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AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ SİYASETİ ve ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER
ANABİLİM DALI

**THE MORAL ECONOMY OF EU-AFRICA INTERREGIONAL RELATIONS:
THE CASE OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN AFRICA**

DOKTORA TEZİ

Bahar Dilşa KAVALA

İstanbul - 2022

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ÖZET

Bu çalışma, AB'nin bölgesel bütünleşme söylemi ile Afrika ülkelerine yönelik ticaret ve kalkınma politikaları arasındaki etkileşimi ortaya koymayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu çalışmanın temel kaygısı, Afrika'da devam eden kalkınma ve bölgesel bütünleşme sorunları olup AB'nin neoliberal piyasa yönelimli politikalarının bu sorunlarda rol oynadığı varsayımından hareket etmektedir. Bu çalışma şu soruya yanıt bulmaya çalışmaktadır: AB'nin bölgesel bütünleşme söylemi, Afrika'ya yönelik ticaret politikasının Afrika'nın kalkınma ve bölgeselleşmesi üzerindeki etkisini gizlemeye nasıl hizmet etmektedir? Çalışma ilaveten bölgesel bütünleşme söylemi ile bölgelerarası ilişkilerde süregelen çıkmaz arasındaki bağıntıyı da araştırmaktadır. AB'nin Afrika ülkeleri ile ilişkilerinde sergilediği normatif gücü eleştirel olarak anlamak amacıyla Moral Ekonomi Yaklaşımını benimseyen ve bunu Tarihsel Söylem Yaklaşımı ile birleştiren bu çalışma, bölgesel bütünleşme normunun AB-Afrika bölgelerarası ilişkilerinin moral ekonomisi içerisinde toplumsal olarak inşası ve ardında yatan neoliberal ideolojinin yeniden üretimi süreçlerini incelemektedir. Çalışma bulguları AB'nin eşitsiz bir ilişkinin sürdürülmesini meşrulaştıracak şekilde "özel ilişki" söylemi içerisinde Afrika'yı bir bölge olarak inşa ettiğini ortaya koymuştur. Ayrıca AB'nin Afrika'nın bölgesel bütünleşmesine desteğinin altında Afrika'nın Avrupa piyasaları ile entegrasyonunu sağlamak yataken bu entegrasyonu hızlandırmak amacıyla Ekonomik Ortaklık Anlaşmalarının müzakerelerine yönelik olarak Afrika'da alt-bölgesel grupların söylemsel bazda inşası da AB-Afrika ilişkilerinin moral ekonomisi içerisinde inşa edilen bölgesel bütünleşme normundan bir sapma teşkil etmektedir. Bu sapma Ekonomik Ortaklık Anlaşmalarının müzakerelerinde yaşanan direnç ve gecikmeleri moral ekonomi perspektifinden açıklayabilmektedir. AB tarafından bölgesel bütünleşme normunu yeniden şekillendirmek üzere benimsenen Pan-Afrika yaklaşımı söz konusu sorunları çözmek bir yana Afrika'daki bölgesel bütünleşme çabalarını daha da güçleştirmiştir.

GENERAL KNOWLEDGE

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ABSTRACT

This study aims to reveal the interplay between the EU's regional integration discourse and its trade and development policies towards African countries. The primary concern of this study is the ongoing development and regional integration problems in Africa, and it starts with the assumption that the EU's neoliberal market-oriented policies have played a role in it. This study tries to find an answer to the question: how does the EU's regional integration discourse obscure the impact of EU trade policy on the development of and regionalization in Africa? It also explores the correlation between regional integration discourse and the impasse in the current interregional relations. Adopting the Moral Economy Approach to critically understand the normative power of the EU in its relations with African countries, and combining it with the Discourse Historical Approach, this study analyzes the social construction of the regional integration norm within the moral economy of EU-Africa interregional relations and the reproduction of the neoliberal ideology behind it. The findings indicated that the EU has constructed African countries as a region within the "special relationship" discourse to justify maintaining an unequal relationship. While the main motive for the EU's support to African regional integration was to ensure the integration of Africa with European markets, findings also showed that discursive construction of the sub-regions in Africa for the purpose of EPA negotiations to accelerate this integration constitutes a deviation from the regional integration norm constructed within the moral economy of the EU-Africa relations. This deviation could explain the resistance and delays encountered during the negotiations of EPAs from the moral economy perspective. The Pan-African approach adopted by the EU with the aim of reshaping the regional integration norm has been far from serving to overcome these problems and even further complicated the regional integration efforts in Africa.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AASM	Association of African States and Madagascar
ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States
AEC	African Economic Community
AfCFTA	African Continental Free Trade Area
ASEAN	The Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU	African Union
BLNS	Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
CEE	Central and Eastern Europe
CEMAC	Central African Economic and Monetary Community
CEN-SAD	Community of Sahel-Saharan States
CEPGL	Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
DG	Directorate-General
DHA	Discourse Historical Approach
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EAC	East African Community
EBA	Everything But Arms
EC	European Community
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EDF	European Development Fund
EEC	European Economic Community
EP	European Parliament
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement

ESA	Eastern and Southern Africa
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESF	European Services Forum
ETUC	European Trade Union Confederation
ETUC/TCL	European Trade Union Committee for Textiles, Clothing and Leather
EU	European Union
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
GATS	General Agreement on Trade in Services
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GSP	Generalized System of Preferences
ICFTU	International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOC	Indian Ocean Commission
IPE	International Political Economy
ITGLWF	International Textile, Garment and Leather Workers' Federation
LDCs	Least Developed Countries
Mercosur	Common Market of the South
MRU	Mano River Union
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGOs	Non-governmental Organizations
NPE	Normative Power Europe
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OCT	Overseas Countries and Territories
OEEC	Organisation for European Economic Co-operation
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
REC	Regional Economic Communities

RRF	Rapid Reaction Force
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation
SACU	Southern African Customs Union
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
SAP	Structural Adjustment Program
STABEX	System for the Stabilization of Export Earnings
SYSMIN	System for the Promotion of Mineral Production and Export
TEU	Treaty on European Union
UEMOA	West African Economic and Monetary Union
UMA	Arab Maghreb Union
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
WB	World Bank
WDM	World Development Movement
WTO	World Trade Organization

INTRODUCTION

Interregionalism has become an important part of the European Union's (EU) trade and development policy towards former colonies of its Member States in Africa, in the post-independence period since the association of overseas countries and territories with the Community under the Treaty of Rome (1957, Art. 131). This relationship between a regional organization and a regional group of states was related to the maintenance of the relationship with former colonies of the member states at the beginning of the European integration process. The EEC thus chose to establish relations with former colonies of the Member States on a regional basis. Then, the EEC put emphasis on the former colonies' own regional integration in parallel to the neoliberal turn in its own integration process in the 1980s.

Following the stagflation and unemployment crises in the 1970s which led to Europessimism, neoliberalism prevailed in the struggle among rival projects for European socio-economic governance which means supporting open markets and global free trade, while limiting the regulatory power of the state (van Apeldoorn, 1998: 19). This neoliberal approach of the EU is reflected in linking trade liberalization with its development policy by imposing conditionality for the implementation of neoliberal policies against financial support, either for the implementation of structural adjustment programs, strengthening regional integration organizations or further liberalization and integration with the global economy by including issues wider than the multilateral trade talks such as services, investments, public procurement, competition, and intellectual property. Despite the EU's discursive support to regional integration in Africa, limiting the state's regulatory power by imposing neoliberal policies has deprived its regionally grouped former colonies of the protectionism that the EU has itself benefited in the course of its own regional integration process, such as under the CAP (Hurt, 2003: 174). These neoliberal policies exposed the African countries to the excesses of the market without protection and aggravated the development problems in Africa.

The normative language used by the EU officials in their relationship with developing countries has served the perception and adoption of the detrimental neoliberal EU policies as necessary and legitimate without questioning. When one takes the

discourse as the “taken-for-granted structures of shared meaning” such as ideas, norms, and identities (Aydın-Düzgit and Rumelili, 2019: 286), the normative use of the language by the EU shaped these shared meanings, i.e., norms, based on which the asymmetrical relationship between the EU and African countries was constructed and maintained.

Development, poverty alleviation, solidarity, equitable partnership have all been the main norms and principles of the relationship between the EU and African countries (Langan, 2016: 44) shaped by the discourse of the EU. From a moral economy perspective, these mutually compromised norms regarding the rights and responsibilities of actors towards each other (Sayer, 2000; 2007) are what make the EU-Africa economic relationship a moral economy and the EU’s discourse plays an important part in it. The moral economy of the EU-Africa relationship has evolved in line with the neoliberal norms which legitimize EU development policies serving the integration of African countries to European markets and maintaining asymmetrical economic relations. This thesis argues that regional integration has been one of the norms constructed by the EU’s discourse in this moral economy, which helped the implementation of neoliberal policies to the detriment of the regional integration and development efforts in Africa.

The regional integration discourse of the EU linked the development of African countries with trade liberalization through regional integration. The EU promoted regional integration in Africa not only as a means of increasing south-south integration but also North-South integration. Regional integration has been promoted as a means of accessing the global markets and integrating into the global economy (Commission of the European Communities, 2000: 25). The regional integration discourse has helped the EU to legitimize the imposition of the neoliberal regulatory agenda such as competition and investment policies on the African countries in the name of further integration with the world markets. While the discourse served to legitimize neoliberal policies in external relations, the outcome of the implementation of these policies in African countries did not conform to the preceding normative claims of achieving development in Africa.

Despite all the promises of supporting regional integration in Africa, the share of intraregional trade among eight regional economic communities in Africa is still low, with 14.4% in 2019 (UNCTAD, 2021: 4). The share of intraregional exports in 2019 is

also low, with 14.4% of total exports from Africa (UNCTAD, 2021: 39). Sub-Saharan Africa's integration into the world trade is also low. In 2019, the share of Sub-Saharan Africa in world imports is 1.96%, and its share in world export is 1.91% (World Bank, n/a). On the other hand, the EU is the largest export and import partner for Africa. While 33% of African exports are made to the EU in 2020, 31% of imports are from the EU as well (Eurostat, 2022). These figures are almost double the export and import among African countries in 2020 (Eurostat, 2022), which demonstrates the better integration of the African economies with European markets instead of among themselves.

The discrepancy between the normative claims of the EU on regional integration in Africa and the actual outcomes makes it a case for the moral economy approach. The main motive of EU development and trade policies after the independence of African countries has been defined as the well-being of the former colonies because the Member States were deemed responsible for their welfare. This well-being was expressed in terms of human and economic development in African countries through regional integration. The different policies and actions such as import substitution industrialization, structural adjustment, or Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) have all been justified as serving the regional integration of African countries in the same way. Understanding the construction of the regional integration norm within the moral economy and its evolution in terms of how it is used in connection with these different trade and development policies offers a lot to explain this discrepancy between the normative claims and the consequences of the discourse in practice.

1. Main Aim and Research Questions

This thesis aims to reveal the interplay between the EU's regional integration discourse and its trade and development policies toward African countries. The thesis proceeds from the assumption that the EU's neoliberal market-oriented policies have played a role in the ongoing development and regional integration problems in Africa. The regional integration discourse, constructed and maintained within the moral economy of the EU-Africa relationship served to legitimize these policies and obscure their impact on the reproduction of the ongoing development and regional integration problems in Africa.

Hence the research question of this thesis is: how does the EU's regional integration discourse obscure the impact of EU trade policy on the development of and regionalization in Africa? The thesis further traces the correlation between regional integration discourse and the impasse in the current interregional relations between the EU and Africa.

This thesis combines the moral economy approach and the Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) to answer its main research question. It assumes that the moral economy of EU-Africa relations is based on certain norms constructed, maintained, and reproduced within the EU's trade and development policy-related discursive context. To reveal the construction of the regional integration norm of this moral economy, within the regional integration discourse, this study first looks at the role of norms in general in EU foreign policy. This study then focuses on the role of regional integration as a norm in EU foreign policy, in which the EU is claimed to promote regionalism with the aim of replicating itself and legitimizing its policies. Questioning this role of regional integration norm in the EU's external relations allows one to focus on the discursive construction of this norm within the moral economy of EU-Africa interregional relations.

This study adopts the DHA to analyse the construction of the regional integration norm within the moral economy of the EU-Africa relationship. The DHA focuses on identity constructions within discourses and displays how the discourses reproduce the ideologies behind them, which help to establish and maintain unequal relationships (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016). This thesis uses the DHA to reveal the neo-liberal ideology behind the regional integration discourse and how it is reproduced within the moral economy context of the EU-Africa relationship. To answer the main research question this thesis asks the following sub-questions of the DHA, to reveal the construction and reproduction of the regional integration norm under the regional integration discourse within the moral economy of the EU-Africa relationship:

1. How are European and African states named and referred to linguistically within the moral economy of EU-Africa interregional relations? What traits, characteristics, qualities, and features are attributed to them?

2. How is the regional integration norm linguistically constructed within the moral economy of EU-Africa interregional relations?
3. What arguments and argumentation schemes are used in the regional integration discourse for Africa?
4. From which ideological perspective are these arguments expressed? How do the EU's arguments feed into market-based neoliberal logic?
5. How does the "regional integration" discourse relate to other EU policy discourses on Africa?
6. How does EU regional integration discourse affect African regionalization?

2. Main Arguments

In response to the research question, the major argument of this thesis is that the norm of regional integration, based on a neoliberal ideology, has become "normalized" in the moral economy of the EU-Africa relationship and the EU's discourse on regional integration in Africa has legitimized its markets-oriented and interest-driven policies rather than helping African development and regional integration. This argument is supported by three interrelated arguments. The first one is that region-building has been one of the main norms of the moral economy of the EU-Africa relationship, which has been instrumental in the management of relations after the independence of the Member States' former colonies. The uniting Europe, as a normative power, wanted to export region-building as a norm in its dealings with the former colonies of its Member States. The contractual relationship between Europe and Africa established following the independence of African countries was also built upon region-building. Region-building, being the main norm, has served to establish a specific relationship between the EU and the former colonies of its Member States, which allowed for the maintenance of a hegemonic relationship between Europe and Africa.

The second supporting argument is that the EU's external policies have rather been designed to serve Africa's market integration with the EU, instead of regional market integration among African countries. The EU's support for African regional integration which is deemed to serve Africa's integration with world markets has been widely articulated in various European texts. Yet, this thesis claims that the discourse

around the support for regional integration in Africa has been used to disguise the main motive of the EU, which was the further integration of Africa with European markets, in line with European interests rather than those of African peoples.

The third argument is that the deviation from the regional integration norm could explain the problems encountered during the negotiations of Economic Partnership Agreements between the EU and the ACP, from a moral economy perspective. In the Cotonou era, the EU was so eager to speed up the market integration of the ACP countries with itself that the Economic Partnership Agreements were imposed to be negotiated with sub-regions, which did not even correspond to already existing regional economic communities in Africa. This approach was highly criticized for potentially dividing the African regional integration process. This move against regional integration – one of the main norms of the relationship since the independence of African countries – has encountered resistance from some African countries, and even delayed the negotiation process, which could also be explained by the moral economy approach.

3. Conceptual Framework and Methodology

This thesis uses the moral economy approach to prove the argument that the regional integration norm in the EU-Africa relationship is constructed in line with a neoliberal ideology and used in a way that serves the EU's interests, which is African countries' better integration with European markets, to the detriment of their development efforts and regional integration among them. The moral economy approach is chosen to reveal the interplay between the European discourse that depicts the EU as a norm-setter – as promoting the regional integration norm in the case of Africa – and the European constructions of Africa's underdevelopment and complex regional integration as a pretext for pursuing interest-driven policies there. The role of norms in EU foreign policymaking and its implementation have been addressed by the Normative Power Europe (NPE) approach, which has been widely used in EU foreign policy studies. The NPE approach is based on Manners' (2002: 252) claim that the EU has a "normatively different basis for its relations with the world", which gives it the ability to shape international norms and the behaviours of its partners by promoting universal norms. While it is a useful approach as it puts the focus of research on norms in the EU's external relations, its claim to

universality has been highly criticized for disregarding the consideration of possible direct effects on third parties and their involvement in the foreign policymaking process (Diez, 2005; Bicchi, 2006; Börzel and Risse, 2009). This approach has also been criticized for being ahistorical by ignoring the domestic conflicts in values and norms (Falkner, 2007: 511), and overlooking the main concern of the EU in the international system which is maximizing its power (Hyde-Price, 2006: 221).

Regarding the relevance of the NPE approach to the relations between Europe and Africa, the nexus between the EU's trade and development policies and normativity and outcome gap have dominated the recent academic research. Storey (2006) discussed the promotion of a particular model of "good governance" which was far from guaranteeing positive outcomes for African countries. In addition to Storey, the EU's use of trade and interregional trade agreements as a tool for development and the paradoxical consequence of this normativity in terms of development have also been studied by various authors such as Bailey and Bossuyt (2013), Elgström and Pilegaard (2008), Di Caprio and Trommer (2010), Elgström and Frenhoff-Larsen (2010), Hurt (2012), Langan (2012), Langan and Scott (2014), Langan and Price (2015).

Considering the interregional relationship between European countries and their former colonies established after the independence, this thesis has focused on the role of norms in EU trade and development policy-making towards African countries from the moral economy approach. According to Langan (2012: 243), the moral economy perspective could be used for critical reorientation of the concept of normative power to appraise the discrepancies between nominal EU norms and material policy outcomes, by analysing the infringed norms within the "moral economies". The moral economy approach used in this thesis helps understand the role of ideas and norms in EU trade policy-making. It serves to critically analyze the institutionalization of EU-Africa development cooperation in negotiation with moral norms, in a dialectical relationship between normative ideas and overriding power interests. According to the moral economy approach, once the economic practices are established through the settling of normative questions, whether by argument or by power, they are forgotten and become normalized (Sayer, 2007: 263). Thus, norms that are conveyed within discourse may serve for

legitimizing the economic relations or practices that are far from ethical objectives. In this way, the moral economy approach helps to demonstrate the true nature of the EU's normative power which is put forward as its ability to utilize moral norms for legitimization and rationalization of the pursuit of commercial and geopolitical interests where actions go against ethical objectives (Langan, 2016: 56).

This thesis analyzes the moral construction of the EU-Africa economic relationship and the disparity between normative legitimations and policy outcomes, from a moral economy perspective. The thesis claims that the norm of regional integration has been constructed based on a neoliberal ideology and became “normalized” in the moral economy of the EU-Africa relationship and performs DHA to reveal the argumentation strategies used to legitimize and construct this norm in this specific way. Since the moral economy approach deals with the social construction of reality, i.e. economic structures, and their consequences on people's wellbeing, it is possible to combine it with the social constructivist DHA methodology to expose how the norms are embedded and have evolved in those structures. The DHA is interested in the “real” consequences of socially constructed discourses in social structures and how linguistics and other semiotic practices conciliate and reproduce ideologies in social institutions (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016: 637). That is why it is well-suited to defend the arguments of this thesis.

The DHA is an interdisciplinary approach combining linguistic analysis with sociological and historical approaches, which requires resorting to theory and data recursively, taking into consideration the historical context as well. The DHA first identifies a discourse's main topics, then investigates the discursive strategies and examines linguistic means and realizations (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016: 778). Reisigl and Wodak suggested an eight-step programme to follow for analysis, which starts, first, with referring to the previous theoretical knowledge and research (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016: 795). Secondly, discursive data should be collected through various media, genres, and texts (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016: 795). After selection and downsizing of the collected data, research questions and assumptions can be formulated (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016: 795). A qualitative pilot analysis can be conducted upon the downsized data to test the first assumptions, which could be followed by detailed case studies (Reisigl and Wodak,

2016: 795). Formulation of a critique and practical application of analytical results, if possible, are also considered as important steps of a DHA (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016: 795). These ideal-typical steps of a DHA could be applied recursively, and depending on the scale of a research project and constraints could be restricted to smaller steps and data collection ranges (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016: 795).

Based on the eight-step programme for an ideal-typical discourse-historical analysis developed by Reisigl and Wodak (2016: 791) this study first provides a discussion of the theoretical basis of the moral economy approach and the role of norms in the EU's foreign relations. After that, context information and data on African regional integration discourse by various EU actors (leaders, officials, institutions) from various semiotic texts were collected. The research covered the period starting from the Treaty of Rome (1957) until 2021 (the full year before the submission of this thesis), focusing on the periods of the negotiation and conclusion of trade agreements and their revisions. The data that are subject to analysis covers 75 representative speeches and interviews by Commission officials and EU leaders, as well as official documents and agreement texts, and all the 224 issues of the *Courrier Magazine* which were published by the European Commission, from 1963 until 2006.

The data subject to the analysis was selected and downsized according to the representativity and proto-typicality criteria, which means their ability to represent the structure of the totality of data (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016: 1285). The typicality of the texts is determined by their context including their topics, the authors/speakers, the audience, and the occasion of the text, under the guidance of the research question and theoretical perspective of this thesis. All the samples are written texts, whose audience or readers are African high-level officials, bureaucrats, or public opinion in general. The authors of the texts are chosen from the highest level of representation of the European institutions in the EU-Africa Relationship such as the European Commission, Council of the European Union, and the European members of the ACP/EEC Council of Ministers. The texts are either the speeches and interviews done on the occasion of the milestones of bilateral relations such as the negotiation or signature of an agreement or a high-level gathering such as summits, visits or bilateral institution meetings, or documents and

reports issued by European institutions about the bilateral economic relationship between the EU and Africa. The DHA is interested in identity construction, therefore texts that are defining Europe and Africa, and the relationship between Europe and Africa were considered more typical. The final criterion for typicality has been the topic of the texts, including the regional integration in Africa, and development and trade policies for Africa from the point of interdiscursivity with regional integration.

Following the selection and downsizing of the data according to typicality and interdiscursive scope, the data was analyzed with respect to its structure and context. First, micro-analyses were applied to the structures of the downsized data, mainly to reveal nomination, predication, and argumentation strategies used to construct Europe and Africa, the relationship between Europe and Africa, and the regional integration norm. These micro-structure analyses were combined with context analysis, which includes interdiscursivity with other discourses such as *mission civilisatrice*, development, and neoliberal discourse. Finally, a critique has been formulated based on the empirical analysis, in line with the moral economy approach.

4. The Organization of the Thesis

The first chapter is dedicated to explaining the theoretical and methodological framework. It discusses the moral economy approach and the DHA, and their relevance to the objectives of this particular thesis. First, the evolution of the moral economy concept and its application as an approach is elaborated. In the second section, the DHA as an approach within the critical discourse analysis is addressed. The last part discusses how these two approaches could be combined to analyze the construction of the regional integration norm within the EU-Africa interregional relationship.

The second chapter discusses the role of norms in EU foreign policy in general, and region-building and regional integration in particular. It investigates the different characterizations of the EU's role and power in global politics, with a focus on the Normative Power Europe (NPE) approach to demonstrate the diffusion of norms in the EU's external relations. Without overlooking its limits to explain the ethical outcomes concerning the well-being of actors involved, this chapter addresses the NPE approach to

reveal the existence of regional integration as a norm in the EU's external relations and to discuss how it is being promoted in its dealings with third parties.

The third chapter describes the evolution of EU-Africa interregional relations from the interwar period until the Cotonou era to give a historical context to the discursive analysis that follows in the last chapter. The first section addresses the "special" relationship between Europe and its former colonies in Africa, beginning from the interwar period until the establishment of the ACP group and the conclusion of the Lomé Conventions. The second section describes the establishment of the ACP group following the accession of the United Kingdom to the European Community and the successive Lomé Conventions made under the neoliberal influences. The last section of this chapter portrays the changing Europe-Africa relationship following the conclusion of the Cotonou Agreement and the negotiations of Economic Partnership Agreements with the ACP sub-regions, including the difficulties and resistance encountered during the whole process.

The last chapter reveals and discusses the research findings from the discursive analysis of the period covered by this thesis. It unveils the dominant discourses which helped the normative construction of the moral economy of the EU-Africa relationship. The first section reveals the findings related to the building of Africa as a certain type of region, with the ethical outcomes of this construction regarding the development path followed by the African countries. The second section addresses the efficiency of development cooperation discourse and discusses its role in shaping regional integration in Africa through the regional economic communities. The last section reveals the change in the development cooperation discourse with the Cotonou era. It lays out the findings to support one of the arguments of this thesis that the EU's moves which deviate from the regional integration norm could explain the resistance from African countries to the imposed Economic Partnership Agreements from the perspective of the moral economy approach.

Finally, the conclusion lays down the findings of this study as follows: The DHA method applied to the sample texts has revealed the use of binary oppositions to construct Africa as an inferior party that needs the help of the EU to improve its position.

The EU's use of argumentation strategies such as *topos* of history to construct the relationship as "special" or as based on "solidarity" have helped to justify the construction of Europe as the partner that has a "duty" to help Africa. The construction of Africa as a region in need of help from Europe has served to justify the establishment of EU-Africa relations on the basis of development cooperation, within which Europe would provide financial help to Africa to improve development and regional integration. The EU's discursive and financial support to certain types of regional integration models/institutions in Africa has served better to the implementation of policies that aim African countries' integration into the European markets, rather than leading to integration among African countries. Despite the European claims that the regional integration norm and policies designed to support Africa have served the development of African countries, the outcome has conversely been ongoing underdevelopment in Africa, with numerous regional economic organizations, implying overlapping memberships and trade rules. Thus, in its conclusion, this thesis suggests a more balanced relationship with the regional economic communities and the African Union, to prevent obstruction in the regional integration process in Africa and to overcome the impediments in the interregional relationship between Europe and Africa.

5. The Importance of the Thesis

The impact of EU development and trade policy and recent Economic Partnership Agreements on Africa's development and regional integration has been widely studied in the last two decades. Scholars from different disciplinary perspectives mostly focused on the impact of EPAs on the ACP countries' regional integration and development in terms of trade, budget, welfare, and revenue effects (Bussolo, 1999; McKay et al., 2000; Busse, Borrmann and Großmann, 2004; Milner, Morrissey and McKay, 2005; Jallab et al., 2005; Borrmann, Grossmann and Koopmann, 2006; Busse and Großmann, 2007; Gavin, 2007; Keck and Piermartini, 2008; Fontagné, Laborde and Mitaritonna, 2011; Morrissey and Zgovu, 2007), or directly on the regional integration efforts in Africa (Borrmann, Busse and De La Rocha, 2007; Babarinde and Faber, 2009; Marinov, 2013, Ramdoo and Bilal, 2013). Langan (2016) analyzed the moral dimensions of the EU-Africa contractual relationship to evaluate how the "pro-poor" moral norms

related to the EU's aid concessions in Africa are linked to free-market policies and to bring into play discursive legitimizations to maintain asymmetric power relations between the EU and the African countries.

There are also studies on regionalism in Africa focusing on the internal dynamics and failures of regional integration in Africa in its relationship with the EU as a model of regional integration (Mistry, 2000; Clapham, 2001; Asante, 2016; Akokpari, 2008). Albeit to a lesser extent, the normative dimensions of the EU-Africa relationship in relation to regionalism in Africa have also been analyzed. The normative substance of the EU's support to regionalism in Africa by promoting its own regional integration model associated with norms such as democracy, human rights, and good governance has been criticized with regard to its underlying motivations such as enhancing economic liberalization in Africa for the EU's self-interest (Söderbaum, 2007: 198).

Yet the literature mostly approaches the EU's promotion of regional integration in Africa, based on the diffusion theory and focuses on the EU's material diffusion of regional integration through external incentives as a civilian power such as positive conditionality or capacity-building (Söderbaum, 2007: 199; Börzel and Risse, 2009). It does not say much about the content of this regional integration norm promoted for African countries in relation to its relative failure compared to the EU model. Even when the ideational diffusion of the EU-type regional integration is considered from a normative point of view, it is associated with the socialization of local actors within institutional settings, and the emulation of the EU ideas and norms by the local actors is explained by the superiority or appropriateness of the norms (Lenz, 2013: 216). Diffusion theory does not show how the regional integration norm is normalized by the local actors and does not say much about the gap between intentions and results either, apart from limitations to the EU's ideational diffusion (Lenz, 2013: 218). This gap is between the discursive support to the EU-type regional integration in Africa and the negative result as a failure to achieve it. The importance and contribution of this thesis is that it applies the DHA to reveal how the regional integration norm is constructed within the moral economy of the EU-Africa relationship. While the DHA analyzes the discourse, it reveals the ideologies behind the discursive construction process. Differently from the existing

literature, by applying the DHA, this thesis explains the gap between the intention of achieving regional integration in Africa and the negative outcome not as a result of limits to the EU's ideational diffusion, but as a result of the EU's pursuance of interest-driven policies guided by neoliberal ideology.



1. THE MORAL ECONOMY APPROACH AND DISCOURSE HISTORICAL APPROACH

This thesis searches for the discursive construction of regional integration as a norm in the moral economy of EU-Africa interregional relations and the role of this discourse in obscuring the impact of EU trade policy on the regionalization of Africa. This chapter tries to demonstrate the compatibility of the moral economy approach with the methodology of the DHA to deconstruct the hegemony of a specific European model of regional integration discourse.

1.1 The Moral Economy Approach

The moral economy approach provides a useful framework to evaluate the dialectical relationship between normative ideas and overriding power interests and embedding of norms in the institutionalization of economic structures. This section first presents the evolution of the moral economy concept and its early applications, then elaborates the moral economy as an approach to understand the evolution of the ties between the EU and Africa and the construction of “regional integration” as a norm within those ties.

1.1.1 Evolution of Moral Economy Concept

The evolution of the moral economy concept could be traced back to the old discussion about the relationship between markets and society. Whether economics is subordinated to society and has a moral function, such as serving for a good life or is autonomous from it, with its own rules and laws, is a debate that starts with Aristotle and continues with the Scottish Enlightenment or Marx’s critique of classical political economy.

Polanyi (2001) has formulated the concept of “embeddedness” in his famous Great Transformation, to claim that before the 19th century, the economy was always embedded in society and he pointed to the overwhelming consequences of subordinating society to the market laws by classical economists, as opposed to subordinating economy to social relations. Although there is a discussion on whether Polanyi claimed that

economic activity is disembedded from society and no longer subject to any morality with the rise of capitalism, there is a normative agenda in his analysis of embedding and disembedding, with his critique of the threat to well-being posed by commodification and self-regulating markets. (Sayer, 2004: 4)

The term “moral economy” was first used by Thompson (1971) in his study of the English crowds protesting food prices in the 18th century. He explained the action of rioters based on their moral judgments about economic norms and obligations. Contrary to the assumption that food riots were occasional and spasmodic intrusions stimulated by economic turbulence or distress, he claimed that these riots were guided by some legitimizing notion which was the belief of defending traditional rights, threatened by illegitimate practices in marketing, milling, baking, etc. (Thompson, 1971: 78). In his view, “traditional view of social norms and obligations, of the proper economic functions of several parties within the community, which, taken together, can be said to constitute the moral economy of the poor” (Thompson, 1971: 79). Violation of those norms was the motive behind direct action, which was rioting in this case.

Thompson (1971) also claimed that the breakthrough of the new political economy of the free market which was defined as a political economy in which “human reciprocities were diminished to the wages-nexus” was also the breakdown of the old moral economy of consumer conscient provision. He argued that the 18th-century social history can be read as “a succession of confrontations between an innovative market economy and the customary moral economy of the plebs” (Thompson, 1978). While rejecting the claim of popular opposition to the rise of commercial capitalism and market innovations, Bohstedt (1992: 267) agreed the moral justifications of rioters’ actions as their “righteous indignation at market cheating or extortionate prices; their assertion of their right to survive; and the immanence of riot repertoires in popular mores”.

In the 1970s, the moral economy concept was applied to the study of anti-capitalist protest movements and colonialism. Scott (1976) used the moral economy term in his study of the peasant movement against capitalism in Vietnam. He examined the agrarian society in lower Burma and Vietnam and explained the situation of potential rebellion and revolution in those societies by the systematic violation of the peasants’

“moral economy” under the transformations of the colonial era (Scott, 1976: 4). His analysis was focusing on searching for the factors that cause the indignation and rage of peasants and he claims that those factors were the basics of their moral economy which he defined as their conception of economic justice and exploitation, which makes certain claims tolerable and others intolerable (Scott, 1976: 3).

Scott (1976: 2) put the term “subsistence ethic” at the centre of his analysis and claimed that in most pre-capitalist peasant societies, some production techniques and social patterns were developed as a result of trials and errors, over the centuries to guarantee the subsistence levels for all society. The imposition of a capitalist cultural system and the development of the modern state under colonialism were claimed as the main transformations that undermined the pre-existing social arrangements in peasant societies and infringed on the moral economy of the subsistence ethic (Scott, 1976: 7). The claims by landlords, moneylenders, or the state on peasant incomes that violated the culturally defined subsistence levels were not considered as legitimate and the products of the land were called to be distributed as to guarantee the subsistence levels for all by peasant protests throughout the period (Scott, 1976: 10).

Booth (1994: 656) opposed the alleged claims of moral economists that modern markets were autonomous and self-regulating, escaping the control of the community, in contrast to the embedded non-market or pre-market societies, with a normative standing. He argued that market economies have also a moral standing and all economies, including modern market economies, are moral economies since they are also ridden with the norms of their communities (Booth, 1994: 662). One society could recognize freedom as the highest norm, while in another equality could be prized above all, yet any divergence from whatever compromised norms would impose attempts to bring harmony back to the economy (Booth, 1994: 662).

Keat (2004: 1) also accepted that all economies were moral economies, suffused by the norms of the community, and in case of divergence, either the economic relations or the community’s norms would change to restore harmony. He added that market economies were ethical as well, just like the pre-market societies, and presented the market as an instrument and the use-value of consumer goods as its ethical goal, through

which it contributes to human well-being (Keat, 2004: 1). He also looked at the inside of the firm and production, to find out the ethical character of the conduct of economic activity (Keat, 2004: 1).

In more recent studies, political scientists and sociologists have rediscovered the term moral economy, associated with the citizens' rights and responsibilities as regards public policies and institutions. The role of public policies and institutions was emphasized since they "influence the ways individuals understand their rights and responsibilities as members of a political community" (Mettler and Soss, 2004: 61). From a class point of view, Svallfors (2006: 1) claimed that within the moral economy in society, people get their notions of mutual rights, obligations, and responsibility from public policies and institutions. However, the contents of this moral economy vary between different classes which have different senses of reasonableness and fairness with regard to the particular types of distribution of resources or the function of social institutions (Svallfors, 2006: 2).

To analyze the motives behind people's support or disapproval of collective welfare provision and to explain why some redistributive schemes are accepted and others are rejected by the people, Mau (2004: 54) claimed that the people's interpretations of fairness and responsibility, and the preference for the transfer of wealth and income are institutionally biased. They are influenced by the institutional setting that people accommodate themselves, which also manifests society's normative self-understanding and shared moral assumptions (Mau, 2004: 58).

Posusney (1993) also argued that workers' beliefs in their rights and responsibilities towards the state were a determining factor in the collective action by Egyptian labour in the period between the 1952 coup in Egypt and the late 1980s. This idea of reciprocal rights and responsibilities was promoted by Nasser and codified in the National Charter of 1962: "Every citizen should be aware of his defined responsibility in the whole plan and should be fully conscious of the definite rights he will enjoy in the event of success" (Posusney, 1993: 91). Workers accepted that they were entitled to be fairly compensated for their labour, which was guaranteed by the state, in exchange for their obligation to the state, their "responsibility as lying in production, to contribute to

the postcolonial modernization and development of their country” (Posusney, 1996: 223). This moral economy approach thus explains the relative scarcity and eschewal of strikes in Egypt and the choice of the types of protests that did not hinder the work with workers’ sense of responsibility towards the state.

Posusney’s work was also an example of several case studies that used the moral economy approach. Applying this approach to the labour protests in Egypt, she concluded that protests or collective action under a moral economy were not aiming to change the terms of exploitation or end it by virtue of emerging new consciousness, but to preserve the status quo ante, to ask for dominant elites to reinstate the violated norms and standards that the subaltern¹ class becomes accustomed (Posusney, 1993: 85).

The moral economy approach has also been used in various other case studies, including anti-state labour protests in Algeria (Alexander, 2002), economic practices in Kyrgyzstan (Sanghera and Satybaldieva, 2005), or Nigerian food systems (Lyon and Porter, 2009). Alexander (2002) applied the moral economy approach, together with macrostructural and institutionalist approaches to explain the reason for different reactions by workers to privatization and other types of reforms in the 1980s and 1990s in Algeria, in terms of developing strong collective identities and strategies. He accepted that workers have a common position as subaltern clients who sell their labour to economic patrons and they also share a moral vision about the essence of political and economic relationships, such as mutual rights and responsibilities, i.e., political support and labour for development in exchange of fair wages and prices, and equal pay for equal work (Alexander, 2002: 315-316). While they accept exploitation as long as it conforms

¹ Antonio Gramsci used the term *subaltern* linked with his conception of hegemony when referring to the subordinate social group or classes subject to policies and initiatives of the dominant class (Green, 2002:2). Gramsci has been the most significant influencer of the scholars of Subaltern Studies who introduced the term subaltern to the post-colonial studies (Currie, 1995: 219). Ranajit Guha (1988: 35), founder of the Subaltern Studies first used the term subaltern in the Selected Subaltern Studies as “a name for the general attribute of subordination in South Asian society whether this is expressed in terms of class, caste, age, gender and office or in any other way”. Accepting the political dominance but rejecting the concept of imperialist hegemony, the Subaltern Studies scholars basically searched the agency of common people in the history of India, “a new kind of history from below”, instead of the elites (Ludden, 2003: 12). They aimed to give voice to the subjected people and explain their contribution to the history on their own, independent from the elites (Guha, 1988: 39).

to the norm set of this patron-client relationship, they protest when the established norms are violated by elites (Alexander, 2002: 316).

