

YEDITEPE UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

**IS IT POSSIBLE TO OVERCOME PRINCIPIUM
INDIVIDUATIONIS? A CRITICAL READING OF NIETZSCHE'S
VIEWS IN THE BIRTH OF TRAGEDY**

Denizalp Şimşek

Istanbul - 2024

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By
Denizalp Şimşek

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Supervisor
Assoc. Prof. Lale Levin Basut

Jurors
Assoc. Prof. Lale Levin Basut
Assistant Prof. Levent Yurdakul Kavas
Prof. Dr. Berfin Kart Tepe

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ABSTRACT

IS IT POSSIBLE TO OVERCOME PRINCIPIUM INDIVIDUATIONIS? A CRITICAL READING OF NIETZSCHE'S VIEWS IN THE BIRTH OF TRAGEDY

The purpose of this thesis is to critically examine the concept of *principium individuationis* in the context of Nietzsche's first published work, i.e., *The Birth of Tragedy*, and discuss whether it is possible to overcome this principle as Nietzsche asserted. At first look, it is seen that, according to Nietzsche, *principium individuationis* pertains to image-making, the forms of cognizing appearances, the individuality of objects of experience and the self-identity of the subject. The current study argues that even though he did not explicitly discuss the problem of individuation, Kant's views on the synthetic unity of apperception can be interpreted as his understanding of *principium individuationis* and can be seen as the proper predecessor of Nietzsche's thoughts in his first published work. Accordingly, it is argued that, although on some special instances there can be disruptions regarding some aspects of the principle, it is nevertheless impossible to overcome the *principium individuationis* completely, since the synthetic unity of apperception, as the *principium individuationis*, grounds the possibility of all experience.

Keywords: Apperception, principium individuationis, the Birth of Tragedy

ÖZET

BİREYLEŞİM İLKESİNİ AŞMAK OLANAKLI MIDIR? NİETZSCHE’NİN TRAGEDYA’NIN DOĞUŞU’NDAKİ GÖRÜŞLERİNE İLİŞKİN ELEŞTİREL BİR OKUMA

Bu tezin amacı, Nietzsche'nin ilk yayımlanan eseri *Tragedyanın Doğuşu* bağlamında *principium individuationis* kavramını eleştirel bir biçimde incelemek ve Nietzsche'nin iddia ettiği üzere bu ilkeyi aşmanın olanaklı olup olmadığını tartışmaktır. İlk bakışta Nietzsche'ye göre *principium individuationis*'in imge oluşturma, görünüşleri bilme kalıpları, deneyim nesnelerinin bireyselliği ve öznenin kendisi ile özdeşliği ile ilgili olduğu görülür. Bu çalışma, her ne kadar bireyleşim problemini açıkça tartışmamış olsa da Kant'ın appersepsiyonun sentetik birliğine ilişkin görüşlerinin, onun bireyleşim ilkesine ilişkin anlayışı olarak yorumlanabileceğini ve Nietzsche'nin ilk yayımlanan eserindeki düşüncelerinin uygun öncülü olarak görülebileceğini ileri sürmektedir. Buna göre, kimi özel durumlarda ilkenin bazı yönleriyle ilgili bozulmalar söz konusu olabilse de *principium individuationis*'in tamamen aşılmasının yine de olanaksız olduğu, çünkü *principium individuationis* olarak appersepsiyonun sentetik birliğinin, tüm deneyimin olanaklılığının temeli olduğu ileri sürülmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Appersepsiyon, principium individuationis, Tragedyanın Doğuşu

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1. INTRODUCTION

Friedrich Nietzsche's first published book, *The Birth of Tragedy* (1999), is seen as a problematic start for a philosopher's career, even by Nietzsche himself, as he expresses it in *An Attempt to Self-Criticism* (Nietzsche, 1999) and *Ecce Homo* (Nietzsche, 2007). Many scholars suggest that there are various elements to be clarified and discussed (Clark, 2015; Daniels, 2014; Tongeren, 1996; Winfree, 2003) since the book can be still regarded as an "enigma" with "historical difficulties" and "philosophical complications" (Daniels, 2014, p.1). Furthermore, one might even consider the book a "failure" (Tongeren, 1996) as suggested by the philosopher himself in *An Attempt to Self-Criticism* (Nietzsche, 1999) as well as, according to Nietzsche's testimony (1872), his teacher Hermann Usener, whom Nietzsche respected greatly. As we know from one of Nietzsche's letters to Erwin Rohde (1872), because of Nietzsche's claims in *The Birth of Tragedy*, Usener condemned Nietzsche by stating that he must be "scientifically dead" (*wissenschaftlich todt*). Another highly discussed issue is the matter of originality. Although it is mostly accepted that Nietzsche is mostly a Schopenhauerian in this early work, many scholars indicate that *The Birth of Tragedy* has an original philosophy of its own, arguments of which can be seen as predecessors of what mature Nietzsche cultivates in his later philosophy (Han-Pile, 2006, p.373-374; Gemes & Sykes, 2014, p.81). Moreover, as presented by Janaway (1998), Nietzsche's *On Schopenhauer* provides evidence which suggests that Nietzsche's departure from Schopenhauer's philosophy had already begun when he was writing *The Birth of Tragedy*, as early as 1868.

Nietzsche's first published book can be viewed as a multi-layered work in terms of its subject matter, which can be discussed in relation to topics such as politics (Wilson, 2013), aesthetics (Halliwell, 2018), psychology (Stolz, 2019), and literary criticism (Lenz, 2017). Hence, it can be said that the literature concerning *The Birth of Tragedy* is related to various areas of research which also includes non-philosophical disciplines. On the other hand, the scholarly discussion also shows that some studies focus on issues such as morality (Came, 2004; Raymond, 2014) and pessimism (Duncan, 2007), while others examine *The Birth of Tragedy* as an important historical moment for the development of Nietzsche's views regarding his mature philosophy (Han-Pile, 2006; Gemes & Sykes, 2014; 2014a). Thus, these studies also include elaborations regarding Nietzsche's relationship to his predecessors and contemporaries. However, besides this rich and colourful body of knowledge, there

seems to be a lack of studies regarding Nietzsche's understanding in terms of the concept of *principium individuationis*, which is central to his basic assertions regarding Apolline and Dionysiac; one can even say that Nietzsche's definitions regarding these terms are solely based on his understanding of the *principium individuationis* (Nietzsche, 1999, p.26; 120). Furthermore, one of the most mysterious aspects of the book is Nietzsche's claim regarding the "tearing-apart" or "destruction" of the *principium individuationis* (Nietzsche, 1999, p.20-21; p.41; p.48; p.80-81; p.104); in several passages, he refers to the Dionysiac ecstasy, the destruction of *principium individuationis*, as the complete self-oblivion, i.e., negation of subjectivity (Nietzsche, 1999, p.17; p.19; p.21; p.27; p.102; p.120; p.132), by virtue of which one acquires a sense of oneness with the source of all beings (Nietzsche, 1999, p.19; p.49). Since this claim is the basis of many conclusions of the book, it might not be an exaggeration to state that *The Birth of Tragedy* cannot be wholly understood without explaining these discussions, and examining whether this kind of state is even philosophically possible for the subject. In that regard, there seems to be a need for a study to examine Nietzsche's views in *The Birth of Tragedy* with an emphasis on the concept of *principium individuationis*, since this kind of reading can provide a new perspective that can be useful to elaborate on this complicated work.

Accordingly, while positioning itself alongside the view that favours Nietzsche's originality, the current study argues that the views in his first book are quite valuable. This said the current study aims to offer an alternative reading of Nietzsche's views regarding the *principium individuationis* and Nietzsche's implications of overcoming the principle in *The Birth of Tragedy*. By doing this, it would be possible to show that besides their implications concerning aesthetics, history, and other disciplines, Nietzsche's claims can be also read in terms of their epistemological implications. Accordingly, as it would be hopefully clear, it will be shown that the *principium individuationis* seems to be closely related to Nietzsche's views regarding the subject-object dichotomy and his Kantian commitments. To put it clearly and more precisely, the current study aims firstly, to provide an alternative reading which focuses on the concept of *principium individuationis*, and secondly, based on this reading, to examine whether it is indeed possible to overcome the *principium individuationis* as it is claimed by Nietzsche in the mentioned work. However, before further specifying the purpose and methodology of the current study, it is first important to have a general look at Nietzsche's assertions in his first published book.

To give an overview of the discussions that are related to the current study, in *The*

Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche describes art as the only way to affirm life on earth as he claims "only as an aesthetic phenomenon do existence and the world appear justified" (Nietzsche, 1999, p. 47; p. 113), moreover, he states that the continuous evolution of art is driven by two opposite artistic drives (*Trieben*) and these adverse drives are represented by two Greek gods; Apollo and Dionysos (p. 14). Even though he does not give a clear explanation about how these art drives originated or what the ground for them to exist in the first place, he stresses that these drives stem from nature itself even without the mediation of an artist (p. 19). According to Nietzsche, just like the reproduction of the individuals of the human species depends on the interaction of two sexes, artistic production also depends on these co-existing and constantly conflicting drives and although they seem like opposites, they occasionally reconcile (p. 14). Their reconciliation as equals in Attic tragedy can be seen as the highest form of art, therefore, affirmation of life, since as also Nietzsche states: "Dionysos speaks the language of Apollo, but finally it is Apollo who speaks that of Dionysos. At which point the supreme goal of tragedy, and indeed of all art, is attained" (p. 104).

According to Nietzsche visual arts like sculpture as well as epic poetry can be seen as Apolline arts since the main function of these arts is image-making (p.23-25) while "imageless art of music" can be seen as a Dionysiac art, since, according to Nietzsche, its Dionysiac impact destroys the barrier between object and the subject by revealing the primordial unity, *das Ur-eine*, which lies beyond the world of representations (p.18). As mentioned before, since art is the way to justify life for Nietzsche, both of these art drives have their own way of justifying, however, their reconciliation in tragedy is the highest form of this affirmation.

Firstly, Apolline arts affirm life by concealing the horrors and terrors of existence by creating an image world. This can be seen especially in the Homeric epic; since, according to Nietzsche, the creation of Olympian gods was a result of a need to affirm life against the horrific Dionysiac truth, the wisdom of Silenus: "...The very best thing is utterly beyond your reach not to have been born, not to be, to be nothing. However, the second best thing for you is: to die soon." (p. 23). He argues that Greeks were obliged to create these gods as a middle world to veil the truth about the terrors of existence and to continue living (p.23).

Secondly, Dionysiac arts also affirm life from a different perspective. It makes us "recognize that everything which comes into being must be prepared for painful destruction" (p. 80). This is done by the revelation of the primordial unity, through which the world of

appearances, the world as representations, is left behind and the metaphysical truth about the “ground of things” becomes accessible (p.39). In this state of ecstasy, it seems like the distinction between different representations, between subject and the object as well as the distinction among different subjects become negated. Although the Dionysiac art, the destruction of the cognitive forms of the phenomenal world, creates feelings of confusion and enormous horror, it also makes humans realize that they are "part of a higher community" (p.18) in which they are one with their neighbours and it shows that "we are happily alive, not as individuals, but as the one living being, with whose procreative lust we have become one" (p. 81). However, this aspect of Dionysiac art as the sense of pleasure, stemming from the unity with nature and others, seems like does not always be the case, since, as Nietzsche explains, there is a crucial difference between the Dionysiac Greeks and Dionysiac barbarians; in the barbaric festivals, Nietzsche asserts that the force of the Dionysiac takes it to the extent of self-forgetting and destruction of all family life by the “unleashed cruelty and sensuality”, which he also calls the "witches' brew", while in Greek festivals and tradition, Greeks were completely protected from this feverish stirrings by the Apolline (p. 20). Consequently, it is possible to conclude that in order to comprehend the Dionysiac truth, humans, as subjects, need the Apolline. Otherwise, there would not be a subject to comprehend, since that which is Dionysiac, in its full force, is the primordial unity.

This brings us to the union of Apolline and Dionysiac. As also stated before, according to Nietzsche Attic tragedy includes both Apolline and Dionysiac and it is the highest form of art that helped Greeks to justify their existence (p. 14; p. 104). Nietzsche claims that tragedy was born out of the tragic chorus; at first, there was the chorus as the Dionysiac element of the tragedy and the dialogue, stage and Apolline images of tragedy came after that (p. 36). Similar to primordial unity, there is no individuality in the chorus, and it reveals the primordial unity by the Dionysiac element of music, thus, tragedy appears as "a Dionysian chorus which discharges itself over and over again in an Apolline world of images." (p. 44). Therefore, what happens in tragedy is the Dionysiac truth as what lies beyond the cognitive forms of the phenomenal world, beyond the *principium individuationis*, expressed in the Apolline language of images which indicates that besides all the destruction and suffering, life prevails beyond the *principium individuationis* (p. 85). The combination of the Dionysiac lyric and Apolline dream-world of the stage in tragedy makes the spectators feel a "metaphysical solace", in which we understand "that in the ground of things, and despite all changing appearances, life is indestructibly mighty and pleasurable " (p. 39). This

said Janaway's reading of Nietzsche can be interpreted as a sound way of elaborating on the issue since he asserts that by dissolving the sense of individuality in the spectator and merging the viewers into a "primal oneness", tragedy "enables one to live with the truth by confronting it in an affirmative frame of mind, not to live despite the truth by veiling it over." (Janaway, 2014, p.45).

All the discussion presented above, however, is founded on Nietzsche's views on what these art drives, namely, Apolline and Dionysiac, indicate regarding the concept of *principium individuationis*. The concept of *principium individuationis* in this context is borrowed from Schopenhauer who has a major influence on Nietzsche's early works, especially on *The Birth of Tragedy*. Schopenhauer also borrows this term from scholastic philosophy to indicate space, time, and hence, causation (Schopenhauer, 2010, p. 137). As he states in *The World as Will and Representation*, the world as representation is governed by the principle of sufficient reason, and *principium individuationis*, as an aspect of the principle of sufficient reason, is what makes representations distinct from each other as individual representations, thus giving the possibility of multiplicity (Schopenhauer, 2010, p. 137). It is also possible to understand this principle as the equivalent of Kant's categories as pure forms of thinking and, space and time as pure forms of sensibility, which would be elaborated on later in detail since Nietzsche also calls *principium individuationis* as the "cognitive forms of the phenomenal world" (p. 17). This said, Nietzsche frequently describes Apolline as the expression, or even deification, of this principle while locating Dionysiac as the art drive that destroys the *principium individuationis*. Therefore, it is no surprise that he associates Apollon with dreaming (p.14-15; p.25; p.121; p.127), image-making (*Bilden*) (p.15; p.16; p.19; p.120; p.123), illusion (p.25; p.40; p.85) and semblance (p.15-17; p.24-27) while associating Dionysos with intoxication (p.14; p.17-19; p.70), ecstasy (p.17-18; p.40; 81; p.98), truth (p.53; p.132), and limitlessness (p.16; p.27; p.40).

Consequently, the current study asserts that comprehending Nietzsche's understanding of the concept of *principium individuationis* can be used as a key to understand his views regarding the Dionysiac and Apolline. Because the discussion in the book seems to be based on the conflict between the deification or expression of the principle (Apolline) and the destruction or negation of the principle (Dionysiac). Accordingly, when Nietzsche's understanding of the *principium individuationis* is clarified, it would be possible to define and discuss the meaning of Apolline and Dionysiac more clearly. However, since the concept of *principium individuationis* has a long history, Nietzsche's use of the term

cannot be regarded independently from the historical discussions. Hence, to attain the purpose of the current study, namely, to provide a reading of Nietzsche's views on the *principium individuationis* in *The Birth of Tragedy* and examine whether it is possible to overcome this principle, it is imperative to first present a historical analysis regarding how the conceptualization of the principle changed from the earliest discussions to Nietzsche. Thus, it is crucial to examine the concept of *principium individuationis* and the discussions related to the problem of individuality in general from the earliest comprehensive discussion on the issue, as in Suarez, to the sources that are historically more proximate to Nietzsche such as Kant and Schopenhauer. It is argued that such an analysis would show that, in the context of Nietzsche's views on *principium individuationis* in *The Birth of Tragedy*, it can be seen that Nietzsche owes Kant more than Schopenhauer. Since it would be shown that his views on *principium individuationis* share many parallels with Kant's elaboration on the synthetic unity of apperception, rather than Schopenhauer's understanding of individuation. Hence, it will be seen that the *principium individuationis* is impossible to overcome, at least for us humans. Since if it is understood as the synthetic unity of apperception, which is solely grounded on the thoroughgoing identity of self-consciousness, the overcoming or destruction of *principium individuationis* would pertain to the complete annihilation of the subject, therefore, there would be no self to have a "Dionysiac experience" or "ecstasy", since there would be no thinking being to be in a "Dionysiac state" at all, let alone experience a sense of oneness with the "primordial unity". Thus, these implications must be interpreted differently than what Nietzsche's explanation initially suggests.

However, it is now time to digress from these discussions and elaborate on the methodology of the current study. To accomplish the goal that has been presented above, it is crucial to first examine Nietzsche's views about *principium individuationis* in *The Birth of Tragedy*, this examination would provide a detailed presentation of the problem that is being investigated in this research. When the implications of the principle of individuation, in the context of *The Birth of Tragedy*, are expressed in this section, to contextualize them and investigate them under a new light, it would be imperative to examine the change of the conceptualization of the *principium individuationis* from Suarez to Kant. Since Nietzsche never explicitly discusses his understanding of neither the principle of individuation nor overcoming it, this historical investigation would enable us to grasp how Nietzsche viewed this principle, hence, it would be clear what implications his assertion may have. In that regard, the tools which are developed through the historical analysis could be used to

examine whether the principle of individuation can be overcome or not. However, it is also important to stress that the current study will not be focusing on music, tragedy, or art in general. In that regard, whether music, tragedy or any art can be viewed as a catalyst for the Dionysiac "ecstasy" or the destruction of the *principium individuationis* is not a matter of investigation here. It is utterly urgent to state that the sole aim and focus of this research is to examine Nietzsche's understanding of *principium individuationis* and investigate whether it is indeed possible to overcome it, as Nietzsche claimed in *The Birth of Tragedy*.



2. SCHOPENHAUER AND NIETZSCHE ON THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUATION

To clarify the research question of the current study, it is imperative to dwell on the views of Nietzsche in *The Birth of Tragedy* (1999) comprehensively. Through the examination of this work, it would be possible to lay out Nietzsche's position regarding his understanding of the principle of individuation and his claims regarding overcoming it. Since in this early work, he is heavily under the influence of Schopenhauer, this examination must include Schopenhauer as well. By doing this, it is aimed to clarify what each philosopher understood from the concept of *principium individuationis*, and, in their individual views, how can this principle be overcome. Since the aim of the current study is to examine the possibility of overcoming the *principium individuationis*, in this section, it would be useful to keep the discussion as precise as possible, however, as also future elaborations would show, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche are not the best candidates when we consider clarity and precision. In that regard, although the works that are going to be used and examined in this section have multilayered discussions, comprehending issues from epistemology, and philosophy of science to aesthetics, this section would try to focus on issues that are related to the principle of individuation as much as possible. After presenting the views of both philosophers, it would be possible to clarify on what points Nietzsche departed from Schopenhauer, by clarifying which, we would be able to present Nietzsche's original account of the principle of individuation and overcoming it.

In terms of Nietzsche, it is possible to divide *The Birth of Tragedy* (1999) into sections based on the subject matter that is included. While 1st to 4th sections of the book focus on Nietzsche's understanding of Apolline and Dionysiac, in 5th and 6th sections emphasize lyric poetry as the Dionysiac predecessor of the tragedy. On the other hand, from the 7th section to the 10th section he focuses on explaining the union of Apolline and Dionysiac in the Attic tragedy. Following this, until the 15th section, the decline of tragedy concerning Socrates and Euripides is examined, and from the 16th to 25th sections, Nietzsche elaborates on the possibility of the rebirth of the tragedy in the proper sense in modern times. Although the whole book can be considered very valuable in terms of philosophy of art, the current study would only focus on the sections from 1st to 10th, since what is being discussed in the remaining sections simply does not relate to the subject in question. Furthermore, since

Nietzsche's views in *The Birth of Tragedy* can be better understood in relation to Schopenhauer's philosophy, it would be suitable to elaborate on Schopenhauer's philosophy in general first and then discuss Nietzsche's mentioned work.

Since, unlike Nietzsche, one can regard Schopenhauer as a "systems philosopher", one might even say he was the last one of his kind, it is almost impossible to explain his views by only using one source. In that regard, to grasp his influence on Nietzsche and his assertions regarding overcoming the principle of individuation, it is crucial to have a general understanding of his views in *The World as Will and Representation*, moreover, to grasp the latter, one also needs to be introduced to his views in his doctoral dissertation. In this early work of Schopenhauer, he elaborates on his understanding of the principle of sufficient reason and its various modes. It is utterly important to have an efficient understanding of this work since, as it would be seen, the principle of individuation in Schopenhauer is almost indistinguishable from the principle of sufficient reason (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.136). After clarifying the ground by elaborating on these works, it would be possible to examine Schopenhauer's aesthetics, hence, his views regarding overcoming the principle of individuation and, accordingly, its influence on Nietzsche.

Following our elaboration of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, the current section will be completed by examining and discussing the similarities and important differences in their views. Consequently, it would be possible to have a comprehensive opinion about the statement of the problem regarding the current study, as we would present Nietzsche's claims on the matter more clearly. However, let us begin by examining Schopenhauer who seems to be the first one to assert that it is possible to overcome the principle of individuation, to accomplish which we must first begin by elaborating on his doctoral dissertation.

2.1. Schopenhauer: An Overview

2.1.1. On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason

Schopenhauer's philosophy cannot be elaborated on without mentioning his doctoral dissertation, *On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason*. In this work, it is possible to see how much his commitments to other philosophers shaped his own views. Firstly, he takes the Leibnizian-Wolffian concept of the principle of sufficient reason to his focus and reinterprets it with his Kantian views. This paints a picture similar to Kant's genealogy of representations in A320-B377, similarly, it encompasses all world as

representation based on the faculties of the mind (Schopenhauer, 1974, p.2). That said, secondly, he also shares his admiration for Plato in the beginning sections, mentioning him with the highest regard, alongside Kant (Schopenhauer, 1974, p.1-2), later, he would also argue that their purpose for philosophizing, as well as their assertions, are almost one and the same (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.197). Accordingly, his whole understanding of the fourfold root of the principle of sufficient reason is grounded on the two laws of human thought, as stressed by Kant and Plato according to Schopenhauer, namely, the laws of *homogeneity* and *specification* (Schopenhauer, 1974, p.1-2). The law of homogeneity expresses that things that share similarities and correspondences must be united in genera, and these genera must be united in families until one arrives at the most general, all-encompassing concept, on the other hand, the law of specification expresses that things that are capable of division into classes must be divided clearly and tediously from an all-encompassing concept to minutest classes (Schopenhauer, 1974, p.1-2). However, before going further into that discussion it is first important to have a sketch of the cornerstones of Schopenhauer's philosophy.

As a loyal follower of Kant, Schopenhauer also adopts the basic tenets of transcendental idealism; the world around us is not in itself, but rather only a representation (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.23). In that regard, he first distinguishes the world as representation and the world as *Will*. Even though it would be elaborated on later, it is safe to mention that in Schopenhauerian metaphysics, *Will*, as a universal driving force that is "the inner essence of the world" (p.54), is the thing in itself (p.145). That said, the world as representation is fundamentally divided into subject and object; this is the "most universal" form of the world as representation (Schopenhauer, 2010, p. 57). Following that distinction, the objects in the world of representation, in turn, can be divided into two groups; ones that are subjected to the principle of sufficient reason and the ones that are not. "Platonic Ideas" as what constitutes the latter group are seen as problematic elements in Schopenhauer's philosophy (Costanzo, 2020) and will be discussed accordingly, however, the objects in the former group must be discussed first to understand Schopenhauer's views in his doctoral dissertation.

The principle of sufficient reason is presented by Schopenhauer in accordance with the Leibnizian-Wolffian view: "Nothing is without a ground or reason why it is" (Schopenhauer, 1974, p.6). Putting aside the representations as Platonic Ideas, all objects of the world as representation stand under this principle and are governed by it, in that regard,

the law of homogeneity is expressed since this principle is the most general form of all representations after the subject-object distinction. However, Schopenhauer stresses that the previous elaborations on this principle lack the expression of the law of specification, as he underlines that the principle acquires a different meaning in each of its diverse applications based on diverse cognitive powers from which the principle of sufficient reason originated (Schopenhauer, 1974, p.2). Although, as mentioned before, Leibniz was aware of a distinction for the application of the principle of sufficient reason as he stressed that the difference between the truths of reason and the truths of fact (Leibniz, 1918, p.256), this division is not sufficient for Schopenhauer. Thus, the proper application of the law of specification must be attained since it would bring the "greatest and most important advances" (Schopenhauer, 1974, p.3). Following that, the principle of sufficient reason can be understood in a fourfold manner, according to the objects it governs as representations of different faculties.

The first class of objects are the intuitive, complete, empirical representations (Schopenhauer, 1974, p.45). These representations constitute the empirical world around us with its diverse objects; this empirical world is mostly regarded as the physical reality. According to Schopenhauer:

They are *intuitive* in contrast to those which are merely thought, that is, to abstract concepts; complete insofar as, following Kant's distinction, they contain not merely what is formal, but also what is material in appearances; *empirical*, partly insofar as they proceed not merely from connection of thought, but have their origin in an excitation of sensation in our sensitive body to which they constantly refer as evidence of their reality, partly because in accordance with the laws of space, time, and causality in union, they are connected in that complex, without beginning or end, that constitutes our *empirical reality*. (Schopenhauer, 2022, p.33)

Hence, although the matter of these representations is dependent on the excitement of the body as sensation, they are still in accordance with our sensible forms of intuition, space and time, as they are nonetheless transcendently ideal, thus, the principle of sufficient reason must be related to these forms for this class of representations

(Schopenhauer, 1974, p.45). Now, without time, succession is not possible, and since time is the possibility of opposite determinations of an object, as succession of diverse determinations, all change is grounded in time; on the other hand, without space, simultaneity becomes impossible, hence persistence and duration cannot be understood since this is only possible by discerning that an object stays the same even though other objects that are simultaneously present with that object changes through time (Schopenhauer, 1974, p.46). In that sense, these forms must have an intimate unity that is affected by the faculty of understanding, since all the empirical reality would not be possible otherwise (Schopenhauer, 1974, p.47). However, these forms themselves are not perceivable, they require some content to be perceived, thus, they must be filled with immediate content, namely, sensation (Schopenhauer, 1974, p.46). Only by these ingredients, the empirical reality is possible for us. Accordingly, this empirical reality is governed by the rule that arises from the union of its forms, namely, the principle of sufficient reason of becoming or more widely known as causality (Schopenhauer, 1974, p.52-53). This is the first form of the principle of sufficient reason and the corresponding cognitive faculty is understanding since it is the faculty that unites space and time, hence, arriving causality as its rule (Schopenhauer, 1974, p.47).

The second class of representations, in contrast to the first group as intuitive representations, are abstract representations, which also can be referred to as concepts (Schopenhauer, 1974, p.145). According to Schopenhauer reason is the faculty that differentiates humans as a species from animals and all other living things, and as a contribution of this faculty, humans can form abstract representations from the physical objects, i.e., intuitive representations, around them; in this regard these abstract representations can be called representations of representations (Schopenhauer, 1974, p.145-146). Hence, since they cannot form concepts, it is impossible for animals to laugh or speak, moreover, although it does not mean freedom in the proper sense, we are able to choose our course of action if we must achieve a goal, while animals cannot, and this is only possible by the abstractions of the faculty of reason, by which it can simulate future outcomes by use of the concepts (Schopenhauer, 1974, p.145).

As abstract representations, concepts must be general since each concept subsumes innumerable individual things that are thought, and signified, through them. In the formation of these representations, reason separates (abstracts) the intuitive, complete quality of

representations for the price of thinking about them in isolation (Schopenhauer, 1974, p.146-147). Thus, the intuitive content is left behind to think of these representations using only what was necessary (Schopenhauer, 1974, p.147). This is precisely the reason why it takes less effort to handle these representations, for instance, it is easier to work with numbers, as concepts of arithmetic, in contrast to counting by using intuitive representations, for example, using an abacus (Schopenhauer, 1974, p.150). According to Schopenhauer, while working with concepts, the mind uses only what is essential for its purpose, as opposed to reproductive use of empirical imagination, which requires a high load of inessential features to be reproduced; this also marks the difference between a mental image and a concept, while the former still an intuitive but not an immediate representation, thus, it does not belong to the experience, the latter is purely abstract and devoid of intuitive content (Schopenhauer, 1974, p.150-151).

That said, the mere presence of concepts in the mind is not sufficient for thinking as a mental activity, rather, it is attained by combination and separation of these abstract representations in judgements, i.e., the relationship of concepts that are “clearly conceived and expressed” (Schopenhauer, 1974, p.156). In that regard, the principle of sufficient reason must be understood in accordance with the character of this class of representations. Now, each judgement receives its truthfulness in relation to its ground; if it has sufficient ground, then, a judgement can be viewed as true (Schopenhauer, 1974, p.156). This is the principle of reason of knowing, the special form of principle of sufficient reason for our judgements, however, although this is the general principle for judgements, the truthfulness of a judgement can be classified diversely based on the kind of ground it has (Schopenhauer, 1974, p.156-157). For instance, if a judgement has another judgement as its sufficient ground, then, this judgement expresses a *logical* or *formal* truth, although it does not express anything related to its material truthfulness (Schopenhauer, 1974, p.157-158). For this kind of material grounding, we need intuitive, empirical representations that are in the first class; if the ground for a judgement can be found only in experience, then, it expresses a *material* or *empirical* truth, in other words, the judgement is grounded on experience (Schopenhauer, 1974, p.159). Furthermore, if the ground of a judgement is the forms of intuitive cognition, in the faculty of understanding and pure sensibility “as conditions of the possibility of all experience”, then, this judgement expresses a *transcendental* truth (Schopenhauer, 1974, p.160). Lastly, a judgement can also be grounded by the rules of thinking in general as rules

of the use of the faculty of reason, if so, the judgement expresses a *metalogical* truth according to Schopenhauer (Schopenhauer, 1974, p.161). To sum up, the principle of sufficient reason is viewed as the principle of reason of knowing as the principle that governs our abstract representations, and consequently, its corresponding faculty is the reason (Schopenhauer, 1974, p.163).

The third class of representations belongs to the pure sensibility as their corresponding faculty, i.e., space and time as pure intuitions, and constitutes the formal part of the first class of representations (Schopenhauer, 1974, p.193). Schopenhauer stresses that, even though they are part of our complete representations, nonetheless they must be regarded separately since intuition for us does not only include empirical intuition; for instance, the infinite divisibility of space and time, although never empirically possible, can be attained by pure intuition (Schopenhauer, 1974, p.193). Moreover, even though the points and lines in space, as also objects of geometry, are never empirically intuited since they always require some drawing or exposition to be pointed out, they can be intuited *a priori*, in that regard, although they are only perceived (empirically cognized) when they are filled with matter, space and time are indifferent to being full or empty (Schopenhauer, 1974, p.193).

Space and time, as forms of *a priori* intuition, are representations of a special kind, their constitution in such a manner that all their parts are determined by others; this is called position when space is concerned, and succession when time is concerned (Schopenhauer, 1974, p.194). These relations are so special that to cognize the position of an object or its temporal location in time, the use of concepts or causality becomes futile (Schopenhauer, 1974, p.193). Since the position of a certain object in space is solely determined by the other parts, hence, the totality of space, this is also the case for time, just as what we call right or left according to each other, what we call before and after is also determined by the successive order of them, thus the totality of time. In that regard, the principle of sufficient reason for position and succession, hence space and time, must be of a different kind when compared with the first two classes of representations. Schopenhauer calls the special form of the principle for the third class of representations as the principle of sufficient reason of being (Schopenhauer, 1974, p.194). The pure manifoldness of space and time are as they are due to their special constitution.

Following this examination, it is revealed that the principle of sufficient reason of being is the principle that makes geometry and arithmetic possible. Firstly, when only time

is concerned, the principle of sufficient reason of being is conceived very easily, since it has only one dimension; it is the law of succession (Schopenhauer, 1974, p.197). As Schopenhauer expresses: “Every moment is conditioned by the previous one; only through predecessor can this moment be reached. It is only insofar as that other was and has elapsed” (Schopenhauer, 1974, p.197). In that regard, this is the base of all counting, which is simply the identification of all the individual steps of succession, moreover, since all arithmetic is all about “methodical abbreviations of counting”, all arithmetic is grounded in this principle (Schopenhauer, 1974, p.197). Secondly, when only space is concerned, similarly, all positions are based on the thorough-going extensiveness of space (Schopenhauer, 1974, p.195-196). Since that is the case, what needs to be done in the field of geometry is not a conceptual demonstration, as Euclid did, but rather, simply showing the necessary relation of lines, or shapes to each other, because the positions in space are not cognized through concepts or judgements, rather, they are grounded in pure intuition; in that regard, one must reduce all geometrical elaborations to pure intuitions and merely express the necessary relation of different positions (Schopenhauer, 1974, p.198). Accordingly, it is also revealed that all evidentness and certainty in mathematics in general, when compared to other sciences, is due to the self-evidentness of pure intuition (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.94). In all other sciences, reason must take its content from somewhere else, the matter of our representations, however, in mathematics, all principles are derived from the already established law likeness of the constitution of the mind itself, i.e. pure intuitions (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.75).

Finally, it is important to speak of the fourth and last class of representations. This class of objects are very unusual to hear for the first time, as there is only one object for each subject of knowing. This object is the subject of willing that is known by the subject of knowing and is only given in the inner sense (Schopenhauer, 1974, p.207). According to Schopenhauer, each cognition requires a subject and an object; the subject and object are separated fundamentally as the one who cognizes and that which is cognized; hence, it is impossible for a subject of knowing to be cognized (Schopenhauer, 1974, p.207-208). I, as the subject of all cognition, is the necessary correlate of all representations and objects, therefore, the subject itself can never be a representation, in that regard, the phrase “I know that I know” means nothing more than the phrase “I know”, furthermore, the latter means nothing more than the “I” (Schopenhauer, 1974, p.208-209). However, it becomes a matter

of question; if the subject itself is unknowable, how can one recognize the various sources of cognition such as sensibility, understanding and reason? According to Schopenhauer, these are not recognized due to the subject's knowledge regarding itself as a knowing subject, but rather, by inferences derived from the diverse representations, which give clues about the cognitive powers they originate in (Schopenhauer, 1974, p.209).

That said, besides the outer objects as our representations of outer sense, we have also an inner cognition, which cognizes only one object, the subject of willing. All introspection results in this object, whenever we look inward, we find ourselves always willing. In that regard, while "I cognize" is an analytic, *a priori* proposition, "I will" is a synthetic *a posteriori* proposition since cognition regarding the subject of willing can be only achieved as it is given to the subject of knowing *in time* (Schopenhauer, 1974, p.2011). Following this, another issue must be stressed, it also becomes a matter of question how the subject of knowing and the subject of willing unite as one identical subject. According to Schopenhauer, this is immediately given, since the relationship between the objects of outer experience and the subject is dramatically different from the relationship between the willing subject as the inner object and the knowing subject; although for all objects we are certain that these objects are *not* us, we are equally certain that the subject of willing and subject of knowing is *identical* in a direct manner; this is a "miracle *par excellence*" for Schopenhauer (1974, p.211-212).

Now, in the light of this discussion, it is easy to see that just as one cannot give ground to the material aspect of the outer experience, i.e. the sensation, one cannot also give ground for the material aspect of the inner experience; in other words, the question "Why I have this motive?" or "Why am I willing this?" is unanswerable in a similar manner to the question "Why is the content of my empirical intuition is the colour red?"; this is because the material aspect of our experience, in general, is immediately given, hence, they are groundless (Schopenhauer, 1974, p.213). In that regard, even though our actions can be traced back to our motives, there cannot be a sufficient reason or ground for why the motive is determined this way. The subject of willing with its motives cannot be further investigated (Schopenhauer, 1974, p.213-214). Consequently, the principle of sufficient reason for the object of inner sense is the principle of sufficient reason of acting, or the law of motivation, in other words, "causality seen from within" (Schopenhauer, 1974, p.214). Every action is grounded on the motive of willing subject, which becomes the object of the knowing subject

through inner sense, and since the willing subject is given immediately there is no further ground for why this special object is as it is. Thus, the fourth form of the principle is the law of motivation, and the corresponding faculty is the inner sense.

Before closing our discussion on the doctoral dissertation of Schopenhauer, it is important to mention the practical use of reason in our actions. According to Schopenhauer, since humans have the differentiating faculty of reason, abstract representations become possible, unlike animals (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.27). Thus, this ability to form abstract representations and think of objects in isolation also grants humans the ability to choose electively. Although this may seem like his understanding of freedom, it would be evident that for Schopenhauer, freedom in the proper sense is impossible. This elective choice enables us to compare and evaluate different current motives and the ways for achieving the goals which the motives direct us towards. The reason can put all diverse motives "side by side" and evaluate them, however, although motives may contradict and try to negate each other, regardless, it is inevitable that the most powerful motive overcomes others and determines the course of action (Schopenhauer, 1889, p.240; 2010, p.324). This is the sole use of practical reason for Schopenhauer; in terms of our actions, the only use of reason is to evaluate different motives and ways of attaining goals and choosing the strongest one. Distinguishing his ethics from Kant, it is not the reason that determines the will of the subject, rather, it is the groundless will, that appears as motives in the subject, that which determines the reason.

2.1.2. The World as Representation

Although Schopenhauer's doctoral dissertation is very informative about his views considering the world as representation, he covers additional content in the first book of his *magnum opus*, *The World as Will and Representation*. Even though examining the whole text extends beyond our scope, it is important to note the key points of his thought. When Schopenhauer explains what he understands as the world as representation, he underlines that the subject itself is the sole ground of it; "it is the general condition of all representations" (2010, p.25). That said, the most important division regarding the world as representation is the one between our intuitive representations and abstract representations (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.27). While the concepts are considered universal and abstract, the intuitive representations are considered individual representations (p.65). Even though he first

discusses the intuitive representations, for facilitating our account, it would be first to consider his explanations regarding abstract representations.

Concepts, as abstract representations of the faculty of reason, are devoid of content and they are general; multiple intuitive representations, only differing in terms of “unessential” features, are subsumed under a single concept (Schopenhauer, 2010, p. 62; p.65). Reason puts forth concepts by copying intuitive representation through the act of reflection (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.63). Since they lack content, the cognition regarding these representations is only abstract:

Concepts can only be thought, not intuited, and only the effects that people bring about through concepts are objects of experience proper. These effects include: language, action that has been thought out and planned, science, and what results from all these. As an object of outer experience, speech is clearly nothing other than a highly perfected telegraph that communicates arbitrary signs with the greatest speed and the finest nuance. (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.62)

Following this, the validity of concepts becomes an issue; if language is the expression of concepts and is immediately understood, then it must be the case that concepts must stand in a necessary relation with the intuitive representations, which constitute the world around us. In that regard, if we consider the principle of sufficient reason of knowing, as the principle for the second class of representations, we will see that concepts eventually are grounded on intuitive representations; although concepts can also be grounded on concepts, this can never last forever (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.64). Thus, the ground for our judgements which are empirically true, is the intuitive representations. Accordingly, even though all the concepts are abstract without question, he identifies the concepts that are directly grounded on intuitive representations as *concreta*, and the ones that are mediately grounded on intuitive representations, but directly grounded on *concreta*, as *abstracta* (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.64). While concepts such as "chair" and "table" can be examples of *concreta*, the ones such as "relation" can be examples of *abstracta*.

Since all concepts eventually depend on individual, intuitive representations, each concept has an extension, or sphere as Schopenhauer calls it, that encompasses the intuitive

representations that are subsumed under it (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.65). These spheres or extensions of concepts define their area of use and their distinctness; even though some spheres can collide, and they might have common individual objects if their spheres are not completely aligned, they are nevertheless considered different concepts since one of them still includes some object that is not in the second one, otherwise, they are considered as coextensive, interchangeable concepts (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.65). In that regard, to recognize the relationship between these concepts, consequently, their spheres are to judge (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.65). Therefore, when one expresses a relation between concepts in a proposition, it can be considered as a judgment. That said, for Schopenhauer, there are five conceptual relations that are fundamental, in other words, all various combinations of concepts can be reduced to these relations (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.65-67). Although Schopenhauer himself does not dwell on this subject much, it is important to note that these constitute the rules of logic as they present all possible combinations of concepts. These five relations are as follows:

- (I) The spheres of the two concepts are exactly equal.
- (II) The sphere of one concept completely encloses the sphere of another.
- (III) A sphere includes two or more further spheres, which are mutually exclusive and at the same time exhaust the first sphere.
- (IV) Two spheres each include a part of the other.
- (V) Two spheres lie inside a third, but do not exhaust it. (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.66-67)

According to Schopenhauer, all science, all certainty, and truthfulness of all judgements depend on the faculty of reason, hence, concepts. Reason does not expand our cognition, rather, it gives a different form to it (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.78). What is cognized intuitively, becomes abstract; this is crucial since the faculty of sensibility and understanding can grasp only one object at a time, however, with the use of concepts and reason, one can think all these representations, even though by losing their intuitive qualities, at once and grasp them as a system of a whole (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.78). For instance, while understanding is only responsible for cognizing the causality in intuitive representations, only reason can be held responsible for human artefacts, buildings, or construction of

machines, as it enables humans to apply what is cognized abstractly (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.78). This is only possible, for example, if the spatial relations of pure intuition are converted to abstract concepts, in arithmetic and geometry; even though we can perfectly grasp complex objects such as a parabola or a spiral, we must convert them to numerical concepts to construct them in actuality, in architecture for instance (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.78). Since one-dimensional time can easily be converted to numbers as determined magnitudes, this is not the case for three-dimensional space; we are obliged to reduce spatial intuitive relations to first one-dimensional relations and then use numbers as abstract concepts to grasp them (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.78-79). In that regard, our cognition regarding the spatial objects is not expanded but their form is changed.

This is the base of all science for Schopenhauer, converting what is intuited to abstract representations as concepts; consequently, the meaning of knowledge is also explained. As an activity of knowledge of the world, science deals only with abstract cognition. Knowledge is abstract cognition, and to know is “to have the mental power to reproduce at will those judgements that have their sufficient cognitive ground in something external to themselves, i.e. those judgements that are true” (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.75). Thus, it is certain that animals cannot have knowledge, although it is stressed that they must have consciousness to some extent. For Schopenhauer, consciousness is about being able to cognize, and since animals can have intuitive cognitions, their consciousness cannot be denied, however, since they lack reason, they lack what makes possible knowledge itself, i.e., the abstract cognitions (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.75-76).

When compared to his views on abstract representations, Schopenhauer's account of intuitive representations is more significant and unique, since it clearly distinguishes him from other philosophers, especially Kant, in terms of his assertions on some important concepts. Firstly, his examination of the matter should be explained. It was mentioned that the essence of time was succession, and the essence of space was position. These conclusions were made by recognizing the principle of sufficient reason in those representations. Now, if we also apply the same to matter, according to Schopenhauer, it is possible to see that the essence of matter is causality. Causality as explained by Schopenhauer can be understood as follows:

But the law of causality gets its meaning and necessity from this alone: that the essence of alteration is not mere change of state itself, but rather lies in the fact that *one and the same* position in space contains now *this* state of affairs, but then later *another*; and the fact that at *one* and the same particular time there is one state *here* but another state *over there*: only this mutual constraint of space and time lends meaning, and at the same time necessity to the rule that governs the way alterations must proceed. (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.30)

Hence, it is certain that causality cannot be regarded only in relation to space, nor only concerning time, rather, it presupposes both of them united; although both time and space can be regarded separately, in pure intuition, i.e., without the matter, matter itself cannot be cognized independently from these forms (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.30). Moreover, matter does not presuppose these forms separately, it precisely presupposes their union as causality, in that regard, even though one can think of space and time coexisting and running their course separately, it is impossible to think of matter filling them since it is only possible if they are combined (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.30). Following this reasoning, Schopenhauer asserts that the whole being of matter is constituted by its acting, through which it fills space and time and also affects other material bodies; if there were only space, the world as representation would be rigid and unmoving, hence, there would be no possibility of succession, action or change, on the other hand, if there were only time, all world would fleet and nothing would subsist, there would be no simultaneity, no persistence of substance, thus, again, there would be no matter (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.30). However, the essence of matter as activity and causality presupposes both of these conditions that would be lacking if one of the pure forms does not exist; simultaneity cannot be separated from actuality since the existence of multiple states at the same time makes duration possible and this duration is only can be grasped in contrast to change in some entity, as what stays the same through that change (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.31).

That said, the sole use of the faculty of understanding is grasping this activity as the essence of matter. In that regard, while Schopenhauer unwillingly states that space and time as pure forms of intuition belong to pure sensibility, the subjective correlate of matter, as understood as causality, is only the understanding (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.32). His views,

more or less, coincide with Kantian philosophy until this point; however, he immediately departs from Kant as he suggests that understanding is a faculty of intuition, not of concepts. As he stresses in his essay *On Vision and Colours*, all intuition is intellectual (Schopenhauer, 2022, p.213), however, it is important to note that what Schopenhauer understands from the term intuition differs significantly from Kant. Intuition for him is the cognition of an object (Schopenhauer, 2022, p.213), in that regard, although he does not mention the use of concepts, what is intuited is not merely sensation, i.e. meaningless alterations in our body which cannot produce any cognition at all, rather, it is a definite objective representation (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.32-33). Concepts and all thinking by virtue of them, on the other hand, solely belong to the faculty of reason, whose representations constitute a fundamentally distinct class of representations. Consequently, since all use of the understanding is the cognition of a cause based on the effect, it is by only this faculty the physical world is "spread out in space" and time is possible for us (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.33). As material bodies, the bodies of humans and animals are also subject to this principle; they are affected by other material bodies (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.33). The faculty of understanding cognizes these effects and infers a cause to them, hence, the world as a representation becomes possible for us, in terms of intuitive representations. This referring is not attained by virtue of abstract concepts in voluntary reflection, but rather an involuntary, "immediate, necessary and certain" cognition of the cause (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.33). Without the application of understanding the products of sensibility are merely data, they cannot amount to any cognition; for instance, the initial appearance of an object in the eye is upside down, however, by the function of our understanding, this dull datum becomes organized, and we do not see objects as such (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.34). In that regard, all intuition can be seen as the cognition of cause and effect, the cause being the material bodies outside of us, and the effect being, the affections and alterations on our material body, in Schopenhauer's words, it is the causality between mediate objects (the objects besides our bodies), and the immediate object (the body of the subject) whose alterations and inner changes are given immediately to the knowing subject (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.42).

By the above explanations, Schopenhauer rejects all doctrines which defend that presuppose a cause-effect relationship between the subject and the object. As two opposites, Fichtean idealism, and dogmatic realism or materialism, both have problematic assertions

about the issue (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.35-36). The former supposes that the whole world as representation solely sprang out of the subject by positing the principle that states *A is A*, which also makes it necessary to posit *A is not A* (Fichte, 1982, p.93-105). Hence, in that case, the subject becomes the cause and the object becomes the effect, on the other hand, the latter view supposes that the physical world is not a world of representations but a world that is in itself, thus, when the chain of causality eventually produces human beings or any being with cognition, it can be said that the object as cause produced the subject as effect (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.49; p.55). Schopenhauer rejects both accounts as well as scepticism (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.35). Even though he presents a diverse discussion on precise issues, the core of his criticism stems from the most general principle of the world as representation, namely, the subject-object division (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.47). He states that subject and object presuppose each other fundamentally, hence, one cannot regard them separately as cause and effect, rather, the division itself is the condition for the world as representation, which has the general form as the principle of sufficient reason (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.56-57). Thus, it is impossible to speak of causality as if it precedes the subject or the object.

