

T.C.
ANTALYA BİLİM UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF POSTGRADUATE EDUCATION
GLOBAL POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
THESIS PROGRAM

FRAMES OF AFGHAN REFUGEES IN PAKISTANI
POLITICS

DISSERTATION

PREPARED BY
FATIMA SOHAIL

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PREFACE

This study is prepared as a Master's Thesis of Antalya Bilim University and covers the frames of Afghan refugees used in Pakistani politics. Within the framework of this study, a literature review was done and studies on the subject were examined. I would like to extend my gratitude to Assistant Prof. Dr. Nermin Aydemir avuř for her invaluable feedback and guidance throughout the thesis. I would also like to thank my family and friends for their support over the years.



ÖZET

Pakistan, kırk yılı aşkın bir süredir Afgan mültecilere ev sahipliği yapmaktadır. Bunun yanı sıra, özellikle 2008'den bu yana Pakistan'daki terör saldırılarının artmasıyla birlikte, Pakistan'ın bu şekilde kuçak açmanın sonsuza kadar devam etmesi pek mümkün görülmemektedir. Siyasi partiler ve Pakistan Ordusu mültecilerin Afganistan'a geri gönderilmesi çağrısında bulundu. Bu çalışma, Parlamento, Facebook, Twitter ve basın bültenlerinde Afgan mülteciler için kullanılan çerçevelmelerin siyasi partiler arasında değişip değişmediğini, çerçevelemenin zaman içinde mi yoksa kurumsal ortamlara göre mi değişiklik gösterdiğini bulmaya çalışmaktadır. Çalışma, Pakistanlı parlamenterlerin, ana akım siyasi partilerin ve Pakistan Ordusu gibi diğer ilgili aktörlerin tartışmalarında Afgan mültecileri nasıl çerçevelediklerini ve olası farklılıkların arkasındaki nedenleri incelemektedir. Bu amaca doğrultusunda meclis tartışmaları, sosyal medya ve basın bültenlerinde nitel bir içerik analizi yapılmaktadır. Bu araştırma 2008'den 2020'ye kadar olan on yıldan fazla bir zaman dilimini kapsamaktadır.

Anahtar kelimeler: Afgan mülteciler, çerçeveleme, güvenlik, hümanizm

ABSTRACT

Pakistan has been hosting Afghan refugees for more than forty years. Nevertheless, an endless welcome is hardly the case in Pakistan especially with the increase in terror attacks in Pakistan since 2008. Political parties and Pakistan Army called for repatriation of refugees back to Afghanistan. The study tries to find out the common frames used for Afghan refugees in Parliament, Facebook, twitter and press releases, whether the frames vary across political parties and whether the framing change over time or with change in institutional settings e.g. parliament, social media? The study examines the way Pakistani parliamentarians, mainstream political parties and other relevant actors such as Pakistan Army frame Afghan refugees in their discussions and the reasons behind possible variance. A qualitative content analysis is conducted on parliamentary debates, social media and in press releases to achieve this goal. The study covers a time period of more than a decade, from 2008 to 2020.

Keywords: afghan refugees, frame, security, humanitarianism

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ANP	:Awami National Party
BAP	:Balochistan Awami Party
BNP	:Baluchistan National Party
CNIC	:Computerized National Identity Card
FATA	:Federally Administered Tribal Areas
GoA	:Government of Afghanistan
GoP	:Government of Pakistan
IDP	:Internally Displaced Person
ISPR	:Inter-Services Public Relations
KPK	:Khyber PakhtunKhwa
MQM	:Mutahida Quami Movement
NAC	:National Action Plan
NADRA	:National Database & Registration Authority
NWFP	:North Western Frontier Province
PML(n)	:Pakistan Muslim League nawaz
POR	:Proof of Registration
PPP	:Pakistan People's Party
PTI	:Pakistan Tehreek-i Insaf
RSD	:Refugee Status Determination
SAFRON	:The Ministry of States and Frontier Regions
SUP	:Sindh United Party
TTP	:Tehrik-i-Taliban in Pakistan
UNHCR	:United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
USSR	:Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

CHAPTER 1

1. INTRODUCTION

In the recent years, the human mobility level observed accross the world was beyond the ordinary. The number of people fleeing war, persecution and conflict exceeded 70 million globally in 2018 - the highest number in the UN refugee agency's almost 70 years of operations (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2019). The world has seen people of Venezuela, South Sudan and Myanmar turning into refugees because of political instabilities. The world has witnessed Syrians turning into asylum seekers and refugees during Syrian civil war, similarly it has witnessed Afghans fleeing from their countries during Soviet invasion and with the rise of Taliban¹. Similarly, the world has seen people of Venezuela, South Sudan and Myanmar forced to leave their countries because of political instabilities. The number of people fleeing war, persecution and conflict exceeded 70 million globally in 2018 - the highest number in the UN refugee agency's almost 70 years of operations (UNHCR, 2019). But, beyond the statistics are human beings in desperate straits—separated from their homes, from their communities, from means of subsistence, often with nothing but the clothes on their backs, and vulnerable to disease, hunger and human rights abuse. According to Amnesty International report, there are 26 million forced migrants globally and 85% of them are being hosted in developing countries. In 2019, more than two-thirds of all forced migrants came from just five countries: Syria, Venezuela, Afghanistan, South Sudan and Myanmar. Worlds' top ten hosting countries in 2019 include Turkey, Jordan,

¹ There is no legal term for Afghan migrants in Pakistan, however UNHCR refers them as 'refugees' and so do the academic scholars like Rashid (2019), Zubair, Khan and Shah (2019), Borthakur (2017), Emery and Ruiz (2001). The study will be using the term 'refugees' to denote a social fact for forced migrants including forced migrants who are staying in Pakistan. Similarly, several studies on forced migrants in Turkey like Makovesky (2019), Yılmaz (2019), Muftuler-Bac and Apaydin (2020), İçduygu and Aksel (2013) have used the word 'refugee' for forced migrants for broader understanding even though there is no legal status (Makovsky, 2019).

Columbia, Pakistan, Lebanon, Uganda, Germany, Sudan, Iran, Bangladesh in descending order (Amnesty International, n.d.).

With the increase in civil wars, proxy wars and war on terror has turned a lot of people into forced immigrants. Since the number of people displaced are quite high compared to the capacity of countries who receive them, legal process has become stricter and the entrance to such countries have become difficult. These people have no choice but to flee because of fear of death, torture, rape and other gruesome sufferings, a lot of them have to opt for illegal ways to cross the border of developed countries. But such paths are full of death risks. All of us are aware of the Alan Kurdi, a three-year-old Syrian with his brother and mother died on their way to Greece trying to cross the border via sea in a small dingy in 2015. A lot of asylum seekers who try to cross the Greece border via sea die during the voyage or they are detained, harassed, sexually abused and are forced back to Turkey according to Human Rights Watch (2020). Images of overcrowded dinghies trying to cross the strait of Gibraltar are often met with tragic consequences are seen common across Spanish national media. Yet, the personal tragedies are not the only difficulties these immigrants face. Most of the time they also experience stereotypic hatred from countries they aim to go. For instance, in German press, according to UNHCR report (2015), the perceived threat posed by immigrants were contextualized by framing them as security threat after terror attacks e.g the Madrid bombing in 2012. With the association of terror attacks with immigrants coming from Middle East has further created problems for refugees in European countries. Framing of refugees as security threat by media and reporting possible links between immigration and crime has deepened public fear. This fear has been cashed by mainstream political parties and has increased public support for conservative and populist parties, while decrease has been noticed in public support of liberal political parties who frame refugees in an inclusive and positive manner across European countries (Pisoiu and Ahmed, 2015). With the current influx of people fleeing from persecution mostly from middle east and north African countries, right wing populism has seen to be on the rise and decline in center left liberal ideologies (Mishra, 2021). The right wing populist parties with anti-immigrant rhetoric that have gained popularity among the masses are France's the National Front, the Freedom Party (FPÖ) in Austria, The nationalist Alternative (AFD) in Germany and Victor Orban's Fidesz party in Hungary (Greven, 2016). PEW research report shows decline in social democratic

parties in the national legislative elections across Europe. It includes Social Democratic Party (SPD) in Germany, French Socialist Party and Dutch Labor Party (Taylor, 2018). It also includes Poland's far right Confederation Party (BBC, 2019).

Pakistan has been hosting Afghan refugees from the past forty years. This research will focus on how Afghan refugees are framed in Parliamentary debates and on social media by mainstream political parties, politicians and Pakistan Army. The research will analyze parliamentary debates, Facebook posts, tweets and press releases from 2008 to 2020. This is important as there are not many studies on forced or political migration outside Europe and America. Most of the literature looks into western European cases. Recently there is a growing interest on those cases receiving Syrian immigrants such as Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey (Brand, 2010; Tobin, 2018; Sirkeci, 2017).

But the literature hardly addresses how Pakistani Parliamentarians perceive and frame the Afghan refugees in and outside the Parliament. Pakistan is important for being one of the earliest receiving countries outside Western regions. Apart from Afghanistan being the neighboring country, it also shares religious and cultural bond with Pakistan and has strong ethnic Pashtun ties that have been there along the borderline even before the birth of Pakistan. I have tried to address this gap that exists in the literature. Taking into account the theories and frames developed by western theorists like Weiner (1992), Van Gorp (2005), Semetko and Valkenburg (2000), I have tried to conduct qualitative content analysis to gain in-depth insight on the most common frames used during parliamentary debates, facebook posts, tweets and press releases to describe Afghan refugees. Directed approach in content analysis is used as I have built upon my work on existing theories and frames as well as creating new ones when it was relevant to do so. In this study, frames like humanitarian, religious and ethnic brotherhood, victim and international obligation are taken from the literature while dignified repatriation frame is new one that has been added to this study. Coding schema is developed by thoroughly reading the relevant literature as well as analyzing parliamentary debates, face book posts, tweets and press releases and categorized them in various frames based on underlying themes and narratives. Following questions have been taken into account: Do frames vary by political parties? How do Pakistan's mainstream political parties frame the crisis? What are the possible differences in the

frames used in the parliamentary debates and social media? What are the possible changes over time?

Analysis shows that positive and negative frames discussed in the study are similar to what one can see in the western literature but with few exceptions that are; unlike western literature, in Pakistan conservative and populist parties frame refugees in positive and inclusive manner while liberal parties frame refugees in negative and exclusionary manner. Another unique feature of this study is, it contains dignified repatriation frame which is not seen in the western researches. All the actors are in favor of dignified repatriation as Pakistan has hosted these refugees for more than four decades and Afghanistan being the neighboring country, actors believe that it is important to keep the element of dignity to ensure peace in the region. The framing did not change with change in institutional settings. Political parties framing of refugees remained constant both in parliamentary setting and on social media. However, lack of availability of literature regarding Pakistan's case and lack of overall data available online are this study's weak points. This study would contribute to the existing literature by introducing dignified frame and would further help in comparing western European cases with outside European cases like Turkey and Pakistan.

The research consists of five chapters. Chapter 1 is the introduction to the topic under study. Chapter 2 discusses the most relevant literature and its relation to the topic under study and addresses the gap in the existing literature and the reason of my research. Chapter 3 focuses on the research questions under study and methods used to study the topic. Chapter 4 is dedicated to the results discussion while Chapter 5 presents conclusion along with limitations of the study and suggestions for future research.

CHAPTER 2

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. History of Afghan Refugees in Pakistan

2.1.1. The Early Days of Conflict

The first series of conflict were caused by the coup in April 1978 that brought a communist government to power in Afghanistan and that resulted in death of about 1.5 million Afghans (Human Rights Watch, 2001). Seeing the extensive resistance, the communist government turned to violence. It was estimated that the number of people displaced from their homes was over 7 million (Human Rights Watch, 2005, p.12).

In December 1979, Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan because of the concern that the communist government in Kabul was losing ground. The Afghans once again were facing violence and more Afghans were forced to become refugees. New Afghan opposition forces whose aim was to defend Afghan and Islamic values against soviet invasion and its ideology, called the war against communism jihad (war) became popular among the Afghan tribal and urban groups being Islam as uniting inspirational source. Since they referred their war against communism jihad, they came to be known as Mujahideen (those who engage in war) among their supporters and Mujahideen increased in number (Human Rights Watch, 2005, p.12. It increased the magnitude of conflict leading to increased numbers of Afghan refugees. The number of refugees increased from 1.9 million in 1980 to 6.2 million in 1990, most of them fleeing to Pakistan and Iran (UNHCR, 1997). According to the Amnesty International report (2019), Pakistan during that time period took the widest share of Afghan refugees with

4 million as the neighboring country. Majority of Refugees in Pakistan were housed in KPK (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and Baluchistan by the UNHCR. In KPK, refugee camps were built in Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) and Peshawar because of two major reasons, first, they share border with Afghanistan. Most of the refugees belong to Pashtun ethnicity (European Resettlement Network, 2013) and these two areas FATA and Peshawar are ethnically Pashtuns. In Baluchistan, Quetta hosted the remaining refugees because of its proximity to Afghan border.

After a decade in Afghanistan, Russia pulled out its troops in February 1989 after disintegration of USSR but pro-communist government led by Muhammad Najibullah was still present. United Nations (UN) failed to establish a peace treaty between the Mujahedeen and Najibullah. Najibullah was killed by the mujahedeen when they took over Kabul in April 1992 (Forced Migration Review, n.d, p.9).

2.1.2. Civil War

Due to the Mujahedeen's capture of Kabul, there was a sudden increase in numbers of Afghan refugees returning home. There numbers of Afghans returning home suddenly started to decrease, two factors played a role in this: The mujahedeen, did not agree with this arrangement related to political sharing of power, the hostility among themselves led to use military means to achieve their objectives (British Agencies Afghanistan Group, 2001). Fighting broke out between different mujahedeen groups that collectively forced out Najibullah and Soviets and second factor was the lack of aid by international agencies in helping Afghans returning to their country.

2.1.3. The Emergence of the Taliban

Madrasahs, namely religious schools, were popular with the Afghan refugees in the early 1990s when the government of Afghanistan transferred power

to the Islamic Jihad Council (IJC). Except for the religious education for boys, every other kind of education was discouraged along with overall education for girls. Secular education took a back seat. Universities were closed. Libraries were burnt (Sadat, 2004). These schools were the only mode of education available for the young Afghan boys. The fundamentalist groups in Saudi Arabia and the conservative religious Pashtun leaders in southern Afghanistan and Pakistan funded Madrassas. These schools focused on the study of Quran and Jihad and not on mathematics/science or literature. These madrassas became the foundation and later recruitment centers for Taliban movement. Students were brain washed into thinking that the formation of an Islamic state is the only solution to the Afghanistan's problems of lawlessness that has taken over the country and different groups fighting there. The Taliban took over the Kandahar region in 1994. All the female schools were closed and female education was banned during the Taliban rule (1996-2001). Only Kabul Medical Faculty was allowed to have female students because the Taliban had allowed only female doctors to examine female patients. Women were banned from holding jobs except those who worked as nurses or doctors (Khwajamir, 2016).

The Taliban movement followed a former tribal social code Pashtunwali strictly that included administering religious fundamentalist approaches such as killing people who did not follow their version of Islam and banning women from getting education which was disliked by the majority of Afghans as they had never had to put through such restrictions before in their lives (Ruiz, 2001).

When the Taliban movement moved towards the north, the former mujahedeen groups resisted against them and collectively formed the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance. In 1996, the Taliban took over Kabul and Jalalabad and later in 1998 they captured Mazar-e-Sharif, which served as the Alliance's capital. The number of refugees increased as the fighting moved towards the northern Afghanistan, forcing more Afghans to flee Afghanistan and take refuge in Pakistan as they were against the restrictions that the Taliban forced on the them.

The US and its allies invaded Afghanistan after the twin tower attack in New York City in September 2001. The US believed that the attack was carried out by Al-Qaeda. The invasion of Afghanistan was termed as War on Terror by US. The War on

Terror caused millions of Afghans to seek refuge in Pakistan (Emery and Ruiz, 2001). The Afghan refugees in Pakistan face a lot of difficulties, yet they are reluctant to go back to Afghanistan because of the increased sectarian violence, terror attacks, fights led by Taliban and the absence of law (Public Broadcasting Service, 2011).

According to the latest data collected by UNHCR, there are about 2.5 million registered Afghan refugees all over the world (2020b), 1.4 million of them live in Pakistan (2020a). After Syrian refugees which consist of 6.6 million in number, the Afghan refugees are the second largest in the world and largest refugee population in Asia (Mercy Corps, 2020).

