REPUBLIC OF TÜRKİYE
TURKISH NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY
ATATÜRK INSTITUTE OF STRATEGIC STUDIES
DEPARTMENT OF WAR STUDIES
WAR STUDIES PROGRAM

SOURCES OF CHINESE MILITARY CHANGE IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

MASTER'S THESIS

MAHMUT ENSAR AKTÜRK
1920103104

SUPERVISOR: Asst. Prof. BARIŞ ATEŞ, Ph.D.

ISTANBUL
SEPTEMBER 2022

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Date of Submission : …….
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This thesis is hereby officially accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of War Studies.

Title	Name and Surname	Signature
Asst. Prof.	**Barış ATEŞ**	
Asst. Prof.	**Kemal OLÇAR**	
Asst. Prof.	**Mustafa KARAHÖYÜK**	

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Millî Savunma Üniversitesi Enstitüleri Dönem Projesi ve Lisansüstü Tez Hazırlama Kılavuzu'nda yer alan kurallarına uygun olarak hazırladığım bu tez çalışmasında; tez içinde sunduğum verileri, bilgileri ve dokümanları akademik ve etik kurallar çerçevesinde elde ettiğimi, tüm bilgi, belge, değerlendirme ve sonuçları bilimsel etik ve ahlak kurallarına uygun olarak sunduğumu, tez çalışmasında yararlandığım eserlerin tümüne uygun atıfta bulunarak kaynak gösterdiğimi, kullanılan verilerde herhangi bir değişiklik yapmadığımı, bu tezde sunduğum çalışmanın özgün olduğunu, bildirir; aksi bir durumda aleyhime doğabilecek tüm hak kayıplarını kabullendiğimi beyan ederim.

Bu tezdeki düşünce, görüş, varsayım, sav veya tezler bana aittir; Millî Savunma Bakanlığı, Millî Savunma Üniversitesi ve Atatürk Stratejik Araştırmalar Enstitüsü sorumlu tutulamaz.

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Değerli aileme.

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September 2022 Mahmut Ensar AKTÜRK

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ABBREVIATIONS

A2/AD : Anti Access/Area Denial

AVF : All-Volunteer Force

BUR : Bottom-up Review

C4I : Command, Control, Communications, Computing, and, Intelligence

C4ISR : Command, Control, Communications, Computing, and, Intelligence, and Reconnaisance

CA : Civil Affairs

CMI : Civilian Military Integration

COIN : Counter-Insurgency

COSTIND : Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense

CPC : Communist Party of China

CTC : Central Theater Command

ETC : Eastern Theater Command

FY : Fiscal Year

GAD : General Armament Department

GLD : General Logistics Department

GPD : General Political Department

GSD : General Staff Department

GWOT : Global War on Terror

HQ : Headquarters

IED : Improvised Explosive Device

IT : Information Technologies

JDAM : Joint Direct Attack Munitions

JRRF : Joint Rapid Reaction Forces

JV-2010 : Joint Vision 2010

LB : Livre Blanc

LWUHTC : Local Wars under High Technology Conditions

MARSOC : Marine Corps Special Operations Command

MCF : Military-Civilian Fusion

MCI : Military-Civilian Integration

MOOTW : Military Operations Other Than War

MR : Military Region

MTR : Military Technical Revolution

NATO : North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NBC : Nuclear Biological Chemical

NCO : Non-Commissioned Officer

NDS : National Defense Strategy

NHM : New Historic Missions

NPC : National People's Congress

NSS : National Security Strategy

NTC : Northern Theater Command

PGM : Precision Guided Missile

PLA : People's Liberation Army

PLAA : People's Liberation Army Army

PLAAF : People's Liberation Army Air Force

PLAJLSF : People's Liberation Army Joint Logistic Support Force

PLAN : People's Liberation Army Navy

PLARF : People's Liberation Army Rocket Force

PLASAF : People's Liberation Army Second Artillery Force

PLASSF : People's Liberation Strategic Support Force

PRC : People's Republic of China

PSYOPS : Psychological Operations

QDR : Quadrennial Defense Review

RMA : Revolution in Military Affairs

SASTIND : State Administration of Science and Technology Industries for National Defense

SDR : Strategic Defence Review

SOF : Special Operations Forces

SOP : Standard Operating Procedure

SRBM : Short Range Ballistic Missile

STC : Southern Theater Command

UK : United Kingdom

US : United States

USA : United States of America

USSR : Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WMD : Weapons of Mass Destruction

WP : White Paper

WTC : World Trade Center

WTO **:** World Trade Organization

ÖZ

Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Dönemde Çin Askeri Değişiminin Sebepleri

Mahmut Ensar AKTÜRK

Millî Savunma Üniversitesi, Atatürk Stratejik Araştırmalar Enstitüsü

İstanbul, Eylül 2022

Bu çalışma orduların yapısında, kuvvet büyüklüğünde, organizasyonunda ve doktrinlerindeki değişiklikleri inceleyen askeri değişim çalışmaları alanında öne çıkan teori ve konseptler ışığında Soğuk Savaş sonrası Çin Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu'nda (ÇHKO) gerçekleşen değişikliklerin sebeplerini açıklamaya çalışmaktadır. Bu değişimler liderlere, uluslararası güvenlik durumuna, teknolojiye ve daha birçok sebebe bağlı olarak farklı ivmelerde gerçekleşmektedir. Çin Ordusu açısından Soğuk Savaş'ın ardından gerçekleşen Körfez Savaşı, Tayvan Boğazı Krizi, Çin'in Belgrad Büyükelçiliği'nin bombalanması, siyasi liderlerin askeri düzene müdahaleleri ve savunma harcamalarındaki değişiklikler askeri değişimi etkileyen faktörler olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır. Ancak, ÇHKO'nun değişiminde özellikle siyasi liderlerin diğer ülkelere nazaran daha belirleyici olduğu görülmektedir. Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, Fransa ve Birleşik Krallık ordularında yaşanan askeri değişim bu tespiti doğrulamaktadır. Daha önce Maocu düşüncenin etkisiyle insan gücüne dayalı bir ordu olarak öne çıkan ÇHKO, Jiang Zemin'in liderliğinde batılı çağdaşlarında olduğu gibi sayıca küçülen ancak kabiliyet olarak büyümeyi hedefleyen bir yapı haline gelmiştir. Jiang Zemin sonrası dönemlerde liderlerin ordudaki değişim hareketleri üzerindeki etkisi açıkça görülürken bunların yanında sivil-askeri ilişkileri, tehdit algısı, parti içi birlik, askeri harcamalar ve yolsuzluk, sivil-askeri entegrasyonu gibi diğer faktörler de göze çarpmaktadır. Bu doğrultuda ÇHKO'nun değişimini anlamak için önde gelen akademisyenlerin kitapları ve çalışmaları, devletlerin resmî belgeleri ve internet kaynakları kullanılmıştır.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Askeri değişim, Yenilik, Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti, Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Dönem

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Tez Danışmanı : Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Barış ATEŞ

ABSTRACT

Sources of Chinese Military Change in the Post-Cold War Era

Mahmut Ensar AKTÜRK

Turkish National Defense University, (The Atatürk Institute of Strategic Studies)

İstanbul, September 2022

This study tries to explain the sources for the changes in the China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) in the Post-Cold War era in the light of prominent theories and concepts in the field of military change studies, which examines changes in the structure, force size, organization and doctrines of armies. These changes occur at different speeds depending on the leaders, the status of international security, technology and many other reasons. The main subject of this study is to investigate how the Gulf War, the Taiwan Strait Crisis, the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, the interventions of political leaders in the military order and how shifts in defence spending caused changes in the Chinese military after the end of the Cold War. In addition, what theory and concept must be used to evaluate the change of the PLA are discussed in the study's conclusion. Furthermore, the changes in the militaries of the United States, France and the United Kingdom were also analyzed to compare the reasons for the military change of China with the military changes of its western contemporaries. Under Jiang Zemin's leadership, the PLA, which had previously gained prominence as a manpower-based army, evolved into a structure that decreased in size while aiming to increase in capabilities, much like its western counterparts. While the post-Jiang Zemin period clearly demonstrates the importance of leaders on the change movements in the military, other factors, including as civil-military relations, threat perception, party unity, military expenditures and corruption, civil-military integration, are also notable. Accordingly, the books and studies of leading academics in the field, official documents of states, and internet resources were used.

Keywords: Military change, Innovation, People's Republic of China, Post-Cold War Era

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1.INTRODUCTION

“The only constant in life is change.” For ages, Heraclitus' remarks have served as a reminder to mankind that change is unavoidable. Since the inception of mankind every aspect of life has been subject to change. This reality cannot be divorced from war and the evolution of warfare, and the armies. Technology, political agendas of leaders, changes made by rivals for their own good, the international security environment, and many of other reasons have caused and continue to cause armies to change. Military change studies aim to understand how these changes affect the military organizations. Unlike the international relations studies, military change studies is a relatively Scholars and experts from numerous fields have been attempting to explain why militaries change and what drives that change. Despite the fact that this field has been flooded with various ideas and theories, no consensus has been achieved even for the definition and driving factors of the military change.

Military change studies is a more recent subject of study when compared to international relations studies and their theories. Because of this, scholars have not yet come to an understanding of what constitutes change. This provides a challenge for our research as well. But the lack of a definition does not preclude the existence of concepts. I'll now discuss some theories and ideas in order to explain my thesis. It should be emphasized once more that these are not theories with distinct borders like those in international relations. The approaches, conceptualizations, and theories of academics like Adam Grissom and Rob Sinterniklaas will be more valuable for comprehending the topic.

The area of military change has emerged as a result of the critiques, reactions, confirmations, and refutations of Barry Posen's work[1], one of the most well-known authorities on the subject, which was published close to the end of the Cold War. The disintegration of the Soviet state, the impact of the budget allocated for defence, and the role of both military and political leaders in this process have all been the subject of military change discussions since the end of the Cold War in 1989, Malta Summit. States have undertaken changes in their armies, as well as other areas, to conform to the emerging unipolar security structure. Downsizing the army, the introduction of new

[1] Barry Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine*, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1984).

doctrines, the establishment of new missions, and the changing of the army's contact with other stakeholders in society are all examples of these changes.

The removal of the Soviet Communist menace did not, however, imply that the world would undertake a major peace process. With the prospect of a Soviet invasion no longer present, other threats emerged to fill the vulnerabilities in the new security system that had previously been ignored. The post-Cold War era's uncertain environment made it ideal for terrorism, narco-terrorism, ethnic or religious extremism, and other forms of extremism and violence. New missions have been handed to the military as a result of this, the most significant of those are humanitarian aid, disaster relief, and peace operations.

1.1. Aim of the Research

The purpose of this study is to identify the similarities and dissimilarities between the change of western militaries and that of the Chinese military. To achieve this purpose, it will be attempted to demonstrate the Chinese military's compatibility with the concepts and theories advanced by renowned academics and experts in the field. This study is aims to answer these questions: “To determine the applicability of the works used by authors to explain the western militaries, who have long maintained their stature in the literature, to China, an eastern nation whose geography, history, culture, and management style differ from theirs.”, “What are the factors affecting the Chinese army's change in comparison to the western militaries, or what are the factors that stand out the most?”.

1.2. Importance

Military change studies that have been done after the Cold War mainly look into the causes of changes in western armies. While many studies on several western countries, particularly the United States are available in the literature, studies on China are scarce. This study tries to identify the factors that enabled the change of the Chinese military and how it varied from its Western counterparts. Despite its limitations, this study attempts to contribute to the subject of military change studies, which is still relatively new compared to other academic fields of study and can only be described by its own concepts and theories.

1.3. Methodology

This research tries to determine how valid and correct theories in the subject of military change, as well as the reasons for the change, are for China. Although this study is not thorough or sufficient to fill the gap in the Turkish military change literature, it is hoped that it will contribute to the field. The study is divided into five chapters including: an introduction, the text section that includes second third and fourth chapters, and a conclusion. In the second chapter, the text examines the terminology of military change before moving on to an examination of the research that renowned scholars made to the topic. As a result, the characteristics of post-Cold War militaries, military models, and concept of Revolution in Military Affairs are discussed. The third chapter examines the military change after the cold war in relation with the military models and revolution in military affairs followed by case studies from US, British, and French forces, which are regarded pioneers of post-Cold War technological and organisational transformation. Of course, these nations are insufficient to comprehend and analyse studies of military change. However, taking into account the extent of our research, it is intended to establish a reference in order to comprehend the change of the Chinese military. The US army was chosen because it was the great power that survived the cold war competition and led the way for military change[2], the French army was chosen because it was the country that placed a high value on land forces in continental Europe and kept compulsory military service in place for a long time, and the UK army was chosen because it shrank in size both in terms of budget and manpower.[3] The Chinese military's post-cold war change is explored in the fourth chapter, particularly in terms of leaders, followed by economic indicators and civil-military integration in China, and lastly, the fifth chapter is appraised as the conclusion section. In the section on leaders, it's worth mentioning that three different roles in the Chinese army can be called leadership positions. The President of the People's Republic of China, the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, and the Chairman of the Central Military Committee are standing out of order. While two

[2] Barış Ateş, "Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Dönemde Askeri Değişim: Nato Orduları Ve Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Üzerine Karşılaştırmalı Bir Analiz" (PhD Thesis, Gazi Üniversitesi 2014), 53-65.

[3] * UK's latest budget increase announced in 2020. "Boris Johnson unveils the UK's biggest military budget in 30 years" https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/boris-johnson-unveils-the-uk-s-biggest-military-budget-in-30-years-41653 [Accessed: 08.06.2022]

of the three leaders we examined at (Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao) were able to occupy some of these roles (General Secretary and Presidency) early in their careers, they only became Chairman of the CMC later because prior leaders had held it. As a result, the first dates of arrival of leaders to any of these three positions are given.

1.4. Limitations

Because China values organizational secrecy and the fact that the truths in the documents it shares are collusive, or the data is far from convincing in terms of transparency and reliability it does not always provide the most accurate and thorough information in the documents it releases. Thus, this research largely relies on secondary sources. In order to overcome these issues, I attempted to use internet sources and magazines that have built international trust, as well as publications and books written by experts in the subject, particularly those that publish about China. Furthermore, I attempted to supplement the substance of my work with Chinese self-published official papers or unabridged straight translations.

2. MILITARY CHANGE CONCEPTS AND THEORIES

The military change terminology, definitional arguments, and theories that led to the study of military change are briefly examined in this part to give a foundation for readers.

2.1. Military Change Terminology

Discussions on military change have been going on for a long time. Barry Posen's book "The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany" by is often regarded as the starting point for the debates. Long-running debates which included agreements, disagreements, and allegations regarding Posen's work, drew experts from various professions and areas. Different scholars and different professionals from different and unique academic and professional backgrounds contributed to the field. As a result, while the scholars tried to explain the sources of military change from their ideologic or academic perspective, they flooded the field with different terms and phrases. Even though ordinary readers can understand what the writer(s) generally mean by using these terms according to the flow of the certain text it is important for us to use the terms correctly. Nowadays when we read an article or a book related to the field we generally come across these terms used interchangeably to refer to military change:

- Military Innovation
- Military Transformation
- Military Reform
- Military Modernization, etc…

This is a direct result of military change studies being a multidisciplinary field as we mentioned afore.

Military transformation might be one of the most inclusive terms to explain the military change. Transformation is an open-ended novelty that aims to adapt the given military, military personnel, material, etc. to a new strategic environment, new mission sets, and so on. Anthony King[4] uses the word transformation in his work to explain the long-term

[4] Anthony King et al., *The Transformation of Europe's Armed Forces*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2011).

changes undertaken by the European militaries to adapt their organization and structure to the new strategic environment after the 9/11 attacks.

Oxford Dictionary explains reform as "change something in order to make it better"[5] the word reform aims for betterment for a certain organization, system, or procedure. Military reform, therefore, is not a total change but rather fixing the flawed parts or procedures and changing them with better fitting ones otherwise it would not be cost-efficient. While Adam Grissom did not give a certain definition for military reform, he kept out acquisition reforms and minor reforms outside of the military innovation.[6]

Grissom conditions military innovation to three different results. Military innovation should change the military formations, military innovation should be significant and, should increase military effectiveness.[7] One of the three avenues for military change, along with adaptation and emulation, according to Farrell and Terriff, is military innovation.

