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RADICALIZATION AND EXTREMISM IN AFGHANISTAN

Master's Thesis

Sayed Amrullah Ahmadi

Ankara 2020

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ACCEPTION AND APPROVAL

This is to certify that this thesis titled “Radicalization and Extremism in Afghanistan” prepared by Sayed Amrullah Ahmadi meets the committee’s approval unanimously as Master’s thesis in the field of International Relations following the successful defense of the thesis conducted in August 6, 2020.

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I hereby declare that:

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ÖZ

AHMADI, Sayed Amrullah. Afganistan'da aşırıcılık ve radikalizm, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ankara 2020.

Bu araştırma radikalizmi ve aşırıcılığı Afganistan'ın iç ve dış politikası üzerine siyaset bağlamında incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu çalışma Özellikle Afganistan iç savaşından (1990) beri Afganistan tarihinde aşırılık yanlısı grupları ve muhafazakar zihniyeti üzerinde durulacaktır. Dolayısıyla, bu araştırma çoğunlukla Afganistan'da uzun zamandan beri sosyal, politik ve ekonomik alanlarin şekillenmesinde büyük rol oynayan dini aşırılık üzerine yoğunlaşmaktadır. Afganistan, sosyal, kültür, ekonomi ve politika açısından radikalizm ve aşırıcılık kavramlarından etkilenmiştir. Öte yandan, Afgan politikacılar dinin aşırılıkçılığının iç ve dış ilişkilerdeki etkisini görmezden gelmişlerdir. Bu nedenle, bu araştırmanın amacı esas olarak Afganistan'ın politikasında ve uluslararası ilişkilerde Taliban ve Alqaeda gibi dini aktörlerin ve aşırılık yanlısı grupların rol ve işlevlerini açıklamaya dayanmaktadır.,Ayrıca bu çalışma Afganıstan ve Pakıstan arasındaki ilişkiyi de kısaca analiz ediyor.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Radikalizm, Taliban, Afgan-Sovyet savaşı, Afganistan Dış Politikası, Dini Gruplar

ABSTRACT

AHMADI, Sayed Amrullah. Extremism and Radicalization in Afghanistan, Master Thesis, Ankara 2020.

This research aims to analyses radicalism and extremism in the context of politics on Afghanistan's interior and foreign policy. It will briefly identify the extremism groups and conservative mindset in Afghanistan's history especially since the Afghan civil war (1990s). So, this research mostly concentrates on religious extremism which has a huge role in shaping of the social, political and economic in Afghanistan since long time. Afghanistan has been affected in terms of social, culture, economy and politics from radicalism and extremism concept. On the other hand, Afghan politicians have ignored the influence of religion extremism in domestic and foreign affairs. Therefore, the objective of this research is mainly based on explaining the role and functions of the religious actors and extremist's groups such as Taliban and Alqaeda in Afghanistan's policy and international relations and also research briefly analyses the relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Keywords: Radicalism, Taliban, Afghan-Soviet War, Afghanistan Foreign Policy, Religious Groups

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CONTENT

THIRTH CHAPTER

PAKISTAN CONSEQUENCE OF DETERIOTING SECURITY IN AFGHANISTAN

ABBREVIATIONS

The abbreviations which has been used in this study are as following.

Abbreviation	Descriptions
IS	Islamic State
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
PVE	Preventing Violent Extremism
OSCE	The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
KHKO	Kurt Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu
PKK	Partiye Karkeren Kürdistan
FATA	Federally Administer Tribal Areas
NWFP	Northwest Frontier Province
HIG	Hizb-i- Islami of Gulbuddin Hikmatyar
JUI	Jamiat-i-Ulama Islami
NAP	National People’s Party
PDPA	People Democratic Party of Afghanistan

INTRODUCTION

Radicalization is a hot topic facing the modern world. From Europe to Australia, and from America to Africa and Asia, the virus has spread rapidly under various names like color, religion and ethnicity etc. This not limited to any particular region, religion or ethnicity. However, there are some terms which are studied as radicalization; like militant and terrorist. A militant is a person who, in order to achieve certain aims, pick up arms and do fighting. A militant can resort to aggressive verbal or physical confrontation to achieve his objectives. A terrorist is a person who terrorizes others to make them listen to him or to submit. A terrorist uses the means of terror to affect others. He may or may not pick up arms to commit terror. In this way, a militant is a kind of terrorist who picks up arms to achieve his ends. This study discusses radicalization and violent extremism in the context of Afghanistan. The aim is to analyze the issue from different perspective in Afghanistan. The research is based on discussing various factors and historical background behind radicalization in Afghanistan. The birth of radicalism can be traced back to the 18. Century.

The term radicalism presented solution for science, religion and politics deadlock at that time and underpinned wide range of innovation in the late 18 centuries. But in this study I have confined myself to radicalization and extremism in Afghanistan therefore I didn't touch the issue of Europe or other countries. Therefore, it is important to focus on the issues we are talking about in the process of radicalization. There are three hypotheses in This study. First hypothesis is Theories of Radicalization. In this section radicalization is just studied in terms of theory. The second hypothesis is radicalization and violent extremism in Afghanistan. This part emphasizes the evolution and process of radicalization in and the impact of civil war on radicalization in Afghanistan. The third argument emphasizes the Pakistan consequences of deteriorating security in Afghanistan. This part will discuss the relation between Pakistan and Afghanistan in the historical process and elucidate the security of Pakistan within the border with Afghanistan. During the government of Zia Ul-Haq in 1977, this section provided information about Islamization of Pakistan and the effects of terrorism in the region since 11, 2001 attacks.

Radicalization and violent extremism are hot issues facing the modern world. This has spread rapidly by various name like color, religion or ethnicity etc. The term is very complex and contains many other concepts. Therefore, this study aims to study radicalization in Afghanistan. The study particularly will point out to Islamic and ethnic radicalization. And the impact of Pakistan's madrassas in creating terrorism in Afghanistan. The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan has a history of aggression against the government, guerilla warfare, foreign occupation going back to the 19the century. The Soviet invasion and Afghan civil war in the 1980s and early 1990s brought thousands of Islamic fighters to the country, including the founder of Al-Qaeada Osama Bin Laden.

The idea of Radicalization and extremism grew rapidly after the 9/11 attacks on the twin towers of New York and the Pentagon near Washington, D.C, after the invasion of US attack in Afghanistan. Afterwards in 2003, the U.S. invasion of Iraq further complexed the issue. These waves of radicalization have affected not only Afghanistan and Iraq but also spread to other countries such as, U.S. and western countries. All these turbulences and foreign interventions in Afghanistan facilitated rising radicalization and intensified militancy. Therefore, to have a better understanding radicalization and violent extremism in Afghanistan, the research will study the social structure of Afghanistan and its relations with Pakistan in 20th century as well.

In what ways radicalization and violent extremism has determined new direction of Afghanistan's foreign policy? As the topic is quite broad, the area under study has been limited to evaluate radicalization and violent extremism in Afghanistan. For the Brevity, Afghanistan civil war, Soviet invasion and the 9/11 has been considered. The term radicalization, militancy has got currency in Afghanistan after the sordid event of 9/11. Hence, the aim is of this research paper is evaluate radicalization in Afghanistan.

Research is a planned inquiry undertaken to examine an event closely. To do research, out of the given two methods of research (qualitative and quantitative), the qualitative method is being selected to generate and analyses the data. Qualitative research is interpretivist in nature and is subject the interpretation of the researcher. To do this, library, books, essays, journals, and internet sites will be utilized. Analytical method will be applied to prove the threats of radicalization to the existence of Afghanistan.

The concept of radical can be described for the first time throughout the 18th century in Britain as movements that advocate a wide-ranging innovation in science, religion and politics. The concept was later used for those who demanded political changes that could significantly transform the social order. Radicalism is associated with terrorism today. According to Saiful Umam radicalism is a tendency to bring changes in habits, conditions and institutions. British statemen Charles James Fox' request for a radical reform in order to promote the men's right to vote can be regarded as the first extreme political movement. Taarnby Islami defines radicalism as an increasingly personal change from a law-abiding Muslim to a militant Islamist. Oliver Roy, in his ''Islamic Radicalization in Afghanistan and Pakistan'' essay, defines Islamic radicalism as the combination of two criteria: the return of all Muslims to the true beliefs of İslam and its principles (generally acceptance of salafis values). The second criteria is the holy war against all Islamic enemies.

Regarding the existence of radicalization and violent extremism in Afghanistan, historically dating back to the Soviet invasion in 1978. Although conservative thinking existed in Afghanistan long ago, the modernization period of King Amanullah Khan, which included liberation of women, begun with the conservative mindset of the people which led to his overthrown in 1929. But the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 was motivated by religious and extremist motives, which formed a stronger layer of extremism in Afghanistan. Various Islamic groups were formed by war with councils, and later these groups expanded their ideology as the basis of their party activities. After the withdrawal of Soviet forces, those groups started fighting one another and that resulted emerging Taliban to come to power with stricter form of Islam. After the September 11, 2001 attacks on the twin

towers of New York and the Pentagon, the idea of radicalization and violent extremism rapidly gained weight. As a result, the ideology of Jihad formed, which was not only the basis of struggle against Soviets, later on made the way for coming extremist groups (Taliban) to the power who defended custom and traditional lifestyle and they were against the western values. And the ideology they are following, is still important as the basis of the ongoing struggle. Under United States leadership, ousted the Taliban by December 2001, and the terrorist group fled to Pakistan's neighbors. The remaining fighters fled to Pakistan's Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (Fata) or re-entered to Afghan society. Taliban Fighters in the FATA finally form, Tahrik-e Taliban, and Pakistani Taliban, 2007.

Radicalization in Afghanistan have been always linked with the Afghanistan and Pakistan border. Pakistan's security dynamics are directly connected to Pakistan's troubled tribal territories, also known as FATA which is home to Al Qaeda and the Taliban. The fact is that the mindset of radicalization has been developing in those mountains between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Therefore, this research explains the radicalization in Afghanistan from a historical perspective and sheds light on the political and social structure of FATA which has always been threat for Afghanistan.

FIRST CHAPTER

THEORIES OF RADICALIZATION

1.1. What are Radicalization and Violent Extremism?

Radicalism, violent extremism and terrorism, sit at the leading of modern world's policy discussion. In the recent years, Radicalization has become one of the most controversial concept across the world. This disease has been infecting sharply by various names such as; race, religion and ethnicity. In addition, this virus has almost spread from Europe to Australia, and from America to Africa and Asia. So radicalization is not confined to any main ethnicity, religion and region. However, there are some terms which are studied as radicalization, like militant and terrorist. The term radicalism presented solution for science, religion and politics deadlock at that time and underpinned wide range of innovation in the late 18 Century. The concept was later used for those who demanded political changes that could significantly modify the social order. Radical is derived from the word radix in Latin, which means root. In other word, radicalism denotes changing the way of life even if it's wrong, and it's a kind of struggling against the current social order (Msozcan, 2017, p. 109-110). Academics like Saiful Umam defines radicalism, as a tendency and willingness to make radical changes in existing views, habits, conditions and institutions. Additionally, according to Saiful Umam, a radical person not only believes in a certain thing, but also defends the necessity of extremism (Saiful Umam, 2006, p. 1-16).

The experts and academics working on terrorism define radicalization as a process rising from pacifism to violence rather than a phenomenon that develops at once. Ted Gur, one of the researchers, defines radicalization as a process in which a group or community is mobilized for a political or social purpose and fail to satisfy the activists. (Robert Gurr, 1970, p. 421). McClauley and Moskalenko describe radicalization as the practices of both state and non-state actors to prepare for conflict. According to them, a state and its citizens can increasingly adopt radicalization, as a proper response to the terrorist attacks to which they have been subjected. The first extreme political movement could be cited by the British statesmen Charles, who demanded a radical reform to promote the men's right to vote. The concept was later

used to point out to those who advocated parliamentary reform. On the other side, this concept had been used to support equal rights, division of church and state, pity on animals, abolition of slavery and homosexuality. This movement was pioneered by James Mill, Jeremy Bentham and David Ricardo. Michael Taarnby defines Islamic radicalism as an increasingly personal change from a law-abiding Muslim to a militant Islamist (Msozcan, 2017, p. 112-113).

Oliver Roy, in his ‘’Islamic Radicalization in Afghanistan and Pakistan’’ essay, defines Islamic radicalism as the combination of two criteria: Muslim’s pure beliefs on İslam and its doctrine (generally accepting of selefis values). The second criteria is holy war against all Islamic enemies (Oliver Roy, 2002, p. 3). In this context, El-Kaide terrorist organization has become the key source of inspiration for radicalization of many terrorist organizations and the transformation of ideology and movements into terrorist acts. Radicalization may not always result in an attack on the west. Radicalized individuals give important to the conflict areas for becoming heroes. Because this status is perceived as a symbol of honor and courage for them (Msozcan, 2017, p. 114).

Radicalism is the imposition of one’s thought over another person without giving importance to their thoughts. Radical movements can be happened within the framework of a certain political, ideological thought system or these can be exhibited in the axis of religious, racial, cultural and economic interests. Terrorist groups, who are perceived as radical groups, utilize violence extremism in way that provides political interests. Therefore, the more the action of a terrorist group makes sound, the more they show their existence and effects. For this reason, terrorist organizations do more bloody actions to show that they are strong and the more they adopt radicalism, the more successful they are (Msozcan, 20117, p. 115). Since 2001, The number of Islamic extremism have been increasing in the West countries where a large number of Muslims live. The percentage of Islamic radicalism has increased in the following countries; 38 percentage points in France, 29 points in Spain, 21 points in the United Kingdom, 20 points in Germany and 17 points in the United States (Jacob Poushter, 2015, p. 1-3).

In this context, violent extremism is another important term, which implies ideological beliefs and an action of people that motivates violence to further radical ideology, religious, or political aims. Since 2001, there has been a constant increase in the number of victims of violent extremism movements. These extremist groups are such as Al-Qaeda, Islamic State (IS), Boko Haram in Nigeria, and Al-Shabaab in Somalia and Kenya. In this context, 2015 terrorist attacks in Europe were posed as a violent extremism and demonstrated Islamic extremism against modern values. Within this period the notion of Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) gained attraction among state actors around the globe (Christian Nünlist, 2015, p. 1). The term of Countering Violent Extremism, in regard with peace and development policies is a modern approach to counterterrorism. A first group of individuals are stimulated to join violent extremist organization by their desire to right or avenge injustice committed against the group with whom they identify. These groups identify their affiliation around the notion of Sunni marginalization, occupation and oppression. They are against US or the West broadly. This division is dating back to the post-World War I interventions in Arab Affairs but exacerbated after Israel occupation of Palestinians lands. Later on the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq has incited youth to join a violent extremism (Harper, 2018, p. 12).