2.2. Legal Status

Despite hosting the largest forced migration population after Turkey and Colombia respectively (UNHCR, 2020), there is no law determining the status of refugees in Pakistan. According to UNHCR (2004, p.182), the country did not sign the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (United Nations General Assembly, 1951, p.137). According to the convention, a refugee should not be forcefully returned to the country where there are serious threats to his life and his freedom. This principle is called as the principle of non-refoulement. It defines the term refugee and describes the rights of refugees (United Nations General Assembly, 1951, p.137). According to UNHCR (2004, p.182) Pakistan is also not a part of 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. But it is a part of 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which says that a government is bound to take legislative, administrative and judicial measures in order to ensure the protection of civil and political rights (United Nations General Assembly, 1966, p.171). According to this covenant, refugees can only be expelled within the limits set by the law. Pakistan is a part of 1984 Convention against torture (Grare and Maley, 2011) and in spite of this, refugees can still be expelled.

“Cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which prohibits refoulement of anyone in instances where there is a substantial risk that the individual will be tortured.” (UN General Assembly, 1984).

2.2.1. Pakistan: an End to the Welcome

In late 1995, the Western block's political interest in the region faded after disintegration of USSR. Thereafter, the UNHCR and the World Food Program (WFP) in Pakistan encountered funding deficits in their aid work. As a result, they ended the food assistance to the refugees living in camps. These organizations also faced threats from local warlords in Pakistan (United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 2001). The food aid was cut after a survey that showed that the majority of the Afghan refugees were self-reliant or if necessary can become self reliant. After a year, World Refugee Survey in 1997 showed that many refugees were living in extreme poverty and depended on the daily laboring work. Millions of Afghan refugees were dependent on World Food Program and UNHCR which was discontinued in 1998 and this left all the burden of assisting refugees on Pakistan (Ruiz, 2001, p.09).

In the mid-2000s, Afghanistan was hit by heavy droughts and there was heavy fighting in its northern region because of War on Terror (WoT). It increased the refugee influx towards Pakistan. According to the survey conducted by the United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (2001), about 172,000 Afghan refugees entered Pakistan in 2000 and in November 2000, Pakistan closed down its borders with Afghanistan due to this heavy influx.. Although it did show Pakistan's tough stance on accepting refugees, it was not effective in practical terms as the border was highly porous. Pakistan housed more than two million refugees and the full repatriation was not confirmed. The international community abandoned Afghanistan after Soviets left. In such context, Pakistan's hardened stance on refugees can be linked to the abandonment of Pakistan by international agencies in facilitating refugees (Ruiz, 2001., p.10).

Because of the above situation, the Afghan refugee rights were affected as those Afghans who entered post 2000 were considered as illegal immigrants. These Afghans were no longer sheltered from being considered as illegal aliens, forced evictions and did not have access to education, healthcare, freedom of movement and safe asylum (United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 2001).

This situation prompted the Afghan refugees to move out to urban areas from their refugee camps as official pathways to enable them meeting their basic needs for closed. The Pakistan government did not seem to have an issue with this and implicitly approved such informalization of asylum (Zubair, Khan and Shah, 2019, pp. 28-38). The refugees could not go back to Afghanistan because of the conflict arise after the US led invasion on the one hand and draught affecting their country on the other hand (Rashid, 2019, p.55). In Pakistan, they were not welcomed as they were deemed as illegal immigrants and did not have a valid visa according to Foreigners Act 1946 and Foreigners Order 1951. Moreover, the Afghan refugees were not allowed to legally acquire work and were always under a threat of detention and arrests from the law agencies. The undocumented Afghans in major cities were deported by the Police if they did not pay bribes. The stalls of Afghan traders in Peshawar were destroyed by Police in June 1999. Moreover, the police also assaulted the Afghan traders and their customers (UNOCHA, 2001) and harassment of refugees at the hands of police still continues (Zaidi, 2015; Human Rights Watch, 2016).

After 9/11, due to the US led forces attack on Afghanistan, Pakistan was forced once more to shelter large numbers of refugees. The Afghan refugees were not included in a database until 2004 for a joint consensus carried out by Pakistani Government and UNHCR. It was not until 2006 that refugees registered in consensus of 2004 were provided with Proof of Registration (POR). These cards were supposed to expire in 2015 but they have been extended (Society for Human Rights and Prisoners' Aid – Pakistan, 2019). Since 2015, Pakistani government has pressed for the return of Afghan refugees but as of 2018 there are still a million and half refugees residing in Pakistan (Borthakur, 2017, pp.488-509). About two-thirds of POR card holders live outside refugee camps. They do not receive any sort of aid from UNHCR or Pakistani government. The UNHCR has focused on these urban refugees to return back to Afghanistan (Rashid, 2019).

Officializing the status of Afghan refugees under the legal framework of citizenship is shown as a way to make them integrate into the host society. But Pakistan is hesitant to follow this path because of several political reasons which are discussed below. The following article of the 1951 Pakistan Citizenship Act is worthy of note at this point:

“Article 4: Citizenship by birth.— Every person born in Pakistan after the commencement of this Act shall be a citizen of Pakistan by birth: Provided that a person shall not be such a citizen by virtue of this section if at the time of his birth: -- (a) his father possesses such immunity from suit and legal process as is accorded to an every of an external sovereign power accredited in Pakistan and is not a citizen of Pakistan; or (b) His father is an enemy alien and the birth occurs in a place then under occupation by the enemy.”

Pakistan does not recognize Israel as an independent state and Pakistan has unsettled political tensions with India since the partition in 1947. That is why it is difficult for Pakistani born Indian or Israeli children to be granted a Pakistani citizenship and vice versa in Pakistan. Apart from whose parents are from these two countries, anyone born in Pakistan is eligible for Pakistani citizenship. Still, this law can be used as the legal basis of providing citizenship to the children born into Afghan refugee families in Pakistan. Still, such practice has never been the case (European Asylum Support Office, 2020). It can be deduced that the reason for not granting Pakistani citizenship is because military views Afghan refugees as a national security threat as they are involved in terror activities and the government of Pakistan views them as a negotiation deal with Afghanistan. If Islamabad and Kabul's relations are severed than more than a million Afghan refugees could be sent to Afghanistan. Since 2016, about six hundred thousand Afghan refugees have been expelled by Pakistan because of their possible involvement in terror activities (The Express Tribune, 2018; The News International, 2016). It can also be argued that it is a result of the National Action plan which called on to eradicate terrorists from Pakistani soil (Rauf and Ahmad, 2019).

In short, no legal framework has been established which determines the status of refugees in Pakistan. For the government of Pakistan, UNHCR is responsible for carrying out the refugee status determination (RSD). In this case, the refugees are protected under the UNHCR-asylum framework and cooperation agreement between Government of Pakistan and UNHCR, 1993 (Grare and Maley, 2011). UNHCR refers them as 'refugees' and so do the academic scholars like Rashid (2019), Zubair, Khan and Shah (2019), Borthakur (2017), Emery and Ruiz (2001).

2.3. Literature on Framings of Asylum Seekers and Refugees

Before coming towards stance of mainstream Pakistani political parties on Afghan refugees, it is important to look at the literature on Europe's stance on refugees. Asylum comes one of the biggest concerns of EU voters. According to 2015 Standard Eurobarometer survey, 58% of EU citizens consider migration as one of the two main issues, the other being terrorism (25%) (European Commission, 2015). In 2019, again the citizens considered migration (34%) as one of the two major issues in EU and climate change (22%) being the second one (European Commission, 2019). 23% of EU population still perceives migration second major issue in EU in 2020 (European Commission, 2020).

Right wing political parties thrive on such fears it does not matter whether the fear is actual or perceived. We have seen rise in right wing populism recently in the West which dismisses the idea of multiculturalism, multilateralism and globalization. The populists in Europe have directed their hostility towards migrants, asylum seekers and refugees from Arab and African countries while in US the hostility is towards migrants from Mexico and Central America (Habib, 2018). For example, in the EU, the right wing and/or conservative populist parties portray immigrants as taking away the available jobs, depressing wages, putting a strain on social services and associating the migrants with increase in crime rate (European Commission, 2015, 2019 & 2020). Similarly, in the US, the conservative Trump administration under the slogan of 'make America great again' focused heavily on anti-immigration policies unlike the old times. In short, anti-immigration policies comes from conservative nationalist ideology (Hiel and Duriez, 2004).

If we look at other cases like Turkey who has conservative ruling party has welcoming attitude towards Syrian refugees and revolves around 'Islamic brotherhood' but that just lasts for short period of time. When the stay extends, the differences become more prominent (Yilmaz, 2019, pp.9-22). Similarly, in Pakistan's case, the welcoming attitude towards Afghan refugees died slowly. Initially, Pakistani Government welcomed them with open arms because the idea was the refugees would go back after a short period of time but because of instability in Afghanistan, the refugees stay prolonged and as mentioned above in the history of conflict, Pakistan's stance hardened with increasing refugee influx and limited international aid.

Moreover, in the literature, most of the theories on migration are related to economic migration. Major migration theories include Kinetic Model Theory by Kunz (1973, pp.125-146), followed by Lee's theory of migration (Lee, 1996, pp.47-57) and Network Hypothesis by Hatton and Williamson (1998). Whereas I am focusing on political immigrants / forced immigrants / refugees. Very less literature is available regarding forced or political migrant cases that are happening outside Europe and America. Most of the literature looks into western European cases.

In this context, it is important to note that a considerate and long-term migration policy can be formed by studying the reasons behind a perception that immigration is a security threat. In this context, the important thing is to look at the theoretical approaches to understand the relationship between security and migration. These perspectives vary across the literature and sometimes are contradictory in nature. Weiner's (1990) framework will serve as an important model. The factors that make migration a problem includes the economic potential of the receiving countries, religious/ethnic conflicts and the immensity of migration. According to this framework, the wealth of a country does matter. A country with a flourishing economy will more easily welcome refugees and will possibly stop all sorts of incoming refugees during a period of recession. Secondly, racial or cultural kinship can be the main cause of embracing or rejecting migrants. A country will be welcoming to those migrants who share the same values, race and religion and refusing those who do not share the same identity. Refusing to welcome refugees from different cultural or religious background can be hard because the possible threat of change in values of the host country. Thirdly, It is clear that a country with small influx of immigrants will not feel threatened as compared to a country receiving a large influx.

From this perspective one might expect the host countries adopt strict border control measures when the migration is understood as a security threat. For instance, this is the case in Western Europe which has controlled its border to a great extent by issuing of identity cards and penalizing employers who have illegal employees. Still, sometimes the geography of a country makes it difficult to exercise strict border control and it triggers security related concerns. It is hard for countries to protect themselves against large influx of illegal immigrants even if they have the power to protect themselves against invasions with powers such as tanks, missiles (Weiner, 1992).

Such proposition very much applies to the case of Pakistan. In Pak-Afghan case, three important issues make border control difficult. First problem is the geographical location; the mountain terrain surrounding the area and lack of defined boundaries. With Kabul offering limited cooperation in securing the border, the border has become penetrable and root of instability in the region. Borderline control is difficult as the area is large and mountainous. The high mountain ranges such as Hindukush and Himalayas surround the Pak-Afghan border. Moreover, the narrow valleys and deserted areas make it tough to fence the border. Hence this makes the illegal movement across the border easy (Bajoria, 2009). Second issue is with border officials being easily bribed, Pakistan does not have the administrative and political potential to impose border entry rules (Sabawoon, 2020). Terror activities could not be stopped in Pakistan even after the military operations in FATA which did manage to eliminate terrorists. Pakistan believes that these terrorist activities were operated from Afghanistan. In 2016, Pakistan formed the National Action Plan to secure its border and get rid of terrorists from Pakistani soil. Hostility increased between Kabul and Islamabad when soldiers died during exchange of fire at the border (Khan, 2016). Third issue is the ethnic ties in people and tribes on both sides of the border make it difficult to secure the border (European Asylum Support Office, 2020).

2.4 Migration as a Security vs. Humanitarian Approach

Existing studies mostly use the dichotomy of humanitarian vs. securitization frames on the subject matter of forced immigrants (Van Gorp, 2005, pp.485–508; D'Haenens and De Lange, 2001; Weiner, 1990). As far humanitarian frames, one of the frame is Von Gorp's victim frame who discovered it during his research on Belgian press coverage. Here, the scholar portrays forced immigrants as the victims of the crisis and emphasizes the life-threatening conditions faced by political refugees back home as well as during their migratory journey (Van Gorp, 2005, pp.485–508). Forced immigrants are depicted as people in dire need of saving and are fleeing for their life because of the situation they are in. In another much cited media study, D'Haenens and De Lange (2001) argues that the victim frame provides an empathetic understanding of the

frames prioritizing the interests of the human beings. Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) links such empathy to morality that the host society ought to have in their definition of human interest frame, which is quite close to the abovementioned victim frame of Van Gorp (2005). Morality frame described by Semetko and Valkenburg (2000), highlights events or issues in the context of religious, social, or moral ways on behavior. According to (Helbling, 2014), there is a generalized moral structure that is used to consult to general humanitarian rights and moral principles that are considered appreciable by everyone, no matter what their ethnicity or cultural identity is. Another important frame identified by Guest (2018, p.30) in his research on framing Syrian refugees in the Canadian Parliament was international obligation frame which emphasizes on international treaties on refugees signed by host countries and expectations from the host countries by international community.

When it comes to frames, under the securitization perspective, Van Gorp's (2005) intruder frame comes to the forth. The scholar argues that those contents portraying migrants as security threats usually describe them as intruders invading the European countries. Intruder frame focuses on fake asylum seekers, describe immigrants as illegal and argues that these immigrants are economic rather than political. Asylum seekers were shown as danger to the country's society. In the media, the influx of migrants was often portrayed by words such as 'stream of migrants' or 'flood of are perceived by the citizens. Hence, the negative perceptions of migrants are anticipated in the fields of security, economy and identity (Van Gorp, 2005, pp.485–508). Other scholars (Helbling, 2014; Philo, Briant and Donald, 2013; Haynes, Breen and Devereux, 2005) divided this lump into subcategories of negative frames. The generic frames of economic consequences and conflict by (Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000) might be useful in interpreting some negative aspects of migration (e.g., De Lange and d'Haenens, 2001, pp. 847 - 860). Using the economic consequence frame on forced immigration, abuses of the welfare systems, increased unemployment rates and job competition come to the forth. Haynes, Breen and Devereux (2005) have put forward frames that portray migrants as a threat to safety of host nations and an economic threat to host nation's economic prosperity. In addition to the economic and criminal threat frames, the authors include the nationalistic identity frame. As asylum seekers come from diverse backgrounds with different religious beliefs and ethnicities, the nationalistic identity frame portrays them as a threat to national or local cultural values

because the incoming migrants may change the cultural values of host countries. When these frames portray migrants as intruders, it causes locals to worry about the security, identity and economy of their communities and countries at large.

2.5. Theoretical Explanations of Frame Variation

According to this school of thought - identities, ideas, norms and interests are socially constructed. From the constructivist point of view, interests and preferences are not external, they are formed socially, and thus collective understandings are important (Price and Reus – Smit, 1998). For example, the reactions of European countries to refugees show how the living conditions of refugees will be affected. States such as Sweden, which grants entry visas to refugees easily, and Germany are pro-migrant and living conditions for refugees are much better there as compared to states being anti-migrant such as Austria, Hungary and Poland. Living conditions are difficult for refugees in the latter countries due to the increase in xenophobia and nationalism which makes it difficult for refugees to find work as well (The Guardian, 2018a). Similar to Germany, in Sweden it is easier for migrants to find work (Bauer et. Al, 2000).

On this account, the different approaches of EU countries on immigration from Syria validate this point. Germany welcomed Syrian refugees with open arms in the beginning but Hungary was reluctant to accept the refugees. Discussing it through social constructivists point of view which recently became a significant approach. They claim that the world is socially constructed and material factors find their meaning through social relations. Angela Merkel, German Chancellor, believes in a 'Multi-Cultural Europe' which reinforces the country's beliefs of being more welcoming to refugees. In an interview for Der Spiegel, she said if Germany does not show a kind face, it is not her country (Der Spiegel, 2015). She expresses that the Europe must deal with refugee crises unanimously; if it fails, it means that it has failed to address the universal civil rights (The Guardian, 2015). Some politicians have shown support such as Secretary-General of German Social Democratic Party, Yasmin Fahimi, who assents that Germany needs to show to the world that it has not forgotten the European values regarding humanity in difficult times (Reuters, 2015). Angela Merkel has opposed Hungary's policy on refugees and calls Oban's statements against immigrants as "Shame of

Budapest" (Reuters, 2015). He sees refugees as a danger to Europe's and Hungary's Christian identity as observed in his statements like "European identity is rooted in Christianity" and "keep Europe Christian" (The New York Times, 2015). He clearly differentiates between non-European identities and Christian identities and strongly supports European identities. To emphasize his concerns, he further explains that Christian values involve freedom of expression and gender equality (EurActive, 2015). Due to the difference in opinions of these leaders we notice a less tolerant, more right wing nationalistic and culturally self-absorbed Hungary versus a more tolerant and liberal Germany. Both the countries are members of European Union and yet the values they embrace are different. With German Chancellor holding a pro-migrant stance in the refugee crisis portrays Germany's positive position towards refugees and shows a multicultural attitude.

