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COLLECTIVE IDENTITY FORMATION AND
THE CONVERGENCE OF BRICS CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY

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COLLECTIVE IDENTITY FORMATION AND THE
CONVERGENCE OF BRICS CLIMATE CHANGE
POLICY

A Ph.D. Dissertation

by
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Ankara
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To my parents

COLLECTIVE IDENTITY FORMATION AND THE CONVERGENCE OF BRICS
CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY

The Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences
of
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by

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ABSTRACT

COLLECTIVE IDENTITY FORMATION AND THE CONVERGENCE OF BRICS CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY

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This dissertation explores what explains the convergence among the BRICS, the acronym standing for Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, on climate change, despite their divergent characteristics in terms of leading production sectors, demographic trends, population size, emissions profiles, and roles in the energy market. Based on the methodological principles of the theory testing branch of process tracing, there are three potential arguments driven by the existing theories to understand the phenomenon at hand. Hence, the dissertation utilizes *soft-balancing* of Neorealism, *functional cooperation* of Liberal Institutionalism, and *collective identity* formation of Constructivism. The main argument contends that the increasing interaction among the BRICS states, changes in the material world, and, as a result, the cohesion on the basis of *collective identity* have expanded the web of intra-group cooperation and collaboration within the club and generated shared ideas, discourse, and values on climate change-related issues over time. Adopting an interpretive discourse analysis, the dissertation also relies on primary textual materials consisting of the declarations of the BRICS platform, high-ranking state representatives' speeches and statements, and other official documents. The dissertation unravels how their *collective identity* position the BRICS as emerging powers between developed and developing countries and urge their active involvement in tackling climate change in connection with their overlapping

discursive, ideational, and policy frameworks. Thus, the dissertation contributes to the literature by unveiling the roots of the convergence among the BRICS, extending the timeframe for uncovering the shared BRICS positions, and marking the relevance of *collective identity* formation for BRICS cooperation.

Keywords: BRICS, Climate Change, Sustainable Development, Green Transition, Collective Identity



ÖZET

ORTAK KİMLİK OLUŞUMU VE BRICS İKLİM DEĞİŞİKLİĞİ POLİTİKASININ YAKINLAŞMASI

Kıprızlı, Göktuğ

Doktora, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

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Bu tez, başat üretim sektörleri, demografik eğilimleri, nüfus büyüklüğü, emisyon profilleri ve enerji piyasasındaki rolleri açısından farklı özelliklere sahip olmalarına rağmen Brezilya, Rusya, Hindistan, Çin ve Güney Afrika'dan oluşan BRICS'in iklim değişikliği konusunda neyin aralarındaki yakınlaşmayı açıkladığını araştırmaktadır. Süreç izleme yönteminin teori testi türünün metodolojik ilkelerine bağlı kalarak, incelenen olguyu anlamak için mevcut teorilere dayanan üç potansiyel argüman bulunmaktadır. Böylece tez, Yeni-Gerçekçilikten yumuşak *dengeleme*, Liberal Kurumsalcılıktan *işlevsel işbirliği* ve İnşacılıktan *ortak kimlik* kavramlarını kullanmaktadır. Çalışmanın ana argümanı, BRICS devletleri arasında artan etkileşim, fiziki dünyada ortaya çıkan değişiklikler ve bunların sonucu olarak *ortak kimlik* temelinde yaşanan uyumluluğun BRICS kulübü içerisinde grup-içi birlikte çalışma ve işbirliği ağını genişlettiğini ve zamanla iklimle ilgili konularda ortak düşünce, söylem ve değerleri ürettiğini ileri sürmektedir. Ayrıca tez yorumsal söylem analizini benimseyerek BRICS platformunun deklarasyonlarından, üst düzey devlet temsilcilerinin açıklama ve konuşmalarından ve diğer resmi dokümanlardan oluşan birincil metinsel materyallerden faydalanmaktadır. Tez, *ortak kimliğin* BRICS'i yükselen güçler olarak gelişmiş ve gelişmekte olan ülkeler arasında nasıl konumlandığını ve örtüşen söylemsel, düşünsel ve siyasal çerçeveleriyle bağlantılı

olarak iklim deęiřiklięi ile m¼cadelede aktif katılımlarını nasıl teşvik ettięini ortaya çıkarmaktadır. Bu sayede tez, BRICS arasındaki yakınlaşmanın köklerini açığa çıkararak, paylaşılan BRICS pozisyonlarını ortaya çıkarmak için incelenen zaman dilimini genişleterek ve *ortak kimlik* oluşumunun BRICS iş birlięi için önemini göstererek literat¼re katkı sağlamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: BRICS, İklim Deęiřiklięi, S¼rd¼r¼lebilir Kalkınma, Yeřil D¼n¼ř¼m, Ortak Kimlik



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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BASIC: Brazil, South Africa, India, China

BRIC: Brazil, Russia, India, China

BRICS: Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa

BRICSAM: Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Mexico

CBDR: Common But Differentiated Responsibilities

CBDR-RC: Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities

CDM: Clean Development Mechanism

COP: Conference of the Parties

EKC: Environmental Kuznets Curve

EIT: Economies in Transition

EU: European Union

GATT: The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

GHG: Greenhouse Gas Emissions

INDCs: Intended Nationally Determined Contributions

IMF: International Monetary Fund

LNOB: Leave No One Behind

MDGs: Millennium Development Goals

NAM: Non-Alignment Movement

NAMAs: Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions

NDB: New Development Bank

NDCs: Nationally Determined Contributions

OPEC: Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

RIC: Russia, India, China

SDGs: Sustainable Development Goals

SSC: South-South Cooperation

UN: The United Nations

UNFCCC: The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

UNGA: United Nations General Assembly

WB: World Bank

WTO: The World Trade Organization



CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The introduction part intends to clarify the puzzle, which is the main motivation of this dissertation, ask the research question, and present the main argument of the dissertation together with other alternative explanations. This Chapter continues by offering an extensive literature review. Building on this review, the growing role of the BRICS countries in global issues, especially in finance and energy, and their relevance and importance regarding the subject of climate change are revealed. Lastly, the Chapter indicates the gaps in the existing literature and presents the contribution of the dissertation.

1.1. Puzzle, Research Question, and Arguments

The origin of the BRIC cooperation can be traced back to the idea of the strategic triangle between Russia, China, and India mooted by then Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov (1998-1999) during his visit to India in December 1998. Initially, Beijing and New Delhi approached his proposal with caution, but both advancing bilateral relations among Russia, China, and India and emerging geopolitical changes in the world politics aroused their attention to this trilateral rapprochement (Lukin, 2013).

Besides the interstate communications, the ideational foundation of potential cooperation among Brazil, Russia, India and China was built by Jim O'Neill (2001), who was the Chief Economist of Goldman Sachs back then. He coined the acronym

BRIC by considering the distinctive size of these countries in the world economy as well as their fast growth rates and large populations. In his article entitled “Building Better Global Economic BRICs”, O’Neill (2001) emphasises the emerging characteristics and potentials of these countries and assumes a necessity for readjustment in international policy-making and policy-coordination processes in the fields of global monetary, fiscal, and other economic policies. Despite the fact that the term had not referred to a political grouping, the ongoing economic shift in favour of the BRIC countries and the following international developments brought a political dimension to the concept (Stuenkel, 2013a).

Although O’Neill’s concept originally included Brazil, the first meetings were organised in the trilateral formation between Russia, China, and India, and scheduled at the level of Foreign Ministers on the margins of the sessions of the UNGA in 2003 and 2004. The first meeting of Foreign Ministers, which was arranged independently of any other international event, was held in 2005 (Lukin, 2013). Efforts on strengthening trilateral economic cooperation, and international and regional problems including the war on international terror, illicit drug trafficking, and other major challenges occupied the agenda of these ministerial meetings (Nivedita, 2012).

A new step about the future of the BRICS was taken in 2006 when Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s (2004-ongoing) suggestion to invite Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim (1993-1995 and 2003-2011) to one of the regular New York lunches of the RIC Foreign Ministers was accepted by other representatives (Li & Carey, 2014). Therefore, the coordination among Brazil, Russia, India, and China was informally initiated on a regular basis. The luncheons on the margin of the UNGA started to be organised by Brazil, and these countries were interested in deepening their dialogue. Thus, the grouping began to acquire a political dimension (Reis, 2013) and they established the ground for exchanging their views on main issues appearing on the global agenda. By agreeing that they share common interests and incentives to coordinate their actions, these four states laid the foundation of the BRICS group and put the concept generated by O’Neill as an acronym into practice (Lukin, 2013).

In the upcoming years, the BRICS achieved to transform itself from a catchy acronym to a club with annual leaders' summits, ministerial meetings, and joint statements. The establishment and evolution of the BRICS mark the emergence of a cooperation initiative across regions and continents with its flexible and all-encompassing structure. With their rapid economic development and recent advances in the way of institutionalisation, the BRICS grouping went beyond its initial formation where its members came together and shared their ideas. In this sense, the BRICS club has emerged as one of the most significant gatherings where some of the most prominent economic powers in the world come together.

Still, there are studies pointing out the future challenges for the BRICS grouping by showing the limitations and differences among these countries as the reasons for their argument (Desai, 2007; Cheng, 2015). At this point, Luckhurst (2013) indicates the studies carried out by Armijo (2007), Armijo and Burges (2010), Glosny (2010), Hurrell (2006), Roberts (2010), and Sinha and Dorschner (2010) and brought the competitions, disagreements, and differences between the BRICS states to light. For example, one of the competition areas grabbing the attention of researchers is the border disputes between China and India (Cooper & Flermes, 2013; Laidi, 2012). Researchers argue that this geopolitical tension hampers the cooperative environment and the mutual trust between these two countries.

The heterogeneity in terms of ideology and political regimes is offered as another source of difference among the BRICS nations. While Brazil and India have adopted Western norms to consolidate their democratic political system and South Africa has emerged as a positive example of democracy in Africa, Russia has an authoritarian rule and China is a one-party state under a leader for life (Armijo, 2007; Luckhurst, 2013; M. Müller, 2011).

Beyond these fundamental variations among the members, each state, however, has reached different stages of economic development. In addition to the disparity in their economic size and performances, these countries follow a diverse range of integration strategies with the world economy. Both China and India, in general, are the actors affording to be part of the supply chains and service industry in the globe. While China focuses on the manufacturing industry, IT-related services stimulate the

economic growth in India. Brazil, Russia, and South Africa mainly export natural resources. At this point, agriculture, forestry, and the mining sectors in Brazil, export of petroleum and natural gas in Russia, and mineral exports in South Africa drive the economic development in these countries (Azevedo, Sartori, & Campos, 2018; Armijo & Burges, 2010; Luckhurst, 2013; Stuenkel, 2013a; Hopewell, 2016). Moreover, these five emerging economies have different economic priorities (Stuenkel, 2013a) and compete for obtaining a footing in the same markets (Luckhurst, 2013). These variations and competitions indicate both divergent and competing trade interests and objectives, and the differences in the nature of their economic orientation.

Along with various demographic trends and population size, the five BRICS member states play different roles in energy supply and consumption. Therefore, while Brazil, Russia, and South Africa are on the side of energy supply, China and India are importers of energy resources (Taylor, 2018).

Furthermore, there are discussions on the different emissions profiles (Davenport, 2012) which are used to show divergent interests and objectives of the BRICS members in this context. To illustrate, their shares of global GHG emissions in 2019 are as follows: Brazil-2.9%, Russia-3.9%, India-6.8%, China-24%, and South Africa-1.1% (Climate Watch, n.d.). Yet, Davenport (2012) recognises the importance of the BRICS countries in terms of climate governance as a result of their size and their gains thanks to the shift in the global economy. The BRICS states also acknowledged the importance of climate change-related topics and have mentioned these items in every single Declaration since 2009.

Despite the existence of the abovementioned asymmetries and divergences between the BRICS states, their issue-based cooperation has expanded towards and deepened in various fields, including climate change-related subjects. Therefore, the dissertation aims to investigate the following: why do the BRICS members generate a common stance at the international level regarding climate change against the divergences in their emission profiles, economic structure, and energy needs? In connection with this, this dissertation focuses on exploring the underlying factors that urge these countries to act in unity.

Before going further, there is a need for giving some hints about the research design at this point. In the light of the assumption that states are unitary actors, the dissertation sees their foreign policy and by extension their stances at the international level regarding climate change-related issues as the by-products of their unified nature of the governmental composition (Breuning, 2007: 57). Still, the dissertation is not interested in the foreign policy-making processes of the states taking part in the BRICS cooperation. Furthermore, it neither looks at their national legislative regulations nor investigates their domestic policy implementations and the translation of their policy concepts into practice. Rather, the purpose of this dissertation is to reveal the convergence and the internal dynamics of the convergence process among the BRICS states, despite the existence of their divergent characteristics. Also, the dissertation does not compare the BRICS group with other multilateral platforms composed of various combinations of the group members, such as BASIC or IBSA. Without assessing whether those international climate change negotiations produced any successful outcome, or any decision transposed to their national law, the dissertation adopts the methodological principles of the theory testing branch of process tracing and aims at tracing the process of how the BRICS constituents have pursued common political and discursive stance on climate change. Additionally, this dissertation starts its analysis with the Earth Summit assembled in Rio following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and it sets its timeframe up until 2021.

Formulated on the basis of the existing theories, there are three potential arguments to explain the BRICS cooperation in the field of climate change. The first explanation, which is derived from Neorealist International Relations Theory, emphasises the role of power relations in the international system (see sub-section 2.1.1.). According to this argument, although the U.S. preserves its superiority in the international system, the rise in the BRICS countries' material power, the erosion in the U.S. image, and its growing disinterest in executing its long-performed role of systemic stabiliser paved the way for the BRICS states to emerge as new political and economic powers in international relations. By considering the military preponderance of the U.S., the BRICS grouping is involved in *soft-balancing* the

U.S. unilateral actions at the international level and the partner states pursue their interests in respect to global issues including climate change.

The second alternative explanation is generated by relying on the presumptions of Liberal Institutionalists (see sub-section 2.1.2.). For this argument, the initial cooperation among the BRICS countries in times of economic and financial crisis sustained the platform where these states were able to deepen this intra-group cooperation, develop policy alternatives to provide solutions for global challenges, and thus functionally incorporate new policy areas, such as energy, development, as well as climate change, to overcome traditional tragedies of international politics.

Lastly, the third explanation is built on Constructivism in International Relations which ponders over ideational factors to understand the BRICS cooperation in climate change (see sub-section 2.1.3.). This theory-guided mechanism is the main argument of the dissertation and proposes that the increasing interaction among the BRICS members, changes in the material world and, as a result, the cohesion on the basis of the *collective identity* has expanded the web of intra-group cooperation and collaboration within the club, and generated shared ideas, discourse, and values on climate change-related issues in the progress of time.