Another significant criticism Schopenhauer expresses is towards Kant, according to which he asserts that Kant claimed that the cause of the cognition is the object, in other words, there is a cause-effect relationship between subject and object (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.532). Although Kant clearly underlines that causality is a pure concept of understanding as a category, hence its use besides the objects of experience is a great mistake, he states that the sensation is an affection or an alteration of the mind, which must correspond to thing in itself as the origin of this affection (Kant, 1999, p.172; 2004, p.66). Schopenhauer sees this as a grave misconception and rather suggests that sensation is nothing other than a mere effect on a material body which was inflicted by another material body (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.34). However, in this case, the subject immediately cognizes the effects on the immediate object, as its own body, i.e., the starting point of cognition, and infers a cause to mediate objects, which can be cognized only through the immediate object (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.41). Consequently, sensation does not have an effect on the subject but rather on the immediate object, alterations of which are directly given to the cognizing subject. Thus, sensation is simply the cognition of a causal relation between objects, although one of the objects has a very special relationship with the subject.

Regarding the discussion so far, it is certain that for Schopenhauer, there cannot be any causal relationship between subject and object, hence, the doctrines that start either from the subject or object must be rejected; he suggests that one of the biggest achievements of his philosophy is his method which starts from the representation itself as the “primary fact of consciousness” (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.57). In that regard, if one starts from representation, one sees that the subject-object dichotomy is already presupposed in it as the most general form, and the principle of sufficient reason is also presupposed under this general form with all four of its modes. These modes govern their corresponding representations so completely, that one can easily attain the essence of a certain representation by only looking at it with the correct mode of the principle of sufficient reason. However, the world as representation also presupposes that something being represented, thus, although the principle of sufficient reason can give us the essences of representations, the innermost essence of the world must be "utterly distinct" from the world as representation (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.57).

2.1.3. The World as Will

In the beginning of the second book, Schopenhauer states that, so far, he focused solely on the general form of the world as representation but not the content of it (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.119). Although this inquiry had directed him to understand the nature of the world as a representation, this is not enough to grasp the "inner essence" of the world (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.119). In that regard, one must also attain the content of the representations to grasp this inner essence. Now, he turns to natural sciences, mathematics and philosophy for aid (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.119). Firstly, philosophy, until this point, could not penetrate the world as a representation but revealed its form as the subject-object dichotomy and the principle of sufficient reason (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.119-120). Secondly, mathematics, cannot help us either, since firstly, it is a field of knowledge that precisely deals with pure intuition, thus, the formal part of intuitive representations, and secondly, it elaborates on objects as quantities and compares them by answering the questions such as "how many?" or "how large?" (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.120). Since these can be answered only relatively, i.e., by comparing certain representations, they cannot help us either in terms of any knowledge regarding the inner essence of the world (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.120).

The third candidate, natural science, seems also to have potential with its many subdisciplines. According to Schopenhauer, natural science can be divided into two main fields of knowledge, each of which has many different sciences subsumed. These are *morphology* and *aetiology* (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.120). While the former deals with the "description of forms", the latter deals only with the alteration of matter (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.120). Accordingly, morphology tries to explain the static forms that are encountered in nature; thus, the general product of morphological sciences can be seen as natural history; with sciences such as zoology or botany, morphology informs us with various organic forms (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.120). On the other hand, the sciences that are in the group of aetiology, as they deal with the transition of matter from form to form, try to posit the laws governing this transformation and change (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.120). In that regard, sciences such as physiology or mineralogy can be seen as members of this group; hence, all sciences that deal with cause-effect relationships can be seen as proper aetiologies, since the main purpose is to investigate the material activity (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.121). Although it is evident that morphology cannot give us the knowledge we are looking for as the science of forms, aetiology seems more complicated, as Schopenhauer also dwells on the issue several times (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.121; p.132; p.147).

First of all, since aetiology only deals with causality, it only can tell us about the circumstances regarding which state of matter would turn into another, in other words, the principle of sufficient reason for intuitive representations, hence, it is inefficient (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.121). Secondly, it cannot explain the groundlessness of the determination in representations; for instance, although physiology can give a consistent account of how bodily functions occur, by explaining muscle movements, and physical and chemical reactions in the organism, it cannot explain why the organism have these parts, organs or movements in the first place, nor it can explain why the motives, which determine the actions and behaviours of the organism happen to be appearing as such (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.133). Furthermore, thirdly, aetiology is also problematic in another sense, since it asserts that by reducing the physiological processes to chemistry, chemistry to basic mechanics of physical bodies and to geometry and arithmetic, the explanation regarding these issues becomes complete (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.147). However, what is being done here is only changing the mode of the principle of sufficient reason, namely, from the most complicated to the most easily graspable; in that regard, this inquiry is fruitless for

Schopenhauer (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.147-148). Whatever sciences achieve, they can only attain the principle of sufficient reason in its precise modes, nothing more, in other words, the inference from consequent to the ground could not end; even though this would somehow be achieved, what would be discovered is that the original natural forces cannot be explained by using the general form of representations (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.149). Whatever explanation can be made, it cannot explain why there is gravity in the universe, or why opposite electrically charged objects move towards each other. Hence, all science must stop its examination at some point and admit that "there is an aspect to every single thing in nature that can never be assigned a sufficient reason, that can never be explained, something for which no further cause can be found: this something is the specific mode of its operation, i.e. the very mode of its being, its essence" (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.149). Since the essence is nothing different than the *whatness* of things, science can only explain *how* things are (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.148).

Consequently, it has been demonstrated that none of the candidates can aid us in this task. This is because, to accomplish this, one must go beyond the conditions of the world as representation, in other words, to answer this riddle one must be the pure subject of cognition, i.e., a subject that is without a body, however, that is not the case, each subject has "rooted in this world" as an individual, thus, the cognition of the subject must be in accordance with certain rules that cannot be violated (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.124). However, it is certain that, for the pure subject of cognition, the organic body is also a representation among other representations, more precisely, other material bodies, hence, the subject can cognize its movements and actions just like any other object (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.124). Although that is the case, the subject is aware of the movements and changes in its body in a quite special manner; it would be a total mystery if that was not the case, and the subject would attribute the alterations in the body merely to the necessity of natural law (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.124). Since this seems simply wrong, we can conclude that the body is given to the subject in two different manners. Firstly, it is given as an object, a mere intuitive representation that the subject cognizes among other objects and governed by the same laws and secondly, it is given as something completely familiar with it, unriddling the inner workings of its deeds and movements, namely, it is given as will (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.124). The acts of will and movements in our body are inseparable, however, they are not related by causality, rather, "they are one and the same thing, only given in two entirely

different ways: in one case immediately and in the other case to the understanding in intuition" (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.125). A closer look would reveal that not just our voluntary actions but also involuntary reactions to certain stimuli are also the will itself. According to Schopenhauer, the entire body is the objectified will, in that regard, what he calls an immediate object, i.e. body of the subject, now referred to as the objecthood of the will (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.125). As also mentioned in the previous section of his dissertation, the subject of cognition, when introspects, always recognizes itself as the subject of willing, which has its motives that determine its actions and movements. Therefore, all acts of its body are also the acts of its will; Schopenhauer explains this as follows:

And thus we can also say, in a sense: the will is *a priori* cognition of the body, and the body is *a posteriori* cognition of the will. – Resolutions of the will concerning events in the future are really just rational deliberations over things that will be willed later, they are not true acts of will: a decision is stamped only in the execution, and until that time it remains an unsettled design and exists only in reason, abstractly. Willing and doing are different only for reflection: in actuality they are one. (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.125)

That said, however, we are nevertheless unable to cognize our will in its entirety; although, as the seat of the subject, the body is the condition for intuitive cognition, it is nevertheless subjected to the laws governing the world as representation, in that regard, the will is only cognized in its individual acts (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.125). These individual acts, as also acts of the body, would have their ground outside of themselves, namely, in motives, which expresses what is willed "at this time, in this place, under these circumstances" (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.131). In that regard, motive can explain the actions of the subject only if the subject is considered empirically, for it is unfathomable why one wills this or that; the motives themselves cannot be explained by the principle of sufficient reason nor the fact that why we will in general (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.131). The principle of sufficient reason can only explain the appearance of the will, not the will itself, which is groundless (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.131). Based on this revelation, Schopenhauer would expand this discussion to include not only the immediate objects but also other objects, all

animal and plant life, and even the inorganic nature. However, before dwelling on this issue, it is first important to elaborate on the will as the thing in itself to make Schopenhauer's account clearer.

According to Schopenhauer Kant was a great philosopher since he was the one who broke the ground in philosophy by showing that space, time and causality do not belong to the object themselves but rather to the subject constitution; in that regard, he showed that "subject's mode of intuition" is also the "characteristics of the object" (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.144). These can also be regarded as the "indivisible boundary" that separates the subject from the object; all objects necessarily appear in them, and the subject also regards these qualities *a priori*, since they solely originate in the cognizing subject (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.144). However, one must also admit that these representations are not mere phantoms of our imagination, since we are certain that there is something in them which is not relative and is able to exist without external support, therefore, we conclude that beyond our world of representations, there must be a thing in itself, i.e. an extramental reality that cannot be cognized as it is, in accordance with our forms of cognition (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.144). In that sense, all the forms of representation must be unrelated to this thing in itself, since the subject is the only one that produces these forms and generates cognitions of these forms; hence, it is also certain that the content of these representations, as the aspect of appearances that cannot be conditioned by space, time or causality, i.e. *what* enters into these forms, essentially remains unknown to us (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.144-145). This is why no science or discipline was able to aid us in the content of our representations.

Accordingly, since we do not have any cognition regarding it, as also explained by Kant (1999, p.172; 2004, p.66)., it must be the case that the existence of the thing in itself only inferred to us; we can know it exists only in a mediated, abstract manner (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.136). In that case, it is very possible to view the thing in itself as an unknown quantity, thus, it can be called whatever we want, and the term must only signify this unknown aspect (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.136). However, for Schopenhauer, this is not the case, rather, the thing in itself, as the aspect of cognition that does not rely on the subject, is the will, and it is quite familiar and knowable to us; since we have an immediate cognition of ourselves as subject of willing, we are immediately aware that what is cognized and the cognizing one are the same (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.136-137). In that regard, even though

we cannot know the will itself in its entirety, we can be certain that it is not an unknown aspect, but rather, a very familiar aspect of the world (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.136).

Now, since the thing in itself is viewed as will, it must be completely independent of all forms of appearance and cognition, in other words, forms of appearance only can be seen as a part of its objecthood (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.137). Hence, as aspects of the principle of sufficient reason, space, time and causality cannot pertain to the thing in itself (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.137). As viewed by Schopenhauer, space and time (hence, also causality) are *principium individuationis*, which is inseparable from the principle of sufficient reason (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.137). As borrowed from Suarez, this principle holds that when the will, as the thing in itself, enters into forms of appearance and cognition, it becomes individuated by many individual representations that are endless in number (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.137). Since space and time give the possibility of the "multiplicity of coexistent and successive things", they are regarded as the principle of individuation (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.137). Following this, if it is accepted that the thing in itself is independent of such forms, then it must also be stated that "the will as the thing in itself lies outside the province of the principle of sufficient reason in all its forms, and therefore has absolutely no ground", moreover, since it lies beyond the possibility of multiplicity, it is itself one and undivided. However, this unity does not indicate any quantitative determination, since quantity is only possible with multiplicity, rather, it must be understood that it is the absolute unity, in the sense that it is the single all-encompassing source of every representation, even the person, as an individual (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.137-138).

That said, anyone who concludes that the body is given in a twofold, unriddled manner, has two different options. First, one can regard the other objects, besides the immediate object as a body, as fundamentally different, Hence, in terms of reality, these objects cannot be the same as the body of the subject and must be mere plays of our imagination. Second, one can also regard other objects in the same manner and assume that their inner essence is also the will, but they are only given mediately to the subject (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.128). According to Schopenhauer, the former is simply madness and must be treated with medication, not refutation, thus, he leaves only one option to proceed (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.129). Therefore, anyone who chooses the second way holds the key to the riddles of nature, the only thing to do, then, is to apply this insight to all other mediate

objects, and soon, one would realize that all animal and plant life, as well as the inorganic objects, are all appearances of the one and the same will (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.134).

Until this point, only the human body is revealed to be the objecthood of the will, as its deeds are grounded on motives, which are, in turn, groundless. However, the same can also be said for animal life, although in animals, the motives appear as instincts, or blind impulses that drive the organisms' movements and actions, without abstract cognition (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.139). Even though animals have intuitive cognitions, since they lack abstract cognition, thus, lack elective choice, their actions and behaviours are viewed as a part of the necessity in nature, nevertheless, it is imperative to admit also will is also at work here; in that regard, although the will is accompanied by cognition, it is not guided by it (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.139). Further, it is also possible to expand this insight by comprehending the plant kingdom as well, in which there is no cognition at all, but only blind, driving forces of life, which enables plants to move according to certain stimuli (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.142). In that regard, it is possible to grasp that, in principle, there is no difference between a human, an animal or a plant, all of which are objectified will. For instance, the house of a snail, i.e., its shell, and the house of a human is also the expression of the one and the same will, guided by cognition in the latter example and not guided by cognition in the former (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.142). Even though, as an aetiology, the science of physiology can explain the causal relationships between the processes of hunting, growing towards the sun or water, or the physiological reactions of a man, building his own house, it eventually comes to a dead end and cannot explain what grounds all of these activities (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.164).

Now, there seems to be nothing preventing us from taking a step further, by expanding the same insight by including inorganic nature, hence, the whole physical world (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.142). Although cannot be regarded as motives, also inorganic material bodies have ground for their alterations and movements, namely, this ground is constituted by the most fundamental, original forces of nature such as gravity or electromagnetism (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.142). Even though they ground the causal proceedings of the inorganic bodies and are mentioned in every account explaining natural phenomena, these original forces themselves are unfathomable, thus, they are always regarded as the unexplained aspect of the physical world (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.160-161). In that regard, it is not difficult to state that the same pattern of thought can be applied to

these kinds of bodies as well as the immediate object as the material body of the subject; just as our bodies are both intuitive representations and objecthood of the will, the inorganic objects must be also objecthoods of the will and also intuitive representations of the physical world, even though their objectification pertains to the lowest level; in this case, however, the will is not guided by cognition or any processes of the organic life, rather, it appears as a raw, striving natural force (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.142-143). Even though the view that both regard human beings and inorganic objects as the appearances of the one and the same will seem overgeneralizing, Schopenhauer states that the distance between them stems from the fact that humans have a very high degree of individuation, as the highest level of the objectification of the will, they express individual character rather than the character of the species (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.143-144). This is not the case for inorganic beings, since they have the lowest degree of objectification, they express only the character of their species (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.144). In that regard, the individuality, and the complexity of natural laws that unite in an appearance, gradually decreases as the level of objectification declines. Following this, it is revealed that both the character of a person and the original forces of nature are unexplainable, no ground can be given for each case; hence, they are regarded the same as the appearances of the same will, i.e. the thing in itself.

Before thoroughly explaining this latter proposition, it is first required to give an account of how Schopenhauer views Platonic Ideas as the levels of objectification of the will, this however, would be attained in the following section. In that regard, for now, it is sufficient to summarize our account so far. According to Schopenhauer, as the most proximate and unriddled representation, the human body is given to the subject of cognition in such a way that the subject can view it in two completely different ways, namely, as the immediate object through which all other representations become possible, and also as the objectification of the will. In that regard, the latter is the first and most immediate cognition, since even the subject of knowing does not grasp itself as a knowing being, but rather as a willing being. It is directly revealed that with all its organs and organization, the whole body is nothing other than the objectified will. All our deeds are grounded on our motives, which are evaluated by the stillness of reason and one of them is chosen by it, however, this choice is not an expression of freedom, but rather a special determination, i.e. a determination that is grounded on a person's character, which is itself groundless.

Following this revelation, one must also use this insight for other intuitive representations, since one is aware that the content of the most immediate representation of itself, is nothing other than the will. Thus, it must be also the case that the content of all representations is the will. In that regard, this insight can be expanded from animals to plants, further to all inorganic things, by doing which one arrives at a conclusion that indicates, that whatever there is, must be a representation of one and the same will as the thing in itself. Consequently, it is revealed that although the world as representation is constituted by diverse and varied representations, in terms of their inner essence, they are one and the same. Therefore, the riddle of the first class of representations is solved through the fourth class of representations. This point holds much significance for Schopenhauer, as he also mentions it several times, all his work in *The World as Will and Representation* is dedicated to explaining this truth, which he also claims to be the *philosophical truth par excellence*. (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.127).

2.1.4. Schopenhauer's View of Individuation

In *The World as Will and Representation*, it is possible to see that Schopenhauer's metaphysical outline of all there is includes three main elements: the Will as the thing in itself, Platonic Ideas as the levels of objectivation of the will, and individual representations. To speak in a superficial manner, the individuation occurs by will's objectification through first Ideas, and then through the principle of sufficient reason, hence the principle of individuation, to countless individual representations. Although the first and the third are explained narrowly, one cannot help but think the picture is complete, however, Schopenhauer unexpectedly includes a new element. Surely, this is a sign that indicates his devotion and love to Plato's philosophy, however, as also would be clearer discussion proceeds, it seems quite extraordinary to include this element as it significantly makes it difficult to coincide this element with what has been said so far. However, it is nevertheless important to at least have a general understanding of this aspect as it would contribute to our understanding of how Nietzsche is influenced by Schopenhauer's aesthetics. Before diving into elaborate on Schopenhauer's account of them, it is first crucial to note that even though they are called Platonic Ideas, how Schopenhauer views them resembles neo-Platonic understanding of Ideas more than Plato's own account. In that regard, Russell may be right when he states, "I do not think he owes as much to Plato as he thinks he does" (Russell, 2008, p.753).

According to Schopenhauer, Ideas are "nothing but particular species, or the original, unchanging forms and qualities of all natural bodies, inorganic no less than organic, as well as the universal forces that manifest themselves according to natural laws" (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.191), elsewhere he also calls them "different levels of objectivation of the will that exists as the unattained models of the countless individuals in which they are expressed, or the eternal forms of things, do not themselves enter time and space" (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.154) and also labels them as "archetypes" (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.155). Consequently, it is quite valid to assume that the terms such as "level of objectification of the will", "species", "universal natural forces", "models of countless individuals", "eternal forms of things", "archetypes" and surely, "ideas" are interchangeable terms. In that regard, although seems challenging, regarding these terms as such would be considered acceptable in our account.

Schopenhauer first introduces this term in the 25th section of *The Worlds as Will and Representation*. At the lowest levels, the will objectifies as the original natural forces such as gravity, impenetrability, rigidity, fluidity, elasticity, and magnetism etc., moreover, each of these forces strives to control the matter in the universe, in that regard, even though they appear in the matter without exception, some matter is controlled by one of them, and other parcels of matter are controlled by another; only by virtue of this division matter "acquires its specificity" (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.155). Just like a person's character, all ideas, as levels of objectification of the will, are groundless, no science can explain and ground these occult qualities; no cause can be given for gravity or electromagnetism. Although these original forces dominate matter through causality, in other words, they control matter by having it follow the causal chain that is specific to the certain original force, they can be regarded as neither effect nor cause and hence, they must be regarded as they are outside of causality, outside of the principle of sufficient reason (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.155). In that sense, it is problematic to view the cause of a falling stone as gravity, it is rather the earth that pulls the stone with its mass to itself, thus, gravity is outside of this causal chain, just as any Idea (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.155-156). That said, the Idea itself is not the law of nature, rather it is the original force that the law of nature expresses, in that regard, Schopenhauer states that the law of nature is the relationship between the form of appearance and the Idea (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.157; p.159). Even though the Idea expresses itself through innumerable appearances in space and time, the temporal succession amongst these appearances is nevertheless determined by causality, thus, causality can also be seen as that

which makes it possible that some appearances disappear, and others take their place, by providing a ground for change and alteration (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.159).

This conflict among different Ideas is what drives will to objectify at higher and higher levels; when Ideas get into conflict, a higher Idea will rise from this conflict, dominating the lower ones (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.169). This can be seen as the purpose of the will's objectification, namely, expressing itself at the highest level possible. Even though a higher Idea overpowers the lower ones, these lower Ideas still proceed to force their claim on the matter, however, they remain subordinate to the overpowering Idea (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.157; p.170). For instance, in the solidification of bones or flesh, it is possible to see that chemicals such as calcium behave in a completely different manner when compared to their states outside of the organism, in that regard, it is possible to say that the Idea of the species dominates the chemical and physical forces that governs the simple materials that constitute the bone or the tissue of the flesh; although these original chemical forces still at work, they are nevertheless subjected to the character of the species of the animal (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.169-170). However, as explained, when a certain appearance, an animal in this case, ceases to exist due to a causal chain of events, these original forces that are once subordinated to the higher Idea, would again gain control of the matter (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.171). This is why all life decomposes back to the materials of their constitution.

That said, it would be useful to explain the increasing level of objectification starting from inorganic objects to human beings. According to Schopenhauer, since even the lowest levels of objectification of the will are in conflict over the domination of matter, it is natural to see conflict everywhere in nature; "victory always changing hands" (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.171). This is an essential aspect of the will, as it strives for higher levels of objectification, which is only possible by conflict. In the lowest levels, the Idea expresses itself with the least individuality, hence, in inorganic nature, "each of these forces presents itself to us in millions of identical, lawlike appearances which do not register a single trace of individual character, but rather are simply multiplied in time and space, i.e. through the *principium individuationis*, as an image is multiplied in the facets of a glass" (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.174). However, we also see will at work in the plant kingdom, where it expresses itself at a higher level, as a blind force of life, although without a single trace of cognition, only vegetative life (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.174).

At higher levels, will is objectified as animal life, as intuitive cognition accompanies it (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.175). This expresses a higher objectification since the plant life is unable to pursue nutrition and give rise to more complex structures; while plants must wait for their nutrition and resources, animals can chase these resources with their ability to cognize intuitively, which itself expresses the will in a higher degree since it requires the subordination of more Ideas (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.174-175). However, intuitive cognition also comes with a price, namely, a tendency to fall for illusion and deception, which overshadows the certainty of blind necessary drives in vegetative life (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.175). In this case, the stillness of reason, elective choice, hence, abstract cognitions as concepts, which enable the subject to examine the future as well as the past and plan its actions, comes to the aid of the animal, as it is in the human being (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.176). In this level of objectification, raw instincts disappear, and calm deliberation enters the picture instead; this makes a higher degree of objectification of the will possible, through which appearances of the will express individuality at the highest level, and the expression of the character of species decreases to the lowest degree possible (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.176). This final step as the Idea regarding humans, has two important inferences; firstly, intuitive and abstract cognitions are a necessary result of wills course of objectification, thus, knowledge itself is only a tool for the individual human beings to preserve their existence and contributes to the continuation of their species (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.177), and secondly, the human being is so highly objectified will that each human being can be viewed as a “particularly determined and characteristic appearance of the will” (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.156). In that regard, each character can be viewed as its own Idea; in the human being, the character as the particular determination of the will subordinates other levels of objectification in such a unique manner, that it almost becomes utterly difficult to regard individuals of this species under the same Idea (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.157).

Even though dwelling on this issue in a more comprehensive manner is possible, we must digress to examine Schopenhauer's aesthetics in the light of what has been discussed so far. However, it is first useful to give a summary of individuation according to Schopenhauer. Now, beyond the world as representation, there is only will as the thing in itself. It is one and undivided as the source of every representation, and even of the subject as well as the object. Although without the governance of principle of sufficient reason, hence, time and space, the will as the thing in itself individuates to some degree in Ideas as

the adequate objects, which express the levels of its objecthood; they do not take part in coming to be and passing away (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.202), rather, as Schopenhauer states in accordance with Plato (2008, p.16), Ideas express being in the proper sense (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.194). Even though these Ideas cannot be regarded as individuals since they are outside of the governance of the principle of individuation, they must nevertheless be regarded as individuated representations to some degree as they are many in number. These ideas as original natural forces, species, archetypes of everything, eternal forms of things or the levels of objectification of the will, strive to dominate matter in the universe and increase their representations in the empirical world that is governed by the principle of sufficient reason, thus paving the way for higher and higher degrees of objectification of the will, the highest level expressing the Idea of human beings in great individual diversity.

However, lastly, it is important to note that the process of individuation occurs by the representation aspect of the will. Although being eternal forms or archetypes that are beyond the governance of space and time as forms of cognition, these Ideas nevertheless are representations since they are regarded as "adequate objecthood" of the will, under the most fundamental form of subject-object distinction. Hence, it is possible to conclude that individuation is inseparable from the most general form of representation, namely, the distinction between the subject and the object (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.144). This last point would be significant in other discussions when we discuss Nietzsche's metaphysics in *The Birth of Tragedy* and its internal connection with Kantian philosophy. Regardless, now it is possible to dwell on the issue of how Ideas can become objects of cognition, which is the most fundamental aspect of aesthetic experience in Schopenhauer.

2.1.5. Schopenhauer's Aesthetics

From what has been discussed so far, although it is quite possible to see how Schopenhauer's thought in general deeply influenced Nietzsche in terms of *The Birth of Tragedy*, it would not be an exaggeration to state that it is precisely Schopenhauer's aesthetics that shaped some of the core tenets in the mentioned work. Besides Nietzsche, many philosophers and artists were heavily influenced by Schopenhauer's philosophy of art, he was particularly popular among composers (Cartwright, 2010, p.318) as he gave music an exceptional role in his elaborations. In the third book of *The World as Will and Representation*, Schopenhauer focuses on art and explains his views regarding his

philosophy of art, as his second consideration of the world as representation. Even though the third book in itself is rich enough to be the subject of a whole other study, however, for the purposes of the current study, it is only aimed to explore two important aspects of Schopenhauer's aesthetics, each of which can be seen in different forms in Nietzsche's early thought. These aspects are namely, the aesthetic experience and the hierarchy among fine arts.

2.1.5.1. *Aesthetic experience*

In the natural course of daily life, each object of experience appears to us as an object of pleasure and displeasure, namely, these objects are identified according to the determinations of our individual will, according to the interest (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.199). Although every human can be regarded as the subject of cognition, they are nevertheless individuals; a subject that cognizes the world through an object which, in essence, is not different from the other physical objects that are subjected to the necessary rules of the world as representation. In other words, since the body is nothing other than the objectified will, the subject's cognition is always accompanied by the will, which is why the subject always cognizes itself immediately as a willing subject. Moreover, as discussed in the previous sections, the only possible cognition for the subject is that which is according to the principle of sufficient reason and its modes, which, in terms of empirical reality and physical objects, is nothing other than causality (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.198). Hence, it can be said that ordinary cognition is always attained under the principle of individuation, i.e., space and time. In that regard, the cognition of Ideas as the adequate objecthoods of the will, which are independent of the principle of sufficient reason, thus, of individuation, is excluded here. However, although it seems Schopenhauer is very eager to conclude otherwise, he nevertheless admits that the Idea and the thing in itself are not the same (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.197), thus, Ideas must be regarded as representations, even though a special kind. Since the Ideas eventually belong to the world as representation, they must be cognizable.

On one hand, we can call the experience of the subject of cognition, which must be in accordance with the principle of sufficient reason, ordinary experience, on the other hand, we can call the experience of the subject of cognition, which is completely different than ordinary experience, as *aesthetic experience*. The aesthetic experience may arise from any object such as an art piece or a natural object (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.202), however, it is different from the ordinary experience in the sense that the objects that are cognized are not

regarded as individuals, rather, they are eternal forms of things as Ideas (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.200), expressing the levels of objectification of the will, as its true objecthoods. Since the objects that are cognized are not individuals, Schopenhauer stresses that the subject of cognition must also leave its individuality behind by becoming the pure subject of cognition, which is independent of the will, in a state of tranquil contemplation of objects (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.201). The alteration of this sort in the object makes it necessary that the subject itself is no longer individual. Therefore, in aesthetic experience, both the subject and the object are altered dramatically, they are elevated above the principle of sufficient reason and the principle of individuation. This is explained by Schopenhauer as follows:

This transition occurs suddenly when cognition tears itself free from the service of the will so that the subject ceases to be merely individual and now becomes the pure, will-less subject of cognition, no longer concerned relations following the principle of sufficient reason but instead resting and becoming absorbed in a steady contemplation of the object presented, aside from its inter-connections with any other object. (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.201)

However, the connotations of the above passage must not mislead the reader, since usually, when "pure cognition" or "will-lessness" is mentioned, it is easy to assume that what is discussed is abstract cognition, cognition in terms of the faculty of reason. This is definitely not the case for Schopenhauer, as he makes it clear that a concept is, by nature, very different from the Idea. Firstly, the concept is a representation that is governed by the principle of sufficient reason of knowing, which is the second mode of the principle of sufficient reason, but the Idea is not governed by this principle, it is a representation that is beyond this principle. Secondly, the concept is an abstract, undetermined representation of the faculty of reason; although it includes necessary features that can be seen as the boundary of its extension, it is indifferent towards many intuitive, individual representations that are thought under it. Hence, the representation of a concept has a secondary significance when compared to intuitive representations. However, the Ideas are not representations of that kind, although they can be "perhaps best defined as adequate representatives of concepts", they "are thoroughly intuitive and, despite the fact that they stand for an infinite number of particular things, they are nonetheless thoroughly determinate", furthermore, since they are

adequate objectification of the will, in terms of significance, they precede the intuitive representations (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.260). Moreover, Schopenhauer was certain that the principle of individuation and the forms of the world as representation expresses the boundary between the subject and the object (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.144), thus, it becomes a matter of question how an aesthetic experience is ever possible. Although it is never explicitly explained, Schopenhauer states that in aesthetic experience, this boundary almost vanishes. He states:

if we stop considering the Where, When, Why and Wherefore of things but simply and exclusively consider the *What*, if we do not allow our consciousness to become engrossed by abstract thinking, concepts of reason; but if, instead of all this, we devote the entire power of our mind to intuition and immerse ourselves in this entirely, letting the whole of consciousness be filled with peaceful contemplation of the natural object that is directly present, a landscape, a tree, a cliff, a building, or whatever it might be, and, according to a suggestive figure of speech, we *lose* ourselves in this object completely, i.e. we forget our individuality, our will, and continue to exist only as pure subject, the clear mirror of the object, so that it is as if the object existed on its own, without anyone to perceive it, and we can no longer separate the intuited from the intuition as the two have become one, and the whole of consciousness is completely filled and engrossed by a single intuitive image. (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.201)

Even though this passage is quite explanatory, it necessarily raises one fundamental question: How cognition, as a feature that is a result of the will's objectification and as a feature that serves the will, can be will-less by escaping its servitude? This matter is not clearly explained by Schopenhauer himself, however, the secondary literature on the issue asserts that the subject of cognition never actually escapes the will's servitude but rather bypasses the individual will to life (Neil, 2008, p.188). According to a reading by Alex Neil, it is stressed that although the will as the thing in itself is groundless, its appearances, thus whole nature *in concreto*, does not permit any gaps, in other words, there seems to be some

kind of purposiveness in nature, through which the will expresses itself as the original forces of nature, functioning blindly on matter, and eventually producing human beings with intellect which in turn makes possible the self-knowledge of the will by this pure cognition. In that regard, the aesthetic experience is not an escape from Will's servitude, but rather, a continuation of it as the feature that makes Will's self-recognition. Neil supports his view by pointing to the epigraph of the first volume of *The World as Will and Representation*: "Might not nature finally fathom itself?", which is from a poem by Goethe. This is obviously a very Hegelian reading of Schopenhauer's metaphysics; however, it nevertheless facilitates making sense of the possible obscurities that may arise from Schopenhauer's writings. According to this view, even though the will to live, the appearance of the will as the thing in itself in an individual human being is left aside, will as the thing in itself can never be escaped.

That said, besides its special subjective conditions, the uniqueness of aesthetic experience in Schopenhauer's philosophy also stems from another feature, namely, the tranquillity of aesthetic experience. So far, Schopenhauer's account of nature revealed that all things share a common root, i.e. the will as the thing in itself. All the objects of the phenomenal world as well as the material body of the subject of cognition, and even the subject itself are objectified will, thus, besides the world as representation, everything is united in one and all-encompassing will. However, in the world of representation, the will first objectifies itself through different levels as Ideas, then, as individual appearances. As soon as the individuation begins, will becomes an enemy for itself (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.392), even the most adequate of its objectifications that are outside of time and space, get into conflict as they strive for domination for matter and increase their individual appearances under the principle of sufficient reason, moreover, when the living beings concerned, even the individuals themselves are always in conflict, because their individual wills make negation of other individuals necessary. Furthermore, suffering itself is inescapable, since as long as there are individual wills, there would be suffering in the world in the form of need or deficiency (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.114). This picture itself is almost sufficient for making Schopenhauer a "pessimistic" philosopher.

Regardless, his elaboration on aesthetic experience provides a consolation, or a "metaphysical solace" as Nietzsche calls it. In the world of representation, there is no being

in the proper sense, there is always becoming or passing away, accordingly, there cannot be lasting happiness:

Thus, as long as our consciousness is filled by our will, as long as we are given over to the pressure of desires with their constant hopes and fears, as long as we are the subject of willing, we will never have lasting happiness or peace. (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.220)

However, if one raises above the principle of sufficient reason and individuality, another possibility arises:

But when some occasion from the outside or a disposition from within suddenly lifts us out of the endless stream of willing, tearing cognition from its slavery to the will, our attention is no longer directed to the motives of willing but instead grasps things freed from their relation to the will, and hence considers them without interests, without subjectivity, purely objectively; we are given over to the things entirely, to the extent that they are mere representations, not to the extent that they are motives: then suddenly the peace that we always sought on the first path of willing but that always eluded us comes of its own accord, and all is well with us. (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.220)

In light of these passages, it is possible to conclude that even though Schopenhauer's account of nature is quite grim and pessimistic, he nevertheless provides a possible way out of the world as willing and suffering. In the tranquil contemplation of the Ideas, when the objects stop being identifiable by the interest, i.e., according to the individual will to live, and a disinterested relationship with the object is attained, it is possible to taste the true and lasting happiness and peace.

Lastly, it is important to mention that for Schopenhauer, as resulting from the subjective condition of the world as representation, the aesthetic experience can be shared by every human being; the conditions for the aesthetic experience, namely, being a pure

subject of will-less cognition is defined as genius by Schopenhauer. It expresses a "capacity for cognition independent from the principle of sufficient reason" (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.218). Since Ideas are non-individual objects, which are independent of the principle of sufficient reason, genius as a capacity expresses the possibility of being the subjective correlate of an Idea, and for Schopenhauer, it seems necessary to at least assume that this capacity is shared by all human beings, since otherwise, beauty or sublimity would be impossible to grasp for certain individuals (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.218). Although shared by everyone, genius differs in terms of degree in each person; as the capacity to maintain the pure, will-less state of cognition, this kind of clarity of the mind might exist in higher degrees in some human beings and in lesser degrees in other ones (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.218).

2.1.5.2. *Hierarchy among fine arts*

According to Schopenhauer, it is certain *a posteriori* that matter itself does not have a corresponding Idea but it expresses all lower levels of objectification of the will; appearances of all Ideas, which are the original forces of nature in the lower levels, enter the forms according to the principle of sufficient reason or *principium individuationis*, through its expressions in matter (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.238-239). In that regard, as "the common substrate of all particular appearances of the Ideas" matter is regarded as the "link" between Idea and its appearances (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.238). It was mentioned that this can be seen even in the most mundane and general qualities of matter, all of which express an Idea; even features such as gravity, rigidity, fluidity, or cohesion express Ideas as levels of objectification of the will, thus, in individual things, as appearances, when Idea is expressed through the matter, it becomes intuitively cognizable (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.239). In that sense, it is possible for the work of art, as well as a natural object, to "represent" the Idea in such a way that the individual representation can pave the way for aesthetic experience as it expresses the Idea in the most clarity (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.239). This seems to be the task of every field of art according to Schopenhauer. In this framework, then, these various fields can be put in a hierarchical order according to the Ideas, i.e., levels of objectification of the will, that are expressed through the works of art.

Accordingly, for Schopenhauer, as the art form that expresses the lowest levels of objectification of the will, architecture seems to be occupying the first level as far as this hierarchy is concerned. Even though in some cases, it is difficult to even count architecture among fine arts since it serves the needs of the material body, hence, the individual will, by

its function, it is still possible to express the original forces such as gravity and rigidity through architecture, hence, the only aesthetic content of architecture is the struggle between the gravity and rigidity; the mass of the solids that are used in a building or a structure pulled by the earth's mass, their natural course of motion is downwards, however, through the design and the positioning, rigidity of these masses enables the architect to produce constructions that can express the complicated relationship between these two forces as masses of unimaginable magnitude stands tall, in a purposiveness that is unique to the work of art (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.239-240). The work is designed in such a way that even if one element is removed, the whole structure may collapse (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.240). A similar case can be presented for also fountainry, which uses fluidity as opposed to rigidity to form structures that can express the Idea; in fountainry, then, the artist produces structures based on the contrast between the fluidity, formlessness, transparency of one hand and gravity on the other hand (Schopenhauer, 2010, p. 243). The examples can be increased but the definitive feature of architecture and fountainry is their ability to convey Ideas of the lowest kind through their constructed structures, i.e., individual representations.

When we move towards higher Ideas, we encounter landscape gardening as a field of art that is, in principle, the same as architecture, however, instead of only conveying the lowest levels of objectification, it additionally expresses the vegetative life of plants (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.243). The genius in landscape gardening stems from the combination of diverse species of plants in such a way that it exerts admiration in the viewer and creates a scenic beauty in which each species of plants is distinguished, in this regard, the artist has a very limited role regarding the beauty of the scenery (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.243). Parallel to landscape gardening, landscape painting also expresses beauty in terms of vegetative life, i.e., life that lacks cognition in the plant kingdom, however, for Schopenhauer, landscape painting differs from the first two in the sense that it affects a subjective alteration rather than the apprehension of the object (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.244). Since by the virtue of the painting, the painter allows us to see through the artist's eyes, the viewer is guided to attain pure, will-less cognition as this shared view in the painting indicates the insignificance of individuality and emphasizes pure cognition as a shared capability (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.244). Although this is the case since it expresses higher and more significant objectification of the will, aesthetic pleasure balances the subjective side (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.244).

Landscape painting is followed by paintings and sculptures of sentient life, namely, animals; examples of this kind of art can be found in ancient relics and buildings. These artworks express the will, which is also in us, however, in animals, it is not tamed with the calmness of reason (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.244). Thus, in these artworks, the will is expressed clearly with “grotesque and monstrous” elements (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.245). Consequently, although the artwork is enjoyed with aesthetic pleasure, as the viewer loses individuality in pure cognition, the effect of the work as such is not experienced with proper stillness because the viewer is greatly “occupied with the restlessness and intensity of the will that is portrayed” (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.245). On the objective side however, the unity in nature is presented to the viewer, through the expression of the will, besides the great diversity of life that is portrayed in the artwork (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.245).

Not unexpectedly, historical paintings and sculptures follow these kinds of artworks as they express higher Ideas, namely, of humanity; a peculiar difficulty can be seen in these works of art since the artist must convey both the Idea of the species, humanity, and the Idea as the individual’s character, which does not exist for animals, plants and inorganic objects (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.245-246). Paintings and sculptures that portray human beings immediately “draws us into purely aesthetic intuition”; according to Schopenhauer, the aesthetic experience is induced most easily by these works of art when compared to the previously mentioned ones, since “we ourselves are the will” that is adequately objectified and cognized in the artwork (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.246). This is why human beauty is recognizable by each one of us when we encounter it, in that regard, it is possible to say that the beauty of the species and the beauty of the individual character seem to be intertwined in the artwork since although each individual is portrayed uniquely in accordance with the individual will as seen in the form of unique facial expressions and bodily dispositions, “the individual always belongs to humanity and humanity, for its part, is always revealed in the individual” (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.250-251). In that sense, the beauty of the species never contradicts the individual character, rather, it is only by the individual character the beauty of humanity can be conveyed. Consequently, for Schopenhauer, in terms of the content of the work, there can be no hierarchy among the works of art that portray different social classes. For instance, portraying important events or people can be never superior to portraying peasants or regular citizens, since what is being portrayed is not merely the

individual circumstances but what is universal, namely, the Idea of humanity (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.256-257). As he states:

In addition, events whose outer significances are very dissimilar can have the same inner significance; for instance, it is very much the same with respect to inner significance whether ministers with their maps fight over countries and peoples, or whether peasants in the tavern stake their claims over cards and dice, just as it makes no difference whether you play chess with figures made of gold or of wood. Moreover, the scenes and events that make up the lives of so many millions of people, their comings and goings, their hardships and their joys, are for that very reason important enough to be the subject-matter of art, and through their rich variety must provide sufficient material for unfolding the many-sided Idea of humanity. (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.256-257)

Poetry can be counted among the arts that is superior even to historical painting and sculpture, because of its vast ability to convey innumerable and varied Ideas (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.270). It is different from the arts that are mentioned so far in the sense that it does not use any intuitive representation for the cognition of the Idea, rather, it uses abstract representations (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.269). In that regard, Schopenhauer once more stresses the difference between an Idea and a concept; while Idea precedes individual, intuitive representations as it is the “unity shattered into multiplicity through the temporal and spatial form of our intuitive apprehension”, concept is preceded by individual representations as the formation of a concept requires abstraction as a mental act that unites many intuitive representations of the understanding in the abstract representations of the faculty of reason (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.261). Accordingly, the Idea can be called “unity before the fact”, and the concept “unity after the fact” (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.261). Although they are fundamentally different, they only share one feature, namely, being a unity, which stands for “multiplicity of actual things” (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.259).

Now, poetry, as an art form that aims to communicate the Idea through abstract concepts rather than individual representations, possesses a special place among fields of

art; the true poet, also with the aid of the imagination of the perceiver, must always create an image that is an “intuitive representative”, however, this becomes a difficult task since poetry can only be attained by abstract representations (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.269). In that regard, the poet must arrange these abstract representations in such a manner that it excites first the imagination and then, in turn, the aesthetic experience (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.269). Therefore, it holds utter significance that the poet does not permit the generality of the used material to be kept; this generality must vanish as soon as the concepts become expressions that are arranged in the artwork (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.269).

There are many advantages of poetry over visual arts. Although the latter is more efficient in terms of expressing the lower levels of objectification of the will, the former is far more superior in terms of higher Ideas. This has several reasons. Firstly, the rhythm and rhyme excite us more easily since they also pertain to time as a part of the subject’s constitution; the successive patterns facilitate the aesthetic experience, secondly, as also mentioned before, since the material that poetry uses, i.e., concept, is general, it is superior in terms of expression, and thirdly, since it is not a mere image or portrayal that is being conveyed, poetry enables us to portray humanity through whole chains of actions, thoughts and affections that are described (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.270). In that sense, it can be said that the “great subject-matter of poetry is thus the revelation of the Idea that is the highest level of the will’s objecthood, the presentation of human beings in the inter-connected series of their actions and endeavours” (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.270-271).

Different genres of poetry can explore different aspects of the Idea of humanity. For instance, in lyrical poetry and singing, “what is portrayed is at the same time the portrayer”, consequently the subjective emphasis is very powerful in these genres of poetry since what is described is usually the feelings, thoughts and the inner state of the poet (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.275). On the other hand, however, genres such as epic poetry, drama and novel, can be considered more objective when compared with lyrical poetry and singing, since they portray fictional characters in various circumstances which enables them to express more general and objective aspects of the Idea of humanity (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.278). Although many examples can be given about the genres of poetry, the most superior one is tragedy according to Schopenhauer, since it has a unique cognitive significance.

As the "pinnacle of literature", tragedy's sole aim is to portray the sufferings of life, through expressing the evil's victory, uncontrollable domination of mere chance, and the fall of values such as innocence or righteousness (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.279-280). Surely, this is not for the mere sake of inducing displeasure in the viewers, rather, according to Schopenhauer, by conveying these features of life, tragedy shows the inner essence of whole nature, the world and existence itself (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.280). As explained previously, for Schopenhauer, the will becomes an enemy to itself as it enters the forms of cognition, more precisely, *principium individuationis* (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.280). All individual wills, even the most mundane forces of nature, battle amongst themselves. In that regard, when this is portrayed in an artwork, the viewer gains an insight into the inner essence of the world. Accordingly, even though in tragedy, the subject matter includes much suffering and pain when this insight is gained, it acts as a tranquillizer of that pain; one catches a glimpse of the world beyond representations, beyond the principle of individuation (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.280). In tragedies, this is represented by portraying the characters that give up their purposes which were tried to be achieved with great effort, or even giving up the will to live; examples of this can be seen in many artworks such as Hamlet or Faust (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.280).

That said, according to Schopenhauer, this effect can be attained by different means; the sorrow in the tragedy can be a result of either a purely evil character, such as Creon in Antigone, or it can be due to mere chance as in Oedipus Rex (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.281). The latter is tragedy proper for Schopenhauer since putting all the guilt on a character can diminish the aimed effect of tragedy, rather, composing the tragedy in a manner in which the sorrow and pain arise due to mere chance and coincidence, the poet can express that, to put it narrowly, the guilt is on the world itself; as if all the suffering in the tragedy was a result of necessity (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.282). In that sense, when the individual deeds of morally ordinary characters clash and result in such a painful outcome, when the suffering arises "effortlessly and spontaneously", the whole world becomes summarized in the artwork, hence, it enables the viewer with an insight that reaches beyond the world as representation (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.282).

Lastly, it is important to elaborate on the most superior fine art for Schopenhauer, namely, music. This form of art stands distinctly apart from any of the art forms that are mentioned here, this is due to its effect being necessarily, immediately and easily seen by

any viewer, regardless of individual difference (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.283). In that regard, this peculiarity regarding the music is due to its epistemological and metaphysical significance for Schopenhauer. Since this is the case, he admits that music falls out of the categorization of fine arts that has been presented; from architecture to tragedy, there seems to be a hierarchy regarding the expression of Ideas, more precisely, the conflict between the Ideas (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.283). While in architecture, the conflict between the lowest levels of objectification of the will as original forces, namely, rigidity and gravity, is expressed, in tragedy, what is conveyed is the conflict between the highest levels of objectification of the will, namely, individual human beings; the latter also reveals that the whole world is, in essence, nothing other than the will as individuated in representation and becomes an enemy to itself (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.283). Music, on the other hand, cannot be presented in this hierarchy since it is beyond and above it, as what is expressed in music is superior to any Idea whatsoever, namely, the will itself (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.285).

According to Schopenhauer, the individual, intuitive representations are only indirect objectification of the will, they are appearances of Platonic Ideas, which are adequate objecthoods of the will, in that regard, whatever is presented in the world as representation, must have a secondary relationship with the will. However, Schopenhauer states that there is only one exception: music. Music, as a fine art, does not pertain to the world as representation, rather it is directly a copy of the will itself (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.285), although it appears to us in the world as representation, it is beyond it. Accordingly, as an unmediated copy of the will, in terms of metaphysical significance, music is equal with the whole world as representation, including the Ideas, “this is precisely why the effect of music is so much more powerful and urgent than that of the other arts: the other arts speak only of shadows while music speaks of the essence” (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.285). Surely, this does not mean that music is equal to the will itself since it is possible only to perceive music in time, which is a necessary form of representation and principle of individuation. However, we can conclude that music seems to be independent from all other forms.