> *"Innovation involves developing new military technologies, tactics, strategies, and structures. Adaptation involves adjusting existing military means and methods. Adaptation can, and often does, lead to innovation when multiple adjustments over time gradually lead to the evolution of new means and methods. Last, emulation involves importing new tools and ways of war through imitation of other military organizations. It is only when these new military means and methods result in new organizational goals, strategies, and structures that innovation, adaptation, and emulation lead to major military change".* [8]

One of the least common terms to explain military change is transition. While there is not a significant usage of the term in the military change studies literature; there are several occasions you can come across with it. Former Chief of Staff of the US Army General Raymond Odierno uses the term to explain the changes of the Army has to adapt. Those are, declining budgets, shift towards the Asia-Pacific region and the changes in mission

[5] *Oxford Wordpower Dictionary*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1993).
[6] Adam Grissom, "The Future of Military Innovation Studies", *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 29, (2006), 907.
[7] Ibid, 907.
[8] Theo Farrell and Terry Terrif, *The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology*, (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 15.

set.[9] Another usage of the term was represented by Kaushik Roy. He used the term to explain the application of technology to the military systems such as gunpowder.[10]

There were several attempts to explain these terms and create a standardized approach to the terminology. One of the most recent and thorough studies belongs to Rob Sinterniklaas[11] in which he reviews multiple studies that have already been published beginning with Barry Posen's study. Adam Grissom was criticized by Sinterniklaas for including scholars in his study who wrote about military hardware acquisition but not necessarily on military innovation.[12] Sinterniklaas proposes a simple yet very useful framework to solve the confusion about military change terminology.[13] He starts with the proposal of using authoritative dictionaries[14] then lists six variants* which determines the driving factors for military change:

"(1) Technology,
(2) The operational environment,
(3) Civil-military relations,
(4) Alliance politics and domestic politics,
(5) Cultural norms,
(6) Leadership."[15]

To make this work readable, easily understood and away from the ambiguity we are going to use Sinterniklaas's approach -using authoritative dictionaries- to terminology. In addition to that, during the case study section -which starts in the third chapter- some of the driving factors that were listed above will be used.

[9] Raymond T. Odierno, "The U.S. Army in a Time of Transition: Building a Flexible Force", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 91 No. 3, (2012), 7-11.
[10] Kaushik Roy, "Horses, Guns And Governments: A Comparative Study of the Military Transition in the Manchu, Mughal, Ottoman And Safavid Empires, Circa 1400 To Circa 1750", *International Area Studies Review*, (2012), 99-121.
[11] Rob Sinterniklaas, *"Military Innovation Cutting the Gordian Knot"* (Publication of the Faculty of Military Sciences Netherlands Defence Academy, 2018).
[12] Ibid, 8.
[13] Ibid, 29-32.
[14] Sinterniklaas used *Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English* and *Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary* in his proposal.
*These factors have already been determined by Theo Farrell but Sinterniklaas added *Leadership.*
[15] Ibid, 31.

2.2. Understanding Military Change

The end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) accordingly have triggered the emergence of a new international and strategic environment. United States of America (USA) and her allies were expecting a Communist military invasion from the USSR after the Second World War and throughout the Cold War. Now that the threat of communist invasion and the threat to the European states' territorial integrity has vanished, they started to change their military structures, abolish some of their forces and reallocated the budget for those in other public services and used them for related expenditures. Every state -and therefore governments- responded to this new strategic environment in different ways.

Militaries, due to their large organizational structure and bureaucratic bodies are expected to resist movements of change or simply stagnate in their current condition. While this is the common expectation from them it is also irrational. Tasked with ensuring the security of a nation and its interests resisting change will not make that task easier. For militaries whose main duties are to defend the state from external and internal dangers and safeguard its interests, refusing or ignoring the changes that time demands can have catastrophic results. For that reason, scholars have been trying to answer these two questions "Why and how militaries change? Under which circumstances and driving factors do these changes occur?"

One of the first studies in the field has been made by Barry Posen in 1984. In his seminal work, Posen used organization theory and balance of power theory to explain the doctrinal change in British, French, and German militaries during the interwar period. [16] With organizational theory, he tries to explain why militaries as large bureaucracies with standard operating procedures (SOPs) innovate or stagnate.[17] Due to being specialized institutions and rational mindset of organizations they put great emphasis on predictability and stability.[18] Change in this sense increases ambiguity and blurs the SOPs which in return decreases the efficiency. However, innovation in organizational theory occurs in

[16] Barry Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine*, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1984), 7.
[17] Ibid, 35.
[18] Ibid, 46.

exceptional circumstances, too. These circumstances are (1) Failure, (2) Civilian pressure and intervention, (3) Will to expand and secure their interests.[19] New technologies can also be a driving factor if they have been confronted directly in a combat environment. Otherwise, emerging technologies are not great motivators for doctrinal change.[20]

States due to the anarchic nature of international relations and lack of a regulatory power try to increase their security and interests; while taking actions in order to do so other states -whether they are neighbouring or not- might feel threatened and respond to these actions. These balancing reactions make up the core of the balance of power theory. Unlike the organizational theory innovation in Balance of Power theory is rather welcomed if it will help to secure the interests of the state.[21]

In his book "Winning the Next War," Stephen Rosen compared the US and British militaries and discussed what motivates innovation in the armed forces.[22] Rosen examined military innovation under three titles; (1) Peacetime, (2) Wartime, and (3) Technological Innovation. He vehemently disputes Posen's arguments that "civilian intervention" and "defeat" are the causes of military change and maintains both of these factors fall short of explaining why or how military organisations develop in peacetime.[23] But he also acknowledges the influence of civilian leadership and lists Richard Neustadt's five prerequisites, which are:

> *"(1) The president himself must be clearly involved in the decision, (2) His orders must be unambiguous, (3) His order must be widely publicized, (4) The men who receive it must have control over everything needed to carry it out, (5) They must have no doubt of his authority to issue the order."*[24]

These circumstances just highlight how crucial it is for the leader's interaction with their subordinates to be intelligible. To him, innovation should entail alterations to the relationship between combat arms and how they engage in combat. He then entitles the military as a political power that expands its power through rank promotions. High-

[19] Ibid, 46.
[20] Ibid, 59, 239.
[21] Ibid, 74.
[22] Stephen Peter Rosen, *Winning the Next War*, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1991.)
[23] Ibid, 18.
[24] Ibid, 10.

ranking officers who have control over the promotion channels can therefore foster innovation.[25]

"Engaging the Enemy" by Kimberly Marten Zisk[26] is a critical study that analyses the doctrinal changes of the USSR in reaction to US and NATO military doctrines. Innovation is a reaction that consists of major changes in preparing for future wars in accordance with the potential opponents' doctrinal change.[27] Zisk rejects Posen's variables which are civilian intervention and organizations' lack of desire to change, and then she proposes three new variables. (1) Officers, -because of their duty and frame of mind- monitor and examine their adversaries. Thus, they can notice changes and react to these doctrinal changes if needed to win future wars. (2) The monist approach of Posen's to officer corps is not rational. There are different officers with different behaviours and backgrounds who might encourage organizations to innovate or embrace the innovation by themselves in reaction to the changes in adversaries' doctrines for future wars. (3) Civilian intervention might bring bureaucratic crisis; to avoid this to happen they try to change the behavior of the organization or expand the defense policy community. Thus building new alliances with officers within the community to gain or increase political power.[28] In sum, reactive innovation or innovation in military organizations occurs in order to protect the state's interests and win future wars regardless of a civilian intervention or not.

Sociologists also try to find the sources of military change. It is worth mentioning the books prepared by Theo Farrell and Terry Terrif with reference to the work of sociologists. "The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology" is aims to explain the military change with three variables: (1) cultural norms, (2) politics and strategy, (3) new technology.[29] From their perspective, these variables are major sources of military change which they define as change in strategy or structural change in the military organization.[30] Cultural norms -if they were embraced by the organization in their

[25] Ibid, 21.
[26] Kimberly Marten Zisk, *Engaging the Enemy Organization Theory and Soviet Military Innovation 1955-1991,* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993)
[27] Ibid, 4.
[28] Ibid, 5.
[29] Theo Farrell and Terry Terrif, *The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology,* (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 7-16.
[30] Ibid, 5.

day-to-day operations- can provide an insight into the current situation of the system that the organization is in. Culture change, therefore, may bring military change.[31] Cultural change occurs in two ways. First, a planned change that happens with the intervention of political elites. The second way is an external shock to the present cultural understanding. The rise of the anti-militarist discourse in the United States which was fueled by the high number of casualty levels of the US Military in the Vietnam War can be interpreted under this suggestion. Politics and strategy explain the change in the scope of threat perception and power relations in the international arena. Technological determinism is an easy explanation for the military change. However, it has been refused by sociologists who claim that there is nothing normal other than new technology taking place of the older one.[32] Social networks around the military-industrial complex can also force-feed these new technologies to the military to achieve a monopoly over the military-industrial complex. This understanding can also be seen in Sean McFate's work in which he accuses the "technophiles" of seducing the Pentagon to buy unnecessary high-tech weaponry. [33]

Elizabeth Kier explains the French doctrinal change between two world wars from a cultural perspective.[34] She argues that the doctrinal change does not have to be the result of an external shock or a civilian intervention that aims to achieve certain interests; to Kier, these are not enough to explain the military doctrinal change. Culture on the other hand draws the borders for military doctrinal change within the limits of past experiences. Culture in this sense is superior to interests or determines the limits of interests in terms of affecting change.[35]Her work explains that the French military doctrinal change from offensive to defensive was the only possible move due to the cultural limitation. Even though there was not a political strain or an external factor the French Military chose to adopt a defensive doctrine due to the shortened length of service. It is true that the leftists

[31] Ibid, 8.
[32] Ibid, 13.
[33] Sean Mcfate, *The New Rules of War: Victory in the Age of Durable Disorder*, (New York: William Morrow 2019). The third group of the war futurists according to McFate's analogy. In his words "They *(technophiles)* fetishize exotic machinery and foretell the rise of Terminator robots, the creation of Iron Man suits, and the dawn of some version of Skynet or the Matrix."
[34] Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars", *International Security*, Vol.19, No.4 (1995) 65-93. https://doi.org/10.2307/2539120
[35] Ibid, 80-83.

wanted to shorten the military service to keep the military out of the cities in an internal crisis and also prevent military to create an additional social class, but they did not enforce adopting a defensive doctrine on the military.[36] French military culture based on the assumption that short-term conscripts were only good for executing defensive doctrines because of their lack of training and discipline.[37]In sum Kier suggests that culture is the main reason behind the doctrinal changes. While every other variable that may affect the military decision-makers change, culture relatively stays the same.

Dima Adamsky is another scholar who put forward culture as a means for military innovation. His work tries to shed a light on how strategic culture affects military innovation.[38] Revolution in Military Affairs and Military Technical Revolution are what he examines as military innovation in his work. He uses culture as a determinant to explain why the USSR could only produce the theoretical and intellectual framework for RMA and could not put it into practice, why the US could not fully capitalize on the RMA as an operational concept even though they had the technology for it and why Israeli Defence Forces could only use it as a force multiplier in combat and could not see the potential of a revolutionary approach to military affairs. The answer to these questions is the variance in strategic and institutional behavior which can pave the way for intellectual entrepreneurs.[39] According to Adamsky's study, cultural psychology and organizational culture are, therefore can be mentioned as the main unlockers for military innovation which are the direct results of discontinuities in military affairs paradigms.

Another scholar that accepts the strategic environment and threat perception as a motivator for change is Anthony King. King examines the transformation of European militaries after the cold war in operational and tactical levels,[40] then he explains the transformation of the military organizations' structural change caused by the Cold War's end, therefore, end of the mass mobilization of the militaries against a common

[36] Ibid, 72.
[37] Ibid, 73-74.
[38] Dima Adamsky, *The Culture of Military Innovation: The Impact of Cultural Factors on the Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, The US and Israel* (California: Stanford University Press, 2010), 9.
[39] Ibid,132-135.
[40] Anthony King et al., *The Transformation of Europe's Armed Forces*, 2003. King uses the term "condensation of military power" to explain Post-Cold War militaries that are more capable than their predecessors but smaller in size. (Ibid, 33).

conventional threat that is the USSR. Militaries now rather fight against irregular forces with threats occurring from sub-national conflicts, such as terrorism rooted in Afghanistan as the given case in the book. Militaries in the light of this new threat perception transform themselves with rapid reaction forces, smaller but more capable units compared to Cold War militaries.[41]

While Posen's civil-military approach explains some of the cases in military change, Deborah Avant compares the US and UK militaries and their responsiveness to the civilian intervention. According to Avant civilian intervention is neither necessary nor sufficient enough to explain why military leaders would go along with the civilian policymakers. While the British military leaders tried to satisfy the political needs and goals of politicians, the US military leaders on the other hand were not ambitious as their British counterparts, even though civilian intervention was more visible than in the UK.[42] Political oversight and monitoring is decisive according to Avant. Congress's oversight on budgetary issues is vital for the US military since each service try to impose their strategic view upon the Congress and gain profit for their budget. This being said the US Army gets the lion's share in the budget with their strategic vision and goals imposed upon the civilian administration. Army's irresponsiveness to call for change from government during the Vietnam War were linked to two factors. First, while the President Kennedy and President Johnson put pressure on military leaders to adopt a counterinsurgency capability, the Congress' budget distribution put the European theater ahead of Vietnam. Therefore, Vietnam hardly mattered officers for their career. Mixed orders given at same time from Presidents and Congress did not ease military leaders job, too.[43] For the British Army officers, losing a battle or being defeated meant losing their jobs or decline in their career. Army leaders were expected to be rewarded with their success in the battlefield therefore innovation, change and adaption was inevitable to win. If they failed to do so they would probably get sacked or replaced which happened in Sir Redvers Buller's case in Anglo-Boer War.[44] In sum the power and the scope of civilian

[41] Ibid, 7, 11.
[42] Deborah Avant, *Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons From Peripheral Wars*, (New York: Cornell University Press 1994), 5.
[43] Ibid, 49. 73-4 This also justifies Neustadt's conditions that orders must be clear and unambigious
[44] Ibid, 108.

oversight on military officers and career promotions are more important than the civilian intervention or pressure itself.

Michael Horowitz and Shira Pindyck's study is among the most recent ones on the topic.[45] The authors draw attention to the confusion and the lack of consensus on the terminology in the field. After a literature review, Horowitz & Pindyck define military innovation as change to increase the ability of a military to generate power. By this definition, military innovation is not correlated with the outcome of a war. That is, the primary goal of innovation is not to win the war but increase the capability of producing more military power.[46] Conduct of warfare should also be affected by the innovation which represent itself in the operational domain of the warfare. Different from other studies, this study does not worry about the driving factors of a military innovation. Their approach is, according to the writers, agnostic about the drivers of the innovations but propose another way of thinking. That is accepting the military innovation as a process rather than a consequent. By doing so, they claim, we can explain and track how and when military innovations occur.[47]

Scholars studied the transformation of the European militaries after the end of the Cold War thoroughly, since it was more visible to observe the changes that were directly linked to the results of it. Anthony Forster unfolds the transformation of the European Militaries correlatively to the change in the strategic environment. The new strategic environment and the absence of a conventional enemy (the USSR in this case) created new missions for the military organizations. These new missions embraced by the militaries include peacekeeping and humanitarian efforts.[48] Due to these new missions and new strategic environment European militaries underwent several transformations in order to achieve professionalism. Forster sums up these transformations under four ideal types of military model:

(1) Expeditionary Warfare,

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[45] Michael C. Horowitz & Shira Pindyck, "What is a military innovation and why it matters", *Journal of Strategic Studies*,(2022) DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2022.2038572
[46] Ibid, 15.
[47] Ibid, 23.
[48] Anthony Forster, *Armed Forces and Society in Europe*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 2-4.

(2) Territorial Defence,

(3) Late Modern,

(4) Post-Neutral.[49]

Forster also mentions the September 2001 attacks as a source of transformation of the military force structure and mission definition. Now the contemporary security environment requires combined war-fighting and new measures for internal and external security against non-state actors or other terrorist organizations.[50]

2.3. School of Thoughts in Military Change Studies

We have argued that it is difficult to adequately explain military change studies using theories of international relations. This is understandable given that research on military innovation is more relatively new than that in other social sciences. Numerous research and experts have made an effort to contextualise and explain military change since Barry Posen's book since 1984. One of the latest and probably the most important work in the field belongs to Adam Grissom. As he explains what military innovation is according to the current studies; he also sorts them out under four schools:

(1) Civil-Military Model of Military Innovation,

(2) The Interservice Model of Military Innovation,

(3) The Intraservice Model of Military Innovation,

(4) The Cultural Model of Military Innovation.[51]

The Civil-Military Model consists of Posen's explanation that highlights the importance of civilian interference and collaboration to innovate.[52] To support his views, Grissom includes several examples from other experts for the civil-military model. The introduction of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) program by the United States Air Force (USAF), according to Edmund Beard was a direct order by the Eisenhower

[49] Ibid, 44-67.
[50] Ibid, 41.
[51] Adam Grissom, "The Future of Military Innovation Studies", *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 29, (2006), 905-934 https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390600901067.
[52] Ibid, 908-910.

administration which enabled the USAF to shift from manned bombers to missile systems.[53]

Maximizing the interests of a certain service via expanding influence or dominating the budget allocation is the core of the Interservice Model. The competition between the services for the power of influence or getting a bigger share from the state budget allows services to innovate. For example, the US Army was not satisfied with the USAF's hegemony over the close air support platforms. To overcome that issue the Army developed its own attack helicopters which paved the way for the Army Aviation and ultimately the creation of AH-64 Apache attack helicopters.[54]

The intraservice model explains the military innovation with the competition of different military branches that are under the same service. This model aims to explain the military innovation in regards of the competition of the branches that are in the same service. As a result of this competition, innovation occurs.[55]

The cultural model is what Farrell brought to the field; in this model innovation is the result of culture. Whether it was planned or was the outcome of an external shock.[56] Grissom deduces that these four schools promote a "top-down innovation" process. Top-down innovation is based on the presumption that military organization is driven to innovate by their leaders in the light of these four schools.[57] Finally, Grissom challenges this idea and uses historical and contemporary cases for bottom-up innovation and paves the way for further studies in this area.

