 2001. Under this act, the government of Zimbabwe would no longer has access to receiving loans from international institutions such as the African Development Bank (ADB) the IMF and the WB only with the exception that the loan is authorized by the US itself (Chingono 2010, 70).

The dismissal of Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth was said to be due to racism against white people in Zimbabwe (2010, 912). Under ZIDERA, the President of the US was the main authoriser of any loan to Zimbabwe by the Brettonwoods institutions. Jonathan Moyo who was the Minister of Information at the time called the sanctions "organised economic terrorism" directly targeted at Zimbabwe's sovereignty. Zimbabwe was also no longer allowed to trade in military equipment, a decree made by the US. The Zimbabwean government argued that the country was being penalised for claiming back its rights, the rights to land. Zimbabwe was on the way from losing the title darling of the West when the government signed the LAA into law (Chipanga 2015, 298-99).

On the other hand, according to the US, ZIDERA was meant to assist in the rebuilding of the Zimbabwean economy as well as encouraging democratic rule. Under ZIDERA, the Zimbabwean government was not allowed to partake in economy development programmes introduced by the International Bank for Construction and Development (IBCD) (Chipanga 2015, 292-293). In addition to financial restrictions, the political elites of Zimbabwe who had involved, directly or indirectly, in the FTLRP and kleptocracy received targeted sanctions. As a result, these individuals could not travel to certain countries and their family members in those countries were to face deportation. Money belonging to Mugabe's loyalists held in any European banks as well as other assets was to be frozen (Chingono 2010, 71).

Along with the US, travel bans that were issued on the ZANU members and their children also extended to Switzerland, New Zealand and Australia (Chipanga 2015, 299). The sanctions placed on the actors were a means to repress corruptive attitudes and kleptocratic tendencies which affect the functioning of institutions as the actors in this case of the LRP managed to bypass the constraints of the institutions governing them in pursuit of their own interests (International Crisis Group 2012, 4). A travel ban was issued against seventy-six state officials as well as President Mugabe himself by President Bush 2002 February (Grebe 2010, 16).

The EU sanctions were issued in accordance to the Council Common Position 2002/145/CFSP in 2002 on the 18th of February (Grebe 2010, 12). German landowners who held German citizenship found themselves falling victim to the land occupations which is why the EU participated in the sanctions. Relations between Germany and Zimbabwe collapsed for the government of Zimbabwe did not adhere to the agreement made between the two nations involving the exclusion of Germans from the compulsory land acquisitions. This brought into focus the issue of property laws (Chipanga 2015, 302).

At the 68th UN General Assembly, President Mugabe gave a speech and used the platform to speak on the sanctioning of Zimbabwe. He said,

"the illegal economic sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe by the United States and the European Union violate fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter on state sovereignty and non-interference in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state" (Moving Africa2Freedom 2013, 15:11).

He further expressed that the transference of land to the Zimbabwean people was not against the law and should not warrant sanctions. He continued saying,

"in the eyes of our people the sanctions constitutive form of hostility and violence against them for the simple crime of undertaking in the land reform program by which land was put in the hands of the then majority landless Zimbabweans are small and peaceful country is threatened daily by covetous and bigoted big powers whose hunger for domination and control of other nations and their resources knows no bounds shame shame shame we say to the United States of America shame shame shame we say to Britain and its allies" (Moving Africa2Freedom 2013, 15:41).

As provision of UK aid to Zimbabwe was also cut back, the sanctions were seen by the government as a form of political coercion on Zimbabwe for the many restrictions to food, medical, and financial aid led to the failing of the government to meet the medical and food demands of the people. Aid from the EU also enabled the government to give the teachers decent salaries however, after 2000 this changed leading to large-scale brain drain when it comes to teachers (Chipanga 2015, 306-307). On the contrary, it is argued that the illegality of the sanctions can be debunked by considering that the sanctions were used not to disable the country but to restrict activities that may encourage corruption as well as the exploitation of then citizens. For example, the exchange of military equipment was done so as to prevent an influx of arms into the country which would be used as a means of control against the citizens (International Crisis Group 2012, 2).

5.4. Conclusion

The years 2000 to 2003 saw the disintegration of ties between Zimbabwe and Britain. As the government of Zimbabwe did not take action against the violation of human rights which took place against the British farmers, President Mugabe became an unpopular figure. The former friend of the west was now seen as a dictator. Tony Blair in his rhetoric helped to solidify this claim by insinuating that President Mugabe's government was misusing the funds meant for the land reform.

Consequently, Zimbabwe was sanctioned by many countries of the global north. The first group of sanctions came from the United States of America. ZIDERA gave the power to decide whether or not Zimbabwe was to receive loans to the President of the US. Those who were members of ZANU also received targeted sanctions, travel bans and the withholding of their bank accounts in other countries that wee in support of the sanctions. President Mugabe expressed that the sanctions were not legal and they were a form of retaliation against Zimbabwe's sovereignty. The FTLRP resulted in the economic alienation of Zimbabwe as well as sanctions which further crippled the already struggling economy.