That said, Schopenhauer admits that he cannot give any logical explanation to what has been said above since all these conclusions are expressed as a result of a very subjective elaboration, he only claims that if one listens to music frequently and considers what he says, it would be possible to understand his arguments (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.284). In that regard, he honestly leaves this aspect of his aesthetics open to criticism. However, he

supports his views by means of an analogy between music and the world as representation; for Schopenhauer, since they are equivalents in terms of his metaphysical account, there must be commonalities between them (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.285). To present it shortly, according to the analogy, in the ground bass, as the lowest frequencies in music, the inorganic nature as the lowest objectification of the will is recognized. This represents the "mass of the planet". Schopenhauer also explains by using the theory of harmony, all other elements of higher frequencies are alterations of these lower frequencies, which is analogous to the plant and animal life that springs from the inorganic nature (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.285-286). As we move higher and higher melody is presented as the high-singing sound that leads all the composition, although expresses much freedom in its alterations (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.287). This represents human beings as the highest objectification of the will, moreover, even though they must be in accordance with the scale of the composition, melodies come with great variety, as it is in the character of human beings (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.288). The analogy is also strengthened with another aspect; while the elements of lower frequencies as the bass of the composition changes in a very slow pace, the melodies come and go in very short periods of time; this latter feature represents the contrast between human life and the inorganic nature; while the inorganic nature gives sustenance to the world, with the slow-paced change, the individual human will always strive, satisfies and strives again, which takes place in a very short period of time, compared with the change in inorganic nature (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.286-287). In that regard, the stratification in music in terms of lower and higher tones is a perfect mirror of the world as represented under the forms of the principle of sufficient reason, hence, of individuation, which is stratified in terms of Platonic Ideas, as the adequate objecthoods of the thing in itself.

2.2. Nietzsche's Views in *The Birth of Tragedy*

In *The Birth of Tragedy*, it is almost universally accepted that Nietzsche is widely under the influence of Schopenhauer (Duncan, 2007; Gemes & Janaway, 2011); not only does he use big blocks of quotations from Schopenhauer, but he also sometimes uses Schopenhauer's concepts with great comfort without giving a clear explanation of his understanding of them. That said, it can be said about both philosophers that they have a special treatment of tragedy and music. As explained earlier, for Schopenhauer, tragedy is the highest point of literature since it reflects the terrible truth about the world; the will as

the thing in itself, when enters into forms of representations, i.e., when it individuates under the *principium individuationis*, it becomes an enemy to itself; all the individual appearances of the will can be seen in a never-ending conflict (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.279-280). Since tragedy can express that even the deeds of morally ordinary individuals can get into conflict by mere chance and this can lead to catastrophic consequences, the artwork portrays the most fundamental condition in the whole existence; this portrayal has an epistemological significance because when Will's adversity towards itself expressed in such a clear manner, viewers gain insight regarding what is beyond the world as representation, thus, they are introduced to the inner essence of the world (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.280). On the other hand, music, as a direct copy of the will itself, encompasses all world as representation, expressing the gradations of objectifications of the will in its elements, hence, music expresses the entirety of the will as it gradually objectifies (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.285-288). Thus, Schopenhauer regards music as the highest fine art, which has the most powerful effect on us since although as a form of art in the world as representation it is seen as an equivalent to the whole world as representation in terms of its metaphysical value (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.285).

Regarding these elaborations, for Schopenhauer, it is clear that both music and tragedy can be seen as separate from other arts since what defines other fine arts is their portrayal of the conflict between different Platonic Ideas (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.283), by doing which they enable the viewer to become a pure subject of cognition (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.220). Although tragedy expresses the conflict in the Ideas as human deeds (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.281-282), it nevertheless reflects the whole world as a representation, thus, showing the viewer the general condition of the objectification of the will (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.280). In that regard, tragedy can be also positioned beside music, in the sense that they both do not merely express the conflict among different Ideas, rather, it can be said that they express the will in its entirety. Consequently, both music and tragedy are considered in higher regard when compared to other fine arts, since through the medium of art, they have the power to convey the philosophical truth par excellence (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.127), i.e., the inner essence of the world as *Will*. Hence, it follows that music and tragedy must have some kind of internal connection to each other. This internal connection seems to be recognized by Nietzsche himself, as he titled his first

comprehensive work *The Birth of Tragedy Out of the Spirit of Music*, and accordingly claimed that tragedy as an art form sprang out of the music:

This evidence tells us most decisively that *tragedy arose from the tragic chorus* and was originally chorus and nothing but chorus. From this we derive the obligation to look into the heart of this tragic chorus as into the true, original drama, rather than simply contenting ourselves with the usual artistic clichés, such as the claim that the chorus is the ideal (*idealisch*) spectator, or that it represents the people in contrast to the princely region of the stage. (Nietzsche, 1999, p.36)

In that regard, Nietzsche's subject of investigation seems to be based on his commitment to Schopenhauer's philosophy, as they both regard art, especially music, in a manner that expresses the importance of art, not from merely an aesthetic, rather an epistemological point of view, since it is clear that the intensity of the effect of art on us is heavily based on its ability to convey the philosophical truth regarding the dichotomy of world as representation and the reality that is independent from the conditions of the subject. However, as the discussion proceeds, it would be possible to see that even though the starting point of Nietzsche's account can be seen as very Schopenhauerian, his explanations regarding Apolline, Dionysiac, and accordingly, the principle of individuation would reveal that he has a very different reasoning underlying his elaborations when compared to Schopenhauer. To attain these elaborations, it is imperative to examine the sections 1st-10th of *The Birth of Tragedy*.

2.2.1. Apolline and Dionysiac

In the very first section of *The Birth of Tragedy*, Apolline and Dionysiac are introduced as the opposite art drives of Greeks; by analogy, Nietzsche claims that although occasionally these artistic drives reconcile, they are nevertheless always in conflict and these drives can be seen akin to sexual drives of humans which are responsible for the reproduction of individuals for human species (Nietzsche, 1999, p.14). Thus, the co-existence of Apolline and Dionysiac in this "perpetual conflict" is the ground for the evolution of all art. That said, Nietzsche asserts that the names of these drives express the Greek understanding of art and its double-sided meaning (Nietzsche, 1999, p.14). It can be said that even though they did

not express their views using concepts, Greeks used the figures of their Olympic gods to portray their understanding of the world. In that regard, these two opposite art drives can be seen as personified in the images of Dionysos and Apollo (Nietzsche, 1999, p.14). The conflict between Apolline and Dionysiac can be seen as the conflict between the art of image-making and the image-less art of music (Nietzsche, 1999, p.14). As also the title of the work implies Nietzsche's aim in this book is to investigate the origin of Attic tragedy as an art in which the Dionysiac and the Apolline merged and coincided with equal force (Nietzsche, 1999, p.14), in that regard, the Attic tragedy can be seen as the highest form of art (Nietzsche, 1999, p.104). To facilitate the comprehension of these art drives, Nietzsche suggests that they can be regarded as two separate art worlds which can be understood in analogy regarding two physiological processes, namely, the art world of *dream* and the art world of *intoxication* (Nietzsche, 1999, p.14-15).

The art world of dreams is easily comprehensible by any human being since each of us can regard ourselves as artists because we also form an image world in our dreams (Nietzsche, 1999, p.14). The capability to form images is a fundamental faculty of the human mind, and indeed a precondition of all art (Nietzsche, 1999, p.14). Nietzsche asserts that there is a pleasure that is inherent to the act of dreaming since the images that are encountered are created by the dreamer, however, it is also a necessary element of dreaming to recognize that this image world is a world of semblance, in other words, it is a world of representations (Nietzsche, 1999, p.14). Thus, one must also recognize that beneath this world of semblance, there must be a second, "quite different reality" (Nietzsche, 1999, p.14). Although Nietzsche seems to be speaking from an aesthetic perspective in terms of his understanding of dreaming, he stresses that this elaboration have also a metaphysical significance regarding the subjective conditions of the human mind, because deep down we are aware that the world we live in, is a world of representations, hence, all the representations are like fleeting images, therefore, this parallelism also suggest that there must be something one and eternal, beyond these representations, underlying all appearances. In that regard, one can even regard the dream images as semblance of semblance because the ordinary condition of the subject already suggests that we are "trapped" in a world of semblance (Nietzsche, 1999, p.25-26). Accordingly, Nietzsche states that "a person with artistic sensibility relates to the reality of dream in the same way as a philosopher relates to the reality of existence" (1999, p.15).

As the god of “image-making energies”, Apollo expresses the joy of the art of image-making, it is also evident from the fact that his name etymologically indicates he is the god of light (Nietzsche, 1999, p.16), which makes even possible the act of seeing in the first place. Therefore, in a way, Apollo can be seen as the expression, or even deification of the *principium individuationis*, which indicates the necessary rules of the world as representation (Nietzsche, 1999, p.26). Nietzsche views this principle almost exactly similar to how Schopenhauer views it. According to Schopenhauer, this principle indicates pure forms of intuition, namely, space and time, in that regard, Schopenhauer sometimes uses it as it is almost equivalent to the principle of sufficient reason, which can be seen as an equivalent of Kant's understanding of space, time and categories as the pure forms that are originated in the mind of the subject and pertain to necessary rules of intuition and thinking. For Nietzsche, the principle of individuation seems to be understood similarly, as he refers to it as "cognitive forms of the phenomenal world" (Nietzsche, 1999, p.16). Regardless, it is the principle according to which the world as representation is formed and, at least for us humans, this principle indicates a connection to our capability of image-making as Nietzsche states that the Greeks expressed the joy of semblance, the calmness of the world as representation with the god Apollo (Nietzsche, 1999, p.17).

The stillness of the world of representations, however, can become futile and this calmness may be transformed into horror and confusion if there were any disruptions in the principle of individuation, in other words, if one loses trust in the necessary rules according to which this world of semblance is formed (Nietzsche, 1999, p.17). However, when this horror and confusion is accompanied by a "blissful ecstasy", which is invoked from the "innermost ground" of humans, then it is possible to have an insight regarding the Dionysiac, as the destruction of the principle of individuation, expressed in the analogy of intoxication (Nietzsche, 1999, p.17). These mystical phrases, hopefully soon would be clear as they are grounded by the explanations of the current study, indicating that in this state, all subjectivity disappears (Nietzsche, 1999, p.17). The disappearance of subjectivity can be understood as the disappearance of the distinction and boundaries between the object and the subject, among objects and as well as among subjects; as Nietzsche claims, in this state of ecstasy, "the bond between human beings renewed", and nature reconciles with humanity as its lost child (Nietzsche, 1999, p.17). Since, as expressed by the Dionysiac, all "barriers and limits of existence are destroyed", when the principle of individuation is disrupted, the world as

representation with its individuals as appearances gradually dissolve into an eternal oneness, which Nietzsche calls the "primordial unity" or *das Ur-eine* (Nietzsche, 1999, p.17). This new altered state is expressed through singing and dancing, as a sign that all individuals, when these barriers are removed, belong to a "higher community" (Nietzsche, 1999, p.17).

Now, since these art drives are generally explained, it is possible to elaborate on them as they appear in the art of the Greeks. While the Apolline art world of dream is expressed through the epic poetry of Homer and the art of sculpture (Nietzsche, 1999, p.30), the Dionysiac art world of intoxication on the other hand, is expressed in the Dionysiac festivals, through extreme gestures, dance and especially music, where the individuality disappears, the disruption of the principle of individuation becomes an aesthetic phenomenon (Nietzsche, 1999, p.20). Although music as an art form was seen as an Apolline art by Greeks, Nietzsche states that this only encompasses a specific kind of music, namely, the music with highly structured forms, which includes a "wave-like pattern" that contributes to the image-making power of Apolline art (Nietzsche, 1999, p.20; p.122). However, Dionysiac music, especially the choral songs of the cult of Dionysos in the form of Dionysiac dithyramb, in which the melody and harmony are emphasized, excites an overflow of emotions through which the individuality is lost (Nietzsche, 1999, p.20; p.122). According to Nietzsche, this kind of Dionysiac music and the view in Dionysiac festivals induced feelings of horror and astonishment in the Apolline Greeks; this combination of contradictory feelings may arise because even though the Apolline Greeks feared the Dionysiac, they nevertheless recognize that it is not foreign to them after all (Nietzsche, 1999, p.20).

To understand why this is the case, one must investigate the Apolline culture thoroughly, however, as soon as one begins to investigate, it is possible to encounter an intriguing dichotomy; Olympian gods on one hand and the wisdom of Silenus on the other (Nietzsche, 1999, p.22-23). According to Nietzsche, the Greeks were aware that the Dionysiac truth, namely, whatever exists in the world as representation, as individuals, they must "be prepared for painful destruction" (1999, p.80); in a way, Greeks knew the "terrors and horrors of existence" (Nietzsche, 1999, p.23). For Nietzsche, this is evident from the tale of King Midas and Silenus, in which Midas asks Silenus about what the best thing for human beings and Silenus answers as follows: "The very best thing is utterly beyond your reach not to have been born, not to be, to be nothing. However, the second best thing for you is: to die

soon” (Nietzsche, 1999, p.23). Since the continuation of life and the wisdom of Silenus seem mutually exclusive, Nietzsche suggests that Greeks invented Olympian gods to justify their lives:

In order to be able to live, the Greeks were obliged, by the most profound compulsion, to create these gods. This process is probably to be imagined as taking place gradually, so that, under the influence of the Apolline instinct (*Trieb*) for beauty, the Olympian divine order of joy developed out of the original, Titanic divine order of terror in a series of slow transitions, in much the same way as roses burst forth from a thicket of thorns. (Nietzsche, 1999, p.23)

Thus, for Nietzsche, since eternal life was impossible for humans, Greeks in this case, created immortal gods, who were justifying the life of humans by "living it themselves" (Nietzsche, 1999, p.24). In that regard, the wisdom of Silenus is reversed in Apolline world of images; previously the non-being was better for humanity, instead of existence, but now, with the creation of Olympian gods, life was nevertheless justified in a world of illusion and semblance, or we may call, a world of denial (Nietzsche, 1999, p.24).

2.2.2. The Union of Dionysiac and Apolline in Attic Tragedy

Now, since the expressions of Dionysiac and Apolline in the Greeks' understanding of art are also explained, it is time to examine Nietzsche's account of tragedy. He opposes Homer, epic poetry, to Archilochus, lyric poetry, as he opposes Apolline to Dionysiac (Nietzsche, 1999, p.29). According to Nietzsche, these figures can be seen as the progenitors of Greek poetry; while Homer represents the dreaming artist, Archilochus represents the intoxicated artist (Nietzsche, 1999, p.29). Hence, it is expected that their union can be seen as what paves the way for the tragedy. However, although in the book Nietzsche usually regards the tragic as the synthesis of Apolline and Dionysiac as equals, one can easily see that he sees the Dionysiac in a higher regard and views it as the true source of tragedy. In other words, instead of understanding the tragic as a third thing that is the result of the synthesis of Apolline and Dionysiac, he views it as a new version of the Dionysiac which is tamed by the Apolline image-making forces. Thus, to understand tragedy one must first

understand lyric poetry since lyric poetry can be regarded as the true source of tragedy and Dionysiac dithyramb (Nietzsche, 1999, p.30).

In lyric poetry, surely words as images and concepts are used as necessary parts of the poem, however, instead of the Apolline artist who is lost in the world of images as it is in epic poetry and sculpture, the Dionysiac artist as lyric poet first immerses oneself in a musical mood, i.e., in the state of "self-abandonment and one-ness", then the poet lets the world of images and symbols grow out of this mystical state (Nietzsche, 1999, p.30). This is attained by the effect of music; the lyric poet is also the musician as the poem is sung by the poet, in that regard, what is essential in this genre of poetry is not the words themselves, but rather the ecstatic state that is induced by the music (Nietzsche, 1999, p.30). As Nietzsche states, "melody gives birth to poetry", since in this kind of poetry, the language aims to *imitate* music, and through the words that sprang out of music, the Dionysiac content is portrayed (Nietzsche, 1999, p.33; p.35). As the discussion would show us, this is the fundamental condition of the tragedy itself; the expression of Dionysiac truth in Apolline forms, by which "Dionysos speaks the language of Apollo, but finally it is Apollo who speaks that of Dionysos" (Nietzsche, 1999, p.104).

In that regard, the case of tragedy can be seen as akin to lyric poetry, as Nietzsche also states that tragedy, as an art, is born out of the Dionysiac chorus (Nietzsche, 1999, p.36). There were no dialogue and no individual characters but only the chorus (Nietzsche, 1999, p.36). Thus, similar to its predecessor, lyric poetry, tragedy was also born out of the spirit of music. Although there are many classical interpretations of the chorus as the "ideal-spectator" which represents the common people as opposed to the nobility that is shown as characters of the drama in tragedy, Nietzsche rejects such a "democratic" interpretation and suggests that the tragedy is related with religion more than it is related to politics (Nietzsche, 1999, p.36-37). Satyrs, as the members of the chorus, receive their qualities from humans and goats, which are animals generally viewed concerning Dionysos, and appear on the stage as their existence is secured by the myth and cult (Nietzsche, 1999, p.39). The chorus expresses the "state of nature" as it is constituted by satyrs as "creatures of nature" who, when looked at, invoke in the cultured Greek people a feeling of unity with nature, as well as unity amongst themselves, as they see a more primordial form of themselves in these creatures since the satyr is nothing other than the "original image of the mankind" as "untouched by knowledge". Hence, "tragedy begins with the satyr, and that the Dionysiac

wisdom of tragedy speaks out of him" (Nietzsche, 1999, p.39). As satyrs seem to continue their existence regardless of the developments in civilization, and the cultured world, they represent the primordial unity, which is one and eternal source of every representation, in that regard, this first Dionysiac effect of the tragedy has fundamental significance for Nietzsche (Nietzsche, 1999, p.39).

That said, in tragedy, as its mature form, the tragic chorus of satyrs is presented as it "discharges" itself in the Apolline images on the stage (Nietzsche, 1999, p.44). The world of images is introduced by stage, dialogue and presentation of individual characters (Nietzsche, 1999, p.44; p.46). Hence, the dramatic aspect of the tragedy seems very Apolline, thus, it is similar to epic poetry in that regard (Nietzsche, 1999, p.44; p.46). The dialogue appears to the viewer as very clear, simple, and beautiful, however, for Nietzsche, this Apolline beauty of semblance in tragedy has only an instrumental significance; when the viewer "diverts" from the Apolline elements in tragedy, it is quite clear that there is a darker reality underlying these images (Nietzsche, 1999, p.46). In other words, the sole purpose of Apolline images on the stage as dialogue, characters, and different images of semblance, is only to express that they are nevertheless merely images, representations after all (Nietzsche, 1999, p.103). The Dionysiac truth is only can be understood by its contrast with the Apolline illusion, since, in itself, the Dionysiac truth as the expression of primordial unity is inaccessible to us, since it is beyond the world as representation, beyond subjectivity. In that regard, only through the push and pull of Apolline and Dionysiac in tragedy, this inaccessible truth becomes, at least to some extent, accessible to us because it is conveyed in Apolline images, i.e., through representation; although what is being presented is only Apolline forms, the content is nevertheless Dionysiac, hence, one might say "it is Apollo who speaks that *of* Dionysos" (Nietzsche, 1999, p.103-104).

In this regard, the suffering of the tragic hero can be seen from a different perspective. According to Nietzsche, all tragic heroes are expressions of the sufferings of Dionysos, indicating an underlying pattern in various tragic works (Nietzsche, 1999, p.45; p.51). As seen in characters such as Oedipus or Prometheus, all the efforts and deeds of these characters result in vain, even though their stubborn actions are portrayed throughout the artistic work, they nevertheless lead to the passivity and negation of the individual hero (Nietzsche, 1999, p.47-49; p.80), hence, the hero appears to the viewer as a pure suffering being (Nietzsche, 1999, p.47). However, suffering in itself is not the purpose of the tragedy,

it can be understood that suffering expresses the destruction of the principle of individuation; it expresses the individual's transformation to basic elements of nature, expresses the fact that the source of all suffering is individuality itself (Nietzsche, 1999, p.52-53). In that regard, when the tragic hero is negated due to a long process of suffering, the tragedy translates to the Dionysiac wisdom that beyond all individual representations lies the primordial unity, or Will, as the thing in itself, indifferent to the annihilation of individuals (Nietzsche, 1999, p.80). Accordingly, the viewer follows the tragic hero, through suffering, on the path from individuality, hence, semblance and representation, to the primordial unity, as the oneness of whole existence. Therefore, tragedy expresses that just like the tragic hero, we, as viewers, are also individuals, i.e., appearances, thus, beyond all the suffering and futile, transient existence of individuals, "despite all destruction", "we are happily alive, not as individuals, but as the *one* living being, with whose procreative lust we have become one" (Nietzsche, 1999, p.80-81). Consequently, it seems justified to assume that the Apolline elements as images and individuals are only taken to the stage to be destroyed and negated; they are only used to convey the Dionysiac truth by expression of the contrast between representation and the thing in itself, through which the above-explained "metaphysical delight" (Nietzsche, 1999, p.80) is possible.

That said, it is important to elaborate on Nietzsche's views on the "Dionysiac state", through which the aim of tragedy is attained. First of all, it is a state of "ecstasy", indicating that in this state the consciousness of the subject is altered in a disorderly manner, it is utterly distinct from the everyday consciousness of the cognizing subject (Nietzsche, 1999, p.40). As the principle of individuation, the form of all representations starts to dissolve, one gradually realizes that the features of one's experience are created by none other than oneself, thus, they do not belong to the world as it is in itself. Hence, individuality, once regarded as the necessary condition of the experience of the subject, as an objective element of reality, is viewed as a fleeting element that is almost arbitrary. In such a state of "self-oblivion" (Nietzsche, 1999, p.27), the usual barriers and boundaries become negated (Nietzsche, 1999, p.40), and consequently, whatever there is, now appears in an all-encompassing union as the primordial unity (Nietzsche, 1999, p.18; p.105). In that regard, according to Nietzsche, it seems that the dissolution of the cognitive forms of the phenomenal world, also pertains to the unification of all things, as the distinctions, limits, and determinations of the *principium individuationis* become negated. However, it seems that he also acknowledges that

maintaining this state of ecstasy seems impossible; since if subjectivity would entirely disappear, there would be no subject to take part in the metaphysical solace or delight in the first place. In that regard, it asserted that, at least in tragedy, Apolline's "deception" as the world of images, restores subjectivity once again, preventing the subject from "direct oneness" with the primordial unity (Nietzsche, 1999, p.111). As the "daily reality re-enters consciousness" through the intervention of the Apolline, one does not return to the same state that before this alteration, rather, it might be said that the person is renewed; in this new state, one experiences "an ascetic, will-negating mood"; since the viewer acquires an insight regarding the ground of all things, thus, understood the insignificance of all individual appearances including oneself, the daily life appears in a different perspective (Nietzsche, 1999, p.40). Regardless of all the sufferings, life itself is justified, however, this is attained not by the illusion as the denial of the truth as in pure Apolline arts, rather, it is attained by acknowledging the Dionysiac truth and living despite it, since beyond our representations and individuality, everything is one, and life continues regardless of the sufferings of the individual (Nietzsche, 1999, p.39; p.80). This so-called "metaphysical solace", for Nietzsche, is the true source of our pleasure in tragedy, and accordingly, the very purpose of the tragedy (Nietzsche, 1999, p.41; p.80, p.84).

2.3. Discussion: Schopenhauer and Nietzsche on *principium individuationis*

Now, since their accounts are given, it may be suitable to compare Schopenhauer and Nietzsche and point out parallelisms and disagreements between them, then it would be possible to examine what their views imply for the aim of the current study. To begin with, regarding the parallelisms between two philosophers in terms of the principle of individuation and overcoming it, the most general and shared view for both thinkers can be expressed as follows: Whatever the thing in itself may be, in appearances, it individuates to many individual representations according to the principle of individuation, i.e., the principle that governs the world as representation. This individuation is the ground of all suffering and despair, however, there is a possibility to escape from this cycle of suffering and despair through the intervention of art, which is claimed to undo the individuation in some sense, by creating an alteration in the subject, through which it becomes possible to relate to the world in a completely different manner. In that regard, it would not be an exaggeration that both philosophers viewed art as a remedy to justify existence, in their respective views. However, the artistic intervention is not seen as a necessary aspect, since both philosophers stress that

this fundamental alteration can be triggered by also other things; the beauty of natural objects for Schopenhauer (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.202), “the narcotic drink” or “the drive of spring” for Nietzsche (1999, p.120; p.122). Nevertheless, in both cases, this altered, special condition of the subject is contrasted with the regular conditions of the subject of cognition regarding cognition of individual representations.

Besides these commonalities, however, these thinkers differ on some crucial topics. For instance, although they both certainly regard music as the direct copy of the thing in itself, the *Will* for Schopenhauer (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.285), and *das Ur-eine* for Nietzsche (Nietzsche, 1999, p.30), their views of tragedy have some important differences. In the case of Schopenhauer, the sole aim of tragedy is to portray conflicting deeds of individual human wills, by doing which it expresses the futility of desires and endeavours that are driven by the will as the thing in itself (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.279-280). This gives an insight to the viewer regarding the original condition of the world as representation, through which Will individuates in separate representations and becomes an enemy to itself (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.283). When the viewer sees the negation of the individual wills of characters, a will-negating mood arises, and it becomes possible to escape from the never-ending cycle of pain and pleasure (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.280). Moreover, more preferably, if the tragedy does not include extremely evil characters that can be blamed for the catastrophe that is portrayed, then, it must be the case that this catastrophe is a result of mere chance, hence, instead of attributing all the guilt on an evil character, the viewer attributes it to the world itself, which contributes to this will-negating mood (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.282). Consequently, even one can say that, for Schopenhauer, tragedy can induce some kind of pleasure, this pleasure must be related to the purification of the subject from the volitions of the individual will, represented as futile efforts to pursue happiness and averting pain, thus, what is essential for tragedy is the fact that it expresses "great misfortune", through which the viewer abandons all hope, which in turn makes it possible to relate to the world in a will-less manner, only considering the stillness of the Platonic Ideas above innumerable individual representations (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.279-280).

However, in *The Birth of Tragedy*, it is apparent "how differently Dionysos spoke" to Nietzsche; he condemns Schopenhauer by stating that Schopenhauer's understanding of tragedy amounts to a philosophy of resignation from life, since according to Schopenhauer, tragedy's goal is to make the viewer understand that life cannot offer any true satisfaction,

hence, one must detach from the world itself (Nietzsche, 1999, p.10). However, as stressed in *An Attempt to Self-Criticism*, Nietzsche asserts that his aim was the opposite; instead of presenting a philosophy of resignation, Nietzsche aims to persuade the reader to view life as inherently joyful despite all the sufferings and desperation in the world due to individuation (Nietzsche, 1999, p.10). Although the thing in itself appears as divided and individuated in the world of representation, as an enemy to itself, according to Nietzsche, the Dionysiac effect induced by tragedy or music shows us that besides all individuation, everything is one and eternal, hence, all individual representations, including ourselves, are a part of a higher community (Nietzsche, 1999, p.18). Although also in Nietzsche's case, tragedy creates a negation of the individual's will to live, this does not lead to a mood of resignation, rather, it induces a long-lasting joy that has endurance regardless of the sufferings of the individual, since what is understood was that suffering is a necessary part of the life (Nietzsche, 1999, p.80-81; p.84). This crucial contrast can be traced back to a fundamental difference in terms of the philosophical accounts of these philosophers, namely, their understanding of individuation. As it would be seen, while Schopenhauer asserts that even overcoming the principle of individuation is not sufficient for attaining the unity behind all representations, Nietzsche would argue otherwise. In that sense, it is understandable that where Schopenhauer sees fragmentation and conflict, Nietzsche sees underlying unity and harmony, hence, one might say that their different views regarding tragedy are based on the difference in their views regarding what tragedy reveals.

This brings us to the second point of departure, namely the Platonic Ideas. Although the general assumption of both thinkers on the principle of individuation, as explained above, seems very similar, the explanation of each philosopher regarding overcoming the principle shows that the underlying reasoning for both explanations cannot be reconciled. They share the view that to overcome the principle of individuation, there must be a special condition that separates this altered state of consciousness from the consciousness of daily reality. For Schopenhauer, this special condition of the subject pertains to the cognition of the Platonic Ideas as non-individual representations, which are adequate objectifications of the will as disinterested objects of cognition, and to cognize Ideas, the subject must also be raised above individuality, i.e., the individual will (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.200-202). On the other hand, for Nietzsche this is not the case; he asserts that in this altered state of consciousness, one sees that the boundary between different subjects of cognition as different human beings, as

well as the boundary between the subject and the objects in nature, which are regarded as “alienated, inimical, or subjugated” starts to disappear and the cognition regarding the *primordial unity* that is behind the whole world of representations starts to emerge (Nietzsche, 1999, p.18-19; p.40). In that regard, according to Schopenhauer, even though overcoming individuality is possible, it is impossible to attain the unity behind the world as representation. Although one can rise above individuality, the Will nevertheless appears as fragmented as it objectifies into Platonic Ideas. However, for Nietzsche, since the Platonic Ideas are nowhere to be found when individuality has been overcome, it becomes possible for one to attain unity which is the ground of all things.

If we remember the views of Schopenhauer on individuation, there appears a structure that consists of three layers; the will as the thing in itself, the Platonic Ideas as adequate objecthoods of the will, and empirical, individual representations. Accordingly, first, the will is individuated through the Ideas, and then, these Ideas are in turn individuated by their innumerable empirical appearances under the principle of sufficient reason, and hence, the principle of individuation. The individuation of Ideas seems like a mystery in Schopenhauer's account, as he refers to them as non-individuals, however, some scholars conceptualize the individuation of Ideas and individuation of empirical representations of the Ideas by calling the former as transcendental individuation, and the latter as empirical individuation (Han-Pile, 2006, p.375). Although the legitimacy of this conceptualization is open for discussion, it is certain that, at least, there needs to be a distinction between them, since even though Schopenhauer explicitly does not present any account regarding the individuation of Platonic Ideas from the Will, it would be against reason to deny their individuation, as they each have a unity of their own (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.261) and they are clearly distinct from each other (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.154).

In that regard, at least for Schopenhauer, overcoming the principle of individuation does not mean that the world as representation disappears completely, rather, this overcoming merely pertains to overcoming the cognition of individuals as empirical representations, as objects of interest, regarding the ordinary condition of the subject. Accordingly, by overcoming the principle of individuation, one attains the cognition of objects properly, namely, disinterested cognition of the Platonic Ideas. In this sense, even though he suggests that in aesthetic experience, the subject loses itself in the object (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.220), the distinction between subject and object, as well as between

objects, is preserved (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.203). The only differences between this special condition and ordinary consciousness are regarding the objects that are cognized and the relationship between the subject of pure cognition and willing. Hence, this discussion begs the question of how there can be individuated objects, whether they are empirical representations or adequate objecthoods of the Will, if the principle of individuation has been overcome. According to the writings of Schopenhauer, this issue is never discussed nor answered, however, we might conclude that since he defines the principle of individuation as space and time (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.137), it only comprehends the individual appearances of empirical reality. This can be also justified if we consider the concept of the individual in its historical context, as beginning from the Middle Ages, the term "individual" used to refer to particular objects of physical reality that cannot be divided further into specifically same individuals (Suarez, 1982, p.30). In that regard, since Ideas are seen as representations that are communicable to many individuals of the same kind, it is understandable that Schopenhauer referred to them as non-individuals. Nonetheless, this does not decrease the importance of the requirement of further explanation regarding the unity and distinction of Platonic Ideas.

On the other hand, if we remember Nietzsche's views in *The Birth of Tragedy*, first we realize that his account of individuation has two layers, namely, the primordial unity, or Will as the thing in itself and the individual representations of empirical reality. Although his presentation of the primordial unity as the thing in itself is never exactly clear, it seems that his conceptualization is very similar to Schopenhauer's conceptualization of the Will as the thing in itself, as he seems to be referring to the primordial unity and the Will interchangeably (Nietzsche, 1999, p.30; p.35; p.77). Regardless, it is certain that the primordial unity refers to the lack of individuation (Nietzsche, 1999, p.19; p.43; p.111; p.114), it can be understood as the fundamental root of everything (Nietzsche, 1999, p.31; p.39; 52). That said, when one examines Nietzsche's explanation regarding individuation, it is almost immediately certain that Nietzsche did not share Schopenhauer's admiration of Plato, hence, he did not bother to reconcile his Kantian commitments with Plato's philosophy, rather, he simply disregarded Platonic Ideas. Besides all the similar terminology and conceptualizations, different from Schopenhauer, Nietzsche never mentions a third middle set of individuals, rather, his explanations suggest that individuation occurs from the primordial unity as the thing in itself, to individual representations of the empirical reality,

according to the principle of individuation (Nietzsche, 1999, p.26). In that regard, Nietzsche's account seems to be, at least, free from the above-mentioned complications regarding Schopenhauer's account. Hence, unlike Schopenhauer, for Nietzsche, overcoming the principle of individuation seems to be equivalent to overcoming individuality itself, as understood as all the distinctions and determinations. To clarify his account, we must assume the duty of elaborating on what exactly Nietzsche might understand from the principle of individuation. Although the definition of the principle of individuation is never explicitly presented, it is possible to find certain crucial features based on Nietzsche's account.

Firstly, the first mention of the principle is in a quotation from *The World as Will and Representation*, from which Nietzsche understands the principle of individuation as the “cognitive forms of phenomenal world” (Nietzsche, 1999, p.17). This indicates that the principle of individuation is the principle that constitutes the forms of cognition, hence, in a quite Kantian sense, it can be understood that the principle is rooted in the mind of the subject. If we consider Schopenhauer's understanding of the principle of sufficient reason, which indicates that the principle and all of its modes are grounded on subjective powers of the mind (Schopenhauer, 1974, p.2), and we also consider that the principle of individuation is seen equivalent to the principle of sufficient reason by Schopenhauer (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.137), Nietzsche's conception of the principle of individuation seems understandable. Secondly, almost every instance of mentioning *principium individuationis* is immediately followed by an explanation regarding its being the deification or expression of the Apolline (Nietzsche, 1999, p.19; p.26; p.76; p.98), which is an art drive that is heavily related with the image-making powers of the mind, in that regard, one can say that the principle of individuation is a principle of “image-making” (Nietzsche, 1999, p.15; p.16; p.19; p.120; p.123). On the other hand, thirdly, almost every mention of the Dionysiac is immediately followed by an explanation regarding the “tearing-apart” or “destruction” of the principle of individuation (Nietzsche, 1999, p.20-21; p.41; p.48; p.80-81; p.104). In that sense, since the “self-oblivion” or destruction of subjectivity is presented also as crucial feature of the Dionysiac ecstasy (Nietzsche, 1999, p.17; p.19; p.21; p.27; p.102; p.120; p.132), it is quite safe to conclude that world as representation, as Apolline images of semblance, has a very important relationship to the unity of consciousness or the self-identity of the subject, because it seems as subjectivity disappears, i.e., the boundary between object and subject starts to disappear, the determinate, individual representations of empirical reality also

begins to dissolve into the primordial unity. Hence, the dichotomy between dreaming and intoxication becomes clearer for us, while the former is related to determination and boundaries, the latter refers to the destruction of them in every sense, accordingly, while the former seems to refer to the mind's ability to form images, hence, determination of representations by drawing boundaries and distinctions, the latter seems to be related to the opposite, namely, a state in which the mind's ability for distinguishing and determining representations is disrupted. Consequently, our findings indicate that according to Nietzsche's views in *The Birth of Tragedy*, the principle of individuation has several intriguing connotations; it pertains to the forms of cognition of appearances, to the image-making powers of the mind, to the boundary between subject and the object as well as the boundary between objects, and to the self-identity of the subject. Since all of these features belong to the same principle, it is imperative that these can be explained thoroughly in a unified discussion, which is lacking in Nietzsche.

In that sense, although it seems that Nietzsche borrowed the concept of *principium individuationis* from Schopenhauer, to present a coherent account of Nietzsche's views regarding this concept, it is crucial to understand how the conception of the *principium individuationis* changed throughout history of philosophy until Schopenhauer, since a simple examination would reveal that the features that are identified above are not traditionally seen as a part of the discussion of the problem of individuation. In that regard, to present a consistent and comprehensive discussion on the issue and understand what exactly Nietzsche understood from this principle, it seems crucial to present a historical examination of the principle of individuation, thereby presenting how the conceptualization of individuality evolved throughout the history of philosophy. Then, it would be possible to examine Nietzsche's views in a new light, which would enable us to discuss whether overcoming the principle of individuation can be attained or not, in the context of our new framework.

3. A HISTORICAL EXAMINATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUATION: SUAREZ AND LOCKE

3.1. Francisco Suarez and the Concept of *principium individuationis* in Metaphysical Disputations

The discussions on the problem of individuality created a “hair-splitting and controversy among the scholastics” (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.137) and not surprisingly, the discussion regarding the subject is hard to conceive and, even worse, the elaborations on it are dispersed and sometimes might seem incoherent. However, thankfully, the works of 16th-century philosopher Francisco Suarez can be used to aid scholars regarding the issue, as also Schopenhauer -whose views have a great impact on Nietzsche's early works, thus will be examined in detail later on- acknowledges his authority on the matter by directing his readers to Suarez's *Metaphysical Disputations*, in which one can find different views of other philosophers collected together as well as Suarez's own, regarding the problem of individuality (Schopenhauer, 2010, p.137). In that regard, to trust Schopenhauer's wisdom, in this section, the fifth one of Suarez's *Metaphysical Disputations* will be examined in detail, since it is the disputation that heavily focuses on individual unity. However, other sources will be also used to have a wider understanding of Suarez and to contextualize his arguments. In that regard, the focus of the current section is the principle of individuation for Suarez, which he elaborates on in sections III-VII, however, to understand the matters related to it, it is also required to examine the previous sections. Therefore, sections I-VII of *Metaphysical Disputations V* will be discussed according to the order of the sections. Since this is the case, to have a grounded beginning to examine the concept of *principium individuationis*, it is crucial to understand what Suarez contributed to the discussions regarding the problem of individuality and what has been said before him.

In *Metaphysical Disputations V*, Suarez explicitly states that what constitutes the individual's individuality is incommunicability, i.e., its incapability to be divided into entities that are specifically the same (Suarez, 1982, p.30). However, besides indivisibility, other features are considered to accompany the individual, such as the individual's separation and distinction from other individuals regardless of whether they belong to the same species. According to some, this was even considered the defining feature of individuality (see Boethius, 1973, p.7; Aquinas, 1946). This was surely unacceptable for Suarez since the principle of individuation must be intrinsic to the individual (Suarez, 1982, p.76), however,

for Suarez, distinction from other individuals is a consequential, an extrinsic, aspect of the individual, moreover, the distinction from others is a feature that must necessarily follow the indivisibility of the individual, which is its defining feature, therefore the indivision is a requisite for distinction from others (Suarez, 1982, p.84). Regardless, until the 16th century, the problems regarding the content of the concept of individuality, i.e., what “individuality” means, were discussed from different points of view and there was not a concise examination of the issue, therefore, some of the accounts were not distinguishing these features clearly, which can lead to confusion (Gracia, 1984, p.18-21).

For example, if we consider Boethius’ *De Trinate* (1973), we see that Boethius does not explicitly consider individuality as indivisibility, which contributes to the confusion and displaced emphasis on the issue. In *De Trinate*, I, where he is talking about the holy trinity, he states that “the essence of plurality is otherness” and he claims that without this otherness, plurality cannot be understood (Boethius, 1973, p.7). He then presents that sameness and difference can be by genus, species, and number; for individuals of different kinds, this otherness stems from the difference of their species and genus, however, for individuals of the same kind, the otherness, or the difference in number stems from accidents that they possess (Boethius, 1973, p.7). For example, although Friedrich and Immanuel are the same in terms of genus and species, – and also in number since they are each numerically one – these two individuals differ from each other regarding the variety of their accidents; in this case, Boethius gives place as an example since it is considered one of the accidents of the *ousia* in Aristotle and he states that these two human beings cannot be at the same place at the same time (Boethius, 1973, p.7). Although it is significant since it clearly distinguishes the difference between individuals from different species or genera and numerical difference, this elaboration regards the principle or cause of individuation as partially accidental, thus lacking the conceptual necessity that separates the individual from other individuals due to the disregarding the matter of indivisibility. The same issue can be encountered also in Thomas Aquinas’ Commentary on *De Trinate*, in which Aquinas tries to form a framework for Boethius’ account but he also does not separate indivisibility and distinction in this text (1946). Unlike Boethius or Thomas Aquinas, on the other hand, Suarez separates these issues and puts indivisibility as the primary feature of individuality. Following Aristotle’s views in *Metaphysics V*, Ch. 6, 1017a15-20, he emphasizes that to be an individual, to be incapable of division, is to be one, a unit (2016, p. 77); stressing that it

is imperative for something to first have a unity in itself, in order to be discerned from others. In other words, distinction from others presupposes the unity of the individual and also the unity of other individuals, following which it is possible to judge that these are distinct unities. This is crucial since it stresses that distinction from others cannot be explained without the concept of “unity”. Therefore, it is important to understand Suarez’s views on this concept to understand his account of individuality as indivisibility; since throughout the *Disputations*, he frequently refers to “individual” as also “individual unity”.

Although Suarez talks about many kinds of unities, the most important one is the “transcendental unity”. Following the scholastic tradition, it would not be unexpected to assert that Suarez views this transcendental unity as interchangeable with the concept of “being”, which indicates the terms “one” and “being” can be used to indicate the same thing (see Aquinas’ *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Pars, Q.11, Article I). Every being is one and everything that is one is a being; in that sense, although it is possible to distinguish them as separate concepts, unity always accompanies being. Therefore, it is viewed that unity is a fundamental property of being, just as reason is for humans, which is the ground for this accompanying (see Porphyry, 1975, p.48). However, this account does not explain the relation of “unity” to “being” efficiently, since the premise is that “ ‘one’ is the same as ‘being’ ” (Aquinas, 2017), thus this problem was a matter to discuss for scholastics.

Regarding this issue, in *Metaphysical Disputations IV*, Suarez focuses on three main views and aligns himself with the last one. According to the first view that Suarez attributes to Avicenna, Dun Scotus, and Antoninus Andrea, unity adds something positive to the reality of being and this addition is really distinct from the being (Suarez, 1960, p.487). In short, the first view suggests that although unity accompanies being in all cases, they are not interchangeable concepts, what they signify differs since “unity” in this case adds a positive accident to “being” that is by nature distinct from it (Suarez, 1960, p.487). Therefore, according to this view “to be one” is something really more than “to be”, which surely contradicts Aristotle (see *Metaphysics IV*, ch. 2, 1004a25-30), thus rejected by Suarez (1960, p.487).

On the other hand, the second view which is attributed to Bonaventure and Alexander of Hales agrees with the first view regarding that unity adds some positive property to being but this view holds that this property is not “really” but only “conceptually” differs from the being (Suarez, 1960, p.488); which is to say that although being and unity can be found in

the same things, they differ in terms of the contents of their concepts, unity adds something conceptually more to being. The relation between them is similar to the relation of notions such as justice or wisdom to God; even though they are only distinguished from God by the use of reason, they add something to the concept of God and are positive attributes of Him (Suarez, 1960, p.488). Suarez states that both for Bonaventure and Alexander of Hales, unity adds “indivision” to being; even though it seems that it is a negation, it adds a negative aspect, for these philosophers it is a positive aspect for the thing that is receiving the addition since it is an addition nonetheless (Suarez, 1960, p.488), which is a problematic assertion for Suarez (1960, p.494).

Finally, the third view that Suarez aligns himself with and attributes to Aristotle, Cajetan, and Thomas Aquinas, unity does not positively add anything neither real nor conceptual to the being and, if adds anything, it is neither distinct in terms of reality nor conceptually distinct from the notion of being (Suarez, 1960, p.491). According to this view, which Suarez names as the *vera sententia* (true judgement), unity does not express any positive notion besides the notion of being; unity and being must be of the same nature, since nothing positively more or different is expressed when one compared with the other (Suarez, 1960, p.491). In that case, initially, it seems that Suarez here claims that these two terms are identical. However, he reveals that “unity” must be different from “being” since they are not the same concepts; we use these two different names since they lead to different objective and formal concepts in the mind (Suarez, 1960, p.495). Therefore, it must be the case that the unity conceptually includes something distinct from the notion of being, however, this difference is not related to the addition of a positive aspect, rather it is related to a negative one, namely the negation of division, by which the entity becomes one, otherwise, it would be a multitude since it is capable of division (Suarez, 1960, p.495-496). Suarez reveals that the negation that unity adds to the being is a *privative negation* that differentiates it from being, which is the negation of division in being itself (Suarez, 1960, p.495).

Before explaining what this means, it is important to elaborate on the notion of “privative negation”. For scholastics, especially Suarez, negation refers to simply a lack, a matter of non-being (Suarez, 2005, p.98). For instance, a man being not a horse, or not having horns is a negation. On the other hand, privation is similar but, in this case, something is lacking which was supposed to be present (Suarez, 2005, p.102; see also the discussion on good and evil in *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Pars, Q. 48, Article 5, by Thomas Aquinas); for

instance, Homer's blindness is a privation, for the nature of human beings does possess the property of sight. In that sense, "privation means a lack of form in a naturally apt subject, but negation means a lack without any subjective aptitude" (Suarez, 2005, p.102). Here what makes this negation "privative" seems to be grounded in faith. Besides God's unity, no other unity is essential, therefore, God does not have an aptitude for division essentially, thus, God's indivisibility is a negation in a proper sense (Suarez, 1960, p.500). However, for created things, anything else besides Him, this unity seems as not something essential, thus, in a way, they are capable of division, thus, the negation of division seems like a privation for all other things (Suarez, 1960, p.500). Regardless, Suarez still calls this a negation, not a privation, indicating that "to be" is "to be indivisible". In that sense, "one" and "being", just as "unity" and "entity" always accompany each other, the only difference is that the concept of "unity" includes something distinct from "being", "a kind of privative negation" (Suarez, 1960, p.495), namely, the negation of division.

This is an important point for understanding Suarez's definition of individual unity, and this privative negation should be distinguished from other negations. Since it can be understood both as the negation of division concerning other entities and negation of division with respect to the entity itself, on which Suarez states that the former does not belong to the concept of unity, it is rather deduced from it, while the latter is properly belonging to it (Suarez, 1960, p.501). As mentioned before, Suarez rejects that distinction from others comes before indivisibility since he states that to be divided from others is not a precondition of being one, rather it is the condition for being one among many (Suarez, 1960, p.496-497). Here we can consider God as an example; even though there were not any created things before, God still existed and he was one (Suarez, 1960, p.498). In that sense, it is possible to state that unity implies a capacity to be fundamentally distinct from others, however, it is not constituted by it. According to Suarez, distinction follows unity similarly to equality and inequality follows quantity; distinction is not a pre-condition or requisite of unity, rather it is a mere consequence of indivisibility (Suarez, 1960, p.498). Regarding the discussion above, it is now clear that unity is an attribute of being that is almost identical to it, besides it adds the privative negation regarding division, i.e., the indivisibility, to the notion of being. Now, since the most general type of unity, the transcendental unity is explained, it is time to discuss what individual unity is, and how it differs from other types of unities.