[53] Ibid 909.
[54] Ibid, 912.
[55] Ibid, 913-6.
[56] Ibid, 916.
[57] Ibid, 919-20.

3. MILITARY CHANGE AFTER THE COLD WAR

The results of Cold War manifested themselves in different spheres of the society. Long lasting military build-up and constant tension between the Eastern and Western blocs were not there anymore in terms of military competition. This new international system imposed inevitable changes upon military organizations as well as other state institutes. Christopher Dandeker labeled this new reality -which was free from the Communist threat but more fragile and uncertain than the Cold War period- as "New Times".[58] Just as there is no consensus on why militaries change, there is also no consensus on how to name the wars and the militaries that emerged with the changes brought by the "New Times". However, there are similarities that scholars agree on, too: 1)International system is more turbulent than ever, 2)Threats root from subnational violence (based on ethnic, religious, identity problems) thus the militaries and governments are mostly involved in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, 3)Militaries are now smaller in size but specialized and more professional in terms of conducting various missions, 4)Military operations are now conducted under the jurisdiction or approval of international organizations rather than nation states. 5)Civilian intervention to the military decision-making process and defense industry are now more observable. [59]

The turbulent and uncertain environment in the international system forced a new type of military organizations and force structures. Post-Cold War environment had its unique challenges for governments. While the large standing military was not necessary anymore the uncertain challenges of the era demanded qualified and professional military personnel. Reducing the number of personnel may appear simple, but when specific military personnel were discharged, organization also lost essential experience and know-

[58] Christopher Dandeker, "New Times for the Military: Some Sociological Remarks on the Changing Role and Structure of the Armed Forces of the Advanced Societies", *The British Journal of Sociology* Vol. 45, No. 4 (December 1994), 637-654.

[59] Dandeker 639-42; Charles Moskos , Williams J.A, Segal D.R *"The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War"* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p 2,15; Mary Kaldor, *New&Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012), 96; Anthony King, *Transformation of Europe's Armed Forces: From Rhine to Afghanistan*, (Cambridge University Press, New York 2003), 33.

how; this increased acquisition of military technology and civilian and non-citizen employment in the military, privatization of military missons etc.[60]

Due to globalization and democratization of communication and information technologies (IT) regional problems echoed in the international arena which empowered the human rights activists to pressure their governments to act up against regional conflicts that are away from the homeland. Reduced manpower and budget, cost of starting and sustaining a military campaign alone prevented nation-states to act alone in these types of situations. Because of the burden sharing and legitimization of the intervention with international law, international reaction (Peacekeeping operations or humanitarian assistance under United Nations decisions) to regional problems has become a go-to option for the governments.

Military types had to change due to this new strategic environment, threats, and missions. Charles Moskos and Anthony Forster are two scholars whose research on this topic stands out the most. Moskos et al classifies militaries based on eleven variables in a threefold typology. Modern, late-modern, post-modern is the triumvirate of Moskos and (1) Threat perception, (2) force structure, (3) major mission definition, (4) dominant military professional, (5) public attitude toward military, (6) media relations, (7) civilian employees, (8) women's role, (9) spouse and military, (10) homosexuals in military, (11) conscientious objection are the variables.[61] Modern military defined as a force consisting conscripted lower ranks and professionals on senior levels, focused in warfighting. Modern military is the pre–Cold War military type. Late-modern military is traced back to end of the World War II, considered as a transition phase to the post-modern military. Increased professionalization of the militaries and professional military education is the most important indicator of Late-modern military. End of the Cold-War marks the inception of the post-modern phase in military organizations according to Moskos's study. Blurred distinction of civilian and military spheres, decreased differences in military based on roles, services and ranks, military missions other than warfighting

[60] Charles Moskos, "*Military Systems in the 21st Century: Changes and Continuities",* Defence Transformation in Europe: Evolving Military Roles (ed.) Timothy Edmunds and Marjan Malesic. (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2005), 21.
[61] Moskos (2000), 15

(peacekeeping, humanitarian operations etc.), military operations conducted under the direction of international organizations, and finally the internationalization of military forces themselves (military alliances such as NATO).[62] We should keep in mind that this classification emerged as a result of the study of mostly Western armies. Specifically, Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, South Africa, The United Kingdom, and The United States of America.

3.1. Typology of Post-Cold War Militaries

Anthony Forster unlike Moskos, examined the European Militaries under the scope of professionalization and warfare types. Forster classified army types under four headings in the light of his study. Forster claims that even though these classifications do not appear to be as precise as portrayed, they nonetheless aid policymakers in their decisions about the professionalisation of the military.[63] Following sections explain Forster's typology of post-cold war militaries.

3.1.1. Expeditionary Model

In this type, armed forces tasked with missions outside the state borders in a fashion promoting joint and combined warfare. Expeditionary model relies on professional military personnel in order to execute certain missions since conscripts might not be eligible to perform these missions due to their lack of technical literacy and training. Military transformation with no certain limits is the core of this model. Armed forces are expected to perform and execute a variety of missions in the combat spectrum from low to high intensity missions. Due to the high tempo of military operations, promotions are determined by the operational experience of individuals and without adequate funding expeditionary warfare places additional burden on the state budget. [64]

3.1.2. Territorial Defence Model

This model allows militaries to perform defence operations within the state borders as well as limited international missions outside the state borders. Missions within the state are mainly defence against land invasions and air strikes. Force structure therefore

[62] Ibid, 1-3
[63] Forster (2006), 44.
[64] Forster (2006), 44, 53.

composed of heavy armored formations. The scale of the armed forces makes a broad, comprehensive change expensive. Therefore, transformation is limited to modernization of certain services, branches, troops etc. Monetary restrictions, relying on a single military service rather than a joint approach for territorial defence missions and carrying on the Cold War legacy in military education are the predicament of this model.[65]

3.1.3. Late Modern Model

Late modern model allows a duality of committing both territorial defence and international operations. Unlike the previous Territorial Defence model, in Late Modern model armed forces can contribute notably to a higher degree. In that case their warfighting is limited compared to Expeditionary Model. Transformation of the forces are limited to units that can conduct joint and combined operations with expeditionary forces. Allocating budget, manpower and resources between domestic and international missions are one of the three challenges of Late Modern model. Second, is the decreasing trend in defence expenditures. Third is the product of the former two, the problem of where to allocate the budget, on international missions or territorial defence. [66]

3.1.4. Post-Neutral Model

Post neutral model defines primary objective of the armed forces as national defence. Force structure relies on lightly armed ground forces differing from the Territorial Defence model. Mass mobilization is the key in times of crisis. Being smaller in force size limits the involvement of international missions. Military transformation is limited to modernization. Post Neutral model problems are identified as the high value placed upon the peacetime military which generally lacks operational expertise, while the recruitment relies on conscription, professional military education is better than other models in terms of quality. Finally, pressure on the government and military to increase their ability to engage in combined-joint military operations with other states to support peace operations.[67]

[65] Ibid 46, 56.
[66] Ibid, 46-7, 62.
[67] Ibid, (2006) 47,65-7

3.2. Revolution in Military Affairs

The Cold War at its peak witnessed maybe one of the most argued yet accepted theories of military history. During the 1960s Soviet military scholars and staff officers began to write about the potential effects of scientific progress on warfare.[68] By the 1970s Soviets began to understand the importance of precision guided missiles (PGMs), micro-electronic surveillance, reconnaissance, command and control systems during the Vietnam War.*[69] Findings of Soviet writers about the potential of long range missiles, PGMs, surveillance, computer -technical advancements in short- were collected by Soviet Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov under the title of "Military Technical Revolution." [70] Soviets proclaimed that the discontinuities in history dictate the revolutions, MTR in that sense is the product of the discontinuities in military technical advancements.[71] To them, new technologies in this field would disrupt the usual character of warfare at that time therefore resulting in a revolution.

Due to the budgetary restrictions and bureaucratic inertia Ogarkov's findings could not be utilized under the Soviet regime. Irony of fate the Americans have already been following these studies. It was later figured out by the Americans that the Soviets studied MTR in a limited framework and understanding; technological advances and ground warfare were Soviets' core study fields.[72] American studies later revealed that the revolution cannot be limited to a single determinant that is technology[73]; military systems evolution, operational innovation and organizational adaptation are other components of

[68] Andrew Krepinevich, Barry Watts, *The Last Warrior*, (New York:Basic Books, 2014.), 194.
*PGMs were fest used in Vietnam War even though they were pretty primitive compared to the ones in Gulf War.
[69] Andrew Krepinevich, *Military Technical Revolution: A Preliminary Assessment*, (Washington:Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment 2002), 8 ,https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/2002.10.02-Military-Technical-Revolution.pdf [Accessed: 19.12.2021]
[70] Elinor Sloan, *Revolution in Military Affairs Implications for Canada and NATO*. (London: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002), 26.
[71]Steven Metz, "America's Defense Transformation: A Conceptual and Political History", *Defence Studies*, Volume 6, Issue 1, 1-25(2006): 3, DOI: 10.1080/14702430600838511
[72] Eliot Cohen, "A Revolution in Warfare", *Foreign Affairs(*Mar/Apr 1996), 39.
[73] Adamsky (2010), 1.

a military revolution.[74] Thus MTR renamed as Revolution in Military Affairs by Andrew Krepinevich in 1993.[75]

While the Soviet's General Staff were consisted of the intellectual elite, US' Joint Chiefs of Staff were tasked with budgetary and personnel planning. That was why the Soviets were ahead of their rivals in theorizing the Revolution.[76] That being said, American human resources and the cultural acceptance of innovation allowed them to articulate technological advancements into organizational and doctrinal change. Dominating the information and Information technology, automated reconnaissance, long ranged precision guided missiles, increased joint and combined warfare capability, just a few outcomes of the American RMA. Neither theoretical knowledge nor the technological advancements are not sufficient to achieve a revolution. Revolution requires revolutionaries and revolutionaries need their way removed from the obstacles. Hence Rosen stresses the importance of promotion pathways in military innovation.

It is accepted that the American RMA made its debut in 1991 Gulf War. Saddam Hussein led the invasion army into Kuwait in 1990 claiming Kuwait has been exceeding the petrol producing quotas. US led UN coalition responded to the invasion with military force. Stealth fighters dropping PGMs and Navy striking with Tomahawk cruise missiles destroyed the Iraqi resistance and military facilities.[77] After the aerial bombardment land phase of the war lasted only 100-hours. The swift military victory of the coalition forces shook the world. On the other hand, we should keep in mind that the coalition forces vastly outnumbered their Iraqi counterparts[78] in size, more skilled[79] and experienced in operational terms compared to Iraqis. One way or another the coalition beat the Iraqi military with minimum casualties and collateral damage[80]. This was the first battle experience of the American RMA. Precision guided bombs were consisting 8.8% of the

[74] Krepinevich (1992), 3.
[75] Krepinevich, Watts (2014), 211.
[76] Adamsky (2010), 132.
[77] Krepinevich, Watts, 198.
[78] Eliot Cohen, 40.
[79] Elinor Sloan, 30.
[80] Needless Deaths in the Gulf War: Civilian Casualties During the Air Campaign and Violations of the Laws of War, *Human Rights Watch Report*, (New York:1991), 18. https://www.hrw.org/reports/pdfs/u/us/us.91o/us910full.pdf [Accessed: 22.12.2021]

bombs that were dropped from the coalition forces with a 91% accuracy rate.[81] Following years were not absent from military conflicts. Kosovo Intervention, followed by Afghanistan and Iraq invasion as a retaliation to 9/11 attacks proved the capabilities and potentials of American RMA which includes the use of PGMs, automated command, control, communications, computing, and intelligence (C4I), special operations forces (SOFs) etc.[82] Surely RMA reduces the fog of war, but it is unable to remove it completely. Kosovo Intervention for instance witnessed the bombing of Chinese Embassy with Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM)[83] believing it was Yugoslavian Army supply center leaving 3 killed and 20 injured.[84]

One fact should be kept in mind is that the American RMA has been tailored to the American needs. Having two shores to the oceans and being away from Europe and Euroasia, relatively smaller population compared to land compelles US to offset its enemies in terms quality rather than quantity. Therefore, the US military have to achieve more with smaller, fast deployable and self-sustainable forces that can conduct joint operations[85] rather than large forces and mass mobilization. Thus, RMA is inseparable from geography and geopolitics, culture, and manpower[86]. Simply copying the US approach would not make the ends meet.

War, in the end, is a two-sided action. While the US and Western militaries adopted new technologies, doctrines and other developments brought by the RMA, countermeasures have taken by their opponents. These counter measures come in a variety of ways. For instance, Anti Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities employed by China, production of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) including Nuclear, Biological and Chemical weapons by Iraq, North Korea and Iran[87], building primitive or complex underground

[81] Ibid, 5.
[82] Elinor Sloan, *Military Transformation and Modern Warfare: A Reference Handbook*. (London: Westport, 2008), 4-5.
[83] JDAM is a guidance kit which converts conventional bombs into PGMs.
[84] Clinton Apologizes to China over Embassy Bombing May 10, 1999 http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9905/10/kosovo.china.02/ [Accessed: 22.12.2021]
[85] Metz S.,(2006), 10.
[86] Cohen E.(2004), 395-8.
[87] Ibid,402

tunnels[88] for concealment and transportation, employing asymmetric threats by terrorist organizations.

3.3. Forerunners in Western Military Change Movements

We have outlined the main schools of thought, terminology, and currents of discussion in military change studies in earlier chapters. Through case studies, we shall analyze military change studies in this part. Notable post-Cold War Western armies are among these instances (USA, UK, France). These nations were not, of course, picked at random. While the UK aims to have an army that was continually reducing in size but also can cooperate with the USA at the highest level. The USA, which survived the Cold War and actively spearheaded the change of other militaries, and France, on the other hand, placed more importance on their land forces and removed conscription later than its contemporaries. The similarities between the three nations are that, in comparison to their contemporaries, they are engaged in both regular military operations and the global war on terrorism, place a high priority on defence spending, and are not resistant to change. Whether to meet specific strategic objectives, or changes prompted by the United States.

Naturally, these three nations might not offer a sizable enough sample size to adequately account for all military change studies, but we don't intend to do that, anyway. These three nations were chosen for the three reasons listed above. Our goal is to establish a reference point which we can draw comparisons regarding the change of the Chinese military within the context of these factors and nations.

3.3.1. United States Military after the Cold War

General Powell in late 1980s foresaw threats emitting from the USSR would decrease due to their military budget cuts and the Union would transform to a federation.[89] Years of rivalry with the USSR kept the US military well-funded and equipped. Diminishing Soviet threat during the late 1980s and increasing regional conflicts forced him to study on the future of the US military. To Powell, declining budgets and decreasing Soviet threat combined with constant manpower and missions would be problematic and create

[88] Krepinevich (1992), 12.
[89] Lorna Jaffe, *The Development of the Base Force 1989-1992*, (Joint History Office, Office Of The Chairman of The Joint Chiefs of Staff:1993), 14.

vulnerabilities. As the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell came up with a long-studied proposal to reduce the manpower accordingly with the budget. His proposal included reducing the Army's 18-division force to 10-12 division, Navy's 551 ships (15 carriers included) to 400 ships (12 carriers), Marine Corps's active personnel of 197,000 to 125,000-150,000.[90] According to this proposal manpower would be reduced by 480,000. History proved him right, at least partially. USSR dissolved in 1991 leaving the United States became the only superpower left from the Cold War. After losing their "best enemy"* in 1991 budget reductions and restrictions became inevitable. Chairman Powell in this strategic environment he brought another proposal -which was similar to the first study but reconfigured accordingly to the international environment and made more appealing in order to overcome the bureaucratic ineratia that called "Base Force". Base Force was projected to be achieved by Fiscal Year (FY)1995 with several changes. The proposal and the result can be seen below.