1.2. Gaps in the Literature and the Contribution of the Dissertation

The studies focusing on BRICS have been carried out especially since the second half of the 2000s. To reveal the contribution of the dissertation, it is important to indicate the gaps in the existing literature.

1.2.1. Explanations on Cooperation Among the BRICS Countries

Studies argue that the BRICS states want to take advantage of the club to pursue their regional and global aspirations (Kingah & Quiliconi, 2016). In this regard, it is proposed that Chinese leaders realised that their engagements in multilateral platforms, such as BRICS, are useful to promote their interests (Wang, 2012). Glosny (2010) evaluates that China considers BRICS as a way of lessening its dependence on the U.S., limiting the U.S. unilateralism, and building a cooperative

environment with other member states. Therefore, it is believed that China strengthens its identity as a developing country devoting its efforts to SSC and favouring multilateralism (Cheng, 2015; Abdenur, 2014). By this way, China disseminates that it does not aspire to reach a superpower status (Luckhurst, 2013).

In the case of Russia, it is asserted that the administration under the Presidency of Vladimir Putin (2000-2008 and 2012-ongoing) goes after retrieving the great power status of Russia in international affairs. Russia seeks to restore and enjoy its connection with African and Latin American countries, and thus this perspective paves the way for its active involvement in multilateral cooperative efforts, such as the BRICS group (Simão, Barrinha, Nasser, & Cravo, 2014; Johnson & Köstem, 2016). It is thought that for Moscow, the BRICS cooperation serves as a platform where it can voice its discontent with the prevailing global economic and financial system, and its restlessness in military actions carried out by the U.S. and NATO (Sergunin, 2015). While Russia aims at gaining status (Sergunin, 2015; Luckhurst, 2013) and alleviating the economic and social setbacks (Parlar Dal & Erşen, 2020) via its membership in BRICS, the club's itself presents an alternative for Russia to the Western-led international system (Salzman, 2015; Roberts, 2009).

Likewise, it is proposed that Brazilian decision-makers aim at enhancing their country's soft power by taking active roles in multilateral institutions and global discussions on environmental issues (Hochstetler & Milkoreit, 2014). The BRICS grouping helps Brazil to build a coalition to further its ambitions toward strengthening its position in and uttering the expectation of reform within the UN (Doval, 2015; Vieira & Ouriques, 2016; da Silva, 2018). Additionally, it is put forward that Brazil utilises its BRICS membership to create a multilateral challenge to the supremacy of the U.S. (Luckhurst, 2013; Vieira & Ouriques, 2016).

Similarly, it is suggested that India wants to use its participation in the BRICS grouping as a means to improve its status in the international arena and establish relations with other major powers (Kumar, 2017; Sinha & Dorschner, 2019). However, some think that Indian policy-makers do not regard the membership of the BRICS club to counter the West and the U.S. in particular (Kumar, 2017; Sinha & Dorschner, 2019; Luckhurst, 2013).

Lastly, it is contended that South Africa also intends to advance new networks and opportunities offered by its involvement in BRICS (Neethling, 2017; Anuoluwapo, Abdul-Wasi, & Edwin, 2018; Luckhurst, 2013). Bringing international prestige, South Africa's membership to BRICS is seen as an instrument for its policy-makers to go for reforms in global governance (Shoba, 2018) and to promote their vision that covers South Africa's probable leadership on the continent (Neethling, 2017; Stuenkel, 2013b).

It is also argued that as their power in the global economy and politics have increased, the growing self-confidence of the BRICS countries in terms of their economic strength enables them to air their voices at the international level increasingly (Cooper & Farooq, 2013). At this point, the analysis of Nel (2010) is helpful to understand the foreign affairs incentives of the leaders from emerging economies. According to Nel, developing world leaders, on the one hand, want to ensure a favourable environment for gaining better distributional outcomes in the global political economy, and, on the other hand, their struggle for recognition motivates them. For emerging powers, the notion of recognition refers to the search for full and equal membership and participation in multilateral institutions, their efforts to awaken respect for their distinctiveness, and their fighting against discrimination, disrespect, and humiliation.

Furthermore, Stephen (2014) indicates that as the BRICS states integrate into the global economic structure, their dependence on existing organisations of global governance increases and, so, these countries work together with the established powers. However, emerging powers conceptualised an alternative way of development model relying upon statist mode. As a result, they combined their integration into liberal order with their statist variant of economic development.

In this sense, the BRICS member states employ the strategy of coexistence promoting the principles of respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and do not expostulate about the liberal order, but they intend to constrain hegemonic actors in imposing their peculiar ideologies on other members of the international community (de Coning, Mandrup, & Odgaard, 2014). Still, their cooperation within the body of

the BRICS club is considered by its members as a platform that enables them to further their intra-group connections and collaborations in favour of the socio-economic well-being of their societies and other developing nations.

1.2.2. Increasing Role of the BRICS States in Global Issues

The analyses of the BRICS cooperation have mainly thought of how the participants consider the club as a means to promote their interests in order to change the prevailing international structure and pursue their greater geopolitical ambitions. Besides these subjects, the growing conspicuity of the club members concerning international affairs and their assertive foreign policy understanding make it essential to examine the implications of their prominence for global governance, particularly in the fields of finance, energy, and climate change.

1.2.2.1. The BRICS States in Global Finance

According to Stuenkel (2013a), the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 was the reason for the emergence of unprecedented cooperation for emerging powers. This crisis can be seen as the starting point of the shift within the architecture of global governance. It also provided a basis for a call on reforms in global governance institutions as a result of the poor performance of developed states before and after the period of economic downturn. With the increasing visibility of emerging powers, new alignment models such as the formation of the BRICS club were created and these multilateral cooperative agencies opened the normative deficiency and structured rule-maker and rule-taker dichotomy up for discussion (Weiss, 2016).

The BRICS countries emerged as new players in international politics by virtue of their outstanding economic performances and they were able to finance the deficits of developed countries and make a contribution to global economic growth (Petropoulos, 2013). Their remarkable economic growth paved the way for their reintegration into global economic institutions and enhanced their ability to compete in international markets. Emerging powers, Brazil, India, and China, in particular, aimed at achieving cautious engagement in the international economic system and

imposing their influence over the reconstruction process of global institutions rather than their changes in a radical way (Kahler, 2013).

The power shift to emerging powers, particularly to the BRICS countries, encouraged them to demand their adequate representations in international institutions such as the IMF, the WB, or the WTO and to support each other's enthusiasm to play a greater role within the body of the UN (Jang, McSparren, & Rashchupkina, 2016; Naudé, Szirmai, & Haraguchi, 2015). As a result of their ambitions targeting international institutions, emerging powers called for reforms to make these organisations more representative, inclusive, and south-oriented (Stephen, 2012: 289). For Stephen (2017), the rise of emerging powers in the global economy challenged the prevailing structure of global institutions in terms of leadership and privileges and caused a degree of informalisation and fragmentation in global governance.

Differently from the previous examples in history, the BRICS is trying to take place in global governance which has been already characterised by the institutionalised Western domination. Even though different institutional features created varying representational inequalities, international institutions of global economic governance performed a level of adaptation and reform within their institutional structure (Parízek & Stephen, 2017). For instance, the Heiligendamm Process, which was designed to initiate an in-depth dialogue between the G8 countries and important emerging economies –Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and South Africa– framed more inclusive global governance and new institutional initiatives to overcome the legitimacy and efficiency crisis of the G8 (Cooper & Antkiewicz, 2008).

The Global Financial Crisis of 2008 has enhanced the bargaining ability of emerging powers, the BRICS especially, and elevated them as agenda-settlers (Stuenkel, 2013a). This situation led to the resistance to the proposals brought forward by developed states and triggered incentives to make counter-proposals. Accordingly, the BRICS countries preferred to lend resources to the IMF by purchasing new notes of the institution in the post-crisis period instead of accepting the formula of the New Arrangements to Borrow as offered by developed states (Woods, 2010).

In this sense, international financial institutions faced reform demands in favour of emerging powers and developing countries. While the realignment of quotas and the reformulation of the selection process of high-ranking officials came to the forefront in the IMF, the issue of the redistribution of votes was added to the agenda of the WB. Although these institutions had to initiate processes towards their internal governance, there are discussions on whether these reforms have failed or succeeded in satisfying the expectations of emerging powers (Lesage & Van de Graaf, 2015).

1.2.2.1.1. Institutionalisation of the BRICS Grouping

Although the subjects of international political economy and international security are some of the issue areas to analyse the institutionalisation stages of the grouping (Ramos, Garcia, Pautasso, & Rodrigues, 2018), the creation of the NDB is a critical advancement taking the institutionalisation initiatives of the BRICS platform forward. The NDB was instituted to put resources into use for financing infrastructure and sustainable development projects in the BRICS, other emerging economies, and developing countries with the purpose of supporting their economic development and closing the deficit in accessing required funds. Additionally, the Bank lends its technical assistance for the projects and facilitates information, cultural, and personnel exchange to achieve environmental and social sustainability (“Environment & social sustainability”, n.d.).

The NDB adopts an idiosyncratic administrative mentality differing it from other development bank models. Cooper (2017) compares the NDB with Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and discloses the former’s unique features. Therefore, the principle of equal rights and obligations, financing of sustainable development projects via green infrastructure, derivation of its capital base through green bonds, and its implications in terms of delivery innovation are the attributes that enable the NDB to differ from other development banks.

Investigating the question of why the BRICS Development Bank is created, some studies assert that the underlying reasons are the result of a combination of international and national dynamics. The large deficit in transferring the resources for infrastructure investments in developing countries after the Global Financial

Crisis of 2008 takes part together with the national interests of each member in the process of promoting the NDB (Chin, 2014). Also, the dissatisfaction of the BRICS countries with the current international financial architecture as a consequence of the inequality between their growing share in global GDP and their voting power in existing multilateral organisations is shown as the driving motivation behind the initiation of the NDB (Suchodolski & Demeulemeester, 2018).

Others have argued that the BRICS countries founded the NDB with the aim of financing infrastructure gaps and use it as a platform for policy learning rather than replacing the Bretton Woods institutions (Qobo & Soko, 2015). This argument can be interpreted as evidence that BRICS does not challenge the prevailing world order and its institutions, but can take actions in accordance with the perceived change in the distribution of power in their favour.

The institutionalisation process of the BRICS club has been an important step in the direction of improving and expanding the cooperation among the member states. So, the BRICS countries advanced and diversified the cooperation areas among them by taking advantage of the legitimacy crisis of the existing international institutions (Stuenkel, 2013a). The prominence of BRICS in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 attracted researchers to investigate its role in other areas of global governance as well.

1.2.2.2. The BRICS States in the Field of Energy

The BRICS countries are important actors for global energy markets in terms of energy supply, demand, and security. The existence of divergent interests (Downie, 2015) and their varying roles in energy consumption and production indicate the heterogeneity among them, but social, economic, and climate change-related challenges posed by their growing populations urge them to work on green energy and green development (Sahu, 2016).

From the perspective of ecological economists, the BRICS states have occupied an important place in establishing a dialogue between civil society and actors in the economy, merging conflict resolution practices with the tools of sustainability

assessment systems, and cultivating integrated development policies, which include the responsibilities of the agency (May, 2008).

Apart from the BRICS' potential in engaging in the avenues of energy innovation and governance, the EKC hypothesises that the higher income brings the means to reduce the deleterious effects of large-scale consumption (May, 2008). Growing industrial activities cause environmental degradation due to the initial dependence on fossil resources, but the high cost of this environmental deterioration motivates the policies to reduce environmental pollution and promote renewable energy consumption and sustainable production (Nassani, Aldakhil, Abro, & Zaman, 2017). In this context, energy-related climate change mitigation policies and energy efficiency practices take place in Brazil, Russia, India, and China (Viola & Basso, 2016). In particular, the linkages between energy, green industrialisation, competitiveness, and environment determine their priorities in the climate change-related policies (Schmitz, 2017).

Within this scope, the topics of energy efficiency and energy-saving created fertile ground for furthering intra-BRICS cooperation and collaboration (Sahu, 2016). Since it is realised that the innovations in green technology make contributions to both sustainable performances of the BRICS countries and their productivity in the energy sector (Santra, 2017), decision-makers of the BRICS nations strive for overcoming the negative impacts of environmental degradation and climate change problems on their economic growth and acknowledge the vital role of green growth and sustainable development to support their economic advancement (Zaman et al., 2016). Hence, the BRICS club engages in funding clean and renewable energy, using energy-efficient and alternative technologies to achieve sustainable development, deal with poverty, and respond to climate change (Gu, Renwick, & Xue, 2018).

1.2.2.3. Discussions on Climate Change and the BRICS

Climate change-related issues became one of the most prominent subjects in global governance as a result of increasing concerns about the sustainability of fossil-fuel based economic development, environmental degradations, and human health. The nature of global challenges necessitated the involvement of emerging powers and

other developing countries in problem-solving processes as well as in managing global common goods (Klingebiel, 2017). In terms of climate change, the upward trends in their emissions profiles made their contributions essential (Klingebiel, 2016; Happaerts & Bruyninckx, 2013). Their higher rates of GHG emissions put pressure on these countries to take tangible actions and adopt active engagement in international climate change negotiations (Gupta, 2010).

Therefore, the rapid economic development of emerging powers, the BRICS countries especially, and their significance in acting on these issues either constructively or perniciously make them key players in global climate change governance. In this context, the shift in power structure resulted in a proliferation of the platforms where climate change has appeared as a new discussion topic and these structures enabled their member states to voice their collective demands and overcome the complexity of multilateral negotiations (Happaerts & Bruyninckx, 2013).

1.2.2.3.1. Why the BRICS Countries Are Relevant in the Field of Climate Change

Changes in the material world have promoted the significance of the BRICS' political stances and strategies at the international level. In line with this, the dissertation, first of all, highlights GDP rates, levels of energy use and consumption, and emissions profiles of the BRICS countries to illustrate their significance, common features, and relevance regarding climate change. It is also important to note that data availability has determined the range of years of the presented tables.




Figure 1: Annual GDP Growth of the BRICS Countries and the World Between 1990 and 2021 by Percentage.

Source: World Bank (n.d.), World Development Indicators: GDP growth (annual %).

The preceding Figure demonstrates the annual percentage of GDP growth rates for each BRICS country and the world. Whereas the negative effects of both the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, and the COVID-19 Pandemic caused a decline in the selected samples, most of the BRICS countries have achieved to catch an upward growth trend in comparison to the world.

Table 1: The Share of the BRICS Economies in the World's GDP Between 2000 and 2021.

