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YEDİTEPE UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

COLD WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST: SOVIET INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE AMERICAN EFFECT

by

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ABBREVIATIONS

ABMT	Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
Aramco	Arabian-American Oil Company
BRICS	Five Major Emerging National Economies: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
CENTCOM	US Central Command
CENTO	Central treaty Organisation
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
Comintern	Communist International
EU	European Union
IEA	International Energy Agency
IMF	International Monetary Fond
INOC	Iraq National Oil Company
MI6	British Military Intelligence Service
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEDC	Near East Development Corporation
OIC	Organisation for Islamic Cooperation
OPEC	*Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries*
PDRY	*People's Democratic Republic of Yemen*
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
RDJTF	Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Tasks
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UN	United Nations
UNSCOP	United Nations Special Committee on Palestine
US	United States
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WTO	World Trade Organization
WWI	First World War
WWII	Second World War

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ABSTRACT

COLD WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST: SOVIET INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE AMERICAN EFFECT

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M. Sc, Political Science and International Relations

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As a geographically and geo-strategically important oil-rich region, the Middle East witnessed the interest clashes of the great powers from the early times. The Soviet Union and the United States kept their everlasting rivalry going in the Middle East during the Cold War. The Soviet, as a continuation of its centuries old interests, maintained its influence in the Middle East, while endeavouring the containment policy of United States as the most powerful rival in this regard. Both superpowers, engaged in various alliances and wars, directly or indirectly, within the framework of such concepts as ideology, arms sales, energy politics and open market. Most of the alliances in the region were formed on the basis of military and economic assistance and political support. While the Soviet Union preserved its sphere of influence by means of anti-capitalism and Arab nationalism in the region, the United States took its part as the sole guarantor of the State of Israel and an ally of oil rich pro-Western dictatorships. In this regard, the Arab-Israel wars laid the basis for this superpower interest conflicts. As a result of the political polarization, the Soviet Union supported the Arabs, and the United States remains on the side of Israel, in order to preserve and expand their influence in the region. Cold War rivalry in the Middle East came to an end with partial peace between the Arabs and Israel, witnessing the United States as the winner of the rivalry, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Rising from its ashes, the newly established Russian Federation, after a short period of stagnation, continued its old interests with new perspectives to become an influential power within the region and in the world, however this time facing a more proponent United States.

Key Words: Cold War, USSR, USA, Middle East, power balance, bipolar world order, Arab-Israel conflict, oil reserves, arms sales

ÖZET

ORTA DOĞU'DA SOĞUK SAVAŞ: ORTA DOĞU'DA SOVYET ÇIKARLARI VE AMERİKAN ETKİSİ

İğdeci, Rahime

Yüksek Lisans, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler

Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Mesut Hakkı Caşın

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Coğrafi ve jeostratejik öneme sahip olan ve geniş petrol rezervleri bulunan Orta Doğu, eski zamanlardan beri büyük güçlerin kozlarını paylaştıkları önemli bir bölge olmuştur. Sovyetler Birliği ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Soğuk Savaş boyunca devam eden rekabetlerini Orta Doğu'da da devam ettirmiştir. Asırlık çıkarlarının bir devamı olarak, Sovyetler Birliği etkisini Orta Doğu'da sürdürürken, diğer yandan en güçlü rakibi olarak Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin çevreleme politikasıyla karşı karşıya kalmıştır. Her iki süper güç de, ideoloji, silah satışı, enerji siyaseti ve serbest pazar kavramları çerçevesinde, doğrudan ya da dolaylı olarak, bölgede çeşitli ittifaklar kurmuşlar ve savaşlara müdahil olmuşlardır. Bölgede kurulan çoğu ittifak, askeri ve ekonomik yardım temeline dayanmıştır. Sovyetler Birliği anti-kapitalizm ve Arap milliyetçiği sayesinde bölgedeki etki alanına devam ettirirken, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri de hem İsrail'in tek garantörü olarak hem de Batı yanlısı zengin petrol kaynaklarına sahip diktatörlüklerin müttefiki olarak bölgedeki rolünü oynamıştır. Bu bağlamda, süper güçlerin çıkar çatışmalarının sahnesi olarak Arap-İsrail savaşları kullanılmıştır. Siyasal kamplaşma neticesinde, Sovyetler Birliği Arapları desteklerken, Amerika Birleşik devletleri de İsrail'in yanında yer almış ve bu şekilde bölgedeki nüfuzlarını koruma ve bu nüfuzu artırma çabasına girmişlerdir. Orta Doğu'daki Soğuk Savaş çekişmesi bir yandan Arap Devletler ve İsrail arasında sağlanan kısmi barışla sona ererken, diğer yanda Amerika Birleşik Devletlerinin zaferine ve Sovyetler Birliği'nin ise 1991 yılında yıkılmasına sahne olmuştur. Yeni kurulan Rusya Federasyonu, kısa bir durgunluk sürecinin ardından, adeta küllerinden doğarak, bölgedeki eski çıkarlarını yeni bakış açılarıyla devam ettirerek, bölgede ve dünyada etkin olma çabasına girmiştir. Fakat bu defa karşısında daha güçlü bir Amerika Birleşik Devletleri yer alıyordu.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Soğuk Savaş, SSCB, ABD, Orta Doğu, güçler dengesi, çift kutuplu dünya, Arap-İsrail çatışması, petrol yatakları, silah ticareti

COLD WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST: SOVIET INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE AMERICAN EFFECT

CHAPTER I

1. INTRODUCTION

Throughout the history, Russia (as Russian Empire, the Soviet Union and Federation) has struggled to become an important actor in the world politics. As a result of this urge of empowerment, Russia faced many other actors in the international arena. In general terms, strategically important regions witnessed the clashes of the great powers. Europe and Middle East are among these regions and the most important ones. Especially during Cold War, the Soviet Union and the United States showed up as super powers of the bipolar system. Their rivalry affected all relations between them and their allies in the region. This study is planned to describe the main Soviet and American interests and policies in the Middle East and their reasons, how events evolved and how they set light to today's realpolitik in the region.

In order to be able to evaluate the foreign policy, international system and relations should be taken into consideration. With the help of theories, we can compare and contrast the past events with today, thus formulate a specific point of view and make predictions about future events. In this regard, the place of theory in international relations and the basic tenets of Realist Theory will be explained and discussed in the first chapter. Within this framework behaviours and actions of state and statesmen in the international system and the role of society in their decisions will be evaluated to see how Realist Theory accounts for the forming of foreign policies. Together with all these assumptions explained in the first place, Cold War politics will be considered in terms of Realist Theory to show how both US presidents and the Soviet Union leaders acted in a realist and rational manner. Taking these into consideration, brief historical background information will be given on the general characteristics and events during Cold War. Additionally, since this thesis focuses especially on how Cold War affected and changed the dynamics in the Middle East, the general overview of the situation of the Middle East starting from 1900s is thought to be helpful in understanding the development of events in the region.

History accounts for today's events. To be able to analyse and evaluate the international relations today, we need to know how events evolved in the past. In this regard, second chapter is planned to be handled under three different titles in order to deeply analyse the events during Cold War and to how they set light today. Firstly, Soviet interests and policies in the Middle East will be discussed by giving substantial examples and reasons. In this direction, it is also crucial to analyse the US interest and policies, their reasons and expectations in the region to be able to make a comparison and evaluate the events accordingly. Under the light of these Soviet and American positions, in the final section of the second chapter the rivalry between the two will be tried to be explained by determining main policy and interest differences and resemblances, identifying influential friends and allies of the two superpowers in the region by focusing main events especially reflecting the main difference of opinions setting out from the very establishment of Israel State in 1948.

Today Middle East is such a region whose geopolitical and geostrategic position draws attention and thus causes interest clashes among the great powers. The struggle for hegemony in the region throughout the history shows its marks even today whether it is among different powers and for different reasons. Ongoing wars and tensions in the region, the most current being Arab Spring, point to the fact that great powers, especially Russian Federation and the United States, still remain influential in the course of events and still have crucial interests in the region. In this regard, the final chapter of this thesis focuses on how thing evolved after the downfall of the Soviet Union, how the relations between the United States and Russian Federation ameliorated generally and in the region particularly, despite positive developments and cooperation how their interests still clash in the region, being reflected especially in Arab Spring taking Libya and Syria cases into consideration. Finally, in the light of the given information, current power balances in the region will be discussed.

1.1 Objective

The objective of this thesis is to evaluate the Soviet Middle Eastern policies together and to show how American interests in the region affected and became a rival to the actions of the Soviet Union. The question of "How did the great powers play their roles in the way of becoming dominant powers in the region?" is crucial. In this framework, my argument is

that Middle East is a significant region for Russia in the way of becoming a greater power in the world politics. In this regard, Russian policies and interests have been confronted by the United States in Middle East as a continuation of cold war rivalry. Today, these substantial powers still confront each other in the region, whether it is common interests and alliances or complete disagreement on the course of events.

1.2 Scope

The scope of this thesis is to explain the Realist Theory as the prominent foreign policy framework during Cold War; giving background information on the events of Cold War and interpreting the general situation in the Middle East during that era, which was thought to be crucial to understand the interests and rivalry of the Soviet Union and the United States in the region; to define the Soviet Middle Eastern policy and determine its basic aims and interests in the region; to define the American Middle Eastern policy and determine its basic aims and interests in the region; to show Soviet and American rivalry in the region as a continuation of Cold War politics by giving concrete explanations on specific events and defining their places in these events and finally to evaluate today's Middle East politics in the light of Cold War rivalry.

1.3 Research Question

In an attempt to create and verify the argument of the study, I am going to seek answers to the question of "What basic interest does the Soviet Union/Russian Federation look after in the Middle East during and after the Cold War, and how are these interests affected by the interests of and relations with the United States?". I choose this combined question as my research base, since in the literature there a few studies focusing on both Russian interests and American rivalry in the Middle East. Many of the studies just include Soviet/Russian Middle Eastern policy or Soviet/Russian and American contest in the Middle East. In this regard, my study will constitute a basis and offer answers for these issues as combined.

1.4 Research Method, Data Gathering, Evaluation and Interpretation

For the purpose of designing this thesis, a detailed literature review is made through academic articles, books, reports and previously published thesis and dissertations. In this

thesis, I used books, periodicals, reports, official declarations, press declarations, noted publications and articles that focuses on and analysis the historical evolution of Russian involvement in the Middle East and its relations with the United States. My main focus while analysing the sources was the interpretation and comparison method. After collecting the information, I interpreted the whole data and compared and contrasted them on the basis of soviet/Russian interests in the region and the relations with the United States. That being the case, I used qualitative method for most of the part. So there will not be any statistical data and analysis in my research, other than some examples supporting my findings. Generally, I questioned the events and phenomenon and try to find out what happened when and why; which actors are involved, how and why; what consequences we draw and what responses did the actors gave, what behaviour and attitude they adopt and why.

1.5 Limitations

This study is a moderate attempt to explain the Soviet interests and American relations in the Middle East during Cold War. In this regard their primary rivalry is elaborated through the Arab-Israel conflict within the concept of Soviet containment in the region. Thus, other than the domestic affairs of the countries in the region, their positions according to time and conditions (sometimes affected by their own internal developments) were analysed. That is why, this study does not offer a detailed and historical explanation of the events. Furthermore, the relations among the Arab countries in the region are not included in the study.

Turkey is another limitation of this study. The relations between Turkey – USA – Soviet Union (Russian Federation) and the Middle East are deemed a more comprehensive area and for this reason it should be elaborated on in a further study, separately.

2. THE PLACE OF THEORY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

2.1 The Relationship between Theory and International Relations

Theory can be described as a frame that is useful and required for understanding and analysing the relations between events and phenomena in a specific area, and in addition to this they help us make predictions about future possibilities.[1] Just like any other natural sciences, political science need theories in order to eliminate the basic concern of war and preserve peace and values in international relations. According to Kenneth Waltz, theories not only define terms but they also identify what is to be done or what is justifiably expected to be done.[2] They point to what is connected to what and how this connection has been established. That is, they explain the past events and processes to set light upon today and future.

Why do we need theories in international relations? Do these theories last forever? Do we need the take the whole theory in order to explain a phenomenon? These are the questions first come into mind when asked the importance and place of theory in political science. Theories in political science help us understand the reality of politics and explain it, evaluate our knowledge at a certain level, and thus form new ideas about the complex structure of international arena and international relations. For Viotti and Kauppi, theories help political scientists to have access to abstract and reasonable knowledge which explains the international systems and international relations in the world.[3] By means of conceptualising, making generalizations, creating cause-effect relations, making predictions and hypothesis, theories give a substantial framework for states and other actors of international politics in determining their relations and the very position taken by a state towards certain actors or events. That is, they help shaping the foreign policy. However, like any other social sciences, theories in international relations are generally developed for explanation of the very time that they put forward. In time they most probably change or adapt their assumptions, or lead to new directions within that trend according to the requirements of time and place. According to Mearsheimer there are two

[1] Arı, T., 2011, Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorileri: Çatışma, Hegemonya, İşbirliği, 7th Edition, MKM Yayınevi, Bursa, p. 15.

[2] Waltz, K. N., Quester, G. H., 1982, Uluslararası İlişkiler Kuramı ve Dünya Siyasal Sistemi, Translator: Ersin Onulduran, SBF Yayınları, Ankara, p.14.

[3] Viotti, P. R.; Kauppi M. V., 1993, International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, Macmillan Publishing Company, New York, p. 3.

ways to assess theories of international relations. You can analyse its internal logic that is core concepts, assumptions, and logical consistency. Alternatively, one can take theory as it is and test it against the historical record by examining how well it explains the past and present behaviour of states, and how useful it might be for explaining the future actions.[4] Here, we can come up with the idea that there are no completely right theories and not all theories, even not all assumptions within a theory, are enough to explain a certain phenomenon. That is, we can use some useful parts of a theory to put our behaviours and actions into a frame.

To sum up, the aim of a theory according to most scholars is to explain and provide for past and present events and phenomena thus produce new knowledge in that specific area. Therefore theories in international relations can be seen as an attempt to explain the reality underlying the situations and even a guide for foreign policy choices.

[4] Mearsheimer, J. J., 2011, "Realists as Idealists". Security Studies. Vol: 20, No:3, p. 424.

3. REALIST THEORY

Realist thought reigned between 1930s and 1980s in the international relations arena and has considered itself as a theory and not just an approach[5] placing the concept of power and national interest to the centre. E. H. Carr claims that the regulations made after the First World War are the dissolution of idealist liberal ideas.[6] After the Second World War, Realism emerged as a criticism and reaction to the failure of the order and the predominant liberal ideas between the two world wars and interpreted itself as the most objective, concrete and scholarly theory resolving the problems of states.

The assumptions of the current realist thought lay their basis on the culmination of thinking about international relations for the last five centuries with the prominent contributions of notable intellectual precursors such as Thucydides, Niccòlo Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, Hugo Grotius and Carl Von Clausewitz and also more recent intellectuals in the tradition such as E. H. Carr and Hans J. Morgenthau.

As being cited as the first writer in realist tradition Thucydides expresses the cause of the Peloponnesian War as fear associated with the change in balance of power in his book *The History of the Peloponnesian War*. According to him, when statesmen see that the balance of power is shifting in their disadvantage, they make effort to change it on their advantage. This situation causes fear, distrust and suspicion among the rivals. After all, fear is a dominant characteristic and a motivating factor for arms races and war itself.[7] Actually, Thucydides legitimizes resorting to war and imperialism. By reasoning the attack of Sparta to Athens as the empowerment of Athens, he points out that the resulting fear and suspicion make the attack inevitable. According to him Sparta was forced to violate the agreements. Concepts such as justice and humanity are luxurious and unnecessary when it comes to state interests and obligations.[8]

Like Thucydides, Machiavelli focuses on national security in his classic *The Prince* and also deals with the issues of power, balance of power, alliances and counter-alliances,

[5] Rosenberg, J., 1994, The Empire of Civil Society: A Critique of the Realist Theory of International Relations, Verso, London, p. 10.
[6] Carr, E.H., 2001, The Twenty Years Crisis; 1919–1939, Perennial, New York.
[7] Viotti, P. R.; Kauppi M. V., 2010, International Relations Theory, 4th Edition, Pearson, New York and London, p. 46.
[8] Arı, T., 2011, ibid, p. 173.

conflicts and their reasons and morality. For him the security and wellbeing of the citizens is important and the prince should take decisions and actions by anticipating the consequences and protect the interests of their people at whatever expense. If war is necessary for preserving the national interests, then it should be fought. However, there are no concepts as just and unjust war according to Machiavelli. There is no necessity to wait for an attack from the enemy if a threat is felt openly, thus this kind of a war to protect themselves is necessary and just[9]. According to Machiavelli, a prince should seem kind, loyal, faithful, honest, merciful, humanist and religious, but he should not necessarily be like that. When a prince is to be judged for his actions, what is important is the end, not the means. Thus, a prince should always aim at capturing and retaining a state. Only then his aims can be praised. Even if a prince does not believe in peace and loyalty, he should seem promoting them, because people believe in what they say and very few of them notices the reality. According to him, the aim of survival and existence of a state prevail all other aims[10]

Like Machiavelli, the source of a right is power for Hobbes. That is, power entails right. In a state of nature, everything that is in line with natural law is moral. In a state of war, the weak uses every means and tricks to overcome the strong. Force and deception are the two virtues of war[11]. Hobbes in his *Leviathan* focused on domestic politics and for him a powerful and centralized political authority is important. Fear and suspicion, that is the pessimistic view on human nature, are what causes people to agree to place all their power in the hands of a sovereign or Leviathan (a state authority, or supreme ruler, either a monarch or parliament) that would end the anarchy of the state of nature, using power to maintain the order in the social life.[12] From this point of view, Hobbes argues that there is no supreme authority with power to sustain the authority in international politics, thus we witness anarchy in which states are sovereign, independent and autonomous, responsible for using the power for their own survival and security. That is power politics sustains the order in international relations.

[9] Ibid, p. 161.
[10] Machiavelli, N., 1994, Prens, Translator: Nazım Güvenç, Anahtar Kitaplar Yayınevi, İstanbul, p. 111.
[11] Arı, T., 2011, ibid, p. 176.
[12] Viotti, P. R.; Kauppi M.V., 2010, ibid, p. 49.

On the other hand, unlike Machiavelli and Hobbes, Grotius proposes that the anarchy in international relations can be dealt with and the order can be sustained with the establishment of basic laws and rules by states as binding. In this regard, Grotius places ration and the natural law as the basis of general principles in international law. Clausewitz places great importance on political and military elements of a state's power. According to him war is a continuation of political activity by other means,[13] and he focused on the use of force and rational leadership.

Carr sees politics superior to ethics, and according to him leaders rule because they are powerful and the ruled are subject to them because they are weak. Beyond power and interest, Carr gives importance to morality and proposes that politics is made up of two elements: utopia and reality – values and power. According to him, the utopian wants to develop an absolute standard. But in doing this, he does not reveal that his interests are the interests of the world. First he defends the idea that what is beneficial for the world is beneficial for his state, and then turns this argument inside out and say what is beneficial for his state is also beneficial for the world.[14]

As a more recent theorist, Morgenthau is cited as one of the most influential realist. His six principles of political realism set light to many statesmen and realist theorists. These can be explained as: (1) Politics is governed by objective laws; (2) Interest in IR is defined in terms of power; (3) Interest depends on political and cultural context; (4) There is a tension between realpolitik and morality, but universal moral principles can be filtered according to circumstances, time and place; (5) No identification of moral aspirations of a particular country; (6) Interest defined as power gives international politics a different stand.[15]

Realists think that humans are bad, evil, sinful, selfish and aggressive, and have a pessimistic nature that puts power above everything in their relations with each other. According to classical realism, as people prioritize power and interest in their relations, states follow power and interest in their international relations. As a result, war becomes possible in such a structure. In this regard, fear, suspicion, lack of confidence, security

[13] Ibid, p. 51.
[14] Carr, E., H., 1972, "Utopian Background", in Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., (Ed.) Politics and the International System, 2nd ed., J. B. Lippinncott Company, New York, p. 33.
[15] Morgenthau, H. J., 1970, Uluslararası Politika, Vol. 1, Translator: Baskın Oran and Ünsal Oskay, Sevinç Matbaası, Ankara, pp. 2-14.

dilemma and gaining prestige are factors that lead a statesman. Especially fear and security dilemma among these are main reasons that pushes them towards war. What motivate a statesman are the national interests and actions to be taken in the light of them, rather than moral principles.[16] There is no authority among states and the international structure is anarchical. In such an environment, the balance of power and the states' actions to preserve it is what sustains the order and stability and leads states to cooperation and institutionalize.[17]

There are many different views on the essentials of realist theory. For example, Vasquez summarises the assumptions of realism under three articles: (1) State is the main actor in international relations; (2) Domestic and international politics are different and separate from each other; (3) International politics is seen as power struggle.[18] However, most of the scholars accept these four basic assumptions: Firstly, states, as the key unit of analysis, are the principal and most important actors in an anarchical international structure lacking any central legitimate authority. Based on the sovereign equality among states since the Treaty of Westphalia, realists claim that the international systems is structured chaotically in an anarchical structure and they are not responsible to any authority above them.

Secondly, states in the political stage are unitary actors. In their international relations and foreign affairs, states act as an integrated unit. Governments always speak with one voice for the state as a whole. Thirdly, states are essentially rational actors with purposes. In the decision making process, states take all possibilities, objectives, interests, alternatives and means to these alternatives into consideration and try to calculate all the benefits and costs in each decision to attain their national interests. Fourthly, according to realists, military and related political issues dominate the world politics and national or international security is the most significant duty of a state.[19]

In the next section, we will elaborate on the basic assumptions and tenets of realist thought with the concepts of power, balance of power, security, sovereignty, anarchy, unitarism, rationalism and national interest.

[16] Arı, T., 2011, ibid, pp. 160-162.
[17] Stone, A., 1994, "What is Supranational Constitution? An Essay in International Relations Theory", The Review of Politics, Vol. 56, No. 3, pp. 452-453.
[18] Vasquez, J. A., 1998, The Power of Power Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 37.
[19] Viotti, P. R.; Kauppi M.V., 2010, ibid, pp. 42-43.

3.1 Basic tenets of Realist Theory

State is the primary concern of realists. Throughout the history, states have been seen as the most important actors in international relations. States are rational unitary actors that are sovereign, autonomous and have a right to self-determination. They speak with one voice and they calculate the cost and opportunity cost of their actions and behaviours and try to maximize profit. They have the full right to determine their domestic and foreign politics. No one has the right to intervene in other's affairs. That is, states are equals in an anarchic system. Anarchy is permanent and structural which is inherent in international relations, but it does not necessarily entail violence.

Mearsheimer explains anarchy as follows: "It simply means that there is no centralized authority, no night watchman or ultimate arbiter that stands above states and protects them."[20] Waltz also argued that the fundamental "ordering principle"[21] of the international political system is anarchy, and it is defined by the presence of "functionally undifferentiated"[22] individual states lacking "relations of super- and subordination"[23] that are distinguished only by their varying capabilities.

Here we can imply that there are no hierarchical authority relations among states, they are equals in this regard; however there surely are hegemonic position variations in the power balance. In this structure, major actors with greater capability set the scene in which others must act. However, this hegemonic power is not a legitimate authority and does not contrast with anarchical characteristic of the structure. Anarchy is the definitive characteristic of the international environment. Since there is no authority over the states in the international arena, there is no institution to make common laws and execute them, to prevent conflicts and wars, in other words keeping the powers in balance.

We have already stated that anarchy does not necessarily mean violence, though it causes suspicion. Their primary aim in this anarchical structure is security and to survive and they are responsible for their own protection. Every state seek its own interest so, there is no trust among them, because they can easily turn their back to you for their interests.

[20] Kaplan, R. D., Dec. 20, 2011. Why John J. Mearsheimer Is Right (About Some Things)
[21] Waltz, K.. N., 1979, Theory of International Politics, McGraw-Hill, New York, p. 88.
[22] Ibid, p. 97.
[23] Ibid, p. 88.

Mearsheimer puts the uncertainty of interests as: *the leaders of one great power in this anarchic jungle of a world can never know what the leaders of a rival great power are thinking. Fear is dominant.*[24] This suspicion and lack of trust make the structure a self-help system. The state-cantered perspective of Realism gives the responsibility of providing national and state security to the state. Realists believe that only with national security, can they ensure individual security. The concept of security in Realism is frequently used a synonym of military security. Realist theory claims that as a result of rational political behaviour upgrading military capacity to diminish the threats to the common interests of foreign politics has the priority.

Morgenthau's first principle, "politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature,"[25] highlights both objectivity and rationality. That is statesman acts in a rational manner. The assumption of the unitary rational actor is particularly important in the application of game theory and other rational choice methods to deterrence, arms control, balance of power, use of force and other studies of interest to realists.[26] According to game theory approach, states try to maximize their gains and minimize loses under conditions of uncertainty and lack of information. Here the rational choice is important. According to Morgenthau "we put ourselves in the position of a statesman who must meet a certain problem of foreign policy under certain circumstances, and we ask ourselves what the rational alternatives are … and which of the rational alternatives this particular statesman, acting under these circumstances, is likely to choose.".[27]

The rational choice is basically required for the protection of national interests. Realist theory argues that the main reason of states' foreign policy actions is to protect the national interests. National interests are one of the main stimuli of states for actions taken for the foreign politics; however it is hard to define this concept clearly.[28] Interest according to realist goes beyond mere survival. Strategic interests, political interests, economical interests, constitutional interests, and ideological interests etc. all matter for states when it

[24] Kaplan, R. D., Dec. 20, 2011, ibid.
[25] Morgenthau, H. J., 2005, Politics Among Nations, 7th ed., Revised by Kenneth W. Thompson , David Clinton McGraw-Hill Humanities/Social Sciences/Langua, p. 4.
[26] Viotti, P. R.; Kauppi M. V., 2010, ibid, p. 43.
[27] Morgenthau, H., J., 2005, ibid, p. 5.
[28] Finnermore, M., 1996, National Interests in International Society, Cornell University Press, p. 1.

comes to determine their relations with others. From this point of view, even cooperation as an outcome of rational choice can be included under the concept of interest.

Realists believe that power is an important aspect of international relations. Morgenthau's second principle puts that "The main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power."[29] This idea of power functions as both a means and an end. It is an end because states wish to survive and are uncertain about other states' intentions. It is a means to satisfy particular interests, which go beyond mere survival.[30] In this regard, Morgenthau says that "Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics are, power is always the immediate aim."[31]

Although for realists, power is substantial for the preservations of interests, there is no clear consensus on how to define it. In this regard, we can talk about material capabilities and relative capabilities to others. For example, some realists understand power to be the sum of military, economic, technological, diplomatic and other capabilities, while other see power as relative capabilities such as a states' influence on others. In this regard, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye,[32] define power as "the ability of an agent to make another agent do a specific action that this agent would not do under normal conditions". From this point, hard power as economic and military capabilities, and soft power as diplomatic capabilities that comes from culture or values matter. Great powers, as the main actors in the realists' account, pay careful attention to how much economic and military power they have relative to each other. It is important to have a substantial amount of power, but also to make sure that no other state sharply shifts the balance of power in its favour.[33] States need to protect themselves, so power maximization is one of the key objectives for security.

Thucydides in his book History of the Peloponnesian War states the main reason of war as the increasing power of Athens and the Spartans' fear of this power. That is, the real reason

[29] Morgenthau, H. J., 2005, ibid, p. 5.
[30] Cristol, J., 2009, "Morgenthau vs. Morgenthau? The Six Principles of Political Realism in Context", American Foreign Policy Interests, Vol. 31, No.240, pp. 238-244.
[31] Morgenthau, H. J., 2005, ibid, p. 5.
[32] Keohane, R. O.; Nye, J. S., 2001, Power and Interdependence, Third Edition, Princeton Press.
[33] Mearsheimer, J. J., 2013. "Structural Realism" in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith, eds., International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity. 3rd edition. Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 78.

of this war was derived from the fear of change in the power balance itself. Realist theory suggests that there can be a certain order in the international system through war or power balance. However, a peaceful order can only be possible through power balance, in the international system dominated by power struggle.