Table 3.1: Proposed Force Structure for Base Force and the Result.

Service	***Proposed division/wing team/ship (Active/Reserve)***	***Minimum Force Required****	***Result (Active/Reserve)***	***Estimated Base Force FY 1995***
Army	12/8	560,000	12/6	535,000
Navy	450/12	490,000	451/12	509,700
Marine Corps	150,000/38,000	160,000	170,600	170,600
Air Force	16/12	490,000	15/11	437,200

Lorna Jaffe, *The Development of the Base Force 1989-1992,* (Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:1993), 21.

Uncertainty and budget cuts continued in the following years and administrations. "Report on the Bottom up Review" (BUR) released in 1993 in order to understand the current environment and provide recommendations for future to reduce these uncertainties and cope with the budget cuts. Threat perception has shifted from state-based threats to threats emitting from regional conflicts and the proliferation of Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Weapons (NBCs) by hostile regional powers (Iraq, North Korea).[91]

[90] Ibid, 14-5.
[91] Les Aspin, "Report on the Bottom-Up Review." (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Defense : 1993).

While Powell's proposals did not put any specific emphasis on technology, BUR highlights the importance of employing "weapons technology" to the weapon systems. Information technologies which are the backbone of RMA and battlespace awareness, were mentioned as support systems to the weapon technology even though the report was written after the Gulf War. Finally, the report envisions the force structure below to reach by 2000 in order to fight and win two major regional conflicts (MRCs)[92]:

Table 3.2: US Military Force Structure to Reach by 2000

Services	Force Structure
Army	10 divisions (active) 5+ divisions (reserve)
Navy	11 carriers (active) 1 carrier (reserve/training 45-55 attack submarines 346 ships
Air Force	13 fighter wings (active) 7 fighter wings (reserve) 184 bombers
Marine Corps	3 Marine Expeditionary Forces 174,000 (active personnel) 42,000 (reserve personnel)
Strategic Nuclear Forces (by 2003)	18 ballistic missile submarines 94 B-52H bombers 20 B-2 bombers 500 Minuteman III ICBMs (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles)

Aspin Les, "Report on the Bottom-Up Review." (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Defense : 1993), 28.

Released in 1996, Joint Vision 2010 (JV-2010) is notably one of the most important strategic documents related to RMA and force transformation in the US military. JV-2010 aims to exploit the information technologies to create joint force to overcome the uncertainties of battlefield, budget cuts and reduced personnel numbers.[93] The Joint Force aims to achieve "Full Spectrum Dominance" via four concepts that are:

[92] Bottom Up Review(1993), 28.
[93] Joint Vision 2010, (Office of Joint Chiefs of Staff: July 1996) https://www.airforcemag.com/PDF/DocumentFile/Documents/2005/jv_2010_071696.pdf [Accessed: 14.01.2022]

(1) Dominant Maneuver,

(2) Precision Engagement,

(3) Focused Logistics,

(4) Full-Dimensional Protection.[94]

Following that year "Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review 1997" released by the Department of Defense. The report has continuities from BUR as well as changes. First of all, "regional dangers" now includes Iraq's and Iran's hostile actions in Southwest Asia and their hegemony on the oil fields that possess danger to the US's accession to oil. Globalization, a much-celebrated trend, is now beginning to be mentioned with a dangerous consequence which is the exploitation of sensitive technology and information by terrorist organizations. In addition to that the term "failing states" is on the document too. Considering the Black Hawk Down incident in the Battle of Mogadishu in 1993 it is not a surprise that the Secretary Cohen mentions Somalia exclusively. [95] When it comes to the state competition, China's military modernization does get the attention of the Review. While China's action was not labelled as hostile or dangerous it is important that it was mentioned with Russia as the potential global competitors.[96] RMA and Information Technologies have distinct mentions in the document unlike BUR 1993 in which IT was mentioned as support systems to the weapon technology. In the scope of JV-2010's primary goal of achieving full spectrum dominance, IT is now more important than ever. Developing command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities requires intense use of information technologies which is labelled as the backbone of the modernization of the US military.[97] The QDR 1997 retains the capability of fighting and winning two major conflicts simultaneously. To deter enemies, and fight wars QDR proposes changes given below in force structure

[94] Ibid, 20-24.
[95] William Cohen, "Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review", (Department of Defense: 1997), 3-4. https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/quadrennial/QDR1997.pdf?ver=2014-06-25-110930-527 Accessed: [15.01.2022]
[96] Ibid, 5.
[97] Ibid, vii, 39.

and manpower reducing the manpower to 1,360,000 active and 835,000 reserve personnel.[98]

Table 3.3: Quadrennial Defense Review 1997's Proposed Force Structure

SERVICES	**Programmed Force**		**QDR**
	FY 1997	**FY 2003**	
ARMY			
• Active Divisions	10	10	10
• Reserve Personnel	582,000	575,000	530,000
NAVY			
• Carriers (Active/Reserve)	11/1	11/1	11/1
• Air Wings (Active/Reserve)	10/1	10/1	10/1
• Amphibious Ready Groups	12	12	12
• Attack Submarines	73	52	50
• Surface Combatants	128	131	116
AIR FORCE			
• Active Fighter Wings	13	13	12+
• Reserve Fighter Wings	7	7	8
• Reserve Air Defense Squadrons	10	6	4
• Bombers	202	187	187
MARINE CORPS			
• Marine Expeditionary Forces	3	3	3

William Cohen, "Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review", (Department of Defense: 1997), https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/quadrennial/QDR1997.pdf?ver=2014-06-25-110930-527 Accessed: [15.01.2022], 30

In sum QDR 1997's most prominent feature is that it highlights the importance of RMA and IT to achieve full spectrum dominance, keeps reducing the troops from services and recognizing China as a possible rival; at the same time acknowledging the importance of accessing the oil free from any regional conflict and hostile regime.

Years of decrease in defense budget and force reductions resulted with the most violent attack on the US soil in 2001. On September 11 World Trade Center and Pentagon were hit by three commercial planes hijacked by Al-Qaeda terrorists. The fourth plane crashed in an open field in Pennsylvania. Attacks claimed nearly 3,000 lives. Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review 2001 was waiting to be released when the attacks did occur. Therefore, the review puts emphasis on homeland security without pointing any specific threat. The US military has been tasked with defending the Nation from all enemies.[99]

[98] Ibid, v- vii.
[99] Donald Rumsfeld, "Report on the Quadrennial Defense Review" (Department of Defense: 2001), 18. https://www.comw.org/qdr/qdr2001.pdf [Accessed: 06.05.2022]

This situation has been explained on the first pages on the review. Defense planning model has been shifted from "threat-based" model to "capabilities based" model.[100] This model focuses on the strengths and vulnerabilities of the military therefore the Nation's. This approach provides an overview on the existing state of the defense planning. On the other hand the Review shows a strong determination to military transformation and joint force unlike previous reviews. Donald Rumsfeld was an ambitious advocate for military transformation. His appointment as secretary of defence by President George W. Bush was not unexpected. In his speech to Pentagon employees a day before the attacks on September 10th 2001, Rumsfeld stated that the adversary was the Pentagon bureaucracy and he wanted to "liberate it *[from itself"]*.[101] He put new ways of thinking and new ways of fighting, not technology, at the center of military transformation.[102] With his initiative, Office of Force Transformation established with Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski appointed as the chairman.[103] Arthur Cebrowski is famous for his study "Network Centric Warfare". Network Centric Warfare based upon to decentralization of the flow of information in military organization and structure. Network centric approach takes the authority of information gathering from the ones from the ones on top of the hierarchical pyramid and gives it to the ones in the bottom. This allows sub-ordinates to adapt and overcome the obstacles faster and increases battlespace awareness. In terms of fighting Network Centric Warfare aims to increase the precision on targets thus degrade the opponents will to fight by dismantling their will to resist. [104]

[100] Ibid, iv.
[101] "Rumsfeld cuts Pentagon red tape" http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1536135.stm [Accessed: 16.01.2022]
[102] Donald Rumsfeld, "Transforming the Military", *Foreign Affairs*, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 3 (May - June, 2002), p. 21.
[103] Mark David Mandeles, *Military Transformation: Past And Present, Historical Lessons For the 21st Century*, (Connecticut: Praeger Security International: 2007), 3.
[104] James R. Blaker, *Transforming Military Force: The Legacy of Arthur Cebrowski and Network Centric Warfare*, (London: Praeger Security International: 2007), 48-59.



Figure 3.1: Transformational Shift in Command and Control Models

James R. Blaker, *Transforming Military Force: The Legacy of Arthur Cebrowski and Network Centric Warfare*, (London: Praeger Security International: 2007), 49.

Report on the Quadrennial Defense Review 2006 is a wartime report. By the time 2006 wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have already in their counter-insurgency (COIN) period. Thus defeating terrorism and homeland security are the main concerns of the military. As usual preventing terrorists and hostile nations from using WMDs continues to be a constant priority. Unlike the previous reports QDR 2006 proposes a significant 15% increase in Special Operations Forces (SOF), establishment of Marine Corps Special Operations Command (MARSOC), 33% increase in Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) and Civil Affairs (CA) units.[105] These increases are the results of the ongoing COIN phases. Due to irregular character of warfare that are being conducted both in Iraq and Afghanistan these increases are understandable. Another outcome of these wars is the creation of Joint IED (Improvised Explosive Device) Defeat Task Force. Task Force aims to eliminate the IED threat from the battlefield with the help of electronic warfare and surveillance. Result of these efforts was the decrease of IED casualty rate by a factor of two.[106] Finally, state rivalry once highlights the China's effort in military modernization. The Report claims that China's military build-up endangers the regional military balances.[107]

While fight against terrorism, Al-Qaeda and Taliban remains the highest priority in QDR 2014, China's military modernization and long-range missile programs, electronic

[105] Donald Rumsfeld, "Report on the Quadrennial Defense Review" (Department of Defense: 2006), 5.
[106] Ibid, 64.
[107] Ibid, 29.

warfare and other military capabilities also labels it as a state of interest.[108] Since the Wars have now far past the invasion phase, the Report mentions other threats ranging from asymmetric threats from the non-state or terrorist organizations to WMDs or A2/AD capabilities of state powers.[109] Also the report was released after the killing of Osama bin Laden* founding leader of Al-Qaeda, therefore objectives other than war on terror took place on the Report.

National Security Strategy (NSS) 2017 and National Defense Strategy (NDS) 2018 differs from the previous NSS and QDR papers. While Iran and North Korea remains as rogue states China and Russia are being mentioned as current challengers against the American power and influence.[110]

2018 National Defense Strategy mostly puts emphasis on state competition rather than non-state actors. China's military actions in the South China Sea and economic opportunism makes it enough to label as a strategic competitor[111]. United States' reliance on space assets (whether for military or civilian purposes) is visible on every strategic paper. Advanced C4ISR capabilities of the US makes space even more important. Because of the increasing capabilities of near-peer competitors in space, on 20 December 2019 President Trump signed the National Defense Authorization Act into law to allow the establishment of United States Space Force[112]. It is clear that the US decision makers -both military and political- came to a conclusion that China will be their long-term strategic rival. It is even more obvious on the "Interim National Security Strategic Guidance" that was released in March 2021. China was especially noted as the only competitor potentially capable of combining its instruments of national power.[113]

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[108] Robert Gates, "Report on the Quadrennial Defense Review" (U.S. Department of Defense:2010). 31, 60. https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/quadrennial/QDR2010.pdf?ver=vVJYRVwNdnGb_00ixF0UfQ%3d%3d [Accessed: 07.02.2022]

[109] Ibid, vii.

*Killed on 02.05.2011.

[110]Donald J. Trump, *National Security Strategy 2017* https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf , 2. [Accessed: 08.02.2022]

[111] James N. Mattis, National Defense Strategy https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf , 1 [Accessed: 08.02.2022]

[112] United States Space Force History https://www.spaceforce.mil/About-Us/About-Space-Force/History/ [Accessed: 08.02.2022]

[113] Biden J, *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance*, (Washington D.C: 2021), p 7.

US military throughout the post-Cold War era has been in a constant change. These changes include budget changes (both decreases and increases), re-organization and restructuring of the military and defense institutions, changes in threat perception ranging from non-specific threats to hostile states and near peer competitors to pandemics.[114] The changes that the US military went through seems to be direct result of lack of a serious threat against the homeland and to American influence. Today the US military sits on a $768,2 billion budget in FY 2022.[115] Finally, active manpower and budget comparison since 1989 to 2021 and proposed manpower for FY 2022 is shown in the table below:

Table 3.4: Active Manpower and Budget Comparison Since 1989-2021.

Services	**FY 1989**[116]	**FY 2021**[117]	**FY 2022**[118]*
Army	769,741	482,000	485,000
Navy (Ships/Carriers)	592,652 (592/14)	347,256 (xxx/11)	346,200 (296/11)
Marines	196,956	178,934	178,500
Air Force	570,880	333,155	328,300
Total Manpower	2,157,224	1,341,345	1,338,000
Budget	**$322bn**	**$741bn**	**$770bn**

3.3.2. United Kingdom Military after Cold War

Ever since the Cold War ended, United Kingdom has been in a constant decrease in terms of manpower and budget. After the collapse of Warsaw Pact money and manpower became a burden on the governments shoulder. In the first decade after the Cold War, UK

[114] Ibid, 7-8.
[115] US Congress passes roughly $770 bn defense spending bill for FY2022 https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/us-congress-passes-roughly-770-bn-defense-spending-bill-for-fy2022-121121600071_1.html [Accessed: 23.01.2022]
[116] The Defense Manpower Data Center, Historical Reports FY 1954-1993, MILITARY PERSONNEL ON ACTIVE DUTY BY GRADE IN WHICH SERVING, Department of Defense https://dwp.dmdc.osd.mil/dwp/app/dod-data-reports/workforce-reports [Accessed 23.01.2022]
[117] The Defense Manpower Data Center, Armed Forces Strength Figures For November 30,2021 https://dwp.dmdc.osd.mil/dwp/app/dod-data-reports/workforce-reports [Accessed: 23.01.2022]
[118] Cancian M., *U.S. Military Forces in FY 2022 Peering into the Abyss: The Budget and Strategy Overview* https://www.csis.org/analysis/military-forces-fy-2022-peering-abyss-budget-and-strategy-overview [Accessed: 23.01.2022]
* Numbers rounded up to nearest hundred.

reduced their military spending by 23%.[119] Constant budget cuts and lessen number of military personnel ended up with an overstretched military with less manpower and funding with more missions to execute. These affected not only combat arms personnel but also the enablers.[120] UK's threat perception on strategic papers shifted from European theater to global terrorism and finally state-led threats. Strategic Defence Review (SDR) placed the European theater especially Balkans in the center of attention. Following US's footsteps in operation planning, UK Ministry of Defence acknowledged the importance of Joint Operations and they established a new Joint Rapid Reaction Forces (JRRF) to put it on a solid ground. SDR 1998, created a framework for the military that includes the expeditionary approach to threats and regions in crisis. Since there were not threats emitting from the Warsaw Pact, UK military tasked with going to the crisis.[121] This expeditionary approach became the fundamental reaction to the instabilities that may affect the UK's security. Force structure and military missions revised accordingly, too. Due to decreased state-led threats, Navy's missions shifted from open-ocean to littoral warfare, 5th Airborne Brigade of the Army converted into the 12th Mechanized Brigade in addition to that troops stationed in Germany were set to be removed back to Britain*, and Royal Air Force set to disband 17th Squadron in 1999 and the total amount of jets reduced to 154 from 177.[122]

After the 9/11 attacks in 2003 White Paper reiterated the importance of flexible and rapid deployable forces. Increasing joint operating capability and capacity of services is believed to be enhance the military effectiveness.[123] While international terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction takes the highest priorities in security challenges due to the ongoing Global War on Terror (GWOT) mainly in Afghanistan and Iraq, failing states also took place in the paper. Changes in manpower, decreases in UK's case, were comprehensively explained in 2004 with an updated version of the Paper. A

[119] Robertson G., Strat*egic Defence Review* (Ministry of Defence, London: 1998), Ch1 Para 11.
[120] United Kingdom House of Commons Defence Committee, "A New Chapter to the Strategic Defence Review" (London:2003), 46.
[121] *Strategic Defence Review 1998*, Introduction para 6.
[122] Mark Oakes, Tom Dodd, *Research Paper 98/91 The Strategic Defence Review White Paper,* (House of Commons Library, London: 1998) 36.
[123] United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, "Delivering Security In a Changing World: Defence White Paper" (London:2003), 2.

