


T.C.
ANTALYA BİLİM UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF POSTGRADUATE EDUCATION
GLOBAL POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
THESIS PROGRAM



**AN ANALYSIS OF CHINA’S APPROACH TO LIBERAL
INTERNATIONAL ORDER FROM THEORETICAL AND
EMPIRICAL POINTS OF VIEW**

DISSERTATION

PREPARED BY
IFRAH WALI

ANTALYA – 2021

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APPROVAL/NOTIFICATION FORM

ANTALYA BİLİM UNIVERSITY

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IFRAH WALI, a student of Antalya Bilim University, Institute of Post Graduate Education, Global Politics and International Relations owning student ID 181115002, successfully defended the thesis/dissertation entitled “AN ANALYSIS OF CHINA’S APPROACH TO LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL ORDER FROM THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL POINTS OF VIEW”, which she prepared after fulfilling the requirements specified in the associated legislations,

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PREFACE

This study is prepared as a Master's Thesis of Antalya Bilim University covers China's approach to Liberal International Order. Within the framework of this study, a literature review was done, and studies on the subject were examined. I would like to share my gratitude to Prof. Dr. H. Tarık OĞUZLU, who shared his views and suggestions with me at various stages of the thesis. I would also like to thank my family and friends for their supports over the years.

ÖZET

Liberal Uluslararası Düzen (LUD), soğuk savaş sonrası ABD hegemonik düzeninde örtülü olarak devam etmektedir. Bu tez, Çin'in LUD'a yaklaşımını teorik ve ampirik bir perspektiften incelemektedir. İkincil araştırmalar kullanılarak betimsel bir analiz yapılmaktadır. Uluslararası ilişkiler kuramsal toplumsallaşma anlayışı ele alınmaktadır. LUD'un evrimi, LUD'un alanları, kurucu normları ve ilkeleri ele alınmaktadır. Çin'in düzen unsurlarının normlarına ve kurumlarına sosyalleşmesi analiz edilmektedir. Bulgular, Çin'in uluslararası düzende bir liderlik pozisyonu elde etmeye çalışırken ulusal çıkarlarını korumak için çeşitlendirilmiş bir strateji izlediği sonucuna varmaktadır. Çin düzeni bastırmaya çalışmadığı gibi düzen içinde pasif bir aktör olarak da kalmıyor. Giderek daha etkili bir ulus olarak Çin, düzenin değerleriyle uyuşmayan veya ulusal çıkarlarını tehdit etmeyen yönlerine meydan okuma, biçimlendirme ve reform yapma konusundaki istekli olduğunu göstermiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Çin, Liberal Uluslararası Düzen, Uluslararası Kurumlar, Sosyalleşme, Normlar.

ABSTRACT

Liberal International Order (LIO) remains embedded in the post-war US hegemonic order. This thesis delves into China's approach towards LIO from a theoretical and empirical perspective. A descriptive analysis is conducted utilizing secondary research. International relations theoretical understanding of socialization is considered. The evolution of the LIO, the domains of the LIO and its constitutive norms and principles are discussed. Socialization of China to the norms and institutions of the elements of the order is analyzed. The findings conclude that China pursues a diversified strategy to safeguard its national interests while striving to obtain a leadership position within the international order. Neither is China working to suppress the order nor is it staying as a passive subject to it. As an increasingly influential nation, China has displayed its willingness to challenge, mold and reform the aspects of the order which do not align with its values or threaten its national interests.

Keywords: China, Liberal International Order, International Institutions, Socialization, Norms.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADB	: Asian Development Bank
AIIB	: Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
ARF	: ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	: The Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BOP	: Balance of Power
BRI	: Belt and Road Initiative
CCP	: Chinese Communist Party
EEZ	: Exclusive Economic Zones
EU	: European Union
GATT	: General Agreement on Trade and Tariff
IMF	: International Monetary Fund
IO	: International Organization
IR	: International Relations
LIB	: Liberal International Order
MIDs	: Militarized Interstate Disputes
NATO	: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OECD	: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSCE	: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PCA	: Permanent Court of Arbitration
PRC	: People's Republic of China
RCEP	: Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
SCO	: Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SRF	: Silk Road Fund
TPP	: Trans-Pacific Partnership
TTIP	: Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
UN	: United Nations
UNSC	: United Nations Security Council
USA	: United States of America

WB : World Bank
WTO : World Trade Organization



CHAPTER 1

1. INTRODUCTION

During a Politburo Standing Committee Members' meeting the president of People's Republic of China (PRC) Xi Jinping announced that the “*fundamental purpose*” for China’s “*participation in global governance*” is to “*serve the achievement of the Chinese Dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation*” (Bandaranayake, 2020). The “*Chinese Dream*” commits that by the 100th year anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2021 Chinese domestic economy will have doubled, the nation would be powerful and prosperous, and the “rejuvenation of the great Chinese nation” will be achieved. According to the CCP in order to achieve the rejuvenation aspirations of China, an important task to accomplish is the “recovery of sovereignty over Chinese territories lost through the imposition of unequal treaties by hostile foreign powers”. Mingfu, author of the “*China Dream*” book, stated that the geopolitical map used by PRC is the “*clear standard for national sovereignty and territory*” (Sunday Guardian, 2020).

The ambiguity of the statements made by the Chinese political elites along with the contrasting and contradictory approach taken by PRC in the international system has raised many questions regarding China’s approach towards the current Liberal International Order (LIO). The CCP leadership has time and again mentioned their support for the rule-based multilateral elements like international institutions of the LIO but have rejected the US led liberal norms of democracy promotion and human rights along with the system of military alliances which are the foundation of the post war American hegemonic order (Ying, 2016).

It is fairly obvious that China’s attitude towards the LIO and China’s behaviour regarding it will be critical in establishing the future of the LIO. If China adapts the key norms of the order, gets socialized into the domains of the LIO and adheres to them during

its interactions with other actors then even if China remains critical of the US and maintains its middle kingdom aspirations the LIO will remain strong. On the other hand, if China holds a revisionist objective towards the LIO, questions the legitimacy of the institutions of the LIO and establishes substitute institutions along with staking sovereignty and territorial integrity claims on land and on sea despite the potential for war it will cause the LIO to crumble. It will cause tensions to peak between China and the main proponent of LIO i.e. US.

As China becomes a major power in the international system, it is important to consider whether China will use its influence to undermine the established international norms crucial to the order's continued success. For this we have to firstly look at the socialization of states to the international order. Socialization is the compliance towards norms provided by outside actors within the international system. The degree of socialization can be simple or complex. The former leading to behavioural changes of the subject states and the later causing a shift in values and beliefs causing identity changes of the norm receivers. To avoid threat to American hegemony, US worked towards socializing China into the US led liberal international order seeking China's adherence towards the hegemon's normative agenda. The liberal international order consists of a defined security, economic and human rights/political order that form the domains of the order.

To understand the success of PRC's socialization to the order one has to observe China's interactions with the individual elements of the order. Broadly speaking, since China's opening up in the 1980's it has integrated and adhered nicely to the norms and institutions of the economic order and has held grievances with the liberal values and human rights aspects of the order. This research finds that PRC follows a realpolitik understanding of the LIO with its overall approach being a mixture of preservation and reformation. PRC retains considerable vested interests in the established international order (IO) politically (PRC is a permanent member of UNSC) as well as economically (PRC has benefited significantly from the economic order). But China remains displeased with the leadership role and dominance of the US within the order. Chinese leadership has consistently voiced their dissatisfaction with the Western facing aspects of the order that criticise or disagree with the non-western states political and governance system. China has therefore approached

the international order in two ways. One is to reform the established institutions to better represent China's interest and the other is to create alternative regimes that compete and/or challenge the institutions of the LIO.

The complexity of the LIO and the tensions between its elements makes it difficult to analyze PRC's attitude towards the LIO. Along with other major powers in the order, China also actively participates in most of the key institutions of the LIO. If we observe China with regards to other leading states, we see that China follows a similar approach disregarding the norms and rules of the LIO which can threaten its national interests.

1.1. Methodology

In order to conduct a descriptive analysis, available theoretical data was collected through secondary research. Data collection includes published studies, journal articles, academic books, news sources and information uploaded on official sites of various institutions. To gather available evidence on PRC's beliefs, attitudes and behavior, official Chinese documents and publications, statements from China's leadership and scholarly writings were assessed. Recent activities and historical trends were reviewed regarding the LIO and China's interactions in the international system via information gathered through research publications by scholars, institutions, and government bodies.

1.2. Research Outline

The thesis analyzes China's approach to liberal international order from theoretical and empirical points of view.

The theoretical analysis details the concept of state socialization and highlights Realist, Liberal and Constructivist understanding of state socialization. It also provides an understanding of the liberal international order, its foundation, and the core elements and constitutive norms of the order. It outlines the mechanisms for influencing state actions and behavior, norm diffusion and norm compliance by subject states.

The empirical part details China's attitude towards the current order, its participation in international institutions, compliance with the norms of the order, acceptance/rejection of the established rules and conventions, and its behavior in the international arena to safeguard PRC's national interests under the setup of the liberal order.

CHAPTER 2

2. A THEORETICAL UNDERSTANDING OF STATE SOCIALIZATION

2.1. Introduction

In the field of social sciences, socialization is understood as '*the means by which social and cultural continuity are attained*' (Clausen et. al., 1968, p.5). Socialization is about accepting and following norms and beliefs regarding acceptable behavior in the social setting. The concept of socialization in IR is a complex phenomenon which is understood differently by the main IR theories of realism, liberalism and constructivism.

This chapter explains the concept of state socialization. Level of analysis and steps for socialization are discussed. Mechanisms of influencing state behavior, norms diffusion and norm compliance are discussed from the perspective of realism, liberalism and constructivism.

2.2. Concept of State Socialization

State socialization is the internalization of norms which were derived from outside actors within the international system. This happens through three prominent processes which are; shifts in the belief system of the individuals, persuasion and political pressure, and institutionalization. We observe similarities among the realist and liberal viewpoint toward norms as both accept the significance of norms in the international system and both also see it as a product of self interest in world politics as opposed to being a hindrance to it. State socialization has also been used to describe various aspects of global politics and

international relations, including but not limited to, reach of hegemonic powers (Ikenberry and Kupchan, 1992), the fusion of the economic and political systems (Halliday, 1992), the addition and acceptance of the non-western states into the main international institutions introduced by the West (Schimmelfennig, 1994), as well as the reeducation of 'rogue states' (Armstrong, 1993).

The extensive research available on international socialization in the Global Politics discipline is directed by a group of relatively consensual assumptions (Alderson, 2001). The assumptions are noted below; Firstly, there is a general consensus amongst scholars that socialization is a social process that deals with the socializee states to internalize the ideas that have arisen from different parts of the international system (Schimmelfennig 2000). Secondly, the general agreement among the researchers is that these ideas can take various forms. These ideas can be placed in two broad categories, '*causal beliefs*' which are ideas that connect causes to effects and '*principled beliefs*' which means ideas that differentiate between right and wrong and describe desired social objectives (Keohane and Goldstein, 1993). Thirdly, it is mainly acknowledged amongst the scholars that internalization of ideas denotes that these ideas are pursued by free will and without the use of any long-term external force (Checkel 2005). Fourthly scholars admit that the process of socialization is not one-way process, operating from educated and enlightened socializers towards uneducated and ignorant socializees, because socializees can very well dismiss the ideas of the socializer and embrace alien ideas as well as advance ideas opposing the socializee (Gregory 2012; Charlotte 2012; Terhalle 2011). Finally, notwithstanding the fourth point, scholars acknowledge that the existing ideas held by the hegemon and other powerful actors in the international arena, regardless of being opposed and disputed, usually disperse and diffuse globally as the socialisation process is deeply rooted in the global power structures (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990; Adler and Bernstein 2005).

2.2.1. Level of Socialization

Scholars argue over categorizing international socialization in either macro level of inter-state socialization or micro level interpersonal socialization. International relations theory commonly follows the inter-state conceptualization of socialization. Schimmelfennig (2001) states that international socialization with regards to IR refers to '*socialization of states*', also pointing out that this socialization may not require the '*personal internalization at the level of policy-makers*'. For Schimmelfennig it doesn't matter that the policy makers may very well endorse ideas without actually having any faith in their core values so long as the policy makers keep complying with those norms. Similarly, Bearce and Bondanella (2007) state that for the discipline of International Relations socialisation only matters so long as it is studied at the state level implying that socialization at individual level is a subject for other disciplines. For them the main actors in international relations are states which in turn explains their state-centric perspective (Schimmelfennig, 2000; Bearce and Bondanella 2007).

Apart from this, scholars have also posited alternative formations of state level socialization. Firstly, one group of scholars have ascribed personhood to states. Wendt (2004) argues that states are social actors and are therefore persons. This is not to say states are singular organisms with conscience rather that states are deliberate and calculative actors, which possess socially constructed personas constructed by engaging with different states. Therefore, states are able to socialize with other states, become socialized through others, or deliberately impede the socializing structures in the same manner as a natural person. A vast majority of state centric analysts disagree with Wendt's scientific realism and alternatively depend on a different conceptualization of state-centric socialization. For them, the state's personhood is functional as well as fictional i.e. a state doesn't actually possess consciousness like a human but it is still treated as such. This belief can be seen in the neo-realist Waltz (1979a, p.74-77) writings as he mentions that states '*imitate each other and become socialized to their system*'. Although Waltz considers states as the main actors in the international arena, he also acknowledges that domestic and individual actions motivate states behavior.

Another group of state-centric scholars approach state structure as a group of individuals thus conceiving all state actions as an inter-group relationship (Alderson, 2001). In this regard, scholars like Fockhart(2006) understand socialization of state as interactions between the elite class corresponding to the social identity theory. Following this theory, the elites can incorporate a foreign idea into the state philosophy which very well may not be accepted or even acknowledged by the masses specifically if the masses and the elite have different and varying conceptions of the state culture. Thus, the masses may even negate or reject incorporation of foreign ideas in this case (Hopf, 2013). Therefore, under this comprehension of state socialization interpreted as the '*internalization of foreign ideas by the elites*', socialization is not accepted as an adequate criterion for the incorporation of foreign ideas by the state as a whole.

Regardless of these distinctions, all of the above-mentioned conceptions of state socialization happen at the state level (where the state is seen as either a singular and human entity, a useful fiction, or a group of elites). A different way to understand state socialization is to observe it at the individual level instead of at the state level (Wendt, 1992). Scholars have understand that some individuals also hold the power to become socializers, diffusing foreign ideas among the masses. Driving from the works of scholars like Finnermore, Martha and Kathryn (1998) on norm diffusion, researchers of International Relations have written that individuals working as norm entrepreneurs or idea givers can socialize foreign ideas among idea takers aka the socializees who are also understood in this regard as individuals instead of aggregate actors. Academics have defined norms as the shared beliefs or expectations of apt and reasonable behavior. Norm theorists take an inverse approach to the international arena arguing that states construct their identities and belief systems through social interactions with other actors within the international sphere. And therefore, the international arena, along with states, is constructed and composed by inter-actor interactions within the international realm (Wendt, 1992).

Given the above understanding, we are able to connect individual level socialization to behavioral change at the level of state in either of the following ways; firstly, we can assume that there are individuals with enough authority to make decisions regarding state policy without the interference from any/all relevant actors (Chwierothe 2007). If these

individuals become socialized to foreign ideas, they will be able to forge them into state behavior. This can be seen in the incorporation of neoliberal ideas of capital account liberalization among the developing state, as the finance ministers as well as the heads of the state banks in these countries became socialized by outside actors (Chwieroth 2007). Secondly, we can also conceptualize state as an amalgamation of various individuals, with no single individual possessing the ability to control the state fully even if we consider states with dictatorial regimes. So the individuals composing the state, interact with each other to varying degrees as well as interacting with the outside actors. In this conceptualization state socialization takes place when individuals are first socialized to a foreign idea, start interacting and socializing other individuals of the state and the process goes on until a large and significant body of individuals within the state become socialized to that foreign idea and hence are able to collectively institutionalize the foreign idea in the state culture (Flockhart 2006). We can observe that this perspective of state socialization at the individual level is similar to the inter-group dynamic discussed earlier. Therefore, we can gather that conceptualizations of international socialization at individual level and state level are not incompatible with each other. By acknowledging that state is neither one person nor machine run by a single individual, the perspective of international socialization as an intergroup process and the perspective of socialization as a diffusion of ideas within the state culture becomes compatible (Flockhart 2006).

2.2.2. Steps for Socialization

According to Alderson (2001, P. 417-420) Socialization takes place in three steps: First, is the alteration of the beliefs of individuals at the intra-state level. Second, voter demands for invoking change leads to political pressure for the state's administration to observe and follow the internationally acknowledged norms along with the urging and cajolery from agents who want to prompt change by 'selling' their policies. Third is through institutionalization via bureaucracy and legal structures.

States and international institutions use three distinct mechanisms to influence the behavior and action of other states. These states and institutions can exert influence over recalcitrant states in order to make them comply with international norms and behave in an accepting manner. This can be done through three processes i.e., coercion, persuasion and acculturation. Where the liberal and realist perspective tends to incline towards coercive and persuasive tactics for the process of diffusing norms to socialize states, constructivism mainly focuses on acculturation through ideas and value transfers.

2.2.3. International Norms and Norm Diffusion

Risse and Sikkink's (1999) approach underlines that in order for the diffusion of norms it is necessary for structural changes to be made at the domestic level. Before this, earlier debates around conception of global norms did not pay attention as to why democratic norms and beliefs were not adopted readily and freely among certain states in the international system (Risse and Sikkink, 1999). Thus, the attention was now centered on dissimilarities in domestic structures of states and their rationales for having reservations against accepting or adopting democratic norms.

In the context of limitations on democratic norms, theorists argue that the frequent issues come at the level of broader society and not at the state level which meant that it was difficult for the democratic norms and beliefs to be understood and accepted by the target society by merely having inter-society interactions with the democratic norm holders (Risse and Ropp, 1999). This would occur if the target society lacked adequate 'existing collective understanding' or 'political cultures'. Therefore, it was pertinent that external pressure be applied not only on the state but also on the societies in order to alter their norms and beliefs regarding appropriate behaviors. Uncooperative elites were pressured into adopting liberal democratic values. Recalcitrant states thus adhered to the liberal democratic norms and accepted the liberal international order to stay in power and to receive foreign aids and other benefits (Risse and Ropp, 1999).

Roland Paris (2004) brings forward the '*institutionalization before liberalization*' understanding which observes that democratic norms can only have sustainable diffusion among recalcitrant states if the broader society is first coaxed or coerced into changing their behavior which would allow for the 'norm giver' state to be able to have a 'true dialogue' with the target states. Paris (2014) adheres to the constructivist understandings of the construction of an actor's beliefs and interests through social interactions, albeit still contends that liberal international theorists have underrated the broader society's norms and belief systems impact on states behavior and self-interests. Paris argues that in the case of recalcitrant states, imposition of liberal democratic values of governance and free market economy does not aid in benefiting the recalcitrant states or 'free' its subjects as these societies do not possess the required ideational as well as cultural prerequisites for it to work and hence such an imposition has a concerning and problematic impact on the non-westerns society which in essence hold a non-liberal outlook.

2.2.4. Global Diffusion of Liberal Norms

During the era of the Cold War, theorists from classical, liberal and rationalist schools of thought perceived states as self-interested, rational actors who would enter the international system with preconceived beliefs and interests and would work towards achieving/securing them (McPherson, 1962). Ever since the Cold War ended, democracy promotion was seen as the most prominent and pertinent objective of the winning hegemon, in the unipolar era. The route to go about achieving democracy promotion was through the global diffusion of liberal norms (rule of law, human rights, good governance and so on) set forth by the United States (McFaul, 2005). This diffusion of global liberal norms in effort to promote democracy in the international system can be divided into three phases: first phase (late 80's to mid-90's) took into consideration the social construction of shared meanings in the international system; second phase (mid to late 90's) brought to attention the obstructions caused by the elites and the importance of non-state actors; third phase (2000's and forward) consisted of critical approaches and underlined the gravity of domestic ideational

frameworks, focusing especially on the deep rooted cultural and traditional beliefs of the Eastern subjects. The third phase norm theorists understand the international arena as a differentiated one in which democratic norm diffusion is highly complex and conditional project (Widmaier, 2011)

The early 2000s saw the acceptance and adherence of sociological approaches by the states in their policy agendas which brought forward various endogenously created approaches explaining the barriers on the democratic norms promotions due to the ideational and cultural systems of the recalcitrant societies.