Year	Brazil	China	India	Russian Federation	South Africa	Total Share of BRICS in the World
2000	1,95%	3,61%	1,38%	0,77%	0,41%	8,11%
2001	1,67%	4,01%	1,43%	0,92%	0,36%	8,40%
2002	1,46%	4,24%	1,46%	1,00%	0,33%	8,50%
2003	1,43%	4,27%	1,54%	1,11%	0,45%	8,80%
2004	1,53%	4,46%	1,60%	1,35%	0,52%	9,45%
2005	1,88%	4,81%	1,70%	1,61%	0,54%	10,55%
2006	2,15%	5,35%	1,79%	1,92%	0,53%	11,74%

2007	2,41%	6,13%	2,07%	2,24%	0,52%	13,37%
2008	2,67%	7,23%	1,87%	2,61%	0,45%	14,83%
2009	2,77%	8,48%	2,20%	2,03%	0,49%	15,96%
2010	3,35%	9,25%	2,51%	2,31%	0,57%	17,99%
2011	3,57%	10,33%	2,49%	2,80%	0,57%	19,75%
2012	3,29%	11,42%	2,44%	2,95%	0,53%	20,62%
2013	3,21%	12,46%	2,41%	2,98%	0,48%	21,53%
2014	3,10%	13,24%	2,58%	2,61%	0,44%	21,96%
2015	2,41%	14,77%	2,81%	1,83%	0,42%	22,23%
2016	2,36%	14,73%	2,99%	1,69%	0,39%	22,16%
2017	2,55%	15,16%	3,22%	1,95%	0,43%	23,31%
2018	2,22%	16,08%	3,13%	1,92%	0,47%	23,81%
2019	2,14%	16,29%	3,23%	1,93%	0,44%	24,03%
2020	1,71%	17,30%	3,14%	1,75%	0,40%	24,29%
2021	1,67%	18,45%	3,30%	1,85%	0,44%	25,72%

Source: World Bank (n.d.), World Development Indicators: GDP (current US\$).

As these countries have produced almost a quarter of overall global GDP in line with their incremental annual growth rates, their flourishing significance and self-confidence thanks to their economic strength enabled them to air their voices at the international level increasingly (Cooper & Farooq, 2013).

Although the issues concerning international finance generated the initial thrust for the intra-BRICS cooperation, simple and incipient motivations for collaboration and interactions leading to the process of confidence-building among the BRICS countries allowed them to identify common interests at the intra-governmental level (Stuenkel, 2015). The issue areas of intra-BRICS cooperation can be categorised under different policy areas such as finance, trade, investment, security, energy, health, and climate change and the environment. As noted above, the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 laid the basis for the foundation of BRICS and the member countries explored new interest areas they share. Economic development has been the priority of the BRICS countries. However, their rapid economic growth and export-oriented economic boom gave rise to criticisms as this development process harms the environment.




Figure 2: CO2 Emissions in the BRICS Countries and the World Between 1992 and 2019.

Source: World Bank (n.d.), World Development Indicators: CO2 emissions (kt).

CO2 emissions stemming from the burning of fossil fuels and the manufacture of cement are produced during the consumption of solid, liquid, and gas fuels and gas flaring. Although Brazil, Russia, India, and South Africa have had stable CO2 emissions levels comparatively, the escalating negative contribution of China cannot be disregarded. This upward trend also mirrors the increasing domestic demand for energy consumption to prolong the period of the economic boom in the BRICS countries, and especially in China.

The BRICS states, on the one hand, faced the negative impacts of environmental degradation at the domestic level, and, on the other hand, had to deal with the concerns at the international level about their environmentally-hazardous production techniques and high-level energy consumption.




Figure 3: Energy Use of the BRICS Countries and the World Between 1990 and 2014.

Source: World Bank (n.d.), World Development Indicators: Energy use (kg of oil equivalent per capita).

Figure 3 illustrates that the BRICS countries have a considerable level of primary energy use as input before transformation to other end-use fuels. This situation confirms the energy-intensive industrialisation development process in most of the BRICS member states. Yet, the escalating energy use in the BRICS economies does not merely explain their contributions to the global GHG emissions. In this regard, a closer look needs to be given at the carbon-based fuels' composition in total energy consumption.




Figure 4: Fossil Fuel Energy Consumption in the BRICS Countries and the World Between 1990 and 2015.

Source: World Bank (n.d.), World Development Indicators: Fossil fuel energy consumption (% of total).

In relation to this, fossil fuel consumption materials comprised of coal, oil, petroleum, and natural gas products compose the main ingredient of their energy consumption. Thus, the large portion of natural resources emitting GHG supports the argument that the BRICS states negatively made a contribution to global climate problems. Beyond the energy-related analyses of the BRICS countries' carbon footprints, a sector-specific investigation is also useful. Some of the most prominent sectors with their high carbon profiles are agricultural activities and forestry.




Figure 5: The Share of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing in Total GDP of the BRICS Countries and the World by Percentage Between 1995 and 2021.

Source: World Bank (n.d.), World Development Indicators: Agriculture, forestry, and fishing, value added (% of GDP).

Agricultural production and other related activities are additional factors affecting environmental degradation. Agriculture corresponds to forestry, hunting, and fishing, as well as the cultivation of crops and livestock production. The statistics of the WB calculate the figures without making deductions for depletion and degradation of natural resources. In spite of the decline in the share of agricultural production in China and India, agriculture and other relevant economic fields still generated a remarkable portion within the GDP of the BRICS economies.

While the BRICS countries were paying close attention to their economic growth and define a direct connection between their economic development and their power, they realised that they need to follow a growth pathway to achieve their economic and political ambitions in keeping with the increasing scarcity of global resources and externalities of environmental deterioration (Hallding, Jürisoo, Carson, & Atteridge, 2013). Issues related to climate change left the BRICS states' policy-makers no choice but to evaluate their national development strategies together with

its environmental costs and burdens whilst maintaining rapid growth rates (Downie & Williams, 2018).

At this point, the BRICS countries acknowledged that they had to take some steps against environmental deterioration and climate change as a result of internal or external factors such as health issues, agricultural production, energy governance, and natural hazards. The concept of sustainable development and other relevant subject matters such as green growth or resource creation have found a wide place in the BRICS agenda.

However, the state of inequality and unfairness at the international level led to the divergent interpretations of the principles and the adaptation of new ideas framing the issue of climate change. The BRICS has pioneered and sought to promote the new outlook on the basis of fairness and equality, and to ensure the national development pace (Xiangyang, 2011).

Their economic sizes and dynamism, high growth rates, rapid development records, ascending GHG emissions, and political activism cast the BRICS countries' new roles and laid a burden on them to play a greater part in global climate governance (Hurrell & Sengupta, 2012). So, the BRICS group bind together at the international level in terms of generating a common approach to climate change-related issues.

1.2.2.3.2. Assessments of the BRICS States and Their Policy Stances Against Climate Change

In addition to the influence of emerging powers over the initiatives for global governance and the relevance of the BRICS countries in the discussions on climate change, the prominence of this topic at the international level offers a new platform for the BRICS states to take an active position at the international level (Yang, 2011).

There are studies in the literature exploring the individual dynamics of climate change policies for each BRICS country. While some studies examine the evolution

of India's climate policy within the framework of its larger foreign policy agenda (Mohan, 2017), some works have been conducted to reveal the specific objectives of China concerning climate change (Harris, 2011; McBeath & Wang, 2008; Harris, 2004). Additionally, South Africa's approach to climate change (Olutola & Landsberg, 2018), Brazilian climate politics (Riethof, 2016; Hochstetler & Viola, 2012; Viola & Franchini, 2014), and the factors determining Russian climate policy (Henry & Sundstrom, 2012) have been examined in the literature. Additionally, Bailey and Compston (2012) discuss the political obstacles to Brazil, Russia, India, and China in conducting their own climate policies by adopting the policy-network theory and integrating public and private actors such as politicians, government officials, and non-government groups into their research.

Some studies also point out the limitations and differences among the BRICS countries as the future challenges for group cohesion (Desai, 2007; Cheng, 2015). In this regard, there are discussions on the different emissions profiles (Davenport, 2012) and economic models of the BRICS countries (Hopewell, 2016) which are used to reason the argument that they hold divergent interests and objectives. Therefore, the varying national interests, changes in individual goals, differences in energy strategies, and disaccord on the nature of binding commitments are presented as the factors blocking the common vision among the club members (Rinaldi & Martuscelli, 2016). Nevertheless, other scholars emphasise the economic and political convergence within the BRICS grouping (Armijo, 2007; Glosny, 2010; MacFarlane, 2006).

Thus, the cohesion of BRICS with regard to their foreign policy positions towards climate change has been the academic focus of a small number of publications. While the BRICS's growth potentials, crowded populations, and exponential environmental pollutions are their common characteristics making them important actors in global climate change governance (Happaerts & Bruyninckx, 2013), almost the same drivers make the BRICS member states vulnerable (Markandya, Galarraga, & de Murieta, 2014). Although each BRICS country takes various mitigation and adaptation measures and these measures show a dissimilar level of ambition, the actions are initiated within the body of the BRICS club serve to explore the potential for intra-group cooperation and generate convergence and a common position among

the members (Gladun & Ahsan, 2016). Furthermore, some studies assess increasing BRICS commitments to and interest in climate change as a solution to level up their soft power (Petrone, 2019).

Brütsch and Papa (2013) also think that the analyses uncoupling the BRICS alignment and stressing member states' differences are not fruitful to perceive their team synergy, their efforts to overcome strategic competitions, and their goals beyond the restrictions of individual gains. In this sense, the authors set an analytical framework consisting of "the rationalist literature on bargaining coalitions and the constructivist literature on 'imagined' [international] communities" to understand whether the member states use their affiliation as a strategic tool, as a way to rise in tandem, or together (Brütsch & Papa, 2013: 299). While the first case is related to monetary issues, the second case is derived from climate change. In the case of climate change, Brütsch and Papa argue that the repeated interactions among BRICS and the inclusive decision-making processes in various issue areas promote the BRICS cooperation in developing their collective responses to climate change but the authors assesses the BRICS as it felt short in emerging as a bargaining coalition.

Downie and Williams (2018) investigate the cooperation between BRICS countries after 2015 at the multilateral and bilateral levels. They mark that variations in production and consumption of fossil fuels among the BRICS countries hinder their capacity to coordinate their actions in the form of a coalition on climate change. However, the multilateral and bilateral meetings between BRICS in the fields of energy efficiency, agriculture, and development finance, and the efforts in the direction of institutionalisation set the ground for future cooperation in a variety of areas related to climate change. Still, the authors state that a lesser number of studies have been conducted on the role of BRICS in global climate governance.

In sum, the researchers mainly explain the wide range of cooperation within the body of the BRICS club as a result of the power shift in favour of these countries and its consequences on the process of the decline in the predominant status of the U.S or on the international organisations. However, the BRICS cooperation cannot be reduced to the concept of the rise and fall of great powers or the transformation observed in

international multilateral institutions. As drawn from the literature, this reasoning neglects the BRICS members' positions towards climate change.

While their activities in energy governance draw attention per their economic weight and their energy production and consumption levels, a limited number of studies, as stated by Downie and Williams (2018), have been carried out to investigate the cooperation of the BRICS countries on global climate governance. In general, the relevant studies indicate the different and common positions and interests of the BRICS members, but these studies have not engaged in revealing the underlying dynamics of these propositions thoroughly. Scholars mainly try to explain these propositions within the framework of economic indicators of the member states and isolate the BRICS countries from the grouping itself. Still, any study doesn't attempt to comprehensively analyse the climate change-related items in the declarations of the BRICS Summits. At this point, this dissertation seeks to contribute to the literature by working on the coherence among the BRICS states in the field of global climate change and extending the timeframe for the phenomenon of the converging positions among the BRICS states.

The below-quoted paragraph took place in Joint Statement for the 5th BRICS Ministers of Environment Meeting in August 2019 and exposes the main motivation of the dissertation to conduct a detailed investigation for revealing the underlying factors that explain the expanding and flourishing cooperation among the BRICS states in the field of climate change.

We acknowledge the importance of global action against climate change. We are committed to work together [...]. Our countries are committed to the successful implementation of the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement and urge that negotiations be transparent and result in outcomes that are fair and effective in addressing the challenge of climate change, while reflecting the principles of the Convention, especially the principle of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC), in the light of different national circumstances (BRICS, 2019a).

To this end, different from the previous works, this dissertation firstly intends to discover the initial positions of each BRICS state, and explain and understand the dynamics that gave rise to the conditions that led to the onset of overlapping policy

stances among these five countries from 1990 to 2009. Then, this dissertation frames the common policy stances of the BRICS club by relying on the declarations of the BRICS Summits, official documents released within the framework of the BRICS platform, and the speeches delivered by the high-ranking officers from the BRICS countries at the level of multilateral organisations.

Additionally, the BRICS states might have been less sensitive to climate change since their primary incentives for actively engaging in global issues were related to their increasing economic powers and their motivations to gain ground due to the shock in global financial structure, however, they have exhibited dynamic and constructive involvement in the direction of fight against the problems of climate change. At this point, a general discussion about the BRICS cooperation in the literature focuses on their economic incentives, energy demand, their position in the face of the U.S. predominance, and thus the subject of the climate change remains to be of secondary importance. This dissertation recognises but moves beyond the widely discussed variables, such as economic motivations, and presents the additional factors leading to convergence in climate change policies among BRICS members. Therefore, it is the potential contribution of the dissertation that it searches for an answer to the underlying factors that promoted these states to generate a common stance on climate change.

1.3. Outline of the Dissertation

This dissertation is divided into six subsequent chapters. While Chapter 1 is organised as an introduction of the dissertation, the following Chapter builds its methodological approach and sets its theoretical framework. Therefore, Chapter 2 aims at testing the competing theories against each other. Through a comparison of the selected IR theories (Neorealism, Liberal Institutionalism, and Constructivism) to explain BRICS cooperation in the field of climate change, Chapter 2 provides a theoretical lens to explain the phenomenon at hand. So, it builds alternative mechanisms drawn from the literature.

Chapter 3, Chapter 4, and Chapter 5 are the parts of the dissertation where the analyses of the collected empirical evidence take place. Hence, the empirical

relationship between the material and ideational factors concerning the convergence among the BRICS states will be the core of the discussion through the instrumentality of the official documents and statements produced by representatives from the BRICS states or the BRICS platform. The Concluding Chapter will provide a general discussion of the findings of the dissertation, indicates its contribution and implications, and sets the paths for future research.



CHAPTER 2

COMPETING THEORIES AND THE METHODOLOGY OF THE DISSERTATION

As revealed in Chapter 1, the increasing role of the BRICS states in global governance overlaps with their growing weight in the existing international system and significance in climate change-related issues. Accordingly, the routine interaction among the member states at the body of the club enhances the level of within-group cohesion and cooperation and this leads to the inclusion of new issue-areas in the scope of their joint agenda. At this point, the empirical assumptions provide prospects that this development forms a platform that enables the member states to generate common policy stances and triggers the process of converging policy positions at the international level. Hence, this Chapter firstly aims at building the alternative mechanisms in line with the competing theories for explaining and conceptualising the BRICS cooperation and the dynamics of their joint policy practices, especially in the field of climate change. After I present the alternative explanations that compete for solving the puzzle of the dissertation, the second part of the Chapter introduces the methodological principles of process tracing and the particular features of its theory testing variant.