But recently, countries under the domination of right wing populist sentiments has given quite different reactions to the subject matter. Hungary and Germany already had a strong following of these parties, but other countries in Europe are seeing their numbers increasing to a point where they are threatening to the parties in power. Parties, such as Golden Dawn Party in Greece which has anti-immigrant views, National Front in France which encourages anti-immigration stances and Freedom Party in Austria which asks for favoring Austrians in the job market and limiting freedom for immigrants (The New York Times, 2016) have seen electoral success at the polls. Asylum seekers have been portrayed as a hazard to the cultural values and identity of host countries and are shown as the face of socio economic issues (Huysmans, 2006). Because of these images, judicial and police collaboration have increased with countries sharing the borders and more constraints have been forced on asylum seekers (Malcolm and Bort, 2001). Migrants have been considered a threat to national security due to the attacks such as the infamous September 11, 2001 attack and subsequent attacks France, UK and Spain. Analyzing this, it can be said that migrants have been blamed for terrorism and the views of European countries have changed due to this. Migrants are perceived as a threat to the communities in European countries which have a shared or similar identity and values. Syrian refugees have been judged as a threat because of different values and identities. Politics in both countries got influenced by these changing views.

Another way to explain the attitude of West towards refugees is through the lens of institutionalism. Institutions is defined as norms, rules and decision-making procedures play important role in shaping human interactions. Institutions have constraining and constitutive effects on its actors and play important role in the process of policy making with regards to their constitutive and constraining effects (Caporaso and Jupille, 1999; March and Olsen, 1984; Olsen, 2001; Hall and Taylor, 1996; Peters, 1998). The states do have freedom to exercise whom they give permission to enter in their country, but they are restrained by both national as well as international institutions when allowing migrants. The national policies on asylum are influenced by international bodies such as European Court of Human rights and international legal institution such as the Geneva Convention. 1951 UN's Convention on the Status of Refugees called Geneva Convention, article 33 is the main legal instrument that highlights asylum seekers' rights. This Convention safeguards the asylum seekers' rights who are threatened on the basis of their religion, race or by being a part of certain community or holding a particular political opinion. The Geneva Convention plays an important role in refugee protection. it contains principle of non-refoulement, which basically states that states are not allowed to send refugees back to countries where they fled from prosecution. Unlike European countries, Pakistan is not a signatory of 1951 UN's Convention on the Status of Refugees (UNHCR, 2004, p.182).

The International frameworks of this stature are complemented by NGOs such as Amnesty International and organizations such as UNHCR exert pressure to the countries that do not observe these practices of human rights. Countries are often vulnerable to pressure as they widely care about public opinion nationally as well as international reputation (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, 1999; Risse-Kappen, 1995). The European Court of Human Rights by publishing reports and court documents applies pressure on countries by naming the violators. They cannot grant residence or asylum to migrants but they can stop the signatory countries from expelling migrants who are endangered with cruel treatment or torture in their home countries (Hailbronner, 1999) unlike in Pakistan.

2.6. Issues Related to Security

The post 9/11 era can be marked by the increasing movement of people, ideas and goods in a globalized world. The armed conflicts and the increasing global inequalities in the human side have increased the influx of refugees towards the western world, which sees them as a security threat. (Buzan et al., 1998) argue that securitization is an intense form of politicization and often require a strict security response. It gives rise to security threat that is not evidence based but these threats are prioritized about over other issues. The refugee influx in Europe and on its external borders has been termed as a crisis and has become the catalyst for restoring the European cultural identity across Europe (Mountz and Hiemstra, 2013, pp. 382-390).

On the other hand, some perspectives totally dismiss the relationship between security and migration such one perspective is human security perspective which puts human security in the center and not the state security. Migrants should not be treated as an element that threatens the sovereignty of a state. They should be taken as numbers and nothing more (Alkire, 2003). A state should focus on resolving economic crises, natural disasters, poverty to ensure its security (UN, 2020).

Another standpoint that establishes a relationship between migration and security emphasizes identifying circumstances where migrants and migration as a whole is assessed as a threat to security and stability of host nation (Weiner, 1992). In Pak-Afghan case, mainstream political parties blame the Afghan refugees for the security affairs in Pakistan which comprises of a rise in the militant factions (Harpviken, 2019) in the country that aids Talibanisation in region (Javaid, 2011, pp.73-80), smuggling of firearms (Hussain, Ullah and Khilji, 2009, pp.39-66) ethnic wars, sectarian conflicts, black market of drugs (Ahrari et al., 2020). The rise in terrorism in the host country has made them reluctant to accept the refugees.

In some cases, as seen in the literature refugee camps themselves have become a security challenge, as they are being used as the recruitment grounds by different militant groups. It is not a secret among humanitarian community and national authorities of Jordan about the Syrian refugee children, regardless of age, being recruited from Jordanian refugee camps to fight in the Syrian war. The refugee camps hence have become a threat for the globalized community and diminishes the status of being a safe place for the migrants according to UNHCR. (2015a). According to another report, in Northeast Syria, another refugee camp, Al-Hol, is labelled as the recruitment

ground for ISIS soldiers (Williams, 2019). Similarly, in 1980's, during the Soviet Invasion, in Pakistan some of the Afghan refugee camps were used for training and recruiting the Mujahedeen. As these camps also carried out anti-state activities, they were disbanded after 2000. The Afghan refugee kids go to Madrasahs, where priority is religious education because most of the Afghan refugees do not have high income. They cannot afford regular schools. Most of these Madrasahs are run by militant factions, although there are few Madrasahs which provide regular education (Kapur and Ganguly, 2012, pp. 111-141). The government of Pakistan suspects that these Madrasahs carry out anti-state activities (Borthakur, 2017, pp.488-509). On 16th December, 2014 Tehrik-i Taliban Pakistan (TTP) attacked Army Public School in Peshawar where more than 140 school children lost their lives. The TTP leaders live in Afghanistan but the Pakistani government concluded that Afghan refugees have facilitated the TTP in this attack (Zahid, 2015). That day is remembered as the black day in the history of Pakistan. Following this attack, Pakistani authorities became more hostile towards the Afghan refugees living in Pakistan. Cases of refugee harassment like extortion, intimidation and unreasonable torture came to surface, every Afghan refugee returnee interviewed by Human Rights Watch said that they have returned to Afghanistan out of fear of harassment at the hands of Pakistani police (Gossman 2015). In December, 2014, Pakistani Government announced 'National Action Plan' which notified the return of refugees. As the government did not make any distinction between the unregistered and registered refugees, this was a huge distress to Afghan refugees (National Action Plan, 2014). Pakistan Air Force at Badaber was also attacked by TTP in September 2015 (Akbar, 2015) and in KPK, on Bacha Khan University in July 2016 (Akbar, 2016).

Another perspective that links security with migration draws our attention to difference between real and perceived threat regarding migration. A host country's preconceived notions of threat and anxieties can appear xenophobic. But it is significant to realize that concern regarding refugees should not resort to disbaring of refugees and at the same time fear of immigration should not be discharged (Weiner, 1992). There are perspectives that see immigrants as threat to the well-being of a country and after the rise of right wing populism in early 2000's has strengthened this perspective which makes it a legitimate threat where states take harsh measures against it. This gives rise to another issue where socio economic problems like unemployment and crime starts to get associated with migrants without proof of evidence. Moreover, politicians use this

tool to the fullest extent (Humphrey, 2013, pp. 178-195). Reports have shown that refugees are harassed and arrested by the security forces and forcefully expelled from Pakistan (Human Rights Watch, 2015). After 2014 Army Public School attack, more than 25,000 Afghan refugees were forced to leave Pakistan due to police harassment (Breitbart, 2016).

2.7. Issues Related to Economy

Economy can be a main factor in shaping the perception of host countries regarding refugees is they are regarded as socio-economic burden by these countries. Sometimes these migrants due to their association with criminality, welfare dependency and delinquency inflict economic costs on the host country. Such migrants burden the housing, education facilities and transportation because they fall in very low incomes (Weiner, 1992). This is very likely of the refugees in the modern era because of their low skills and the decreasing need for labor power in the host countries.

In 2008, Pakistan approved Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which gave the refugees the right to work. The refugees can easily work in the informal sector but in the formal sector, they faced some issues because they were required to have a Pakistani business partner to own an immovable property or obtain any documents (Afghan Displacement Solution Platform, 2018). But since current PTI's government, things for refugees have become easier i.e Government of Pakistan (GoP) in 2019 let the refugees open bank account (The Express Tribune, 2019) if they hold Proof of Registration (POR) which will very much put an end to the unfair treatment by their Pakistani business partners (Khan, 2020). Studies show that while having the convention of right to work Afghan refugees can rarely find jobs in the formal economy of Pakistan. Most of the Afghan refugees fall below the poverty line. The Afghan refugees work in the handicraft production or daily wage labor whether they are registered or unregistered. Few of the unregistered refugees are held in bonded labor, they work in brick kiln industry. Very small populations of Afghan refugees work as teachers or operate small businesses. According to (Weiner, 1992), a country regards migration as beneficial if it has employment opportunities, enough financial resources

to provide basic facilities to the immigrants. On the flip side, a country regards migration as destabilizing both on economic and social level if it has high unemployment rate, limited financial resources to provide basic facilities to the immigrants.

2.8. Issues Related to Ethnic and Sectarian Identity

2.8.1 Ethnic Related Issues

According to one argument that relates migration with security threat is the difference in ethnicities. Countries can be more willing to accept migrants that share same language, religion or race (Weiner, 1992). Another perspective claims that immigrants who are not of the same race, ethnicity or religious beliefs are seen as a threat to society by government and its citizens (Weiner, 1992). There can be similar examples given from the Western cases. For instance, the perception that refugees who belong to the Muslim background are seen as a threat to the European culture takes various forms in the immigration discussion. Le Pen, leader of far right wing French political party stated that and I quote: “There are a number of neighborhoods where you are no longer living a French life” (Beck, 2017).. In a different context, Le Pen continues as follows: “France is not burkinis on the beach. France is Brigitte Bardot. That’s France” (Cbsnews, 2017).

The claim that immigrants are a threat to European cultural achievements is not just a belief held by right wing political parties. Some mainstream views – including liberals - also consider immigrants from Muslim countries as a threat to their culture. Danish left wing current ruling party, the Social Democrats with its anti immigrant and anti muslim rhetoric gained popularity among Danish people (Elabdi, 2019). The party leader’s portrayal of immigrants as a threat to Danish welfare system and presentation of muslim immigrants as a threat to the country’s liberal values can be seen in the extract taken from her interview to the Danish newspaper BT in 2017 in which she said that she wishes to “*close down*” muslim schools in Denmark because, “*for many years, the Jewish minority has not caused any problems. But we now have*

many challenges with a large Muslim minority.” (Karker, 2017). In a similar vein, a prominent German women’s rights activist and journalist, Alice Schwarzer in 2015, published a list of demands that asks for these conditions to be implemented in her magazine Emma (2015). Her demands were: (1) acts such as male immigrants avoiding accepting help from female police officers or waitresses should not be tolerated, (2) Islamist arguments that do not favor German customs in refugee camps should not be entertained, (3) Backward Muslim associations such as Salafis and others should immediately stop their advertisement and recruitment activities in refugee camps, courses on democracy and (4) gender equality needs to be mandatory as well as on accepting different sexual orientations.

We see a different picture in those receiving countries who share ethnic and sectarian cleavages with sending societies. Pakistan has following distinct ethnic groups spread all accross the provinces. Punjabis live in Punjab, Sindhis and Muhajirs are found in Sindh, Pashtuns make up KPK and Balochis are present in Balochistan (Ethnic groups in Pakistan, 2012). Pashtun is an ethnic group spread across the tribal belt situated along the borders of Khyber Pakhtun Khwa (KPK), Balochistan and Afghanistan (Yousaf, 2019) as shown in the Map 1 below. 81.5 % of Afghan refugees in Pakistan are Pashtons (European Resettlement Network, 2013). If we look at Pakistan, Afghan refugees integrate better in the North Western Pakistan now called Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) as compared to the rest of Pakistan. Peshawar, in the province of KPK being in close proximity to the Pak-Afghan border, is very important city for Afghan refugees. The province of KPK is called Pashtun homeland as it is predominated by Pashtuns. They share tribal, cultural and religious bonds with Pashtuns in Afghanistan so the presence of a border line has not affected social ties and cultural ties heavily among the people (Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2006). Peshawar has provided better business and trade opportunities for the migrants and refugees as it is the center of culture and trade. After Kabul, Peshawar became the second best city for business and trade (Khan, 2006).

One might expect that refugees and citizens of the host countries might co-exist peacefully because of ethnic affinity. It might work if refugees are on temporary stay but to think that this will work for longer or permanent refugee stay is far from realistic expectation. For example, if we look at Afghan refugees in Pakistan, they are in

Pakistan for more than forty years and despite having ethnic ties with Pakistani Pashtuns, some studies show that public blames the refugees for the increase in ethnic tensions in Pakistan. Due to rise of Afghan refugee population, areas and provinces which share border with Afghanistan have experienced a demographic change, they include tribal areas, KPK and Baluchistan (Ghufran, 2018). The local ethnic groups in cities such as Quetta in Baluchistan, Peshawar in KPK and Karachi in Sindh fear being marginalized due to presence of refugees in their cities. Before going into detail, it is important to discuss the importance of these cities in relation to refugees. Baluchistan and KPK share border with Afghanistan hence large number of refugees live in Peshawar, Quetta and Karachi (Chatterjee, 2013). Karachi being the hub of economic activities and providing livelihood opportunities to people from all segments of society does not share border with Afghanistan. In Baluchistan, Afghan refugees are more than 3 indigenous ethnic groups (Baloch, Brahui and Pashtuns) combined (Lakdawalla, 2012). Since 2010, Baluchistan has received more than 400,000 Afghan refugees which are mostly Pashtuns. They are seen as a threat to demographic Baloch majority (Irantalab et al. 2012). There has been a rise in ethnically motivated conflict between Pashtuns and Baloch Sardars (Aslam, 2011). Tensions among Pashtuns have risen as there are Afghan refugee Pashtuns who mainly support Taliban and there are Pashtuns who are against Taliban in KPK (Sheikh, 2018). In Karachi, there has been major conflict between Pashtuns and Mohajir. Muhajir are Urdu speaking population that have migrated at the time of independence from India. The political parties have exploited their respective ethnic groups. In 1980, a major fight broke out between the Afghan refugees, backed by Mohajirs, and activists of a socialist democratic political party, Mutahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) in Karachi. Moreover, Karachi saw the deadliest ethnic violence between Mohajirs and Pashtuns in 1985 when a girl from an Urdu speaking background died in a road accident caused by a driver who was Pashtun. The government of Pakistan in 2010 renamed the (NWFP) North-Western Frontier Province as (KPK) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, it caused a huge havoc. Some ethnic groups were not in favor of this change of name. The government does not support the claims of these ethnic groups, as they asked for a separate country 'Pakhtunistan' (Borthakur, 2017, pp.488-509). Islamabad was one of the major cities after Peshawar to receive refugees as it was geographically closer to the North Western Pakistan. Even though Islamabad is ethnically diverse having 65% Punjabis, 14% Muhajir, 10.5 %Pashtuns and 7%

Sindhis, Balochis and minor ethnicities combined (World Population Review, 2021) it is less acceptable towards the refugees. Islamabad is reserved towards the refugees as it is a witness to how the conflict in Afghanistan has affected Pakistan's economy and culture. Residents of Islamabad blame the refugees for arms and illegal narcotic trade. The government is under huge tension due to receiving limited international trade while being a host to one of the largest refugee population in the world. With Islamabad pushing for the refugee return, tensions have arose between Islamabad and Kabul (Ansari, 2019). However, to what extent does this attitude towards Afghan refugees is reflected in the parliament? or to what extent does this attitude towards Afghan refugees is reflected on the social media accounts of political actors? To what extent the political acctors are cohesive on both platforms? What are the reasons behind possible variation? These are the questions that literature fails to answer and needs to be researched on.





Map 1: Afghanistan – Pakistan: Central Border (Council on Foreign Relations, 2008)

2.8.2 Sectarian Related Issues

Another key factor to determine the relationship between security and migration is religious or sectarian overlap among refugees and the host society (Choucri, 2002, p.109). As discussed above, existing literature widely discusses the securitization of Muslim immigration to European countries in general and the fear of jihadi terrorism in particular (Lyck-Bowen and Owen, 2018). But there is limited literature that sheds light on possibility of conflicts that rise because of difference in religious perceptions and lifestyles of immigrant and host society despite belonging to the same religion.

In Pak- Afghan refugee case, Kurram agency, a district of KPK province saw a rapid rise in the incoming Afghan refugees because its borders are connected to three provinces of Afghanistan Pakista, Khost and Tora Bora. The Khurram agency has been associated with the increase in sectarian disputes in this area (Azam, 2014). Government of Pakistan provided firearms to Sunni tribesmen and Afghan refugees to engage in Afghan jihad in the 1980's. It caused major clashes against Shia population by the Hezb-e-Islami fighters. These clashes occurred during religious ceremonies of their respective sects. During the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, Afghan militants and Taliban took refuge in Kurram Agency heavily populated by shia muslims. This made the Kurram agency a strong hold of Sunni Militants. They also shut off Upper Kurram which stopped the movement of Shias into urban regions as it was the sole route (Foschini, 2011).