2.3. International Relation Theories on State Socialization

2.3.1. Realist Perspective

Realists' perspective posits that norms in the international arena are originated and imposed by the powerful states over the weak states who are compelled to follow the norm based on rational interest in avoiding costs pertaining to disobedience (Alderson, 2001).

According to Johnston (1998) realist theorists put forward the belief that states which do not adhere to realist approaches towards structural anarchy in the international arena will end up either facing negative consequences or will fizzle out of the system; for realists this is their understanding of the concept of socialization. However, the opposing theorists believe that realist theorists overstate the systemic effects stating that history shows that states which did not become socialized did not in fact fizzle out. Whereas if we consider contractual institutionalists, they do not find socialization to be an important factor and have a rather toned-down opinion towards it. Although they do accept novel information can change 'beliefs' regarding 'states of the world', they state that socialized behavior is adopted by states due to institutions enforcing positive and negative sanctions, through replacing or

modifying the internal balance of power, and through motivating states to uphold their reputation during transactions with other actors.

Classical Realism theorists are conflicted between the urge to essentialize power seeking in a self-help world and its sensitivity to historical contingency. The Classical realist, Morgenthau accepts the possibility of actors internalizing the norms of behavior to the point of becoming second nature. In fact, for Morgenthau, the time when the kings and rulers abided by the norms of behavior due to fear of social punishment from going against the socialized norms is a time he wishes could revert in the European interstate relations (Morgenthau, 1978).

Morgenthau also has pointed out the possibility of the meaning of power and interest being culturally dependent. This means that there can be a difference in the way actors are *“socialized to conceptualize legitimate ways of pursuing legitimate interest”* (Johnston, 2007).

Research is lacking in regard to the way in which actors get socialized *“into or out of perceptions of the world as competition for power and influence in an anarchical system”* (Johnston, 2007). With this in mind, it becomes understandable that Morgenthau and other realist theorists would have to recognize that the realism in political practices embedded in the international arena are not given but in fact learned. But Classical realists are unable to find a socialization theory that can provide an explanation for the differences in understanding the interpretation of power and interests by different actors. The same goes for neoclassical realists (Rose, 1998).

Neorealists have a narrower understanding of international socialization, where they perceive that the international system provokes a self-help approach and balance of power understanding into the identity as well as actions of states due to the anarchic structure of the international system (Waltz, 1979).

For neorealists, socialization will only take place when states adopt realpolitik behavior in the international system and eradicate the likelihood of system level socialization towards a non-realpolitik direction (Morgenthau, 1978). But history has presented us with

numerous significant examples which say so otherwise, disregarding the neorealist claim. This suggests the presence of domestic as well as systemic normative structures that help socialize states (Price and Tannenwald 1996; Kier 1997). This begs the question of the actual performance of material structure and anarchy towards socializing considering the presence of empirical frequency of non-balancing behavior (Reiter 1996; Schweller 1994; Schroeder 1994; Johnston 1998b).

2.3.1.1. Mechanisms of Influencing State Behavior

Coercion is the most obvious social mechanism in which states and other institutions influence the behavior of other states by either increasing the advantages of conformity or by increasing the price of non-conformity by using carrots or sticks method. It is important to note that coercion may not alter the underlying preferences of the target actors but only their actions with regard to the specific directions of the enforcers. For example, in accordance with the Foreign Assistance Act, the United States refuses to provide foreign aid to any state which “*engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights*” (USC 02). Therefore, target states are coerced into changing their behaviour in order to receive financial aid. So in the case of coercion, states and institutions alter the behavior of target states by altering the cost and benefit analysis of compliance rather than changing the underlying motivations for target states actions. Furthermore, even though international institutions are not able to change states underlying motivations and preference, they are, in specific circumstances, able to limit strategic options by stabilizing mutual expectations of state behavior (Keohane, 1974; Legro 1997). In other words, the target states modify their behaviour because they believe it's in their material interest to do so.

For scholars who uphold coercion to be the biggest mechanism of changing state behavior, consider material distribution of power in the international arena to be the main determinant of state behavior (Keohane, 1986; Guzman, 2002). Therefore, institutionalization of norms in the global arena correspond to the needs and preferences of

powerful states (Krasner, 2001; Goldsmith and Posner 1999) and adherence to these norms is mainly due to the enforcement of them by the powerful states (Weisburd, 1999; Krasner 1993). Following this view, the goal of international institutions is to assist in cooperation and coordination between states by decreasing the costs of transaction as well as curbing any and all collective action issues.

It is important to note that the Neorealism theory does not clearly mention whether states consciously and actively pursue balance of power or are mainly unconscious participants in the formation of the BOP system. Having an anarchic international system makes it hard to ascertain whether the social interactions generate emulation or mimicking. Simply put, we do not have enough empirical data to state that selection takes place. Also, due to the presence of a security dilemma one cannot point out any state as a successful example of this in the global arena.

Neorealist theorists tend to overstate the structural pressures to homogenization. It has been observed that in the international arena, oftentimes states do not compete for scarce resources rather some states find particular niche where one does not have to compete for survival and are able to survive somewhat harmoniously without feeling any selection pressure to homogenize.

Also, there has been a dramatic decrease in states that have ceased to exist since in the last century. Weak states or even failed states who forgo self-help behavior as well as ignore balance of power politics are no longer disappearing (Fazal, 2001). Even new states have come into existence in the second half of the 20th century. These new states have kept their heterogeneous behavioral traits assisted to some extent by institutions and international organizations. This leads us to believe that strength of states in terms of self-help balancing in an anarchic international system has not increased in the last half century, rather the international system has allowed for these weak and/or failed states to somehow exist by adopting strategies which do not require them to follow the self-help BOP doctrine.

Neorealist Mearsheimer (1994), defined institutions as "*sets of rules that stipulate the ways in which states cooperate and compete with each other*". Keohane (1989) defined institutions as "*persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe*

behavioral roles, constrain activity and shape expectations". Martin (2001) following the above-mentioned definitions derived that the work of institutions is to "*prescribe acceptable forms of state behavior, and proscribe unacceptable kinds of behavior*". So according to these theorists, for an institution to be effective it has to be able to get agents to internalize and adapt the actions which have been advised and directed and unlearn actions which have been prohibited or forbidden. Over the course of time this will get the agents to analyse and make decisions on the basis of appropriateness rather than on cost and benefit analysis. This means that agents would move from looking at behavior that is allowed or forbidden as beneficial or detrimental to behavior that is acceptable or unacceptable (Abbot and Sindal; 1998).

2.3.1.2. Mechanisms of Norm Diffusion

Internationally agreed upon norms of state sovereignty, non-aggression, self-rule etc. allows for weak and unfit states to coexist with the rest in the international system. Thus, we can say that the structure of the international system cannot simply be boiled down to anarchy with self-help balancing like how Neorealists would perceive, rather it's a more nuanced and complex structure. The social environment in the international arena where these new states interact does not only benefit or recognize states that align themselves with self-help balancing emulating the successful states but rather also aids or benefits the 'deviant' states which do not hold such characteristics (Kocs, 1994).

The realpolitik socializing that takes place in the international system, is not technically dependent on structural anarchy rather on the pre-established norms of realpolitik which may have been derived from either the system or the agents (Johnston 1996a, 1998a).

We can see the mechanism of norm diffusion by taking the USA as an example. Observing the way in which the USA socializes countries through military interactions within the subject countries we notice that socialization takes place firstly at the level of the

individual wherein the military officers go through a change in their values and beliefs by the help of US's military education and their various exchange programs. This brings about a modification or alteration in the resultant behavior due to the belief change (Atkinson, 2006, p. 513–514). Afterwards the behavioral change becomes institutionalized in the subject country through deploying carrot and stick policy (coercion, material rewards and incentives etc.) and finally is displayed to and strengthened in the international arena.

Looking at PRC, it made a strategic and rational decision to join the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) despite having many reservations against it because it provides China with a platform to interact with the ASEAN states, establish somewhat cordial relations with its neighbors in the Asia Pacific, initiate a charm offensive and to change the narrative of PRC being a threat in the region. This would allow China to deal with the misgivings Vietnam has created and increase its influence by establishing trade and investment relations with the Southeast Asian states (Bearce and Bondanella, 2007).

Research states that post-colonial Asia prefers local solutions to regional problems. Thus they have a high regard for following the norm of noninterference and the norm of nonintervention by foreign sources. Preferring to solve regional issues by using ingroup solutions. Contrasting to European setup Asian states like China and India have generally adapted and tweaked international norms to mold them in a way that better suits regional traditions and practices.

Regarding socialization of liberal norms of the West in the 19th century either the Eastern states would adapt and uphold the liberal values and human right norms, or the norms diffusion would be ignored or outright rejected as cultural elitism (Keck and Sikkink; 1998, pp. 73–74, Acharya; 2009). After WW2 many Asian states were socio-culturally biased against multilateral security organizations in order to show their refusal of Western domination over them (Widmaier and Park, 2012, p. 124).

2.3.1.3. Mechanisms of Complying with or Internalizing Norms

Considering the mechanisms of complying with norms, we first have to note that there are certain unchanging facts in the international system which cause states to regulate their behavior. The subjective and intersubjective interpretations of power and interest have been deemed by the academics as significant in understanding the conduct of states in the global arena. This being international relations are carried out among states who are self-serving, sovereignty protecting, relative power sensitive, zero sum exchanging realpolitik struggling in an anarchical international arena.

Johnston (2007) in his book, points to the paradoxical nature of this understanding. When the subjective and intersubjective interpretations of the global arena are given independent causal importance, it allows for the possibility of having a disconnect between our estimation of this international arena and actual international arena where states pursue their realpolitik interests and have material power distribution. This allows us the possibility where a change can happen in subjective and intersubjective interpretations of the international arena whilst having the material distribution of power stay the same. The presence of this possibility means that the international arena to an extent does not predictably or directly influence actions of agents. Making the material power imbalance as well as the reality of anarchy less determinative.

This possibility allows us to deduce that the realities of the international system (anarchy etc.) do not hold much stand-alone significance regarding the understanding and beliefs of agents towards the international arena. Neoclassical realists cannot understandably come to terms with this as this conclusion also makes one inquire the origins of these understanding, beliefs and preferences of the agents. Unable to provide a response rooted in realism, Neoclassical realists do not have a socialization theory.

Neorealism utilizes the theory of socialization to explain the 'homogenization' of balance of power and self-help orientation of states protecting their sovereignty in an anarchic international system (Waltz 1979). But it is also not completely correct to call it

homogenization as firstly socialization is not the same as homogenization in a simpler understanding of the term. Kenneth Waltz used collective consciousness theory of psychology for his interpretation of interactions in global politics and international relations. Waltz (1979) replaces the collective consciousness concept with the “selection and competition” concept. According to Waltz, repetitive interaction among states in the international system through selection and emulation (matching, surpassing or imitating) results in the similarities of behavior among states. Hence the states which are not in line with emulating the balance of power in this self-help system will be selected out of the system leaving only those states which operate under the similar realpolitik understanding.

Neorealism does not associate socialization with a state's individual preferences or interests rather the material structure of the international system is considered which constrains a state's behavior. Johnston (2007) suggests that socialization allows agents to have a better understanding of the costs and benefits of opting for certain preferences which forsake structural importance of balancing. Diffusion of norms in the international system causes states to better perceive the signs received from the material structure. This helps in deducing which state fails and which succeeds and for what reasons. Unitary states who act rationally would not have much difficulty in understanding this information as it would simply mean states who follow self-help balancing become successful and others don't. But the procedure through which states interpret the signs correctly does not entail a change in the behavioral practices, beliefs and preferences of the state or understanding the nature of the international system. This understanding makes it difficult for it to be regarded as socialization.

2.3.2. Liberal Perspective

Liberal theorists tend to skirt around socialization theory while ignoring its ontological and epistemological basis. Taking the example of Moravcsik (1997) who suggests that the agent's interests and preferences can get altered or modified through social

interactions on the basis of identity construction. Moravcsik put forth an excellent criticism of constructivism's under specification of agency at both the state and substate levels when it comes to the diffusion of norms. Specifically speaking Moravcsik questions the constructivists for not taking into account how the development and dissemination of preferences at the states level affects the diffusion of norms from the system structure. This means he agrees to the likelihood of diffusion taking place which may lead to internalization by the agents. But it also means that the level of internalization and the products of internalization will differ depending upon the pre-existing identities and beliefs of the state and substates.

Johnston (2007) also agrees with Moravcsik's agreement. Moravcsik (1997, p.517) states in his paper that "*liberal theory seeks to generalize about the social conditions under which the behavior of self-interested actors converges toward cooperation or conflict*". Talking about these social conditions, one important social condition to consider is the degree of convergence or divergence over values and beliefs. Academics are unclear as to where this convergence stems from.

Moravcsik (1997, p.521) mentions that "*for liberals, the form, substance and depth of cooperation depends directly on the nature of these patterns of preferences*", which depends on dispersion of the preferences which have been formed through the various social interactions among several agents. Although academics have not grasped in what manner distinct or specific preferences loopback to influence the degree of convergence or divergence over beliefs and interests that will lead to cooperation or conflict. Moravcsik (1997, p.522-523) further proposes that agents' preferences can differ "*response to a changing transnational social context,*" and as an example, "*the position of particular values in a transnational cultural discourse may help define their meaning in each society*".

To surmise, Liberalism on the concept of socialization assumes that intrastate institutions will lead to the diffusion of norms that will blend and form preferences as well as generate policy outcomes. Liberal theory tends to ignore the basis behind emergence, formation and the content of the preferences and is more or less indifferent regarding social origins of preferences (Moravcsik 1997, p.525).

2.3.2.1. Mechanisms of Influencing State Behavior

Liberalism views socialization as the act of deploying soft power in order to change the behavior of weaker states (Ikenberry and Kupchan, 1990; Wang, 2003; Atkinson, 2006). According to Ikenberry and Kupchan, one of the main examples of this was the USA's ability to socialize many periphery states post WW2 not only at the superficial level by providing material rewards but rather at the core of changing values and beliefs.

Persuasion has been long used as a mechanism for influencing state behavior. Persuasion is a mechanism for social influence in which the influencer (considered a '*norm entrepreneur*') strategically and actively instills his ideology and norms among the socializees (Finnermore and Sikkink, 1998). According to this perspective, state behavior is affected and shaped by international law with the help of transference of knowledge, inducement and social '*learning*'. Therefore, persuasion can be explained as the art of swaying and urging the mind of others towards a specific perspective through careful deliberation and thought provocation. This causes the influenced actors to realign their belief systems along the lines of the influencer, internalizing the socializers' norms and beliefs and modifying their behavior accordingly while also changing their interests and identities (Koh, 1997; Checkel, 1999). Persuasion can only work when the actors designated to be persuaded, evaluate and judge the content of the socializers' message to be righteous, valid and needed and therefore '*change their minds*' regarding their own previously upheld belief systems (Hovland et al, 1953; Dillard and Pfau, 2002).

As discussed, persuasion is one of the mechanisms of social influence and the research on persuasion can help us understand the conditions for successful international socialization to occur. The conditions for the persuasion to work are as follows: the norm receivers are in a new and uncertain environment; the beliefs and identities of the socializer are compatible with those of the socializee or the norms of socializer are not at odds with or against the beliefs of the socializee; the socializing agent is an important and commanding member of the group the socializee wants to be a part of; the socializing agent follows the

rules of the norms and displays appropriate behavior, setting forth the deliberative discourse for the socializee to follow/imitate; and finally the interactions between the socializer and the socializee happen in an informal setting which is diverted away from the scrutiny of the media and the public.

This covers the gist of the scope conditions, to cover a more detailed and exhausting list go through the readings of Checkel (2005, p.813) and Zürn and Checkel (2005). Additional factors for social influence are the size of target actors, intensity and frequency of contact, and shared values and beliefs between the socializer and the socializee.

Contractual institutionalists employ the use of information to obtain cooperation among member agents. Social interactions within the institutions provide agents with novel information that can impact the needs-based relationships, understanding regarding causality and the preferences of fellow agents (Martin et. al., 1999, p.84). With the help of information institutions reduce the uncertainty regarding members' objectives and commitment to the cause and allows agents to normalize their expectations regarding the outcome of cooperation.

It can be said that information generally only impacts the understanding regarding the strategic environment within the institution in which the agents pursue their goals and preferences. For constructional institutionalists, within the institution information is deemed reliable and reduces uncertainty among the member agents. New information provided is deemed generally credible due to the negative consequence (in terms of material welfare or power) that the provider will succumb to in case of providing non-credible information.

Some contractual institutional academics agree with the neorealist understanding of anarchy and the resultant security maximizing approach. This is used to describe agents' motivations for obtaining absolute gains which lead to common interests making it imperative for institutions to be established. These institutionalists concede that the neorealist approach towards socialization might very well be flawed, deficient and/or obstructed. Still, Institutionalists do not point to any opposing forces towards socialization within the institution as the reason for deficient or fragmented socialization rather institutionalists explain away this through outside factors like changes in the domestic political situations,

external technological leap through, and any other outside factors relating to absolute gain concerns and common interests. Contractualists follow the sociological understanding of institutions. Here the goal of an effective institution is the socialization of member states.

2.3.2.2. Mechanisms of Norm Diffusion

Academics have focused on Europe in order to understand norm diffusion through international organizations, as Europe has seen a rapid increase in international organizations and institutions forwarding the liberal viewpoint. European IO's like EU, NATO, OECD, OSCE etc. have been long working towards socializing the Central and Eastern European states towards liberal norms of democracy, human rights, minority rights and citizenship rights etc. (Adler, 1998; Linden, 2002; Checkel, 2003; Kelley, 2004; Schimmelfennig, 2005, 2001; Flockhart, 2006).

Simply put, the Euro Atlantic community has invited the Central and Eastern European states to join, tempting them to adopt the Western Liberal Norms with the likelihood of EU expansion. Realists talk about the subject states inclination towards joining the EU for material benefits and security concerns which impacted their decision of adhering to the western liberal norms. China also went through the process of socialization to adapt the multilateralism norms of liberalism through its membership in international organizations (Kent, 2002). Johnston (2007) performed a detailed research regarding this and described how China's socialization in liberal security institutions (ASEAN Regional Forum, UN Conference on Disarmament, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Anti-Personnel Landmine Regime) in the last decade of the 20th century took place.

It is deemed pertinent to have multilevel and multi-stakeholder initiatives in order to create a transformation in the ideational and behavioral framework of the target through their participation in a variety of policy actions (Belloni, 2008; Paffenholz, 2009). Fellow researchers have also made similar assertions where the imposition of liberal democratic norms have been unsuccessful on certain states whose societies possess non liberal or a-

liberal values and have therefore been counter-intuitive to the objectives behind democracy promotion (Richmond, 2011; Mac Ginty, 2011; Robers, 2008; Zurcher and Barnett, 2009).

The diffusion of liberal democratic norms in such cases is established through international state building. Modifying and refining state institutions allows for talks between state and international institutions. Assisting target states to benefit from the norms of liberal democracy and membership in LIO institutions instead of being a threat to the global liberal democratic order (NSS, 2002). This is observed amongst all main international institutions including NATO, EU, UN, WB, IMF all of whom have used state-building as a tool for democracy promotion by establishing appropriate institutional behavior by meting out material rewards and punishments (Ghani and Lockhart, 2008; Collier, 2010).

At the level of state, endogenous approaches assert the crucial means to comprehending the difficulties faced in the diffusion of democratic norms are beliefs and cultures of the broader civil society. This understanding was developed during the 90's when many of the states in Central and Eastern Europe gained independence post-Cold War, and the topic of transformation of these states in the essence of liberal democratic norms was raised. These discussions recognized that outside help was necessary for state-building in these newly independent states for democracy as well as free market economy to be adopted and accepted without any resistance (Fukuyama, 2008; Schmitter and Karl, 1991; Gunther et al., 1996). The endogenous approaches to democracy promotion consider the issues of assisting transition as crucial to state-building and international development where '*institutional path-dependency*' constrains the adoption of global liberal democratic order (North et al., 2009). This endogenous approach seems to give higher importance to the ideas, values, cultures and social institutions of the society as opposed to the economic status and socio-economic relations (Snyder, 2000; Zakharia, 2003).