2.1. Competing Theories in Explaining Cooperation Among the BRICS States in the Field of Climate Change

In accordance with the methodological principles of theory-testing process tracing, the next step after the selection of the case is the selection of theory (Blatter, 2012:

7). To this end, it is important to take the plurality of theories into consideration. Thus, the research needs to engage in existing theories in detail. The existing knowledge requires to be evaluated whether any alternative explanation is plausible for understanding the phenomenon at hand. The assessment of the validity of the competing theories is crucial and their survival depends on this evaluation (Bennett & George, 1997: 15; Beach & Pedersen, 2011: 2; Beach, 2017: 20).

In this regard, the empirical assessment of the BRICS cooperation in the field of climate change (Chapter 4 and Chapter 5) is scrutinised as to whether the predicted observable implications of the theorised mechanisms are complying with designated theories—Neorealism, Liberal Institutionalism, and Constructivism—or not. While Neorealism and its variants explain the cooperation among the BRICS countries by considering the interaction between the U.S., as the hegemon, and the BRICS countries, as the revisionist powers (Leal-Arcas, 2008; Skak, 2011; Glosny, 2010), in the international system, Liberal Institutionalism ponders over the intra-BRICS cooperative environment by considering actors' utility calculations and the effect of international institutions (Armijo, 2007; Tudoroiu, 2012). However, the Constructivist account offers a wide variety of motivations for explaining intra-BRICS policy convergence, such as the emergence of collective identity, shared values and ideas, and the formation of discursive alignment.

In the literature, several leading studies explain the phenomenon of the BRICS by adopting the Marxist perspective (Stephen, 2014; Parízek & Stephen, 2017; Jayan, 2012; Muhr, 2016; Vadell, 2020; Yang, 2019) or bringing the question of sub-imperialism (Bond, 2015; 2016; 2018; 2020). This dissertation recognises the theoretical contributions of these critical accounts of International Relations to the discussion of the BRICS. Yet, the arguments of this dissertation are derived from the three mainstream schools of International Relations because these theoretical approaches mostly occupy the debate of the BRICS.

2.1.1. Neorealism and Its Critique

Neorealism deduces that power relationships determine the structure of international politics under anarchy. As the ordering principle, anarchy defines the political

structure and so the outcomes in international politics are the products generated by the distribution of the units' capabilities. Thus, the international system becomes a force that constraints unit behaviour while driving them towards other states with the security concerns at the top of their agenda (Waltz, 1988: 621).

As a consequence of the international system under anarchy, states are principally concerned with their own security. Every unit is responsible for its survival. Hence, it strives to maximise its power relative to other states as a result of the perception of today's friend tomorrow's enemy. Neorealism prioritises the impact of the structure of the international system on state choices. The anarchic nature of the international system implies sameness (Waltz, 1979: 93). Therefore, states are treated as self-interested like units acting in the self-help system. In this regard, Neorealism has a limited ability to account for the change in the international system.

Although Waltz recognises the changes in international politics in the event that hierarchy replaces anarchy at the unit level (Schroeder, 1994: 113) as a reflection of a shift that occurred in the configuration of material capabilities (Ruggie, 1986: 140), this development refers to within-system changes (Waltz, 2000: 5). Changes in the structure of the system indicate the transformation of international polarity, but any tendency towards the transition to hierarchy would be prevented by the structure of anarchy, and thus would trigger the attempts to balance the emergence of a dominant force (Ruggie, 1986: 140). Still, Waltz (2000: 5-6) contends that changes at the unit level and changes of polarity do not lead to the transformation of the system itself.

Neorealism accounts for the impact of the structure of the international system on state preferences which are regarded as exogenous (Powell, 1994: 317). In accordance with its assumptions about the fixed state preferences, Neorealism holds a structuralist perspective which is relevant in times of relative stability in international relations (Gill, 1993: 29).

As discussed in Chapter 1, the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, however, paved the way for an increase in the economic powers of non-Western states, or emerging powers. The first quarter of the 21st century witnessed the process that reshaped the global system. Thus, the new and influential medium-sized powers have adopted

more dynamic and proactive stances in world politics. Considering their rapid economic development levels, active positions in the international system, prominent roles at the regional and global levels, and capabilities to persuade other stakeholders made them different from other medium-sized powers and fall into the category of emerging powers on the global scale (Klingebiel, 2017: 6).

There is a cluster of countries that can be considered as emerging powers –Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa– and these countries disclosed their will to establish coordination between each other at the body of the BRICS platform. Hence, they instituted a mechanism which aimed to overcome the past failures suffered by developing countries due to the weaknesses in generating collective action (Cooper & Flesmes, 2013: 944).

The emergence of the BRICS group as a dynamic platform and the broadening cooperation among its member states urged scholars to discuss the rise of the BRICS club in the framework of its potential revisionist stance towards prevailing international order and the envisioned power transition in international relations. In the post-Cold War era, the status of the U.S. as enjoying the exclusive superpower role indicates the asymmetry in the distribution of power in the international system (Hurrell, 2006: 3 and 5). These unbalances in power distribution induced less powerful states to play the game within the limits set by the preponderant position of the U.S.. As a result, Hurrell (2006: 16) argues that the BRICS states got involved in a search for containing the power of the U.S. in a wide variety of issue areas. Furthermore, some argue that the BRICS was established to counter the U.S.-led international structure (Korolev, 2016: 38), strategic balancing (Neack, 2018: 146), or soft-balancing the U.S. hegemony (Hurrell, 2006; Skak, 2011).

The book edited by Nadkarni and Noonan (2013) aims at examining the character of the anticipated power transition, the importance of the international power hierarchy, the significance of national role perceptions, the effect of globalization, and the impact of demographic factors on established and rising powers in general. While China's participation in international organisations and its engagement with other emerging powers at the level of multilateral platforms such as the BRICS were considered as the means of Beijing's soft-balancing strategy against the U.S.

dominance, the position of the U.S. as the world's dominant power dissuaded Chinese policy-makers from endangering its relations with the U.S. in spite of its increasing confidence after the global economic downturn (Zhao, 2013). Moreover, the existence of conflictual subjects such as trade, market access, and climate change and New Delhi's disapproval to back American policies in the countries where India has established close ties caused reactions on the side of India (Nadkarni, 2013). Additionally, the Bush Doctrine formulated on the basis of the U.S. unilateralism induced Brazilian decision-makers to re-adjust their foreign policy by pursuing a more active engagement in the UN peacekeeping operations as an instrument for conducting South-South diplomacy and participation in emerging power coalitions and initiatives such as the BRICS (de Castro Neves, 2013).

Noonan (2013) also explores whether the U.S. will be another example of the decline of the great powers or will be an exception to the phenomena of decline and fall of hegemonic powers. Even though she only regards the rise of China rather than other emerging BRICS countries as the major challengers against the U.S. position in international affairs, she thinks the U.S. would remain as the leading player on the world stage, even though the author recognises that the world moves to multipolarity.

The central position of the U.S. in the global political and economic structure, growing but not sufficient level of trust among the BRICS countries, the high cost of counterbalancing behaviours against the U.S. (Pant, 2013; Glosny, 2010), a relative deficiency of the BRICS states in terms of military strength (Chun, 2016), the U.S. leadership in promoting liberal world order and sustaining its interdependent ties (Kiely, 2015), and the domestic inequality and the lack of technological innovation in the BRICS countries (Beausang, 2012) are scrutinised as the factors making any attempt to counter the U.S. unrealistic. In this respect, any emerging power blatantly challenges and balances the U.S. primacy, although a shift in material capabilities has been experienced in the international system and the existing political, economic, and military capabilities have been being reshaped (Armijo & Roberts, 2014).

Against the pessimistic expectations of Neorealism and its variants, while Paul (2016) assesses the establishment of the BRICS group as a way to induce the U.S. to adopt accommodative policies towards them, and thus make meaningful gains,

Hurrell (2013: 211) points out the accommodative policies of major powers as alleviating the tension between rising powers and pre-existing hegemonic state. Nonetheless, Skak (2011) analyses the notion of the BRICS in association with the concept of soft-balancing originated from Neorealism. Although Skak determines the signs of both soft- and hard-balancing in foreign and security policy practices of Brazil, Russia, India, and China, he argues that these implementations are the consequences of second-image dynamics and considers them as the responses of decision-makers in the face of globalisation. For Skak, being a rising power would not make the BRICS countries avid challengers of the existing global scheme since they can manage to find new ways to utilise the presented opportunities.

As holding the perception that unipolar international order prevails, Glosny (2010: 108-110) emphasises the structural constraints imposed by the dominant power. Even though the Iraq War and the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 eroded the image and power of the U.S., the power asymmetry in favour of the U.S. would restrain the transition from unipolarity to multipolarity. In this sense, Glosny thinks that the leadership of the U.S. in international relations might induce the BRICS states to represent themselves as they and their grouping do not challenge and balance the U.S. and threaten the Western liberal order.

However, it is contended that rising powers embraced the norms, discourses, and institutional mechanisms once the U.S. had enjoyed with no competitor and this development corresponds to the counter-movements against the U.S. hegemony rather than neoliberal world order (Hopewell, 2016). By utilising the weight of their number, these countries try to have a place in the international system and become a part of a multilateral order through prioritising cooperation (Cooper & Flesmes, 2013: 948 and 954). Emerging powers, Brazil, China, and India especially, appear as the new political forces in addition to their economic significance. The degree of cooperation and unity among these actors brought the preponderance of the U.S. into question (Hopewell, 2017).

Contrary to the premises of the Power Transition Theory, which mainly argues that rising powers discontented with the existing rules of the system, challenge the dominant power, and this situation may set the ground for international conflicts

(Organski, 1968; Gilpin, 1981), the BRICS can be seen as reformist states rather than revisionist as a result of their attitude which favours peaceful methods to solve the disputes (Sergunin, 2015). These reformist goals to some extent enable the BRICS states to establish cohesion within their grouping (Brütsch & Papa, 2013: 327). At this point, Kähkönen (2014: 94 and 101) acknowledges that the sole antipathy towards the U.S. hegemony does not explain the coherence among the BRICS grouping. Still, some propose that in the current world order, the military supremacy of the U.S. makes a military confrontation less likely, but still the attitudes determined by the perception of the unipolar world order in the fields of diplomacy, economy, and climate change create an opportunity for the BRICS states to take the advantage of playing the leading role of global opposition to unipolarity and take action for changing the balance in their favour (Petrone, 2019: 25).

One of the fundamentals of Neorealism receives a pessimistic viewpoint regarding the cooperation among states. The concerns about being cheated and relative gains considerations discourage cooperative incentives at the international level (Mearsheimer, 1994-1995: 12). Yet, Neorealist theory argues that already powerful and privileged states would derive benefits from this non-cooperative framework in international politics as well as in environmental issues (Paterson, 2005: 76). Concerning the relevant discussion on environmental problems, Waltz (1979: 109 and 209) defines poverty, population, proliferation, and pollution as the four “p’s” that are structural and common problems representing a global characteristic. However, in the light of his cautious position regarding the concept of interdependence in a self-help system, which is the fundamental trait of the international system for Waltz, he asserts that states would engage in a struggle to steer the international management of global problems.

By acknowledging that solutions at the global level dependent on the national policies, Waltz’s (1979: 109) analysis points out that the structure of the international system would constrain state policies. Accordingly, it leaves second-tier states with limited options known as either balancing or bandwagoning strategies (Hurrell, 2006: 5-6). Moreover, Neorealism casts a reactive role for second-tier states within the international system where they show a lack of ability to make a meaningful change (Klingebiel, 2017: 5). Thus, financial, military, and research resources compose the

material components of the concept of power, so only major powers would shape the international responses to climate change and environmental issues at the global level (Rowlands, 2001: 45 and 48). At this point, a powerful state or group of states may have the ability to utter threats and induce other countries to alter their activities when they cause environmental damage. Also, their contribution to and involvement in global climate change and environmental issues may be necessary to achieve a successful agreement (Rowlands, 2001: 44-47; Below, 2017: 6).

As one of the variants of the Neorealist account, some scholars developed an approach that international cooperation might be possible when a single predominant actor exists in the international system and is ready to make use of its power resources to stabilise the structure by employing coordinative and disciplinary measures. In this sense, the hegemonic stability thesis is utilised to explain international cooperation on climate change and the environment. In this context, the self-interested states would act in accordance with international rules once a dominant hegemonic power compels other states (Below, 2017: 6).

If this was the case, it would be expected that the U.S. would display active and productive participation in climate change negotiations and environment-related global actions. However, contrary to expectations, the U.S. as the player of the hegemonic power role, especially in the post-Cold War period, has been either absent or posed obstacles to the construction of international agreements on climate change. Additionally, resulting arrangements on the climate change-related issues should not have precisely overlapped with the preferences of the U.S. (Rowlands, 2001: 46). By considering the theoretical discussion above, the mechanism for the Neorealist Approach for explaining the BRICS states' cooperation in the field of climate change is framed as follows:

Potential Mechanism 1: The decline in the U.S. predominant position enables the BRICS countries to act together for encouraging a multipolar international system by employing soft-balancing measures at the international level against unilateral actions of the U.S. hegemony, and thus these countries found an opportunity to pursue their reformist agenda regarding the global issues as well as climate change.

As a consequence of its static nature, Neorealism does not provide adequate means to understand the recent rapid shifts in the international system due to the diffusion in the distribution of material power (Paterson, 2005: 74) and fails to account for the changes in ideational factors such as ideology and historical and cultural predispositions in this respect. Contrary to the particular focus of Neorealism on the major power in analysing international relations, the processes intending to find solutions to global challenges, including problems brought by climate change, require the involvement of those emerging powers due to the increase in their material capabilities (Klingebl, 2017: 38). By favouring international cooperation and associating themselves with developing countries and the idea of being emerging powers, the BRICS acknowledges the benefit to act with the weight of the arising sense of solidarity within a coalition at the international level regarding climate change issues (Below, 2017: 9), and thus notices the recently assigned collective responsibilities to them in the field of climate mitigation. Yet, the underlying reasons for the expectations regarding the active involvement of the BRICS states in dealing with climate change are their growing carbon footprint and their changing status in international relations.

In sum, states' material capabilities are the main concerns for Neorealism. While Neorealism adopts a reproductive logic for the question of systemic transformation (Ruggie, 1998: 875), it fails to explain how the emergence of states from the East and the South particularly affects the international system. This school of thought ontologically recognises states and the system of states, but it assesses state identities and interests as given and fixed. In this regard, Neorealism has no analytical means for understanding the dynamic nature and impact of identities and interests on international outcomes and casts a limited role for ideas (Ruggie, 1998: 863 and 865). This flaw in Realist theory does not serve to thoroughly understand why the BRICS states developed issue-based cooperation after the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 and this intra-BRICS cooperation has not remained limited to the financial area (Stuenkel, 2013a: 622-623). Within this context, accelerating deterioration of the environment necessitates the meaningful engagement of the BRICS countries in global initiatives and their growing importance makes their remarks valuable for international climate debates. Rather than power struggle at the systemic level,

factors such as changing perceptions on responsibilities on the global scale and their sense of solidarity with other developing states urge the members in the BRICS club to take action on climate change efforts.