Chapter 3, 4 and 5 sum up the entire span of the LRP, therefore in the following chapter, I examine the data in these chapters against the arguments posed in the literature.

6. FINDINGS

6.1. Introduction

The aim of the study is to understand the causal mechanisms behind the failure of the Land Reform Programme (LRP) institution and the factors which led to its failure as well as the effect that had on the Zimbabwe-Britain relations. In my findings, I apply Within Case Comparison process tracing while testing the findings against the arguments posed in Chapter 2 on material-interests, path dependence as well as the assumptions about post-colonial institutions. In this chapter, I present the data while highlighting the path dependent periods of the LRP and the forces behind them. I also give evidence of the periods of continuity versus the periods of change within the LRP framework which encompass the identification of factors such as the pursuit of material-interests by actors. I test the role played by factors such as "increasing returns, self-reinforcement, positive feedback, and lock-in" (Page 2006, 88) throughout the all the phases of the LRP. In chronological order, I identify the mechanisms behind transformation and determine to what extent they contributed to the failure of the institution. In so doing, I do not employ theories to make generalisations unto the case, but I measure the applicability of the theories against the data.

6.2. 1980-2003

The creation of the LRP as a "path" to Zimbabwe's economic, political and social emancipation is observed in 1979 when the LRP agreement was made, and in 1980 when implementation began. From this point it is seen that the historical background of the Zimbabwe and Britain had great influence on the creation of the LRP. This gives evidence to the claim made by Sydow that when institutions or actors make decisions, those decisions are usually "historically conditioned" (Sydow et al. 2009, 690). The British settlers in Zimbabwe took a lot of land from the indigenous dwellers, creating class and racial divisions. Therefore, after the Second Chimurenga, the taking back of land was the focus for the Zimbabweans. The redistribution of land was a necessity if Zimbabwe wished to be free from colonial rule.

The impact of history on decisions is also perceived by the initiation of socialist policies soon after independence. When Robert Mugabe became the first president of Zimbabwe, his very first policies were socialist, and they were centred on the emancipation of the indigenous population. These were the Growth With Equity plan (GWE) introduced in 1981 and the Three-Year Transitional Development Plan (TNDP) which was introduced the following year in 1982 till 1984. GWE was a response to the colonial Rhodesian exploitative and discriminatory regime for it gave much access to Zimbabweans to equal opportunities as the British (Fisher 2010, 30). The GWE plan addressed mostly social issues such as education and health, whereas the TNDP was geared towards the creation of a social economy (Republic of Zimbabwe TNDP 1982,1).

In the first few years of the LRP, the redistribution of and was supported by socialist policies which gave the indigenous people an upper hand in obtaining land quickly, gave them access to better schools and better healthcare services. However, the

socialist path was not long lived despite the evidence of "positive feedbacks" which were the successes of GWE. According to Page (2006, 88), "positive feedbacks" give encouragement to actors to adhere to a path for a long period of time. This was not the case with the socialist policies for in 1986, the Zimbabwean government began to consider policies which were more geared towards economic growth. This meant that they had to adopt a capitalist outlook. As a result, in 1985 the TNDP was discontinued and the first Five-Year National Development Plan (NDP) of 1986 was introduced. The "positive feedbacks" from GWE and the TNDP were greatly on the social level and not the economic level thus why they were discontinued.

Thus, socialism was the focus in the first half of the first decade after the initiation of the LRP, followed by capitalism. However, both approaches did not bear the desired results for the Zimbabwean government. This created an environment of desperation which led to the first pivotal moment which was the adoption of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP). I identify the ESAP as a pivotal moment in the progression of the LRP for it set off a chain of events which collectively led to the failure of the institution. It was a sharp deviation from the people friendly policies which the government had implemented in the first decade of the LRP.

One of the most notable drivers of change in institutions is the role played by critical junctures and institutions. I identified two instances which caused drastic changes in the LRP. The first one was the Economic Structural adjustment Programme (ESAP) of 1991 and Clare Short's letter in 1998, however, I shall review the impact of the ESAP first. According to the path dependence theory, critical junctures can be positive or destructive depending on their nature and the environment in which they occur (Thelen 1999, 392). In addition to Thelen's view of critical junctures in the literature, Page (2006, 87) alludes to the role played by "shocks" to affect the direction of events. Such "shocks" tend to be unplanned, and their impact is often met with unpreparedness for the receiving end thus giving these "shocks" the ability to "alter the course of history".

In the LRP case, the first critical juncture and shock was the introduction of the ESAP. The ESAP was a product of the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It pushed for the adoption of neo-liberal market policies on a government that was engaging with protectionist socialist policies. The ESAP was detrimental to the redistribution of land and poverty alleviation for it created a wealth gap between ordinary citizens and the capitalists. The market based LRP through the ESAP, and neo-liberal approach made the LRP an elitist pursuit at the expense of the landless (Lebert 2003, 12). The impact of the ESAP contributed to the restlessness that grew within the peasant communities which had become more impoverished leading to the farm invasions.