Before moving to Neorealism, we have to mention that classical realists emphasize power over morality. Classical realists sought to bring power back into IR theory and to create a theory that completely favoured neither "utopia" nor "reality".[34] E.H. Carr writes that "pure realism can offer nothing but the naked struggle for power which makes any kind of international society impossible."[35] Human nature is characterized by lust for power but also conformity with what is ethically right. Thus Morgenthau says that "Political realism is aware of the moral significance of political action … but universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states in their abstract universal formulation but they must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place."[36] According to realism, the ethical and moral behaviour of a state is to protect its own national interests.

3.2 Neo-Realist Theory (Structural Realism)

International arena and relations have experienced many changes and cycles throughout the history. When we look at the 20th century, two world wars drastically caused changes in the system and the relations among states. The international system has changed from being focused on the United States and Soviet Russia struggle, to being a multi-polarized structure with the rise of Europe and Far East.[37] Since theories are formed in order to comprehend the present and the past, they have to be adjusted according to time and place. During the détente period and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, new waves in the international relations theory have started to be discussed with the aim of explaining the new order.

In this changing environment, towards the end of 1970s, Neorealism emerged with the works of Kenneth Waltz, Robert Gilpin, John Mearsheimer and Stephen Krasner. Neorealist theory has emerged in the détente period of the Cold War. During this time,

[34] Cristol, J., 2009, ibid.
[35] Carr, E. H., 2001, ibid, p. 87.
[36] Morgenthau, H. J., 2005, ibid, p. 12.
[37] Gilpin, R., 2008, War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 115.

rivalry relations started to change between the United States and the Soviet Union, financial issues engaged the agenda, along with states new actors entered the international arena and they did have substantial power and the classical power and power balance idea started to fall short to explain the changing international system any longer. As a result of all these incidents, realism has been transformed with new approaches and viewpoints.

Starting from the 1970s, financial power and economic interests once again surpassed diplomatic and geographical power games. Economic power relations became a vital point in the international structure. By giving more emphasis on political interests, power politics and balance of power, Classical Realism somehow neglected the significance of economic relations which is the very part that Classical Realism is criticized. In this regard, we can say that Neorealism filled the gap in terms of economic and social aspects. What distinguishes Neorealism from Classical Realism can be explained by finance, in which Neorealists refer to economics and social issues alongside the military and power politics.

Kenneth Waltz is known as the founder of this theory. In his "Theory of International Politics"[38] and other works, he reveals the basic principles and ideas of Neorealism. According to him, a theory is useless if not the changes in the system but the changes of the system happen. Changes happen within the system all the time, they do not change the structure of the system and this leads theories being revised rather than becoming obsolete. The introduction of nuclear weaponry was the greatest of such changes. Yet in the nuclear era, international politics remains a self-help arena. Nuclear weapons decisively change how some states provide for their own and possibly for others' security; but nuclear weapons have not altered the anarchic structure of the international political system.[39] He also distinguishes between changes in the structure and changes at the unit level. In this regard he asserts that changes in polarity also affect how states provide for their security.[40] The number of great powers significantly affects the relations and gains it new perspectives. All this taken into account, revision and transformation of realism is needed according to him.

[38] Waltz, K. N., 1979, ibid.
[39] Waltz, K. N., 2000, "Structural Realism After the Cold War", International Security, Vol. 25 No. 1, p. 5.
[40] Ibid, p. 5.

Waltz tries to explain the reason behind the tendency of adopting similar behaviours and policies by the states that have different political systems and ideologies.[41] According to him the reason is the international structure. Waltz finds out the two relevant characteristics of the international system as anarchy and relative capacity (power). The characteristics of the structure constitute the reason why states follow similar policies under similar conditions despite their differences.[42] According to him there is a mutual interaction between states and the structure, while structure affects states, states affect and shape the structure in return; thus it is nearly impossible to draw a line here.[43] The most important actor of the international system is state and they primary objective is survival. States are unitary actors who essentially care for their own preservation and then universal domination.[44] Neorealists share much of the basic assumptions of Classical Realism. However, they differ from realists with the idea of other actors shaping the international structure (though they do not have substantial effect from a neorealist perspective) and their focus on structure and the system determining the relations. According to them, the International structure is formed through the interaction of states and this structure directs the actions of the states.

Classical realists see anarchy as a result and do not pay much attention to its determinative characteristic on states. However, Neorealists see anarchy as a reason and focus on it as a starting point for explaining the foreign affairs of the states.[45] Anarchy does not necessarily imply that violence is common in the international system. However, the threat of violence is always present. Anarchy entails a self-help system. Waltz discusses how the structure of the international system limits cooperation: First, insecurity that is the uncertainty of each about the other's future intentions and actions works against cooperation. A state worries about a division of possible gains that may favour other more than itself.[46] Second, a state also worries lest it become dependent on others through trade and cooperation, and

[41] Linklater, A., 1995, "Neorealism in Theory and Practice", Ken Booth and Steve Smith (eds.), International Relations Theory Today, Polity Press, Cambridge, pp. 242.
[42] Arı, T., 2011, ibid, p. 187.
[43] Waltz, K. N., 1992, "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory", Robert L. Rothstein (ed.), The Evolution of Theory in International Relations, University of South Carolina Press, South Carolina, pp. 36-37.
[44] Waltz, K. N., 1979, ibid.
[45] Arı, T., 2011, ibid, p. 192
[46] Waltz, K. N., 1979, ibid, pp. 105-106.

therefore also chooses to limit its cooperation with other states.[47] States do not willingly place themselves in situations of increased dependence. In a self-help system, considerations of security subordinate economic gain to political interest.[48]

Neorealists believe that international institutions are shaped and limited by the states that found and sustain them and have little independent effect.[49] In his article "False Promise of International Institutions" Mearsheimer focuses on institutions and asks the question of "Can international institutions prevent war by changing state behaviour?" That is can institutions push states away from war by getting them to eschew balance of power logic, and to refrain from calculating each important move according to how it affects their relative power position?[50]

Neorealists believe that institutions cannot get states to stop behaving as short term power maximizers. For realists, institutions reflect state calculations of self-interest based primarily on concerns about relative power. Intuitional outcomes reflect great power interests, and are essentially tools that great powers employ for their own selfish purposes[51] For Mearsheimer, the focus must be on "outer-directed" institutions, that is the target of an alliance's attention is an outside state, or coalition of states, which the alliance aims to deter, coerce or defeat in war rather than keeping peace among memberships, instead of "inner-directed" that is they are designed to manage and resolve conflicts among the member states and facilitate cooperation among them. He argues that alliances cause peace by deterrence.

Glenn Snyder said that alliances have no meaning apart from the adversary threat to which they are a response.[52] Waltz, in this regard, claims that the recent history of NATO illustrates the subordination of international institutions to national purposes.[53] He expected that NATO will lose its significance and disappear after Cold War[54]. He affirms

[47] Ibid, p. 106.
[48] Ibid, p. 107.
[49] Waltz, K. N., 2000, ibid, p. 18.
[50] Mearsheimer, J. J., 1995, "A Realist Reply", International Security, Vol.:20 No:1, p. 82.
[51] Ibid, pp. 82-83.
[52] Snyder, G. H., 1997, Alliance Politics, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., pp. 192.
[53] Waltz, K. N., 2000, ibid, p. 18.
[54] Waltz, K. N., 1993, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics", International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2 pp. 75–76

that his expectation has been borne out because NATO is no longer even a treaty of guarantee because one cannot answer the question, guarantee against whom and he claims that the survival and expansion of NATO shows American power and influence rather than institutions as multilateral entities.[55]

A great majority of classical realists the urge for power stems from human nature. Morgenthau asserts that statesman who continuously goes after power and tries to attain it behaves rationally. Here power is the primary aim itself.[56] Contrary to the realists, Neorealists perceive power as an instrument, not as a target that is resorted when needed. Under extraordinary conditions, the ultimate worry of the state is not power but security.[57] However, the concept of power is the main element in both classical realism and Neorealism.[58] According to Waltz, power can be military, financial and technological and a state's power depends on its influence on other states. The more powerful a state gets, the more it influences other states while at the same time staying uninfluenced.[59]

There are defensive and offensive realists in terms of power gain. Defensive realists like Kenneth Waltz focus on maintaining the existing balance of power, preserving power rather than increasing it. On the other hand, offensive realists like John J. Mearsheimer see states as maximizing their power and their main goal is to be the hegemon in the system. However, in any case, power maximization for defensive or offensive purposes, cause suspicion among others and this leads to security dilemma. States as rational actors assumes the worst case and act accordingly. The more you get armed to protect yourself, the more you get threatened. Here what is important is to keep the system balanced. Waltz completes balancing with bandwagoning. In bandwagoning, weaker states choose to ally with the stronger state. Waltz argues that because power is a means not an end, states may prefer to join the weaker of two coalitions.[60] Here we see again that the structure of the international system and the urge of survival shape this behaviour.

[55] Waltz, K. N., 2000, ibid, p. 20.
[56] Arı, T., 2011, ibid, p. 190.
[57] Waltz, K. N., 1992, ibid, p. 36.
[58] Buzan, B., 1996, "The Timeless Wisdom of Realism", Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalevski, International Theory: Pozitivism and Beyond, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 50-51.
[59] Waltz, K., N., 1979, ibid.
[60] Waltz, K., N., 1979, ibid, p. 126.

For all realists, balance of power is the only way to sustain the stability. In terms of power balance, a new question arises among the realists: a bipolar or multipolar system is desirable for stability? According to John Mearsheimer, a multi-polar system has the possibility of war within itself more than a bipolar system. He argues that the multi-polar system that has some potential dominant states is the most dangerous of all systems (Mearsheimer, 2001:21). Waltz acknowledges that bipolar system is desirable, since there are only two hegemons and the uncertainty is limited.[61] However, Singer and Deutsch assert that multipolar is more stable since there are many dominant states, they become more cautious and the attention is allocated to a larger number of states.[62]

Realists have also discussed among themselves if the power balance is achieved automatically or through the will of state leaders. Kissinger as a classical realist emphasizes voluntarism and proposes that balance of power is a construction by states and it does not occur automatically.[63] That is, statesmen as foreign policy makers create this balance of power and maintain it as long as their judgements, wills and expectations allow them. On the other hand, Waltz deals with the concept of balance of power in a determinist way. He sees it as an attribute of the system which will definitely occur whether it is willed or not. He argues that the balance of power is not so much imposed by statesmen on events as it is imposed by events on statesmen.[64] The emphasis here is on the system itself and Waltz asserts that the freedom of choice of any one state is limited by the actions of all the others,[65] that is in addition to the structure and characteristic of the system, the competition to become hegemon in the system limits states' capabilities as a rational and unitary actor to accomplish their will. It is all dependent on the system.

As I have already mentioned above, this point of view giving more emphasize on the system in terms of balance of power constitutes Neorealists' basic difference from classical realists who gives statesmen or policymakers greater freedom to shape and affect the international events. While realists see the international politics roughly as a process of interaction among states, Neorealists focuses on the system level and the structural causes,

[61] Arı, T., 2011, ibid, p. 188.
[62] Viotti, P. R.; Kauppi M. V., 2010, ibid, p. 63.
[63] Ibid, p. 60.
[64] Waltz, K. N., 1954, Man, the State and War, Columbia University Press, p. 209.
[65] Ibid, p. 204.

and also unit level causes that arise from the states themselves separately. Thus structure gains importance in neorealist thinking.[66]

When it comes to the concept of morality, it is noteworthy that Neorealism does not give emphasize enough to morality and that moral elements should be kept out of the politics which constitutes one of the main characteristics of classical realism. In this regard, acting with the concern of being scientific on one hand, ignoring the principle of value free science on the other is an important critic directed to Neorealism.[67]

3.3 Realist Theory and Foreign Policy

In general realism foreign policy process should be shaped such that to take the advantage of international power opportunities. Realist foreign policy emphasizes the role of national power and the character of states and their relationship with the domestic environment (unit level). From this perspective, we can say that classical realism is a state-driven foreign policy. Realist theory suggests that states as unitary actors acts rationally in their foreign policy choices. Their primary concern is to maximize their interests and power with the very aim of survival. In this regard, states thinks the worst case and act accordingly. In their foreign policies, states, according to Morgenthau, follow three different policies: preserving the status quo and keeping their power; urge for imperialism and increase their power; and creating prestige and demonstrate their power.[68]

According to realism, the ethical and moral behaviour of a state is to protect its own national interests, and foreign policy cannot be identified with states' ethical choices or with principles governing the international relations As I mentioned above Morgenthau states that "Political realism is aware of the moral significance of political action … but universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states in their abstract universal formulation but they must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place."[69] In the end the scope of interest defines the actions of states ranging from ethical radicalism to political mistakes. States always prioritize their interests in all kind of relations that they enter into.

[66] Arı, T., 2011, ibid, p. 189.
[67] Forde, S., 1995, "International Relations and the Science of Politics: Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Neorealism". International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 39, No.2, p. 143.
[68] Morgenthau, H., J., 1960, The Purpose of American Politics, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, p. 39.
[69] Morgenthau, H., J., 2005, ibid, p. 12.

As I mentioned above while realists see the international politics roughly as a process of interaction among states, Neorealists focuses on the system level and the structural causes giving emphasis on anarchy as the system determinant on foreign policy,[70] and also unit level causes that arise from the states themselves separately. According to Neorealism, a state's foreign policy is determined by both its domestic sources and the international system. We can say that neorealist foreign policy is a system-driven approach. Waltz asserts that the freedom of choice of any one state is limited by the actions of all the others;[71] that is, in addition to the domestic policy choices and the structure of the system, the competition to become hegemon in the system limits states' capabilities as a rational and unitary actor to accomplish their will. In this sense, in order to discuss foreign policy, we should pay attention to the structure of the international system and the state's position in this system, - the hierarchy of power. According to Waltz, foreign policy analysis depends on the adapting to the systemic imperatives and cost-benefit calculations.[72]

Waltz tries to explain the reason behind the tendency of adopting similar behaviours and policies by the states that have different political systems and ideologies as the international structure. Although political structures of the states differentiate, their behaviour within the system is similar to each other. Thus, the system causes their behaviours in foreign policy to be much closer. For example, during the Cold War period, the United States and Soviet Russia have completely different political systems and ideologies; however, both their military policy and their interventions in other states' domestic policies were very similar. The bipolar system defines and directs their actions in this regard and forms their foreign policies towards each other and other states.

What classical realism misses is the importance of economic relations and processes on the outcomes of power and policy. Neorealist theory, on the other hand, focuses on the financial situation of the states as playing a substantial role in their foreign policy. Thus the importance gap in realism of financial contradictions and conflicts is filled by neorealist tradition.

[70] İşyar, G., 2009, Karşılaştırmalı Dış Politikalar: Yöntemler-Modeller-Örnekler ve Karşılaştırmalı Türk Dış Politikası, Dora Yayınları, Bursa, p.368.
[71] Waltz, K. N., 1954, Man, the State and War, Columbia University Press, p. 204.
[72] Waltz, K., N., 1979, Theory of International Politics, McGraw-Hill, New York, p. 118.

4. REALIST THEORY AND COLD WAR

4.1 Cold war

Realist theory focuses on power politics and assumes that the more states become powerful, the more they become more prosperous. Struggle for power in order to achieve national interests is the core of Realist thought. From a realpolitik perspective, during Cold War, we witnessed a bipolar world in which two rival hegemons tried to dominate the international affairs. This explanation may be very simple, but realist thought was at the core of the Cold War with its powerful perspective of war, alliances, imperialism cooperation, obstacles and other international phenomena. Realist focus on competition well explains the circumstances and factors behind the American and Soviet rivalry during Cold War.[73]

After the Second World War, as the most catastrophic event in the world history with over 50 million casualties, within the concept of security, the idea to resort to war was seen as the last option taking the increase in the nuclear armament and its devastating results into consideration. Nuclear arm constituted the factors of political prestige and military deterrence of the superpower policies.[74] In such an environment, on one side the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in the rivalry of armament in order to balance their military power against each other, on the other side, they created such alliances as NATO in 1949 and the Warsaw Pact in 1955 to back their military power with the help of diplomatic and military cooperation of their allies.

[73] Walt, S.M., 1998, "International Relations: One World, Many Theories", Foreign Policy, Vol: 1, p.31.
[74] Caşın, M. H., 2006, Novgorod Knezliği'nden XXI. Yüzyıla Rus imparatorluk Stratejisi, Okumuş Adam Yayınları, İstanbul, p. 212.



Figure 4.1 The United States and the Soviet Union/Russian Federation Arms Race[75]

In the post war period, power politics and power relations came into prominence and created a fertile environment for realism to prosper. When we consider the attempts to create a new order during this period, the new order was shaped around "the present power relations" rather than "how they should be". Thus the post-war order reflected the power relations and positions very clearly and this led to a more polarized world with the United States as the possible leader and the Soviet Union as a balancing actor. In a rapidly polarising environment of Cold War, power politics stand out with the military dimension.[76] As Waltz puts it, the Cold War "is firmly rooted in the structure of post-war

[75] Source: US and Russian leaders hail nuclear arms treaty, 8 April 2010, BBC, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8607985.stm (Accessed on 21.07.2014)

[76] Herz, J. H., 1981, "Political Realism Revisited", International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 25 No. 2, pp. 2-15.

international politics and will last as long as that structure endures."[77] Realism legitimized the inclination of the United States to armament in order to obtain the leadership in the power struggle after the Second World War on one hand, but proposed rational policies in order to reduce the tension in the international relations and soften it in a bipolar world on the other.[78] The détente period during Cold War was a result of these rational politics of giving importance to strategic factors other than pure ideology.

Security politics during Cold War were substantially affected by realism and the concept of balance of power. The surviving actors of the Second World War became the new balancing factors of the international system. Hence, the polarization on the axis of capitalism – socialism and NATO – Warsaw Pact played a substantial role shaping the perception of post-war security.[79] Within this framework, perception of security is associated with military and economic power. In a bipolar structure, the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in rivalry in all spheres and they found the best way to guarantee their national securities as strengthening their armies and increasing their capacity of armament and defence. Military threads became the primary targets to be suppressed by means of military power in order to provide security. However, this power maximization eventually resulted in security dilemma. Moreover, with the increase of nuclear weapons, the possibility of a nuclear destruction led both sides to act within the power balance system paving the way to arms reduction. They preferred to play the game according to the rules with limited and relative gains and interests.[80]

4.1 Post-Cold war

Unlike the general idea of single US hegemony, at the end of the Cold War, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the structure of the international system has changed from bipolar to multipolar, many other actors becoming prominent and influential in international relations in a short period. In order to create and preserve the international peace in a multipolar environment, actors of international system should be effectively

[77] Waltz, K. N., 1988, "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory," Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 18, No. 4, p. 628.
[78] Eralp, A., 1996, Devlet Sistem ve Kimlik, Uluslararası İlişkilerde Temel Yaklaşımlar, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, pp. 71-89.
[79] Elmas, M. S., 2013, "Modern Toplumun Güvenlik Çıkmazı: Tehdit, Risk ve Risk Toplumu Perspektifinden Güvenlik", International Strategic Research Organization (United States), p. 49.
[80] Ibid, p. 54.

balanced against each other. It is a fact that balancing gets more difficult with so many actors on the arena then only two actors of bipolar era. However, no matter how the system and circumstances change, the basic principles of a foreign policy are consistent with the realist principles of survival of the state and national interest, broadly speaking, despite this, the changing environment requires theoretical approaches to renew themselves in order to be able to account for the new international agenda.

Despite many authors' exaggerated expectations that Realism will be useless explaining the post-Cold War period, neorealist attention to relative and absolute gains by Joseph Grieco and Stephen Crasner, ethnic conflict by Barry Posen and many other perspectives help realist thought continue to survive, preserve its dominant position and create realistic explanations for international affairs after Cold War.[81] The split of "defensive" and "offensive" positions of states along with "relative" and "absolute" gains and benefits seem to underline the cooperation with each other in order to reinforce their power positions, however, it is also a realist assumption that states cannot be trusted since they follow their own interests and they may let the allies down in a collaboration for their own sakes. Thus, Neorealists also underline when applying these concepts for more diplomatic and collaborative relations that states always consider the actions and tendencies of other and they only engage in cooperation as long as their interests are at stake.

During post-Cold War period, a new democratic wave was witnessed in Eastern Europe and Eurasia. Within this framework, the idea of war became obsolescent among the advanced industrial states combined with Michael Doyle's "democratic peace theory".[82] With the help of universal values, norms, morality and ethics, together with the expansion of democracy, it is believed that peace can be spread and wars will come to extinct. However, this is not the real case in post-Cold War period. The democratic wave came along with many small scale wars, even if they were not as destructive as the previous two World Wars, they cost countless lives. Democratic peace theory did not account for the whole period and today, because the causes of war do not only lie on the internal dynamics of states. In an essay, Waltz describes the interdependence as "an ideology used by Americans to camouflage the great leverage the United States enjoys in international

[81] Waltz, K. N., 1988, ibid, p.35.
[82] Doyle, M., 1986, "Kant: Liberalism and World Politics", American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4, pp. 1151–1169.

politics by making it seem that strong and weak, rich and poor nations are similarly entangled in a thick web of interdependence."[83] The uneven effects of interdependence, with some gaining more and others less, are suppressed by the term "asymmetric interdependence" by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye in terms of dependence and independence among states.[84] This uneven interdependence will always put international peace at danger.

[83] Waltz, K. N., 1970, "The Myth of National Interdependence," in Charles P. Kindleberger, ed., The International Corporation, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
[84] Keohane R. O.; Nye J. S., 1989, Power and Interdependence, 2nd ed., Harper- Collins, New York.

5. COLD WAR

5.1 The Origins, General Characteristics, and Main Events

The term "Cold War" was used by Bernard Baruch (a multimillionaire and financier) in his speech in the South Carolina House of Representatives for describing the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Cold War can be briefly defined as the period of continuous tension and limited armed conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union after the Second World War, and the essentials of the Cold War can be summarized under the topics of bipolarity (tight/ lose), ideological/military supremacy and competition for world dominance and global power, spiralling arms races, the invention of nuclear missiles and weaponry, control of regional proxies (centre-periphery relations), the importance spying and intelligence, increasing defence budgets and economic competition. Within these concepts, the Cold War lasted for almost 45 years as an uneasy peace between the USA and the Soviet Union, and a propaganda war between Democracy vs. Communism fought on political and economic fronts rather than on military battlefields, though the threat of military war was always present.

Although, according to many scholars, the roots of the Cold War lies on the new structure of international politics, created with the Second World War and continued until today, in fact it is an offspring of the East-West dispute starting with the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution on the competing ideological systems of the Soviet Union and the United States. Heated with the events of 1930s and 1940s, this dispute intensified and became prominent after the Second World War. The structure of the international relations experienced a substantial change. With their absolute military superiority after the Second World War, two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union shaped the new order under power balance of a bipolar structure and filled the power gap left with the war.[85] This rivalry lived through ups and downs of post-war period finally coming to an end with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

[85] For more information on the post-war partitions, positions and conditions of the European great powers, USA and the USSR, and also the roots of the Cold War: Roberts J. M., 2010, Avrupa Tarihi, Translator: Fethi Aytuna, Inkilap Kitabevi, İstanbul, pp. 678-686; Simms, B., 2013, Europe: The Struggle for Supremacy 1453 to the Present, Penguin Group, London, pp. 382-395; Judt, T., 2010, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945, Vintage Books, London, pp. 100-164.

As a result of the two revolutions in Russia, Lenin became the new leader with the strong belief of overthrowing capitalism, abolishing capitalist institutions and then setting up a new system which would be dominated by proletarian dictatorship first, and later as Marx predicted, classless society would be created. As one of the Wilson's 14 points, open door world economy implied that tariff barriers, imperial preference and all other state-centred obstacle to the free flow of capital and goods worldwide must be dismantled. And the October 1917 Bolshevik revolution was the first decisive rejection of this capitalist vision.[86] The policies that Lenin followed (abolishing private property; nationalization of Russian economy; refusing to pay Tsar's debt to Europe and the United States; denying all capitalist institutions and introducing a new world order which was a direct challenge to capitalism), eventually made Russia the USA's main target.

Consequently, the United States did not recognize the revolution, did not respond to the cooperation requests of Lenin (during famine years)[87] and even sent troops to Russia helping the Whites in order to bring the Tsar back during the civil war. When the civil war was over and the Reds won the war establishing the Soviet Union in 1922, USA cut off all its diplomatic relations and called its ambassador back to Washington (the relations between the two were to be restored by Roosevelt in 1933). Although there was no diplomatic relations until 1933, trade with the Soviet Union continued[88] serving the American interests and aims under the concept of "open door policy".[89]

After the Bolshevik Revolution, the Soviet Union followed a balanced and silent policy leaving it outside the circle of super powers until 1940s. When the USA restored its diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1933[90], at first the United States thought that both countries had different world views, but they could co-exist through trade and by

[86] McCauley, M., 2008, Origins of the Cold War: 1941-1949, Revised 3rd edt., Pearson Education, Great Britain, p.3

[87] Browder, R. P., 1953, The Origins of Soviet-American Diplomacy, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, pp. 3-18.

[88] Ibid, p. 4.

[89] "Open Door Policy" was proposed during the presidency of William McKinley and outlined in Secretary of State John Hay's Open Door Note to sell the overproduction in the USA to overseas. This policy became the main foreign policy of the United States in the late 19th century and early 20th century with the aim of keeping the trade routes in the World open. This concept will be dealt in detail in the next chapter.

[90] For more information about the recognition process: Browder, R. P., 1953, The Origins of Soviet-American Diplomacy, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, pp. 127-152.

recognizing and respecting each other's sovereignty. However, after a short period of time, the USA realized that this was an illusion[91].

In 1939, Stalin wanted to form an alliance with Britain and France at Munich Conference, but when they rejected, he signed a Nazi-Soviet Pact in 1939 dividing the East Europe between Germany and USSR.[92] Afterwards, during the war, West could not do much to prevent this and the Soviets controlled East Europe. From the Second World War on, an active, expansionist and aggressive foreign policy,[93] together with the technological developments moved the Soviet Union to the forefront of international politics. This rise entailed the introduction of the factors of doctrine and ideology in international relations.[94] In this regard, after the war, the Soviet foreign policy focused on the doctrine of spreading communism around the world, which became the biggest opponent against the capitalist doctrine of the United States. Partition was the undeniable fact of the post-1945 world; the globe was ideologically divided between a Democratic West and a Communist East.[95]

On one side, the Soviet Union gave pace to its actions to establish communist regimes in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria[96] under the cover of protecting and saving them from German invasion, and helped Mao Zedong to bring communism in China, on the other. The struggle over Germany and Poland was especially important because if the Red Army occupied Poland and it fell into communist hands, then the Soviets could not be prevented from overrunning all Europe. This was the main concern and fear of the United States.

Meanwhile, the successful test of the atom bomb took place while President Truman was at Potsdam, encouraging him to take a harder line. The atom bomb and the financial position of the USA gave Truman and his chief advisers a feeling of awesome power to challenge the Soviet threat in Europe, especially over the Germany issue. From Potsdam on, the

[91] McCauley, M., 2008, ibid, p. 5.
[92] Simms, B., 2013, Europe: The Struggle for Supremacy 1453 to the Present, Penguin Group, London, p. 360.
[93] McCauley, M., 2008, ibid, p. 6.
[94] For detailed information: Roberts J. M., 2010, Avrupa Tarihi, Translator: Fethi Aytuna, Inkilap Kitabevi, İstanbul, pp. 652-654.
[95] Simms, B., 2013, ibid, p. 382.
[96] See Naimark N.; Gibianskii L., 1998, The establishment of communist regimes in Earstern Europe, 1944-1949, Boulder and Oxford.

bomb was the constant factor in the American approach to the Soviet Union. One of the greatest fears in American military was that after Germany, the West now had to deal with the Red Army and the only nation capable of this was the United States, but domestic political realities prevented forming a large US army in post-war Europe. The bomb seemed to solve all these problems, instead.[97] The tests in Hiroshima and Nagasaki clearly showed the power of the atom bomb.[98] However, the atom bombs of 1945-1949 period were not powerful enough to deter the Soviets and USA did not have enough bombs to make a massive attack, either. It was easier to threat using the bomb rather than finding excuses to use it. For example, when in 1948 Communists took over Czechoslovakia, the United States did not use the bomb and no other tools available to punish them, so they did nothing.[99] What is more, with the successful test of the atom bomb, arms race intensified substantially. Eventually when the Soviet Union tested its own atom bomb in 1949, ending the US monopoly,[100] both sides became aware of the possible devastating power of nuclear weapons, which led to a period of détente with a consensus to limit and control the nuclear weapons.