In another case study, Lyon and Porter (2009) analyzed the functioning of the informal Nigerian domestic food system in very difficult business conditions, with minimal regulation by the state, increased levels of corruption and violence. They concluded that economic behaviour in the Nigerian informal food market is shaped by trust, both based on personal relationships and institutional forms. Social institutions also affect/determine economic behaviour in this regard because trust is mainly embedded in social institutions and because they possess and act on certain norms. Lyon and Porter (2009) applied the moral economy approach to investigate how economic activities are framed by norms. A case study on the conflict over access to land in the Jos Plateau, which was a place for wide-scale vegetable production, between indigenes and settlers in 2001 showed that norms can change for a brief period due to the interplay between dominant participating parties and explained the conflict arising from the different understanding of what is fair and efforts to re-establish the “normality” by the moral economy approach.

Sanghera and Satybaldieva (2005) applied the moral economy approach to analyze the transformation of Kyrgyzstan to a market economy. They contributed to the literature on the moral economy by pointing out the role of emotions, sentiments, and feelings as internal forms to normalize socio-economic practices, in addition to the norms, habits, rules, entitlements, customs, trust, and conventions. They claimed that moral sentiments and feelings were affected by economic inequalities and pressures in Kyrgyzstan. They also showed how this negative impact of the transition to the market economy discourse in the economic life on the moral emotions and sentiments had resulted in distortions in economic practices and relationships (Sanghera and Satybaldieva, 2005: 921-922).

The moral economy concept has evolved considerably since then and could even be applied to what is going on today with the Occupy Wall Street movement. Tabb (2014: 90) claimed that the generalized austerity regimes imposed by neoliberalism due to increased debt dependency and current urban fiscal crises were results of “disembedding

of markets from moral restraint” under global neorealism, which means a market without shared values and norms. He also claimed that movements such as Occupy Wall Street are part of a process where the market relations are being re-embedded in a moral economy (Tabb, 2014: 87). In this regard, recent urban struggles are explained by the need to link the global market with compromised values and norms from a moral economy perspective.

1.1.2 Moral Economy as a Critical Approach

Scottish Enlightenment authors such as Hume or Smith thought that individuals were social beings connected to each other with moral sentiments which were impaired by the growth of trade and development of economic relations with distant individuals, development of the division of labour, and advancement of competitive markets (Sayer, 2000: 86). Economic activities were aimed to “disembed” from those social connections and Scottish Enlightenment authors adapted their theories to this trend in which the economic system, with its own logic and momentum, started to dominate the “lifeworld” (Sayer, 2000: 86). Values and norms, rights, and responsibilities were de-rationalized in the study of economics, instead, the economic system’s and self-interested, liberal actors’ behaviours and preferences gained importance (Sayer, 2000: 87). Thus, Habermas (1979: 6) argued, “the development of capitalism turned questions of validity into questions of behaviour”.

Amartya Sen (1989: 3) makes a distinction between “engineering” and “ethical” approaches to economics because of the split-up between positive and normative thoughts in political economy. While the engineering approach tries to describe and explain the ways that economies work to be able to fix economic problems, when necessary, the ethical approach considers economies as social organizations which are evaluated on ethical or moral grounds (Sayer, 2015: 291). Dominated by the engineering approach, liberal thought embraced formal, reason-based conceptions of morality, instead of moral sentiments, and individuals were considered as self-interested and asocial beings, who merely respect each other rights (Sayer, 2000: 86). The moral economy approach opposes a strictly economic approach which ignores the sociocultural elements of behaviour (Scott, 1976: 166).

Even political economy analyzes the observable behaviour without challenging the constructed norms leading to those behaviours and the moral economy approach is an approach that tries to reverse this shift from validity to behaviour, by discovering and questioning the legitimations behind those once settled norms (Sayer, 2007: 265). Götz (2015: 158) claimed that even Thompson, the pioneer of using the term moral economy, remained weak in questioning the validity claims by neoclassic economists who postulate disconnecting from societal context and relying upon their own premises system. As a result, moral economists radically oppose the “economic approach to human behaviour and institutions” which turns people into *homo economicus* and societies into a “prop” for markets, making the modern economic theory unable to analyze nonmarket communities (Booth, 1994: 653). The moral economy approach sees negotiated and compromised norms behind all economic behaviours and institutions. But once the economic structures are established, the controversies behind these compromises become normalized, without any further need for legitimation or questioning (Sayer 2015: 291). This is where moral economy breaks up from the study of political economy as well, by offering to reinforce the critical standpoints of radical political economy, which has declined not only because of the rise of neoliberalism but also indifference to those critical views (Sayer 2007: 261).

From a critical standpoint, the moral economy approach analyzes the moral economies on the basis of their ethical implications for the beneficiaries. The moral economy approach does not only consider the norms as normalized conventions but also questions their content in terms of moral implications. Thus, the normative content of the norms is also important for a critical moral economy approach. Instead of focusing on the empirical questions regarding the functioning of the economic systems, Sayer (2000: 90) claims that one should focus on the *raison d’etre* and the motives of economic activities, such as the well-being of people, and inquire whether the outcomes correspond to those motives. Any political economic analysis would be critical if it can reveal the moral justifications of particular economic processes and organizations, their effects on actors’ wellbeing, and their evaluation by those actors (Sayer, 2007: 261).

The moral dimension of economic relations does not rule out the acknowledgment of the importance of power. The exercise of power is dependent on actors who have moral concerns and commitments, identities, and ways of life (Sayer, 2007: 262). For example, workers' moral commitment to their fellow workers is considered as one important factor of power imposed by employers upon them (Sayer, 2007: 265). In this vein, moral economy questions the power relations and studies whether this normative construction of economic practices is of use to legitimize practices that transgress the ethical concerns and increase the status or influence of dominant actors (Langan, 2012: 249).

According to this approach, moral economic norms about rights and responsibilities and associated behaviours are under the impact of the social organization and power in society. There is an ongoing tension between different norms, and they co-evolve with economic systems (Sayer, 2007: 4). There is also a division regarding the entitlements, rights, and responsibilities that are settled and those which are unsettled and left open to negotiation and bargaining (Sayer, 2007: 5). Goffman (1974) claims that economic practices and actions are “framed”, based on the agreed norms. The action takes place by ‘bracketing’ the outside world, within this normative frame based upon the mutual and tacit agreement of the parties, yet it is still subject to externalities causing overflows across boundaries (Callon, 1998: 249).

Arnold (2001: 85) asserts that the idea of moral economy is a “claim about the conduct of the inquiry, of what to study and how”. It was Sayer (2007: 262) who clearly defined the moral economy both as the study of moral norms in an interactive relationship with economic practices and as the object of such a study since all economies are considered as moral economies. This definition was widely accepted within moral economy studies by scholars such as Bernstein (2007) and Langan (2016). Accordingly, “moral economy” both represents the object and the approach of this thesis. As the thesis analyzes the relationship between the EU and Africa, it takes all the economic practices, relations, and institutions as morally constructed. The contractual relationship between the EU and Africa can thus be interpreted on moral economy lines in this respect.

Langan (2016: 55) claims that the moral economy approach can demonstrate the essence of the EU's normative power which is its capacity to utilize norms for self-legitimization in its seeking of commercial and geopolitical interests in case of conflict between ethical objectives and actions. Accepting the role played by norms in the EU's external relations as claimed by the NPE approach, this thesis adopts a moral economy approach to critically understand the normative power of the EU in its relations with African countries. As moral norms constructed in the EU's external action shape the actors' rights and responsibilities towards each other, this thesis looks at the norms and processes of their construction, to evaluate their ethical outcomes concerning the well-being of the actors involved.

Recent studies of moral economy that focus on the normative creation of structures and institutions and the discrepancies in outcomes offer a limited methodology to reveal how the norms are embedded in economic structures and how they evolve in response to institutional changes (Langan, 2016: 18). Goffman's (1974) concept of "framing" of action in which certain activities are allowed based on the shared norms and understandings (while others are excluded), could explain the institutionalization of the EU-African interregional moral economy in a very long-standing negotiation process. However, it still does not explain how moral economic norms that are fundamental to this framing are constructed.

Langan (2016: 8) suggests discourse analysis as the central method to reveal the role played by discourse in the institutionalization of the norms in the moral economy of the EU-Africa relationship. He also claims that discourse analysis is fit for understanding the dissemination and reconfiguration of norms in response to shifting commercial and political interests (2016: 8). The next section elaborates on critical discourse analysis and discourse historical approach (DHA), specifically, to reveal how this thesis offers a way to explain how the norms are morally constructed in economic relations.

1.2 Discourse Historical Approach

The previous section has argued that the moral economy approach is a useful framework to analyze the dialectical relationship between norms and interests, however, it should also be completed by the DHA to understand how norms are institutionalized in the economic structures. This section examines the critical discourse analysis in general and the DHA in comparison to other major approaches to critical discourse analysis. It aims to understand how the DHA can be combined with the moral economy approach to explain the normative construction of regional integration within the EU-Africa moral economy.

1.2.1 Critical Discourse Analysis

This section presents the emergence and the evolution of the discourse analysis as of the 1960s, and how the critical discourse analysis was born as a non-homogenous research program with certain commonalities as a result of adopting a more critical approach to the discourse analysis. The section also examines the key concepts of critical discourse analysis.

1.2.1.1 Discourse Analysis

The term discourse analysis was first used by Zellig Harris in 1952 who defined it as “a method for the analysis of connected speech (or writing)” to “obtain new information about the particular text we are studying, information that goes beyond descriptive linguistics” (Harris, 1952: 1). After that, the term has turned into a research method in the mid-1960s and become an interdisciplinary approach involving areas beyond linguistics and semiotics, such as pragmatics, psychology, sociology, and ethnography (Van Dijk, 2008:7). Due to the engagement of a wide range of disciplines, there is no standard definition of neither discourse nor discourse analysis. Aydın-Düzgit and Rumelili (2019: 286) define discourse in a broad sense as “taken-for-granted structures of shared meaning” such as ideas, norms, identity, and culture. Based on this definition of discourse, discourse analysis is a methodology of using discourse analytical tools to analyze discursive practices to identify structures of shared meaning (Aydın-Düzgit and Rumelili, 2019: 286). Paltridge (2006: 2) also defines discourse analysis in a

generalized manner as a language analysis approach that concentrates on the linguistic futures of the texts, both spoken and written, and examines the patterns of the language across the texts and also their relationship with the social and cultural setting in which the texts were created and being used. In this regard, discourse analysis looks at how the relationship between participants influences the use of language and how this use of language influences social identities and relations (Paltridge, 2006: 2).

Van Dijk (2008: 6) identified commonalities in new disciplines that emerged in humanities and social sciences in the mid-1960s, studying language and communication in a new way, such as pragmatics, psycholinguistics, sociolinguistics, and ethnography of speaking. These disciplines focused on contexts of languages and language uses (Van Dijk, 2008: 6). They took linguistics in a wider frame and studied action and interaction, including non-verbal aspects such as gestures, films, and images (Wodak and Meyer, 2016: 163). They also focused on dynamic (socio)-cognitive or interactional moves and strategies and studied the functions of contexts of language use (Wodak and Meyer, 2016: 162). Although they started to study the context in a way limited to the “verbal context” of previous and following words and sentences, it is only at the end of the 1970s and early 1980s that they started to study social, historical, and cultural contexts of discourse structures (Van Dijk, 2008: 7).

Discourse analysis has been a widely used approach within social constructivism. There are several diverse social constructivist approaches, which make it difficult to give an overall description. But Jorgensen and Phillips (2002: 5) identified some common premises as follows: They have a critical approach to the way that we know the world. We know the world by categorization; thus, our knowledge is produced by discourse (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002: 5). This knowledge is also historically and culturally specific and contingent (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002: 5). The characteristics possessed by people are also constructed by social processes and this social construction has also social consequences, which makes some social actions acceptable, while others unthinkable (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002: 6).

Michel Foucault’s discourse theory has been the most influential in the development of contemporary discourse analytical approaches. Adhering to the general

social constructivist premises and accepting the truth as a discursive construction, he claimed that what is true is determined by particular regimes of knowledge, in a particular historical epoch and referred to these as regimes of truth (Foucault, 1994: 112). He was interested in the rules that make statements meaningful.

The contemporary discourse analytical approaches generally adopted Foucault's conception of discourse as the following:

We shall call discourse a group of statements in so far as they belong to the same discursive formation; it does not form a rhetorical or formal unity, endlessly repeatable, whose appearance or use in history might be indicated (and, if necessary, explained); it is made up of a limited number of statements for which a group of conditions of existence can be defined. Discourse in this sense is not an ideal, timeless form that also possesses a history; the problem is not therefore to ask oneself how and why it was able to emerge and become embodied at this point in time; it is, from beginning to end, historical — a fragment of history, a unity and discontinuity in history itself, posing the problem of its own limits, its divisions, its transformations, the specific modes of its temporality rather than its sudden irruption in the midst of the complicities of time. (Foucault, 2002: 131)

This notion of the discursive statement, what it is, and how it works developed by Foucault (2002) had a huge impact on the critical character gained by discourse analysis. The statement is not a structure but a function of existence belonging to the signs of a language, which enables them to exist (Foucault, 2002: 86). In this regard, statements create a field of relations between different elements of speaking, which would not exist without the statement, but also gives the statement its own meaning (Nonhoff, 2017: 4). The practice of discourse analysis also operates in the medium of discourse and generates statements in accordance with Foucault's understanding, which also become discursive formations (Nonhoff, 2017: 4). This reflection of its own intervening position with regard

to knowledge and power structures attributed a critical character to discourse analysis which paved the way for the Critical Discourse Analysis movement later on.

1.2.1.2 Critical Discourse Analysis

A team of researchers led by Roger Fowler adopted a more critical approach to study linguistics and discourse towards the end of the 1970s (Wodak and Meyer, 2016: 275). This approach initiated an international movement called Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) in the 1990s. After attending a symposium at the University of Amsterdam, in January 1991 Teun van Dijk, Norman Fairclough, Gunther Kress, Theo van Leeuwen, and Ruth Wodak started to gather to discuss the theories and methods of critical discourse analysis and compare the different approaches, which went through important changes since then (Wodak and Meyer, 2016: 200).

Critical discourse analysis has not been a homogeneous theory with defined tools, but it was developed as a research program including different theoretical and methodological approaches (Wodak, 1999). The main interests of the critical discourse analysts were the political discourse, ideology, discursive reproduction of social power, and fundamental social problems, and the CDA was also inspired by the feminist movement and the critical study of gender, language, and discourse (Van Dijk, 2008: 8).

Despite differences in approaches within this research program, some commonalities were identified by Jorgensen and Phillips (2002). Discursive practices are considered as important social practices that constitute the social world, including social identities and power relations; yet they are also constituted by other societal forces in a dialectical relationship (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002: 65). Language use in social interaction should be analyzed via linguistic textual analysis (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002: 62). Not only the construction of the social world through discursive practices but also their role in creating and reproducing the unequal societal power relations are analyzed (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002: 63). This is what makes critical discourse analysis a critical approach, which aims to reveal the discursive practices' role in furthering the dominant social groups' interests, and which struggles for a social change based on these results (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002: 2).

Fairclough (1995: 132) defines critical discourse analysis as an approach, which explores “[o]ften opaque relationships of causality and determination between (a) discursive practices, events and texts, and (b) wider social and cultural structures, relations and processes”. In his view, CDA discloses how “practices, events and texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations of power and struggles over power” and “how the opacity of these relationships between discourse and society is itself a factor securing power and hegemony” (Fairclough, 1995: 132).

CDA is typically social constructivist, understanding discourse as social constructions, with “real” consequences in social structures, such as discrimination against immigrants (Wodak and Meyer, 2016: 473). Thus, CDA aims to understand the social wrongs that are harmful to human well-being, such as poverty, inequality, lack of freedom, or racism, which could be alleviated through major changes in those systems or orders (Fairclough, 2016).

CDA approaches are analyzing complex social phenomena, thus require interdisciplinary work to understand how the language constitutes and conveys knowledge and implements power and domination in the society (Wodak and Meyer, 2016: 157). CDA scholars use various methodologies and have diverse epistemological positions, ranging from poststructuralism to the theories of the Frankfurt school (Forchthner, 2011). There is no dominant theory in CDA, but rather eclectic approaches that refer to theories on power and society with Foucauldian background, social cognition theories, or concepts borrowed from larger theoretical traditions (Wodak and Meyer, 2016: 425).

CDA uses a wide range of methods, from analysis of grammar, rhetoric, narrative, and semantic, to experiments, observation, interviews, etc. (Wodak and Meyer, 2016: 179). CDA researchers aim to deconstruct ideologies and power by analysing semiotic data while making their positioning explicit and remaining self-reflective through the research process (Wodak and Meyer, 2016: 222). CDA is not an explicit method to describe the structures or strategies of discourses but rather signifies being critical in approaching them.

1.2.1.3 Key Concepts of Critical Discourse Analysis

Although CDA is not a homogeneous theory but a research program with different theoretical and methodological approaches, these approaches have a common ground in attaching importance to discursive practices as the constituents of the social world and being critical by investigating unequal societal power relations created and reproduced by these discursive practices (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002: 63) as explained in the previous section. Since the common aim of CDA is to deconstruct these unequal power relationships and ideologies constructed and reproduced by discourse, this section describes the key concepts as “discourse”, “critical”, “power” and “ideology” shared by most CDA scholars.

1.2.1.3.1 Discourse

“Discourse” generally refers to both written and oral texts in the English-speaking world, however, Reisigl and Wodak distinguish between “discourse” and “text” (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016: 736). Texts are considered as parts of discourses, which objectify linguistic actions by bridging speech production and speech reception and make speech acts durable. Lemke (1995: 6) defines texts as the concrete realization of discourses that are abstract forms of knowledge (Wodak and Meyer, 2016: 259).

On the other hand, the term discourse has various definitions in the discourse analysis field. The term “discourse” may designate the semiotic elements of social life such as language or body language or may designate specific ways of representing specific aspects of social life, such as particular political discourses representing particular problems in different ways (Fairclough, 2012). For the discourse-historical approach that is used in this study, “discourse” refers to structured forms of knowledge, and “texts” pertain to concrete oral utterances or written documents (Wodak and Meyer, 2016: 259).

Critical discourse analysis sees discourse as a social practice, in dialectical relation with the framing situation(s), institution(s), and social structure(s) (Wodak and Meyer, 2016: 245). Discourse is considered as socially constitutive, but also socially conditioned. It has social consequences by constituting social relations, identities,

situations and contributes to sustaining and reproducing the social status quo and also transforming it. It may cause important ideological effects, by contributing to producing and reproducing unequal power relations (Wodak and Meyer, 2016: 249).

Discourse analysis takes discourses not as simple ideas or words, but as societal means of production which produce subjects and reality. In addition to reflecting the “reality”, discourse, as an “institutionalized way of talking” also shapes it, by controlling and reinforcing action and, thus exercising power (Jager and Maier, 2016).

1.2.1.3.2 The “Critical” in Critical Discourse Analysis

The “critical” in CDA means accepting the complexity of social interaction and processes and trying to reveal the contradictions by avoiding easy and dichotomous explanations. Being critical also involves being self-reflective while doing research, since the choice of the object of research and the way that it is being done are firmly associated with the researchers’ values and beliefs (Wodak, 1999).

The development of critical perspectives in discourse analysis is linked with the philosophers of the Enlightenment, Marx, and the Frankfurt School, which accept the necessity of critique and changing the society, in addition to understanding it (van Dijk, 1993). The adoption of the notion of self-reflectiveness comes from Jürgen Habermas (1971). Their neo-Marxist lines are linked with Gramsci (1971) and his followers, such as Stuart Hall (1981). Their theoretical premises are also influenced by the works of Althusser (1971) and Foucault (1980) and the feminist scholarship (Thorne et al., 1983).

CDA scholars’ main concern is social equality and justice, and they are focused on the discursive production or reproduction or power abuse and the resistance against it. (Van Dijk, 2016). They are interested in discourse as a social activity of meaning-making and search the role of discourse in the (re)production of inequalities and discrimination and how it disguises these power relations (Forchtner, 2011).

Critical theories aim at producing critical knowledge that will lead to the emancipation of human beings from domination thanks to self-reflection and awareness. CDA researchers are also driven by socio-economic and political motives. Being

“critical” is associated with particular ethical standards by making one’s position, values, and interests clear transparent (Wodak and Meyer, 2016: 284).

1.2.1.3.3 Ideology, Power and Discourse

The notion of ideology was born at the end of the 18th century in France and since then, gained diverse meanings. Generally, it refers to a systematic and consistent set of attitudes, values, and beliefs of groups of people about certain elements of the social world (Wodak and Meyer, 2016: 307). The concept of “ideology” gained a bad connotation during the times of fascism in the interwar period and the Cold War, due to the hostility of the totalitarian ideology to democracy and the era of “new capitalism” has also added to this bad connotation (Wodak and Meyer, 2016: 307).

The notion of ideology is important for this thesis especially in relation to its dominant nature, which means the role that it plays in legitimizing the abuse of power exerted by dominant groups in the society (Van Dijk, 2006: 729). When the dominated groups embrace the ideologies of the dominant groups as natural, without questioning, ideological dominance takes the form of hegemony (Gramsci, 1971). If there is hegemony, then people, even from different social groups, think about the issues automatically in the same way, without challenging any assumptions pertaining thereto, as if there is no alternative way of thinking. In this regard, van Dijk (1993: 258) accepts the ideologies as worldviews, establishing social cognition which is defined as “schematically organized attitudes [...] formed by general, socially shared opinions, that is, by evaluative beliefs” towards the social world.

Fairclough (2003: 218) defines ideologies as “representations of aspects of the world which contribute to establishing and maintaining relations of power, domination and exploitation” and claims that the analysis of texts is an important part of ideological analysis and critique. In this regard, CDA is interested in the hidden ideology, disguised through the metaphors and analogies in the everyday language, and the functioning of this latent ideology in everyday life and beliefs, through the analysis of texts and their effects in maintaining or changing ideologies. The main aim of CDA is to reveal power

relations and unveil the ideologies embedded in social structures and institutions (Wodak and Meyer, 2016: 222).

One of the main characteristics of ideologies is their power over cognition (Mullins, 1972). This makes power another central concept of CDA. CDA aims at exploring the structures of power and revealing the ideologies behind. Power has diverse meanings. Although there is no agreement on the definition of power, one can start with Weber's suggestion. Weber (1946) defines power as the capacity of an actor to exert his or her will in a social action, even if it is against the other actors' will. In a similar vein, Dhal (1957: 204) claimed that the power relation includes "a successful attempt by *A* to get *a* to do something he would not otherwise do". Bachrach and Baratz (1975: 902) added to this the decision-making aspect which means winning the issues once they appear, the control over non-decision-making processes, which means preventing both overt and covert conflicts from even surfacing by shaping political consensus. Lukes (2005: 109), accepting these two dimensions of power as control over decision-making and non-decision-making processes in overt or covert conflict situations, added a third dimension of power which is to "secure the consent to domination of willing subjects" by shaping their beliefs and desires.

Foucault (1975) also concentrates on the structural dimension of power and combines the concepts of power and dominance. Dominance is not only the exercise of the will of one person on the other overtly, but it is the exercise of pressure by diverse actors simultaneously within society to subjects who are even unaware (Wodak and Meyer, 2016: 336). This is where discourse plays a crucial role in conveying power and domination in society (Hall, 1992). Discourses are shaped by power and social domination and in turn, they feed into and reproduce them. CDA is interested in analysing the dynamics of power and control in society, which are mostly invisible. Thus, CDA investigates the linguistic manifestations of power relations, discrimination, and social inequality in modern societies. CDA analyzes the texts which are the sites of struggle where different discourses and ideologies contend, and discursive differences are negotiated (Wodak and Meyer, 2016: 381).

1.2.2 Major Approaches to Critical Discourse Analysis

After presenting the evolution of critical discourse analysis and the key concepts used in common in major approaches in critical discourse analysis, this section examines those major approaches in their differences. First, it examines the socio-cognitive approach and dialectical relational approach in detail, whereas the next section separately discusses DHA, which is one of the main approaches used in this thesis.

1.2.2.1 The Socio-cognitive Approach

Van Dijk's socio-cognitive approach claims that the relations between society and discourse are the result of cognitive mediation (Van Dijk, 2016: 1316). The structures of discourse and social practices can only influence each other through the social representations in peoples' minds, as well as their interpretations of social environments, and the "same cognitive interface of mental models, knowledge, attitudes and ideologies" (Van Dijk, 2016: 1316). Discourse and reproduction of inequality and dominance are related to the mental representations of social actors. Mental models are developed based on past experiences and are "subjective representations of events or situations", schematic structure of which helps for the identification and categorization of these events and situations (Gyollai, 2020: 4). The socio-cognitive approach claims that this social cognition is a necessary intermediary between discourse and dominance (van Dijk, 1993).

Van Dijk (2016) claims that people have socially shared cognitions of the world which means shared attitudes or ideologies as the members of the same epistemic community. According to this view, their personal experiences are interpreted through mental models, which are more or less like those of others, based on these shared cognitions. This allows cooperation and communication among people and also affects the development of discourse (van Dijk, 2016). Different discourses in the same social situation are explained by this cognitive mediation of shared knowledge and ideologies and their influence on "personal mental models" that control the discourse structures (van Dijk, 2016: 1414).

The socio-cognitive approach differs from more structuralist and deterministic formulations as it claims that the relation between discourse and social situations is

intersubjective and interpretative, and it accepts the influence of material conditions on discourse only through the mental representations and interpretations by individuals (van Dijk, 2008: 119). Gyollai (2020) connects this theory of mental models of the socio-cognitive approach developed by Van Dijk, with phenomenological sociology and suggested integrating the theory of intersubjective understanding developed by Schutz (1972) into the socio-cognitive approach. He claims that “intersubjective understanding, the relationship between subjective and objective knowledge, and our own constitutive role in the construction of social meaning”, that are the main problems of phenomenological sociology are also related to the Socio-cognitive Approach’s emphasis on the role of the definition of a social situation by participants (Gyollai, 2020: 3).

Van Dijk claims that while the perception and understanding of discourse occur in short-term memory, personal and past experiences that are resulted from this understanding in terms of knowledge, ideologies, norms, and values are stored in episodic and long-term memories (van Dijk, 2003: 208). Wodak (2006: 184) argues that storage of these past experiences as “event models in episodic and long-term memories” could be well integrated into DHA which includes a detailed historical dimension in explaining “why certain events, experiences, utterances, and so forth were perceived and reproduced in specific, prejudiced ways [...] and how they are tied to specific ideologies in certain periods of time in specific socio-political contexts”.

Van Dijk’s (1995:18) definition of ideology as “the interface between the cognitive representations and processes underlying discourse and action, on the one hand, and the societal position and interests of social groups, on the other hand” had an impact on various studies. Begoña Núñez-Perucha (2011:102) applied a socio-cognitive approach in her analysis of “ideologies of resistance in feminist discourse” to investigate the women’s conceptualisation of their unequal position vis-à-vis men by focusing on the cognitive structures producing the ideological categories which play role in women’s self-conceptualisation. Based on the socio-cognitive approach’s group-based ideology definition, Sing (2011: 168) also claimed that ‘new’ and ‘old’ have been attributes to define group-membership in case of the construction of European identities and cognitive representation of ideological discourse structures had played a role in this dichotomous evaluation of attributes. This socio-cognitive process of production and interpretation was

accepted as an important dimension of discourse by dialectical relational approach (Clark et al. 1991: 44), as well, which is explained in detail in the following section.

1.2.2.2 The Dialectical Relational Approach

The Dialectical Relational Approach is developed by Fairclough (2016) and analyzes the dialectical relations between discourse and social structures. Being part of critical discourse analysis, it aims to understand the dialectical relationship between discourse and other parts of social life, with the objective of explaining the part discourse plays in the production and reproduction of unequal power relations and changes pertaining thereto (Fairclough, 2016). It also aims to understand how the dominant logic is resisted by people to identify the ways to overcome the obstacles to improve well-being (Fairclough, 2016).

Fairclough (2016) classifies three different uses of the term discourse: first, it is used to refer to a meaning-making element of social practice. Its second use is related to the language associated with a specific field, such as “political discourse”. Finally, discourse also refers to a way of talking about the world from a certain social perspective, such as the “neo-liberal discourse of globalization”. To avoid confusion, Fairclough (2016) claims that he uses the term “semiosis” for the first common use of the term discourse, i.e., “meaning-making as an element of the social process”, in contrast to Laclau and Mouffe (1985:113), who consider all social practice as discourse. For Fairclough, discourse analysis is concerned with all semiotic modalities, i.e., visual images and body language, in addition to language (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002).

Jorgensen and Phillips (2002) argue that Fairclough’s approach takes discourse in a dialectical relationship with the social world in which discourse plays a large part in constructing the social realm to the extent that it (re)produces knowledge, identities, and power relations. It is constituted by social structures and practices which consist of both discursive and non-discursive components (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002). Thus, although Fairclough acknowledges the discourse’s constructive role, he differs from a more poststructuralist approach by accepting that there are many aspects of social practice, and discourse is just one of them (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002). However, this dialectical

relational approach takes language as a basic component of social life, in dialectical relation with other parts of social life (Fairclough, 2003). It tries to understand the dialectical relations between semiosis and the issues, problems, and changes in the social processes (Fairclough, 2016).

As Fairclough's approach accepts the dialectical relationship between semiosis and other components of social life, it has a more transdisciplinary methodology. It applies discourse analysis as a point of entry to understand the research object and benefits from different theories and disciplines to reveal the relations among the level of events and the level of social practices, as well as orders of texts and discourse (Fairclough, 2016). In his view, the dialogue between different disciplines and theories brought together for the research is also a "source for the theoretical and methodological development of each of them" (Fairclough, 2016: 1871)

Intertextuality is another important feature of the Dialectical Relational Approach, shared with other CDA approaches. Fairclough (2003: 39) takes intertextuality in a broad sense and considers intertextuality as the presence of both direct and indirect speech elements of other texts within a text. He also links assumptions to the intertextuality as connections of the present texts with an unsaid background, which is left vague (Fairclough, 2003: 40).

Intertextuality and interdisciplinarity are important to all CDA approaches, including the Socio-cognitive and Dialectical Relational Approaches, as well as the Discourse Historical Approach which is the main approach adopted in this thesis. Wodak and Meyer (2016) claim that being deductive is also common in CDA approaches that are explained so far (i.e., Socio-cognitive and Dialectical Relational Approaches) and this entails them to adopt a general perspective in dealing with research issues, based on a few examples in line with their claims. This is in contrast with the Discourse Historical Approach explained in the next section, which has a more inductive perspective, which employs detailed case studies and extensive data collection (Wodak and Meyer, 2016).

1.2.2.3 The Discourse Historical Approach

Having examined the two major approaches to the critical discourse analysis in the previous section, this section focuses on another major critical discourse analysis approach, which is DHA. After reviewing the principles of this approach, the section examines the tools of the DHA in detail, which is also used in this thesis.

1.2.2.3.1 Principles of Discourse Historical Approach

The main interest of the DHA is the reproduction of ideologies through linguistic and other semiotic practices. This approach aims to deconstruct the hegemony of discourses by revealing the ideologies behind them, which create shared social identities and establish, maintain, or resist the unequal power relations (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016). The DHA has a focus on identity construction. It explores how us/self and them/other are constructed through discourse. The DHA was first used for analyzing the antisemitic stereotypical images in public discourses during the presidential campaign of former UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim in 1986 in Austria by Wodak and revealed the hidden National-Socialist past of General Waldheim (Wodak et al.², as cited in Reisigl and Wodak, 2016). It was then expanded to other studies such as racist discrimination against migrants from Romania after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and discourse about national identity in Austria (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016).

For the DHA, texts are the sites of social struggle, which illustrate the footprint of ideological struggles for dominance and hegemony and language is a means used by the powerful to acquire and perpetuate power (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016). The DHA tries to reveal how the linguistic forms are employed in expressing and manipulating power (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016). Besides the discursive establishment and continuation of power via grammatical forms, the DHA is also interested in the “control of the social occasion” of the use of language, via the control over the choice of the “genre of a text” or the access to the public sphere (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016: 644).

² Wodak, R., Nowak, P., Pelikan, J., Gruber, H., de Cillia, R. and Mitten, R. (1990). *Wir sind alle unschuldige Täter. Diskurshistorische Studien zum Nachkriegsantisemitismus*. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

The DHA is adherent of the socio-philosophical orientation of Horkheimer and Adorno's Critical Theory. The DHA's understanding of critique is mainly about deconstructing and deciphering power structures from the "perspective of those who suffer" and this conforms with other CDA approaches (Forchtner, 2011). The difference lies in the DHA's adherence to the Frankfurt School, with its foundational notion of emancipation, and its call for self-determination, social recognition, and transformation towards fewer inequalities (Forchtner, 2011).

The DHA is an interdisciplinary approach, which investigates complex, multifaceted social phenomena, employing different analytical perspectives. Unlike other CDA approaches, the DHA investigates "discourse" in relation to a macro topic or multiple perspectives (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016). The DHA follows the triangulation principle. Triangulation means treating discourses through multiple methodologies and theoretical perspectives in order to reveal the interconnection between discourses and extra-linguistic social structures (Wodak et al. 2009). Triangulation brings intertextuality in the DHA and serves for finding out the discursive patterns in different realms that enable the (re)production of the discourses or the alternative discursive constructions in unofficial and private settings. (Aydın-Düzgit, 2014). In analysing the moral economy of the EU-Africa interregional relationship, this principle permits this thesis to combine political, economic, historical, and linguistic perspectives based on the analysis of different data sets such as newspaper articles, political speeches, and official reports with the aim of portraying a detailed picture of this relationship in a historical context.

The DHA investigates intertextual and interdiscursive relationships in historical context to explain the change in discourses in connection with the socio-political change (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016). Intertextuality refers to the connection and relationship between texts. More concretely, it concerns the ways through which a text draws from another text in the present or the past (Aydın-Düzgit, 2014: 358). This relationship could be established through referring to the same topic or actors, or same events or directly transferring another text's main arguments (Wodak, 2008: 3). While transferring an argument, first, the argument is removed from its initial context, which is called "de-contextualization". After that, it is restated in a new context, through which it gets a new

meaning. This latter is called “recontextualization” (Wodak, 2008: 3). Interdiscursivity, on the other hand, refers to the linkage between different discourses and implies that discourses draw from each other. One discourse may refer to elements of other discourses, such as topics or subtopics (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016).

The DHA examines interdiscursive and intertextual relationships between texts, genres, and discourses within specific fields of action (Resign and Wodak, 2016). Girth³ calls “field of action” as a segment of the respective social reality that creates the “frame” of discourse (as cited in Reisigl and Wodak, 2016). Fields of action are differentiated according to the functions of discursive practices (Wodak, 2011). For example, in the arena of political action, eight different fields are defined by eight political functions (formation of public attitudes, opinions and will, lawmaking procedure, political advertising, inter-party formation of attitudes, political control, organization of international/interstate relations, political executive and administration) (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016). Wodak (2011) illustrates how political action fields are linked to specific genres of texts, which refer to specific discourse topics. For example, the organization of international/interstate relations as a field of action is linked to political genres of texts such as speeches on the occasion of a state visit, inaugural addresses, speeches in meetings/sittings/summits of supranational organizations, etc. On the other hand, the formation of public attitudes, opinions and will take shape through press releases, press conferences, interviews, talk shows, speeches of members of parliament, articles, books, lectures, etc. (Wodak, 2011). Texts from different political genres may refer to similar, intersected, or interconnected discourse topics. The intersection of discourse topics referred to by different texts reveals the intertextual relationship. The DHA analyzes these intertextual and interdiscursive relationships between fields of action, text genres, and macro discourse topics (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016).

The DHA applied in this thesis focuses on the organization of international relations, specifically interregional relations between the EU and Africa, and the formation of public attitudes and opinions with regard to the nature of this relationship.

³ Girth, H. (1996). Texte im politischen Diskurs. Ein Vorschlag zur diskursorientierten Beschreibung von Textsorten. *Muttersprache*, 106: 66-80.