2.1.2. Liberal Institutionalism and Its Limits

Theoretical developments in the literature of the Game Theory provided analytical tools for researchers to show that reiterated games can lead to cooperative outcomes contrary to the presumptions of the Neorealist account about the nature of international politics (Paterson, 2005: 68). At this point, Liberal Institutionalists intend to answer how to encourage and maintain cooperation in an anarchic and competitive international system, and under what conditions states involve in cooperation in a post-hegemony world. For Liberal Institutionalists, the competitive nature of the international system does not inhibit the opportunity for cooperation as states discover the areas where they share mutual interests, and thus the effect of anarchy may be mitigated (Powell, 1994: 326).

In this regard, Liberal Institutionalists hold that states do not pay attention to the gains of other states and they pursue to reach the maximum of their absolute gains. As examined by Grieco (1988: 496), states exist in an anarchical environment and consequently act as rational egoists. Therefore, state utility functions are indifferent to other unit's gains or losses and so states aim at maximising their utility on the basis of their consistent and ordered preferences. The major obstacle to maintain international cooperation is the concern about being cheated by other units (Grieco, 1988: 497). However, the motivation for maximising the absolute gains increase the likelihood of cooperation among the actors (Paterson, 2005: 68-69). In this respect, cooperation becomes easier to be achieved since institutions, which are defined as "persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations", serve to lessen the inhibiting effect of anarchy on international cooperation (Keohane, 1989a: 250).

According to Keohane (1984), hegemonic power, which is able to set the international rules, designs its hegemonic leadership and international system, and international regimes created by the hegemon guide the behaviour of other states, and

thus make cooperation possible even after the decline of the hegemonic power. State behaviours take form in accordance with expectations about other state behaviours, hence international institutions give shape to the preferences of states since institutions reduce uncertainty, affect patterns of costs, decrease transaction cost, supply information by means of monitoring, provide consistency to state expectations, clarify the conditions under which reciprocity would be employed, and determine enforcement rules (Keohane, 1988). Therefore, international institutions become actors in international relations by virtue of their impact on state choices and international outcomes.

Although Liberal Institutionalism explains behavioural regularities and the restrictive impact of the system on state behaviour as Neorealism (Keohane, 1989b: 7-8), the former school of thought takes the independent effect of international institutions on changes in state behaviours and incentives into consideration rather than analysing changes in terms of distribution of power as in Neorealism (Hellmann & Wolf, 1993: 6).

The Liberal Institutional perspective also recognises the influence of medium-sized powers in shaping international relations (Klingebiel, 2016: 37). In this context, a group of developing countries enjoyed rapid economic growth in the post-Cold War era. The 2008 Financial Crisis weakened Western states' exclusive control over international institutions (Cheng, 2015: 13 and 16). This situation marked the inadequacy of the existing international governance organisations in meeting the demands of developing countries. While major powers attached priority to different subjects on their agenda, these countries also held distinct views on these topics. Thus, these states, especially the BRICS countries, resolved not to preserve but rehabilitate the existing international order and institutions (Cheng, 2015: 13-14). For instance, the BRICS countries intended to build a coalition and determine an agenda once they came to the negotiation table with the largest economies in the world. Therefore, these countries sought to form a collective bargaining power at the level of international financial institutions through the instrumentality of the efforts to increase the voice and representation of developing countries and constitute a just international monetary structure on the basis of equal partnership (Jayan, 2012: 371-372).

Additionally, climate change-related issues are one of the most important challenges for the existing international order (Cheng, 2015: 13). For Liberal Institutionalists, the main concern about global problems caused by climate change is the collective responses at the level of international regimes (Paterson, 2000a: 7). Therefore, collaboration can settle collective action problems by referring to the concepts of “jointness of supply (so that, for example, no country can single-handedly provide a stable climate globally) and ‘non-excludability of benefits’ (no country can insulate itself from the impacts of climate change, or make sure that only it benefits from a stable climate)” (Paterson, 2000b: 12). Thus, the perception of vulnerability and interests in protecting global commons present explanations to international cooperation over global climate change problems (Harris, 2013a: 36).

Once states realise that pursuing their interests individualistically may face shortcomings in obtaining joint gains, they incline to cooperate under anarchy (Rowlands, 2001: 55). Although states have varying levels of vulnerability to the impacts of climate change and global environmental problems, and institutions have different degree of formative power over their members, global characteristic of these problems obligates every state to involve in international processes (Rowlands, 2001: 56).

Linking global challenges stemming from climate change to the concept of global commons problem, international environmental regimes maintain without the existence of a commanding hegemon (Vogler, 1997: 234) and cooperative actions take place despite the veto powers of certain states (Below, 2017). At this point, a policy convergence can be observed as a result of the delimiting effect of institutionalised treaties and regimes on international actions, behaviours, and responsibilities. Acting as enforcement mechanisms (Axelrod & Keohane, 1985: 237), institutions encourage and facilitate interstate cooperation by playing the role of the hegemon to some extent.

International environmental institutions serve to increase the degree of states’ awareness towards climate change problems, reduce transaction costs, and enlarge the shadow of the future by designing an international stage for iterated interactions

among states. International environmental institutions also constitute a platform for the transfer of resources, know-how, and information (Haas, Keohane, & Levy, 1993). Additionally, international environmental regimes still have an impact on state behaviours and alter their perceptions (Vogler, 2016).

However, as Keohane and Victor (2011) point out, it is highly unlikely to solve the problems related to climate change by forming a comprehensive international regime. Therefore, there are various institutionalised mechanisms showing different membership and content profiles. Although the existence of multiple international institutions reflects the divergent interests among different groups regarding climate change, the network among these international organisations constitutes the mainframe of global climate change governance. Furthermore, Rowlands (2001: 57-58) reminds that divergent interests may lead to divergent strategies adopted by various states. In this context, these states act within the framework of negotiations blocs in international climate debates.

In sum, Liberal institutionalism enables to analyse of the contribution of institutions to international cooperation on climate change. Accordingly, the mechanism drawn from Liberal Institutionalism is stated below:

Potential Mechanism 2: Although the global economic and financial turbulence initially encouraged the BRICS countries to cooperate for overcoming global challenges, the overlapping material interests and increasing common policy implementations among them have stimulated these member states to incorporate new policy areas, including climate change, into their network of international cooperation in which they make use of this opportunity to maximise their common benefits, reduce transaction costs, create synergy, and overcome tragedies of international politics and diplomacy.

However, the Liberal Institutionalist perspective on state preferences has been questioned as a result of its analytical lack of interest in the process of preference formation (Harris, 2013a: 37). For example, there is a considerable difference between European states and the U.S. with respect to climate change problems.

Although these countries are members of the same international organisations and internalised similar liberal economic principles, political systems, and values, they hold divergent policy positions, interests, and ideas with regard to problems caused by climate change (Duggan, 2015: 12). In the case of the BRICS partnership, being democratic or not, they have stood by other developing countries' side in identifying their positions on climate change problems (Armijo, 2007: 37).

In this respect, while the focus of the Liberal Institutional account on the possible prospects for international cooperation may produce misinterpretation on the idiosyncratic variations among actors, it also fails to embody the necessary tools for understanding the historical dimensions of state behaviours regarding climate change-related issues. Its ahistorical vision limits the theory's ability to uncover the idiosyncratic practices of actors and those dynamics affecting state actions against global climate change problems. While Liberal Institutionalism, as a rationalist theory, highlights the concept of utility-maximisation in analysing state actions, this theoretical position prevents itself from dealing with normative notions such as fairness, legitimacy, and responsibility which are the prominent dynamics expressed among less powerful states in terms of international climate change politics.

Although Goldstein and Keohane (1993: 3) address the role of ideational factors in determining government policies and clarifying actors' goals, they recognised the potential of ideational factors when these factors present a "principled or causal road map" in shaping state strategies in the absence of a "unique equilibrium", and is wedded to institutions (Goldstein & Keohane, 1993: 8). Therefore, ideas serve to order the world, frame agendas, and thus affect outcomes (Goldstein & Keohane, 1993: 12). Yet, Ruggie (1998: 866) contends that Goldstein and Keohane's treatment of ideational factors falls into the neo-utilitarian category since they do not concentrate on the impact of these factors on actors' identities. Lastly, Ruggie (1998: 869) argues that some ideational factors may not build a casual pathway in state actions as some ideas, such as aspirations, legitimacy, and rights, may be the reasons for actions rather than causes.

Furthermore, ideology and culture appear as decisive factors shaping actors' practices. In respect to international climate change politics, the division between the

wealthy and the poor, as manifested in the context of the North-South split, the varying level of dependence on fossil fuels, the differences in vulnerability to climate change problems, and the attitudes which are derived from historical experiences affect states' stances towards the issue of climate change (Paterson, 2005: 73). In addition, the concept of identity shapes the state's policies and their interactions with its counterparties at the international level. In part, this indicates that the understanding of identity as a socially constructed factor has determinative implications on the social preferences, policy interests, and behaviours (Kahler, 1998: 933 and 936). All these mean that there are factors beyond the relationship between the preferences of the actors, their powers, and the existing structure (Paterson, 2005: 74-75).

As revealed in Chapter 3, whilst preserving their historical connection with the developing nations—which is an overlooked dimension of Liberal Institutional research agenda—the BRICS countries also conceptualised new ideas and approaches and followed a strategic reorientation in their foreign policy following their rapid economic growth after the mid-2000s. Under these circumstances, new ideas have gradually reformulated the traditional ones and the emergence of adapted self-perceptions has made the BRICS countries to be more inclined to cooperate with each other in the international arena. Furthermore, gaining a *collective identity* under the title of emerging powers enables the BRICS member states to highlight their commonality distinguishing them from the rest of the developing world. In addition to aiming at maximising their economic benefits, these countries act together within the framework of the BRICS cooperation on the basis of ideational factors such as their historical ties with the developing world, pursuing their global ambitions, and presenting themselves as the responsible partners at the international arena. These ideational motivations may be regarded as the by-product of their assumptions of being emerging power identity.

2.1.3. Constructivist Account for the Issue of Global Climate Change

Constructivist research agenda aims at exploring and construing the narrowly theorised concepts of actors' interests and identities on the basis of intersubjectively defined social action and social order (Ruggie, 1998: 862). Although actors hold pre-

existing ideas regarding their identity prior to their interaction with other actors (Zehfuss, 2002: 44), actor's ideas about the Self and the Other subsequently constitute their identities and interests (Tannenwald, 2005: 19; Tannenwald & Wohlforth, 2005: 7). At this point, Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston, and McDermott (2009: 18) delve into the concept of collective identity. According to the authors, collective identity consists of two dimensions –content and contestation–. Contestation describes the level of agreement within the group over the meaning of the group's Self (Abdelal et al., 2009: 18). Contention over the content of the collective identity occurs within the group and this factor determines the fluid and varying nature of collective identities (Abdelal et al., 2009: 19-28).

On the one hand, social contestation within the group produces the content of a collective identity, on the other hand, the term content specifies the meaning of a collective identity. The content of social identity is composed of constitutive norms, social purposes, relational comparisons, and cognitive models (Abdelal et al., 2009: 19). While constitutive norms serve to recognise a group member on the accounts of established rules, fixed meanings, determined proper behaviours, and shared collective expectations within the group (Abdelal et al., 2009: 20), social purposes reveal the practices performed in line with distinctive goals specified by the group identity (Abdelal et al., 2009: 22). Furthermore, relational comparisons mark the process in which identity is a result of comparisons and references to other collective identities on the basis of in-/out-group differentiations (Abdelal et al., 2009: 23-24). Lastly, cognitive models disclose the worldview of collective identity and its interpretation and understanding of the past, present, and future (Abdelal et al., 2009: 25).

While the relationship between the Self and the Other defines the political, cultural, and economic confines and delineates the social purposes in line with the characteristics of the perceived collective identity (Köstem, 2018: 730), identities can demonstrate a multifaceted characteristic which refers that an actor may possess multiple social identities at the same time (Wendt, 1999: 230; Wendt, 1994: 385). In relation to this, social identities constitute actors' interests and this process produces and reproduces the ideational structure (Reus-Smit, 2008: 406). Therefore, intersubjective understandings, subjective knowledge, and material objects constitute

the social world. As a consequence, ideational structure (re)defines the meaning and identity together with material structures, and both of these structures are mutually constituted by actors and vice versa (Fierke, 2013: 190; Ruggie, 1998: 862).

Constructivism has more explanatory power for the change in material structure. For instance, their economic, military, and demographic powers, technological development level, geopolitical importance, and resource-rich possessions encourage the BRICS states to exert their influences over the international order (Hurrell, 2006: 2). In accordance with the increase in their material powers, the BRICS states champion the design of a more inclusive, democratic, and equitable international system coupled with a comprehensive South-South dialogue as a result of the change in the distribution of power, especially after the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 (Van Noort, 2017: 124-125). In this context, the BRICS states achieved a remarkable level of collaboration and unity at the body of WTO by forming an alliance between emerging powers and the larger group of developing countries (Hopewell, 2017: 1379).

While ideas give meaning to the material world, the impact of ideas appears on the actors' roles, identity- and interest-formations, and their search for legitimacy and justification. In part, collective intentions, which are the knowledge shared by states, generate new rights and responsibilities and so create shared narratives about the objectives to be accomplished and interpretations about the future acts (Ruggie, 1998: 870; Stevenson, 2015: 43). For instance, along with the increase in their material capabilities, the BRICS countries demonstrate active and persuasive participation in global governance. While the BRICS states identify themselves with the concept of emerging powers, they at the same time aim at representing themselves as responsible international stakeholders promoting international justice and morality.

In addition to its direct effect on actor behaviours and international outcomes, ideas can also shape behaviours and outcomes indirectly by framing the social world and setting the ground for actions (Tannenwald, 2005: 19; Reus-Smit, 2008: 405-406). Accordingly, while norms, expectations, perceptions, and shared beliefs shape the actors' identities and interests and affect their relations, social agents construct an

international system based on their ideas, thoughts, and norms. As mentioned by Wiener (2006: 13), observation of identities and interests is related to global politics. And intersubjectively shared ideas, norms, and values guide it (Copeland, 2000: 189). Beliefs, expectations, and interpretations are inseparable components in international affairs (Hurd, 2008: 301). Therefore, constructivists highlight the importance of norms, rules, and language in international relations (Fierke, 2013: 189).