Violent extremism is not only associated with individual terrorist assaults, but also it has severe relation with proxy war which has been causing tens of thousands of deaths and injuries. In 2016, United Nation Secretary- General Ban Ki Moon announced ‘’United Nation Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism’’. According to United Nation Plan, violent extremists should be eliminated by soft power not by suppression apparatus such as, police, intelligence and military means. The structural causes of violent extremism should also be tackled, including intolerance, government failure and political organization. As Ban ki Moon mentioned ‘’ Missiles may kill terrorists. But I am convinced that good governance is what will kill terrorism.’’ In this context, after the spread out of Preventing Violent extremism (PVE), all countries found the idea that elimination of violent extremism and terrorism must include both strict and smooth preventions. In the early December 2001, OSCE (the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) had announced in its annual meeting that global violent extremism and terrorism must counter not only by military and

intelligence means, but also by tracking the main roots of terrorism. In this regard after the attacks had been conducted in 2004 in Madrid and London 2005, the concept of CVE was introduced in Europe. In 2005, the EU made its anti-terrorism strategy which was based on four key factors: To prohibit, to preserve, to follow and to answer. On the other hand, CVE and PVE relates to the anti-terrorism strategies that afford the motives which guide people to connect politically or ideologically- motivated violence (Nünlist, 2015, p. 1).

There are several views in the definition of violent extremism, radicalization and terrorism. In July 2005, US president George W. Bush defined the term violent extremism as a variant to the much-criticized concept of the ‘’war on terrorism’’. Some argues that term violent extremism refers to something various than terrorism. However, the attempts of both terms are to obtain political goals through violent means. Besides, the ways by which a person resorts to terrorist or violent extremist is called Radicalization. This indicates the direct relations between radicalism and extremism or violence (Nünlist, 2015, p. 2). With all this there are some factors that can lead individuals to embrace violent extremism ideology. But these are not enough, that act of joining a violent extremist group or using violence to realize such ends requires opportunity, or enablers. For instance, some violent extremists are stimulated by the sense of religious obligations and others are motivated by sense of separatist or sense of extreme left. So, in the other part, the types of radicalism will be explained one by one (Çitlioğlu, 2005, p. 305).

1.2. Types of Extremism

1.2.1. Religious extremism

Extremism of religion is a global challenge that is now a worldwide concern. One of the most important points of our study is radicalism in groups that misuse religion. In this context it should be elucidated, radicalizations in these groups are based on religious origins. Religious radicalization is to be observed, when religious feelings or rituals are suppressed, and people cannot find the ground to realize their religious beliefs more comfortably. In this type, religious beliefs are used as a reference to violence and terrorist organizations construct relationship between religious resources and acts of violence. There are certain expressions or discourses in

religious scriptures that can directly or indirectly incite people to violence. For example, in the Old Testament; from time to time the Israelites are invited to kill their enemies, plunder their property, and destroy it (Samuel, 15: 2-3). In the New Testament texts, sword and blood are mentioned in many places; the extermination of enemies of Christ and the themes of anger and hatred against them. (Mathew, 10: 34-35, 23:33; Luka, 19: 27, 22: 36-38; Vahiy, 2: 27-28). In the Qur'an, there are also statements suggesting violence; the importance of jihad has been emphasized. There are also signs of killing enemies to be observed within in the Quran (Gündüz,2005, p. 16, 10). The fact of religious radicalism and religious fundamentalism is becoming a bad phenomenon in the world. Robert N. Bellah, an American sociologist, argues that the tendency of religious radical groups to see Quran and Sunnah as a perfect entity and sacred (mafhud, Niken, Wahyudin, Diyah, Heni, 2018, p.8).

Marx also describes religion as opium of the people. According to Marx, religions helped alienate people and played a major role in giving up their true consciousness. This identifies that religion can be used by upper class in many different ways to gain their interests (Lefebvre, 2018, p. 35) According to Bassam Tibi, religious radicalism and fundamentalism is one of the huge problems in global world politics. Tibi claims that these radical groups consider the West as failing in organizing and managing progress and justice in the world. Therefore, the world system needs to be transformed. In contrast to Tibi and Bella, Bruce Be Lawrence describes the sign of radicalism and fundamentalism as an anti-modernity phenomenon. In his book on ‘’Defenders of God’’, he elucidates religious radicalism versus modernity (mafhud, Niken, Wahyudin, Diyah, Heni, 2018, p. 9).

Religion or religions can be portrayed as the things that eliminate individuality and try to integrate it into itself and sees the others need to be destroyed. Thus, the religious radical attitude defines itself as being against the other and specially against modernity (Mahçupyan, 2000, p. 151). Religion is an important sociological phenomenon in social life and not only terrorist organizations such as El-Kaide, Hizbullah and ISIL, sometimes states also have been exploiting religion for obtaining their objectives. This has been throughout the state’s history (Msozan, 2017, p. 126). For instance, there was no hope for Pakistan to defeat India on the battleground

especially in Afghanistan, which has been a political field of interest for the region. In 1977, Gen. Muhammad Zia ul- Haq took power in a coup in Pakistan. After seizing power Zia introduced Islamic training in the curriculum of the Command and Staff College. The Pakistani Army relied on Islamic discourse and with its ally USA used the term of Jihaad for fighting against Soviet in Afghanistan.

In this context, the Pakistan Army used religion means for achieving different kinds of institutional and national goals (Fair, Is Pakistan's Army as Islamist as We Think? 2011). In November 1947, religious radicalism in Pakistan began, one of the religious parties that declared its restoration as a Pakistani chapter was Majlis-e-Ahrar-e-Hind. Later on, in 1977 when Zia-ul Haq seized the government. In his first speech to people, he stated that all the political, social, economic and legal institutions of the country should be based on the Islamic principles must follow the Islamic laws. Due to religious extremism Pakistan has been facing with many problems. Therefore, due to extremism the image of Pakistan has demolished both nationally and internationally. Pakistan has been suffering because of religious radicalism since 1977. The two major sects in Pakistan are Sunni and Shia. They both have their own interpretation Islam religion. They have their own madrassas and organizations. Sunni and Shia have been trying to strengthen their position in Pakistan government and always wanted to reduce the dominance of other. In this context, religious Ulemas are playing decisive role in shaping the society and radicalizing youths. Therefore, the misconceptions about Sunni and Shia also increase sectarianism and extremism in the country (Fatima Riffat, 2015, 71-74). All these trends of extremism and terror are mostly prevalent in the underdeveloped and developing world and Pakistan also includes in the list of such countries (Rizvi, 2005, p. 486).

1.2.2. Radicalism in leftist movement

The term left was, for the first time in the world, used after the 1789 French Revolution. The left-wing adopted violence in order to bring reforms and was against the values of ancient regime (Demirel, 2001, p. 38). The acts of violence adopted by groups aiming to change the existing order and the social institutions in order to create a society based on Marxist philosophy. Left-wing radicalism seeks in theory to eliminate class distinctions and it develops from working-class movements.

Communism give birth to left-wing extremism. The notion Working class, exploited by the bourgeoisie, will rebel against bourgeois and its authority and bring socialism, where there is no class and everyone is equal and will be switched to communism, where the state is abolished. The reorganization of the capital after World War 2 and the international developments around the world, led to class divisions and emergence of the left movement for the second time. In this period Radical left movements was instigated with economic, political and social factors. Many students stood against their government's policy and protested the system (Msozcan, 2017, p. 117, 118, 120).

Carlos Marighella, a friend of Che Guevara and Castro, argues that guerrilla activity should take place in the city instead of in the countryside. He claims that the process of radicalization in the left-wing is divided into five stages.

1- Preparatory phase: to provide weapons and money and gives training to militants. After this stage, there will be infiltrations into media, universities, and the army institutions.

2- Terror phase: robbing banks and gathering ransoms.

3- Cooperation phase: at this stage militant reach the countryside and cooperate with the army

4- People, army and guerrillas came together in the countryside and will attack cities.

5- Final stage everything will be nationalized and declared socialism

In this context, within the period 1960 and 1980 in Turkey, there has been very intense mobilization among youth especially in university. According to these groups the system is not in favor of people and should be overthrown. They justified all their actions through the political and economic crisis in the country (Msozcan, 2017, p. 119-120). On the other hand, The Communist Party of the U.S.A had a significant impact on leftist revolutionaries in the United States. A brother-son network in the United States which aided Soviet intelligence agents, was operated by the Communist Party of the U.S.A. During its early years, the network was heavily funded by Moscow. In addition, the Communist Party of the U.S.A. asked other leftist parties to help them in "fight for a Socialist U.S.A.". From the late 1960s to the middle of 1980s, leftist ideology was a big challenge for the United States. (Beichman, 1995, p. 34). Thus,

there are two kind of threats coming from the Leftist extremism in the USA. The first intimidation is created by terrorism. Left-wing terrorists have perpetrated bombings, assassinations, robberies, and planned attacks on 6 infrastructure targets in the USA. The second menace is their hidden support of espionage done versus the United States by supporting countries such as Cuba. Since Fidel Castro took power, the government of Cuba has advocated Marxist revolutionary groups and leftist terrorists. (Seger, 2001, P. 5-7).

1.2.3. Radicalism in ethnic nationalist movement (sparest movement)

A group of ethnicities who claims the superiority of a particular race and use violence and threat to make it the dominant ideology are called ethnic nationalist radicalism (Alkan, 2002, p. 21). Ethnic nationalism or micro-nationalism adopts narrow-minded consciousness, such as stature, tribe, sect and ethnicity. Micro-nationalism movement transcends the national state and perceives it in smaller pieces. They consider protecting cultural diversities as an integral part of the field of democratic rights and freedoms. The last example as we saw in the case of Yugoslavia. The state has been divided into several small states. There are, of course, various reasons for the emergence of ethnic nationalism movement. In this context, globalization has been one of the most effective factors which affected nation state in terms of economic, political and cultural. Globalization emphasizes even the smallest cultural differences (Kongar, Küreselleşme, Mikro millyetçilik, 2015).

An action which is lead to separate certain region from independence state and making it independent is called the separatist radicalism.UK-based IRA, ETA in Spain and the extremist PKK operating in Turkey, adopted separatist radicalism, are considered as the terrorist organizations (Alkan, 2002, p. 22, 23). The ultimate goal of ethnic or racist nationalism as a separatism movement is to use violence in order to achieve its political purposes. It is a proven reality that one or more of the states are behind the separatist movements. There is no terrorist organization has the ability to survive without political and economic support of external power. Because they need sources of income for logistical support and intelligence activities such as shelter, weapons, ammunition, explosives, communication devices, fake passports, ID cards, propaganda materials (Çitlioğlu, PKK’nın Siyasi ve Ekonomik Desteklerinin

Kesilmesine Yönelik Saptama ve Çözümler, p. 4). In this context, the ethnic separatist terrorist organization in Turkey started to operate in accordance with the Marxist Leninist ideas with name of APOCU. Later on, KHKO (Kurt Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu) and PKK (Partiye Karkeren Kürdistan) was found by Abdullah Ocalan (Demirel, 2001. P. 519-525).

According to Abdullah Öcalan, social and cultural development first must be established for the formation of the Kurdistan state, which consists of southern Kurdistan (a piece of North Iraq), eastern Kurdistan (a piece of Iran) and northern Kurdistan (a piece of Turkey). Then each piece should have an autonomous and autonomous administration in its country and by continuing the struggle independence should be achieved. In the final stage, these three states which gained their independence separately, should be united and formed a great state (Demirel, 2001, p. 527). The purpose of the separatist terrorist organization (PKK) is to establish a unified and democratic Kurdistan. They consider Turkey state as an obstacle for their goal. Therefore, they are very decisive in their fight with Turkey. Because of implementing their goal separatist organization resort to political, social and armed struggle method. Thus, within the framework of this strategy, the separatist organization continues its activities. Generally, the aim of the separatist organization is to disrupt or transform the social order through intimidation and bloody actions. The main reasons behind participation of youth into radical ethnic's groups are based on socialization problems, economic problems and ideological misapprehension. Therefore, Separatist movement mostly gathers their personnel from rural by threatening, intimidation and using weapons (Msozcan, 2017, p. 123).

1.3. Socio-Economic Roots of Radicalization

In several conditions people are accused to follow the path of radicalism and terrorism, such as poverty, lack of education and economic inequality where they can find any better way than the way of radicalism and terrorism. According to Andrew Johnsonthe transnational terrorism is largely the consequence of underdevelopment and poverty. Jeffrey Frankel and David Romer and Brian Lai disputed that countries which has more economic inequality and weak economic will to have more terrorism than equilibrium societies. Moreover, the third world countries are more presumably

to shelter radical groups. In this context, the obvious conclusion is as follows; To eliminate radicalism and terrorism, countries must develop socially and economically. Krueger and Maleckov state that the link between terrorism, poverty and education is devious, complex and fully weak. The root causes of radicalism are quite complex, multidimensional. Therefore, neither theoretician on its own provides a complete account of the root causes of radicalism. Nonetheless, it will just emphasize the socio economic root causes of radicalization (Fadi Farasin, Cihat Battaloglu, Adam Atauallah Bensaid, 2017, p. 2-3). Muslims worldwide have been confronting a multidimensional crisis for years. Its roots which are formed from economic, social, political, and cultural dimensions very complicated and interweaved, However, the socioeconomic of this crisis is very important which leads youth to radicalization and violent extremism activities.

SECOND CHAPTER

VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND RADICALIZATION IN AGHANISTAN

2.1. The Evolution of Islamic Extremism in Afghanistan

Although the conservative mindset in Afghanistan dates back to the King Amanullah Khan's era of modernization. Amanullah Khan tried to bring social reformation including the women's liberation which caught the conservative mindset of the people and led to his overthrow in 1929. But in 1979, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan exacerbated religious ideology and extremism in Afghanistan. Various Islamic movements were formed and mobilized fighting the Soviets and their supporters. When the Soviet forces defeated from Afghanistan, the fight between Islamist groups started which created an opportunity for Taliban to enter and began their regime in the country with stricter rules of Islam. During that period Afghanistan changed to a secure haven for external Islamist fighters (Idrees, 2002, p. 4-5).

The Islamic extremism ideology was first found by modernist Islamist movements that had been trained under the influence of the Muslim brotherhood at Al Azhar University in Cairo. They mostly focused on giving training and recruiting students. These groups later divided into two factions, Hizb-e-Islami controlled by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Jamiyat-i-Islami led by Burhannudin Rabbani in 1975. Later on the Hizb disarticulated into two factions, one was guided by Hekmatyar and the other faction controlled by Yunes Khalis. Jamiyet-i-Islami which was led by Rabbani, was more prosperous in harboring the tribal organizations, and was a more balanced Islamist party in Afghanistan and also within the same united front. On the other hand, Hizb-e-Islami led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar rejected those who were against the Islamist ideology. The Islamist revolution was reinforced by Hekmatyar to fight against the Communist regime in Afghanistan. They achieved too many supporters from Sunni sect across the country. The Jamiyet has supporter among Sunni Persian speakers, Uzbeks and Pashtuns. During the Soviet union's resistance, the Hizb-i-Islami ranked and announced as a central of political party, emerged with Arab and Pashtun volunteers such Jalaluddin Haqqani (Mufti, 2012, 20-21). After the Soviet

war, Jamiyet left its Islamist ideology and evolved as a nationalist party, presented itself as a Northern Alliance which was against the Taliban (Roy, 2002).