In chapter two, I alluded to Sorensen's discussion on institutional transformation. Some of the catalysts for transformation which Sorensen referred to are "layering", "drift", "displacement" and "conversion" (Sorensen 2014, 20). I have taken note of the evidence of this phenomenon within the case study at various intervals during the second phase of the LRP. A period of institutional transformation is observed in the second phase of the programme whereby a lot of amendments were made to the constitution by the government and the President. Sorensen's contribution on institutional transformation is

of great importance in this case study for it enriched my knowledge on understanding how drastically and subtly institutional transformation can take place.

Firstly, "layering" is defined as applying new schemes or strategies onto old ones to lessen the limitations of the old existing schemes (Sorensen 2014, 21). As the LRP constitution reached its ten-year mark where it was agreed that it would be modified, and the willing buyer willing seller (WBWS) terms would change but the British government displayed an attitude of resistance to change. Consequently, the Zimbabwean government made amendments to the constitution for they could not do away with the WBWS clause completely.

When the first decade of the LRP ended, the Zimbabwean government wanted to do away with the market controlled WBWS restriction (Lebert 2003, 11). The first instance of institutional transformation through "layering" is observed after 1990. The goals of the British and the Zimbabwean governments were diverging and some of the points of diversion as highlighted by the Zimbabwean government were,

"i) The extent to which redistribution should include small and medium black capitalist farmers rather than poor and landless peasants; (ii) The UK's insistence that land redistribution be gradualist, releasing 50 000 hectares per year to below 3000 households; (iii) The conditionality of UK support on demand-driven acquisition, and decentralised and civil society engaged institutional approaches which limits the role of central government" (Lebert 2003, 12).

The acquirement of land on a compulsory basis and without any compensation was made illegal in the Zimbabwean constitution under chapter 3 of the declaration of rights between section 11 and 26. Section 11 stated that land would not be taken if no payment was to be given to the farmer. Section 16 supported this, affirming property rights by stating that all property that had been purchased according to the law was considered legal and the holder of that property could only surrender it willingly and not by force. Chapter 16 of the Zimbabwean constitution bound the government to adhere to the WBWS clause. Consequently, it is this section which was modified from time to time to accommodate the goals of the government concerning the redistribution of land (Naldi 1998, 80). Sorensen's concept of "layering" is therefore seen when the acquisition of abandoned land was drafted into the constitution. Land which was considered abandoned was to be repossessed by the government despite it being under the ownership of an individual (Madhuku 2004,132).

Sorensen highlighted that change could take place through "drift" whereby an institution transforms as a response to external changes which may be limiting its capabilities in terms of achieving goals (Sorensen 2014, 21-22). The evidence of "drift" in the case study is when seen when the Bill of Rights which preserved the British farmer privileges expired in 1990 and the Zimbabwean government sought to make drastic changes to the constitution. In 1991 on the 17th of April, the new constitution stipulated that all British farms were eligible for mandatory procurement whether they were being used or not, payment was to be made within a feasible time not as immediately as proposed by the Bill of Rights and lastly, the court no longer had power to make any deliberations on the objectivity of the land acquisition (Madhuku 2004,132-133).

This amendment was a modification of section 11 which previously did not commend compulsory acquisition of land. With the constitution modified the Zimbabwean government now had the right to take land by force, however, with compensation being given to whom the land has been taken from. With this, the government now had the power to set the price to be given for farms, when money would be given and the conditions upon which land would be taken. The government was the sole decision maker in this process (Naldi 1998, 80). Nevertheless, this decision was revised again in 1993 when the court was given some power to state the amount of money to be given for land as well as the selection of farms to be taken for distribution (Naldi 1998, 82).

Evidence of the concept of "displacement", which is the substitution of policies which have proven to be ineffective with effective policies, is observed in the year 1992 with the Land Acquisition Act was passed (Sorensen 2014, 21-22). The LAA of 1992 stipulated that all the land which was still in British farmers possession was going to be purchased and redistributed. The act was made compulsory due to the failure of the willing buyer willing seller concept of land redistribution which saw less than half of the land expected to be surrendered not being sold. The Land Acquisition Act was stalled but then fully implemented from the year 1998. The act was locked to the principles of the 1990 agreement which stated that farms would be taken from farmers who were not using the land, was not present on the land, or had several other farms. In a bid to avoid complexities, President Mugabe alerted the British government of his plans concerning the Land Acquisition Act and advised them that the farmers who were going to lose their land would need compensation. He made this plea at the Commonwealth Heads of Government conference in 1997 which was held in the UK (Thomas 2003, 699).