The process that an individual develops a sense of belonging with a group promotes cooperative behaviours, whereupon it tailors its behaviour (Beyers, 2010: 909). As Johnston (2005: 1021) points out, the style of discourse and shared language enable a more flexible environment for socialisation. To exemplify, Brazil, Russia, and South Africa gradually adopted the developmental-multipolar discourse of China and India by the mid-2000s. This discursive affinity paved the way for establishing a cooperative environment among these countries (Mielniczuk, 2013: 1087). At this point, the Constructivist project holds the view that actions and practices which are made possible by the beliefs or meanings can be revealed with the help of interpretation of the contextual web of meanings (Stevenson, 2015: 44). Discourse plays a central role in empowering ideas to shape identities and so triggers a change in international relations. Hence, discourse analysis is an instrument to conceptualise and measure social identities (Sylvan & Metskas, 2009: 72).

Constructivists also recognise the role of collective identities in global governance (Jayan, 2012: 368). Culture, history, ideas, and institutional legacies establish the basis of a shared belief system (Garrett & Weingast, 1993: 182). As the constituents of identity, shared belief systems, coordinated expectations, social norms, and institutions enable actors to achieve cooperation (Garrett & Weingast, 1993: 177). In view of the argument that a country's identity shapes how it participates in global governance, the histories of the five BRICS countries present an antagonism and contestation against the Western supremacy in accordance with their "communist, non-aligned, or almost non-aligned" characters (Tudoroiu, 2012: 34). Over time, the increasing interaction among a group of states can lead to the generation of a collective identity. At this point, a sense of a *we*-group and exclusion of the Other reify the collective identity. The image of the Significant Other is chosen or

constituted on the basis of the actor's material extension and resources, and its past experiences rooting back to its identity (Duggan, 2015: 13-14).

As discussed by Herrera (2005: 59), the formation of economic interests is not limited to external economic conditions and motivations for utility maximisation. The relationship between economic conditions and interests indicates a more complex setting. In contrast to the Realist School of Thought, which treats the disparities in relative power and security concerns as the fundamental sources of state behaviours and practices, and Liberal Understanding, which regards material incentives as the main factors in explaining state behaviours and practices, Constructivism adopts a broader perspective and includes the concept of national identity into its research agenda (Abdelal, 2009: 71). For Constructivism, varying collective identity perceptions among different societies produce different interpretations regarding their position in world affairs and their presumed purposes for economic activities (Abdelal, 2001: 1-2). For example, according to the assessment made by Hopewell (2017: 1380), the members of the BRICS cooperation forged "a strong collective identity and strategic alliance [...] in relation to the established powers", which is the contextual Other of these emerging powers at the global level. This perception of collective identity and alliance enabled the BRICS grouping to act together at the WTO despite the differences in their trade interests and targets.

Emphasising the prominence of developmental issues and potential contributions of developing countries, the BRICS grouping stimulates its role as the leader of the developing world with regard to their collective identity as responsible, mature, and active emerging powers (Duggan, 2015: 21). As a reflection of their identity, the BRICS countries aim at fostering their active involvement in global governance rather than remaining as rule-takers within the global governance system (Wang & French, 2013: 994). Thus, the BRICS grouping focus on strengthening their effort to reach the status of agenda-setter by empowering their leadership position through acting as the voice of small and medium-sized developing countries and incorporating their interests and ideas into the BRICS' agenda-building process (Schirm, 2010: 199).

Ideational factors matter in explaining state behaviours, but their role is not limited to changes in state interests. By counting on the mutually constitutive relationship between ideational and material forces, the political outcomes are shaped in line with ideas which architect the social context for sharing values and practising material interests (Ipek, 2015: 175-176). In this sense, social dimensions of the economic activities enable the interpretation of the material process of production and economic relations socially (Abdelal, Blyth, & Parsons, 2010: 9). The growing interaction among the BRICS initiated a process of “ideational consensus about shared goals and values that are to be promoted to respond to” environmental issues (Brütsch & Papa, 2013: 324). From a climate change perspective, the BRICS’ joint policy concepts have taken shape in accordance with the facts that scientific evidence of dangers and catastrophic impacts of anthropocentric climate change introduced new values, principles, and ideas into the development of economic strategies. In this regard, inclusions of new methods and other changes, and transitions in the production process refer to a meaning in the social context.

Within this scope, Constructivism regards climate change as a social process. It serves to understand the emergence, construction, and impediment of certain meanings and political nature of environmental issues in respect of historical and social backgrounds (Pettenger, 2007: 11-12). For example, the idiosyncratic perceptions of the actors towards the highly disputed concepts such as sustainable development, understandings of fairness, or historical responsibility gain meaning once they appear over the issue of climate change. The bloc of developing countries, such as the G-77 plus China, their collective history with respect to colonisation, and their discourse and ideology regarding global climate change politics obtain relevance in this context. In relation to their ties with the G-77 and less developed countries, the BRICS has intended to take a stance that is closer to those countries on the purpose of being recognised as the voice of less powerful states despite their varying levels of vulnerability to climate change problems and differences in their economic structures. As argued by Brütsch and Papa (2013: 307), in the post-colonial era, the aspiration of their past experiences in the colonial system motivates the sense of kinship among these countries against the major polluters.

The disproportional vulnerability to the detriment of developing countries generates a normative framing. Therefore, expectations of more vulnerable countries from emerging powers in the international system hint at the need for a historical enquiry of the polluter-victim spectrum (Paterson, 2005: 75), the shared idea on the conception of burden-sharing (Hochstetler & Milkoreit, 2015: 209), the principle of CBDR, and the North-South dichotomy regarding international climate change politics (Below, 2017). Thus, the constructivist mechanism in explaining the BRICS cooperation in the field of climate change is built as presented below:

Potential Mechanism 3: Increasing interaction, changes in the material world and, as a result, the cohesion on the basis of the collective identity expanded the web of intra-group cooperation and collaboration among the BRICS states by creating a social context for them to generate a shared discourse at the international level, embrace shared values, and encourage them to adopt a common agenda about the issue of climate change.

In conclusion, Constructivism's recognition of both ideational and material structures provides the basis for understanding state behaviours and the relationship between climate change-related issues and the formation of interests. In contrast to Neorealism and Liberal Institutionalism, whose focus exclusively incline to the implications of the international system on state behaviours in global climate change issues, Constructivism captures the objective facts and intersubjective perceptions and acknowledges the interrelationship between ideas and identity surfacing in international climate change politics.

2.2. Methodology

Vanhala (2017) reveals the works of Cao Milner, Prakash, and Ward (2013), Hochstetler and Laituri (2014), Mitchell and Bernauer (2004), O'Neill et al. (2013), and Steinberg and Van Deveer (2012) to draw the scholars' attention to the necessity of employing appropriate methodological practices for researches in the field of environmental politics. As indicated by Hochstetler and Laituri (2014), researchers, especially in the field of international environmental politics, have barely paid their attention to the methodological approach. At this point, Vanhala (2017) contends that

the practice of process tracing and the build-up of causal mechanisms provide a fruitful research agenda to the studies conducted in this field.

Hence, this dissertation offers an in-depth case analysis focusing on the sources of converging policy stances among the BRICS countries in terms of climate change-related issues in spite of the different nature of their economies and political systems. Relying on the qualitative research approach, the dissertation adopts process tracing. The qualitative research design considers “the causation in terms of necessary and/or sufficient causes” by taking into account the impact of variables (Mahoney & Goertz, 2006: 232). At this point, the main focus of the dissertation is to reveal the connection between the motives behind the intra-BRICS cooperation and the convergence in their policy positions to climate change-related issues.

Related to this, case selection is a critical step in process tracing. Beach and Pedersen (2012) create a two-dimensional Cartesian plane and they place the outcome on the vertical axis (y-axis) and the causal condition on the horizontal axis (x-axis). Accordingly, the authors advocate that the cases linking X to Y should be selected. With this object in mind, the sub-section of 1.2.2.3.1 explains why the issue of climate change is a relevant case in analysing the policy convergence among the BRICS club. In brief, the mentioned sub-section shows that their rapid economic growth not only has strengthened the BRICS countries’ positions in articulating their standpoints regarding the issues of global governance but also has obliged them to take actions and involve in international responses as active participants. Therefore, the member states of the BRICS club appeared as one of the most prominent actors in international discussions on climate change.

After selecting the case, the next important step for process tracing is to determine the theoretical framework of the research. Bennett and George (1997) indicate two methods of process tracing; process verification, which engages in testing the process tracing observations by employing previously determined theory, and process induction, which is generating potential hypotheses for future testing. Beach and Pedersen (2012: 4) flesh out this categorisation and introduce three types of process tracing; theory-testing, theory-building, and explaining the outcome. A research employing process tracing can unveil the relationship between possible causes and

observed outcomes by ways of theory testing and theory/case centric analyses (Vennesson, 2010: 231). Theory-testing process tracing offers the researcher to deduce a mechanism from the more general and existing theorisation, and test the validity of hypothesised causal mechanism against the case in hand. As Beach and Pedersen (2011: 4) express, a high level of confidence in theorised causal mechanism and making strong within-case inferences can be achieved by examining causal mechanisms in qualitative in-depth case studies adopting process tracing. In this respect, the previous section of Chapter 2 addresses the theories explaining the cooperation within the BRICS club. The section discusses how the selected theories—Neorealism, Liberal Institutionalism, and Constructivism—construe the phenomenon of the BRICS cooperation in the field of climate change, and then built mechanisms drawn from each competing theory to expose the relationship between the independent variable—*soft-balancing* for Neorealism, *functional cooperation* for Liberal Institutionalism, and the *collective identity* among the BRICS members for Constructivism—and the outcome—converging policy stance of the BRICS grouping towards climate change-related issues—.

Moreover, it is envisaged that linearity is not a necessary feature of the causal path, but it “may be circuitous with multiple switches and feedback loops”, and thus process tracing enables the researcher to discover the interrelation between variables (Ulriksen & Dadalauri, 2016: 227). Rather than acknowledging only a one-directional flow of causality from the independent variables to the outcome, a constructive process recognises the communication among the specified independent variables. Therefore, this dissertation integrates the interaction of the independent variables in-between into the causal path. This perspective gives a more dynamic nature to the factors and enables to take account of their combination and interaction in producing the outcome in the process. In this sense, the study holds the mutual constructiveness of determined independent factors as a result of the increasing interaction among the actors in question, the BRICS states. To this end, the aim of Chapter 3, Chapter 4, and Chapter 5 of the dissertation are to thoroughly investigate the factors contributing to the outcome.

While process tracing is an instrument to analyse how the intervention of the independent factors contributes to the outcome through the developed mechanisms

(Beach & Pedersen, 2012: 3), it enables to link the forces, events, sequences, and the outcome (Bennett & George, 1997: 8; Bengtsson & Ruonavaara, 2017: 46; Trampusch & Palier, 2016: 6). In other words, as analytical explanations built on a theoretical account are the core elements differing the historical narrative from process tracing (Bennett & George, 1997: 6), the comparison of evidence and historical records, and theoretical explanation are vital for a deductive process tracer (Bengtsson & Ruonavaara, 2017; Trampusch & Palier, 2016: 9). Thus, process tracing allows the researcher to identify the mechanisms either by analysing sequences and temporal orders of events or by opening the black box of inferences (Trampusch & Palier, 2016: 6; Beach & Pedersen, 2012: 1).

As it appears, process tracing uses a longitudinal research design where the researcher concatenates a sequence of events (Waldner, 2012: 68) and so the method allows to identify the steps in this process leading to the outcome in this particular historical context. The researcher connects relevant events and generates chains that connect forces to the outcome. Therefore, how one event stimulates actions that create new events leading to preference shifts, engagement in collective actions, change in values, norms, and/or identities can be investigated, and the production of the final event can be exposed (Waldner, 2012: 70).

In line with this, the study investigates the declarations of the BRICS Summits, joint statements of BRICS Environment and Foreign Affairs Ministers after their official Meetings, and comments, addresses, and remarks made by state officials during these Summits. These materials are the primary sources in uncovering the context, components, and the range of their cooperation. Additionally, the dissertation measures their cooperation by analysing states officials' speeches at the international climate change negotiations such as COP meetings of UNFCCC and the UNGA. Therefore, the dissertation traces the changes, expansions, progresses, and convergence in the field of climate change policies of the BRICS grouping and the BRICS members' positions. In line with this objective, web-based archival research is conducted to have access to primary sources. The official web pages of the BRICS countries' presidential offices and those Ministries which are responsible for foreign affairs, energy, and environment provide the speeches and statements delivered by the high-ranking government officials, ministers, and presidents together with reports

and presidential or ministerial announcements. It is critical to note that these official web pages keep a limited number of documents dated prior to the year 2009. Thus, the digital archive engine named Factiva is used to bring the statements, comments, addresses, and remarks of the BRICS countries' representatives to light.

Lastly, the dissertation considers the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference in December 2009 as the cornerstone to understand the depth and tune of future cooperation among the BRICS states. Thus, the dissertation starts tracing the positions of the BRICS countries before the formation of the BRICS grouping and then concentrates on the level of in-group convergence with regard to climate change-related issues after Copenhagen.

2.3. Conclusion

The process of theory testing initially encourages taking the competing theories into account in understanding the phenomenon at hand. In this respect, in the first part of this Chapter, I discuss the prominent theories in the literature which are utilised to assess the BRICS cooperation at the international level. While Neorealism underlines the impact of the structure of the international system on states, its research programme highlights the limits on state behaviours. While state interactions imposed these limitations, Neorealism relies on the perception of fear of survival in reasoning the international conditions inhibiting cooperation among states. In this sense, the presumptions on *balancing* behaviours within the scope of the BRICS cooperation dominate the Neorealist agenda. Furthermore, climate change problems fall into the category where national policies preclude international initiatives for cooperation.

Additionally, Liberal Institutionalism recognises that the international interaction can change states' utility calculations and the cohesion among states' interests encourages them to include new issue-areas to their agenda for reducing costs and achieving synergy. Liberal Institutionalist understanding of state preferences does not possess the essential framework to examine the historical dimensions of state behaviours and fails to analytically examine the preference formation process by counting on state identity and ideas.

At this point, the Constructivist account has explanatory power in understanding the policy convergence among the BRICS states by recognising the mutually constitutive relationship between ideas, identities, and interests. Therefore, the concepts of *collective identity* and the intersubjectively shared ideas, values, and discourse enable to make sense of the intra-BRICS cooperation in climate change issues at the international scale. In line with this, the next three Chapters focus on the policy stances of the BRICS countries regarding climate change before and after the formation of the BRICS club, and the level of and the motivations behind their policy alignment in the light of the empirical evidence collected from climate change negotiations at the body of the UN and the primary sources composed of the documents of the BRICS platform and the speeches of high-ranking officials from the BRICS states.