Until the end of 1980s, several Islamist groups made the forehand of radical Islam. In 1970, when Borhanuddin Rabbani and Ghulam Niyazi came back to afghanistan from Al-Azhar in Cairo where they impressed from Muslim Brothers, at that time Afghan Islamist movements dates started. They recruited many university students in Afghanistan. In 1973 the Muslim Youth was very active on the Kabul campuses and also the Jama'at-i- Islami of Pakistani was advocating this movement. Soon thereafter the Soviets-Afgan war, the movements divided into two factions: The Hizb-i-Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and the Jami'at-i-Islami of Borhanuddin Rabbani and Ahmed Shah Masood. In this context, the Hizb was more helped by Pakistani authorities. Tajiks with Masood, Uzbeks with the former communist General Dostum and Shia Hazaras under Sheykh Mazari took over Kabul in April 1992. Since the creation of Afghan state in 1747, this was the sole example of non-Pashtun leadership (Roy, 2002).

On the other hand, during the twentieth century among some countries with Muslim population, Afghanistan and Pakistan were the countries which had very active rural madrasa. During the Soviet occupation, religious networks of madrassa mobilized their students against Soviet and communist supporters who were perceived as infidel (Giustozzi, 2010. P. 183). In this process Pakistani madrassas had huge impact on radicalization of youth. After the Soviet occupation, many Afghan citizens left their country and immigrated to Pakistan and Iran. Most of them could not send their children to school for education because they were poor. Therefore, it was the last alternative to send their children to the religious madrassas. These madrassas located in tribal areas of Pakistan (FATA) (Borchgrevink, 2016).

In 1989, when Soviet defeated, Afghanistan became a ground of civil war among rival mujahideen groups. During civil war not only thousands of lives were destroyed but also the country's infrastructure was deteriorated. After Mujahideen group had captured Kabul in April 1992, the civil war exacerbated. The 1992 civil war happened among the Tajik Jamiat-i-Islami and the Pashtun HiG. During the civil war in Afghanistan in 1992, Saudi Arabia invested more religious schools in Pakistan that

attempted to diffuse the Wahabi version of Islam throughout the country. Deobandi School of Islamic thought was very active in Pakistan and these madrassas gave education to numerous displaced refugees who had left Afghanistan during the civil war, especially for those poor families who were not able to tolerate the secular schools. In this period the Taliban also emerged from North-West Frontier Province and federally operated tribal area of Pakistan. While in Afghanistan these groups were recruited in Ghazni and Kandahar. In 1996, with a vast private assistance from Pakistan's ISID, Army and Air Force and the extremism group (Taliban) overthrew Mujahideen regime in Kabul (Rashid, 2001, p. 85, 93). After the Taliban conquered Kabul in 1996, they brought restrictions on human rights and banned secular education (Khalilzad, 2016).

The roots of the Taliban dates back to Mujahideen attempt against the Soviets (Rashid, 2001, p. 19). This group indicated a rise to power of the radical Islam (Mullahs). Deobandi madrassas in Pakistan had a significant impact on Taliban. Deobandi Islam follows a Salafist equality model that attempts to imitate the life and times of the Prophet Mohammed. Deobandi school located in India and became the primary producer of Mullahs. Deobandi school believes that a Muslim should obey Islamic rules. Deobandis also believe that they have a duty to do jihad to defence the Muslims of every country. Shias are known as non-Muslim in Deobandi Madrassas. After Taliban came to power, they did anti-Shia program against Hazara ethnic of Afghanistan. They led numerous massacres against Hazara Shia in Afghanistan. (Johnson, Mason. 2007. P. 75).

Before the Soviet occupation, two types of radical networks emerged from different madrassas in the region; Pashtu-speaking ulema who had studied in the madrassas of Deobandi in northwest Pakistan and those who had studied in Kandhar and Ghazni, Afghanistan. In this period, students and ulema were mobilized to resist Soviet forces. They joined Harakat Inqilaab-e-Islami to fight alongside the mujahideen and moved to northwest Pakistan to resort refugees at religious madrassas. During the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, ISI and CIA advocated clerical and Islamist network in order to fight the Soviet forces. They provide funds, weapons and shelters for mujahideen. On the other hand, the anti-Soviet extremists had come from different

Arab countries. They did not want communism to be spread. In addition, most the members of the Taliban movement which emerged after the Soviet withdrawal were Afghan and had link with the Deobandi Madrassas network in Pakistan and Harak-Inqilab-e-Islami in Afghanistan. In this context, Rashid expresses that the "Taliban exegesis of Sharia was based on extremist Deobandi views in Pakistan, a deviation of Pashtunwali (the traditional Pashtun code of conduct), and its tough implementations throughout Afghanistan. Roy also stated "there are three momentous types of neo-fundamentalist shift in Islam; first, a limited exegesis of sharia; second, a decrease of politics to the usage of sharia and accurate exegesis of the Sunna; and third, a severe opposition of western culture. Besides, Al Qaeda's alliance with the Taliban was due to links that existed during Afghan Jihad against the Soviet forces. They emerged as the vanguard of global jihad in 1990s. Al Qaeda has attempted to mobilize the entire Muslim community. Al Qaeda has been affected by Wahabism in terms of their hostility against the Shia community (Mufti, 2012, p. 21-24). So, the idea of extremism in Afghanistan has been increasing for the past four decades. Various factors like the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the U.S interference in Afghanistan along with poverty, weak institution, joblessness, corruption and lack of education are involved in its expanding (Idrees, 2016, p. 13)

2.2. The Motivation Sources and Elements of Radical Islam

2.2.1. Muhammed Abduh

Muhammed Abduh was known as the establisher of Islamic modernism. He was an Egyptian juristconsult, religious erudite and liberal reformist, (Abdullah, 2018, p. 2). Abduh was born in 1849, and died at the age of 56, in 1905. He studied logic, philosophy and Sofism at the university of Al-Azhar. He was a student of Jamal al-Din Al Afghani, a philosopher and Muslim religious reformist who supported Pan-Islamism to stand against European Colonialism. Under Afghan's influence Abduh combined journalism, politics and his fascination in Islamic mystical ideality (Harder, 2016). Abduh believed that "Muslim nations could not become stronger and prosperous again until they acquired from Europe the sciences which were the product of its activity of mind, and they could do this without abandoning Islam, for Islam thought the acceptance of all the products of reason" (Terebessy, p. 3).

In 1899 Abduh became the Grand Mufti of Egypt, a position he held until his death. Risala-al-Tawid was his best-known work. Abduh tried to illustrate the Islamic view in his book Risala-al-Tawid. Abduh strictly believed in the mastery of the disciplines and according to him there is no difference between reason and revelation. “Abduh a believer in the harmony between reason and revelation and the ardent advocate of Islamic renewal, advocated legal and theological reform and called for universal education” (Hussein, 1997. P. 1-2). Abduh has been known as a reformer and as a Salafi. He noted that “I went to the west and saw Islam, but no Muslims; I came back to the east and I saw Muslims, but no Islam”.

On the other hand, Muhmmad Abduh chose Islamic values rathen than 19 century rationalism. According to Abduh, “Muslims could not simply rely on the interpretations of texts provided by medieval clerics, they had to use reason”. His opponents called him infidel. while those who followed him knew Abduh as a sage, reformer and reviver of religion. According to Abduh Islam is fact free humanity from slavery. He was against polygamy. He supported equal rights and rejected from juristic exclusivity in the explanation of Islam (Abusulayman, 1993, p. 45).

2.2.2. Abul Ala Mevdudi

Abdul Ala Mevdudi was a Muslim jurist, historian, journalist, philosopher, scholar and activist from the Indian subcontinent. He was born in 1903 in Hyderabad, India and died at the age of 75 in 1979 in New York, US. He has written many books in Urdu language such as; Quranic exegesis, law, Hadith, philosophy and history, but then these books were translated into other languages like, English, Arabic, Indi, Bengali, Tamil, Telgu, Kannada, Burmas, Malayalam etc, (Saeed, 2006, p. 145). According to Mevdudi religion should not be separated from politics and the state should retain Sharia and Islamic culture. He attempted to revitalize Islamic culture and to propagate what he perceived to be “true Islam” (Martin, 2004, p. 371). He was one the first scholar of the Islamic world who had received Saudi Arabian King Faisal International Award for his contributions to Islam (Jackson, 2010). He is the founder of the Jamiat-i-Islami which has been the oldest militant Islamist party in the area. This party was founded in 1941 and opposed the concept of secular Pakistan during the

partition of India. According Mevdudi, Pakistan is based on the Islamic values, therefore, it should be an Islamic State (Nasr, 1994. P. 194-195).

In addition, Mevdudi's best-known work is the Tafhim-ul-Quran. He introduced the four relevant concepts in this book: "ilah (divinity), rabb (lord), ibadah (worship) and din (religion)". According to him, "Qur'an was not just religious literature to be recited, pondered, or investigated for hidden truths, but it is a work to be accepted "at face value" and obeyed". (Nasr, 1979, p. 334). Moreover, Mevdudi saw Muslims not only as the followers of the religion of Islam, but also as an obedience to divine law and having made a shahada (declaration of belief in the oneness of God and the acceptance of Muhammad as a God's Prophet). He emphasized that Muslim is a "slave of God". He also believed that Islamic rules encompasses all aspects of human being's life.

In this context, Mevdudi criticized western civilization and he saw Mughal Empire's achievements as an "Un Islamic". He emphasized that Islam advocated modernization but not westernization (Nasr, 1996, p. 53). He was against the concept of secularism and he knew secularism as "La Din" or religion less. According to his opinion, secularism was dangerous for Muslims Society, because this concept eliminates not only the morality but also removes religion from society (Adams, 1983, p. 103). Besides, Mawdudi assesses nationalism as a western concept. According to Mevdudi nationalism separated the Muslim world and extended the Western Imperialist powers. On the other hand, Mevdudi criticizes traditionalist clergy. He saw traditionalist clergy quite unsuccessful in understanding the principles of Islam (Nasr, 1996, p. 115). Al Jihad Fil-Islam was Mevdudi's first work which was about the Jihad concept. The concept of Jihad should be used to create the worldwide Islamic state and root out un-Islamic rule. As Mevdudi specified, "Islam wishes to destroy all states and governments anywhere on the face of the earth which are opposed to the ideology and program of Islam, regardless of the country or the nation which rules it. The purpose of Islam is to set up a state on the bases of its own ideology and program" (Maududi, p. 6, 7, 22).

2.2.3. Abdullah Yusuf Azam

The guider of Osama Bin Laden Abdullah Azzam was born in 1941 in the Palestinian villages of Silat al-Harithiya. He died due to explosion in a car in 1989 in Peshawar, Pakistan. During the Soviet-Afghan war, Osama was encouraged by Azzam for assisting him in Jihad. Azzam has written more than 100 books and articles (Kepel Gills, 2002, p. 145). In 1963, Azzam studied Sharia at the university of Damascus in Syria. After his graduation he came back to the west bank and started teaching Islamic rules. He also got a position of lecturer at King Abdul Aziz university, in Jeddah Saudi Arabia. (Allen, 2006, p. 285-286). Azzam was a Palestinian volunteer jihadist who went to Afghanistan for helping Afghan anti-Soviet regime in 1980. After Soviet invasion. He has been known as an ideologue behind Al Qaeda (Mufti, 2012, p. 24).

Moreover, Azzam developed and expanded the idea of Global Islamic Jihad around the world. Azzam repeatedly emphasized Afghanistan and other Islamic territory must not be under the control of infidel and they should be liberated. Abdullah Azzam had also connection to Hammas from the early 1987. He claimed that Hammas was the only Islamic movement who could defeat Jews in Palestine. Therefore, he retained his ties with the movement and advocated it financially and ideologically. According to him the main place to continue the Jihad was his birthplace, Palestine (Maliach, 2010, p. 82, 85, 91). On the other hand, Azzam, claimed “Afghanistan was as obligatory as Palestine; they were both just parts of a global battle for Islamic dominance” (Henry, 2018, p. 70).

He strictly emphasized that “I am a Palestinian and if only I could find a way into Palestine and the Aqsa Palaza, I would prefer to fight there. Whoever thinks that Jihad in Afghanistan means the abandonment of the Islamic problem in Palestine is delusional. The bloody history of Kabul is the history of the war of wounded Palestine. We hereby declare to Jews and their satellites and the Americans and the communist: we will not rest until we return to the Jihad in Palestine. Indeed, there is barrier between us in the Jihad in Palestine because of the circumstances and because of the guarded borders but, this does not mean we have stopped dreaming about Palestine. Palestine precedes Afghanistan, but now that our hands are in manacles in the borders are closed, we refuse to leave like that and instead travelling to the land of the Struggle-

Afghanistan" (Abdullah Azzam, 2000). In Jordan, Azzam took part in paramilitary operations against the Israel occupation, but became disillusioned with the secular and provisional nature of the Palestinian resistance coalition held together under the roof of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and led by Yasser Arafat (Bartal, 2015, p. 66).

Azzam issued a Fetwa when the Soviet Union occupied Afghanistan in 1979. His fatwa was "defense of Muslim Lands, the first obligation after faith declaring that both Afghan and Palestinian struggles were Jihads in which killing of occupiers of your land incumbent for all Muslims". In 1980 he moved to Peshawar, a disputed region between Pakistan and Afghanistan and border between these two countries where he established Mektab ul-Khedmat. Hundreds of students from various countries have been graduated by this school and sent them to fight against the Soviet in Afghanistan (Henry, 2018. P. 75). After Azzam's death in 1989, the word Al-Qaeda was used and Osama Bin Laden followed to adhere to the idea of global Islamic Jihad (Maliach, 2010, p. 83). Beside this his ideology and related paramilitary manuals which were promoted by Azzam's Publications were shut down after 11 Sept attacks.

2.2.4. Ibn Taymiyyah

Ibn Teymiyyah was born in Harran, Turkiye in 1263 and died at the age of 65 in 1328 in Damascus, Syria. After Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal, He was known as the second most famous Hanbali theologian and juris consult (Laoust, 2020, p. 1). Khalid El-Rouayheb stated that "Ibn Taymiyyah had very little influence on mainstream sunni Islam until the nineteenth century" (Rapoport, Ahmed, 2010, p. 269). On the other hand, Al Matroudi noted that "Ibn Taymiyyah was perhaps the most imminent and influential Hanbali jurist of the middle ages and one th most prolific among them. He was also renowned scholar of Islam whose influence was felt not only during his lifetime but extended true the centuries until the present day" Al-Matroudi, Ibrahim, 2015).