Endogenous framework, at the individual level posits that humans are ill equipped to handle change and thus are inclined to behave as per the preconceived sociological institutional notions and personal experiences. Postulating from the work of eminent neoliberal theorist Fredrich Hayak (1952), academic North asserts that the discipline of evolutionary psychology furnishes a compelling and sound approach to comprehending the

various social constructions of meanings and thus the imbalance in the market economic results (North, 2005).

Let's consider the entry of Vietnam into the regional multilateral organization Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). With its entry Vietnam started complying with the objectives and general processes of ASEAN. Vietnam had been widely isolated in the international system because of its occupation of the neighboring state Cambodia thus the membership in ASEAN allowed for the reentry of Vietnam into the international system. Vietnam became one of the key US allies in the Pacific deepening military ties to the US which allowed protection against China's threats. As a member of ASEAN, Vietnam could garner diplomatic backing to shield and defend against its territorial claims over the islands in the South China Sea which the People's Republic of China is also claiming sovereignty over.

As these disputed archipelagos would no longer be a bilateral issue between Vietnam and China, instead it would have to be dealt with between ASEAN and China. Not to mention as Vietnam would be coming out of its exile it will be able to attract and receive foreign investment and benefit by being considered in the ASEAN Free Trade Area and ASEAN Investment Area.

India generally acknowledges the norm of multilateralism and institutions. Considering the case of India, being a member of ARF allows it to improve its economic situation whilst creating relationships with the prosperous ASEAN members, and also being able to strategically compete with China for power over the region. India sees the membership and participation in these institutions as an opportunity to safeguard and promote its national interests.

A crucial reason for the diffusion of norms in Asia was that the regional institution ASEAN was considered the main avenue of socialization in all of Asia. Due to its status it also commanded a high level of authority (mainly before the Asian Financial Crises during the late 90's) and for this reason it was also seen as lucrative and beneficial for the states of China, India and Vietnam to have participation in the ASEAN-led regional institution. The reason ASEAN commanded authority was because of certain factors including but not

limited to, it's long-standing lifespan (also considered as the oldest working political group in all of Asia), it's role and chief participation in concluding the Cambodia peace process, also the relative stability and peaceful inner workings of the forum and importantly its established framework of dialogue diplomacy with other major powers in the international arena. ASEAN over the years had portrayed its belief in and execution of the, adapted and tweaked, norms of non-intervention as well as non-use of force. We have to note down that the ASEAN commands it's authority also due to the fact that no other major power (be it state or an institution) in and of Asia could take up a leadership role because of reasons such as failures in the past (e.g. India), tumultuous relationships (China and Japan), sovereignty and security prioritization (South Korea) and/or non-member or outsider identity (US, Russia, Australia, EU etc.) (Acharya, 2011).

2.3.2.3. Mechanisms of Complying with or Internalizing Norms

According to Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990, p.283) socialization of weaker states through the deployment of soft power means the acceptance and buy-in of the hegemon's normative agenda by the power holders and elites of the weaker state. This can happen in the following ways. Initially the subject state acts in accordance with the hegemon's wishes due to the threat of coercion which allows for socialization to take place. This leads to a change in the long-term interests of subject states due to the initial change in preference dictated by the hegemon. Because of this, the elites of the subject state gradually go through a pronounced change in their values and beliefs.

Looking at history, international organizations of Europe have been successful in implanting their norms regarding human rights and democracy among the states in Central and Eastern Europe by baiting them with membership in European IO's. But these IO's have not been successful in garnering compliance from illiberal states using the same method. Signifying that identity plays a role in the states' inclination towards socialization and the intended behavioral outcomes through material rewards (Schimmelfennig, 2003 and 2005).

We can observe the interconnection between material power with socialization but its impact rests on subject agents' property effects.

Neoliberals concur with the rationalist framework while examining compliance through the international institutions and regimes. These international institutions and regimes were therefore created in pursuit of existing self-interests to aid in coordinating the expectations and behavior of states, reducing transaction costs, increasing degree of certainty and enhancing cooperation among the member states. Whereas social constructivism differs from the neoliberal understanding of international regimes and institutions. It concentrates more on the social state and circumstances under which state interactions occur. These interactions help create states interest, identities, perception of policy and governance needs (Katzenstein, 1996). This perspective highlighted a different understanding regarding the options states chose with regards to democratic norms which focused on the significance of global 'norms, identity and culture'.

Liberal institutionalism perspective sees norm adoption as moderately unbiased. For them norms emerge and are adopted because it assists self-interested actors in coordinating expectations and behavior and curbing collective action issues (Ullmann-Margalit, 1977).

Contractual institutionalism doesn't put much thought to socialization theory in international relations. Contractual institutionalists are generally unconcerned with the concept that social interaction by states will result in a change in the agent's interests, beliefs and behaviors or the fundamental security philosophies and norms. Contractual institutionalists perform their analysis assuming these variables as fixed. Thus, the social interactions between agents within the institutions is perceived to have little to no effect on the values, beliefs and norms of the agents. Signifying that the state's interests, behaviors and characteristics with which they enter the institutions remain constant even after spending considerable time socially interacting within the institution.

For contractual institutionalists the attitudes and behavioral norms of the actors do not impact the norms and traits of the institution itself either. Thus, an effective institution internalizes and represents the nature of the cooperation problem rather than the nature of the member agents. And the institution's behavioral norms along with the regularity and intensity

of interaction does not impact the values, beliefs and attitudes of the member agents and their basic preferences remain unchanged.

Contractual institutionalists explain away the “*the undersocialized nature of institutions*” by evoking cooperation between and among agents using different methods. One method being making agents focus on maintaining their reputations. As its imperative for actors in institutions working on common interests to have a good working relationship, therefore the first thing for the actors to maintain is a positive reputation within the institution. If the agents are known to have a cooperative attitude it will help them in networking and fostering profitable relationships. Thus, an agent's preference to establish a dependable and reliable reputation will lead the agent to uphold a norm-conforming and pro-social attitude (Kreps, 1992).

Academics have pointed out that in order for a reputation to be deemed perfectly credible in institutions it should be based on behavior, which is natural, automatic, unrestrained and comes from the heart (Frank, 1988). This means that for groups to avoid any internal conflicts, mistrust and formation of opposing parties they have to ensure that their members have internalized the credible, “taken-for-granted” responses to social interactions.

As I mentioned ASEAN before considering the value of ASEAN and its worth towards Asian regionalism one must consider the specifics of norms accepted and adopted through socialization. To put this in perspective we can look into the differences in priority over norms in European and Asian context. Rights of minorities and democratic due process are norms which are considered high priority in European region and are crucial factors for socialization. Whereas in Asia, the highly coveted norms are norms of non-interference in domestic issues as well as regional autonomy (Zurn and Checkel 2005). If ASEAN does not uphold the norm of non-interference in states domestic issues, states like China or Vietnam would not have become ASEAN members and similarly would not have preferred taking part in Asia Pacific Economic Conference, East Asia Summit and Asian Regional Forum.

2.3.3. Constructivist Perspective

Constructivists scholars take a broadened and extensive approach to state socialization in which they deem it to be a continuous and prevalent cognitive and social processes through which interactions among states in the international arena shape state identities and interest (Finnemore, 1996; Bukovansky, 1994). For constructivists, in the studies of Global Politics, social norms provide a radical alternative to the more widely explored power and interest-based accounts (Onuf, 1989; Wendt, 1982). Constructivists oppose rationalist perspective on norms, as for them norms operate by constructing shared meanings instead of preventing unwanted behavior. Constructivists believe the spread and adoption of norms adjust state behaviors through the redefinition of state beliefs and identity and not through tilting of the cost-benefit analysis of state actions in the international arena (Klotz, 1995; Adler, 1997) .

Constructivism theory is directly concerned with outlining the strategies of change which are generated through the process of socialization. Acharya (2007) asserts that, *“there is also a great deal of policy space for socialization arguments. After all, governmental and non-governmental diplomacy is often an effort to persuade, shame, cajole, and socially ‘pressure’ states to change their collective minds and behavior.”* This is also supported by the academic writings and policy papers of/regarding Asian regionalism which demonstrate constructivist approach to international socialization (Severino 2006, East Asia Vision Group 2001, East Asia Study Group 2002).

One of the main contribution of Constructivism towards the study of global politics and international relations has been the socialization strategies which stands as an opposing technique for states who deem using the realpolitik strategies of engagement (balancing against threats or power, buck passing, hiding, and band wagoning) unfit, ineffective or costly. Through socialization states can cause or produce counter realpolitik response in the target socializee states.

Reading through constructivist writings regarding socialization, the following main points emerge firstly, the earlier research on the subject was directed towards the thought processes and the actions of socializer or the norm-giver whereas the recent publications have been more focused on the target actors or norm receiver and socializees' point of view. Here the underlying belief has been that in order to comprehend socialization fully, it is more important to observe the domestic and the international situation of the target actor and norm-receiver instead of the socializer (Acharya 2009, 2011; Johnston 2007).

Structural Constructivist, claim that states perform particular conduct due to internalizing the norms of appropriateness (can be either cooperative or conflictual). For Johnston (1998) Constructivist theory can only explain socialization- correlation between norms and behavior- in only outlier cases (which have mostly been deemed to be insignificant by realist theorists). Constructivism has had little success in explaining in what way norms diffuse among states with varying levels of resistance.

Finally, in order for socialization to occur some conditions have to be met. These conditions include essentials of the international institutions which prompt socialization, traits of the political systems and actors that are socialized, characteristics of the ideas, interests and norms with respect to type of socialization that occurs and finally attributes of the interaction between the norm providers and norm receivers (Zurn, 2005).

2.3.3.1. Mechanisms of Influencing State Behavior

When considering socialization through the lens of constructivism one can not ignore the significance institutions hold both for constructivist theory as well as function of socialization. According to the constructivist perspective, in order to successfully socialize states in institutions, socialization must come from the process of persuasion and pressure rather than through coercion and constraint. Logic of appropriateness would work best for socialization in institutions as compared to logic of consequence. To have a conducive

environment for the socialization process, institutions adopting an inclusive membership, having a deliberative mandate, and problem solving through consensus work best generally speaking as they help in persuading the members of the institution. When discussing ideology, having a non-rigid ideology that can be adapted to better fit incoming scenarios works best for socialization. Looking at ASEAN institutions, the relationship between socialization and institution framework has been a two-way process which to speak means that prior norms that came to be through recurrent interactions and informal institutions like the Bandung Conference impacted the framework of formal institutions such as ASEAN. These frameworks have mostly been observed to be stable in institutions albeit not permanent.

Acculturation happens when a person from one culture adopts the norms, practices and behavioral patterns of the neighboring cultures. Acculturation works by prompting changes in the behavior of the target state pressured into assimilating with the socializers culture. This pressure can either be forced upon by the socializers or can even be induced by the target state themselves (Zucker, 1977). It is driven by '*social pressures*' applied by the socializers in order to make the target state conform to their culture. It's the same as carrot and stick type inducement, like enacting psychological costs by ostracizing and/or shaming the target state. Similarly, it can also be achieved through establishing perceived psychological benefits of conformity, through praises, public recognition and admiration (Risse et al, 1998)

In his seminar, Johnston (1998) stated that according to scientific literature socialization can operate in two ways. First being persuasion in which the actors beliefs, norms and attitudes are shifted/changed without the use of material and mental coercion. Second is through 'back patting and opprobrium'. Utilizing Habermas concept of 'communicative action' constructivists analyze the process of persuasion. Although researchers believe that constructivists have overlooked the circumstances in which communicative action will be effective. According to research, persuasion is mostly likely to work in international institutions if the participating members are less, general agreement and consensus is used to make decisions, mandates are discussed upon, and the agents have autonomy to make decisions without seeking prior approval from the state position holder.

Social back patting and opprobrium's effectiveness depends upon the actors desire to maximize status, prestige and diffuse image. Actors thus engage in pro social behavior due the above-mentioned desire in order to maximize on the status markers decided by the group. This desire allows for actors to overlook the negative effect of their actions towards relative power.

Coming towards social influence in international institutions works best when the number of members is high, voting is used for decision making, mandate is to assign and distribute benefits, and the participating agents have less autonomy from their state leaders.

The disciplines of international peace building and state building was once viewed as the spread of liberal democracy among recalcitrant or authoritarian regimes through ousting/defeating the governments and freeing the people. This discussion has been repositioned towards transforming the society itself, altering their ideas, beliefs and norms through different techniques of social intervention as a theme of the establishment of good governance (Chandler, 2010).

2.3.3.2. Mechanisms of Norm Diffusion

With the help of the above-mentioned literature, we can understand in what manner IO's have worked towards the socialization of the normative liberal ideals in order to support the reign of liberal international orders. At times IO's join hands with non-state actors like INGO's for the promotion of liberal values. These NGO's and other transnational advocacy groups work towards socializing liberal norms to targeted non liberal states (True and Mintrom; 2001). These NGO's and advocacy groups employ Western activists (who are mostly supported by their home states) to help spread the liberal norms (Keck and Sikkink; 1998). The subject states get socialized into wishing to be a part of the informal groups of liberal states (eg; liberal states whose goal is to safeguard human rights etc) (Risse et al., 1999). Finally, these non-state actors play a major part in ensuring the maintenance of liberal international order in the international system through the process of socialization. Acharya

(2011) states that Asian regionalism stems from localization and subsidiarity following a bottom-up approach towards norm creation.

As discussed earlier, institutions perform a key role in international socialization either through upholding and executing socialization processes on the target states or through being the sites of socialization when the target actor is a member of the institution.

Constructivists agree that socializees compliance with norms and display of appropriate behavior is not inconsistent with self-interested actions. But academics haven't concluded whether such behavior of compliance based on rational cost-benefit choices can turn into internalized beliefs and values and an overall alteration of socializees' identity and interests over the long term. Although we can still observe key indicators of internalization in the cases where regional institutions have played a vital role either as a socializing agent or as a site of socialization.

Looking at Vietnam we can observe that Vietnam agreed and internalized the norm of non-intervention upheld by ASEAN letting go of its previously held disregard and disobedience of the norm (for example; Vietnam's previous occupation of its neighboring Cambodia). Observing China, with its entry into ARF, the main difference has been China's approach to handling disputes shifting from a bilateral to a multilateral style. This change in technique of conflict management becomes apparent in China's approval to have multilateral talks with ASEAN on the issue of South China Sea. This change in approach by China has led to the Declaration on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. China's increasing support for the ARF in spite of its earlier reservations regarding the forum is also of great significance.

Literature shows that during the 90's a conceptual shift took place regarding China's approach towards multilateralism (Acharaya, 2011). There is substantial research available that shows the alterations in China's bureaucratic and decision-making structures which favor internalizing the norms of multilateralism (Johnston, 2007). In India we can observe a gradual change from economic mercantilism and removal of protectionist policies in favor of trade liberalization, free market economy and foreign direct investment (FDI).

It is important to point out that this change is happening (although unsteadily) not merely because of the regional institutions, but also because these institutions have presented key sites for change, including discussion regarding the ASEAN-India Free Trade Agreement and India's personal interest in creation of an Asian Free Trade Area all of which is evidence of India's acceptance of the free trade liberalization norms. It is interesting to note that considering India's membership in the various regional institutions (like ASEAN and ARF), India does not have the lead in these institutions as opposed to the past in the 40's and 50's in which India was heading regionalist ideas in Asia and was also a central figure supporting various multilateral initiatives in Asia (like Asian Relations Conference of 1947 and 1949, and Asian African Conference 1955).

Internalization of norms as a measure of state socialization have their limits. As in the case of ARF and ASEAN, although China has sought membership in it. PRC is not upholding a preventive diplomacy position which would indicate deeper multilateralism. Similarly, when it comes to resolving the issue regarding the political status of Taiwan, China does not approach it from a multilateral perspective and neither does China allow outsiders to intervene in this issue. Likewise, India does not seek a multilateral approach when it comes to the Kashmir dispute with its neighboring Pakistan. Be that as it may, the changes in the established norms and behaviors are irrevocable. As Vietnam will not be going back to its era of Indochinese federation, neither will China be returning to its bilateral approach to international relations, nor can India have liberal and idealistic type of fabianist socialism again.

It would be fair to assert that these alterations were a product of norm diffusion by the regional institutions for the greater part. Regional institutions have played a major role in the creation and reinforcement of the convergence between intrastate interests, long term actions and international behavior.

Norm diffusion has also been made possible because of compatibility of the norms between the norm giver and receiver which is one of the conditions for successful persuasion and/or acculturation. As norm diffusion is a major factor in the process of state socialization, it is necessary to acknowledge that certain norms of the socializing agents like Australia or

former Soviet Union were in line with the existing beliefs and rules of the Asian target states. These norms included economic regionalism and security cooperation which were readily accepted in Asia by China and ASEAN members as they were either compatible or made to seem like so by the norm givers. There were also norms that didn't take hold in Asia including the norms of humanitarian intervention and single market system of European Union as these were incompatible and conflicting with the established local norms of non-intervention and developmental regionalism (Acharya, 2004 and 2009).

2.3.3.3. Mechanisms of Complying with or Internalizing Norms

Constructivism highlights the compliance of norm by the subject states by acknowledging the socially constructed views of right and wrong emphasized by the socializers. The hegemon socializes the subject state through the concept of right and wrong. And by instilling in the subject state a desire to follow a righteous path. Moreover, compliance leading towards internalization can also take place when the subject state is taken over and its processes/administration are overhauled and reconstructed after being occupied. See the US occupation of Germany and Japan after WW2 (Ikenberry and Kupchan, 1990, p. 290). Adding to this, Wang (2003) observes hegemon's ability to utilize administrative policies caused by accumulation of events in order to socialize the elites of the subjects and alter the public opinions. Unfortunately, Wang, Ikenberry and Kupnchan haven't pointed out the micro processes of socialization as well as how the elites of the hegemonic state persuaded the elites along with the general public (commoners) of the subject states to adapt the hegemons normative ideals and subsequently how the subject state internalized these normative ideals.

Flockhart (2006, p. 91) states that state's social identity led to the difference in acceptance of the norms purported by the US led western alliance in Europe towards the Central and East European states post WW2. He also asserts that the states stay in social clusters defined using 'us' vs 'them' ideologies that shape the understanding of norms

provided by norm givers. In this case socialization consists of both material and ideational influences which in turn impact both the agents' identity and his behavior.

Compliance by socialization can be achieved through many ways. The target state may socialize as a result of logic of consequence, performing cost benefit analysis and to receive material rewards or avoid punishments. Target states mode of action can also be a decision of logic of appropriateness, here it is important to point out appropriateness does not mean morally right, but rather what is socially appropriate and what is advantageous for the civil society.

Once socialization has occurred internalization by the norm receiver of the ideas, beliefs and norms of the norm provider takes place. This internalization is not constant among all target actors and varies in degree for all. Complete internalization would mean the target actor alters/discards their ideas, beliefs and principles and internalizes the values, roles and understandings of the norm provider by accepting them to be true and these new norms take on a character of '*taken for grantedness*' becoming second nature for the target actors (Johnston, 2007).

Target states can keep their previous belief systems and identities intact while being socialized and only accept to partake in the socializers rules, norms, and expectations of appropriate behavior without developing a '*we feeling*' or altering their interests. This degree in socialization has been categorized as simple learning (behavioral changes of subject actor) and complex learning (identity changes in subject actor). Where in the former type, target actors display appropriate behavior as defined by the socializers, after making a rational cost-benefit analysis and anticipating material rewards and punishments for their action. The socializee's adhere to the socializers rules and norms without necessarily believing in them. In the latter, complex learning, the target actors completely internalize the socializers values and norms, believing them to be true and just and in essence transform their identities and their behaviors in the long term in such that the socializers values, roles and understandings become '*taken for granted*' (Checkel, 2005).

To understand the reasons behind internalization's occurrence in Asia, we have to look at the conditions of socialization mentioned earlier. An overarching factor has been the

new and uncertain political and economic environment after the Cold War, academics have pointed out that in the post-Cold War era, the main objective of regional institutions in Asia has been to reduce and manage uncertainty (Khong, 2004). The main aspects of the security discourse during this period was speculations regarding the United States military stance, China's increasing political, economic and military power, power struggle between Beijing and Tokyo, the creation of European Union's single market, and the rise of regional trade blocs after establishment of North American Free Trade Market (NAFTA). This discourse grounded the establishment of the regional institutions in Asia.