Transformation within institutions through "conversion" takes place when the existing policies are not changed but they are applied in a different way (Sorensen 2014, 21-22). With the LAA of 1992 already in existence, "conversion" takes place with the LAA of 1998. LAA of 1998 gave authority to the government to cease land for redistribution through giving full authority to the president to continue land acquisitions as long as it was also for the benefit of the country. In section 12 and 13, now stated that the Minister of Agriculture could select land that was to be taken for redistribution, notify the owner as well as the public of this decision. In the latter however, the farmer could contest the decision by the minister who was then expected to make necessary arrangements to investigate the matter then finalise his or her decision (Naldi 1998,82-83). After that in section 17 and 18, the Compensation Committee would then deliberate on a reasonable amount to be given for the land after it had been evaluated (Naldi 1998, 803).

The second critical juncture and "shock" Clare Short's to the Minister of Agriculture. This letter was a blunt announcement from the New Labour Party that they were not going to take part in the helping to finance the LRP. In the second phase of the LRP, the New Labour Party came into office in Britain, and it had a different vision for the country. That vision included discontinuation of the LRP funding. This was a remarkable turn of events, however the letter from Clare Short played a very important role in sparking the land invasions. Prime Minister John Major of the Conservative Party,

which was the party that was in office when the Lancaster agreement was signed in 1979, was not opposed to funding the LRP. However, his predecessors, the New Labour Party were not of the same mindset. The letter from Clare Short was received on the 5th of November in 1997. This letter has been criticized as a 'diplomatic blunder' and a sign that the New Labour Party was not well versed in the nature of the land issue (Streater 2018,141). The letter was addressed to the Minister of Agriculture and Land. Short stated,

"I should make it clear that we do not accept that Britain has a special responsibility to meet the costs of land purchase in Zimbabwe. We are a new government from diverse backgrounds without links to former colonial interests" (The Guardian 2011).

She then said that the new government was aware of the problems the country was facing but would only be involved in "poverty eradication" schemes and not land reform funding. For this too, transparency was required from the Zimbabwean government. Furthermore, the new government had no interest in supporting the "rapid land acquisition" for it no longer suited their agenda (The Guardian 2011).

In the case of the LRP, the hypothesis that "reactive sequences" can lead to positive reactions which may result in "future inefficiency" is confirmed by the frequency of the constitutional amendments to the LRP terms and conditions. President Mugabe facilitated a number of constitutional amendments to the LRP's conditions as a reaction to the lack of engagement from the British. These amendments did not provide permanent solutions but gave short lived positive reactions which accumulatively contributed to the failure of the LRP. Amendments were made to the Bill of Rights which protected private property ownership privileges to the British farmers. Despite the short-lived positive reactions such as the granting of power the judges to deem land eligible for redistribution under the LAA/1992, the "future inefficiency" of these "reactive sequences" had more severe impact on the institution. This is due to the reason that despite the various amendments which gave more power to the local government to enforce redistribution, the government lost financial support from donors and other parties. The amendments made to the Bill of Rights concerning the acquisition of land were seen as too harsh and a violation of property rights, hence this cost the government a great deal of financial support.

Each amendment that was made, was made to escape the binding legalities of the Bill of Rights. In the final years of the LRP, "displacement" resulted in "lock in" whereby the FTLRP was constitutionalised completely doing away with the LRP Bill of Rights. In 2000, the Land Acquisition Amendment Act ushered in the FTLRP whereby the Zimbabwean government was not required to offer payment for acquired land. According to the amendment of 2000, notices given to farmers were to be valid for one year. But in the next year, the amendment increased the number of years to two after notice was issued (Madhuku 2004, 139-140).

Both the Zimbabwean and the British governments tried to manipulate the law to further their politically and economically motivated goals. Britain's Bill of Rights was protectionist against complete loss of land to the Zimbabwe whereas the Land Acquisition amendments were to loosen the restrictions that hampered the LRP (Madhuku 2004, 145).

Soon after the constitution amendment, in 1992, an announcement was made in the government newspaper alerting farmers whose farms were to be taken for redistribution. Once a farmer's land was enlisted for acquisition, the farmer could not rent out or sell the land unless with the Minister's approval (Madhuku 2004, 133-134). Under the LAA of 1992, the law no longer shielded private property rights for it legalised mandatory farm acquisition, nevertheless, farmers could still challenge the decision in court (Madhuku 2004, 135).

In the final phase of the LRP, I observed that Greener's "a logic of protection" is evidenced by the constitutionalising of the FTLRP by President Mugabe in 2000. Greener (2005,67) "a logic of protection" is a phenomenon which takes place when actors become protective over an institution from forces of change by being locked-in onto paths or decisions which are more rewarding to them. While Greener's definition implies that the protectionist approach is created to avert change, in the case if the LRP, change was used as a shield to protect the LRP from complete abandonment. This is seen when President Mugabe signed into law the new terms for the FTLRP for the land redistribution initiative was under threat from external forces such as Britain. So, to continue with redistribution, the LRP was modified into a more radical FTLRP to safeguard the goals of land redistribution thereby creating a lock-in onto the FTLRP and abandonment of the LRP.