This analysis aims to reveal the formation of the discourse topic “regional integration in Africa” and its relationship with other discourse topics related to the organization of this interregional relationship, as well as the intertextual relationship with other fields of action, such as the formation of public opinion.

1.2.2.3.2 Tools of Discourse Historical Approach

There are three dimensions in DHA: the identification of the specific topic or content of a specific discourse, the analysis of discursive strategies, and the analysis of context. Discourse strategies are generally analyzed by asking five questions:

1. How are persons, objects, phenomena/ events, processes, and actions named and referred to linguistically?
 2. What characteristics, qualities, and features are attributed to social actors, objects, phenomena/ events and processes?
 3. What arguments are employed in the discourse in question?
 4. From what perspective are these nominations, attributions, and arguments expressed?
 5. Are the respective utterances articulated overtly, intensified, or mitigated?
- (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016)

The responses to these questions reveal the construction and naturalizations of different “we”s (Aydın-Düzgit, 2014: 359). The discursive practices that are addressed by those questions are called discursive strategies (Aydın-Düzgit, 2014: 359). In the DHA five groups of discursive strategies are analyzed: nomination, predication, argumentation, perspectivization, and intensification or mitigation, as provided in Table 1 (reproduced from Reisigl and Wodak, 2016). The nomination strategy aims to achieve the discursive construction of social actors, objects, phenomena, events, processes, and actions. The DHA searches to find out how these social actors, objects, phenomena, events, processes, and actions are named and referred to linguistically in the text, via the use of tropes, substitutions, metaphors, and metonymies, to create ingroups and outgroups in discourse (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016).

Table 1. Discursive Strategies

Strategy	Objectives	Devices
Nomination	Discursive Construction of social actors, objects, phenomena, events, processes, and actions	-membership categorization devices, deictics, anthroponyms, etc. -tropes such as metaphors, metonymies, and synecdoches -verbs and nouns used to denote processes and actions etc.
Predication	Discursive qualification of social actors, objects, phenomena, events, processes, and actions (positively and negatively)	-(stereotypical) evaluative attributions of negative or positive traits (e.g., in the form of adjectives, appositions, prepositional phrases, relative clauses, conjunctive clauses, infinitive clauses, and participle clauses or groups) -explicit predicates or predicative nouns/adjectives/pronouns -collocations -comparisons, similes, metaphors, and other rhetorical figures (including metonymies, hyperboles, litotes, euphemisms) -allusions, evocations, presuppositions/implications, etc.)
Argumentation	Justification and questioning of claims of truth and normative rightness	-topoi (formal or more content-related) -fallacies
Perspectivization	Positioning the speaker's or writer's point of view and expressing involvement or distance	-deictics -direct, indirect, or free indirect speech -quotation marks, discourse markers/particles -metaphors -animating prosody, etc.
Intensification or Mitigation	Modifying (intensifying or mitigating) the illocutionary force and	-diminutives or augmentatives

	thus the epistemic or deontic status of utterances	-(modal) particles, tag questions, subjunctives, hesitations, vague expressions, etc. -hyperboles or litotes -indirect speech acts (e.g., question instead of assertion) -verbs of saying, feeling, thinking, etc.
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Source: The author's own table as reproduced from Reisigl and Wodak (2016: 787)

The predication strategy intends to discursively qualify social actors, objects, phenomena, events, processes, and actions (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016). Thus, the DHA analyzes the characteristics, qualities, and features of social actors, objects, phenomena, events, and processes, via attributes, collocations, predicative nouns/adjectives, and other rhetorical devices as implicit predicates (Aydın-Düzgit, 2012).

The argumentation strategy serves for the justification or challenging validity claims of truth and normative rightness. Argumentation strategies can take many forms, among which *topos* is most commonly employed (Aydın-Düzgit, 2014: 359). *Topoi* (singular *topos*) are “parts of argumentation that belong to the obligatory, either explicit or inferable, premises” (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 74). “They are the content-related warrants or “conclusion rules” that connect the argument or arguments with the conclusion, the claim” (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 74-75). The argumentation strategy aims at convincing the recipient with persuasive arguments and/or suggestive fallacies, which are fallacious *topoi* as detailed in Table 2 below. *Topoi* are based on social conventions and not always explicit but can be revealed through conditional or causal paraphrases (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016). The *topoi* of culture and history, as well as *topos* of threat, are the most used in the discursive construction of national identities (Aydın-Düzgit, 2014: 359).

Table 2. List of Fallacies Most Frequently Identified in this Study

Fallacies: When the <i>topoi</i> are fallacious and not reasonable, and the “rules for rational disputes and constructive arguing” such as “freedom of arguing”, “obligation to give reasons”, “correct reference to the previous discourse the antagonist”, “obligation to ‘matter-of-factness’”, “correct reference to implicit premises”, “acceptance of shared starting points”, “use of plausible schemes of argumentation”, “logical validity”, “acceptance of the discussion’s results” and “clarity of expression and correct interpretation” are violated, they are called <i>fallacies</i> (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016: 819) . List of Fallacies: -<i>argumentum ad populum</i>: fallacy which aims to “win popular assent to a conclusion by arousing feelings of the multitude” (Copi et al., 2014: 112). -<i>faulty/hasty generalization fallacy</i>: fallacy which refers to the conclusion when there is not enough evidence to support it (Tindale, 2007: 153). -<i>ad verecundiam</i> (argument from authority): <i>fallacy which</i> refers to cases “in which reference to authority is open to the imputation of fallacy” (Bentham, 1824: 44) -<i>causal fallacy / non sequitur</i>: fallacy which refers to a conclusion that does not logically come from the premises (Van Vleet, 2011: 61). -<i>single cause fallacy</i>: fallacy in which events are reduced to only one cause (Van Vleet, 2011: 34). -<i>fallacy of continuity</i>: <i>fallacy which</i> refers to assuming that “similar initial conditions will give similar results” (Goodin, 1996: 94)
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In analyzing the perspectivization strategy, the DHA looks at how the speaker positions his/her point of view and expresses his/her distance or engagement. Finally, intensification or mitigation strategies modify (increase or weaken) the illocutionary force and epistemic or deontic status of utterances, through hyperboles, diminutive or augmentatives, overlexicalization, omissions, and disclaimers (Aydın-Düzgit, 2012).

In conclusion, the DHA takes discourse as semiotic practices clustered within a specific field of social action (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016: 733). These discursive practices are connected to a macro-topic and argumentation schemes about truth and normative validity claims, dependent on the context and related to other texts, utterances, and discourse fragments (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016). In this regard, the DHA rests upon three main pillars. First, macro discourse topics, which are the main contents of the themes and discourses in the narrative on a certain subject are described (Aydın-Düzgit, 2014: 358). Second, discursive strategies used in the narrative to achieve particular social, political, psychological, or linguistic goals are explored (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016). The third pillar

of the DHA consists of analyzing the linguistic means that are employed to realize these discursive strategies (Aydın-Düzgit, 2014: 359).

Reisigl and Wodak (2016) suggest a research design for a large-scale interdisciplinary DHA project which should follow an eight-step program:

1. Literature review and activation of preceding theoretical knowledge through recollection, reading and discussion of previous research;
2. Systematic collection of data and context information;
3. Selection and downsizing of data for specific analyzes;
4. Specification of the research questions and formulation of assumptions on the basis of the literature review and first skimming of the data;
5. Qualitative pilot analysis, including a context analysis, macro-analysis and micro analysis to test first assumptions and to make further specification of assumptions;
6. Detailed case studies, both qualitatively but in part also quantitatively;
7. Formulation of a critique;
8. Practical application of analytical results, if possible (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016: 795).

These are the overall steps for an ideal-typical DHA project research design. Concerning a smaller project, such as a Ph.D. thesis, Reisigl and Wodak (2016: 805) find it legitimate to make choices from within this list and conduct a few case studies, based on restricted data collected from a few genres. What is important is to retain the three dimensions of the DHA mentioned above in a pilot study which could be extended to more comprehensive studies or subject to a follow-up project later on (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016).

1.3 Combining the Moral Economy and Discourse Historical Approaches

The moral economy as an approach with a certain degree of positivist and critical realist character acknowledges the existence of the objective reality related to human flourishing or human suffering, yet also deals with the social construction of this reality through norms and discourses. This thesis has adopted the moral economy approach to

analyze the social construction of the norms and discourses related to the relationship between Europe and Africa, with the possible discrepancies in the outcomes as a result of this moral construction.

Although the moral economy approach offers a suitable approach to analyze both the reality and its social construction, the recent studies of the moral economy offer a limited discussion and methodology to assess the way in which the norms are infused in economic structures and how they evolve in response to institutional changes (Bernstein, 2007; Langan, 2016). Langan suggested that in order to address this lack, discourse analysis could be the central method to reveal the role of discourse in instituting norms in the moral economy of the EU-Africa Association, their dissemination, and reconfiguration in response to shifting commercial and political interests (Langan, 2016).

The DHA is interested in the “real” consequences of socially constructed discourses in social structures (Wodak and Meyer, 2016: 473) and how linguistics and other semiotic practices conciliate and reproduce ideologies in social institutions. This method aims to deconstruct the hegemony of specific discourses by unravelling the ideologies behind them which work for establishing, perpetuating, or resisting dominance. While adopting a moral economy approach, this thesis uses DHA methodology to overcome the shortcomings of the moral economy approach. It relies on this social constructivist stance of the moral economy approach and combines it with the DHA methodology to deconstruct the ideological hegemony behind the regional integration process in Africa. The DHA is used to demonstrate the interdiscursive relationship between development and regional integration discourses to reveal the construction of a specific regional integration norm in the moral economy of the EU-Africa relations.

Based on the eight-step programme for an ideal-typical discourse-historical analysis (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016), this thesis discusses the role of norms and ideas in the EU’s Foreign Policy, with a focus on the specific regional integration norm. The evolution of the EU-Africa relations is also discussed here because “discourses are historical” (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016: 530), and this makes the historical context important for analysis. Finally, data on African regional integration discourse by various

EU actors (states, politicians, EU institutions, NGOs) from various semiotic media, genres, and texts are analyzed with respect to their macrostructures, microstructures, and contexts, with the aim to reveal how norms are used to legitimize certain policy practices for public acceptability despite the negative results for African countries.

This study asks the following questions to the downsized data to explore the discursive strategies used to construct the regional integration norm within the EU-Africa moral economy: How are European and African states named and referred to linguistically within the moral economy of the EU-Africa interregional relations? What traits, characteristics, qualities, and features are attributed to them? How is the regional integration norm linguistically constructed within the moral economy of the EU-Africa interregional relations? What validity claims of truth are explicitly made in the EU's regional integration discourse for Africa? By means of what arguments and argumentation schemes does the EU justify and legitimate a specific model of regional integration? From which ideological perspective are these arguments expressed? How does the regional integration discourse relate to other EU policy discourses on Africa? What are the moral implications of EU regional integration discourse on African regionalization?

In the DHA, the answers to those questions give us all the discursive strategies, including the nomination, predication, argumentation, perspectivization, and intensification or mitigation, to construct a specific regional integration norm within the EU-Africa moral economy. These questions are also related to how the EU's identity is constructed through discourse. Once it is revealed how the regional integration norm is constructed, a critique is formulated based on the empirical analysis, in line with the moral economy approach, to discuss the legitimations used for certain choices and the inconsistency with the outcome.

2. THE ROLE OF NORMS IN EU FOREIGN POLICY

The previous chapter discussed the moral economy approach and the DHA in detail to understand how they could be combined to search for the discursive construction of regional integration as a norm in the moral economy of the EU-Africa interregional relations and the role of this discourse in obscuring the impact of EU foreign policy on the regionalization of Africa. This chapter examines the role of norms in shaping EU foreign policy and the limits of Normative Power Europe as an approach. It also explores the role of regional integration norm in EU foreign policy, which allows for a focus on the discursive construction of this norm in the moral economy of the EU-Africa interregional relations as provided in the last Chapter.

2.1 The EU's Actorness and Role Conceptions

European Foreign Policy is defined as “the ensemble of the international activities of the European Union, including output from all three of the EU's pillars” (Hill, 2004: 145). It has been subject to discussion with regard to the EU's characteristics and its role that make the Union distinct from other foreign policy actors. The role of norms and the EU's responsibilities in its external relations have been widely discussed, which led to the different characterizations of the EU's actorness and role in global politics.

Within this literature on the international role of the EU in the 1970s, Sjöstedt (1977) discussed the capabilities of an international actor and tried to measure the extent to which an international actor the EU is. He defined actorness as the “capacity to behave actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system” (Sjöstedt⁴, as cited in Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 16). Hill (1993: 309) refers to Sjöstedt's definition of the international actor as “an entity which is (1) *delimited* from others, and from its environment; which is (2) *autonomous*, in the sense of making its own laws and decisions [...] and which (3) possesses certain *structural prerequisites* for action on the international level, such as legal personality, a set of diplomatic agents and the capability to conduct negotiations with third parties”. Wallace (1978) claimed that Sjöstedt's model lacks to portray a complete picture of what an international actor really is and concludes

⁴ Sjöstedt, G. (1977) *The External Role of the European Community*, Farnborough: Saxon House.

“that the Community according to the criteria used seems to be some sort of half-developed international actor”⁵ (as cited in Wallace, 1978).

Following the discussions about the sui generis character of the EU between a state and an international organization, actorness is defined by Hill (1993: 306) as the ability to agree and dispose of resources and instruments to act upon expectations in the international level, with an impact on events. Based on this definition Hill tried to conceptualize Europe’s international role and made a differentiation between the Community’s actual and potential capabilities by looking at the functions that the European Community has performed so far or might perform in the future (Hill, 1993: 310). He claimed that there is a capability-expectations gap in terms of the EU’s impact in the world (Hill, 1993: 321).

Bretherton and Vogler (2006: 2) define an international actor as an entity that is capable of agency, which means formulating and acting upon decisions. Agency is limited by the internal character and capabilities, as well as external opportunities. Opportunities are defined as external ideas and events that constrain the actorness, which are discursively constructed but also in connection with material conditions (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 23). By presence, Bretherton and Vogler (2006: 25) mean the ability to have an external influence by shaping others’ perceptions, expectations, and behaviours. This influence is a consequence of one’s identity, which is one of the most important elements of actorness (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 26). Based on this definition, Bretherton and Vogler (2006: 34) see the EU as a sui generis actor “under construction”, whose identity and roles as an international actor are socially constructed and reconstructed.

Aggestam (2006: 11) proposes role theory analysis based on sociological role theory to understand how roles are constructed, maintained, and reconstructed in foreign policy. The sociological concept of “role” was introduced in foreign policy analysis by Kalevi Holsti⁶ (as cited in Aggestam, 2006: 13) who argued that the foreign policy choices

⁵ Sjöstedt, G. (1977). *The External Role of the European Community*, Farnborough: Saxon House.

⁶ Holsti, K. (1970). National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy, *International Studies Quarterly*, 14:3.

of a state were influenced by its national role conception, which is a cognitive construct, a product of the socialization process of a nation, influenced by its own culture and history. In this regard, a role conception refers to the images related to the function and performance of the EU in the international system conceived by European policymakers (Aggestam, 2006: 19). It helps explain EU foreign policy choices, not only by traditional interest maximization but also policy-makers' perceptions about the obligations and commitments of the EU as an international actor in the system (Aggestam, 2006: 25).

Role theory provides a useful tool to analyze the evolution in the EU's foreign policy through the shifts in its various role conceptions. This thesis focuses on the normative power Europe conception, which is explained in detail in the following section. Before that, it is important to elucidate the civilian and military power Europe concepts to understand two main role conceptions in the opposing ends that were claimed for the EU.

François Duchêne (1973) conceived the EU as a civilian power. The novelty and strength of this conception emanate from its use of economic and political means, instead of military ones, to promote its own model of ensuring stability and security (Sjursen, 2006). At the beginning of the 1970s, François Duchene claimed that Europe was a "civilian power" that was "long on economic power and relatively short on armed force" and he suggested that the European Community would be an "exemplar of a new stage in political civilisation" (Manners, 2002). According to Duchene, the European Community (EC) would have a "chance to demonstrate the influence which can be wielded by a large political cooperative formed to exert essentially civilian forms of power" (Duchêne, 1973: 19). As a "civilian power", it was for the advantage of the European Community to domesticate international relations and to "bring to international problems the sense of common responsibility and structures of contractual politics which have in the past been associated almost exclusively with "home" and not foreign, that is, *alien* affairs" (Smith, 2005).

According to Kenneth Twitchett⁷ (as cited in Manners, 2002), the three defining aspects of a civilian power are the primacy of diplomatic cooperation as a solution to international problems, the priority given to economic means to accomplish national targets, and the employment of legally-binding supranational institutions in international relations. Hanns Maull (1990) argues that a civilian power cooperates with others and prioritizes non-military and economic means to achieve national objectives and goals. Military power is used only to secure other means of international management and supranational structures are preferred while addressing critical matters in international relations.

According to Karen Smith (2005), a civilian power is “an actor, which uses civilian means for persuasion, to pursue civilian ends, and whose foreign policy-making process is subject to democratic control or public scrutiny”. Smith was one of the advocates of the advantages of being a civilian power and pursuing a “different kind of international relations” while quitting the power politics among its members. She claimed that shifting from a civilian to military power “would represent the culmination of a ‘state-building’ project” (Smith, 2005).

Hedley Bull (1982) claimed that there was a contradiction with regard to the concept of civilian power since the exertion of the power of influence by civilian actors required a strategic environment guaranteed by the military power of the states that they did not control. He criticized the notion of civilian power as an ineffective instrument. He claimed that the divergence of interests in certain issues might necessitate a disengagement from reliance on the United States in defence matters, and in that case, Western Europe would need to be self-sufficient to preserve the military power balance with the Soviet Union (Bull, 1982). On the other hand, holding a very Eurocentric view, Smith (2005) describes the characteristics of being a military power as using military means, prioritizing coercion to influence other actors, having an undemocratic foreign policy-making process, and pursuing unilaterally military ends.

⁷ Twitchett, K. (1976). *Europe and the World: The External Relations of the Common Market*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

On the other hand, some analysts have claimed that the EU has gradually evolved into military power. Whitman (1998) argues that the Treaty on European Union (TEU) was the sign of the member states' aim to shift from "civilian power" Europe towards developing and adding a defence dimension to the EU's international identity. Hyde-Price (2006: 230) claims that in post-Cold War Europe, which is characterized by multipolarity, the states strategically tended towards maximization of security because there is no hegemonic power to ensure security. In his view, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) represents a response developed by the member states of the EU to the security-related uncertainties, which is a tool for coalitional coercive diplomacy and military crisis management as defined by Petersberg Tasks and European Security Strategy (Hyde-Price, 2006: 230). The failure of civilian power Europe in the Balkans is considered as the motive for EU member states to develop an ESDP (Hyde-Price, 2006: 231).

However, many authors asserting the EU as a civilian power rely on that the EU concentrates on economic means to achieve its objectives, keeping military power only to safeguard other means, and thus, it can still be a civilian power while retaining military instruments (Smith, 2005: 7). Pursuing civilian ends is considered the most important criterion for being a civilian power. For some authors, although Petersberg tasks include the use of military instruments, they are only one of the several instruments that the EU could use, especially as a last resort (Smith, 2005: 9). According to Stavridis (2001:10), using military means might be necessary for a civilian power to pursue civilian ends, especially in promoting human rights and democratic principles worldwide. In his view, the threat of the use of force is seen as necessary when promoting particular norms (Stavridis, 2001: 15). Helene Sjursen (2006: 239) also argues that a reaction responsibility would arise if the essential norms are clearly and systematically damaged.

According to Hill (1990), civilian powers' instruments are persuasion and negotiation while managing international issues, on the other hand, power blocs employ coercion. Karen Smith (2005: 4) argues that there is a spectrum of instruments between civilian and military ones corresponding to civilian and military ends and civilian instruments can be used quite coercively, even if only with civilian means, obscures the

civilian character of an actor. The use of force in Bosnia-Herzegovina would place the EU in the military power end of the spectrum, however, the humanitarian motives behind the use of force would place it to the other end (Smith, 2005: 7). Therefore, Karen Smith (2005: 17) argues that the EU cannot be considered as a pure civilian power anymore, but it is located somewhere between the civilian and military power ideal-types. And it also encounters ethical dilemmas between its duties towards its citizens and foreigners, like other international actors.

The scholars interpret this issue in different ways. Whitman (2002) argues that the fact that Cologne European Council has committed the EU to have a 60,000-person Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) in June 1999 is a substantial achievement regarding the military power Europe. Smith (2000: 15-16) puts forward that the EU is still a civilian power because the military power will be retained as a residual instrument that will be referred to as the last resort and common defence would remain within the realm of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

After the end of the Cold War, the traditional approaches to European integration were not enough to explain the change in the EU's external relations. Scholars began to be interested in the "software dimensions" of EU politics with different theoretical approaches (Lucarelli, 2006). Since Duchene's first conception of the EU as a civilian power, considerable efforts have been devoted to understanding the EU's global role and what type of power it is. Many analysts studied the EU's role conceptions with different names and through different conceptualizations. Some of these conceptions are as follows: the EU is a gentle power (Merlini, 2001), quiet superpower (Moravcsik, 2002), normative power (Manners, 2002), vanishing mediator (Nicolaidis, 2004), post-modern superpower (McCormick, 2006), responsible actor (Mayer, 2008), ethical power (Aggestam, 2008), small power (Toje, 2010).

2.2 The Normative Power Europe Approach

According to Ian Manners (2002), the EU is constituted as “normatively different”, and its external action cannot only be explained by material interests. In other words, the EU’s power is ideational. He argues that the EU is a normatively constructed polity, and this predisposes it to act in a normative way in international relations.

Along with François Duchêne’s (1972) understanding of the EU as a “civilian power”, Manners’ (2002) Normative Power Europe (NPE) has become a core reference in this literature. However, the idea of normative power is not new in the literature. In addition to the distinction between economic power, military power, and power over opinion used by Bertrand Russell (1938) and E. H. Carr (1962), Johan Galtung⁸ (as cited in Manners, 2002: 239) also claimed that “ideological power is the power of ideas” whose power comes from the penetration of the ideas of power-sender that shape power-recipient’s will (Manners, 2002).

Ian Manners (2002: 239) claims that the “conceptions of the EU as either a civilian power or a military power, both located in discussions of capabilities, need to be augmented with a focus on normative power of an ideational nature characterized by common principles”. He also claims that the normative power EU diffuses its norms in its international relations without primarily employing coercion and military means (Manners, 2006: 184). Instead, the EU diffuses its norms thanks to its ability to shape the conceptions of “normal” in the international arena (Manners, 2002: 239).

In the literature that tends to explain EU’s external action through normative connotations, the EU is depicted as a different actor in international relations since it is not only a civilian power, which does not rely on military instruments but also it is a normative – “ethical” – power (Sjursen, 2006). Manners (2002) asserted that the EU is a new and distinct actor in the international arena, going beyond the anarchic and self-interested state behaviour. According to the NPE approach, the main characteristics of

⁸ Galtung, J. (1973) *The European Community: A Superpower in the Making*, (London: Allen & Unwin).

the EU are its difference from the previous political forms, which motivates it to act in a normative way (Manners and Whitman, 2003).

NPE concept focuses on the EU's ontological foundations. By differentiating the normative power concept from civilian and military ones, Manners emphasized the power of norms and ideas as the basis of EU studies. He explained the sources of the EU's normative power as the destructive experience of world wars (the historical context), its hybrid polity as a post-Westphalian order with supranational and international institutions, and political-legal constitutionalism. These three features helped the formation of and commitment to the common principles of the EU and put those principles at the centre of the EU's international relations (Whitman, 2011). This commitment is also discerned from the EU's representatives' and officials' discourses. The then High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Catherine Ashton stated in a speech that human rights were "woven into everything [that the EU does], in Europe and beyond" (Ashton, 2012).

The NPE approach also seeks to explain the type of influence that the EU has in world politics. Acting normatively in world politics, the EU aims to promote its common principles and norms, through its policies and being a role model with its values. That's how the EU shapes "conceptions of 'normal' in international relations", by directly and indirectly promoting its values (Manners, 2002: 239).

According to the NPE approach, the EU seeks to promote liberal-democratic principles, identified as "common to the member states" in Article 6 of the TEU, such as liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law. The EU also tries to promote less-common social-democratic principles, such as equality, social solidarity, sustainable development, and good governance that are defined in Articles I-2 and I-3 of the Constitution for Europe (Manners, 2004). Although the Constitution for Europe was not ratified, it is important that these principles were placed in this constitutional initiative, as underlined by Manners. However, Whitman (2011) also suggested that these principles are not exclusively European, but they refer to the internalization of the universal principles, adopted as common to the member states with a European reading.

It can also be observed that the EU's relations with third parties are guided by these normative principles. European Security Strategy (Council of the European Union, 2009) puts the well-governed democratic states at the core of providing security. Furthermore, the Strategy underlined "spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights" as the best ways of strengthening international order (Council of the European Union, 2009: 37).

Manners (2002) claims that there are six factors in the diffusion of EU norms. These are contagion, informational diffusion, procedural diffusion, transference, overt diffusion, and cultural filter. Contagion occurs as a result of the unintentional diffusion of EU norms to other actors. Informational diffusion occurs through the strategic and declaratory communications of the EU. Procedural diffusion results from the institutionalization of relationships between the EU and other actors, under cooperation agreements, membership procedures, bilateral or interregional negotiations, etc. Transference involves the EU's transactions with third parties, including trade, development aid, or technical assistance in exchange for financial means, facilitated by rewards, sanctions, or "conditionality". Overt diffusion results from the physical presence of the EU in the third parties such as the presence of Commission delegations and Member State embassies. Finally, cultural filter involves the impact of norms and political learning on others, as a result of interaction between the knowledge construction and the identity construction by the subjects of the norm diffusion.

The difference of the NPE approach from the civilian and military power approaches depends on the extent to which the EU tries to change and shape the norms adopted in international relations, more specifically the notions of the role of economics and the role of force in international relations. The normative power approach is concerned with the EU's intent to set standards for others by diffusing the norms instead of exerting power by using military or economic sources (Manners and Diez, 2007).

The NPE approach puts the emphasis on the "non-material exemplification found in the contagion of norms through imitation (*mimétisme*) and attraction" (Manners and Diez, 2007). While civilian power underlines the absence of military resources, it still

accepts the importance of economic resources or objectives, thus, material power. The NPE approach also avoids reducing the international society to the relations between the states and rather accepts it as constituted by various actors. The conception of NPE is, therefore, distinct from the soft versus hard power dichotomy. It rather aims to bring normative theorizing to international politics (Whitman, 2011).

It is claimed that the NPE approach's discursive construction of the EU as a force for good does not necessarily have to be a bad thing provided that the actors' normative constellations overlap (Diez, 2005). In this regard, the possession and employment of civilian and military capabilities do not infringe the EU's normative identity. Even the use of military force could be normatively justified in certain cases, such as humanitarian interventions. The existence of military power causes a problem when the norms or the construction of European identity is projected in an unreflexive way (Manners and Diez, 2007).

2.3 Debating the EU's Normative Power

There are three basic approaches to the normative implications of European foreign policy. The rationalist approach claims that the EU promotes its norms to take advantage of their adoption, thus the EU's external action is Eurocentric. The constructivist approach suggests that the EU promotes universal norms, thus its action is inclusive. Although it starts reflexively to promote them, its action is driven into unreflexivity through path dependency. Finally, according to sociological institutionalism, the EU promotes its own norms, since institutions promote institutional isomorphism as a default option which is the case from the West towards the rest of the world (Bicchi, 2006).

The debate around the EU's normative power has been concentrated on the universality of EU norms, its inclusiveness, and reflexivity, whether the EU's foreign policy is shaped by norms or interests, and the inconsistent action due to the competing norms or the gap between the norms and the outcome. The extent of these elements shall influence the degree of the EU's normative power.

2.3.1 Universality of EU Norms from Reflexivity and Inclusiveness Points

The debate on the NPE's claim about the universality of norms is part of a broader debate between the cosmopolitan view, which considers the ethical principles as universal natural rights, and the communitarian view, which sees them limited to a particular cultural context (Aggestam, 2008).

Constructivists put forward that the reciprocal disposition of actors changes by repetitive social communication and an initial intentional behaviour is inclined to be routinized conforming to the path dependency argument of historical institutionalism (Bicchi, 2006: 291). For example, authoritarian regimes might develop a concern for human rights in appearance under the pressures of international organizations such as the UN or the EU. However, the discourse developed to conform with those external pressures might restrict their own actions over time and start to shape their conceptions in accordance with human rights principles. In this respect, the justification of the promotion of standards, irrespective of their inclusiveness, comes from the universal character of the norms promoted by the EU such as democracy, rule of law, social justice, and human rights as defined by Manners (2002) and the aim of democratic transformation. Thus, this approach defines normative power based on the universality of values that assures inclusiveness (Bicchi, 2006).

However, the NPE approach's claim for the universality of norms has also been criticized in terms of reflexivity and inclusiveness. Inclusiveness of the foreign policy-making process means the involvement of the external actors influenced by that foreign policy in policymaking. Sjursen (2006: 243) claims that "the EU, in its external action, refer[s] to reasons that can be expected to gain approval in a free and open debate in which all those affected are heard." This normative argument claims that inclusiveness is ensured by the universality of norms, which would guarantee that the third parties involved would agree in case they had the opportunity to speak their mind (Bicchi, 2006: 292). The question of how to be inclusive towards the non-democratic states arises at this point (Bicchi, 2006: 292). The universality of norms in every situation is another problematic area. Different universal norms may be in conflict in a given situation or context that would indicate different paths (Sjursen, 2006: 243).

Institutional reflexivity, on the other hand, refers to the capacity of foreign policymakers to critically analyze the expected effects of a given foreign policy on all the parties involved and to adapt it to these effects (Bicchi, 2006). Sociological institutionalism puts forward that the promotion of European norms is unreflexive, and the EU exports its own norms to all its partners irrespective of their particular context. Börzel and Risse (2009) claim that the EU projects its own identity onto its relations with the third parties, following “one single cultural script” and displaying a “one size fits all” attitude. Federica Bicchi (2006) modifies this interpretation as “our size fits all”, emphasizing the link between domestic and international norms. Bicchi (2006: 287) tries to investigate the normative nature of the EU and answer questions such as whether the EU is a “normative power” which promotes universal norms or a “civilizing power” which promotes its own conception of norms to the world. She argues that European Foreign Policy’s normative connotation differs in proportion to the degree of its inclusiveness and reflexivity (Bicchi, 2006: 298). Normative Power Europe can be defended when European foreign policy is both inclusive and reflexive, but this does not conform generally to reality (Bicchi, 2006: 298). She suggests categorizing the actions of the EU which are eurocentric and/or unreflexively inclusive under the “Civilizing Power Europe”, not under “Normative Power Europe” (Bicchi, 2006: 298). She argues that in most cases European Foreign Policy having a normative connotation cannot be considered either reflexive or inclusive and puts these cases under the “civilizing power” category (Bicchi, 2006: 298).

Diez (2005), from a different perspective, argues that the normative power Europe argument is mainly about the construction of European identity. The identity perspective foresees the connection of actor rationality to a particular context, which limits the possibility of a rational reconciliation over different identities. Thus, the universality claims are considered as a reflection of a particular conception of good and the others should be convinced to adopt the standards of the self. Diez draws attention to the flaws of the normative power argument and claims that the EU promotes its own norms like the historical empires and contemporary powers (Sjursen, 2006).

The discourse of the European way of managing international relations entails a system of European values which dictates the rules for external action. It also presumes that this European way of doing things and its successful outcomes are transferable to other countries and regions. This aspiration to change the world is built on the premise that the system of European values is superior to the “others”. Aggestam (2008) argues that this unreflexive conception and the subsequent “us” and “them” divide could be seen as an “incipient cultural imperialism”, which implies the perception of “others” as in need.

The NPE approach’s assertion of universality is rooted in a Kantian philosophy which puts morality as the ultimate goal of human activity (Dillon, 2007) and which leads to the universalization of the particular European experiences as “ostensibly *universal* legal cosmopolitan values” (Parker and Rosamond, 2013: 231). Staeger (2016: 984) also claims that Manners’ suggestion of certain norms such as peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law, and human rights as the ontological basis of NPE recalls Kagan’s⁹ idealist representation of Europe as the “Kantian miracle” (as cited in Staeger, 2016: 984), with NPE’s claims resembling Kant’s Perpetual Peace. However, such a reading would put NPE in Eurocentric intellectual traditions. The Eurocentric Kantian ontological postulates of the NPE approach presuppose the imposition of European norms on third parties, including the African countries, and give no place to the third parties’ knowledge and values – in our case, the African knowledge and values (Staeger, 2016: 986).

Staeger (2016: 985) argues that the NPE approach’s narrative on the normative basis of Europe which rests on its historical experience lacks Europe’s past as an imperial power. This “virgin birth” narrative of NPE depicts the EU as dissociated from its member states’ colonial past (Fisher Onar and Nicolaïdis, 2013). For example, Catherine Ashton (2011) claimed that the EU “can offer something special: post-imperial partnerships for a post-imperial age”.

Making historical references to Europe’s past, the NPE approach constructs Europe’s past as its temporal “other”. This temporal othering using transhistoricity entitles the Europeans to know the “different” and “inferior” which infringes “universal”

⁹ Kagan, R. (2007). *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order*, New York: Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group.

principles. Prozorov (2011: 1283) demonstrated that the EU's "temporal othering" with its own past necessitates "spatial othering" to exist in empirical reality. Thus, while Europe's own tragic past appears as NPE's temporal other, Africa as a region arises as the actualization of this anachronistic backward past spatially (Staeger, 2016: 985).

This thesis considers NPE as a discursive construct, an episteme in the Foucauldian sense. Foucault (2002: 148) defines episteme as "something like a worldview, a slice of history common to all branches of knowledge, which imposes on each one the same norms and postulates, a general stage of reason, a certain structure of thought that the men of a particular period cannot escape". The texts and discourses of top-level EU representatives and officials about EU-Africa relations generally claim that the universal European norms underlies the EU's "unique" relations with Africa. On the one hand Nicolas Sarkozy criticized European colonialism in one of his speeches. On the other hand, he appraised colonialism by describing European civilization as a "colonial gift" to Africans who should consider themselves as the "heirs" of universal human civilization and "appropriate" the "common heritage" of "human rights, democracy, liberty, equality and justice" (Sarkozy, 2007). Acting as a normative actor in accordance with the NPE approach, the EU reaffirms the universality of its norms in its relationship with Africa, which also contributes to the knowledge production in EU-Africa relations. However, the NPE's universality is questionable since, as the typical excerpt of Sarkozy's speech shows, it is rather Eurocentric since it gives no place to African views. It is also neo-colonial due to its paternalist stance (Staeger, 2016: 986).

The normative power of the EU is also criticizable when it fails at exerting influence by diffusing its norms. Diez (2005: 616) puts forward that normative power exists when "A ... [is able] to make B do what s/he would otherwise not have done". The EU's ability to influence the behaviour of third parties could be limited in some cases due to conflicts between the norms and interests of its member states. In such cases, the normative power of the EU is undermined by the inconsistency in the application of its norms.

The policy of promoting democracy, the rule of law, and human rights, which mirror the values of the EU, is not considered consistent since the EU treats third countries

differently and applies the principles consistently where it is not very costly. For example, no important sanctions are imposed on Russia for the war in Chechnya, or Israel for its policies towards Palestinians, although the EU threatens to do so. These examples lead to the criticism of hypocrisy in the EU's external policy (Eriksen, 2006).

Aiming at assessing the EU's normative power, Lerch and Schweltnus (2006) carried out a research comparing the legitimization of the EU's external policy on two topics: minority protection and the death penalty. The findings of Lerch and Schweltnus (2006) concerning the normative power of Europe are mixed. Their study on the death penalty shows that the abolitionist policy was adopted for normative reasons and justified in a coherent manner; however, the minority protection policy was adopted with concerns about stability and security (Lerch and Schweltnus, 2006: 317). The EU could not manage to justify this policy consistently and in line with the Union's values, although it tried to use conditionality to combine the economic means with the normative arguments. As a result, the persuasive, and thus, the normative power of the EU in the promotion of minority protection policy has weakened (Lerch and Schweltnus, 2006: 318). The authors conclude that the "EU is not necessarily normative by nature", and its normative power relies on the interaction between its policy objectives, instruments, and legitimization in a given issue area (Lerch and Schweltnus, 2006: 318).