2.4. Conclusion

In IR socialization provides an understanding to the states regarding appropriate behavior in the international arena. The effect of socialization leads to either simple learning of behavioral changes or complex learning of identity changes within the states. For realists, socialization in the international system is mainly due to the state's need for survival in the anarchic jungle. Emulating or mimicking the actions of the strong to secure one's survival. Adopting a realpolitik behavior in the international arena to secure the states interests. Liberal understanding of socialization seeks to modify state behavior through repeated social interactions within institutions. Institutions help in coordination and cooperation among the actors working towards their self-interests. Constructivists observe the international system as being infused with social values. States exist in the international system and derive their understanding and role in the system from others around them. Social pressures cause the states to alter their norms, and behavioral patterns to align with the others.

CHAPTER 3

3. THE LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL ORDER

3.1. Introduction

For the past eight decades, the Western Liberal Order has been maintaining the international system. With the end of WW2, the USA and its allies created a multifaceted international order consisting of multilateral institutions, open-door economic policies, security cooperation, and democracy-based policies. The USA birthed as well as lead this liberal order through its hegemonic leadership ensuring the stability of the international economy, entreprenuring values of 'free world', strengthening alliances, and promoting a cooperative environment. The earliest members of this liberal order being the nation-states of Western Europe (US allies) as well as Japan who fastened their economic and security well-being to the liberal world order. With the end of the Cold War, the USA became hegemon of the unipolar international system allowing for the liberal international order to further spread into East Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America where many countries turned a new leaf by establishing democratic governments and entering the liberal economic system. The expansion of the liberal order came with the expansion of its governing institutions.

Liberal internationalism is deeply rooted in the postwar US hegemonic order. This order constitutes of open economic policies, security cooperation along with combined efforts to maintain peace, rule of law, and uphold numerous international institutions formed for handling any/all problems arising due to the increasingly interconnected world.

Academics of the liberal international order recognize it as an “*open and rule-based international order*” which is “*enshrined in institutions such as the United Nations and*

norms such as multilateralism” (Ikenberry, 2011). This understanding does not help us in explaining what openness entails in an international system nor does it go through the rules that actors of the order should consider. Also, the term ‘liberal’ in the liberal international order is also not well-defined and left to interpretation. Is the term ‘liberal’ being used referring to political liberalism? Or is it economic liberalism? Or the liberalism as interpreted by IR theorists? A simple answer would be that it refers to all three (economic, political, and theoretical) as they are all intricately connected (Kundani, 2017).

These three aspects of liberalism have a complex, nuanced relationship that cannot be easily explained in today's world. Also, we are observing tension between the three aspects of Liberalism (Kundani, 2017). Considering the example of hyper-globalization, some academics (Rodrik, 2011) have argued that globalization, which is one of the intended outcomes of the liberal world order, has now reached a point where it is undermining democracy. This implies that the form of economic liberalism that the US and its allies have long championed is now impairing and undercutting political liberalism (Rodrik; 2011). This is not to say that hyper-globalization did not prove beneficial as many countries and their populations reaped the benefits of hyper-globalization., But hyper-globalization became the problem for the champions of liberal democratic order who faced considerable economic crises and political issues in their own countries. China and Russia greatly profited from hyper-globalization, as economic dynamics aided in making China a dominant state while simultaneously aiding Russia in re-establishing its strength in the international arena. According to Kundani (2017), China and Russia re-established themselves as great power causing a shift in the balance of power dynamics resulting in finishing unipolarity, which Kundani believes is a prerequisite for Liberal International Order.

3.2. The Evolution of LIO

Let us consider the evolution of LIO. We will look at the evolution through two phases. The first being the pre cold war era and the second being the post-cold war era.

3.2.1. Cold War Era

Liberal International Order came into being from the fusion of two pronounced efforts toward creating and managing order in the international system. First was the state system which has been derived from the treaty of Westphalia 1648 establishing the concept of state sovereignty. Second being the liberal order created and managed by the United States and United Kingdom which spread rapidly in the second half of the twentieth century in which many countries established themselves as liberal democratic states (Ikenberry, 2011 p1). As mentioned above the order of Westphalia was rooted in the concept of state sovereignty. The liberal order of the US and its allies consisted of “*open markets, international institutions, cooperative security, democratic community, progressive change, collective problem solving, shared sovereignty, [and] the rule of law.*” (Ikenberry, 2011, p2). In simple terms, ‘liberalism’ of today’s global system in-fact comes from an older foundation of ‘order’ which had more to do with a realist as compared to liberal operational strategy. The end of WW1 did not also automatically end the running realist order but rather caused it to become the basis for the creation of a new order which developed on top of it. Ikenberry (2011, p. xii) suggests that we can perceive liberal international order using the geographical understanding of layers. The base being the order of Westphalia upon which different forms of orders have been layered and have gradually turned liberal. Additionally, within the LIO, we can observe a straining relationship between ‘liberalism’ and ‘order’ by looking at the evolution of the LIO post WW2.

But we must keep in mind that these papers based on liberal ideals were both championed by as well as signed by only the Western powers. Hence no agreement among the world then and the Western powers was made regarding the establishment or acknowledgment of liberal international order. The UN charter can be considered as the only shared basis for the post-war order acknowledged by all but one of the original 51 member countries of the UN in 1945. But this charter was founded on Westphalian principles and not

on liberal ideals forwarded by the Western powers after WW2. With the establishment of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) in 1947, the world economy became considerably more liberal. But the institutions of the Bretton Woods System, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were neither completely Western and nor global institutions. Although these institutions intended to be considered global, it wasn't possible as its membership as well as positions of power were dominated by Western powers and, therefore, were generally aligned in line with the economic interests of the West.

3.2.2. Post-Cold War Era

When the Cold War came to an end, in order to maintain, stabilize and spread the LIO, three main actions were taken. The first, was to expand membership in established institutions that run under western leadership and to also create new institutions where there was a need. The goal was to form a system of international institutions possessing universal membership that provided the said institutions to hold power and influence over the member states actions and behavior. Secondly, it was crucial to establish a global economic system that maximized free trade, open borders and allowed a free reign to capital markets. Compared to the economic order of the cold war in the West, this new hyper-globaized economic system was planned to be highly ambitious in its scope. Lastly, it was vital for the West to spread liberal democracy to other countries and bring them under the liberal democratic umbrella, the goal which was consistently impeded during the Cold War era when the US and USSR were fighting for power. This mission of turning the globe into liberal democratic states was not only upheld and recognized by the US but also its European allies that also worked towards making it successful as can be seen in the policies of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) (Jawad, 2008, p.611-629).

With the end of the Cold War, Liberal International Order entered a new phase. In this period, one can consider the US-led western democracies acting as 'revisionist' in place of the non-western rising powers. As the US moved from its containment policy to

enlargement (of post soviet states) and engagement (of China) policy, democratic institutions like International Criminal Court (ICC) were established and liberal democratic ideas such as “responsibility to protect” (R2P) and “humanitarian intervention.” were spread. These principles have created a complex and, to an extent, paradoxical concept of state sovereignty. If we consider state sovereignty as a key component of the liberal international order, then powers like China and Russia who consider state sovereignty as integral can be considered (argued by these states) as the main proponents and guardians of the principles of LIO instead of US and other western powers.

The above-mentioned objectives form Kant’s Holy Triangle which are combined from the principle of liberal theory of peace ensuring peaceful interstate relationships, hierarchy among states, and domestication of international politics. The main tenets of Kantian approach for peace are liberal institutionalism, economic interdependence theory, and democratic peace theory. According to the liberal analysts and policy makers of the time, formation of a sustainable LIO would ensure peaceful relationships in the international system.

3.3. The Main Characteristics of Liberal International Order

After explaining the evolution of LIO, it is also important for us to examine the core elements that constitute the LIO and the interactions of the constituent parts along with their overall impact on the LIO. Looking at the liberal international order through the lens of the constituent parts allows us to see the individual evolution of these parts over the decades. Looking at the constituent parts also helps keep track of the change in the relationship between these parts and the consequences of these changes. This understanding takes us beyond the nominal concept of “open and rules-based order” and offers various perspectives in which the liberal international order is viewed as ‘liberal’ and further portrays the underlying complexity present within the order.

3.3.1. The American Hegemony

The American hegemony started with the end of WW1 when the world moved away from a multipolar world. The dissolution of the Soviet Union effectively turned the international system into unipolar under US hegemony. The LIO is established and maintained under the umbrella of American hegemony. Following the Kantian principles of liberal peace theory, the US has worked arduously for the establishment and spread of the LIO. It was essential for the success of LIO to have China and Russia integrated into it, as they were both regional hegemons and forces to reckon with who could challenge the US position as the global hegemon. Therefore, the aim was to embed China and Russia into all the necessary international institutions of the LIO, integrating them into the open economic order and assisting them into becoming liberal democracies. Hence after the Cold War, US policies moved from containment to enlargement and engagement. Enlargement of the international institutions through the inclusion of former soviet states and communist countries into it and engagement of China in the international economic order and incorporation of it into the LIO instead of viewing China as a potential challenge or threat rather deal with it as a competitor in the international system.

NATO, a multilateral security organization, under the leadership of the US, expanded into Eastern Europe to turn the bounded Western order into LIO. This was part of a border strategy by the US which also included the expansion of the EU and the promotion of the color revolutions in Eastern Europe (Mearsheimer, 2014, p.77-89). The strategy of the US was to achieve their liberal democratic goals through the integration of the Eastern European states into the “security community” that the US painstakingly developed in Western Europe starting after the end of WW2.

The US followed a similar policy approach when dealing with China after the end of the Cold War. The then-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright (1997) stated in order to ensure peaceful relations with China, the US will have to start engaging with it instead of thinking of containing China, the way it planned for the USSR during the Cold War. Her

thinking was that engagement with China would result in its active membership in the US-led international institutions easing China into the liberal economic order, getting China to fully adopt liberal democratic values. China would become a “responsible stakeholder” with a vested interest in maintaining peace in the international system (Talbot, 1995, p.27-28).

Apart from the above-mentioned examples, the Bush Doctrine which was used as a justification for the Iraq invasion of 2003 is also a pivotal example of the US policy for establishing LIO. As a result of the 9-11 terrorist attack at the twin towers in the US, the Bush administration judged that in order to succeed in the global war on terror US not only has to deal directly with the terrorist group like Al-Qaeda but also has to promote democracy in the countries where these terrorist organizations hold power and maintain their bases. Termed as ‘axis of evil’ these countries which included Syria, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, etc., harbored, financed, and aided terrorists according to the US administration. President Bush stated in his state of the union message, *“States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic... We will work closely with our coalition to deny terrorists and their state sponsors the materials, technology and expertise to make and deliver weapons of mass destruction”* (Politico, 2002)

The assumption here was that by turning these Middle Eastern countries into liberal democracies, the Middle East would become a peaceful zone and the threat of terrorism and proliferation will be thereby eradicated.

The global financial crisis of 2007-2008 that shocked the world, also called into question the ability of the authority holders managing and running the LIO especially the US (Lanchester, 2018, p.3-8). Along with the declining relationship of the US with Russia there are also sparks of conflict arising between China and the West. This will have an impact on the situation regarding the East China Sea, the South China Sea, Taiwan, and the China-India border. Mearsheimer believes that the United States is once again returning back towards its

policy of containment instead of engagement with China as can be observed by the US trade representatives statement that the US “*erred in supporting China’s entry into the WTO on terms that have proven to be ineffective in securing China’s embrace of an open, market-oriented trade regime.*” (Foreign Affairs, 2013) President Trump imposed a 60 billion USD trade tariff against China which shows the US discontent with China’s attitude towards the liberal democratic and open economic orders. As China maintains its protectionism policies and WTO’s rule-based system is unable to squander China’s attitude rather allowing China to thrive in the system while disregarding the norms (Puddington and Roylance, 2017, p.4).

As discussed earlier, US has been keenly interested in converting China along with Russia into liberal democratic states and the Western leadership has made this abundantly clear with their policies and strategies by not only exercising the state administrations authority but also relying on international organizations and international non-governmental organizations to further this cause as well as weaponizing media and film industry to inject the US backed Western values and norms within the populace of the East. The goal is to achieve a peaceful regime change. But as predicted both China and Russia have shown resistance and withstood the West’s efforts towards liberal democratization for the same reason as the regional powers have opposed West’s interference in their domestic politics and just like how US government and the citizens have vehemently protested against Russia’s interference in their 2016 elections and the country’s politics.

3.3.2. The Domains of LIO

LIO can be disaggregated into three domains that combine to form the whole. These domains being the security order, the economic order and the human rights order.

3.3.2.1. The Security Order

When the academics, theorists and analysts use the term ‘rule based’ to explain the LIO, it is usually because of the present security order within the LIO that allows them to claim it as ‘rules based’. Ikenberry (2011, pxii) in his writing distinguishes between liberal order that is “rules-based” compared to one that is “*organized into rival blocs or exclusive regional spheres.*” Meaning that a liberal order based on rules is one in which the strength of a state does not determine what it can or can not do. Rather states have to abide by the international laws agreed upon in the international system and operate within the limits of these laws to avoid any negative consequences. We can take the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea as a good example to understand the ‘rules-based’ system. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea was adopted in 1982 which according to the International Maritime Organization “*lays down a comprehensive regime of law and order in the world's oceans and seas establishing rules governing all uses of the oceans and their resources.*” This convention on the law of the sea establishes the international law on maritime disputes. This law now holds particular significance concerning the issues in the South China Sea and the East China Sea. Another example is of the United Nations Security Council which delineates the actions states can and can not take.

The security order of the liberal international order evolved in a specific manner in Europe after the end of WW2. Firstly, the world observed a post-WW2 order, which could also be deemed as the system formed during the early days of the Cold War. This system was formed following the guidelines of the Yalta Conference that took place in February of 1945 with the heads of the US, UK, and USSR delineating the plans for the post-war world, reorganization of Europe, and handling of Germany. This agreement was based on the principles of state sovereignty derived from the treaty of Westphalia. The post-WW2 order transformed around the end of the Cold War, becoming a post-1975 order. This order was established and executed through the Helsinki Accords, signed in August 1975. It further instilled sovereignty through the territorial integrity of states concept and resulted in the creation of Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Last order of the 21st century followed after i.e. the post-Cold War order. This system was based on the Charter of Paris for a New Europe adopted by a summit meeting by European states along with the US,

Soviet Union, and Canada in November of 1990. The charter established democracy as “*the only system of government of our nations.*” With the help of these agreements accepted and upheld by the US and its allies (European states, Canada) and the Soviet Union helped to further ‘liberalize’ the security order of Europe through the expansion of the various systems of rules and institutions that were made to govern.

According to the political analysts and academics of the West, Russia and China, both have been willfully disregarding the rules and norms of the Liberal International Order when it comes to securing state interests. The annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by the Russian Federation in the early months of 2014 was regarded as Ukrainian territory under international law. This has been observed as “*the smoothest invasion of modern times*” (BBC, 2014) and is in complete and utter violation of the European security order. Along with this, China’s island-building projects in the South China Sea, and territorial disputes over uninhabited lands in the East China Sea are also seen as acts of rule violation by authoritarian states. These acts of acquiring and enhancing territory by Russia and China through the use of force are deemed as a violation of the rules and norms of the liberal international order and hence pose a challenge to the efficacy of the order. In his paper, Ikenberry (2011, p.63) states that “*democracies are — in contrast to autocratic and authoritarian states — particularly able and willing to operate within an open, rule-based international system and to cooperate for mutual gain.*”. On the other hand, there is no shortage of political scientists who have pointed out the glaring indifference shown by the West towards the rules and norms of the security order during the post-Cold War period. Specifically, the military intervention by NATO in Serbia during 1999 was performed without the mandate of the United Nations Security Council. This intervention was considered a violation of international law by many, particularly the non-western forces. The 2003 invasion of Iraq led by the US under their ‘responsibility to protect’ doctrine, after the long imposed economic sanctions on Iraq particularly increased the devastation. We are not discussing whether the above-mentioned interventions were justified. Also it is worth noting that neither of these interventions led to territorial gains for the interventionist. But rather these interventions help us understand that when the security interests of the west are challenged, regardless of the Western powers being the propagators and defenders of the

liberal international order, they are very much willing and ready to ignore and break the laws of international order to safeguard their interests. Now that other non-western powers have also begun to infringe on these norms and rules of the order, the West started to emphasize the significance and necessity of a “*rules-based*” order.

3.3.2.2. *The Economic Order*

When talking about the open and rule-based Liberal International Order, openness refers to the economic order of the LIO. Under the LIO the economic relations in the international system are run by the principles of liberalism. As liberal analysts point out that the ‘open’ economic order is established through the exchanges and trades between states based on mutual gains (Ikenberry, 2011, p18). One of the vital elements of ‘liberalism’ is having an open economic order and this open economic order is closely linked with globalization which is defined by the economist Stiglitz (2002, p.9) as “*the closer integration of the countries and peoples of the world ...brought about by the enormous reduction of costs of transportation and communication, and the breaking down of artificial barriers to the flows of goods, services, capital, knowledge, and people across borders.*” In-fact LIO and globalization are so intricately intertwined that it is nearly impossible to separate them and observe them individually.

The postwar international economy saw limited liberalism of the economic order. This was the era of General Agreements on Trades and Tariffs (GATT). It was a reconciliation of market and society termed as ‘*the compromise of embedded liberalism*’ by Ruggie (1982) who further explained that “*unlike the economic nationalism of the thirties, it would be multilateral in character; unlike the liberalism of the gold standard and free trade, its multilateralism would be predicated upon domestic interventionism.*” The economic order turned highly liberal after the end of the Cold War, this was specifically a result of the establishment of the World Trade Organization in 1994 which has been considered as “*the*

most formal and developed institution of the liberal international order.” (Ikenberry, 2011, .62)

Along with the rules governing the security order of the LIO, the guidelines and rules of the WTO are also the main element of what is considered the “rules-based” order. The International liberal economic order turned into a global economic order after the acceptance in WTO of China in 2001 and Russia in 2012. This period oversaw the economic order becoming closely interlinked with hyper-globalization which was termed and criticized by Rodrik (2013) over the unlimited economic integration beyond national borders.

On one end of the spectrum, Rodrik along with other economists has started criticizing this form of extreme globalization since the last decade but on the other end, there are many defenders of the LIO who deny any need for reform towards the economic order. These defenders propagate this form of economic liberalism which has been pursued by the US and Europe for the last three decades. Critics refer to them as Neo-liberals who argue furthering this ‘hyper-globalization’. Several political analysts and economists from the West have stated that “mega-regional” trade agreements like the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) have been critical in maintaining the LIO. This kind of thinking displayed by the Western policymakers shows their willingness towards eliding the US and European policy with the LIO.

3.3.2.3. The Human Rights Order

The human rights order is a vital aspect of the Liberal International order. The human rights order represented in the United Nations Charter “*reaffirmed faith in fundamental human rights, and dignity and worth of the human person*”. The UN called for all member states to highlight the importance of human rights globally, without any distinction of race, sex, language, and religion with ultimate freedom of life. The Universal Declaration on

Human Rights was adopted by the United Nations Assembly in 1948 (Charter of United Nations, 1948)

According to Ikenberry (2011, p.61), this aspect of the order made slow progress and remained mostly perfunctory during the Cold War. With the end of the Cold War, the West expanded the human rights order but in disputed ways concerning state sovereignty. Specifically, the establishment of the International Criminal Court and the US '*Responsibility to Protect*' mandate along with deploying liberal intervention all became the genesis for the design of the US-led human rights order.

In the last decade of the 20th century, many states approved and adopted these elements of the human rights order. It is evident to us now; the expansion of the human rights order didn't come without any costs. Particularly, Russia has taken Western interventions to defend its own interventions in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 both of which were seen as a threat to LIO by the Western analysts (Ignatieff, 2014). With the benefit of hindsight, we can observe that in order to develop the human rights order, the West effectively sabotaged the security order. That is to make the LIO more 'liberal', the order itself was undermined. This unfortunate paradox has strained the relationship between the 'order' and 'liberalism'.