The protectionist approach was also influenced by the blunt declaration in Clare Short's letter that the British government was not obligated to assist in the LRP. This event was a "shock" in the path. It resulted in radical change whereby President Mugabe made the acquisition of farms compulsory and the sole responsibility of the British government to fund them.

In conclusion, the hypothesis provided by the path dependence theory is applicable to a larger extent to understanding how institutional transformation took place in the LTRP leading to its failure. In the next chapter I present my arguments pertaining to the research questions as well as my opinions on the factors leading to the failure of the LRP.

7. ARGUMENT

There are polarised opinions that state that the LRP impoverished Zimbabwe and led to starvation due to the disruption of agricultural production by policy amendments. This is the view of the scholars, whereas on the other hand, the nationalists argue that land redistribution gave way to a new community of small-scale indigenous farmers (Southall 2011, 83-84). Both scholars and nationalists, which includes technocrats as well as politicians, acknowledge that the LRP did not achieve its goals in the set time. However, the scholars attribute those shortcomings to the government, and the nationalists attribute them to the restrictions of the LRP agreement (Southall 2011, 84-85).

Southall (2011,88) identified five "myths" associated with the LRP. The first assumption was that LRP was completely unsuccessful. Secondly kleptocratic politicians gained the most from the programme. Thirdly, the government did not make any infrastructural improvements in the reallocated areas. Fourthly, restructuring agricultural economy led to the failure of the agricultural sector leading to nationwide hunger. The last assumption was that the LRP worsened the quality of life in rural areas.

Nevertheless, the failure of the LRP was not only brought about by the weaknesses of the Zimbabwean leadership and institutions, but also by the actions of the British government. Therefore, in the case of Zimbabwe, for the economy and society of the nation to thrive, there needed to be the support of good and efficient institutions, local and from abroad. Poor decision-making in institutions set off a chain of negative consequences which led to the overall failure of the LRP (Matondi 2012, 4-5).

I agree with all four claims. The LRP was unsuccessful. This is noticeable when we observe the set goals it was meant achieve versus the outcome over two decades. Throughout the process of transitioning to a fully independent state, Zimbabwe went from being the breadbasket of Africa to the reputation of highest inflation rates and poverty. From fostering positive and compliant diplomatic ties with the west, President Mugabe fell from the glory of being praised as a peaceful leader to a dictator, and his country identified as a rogue state.

The first sign of the failure of the LRP can be seen from the year it was agreed upon. The agreement itself came with a lot of compromise on the side of an already frustrated colony. The terms of the LRP were not what Mugabe and Nkomo had desired for the terms gave more protection to the British farmers. Lord Carrington and the Zimbabwean delegation both sought to win in these negotiations. However, one party had more bargaining power than the other. The British government had more power for it had the financial muscle Zimbabwe lacked. The British had the money and the land. That meant the odds would be in their favour for they could set their demands and the Zimbabwean delegation would have no option but to agree to. Hence the WBWS clause was put forward the British government with a promise to also provide the finances to help the Zimbabwean government buy the farms. They had the land and the money, both of which the Zimbabwean statesmen did not have.

As a result, this showed the Zimbabwean delegation that the land question was not going to be addressed on a level playing field which in turn meant they had to turn to devising rather radical means of their own. These were going to be enabled through policies that promoted equality in the country in order to counteract the inequalities if the LRP. One of the first steps was the Growth With Equity (GWE) plan. It was a policy focused on promoting equality and allow the Zimbabwean majority an opportunity to catch up with the British minority for example in education (Fisher 2010, 30).

The GWE plan was soon paired with the Transitional National Development Plan (TNDP) of 1982 to push forward the socialist agenda. However, transforming a capitalistic country into a socialist system was not a simple transition. The transition was also worsened by the economic recession that was affecting the globe. Already the odds were against the LRP and its socialist branch. Another factor that worsened the performance of the policies was that lack of know-how of the ministries and individuals put in charge of overseeing them. The MLRRD was an institution created hastily out of necessity. Therefore, it did not have the expertise and systems on how to facilitate a country wide land reallocation programme. In addition to that, the TNDP also failed partly due to the global recession and the lack of procedural knowledge. In simple terms, the agenda was clear, the reacquisition of land, but the process was unclear. As a result, they had to rely on the processes and the knowledge of the pre-independence Ministry of Agriculture which favoured the British.

In the first half of the decade, the main causal mechanisms that weakened the LRP were lack of experience. Had there been a clear cut and fail proof system the LRP would have set off on a strong footing. On the socialist end, the policies bore desired results, but as to the land question, progress was slow. Perhaps, the main issue was that of speed. As a country that was under colonial rule for decades, the desire for reform was great. However, there could have been instead a gap between the LRP agreement and the introduction of institutions and policies in order allow for time to carefully carve out a detailed and fail proof land acquisition procedures. As highlighted before, the MLRRD was unprepared and had a lot of pressure to deliver. That meant there were short-cuts and lack of consideration of the long-term impact of decisions made. These decisions contributed to the increasing “negative feedbacks” which accumulated until the policy was abandoned.