Ibn Tamiyyah aimed to teach the people regarding the primary faith of Islam, affirming the Qur'an and Sunnah as the basic foundation of Islamic religion and the Shari'ah. One of the most important treatises of Ibn Tamiyyah is Kitab al-Siyasah al-shariyyah and Kitab al Iman is his well-known work. He wrote his famous book "Kitab

al Iman" for describing the real notion of Iman and for removing its predominant misconceptions. Ibn Tamiyyah has specified the concept Iman according to the verses of Quran and Sunnah. For Ibn Temiyyah some of the prominent ideas which was supported by different Islamic sects was not acceptable, such as Mu'tazilitieS (Mutazilah), Ash'arities (Asha'irah), and Murji'ites (Al-Murji'ah). He believed their opinions were based on rational thinking. He also emphasized that the primary notions of Islam should be construed from the usual, the roots of which are existed in the Al'ulum Al-Naqliyyah which are according to the Quran and Sunnah. Furthermore, Ibn Teymiyyah wrote most of his books and treatises in order to highlights the Islamic principles as a response to the threats that came across the Muslim community. He intended to interpret the concept of Iman and its link to Islam, Ihsan and Tasdiq. He was very interested in describing what forms Iman (Ibn Taymiyyah, 13th century, p.4, 7, 8).

According to Ibn Teymiyyah, the practice of Islam through the ways of the prophet (pbuh), his companion, successors and pious ancestors in the first three centuries of Islam had changed because some members of the Muslim society have been influenced by different Islamic factions. On the other hand, Ibn Teymiyyah saw the failure and the weakness of Muslim community due to the lack of practice in Islam. Moreover, Ibn Teymiyyah was keen on resorting true Islam to the people. He felt that the correct understanding of the words of Allah and his Messenger is the best way to resolve these controversies. Every theme he highlighted was always according to the Quran and saying of the Prophet (pbuh). (Ibn Teymiyyah, 13th century, p. 9).

2.2.5. Wahhabism

Wahhabism ascribed to Muhammad ibn Abd Al Wahab and commenced as a doctrine of reform in the eighteenth century. Muhammad ibn Abd Al Wahab was born in 1703 in the Najd district of Al-Uyaynah, and died in 1792 (Muhammad Ayoub, 2008, p. 193). He studied hadith collection, Tafseer of Quran, Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), and writings of different religion scholars on the basic tenets of Islam. The most effective of them were hadith and Tafseer which developed his worldview (Bayram, 2014, p. 248-249).

In addition, Muhammad ibn Abd Al Wahab obtained his education in law, theology and Sufism in the holy cities of Mecca and Madina and also he studied in the most difficult Sunnis school called Hanbali school. In this period, he became acquainted with the teachings of Ibn Tamiyyah, a prominent religious scholar who fought opposite the crusaders. Ibn Abd Al-Wahab's ideology was affected by these teachings in Medina and Mecca. His ideology mentor Ibn Taymiyyah was against the Suffis and called them pagans and infidels. Simultaneously, Ibn Abd Al-Wahab refused the Suffis practiced saint veneration. Like other Sunnis Wahhabism is also against Shia, but Wahhabism seems to be most vocal about it. Hanbali school has significant impact on Wahhabism. In 19th century, Abdul Wahab was influenced by the ideas of Ibn Tamiyyah. Ibn Abdul al- Wahhab went to Basra with the aim of teaching the Shiites and the right way of God, but he was forcibly expelled from Basra by Shiites. He was displaced to Dar'iyyah, which is very close to Riyad, and where he met Amir Muhammad ibn Suud. Consequently, the agreement between him and Ibn Suud, provides the basis for the Wahhabi state established in 1744. His experience was the impetus for his anti-Shiite activities, which he followed till the end of his life. Because of his actions he also alienated from his father and brother. His father was punished for his son's action and fired from his position. According to Ibn Wahhab, Muslim community was living in the pre-Islamic period, Jahiliyya (period of ignorance). He issued command in order to destroy all the tombs, the mosques built on the tombs, do not worship anyone rather than God. He claimed these acts were "concrete superstition and idolatry, which are the worst sins in Islam, condemn these ideas and apply unauthorized innovations". (R. Dillion, 2009. 14-15). (R. Dillion, 2009, 15-16).

The term Wahhabism was known as a reactionary movement against extremist sentiments about the sanctity of saint people, who had previously died, and wishing intercession and blessing from them. Prior to the Islamic culture, both religious principles and rituals had been localized and pre-Islamic culture. Therefore, Wahhabism was against the all above-mentioned trends and revived Ibn Tamiya's ideas in terms of both religion and worldview. The official sect of Saudi Arabia is Wahhabism. Ibn abd al-Wahhab started to propagate his ideology and opinions through his own book Kitab al- Tawheed. He invited people to the right religion by

abandoning polytheism (association) and all suggestions (innovations) (Ethem Ruhi, 2001, p. 105, 107). In terms of Jurisprudence, Wahhabis introduce themselves as Hanbali, insisting on monotheism as their priority (F. Alrebh, 2017. P. 279).

Furthermore, according to Wahhabism, the main concept of Islam is Tawhid. However, it states that true belief is not enough without having correct Islamic behavior (R. Dillion, 2009, p. 28). Ibn Abdul wahhab, presents three types of Tahid: The monotheism of the lord (rububiyyah), monotheism of theology (uluhiyyah) and the names and attributes of the monotheism of God (Bayram, 2014. P. 252). In the view of Wahhabism, belief in God is insufficient without the following of deeds and cloths that leads to paganism and domination (disbelief). Thus, drawing any living thing with a soul, listening to specified types of music, praying on the tombs of pantheon (including the tombs of the prophets) and following any of the worshipers (schools of Islamic jurisprudence) who deviate from the main sources are forbidden by Wahhabism (R. Dillion, 2009, p. 28).

The Wahhabis separate themselves from the Sunni orthodoxy and claim that the pious ancestors (al-salaf al-salih) are the model that all Muslims should follow. This concept led them to blame the majority of Sunni Muslims living under the Ottoman Caliphate (promotion) and the ruler (disbelief) because the political system was known to pious ancestors. Besides, Wahhabism claimed that whole Muslims who did not follow Wahhabism were guilty of polytheism (polytheistic sin) because they were not in the path of pious ancestors or subject to takfir (takfir). The above accusation had huge influences as it paved the way for “Jihad against one’s own people,” and this would be justification for Wahhabis to kill other Muslims. After the creation of modern state by Abdul Aziz, “Wahhabism was changed from a revolutionary jihadist to a conservative da’wa (rightist) movement, social, political, theological and religious and became loyal to the royal Saudi family (R. Dillion, 2009, p. 28-29).

There are several reasons that why Wahhabism has been able to survive and expand in today’s Islam. First, Wahhabi revolts against the former Ottoman created a strong bond for Arab independence and independence for some Muslims who embraced the emerging ideologies of Arab nationalism. Second, Wahhabism

incitement of going back to the early period of the “rightly guided” (Al salaf al-salih) for many Muslim reformers it meant a rebirth of Jihad, which would remove all previous interpretation and bring a change into the traditional sources. Third, by conquering Macca and Madina, the Saudis had the ability to attend large numbers of pilgrims and the Hajj had the ability to influence and quite possibly control Islamic belief system. Finally, the vast oil wealth of contributed the Saudi’s need to export Wahhabism and infiltrate Islamic world in exchange for supporting them (Abou El Fadl, 2007. P. 71-72).

After the September 11, 2001, the world was aware of the Saudi’s action and emphasized that their actions spread radical and extremist ideology. Prior to the 11 September 2001, Saudi support the Jihadi movements in the conflict against the Soviet invasion in 1979 in Afghanistan. Later Saudi support for the Taliban (1996-2001) and other radical groups that fought against foreign interference in the Muslim countries. While after the 11 September Saudi Wahhabis shows a decline of support for Jihadi movements. Finally, it’s important to understand how Ibn Al-Wahhab defined Jihad. According to Ibn Abd al Wahhab, “Jihad is fard kifaya, or collective duty, required by those who fulfill the requirements established by God: submission to Islam, maturity, financial ability, free status, the intent to remember and serve God in this endeavor and good moral character”. He claimed that “A Muslim is obligated to participate in jihad except for periods of Hajj or of Peace and truce”. At this point Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was called jihad for Muslim world (R. Dillion, 2009, p. 50-51).

2.3. The Islamist Movements in Afghanistan

During the Soviet invasion, various Islamists movements were mobilized to fight communism and their supporters in Afghanistan (Idrees, 2016, p. 4). In this period Any Afghan who took up arms in order to fight Soviet forces and engaged in jihad was called Mujahed (Marsden, 2002, p. 26). The Mujahedeen were a complicated group of Islamic jihadists which were controlled by dufferent military leaders with various ethnic and religious backgrounds. However, despite most of the war budget and weapons, which have been distributed to Islamist groups such Hizb-e-Islami guided by Hekmatyar and Jamiat-e-Islami guided by Burhannudin Rabbani; they were able to build centralized, political organizations that had significant influence until the

end of the war (Rashid, 2001, p. 19). The most influential Islamist movements in Afghanistan are to be discussed in the following.

2.3.1. The Afghani Hizb-i İslami

Hizb-i-Islami, an extremist group based in Afghanistan, is led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. It was the most radical group of the mujahideen to fight the Soviets in the 1980s (Dale Scott, 2003, p. 49). In the mid-1970s, after the separation from Jamiyat-e-Islami led by Rabbani, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar formed Hizb-i-Islami of Afghanistan (Mufti, 2012, p. 64). Shamshato and Jalozai were a refugee camp in the NWFP (Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province) where Hekmatyar trained Afghan and foreign guerilla fighters for fighting against the Soviet forces. He also run numerous hospital and schools at the Northwest Frontier Province. He was financially supported by Saudi Arabia's charity organization, Muslim Brotherhood, Osama Bin Laden and other wealthy Arabs

Hekmatyar was the leader of Hizm-i-Islami and he was born in Northern Kunduz province in 1947. He belongs to the Kharotai tribal which is the sub-branch of Ghilzai Pashtuns. While he was studying at the Kabul University, he became a member of the religious youth movements. This movement was influenced by Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Hekmatyar was imprisoned for the murder of a Maoist. After the 1973 military coup by Sardar Daud, he was exiled to Pakistan. Hekmatyar focused on creating a pure Islamic state and used a highly disciplinary organizational structure built around a small personnel of educated elites. In 1979, Hizb-i-Islami divided into two factions. Hizb-i-Islami led by Hekmatyar and the other Hizb-i-Islami led by Mawlawi Khalis (ISW: Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG)). During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, HiG became involved in resistance against Soviet forces. ISI Pakistan and the United states supported HiG in its fight against the Soviet forces (mufti, 2012, p. 64).

After the communist government of Dr. Najibullah in 1992, the president Rabbani offered the position of prime minister of the country to Hekmatyar. But he denied to join the government, he sent one of his party members named Ustad Farid to Kabul to become a prime minister instead of him. The alliance between Jamiyat Islami and Hizb-i-Islami were temporary. In 1994, Hekmatyar started rocket attacks on the

capital and thousands of people was killed, got the nickname “Butcher of Kabul”. The ISI of Pakistan supported HiG to topple Tajik dominant government in Kabul (ISW: Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG)). After the Taliban took Kabul in 1996, Hekmatyar was forced into self-exile in Iran. While later Iran expelled him, that have been claimed came back to Afghanistan in February 2002 after 2001 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. Although he pledged his support to the Taliban. He was against the U.S. and NATO forces. However, the relation between Taliban and HiG has been complex. On the other hand, after Karzai took power in Afghanistan, the HiG decided to work with the government against the Taliban in order to stop further loss of its influence in the region. (Mufti,2012, p.65). Finally, on September 22, 2016, Hezb-i-Islami signed an agreement with the government of Afghanistan. The last accord grants Hekmatyar amnesty and r that the requires the Afghan government to lobby international actors to r raise the group sanctions.

2.3.1. Jamiat-i- Islami

The oldest Muslim political party in Afghanistan is the Jamiat-i-Islami. It was made by various students at Kabul University. Most of the members of the party belong to Tajik ethnic of Western and Northern area of Afghanistan. The party’s ideology was formed based on Islamic law. The party was led by Burhaniddin Rabbani who was an Islamic theology professor at the Kabul University. Burhaniddin Rabbani served as a president of the Islamic State of Afghanistan from 1992 to 2001. Jamiat-i-Islami was one of the most powerful Mujahideen groups, during the Soviet-Afghan, which was happened in 1980s against the communist government and the following Afghan civil war (Abasin Zaheer, 2011, Pajhword Afgan News).

Jamiat-i-Islami originally emerged in 1972 among the Islamist groups. This group was influenced by Abul A’la Mevdudi and his Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan (Haqqani, 2005, p. 171). The Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan is the biggest Islamic political party which was in top of its political power under Zia’s regime in 1980s. Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan, through its network of religious schools, charities and businesses, supported the Afghan Mujahideen in the Soviet-Afghan war and this had a major impact on the Islamist forces of Hekmetyar and Rabbani in Afghanistan (Mufti, 2012, p. 29-30). When Duad Khan’s government declared Rabbani’s

arrestment in 1973, he fled to Pakistan, and hosted by Jamaat-e-Islami. Furthermore, the Jamiats dominated the Tajiks, but had more tribal and regional divisions than other groups, and were willing to search "common ground" with non-Muslims. It gained prominence because of the battlefield of Ahmad shah Masoud (Kepel, 2002, p. 141). When the Taliban took power in Kabul, the Major factions of the Mujahideen formally united, the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan which was known as the Northern Alliance in the West, with Rabbani, formally becoming its political leader. Other members of the Jamiat in the United Front government held senior position. (Sources: internet).

2.3.3. Taliban and the role of Taliban during civil war

The Taliban's ideological and structural roots commenced with the Mujahideen during the Soviet war in Afghanistan. The Taliban is a jihadist radical group operating in Afghanistan against the current Western-backed government. They were founded in 1994 by Mullah Omar in Kandahar, Afghanistan. Taliban are Islamic extremist group that captured the majority of Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001. The Taliban have played many different roles after Soviet-Afghan war. The Taliban started as a revolutionary grassroots movement, and eventually became a well-known government of Afghanistan. During the Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001, The Taliban were defeated by the United States and its union. Today, the Taliban have become the most radical movement in the region (R. Smith, 2001, p. 4).

The Taliban primarily consists of Ghilzai confederation and Kakar tribe of the Ghurghusht confederation. Most of the senior members of the Taliban, including Mullah Mohammad Omar Akhund, are from the Hotak Ghilzai tribe. Ghilzai Pashtuns are concentrated in the southeast; in Oruzgan, Zabul, Daikundi, Gardez and Katawaz region of Paktika province. But there are also some Ghilzai Pashtun in the center and north of the country. Taliban advent from the religious schools of NWFP (Pakistan's North West Frontier Province) and FATA (Federally Administer Tribal Area). In Afghanistan, the Taliban were recruited primarily from madrassas near Ghazni and Kandahar (Johnson and Mason, 2007, p. 74, 76).