CHAPTER 3

FROM THE RIO EARTH SUMMIT TO THE COPENHAGEN CLIMATE CHANGE CONFERENCE: EXAMINING INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE POLITICS OF EACH BRICS STATE

After the Second World War, global economic recovery increased environmental pollution. During the 1950s and 1960s, these environmental issues were discussed in UN Special Agencies. Following the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm in 1972, both UN Environment Programme and other relevant environment departments were established by the UN member states. Within this context, the idea that mitigation should be pursued through domestic emissions reduction targets started to be considered as a legitimate notion in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

In the post-Cold War period, the positive atmosphere in international relations paved the way for the Earth Summit held in Rio in 1992. Thus, for the first time, states began to come together on a regular basis to discuss environmental problems in the early years of the 1990s. Within this period, there were important milestones in international climate change negotiations, such as the Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol is the first international agreement to set binding emissions reduction targets and affected development policies and global governance. The Protocol constituted a model, introduced country-by-country reductions in GHG emissions, and laid the groundwork for global efforts in the future. At this point, it is crucial to note that although the Kyoto Protocol has significant importance in the literature on

international climate change talks, this dissertation does not deem the Protocol critical in the progress towards the BRICS group cooperation in the field of climate change. Their increasing economic dynamism and visibility in global governance rather than the Protocol's itself would determine the characteristic of the cooperation within the BRICS format.

Even though participant countries had not been making major changes in their traditional strategies during the UNFCCC negotiations over the years, the international community at the COP-15 round of climate change negotiations witnessed breakthrough changes in both states' negotiation strategies and the way how relevant actors had been trying to deliver an acceptable solution for climate change-related problems. In this respect, the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 dragged existing international institutions into a sort of legitimacy dispute, so the currently shaping global order paved the way for the energetic involvement of leading actors from the developing world. This development not only motivated the emerging powers, including Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, to play greater a role in international organisations but also compelled them to take new responsibilities and change their long-established policy concepts. Following the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, one of the first prominent international events would be the Climate Change Conference held in Copenhagen in 2009. This international gathering would be a platform that enables to observe changes in and convergence among the BRICS countries' policy perspectives.

3.1. Critical Juncture in International Climate Change Negotiations: The 2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen

Copenhagen COP-15 in 2009 was supposed to be the meeting where the successor of the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol would be designed. The Conference placed climate change policy at the top of the world leaders' and other relevant actors' agenda, and the issue was discussed at all levels. However, beyond the discussion on the outcomes of the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference, the importance of the COP-15 for this dissertation arises from its role in opening up a new episode where the BRICS states' perspectives on global climate change and

their policy stances exclusively converged for the first time. Therefore, this dissertation marks the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference as a critical juncture.

Critical junctures are generative and swift cleavages (Hogan, 2006: 664-665) that challenge the firmly institutionalised ideas (Flockhart, 2005: 259), undermine the set of norms and accepted behaviours (Flockhart, 2010: 796), destabilise the existing identity constructions (Marcussen, 2001: 118), lead to changes in identity and/or ideational world (Flockhart, 2016: 807), form new ideational consolidations (Hogan, 2019: 181), and remove the option for reversibility (Hogan, 2006: 660). Risse and Wiener (1999: 780; 2001: 204) define critical junctures as periods of significant shifts that “lead to changes in actors’ ideas about their underlying interests and to changes in their collective identities”. At this point, as highlighted by Hogan (2006: 661), understanding the past–ex-ante, pre-Copenhagen–is crucial for explaining the present–ex-post, post-Copenhagen–.

However, the expected effects of the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference as a critical juncture would vary in the light of the *Potential Mechanisms* derived in Chapter 2. If the future members of the BRICS club had cooperated with the purpose of *soft-balancing* against the U.S. preponderance, a perceived threat from the U.S. should have motivated such a diplomatic initiative and their aim should have been built on *balancing* political and ideological dominance of the U.S. and other Western states. At the Copenhagen Climate Change Summit, these five states should have involved in competitive actions that occupied with the mentality of schismatic strategies and closed-to-cooperation with the U.S. and other Western countries in order to achieve *soft-balancing* against these actors. Thus, the future participants of the BRICS cooperation would have cared less about the negative impacts of environmental degradation and climate change-related problems to reap more material gains and so boost the political and economic leverage over the U.S. in decline following the Global Financial Crisis of 2008.

Contrary to the abovementioned expectation, the idea that international institutions create an environment encouraging and facilitating interstate cooperation fundamentally advocates the policy convergence among member countries of these institutions. However, once the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 hit the world

economy, the deficiencies and insufficiencies of global governance institutions were exposed. In response, multilateral organisations composed of only a few states were established and proliferated to meet new requirements of the global system and give voice to the demands of often-ignored actors. Therefore, a limited number of states came together on the basis of their specified interests and so found an opportunity to incorporate new policy areas to promote their common goals and targets. As a result, states may easily articulate their divergent interests regarding international issues. The reflection of this development at Copenhagen in 2009 would have been the emergence of the UN organs to remove the disharmony among the state groupings, overcome the stalemate of the negotiations, and prevent the breakdown of the international attempts to produce meaningful arrangements in the field of international climate change talks.

Lastly, while the future member countries of the BRICS grouping were acting within the larger coalitions consisting of partner states and taking a stance accordingly, these states backed similar policy perspectives and principles at the international level. However, after the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, these five states gained confidence in exploring and expressing their differentiated policy outlooks from the rest of the developing nations. Furthermore, they recognised the need and were also obliged to assume new roles and responsibilities concerning global issues. By extension, the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference would have been a critical juncture for these five emerging powers where the initial signs would have been received in terms of their position alignment towards climate change problems at the global scale, common discourse generation, and *collective identity* formation.

In line with this, the Chapter aims at tracing the transition of how the strategies of each BRICS state in international climate change discussions changed over years starting from the end of the Cold War to 2009, and thus this analysis covers the time period before the establishment of the BRICS club.

3.2. Tracing the Process of the Policy Change for Each BRICS State

The Chapter argues that their increasing economic activities and GHG emissions obliged Brazil, India, China, and South Africa to modify their initial status as parts of

the large group of developing nations. Both changes in their ideational structure and shifts in material capabilities motivated them to reconsider their positions in global climate change-related issues. At this point, they realised their differences from the larger body of developing countries, peeled their developing country identity, incorporated new responsibilities regarding global climate change governance, combined new elements into their discourses, and came together under the portrayal of emerging power identity where their policy stances and perceptions on addressing climate change started to converge with the Russian Federation.

Therefore, the rest of the Chapter, first, intends to reveal the fundamentals in global climate change politics for each BRICS state by noting the main narratives driving their climate change policies. And then, it aims at revealing the shifts in their negotiation positions and address how these transformations manifested themselves in each BRICS country's identity construction and ideational reorientation in the road to the Copenhagen Summit.

3.2.1. Brazil's Approach to International Climate Change Politics

The colonial history of Brazil had constituted the basis of its sensitivity to sovereignty in international relations. Therefore, the Brazilian identity in the international arena had instructed the Brazilian decision-makers to preserve the state sovereignty and national control over natural resources. From an environmental aspect, protecting the sovereign authority over the Amazon rainforest had been the main subject for Brazil during the international dialogues on environmental problems (Kiessling, 2018: 387-388). For this reason, Brazil deliberately wanted to postpone the negotiations over land-use and forestry (Johnson, 2001: 187).

However, the initial cautious position of Brazil in connection with its firm understanding of national sovereignty was gaining a new dimension. In time, the constitutive components of the Brazilian position blossomed. These were the embracement of the leadership role, alignment with the G-77 plus China, advocating the principle of CBDR between the states of the Global North and the Global South, and the North's historical responsibilities (Kiessling, 2018: 391-393).

First, at the beginning of a new decade when concerns about climate change took place at the top of the international agenda, Brazil acquired a reputation as the leading actor on this subject by hosting the Rio Earth Summit in 1992 (Kiessling, 2018: 389). Additionally, linking the issue of climate change with the subject of energy use and developmental ambitions helped Brazil to line up with the Global South under the name of the G-77 plus China (Kiessling, 2018: 404).

Celso Lafer, Brazil's foreign minister (1992-1992 and 2001-2003), stated:

We consider that as host country our efforts should be to transcend specific positions and try to work out ways countries can find common ground on issues. We're capable of doing this because our own experience makes us aware of conflicts between North and south as we have both problems of poverty and industrialisation within Brazil (Lamb, 1992).

This statement reveals the connection between the perception of Brazil's increasing reputation thanks to being the host country of the Rio Earth Summit and its power to comprehend the Southern concerns over environmental challenges due to similar problems it faces. In this context, the G-77 plus China articulated the prospect for financial resource allocations and technology transfer from developed to developing countries during the negotiation of the UNFCCC, which was an international treaty adopted at the Rio Earth Summit (Machado-Filho & Poppe, 2011: 332 and 336). For the G-77 plus China, North-South cooperation within this framework would allow social and economic development of developing countries by scaling down their GHG emissions without frustrating their pursuit of developmental impetus (Johnson, 2001: 180). Yet, different from this concept of North-South cooperation, Brazil brought the SSC to the forefront. SSC had come out in the Bandung Conference of 1955 as a result of the end of the colonial period (Bry, 2017: 160). Conditions set by the Cold War incited a majority of newly decolonised states from Asia and Africa to secure their political and economic independence, promote their economic growth (Harris, 2013b: 272), de-link themselves from advanced industrialised economies (Moore, 2012: 2), exchange their experiences, and create an alternative path to the North-South cooperation (Bilal, 2012: 16) on the basis of principles such as equality, mutual development, non-interference (Bry, 2017: 163), and respect for national sovereignty (Li & Carey, 2014: 11).

SSC fashionably became operational in the post-Cold War period once again (Hall, 2018: 535). Whilst the main purpose of SSC does not replace the North-South cooperation, SSC has been considered as an alternative way for achieving economic independence by relying on the resources of the South on the basis of solidarity and common objectives shared within the developing world (Morazán, Knoke, Knoblauch, & Schäfer, 2012: 10). In accordance with these incentives generated by the idea of SSC, Brazil presented its willpower to utilise its capacity in sustainable use of bio-energy for achieving technology diffusion outside developed countries (Machado-Filho & Poppe, 2011: 345).

Second, its identity as a developing country from the Global South encouraged Brazilian negotiators to adhere to the efforts of economic development. Its active involvement in multilateral platforms and self-perception as a leading country in the Global South inspired Brazil for being the voice of the developing world in international climate change negotiations and resisting any initiative to introduce emissions commitments for developing states (Yamin, 2014: 9 and 14).

Third, Brazil held that the principle of CBDR and historical responsibilities should be considered as complementary concepts for each other. The intellectual foundation of the principle of CBDR¹ has a link to the *Climate Justice*. While the *Climate Justice* approach addresses the social inequalities in terms of varying levels of exposure to the detrimental impacts of climate change and the different levels of responsibility in contributing to global environmental problems, its reflection in international debates on climate change expresses the vulnerability of the Global South and the historical GHG emissions patterns of the industrialised economies in the Northern hemisphere (Milanez & Fonseca, 2011: 224-225). Within this context, Brazil backed the idea of historical responsibilities in 1994 in order to counteract any

¹ The principle of CBDR is composed of two components. While common responsibility is indicating the principle of cooperation to prevent trans-boundary problems, differentiated responsibilities acknowledge the differing contributions and capacities of states in dealing with climate change. This leads to contradictory interpretations of the principle. The developed countries focus on the part of common responsibilities in coping with climate change, on the one hand, and the developing states emphasis the term differentiated on the other (Kasa, Gullberg, & Heggelund, 2008: 116). For the developing states, CBDR emphasises the primary responsibility of the developed countries (Rajamani, 2000). Hence, they cast industrialised countries a greater role in acting against climate change-related problems as a result of their historical contributions to climate change.

potential misinterpretation of the principle of CBDR as a simple division of countries into Annex I and non-Annex I states and, thus, merely an imposition of emissions reduction commitments on Annex I countries (Miguez & de Oliveira, 2011: 29). Brazil's proposal covered that emissions reduction targets should be in compliance with the industrialised countries' historical contributions to global warming rather than measuring the targets based on total annual emissions (King, Cole, Tyldesley, & Hogarth, 2012: 65).

Even though this proposal was not straightforwardly accepted during the negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol, the Brazilian proposal framed under the notion of historical responsibilities indirectly shaped the text of international climate change negotiations since accepted results of these negotiations induced developed countries to take the lead in emissions reduction efforts and bear the cost of relevant measures (Johnson, 2001: 192). So, this idea continued to gain recognition among developing states.

Brazil also continued its active involvement in international climate change negotiations. In 1995, after his election as the President, Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2003) began framing the Brazilian position with the values of democracy, free market, and social justice in an attempt to increase prosperity through privatisation and structural reforms. Thus, economic stability and sustainable growth placed at the top of Brazil's development agenda and economic cooperation mechanisms were wanted to be released from the confines of the North-South divide (Mielniczuk, 2013: 1079). In 1997, the convergence between the U.S. and Brazil on allowing a degree of flexibility for developed countries to be able to meet their emissions targets established a favourable environment for Brazil to acquire the role of balancer between the interests of the Global North and South. This converging Brazilian position with the U.S. sent the initial signal of Brazil's re-positioning as an emerging power at the global level (Johnson, 2001: 191). The comment of President Cardoso indicates the early sign of acknowledgement of "unique roles" that can be played by "big developing powers such as Brazil, China and India in negotiations on the reduction of greenhouse emissions" ("Brazilian President slams", 2001). Therefore, President Cardoso recognised the exceptional status possessed by developing states including Brazil, China, and India in climate change talks and disclosed his categorisation among the group of developing countries. The comment of President

Cardoso also supports the argument of this Chapter that the future emerging powers had discerned their differences from the small countries of the developing world, and signalled their readiness to take new responsibilities.

Yet, Brazil supported the top-down structure of the Kyoto Protocol since it believed that the top-down obligations determined under the Protocol would better serve to push international actions against climate change rather than leaving the fate of this struggle to the mercy of each country (King et al., 2012: 65). In this regard, Brazil succeeded in the creation of flexible mechanisms such as the CDM at the COP-3 in Kyoto. Guarantying the compliance of industrialised countries with the Kyoto Protocol scheme, flexible mechanisms including CDM allowed developing countries to receive assistance from developed states in the form of emissions reduction projects (Kiessling, 2018: 395). However, as President Cardoso announced that the “‘savage occupation’ of the Amazon basin” would not be tolerated once again (Christie, 1997), Brazil was cautious about the forest-preservation projects to produce GHG emissions credits since it was assumed that that kind of exchange may end up with the domination of foreign firms in the Amazon and lead to foreign environmental imperialism (Johnson, 2001: 198).

Even though institutional mechanisms that enabled technology transfer and resource allocation from the North to the South were considered as an opportunity for Brazil to ensure its industrialisation and rapid and competitive economic development model, Brazil’s exceptional condition in comparison to other developing countries need to be recognised. Beyond its developmental enthusiasm shared by other developing states, Brazil has also had features such as possessing large industrial infrastructure and technological capacities that are closer to the properties possessed by developed countries (Johnson, 2001: 201-202).