The failure of policy and institutions led to the creation of more policies to rectify the errors of the policies before. The first decade of the LRP was spent making efforts to conduct land acquisition under the constraints of the LRP constitution and at the same time trying to manoeuvre around the weaknesses of the policies before. As the first half of the first decade ended, the First Five Year National Development Plan was put in place after witnessing the failure and ineffectiveness of short-term policies. Although the policies that came before the five-year NDP were mainly socialistic, the reacquisition of land was taking place at a quick pace. The speed of the land acquisition however ever did not equal the production but instead it disturbed productivity. Farmers were constantly disturbed as the acquisition of farms was taking place at high speed, which Department of Rural Development (DERUDE) and the Commercial Farmer’s Union (CFU) warned against, and the normal cycle of production and business was disrupted. This meant that business was slow and it in turn affected the contributions the farmers made to the nation’s

economy (Dashwood 1996, 37). It is important to acknowledge that although the goal of the LRP was to take back as much land as possible it was just as important to achieve economic growth through agricultural productivity from the acquired land. Thus, why on this front, the policies failed for the economy did not improve but instead worsened and the agriculture sector did not experience a great improvement. There was need to reorder the priorities of the LRP in order to achieve economic growth through agricultural activities.

After that the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) worsened the economic state of the country and the citizens. The ESAP was perhaps a policy that was put in place at premature time. They focused on economic reforms first rather than rectifying the problems from the previous decade to create a stable economy which would be conducive for economic development in different sectors. This would have prepared the country for a role in the global economy through open trade. Not enough time was given to properly tend to the problems created by failed socialist policies, but instead other policies were put in place shortly after to counteract the previous policies.

There is a direct correlation between the decision of Blair's New Labour government with the FTLRP. When the decision to stop all funding for the LRP was made, President Mugabe legalised the FTLRP despite it being against the initial agreement under which the land question was being addressed under. The standing agreement was that of the WBWS basis which was intended to last only ten years to be renegotiated in 1990. Since Britain refused to reconsider this clause. The loss of Britain's financial assistance was most evident in 1997 when the compulsory acquisition of over 1000 farms was published in the newspaper. This was a desperate move by the government of Zimbabwe after realising that two decades and almost passed and still the target of land to be acquired had not been met. Zimbabwe lacked the financial capacity to fund the program and it had lost favour in the international arena due to allegations of corruption. The FTLRP and the land invasions themselves are evidence of a failed programme. Had the LRP been successful, the need to draft a FTLRP into the constitution would not have risen (Peters 2016).

The growth of kleptocratic tendencies and the lack of room for transition of power between political parties, made Zimbabwe lose the trust of its donors and investors. The rigidity of the internal politics of the country meant that the pursuit of material-interests by actors would prevail and go unchecked much to the disadvantage of the economy and the society reliant on that government. Consequently, funds were withheld, and it became difficult to convince potential donors to assist in the program (Hjort 2010, 690).

The question of path dependence arises. Between 1980 and 1985, 3 short term institutions were created. In 1985, the First Five Year NDP, which was socialist and capitalistic, was created however in 1990, it was completely abandoned as a new set of policies, very different from the former was introduced. The lack of uniformity or a set process to be followed for a long period of time was detrimental to the success of the LRP goals. Stability cannot be established in an ever-changing environment whereby rules and the way business is conducted is bound to change every three years. A certain degree of permanency would have been of great benefit to the maturation of the country's economy

and more importantly its institutions. A sense of permanency as well as trust is important for the success of policy and agreements between two parties.

In addition to food shortages created by poor production and the radical changes of the constitution which disrupted the production chain, the LRP failed to unify Zimbabweans. The redistribution of land revealed new class structures and struggles amongst the Zimbabweans themselves. It made the division between the landless, especially in the rural communities, large scale farmers, commercial farmers, and political elites more apparent. The creation of a land market whereby farmers who could not reach their maximum production capacity were renting out parts of their farms to those who had not received any land. The LRP also disrupted traditional values and customs of land allocation to a more profit based and politically motivated land redistribution. As former farm workers found themselves without employment, crowding on small pieces of land, squatting on British farms as well as food shortages, the quality of life of the poor worsened. The goal of poverty alleviation had failed (Moyo 2011).

The landless in Zimbabwe before and after independence included the individuals who worked on the farms as employees. After the implementation of the LRP, much focus was placed on poverty alleviation and the redistribution of land to the landless. However, farm employees found themselves not fitting into the main category of the intended beneficiaries of the LRP. The plight of the farms workers was unique and much different to that of the employed landless peasants. With the LRP, they were not placed in their own category which recognised their needs as unique but instead they were lumped together in the they were placed under the same umbrella as the poor landless (Moyo et al. 2000, 181).