3.1.1. Section I: Whether All Things That Exist or Can Exist Are Singular and Individual

At the beginning of *Metaphysical Disputations V*, Suarez immediately makes it clear that he has three main intentions; to explore where individual unity resides, what is it and what is the principle that individuates individuals (Suarez, 1982, p.29). The first section of his work is devoted to dwelling on the first two issues. In this section, Suarez explains what he understands from individual unity and what can be called individuals. However, to facilitate the conception of his account it is important to first focus on what he understands by the “individual unity”. He explains the issue as follows:

...that is called 'common' or 'universal' which is communicated to many entities or is found in many entities according to one single nature. On the other hand, that is called 'one in number' or 'singular' or 'individual' which is one being in such a way that according to that nature of being through which it is called 'one', it is not communicable to many entities. For example, to those that are lower to or placed below it, or to those that are many under that nature . . . (Suarez, 1982, p.30)

Here we see that, firstly, he uses the terms individual, singular or one in number interchangeably, moreover, the definition of individuality is presented in contrast with the definition of universality. This contrast is based on communicability; while universal is communicable to many entities of the same kind, the individual is that which cannot be divided into many entities of the same kind. Even though in that framework individual is opposed to the universal, Suarez makes it clear that there is no need for being of a species to be an individual as it is in the case of divine nature (Suarez, 1982, p.30). As explained also earlier, this indivision as incommunicability precisely refers to the indivision of a certain entity to entities of the same kind and, is the definitive feature of the individuality or individual unity. In that respect, individual unity as incommunicability should be distinguished from other types of unities. Although all types of unity require the negation of division due to transcendental unity, these unities do not necessarily require incommunicability. For instance, common natures such as “humanity” also have a unity and one in number as a form or a universal; they possess a formal unity (Suarez, 1982, p. 87).

However, they are not incommunicable, since they can be divided into many entities that are specifically the same.

Regarding this issue, a reasonable objection may be presented in terms of homogenous substances such as a pile of stones or a litre of water. Suarez mentions an example of such when he talks about this issue. It is a difficult task to answer this objection since initially, it seems that a pile of stones, a wooden piece or a litre of water seems communicable to parts that are the same in nature. Suarez answers this by stating:

The answer [to this] is that what is divided [i.e. this water] is not divisible into many [entities] which are [also] "this water," but [rather] which are [just] water; and hence, "this water" is singular, while "water" [is] common. (Suarez, 1982, p.32)

So he argues that when we divide a homogenous substance as individual, "this water" or "this wooden piece" in this case, what we acquire is not a bunch of entities that are the same as "this water" or "this piece of wood", rather, they are other individuals which share the same nature of "water" or "wood", thus "this water" or "this piece of wood" is no longer existent in this case. The act of dividing "this water" or "this piece of wood" into "these waters" or "these pieces of wood" also ends the existence of "this water" or "this piece of wood". Therefore, it is not communicated, but rather, negated.

Another discussion in Section III can also help us to understand another issue related to individuality, namely, the relationship between indivision and distinction from others. Suarez states that:

Although a thing's being one in itself [i.e. individual] is by nature prior to its being distinct from others, nevertheless the latter follows intrinsically from the former without any positive addition being made to the thing itself that is one, but only by negation, by which, having posited the other term, it is true to say that this is not that. Accordingly, the same positive thing that is the foundation of unity with respect to the first negation or indivision in itself, is subsequently the foundation of the later negation consisting of distinction from another. In this sense, it is usually said with

great truth that a thing is distinguished from others by that whereby it is constituted in itself because it is distinguished by that whereby it is. . . . Therefore, likewise in the case of individual unity, what is a principle of the individual concerning its constitution and its incommunicability or indivisibility in itself is also a principle of its distinction from others; and, conversely, what is a principle of distinction must also be a principle of the constitution. (Suarez, 1982, p. 84)

Here we see a similar type of reasoning that is presented in the discussion of transcendental unity. It is asserted that distinction from other individuals is a natural consequence of individuality, however, the distinction in this case is consequential or accidental. If we consider two individual unities as examples, we conclude that these are distinct from one another because each of these individuals is one in themselves, in other words, they cannot be taken together as one individual or they cannot be divided into other individuals. Otherwise, it would be possible to conclude that they are individuals since they are distinct; but by doing so, we would need another standpoint to assert their distinction. According to Suarez this very standpoint that we separate them from each other is their individual unity, their oneness in themselves. Consequently, the distinction from others requires that firstly, there must be an individual and secondly there must be other individuals, both of these requisites are grounded in Suarez's arguments since it is required that every individual have unity to be distinguished. In other words, both of these conditions cannot be provided without individual unity. Thus, distinction from others simply becomes an accidental consequence if more than one individual is present. The same reasoning also can be applied to the matter of multiplicity within a species. For, the discussion above also excludes the necessity of being a member of a certain species to be an individual; the example of God is significant in this sense. Therefore, neither distinction from others nor the multiplicity within a species can be considered necessary for individuality.

After clarifying what "individuality" means, to grasp Suarez's views, it is important to understand the issues related to what the concept implies in reality, what can be called individual. This issue seems a central part of the first section since the question regarding this matter is presented as the title of Section I of the fifth Disputation; whether all things that exist or can exist are singular and individual? He also answers:

...all things that are actual beings or that exist or can exist immediately are singular and individual. I say 'immediately' in order to exclude the common natures of beings, which as such cannot immediately exist or have actual entity, except in singular and individual entities. If these [individual entities] are removed, it is impossible for anything real to remain. (Suarez, 1982, p. 32)

Regarding the passage above, it is clear that for Suarez, every actual thing is individual. What he means by “everything” can be understood as whatever exists in actuality, i.e., extramental reality. The term “extramental”, in this case, is being used to indicate concrete, real things while excluding concepts, essences, common natures, or universals. Besides these, all spiritual beings, composite beings, and material beings with all their features and components are individual since they are actual and real.

One might say even God is individual “since God is one in number in such a manner that [the divine nature] cannot be multiplied in any way” (Suarez, 1982, p.33). In that respect, God’s unity can be seen as the source of all individual unity, because, his existence, hence his unity is essential (Suarez, 1982, p.34). Otherwise, it would be possible to infer that God is communicable to many specifically the same entities, meaning that there can be several gods, which is absurd for both philosophical and religious reasons. Suarez also holds a similar view towards the individuality of angels and criticizes some commentators of Thomas Aquinas in Section I, 7, who assert that spiritual beings such as angels or God are not individuals (Suarez, 1982, p. 34). It is understandable the grounds for such a claim since, as discussed earlier, according to Thomas Aquinas and his followers, individuality is defined by the feature of distinction from others or the multiplicity within a species, therefore, according to them, regarding God as the individual would allow the possibility of other entities of the same kind. However, Suarez presented that unity, the feature of indivisibility, must be the defining feature of individuality, thus, multiplicity within species and distinction from others are only possible with this feature and they are not necessary for constituting individuality, moreover, individuality as the incommunicability and universal as communicability are mutually exclusive concepts -one cannot be the other-, in that respect, regarding spiritual beings like God and angels as non-individuals, therefore, universals, as

the Thomists did, would permit the existence of more than one God, not the other way around.

That said, returning to the discussion of “everything”, for Suarez, the only kind of unity that is actual in the universe is individual unity. As he asserts that “to be an entity [i.e., one being] and to be divisible into many entities [i.e., capable of becoming many beings of the same specific kind as the original being] implies a contradiction” (1982, p.32), it becomes clear that besides individuals, there are no actual things; reality only consists of individual unities thus, the universals and forms or common natures cannot be regarded as “real” or “actual”. That means that Suarez rejects the Scotist view of individuality. According to the Scotist view, as it is presented in *Ordinatio II*, the 6th question of the 3rd distinction, an individual is a composition of two unities, the unity of nature and the unity of the individual, it can be also called the common nature and the *haecceity* (thisness). Even though for Scotus, the common nature in individual things is not a proper unity, it still partially constitutes the entity of the individual (Scotus, 2023, p.202). However, Suarez seems to disagree with this view, since he stresses that to be an actual entity is to be an individual, thus, universals, or natures are seen as non-actual things. In that regard, they cannot be constituents of the individual thing. According to Suarez, these also have a kind of unity, but their unity is only conceptual (Suarez, 1982, p. 47). Besides the unity of the individual which is the only actual unity, the unity of common natures or universals is only a matter of mental consideration since their unity is only conceptual (Suarez, 1982, p.30; p. 47).

Now at this stage, finally it is also important to talk a bit about the relationship between individual unity and transcendental unity to understand the matter more clearly. As we have seen, in reality, there are only individual beings, “being” becomes convertible to “individual unity”, and consequently, “transcendental unity” becomes convertible to “individual unity”. At first sight, this seems like transcendental unity is identical to individual unity regarding both extension and intension. When we first look at the extension, we easily see that this is the case, since every real thing is individual, in actuality, individual unity and transcendental unity signify the same thing, therefore they are coextensal. This is also asserted by Suarez in the 9th section of *Metaphysical Disputations IV* (1960, p.492-493). However, regarding their intension, there is no clear answer; we have seen that the defining feature of transcendental unity is the negation of division while individual unity is

defined by the feature of incommunicability to specifically the same entities. As mentioned, in reality, these two features imply the same thing, the indivision of individuals.

However, as explained by Suarez in *Metaphysical Disputation VI*, besides the individual unity which comprehends all actual things and expresses numerical indivision, there are also other unities such as formal unity which expresses the essential or formal indivision (Suarez, 1960, p.698). Even though in reality individual and formal unity is indistinguishable, by abstraction and using understanding, it is possible to posit what is common among individuals, not vice versa (Suarez, 1960, p. 705). Since transcendental unity is the most general type of unity and simply indicates the negation of division, in this case, we can see that forms, universals, or common natures take part in it only formally or conceptually; they cannot be divided into in terms of their formal or essential predicates (Heider, 2014, p. 166). For example, there cannot be more than one universal for a certain kind such as “human”, nor “human” cannot be formally divided into predicates “human” and “non-human” (Heider, 2014, p. 166). Consequently, transcendental unity can be seen as the type of unity which can include different kinds of unities such as individual unities which are the only actual unities in reality, and formal or conceptual unities, which are non-actual but conceptual. Thus, transcendental unity can appear as individual unity in terms of actual things, it appears as conceptual or formal unity in terms of concepts, common natures or universals. Therefore, individual unity and transcendental unity can be seen as coextensial while they are intensionally different, the latter being a narrower version of the former.

3.1.2. Section II: Whether in All Natures the Individual and Singular Thing as Such Adds Something to the Common or Specific Nature

It appears that Suarez devotes the second section to understanding what individuality adds to the common nature, if adds anything, moreover, he also investigates how this addition is distinguished from the common nature. Thus, he views the problem as related to two issues. Firstly, he is interested in whether the individual adds something to the common nature, in other words, whether the individual is something more than the common nature (Suarez, 1982, p.41). For example, whether Immanuel adds something to, or is something more than, the “human being”. Secondly, he investigates whether what is added is a real or a conceptual addition, whether Immanuel is really or conceptually something more than a “human being” (Suarez, 1982, p.42). In this framework, he first presents the views of other philosophers and then, his own.

According to the first view that he attributes to Scotus and Fonseca, "the individual adds to the common nature a real mode, distinct *ex natura rei* from the nature, and, together with it, it makes up the individual" (Suarez, 1982, p.41). According to Scotus, what makes up the individual is common nature and the "thisness"; it is the "thisness" that is being added to the common nature and individuates it (Scotus; 2023, p. 176; p.201-202). In Suarez's elaboration, the "thisness" is presented as a real addition, as "a mode" (Suarez, 1982, p.41). In that sense, according to the first view, firstly, there is something added to the common nature, secondly, what is being added is "a real mode", therefore, the addition is not conceptual but real. It is also distinct from the common nature. However, how it is distinguished requires a concise examination. According to Scotus, "thisness" is considered as a form that is unique for each individual and also formally distinct from the unity of common nature (2023, p.202); regarding this, since the real thing as an individual is composed of both the common nature and "thisness", neither of them can be considered really distinct from each other as "thing and thing"(see *Ordinatio II*, 3rd distinction, Question 6). Moreover, they cannot be also distinguished conceptually, since "this human" and "human being" can be considered conceptually the same. However, one can state that there is a formal distinction between thisness and the common nature since Scotus presents thisness as a unique form for that individual, which by definition must be distinct from the common nature.

The second view, which Suarez mentions as the contrary extreme from the first one, and attributes to Ockham, Henry of Ghent, and Gabriel Biel, stresses that "the individual adds absolutely nothing positive and real to the common nature, whether really or conceptually distinct from it, since everything or nature is essentially (*per se*), primarily and immediately individual" (Suarez, 1982, p. 42-43). Contrary to Scotus, Ockham claims that the common nature does not have a unity and a being proper to itself, rather, only individuals exist, and common natures do not exist in any way (see *Scriptum in libros sententiarum*, Book I, Distinction 2, Question 4, *Opinio Auctoris*). Only unity and being belong to individuals. Therefore, since there is no formally distinct addition being made to the common nature-because it is non-existent-, there is no individuation. In that sense, firstly, there is nothing added to the common nature, secondly, since there is nothing added to the common nature it is neither added really nor conceptually, moreover, the common nature can be

neither conceptually nor really distinguished from the individual since the individual is as such regarding its own virtue; the nature of the individual is to be an individual.

The third view that is attributed to Thomas Aquinas and, according to Suarez, is based on Aristotle's views in *Metaphysics VII*, 1037a30-35 "where he says that in immaterial things that which [the thing] is (*quod quid est*) is not distinguished from that of which it is (*eo cuius est*), while in material [things] it is distinguished" (Suarez, 1982, p. 43). Here, the main argument of this view is that while nothing added to the common nature regarding immaterial things, the case is the opposite for material things. In other words, immaterial things are identical with their essences, for there is no addition to them. However, it is crucial to stress what is meant by the term "essence"; Suarez understands the "definition" or the "quiddity" (Suarez, 1982, p. 43-44). Therefore, Aristotle's views of "immaterial things" might be understood as concepts since Suarez exemplifies what he means by the explanation with a quotation from Aristotle's *On the Soul*, 429b10, as follows: "Magnitude is one [thing], to be of a magnitude another." Here, it is possible to see that while the individuality of the term "magnitude" is nothing other than the definition or the quiddity of the magnitude, the individuality of a thing that has a magnitude requires quantified matter.

Regarding the discussion above, it is easy to see the conceptual foundation of the third view. Initially, there is a division between immaterial and material things. While immaterial things' individuality adds nothing to the common nature, the individuality of material things provided with the addition of designated matter, i.e., matter under the accident of quantity, to the common nature (Aquinas, 2007, p.75-76). In other words, what individuates the material things is the designated, quantified matter. In that regard, firstly there is an addition to the common nature, secondly, what individuality adds is real. This view seems similar to the second view in terms of immaterial things; however, it resembles the first view regarding material things. However, surely, they differ in their fundamental premises. On one hand, what Ockham stresses regarding the individual being identical to nature is the fact that every existing thing is individual by nature, in other words, individuality is the nature of every real thing, but for Thomas Aquinas, the overlap of individuality and the nature is not resulting from the fact that immaterial things are individuals by nature, rather, it is due to the fact that there is no individuating addition, i.e., matter, being made to them, on the other hand, it differs from Scotus' view, since the thisness as the individuating addition is only formally

distinct from the common nature, while, for Thomas Aquinas, the individuating features as the matter is really distinct from the common nature (see Gracia, 1994, p.491).

After explaining the main views regarding the issue, Suarez presents his own account, which differs from all of them in terms of certain aspects. He does it in certain steps:

I say, first, that the individual adds something real to the common nature, because of which it is a particular individual and there comes to it the negation of divisibility into many [individuals] similar [to itself]. (Suarez, 1982, p.45)

...the common nature does not include (*postulat*) of itself such a negation, and yet such negation pertains essentially (*per se*) and intrinsically to the nature as it exists in reality and has been made "a this." (Suarez, 1982, p.45)

...the common concept of man, lion, etc., has nothing incompatible with communicability, and thus it is said to be negatively indifferent, as we shall see below. Owing to this individuation, however, its indifference is removed and it is made incapable of such division insofar as it has been made singular. (Suarez, 1982, p.46)

In the first step, he underlines that the individual adds something real to the common nature; as explained earlier, the common nature by itself is not real but only an abstraction, moreover, it also lacks the negation of divisibility, thus it is indifferent. On the other hand, to be something real is to be an individual, that is to have individual unity, and an individual is as such regarding the incommunicability, its inability to be divided into similar entities. Therefore, by removing the indifference by being made something singular and individual, with the addition of something real, the common nature is made "a this".

I say, second, that the individual as such does not add anything distinct *ex natura rei* from the specific nature. (Suarez, 1982, p.46)

I say, third, that the individual adds to the common nature something conceptually distinct from it, belonging to the same category and metaphysically composing the individual as an individual difference that contracts the species and constitutes the individual. (Suarez, 1982, p.52)

The second and third steps stress that what is added by the individual is not really, but conceptually distinct from the common nature. To comprehend these steps, it is important to remember Suarez's views on the common nature. According to him, to say that the individual is really distinct from the common nature is to view common nature as something real, however, to assert such a claim is to say that nature has an actual unity, therefore, it should be either individual or universal (Suarez, 1982, p.47). The former possibility is not reasonable since common natures are communicable while individual unity is not, then nature should have universal unity, but again this is also impossible since universals are not real due to the premise that to be real is to be an individual (Suarez, 1982, p.32; p.47). Then, following the Scotist view, the common nature should have a formal unity, that is "being no other than the unity of essence expressed by the definition" (Suarez, 1982, p.47).

As the second step suggests that there is not a real distinction between common nature and what is added to it, then, what is added should be distinguished conceptually as it is suggested in the third step. It is important to clarify that what is added to the common nature is real since individual unity is the only real unity, on the other hand, as stated above, the unity of the common nature is only formal unity because it is not a real thing but rather an abstraction. Therefore, the distinction between common nature and the individual is only conceptual. In that regard, "human being" and "this human being" cannot be distinguished in reality, since the former signifies nothing actual to be distinguished from the second; "human being" is not real but "this human being", such as Immanuel, is real. However, in our minds, we can conceptually distinguish between them as they are regarded separately, thus, there must be at least a conceptual distinction, even though in reality "this human being" cannot be distinguished from "the human being" because they refer to the same actual thing (Suarez, 1982, p.52). At this point it is important to underline the issue that there is nothing problematic with the argument that what is added is real although it is distinguished from the common nature only conceptually; the common nature as an abstraction only has

formal unity, in other words, it exists only in the mind (Suarez, 1982, p.51), therefore, although by the virtue of individuation, something real is added to the common nature and made individual, the mode of this addition, thus, the distinction between the common nature and the individual, is only conceptual (Suarez, 1982, p.52). Moreover, this view also applies to the immaterial things as he states: “I say, fourth, that the individual adds something conceptually distinct to the species not only in material things and accidents but also in created and finite immaterial substances” (Suarez, 1982, p.55).

Considering the other philosophers’ views presented by Suarez and his own account, it is possible to conclude that, for Suarez, firstly, there is something added to the common nature and secondly, what is added is real. Thirdly, what is added is not really, but conceptually distinct from the common nature.

3.1.3. Section III: Whether Designated Matter is the Principle of Individuation in Material Substances

In the following sections, Suarez focuses on the principle of individuation. Similar to other sections of his work, before giving his account, Suarez first discusses the views of other philosophers such as Thomas Aquinas and his followers. While Section VII focuses on the principle of individuation of accidents, Section III-VI focuses on the principle of individuation of substances. Accordingly, the principle of individuation of substances would be first examined. He elaborates on this issue by presenting three main views: individuation by matter, individuation by form, and individuation by existence. He stresses the importance of excluding extrinsic causes of individuality since it would not be necessarily valid, therefore, he underlines that he is looking for an intrinsic cause of individuality (Suarez, 1982, p.76). First, he begins with the view that holds that substances are individuated by matter, and he devotes the third section to discussing it. This view has three different interpretations. He presents and opposes them each.

According to the first interpretation, the principle of individuation consists of two components, matter, and quantity; while matter provides incommunicability to the individual, quantity provides distinction from others (Suarez, 1982, p.81). According to Suarez, this interpretation stems from Thomas Aquinas' writings (Suarez, 1982, p.76). Suarez disagrees with this view in many ways but most of them can be considered as related to the fact that quantity is an accident, in other words, it is posterior to the substance (Suarez,

1982, p.82-83). This interpretation creates a lot of inconsistencies, since, to say that quantity is a part of the principle of individuation, is to say that an intrinsic feature of the substance, namely individuality, results from an accident. Suarez's objection is also applicable to the bundle theories of individuation in which scholars claim that what makes a thing a unique individual is the bundle or cluster of properties, i.e. accidents, that it possesses (see Gracia, 1984, p.39).

The second interpretation acknowledges this problem and holds that the principle of individuation does not include the accidental quantity in it, rather it includes the indeterminate quantity as the potentiality for being quantified. This is based on a passage in the Commentary on Boethius' *De Trinite* (see Question IV, article 2, Aquinas's response to the question). According to this view, it is claimed that the matter itself holds the potential to be quantified and this very feature is the source of individuation (Aquinas, 1946). Suarez's objection to this interpretation is almost the same as the first objection; he ridicules the unnecessary distinction between the matter's potency to be quantified and actual quantified matter (Suarez, 1982, p.89).

Finally, the third view is presented. This view differs from the first two in terms of its premise, according to which the designated matter is not included in the principle of individuation; this view holds that the matter is not part of the principle of individuation, but it is the cause of the discernibility of the individual (Suarez, 1982, p.95). Even though it can be accepted as a useful view, according to Suarez, this view leaves the actual question unanswered (Suarez, 1982, p.99).

3.1.4. Section IV: Whether the Substantial Form is the Principle of Individuation of Material Substances

In Section IV, Suarez presents the view that takes substantial form as the principle of individuation. He attributes this view to Durandus, Averroes, Avicenna, and other scholars (Suarez, 1982, p.105). The main argument of this view is that what gives the numerical or individual unity to the subject is the form. According to Suarez, this view finds its ground in Aristotle's writings, precisely in *On the Soul* II, Ch. 1, 412a 6, for he states that form is what constitutes the particular, 'this something' (Suarez, 1982, p.105). This view can be challenged by stating that the substance is a composite of both form and matter, in other words, the

individual unity of the substance both include form and matter, therefore, what accounts for the entity and individuality of a certain thing cannot be only the form (Suarez, 1982, p.106).

Objecting to the latter view can be done by using Durandus' arguments in *On IV* [of the Sentences], in which he states that the form gives individuality to the composite as well as the matter itself; the matter's numerical unity stems from the form (as cited in Suarez, 1982, p.106). Therefore, matter becomes numerically the same by merging with the form (as cited in Suarez, 1982, p.106). According to Suarez this view is false and needs to be rejected since both matter and form can be viewed as being continuously in flux, even though the unity is preserved (Suarez, 1982, p. 106). He exemplifies this with a tree, a river, and a brute. According to Suarez, due to the biological development in the cases of the brute and the tree and the ever-changing stream of water in the case of the river, it must be said that the form of these substances growing and changed while the matter that constituted in them are also constantly replaced, although they preserve their being and unity (Suarez, 1982, p. 106). Thus, the form cannot be what gives a composite its unity since the unity is preserved regardless of the changes in form (Suarez, 1982, p. 106-107). On the other hand, even though it is true that form provides the specific properties of an individual, without matter it cannot become an individual as “a this”. In other words, the form itself is not a real thing (Suarez, 1982, p. 107-108), it needs matter to become a composite as an individual. In that regard, since the matter is a requirement for the form to become “a this”, Suarez states that it is the root of individuation; matter can be seen as the principle of individuation of form (Suarez, 1982, p. 107-108). Following this one might also say that matter is the principle of individuation of the composite (Suarez, 1982, p. 107-108). However, as seen in the former section, this view is to be rejected.

3.1.5. Section V: Whether the Existence of the Singular Thing is the Principle of Individuation

In Section V, Suarez discusses the views that assert the principle of individuation as existence. The terminology can be traced back to the writings of Thomas Aquinas in which the distinction between existence and essence is made; while the former answers the question “Is it?”, the latter answers “What is it?” (see *On Being and Essence* by Thomas Aquinas, ch. IV). Since like individuality, existence seems also “incommunicable”, the question of whether existence is the principle of individuation is posed. Suarez discusses three views based on what is understood by existence.

The first view holds that existence is separate from the essence of the individual, and existence is the principle of individuation. Suarez partly agrees with this view, he states:

...it will be formally true indeed that each thing within the notion of an existent has some individual feature (rationem) from existence itself; just as "this white," concerning the formal notion of white, is constituted by whiteness, although absolutely (simpliciter) "this white" is not constituted by whiteness because it is taken as a subject. (Suarez, 1982, p.114)

He states that in terms of form, it is true that every individual takes part in existence as they are all existent (Suarez, 1982, p.114). However, he disagrees with this view nonetheless and presents three arguments. Firstly, if existence and essence were separate, then it would be possible that an actual Immanuel would be an individual while a possible Immanuel would not. According to Suarez, this is absurd, since even though we can talk about a possible Immanuel by abstraction, conceptually, he still preserves his individuality (Suarez, 1982, p.114). Furthermore, if existence and essence are separate and existence is the principle of individuation, it would not be possible to make a distinction between a possible Immanuel and a possible Friedrich, however, according to Suarez, this is not the case because even though they exist or not, these possibles, who are not existent, are still individuals as we can speak of them separately (Suarez, 1982, p.114). Therefore, existence in this sense cannot be the principle of individuation.

Secondly, if one accepts the view that essence and existence are distinct in reality, then it would be necessary that the essence also possess an individual unity, in other words, the essence should also be a real individual thing, and by the virtue of its individuality, it can be distinguished from the existence (Suarez, 1982, p.115). However, this is also absurd, since in that case, it would be necessary that existence is included in the essence, thus they cannot be separate (Suarez, 1982, p.115).

Thirdly, regarding the view that holds existence and essence are separate and existence is the principle of individuation, one might ask what makes an existence "a this" (Suarez, 1982, p.115). There seems to be no answer more satisfactory than the answer that states it is made "a this" by itself (Suarez, 1982, p.115). Suarez then suggests why should

not one also use this reasoning for the essence (Suarez, 1982, p.115). Since essence is prior and more fundamental than existence, it can be said that existence is the act of the essence, then it should also be stated that essence individuates itself (Suarez, 1982, p.115). By thinking in that manner, one also claims that existence is what actualizes the essence, and, in that regard, each individual would be of a different essence, even though they are specifically the same (Suarez, 1982, p.115). For instance, Immanuel and Friedrich would be of different kinds of humanity just as a man and a lion are related to distinct essences (Suarez, 1982, p.115). Thus, this is also absurd in the context of this view.

The second view he discusses views existence as subsistence, therefore, subsistence is the principle of individuation. Subsistence can be understood as *suppositum*; the feature that makes a thing the subject of predication, because subsisting is staying under the accidents and properties and *suppositum* is that which stands under them as the subject. This view holds that this feature is what constitutes the individuality of an individual. Even though Suarez discusses this matter in great detail in terms of Christian theology, since it would be very difficult to present this discussion in a detailed manner here, his views can be summarized as they are centred around the matter of incarnation (Suarez, 1982, p.116). According to Suarez, subsistence is, by nature, distinct from the substance; although in ordinary cases, it can be seen that it accompanies the substance, it cannot be said that it is an intrinsic feature of it (Suarez, 1982, p.116). It can be seen that as far as the Christ is considered, the individuality of the nature of the Christ is preserved even after his subsistence, his human body, is no longer accompanies it (Suarez, 1982, p.116). Therefore, since individuality can be preserved without subsistence, it cannot be intrinsically individuated by subsistence.

3.1.6. Section VI: Finally, What the Principle of Individuation is in All Created Substances

The third view is the view that Suarez aligns himself with; according to this view, existence as the principle of individuation is understood as the individual's own entity. In Section VI, Suarez states that:

From what has been said thus far against the views above, and after as it were, a process of elimination it seems that every singular substance is singular in itself, that is, by its entity [and] needs no other principle of individuation in addition to its entity,

or in addition to the intrinsic principles which constitute its entity. (Suarez, 1982, p.121)

As it is presented previously, individuality is rooted in the negation of division, which is the defining feature of transcendental unity, moreover, since transcendental unity is convertible to being and, in actuality, it is seen as individual unity which belongs to every existing actual thing, it is no surprise that Suarez's assertion regarding the principle of individuation is stemming from the very being of the individual thing itself, its entity. In Section VI-VII, on this basis, he can provide the principle of individuation for all created substances. The exclusion of God, as the uncreated substance, is significant since God's individuality does not need a principle of individuation, as Suarez states: "the divine substance. . .is individual by itself and essentially; whence, there is no more reason to look for a principle of individuation in it than for a principle of its essence or existence" (Suarez, 1982, p.75). In that sense, God is an individual without an individuation and his individuality is the model for all individual unities, since his indivisibility, his existence, hence, his individuality is essential (Suarez, 1982, p. 42). Returning to created substances, however, according to Suarez these substantial realities can be examined under several different headings such as matter, form, mode, composite, and spiritual substances, each of which has the same principle of individuation.

3.1.6.1. *Individuation of matter*

Starting with matter, Suarez stresses that matter is individual by itself without any extrinsic influence, because the matter under the form of wood is numerically diverse from the matter under the form of water or human, therefore, it has an individual unity in itself; the source of this unity is not the form, since, as stated previously, matter can be numerically the same although the form changes, thus, it must have an individual unity in itself (Suarez, 1982, p.122).

3.1.6.2. *Individuation of substantial forms*

Regarding the principle of individuation of forms, again, Suarez stresses that the principle is again the entity. He first refutes the claim that the form is individuated by accidents (Suarez, 1982, p.124). Then he continues discussing the matter. It is important to remember that the matter is an intrinsic principle of the composite, but not of the form, since the form itself is distinguished from the matter and individual in itself, and the composite is

formed by the union of those two (Suarez, 1982, p.125). Though it is possible to state that matter individuates form, as presented above, since matter seems unchanging even after different forms, however, form does not seem indifferent in that manner; for actualizing as a composite, the form seems to need matter (Suarez, 1982, p.125). However, Suarez argues against this view, as he examines the example of a rational soul; firstly, the human soul is form, actualized through certain parts of the body which include diverse kinds of matter, secondly and more importantly, it constantly acquires new matter through nutrition and loses it, while remaining numerically the same (Suarez, 1982, p.126). Therefore, the matter cannot be seen as the principle of individuation of forms. Forms are individual by their entity and each composite is actualized by the union of "this matter" as well as "this form".

3.1.6.3. *Individuation of substantial modes*

In terms of substantial modes, according to Suarez, each mode is "simple and in its own way indivisible, also has its individuation from itself, and not from some principle distinct *ex natura rei* from itself" (Suarez, 1982, p.131). Here, it seems that by mode, Suarez understands the mode of the union of form and matter as he states:

Again in the subsistence of a simple [entity], and the same would be [the case] concerning existence if it were a real mode of essence *distinct ex natura rei* from it. Accordingly, it is certain that the union which my soul has to my body now is numerically one and individual, both because it is something real and existing in reality and distinct *ex natura rei* from the soul, and also because it differs numerically and not specifically from the mode of the union of another soul to its body. (Suarez, 1982, p.131)

In that regard, the union of a certain matter and a certain form is numerically distinguished from other unions as such, which implies the individual unity of this mode since numerical distinction only follows indivisibility (Suarez, 1982, p.131). Moreover, the individual unity of this mode of the union is not caused by either form or matter, because this union cannot be constituted by another form since it has a special real identity with "this form" and also same cannot be done with another matter due to a certain actual nature that

is determined to "this matter" (Suarez, 1982, p.131). According to Suarez, even if it is assumed that the union is dissolved, thus form and matter are separated, and God united them again, there is no reason for the numerical identity of the previous mode to be the same as the new one (Suarez, 1982, p.132). Accordingly, he states "Those unions can be numerically distinguished in the same form with respect to the same matter; therefore, its principle of individuation is not sufficiently taken from this form or this matter" (Suarez, 1982, p.132). In that sense, the individuality of the mode of union must reside in the entity of the mode itself.

3.1.6.4. *Individuation of composite substances*

The principle of individuation of a composite substance, on the other hand, "is this matter and this form united to each other.". In other words, "this matter" and "this form" united in "this mode of union", are the intrinsic principles of "the whole entity of the composite" (Suarez, 1982, p.133). Therefore, they are physical principles of the composite substance's individuation (Suarez, 1982, p.133). In that regard, neither form nor matter, by itself, cannot be the principle of individuation, rather, taken together as the whole entity, they constitute the principle of individuation of composite substance (Suarez, 1982, p.133). Accordingly, if either of them changed, the composite cannot be regarded as numerically the same, since that means that its entity is changed in some respect; "That the principles of unity are the same as the principles of the entity; but this matter and this form are the adequate intrinsic principle of this composite entity, and, therefore, of unity and individuation." as Suarez puts it (1982, p.133).

3.1.6.5. *Individuation of spiritual substances*

Besides God as the uncreated substance, there are other immaterial, spiritual substances such as angels. As previously discussed, the Thomist view considers immaterial things identical to their essence and nature due to their lack of matter. On the contrary, according to Suarez, an angel is still something really more than its essence and nature regarding the individuality that is added to it (Suarez, 1982, p.135). This individuality is added to their essence by the virtue of their entity; Suarez here emphasizes his point that focuses on the fact that distinction from others, as well as within the species, follows

individuality as indivisibility (Suarez, 1982, p.136). Although some angels can share the same nature or essence, it is possible to distinguish them individually, thus, they must have individuality (Suarez, 1982, p.136). In that regard they cannot be equal to their essences, since essence is what is common to individuals, therefore, if the spiritual or immaterial substances can be distinguished, it must be due to an addition to their essences, which is, in this case, is the mere entity of them “since in them there is nothing but the complete, simple, substantial entity” as they are devoid of matter (Suarez, 1982, p.135-136).

3.1.7. Section VII: Whether the Principle of Individuation of Accidents is to be Taken from the Subject

The issue of the individuality of accidents is examined by Suarez in Section VII. Apparent also from the title, the problem is investigated based on the source of individuation of accidents as it is accepted as the subject by many scholars. Suarez states that the same reasoning that is previously discussed in terms of the individuality of substances can be applied also to the individuality of the accidents (1982, p.139). However, before answering the problematic questions and giving his own account, Suarez first discusses the views of others.

The view which he attributes to Thomas Aquinas and also defended by many others holds that since accidents have all their being concerning the subject, their being and individuality must depend on the subject, moreover, since it is impossible to see that a subject is predicated with two different whitenesses, for in that case there would be a numerical distinction between these two whitenesses which would imply that their individuality is not provided by the subject but something else, thus, the individuality of the accidents must stem from the subject (Suarez, 1982, p.140). However, Suarez would disagree with this view based on the relationship between the subject and the accident.

The view he aligns himself with and attributes to Durandus holds that regarding the relationship between subject and accident, neither of them is intrinsically related, rather, their relation is contingent (Suarez, 1982, p.140). In other words, there is no intrinsic principle that necessarily requires that a certain subject must have a certain accident, the contrary is also true since there is no intrinsic principle for a certain accident to belong to a certain subject. Suarez also states: "The subject cannot be said to be the intrinsic principle of the individuation of accidents, as intrinsically and essentially composing the accident . . . since

the accident is certainly not intrinsically composed of the subject" (Suarez, 1982, p.141). Surely, this is why the whiteness of something is accidental for that certain thing.

Then, if the subject is not the principle of individuation of accidents, it must be the accident entity. This is based on the previous discussions also, as Suarez states: "...accidents do not have their individuation and numerical distinction from the subject but from their proper entities..." (1982, p.142). In that regard, the principle of individuation must be something intrinsic to the accident (Suarez, 1982, p.141). In that regard, the redness of a certain object, a pencil for example, is not individual as "this red" due to the pencil, rather it is individual by its own entity, it is a "this red" by itself.

3.1.8. Concluding Remarks

The current section has aimed to understand the concept of *principium individuationis* in Suarez's disputations while examining what has been said before him as well as his contributions to the problem of individuation. First, the concept of "transcendental unity" was elaborated on as it is the most general type of unity for Suarez. As the most general type of unity, in other words, the unity that is shared by not just actual things but also concepts, forms, and essences, the "transcendental unity" is initially understood as identical to the "being". However, as Suarez showed, it is distinguished from the being by a privative negation, i.e., the negation of division. This is perceived differently regarding what the unity belongs to; it is individual unity for real entities, the actual things in the universe, while it is formal unity for common natures, and concepts, and universal unity for the universals. Besides the first group, Suarez does not stress his elaborations in the fifth Disputation.

As the only actual unity in the universe, individual unity is defined by the feature of incommunicability. All other features such as plurality and distinction from others necessarily follow incommunicability, since to be many it is initially necessary to be one. Therefore, according to Suarez, all things are individual. What renders those individuals as such for Suarez was the main question of this section. It is revealed that the existence as the entity of the individual itself is the cause of its individuation. In other words, individuals are individuals by virtue of their own existence. In that regard, the essences, and common natures have only conceptual or formal unity, therefore, they are not actual, which in turn allows the possibility of them to be communicable to many entities since being divisible and actual expresses a contradiction. Thus, existence as the entity of the individual is what

individuates it from the essence. Consequently, the *principium individuationis* is understood regarding existence as entity according to Suarez. Even though the framework of Suarez's understanding of the issue is expressed, it is possible to become confused and disregard its differences with other philosophers such as William of Ockham. However, a quick examination would reveal that this is not the case.

Also pointed out by Gracia (1994, p.499-500), Suarez and Ockham can be distinguished regarding many aspects of their thought, however, the most important one is their views regarding the essentiality of individuality. Firstly, while Ockham focuses on the composite substances and not on their components as individuals, Suarez distinguishes the individuality of the components of composite substances as well as the individuality of the composite substance itself. Secondly, according to Ockham, individuality is an essential feature of the individual, meaning, besides the individual thing, there is no essence or common nature; in other words, there is no individuation since the individuals are individual *per se*. On the other hand, as we have seen, for Suarez, individuals are as such with an addition to the essence, even though the essence or common nature, in this case, is understood only as conceptual. In that regard, what is essential is that which is common to all individuals from a certain genus or species, since essence refers to the quiddity, the whatness, and what is essential is related to the definition of what is common to all members of that group. In other words, individuality is not an essential feature of the individual. Therefore, it is important to underline that although for both Suarez and Ockham individuals are individuals by their existence, for Ockham, this results from the fact that there is no individuation since individuality is an essential feature of the individual, on the contrary, for Suarez, the only being that is essentially individual is God, therefore, individuality is not essential for the created substances. In that sense, Suarez still holds the notion of the essence as what is common to all individuals, although the essence in this case considered only an abstraction.

3.2. Locke's "Of Identity and Diversity"

Added to Locke's comprehensive work, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, in the second edition, the chapter called "Of Identity and Diversity" holds great significance in terms of how the issue of individuality evolved to be understood by scholars after medieval times. Although Locke's views contrast dramatically with the Scholastic philosophers of the Middle Ages, it is possible to see that Locke's elaborations regarding

identity and diversity have much in common with the discussions of the problem of individuality, which was made a subject of inquiry by philosophers such as Thomas Aquinas, Durandus and Suarez. A detailed examination would even make it clear that Locke shared some of the key features of Suarez's views.

However, initially, it is very important to state that Locke's work can be considered as a part of the school of Mechanical Philosophy, which is a school of philosophy that opposes the main premises of Aristotelian Scholastics, for instance, the concept of substantial forms (McCann, 1987, p.54). On the other hand, scholastics believed that there is a process called individuation, which indicates the priority of that which is general and universal; according to the general scholastic perspective, each individual is individuated from a universal that constitutes their essence, therefore, the actual individual is individuated from that essence (McCann, 1987, p.56). However, Locke would disagree with this view and states that:

...general and universal, belong not to the real existence of things; but are the inventions and creatures of the understanding, made by it for its use, and concern only signs, whether words or ideas. When therefore we quit particulars, the generals that rest, are only creatures of our own making, their general nature being nothing but the capacity they are put into by the understanding, of signifying or representing many particulars. For the signification they have, is nothing but a relation, that by the mind of man is added to them. (Locke, 1995, p.330)

In that regard, we see that Locke and Suarez agree in terms of the view that holds what is general or universal, not real but only conceptual. Therefore, it is not a surprise that both philosophers argued that whatever exists is individual and singular. Furthermore, as apparent from II.27.3, like Suarez, Locke also holds that the principle of individuation is the existence itself (1995, p. 242). In this context, although Locke differs from Suarez in terms of the premises such as the views about substantial forms, it is important to note that these two philosophers agree on some crucial points.

Moreover, there is also a difference in terms of the focus; for scholastics in general and Suarez in particular, the issue was to identify the features of a thing that renders it as individual, thus, distinguish it from all other individuals, by doing which one may also explain the numerical distinction within a species. However, for Locke, the issue is to understand and explain the ideas of identity and diversity as ideas of human understanding, by doing so he can present his account for the identity of material objects, as well as plants, animals, humans, and also for personal identity. Even though the concerns and the way of reasoning about the issue are different, both elaborations focus on what distinguishes an individual thing from others, and what constitutes the identity of the individual. While for Suarez, what constitutes identity and individuality is the transcendental unity that is convertible with being, the individual thing's existence as its entity, for Locke, as it will be clarified, this is the individual's existence as its spatiotemporal determination.

According to Locke, identity and diversity are initially ideas (Locke, 1995, p.244; McCann, 1987, p.58). The formation of these ideas stems from an act of the mind, through which we compare "the very being of things, when, considering anything as existing at any determined time and place, with itself existing at another time" (Locke, 1995, p.241). This comparison is the root of the ideas of identity and diversity. Even though two things that are seemingly identical to each other can be seen in different places at the same moment, we are sure that these are two separate things; because it is impossible to conceive or encounter neither a thing in different places at the same time, nor two different things existing in the same place at the same time (Locke, 1995, p.241). This is the basic principle that Locke presents in the first section of the chapter. Therefore, the identity of something is always understood as belonging to something that existed in a determined place in a determined time; identity, as Locke understands it, then, refers to the thing's being the same with itself in that framework. Following this, there cannot be two beginnings of existence for a certain substance, nor two things cannot share the same beginning, for it would contradict the principle that is presented above (Locke, 1995, p.241).

He goes on to distinguish between different types of substances; again, the ground for such a distinction is the fact that we have ideas regarding only these three kinds of substances: God, finite intelligences, and bodies (Locke, 1995, p.241). Firstly, since God does not have a beginning in existence, eternal, everywhere, and unchangeable, his identity does not give room to doubt Locke (1995, p.241). Secondly, finite intelligences -he also calls

them spirits- have a determined time and place for their beginnings, thus their identity is constituted by the relation that they have to the time and place of their beginnings (Locke, 1995, p.242). Here, it is important to clarify that Locke does not exclude spatial relations when talking about spirits or intelligences. Although it is expected that he would do that similar to Descartes, Locke insists on this matter. This is also apparent from II.23.19, where he states that just like bodies, spirits are also capable of locomotion, thus, one can say that two spirits are distant from each other (Locke, 1995, p.217). In that regard, it is evident that although spirits can think, will, and operate on the body, this is based on spatial proximity. In Locke's words, a spirit in Oxford cannot operate on a body in London, or vice versa (Locke, 1995, p.217). Since the spirit is united with the body, like a carriage follows the horse, the spirit follows the body (Locke, 1995, p.218). Thirdly, the same principle regarding identity, applies also to the particles of matter, and consequently bodies, since they are constituted from the particles of matter, as they exist in a determined place and a determined time, if no addition or subtraction is done, they are identical with themselves (Locke, 1995, p.242). This rule also includes the relations and modes of substances, for the identity and diversity of them also is founded on the determination of their existence with time and space; this is even valid for motion and thought since their existence is in succession (Locke, 1995, p.242).

In that regard, Locke states that there is no contradiction for two different kinds of substances, such as finite intelligence and a body, to exist in the same place at the same time (Locke, 1995, p.242). This is also the case for any given place at any time since God is eternal, everywhere, and without a beginning, by definition, whatever exists must exist in the same place at the same time with God. Regarding the discussion so far, Locke explicitly states that the *principium individuationis* (principle of individuation) is the existence itself (Locke, 1995, p.242). Existence is understood as something that determines the being to a particular place and a particular time (Locke, 1995, p.242). Thus, the existence of a substance is incommunicable to two beings of the same kind (Locke, 1995, p.242). From this statement it is clear that what Locke understood as an individual thing, as either a material body or a finite intelligence, is that which is identical to itself and diverse from all other individuals, and what constitutes this individuality, thus the identity is the existence of that very thing, determining it to a certain time and place. So far, it is easy to see that Locke's account does not extremely deviate from the early discussion of individuation. However, what seems

important about his views is his elaborations on the identity of matter, plants, animals, and finally persons. Each will be discussed separately in this section.

3.2.1. Identity of Material Bodies

As mentioned, the principle of individuation for finite intelligences and material bodies is spatiotemporal continuity, in other words, the existence itself as far as it is determined by a certain time and place. However, for material bodies, Locke also speaks of another condition:

...let us suppose an atom, i.e. a continued body under one immutable superficies, existing in a determined time and place; it is evident, that, considered in any instant of its existence, it is in that instant the same with itself. (Locke, 1995, p.242)

In like manner, if two or more atoms be joined together into the same mass, every one of those atoms will be the same, by the foregoing rule: and whilst they exist united together, the mass, consisting of the same atoms, must be the same mass, or the same body, let the parts be ever so differently jumbled. But if one of these atoms be taken away, or one new one added, it is no longer the same mass or the same body. (Locke, 1995, p.242-243)

Here it is evident that the identity of composite bodies that are constituted from atoms, simple substances, depends on the identity of these atoms, that is their existence in a determined time and place. Consequently, the identity of the bodies can be understood based on the sameness of the mass of constituting atoms, since if there is a subtraction or addition of atoms, the composite body will not be the same as itself. In other words, a composite material body's identity, as its continued existence through a certain place or time, depends on the spatiotemporally continued existence of its atoms. By the statement of this criterion, it is asserted that a material body is identical to itself as long as it has numerically the same matter, even though its shape, volume, and other qualities might change with the reorganization of the atoms (Locke, 1995, p.243).

As the discussion suggests, Locke seems to follow a view that is close to Democritean atomism, by which atoms are presented as indivisible, unalterable simple material objects (see Aristotle, 1965, p.165). Since they are indivisible, they exclude all other bodies; the space that they occupy through their extension has no emptiness. Although the organization of these atoms can change by motion and the state of their positioning, they continue to exist by occupying space. This atomist influence is significant because it allows Locke to explain the identity of material objects without using concepts like form or a non-material principle of unity; he presents the issue by using only material explanations (McCann, 1987, p.62).

3.2.2. Identity of Plants and Animals

In the closing part of II.27.3. Locke states that the case is different for living creatures; their identity cannot depend on the mass of the same particles of matter. Because living creatures always exchange matter with their environment through certain processes such as nutrition, yet the identity remains intact (Locke, 1995, p.243). For instance, an oak tree grows to become a tree from a seed, constantly exchanging matter with its surroundings and constantly changing its parts (Locke, 1995, p.243). The case is also the same for a horse. As an animal, a horse also seems to change, sometimes it is slim or sometimes it is fat (Locke, 1995, p.243). However, regardless of the change in the matter, we are certain that these are the same oak tree and the same horse (Locke, 1995, p.243). Thus, Locke concludes that a mass of matter and a living body is not the same thing and consequently, the idea of identity must stem from different sources regarding both of them (Locke, 1995, p.243).