General Zia's regime (1977-88) is held responsible for the increase in sectarian violence in the region by scholars (Ahmad,1996; Abbas, 2010) He became President of Pakistan after declaring martial law in 1977. He formulated policies and legislation that favored orthodox version of Sunni Islam while ignoring other sects. According to them, to gain the support of right wing Islamic Sunni Parties like Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-f), General Zia used religion. From then onwards sectarian war between Shia and Sunni militant groups gained momentum (Adil, 2013, December 1). This belief was reinforced when Pakistan started to strengthen its ties with Mujahideen from Afghanistan after the invasion of Soviet. In 1980's Pakistan was a proxy ground for battle for Iran-a Shia majority state, and Saudi Arabia-a Sunni majority state. Both of these countries financed Madrasehs, religious schools which prepared Mujahideen to fight against soviet invasion in Afghanistan, of their particular sects (Borthakur, 2017, pp.488-509). Afghan refugees were used by Pakistan to fight against the Soviets who were in Afghanistan by joining forces with Taliban and the Mujahidin (Grare and Maley, 2011). These groups also included Al-Qaeda. These groups were used to fight against the Soviet Invasion and Afghanistan. Moreover, they were also manipulated to benefit the political interests national as well as international authorities. These groups also established their own Madressehs which concentrated on Jihad influenced syllabus. The recruits were from refugee camps located in Peshawar, Bajour, Lahore and Karachi (European Asylum Support Office, 2016). The refugees gained an employment opportunity in the Taliban backed Madressehs as they were provided with monthly allowance (Siddikoglu, 2016).

Although there is lack of research on the way mainstream Pakistani political parties and Pakistan army frame refugees but we can observe the actions that they have taken during their respective ruling period on Afghan refugee subject. During military's rule from 1999 to 2008, several Afghan refugee camps were closed. Nasir Bagh refugee camp in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) was closed down in 2002, followed by closure of Emirates refugee camp in Balochistan (The New Humanitarian, 2003) and Kacha Garhi camp in KPK in 2007 (Ali, 2007, July 27). Pakistani authorities stated security concerns behind the closure of camps calling these camps shelter for 'terrorists' and criminal activities (The New Humanitarian, 2008, April 17). Military rule ended in 2008 making way for civil rule.

Pakistan People's Party (PPP), a center left social democratic political party began its tenure in 2008. It closed down one of the major Afghan refugee camps located in KPK called Jalozai camp in 2008. Again, Pakistani authorities stated security concern for the closure of the camp (IRIN, 2008, April 17).

PPP's government ended in 2013 and Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz (PMLN), a center right liberal political party came to power. The government implemented National Action Plan (NAP) to counter terrorism after Peshawar School attack in 2014, under this plan Afghan refugee settlements in the outskirts of Islamabad were demolished (Gillani, 2015). PMLN's tenure came to an end in 2018 and Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), a centrist populist Islamic political party became the ruling party. PTI opened Torkham border for 24 hours everyday for trade and border crossing purposes (Dawn, 2019, September 18). Torkham border is one of the major Pak-Afghan borders. For the first time in history, Afghan refugees are allowed to open bank accounts in Pakistan, it is a huge step taken by PTI's government (UNHCR, 2019, February 25). Other than Pakistan army, another important institution that comes to mind while talking about Afghan refugees is Ministry of States and Frontier Regions (SAFRON). It comes under federal government of Pakistan looks after refugees and tribal areas issues in Pakistan. It helps the young male and female refugees in finding suitable jobs related to their skills when they return back to Afghanistan by providing them skills based training programs (Khan, 2019). It carries out major projects in the refugee camps in the water, health and education sectors in collaboration with UNHCR.

Keeping in view security, economic, sectarian and ethnic concerns that political actors and institutions have regarding presence of Afghan refugees in Pakistan for forty years, in order to get better understanding of the above actors concerns, it is important to know what do the actors say when speaking about Afghan refugees on social media platforms and in parliament? How does critical happening in history effect problem framed by these actors? Whether framings change with change in institutional setting. And the role of ideologies practiced by actors in framing the refugees which the literature fails to address and needs to be extensively researched on.

The remaining study will be dedicated to addressing the gaps in the literature review.

CHAPTER 3

3. METHODOLOGY

3.1. Introduction

This study is innovative as it is among the first ones to address framing of the Afghan refugee by Pakistani political parties over an extended timeframe, and through parliamentary debates, tweets and Facebook posts. The relative lack of literature and data on this subject makes this analysis timely and useful as a first attempt to analyze framing of the Afghan refugee crisis in Pakistani parliament and on social media.

This research uses qualitative content analysis for subjective evaluation of data through coding and recognizing patterns. It pays attention to elements of language as communication with focus on content or contextual meaning of text (Donohew, et al., 1967). The process of content analysis is defined as “any qualitative and sense making effort that takes a volume of qualitative material and attempts to identify core consistencies and meanings” (Patton, 2002, p.453). Text data can take the form of digital, written, or unwritten form potentially collected through narrative responses, unrestricted surveys, interviews, target groups, views, or print media including books, articles, or manuals (Kondracki, Wellman and Amundson, 2002, pp.224-230).

3.2. Data

Parliamentary documents contain a wealth of information regarding attitudes and viewpoints of politicians and their respective parties concerning the most significant issues that the countries and its citizens are facing and likely insights into the democratic

procedure of the world's legislative assemblies. According to Greussing and Boomgaarden in 2017 (pp. 1749-1774), parliamentary debates provide an essential backdrop and arena for the formation of public opinion, political mobilization, and policy support. Same goes for social media debates. Recently, social media's influence on the communication in society and public discussions has increased significantly. Social media is used widely in political context. In recent years, Twitter and Facebook have played important role in increasing political participation among masses. Even though twitter is an absolute example of spreading general information as well as political judgements by the public, it is also used along with Facebook pages by political parties, political foundations and politicians to directly connect with citizens and engage in political discussions with them. Unfortunately, almost nothing has been written on parliamentary debates in Pakistan on refugees while a lot of literature about parliamentary debates on refugees in Western refugee hosting countries can be found. And most recently, literature regarding Turkish Parliamentary debates on refugees is being developed i.e. (Muftuler-Bac and Apaydin, 2020; İçduygu and Aksel ,2013).

In Western examples, parliamentary debates generally entail careful analysis and alignment with party platform, political agenda, and proposed policies. Therefore, how an issue is framed and presented can prove to be enlightening on how each party expects to propose policy solutions, frame the debate, and shape the outcome. It says a lot about party preferences. Similarly, Pakistan has an established parliamentary structure like in the western countries.

The analysis first starts by analyzing parliamentary documents which are 83 in number. Pakistani Parliament consists of two Houses. They work as a representative of Pakistani citizens. These houses construct laws, keep a check on the work of government and make ruling regarding issues. Both Houses (Upper House: Senate, Lower House: National Assembly) of Parliament conduct debates where members of their respective houses debate on current issues of the day, government policies and suggest new laws. Debates are used in both the Houses to scrutinize the work of the Government. They enable MPs to obtain more detailed responses from the Government and allow opinions to be voiced and issues to be discussed at length. The sessions are broadcasted live on national TV, and then they are transcribed and uploaded on the official website of Senate and National Assembly.

The dataset on parliamentary records was collected from official website of Senate and National Assembly, which house a Pakistani Parliament dataset – records and transcripts of all parliamentary debates and comments. Although the war in Afghanistan officially began in 1979, parliamentary debate archives are not available online from that era. nor tweets or social media posts are available from that period. However, parliamentary debates from 2008 and onwards are available online. Hence, to ensure saliency in the sample, I limited my data sources from 2008 till 2020. The reason February 2020 was chosen as the ending period and not December 2019 was because Pakistan hosted Refugee Summit to mark forty years of hosting Afghan refugees and the event was attended by UN Secretary General in Feb 2020. The reason for not including entire 2020 was the time restriction to complete the study. There has not been any substantial debate on Afghan refugees. Interestingly, 2014 school attack in Peshawar effected Afghan refugees badly as forceful repatriation began. Similarly, terror attacks on an air force base and Bacha Khan University indirectly effected Afghan refugees. By capturing these debates in the data set, my analysis was able to capture the preceding deliberations on refugee policy prior to the immediate concerns with the resettling of Afghan Refugees.

As a first step, the data, which was in pdf format, had to be downloaded session wise. In the second step, I went through table of contents and searched which ones discussed Afghan refugees. Then I manually read 20 debates to find out repetitive words used in these debates to address the Afghan refugees. The repetitive words I found were Afghan (افغان), refugees, Muhajir (مهاجر), illegal migrants and migration (هجرة). I later referred them as keywords.

Keywords both in English and Urdu selected were based on repetitive words used by the politicians during the debates. For the remaining debates, I applied search function using the above key words. This work builds on a dataset of 83 speeches made by Pakistani members of Parliament during parliamentary sessions.

Since there were only a limited number of cases addressing Afghani immigrants in Pakistani Parliament, I also decided to include social media accounts and press releases of relevant political actors. This broadened data enabled to see whether parliamentarians' attitude changes with change in medium of communication as well as providing a more complete picture of relevant debates. 94 tweets from 15 official twitter


accounts 156 posts from 12 official Facebook pages and 29 press releases from the official websites of mainstream political parties, mainstream politicians and Pakistan army were taken. Twitter and facebook accounts included PTI, PPP, PMLn, ANP and their mainstream politicians, it also includes Pakistan army and Ministry of States and Frontier Regions (SAFRON). The dataset was taken from January 2008 to February 2020. The data is entirely made up of speeches, questions, responses, press releases, tweets and Facebook posts related to the effects on refugee migration due to Afghan conflict. The same keywords as above were taken into consideration while retrieving the data. Just to be on the safe side, every tweet and facebook post for the given period of time was read carefully in order to not miss anything important. The process was time consuming but it increased my satisfaction level. The lengthy time period from January 2008 to February 2020 allows reflection on their perceptions about refugees taking into account major incidents that shaped the refugee policies over time. Facebook started to become popular among public in 2008 and 2009 while twitter started to become popular in 2010 (Dawn, 2011, Feb 22). Parliamentarians and their political parties started to become active as well on social media and public started to follow them on social media. Social media sites are used by military officials and politicians to make official statements especially twitter. (Jahangir, 2019, May 13). For the purpose of analysis, only the relevant FB posts related to any aspect of refugees were included. Facebook posts that were not directly related to Afghan refugees were excluded from the analysis. After retrieving all the posts associated with Afghan refugee from previously mentioned facebook sources, content analysis was applied to code, analyze and categorize the posts. Same method was applied to tweets. Tweets related to any aspect of refugees were included and those tweets were excluded that did not relate to Afghan refugees. Just like content analysis was applied to facebook posts, it was applied to tweets as well. The active tweeter accounts tweeted 20 to 25 tweets per month while active Facebook pages posted 30 to 35 times per month (general tweets and posts). Since major incidents like terror attacks and forceful repatriation of refugees presented an opportunity to study classic frames and interpretations of refugee issues, the frames employed before and after those events provided insight into the modifications of Pakistan's interpretations of refugee policy. The study also aimed to look at changes in framing over time.

3.3. Framing

Framing analysis was used to identify the main approach in the data analyzed. Framing depends on selection and salience. Selecting targeted data from recognized reality and presenting in a way that makes it appear salient to the audience. It is composed of the presenter, audience, information, and culture (Entman, 1993, pp. 51-58). Similar to the findings of the researches, the role of framing in media and political communication shows how stressing particular events while ignoring politically expedient aspects draws contrasting reactions from the public. A modern day example is the portrayal of Iraq invasion of United States by the western media as a justified invasion.

To determine the primary frames and variables, first, I read through a random sample from my dataset, and pulled out the primary themes and narratives I could identify. Next, I informed my frame selection by examining what other scholars had identified as the primary frames used in regards to refugees. This information came from my literature review, and resulted in identifying and substantiating frames. The positive frames used in my study that I took from the literature were Von Gorp's (2005, pp.485–508) victim frame, Semetko and Valkenburg's (2000, pp. 93-109) morality frame that identifies morality on the basis of religious, cultural and moral ways of behavior and Guest's (2018, p.30) international obligation frame. Negative frames taken into account were Van Gorp's (2005, pp.485–508) intruder frame that caters to security, economy and identity threat. Similarly, economic threat frames used by Haynes, Breen and Devereux in 2005, Semetko and Valkenburg in 2000, De Lange and d'Haenens in 2001 were used while analyzing the data. New frame that was identified that was not taken from literature was dignified repatriation frame. I investigated the most recurring phrases and terms in the body and chose those that were significantly associated with the issues surrounding the crisis and my chosen frames; the goal of this step was to identify a series of phrases and terms that are associated directly to the subject and assessed it further if and how those terms and phrases are utilized when combined with each other in internally coherent frames.

The study uses directed content analysis, it is directed by the existing literature but at the same time also enabled me to develop new codes through open coding approach. To develop the coding, I independently read through the speeches, and identified the most prevalent themes supporting or opposing refugee integration, how refugees were depicted, how Pakistan was seen in relation, and how the government should respond specifically to the Afghan refugee crisis. Texts that could not be classified with the initial coding scheme have been assigned a new code. This allows furthering existing theory that is insufficient, aligned to the purpose of my research. The purpose of a directed approach to content analysis is to verify or further conceptually a theory. Existing theory helps focus and indicates variables of interest, helping the process to determine initial coding or relationships between codes' description.



Graph 1: Frames used in the data analysis

3.4.Limitations

The research does not cover how local-level understandings may differ from national-level criticism. Other than that, this research is limited with recorded data and misses unrecorded communication. Some politicians who spoke extensively in Parliamentary sessions regarding refugees do not have twitter/Facebook accounts. Few other politicians and ministry of SAFRON do have accounts but are not active twitter and facebook users. Except PPP, PTI and MQM, other political parties websites did not


actively post press releases, BNP does not even has a website. Less than 15 tweets/posts in half a year. Still, this research will provide a basis for further analyzing frames that were not necessarily discussed in previous studies and might help in developing theories related to forced immigration outside Western regions.



CHAPTER 4

4. DISCUSSION

Three macro-frames, emerged from my analysis. First, positive frame that depicted Afghan refugees in a compassionate, human interest and victimized frame. Second, the “negative frames” – addressed refugees as security threats, identity threats and economic burdens. Thirdly, ‘dignified repatriation’ frame was present, which included sending back refugees voluntarily and in a dignified way. This frame is peculiar to the case of Pakistan and appears as a new frame which does not exist in the available literature. The following pie chart gives us visual representation of the frames mentioned above. Dignified repatriation frame is the most prominent frame followed by negative and positive frame respectively as shown in piechart 1.



Piechart 1: Positive, negative and dignified repatriation frames.

Humanitarian frame, religious and ethnic brotherhood frame, victim frame, and international obligation frame appeared as subframes under the positive main frame. Humanitarian frame encompassed discussion of compassion and humanitarian duty to protect and shelter refugees. It included viewing the refugees as fellow human beings in need and worthy of respect and care. For example, when Alan Kurdi's picture got attention throughout the world, Imran Khan spoke out on inhumane treatment of Syrian Refugees, *"....humanity should always be first. Pakistan opened its doors to refugees even with such limitations of resources; the world must become more humane to the pain of other human beings. It is a step towards finding a new way to peace."* (Imran Khan, 2015, September 5). Religious and ethnic brotherhood included discussion on taking care of refugees on the basis of Muslim brotherhood as Muslims all around the world are each other's brothers irrespective of physical borders. The concept of Muslim Ummah is very important in Islam as it emphasizes on helping fellow Muslim in need. PTI Senator during a debate on providing citizenship to Pakistani born Afghan refugees said, *".....for the sake of muslim ummah, being muslim its our responsibility to take care of fellow muslims. Anyone where he is born in the son/daughter of that soil"* (Khan, 2018, October 03). Ethnic brotherhood shed light to Afghan refugees' close ethnic and cultural proximity to Pakhtun people of Pakistan especially those who are living near the border with Afghanistan. It included sharing similar language and having strong tribal relations. E.g. Shah Jee Gul Afridi, member of National Assembly (MNA) condemning the terror attack on Government Hospital in Quetta that killed more than 70 people in 2016 said during National Assembly session, *"We are lucky that we have got a neighbor which has the same traditions. Afghan refugees have been in Pakistan for over 30 years, we should be kind towards them"* (Afridi, 2016, August 08). Victim frame encompassed representations of refugees as lacking in agency, hapless, silent, or helpless victims in need of protection and emotionalized compassion towards refugees. It also included care for the plight of refugees and in dire need of Pakistan's help. E.g. Senator and founder of Qaumi Watan Party (QWP) Sherpao during a Senate debate on repatriation of refugees after Peshawer School Attack while referring to refugees said *"poor humans looking for a homeland"* and it was Pakistan's duty take care of them. (Sherpao, 2015, December 17). International obligations frame focused on discussion of international treaties related to refugees that Pakistan is a part of, international expectations and obligations for Pakistani engagement as well as to what degree

international legal instruments limits the actions of policy makers of Pakistan at national level. For example, Mr. Jamal during parliamentary debate on repatriation of Afghan refugees after Peshawer School attack said that Pakistan being a signatory to the UN laws on refugees and international human rights, cannot forcibly expel the refugees from its territory (Jamal, 2016, August 15).