After independence, most African countries did not achieve economic prosperity. This is claimed to be a result of the post-colonial ideologies of the new governments which sought to cement the power of the state overall while neglecting and failing to see the value of long-standing cultural institutions that were there before colonisation. One success story that is often compared to post-colonial economic failures is that of Botswana. Botswana was able to achieve greater economic development due to having more favourable political outlooks compared to its neighbour Zimbabwe (Hjort 2010, 690). It can be argued that some of the pre-independence institutions did not go through major transformation such as the Ministry of Agriculture which the MLRRD continued to adapt its system after, because of the size of such a task. In addition, some of the inequalities that were previously between British and indigenous farmers were now shifted to the landless citizens versus the elites. Inequalities introduced by colonial institutions were not completely dealt with by the post-colonial institutions (Frankema 2010, 447).

The British removed traditional institutions which they saw as primitive, yet they were functional in the societies they were in (Hjort 2010, 695). The abandonment of the role of traditional authority by the post-colonial government is land distribution might have done more harm than good to the LRP. The MLRRD completely institutionalised the distribution of land making the state the sole owner of land with the power to allocate and take land. As a nation which claimed that land was part of their culture, the importance of communal leadership such as chiefs should have been preserved to avoid

a haphazard and chaotic land grabbing stint. Instead, the chiefs were stripped of that power to allocate land which was a responsibility they had before colonialism. Having these traditional authorities operating in unison with the state institutions would have helped to maintain a sense of order as well as clear bureaucratic and fair system of land allocation.

The traditional and communal institutions of governance were left without power as they were seen as a potential threat to the post-colonial state. It can be argued that a symbiotic relationship between the traditional and post-colonial institutions could have assisted in establishing a more socially and economically cohesive environment for growth. Power was centralised towards the government which lacked experience and became overwhelmed by the great responsibility it had to undertake. Traditional institutions had prior experience of how to manage land and share resources amongst the members of the community. These systems could have been of great advantage to the infant post-colonial government as they would lend knowledge on how to manage and share the land. On the other hand, giving power to traditional institutions could have jeopardised the opportunity the government had to engage with western support, hence, the institutions and power structures in Zimbabwe had to be modelled after the west's (Ogbaharya 2008, 400-401).

The redistribution of land was to be of benefit to the Zimbabwe majority however, the majority did not participate in the decision-making process (Alexander 1994, 331). This was due to the reason that actors within institutions often act and make decisions based on their egos which in turn affect policy implementation (Peters 2019, 55). I agree with both statements from Alexander and Peters for since land was an important part of tradition and cultural identity, it was necessary for the Zimbabwean government to maintain the traditional value of local leaders such as chiefs when it came to land allocation. Although corruption can take place at any level, the chiefs as locals had the advantage of knowledge when it came to the level of productivity the recipients could achieve versus allotting land to unproductive families. As a policy that had great impact on the livelihoods of the recipients, it was also important for their opinions to be considered in the policy making processes.

An extensive study could have been made on the ground to help plan how the resettlement could be carried out. It was necessary for the policy enforcers to be well versed in the demands and the needs of the people at community and household level. This practice is done by non-governmental organizations before they carry out any project. The same should have been done especially for a large scale and important initiative such as this. It was also an error to expect peasant farmers to start producing commercial agricultural produce for trade without any prior knowledge or training on how to operate large scale farming operations and without adequate government assistance.

There is need for there to be separation between nationalistic goals, political goals and social transformation goals. The LRP was an institution used as a tool to achieve all these goals. This merging of goals under one policy can make the implementation difficult and unclear for there will be no boundaries to draw the line where each goal starts and to where it ends. For example, using the redistribution of land to gain political mileage,

entrusting the growth of agricultural trade to communal farmers who were naturally more concerned with growing food for their own families and to trade amongst themselves.

If the threat of losing the country's sovereignty was an issue pertaining to the ownership of large pieces of land by British farmers, the government of Zimbabwe could have introduced its own set of trade and agricultural production laws that countered those introduced by western institution such as the IMF. Instead of accepting the ESAP introduced by the IMF from its own external observations and trade ambitions, the state should have had its own roadmap on how it was going to help the country recover from the economic slump it was in. This is important because the ESAP worsened the economy which in turn increased the need for resettlement and acquisition of farms.

The states' lack of its own "ESAP" affected the success of the LRP. This goes back to the main issue with the LRP and the MLRRD that being that the LRP was more results focused and overlooked the need for a clear and precise process. The processes of the LRP were engineered as it progressed, it was one policy after another. When a challenge emerged, a new policy would be introduced to try to counter the hurdle. It is ideal for an institution to have foresight pertaining to the kind of hurdles it may face in the implementation of a project. Most of the counter policies that emerged to address issues such as lack of cooperation by the British farmers and the government should have been laid down prior to the problems materializing.