As to the examples of EU's inconsistent external behaviour in labour standards issue, Tsogas (2000: 362) explains Burmese and Pakistani cases as the most famous ones. After the first social Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) clause came into force in the EU on 1 January 1995, two complaints were made against the labour rights practices in Burma and Pakistan by the international trade union movement that resulted in quite different ways. In 1995, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) made a joint complaint against the forced labour practices in Burma which resulted in Commission's investigation. The Commission's view that the tariff preferences conceded to Burma should be removed was approved by the Council in March 1997. However, at the same time the ICFTU, ETUC, the International Textile, Garment and Leather Workers' Federation (ITGLWF), and the European Trade Union Committee for Textiles, Clothing and Leather (ETUC/TCL) made

a joint complaint against the practice and extent of forced labour in Pakistan. This complaint has never resulted in any investigation by the Commission. Tsogas (2000: 362) argues that the EU member states' fear of "retaliation and cancellation of contracts in Pakistan" was the main reason for their unwillingness to launch an investigation against this country. Besides, instead of withdrawing trade preferences, Pakistan was included in GSP drug arrangements. The case of China also seems to verify the reluctance of the EU to withdraw the preferences conceded to important trading partners. The complaint of the European Parliament (EP) against the forced labour practice in China did not result in any investigation on that country, either (Portela and Orbie, 2015: 70).

Inconsistency in the EU's applications of its norms in its relations with third parties as a result of conflict between norms and interests is a limitation for its normative power. Norms are applied less strictly to the countries that the EU had important economic relations and its interests were in play, such as less emphasis on human rights conditionality in relations with Asia or cease of support to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) resolutions criticizing China due to the enhancing economic relations of Germany and France with China (Balducci, 2010). On the other hand, the EU was stricter asking for the inclusion of human rights clauses in the trade agreements with the African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries (Mayer, 2008).

2.3.2 Norms vs. Interests Dichotomy

The structural-realist approach refuses the claim that the EU is an actor, distinct from its member states, with a normative power to exert in international relations. Adrian Hyde-Price (2006) argues that the EU is an instrument used by its most powerful member states to collectively exercise hegemonic power, to shape its near abroad conforming to its member states' economic and strategic interests.

Hyde-Price (2006) accepts that the states also pursue ethical concerns which mirror their particular political values such as protecting the environment or international human rights, besides their security and power maximization concerns. However, the former is considered as "second-order" concerns which can be subordinated to national security and core national interests. According to this approach, the EU would act in

accordance with shared ethical concerns, if this does not hinder substantial national interests of the member states. Forsberg and Herd (2005: 477) argue that the EU's acceptance of the Russian definition of the Chechen conflict as an "anti-terrorist" struggle and its preference for a focus on the common security threats instead of human rights concerns demonstrated the promotion of state interests – i.e., *realpolitik* – instead of normative agenda. In this respect, arm deals with China or economic relations with Russia headed by Putin highlight the limits of normative power Europe conception.

Allegedly, the EU's trade agenda is shaped by *realpolitik* pursuance of self-interest, under the impact of corporate lobbying and influence (Deckwirth, 2005). A study by Burchell and Lightfoot (2004: 340) on the EU's position at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002 demonstrates that the EU's commitments to the sustainable development norm were eroded under corporate interests and lobbying. Lobby groups made a huge effort to influence the Directorate-General (DG) Agriculture, which is inclined to protect the European farmers' interests, and DG Trade, which is inclined to support free-market liberalism (Storey, 2006: 333).

Another example is that the EU's Strategy for Africa (European Commission, 2005) mentions the challenges and opportunities for its Africa policy posed by the changing geopolitical context, attracting new players such as Brazil, India, and China, alongside the renewed interests of traditional actors in Africa such as the United States, Japan, and Russia. This also shows the ongoing importance of the defence of self-interest in EU foreign policymaking, under the influence of corporate interests and lobbying. Despite the claims in the EU's Strategy for Africa (European Commission, 2005) that the Africa policy is designed to promote growth in Africa and to strengthen Africa's stance in the world economy by improving its investment environment and supporting the regional integration process through EPAs, concerns about the economic potential of Africa which attracts other competitors seems intermingled with normative concerns for promoting neoliberal governance norms in Africa.

Some NGOs have also largely criticized the claims with regard to the normative actorness of the EU. World Development Movement (WDM) (2003: 2) claimed that during the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) negotiations, the EU was

aiming at the poorest countries in the world, which had “effective non-market-based service delivery systems are in operation”, for opening specific sectors up to EU firms. The leaked documents obtained by WDM showed that these requests for targeting the not-for-profit systems in those poor countries which were restricting the commercial opportunities for European service exporters largely came from the European Services Forum (ESF), which is a European business lobby group (Storey, 2006). This example shows the alignment of the EU’s normative commitment with its pursuit of self-interest in external action.

Orbie (2011: 168) argues that in trade-related issues, the EU gives precedence to “free-market liberalism” rather than acting as a normative power. He puts forward that there is a complex and disputable relationship between the EU’s normative power and its internal constellations, considering that its member states have different views regarding the EU’s external action and its capacity to act externally on several issues is also questionable (Orbie, 2011: 165).

The tension between the EU’s norms and economic interests is aggravated by the EU’s development and capacity-building programs which were claimed to be normative, with a human rights approach. Youngs (2004: 419) claims that normative dynamics co-exist with rationalist self-interest in EU foreign making and promotion of human rights norms has been strongly linked with the strategic interests of European countries in the post-cold war era, which sometimes led to the dilution of the human rights component in the development projects and dialogues. For example, the Commission initiated cooperation programs with China in the mid-1990s within the framework of development assistance and financed two programs in China, the EU-China Legal and Judicial Cooperation Programme and the EU-China Village Governance Training Programme. These initiatives were criticized because of the lack of complementarity and coordination with the bilateral development initiatives of the Member States of the EU and their lack of focus on human rights (Balducci, 2010: 48). When it comes to bilateral programs, the Rule of Law Dialogue initiated by Germany with China in 1999 is also criticized for its business-oriented approach, weakening the human rights aspect, and focusing on economic rule of law instead (Balducci, 2010: 50). While France’s activities

with China were concentrated on training programs and academic exchanges aiming to create links between Chinese and French officials, the promotion of human rights hardly existed in those programs (Balducci, 2010: 51).

Storey (2006: 334) claims that norms could also emanate from interests that represent the wider political-economic considerations of European governments, institutions, etc. For example, the EU may try to diffuse the good governance norm not only for its own, long-term interest but also because of a normative concern and engagement. The market liberalization norm may be advocated with the conviction that it would enhance global economic relations which is the solution to the development of poor countries. It is also not easy to separate norms and interests for Youngs (2004: 420) who claimed that norms are “woven into material interests” and such norms could deem “normative authority”.

Diez (2013: 195) argues that normative power can be replaced with the Gramscian conception of hegemony, with a focus on the power of ideas, to overcome some of the limitations of the normative power approach. Hegemony is not understood as domination by force in the Gramscian conception, but as a relationship in which the subjects of the hegemony agree on the social conceptions with regard to the definition of problems and solutions. Diez (2013: 200) claims that this relational aspect makes the hegemony closer to the normative power approach of Manners (2002: 239), which is the ability “to shape conceptions of the normal”. Diez (2013: 206) also claims that the concept of hegemony offers a reorientation of the debate about normative power by re-establishing the critical purpose. It is not the norms and interests that conflict with each other, but the struggle is about the norms or the competing paths to apply the norms. The concept of hegemony accepts this struggle about the norms instead of pre-established norms set, which explains the inconsistencies inherent to the normative power. In the Gramscian understanding of hegemony, the political and cultural discursive factors are not only shaped by economic factors but are influenced by each other. Norms and interests are not separated but make a whole by infusing each other.

2.4 The Role of Regional Integration Norm in the EU's Foreign Policy

After examining the role of norms in EU foreign policy in the previous sections, this section focuses on the regional integration norm. It tries to define regional integration and understand its place in EU foreign policy. It also presents the ways that the regional integration norm is promoted in the EU's external relations.

2.4.1 What is Regional Integration?

This thesis searches for the discursive construction of regional integration as a norm in the moral economy of EU-Africa interregional relations and the role of this discourse in obscuring the impact of the EU's trade policy on the regionalization of Africa. Thus, the definitions of the terms regionalism, regionalization, and regional integration must also be given, starting from the term region itself.

There are various definitions of a region in different disciplines. Regions are defined according to factors such as geographical proximity, cultural, economic, political, linguistic, social, and historical ties (Cantori and Spiegel, 1970; Nye, 1971; Thompson, 1973), cohesiveness (Hurrell, 1995), or interdependence over different dimensions such as security (Buzan and Waever, 2003). From a social constructivist view, identity defines region regardless of geographical proximity. In this vein, Katzenstein (1997: 7) argues that regional designations are not "real", "natural" or "essential" geographically. They are "socially constructed and politically contested", and, they are, thus, open to change (Katzenstein, 1997: 7). As social constructs, they can be defined according to the problem or question being investigated (Hettne, 2005: 544). Hettne and Söderbaum (2000: 460) developed the concept of regionness to define regions according to their capacities as actors, based on their position in terms of cohesiveness.

Regional integration as a concept belongs to an earlier discussion of regional formation, European experience being at the centre. It was defined as integration linked to market factors focusing on trade relations. Balassa (1961) has theorized about regional integration based on a five-step process starting from free trade area to customs union, common market, monetary union, and arriving at the political union as a final stage. Although there have been different views about whether integration is considered as a

terminal condition or a process, it has been related to the examination of the conditions of the change in states' sovereignty (Haas, 1970). It has been defined as national units sharing "part or all of their decisional authority with an emerging international organization" (Schmitter, 1970: 836).

The concepts of regionalism and regionalization have become part of a more recent effort to explain the region formation phenomenon all over the world as of the 1980s, which is different from the European experience. Although there are different views on whether it is about the concentration of economic flows or foreign policy coordination (Mansfield and Milner, 1999), regionalism is generally defined as a political commitment or project for increased cooperation in policy areas within a region, driven by the states (Breslin and Higgott, 2000; Fawcett and Gandois, 2010) but sometimes also including the non-state actors (Hveem, 2003). There are also differing views about whether it is policy cooperation or an increase in trade flows among a group of states (Krugman, 1991; Frankel, Stein and Wei, 1995). During 1990's the term "new regionalism" was put in use to differentiate between the formal regional organization from a more complex and multidimensional process involving both state and non-state actors (Passi, 2009).

Regionalization, on the other hand, is mostly seen as a process defined by an increase in regional interplay and activities in the economic field (Breslin and Higgott, 2000; Mansfield and Milner, 1999). While there is no consensus on whether this is a spontaneous or planned process (Hettne, 2005), it is generally agreed that it is led by the private sector or other non-state actors (Breslin and Higgott, 2000; Fawcett and Gandois, 2010).

Fawcett and Gandois' (2010) distinction between *regionalism* as a top-down political project of region-creation and *regionalization* as mostly a bottom-up process of region-formation is considered as one of the most helpful explanations of these concepts. In this study, the terms "regionalism" and "regionalization" for Africa are used in accordance with this taxonomy.

2.4.2 Motives Behind the Normative Engagement for Regional Integration

The EU's objective of promoting regional integration in other parts of the world has been explained from different points of view. Farrel (2009: 1179) argues that the EU's promotion of regional integration is an instrument to be influential on the international stage as an international actor. Yet most of the scholars associate the EU's promotion of regional integration with its identity, values, and self-perception. For example, Smith (2003: 95) claims that the EU's promotion of regional integration is a "foreign policy objective that stems directly from its own internal identity [...] as the most successful regional grouping in the world seeking to impart its own experiences to others." Söderbaum (2007: 197) also argues that the EU promotes its "own particular regional integration model" based on projecting its self-image as the "most important reference model". Bretherton and Vogler (2006: 249) claim that the EU aims to reproduce itself while advocating its "own form of regional integration" abroad.

Börzel and Risse (2009: 10) claim that following the end of the Cold War, the EU has broadened its foreign policy, which included the promotion and diffusion of its model of regional integration. The EU had been supporting regional integration in the world since the 1960s (Farrel, 2009: 1165). Yet, since the end of the Cold War, this objective has been explicitly an integral part of the EU's external policy:

[...] support for regional cooperation and integration is a major feature of the European Union's development policy and may contribute, as stated in Article 130u of the Treaty, to fostering "the smooth and gradual integration of the developing countries into the world economy", and establishing sustainable growth. (European Council, 1995).

The EU's support for regionalism and interregionalism is closely linked with its own identity. The EU projects to the world its own model of regional integration which forms its identity as "the only successful example of regional integration" (European

Commission, 1995: 8). This self-image and identity give legitimacy to the EU for promoting its model of regional integration in the world, by engaging in interregionalism (Söderbaum, 2007: 201).

In addition to human rights, democracy, and the rule of law, regional integration has become an important part of the governance package that the EU has tried to promote through agreements with third parties. This motive was also clearly stated in one of Prodi's (2000a) speeches:

Our European model of integration is the most developed in the world. Imperfect though it still is, it nevertheless works on a continental scale. Given the necessary institutional reforms it should continue to work well after enlargement, and I believe we can make a convincing case that it would also work globally.

The EU's efforts to advocate regional integration to its external environment was not only an instrument to promote global trade via multilateral trade liberalization, but also represents the EU's approach to managing global issues in a new global order where regional bodies are considered as the constitutive elements of international relations. Since interregional relations necessitate the presence of two independent regional groupings, the EU has supported regional integration movements by attracting them to itself, which has been a top-down process (Börzel and Risse, 2009).

The European Union has supported and been involved in various regional projects in the developing countries, in line with its foreign policy goals, with the aim of strengthening and promoting regional integration globally (Bachmann and Sidaway, 2010). The EU's support for regional cooperation and integration has first started with its former colonies in Africa (Smith, 2003: 73). The establishment and evolution of this relationship from a moral economy perspective, in relation to the regional integration norm, is explained in detail in the following Chapter. This section only mentions the "soft

imperialism” concept as an alternative explanation of the motive for the EU to promote regional integration in Africa within the context of colonial history. The EU’s external policy to shape the world through interregional relationships is considered by some authors as an imposition on others. Hettne and Söderbaum (2005) define soft imperialism as the imposition of norms and conditionalities mainly to pursue self-interest within an asymmetric dialogue. For example, the EU has encouraged regional cooperation among three regions of the ACP group of states, which were selected based on their former colonial relationship with the EU (Hettne, 2007: 115). The formation of the ACP Group is, thus, an example of the EU’s imposition of regional cooperation with the aim of pursuing an asymmetric dialogue through the Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions period. (Hettne, 2007: 115)

The EU’s insistence on economic liberalization in Africa through EPAs and its financial and technical support to African regional integration is also explained by the dialectics of regionalism and NPE. Staeger (2016: 992) claims that enhancing structural similarity increases the EU’s chance for normative engagement with Africa. Furthermore, increasing normative engagement also reinforces the EU’s structural aspirations (Staeger, 2016: 992). Barroso’s opening speech at the African Union Assembly on 4 July 2005 demonstrates how the toponyms of Europe and Africa are used as metonymies for European integration and African integration and how they are characterized as similar to the point that they are used interchangeably:

Africa will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity. If this sounds vaguely familiar to you, you shouldn't be surprised. Replace ‘Africa’ with ‘Europe’, and you have the famous Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950. This set in motion an unprecedented period of integration and co-operation which has delivered 50 years of peace and prosperity on my continent. I believe what worked for Europe can work for Africa too. Six years ago, here in Sirte, Africa also picked the path of political, economic and cultural integration and co-operation. (Barroso, 2005).

In the paragraph above, Barroso changes the word “Europe” in a key quotation from Schuman Declaration with “Africa” to argue the similarity between the two region-building processes. He continues by suggesting that the integration path taken by Europe should also be taken by Africa. This line of reasoning to support the EU’s structural aspirations towards African regional integration process is also reflected in the excerpt below, taken from the closing remarks by the President of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy at the 5th EU-Africa Business Forum in Brussels, in 2014:

But sustainable long-term growth must be based also on Africa's own markets. We know from our experience in Europe that integrating national markets on a regional basis is a real stimulus for socio-economic growth and we stand ready to continue to share our experience in this field. This is why Europe is fully supportive of the African ambition to create a continental free trade area in Africa. We are convinced that faster regional integration, supported by appropriate economic partnership agreements and infrastructure, will be helpful to support this process. The political leadership bears an important responsibility vis-à-vis the business community to put in place the institutional conditions for this scenario to materialize (Van Rompuy, 2014).

The excerpt above shows the European efforts to establish institutional similarity between the regional integration experiences of the EU and the AU. The emphasis is on the “help” of the European experience. This reminds one of the colonial practices which were mainly based on the white man’s help to African societies to civilize them. Staeger (2016) claims that these types of public speeches regularly serve to legitimize EU-Africa postcolonial ties based on the superiority of the EU, while it does not give any place to “African knowledge” (Staeger, 2016: 986). He also adds that this superiority is similar to the “paternalism of colonization’s *mission civilisatrice*”, which is based on the depiction of a “lacking, malleable Africa”, and legitimizes the EU’s involvement in Africa by its

policies, aid, and regionalisation (Staeger, 2016: 986). Bearing in mind this “imperial flavour” of the EU’s interregional policies towards Africa (Söderbaum, 2007: 202), one should also look at other regions such as Asia, the Mediterranean, or Latin America to compare the normative aspect of the EU’s regionalism towards these regions.

The EU’s bilateral relationship with Mediterranean countries has begun to change as of the 1990s, under the influence of southern members of the EU, led by France, which wanted a new strategy towards the countries in the Mediterranean (Smith, 2003: 76). The Euro-Mediterranean partnership was launched in November 1995, in Barcelona between the EU and 12 non-EU countries in the Mediterranean, which did not exist as a regional grouping before. The EU tried to construct the Mediterranean as a region and implement “the EC model of functional cooperation to the construction of peaceful relations in the Mediterranean region” (Bretherton and Vogler, 1999: 161). The vision of the Mediterranean as a region was pushed by European partners, especially France whose motive was to “Europeanize” relations with the Mediterranean countries, despite the reluctance of the non-EU Mediterranean partners, due to their concerns about the EU’s intentions, its agricultural protectionism or anti-immigration policies (Smith, 2003: 76-77). The Euro-Mediterranean policy, built around the belief that regional cooperation would bring peace and economic growth, demonstrates the co-existence of both altruistic and self-interested reasons behind the promotion of regional integration norm in the EU’s external relations (Smith, 2003: 84). The Commission clearly states in its Regional Strategy Paper for the Mediterranean that “underlying this regional cooperation is the EU’s own philosophy that deeper co-operation with neighbouring countries is a route to national as well as regional stability and growth and that such co-operation serves their mutual interests” (European Commission, 2002a: 6).

One can notice more self-interested reasons for regional integration promotion in other parts of the world, such as Asia or Latin America, which were motivated by the market rivalry with the US and concerns about being excluded from them (Smith, 2003: 85). The EU has emphasized interregional cooperation pursued in an array of bloc-to-bloc cooperation, such as the EU-ASEAN, and the Asia-Europe Meetings, and bilateral cooperation under the framework of the EU-China dialogue, EU-India or EU-Japan,

while the promotion of the regional integration discourse has been limited to South Asia and the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) (Farrell, 2009: 1173). The EU has also featured itself as a bilateral actor in its external relations with individual Asia countries (Murray, 2009: 253). Farrell (2009: 1179) claims that less significant power asymmetries between the EU and Asian countries in contrast to the case of Africa constitute one of the reasons for the EU's downplay of the promotion of regional integration as a policy in Asia.

The EU's support for regional integration in Latin America is also explained by growing competition with the US, and its push for a free-trade agreement of the Americas (Smith, 2003: 80). It is developed as a response to the new economic interventionist policy of the US following the end of the Cold War which emphasizes promoting US economic security and securing its integration in the regional trading blocs (Smith, H., 1998: 166). Although the US supported weak regions linked only by trade exchanges, the EU preferred to promote "multidimensional intra-regional links as well as institutionalized inter-regional relations" (Hettne, 2007: 107). This reflects the EU's interest-driven commitment to interregionalism elsewhere in the world, used as a strategy to remain competitive globally.

As discussed above, according to the sociological institutionalist approach, there are two criteria to assess the normativity of European policy: reflexivity and inclusiveness. This approach interprets the EU as a "civilizing power" and European foreign policymaking is generally unreflexively Eurocentric. Since the institutions are inclined to export institutional isomorphism as a default option, Bicchi (2006: 287) claims that the EU's external action can also be described as an unreflexive attempt to extend its own model. She argues that the normative power Europe conception should be nuanced, and the EU promotes its own model in its external action (Bicchi, 2006: 287).

The EU's attempts to project its model by imposing structural similarity through either the trade and partnership agreements or financial and technical assistance seems like a neo-colonial practice of institutional mimicry. One might see that the regional integration norm is not consistently pursued in the EU's interregional relations with all regions in the same way. Apart from the discussions about the universality of the regional

integration norm promoted by the EU (Bicchi, 2006: 300) or its consistency, the imposition of institutional similarity has certainly helped increase the EU's normative engagement with Africa. The more the EU has been normatively engaged, the more regional integration has become a norm of the moral economy of the EU-Africa relationship.

2.4.3 The Promotion of the Regional Integration Norm by the EU

Considering itself as the state-of-the-art form of regional integration in the world, the EU is dedicated to the objective of regional integration and necessary trade reforms, which would bring growth and integration to the world economy for the ACP countries (Banthia, 2007). The public policy concept of diffusion has been used by scholars to examine the relationship between the EU and other regional organizations. According to the diffusion approach, the EU supports and advocates regional groupings in the developing world for the basic motive of self-replicating and self-justifying by increasing its own legitimacy as an international actor (Haastrup, 2013: 786). In this approach, diffusion is defined as a process to spread European norms and ideas through interregional policy schemes (Haastrup, 2013: 791).

Risse (2000: 33) argues that actors dispose of three modes of social action in their relations with social structures and institutions: instrumental rationality (rational choice), normative rationality (norm-guided behaviour), and argumentative rationality (communicative action). Based on these three logics of social action, Börzel and Risse have proposed a typology of five mechanisms for the diffusion of ideas which could be applied to the diffusion of regional integration norm provided in the following Table 3 (reproduced from Börzel and Risse, 2009: 6-9):

Table 3. Mechanisms of Diffusion

Social Mechanism and Underlying Theory of Social Action	Promoter of Ideas	Instrument
Coercion (legal and physical imposition)	Coercive authority legal or physical force	Military Intervention
Manipulation of Utility Calculations (instrumental rationality)	(Positive and negative) incentives	Conditionality
Socialization (normative rationality)	Promote ideas through providing an authoritative model (normative pressure)	Political dialogue
Persuasion (communicative rationality)	Promote ideas as legitimate or true through reason-giving	Political dialogue
Emulation (<i>indirect influence</i>) a) lesson-drawing (<i>instrumental rationality</i>) b) mimicry (<i>normative rationality</i>)	Promote comparison and competition – strictly speaking, this mechanism does not require the active promotion of ideas)	Political dialogue, conditionality

Source: Reproduced from Börzel and Risse (2009: 6-9).

The first mechanism is coercion which relates to either internal diffusion of ideas through an obligation to comply with the EU law (i.e. Europeanization as in the case of the EU's Member States) or use of military force in external relations (Börzel and Risse, 2009: 7). The second mechanism is the manipulation of utility calculations which is in the realm of instrumental rationality. Actors try to make their ideas accepted through rewards or sanctions (Börzel and Risse, 2009: 7). The third mechanism, socialization, refers to the promotion of ideas by setting an authoritative model which is being followed by others that learn to internalize the rules and the norms to be good and do the right (Börzel and Risse, 2009: 7). The fourth mechanism, persuasion, is related to communicative rationality, where actors try to convince each other by using argumentative strategies (Börzel and Risse, 2009: 8). And finally, emulation refers to an indirect influence mechanism through which actors emulate others for either instrumental

reasons, such as competition, or normative reasons, such as increasing legitimacy, through processes of mimicry and lesson-drawing (Börzel and Risse, 2009: 8).

Börzel and Risse (2009: 9) claim that the EU has developed a toolbox for the diffusion of the regional integration norm to third parties. Tools such as political dialogue, conditionality, or capacity-building are expected to influence the strategic preferences of developing countries in favour of regional integration and assist them to carry out the required policy changes (Börzel and Risse, 2009: 9). Political dialogue and conditionality are used within the framework of shaping utility calculations, socialization, persuasion mechanisms, and support the emulation process, whereas capacity-building is a tool that enables all the diffusion mechanisms listed (Börzel and Risse, 2009: 9).

Conditionality is by definition an instrument that implies:

the linking, by a state or international organization, of perceived benefits to another state (such as aid, trade concessions, cooperation agreements, political contacts, or international organization membership), to the fulfilment of conditions relating to the protection of human rights and the advancement of democratic principles. (Smith, 1997: 6)

The EU introduced positive and negative conditionality as an instrument for diffusion of the human rights norm for the first time in its relationship with the ACP Countries in the revised Lomé IV Convention in 1995 (Fourth ACP-EEC Convention, Art. 5), which is discussed in detail in the following chapter. Positive conditionality means offering benefits to a state in return for the fulfilment of one's conditions, whereas negative conditionality is "reducing, suspending, or terminating those benefits if the state in question violates the conditions" (Smith, 1997: 6). Positive conditionality was also used to support the regional integration norm in Africa, especially through financial support to regional cooperation projects and organizations as early as Lomé I Convention, in 1975 (ACP-EEC Convention, Art. 47).

The promise of access to European markets through preferential trade arrangements or capacity-building programs aiming at African countries' socio-economic development are examples of other positive incentives used by the EU (Haastrup, 2013: 793). The Communication on the European Community Support for Regional Economic Integration Efforts among Developing Countries identified capacity building and institutional strengthening at regional and national levels as one of the main areas for support to development cooperation (European Commission, 1995: 13). Technical assistance and training aiming to increase local capacity to undertake and execute regional integration policies or promotion of research on regional integration were the main aspects of the EU's capacity-building support towards developing countries (European Commission, 1995: 14).

The diffusion approach assumes a one-way movement of ideas. In the context of diffusion of regional integration between the EU and Africa, the former becomes the leader, and the latter becomes the follower (Haastrup, 2013: 795). This approach overlooks the southern literature on regional diffusion and is criticized for being neo-colonial, Eurocentric, and unreflexive, which undermines the legitimacy in promoting regionalism (Haastrup, 2013). Yet, in the context of the EU-Africa regional relationship, the promotion of regional integration norm using the instruments of diffusion is evident from the EU side and helps explain how regional integration has become one of the main norms of the moral economy of the EU and Africa relationship.

Concluding Remarks

Since the moral economy approach deals with the economic structures' establishment in negotiation with moral norms, normative power Europe approach and norm diffusion approaches have been analyzed here in order to understand the establishment of regional integration norm and its evolution within the EU-Africa moral economy. According to the NPE approach, the EU, as a normatively different entity, establishes what is normal in international relations, by promoting its norms and values through its policies and modelling (Manners, 2002). The NPE approach also claims the universality of the norms promoted by the EU and thus it is criticized by various authors (Börzel and Risse, 2009; Sjursen, 2006; Bicchi, 2006). The EU's promotion of its own

norms and values, based on the supposed “superiority” of the European way of doing things has also been defined as cultural imperialism (Aggestam, 2008).

In addition to the problem with the universality claims regarding the European norms, the EU’s inconsistent norm application in its relations with third parties is also criticized because of the conflicts between its norms and interests. These inconsistencies and the norms-interests dichotomy observed in its policies surely limit and sometimes displace its normative power.

Diez (2013: 195) offered to use the concept of hegemony to overcome some of the limitations of this normative power concept while explaining the EU's ability to “shape the conceptions of the normal”. In the Gramscian conception of hegemony, domination is understood in a relational context within which the subjects of hegemony agree on the social conception and the definition of problems and solutions. This hegemony approach, instead of the universality of norms or the norms and interests dichotomy leading to the unreflexive and inconsistent application of EU's normative power, accepts the existence of a struggle about the imposition of different norms and pursuance of the EU’s interests.

In addition to revealing the role of norms in the EU’s external relations and their diffusion in general, this chapter is also specifically focused on regional integration as a norm. After giving the distinctions between regionalization, regionalism, and regional integration, it claimed that the diffusion of the EU’s own model of regional integration, which can be defined as the market factor integration (Balassa, 1961), under shared authority (Schmitter, 1970), had become an important element of its foreign policy after the end of the Cold War, with the aim of reproducing itself (Börzel and Risse, 2009). This thesis argues that even before the end of the Cold War, the regional integration norm had been fundamental in the EU-Africa moral economy since the beginning of post-independence/post-colonial relations. Promoting its region-building in Africa has been instrumental in dealing with the management of decolonization in the early post-independence period, and then the EU has started to promote its own model of regional integration with the introduction of the regional integration in texts and discourse as of the Lomé II Convention.

This chapter also discussed the diffusion approach for explaining the EU's support to regional groupings for the developing countries with the motive of self-replication and legitimating itself as an international actor. Methods used for the promotion of norms are described as arguing and persuasion within the context of institutionalized political dialogue (Börzel and Risse, 2009).

This study relies on the existence of norms inherent to all economic structures and relationships from a moral economy approach and accepts the EU's normative power to shape the norms in its external relations. Yet, those norms are neither universal nor static but are the results of a particular European experience and subject to change in time. Accepting Diez's suggestion to use the Gramscian conception of hegemony to understand how the domination of these European norms occurs, this thesis uses the DHA to deconstruct this hegemony by revealing the struggle of norms and ideologies for dominance and the reproduction of specific ideologies through linguistic practices. The DHA allows one to reveal the argumentation and persuasion that serves the specific regional integration norm as imposed by the EU on African countries, and the underlying ideology behind the legitimation of the EU's policies.

3. THE EVOLUTION OF EU-AFRICA INTERREGIONAL RELATIONS

The previous Chapter discussed the role of norms in EU Foreign Policy, with a focus on the regional integration norm. Before analyzing the discursive construction of the regional integration norm in the moral economy of EU-Africa relations in the last chapter of this thesis, the evolution of EU-Africa interregional relations in the historical context is examined in this chapter. This allows us to understand the general discursive context of the relationship and how it evolved historically. This also helps to demonstrate the link between the different discourses and how their relation helped to legitimate regional integration as a norm in the moral economy of EU-Africa relations.

This section studies the relationship in three periods. First, the Europe-Africa relations from the interwar period to Lomé Conventions are explored to understand the colonial roots of the relationship. Then the successive Lomé Conventions and how the relationship was evolved during the decolonization process under the systemic constraints are addressed. The last section focuses on the Cotonou Agreement and the change in the whole system stipulated by it.

3.1 Europe-Africa Relations from the Interwar Period to the Lomé Conventions

In this section, the discursive context of the Europe-Africa relations from the interwar period to the signature of Lomé conventions is examined. First, the section looks at the emergence and the development of the Eurafrika discourse between the First and Second World Wars from the perspective of the colonial past of the relations between the two continents but also from the geopolitical perspective.

3.1.1 Europe-Africa Relations in the Interwar Period and the Eurafrika Discourse

Hansen and Jonsson (2011: 447) claim that the European domination of Africa is related to the project of European integration more than we thought. Richard

Coudenhove-Kalergi published a programmatic book *Paneuropa*¹⁰ in 1923 and claimed that the European states should have been united under a Pan-European union to prevent the hostility between France and Germany over Ruhr and being torn between the growing powers of the United States and the Soviet Union in the west and the east (cited in Hansen and Jonsson, 2011: 447). This claim was reflecting the liberalist ideals and reflecting the views of free trade internationalists who suggested setting aside national rivalries and transforming the colonies into free trade markets for all Europeans (Ageron, 1975: 451). The United States and the Soviet Union were enjoying the advantages of the organization of their economies on a continental scale, while European economies were suffering from large trade barriers (Hansen and Jonsson, 2011: 448).

Coudenhove-Kalergi¹¹ suggested that the Pan-European union would incorporate the African colonies of the European states as an integral part of this continental-scale political project (cited in Thorpe, 2018: 504). Coudenhove-Kalergi mentioned it as a “clear-cut geographical unit [...] based on common civilization, a common history and common traditions” which stretches out from Petsamo (on the Finno-Russian border) in the east into Katanga (the South-eastern province of the Belgian Congo) and to the Atlantic Ocean in the west (cited in Thorpe, 2018: 505)

Guernier, Coudenhove-Kalergi, Sörgel, and others suggested that the European unification and African colonization were closely linked projects that necessitate each other (Hansen and Jonsson, 2011: 450). Those Pan-Europeans justified the Eurafrica entity with the necessity to rationalize trade and resources by providing an access to raw materials for Europe and access to markets for Africa (Thorpe, 2018: 504). Coudenhove Kalergi¹² (cited in Hansen and Jonsson, 2011: 449) expressed in his essay “Afrika” in 1929 that “Africa could provide Europe with raw materials for its industry, nutrition for its population, land for its overpopulation, labour for its unemployed, and markets for its products.” He also wrote that “The African problem thus brings us back to Europe. Africa cannot be made available if Europe does not unite.” (Coudenhove Kalergi, as cited in Hansen and Jonsson, 2011: 449). From the geopolitical point of view, Africa was

¹⁰ Coudenhove-Kalergi, R. N. (1926) [1923]. *Paneuropa*, 2nd edn., Vienna: Paneuropa.

¹¹ Coudenhove-Kalergi, R. N. (1953). *An Idea Conquers The World*, London: Hutchinson.

¹² Coudenhove-Kalergi, R. N. (1929). ‘Afrika’, *Paneuropa*, 5(2), pp.3-18.

considered as an essential part of Europe's geopolitical sphere, which can only be exploited appropriately if it is strongly connected to the united European states and help them to realize their economic and political potential (Hansen and Jonsson, 2011: 448). Africa's joint exploitation was seen as a common cause that would grow the bonds between European states and unite them and create a new sustainable and prosperous geopolitical sphere (Hansen and Jonsson, 2011: 449).

According to Coudenhove-Kalergi (1929, as cited in Hansen and Jonsson, 2011: 449), the connection of Africa to the unified European states would also help Germany to access again to its former colonies, lost in the First World War, which explains the support to a unified Europe by Germany. It would thus help avoid the threat of intra-European political tension between those states who have colonies and those that have not (Thorpe, 2018: 505). Herman Sörgel¹³ (as cited in Hansen and Jonsson, 2011: 449) also claimed that connecting Africa to Europe would provide vital resources to the depressed European economy and the required Lebensraum to the white race. E. L. Guernier¹⁴ (as cited in Hansen and Jonsson, 2011: 450), French author of various works on colonialism has also asserted a new kind of colonialism, in which Europe provides morality, culture, and civilization to Africa and Africa provides raw materials, resources, and opportunities required for the investment and growth of European economies through a new geopolitical bloc that would create an equilibrium in the global world system. Guernier¹⁵ (as cited in Dramé and Saul, 2004) developed the theory of geographical complementarity to justify his ideas of fusion between Europe and Africa, based on the privileged geographical situation of the franco-African bloc. He divided the world into three north-south geopolitical blocs, one of them being Eurafrica which was a natural geographical division (Guernier, 1933, as cited in Muller, 2000: 4). The natural complementarity between Europe and Africa was inevitably necessitating solidarity in the economic field (Dramé and Saul, 2004: 98).

¹³ Sörgel, H. (1932). *Atlantropa*, Munich: Piloty and Loehle. Zurich: Fretz and Wasmuth.

¹⁴ Guernier, E. L. (1933). *L'Afrique : champ d'expansion de l'Europe*, Paris : Armand Colin.

¹⁵ Guernier, E. (1930). Les grands courants modernes des migrations modernes. *L'Afrique champ d'expansion de l'Europe*, *Quinzaine coloniale*, 34: 579, 554-555.

This new geopolitical bloc was named Eurafrica in the lead article of Coudenhove-Kalergi¹⁶ to the February 1929 edition of the *PanEuropa* journal, which focused solely on the African colonies of Europe (Thorpe, 2018: 506). He asserted: “[...] Pan-Europe is enlarged to Eurafrica [...] Europe is the head of Eurafrica – Africa its body. The future of Africa depends on what Europe makes of it” (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1929, as cited in Thorpe, 2008: 507). This interwar Eurafrica discourse was a racist one that helped claim European presence in Africa as indispensable but refuse the African presence in Europe (Hansen and Jonsson, 2011: 450). It was constructed as a solution to enable the colonial powers of Europe to continue economic and strategic gains from Africa while accepting the growing demands of autonomy or self-government (Hansen and Jonsson, 2011: 458). The following sections analyze the institutionalization process of the economic relations between Africa and Europe in parallel to the European integration project, starting from the Treaty of Rome and going through all the economic agreements between the EU and the ACP countries.

3.1.2 Treaty of Rome and the “Special Relationship”

After the Second World War, the Eurafrican idea of the interwar period was revived. Just after the end of the war, Ernest Bevin, who was the foreign secretary of Britain at that time called for close colonial cooperation between Britain and France to integrate the African colonies into the Western European power sphere (Hansen and Jonsson, 2011: 451). He suggested creating a “Third World Power” from these colonies, an imperial grouping with economic and defence elements, to access natural resources and boost European economies by establishing a strategic area between the Soviet Union and the United States (Deighton, 2006: 835). The Eurafrica idea was also put forward against the liberation movements encouraged by anticolonialism of the United States and the USSR, and it reflected the will of France to maintain its sovereignty in North Africa as well as to renew Europe’s links with the newly independent states (Dramé and Saul, 2004: 99).