Under the umbrella of negative macro frame, there were four sub frames. These were the dehumanized frame, security threat frame, economic cost frame and ethnic/sectarian threat frame. Dehumanized frame talked about refugees in a dehumanized manner. The language often used imagery relating to outer space creatures like “*aliens*” as well as relating immigrants to diseases and epidemic. One of the main features of this frame was dehumanizing refugees by identifying them with anonymous numbers. E.g Mr.Tahir from PMLn asked the relevant minister in parliament when is this *waba* (epidemic) going to go back? reffering to refugees as epidemic. (Tahir, 2008, November 12). Security threat frame provided an insight on security issues and threats arising from refugees. Especially focusing on terror attacks on schools, hospitals, military establishments and mosques. E.g. Mr. Ahmed from MQM during parliamemtary debate on demolition of Afghan settlements in the outskirts of Islamabad after Peshawer School attack favoured the demolition. The Afghan settlements, according to Mr. Ahmed, were mere centres of crime, drugs and weapons (Ahmed, 2015, July 31). Economic cost frame dealt with representation of refugees as burden on Pakistan’s economy, dealt with importance of taking care of Pakistani citizens first and then refugees, which is also called priority of compatriots. E.g Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr.Khan during his speech in National Assembly emphasized on repatriation of Afghan refugees as soon as possible as they “*creating economic problems*” (Khan, 2009, November 11). Ethnic and sectarian threat frame included discussions on ethnic and sectarian threats arising from refugees. Pakistan has four distinctive ethnicities - Balochi, Pashtun, Sindhi and Punjabi. Majority of Afghan refugees belong to the Pashtun ethnicity – opening grounds for feelings of being threatened among ethnicities other than the Pashtun one. E.g Balochistan National Party (BNP) on its facebook page wrote, because of “*Afghan immigrants*”, “*Baloch nation is converting into minority*” (Balochistan National Party, 2016, February 19).

Third macro frame that emerged in my studies is dignified repatriation frame. As indicated in the beginning of my discussion, this is not seen in the literature available on Western cases. During my research, I had not come across a framework that caters to dignified repatriation when it comes to politicians speeches in the West. Pakistani case, however, encompassed discussion on the lack of capacity to accommodate refugees after 40 years of hosting them, and strain on social services. This included views that Pakistan needs to repatriate refugees as soon as possible but in dignified manner. e.g Minister of SAFRON while replying to a question on when refugees are going back home said, “*Repatriation can not be done forcefully, you can not forcefully expel your guest. But Pakistan wants voluntary repatriation*” (Baloch, 2013, August 16).

4.1 Explaining Reasons Behind Positive Frames

Positive frame was seen among several politicians both inside and outside the Parliament. Most of them belong from current ruling party Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), Pashtun ethnic political parties and conservative Islamic political parties. PTI being a centrist Populist Party which believes in an Islamic welfare state has emphasized on making Pakistan like ‘Medina’ in which refugees are guests that need to be taken care of. Ethnic Pashtun political parties and independent candidates who belong from Pashtun ethnicity share ethnic bond with Afghan refugees who mostly belong from the same ethnicity. Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Fazal-ur-Rehman (JUI-f), an Islamic conservative rightest Sunni party that believes in Islamic brotherhood and need to help fellow Muslim brothers when in need irrespective of geographical boundaries.

Humanitarian frame was seen prominent in PTI. During PTI’s tenure in the KPK province (2013-present), which accommodates majority of Afghan refugees (UNHCR, 2016), PTI’s leader Imran Khan adopted a pattern of emphasizing the humanitarian treatment of refugees even in the times when mainstream political parties blamed Afghan refugees for horrifying terror attacks and were in favor of repatriation as soon as possible. After horrible school attack in Peshawar 2014 where more than 100 children got killed and few Afghan refugee suspects were put behind the bars, resentment of

public and mainstream political parties towards Afghan refugees increased. Refugee harassment by the hands of police and law enforcement agencies became unbearable and refugees started to leave Pakistan although exact figures are not available. The harassment included unreasonable extortion, intimidation and detention of refugees by police to the extent that they fear for their life (Gossman, 2015). PTI's leader went on to social media and urged the government and people to not treat these refugees as lesser human beings. *"I urge the KP government and people of KP to treat Afghan refugees with dignity and respect as people only leave their homes in desperate circumstances. It has been the tradition of Pukhtuns to treat those who come to them with kindness & respect. This tradition must be upheld by KP govt"* (Imran Khan, 2016, July 23). One of the most common ways in which PTI politicians used this category was to assert the humanitarian side of the issue, mentioning 'we' and 'must' to show their support and care. This was shown in this extract taken from PTI leader and current Prime Minister Imran Khan's meeting with Afghan refugee elders, he put emphasis on ending harassment of Afghan refugees with the following words: *"We must realize no one leaves their homes voluntarily. We have extended hospitality to the Afghan refugees for 3 decades. Their harassment over the last 3 months must stop immediately"* (Imran Khan, 2016, August 12). Khan underlined the primary responsibility of Pakistani people by using words like 'no one'.

According to Pomerantz (1986), statements like these gauge the rightness and wrongness of the behavior morally, in the above case concluding that actions of refugees are reaction to critical conditions as 'no one' would leave their home otherwise. The statement includes 'we' in relation to the moral duty to help fellow humans. It implies the innate human characteristics 'need to survive' and 'moral duty to help' proposing that the ones who flee from danger and the ones who provide shelter for the former ones shows commonness with regards to collective identity as human beings. Through such statements that discuss about the humanitarian crises nature, Khan understands the response of refugees towards severe conditions and an undeniable urge to help hence making the refugees case worthy of maximum attention. Similar kind of sentiment is shared by Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PMAP) and Awami National Party (ANP). Both the parties are ethnically Pashtun parties and share tribal relations with the Afghan Pashtuns and majority of Afghan refugees in Pakistan are ethnically Pashtuns. ' The issue of harassment of Afghan Refugees was raised by them in parliament on various

occasions. For example, Senator Kakar from PMAP, referring to the harassment of refugees in Baluchistan and Punjab province, said that the behavior towards the Afghan Refugees is inappropriate ‘*namunasib*’ and derogatory ‘*tazheek amaiz*’ (Kakar, 2016, October 03). ANP senator Ms. Sitara Ayaz raised her concern regarding blockage of Proof of Registration (PoR) cards of Afghan refugees by Pakistani government after deadly Taliban attack in school in Peshawar in December 2014 (Khan, 2015, February 25). Referring to blocking of Proof of Registration (PoR) cards of the refugees, Ms Ayaz said that blocking of these cards especially, those belonging to the Afghan refugees. in such huge number is hugely unfair. She further said that such treatment of refugees is unfair as if they are not worthy of respect and just because some of them have been associated with criminal agents does not mean each and every one of the millions of these human beings is a terrorist (Ayaz, 2015, April 14).

In 2017, Pak-afghan Torkham border was closed after involvement of militants based in Afghanistan in a series of terror attacks that took place in Pakistan. Torkham border is the major border crossing between Afghanistan and Torkham, Pakistani city. Due to this, a large number of Afghan refugees were stranded on both sides of the border further aggravating their pain. PTI referred to the closure of border as ‘*humanitarian crisis*’ and urged Pakistani Government to allow refugees with necessary documents to cross the border (Imran Khan, 2017, March 5). PTI has always been empathetic and compassionate towards Afghan refugees in its speeches and also in its actions e.g. From vaccinating refugee children free of cost against polio virus (Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, 2019a) to allowing free of cost cancer treatment of refugees in Khan’s hospital and allowing refugees to open bank accounts during its government (Bond, 2020). PTI is ruling Khyber Pakhtun Khwa (KPK) since 2013 and has always applauded the empathy of KPK people for giving space to refugees in their homes. E.g Imran Khan tweeted, “*That is 3 million refugees in smallest province. Hats off to the people of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) for accommodating them, giving them space in homes*”- (PTI, 2015, January 23). On finding explosives in different KPK areas after the deadly school attack in Peshawar in 2014 (Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, 2015), Khan did not blame Afghan refugees. Instead, the PM said he will do everything to make the area more secure. Whenever Mr.Khan condemned terror attack especially the school attack, he did not point his fingers on refugees, instead ensured full support to eradicate terrorism and asked people of KPK to show more patience as shown in this tweet: “*I request*

people in KP to show a little more patience as situation in Afghanistan is still not favorable for refugees to return” (PTI, 2015, December 13).

Pakistan Tehrik e Insaf (PTI) is a centrist political party with a populist approach. The PTI claims to promote egalitarian Islamic democracy. Unlike the populist parties of the West, this party is embracing immigrants and calls them as brothers/sisters in need and attributes amoral/ethical duty to Pakistani people to support those brothers/sisters in need.

In Positive frame, one of the sub frame that appears in the documents was Islamic and ethnic brotherhood which is seen in politicians belonging to PTI, Islamic conservative parties and belonging from Pakhtun ethnicity. The common ideology among them is they give more importance to religious and ethnic brotherhood than a nationhood limited by geographical borders and a secular understanding of nationalism. Shehryar Afridi from PTI, minister of SAFRON celebrated 40 years of hosting Afghan refugees on his Facebook page (Shehryar Khan Afridi, 2019, May 29). Afridi said that Pakistan has kept refugees for 40 years as brothers, they are living in Pakistan and applauded it for hosting the refugees with *‘wide open arms’* emphasized that Afghan refugees and Pakistan share ties *‘beyond the borders’*. *‘Beyond the borders’* indicate religious, cultural and ethnic similarity. He discussed on Pakistani values and Pakistan’s religious character and history. Such kind of messages linking Pakistan with a glorified Islamic history and a proud moral tradition were found in other political parties as well. When Imran Khan came to power, he emphasized on making Pakistan similar to *‘riyasat-e-madina’* which means *‘state of Madina’* and welcoming refugees warmly and treating them in the same way *‘ansar’* in Madina treated *‘muhajireen’* who migrated from Mecca. This event is very important Islamic history as it promotes brotherhood and helping each other in need. It is reflected by the current Prime Minister Imran Khan’s tweet during the refugee summit in Pakistan which was attended by UN secretary general Antonio Guterres where PM said, *“When Prophet Muhammad SAWW and his companions migrated from Makkah to Madina, the relationship between the hosts of Madina and the refugees from Makkah was exemplary. And it has stayed in Muslim psyche for all these years”* (PTI, 2020, February 17). Mr. PM continued in next tweet and said, *“The reason why I feel the relationship between Pakistan and Afghan refugees is because of our Prophet Muhammad”* (PTI, 2020, February 17). PTI politicians

emphasized the importance of providing refuge and Khan in 2018 even issued a statement in media on granting citizenship to Afghan refugees who were born in Pakistan which was backed by Jamat-e-Islami and Pashtun ethnic party Awami National Party (ANP) while opposition parties criticized heavily of the government's stance (Khan, 2018). When a Taliban suicide bomber attacked Government Hospital in Quetta that killed more than 70 people in 2016, Shah Jee Gul Afridi who is an independent candidate and comes from Pashtun background condemned the terror attack in National Asembly and said that Pakistanis "*blame afghan refugees for the terror attacks*" without evidence. He further said that such kinds of statements are harmful for Pak-Afghan relations and added "*Pakistan should not forget that it considers Afghanistan its fifth province*" and "*We are lucky that we have got a neighbor which has the same religion and traditions. we should be kind towards them*" (Afridi, 2016, August 08). During the same session, Mr. Sherpao who belongs from Pashtun ethnicity and is leader of Qaumi Wata Party (QWP) condemning the terror attack said similar things said by Mr. Afridi. Mr. Sherpao said that whenever a terror incident happens, without proper investigation the "*blame is deflected towards Afghan refugees*". Mr. Sherpao further added that full proof investigation is not done when such incidents happen and before blaming innocent refugees, and suggested that the government should carry out proper investigation before blaming it on refugees (Sherpao, 2016, August 08). Mr. Jamal who belongs from Pashtun ethnicity and an independent candidate adding to Mr. Sherpao's statement said, "*....we have extended hospitality to Afghan refugees for the past thirty five years, we should not ruin Pakistan's impression that refugees hold*", Mr. Jamal further added that such kind of mindset about refugees is "*not good for Pak-Afghan relations*" (Jamal, 2016, August 15).

After Taliban attacked on Peshawar school in December 2014 that killed 144 people including students and teachers, government (PMLN) started crackdown on Afghan refugee settlements called Kachi Abaadi under National Action Plan (The News International, 2015a). Under this plan, Afghan refugee slums in the outskirts of Islamabad were bulldozed. Debate in the parliament took place regarding the demolition of a *Kachi Abaadi* in Islamabad on orders of the Supreme Court of Pakistan (Gillani, 2015). Only few parties criticized the government's move. Pakhtun Khwah Awami Milli Party was one of them. The party believes in standing up for Pakhtuns and that includes supporting Afghan refugees. Mr. Abdul Qahar Khan Wadan who belongs to Pakhtun

Khwah Awami Milli Party stated that the word Afghan is written in the ethnicity column of all the Pashtuns living in KPK. According to Wadan, this denounces such identity and associates it with terrorism is synonymous to disrespecting all those people who belong to it, including the residents of Pakistan (Wadan, 2015, July 31).

Next sub frame of humanitarian frame is victim frame. It is seen among the speeches of parliamentarians belonging from PTI, and parliamentarians who belong from Pashtoon background. In 2019, PTI's government hosted a huge event celebrating 40 years of hosting Afghan refugees. Shehryar Afridi from PTI's gave speech on the occasion holds victim frame. It encompassed emotionalized compassion towards refugees; generally compassionate view of the refugees' stories and situations. He emphasized on educating refugees as they are '*our*' (includes every Pakistani) brothers and sisters in need and stressed on making the refugees '*feel home*'. He sympathized with them for being innocent victims, a fate that was chosen for them, an unfortunate one (Shehryar Khan Afridi, 2019, May 29). Following the Peshawer school attack, refugee harassment by the hands of police became unbearable to the extent that Afghan refugee women raised their voices so Sherry Rehman from PPP in 2016 moved calling attention notice in senate on the problems being faced by women Afghan refugees. She pointed out the illegal arrest of husbands of Afghan refugee women and issues these women are facing because of that and made sure the senate took notice of it. She talked about harassment of refugees at the hands of police and asked the government to look into the matter (Senator Sherry Rehman, 2016, September 28).

After the Peshawar school attack, government (PMLN) decided to demolish Afghan refugee settlements in the outskirts of Islamabad called Kachi Abadi in 2015 (The News International, 2015). Debate on demolishing Kachi Abadi took place in Parliament. During the debate, Arif Alvi from PTI (the current President of Pakistan) informed the house about the serious violation of human rights is taking place in disguise of maintaining law and order and demolishing allegedly illegal settlements of the poor while turning a blind eye to the allegedly illegal societies of the rich (Alvi, 2015, July 31). Aftab Ahmed Khan Sherpao, founder of Quami Watan Party, a center Pashtun nationalist political party, in 2016 during his speech in the parliament condemned terror attack on a group of lawyers in Baluchistan that killed 70 people (Aljazeera, 2016) came to refugees rescue when most of the parliamentarians. He said "... *The government has*

major issue of deflecting whenever incidents like Peshawar school attack happen. When it happened, government blamed it on Afghan refugees even before getting results of investigation....”(Sherpao, 2016, August 08). When Mr. Naveed Qamar from PPP (center left social democratic party) asked during debate on Afghan refugees he argued that Pakistan needs to reconcile with the fact that the Afghan Refugees are to stay forever there in Pakistan (Kaira, 2015, December 17). Mr Sherpao, founder of QWP once again came to the rescue of the plight of these refugees looking for a homeland. He asserted that Pakistan must adopt a mature policy in this regard, keeping in view that even those refugees who are forcibly expelled will return if conditions in Afghanistan are not livable. He concluded his remark on this by pointing toward an interesting fact that there are some Afghan Refugees who were born in Pakistan and have never even seen Afghanistan till now. His compassion and care for the plight of refugees reflects his party's values -standing up for fellow Pashtuns and his tribe and the party's moral duty to take care of the refugees. He said, "... *When there was a bomb blast in Karachi, the knee-jerk reaction was to blame it on RAW. Similarly, when catastrophe struck the APS, Afghan Refugees were blamed instantly for it...*" (Sherpao, 2015, December 17). Mr Sherpao was trying to impress the important point that blaming Afghan Refugees for terrorist attacks in Pakistan is not only disrespectful and dehumanizing in its own character but also damaging in regard to solving the actual problem. He understood that the Afghan Refugees, have to eventually go back. But he maintained that they should not be kicked out without even letting them pack their belongings. At the least, they should be allowed to wrap up their businesses, their kids allowed to finish their schools, and they be allowed to say goodbye to their loved ones. Or they would remember us (Pakistan) in the end as their spiteful enemies and not as their incredible hosts we (Pakistan) have been for the past so many years.