After the Second World War, the influence of the Soviet Union increased especially in the Central, East and Southeast Europe by taking the countries in these regions under its control.[101] Thus, establishing communist regimes and gaining allies near its borders, the Soviet Union both created a security circle around it and gained outposts in Europe. [102] In addition, Soviets also engaged in various kinds of oppression on Iran, Turkey and Greece while trying to reach to the Mediterranean Sea and Persian Gulf.

During 1946-47, the Soviet Union aimed at expanding to Middle Eastern energy sources, Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean through Iran, to Turkish Straits, Aegean and Mediterranean Sea through Turkey and Greece.[103] As a result of its actions during these years, Soviets strengthened their position in Europe such that the communist threat and fear gripped

[97] Ambrose, S. E., 1985, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938, Forth revised edition, Penguin Books, USA, p. 71.
[98] Roberts J. M., 2010, Avrupa Tarihi, Translator: Fethi Aytuna, Inkilap Kitabevi, İstanbul, p. 681; Simms, B., 2013, Europe: The Struggle for Supremacy 1453 to the Present, Penguin Group, London, p. 390.
[99] Ambrose, S. E., 1985, ibid, p. 72.
[100] Roberts J. M., 2010, ibid, p. 681.
[101] Simms, B., 2013, ibid, p. 393;
[102] Armaoğlu, F., 2009, 20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi, Alkım Yayınevi, İstanbul, p. 529.
[103] Ibid, p. 537.

every state in Europe and also the United States. This expansion aims caused serious crisis in the relations between the Soviet Union and the United States and shattered the hopes of cooperation. With the Soviet fear in mind the United States actively involved in the domestic politics of these regions mainly with the efforts of preventing communist regimes or governments to take over the domestic politics.

American response to Soviet challenge revolved around three possibilities: 1) built up America's own military resources, 2) sent military aid to threatened nations, 3) give economic and technical assistance to needy people.[104] The roots of American imperialism actually rest upon its economic power.[105] Truman defined the American policy as "wherever an anti-communist government is threatened, the USA will supply political, economic and military aid."[106] The challenge from the Soviet Union was economic and political which should be met by long term patient containment. Containment is a term put forward by George F. Kennan (Senior State Department Official of the United States at the time) meaning "building up the military strength of America and her allies and a willingness to stand up to Russians wherever they applied pressure".[107]

Within this framework, in order to protect the European states against the Soviet expansion, the United States announced the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan in 1947.[108] With the Truman Doctrine, the United States aimed at supporting the states under Soviet threat, and with the Marshall Plan, aimed at economically reconstructing, developing and strengthening the Europe for both economic and military reasons.[109] Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan are completing each other. The emphasis on Greece and Turkey was military while in West Europe it was economic, but both were designed to contain the Soviets. On the purpose of protecting the European States, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was established in 1949. However, this also eventually led to the establishment of Warsaw Pact in 1955 separating the blocks definitely. As a result of the Marshall Plan, Western European states came under the influence of the United States,

[104] Ambrose, S. E., 1985, ibid, p. 81.
[105] Roberts J. M., 2010, ibid, p. 681.
[106] Ambrose, S. E., 1985, ibid, p. 86.
[107] Ibid, p. 100.
[108] For detailed information "Marshall Planı": Roberts J. M., 2010, Avrupa Tarihi, Translator: Fethi Aytuna, Inkilap Kitabevi, İstanbul, p. 686.
[109] Simms, B., 2013, ibid, p. 397.

while the Eastern European states witnessed the establishments of communist governments in alliance with the Soviet Union; thus the Cold War reached its peak. However, the Soviet threat was largely theoretical, the Red Army had not marched beyond the position it held in 1945, not even into Czechoslovakia.[110]

Map 5.1 Cold War Europe, 1945 - 1988[111]

From the 1950s onwards, Cold War struggle expanded outside the Europe especially to the Middle East, Central America and Asia-Pacific region, reflecting proxy wars in a sense. Soviet engagement in the Middle East was in a way supporting Arab nationalism against the American imperialism and the establishment of the State of Israel. However, it can be said that this involvement in Middle Eastern politics used the Arab nationalism in order to achieve the aims of controlling this geopolitically strategic region. In many cases, the

[110] Ambrose, S. E., 1985, ibid, p. 109.

[111] Soruce: Joung, J., 1999, Longman Companion To America, Russia And The Cold War 1941-1998, UIP, p.83.

Soviets supported the Arab states against Israel, thus balancing the power against the United States, when we look at the big picture.

American fear of communist expansion once again showed itself in Korean and Vietnam Wars, Berlin Crisis and the Cuban Missile Crisis[112] during 1950s and 1960s. After losing China to Mao, the United States had to act and take concrete steps to show US people and world that they were not soft on communists. These countries became the battle grounds where the Soviet Union and the United States showed off and tested their military capacities against each other.

Starting from 1960s (especially after the peak of nuclear danger in the Cuban Missile Crisis) and during 1970s, a new era called détente began. A long period of constructive relations between the United States and the Soviet Union was started. The talks on the proliferation of nuclear weapons throughout the 1960s occupied the agenda and resulted in the non-proliferation treaty of 1968. During 1970s, several substantial accords were concluded, such as the SALT and ABMT agreements.

One of the purposes of détente was to avoid a nuclear war between the two. Thus, efforts were made to improve direct communication between them with the Hot Line Agreement in 1963. Moreover, agreements on reducing confrontations by mistake were signed such as the US-Soviet Incidents at Sea Agreement in 1972, the Text of the Basic Principles of Relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1972, and the Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement in 1973. Later, in order to finalize the disputes between the two blocks, the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was signed in Helsinki in 1975.[113]

Another purpose of détente was to limit the nuclear arms race. In this regard, in 1963 Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was signed, however this was not quite effective on the positions of both sides to keep their present arsenals of nuclear weapons and further the option of having additional weapons. Thus, the purpose of this agreement was to control

[112] Simms, B., 2013, ibid, p. 434.
[113] Wallensteen , P., 1985, "American-Soviet Detente: What Went Wrong?", Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 2-3.

and slow down the arms race. Within this framework, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was signed in 1968. [114]

A further purpose was economic benefits with the help of slowing down the arms race and also the direct exchanges between the two. The Soviet Union was interested in grain and technology while the United States was appealed by new markets. Taken all these into consideration, it was a peaceful co-existence, a relaxation of tension and an elimination of conflict within the ups and downs of the Cold War. [115]

During détente era, some other developments also showed how American challenge against the Soviets faded gradually and how relations between the two had different paths apart from direct military struggle. For instance, in 1971 winners of WWII signed the Berlin Accord and it became a part of the more comprehensive Berlin Agreement in 1972. Then in 1974 formal diplomatic relations were established between USA and East Germany which meant that USA abandoned its 30 years old policy of united Germany. In 1972 Helsinki Accords were signed and USA recognized the boundaries of various Russian satellites. This meant that USA no longer challenged USSR in the area. All this meant that enormous American power and economy of 1945 declined.[116]

In 1979 the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and the relations again worsened. Fearful for the West's oil supplies, the US President Carter backed away from SALT II, increased defensive spending and proclaimed Carter Doctrine for the Southwest Asia. He defined the Persian Gulf as the zone of US vital interests and declared that any assault in the region by Soviet will be repelled by the United States by any means. However, despite the Carter Doctrine, USA did not involve in Iran-Iraq war, but the United States involved in Lebanon war to contain the Soviet Union.

When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, détente era faced its end. However, the reason why American-Soviet détente did not last more cannot be confined to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The scepticism on the both sides increased substantially over the issues of missile crisis, Camp David Agreement (excluding the Soviet Union from the peace process in the Middle East), the Soviet treaty with Vietnam, American diplomatic

[114] Ibid, pp. 2-3.
[115] Ibid, pp. 2-3.
[116] Ambrose, S. E., 1985, ibid, p. 240-241.

recognition of China (leading to the postponement of SALT) and the discovery of a Soviet brigade on Cuba. One by one, the assumptions and aims of both sides turned out to be unrealistic, and, consequently, the overall purpose of a constructive and predictable relationship could not be achieved.[117] The United States and the Soviet Union turned back to their old positions of seeing each other as primary rivals. However, this time circumstances showed difference from the Cold War politics of 1950s and 1960s, since there was neither a war going on directly or indirectly supported by both sides, nor heated disputes over a certain country.

However, when the Michael Gorbachev came to the office in 1985, the relations again came to a softer stage. The initiatives and policies of Gorbachev with the "glasnost" (openness) and "perestroika" (restructuring) were perceived as liberalization.[118] As a result of the constructive meetings between the United States and the Soviet Union Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty was signed in 1987. This cooperation also opened the way to other treaties and agreements, and the relations enhanced remarkably with the Soviet decision of removing the army from Afghanistan in 1989. The new order established after the Second World War started to shatter with the regime changes in the Eastern Europe and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Finally, when the Soviet Union dissolved, leaving its place to Russian Federation, the Cold War reached to its end.

[117] Wallensteen, P., 1985, ibid, p. 3.
[118] Roberts J. M., 2010, ibid, p. 737.

6. MIDDLE EAST DURING COLD WAR

6.1 General Situation from 1914 to 1990s

Middle East has been the focal point of the struggle among the Great Powers throughout the history with its natural resources, geopolitical, geostrategic and socio-cultural values.[119] Middle East (or Near East) is a politico-geographic term used in the international relations terminology that has been put forward in the 19th century by the West and then spread to other parts of the world.[120] While historically the region was a cradle to the Umayyad Caliphate, the Abbasid Caliphate, the Seljuk Empire and the Ottoman Empire, today Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan Lebanon, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, Palestine, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates comprise the Middle East. Geographically, it covers the area stretching from Morocco through Afghanistan, and is roughly equivalent to the area of the first wave of Muslim conquests plus Anatolia.[121]

When we look from the historical perspective, although the Middle East is comprised of people from different ethnicities believing in different religions until the beginning of the 20th century, they lived in harmony under Ottoman Empire. Especially after the Suez Canal was opened in 1869, the strategic and commercial importance of the region increased substantially. When the importance of the petroleum as an energy source was realized around the world, particularly by the industrializing Europe,[122] the Middle East became the new area of interest of other Great Powers, and this importance continued until today. During the 20th century and still today, these ethnic and cultural differences, religious and ideological conflicts and territorial disputes come to the forefront as the umbrella and the very basis of the energy politics when considered together with the foreign interventions.

Arab states in the region gained their independence as a result of their struggle with Great Britain and France who established mandate governments in the region. Great Powers colonized the Middle East and most of the North Africa after the First World War, under

[119] Caşın, M. H., 2013, "Küresel Güçlerin Orta Doğu Politikası: Mücadelenin Diplomatik ve Stratejik Boyutları", in Orta Doğuda Siyaset, eds. Davut Dursun and Tayyar Arı, Saray Matbaacılık, Ankara, p. 229.
[120] Lewis, B., 1964, The Middle East and the West, Bloomington, Indiana, pp. 9-10
[121] Keddie, N. R., 1973, "Is There a Middle East?", International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 4, No. 3, p. 255.
[122] Speiser, A., 1953, "Cultural Factors in Social Dynamics in the Near East", The Middle East Journal, VII, p. 133.

the permission of the League of Nations.[123] Thus, after the elimination of the Ottoman Empire from the Middle East, Great Britain and France divided the region between themselves.[124] According to this division, Great Britain already having the control of Egypt and the Persian Gulf countries added Jordan, Iraq and Palestine among its mandates. France, on the other hand, established mandate governance in Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Lebanon and Syria.[125] As a matter of fact, Great Britain and France supported Arab and Jewish nationalisms in the region after the First World War.[126]

The relations of these mandate countries with their mandates and other independent countries in the region until the Second World War help us understand how the power balances occurred in the Middle East. In his regard, we can say that most of the countries that had to struggle for their independence from British or French mandates developed a strong sense of Arab nationalism and anti-Western attitude. In order to evaluate these shifts in the power balances, brief information on how these countries gained their independence will be given.

Nationalism in Iraq made itself apparent from the very days of the 20th century, thus Great Britain followed the policy of binding Iraq by treaties instead of mandating it. With the treaty made in 1922, Great Britain gained the right to intervene in Iraq's domestic and foreign affairs.[127] However, as a result of domestic dynamics and the nationalism movements Iraq gained its full independence in 1930, and became a member of the League of Nations in 1932.[128]

[123] The mandate system was established under Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, entered into on 28 June 1919. Article 22: "To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant." Available at: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp#art22

[124] Caşın, M. H., 2013, ibid, p. 229.

[125] Armaoğlu, F., 2009, 20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi, Alkım Yayınevi, İstanbul, p. 250.

[126] Said, E., 1973 "US Policy and the Conflict of. Powers in the Middle East." Journal of. Palestine Studies, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 30-50.

[127] Arı, T., 2008, Geçmişten Günümüze Orta Doğu: Siyaset, Savaş ve Diplomasi, Mkm Yayıncılık, Bursa, pp. 170-171.

[128] Armaoğlu, F., 2009, 20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi, Alkım Yayınevi, İstanbul, p. 255.



Map 6.1 Middle East Before and After WWI Settlements, 1914-1922[129]

Unlike Britain in Iraq, France in Syria chose to divide it in order to break and control the Arab opposition. Therefore, France separated Lebanon from Syria, and established a federal system[130] on the remaining territories of Syria by dividing it into three autonomous regions,[131] with separate areas for the Alawis on the coast and the Druze in the South, which made the opposition even fiercer. In a short time, France faced that this was a political mistake and established republics both in Lebanon in 1926 and Syria in 1930, thus giving them their quasi independence. What they had was quasi-independence because according to their constitutions, France kept most of its mandate rights. This kind of a French involvement kept the struggle against France continuing.[132]

[129] Source: Zand, B., 31 January 2014, What World Wor I Did to the Middle East, Der Spiegel, available at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/world-war-i-led-to-a-century-of-violence-in-the-middle-east-a-946052.html (accessed on 21.07.2014)

[130] Uçarol, R., 2013, Siyasi Tarih:1798-2012, Der Yayınları, İstanbul, p. 717.

[131] Arı, T.,2008, ibid, p.159.

[132] Armaoğlu, F., 2009, ibid, pp. 250-251.

Transjordan was recognized by the Council of the League of Nations as a state under the British Mandate in 1922[133]. Since Transjordan lacked the needed economic sources, it became highly dependent on Britain both economically and militarily. In 1946, the United Nations approved the end of the British Mandate and recognized Transjordan as an independent sovereign kingdom, and in 1948 the name was changed as Jordan.[134]

Egypt is another country where nationalism overcame the foreign intervention and control. The First World War speeded the nationalism up in Egypt, since it became the military base of the British and New Zealand soldiers. This resentment together with the independence hopes within the framework of Wilson's 14 Points led Britain accepted the independence of Egypt in 1922.[135] However, again, Britain did not renounce its rights on the Suez Canal and the minorities within the country.[136]

One of the most important developments after the First World War was the establishment of Saudi Arabia in the Arab Peninsula. After unsteady relations with the Ottoman Empire and bringing Hejaz under their sway, Saudi Arabia sustained the control in the region with British support. More importantly, we can say that the oil agreements signed with Aramco (Arabian-American Oil Company) in 1933 and 1936 opened the United States the pathway to the Middle East.[137] With the establishment of Saudi Arabia in the North, Yemen came under a substantial threat and also had to struggle against Britain until 1934 treaty of friendship, which Britain recognized Yemen as an independent country.[138]

In a treaty signed in 1907, Iran was divided into regions of influence between Britain and Russia.[139] However, after the 1917 Revolution in Russia, Britain wanted to take the military and administrative control of Iran with an agreement of 1919, and also offered technical and economic help. This agreement faced with anger among the nationalists and the Iranian Parliament refused to approve it, instead signing a treaty of friendship with

[133] Uçarol, R., 2013, ibid, p. 714.
[134] Armaoğlu, F., 2009, ibid, pp. 256-257.
[135] Arı, T., 2008, ibid, p. 185.
[136] Armaoğlu, F., 2009, ibid, p. 257-258.
[137] Armaoğlu, F., 2009, ibid, p. 259-261.
[138] Armaoğlu, F., 2009, ibid, p. 261.
[139] Uçarol, R., 2013, ibid, p. 714.

Soviets in 1921.[140] With this agreement Iran expected to develop close relations with the Soviets against Britain, since Soviets promised to show respect for the territorial integrity and the independence of Iran. Article 6 of this agreement is especially important because according to the article the Soviet Union gained the right to deploy soldiers in Iranian territory in case of a thread by a third country against Iran, if it fails to respond to this thread. This article was against Britain in the first place and the deteriorating relations between the two continued, reaching its peak with the dispute on the Abadan oil fields in 1932. Despite this agreement, communist propaganda activities of the Soviet Union caused suspicions and distrust in Iran and prevented further political relations, which led to British and Soviet invasion of Iran in 1941.[141]

Afghanistan was put under the influence and control of Britain in 1880. Finally in 1919 Afghanistan gained its independence from Britain and developed close relations with the Soviet Union signing a treaty of friendship in 1921. However, the relations deteriorated as a result of the revolts in Central Asia caused by Soviet Bolshevik propaganda in the region. When Britain and the Soviet Union invaded Iran in 1941, Afghanistan inevitably entered under the pressure of Britain and the Soviet Union, which continued as Soviet influence after the Second World War.[142]

Initial steps to establish a Jewish state on the territories of Palestine were taken by the Jews migrated from Russia to the region as a result of anti-Semitic activities in 1880s. The hope for a Jewish state was strengthened with the 1896 work of Theodor Herzl "Der Judenstaat" and the establishment of World Zionist Organization in the same year. During the First World War, Zionists influenced the United States and Britain.[143] In this regard, Great Britain directly supported the idea of creating a nation state for the Jews. The most substantial document was the Balfour Declaration of 1917. In this declaration, the English Government expressed its sympathy to the establishment of a Jewish State upon the territories of Palestine, and after the First World War, the Jewish migration to the region accelerated under the English mandate.[144] During these years conflicts between the Arabs

[140] For more information, Russel J., Cohn R., 2012, Russo-Persian Treaty of Friendship (1921), Books on Demand.
[141] Armaoğlu, F., 2009, ibid, p. 262-264.
[142] Armaoğlu, F., 2009, ibid, pp. 264-266.
[143] Ibid p. 252.
[144] Arı, T., 2008, ibid, pp. 203-204.

and the Jewish migrants started gradually as a result of territorial disputes. Most important ones of these disputes took place during 1921, 1929, 1933 and 1937-39.[145] In an attempt to solve this problem, prevent casualties and provide the Jews a united community, Britain put forward some plans in 1930, 1931, 1937, 1938 and 1939. In this regard, 1937 Peel Commission and 1938 Woodhead Commission offered partition,[146] which were not approved by Britain. However, neither Jews nor Arabs accepted the plans offered by Britain. The independence of Iraq in 1930 and Syria in 1936 also accelerated the Palestinian struggle with their increasing focus on the issue.[147]

After a while, Britain took the issue to the United Nations in 1947. A special committee was formed to find a solution to the problem. United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) published a report proposing independence for Palestine decided unanimously. In 1947, partition of the Palestine between the Jews and Arabs was decided upon with 33 votes in the General Assembly.[148] The United States, Soviet Union and France supported the partition while Britain abstained from voting. Despite their support for the Arabs against the West, the reasons why the Soviet Union supported the partition were firstly, Arabs feared and took an opposing stand against Soviets because of their incitement of communist parties in Arab countries and secondly, the Soviets wanted to stir up trouble in the region to make things hard for Britain.

This decision of partition raised reaction among Arabs. In a meeting in 1947 in Cairo, they took the decision of waging war to prevent this partition. Here, more important was that seeing these reactions the United States changed its stand from supporting the partition and proposed to place Palestine under the guardianship of the United Nations. However, this proposal even created more reaction on both Jewish and Arab sides. In 1948, Britain announced to remove its armies from Palestine and after the removal of British Armies, on 14 May 1948, the establishment of the State of Israel was announced by National Council of Israel. Upon this, armies of Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq waged war on Israel on 15 May 1948, thus the First Arab-Israel war began.[149] From then on, the major Arab-

[145] Armaoğlu, F., 2009, ibid, p. 253.
[146] Arı, T., 2008, ibid, p. 210.
[147] Armaoğlu, F., 2009, ibid, pp. 254-255.
[148] Pişirici, F., 2013, Soğuk Savaş Döneminde Orta Doğu, in Orta Doğuda Siyaset, eds. Davut Dursun and Tayyar Arı, Saray Matbaacılık, Ankara, p. 71.
[149] Armaoğlu, F., 2009, ibid, pp. 587-590.

Jewish conflict started with the establishment of the State of Israel and Palestine has been the very centre of the disputes in the Middle East until today. In this regard, Arab-Israel conflict and the Palestine problem determined the main axis of the Middle Eastern policies of the United States and the Soviet Union.

If we try to find a relationship between the power formulations in a region and the natural resources, we can give as an example that Germany wanted to include the Ottoman Empire under its control (though as an alliance) before the First World War just to be able to reach the Ottoman natural resources and use them to sustain its logistic infrastructure. After the First World War, this kind of power formulation left its place to a broader balance of power understanding. While Germany, Austria and the Ottoman Empire were disbanded, boundaries were redefined both in Europe and the Middle East. This change in the system eventually recast the global actors, altering the balances on the advantage of the United States and the Soviet Union.[150]

The end of the Second World War stated a new period in which the Great Powers changed their Middle East policies. The decreasing powers of Great Britain, Germany, France, and Italy consequently changed the regional dynamics. In this period, the region witnessed new political and economic changes. The Great Power balances lived through a revision, leaving their places to Super Powers' struggle.[151] In this bipolar world order, Middle East continued to be the area of interest of both sides. After the Second World War and during the Cold War, the change in the Middle East was led by different channels.

We can explain the power balance of the United States and the Soviet Union in the region as the influence of their regimes and testing this in different variations. It can be seen that the United States created its influence through pro-American regimes as dictators with autocratic policies. On the other hand, the Soviet Union used the Baath regime to generate a political influence. These Superpowers used military intervention as a successful way of changing a regime to serve for their own interests. For example, in order to fill the power gap left by Great Britain and the Soviet Union after the Second World War, the United States supported the Shah regime to take over the power through coup d'état in Iran to provide the military security of the Persian Gulf. The democratically elected government

[150] Akın, İ. F., 1983, Siyasi Tarih: 1870-1914, Fakülteler Matbaası, İstanbul, p. 253.
[151] Pişirici, F., 2013, ibid, p. 69.

of Mohammed Mosaddegh was overthrown in 1953 as a result of a military coup with the support of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi establishing the absolute monarchy again.[152] The political and ideological influence of the Soviet Union played an important role in the Mosaddegh regime via communist party members and actually the regime change happened with the help of the American military and intelligence.[153] Similarly, the regimes of Jordan and Morocco were changed through military coups. In 1961, Syrian Arab Republic was established again via a military coup. Iraq lived through the same experience in 1936, 1941, 1958 and 1963.

During the Cold War, the Superpowers armed the countries in the Middle East as a part of their foreign policies and security strategies. The power balance between the United States and the Soviet Union was formulated as arms transfers, help for the military leaders and regional conflicts. Both the United States and the Soviet Union not only controlled the countries domestic and foreign policies to which they provided weapons, but also manipulated the existing conflicts by influencing the military leaders. This process directly contributed to the arms race of the both sides, focusing a system level rivalry of the United States and the Soviet Union on the Middle East. Thereby, those arms and missiles provided for the Middle Eastern countries formed the basis of the conflicts between 1945 and 1991.

In this regard, the United States supplied Israel, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries as its allies with arms. In return, the Soviet Union provided arms for Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Chad and Algeria. However, this arms sales balance was subjected to change from time to time. For example, Egypt took the American side after 1967 Yom Kippur War, and after the Libya – Chad War in 1979, Chad became the arms market for the United States. Moreover, while Pakistan bought arms from the United States, India collaborated with the Soviet Union in terms of arms sales. This kind of a distribution and the changing dynamics of the balances also affected the power and leadership position of the both sides and their decision making processes in the foreign policies.[154] Another point to make is that while the pro-Soviet countries used these weaponry and equipment systems to maximize their

[152] Cottam, R. W., 1964, Nationalism in Iran, the University of Pittsburgh Press, pp. 226-230.
[153] Bill, J. A., 1969, "The Military and Modernization in the Middle East", Comparative Politics Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 41-62.
[154] Kinsella D.; Tillema, H. K., 1995, "Arms and Aggression in the Middle East: Overt Military Interventions", 1948-1991, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 39, No. 2, pp. 306-329.

national powers, pro-American countries such as Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Qatar and Jordan supported the American policies in the region. In this regard, the most important ally of the United States, however, was Israel. After all, the United States and the Soviet Union continuously armed the region between 1945 and 1991.

Arab-Israel conflict and the Palestine problem has been one of the most intractable and chronic issues of the international relations until today.[155] 1956 is the year presenting another breaking point of the power balance in the Middle East, the Suez Crisis. Egypt's nationalization policy of the Suez Canal as a result of Soviet influence led to Israel's attack to the country, hence providing the Great Powers another ground to manipulate the Middle Eastern power balance.[156] 1967 Arab-Israel War (Six Days War) constitutes another turning point in the Middle Eastern affairs, since Israel quadrupled its territories and the Arab-Israel dispute gained a whole new dimension. From then on the War of Attrition was started to weaken Israel.[157]

1973 Arab-Israel War (Yom Kippur) and the OPEC Crisis made their marks on 1970s. Unlike the previous wars, the very reason of the war was to regain the territories lost to Israel in 1967 and thus strengthen the Arab prestige in the world. Arabs, especially Egypt, gained a great success in the Middle Eastern diplomacy with this war. Moreover, shuttle diplomacy of Henry Kissinger during the negotiations paved the way to 1978 Camp David Accords, a step toward Arab-Israel peace. Additionally, with the OPEC Crisis, Arab countries also gained a strong stand in the world.

OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) was founded at the Baghdad Conference in 1960, by Iraq, Kuwait, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela (later nine more governments Libya, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Indonesia, Algeria, Nigeria, Ecuador, Angola, and Gabon joined the organization.).[158] The aim was to coordinate the policies of the oil-producing countries. In order to secure the incomes, most of the Middle Eastern countries started to nationalize the oil companies in 1970s. For instance, Iraq nationalized

[155] Ambrose, S. E., 1985, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938, Forth revised edition, Penguin Books, USA, p. 262.
[156] Lacouture, J., 1973, "The Changing Balance of Forces in the Middle East", Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 2, No. 4, p. 26.
[157] Pişirici, F., 2013, ibid, p. 87.
[158] Arı, T., 2008, ibid, p. 380.

Iraq Petroleum Company in 1972, likewise, Iran united all of the oil companies under the control of Iraq National Oil Company (INOC) in 1973. Other countries, especially the Gulf countries, increased their shares in the foreign companies.[159] On the other side, they wanted to use the oil as an economic mean to put pressure and apply sanction on the Western countries and the United States. For this kind of a pressure, they had two options: to reduce the production, or to increase the prices. Since reducing the production would decrease the income of the producers and also could cause a wide reaction in the West whose industry completely depended on oil.[160]

Therefore, after the 1973 Arab-Israel War they increased the oil prices which led a deep panic in the Western Europe and Japan. They used the oil as a political weapon not against Israel but against the West giving rise to a worldwide crisis.[161] As a matter of fact, this crisis was not a direct outcome of the 1973 War, but accelerated it. Affected from the crisis and fearing from further sanctions, Western countries started to support the Arabs in their case. However, soon after, they adapted their economies to the increased prices because after all the incomes of the oil companies entered into the Western capital and cash market via Western banks. Also Western countries easily regained these extra amounts they paid for the oil via arms sales.[162]

Towards the end of 1970s and the beginning of 1980s, Middle East witnessed three major events: 1979 Iran Islamic Revolution, 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War. These three events substantially changed the strategic structure of the Middle East. As a result of the 1979 revolution, Iran's relations deteriorated with other Middle Eastern countries, especially Sunni countries. From the very first day, Iran denounced both the United States and the Soviet Union, also cut its relations with Syria and supported the Palestinians. While Syria, Libya and Yemen (as pro-socialist countries) supported Iran, Gulf Countries and Saudi Arabia (as conservative and Sunni monarchies) developed worries about the new Shia Khomeini regime.[163]

[159] Ibid, p. 381.
[160] Armaoğlu, F., 2009, ibid, p. 868.
[161] Arı, T., 2008, ibid, p. 380.
[162] Armaoğlu, F., 2009, ibid, p. 870.
[163] Pişirici, F., 2013, ibid, p. 103.