¹⁶ Coudenhove-Kalergi, R. N. (1929). ‘Afrika’, *PanEuropa*, 5(2), pp.1-19.

Interwar Eurafrica ideas were also reflected in the 1951 Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) Report, which was calling for the contribution of all its members (not only Europe's colonial powers) to the public and private investment in infrastructure, water control, and agriculture in overseas territories (Hansen and Jonsson, 2011: 451). The report also described the Eurafrican planning as a "long-term task", as if colonialism would never end (Hansen and Jonsson, 2011: 451).

The trade between Europe and Africa was also stimulated by the dollar shortage in Europe. In 1952, the Strasbourg Plan which was developed by the governments of former OEEC recommended developing aid and trade relations with overseas territories, by introducing mutual preference concessions to bring Europe independence from dollar aid (Gruhn, 1976).

Regarding the Eurafrican institutionalization, Schuman Declaration (Schuman, 1950) asserts that "...with increased resources Europe will be able to pursue the achievement of one of its essential tasks, namely, the development of the African continent". McKay¹⁷ (as cited in Hansen and Jonsson, 2011: 454) claimed that Jean Monnet, who was a fervent Eurafricanist and suggested that Africa could be given as a "dowry to Europe" by France was behind this formulation.

France required the establishment of a "special relationship" between the European Community and its overseas territories, during the European Common Market negotiations, as a precondition for its participation. Sharing the burden of aid to overseas with six Community members was a crucial impetus for France, in addition to the trade preferences (Gruhn, 1976). France even threatened not to sign the Treaty if it does not include a provision to adapt its relations with former African colonies (Whiteman, 1998).

The main motivation of France to support the codification of the relationship between Europe and Africa with the Treaty of Rome was to preserve its colonial markets and protect the primary goods supplies from colonies (Zartman, 1976). For France, the Treaty was also a means to protect its sphere of influence in Africa after decolonization

¹⁷ McKay, V. (1963). *Africa in World Politics*. New York: Harper & Row.

and a way of reducing the economic burden of providing aid to the colonies by sharing it with EEC members (Banthia, 2007). The newly independent African states were still dependent on former European colonizers, in terms of trade and aid. France consistently provided considerable aid packages and preferential reciprocal trade access for its former colonies in Francophone Africa in line with the discourse of preventing these young and fragile economies from the harms of opening to world markets (Zartman, 1976). With these motivations, France explicitly put forward the strong trade links between the metropole and the French Union as an incentive to tempt other members to embrace the Eurafrica idea and to contribute to overseas development aid (Brown, 2017: 196).

The Germans, the Dutch, and the Italians did not share France's motive to attach an African dimension to European affairs (Dramé and Saul, 2004: 110). They saw the protection of the relationship with France's colonial dependencies mostly as the external affair of France, yet France managed to achieve an acceptable agreement on the provisions related to its dependencies in exchange for its signature of the Treaty (Holland, 2002: 26). As a result, the Treaty of Rome, founding the European Economic Community in 1957, included a special section IV on the Association of the Overseas Countries and Territories. In this section IV, Article 131 stated that the EEC will "associate with the Community the non-European countries and territories which have special relations with Belgium, France, Italy and the Netherlands" (Treaty of Rome, 1957).

Former colonial relations were reflected in Part IV of the Treaty of Rome, which allowed European states' African colonies to join in a free trade area with EEC member countries and have free access in each other's markets for both European and African products (Zartman, 1976). It secured the colonial markets and supply of primary products not only for the metropole but also for all members and opened the colonies for more trade and investment (Zartman, 1976: 328).

According to Article 132 of the Treaty of Rome, the main principles of the Association were as follows: in trade relations, the member states treat Associate states in the same way as they treat each other and the associate states will treat all the member states same way as they treat the "European State with which it has special relations" (Treaty of Rome, 1957). This provision meant discrimination against other developing

third countries and it was a starting point of a decades-long problem for Europe's relationship with the developing world, which was taking the historical ties rather than needs as a basis for preferential treatment to the developing world (Holland, 2002: 27).

The association between the EEC and its Member States' Overseas Countries and Territories (OCT) was unilateral since the associated countries were colonies at that time and under the colonial powers' responsibility. This unilateral association served to maintain the trade and aid links. The Member states bore a legal obligation "to contribute to the investments required for the progressive development of these countries and territories" (Treaty of Rome, 1957, Art 132.3). The European Development Fund (EDF) was established in 1958, to provide aid for the development of social and economic infrastructure projects (The Courier, 1990: 120). The EDF's role has increased since then and has become one of the key instruments for the EU's development policy. Despite all the assistance and market preferences outlined in Articles 131-6 in the Treaty of Rome, the associated states could not manage to enhance their economic performance and these articles were highly criticized for maintaining colonial dependency (Holland, 2002: 27).

3.1.3 Yaoundé Conventions and Reverse Preferences

An implementing convention was supposed to be made five years after the entry into force of the Treaty of Rome, to determine the details of and the procedure for the association of the overseas countries and territories (Treaty of Rome, 1957, Art. 136). During those five years after the entry into force of the Rome Treaty, most of the associated states and territories became independent and asked for the continuation of their association with the EEC (Gruhn, 1976: 244).

18 newly independent African countries established the Association of African States and Madagascar (AASM), aiming to maintain their relations with the EEC. A bilateral negotiation between AASM and the EEC was conducted in 1963, and a renewable Convention was concluded in July for five years (Glaser, 1990: 24). This Convention was signed at Yaoundé on 20 July 1963 (entered into force on 1 June 1964) and contained preferential trade agreements, which provided financial and technical assistance to AASM and access for raw materials to Europe. The second EDF provided

the financial pillar of this Convention and raised 800 m units of account (Glaser, 1990: 24).

With Yaoundé Convention, a partnership based on complete equality and friendly relations between EEC and 18 former African colonies was defined. The Yaoundé Convention did not bring major changes to the relationship codified with the Treaty of Rome. It preserved the reciprocal free trade zone, which was established with the Treaty of Rome and provided EEC and African countries access to each other's markets (Banthia, 2007: 5). The changes were the incorporation of the European Development Fund amounting to 750 million units of account under the financial and technical cooperation (Convention of Association between the European Economic Community and the African and Malagasy States associated with that Community, 1963, Art. 16) and the creation of the new association institutions to govern the relations such as the Association Council, the Court of Arbitration and the Parliamentary Conference (Convention of Association between the European Economic Community and the African and Malagasy States associated with that Community, 1963, Art. 39).

As of the signing of the First Yaoundé Convention, many colonies of France in Africa started to become independent. The African states' main objectives were to build a nation and a strong economy based on industry and create a large middle class, in line with Rostow's take-off theory (Glaser, 1990: 24). It was also a period of the post-war economic boom in Europe. As a result, European aid was directed towards infrastructure and industrial projects in Africa, which would help to build the sense of national identity and economic "take-off" (Glaser, 1990: 24). This formulation laid the principles of EEC-AASM cooperation at that time (Glaser, 1990: 24).

The provisions related to the association of the overseas countries and territories in the Treaty of Rome had been negotiated by the metropole on behalf of colonies, so they were not appropriate for former colonies which became newly independent anymore (Zartman, 1976: 328). But the leaders of the new African countries wanted to preserve the benefits of the "special relationship" with their former colonizers (the metropole) which seemed essential for economic survival following their independence (Gruhn, 1976: 247). France, Italy, and Belgium were also interested in maintaining the special

relationship with their former colonies, which were too fragile to engage immediately in world market competition (Zartman, 1976: 328). On the other hand, Germany and the Netherlands wanted to end the special economic ties of colonies with metropole and accord equal status to all the African states, including those states that are not covered by the Treaty of Rome and they had greater trade relations (Zartman, 1976: 328).

During the negotiations of the First Yaoundé Convention, the newly independent African states were also discussing the political future of the continent through African unity on a continental basis (Gruhn, 1976: 244). The African states in the Commonwealth, i.e., former British colonies, led by Nigeria and Ghana accused the EEC of interfering with African unity and rejected the association in the beginning (Gruhn, 1976: 244). However, in the 1960s, the European Community has become some kind of a pole of attraction in a period of economic growth and the UK unsuccessfully tried to become a member of the EEC. Nigeria signed an agreement with the EEC, although this agreement did not enter into force because of the Nigerian civil war, and Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania signed Arusha Agreement with the EEC in 1969, which provided preferential treatment in the EEC market (Glaser, 1990).

The Yaoundé Convention was renewed in 1969 to include three new AASM members. The Second Convention of Association between the European Economic Community and the African and Malagasy States associated with that Community (signed on 29 July 1969 and entered into force on 1 January 1971) was basically a continuation of the First Yaoundé Convention's provisions, with the establishment of an emergency reserve fund up to \$80 million to protect against a possible fall in the world tropical products prices or a natural disaster (Zartman, 1976: 330). The special treatment accorded with the Yaoundé Convention did not bring an important increase in the trade of the Associates with the European market and the Second Yaoundé Convention was a transitional solution until an agreement was reached on more profound changes in the preferences system in the future (Zartman, 1976: 330). Regarding trade relations, there were still separate trade zones between the EEC and each African country, and the decision was still being made by the EEC despite the negotiations with the African states (Zartman, 1976: 331).

Although the system established with the Yaoundé Conventions was based on reverse preferences, it still represented a relatively special treatment accorded to former colonies compared to other countries producing the same tropical products in the world. During this process, the special relationship principle became such an essential norm of the moral economy of the EU-Africa relationship that it led to the removal of reverse preferences by the subsequent Lomé Conventions.

3.2 Lomé Conventions with African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States

The accession of Great Britain in January 1973 put the EEC in a relationship with not only Anglophone African countries, but also with a geography larger than Africa, including the Caribbean and the Pacific. As a result of extensive negotiations, 20 Commonwealth countries became part of Protocol 22, annexed to the Act of Accession of Great Britain to the Community (Glaser, 1990: 25). This opened the door for negotiations for a special relationship between them and the Community as well. This opportunity was not only limited to the Commonwealth Countries but also provided to those states which were neither the AASM member nor the members of the Commonwealth (Glaser, 1990: 25).

However, considering that the Second Yaoundé Convention would be expired in January 1975 and the first meeting of both blocs was in July 1973, the African Caribbean and Pacific countries could not have enough time to lay a solid groundwork for negotiations. They only could decide on negotiating the principles in May 1973 (Glaser, 1990: 25). The EEC gave those countries -three options at that time: either to join with other countries in an enlarged Yaoundé Convention, or to make individual conventions with the EEC based on Article 238 of the Treaty of Rome, or to sign preferential trade agreements similar to the Arusha Agreement signed by Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania (Glaser, 1990: 25).

African trade ministers came together in Abidjan in May 1973 at the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Summit to agree on the terms of block-to-block negotiations. The African countries' demands were against some of the basic principles of the Yaoundé Convention, such as the elimination of reverse preferences, unrestricted

access to European markets for every product, the establishment of stabilization mechanisms for price fluctuations, improvement in African monetary independence, and the establishment of a development fund amounting to USD 8 billion (Zartman, 1976: 331). However, the EEC Member States did not want to be responsible for the economies of the African states anymore, when there were conflicting interests affecting the Community's development (Zartman, 1976: 331).

In October 1973, the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States managed to assign one spokesman, Namwisi Wa Kole from Zaire to speak on behalf of all of them during the ACP-EEC Council of Ministers meeting (Glaser, 1990: 25). It became clear that a new sort of Convention was on the road, based on the OAU guidelines (Glaser, 1990: 25). Babacar Ba, who was the spokesman of the African group, in 1974 told the Community members that "you have before you not three groups expressing harmonized positions with one voice, but a single group of ACP countries which want to recognise their common destiny and the unshakeable desire to achieve positive results at these negotiations" (Glaser, 1990: 25). On 28 February 1975, the first Lomé Convention was concluded with 44 APC countries (entered into force on 1 April 1976).

During the Pré-Lomé period, Nigeria, together with the African Commonwealth states, suggested a united ACP secretariat, whereas the OAU pushed for a Pan-African context (Gruhn, 1976: 250). As a result, the ACP Group was institutionalized with a secretariat and gained a permanent structure with the Georgetown Agreement, signed in Guyana on 6 June 1975 and entered into force on 12 February 1976 (Georgetown Agreement on the Organisation of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, 1975, Chapter III). The Group was composed of 79 African, Caribbean and Pacific signatory states¹⁸. The EEC has moderated its position and no longer imposed options

¹⁸ ACP Group of States consists of 48 Sub-Saharan African states, 6 Caribbean States and 15 Pacific States: Antigua and Barbuda, Angola, Barbados, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Benin, Bahamas, Botswana, Belize, Central African Republic, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Cook Islands, Cameroon, Cuba, Cape Verde, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Federated States of Micronesia, Gabon, Grenada, Ghana, Gambia, Republic of Guinea, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Kenya, Kiribati, St Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, Liberia, Lesotho, Comoros, Madagascar, Marshall Islands, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Solomon Islands, Seychelles, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Somalia, Suriname, Sao Tomé and Príncipe, Swaziland, Chad, Togo, Timor Leste, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, Tanzania, Uganda, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Vanuatu, Samoa, South Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe

and the word “partnership” got on the stage instead of “association” (Gruhn, 1976: 250). The African group was more prepared for the Lomé negotiations when compared to Yaoundé due to factors such as the Yaoundé associates’ acquaintance with EEC bureaucracy, the competent and skilful Caribbean negotiators, and African institutional structuration (Gruhn, 1976: 254).

3.2.1 Lomé I

Since the Treaty of Rome, the structure of bilateral relations between the European countries and their former colonies had profoundly changed. Although a certain degree of imbalance in the relations remained, with the existence of the postcolonial community¹⁹, defence treaties, enduring business interests, and monetary zones, the degree of this imbalance in the relations and the cases of postcolonial communities had decreased (Zartman, 1976: 337). The loosening of bilateral relations with the metropole eliminated the policy differences among the African states and they could obtain maximum benefits during the negotiation of the Lomé Convention as a united front (Zartman, 1976: 338).

Zartman (1976: 342) qualified the Lomé Convention (Lomé I), signed on 28 February 1975, in Togo and came into force on 1 April 1976 as a welcoming development, a natural stage in the decolonization process. Instead of seeing it as a neo-colonial consolidation or institutionalization of dependency, he claims that the Lomé Convention loosened the bilateral bonds between former colonies and their metropole and enhanced the capacities of the developing African economies.

Lomé I brought radical changes compared to the Second Yaoundé Convention. In terms of membership number and geography, Lomé I spread substantially. With the accession of Great Britain to the European Community in 1973, its former colonies have been included in the relationship, which more than doubled the number of members of the Second Yaoundé Convention (Banthia, 2007).

([https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Glossary:African,_Caribbean_and_Pacific_\(ACP\)](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Glossary:African,_Caribbean_and_Pacific_(ACP))).

¹⁹ The French Community was established in 1958 as a successor of the colonial French Union, as a French-language commonwealth, to pursue the idea of Francophonie.

Lomé I brought a single multilateral cooperation relationship between the 55 signatory states²⁰, which were divided into two groups of states. This new form of relationship was not as tight as the previous one among the Associates and the EEC countries, but it was also tighter than the previous one with non-Associates (Zartman, 1976: 331). This new Convention established 37 one-way free trade zones between the Community and the individual African states, which were not called “Associates” anymore, including quota and duty-free access for them to Europe (Zartman, 1976: 332).

The second radical change of Lomé I was to replace the reciprocal free trade zones established under the Treaty of Rome and the successive Yaoundé Conventions, with non-reciprocal trade preferences. The reverse preferences of Yaoundé led to the split between the francophone/commonwealth ACP countries and EU members. The acceptance of the principle of non-reciprocity in Lomé was the recognition of the preceding inequalities (Gruhn, 1976). The non-reciprocity would allow the ACP countries to access European markets duty-free in exchange for preferred access to ACP markets for European countries. Lomé I also provided guaranteed quotas and fixed prices for certain ACP products, such as sugar, beef, veal, and bananas under special protocols.

The third significant change of Lomé I was the establishment of the System for the Stabilization of Export Earnings (STABEX), in what concerns financial cooperation. The EEC would provide funds to compensate for adverse effects in export revenues of the ACP countries caused by fluctuations in the sensitive agricultural products (The Courier, 1975: 25).

The motivation for the new Lomé Convention was a result of the acknowledgment of the failure of the Yaoundé convention in terms of the desired results (Banthia, 2007). The privileges and special treatment offered to the 18 associates of the Yaoundé Convention were not enough to increase the trade between EC members and the

²⁰ European signatory states were Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, United Kingdom. ACP signatory states were Bahamas, Barbados, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Guyana, Jamaica, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Malagasy, Mali, Mauritius, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Chad, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Western Samoa, Zaire, Zambia.

associates, who had been affected by the tropical products market and could not increase their penetration in the European market (Zartman, 1976). This led to the acceptance of the special responsibility of the EC as a whole towards the former colonies of some of its members with the introduction of the principle of non-reciprocity and a remedy fund such as STABEX.

According to Zartman (1976: 333), the EC agreed to the terms of Lomé I and maintained its relations with the ACP countries for two reasons. First, for the EC, the relations with the ACP countries were a family affair and they were considered as “former students or apprentices now on their own” (Zartman, 1976: 333). This reflects the consolidation of the “special relationship” discourse developed by the former colonizer members of the EC, led by France during the negotiation of the Treaty of Rome. France managed to establish its family affair as a community affair, and the EEC accepted not only to provide non-reciprocal market access but also to protect former colonies against market fluctuations.

The second reason for accepting the terms of Lomé I was the dependence of Europe on raw materials from Africa and its strong interest in securing access to those raw materials, especially after the 1973 oil crisis (Arts and Byron, 1997). The first Lomé Convention was negotiated during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, followed by the oil crisis, which turned the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) into a major commodity cartel. The South was gaining economic power in the field of commodities. Money was abundant and Arab oil funds were in surplus. Nigeria had become as wealthy as an Arab oil state. Other ACP countries were also benefiting from the higher prices in commodities, such as coffee, cocoa, bauxite, diamonds, rutile, and copra (Glaser, 1990).

During the negotiations of Lomé I, the North and the South were in a state of mutual dependency than they ever were. On the one hand, there were social, political, and economic problems in the West due to the consecutive oil shocks, use of oil as a weapon, and OPEC, becoming a commodity cartel, which caused fears that this could also happen for other commodities such as sugar, uranium, coffee, and cocoa (Glaser, 1990: 25). On the other hand, billions of petro-dollars were deposited in Western banks, seeking worldwide opportunities for investment (Glaser, 1990: 25).

Compared to the other Lomé and subsequent agreements, Lomé I was the closest to a partnership between equals. Colonial preferences were partly maintained by protocols on sugar, beef, rum, and bananas. STABEX was established to protect the revenues of primary commodity exporters against a fall in prices or production levels. Permanent dialogue institutions such as the Council of Ministers, Committee of Ambassadors, and Consultative Assembly were strengthened and the increase in the Fourth EDF was almost up to 3.5 billion units of account (Glaser, 1990).

Lomé I signified the beginning of regional solidarity among the ACP Group of countries, established as a separate region vis-à-vis the EC. Two regional groupings composed of developed and developing countries, the EC and the ACP, concluded an agreement based on an equal partnership principle and discrimination against the third-party countries. This also meant the consolidation of the special relationship between the EU and the former colonies of the Member States by according to them a preferential treatment under the non-reciprocity principle. The main norms of the moral economy of the EU-Africa relationship such as solidarity, interregionalism, and development have been thus crystallized with the negotiation and conclusion process of the Lomé I Agreement.

3.2.2 Lomé II

In the Second ACP-EEC Convention - Lomé II (signed on 31 October 1979 and entered into force on 1 January 1981), the System for the Promotion of Mineral Production and Export (SYSMIN) was created to support ACP producers to ameliorate the mine facilities which were damaged and increase the mine production. Except for the establishment of the SYSMIN, which was quite innovative, Lomé II (1979) did not bring major changes to the provisions of Lomé I (Banthia, 2007).

After the first oil shock in 1973, commodity prices started to dramatically increase, and the second oil shock came in 1979. It was not possible anymore to continue the per capita gross domestic product (GDP) growth levels of the 1960s in sub-Saharan Africa. There was a steady decline in food production outputs, despite the continuous focus on project aid and call for investment in export crops and industry. The gap between

the quality of life in rural and urban areas was growing. In conclusion, what followed the innovative Lomé I was considered as a disappointment for the ACP countries (The Courier, 1990, No: 120).

Against this economic background, Lomé II put more emphasis on the responsibility of the ACP for their development by engaging them in consultative and decision-making processes and stimulating regional cooperation and trade promotion (Cosgrove-Twitchett, 1980: 114). It was also for the first time that the EC tried to incorporate neoliberal ideas with a political aspect in the EU-ACP relationship. The EU tried to include aid linkage to human rights during the negotiations, although it was rejected by the ACP and was only included during the Lomé III (Hurt, 2003: 162). Yet Lomé II did not meet all the demands of the ACP countries such as complete free market access in all products and joint management of EDF (Cosgrove-Twitchett, 1980: 114). The relative equal partnership established with Lomé I got broken with Lomé II.

3.2.3 Lomé III

The equality in the relationship between the ACP and the EU was at the forefront of Lomé I. The ACP could articulate their worries about issues of interest such as reciprocity and the absence of commodity support and managed to negotiate more advantageous terms (Zartman, 1976). However, equality during the negotiations has been broken since then. As of the Third ACP-EEC Convention (Lomé III), the ACP started to lose their voice during negotiations, where the EC put the policies on important issues on the table at the last moment and did not offer choice to the ACP countries. Negotiating the financial envelope by the EU member states without the involvement of the ACP countries and presenting it to the ACP countries just three months before the signature of the convention were such moves (Herbst, 1987).

During the 1980s, per capita GDP, agricultural production, and export levels were falling dramatically in Africa (Hill, 1985: 668). The African industry was working below capacity, and they had currency supply problems (Glaser, 1990: 26). Most African countries underwent “sustained deindustrialization” in this period (Lall, 1995: 2022). The

economic situation was further deteriorated due to a decline in trade and access to international finance (Noorbakhsh and Paloni, 1999: 549).

Due to deterioration in the economic situation, the ACP countries needed to reschedule their debts and started to engage with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to negotiate stabilization programmes (Hill, 1985: 668). The stabilization and structural adjustment programs, put in place by IMF and WB covered 29 African countries by the end of the 1980s²¹. The term stabilization is used to depress demand and structural adjustment is meant to stimulate supply (Lall, 1995: 2029). Although depressing demand was easier, African governments had difficulties in stimulating supply and minimizing the social costs (Glaser, 1990: 27). The weakness of African countries in stimulating supply was evident in the manufacturing industry whose share in GDP of all Sub-saharan African countries was small compared to other structural adjustment program countries in the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s (Noorbakhsh and Paloni, 1999: 558).

The ACP countries' structural adjustment difficulties were in the focus of Lomé III negotiations and the decline in Africa's development was also associated with major global problems such as the dramatic famines in 1984 and 1985, environmental degradation, and rapid increase in population rate (Glaser, 1990: 26). The questions of and concerns for changing the Lomé system in a way to address these problems dominated the negotiations from October 1983 to December 1984 (Glaser, 1990: 26). As a result, food security and self-sufficiency were identified as the main priorities to achieve development and the EC proposed policy dialogue to ensure efficiency in the implementation of programs in these areas (Glaser, 1990: 26). The ACP countries saw this greater involvement of the EC in the selection and monitoring of development projects through the policy dialogue as a "camouflage" to bring conditionality in Lomé aid system (Kotsopoulos and Mattheis, 2018: 452) The "policy dialogue" has been one of the most controversial issues during the negotiations (Hill, 1985: 666) and the Third ACP-EEC Convention-Lomé III, was signed on 8 December 1984 (entered into force on

²¹ The stability and adjustment programs were in place during 1987-91 were: Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. (*World Bank*, 1994).

1 May 1986) with no direct reference to policy dialogue as a result of the ACP countries' resistance. However, it was included in the first Chapter that "support shall be provided in ACP-EEC cooperation for the ACP states' own efforts to achieve more self-reliant and self-sustained development" (Third ACP-EEC Convention, 1984, Art. 4) and with this aim, "special efforts shall be made under this Convention to promote rural development, food security for the people and the revival and strengthening of agricultural-production potential in the ACP States" (Third ACP-EEC Convention, 1984, Art. 5). In line with the ACP countries' concerns, this was actually the beginning of the inclusion of further economic and political conditionality in the subsequent Lomé IV Agreement.

3.2.4 Lomé IV

The negotiations of the Fourth ACP-EEC Convention (Lomé IV, signed in Lomé on 15 December 1989, entered into force on 1 September 1991) started in 1988, in an atmosphere which was not so much promising for the ACP countries, which were still in economic despair. On the one hand, Southeast Asia and the Pacific rim were in a promising economic situation compared to the ACP countries and called Europe's attention (Glaser, 1990: 28). On the other hand, Jacques Delors became the Commission President and European integration was strengthening with increasing efforts to create the Single Market and future plans for economic and monetary union (Glaser, 1990: 28). In the wider plan, the political and economic order of the post-war era was changing, and the Eastern European countries were moving away from the communist model and approaching Western Europe (Glaser, 1990: 28). Negotiations for Fourth Lomé started in this distracting context where the European Community was not able to ensure that all demands of the ACP countries would be met (Glaser, 1990).

The Lomé IV brought several changes to the system. The "Lomé fatigue", which resulted from the economic failure of the ACP countries, despite decades of trade and aid policies and subsequent frustration led to those changes (Banthia, 2007: 8). Economic and political conditionality was one of these changes. From the economic point of view, the ACP states had to put in place Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) to be able to receive aid (Banthia, 2007: 8). From a political point of view, the ACP states accepted to comply with the international human standards to access aid, which they strongly resisted

during the negotiations of Lomé II and III (Banthia, 2007: 8).

The ACP states had to implement SAPs to receive aid and comply with the international human rights standards under Lomé IV (Banthia, 2007). The political objectives mentioned in Lomé IV were almost the same as the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) provisions of the Maastricht Treaty, which demonstrates the lack of contribution by the ACP countries to the shaping of the policy in Lomé IV (Banthia, 2007: 14). This reflects the erosion of the bargaining power of the ACP countries during the negotiations due to their trade and aid dependence and associated conditionality. The construction of the former colonies of the member states as inferior and in need of Europe's help within the moral economy of the EU-Africa relationship helped to formulate a development policy that paved the way to such an aid dependency and the EU's use of conditionality.

The changing international political environment after the Cold War was another reason for bringing the conditionality to Lomé IV. Western European Countries chose to concentrate on the former communist states in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and marginalize Africa which was in stagnation and unpromising economic conditions (Whiteman, 1998). As a result, European aid resources were directed towards those CEE countries, which reduced the amount of funds for the ACP countries and turned them into a tool of punishment (Banthia, 2007).

Lomé IV also prioritized regional cooperation and integration, compared to the previous agreements although there were no specific provisions (Banthia, 2007). It was stated in Title IX on Development of Services, Article 114 that “the Community shall support the ACP States’ efforts to increase their domestic capacity to provide services with a view to improving the working of their economies, relieving balance of payment constraints and stimulating the process of regional integration” (Fourth ACP-EEC Convention, 1989, Art. 114).

Lomé IV had a reform in 1995, which enhanced the link between aid, trade, and human rights adherence (Crawford, 1996: 506). Article 5 of the Lomé IV or similar agreements did not give a clear legal basis for suspension or denunciation in case of

serious human rights violations or interruptions in democratic processes. For this reason, a clause accepting the respect for human rights, democratic principles, and the rule of law as an “essential element” was introduced in the agreements with Brazil, the Andean Pact countries, the Baltic States, and Albania in 1992 (Commission of the European Communities, 1995: 7), that would allow for the suspension of the agreements in case of a serious violation (Crawford, 1996: 507). In Lomé IV-bis, Article 5, the goals of conditionality were extended to the rule of law, democratic principles, and good governance accordingly (Banthia, 2007). Crawford (1996) claimed that this political conditionality overshadowed the founding principles of the partnership and made Lomé no different than other aid programs, used as a power instrument to have leverage over the recipient countries’ economic and political policy frameworks.

The renewal of the EDF has also come with important changes in Lomé IV-bis. As a result of the marginalization of the ACP countries compared to the CEE countries, the amount of funding lessened (Bantia, 2007). In addition to that, the EDF aid was to be released in two portions. 70% was supposed to be delivered at the beginning and the sending of the remaining was conditional upon the implementation of the initial allocation in a satisfactory manner (Crawford, 1996).

3.3 Europe-Africa Relations in the Cotonou Period

The previous section explained the framework of the relationship established by Lomé Conventions. This section examines how the elements of the relationship have been subject to change by the Cotonou Agreement (signed on 23 June 2000 and entered into force on 1 April 2003), what the reasons behind this change are, and how this has affected the Europe-Africa relationship.

3.3.1 Cotonou Agreement

The trade preferences accorded by the Lomé system has started to be widely criticized at the end of the 1990s. Even the European Commission declared the impact of trade preferences as disappointing and made suggestions to replace the Lomé system with a new trade regime (European Commission, 1996). The World Bank classified forty out of 77 ACP signatory countries as LDCs in 2000, which shows that despite the aid and

development policies implemented for decades, the ACP states could not achieve economic development and they remained among the poorest countries of the world (Babarinde and Faber, 2004: 11). In Sub-Saharan Africa, the number of people who had to live on less than one dollar a day increased by 75 million between 1987 and 1998 (Babarinde and Faber, 2004: 12). There was a wide range of consensus on the failure of the Lomé system in both integrating the ACP in the world economy and preserving their share in EU markets (Gibb, 2000: 463)

The ACP countries had no gains from the previous preferential trade regime which was demonstrated by the fact that as of 2000, the share of the ACP countries in the EU market had fallen by half compared to their share in the 1970s (Carbone, 2013: 744). The share of the ACP countries in EU imports fell from 5.1% in 1970 to 1.5% in 2003 (Bormann, Busse and Neuhaus, 2005). The ACP countries continued to be dependent on the export of diamonds, cocoa, coffee, sugar, and beef, regulated by special protocols, which accounted for over 60% of all ACP exports (Gibb, 2000: 464)

The special protocols allowed for the access of the ACP products to European markets under guaranteed quotas and prices (Nunn and Price, 2004: 212). This system, also supported by STABEX, brought the massive involvement of European multinational corporations in the production of the ACP export goods²² (Nunn and Price, 2004: 213) and the ACP countries continued to produce these goods under guaranteed export, above market prices. For example, the protocol on sugar provided guaranteed export of certain quantities of sugar from the ACP countries at prices almost double the world price (Bartels, 2007: 735). The result of this trade regime established by the successive Lomé agreements had been the increased dependence of the ACP countries on EU markets (Nunn and Price, 2004: 215).

The change in the Lomé system was defended by the acknowledgment of the fact that the preferences system did not bring about the expected results and it was necessary to achieve integration against the dependency and vulnerability caused by

²² German Saarbergwerk, Belgian Petrofina, and Royal Dutch Shell were involved in the ACP mineral sector, whereas Tate and Lyle, Booker McConnell, and Unilever were involved in the agriculture. Note that Nunn and Price (2004: 213) cite Long (1980) here. Long, F. (1980) *Political Economy of EC Relations with African, Caribbean and Pacific States*, Oxford: Pergamon.

artificially protecting the ACP states from the global economy (Mandelson, 2005). The need to comply with the WTO rules, asking to terminate the non-reciprocal trade preferences for non-LDC countries was the other reason for the change in the regime (Babarinde and Faber, 2004). European Commission Green Paper on Relations between the European Union and the ACP Countries on the Eve of the 21st Century also highlighted the emergence of a multipolar world following the end of the Cold War and the increasing gap between the high performant African countries those that fell behind within the ACP group as the reasons for a change in the trade regime (European Commission, 1996).

Aid fatigue added to the frustration caused by low development levels of the ACP countries, in addition to the financial pressures on the EU budget caused the EU to seek new ways to promote economic growth in the ACP and reduce poverty (Banthia, 2007). After an intensive public debate on the EU-ACP cooperation, the negotiations started in September 1998, which led to the conclusion of a new Partnership Agreement on 23 June 2000, in Cotonou between the ACP and the EU.

The fundamental principles of the new Cotonou Agreement were laid in Article 2 as follows: 1- encouraging the ACP States' ownership of their own development strategies based on the equality of the partners; 2- encouraging the integration of all parts of the society, both private and CSOs to the partnership process; 3- acknowledging the importance of the role of dialogue between parties in assuming their obligations; 4- differentiating cooperation arrangements according to the ACP countries' levels of development, performance and long-term development strategy, with a special treatment to the least-developed countries (Cotonou Agreement, 2000).

Although the equal partnership was one of the underlying norms of the relationship from the very beginning, it seemed to be sacrificed for the sake of other objectives such as the efficiency with Cotonou. The EU stated even before the conclusion of the Cotonou Agreement that “the respect for national sovereignty that once took the form of an almost boundless trust in the recipient governments is evolving into an approach guided by efficiency” in the 1996 Green Paper (European Commission, 1996: 12). The Agreement acknowledged the respect for human rights, the rule of law, and

democratic principles as “essential”, and good governance as “fundamental” principles (Holland, 2003). Violation of these essential elements of the Agreement would call for “appropriate measures” to be taken, which include the suspension of aid (Carbone, 2013: 745).

Hurt (2003) claimed that the Cotonou agreement reflected the “disciplinary neoliberalism” in EU-ACP relations, with the mixture of consent (dialogue, partnership, ownership) and coercion (aid reviews, aid conditionality). He also defended that the “rolling programming”²³, which brought political dialogue between the individual ACP states and the EU, to regularly monitor the aid allocations, eroded the equal partnership concept. Although Cotonou gives equal rights to both parties to take “appropriate measures” in case of a violation of the essential element clause (Cotonou Agreement, 2000, Art. 96), the EU is the only party to exert conditionality, holding the power to reduce aid or trade. This reveals the asymmetrical/hierarchical nature of the relationship between the EU and the ACP countries. The ACP countries’ dependence on the EU for trade and aid undermines the equality in the partnership.

The revision of the Cotonou Agreement in 2005 brought the EU more flexibility in the aid allocation process, such as raising country allocations unilaterally (Carbone, 2013). In addition, the revised version of Article 34 of Annex IV²⁴ replaced the “Chief Authorizing Officer” with “the Commission”. This brought centralization of the decision-making powers related to funding within the European Commission and made the National Authorizing Officer, who is usually a minister of finance or planning of an ACP country more vulnerable vis-à-vis the European Commission (Kingah, 2006: 68). This change had led to further questioning of the relationship between the EU and the ACP, which seemed more of a “principle-agent relationship” than “partnership” (Kingah, 2006:

²³ Rolling programming is a system introduced by the Cotonou Agreement which refers to the systematic review of the progress in the implementation of the National Indicative Programmes funded through EDF. This brings the risk of adjustment or drop of programs in case of poor performances of the governments and redirection of the resources to better-performing ACP countries (European Center for Development Policy Management, 2001: 2)

²⁴ Revised Annex IV, Article 34, p.1: “The Commission shall undertake the financial execution of operations carried out with Fund resources, with the exception of the Investment Facility and interest-rate subsidies, using the following main methods of management: (1) centralised management; (2) decentralised management.” (Agreement Amending the Cotonou Agreement, 2005).

68). The principle-agent relationship occurs when one party, the principal, engages with a second party, the agent, in a contractual relationship, in which the former delegates the responsibility of carrying out functions and tasks to the agent on its behalf (Kassim and Menon, 2003: 122). The influence of the Commission is further emphasized in Article 15 paragraph 4 of Annex IV which provides that the Commission would sideline the National authorizing officers of the ACP countries in the appraisal of non-state actors to implement eligible programs and projects (Kingah, 2006: 68).

The objectives of the Cotonou Agreement such as developing the private sector in the ACP countries, liberalization of trade and foreign exchange regimes, as well as promoting competitive market economies (Cotonou Agreement, 2000, Art. 19) indicate the shift towards the hegemony of neoliberal values of political elites. With the rise of neoliberal ideas and the acceptance of liberalization as the only way to achieve development, EU-ACP relations have transformed from cooperation in Lomé to coercion in Cotonou (Hurt, 2003). This hegemonic dominance of neoliberalism was manifest in the insistence to comply with the core principles and rules of the WTO, as justification for urging to change the system. Instead of working together with the ACP countries to change the WTO rules preventing the continuation of the Lomé regime, the EU chose to justify the need for change with the need to comply with WTO rules and principles. This can be considered as a strategic choice by the EU to externalize its responsibility for its own policy (Hurt, 2003).