Therefore, it is imperative to find what distinguishes a mass of matter from a living body; while the former is just the aggregation of matter, that is united to form a composite body, the latter is something more (Locke, 1995, p.243). A living body, such as an oak tree, is not only the matter that is required to form the oak tree but also the organization of parts that are aimed to receive and distribute the nourishment for the oak tree to continue its existence (Locke, 1995, p.243). The organization of these parts is what constitutes the vegetable life, then, the life of the plant which is communicated to parts of the plant by the organization of them, which in turn communicated to new particles of matter becomes the source of the identity for that plant (Locke, 1995, p.243). Through this organization, the organic and functional unity is accounted for, thus the life of the living thing is sustained. This life is what provides the spatiotemporal continuity of “this plant”, since without the

organization of that sort, the life, i.e., the spatiotemporally continued existence of the living organism, cannot be sustained. If the principle of individuation as the principle that determines the identity is the existence itself, then it presents itself as life itself in the case of living things.

The reasoning is also similar for the animals. In this case, Locke compares an animal to a watch (Locke, 1995, p.243-244). According to him, the watch is essentially “a fit organization or construction of parts to a certain end, which, when a sufficient force is added to it, it is capable to attain” (Locke, 1995, p.243-244). He encourages the reader to imagine that the watch, as a continued body, is capable of repairing itself and increasing its function by constant addition and replacement of parts with one common life (Locke, 1995, p.243-244). If one imagines such a thing, it would be easy to conclude that this imagined watch is very much like an animal (Locke, 1995, p. 244). The only difference is that in machines, this motion and function of life can be triggered only with the motion coming from outside, however, in animals, this can only be done by the motion within (Locke, 1995, p. 244). In that regard, life as the principle of individuation in living bodies is something over and above the matter; although it is related to the exchange of materials, Locke distinguishes it as a separate thing that constitutes the identity of living things.

Then this discussion naturally leads to the discussion of the identity of humans, which is a complicated issue and requires a thoroughgoing examination. At first look, the arguments concerning the living bodies, namely plants, and animals, can be also valid for humans if it is accepted that the continued life as the organization of parts of the body is what makes the identity of humans since humans are also a kind of animal. However, it is also argued that what constitutes the identity of humans is the soul (Locke, 1995, p.244). In that case, it would be possible for the same spirit to unite with different bodies, therefore, this would mean that different individuals from different ages with different backgrounds might be the same human being (Locke, 1995, p.244). Moreover, it would also be possible to state that a parrot or a cat is human if it has the capacity to reason, think, talk, etc., however, this is not the case according to Locke (1995, p.245-246). If one encounters a human who lacks reason, and a parrot or a cat with the capacity to reason, he/she still asserts that what they encountered was a “dull irrational man” or a “very intelligent rational parrot” (Locke, 1995, p.245). Therefore, it is evident that the identity of humans is not only about the body or the spirit. As Locke says “It is not the idea of a thinking or rational being alone

that makes the idea of a man in most people's sense: but of a body, so and so shaped, joined to it; and if that be the idea of a man, the same successive body not shifted all at once, must, as well as the same immaterial spirit, go to the making of the same man" (1995, p.246) Thus, the idea of identity regarding humans should be related to both soul and the living body.

3.2.3. Personal Identity

Locke elaborates on the issue of personal identity the most, as it will be clear in the following discussions, he clearly distinguishes between substances as the body and the spirit, the human as the union of those substances, and the person as the one who has consciousness. He starts by attempting to define what a person is. According to Locke a person is "a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking, and, as it seems to me, essential to it: it being impossible for anyone to perceive without perceiving that he does perceive" (1995, p.246). So, it is apparent from the statement that what makes a person is the consciousness that enables him/her to perceive that he/she is perceiving and by virtue of which he/she can consider him/herself as the same person in different times and different places. In that case, without consciousness the existence of a person is impossible, consequently, it is the consciousness that provides the ground for the idea of identity for a person.

However, Locke states that there are also ones that assert that personal identity is related to the sameness of the substance; since there are sometimes interruptions in the consciousness regarding forgetfulness, not being able to remember the early parts of our lives, or being in a sleeping state (1995, p.247). Resulting of this, some may ask whether one is the same substance or the same finite intelligence after those interruptions. According to Locke, although this can be asked, it is not related to personal identity, for the issue of personal identity is not related to the sameness of the substance but rather the consciousness (1995, p.247). In that sense, it can be argued that regardless of the interruptions in the conscious state, it is the same human being, i.e. same body and same finite intelligence, thus the identity in terms of the substance is preserved throughout a human being's life. However, since consciousness is the principle of individuation as what constitutes the identity of the person, the issue is not about the identity of the substances, for just as life can unite different substances (as in the case of plants and animals), consciousness also can unite different

substances; in this case, at least we can say that it unites the living body, i.e. the life of the living organism as it includes all the material substances that are exchanged, and the immaterial substance as the finite intelligence (Locke, 1995, p.247). Thus, the issue of the identity of the person should be examined considering not the sameness of the substance but the consciousness, therefore, as long as one can repeat the idea of a past action with the same consciousness, regardless of the interruptions of consciousness, there is no doubt that it is the same person, just as there is no doubt that it is the same animal or plant life regardless of the exchanged material substances with the environment (Locke, 1995, p.247). Consciousness can extend to past, present, and actions to come, and thereby can unite the succession of substances into one consciousness as one person (Locke, 1995, p.247-248). Then one may also ask whether Locke refers to the material or immaterial substances in terms of their unity by virtue of consciousness. He discusses the issue for both of them.

In terms of material substances, it is evident that as a person, one is conscious of his/her body; the limbs and parts of the body are then united in the consciousness as a person directly related to them (Locke, 1995, p.248). It is the consciousness that unites our body parts or limbs as different material substances in one person. In that regard, when we cut off a hand or a finger, it is no longer considered a part of the self, rather, it becomes an alien object just as any other material substance outside of our body (Locke, 1995, p.248). Since the self is preserved despite the subtraction of the material substance, it is easy to conclude that personal identity is not related to the identity of the body as the material substance.

On the other hand, one might also ask whether personal identity is related to the identity of the immaterial substance, the finite intelligence. In other words, can personal identity be kept intact regardless of the succession of immaterial substances? Although Locke does not have a clear answer to this question since it is very unlikely to see that consciousness is preserved through two or more different human beings, he does state that if one can represent the past actions of another human being with the same consciousness, then it is possible to state that consciousness can also unite different finite intelligences, as it is preserved through the succession of them as he states:

...it must be allowed, that, if the same consciousness (which, as has been shown, is quite a different thing from the same numerical figure or motion in body) can be

transferred from one thinking substance to another, it will be possible that two thinking substances may make but one person. For the same consciousness being preserved, whether in the same or different substances, the personal identity is preserved. (Locke, 1995, p.249)

Another issue related to the one that is discussed above is the question that inquires whether there can be two distinct persons in one immaterial substance as a finite intelligence. Here, Locke presents the question as follows:

Whether the same immaterial being, being conscious of the action of its past duration, may be wholly stripped of all the consciousness of its past existence, and lose it beyond the power of ever retrieving it again: and so as it was beginning a new account from a new period, have a consciousness that cannot reach beyond this new state. (Locke, 1995, p.249)

Here, two distinct persons' possibility of sharing the same soul is questioned. Locke exemplifies this by using one of his past acquaintances who claim to have the soul of Socrates (1995, p.250). The main problem is whether they are the same person; as it is shown, the identity of the substance as the same numerically one spirit does not provide the personal identity, thus this person cannot be Socrates as himself (Locke, 1995, p.250). However, as the principle directs, it is not impossible for two persons to reside in the same immaterial spirit. In that case, if we take that a person who has numerically the same spirit as Nestor from the siege of Troy, as long as he/she cannot state that he/she is conscious of any of Nestor's actions, although it is the same immaterial substance that is combined with the same parcels of matter that once formed the body of Nestor, we cannot say that he/she is the same person with Nestor, thus, it is possible for two distinct persons to share the same soul (Locke, 1995, p.250).

This brings us to an important distinction between a human being and a person. Here Locke underlines that what he means by assertion that the same human being is the unity of the same finite intelligence and the same living body (1995, p. 253). Therefore, it is possible

to assume that two different individuals from distant ages can be the same human being since it is possible for the same material substances and immaterial substances to be united, separated, and united again at different points in time, however, it is impossible to assert that they are the same person since personality depends solely on consciousness (Locke, 1995, p.253). For instance, if it were the case that a soul of a prince with the consciousness of the same person was united with the body of a cobbler, we sure would say that it is the same person due to the identity of the consciousness, but we cannot state that it is the same man (Locke, 1995, p.250-251). For, the prince would be himself for him but a cobbler for everyone else, and if the consciousness was not kept in this supposition, even he cannot regard himself as the same person, or even the same man, since it is not the same unity of body and spirit (Locke, 1995, p.250-251). Since this is the case, another question also can be answered regarding forgetfulness and being unable to retrieve the memories of the early parts of our lives in terms of personal identity. As we have seen, Locke clearly states that the same human being and the same person are two distinct issues to elaborate on. In that regard, in the cases of absolute oblivion to the degree that there is no possibility to retrieve the representation of past actions with the same consciousness, it can be said that it is not the same person, same consciousness but the same human as the unity of same spirit and the same body (Locke, 1995, p.252-253). This can be applied to instances of not remembering the infant days of our lives as well as in the instances of madness or intoxication, for which even the language indicates with expressions like “he was not himself” (Locke, 1995, p.253).

Now, it is clear that consciousness is the ground for personal identity, and it can unite existences that are remote in time into the same person (Locke, 1995, p.254). In that regard, the self as the personal identity does not depend on the identity of the substance but the consciousness itself; as far as the consciousness expands, regardless of whether the substance is immaterial, material, simple, or compounded, it is the same person, same self (Locke, 1995, p.254). This is evident also from the fact that every person is only concerned for themselves but not the substances; for example, if we return to the cut finger, a person is no longer concerned for the finger that is cut off from his/her body since it is no longer a part of the self. This shows us where personal identity resides. Since the continued consciousness constitutes the self, unification, and separation of substances do not affect it, as long as the substances are vitally united with the consciousness, we see them as parts of ourselves, however, upon separation, it is no longer considered as a part of the self, rather an alien

object. Thus, the objects of rewards and punishments are not substances but rather persons (Locke, 1995, p.252). The one that must be rewarded or punished for the actions that have been taken is the person, not the substance, i.e. the living body or the finite intelligence as the immaterial substance (Locke, 1995, p.252).

3.2.4. Discussion on Suarez and Locke

To sum up the whole discussion on identity and diversity as what Locke understands as individuality, it is important to trace back the steps that are taken. Moreover, it would be also suitable to stress where Locke stands regarding the Scholastic debate on individuality and why his account is historically significant for philosophers to come. As seen above, according to Locke, there are three kinds of substances: God, finite intelligences as immaterial substances, and material substances as bodies (Locke, 1995, p.241). For all of them, the principle of individuation is the same: existence, which in this case is understood as the spatiotemporal continuity of the being of these substances (Locke, 1995, p.242). Besides the first one, since God's identity is no matter of doubt as he is eternal, without beginning and everywhere, the individuality of all substances can be demonstrated according to Locke's principle (Locke, 1995, p.241). Even though different kinds of substances can exist in the same place at the same time, it is impossible for substances that are of the same kind (Locke, 1995, p.241). In that regard, the idea of identity stems from the existence of a substance in a determined place and a determined time.

This applies in different ways to animals, plants, and persons. For animals and plants, i.e., living bodies, it is the life that constitutes the identity, even though the identity of material substances stems from the spatiotemporally continued existence of numerically same simple substances as atoms, the living bodies always exchange material with their environment through biological processes such as nutrition. Thus, their identity cannot stem from the identity of their atoms, rather, life itself, as the organization of parts and the material substances, constitutes the identity of animals and plants (Locke, 1995, p.243). Accordingly, the existence of the animals and plants as spatiotemporally continued beings grounded on the life of that animal or plant, and as soon as life vanishes, the existence also vanishes. It is also similar to personal identity; however, it is important to underline the difference between a person and a human being.

According to Locke, a human being is a finite intelligence that is combined with a living body; thus, the identity of a human being must be related to each of them as well as their union (Locke, 1995, p. 253). On the other hand, personal identity is grounded in the consciousness (Locke, 1995, p.246). Consciousness is the essential feature of thinking, through which the person perceives that he/she is perceiving and considers him/herself as him/herself (Locke, 1995, p.246). Since it is separate from the substantial features of body and spirit; in principle, Locke allows consciousness to expand and unite different material and immaterial substances, in that manner, consciousness is similar to life (Locke, 1995, p.247). Therefore, as long as consciousness exists it is possible to account for personal identity. Although it must be granted that Locke's account is very detailed and sound, the difference between finite intelligence and consciousness is not well-explained, since if consciousness is essential for thinking, it is problematic to speak of them separately, as finite intelligence refers to thinking, immaterial substance.

Nonetheless, if Locke's views are examined, it is possible to draw parallels with the Scholastic tradition and especially with Suarez. Although Locke does not follow the traditional Aristotelian framework, both philosophers elaborate on individuation from similar perspectives. For both Suarez and Locke, whatever exists in the universe is individual and singular, in other words, common nature or essence as the universal does not exist in actuality, the universals as such are only abstractions, they are fabrications of the understanding as Locke puts it (Locke, 1995, p.330). In that regard the individuation does not occur through the communicability of universals in reality, rather, it is the actualization of what is conceptual through existence.

What Suarez understands from existence is the entity; to be is to be an individual since each existing thing has transcendental unity, the negation of division, which is extensionally the same with being and convertible with it, therefore, what individuates the individual from the essence is the mere act of existing. On the other hand, Locke understands existence as the spatiotemporally continued being. The individuality or the identity of a certain thing is constituted by its determination in time and space, it is that feature that makes a certain being distinct from all others. In that regard, similar to Suarez, for Locke, essences are abstract ideas as mental representations (Locke, 1995, p.330-331). However, he uses the term "essence" implying two different meanings of the word. According to Locke, the term initially meant the very being of things, however, the discussions on genus and species in

the Middle Ages were so widespread, the use of the term essence was shifted from signifying the real constitution of things to the artificial constitution of genus and species (Locke, 1995, p.333). Locke calls the former use as *real essence* and the latter the *nominal essence* (Locke, 1995, p.333). In that regard, a name is a word, which is used to signify the abstract idea (Locke, 1995, p.333), i.e., the nominal essence, which in turn was formed by the human understanding of the collection of simple ideas (Locke, 1995, p.332), i.e., mental representations of things that are presented to the mind by either sensation or reflection (Locke, 1995, p.59). Therefore, when one talks about the genus, species, or essence of a certain thing, it is equivalent to talking about the thing's nominal essence. Since the essence is formed by the mind, it is only conceptual, thus, the essence is communicated to the individuals by the mere existence, i.e., spatiotemporal determination, of things.

After summarizing Locke's account of identity and individuality, it is important to stress a subtle but crucial point, through which his account is distinguished from the ones before him. In Scholastic tradition and for Suarez, individuality is a feature of the things of extramental reality. According to Suarez, the most general type of unity is the transcendental unity, which is convertible with being and intensionally adds the negation of division to the being. This means that all beings, by the virtue of transcendental unity, are incapable of division, since otherwise, they would not exist, in other words, it might indicate that a certain thing cannot be identical with itself after such division. In individual things, this transcendental unity presents itself as individual unity, the incommunicability to the things that are specifically the same. According to Suarez, God is singular and individual, his individuality is essential and thus, a model for all other individual unities. Even though, for other beings, individuality is not essential, it is a feature they have by their existence as an entity. Therefore, individuality is a feature that things themselves have, it has nothing to do with human understanding.

On the other hand, Locke stresses that his account of individuality as identity and diversity is related to the *ideas* of identity and diversity (Locke, 1995, p.241). By the very first part of the examined chapter, he is clear that identity and diversity are initial ideas, i.e., mental representations that are constructed by the mind itself. The construction of the ideas of identity and diversity is done by the operation of the mind, through which it compares "any existing thing at any determinate time and place" with "itself existing at another time" (Locke, 1995, p.241). In that regard, the identity is grounded in the mind, not the external

objects. Elsewhere, Locke also states that identity is not comprehended by the unity of the substance but by our idea regarding the object of examination (Locke, 1995, p.244); for instance, the identity of material substances depends on the masses of matter that satisfy the idea, or the identity of an oak tree depends on the satisfaction of our idea through a succession of parcels of matter and organization of parts which is called the life of the oak tree (McCann, 1987, p.58; p.67). In any case, the same continued existence, as the object spatiotemporally continued satisfying the idea is what accounts for the continued identity.

All in all, even though it is subtle, the assertion that identity is not a constituent of the object and what makes an object the same as itself is the idea that holds much significance. This can be seen as both philosophical and historical significance; on one hand, the issue of individuality and identity becomes a matter of investigation for endeavours that are related to the mind, rather than the extramental reality, on the other hand, this assertion becomes an important point for philosophers to come such as Immanuel Kant, as it will be seen in the coming sections.

4. THE PROBLEM OF INDIVIDUATION IN KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY

In the late 18th century, the course regarding the history of philosophy changed with one special work that the current study would focus on, namely, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* by Immanuel Kant, whose contributions have been seen as a revolution for philosophy just as Copernicus' contributions received as a revolution in the field of astronomy. Even though, as also pointed out by F. L. Cross (1937), Kant himself did not use the phrase "Copernican revolution", he stresses that his way of philosophizing can be seen as akin to Copernicus' way of thinking (1999, p.110). This is a valid point since his elaborations on concepts such as space, time, object, or causality fundamentally altered the way in which these concepts were understood. Like Copernicus, his views showed that it is imperative to examine the issues from a totally new perspective. Formerly conceived as essential features of extramental reality, these concepts are now understood as having their ground or origin in the mind of the subject, rather than things themselves.

As it will be apparent in future discussions, Kant's understanding, and explanations regarding the concepts such as unity and identity, which were closely related to the discussions on the problem of individuation, as it was shown in the previous sections, also received the same treatment. This separates Kant from the philosophers before him such as Leibniz, Locke, or Suarez. Even though with Locke, the role of the mind in the formation of identity or individuality as an idea, i.e., a representation, was stressed, a close examination would reveal that Kant took the issue to another level. Unfortunately, it is not likely to find an explicit discussion on individuation in Kant's works, however, that did not prevent the scholars from dwelling on the issue (Friebe, 2017; 2022; Howell, 1973; Rubenstein, 2001; Thiel, 1997) since it is possible to find explanations on matters like unity, identity, discernability, which could able the researcher to form an understanding regarding the problem of individuation in Kant's writings. Accordingly, the purpose of this section is to present a coherent account of Kant's views on individuation, by doing so it is aimed to understand how philosophers after Kant, such as Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, might looked at this issue and formed their own thoughts.

As it is generally referred to, Kant's philosophy can be defined as transcendental idealism, according to which all objects of experience are treated as representations. Kant

himself defines his philosophy as opposed to transcendental realism, which is easier to grasp at first look. He explains:

I understand **the transcendental idealism** of all appearances the doctrine that they are together to be regarded as mere representations and not as things in themselves, and accordingly, that space and time are only sensible forms of our intuition, but not determinations given for themselves or conditions of objects as things in themselves. To this idealism is opposed to **transcendental realism**, which regards space and time as something given in themselves (independent of our sensibility). The transcendental realist therefore represents outer appearances (if their reality is conceded) as things in themselves, which would exist independently of us and our sensibility and thus would also be outside us according to pure concepts of the understanding. It is really this transcendental realist who afterwards plays the empirical idealist; and after he has falsely presupposed about objects of the senses that if they are to exist they must have their existence in themselves even apart from sense, he finds that from this point of view all our representations of sense are insufficient to make their reality certain. (Kant, 1999, p.426)

Here it is possible to see that for Kant, all objects of experience are representations, rather than things in themselves. Accordingly, space and time are merely sensible forms of intuitions that are pure and have transcendental ideality, in other words, they reside in the subject; they are nothing if the subjective constitution of the mind is put aside (Kant, 1999, p. 177; p.181). Thus, he claims that the reality of empirical representations is not subject to doubt since they are immediately perceived, they are as they are since what is real for us is what is represented, hence, one must posit that all representation as well as the one who represents exist (p. 426-427), because the world as beyond representation is simply nothing for us (p. 231). On the other hand, transcendental realism would have to adopt some kind of scepticism since it presumes that the objects themselves and how they appear to us must be different due to them having a separate reality from the mind that perceives them (Kant,

1999, p.426). An example of this can be encountered in Locke¹ who claims that objects have primary and secondary qualities; while the former group includes features such as extension and that exist independently from the mind, the latter group includes qualities such as colour, taste and odour which are represented only via sensibility, thus, do not have objective reality (Locke, 1995, p. 85-87).

This said, for the purposes of the current study, it is imperative to ask: How the problem of individuation can be understood in the context of Kant's philosophy of transcendental idealism? It was shown that for pre-Kantian philosophers who dwelled on the problem of individuation, namely, Suarez and Locke in that regard, whatever exists is individual and what accounts for the individual's individuality is its existence; for Suarez, existence was understood as the entity (Suarez, 1982, p.121), the mere act of existing, which gives the unity as indivisibility, and it was the spatio-temporal continued being for Locke (Locke, 1995, p.242). However, from the point of view of a transcendental idealist, whatever exists, exists as an object of experience, as representation. This stresses that all the objects filling the space and time are given to a subject. Since three of the views mentioned above signify the same group of things, namely, the objects of the world around us, they must have some kind of internal connection which must be shown and elaborated on. Therefore, the problem of individuation, and the concepts that are related to it, must be examined in the framework of Kantian philosophy. By doing this, it would be possible to account for a Kantian view of individuation. If we remember the Suarezian account of individuality, we will see that what accounts for an individual's individuality is not its distinction from other individuals but rather the transcendental unity, i.e. the negation of division (Suarez, 1960, p.495-496). Although transcendental unity has many kinds, it can be seen as individual unity for the real things, which are solely the individuals (Suarez, 1982, p. 32), while concepts, universals, or common natures constitute merely formal unities (Suarez, 1960, p.698) that have their ground only in the mind (Suarez, 1960, p. 705). Individual unity, as a kind of transcendental unity, is the inability to be divided into further individuals of the same kind (Suarez, 1982, p.30). In that regard, if one is willing to provide an equivalent of this from a Kantian perspective, one must provide an account that explains how the objects of experience receive their transcendental (therefore, individual) unity. To accomplish such a goal the current study aims to dwell into Kant's writings, focusing on the *Critique of Pure*

¹ See, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Book II, Chapter VIII

Reason as well as other works, however, as it would be seen, there will be an emphasis on examining the sections of *Transcendental Aesthetic* and the second chapter of *Transcendental Analytic, On the deduction of the pure concepts of the understanding*. By doing this, it is aimed to elaborate on the interplay of two fundamental faculties of the human mind, namely, **sensibility** and **understanding**, through which (and also with the aid of the faculty of **imagination**), as the current study claims, the objects of experience receive their unities and rendered as individuals. Accordingly, the initial step must be the explanation of the aforementioned faculties of the human mind in the Kantian sense. When the examination regarding the faculties of sensibility and understanding is complete, it would be possible for the current study to take a step further and present a discussion on the Kantian view of individuation. Let us start with examining the faculty of sensibility.

4.1. The Faculty of Sensibility

For Kant, our mind's capacity (receptivity) to acquire representations by being affected by the objects² is the faculty of sensibility (Kant, 1999, p.155; p. 172). In that regard, the objects must be given to that faculty, therefore, the mind relates to these objects via cognition immediately (Kant, 1999, p.155). The representations of that kind, i.e. representations of the faculty of sensibility, which are cognized immediately, are referred to as *intuitions* (Kant, 1999, p.172). The content of these representations, that which fills the pure forms of sensibility as the given manifold of sensible intuition, in other words, the affections and modifications of the mind, are called *sensations* (Kant, 1999, p.172). The term sensation holds utmost significance for Kantian philosophy in a twofold manner. Firstly, it is the only empirical input of the mind (or the faculty of sensibility in this context); all representations regarding objective reality can somehow be traced back to sensations, i.e. affections of the faculty of sensibility. Secondly, it is the subject's ground for attributing existence to something besides itself, to something that is independent of the mind, i.e. the thing in itself. This latter point is to be explained.

² Here, the word "object" is used in a general manner. As it will be understood later, according to Kant, a representation can be referred to as an object only with a concept that corresponds to it; since an object for a subject is an empirical intuition that is represented under an adequate concept. In this case, since it is only the faculty of sensibility is being elaborated on, the concepts and the faculty of understanding are not considered here. Thus, the term "object" is used to signify that which affects the mind; it is not an object in the proper Kantian sense but a thing that has extramental reality.

As Kant also states in *Prolegomena* (2004, p.66), adopting transcendental idealism as the view according to which all objects of senses are merely representations of the mind as appearances, one must, at the same time, admit that these are appearances of something that has extramental³ reality, i.e., thing in itself. Although we are not acquainted with this thing in itself, i.e., we know nothing about its constitution and are only affected by it by our senses, we can confidently say that it exists (Kant, 2004, p.66). For, the empirical content of our sensible representations cannot be given by the virtue of the mind itself, our mind is receptive in that regard, we only represent the content of our sensible intuitions, i.e. sensations, as far as we are affected (Kant, 1999, p.172). Thus, they are modifications, affections, or alterations of our faculty of sensibility (Kant, 1999, p.161) that must find their source in that which affects the mind. In that regard, since the whole content of our conception of reality is only the alterations of our faculty of sensibility, we cannot know anything about that which affects it other than the fact that it exists. In other words, although we cannot cognize that which transcends our forms of knowledge and our mind itself, we can infer that this something exists since we are affected by it.

The discussion so far is aimed at explaining the content of our intuitive representations, namely, sensations. According to Kant the appearance that corresponds to the sensation is *matter* (Kant, 1999, p.155; p. 172). Although the discussion on the empirical input of the mind as the “real” content of our representations as sensation, i.e. matter, is crucial for the reasons explained above, it is only a partial elaboration on the faculty of sensibility. Besides the empirical side, there lies also a pure, non-empirical, constituent of the faculty of sensibility according to which the matter as sensations, i.e. the manifold of appearance, to be ordered in certain relations, which can be called the *form* of appearances (Kant, 1999, p.173; p. 156). At this point, it is useful to explain what Kant understands when he uses the terms *pure* and *empirical*. As it is stated in *Transcendental Aesthetic*, the term *pure* is used for representations, “in which nothing is to be encountered that belongs to sensation” (Kant, 1999, p.173). Accordingly, a representation (in this case, intuition) is called *empirical* when it “is related to the object through sensation” (Kant, 1999, p.172). For this reason, the form of appearances, in which the manifold of sensible intuition, the matter,

³ The term “extramental” is borrowed from the previous discussions on Suarez. Although it may be contradictory to use spatial terms such as “extra-” or “outside” for speaking about the thing in itself, since, according to Kant, space itself is a pure intuition that finds its origin in the subject, therefore, it has no valid use besides the empirical intuitions, it facilitates the discussion early on for explanatory purposes.

is represented in certain relations, is encountered in the mind *a priori* since they are pure, i.e. devoid of empirical content (Kant, 1999, p.290). On the other hand, all other intuitive representations, the sensation as well as all the appearances as form filled with sensation, are encountered *a posteriori* since they are empirical (Kant, 1999, p.173). The form of appearances is *a priori* in the sense that they do not belong to the experience, rather they provide the possibility of experience (Kant, 1999, p.158; p.175); in that regard, since all the representations that originate in sensibility are called intuitions, the form of sensible representations can be called *pure intuition*, while sensation and appearances as form filled with sensation can be called *empirical intuitions* (Kant, 1999, p.173). That said, the form of appearances, pure intuition, should be further explained. Following *Transcendental Aesthetic*, this goal becomes possible to attain. According to Kant, the science that investigates the principles of *a priori* sensibility is *transcendental aesthetic*. He states:

In transcendental aesthetic, we will therefore first isolate sensibility by separating off everything that the understanding thinks through its concepts, so that nothing but empirical intuition remains. Second, we will then detach from the latter everything that belongs to sensation, so that nothing remains except pure intuition and the mere form of appearances, which is the only thing that sensibility can make available *a priori*. In this investigation, it will be found that there are two pure forms of sensible intuition as principles of *a priori* cognition, namely space and time, with the assessment of which we will now be concerned. (Kant, 1999, p.174)

According to the passage above, the methodology of the science of transcendental aesthetic is to first abstract from the faculty of understanding, thus all the concepts and thought, to isolate the appearances as empirical intuitions, and second to abstract from the empirical content as sensation, the matter of sensibility, to isolate the pure intuition. By doing this, it is possible to investigate the subjective ground, the pure form, of the faculty of sensibility and this pure intuition is revealed to be twofold, namely, consisting of space and time as forms of outer and inner sense respectively (Kant, 1999, p.174). Both outer and inner sense are presented as the properties of the human mind, the former is the ability to represent objects as they are “outside” of us, and all in space, while the latter can be defined as the

capacity that enables the mind to intuit itself, form representations of its inner state (Kant, 1999, p.174). Surely, the mind cannot intuit itself as a total object, as a "soul" for instance (Kant, 1999, p.174). Unlike the outer sense, through which objects are intuited in three-dimensional space in their totality and as thoroughly continuous, the representations of the inner sense are represented only in one dimension, and they are represented as scattered and dispersed (Kant, 1999, p.247). Regardless, the intuitions of inner sense must also be determined to a rule just like all objects of outer sense are intuited in space, what gives this rule is the time as the form of inner sense; "everything that belongs to the inner determinations is represented in relations of time" as Kant puts it (Kant, 1999, p.174). In that regard, a question arises for instructing ourselves about the pure side of the faculty of sensibility: What are space and time?

Beginning with space, Kant first clarifies what space is not. Firstly, space is not an "empirical concept that is abstracted from outer experiences", since to represent something as being outside of me, "i.e., to something in another place in space from that in which I find myself", and to represent objects as distinct from each other, therefore, in different places, the representation of space is required; space must already be grounding all these representations (Kant, 1999, p.174-175). In that regard, the outer experience itself is only possible with the representation of space, not the other way around. Thus, space is a necessary, pure, *a priori* representation (Kant, 1999, p.175). It is necessary in the sense explained above; it is possible to represent space without any object in it, but it is impossible to represent that there is no space. Therefore, it is the "condition of the possibility of appearances, not as a determination dependent on them" (Kant, 1999, p.175). It is pure since it is intuited without empirical content and it is *a priori* as it cannot be derived from outer experience, rather, it precedes and grounds it. Secondly, space is not a discursive or a general concept, but pure intuition (Kant, 1999, p.175). By that, Kant means that space is always represented as singular; although it is possible to speak of different spaces, it is always the many parts or components of a singular, unique, all-encompassing space. Thus, we do not arrive at a general concept from particular, distinct spaces, rather, we regard these spaces as a part of one infinite space (Kant, 1999, p.175).

From these elaborations, it follows that space does not belong to things themselves, rather, it is the form of all appearances of outer sense, it belongs to the subjective constitution of the mind as a condition of the faculty of sensibility that makes outer intuition possible

(Kant, 1999, p.176). One can easily say that space as the condition that grounds outer experience must be given to the mind prior to sensation because no empirical intuition can arise without the affections of sensibility, and these affections as sensations must always be represented as they belong to the external objects (Kant, 1999, p.177). Since that is the case, space is nothing if we consider it apart from “our subjective constitution”, i.e. if we view it as it is belonging to the things in themselves (Kant, 1999, p.177). The objects are represented in space as far as they appear to us, it can only be the condition under which external objects are perceived; space signifies nothing when we consider things in themselves or how things in themselves appear to a different subject that has different subjective conditions. These considerations show both the empirical reality and transcendental ideality of space; it has reality, i.e. objective validity, because it is the condition under which everything comes before us, thus, whatever is "real" is for us, in terms of outer sense, must be in space, it has “transcendental ideality” because it is a pure representation which is a part of our subjective constitution and that which grounds the possibility of all outer experience (Kant, 1999, p.177). On this ground, *a priori* cognition regarding our intuitions and outer experience becomes possible (Kant, 1999, p.178). As the discussions above showed, the intuitions as the output of the faculty of sensibility have a pure and empirical side. Although empirical intuition as sensation, i.e. taste, odour, colour, sound, and texture, as the affections of this faculty are contingent and cannot cognized *a priori*, in other words, they must originate apart from the subject, the pure form of outer intuition as a part of the subjective constitution of our mind has its origin in the subject, thus, cognition regarding it does not require sensation. In that sense, since the form of all outer sense and its empirical intuitions (as form filled with sensation) can be cognized *a priori*, determinations of space, therefore, the concepts that are derived from the space itself, such as the concepts of geometry, can and must be represented *a priori*, furthermore, these representations can be used with apodictic certainty (Kant, 1999, p.178).

When we consider the other pure form of our sensible intuition, namely, time, a similar discussion can also be presented. According to Kant, time is not an empirical concept, that is derived from experience, in that regard, simultaneity and succession cannot be derived from the objects of experience, rather, our representations appear as simultaneous or as succeeding each other because time grounds simultaneity and succession *a priori* (Kant, 1999, p.178). Therefore, time as a representation precedes representing several things at the

same time (simultaneity) or at different times (succession) (Kant, 1999, p.178). Since all appearances are either intuited simultaneously or successive, it must be the case that time is a necessary representation that grounds all intuitions; we cannot represent appearances without time, however, we can represent time without appearances, thus, the representation of time does not require sensation (Kant, 1999, p.179). In that regard, it is a pure representation that is given *a priori*, through which all actuality of appearances is possible (Kant, 1999, p.179). Although the actuality of appearances might disappear, time as their fundamental condition cannot be removed. Furthermore, “time is not a discursive or general concept” that is derived from the experience of different times, but rather a pure form of intuition; “different times are only parts of the one and the same time”; the presupposition that these different times are not simultaneous but only successive cannot be derived from concepts but immediately intuited *a priori* through the representation of time according to Kant (Kant, 1999, p.179).

It follows from the discussion above that time, just like space, is not a determination of extramental reality, in other words, it does not belong to things themselves, it has its origin in the mind of the subject (Kant, 1999, p.180). If the opposite was the case, then it would be "something actual without any actual object", which would be contrary to reason (Kant, 1999, p.180). Moreover, if time belonged to the things themselves, it would be impossible for it to precede objects as a determination and it would be impossible for us to cognize or intuit time *a priori* (Kant, 1999, p.180). However, the latter is the case, as explained, since time is the subjective condition of intuiting, it must be “represented prior to the objects”, thus *a priori* (Kant, 1999, p.180-181).

That said, at the beginning of our discussion on pure forms of sensibility, it was stressed that while space is the form of outer sense, time is the form of inner sense. Since time does not belong to things themselves, and it also does not belong to the outer intuition, i.e. it is not related to shapes, positions, in short spatial properties, it is nothing other than the form of inner sense (Kant, 1999, p.180). It is common to represent the temporal sequence with analogies, for instance, as a line, for, inner intuitions, namely, intuitions regarding ourselves and our inner state, are without shape (Kant, 1999, p.180). Although that is the case, this shows that time is an intuition since all its properties can be represented in the outer sense (Kant, 1999, p.180). The only differences are that firstly, it is one dimensional and secondly, while the parts of the line are intuited simultaneously, parts of time are only

successively (Kant, 1999, p.180). In that regard, initially, it seems that the inner and outer intuition are separated and must be determined by different forms. Even though this is partially the case, Kant asserts that time is the form of all appearances which includes the intuitions of both outer and inner sense (Kant, 1999, p.181). This is because the relation between the inner and outer sense is not mutually exclusive; even though the inner sense excludes space as a form, and includes it as content; it encompasses the outer sense and its intuitions since whatever is given in the outer sense, more precisely all appearances as representations, in the end, are determinations of the mind, thus, they must belong to the inner state, which is determined by the conditions of inner sense, namely, time (Kant, 1999, p.181; p.228). Therefore, by this elaboration, it is revealed that time is the form of all appearances; it is the immediate form of all inner intuition, and it is the mediate form of all outer appearances. Consequently, it can be said that time is the form that includes the form of outer appearances, space, and sensation as well as our inner intuitions which have their origin in our inner state; sensation fills the space and space filled with sensation, fills time.

Just as space is nothing without the subject, when we consider things in themselves, time has also no validity concerning the same condition. If we remove all representation, our intuiting regarding ourselves and our inner state and by that also the outer intuitions, time is nothing (Kant, 1999, p.181). It has objective validity only concerning the objects of our experience since it is the form of all appearances. In that sense, time has empirical reality; all objects of our experience, thus, all intuitions, regardless of them being pure or empirical, must be in time, however, if we abstract from all that is being described above, in other words, if we remove the world as representation that is peculiar for us (humans), and we consider the things themselves, time has no objective validity nor reality, since in that case it would be also absurd to talk about any object whatsoever because there would be no subject that would stand against something which would be an object (Kant, 1999, p.181). This point also reveals the transcendental ideality of time, in the sense that it is the subjective condition of possibility of any intuition and any experience, therefore, if there were no subject it would be impossible and absurd to talk about time.

To sum up Kant's account of the faculty of sensibility, it is the mind's capacity to be receptive, whatever empirical input enters the mind, does it by virtue of this faculty. The discussion above is concerned, with the faculty of understanding and any concept whatsoever is not considered here, the mind is only considered by its receptive element. That

said, as it is stated in the *Transcendental Aesthetic*, the faculty of sensibility can be examined by a division of its representations, namely, pure representations and empirical representations. Since the representations of sensibility are regarded as intuitions, the same statement can be presented for pure intuition and empirical intuition. What Kant has in mind when he says pure or empirical, he uses these adverbs to describe them based on their relationship with sensation. Sensation, as seen before, is the alterations and modifications of our mind, therefore, even though the content of our sensible intuitions are merely representations, in other words, they are produced in the mind, they must find their origin not in the mind but in something that affects the mind, since the mind itself is not capable of producing its own empirical manifold without such an affection. That something is the thing in itself, i.e., about which we can know nothing but only the fact that it exists. In that regard, the representations that are immediately related to sensation, such as the content of our five senses, are called empirical. Consequently, what is not related to sensation in such a manner, therefore, the representations that find their origin solely in the mind of the subject are called pure. Studying the pure side of sensibility is what the science of transcendental aesthetic aims to achieve.

Thus, in the mentioned section of his major work, although he starts from experience itself, Kant first excludes the faculty of understanding and all the concepts and thinking, secondly, he then excludes all the empirical representations, i.e. related to sensation. By doing this, he provides a ground for explaining what can be cognized *a priori*, since what is left is what precedes sensation. When abstracted from understanding and sensation, it is revealed that our pure forms of intuition are space and time. While sensation is the content, i.e. the matter of sensibility, space and time are the forms of this faculty. In other words, whatever is intuited empirically is always in space and time, the mind always represents this content by the rules of these forms.

Although what has been said can be seen as an efficient summary of Kant's account of the faculty of sensibility, one more aspect must be elaborated on for the purposes of the current study, i.e., the concept of manifold. In the context of the faculty of sensibility, a manifold is generally defined as an "unorganized, unstructured flux of data that is presented to senses" (Blackburn, 2005, p.222). It is unorganized and unstructured in the manner that it is devoid of thinking in general, it lacks concepts, thus, it can be described as our experience of the external world that lacks our conceptual structuring of it (Blackburn, 2005, p.222).

However, it is important to underline that without the faculty of understanding and the concepts, experience is impossible. At least for us (humans), whatever is presented before us is apprehended always under a conceptual structure, therefore experience and perception always include both sensibility and understanding (Kant, 1999, 234; p.238). As Heidegger points out in *The Origin of the Work of Art* (2002, p.8), in an experience, we never solely cognize the empirical input, the sound for instance; when we hear a doorbell, we experience a bell that belongs to a door, which someone rings with the purpose of meeting us or entering our house, in other words, we always perceive it in a conceptual structure. In that regard, when we abstract from the faculty of understanding and talk solely on the faculty of sensibility, it is important to note that we are talking about what we have never *experienced*. Thus, the manifold of sensible intuition can be understood as what the mind intuits, as the content of the intuiting, when we speak of sensation or sensibility in general. This manifold, as unstructured and unorganized flux, can be seen as whatever representation, pure or empirical, therefore, the term manifold can be used for sensation as well as pure intuition.

This last point may excite some curiosity since what has been said until now is that while sensation is the content, pure intuition is the form, therefore, it may seem like space and time are completely devoid of any content; it may seem like space and time does not provide any data that can be categorized as a manifold. However, Kant asserts that although they are forms of intuition, they also are intuitions (Kant, 1999, p.154), in other words, they also contain a manifold that is pure (Kant, 1999, p.210); it is also apparent from the fact that he calls space and time pure intuitions. In that regard, they are intuited *a priori* and give the possibility for *a priori* cognition (Kant, 1999, p.157; p. 176; p.180). This assertion would be very crucial for future discussions, but it is possible to shortly elaborate on it. Space and time have a pure manifoldness that enables the mind to go over it, just like it is possible for any manifold, and form concepts and structures out of it which in turn shows the possibility of pure concepts that are formed *a priori* (Kant, 1999, p.210). Since that is the case, the concepts that are formed from pure intuition can acquire apodictic certainty. For instance, the concepts of geometry and arithmetic as concepts that are formed from the pure manifold of space and time, enable us to put forth *synthetic a priori* judgments about the world we live in (Kant, 1999, p.166). However, the pure concepts of the understanding do not end with the concepts of geometry and arithmetic, although they will be dealt with later. Now, since

the examination concerning the faculty of sensibility can be at least considered adequate considering the purposes of our study, we can move on to the faculty of understanding.

4.2. The Faculty of Understanding

As it is stressed above, for us (humans), experience always consists of both sensibility and understanding. Hence, cognition in the proper sense is possible only if our intuitions always accompany our concepts; according to Kant's famous assertion, "Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind", our very capacity to intuit or see is useless if it is without thinking, and our faculty of thinking is also useless without receiving its content from intuition (Kant, 1999, p.193-194). As explained above, sensibility is our mind's capacity to be receptive in terms of forming representations, it is the faculty that makes it possible to receive representations as far as our mind is affected, on the other hand, the other possibility of our mind is spontaneity as the capacity to actively put forth representations, which is called the faculty of understanding (Kant, 1999, p.193). By their very nature, the functions of these two faculties differ dramatically. Neither any thought can arise from sensibility, nor any intuition can arise from the understanding since intuition is represented by receptivity while concepts are represented by spontaneity, thus, it is impossible for these faculties to exchange their functions, only by their unification the cognition in the proper sense is possible (Kant, 1999, p.193-194). However, even though that is the case, one can examine these two faculties, namely sensibility and understanding, separately; their necessity of binary usage does not prevent us from dwelling on the issues related to them, Kant himself warns the reader and states that mixing up the roles of these faculties is a grave mistake and the separate examination of them is crucial (Kant, 1999, p.194). In that regard, while the study of the rules of sensibility was called aesthetic, accordingly, the study of the rules of understanding in general would be called logic. Just as the science of transcendental aesthetic was used to show the pure side of sensibility and the condition of possibility of experience as far as sensibility is concerned, the science of transcendental logic would be used to accomplish the same goal as far as the faculty of understanding is concerned (Kant, 1999, p.194). However, initially, it is important to understand how Kant himself classifies transcendental logic as a science. Thus, his elaboration on logic in general should be stressed.

4.2.1. Transcendental Logic as The Science of Pure Thinking

The science of logic can be subject to a division based on its aims; it is general if it pertains to the general use of the understanding, and it is particular if it pertains to the particular use of the understanding (Kant, 1999, p.194). The particular logic, in that regard, can be seen as consisting of the rules to think on a particular subject correctly, thus, it can be classified as belonging to scholarly use for education in different sciences (Kant, 1999, p.194). However, general logic must include the fundamental rules of thinking, regardless of the differences of objects being thought, therefore, without these rules, it is impossible for the faculty of understanding to accomplish its function (Kant, 1999, p.194). General logic itself can also be divided into pure or applied logic; the latter, although still general, can be understood as the representation of the faculty of understanding *in concreto*, which belongs to the contingent subjective conditions of the mind (Kant, 1999, p.194). It deals with issues such as attention, cause of error, hindrance, and condition of doubt (Kant, 1999, p.195). Shortly, general applied logic can be seen as a field of study in which the subject matter is the thinking subject on action. Therefore, it examines thought under empirical and contingent conditions of the subject (Kant, 1999, p.195). Regardless of this, applied logic still takes the rules to examine the thinking subject *in concreto* from general rules of thinking about an object. On the other hand, general pure logic is abstracted from all empirical conditions, the influence of senses, and prejudice (Kant, 1999, p.194). In other words, general pure logic is devoid of any causes that result in the production of a cognition; therefore, it entails merely the form of the cognition (Kant, 1999, p.194). Whatever pertains to the content is excluded here, not the cognitions themselves but their relations are considered; in that sense, regardless of the quality of the content, it deals strictly with *a priori* principles of the formal use of the understanding (Kant, 1999, p.194). Consequently, general pure logic is the canon of the understanding, firstly it is general since "it abstracts from all contents of the cognition the understanding and of the difference of its objects, and has to do with nothing but the mere form of thinking" and secondly, it is pure since "it has no empirical principles, thus it draws nothing from psychology (as one has occasionally been persuaded)" (Kant, 1999, p.195); even though it is devoid of content and lacks fruitfulness, according to Kant it is the science proper. In that sense, he would refer to general pure logic as general logic from this point forward (Kant, 1999, p.194-195).

Now, another division must be made for general (and pure) logic, namely, into analytic and dialectic. For Kant, this division is closely related to our understanding of truth. It is generally accepted that truth is defined by the agreement between the cognition and the object, however, as also it would be apparent in the coming discussions, since logic does not pertain to the content of the cognition but the form, it can only give the certain criteria for the truth regardless of the object (Kant, 1999, p. 197). Since truth is the agreement between the cognition and the object, and logic abstracts from all the content of the cognition even though truth concerns specifically this content, it would be impossible for logic to say anything positive about the truth of a cognition (Kant, 1999, p. 197). For instance, in that case, logic cannot tell us which cognitions are false or which of them are true, rather, it can only give us the conditions under which the truth of a cognition is possible (Kant, 1999, p. 197). Logic, as concerning the mere form of cognition, therefore, is capable of only presenting general criteria of truth by pertaining to the general and necessary rules of understanding, i.e. of thinking in general, can only help to identify that which is false by showing that it contradicts these general and necessary rules (Kant, 1999, p. 197). The opposite only shows the possibility of truth; for instance, although cognition is in accord with these rules, it can still be false, since there is nothing regarding the content has been examined (Kant, 1999, p. 197-198). In that regard, Kant states that:

The merely logical criterion of truth, namely the agreement of a cognition with the general and formal laws of understanding and reason, is therefore certainly the *conditio sine qua non* and thus the negative condition of all truth; further, however, logic cannot go, and the error that concerns not form but content cannot be discovered any touchstone of logic. (Kant, 1999, p. 198)

General logic separates each component of the entire formal structure of the faculty of understanding, in other words, it analyses thought regarding the form of cognition and presents its principles and rules as the negative criteria of truth, according to which the truth of cognition becomes possible, thus, this part of the general logic can be called an analytic (Kant, 1999, p. 198). Whatever is the case, one must first examine these rules as the form of all cognition before one investigates the content, the matter, of the cognition, by which accounting for the truth of a cognition positively is enabled (Kant, 1999, p. 198). It is very

crucial to keep in mind that distinction, since, according to Kant, it would be a very profound mistake to infer truth positively, concerning its content, by using general logic, which pertains merely to the form of cognition as the negative criteria of truth (Kant, 1999, p. 198). Although that is the case Kant states many feel inclined to do so since they are seduced by this misuse. He stresses this by stating that using general logic, which is initially a canon for judging, should not be used as an organon for the actual production of objective assertions; he characterized this sort of misuse of general logic as dialectic, the logic of illusion (Kant, 1999, p. 198). In that regard, Kant's use the term "dialectic" as a form of sophistry, which consists of the misuse of general logic as an organon, as a tool to judge the truthfulness of cognitions or propositions positively, i.e. in terms of their content, even though general logic itself has nothing to do with the content but pertains to merely the form of cognitions, thus, only provides the formal criteria for the truth (Kant, 1999, p. 198). Although "dialectic" as "critique of dialectical illusion" holds a significant position in the science of logic for Kant (Kant, 1999, p. 199), for the purposes of the current study, it would be best to only warn about this distinction and special use of the term and move on with the discussion on transcendental logic.