1,500 decrease in Navy, 1,000 in Army, 7,500 in Air Force is set to be achieved by 2008. Apart from the manpower another 10,000 civilian personnel will be reduced from the MoD. [124]

Table 3.5: MoD Planned Manpower to be Achieved by 2008

Services	Manpower in 2008
Army	102,000
Navy	36,000
Air Force	41,000

United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, *Delivering Security in a Changing World: Future Capabilities*, (London:2004), 12.

In 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR 2010), military capabilities were planned to meet demanding limited scenarios.

> *"A stabilization operation with naval and air support at brigade level while one non-enduring complex intervention or one non enduring simple intervention."*[125]

These scenarios create the basis of "Future Force 2020" which is the most prominent project of the UK for military modernization to increase the readiness of the forces. Future Force 2020 envisions 17,000 deductions from the services by 2015.[126] We see that most of the military change happened in UK resulted in reductions in manpower. In the scope of the Integrated Review 2021 British Army prepared its own transformation plan "Future Soldier". Future Soldier plan aims to deliver a modernized division by 2030.[127] One of the aspects that stand out in the plan compared to other official papers and reviews, is the impact of climate change on the operational level. Land Special Operations capability was also increased with establishment of the new Army Special Operations Brigade.[128]

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[124] United Kingdom Ministry of Defence *Delivering Security in a Changing World: Future Capabilities*, (London:2004) 12.
*Withdrawal was completed on February 2020 *"British Army Hands Back last Headquarters in Germany"* https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/feb/22/british-army-hands-back-last-headquarters-germany [Accessed: 10.02.2022]

[125] United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, *Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review*, (London:2010), 20.

[126] Ibid, 20-32. See also Future Force 2020 Fact Sheet Future Force 2020 Fact Sheet https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/62487/Factsheet5-Future-Force-2020.pdf [Accessed: 10.02.2022]

[127] The British Army Future Soldier Guide https://www.army.mod.uk/media/15057/adr010310-futuresoldierguide_30nov.pdf [Accessed: 10.02.2022]

[128] Future Soldier Guide, 5,17.

Even though the UK is said to have the most inter-operable military with the United States military[129], it is debatable that whether these reductions affected this in a positive way. Hence Prime Minister Boris Johnson announced £16.5bn additional defence spending in 2020, ending a long-lasted budget cut since end of the Cold War.[130]

3.3.3. French Military after the Cold War

After the Cold War, requirement for conscript-based-military started to be questioned and criticized by the French population, yet it was the Gulf War that proved French decision-makers to establish a more competent expeditionary force. France, contributed around 15,000* troops to the Alliance while Britain sent more than 30,000 troops to the War.[131] Since the conscripts could not be deployed overseas without the approval of the Parliament[132], solution to that came from President Chirac in 1996 when he declared the end of conscription and the transition to an All-Volunteer-Force(AVF).[133] Considering the previous debates about conscription, this statement was expected to be a subject to great controversy; and yet it did not happen.[134] The conscripts were doing all sorts of jobs in the military during their area. This relatively cheap human power was set to be replaced with a more expensive professional force which required changes in recruitment, doctrine, and training. Also France's ambition to retain its nuclear capability and seize the leadership of Europe did not seem possible with conscripts who lacked the technical literacy in modern technologies.[135] 1994 Livre Blanc's (LB) highlighted the uncertainty of the international system, return of national and ethnic fanaticism, proliferation of NBC

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[129] Gordon Adams, Guy Ben-Ari, *Transforming European Militaries Coalition Operations and the Technology Gap*, (Routledge, Taylor& Francis Group: New york, 2006), 12.
[130] "Defence funding boost 'extends British influence', says PM" https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-54988870 [Accessed:10.02.2022]
*Number varies from 12,000 to 15,000
[131] Bernard Boëne, Michel L. Martin, "France: In the Throes of Epoch-Making Change" *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War*., (ed) C. Moskos, J.A. Williams, D. R. Segal, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.), 55.
[132] George A. Bloch, "French Military Reform: Lessons for America's Army?," *Parameters* 30, no. 2 (2000), 34. https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol30/iss2/1 [Accessed: 20.02.2022]
[133]Chirac Lays Out Radical Plan To Reorganize French Military https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1996/02/23/chirac-lays-out-radical-plan-to-reorganize-french-military/6b8a6118-eed9-4d5c-bbbe-beb8bcb4686d/ [Accessed:20.02.2022]
[134] Ronald Tiersky, "French Military Reforms and Strategy", *Strategic Forum*, No.94, 1996, 5.
[135] Sylvain Daffix et al, Transition to an "All-Volunteer Force The French Experience", *Service to Country: Personnel Policy and the Transformation of Western Militaries*, (ed.) Curtis Gilroy, Cindy Williams, (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2006.), 313.

and other non-state actors or events as the new threats.[136] Which was seen in other examined states' strategic documents. Chirac's plan aimed to professionalize the military by 2002 which was achieved as it was planned. Manpower was reduced from 571,000 to 416,000 including civilians in the military.[137]

2008 Livre Blanc puts jihadism inspired terrorism as the main threat. Idea of making Europe a stand-alone military and politic power remains as their priority continuing since General De Gaulle. Cyber-attacks, narco-trafficking, health risks and natural disasters are acknowledged as the new vulnerabilities on the document. To confront these challenges, support GWOT and chase the ambitious idea of making Europe an effective player in international system, France plans to develop an intervention force with 60,000 soldiers within the army. An aircraft carrier-group for navy and 300 joint-combat aircraft. The importance that France give to Space can be also tracked in the document with the establishment of The Joint Forces Space Command under the Ministry of Defence.[138] Their commitment to these decisions were represented in the Afghanistan when the French forces took-over the control of Kapisa and Surobi districts.[139] 2008 LB proposed a 54,000 personnel reduction across all forces.[140] Conscription before, after force reductions and budget cuts pushed France to rely on cooperation with other states and burden sharing. British-French defence cooperation is an example of this burden sharing. Treaty includes joint exercises, research and development, cooperation between defence industries, deploying and employing forces by demand etc.[141]

To conclude the Post-Cold War environment pushed France to increase its expeditionary and joint warfare, improve their interoperability capability with allies, and professionalization of the military to adapt to NCW. Today France has a military with a half size of what they had in 1989. More than thirty years passed since the end of the Cold

[136] Boene B., 53.
[137] Sylvain Daffix, 316.
[138] The French White Paper on defence and national security, French Presidency 2008. http://archives.livreblancdefenseetsecurite.gouv.fr/2008/IMG/pdf/white_paper_press_kit.pdf [Accessed: 22.02.2022]
[139] Remembering The French War In Afghanistan https://warontherocks.com/2018/09/remembering-the-french-war-in-afghanistan/ [Accessed: 22.02.2022]
[140] Stephen Larrabee et al., NATO and the Challenges of Austerity. (RAND Corporation, 2012), 19.
[141] Treaty between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic for Defence and Security Co-operation, 2010.

War. France now enjoys a half sized military back when they had during the Cold War and yet it is not the size of the military that matters nowadays, it is the capabilities. To increase their military influence and power, France invests in cyber and space domains while also fighting low-tech enemies in Sahel region. Thus, the French military is believed to be able to fight terrorism while also be ready to fight state adversaries.

Consequently, we can summarize the changes done to the militaries of the three states as follows. After the dissolution of the USSR, the US had to adapt to the declining budgets and a new security environment where it did not have a state adversary like the USSR anymore. Consequently, the military needed to be reorganised, and some troops had to be let go. After the Gulf War, the US military's adaptability to the new environment was enhanced by the release of BUR and JV-2010. The force structure, priority of the military services were explained in these reports. In the 1997 QDR, while the technological advances brought forward by these two documents formed the core of the document, China stood out as a potential competitor. After the 9/11 attacks in 2001, the United States has devoted most of its attention to war on terrorism. Defense planning model changed towards to capabilities based model and the command and control models evolved into what's called network centric model accordingly to the new needs of the US. Only when Osama bin Laden was dead and counter-insurgency operations slowed down was the USA free to concentrate on near peer rivalry once more. While al-Qaeda was still being mentioned in the QDR 2014, China's military prowess was the focus of the remaining sections of the report. The interstate conflict has been more prominent in official documents throughout time.

The United Kingdom military largely focused on the Balkans rather than Europe before turning its attention to the war on terror under the US' leadership. In 2010, it was attempted to categorise the military's capabilities as follows: "A stabilisation operation with naval and air assistance at brigade level while one non-enduring complex intervention or one non-enduring simple intervention."[142] The British army maintained its personnel reduction during the ensuing time. Future Force 2020 and Future Soldier studies were introduced in the years that followed in order to stay up with the times. The Army

[142] United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, *Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review*, (London:2010), 20.

Special Operations Brigade was also developed to boost the British army's requirement for special operations capacity in the land domain.

The fact that they were unable to send as many people to the Gulf War as they had anticipated was one of the main elements influencing the French army's change following the Cold War. The French army could not be dispatched overseas without the parliament's consent, according to the legislation. Conscription was first abolished, and the All-Volunteer Force was put into place as a result of this circumstance. The 1994 Livre Blanc underscored the need for the French military to adjust to the unpredictability of the international system in the next years. As we indicated in relation to other allied nations, GWOT dominated France's agenda in the years that followed. To this purpose, France planned to establish a joint space force command, a carrier strike group, a 300-aircraft air force, and a 60,000-person intervention force in 2008. The French army has two key objectives right now: to continue fighting terrorism and to accept its leadership in Europe.

4. CHINESE MILITARY AFTER THE COLD WAR

We examined leading countries in the field of military change, how their military changed, what events were affected and how they were related to the theories mentioned at the beginning. The Chinese army was chosen to assess if theories and concepts that are typically employed to describe change movements in the military of world nations still hold true in a nation with a diverse administrative structure, culture, history, and geography. Of course, aside from their operational capacities, financial resources, and perceptions of threat, the three nations we previously analysed are not that dissimilar from one another in terms of their ambitions for similar goals in the western geographic region and their shared cultures. But China stands out as a nation that is runned by a party state differs from these three western nations in terms of administration, culture, and history. Our prediction is that China is able to adapt to changes and focus on new goals, largely at the behest of its leaders and bureaucrats. Following paragraphs aim to give brief information about the People's Republic of China's armed forces and its organizational structure right after the end of the Cold War.

Even though the People's Republic of China's (PRC) armed forces also include the People's Armed Police and the militia[143], this study exclusively focuses on the People's Liberation Army which is the armed wing of the ruling Communist Party of China (CPC). PLA services are the People's Liberation Army Army (PLAA), People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), and the branch of People's Liberation Army Second Artillery Force (PLASAF).* Unlike most nations around the world, PLA is not a national army but the ruling party's (CPC) armed wing. Therefore, the "*party controls the gun, not the other way around."*[144]

People's Liberation Army was established in 1927 and only consisted of a ground force. After World War II in 1949, PLA Navy and PLA Air Force were established for maritime and air domains. The Second Artillery Force, which is responsible for both conventional and nuclear missiles, was added to the force structure in 1966. The Central Military

[143] Peng Guangqian, Zhao Zhiyin, Luo Yong, *"China's National Defense"*, Cengage Learning Asia; 1st edition (August 1, 2010), 49.

* PLASAF was renamed PLA Rocket Force in 2016 and was promoted from a branch to a service, putting it on par with the other services.

[144] Mao Zedong Thought http://www.cdsndu.org/en/index.php/zgjswha/494.html [Accessed 23.04.2022]

Commission (CMC) is the military's highest body that is in charge of military affairs, operations, education, planning, responsible for doctrinal change, etc., and its chairman and members are elected by the National People's Congress (NPC). Military administrative affairs are organized by the General Departments: General Staff Department (GSD), General Armament Department (GAD), General Political Department (GPD), and General Logistics Department (GLD).[145] The CMC rules over the PLA through these departments. Apart from their primary duty, GDs also acts as the administrative body of the PLAA. The primary duty of the GSD is to organize and direct the armed forces and it also acts as the headquarters (HQ) of the PLAA. GAD is in charge of arms acquisition and general oversight of the military equipment while also conducting Research & Development for the PLAA equipment. GPD can be named as the indoctrination tool of CPC over the PLA, and finally, GLD controls the logistical duty and administers the budget. Other organs for military administration are the Military Area Commands or Military Regions (MRs, see Table 4.1 and Table 4.2). Seven different MRs are established to provide strategic or operational needs of the geography.[146] The PLA organizational chart is shown in table 5.1 below:



Figure 4.1 Pre-2015 Reforms PLA Organization Chart

Saunders, Wuthnow J., "Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA", Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms. ed. Philip Saunders, Arthur Ding, Andrew

[145] White Paper on China's National Defense in 2002 http://en.people.cn/features/ndpaper2002/nd.html [Accessed 23.04.2022]

[146]China Publishes a White Paper on National Defense (2006) http://www.china.org.cn/english/China/194332.htm [Accessed: 06.06.2022]

Scobell, Andrew Yang, Joel Wuthnow. Washington: National Defense University Press, 2019, p 6.

Figure 4.2: Seven Military Regions of the PRC

Blasko D., "*The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century"*, Routledge 2006, p 33.

After the Cold War PLA went through four downsizing period bringing down the size of the military to 2,000,000 including Xi's most recent reduction of 300,000.[147] There were several breakpoints for PRC during this period, these breakpoints and their effects on PLA are examined according to the periods of the leaders who ruled China after the Cold War.

4.1 Military Thoughts of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping

Until the 1990s PLA was operating within a certain framework that was set during Mao Zedong's and Deng Xiaoping's leadership. Mao's military thought aims to annihilate equal or superior enemies through an indigenous way of fighting.[148] Being the weaker side of the conflict, the Chinese military had to be mobile, flexible, and able to conduct guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines. Based on these requirements, Mao's strategic

[147]建国以来解放军历次体制编制调整改革 https://china-caixin-com.translate.goog/2015-11-27/100878949.html?_x_tr_sl=zh-CN&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=tr&_x_tr_pto=wapp Translated via Google Translate, [Accessed:23.04.2022], Premier Li: China has reduced army size by 300,000 http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2018-03/05/content_7959842.htm [Accessed: 02.06.2022]

[148] Andrew Scobell, *Chinese Army Building in the Era of Jiang Zemin*. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College August 2000), 9.

thought brought two guidelines: People's War and Active Defence. People's War is often and mistakenly equated to guerrilla warfare. People's War is a strategic thinking which is still valid to date. It is a people-centric approach that aims to confront an invasion force in the vast China mainland with a combination of regular forces with the militia and guerilla while getting support from the people in terms of logistics, equipment, or as a direct fighting force.[149] Active Defence is another concept that shapes the PRC's strategic thinking. It is the combination of enjoying the stronger form of war (defence) and pursuing offensive actions on the strategic level. Active Defence reflects the Marxist dialectical creed, the main principle is to stay in defence against offensive enemies while constantly employing offensive actions to annihilate the enemy.[150]

Deng Xiaoping era in PRC is important in terms of economic integration into the global market and opening to foreign investments. The Chinese military, like other components of the society, has had its share of these reforms. Economic and technological development is the core of Deng's thinking. It is also apparent in the "Four Modernizations" that were declared by him which aims to modernize agriculture, industry, science, technology, and finally military.[151] The logic behind Deng's approach was that as the Chinese economy grew and technological progress was achieved, the Chinese military would also be affected by these developments and would naturally modernize. Deng recognized and acknowledged that China's technological development was 20-30 years behind its contemporaries.[152] Modern warfare, to Deng, relies on scientific and technological advancement. People's War is still valid, and fighting with high-tech military gear is better than fighting without them.[153] Thus increased emphasis on science and technology would force the military to modernize; to invest more in these

[149]In Their Own Words: 2020 Science of Military Strategy, 29. https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Translations/2022-01-26%202020%20Science%20of%20Military%20Strategy.pdf [Accessed: 23.04.2022]
[150] Ibid, 31-32.
[151] David Shambaugh, *"China's Leaders: from Mao to now"*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2021), 188.
[152] Dennis J. Blasko, " 'Technology Determines Tactics': The Relationship between Technology and Doctrine in Chinese Military Thinking," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 34, no. 3 (2011): 355–81, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2011.574979. 361.
[153]Deng Xiaoping's Thinking on Military Building for a New Era http://www.cdsndu.org/en/index.php/zgjswha/780.html [Accessed: 23.04.2022]

areas Deng Xiaoping ordered a force reduction of a million personnel in 1985.[154] The most significant military disobedience that occurred in Deng's era -even though he was retired from his posts, he was still maintaining political power over the Party- was the Tiananmen Square protests where the government imposed martial law and mobilized PLA to end the anti-government protest. The CPC-PLA relations were damaged when certain units and commanders declined to employ lethal force against demonstrators. It was perceived as a major problem for "controlling the gun".