As of 1999, there has been a shift of focus from structural adjustment to poverty reduction in the development programs and operations of the WB and other international financial institutions (UNCTAD, 2002: 1). This move was also reflected in the EU-ACP relationship, with an emphasis on poverty reduction (Hurt, 2003). One of the innovative reforms that the Cotonou Agreement brought to the 25-year-old Lomé System was that poverty reduction and eradication were stated as the main goals of the partnership established with the agreement, “consistent with the objectives of sustainable development and the gradual integration of the ACP countries into the world economy” (Cotonou Agreement, 2000, Art. 1). This was the first time that “poverty eradication” was stated as a manifest objective, which endorsed the deteriorated situation of the ACP

economies facing extreme poverty, contrary to the initial aims of the partnership (Banthia, 2007).

Elgström (2000) claimed that Cotonou represented a change in the EU's normative approach vis-à-vis its member states' former colonies. While the notions of partnership and responsibility were undermined, the notions of liberalization and democratization gained importance. The new economic liberalization model promoted by the EU intended to guarantee access to emerging markets for the EU (Carbone, 2013). It was also called as "triumph of realism over idealism" (Farrell, 2005: 263).

The Cotonou Agreement expressed the EU's support for the regional and sub-regional cooperation, integration of the ACP states, and "the gradual integration of the ACP States into the world economy" as an objective (Cotonou Agreement, 2000, Art. 28). This statement also confirms Hurt's (2003: 174) claim of embracement of neoliberal values in the Cotonou Agreement by the EC and demonstrates its "desire to influence and shape the political systems and policies of ACP states". Article 67 paragraph 4 (Cotonou Agreement, 2000, Art. 67, p.4) referred to other multilateral donors in the implementation of macroeconomic and sectoral reforms at the regional level, that would serve the integration of the ACP markets with the world economy. This signifies a departure from the special relationship discourse and accompanying solidarity principle of the moral economy of the EU and the ACP relationship since the Treaty of Rome towards a more politicized and asymmetrical relationship, in which speeding up market integration becomes the main motive.

The EU-ACP relations have increasingly been politicized and securitized with the Cotonou agreement. The launch of the funds for the African Peace Facility within the EDF framework, or the Governance Incentive Tranche, which provided additional funds on the condition that governance reforms were implemented demonstrated that the Cotonou Agreement carried the relations beyond trade and aid (Carbone, 2013: 748). Climate change and global warming had been the main concerns of the Cotonou review in 2010, in addition to issues such as migration control, political instability, and food security (Carbone, 2013: 746). Increased politicization linked with aid conditionality was accompanied by an increase in the discord with regard to the nature of the relationship

between the EU and the ACP.

The Cotonou Agreement was assessed differently by the EU and the ACP countries (Bengtsson and Elgström, 2012: 103). The ACP countries perceived the EU as a generous contributor to their development, but also an imperialist great power, generously aiding with a feeling of superiority, while the EU considered itself as the promoter of norms and values and partner for development (Bengtsson and Elgström, 2012: 103). As a result of the interviews with the ACP and the AU officials, Sicurelli (2011: 191) emphasized that the colonial factor still had an impact on the EU-ACP relationship. It was creating an expectation for compensation from the ACP side and leading to frustration when they are not satisfied through aid conditionality or protectionist measures by the EU, in terms of its agricultural policy or liberalization of trade policy (Carbone, 2013).

The promotion of norms such as regional integration (Farrell, 2009), human rights, and democracy (Del Biondo, 2012; Crawford, 1996) through the Cotonou process ended up with an increasing gap between reality and rhetoric. Even if one accepts that the EU has genuinely aimed to diffuse these norms instead of pursuing its own interests, one should accept that the diffusion of the neoliberal norms might not be the solution to meet the ACP countries' developmental needs (Storey, 2006).

3.3.2 Economic Partnership Agreements

The Cotonou Agreement stipulated that new trade arrangements would be concluded and introduced gradually, in compliance with WTO rules. This meant the gradual removal of the non-reciprocal preferences accorded by the EU to the ACP countries under the Lomé regime, which would be maintained until December 2007. In the meantime, the EU and the ACP countries would be negotiating Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) which were supposed to enter into force in 2008. EPAs were defined as “development instruments” that “aim to foster smooth and gradual integration of the ACP States into the world economy” (Cotonou Agreement, 2000, Art. 36) by “establishing a timetable for the progressive removal of barriers to trade between the Parties, in accordance with the relevant WTO rules” (Cotonou Agreement, 2000, Art. 37-

4.). As of January 2022, interim EPAs are in force with 14 ratifying countries out of 49 sub-Saharan African countries. This section addresses the current state of negotiations and discussions around the EPAs.

3.3.2.1 EPA Negotiations with regional groupings

Negotiations of EPAs between the EU, represented by DG Trade and six ACP regions started on 27 September 2002, within the framework set by the Cotonou Agreement:

Negotiations of the economic partnership agreements will be undertaken with ACP countries which consider themselves in a position to do so, at the level they consider appropriate and in accordance with the procedures agreed by the ACP Group, taking into account regional integration process within the ACP (Cotonou Agreement, 2000, Art. 37-5).

At the beginning of the negotiation process, the EU encouraged the negotiations to be made with the ACP countries in groups that they chose, which would supposedly support the regional integration process (Bartels, 2007: 751). In this regard, the EPAs were declared to be built on existing regional integration initiatives (European Commission, 2002b: 5).

The EU outlined seven regional groupings for the EPA negotiations: West Africa, Central Africa, East African Community (EAC), Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Caribbean, and the Pacific Region. The main aim of the negotiations was to establish Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) between the EU and each of these regional ACP negotiating groups (Hinkle and Schiff, 2004: 1322).

The regional groups created for the negotiations of the EPAs have not corresponded to the already existing regional economic communities in Africa. The EPA

process split the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) because the largest COMESA economy, Egypt, is not an ACP country and party to the ESA configuration negotiations (Goodison, 2005a). 15 SADC member states were also split up into four different regions such as Central Africa, ESA, EAC, and SADC-minus (Buzdugan, 2013: 937). With the starting of negotiations in 2004, members of the SADC such as Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles, Zambia, Zimbabwe, joined the ESA group, together with COMESA members such as Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan (Buzdugan, 2013: 937). While the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) attended the Central Africa group, Tanzania moved from SADC-minus to the EAC group (Vickers, 2011: 189) The EPA negotiation process had an impact on the political and economic alignments among the SADC members, which could possibly alter the regional political landscape in southern Africa in the future (Buzdugan, 2013: 938).

The EU imposed the same tariff structure on the BLNS countries (namely, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland) and South Africa as the basis of an EPA with the SADC (Storey, 2006: 338). Goodison and Stoneman (2004: 727) claimed that this could be a problem with regard to the needs and constraints of the smaller BLNS countries. This is why Zimbabwe and Mauritius preferred to join ESA instead of the SADC, not to liberalize their markets according to the EU-South Africa schedule (Storey, 2006: 338).

The negotiations for the EPAs were supposed to be concluded by 31 December 2007, until the expiry of the WTO waiver allowing preferential treatment to the ACP countries accorded by the Cotonou Agreement (Bengtsson and Elgström, 2012: 102). However, in late 2007, it became apparent that the timetable would not be met (European Commission, 2014). Thus, the EU and the ACP countries agreed to sign “interim agreements” that would allow the ACP countries access EU markets, as a temporary solution until all the EPAs were concluded (Ashton, 2009a).

Currently, the negotiations for full EPAs are still ongoing. As of 2022, 30 out of 49 sub-Saharan African countries signed the EPA with the EU, and 15 out of 30 ratified

it. Interim EPAs are in force with 14 ratifying countries²⁵ (European Commission, 2021b).

In the SADC group, the EPA was signed with Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland in 2016, with Angola being opted to join later, and the agreement became the first fully operational regional EPA as of February 2018 (European Commission, 2021b). In West Africa, Interim agreements were signed with Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana (European Commission, 2021b). Negotiations of the regional EPA with West African countries were concluded on 30 June 2014 (European Commission, 2021b). As of January 2022, 15 West African countries signed the EPA with the EU, except for Nigeria. The regional EPA will be submitted for ratification after signature by all the Parties (European Commission, 2021b).

In Central Africa, Cameroon is the only country that signed the EPA with the EU on 15 January 2009 (European Commission, 2021b). Other countries in the region opted not to join the agreement and the contacts are ongoing to include them in the agreement (European Commission, 2021b). In Eastern and Southern Africa, the interim agreement was signed by Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, Zimbabwe, and Comoros in August 2009 and is in provisional application (European Commission, 2021b). The agreement is open to other countries in the region which want to join in later (European Commission, 2021b).

In the EAC, the negotiations were finalized with Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda in October 2014 (European Commission, 2021b). Only Kenya and Rwanda signed the agreement, and Kenya ratified (European Commission, 2021b). South Sudan also became a member of EAC in September 2016 (European Commission, 2021b). The EPA will enter into force after the signature and ratification by all members (European Commission, 2021b).

Due to the delays in negotiations and ratification processes, the EU had to adopt a market access regulation to provide temporary market access until the completion of all ratification processes in 2007 (Council of the European Union, 2007a). This regulation

²⁵ These 14 ratifying countries from four different negotiating regions are Cameroun, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Mauritius, Seychelles, Zimbabwe, Madagascar, Comoros, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Eswatini (European Commission, 2021b).

had to be further extended in 2014 and repealed in 2016 with another regulation (European Union, 2016). Those countries which have not concluded an EPA with the EU benefit from trade preferences either under Everything but Arms (EBA) or GSP, except for Gabon and Equatorial Guinea which are considered as upper-middle-income countries (European Commission, 2022). The following section addresses some of the issues that contributed to the difficulties and delays in the EPA negotiation process.

3.3.2.2 Critics on the EPAs

The EPA negotiations led to strong debates in various circles, not only with regard to the negotiations itself but also the nature and the future of the EU-ACP relationship. Carbone (2013) argues that the Cotonou Agreement strengthened the asymmetrical relations of the previous century, instead of promoting partnership. This was reflected in the imposition of greater conditionality through the demands for reciprocity of markets during the negotiation of the economic partnership agreement, with the aim of maintaining and enhancing market access (Farrell, 2005: 266). This asymmetrical relationship was also reinforced by splitting the ACP Group into sub-regions during the negotiations of the EPAs, which weakened the solidarity among its members (Carbone, 2013: 748).

The debate on the EPAs was related to the wider debates on economic development based on the claim of the “shrinking of the development space” (Wade, 2003). The extensive scope of the EPAs is claimed to prevent the ACP states to pursue more interventionist policies to enhance their own competitiveness and stimulate their economic development (Bilal and Rampa, 2006). The EPAs have been seen as reflecting a shift from a redistributive approach to a neoliberal one, locking the ACP states into a neoliberal model of economic governance, which may force the ACP states to abandon some parts of their policy-making autonomy (Nunn and Price, 2004).

From the ACP side, they claimed that their policy space was restricted by the European Commission (Carbone, 2013). They also stated that after the failure of the Doha Round, the EC tried to include the behind-the-border issues (services, investments, public procurement, competition policy, and intellectual property) in various EPAs, with the aim

of achieving liberalization advantages to tackle the competitors (Heron and Siles-Brügge, 2012). The EPAs went beyond the original requisite of WTO compatibility in parallel to the EU's bilateral agreements with commercial orientation. Services and investment became the key motives for preferential liberalization in EU trade policy. The aggressive approach to access markets in the developing countries is also reflected by the insistence on the liberalization of the areas which are not addressed in Lomé, thus not subject to WTO compatibility.

Heron and Siles-Brügge (2012) explain the aggressiveness of the EPAs within the wider EU trade policy shift from a traditional multilateral approach towards a more assertive bilateral and regional trade strategy, by referring to the systemic and domestic-societal drivers of preferential liberalization. As the systemic drivers, the collapse of Cancun²⁶ and the shift of the US and Japan towards bilateral trade agreements, with a strong focus on the liberalization of services and investment and regulatory harmonization led the EU to launch a more offensive external trade strategy – “Global Europe” (Heron and Siles-Brügge, 2012). The Global Europe strategy aims to stimulate European competitiveness and employment creation by further liberalising global trade, opening markets and promoting integration by “tackling issues which are not ready for multilateral discussion” within the free trade agreements (European Commission, 2006: 8). According to Heron and Siles-Brügge (2012), this represents a shift from “*multilateralism first to competitive liberalization*”²⁷ (Heron and Siles-Brügge, 2012: 251).

In terms of domestic-societal drivers of the more aggressive bilateral and regional trade strategy during the EPA negotiations, Heron and Siles-Brügge (2012) highlight the role of interest groups which would push for guaranteeing proportionate market access to compensate any losses that could potentially occur by the trade diversion from a preferential trade agreement, in line with the domino theory of regionalism (Heron

²⁶ WTO talks in Cancun started on 10 September 2003 and collapsed on 14 September 2003. One of the issues that led to the collapse was the insistence of the EU to include the “Singapore issues” into the Cancun text (Bhagwati, 2004: 60). Singapore issues are those issues that were first raised during the WTO ministerial meeting in Singapore in December 1996 such as competition policy, transparency in public procurement, trade facilitation, and investment (Heron and Siles-Brügge, 2012: 250).

²⁷ Emphases original.

and Siles-Brügge, 2012: 253). They claim that multinational firms seek to guarantee “first-mover” advantages in the regulated service markets in developing countries and services and investment liberalization stimulates developed countries to rival in getting preferential access to the markets of developing countries (Heron and Siles-Brügge, 2012). As a result, in contrast to the “collusive delegation” argument²⁸, the delegation of authority in trade policymaking to a supranational organ sustain the EU member states’ protectionist interests instead of their commitment to multilateral liberalization (Heron and Siles-Brügge, 2012: 255).

Besides the content of the EPAs, the EU has been also heavily criticized by some of its Member States, led by the UK and several members of the European Parliament, for its inflexible approach in imposing the neoliberal EPAs across different regions within a relatively short period of time (Carbone, 2013: 747). The British government asked for an extension of the timetable for full import liberalization from the side of the ACP states to a minimum of 20 years and opposed the use of EPAs by European countries to get more access to the developing country markets in March 2005. A British parliamentary report even objected to setting a fixed timetable for liberalization and argued that reciprocal market access should be offered to LDCs only after graduating out of LDC status (Goodison, 2005b).

Some NGOs have initiated a “stop-EPAs” campaign, objecting to the link between development and trade liberalization and denying the EPAs’ claim of equality between partners (Del Felice, 2012). One of them was the Traidcraft organization²⁹, which was the prominent critic of EPA negotiations in terms of the imposition of the liberalization of public procurement for EU firms in the ACP countries, without any prioritization for local contractors (Storey, 2006: 340). Traidcraft also declared the shift towards liberalization of all services sectors, even beyond GATS and insistence on the equal treatment for European companies in the ACP countries as the indicators of the

²⁸ Collusive delegation argument used in the literature on EU trade policy claims that the national governments chose to delegate the authority to make trade policy to the supranational Commission in the Treaty of Rome to avoid the protectionist pressures and to foster liberalization of trade (Heron and Siles-Brügge, 2012: 252).

²⁹ Traidcraft is a UK based fair trade organisation that was an active member of the “Stop EPA” campaign in April 2004 (Dur and De Bièvre, 2007: 89)

pursuance of the European commercial self-interest (Storey, 2006: 340)

Borrmann, Busse and Neuhaus (2005) analyzed the expected impact of EPAs on the African countries. They projected a loss of customs revenues between 5 to 10 percent in West Africa, which could have a severe impact on the countries' capacity to provide public goods such as infrastructure and education (Borrmann, Busse and Neuhaus, 2005: 171). Their findings pointed to the declining welfare levels as the impact of EPAs in other regions such as SADC and ESA (Storey, 2006).

Milner, Morrissey and McKay (2005) also conducted a study to estimate the EPAs' economic impact on East Africa, focusing on Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda. In their view, removing the trade barriers would deprive all three countries of tariff revenue, which is a severe impact, considering that the tax base is not diversified (Milner, Morrissey and Mc Kay, 2005). For Tanzania and Uganda, this meant losing half of the current tariff revenue (Milner, Morrissey and Mc Kay, 2005: 346). While consumers in Tanzania and Uganda might take advantage of cheaper products imported from the EU, this would be detrimental to Kenyan producers who are currently supplying these products (Milner, Morrissey and Mc Kay, 2005: 338). Milner, Morrissey and McKay's (2005) conclusion is that they do not expect positive welfare effects and the static effects would be negative, even for the relatively powerful Kenyan economy. Even though the EPA negotiations in East Africa are conducted with a regional economic community (EAC), not all the members' development levels are the same and they are exposed to different vulnerabilities against the EPAs. This is a factor that might hamper solidarity during the negotiations of the EPAs and also harm regional integration after the conclusion of the agreement.

In addition to the impact on the economic development of the ACP countries, the EPAs were also criticized with regard to their impact on the regional integration process in the ACP regions. Although the Cotonou Agreement claimed that the negotiations of the EPAs would take into account the regional integration process within the ACP (Cotonou Agreement, 2000, Art. 37-5), the regional negotiation groups have been established externally by the EU and did not always correspond to the already existing regional groupings in Africa (Hurt, 2003). This undermined the equality of

partners in EPAs and caused difficulties and complexity for cooperation among the ACP countries because of their overlapping regional arrangements (Borrmann, Busse and Neuhaus, 2005).

Slocum-Bradley (2007: 644) argues that the EPA negotiations dismantled the ACP group and weakened its solidarity. The EU's negotiation with smaller regional groups, instead of the ACP as a whole (as was the case for Lomé) weakened the collective bargaining power of the ACP countries (Dur and De Bievre, 2007). Stevens (2006) claims that the regional groups broke apart during the negotiations, depending on the extent to which members were willing to open their markets to the EU and other ACP countries. The lists of the excluded items determined by the members of the regional groups did not overlap, and this created difficulty to reach a common list of products that would be excluded from liberalization during the negotiations (Storey, 2006). The less powerful states in the groups were also exposed to pressure by powerful states in the groups to accept the agreement terms, which would be disadvantageous for the small states, but favourable to those powerful ones (Bormann and Busse, 2007).

Another problem arising from conducting negotiations with regional EPA groupings is that many ACP countries that joined one of the EPA groupings were already classified as LDCs, which provided them almost unlimited duty- and quota-free access to EU markets under the Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative (Storey, 2006). This preferential access of many ACP countries to the EU markets further problematized the negotiations with regional EPA groupings because lowering the import barriers to the ACP states, in general, would destroy the relative advantages of LDCs and worsen the treatment they got under EBA (Gillson and Grim, 2004).

Concluding Remarks

The relationship between Europe and Africa has been shaped under the Eurafrika discourse which started during the period between the First and Second World Wars. The Eurafrika discourse was based on the claim that European unification and African colonization projects were closely linked, and the two sides needed each other (Hansen and Jonsson, 2001: 450). Even the unification of Europe was deemed necessary for the

creation of this new geopolitical bloc which would provide Europe with the essential resources E. L. Guernier³⁰ (as cited in Hansen and Jonsson, 2011: 450).

Following World War II, the Eurafrica idea was revoked and seeped into the “special relationship” discourse developed during the negotiations of the European Common Market. Sharing the burden of aid towards the overseas colonies with other Community members being one of the motives for France behind this discourse, preserving its sphere of influence in Africa during the decolonization process was another. This discourse has resulted in the creation of a special section IV on the “Association of the Overseas and Territories”, which “have special relations with Belgium, France, Italy and the Netherlands” (Treaty of Rome, 1957, Art. 131).

The special relationship established with the Treaty of Rome has also continued during the Yaoundé Conventions period, between 1963 and 1975, which preserved the reciprocal free trade zones between EEC and the African countries and the reverse preferences system. This period has also corresponded to the independence of former colonies. In parallel to the accession of the UK to the EEC in 1973, the extent of the “special relationship” also increased as to cover the 20 Commonwealth countries and ended up with the institutionalization of the ACP Group and establishment of its permanent structure in June 1975, which became the counterpart of EEC to conduct the Lomé negotiations.

The Lomé I brought profound changes to the system established with the Treaty of Rome and the Yaoundé Conventions, the most important one being to replace the reverse preferences with non-reciprocal trade preferences. Lomé I was the agreement closest to the partnership between equals. When Lomé II was concluded in 1979, the relationship came under the influence of neoliberal ideas in line with the neoliberal turn in European integration. Liberalization became the only way to achieve development, and, aid linkage, policy dialogue, effective aid management, economic and political conditionality were the political aspects of this turn reflected in the relationship.

³⁰ Guernier, E. L. (1933). *L’Afrique : champ d’expansion de l’Europe*, Paris: Armand Colin.

The low level of development and economic failure of the ACP countries have been discursively connected to the failure of the non-reciprocal preferences system brought by Lomé Conventions and the necessity to terminate them to comply with the WTO rules. The emphasis on the efficiency of the aid and political conditionality has undermined the equality between partners and the hegemony of neoliberalism has been manifested in the wider acceptance of liberalization as the only way to the development in the ACP countries. The Cotonou Agreement has also embodied the neoliberal values by manifesting its support to the regional and sub-regional cooperation and integration of the ACP states and the gradual integration of the ACP states into the world economy through the Agreement.

The solution to comply with the WTO rules was found at negotiating and concluding new trading agreements that would include the removal of non-reciprocal preferences granted to the ACP countries. These EPAs were decided to be negotiated with six regional groupings created by the EU. Although the EU has claimed that the EPAs were intended to increase the global competitiveness of the ACP countries by increasing the integration among the ACP countries and gradually integrating them into the world economy, it did not help to prevent the bottleneck in the EPA negotiations process manifested by the resistance from certain ACP countries, “Stop-EPAs” campaign led by NGOs and serious delays in the conclusion and ratifications of EPAs by regional groupings. The main objections against the EPAs concentrated on the claims that they would fragment the ACP group and weaken its solidarity established throughout the whole Lomé process, restrict the policy space of the ACP countries in line with the neoliberal model of economic governance, decrease the welfare levels of the ACP countries and dismantle the already existing regional groupings in Africa.

In the face of all these objections and the bottleneck in the negotiation of the EPAs, the original deadline for the conclusion has not been met, and “interim agreements” were agreed to allow signatory countries to continue to access EU markets as a temporary solution. As of February 2021, 7 regional EPAs are in application with only 32 of 70 ACP countries, 14 of them being African countries (European Commission, 2021a).

Criticism and objections explained in this chapter point to the impact of the EPAs on the economic development and regional integration of African countries, which were widely shared among academics, civil society, and the leaders of the African countries. These are the main issues behind the delay both in the negotiation and implementation of the EPAs with all ACP countries. This thesis claims that the moral economy of the relationship between the EU and Africa is based on norms such as development, solidarity, and regional integration. These were also the main issues around which the criticism and objections towards the EPAs were built up. The following chapter analyzes the discursive construction of these norms within the moral economy of the EU-Africa relationship, with the aim of explaining the objections and resistance in the EPA process with the deviation from the main norms from a moral economy perspective.

4. ASSESSING THE REGIONAL INTEGRATION NORM IN THE MORAL ECONOMY OF THE EU-AFRICA RELATIONSHIP

This thesis argues that the norm of regional integration based on a neoliberal ideology was constructed and became “normalized” within the moral economy of the EU-Africa relationship. It aims to identify discursive strategies used to promote regional integration for Africa and the main ideology behind it. In this chapter, the DHA is employed to analyze the discursive articulations of regional integration in Africa.

This chapter tries to reveal the identity construction within the context of EU-Africa trade and development cooperation. It explores the discursive construction of “us” and “them” in EU-Africa relations in this regard. It analyzes the stereotypical images for African countries in the public discourses and what discursive strategies are used in this identity construction. It asks DHA questions such as: “How are the EU and African states named and referred to linguistically within the moral economy of EU-Africa interregional relations?”; “How is regional integration referred to linguistically?”, “What linguistic means are used?”; “What traits, characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to them?”; “What arguments and argumentation strategies are used to justify, legitimize and naturalize certain representations of the EU and Africa?”; “How is the regional integration norm constructed within EU-Africa moral economy in relation with the construction of identities in the narrative?”; “Which arguments and argumentation schemes are used to justify, legitimize and naturalize certain representations of the EU, Africa and regional integration?”. The thesis also investigates the ideological perspectives behind these arguments.

The data that is subject to analysis covers political speeches by the European Commission officials and EU leaders, official documents – especially declarations – on EU-Africa relations, and the issues of *Courrier* magazine, first published by the Directorate General of Overseas Development of the EEC Commission in 1963, targeting the peoples of the associated overseas countries that came to Europe as scholars, interns, or participants to the seminars. The choice of the *Courrier Magazine* rests on the significance of the target group of the magazine. In the first issue of the Magazine, which was published in French and under the name “*Courrier de l’Association*” on 1 September

1963, it was described as “a newsletter for nationals of the Associated Overseas Countries who came as scholarship holders, trainees, or conference participants³¹” (Courrier de L’Association, 1963: 1). The target group consisted of former scholarship holders or interns from African countries, or those who came to Europe to attend conferences and study trips and then went back to assume public and political duties in their countries. The Magazine has urged its target group to keep engaged by sending back their opinions and suggestions as well. Its significance comes from being one of the means through which the Commission was in constant interaction with the future decision- and policy-makers/officials of the African countries. It offered an opportunity to the Commission to influence public opinion in those countries. It did not only represent the point of view of the Directorate General for Development but also gave place to interviews and articles from European and African leaders, European Commission officials, as well as the texts of official documents and press coverages on each milestone in EU-Africa relations.

For the discourse analysis in this section, the data was collected from 224 issues of Courrier Magazine, published by the European Commission under the following names: *Courrier de l’Association* (by Direction Générale du Développement de l’outre-mer, 1963-1967), *Courrier de l’Association-Association News* (by Direction Générale de l’Aide au Développement, Commission, 1968-1973), *Courrier de l’Association-Association News* (by Directorate General for development and cooperation, 1973-1975), *The Courier* (by Directorate General for Development, 1975-2004), *eCourrier* (by Directorate General for Development, 2005-2006). Other documents analyzed in addition to the Courrier Magazine are 75 speeches by the representatives of the EU (selected from the speeches delivered at the milestones of relations such as the signature of an agreement or EU-Africa summits), 15 issues of Bulletin from the European Community, published and distributed on behalf of the European Economic Community in Washington D.C., two issues of European Parliament Monthly Bulletin of European Documentation related to regional integration in Africa, as well as official documents related to the EU-Africa development and trade relations such as association and economic partnership agreements and joint Africa-EU Strategy, working documents, working papers prepared by different

³¹“un bulletin de liaison à l’intention des ressortissants des pays d’Outre-Mer associés qui sont venus comme boursiers, stagiaires, ou participants aux colloques” (The translation is made by the author).

EU institutions and bodies, covering the period between the Treaty of Rome (1957) and 2021 (the full year before the submission of this thesis).

Table 4 below shows the overview of discursive strategies used by the EU in depicting EU-Africa relations and setting regional integration as a norm for Africa in line with the discursive strategies proposed by the DHA (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016). It also displays the objectives behind the employment of specific discursive strategies such as the discursive construction or qualification of social actors, which are Europe and Africa in our analysis; of processes and phenomena such as the relationship between Europe and Africa and the regional integration, as well as the objectives for the use of other discursive strategies and the most common linguistic devices (expressions, terms, truth claims, etc.) used to construct identities and justify policies in this regard, which were identified in the analysis.

Table 4. Categories for the Analysis of Discourse on the Regional Integration in Africa

Discursive Strategies	Objectives	Devices
Nomination Strategies <i>(How are actors, actions and processes related to the interregional relationship between Europe and Africa and regional integration phenomenon named and referred to linguistically?)</i>	Discursive construction of social actors	▪ Deictics and phoric expressions: we, they, us, them ▪ Collectives, including metonymic toponyms: - North, West, European Economic Community, European Community, European Union, Western World - Overseas territories/countries, associated states, Third World, Associated African and the Malagasy States, the African, Caribbean and the Pacific (the ACP), Africa, African states, Africa Union, South, ACP sub-regions, Regional Economic Communities (RECs), West Africa, Central Africa, Eastern Africa ▪ Anthroponyms referring to geopolitical units: Europeans, Africans

		▪ Relational anthroponyms: our neighbours, mother countries, our African friends, our associates, our partners, twin continents
	Discursive construction of processes and actions	▪ Relational terms: association, cooperation, Eurafrica, partnership, help, responsibility, burden, duty, ties, solidarity, development cooperation, ▪ Economic relational terms: Euro-African economic area, structural adjustment, industrialization, import-substitution, integration to world markets
	Discursive construction of the regional integration phenomenon	▪ Regional: Regional groupings, African sub-regional markets, intrasubregional groupings, subregions, regional economic initiatives, subregional groupings, economic integration, regional integration, regional economic cooperation, regional cooperation, sub-regional economic integration, market integration, project-oriented and functional cooperation, South-South market opening ▪ Continental: economic integration across the continent, continental integration, continent-to-continent partnership, continental integration, continental connectivity, pan-African economic community, pan-African organization
Predication strategies: (What characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to social actors, objects, phenomena/events and processes?)	Discursive characterization/qualification of social actors, objects, phenomena, events processes and actions (positively or negatively)	▪ Characterization of African countries: developing countries/nations; least developed countries; poor; in poverty, disease, hunger, despair, chaos; poor of the middle age, workers; disunited; rising; emerging; land of opportunities; with economic and human potential; young population; better-off, less deprived, poorest, land-locked, least developed African countries; diversity within ACP countries; owner of challenges/solutions ▪ Characterization of Africa Union: owner, privileged partner, leader

		▪ Characterization of Europe: rich; developed; solidarity/development policy as identity of Europe, old/ageing ▪ Qualification of Relationship: special, donor-beneficiary, North-South, change in spirit, renewal, contractual, reciprocal, needing differentiation, shift from aid to trade and investment, tailor-made EPAs, pan-African approach/dimension in relationship, continent-to-continent, Strategic partnership ▪ Qualification of regional integration related processes: small markets, consolidation of markets, multiple and overlapping regional economic initiatives and groupings, duplication of efforts, fragmentation of markets, sub-regional multipurpose institutions, pan-African continental integration
Argumentation strategies: <i>What arguments are employed in discourses about African regional integration?</i>	Persuading of the validity of specific claims of truth and normative rightness³²	▪ claims of truth: <i>Topos</i> of history or fallacies to persuade for the inferiority and dependence of Africa, the necessity to implement specific policies for development, industrialization, regional integration in Africa. ▪ claims of rightness: <i>Topos</i> of differentiation between the developing countries to justify for change in the non-reciprocal preferences system, negotiating different trade arrangements; <i>Topos</i> of history and fallacies to justify the coordination by Europe of industrialization / structural adjustment in Africa on a regional basis and lack of capacity of the African countries to do it by themselves.
Perspectivization strategies: <i>From what perspective are these nominations,</i>	Positioning the speaker's or writer's point of view and expressing involvement or distance	▪ neoliberal, regionalist - <i>regional integration appears as a factor of development and a necessary step for a harmonious integration into the world economy.</i>

³² Selection of examples for *topoi* and fallacies used to persuade for the validity of various claims of truth and normative rightness.

<i>attributions and arguments expressed?</i>		- The <i>EU must ease the gradual integration of developing countries into the world economy</i> - <i>unique occasion; for the first time a “North-South Agreement” on the philosophy underlying structural adjustment.</i>
Mitigation and intensification strategies <i>Are the respective utterances articulated explicitly, are they intensified or mitigated?</i>	Modifying the illocutionary force of utterances in respect of their epistemic or deontic status	▪ verbs of saying, feeling, thinking etc.: <i>I think, we no longer think, we believe</i> ▪ hasty generalization: <i>no one has the slightest doubt</i> ▪ strong modalities: <i>we must see in it, we must not underestimate, they must join forces, they need a fuller, pan African dimension, we need each other.</i> ▪ Diminutives or augmentatives (modal) particles, tag questions, subjunctives, hesitations, vague expressions: <i>has nothing in common</i> Hyperboliques: <i>flotsam, jetsam</i>

Source: Discursive Strategies table from Reisigl and Wodak (2016) applied specifically to this case study by the author.

The data analyzed for this study conducted on the basis of the framework drawn by Table 4 reveals that in different periods between the Treaty of Rome (1957) and 2021 (the full year before the submission of this thesis) the following depictions in Table 5 are especially used by the EU in its relations with African countries and for the promotion of regional integration norm in Africa:

Table 5. Regional Integration Related Discourses in the EU-Africa Relationship

Discursive Objective	Discourses	Time Period
Construction of Africa and Europe	Africa is economically <i>inferior</i> and <i>in need of</i> Europe's help	Treaty of Rome, Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions
Construction of the EU-Africa Relationship	Europe's <i>duty/responsibility</i> to help Africa due to the <i>special relationship</i>	Treaty of Rome, Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions
Construction of Regional Integration	-Africa should be united as Europe (The EU as a model) -Africa can develop on a regional basis -EU-Africa relationship supports African regional integration	Treaty of Rome, Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions Treaty of Rome, Yaoundé, and Lomé Conventions
Reconstruction of Actors	Africa is <i>rising/emerging</i> , owner of its own challenges	Cotonou period
Reconstruction of Relationship	From <i>donor/recipient</i> to <i>strategic partnership</i>	Cotonou period
Reconstruction of Regional Integration Approach	The EU supports Africa's continental integration	Cotonou period

Source: Table by the author.

These are the interrelated discourses that shape the moral economy of EU-Africa interregional relations during the examined period. The subsequent sections look into the excerpts from sample texts, representing these discourses, and analyze the strategies and devices used to establish the related discourses.

4.1 Construction of Europe and Africa in a Dependence Relationship

This section provides an analysis of how Europe and Africa are constructed discursively with a view to continuing a relationship of dependence in the decolonization process. Africa is constructed as a region in need of the help of Europe in the early decolonization period as the extension of the *mission civilisatrice* discourse of the colonization period. This construction helped to claim Europe's *duty/responsibility* to

help Africa because of the *special relationship* between them. The European Community has thus, assumed the responsibility to “promote the economic and social development of the countries and territories” with which it has “special relations” (Art. 131, Treaty of Rome). This *duty/responsibility* for the development of Africa has become one of the main norms of the moral economy of the EU-Africa relationship, although the development policies supported for Africa changed over time. Europe was predicated as “responsible” to help Africa for it to develop through industrialization by import substitution, or by implementing structural adjustment programs and integrating with world markets through private investments. The common feature of all these policies associated with the development cooperation was their programming or coordination at the sub-regional level and the dependence of Africa on the EU for their implementation.

4.1.1 Constructions of Social Actors: Europe and Africa

The DHA adopted in this thesis is particularly interested in the formation, construction, and change of the identity of actors through establishing *similarity* and *difference* which influence their performance (Wodak, 2011: 13). This section analyzes the construction of identities of Europe and Africa through discourse, which helps to understand the construction of the moral economy of the relationship between these two actors. Africa is constructed as an *economically inferior region* compared to Europe and is thus depicted as one that needs the help of Europe, which was constructed as *superior*. This claim lies behind the whole Europe-Africa solidarity discourse after the independence of African countries, but it has also strong interdiscursivity with the *mission civilisatrice* discourse of the colonial era.

Mission civilisatrice discourse was based on the ethical presupposition of the superiority of France over other civilizations. It assigned France the duty or mission to bring these civilizations to a superior level to justify the colonial expansion of France in Africa and other regions during the 19th and 20th centuries (Røge and Leclair, 2012: 117).

We should say openly that in fact the superior races have a right vis-à-vis the inferior races...I repeat that there is a right for the superior races, because there is a duty for them. They have the duty to civilize the inferior races.³³ (Ferry, 1885)

The excerpt above is taken from the address of Jules Ferry, French Statesman and President of the French Senate, during the Parliamentary session about the financing of an expedition to Madagascar where France was trying to impose its protectorate on 28 July 1885. It is a typical example of the *mission civilisatrice* discourse which is based on the construction of a dichotomy between races with the use of superior and inferior predications. The right of the superior civilization to establish a relationship of dependence with the inferior ones is justified by the mission/duty of bringing civilization to them. This predication and argumentation strategy is also visible in the Eurafrica discourse of the interwar period:

Europe's mission in Africa is to bring light to this the darkest of continents. As long as the black race is unable to develop and civilize its part of the earth, the white race must do it [...] Europe is Eurafrica's head, Africa its body (Coudenhove-Kalergi, as cited in Hansen and Jonsson, 2014: 38).³⁴

This excerpt taken from Coudenhove-Kalergi's "Afrika" shows the continuation of the *mission civilisatrice* discourse in the interwar period. It predicates Africa as the "dark continent", which was one of the main components of the colonial discourses that served to label Africa with primitivism and Europe as progressive – i.e., on an evolutionary axis (Hansen and Jonsson, 2014: 35). The stereotyping fallacy of the inability of the "dark side" to develop and civilize themselves justifies the need for the

³³ "Il faut dire ouvertement qu'en effet les races supérieures ont un droit vis-à-vis des races inférieures... Je répète qu'il y a pour les races supérieures un droit, parce qu'il y a un devoir pour elles. Elles ont le devoir de civiliser les races inférieures." (Ferry, 1885) (The translation is made by the author.)

³⁴ Coudenhove-Kalergi, R. N. (1929). 'Afrika', *Paneuropa* 5(2): 1-19.