The Taliban emerged during Afghan civil war in the 1990s and marched on the ulema, belonged to the to the Deobandi madrassa network in Pakistan. The ideology

and social structure of the Taliban have been defined in the literature in different ways. The most conclusive Taliban report is provided by Rashid, he emphasized that the "Taliban interpretation of sharia was influenced by extremist Deobandi Islamic teachings in Pakistan, perversion of Pashtunwali (the traditional Pashtun code of contact), and its harsh enforcement all over Afghanistan". On the other hand, Roy offered three important features of the Taliban: "first, a narrow interpretation of sharia; second, a reduction of politics to the application of sharia and strict interpretation of the Sunnah; and third, a vehement opposition to Western culture" (Mufti, 2012, p. 23). Deobandi Islam is a conservative Islamic orthodoxy that seeks to imitate the life and times of the prophet Mohammed (Johnson and Mason, 2007, p. 75). According to Deobandis, a Muslim must be first loyal to his religion and then to his country. The Deobandis are against to any kind of social caste system in Islam (Rashid, 2001, p. 77).

The Mujahideen began fighting among themselves after the withdrew of Soviet Union from Afghanistan (Dorronsoro, 2005. P. 4). They were a complicated group of Islamic Jihadist dominated by different leaders of various ethnic and religious background (Rashid, 2010, p. 18). The Afghans who allied under the leadership of Mullah Mohammed Omar were called Taliban and claimed control of various warlord to control southern Afghanistan (R. Smith, 2001, p. 10). In 1996, Omar declared himself as emir ul-Momineen the legitimate spiritual leader of Muslims in Afghanistan. In 1996, when the Taliban took Kabul, they regulated some restrictions for people such as disarming the Afghan population, enforcing sharia, and defending the Islamic character of the "Emirate of Afghanistan". Moreover, The Taliban barred most sporting events and entertainment. They banned all girl's schools and not allowed women for appearing in public, punishing them with death by stoning and amputations. Even when families were in their homes, the windows were painted black to prevent passers from staring at women in their private neighborhood (Rashid, 2001, p. 22, 90).

At that time Pakistan was one of three countries, the other two were Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, in the region which announced the recognition of the Taliban regime and maintained its relation with the Taliban through Pakistani embassy in Kabul throughout the Taliban regime. The "strategic depth" of Pakistan on

its western flank seemed stable during the Taliban regime from 1996 until the American joined Afghanistan after 9/11. On the other hand, India, the rival of Pakistan, could not expand its influence in Afghanistan with conservative Taliban (Rashid, 2008, p. 15). In this context, JUI (Jamiat-i-Ulama Islami) of Pakistan had set up a network of its own to expand the influence of the Deobandi School of Islamic thought. These madrassas helped various displaced refugees who had left Afghanistan during Soviet-Afghan war and created the opportunity for the poor families to send their children into school who could not able to pay for the secular schools. The Afghan civil war not only killed thousands of people but also displaced many people across the country and destroyed the country's infrastructure. After mujahedeen group conquered Kabul in April 1992, the civil war exacerbated and later with big change assistance from Pakistan ISID, Army and Air Forces, in 1996 Taliban captured Kabul. The Taliban blamed this regime for continuing civil war and the worsening security in country, as well as discrimination against Pashtuns (Johnson and Mason, 2007, p. 73).

Financially, the Taliban had been supported by Saudi Arabia, Middle East Countries and the Pakistan government. On the other hand, the narcotics economy funded the Taliban. Meanwhile, Al Qaeda played a major role in the development of the Taliban. Al Qaeda has provided the Taliban with funding, training facilities, and militants to fight its battles. Moreover, Al Qaeda's global jihadist ideology has had the effect of rendering the ideological vision of the Taliban leadership more extreme. After the Afghan war, Pakistani ISI started to support the Taliban. In Pakistan, the Deobandi clerics and some army officers were trying to back the Taliban regime (mufti, 2012, p. 60-61).

Furthermore, there has been increasing Talibanization in Pakistan since 2006. Former Pakistan president, General Pervez Musharraf sees Talibanization as a great menace to the world. Musharraf claimed that the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan could lead to a Talibanization of the Pashtuns. On the contrary, the Afghan Taliban has been created by the Pakistani government to bring peace to Afghanistan by ending warlordism in the war-ravaged country during the 1990s. Maulana Jalaluddin Haqqani, and his son, Sirajuddin Haqqani Alias Khalifa, who runs

the infamous “Haqqani network” from the Khost province of Afghanistan had major impact on the Pakistani Taliban groups in 1980s (Zetterlund, 2009, p. 41-43).

After the 11 September 2001, terrorist attacks, U.S. President George W. Bush demanded that the Taliban turn over all al-Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan; release all imprisoned foreign nationals; protect foreign journalists, diplomats and aid workers; immediately close every terrorist training camp, and handover every terrorist and their supporters; and gave the United States full access to terrorists training camps for inspection. After Taliban refused U.S demands, the United States and United Kingdom launched air-strikes to topple Taliban from power. The U.S led coalition forced the Taliban to relinquish from its controlling Afghan’s territory and the government. After the Taliban withdrawal, Afghanistan held its first democratic presidential elections in October 2004 and Hamid Karzai was elected as president of Afghanistan (Taliban, 2001, p. 113).

2.3.4. Al-Qaeda

In 1988, Osama Bin Laden formally established Al Qaeda from a network of veterans of the Afghan insurgency against the Soviet Union (Thomas, 2018, p. 1). Al Qaeda emerged as the vanguard of global jihad. Indeed, the emergence of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan dates back to the Soviet occupation, when the Saudi governments, the ISI, and the CIA instigated volunteers to Afghanistan to assist the jihadist groups. Abdullah Azzam was one such volunteer and was widely perceived as the ideologue behind al Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden’s mentor. After his death, Bin Laden became the head of Al Qaeda group. Bin Laden conveyed Fatwa on February 23, 1998, which represented Azzam’s ideology and objectives “to wage against America in response to the financial, military and cultural threat that it posed to Muslim identity” (Gunaratna, 2005. P. 61, 63). In this context, Al Qaeda committed terrorist attacks against America and its allies, including the 1998 bombing of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and the 2000 attacks on the U.S.S. Cole in Aden, Yemen (Thomas, 2018, p. 2).

Suicide has been one of the best tactic of Al-Qaeda for achieving its goal. This group has been devoted much of its time in struggling to provoke its fighter for death and instigating its fighters to die to drive fear into the enemy. Meanwhile, Al-Qaeda has very complicated financial network, philanthropists, businesses, and other

foundations in the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. The above mentioned are the primary sources of funding for Al Qaeda. In addition, Al Qaeda has developed legal institutions, including public and private charities, banks and companies. As well as, it has an extensive network of investments and small businesses in order to generate funds (Gunaratna, 2003, p. 90).

After the withdrawal of Soviet Union from Afghanistan in 1989, foreign extremist fighters went back to their homeland to process Islamic campaigns there. One of them was Osama Bin Laden, who returned to Saudi Arabia and later came back to Afghanistan in 1996, and shaped al-Qaeda as an organization promoting a violent jihad. As a very famous writer "Gunaratna" claims that "Bin Laden defined short-term, mid-term and long-term goals for the group". Before September 11, Al Qaeda's aim was the to withdraw U.S. forces of from the Saudi Arabia after the Gulf War. The medium-term goal was to create Islamic states that follow Islamic law. The long-term aim was to bring these Islamic states and encourage them for war the United States and its allies (Mufti, 2012, p. 66). In 1997, the Taliban authorized were allowed to open training camps for al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. After Bin Ladin returned to Afghanistan, between 10000 and 20000 volunteers were trained. After the 9/11 attacks, Operation Enduring Freedom began on October 7, 2001. Al-Qaeda lost at least 80% of its members and training camps (Byman, 2015, p. 22, 42). However, the group played a major role in conducting numerous terrorist attacks. Finally, the prominent leader of Al Qaeda Osama bin Laden was killed by U.S. forces in Abbottabad, Pakistan, and Zawahiri became the leader of Al-Qaeda instead of him.

2.3.5. ISIS

The Islamic States is the result of the American intervention in Iraq. The 2003 intervention shifted the political balance in the country, shifting the political power from the formerly dominant Sunni minority to the Shiite minority. Militant Sunni extremist made an agreement with tribal leaders and former Sunni politicians to oppose the American intervention and Shiite- led government. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,a Jordanian professional Jihadist, emerged as the movement's most ruthless and radical leader. In 2002, Zarqawi moved to Iraq and became an active leader in the fighting against U.S. forces. He also consolidated his link with the Al Qaeda group in 2004.

His relationship with Osama Bin Laden gives him immediate credibility with international Salafi jihadist, made him the head of the Sunni Arab Iraqi rebel movement.

The new leader of Al-Qaeda, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, transformed its headquarters from Iraq into Syria after the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq in 2011 and the start of a civil war in neighboring Syria. After could not control his leadership over another current Al Qaeda affiliate, Baghdadi disbanded with the previous organization in 2014, formed the Islamic State as the new claimant to global leadership of the Salafi jihadist movement. In early 2015, the Islamic State succeeded to control more than 100,000 kilometers square of land inhabited by more than 11 million people, mostly in Iraq and Syria. At the same time, the Islamic State added new provinces, in Libya, Egypt, Nigeria, and Afghanistan. The Islamic State also had ideologically influence over Saudi Arabia, Algeria and Caucasus, but they were unable to control any territory there. Salafi Jihadist groups in Somalia, the Philippines, Turkey, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Mali and Tunisia have pledged allegiance to the Islamic State. The group has strengthened its control and expanded its control by using brutal violence and cooperation of deprived local individuals and groups (Rand Corporation; (Johnes, Dobbins, Chandler), Rolling Back the Islamic State, 2017). According to William McCants, one of the most successful Salafi Jihadist groups in modern history is the Islamic State and even surpasses Al-Qaeda (McCants, 2015).

The strategy of the Islamic State is expansionist and its goal is to creat a Pan-Islamic Caliphate. The Islamic State is not have interested in capturing specific countries or even regions. Despite its expansionist ideology, the group has faced significant roadblocks. Between 2014 and 2017, the Islamic State faced increasingly effective resistance from local government forces in Syria, Afghanistan, Libya and Niger and declined its control over these countries. The Islamic State is originally based on religious fervor and apocalyptic prophecy. After separation from Al Qaeda, Islamic States attempted to form a Pan-Islamic Caliphate that would spread across Africa through the Middle East, South Asia and part of the Pacific. In addition, Ebu Bakr al Baghdadi declared to his obeyed, “Rush O Muslim to your state. Yes, it is your state. we make a special to the scholars and callers, especially the judges, as well as

people with military, administrative and service expertise and medical doctors and engineers of all different specializations and fields" (Al Baghdadi, 2014).

The Islamic State is trying to gain control over the local people and to create an extremist version of Sharia. It seeks to support itself via local economy. Furthermore, the Islamic State has been against the Shia religion. Baghdadi condemned Shiite as infidel and incited violent jihad against them: "I direct my call to all the Muslim youth and men all over the world, and call them to make Hijrah to us to consolidate the pillars of the State of Islam in perform jihad against the Safavid Rafida" (Al Baghdadi, 2012, Fursan Al Balagh Meida). Moreover, in 2015 the Islamic State intensified its operation in Afghanistan, estimating 511,777 people and roughly 2,919 Km2 territory in Afghanistan. Most of this control includes the Southwestern province of Farah, the Eastern province of Nangarhar, and the Kajaki district in the Southern Helmand province. However, during conflict with the Taliban and periodic attacks by U.S. and Afghan forces, the Islamic State lost most of its territory and suffered heavy casualties including the assassination of deputy leader Abdul Raziq Mehadi (Rand Corporation; Johnes, Dobbins, Chandler, 2017, P. 20-21).

Finally, these numbers presented a significant reduction in Islamic State control of population between 2014 and winter 2016-2017: 56 percent decline in Syria, 83 percent in Iraq, 75 percent in Nigeria, almost 100 percent in Libya, and 87 percent in Afghanistan. The Islamic State of Egypt did not lose much, although it operated in only a small part of Sinai (Tse-Tung, 2000, p. 51).

2.4. The Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989)

The war between Soviets-Union and Afghanistan started in December 1979 and lasted until February 1989. (Reuveny and Prakash, 1999, p. 696). This conflict was known as the birthplace of Islamic extremism and the global terrorism by many experts (Commins, 2006. p. 4). The Democratic People's Party came to power during the April 1978 coup. Sardar Daoud was overthrown and killed after the coup. The coup was carried out by some of the same agents who helped Daoud during its presidential campaign almost five years earlier. The military officers released the People's Democrat party leaders who had been imprisoned by Daoud. In December 1978, when the communist party took control of the Afghan government, they signed an agreement

with the Soviet Union which was aimed at providing extensive military assistance to Afghanistan (Haqqani, 2005, p. 176-177). At that time, various Islamic groups began to fight against the People's Democratic Party of communists.

The war between Soviet-Union and Afghanistan started in 1979 and lasted until 1989. During this 10 years' war 1,5 million civilian lost their lives and millions were compelled to leave their country. Many of them settled in Pakistan and Iran. The war started in 1978 after Nur Muhammad Taraki took the power with military coup. Taraki's regime attempted to bring a series of Fundamental reforms all over the country. These reforms were unusual among the most traditional rural populations and founding power structures. The Democratic People's Party suppressed opposition, including the execution of thousands of political prisoners (Kayniyilmaz, 2018, p. 136). By the late of 1980, almost one million Afghans had gone to Pakistan as refugees. By 1988, the number of refugees increased to three million. With the Mujahidin's guerrilla attacks, Afghanistan became insecure for Russian and Afghan communist forces, the security of small towns and suburbs became fragile. Pakistan sheltered Afghan refugees in nomadic villages mainly in the NWFP and Balochistan. Their expenses are paid by the Office of the United Nation high commissioner for Refugees. The most important person to reach Pakistan at the time was Palestinian scholar Abdullah Azzam, who established the Maktab al-Khidmaat (school of services) to facilitate the involvement of foreign mujahidin in the Afghan Jihad (Haqqani, 2005. P. 189, 191)

In early 1979, The Unites State assisted insurgents opposed the pro-Soviet, Marxist government of President Taraki. In 1979, President Carter's National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, instigated covert effort for Mujaheddin to fight against the Afghan government in an attempt to lure the Russian into what he called "trap of Afghan". He was very proud of them falling into the "Afghan trap" (Chomsky, 2001). A strong bipartisan consensus emerged within the Reagan Administration that the United States should support the Afghan resistance. The United States increased the quantity and quality of arms sent to the Afghans, including the stinger anti-aircraft system for targeting Soviet airpower. In 1986, Gorbachev sent message to Afghanistan's communist leader that his regime would have to defend from the

Mujaheddin resistance. Simultaneously, Gorbachev declared in his public speech that Afghanistan was “a bleeding wound” (Khalilzad, 2016).