Observing the non-western opinion of the LIO we notice a stark difference in how the order and especially the role of its main proponent the US is perceived in the West vs the rest. The Chinese representative in 2016 Munich Security Conference, differentiated three elements of the "*US-led world order*". The three elements being; firstly the American Value system, secondly US military alliance system, and lastly the international institutions. The representative pointed out that when China states it will support the LIO it is usually referring to the third element i.e. China supports a rule-based order of Liberalism and not the Liberal democratic values and norms like democracy (Fu Ying, 2016).

The difference in this thinking between the West and the non-western states is mainly a consequence of the understanding of the role played by the US in the LIO. Where in the West, the role of the US is observed as a provider of public goods and enforcer of international security while states in the non-western areas see the LIO as a particular

ideological agenda of the US and its allies. Observing the Washington Consensus which provided a set of economic policy recommendations for developing countries, which has been criticized for having harsh conditions imposed by the WB and IMF for the developing states to receive benefit and ultimately being unhelpful in economic recovery. Hence the LIO is seen as safeguarding the interests of the core states (particularly the US, UK, France) in the international system. So the steps taken by the LIO proponent states to maintain the order are perceived as the core states' attempts to ensure their supremacy in the international system. A realpolitik understanding of US hegemony by the non-western states. And since the disaster of the Iraq war and the consecutive financial crises the credibility of US protection of the components of the order has been called into question.

We can easily observe the biased perception by taking the economic order into account. The West assumes the current economic order displays shared interests of all instead of supporting the interests of the leading group. For liberal economists, trading results in absolute gains and benefits all parties and therefore believe liberalization of trade is a kind of public good. By establishing various international trade agreements like Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and Trans-Pacific Partnership the US and its allies have tried to establish guidelines and rules for conducting international trade. This step is viewed by many in the non-west as an effort by the US to deploy “geo-economic containment”. TTP has been called a method for the US to contain China and the emerging economies of Asia.

It is also important to note that the US security guarantees have created somewhat peaceful conditions in places like East Asia and prevented the existence of regional hegemons. The economic order and the spread of globalization have not only helped the dominant states in amassing wealth but also has resulted in decreasing the significant amount of poverty level in the weak and developing states.

3.3.3. The Constitutive Norms and Principles of LIO

Apart from the three constituents/elements of LIO, Glaser (2019) has narrowed down five mechanisms or causal logics that the liberal international theorists believe bring forth the LIO's outcomes. These mechanisms are

1. Democracy
2. Hierarchy built on legitimate authority
3. Institutional binding
4. Economic interdependence
5. Political convergence

It is important to understand these causal logics to judge properly the positive or negative influence of the order on the international system and results. Academics have written comprehensively regarding the elements of LIO which I have discussed in this chapter under the three constituents of LIO, these elements include the norms of sovereignty, open economic system, alliances, etc. Although scholars from all sides concur that all of these elements have impacted the international system, they disagree on the kind and intensity of the influence the elements of the order have had on the international system (Glaser, 2019).

3.3.3.1. Democracy

Liberal theorists posit that various elements of democracy allow for liberal order to bring forth cooperation in the international system, unilateral restraint by the actors, and finally peaceful coexistence. This peace is maintained, according to liberal theorists due to democratic states having common interests so they regard their relationship with other democratic states to be consensual and rooted in the concept of reciprocity and not only on the threat of exerting power. This also allows the liberal democratic states to overcome the security dilemma while forming reliable commitments which gives confidence to the liberal

democratic order's members that the powerful states will restrain their use of force (Ikenberry, 2011, p.61-66 ; Doyle, 1997, p. 205–311). Due to this, democratic states can be confident in upholding alliances, pursuing open and free trade along with creating and following the rules and norms that cause smooth running of the international system. For long academics have been debating on the impact of democracy on the global political framework (Russett, 1993). Immanuel Kant's democratic peace theory which posits that democratic states maintain peaceful relations allowing for cooperation and mutually beneficial transactions and other relevant aspects of democratic exceptionalism have been backed up by many liberal theorists although academics still maintain varying opinions on which particular mechanisms bring these outcomes. Scholars endorsing democracy's ability to bring positive outcomes in the international system state the liberal democratic order will greatly benefit the states that adopt its processes and norms as compared to those who have reservations regarding democracy's peace establishing property.

3.3.3.2. Hierarchy Built on Legitimate Authority

Realists claim that the international system is based on anarchy but for the proponents of LIO the international order is characterized by hierarchy rather than anarchy meaning that lack of international institutions or powerful states can stop the use of military force and enforce the international agreements (Glaser, 2019). In IR literature the concept of hierarchy comes with various definitions and logics (Donnelly, 2006, p.139-170; McConaughy, Musgrave and Nexon, 2018, p.181-218) . The LIO utilizes a specific and narrow understanding of hierarchy. This understanding of the term being, *“hierarchy is manifested in legitimate political authority between superordinate and subordinate states”* (Mattern and Zarakon, 2016, p.623-654) Lake in his paper explains that, *“hierarchy exists when one actor, the dominant state, possesses authority over another actor, the subordinate state.”* (Lake, 2007) and similarly Ikenberry (2011, p.56) has described regarding the hierarchical systems, *“order is established or imposed by a leading state wielding concentrated power and authority ... hierarchical orders can vary widely in terms of the degree to which*

superordinate and subordinate roles are established and maintained by such factors as coercive power, legitimate authority, institutionalized relations, and a division of labor.”

Hence in LIO where hegemonic order is at work its legitimate authority that leads to compliance rather than coercion having a huge impact.

Under this order, the legitimacy of the states on the top of the hierarchy lies in the powerful state's inclination to employ bargaining for reaching agreements with the other member states (Ikenberry, 2011, p.70-74; Hurd, 1999, p. 379–408). However, it is important to note that states can utilize coercion if it is run through international institutions (Thompson, 2006, p1-34). The LIO is built upon negotiated rules that every member state has to accept and exercise. As a result, the weaker states have to consider, deal with or concur with the most powerful states' ability to influence the establishment of the terms of the consensus (Butt, 2013, p. 575-607; Finnemore, 2009, p.58-85). For that reason, the weaker states will most likely accept the terms of the agreements which in turn amplifies the likelihood of the powerful states for maintaining their long term top position. However, the structural relationship within the order stays hierarchical as the dominant states disproportionately influence the terms of the agreement.

Lake (2018, p.6-11) provides a nuanced approach to hierarchy resting on the concept of, *“relational authority.”* Lake mentions, *“in a relational approach, authority is understood to rest on an exchange relationship between dominant and subordinate states, in which the former provides a social order in return for compliance and legitimacy from the latter.”* The legitimacy granted to the powerful state by the weaker state differentiates the product of relational authority from the standard bargained agreement. Lake (2009, p.22, p.30, p.51-52) utilizes the concept of duty in explaining legitimacy stating that the weaker state deem it as a duty to follow through with the commands of the most powerful state within the order or alternatively observe the orders of the powerful states as legitimate actions that allow for a distinction between one's authority to lead/direct and using coercion for reaching objectives.

Donnelly (2006) has mentioned that they are not mutually exclusive and hierarchy can exist within an anarchical system. Therefore, having hierarchy present in the LIO says little about the comparative relationships between states within and outside of the liberal

democratic system including and most importantly China today and the USSR. Glaser (2019) states that the relationship of the US, the leading member of the LIO with both China and Russia have remained anarchic even with all the security concerns and the favorable incentives provided by the international system under specific conditions.

One of the criticisms towards categorizing hierarchy in the LIO is that it is difficult to identify evidence of hierarchy as transactions and bargaining between the weak and powerful state can provide results that can conveniently be understood through the use of legitimate authority. But still, a powerful state can employ the vast power difference to obtain significantly biased results without resorting to any threats of use of force. The powerful states can use tacit force while bargaining over the creation of an alliance or amendments to pre-established alliances. Therefore, subordinate states who need the security protection granted by the alliance will have to agree with the asymmetric terms of the negotiations. A noticeable example is the US negotiations and bargain with its European allies during the Cold War to abstain from developing nuclear weaponry or the US would either take away or significantly reduce its military protection and support which its allies heavily relied on for the successful advancement of their states (Gerzhoy, 2015, p.91–129; Miller, 2014, p. 933–937; Schuessler and Shiffrinson, 2018). Furthermore, despite being a hegemon and the leader of the LIO, the US has quite often seen disinclination of its allies to cooperate and fulfill their financial and manpower requirements to the US for being under their security wing.

US President Trump has been very vocal regarding his dissatisfaction with the allies not pulling their weights within the institutions and shirking away from their commitments, but this issue has been long withstanding within the institutions of LIO. The dissatisfaction of the US with the members of NATO for not fulfilling their monetary requirements has been long going (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1990). Cooper and Zycher (1989) mentioned in their paper, *“the allocation of burdens and responsibilities has been a contentious issue since the formation of the alliance. ... Several enduring themes have bedeviled burden-sharing issues almost from the inception of NATO.”* Ringsmose (2010, p.321) talked about this in her writings, pointing out that, *“given that the United States could in fact withhold its indispensable contribution to the alliance, the senior ally was able to ‘induce its smaller partners to do more than they planned and intended.’”* Thus, if the allies of the US had felt

the duty to follow through with their commitments towards the institutions, this asymmetric burden sharing issue would not have been prevailing for long.

3.3.3.3. Institutional Binding

Academics studying institutions have listed various ways through which IO's assist interstate cooperation and realize common goals. These ways include institutions' ability to provide useful information, reduction of transactional costs, and enhancing efficiency in implementing joint functions (Glaser, 2010, p.161-166). According to the concept of LIO states can bind themselves with institutions. Talking about liberal theory, Ikenberry (2001, p.15) pointed out that although liberal theory posits the ability of institutions to direct and constrict states behavior, liberal theorists haven't performed comprehensive research to understand dominant states place restrictions on themselves through the institutions so that the other states will not fear domination or abandonment from leading states. Ikenberry posits that as dominant states bind themselves to the international institutions making it difficult and costly for them to leave, allows the weaker states a sense of comfort that the dominant states will follow through with the institutional obligations and will not employ force to go against the weaker states interests. He further argues that *"the logic of institutional binding and supranationalism, is to restrain power through the establishment of an institutionalized political process supervised by formal-legal authority... States might ordinarily prefer to preserve their options ... Through institutional binding, states do exactly the opposite: they build long-term security, political and economic commitments that are difficult to retract."* Examining the power of the strong states increases the weaker states readiness to conclude agreements which increase their dependence on the dominant state and their potential vulnerability to its power (Ikenberry, 2001, p. 7–17, 40–44, 199–210; Ikenberry, 2011, p. 61–62).

Theorists have also laid out criticism regarding the institution binding argument stating it has several weaknesses. The critiques mention that it's not possible for dominant

states to effectively restrain their power and force when facing serious issues like when a state may initiate a war, use its military power or start a trade war (Mearsheimer, 2018; Schweller, 2001, p.176-184). Schweller (2001, p.179) points out a number of cases in which the US violated “*the spirit of multilateral cooperation within its own alliance system,*”. Some of these instances include the US decision to hold back support for UK and France during the Suez Crisis and President Nixon's decision to initiate diplomatic relations with China without consulting US key regional ally, Japan which had a contested relationship with China at that time (Schweller, 2001, p.179). Both of these are important examples of the US behaving based on its national interest without any regard to its allies' preferences. However, theorists do argue that these reasonings do not delve deeper into the basis of the binding argument which is the desire of the weak state to safeguard itself from the power of the strong states.

3.3.3.4. Economic Interdependence

One of the key tenets of the liberal approach is that trade and commerce create economic interdependence which lessens the probability of war. Due to interdependence, all parties invest in this economic relationship as their monetary profits are linked together. States thus ensure that their relationship continues smoothly and is not breached. As significant losses can be suffered if there is a disruption in the international system and the economic order, therefore, states have an incentive to avoid conflicts. The US policymakers stance on economic interdependence as well as their understanding of the unconstrained economic competition which led to the great depression of the 1930s coupled with the costs of WW2 significantly influenced the US in designing and forming the LIO (Ikenberry, 2001, p.162-214). Just like the heavily debated role of democracy in lessening anarchy and promotion of peace, theorists have also been debating over the link of economic interdependence with the reduction in probability of wars (Gelpi and Grieco, 2008, p.44-59; Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2010, p.775-808). Nearly half of Germany and Japan's GDP comes through trade due to which both of these states are highly invested in the spread of

globalization and proponents of free trade policies. Realist theorists posit that the state can become vulnerable due to its economic interdependence on others, and this vulnerability can lead to states resorting to force by initiating trade embargoes and trade wars. And a state not being able to receive its key imports will drive or trigger military competition and reason for initiating war (Copeland, 2014, p.16-50; Waltz, 1979, p.129–160). Depending upon the value of the economic transaction and economic relationship, as well as states perception regarding the probability of any future wars or political conflicts, leads to a state's decision regarding how much economic vulnerability can the state allow. However, states can have no choice but to trade if they lack vital resources and goods they need to import for the successful running of the country, especially oil which leads to such states having no other choice except to accept the vulnerability (Kelanic, 2016,p.181–213; Glaser, 2013, p.112–146; Colgan, 2013, p.147–180).

3.3.3.5. Political Convergence

Wright (2017, p.1) wrote about convergence that, *“as countries embraced globalization, they would become more ‘responsible’ members of the liberal international order and would, over time, liberalize domestically.”* Specifically speaking with states increasing participation in the open liberal economy combined with their monetary success and development will eventually turn the authoritarian states into liberal democratic states. This democracy will cause peace and cooperation among states in the international arena according to the democratic peace theory of liberal internationalism. Compared to the other mechanisms the thesis of convergence is that it is transformational i.e. the LIO is able to realize these goals by transforming states and aligning their interests with other liberal democracies and reshaping their beliefs regarding suitable methods to attain their foreign policy outcomes (Mandelbaum, 2003; Friedman, 2000).

After the end of the Cold War, the US saw Russia and China as the key states for political convergence, especially considering China’s abundant land, raw material, human

resource, and the potential to develop into an economically and technologically advanced state and a trading partner of the US. Mandelbaum (2000, p.265) explained in his paper that the policy of the US and its allies after the end of the Cold War for China and Russia along with other developing states and/or weak states was one of the central arguments of liberalism which is “*free markets make free men.*”

The political convergence theory has also faced its fair share of criticism. The major one being that although the theory suggests after consecutive interactions with the international economic system authoritarian states like China and Russia are yet to turn into liberal democratic states. The Trump administration outlined the same concern in 2017 when the NSS stated that the US needs to “*rethink the policies of the past two decades—policies based on the assumption that engagement with rivals and their inclusion in international institutions and global commerce would turn them into benign actors.*” (White House, 2017).

3.3.3.6. Application Towards China

As the LIO concept generally is inward-focused, it deals with the relationships of states within the order, which has caused many shortcomings because of this outlook. Looking at China, one can easily notice that China isn't a democratic state and neither is China a participant of the US security alliances in Asia and China has become the target of US-backed Asian security alliances. Hence neither the binding argument nor the hierarchy argument applies to China's situation. However, China has become a part of the economic order (China became a member of WTO in Dec 2001) and China established significant trade relations with the US significantly increasing the economic interdependence between the two. Consequently, China also saw a sharp increase in its wealth and development. So both the economic interdependence and the political convergence mechanisms apply to China. The LIO concept has not provided any explanations regarding the outcome when not all mechanisms are applicable. However, looking at China we can say that the outcome of the applicable mechanisms has not been sufficiently adequate. China's growing participation in

the international economy and trading relationships has not resulted in reduced tensions, rather as we observed during the Trump era, tensions escalated between the two major powers resulting in trade wars. China observed a rise in authoritarianism and centralized ruling while simultaneously having technological developments and a significant increase in GDP. China's administration and elites' disinclination to adopt a democracy is an immense disappointment for LIO advocates.

3.4. The Future of LIO and the Rise of Non-Western Powers

There are various kinds of international orders, and for a particular order to rise will depend mainly on the global distribution of power. When the international system is unipolar than the political ideology of the global hegemon will dictate the kind of international order being upheld. According to Mearsheimer (2019) for the liberal international order to work, a unipolar system that is led by liberal democracy is a prerequisite. Mearsheimer, in his paper, states that LIO needs the hegemon to be a liberal democracy having significant influence within the chief institutions that lead and maintain the LIO. This must be added with a significant number of liberal democratic states within the international system along with an open world economy. The main objective of the liberally democratic states, specifically leading ones is to promote democracy in the international system and to have increasing economic integration and cooperation among states along with the creation of dependable and effective international institutions. Simply put, the objective of the LIO is the formation of a global order which comprises solely of liberal democratic states who maintain economic relationships while being tied together by a set of common rules. Liberal analysts work under the assumption that liberal democracies do not fight each other, creating a peaceful international system that allows for healthy competition and cooperation resulting in mutual prosperity of all.

Mearsheimer (2019) believes that the LIO's inclination for the supremacy of international institutions over its domestic counterparts along with its dedication towards open borders results in insidious political outcomes within the liberal democratic states including the leader of the LIO, USA. These policies come in conflict with nationalism over issues of vital importance such as the concept of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national identity. And when these conflicts take place, nationalism usually comes out as the winner as it is one of the reigning political ideologies in the globe compromising and diminishing the effectiveness of the LIO at its core.

Hyperglobalization which has become intricately combined with LIO resulted in a decrease in jobs along with employee wages and an increase in income inequality all over the liberal democratic states. Hyperglobalization also caused the stability of the international financial system to falter resulting in various high-impact financial crises in the international system. These issues became political troubles leading to a decline in proponents of the order. Hyperglobalization also chips away at the economic order by assisting other states to gain power which can threaten the position of the hegemon which maintains and leads the order.

Mearsheimer's (2019) article runs under the assumption that the world has turned multipolar from unipolar around 2016, especially due to the rise of China and the revival of Russia under Putin's leadership. According to Mearsheimer without a unipolar world, LIO can not keep standing and therefore a new order will take the place of LIO which will be closer to realism based international order. This order will bring significant changes in the handling of the global economy, taking care of arms control, and dealing with issues related to global commons such as mass poverty and climate change. Along with this international order, both the US and China will be heading their own bounded orders competing in the economic and military realms.

Globally nationalism is a highly followed political ideology because of its right to self-determination along with the sovereignty of state. Apart from this, there is also realist reasoning behind the opposition from China, Russia, and other similar states towards LIO because if China and Russia both accept the order in its entirety it would mean that the US becomes the leader of the free world and the international system and will have reign over

the international politics, economy and military aspects. It is obvious that both China and Russia will be against having the US military forces anywhere near the countries borders or in their neighboring states. Therefore it comes as no surprise that China demands and insists on the US to remove its military presence from the Western Pacific and Russia for long has resisted and objected to both NATO and EU's expansion in Eastern Europe. Analysts have also made the case that the Crimean annexation and Ukraine crisis of 2014 has been a result of the West's expansion into Eastern Europe and Russia's response as a result of the security dilemma. This contestation regarding Ukraine has soured Russia-West relations and also has provided Russia with an incentive to challenge the NATO authority and presence in its backyard. To surmise, Nationalism and Realism both have played a major role in the decision-making of the two regional powers, Russia and China, to challenge and hinder the growth of US-led liberal democratic order.

For liberal democratic states, international institutions are of high value because of which these states are willing to give their authority to these international institutions that help make up the LIO. But this approach is also seen by many as liberal states voluntarily handing over their sovereignty to the international institutions. Many academics do oppose this statement that liberal states are giving up their sovereignty to the international institutions but either way, it is evident that liberal states are at the least delegating the authority to international institutions to make important decisions on their behalf which may create significant political issues in today's nation-states (Grinberg, 2018; Schmitt, 2005). As we know nationalism privileges self-determination and sovereignty therefore nationalism can never be on the same page with international institutions which evidently takes away the authority from states to make certain decisions and formalize policies that can have important repercussions for the member states (Jackson, 2007, p.78-103). As stated by Colgan and Keohane in their paper, *"the cumulative effect of such expansions of international authority is to excessively limit sovereignty and give people the sense that foreign forces are controlling their lives"* (Colgan and Keohane, 2017. p.42).