“enlightened side” to civilize them. This binary construction is also reinforced using the dichotomous metaphors, “head” and “body”, to establish the relation of power between the superior and inferior entities. The “head” refers to the brain, the thinking and thus progressing side, whereas the “body” without the brain (the “head”) cannot function properly. Thus, the “head” leads and the body follows suit. This reminds one of the “ideal power Europe” metanarrative which constructs the EU as superior vis-à-vis its others and legitimizes its asymmetrical relations with them through which the EU sets the rules and the others are expected to follow suit (Cebeci, 2012: 579).

The binary dichotomies continued to reproduce identity constructions during the Association period, starting with the Treaty of Rome in 1957 which proposed the association of the overseas countries and territories, in line with the key “superior” and “inferior” assumptions of the *mission civilisatrice* and Eurafrika discourses:

No one in the West, I think, has the slightest doubt that we have responsibilities to the developing nations, of which I count more than 90. We and these nations are agreed on this fact: that poverty, hunger, disease and despair are not the natural condition of man in the 20th century. (Hallstein, 1961: 1, emphases added)

In the excerpt above, from the speech of W. Hallstein, the President of the Commission of the European Community to the New York Council on Foreign Relations, that he made in 1961, a dichotomy is constructed between *developed* Europe and *underdeveloped* Africa, based on economic standards. Africa’s inferiority is presented as a “fact”. It is based on the fallacious argument (i.e., based on its appeal to people - *argumentum ad populum*) that “we and these nations are agreed on this fact”. It is also intensified by the sentence that the speaker *thinks* that “no one in the West has the slightest doubt” about the responsibility of the West to developing nations. This *hasty generalization* of the consensus on the responsibility of the West supports the argument that these countries are in “poverty, hunger, disease and despair”.

Other binary oppositions identified from the analysis of the data is as follows: “privileged” vs. “poor³⁵”, “rich” vs. “poor”, “industrialized” vs. “non-industrialized”, “developed” vs. “underdeveloped”/“developing”, “have states” vs. “have-nots” etc. These dichotomies serve to establish the power relationship between the binary opposition poles and construct Africa as the “weak” party, which needs the help of the “stronger party” – this also paves the way for an asymmetrical relationship between them where the Europeans set the rules and the Africans are expected to follow suit (Cebeci, 2012: 579).

If this Association is to lead to anything really sensible, then we must see in it much more than can be reflected in a recital of technical provisions – we must see in it something which I should like to describe in a French term as a new form of the “*présence européenne*” in Africa. As I see it, this term has nothing, really nothing whatever, in common with the old ideas of colonialism, and is not intended to make that out-moded concept respectable by internationalizing it. It simply gives expression to something that the Africans themselves have stressed often enough: the *need* for European help in Africa by lending technical, financial and moral support in order thus to come to fruitful co-operation. (Dr. Allardt, 1959: 26)

The excerpt above is taken from the speech of the Director-General of the Overseas Countries, Dr. Allardt. It is titled “the Tasks and the Aims of the European Economic Community in Africa”, and it was given on the occasion of Africa Day in 1959. He claims that the “Africans” are *in need of* “European help in Africa” in the form of “technical, financial and moral support” for “a fruitful cooperation”, and this is different than “colonialism”. Again, a fallacious argument (*argumentum ad populum*) is used to justify and intensify that Europe’s help is needed by Africans and intensified by the claim that Africans themselves had stressed it “often enough”. When looking at the

³⁵ “Des pays favorisés” vs. “ceux qui subissent la pauvreté”

perspectivization strategy, the speaker put himself as against colonialism, which is also common in most early post-independence data. Thus, it can be argued that in these texts, while the African need for help from Europe is underlined, at the same time a quick dissociation from colonialism is also made.

During the Lomé Period, Africa continued to be represented as the *poor* and in need of *rich* Europe's help for its development, as exemplified in the text below, taken from the speech of Edgar Pisani, European Commissioner for Development, made during the Consultative Assembly of ACP-EEC, in Luxembourg, on 29 September 1981:

It [the Lomé Convention] is an exemplary document insofar as it is based on the contract and on the concerted management of the intervention of rich countries in the effort that *poor* countries make for their own development. (Pisani, 1981: 1-2, emphasis added)³⁶

This inferior representation of Africa was not only employed at the beginning of the Association relationship in the early independence period but has also continued during the analyzed period of the relationship between the EU and Africa, which covers the period from the association of overseas countries and territories by the Treaty of Rome in 1957 to the negotiation of Economic Partnership Agreements today. It paved the way for the establishment of an asymmetric relationship between the EU and Africa, and the EU's positive self-representation led to a superior power positioning, which also helped it to employ particular norms within the moral economy of the EU-Africa relationship.

³⁶ “C’est [La Convention de Lomé] un document exemplaire dans la mesure où il a fondé sur le contrat et sur la gestion concertée l’intervention de pays riches dans l’effort que des pays *pauvres* font pour leur propre développement.” (Pisani, 1981: 1-2) The translation is made by the author.

The next section analyzes the construction of this relationship based on these dichotomic actor representations.

4.1.2 Construction of the “Special” Relationship between Europe and Africa

The African states, following independence, started to be represented as distinct, “sovereign”, “independent”, “free” and “equal” yet economically “inferior”, entities, in need of the help of Europe. This established inferiority and need for help went in parallel with the “special relationship” discourse. The European Community self-declared its responsibility to “promote the economic and social development of the countries and territories” with which it had “special relations” (Art. 131, Treaty of Rome). This special relationship was based on history, which is obviously the colonial one, even though not mentioned directly in the texts. The *topos* of “history” is frequently used in the sample data analyzed for this study for the discursive construction of the special relationship between Europe and Africa.

Being more fortunate than others, we are aware that we bear greater responsibilities. These, to be sure, extend to all the developing peoples and, although we have endeavoured to take this into account in our initiatives within the major international organizations and in the very structure of our two Yaoundé association conventions, we none the less feel that we have special responsibilities towards the African and Malagasy peoples. The ties and the memories which bind us to them, over and above political links that are now no more and definitely belong to the past, have created between us a special attachment which we still feel. This being so, we have been happy to create with them – quite apart from bilateral aid schemes, which are still worthwhile and whose concrete results are to be seen everywhere in Africa and here in Yaoundé too – an association of a Community nature marking the solidarity which Europe as a whole, with its increased resources, feels towards this great continent. (Rey, 1969: 3, emphases added)

The excerpt above taken from the speech of M. Jean Rey, the President of the Commission of the European Communities³⁷, during the signing of the second Yaoundé Convention on 29 July 1969, constructs Europe as a homogenous entity by the deictic pronouns *we* and *us*, as the one which has “ties and memories” binding it to African and Malagasy peoples, arising from colonial history, although not all European Community members had these ties. This collectivization of colonizer identity was also in line with Eurafrica ideology and European identity formation and integration. As mentioned in the first chapter of this study, the Eurafrica discourse, which dominated the Interwar Period in defining the relationship between Europe and Africa, was constructed as a solution to the self-government demands and continuation of economic and strategic gains from Africa (Hansen and Jonsson, 2011). The Eurafrica discourse would ensure the continuation of the exploitation of Africa appropriately, by connecting it to united Europe, thus supporting the European integration idea. The Eurafrican idea claimed that the coordinated exploitation of Africa by the members of the EEC was a prerequisite for European integration and the continuation of this exploitation could only be possible by the integration of European countries (Hansen and Jonsson, 2014: 7). *Topos* of history is often used to construct the EEC as having responsibility towards former colonies of its member states – in other words, it legitimizes the colonizer identity, building its policies on the colonial past of some of its members.

Dissociating this special relationship from the colonial domination and its effect on development and welfare in Africa (Baten and Maravall, 2021) in the texts as if it is something that belongs to the *past* ignores its role in the established inferiority of the former colonies in the present. “Special responsibility” in this “special relationship” does not result from the role of the EU in the ongoing material effect of the colonial practice but from its established superiority which is associated with *fortune* (Europe’s “being more fortunate than others”) in the excerpt above. Thus, the *topos* of history is used to assert the truth of the claim that there is a special attachment between Europe and Africa without mentioning the links with the colonial domination in the past serves to establish the special responsibility of Europe within this relationship which is defined as *solidarity*

³⁷ Hereinafter, “the European Commission” will be used to avoid any confusion.

with Africa. However, this responsibility of solidarity is not associated with the past actions of European colonizers but arises from its economic superiority and thus, justifies its position in determining the conditions of this solidarity.

The “special relationship” discourse, constructed in parallel with the Eurafrica ideology also dominated the successive Lomé Conventions periods and paved the way for the “spirit of Lomé” discourse, although the key concepts of Eurafrican ideology were still behind this one (Langan, 2016). In the following statement, Peter Barry, the President of the European Council of Ministers, on the occasion of the signing of the Lomé III Convention on 8 December 1984 in Lomé, declared the “Spirit of Lomé” as a “spirit of cooperation” between Europe and Africa, and as a “common heritage” based on fundamental principles such as mutual interest, respect for sovereignty, equality and solidarity with the poor (Barry, 1985: 7).

The different Conventions which have over several decades associated independent African, Caribbean and Pacific countries with the European Community, have allowed us to build up a unique system of co-operation of the highest political significance and which we regard as our common heritage. We have founded this common heritage on a number of fundamental principles which guarantee its value and its strength. They are interdependence, mutual interest, respect for each other’s sovereignty, equality between partners and the right of each state to determine its own political, social, cultural and economic policy options. Beyond these basic principles, the Convention of Lomé which includes *more than half of the poorest countries on the planet*, is above all an act of solidarity aimed at improving the economic circumstances of millions of men, women and children. (Barry, 1985: 7, emphases added)

This excerpt clearly shows the continuation of the binary construction in the Lomé period, based on the negative representation of the African countries in economic terms which include “more than half of the poorest countries on the planet”. The principle

of solidarity, which was one of the main constituents of the “spirit of Lomé” discourse was also associated with this construction of Africa as inferior.

On the other hand, the Lomé period had also been characterized by the ongoing discourse of Lomé as the unique model for managing North-South relations. Europe was referred to as “the North”, and Africa was named as “the South” in the following excerpt from the speech of Michel Rocard, President of the Council of the European Community: “Completely innovatory when it was conceived, even if it benefitted considerably from the experience of the Yaoundé Conventions which preceded it, it has been improved with every renewal and remains a unique model in North/South relations.” (Rocard, 1990: 5)

The North-South divide is explained by patterns of colonial relations by dependency theory. In this regard, managing the North-South relations refers to the implementation of structural adjustment programs. Structural adjustment means the introduction of free-market policies in developing and underdeveloped countries, in order for them to be able to get loans from the IMF and the World Bank. In this regard, the discourses of “special relationship” between Europe and the ACP countries, and the “solidarity” of Europe towards them were used to give the EU a prominent role in the management of the North-South relationship mainly through structural adjustment assistance, throughout the 1980s and 1990s (Mahler, 1994: 240).

A long negotiating process has enabled us to reach a good agreement which consolidates, improves and strengthens a cooperation which is founded on solidarity and mutual interest [...] I am confident that our special relations will make a decisive contribution to the improved conception and implementation of structural adjustment programmes. This, in my opinion, is a unique occasion; for the first time there has been a “North-South Agreement” on the philosophy underlying structural adjustment. (Marin, 1990: 8-9)

In this statement, made during the signing of the Lomé IV Convention in Lomé, on 15 December 1989, by Manuel Marin, the Vice President of the European

Commission, the “special relationship” itself becomes a *topos* to justify the claim of rightness in putting Europe in a position to manage the structural adjustment arrangements with the “South”. The Vice President’s neoliberal position in endorsing the structural adjustment programs was also perspectivized by defining the signing of the Lomé IV Convention as a “unique occasion” and intensified by declaring that it is “in his opinion”.

The EU-Africa special relationship discourse was based on Europe’s superior position in this relationship and its duty/responsibility to help Africa that arose from this superiority. This asymmetrical construction of solidarity served the EU to impose different norms and policies towards the weaker part of the relationship, Africa, at different times. The next section analyzes the construction of regional integration norm in the moral economy of the EU-Africa relationship in parallel to this asymmetric special relationship and solidarity discourses.

4.2 Construction of the Regional Integration Norm for Africa

This section analyzes the construction of regional integration norm within the special relationship established between the EU and Africa in the independence period of the former colonies of the European states. It explores how the positive representation of the EU in a superior position helped to self-impose as the model of regional integration, which should be followed if one wants to achieve development. This section also identifies the predication strategies used to describe regional integration for Africa and argumentation strategies used to associate it with the development of Africa. It reveals how these strategies served to liberalize African countries to integrate with the European market instead of integration among themselves and how they were employed as a legitimation for the establishment and maintenance of the asymmetric EU-Africa relationship.

4.2.1 Europe as a model of regional integration for Africa

In the post-independence period, Africa and Europe are placed as two entities in oppositional categories. Economic superiority of the “united Europe” is claimed against the “disunited Africa” to underline the need for Africa to unite to become an equal partner

in its relations with Europe. In the statement below, taken from an address of M. Heinrich Hendus, the Director-General for Overseas Development, the “disunited Africa” is put forward as a claim of truth for the cause of the economic inferiority and dependence vis-à-vis Europe, which excludes the structural reasons of the continuation of this economic dependency. A united Africa was suggested and supported as a condition to become the counterpart of Europe on the *same footing*:

My second idea affects you, because you are the only ones capable of providing us with one of the essential *conditions* for the establishment of cooperation between partners on the *same footing*, if not between equals. At the moment, there is too great a discrepancy between *united Europe* and *disunited Africa*. Now that the states of Africa have their political independence, they must join forces and work for unity in order to ensure their economic independence. (Hendus, 1963: 9, emphases added)

On the other hand, the following excerpt from the European Parliament’s Publication on Regional Economic Cooperation and Integration in Africa (European Parliament, 1996) is an example of the construction of teacher/student dichotomy based on the inferior construction of Africa:

The European Union is seen as a model for regional integration. The completely justifiable question therefore arises as to what other regional groupings can *learn* from the European integration process. However it must be completely clear that European experiences cannot be transferred indiscriminately to developing countries. Starting points, *mentalities* and aims differ too much. (European Parliament, 1996: 32, emphasis added)

In addition to establishing regional integration as a must for being a counterpart to the EU, the EU is also setting itself as an experienced and knowledgeable model for regional integration, which reinforces the need for itself in the learning process for Africa. Although the EU is put forward as a model of regional integration, it is understood from the excerpt above that the regional integration meant for Africa is not the same as the EU's own experience. Mentality difference is claimed as one of the reasons for the difference in approach to regional integration for Africa. Herzfeld (2002: 142) claims that mentality is a key term in the nationalistic discourse used to construct a national homogeneity. In the excerpt above, the use of this essentialist trope serves to construct a homogeneous pan-European identity and essentialize its difference from other regions.

Although the European experience was claimed as a model for African regionalization in different texts, a distinction between the regionalization types also appears in parallel to the difference in mentalities. One of them is the integration of markets, complemented with political integration, including the transfer of sovereignty as is the case in the European model (Pisani, 1983: 4, Laporte, 1993: 62). The other one is gradual, functional, and problem-oriented cooperation between countries based on geography in certain areas of concern (Pisani, 1983: 4, Laporte, 1993: 62). The gradual, functional approach was suggested in certain policy fields and these suggestions discarded any transfer of sovereignty, which makes regionalization suggested for Africa different from the European experience (Laporte, 1993: 62).

An example of asserting two options for Africa in its regionalization efforts is also expressed in the excerpt below, from the Parliament Publication on Regional Economic Cooperation and Integration in Africa (European Parliament, 1996). The regionalization process is defined as either integration or cooperation.

Economic cooperation, which is the primary concern here, can take place within the framework of regional integration or regional cooperation. The process of integration involves the dismantling of inter-state restrictions on the movement of goods, services and factors of production and actual integration means a

situation in which these obstacles are completely or partly removed. [...] The process of integration is at its most advanced in the European Community. [...] In contrast to integration, economic cooperation involves attempts aimed at the removal of other obstacles to economic relations within the grouping (for example improvements in transport and communications structures) and all other attempts to improve cooperation and the management of common resources and greater interdependence of the economies. (European Parliament, 1996: 7)

The excerpt above is a typical example of the ambiguous use of the words “integration” and “cooperation” in the texts. At first, regional integration is named as one of the forms of economic cooperation, then, later in the paragraph, integration and cooperation are put in oppositional categories. The convenient ambiguity (Cebeci, 2012: 577) in the description of regional integration allows for the employment of the term in accordance with the EU’s interests. The EU constructs itself as a model of regional integration for Africa, which allows it to keep its superior, “teaching” position in the relationship. Yet the model suggested for Africa is not the EU’s experience per se, but the creation of loose economic organizations with limited, less ambitious aims, whose primary concern is coordination of policies rather than trade and economic integration (European Parliament, 1996: 31). This is the point where the EU does not act with normative concerns but uses the term “regional integration” arbitrarily to reproduce itself as a “model”.

This thesis argues that while liberalization through market integration has been supported by the EU for the integration of African economies to the world markets in general, or the European market in particular, regionalization in Africa was meant for cooperation between African countries in certain problematized and securitized areas, such as conflicts, migration, environment, or the policy areas; aiming liberalization for integrating them into the European market. In other words, other types of African integration models/projects have not been supported by the EU as they do not serve European interests. Although the EU, as the superior regional integration model, has

supported and promoted regionalization efforts in Africa since the beginning, the motive of transforming the disintegrated former colonies into unified counterparts that are integrated with the EU has been the main motive, instead of a European type supranational integration with the transfer of sovereignty. These ambiguous motives were also reflected in the sample texts with ambiguous and confusing employment of the words “regional integration” and “cooperation”. The next section analyzes the interdiscursivity between regional integration and development discourses in the early period and how the regional integration was justified to achieve Africa’s development.

4.2.2 Regional Integration for Africa’s Development

The construction of the regional integration norm in the EU-Africa relationship is strongly interrelated with the development discourse for Africa. After the independence of African countries, industrialization was claimed to be the way to the development for Africa, in accordance with the “industrial development” discourse which emerged in the Post World War II era for the reconstruction of Europe and Japan. The information memo published by the Commission of the European Communities states accordingly:

The EEC Commission recently transmitted to the Associated African States and Madagascar (AASM) and to the Member States the results of a survey on industrialization prospects in the AASM begun in September 1965 by three teams of *independent experts* [...] *There can be no denying* that industrialization is one of the main roads to economic growth and social progress for the developing countries. Experience shows in most countries of the world a substantial increase in individual income goes hand in hand with a rise in the share of industrial production in the national product; this in turn brings about a gradual transformation of the external trade pattern of the countries concerned. Simultaneously, the share of agriculture and the other primary activities in the national income tends to dwindle. (Commission of the European Communities, 1967: 1, emphases added)

The premise that the survey is done by experts in the field, and the assertion that “there can be no denying that industrialization is one of the main roads to economic growth and social progress for developing countries” refer to a truth claim. The *ad verecundiam* fallacy (argument from authority) makes it difficult to critically question the opinion of the experts. The authority of the speaker, which is that of the EEC Commission, alleges the existence of the experience to support the first claim, yet no other evidence is put forward. It helps strengthen the superior, expert, and teacher position of the EU that allows it to impose specific development policies on African countries, associated with regional integration.



To get out of the vicious circle – which is likely to have the effect that because all countries want to industrialize at the same time and in an uncoordinated way, none of them seriously proceeds in way of industrialization – to get out of this vicious circle, it is necessary to engage in the way of *industrial programming at the regional level*. In this way we could arrive at the constitution of “package” projects in which each of the countries in question would find their account in a multiannual perspective.³⁸ (Rochereau, 1969: 11, emphasis added)

The argument in the excerpt above from the speech of M. Henri Rochereau, Member of the Commission of the European Economic Community and Chairman of the Overseas Development Group, that he made during the 5th meeting of the Parliamentary Conference of the Association between the EEC and the AAMS in Antananarivo, in January 1969, is that since all countries want to industrialize at the same time and in an uncoordinated way, none of them seriously proceeds towards industrialization. The rightness claim that the EC should coordinate the industrialization of AASM on a regional

³⁸ Pour sortir du cercle vicieux – qui risque d’avoir pour effet que, parce que tous les pays veulent s’industrialiser en même temps et de façon non coordonnée, aucun d’entre eux n’avance sérieusement dans la voie de son industrialisation –, pour sortir de ce cercle vicieux, il faut s’engager dans la voie de la *programmation industrielle au plan régional*. C’est ainsi qu’on pourrait arriver à la constitution de « paquets » de projets dans lesquels chacun des pays en cause trouverait son compte dans une perspective pluriannuelle. (Rochereau, 1969: 11) (The translation is made by the author.)

basis within multiannual financial programs is based on a causal fallacy. The argumentation strategy of *non sequitur* is used to explain the lack of industrialization in African countries with the claim that they “want to industrialize at the same time and in an uncoordinated way”. The actual situation of the lack of industrialization in African countries is also presented as proof that they will not reach it on their own without regional planning and, especially, without the help of the EU. This also strengthens the EU’s mentoring position in the regional integration efforts, which are defined as coordination and programming development via industrialization in Africa at a regional level.

The method advised for the industrialization of the developing countries was import substitution at first, which necessitated the production of foreign, industrialized products locally, under the state guidance, through the subsidization of vital industries (Commission of the European Communities, 1967: 3). Import substitution industrialization dominated the European discourse on AASM’s economic development through the 60s and 70s. Although the common feature of structural economic theories behind the import substitution industrialization was the state-led planning of economic development, it was claimed that the small size of markets in African states was an obstacle for the success of industrialization and the suggested remedy was the consolidation of markets. As a discursive strategy, arguments by example and generalization were frequently used to support this claim. The excerpt below from the Information Memo on the Industrial Development of the Yaoundé Countries by the Commission of the European Communities in 1967 had an alarming tone urging for consolidation of markets, the lack of which was claimed to be the only reason for a chain reaction that would decrease the profitable and competitive investments.

The small dimensions of the associated countries’ markets – a result of low per capita incomes and small populations – would indeed seem to be the chief obstacle to the steady growth of industry geared to producing import substitutes on a competitive and profitable basis. Unless there is some consolidation of these markets the scope for profitable and competitive investment will tend to dwindle in the years to come, despite the fact that new investments help to develop

domestic demand, and there would inevitably be wastage and industrial overlapping, increasing endeavors by the different nations to outbid their rivals, and a growing tendency to over-production by certain local firms. Some of these phenomena can already be observed in certain regions of black Africa. (Commission of the European Communities, 1967: 4)

In the excerpt above, the consolidation of markets is set as a remedy against the threat of a decrease in profitable and competitive investments in the future. This is a typical example of appealing to the single cause fallacy. The text refers to a small sample of “certain regions of black Africa” which are claimed to suffer from the negative impact of the small size of the markets. *Hasty generalization fallacy* is used here to support the validity of the claim for the necessity of consolidation of markets for all African countries based on this small unspecified sample of “certain regions of black Africa”. These typical argumentative strategies used for the consolidation of markets in Africa were the precursor of the neoliberal discourse around which regional integration started to develop as a norm in the EU-Africa relationship based on development cooperation.

The development discourse dominating the EU-Africa cooperation did not bring the expected results for the ACP countries. As a result, the efficiency of development projects supported under EC development policy began to be questioned in the 1980s. The 1980s and 1990s were the periods where aid efficiency and the effectiveness of cooperation dominated the discourse on development cooperation, in parallel to the global discourse on the structural adjustment programs implemented by the IMF and the World Bank. This is also the period where market-driven liberalization through structural adjustment programs took the place of the previously proposed import substitution industrialization. The need for reforms and structural adjustment in Africa in the speeches of European officials (Marin, 1990) were discursively linked with this concern for the efficiency of the development projects within the context of the changing global development discourse.

With the Lomé II Convention, the terms “regional cooperation” and “integration” entered into the text. The claim was that the EU supported regional cooperation and integration to accelerate “development both within and between regions of the ACP States” (Second ACP-EEC Convention, 1979, Art. 133). Yet, in addition to development, the structural adjustment discourse was also closely linked to the promotion of regional integration in the 90s. “Harmonization of trade policies” and “investment incentives” at the regional level were the main elements of this linkage (Directorate-General for Development at the EC Commission, 1993: 69).

In future, however, part of the aid will have to be directly linked to measures and reforms that may be desirable for particular countries but which can only be implemented, or would be implemented to better effect, at regional level. [...] A further basis for regional conditionality is what might be called the new theory of regional integration, which sees regional integration as an institutional means of encouraging the adoption of economic policies which are to some degree sheltered from particular, more powerful pressures at national level (Directorate-General for Development at the EC Commission, 1993: 69).

The excerpt above from a document by the Directorate-General for Development at the EC Commission published in the Regional Integration dossier at *Courrier Magazine* (Directorate-General for Development at the EC Commission, 1993: 70) is an example of the instrumentalization of regional integration for the successful implementation of structural policies at the national level. The use of the “shelter” metaphor even suggests protection from the pressures at the national level which might arise due to the negative outcomes of the adoption of structural policies. This strategy helps to construct regional integration with positive qualities to counterbalance the hesitations and reluctance of African leaders who had concerns about losing their countries’ sovereignty.

Region-building in Africa through cooperation has been the norm for the establishment of the interregional relationship between Europe and Africa. Regional

economic integration was added to the discourse related to region-building in parallel to the rise of structural adjustment as of the 1980s. It was also labelled as the first stage for integration into the world economy through structural reforms (Directorate-General for Development at the EC Commission, 1993: 70). With the neoliberal turn in European integration, regional economic integration in Africa had been discursively legitimized by the need to integrate Africa into the world economy, in general, and to the European market, in particular. In this respect, regional integration was not only an aim in itself but a strategic narrativization to justify the imposition of neoliberal policies upon African countries.

As the economic and trade relations become globalized, regional integration appears in Europe, Asia and America as a factor of development and a necessary step for a harmonious integration into the world economy. It can and must play the same role in Africa.³⁹ (Santer, 1996)

The excerpt above is taken from the speech of Santer, the President of the European Commission, that he made during the opening session of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) Summit, in Ouagadougou, on 10 May 1996. It is an example of the use of the *topos* of comparison to justify regional integration in Africa. It is a typical argumentation scheme utilizing explicit comparisons with other regional integrations in the world to predicate regional integration as a natural and imperative phenomenon for Africa as well and a necessity for Africa's integration into the world economy.

In addition to international market integration, promoting investments in Africa was also a strong motive in supporting regional collaboration discursively. The ACP

³⁹ “Alors que les relations économiques et commerciales se mondialisent, l'intégration régionale apparaît en Europe, en Asie, en Amérique comme un facteur de développement et une étape nécessaire pour une insertion harmonieuse dans l'économie mondiale. Elle peut et doit jouer le même rôle en Afrique.” (Santer, 1996) (The translation is made by the author.)

countries were even encouraged to enter into regional investment protection arrangements in order to rationalize the investment environment and increase the investment levels. The Green Paper on Relations between the European Union and the ACP countries on the Eve of the 21st Century argued that the EU's support for such regional arrangements was necessary and even "the most advantageous" (European Commission, 1996: 67). The EU assumed its role of "helper" again for guiding the regional arrangements for protection and stimulation of investments in Africa.

According to the EU's discourse, the ACP countries were not able to do these regional arrangements alone, thus, the EU's help through Economic Partnership Agreements was predicated as the best way to achieve this. Thus, European officials referred to the Economic Partnership Agreements to be concluded within the framework of the Cotonou Agreement as instruments that would support the process of regionalization and rationalization of the investment environment in the ACP countries. For example, former Commission President Barroso (2014a) stated in a speech that he made at the EU-Africa Business Forum in Brussels, on 31 March 2014 that "EPAs [were] precisely the kind of partnership that promotes a business-friendly environment in Africa". He further stated: "Beyond tariffs, they contribute to wider reforms to strengthen the rule of law and to ensure a stable, predictable and transparent economic climate, which helps African countries attract much needed investment" (Barroso 2014a). His statement is important as it manifests the neoliberal market-oriented logic inherent in EPAs. What is crucial to note in this regard is that this logic is disguised with the discourse of the EU's responsibility to "help" African countries develop into stronger economies because of the success of its own model of development.

No question in Europe's development and trade policy is more pressing than how we can use trade to help African, Caribbean and Pacific countries build stronger economies that can contribute to poverty reduction and break their dependence on trade preferences and basic commodity trade. The key is to give greater confidence and more opportunities to local businesses, attract new investment and build strong regional markets. These will in turn strengthen their

capacity to compete in global markets. The Economic Partnership Agreements that the EU is currently negotiating with the ACP regions are designed to help do all these things. (European Commission, 2007)

In the excerpt above, from the Open Letter to Anti-Poverty Campaigners from EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson and EU Development Commissioner Louis Michel, once again, the EU is predicated as the “helper” of the ACP countries to strengthen their economies. Attracting investments and building strong regional markets were claimed as obvious ways to achieve this. The “help” of the EU was giving confidence and opportunities to the ACP countries. Through the giver and taker dichotomy, one can see the continuation of the unbalanced/asymmetrical relationship between the EU and the ACP during the Cotonou period as well, which allows the EU to continue imposing neoliberal policies on the ACP countries in parallel to its support for regional integration within the framework of its help.

4.2.3 The EU-Africa Relationship and Regional Integration in Africa

The EC’s support for a united Africa was intended for African countries’ cooperation in their relations with the EC, including their integration into the European markets within the framework of the Association. Any market integration between African countries through supranational institutions per se was not envisaged at that time. The argument for the contractual relationship with the “integration model” Europe, first, through the Association and then through the Lomé Conventions, was that it would automatically establish and develop cooperation and solidarity among the African states as well. The European argument was that integration with the European markets would bring integration among the African states in turn. Nevertheless, the level of regional integration in Africa has been far from proving this argument. Yet, discursive parallelism between integration with European markets and integration among the African states has dominated the whole EU-Africa relationship. This section analyses the construction of this parallelism in various texts throughout the establishment of the EU-Africa relationship.

In the 1960s, the Association established between the EEC and AAMS was accused of dividing Africa into two blocs (Rochereau, 1962: 10-11). The Yaoundé Convention was concluded with the former French colonies and the two blocs of division were the French-speaking, francophone countries and English-speaking, Commonwealth countries. The discourse around the EU-Africa relationship has been shaped accordingly to defend against the allegations of dividing Africa. The main argument was that the Association between the EEC and the African countries was supposed to develop the cooperation among the African states as well, which had to work together to develop common positions for the negotiations with EEC.



Indeed, we no longer think today that the Association divides Africa, as some feared 10 or 15 years ago; on the contrary, the Association appears as a factor of inter-African cooperation by its very existence. First cooperation between the 18 A.A.M.S. themselves, now 19, which have become accustomed to meet and work together to prepare common positions during the negotiations in particular, but also to examine the topics discussed during the meetings of the Association institutions: this is how a coordinating secretariat for A.A.M.S. has been set up in Brussels, as well as a Coordination Committee and Council.⁴⁰ (Courrier de l'Association, 1973: 4)

In the excerpt above, from the Editorial of the Courrier de l'Association (1973) coordination institutions established in Brussels for 18 AAMS are shown as proof against accusations of dividing Africa. However, the major criticism was that the Association itself divided Africa into two blocs in the first place (Rochereau, 1962: 10-11). The

⁴⁰ “En effet, on ne pense plus aujourd’hui que l’Association divise l’Afrique, comme certains l’ont redouté il y a 10 ou 15 ans; au contraire, l’Association apparaît comme un facteur de coopération interafricaine par son existence même. Une coopération d’abord entre les 18 E.A.M.A. eux-mêmes, maintenant 19, qui ont pris l’habitude de se rencontrer et de travailler ensemble pour préparer des positions communes lors des négociations en particulier, mais aussi pour examiner les sujets débattus au cours des réunions des institutions de l’Association : c’est ainsi que l’on a vu se créer à Bruxelles un secrétariat de coordination des E.A.M.A. ainsi qu’un Comité et un Conseil de coordination” (Courrier de l’Association, 1973: 4) (The translation is made by the author.)

argument that the EU-Africa Association unites Africa by developing cooperation between 18 AAMS is fallacious because it does not refer to the claimed division of the whole African continent which was subject to the African fears that were prevalent “10 or 15 years ago”. Yet, the discourse related to solidarity and cooperation among the African states due to the relationship with the EU was there since the beginning and continued with the subsequent Lomé Conventions as well.

The excerpts from the Lomé period also prove the continuation of this solidarity discourse which claims that the Convention led to the solidarity among the ACP states, which are diverse and dispersed otherwise. “Solidarity” is used to refer to the cooperation among the ACP states in their external relations, i.e. with European Community, as shown in the excerpt below, taken from an interview with Jean François-Poncet, French Minister for Foreign Affairs and Joint President of the ACP/EEC Council of Ministers for the first half of 1979:

It is easy to see that the large number of ACP states, the far-flung areas they come from and the diversity of problems each faces, make it particularly difficult for them to agree on a common position. But I am struck by the fact that, with political will, they always manage it, sometimes faster than the nine members of the Community do. And they display a great deal of confidence in their spokesmen at the negotiations. This solidarity is certainly one of the achievements of the Lomé Convention. (François-Ponçet, 1979: 21)

The excerpt above is a typical example of the positive representation of Africa’s contractual relationship with the EU which is claimed to increase solidarity and cooperation among the ACP countries despite their differences. However, this positive representation serves to disguise the deterioration in the relative equality in the bilateral relationship. It does not mention the pressure imposed upon the ACP countries to reach common positions in a short period of time to be able to continue to benefit from the relationship although the result did not always meet their expectations and concerns

regarding the deteriorating trade balance with the EEC, rules of origin and aid procedures (Cosgrove-Twitchett, 1980: 113).

The positive representation of the EU-Africa contractual relationship, contributing to the bonding between the African countries continues in the Cotonou period as well. The Economic Partnership Agreements claimed to contribute to the regional integration among the ACP countries despite the exact opposite concerns and critics.

EPAs will build on regional integration initiatives that already exist between the ACP countries. They will lead to the gradual introduction of free trade areas between the parties. They will strengthen and deepen regional integration and therefore enlarge ACP markets. This will allow for economies of scale, will improve the level of specialisation, will reduce production and transaction costs and will help to increase ACP competitiveness. Most importantly it will help attract more investment to the ACP economies. (Dihm, 2002: 15)

The excerpt above from Martin Dihm, who was the DG Trade official, responsible for the EU-ACP EPA negotiations, represents the typical claim that the EPAs would be negotiated with the existing regional organizations within the ACP group, which would also help strengthen regional integration among themselves. However, only two of the five regional EPAs with sub-Saharan African regional groups corresponded to the existing regional organizations (East African Community and Southern African Development Community). Although it was claimed that the ACP regions' division for EPA negotiation purposes was to be done according to the existing regional organizations within the group, it has not been the case for all regions. All sub-regions did not correspond to an actual regional organization, which aggravated the situation that some African countries had already overlapping memberships to different regional organizations, developed by the support of the EU. Some African countries did not only have overlapping regional organization memberships but they were also included in EPA

negotiation groups whose members are different than the members of the actual regional organizations that they belonged to. This nomination strategy discursively excludes the concerns and discussions on the overlapping memberships of African countries under the complex regional organizations map in Africa and its possible impact on the regional integration efforts in the continent. Based on this faulty generalization and false premises, the discourse related to the EU-Africa contractual relationship as a means of serving regional integration in Africa continued to shape the construction of regional integration in Africa in the Cotonou period as well.

4.3 Change and Continuity in the Regional Integration for Africa after Cotonou

With the conclusion of the Cotonou Agreement, the ACP countries were required to negotiate new EPAs with the EU according to a timeframe. This section investigates if there is any change in the moral construction of the EU-Africa relationship that caused the delays and problems encountered during the negotiations of the EPAs, with a focus on the regional integration norm. The section first analyzes the discursive change and continuity in the construction of the actors in the EU-Africa relationship and asks the DHA questions to identify if there is any change in the nomination and predication of the EU and African countries. It then focuses on the moral construction of the special relationship between the EU and Africa and explores any changes in the discursive content which masks the structural continuity in this relationship and its reflection on the regional integration discourse.

4.3.1 Change and Continuity in Actor Constructions: Europe and Africa

In the Cotonou period, the discourse of globalization started to dominate North-South relations, instead of the development discourse, as can be seen in the excerpt below from the Green Paper on Relations between the European Union and the ACP countries on the eve of the 21st Century (European Commission, 1996):

Not only does the new global landscape alter the EU's objective interests and those of its developing partners, it also involves increased responsibilities for a *player of the EU's size*. [...] These responsibilities are also of an economic nature: the EU must complement the effects of globalization by making the necessary adjustments within the Union to improve job prospects and reverse trends towards exclusion by playing an active role in international economic cooperation, helping frame and enforce multilateral rules and easing the gradual integration of developing countries into the world economy (European Commission, 1996, emphasis added).