According to Kant, the science of transcendental logic can be understood as general logic with special content (Kant, 1999, p. 196). As explained above, general logic itself is devoid of any content, it consists of formal rules of thinking in general and, thus, applicable to any type of content regardless of whether it is pure or empirical, however, although a detailed examination is necessary, transcendental logic can be shortly explained by stating that it is the general logic with pure content, namely, pure thinking (Kant, 1999, p. 196). Previously, it was explained that the intuitions, which give the content for thought, can be either pure or empirical. In that regard, thinking can also acquire its content as pure or empirical. Therefore, there would be a type of logic that merely examines thought with pure content, excluding all empirical thinking in the process; this type of logic is described as transcendental logic by Kant (Kant, 1999, p. 196). Although this can be seen as a narrow explanation, Kant's usage of the term "transcendental" here should be elaborated on, which would enable us to have a clearer comprehension in terms of understanding both transcendental aesthetic and transcendental logic.

Kant stresses that he is not using the term "transcendental" to imply all *a priori* cognition (Kant, 1999, p. 196). He explains:

And here I make a remark the import of which extends to all of the following considerations, and that we must keep well in view, namely that not every *a priori* cognition must be called transcendental, but only that by means of which we cognize and how certain representations (intuitions or concepts) are applied entirely *a priori*, or are possible (i.e., the possibility of cognition or its use *a priori*). Hence neither space nor any geometrical determination of it *a priori* is a transcendental representation, but only the cognition that these representations are not of empirical origin at all and the possibility they can nevertheless be related *a priori* to objects of experience can be called transcendental. (Kant, 1999, p. 196)

As seen above, the term “transcendental” does not imply anything in terms of the relationship between cognition and the object, rather, it belongs to the “critique of the cognition”; when a cognition tells that certain representations can be applied *a priori*, or it shows the possibility of *a priori* cognition, it can be called transcendental (Kant, 1999, p. 196). In that regard, the science of transcendental aesthetic is called such not because it dwells on transcendental representations, rather, it gives us cognitions regarding the pure side of sensibility, in other words, it shows that the faculty of sensibility also contains space and time as pure representations which originated in the mind. This in turn shows the possibility of formation of *a priori* concepts that are derived from the pure manifoldness of space and time and, thus, can show that these representations may provide a ground for *a priori* cognition. Following this framework, then, transcendental logic would be expected to show the possibility of *a priori* cognition in terms of the faculty of understanding, thus, it must show the possibility of applying concepts of objects *a priori*. This can be explained as follows; whatever is given in empirical intuition, i.e., sensation, fills the pure manifoldness of space and time, space and time are pure forms of sensible intuitions that originate in the mind, and they also provide a manifold that is pure, therefore, when there are concepts which are formed from this pure manifoldness, through these concepts, *a priori* cognition becomes possible since these concepts’ objective validity stems from the fact that whatever object is given, it is given in space and time. Transcendental logic is “transcendental” since it can show this possibility.

As was the case in the transcendental aesthetic in the manner of isolating the faculty of sensibility, in a transcendental logic, the faculty of understanding is isolated and the aim is to uncover the possibility of pure cognition, i.e., the part of our thinking that finds its origin solely in the understanding. Since transcendental logic is the general logic with pure content, namely, the thinking which receives its content from the manifoldness of space and time, and this pure content is the form of all intuitions, the pure concepts of the understanding as the point of interest of transcendental logic, provides the form of all our thinking. Because whatever intuitions fill space and time as their form, must be thought in accordance with the concepts that are formed from the representations of space and time. In that regard, the pure concepts of understanding are the form of all thinking of objects. Now, the focus of transcendental logic, in general, is these pure concepts of understanding as also pure cognitions.

Just as general logic is divided into analytic and dialectic, accordingly, transcendental logic can also be divided into transcendental analytic and transcendental dialectic (Kant, 1999, p. 199). The part that examines the elements of pure cognition, as explained above, and the principles without which we cannot think of any object at all is the transcendental analytic; Kant also calls transcendental analytic “logic of truth” since it provides the rules and principles for thinking objects of experience, being true and contradicting these rules and principles is mutually exclusive (Kant, 1999, p. 199). However, there is also a non-legitimate use of these rules, stretching their applicability even beyond experience, which is the sole element that can provide thinking its material content, the objects, to which these pure concepts can be applied (Kant, 1999, p. 200). Using these rules in such a manner, namely, using merely formal principles as material principles is called dialectical (Kant, 1999, p. 200).

4.2.2. The Transcendental Analytic, Table of Judgements and Categories as the Pure Concepts of the Understanding

Kant explains transcendental analytic as the analysis of our *a priori* cognition into its elements, consequently, the primary concern is the pure concepts of the understanding, as they belong solely to the understanding and as the smallest units of our *a priori* cognition, they are “elementary concepts” that from which all others either derived or consist of a composition of them (Kant, 1999, p. 201). They are as they are since they “exhaust” the entirety of the pure understanding, in other words, they cannot be more or cannot be less in

number (Kant, 1999, p. 201). Thus, an investigation as such cannot be accounted for in an arbitrary manner, rather, it is only possible by an “idea of a whole”, which expresses the interconnectedness of these concepts and the unity that is shared in their content (Kant, 1999, p. 201). This said, what Kant plans to achieve is the analysis of the faculty of understanding itself, by doing this it would be possible to find *a priori* concepts in the understanding as their place of origin (Kant, 1999, p. 202). It differs from the usual logical treatment of concepts which has been done in the field of philosophy in general, rather, as the proper method of transcendental philosophy, Kant aims to show how the predisposition of the human mind enables such *a priori* cognition to arise from the first seeds to fully developed pure concepts of the understanding (Kant, 1999, p. 202).

So far, it is said that the faculty of understanding only is not a faculty of intuition and receptivity but rather a faculty of thinking and spontaneity, moreover, the science that would uncover its pure domain was explained in detail. The faculty of understanding is a nonsensible faculty of cognition, however, at least for us humans, a different kind of cognition, namely, not intuitive cognition but cognition through concepts, is also possible (Kant, 1999, p. 205). Since the intuitions arise from receptibility, they rest on affections, on the other hand, since all concepts arise from spontaneity, they rest on functions. According to Kant, this function is defined as “the unity of action of ordering different representations under a common one”, thus the spontaneity of thinking functions through uniting different representations in a common representation, by doing which, understanding equips itself with tools for judging, since concepts have no other use (Kant, 1999, p. 205). In that regard, the faculty of understanding can be viewed as a faculty for judging and when abstracted from all content, either pure or empirical, in those judgements, one might trace all actions of the understanding to its most basic functions (Kant, 1999, p. 206). If that is done, namely, merely the form of the understanding concerned, the function of thinking can be studied under four titles, each of which has its own three moments. These are Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Modality respectively; these moments account for the twelve functions of thinking without any reference to any content whatsoever (Kant, 1999, p. 206). Therefore, these twelve modes of the function of the understanding, which is putting different representations together and uniting them in the concept, also present the roots of the categories, since they can be seen as a production of these functions, that are put forth by the synthesis of the pure manifold of space and time. Now although it is possible to find logical explanations regarding each of

these functions, Kant does not dwell on the issue that why they are in that number; they are the basic functions of our thinking, not one more and not one less, since, as we have stated above, the understanding is "completely exhausted and its capacity entirely measured" by these functions (Kant, 1999, p. 205).

As seen from the discussions above, the main difference between general logic and transcendental logic was based on their position regarding the content of thinking. General logic, as the science of mere forms of thinking, pertains to thinking without any content whatsoever, therefore, it can be said that the functions of judgements, or thinking as Kant would also say, as the most basic forms of thinking, are what the general logic was aiming to achieve and provide. On the contrary, transcendental logic, as the science that aims to show the ground for *a priori* thinking of objects, has its content, a pure manifold that is provided by the transcendental aesthetic, thus, lies before it *a priori*, from which it can account for the pure concepts of the understanding; if that was not the case, then, these concepts would lack their matter, thus, would be empty (Kant, 1999, p. 210). Although this pure manifold, the manifold of space and time, initially lies in sensibility, therefore, receptibility, the concepts that are derived from them nonetheless must belong to the spontaneity of the mind, therefore, this manifold must be worked on by an operation of the mind, namely, it must "first be gone through, taken up, and combined in a certain way in order for a cognition to be made out of it" (Kant, 1999, p. 210). This operation or action is called synthesis (Kant, 1999, p. 210).

According to Kant, synthesis, "in the most general sense" is the action of putting various representations together and making a cognition out of them which comprehends the manifold of these separate representations (Kant, 1999, p. 210). When the concerned manifold is empirical, i.e., directly related to sensation, the synthesis can be called empirical, on the contrary, it can be considered as a pure synthesis, if the manifold given for a synthesis is given *a priori*, as in the case of pure manifoldness of space and time (Kant, 1999, p. 210). Since for Kant, the cornerstones for human cognition are all in a synthetic structure, thus, in need of analysis, the result of a synthesis of this manifold is initially "raw and confused" and even though that is the case, it is this cognition that we start from, in which elements for a cognition are collected and synthetically unified into the content of our thinking (Kant, 1999, p. 210-211). Even though this action, namely, synthesis, is what makes pure concepts of understanding possible, the faculty of understanding is not the only capacity of the mind that

is responsible for it. The synthesis in general is the mere operation of the faculty of imagination, it works blindly, combining and putting together representations, nevertheless, it is a crucial operation for our cognitions since without it no cognition is possible (Kant, 1999, p. 211). It is blind since the operations of the imagination are very rarely consciously perceived, the mere act of putting together is, therefore, done by this faculty, however, we also need unity to be given to these representations that are put together by the imagination, this unity is given by the understanding in the concept; only uniting the manifold of intuition, pure intuition in this case, in the concept is the cognition in the proper sense (Kant, 1999, p. 211).

Now, according to transcendental logic, in order to have pure concepts of the understanding that provide us with a ground for *a priori* cognition of objects, we first need a pure manifold of intuition that is given *a priori*, as shown in the transcendental aesthetic, this is provided by the pure forms of sensible intuitions, namely, space and time, secondly, this manifold should be gone through, taken up and put together by the synthesis of the imagination. Even this is not enough since although the manifold is put together, it does not yield a cognition in the proper sense, because it requires one more step. The last step is uniting by the faculty of understanding what is put together by the faculty of imagination, therefore, thirdly, we need concepts to give this “pure synthesis” a unity, which depends solely on the understanding. What unifies certain representations in a judgement, namely, what is represented by the copula in judgements and propositions is the same function that gives unity to the manifold of intuition (Kant, 1999, p. 251). Therefore, the faculty of understanding, when abstracted from all content, appeared to us a faculty of judging, and its most basic functions appeared to be the twelve modes of thinking. Consequently, when these twelve modes of thinking as the most basic functions in all possible judgments, which exhausts all of the understanding, acquire their content from the pure manifoldness of space and time, which express the conditions of possibility of all givenness of objects, there arise categories as pure concepts of the understanding, which express the rules of thinking of all possible objects since the pure manifoldness is united in them. Hence, it seems that this is why, according to Kant, “the categories are nothing other than these very functions for judging” (Kant, 1999, p. 252).

This hopefully marks our elaboration on the faculty of understanding nearly complete. Even though a much more comprehensive account can be presented, the aim of the current

study seems to be attained in terms of explaining the faculties of sensibility and understanding. Now, it is imperative to dwell on the interplay between these two faculties and the faculty of imagination to present a Kantian account of individuation, which is the main purpose of the current section.

4.3. Kantian View of Individuation

As mentioned in the sections above, Kant himself does not discuss the problem of individuation, hence, the *principium individuationis*, explicitly. However, scholarly debate on this issue provides us with secondary literature that might help us to find guidance (Friebe, 2017; 2022; Rubenstein, 2001). The desirable way of elaborating on a Kantian view of individuation seems to consider this body of research first, finding out the basic premises and discussing them to understand what has been said and then presenting an original account by also addressing what was missing in those discussions. Moreover, it is crucial to find support for the view of the current study by relying on Kant's writings as much as possible.

Most of the studies that are conducted on the principle of individuation in Kant's philosophy investigate the issue by comparing Kant's views with Leibniz' (Friebe, 2017; 2022; Rubenstein, 2001; Thiel, 1997). This is due to the passage in the *Appendix On the amphiboly of the concepts of reflection through the confusion of the empirical use of the understanding with the transcendental* (A264-B320) which discusses the identity and difference, while answering Leibniz regarding related issues with identity and difference, such as numerical difference and non-discernibility (1999, p.368-389). Regarding that passage, Kant seems as if he suggests that space is the principle of individuation of outer objects of experience, at least this is the interpretation of certain scholars. However, Kant actually states that the difference of places is the ground for the numerical difference of appearances (1999, p.368). Thus, it can also be said that he stresses the principle of diversity, this does not necessarily account for individuation. Kant appears to stress this by criticizing and rejecting the *principium identitatis indiscernibilium* (1999, p.368-389), which is a principle that is put forth by Gottfried Leibniz (1918, p.111; 1989, p.32.). Before examining this passage in more detail and discussing the views of different scholars on this debate, it seems imperative to first present what Leibniz thought of individuation in general. Although it would be impossible to discuss this topic in a manner that would provide the details which

it deserves, it seems crucial for the current study to at least briefly discuss the Leibnizian view of individuation.

4.3.1. Leibniz' Views on the *principium individuationis*

It would not be an over-exaggeration to state that the problem of individuation is central to Leibniz's philosophical career. As will be seen, both his early period and mature philosophy focus on the issues that are closely linked with individuality. To understand Leibniz's views, it is first aimed to examine his dissertation *Disputatio Metaphysica De Principio Individui* and then briefly outline his position towards the problem of individuation in his later works. Unfortunately, the English translation of the text is lacking, therefore, in the current section, the elaboration of the matter cannot be attained through the original text. However, thanks to the works of Laurence B. McCullough (1994; 1996), it is possible to have a fair understanding of Leibniz's position regarding the issue in his early years. McCullough dedicated the first half of his book, *Leibniz on Individuals and Individuation* (1996), and the chapter he wrote for a book titled *Individuation and Identity in Early Modern Philosophy: Descartes to Kant*, to *Disputatio Metaphysica De Principio Individui* (1994), hence, it is possible to use these works as the basis for our purposes. Moreover, although he did not translate the whole work, McCullough translated some of the crucial parts in the text, which would help us to use them as the foundation as much as possible.

4.3.1.1. Leibniz's early views in *Disputatio*

In the opening sections, Leibniz first explains what he understands from the principle of individuation; he stresses that both the terms “principle” and “individual” can be understood in many ways (as translated in McCullough, 1996, p.22). Firstly, he distinguishes two senses of the “individual”: namely, metaphysical, and logical; The metaphysical account of the individual is stressed as "according to the thing", also called "fundamentally" speaking on the individual, on the other hand, logical account of the individual can be stressed as “according to the concept” or “formally” (p.22-23) speaking on the individual. Secondly, the term “principle” can be understood as the principle of knowing or the principle of being, however, it seems that the former is not what Leibniz is interested in this early work since he continues his account by talking about the principle of being; this is also evident from his explanation which states that he would treat the principle of individuation as a “physical principle” (p.23). In that sense, about the term "individual", it seems as if Leibniz is using the metaphysical account of the individual, which is understood according to actual things,

not their concepts, while he is also using the term "principle" in the sense of the principle of being. Hence, he seems as if he gives more importance to these accounts since he states that what grounds the formal notion in the mind is the actual things (p.23).

After clarifying his understanding of the principle of individuation, in the third section, Leibniz lays out the possible theories of individuation (p.23). First, he divides them into two groups; on one hand, there are ones, like Scotus, defending that the principle is the same for all individuals (in Scotus' case, "thisness") and on the other hand, there are ones that claim that principle can be different according to the kind of the substance (p.23). Secondly, Leibniz stresses that he is only going to discuss "general opinions", therefore, he would hold back from discussing material and immaterial substances separately (p.23). That said, he begins to mention the possible candidates that are in the first group regarding the principle of individuation; it is important to remember that all these candidates are metaphysical principles that explain individuals according to the actual things and in themselves, they pertain to all individuals regardless of them being different kinds of substances (p.23). He states:

The principle of individuation is taken to be either *the whole entity* (1), or not the whole entity. Less-than-whole entity is expressed either by *negation* (2), or by something positive. Concerning the positive sense of less-than-whole entity, one may take one of two views: (3) there is a physical part of the individual that terminates its essence, *existence*; or (4) a metaphysical part that terminates species, *haecceity*. (as translated in, McCullough, 1996, p.23)

The first candidate as the whole entity is what Leibniz would eventually adopt as the principle of individuation (p.100). This assertion and the criticisms of other philosophers in the *Disputatio* in general seem very Suarezian in that regard. Before explaining the whole entity as the principle of individuation, it is crucial to initially lay out Leibniz's criticisms towards the other candidates. It is possible to see branches of possible explanations from the above-mentioned quotation. If the principle is not the whole entity, then it must be less than the entity itself. Then it must be something either positive or negative, in the latter case it is negation. If it is not a negation, then something that is a less-than-whole entity must be positive, an addition. If this addition is viewed as something added to the essence, we find

existence as a possible candidate. However, if we view this addition as something added to the species, then, we see thisness as another candidate.

Let us start with the negation. This appears as an odd candidate since in the beginning Leibniz stressed that the principle of individuation must be intrinsic to the individuals, therefore, it cannot be related to the human mind. However, negation can be seen as an act of the human mind itself. In that regard, it seems obscure to speak of it as a proper candidate. This obscurity is also recognized by Leibniz himself since he explicitly states that he doubts if any person is defending it as the principle (p.37). According to McCullough (1996, p.38) the mentioning of negation as a candidate, results from the fact that the Scotist literature discusses it frequently, however, it seems that even in those texts, negation is mentioned only to be rejected, rather than defended or attributed to some other philosopher. Dun Scotus' understanding of negation as the principle of individuation is that being one is indivision and indivisibility is a negation, thus, individuation must occur by negation⁴; as he states "One' means indivision; 'indivision' means negation. Therefore, through nothing positive is an individual individuated" (as translated in McCullough, 1994, p.207). Another account belongs to Ramoneda⁵, according to which negation as the principle seems to be related to an individual's indivision from itself and distinction from others, these two features are seen as a double negation; first, it is the individual's negation of division from itself, second, it is its negation of identity with others (as translated in McCullough, 1994, p.207). As presented in the 11th section of *Disputatio*, Leibniz's own understanding of negation as the principle is similar. He states that the ones who hold this view claim negation individuate the individual from *summum genus*, the most general genus, to *infima species*, the narrowest species, by determination of differences, i.e. the negation of identity; the descension, hence determination, is complete where there is no possibility for further division (as translated in McCullough, 1996, p.37). That said, in section 12, Leibniz also discusses his criticism, according to which negation of division and negation of identity with others are features that are positive determinations of the individual, in that sense, they are perfections so they cannot be perceived as negations (p.37-38). Accordingly, Leibniz holds that a being that posits its reality cannot be constituted by a negative being since from a certain point of view

⁴ See Johannes Duns Scotus, *Reportata Parisiensia*, II, distinction 12, question 6, Part I, p. 329b: "Unum dicit indivisionem, indivisio negationem, igitur per nihil positivum individuat."

⁵ See Christian de Ramoneda, *Commentaria in libellum de ente et essentia Divus Thomae Aquinatis*. Perpignan: Sanson Arbus, 1596, *Disputatio de materia*, article 3, p. 380

“every negation is of something positive” (p.38). For instance, if Socrates and Plato are two distinct individuals and we hold that negation is the principle of individuation, then the principle of Socrates would be the negation of Plato and the reverse would be also the case, however, this would be absurd since we would still see that “there will be something positive” on which we can stand, in other words, there would be still two real distinct individuals which are positing their reality (p.38). Socrates cannot be constituted by the negation of Plato or the reverse, rather, there must be something intrinsic to each of them which constitutes their unity, and consequently, their distinctness.

Haecceity (thisness) is the second candidate that Leibniz criticizes. As also mentioned in the section on Suarez, according to Scotists, two unities constitute the individual, first, there is a common nature, the unity of species, which is identical in every member of the same species, and on the other hand, there is haecceity or thisness, which is added to the common nature and unique for each individual, hence, the individual is individuated by it; this is also explained as the contraction of the common nature. For Leibniz, Scotists were "extreme realists" regarding the universals; he claimed that Scotists believed that the universals have objective, extramental reality (as translated in McCullough, 1996, p. 56), moreover, they defend that each species is differentiated from the genus by difference, following that, all individuals are also distinguished from the species by numerical difference (p.56). He attacks the Scotist doctrine from various perspectives, however, all his attacks are based on denying the existence of common natures outside of the mind. He presents his account in seven counterarguments. The first argument is directed to the Scotist premise that every unity follows some entity, in that regard, the unity of the individual must follow the numerical entity, however, the entity, or we can say existence, of the individual is not included in the species itself, therefore, it must be something distinct from the species that are added to it (p.60). Leibniz replies to this premise by stating that unity and entity can be separated only conceptually, thus, the premise at hand can be seen as accountable only in concept (p.60). He claims that first, the entity and the unity of the individual are inseparable, they are the same, in the individual thing itself, second, the entity of the individual and the entity of the species is also inseparable in the thing (p.60). His other counterarguments are as follows:

II. Species is not contracted either through form or through matter, or through accidents, etc. Therefore, there remains haecceity. I answer that it is contracted through nothing, because there is no [species] outside the mind.

III. Those things that differ do so through something already diverse. Thus, Socrates and Plato [differ] through some ultimate difference, namely haecceity. I answer: "Those things that differ ... " must be qualified, by adding: "unless they are themselves already diverse and differ from themselves through something [already diverse]," etc. Hence, I deny the minor.

IV. Species contracts genus through specific difference. Therefore, the individual [contracts] species through numerical difference. I answer by denying the antecedent as true outside the mind.

V. From Fonseca (l.c.): Individuals under some nature are univocal. Therefore, they include something already diverse. I answer as before.

VI. Similarly: The individual exceeds the species through difference. Therefore, there is such a difference. I respond as before.

VII. From Bassolis: Specific nature of itself has less than numerical unity, and really has a unity other than numerical unity. Therefore, [there is a numerical unity]. I respond by denying the antecedent. The proof will be given later. (as translated in McCullough, 1996, p.60-61)

As seen above, Leibniz, mentions Scotist arguments and rejects each of them. Although he presents his account in seven arguments, most of them are based on his rejection of the reality of the common natures outside of the mind. It can be summarized that he first rejects common natures as real entities, and then he also hints at his understanding of the principle of individuation by stating that each individual is already

distinct from the others without the requirement of an addition. In that regard, if all individuals' unities and entities are one and the same in extramental reality, namely, in the thing, and if the individuals are already distinct from each other, all discussions on common natures become merely conceptual discussions. Even though it can be accepted that species are differentiated from the genus, and they are themselves differentiated by individuals, it can be only a matter of mental consideration. Accordingly, in reality, outside of the mind, the search for some feature that makes individuals from the same species distinct by an addition to the common nature becomes redundant since what is regarded as species or common nature is simply non-existent.

Among the candidates mentioned before, existence remains to be discussed. His account of existence as the principle of individuation is initially simple to grasp; it is either absurd to defend it as a principle or it coincides with Leibniz's own view. This is based on how the relationship between the essence and existence is understood, the existence and essence are either can be separated in actuality or merely conceptually. As he states in the 14th section:

But this [position] can be taken in two ways. In one way, existence might be some real mode, intrinsically individuating the thing and distinct *a parte rei* from its essence. If this is the case, it can by no means be defended, as will become clear shortly. But, if [existence] differs only mentally from essence, [this position] agrees uncommonly well with us. (as translated in McCullough, 1996, p.46)

Since he accepts the latter, his critique of the former should be examined. In the following section, he stresses that if essence and existence can be separated in reality, one must admit the claim that essence can exist apart from existence, which is problematic (p.47). Even though the refutation by *reductio ad absurdum* seems to be complete, he goes on to dwell on the obscure possibility. If the separation is even attainable, then the essence must be a real thing or nothing, following that, if essence is nothing, it is not in the created things, which is absurd for Leibniz (p.47). On the other hand, if essence is a real thing, then it follows that it is either "purely potential" or it is actual (p.47). The latter cannot be the case since it was accepted that it was separated from existence, by only which something can become actual, therefore, following this reasoning, essence must have a purely potential being (p.47).

However, in readings of Aristotle, pure potentiality is equated with prime matter (Robinson, 1974, p.168), in that regard, the essential part of a composite becomes the matter. For instance, the essence of a human being becomes the numerical matter that constitutes him/her. If that is the case, all specific difference becomes impossible since what accounts for the specific difference is the form of the composite. In other words, if essence is pure potentiality and pure potentiality is prime matter, then the specific distinction between a “brute” and a “human being” becomes unattainable, because it is the form that determines the matter in a composite that can be seen as of a certain species according to the essence of that certain thing (p.47). Consequently, since it leads to absurd conclusions, the premise that essence and existence can be separated is rejected by Leibniz. This in turn leads us to consider that existence and essence cannot be separated in reality but they can only be separated mentally. If that is the case, then, we arrive at the view that Leibniz adopts. Existence, as understood correctly, can be the principle of individuation, since for Leibniz, what constitutes the individual’s individuality is its whole entity.

This naturally brings us to the view that Leibniz adopts in his *Disputatio*, which defends that the principle of individuation of individual substances is their whole entity. Even though he states his view as early as the 4th section, the order of elaborations was changed to facilitate the understanding of the relationships between different views. In the 4th section, Leibniz states:

The first opinion, because it is held by the most distinguished men and removes all difficulties [that pertain to the rejected candidates], will be adopted by us, the confirmation of which furnishes, as it were, a general argument against the remaining views. Therefore, I maintain: every individual is individuated by its whole entity. (as translated in McCullough, 1996, p.100)

Leibniz presents five arguments that support his view, however, it would be satisfactory to understand only the first argument in the purpose of the current study, since elaborating on the other arguments may lead an entire discussion on universals and singulars and requires elaboration on the context of discussing them in the scholastic tradition, which would surpass the extent of this section. The first argument shares parallels with Suarez's understanding that the principle of individuation is existence if correctly understood, as an

entity. Leibniz's addition of the term "whole" seems to stress that there is nothing that needs to be added to the entity itself. Leibniz states that "by means of which something is, by means of it that something is one in number" (as translated in McCullough, p.101). That explanation, in a manner, equates being with being one. Since the being of a thing is only possible by its entity, then it must follow that the ground of the individual unity of the thing, hence, its unity in itself and consequently its distinction from others, is its entity (p.101). This indicates that, for Leibniz, nature is already individuated, since each individual has their unique nature and determination (p.102). Since indivisibility is already given by mere existence, as understood as the entity, of the thing, nature does not need any addition for individuating, it is already individuated. Hence, the common nature and haecceity are immediately out of the picture. As a result, since there is nothing common *in re*, nature is already individuated in the individual and must be unique to it and only by abstraction, an operation of the human mind, it is possible to gather these unique individuals, "compare their natures", and regard them under the same, "indifferent" concept due to their similarities; what is common in things is only attainable with the operation of the human mind, in other words, the common natures or species have reality only in the mind, through concepts (p.102). The case is the same for the accidents of the individual substances, as in each individual substance, nature is individuated by its whole entity, and each accident of that individual substance is also individuated by its whole entity. Thus, according to the view that Leibniz holds in the *Disputatio*, finite individual substances are as such by their whole entity, and every feature of every individual substance is thereby also their intrinsic determination. As it will be seen in his later works such as *Monadology* (1918, p.250), this indicates that each individual is unique, and commonness does not exist among things but only in the mind.

4.3.1.2. *Leibniz's mature views*

Right after his *Disputatio*, Leibniz's understanding seems to be shifting dramatically. McCullough (1994, p.211; 1996, p.134) asserts that this shift can be understood from a static to a dynamic model of individuals. This change from static to dynamic is indicated by his

views in *De Transubstantiatione*, which can be dated back to 1668, which is only five years later from Leibniz's *Disputatio*. In *De Transubstantiatione*⁶, Leibniz states:

1. Substance is a being which subsists in itself.
2. Being which subsists in itself is that which has the principle of action in it.
3. Whatever has the principle of action in it, if it is a body, has the principle of motion in it.
4. No body, cut off from a concurrent mind, has the principle of motion in it.
5. Therefore, no body, taken as cut off from a concurrent mind, is a substance.

(as translated in McCullough, 1996, p.134)

According to the reasoning presented above, substance is understood as that which subsists in itself, and this in turn requires the self-activity of that thing. Then, it follows that the mind, not the body, is the substance proper. This is a significant turn in Leibniz's career since it shows the ground of his mature metaphysics. In that regard, McCullough seems to be right indeed, since according to the previous views of Leibniz, whatever exists is individual and it is as such by its whole entity, although the individual substance can go through accidental change, what accounts for its individuality is what remains the same, its entity. In other words, the individual substance has unity as indivisibility, hence, diversity from other individuals, as long as it exists. However, even though Leibniz keeps his main views, what is controversial in his later perspective is his claim that subsisting, hence entity, is only possible with an internal "principle of action" (p.134). Then, it follows that the individual substance, previously understood as the self-individuated *nature* that is unique to the individual, is now seen as that which subsists through its internal principle of *action*. Thus, the intention of the term individual shifts dramatically, following that shift in the definition, the extension of the term also changes. What was understood as substances in general, encompassing both material and immaterial as Leibniz stated in the beginning

⁶ See source: Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, "De Transubstantiatione," in Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, *Siimtliche Schriftenund Briefe*, Sechste Reihe, Erster Band (Darmstadt, Germany: Otto Reichl Verlag, 1930), pp. 508-513.

sections of *Disputatio* (p.23), is now taken as only immaterial according to the reasoning in *De Transubstantiatione*. Accordingly, in *Monadology* (1918), which can be seen as a summary of Leibniz's philosophy, Leibniz uses the term “monad” to explain entities which are simple, immaterial, individual substances (p. 249). Although there is much controversy about the monads and Leibniz's metaphysics in general, it would be helpful to briefly explain them and have a general understanding of Leibniz's mature philosophy to comprehend and discuss its fundamental principles, one of them being *principium identitatis indiscernibilium*, which would be our primary focus to clarify the discussions of individuation in Kant's philosophy.

In *Monadology*, he states that monads are the building blocks of the universe, as simple substances (Leibniz, 1918, p.249). There must be simple substances due to the existence of composite ones, and these composites must be the result of the aggregation of the simple substances, in that sense, monads are perceived as “true atoms of nature” or “the elements of things” (Leibniz, 1918, p.249). However, what differentiates them from atoms is that the monads are immaterial, therefore, they do not take any part from extension, hence spatial relationships. In that regard, it seems that his views are open to criticism⁷ since they beg the question of how things which do not occupy space can be aggregated in the first place, moreover, in accordance with Kant's criticism (Kant, 1999, p.373-374) it can be said that phrases such as *inside the monad* or *outside of the monad* seem contradictory for the same reason, although Leibniz frequently uses them. Nonetheless, this is the picture he draws in *Monadology*. In that regard, all coming to be and passing away can be understood as gradual aggregation and decumulation of simple substances in the composites, however, only simple substances concerned, coming to existence and vanishing must be instant, since they are not composites; as Leibniz states: “monad can begin only through creation and end only through annihilation” (Leibniz, 1918, p.249). Then, it follows that the change in the monads cannot be explained by the same aggregation-decumulation argument, thus, they “have no windows through which anything may come in or go out” (Leibniz, 1918, p.250).

This seems ambiguous since some change must be happening in them, or there must be some quality of them to drive monads to aggregate or decumulate regarding the nature of ever-changing composite things; the change in the composite things must be grounded in the

⁷ See A266-B322 in *Critique of Pure Reason*

change of simple substances. Leibniz also stresses this, as he states that they must have at least some qualities besides the negative qualities that have been mentioned, since, to exist is to have some kind of quality, in other words, if these simple substances did not include any quality whatsoever, the change in things would be impossible (1918, p.250). Hence, this change, then, must be grounded in an internal principle of the monad, since the monad cannot be affected from the outside (p.251). According to Leibniz, what accounts for this passing, as the condition that gives the possibility of change, “multiplicity in the unity”, is perception (p.251). As mind-like, simple, immaterial entities, monads acquire different perceptions. These perceptions should not be understood as apperception or consciousness (p.251), rather, they are like apprehensions of a mind in the state of “fainting” or “dreamless deep sleep” (p.253), in which the perceptions cannot be distinct; it, in a way, resembles what we discussed regarding the undetermined manifold of sensible intuition in Kant. The internal principle that drives these monads to acquire perceptions is called the appetite (p.251). Each monad has an appetite that is unique to itself, which strives for perceptions, even though it does not mean that the acquisition of the perceptions always satisfies this appetite, the drive for acquiring the desired perceptions itself can also lead to different perceptions (p.251-252). Hence, the appetite seems to be the “internal principle” of action, which is the feature that makes substance subsist by itself (p.251). To sum up, the universe consists of composite things, these composites consist of simple substances, thus, change, coming to be and passing away is explained by the aggregation and decumulation of these simple substances. These simple substances are immaterial, mind-like entities that have an internal principle of action as appetite, which drives them to acquire unique, different perceptions. This accounts for the change in these simple substances, which, in turn, accounts for the change in the composite things. Although it is possible to discuss it further in a more comprehensive manner, this seems to be the summary of Leibniz's account of what there is. Based on this, a question may arise: How do immaterial, non-extensional beings can result in a corporeal world? He gives us a hint in one of his letters to de Volder (Leibniz, 1989, p.181). Leibniz's answer is presented as follows:

I don't really eliminate body but reduce [*revoco*] it to what it is. For I show that corporeal mass [*massa*], which is thought to have something over and above simple

substances, is not a substance, but a phenomenon resulting from simple substances, which alone have unity and absolute reality. (Leibniz, 1989, p.181)

Accordingly, then, the simple substances are only generating perceptions due to the appetition, and the whole corporeal world somehow becomes an appearance for us which is affected by the monads. In that context, the principle of individuation must be elaborated on again, due to the change in Leibniz's views from the views in the *Disputatio*. To readdress Leibniz's previous views, the principle of individuation is the whole entity, the whole entity here was understood as the existence proper, which is itself incommunicable to any other being. This is the internal principle of unity of the individual, by virtue of this, it is undivided in itself and distinct from all other individuals. Previously understood it was the self-individuated, unique nature, what McCullough calls the "static" model of individuation. However, the shift to a "dynamic" model changes the conception of the principle. According to Leibniz's mature accounts that were presented above, existence itself is only possible with an internal principle of self-activity. Only by this, a substance can subsist, thus, the entity is possible. This principle being appetition, each monad is indivisible since they have no parts. The only positive quality they possess is to acquire different perceptions based on appetition. Further, each perception must be unique and non-repeatable as Leibniz states:

For two different subjects, as A and B, cannot have precisely the same individual affection, since it is impossible that the same individual accident should be in two subjects or pass from one subject to another. (Leibniz, 2000, p.46)

Consequently, first, all substances (monads in that case), are individuated by their whole entity, existence, which is possible only through an internal principle of action, appetition in that case. Second, the distinctness of the monads is also a result of this internal principle, since appetition makes monads have perceptions, the only quality a monad can have, and these perceptions are unique, unrepeatable instances. Following that, each simple substance must be unique in its perceptions, which leads to the conclusion that whatever exists, simple or composite, must be unique. Then, also by McCullough's reading, it can be stated that while the former principle of individuation is "whole entity" understood, in a Suarezian manner, as self-individuated unique nature of the substance, the mature principle or cause of individuation for Leibniz is the "whole entity" understood as self-individuated

appetition with self-individuated unique perceptions. Now, after sketching the fundamental features of Leibniz's mature metaphysics and the principle of individuation in accordance with it, it is important to elaborate on certain principles that are grounded in his metaphysics that would enable us to discuss *principium identitatis indiscernibilium*, also known as the principle of identity of indiscernibles (PII).

For Leibniz, the PII can be seen as the direct result of two other fundamental principles (1989, p.32). These principles, namely, the principle of contradiction (PC) and the principle of sufficient reason (PSR), are the foundation of all human reasoning, as described in *Monadology* (1918, p.255). Therefore, the PII is also a part of the foundation of all human reasoning since it immediately follows PC and PSR. To briefly state, according to PII, there cannot be two distinct individuals with the same properties, in other words, if two things have the exact same properties, meaning they are indiscernible, then it must follow that they are the same thing, they are identical. At first sight, it can be difficult to fully comprehend what Leibniz means. However, PII would be clearer to grasp after explaining the PC and PSR.

According to Leibniz's statements in his second letter to Clarke, the PC or the principle of identity, is described as the foundation for all mathematics and indicates "that a proposition cannot be true and false at the same time, and that therefore A is A and cannot be not A" (Leibniz, 2000, p.7). As explained by Leibniz elsewhere, this is also one of the primary truths, to which all other truths can be reduced (1989, p.30-31). Quite self-explanatory, as the basis of mathematics, PC can be understood as the principle of necessary truths, however, Leibniz also stresses that we require another principle to move from mathematics to natural science, since while mathematics deals with necessary truths, natural science deals with contingent truths (1918, p.256). Hence, there is a need for another principle, namely, PSR, which indicates that "nothing happens without a reason why it should be so rather than otherwise" (Leibniz, 2000, p.7). Although, from this explanation, PSR is understood as a causality rather than an epistemological principle in terms of grounds and assertions, in other words, PSR is only concerning facts as the principle of cause and effect, this is not the case. In *Monadology*, where he explains the two fundamental principles, he states:

31. Our reasonings are based on *two great principles, that of contradiction*, in virtue of which we judge that which involves a contradiction to be false, and that which is opposed or contradictory to the false to be true.

32. And *that of sufficient reason*, by virtue of which we consider that we can find no true or existent fact [*fait*], no true assertion [*énonciation véritable*], without there being a sufficient reason why it is thus and not otherwise, although most of the time these reasons cannot be known to us. (1989, p.217)

From this explanation, it follows that not only facts, but also true assertions must have a sufficient reason, for why they are as they are and not otherwise, even though sometimes the sufficient reason is unknown to us. This principle can be understood as the relationship between cause and effect for facts, and it can be understood as the relationship between logical ground and consequent for the assertions. It follows then that every effect must have a sufficient cause and every assertion must have a sufficient ground. This said, since every contingent truth must have its reason for another one, in terms of facts, when traced back, there must be a reason for the existence of the universe as well as for each step of its functioning (1918, p.257). All finite things that surround us do not posit a necessary existence, in that regard, there must be a sufficient reason for the existence of the universe which is necessary and eternal (Leibniz, 2007, p.130). It must also be the case that whatever this sufficient reason may be, it must be an intelligent being (Leibniz, 2007, p.130). Since the world is contingent, "an infinity of other worlds being equally possible", anything could be otherwise, therefore, any of these worlds have an equal claim on existence, however, only one of them exists, thus, there must be a sufficient reason why the cause of the world fixed only one of these possible worlds (Leibniz, 2007, p.130). In that regard, the cause of the world must have an *understanding* to go over the possibilities and fix on one of them, it must have the *will* in order to take part in the act of choosing, and it must have *the power* to initiate existence (Leibniz, 2007, p.130). Not surprisingly, the cause of the world that has intelligence is presented as God. Since God has supreme wisdom, he must have a sufficient reason to choose one of the possible worlds over others and since his wisdom is not questionable, it must be the case that this world is the best of all the possible worlds (Leibniz, 2007, p.131). Consequently, even though God is the supreme creator of the universe and the

cause of all existence, he cannot be acting disorderly; whatever God initiates, even though it seems extraordinary to us in the example of miracles, it must be in accordance with the general unity and order amongst things, since God *must* choose the best (Leibniz, 2007, p.131). In other words, PSR dictates that even God is obliged to act in accordance with it.

Now, in light of these discussions, it necessarily follows that there cannot be two distinct individuals that share the exact same properties (PII). In several places, Leibniz demonstrates this necessity by showing the impossibility of the supposed case in terms of PC and PSR. In *Primary Truths*, he states that if there were two identical individuals that are distinct, there must be at least some quality of them as the sufficient reason for their diversity (PSR), moreover, if they are indiscernible, i.e. they differ only numerically, this is impossible since they must be identical, hence, the diversity of them becomes a contradiction (PC) (1989, p.31). Furthermore, in also his letters to Clarke, he emphasizes that “For two states indiscernible from each other are the same state, and consequently, it is a change without any change. Besides, there is neither rhyme nor reason in it. But God does nothing without reason, and it is impossible that there should be any here” (Leibniz, 2000, p.23). Hence, the existence of indiscernible individuals contradicts PSR in another way, namely, by supposing God, who has the highest wisdom and has sufficient reason for each of his actions, is acting arbitrarily, which is contradictory, since “good reasons for a choice are not to be found where everything is indiscernible” (Leibniz, 2000, p.51). Consequently, also since even God is acting in accordance with PSR, the existence of indiscernible but distinct individuals must be none other than “impossible fiction” (Leibniz, 2000, p.51).

That said, it is crucial to note that Leibniz excludes some qualities when he regards “all qualities” in the PII. These qualities are namely spatio-temporal qualities, which are taken as extrinsic features of the individual (Leibniz, 1996, p.147). Since we distinguish time and place based on the things that are in time and space, he posits that they have a secondary importance in terms of the identity and diversity of things, in other words, they do not constitute the intrinsic determinations of the individual (Leibniz, 1996, p.147). In that regard, even though it might be asserted that two indiscernible individuals can exist in different spatio-temporal conditions, for instance, different places at the same time, this means very little for Leibniz. This is because these extrinsic determinations are somewhat accidental, therefore, they must be grounded on the internal determinations of the individuals; even though they are in different locations, they must have some internal determination, maybe

only known to God, which makes them those locations in a determinate time, hence, this internal quality that determines them differently prevents them to have the same properties.

To gather all the discussions presented above to wrap up, Leibniz's understanding concerning the problem of individuation seems simple; there is no problem of individuation. Whatever exists is individual and unique, this was also evident even from his early discussions in the *Disputatio*, his mature discussions in *Monadology* and his views concerning PII. Each individual is individuated by its whole entity, the unity of the individual is inseparable from the existence of the individual, and although it is given by God, an external source, the cause of individuation as existence is internal to the individual and incommunicable to other entities. After talking about Leibniz's views and clarifying what he understood as the PII, now it is suitable to go back to the discussions on Kant's understanding of individuation.

4.3.2. Leibniz vs Kant

As also mentioned before, the literature on the Kantian principle of individuation mostly relies on the mentioned passage in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1999, p.368-389), in which Kant criticises the PII. Let us first consider what is being said in A264-B320:

If an object is presented to us several times, but always with the same inner determinations (*qualitas et quantitas*), then it is always exactly the same if it counts as an object of pure understanding, not many but only one thing (*numerica identitas*); but if it is appearance, the issue is not the comparison of concepts, but rather, however identical everything may be in regarding to that, the difference of the places of these appearances at the same time is still an adequate ground for **numerical difference** of the object (of the senses) itself. Thus, in the case of two drops of water, one can completely abstract from all inner differences (of quality and quantity), and it is enough that they be intuited in different places at the same time in order for them to be held to be numerically different. Leibniz took appearances for things in themselves, thus for *intelligibilia*, i.e., objects of pure understanding (although on account of the confusion of their representations, he labelled them with the name of

phenomena), and there his principle of **non-discernibility** (*principium identitatis indiscernibilium*) could surely not be disputed, but since they are objects of sensibility; the understanding with regard to them is not of pure but of empirical use, multiplicity and numerical difference are already given space itself as a condition of outer appearances. For a part of space, even though it might be completely similar and equal to another, is nevertheless outside of it, and is on account a different part from that which is added to it in order to constitute a larger space; and this must therefore hold of everything that exists simultaneously in the various positions in space, no matter how might otherwise be. (Kant, 1999, p.368-389)

Unlike Leibniz, according to Kant, it seems that PII also includes spatial location. In that regard the possibility of seemingly indiscernible objects in different places is at least accountable since regardless of the inner determinations and intrinsic qualities of objects, they can be numerically distinct simply by their places. Contrary to Leibniz, Kant stresses that the ground for numerical difference is not all of the features that an individual possesses, i.e., their intrinsically determined uniqueness, but rather, their being intuited in distinct places. In that regard, also stated by Kant himself, the ground for numerical distinctness is space.

In several articles, Cord Friebe lays out the main points of Kant's criticism of Leibniz regarding this matter in a very detailed manner (2017; 2022). According to Friebe, firstly, space is the principle of individuation for Kant (2017, p.3; 2022, p.501). He is very aware that his reading also can be interpreted as problematic since what is being discussed in A264-B320 seems to be heavily focused on numerical distinctness, i.e., diversity, rather than the problem of individuation itself (Friebe, 2017, p.7). However, he insists that Kant is not discussing a merely epistemological problem here, rather, he asserts that Kant is explaining the ground for the numerical distinctness of the objects with an ontological concern; as he states: “the difference of place is an adequate ground not only for the recognisability of the numerical difference of the object but for its ontological, numerical distinctness itself” (Friebe, 2017, p.4). He bases this reading on Kant’s statement regarding the difference of places as the ground for numerical distinctness. He emphasizes this by stating: “spatial

difference does not merely *coincide* with numerical distinctness, neither contingently nor necessarily, but is the *ground* for it” (Friebe, 2017, p.4). Since space is the ground for the numerical difference ontologically, Friebe claims that the Kantian principle of individuation must be space⁸.

Further Friebe states that Kant is not simply adding space as a property of the individual, which was excluded by Leibniz, and briefly modifies the PII; rather, Friebe asserts that Kant rejects PII by showing the obscurity of it, even with the possibility of taking space as a property (2017, p.4). Since Kant underlines that, different parts of space, even though numerically distinct, are "completely similar and equal to [one] another" (Kant, 1999, p.368), taking space as a property would not distinguish objects in terms of properties, rather, the two objects would assume a quality that is shared. Although this is only one way to see it, Kant also states that regardless of this commonality, one place would be still outside of the other and distinguish these two objects. Consequently, Friebe claims that Kant rejects the reasoning of Leibniz altogether (2017, p.4). It must follow then, according to Kant, Leibniz must be mistaken gravely regarding his understanding of space. According to Friebe, Kant views Leibniz as taking space and time as irrelevant or impotent for the numerical distinction of objects (2017, p.5), however, in a Kantian perspective, space and time are a part of the objects' constitution for us, thus, whatever object we encounter, it is always in space and/or time, the numerically distinctness of objects is already given in these pure intuitions. Therefore, defending PII as a principle is equivalent to taking objects that must always be in space and time as outside of them since it would be the same to assert that things internally (without space and time) have numerical distinctness, which can be seen as absurd since without space there would be no extension, no "internal" nor "external".