According to Mearsheimer (2019), the gravity of this issue mainly depends upon the amount of power and influence that corresponding international institutions hold on the member states. And as we discussed the rationality behind the creation of these international

institutions we know they are developed with the main goal of impacting and affecting the interests and behaviors of the member state, making them align with the objectives of the international institutions. This influence of international institutions on the policies of member states raises the question of ‘democratic deficit’ and perceived lack of accessibility and representation of the populace of the member states as well as lack of accountability of the international institutions. Ordinary citizens of these countries deem that these international institutions who have a major say in their government's policies and decision making are neither appointed by the citizens of these states nor are accessible and accountable for the consequences of their meddling in the member states affairs.

We can take European Union and its member states as an evident example of this thinking (Alemanno, 2018). In recent history, the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU and European Atomic Energy Community through a people's referendum can be considered as one of the main examples of citizens aiming to take back the state's decision making power and disallowing the international institutions which are in this case EU from holding power over the country's foreign and domestic affairs. The UK nationals voted for Brexit as they believed their state had given considerable authority to the EU. For the citizens it became important, in these uncertain times of political unrest, to claim back the state's sovereignty. Specifically speaking, the citizens of the UK were unaccepting of the level of control regarding the country's economic policy that had been handed over to the EU by the UK government which was threatening democratic accountability (Clarke et al, 2017). One main point of contention was that the appointed representatives of the EU were the brains behind UK's economic policy and these representatives not being elected by the UK citizens did not sit well with the general public. Thus Clarke et al stated in their paper, *“regaining sovereignty and taking back control was a major theme in the 2016 referendum.”*

With the increase in populism in Europe states on the other side of the Atlantic have also not remained unaffected. Recent US politics have witnessed concerns regarding sovereignty by the citizens and the elected representatives. The US president Trump also won his election, by running his campaign voicing concerns over the loss of sovereignty and promises to keep ‘America First’ approach in his politics. Trump has also been an avid critic of the international institutions and multilateral organizations like the EU, IMF, NATO, and

World Bank, all of which are the pillars of LIO. Trump has also called for a stop to the country's long pursued nation-building projects in the Middle East and other parts of the world and also called back many of the military personnel from Afghanistan and other troubled countries. Various analysts have claimed that it seems liberal democracy is also taking a step back while a variety of 'new authoritarianism is on the rise in states such as Hungary, Poland, Spain, the Philippines, Turkey, and India. And among the many states which adopted the liberal democratic values are now facing populist, nationalist, and xenophobic strands of backlash politics (Luce, 2017; Zhong and Mozur, 2018; Uhlmann and Grigg, 2018; Sanger et al., 2019; Wolf, 2019).

3.5. Conclusion

Since the introduction of LIO, it has remained embedded in the postwar US hegemonic order. LIO has been marked by policies relating to economic openness of states in the international system, security cooperation through multilateral institutions and alliances as well as combined efforts to maintain the peace, promotion of the rule of law, and sustaining international institutions established to handle the issues of interdependence caused by globalization. This complex and nuanced liberal order came about in phases and originated in the 20th century when the international system was overcome by the world wars, financial recessions and economic depressions, fascism and totalitarianism, and other significant social catastrophes.

Currently, the US-led LIO is facing some critical challenges and the future of the LIO will depend heavily on the actions of the US-led liberal states and the major illiberal and authoritative states particularly China and Russia along with the developing economies of Asia and Africa. Considering history one can say that the liberal order has been through many challenges and upheavals since the 18th century being the same if not more critical than the issues faced today. It's more beneficial to approach the LIO using Dewey's understanding

which sees LIO as “*a framework for coping with the inevitable problems of modern society*” (Boyle, 2016).

With the emergence of the PRC, a growing number of political analysts have started to envision a more constricted understanding of the LIO. Consisting of a rule-based multilateral order which excludes the US-led Western values and liberal democratic norms like human rights. Such an order is not only welcomed by PRC but will also be fervently supported if the current LIO is molded or transformed as such.



CHAPTER 4

4. CHINA'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL ORDER

4.1. Introduction

To understand PRC's position in the world it's important to consider factual information. According to the International Monetary Fund (2020) PRC has the world's second largest economy, losing only to the US. With a nominal GDP of 14.3 trillion USD in 2019 PRC lagged behind US's 21.4 trillion USD. China's economy took the global lead by producing 22.5 trillion USD in 2019 based on purchasing power parity compared to US 20.5 trillion USD (World Bank, 2020). According to latest available information on World Bank, PRC was highest exporter and second highest importer in 2018. China is also the only major economy to receive positive growth in 2020 (World Bank, overview). PRC has also drastically increased its FDI and foreign aid provisions since 2010 (Dreher et al. 2018; Wang and Zhao 2017).

Moving towards security aspect, PRC is leading the world in largest armed forces by active-duty military personnel at around 2.2 Mill active soldiers. PRC is followed by India, US, N. Korea and Russia respectively. PRC comes second in highest military spending with 252 billion USD with the US placing on top with 778 Billion USD spending in 2020 (Statistica, 2020). China's economic rise has also been followed by an assertive geopolitical response reflecting its hard and soft power capabilities (Liao, 2018). PRC's economic development assists the military modernization through increasing defense budgets, CCP projects like BRI, and through developments in its R&D, technology and production industry (Department of Defense, 2020).

As we know, China has been observing a significant rise since its entrance into the liberal world in the 70's. China saw drastic development, technological advancement, momentous increase in its military and economic power all leading to China becoming a powerful actor in the international system (Zeng & Breslin; 2016). How this rise of China will affect the international system and the global orders is an important question. Academics and historians have provided vast literature on the impact and consequences of powershift between the hegemons and the rising powers. Although it remains to be seen whether the White House and Beijing will also clash according to what the scholars have opined (Houlewig, 1988; Maher, 2016). Political analysts have diverging opinions regarding China's approach to the international order. Some analysts argue that China plans to overturn the international order specifically bringing down the leadership of the current order aka USA (Pillsbury, 2015), similarly other academics have argued Chinese vision of an international order (Jacques, 2012). Academics and analysts alike have also detailed the practical realities of the established international order (the LIO) and pondered on whether China has an actual ability to overturn it (Tunsjø, 2018; Zeng & Breslin, 2016). These experts have broadly concluded that China is not satisfied with the LIO and the hierarchy in the international system. But China does not seek to overturn the order, rather simply tweak and mold it according to their wishes (Swaine, 2016). Western analyst also question China's capacity to actually challenge the established powers of the liberal order (Shambaugh, 2014). While other analysts have acknowledged China's influence on the global south, observing a complex, detailed picture of China's interaction with the LIO and its bilateral approach towards the actors of the order. These analysts have surmised the unique approach of China is chipping away at the structure of the LIO and bypassing the established norms and rules of the order to safeguard China's interests (Shambaugh, 2014; Christensen, 2016).

It is obvious that China's attitude towards the LIO and China's behavior regarding it will be critical in establishing the future of LIO. If China adapts the key norms of the order, gets socialized into the domains of the LIO than even if China remains critical of the US and maintains its middle kingdom aspirations the LIO and its domains will remain strong. On the other hand, if China's holds a revisionist objective towards the LIO, questions the legitimacy of its institutions and challenges it by establishes counter institutions along with staking

sovereignty and territorial claims on land and on sea despite the potential for war then China will lead to fall of the LIO and causing a standoff between China and America.

The nuances of the LIO and the relationship and tensions between its elements makes it difficult to analyze PRC's attitude towards the LIO. Along with other major powers in the order, PRC also actively participates in most of the key institutions of the LIO while following and maintaining if not adapting the norms and rules of the elements. At the same time, China has also been observed to hold against a number of key norms and international institutions of the order such as the human rights order, R2P concept, Western led liberal values and security based on military alliances. If we observe China with regards to other leading states, we see that PRC follows a similar approach in which it disregards the norms and rules of the LIO which can threaten its national interests.

4.1.1. Core Chinese National Interests

China's interaction with the global order and its foreign policy is heavily determined by what the Chinese leadership termed its 'core' interests. These core interests include the following.

- Sovereignty and territorial integrity (both land and sea)
- Security
- National reunification with the mainland
- Stability of the Communist Party of China (CCP)
- Economic and social development

Since China's opening up it has administered Deng Xiaoping's "*hide your strength, bide your time*" strategy (Deng, 1994, p.321-353). Where it maintained its focus on the country's economic and technological development while keeping in check its military

aspirations. President Xi Jinping has continuously verbalized China's "*peaceful development*" to assuage the distrust and doubt among the actors of the international system and to quell any rising questions regarding China's intentions towards revisionism (Information office of State Council PRC, 2011). Keeping the '*peaceful development*' concept in mind along with President Xi's '*Chinese dream*' which mainly means the renewal of the Chinese nation according to China's leadership, many political analysts have pointed out that securing and promoting the core values will highly depend upon the PRC's ability to influence the international system (Xinua, 2014). Talking about the international system President Xi also stated to the global community and the world leaders during the UN General Assembly that the Chinese dream cannot come to fruition if the international system does not remain peaceful and the international order stable. President Xi, also asked for the understanding and support from the international community to help China in realizing its dream (Jinping, 2015).

4.1.2. Chinese Dream

Talking to the media Xi Jinping has consistently mentioned the Chinese Dream. Xi's vision for China is "*achieving the Chinese dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese people.*" This political theory of the CCP is rooted in the material goal of becoming a moderately prosperous society by 2020, and the modernization goal of becoming a fully developed nation by 2049. Through deepening reform, governing the country according to the rule of law, and enforcing strict party discipline. (Chai, W., & Chai, M.,2013) The Chinese Dream, is a nebulous concept that shares many of the materialistic components of the "*American Dream,*" at the same time emphasizes the Chinese nation's rejuvenation to a position of wealth and power.

President Xi Jinping has used the term numerous times in national and international settings. During his first address to the nation as head of state on 17 March. Xi mentioned, "*we must make persistent efforts, press ahead with indomitable will, continue to push forward*

the great cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and strive to achieve the Chinese dream of great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation... To realise the Chinese road, we must spread the Chinese spirit, which combines the spirit of the nation with patriotism as the core and the spirit of the time with reform and innovation as the core." (BBC, 2013)

China uses media technology to gain soft power and spread Sino-centric values in line with the Chinese dream to the rest of the world (Shambaugh, 2015). President Xi Jinping said, *"we should increase China's soft power, give a good Chinese narrative, and better communicate China's message to the world"* (Reuters, Nov 2014) China invests heavily in mass media supporting the Chinese film and television industry and publishing the Chinese news and drama channels in multiple languages for the populace in other states to view. China only allows a certain number of international films to be played in its cinema industry which is one of the world's most lucrative industry. These international films can only enter the Chinese market if they meet particular requirements set by the Chinese government such as having at least one Chinese within the firm, partnership or the production is by Chinese firms, product placement by Chinese local industry etc (The Diplomat, Nov 2017). China is making all these efforts to spread a China version of reality, and diffuse social constructs that support the Middle Kingdom ideology among the global audience.

4.1.3. China's Vision of International Order

A recent study performed by the National Bureau of Asian Research (ABR) detailed China's vision of the international order. The findings highlighted that China's vision of IO is rooted in the Chinese concepts of 'tianxia' and 'mandate of heaven' (Rolland, 2020). Tianxia meaning 'under the heaven' details a universal system responsible for order in the 'metaphysical realm'. Political sovereignty of PRC under tianxia concept and the right to rule granted by the mandate of heaven both confer PRC the legitimacy and power to be at center stage in the world order. The CPC and Chinese elites reject the Western conceptualization of the world order and rather push the historical and traditional Chinese conceptions of

empire—tianxia (everything under heaven) and the tributary system (Rolland, 2020). China also favors the Leninist principles of power and dominance (Rolland, 2020).

The Chinese vision of the international order remains a hierarchical system in which China is placed at both the top and center of the global world order. With China being the nucleus, the most powerful and technologically advanced state which inspires and maintains dominance over the rest of the states revolving around the nucleus (Xianlin & Sigley, 2000; Wang, 1999).

According to Bang Wang (2017) the Confucian idea of Tianxia stands in opposition to the modern state system and political theory. It provides a framework for social and political life, crucial to its legitimacy is winning the hearts and minds of the populace. Under Tianxia concept states are not aligned through coercion rather relationships are sustained through effective ties established by cultural competence. Geographical boundaries are not as relevant; rather the inner circle members revolving around the Chinese nucleus are those who have understood and internalized the Chinese cultural norms.

According to Xuewu (DW, 2020) China's vision of a world order is one that is *"politically multipolar, functionally multilateral and ideologically pluralistic."* Linking it to the Chinese dream of establishing *"the community of shared human destiny."* This concept acknowledging that there is one earth, and all nations must learn to coexist in this shared space.

China has always regarded its history as a dominant player in the international politics for well over 2000 years. Referring to itself as Middle Kingdom or Central kingdom or in Mandarin *'Zhongguo'* considers itself as the center of civilization or the center of the world. With China situated at the center the rest of the nations effectively gravitate towards the Middle Kingdom for political, economic and cultural salvation. This China centric view has shaped China's behavior, post 1949 (Ghosh Dastidar).

It is important to mention that for the PRC, the difference between the multipolar order and the current order is that in the former norms and decision power is divided equally between Western and Non-Western countries. While in the latter, the US and its allies enjoy

much more privileges than the rest of the world. A major reason for China offering a change in representation in the international institutions is that they believe in the shift of global power as more and more developing countries rise (Xi, 2015). In Sept, 2017 during the 9th BRICS summit, the Chinese representative highlighted the need building, *“a more just, equitable, fair, democratic and representative international political and economic order”*. A vision that PRC plans to lead in implementing (BRICS Summit, 2017).

PRC has however contradicted its own vision of multipolar order as it has shown major reluctance in allowing other Non-Western countries to gain power and recognition in the international institutions. Take for example in 2005, PRC along with the US vetoed a proposal for expansion of the UN Security Council by adding six permanent members- Japan, India, Germany and Brazil (Xinhua, 2005). Thus, it is fair to say that China does favor a type of multipolarity that lessens US influence and domination but at the same time allows China to keep a hold on regional dominance- one where China enjoys a regional hegemony-with a Sinocentric version of multipolar order.

4.2. China and the LIO

The Maoist era saw PRC opening up to the developing world and embracing either the US or the Soviet Union, as per the requirement. PRC's relationship and connection with the UN in the Mao era were limited due to political seclusion. However, this paradigm of China's international relations shifted when the US recognized PRC at the end of 1970s. This opened up avenues for political reform and a prospect of new and more open policies. China's official recognition meant PRC becoming a member of the UN, which in turn paved way for China's influence and role in international development and international trade.

Present-day, the legitimacy offered by impartial institutions such as the UN is appreciated by the Chinese leaders, especially when it comes to allowing Beijing to exert its influence. However, PRC strongly disapproves and berates what they see as uneven

distribution of assistance and benefits that the US receives from existing institutions (Ying, 2016). It also opposes any conventions or international norms that they see as favoring the Western Countries, as they believe it to threaten the sovereign status of PRC and other developing countries (Yan, 2018).

Chinese institutions' constant insinuation that they "support the International Order " is more of a reference to PRC's inclusion and participation in Institutions such as the United Nations and the World Trade Order, and its assistance in significant International laws and treaties (Xinhua, 2015). In contrast to this however, Chinese leaders reject and condemn the values and norms imposed as a supporting factor for the western "political ideology". Niu Xinxun, CICIR's scholar stated that PRC had "*integrated successfully into the international economic system*" but noted "*increasing difficulties with political and ideological integration.*" He emphasized that current norms and ideologies nurturing and supporting the international order are built on western values which do not suit the rising powers. For instance, he explained how the West's proclivity for 'hegemony' is in contrast with the non-Western countries proclivity for a "'balance of power", similarly he contrasted "capitalism" with "socialism" and similar economic models, and "democracy" with "authoritarianism" and other similar government models. On reverberating a widespread Chinese media suspicion, Niu charged the US in an attempt to "*incorporate and tame PRC*" by its western political ideology (Xinchun, 2012, p.77-90). On a broader level, PRC's attitude towards the LIO can be surmised to a number of broad themes explained below.

4.2.1. China and the American Hegemony

Let's start by looking at how China deals with aspects of American hegemony that it does not agree with. The Chinese diplomat Fu Ying stated, "*China is never fully embraced to this (US) order system. Despite its tremendous progress, China has long been alienated politically by the western world. The US-led military alliance puts their interests above other's and pays little attention to China's security concerns. It is even asserting increasing*

security pressure on China in the Asia-Pacific these days." (China Daily, July 2016). PRC does not approve of how US led international institutions like NATO view and emphasize western values in human rights and democracy and even the US military. China is of the opinion that US military intervention in the order is a form of contravention and thus it views these alliances as an attempt to control PRC (Tiezzi, 2015). PRC also refutes how some liberal norms are part of the order and how these norms are essentially against the core Westphalian sovereignty beliefs (Etzioni, 2016). As former National Security Council Senior Director for Asian Affairs Jeffrey Bader put it, "*China often defends the more old-fashioned interpretation of sovereignty against efforts to reinterpret sovereignty in a more limited way*" (Bader, 2016, p. 189). PRC has especially opposed involvement of the US military in the name of liberal norms and how it is used to justify the military intervention under the guise of humanitarian reasons (Chen, 2016, p. 25, 59)

PRC disapproves how the US is allowed unchecked freedom in its actions, it clearly violates rules and other mechanisms. For example, when the US contravened the Security Council resolution in 2003 invasion of Iraq (Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nation, 2003). China, although at the same time does want to enjoy similar exceptionalism as in the case of South China sea when it denied Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) to rule on sovereignty claims between China and Philippines. They also denied the PCA final ruling as well, which opposed China's "nine-dash line" claim (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016). PRC has used militarization pressure tactics in the South China seas rather than relying on multilateral legal processes. Thus it has used power to enhance its claim in the South China sea (Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, undated)

PRC also rejects U.S policies that uphold westernized values such as individual freedom, human rights and democracy. PRC has also thus opposed military intervention with UN backing (Xinhua, 2016). China daily, declared that US is ridiculing "*Pax Americana*" by furthering a "*period of incessant warfare*" by "*military intervention*" (Leng, 2016). The criticism amplified when after in 2011, operation in Libya- with the help of PRC as well- went well past the UN mandate proved dangerous for PRC (Christensen, 2016, p. 267–270).

China's postwar attitude towards the international order can be surmised in three major tensions. One being its desire to bring about more equality and stability of power

between the US and China. Second being, the interventionist property of order and how it interferes with China's definition of sovereignty (Kent, 2002, p. 358). Third and final tension is the relation and commitment to international rules and its desire for regional dominance at the same time. Which involves privileges that PRC wants to enjoy as per its interests and demands. China's relation with the international order demands complexities beyond normal interactions.

It's important to note that we have observed a similarity between Beijing and Washington regarding particular norms which both have dismissed mainly the International Court of Justice jurisdiction over issues of state sovereignty and considering capital punishment as a violation of human rights.

To curb the US influence in the international system and to face the American hegemony PRC invests in propagating Chinese norms in the international system. PRC is working to bring other states within its sphere of influence through soft and hard power politics. PRC has been utilizing various methods to influence the domestic politics of other states as well as influence the elites and the general populace to favor the China way. Taking a page out of Russian tactics, some of the more outright negative methods include disinformation and propaganda campaigns using online networking platforms like Facebook, Instagram, Youtube, Snapchat and recently Tiktok on countries in Asia (Paul Mozur, 2018). Academics have stated that PRC uses social media to manipulate the sociopolitical agenda in line with their ideological, financial or political aims to be more in line with Chinese political and developmental interests (Tucker et al. 2017). PRC has effectively hired trolls, created and mobilized bots and other forms of computational propaganda to achieve its goals. We are yet to see the effectiveness of these actions taken by the Chinese administration nevertheless it illustrates PRC's dissatisfaction with the norms and values propagated by the US hegemony. China also uses international education as a method of diplomacy for moving towards the Chinese Dream. As of 2018 China hosts 492,185 international students in its higher education, losing only to the US which hosts around 1 million international students. By sharing the Chinese culture, values and languages with the international students China also aims to create a positive image of China in the home countries leading to acceptance and spread of Chinese values (Cai, 2018). Also 35pc of the total international student population

in US is of Chinese students (Shepardson, 2021) and China accounts for 10.5 Billion USD of total 37.5 Billion USD of the international education sector of Australia. With the push from US, Australia introduced the Australian Foreign Relations bill to curb the Chinese influence on Australian institutions including higher education institutes (Hare, 2021).