Afghanistan has long been under the influence of the Soviet government and received large amounts of assistance, economic aid, military equipment training military hardware from the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Soviet influence in Afghanistan raised during the republic regime of Sardar Muhammad Daoud after the overthrow of the Afghan monarchy in 1973. On December, 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1978 under the pretext of supporting the Soviet-Afghan Friendship agreement. The Soviet Union sent a large military airlift to Kabul, consisting of almost 280 transport aircraft and three divisions of approximately 8,500 men each. Within a few days the Soviets had supplied Kabul. On December 27, the ousted leader of Parcham faction of the Marxist People’s Democrat Party, Babrak Karmal, became the new head of the Afghan government. However, the Soviets and its backed regime were faced with fierce resistance from insurgent groups known collectively as the mujahidin and smaller Maoist groups. The Mujahidin saw atheist Soviets who controlled Afghanistan as a contradiction of Islam and also of their traditional culture. They announced Jihad against Soviet Army and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and won the support of Islamic world. They were supported primarily by the Saudi Arabia, United States, United Kingdom and Pakistan (History.com Editors).

Prior to the Soviets invasion, Pakistan sought to expand its influence in Afghanistan with the help of Jammat-e-Islami Rabbani and Hekmatyar’s Islamic party. They were ideologically affiliated with the Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan and the Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East. The revolution in Iran was waged to revive intelligence cooperation between Pakistan and United States, paving the way for Pakistan to achieve what it later wanted in Afghanistan (Haqqani, 2005, p. 103, 178). Within a few months of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Pakistanis had achieved significantly higher levels than United States support for their secret operations. Pakistan had invested heavily in its intervention in Afghanistan. on the other hand, Carter administration provided an initial package of 400 million dollars in economic and military assistance to Pakistan to support the Afghan mujahideen.

Within a few months, Saudi budget increased as much as the Pakistan's Afghan Jihad (Haqqani, 2005, p. 186-187).

In the 1987 the new leader of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, decided to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan. Soviet forces began withdrawing in 1988. This was the Soviet Union's first military trip since World War II Eastern Bloc, marking the end of a period of improved the cold war relations (History.com Editors).

THIRTH CHAPTER

PAKISTAN CONSEQUENCE OF DETERIOTING SECURITY IN AFGHANISTAN

3.1. Relations Between Afghanistan and Pakistan

Afghanistan and Pakistan have had very warmth and affinity relations since the independence of Pakistan in 1947. They have deep- rooted historical ties, traditional affiliations, shared religious identity, ethnic and cultural ties and strategic partnerships. However, bilateral relations between the two have been very volatile and full of ups and downs. Afghanistan is one of Pakistan's most important strategic, cultural, geographically and politically neighbors. Throughout history, the invaders, traders and visitors came to the Indian sub-continent through and from Afghanistan, crossing the Khyber Pass and lands of Sindh and Punjab ending up in Delhi. History shows that there has been a continuous contact among the people of these two countries. After independence, Pakistan consolidated its relations with Afghanistan (Mairaj Ul Hamid, 2017, p. 59-60).

Afghanistan has been very special importance to Pakistan. It has historically been a gateway to force, mostly beyond the Hindu Kush, which is on its way to the indian subcontinent and Pakistan. The thinking of Pakistan's security establishment, Siddiqi mentioned "the history of various invasions of India and argued that, because most invaders of India came through Afghanistan and because historically the land that now constituted West Pakistan was closely linked to Afghanistan, Pakistan's defense could be ensured only by integration of the two contemporary states. He cited that toward the West, Pakistan can have depth in defense and Afghanistan and Iran could provide depth in Pakistan's defense against India" (Husain Haqqani, 2005, p. 166-167).

Afore mentioned Pakistan and Afghanistan share religion, culture, ethnic links and history. This makes the nature of the bilateral relations very strong and this bilateral links described by former Afghan president Hamid Karzai as "conjoined and inseparable twins". This relation also described by Prime Minister Nawas Sharif: "enemies of Afghanistan cannot be friend of Pakistans". On the other hand, Pakistan

and Afghanistan share border measuring 2, 500 Kilometers, which is crossed each day by thousands of people and the large measure of trade and economic interactions are being implemented through this border. Moreover, this mutual dependency is supported by the factor of reciprocal strategic. For instance, stability of one state directly effects the internal stability of the other (Mairaj, Ul Hamid, 2017, p. 60). This multidimensional relation has evolved over a long period of time. Because both practice the same religion (Islam), Sunni version of Islam generally conforming to Deobandi school of thought. The Afghan Jihad against former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was an overwhelming manifestation of unanimity of thought engulfing the two peoples (Martin W. Lewis, 2010). After Pakistan receiving its independence on August 14, 1947, resentment and hostility between these two countries got new phase, as Afghanistan assumed fresh positions over some of already settled issues (The Durand Line) and over some the partially unresolved issues (Mairaj, Ul Hamid, 2017, p. 60). After Pakistan's independence, Afghanistan was the only country to oppose Pakistan's bid to join the United Nations membership. Although, the negative vote was soon withdrawn (Shamshad Ahmad, 2010, p. 302).

Even though the border agreement of 1893 was continuously ratified by the successive rulers of Afghanistan. The Durand line was the first issue that Afghanistan raised in different forums (Ahmad Shayeq Qassem, 2008, Pakistan and Afghanistan relations: The Durand line issue). In case of Durand line, Afghanistan has been claiming over territories covering some of the Pashtun inhibited areas falling in tribal areas, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and parts of Balochistan province of Pakistan. Notwithstanding Indian-Pakistan war, Afghanistan promised to Pakistan posing no threat from its western border. Therefore, Pakistan relocated its troops from Pak-Afghan border to combat zones on India-Pakistan border. Throughout these years Afghanistan remained under the rule of King Zahir Shah (Umar Sharifi, 2009, Pakistan's foreign policy toward Afghanistan from 1947-2008). In 1973, the Afghan monarchy, overseen by Zahir Shah, was overthrown in a military coup by Sardar Muhammad Daoud who was supported by Soviets. After Daoud ousted the monarchy, he announced the republic of Afghanistan and he became its president (Husain Haqqani, 2005, p. 167).

Because of its modernization and reform policy, Daoud's coup showed the discontent of educated urban elites. On the other hand, Daoud wanted to accelerate Afghanistan's development and tried to bring Soviet aid to Afghanistan. After Daoud took power, he signed up seventy new projects including Soviets assistance. Daoud's government was advocated by Pashtun nationalists, Baloch and PDPA (Husain Haqqani, 2005, p. 168). During Sardar Daoud era, Kabul once again raised the issue of Durand Line and moved Afghan troops to border areas. These actions made the bilateral relations so tense, even Sardar Daud did not participate in Islamic Conference Summit 1947, held in Lahore After Daud era. All rulers of Afghanistan were propelled to power by covert or overt support, until Soviets invaded Afghanistan Militarily in 1979 (Mairaj, Ul Hamid, 2017, p. 62).

In Pakistan in 1970, Zulfiqar Ali Butto, civilian government, was in power. He took the power after the Pakistan's military retreated and defeated in Bangladesh. The 1970 election gave the opportunity to provide Bhutto the mandate ruling West Pakistan and to deploy a large number in Baluchistan and the NWFP to the ethnic-based National People's Party (NAP). Abdul Wali Khan, the leader of NAP, was the son of a Pashtun nationalist, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, and was therefore vulnerable to the search for Pashtunistan. In this context, Bhutto abandoned her authoritarian tendencies and shared power with the Baloch and Pashtun leaders, to prevent any insurgency coming from the Pashtuns or Baloch leaders. Later everything happened reverse and the ISI informed Bhutto from the NAP's plans for insurgency in Baluchistan against the Central government. Therefore, Bhutto dismissed the Baluchistan government, accusing it of planning the rebellion and the leader of NAP Abdul Wali Khan and his colleagues were imprisoned (Husain Haqqani, 2005, p. 168-189).

During the Baluch war against Pakistan's army, republican regime of Daoud in Afghanistan, backed leaders of the Baluch tribal with publicity and small arms. At that time, several Pashtun and Baloch leaders escaped from Pakistan and settled in Kabul. Soon after, CIA, ISI, and the secret service of the Shah of Iran (Savak) began to implement covert operations in Kabul, running it into an arena for Cold War rivalries. Afghan Islamists were the Pakistan instruments in this game. Because religious sentiments have always been a very strong element in creating anarchy in Afghanistan.

In 1931, Afghanistan's dual legal constitution was created, with Sharia courts alongside with Islamic courts. Moreover, in 1950, King Zahir Shah created the faculty of Theology at Kabul University and even appointed theologian's professors as his advisers (Husain Haqqani, 2005, p. 170)

During 1979, Pakistan government advocated the people of Afghanistan in opposing and resisting the Soviet invasion and prolonged occupation, diplomatically and militarily. After Geneva accords and Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1988, Pakistan supported a broad-based government compromising of Mujahideen leadership and later as Taliban took Power in Kabul, Pakistan extended diplomatic recognition to Taliban government 1996. Thus, Pakistan's relations with all post-Soviet governments in Afghanistan remained warm till 9/11 (Mairaj, Ul Hamid, 2017, p. 63). In the 1970s, Jamaat-e-Islami and the Pakistan security services had common goals in Afghanistan. Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan wanted to incite Islamic groups in Central Asia consisting Afghan mujahideen. On the other hand, ISI also reorganized the potential for Pakistan's important role in the fight against communism with a religious factor. ISI closely monitored developments in Afghanistan.

After Daoud coup d'état in 1973, the leader of Afghan Jamait-e-Islami, Burhandin Rabbani fled to Pakistan, in where he was provided financial support by the ISI. Later, after Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistan supported Islamic and financial uprisings, and the U.S- backed Jihad against Soviet occupation. In this process, large-scale covert operations and proxy warfare in support of the Afghan mujahideen strengthened Pakistan's value as ally of the U.S. At that time, Pakistan was a major factor in the defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Even Pakistan jeopardized its stability by accepting 3.5 million Afghan refugees and by serving as a conduit for weapons from the United States to the Mujahideen. In this context, Pakistan was attempting on identifying future leaders for Afghanistan who are more closely associated to Pakistan. Therefore, from the Islamist leaders Hekmatyar the leader of Hezb-e-Islami, from the staring was intend to accept radical methods, was selected for that role (Husain Haqqani, 2005, p. 172, 174).

In the 1970s, Pakistan and Afghanistan were engaged with a proxy war. Sardar Muhammad Daoud advocated the Baloch revolts in Pakistan. Daoud's government

created training camps for Baloch rebellions and there had been trained, and between ten and fifteen thousand tribes were trained to fight against Pakistan. In contrast, Pakistan supported the Afghan Islamist rebels based in Peshawar. However, the Pakistan's secret operations showed Pakistan's long-standing interest to Afghanistan. Daoud's assistance for Baloch and Pashtun's area was the reason for ISI to support the leader of Jamiat-e-Islami, Rabbani, and Hekmatyar the leader of Hezb-e-Islami. Pakistan was trying to exert its influence in Afghanistan, and as a result of this assessment, a program to support the insurgency formed. Later, after distancing himself from the Soviet Union and Afghan communists, Daoud established new relations with Arab regimes, Iran and the United States. During a visit to Pakistan in March 1978, Daoud terminated a treaty with Pakistan that recognized the Duran Line, ending Afghanistan's support for Pashtunistan in exchange for the return of the Baloch and Pashtun independence in Pakistan (Husain Haqqani, 2005, p. 175).

In addition, On April 27, 1978, Sardar Muhammad Daoud was overthrown in a coup carried out by communist military officers. Daoud was killed in 1973 by the same agents who helped him come to power (Louis Dupree, 1979, p. 5). Pakistan recognized the new regime and maintained its diplomatic ties with the Kabul government. On the other hand, this new situation obliged Pakistan to accelerate its backing for Islamist insurgency in Afghanistan. In 1978, in a meeting with General Zia Ul Haq, the new President of Afghanistan Nur Muhammad Taraki cited: "That the Afghan royal family had exploited the Afghan nation for 200 years. Now everything belongs to the people. The revolution has given land to eleven million". While General Zial Ul Haq disagreed with Daoud in interpretation of fundamental of beliefs and he mentioned that all property as belongs to Allah and should see man as his guardian. On the other hand, Taraki said, to serve the people is to serve Allah.

In December 1978, when PDPA government in Afghanistan signed a friendship pack with the Soviet Union, the Pakistanis attempted to sound the alarm in Washington by reviving Pakistani requests for U.S assistance. The revolution served to revive intelligence cooperation between Pakistan and the United States. By July 1979, the Carter Administration had approved a hidden aid to the Afghan Mujahideen against the pro-Soviet government of President Taraki. The covert operation was being

implemented through Pakistan. General Zia Ul-Haq considered the Afghan Jihad to be the main policies of his regime. Almost three million population of Afghanistan Left their country and settled in Pakistan, because of Afghan-Soviet war and it was an opportunity for Pakistan to relocate a large numbers of Afghans for the resistance organizations organized in Peshawar. General Zia took political control over CIA's weapons and money. The U.S Provided money arms for the Mujahideen. While Pakistan had the responsibility of recruiting and training of Mujahideen. Pakistan sheltered Afghan refugees mainly in NWFP and Balochistan (Husain Haqqani, 2005. P. 176-178, 188-189).\

After Soviet's withdrawal and the death of pro-Soviet President Doctor Najibullah in Kabul, Afghanistan once again sunk in a civil war in 1993. At that time Pakistan was very close to reach its ambitions in Afghanistan. Pakistan aimed appoint its favorite Pashtun Islamist leader, Gulbeddin Hekmatyar, as Afghanistan's new ruler. Although the position of Prime Minister in the Mujahideen government was given to Hekmatyar, on the condition of an agreement negotiated between the Saudis and Pakistan. While forces of Commander Mssoud did not allow him to come to the capital city of Afghanistan, Kabul. Therefore, Hekmatyar's forces started bombing to the Capital, Kabul. On the other hand, Massoud was known as an obstacle to peace as well as Pakistan-friendly Afghanistan by the Pakistan government.