This brings us to the appearance aspect of the individuals. No matter how much we elaborate on Leibniz and Kant, the obvious separation comes from the basic premises of their thoughts. Thus, another important issue is how individuals are understood in the context of these two philosophies; Leibniz takes individuals as things in themselves, while Kant takes them as mere appearances. For Leibniz, all the individuals are *fully determined* in terms of their predicates. As he states in *Discourse* and *Primary Truths*, all predicates are based on

⁸ Although the main emphasis is on space, according to the mentioned passage and Friebe's reading of it, the principle of individuation should be understood as both space and time or spatiotemporal location. This is because Kant does not solely elaborate on space, but he also uses "at the same time" to indicate the "different places" of objects. Therefore, Friebe's use of "space" can be read as "spatiotemporal location".

an individual's nature, and since every individual is individuated and has a unique nature, whatever predication is the case, the individual is necessarily including all of its predicates in a way that is distinct from all other individuals (1918, p.13; 1989, p.32). This also encompasses the predicates that are yet to be predicated to the individual, for instance, although Alexander is not the king right now, being king is in his nature, therefore, he also carries this feature, even though not "expressively" but "virtually" (1918, p.13). In that regard, since each individual is fully determined, even regarding its predicates to come, it follows that each individual can be given a fully determinate, complete concept (1918, p.13; 1989, p.32). This complete concept of an individual substance "includes once for all everything which can ever happen to it and that in considering this concept one will be able to see everything which can truly be said concerning the individual, just as we are able to see in the nature of a circle all the properties which can be derived from it" (1918, p.19). Although according to Leibniz, it is possible for us to say that "there were always in the soul of Alexander marks of all that had happened to him and evidences of all that would happen to him and traces even of everything which occurs in the universe", it is only possible for God to know the complete concept of each individual in its entirety (1918, p.14). Hence, the individuals can be distinguished and given by their complete concepts, which indicates that they are *objects of pure understanding*; since Leibniz also claims that the connections and "evidences or the reasons for the reality of each event" can be seen *a priori* (1918, p.19), which also presumes that these are already in the individual regardless of the state of the subject, which in turn regards individuals as things in themselves.

On the other hand, for Kant, individuals can only be intuitions, as they are singular representations (Kant, 1992, p.589), since concepts, however narrow they are, must be general (Kant, 1992, p.589; Kant, 1999, p.630). It is also evident from the statement that what distinguishes two indistinguishable drops of water is not their *being* in different places, but rather, their being *intuited* in different places. This is what makes the claim that "the ground of numerical difference is space" specifically Kantian for Friebe (2017, p.5). Therefore, contrary to Leibniz, for Kant, objects cannot be given by concepts but rather intuitions; objects are only thought through concepts and given by intuition. According to this account, it becomes possible to encounter different, seemingly indiscernible objects since whether these objects are identical or not becomes a matter of consideration, since it is sufficient that they are intuited differently, i.e., in different places at the same time.

Following that Friebe states that while for Leibniz individuals are unique [*einzig(artig)*], according to Kant, they are merely singular [*einzel*]

 (2022, p.504). In that regard, referring to the individuals is only possible with their respective individual concepts for Leibniz, but for Kant, concepts themselves (understanding) are not enough, they must be applied to intuitions (sensibility) (Kant, 1999, p.62; 254), by which they can refer to individuals as singular representations.

The discussion so far summarizes Cord Friebe's account for our purposes. Friebe lays out the main differences between Leibniz' and Kant's accounts in a detailed manner, however, his suggestion for the principle of individuation, not of only diversity, space, seems to be only finding support from the statement that takes space as the ground of numerical distinctness, moreover, although Friebe claims that this is not only epistemological but also an ontological account, it is difficult to find any evidence for that reading. Thus, it is quite problematic to justify this reading, since, also discussed earlier, individuation is not initially about the problem of diversity. As Suarez stresses, the diversity of individuals must follow the unity of the individuals since there cannot be two individuals that are distinct without firstly each of them being one in themselves, accordingly, what accounts for the individuation is not just the individuals' being distinct. Moreover, Gracia also showed that even though these are elaborated on in a mixed manner in the scholastic literature, diversity and individuality are precisely distinct issues that must be examined separately (Gracia, 1984, p.21-22). Although claimed otherwise, there is not much to be found regarding what provides the unity of the individual, i.e., the principle of individuation proper. Then, what has been discussed by Friebe, is only the contrast between Leibniz' and Kant's views on the *diversity* of individuals, not their *individuation*. This also seems to be understood by Eric M. Rubenstein (2001, p.76-77), who claims that in A264-B320, Kant is not proposing a solution to the problem of individuation, but rather, of diversity. He clearly distinguishes three questions (2001, p.76), two of them being related to diversity and one of them is related to the individuation:

*Diversity**Individuation*

D1: How does one discern one from another? What makes an individual an individual?

D2: What makes one individual distinct from another? (Rubenstein, 2001).

According to this framework, Rubenstein stresses that the mentioned passage only answers questions D1 and D2 but does not answer the question regarding individuation (2001, p.77). Like Friebe's examination in many respects, Rubenstein also explains the fundamental differences between Leibniz and Kant, but he also covers additional content which would help us to understand Kant's criticisms more clearly. Being focused on Leibniz's negligence of the faculty of sensibility, Rubenstein underlines Kant's account in A272-B328:

Leibniz accordingly compared the objects of the senses with each other as things in general, merely in understanding, first, so far as they are to be judged by the understanding as identical or different. Since he, therefore, had before his eyes solely their concepts, and not their position in the intuition in which alone the objects can be given, and left entirely out of consideration the transcendental place of these concepts (whether the object is to be counted among appearances or among things in themselves), it could not have turned out otherwise but that he extended his principle of indiscernibles, which holds merely of concepts of things in general, to the objects of the senses (*mundus phenomenon*), and thereby believed himself to have made no little advance in the cognition of nature. (Kant, 1999, p.372)

Here, Kant exposes Leibniz's mistake precisely; according to Kant, “if I know a drop of water as a thing in itself with all of its intrinsic determinations”, I can rightly state that a drop with the exact same properties cannot be a different drop since their complete concepts would be identical, so the understanding would not have sufficient ground to distinguish them (Kant, 1999, p.373). However, Kant stresses that if one grasps that this is an appearance

in space, one can see that the drop of water does not entirely belong to the understanding as a concept but also to sensibility as an outer intuition in space, which is indifferent to the content that fills it (Kant, 1999, p.373). Thus, it is very much possible to encounter objects, besides their places, exactly similar. According to this view, the multiplicity and diversity of the objects in space are not only possible but also necessary. In that regard, the first question on diversity, D1, is answered; grasping different spatiotemporal locations of objects is sufficient for discerning their distinctness. The second question D2 is also answered; what makes individuals distinct is the pure intuitions of space and time. However, the question that matters most is still to be answered. The whole discussion on PII and space presented us with nothing with individuation but a detailed account of diversity. According to Rubenstein (2001, p.87), this question seems unanswerable from a Kantian perspective since as soon as we include *knowers* in the discussion, then we must admit that it is possible to speak of individuals, but it is certainly not possible to speak of them independently of the conditions of the subject, consequently, we can only speak about diversity. Hence, the principle of individuation is still a mystery to be discovered.

To sum up the discussions so far, it is first possible to discern that each scholar first states a separation in terms of epistemology and ontology, however, in Kantian philosophy, it is almost impossible to speak of ontological issues without considering the epistemological ones, since all transcendental idealism first recognizes that the world we live in is not in itself, it is given to us as an appearance, a representation. Thus, it is possible to posit very few arguments; firstly, as the one that is represented, there is the thing in itself, which is unknown to us but the existence of it must be addressed due to our subject's being affected by it, secondly, there is the subject, i.e., the one who represents. All discussions in one way or another can be traced back to this distinction. Even though Friebe is aware of this and attempts to provide a principle of individuation (as space and time), he neglects the matter of individual unity and focuses on diversity, thus missing the crucial point. On the other hand, Rubenstein acknowledges the issue but leads the discussion to a dead end. His explanation is surely sufficient regarding the principle of individuation as understood in the traditional Suarezian-Leibnizian sense since it is almost impossible to claim that there are mind-independent individuals while the extra-mental reality is obviously inaccessible to us. Hence, we do not have a ground to state that there are individuals in themselves, but we can only talk about our representing them as individuals. Although that is the case, it is possible

to argue that there can be still a principle of individuation to be found since the principle was never about the individuality of the thing in itself, but rather, about the objects of experience, the world that we live in. Hence, the individuality of things that are unknown to us was never investigated in the first place, instead, it was questioned how the objects that around us as the individual unities receive this unity and become distinct from each other. So, one can still investigate this question, even though one is certain that the whole world is given to us as representation. The Suarezian account was that the principle of individuation must be what gives the individual its unity, i.e., indivision, thereby providing the ground for diversity from others. Accordingly, it is possible to argue that even though we cannot access the thing in itself, but only represent it as many diverse individuals, we still need a principle which must give unity to the objects of experience to make diversity possible.

4.3.3. Transcendental Deduction and the Synthetic Unity of Apperception

In the transcendental deduction of the categories, Kant aims to justify the use of categories, namely, the pure concepts of understanding. Although it is not directly related to our purposes, it is imperative to at least mention Kant's account. To summarize, as previously explained, the manifold of intuition is united in the concepts. Intuitions, as they belong to the faculty of sensibility, can either be empirical, i.e., related to sensation as the modifications and affections of the mind, or pure, i.e., related to the pure forms of sensible intuitions, namely, space and time. While empirical intuitions can be seen as belonging to the sensations, hence, affections of the mind, they must have an origin independently from them, however, as the forms of intuition, space and time must have an origin in the mind since they organize the content of the intuitions in a thoroughgoing manner; whatever we intuit we always intuit things in space and/or time. Accordingly, if the mind forms concepts from the manifold of empirical intuition, these concepts must be empirical, on the other hand, if the mind forms concepts from the pure manifoldness of space and time, then, it follows that these concepts are formed *a priori* and, they also provide *a priori* cognition. Further, they pertain to the general rules of all thinking of objects, since they are concepts that include rules of time, (thus, also space *in* time). Because each concept expresses a rule according to which the object is thought (Kant, 1999, p.232), and concepts derived from space and time, consequently, expresses the rules of how an object can be given. Since this is the case, categories as pure concepts of the understanding precede all empirical cognition as *a priori* concepts (Kant, 1999, p.243) and have objective validity and their sole use is in experience

(Kant, 1999, p.254-255). This can be seen as a general and narrow summary of his account regarding the deduction. However, what is especially interesting is Kant's examination of how cognition can arise in the mind, in other words, what are the fundamental functions of the mind that enable us to have experience.

According to Kant, there are three original sources of cognition, these sources, as faculties of the human mind that constitute the conditions of the possibility of all experience, are original in the sense that they cannot be further attained from any other sources (1999, p.225). These faculties are **sense**, **imagination** and **apperception**, they are responsible for “the **synopsis** of the manifold *a priori* through sense”, “the **synthesis** of this manifold through the imagination” and “the **unity** of this synthesis through original apperception” (1999, p.225). Now, the synopsis of the senses cannot itself provide any cognition, since the mind is only receptive in terms of sensibility, hence, synopsis corresponds only to the mere aggregation of sensible representations (1999, p.228). Therefore, there is no connection between them. However, if that were the case, we would have no cognition at all. For cognition, the mind’s ability to receive passively is not enough, it is also needed that the mind actively produces its representations. Thus, we also need **spontaneity** alongside **receptivity**, in order to synthesize the aggregated sensible representations and make cognitions out of them (Kant, 1999, p.228). According to Kant, “This is now the ground of a threefold synthesis, which is necessarily found in cognition: namely, of the **apprehension** of the representation, as modifications of the mind in intuition; of **reproduction** of them in the imagination; and of their **recognition** in the concept” (Kant, 1999, p.228). To prevent any misunderstanding, these syntheses are not in any hierarchy in terms of time or necessity, three of them are necessary and fundamental for any cognition at all. Since these are the subjective sources of all cognition, they even make possible the understanding itself, and through that, “all experience as an empirical product of the understanding” (Kant, 1999, p.228).

As explained earlier, whatever representation is the case, it eventually belongs to the inner sense; for instance, although the representation of an outer appearance, its form being space, in the end is subjected to the conditions of the inner sense, namely, time (Kant, 1999, p.228). In that regard, every manifold of sensible intuition is represented only through the distinguishing of the time in the succession of the representations, since in one moment, it is impossible to find a succession, thus, whatever manifold is the case, it cannot be represented

at all, because what would be intuited would be an “absolute unity” in which there is no possibility for discerning an individual representation (Kant, 1999, p.229). Therefore, for any intuition that has a unity to arise, the mind needs to “run through” the manifold in time and “take together this manifoldness” as a separate representation that has a unity (Kant, 1999, p.229). For instance, to perceive a table, one would have to go through the table with one’s eyes *in time*, then, needs to decide that *it is a table*. Kant calls this the **synthesis of apprehension**. By the virtue of this synthesis, we acquire perceptions (Kant, 1999, p.229). Although its empirical use is stressed here, Kant states that it can also be attained *a priori*, without which the representations of space and time cannot be generated; even though space and time can only be apprehended with the content in them, Kant underlines that we have also a pure synthesis of apprehension, through which pure manifoldness of space and time is synthesized (Kant, 1999, p.229).

When the **synthesis of reproduction** is concerned, we find that the mind always passes from one representation to another, even though the object is not present; one representation makes the mind transition to another one (Kant, 1999, p.229). This transition must have a *constant rule*, since otherwise, this empirical use of the imagination would be a faculty that is useless in the mind (Kant, 1999, p.229). If that is not the case, then, there must be something that grounds this reproduction of the appearances and makes it possible. Kant here stresses that if one can show that not even the purest intuitions can provide no cognition without such a synthesis, then it would be clear that no cognition (*a priori* nor *a posteriori*) can arise in the mind (Kant, 1999, p.230). Although we are aware that the empirical use of reproductive imagination, as the association for example, is always according to certain rules, it can vary from person to person, because it cannot be predetermined who connects a certain representation with which representations, it is merely contingent (Kant, 1999, p.251). However, if one can provide an account for the pure reproductive use of the faculty of imagination that would ground the empirical one and make it possible, then, it would be easier to grasp the importance of the synthesis of reproduction in terms of all cognition.

As the synthesis that grounds all cognition, the synthesis of apprehension requires the mind to go through the manifold of intuition in time, however, the mind needs to reproduce the manifold that it went through a moment ago in order for a whole representation to form (Kant, 1999, p.230). Kant gives three examples to clarify his account:

Now it is obvious that if I draw a line in thought, or think of the time from one noon to next, or even want to represent a certain number to myself, I must necessarily first grasp one of these manifold representations after another in my thoughts. But if I were always to lose the preceding representations (the first parts of line, the preceding parts of time, or successively represented units) from my thoughts and not reproduce them when I proceed to following ones, then no whole representation and none of the previously mentioned thoughts, not even the purest and most fundamental representations of space and time, could ever arise. (Kant, 1999, p.230)

According to his arguments, even the pure intuitions of space and time are subjected to the synthesis of reproduction, since, for instance, without reproducing the manifoldness of time itself, it is impossible to grasp the present moment and the preceded one constitute *one and the same time*, as successive dots on a line, thus, this makes even synthesis of apprehension impossible (Kant, 1999, p.230). Consequently, the synthesis of apprehension cannot be separated from the synthesis of reproduction.

Then, it would be a matter of questioning the rule according to which the reproduction of the manifold is attained. The rules that determine the manifold of intuition, and by virtue of this, make the synthesis of reproduction possible are contained in the concept (Kant, 1999, p.232). As mentioned earlier, each object of experience belongs also to the understanding alongside the faculty of sensibility, being thought by the former and intuited by the latter, accordingly, every cognition requires concepts as well as intuitions (Kant, 1999, p.224; p.254). Concepts, as general representations, provide the rules according to which a manifold of sensible intuition is determined and, hence, recognized as the object it is. Consequently, it is in the concept that the manifold of intuition is synthesized and united. For instance, the concept of the body provides us with the rules for cognizing outer appearances by the unity of the manifold that is thought in it. In that regard, since it gives the rules for reproducing the manifold in the synthesis of reproduction, **the synthesis of recognition in the concept** is also inseparable from the syntheses that were formerly discussed (Kant, 1999, p.230-231). Hence, without the recognition of the concept neither reproduction nor apprehension is possible.

Recognition of the concept, however, requires the unity of consciousness, without which the object cannot be recognized as the object it is, in the concept of which the manifold of intuition is united by the consciousness (Kant, 1999, p.231). Distinguishing the time in apprehension, reproducing the preceding representations, and acquiring a cognition out of these syntheses, requires also grasping that it is the very same thing that is being apprehended, and it is the very same thing that the manifold belonging to it is reproduced by the imagination (Kant, 1999, p.230). Otherwise, all these actions would be in vain, no unity can be given to the representations since each moment would bring a new representation that is solitary and cannot be combined with the previous ones, therefore, no cognition can arise, therefore, "the consciousness that that which we think is the very same as what we thought a moment before" is crucial for reproduction, hence, apprehension (Kant, 1999, p.230).

The ground of this unity of consciousness, however, cannot reside in the object itself. According to Kant, even though we perceive objects, we know that we only have appearances as sensible representations, which cannot be regarded as things in themselves, therefore, there must be something that these appearances are representing, which affects the mind and is independent from it. However, we only deal with the manifold of our representations, hence, that which corresponds to them as taken something separate from all our cognitions and representations, cannot be anything at all for us, due to its inaccessibility (Kant, 1999, p.231). Thus, the unity that is in the perceived object cannot reside independently from the mind, i.e. in the object itself, rather, it is "nothing other than the formal unity of the consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of the representations" (Kant, 1999, p.231). The mind successively intuits and reproduces the manifold and gradually generates the object through its act (Kant, 1999, p.230), and the unity of this act, the mind adding one representation to another and being conscious of it, is what constitutes the unity in the object (Kant, 1999, p.247). Only by this unity of consciousness, the mind can cognize an object since it ascribed the synthetic unity in the manifold of intuition (Kant, 1999, p.231).

In that regard, the unity of consciousness is a necessary condition for the possibility of all experience, thus, it must precede all data of sensibility in the first place (Kant, 1999, p.232). Since each necessary condition has a transcendental ground, the transcendental ground of the unity of consciousness must have also a transcendental ground; according to Kant, the ground for such a unity is the pure, unchanging consciousness, namely,

transcendental apperception (Kant, 1999, p.232). It is transcendental since “even the purest objective unity of *a priori* concepts (space and time) is possible only through the relation of intuitions to it” (Kant, 1999, p.232). Elsewhere Kant states that the transcendental apperception amounts to the representation “I think”, in that regard it is also called the pure or original apperception since it accompanies all representations and provides the ground for acquiring representations (Kant, 1999, p.246). Thus, the transcendental apperception expresses the thoroughgoing identity of the subject, which “precedes all experience and makes the latter itself possible” (Kant, 1999, p.232). However, Kant is very clear on the issue that it must be distinguished from empirical apperception, which is the consciousness of oneself *in concreto*, i.e., according to the inner perceptions, which are empirical; this cannot account for such a unity since empirical data is dispersed and variable, the numerical unity such as this must even ground that empirical apperception, as he explains:

Thus the original and necessary consciousness of the identity of oneself is at the same time a consciousness of an equally necessary unity of synthesis of all appearances in accordance with concepts, i.e., in accordance with rules that not only make them necessarily reproducible, but also thereby determine an object for their intuition, i.e., the concept of something in which they are necessarily connected; for the mind could not possibly think of the identity of itself in the manifoldness of its representations, and indeed think this *a priori*, if it did not have before its eyes the identity of its action, which subjects all synthesis of apprehension (which is empirical) to a transcendental unity, and first makes possible their connection in accordance with *a priori* rules. (Kant, 1999, p.233)

Then, it is revealed that the unity that is contained in the object of experience is no other than the unity of the subject itself; the objects of experience receive their unity from the thoroughgoing identity and unity of the subject (Kant, 1999, p.243). The mind synthesizes the manifold of intuition and determines it with the thinking of the concept of the object thereby giving a *transcendental unity* to the object through its own numerical identity.

To sum up the discussion so far and give a coherent account, let us gather what has been said. The possibility of all experience and cognition relies on three subjective sources as capacities of the human mind, namely, sensibility, imagination, and apperception; each of these faculties has empirical use as well as *a priori* use which even grounds the former (Kant, 1999, p.236). First, pure intuition (space and time) grounds *a priori* all possible intuitions, and also perception, second, the productive (apprehension), hence the reproductive (reproduction), use of imagination grounds all synthesis and association *a priori*, third, the throughgoing identity of self-consciousness (apperception) grounds all consciousness of things (empirical consciousness) *a priori* (Kant, 1999, p.236). It follows that, if the pure manifoldness of space and time, apprehended *a priori*, by the pure use of the faculty of imagination as the transcendental synthesis, and thus, united in concepts by the original apperception that grounds all representations, then, the concepts that are formed must be the pure concepts of the understanding that provide *a priori* cognition and ground all thinking of objects, hence all other concepts. In that sense, the understanding is nothing other than the unity of apperception in regard to the synthesis of the imagination, and the pure concepts are none other than the categories themselves (Kant, 1999, p.238), as the primordial form of all concepts. Although there is much more to be discussed, this is the main focus of the deduction as it shows the objective validity and necessity of the use of categories. However, a clue, that would lead us to the Kantian principle of individuation, is also given along the way, if we inspect how an individual object is ever possible at all for us.

Now, each object of experience has a unity of its own and is thus diverse from all others. To give an account of how these objects receive their unities, and also following that unity, how they differ from each other, would enable us to present a view of individuation in terms of Kant's philosophy. So far, it has been established that objects are not things in themselves, and since the extra-mental reality is nothing for us, the unity in the object is given by virtue of the mind itself. Thus, all objects of experience have a synthetic unity. Hence, the unity of the object presupposes a synthesis (Kant, 1999, p.237), and a synthesis further presupposes a content that is to be synthesized. As the first source of experience and cognition, sensibility can be seen as the responsible faculty for gathering this content as the manifold of intuition in a synopsis (Kant, 1999, p.225). The mind is merely receptive and passive in terms of this faculty, and different from the perception, without the consciousness, the appearances of sensibility cannot be representations for us, they can yield no cognition at all, they would be

nothing for us (Kant, 1999, p.237). Further, even though we assume that would be the case, perceptions, by themselves, are dispersed and diverse, thus, there must be a faculty which is an active capacity to synthesize them (Kant, 1999, p.239). The faculty of imagination, as the second source of our cognition, brings the manifold of intuition together and thereby produces an **image** as an act of spontaneity of the mind (Kant, 1999, p.239). It immediately exercises its action on perceptions, thus the productive use of the imagination as apprehension is also inseparable from its reproductive use in the synthesis of reproduction, since without reproduction, i.e., without keeping the series of perceptions, no image can be produced, however, the reproduction is also not possible without rules according to which a representation enters in a connection with another certain representation instead of the other (Kant, 1999, p.239). The ground for such reproduction is association; again, the association itself cannot be attained if there were not any objective ground, a unity according to which this transition from one representation to another is justified, otherwise, the associations of the mind would be still undetermined and unorganized (Kant, 1999, p.239). Thus, there must be a ground on which the mind can ascribe all these diverse perceptions and associations to a unity, in other words, without the consciousness of that which the mind cognizes is the same thing in all these dispersed perceptions, the synthesis of imagination cannot provide any cognition at all (Kant, 1999, p.239). This unity of consciousness, however, can be none other than the subject's own numerical identity since the empirical data cannot provide any unity as such, as Kant states: "For only because I ascribe all perceptions to one consciousness (of original apperception) can I say of all perceptions that I am conscious of them" (Kant, 1999, p.240). Consequently, the objects of experience receive their unities only from the synthetic unity that is given by the original apperception, as the third source of our cognition, the thoroughgoing self-consciousness of the mind.

4.3.4. The principle of individuation at last

From the discussion above, it is possible to provide an account of individuation according to Kant, first, it is possible to present an account of how objects receive their unities and second, how can they be diverse from each other accordingly. However, as stressed frequently, diversity itself always must follow individuality, i.e., the individual's unity as itself, since being something different from another thing presupposes being the same with itself. This unity, for Kant, is not a feature that objects possess by themselves, rather it is given by the mind of the subject; the unity of the objects of experience is the

thoroughgoing self-consciousness of the I. In that regard, the principle of individuation is revealed to be the synthetic unity of apperception; accordingly, it includes the synopsis of sensibility, synthesis of imagination and the unity of apperception. Only by virtue of the activity of the mind, an individual is even possible. This said, the account of diversity must be also examined in accordance with this principle of individuation, which must ground the diversity of individuals. Then, what has been discussed in contrast with Leibniz also must become clear with what has been said for the Kantian principle of individuation.

Although Friebe (2017;2022) claimed otherwise, the elaboration of Rubenstein (2001) showed that space (and time) is not the principle of individuation proper, but rather, of diversity; as also stated by Kant, space is what grounds the numerical distinctness of objects. However, a closer examination can reveal that space is the ground for diversity only as a part of the constitution of the mind of the subject. As Kant writes:

We can accordingly speak of space, extended beings, and so on, only from the human standpoint. If we depart from the subjective condition under which alone we can acquire outer intuition, namely that through which we may be affected by objects, then the representation of space signifies nothing at all. (Kant, 1999, p.177)

...if we remove our own subject or even the subjective constitution of the senses in general, then all constitution, all relations of objects in space and time, indeed space and time themselves would disappear, and as appearances they cannot exist in themselves, but only in us. (Kant, 1999, p.185)

From these elaborations, it becomes clear that the significance of space and time is only through the subjective constitution of the mind, in other words, space itself means nothing, thus, the view that posits space as the principle of individuation, or even of diversity is somehow inefficient, since, as the alleged principle as what individuality or diversity depends on, space and time, depends further on the subject. Surely, here it is not claimed that Kant is inconsistent since he neglects the former point, rather, it is claimed otherwise. When the section that criticizes Leibniz is examined again, this misunderstanding can be prevented. There, regarding two drops of water, Kant precisely states that “it is enough that

they be *intuited* in different places at the same time in order for them to be held to be numerically different” (emphasis by me). Elsewhere, in an endnote, he also writes:

Whether the representations themselves are identical, and whether therefore one could be thought through the other analytically, does not come into consideration here. The consciousness of the one, as far as the manifold is concerned, is still always to be distinguished from the consciousness of the other, and it is only the synthesis of this (possible) consciousness that is at issue here. (Kant, 1999, p.246)

Hence, what accounts for the diversity of representations is not the representations (such as space and time) themselves, but rather, our being conscious of them since each consciousness (of an object) is different from the other necessarily. Thus, the consciousness of the manifoldness of space (and time) can be sufficient for diversity. Here, it is important to mention that in A264-B320 Kant stresses that being *intuited* in different places at the same time is sufficient for distinctness, which surely does not equate to consciousness; as already mentioned, consciousness significantly means much more than merely intuition. However, it can be said that being conscious of an object of experience also includes intuition since it is one of the sources of cognition (Kant, 1999, p.224). In that regard, it can be said that Kant's account of diversity is also closely related to his views related to the unity of the object of experience, hence, individuality. Consequently, it can be concluded that the objects of experience have their individual unities by virtue of the self-consciousness of the subject as transcendental apperception, which is not an isolated faculty but always must be thought in relation to sensibility, imagination, and obviously, understanding. Hence, it follows that, objects are diverse due to the mind's differentiation of them as such; although it is the one thoroughgoing consciousness that renders them as individuals by the unity of apperception, it is also this act that differentiates them since giving identity to a representation is also distinguishing it from the others.

4.4. Kantian individuation in relation to other views

Until this point, several philosophers regarding the problem of individuation have been discussed in the history of philosophy, namely, Suarez, Locke, Leibniz, and Kant. All philosophers, besides the specific differences in their accounts, unite in the view that there are no actual universals, common natures, or essences, hence, whatever exists is only

individual. Moreover, all of them presented a principle of individuation that is incommunicable to other individuals, namely, it is existence for the first three and for Kant, the synthetic unity given by the apperception in the consciousness of an individual object of experience. Even though what is understood by the intension of the concept of the individual is diverse amongst these thinkers, it would not be an exaggeration to state that they were referring to the same things, namely, the objects that are around us in the world we live in. In that regard, it is quite possible to compare these accounts and find equivalences between them. The main purpose of this section was to present an account of individuation in Kant's philosophy, by doing this it would be possible to understand and explain how Schopenhauer and, surely, Nietzsche conceived the issue. To attain that goal, it would be necessary to put the discussion regarding Kant's views in relation to other views that are presented, which would enable us to comprehend how the problem of individuation evolved until Nietzsche.

The relationship between Leibniz and Kant's views has been demonstrated above, thus, it is first useful to begin with the relationship between Kant and Locke, since Locke is historically more proximate. According to Locke, the principle of individuation is existence (1995, p.242), as understood as spatiotemporally determined being of things; this principle applies to all things as far as they have an exact beginning at a certain time at some determined place and also have a determined end (Locke, 1995, p.241). It is the spatiotemporally continued being of atoms as simple substances for material bodies (Locke, 1995, p.242-243), the life as the spatiotemporally continued existence for plants and animals (p.243) and empirical consciousness for personal identity (p.246). Naturally separated from Leibniz's views, since Locke immediately neglects the "inner determinations" of the individual and stresses "external determinations", his comprehension of the issue shares parallels with Kant's; both philosophers emphasized the incommunicability of an individual's being in a certain place at a certain time, thus, they stressed that the diversity of the individuals related to space and time. Furthermore, both thinkers shared the view that identity and diversity do not belong to things themselves, rather, they belong to the constitution of the mind, while stressing the role of consciousness regarding the problem of individuation. However, surely their views become highly contrasted with a closer examination.

Firstly, it is crucial to state that Locke seems to be focused solely on diversity when he is regarding the problem of individuality since although he elaborates on the idea of identity,

he does not provide any explanation of how the objects have individual unity. In that regard, even though one can say that the idea of identity must be based on the mind's comparison of the same thing in different places and at different times (Locke, 1995, p.241), it is very difficult to find any explanation on by virtue of what these objects have unity. However, in Kant's writings, it is possible to provide an account for both individual unity and diversity from others as shown above. Secondly, although Locke asserted that identity and diversity, hence individuality in his understanding, is possible only if their ideas are satisfied (1995, p.244) and by the operation of the mind the object is judged as such, he still believed that space and time have extramental reality. Thus, he is separated from Kant, since even though it is the mind that judges something is identical with itself due to the comparison of the same thing with itself at different times, it still needs space and time as external criteria but according to Kant, space and time are inseparable from the mind's subjective constitution. Thirdly, as mentioned before, for Kant, space and time themselves do not account for the diversity, rather for our being conscious of the objects in them, by also being conscious of their manifoldness, suffices for the diversity of individuals. For space and time are nothing more than our representations.

These indicate that the difference between these accounts seems to be related to the core views of each philosopher. As a transcendental idealist, naturally, Kant regards the experiential world, even space and time, as representations, thus, he is not interested in how things themselves might be independent of the mind. Therefore, the world as representation must be the only real world for us; the issue that how things in themselves differ from our representations is not considered as a matter of inquiry, since they are, by themselves, nothing for us. On the other hand, Locke assumes that things themselves have at least some features such as shape and size (primary qualities), that are independent from the ones that arise from the mind's representation of the objects such as colour, odour, texture, sound, or taste (secondary qualities) (Locke, 1995, p.85-87). Hence, properties such as extension, are already presupposed in the object. In that regard, Locke plays the role of transcendental realist (or empirical idealist), who believes, according to Kant, that although we have some kind of comprehension of objects, it is not certain that they are adequately represented in the mind (Kant, 1999, p.426).

Furthermore, both philosophers regard consciousness in different ways. According to Locke, consciousness is the ground of personal identity. As he states:

...a person is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking, and, as it seems to me, essential to it: it being impossible for anyone to perceive without perceiving that he does perceive. (Locke, 1995, p.246)

Thus, for Locke, consciousness is understood similarly to Kant as perceiving that one does perceive, namely, the apperception. However, what this implies for each philosopher differs heavily. As the ground of personal identity, Locke regards consciousness, as it is spatiotemporally determined; if one can repeat the actions from the idea of a past action with the same consciousness, it can be said that it is the same person (1995, p.247). Hence, personal identity is determined empirically. On the contrary, for Kant, this kind of assertion can be valid only if we view what is implied by the term "person" as empirical self, i.e., our consciousness regarding the empirical conditions of our inner state, i.e., *in concreto* (Kant, 1999, p.232; p. 250-251). As explained previously, since the empirical representations of inner sense are dispersed and varied, they cannot account for a thoroughgoing identity of self-consciousness, rather, they must be grounded by it (Kant, 1999, p.247). Therefore, from a Kantian perspective, what Locke had in mind is insufficient since the consciousness of that kind (empirical consciousness) is only possible if pure apperception (I think) grounds it; even though it can be accounted for only if we regard "person" as empirical consciousness, Locke's account does not provide any ground for the numerical unity of self-consciousness of the subject as explained in Kant's texts.

The relationship between Suarez and Kant remains to be discussed. Since Suarez can be regarded as the philosopher who investigated the problem of individuality in the most detailed way possible while presenting diverse discussions related to the issue efficiently, finding equivalencies between Kant and Suarez is crucial to justify our account regarding Kant. According to Suarez, the distinction from others and distinction from the members of the same species is secondary, what must be first accounted for is the individual's unity in itself, which makes possible its division from others initially (Suarez, 1960, p.496-497; 1982, p.84). Thus, his focus is on the matter of unity. It was discussed that for Suarez, whatever there is, both conceptual and real, have a unity. This unity, as the most general type of unity,

is called transcendental unity. Here, the use of the term “transcendental” surely does not imply a possibility for *a priori* cognition, or it cannot be related to the conditions of possibility of experience, rather, by scholastic understanding of the term (Gracia, 1992, p.113), it seems to be referring to predicates that can be predicated to every possible thing. According to Owens (1963, p.111), a transcendental predicate such as “being”, “runs through all the Aristotelian categories”, not belonging to a precise one, and “extends beyond to their first cause”, hence, it can be said that a predicate becomes transcendental if it exhausts all categories of things and extends *beyond* them. In that regard, although the term has many implications for Suarez regarding actual unities or conceptual unities, as a predicate, the unity itself must be transcendental since it is shared by every possible thing we can think of. On the other hand, in terms of its intension, this transcendental unity amounts to a privative negation as the feature that provides the negation of division (Suarez, 1960, p.495-496). Although it is frequently discussed in scholastic literature that the “unity” is the same as “being”, which itself is another transcendental predicate since all beings are regarded as numerically one, Suarez stresses that it is intensionally different than being and it adds a privative negation as indivisibility (Suarez, 1960, p.495). This indivision can apply differently for conceptual unities and actual unities.

According to Suarez, the only real unity is individual unity, indicating that common natures, universal or essences are not real but only conceptual, while individuals are only real things in the universe (Suarez, 1982, p.30). Individual unity, then, is defined as the incapability of being divided into individuals of the same kind (Suarez, 1982, p.30), on the other hand, the conceptual unity of universals, common natures or essences, although capable of being divided into individual entities of the same kind (Suarez, 1982, p. 87), cannot be formally divided in terms of its essential or formal predicates, which grounds the unity of the concept (Suarez, 1960, p.698). To exemplify, a piece of wood, “this piece of wood”, as an individual cannot be further divided into “these pieces of wood”, since the act of dividing it ends its existence, “this piece of wood” cannot be communicated but “wood” can be, hence, what is communicated is not the individual, rather, the common nature as “wood”. On the other hand “wood” as a common nature also cannot be divided into predicates as “wood” and “non-wood” since it would be absurd; the formal indivisibility of the concept is also the ground for its communicability into real entities of the same kind, if there were no formal unity, it would be impossible to speak of any common nature, since

commonality would disappear, hence, communicability would not be possible. In that sense, while *really* dividing individual unities negates their existence, although *really* dividing conceptual unities into individual unities is possible, dividing them *conceptually* in terms of their formal and essential predicates negates their validity. Consequently, transcendental unity can be viewed differently for individuals and concepts. However, in terms of extension, transcendental unity seems to be the same as individual unity since whatever exists does so as an individual (Suarez, 1960, p.492-493). Even though transcendental unity is wider in terms of intension, it is coextensive with individual unity.

That said, the principle of individuation according to Suarez is the principle that must render individuals as individuals. Since individuals are called as such due to their individual unity and this in turn defined to be incommunicability, the cause or principle of individuation must be that which provides the individual with such a feature. Then, it becomes clear that this principle must be the existence, as understood as an entity, of the individual (Suarez, 1982, p.121) since it is clear that the act of dividing an individual is also the act that ends the existence of the individual as that individual; the existence is also incommunicable for the individual thing. Hence, individuals need no other cause or principle besides their own entities. The only exception is God, since his individuality and indivisibility are essential (Suarez, 1982, p. 42), thus, although it is possible to divide individuals and negate the existence in the process since it is not an essential feature for created substances, for God, it is impossible to be divided nor negated, since his existence and unity is essential, thus, his individual unity can be seen as the source of all individuality. Then, although the common natures, universals, and essences as concepts can be regarded in terms of only mental consideration, yet for Suarez, the individual things are individuated from these by merely their existences as their entities.

Now, Kant's views must be elaborated on, in relation to the Suarezian account that is presented above. It is quite certain that finding exact parallels for these two thinkers might be problematic due to many differences in terms of their fundamental definitions and the problems that they discussed in their times, there seems to be equivalences between their accounts that might help to validate the purposes of the current study. Firstly, starting from the transcendental unity, although regarding "unity" as a mere predicate may be insufficient, it can be said that all objects as well as their concepts, all representations as far as they are "mine" must be synthesized with pure apperception (Kant, 1999, p.247). Thus, they must

have the unity given by apperception, in that regard, unity can be seen as transcendental in a scholastic sense since whatever representation there is, it must have unity since the unity of apperception is the ground for the unity of all representations and it is also transcendental in a Kantian sense since it grounds *a priori* the condition of possibility of all experience, i.e., all cognition (Kant, 1999, p.249). In that regard, it is possible to see that both philosophers regarded unity in quite similar respects in the context of their own philosophies. Secondly, the distinction between conceptual unities and real unities in Suarez can be seen as a parallel to representations of sensibility and understanding, namely, intuitions and concepts respectively. For, as singular representations, intuitions cannot be further divided into simpler representations, as understood as representations of empirical consciousness and particularly outer sense, they constitute the objects of outer experience, on the other hand, concepts regarding these objects are, in a way, can be divided into diverse intuitions, since concepts are general representations under which many objects are thought; it can be said that they can be seen as parallels to common natures or universals in Suarez' account.

In this regard, a similar distinction between these unities can be made, the transcendental unity of apperception as the ground of all unity of representations, can also be regarded as the unity of intuition and the unity of the concept. In Suarez, the individual unity, and the formal unity of the concept are stressed separately; individuals receive their unities by their entity (Suarez, 1982, p.121), and concepts from the mind, as they are formed by abstraction (Suarez, 1960, p. 705). However, examined closer, it is possible to see that the unity of the concept and the unity of intuition cannot be separated in Kant, since the unity of intuition is only possible with the unity of the concept, the unity of consciousness in the concept makes possible recognition (Kant, 1999, p.231), according to which it is possible to reproduce the manifold of intuition, which in turn makes possible apprehension (Kant, 1999, p.230). Thus, the manifold of intuition is synthesized and united in the concept, the objects are only possible for us with this twofold process; we need intuition as well as the concept. Hence, formerly regarded as separated unities of individual and universal or common nature in Suarez, must be regarded indistinctively in Kant, since as representations of understanding, concepts determine the intuitions. Concepts posit rules and according to these rules the manifold of intuition is united and thought through them (Kant, 1999, p.231).

In terms of the principle of individuation, for Suarez, the existence as the entity of an individual is understood as the source of its individuality; the unity and entity of the

individual is almost found to be inseparable (Suarez, 1982, p.121). On the other hand, our elaborations on Kant revealed that individuals as understood as individual objects of our experience, can be considered as individual unities since their manifold is synthesized by the imagination and united in the concept. The source of their unity in this case is the synthetic unity of apperception, which indicates that the thoroughgoing identity of self-consciousness is the ground for all cognition and experience, without which the dispersed and varied empirical representations could not account for even an object. Intuition can provide the unity of an individual object not just because its manifold is synthesized in one consciousness but also because it is synthesized with one consciousness as its object. In that regard, the individual unity of the object and the consciousness regarding that object cannot be separated. In this context, connecting these accounts would require showing the common ground between Suarez's understanding of the entity of the individual and Kant's understanding of consciousness regarding an object. To achieve this, it seems imperative to discuss Kant's understanding of the term *Realität*. Hopefully, this would enable us to look at the term entity from a different perspective.

As the common usage of the term suggests, as also used in that sense in the current section occasionally, reality indicates existence, being or actuality, that is independent of the mind of the subject as opposed to appearance or representation. However, as also pointed out by Marco Giovanelli (2011, p.20), Kant does not oppose reality to appearance, rather, it is opposed to negation. As it was shown, reality is closely related to appearances, since the inaccessible thing in itself is nothing for us, moreover, without the synthesis of "I think", it is impossible to have representations in the first place, what is real is not opposed to appearance, rather, it is regarded as such by the virtue of the appearances. Surely, we must point out that the discussion on thing in itself at the beginning of the chapter spoke of "extra-mental reality", however, in a narrower and more technical sense, reality cannot be "extra-mental" for Kant; as a pure concept of the understanding, its sole usage must be *on appearances*, therefore, any other use of this concept posits the danger of grave mistake.

Now, reality as a category of the understanding, stands under the general heading 'quality', which is defined as "the inner determination of a thing through which it can be distinguished from another as a unity" (Kant, 2005, p.380). Moreover, Kant also states that "the quality of a thing is the determination that represents it as a something or as mere absence, i.e., whose concept contains a being or non-being" (Kant, 2005, p.379). From that

definition, it is apparent that reality, as a determination, represents a thing as something, while negation represents it as merely an absence. Hence, distinction from other things as something, as a unity itself, is closely related to reality as a qualitative determination. That said, reality must be related to materiality, thus, a positive quality must be the case, i.e. sensation, which is the matter of our senses, which cannot be anticipated, i.e., cognized *a priori*, but only empirically apprehended (Kant, 1999, p.290). Accordingly, Kant states that in empirical intuition, reality corresponds to sensation while the absence of the sensation corresponds to negation, in which case there is only pure intuition (Kant, 1999, p.290). In that regard, although there cannot be any extensive magnitude of sensation, since it is independent of space, we can state that it has an intensive magnitude as its degree of affection in sensibility (Kant, 1999, p.290). As long as this intensive magnitude is not zero ($=0$) we can speak of the reality of the object (Kant, 1999, p.290), since “the object as something, *aliquid sive obiectum qualificatum*” (something or the qualified object), is the occupation of space and time” (Kant, 2005, p.380).

In this regard, the reality of the object is not grounded in its existence independent from the mind, as Suarez's entity, rather, it is grounded in its being sensed by the sensibility as the matter of intuition, hence, the reality of the object is grounded in the mind itself. If Suarez's entity is understood as an existence that is independent from the mind, then, things are by themselves individuals, they individuate from their common natures or essences, which are solely mind-dependent as they are the result of a mere abstraction (Suarez, 1960, p. 705), through their entity. Furthermore, this entity grants individuals with their unity as indivision although the entity itself must be coming from God, who can be seen as the source of all individuality. On the other hand, in a Kantian sense, if the entity of the individual object is understood as its reality, i.e. thinghood (which is the actual translation of *realitas*), then the entity can be viewed as the positive qualitative determination of the individual object which is grounded in the sensation as the content of our intuition. Sensation as the empirical manifold and all manifold of intuition, in general, is synthesized by the faculty of imagination and united by the original apperception in the concept of the object, by virtue of which the object first becomes "an object for us", thus, reality and unity of the individual object as the object that exists for us, again, seems to be dependent on the mind, more precisely, the consciousness that unites and renders them as such. In that regard, individual objects, as determined representations, become individuated from the undetermined,

unorganized manifold of representations of the mind by the principle of synthetic unity of apperception. Consequently, the subject itself becomes the source of all unity, hence, individuality, as what grounds the unity of all representations.



5. NIETZSCHE'S VIEWS ON PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUATION RE-EXAMINED

After our historical analysis, it is now time to properly attend to the question of the current study: Is it possible to overcome *principium individuationis*? However, as also mentioned earlier, to answer such a question in the context of Nietzsche's elaborations in *The Birth of Tragedy*, it is crucial to first present how Nietzsche might view the principle. Thus, we have to make a last detour and discuss Nietzsche's understanding of *principium individuationis*, which would enable us to further inquire whether it is possible to overcome it. Since our examination of the history of the principle of individuation granted us with tools to investigate this issue, it is now time to present our reading of Nietzsche's understanding of *principium individuationis*, as the elaborations of the sources of Nietzsche in this early period, such as Schopenhauer and Kant, are explained. In the previous sections, before the historical overview, it was discussed that the principle of individuation, according to Nietzsche's views in *The Birth of Tragedy*, can be viewed as firstly, as a principle that is related to image-making powers of the mind, secondly, a principle that pertains to the forms of cognition of appearances, i.e., "cognitive forms of phenomenal world", thirdly, as a principle that is closely related with the self-identity of the mind of the subject, and lastly, as a principle that determines the distinctions and boundaries between particular objects of representation, as well as the boundary between the subject and the object. In this section, it is argued that each of these diverse aspects of the principle of individuation can be reconciled and presented in a cohesive account. This can be attained if Nietzsche's views are discussed in relation to Kant's understanding of the principle of individuation, which the current study argues is the synthetic unity of apperception. However, before diving into pointing out the parallelism between Kant and Nietzsche, it first might be useful to discuss a little about how Kant can be seen as the predecessor of the views presented in *The Birth of Tragedy*.

Now, at the time of *The Birth of Tragedy*, it is certain that Nietzsche admires both Kant and Schopenhauer and, admits that what these philosophers put forth became the foundations of his own thought (Nietzsche, 1999, p.87). He praises them by stating that they can be seen as victors of a very hard-won war that required "enormous courage and wisdom" against optimism, which is defined as humanity's belief regarding the assertion that all the mysteries of the universe are solvable since we have access to "eternal truths" (Nietzsche, 1999, p.87). According to Nietzsche, optimism is understood very similar to Kant's

understanding of transcendental realism; optimists defend that space, time and causation are “unconditional laws” that have general objective validity beyond the power of the mind, i.e., they are in themselves (Nietzsche, 1999, p.87). In that regard, optimism can be understood as the belief that the lawfulness of the universe belongs to the universe itself, and humans, as beings with reason, have the ability to know these unconditional laws of the universe through their distinct capability. However, Nietzsche claims that by showing that the lawfulness of the universe is not grounded on the things themselves, but rather on the mind, Kant prevailed against optimism since he showed that the universe, as it is in itself, is unknowable to us. Surely, it would be a matter of debate whether Kant can be seen as a pessimistic philosopher as opposed to an optimistic philosopher, however, there is no doubt that Schopenhauer is one. That said, although his praises are attributed to Schopenhauer as well, Nietzsche’s explanation shows that the victory against what he calls “optimism” can be solely attributed to Kant; Schopenhauer’s role can be seen as secondary, since although he builds his philosophy based on Kantian foundations, Kant is the one who provided these foundations in the first place. Hence, since this victory expresses the foundation of the tragic thought that Nietzsche appropriates in his first published book, Nietzsche seems to own Kant more than Schopenhauer.

Supporting our view, regarding the literature on Nietzsche’s connection with Kant, some scholars also suggest that due to his rejection of the notion of “Platonic Ideas”, he can be counted as a Kantian rather than a Schopenhauerian (Hill, 2003, p.3). Regarding this assertion in terms of the rejection of “Platonic Ideas”, if we remember the discussions of individuation in Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and Kant, it would be possible to see that Nietzsche’s understanding of individuation resembles Kant more than Schopenhauer. Although, Kant did not mention any “primordial unity”, if we accept that the primordial unity of Nietzsche can be seen as the thing in itself, it follows that according to both Nietzsche and Kant, individuation occurs from the thing in itself as the unknowable source of all representations, to individual objects of experience, which are individuated by the virtue of the mind. However, Schopenhauer's understanding of individuation is utterly different from this; according to him, the Will as the thing in itself first individuates to Platonic Ideas as "eternal forms of things", then, these Ideas further individuate to particular individual representations of the empirical world.