Apart from this China has also used coercion and bribery of political elites in other states to meet its political objectives (Mattis 2018, Westbrooke, 2018) More subtle actions taken by China involve sponsorships through China backed institutes to frame public issues and set agenda, providing investment and financial support through China Central Bank, AIIB, and SRF (AIIB and SRF are parallel institutions established by China to compete with the US led liberal institutions like IMF and WB) to other participant states of the China's BRI project to bring them under PRC's sphere of influence. BRI has also resulted in greater trade relationships with many countries increasing China's power in the international system. All of the above mentioned actions performed by China impact the subject states in the social and political realms.

4.2.2. China and existing International Organizations and Conventions

Research shows an unbalanced and stratified observation of norms and rules of the LIO by PRC but analysts have pointed out the possibility for compliance as well if some leeway is provided. Also, as China is gaining more representation in the institutions of the order it has started to utilize this dominance to walk along the grey area of the unwritten rules and expectations of the institutions creating exceptions for its own gain (McLaughlin, 2021).

In order to analyze PRC's behavior towards LIO one has to firstly start by looking at the degree of participation in the key international institutions that uphold the LIO. To surmise, PRC has had a positive relationship with most of the international institutions if we consider the number of the major institutions China has taken membership of and this leads to a constructive interaction of PRC with LIO. It is important to understand this point under the context of the shift from Maoism with China being a revisionist communist state

challenging the reigning capitalist order led by US to an active participant of the non-aligned movement during the Cold War along with India and other third world countries. Calling itself a developing state first and then becoming a proponent of globalization, and contributor to the multilateral aspects of the order. We can see China has come a long way from the periphery as a third world country around 30 years ago. Although this attitude of PRC might shift again with changing times, but generally PRC's relationship and interactions with the LIO specifically after the 1970's have been following a positive trend. We can easily observe this by looking at PRC's deep engagement and involvement with the various institutions of LIO.

Taking the words of Nathen (2016, p.171) PRC has *“moved from a position of almost no participation in international regimes to the current position in which it participates in almost all of the major international regimes in which it is eligible to participate.”*

Following are the key international institutions of the LIO that PRC is a member of :

1. The United Nations
2. International Monetary Fund
3. World Bank
4. Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
5. UN peacekeeping operations
6. The Group of Twenty
7. Asian Development Bank
8. International Labor Organization
9. International Atomic Energy Agency
10. Paris Accord on Climate Change
11. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

12. Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty
13. Biological Weapons Convention
14. Chemical Weapons Convention
15. Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
16. Montreal Protocols
17. Conventions on Rights of Persons with Disabilities

Looking at the other side, PRC has also rejected and opposed a number of key international institutions. These being the following (Nathan, 2017, p.171-172):

1. Rome Statute i.e. establishment of the ICC
2. Land Mines Convention
3. Various economic sanctions which haven't been ratified by UNSC
4. International Court of Justice jurisdiction over sovereignty issues
5. Proliferation Security Initiatives

By looking at this list we can note that, when it comes to matters of state sovereignty, territorial integrity and human right issues, the PRC takes a step back safeguarding and prioritizing the interests of the CCP. PRC becomes less active and its contributions halt when the institutions move towards strengthening the US leadership or forward the US led liberal values. PRC's values are reflected by its deliberate interactions with the various aspects and elements of the order including the economic aspect, sovereignty based UN system, social development, and the counter-terrorism, non-proliferation and anti-piracy aspects of the security order (Johnston, 2016, p. 7–17). Moving away from this, PRC has increasingly taken up mediator and arbitrator positions for conflict management in Africa and Asia (Wong and Jolly, 2017).

PRC has repeatedly supported international institutions that give it at the least equal level of influence. For instance, PRC has Veto power in the UN while also being a permanent member of the Security Council. PRC has exercised this power occasionally (Security Council Report, 2016). PRC also has the same power as others in the WTO to start the process for dispute resolution. However, when it comes to institutions that offer the PRC less power, its leaders want redistribution in order to have equal level of influence as the western members. This will enable PRC to have a stronger influence in determining outcomes. For instance, China's plea for years to include their currency Renminbi as one of the international reserve currencies in IMF Special Drawing Right (SDR). This petition was accepted in 2016 when renminbi was added to IMF's SDR list, the first currency to do so in 15 years. PRC has also started creating international institutions of its own in which it has leading role (McDowell, 2015). One such example is Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)- a forum created with Russia and Central Asian states. Other examples include Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) and similar others.

Considering the established institutions of LIO, PRC here has also utilized its position as a leading member to impede the implementations of norms. China has done that by voting against or veto'ing certain resolutions being passed. China stopped the UN from participating in the civil war in Syria stating Syrian state sovereignty will be violated. China has had a history of supporting and blocking resolutions being passed in the international institutions even when they have no impact on China's interests. Analysts have pointed out that this is a strategy by China to weaken the international institutions and hence the LIO. China upholds the norms that align with Chinese values and with irregular implementation of the rest of the norms by the international institutions China attempts to weaken the LIO machinery by messing up its processes (Bandaranayake, 2020).

One of the key norms of the LIO backed by the UN system and multilateral institutions is the 'prohibition on unprovoked territorial aggression'. PRC has time and again opined its full acceptance of the Westphalian understanding of the norm of sovereignty and non-intervention and non-aggression norms (Griffiths, 2013). PRC also vehemently opposes influence of other states on its national policies and administration. If we take a closer look

at the physical evidence and practical actions of PRC we are faced with a somewhat hypocritical stance of China. Particularly in dealings with Taiwan and its land and maritime claims in South and East China Sea. PRC has adopted coercive tactics when dealing with such issues although PRC itself claims it as simply China's right to self-defense to ensure its territorial integrity. This leads us to believe that China's support for sovereignty norms has more to do with ensuring Chinese national interests rather than PRC's socialization to the norms of sovereignty.

PRC has been walking on the fine line of acceptable and unacceptable behavior, acting in mainly reserved and control steps that cannot be directly perceived as unambiguous aggression towards other actors of the international system. One technique PRC has adopted to achieve this is by establishing a clear-cut difference between PRC's militaristic and hard power approach in the South and East China Sea and the more common forms of interstate aggression which is usually taken up in the international institutions (like the UN charter) for resolution of the conflicts. Although a number of analysts have categorized these actions of PRC as different forms of aggression particularly considering the case of the takeover of the Scarborough Shoals of the Spratly islands which resulted in the naval standoff between China and Philippines in 2012. Basically PRC tries to use this strategy of laying in the grey area to stake its claims without displaying overt interstate aggression to not come under the questioning of the established norms all the while securing China's interests (Waldron, 2018).

According to research, the approach is a mixed bag with PRC not sticking to one way or the other. Since the last decade of the 20th century PRC has engaged in a number of territorial claims and other matters regarding state sovereignty resulting in notable regional and global response followed by a cooling off period during which PRC concentrates on making peace and mending the strained relationships with the other parties. Inevitably because of this foreign policy of restoring a working relationship PRC has continuously participated in international conflict management and conflict resolutions. PRC deliberated with the ASEAN members as well over the issue of the contested islands in South China Sea and discussed acceptable forms of conduct within the EEZ voiced expectations for a win-win solution. Some researchers have concluded that even with all the overt and subtle actions

taken by PRC regarding the possession/claim over the island, PRC is yet to penalize the opposition states in a outwardly coercive manner (Poh, 2017).

Analysts have two different opinions regarding this behavior of China, where one side purports that PRC actions in the South and East China Sea are mainly in response to the opposing parties actions and PRC is not always the one to strike first, it is more of a balanced action where both sides have taken around equal amount of first step of aggression. Whereas the other side claims that is because PRC needs a pretense or at least an ostensible excuse for its foreign policy reasoning in order to execute their strategies (Zongyou, 2017, p170-174).

Looking back at PRC's action regarding territorial norm violations of the past 30 years we see that except for a few cases PRC hasn't directly obviously violated the territorial norms of the IO. Although PRC tends to walk in the grey area of what is expected and allowed in the international system, mainly countering other states' behavior deemed aggressive or excessive by China and setting up the basis for PRC's subsequent operations. The norm of non-aggression is recognized by the UN charter, Article 2 Part 4 which forbids states from using force or threat of aggression against the territorial integrity or political independence of states. PRC's takes up a narrowed understanding of this norm limiting it to mainly threats or use of force against the territorial integrity of other countries in the international system (Zacher, 2001). Analyzing PRC's actions regarding this understanding of the norm can be done through a number of ways. Firstly it can be done through evaluating PRC's Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) behavior. Recent study done by Mazzar, Heath and Cevallos (2018) shows that from 1945 till 2010 PRC has started 98 MIDS compared to 113 of US, 143 of Russia and 103 of Iran. It is important to note that these numbers should not be understood independently because in the international system not all states have the same amount of influence, power or reach neither do all states have peaceful relationships with the neighboring states in the region. Meaning major regional or global powers have to deal with a higher number of issues as their scope of influence is greater and therefore are faced with more circumstances that calls for resorting to MID's.

Taking data from Correlates of War Project (Palmer et al., 2020), I have compiled and compared the MID initiations by 4 countries after the end of Cold War, the results of which are mentioned below:

Correlates of War Project	
MID 5 Project; Duration 1990-2014	
States	MID's Initiated
<i>PRC</i>	46
<i>US</i>	52
<i>Russia</i>	74
<i>Iran</i>	42

Looking at the results we notice that PRC's actions are aligned with if not subdued compared to other regional and major powers. This result is also supported by the qualitative research done by Griffiths (2016, p. 536–540) which surmised that China generally observes non-aggression norms. But the results also tell us that PRC isn't a state that is content with the international system and the global order. Going into details of the results we have observed some overarching issue areas and specific states with which China has deployed aggressive actions.

PRC's approach toward international order is focused towards showing their participation in order to have some sort of influence. Ann Kent argues in *"it now prefers to be seen as part of a global consensus rather than as a spoiler of international harmony"* (Kent, 2002, p. 340-358). This reflects the argument that state actions are judged against rule-based standards of the multilateral order. China has portrayed a desire to be seen as a reliable and responsible leader. Such an outlook is preferred as compared to being seen as a unilateral power that can dictate decisions and outcomes.

PRC appreciates the fact that international order focuses on rules and mechanisms which give stability and legitimacy to international relations and state behavior (Fingar, 2012,

p.348). PRC specifically recognizes the UN's part in multilateral decisions regarding use of force. It is also a regular active member of WTO in fact as per the U.S Trade Representative, China has not only used correct mechanisms in WTO but is also compliant in most areas with WTO regulations (Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 2015). Actually 18 out of 30 cases against PRC have been resolved.

As with the global institutions it's also important to look at PRC's increasing participation within the regional institutions. The US backed Asian alliances and PRC led SCO or the RCEP, China's approach has always been to secure its interests. PRC's approach has been noted as particularly conflicting within these regional institutions because PRC's with its membership, participation and contribution towards the regional institutions aims to display a peaceful coexistence with the neighboring states all the while demanding leadership positions within the regional institutions aligned with the Middle Kingdom aspirations. PRC very much pushes the borders of multilateral equity expecting fellow member states to follow PRC's lead (Olson and Prestowitz, 2011).

With both the global and regional institutions considered, we see a similar approach by PRC, which is to seek membership within these institutions and then mold and tweak the institutions to better fulfill PRC's interests and objectives (Khong, 2013, p.161-164).

4.2.3. China and the Constitutive Norms of LIO in Different Domains

As mentioned in the earlier chapters, the problem with providing a clear cut analysis of China's approach to the LIO is due to China's individual interactions with the elements of the order. Wherein for China, the economic order is of great importance and has mainly been the key reason for China's exponential economic success and therefore China's attitude towards the economic order is broadly confirming. If we observe the human rights/political order we see China's defensive stance against the established norms and rules along with the political mainly liberal values the order possess. China's attitude towards the security order is generally fragmented. It supports some aspects of the order while standing against the

others. China has generally been a proponent of protection against international piracy while questioning the US military presence in Asia, and US backed alliances in Asia which mainly challenge and oppose China's efforts towards regional hegemony. We cannot definitely say one way or the other when talking about China's attitude towards the LIO as a whole, one has to delve deeper and look at various constitutive norms of the order and the particular domains in question that China is interacting with.

The coming sections will provide details regarding the practical behavioral actions of PRC towards the domains of LIO once China started international engagements in the 70's. After reviewing the information compiled by various governmental organizations, policy institutes and academic researchers the major finding is that PRC has maintained a generally positive relationship with the established international institutions of the order. This was a stark difference from the previous Maoist era's revisionist outlook regarding the then capitalistic order. Moving towards a more open, indulging attitude from China, aiming to take membership in most major international institutions of the order as well as participating vigorously aiming to become leading members of the international organizations. China's membership and participation in these international organizations can now be seen at par with the other leading states of the order. And also, as mentioned earlier PRC's actions need to be compartmentalized and observed depending upon the element of the order PRC is interacting with where a clear distinction can be seen with PRC's accepting attitude towards the economic order and resistance and conflict with the human rights aspect of LIO.

Just like PRC's attitude towards LIO, PRC's actions have also shown a contrast between China's appreciation and acceptance of the mainly 'rule based' multilateral order under UN and PRC's disinclination for the US led Western norms and aspects of the order that favor the established leaders generally the global south in the order. Specifically, China has had a straining relationship with the military-based alliance systems under US leadership.

The research has allowed us to have a more nuanced understanding of these complex relationships. Below is a closer look at China's attitude towards the specific domains of the LIO.

4.2.3.1. Security Domain

Recently, we have observed a bolder approach from China towards securing its military interests even in cases where it's costing a straining relationship with its neighbors and denouncements/objections from the international organizations. This has caused the White House to become more wary of Beijing's intentions towards the LIO. Specifically speaking, China has become more 'assertive' (Johnston, 2013, p.19-20) in claiming territorial integrity regards to both land and sea utilizing its military to act according to Chinese interests in the South and East China Sea. Ever since 2008/2009 we have seen a sharp difference in China's approach as China used to act significantly tamed and controlled in the military aspect after it's opening up in the 70's. But now China has started to actively assert dominance and push forward its military and paramilitary actions while blatantly ignoring the international maritime laws and the decisions by the UNSC and ASEAN for joint solutions.

In the security domain, observing the norms of nonproliferation, PRC's approach has been significantly better compared to the human rights norms and liberal values discussed ahead (Christensen, 2016, p. 120–137, 185–189, 222–233, and 270–278). Research purports that China has generally acknowledged and accepted the norms of nonproliferation (Combes, 2011, p.24-29; Kan, 2005; Liping, 2008; Mesbahi and Homayounvash, 2016; Horsburgh, 2015). As with the issue of contradiction with other norms, the same case goes here with China's contradictory approach towards the norms of nonproliferation and arms control (Malik, 2000). Considering PRC's trading of arms we notice a discrepancy between PRC's actions and the objectives and acceptable understanding of the nonproliferation regime.

PRC backed Pakistan's nuclear program and as recently as in 2017 PRC provided Pakistan with two new reactors C-3 and C-4. Reports also claim that China has supported Iran's nuclear ambitions providing assistance and technological knowhow and President Xi recently voiced that '*china supports iran's just demands*' on nuclear deals (Small, 2015, Berger and Schell, 2013, NYT, 2021). PRC is following the same approach as with the human rights regime, with public acknowledgements of the regime along with fragmented

compliance (Stewart, 2015). PRC also has vested interest in supporting the norms of nonproliferation as with the above-mentioned example of Iran, PRC has recommended easing of sanctions against Iran by the international institutions partly because CCP led businesses are invested there (Almond, 2016).

PRC, now is also one of the main contributors to UN peacekeeping missions providing the highest number of troops among the UNSC's permanent members (Zheng, 2017). Apart from this PRC is also providing training to the military force of the UN along with placing Chinese military officials in respective leading positions (Lynch, 2016).

PRC has also taken up leadership positions regarding the SDG's goal 13 of Climate Action and has been calling into action other major powers to tackle North Korea's Nuclear proliferation threat and arms control.

Understanding that only membership in the international institutions as the criteria for the state's acceptance and engagement with the LIO means that we overlook the processes, negotiations, politics, bargaining and influencing that goes behind the scenes in these institutions whenever votes and other practical measures are being held. So simply being in the institution does not mean socialization towards the LIO will take place. Thus the concessions, understanding and agreements that are reached before the initiation of votes is a key aspect of the international institutions. China's bilateral approach towards other states allows China to receive significant numbers when decisions are being made within these institutions. A recent example of this would be when PRC enacted security laws that threaten Hong Kong's legal autonomy many states from the West voiced their utter displeasure and called for action against stopping mainland militarized actions within Hong Kong's border. When the issue was raised in UNHCR two opposing declarations were presented, one championed by the PRC and the other by Britain. In the final verdict, PRC's declaration received 53 votes and Britain received 27. Similarly, in the 60's Taiwan enjoyed greater diplomatic relations with the African Countries as compared to PRC but by the mid-2018, all but one recognized Taiwan as a sovereign nation. This also comes along with increased investment by Beijing in Africa through various Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects. PRC has also created alternate institutions in place of the pre-established ones like AIIB, SRF and

SCO providing China with better position while dealing with the corresponding LIO institutions.

Also, China does not support the established norms and institutions on ideological basis. China backed SCO has been termed as the “*vehicle for Chinese interests*” (Lewis, 2012). This organization is receiving an increasing number of member states, states with observer status and official dialogue partners across the Asian continent (United Nations, 2020). SCO’s main objectives are ensuring regional and border security, dealing with terrorism, organized crime and separatist movements and threats, regional development and interstate cooperation. We can observe that these goals align well with China’s security interests for the Xinjiang province and Tibet.

SCO charter outlines a detailed explanation of the norms China likes to establish and maintain topmost being sovereignty and territorial integrity. The charter highlighted “*mutual respect for sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity of states, and inviolability of state borders, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, non-use of force or threat of its use in international relations.*” (SCO charter, Article 2)

The findings from Correlates of War project highlighted the following. Firstly, China had militarized interactions with Taiwan in which PRC prepped and/or send its military to shore in a response to Taiwan's political or military actions towards independence. Secondly, with states of the East and South China sea particularly Philippines, Vietnam and Japan over contested islands. Here both parties became the initiators of the militarized interactions in different incidences. Thirdly, back and forth with U.S and India over surveillance drones and naval ships in the EEZ. Fourth, joint military operations with Russia or military show of strength over land and water. Fifth, during border incidents with India and N.Korea. Many of these disputes were settled through compromise as well and table talks using multilateral organizations as well. But since 2011, PRC has shown assertiveness regarding the territorial conflicts over the contested islands utilizing coercive tactics and at times ignoring and going against the established rulings of international institutions. Although PRC has definitely become bolder in its foreign policy objectives regarding its land and maritime claims it still

has not performed outright military aggression which can be unambiguously called a violation of the norms of nonaggression of the LIO (Morton, 2016; Thayer, 2011).

Simply put, PRC's interaction with the norm occurs either when it stake its claim over Taiwan and responds to Taiwanese independence movement, or when it claims ownership of the multiple small islands on the South and East China Sea using the 9 dash line as its justification. Neither of these cases can be taken as an example of PRC's rejection of the norm of nonaggression of the LIO. Also the PRC's provocations or coercion can be deemed as aggressive use of force against the territorial integrity of other states (Turcsányi, 2018).

We can also gauge China's attitude towards the security domain by looking at its approach towards shared security concerns regarding all states in the international system. The issue of global warming, terrorism, international piracy etc which requires the attention of all actors in order to be fully resolved. Broadly speaking PRC has approached these issues in a similar manner as it has approached the others, so long as its key interests are not being impeded it displays a positive compliance both in words and action. This outlook of China has remained similar to that of the US which also tends to prioritizes national interest above all.


PRC's administration has categorized climate change and environmental degradation as one of its top priority, PRC has significantly increased its commitment, collaborating with other countries like Japan, US and Korea on clean energy, smog reduction, carbon emission reduction etc. PRC has also been gradually transitioning towards renewable energy with a shift from 7pc to 15pc renewable energy share between 2010 to 2020 (Sandalow, 2019). When Trump withdrew from the Paris Accords, PRC was quick to take up the charge ensuring it will follow through with the policy objectives. This also allowed other states who had become hesitant with their own position to follow China's lead with upholding the agreement. Seeing that when the US backs away from its leading position in the IO, China remains willing and eager to take its place to lead the current IO in a meaningful way.