Next sub frame is international obligation frame. It was seen common among parliamentarians belonging to PMLn and Quami Watan Party which is a center left Pashtun nationalist political party. Mr. Abdul Qadir Baloch from PMLn in 2013, the then minister of SAFRON when fellow parliamentarian during National Assembly's (NA) session asked about the refugee repatriation, he said, "*Pakistan has agreed for voluntary repatriation of Afghan refugees, it can not forcefully expel the refugees, we have signed the agreement, we can not use force in any case*" (Baloch, 2013, August 16). Mr. Baloch responded in a way that stresses on fulfilling the responsibility to take

care of refugees because of the international obligations towards these refugees that Pakistan is part of. Being part of the ruling party, it was part of the party's manifesto to match the rhetoric of Pakistani identity as compassionate, actively engaged in the international community and take on the responsibility of the treaties that Pakistan was part of. Similarly, during the National Assembly session following the deadly Peshawer school attack, Quami Watan Party in 2015 while condemning the incident pointed out that it is inhumane to treat all the refugees as if they were terrorists and should not be expelled forcefully. The party leader said, "... *The status of 'refugee' is given to them by UN Charter for genuine reasons and Pakistan is a signatory of the Charter which means refugees are our responsibility and we need to fulfill our responsibility...*" (Sherpao, 2015, January 07). Mr. Sherpao, founder of Quami Watan Party, is a center left Pashtun nationalist political party, was able to adopt a rational approach toward the problem. He began by identifying the magnitude of the issue of the Afghan Refugees, considering their numbers and the history behind the migration. He pointed out toward the important fact that millions of Afghan Refugees have been living with the local population in various parts of the country since more than three decades and, apart from a few occasional mishaps, this relationship has been remarkably peaceful and even productive at times. Therefore, putting the entire onus of the menace of terrorism, in general, and that of the APS Attack, in particular, on these refugees is hugely unfair according to him. Mr. Sherpao maintained that that they have earned their refugee status here only because the Government of Pakistan is a signatory to the UN Charter and, therefore, it cannot just expel all the refugees from its territory at its mere whim. According to Sherpao, Pakistan must act decisively against the criminal agents that have penetrated the ranks of these refugees, and also must formulate a complete road-map for their ultimate return to their homeland. But it cannot just use them as a "smoke-screen", to hide its own failures in intelligence and investigation..Mr. Sherpao's compassionate tone towards refugees tells a lot about what his party stands for:standing up for fellow pashtuns and his tribe. Mr. Sherpao's stance on refugees reflect a lot about his party's moral duty to take care of the refugees and fulfill international obligations. Syed Ghazi Gulab Jamal who is an independent candidate belonging from Pashun ethnicity drew National Assembly's attention towards the drawbacks of forceful repatriation of refugeesThe people, Mr. Jamal said, are not very keen on the way the refugees are being sent back to Afghanistan forcefully. Refugees believe that Pakistan

hosted them graciously for more than three decades. By forcing them out in not such a graceful manner will only ruin the years of effort we (Pakistan) have put in this regard. Mr.. Jamal also maintained that *“being a signatory to the UN laws on refugees and international human rights. Pakistan cannot forcibly expel the refugees from its territory”* (Jamal, 2016, August 15). Pakistan signed the tripartite agreement in 2003 with UNHCR and Government of Afghanistan on voluntarily repatriation (UNHCR, 2003). The agreement provides an operational and legal framework for voluntary return of refugees. According to the 1996 UNHCR guidelines for voluntary repatriation, the conditions in the home country must be conducive for the safe return of refugees (UNHCR, 1996).

Similarly, after the harassment stories of Afghan refugees at the hands of police came to surface, Imran Khan met Afghan refugee elders in 2016 and put emphasis on the obligation to fulfill Pakistan’s duty to international refugee conventions that Pakistan is part of by saying, *“International conventions make clear states cannot simply force refugees to return”* (Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, 2016, August 12).

If we look at the reasons as to why these parties act this way towards refugees or the way they see the refugees, one way to look at it is through the lens of constructivism. This study verifies earlier studies on constructivism done by (Price and Reus-Smit, 1998, pp. 259-294) who claim that preferences and interests are constructed socially. Data analysis for this research show that different parties frame refugees differently. As we have noticed above that most of the parliamentarians who belong to PTI or Pashtun community or Pashtun political parties or conservative Islamic parties are welcoming towards Afghan refugees because of their political ideologies. PTI is a center Islamic democratic party, which aims to make Pakistan similar to ‘Medina’ and where refugees are treated as guests and taken care of. It believes in Islamic brotherhood and extending support who need it. It also believes in fulfilling international obligations towards Afghan refugees that Pakistan is part of (Shehryar Khan Afridi. 2019, May 20). JUI, an Islamic conservative party believes in turning Pakistan into a Sharia state where Afghan refugees are treated as their fellow Muslim brothers who share the same religion and culture. As Muslims, it is important to take care of fellow Muslims who are in need. Independent candidates like Syed Ghazi Gulab Jamal and Shah Jee Gul Afridi who

belong to Pashtun ethnicity believe in fighting for the rights of their fellow ethnic brothers like Afghan refugees.

Ethnic Pashtun parties like Quami Watan Party (QWP), Awami National Party (ANP) and the PakhtunKhwah Awami Milli Party (PKMAP) believe in standing up for their fellow Pashtuns. Because of the similar culture, language, religion and ethnic identity, it removes the social differences between them and the refugees. Refugees' beliefs and identities might not be seen as a threat to their security, culture, lifestyle and religion. Since this is the case, party leaders are being proactive, for example by taking political risks in observing Pakistani values, like solidarity and tolerance while adapting the structure that meets the needs of Afghan refugees. E.g. Imran Khan talked about granting citizenship to Afghan refugees born in Pakistan, offer free of cost cancer treatment to refugees in his hospital, opened schools in refugee camps (Shah Mahmood Qureshi, 2018) while ethnic Pashtun parties support Khan's efforts in trying to make Pakistan a more welcoming society and more inclusive. Offering new opportunities to this vulnerable group like allowing them to open bank accounts to help improve their business setups. Such opportunities might encourage refugees and give hope to them that they can improve their living conditions not just for themselves but for their families as well and in turn would help them to adapt an integrated lifestyle.

The other way to look at the reasons as to why these parties and government act this way towards refugees or the way they see the refugees is through institutionalism. Does framing change with change in institutional settings like parliamentary structures and social media? In parliamentary settings, due to the nature of its work, structured pattern is followed. That is the reason only limited number of issues e.g. issues that need immediate attention are debated on, because of the way parliamentary debates are structured ranges from hearings, debates, consultations, negotiations and committees. While on social media, politicians do not have to follow a structured pattern like in the parliamentary settings and can discuss whole lot of issues which might not plausibly be addressed in the parliament. This pattern was noticed when I was analyzing the data. Especially Baluchistan National Party (BNP) was very active on social media in raising ethnic and security threat concerns against Afghan refugees compared to when they were addressing their concerns in parliament. But, as far as

change in framing is concerned, there was no difference. The framing of the issue among political parties remained same irrespective of the change in institutional settings.

4.2 Explaining Reasons Behind Negative Frames

Coming towards the sub frames under the negative main frame, dehumanizing frame appeared as a significant pattern in the existing literature. Dehumanizing frame encompassed discussion of refugees in a dehumanized manner. The language often utilized imagery relating to outer space creatures; “aliens”, and related them to a disease “epidemic,”. One of the main features of this frame was dehumanizing refugees by identifying them only in anonymous circumstances and in numbers. Such dehumanizing frame associates immigrants with epidemics. For instance, in 2008, during question hour period in parliamentary session, Chaudhary Muhammad Barjees Tahir from PMLN (centre-right economic liberal political party) while inquiring about refugee repatriation date referred them as *waba* (epidemic), he asked the relevant minister when that “*epidemic*” would go back. Tahir further asked why these refugees were not going back to Afghanistan and what was stopping them from going back (Tahir, 2008, November 12). Similarly, during PPP’s government, a lot of forged passports were recovered from Afghan refugees who were caught on various international airports and were in possession of illegal drugs. It became a serious problem for Pakistani image which was already not good at international level due to terror attacks and security reasons. Rehman Malik from PPP (centre-left social democratic political party) who was Minister of Interior during PPP’s government when asked about investigation regarding providing illegal passports to refugees during a parliament session, he referred to them as ‘aliens’ and said they need to go back to their own country (Malik, 2009, March 05). Associating refugees with aliens means that he does not consider them human beings, as if the refugees are creatures from another planet. One aspect of these arguments is the extent to which refugees are ‘othered’ or ‘dehumanized’. It involves constructing an ‘us vs them’ mentality about people. In ‘dehumanization’, people are seen as devoid of human qualities (Haslam and Loughnan, 2014, pp. 399-423). It could be overt as observed above, when it comes to describing people as non-human categories, like ‘aliens or epidemic’ implying them as a threat to be defended against and which presents them as

threats that need to be defended against or associating them with ‘epidemic’ which needs to be eliminated (Lynn and Lea, 2003, pp. 425-452). Such dehumanization further leads to the argument that these immigrants do not deserve support as Lynn and Lea (2003) indicate.

Next sub-frame underneath exclusion frame is security threat frame. Security threat frame encompassed discussion on security issues and threats arising from refugees similar to Western cases. The security threat frame in Pakistan’s case can be seen similar in some ways to the criminal threat frame identified by Haynes, Breen, and Devereux (2005). The scholars characterize asylum seekers as a criminal element posing a threat to safety.

According to Dawn newspaper, Pakistan’s Immigration Bureau detected several cases of refugees (although the number of cases were not disclosed) possessing fake Pakistani passports and also received complaints from several Pakistani embassies regarding Afghan refugees possessing fake Pakistani passports (Dawn, 2003). Later some officers working in passport and National Identity Card (NIC) issuing offices were suspected of issuing fake NICs and Pakistani passports (Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2010). A parliamentarian asked the concerned minister regarding PPP government’s response towards the issue of forged passports being used by refugees, the minister Mr. Malik’s response was, *“We can not compromise on national security, the government will make sure to cancel any forged passports and ID’s possessed by Afghan refugees and foreigners.”* While talking about Afghan refugees in the same session Mr. Malik said, *“Most of the criminal activities are carried out by these refugees (Afghan) in the refugee camp like suicide jackets, gun culture posing security threat and our government (PPP) wants them to go back to Afghanistan”* (Malik, 2009, October 14). The forced immigrants are perceived as a threat and are associated with criminality, incapable of integration in the society and terrorism. In the debates, refugees were portrayed as a threat to ‘our’ way of life was present but did not refer to a particular example or a story. Mr. Malik’s tone was predominantly negative, linked refugees with security threats, terrorism, drug trade and smuggling. Refugees were seen as the cause of insecurity and unrest and is centered on the notion that they are terrorist travelers, criminals and drug smugglers. The PPP, a

leftist party, always held a firm stance against extremism, particularly since losing its leader Benazir Bhutto to a terrorist attack in December, 2007.

PPP and PMLn members were seen more inclined to use security threat frame, one of the main reasons that was observed was increase in terror attacks during their rule. They associated terrorism with Afghan refugees in their speeches. According to the Directorate of Prosecution Government of KPK, 300 Afghan refugees were arrested between 2014 and 2016 for alleged involvement in terror attacks, bombings and criminal activities (Khan, 2017). Bombing of the Islamabad Marriott Hotel in 2008 by Al-Qaeda resulted in the death of 53 people (Borka, 2008).

In 2008, twenty-eight suicide attacks occurred. As of 2009, Pakistan suffered 36 suicide bombing from January to July. According to the Pakistani Intelligence agency, Pakistan overtook Afghanistan and Iraq in suicide bomb deaths in 2008 (Mufti, 2008). This happened during PPP's government. PPP's leader Benazir Bhutto got killed in a terrorist attack in 2008 and Taliban claimed the responsibility (Business Standard, 2018).

During PMLn's government, tragic school terror attack took place in Peshawar in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province on December 2014. Seven heavily armed Taliban broke into an army public school in broad daylight shooting students and teachers mercilessly and killing 150 people, of whom 132 were students (BBC News, 2015). The martyrdom of 132 children and their teachers in the Army Public School marked a paradigm shift in the Pakistan's national policy on counter-terrorism and counter-extremism. Afghan refugees became the target of criticism and can be seen in the debate extracts below. PMLn, the ruling party at that time implemented National Action Plan to counter terrorism with the help of Pakistan army after thorough discussion in the parliament. Afghan refugee settlements called Kachi Abaadi in the outskirts of Islamabad were demolished without prior warning (The News International, 2015). During the debate on demolishing the settlements in National Assembly (NA), Mr Sajid Ahmed from MQM party was in favor of the demolition of this *Kachi Abaadi*. Mr. Ahmed maintained that the Kachi Abaadi housed criminal elements, alleging that such criminal elements also exist in the Afghan settlements in Karachi, where the Afghan Refugees resist law-enforcement agencies with arms whenever they come to deconstruct them. The Afghan settlements in Karachi, according to him, are

mere centers of crime, drugs and weapons. Mr. Ahmed urged that the December deadline for the return of the Afghan Refugees must not be extended, since Pakistan is entangled in its own myriad problems. (Ahmed, 2015, July 31). Followed by Mr Babar Nawaz Khan of PML-N who said that the arrival of Afghan Refugees in Pakistan has resulted in growth of crime and lawlessness (Khan, 2015, December 15). Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan of PMLn in 2016, the then Minister of Interior while addressing a fellow parliamentarian concern regarding repatriation of refugees said that Afghan refugees were handled with kindness and we took care of them as they were our brothers the way Islam has taught us. *“But now the situation has changed”*. He was referring to increase in terror attacks. He further added *“Terrorist and criminal elements have been found in those refugee camps and need to be looked at”* (Khan, 2016, August 15).

We can observe members of the PML-N, a right-center party trying to voice the overall national sentiment while being pragmatic about the approach on Afghan Refugees. Speeches of its actual members of the Cabinet, however, also reflect the paradigm shift in the narrative of the Pakistani state on the War on Terror. The speeches of Minister for Interior Chaudhary Nisar Ali Khan, are a testimonial to this. On another occasion during parliamentary debate, Minister for Interior Affairs, Rehman Malik of PPP said that these refugees in the refugee camp pose security threat. (Malik, 2009, November 13). Baloch ethnic parties like Baluchistan National Party (BNP) and Baluchistan Awami Party (BAP) have been framing their speeches on security narrative. Constant sectarian killings, forceful abductions, clashes between the militants and security forces have made the Baloch ethnic parties very territorial and instilled resentment towards federal government for ignoring their plight and these party members have lost their family members to terror attacks that were claimed by Lashkar-e-Jhangwi whose support comes from Afghan Taliban. For example, in 2016, senator Jamaldini from BNP lost his son in one of the terror attacks by Lashkar-e-Jhangui happened in Quetta (Aljazeera, 2016). Ethnic Baloch parties like BNP and Baluchistan Awami Party (BAP) believe that terrorists come to their province and find sympathy and protection among refugee population and carry out terror attacks on the citizens.

If we look at the Weiner's (1992) argument regarding importance of distinguishing the real threat from the perceived threat, regarding the concerns of Baloch parties we can observe that their fears are not perceived, they are real. With the

evidences of Pakistan Army recovering illegal weapons, explosives and detonators from the refugee camps in Baluchistan and arresting few refugee suspects from the camps for involvement in terror attacks and facilitating terrorists have made the Baloch political parties stronger in their negative stance towards refugees. As seen in one of the statements given to press by Anwaar-ul-Haq Kakar from BAP, “.... *we’ve got a huge Afghan refugee population in the province. These terrorists come into our country and find sympathizers among the refugee populations, in order to carry out attacks on our people and children*” (Aljazeera, 2016).