Regarding these discussions, although viewing the thing in itself as Will (as also expressed as the primordial unity), having a pessimistic view of the world as representation and viewing music as the direct copy of the Will can be counted among Nietzsche's Schopenhauerian commitments, he nonetheless departs from Schopenhauer regarding his views on how individuation is attained, and he resembles Kant more than Schopenhauer in that regard. Accordingly, the current study argues that if Nietzsche's arguments regarding the principle of individuation are examined in relation to Kant's views on related issues that are presented in the previous section, our understanding regarding Nietzsche's views would acquire higher clarity, since, as claimed by the current study, Kant's views can be seen as the proper predecessors of Nietzsche's assertions in *The Birth of Tragedy*.

5.1. Nietzsche's *principium individuationis* and Kant's synthetic unity of apperception

Since our elaboration regarding Kant and Nietzsche showed the possibility of reading Nietzsche from a Kantian perspective, it is now suitable to address and explain the parallelisms between Nietzsche's understanding of *principium individuationis* and Kant's understanding of synthetic unity of apperception. Our findings regarding Nietzsche's view of the principle of individuation indicated that for Nietzsche the *principium individuationis* firstly pertains to a principle of image-making, secondly, a principle that is closely related to forms of cognition of appearances, thirdly, a principle that is almost seen as an equivalent to subjects' self-identity, and fourthly, a principle that is the source of individuality and distinctness of objects. Let us examine each of these features one by one, expressing their parallelism with Kantian understanding of synthetic unity of apperception while presenting the inner connections amongst these seemingly dispersed assertions.

Firstly, both synthetic unity of apperception and *principium individuationis* are closely related to the capacity to produce images, namely, the faculty of imagination. According to Nietzsche, as the expression and deification of the principle of individuation, Apollo represents the "image-making energies" (Nietzsche, 1999, p.15; p.16; p.19; p.120; p.123), this is why he counts epic poetry, sculpture, and all visual arts as Apolline arts (p.23-25). Moreover, Nietzsche uses the analogy of dreaming to describe the art world of Apolline arts (p.14-15; p.25; p.121; p.127). However, he also states that the act of image-making does not solely belong to the fields of art, rather, one can even say that our daily consciousness is also based on the act of image-making since just like the products of visual arts, "this reality

too is a semblance” (Nietzsche, 1999, p.15); according to the philosophical wisdom, one can grasp that there must lie a second reality beyond our ordinary experience (Nietzsche, 1999, p.15). Hence, just like it is in dreams, in which all the objects and representations are put forth by the dreamer, our reality is also constituted by the images that we produce, in that regard, we are like sculptors or image-makers. On the other hand, when we examine Kant’s views regarding the role of image-making in terms of synthetic unity of apperception, we encounter a parallel understanding. As explained earlier, the imagination is a faculty of synthesis; it provides the synthesis of the manifold that is given to the faculty of sensibility and gathered in a synopsis, for them to be united in a cognition (Kant, 1999, p.225). The faculty of imagination, through the synthesis of apprehension, which is one aspect of the three-fold synthesis, enables the mind to go through the manifold of intuition provided to sensibility in time, and produces an image, as an act of spontaneity (Kant, 1999, p.239). This productive use of the faculty of imagination is attained blindly, meaning that the imagination immediately executes its action on the diverse perceptions to gather them in a synthesis (Kant, 1999, p. 211). Hence, it can be said that whatever individual object of experience we cognize, necessarily presupposes the synthesis of imagination as one of the sources that makes cognition possible in the first place. Consequently, from a certain perspective, one can say that ordinary consciousness of daily reality is only possible as we are, just as in dreaming, image-makers.

The second point of parallelism stems from the expression “cognitive forms of phenomenal world”. As it will be shown both Nietzsche’s *principium individuationis* and Kant’s synthetic unity of apperception have an implication regarding the rules of perception and thinking. Since right after its first mention in a quote from Schopenhauer, Nietzsche uses the phrase “cognitive forms of phenomenal world” (Nietzsche 1999, p.17) to address the principle, it is possible to state that, for Nietzsche, *principium individuationis*, viewed similar to Schopenhauer’s understanding of the principle of sufficient reason. According to Schopenhauer, the principle of sufficient reason has four modes based on four faculties of the mind (Schopenhauer, 1974, p.2), hence, they express the necessary rules of the world as representation, based on the subjective constitution of the mind. At first look, it is easy to conclude that Nietzsche simply referred to Schopenhauer’s understanding of the principle of sufficient reason by stating that the principle of individuation pertains to the forms of cognition of appearances. However, examining Kant’s elaborations regarding synthetic

unity of apperception in relation to categories would enable us to have a deeper understanding of the issue.

Now, it is established that the productive synthesis of imagination is crucial for the cognition of objects, however, if this general explanation is narrowed in a certain way, it would reveal that this productive use can be also responsible for the generation of the categories as pure forms of thought and pure concepts of the understanding, through which the experience is even possible. This seems to be the reason why Kant states that “**The unity of apperception in relation to the synthesis of the imagination is the understanding**, and this very same unity, in relation to the **transcendental synthesis** of the imagination, is the **pure understanding**” (Kant, 1999, p.238). As explained in *Transcendental Logic*, the categories as pure concepts are only possible by the synthesis of the pure manifoldness of space and time, in other words, if the manifold of pure intuition is “first be gone through, taken up, and combined in a certain way in order for a cognition to be made out of it” (Kant, 1999, p. 210). Hence, it is certain that the faculty of imagination is at work here. The pure manifoldness of space and time which resides in sensibility is synthesized by the faculty of imagination (Kant, 1999, p. 210) and united in the pure concepts of understanding by the virtue of original apperception (Kant, 1999, p. 211; p.253). In that regard, space and time themselves do not yield any cognition in the proper sense, they are merely forms of intuition, however, by the synthesis of imagination and the unity of apperception, it is possible to determine the pure manifold “through the transcendental action of the imagination” which Kant calls the figurative synthesis (*synthesis speciosa*) (Kant, 1999, p.256; p.258). Thus, this transcendental synthesis of the imagination, concerning the unity of apperception, makes it possible to give unity to the pure manifoldness of space and time, and accordingly, form concepts out of them. Since these pure concepts pertain to the pure forms of thinking of an object, and they have objective validity (Kant, 1999, p.254-255) since they express the formal condition of cognition in the proper sense, it can be said that they are indeed forms of cognition of appearances, i.e. “cognitive forms of phenomenal world” as Nietzsche puts it. In that regard, the discussion above not only expresses the parallelism between Nietzsche's view on *principium individuationis* and Kant's understanding of the synthetic unity of apperception but also shows that based on the subjective constitution of the mind, the faculty of “image-making” is closely connected with the formation of the forms of cognition, according to Nietzsche as well.

Now, as it would be clear, the discussion regarding the third and fourth points of parallelism cannot be separated. According to Nietzsche's explanations in *The Birth of Tragedy*, the subject's self-identity almost portrayed as it is equivalent to the *principium individuationis*, since Nietzsche frequently states that when there is a disruption in the *principium individuationis*, such as it is in Dionysiac ecstasy, the "subjectivity disappears entirely" (Nietzsche, 1999, p.17; p.120), in a state of "self-oblivion" (p.27; p.120-121) or "self-forgetting" (p.17). In such a state, boundaries that are drawn by the Apolline forces (p.50-51), face dissolution by negation of the individuality (p. 133; p.136); on one hand the subject goes through a process of self-dissolution (p.17; p. 40), on the other hand, as subject dissolves, all individual objects of nature as appearances also dissolves into an undetermined oneness that is the ground of everything (p.19; p. 80-81). In that sense, one can say that according to Nietzsche, the identity of the subject is necessarily related to the identity of each appearance and hence, the distinction among them.

Surely, Kant never spoke of such a "lethargic" state in his elaborations of the synthetic unity of apperception. However, it is possible to point out parallelisms between him and Nietzsche, if we focus on what Nietzsche relates with *principium individuationis*. Our elaborations in previous sections showed that according to Kant, the unity of all individual objects of representation stands on the unity of the subject itself (Kant, 1999, p.232-233). Since, the synthesis of imagination, regarding the synthesis of the manifold of intuition, can yield no cognition at all, if the mind does not ascribe a unity to the object that is being gradually produced by this synthesis, in other words, the synthesis of imagination would be in vain if the mind is not conscious of that which it thinks is the very same thing that it thought in the previous moment (Kant, 1999, p.230). This is because if the unity of consciousness as such is not present, there can be no synthesis of reproduction, and if the synthesis of reproduction is impossible, the productive operation of the faculty of imagination in terms of synthesis of apprehension also becomes impossible since what is being apprehended would not yield any connection to what is apprehended in the previous moment (Kant, 1999, p.230). Hence, this unity of consciousness is necessary for the possibility of all cognition. However, we deal only with the manifoldness of our representations, since as what is beyond our subjective constitution, the thing in itself is inaccessible to us (Kant, 1999, p.231), and since the manifoldness of our representations are dispersed and can express no unity, the unity of consciousness regarding the unity of the

individual object must be grounded on the mind of the subject rather than the objects themselves (Kant, 1999, p.231). In that regard, the unity of our representation is no other than the thoroughgoing identity of self-consciousness, as transcendental apperception.

That said, it is important to further elaborate on the implications of such an assertion. As it would be seen, the transcendental apperception or original apperception as the representation "I think", is the ground for firstly drawing the boundary between the subject and object in general, and secondly, drawing the boundary among different representations as it determines the manifold of intuition. As explained in the B Deduction, the representation "I think" must accompany all the representations, otherwise it would be impossible to have a representation, or the representations would mean nothing to us (Kant, 1999, p.246). In that regard, the consciousness regarding a certain representation, namely, the synthesis of the manifold intuition with the representation "I think" is the ground of the unity of that representation; since by synthesizing the manifold of representations in one consciousness, the mind not only synthesizes the manifold of intuition by merely adding one representation to other but also it becomes conscious of the unity of its act, thereby ascribing unity to the representation (Kant, 1999, p.247). In other words, the unity of the representation is the transcendental unity of self-consciousness. According to Kant, this is the "supreme principle of all use of the understanding", it is the "objective condition" of all cognition, not only as something the subject requires to cognize an object but rather as the condition of possibility for an intuition to become an object for the subject in the first place (Kant, 1999, p.248-249). In that regard, the unity of apperception as the transcendental unity of self-consciousness is the foundation of the boundary between the object and the subject; only by virtue of this unity, any object can be given to the subject at all. Hence, without the synthesis of the representation "I think" with the manifold of intuition, neither subject nor object can be distinguished since thinking would have no content and, thus, no possibility of having an object. Now, since it is established that the thoroughgoing identity of self-consciousness (apperception) grounds all consciousness of things (empirical consciousness) (Kant, 1999, p.236), it is suitable also to discuss the role of the synthetic unity of apperception regarding the distinctness of individual objects. As also explained earlier, what gives unity to the objects of experience is the unity of self-consciousness, hence, just as the unity of the individual grounds its distinctness from other individuals, it must be the case that the unity of self-consciousness also grounds the distinctness of individual objects. If we remember

our elaboration on the diversity of individuals regarding Kant's elaborations in the previous chapter, it would be seen that according to Kant, what accounts for the distinctness of the objects is not the objects themselves, nor the space they occupy, but rather it is the consciousness regarding that object; the endnote in B131 indicates that the consciousness of one object necessarily makes it distinguished from other (Kant, 1999, p.246). In that regard, synthetic unity of apperception can be also seen as the source of the distinctness of individual objects of experience, since giving unity, hence identity, to something can be also regarded as the same as distinguishing from others. Consequently, although Kant did not describe any lethargic state in which the subject loses its subjectivity and the individuality disappears as individual representations dissolve into a primordial unity, it can be said that he explained the inner connection between the identity of the subject and the identity of individual objects of representation. In that regard, these discussions suggest that Nietzsche's understanding of *principium individuationis* is closely related to Kant's views regarding the synthetic unity of apperception regarding subjectivity and individuality.

At the beginning of our inquiry, when our findings regarding Nietzsche's understanding of the principle of individuation were presented. It was discussed that the principle of individuation is a principle of image-making, forms of cognizing the appearances, distinction of individual objects, and self-identity of the subject. Although these elaborations seem dispersed and unrelated at first look, our reading of these explanations with an emphasis on Kant's views concerning the synthetic unity of apperception, enabled us to present all these features in a unified account. Hence, instead of assuming Nietzsche purposefully aimed to discuss these features vaguely, it seems safer to assume that being aware of it or not, he had a Kantian understanding of individuality at the core of his views.

5.2. Is it possible to overcome *principium individuationis*?

Based on the discussion presented above, it is now possible to elaborate on Apolline as the expression or deification of the *principium individuationis* and the Dionysiac as the destruction or overcoming of the principle, in a new light. The conception of Apolline seems quite straightforward and easy to grasp. If it is accepted that the synthetic unity of apperception can be seen as equivalent to Nietzsche's *principium individuationis*, then the Apolline would be the expression of the power of the human mind, as it is certain that the world around us, from a very fundamental perspective, is built by the faculties of the mind.

Just as in dreaming, in which it is certain that all the images are put forth by the dreamer, our consciousness individual objects of daily reality are a result of the most primary functions of the mind itself. As long as sensations arise, which are affections on our faculty of sensibility, the mind synthesizes the manifoldness of its intuitions and gradually generates the reality around us. This is attained as the mind ascribes its own unity to its representations, having distinct and determinate representations as objects as a result. Since the unity of all the representations, hence, the world as representation is grounded on the thoroughgoing identity of self-consciousness, it seems not as a surprise that Nietzsche chose Apollo, whose motto is "Know thyself", to express his understanding of the principle of individuation.

On the other hand, based on the recent discussions, if we examine what would Dionysiac as the destruction or overcoming the *principium individuationis*, it becomes more difficult to grasp what it may imply. This is because it seems quite challenging to even assume that the synthetic unity of apperception, which is discussed to be the condition of possibility of all cognition and experience, can be overcome at all. In order to make sense of this claim, let us examine the possibility of the negation of the features of synthetic unity of apperception as the *principium individuationis*, and have a concluding answer to the question of the research question of the current study.

If the principle of individuation expresses the mind's ability to synthesize and unite the manifold of intuition into determinate individual objects, the destruction or the overcoming of that principle would imply a state in which the mind is unable to attain its most fundamental function. In such a state, the unity of consciousness regarding the unity of the objects would become futile, meaning that since the mind is no longer able to ascribe a unity to its representations, what would remain is that indeterminate, indistinctive stream of representations. In that sense, it may not even be suitable to speak of plural representations, since in this state, if the mind loses its ability to synthesize and unite the sensory input it receives into determinate objects, what will remain may indicate, in a sense, a "primordial unity". However, this unity surely cannot be viewed as similar to the unity that the mind ascribes to its representations, rather, on the contrary, it can be viewed as a state of complete indeterminacy and indistinction. These of course can be considered regarding the first and fourth features of the principle of individuation that are discussed above, namely, image-making and distinguishing the individual objects of experience. On the other hand, regarding the second point, the forms of cognizing appearances, it can be said that, as the synthesis of

imagination and the unity of consciousness regarding the manifold of intuition that is synthesized cannot be attained, it will follow that, there must be disruptions regarding even the purest forms of thinking regarding objects, and even the perceptions concerning space and time, as the unity of pure manifoldness of space and time is also attained by the same function. Lastly, and most importantly, regarding the third point discussed previously, since the fundamental actions of the mind cannot be executed, namely, since the manifold of intuition cannot be synthesized and united into an object of experience, it becomes impossible for the mind to set a determinate boundary between itself and its representations. Hence, the subject's identity appears as a problematic issue. If there are no determinate objects to be perceived, then, perception regarding the perception of objects, namely, the consciousness regarding the act of adding representations to each other and uniting them, i.e., apperception, becomes a matter of question, since the boundary between the object and subject cannot be drawn.

Now, Nietzsche's analogy regarding the Dionysiac ecstasy as intoxication seems to become clearer. As opposed to dreaming, which can be seen as in accordance with the mind's ordinary course, intoxication seems to indicate a state of disruption of the mind's ability to execute its most fundamental functions, as a state of exception, in which subjectivity seems to disappear. Thus, the analogy of intoxication seems to be better understood as an extraordinary state of disruption under the influence of "narcotic stimulants" (Nietzsche, 1999, p.122), rather than mere drunkenness. Although contemplating such a state and examining whether it is even possible to speak of such disruptions is very difficult, since neither Kant ever discussed the possibility of disruption regarding the synthetic unity of apperception, nor did Nietzsche explicitly question his elaborations regarding the principle of individuation, it is possible to find aid from other areas of research.

In the fields of neuroscience and philosophy of mind, issues such as the possibility of complete loss of subjectivity, loss of boundaries between self and environment, and disruptions regarding the perceptual processes are examined concerning the phenomenon (which is used to indicate a state of affairs rather than signifying Kantian understanding of the term) of "ego dissolution" under the influence of psychedelic drugs, i.e., a "narcotic stimulant". Although at first look, these examinations seem to have very little to do with either Nietzsche or Kant, it would be clear that they can aid us in discussing the possibility of states in which subjectivity is absent, which appears as our problem regarding the

Dionysiac ecstasy. Surely these studies do not refer to these occurrences of disruptions as such, but rather as “ego dissolution” (Anderson & Rawnsley, 1954; Cohen, 1960; Denber, 1958), “ego death” (Alnæs, 1964; Grof, 1970; McGlothlin, 1964; Pahnke, 1969), “ego loss” (Alnæs, 1964; Leary et al., 1964), or “ego disintegration” (Eisner & Cohen, 1958; Kast and Collins, 1964). Although it is quite rare, the connection between Nietzsche’s explanations in *The Birth of Tragedy* and psychedelic research concerning ego dissolution has also been asserted before (see Clark, 2022). In that regard, before finalizing our arguments and concluding our examination, it seems quite useful to elaborate on these studies.

5.2.1. Ego Dissolution

The literature on psychedelics can be traced back to Huxley’s work, *The Doors of Perception* (2004) which was based on Huxley’s experience regarding the usage of mescaline under the supervision of Humphrey Osmond. Osmond was a British psychiatrist who was investigating psychosis-mimicking effects of mescaline, and he was the first person that suggests the word “psychedelic” as a combination of two Greek words “ψυχή” (soul/mind) and “δελειν” (to reveal); emphasizing the mind-revealing properties of the psychedelics (Carhart-Harris et al., 2014). Even though political developments in the 1960s led to the illegalization of psychedelic drugs, and consequently, the scientific endeavours regarding them were negatively affected (Grinspoon & Bakalar, 1979; Lee & Shlain, 1987), in the last decades, the interest in psychedelic research was increased (Carhart-Harris et al., 2012; Carhart-Harris & Friston, 2019; Gonzalez-Maeso et al., 2007; Roseman et al., 2018; Yaden & Griffiths, 2021). Although its underlying neuropharmacological mechanisms explained in great detail by researchers (see Carhart-Harris et al., 2012; 2014; Cowdrey et al., 2012; Erritzoe et al., 2009; Glennon et al., 1984; Hagmann et al., 2008; Raichle & Snyder, 2007; Spreng & Grady, 2010; Qin & Northoff, 2011; Zou et al., 2009), it would be impossible and misleading to discuss them here in detail, thus, our focus will be more on its subjective effects on the mind. However, it seems imperative to at least summarize the conception regarding the mechanisms that are affected by psychedelic use to understand its subjective effects on the mind.

In this context, the most useful explanation regarding this issue seems to be put forth by Carhart-Harris et al. (2014) under the title “entropic brain hypothesis”. The entropic brain hypothesis was expanded with Friston’s free energy principle (2010), into a unified model for psychedelics; the relaxed beliefs under the psychedelics (REBUS) model (Carhart-Harris

& Friston, 2019). According to the free energy principle, organisms' brains tend to minimize energy consumption by forming structures that predict the source of sensory input, thereby decreasing the energy consumption resulting from the processing of information (Friston, 2010). In that regard, one of the main premises of the REBUS model is hierarchical-predictive coding. According to this, the brain implements a top-down prediction process for contextualizing sensory input to minimize surprise and explain the source of the sensation in the best way (Carhart-Harris & Friston, 2019). The ascending inputs are compared with descending predictions and prediction errors (surprise) pass through higher levels of the hierarchy for updating expectations (Carhart-Harris & Friston, 2019). In this context, it is claimed that psychedelics relax the weighting of these predictions or priors that are encoded in the neural hierarchies, in a way that facilitates bottom-up information flow, which can be used to revise and update pathological priors (Carhart-Harris & Friston, 2019). In that sense, since psychedelic use induces a disruption in the cortical structures that are seen as organizers of brain activity (Huang & Sereno, 2013; Griffiths et al., 2017), it is asserted that they are linked to decompressing influences on perception, cognition, and emotion (Carhart-Harris & Friston, 2019). To sum up, based on these mechanisms, it is asserted that the mind forms structures to process the data that is given the faculty of sensibility, and the use of psychedelics as a "narcotic stimulant" disrupts the dominance of these structures, thereby loosening the determinations that are previously put forth by the mind. In that regard, although it seems controversial, there is an increasing consensus on the therapeutic effects of psychedelic use regarding mental disorders such as depression, OCD and even drug addiction (Carhart-Harris et al., 2014).

That said, even though it is evident that it can be induced by also meditation (Milliere et al., 2018), and other circumstances such as near-death experiences (Martial et al., 2021), ego dissolution is mostly examined in relation to psychedelic use (Milliere, 2017). Defined as a "complete loss of subjective self-identity" (Griffiths et al., 2008), or more generally, as disruptions in self-consciousness (Milliere et al., 2018), the phenomenon of ego dissolution is reported to include perceptual abnormalities such as disturbance of perception regarding space and time (Milliere, 2017), a sense of loss of boundaries (Blei et al., 2003), enhanced sensory awareness especially in terms of vision (Lebedev et al., 2015), and as the most crucial and controversial feature, subjective disruptions regarding the sense of self, such as the feeling of merging with the environment (Mishara et al., 2015), or "final stage of

egolessness” (Huxley, 2004). Furthermore, personal reports regarding ego dissolution also seem to include expressions like “I experienced a disintegration of my self or ego” (Muthukumaraswamy et al., 2013), “It seemed to me as though I did not have a body anymore” or “Everything seemed to unify into an oneness” (Studerus et al., 2010).

Now, although we can superficially conclude that the alterations regarding perceptions of one’s surroundings, objects, and even space and time might be related to the disrupting effects of psychedelics on perceptual and bodily processes as it is also indicated by the entopic brain hypothesis and the research regarding the chemical and physical effects on psychedelic substances on the brain, it is quite challenging to validate the expressions regarding the instances of ego dissolution. This is due to a variety of complications, for instance, it is questionable to assume whether the participants of the studies mentioned above have a consensus about what they define as their self and ego. Moreover, although the literature indicates that the phenomena related to ego dissolution can be investigated qualitatively (Addy et al., 2015) as well as quantitatively (Lynn, et al., 2023), one must admit that it is a very complicated and multilayered issue, not only due to empirical challenges but also philosophical challenges. For our understanding regarding ego dissolution seems to be always understood in terms of statements that include phrases such as "a feeling of...", and "a sense of...". These phrases seem to indicate a contradiction since it is a matter of question how one can even speak of any "feeling" or "sense" if the subjectivity is negated due to the dissolution of the ego.

On this issue, while some scholars indicate that it is impossible to have an experience without self-consciousness (Billion & Kriegel, 2015), others defend that it is indeed possible as it is in ego dissolution (Letheby, 2020). According to Billion and Kriegel (2015), the former claim can be called as Subjectivity Principle (SP), and they argue that although there are reports counted as counterexamples of SP, as in thought insertion instances in schizophrenic patients, what is disrupted is not the subjectivity itself but rather the patients’ understanding regarding their “subjectivity”, suggesting that the subject is still intact in those instances. Hence, it must be the case that although these patients allegedly perceive themselves as an "alien" (which simply implies that they do not feel like themselves), this only implies a disruption regarding their view of themselves as a subject, not their subjectivity itself (Billion & Kriegel, 2015). Thus, their subjectivity is not indeed disrupted since it is still them that is perceiving. On this view, Letheby (2020) argues that reports of

psychedelic-induced ego dissolutions can be seen as counterexamples to SP since they can be seen as evidence for experiences which does not include self-consciousness, they can be counted as examples of experiences that do not include a subject. However, following SP, Fink (2020) stresses that even though these reports can be seen as genuine, it cannot be denied that they are “self-defeating” in terms of accountability. According to Fink (2020), for instance, if we accept a report that states “I experienced a complete loss of myself” which “explicitly” indicates that the person experienced a state in which his/her self was not existent but “implicitly” supports the opposite of the claim by “affirming” the “existence of the self” by presenting a “first-person” statement, we are doomed to arrive at problematic conclusions. Therefore, since these types of reports indicate a contradiction, they should not be counted as accountable sources of information. Consequently, it can be said that the possibility of the complete loss of subjectivity in a state of ego dissolution can only be argued if the self can be defined without referring to the SP, namely, the necessity of self-consciousness in experience. For otherwise, as is seen above, it would always express a contradiction.

According to Gurwitsch (1941), the views regarding consciousness can be divided into egological and non-egological views of consciousness. Regarding this division, Zahavi (2006, p.99) exemplifies an egological view of consciousness as follows:

...when I watch a movie by Bergman, I am not only intentionally directed at the *movie*, nor merely aware of the movie being *watched*, I am also aware that it is being watched by *me*, that is, that *I am watching the movie*. (Zahavi, 2006, p.99)

Accordingly, it can be said that the egological views of consciousness assert that self-consciousness as the subject of experience cannot be separated from the experience itself, no matter the circumstances. On the other hand, according to Zahavi (2006), the non-egological views of consciousness hold that the experiences cannot be attributed to an underlying ego, rather, “they are anonymous mental events that simply occur, and minimal self-awareness should, consequently, be understood as the acquaintance that consciousness has with itself and not as an awareness of an experiencing self” (p. 100). In other words, the non-egological view of consciousness asserts that there is only experience and awareness regarding the experience, hence, the ego cannot be the ground of experience as self-consciousness since as we are embedded in experiences, i.e. living them, the ego does not

appear (Zahavi, 2006, p.99-100). It only appears in reflection, when one abstracts from all the diverse experiences and attempts to posit what is common in all those experiences. Thus, it follows that the self is not a thing among existent things, but rather only a “representational construct” (Zahavi, 2006, p.102).

This non-egological view of the self can be seen in accordance with Deane’s (2020) explanations regarding ego dissolution. According to Deane, following Friston’s free energy principle, the self can be understood as one of the deep temporal models, i.e., a construct of our brain, that aids the organism in increasing its chance of survival by successfully predicting future events and predicting the actions that should be taken in possible dangerous circumstances. In that regard, this view suggests that our sense of self is merely a mental construct which is a result of neurological mechanisms of the brain to increase the chance of survival. If that is the case, it follows that the psychedelic-induced ego dissolution can be conceptualized as the disruption of the activity of cortical structures that are responsible for the organization of information processing in the brain; since in such a state the hierarchical prediction is disrupted, our sense of the self, as a deep temporal model that can be classified as one of the high-level constructs, is also disrupted.

However, these non-egological explanations of self still beg the question of how one can speak of these experiences if there is no self involved. Zahavi’s account of the two notions of the self can shed light on the issue. After a long discussion on egological and non-egological views on consciousness, Zahavi (2006) attempts to propose a new understanding that regards both of the views as complementary (p.103; p.129). His suggestions seem to indicate that both egological and non-egological views can be seen as accountable since they refer to different aspects of self-hood. While the egological views can be seen as referring to the minimal or core self (p.106), as highlighting “first-personal givenness” (p.122), the non-egological views seem to be referring to the narrative or autobiographical self, which is understood as our understanding of “constructed” self (p.112). Accordingly, the minimal self can be understood as pure subjectivity, and self-referentiality (p.129) as it indicates that there is a self-consciousness that is not affected by any circumstance, on the other hand, the narrative self can be understood as a “narrative construction” that is gradually built by the experiences and our interactions with the world (p.129). It is narrative since it is bound to the rules of time, since it has a beginning and, supposedly, an end. That said, Zahavi underlines the narrative self is “ontologically dependent” on the minimal self (p.129), in that

sense, one can say that the narrative self is an aggregation of experiences that are experienced by the minimal self.

Regarding these elaborations, it is possible to elaborate on the phenomenon of ego dissolution from a different perspective. It is pointed out by different authors that even though the mind is heavily affected by the use of psychedelics, some features of subjectivity must be preserved (Pahnke, 1969; Shanon, 2002, p.203). In that regard, if it is argued that the self-hood can be understood as minimal as well as narrative and if it is also accepted that the minimal self can never be interrupted, i.e., each experience must include self-consciousness, then it follows that the "ego" in the instances of ego dissolution cannot be referring to the minimal self, rather, it must be the case that ego dissolution must pertain only to the narrative self. This is also consistent with the view of Billon and Kriegel (2015) regarding SP, since the narrative self, in principle, is not the traditional understanding of the subject as the perceiving self, rather, it is the perceived self, i.e., our understanding regarding ourselves with an emphasis on the temporal extension of our experiences. In that regard, it is possible to state that the disruption in terms of narrative self can be also regarded as a disruption regarding our perception in general, just as the perceptions regarding the outer objects alter fundamentally, it must be the case that our inner perceptions also altered as such. Consequently, if the "ego" in ego dissolution is understood as the perception of the constructed narrative self, instead of the minimal self-consciousness, it becomes possible to at least make sense of self-reports regarding the instances of ego dissolution.

5.2.2. The impossibility of overcoming the principle

Now, in light of the discussions above, it can be seen that explanations about ego dissolution and Dionysiac ecstasy seem to both assert that it is possible to experience a state in which one loses its subjectivity and feels a sense of oneness with everything that surrounds it. Accordingly, explanations regarding both instances share the same contradiction, namely, the contradiction of having an experience without a subject of experience. The discussion regarding ego dissolution showed that the understanding and definition of self-hood is crucial to conclude that whether such states are even possible. In that regard, if we return to the discussion on whether it is possible to overcome *principium individuationis* in Nietzsche, we can see that answering this question would require Nietzsche's understanding of subjectivity, at least at the time of *The Birth of Tragedy*. There appear to be two possibilities

regarding Nietzsche's understanding of subjectivity, both of which would show that it is impossible to overcome *principium individuationis*.

Firstly, if we assume that Nietzsche's views regarding subjectivity are in accordance with Kant's views just as is the case in terms of individuation, then it would be seen that it is impossible to overcome *principium individuationis*. According to Kant, the transcendental apperception, as the thoroughgoing identity of self-consciousness, is clearly distinguished by the empirical apperception; later he will also refer to the former as apperception, and to the latter as inner sense (Kant, 1999, p.257). He states:

One must distinguish pure (transcendental) apperception from empirical apperception *percipientis*, from *apperceptiva percepti*. The first merely asserts I am. The second that I was, I am, and I will be, i.e., I am a thing of past, present, and future time, where this consciousness that I am is common to all things as a determination of my existence as a magnitude. (Kant, 2005, p.365)

Hence, one can say that while the former expresses pure subjectivity, which is responsible for synthesizing the manifold of intuition in one consciousness and grounds experience and cognition of objects, the latter can be viewed as a mere representation since it expresses how "I appear to myself" (Kant, 1999, p.259), in time. As also explained in B153-B156, while apperception expresses the spontaneity of the mind as it expresses the unity of the action of synthesizes the manifold of intuition, the inner sense expresses receptivity since "we intuit ourselves as we are internally affected" (Kant, 1999, p.259). In that regard, just as the outer intuitions cannot be counted as any determinate object without the synthesis of imagination and the unity of apperception, the intuitions of inner sense also must be synthesized and united for them to be an object for the subject; in that case, the object is subject itself as it appears to itself, not as it is in itself (Kant, 1999, p.259).

Now, if in Dionysiac ecstasy, as a state of intoxication, the mind's most fundamental functions are disrupted, namely, if the synthesis of imagination cannot be attained properly, hence representations cannot receive their unities by the determination of the mind, this inability must pertain to the inner intuitions as well as outer intuitions. In that regard, this would indicate that empirical apperception cannot be attained properly, in other words, the

subject's representations regarding itself also cannot be determined as an object, which would suggest that the existence of the empirical self, i.e., the perceived self as what is common to all innumerable and dispersed empirical representations, cannot be determined as a magnitude. However, although it might be the case that the unity of the thoroughgoing self-consciousness cannot be ascribed to the representations, and thus, it becomes impossible to distinguish and determine the representations of the mind into individual objects, it seems impossible to suggest that the unity of self-consciousness itself is negated. According to Kant's assertions, the unity of consciousness regarding objects is necessarily grounded on the unity of the self-identity of the subject, hence, the thoroughgoing self-consciousness can be regarded as the necessary condition of possibility of all experience. Thus, this must also include the experiences that can be counted as extraordinary such as Dionysiac ecstasy.

According to Nietzsche's explanations, it can be said that even though it is an unusual case, it is nevertheless an experience to be in such a state, hence, it can be said that regardless of his claims concerning the destruction of subjectivity, self-consciousness is still intact. Although much evidence can be found for this claim in *The Birth of Tragedy*, a peculiar passage can be examined to validate the latter argument:

The reason for this is that the ecstasy of the Dionysiac state, in which the usual barriers and limits of existence are destroyed, contains, for as long as it lasts, a lethargic element in which all personal experiences from the past are submerged. This gulf of oblivion separates the worlds of everyday life and Dionysiac experience⁹. But as soon as daily reality re-enters consciousness, it is experienced as such with a sense of revulsion; the fruit of those states is an ascetic, will-negating mood. In this sense Dionysiac man is similar to Hamlet: both have gazed into the true essence of things, they have *acquired knowledge* and they find action repulsive, for their actions can do nothing to change the eternal essence of things; they regard it as laughable or shameful that they should be expected to set to rights a world so out of joint. (Nietzsche, 1999, p.40)

As it can be seen, the above explanation suggests that the Dionysiac ecstasy has a determinate beginning and an end, which in turn suggests that the subject remains intact

⁹ Although translated here as "experience", the original text shows that Nietzsche did not use this word but rather "reality" (*dionysischen Wirklichkeit*) (Nietzsche, 1872, p.35).

whatever the conditions are. Moreover, if daily reality "re-enters consciousness", then it must be the case that there must be a consciousness regarding some other state preceding this re-entering, which is stated to be the Dionysiac ecstasy; this suggests that whatever this ecstasy pertains to, it is regardless a consciousness of some state, which suggests that there is still an implicit distinction between subject and object. This is also evident from the description of the "Dionysiac man" who "gazed into the true essence of things". Although it may seem very controversial, this explanation indicates that there is first a subject of experience, who "gazes", and second, an object of experience as "true essence of things", whatever these may refer to. Lastly, if the first sentences of the passage are examined, it can be asserted that what Nietzsche understands from the subject can be seen as a parallel to Zahavi's understanding of the narrative self or Kant's understanding of empirical apperception, since he does not seem to explicitly deny that the self-consciousness is disrupted, but rather, the subject's view regarding "all personal experiences from the past". While this indicates the mind's inability to distinguish and determine representations, even the ones belonging to the inner sense, it also explains the terms "self-forgetting" or "self-oblivion", which suggest that the subject's view of itself is disrupted, not the subjectivity. Hence, from these elaborations it can be said that even though somehow the mind's ability to distinguish and determine its representations, i.e., synthesizing the manifold of its intuitions uniting them into individual objects, is disrupted by the intoxication in Dionysiac ecstasy, the ground of synthetic unity of apperception, i.e., *principium individuationis*, as the thoroughgoing unity of self-consciousness is still preserved, thus, it can be said that there is still a boundary between the subject and object. Consequently, if it is accepted that Nietzsche shared Kant's views regarding subjectivity as well as individuation, although there can be some sort of disruption regarding *principium individuationis*, it is nevertheless impossible to overcome it completely. Otherwise, the Dionysiac ecstasy would indicate the end of the existence of the subject, which is clearly not the case here.

Secondly, if Nietzsche held a different view regarding subjectivity, in other words, if he did not view self-consciousness as a necessary condition of experience just as in the non-egological view that is presented above, this would indicate that the *principium individuationis* refers not to a principle of individuation but only distinction, which contradicts the basic assumptions of Nietzsche's account regarding Apolline and Dionysiac. Now, according to the views that are presented after the publication of *The Birth of Tragedy*,

namely, Nietzsche's writings throughout the 1880s as they are presented in *The Will to Power* (1968), it is possible to see that Nietzsche holds a non-egological view regarding subjectivity. He argues that the "I" as the self-consciousness that is the ground of all thinking is a "habitual fiction" (p.268). He asserts that Descartes' assertions regarding the ego, must not be seen as metaphysical truths but only results of "our grammatical custom", in other words, he rejects the need for a "thinking subject" that grounds "thinking" (p.268). Elsewhere, he also states:

The "subject" is not something given, it is something added and invented and projected behind what there is. (Nietzsche, 1968, p.267)

Although it might be problematic to consider these views valid for examining *The Birth of Tragedy* due to the risk of anachronism, they nevertheless help us to consider the second alternative regarding his views on subjectivity. If somehow these views are rooted as early as 1872, then, understanding *The Birth of Tragedy* appears even as a harder challenge.

Let us suppose Nietzsche had a non-egological view of subjectivity as presented above. If the subject is something constructed and there is no self-consciousness that grounds all the unity and individuality of the objects of representation, i.e., if our evaluation regarding the *principium individuationis* as the synthetic unity of apperception is simply false, then it must be the case that the objects of experience must be already individuated and yield a unity of their own. This would indicate that the individuality of these objects must be grounded on something other than the mind. In that regard, since the individuals are already individuated, i.e., they have a unity of their own, in other words, if they are in themselves, it becomes imperative to assert that the Dionysiac is not the destruction of individuality, and the primordial unity as the source of all things, simply cannot be understood as such. On the other hand, Apolline also cannot express the semblance aspect of reality, since in that case, the images must be already made, hence, there would be no need for image-making and no semblance. Lastly, if the individual objects have a unity that is not grounded in the mind, i.e., if they are in themselves, then Kant's victory over "optimism", which claimed to be one of the building blocks of Nietzsche's thought in *The Birth of Tragedy*, would become futile since it would become possible to ascribe reality to the objects that are independent from the mind. Consequently, according to Nietzsche in *The Birth of Tragedy*, if there is no self-consciousness that grounds the individuality of objects, then it will follow that the Dionysiac

ecstasy cannot be regarded as a state in which one "acquires knowledge" regarding the "true essence of things", rather, it can be merely referred as a state of exception in which the individual objects falsely appears as if they are dissolving into each other. Therefore, the assumption that it is possible to overcome *principium individuationis* seems to contradict Nietzsche's view of the principle itself. In conclusion, it seems safe to assert that the *principium individuationis* is impossible to overcome.



6. CONCLUSION

The purpose of the current study was to examine Nietzsche's views regarding *principium individuationis* in the context of his first published book *The Birth of Tragedy* and, from a critical point of view, discuss whether it is possible to overcome this principle as Nietzsche asserted in his book. Although *The Birth of Tragedy* can be examined from a variety of perspectives, since it is a multilayered work, the focus of this study was solely on the explanations regarding the concept of *principium individuationis*. This is due to several reasons. Firstly, according to the reading of the current study, the *principium individuationis* seems to be the key concept, according to which the Dionysiac and Apolline are defined. In that regard, it expresses utter significance since many challenging aspects of *The Birth of Tragedy* seem to arise from the vague elaborations on Dionysiac, Apolline and the relationship between them. Secondly, even though scholars presented great effort to understand and elaborate on this controversial work, it seems that the concept of *principium individuationis* is rarely discussed in detail, thus, there seems to be a need for an examination which would hopefully facilitate the understanding concerning the book by presenting a discussion focused on the concept of *principium individuationis*. Thirdly, the principle of individuation seems to play a crucial role concerning one of the most controversial aspects of the book. Nietzsche's explanations suggest that it is possible to overcome *principium individuationis*, which leads to a peculiar state of consciousness, in which the boundaries of existence as the limits that distinguish subject, and object are destroyed. In such a state, according to Nietzsche, while all distinctions and all individuality are negated, the primordial unity as the ground of things becomes somehow accessible. Hence, this study also assumed the duty of making sense of these claims and examining whether these assertions can be attainable. That said, it was not the concern of the current research what may induce such a state of ecstasy, rather, the possibility of such a state in philosophical terms was examined.

To attain the goal that is presented above, it was imperative to present a comprehensive account of the concept of *principium individuationis* and discuss how Nietzsche viewed this principle. At first look, it seems that Nietzsche simply borrowed the concept from Schopenhauer. Accordingly, it seems that he is heavily under the influence of Schopenhauer, at least in terms of his view of music and his thoughts on pessimism. However, it must be stressed that Nietzsche diverts from his Schopenhauerian commitments in many respects, one of the most important being his view of individuation, which is almost

completely different from Schopenhauer's. The examination of Nietzsche's assertions in *The Birth of Tragedy* showed that his understanding of *principium individuationis* has many seemingly dispersed implications. It is a principle of image-making, a principle that expresses the forms of cognition of appearances, a principle that accounts for the individuality and distinctness of objects of experience and a principle that is closely related to the self-identity of the subject. Regarding the last point, it is claimed that as the principle disappears subjectivity vanishes entirely. To discuss these features in a unified account, hence, understanding Nietzsche's views properly, it was required to examine the historical development of conceptualization concerning *principium individuationis*.

The examination of Suarez, whose works provide a rich discussion on the matter, revealed that issues such as plurality and distinction from others can only be possible by virtue of the unity of the individual. Since the universals or common natures do not express a real but only conceptual unity, the only actual unity in the universe is the individual unity. Accordingly, it is seen that the principle of individuation as the cause of individuation is simply the existence of the individual as understood as the entity. Hence, since the individuals individuate from essences or common natures (which have only unity as they are regarded as a matter of mental consideration as abstractions) by their existence, and since the unity of actual things cannot be separated from the existence, it can be said that the *principium individuationis* must be regarded also as the principle that accounts for the unity of the individual.

On the other hand, our elaborations on Locke showed that he also asserted that the *principium individuationis* is existence, however, Locke regards existence as spatiotemporally continued being of a certain thing. Moreover, he viewed individuality as identity. In that regard, we can only speak of the individuality, i.e., identity, of a certain thing if its existence is determined by space and time. For instance, the individuality and identity of a material body depends on the identity of its atoms; as long as it is constituted by the numerically same atoms, it can be said that it is "that" material body. However, spatiotemporally continued existence can be interpreted differently for different things, for example, it can be understood as life, i.e., the biological organization as spatiotemporally continued existence for animals and plants, and it can be understood as consciousness, since it constitutes spatiotemporally continued existence of the person. What is significant in Locke's account is firstly, his emphasis on the identity aspect of individuality and secondly,

and more importantly, his emphasis on identity and diversity being initially ideas of the human mind. According to the latter, it is implied that things are not by themselves identical or individual, but only the mind renders them as such when it compares the very same thing with itself at different times and decides that it is identical with itself, i.e., an individual.

Although the mind's role in terms of individuation is stressed by Locke, it is seen that Kant takes the issue to another level. That said, it is important to emphasize that Kant did not explicitly discuss his views regarding the principle of individuation. However, it is possible to present an account of Kantian individuation based on an examination of his views. The discussion on Suarez revealed that to speak of the *principium individuationis*, it is first imperative to understand what gives unity to objects. According to Kant, the objects around us are not things in themselves but rather only representations, even space and time are forms of intuition that reside in the mind. In that sense, it was necessary to present the source of the unity of objects of experience to account for a principle of individuation in Kant. Since the thing in itself, the reality that is independent of the mind is inaccessible to us, we are only dealing with the manifoldness of our representations. However, the manifold of our representations is dispersed and thus, it cannot account for a thoroughgoing unity, even though it is certain that the objects of experience have a unity through which they can be regarded as the same object, otherwise, all cognition would become impossible for us. Hence, the unity of our representations must be grounded on something else. According to Kant's explanations regarding the synthetic unity of apperception, it is revealed that besides the capability to passively receive representations, our mind also has an ability to actively produce cognitions based on what it receives, as an act of spontaneity. The aggregation of the manifold of sensible intuition is synthesized, organized, and united into determinate objects by the faculties of the mind. In that sense, it is seen that the unity of the object of experience is grounded on the mind itself; as the mind adds one representation to another and becomes conscious of the unity of its act, it becomes possible to ascribe the thoroughgoing unity of self-consciousness to the objects of experience, thereby determining them. Consequently, it is seen that, in Kantian philosophy, the source of the unity of objects of experience is the synthesis of the manifold of intuition and the unity given by the original apperception, thus, the Kantian principle of individuation can be regarded as the synthetic unity of apperception.

After the examination of historical development regarding the conceptualization of the *principium individuationis*, it is now possible to discuss how Nietzsche viewed the principle. It is first important to note that although the principle was originally seen as a physical principle, i.e., a principle that is independent of the mind and as a part of the constitution of objects, throughout the ages, this conception is changed and when it comes to Kant, it is certain that it belongs to the mind of the subject rather than objects themselves. Hence, it is possible to assume that Nietzsche held a similar understanding to Kant, as he also praises Kant alongside Schopenhauer as the predecessor of his thoughts in *The Birth of Tragedy*. Furthermore, if Nietzsche's views regarding the *principium individuationis* discussed in relation to Kant's assertions of the synthetic unity of apperception, it can be seen that his seemingly dispersed views can be presented in a unified discussion. The synthetic unity of apperception holds that the manifold of intuition is synthesized by the faculty of imagination and united by the original apperception. In that regard, the mind actively produces an image as a necessary condition for cognition, moreover, alongside the empirical manifold, the pure manifoldness of space and time is also synthesized and united in the pure concepts of the understanding which express the necessary rules of thinking of an object. All of these are surely grounded on the thoroughgoing unity of self-consciousness, i.e., the identity of the subject, which determines the manifold of intuition and accounts for distinct, individual objects of experience. Consequently, it seems suitable to state Nietzsche's previously mentioned views can be understood in relation to the synthetic unity of apperception.

That said, in this new framework, it is seen that while Apolline expresses the power of the mind, i.e., its ability to actively put forth its images and representations, the Dionysiac on the other hand, as a state of ecstasy and intoxication, indicates a disruption regarding the most fundamental abilities of the mind. Even though the explanations in *The Birth of Tragedy* can be understood as such, one aspect of Dionysiac ecstasy presents a problem, namely, the complete destruction of subjectivity. Since neither Kant discussed such a possibility nor Nietzsche clearly presented what he meant by this, the current study used aid from studies in the fields of neuroscience and philosophy of mind. These studies examined the phenomenon of "ego dissolution", a state in which it is claimed that subjectivity disappears. However, our discussion on the issue revealed that subjectivity cannot completely vanish, rather, there seems to be changes regarding the perceptions of the subject,

including perceptions concerning the subject's own subjectivity. In that regard, instead of a disruption of subjectivity itself, it is claimed that there must be a disruption concerning the perception of subjectivity. If a parallel discussion is presented in the case of Dionysiac ecstasy, it must be seen that although the individuality of representations may become futile, the thoroughgoing identity of the subject cannot be disrupted. In that regard, it is asserted that in the state of intoxication, what is disrupted is the empirical self, as a representation, but not the subjectivity itself. Consequently, even though it can be accepted that there can be disruptions in the *principium individuationis*, it is impossible to overcome it completely.



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