Meanwhile we also have to consider that PRC remains to be the biggest emitter of carbon at 27pc in the world, its emission percentage is more than the combined value of all developed countries. US being coming in second with 11pc and India third with 6.6pc

(Larson et al., 2019). Looking at the graph below we can understand the significant difference between the highest emitter and the second highest. PRC emitting more than double the amount emitted by the US.

2019 net GHG emissions from the world's largest emitters

Million metric tons of CO₂e, including emissions and removals from land-use and forests and share of global total



Source: Rhodium Group

PRC still remains heavily reliant on coal for energy production owning 1059 coal power plants which also is half of the global capacity. China has invested billions in various fossil fuel projects as part of its OBOR objectives. Upwards of 60pc of the energy financing of OBOR has been utilized in nonrenewable projects (Lew and Roughead, 2021).

PRC has established alternate security organizations like SCO. This provides us a platform to consider China's approach to mitigating the threats and security risks by bringing in and gaining support from members who are not satisfied with the established norms of the LIO and are looking for alternatives. The main difference between the China led security organization and the security institutions of the LIO is that China prioritizes regime security and the other prioritizes human security.

The support provided by China using SCO to the states of Central Asia has generated the acceptance and spread of Sinocentric norms which undermine freedom of speech, rights to protest, freedom of press, along with increasing corruption and power grab by the ruling political parties (Lewis, 2012). This has resulted in tensions between the state administration and the opposition and civil advocacy groups, and western led NGOs operating within these states.

4.2.3.2. Economic Domain

A key method to understand PRC's relationship with the economic domain is to analyze PRC's adherence level with the rules of the economic order. Here we will observe how well China adheres to the regulations, laws, guidelines and decisions of the international economic institutions which it participates in.

Looking at labour laws and regulation set by the international institutions mainly UN International Labour Organization, PRC is observed to have been gradually expanding its adherence (Kent, 2002, p. 349–353). During its third world country days with its overflowing population and weak economy PRC used to have poor labour and employment standards. The rapid economic development and technological advancements came with and as a result of weak enforcement of the labour laws. Even now we have cases of multinational corporations operating in China with harsh and poor labor standards, some even have been called out for running sweatshops and employing child labor.

Now that PRC is actively trying to take up a major power position, it has aligned its labor laws with other leading countries although the execution of these laws and the adherence by the firms is still questionable. It seems to be a lengthy and slow process but change can definitely be observed as now with the enactment of laws, companies and organizations can be legally charged for breaking the rules. It is worthy to note that socialization to the LIO rules is taking place through acculturation. Research (Crothall, 2016; Melnicoe, 2017) shows that PRC has adopted aspects of the economic orders rules into the

country's law. An example would be the use of opprobrium by the international community and protests by the citizens regarding the practical enforcement of the labour and employment laws and maintaining of international employment standards. Chinese administration announced steps for enforcement of laws and punishments/legal actions against organizations and firms that do not oblige with the rulings responding to the international outcry.

When it comes to global environmental protection policy and law PRC's has repeated its sovereignty concerns valuing economic development over environmental issues (Combs, 2011, p.15-25). However, research also shows since last decade PRC has been following through with various guidelines, rules and regulations put forth by international institutions regarding environmental protection. Committing to the Paris Accords and taking up a leading position since US withdrawal, President Xi has reiterated China's intention and actions regarding reaching the sustainable development goals (SDG), also calling climate change as one of the main concerns of the Chinese administration. Overall, PRC has been noted to generally respect the environmental laws in the IO, adhering to the rules of the international institutions that it has taken membership in. We have not observed any actions by PRC regarding undermining the environmental protection institutions and even have recently started to participate in forming policies towards a global response to climate change.

A vital example for understanding PRC's adherence to the rules of the order is observing its interactions within the WTO. PRC entered the WTO at the start of the 21st century to secure its economic interests by becoming part of the global trading system in the IO. With the WTO recommendations and domestic economic policy requirements for membership Chinese administration has taken various steps to meet the WTO requirements. Following through with the WTO regulations in the international arena, China has tended to use tactics to favor domestic companies and bypass the policies without being overtly obvious. By limiting imports through enactment of non-tariff barriers such as complex requisites regarding product specifications, 6 sigma requirements, licensing issues, custom regulations and so on. PRC also has been subsidizing its energy and steel exports which go against rules set by the WTO. The outcome shows a positive trend towards rule compliance albeit with conflicting behavior suggesting PRC's compliance has much to do with the self-

interests of the state rather than a movement towards the ideological acceptance or internalization of the orders rule set.

China has a tendency to ignore the IP rights of foreign actors in order to fast-track technological developments without putting actual effort in the innovation process. PRC has also been allegedly involved in cyber spying to obtain IP information. In order for international firms to enter the Chinese market, the administration asks for technology transfer through which Chinese companies are able to obtain the latest tech know-how to monopolize the markets (Stephen, 2011). Although PRC has claimed reformation of such practices no real groundwork can be seen. China along with a number of other countries also participates in currency manipulation to increase the competitiveness of the Chinese products in the international and the domestic market. Overall China's adherence to the international rules set is layered and somewhat deceptive with China adopting practices that favor the local market and products through ways which are not directly aligned with the core values or the rules set of the respective institutions.


Webster (2014, p.574) aptly describes PRC's compliance to the rules set of the economic order institution as China behaving similarly to the rest of the major powers, complying when no national interests are being impeded upon and skirting against responsible action when self-interests calls for it. PRC's action can be seen as reserved compliance to the rules, with PRC acknowledging and investing in the order to better meet its needs rather than trying to overthrow or establish a counter order.

By looking at the institutions of the economic order we can observe PRC's general attitude wherein as per academics PRC's has gradually turned into a "selective revisionist" focused on safeguarding PRC's economic and financial objectives by utilizing firstly its developing country status and secondly through demanding exceptions (McDowell, 2015). Analysts have also suggested that even with its ongoing participation in various international institutions PRC still has not internalized the reciprocity principle and does not view the transactions within the institutions as positive sum. Therefore, always striving for gains at the cost of other members. Looking at one of the main organizations of the economic order, the WTO, PRC has been an active member of the WTO and has been consistently using the


WTO's dispute settlement mechanisms for all the rising issues while obeying the WTO decisions. PRC has also followed through with the structural reforms demanded by WTO, IMF and WB.

PRC has also invested in UN institution, allowing China significant power or voice as can be seen by the leading seats secured by PRC in various UN institutions allowing China to expand its influence globally. These institutions of the UN set the standards for air travel, telecommunication and agriculture whose details are mentioned below. PRC is currently heading 4 out of 15 UN and UN affiliated organizations that makeup the pillars of the UN. Comparatively the US is heading 1, Europe 5, Asia Pacific 2 and Africa 3. The diagram below shows the timeline regarding the states heading the UN affiliated organizations that are all currently under Chinese leadership.


Food and Agriculture Organization




International Civil Aviation Organization



International Telecommunication Union



United Nations Industrial Development Organization



*The World Meteorological Organization is headed by Germany and Finland
Source: the agencies

(Wall Street Journal, Sept, 2020)

China has also established alternative economic institutions like SRF and AIIB which it suggests is to effectively support its trillion dollars Belt and Road initiative. Both SRF and AIIB provide alternative option in place of US led ADB and IMF to the developing states of the world. Establishing parallel institutions doesn't necessarily mean a state has the intention of creating and preserving norms which differ from the ILO's. But coming towards China's establishment of AIIB and SRF, contesting opinions are formed. Realist analysts perceive the introduction of these institutions as a calculated step by PRC to increase its sphere of influence, establishing a system that better protects and represents Sinocentric interests and challenge the authority of the established institutions of the economic order such as the WB and IMF (Moore, 2008). Researchers have also taken AIIB as a proof of the declining US influence over global financial and economic priorities (Subacchi, 2015) and AIIB is China's response to the US and Japan influenced ADB in the Asian region (Japan Times, 2015)

A thorough analysis of AIIB has shown that as of yet it is not an attempt by China to undermine the US led western institutions of LIO. It has followed through all the necessary procedures and protocols to establish itself as an international bank. China does not and cannot take up a position of power within the bank due to the bank's constitution and the established policies that have been inspired by and generated from the WB. AIIB also has a working relationship with the WB and has handed over a number of key responsibilities to WB (Raghavan, 2016, p. 275-277).

4.2.3.3. Human Rights Domain

PRC's beliefs and attitudes have remained in conflict with the liberal human rights elements of the LIO. Although PRC has taken membership of various human rights conventions, its actions do not reflect the norms posed by these conventions and in fact PRC's participation has been counterintuitive and detrimental in some cases (Sceats and Breslin, 2012; Dingding, 2009). Analysts suggest that PRC with its participation in these respective conventions has worked towards compromising the implementations of the norms while

maintaining an image of a responsible stakeholder within the IO. Elizabeth (2017) states that PRC's approach towards these norms hinder it from taking up leadership positions within the current globalized IO. CCP has strict protocols and policies towards any public debates against the CCP leadership which has been observed in the frequent case of policing against Hong Kong protestors and leaders alike. More recently, the Chinese administration started shutting down and locking up citizens who published their dissatisfaction against China's administration of the covid pandemic. Social media like Facebook, Youtube and Whatsapp remain blocked all over PRC. Chinese social media Weibo is heavily scrutinized for diverging opinions. Apart from this, in China dissenters are frequently taken into custody, opposition leaders intermittently go missing, persecution of Uyghur Muslims and China's re-education camps (termed as concentration camps by many outside of China) in Xinjiang, persecution of ethnic Tibetans called 'cultural genocide' by the exiled Tibetan leadership, starkly limited freedom of press and finally ideological indoctrination and propaganda all lead to a highly concerning behavior of China towards the human right norms of the liberal order (Human Rights Watch, 2021).

China has ratified several core UN human rights treaties, it also has membership in UN Human Rights Council (HRC) and has seconded Chinese diplomats to positions within the U.N. human rights system. Academics suggest that China's participation in the human right institutions and conventions and the CCP leaderships acknowledgement of the liberal norms albeit for media purposes still at the very least points towards the legitimacy of these norms in the international system and China's acknowledgement helps with the inclusion of other authoritarian or weak states into the human rights regime. In situations where PRC's own interest are not at stake, PRC takes a leading position along with other major powers to act against the determined cases of genocide and ethnic cleansing.

PRC has also utilized its power within the institutions in order to gain PRC centered reforms. This has been done through a slow process which starts with gaining membership within the organization, then effectively participating and contributing to the international organization and once enough support is reached then strategically manipulating the norms and inner workings of the organizations to move towards a more Sinocentric model of operation. PRC proposed a "*mutually beneficial cooperation*" resolution in the HRC in June

2020. 23 member states voted in favor of it with 16 against and 8 abstentions (Human Rights Commission, June 2020). With the help of this resolution PRC was able to put a stop on a two years effort which shows the Chinese establishments strategy towards gradually undermining the established norms through formal process and buy-in from other member states. This resolution has made it difficult for states to be held accountable for human right violations in the international institutions. PRC also brought forward a resolution termed as “*win-win*” which calls for state to resolve issues through dialogues eschewing the role of independent civil society in HRC proceedings (Fisher, 2018).

Apart from this PRC has also recently started to utilize its technological developments such as 24/7 public video surveillance, location tracking software, biometric tools and advanced facial recognition software for population control and to restrict freedom by monitoring social activities of citizens both within the state and abroad. PRC has also been helping other authoritative and like-minded states by providing (exporting) surveillance technologies and helping with its installment. Chinese companies have specifically exported facial recognition technology to Venezuela, Singapore, United Arab Emirates, and Zimbabwe (Reuters, Nov 2018). And general population control technology has been exported to the state administration of Ethiopia, Ecuador, South Africa, Bolivia, Egypt, Rwanda, and Saudi Arabia (CFR, Dec 2018).

With its actions PRC has shown its defensive and contradictory intentions and behavior towards the liberal human rights order. The trajectory will remain in the same direction for the foreseeable future so long as there is no drastic change within the leadership of PRC.

Some academics have suggested that alternative institutions established by the authoritarian governments are in part an attempt by these illiberal states to contain and undermine democracy that is fervently supported by liberal regimes. These institutions are also meant as a means to voice differing opinions while curtailing the rhetoric of the liberal pro-democracy states. Organizations like SCO and AIIB are strategically formed by China with the agenda to uphold and frame authoritarian rule in a light that is not only more

palatable to the international community but also more attractive to other states (Walker, 2015, p.47).

With the help of SCO, China has also been successful in bringing about new norms in the international system. China used the forum of SCO for campaigning towards the acceptance of refoulement, a concept that is in complete violation of the human rights norm. Even states that are not members of SCO have consented to help China in getting the refoulement process formalized (Bandaranayake, 2020).

Moreover, the creation of these China led alternative institutions provides authoritarian governments, illiberal states, military regimes and other such countries with the option to opt for Chinese style foreign policy which more accurately represents the needs of the political elites of these states. By forming bilateral and multilateral relations with such states, especially through various BRI energy and transport related projects China has been gradually disseminating its own norms and values to the other participant states.

4.3. Conclusion

Overall PRC's attitude towards the norms of LIO including the liberal human right norms, nonproliferation norms, and norms of nonaggression have the underlying complexity, contradiction and in cases hypocritical approach. PRC seems to be struggling with on one hand establishing itself as a leading and responsible stakeholder of the international system and demanding the same level of influence and respect if not more as other major powers. And on the other hand, securing and safeguarding PRC's national interests, values and Middle Kingdom aspirations. Although these two objectives are not exactly mutually exclusive, neither are they complementary of one another. Rather most of the times they tend to end up at opposing sides. The research has shown PRC's restrained adherence to aspects of the LIO norms with cases of carving out exceptions, lip service, perfunctory and token acknowledgements, and finally hypocritical actions. Still, PRC has come a long way from its

old days of revisionism and rejection of the capitalist IO to engagement with the LIO in a manner similar to those of other major powers.

To surmise, China's main focus is on achieving the Chinese Dream and receiving acknowledgement as a leading power in the international system. For this, China has been working on undermining the US led western liberal norms in the international institutions and impeding the enforcement of these norms through the legitimate power gained by membership, participation and contribution to the LIO institutions.

China is also providing parallel institutions to other countries (authoritative regimes, developing states, conflict ridden countries etc.) whose priorities do not align with the democratic and human right aspects of the LIO. Additionally, China's forming bilateral and multilateral ties with the rest of the countries through projects under its BRI program to bring them under the PRC's sphere of influence. All of these efforts are leading to the spread of its soft power, governance system and Sino-centric norms in the IO.

CONCLUSION

Since the last decade researchers and analysts have increasingly termed China as a challenger to the liberal international order in both the regional and global arenas. PRC itself has become more assertive in its foreign policy since Xi took charge of the presidential office. Xi and his administration have repeatedly voiced their disagreement with the current order and their desire to revise it. In a cursory look China does seem to be a revisionist power, working to overturn the constitutive norms and institutions of the IO. This study finds that PRC's attitude and behaviour towards the order is complex and nuanced.

PRC itself has asserted its support for the rule-based multilateral order upheld by the UN and related institutions but does not agree with the US centred liberal values, human rights, and the US military alliance aspects of the LIO. As can be observed by the statement of Fu Ying, a Chinese diplomat, who mentioned PRC is "*offering its own ideas and initiatives to improve the international order system.*" (China Daily, July 2016). Chinese elites and analysts alike, have pointed out that the US, leader of LIO, has on various occasions ignored, rejected or violated the norms or rules of the order in favour of securing self-interests. Opining that the major powers and the hegemons have the privilege of hypocrisy. This way of thinking shows China's approach to IR, in which an increasingly influential China will work towards making the current order more palatable to Chinese needs without completely overturning it.

PRC's entrance into the LIO led to the process of socialization to various norms and institutions held by the global power structure. The study finds that PRC's socialization has been more of a simple learning process and a result of logic of consequence. PRC displays appropriate or acceptable behaviour through a realpolitik decision making while considering the cost benefit analysis. The Chinese Dream and Middle Kingdom aspirations have led Chinese administration to seek a leading power position within the international system. Seeking prestige and glory and securing national interests have been the underlying basis for all of China's actions in the international system. By forming bilateral ties with other states,

especially through its BRI projects in Africa, Central Asia and Eastern Europe, PRC is able to use social influence for socialization in the established institutions to gain dominance and seek resolutions supporting its interests. The African nations overwhelming recognition of PRC since 2000 is a good example of China exerting social influence through established bilateral relationships built on material rewards. China uses its influence in the multilateral institutions, especially the UN system to further its interests.

PRC's reasons for following through with various norms and the institutions is not a result of ideational change in China's values, beliefs and identity. China's ideology remains the same irrespective of the US led liberal nations efforts and its participation in established institutions which play a key role in socialization. PRC supports and upholds the international norms and conventions when its national interests are not being impacted.

Morgenthau mentioned the possibility of the understanding of power and interest being culturally dependent. It can be said that PRC has been "*socialized to conceptualize legitimate ways of pursuing legitimate interests*". PRC's administration considers human rights as regime security rather than individual security therefore endeavours to keep the future of the regime secure. Their stance is also portrayed in PRC foreign policy as can be seen by China time and again blocking or vetoing UN resolutions against Syrian government and authority. China deploys Confucius institutes in the international system to spread its values at individual level in the subject states.

PRC has taken up membership in almost all international institutions of the LIO. As mentioned in the earlier chapters, participation in international institutions doesn't inform much about whether the state has actually gotten socialized or why the states deploy specific strategies towards the norms and institutions. Looking at China's approach to the different elements of the IO, we observe a nuanced and complex mixture of actions. These actions can be categorized as undermining or upholding the order.

In the economic order, PRC has generally shown support of the open economic order. It followed through with the reforms required by the WB and IMF after its acceptance into the institutions. PRC has sought greater influence and power within the established economic institutions. PRC has also built parallel institutions like the AIIB and SRF, to curb the

influence of established ones, and to provide an alternative to like-minded states whose priorities do not align with the norms, rules and requirements of the established LIO institutions. PRC has also used the alternate institutions to bring the other states within its sphere of influence and funded the BRI projects through it.


In the security domain, PRC upholds and supports the norm of sovereignty (through recognition and not responsibility). With a strengthened military, PRC has been assertive and aggressive in its territorial and sovereignty claims along the South China Sea and the East China Sea. PRC has vehemently opposed the US backed security alliance system of the order. China has taken up a leadership role in global climate change issues after the US withdrawal from the Paris accords. PRC is also an increasing contributor to the UN budget and its peacekeeping operations. China has also created a new security institution, Shanghai Cooperation Organization which has membership from Central Asian state to deal with border security, and threats of terrorism, separatism and radicalism. PRC also proposed refoulement through SCO which has sought acceptance from the member states. PRC has introduced the norm of refoulement in the international system which stands against the human rights conventions of the LIO.

In the human rights order, PRC undertakes systemic efforts to undermine and spoil the order which PRC sees as a fundamental threat. In the UN system PRC has been working towards revising norms and manipulating the UN processes to curtail and diminish the scrutiny over PRC administration's actions within the state and abroad. PRC has taken various steps for population control through installation of surveillance technology which it has provided to other authoritarian states in the international system as well. PRC has been heavily criticized for its human rights violations against the Uyghur population in Xinjiang region and the pro-democracy activists and leaders of Hong Kong. China's BRI project has also been criticized for disregarding the human right norms in favour of development processes.

To surmise, this study shows that China's actions and behaviour since its opening up does not mark it as a challenger or spoiler of the LIO but rather a reserved, conditional supporter. PRC's attitude towards the constitutive norms, conventions, and international institutions remains in flux. PRC's actions have significantly increased its influence in the

international system and stand in opposition to US dominance but overall, they don't pose a threat to the fundamental integrity of the LIO.

Doing this research, I found socialization to be comparatively undertheorized in international relations. Recent studies regarding the impact of socialization on the liberal international order are limited. More research is required in the field of socialization in the international system especially considering the art of diplomacy requires changing the minds of other states in the international system.



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