4.2. Jiang Zemin Era (1989)

Under Deng's shadow leadership over the party, Jiang Zemin became the CPC General Secretary in 1989. His leadership however was not absolute for a while since Deng Xiaoping was still the Chairman of the CMC and Yang Shangkun was the President. Even though Jiang Zemin soon became the Chairman of the CMC in 1989 Deng's strong influence on the Party and the PLA prevented him to act freely. As for the Yang brothers (Yang Shangkun as the President and his half-brother Yang Baibing as Political Commissar), they were again forced to leave their positions at Deng's initiative, and Jiang quickly changed the posts of Yang-associated officers and generals. Following the Yang purge, Jiang replaced around 300 generals and 1000 officers by 1994.[155] Unlike his predecessor, Jiang had no military experience except serving as the Vice-Chairman of CMC before, which meant it would be difficult to cooperate and assert authority upon the PLA. These efforts to establish his network were fruitful and by 1996 Jiang had his network.[156] PLA consisted of around 3,000,000 personnel (Table 4.3).

Table 4.1: Manpower of the PLA in FY 1992.

Service	**Manpower**
PLA Army	2,300,000
PLA Navy	260,000
PLA Air Force	470,000

[154] Anthony Cordesman, Steven Colley, "*Chinese Strategy and Military Modernization in 2015: A Comparative Analysis"* October 10, 2015, 166. https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/151010_Cordesman_Chinese_Mil_Bal_Full_Book_0.pdf [Accessed: 23.04.2022]
[155] Shambaugh (2021), 234-5.
[156] Ibid, 236.

Total	**3,030,000**

The Military Balance 1993, *East Asia and Australasia*, International Institute for Strategic Studies (London:Routledge, 1993), 152-155.

Jiang visited all seven Military Regions in an effort to immediately obtain expertise and support following his Chairmanship, and eventually promoted some of the officers he met during those tours.[157]

4.2.1 Reasons for Change During the Jiang Zemin Era

The relatively peaceful international environment ended with the start of the Gulf War in 1991 which showed the capabilities of network-centric warfare and the high technological character of war, especially in the command and control systems. Western RMA was showing his strength on the battlefield with all his stature. Advanced command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities of the US and other advanced militaries shook the PLA and proved to them how far they lagged behind the modern militaries. But it took two years for PRC to react and announce a new military strategy. The CPC-PLA relations were still shaky after the Tiananmen incident, to ensure party unity Deng retired his protégé, Yang Shangkun, from his authorities, and Baibing was stripped from his military duties.[158] This in turn created a better environment both for party unity and Jiang's leadership. Following the purge, Jiang Zemin replaced them with officers and generals loyal to him creating a rather safe political environment for his authority.[159] Then in 1993 finally, a new military" strategic guideline "Winning Local Wars under High Technology Conditions" (LWUHTC) was announced. "Local Wars" are generally interpreted as nearly every military conflict except a world war or a nuclear war.[160] High tech conditions are the reflection of the application of RMA, namely information and other technologies to the battlefield. Jiang had expressed that the new wars would be technology-intensive following that he ordered

[157] Alex Chopan (2002) A Table for Two: Jiang Zemin and the PLA, *"Journal of Contemporary China"*, 11:31, 281-296, DOI: 10.1080/10670560220129630, 285.
[158] Taylor Fravel, "Shifts in Warfare and Party Unity: Explaining China's Changes in Military Strategy." *International Security* 42, no. 3 (January 2018), 77.
[159] David Shambaugh, China's Military in Transition: Politics, Professionalism, Procurement and Power Projection, *The China Quarterly*, No. 146, Special Issue: China's Military in Transition (Jun., 1996), 270-1.
[160] Scobell (2000), 11.

scholars to study future wars and operation plans rather than the past.[161] Local Wars, in contrast to prior doctrines, was a shift in terms of operations from the People's War doctrine, in which the PLA was tasked with luring enemies into the mainland, as well as from the Maoist notion that men are superior to tools (weapon technology).[162] The heavy emphasis that has been put on the ground forces (PLAA) started to erode because of the importance of joint operations and therefore the maritime domain (PLAN) and air domain (PLAAF). LWUHTC did not specify a threat, but it urged PLA to be prepared for a military struggle in a joint operations environment under high technology conditions. Given that the USSR is no longer a superpower and that the US performed admirably in the Gulf War, we may reasonably infer that the greatest danger or, at the very least, the most important factor for the LWUHTC is a potential war with the US or another high-tech force.

Another event that occurred during that period is the visit of Taiwan's President Lee Teng-hui to the United States in 1995 which was considered a violation of PRC's "One China" policy which rejects Taiwan's independence. In July 1995 PLA conducted missile tests in Taiwan Strait. Following that year, Lee ran again for the presidency in the elections. To deter the Taiwanese to vote for him and his independence policies PLA fired short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) close to Taiwan and that brought the US' strong reaction. United States Navy deployed two aircraft carrier groups to the region to show presence. [163] The inability to deter the US to involve in a "domestic" issue was another shock for the PRC. Following a year in 1997, a force reduction of 500,000 was announced to increase the quality of the PLA.[164] This was the first large reduction since Deng's era. PLAA took the biggest hit from the reductions losing 19% percent of its personnel whereas PLAN and PLAAF lost 11%.[165] With the increased budget from the personnel

[161] You Ji, "The Revolution in Military Affairs and the Evolution of China's Strategic Thinking." *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 21, no. 3 (1999), 353–58. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25798464
[162] Prashant Kumar Singh, "*Changing Contexts of Chinese Military Strategy and Doctrine",* (New Delhi : Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 2016), 94.
[163] Eric Heginbotham, Michael Nixon et.al, "*The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996–2017*." (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015) https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR392.html , 25. [Accessed: 24.04.2022]
[164] Ji, 359.
[165] Dennis Blasko, *The Chinese Army Today : Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century*, (London; New York: Routledge, 2006.) 22.

cut, new weapon systems were purchased for the forces. Kilo-class submarines and Sovremenny class destroyers for the Navy and Su-27, and Su-30 jets for PLAAF were acquired from Russia.[166]

1998 stands out with a few changes in the PLA organization. One of them is the creation of the General Armaments Department to increase the oversight over arms and technology acquisition. The second was the establishment of a professional non-commissioned officer (NCO) corps. Jiang Zemin's instruction to divest from the private sector to the PLA is another significant move.[167] It was a concession given to the PLA during Deng's tenure to compensate for the loss of cash caused by reduced defence spending and to keep them from interfering with Party policy. However, because of a lack of civilian oversight and responsibility for these firms, they have devolved into a swamp of corruption.[168]

By the end of the century, CPC released a Defense White Paper (WP) in 1998. Just like its western counterparts, the paper reiterated the turbulent security dynamics of the post-cold war era and the tendency toward a multipolar environment. The main threats for the PRC are mentioned as hegemonism, armed intervention by other states, and the Taiwan issue. National defense was subordinated to the economic and general development of the country. While Active Defence has kept its place in the document as the primary military strategy, science and technology have increased their weight in the human-technology balance of power in Maoist thought. [169]

The event that would shake China for the last time took place when NATO intervened in Kosovo in 1999. During Operation Allied Force, the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade was hit by JDAM missiles killing three Chinese journalists.[170] China never believed that the strike was unintentional, Jiang Zemin did not join the hardliners who asked for retaliation

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[166] Taylor Fravel, *Active Defense China's Military Strategy since 1949*, (Princeton and Oxford:Princeton University Press,2019), 186.
[167] Philip Saunders, Joel Wuthnow, "Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA", *Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA:Assessing Chinese Military Reforms*, ed. Philip Saunders, Arthur Ding, Andrew Scobell, Andrew Yang, Joel Wuthnow. (Washington: National Defense University Press, 2019), 331, 520.
[168] Scobell (2000), 16. Chase, Michael S., Engstrom J., Tai Ming Cheung,et al. *China's Incomplete Military Transformation: Assessing the Weaknesses of the People's Liberation Army (PLA)*. (RAND Corporation, 2015.), 13. Saunders&Wuthnow (2019), 331. Shambaugh (2021), 236
[169] China's National Defense, (1998) http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/5/5.1.htm [Accessed: 26.04.2022]
[170]The Night the US Bombed a Chinese Embassy https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-48134881 [Accessed: 22.04.2022]

on that occasion and the US accepted to pay compensation[171], in return PRC joined World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. While PRC leaders were aware of possible international interference in a possible internal unrest operation, Gulf War and Kosovo showed the West's willingness to interfere in regional conflicts which were also highlighted in 2000 WP. The document's analysis of the security situation is similar to the 1998 WP in which the multipolarity and uncertainty were emphasized. The Taiwan Strait Crisis and the Kosovo Intervention were mentioned in the document as examples of hegemonic nations meddling in the internal affairs of other nations, although the name and event were not specified. In the guise of humanitarianism and human rights, the United Nations has also been criticized for attempting to meet the imperial ambitions of certain countries.

By 2000, China had completed its 500,000-man military reduction which included 200,000 officers.[172] According to the Military Balance, the size of military power in the 2001 fiscal year is as in Table 4.2.

Table 4.2: Manpower of the PLA in FY 2001.

Service	**Manpower**
PLA Army	1,700,000
PLA Navy	250,000
PLA Air Force	420,000
Total Manpower	***2,370,000***

The Military Balance, "*East Asia and Australasia: China*" (London: International Institute of Strategic Study,2001), 188-91.

4.2.2. Civil Military Affairs in Jiang Zemin Era

When we discuss civil-military relations in the context of the CPC and the PLA, we are referring to their authority and power balance over one another. Naturally, what is meant in this context is the party's authority and influence over the army. There is a significant debate in the literature whether the relationship between the CPC and PLA is a symbiosis,

[171] U.S. to Pay China $4.5 Million for Embassy Bombing https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/library/world/asia/073199china-embassy.html [Accessed: 10.02.2022]

[172] Saunders, Wuthnow (2019), 331.

a subjective civilian control, or else. To shed some light on this issue we should remember Deng Xiaoping's words on the PLA:

> *"This essence is the Party's army, the people's army, the army of the socialist state. This is different from the army of other countries in the world ... even different from the army in other socialist states, because their armies and ours have different experiences. Our army will in the final analysis be loyal to the Party, loyal to the people, loyal to the state and loyal to socialism."*[173]

1982 Constitution of the PRC also locates PLA under CMC which is subordinate to NPC. Thus, PLA is subordinate to the party. Since its inception the PLA was allowed and, in a way, had to find funding outside the state budget. This also means that it was allowed to be part of commercial activities. This self-reliance system became even more important during Deng's era when the focus of the state was economic growth and development. Because the state budget prioritized economic and industrial development, the defence budget has seen cuts or no increases.

Immediately after the Tiananmen Square Incident, some unit commanders refrained from imposing martial law and fire on the demonstrators, the most critical priority became ensuring that the army followed commands and remained loyal to the party. Disobedience of the PLA was a serious problem however, before the army's complete commitment, the party's unity had to be secured. To pave the way for Jiang's authority and ensure unity within the party, Deng Xiaoping politically neutralized the Yang brothers. Following the purge of the Yang brothers and his network, Jiang restructured the senior military leadership.[174] To increase his authority over the PLA and the CMC, Jiang slowly but surely promoted or retired officers and bureaucrats. With his allies promoted to key positions such as Zhang Wannian, Yu Yongbo, Fu Quanyou (GSD, GPD, GLD) and potential opponents retired, Jiang created his network over the PLA. By the mid-1990s, no officer with ties to the forces involved in the Tiananmen Square Incident was able to hold any military positions.[175]

After the death of Deng in 1997, Jiang had the opportunity to take control of political power. The deprivation of money from the private sector was the most significant event

[173] Jeremy T. Paltiel, "PLA Allegiance on Parade: Civil-Military Relations in Transition", *The China Quarterly*, 143, 784-800. doi:10.1017/S0305741000015046
[174] Shambaugh (2021), 235
[175] Alex Chopan (2002), 286.

during the Jiang era. The PLA's self-reliance revenue began to cause a dilemma for the party towards the end of the 1990s. Furthermore, the PLA's money from these businesses eroded party authority over the PLA, reduced military readiness and morale, and it was feared that disobedience might recur, as it had in Tiananmen Square. The annual value of these high-level deposits was estimated at $10 billion in 1997.[176] The Divestiture Act of 1998 aims to eliminate these self-reliance incomes and allow the military to rely solely on government funds. As a result, the army's financial autonomy will be removed; the army will be fully controlled by the party, and the party-army balance will be restored in favour of the party. While the Act was an important step against military corruption and an attempt to increase civilian control over it, it was believed that it was only partially successful because the businesses were mostly transferred to officers' families.[177]

4.2.3. Assessment on Jiang Zemin Era

Although Jiang started to work under Deng's shadow and among the Yang brothers' network, his attempts to consolidate his power through MR visits and a reshuffle of the ranks increased his authority over the PLA. Removal of Yang network and purge of officers and generals linked with the Tiananmen Incident helped him to secure civil-military (CPC-PLA) balance. Following the removals, he brought his loyalists to those positions who either he worked with before or met during the visits. These appointments worked well to establish a bureaucracy that works harmoniously with his leadership. Another bold decision was to remove the PLA from private businesses. Incomes coming from that sphere was corrupt and prevented PLA to increase their warfighting skill which was fatal for the military. Although officers or generals made the job cover-up, Jiang's order was answered. It can be argued that he lost time with these in the early years of his leadership, this process developed positively and strengthened his authority for his goals and vision. The two-year gap between the Gulf War and the announcement of a new military strategic guideline for the PLA was the imbalance between the Party and the military. It has been overcome by the removal of certain power centres (Yang network, officers, and generals who were not loyal to Jiang's leadership). Incidents following the

[176] Saunders, Wuthnow (2019), 331.
[177] Ibid, 523.

Gulf War, namely Taiwan Strait Crisis and Belgrade Embassy Bombing, helped his efforts unintentionally. In a time of crisis, PLA had no option but to obey the leader.

Rosen's promotion approach to explaining military innovation is justified by Jiang's established network through promotion and retirement. External shocks like the Gulf War and NATO bombing of Yugoslavia demonstrated that China's military was far behind the established militaries of the West, and they urged the PLA to formulate a new military strategy guideline. During the Jiang Zemin era, the PLA remained a territorial defence military.

4.3. Hu Jintao Era (2002)

Hu Jintao has been compared to his predecessor Jiang Zemin as a less competent leader. However, due to the significant events that occurred during his time, we cannot fully disregard him.

The most important appearance of Hu was during the Kosovo incident. Hu Jintao back then was appointed as the Vice Senior Chairman of the CMC, by Jiang Zemin. Appointing Hu in that position served both ways; generals had to persuade Hu before Jiang, and Jiang could implement his agenda without having to deal with daily hassles. Soon after Hu became the General Secretary of the Party in 2002 but Jiang, like his predecessor Deng, held onto the CMC Chairmanship until 2004. Hu Jintao is mostly characterized by his domestic and economic policies, but it would be unfair not to mention his contributions to the military strategy, while he served as the President, General Secretary of the CPC, and the Chairman of the CMC.

Under Hu's government, Jiang as the Chairman of the CMC announced yet another force reduction of 200,000 personnel in 2003.[178] After Hu became the CMC Chairman, he declared one of the most important guidelines for the PLA: "New Historic Missions" (NHM). New missions, ensures PLA's loyalty to the CPC, not interfere with the economic development of the country and defend its unity, defend China's national interests in the

[178] China to Cut 200,000 from Military https://www.voanews.com/a/a-13-a-2003-09-01-36-china/390545.html [Accessed: 23.04.2022]

international system, and contribute to world peace. [179] The declaration of New Historic Missions is important because it is an official departure from the "territorial defence model to the expeditionary model. NHM also introduced "Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)" another domain for the PLA's military operations. MOOTW includes humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, counter-piracy efforts, etc.[180] Military strategy under Hu with a name change became "Local Wars under Informatized Conditions". While having similarities with the NCW, Informatized Conditions is the general term for the military operations where the information technologies and RMA is the core of the operations. The application of RMA to the Chinese military is a unique experience. In the 2004 Defence White Paper, it is stated that "The forms of war are undergoing changes from mechanization to informationalization." The Paper under the "National Defence Policy" section urges PLA to complete the transition from mechanization to semi-mechanization and achieve informationalization. This transition is what is known as the RMA what stands out is that there is a section named "RMA with Chinese Characteristics" in the paper. The core of this concept is the reducing the manpower (which was declared about a year ago by Jiang Zemin) to increase the quality of the personnel, implementing information technology to command control systems and into the main battle systems to speed up the informationalization, intensifying joint training and innovating political work.[181] RMA with Chinese Characteristics puts the emphasis on every service and PLASAF except the PLAA. This is another departure from the traditional approach the military operations. Due to the increasing importance of joint operations in the Chinese military thinking the importance of PLAA decreases. Hu's authority however was not strong enough on the PLA most probably due to the Jiang network. Also, force reductions and decreased importance of the PLAA's could have startled some sort of interservice rivalry and a problem between the CPC and the PLA.