Security threat frame is seen common among press releases of Pakistan Army. Army started carrying out operations since 2001 against militancy (Khan, 2011) According to the reports published in 2012 by European Asylum Support Office (EASO, 2016, p.24) and UNHCR, Taliban recruit fighters from Afghan refugee camps and madrassas (UNHCR, 2012). Terror attacks intensified after the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) siege. It was Al Qaeda’s response to Pakistan’s alliance with US on war on terror and deadliest battle after 9/11. It was a confrontation battle between Pakistani government and Islamic militants in July 2007. The mosque was led by Islamic Militant Imams who openly supported Taliban. The confrontation killed more than 100 militants including Ghazi-Lal Masjid’s deputy Imam. In response, Al Qaeda’s leader Osama bin laden in an audio message, praised Ghazi and called him the ‘hero of Islam’ and at the same time declared jihad against military establishments all across Pakistan. Ghazi became a source of inspiration for the militants as following his footsteps, a suicide bomber, a teenager boy blew himself up inside the Pakistan Army elite commando unit called Zarrar company, a very high military security base just two months after the Red Mosque episode. Followed by fifteen suicide bombings in fifteen days from 14th July to 31st July. Since then, Pakistan has struggled with fundamentalist Islamic militancy (Marino, 2020). This lead to search operations in refugee camps. During their military operations, military officers discovered illegal possession of weapons and ammunition including explosives, mines and detonators in few Afghan refugee camps in Baluchistan. The army further caught some suspects who had links with Taliban. In one of the press releases issued by the army, Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) addressing a military conference in Germany said, “*Jihad is nothing but terrorism. Out of 131 attacks, 123 were master planned in Afghanistan. The refugees are being used by Haqqani network and other terrorist organizations, hence the refugees need to be*

repatriated” (ISPR, 2018). In 2018, during an intelligence and baseline overview, 8 illegal Afghan refugees were arrested for possessing illegal grenades, rockets and explosives. (ISPR, 2018d). In 2018, during telephonic call with Commander US Central Command (CENTCOM), General Joseph L. Votel on discussion over Pak-US security cooperation, COAS said, *”Return of Afghan Refugees is an essential prerequisite to deny any residual capacity to terrorists of all hue and color in Pakistan. Pakistan is strengthening border control unilaterally and it should be Kabul’s top priority as well. It should be bilateral to ensure peace in the region”* (ISPR, 2018e). The army carried out drone strikes in Hangu district in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province where Afghan refugee camps were located and later on issued a press release which stated *“.....left over terrorists easily morph into Afghan Refugees camps/complexes. Pakistan’s brotherly hospitality to peaceful Afghan Refugees must not be exploited by the terrorists hence we need repatriation of Afghan refugees as soon as possible”* (ISPR, 2018b). Because of terror attacks and security threats that Pakistan has faced over the years, Pakistan army has carried out various military operations in tribal areas against Taliban near Pak- Afghan border and these operations are still going on. The Army Public School attack on 16 December 2014 in Peshawar marked the pinnacle of the internal security threat posed to the state of Pakistan. Thus, whatever political debate that ensued in its aftermath was guided to a large extent by the preferences and the priorities of Pakistan Army. The establishment of military courts, supported even by anti-establishment parties such as PPP, demonstrates this fact. Pakistan Army stresses on the fact that Afghan refugees and their relatives resort to give refuge to fellowmen involved in terror activities. When these kind of statements come to surface with evidences and facts, it is hard to ignore.

Other than dehumanizing and security threat frames, economic cost frame appeared as another sub frame under the negative framings against Afghan refugees. Economic cost frame encompasses refugees as burden on Pakistan’s economy on the one hand and prioritizes compatriots on the other hand. The economic cost frame relates very much to the generic frames of economic consequences brought up in the literature review developed by Valkenburg (2000) and Haynes et. al.(2005).

Before going into the details of the frame, we need to look at the economic situation of Pakistan that might have contributed to the above mentioned frame.

Economic problems of Pakistan started growing worse after 2008 global economic crises. It impacted the country's merchandise trade negatively. Inflation remained high despite decrease in energy and food prices globally. It caused economic hardships for both urban and rural population in Pakistan. Under PPP's government, Pakistan needed 10-15 billion dollars to help stabilize the economy over the next few years (The Nation, 2009). IMF provided loan of worth 7.6 billion dollars (IMF, 2008). The then President of Pakistan visited China to request for loan (Perlez, 2008). It reminds readers of Weiner's argument mentioned in the literature review which says that a country that has limited financial capacity and high unemployment rate perceives migrants as a cause of their destabilized economy.

Keeping these factors in mind, the statements below reveal how official discourse interprets the Afghan refugee issue as a way of demonstrating its lack of capacity and economic power to national and international audiences. It was seen among speeches of politicians mostly belonging to PMLn and PPP. The costs and expenses of refugee services are often grouped in with this language. Shah Mehmood Qureshi of PPP and the then Foreign Minister when asked by a fellow parliamentarian in 2009 on why Pakistan has not signed 1951 Refugee Convention, he said, "*Pakistan does not have enough resources to provide free education to large influx of refugees neither it has enough economic capacity to provide jobs for the refugees*" (Qureshi, 2008, August 22). On another occasion during a parliamentary debate of whether Afghan refugees should be repatriated back or shall they be let to stay longer, another PPP parliamentarian, Najmuddin Khan who was the then Minister for States and Frontier Regions referred Afghan refugees as *bohj* (burden) on Pakistan's economy (Khan, 2008, November 12). According to such point of view, those refugees need to be repatriated because of negatively effecting economic, healthcare and education infrastructure. On another occasion during parliamentary debates, minister for Interior Rehman Malik of PPP said that these refugees are economic burdens and the Pakistani government wants them to go back to Afghanistan (Malik, 2011, October 14). Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan of PMLn in 2016, the then Minister of Interior while addressing a fellow parliamentarian concern that refugees has posed economic threat to Pakistan on which he agreed by saying "*Afghan refugee is a serious issue, no doubt*" (Khan, 2016, August 15). Similarly, Balochistan National Party (BNP) leader Mr. Mengal during a public address in Balochistan in 2015, he said "*Afghan refugees have become a burden on*

Balochistan's economy” (Balochistan National Party, 2015, May 14). He issued similar statement during a public gathering in 2016, referring to Afghan refugees said, “*These people are a burden on the economy of Baluchistan and have occupied all areas including the economic market*” (Balochistan National Party. 2016, July 4).

Another factor that can be noticed among PPP (center left, social democracy political party) and BNP's (Baloch ethnic political party) speeches is priority of compatriot. It claims that states are permitted and often morally required to give some measure of priority to the interests of citizens over non-citizens. When Imran Khan announced granting citizenship to Afghan refugees in 2018, the above mentioned parties asked the government to focus more on providing better care for the citizens and investing on them before granting citizenship to foreigners. Mr. Mengal, leader of BNP, opposed the idea of granting citizenship in one of the parliamentary debates on refugees. Mr. Mengal said that Pakistan should make a national policy where it can call itself ‘*orphanage*’ and give shelter to the ‘*orphans from all over the world*’ referred to refugees and immigrants as orphans, emphasized on how Balochi's are not given their due rights. According to Mr. Mengal, refugees are given priority over the natives. Mr. Mengal further said that this is national issue but that does not mean we Pakistanis put our national identity on stake for the sake of humanity. BNP an ethnic Baloch party believes that Balochi people should be prioritized over Afghan refugees because it is their right being citizens of Pakistan. Mr. Mengal during a public address said, “.... *there are not enough healthcare and economic resources for even Baloch people, how can we take care of Afghan refugees? First we need to provide resources to our people then comes ‘outsiders’*” (Balochistan National Party, 2018, September 20). The reason as to why ethnic Baloch parties react this way can be because Baluchistan having abundant natural resources, having the deep sea port called Gawadar port and covering almost 40% of total surface area of Pakistan remains poorest province of Pakistan (UNPO, 2013). Similarly, politicians from Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) are also of the same view. It is a secular center left political party that believes charity begins from home, the citizens should be taken care of first and then comes the refugees and can be seen among its member speeches. Hina Rabbani Khar of PPP during the parliament debate in 2018 on granting citizenship to Afghan refugees asked whether the state has met the responsibilities of its own people before granting citizenship to Afghan refugees (Khar, 2018). According to such point of view, Afghan refugees are not really citizens of

Pakistan and Pakistani citizens need attention first then refugees come later. Another PPP parliamentarian Nafeesa Shah said that she respects the humanitarian side of the decision, recognizes the rights of refugees but discussing citizenship is very different from humanitarian perspective. Miss Shah went on and asked, “*But what about the rights of natives, what about the rights of local communities.*” Miss. Shah further said that it is very insensitive of Prime Minister to speak about the rights of refugees and not recognizing the rights of its own people (Shah, 2018, September 25). Ethnic and sectarian threat frame is seen common among Balochistan National Party (BNP) politicians. The frame encompasses discussion on ethnic and sectarian threats arising from refugees. This seems to favor Weiner’s perspective discussed earlier in the literature review that claims immigrants who are not of the same ethnicity or religious beliefs are seen as a threat to society by government and its citizens (Weiner, 1992). Among Afghan refugees in Balochistan, Pashtun ethnicity is prominent (UNHCR, 2005).

Before going into details, it is important to mention little background about Balochistan. Baluchistan suffers from sectarian killings more than any other province. The seed of sectarian violence in Pakistan was sowed in 1980’s when former military dictator Zia-ul-haq formulated policies and legislation that favored orthodox version of Sunni Islam while ignoring other sects. From then onwards sectarian war between Shia and Sunni militant groups gained momentum (Adil, 2013, December 1). But right now the sectarian killings in Baluchistan are at the peak. (Asia Foundation. 2017, October). It became prominent in Baluchistan when Lashkar-e-Jhangui, a Sunni militant faction backed by Afghan Taliban (Siddiqi, 2015) started their operations in Baluchistan after Sindh and Punjab. Shias and Sunnis started to kill each other. Ethnic Baloch parties who already feel threatened by presence of non-Baloch ethnicities, with the news of involvement of refugees in terror attacks in Balochistan, the tone in their political speeches became harsher. The way BNP talked about Afghan refugees is observed to be harsher than the rest of the political parties mentioned in my research. This is because it is purely an ethnic Balochi party and aims to maintain Baloch as major ethnic group in Baluchistan. The party believes that that Afghan refugees have become ethnic and sectarian threat in Baluchistan province. BNP’s stance has remained same throughout the years both inside and outside the parliament. In 2015, BNP leader while addressing a public gathering in Baluchistan said that Afghan refugees are taking away ethnic

Balochis rights and sectarian conflict is increasing because of the refugees (Balochistan National Party, 2015, May 14). When Imran Khan, the current PM of Pakistan during an interview in media said that he wants to give citizenship to Afghan refugees who were born in Pakistan, BNP opposed this idea (Dawn, 2018). In protest, BNP's leader walked out of the session during a parliamentary debate on this issue in the presence of Prime Minister Imran Khan (Dawn, 2019, June 13).. Mr. Mengal protested the idea of granting citizenship on social media and said that Blochistan, "*is not a political orphanage for Afghan refugees, they should be sent back*" (Balochistan National Party, 2016c). Sardar Akhtar Mengal on social media said that Afghan refugees belonging to any race, language, sects should not be given Pakistani citizenship (Balochistan National Party, 2016d). This goes in line with Weiner's statement in the literature review regarding absence of ethnic affinity as one of the reasons of rejecting migrants (1992). Because of the increasing population of Afghan refugees, native Balochi people are becoming a minority which is an ethnic threat. We can notice from his speeches the construction of 'us' versus 'them' and citizens need protection from threatening outsiders. They are portrayed as a threat to Balochi culture, values and social cohesion. The sentence, *Baluchistan is not a political orphanage* has been mentioned multiple times in the party's Facebook posts (Balochistan National Party, 2016, 2016a, 2016b).

Now applying constructivists approach to understand why political parties mentioned above i.e. PPP, PMLn and BNP frame refugees in their speeches negatively. As observed in the literature, Constructivists claim that norms, practices and ideas in international relations are constructed socially. Similarly, realities on refugees depends on how the policy makers of the refugee receiving state perceives and its the cultural and national identity. As mentioned earlier, terror attacks started to gain momentum when PPP, a leftist party took over the government after nine years of military dictatorship in 2008. PPP lost its leader Benazir Bhutto in a terror attack so it always held a firm stance against extremism. With evidence of involvement of Afghan refugees, party members emphasized on repatriation of refugees. In addition, Pakistan's economy started to worsen after 2008 global economic crises Similarly, when PMLn came to power in 2013, the rate of terror attacks were still high. The right-center party's ideology at the time was driven by security compulsions to state's security needs. Evidence of involvement of Afghan refugees in few terror attacks added more concern and the party members during their speeches stressed more on repatriation of refugees. BNP is a

Baloch ethnic party that aims to maintain Baloch as major ethnicity in Baluchistan province. The parties mentioned above stress more on welfare of the citizens first and refugees later. Therefore, projecting a communitarian view in their speeches. They maintain that their resources are decreased due to the influx of Afghan refugees. The most critical point is that these politicians perceive the refugees as danger to their nationality and ethnicity. Refugees have been perceived as ‘others’ that are threatening to the community. They are seen as problematical as they have unique norms and values which are different to those of host nation. Such perceptions influenced the ruling party’s policies. Far off the economic and demographic situations, the preceding experiences of terror attacks mostly carried out by Taliban has influenced these political parties and Pak Army’s stance and measures concerning Afghan refugees. Hence, under such circumstances it is strenuous for afghan refugees to acquire work and live in safe environment.

Another way to look at the reasons as to why these parties, government and Pak army act this way towards refugees or the way they see the refugees is through institutionalism. Applying this approach to my research and considering the above mentioned political parties and Pak army as institutions and politicians as an actors, one can say that institutions are used by actors to sustain the fundamental policies in the course of studied period against migrants.

The study has presented that even though refugee crises topic gained more coverage in parliamentary debates after Peshawar school attack in Dec 2014, there was no unexpected climax in PMLn’ attitude regarding migrants which at that time was the ruling party. Instead, their unwillingness to keep refugees longer became more pronounced after the attack. PMLn implemented National Action Plan to ensure Pakistan’s secure future and to get rid of terrorism. It affected Afghan refugees heavily. Their settlements were destroyed, police harassed refugees to the extent that so that they would fear for their lives and went back to Afghanistan (Ali, 2016; Deutsche Welle, 2016). This stance was supported by PPP and BNP. During PPP’s government, “.....In 2007, over 0.203 million unregistered Afghans were repatriated during the grace period and 3.551 million registered Afghan Refugees have been repatriated on voluntary basis till 2008.” narrated by the minister of SAFRON in one of the parliamentary debates (Khan, 2009, January 15). Similarly, an increase in terror

attacks forced government and Pak army to exercise strict control on Pak-Afghan border (Shams, 2017).

Another aspect of institutionalism according to (Peters 1998), is that institutions have constraining effect on its actors. It is understandable that when it comes to policies related to asylum and forced migration, Pakistani lawmakers have been repeatedly repressed by international institutions. The question is to what magnitude international legal instruments coerce the acts of policy makers of Pakistani. Liberal theorists maintain that international human rights agreements contains international principles and norms that limit the power and sovereignty of countries (Rawls, 1971 & Ruggie, 1982). Pakistan is a part of 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political and Pakistan has also signed 1984 Convention against torture and other *“cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which prohibits refoulement of anyone in instances where there is a substantial risk that the individual will be tortured”*(The UN, 1984). Such International legal instruments contain a variety of recognized international legal clauses that influence state policies on forced migration. Up against the conditions of international institutions such as the UNHCR and Amnesty International, which notice the constancy of national policies of these authorities and can pressurize if needed including Pakistan. They are repeatedly subjected to such influences as these countries are worried about the public opinion nationally and their international image (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, 1999), including Pakistan. Hence, PPP and PMLn despite the negative attitude towards Afghan refugees were not able to send the refugees back forcefully during their respective governments because of their commitment to international obligations that discourages forced refugee repatriation.

4.3 Explaining Reasons Behind Dignified Repatriation Frame

Next frame that I have noticed is dignified repatriation. This is not seen in the existing literature, which is mainly focusing on Western cases. During my research, I have not come across a framework that caters to dignified repatriation when it comes to

politicians' speeches in the West. In fact, this frame distinguishes Pakistan's case from the existing cases widely studied in the relevant literature. In Pakistani case, there are references to the lack of capacity to accommodate refugees after 40 years of hosting them. Such limits in turn are shown as a cause straining social services. According to this perspective, Pakistan needs to repatriate refugees as soon as possible but in dignified manner.

Before going into the details of dignified repatriation frame, little background on legal information is important to develop my case. Pakistan has signed an agreement with UNHCR and Government of Afghanistan on voluntarily repatriation in 2003. The agreement is called as a tripartite agreement (UNHCR, 2003). The agreement provides legal and operational framework for voluntary refugee returns. The strategy aims to "assist host countries" in this case Pakistan and "support voluntary repatriation and sustainable reintegration" of Afghan refugees back home (Human Rights Watch, 2017, p. 37). According to the 1996 UNHCR guidelines for voluntary repatriation the conditions of the home country must be suitable for an individual's safe return (UNHCR, 1996).