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan brought further uncertainty in the region. Basing the invasion on the Article 4[164] of the treaty of friendship signed in 1978 between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan,[165] the Soviet Union gained the opportunity to reach the Persian Gulf, Middle East oil reserves and Indian Ocean, leading to the probability of strategic changes in the regional structure. Afghanistan, with its geo-strategic position, has been very important for the control of the region. Therefore, political instability and increasing Soviet influence in the country induced concerns and panic in the West and among other countries in the region especially Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, because now the Middle Eastern oil reserves came under the threat of the Soviet Union, with the instability of Iran adding to this. Together with the strong reactions raised against the invasion and Soviets, the United States tried to increase its influence and preserve the stability in the region announcing the Carter Doctrine in 1980[166] and intensifying its efforts for Arab-Israel peace.[167]

As another cause of instability in the region, historical sectarian struggle and struggle for political superiority laid the basis of 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War.[168] Relations between the two, Iraq governed by leftists and Iran with a pro-Western shah, moderated in 1970s, however, tensed again with the 1979 Iranian Revolution. The new regime in Iran disturbed Iraq because of Shia threat which eventually led a meaningless weary war in the region.[169] During the war, the Soviet Union and the United States tried to remain neutral As a result of the war, divisions in the Arab World sharpened. Gulf countries and Saudi Arabia as Sunni countries would gain an advantage against the Shia, thus they supported Iraq despite its ambitions to dominate the Persian Gulf and take over the leadership in the region. Jordan also supported Iraq which brought its relations with Syria to a climax, because Syria remained on the side of Iran with its Shia population.[170] Only Israel and Egypt gained advantages out of this war. Definite separations among the countries and the troubles

[164] According to Article 4, both parties shall consult with each other and shall take the necessary steps to safeguard the security, independence and territorial integrity of the two countries.
[165] Uçarol, R., 2013, Siyasi Tarih:1798-2012, Der Yayınları, İstanbul, p. 1205.
[166] According to Carter Doctrine, United States would use military force if necessary to defend its national interests in the Persian Gulf.
[167] Armaoğlu, F., 2009, ibid, pp. 909-920.
[168] Pişirici, F., 2013, ibid, p. 104.
[169] Arı, T., 2008, ibid, pp. 539-540.
[170] Uçarol, R., 2013, ibid, p. 1183.

between Iran and Iraq were relaxing developments for Israel. On the other hand, although Egypt showed sympathy for Iraq, it gained influence and prestige by remaining outside the conflict.[171]

At the end of the Cold War, the United States gained the primacy in the power balance in the Middle East, while the Russian Federation engaged more with its domestic affairs. With the First Gulf War in 1990, the United States reached the crucial petroleum reserves in the region, and followed the policy of sustainable access to these reserves by preserving the region via military power with the Second Gulf War (Iraq War) in 2003.

[171] Armaoğlu, F., 2009, ibid, pp. 921-929.

CHAPTER II

7. SOVIET MIDDLE EASTERN POLICY AND ITS BASIC TENETS

The Russian existence in the Middle East goes back a long way in the history. However, the most influential era was during the Cold War. Middle East has always been an area of interest for Russian leaders throughout the history. After the Crusades, most European powers interested in the Middle East as a result of the trade in the Eastern Mediterranean (Levant). In this regard, France and England reached this area by means of the capitulation agreements signed with the Ottoman Empire. Russia was another empire interested in Levant trade after gaining a substantial power in the Black Sea Region. Eventually, Russia also gained privileges in the region with the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca signed with the Ottoman Empire in 1744.[172] Thus, we can say that Russia started to become a substantial power in the Middle East starting from the 18th century.

In his will Tsar Peter I said that Russia should aim at controlling the Persian Gulf securing a free passage to India within the framework of "Pan Slavism" and "Orthodox ideology" after setting up military forces in the Black Sea, taking Istanbul (Constantinople) and weaken the Ottoman navy[173] in order to be a great power in World politics. Thus, throughout the 18th and 19th century Russia followed this will at the core of every action taken.[174] In the struggle among the Great Powers during the 19th century, Russia entered into rivalry with Britain in the Indian Peninsula and the Middle East within the framework of "Great Game", taking the geopolitical concerns into consideration. Also in the 20th century Russia gave, and today still gives great importance to the area and struggles for a powerful and privileged existence.

Until the First World War, the Middle East had been the centre of attention of the Great Powers, including Russia, within the framework of "Eastern Question", while still remaining under the Ottoman control. Russia got involved in this struggle for penetration, as the protector of the Orthodox people within the Ottoman Empire, and actively took part

[172] Kurat, A. N., 1990, Türkiye ve Rusya, Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, p. 30.
[173] Sykes, P. M., 1921, History of Persia, 2nd edition, London, p. 244.
[174] Lenczowski, G., 1958, Evolution of Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East, The Journal of Politics, Vol. 20, No. 1, p. 162.

in the partition plans of the Ottoman Empire and the Middle East during the First World War.

In the interwar period and during the Cold War, Soviet foreign policy was guided by the Marxist ideology in appearance, but each leader applied different policies regarding the Moscow's relations with the outside world.[175] After the 1917 Revolution, when Lenin took the control, he dropped the Soviet Union out of the war by signing the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.[176] His next move was revealing the partition plans of the Middle East and renouncing these imperialist plans agreed in the Sykes-Picot Agreement. From then on, Soviet influence on and communication with the area until the Second World War was limited,[177] as a result of French and British mandates, except for Yemen which gained its independence from Britain in 1928 and established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. However, when Stalin came into power, the Soviet stand in the region started to became powerful, although not directly involved, and Stalin's policies were to turn into more active and expansionist in the future with Khrushchev.

During Cold War, when the Soviet penetration and presence was at the highest point in the Middle East, Soviet subsistence was directly related to the intention of being a superpower and sustaining this power in the region,[178] in an attempt to secure its near neighbourhood. In this regard, Stalin's demands from Turkey, claims of a right to trusteeship over Libya and refusal to withdraw from Iran drove the nations of the Northern Tier into the arms of the West. On the other hand, Stalin's policies toward the Southern Tier were more productive.[179] To that end, during the Soviet Era, the Middle Eastern policy was based on the political doctrine of "liberation of the colonial and semi-colonial people". This was a previously established policy by Lenin. After the 1917 Revolution Lenin officially declared that "the Arabs as well as all Muslims had the right to be the masters of their own

[175] Nizameddin, T., 1999, Russia and the Middle East: Towards a New Foreign Policy, C. Hurst & Co., United Kingdom, p. 255.
[176] Browder, R. P., 1953, The Origins of Soviet-American Diplomacy, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, p. 6.
[177] Uçarol, R., 2013, Siyasi Tarih:1798-2012, Der Yayınları, İstanbul, p.719.
[178] Giritli, İ., 1972, Superpowers in the Middle East, İstanbul Universitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Fakülteler Matbaası, İstanbul, pp. 32-33.
[179] Freedman, R., O., 1991, Moscow and the Middle East: Soviet Policy Since the Invasion of Afghanistan, Cambridge University Press, Great Britain, p. 15-16.

countries and to decide their own destinies as they wished."[180] According to this Marxist-Leninist doctrine this independence and liberation struggles from the western imperialism were to be realized by the working class. To this end, it is decided to form a United Front against imperialism. As a result of 6th and 7th Comintern, the decision to support the anti-imperialist people in the region under reformist leaders was taken. For this purpose, Soviets intensified their support for the communists in Syria, Lebanon, Egypt and Iran. Also, Stalin asserted that imperialism can be weakened by supporting the emirates in Afghanistan. When it comes to Egypt Stalin proposed to support the merchants and intellectuals for a nationalist revolution against imperialism.[181] The real involvement of the Soviets in the Middle East was started in the 1950s when Khrushchev and Nasser in Egypt rose to power, opening a new period of the political and military presence of the Soviet Union in the Middle East.[182] Khrushchev continued to believe in the epic battle between capitalism and communism, but his policies were based on the existing realities at the time, which included the need to steer the Cold War from direct confrontation to the Third World.[183] The Third World was important for Khrushchev and he hoped communism to be effective in these countries through political support, economic and military aid.

From 1950s on, Soviet policies in the Middle East started to be shaped. Within this framework, we can summarize the Soviet foreign policy means towards the Middle East especially during and after the Second World War as follows:

- Military assistance (weapon, spare parts, training and expert help)
- Economic measures and assistance (technical help, money loans, increased trade)[184]
- Cultural cooperation (academic personnel exchange, mutual festivals)
- Diplomatic support for the Arabs against Israel and the West.

[180] Vasiliev, A., 1993, Russian Policy in the Middle East: From Messianism to Pragmatism, Ithaca Press, p. 2.
[181] Stalin, J., 1942, Marxism and the National Question, New York, p. 186-187.
[182] Potserebov, A., 1997, On Russian-Egyptian Relations, International Affairs (Moscow), Vol.43, No.3, p.104.
[183] Nizameddin, T., 1999, ibid, p. 6.
[184] Caşın, M., H., 2006, Novgorod Knezliği'nden XXI. Yüzyıla Rus imparatorluk Stratejisi, Okumuş Adam Yayınları, İstanbul, p. 235.

We should analyse the Soviet Middle Eastern policy after the Second World War particularly within the scope of Cold War rivalry and the containment policy by the USA. Since the relations and rivalry between these two superpowers determined their foreign policies. Iran was the most attractive avenue for expansion in the Middle East in this regard, with its old, established route to the Indian Ocean and great oil resources. Thus, in 1939 Stalin made a deal with Hitler to help him in Western Europe and Africa in return for Iran and Iraq in the Middle East. Thus, Stalin invaded Iran and right after the Second World War, he refused to pull his troops out, violating the agreement made between Iran and the Soviet Union.[185] This created a critical concern over the US strategic interests in the Middle East, therefore, on March 16 1946 Truman sent a protest note to the Soviets demanding immediate withdrawal, and this was their first encounter in the region.[186] As the global Soviet threat grew, the United States became more embroiled in the Middle East, replacing the British power in the region.

The post-war conditions in the Middle East created a suitable environment for the Arab-Soviet relations to prosper. Although Soviet support for the partition plan of Palestine together with the United States, recognition of the State of Israel by the Soviets, and arms sold to Israel by the Soviets during the First Arab-Israel War caused resentment against the Soviets; however, relations got better because Soviets supported the UN decision on the full independence of Syria and Lebanon in 1946, and Soviets acted on the part of the Arabs during the 1956, 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israel wars, First Intifada in 1987 and Second Intifada in 2000, and Arabs presumed the Soviets as a factor of balance against the United States in the region.[187]

1956 Suez Crisis particularly deepened the Soviet existence in the Middle East. Soviets undertook the financial expenses required for the construction of Aswan Dam, and together with the increasing educational and cultural relations, Soviet influence in the region reached to a certain level.[188] Egypt became one of the most important Soviet allies until

[185] Armaoğlu, F., 2009, 20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi, Alkım Yayınevi, İstanbul, p. 517.
[186] Ambrose, S. E., 1985, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938, Forth revised edition, Penguin Books, USA, p. 264.
[187] Al Ashhab, N., 2005, A Necessary Counterbalance, Bitterlemons-International: Middle East Roundtable, Edition 22, Volume 3.
[188] Armaoğlu, F., 1994, Filistin Meselesi ve Arap-İsrail Savaşları (1948-1988), İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, Ankara, p. 116.

1970 when Anwar Sadat became the leader and normalized Egyptian relations with the United States. This turning point in the relations dealt a major blow to the Soviet penetration in the Middle East. As a result of developing Egypt - United States dialogue, Camp David Accords were signed between Egypt and Israel in 1979, increasing American influence in the region while eliminated Soviet power. Besides, 1985 Amman Agreement between the PLO and Jordan via American conciliation was the second major blow for Soviet strength.[189] However, thanks to the growing Arab antipathy towards Camp David, Soviets hoped to provide a ground for their further involvement. However, this anti-Egypt camp later split inside because of their own quarrel, such as between Iraq and PDRY, Iraq and Syria, Iraq and Iran leading other alignments in the region. So, in a state of flux, the Soviet Union wanted to reinforce its ties with many of the states.

Soviets tried to regain their domination and power in the region also by other means with the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Although, Soviet influence indurated in Afghanistan and in the near region, this also revoked new reactions against the Soviet existence. In 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait, the Soviet Union left the initiative in the region completely to United States' and EU's hands, acting in cooperation with the western policies.[190]

In the light of above mentioned information, we can summarize the Soviet interests and relations in the region depending on three main issues: arms sales, energy politics and ideological concerns, bearing the most important final objective of securing the region for Soviet influence in mind. During the Cold War, arms sales in the region were the major areas of rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States, and the main alliances were shaped according to the arms sold to the countries in the region. Both powers gained substantial money from the Arab countries and also from Israel via arms sales especially during the Arab-Israel wars. Moreover, Middle Eastern oil became very vital for the production throughout the world, particularly the United States and Europe, when discovered from 1920s on, which led the Western countries to be eager to control the natural resources or at least manipulate the leaders to get cheaper oil. In this regard, it was crucial for the Soviets to prevent the Western countries, especially the United States, from

[189] Al Ashhab, N., 2005, ibid.

[190] Korniyenko, G. M., 1993, Soviet Policy in the Middle East, Dale F. Eickelman (Ed.), Russia's Muslim Frontiers, Indiana University Pres, p. 45.

being in control of these resources. What is more, expanding the communist ideology in the world was one of the basic aspects of Soviet policies. In this regard, Soviets generally supported the communist or socialist groups and parties in the Middle East both for expanding the ideology and creating new allies in line with the Soviet interests. Even today, arms sales and energy politics still continue to be the main causes of attention on the region.

7.1 Arms Sales

The Cold War arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union resulted in large arms exports to the allies with regard to deepening their influence. When it comes to the Middle East, despite the fact that the Soviet Union and the United States did not directly provoke the crises in the Middle East, they have always plaid a substantial role in the development of the events. In this regard Soviet access to and settlement in the region especially depended on the arms sold to the Arab countries, Egypt being in the first place. In the end, military support was the easiest way to establish strong alliances all over the world.

According to Soviet policy during the Cold War arms transfers were made primarily for political, ideological and security reasons to maintain its spheres of influence.[191] The peacetime arms sales were planned to support the friendly states in expanding their military capabilities, and to acquire influence over them in the process. These sales also continued in the wartimes in order to further strengthen the position of the allies. However this deteriorated the Soviet economy from time to time, because most of the time weapons sales were heavily subsidized.[192] In this regard, between 1975 and 1990, for example, the Soviet Union received only 56 percent of its due payments.[193] Because of the heavy burden of arms sales, Soviets tried to expand their relations with oil-rich countries hoping for payments for the sales. In this regard, the Soviets even encouraged Arab unity expecting the help of richer Arab countries to the poorer ones.[194] With these arms exports, the Soviet

[191] Pierre, A. J., Winter 1981-1982, Arms Sales: The New Diplomacy, Foreign Affairs Vol:60, No: 2.
[192] Pierre, A. J., Winter 1981-1982, ibid.
[193] Davis, C., 2002, Country Survey XVI, The Defence Sector in the Economy of a Declining Superpower: Soviet Union and Russia, 1965-2001, Defence and Peace Economics, Vol 12, p. 158.
[194] Rivlin, P., 2005, The Russian Economy and Arms Exports to the Middle East, The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies (JCSS), Memorandum No. 79, p. 18.

Union became one of the largest arms exporters in the Middle East during the Cold War. Soviet military exports rose from $700 million in 1965 to $21.9 billion in 1987.[195] Its sales of arms and nuclear material in the region threatened its links with the United States and Israel.

The extent of the arms sales was generally defined by the evolving events. For example, although the Soviet Union provided large scales of arms to Israel, this attitude changed to an anti-Israeli and pro-Arab position and the Soviets started to back the Arab countries in their quarrel with Israel. Especially with the establishment of the Baghdad Pact in 1955 the Soviet Union offered arms to the countries opposing the Baghdad Pact being Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia in the first place. This change of policy clearly reflected the mentality of the formed alliances in the Middle East: Give any military support to whoever would deepen your sphere of influence in the region.

From 1945 until 1990, the Soviet Union concluded a great deal of arms sales, transparent or behind the closed doors, with Egypt in the first place, Israel, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, PLO, Yemen and United Arab Emirates.[196] These countries gradually turned into Soviet military bases one by one. Placing their security in the Soviet hands, these countries became important markets for Soviet Arms. Some of these sales were small scale and provisional, and some of them were very important steps in defining new allies in the region. Among these, the arms deals with Egypt, Iran and Iraq were substantial steps taken against the US presence and influence in the region.

Nasser became the new leader of Egypt with the promise of taking revenge from Israel, and soon plunged into a quest for armament. After the First Arab-Israel War, the United States, Britain and France signed a declaration in 1950 for arms embargo to the Middle East, thus limiting Nasser's choices of arms purchase. When Egypt required a well-armed military for political and security reasons, the West closed the doors leaving Egypt with the sole option to seek new weapons from the East. Thus in 1955 at the Bandung Conference

[195] Davis, C., ibid, pp. 145-77.

[196] Detailed data regarding which deal was concluded in what year and what kind of weapons were included in the deal can be found SIPRI's Arms Transfers Database available at http://portal.sipri.org/publications/pages/transfer/trade-register

Egypt reportedly discussed its need for modern weaponry with China and China transferred the request to the Soviet Union.[197]

In 1955, Nasser publicly announced that Egypt and Czechoslovakia had successfully concluded an arms deal of substantial size.[198] The "Czech" arms deal was different from the previous arms transfers concluded directly between the allies and the arms producer. The Czech-Egyptian arms deal started a new instrumentality in the international relations because this deal was actually between Egypt and the Soviet Union. Upon this Nasser started to buy Soviet arms via Czechoslovakia, thus Moscow stepped into the arms market in the Middle East.[199] The whole Soviet arsenal gradually opened up into the region first with Egypt and then Syria and Iraq.

Iran was another country that the Soviet Union sold great deals of arms. Soviet arms were first supplied to the Shah's regime in 1967 in an environment of rising communist tendencies in the government.[200] However, these sales and other credits provided to Iran could not cause a major shift in Iranian alliance with the United States, as was the case with Egypt. However, although the Soviets welcomed the 1979 Revolution in Iran, the Soviet arms sales to Iran decreased during the Iran-Iraq war, given its close relations with Iraq. However, when the international embargo was placed on the exports to Iraq, the Soviets gain turned their faces to Iran for the arms deals, which even further developed towards the cooperation in the nuclear energy. Later with the dissolution of the USSR, Russia became a more reliable supplier for Iran.[201]

The USSR began supplying military equipment to Iraq in 1958 and these sales reached its peak during the Iran-Iraq War. Over 1980-83, deliveries came to $12.2 billion; in 1986-89 they totalled $10.9 billion, and in 1990, $400 million. As a result of these and previous

[197] Heikal, M., 1972, Nasser: The Cairo Documents, New England Library, London, p. 57.
[198] The sale was worth about $200 million and included the transfer of MIG aircraft, tanks, artillery, small arms and submarines: cited in Miglietta, J. P., 2002, American Alliance Policy in the Middle East, 1945-1992:Iran, Israel and Saudi Arabia, Lexington Books, USA, p. 121.
[199] Armaoğlu, F., 1994, ibid, p. 498.
[200] Rivlin, P., 2005, The Russian Economy and Arms Exports to the Middle East, The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies (JCSS), Memorandum No. 79, p. 36.
[201] Kam, E., 2004, From Terror to Nuclear Bombs: The Significance of the Iranian Threat, Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, p. 66.

deliveries of weapons, Iraq became in debt to Russia, which was one of the reasons for its continued interest in Iraq's oil industry during 1990s and onwards.[202]

However, the embargo on Iraq, debt problem with Syria and the relations with the most important arms purchasers and pro-American regimes, Saudi Arabia and Egypt being in the first place, affected the Soviet market share in the region negatively towards the 1990s. With the dissolution, the Soviet Union left a great market for the United States as the biggest supplies, which later changed the balances when the newly established Russian Federation re-established its former relations with the region. Today, it is a fact that alliances dating back to the Cold War era are the most important advantage for Russian Federation arms sales to the region.

7.2 Energy

Coal, as the main energy resource of the industrializing world in the 19th century, gradually left its place for oil towards the end of the century. The use of oil and oil products in the industry brought about new developments and oil became one of the basic factors of international politics in the 20th century. Leaving its mark on the politics, oil led to new energy diplomacy among the superpowers.

Energy issues have been the main concern of the international relations in different perspectives.[203] In this regard, while at the beginning of the 20th century, accomplishing privileges over the oilfields was the main determinant policy of the superpowers, after the Second World War, the ideals of the states gradually expanded to being close to the oil reserves and even controlling those reserves. This struggle over the natural reserves in the oil rich Middle East has been on the focus of the world politics as well.

It is a fact that, in order to gain more strength and become a world power, having a voice, controlling or at least preventing the full domination of others over the Middle East oil has been very important for all. This was what Soviet Union planned and aimed at in the first place and today the Russian Federation still continue to follow. Today, the world's largest

[202] Rivlin, P., 2005, ibid, p. 40.
[203] Gilbar, G. G., 2004, The Middle East Oil Decade and Beyond, Frank Cass & CO. LTD, Digital Printing, UK, p. 10.

oilfields are located in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia being the biggest producer.[204] When this potential started to be discovered from the 1920s on, the rivalry over the Middle East became an inevitable outcome. Just as the United States and other Western countries, Soviets also interested in the Middle Eastern oil. As the Soviet economy started to expand in 1950s, it was expected that its need for oil led it to cast eyes on the oil resources of the neighbouring countries, especially Iran, Iraq and other Middle Eastern companies.[205] However, the Soviet Union was able to tolerate this expansion with the help of its own oil filed discoveries. The Soviet interests in international oil trade changed and with the new discoveries and utilization of its own oil and gas reserves, the Soviet Union decreased its dependency on the imported oil and started to search for new markets in the world for its oil and gas, thus slowly became a self-sufficient and even great exporter, rising as a potential rival to the Middle East.

Despite being both an oil producer and exporter, the Soviet Union also closely kept track of the oil producers in the Middle East. In this regard, when the political alliances were formed in the region, Soviet companies hoped to invest in the oil resources in the region, sharing the profits of the production. Both public corporations and private companies operated especially in Iraq. However, since British and American companies had the biggest shares in the region, one of the basic Soviet policies was to support the nationalization programmes of the oil rich Arab countries. This way, the Soviet Union would become able to manipulate the oil exports to the needy Western countries. For this purpose, after 1950s, the Soviet backed the nationalist movements and the establishment and operations of OPEC, developing close ties with it against the Western influence.[206] As a result, The Soviet Union gradually became one of the biggest oil suppliers to the West.

Following the end of the Cold War, the Soviet presence in the Middle East weakened. However, a few years after the establishment of Russian Federation, a new rivalry over the oil and natural gas reserves in Turkistan and Caucasia started off between the United States

[204] EIA, US Energy Information Administration, Country Analysis: Saudi Arabia, 2013, availablable at http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=SA

[205] Odell, P. R., 2013, Oil and World Power, Routledge, USA, p. 55.

[206] Executive Intelligence Review, Soviets Back OPEC to Expedite Break With Dollar, Vol. 4, No. 31, August 2, 1977, (available online at http://www.larouchepub.com/eiw/public/1977/eirv04n31-19770802/index.html)

and the Russian Federation, showing the significance of the oil and gas reserves in directing the world politics, once more.

Especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union, during 1990s, Russia increased its share in oil production and export sector in the world. Today, Russia is the biggest natural gas producer and exporter, and ranks as the second oil producer and exporter with its natural resources. It has been reported that Middle East and Russia together alone are enough to meet the world's need, Russia being the biggest oil producer outside of OPEC.



Figure 7.1 World Oil Reserves by Region[207]

7.3 Ideology

With the 1917 Revolution, Lenin introduced a new world order which was a direct challenge to capitalism. He denied all capitalist institutions. Lenin's ideology was based on Marxist economic and political philosophy with some adaptation to the time and place and

[207] Source: US Energy Information Administration From Oil and Gas Journal (2007), Oil includes crude oil and condensate.

with new concepts added such as anti-imperialism and vanguard-party revolution.[208] This ideology was international and predicted a revolution against capitalism all over the world, which scared the United States and other capitalist countries, as well as defying their economic and social policies.[209]

Later, Stalin integrated Leninism into Marxist economics and developed Marxism-Leninism as the state ideology. Other than the transformation within the country towards a socialist state and then the full realization of communism, Stalin tried to apply this ideology to other countries under the motto of "socialism in one country", in order to create a worldwide communism. In this regard, it was important to back the communist tendencies and movements around the world. Communist International (Comintern) as an international communist organization organised many World Congress between 1919 and 1943, with the participation of the communist parties around the world, even from the United States. As a result of these congresses and conferences, a concurrent decision was reached to support anti-imperialist movements around the world.

While the Europe was struggling to get rid of the destructive effects of the World War II, the Soviet Union made effort to promulgate its ideology especially in the near neighbourhood and in the Middle East, and the USA struggled to prevent these efforts. This is because, as a part of the Soviet political interests, sustaining the domination in the Middle East has been a crucial step in establishing a global influence and penetration. To this end, engaging ideology into the relations with other countries would bare its fruits politically and economically. Soviets used the tide of Arab nationalism and the Arab-Israeli enmity[210] to deepen their existence in the region. Arab nationalists lined up with the Soviet Union against the Western dominance, because they had not ever experienced Russian imperialism. On the Soviet behalf, via communist parties, it was expected to cooperate with and divert the foreign policies of the countries in the region, thus applying their bipolar ideology against Western powers, especially the United States in the region. This is why they backed the communist parties to take over the regime, or at least

[208] For more information: Evans, A. B., 1993, Soviet Marxism-Leninism: The Decline of an Ideology, Praeger Publishers, USA.
[209] Browder, R. P., 1953, The Origins of Soviet-American Diplomacy, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, p. 4.
[210] Baldwin, H. W., 1957, Strategy of the Middle East, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 35, No. 4.

supported the communist movements to gain momentum in the region, with the aim of expanding the alliances.