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[179] James Mulvenon, "Chairman Hu and the PLA's 'New Historic Missions'", *China Leadership Monitor*, No.27 (Stanford University), 2. https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/CLM27JM.pdf [Accessed: 23.04.2022]

[180] United States Office of the Secretary of Defense(OSD) "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2020 Annual Report to Congress", 124-5. https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT-FINAL.PDF [Accessed: 23.04.2022]

[181] PRC: 2004 White Paper on National Defense Published https://nuke.fas.org/guide/china/doctrine/natdef2004.html [Accessed: 23.04.2022]

Lack of authority became visible when the PLA tested an anti-satellite weapon system in 2007 without the knowledge of Hu or other officials. Another significant attempt was the test of J-20 which was conducted on the same day as the visit of US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.[182] The commissioning of China's first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, in 2012, was another notable event during Hu's tenure.[183] Apart from these Hu Jintao's era was generally under the shadow of Jiang Zemin and his loyalists in terms of military affairs. It is also agreed that Hu's main idea was to achieve a certain level of development in the social and economic domains of the state, increasing the income and wellbeing of the Chinese population.[184] Subordinating national defence to economic development continued as a trend during Hu's reign.

4.3.1. Assessment on Hu Jintao Era

Hu's reign is mainly associated with social and economic progress more than military change as a technocrat leader. The international security environment was preoccupied with the war in Iraq and Afghanistan. Reflections of these wars can be seen in the WPs that were released during his time, increased US presence both in the world and in the region was presented as a cause of discomfort by the PRC. During his time PLA demobilized from 2,500,000 to 2,300,000 active personnel, strategic guideline renamed "Local Wars under Informatized Conditions" and provided the military with a new set of obligations, Historic New Missions. Even if he couldn't build a political network to ensure his control over the party or the PLA, his efforts and actions pushed the PLA down a different road that they could exploit (the change from territorial defence to expeditionary warfare) while the West was preoccupied with the GWOT. To be fair, a leader with no military experience and no ability to develop his network is unlikely to be able to clear up such a large and multifaceted corruption organization and its ingrained bureaucratic structure in one fell swoop. As I already mentioned, Hu had no such purpose. He attempted

[182] Philip Saunders, Joel Wuthnow, "Large and in Charge: Civil-Military Relations under Xi Jinping", *Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA:Assessing Chinese Military Reforms*, ed. Philip Saunders, Arthur Ding, Andrew Scobell, Andrew Yang, Joel Wuthnow. (Washington: National Defense University Press, 2019), 525-6.
[183] China's first aircraft carrier enters service https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-19710040 [Accessed:01.05.2022]
[184] Shambaugh (2021), 487-8.

to hasten the PLA's shift from mechanisation to informatization in order to stay up with sophisticated militaries and the CPC's future vision.

4.4. Xi Jinping Era (2012)

Xi Jinping did not suffer the issues that Hu and Jiang did throughout their climb to power. Shortly after he became General Secretary, Hu did not insist on holding any of his titles. Thus, the transition was peaceful. His first few years in the office were relatively stable without any major changes in military matters. First White Paper during his reign was released in 2013. While there was not a generally significant change in military affairs, threat perception seemed to have changed compared to the former documents. While the question of Taiwan's independence remained essential, Japan's moves on the islands, as well as terrorism, separatism, and extremism, were the main subjects of debate. In comparison to prior White Papers in the scope of MOOTW, peacetime military activity, particularly international maritime operations in the context of peacekeeping operations and a continuation of Hu's New Historic Missions, stood out.[185]

Xi's real impact on the PLA started in 2015 with a series of reforms and a restructuring process. The goal of these changes can be traced to the 2015 WP. The paper explains the modernization process of the armed forces is a must for China's peaceful development.[186] These modernization processes are divided into a three-step strategy in 2019 WP: (1) achieving mechanization by 2020, (2) modernization of the military by 2035, and (3) becoming a world-class military by 2049.[187] Between 2015-19 the PLA went through a serious restructuring.

- PLASAF was renamed PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) and elevated to service level making it equal to PLAA, PLAN, and PLAAF.

[185]Information Office of the State Council, *The Diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces*, http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2014/08/23/content_281474982986506.htm [Accessed: 02.05.2022]
[186] The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, *China's Military Strategy,* http://www.china.org.cn/china/2015-05/26/content_35661433.htm [Accessed: 02.05.2022]
[187] The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China , China's National Defense in the New Era, 10 https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201907/24/content_WS5d3941ddc6d08408f502283d.html [Accessed: 05.05.2022]

- Established a stand-alone HQ for the PLAA
- PLA Strategic Support Force and PLA Joint Logistic Support Force are established
- General Departments were abolished, and the structure of the CMC was reorganized (Table 4.4)
- Seven Military Regions (Shenyang, Beijing, Lanzhou, Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou, and Chengdu) were abolished and five Joint Theater Commands (Eastern Theater Command (ETC), Southern Theater Command (STC), Western Theater Command (WTC), Northern Theater Command (NTC), and Central Theater Command (CTC)) were established instead (Table 4.5 and Table 4.6)
- 18 group armies reduced to 13
- To strengthen and reinforce the military education, 77 universities and colleges were reorganized to 44
- Active personnel number reduced from 2,300,000 to 2,000,000.[188]



Figure 4.3: New Structure of the Central Military Commission

Adapted from: Wuthnow J, Saunders P., "Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA", Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms (Washingon: National Defense University Press 2019), 7.

[188] Ibid, 16-9.

Table 4.3: Operational Structure of the PLA



Adapted from: The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, China's National Defense in the New Era, https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201907/24/content_WS5d3941ddc6d08408f502283d.html

Figure 4.4: Theater Commands of the PLA

Campbell C., *China's Military: The People's Liberation Army* June 4, 2021, Congressional Research Report, 11.

These changes could be argued as the biggest change in the military since the founding of the country. These were not, however, unplanned adjustments. A broad anti-corruption campaign was launched by Xi and his advisers in 2012, including both the Party and the PLA. Jiang Zemin's former CMC vice-chairmen Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong were among the top military officers involved.[189] By 2018 more than 1.5 million officials were punished and more than 70 generals were purged from the military.[190] While fighting corruption, these efforts also eliminated potential competitors and bureaucratic power bases that would obstruct innovation. The establishment of new bodies and regulations (Central Commission for Integrated Military and Civilian Development, CMC Chairman Responsibility System, CMC Leading Small Group for Deepening National Defense and Military Reform, etc.) and the deployment of his trusted aides helped him to achieve a great level of control over the PLA. He explains the necessity of establishing such dominance over the PLA as follows:

> *"Why must we stand firm on the Party's leadership over the military? Because that's the lesson from the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the Soviet Union where the military was depoliticised, separated from the Party, and nationalised, the party was disarmed. A few people tried to save the Soviet Union; they seized Gorbachev, but within a few days it was turned around again because they didn't have the instruments to exert power. Yeltsin gave a speech standing on a tank, but the military made no response, keeping so-called "neutrality" [...] A big Party was gone just like that [...][191]"*

Another major part of Xi Jinping's military modernization is intelligentization. This clumsily translated term refers to the integration of information technology with military systems, platforms, command and control, and decision-making. President Xi directed the PLA to improve military intelligentization and attain joint warfare capacity in 2017[192]. The desire for intelligentization is often linked to growing maritime activities (whether anti-piracy operations in the Horn of Africa or broad application of IT to C4ISR platforms), as stated in the Science of Military Strategy 2013. The concept of "forward defence" pushes PLAN to construct a blue-water navy and spread its reach over the two

[189] Saunders, Wuthnow (2019), 526, 717.
[190] Campbell(2021) 33. Shambaugh (2021), 600.
[191] Richard Bitzinger, James Char, *Reshaping the Chinese Military: The PLA's Roles and Missions in the Xi Jinping Era* (Routledge, 2020), 12.
[192] Elsa B Kania, "Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Hearing on Trade, Technology, and Military-Civil Fusion Chinese Military Innovation in Artificial Intelligence" 2019., 3-6

oceans, the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, as well as their littoral areas, Asia's, Africa's, Antarctica's, South America, North America, and Oceania's borders.[193] With around 350 ships, PLAN is the world's largest naval force by 2021. Artificial Intelligence and its applications are another facet of intelligentized warfare. The win of AlphaGo over (Artificial Intelligence Go player) Lee Sedol in 2016 is widely regarded as another catalyst for the quest for intelligentized command and control systems. The victory of AlphaGo proved the potential of AI in C4ISR systems. Following that year "New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan" was announced by the State Council.[194] The plan, according to the Chinese RMA's broad conception, intends to achieve a leapfrog from informatization to intelligentization, allowing the Chinese military to "win informationized local wars." [195]

4.4.1. Assessment on Xi Jinping Era

Following his predecessors, Xi Jinping strengthened his grip over the PLA in a more successful fashion compared to them. Anti-corruption campaigns merged with Xi placing his trusted agents and aides in key positions helped him to achieve greater control over the PLA, unlike his predecessors. To increase the joint capability of the PLA he established Theater Commands to serve both in peacetime and wartime, this in return will increase joint training and combat capabilities of the subordinate units. In a probable Taiwan scenario, the previous MR map (Table 4.8) shows that Guangzhou and Nanjing MRs had to work together despite not having received joint training. The Eastern Theater is in charge of Taiwan operations following Xi's restructuring and reorganization. The emphasis put on AI and intelligentization has a solid ground now with the establishment of PLASSF. Xi's innovation process can be named as a summary of the military change

[193] Air Force University China Aerospace Studies Institute, *In Their Own Words: Foreign Military Thought Science of Military Strategy (2013),* 309-11. https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Translations/2021-02-08%20Chinese%20Military%20Thoughts-%20In%20their%20own%20words%20Science%20of%20Military%20Strategy%202013.pdf?ver=NxAWg4BPw_NylEjxaha8Aw%3d%3d [Accessed: 06.05.2022]

[194] Notice of the State Council Issuing the New Generation of Artificial Intelligence Development Plan https://www.unodc.org/res/ji/import/policy_papers/china_ai_strategy/china_ai_strategy.pdf [Accessed: 09.05.2020]

[195]The Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, China's Military Strategy http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2015/05/27/content_281475115610833.htm [Accessed: 09.05.2020]

literature. In Xi's era, civil intervention, technology, culture, failure, and other military change drivers may all be witnessed. While every leader since the 1990s has attempted to innovate the PLA, Xi, with a more hands-on approach, has outperformed his predecessors. While it would be dishonest to declare their efforts futile, Xi did honour the work of his forefathers' leaders. But Neustadt's five conditions are more visible.



Figure 4.5: Military Regions of the PLA

Shambaugh D., *Modernizing China's Military Progress, Problems, and Prospects*, (University of California Press, 2002), 314.

4.5 Military Spending, Guns and Butter, Civilian-Military Integration

4.5.1. Military Spending

The most important goal of Chinese leaders since the civil war was to create a developed and prosperous China. "Four Modernizations," which were announced under Deng Xiaoping's presidency, demonstrated the priority placed on the nation's and economy's overall development. In this modernization process, national defence was ranked as the least important development area (1) agriculture, (2) industry, (3) science and technology, (4) national defence.[196] Considering that the latest military threat to the nation was the Soviet deployment of armoured troops on the border in 1969, it's logical that national defence has been pushed aside in favour of agriculture and industrial development. Thus, the military was only preserved in sufficient numbers due to the lack of a global hot war

[196] Blasko (2006), 5.

situation and due to the Maoist approach, which prioritised people over tools (until 1993 Military Strategic Guideline).[197]

That emphasis did not shift with the end of the Cold War. Both Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao ordered the PLA to support the general development of the nation and subordinated military modernization to economic modernization.[198] The relative backwardness of the science and technology of the state was acknowledged by the leadership. Deng Xiaoping stated that China lags behind modern nations by 20-30 years, Jiang Zemin stated that they lag behind in terms of weapons and equipment, and Hu Jintao added that the gap between the PLA and advanced militaries is at least two to three decades.[199] To address this problem, the PLA began to look for purchasing armament systems and platforms directly from other states. Because of the events in Tiananmen Square, Western countries were unwilling to supply China with armaments. Relations with Russia became important at this moment, and China agreed to buy substantial amounts of military equipment from Russia for years. You can see the value of Russian Arms Exports to China, from 1994 to2014 in US million dollars Table 4.9 below.



Figure 4.6: Volume of the Russia-Exported Arms to China

Data from: https://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/values.php Importer/Exporter TIV Tables, Russia Exported arms to China from 1994 to 2020.

[197] Singh (2016), 96.
[198] Blasko (2006) 7-8.
[199] Fravel (2019), 190, Blasko (2011), 361-3

Following Deng Xiaoping's reform and opening-up push, China's military expenditures as a percentage of GDP and government spending both declined steadily. Subordination of the defence modernization to economic and social modernization is a reason for that. The main motivation of the Chinese leadership was explained by Deng as that the international environment was in favour of China's peaceful modernization and development.[200] Later in the 1990s military expenditure started to increase in accordance with the effects of the international security environment. Military spending's share in the GDP decreased from 5.43% in 1979 to 1.7% in 2020. Military's share in state expenditure was also decreased from 17.37% in 1979 to 4.7% in 2020. [201] Total spending has been on the other hand has been increasing constantly since the 1990s and doubled its size since 2010 from $105,5bn to $252,3bn according to the World Bank data online.[202] The table below shows a comparison of China's military spending with those of the countries reviewed previously.



[200] Yao Yunzhu, "The Evolution of Military Doctrine of the Chinese PLA from 1985 to 1995", *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, 7:2, DOI: 10.1080/10163279509464306, 57.

[201] China's National Defense in the New Era The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China July 2019, "Chapter V. Reasonable and Appropriate Defense Expenditure", https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/cegv/eng/zywjyjh/t1683060.htm [Accessed: 19.05.2022], *Military expenditure (% of GDP) – China*, WorldBank https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?end=2020&locations=CN&name_desc=false&start=1988&view=chart [Accessed: 19.05.2022]

[202] Military expenditure (current USD) – China https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.CD?end=2020&locations=CN&name_desc=false&start=1990&view=chart [Accessed:19.05.2022]

Figure 4.7: Military Expenditures of China, France, United States, and United Kingdom in current USD

Data from World Bank: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.CD?end=2020&locations=CN-FR-US-GB&name_desc=false&start=1989&view=chart



Figure 4.8: Military Expenditures of China, France, United States, and United Kingdom in percentage of GDP

Data from World Bank: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?end=2020&locations=CN-FR-US-GB&name_desc=false&start=1989&view=chart

4.5.2. Guns and Butter

A small number of studies have looked at the influence of China's ever-increasing military spending on other governmental expenditures and the public's attitude to these expenditures during the last three decades. A study completed by Han Xiao and his

colleagues found out that Chinese population supports a strong and capable military. This support, however, is not limitless. According to the responses to the survey's other questions, the Chinese people perceive economic issues to be more important than military spending. Reducing income disparity, expanding social welfare, and increasing education investments have higher priority compared to increasing military spending.[203] Another study looked into whether China's military spending has a crowding out effect on other government spending, particularly social welfare spending.[204] The findings back with Chinese leaders' belief that the country's economic growth will have a positive effect on military development. According to the result of the study there is not a crowding out effect between defence expenditure and social welfare.[205]

4.5.3. Civilian-Military Integration

Modern combat vehicles, according to George and Meredith Friedman, cannot be created without national industry and resources. It is vital to have specific resources and to be able to process these resources efficiently in order to attain these goals.[206]At times, it is impossible for the military industry to achieve this alone, and at other times, it is costlier. States have chosen dual-use (technologies that can be utilized in both military and civilian purposes) technological products and encouraged transitivity between military and civilian industries to overcome this challenge.