According to Steve Coll, "the birth of the Taliban during 1994 and the emergence of Mullah Mohammad Omar, were described in the United States and Europe as the triumph of a naïve, pious determined band of religious students swept into power on a wave of popular revulsion over Kandhar's criminal warlords" (Steve Coll, 2004, p. 283). In his book (Taliban), Ahmed Rashid explains, that Pakistan may have been played a role in the rise of the Taliban from the beginning (Ahmed Rashid, 2000, p. 26). After 9/11 invasion, Hamid Karzai came to power as a result of Bonn I Agreement and controlled the country until 2014. Karzai's regime was recognized by international community as well as Pakistan as a legitimate government. After showing initial warmth towards Pakistan, Karzai set out to build more robust strategic partnership with India and India got the opportunity by using Afghan territory for limiting Pakistan's access into Central Asia. While marginalizing Pakistan directly

affect the region. However, support to each other's ethnic group is the biggest problem between these two states. Afghanistan is blamed for being involved in supporting insurgencies among the Pashtuns in Balochistan and tribal belt of Pakistan. While Pakistan is also reproached for supporting Afghan Taliban and terrorist attacks in Afghan territory (Mairaj, Ul Hamid, 2017, p. 63).

3.1.1. The Pashtunistan issue

Pashtunistan or Pakhtunistan, meaning the land of the Pashtuns, historical geographical area inhabited by the indigenous Pashtun peoples of present-day Afghanistan and Pakistan, where Pashtun culture, language, and national identity are established. Pashtunistan borders Iran to the West, Persian-speaking and Turkish regions region in the north, Turkistan and Kashmir to the Northeast, Punjab to the East and Baluchistan to the South.

The indigenous people of Pashtunistan are the Pashtuns. The Pashtuns are mainly concentrated in Southern and Eastern Afghanistan but also exist as a minority in northern and western parts of the country. On the other hand, they are concentrated in the West and northwest, and live mainly mainly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and northern Baluchistan in Pakistan (Feroz Ahmed, 1998).

Pashtuns on both sides of the Duran Line have an ancient social and cultural identity that dates back at least to the Pakistan Kingdom mentioned in the writings of Herodotus and possibly earlier. There are four main groups in Pashtun people: The Duranis and Ghilzai who are concentrated in Afghanistan, the so-called independent tribes, Durand Line and the Khattaks and Bannuchis lived in of Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province. Despite conflict among different Pashtun groups and its hierarchical structures, Pashtun culture has always been egalitarian to their people. Traditionally, Pashtuns have been governing by Jirgay which is called in modern world as (Assembly). The Afghan state was Pashtun in character when Ahmad Shah Durani formed it in 1747. From the structural point. It was a Pashtun tribal confederation created to unite Pashtuns in defending their interests for unity against non-Pashtun rivals. However, the new government was not entirely morally homogenous, but in the early nineteenth century had an overwhelming majority of Pashtuns. As the great game developed during the nineteenth century between Britain and Russia, the British

incited successive Afghan rulers, who later extended the Afghan border of north to the Oxus river. The British had tried to make Afghanistan worse, and the Pashtun rulers in Kabul had their own imperial ambitions. Large areas of the Hazara population, Tajiks, Ozbeks and other non-Pashtun ethnic groups were annexed after a long and costly struggles that left a legacy of internal ethnic conflict (Selig S. Harrison, 2008, p. 3-4).

The Pashtunistan issue is cited as a point of contention between Afghanistan and Pakistan officials (Feroz Ahmed, 1973, p. 8). During the late 19the century, the British influence in the region of Afghanistan and Pakistan was quite evident. The British demarcation in the Duran-Line was a deliberate strategy designed to distribute the Pashtun soil along the border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan. This was part of the strategy of division and rule of British during the 19th century and the division in Duran-line was to alienate the Pashtun tribes into two sides (http://www.icosgroup.net/modules/reports/Afghanistan on the brink). Pashtuns make up 16% Pakistan's population and Pashtuns are the second largest ethnic group after Punjab. Moreover, there are 1.7 million Afghan Pashtun refugees in Pakistan. On the other hand, there are 12 million Pashtuns in Afghanistan, representing 42% of the population. While other sources state that Pashtuns are the largest ethnic group, making up 6% country's population.

During the late history of Afghanistan, Pashtuns have consistently tried to make some form of political unity with the Pashtuns in Pakistan. During the 1920s and 1930s the anti-British sentiment provoked the emergence of Pashtun nationalist movement under Ghafar Khan leadership in Pakistan side. On 22 June 1947, Pashtun nationalist movement's leader Ghafar Khan demanded thet Khan's Bannu Declare, that the Pashtuns should choose between staying with Pakistan or building an independent Pashtun front. Even They boycotted the referendum which was implement by British for transferring North West Frontier Province and FATA to the new State Pakistan. Although laterNational Awami Party, has changed the demand for Pashtunistan as a demand for provincial independence in Pakistan. From the beginning of the partition Ghafar Khan was against to the idea of Pakistan and sided with Indian Nationalist Congress in its struggle against the Britain empire.

Pashtun nationalist proposes for rebuilding the Pakistan government in order to unite all Pashtun areas in FATA, NWFP and northern Baluchistan. But the use of the areas as a refuge by Al Qaeda and Taliban forces since 9/11, leading to Pakistani military strikes in response to U.S pressure, has led to unprecedented inter-tribal contacts leading to further polarization Pashtun nationalist and Islamist forces. Thus, the Pashtunistan movement is gradually coming in a state of general instability and political disintegration in Pakistan and Afghanistan in the coming year (Selig S. Harrison, 2008, p. 5-6). However, The Duran Line and Pashtunistan problems have been increased by various regimes of Afghanistan in the past. But it has always been a temporary issue. Pashtuns has integrated into Pakistani society, the majority of whom do not accept Pashtunistan because of its independent falsification or accession to Afghanistan.

3.1.2. The Durand line

Duran Line's history goes back to the nineteenth century. Even at this time, the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan had begun to play a role in world politics. In 19th century, Russian policy was to extend its border to the ports of the warm seas and prevent British India the expanding beyond the Hindu Kush. On the other hand, the perennial question for British India was to reach beyond Indus. British India fought three wars with Afghanistan and defeated in all of them. At that time there were debates on Afghanistan in the British parliament. For instance, Lord Salisbury supported that the region should be separated into many small principalities. One another statemen named Lady Balfour suggested that a second state should be created (Conrad Shatter, 2013, p. 49-50).

The determination of Afghanistan's territorial borders by the colonial powers of British India and Russia between 1887 and 1895 paved the way for the emergence of the Afghanistan government. The Emirate of Afghanistan was estabished by Amir Abdur Rahman Khan. At that time Abdur Rahman Khan, was in a position of weakness and he had to know the Durand Line as the border with British India in 1893. Despite recongizing Duran Line as a border between Afghanistan Pakistan, Amir continued to demand taxes from areas like Chitral. Afghan rulers continued to exert their

influence on the tribal areas of the border Untill the beginning of the 20th century (Conrad Shatter, 2013, p. 51).

The Duran Line is named after the British Diplomat and employee of colonial British India (Col. Mortimer Duran), who in 1893 negotiated a border treaty between Afghanistan and British India. The frontier has been ongoing point of disputes between the two countries. This line was as the legal political boundary untill India and Pakistan's partition in 1947, when Afghanistan rejected the line as a frontier. The Afghan rejection is based on the premise that the Durand Agreement, lapsed when the British transferred control to Pakistan in 1947. However the agreement didnt describe the line as a border. As Sir Olaf Caroe cited: "Its true that the agreement dit not describe the line as the boundary of India, but as the frontier of the Amir's domain and the line beyond wich neither side exercise influence. This was because the British government did not intend to absorb the tribes into their administrative system, only to extend their own, and exclude the Amir's authority from the territory East and South of the line. İn the international aspect this was no account, for the Amir had renounced sovereignty beyond the line". Afghanistan has unilaterally refuted Durand Line as a border, while Pakistan has been recognizing since its establishment. The boundary situation is further complicated by the fact that a major territorial and ethnic problem area- Pashtunistan- lies astride astride the Duran Line. Afghanistan tries to creat a new state constituted out of Pashtun tribals lying in Pakistan east of the Duran Line. İt is also possible that Afghanistan may want to add the new created state to its territorial (CIA, Geographic support Project, 2012. P. 1-3).

The Durand Line runs through Kafiristan in the northeast and runs right through the tribal region of the Baloch people in the south. Duran Line also divides the core pashtun areas into two sides; Afghanistan side and Pakistan side. The fact that the Duran Line shows the importance of this line for imaginig of Afghanistan as a nation state. İn addition, manny people are convinced that the contract was to be valid for only one hundred years. However, the original treaty does not identify a certain period of time. Finally it is regularly observed that the agreement was ended between Afghanistan and British India and does not automatically legalize the demarcation of the Afghan and Pakistan border (Conrad Shatter, 2013, p. 52-53).

The debate over the Duran Line should be seen in relation to the rise of Pashtuns nationalism. In both Afghanistan and Pakistan Pashtuns begun to develop a national Pashtun ideology. Pashtun nationalism first appeared in British controlled areas of Peshawar in the 1920s. At that time, the nationalist movement named Red Shirt was led by Abdul Ghafar Khan. Since Abdul Ghafar Khan's period, Afghanistan has used the Pashtunistan issue to advocate Pashtuns. Afghanistan has repeatedly demanded the right to determine the fate of Pashtuns in Pakistan. Thus, the dispute over Pashtunistan put Afghanistan and Pakistan on the brink of war in 1955, 1961 and 1977 (Conrad Shatter, 2013, p. 53-54).

3.1.3. The Fata

Federal Administered Tribal Areas, the area is about 27,500 square Kilometers and it is a semi-autonomous tribal area located on the border between northwestern Pakistan's Northern-West Frontier Province and southern Afghanistan. FATA shelters about 3.5 million Pashtuns and around 1.5 million Afghan refugees were moved to the region during Soviet invasion and Afghan civil war. FATA has become one of the controversial regions since United States incursion of Afghanistan in 2001. In recent years, FATA is not only the core of dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan, but it also constitutes a contention place between the United States and Pakistan. Therefore, United State invasions of the region have put the two countries in the brink of war on the border. In recent years, FATA is also become haven for many Al-Qaida operatives, especially countless foreigners from the Arab world, Central Asia, Muslim areas in the Far East. Thus, FATA is an area of political oppositions to the Pakistan's central government of the Baloch tribes, which was often gone to fight against the Pakistan army. The FATA insurgents threaten the Pakistan's political stability. In this context, the Pashtun region of Balochistan is another place for some Afghan Taliban who have taken refuge among neighboring tribes in Pakistan. Balochistan and FATA make the base of attacks against NATO forces in southwestern Afghanistan (Shuja Nawaz, 2009, p. 1).

There are seven agencies that form FATA. These are from North to South; Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Orakzai, Kurram, North Waziristan and North Waziristan. They are under the control of Pakistan, governed through the governor of NWFP

(North-West Frontier Province). Except for Orakzai, they share a border with Afghanistan. Each has its own economic and physical characteristics. 15 million Pashtuns live in Afghanistan while about 25 million live in Pakistan. FATA is an important part of the region between Afghanistan and Pakistan because it includes tribes that surround the Durand Line, the common frontier between British India and then Pakistan and Afghanistan. Half of the FATA populations lives temporarily outside the territory as refugee or displaced persons or due to instability. For instance, about 3 million of Pashtun population live in Karachi.

The Taliban leaders has used this place as a fuel for recruitment and training camp. They allied with various disaffected groups operating in various parts of Afghanistan and FATA against foreign forces in Afghanistan. The Afghan government views the Taliban and its allies as groups that are seeking to gain power and survive in Pakistan because of 'save heavens across' the border, especially in FATA. In July 2008, Afghanistan has condemned Pakistan several times and claiming that its intelligence service and army are behind the bloody Taliban-led rebellion. Afghanistan views Pakistan and its intelligence service as the biggest terrorist producers in the world. On the other hand, Pakistan views Afghan involvement in FATA unrest. The strife between these two countries runs deep into history. The people in FATA wanted to be guided by tribal code of behavior (Pashtunwali) that existed in the region even before Islam. The have added some aspects of Islamic laws, Sharia. FATA is operated by their Maliks. They vary from agency to agency. During the 1980, most of the Taliban leadership are considered to have taken refuge in FATA, where they continued their war toward the United States and the new Afghan state. Moreover, Al-Qaeda continues to use FATA as a training ground. It is to be reported that Taliban and Al-Qaeda have allied and formed affective military base in FATA (Shuja Nawaz, 2009, p. 1-7). So, one of the Pakistan's poorest area, FATA has become a militant breeding ground and poses a serious threat to Afghanistan and Pakistan.

3.1.4. The war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan (Afghan Jihad).

The Soviets intervened in Afghanistan in December 1979. Although the war in Afghanistan was seen by Soviet leaders as a small-scale intervention, it lasted ten years, that caused killing and inuring tens of thousands of them (V. Konovalov, 1989,

p. 3). From 1979 to 1986 the war by the Soviet leadership was considered as an international task and exercise in the good neighborhood (A. Trehub, 1989, p. 2).

After the independence of Afghanistan in 1919, the Soviets had always tried to annex the Northern part of Afghanistan. Therefore, they started to build close relations with some of the Afghan conservative political parties until the Afghan government clearly turned its back to the Soviets. The Soviet Union's intelligence service system had their eye already on Afghanistan and encouraged Afghani officers who had studied in Russia in order to organize a secret revolutionary army in September 1964. It was this organization that convinced Dauod khan to collapse the regime of Zahir Shah with a coup in 1973 (Abdul Jabar Sabet, 2008, p. 24).

Later, Dauod Khan created the one-party system of government with the drafting of new constitution on February 1977 and increased the power of Minister of Interior Affairs (Nuristani). Nuristani used his power to oppress the Political Parties of Khalq and Parcham. As the Russian Ambassador in Afghanistan says:

> *"The oppression of the government made Hafizullah Amin to collapse the government of Dauod Khan in 1977 but he was stopped by the Moscow to do so" (Ahmad Shah Farzam, p. 202)*

The relation between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union was not very deteriorated, but things changed when Dauod Khan had stood against Leonid Brezhnev in their meeting in Moscow and the meeting paved the way for the future actions of the Soviet Union took against Dauod's regime.

> *"Brezhnev objected the existence of experts from NATO member countries in the Northern provinces of Afghanistan and says, in the past we had an agreement with Afghanistan that the experts from NATO member countries would not be allowed to stay in North of Afghanistan, but this agreement hasn't been practiced well".*

In reply, "Dauod Khan with a cold mined reaction says towards Brezhnev, whatever have been told to Afghans will never be acceptable and the Afghan people considers your approaches a very clear interference in the internal affairs of the country

and he also said; we will never allow you to order us how to control our country and whom to employ in Afghanistan, if needed, Afghanistan will remain a poor country, but it would observe its independence and its own decisions"(Abdul Jabar Sabet, 2008, p. 37).

In this context, Dauod Khan's trip to Moscow had Economical and Cultural activities with Iran. In March 1978, he met with Zia-ul-Haq and in the same year he had meetings with Anwar Sadat of Egypt which gave him huge prestige in the interior and foreign policy. Meanwhile, he visited Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Turkey. On the other hand, Moscow was worrying because of Daud Khan's approach. Daoud broke his relations with Parcham and consolidated his relations with Iran. This approach caused massive changes in Moscow's policies towards the communist regime of Afghanistan in 1976. whereas Moscow never encouraged Khalq and Parcham for their separation from communist groups of Afghanistan. while Parcham and Khalq was asked to support the internal reforms of Dauod Khan (Abdul Jabar Sabet, 2008, p. 30).