Since Pakistan shares its border with Afghanistan and share religious and cultural brotherhood too, it believes that practicing dignity and respect while repatriating refugees is one of the important contributing elements in bringing peace and stability to the region whose examples will be given below. This opinion is widely shared among all the mainstream political parties and Pakistan army. For example, during PPP's government, PM (Dawn, 2010) and President (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Government of Pakistan, 2011) visited Kabul several times to discuss efforts to bring peace and stability in the region. Similarly, during PMLN's government PM (Gul, 2015) and President (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Government of Pakistan, 2014) paid several visits to Afghanistan. During current PTI's government PM (The News International, 2020) have met Afghanistan's president to discuss the voluntary repatriation and efforts to bring peace in the region. Sayed Ghazi Gulab Jamal, an independent candidate who belongs to Pashtun ethnicity during parliamentary debate in 2016 said that Afghan refugees is a serious problem but the way we are handling it-forceful repatriation, it will cancel out past 30 years of treating them with hospitality. Mr. Jamal said that it is very important to have dignified repatriation because strong relations with Afghanistan are

very important for Pakistan (Jamal, 2016, Aug 15). Shah Jee Gul Afridi, another Pashtun independent candidate giving Russia's redevelopment example after disintegration of USSR and its diplomatic attitude with the neighboring countries, argued that Pakistan needs to have good ties with its neighboring country Afghanistan: *"We are lucky that we have got a neighbor which has same religion and traditions. So instead of blaming each other over terror activities, Pakistan and Afghanistan should make a joint security force to curb terrorism. Afghan refugees have been in Pakistan for over 30 years, they got education here, they were born here, we should be kind towards them. We need to repatriate them respectfully so that they will remember us in a good way"* (Afridi, 2016, August 08). Leader of Quami Watan Party (QWP), a party that stands for ethnic Pakhtun right, Mr. Sherpao in 2016 showed concern over the way Afghan refugees are blamed for terror attacks in the parliament debate. Mr. Sherpao said that before repatriation, refugees should be given enough time to wind up their businesses/properties if they have any so that they will go back with positive message about Pakistan (Sherpao, 2016, Aug 08). Forcefully deporting them and without warning is inhumane. They should be repatriated in a dignified manner. Similarly, PTI (center populist Islamic party) believes in voluntary and dignified repatriation of refugees. The current Prime Minister and leader of PTI Imran Khan in 2013 said that his party is highly in favor of dialogue with Taliban to bring peace in the region (Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, 2013, September 25). According to Khan, Pakistan has suffered a lot during the war in the past nine years. Mr. Khan underlines the necessity of a ceasefire and argues that it could be possible to have a safe and dignified repatriation of refugees in case there is peace. PTI was ruling KPK province in 2014 when the tragic school attack in Peshawar happened, it still believed in dignified repatriation. It can be observed in an interview on facebook given by Chief Minister Khattak right after Taliban attacked Bacha Khan University in KPK in 2016. Mr. Khattak emphasized that it is time that Afghan refugees need to be repatriated in a dignified manner (Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, 2016, January 24).

Political parties who frame refugees under negative frames also believe in dignified repatriation. Even BNP who has harsher tone compared to other political parties want refugees to be sent back to their home country in a respectful way (Balochistan National Party, 2016c). Mr. Mengal, leader of BNP said on various occasions on Facebook that refugees should be sent back to Afghanistan in a dignified

manner (Balochistan National Party, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c). Press releases issued by Pakistan army also stressed dignified repatriation (ISPR, 2016, 2017a, 2018b).

Politicians from PPP (center left social democratic party) during the parliamentary debates and on social media emphasized on dignified repatriation. During PPP's government, its politicians emphasized on dignified repatriation as soon as possible. E.g During a debate on possession of forged Pakistani passports and drug trafficking incidents involving refugees, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs blamed refugees for forging Pakistani passports and burdening Pakistan's economy and believed in dignified repatriation as soon as possible (Malik, 2009, Mar 05) and also emphasizing on adopting coercive measures to restrict/minimize refugees movement in their respective Refugee Camps stressed on dignified repatriation (Malik, 2009, Nov 13).

PPP's rule ended in 2013 and PMLN (center right economic liberal party) became the ruling party. During its tenure, its politicians in parliamentary debates and on social media framed refugee policies under the understanding of a dignified repatriation. E.g., in 2013 during question hour session when fellow parliamentarians raised concerns about possible involvement of refugees in crimes and requested the Minister for State and Frontier Regions to repatriate them as soon, the ministers responded that repatriation can not be done forcefully. Government wants voluntary and dignified repatriation (Baloch, 2013, August 16).. Leader of PMLN and the then Prime Minister Sharif attended conference on large scale movement of refugees and migrants in New York in 2016 where he emphasized on dignified repatriation of Afghan refugees (PML(N), 2016). The following year National Assembly moved a resolution for dignified repatriation and was adopted unanimously (National Assembly, 2017). All in all, we can say that the governing parties in Pakistan underline the necessity of repatriation on a respectful and voluntary basis.

From the discussion above, it can be observed that the actors favoring dignified repatriation have two things in common. First concern is regarding effect on Pakistan's image at international level Afghan refugees have stayed for over forty years and using force now would send negative image of Pakistan on global level. Second concern is ensuring peace in the region as throughout the years, whenever Pakistani delegation including Presidents and PMs accompanied by top military officials visited Afghanistan

and vice versa, both the governments have put emphasis on improving peace in the region and voluntarily refugee repatriation.

4.4 Timeline of Steps Taken in Support of/Against Afghan Refugees by the Actors

During PPP's government, policies were shaped from security perspective because of increase in terror attacks and evidences of involvement of Afghan refugees in the attacks. E.g, the second largest refugee camp in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), Jalozei Refugee camp got closed in 2008 (Dawn, 2008, May 31) and the government insisted on repatriation of refugees. Between 2003 and 2008, Every year about 320,000 Afghan refugees returned home, in total about 1,930,068 (UNHCR, 2009). Considering the worsening Afghanistan security situation, only 70,000 returned back to Afghanistan over the four years (UNHCR, 2014).

PPP's tenure ended in 2013 and PMLn came to power. Again, the terror attacks were happening, the worst attack happened in 2014 on School in Peshawar and Taliban took the responsibility. National Action Plan (NAC) was implemented (Rashid, 2015, Dec 16). Under NAC, Afghan refugee settlements in the outskirts of Islamabad were destroyed (The News International, 2015). In July –August 2015, NAC comprised of undertaking to register the undocumented Afghan refugees in Pakistan, even though no registration took place (Ali, 2015). In 2016, it was 22,559 (IOM, 2016). In 2017, Pakistan closed Pak-Afghan border for security reasons with the help of Pak Army after a bomb attack on the shrine of Lal Shahbaz Qalandar in Sehwan, Sindh province that killed more than 100 people (Aljazeera, 2017, February 19).

In 2018, when PTI came to power, PM Imran Khan emphasized on making Pakistan similar to the state of Madina where refugees will be treated with care and pledged citizenship to Afghan refugees who were born in Pakistan. (Barker, 2018, September 17). The government built Cold Chain storage facility in Peshawar in 2009 to ensure access to vaccination for Pakistanis & Afghan refugees in villages & urban areas (Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, 2019a). It allowed refugees to open bank accounts (Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, 2019b) and opened Torkham border 24/7 to enable trade and improve relationship between two Muslim countries (Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, 2019).

Even before PTI came to power, its stance towards Afghan refugees has remained unchanged.

Pakistani military has remained the target of terrorism. Terrorists have targeted military institutions i.e. Pakistani Naval Base at PNS Mehran, Karachi in Sindh province was attacked by 15-20 Taliban militants. This is one of the Pakistan's largest Naval establishment (Vira, 2011). In 2014, Army Public School in Peshawar was attacked by Taliban and killed 134 students. In 2015, Taliban dressed in military uniforms attacked Pakistan Air Force base Badaber in Peshawar (The Economic Times, 2015). Army carried out military operations against militants and Taliban in North Western region of Pakistan, caught several suspects including some Afghan refugees during a military operation in 2018 in Girdi Jungle, a small village in Baluchistan with majority of Afghan refugees, army declared it a hub of terrorist activities (ISPR, 2018f). During intelligence and baseline overview in Sambaza, Sibbi, Hazar Ganji areas in Baluchistan, 8 illegal Afghan refugees were arrested for possessing illegal grenades, rockets and explosives (ISPR, 2018d). Around this time Chief of Army Staff (COAS) issued a press release that said return of Afghan Refugees is important to confirm that there is no space for terrorists on Pakistani soil color in Pakistan (ISPR, 2018b). The table in the appendix explained events happened in detail.

CHAPTER 5

5. CONCLUSION

This study aimed to shed light on framings of Afghan refugees in political circles in the case of Pakistan from 2008 to 2019. Parliamentary debates, social media messages and press releases on websites were used as data. To analyze the data, the study focused on qualitative content analysis. Data was interpreted by following the framing approach, which facilitated recognizing patterns and themes during the coding process. This research is based on a directed content analysis, which was directed by the existing codes but also enabled creating new codes through an open coding approach. This approach builds upon existing theory or research that can be taken into account to do further research.

This study sought to answer the following questions: What were the most common frames used during parliamentary debate and on social media to describe refugees? Do the frames vary by political party? How did Pakistan's largest political parties, their members, Ministry of SAFRON and Pakistan Army frame the refugees? How did the framing change over time? Frames vary by political party. Liberal leftist PPP and liberal right party PMLN frame refugees as security and economic threats to Pakistan which is opposite from the western literature. In Western examples, left wing and/or liberal parties are welcoming towards refugees. The framing did not change over time but economic threat became prominent when Pakistan's economy worsened after 2008 global economic crises. Security threat framing got stronger after 2014 Army Public School attack in Peshawar.

Ethnicity is another significant aspect of debates on Afghan refugees in the case of Pakistan. Non-Pashtun ethnic party BNP frames refugees as ethnic and sectarian threats to Baloch majority in Baluchistan province. It has remained same over time. Still, the impacts of ethnic identity is not always negative as the Pashtun MPs illustrate.

Independent candidates who belong to Pashtun ethnicity frame refugees in more humanitarian terms embedded in notions of Muslim brotherhood as well as international obligation frame. So do Center Islamic populist party PTI members. Those supportive framings generally remain stable throughout time. Islamic conservative party JUI frames refugees under Muslim brotherhood frame rather than adding legal obligations as the abovementioned two parties do. Like the supportive PTI and independent candidates of Pashtun origin remain consistent with regard to their inclusive approaches. These parties supportive of Afghan refugees argue that Pakistan needs to take care of Afghan refugees in order to advance connectivity as a good neighbor for regional peace and prosperity.

This research challenges existing literature which is mostly based on empirical analysis of Western examples by showing that conservative political parties frame refugees in an inclusive manner whereas progressive parties take a negative stance. Unsurprisingly, Pakistan Army generally frames refugees as security threats. Such framing has remained rather stable over the years. Ministry of SAFRON frames refugees according to the ruling political party because the ministry comes directly under the government. PPP (center left, social democracy political party), PMLN (centre-right economic liberal political party) and BNP (ethnic Baloch political party) promoted priority of compatriots. As for more detailed topics under this threat framing, the most salient issue areas are the fear of terrorism, criminality, the fear of change in demography, fear of the destabilization of economy and negative impacts tied to it.

Themes of humanitarianism, religious values and international obligations were also discovered during the analysis. PTI, Pashtun ethnic parties, ethnic Pashtun independent candidates and conservative Muslim parties tended to portray refugees as victims and Muslim brothers in need of help, and framed the crisis as a humanitarian issue. These findings were slightly complemented by the literature on framing of refugees in Europe but had its distinctiveness in terms of religion and culture i.e. Afghans and Pakistanis are Muslims, North Western part of Pakistan has Pashtun ethnicity and so does majority of Afghan refugees. When analyzed chronologically, security and economic frame had always been dominant within relevant political debates which refer a lot to the increase in terror attacks. Dignified repatriation frame remained there throughout the timeline without getting affected by the events. Among the political

parties who ruled Pakistan from 2008 till 2020, humanitarian frame seemed to be supported by PTI, while security and economic threat frames seemed to be supported by PPP and PMLn both. My research overlaps existing literature on frames like economic threat, security threat and ethnic threat frames on one hand and humanitarian obligation and humanitarian frames on the other hand. Even if these frames are used by parties from different ideologies in the Pakistani case. Dignified repatriation frame appears as a particular characteristic of the Pakistani example. All the political parties and Pakistan Army irrespective of their stance towards refugees emphasized on dignified and voluntary repatriation.

This study aimed to shed light on how refugees are framed in political circles in the Pakistani case. Among the political parties, PTI (centrist populist Islamic political party) is seen very active on social media compared to others, which might have led to dominating the overall positive frame in comparison to other political parties who share similar positive views like JUI-f and ethnic Pashtuns parties but these parties are not active on social media and less active in parliamentary debates compared to PTI. Similarly, BNP (ethnic Baloch nationalist political party) is seen dominating the ethnic threat frame because it has actively written tweets and facebook posts compared to other political parties who share similar views about Afghans but posted less on the subject matter on Facebook and Twitter and have not spoken that much during the debates. Still, this study aimed to understand framings in the general debates rather than establishing a proportional picture of the relevant content across political actors.

This research will provide a basis for further analyzing frames that were not necessarily discussed in previous studies and might help in developing theories related to forced immigration outside Europe and US. I provided an in-depth analysis of refugee related discussions outside Western examples. This, in turn, might be helpful for future comparisons between West and non-West refugee receiving countries and how they differ when it comes to refugee framing. Sharing religious and cultural bonds or having clashes between sending and receiving countries make the refugee related debates particularly different in the case of Pakistan when the established literature is taken into consideration. The study contributes to the discussion surrounding the influence institutions have on individual actors and hopefully will help in further research

regarding the impact of critical happenings on the way actors frame the refugees in Pakistani context and lessen the gap in the literature.

This research will hopefully encourage readers to have a more in-depth understandings on policies towards those fleeing oppression and seeking safety in the case of Pakistan – which seldom appears on the global public agenda even though carrying a very high responsibility on the subject matter. The research has further practical policy implications in terms of showing the conditionality of welcoming others who face extreme levels of despair.



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Appendix

Ruling party	Steps taken during its ruling period regarding Afghan refugees	Year
PPP – (2008-2013)	Around 90k passports and ID's of Afghan refugees taken illegally have been cancelled (Tarin, 2009, Nov 13) The concerned authorities of Afghan Refugees Camps have been requested to adopt coercive measures to restrict/minimize their movement in their respective Refugee Camps. Islamabad Capital Territory has requested UNHCR for repatriation back of Afghan Refugees (Malik, 2009, Nov 13). National Database & Registration Authority (NADRA) has taken strict disciplinary action against its employees involved in illegal processing of CNICs of all aliens including Afghan Refugees. In the recent past twelve employees have either been terminated (Malik, 2009, Nov 13). Over 0.203 million unregistered Afghans were repatriated during the grace period in 2007. Two camps in KPK i.e. Kacha Garhi and Jalozei have been closed during the years 2007 and 2008 by repatriating the Afghan refugees living in these camps. 3.551 million Afghan. Refugees have been repatriated on voluntary basis till 2008 (Khan, 2009, Jan 15).	2009
	The voluntary repatriation of Afghan refugees under UNHCR Assisted Repatriation Program for the year 2010 has been started with effect from 22nd March 2010 (Khan, 2010, May 03). According to the existing "Management's and Repatriation Strategy/Policy for Afghan Refugees in Pakistan", the temporary stay of all registered	2010

	Afghan refugees has been-extended up till December, 2012 (Khan, 2010, Oct 08).	
PMLn – (2013-2018)	Implemented National Action Plan (NAP) to eradicate terrorists from Pakistan and enhance security of the state. Demolished Afghan refugee settlements in the outskirts of Islamabad. Started deporting of illegal/unregistered Afghan refugees. -National Assembly debate archives	2015
	Closed Pak-Afghan border with the help of Pak Army after a bomb attack on the shrine of Lal Shahbaz Qalandar in Sehwan, Sindh province (Ayub 2017).	2017
PTI – ruling party in KPK (2013-present)	Illegal Afghans who have links to foreign intelligence agencies got arrested and deported (Akbar, 2016, June 28).	2013
	Afghan national Imams of mosques were asked to leave their position under NAC and were deported to Afghanistan under security reasons (PTI Official Videos, 2015, February 26).	2015
PTI – ruling party of the state (2018-present)	Built Cold Chain storage facility in Peshawar that will ensure access to vaccination for Pakistanis & Afghan refugees in villages & urban areas. (Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, 2019a). Allowed refugees to open bank accounts(Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, 2019b) Opened Torkham border 24/7 to enable trade and improve relationship between 2 Muslim countries. (Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, 2019)	2019

Pak Army (2008-2019)	Carried out military operations against militants and Taliban in North Western region of Pakistan, caught several suspects including some Afghan refugees, operations include (Khan, 2011): Operation Zalzala	2008
	Operations Sher Dil Rah-e-Haq Rah-e-Rast	2007–2009
	Operation Rah-e-Nijat	2009–2010
	Operation Zarb-e-Azb	2014-2017

Table 1: Timeline of steps taken by actors during their respective governments.



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