Civilian Military Integration (CMI or MCI), recently referenced as military civilian fusion (MCF), is a concept used by Chinese political and military thought to tackle the above-mentioned difficulties. Military civilian integration aims to increase the collaboration of defence and civilian industries to intensify the nation's development.[207] Although this term became popular in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the fact that the Chinese army is

[203] Han, Xiao, Michael Sadler, and Kai Quek. "Guns and Butter in China: How Chinese Citizens Respond to Military Spending." The China Quarterly 245 (2021): 248–61. doi:10.1017/S0305741020000260.
[204] Ying Zhang, Xiaoxing Liu et. al, "Revisiting the "Guns versus Butter" Argument in China (1950–2014): New Evidence from the Continuous Wavelet Analysis" *Sustainability*, no. 7, 2016. https://doi.org/10.3390/su8070655
[205] Ibid, 11.
[206] Friedman George & Meredith, *Savaşın Geleceği: 21.Yüzyılda Güç, teknoloji ve Amerikan Dünya Egemenliği*, (İstanbul: Pegasus Yayınları, 2015), 49.
[207] U.S Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China A Report to Congress (2021), https://media.defense.gov/2021/Nov/03/2002885874/-1/-1/0/2021-CMPR-FINAL.PDF [Accessed:02.06.2022]

a people's army, and the Maoist thought's promotion of the military and civil society working together for national defence[208], may suggest that the roots are deeper. Deng's approval of the military's entry into the commercial sector may also be indicative of similar strategy in the post-Mao era. Deng's support for civilians in the army, as well as his advocacy for civilian-military unification,[209] underlines the validity of this conclusion. In 1982, the Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND) was founded to uphold Deng's ideas and oversee military-civilian integration.[210] Before it was too late, COSTIND proven to be a profitable venture. By the 1990s, factories that used to make military equipment started producing non-military products. According to Bitzinger's study, former weapon factories produced 70% of taxis and 65% of motorcycles in China.[211] Although some scholars argue that the phrase CMI was replaced by MCF under Hu Jintao's tenure,[212] the foreign ministry's website translation of Hu Jintao's 17th party congress speech does not include the phrase MCF.[213] Hu's possibly biggest contribution to the CMI came with the "The National Medium- and Long-Term Program for Science and Technology Development (2006-2020)" (MLP) in 2006[214] and COSTIND became SASTIND (State Administration of Science and Technology Industries for National Defense) in 2008 with State Council's decree.[215] The MLP strongly encourages defence sector to work on civilian technologies and civilian industry to be allowed into the defence research and development process. According to the MLP, a change in science and technology management is required to allow the two

[208] Mao Zedong Thought http://www.cdsndu.org/en/index.php/zgjswha/494.html , Ch. *The Thought of National Defense Development*, Para. 4. [Accessed: 02.06.2022]
[209] Richard Bitzinger, "China's Shift from Civil-Military Integration to Military-Civil Fusion." *Asia Policy* 28, no. 1 (2021), 13. doi:10.1353/asp.2021.0001. [Accessed: 01.06.2022]
[210]Toby Warden, "A Revolutionary Evolution: Civil-Military Integration in China" (2019) https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/a-revolutionary-evolution-civil-military-integration-in-china/ [Accessed:02.06.2022]
[211] Bitzinger (2021), 13-4.
[212] Warden (2019). Bitzinger (2021) 12.
[213] Full text of Hu Jintao's report at 17th Party Congress, Ch. IX. Opening Up New Prospects for Modernization of National Defense and the Armed Forces, Para. 4. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/ceuk//eng/xnyfgk/t376863.htm [Accessed: 02.06.2022]
[214] The National Medium- and Long-Term Program for Science and Technology Development (2006- 2020) https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Cybersecurity/Documents/National_Strategies_Repository/China_2006.pdf [Accessed:02.06.2022]
[215] Patrick Besha, "Civil-Military Integration in China: A Techno-Nationalist Approach to Development", *American Journal of Chinese Studies*, vol. 18, no. 2 (October 2011), 104.

industries to operate together in a coordinated manner.[216] Xi has put great emphasis on CMI and following the MLP, during his reign CMI elevated to a national strategy.[217] The 2015 White Paper included a section dedicated to the development of CMI, in which they pledged to expand collaboration between the two sectors in order to establish a common standard, produce military armaments and equipment, and make combined use of economic and manpower resources.[218] To successfully oversee and control these initiatives China created Central Commission for Integrated Military and Civilian Development in 2017.[219] It was unlikely that anyone other than Xi would lead this committee, given his dominant personality and strong desire to control and monitor reforms. Following that in July 2017, the State Council released "China's New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan". The plan sets a three-year deadline. In 2020, China will catch up to other artificial intelligence user countries and complete its theoretical and legal infrastructure; in 2025, technology applications will drive China's economic growth; and in 2030, China's artificial intelligence theories and practises will be advanced enough to lead other countries' systems.[220] Apart from setting these years as a goal and developing a theoretical foundation for artificial intelligence applications, the plan assesses civil-military integration in the context of artificial intelligence and strives to improve integration in this direction. The plan encourages to promote military civilian integration in artificial intelligence field for national defence innovation.[221] To achieve these organizational changes occurred during Xi's era. Science and Technology Commission reorganized under direct CMC supervision[222] and for human capital PLASSF

[216] Ibid, Ch. VIII. Major Policies and Measures. "7.Perfecting the Mechanism for Combining Defense and Civilian Sectors, and Making Defense Part of the Civilian Sector."
[217]Campbell (2021), 48. Wuthnow & Saunders (2019), 628.
[218]China's Military Strategy (full text) http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2015/05/27/content_281475115610833.htm ch. IV. Building and Development of China's Armed Forces, In-depth Development of Civil-Military Integration (CMI). [Accessed: 11.06.2022]
[219] Manoj Joshi, "China's Military-Civil Fusion Strategy, the US Response, and Implications for India," *ORF Occasional Paper* No. 345, January 2022, 18. https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/ORF_OccasionalPaper_345_Military-Civil-Fusion.pdf [Accessed: 04.06.2022]
[220] State Council Notice on the Issuance of the Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan https://d1y8sb8igg2f8e.cloudfront.net/documents/translation-fulltext-8.1.17.pdf [Accessed: 04.06.2022], 5-6.
[221] Ibid, 21.
[222] Joel Wuthnow, Philip Saunders, *Chinese Military Reforms in the Age of Xi Jinping: Drivers, Challenges, and Implications*, (Washington: NDU Press, 2017), 36.

made cooperation with civilian academic institutions.[223] Finally, military civilian integration was described as the contribution of economic and social developments to the development of national science and technology, taking into consideration military needs, in the Science of Military Strategy 2020.[224] Apart from the essentials like dual-use and addressing manpower needs, these requirements have expanded to encompass fields like biotechnology, which has grown in relevance in recent years.[225]

[223] Elsa Kania & John Costello, "Seizing the Commanding Heights: the PLA Strategic Support Force in Chinese Military Power", *Journal of Strategic Studies*, DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2020.1747444, 43.
[224] *In Their Own Words: Science of Military Strategy 2020*, China Aerospace Studies Institute 2020 https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Translations/2022-01-26%202020%20Science%20of%20Military%20Strategy.pdf ,37. [Accessed:04.06.2022]
[225] Ibid, 173.

5. CONCLUSION

The causes for the change of western armies after the Cold War can be observed in the shift in threat perception, the articulation of improvements in information technology with military equipment and the battlefield, and the growing relevance of the capacity to conduct combined operations with allies. Gulf War, the 9/11 attacks, as well as the US-led operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, have once again demonstrated the need of technological dominance and combined operational capabilities. It has been shown that in order for the Allied countries to carry out a combined operation with the United States, they must be receptive to change and encourage change in military expenditures, unit structure, army size, and battlefield technical advancements. These requirements appear to have been assessed at a strategic level in the white papers of the countries studied.

The success of a combat style dominated by new types of information technologies, which the US Army put forward notably in the Gulf War, was the catalyst for the Chinese military to change. Although change movements have accelerated in each leader's era, Jiang Zemin's policies of prohibiting the PLA from commerce, updating military strategic guidelines to meet the needs of the time, and pushing technology to the forefront have lasted until today. He also predicted that future battles will be reliant on information technology, which are becoming more powerful by the day, and that wars would be limited in terms of geography, laying the groundwork for the Chinese armed forces' military change movement, which is now nearly four decades old. Despite the fact that the Hu Jintao era was defined by socioeconomic reforms and civic improvements, his contribution was to provide the PLA new tasks. These new roles have resulted in the PLA placing a greater focus on naval strength, and the rate of change is expected to accelerate. The Xi Jinping era, on the other hand, is an era that military change is visible in practically every aspects of the military. The armed forces' services were changed during the Xi period; PLASAF, which had been at the branch level, was elevated to the service level and renamed PLARF; PLASSF and PLAJLSF were established; the CMC's organisational structure was modified; and the theatre of commands, instead of military regions, was established. The military's number was reduced in the Xi time, as it had been in every other leader's period, and it was planned to use the budget in a cost-effective manner in keeping with technical improvements. General Departments were dissolved and PLAA

was guaranteed to have a headquarters, just like other services, to reduce the effect of PLAA, which was prominent in all areas under the old system and on other force services and bureaucracy.

Although the leaders' influence to the change is obvious, the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis was another event that contributed to the PLA's transformation. China does not recognise Taiwan's independence and considers it to be a domestic problem, as expressed in every white paper. Another source of change in the Taiwan Strait Crisis was the United States' direct engagement in mobilising its naval forces and China's understanding that it lacked the power to deter them. In the years that followed, China, once again a victim of US military might, sacrificed three of its citizens in the Belgrade embassy bombing. Despite the fact that the Chinese officials did not trust the US statements that the incident was an accident, they avoided escalating the situation and instead joined the World Trade Organization in exchange for an outcome that would benefit them politically. As a result of its inclusion in the global market, China was able to keep a closer eye on military advancements and trade more freely.

When we review military change theories, we can observe that practically all of them contributed in some way to the Chinese military's change. China abandoned the "men superior over tool" interpretation of Maoist ideology and began to cut the number of its soldiers after learning from the defeat of the Iraqi army in both the Gulf and Iraq wars. Simultaneously, in light of the impact of the United States' technological dominance in these wars, it began to pursue scientific advances and prioritised civil-military integration, realising that it could not achieve this solely by increasing defence spending. Furthermore, leaders established their own networks and promoted officers who would work in harmony with them, compelling those who would work incompatibly with them to retire or, in the case of Xi, eliminate them through corruption probes. As a result, the post-Cold War change of the Chinese army can be seen as an example of practically all literature. While the failure effect of Posen can be illustrated by the Taiwan Strait Crisis and the Belgrade Embassy, the civilian intervention proposal can be illustrated by all three, but particularly Jiang and Xi. According to Grissom, there must be three outputs (change in formation, innovation should be significant, and increase effectiveness) for a change to be considered innovative. To reiterate these outputs, changes in military structures, as well

as military innovation, should be significant in order to improve military efficiency. Furthermore, Neustadt's five criteria, which I have previously underlined and which Rosen mentions in his book, are more prevalent, particularly during the Xi period. Xi has worked extensively to consolidate power, from corruption investigations to the establishment of new organisations and institutes, as well as direct intervention. Jiang and Hu may not have been as involved during their leadership because they had to work in the shadows of their predecessors, but Xi has worked extensively to consolidate power, from corruption investigations to the establishment of new organisations and institutes, as well as direct intervention. In this study, which examines the change of the Chinese army from 1989 to the present, the efforts of the Chinese army to switch from territorial defense to an expeditionary model after Hu Jintao's declaration of historical new missions in the reform process of the Chinese army and Xi Jinping's goal of becoming a world-class military by 2049 are shown. For this reason, China possesses two aircraft carriers, one of which was purchased, repaired, and put into service (Liaoning) and the other of which was built domestically (Shandong). China is reportedly said to have two other aircraft carriers in the under construction.[226] Making the following brief comparison will help clarify the issue and allow us to compare the militaries we have looked at and explain how different the Chinese military change from the others is.

For the United States military, one of the major factors for military change was the dissolution of its best enemy the USSR. Due to the dissolution threat perception of the US has shifted towards hostile regional Powers. The military structure changed accordingly (for instance Base Force, BUR etc.). The release of the JV-2010 RMA increased its importance in the field. The increased effectiveness of the RMA proved itself in the gulf war. In the following years, China was accepted as a competitor which increased the importance of the technological upper hand and full-spectrum dominance for the US. RMA and NCW kept their places during the GWOT however after the death of OBL, asymmetric threats and near-peer competition gained importance.

[226] Kyle Mizokami, China Still On Track to Build Four Carriers By This Year https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/china-still-track-build-four-carriers-year-199091 [Accessed: 10.06.2022]

Military change for the UK started with the end of the Warsaw Pact. Monetary issues became a problem when the biggest threat to the European landscape. Threat perception for the UK shifted from European theater to global terrorism with the push factor of the post-9/11 operations. Because of the character of the Global War on Terrorism, the expeditionary approach gained importance for the British military which led to the establishment of the Joint Rapid Reaction Force. The expeditionary approach affected the Royal Navy too. It was forced to shift its primary missions from open sea operations to littoral warfare.

The French were shaken by the Gulf War. Because of the legal restrictions, they could not participate and contribute enough personnel to the coalition compared to its allies. This in return caused them to leave conscription and establish an All-Volunteer Force (AVF). France's ambition to lead Europe held them back from the GWOT operations, into which they contributed less. However, the French administrations and the military showed signs that they are on the track to change when they declared an intervention force for 60,000 personnel.

The Gulf War represented itself from a rather different perspective to the PLA. The success of air strikes impressed the PRC leaders. With Jiang Zemin's initiative long reigned, the "men over tool" approach started to erode. Even though he had to tackle some internal issues within the party and the bureaucracy in general, Jiang's efforts paid off. In 1993 LWUHTC was released changing the military strategic guideline finally. Another event that shaped the PLA's change was the Taiwan Strait Crisis. When the PLA could not deter the US to intervene in what is called a "domestic issue", it was forced to buy new weapons systems from Russia. These reforms and betterments continued during Hu's era. Compared to Jiang's reforms, Hu had a little trouble with implementing large-scale changes. The military bureaucracy did not harmoniously work with him. But in the end, he managed to declare New Historic Missions, which allowed the PLA to work outside the national borders in cooperation with the UN. The Peacekeeping operations can also be interpreted as a transfer of experience from other nations' militaries to the PLA since their last combat experience was in 1979 in Vietnam. Xi era military changes are probably the most inclusive ones since the nation's founding. During Xi's time we witnessed:

- The elevation of PLASAF to a service level,
- Creation of the PLASSF and PLAJLSF,
- Removal of the General Staff and the creation of the Joint Staff
- Restructuring of the CMC,
- Abolishment of the Military Regions and the establishment of Theater Commands,
- Establishment of the Central Commission for Integrated Military and Civilian Development,
- Creation of the CMC Leading Small Group for Deepening National Defense and Military Reform,
- Increasing the importance of the PLAN and the PLAARF, while slowly eroding the PLAA hegemony over the services,
- Investing in AI and the intelligentization of the military

When we compare the western militaries that were examined and the Chinese military the leadership is what stands out the most as an enabler for change. While the US had to adapt itself to the new security environment the change was inevitable and could not be disputed. As the leading force in the military change, the US dragged allies to this new era. The UK held on to the tracks that the US created and joined the GWOT with plans on modernizing its military. France followed the same suit with different characteristics. However, it took a leader change, a purge and two years for PLA to adapt the new way of fighting that was represented in the Gulf War. The pace of the change increased when Jiang Zemin established his authority over congress, the party and the military. Unfortunately for Hu Jintao, he could never match Jiang Zemin's charisma and authority. However, he managed to impose new missions on the PLA which made the military participate more in the peacekeeping operations. Xi Jinping era is when we see almost every single theory, concept, and explanation for military change studies. New organizations and administrative bodies, changes in services' relation between each other, increased civilian oversight and intervention over the military, new technologies, operational environment, and incentives to shift the PLAN towards an expeditionary force are just a few examples from the Xi era.

In sum, every military that was examined in this study had to change accordingly to the new strategic environment and the threats that came along with it. While the western militaries had to adapt faster because of the threats they were facing and to acquire a prestigious place in the new system, the Chinese military, the PLA, had to be facilitated by an authoritarian leader and acquire direct orders from him and his trusty agents within the system. We may say that if leaders with authority and strong bureaucratic networks were not in charge of China during this time, the military change would not be very likely. As we have previously stated numerous times, Jiang Zemin had to eliminate his rivals, maintain party cohesion, and impose authority over the PLA following the Gulf War for the Chinese army to adjust to the shifting dynamics of the new security environment. It can be claimed that PLA might react even later in a situation where this does not occur. Under Hu's leadership, military change slowed considerably because of his emphasis on the social and economic agenda and the military's lack of respect for his authority.

For the sake of further research, China's military change efforts, which have spanned more than three decades, have yielded substantial results within the context of the Great Power Competition. Studies on how the Chinese army will be in 2049, a year that Xi has identified as a turning point in the country's development as a world-class military, and how this would effect international balances will be very valuable additions to the field.

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CURRICULUM VITAE

Personal Information

Surname, Name: AKTÜRK, Mahmut Ensar

Nationality: Turkish

Education

Degree	University	Date of Graduation
Bachelor's Degree	Istanbul University	10.06.2019

Language Skills

English