This excerpt is an example of the nominalization of globalization to justify the inequalities in the international economic system, by presenting it as a natural process and disregarding any agency (Aydın-Düzgüt, 2012: 37). Metaphorical expression of “player of the EU's size” and the *topos* of responsibility serve to construct the EU as a natural partner for developing countries against the negative effects of globalization, without discussing the inequalities inherent to the globalization process itself. This excerpt also reflects the expansion of the responsibility of the EU, from former colonies of the Member States towards the larger group of developing countries. It also signals the upcoming change in the construction of African countries within the ACP Group, by differentiating them based on their levels of development to allow for this expansion.

The change in the European construction of the African states started with the “Africa rising” narrative after the 2000s, which accompanied the case of economic and demographic growth and emerging middle class, experienced by some countries in sub-Saharan Africa. The description of Africa went from the “poor one in need of help” to the “one with opportunities and potential to be explored with the help of the investments from Europe” as shown in the excerpt below from the speech of Louis Michel, the then European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid:

With its rich economic and human potential, Africa is poised to play a greater role in this emerging new world order. It is in the economic and political interests of Europe to help it do so. Investing in Africa is therefore the right strategic choice (Michel, 2009).

In the Cotonou period, European actors started to refer to Africa as a separate continental actor, instead of being part of the ACP group. This separate actor becomes the “owner” of challenges, mostly associated with globalization and their solutions. The narrative of Europe’s duty/responsibility to help Africa, because of the special relationship between them gave its place to Africa’s “ownership”, “duty”, “responsibility” due to the change in the global dynamics, as shown in the excerpt below from the speech by Barroso, the President of the European Commission, at the opening session of the African Union Assembly in 2005, in Sirte:

In addition to equality, this pact between Europe and Africa also needs to be informed by true ownership. We say the word ‘*ownership*’ so often that it has turned into a bureaucratic term emptied of its original meaning. So let me say what I mean by ownership; ownership means the acknowledgement that each person, society, country or group of countries has the right, and the *duty*, to take command of its own destiny. This means for example that Africa has the duty to assume *responsibility* for tackling its own conflicts, as it is now doing. (Barroso, 2005).

The emphasis on being the “owner” of challenges that are increasingly globalized went hand in hand with the pan-Africanist approach and the support to the leadership of the African Union in dealing with those challenges. The texts below show the manifest support of the EU on the African Union’s “ownership” and its construction as a “partner” to the EU:

The renewed African self-confidence manifested by the AU should be seen as an asset for Africa's sustainable development. The EU therefore supports the *leadership* of the AU where its role and competency adds value and acknowledges its ownership of present and future African development challenges. (Council of the European Union, 2005: 3, emphasis added)

African Union has been described as a counterpart and an important interlocutor in the EU's engagement with the complex regionalization in Africa. In the excerpt above, which is from the EU Non-Paper on EU-Africa Strategic Partnership, the Council of the European Union describes the African Union as the *leader* for Africa's efforts against the development challenges. Similarly in the paragraph below, taken from the Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the EU-Africa Partnership on Infrastructure, the Commission acknowledges the AU as the *privileged partner* of the EU, as a solution to deal with various RECs in Africa and the complex regional integration matters.

The rapidly developing AU is a *privileged partner* for the EU. With its continent-wide political mandate, the AU facilitates dialogue with and between RECs, an increasingly important factor for interconnecting Africa. The AU ensures African ownership, steers overall policy and ensures the continental integrity of the Partnership. (Commission of the European Communities, 2006)

Although the EU's description of Africa has changed and it started to label Africa as the owner of development challenges and the African Union as the leader of this ownership, its negative representation of Africa has continued in this period as well. On the one hand, the capacity and responsibility of Africa are praised in matters of security, such as migration, peace, and environment (Council of the European Union,

2007b: 3). That went in parallel to the increasing emphasis on local ownership in UN peacebuilding discourse in the 2000s to legitimate external intervention in security matters (von Billerbeck, 2015: 300). On the other hand, Africa's negative characterization in economic matters continued despite its positive description as a land of potential.

Europe has, more than others, mobilised its efforts towards ensuring that the *poorest countries, in particular those of Africa*, are not the flotsam and jetsam of international recovery schemes. We must help Africa recover the momentum of economic expansion it has been building up for several years. (Michel, 2009, emphases added)

In the excerpt above, taken from the speech of Louis Michel, the then European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid, African countries are characterized as the *poorest* ones, while being described as “rising” in different texts during the same period. The hyperbolic idiom “flotsam and jetsam” serves to intensify this negative representation; they are even used for negation. The excerpt manifests the continuation of the EU's positive self-representation as the *helper* of inferior Africa. This helps the EU to continue the unequal relationship established so far, in parallel to the changes in the relationship to alleviate the financial burdens on the part of the EU, which is further analyzed in the next section.

The analysis carried out in this section reveals that despite the change in the description of Africa as a whole, with the “Africa rising” narrative and emphasis on Africa's potential, opportunities, and ownership, its construction as inferior vis-à-vis Europe continues in the Cotonou period as well. Europe is described as the helper of this “rising” Africa in a way that will allow Europe to maintain its dominant position in the relationship. The next section deals with the characteristics of the discursive change in the EU-Africa relationship and its implications on the moral economy of the EU-Africa relationship.

4.3.2 From Special Donor-Recipient (Aid) to Contractual (Trade and Investment) Partnership

With the conclusion of the Cotonou Agreement, a change occurred in the description of the relationship between the EU and Africa. The relationship started to be described through words denoting change such as “review”, “reform”, and “change of spirit” (Nielson, 2000a; The Courier, 2001: 11).

The Euro-African relationship after the independence of African states was established to manage the development aid towards former colonies. After the end of the bipolar world, with the financial constraints on development aid worldwide and obstacles to multilateral trade liberalization efforts, the characteristics of the partnership between the EU and Africa started to change. Besides aid, the emphasis on trade and investments increased. Compared to the use of the term “development cooperation” in the previous agreements, the EPAs were called trade agreements that needed to be complemented by development policies (Dihm, 2002). The change in the spirit was a reflection of the change from the “donor-recipient relationship” into “contractual” partnership in development investments and solidarity in the liberalization of trade worldwide (Nielson, 2000b: 12). While being legitimized by compliance to WTO rules regarding the reciprocity in preferences, the inclusion of new issues, wider than the multilateral trade talks such as the environment, investment codes, standards, and competition policies were placed at the core of this new contractual partnership with the ACP countries:

To achieve a stable trade arrangement that is fully compatible with the global trading system under the World Trade Organisation, the Agreement foresees the gradual introduction of reciprocity in ACP-EU trade. This would take the form of WTO-compatible economic partnership agreements that would comprise free trade areas, but would also pay attention to increasingly important themes such as services trade, intellectual property, standardisation, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, labour standards and environment [...] The new regime will be such that it cannot be *challenged by other WTO members* and would thus

be fully secure for traders and investors. In this way, it would constitute a *strong stimulus* for EU investment in ACP states. (Kennes, 2000: 30, emphasis added)

The *topos* of external constraint and challenge, which is compliance with WTO, had often been used in the argumentation schemes to change the trade regime as shown in the text above, taken from an article written by Walter Kennes, a European Commission official from the DG Development. The threat of *challenge by other WTO members* is used to justify the change in the trade regime as if the EU's hands are tied and it cannot be resisted or discussed within the WTO. Then, argumentation for including issues wider than WTO obligations is intensified by describing the imposed regime as a *strong stimulus* to attract European investments in the ACP countries. This is in line with the increasing emphasis on private investments for development in the ACP countries in the Cotonou Agreement period.

In the 2000s, attracting private investment for the ACP countries' development projects gained importance in the EU's development policy instead of direct aids. The impact of the Euro crisis of 2008 on the funds available for development was one of the reasons for this trend. The other one was the new emerging countries' becoming development partners of the ACP countries such as China, India and Brazil in competition to the traditional Western countries. As a result, the emphasis on private investments became more apparent. The "rising Africa, rich in potential and opportunities", itself, became a *topos* that is employed to convince an increase in European private investments in Africa and to liberalize the investment environment necessary for it, as shown in the excerpt from the speech of José Manuel Barroso, the European Commission President, during the 4th EU-Africa Summit:

This partnership of equals, based on mutual respect, is more relevant than ever. Both our continents are going through tremendous change. In Europe, we are deepening and enlarging our Union and now we are happy to see Africa rising. Economic and demographic growth in Africa represents an exciting opportunity.

In the past, in many of our summits and meetings it was to speak more about the challenges, the difficulties, the problems. This time we also addressed the problems and difficulties, but it was under the idea of opportunity that this summit took place and that its work developed. (Barroso, 2014b)

In the excerpt above, the faulty generalization of the economic growth experienced by certain African countries for the whole of Africa is used to justify this “Africa rising” discourse. This discourse itself served to justify the necessity to increase the European private investments in Africa and to liberalize the investment environment in Africa to secure those investments and attract more. The EU assumed to play a positive role in promoting the integration of the ACP economies into the global economy through helping the required institutional and administrative reforms for mobilizing private investments, in areas such as competition policies, business and property law, capital markets development, etc. (European Commission, 1996).

We want to enable Africa to be in a better position to attract international private investment. Europe has clearly underlined with these new partnerships, its commitment to promote the implementation of open and realistic policies, which are essential for mobilizing domestic and foreign investments, fostering the transfer of know-how and technologies, and thus to increase the competitiveness of African economies.⁴¹ (Prodi, 2000b)

The excerpt above, from the speech of Romano Prodi, during the Europe-Africa Summit in 2000 demonstrates the breakup from the previous era approach towards

⁴¹ “Nous voulons permettre à l’Afrique d’être mieux en mesure d’attirer des investissements privés internationaux. L’Europe a clairement souligné, dans le cadre de ces nouveaux partenariats, sa volonté de promouvoir la mise en œuvre de politiques ouvertes et réalistes, indispensables pour mobiliser les investissements nationaux et étrangers, favoriser les transferts de savoir-faire et de technologies et contribuer ainsi à augmenter la compétitivité des économies africaines.” (Prodi, 2000b) The translation is made by the author.

development, which was directly supporting the industrialization in the ACP countries. Increasing the competitiveness of African countries has become the main objective, which would be achieved through the implementation of open policies to attract foreign investments. Yet, Europe's identification as a "helper" continues as shown in the excerpt. Yesterday's helper of industrialization becomes the helper of attracting foreign investments which were assumed to help to increase the competitiveness of the African countries.

But the world has changed a great deal in recent years. We have seen many developing countries, including ACP countries, achieve impressive growth. We live in a world in which a "one-size-fits-all" approach does not work anymore in development terms. A world in which various new actors have become key development partners. A world in which South-South cooperation is gaining momentum, while the financial crisis in traditional donor countries is affecting development aid. A world in which other forms of finance for development are increasingly needed. (Piebalgs, 2012)

In the excerpt above, from the speech of Andris Piebalgs, European Commissioner for Development during the Opening ceremony of the Seventh ACP Summit, the discourse of "change", in parallel to the discursive qualification of many developing countries as achievers of "impressive growth", is used to legitimate the differentiation among developing countries. This is then followed by the real reason for the necessity to differentiate, which is the financial constraints urging for finding new forms of finance for development, other than development aid.

An analysis of the data in the Cotonou period shows that a clear change in the discursive nomination of the relationship is apparent. Africa's positive characterization as "rising with opportunities" was used to legitimize policy shift, from aid for Africa's development through regional integration to enhanced integration with the European market via trade and investments, with an emphasis on Europe's interests. Yet, the

discursive qualification of the role of Europe in this relationship remained the same. The African countries have still been predicated as needing Europe's help to attract investments and the EU continues its superior, mentoring position in this unbalanced relationship.

4.3.3 From Africa's Regional Integration to Inter-Continental Integration

The EU's support to regional projects and organizations in Africa since the Yaoundé Convention has not only had an impact on the type of regionalization in Africa but the subsequent course of regional groupings-formation was also influenced by the discourse on the rationalization of various numbers of regional integration and cooperation organizations. As one can openly see in the then EU Trade Commissioner Catherine Ashton's remarks in a speech that she made in Rome on April 22, 2009, in contradiction to the EU's previous support for the sub-regional arrangements, which were claimed to lead to regional integration in Africa, "multiple and overlapping regional economic initiatives and groupings" have been predicated as the main obstacle to intra-regional trade and integration in Africa⁴² (Ashton, 2009b).

As of the 1990s, selected types of regional organizations started to feature in EU documents, with the aim of rationalization of regionalization in Africa. The selection criteria were not clear and objective but increasingly the same organizations, defined as "sub-regional" were given place in EU documents, which helped the elimination of others from the texts:

As the number of organizations is so great that it poses problems, even for experts, only *the most important* can be considered here [...] Efforts were made to select the 'most important' organizations from among the vast number. The

⁴² "In Africa multiple and overlapping regional economic initiatives and groupings have led to a multiplication of rules and the creation of major obstacles to intra-regional trade as well as international trade." (Ashton, 2009b)

criterion for the importance of the organizations was how *well known* they were. (European Parliament, 1996: 7-9, emphases added)

The excerpt above, from a European Parliament Working Paper on Regional Economic Cooperation and Integration in Africa, is an example of the selection and elimination of various regional organizations in Africa. First, the number of organizations is problematized to support the act of selecting among the existing ones to consider within the Paper. The Paper claimed to give place to *the most important* organizations in Africa according to very subjective criteria such as being “well-known”. Later in the Paper, it is stressed that organizations with looser structures and less ambitious and limited aims from the beginning were more successful in terms of integration. Those regional organizations with looser structures have increasingly received discursive and financial support from the EU as the African RECs, which further consolidated their existence at the expense of others.

In addition to the regional division and overlapping memberships, based on geography, the EU had an impact on the creation of regional groupings based on the level of development, with the differentiated treatment of the LDCs or landlocked countries. As a result of this complicated regionalization map in Africa, which further complicated the relationship between the EU and Africa, the EU has taken on a pan-African approach in its development and trade policy towards Africa, which envisages conducting relations and implementing policies on a continental level, at the beginning of 2000s.

For the European Union, the idea of a partnership with Africa is not new. Starting from the 1960s and early 1970s, we have based all our relations with sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa and then southern Africa on carefully negotiated partnership agreements. The European Union’s most comprehensive network of agreements covers the African continent. These have been regularly updated and upgraded. They have taken on a regional dimension. But they still need a fuller, pan-African dimension. This must come in response to your own efforts to

further economic integration and political unity across the continent. (Prodi, 2003)

In the excerpt above, taken from the speech of the President of the European Commission at the African Union Summit, in Maputo, in 2003, Prodi argues that the pan-Africanist approach is nothing new and is the continuation of the previous approach towards the African continent. This is a fallacy of continuity since it discards the fact that sub-Saharan Africa was dealt with within the ACP group, which was established against pan-Africanist pushes of the OAU. Although the management of post-colonial relationships with countries from different geographical regions was the main concern in the past, the recently adopted pan-Africanist approach is described as if it is the natural continuity of a previous policy, gluing previously separated regional policies. Yet, Prodi explains one year later the motive behind adding the pan-African dimension as “improve[ing] overall coherence and effectiveness” in the relations with African countries and regional economic communities (Prodi, 2004). The EU had to overcome the difficulties in the relationship due to the complicated map of regional organizations in Africa, in which it has also played a part as explained above. Establishing a counterpart on a continental level has appeared as the solution in this regard.

While establishing the AU as the leader in the ownership of globalization challenges and creating a counterpart for the EU itself, the “continent-to-continent relationship” in development and trade areas has been emphasized in the European discourse. This continent-to-continent relationship was the main component of the “Strategic Partnership” defined in the Joint Africa-EU Strategy adopted at the EU-Africa Summit in Lisbon, in 2007:

The four main objectives of this long-term strategic partnership are: [...] To reinforce and elevate the Africa-EU political partnership to address issues of common concern. This includes strengthening of institutional ties and addressing common challenges, in particular peace and security, migration and

development, and a clean environment. To this end, both sides will treat Africa as one and upgrade the Africa-EU political dialogue to enable a strong and sustainable continent-to-continent partnership, with the AU and the EU at the centre. (Council of the European Union, 2007b: 3)

The excerpt above is a typical example of the securitization and collectivization of global issues, such as migration, environment, and development, with the aim of legitimating the Strategic Partnership between the EU and Africa. Without considering the different prioritization of the constraints for the EU and Africa, the frequently used argumentation with the *topos* of common external constraints served to reassure the geographic space of the EU-Africa relationship with latent reference to the Eurafrican construction of the past.

From the economic point of view, supporting Pan-African continental integration has gained prominence over sub-regional, loose, multi-purpose integration organizations as a means to support Africa's integration into Europe. This economic integration is even referred to as a "Euro-African economic area" (Barroso, 2010). Even the EU's financial support to sub-regional groupings in Africa has been redirected towards the pan-African continental integration, under the Strategic Partnership, with the €845 million-Pan-African Programme, established to finance continental and interregional projects for the period 2014-2020 (European Commission, 2019). Junker, the President of the European Commission has declared the intention to turn the numerous European-African trade agreements into a continent-to-continent free trade agreement in his State of the Union Address on 12 September 2018: "To speak of the future, one must speak of Africa – Europe's twin continent. [...] I believe we should develop the numerous European-African trade agreements into a continent-to-continent free trade agreement, as an economic partnership between equals." (Junker, 2018). This statement shows parallelism with the Eurafrican discourse with the intent to establish Africa as a unified counterpart to the EU on a continental basis, which would help to form a Eurafrican entity. Compared to the relational anthroponym of "mother" used to qualify Europe in the Eurafrica discourse of the past, the word "twin" is used to describe both Europe and

Africa in this text, to emphasize the changing nature of the relationship with former colonies of the Member States, which brings shared responsibility.

The analysis of the data in the Cotonou period manifests the shift from support to regional organizations in Africa, which were claimed to lead to regional integration at the African level to an emphasis on a continental level of integration. While the support to regional integration in Africa through regional economic communities was a norm at the beginning of the relationship, there is a discursive change in the focus on African unity and responsibility in the security matters instead of economic integration at the level of regional organizations. Pan-African continental integration is both discursively and financially supported to facilitate the integration of African countries with the European market, which seems the main concern of the EU-Africa strategic relationship design.

Concluding Remarks

This chapter analyzed the construction and normalization of the regional integration norm by the EU, based on neoliberal ideology within the moral economy of the EU-Africa relationship. The data analyzed covered the period between the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 and 2021. Based on the assumption that the EU's neoliberal policies harmed the development and regional integration efforts in Africa, this section tried to reveal how the regional integration discourse had played a role to obscure this negative impact.

Upon the analysis of the data in the post-independence period, with the aim of revealing the discursive identity construction, this chapter has found out that Africa is constructed as “economically inferior” to Europe and “in need of Europe’s help”. This construction has served to legitimize Europe’s involvement in the newly independent African countries’ development efforts. The *topos* of history has frequently been used to employ the “special relationship” discourse, which can be read as the extension of the “*mission civilisatrice*” logic of the colonization period and had also its roots in the Eurafrican ideology developed during the interwar period. This binary construction between Europe and Africa based on economic standards and the “special relationship”

discourse laid, together, the foundations of the early moral economy of their relationship in the post-colonization era.

The region-building and regional integration norms have been closely linked with the EU's external policy towards former colonies since the very beginning. United Africa has been discursively supported for the sake of development cooperation at first, and then for the sake of the structural adjustment policies and liberalization in Africa. Although the binary construction between “developed” Europe and “underdeveloped” Africa was used to justify the need for a united Africa, that would be based on regional cooperation and integrating African countries in European markets in line with the interests of European investors, instead of market integration among African countries based on the European model.

First, import substitution industrialization had been advocated as the only choice for the development of Africa. Due to the small size of markets, regional cooperation and planning were claimed necessary for the import substitution, which would itself require the programming of industrial projects on the regional level. In the 1980s, there occurred a shift in the development cooperation discourse, from supporting import substitution industrialization to implementing structural adjustment programs in the service of market-driven liberalization worldwide. This shift was justified mostly through the concerns related to the efficiency of the development cooperation. This time, regional cooperation in Africa has been discursively supported as a tool to achieve efficient implementation of structural adjustment programs for development. The regional organizations, that were claimed to help efficient implementation of structural adjustment programs on a regional level were financially supported in Africa. This policy led to an increase in the number of regional organizations in Africa that were competing for receiving financial support from Europe. This increase in the numbers of multiple and overlapping regional organizations contributed to the development aid efficiency problem in return. It was then used to justify the discursive need for the rationalization of regionalization in Africa.

The rationalization of regionalization discourse favoured sub-regional cooperation between African countries in problem-based areas or coordination of macro-economic and sectoral policies aiming liberalization and integration into European and

world markets instead of supranational market integration. Among the various regional organizations in Africa, those which serve these purposes were supported discursively for the sake of the efficiency of development cooperation. Thus, the type of regionalization and the actual complex, overlapping map of regional organizations in Africa were shaped by the discourse on the rationalization of regionalization in Africa during the 1980s and 90s.

The Cotonou era has been marked with a clear change in the discursive nomination of the relationship, from “development cooperation”, which was established to manage the development aid towards former colonies, into “strategic partnership”. In this period, Africa had been described as a “rising” region, “owner of its challenges” instead of “in need of Europe’s help”. The characteristics of this strategic partnership between Europe and Africa were “reciprocity” and “contractuality”, based on “mutual needs”, instead of the “donor-recipient” relationship of the past.

WTO-compliance, as a *topos* of external constraint was the main argumentation for this change in the “spirit” of the relationship, whereas financial constraints on development aid and the hindrances in the multilateral efforts to liberalize trade worldwide had been the driving forces. The EU wanted to include issues such as the environment, investment codes, standards, and competition policies in this reciprocity, and thus this approach was wider than the multilateral trade talks. Protecting and stimulating European investments in the ACP as a way for development by rationalizing the investment environment has taken place in the development discourse instead of stimulating industrialization through direct involvement by aid. The content of the European “help” transformed from supporting development via industrialization and regional integration into “help” for institutional and administrative reforms to mobilize and protect private investments and enhanced integration with the European market. The EPAs, which were supposed to be negotiated and concluded with artificially created ACP sub-regions within the framework of the Cotonou Agreement were also defended on the basis of Europe’s help to the ACP countries to achieve better investment environments for increased global competitiveness through the regional arrangement of the rationalization of the investment environment.

Since Lomé III, the “least developed” and “landlocked” ACP states were prioritized in terms of supporting regional cooperation projects. The differentiation based on needs and development levels was used to justify the change towards the reciprocity and different trade arrangements with artificially created sub-regions. The ACP sub-regions established to negotiate the EPAs did not correspond to the existing regional entities, which further complicated the regional integration efforts in Africa. Most African countries had already overlapping memberships in different regional organizations, which were created with the support of the EU. This time, they were in negotiation groups whose members were different from those of the regional organizations they belonged to. Contrary to the claims that the EPAs would support regional integration in Africa, they actually represented a change in the norm of supporting regional integration for the development of African countries into supporting sub-regional market integration with Europe. In line with the moral economy approach, several African countries showed strong resistance towards EPAs because of deviation from this norm.

The Cotonou period marks the nomination of Africa as a separate continental actor than the ACP Group, which is the “owner” of the challenges and solutions, in parallel to the discursive change from the “special relationship” based on “Europe’s duty/responsibility” into “strategic partnership”. This period also corresponds to the description of the African Union as the leader of the African continent and the counterpart of the EU in its relations with the complexly regionalized Africa. The “continent-to-continent relationship” was discursively emphasized. Europe’s financial support to Africa’s integration has also shifted from sub-regional, loose, multi-purpose integration organizations towards pan-African continental integration, under the Strategic Partnership.

The whole EU-Africa interregional relationship, which was supposed to increase regional integration among African countries, serves to increase African states’ integration with the EU instead, at the expense of complicating and obstructing intra-regional integration. The diverse and competing trade rules imposed by the EU also negatively affect African regional integration. The Pan-Africanist discourse raised in the last two decades to deal with criticism and resistance from African countries to the

changes in the norms of the moral economy, in relation to both development aid and African regional integration, serves also to legitimize the policies underlying Africa's market integration with Europe. Contrary to these legitimations, the outcome is a disintegrated Africa, with various regional economic organizations and overlapping memberships, which are more integrated with Europe than among themselves.



CONCLUSION

Fifty years after the independence of African countries, they are still struggling with development problems, despite all the bilateral and multilateral aid and development programs implemented so far. More than half of them have low human development according to the UN Human Development Index. The poverty gap is wider than in other developing countries, despite the economic growth recorded in some African countries in recent years. Africa's share in world trade is still low, as well as the share of intraregional trade among eight regional economic communities in Africa compared to the other regions.

This thesis has tried to contribute to the discussions on the EU's support to regional integration in Africa, which was represented as the major premise of development, economic growth, and integration into world trade. Although regional integration in Africa has been supported by the EC/EU since the end of the 1970s, the regional integration efforts in Africa are far from serving economic growth and development there. Regional Economic Communities in Africa have been financially and discursively supported by the EU, which claimed that they would be the "building blocks" for economic integration in Africa. Now there are fourteen of them, creating obstacles to the implementation of preferential trade integration in the continent with overlapping memberships and imposing trade rules. The situation is further complicated by the conflicting rules of preferential agreements with third countries and regions (Byiers et.al., 2019). The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Agreement signed in March 2018 seems like a positive step towards African economic integration to be achieved through these building blocks of Regional Economic Communities. However, political hesitations, potential revenue losses, ratification delays, and ongoing border closures raise questions about the successful implementation of the Agreement.

Although the Association with Europe under the ACP Group proceeded for African countries more or less concertedly until the Cotonou Agreement, the negotiation of Economic Partnership Agreements under separate sub-regional groups has created tensions since then. Some African leaders resisted the negotiations of EPAs with artificially created regional groups, claiming that the EPAs would be detrimental to

regional integration in Africa. This resistance has caused delays in the negotiation and conclusion of EPAs and crystallized the differences of interests and damaged the “solidarity” among members of RECs.

This thesis has analyzed the problems associated with regional integration in Africa as a premise for development, as imposed by the EU, from a moral economy approach, which is based on assessing the moral dimensions of economic relations. The moral economy approach has been used to explain the role played by the norms in shaping economic relations and the differences between normative claims and the outcomes. This thesis has revealed how the current regional integration efforts in Africa have been shaped by the construction of the regional integration norm within the moral economy of the EU-Africa relationship. It has also demonstrated the tensions in the relationship, as well as the problems regarding regional integration and development efforts in Africa, looking into the changes and discrepancies in this norm from a historical perspective. The thesis has first put forward that “regional integration” was constituted as a norm in EU-Africa relations and it helped to construct former colonies of the Member States after their independence as a region, in such a way to maintain a hegemonic relationship between Europe and Africa. Proceeding from this argument, the thesis has further argued that the EU has benefited from this hegemonic relationship and the regional integration norm, to impose neoliberal policies upon African countries. The main motive of these policies was to integrate African countries into the European markets. The third argument of this thesis has been that the current problems in the interregional relationship between the EU and Africa are associated with the deviation from the regional integration norm and the current intercontinental approach is a move to reshape the economic relationship with the aim of restoring the harmony in the moral economy (Keat, 2004).

DHA has been employed in this thesis to support its arguments. The nomination strategies to construct and describe Europe and Africa discursively, the relationship between them, the EU’s external policies towards Africa and the regional integration norm, as well as the argumentation strategies used to justify and legitimize these constructions during the period from 1957, the conclusion of the Treaty of Rome, to present day have been explored and analyzed drawing on the DHA.

The findings from the analyzed texts demonstrated that the EU has discursively constructed African countries as a region in their relations with Europe after their independence. This construction has its roots in the Eurafrica ideology of the previous period. Eurafrica ideology saw the former colonies of the European states as entities whose fate depended on connecting with the unified European states for access to their markets (Thorpe, 2018: 504).

The thesis has revealed that Africa's inferior construction in the Eurafrica ideology has continued in the post-independence period. Africa has been predicated as an "economically inferior" entity, through the binary oppositions established between Europe and Africa, such as "rich/privileged vs. poor", "developed vs. underdeveloped/developing", "have states vs. have-nots", "strong vs. weak". The EU has constructed its relationship with the African countries through these binary oppositions, which are used to maintain the power relationship between the parties and the establishment of Africa as the "weaker" party "in need of Europe's help". The relationship between Europe and Africa has been described as "special" and the specialty was partly justified with this construction of Africa as inferior, in addition to the *topos* of history frequently used in the sample data. Referring to the colonial past without explicitly mentioning its contradictions and inequalities, the *topos* of history has been used by the EC/EU to construct a special bond between Europe and Africa, to justify the maintenance of this unequal relationship, and to attribute positive qualities and responsibility to Europe vis-à-vis the inferior and needy part, namely, Africa.

The superior construction of "united Europe" against "weaker, disunited Africa" has served to impose the stronger party, the EU, as a model of regional integration. It has also urged the African countries to act as a region against this superior party within this unbalanced relationship. Being united was proposed as a condition to be acknowledged as a counterpart by the EU. Ignoring the structural reasons for economic and developmental problems in Africa, the EU discourse justified regionalization in Africa as the only way to get rid of this economic inferiority within an interregional relationship with the EU, which represents the best model of regional integration.

In accordance with the second argument of this thesis, the analysis showed that the main motive for European support for African regional integration was to ensure the integration of Africa with European markets. Region-building was one of the main norms in EU-Africa relations, especially after the end of the 1970s and the EU's support for regional integration in Africa is apparent in the texts. Although the analogies are being established with the EU model as an argumentative strategy in the sample texts, the analysis of the texts has established that the meaning of the regional integration envisaged by the EU for Africa was different than the European experience in integration. What was advocated for Africa was more of looser cooperation arrangements, aiming to achieve scale economies and facilitate the implementation of European policies and reforms required for integration with Europe, rather than the African states' incremental transfer of sovereignty to a supranational entity in certain economic fields.

The region-building norm has been instrumentalized to impose specific European policies towards former African colonies under different nominations, such as "regional programming", "coordination", "cooperation" and "integration", within the moral economy of the EU-Africa relationship. The development efforts of African countries after independence have been shaped under the policies designed in line with this norm. First of these policies was the import substitution-based industrialization which has dominated the development discourse in the 1960s and 70s. The data analyzed in the last chapter demonstrated that the EU has used its "economically superior" position, established as the developed one, to impose consolidation of markets and import substitute industrialization in African countries through regional cooperation for the sake of development. The challenges of decreasing investments and inability to develop were widely used as a pretext to convince the African countries to accept and implement these policies at the regional level. Yet these argumentation strategies have contradicted the outcome, which has been the continuation of underdevelopment in African countries.

The continuation of underdevelopment in Africa led to the questioning of the efficiency of EU development cooperation in Africa. As a result, the EU's support for import substitution industrialization in Africa shifted towards market-driven liberalization via structural adjustment programs 1980s, in accordance with the neoliberal

turn in European integration. The data examined from this period manifested the introduction of the “regional integration” phrase in the texts and speeches in parallel to the structural adjustment discourse. Once again, regional integration was discursively instrumentalized for the implementation of specific policies from the European side, being structural adjustment policies this time. Both regional integration and structural adjustment were promoted as ways for development and integration into the world economy. Yet the outcome of the structural adjustment programs in the following decades has not proved these helpful.

Despite the EU’s claim of supporting regional integration in Africa, based on the EU model, African market integration has never been the main motive and the outcome. Although the claimed aim was Africa’s regional integration in the way to development, neither the level of development nor the regional integration in Africa today has reached this outcome. The EU has discursively and financially supported certain types of integration and regional integration communities in Africa serving its own interests, which would help the implementation of neoliberal policies and African countries’ integration with the EU market. In parallel to the increase in the number of sub-regional organizations demanding the EU’s financial support and concerns around the efficiency of development cooperation led to the discourse on the rationalization of regional integration and cooperation organizations in Africa. Some organizations were given a place in the European texts as African “sub-regional” organizations, chosen without clear criteria while ignoring others. Organizations with looser structures and limited aims were qualified as more successful in terms of integration. These types of organizations were also the ones that serve the coordination of policies facilitating integration with the EU market. The outcome of this discourse has been an even more complex regional integration map in Africa, with overlapping memberships and complicated trade transactions.

In accordance with the third argument of this thesis, the analysis found that the deviation from the regional integration norm with the negotiation of sub-regional agreements caused resistance from the African countries. This deviation came into being in the Cotonou agreement period, which was marked by the discursive change in the

relationship between the EU and Africa. The sample texts analyzed in this thesis manifested the change in the nominations of the relationship from “donor-recipient” into a “contractual” one, from “special relationship based on aid” into “strategic partnership in trade and investments”. The description of Africa has also changed from a “region in need of help of Europe’s aid” to a “rising region” and the “owner of its own challenges”.

The reciprocity in trade preferences, which would include new issues, such as the environment, investment codes, standards, and competition policies, was at the core of this changed contractual partnership. The blocking in the negotiations of those wider issues during the multilateral trade talks urged the EU to speed up the integration of the ACP markets with European markets, by imposing the Economic Partnership Agreements. While those issues to be discussed under the EPAs were wider than the multilateral trade talks at that moment, the *topos* of external constraint and challenge, which was WTO-compliance, was used as a strategy to justify the negotiations of the EPAs.

This eagerness to accelerate the integration with the ACP markets has led the EU to force the negotiation of EPAs with artificially established ACP sub-regions, which were different than the existing regional economic communities. The analysis of the sample texts showed the discursive construction of these negotiating sub-regions as distinct entities with homogenous bodies. Yet the negotiation groups referred to as the ACP sub-regions did not correspond to the existing regional entities. This nomination strategy disregarded the discussions related to the complex regionalization map in Africa with overlapping memberships of African countries. As a result, the EPAs have led to a deterioration of the solidarity among the ACP countries and caused resistance among some of them, leading to delays in the negotiation and ratification schedules. Dividing African countries into sub-regions that did not even correspond to the already supported regional organizations has been a deviation from the regional integration norm, which was considering Africa as a whole region in its relationship with the EU. That is why it has created so much tension and resistance among African countries.

In parallel to the problems in the EPA negotiations, the EU adopted a pan-African approach at the beginning of the 2000s. The analysis showed that the African

Union was addressed as a “counterpart”, “leader” and “owner of the challenges in Africa” in EU texts. Within this approach, the “continent-to-continent” relationship and “pan-African continental integration” have been discursively supported and prioritized over sub-regional organizations under the strategic partnership discourse, developed against common external challenges. Regional integration, as a norm in the moral economy of the EU-Africa relationship, signified Africa’s acting and being considered as a region in its market integration efforts with the EU. To overcome the problems encountered in the ongoing negotiations of the EPAs, partly due to the divergence from this norm by dividing African countries into artificially established sub-regional groups and aggravating the already existing regional integration problems in the continent, the regional integration norm has gone through a process of reshaping under this pan-African approach. Yet this new approach has also had a negative outcome with regard to regional integration in Africa unlike the legitimations being used. The ACP group and the African Union appeared as two different entities competing to be considered as the EU’s legitimate counterparts. They could not manage to overcome their differences and achieve a common position in the negotiations of the new agreement to succeed the Cotonou Agreement.

While the regional integration norm has been legitimated discursively with the motive of development of African countries during the analyzed period between 1957 and 2021, this moral justification did not correspond to the outcome. The outcome, on the contrary, has been the ongoing underdevelopment of disintegrated Africa, with various regional economic organizations and overlapping memberships, which are more integrated with Europe than among themselves. The recently adopted pan-African approach has added another dimension, which does not seem to solve either the regional integration efforts in Africa or the EU-Africa relationship. This thesis suggests that the EU should have a more balanced relationship with the regional economic communities in Africa and the African Union, to avoid the impediments to the regional integration process in Africa and to overcome the bottlenecks in the economic relationship between the EU and Africa.

This thesis contributes to the comparative regionalism studies with the moral economy approach it adopted to analyze the regional integration experience of Africa from the perspective of its relations with the EU. It sheds light on the differences in African and European regionalisms from the perspective of the dynamics of interregionalism. It also adds to the literature on the EU's "promoting (and sometimes preventing)" role in the construction of regionalism around the world (Söderbaum, 2007: 186). The moral economy approach adopted in this thesis focusing on relations with Africa offers a framework for further comparative research on the interregional relations between the EU and other regions, such as Latin America and Asia.

The thesis also contributes to the studies that investigate the problems encountered during the latest negotiations of trade arrangements between Europe and Africa. It has revealed that the regional integration norm was developed within the EU-Africa moral economy after the independence of the former colonies of the Member States in close connection with the development discourse and it served to obscure the motives of the EU's trade policies and their impact on the development and regionalization efforts in Africa. Yet, future research on the speeches of African leaders for the analyzed period would reveal the intertextual and interdiscursive relationship to identify how other competing discourses on African regionalization were silenced during the construction of regional integration norm within the moral economy of the EU-Africa relationship. It would also help to demonstrate African agency and the counter-narratives with regard to the role of the regional integration norm in the moral economy of the EU-Africa relationship. Bearing in mind these shortcomings, this thesis has examined the dominant discourse from a critical point of view and tried to pave the way for further research on these lines.

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