The most widespread and effective party in the Middle East applying the socialist ideology was the Baath Party. The party quickly established branches in other Arab countries, such as Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Tunisia and Sudan but became the most influential in Syria and Iraq. The slogan "unity, liberty, socialism" represented the essential characteristics of the Ba'athist thought.[211] With the emphasis on being free from colonial oppression, communist ideas became popular in the Middle East, however the Soviet communism later lost much of its earlier appeal and the Soviet Union could not produce a pro-Soviet revolution in the region.[212] Every radical leader in the region adopted the doctrines of anti-imperialism and anti-capitalism without necessarily joining the communist movement. This meant that communists transformed themselves into nationalist-socialists. With respect to this, Arab socialism of Nasser in Egypt was another good example of adapting the communist ideology to the Arab nationalism, and focusing on social and economic justice and the criticism of laissez-faire capitalism.[213]

However in time, as a result of the changing conditions and interests, also the variances in the foreign policies of different leaders, the Soviet Union began to value its regional political allies more highly than its ideological sister parties.[214] For this, in order to be able to further support its allies as nationalist leaders, for instance Egypt in the first place, Soviet ideologists created the terms “non-capitalist path” (meaning an intermediate stage between capitalism and socialism) and “Revolutionary Democracy” (meaning those states moving along the non-capitalist path towards socialism without the help of a communist party) to justify Soviet support for the Third World countries to both suspicious communists under the Arab nationalist regimes and to those in Moscow questioning the wisdom of such support.[215] In this way, the Soviet Union found a new pretext in ideologically supporting both nationalist leaders and communist parties. However, the

[211] Salem, P., 1994, Bitter Legacy: Ideology and Politics in the Arab World, Syracuse University Press, p. 65.
[212] Sayigh, Y.; Shlaim, A., 1997, The Middle East, the Great Powers and the Cold War, in The Cold War and the Middle East, Clarendon Press, England, p. 16
[213] Salem, P., 1994, ibid, p. 183
[214] Salem, P., 1994, ibid, p. 187
[215] Freedman, R., O., 1991, Moscow and the Middle East: Soviet Policy since the Invasion of Afghanistan, Cambridge University Press, Great Britain, p. 20.

ideal of spreading communism ended up with little success and it proved ineffective to align the Arabs with the Soviet agenda or to bring them under Soviet control.[216]

8. AMERICAN MIDDLE EASTERN POLICY AND ITS BASIC TENETS

The American interest in the Middle East began with the discovery of oil in the region in 1920s. Middle East once more became one of the most critical regions of the modern World with this rich petroleum reserves and unique strategic location. The Middle East has a unique strategic location because it connects Africa, Asia and Europe, serving as an area of transition. Thus, creating an influence focus on the Middle East would enable the countries to easily reach and use the rich oil resources, open and secure the transportation routes, seaways, the Suez Canal and the Strait of Hormuz for world trade. This is why almost every US President came to power since the Second World War has emphasized the Middle East as of great political, economic and strategic importance for US interests.[217]

After the Second World War, Middle East became the focal point within a bi-polar world order for both sides. The military relationship between the United States and the region basically began in the Cold War era, during the first Arab-Israel War. The Middle East is of vital strategic importance for the West, and especially for the United States. Therefore the United States endeavoured to prevent any power from dominating the Middle East. Since, such situation might endanger the American interests in the region. Especially in the period after 1945, the developing Soviet control and influence of over the region was the main problem for the United States. In a sense, the Middle East strategy of the United States was designed against the Soviet domination, just like the British policy of preventing the Russia from accessing the warm waters in the 19th century. However, unlike Britain, the United States supported the anti-colonialist movements around the world and sympathised for Zionism which differentiated the policies of both superpowers in the region.[218]

Although Britain consolidated its presence in the Middle East between the two world wars and became the most powerful actor, its influence considerably decreased during and after

[216] Primakov, Y., 2010, Rusların Gözüyle Ortadoğu, Timaş Yayınları, İstanbul, p. 109.
[217] Arı, T., 2004, Irak, İran ve ABD, Alfa Yayınları, Istanbul, p. 182.
[218] Balfour-Paul, G., 1991, The End of Empire in the Middle East: Britain's relinquishment of power in her last three Arab dependencies, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 14.

the Second World War. As a result of British concerns about Jewish migration to the Middle East and attitudes on the partition plans of Palestine, Zionist correctly analysed the conjuncture and sought for American support and help instead of Britain in order to accomplish their objectives bearing the British reservations on the issue in mind. Thus, while the United States gradually became the new power in the Middle East, President Eisenhower realised that Arab countries such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia would serve as better allies than Britain in the region.[219]

In a way to strengthen its position and protect its interests in the region, the United States consistently followed some basic foreign policy objectives to cope with the multifaceted regional and international issues. These goals were successfully summarized by Lugar in his work as follows:

- Providing the security and sustaining the survival of the State of Israel,
- Establishing alliances with friendly Arab states and contributing to their security,
- Promoting peace in the region, especially between the Arabs and the Israelis, in order to preserve the status quo,
- Preventing Soviet influence and penetration in the region and weaken its alliances with radical and moderate Arab states,
- Securing the free flow of oil and international trade.[220]

Therefore, being aware of the weakness of British presence in the Middle East, the United States did not confine itself to the sole alliance of Israel, hence pursued new alliances in the region. In this regard, the United States remained aloof from the Baath regimes because of their closeness to the Soviet Union, and formed cooperation with pro-western regimes. However, when it comes to Arab-Israel struggle, the United States always remained on Israel's side although tried to be seen as a conciliator. Moreover, from the second half of the 1960s, Israel became the most important customer of US fighter jets in the region. These close relations with Israel, sometimes veiled and sometimes explicit, gradually alienated the Arab states from the United States. In order to compensate and ameliorate

[219] Petersen, T. T., 2006, The Decline of the Anglo-American Middle East, Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, pp. 15.
[220] Lugar, R. G., 1986, "U.S. Arms Sales and the Middle East", Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 40 Issue 1, pp. 23-24.

these sensitive relations, the United States always gave substantial importance to the connections with the moderate Arab states of rich oil reserves and continued the arms trade and giving monetary assistance to them, alongside Israel.

In 1956 Suez Crisis, American influence in the region strengthened, which caused reaction among some Arabs. On the other hand, the American perception and image in Iran especially after 1945 was very positive. This image was created through teachers, missionaries and other small groups defending democracy, independence and liberty for Iranian people against British and Russian occupation. However, when Mohammad Mosaddegh developed close relations with the Soviet Union and nationalized Iran's petroleum industry and oil reserves after he was elected as prime minister, this move was interpreted as against American interests and relations nearly came to a halt, which later led to an Anglo-American covert operation to topple down him which led the Shah taking the sole control acting increasingly autocratic, but in line with American interests. As a result of the ameliorated relations, Iran became the most important ally of the United States in the region until the 1979 Revolution.

In this period, various doctrines were proclaimed under the names of the US presidents, and some of them are directly related to the Middle East. The USA promised that it would protect the independent nations against the danger of Communism with the Truman Doctrine in 1947.[221] Especially Eisenhower, when he was the supreme commander of NATO, advocated that together with Turkey and Greece forming the forward defence front of NATO's south eastern wing against the Soviets, Middle East oil reserves should also be protected and defended against Soviet thread. This idea was started to be implemented with the Truman Doctrine in 1946.[222] Truman explained the principles of the Middle East policy of the USA as follows:

> *"Turning to the Near East and the Middle East, we find an area which presents grave problems. This area contains vast natural resources. It lies across the most convenient routes of land, air, and water communications. It is consequently an area of great economic and strategic importance, the nations of which are not*

[221] McCauley, M., 2008, Origins of the Cold War: 1941-1949, revised 3rd edt., Pearson Education, Great Britain, p. 89.

[222] Metz, S., 2013 Eisenhower as Strategists: The Coherent Use of Military Power in War and Peace, CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform.

strong enough individually or collectively to withstand powerful aggression. It is easy to see, therefore, how the Near and Middle East might become an arena of intense rivalry between outside powers, and how such rivalry might suddenly erupt into conflict. No country, great or small, has legitimate interests in the Near and Middle East which cannot be reconciled with the interests of other nations through the United Nations. The United Nations have a right to insist that the sovereignty and integrity of the countries of the Near and Middle East must not be threatened by coercion or penetration."[223]

Eisenhower Doctrine, announced in 1957, also underlined the changing role of the United States in the region. Within the framework of this doctrine it was declared that the United States would give a direct military aid to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations facing the threat of international communism when requested. This doctrine was motivated in part by an increase in Arab hostility toward the West, and growing Soviet influence in Egypt and Syria following the Suez Crisis, and it also formed a legitimate basis for using a direct military power.[224]

During 1960s the United States tried to continue creating an interest-based structure all over the world against the Soviet threat. With the 1968 Nixon Doctrine, President Nixon declared that no military power would be used in regional conflicts thereon and stepped back from an interventionist policy. However, 1979 Iranian Revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and other cases during 1970s caused the United States to adopt an interventionist policy again especially for the Middle East.

In this regard Carter Doctrine was announced by President Carter in 1980 stating that the United States would use military force if necessary to defend its national interests in the Persian Gulf region. This was a response to the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and was intended to deter the Soviet Union from seeking hegemony in the Persian Gulf.[225]

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[223] The Address of Harry S. Truman on April, 6 1946 in Chicago on Army Day, available at http://trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/viewpapers.php?pid=1518 (Accessed on 15.06.2014)

[224] The Eisenhower Doctrine, 1957, http://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/eisenhower-doctrine (Accessed on 19.07.2014).

[225] Ismael, T. Y., 1986, International Relations of the Contemporary Middle East, New York: Syracuse University Press, pp. 155-156.

Carter stated that Soviet troops in Afghanistan posed "a grave threat to the free movement of Middle East oil", and continued:

> *"Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."*[226]

The Iranian Revolution in 1979 was interpreted as the most negative development during the post-war era for the USA. The Middle East policy of the USA took an unexpected blow. The USA lost one of its significant allies in the region,[227] and what is more, Iran also became a new threat factor for the states in the region.[228] Also with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Soviet Union increased its influence in the region while endangering the US strategic, economic and political interests. This invasion was perceived as a security problem of the political regimes in the region by the United States.[229] Therefore, Reagan administration responded harshly to the enlargement of the Soviet Union and applied the containment policy in universal terms.

On the other side, the United States made effort for the Arab-Israel peace in the region. After thirteen days of meetings, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin signed the Camp David Accords in 1979 with the Jimmy Carter as the conciliator.[230] Camp David Accords meant that Egypt turned its back to Arab countries while turning its face to the United States. American promise of economic assistance for Egypt, no doubt, eased this peace process.

When we consider the above mentioned events and processes, we can focus the basic US interests in the Middle East in four categories: maintaining the open door policy, responding to the Soviet threads in the region within the framework of containment policy, arms sales to the region and securing and controlling the energy resources and waterways.

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[226] The State of the Union Address Delivered Before a Joint Session of the Congress by Jimmy Carter, on January 23, 1980, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=33079 (Accessed on 19.07.2014).

[227] Arı, T.,2008, Geçmişten Günümüze Orta Doğu: Siyaset, Savaş ve Diplomasi, Mkm Yayıncılık, Bursa, p. 531.

[228] Divine, R., 1994, America: Past and Present, translated by İhsan Dağı, Ankara: Dış Politika Enstitüsü, p. 250.

[229] Divine, R., 1994, ibid, p. 253.

[230] Primakov, Y., 2010, Rusların Gözüyle Ortadoğu, Timaş Yayınları, İstanbul, p. 221.

These four areas are vital for the American presence and interests in the Middle East, and each time the United States involved into the regional events and wars, during Cold War and even still today, US presidents gave high importance to the preservation of these four interests.

8.1 Open Door Policy

After the American Civil War between 1861 and 1865, America entered into a process which helped America to become an industrial power. In any industrial sector, south included, American production began to increase. In particular after the Gilded age, America had a tremendous amount of capacity to produce capital goods and services. After the American Civil War between 1861 and 1865, America entered into a process which helped America to become an industrial power However, the Gilded age was a very uneven development and also this capacity to produce eventually led to an overproduction. It was a very basic economic rule: "If you do not consume the overproduction, you will have economic crisis inside". Because of this overproduction America had to open up to the world market to sell this surplus of goods and services, because the American market was not big enough to consume.

The United States began to follow the codes of open door based on capitalist liberal market policies around 1900s. The United States wanted to keep the trade routes for American trade around the world. During the presidency of William McKinley, this policy actually was proposed to open up the Chinese market for foreign business investments, and then applied to the whole world. It did not make any difference whether republican or democrat, all presidents pursued this policy of open door and whenever they see a threat to close this door America would enter militarily.

Thomas Woodrow Wilson was another president who was aware that the United States should open up to foreign markets to consume this overproduction. During his presidency, he strongly encouraged different groups (such as bankers, businessmen, tradesmen, etc.) to engage in foreign markets. In May 1914, three months before the First World War, he called for the first annual meeting of National Foreign Trade Council in Washington. This council was made up of big corporations, banks, commercial farmers, financial institutions and religious groups, and Wilson gave a guarantee and encouragement for their overseas

adventure of these groups. After the First World War, Wilson formulated his famous Fourteen Points and the first five points were directly related to the open door policy, because Wilson knew that France and England will share the European market and push America out.

First five articles of the Fourteen Points:

1- Freedom of navigation upon seas
2- Equal trade opportunity
3- Reduction of armament
4- End of colonialism
5- Removal of tariffs[231]

With these articles, it was clear that the United States expected to secure its access to the world markets without any limitations of tariffs and its share in the world market with equal opportunities. The ultimate aim and the goal of the United States can be summarised with the lines of President Wilson in an address of 1919:

> *"The financial leadership will be ours. The industrial primacy will be ours. The commercial advantage will be ours. The other countries of the world are looking to us for leadership and direction."*[232]

This desire to open up to world market also showed itself in the Middle East, [233] as an oil rich region at the crossroads of world trade routes. For this purpose, the United States especially wanted its nationals to participate in the economic development of the Middle East right after the First World War, especially engaging in the negotiations for the admission to the Turkish petroleum Company.[234] From then on American companies gradually increased their share in the oil trade in the region, replacing the British control.

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[231] President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, 8 January 1918, http://www.forgottenbooks.com/readbook_text/Addresses_of_President_Wilson_1000252591/43 (Acessed on 03.04.2014).

[232] Woodrow, W., 2013, Addresses of President Wilson. Forgotten Books, London, pp. 42-3, available at http://www.forgottenbooks.com/readbook_text/Addresses_of_President_Wilson_1000252591/43

[233] For more information on the Industrial policies in the Middle East and the American role: Galal, A., 2008, Industrial Policy in the Middle East and North Africa: Rethinking the Role of State The American University in Cairo Press, NY.

[234] DeNovo, J. A., 1963, American Interests and Policies in the Middle East: 1900-1939, Minessota University Press, USA, p. 196.

In terms of trade, Saudi Arabia was another striking example. By the late 1970s, Saudi Arabia had become the seventh largest market of the Unites States for goods, services and technology.[235]

Another importance of the Middle East for the American open door policy was that it became a substantial market for the American arms exports, with the developments in the weapon industry. As a result of continuous escalations in the Arab-Israel conflict, the United States, together with the Soviet Union, became the biggest arms provider in the region, primarily for Israel and the other pro-Western Arab countries in the region. Especially during the 1970s, arms imports in the Middle East rose fourfold and Iran, Saudi Arabia and Israel were the major recipients of Western arms.[236] The Middle Eastern market continued to grow with the heating Arab-Israel clashes, with the increase in the military spending of the countries.

8.2 Containment

Containment is one of the most important policies of the Cold War, and played a decisive role in American thinking about the East-West conflict.[237] It was crucial for the United States to stand up against the Soviet expansion, which even a slightest move might lead to a domino theory and place the significant places for US interests under communist regimes, thus it was of primary objective to repel and limit the Soviet presence wherever it clashes with American vital interests and national aims, especially in the Eastern Europe and the Middle East.

George F. Kennan's analysis of Soviet expansion during his foreign service provided the intellectual basis for the containment policy and he is known as the father of that policy.[238] In July 1947 Kennan published an article "The sources of Soviet conduct" and it became the quasi-official statement of American foreign policy. In this article he argued that Soviets are motivated an antagonism between capitalism and socialism, and the infallibility

[235] Miglietta, J. P., 2002, American Alliance Policy in the Middle East, 1945-1992: Iran, Israel and Saudi Arabia, Lexington Books, USA, p. 262.
[236] Pierre, A. J., 1981-1982, "Arms Sales: The New Diplomacy", Foreign Affairs Vol. 60, No: 2.
[237] McCauley, M., 2008, Origins of the Cold War: 1941-1949, revised 3rd edt., Pearson Education, Great Britain, p.74.
[238] Ambrose, S. E., 1985, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938, Forth revised edition, Penguin Books, USA, p. 85

of Kremlin.[239] However, unlike others, Kennan did not believe that the Soviets posed any serious military threat to conquer the whole world. The challenge according to him was economic and political which should be met by long term patient containment. In this regard, containment meant building up the military strength of America and her allies and a willingness to stand up to the Soviets wherever they applied pressure.[240]

Within this containment policy, nearly all presidents engaged in the Middle East politics, taking an anti-Soviet and anti-communist stand, and even Truman, Eisenhower and Carter announced doctrines directly related to the active containment of the communism especially in the Middle East.

After the Second World War, although the Soviet troops finally withdrew from Iran in 1946, this crisis made the Truman government think that Iran should be enclosed creating a line against the Soviets.[241] Since, if Iran and Turkey had been under Soviet control, all the Middle East states might have encountered the Soviet threat.[242] Depending on the Truman's statement that "wherever an anti-communist government is threatened, the United States will supply political, economic and military aid." a Middle East Defence Organization was thought be created by the British and American experts, this led to the establishment of the Baghdad Pact with an agreement between Turkey and Iraq in 1955 with the United States' encouragement. This alliance was later enlarged with the accession of England, Pakistan and Iran; the United States did not want to come to Israel's attention by joining the Pact in this period when Arab – Israel conflict was at issue thus it remained within the alliance as an observer, not establishing a legal connection.

This pact was designed to contain the Soviet Union by creating a line of strong states along the Soviet frontier. However, after the coup in Iraq in 1958, Abdul Karim Qasim withdrew from the Baghdad Pact and opened diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. As a result, the name of the organization was changed into CENTO (Central Treaty Organization). Unlike the expected potency, CENTO did not prevent the Soviet influence from expanding to other non-member states in the region. The Soviet Union continued to establish close

[239] Ambrose, S. E., 1985, ibid, p. 99.
[240] Ambrose, S. E., 1985, ibid, p. 100.
[241] Kupchan, C. A., 1987, The Persian Gulf and the West: The Dilemmas of Security Boston: Ullen and Unwin, p. 14
[242] Arı, T., 2004, Irak, İran ve ABD, Alfa Yayınları, Istanbul, p. 182

military and political relations with Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Libya. The Baghdad Pact was not long lived and the Iranian Revolution in 1979 cast the end of the organization, and the British and US alliances continued bilaterally.

As stated before, the Eisenhower Doctrine emerged as a result of 1956 Suez Crisis. This is because; the situation in the Middle East after the Suez Crisis worried the United States. The substantial Western prestige in the region was damaged while the Soviet Russia became the saver of the Arab world. In 1957 Eisenhower Doctrine highlighted the US role in the region. According to the doctrine, any state facing the Soviet thread could receive American economic and military assistance. The real objective here was to restrain Soviet close relations with such countries as Egypt and Syria, and to circumvent the expansion and the influence of global communism in the region.

In an effort to enable the Arab countries to struggle against communism, Eisenhower offered economic assistance to these countries to solve their economic problems and strengthen them, explaining what communism hegemony could result in.[243] This is because; the United States understood that it was not possible to protect the region through regional assaults and solely with military doctrines like the Truman Doctrine. In a reformist change period after the Suez Crisis, it was wise to adopt a new political program to gain the trust of the local people and to remove the colonialist image.[244]

The first successful test of the doctrine was in Lebanon in 1958. Though, the threat was not an armed aggression or a direct Soviet incursion, scared of the toppling down of the pro-Western government of Iraq and also the internal instability of Lebanon, President Camille Chamoun requested American help against his political rivals, some of whom have communist inclinations and ties with the communists in Egypt and Syria. Eisenhower responded the request in an attempt to support and reinforce the Lebanese government against these internal opposition and threats from Syria and Egypt. With this operation, the Eisenhower gave a message that the United States is an active and effective actor in the Middle East politics.

[243] Armaoğlu, F., 1991, Belgelerle Türk-Amerikan Münasebetleri, Ankara: TTK, p. 240
[244] Sander, O., 1979, Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri (1947-1964), Ankara: SBF, pp. 149-150.

Although, the Eisenhower Doctrine was a successful step towards the re-assurance of the US presence in the region, and provided more opportunities for the United States to intervene in the region, it did not fulfil the envisaged expectations. This was mainly because although Lebanon, Libya, Turkey, Iran and Iraq backed this policy, especially Egypt and Syria considered the doctrine as a direct intervention in the internal affairs of the Middle East. As a result, Syria and Egypt intensified their relations with and politically moved towards the Soviet Union giving a rise to the tendency for communism in these countries.[245]

A step forward for the permanency of the US presence in the Middle East and further containment of the communist influence, Carter Doctrine exhibited an attitude completely opposite to the Nixon Doctrine which emphasized only weapon aid to encompass the Soviet diffusion, giving the responsibility of the military defence to the countries themselves. Carter Doctrine legalized the military intervention of the United States and has been the basic axis of the US Middle East Policy since then.[246] In an unstable period of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the United States put the choice of military intervention forward in order to protect its national interests in the Persian Gulf. Within this context, in addition to forming political alliances, building up the military strength in the region became the policy of first priority.

In this regard, the United States established a Rapid Deployment Force in December 1979 to basically ensure the security of the Gulf Region and to protect the economic interests of the United States in the region upon the developments of the invasion of Afghanistan and the overthrown of the Shah in Iran. The aim of the Rapid Deployment Forces was to deter or stop any possible Soviet assault to the region. Later, it was turned into the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) combining the US Naval Forces and the Rapid Deployment Forces.[247] With these forces it was planned to keep a qualified and mobile military force available to intervene in the Gulf region when necessary. However, the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force was proved to be ineffective in the Tehran hostage crisis in 1979.[248] Later, the name of Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) was

[245] Sander, O., 1979, ibid, p. 152.
[246] Özey, R., 1997, Dünya Denkleminde Orta Doğu, Öz Eğitim, İstanbul, p. 27.
[247] Arı, T., 2004, Irak, İran ve ABD, İstanbul: Alfa, pp. 239-240.
[248] Arı, T., 2004, ibid, p. 241.

changed to the US Central Command (CENTCOM) in January 1983 by the Reagan administration and its capacity was increased.

8.3 Arms Sales

The energy dependency of the West placed great importance on the Middle East, hence sustaining the security and the stability of the region was one of the foreign policy priorities of the Western countries. Therefore, military assistance and arms sales to the region became crucial means used by the United States to protect its interests, apart from the economic benefits.[249]

As I already mentioned, conflicts between states in the region, especially the Arab-Israel conflict, have been the major element in the growing tendency in arms race and thus in arms import. Most of the countries in the Middle East lacked the well-developed industrial defence infrastructures and they relied upon arms imports for their security. The rapid shift of wealth with oil exports, enabled the Arab countries to purchase large quantities of foreign military technology and weapons. In this regard, Saudi Arabia and Iran became the biggest purchasers of US weapons.[250]

Both as a part of its economic policies, opening up to the world market, and for political reasons, establishing dominance in the Middle East, the United States provided arms for the countries in the region. In this regard, military aids and sales were applied as a major policy instrument to deepen the penetration in the region which was seen as leverage over the national politics of these countries. Another issue was that, arms sales always brought advisers and technicians to the region, making the penetration even easier.

The American and Soviet rivalry over the Middle East further provided solid grounds for the American military aid and arms sales in the region. Arms sales became a key instrument of diplomacy among the super powers. When superpowers were not keen on intervening with their own armed forces, they were more likely to reinforce the military capability of the friendly states with the provision of arms, creating a playground for the

[249] Pierre, A. J., 1981-1982, "Arms Sales: The New Diplomacy", Foreign Affairs Vol. 60, No: 2.
[250] Lugar, R. G., 1986, "U.S. Arms Sales and the Middle East", Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 40 Issue 1, pp. 25-26.

protection of their own interests via their proxies.[251] Hence the transfer of military goods and services to the allies in the region was the prime instrument and the most important foreign policy tool against the Soviet penetration in the region, and for the rivalry of allegiance of the regional countries. In this regard, committed to the security and the survival of the State of Israel, the United States increased its arms sales to Israel in the first place and to other friendly states in the region Iran and Saudi Arabia.

In an attempt to promote and maintain the American hegemony in the region against Soviets, the United States both provided military assistance and utilized the local partners, Iran and Saudi Arabia being the most significant ones. For this purpose, the US presidents even applied new roadmaps included in the announced doctrines. Although Truman Doctrine, Eisenhower Doctrine and Carter Doctrine primarily involved the deployment of US military forces in the region for the safeguard and protection of the countries from Communist thread, they also promised to provide for military assistance. What is different in Nixon Doctrine in this regard was that it included a twin pillar policy of giving the responsibility of ensuring peace and stability in the region to Iran and Saudi Arabia by improving their capacity with American weapons and military aid.[252]

From 1945 until 1990, the United States concluded a great number of arms deals, transparent or behind the closed doors, with Israel and Egypt in the first place, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Syria, United Arab Emirates and Yemen.[253] As the world's largest arms supplier, The United States exported arms and military goods and services worth around $120 billion during the period of 1950-1980, equal to more than half of the world's total.[254]

Starting with the first Arab-Israel War, the United States continuously supplied weaponry to Israel in increasing quantities. Especially during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, a massive supply of equipment to Israel was realised. From then on, Israel became the biggest recipient of US military goods and services, and also acquired a considerable know-how

[251] Pierre, A. J., Winter 1981-1982, ibid.
[252] Sick, G., 1998, Rethinking Dual Containment, Survival Vol: 40, No: 1, p. 7.
[253] Detailed data regarding which deal was concluded in what year and what kind of weapons were included in the deal can be found SIPRI's Arms Transfers Database available at http://portal.sipri.org/publications/pages/transfer/trade-register
[254] Pierre, A. J., 1981-1982, ibid.

from the United States.[255] The United States believed that a well-armed and strong Israel would feel more secure in the region thus making it more reconciliatory in its relation with the Arabs for the peace in the region.

When Nasser concluded an arms deal with Czechs in 1955, Egypt became the most important ally of the Soviet Union in the region. With its anti-imperialist agenda Nasser became the leader of Arab nationalism, having a paramount influence on the other Arab countries in the region against Israel. Soviet support of Arab cause increased its penetration in the region. This was seen as a major blow to US interests in the region. Hence, the United States intensified its arms-supply-relationships with Iran, Israel, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. However, this in turn aroused anxiety among radical Arab countries, such as Syria and Iraq, pushing them to establish military ties with the Soviet Union.[256] However, when Nasser was replaced by Sadat, Egypt slowly changed its axis and developed warmer relations with the United States. From 1970s on, Egypt became one of the biggest recipients of US military assistance. Especially after the Camp David Accords, the United States supplied good portions of military assistance and weapons for Egypt, Sudan, Oman, Morocco and Tunisia.

When the initial relations were established with Iran after the 1954 coup, during 1950s and 1960s the United States started to provide the Shah with steady military assistance in order to counterbalance the Soviet assistance to the neighbouring Iraq.[257] In line with the Iran's growing income from oil resources, the American supply of weaponry reached to highest points, underlying Iran as one of the most trusted ally in the region. With the Shah and the assistance of the United States, Iran started the largest military build-up in the region.[258] Between 1972 and 1978, Iran ordered $20 billion worth of advanced U.S. armaments and this was the largest arms export ever concluded with a Third World nation up to that point.[259] Such huge export, however, caused concerns and restriction in the Congress. The Iran Islamic Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 changed this

[255] Lugar, R. G., 1986, ibid, pp. 26

[256] Klare, M. T., 1991, "Fueling the Fire: How We Armed the Middle East", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol: 47 Issue: 1, p. 20.

[257] Klare, M. T., Jan/Feb 1991, ibid, p. 22.

[258] Stork, J.; Paul, J., 1983, "Arms Sales and the Militarization of the Middle East", Merip Reports, Mer -112 - The Arms Race in the Middle East, Vol. 13.

[259] Klare, M. T., Jan/Feb 1991, ibid, p. 22.

restriction policy and arm sales once again became an effective tool for diplomacy. With this revolution, the United Sates lost one of its most reliable partners in the region, resulting in the initial recession in the relations, but later arms sales continued again.

Saudi Arabia has been one of the most important partners of and arms importers from the United States, and the United States supplied record-breaking sales to Saudi Arabia. Huge arms deals between the United States and oil rich Arab states further resulted in a flood of arms to the region. Especially after the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Arab states in the region felt more threatened thus paid great attention to accelerating their armament. In this regard, even the smaller Gulf States increased their demands of arms from the West, especially the United States. In this regard, Gulf Cooperation Council[260] was established in 1981 against Iran and Iraq for a unified military power, curving the way deep into further weaponry demands of the founding countries. The United States realized various arms deals involving great amounts of weaponry, military assistance and training.