The first wave of revolution began in Heart on March 1979. The city was brought under the control of the revolutionaries and the administration was collapsed. Fighter jets started their bombarding. Therefore, Taraki traveled to Moscow in March 1979, in order to stop the revolution and to seek the Moscow's help so that he can remain in the power and oppress the revolution (Boris Goromov, 1979, 36). In his visit to Moscow, he met with Kasgin, Andrew Gromyko, Marshal Ostiv, and Ponamov. In 1979 Afghanistan's dependency to Soviet Union at reached at the top level. The Russian fighters could be seen flying over Afghanistan and this was the time where Mujahideen had already made their military gain, but in the leadership level they lacked unity. If this was not the case, they would destroy Hafizullah Amin's regime before the Soviets invasion of the country. In the meantime, during the year 1979 Marshal Paulofoski along with 60 other Generals came to Afghanistan and started their expertise of the region from Afghanistan and this visit was the beginning of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (Antony. Hee. Man, 1987, p. 227).

3.1.5. The rule of the Taliban

The Taliban groups, who called themselves, the Islamic Emirates of Afghanistan, religiously comes from the Sunni sect of Islam fighting with the current

government of Afghanistan and the foreign troops in Afghanistan. This group emerged during 1994 under the leadership of Mullah Mohammad Omar, mainly comprised religious schools (madrasas) in Pakistan.

After defeating Soviet backed regime and winning the Jihad by Mujahideen in March 1979, the country faced the deadliest Civil Wars and internal Conflicts over the distribution of the power between the Mujahideen of the North Alliance and Gulbuddin Hikmatyar where the situation paved the ground for various groups to rise and fight for the power by choosing different ideologies. A new extremist group emerged under the slogans of rescuing Islam and ending the war and to bring the eternal justice and peace in the country who named themselves as the Taliban. So-called Koran students suddenly controlled much of the country with the support of forgetting Pakistan, the United States, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (Mohammad Hassan Kakar, 2011, p. 116)

But the actual foundation of the Taliban movement dates back to the early 1990s when part of the Mujahideen, Islamic militants who had resisted the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979-89) with the secret backing of the Pakistan Central Intelligence (ISI) came into existence in the name of Taliban. They have never been part of the government entities and they were not at all familiar with the governmental rules and regulations. The majority of them were the young religious students and clergyman or religious teachers who were all dealing with religious issues or handling religious ceremonies (Zachary Laub, 2009, p. www.cfr.org/backgrounder).

The Taliban movement first captured the province of Kandahar, later Ghazni, Herat, and Nangarhar and until 1996 they have seized Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan under their rule which was not acceptable for the north front, because the previous groups or regimes who had ruled the country consisting of any ethnicity or language background with different ideologies were still somehow familiar to the people of Afghanistan in general but such a group (Taliban) never have had ruled the country even for one day and no one was expecting them to rise suddenly because people of this group were neither the landowners nor their ancestors or tribal leaders, they were not even the sons and brothers of Businessmen, Generals, warlords, Ministers and government officials and did not have properties and weapons with no

sign of modern professional and technical skills or knowledge and most of them in order to fulfill their daily normal needs were dependent to the generosity of other people (Kakar, p. 117).

3.2. Zia ul-Haq and The Islamization of Pakistan, 1977-1988

More than a decade, Pakistan has been blamed of advocating terrorism for supporting anti-government militants in the disputed region and supporting of Taliban government in Afghanistan. Actually, since Pakistan got its independence, Pakistani leaders have used religious perceptions as a tool to strengthen Pakistan's identity. In this context, General Zia ul Haq went further in Islamizing Pakistan's legal and educational system (Husain Haqqani, 2005, p. 1-3)

General Zia Ul Haq ousted Bhutto and executed her in 1977, brought many changes in the society. General Zia Ul Haq was both personally religious in terms of his social and family background and has close ties with several Islamists. He belonged to the Arian tribes of Punjab, which is famous of its conservatism. He came from a religious family and religion played an important role in shaping his personality. For instance, his father's name was Maulvi Ali Akbar, who worked as a civilian official in the army headquarters. Because of his religious devotion he was called Maulvi. Zia received an excellent education at the prestigious Siant Stephen's College in Dehli (Ian Talboot, 2005, p. 255). He belonged to a conservative Deobandi tradition of Sunni Islam. He was a member of the international Islamic revival movement the Tabliban Jamaat. His lifestyle can be briefed with these words; "Drinking, gambling, dancing, and music were the way the officers spent their free time. I said prayers, instead" (jawed and Craig, p. 5). On July 5, 1977, General Muhammad Zia Ul Haq, became the third military ruler of Pakistan. He has been known as the person most responsible for converting Pakistan into political Islam. Zia sought to establish Pakistan as an Islamic State. He believed that the survival of Pakistan needed an ideological state. General Zia Ul Haq hated Indus and tried to forge the government in the name of Islam. In addition, like previous Pakistan leaders Zia had the dream of Pan-Islamic unity and wished to make the Pakistan as the leader of the Muslim world. On the other hand, Pakistan's previous leaders had used Islam as an instrument in the politic. Moreover,

Zia was not against giving the religious scholars and religious parties an important role in the government (Husain Haqqani, 2005, p. 112, 131-132).

General Zia Ul- Haq openly preferred the Pakistani army to his civilians. He did not criticize his military predecessors and his claim that Islam is the foundation of Pakistan, and that Islamization only reflected the will of the people (See Burki, p. 70). For Zia, Islam was the only characteristic for Pakistan to distinguish the country from India. Moreover, in the political arena, Zia Ul Haq followed organized religious parties, especially as he supported the Jamaat-e-Islami, both for political supports and ideological inspirations. The Jammat-e-Islami became "a pillar of the Zia regime and a staunch defender of the Islamic state (G.H. Khan, p. 350). Cooperation with the Zia military regime damaged some religious parties inside the country. On the other hand, the Jamaat-e-Islami had emphasized the constitution and has developed its image as a major political party of the Islam (Anwar Ahmad, telephone interview with author).

After Zia came to power in 1977, he commenced the Islamization process, which was intended to change Pakistan into an Islamic state, governed according to the Sunni tradition of Sharia. He believed that the Islamization is a way to strengthen the identity of Pakistan as Muslim state (Hussain Haqqani, 2005, p. 135). He accounted his religious policy very important in combating the alleged moral degeneration that had taken place under the Socialist and secular government of Bhutto. He claimed that Islamization is the demand of the people because Islam was the solution for Pakistan's economic, moral and deep political divisions. The goal of Zia's Islamization was to provide legitimization for his long military dictatorship and to refute democratic election for fear of losing power.

Therefore, Islamization was the only ideal pretext for maintaining his power. Soon after coming to power, Zia declared martial law and set the tone for his administration by introducing abroad range of a rush punishments including public flogging, for offenses such as murder, rape, fornication and the drinking of alcohol. Zia's government attempted to impose the Sunni's Hanafi School of legal interpretation, which was the dominant school in Pakistan but which unacceptable to the Shia. Zia sought to create a legal system based on Deobandis interpretation of Islam. In his government he was mostly supported by Pakistani religious parties

especially Jamaat-e-Islami which was overwhelmingly supported by students. In this context, Islamization affected all aspects of Pakistani life and Pakistan became more sectarian. Women were pressurized to wear the Hijab in public and banned of wearing modern dress. During this time, strict government censorship was imposed to all television programs and movies (Eamon Murphy, 2013, p. 87-88).

On the other side, Islamic judicial system based upon the Koran and the Sunnah was introduced and every aspect of life was based on the teaching and practices of Muhammad. General Zia Ul-Haq constructed Federal Sharia court which had the authority of auditing any judicial law as contrary to that of Islam. Under the martial law in 1977 The Hudood Ordinances law set out punishments according to the Koran and Sunnah such as cutting off the hands of thieves and stoning to death for serious crimes. Women's right was restricted by the afore mentioned rule. During his government, Zia gave jobs to the Jammat-e-Islami supporters and other religious parties (Mukherjee, p. 342).

At that time a major factor in the Islamization of Pakistan paved the way for rapid growing in the number of madrassas but this led to a decline in the general standard of scholarship and training. The madrassas provide Islamic education, based upon the reading, recitation and memorization of the Koran. Zia encouraged the proliferation madrassas. There were 900 religious schools in Pakistan in 1971, by the end of 1988, there were 33000 madrassas. With this proliferation the quality of education declined. In addition, during Islamization process, the military was the guardian of Pakistan and Islam. In the previous government the military was just the defender of internal security, while after Zia took power the military role was broadened and became defender of Islam. Thus, the military became as soldiers of Islam. Zia's reform toward Islamization sharpened the divisions and rivalry between the Sunni and Shia sect. Zia's rule had strengthened the influence of the more extreme Deobandi and Wahhabi type organizations, which were encouraged and nurtured by military, for political, if not for religious, reason. Today Pakistan has become a major rigid, less tolerant and, consequently, more vulnerable divided state. Finally, Zia's Islamization and the Afghan Jihad were to be the most important catalysts for the

emergence of terrorism and sectarian violence in Pakistan (Eamon Murphy, 2013, p. 90-93, 99).

CONCLUSION

Radicalism is the imposition of one's thought over another person without giving importance to their thoughts. Radical movements can be happened within the framework of a certain political, ideological thought system or these can be exhibited in the axis of religious, racial, cultural and economic interests. Terrorist groups, who are perceived as radical groups, utilize violence extremism in way that provides political interests. Therefore, the more the action of a terrorist group makes sound, the more they show their existence and effects. For this reason, terrorist organizations do more bloody actions to show that they are strong and the more they adopt radicalism, the more successful they are.

On the other hand, violent extremism is another important term, which implies ideological beliefs and an action of people that motivates violence to further radical ideology, religious, or political aims. Since 2001, there has been a constant increase in the number of victims of violent extremism movements. These extremist groups are such as Al-Qaeda, Islamic State (IS), Boko Haram in Nigeria, and Al-Shabaab in Somalia and Kenya. In this context, 2015 terrorist attacks in Europe were posed as a violent extremism and demonstrated Islamic extremism against modern values. Within this period the notion of Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) gained attraction among state actors around the globe. The term of Countering Violent Extremism, in regard with peace and development policies is a modern approach to counterterrorism.

Although the conservative mindset in Afghanistan dates back to the King Amanullah Khan's era of modernization. Amanullah Khan tried to bring social reformation including the women's liberation which caught the conservative mindset of the people and led to his overthrow in 1929. But in 1979, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan exacerbated religious ideology and extremism in Afghanistan. The Islamic extremism ideology was first found by modernist Islamist movements that had been trained under the influence of the Muslim brotherhood at Al Azhar University in Cairo. They mostly focused on giving training and recruiting students. These groups later divided into two factions, Hizb-e-Islami controlled by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Jamiyat-i-Islami led by Burhannudin Rabbani in 1975.

Until the end of 1980s, several Islamist groups made the forehand of radical Islam. In 1970, when Borhanuddin Rabbani and Ghulam Niyazi came back to afghanistan from Al-Azhar in Cairo where they impressed from Muslim Brothers, at that time Afghan Islamist movements dates started. They recruited many university students in Afghanistan. In 1973 the Muslim Youth was very active on the Kabul campuses and also the Jama'at-i- Islami of Pakistani was advocating this movement. Soon thereafter the Soviets-Afgan war, the movements divided into two factions: The Hizb-i-Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and the Jami'at-i-Islami of Borhanuddin Rabbani and Ahmed Shah Masood. In this context, the Hizb was more helped by Pakistani authorities. Tajiks with Masood, Uzbeks with the former communist General Dostum and Shia Hazaras under Sheykh Mazari took over Kabul in April 1992. Since the creation of Afghan state in 1747, this was the sole example of non-Pashtun leadership. In this process Pakistani madrassas had huge impact on radicalization of youth in Afghanistan.

Two types of radical networks emerged from different madrassas in the region; Pashtu-speaking ulema who had studied in Deobandi's madrassas in northwest Pakistan and those who had been trained in Ghazni and Kandhar Afghanistan. In this period, students and ulema were mobilized to resist Soviet forces. They joined Harakat Inqilaab-e-Islami to fight alongside the mujahideen and moved to northwest Pakistan to resort refugees at religious madrassas. During the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, ISI and CIA advocated clerical and Islamist network in order to fight the Soviet forces. They provide funds, weapons and shelters for mujahideen.

The war between Soviets-Union and Afghanistan started in December 1979 and lasted until February 1989. (Reuveny and Prakash, 1999, p. 696). This conflict was known as the birthplace of Islamic extremism and the global terrorism by many experts (Commins, 2006. p. 4). The Democratic People's Party came to power during the April 1978 coup. Sardar Daoud was overthrown and killed after the coup. The coup was carried out by some of the same agents who helped Daoud during its presidential campaign almost five years earlier. The military officers released the People's Democrat party leaders who had been imprisoned by Daoud. In December 1978, when the communist party took control of the Afghan government, they signed an agreement

with the Soviet Union which was aimed at providing extensive military assistance to Afghanistan (Haqqani, 2005, p. 176-177). At that time, various Islamic groups began to fight against the People's Democratic Party of communists.

Afghanistan and Pakistan have had very warmth and affinity relations since the independence of Pakistan in 1947. They have deep- rooted historical ties, traditional affiliations, shared religious identity, ethnic and cultural ties and strategic partnerships. Another important issue is Pashtunistan or Pakhtunistan. Pashtunistan or Pakhtunistan, meaning the land of the Pashtuns, historical geographical area inhabited by the indigenous Pashtun peoples of present-day Afghanistan and Pakistan, where Pashtun culture, language, and national identity are established The indigenous people of Pashtunistan are the Pashtuns. The Pashtuns are mainly concentrated in Southern and Eastern Afghanistan but also exist as a minority in northern and western parts of the country. On the other hand, they are concentrated in the West and northwest, and live mainly mainly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and northern Baluchistan in Pakistan. The debate over the Duran Line should be seen in relation to the rise of Pashtuns nationalism. In both Afghanistan and Pakistan Pashtuns begun to develop a national Pashtun ideology.

More than a decade, Pakistan has been blamed of advocating terrorism for supporting anti-government militants in the disputed region and supporting of Taliban government in Afghanistan. Actually, since Pakistan got its independence, Pakistani leaders have used religious perceptions as a tool to strengthen Pakistan's identity. In this context, General Zia ul Haq went further in Islamizing Pakistan's legal and educational system.

To sum up, the idea of extremism in Afghanistan has been flourishing for the past four decades. Various factors like the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the United State interference in Afghanistan along with poverty, weak institution, joblessness, corruption and illiteracy, play a role in its expanding.

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