This would have been possible had there been a degree of foresight and placing these conditions to foreseen problems on the negotiation table would have shown the state's preparedness and intentions. The MLRRD was created out of necessity and did not have experienced personnel. A combination of inexperience and lack of foresight created an impression that the government was improvising. Decisions were made hastily. The short-sightedness of the MLRRD was to its detriment.

In conclusion, the LRP has a very significant role in the history of Zimbabwe. Its success or failure affected the nation on a national and global level, affecting its international relations with the global community. The FTLRP till this day remains a common topic of conversation amongst Zimbabweans when they reminisce how it affected their lives and the country's economy. For the government it is still a stumbling block in the way of creating good relations with the west for which it is trying to establish by paying reparations to the displaced British farmers.

8. CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS

The purpose of this research was to investigate the factors which led to the failure of the LRP and the deterioration of the Zimbabwe-Britain relations as a result. I started this investigation with the hypothesis that the role of the British' government's engagement or lack of was one of the major contributors to the failure of the LRP. I employed Within Case Process Tracing as method of investigation to chronologically analyse the events that unfolded throughout the LRP period leading up to the "lock in" to the FTLRP.

In chapter one, I outlined the format of the research as well as the historical background to the LRP. I also highlighted the meaning behind the label "darling of the west" as well as its significance to the study. In the same chapter, I presented my chosen method of research according to the nature of the investigation which is a single historical case study.

In the second chapter, I engaged with three main arguments. These arguments are the role played by the pursuit of material-interests in contributing to the failure of the LRP, the path dependency theory and how it explores institutional transformation and finally, the argument on the behaviour of the Zimbabwean government was typical of post-colonial institutions. The literature enriched the investigation by adding to my comprehension of institutional transformation and how it can be studied critically.

The third, fourth and fifth chapters provide the historical data from which I drew my evidence from. In these chapters I gave a chronological historical account of the LRP from implementation to abandonment. I identified the different policies which were introduced while evaluating to what extent they had a positive or negative impact on the LRP initiative. However, during the collection of historical data, the biggest limitation was the lack of access to historical records from the Zimbabwean government. Access to parliamentary discussions and policy documents was necessary for such data would have given evidence to role played by actor pertaining to decision making. On the other hand, parliamentary discussions by the British were more accessible on the United Kingdom parliament website.

In the sixth chapter, I test the claims and arguments posed in chapter two against the evidence. In this chapter I was able to weigh the plausibility of the arguments to the research question. The path dependence theory was more applicable in understanding how institutional transformation occurs overtime and the role played by actors and external forces. Whereas the post-colonial and pursuit of material-interests arguments proved to be applicable to a lesser extent compared to the path dependence theory. Pursuit of material-interests and post-colonial institutions behaviour imply that the fate of the LRP was solely at the mercy of the interests and temperaments of the actors. Such a claim would have been better tested had there been more data available on parliamentary discussions and proceedings.

Finally, I presented my arguments in chapter seven whereby I acknowledged the extent to which the lack of the British government's cooperation contributed to the failure of the LRP. The purpose of is investigation was to understand why the LRP was a failure.

This was a success for I uncovered the forces behind institutional transformation which resulted in the "lock-in" which was the FTLRP. The LRP was not a single party effort but was a dual responsibility of a former colonial government and its now independent colony. The resistance to change and deflection of responsibility by the British ultimately led to an imbalance in the LRP initiative whereby on party was resisting surrendering power and the other was trying to loosen the former's colonial grip. In addition, I engage with the claim that state centred behaviours of post-colonial institutions confirming that this contributed to the failure of the LRP.

In conclusion, various factors contributed to the failure of the LRP, some being agent driven and others being natural interactions of successes and failures throughout the lifespan of an institution. This investigation adds to the existing hypothesis as to why the LRP was not a success and how it resulted in Zimbabwe earning the label of a rouge nation by providing an analysis of the institutions and actors involved in its creation and decline. For further research, land reform cases from other Southern African countries such as Botswana and Namibia can be investigated along institutional parameters to provide comparison with the Zimbabwean case to draw necessary lessons from how institutions in different circumstances dealt with land reform in their countries.

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APPENDIX 1: WORK PLAN

Event	November 2022	January 2023	March 2023	June 2023	September 2023	June 2024
Proposal writing						
Proposal presentation and approval						
Data collection						
Report writing						
Data analysis						
Report submission and defence						

APPENDIX 2: EXPENSES

No	Item	Quantity	Unit Cost	Amount (TL)
	Flash disc	1	200	200
	File	Uncertain	Uncertain	30
	Transport to and from campus for meetings	N/A	N/A	600
	Laptop	1	10,000	10,000
	Printing	Uncertain	Uncertain	500
	Lunch	Uncertain	Uncertain	500
	Subtotal			11,830