8.4 Energy

When we consider the history of the energy security, controlling and preserving the energy sources has been of great importance for the countries starting with the industrialization. The need for and usage of coal left its place to oil towards the end of the 19th century. When ignition driven motors were discovered, the automobile industry developed quickly, increasing the oil using vehicles in Europe and the United States. Although more expensive than coal, oil with high energy capacity, easy storage and cleanliness made it to be preferred. Its increasing use in the industry and the new developments made the industrialized countries dependent on oil more and more, bringing it to the forefront as a strategic raw material.

In the 20th century, the developments and industrialization of the countries became depended on oil.[261] From the 20th century on, sustainable access to oil, and thus securing the reserves, has been the primary foreign policy objective of the countries. In this regard, great powers found oil as vital for their development and influence on the world politics.

[260] This union was established by the Gulf States of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The objective was not solely in security terms. The members also sought to establish similar regulations in various fields, to foster the scientific and technologic developments in the industry and to strengthen ties among their people.

[261] Akbulut, H., 2001, Uluslararası Ekonomik Sorunlar Dergisi, Dışişleri Bakanlığı Yayınları, Ankara, p. 1.

Oil has become such crucial that during the First and Second World Wars it was a priority to acquire the control of the oil producing regions for the great powers. And this priority continued during the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States.

In the 20th century, and still today, what makes the Middle East significant has been the oil resources discovered towards end of 1800s. It was first discovered in Persia in 1908, later in Saudi Arabia in 1938 and the other Persian Gulf states, and also in Libya and Algeria. In time the Middle East turned out to possess the world's largest easily accessible reserves of crude oil, drawing the attention of the great powers. From the end of the First World War onwards, Britain and France played the main role in controlling the oil reserves in the Middle East.

Until the Second World War, the British influence in the Middle East was quite effective and was primarily based on the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and Iraq Petroleum Company. However, towards the Second World War, the United States gradually increased its penetration into substantial areas, and US based oil companies expanded their shares in the region becoming rivals to the British based companies. The real oil potential of the Middle East was realised after the Second World War and large scale production started after this period. The most important oil producing centres in the world raised in the Middle East and North Africa from 1950s onwards.

The oil industry in the United States was born during the Civil War, and the United States was the world’s largest oil producer and exporter until the First World War. The fear of depletion of the US oil resources from the 1920s on led the America oil industry and the American companies to seek for foreign production. In this regard, one by one, American companies demanded involvement in the Middle Eastern oil reserves. Under the American Petroleum Institute, Exxon, Texaco, Sinclair, Atlantic Refining, the Standard Oil Company of Indiana and Gulf started geological surveys in Iraq, along with British and French companies. In the end, the Near East Development Corporation (NEDC) represented the American interests with its share in Iraq Petroleum Company. Later, the United States intensified its share in the Middle East oil with the new exploration rights in Bahrain and

Saudi Arabia during 1930s leading to the establishment of Arabian-American Oil Company (Aramco).[262]

After the Second World War, the major development in the world politics in a bipolar order revolved around the Soviet aims of rising to power in the Eastern Europe and the Middle East, and the US determination of containing the Soviet threat and increasing its power in the Europe and also filling the power gap in the Middle East, left by Britain and France. In this regard, Soviet and US rivalry for the energy resources and controlling the oil access in the Middle East were one of the most striking struggles of the Cold War period.

	Ownership			
Country and company	Production	American	British	Other
Iraq: Iraq Petroleum	25,270,000	6, 002, 000	13, 267, 000	6, 001, 000
Bahrein: Bahrein Petroleum	6, 561, 000	6, 561, 000	- - -	- - -
Arabia: California Arabian Standard	4, 866, 000	4, 866, 000	- - -	- - -
Egypt: Anglo-Egyptian	8, 953, 000	- - -	8, 953, 000	- - -
Iran: Anglo-Iranian	75,323,000	- - -	75,323,000	- - -
Total (barrels)	120,973,000	17, 429, 000	97,543,000	6, 001, 000
Percent	100	14. 41	80.63	4.96

Figure 8.1 Middle East Crude Petroleum – 1943 Production and Ownership (in Barrels)[263]

The United States nearly did everything to protect its share in the oil resources. As we already mentioned, before the Second World War, British held the lion's share of the Middle East oil. During and after the war American oil companies forced the British to share the riches with them. But the post-war Arab governments, along with Iran, began demanding bigger shares for their precious, limited and only important natural resource, which contradicted to US interests in the region. In this regard, although Mosaddegh

[262] Arı, T., 2007, Irak, İran, ABD ve Petrol, İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları, pp. 287-288

[263] Source: Multinational Oil Corporations and U.S. Foreign Policy - REPORT together with individual views, to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, by the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations; (Washington, January 2, 1975, US Government Printing Office). (available at https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/oil1.htm)

expelled the British companies out of the country and nationalized the Iran oil in 1951, this only resulted in the deteriorated relations, but not a complete disengagement.[264] Instead, Premier Mosaddegh was removed from power with a coup organised by the CIA with the help of MI6 in 1953 (under the name of Operation Ajax).

The new nationalization policies of the oil production after the 1950s, further increased the importance of energy diplomacy in the new directions. This new tendency starting with the nationalization gave path to the establishment of OPEC and utilization of oil as a political weapon starting with the 1973 Arab-Israel War.[265] After the 1970s, this new theme of energy diplomacy was the struggle among the oil producer and oil consumer countries. This struggle was also reflected with the institutions especially after the establishment of IEA (International Energy Agency) by the oil consumer countries against OPEC. As a result, the concept of energy diplomacy has a significant place in today's international relations and international political economy. While the priority of the countries was military security during the Cold War, today this priority left its place to energy supply security and energy politics. In this regard, any overt action threatening the crucial oil resources in the Middle East would provoke the Western intervention by any means, because oil and more importantly cheap oil prices were critical for both US energy security and economic recovery of the European countries after the Second World War.

With the new energy reserves discovered in the United States, today, the Middle East project of the United States is aimed more at the countries dependent on the Middle East economically rather than being dependent on the Middle East oil. By controlling the oil and energy market in the Middle East, the United States is able to control its rivals. Here controlling the Middle East means controlling the economic power of the rivals rather than gaining a lot of money from oil exports. US policy is shaped in this perspective in the Middle East.

[264] Gasiorowski, M., 2010, U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Iran During the Mussadiq Era, in The Middle East and The United States: A Historical and Political Reassessment, ed. David W. Lesch, Westview Press, Colorado, p. 51.
[265] Arı, T., 2008, Geçmişten Günümüze Orta Doğu: Siyaset, Savaş ve Diplomasi, Mkm Yayıncılık, Bursa, p. 380.

Map 8.1 Oil reserves in the Middle East and Caspian region[266]

[266] Source: http://jordanscience.wordpress.com/2008/08/26/petroleum/

Map 8.2 Middle East since WWII [267]

[267] Soruce: Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection available at http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east.html

9. RIVALRY BETWEEN TWO SUPER POWERS END ITS EFFECT ON THE MIDDLE EAST

9.1 Comparing the Soviet and American Spheres of Influence in the Middle East

The global encounter of East and West, namely the Soviet Union and the United States, also curved its inroads into the Middle Eat. The Soviet and American penetration in this region showed a gradual deepening especially after the Second World War. In an attempt to protect and expand their national, political and ideological interests, both states increased their influences and strengthen their presence through diplomacy, military assistance and arms deliveries, economic aid and political support and establishment of alliances, deployment of military and naval forces.

After the Second World War, the main US interests in the Middle East were securing the free flow of oil and the containment of the Soviet Union. The United States made every effort to prevent, or at least diminish Soviet access and hamper the expansion of Soviet influence in the region via containment. For this purpose, the United States followed an active political and military strategy by engaging in cooperation with Israel and Arab countries. Since Israel was the most trusted ally in the region, the security and survival of it was of great importance. The guardianship of Israel, the preservation of the status quo in favour of its own interests and hence containment of the communists finally led the United States to make attempts for an Arab-Israel peace from 1970s onwards.

Laying the foundations of a long standing strong alliance with Iran after the 1953 coup, the United States had a great chance to penetrate into the region, in addition to the good relations with Iraq. By this way, the United States was creating a new military alliance with the countries geographically closest to the Soviet Union in the Northern Tier. Adding Turkey and Pakistan to this alliance, the establishment of the Baghdad Pact in 1955 was regarded as a great success in the containment of the Soviet Union.[268] Furthermore, the United States was negotiating with Egypt for establishing a regional defence pact among the Arab countries, and the close political, economic and military ties with Saudi Arabia were strengthening the US hands. The American naval power was dominant in the Mediterranean Sea with the establishment of Sixth Fleet in 1950 and the United States also

[268] For more information please see the section "Baghdad Pact" in this chapter.

had several air force bases in the Middle East. Through the oil companies in Saudi Arabia and Gulf Countries, the United States was gradually penetrating into the region.[269]

However, the Czechs arms deal between Egypt and the United States via Czechoslovakia and the establishment of the Baghdad Pact, which Syria, Egypt and other Arab countries perceived as a tool of Western imperialism to protect Israel, pushed Egypt towards developing close relationship with the Soviet Union until 1970s. The United States also lost the support of Iraq after 1958 military coup, which also called the end of the initial impact of the Baghdad Pact. Together with the demolishing effects of Arab-Israel wars, the United States further lost one of its primary allies, Iran after the 1979 Islamic Revolution.

The Soviet involvement in the Middle East especially started in a period of strong Western influence in the region. Taking the advantage of the power gaps left by the Western powers after the Second World War, the Soviet Union attempted to alter the balances in its favour, eliminated the American dominance, to protect its security, expanding the Soviet influence through developing close relations in the region, and establishing naval and military basis, as was in the case of the United States. In this regard, the principal objective was to gain an advantage over the NATO alliance by depriving the members of the access to the oilfields, and preventing them from establishing naval and air bases in the Middle East. Via the alliances the Soviet Union both wanted to stop its encirclement by the pro-Western countries and also to prevent the Western penetration among the Arab countries.

As a means of expansion in the region, the Soviet Union used the anti-imperialist movement in the region and taking the advantage of Arab nationalism, the Soviets represented an alternative to the West in terms of military and economic aid. The Soviet support for the Arab countries was for both balancing the Western domination and avoiding a possible Western intervention as a result of Arab-Israel conflict.

After the initial support for the establishment of the State of Israel, the Soviet Union changed the position to a pro-Arab stand and from the 1950s onwards found fertile grounds for expansion in Syria and Egypt. The massive Soviet arms supply to Egypt in 1955 Czech arms deal broke the Western monopoly in arms deliveries and the Soviets became the

[269] Campbell, J. C., 1972, "The Soviet Union and the United States in the Middle East", Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 401, No.1, p. 130.

power behind Egypt as the strongest Arab state at the time. Also becoming the arms supplier and the protector of Syria[270] after the 1957 Syrian Crisis, the Soviets acquired an influential position in the region. They further expand their penetration with the 1958 military coup in Iraq. With this new position, the Soviet Union attempted to expand its military ad naval reach in the region in order to match such American domination and also to gain a geostrategic strength. On one side, they assured a continuous Soviet access to the region through the regional conflicts, on the other side they abstained from a direct confrontation at the superpower level.[271] However, when Sadat took over the power in Egypt, the Soviet Union lost its most valuable asset which led to a decline in the sphere of Soviet influence, which in the end led the Soviet Union to invade Afghanistan in order to gain its advantageous position in the region by other means.

It was a fact that both the Soviets and the United States hesitated to invade the Middle East because of the risk of causing a general war. Instead they preferred to supply military assistance and arms to the region. The Soviet Union and the United States provided arms to numerous Third World clients which helped to sustain enduring regional rivalries.[272] The main reasons for the arms supplies were to establish or maintain the influence in a specific country and the whole region, to get permission to use the military facilities and establish military bases, to improve the balance of payments and to counterbalance the penetration of other countries.[273] The countries in the region demanded arms from the superpowers to protect their sovereignty, to maintain a balance and superiority in weapons against neighbours and to enhance their prestige among others, especially the Arab prestige in the world.[274] With these aims in mind, all countries in the region sought arms and military assistance from the United States and the Soviet Union, and both sides poured arms into

[270] Campbell, J. C., 1972, ibid, p. 128.
[271] Reich, B.; Bennett, A. J., 1984, "Soviet Policy and American Response in the Middle East", Journal of East and West Studies Vol. 13, No. 2, p. 85.
[272] Kinsella, D.; Tillema, H. K., 1995, "Arms and Aggressions in the Middle East: Overt Military Interventions", 1948-1991, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 39, No.2, p. 306.
[273] Pierre, A., J., 1979, Arms Transfers and American Foreign Policy, New York University Press, New York, p. 4.
[274] Pierre, A., J., 1982, The Global Politics of Arms Sales, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 131.

the hands of their friends, to such an extent that in 1973 the Israelis, Egyptians and Syrians fought the second biggest tank battle in history.[275]

In the Middle East, these arms transfers increased during the wartimes especially the Arab-Israel quarrel, which can be traced in the Figures 9.1 and 9.2. Especially during the 1970s, these arms sales grew dramatically when the oil prices increased and the Arab states used oil incomes for armament. Both the United States and the Soviet Union increased their military assistance and armament of the countries in the region against the increase of the military threat to their allies in the region from the other side. The main recipients of the Soviet Union weapons in the region was Egypt (until 1970s), Iraq and Syria, while the United States mainly provided arms for Israel, Iran and Egypt (from 1970s on). However, these alliances over arms sales were not concrete and indissoluble. The supplier axes were altered according to the responses got for the arms demands. For instance, the Soviet Union supplied modern weaponry for Jordan and Kuwait, when these countries faced difficulties to supply from the West; while the United States sought to penetrate into the sphere of Soviet influence in the market by offering deals to Soviet allies such as Iraq.[276]

As I already stated at the beginning of this chapter, establishing military and naval bases in the region were of great importance for both superpowers. Although they abstained from a direct all out invasion, preserving the military bases would serve as a mean of deterrence for the other side and also deepening the penetration into the region and the allies.

[275] Ambrose, S. E., 1985, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938, Forth revised edition, Penguin Books, USA, pp. 263-264.

[276] Klare, M., T., 1991, "Fueling the Fire: How We Armed the Middle East", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol: 47 Issue: 1, p. 23.



Figure 9.1: Superpower Arms Transfers to the Middle East, 1948-1991[277]

Figure 9.2: Superpower Arms Transfers to the Persian Gulf, 1948-1991[278]

[277] Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, cited in Kinsella, D., 1994, "Conflict in Context: Arms Transfers and Third World Rivalries during the Cold War", American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 38, No. 3, p. 565.

[278] Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, cited in Kinsella, D., 1994, ibid, p. 573

On the Arabs side, the fear of Israeli attack which would lead to loss of prestige convinced them to permit a Soviet presence in Arab harbours and airfields. This was also a consequence of continuous Soviet pressure to supply arms and give military assistance only if they offer them such presence. By this way, Soviets gained substantial strategic positions in the form of naval and air facilities in the region as a result of their arms and military goods and services supplied to Egypt and Syria and their support in the Suez Crisis.[279] These bases were considered essential to create a counterforce against the US presence and also to boost the Soviet influence in the Mediterranean Sea. The Mediterranean was a necessary first step, because it was a corridor to the Atlantic through Gibraltar and to the Indian Ocean through the Suez Canal.[280] During the 1960s, the Soviets began to assign units to its Mediterranean fleet to form a permanent squadron. In this regard, from the 1960s to the 1980s the Soviet Union established naval facilities in the Mediterranean and Indian Oceans, namely Marsah Matruh, Alexandria, Port Said and Ras Banas in Egypt, Latakia in Syria, Port Sudan in the Sudan and Hodeida in Yemen.[281] Now with the presence of Soviet fleet, the Mediterranean was no longer an American lake.[282]

Same reasons, that is, to expand American influence in the region, to gain the capability to interfere quickly and to use it as a means of threat, the United States also engaged in negotiations to establish naval and military bases in the region. Also, the United States stationed its power in the Mediterranean on a permanent basis by establishing the U.S. Sixth Fleet, based in Naples. The Sixth Fleet was very useful because in critical situations it was quickly moved to the area and other times, it served as a warning to or encouragement of certain countries. In addition to this, from 1960s onwards, the United States also obtained special military and naval bases in mainly in Israel and Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Oman and the Gulf States of Kuwait, Bahrain Qatar and United Arab Emirates.

[279] Golan, G., 1979, "Soviet Power and Policies in the Third World: The Middle East", the Adelphi Papers 19, No. 152, p. 49.
[280] Campbell, J. C., 1972, "The Soviet Union and the United States in the Middle East", The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science Vol. 401, No. 1 p. 129.
[281] Cohen, S. B., 2003, Geopolitics of the World System, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., UK, p. 197.
[282] Campbell, J. C., 1972, ibid, p. 129.

7.1 Relations in the region: Friends and Foes

As I already mentioned, both the United States and the Soviet Union tried to impose their own Cold War mentality and ideology and they tried to accomplish temporary advantages to turn them into long term gains, by engaging in close collaboration with the countries in the Middle East. In this regard, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union paid substantial attention to the ideologies of the states that they established alliances in the region. It is a fact that generally Americans supported the pro-Western dictatorships while the Soviets supported anti-capitalist and anti-Western countries, however, at various times, the United States gave aid to the most radical countries while the Soviet Union assisted the most reactionary dictatorships.[283] The Arabs, Iranians, Jews and others living in the region never directly supported one side for pure ideology; instead they occasionally took political and economic advantage of this American-Soviet struggle in the region. The relation mostly depended on the national interests, thus the alliances were not so dependable, because one could abandon you for the sake of further gain from the other. Hence, only in the Middle East could allies also be enemies![284]

The Soviets mostly supported the Arab regimes in their efforts for a revolutionary change against Western-imperialism. In this regard, aside from their activities in Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Algeria, the Soviets also became active in Yemen and Morocco and granted economic aid to Tunisia and Sudan. In addition, diplomatic relations were initiated with Libya and Jordan.[285] On the other hand, more conservative regimes engaged in alliances with the United States, namely Saudi Arabia, Iran, Gulf States, Lebanon, Jordan and later Egypt. Most importantly, since its establishment, the greatest pro-Western country and US ally has been Israel.

[283] Ambrose, S. E., 1985, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938, Forth revised edition, Penguin Books, USA, p. 264.
[284] Ambrose, S. E., 1985, ibid, p. 262.
[285] Freedman, R. O., 1991, Moscow and the Middle East: Soviet Policy Since the Invasion of Afghanistan, Cambridge University Press, Great Britain, p. 22.

Egypt

Egypt was closely aligned with Britain in political, economic, cultural and military terms until the 1952 military coup. Since the First World War, British military forces were deployed in Egypt, the Egyptian army was equipped with British weaponry, and British influence on the domestic and foreign politics was immense, which led the United States to presume Egypt under British dominance.[286] However, as a result of growing nationalism, Egyptian masses became strongly anti-British and did not want their presence and penetration in the country, and their control over the Suez Canal.[287] In this regard, the new government with the 1952 coup adopted a nationalist and anti-imperialist position.

The US relations with this new government were friendly during the initial days, because, the United States was not an imperial country and they backed the anti-colonial revolutions around the world. Also the concept of freedom and respect for freedom were very tempting for the new Egyptian government.[288] However, upon Nasser's demand for arms the relations started to deteriorate. When France, Britain and Israel strongly objected[289] to any transfer of American arms to Egypt, the United States had to delay the request. The Tripartite Declaration of 1950[290] was also effective in this decision because the United States, Britain and France came to a decision to restrict the flow of arms into the Middle East.[291] Furthermore, there was no immediate Soviet presence available at the time being. This rejection from the West pushed Egypt to seek for arms from the East.

Another reason for Nasser to distance itself from the West was that he was against any military alliance with the West, because of the domination history of the colonial powers in the region, this was also against the non-alignment policy of Nasser. Thus, for military, political and personal reasons Nasser turned his face to the Eastern Block. The Czech arms

[286] Meyer, G. E., 1980, Egypt and the United States: The Formative Years, Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, Plainsboro, NJ, p. 36.
[287] Lenczowski, G., 1992, The Middle East in World Affairs, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, p. 498.
[288] Al-Sadat, A., 1979, In Search of Identity, Harper and Row, New York, p. 108.
[289] Israel objected, because it was newly established and there was a growing anti-Israeli sentiment in the region, besides all the Arab countries were in continuous war with Israel. France objected, because Egypt was assisting Algerian resistance to France forces. Britain objected, because of their interests in the Suez Canal. For more information: Neff, D., 1981, Warriors at Suez, The Linden Press/Simon and Schuster, New York.
[290] Pirinççi, F., 2013, Soğuk Savaş Döneminde Orta Doğu, in in Orta Doğuda Siyaset, eds. Davut Dursun and Tayyar Arı, Saray Matbaacılık, Ankara, p. 73
[291] Pierre, A., J., 1982, The Global Politics of Arms Sales, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, p. 203.

deal of 1955 was signed between Egypt and Czechoslovakia, resulting in a close alliance with the Soviet Union in various issues such as arms sales, military assistance, the rejection of Baghdad Pact and the Arab nationalism. The Soviet Union enjoyed nearly a twenty years of close ties with Egypt, allowing it to expand its influence, which was a major blow for US presence in the region.

However, when Nasser died in 1970, Anwar Sadat replaced him, affecting the power balance in the Middle East. Soviet military and financial help was not enough for Egypt anymore in a situation of national bankruptcy and poverty. On the other hand, the United States was far better in financial supplies. Besides, it was not seem probable that the Soviets would ever move Israel out the Sinai, which the United States could accomplish. For these reasons, expecting the American help, Sadat expelled Soviet soldiers and technicians from Egypt,[292] and the Soviet influence in the region got a big blow. Unfortunately, Sadat could not get what he wanted from the United States, instead they continued supplying Israel with heavy weaponry.[293] When Sadat could not find what he had expected from the Americans, he turned his face to the Soviet help once more. However, this second approach to the Soviet Union was not long standing. From 1970s onwards, with the US attempts, Sadat was more prone to an Arab-Israeli peace. When the Camp David Accords were signed in 1978, the Soviet Union completely lost its principal ally in the region, accompanied with the loss of naval access to Egyptian ports and Soviet facilities in Egypt.[294] Although Egypt was aligned with the United States with the Camp David Accords, this aroused a lot of criticism among the Arab countries.

Iran

After the First World War, Reza Khan became the Shah of Iran with British help; however, until the Second World War he sustained a balance policy between Britain and the Soviet Union. Iran came under British and Soviet invasion during the Second World War, which further increased the nationalist sentiment in the country. As a result of strengthening position of the nationalist opposition, Mohammad Mosaddegh was elected as Prime

[292] Arı, T., 2008, Geçmişten Günümüze Orta Doğu: Siyaset, Savaş ve Diplomasi, Mkm Yayıncılık, Bursa, pp. 356-357.
[293] Ambrose, S. E., 1985, ibid, pp. 273-274.
[294] Golan, G., 1979, Soviet Power and Policies in the Third World: The Middle East, the Adelphi Papers 19, no. 152, p. 49

Minister. However, when he nationalized the Iranian petroleum and oil industry, he was deposited in a covert operation conducted by the United States and Britain, in 1953. From then on, with the American military support and economic aid, the Shah, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi (son of Reza Shah) became extremely autocratic and also the strongest ally of the United States in the region.

The policies of Shah further strengthen the political opposition which came to a climax with the 1979 Islamic Revolution. With Ayatollah Khomeini as the new leader, Iran announced the end of close relations with the United States and became the centre of anti-Americanism in the region, declaring it the "Great Satan". Khomeini also strongly opposed to the Soviet Union although it was the first state to recognize the Islamic Republic and even Khomeini supported Afghan Mujahidin during the Soviet-Afghan War. Despite Soviet attempts, the relations were not healed during the Iran-Iraq War in which the Soviet Union and also the United States supplied arms for Iraq. However, the United States also supplied arms for Iran secretly during the war.

Iraq

The United States recognized Iraq in 1930 as an independent state, even before its official independence from the British mandate in 1932, and sustained close relations. However, the growing communist influence in the government, especially after the 1958 coup, caused concerns in the United States. The Arab - Israel wars and Camp David Accords further deteriorated the relations. After the 1979 Iran Islamic Revolution and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the relations gradually warmed to such an extent that during the Iran-Iraq War, the United States provided intelligence and military support, and authorized arm sales to Iraq, even chemical weapons. The relations came to a halt once again when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, which later led to a military intervention by US-led forces.

The Soviet Union recognized Iraq in 1944, but because of the Soviet criticisms of Iraq's involvement in Baghdad Pact, Iraq cut its relations with the Soviets. With the 1958 coup, General Abd al-Karim Qasim re-established relations with the Soviet Union, which led to new cooperation in arms sales. He also dropped Iraq off the Baghdad Pact which brought the end of the pact. During 1960s and 1970s the relations further developed to a good level and Iraq became one of the closest allies of the Soviet Union in the region, they even

signed Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1972. During the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq also enjoyed a great deal of Soviet military assistance.

Israel

Actively supporting the foundation of the State of Israel in the Middle East, the United States has always been the most important and strongest ally in the region. During the Arab Israel wars, the United States supplied Israel with economic and military assistance[295], even undertaking the responsibility of security and survival of Israel in the region. In return, Israel was the most important asset of the US Middle East policy, strengthening its presence in the region.

Soviet Union was the second country (after the Unites States) that recognized the newly founded Israel. They even supplied arms, military assistance and oil to Israel during the First Arab-Israel war.[296] Friendly relations were sustained until 1956, when Israel attacked Egypt during the Suez Crisis, and they ceased supplying Israel with oil.[297] When the relations further deepened with Egypt, the Soviet Union changed its policy towards a pro-Arab attitude, with the aim of expanding its influence more among the Arab countries. The relations further severed especially after the 1967 Arab-Israel War and the diplomatic relations broke off,[298] but re-established later in 1991.

Saudi Arabia

During the Cold War, Saudi Arabia was the most significant Arab ally of the United States. Although a complex military, political and economic relationship was established between the two, there were also strains in the relationship from time to time.[299] In 1931, the United Sates and Saudi Arabia signed a friendship agreement including a favoured nation status. Strong relations were established notably with Aramco. Although the relations were

[295] Critics have pointed out that the Unites States was not supplying arms to Israel directly, but facilitating the sales from the Western countries by providing funds for this equipment: cited in Miglietta, J. P., 2002, American Alliance Policy in the Middle East, 1945-1992:Iran, Israel and Saudi Arabia, Lexington Books, USA, p.121.

[296] Primakov, Y., 2010, Rusların Gözüyle Ortadoğu, Timaş Yayınları, İstanbul, p. 310.

[297] Miglietta, J. P., 2002, American Alliance Policy in the Middle East, 1945-1992:Iran, Israel and Saudi Arabia, Lexington Books, USA, p. 82

[298] Freedman, O. R., 1991, Moscow and the Middle East: Soviet Policy Since the Invasion of Afghanistan, Cambridge University Press, the USA, p. 332.

[299] Miglietta, J., P., 2002, ibid, p. 202.

problematic because of the Israeli problem in the beginning, during the Second World War, Saudi Arabia sought US help for protecting its territories from Italian attacks. The United States sustained the security of Saudi Arabia, even gained a military base in Dhahran. When the Cold War began, Saudi Arabia became extremely important for the containment of the Soviet Union. Although from time to time Saudi Arabia favoured its relations with the Arab countries in a pro-Soviet direction, the good relations with the United States immediately renewed each time, with Saudi Arabia seeking for American help. The most important fraction in the relations was the OPEC crisis, when Saudi Arabia supported the oil embargo. When the embargo was removed, they expanded their economic and military cooperation. What is more, with the great wealth accumulated through oil sales, Saudi Arabia purchased a large amount of American military technology after the crisis. After the Cold war the relations continued to improve further.

Syria

The Soviet Union offered its diplomatic and political support and military help since the independence of Syria from French mandate in 1946. With the non-aggression pact signed in 1950, the relations further improved. The strong Arab nationalism and the Soviet assistance against Israel were the two important factors of the close relations. Especially after 1966 coup, the new government realized social reform along communist lines and became extremely anti-Israeli and anti-Western, thus the Soviet Union intensified its actions in the Middle East. Supplying huge sumps of weaponry, the Soviet Union also gained military basis in Syria, the most important being Tartus naval base. Mutually advantageous relations were preserved and improved further even after the Cold War.

7.2 Soviet and American Positions in the Main Events

In this section, I will provide some background information on the evolution of the events that deeply changed the balances and affected the regional peace and security, and more importantly I will explain the Soviet and American positions in these events. To be more specific and to fulfil the main aim of this study, I will discuss the most important crises and wars that clearly required the attention of the two superpowers to get directly involved and affected their manners with regards to each other and relations with other states in the region. It was mainly during these events that both the Soviet Union and the United States

assigned their positions in line with their basic interests in the region. For these reasons, the changing balances or the continuities in the alliances should be evaluated from a Realist perspective, adopting a policy required by the specific event and the time, baring the real greater picture in mind perfectly reflecting the Cold War rivalry, and following the moves of the superpowers in line with this greater picture.

7.2.1 Independence of Israel and 1948 Arab-Israel War

Zionism, a movement born in Russia, advocated that Jews return to their homeland in Palestine to establish their own nation state. Following the Jewish flow in great numbers from Russia, especially after the Second World War most of the Jews in Europe fled to Palestine escaping from the brutality of the Nazis. However, Britain, although announced the Balfour Declaration in 1917 for the designation of home for the Jewish community, tried to prevent further Jewish immigration in the region. They did not want to provoke the Arabs with this immigration because of their large oil interests. Another reason for this attitude was the British concerns about the involvement of the other countries in this area, largely under the control of Britain. Moreover, Britain did not want to involve more in this Jewish immigration and their desire to establish a nation state there, hence they turned the problem to the United Nations.[300] At that time, the Zionists skilfully interpreted the situation, and knowing that the British support was declining, they focused their policy on the United States. This policy was accepted during the American Zionists Conference in 1942 and aimed at exercising pressure on the United Sates.[301]

The United States and the Soviet Union banded together in the United Nations to force a solution on the Arabs, promoting the partition of the Palestine to create a Jewish State.[302] After the recommendation of the United Nations General Assembly (Resolution 181)[303] to adopt and implement the partition plan of Palestine in 1947, the State of Israel was

[300] Armaoğlu, F., 2009, 20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi, Alkım Yayınevi, İstanbul, p.588.

[301] Ovendale, R., 1996, Britain, the United States and the Transfer of Power in the Middle East, 1945-1962, Leicester University Press, London, p. 3.

[302] Ambrose, S. E., 1985, ibid, p. 265.

[303] The full text of the Resolution 181 is available at http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/0/7F0AF2BD897689B785256C330061D253 (accessed on 17.06.2014)

established in 1948 in Palestine. The United States and the Soviet Union recognized the State of Israel nearly at the same time.[304]

On the same day that the establishment of Israel was announced, the Arab countries declared war on Israel.[305] When Arabs invaded Israel as a combined force of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq, Israel asked for help from the United Nations once again United States and the Soviet Union worked together for a truce. After the truce, Israel got stronger with the military help from the East and the West and this time Israel attack the Arabs ignoring the cease fire resolution of the United States. Israel conquered western Galilee and parts of the Negev Desert. In the end when the Egyptians surrendered, the United States once again stepped forward and arranged armistice agreements. Thus the State of Israel was born with Russian military help and American negotiating skills.[306]

On the Soviet side, the reason for their support for the establishment of Israel and during the 1948 war mainly stems from their motive of expelling the British from the area, their hope for the birth of a new communist country and their policy of supporting the national aspirations against the Western influence in the region.[307] By this stance, every diplomatic support and military assistance (during the 1848 war Israel also procured arms from Czechoslovakia[308]) was initiated for the protection of Israel, until 1950s when the Soviets changed their side. On the US side, Israel was promising a good alliance in assisting the US penetration into the Middle East. Starting from the establishment process of Israel, US political, military and financial help was, and has been, the primary support in the conflict with Arab countries. From then on, the United States operated every means for the armament of Israel, balancing the power in the region against Soviet assistance to the Arab countries, and also for the cease fire processes in each war.

[304] Arı, T., 2008, Geçmişten Günümüze Orta Doğu: Siyaset, Savaş ve Diplomasi, Mkm Yayıncılık, Bursa, p. 228.
[305] For more information on the 1948 Arab-Israel War: Morris, B., 2008, 1948: A History of First Arab Israeli War, Yale university Press.
[306] Ambrose, S. E., 1985, ibid, p. 266.
[307] Nizameddin, T., 1999, Russia and the Middle East: Towards a New Foreign Policy, C. Hurst & Co., United Kingdom, pp. 18-19.
[308] Ambrose, S. E., 1985, ibid, p. 266.

7.2.2 1955 Baghdad Pact

The main reason for the establishment of the Baghdad Pact (in 1955) was to provide an effective counterweight against the expansion of the Soviet influence in the region, to contain the communism, and to increase the US penetration. Britain, with the same agenda, also wanted to maintain the little influence it remained. On the other hand, the aims of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Pakistan to join this pact were to strengthen their regional defence policies and to prevent the infiltration of the Soviet Union. Although the United States designed the pact in the first hand, it did not join as a member, but participated only as an observer.

Contrary to the expectations of the United States and Britain, the participation of the Arab countries was very weak;[309] rather the pact caused strong popular Arab opposition especially backed by Egypt.[310] They interpreted the pact as a conspiracy plot against the Arab Union and penetration of Western imperialism in the region. The inclusion of Iraq especially teased Egypt concerning their traditional rivalry for the supremacy in the Arab world, and the reaction of the Israel was tense as well.[311] Even the strongest Arab ally of the United States, Saudi Arabia, wanted to form a joint military command system together with Egypt and Syria against the pact.[312] As would be expected, the Soviet Union openly denounced the pact and the formalization of this pact increased the Soviet anxiety and resentment, leading it to back and further provoke the opposing Arab countries against the West.

The envisaged success and objectives of the pact further destroyed when Iraq withdrew from the alliance in 1958, entailing the change of the name to Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), and its dissolution in 1979. Thus, let alone the United States not only failed to realize its aims in the region, this pact further flourished the Soviet-Arab relations and expanded Soviet penetration in the region.

[309] Armaoğlu, F., 2009, 20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi, Alkım Yayınevi, İstanbul, p. 597.
[310] Uçarol, R., 2013, Siyasi Tarih:1798-2012, Der Yayınları, İstanbul, p. 971.
[311] Miglietta, J. P., 2002, American Alliance Policy in the Middle East, 1945-1992:Iran, Israel and Saudi Arabia, Lexington Books, USA, p. 119.
[312] Primakov, Y., 2010, Rusların Gözüyle Ortadoğu, Timaş Yayınları, İstanbul, pp. 56-57.

7.2.3 1956 Suez Crisis

When Nasser in Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal to solve the financial problems in the construction of the Aswan Dam,[313] Israel together with Britain and France launched a surprise attack against Egypt in 1956 to regain the control over the canal and to depose Nasser.[314] However, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union wanted to allow this kind of an invasion destabilizing the Middle East, because both sides were trying to form a credible alliance with Egypt at the time to increase their impact over the region. Despite British and French attempts to convince the United States that Nasser and Egypt could be toppled, President Eisenhower thought it unlikely, besides although he denounced the nationalization, he wanted to retain his good relations with oil-rich Arabs countries, especially the Saudi Arabia, who was in support of Arabs against Israel all the time.

During the crisis, the Soviet Union strongly remained on the side of Egypt, viewing the nationalization of the canal as a strong move against the Western presence and influence in the region, and supported a peaceful settlement of the crisis.[315] Although during the 1956 Suez Crisis, the United States worked hard for a ceasefire, Nasser turned its face to the Soviets as a result of their existing reliance on and cooperation created with the Aswan Dam construction and 1955 Czech arms deal.[316] Despite American support, Egypt continued to be a strong ally of the Soviet Union, spreading propaganda for the Arab unity and socialism while taking more aid from the Soviet Union and allowing more Russians in the country. Fearing from the strengthening of the Soviets in the region, President Eisenhower announced the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957 with the aim of assisting any nation requesting help against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism.[317]

[313] At first Egypt sought for Western financial assistance in the construction. When rejected, Egypt both received economic help from the Soviet Union and political support for his decision to nationalize the Canal. Armaoğlu, F., 2009, 20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi, Alkım Yayınevi, İstanbul, p. 604.
[314] Mayer, M. S., 2010, The Eisenhower Years, Infobase Publishing, the USA, p. 44.
[315] Govrin, Y., 2013, Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1953-67: From Confrontation to Disruption, 1st ed., Routledge, NY, pp. 242.
[316] Primakov, Y., 2010, Rusların Gözüyle Ortadoğu, Timaş Yayınları, İstanbul, pp. 58-61.
[317] Ambrose, S. E., 1985, ibid, p. 267.

7.2.4 1957 Turkish-Syrian Crisis

In 1954, with a military coup in Syria, Baath regime was established with communist tendency, which developed close ties with Egypt and the Soviet Union. Following the Suez Crisis, Nasser's influence was spread among the Arab countries, particularly their relations with Syria deepened, together with the support of the Soviet Union. The increasing weight of the communists in the Syrian government entailed concerns among the West and their allies in the region, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Israel and particularly Turkey.[318] As a result of the agreements signed, the Soviet Union provided a great deal of economic and military help to Syria in 1957[319] in addition to their first arms sales in 1955. Furthermore, Syria and the Soviet Union signed an economic and technical agreement worth $ 579 million.[320] The declaration of the Eisenhower Doctrine for economic and military aid for those seeking assistance against communism further strengthen the Syrian and Egyptian joint position against the West, and caused strong oppositions on their behalf. All these developing relations and the increasing Soviet penetration in the Syria raised more worries.[321]

The Baghdad Pact countries felt in great danger of an attack from Syria, and the United States assured these countries with military assistance in case of a military operation against Syria.[322] In this regard, the United States deployed its air forces in Turkey and also ordered the Sixth Fleet to patrol the Eastern Mediterranean Sea. Feeling squeezed by the Soviet threat from the North and South, Turkey also engaged in military manoeuvres on the Syrian border. The Turkish mobilization and exercises on the Syrian border entailed the threats by the Soviet Union to attack Turkey[323] if Turkey should attack Syria. On one hand the Soviet Union applied pressure on the Turkish government, and on the other hand increased its propaganda and military build-up in Syria and the Mediterranean Sea, and concluded new arms deal with Syria. As a result of the direct supports of the United and the Soviet Union, together with the conciliatory attempts of Saudi Arabia, tension eased

[318] After the Second World War, with the present Soviet threat for the Turkish Straits, Turkey aligned itself with the West and thus joined the Baghdad Pact as a member in 1955.
[319] Freedman, O. R., 1991, Moscow and the Middle East: Soviet Policy since the Invasion of Afghanistan, Cambridge University Press, the USA, p. 18.
[320] Cited in Nizameddin, T., 1999, Russia and the Middle East: Towards a New Foreign Policy, C. Hurst & Co., United Kingdom, p. 23.
[321] Armaoğlu, F., 2009, 20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi, Alkım Yayınevi, İstanbul, p. 615.
[322] Baş, A., 2012, "1957 Suriye Krizi ve Türkiye", History Studies, Vol: 4, No.1, pp. 98-99.
[323] Freedman, O. R., 1991, ibid, p. 23.

between Turkey and Syria. However, this crisis shows how further the Soviet Union would go to defend its interests in the region.

7.2.5 1967 Six-Day War

After the 1956 War, the Soviets continued to supply Egypt, Syria and Iraq with advanced weapons, and followed an anti-Israel policy at the same time. With a stronger position and better armed,[324] Arabs found the courage to gain their lost territories back from Israel. Although the Soviets encouraged Arabs in their desire, bewaring from a direct United States – Soviet Union confrontation, they changed their position urging caution on Nasser.[325] The United States, preoccupied with Vietnam, wanted to avoid another war, could not simply abandon Israel but also could not dare to take the Arabs on because of their increasing dependency on Arab oil. In this regard, both the Americans and the Soviets urged both sides not to strike the first blow and engage in a war.[326]

When the war began in 1967 with Israeli Air Force strike, both the United States and the Soviet Union assured each other not to intervene unless the other side did and expressed that they were ready to promote a cease fire, because they were not anxious to abandon détente.[327] However, President Johnson put the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean on full alert and sent two aircraft carriers to Egypt.[328] Although the Soviets kept the Sixth Fleet under surveillance, Nasser falsely charged this attempt thus broke relations with the United States along with Algeria, Iraq, Sudan and Yemen, but he could not engaged Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Kuwait, Tunisia and Saudi Arabia in his actions. The war ended with the drastic supremacy of Israel, four folding the Israeli territories.[329] Although the negotiation in the United Nations resulted in the Resolution 242, with the Soviet, US and British diplomacy, calling for Israel to withdraw from the territories it captured in return for Israel's right to live in peace within the recognized boundaries. Also, a UN mediator was created for the peace process. However, the rejection of Israel led to Egypt's war of

[324] Primakov, Y., 2010, Rusların Gözüyle Ortadoğu, Timaş Yayınları, İstanbul, p. 141.
[325] Ambrose, S. E., 1985, ibid, pp. 268-269.
[326] Armaoğlu, F., 2009, 20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi, Alkım Yayınevi, İstanbul, p. 846.
[327] Primakov, Y., 2010, ibid, pp. 153-155.
[328] Ambrose, S. E., 1985, ibid, p. 269.
[329] Arı, T., 2008, Geçmişten Günümüze Orta Doğu: Siyaset, Savaş ve Diplomasi, Mkm Yayıncılık, Bursa, p. 317.

attrition.[330] At the end of the war, the Arab countries formulated the "Three No's" policy denying any recognition, peace, and negotiations with Israel.

The result was vicious both for the Americans and Soviets. The United States' relations with the Arabs deteriorated more, and the Soviets were blamed for not helping more directly and turning its back to Nasser,[331] besides their arms were destroyed and some of them captured by Israel. The Six-Day War can be considered as an implicit confrontation of the United States and the Soviet Union, because the same military relations establish by the United States with Israel was in place also among the Soviet Union, Syria and Egypt. Despite their efforts in the ceasefire process, neither side stopped supplying financial and military aid to their allies during the war. What is more, as a result of the changing balances in the region, the Soviet Union gained naval bases in Egypt, Syria and Algeria, thus formed a big navy in the Mediterranean.[332]

7.2.6 1973 Yom Kippur War

In 1971, Egypt was willing to sign a peace agreement with Israel in exchange for the return of territories lost in 1967. However, his proposal went to naught Israel and the United States ignored it.[333] Having gained nothing from the Americans, Egypt turned its face again to the Soviets for a new surprise attack[334] against Israel in order to regain the territories from Israel and for the restoration of Arab prestige.[335] The Soviet Union once more accepted this request for help and supplied missiles and tanks before the Yom Kippur War, gaining the Arabs some early military victories.

However, these arms sales and supports directly challenged the US presence in the region, entailing a serious risk of superpower confrontation.[336] Although until then the United States tried for a peace in the region and refraining Israel from any attacks; but fearing from the prevailing of Soviet arms over the American, the United States launched an all-

[330] Freedman, O. R., 1991, ibid, p. 37.
[331] Haykal, M., H., 1978, The Sphinx and the Commissar: the rise and fall of Soviet influence in the Middle East, Harper and Row, NY, pp. 169-170.
[332] Uçarol, R., 2013, Siyasi Tarih:1798-2012, Der Yayınları, İstanbul, p. 969.
[333] Beinin, J.; Hajjar, L., 2014, "Palestine, Israel and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Primer", MERIP, p. 8.
[334] After the 1967 fiasco, nobody believed that the Arabs might enter in a new war with Israel. For more information: Primakov, Y., 2010, Rusların Gözüyle Ortadoğu, Timaş Yayınları, İstanbul, p. 187.
[335] Armaoğlu, F., 2009, ibid, p. 857.
[336] Freedman, O. R., 1991, ibid, p. 136.

out airlift for Israel, surpassing the Soviet helps. This situation shifted the tide of the battle, leading both the United States and the Soviet Union to call for ceasefire,[337] because Soviets feared that the Arabs would not stand against Israel with the US help anymore, and the United States feared that an embargo would be placed on oil, which became a reality when oil producing Arab states, led by Saudi Arabia, imposed an effective embargo on oil shipments to the United States and other friends of Israel in Europe.[338]

Comprehending the situation, the United States tried to find a solution for talks in a way not to humiliate the Arabs, because if they were humiliated again there would be no talks, and without talks, there would be no oil.[339] This planned, step by step diplomacy bore its fruits and in 1974 Arab states lifted the oil embargo. This diplomacy included limited bilateral agreements on the partial withdrawals and avoided to open up more difficult issues.[340] These initial diplomatic processes later paved the way towards the Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt,[341] provoking the rejections of such a peace agreement among the Arab countries, and also causing the Soviet influence to decrease in the region.

[337] Primakov, Y., 2010, ibid, pp. 199-202.
[338] Arı, T., 2008, Geçmişten Günümüze Orta Doğu: Siyaset, Savaş ve Diplomasi, Mkm Yayıncılık, Bursa, p. 365.
[339] Ambrose, S. E., 1985, ibid, p. 278.
[340] Beinin, J.; Hajjar, L., February 2014, ibid, p. 8.
[341] Armaoğlu, F., 2009, ibid, p. 879.

CHAPTER III

10. EVALUATION OF TODAY'S MIDDLE EAST POLITICS IN THE LIGHT OF COLD WAR RIVALRY

10.1 Russian Federation and the Middle East Policy

Russia has participated in the great power politics from early times and during the Cold War. However, the Soviet influence declined towards the end of 1980s, failing to keep pace with the United States in the Cold War rivalry. Between the 1989 and 1991, the Soviet Union lost its super power position to a secondary power, as a losing great power.[342] After the decline of the Soviet Union in December, 1991, the Russian Federation under Yeltsin still remained a substantial power in international politics, although not as it used to be, as the successor of the Soviet Union with the holding right for nuclear weapons and its veto right in the United Nations. However, geopolitically, the Russian Federation had smaller population and territory, unlike the Soviet Union, and thus lost its influence in Europe and also had limited access to Baltic Sea and Black Sea.

The new regime found itself in a chaotic political and economic situation of weak administration, corruption, powerful oligarchies and uneven distribution of power and income. Russia had little to sell abroad except oil, gas, and arms, and Yeltsin had to rely heavily on the fluctuating income from these sales. The economic bottleneck together with the negative effects of the Asian economic crisis led to a decrease in the Russian influence in the international status quo and loss of prestige.[343] In this regard, economic cooperation became an explicit pattern in Russian foreign policy. For this reason, under Yeltsin, the Russian Federation started to engage into cooperation with the West and the United States, in an effort to realize its economic and political development.[344] The attitude towards the former members of the Warsaw Pact also changed from the support for the revolutionary movements to the support for appeasing the present conflicts. In many respects, the foreign

[342] Toft, P., 2004, "The Stability of Russia's Grand Strategy", Institut for Statskundskab, Arbejdspapir, 2004/02, p. 6.
[343] Caşın, M., H., 2006, Novgorod Knezliği'nden XXI. Yüzyıla Rus imparatorluk Stratejisi, Okumuş Adam Yayınları, İstanbul, pp. 314-315.
[344] Kibaroglu, M., 2001, "Rusya'nın Yeni Ulusal Güvenlik Konsepti ve Askeri Doktrini", Avrasya Dosyası Rusya Özel, Vol: 6, No: 4, p. 95.

policy of Yeltsin was a continuation of Gorbachev's new thinking.[345] Denying the military and political legacy of Stalinist and Brezhnevist system, attempts were realized to approach the West. Other than geopolitical and ideological opposition, becoming a new member of the West, sharing its values and solving the international problems were the new themes.[346]

This was exactly the situation of geopolitically and economically weak Russia that Vladimir Putin faced in 2000, when he was elected as the second president. The economy was shattering, political system was in chaos and the social and moral structure was under attack. To explain the situation in Putin's own words: "Russia is in the midst of one of the most difficult periods in its history. For the first time in the past 200-300 years, it is facing a real threat of sliding to the second, and possibly even third, echelon of world states."[347] We can summarize the problems that Putin took over as:[348]

- Economic problems,
- Disagreements between the centre and the regions,
- Power position in international arena,
- Population and immigrant problems,
- Struggle with oligarchs,
- Struggle in the Caucasus.

In order to overcome these problems, Putin waged war on oligarchs, tycoons[349] and weakened them, increased his control over the press and media[350], banks and the oil industry, re-established the dominance over the regions and put the country into an economic recovery based on the energy resources, oil and gas exports and arms sales.

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[345] Aron, L., 1998, "The Foreign Polcy Doctrine of Postcommunist Russia and its domestic Context", in The New Russian Foreign Policy, by Michael Mandelbaum (Ed.), A Council on Foreign Relations Book, USA, p. 23.

[346] Bajanov, Y., 2000, "Rusya'nın Değişen Dış Politikası", in Yılmaz Tezkan (Ed.), Menfaatler Çatısması Ortasında Türkiye, Ülke Kitapları, p. 54.

[347] Cited in Herspring, D. R., 2007, Putin's Russia: Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, USA, p. 1.

[348] Özbay, F., 2006, "Tarihsel Süreç _çerisinde Ruslar ve Rusya", in İhsan Çomak (Ed.), Rusya Stratejik Arastırmaları-1, TASAM Yayınları, İstanbul, p. 25.

[349] Rutland, P., 2010, The Oligarchs and Economic Development", in After Putin's Russia, Stephen K. Wegren and Dale R. Herspring (Eds), Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, USA, p. 159.

[350] Lipman, M.; McFaul, M., 2010, "The Media and Politcal Developments", in After Putin's Russia, Stephen K. Wegren and Dale R. Herspring (Eds), Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, USA, p. 109.

In terms of foreign policy, Putin promoted the multi-polarity in world politics with the aim of re-strengthening the Russian position against the United States. Other than a cooperation of equals in its relations with the West, Putin restructured Russia to make it a substantial regional power. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia had to abandon its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, Middle East and other parts of the world. However, together with Putin from 2000 onwards, Russia went through a period of both regulated domestic politics and new policies designed for becoming a new regional and global power. First of all, following a straight line policy, Russia made its way to the league of giants via its developing relations with CIS, EU, the USA and China. In addition to these relations, Russia also developed new policies towards the Middle East.[351] Russia started to pursue more active policies in international arena and especially in the Middle East under Putin.

From 1990s onwards, United States became the sole global actor at the core of world affairs for a short time, with its economic, military, cultural and technologic hegemony, backed by the organizations such as IMF, World Bank, WTO and NATO.[352] After the 9/11, under the concepts of "war on international terrorism", "democracy and freedom" and "pre-emptive strike", the United States has been acting as a hegemonic power ignoring the other states and institutions such as Russia, China, UN and EU.[353] In terms of the Middle East, the United States used its invasive power in Iraq and Afghanistan as a tactic of reinforcing its regional and global influence.[354] Together with the "Greater Middle East Project"[355] and the enlargement of NATO, the United States aims at the encirclement of Russia.

Unlike the open rivalry of Cold War against the West, particularly the United States, Russia under Putin followed different footsteps. Putin closed down the Russian bases in Cuba and Vietnam in 2001. With the new shuttle diplomacy, he featured the economic

[351] Caşın, M., H., 2006, Novgorod Knezliği'nden XXI. Yüzyıla Rus imparatorluk Stratejisi, Okumuş Adam Yayınları, İstanbul, p. 552.
[352] İşyar, G., 2009, Karşılaştırmalı Dış Politikalar: Yöntemler-Modeller-Örnekler ve Karşılaştırmalı Türk Dış Politikası, Dora Yayınları, Bursa, pp. 456-457.
[353] Aklar, Y., 2005, "Yeni Bush Yönetiminin Atlantik Ötesi İliskileri",Stratejik Analiz, Vol: 6, No: 61, ss. 57-58.
[354] Akgün, B., 2006, "Küresel Terör: Mit mi Gerçek mi?", in Orhan Gökçe and Uğur Demiray (Eds.) Terörün Görüntüleri, Görüntülerin Terörü, Çizgi Kitabevi, Konya, p. 407.
[355] Creating a single market with many sub-divisions for American penetration at the heart of Eurasia.

arguments balancing the United States, EU and the Asia-Pacific, in an attempt both to introduce the changing Russian image in the international arena and to develop the Russian economy.[356] After the 9/11, Putin gave his full support to the United States in a number of areas,[357] choosing an alliance axis with the West at first, but later as a result of its strengthening position in the region and world politics, Russia inclined towards interest based policies and alliances. Gradually, Putin signalled that he seeks for greater stakes in the international system rather than accepting the West's junior partnership. Especially after the second term of Putin, Russian policy became much more assertive.[358]

Today, Russia seems to balance the power against the United States in terms of economy, politics, military, technology and social status. The US response to this has been the engagement of its bilateral relations and NATO into military encirclement of Russia. On one hand, the United States regarded Russia as a partner as long as they remain silent to American interests, on the other hand, the relations tensed when Russia initiated its own agenda.[359]

Russia does not want the United States and the West to control the Middle East alone. The waterways between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf are of great importance for both Russia and the United States. Keeping its own interests in mind and shaping the relations and alliances in this regard, Russia knows that a direct involvement into a conflict or clash with the United States in the region would be disastrous. Rather, Russia acts in terms of classical power balance theory and forms alliances with China and Iran as an attempt to counterweight the US presence and influence in the region.

10.1.1 Interest Based Change and Continuity in the Russian Policy

Russia's focus on enhancing its prestige internationally together with economic development led it to become more involved in the Middle East. When became president, Putin openly announced his interests in the Middle East aiming at increasing his presence and influence as an independent actor in the region. In order to regain the previous spheres

[356] Caşın, M., H., 2006, ibid, 415.
[357] Tsygankov, A. P., 2010, "Russia's Foreign Policy", in After Putin's Russia, Stephen K. Wegren and Dale R. Herspring (Eds), Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, USA, p. 230.
[358] Tsygankov, A. P., 2010, ibid, p. 223.
[359] Mikoyan, S. A., 2000, "Rusya, Amerika Birlesik Devletleri ve Avrasya'da Bölgesel İhtilaf", Yılmaz Tezkan (Ed.), Menfaatler Çatısması Ortasında Türkiye, İstanbul; Ülke Kitapları, p. 38.

of influence, Putin initiated changes both in domestic politics and foreign policy.[360] The Russian stance as the balancing power against the United States and the increase in the economic prospects in the region offers Russia the chance of strong penetration. As a continuation of its Soviet legacy, Russia still has both economic and political interests in the region.

Russia uses its Middle East policy as retaliation to the CIS policy of the United States and the European Union.[361] In order to elevate its own penetration, limit the US presence, achieve economic gains via arms and technology sales, dominate the world energy market and elevate the Russian influence as a global power, Russia today provides arms to the region, engages in bilateral relations with HAMAS and backs Iran and its nuclear program.

Although there is a remarkable continuity in the Russian policy towards the Middle East in general terms, such as political, economic, security and cultural interests, today the motives behind these interests are different in some ways than the Soviet era. The change and continuity in the policies can be summarized as follows:[362]

- As a result of its inheritance from the Soviet legacy, Russia has only raw materials and arms to export in its transition to open market economy.
- In line with its foreign policy interests, Russia promotes arms, nuclear and energy sales even at the risk of confronting with the West.
- These arms sales and transfers are now profit-based, rather than subsidization for ideological interests as was the situation during the Soviet Era.
- At the same time, Russian assistance to the countries in the region is regarded as essential for eliminating the threats against Russian interests.
- Different from the Soviet Union, Russia follows a multi-dimensional strategy by maintaining strong economic and diplomatic relations with both pro- and anti-Western countries, especially Israel, with the aim of becoming a balancing factor.

[360] Freedman, R. O., 2004, "Putin Döneminde Rusya'nın Ortadogu Politikası", Bülent Aras (Ed.), Irak Savası Sonrası Ortadogu, TASAM Yayınları, İstanbul, pp. 61-85.
[361] Kamalov, İ., 2008, Moskova'nın Rövanşı Putin Dönemi Rus Dış Politikası, Yeditepe Yayınevi, İstanbul, p. 222.
[362] Rivlin, P., 2005, "The Russian Economy and Arms Exports to the Middle East", The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies (JCSS), Memorandum No. 79, p. 7.

The Middle East is an important economic market and trading partner for Russia because of the ability of the regional oil-rich countries to pay, although some countries such as Syria and Iraq have had large debts since the Soviet era. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, economic motives have become as important as the political ones. In order to get rid of the downswing effects of economy, raising the revenue gained priority over the subsidies of the Soviet legacy. The desire for economic development has focused on the potential of raw material exports and arms sales.

Military equipment sales are considered as a vital way of both maintaining the share in arms industry and prospering the national economy. Furthermore, as was in the Soviet era, these exports also serves for establishing alliances in the region, thus Russia is determined to retain this market. However, arms sales in large volumes, sales to anti-Western countries and organizations, and sales of nuclear materials particularly to Iran have been controversial on the global scene. Between the years 1994 and 1998, Russian arms exports to the Middle East was around $2 billion, which is way behind the US sales. However, the sales especially increased towards the 2000s.[363]

No.	Country	Billion Dollars
1	China	28.15
2	India	18.81
3	Algeria	4.71
4	Iran	3.38
5	Venezuela	2.05
6	Malaysia	1.97
7	Vietnam	1.88
8	UAE	1.14
9	Yemen	1.12
10	Hungary	1.11
11	Greece	1.6
12	Kazakhstan	0.85

Table 10.1 Countries importing Russian weaponry between 1992 and 2009[364]

[363] Rivlin, P., 2005, ibid, p. 10.

[364] Cited in Kamalov, İ., 2013, "Ortadoğu Silah Pazarında Rusya'nın Payı", Ortadoğu Analiz, Vol:5, No: 55, p. 60.

Russia has strengthened its role in the industry in relative and absolute terms over the last decade, and became the world's second largest arms exporter. China and India have been accounted for the largest markets in this regard, and the Middle East was the third largest market.[365] The largest purchasers were Iran, Algeria and UAE followed by the significant markets such as Syria, Egypt, Kuwait, Yemen and Sudan.

Sukhoi Su-30 (Two-Seat, Dual-Role Fighter)	Yakovlev Yak-130 (Advanced Jet Trainer/Light Attack Aircraft)	Miley Helicopter	Air Defence Complex
Algeria	Algeria	Brazil	Algeria
Vietnam	Libya	Venezuela	Vietnam
India		India	Greek Cypriot Administration Of Southern Cyprus
Indonesia		Czech Republic	China
China			Syria
			UAE
			Iran

Table 10.2 Certain Russian Military Technologies and Importing Countries[366]

In terms of energy, the international oil prices and the current complexities in and possible threats to Middle Eastern oil reserves have increased the potential demand for oil supplies other than the Middle East. While this situation highlights Russia as an alternative supplier, it also drives Russia to rivalry and cooperation with the Middle Eastern countries in this regard. On one hand, Russia is interested in the Middle East oil markets in order to become an oil giant in the world, on the other hand Russian companies seek to drill and gain operational rights in oil rich countries. That is, the instability in the Middle East brings its positive and negative effects for Russia. While Russia increased its revenue as a result of the increase in the oil prices, for example during the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, this invasion damaged the Russian companies operating in Iraq.

[365] Rivlin, P., 2005, ibid, p. 9.
[366] Kamalov, İ., 2013, "Ortadoğu Silah Pazarında Rusya'nın Payı", Ortadoğu Analiz, Vol:5, No: 55, p. 61.

Although the energy production in Russia declined during the initial years, the capacity increased especially after 1998. Today, Russia, preserving its large gas and oil reserves, the oil and gas industry remains a key sector of the Russian economy[367] and Russia has become the world's largest exporter of natural gas and the second largest exporter of oil. This renewed position in the energy sector has also brought its benefits in political terms. Russia uses the natural gas pipelines as a political trump against Europe. For this reason, ensuring the Western demand for oil and natural gas together with preserving the good relations with the Middle Eastern producers is vital for Russian foreign policy interests.

In the light of above mentioned issues, it is possible to summarize the Russian interests in the Middle East as follows:

- Russia has political interests in the Middle East. Becoming an influential and active player in the region would serve for the reestablishment of the former potency in international arena, because the Middle East has always been the region of Cold War rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States.
- Russia has security interests in the region. Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism are important threats for Russian security. Balancing the movements and sustaining the status quo and stability in the region would serve for Russian interests. In this regard, Russia develops strategies for military cooperation and applies its own methods for securing the region together with the cooperation with the West from time to time. Preserving the potency in the "Near Abroad" and taking part among the decision makers during the peace process are two main objectives in this regard.
- Russia has economic interests in the region. The oil reserves in the region are of substantial importance. Russia has always been interested in raw material exports, arms sales and also nuclear energy. In this regard, Russia particularly aims at preserving its share in arms sales and military assistance by re-developing the alliance relations with the countries that have long served as an ally of the Soviet Union and also by initiating new ways of cooperation with the other former pro-Western countries in the region. Energy, trade and security are three main pillars of Russian Middle East policy.

[367] Simonov, K., 2012, "The Russian Enegy Sector in 2012", in Russia 2013 Insights of the Observatoire Fanco-Russe, by Pavel Chinsky (Ed.), Le Cherche Midi, Paris, p. 92

- Russia has cultural interests in the region. Russia has a substantially large Muslim population and cultural diversity which leads it to seek for possible ways of establishing close connections, deepening the relations with the countries in the region.

10.1.2 Relations in the Region

In order to be able to analyse the Russian Middle East policy we need to consider its relations in the region, together with its involvement in and reactions to the main events such as 9/11 and the American involvement in Second Gulf War. In this regard, three countries are of great importance for the Russian penetration in the region: Iran, Syria and Iraq. The possibility of Iranian influence over the region, leaving the Russia outside, possesses a great danger and obstacle for Russian penetration. Iran and Syria are main economic and trade partners of Russia in the Middle East. Iraq constitutes another gateway to the region and also an economic liability based on its debt to Russia and the share of the Russian oil companies in the country. The line that is created with these three countries is an important line connecting the Mediterranean Sea and the Caspian Sea, and indirectly controlling the access to the Atlantic and Indian oceans.

Furthermore, Saudi Arabia and Israel have crucial places in the Russian interests. Saudi Arabia and Russia, for instance, works together as oil exporters to manipulate the prices in their advantage. The relations with Israel are developed on the basis of arms exports and technology cooperation. However, although working together on the development of new war technologies and their marketing, they do have their reservations about each other. For example, the Russian arms and nuclear sales to Iran are highly controversial for Israel.[368]

As we already mentioned in the previous chapters, the Soviet involvement in the Middle East against the American domination was conducted through the Arab-Israel conflict, with the Soviets supporting the Arabs. Although this policy gradually left its place to a policy of balancing between the sides and promoting the peace process, Russia today continues its relations with HAMAS in Palestine, which is on the terrorist list of both the United States and Israel.[369] This stance in the conflict shows us the Russian tendency of

[368] Freedman, R. O., 2004, "Putin Döneminde Rusya'nın Ortadogu Politikası", in Bülent Aras (Ed.), Irak Savası Sonrası Ortadogu, TASAM Yayınları, İstanbul, pp. 61-62.
[369] Primakov, Y., 2010, Rusların Gözüyle Ortadoğu, Timaş Yayınları, İstanbul, pp. 424-425.

sustaining the opposing policies against the US presence.[370] For these reasons, close and integrated complex relations with these countries both essential for developing the economy by establishing military and trade partnerships, accessing the region using the geostrategic importance of these countries, taking the part among the decision makers and forming a balance against the Western powers, particularly the United States.

Syria

As one of the most important allies during the Soviet era, Russia lost its influence over Syria during 1990s. Together with Putin, Syria once more became the most important ally in the Middle East, in terms of both Russian foreign policy and Middle East policy. Economic cooperation between the states is highly dependent on arms sales. Syria also offers the chance to establish bases in the Mediterranean, becoming a highly important Russian military base in the Middle East. In this regard, Russia directly involves as the protector and ally of Syria in any move against Syria, continuing its arms sales despite the embargos especially during the Syrian Crisis since 2011. Today, the strategic position of Syria both strengthens the Russian sphere of influence in the Mediterranean and acts as a critical support for the preservation of Russian interests in the Middle East.[371]

Iraq

The relations with another ally of the Soviet era, Iraq, entered into a period of recession because of the domestic challenges inside Russia under Yeltsin and the economic sanctions of the UN as a result of the First Gulf War. The UN sanctions against Iraq negatively affected the Russian economic policy of Iraq, which was before one of the most important trade partners in the region.

Under Putin, during the Saddam regime, Russia tried to establish good relations with Iraq in order to be able to get privileges in oil industry. However, the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 caused a further recession in the relations and a geopolitical loss for Russia. Although Russia acted in line with the West for the intervention in Iraq during the First Gulf War in

[370] Tsygankov, A. P., 2010, ibid, USA, p. 234.
[371] Kerim H., 2012, "Türkiye Rusya İlişkileri Ekseninde Suriye Krizi", Uluslararası Stratejik Araştırmalar Kurumu, Usak Analysis No: 20, Ankara, pp. 4-5.

1991, this time Russia was among those countries opposing the intervention.[372] Taking into account the cooperation against terrorism between the United States and Russia, it was a fact that Russia did not do much to prevent this invasion. Iraqi people presumed that Russia would be a protector against the US invasion, but Russia could not prevent the invasion, even in a sense Russia supported the occupying forces.[373]

After the collapse of Saddam regime, Russia aimed at preserving the old economic ties within the framework of signed agreements. This aim especially became prominent after the annulment of the West Qurna-2 oil field agreement in 2002. Although Putin wrote off about the $40 billion debt of Iraq accumulated between 1997 and 2006,[374] and expressed his readiness for conciliation, with a view to ameliorate the relations, previous President Jalal Talabani accused Russia of following unfriendly policies.[375] Finally in 2009, Russian oil companies Gazprom and Lukoil won the tender in Iraq, regaining their access in the Iraqi energy sector.

Iran

Russia views Iran as a strategic partner, in the region. In a way of ensuring the Russian interests in the Middle East, Russia actively engage in the preservation of ties and cooperation with Iran. Iran, facing with embargo, is an important arms sale market for Russia. Russia is the biggest supplier of military equipment of any kind. Especially nuclear material export to Iran causes controversies with the Western countries, particularly the United States. However, Russia uses Iran as a strategic stance against the American penetration.

Iran and Russia act in cooperation with each other on the issues of Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Azerbaijan.[376] Russia openly stands up against any war near Iranian border, tries to resist the spread of American influence over Caspian Sea region and Central Asia together

[372] Arı, T., 2008, Geçmişten Günümüze Orta Doğu: Siyaset, Savaş ve Diplomasi, Mkm Yayıncılık, Bursa, p. 592.
[373] Kamalov, İ., 2008, Moskova'nın Rövanşı Putin Dönemi Rus Dış Politikası, Yeditepe Yayınevi, İstanbul, p. 228.
[374] Kamalov, İ., 2013, "Ortadoğu Silah Pazarında Rusya'nın Payı", Ortadoğu Analiz, Vol:5, No: 55, p. 65.
[375] Kamalov, İ., 2012, "Rusya'nın Ortadoğu politikası", ORSAM Report No: 125, p. 10.
[376] Freedman, R. O., 2004, "Putin Döneminde Rusya'nın Ortadogu Politikası", in Bülent Aras (Ed.), Irak Savası Sonrası Ortadogu, TASAM Yayınları, İstanbul, p. 67.

with the support of Iran, and uses Iran as an arms market.[377] In return, Russia supports Iran's nuclear program and assist Iran with its nuclear reactor complex in Bushehr region. However Russian position in this regard seems a little paradoxical, and Russia may alter its position if the Russian interests require so. In this regard, Russia both supports the ultimatum on the nuclear program of Iran, while preserving its share in its nuclear complexes. Despite this cooperation, there are certain problematic areas between the two. The partition of the Caspian Sea and the routing of the Caspian natural gas and oil have been the disputed issues. Furthermore, Russia sees Iraq as an important factor to its national security. Thus, on one hand Russia deepens its relations with Iran as an ally, on the other hand always keeps the Iran thread in mind.

Israel

Russian policies toward Israel are no longer influenced entirely by ideological considerations. During the final years of the Soviet Union under Gorbachev, the effective influence of the Jewish diaspora on the United States was realized and turned its position to more friendly relations with Israel. The relations further warmed with the establishment of Russian Federation. Russia followed a policy of balancing both Israel and Palestine in the region, supporting the initiatives for a peaceful resolution of the conflict. In this regard, Russia is included in the Quartet on the Middle East together with the United States, European Union and the United Nations in an attempt to promote the road maps to peace.[378] On one hand, Russia engages in cooperation with Israel in various fields, but on the other hand still preserves its ties with HAMAS and never steps back from giving its support for Palestine.

In 1995, Russia and Israel signed a Memorandum on Mutual Understanding in Military Cooperation. With this memorandum, they aimed at developing their defence industries reciprocally. Military cooperation between Russia and Israel depends on technology transfers rather than arms transfers. This cooperation has also included the space technology. Israel serves as an important country for the Russian oil export and possible transfer routes. Via Israel, Russia would transfer its oil to South and Southeast Asia with

[377] Kamalov, İ., 2008, ibid, p. 225.
[378] Haas, M., 2005, "Putin's External and Internal Security Policy", Conflict Studies Research Center, Vol: 5, Issue: 5, p. 1.

lower costs. The cultural realities also give their fruit on the political agenda. Today there is a highly influential Russian Diaspora in Israel (equal to the 20% of the total Israeli population) which plays an important political role in the relations. Furthermore, both countries cooperate also against terrorism in the region.[379] Putin aims at active involvement in the Middle East peace process, deepening its ties with Israel and re-establish the previous Soviet influence among the Arab States.

10.2 Recent Developments in the Region and the Russian Stance

10.2.1 Arab Spring

The Arab Spring, involving the popular uprisings for democracy throughout the North Africa and the Middle East, came to the international political agenda with the event in which Mohammed Bouazizi burned himself in Tunisia in 2010.[380] The anti-regime movement within the country starting with this event led to the resignation of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, signifying the very start of wider regime changes in the Middle East. The uprising spread to the neighbouring countries under domino effect. Next round found itself in Egypt, pouring the people into streets with the anti-Mubarak protests, requesting his resignation.[381] The successful regime change did not lead the country into a new peaceful order, but a second revolution took place reflecting further interest clashes in the country. Libya was another country that was affected by this movement, but its case turned out to be bloodier than other regime changes. President Muammar Gaddafi was toppled down by a NATO intervention, causing many controversies in the international political arena. The regime of Ali Abdullah Saleh in Yemen was the next to be called off by the opposition in the country. Bahrain was the final stop of these uprisings before they turn Syria into a long and bloody civil war.

These uprisings came as a shock in the international arena, like many countries Russia also was caught unprepared. At first, these uprisings were thought to be harmless for the presence of Russia in the region, even a short period of instability was thought to be advantageous. Because as a result of this instability, oil prices would increase and would lead the countries to question the "reliability" of the regional oil-producers, thus focusing

[379] Caşın, M., H., 2006, ibid, 552.
[380] Yavuz, C.; Erdurmaz, S., 2012, Arap Baharı ve Türkiye: Ortadoğu'da Kırılan Fay Hatları, Berikan Yayınevi, Ankara, pp. 16-17.
[381] Yavuz, C.; ibid, p. 43.

the attention of international demand on Russia as an alternative.[382] However, the expansion and elongation of the Arab Spring started to damage the Russian interests in the region, with the threat of spreading over Iran, Caucasia and even Central Asia, after Syria.

In most of the uprisings, Russia adopted a pragmatic position, except for the case in Syria, and evaluated the movements as internal matters of the countries. While abstaining from a direct involvement in these events, Russia applied a "wait and see" policy and promoted peaceful resolution of these turbulences through dialog, preventing any foreign intervention as much as possible. Thus, the aim was to prevent the United States and other Western countries to enter and settle in the region,[383] what is more, with the conciliatory label Russia would increase its own influence. However, the Russian stance in Libya and Syria, in which Russia has certain political, economic and military interests and geopolitical dependence, differed from the other cases.

During the initial days of the uprising in Libya, Russia followed its "wait and see" policy. However, when a bloody clash initiated between the opposition and Gaddafi's military, Russia condemned these brutality together with the Western powers. Gaddafi's everlasting cruelty finally led to the emplacement of no-fly-zone and arms embargo by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973,[384] which Russia abstained from voting. Although later Russia, together with China, expressed its resentment for this abstaining vote and denounced any intervention in Libya,[385] further developments led to a NATO intervention, violating the no-fly-zone and arms embargo decision of the UN. The regime change in Libya damaged the Russian economic interests in this country, bringing an end to the privileged shares of Russian companies.

The response of the West was two dimensional. On one hand, they were reluctant to directly support these democratic uprisings against pro-Western authoritarian regimes such as Egypt and Bahrain; on the other hand they supported the uprisings, even militarily in

[382] Kamalov, İ., 2012, ibid, p. 14.

[383] Saivetz, C. R., 2012, "Playing to Lose? Russia and the Arab Spring", Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 59, No. 1 p. 3.

[384] Yavuz, C.; Erdurmaz, S., 2012, Arap Baharı ve Türkiye: Ortadoğu'da Kırılan Fay Hatları, Berikan Yayınevi, Ankara, pp. 107-111. Full text of the resolution is available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10200.doc.htm

[385] Lukyanov, F., 2012, "Russia in the Middle East: A Battle for Principles" in Russia 2013 Insights of the Observatoire Fanco-Russe, by Pavel Chinsky (Ed.), Le Cherche Midi, Paris, p. 298.

other countries, such as Libya. This shows us that the acting base of the Western countries was not a single choice between democracy and authoritarianism, but a complex web of economic and political interests, reflecting the Cold War amities and enmities.[386] For instance, the United States supported the regime in Bahrain, as a long-term US ally, while condemning the brutality of the Syrian regime, as a strong Russian ally. However, the aspiration of the invention in Libya had a different pattern than this. Although Libya retained good relations with the West, the large oil reserves may prompted the Western governments with the pressure of their oil companies to further benefit from the Libyan oil, which later turned out in this direction proving the assumption, Western companies concluding large oil contracts in the country.

As a routine of the Middle East, great powers first created problems with their own efforts, and then involved in the region by using these problems as pretexts.[387] The uprisings under the label of "Arab Spring" have revealed the conflicts of interests between the United States and the Soviet Union on one hand, among the major regional powers, on the other.[388] As a result, the policies of the great powers towards Arab Spring were defined in line with regional interests, global power balances and internal political dynamics. Today it is uncertain how the Arab Spring would transform itself to new dimensions.

10.2.2 Syrian Crisis

The popular uprising starting in Tunisia left its marks also in Syria. People in Syria demanded to get rid of the Baath regime that has long been in power. Facing a strong response from President Bashar al-Assad, this clash with the opposition turned the country into an everlasting civil war, with both religious (Sunni-Shi'ite) and geopolitical (Gulf countries against Iran) rationale. The upheavals in Syria and the reactions from all over the world were met with great concerns on Russian behalf. Russia and China gave their full support to Assad.

[386] Tudoroiu, T., 2013, "The Arab Spring: last episode of the Cold War", Contemporary Politics, Vol: 19, No:3, p. 304.
[387] Duran, H.; Özdemir, Ç., 2013-2014, "Ortadoğu'nun Sancılarına Arap Baharı Çözüm Olabildi mi?", Akademik Araştırmalar Dergisi, No: 59, p. 50.
[388] Ayoob, M., 2012, "The Arab Spring: Its Geostrategic Significance", Middle East Policy, Vol. 19, No. 3, p. 85.

The reason why Putin supports the Assad regime is multidimensional other than sole economic concerns. Firstly, a possible regime change would cause Russia to lose its primary ally in the region and its military base in Tartus.[389] The strategic importance of Syria promotes Russian influence within the region and in the Mediterranean. Secondly, in any regime change, there is high possibility of establishing a pro-Western government that remains distant to Russia, as was the case in other countries such as Libya. [390] Thirdly, Syria is an important market for Russian arms, and a substantial trade partner, thus losing this ally in the region would show its effects on the Russian economy. In line with all these considerations, Russia evaluates this event as Syria's internal matter and strongly rejects and uses its veto right against any resolution regarding any intervention.

On the grounds of the dimension that the events in Libya took, Russia thinks that another compromise on Syria would shake its position as a global and regional actor. In this regard, from the very beginning, Russia did not abandon its settled policy. In the United Nations Security Council, Russia, together with China, rejected any regulation against Syria. Even, Russia supported the Assad regime with arms sales and by sending a warship in the Mediterranean. What is more, the good relations with Iran and Iraq also provide for reinforcement of the Assad regime.

The reason why the United States, European powers and certain regional countries condemns the Assad regime should be evaluated from a greater picture. On the United States' and Israel's behalf, the pressure on Israel from Syria and Iran may decrease as a result of regime change, and Syrian effect on Lebanon would also end; in the final step, Iran would become isolated and lose its influence in the region.[391] With this aim in mind, the United States still abstain from a direct military intervention, unlike the Libyan case, and searches for a conciliatory agreement with Russia, while on one hand providing the opposing movement with arms. However, this support for the opposition instead of a military intervention has not met the expected results.[392] The reason behind the US reluctance of any military intervention based on the importance of relations between the

[389] Lukyanov, F., 2012, ibid, p. 297.
[390] Has, K., 2012, Türkiye-Rusya İlişkileri Ekseninde Suriye Krizi, Uluslararası Stratejik Araştırmalar Kurumu, Analysis No: 20, p. 7.
[391] Doster, B., 2013, "Suriye'deki İstikrarsızlık ve Ülkelerin Değişen Siyasetleri", Ortadoğu Analiz, Vol: 5, No: 55, p. 35.
[392] Doster, B., 2013, ibid, p. 34.

West and Russia surpass the Syrian case, both Russia and the United States think that a direct intervention would cause a great crisis between the superpowers.

In order to understand the complex Russian and American stance in the Syrian Crisis these two questions would be helpful: "Why is Russia supporting a criminal dictatorial regime that destroys its own people who are striving for democracy?" and "Why does the West support terrorists and Islamists who rush to take power in one Arab country after another, building on the material and ideological support from the most reactionary governments of the region?"[393] These lines perfectly reflect the interest based policies in the region. It is hard to predict what will happen in the Syrian crisis next. However, the Assad regime is now a way powerful position, militarily and diplomatically. It is a fact that, today the event taking place in Syria not only stems from the internal dynamics of the country, Syria turned out to be a proxy base that the great powers slugs it out, placing it on a global agenda rather than a regional one.

10.3 Current Power Balances in the Region

The United States especially increased its penetration in the Middle East after 9/11, under the concepts of "war on international terrorism" and "pre-emptive strike". However, as a result of its engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States started to lose its influence in terms of politics, economics and military. The stagnation period intensified with the 2008 global economic crisis and weakened the hands of the United States. Gradually the United States strengthen its focus on Asia-Pacific more than the Middle East. The American government no longer seems enthusiastic about intervening militarily in the regional conflicts, even announced the withdrawal of American soldiers from Iraq and Afghanistan.

All these developments set the stage for further Russian influence in the Middle East. Especially during the recent years, Putin has been underlying the end of US focused unilateral world order in the form of Transatlantic alliance under the US hegemony. The focal point in this regard is a multipolar world order in which Russia would engage in world politics more directly. Russia increases its share through the developing relations

[393] These questions were asked in a conversation between a French journalist and Fyodor Lukyanov, described his article in Lukyanov, F., 2012, "Russia in the Middle East: A Battle for Principles" in Russia 2013 Insights of the Observatoire Fanco-Russe, by Pavel Chinsky (Ed.), Le Cherche Midi, Paris, p. 296.

with Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), China and BRICS. Particularly Russia and China alliance come to the forefront as a new trend in the Middle East rivalry. Both countries engage in cooperation in various international platforms and use their soft powers (energy in terms of Russia and economic power in terms of China) to set the balance against the US presence in the Middle East. The comprehensive strategic cooperation and partnership, as defined by Russia and China, brings them together on their responses and positions to certain events in the Middle East, such as Syria.

Russia further develops its relations with the regional countries and actors, which presumes Russian involvement as different from the American one because of the fact that Russia was not involved in any war in the Middle East unlike the United States. From this perspective, Russia deepens its relations with the Organisation for Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and actors such as Hezbollah and Hamas. In addition, Russia develops friendly relations with Israel and Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus for further influence and penetration in the Mediterranean.

Today Russia is a power that is both an adherent to status quo and revisionist from certain perspectives. In this regard, Putin acts in line with structural realism, that is, the policies of the Russian Federation are defined by the external environment in which every interest is interdependent. Success or defeat in one area affects the results of another.[394] In this regard, Russia seems eager to secure its national interests in the near abroad and in other regions of the world.

[394] Lukyanov, F., 2012, ibid, pp. 300-301.

CONCLUSION

Middle East, as a political term more than geographical, has been drawing the attention of great powers with regards to its historical, cultural, economic and geopolitical location and especially its energy potential. During the 20th and 21st century, more than its geopolitical position, its energy resources have been a factor of international political affairs. Following the colonial and mandate period of England and France, the region became a battleground for the Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. Today, although to a lesser extent, the Middle East is a place where the Soviet Union and the United States plays their roles. Russian Empire developed closer interests in the Middle East especially in the second half of 19th century, after the Ottoman Empire's dissolution, and faced with European powers and then the United States in the region, thus has never been able to control the region dominantly.

The Soviet interests in the Middle East both includes traditional and new basis. The Soviet Union continued the century-old Russian interest of accessing the warm waters in the South. In this regard, becoming influential in the Middle East was among the principal interests. Another interest was to expand communism in order to create allies in the world. In this regard, revolutions of the mandates in the region were supported. Arm sales and oil reserves in the Middle East further increased the Soviet involvement.

The interests of the United States in the Middle East stem from its global policy framework: Controlling the Arab oil, containing the Soviet influence in the region, open the doors of free trade in the region, involving in the regional conflicts to secure the pro-Western countries, providing its allies with economic and military assistance to deepen its own penetration and providing the security of Israel. With these aims in mind, both the Soviet Union and the United States remained on the side of Arab countries and Israel, respectively, during the Arab-Israel wars, and thus extended their spheres of influence.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Moscow lost its prestige and influence in the region, as was the case around the world. The United States became unrivalled and started to expand its penetration with unilateral policies. The newly established Russian Federation had to deal with the NATO expansion in the near abroad and the Middle East. Under the concepts of energy, democracy, international terrorism and the security of Israel,

the United States engaged more actively in the region. With Vladimir Putin, as the new leader of Russia, the economic, political and military reforms took place, once more raising the Russia to the level of global actors. Despite the cooperation with the United States in such issues as 9/11 and the invasion of Afghanistan, Russia gradually gained its previous power to realize its own interests around the world, and in the Middle East.

In this context, Russia developed collaborations with the regional countries in energy, military, economy and nuclear energy areas. Middle East constitutes a substantial market for Russian arms sales. Furthermore, Russia took part within the Quartet on the Middle East for the conciliation of Arab-Israel conflict. Countries such as Syria and Iran became strong allies and the relations with PLO, Hamas and Hezbollah also strengthen the Russian position in the region. However, Arab Spring starting in 2010 caught Russia off guard. Russia perceived these uprisings as those countries' internal affairs and refused any foreign intervention as much as possible, because the regime changes in those countries would further destabilize the region and strengthens the Unites States' and its allies' hands.

Today with its support for Syria, Russia is both alienated from the regional countries and faces off against the United States and the Western countries. On the other hand, its relations with Iran and Iraq help to secure its interests in the region. Both Russia and the United States seem to play their cards diplomatically and their Cold War rivalry apparently still goes on, in a way proving my initial argument "Middle East is a significant region for Russia in the way of becoming a greater power in the world politics. In this regard, Russian policies and interests have been confronted by the United States in the Middle East as a continuation of cold war rivalry. Today, these substantial powers still confront with each other in the region, whether it is common interests and alliances or complete disagreement on the course of events."

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