While proceeding to the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, any attempt to institute binding emissions reduction targets for developing countries was seen as a new method of colonialism at the first stage because the developing world believed that these types of pressures may be intuitively designed to curb the progress in their economies or at least to lock them in the circle of underdevelopment (Miguez, 2011: 313). Such demands from the developed world were deemed as

hypocritical attempts since developing economies had the right to grow without restraints as industrialised countries had performed.

Foreign Minister Lafer thinks that developed countries need to alter their “predatory production and consumption” methods rather than demanding emissions reduction targets from developing countries (“Brazil asks rich nations”, 2002). As an extension, Brazilian high-ranking officials maintained their criticisms of Western-style production and consumption habits. Environment Minister Marina Silva (2003-2008) pointed out the necessity for a change of the traditional development paradigm into an advanced version that would take varying environmental conditions into account (Palermo, 2007). Recognised the detrimental effects of climate change on Brazil which was also defined as an emerging power relying on agriculture and industrialisation, President Lula da Silva (2003-2010) promoted the moral and political leverage of Brazil over Europe and North America in calling for fulfilment of those rich countries’ obligations to rehabilitate the negative impacts of their historical activities. In this regard, President da Silva emphasised Brazil’s vast forests and adopted a nuanced position in discussing foreign payments for reductions in the massive deforestation of the Amazon (“Lula criticizes rich countries”, 2007; Rohter, 2007). This reformulation during the Presidency of da Silva promotes the argument of the Chapter that emerging powers, Brazil included, were keen on readjusting their traditional position. Accordingly, Brazil adopted new elements, such as moral superiority over European and North American countries in terms of historical responsibilities and the protection of Amazons, into its discursive structure.

In addition to natural disasters and severe droughts experienced in the first half of the 2000s in Brazil, Brazil’s capacity to substitute clean and renewable energy resources for fossil fuels in its industrialisation thrust paved the way for a change in its position (Johnson, 2001: 185). Whilst President da Silva, in 2003, reemployed the developmental rhetoric and emphasised the motivation for generating autonomous policies in the fields of industry, technology, society, and environment, his inclination to developmentalism inspired revision in Brazil’s policy preferences as well.

On the one hand, in line with his tendency towards developmentalism, President da Silva (2006) announced that:

Brazil is actively preparing itself for a new development paradigm that will meet the environmental and social challenges of the coming decades. Ethanol and biodiesel are the key components of our approach, and we are determined to 'plant the oil of the future'.

Therefore, Brazil under the Presidency of da Silva adopted an approach that binds the environmental necessities with the safety of energy production. At this point, Brazil built up an image that cares about environmental concerns and aligns itself with the idea of environment-friendly energy production.

On the other hand, this developmentalism led to the search for cooperation with other developing countries by bypassing the intermediary role of great powers (Mielniczuk, 2013: 1080). At this point, Foreign Minister Amorim (2006) regarded the rapprochement with African countries, the creation of new trade axes with China and India, and the alignment with South Africa as the prominent progress of President da Silva's foreign policy in his interview. In accordance with the argument introduced in this Chapter, Brazil's policy towards achieving the rapprochement with other advanced developing states evidence that these countries started to develop a level of partnership differentiating them from the large body of the developing world. Moreover, with its industrial infrastructure and technological capacities ahead of other developing states, Brazil made a noticeable investment in clean and renewable energy resources. As expected in this Chapter, these changes in the material structure increased Brazil's self-confidence regarding world affairs, climate change-related issues included, so encouraged Brazil to establish new relationships with other prominent actors from the developing world.

In line with the increasing interaction and cooperation between Brazil and other advanced developing states, Minister Amorim (2007a) emphasised the need for political incentives and efforts of all countries including developing states to reach an arrangement regarding the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. When he delivered a speech at the COP-13 in 2007, Minister Amorim (2007b) said that the sense of common responsibilities to the people motivates their actions in reducing

carbon emissions. Emphasising the necessity to transition to the low carbon economy on a global scale, he invited other developing nations to take bigger and bolder steps to make a contribution to emissions reduction efforts.

In this respect, Brazil, like other emerging powers, showed signs of relaxation in its firm stance against any binding emissions reduction commitment for developing countries after 2007 (Hochstetler & Viola, 2012: 757). This evolution in Brazilian climate change policy was the move from its traditional conservative stance which was the outcome of its alliance with the G-77 plus China, sovereignty-related concerns about the Amazon, and loyalty to the notion of historical responsibilities (Viola & Franchini, 2014: 681). This situation demonstrates the ideational reorientation in Brazil's climate change policy conducted at the international level and the process of overlapping political position among other emerging powers.

Before the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference would be held in December, Carlos Minc (2008-2010), as the Minister of Environment, stated that developing countries should also determine targets to cut GHG emissions that would be different for every developing state. Additionally, Minister Minc thought that developed countries need to meet the requirements they shoulder and so convince developing countries in this regard (Colitt, 2009). Additionally, President da Silva articulated that Brazil expanded its web of dialogue partners and found a new space to further its relations with emerging powers, Russia, India, and China included. Looking beyond the North-South split, President da Silva stated in his interview that their incentives in the COP-15 purely rested on being the part of the solution regarding climate change-related problems at the international level without pretending to lead anyone or to appeal the means causing misunderstandings (da Silva, 2009a). Still, President da Silva did not remain silent regarding the vulnerabilities of small island and other developing countries to climate change in his speeches in the COP-15. For the President, although those countries were the least responsible actors in global climate change, they were the first and foremost victims (da Silva, 2009b). As argued by the Chapter, these statements of the President instantiate the degree of change in Brazil's discourse which, on the one hand, admitted the necessity for emerging powers' contributions to international actions against climate change problems and, on the other hand, advocated the well-established argument aired by the developing world.

Moreover, President da Silva (2009c) untied the relationship between environmental degradation, economic development, and the vast gap among and within the countries. According to the President, the reckless exploitation of natural resources and unsustainable consumption habits exposed the uneven distribution of profit that created the cleavage between the rich and the poor. He underlined that the embracement of the principle of CBDR can provide the solution in overcoming the polarisation of the problem on the basis of the North-South divide. Therefore, whereas developed states should bear the cost of their actions in history, developing countries need to become part of the solution. Despite his remarks before the last day of the COP-15 on the commitments of developed countries to transfer financial and technological resources to developing countries (da Silva, 2009b), his last day speech showed that Brazil did not demand any external resources transfer, but wanted to reach an agreement between rich and poor to protect the future of planet Earth (da Silva, 2009d).

Accordingly, Brazil's expression of its willingness for undertaking voluntary commitment to reduce emissions in 2009 was seen as evidence of a preponderance of its tendency towards a more moderate stance at the international level (Viola & Franchini, 2014: 678-679). Although other emerging powers announced unilateral commitments to reduce their GHG emissions, the targets determined by Brazil were regarded as more ambitious (Jotzo, 2010). Therefore, Brazil's climate change policy did not solely rely on its traditional conservative stance, which was the outcome of its alliance with the G-77 plus China and loyalty to the notion of historical responsibilities. The main causes of such a change in Brazilian strategy rested on the significant reductions in its deforestation and breakthrough transformation in favour of clean energy resources (Hochstetler & Viola, 2012: 763). Brazil achieved the lowest deforestation record in 2009 over twenty years (MMA, 2009) and breakthrough transformation in favour of clean energy resources facilitated such a change in Brazilian strategy (Luomi, 2014). By 2008, Brazil achieved to be ranked among the top five states in terms of renewable power capacity and production (Martinot & Sawin, 2009). As of 2009, the renewable share in Brazil's final energy consumption was 49%, compared to 16.6% globally (International Energy Agency, 2021).

Thus, the observed ideational readjustment in Brazil's policy formulation affected the process of identity construction labelled as an emerging power and introduced new constituents consisted of announcing voluntary emissions reduction targets—which shows Brazil's capability to assume new responsibilities—, striving for being the part of the solution—that illustrates the image of Brazil as the constructive partner—, giving voice to the concerns shared by the rest of the developing world—that promotes Brazil's self-positioning over other developing nations—, and emphasising the common future of the planet—that exposes the discursive readjustment—.

In brief, for Brazil, preserving state sovereignty and national control over its natural resources, acting as one of the prominent actors within the large body of the developing world, and contemplating climate change and environmental issues through the prism of its developing country identity had determined its main policy stance in international climate change debates. However, together with its growing economic power, the record of significant reductions in its deforestation level, stimulation of its clean energy resources, and its growing web of interaction and cooperation with other advanced developing states differed Brazil from other developing nations and assigned it new responsibilities on the international scale. While Brazil was expanding its discourse of historical responsibilities and *Climate Justice* into a country profile who would articulate the overall burden of climate change and the concerns of other developing nations, the manoeuvre of 2009 supported the image and prestige of Brazil in the UNFCCC and consolidated the cooperation and policy convergence with other emerging powers (Carvalho, 2012: 155).

3.2.2. Russia's Stance on International Climate Change Cooperation

In Russian history, the notion of Westernisation had been regarded as a process to join among the European great powers. This ambition had reflected itself in Russian foreign policy to become an actor in the international community (Sabintsev, 2017: 3-4). As an extension, engaging in global initiatives related to climate change and the

environment and ratifying relevant treaties were considered in the Soviet era as the channels for the socialist regime to be seen as a member of the international community and to create an opportunity for cooperation with the West (Makarov, 2016: 536). Andrei Kozyrev (1990-1996), Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, built up the profile of Russian foreign policy after the demise of the Soviet Union and stimulated their willingness to establish partnerships and alliances to be able to carry Russia's role into effect in international relations (Mielniczuk, 2013: 1080). Russian decision-makers continued to take part in international talks and accords in order to achieve their integration into the international community (Makarov, 2016: 536).

After the break-up of the Soviet Union, the developments in international climate change regimes mostly affected the climate change policy of the Russian Federation (Elena, 2001: 289). Even though they had approached the underlying anthropogenic causes of climate change-related challenges and environmental problems with caution (Rowe, 2009: 595) and had not concentrated on dealing with those problems affecting their country (Elena, 2001: 290), Russia acknowledged the scientific evidence about climate change and accepted its anthropocentric nature in time. Additionally, Russian decision-makers' perspective shifted from the expected benefits of global warming to its detrimental impacts on Russian infrastructure, agriculture, water resources, and low coastal areas (Elena, 2001: 295). Beyond these domestic factors, Russia did not absent from international discussions on climate change and the environment.

Regarding the climate change problems, the Russian perspective had differed from the poor countries, who had seen those problems as a developmental issue, and richer states, who had principally focused on the environmental dimensions (Makina, 2013: 38). As experiencing a crisis during the economic transition, and thus the decline in the country's industrial activities and GHG emissions (Sabintsev, 2017: 5), Russian policymakers had treated the environmental problems as challenges naturally faced in industrialised economies (Makarov, 2016: 536). Regardless of their mostly passive position during the constitution of the UNFCCC framework (Andonova & Alexieva, 2012: 616), the key priority of Russian negotiators was to secure favourable language and arrangements for their participation (Henry & Sundstrom, 2007: 47).

As a rich country in fossil fuels, Russia could not isolate itself from the dynamic characteristic of climate change discussions, and thereupon gradually embraced a more active engagement in international climate change debates. This development shaped the Russian position during the 1990s. At the 1996 COP in Geneva, Russia sided with other resource-rich countries, OPEC states, who also resisted any emissions limit on the basis of quantitative targets (Rowe, 2009: 595; Andonova & Alexieva, 2012: 616).

After Russia ensured its status at the COP-3 in Kyoto in 1997 as an Annex-B country, which addressed the special conditions of transition economies at the time of the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, emissions reduction targets for Russia were set by assuming 1990 as the base year (Sabintsev, 2017: 5). At this point, Russia already complied with these targets in that time and, moreover, had carbon space to be able to use up. Following the Conference in Kyoto, Russia started to adjust its policies in accordance with the cooperation formed at the body of the Umbrella Group² (Andonova & Alexieva, 2012: 616). Russia has been rejecting any interference to create any new boundaries between states since the term of Yevgeni Primakov as the Minister of Foreign Affairs. As a result, the Russian overall perspective regarding international relations overlapped the stance adopted by the Umbrella Group in term of climate change (Mielniczuk, 2013: 1081).

Whereas the press releases of President Vladimir Putin before the country would ratify the Kyoto Protocol show that Russia favoured an environment paving the way for a constructive international dialogue (“Russia thinking about”, 2003; “Putin stresses importance”, 2003), the Kyoto process exposed the importance of Russia in international climate change debates (Elena, 2001: 291). Although the states in the Umbrella Group sought to coordinate their policies regarding the execution of the Kyoto Protocol (Elena, 2001: 305), the decision of the Bush administration (2001-

² Umbrella Group is a loose coalition which was constituted after the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol by non-EU developed countries (“Party Groupings”, n.d.; B. Müller, 2011: 5). This coalition is usually composed of Australia, Belarus, Canada, Iceland, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Kazakhstan, Norway, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the United States (“Party Groupings”, n.d.). The primary aims of this Group are to invite the developing countries to make a contribution for mitigation actions and to obscure the distinction between the developed and the developing countries (Moosmann, Urrutia, Siemons, Cames, & Schneider, 2019: 32-33).

2009) to reject the ratification of the Protocol in 2001 threatened the level of the least cumulative emissions share of 55% which was the necessary condition for the Protocol to come into force (Sabintsev, 2017: 5; Makarov, 2016: 537). Without the U.S. contribution, the combined emissions share of the signatory states constituted slightly less than 45%. In that time, the share of Russia in GHG emissions was calculated as 17.4% (Gusev, 2016: 40). Therefore, Russia appeared as a critical actor for the entry into force of the agreed structure in Kyoto. Following the U.S. unilateral disavowal of the Kyoto Protocol, the head of state of the Russian Federation recognised the vital position of his country by stating that “Russia’s position ‘is important enough, since Russia is responsible for a considerable quantity of discharges, and we should determine on what conditions we shall finally ratify this protocol’” (“Russia backs Kyoto”, 2001).

Although there were dissidents within Putin’s close circle such as Andrey Illarionov (2000-2005), Presidential Aide for Economic Issues, who disaffirmed the Kyoto Protocol since it might negatively affect Russia’s target to double its GDP (“Putin aide says”, 2003), President Putin (2003a) expressed in his speech in the World Climate Change Conference that Russia’s ratification of the Kyoto Protocol was in compliance with Russia’s national interest. Therefore, the President indicated that Russia needed to do something to send a meaningful signal to the international community (Putin, 2003b), and thus Moscow aimed at portraying itself whose actions were serving the benefit of humankind (Putin, 2003c). In compliance with the argument presented in this Chapter, this process reveals that Russia experienced a shift in its status from the country profile searching for international recognition to the actor whose contribution and cooperation became necessary and vital to ensure the effectiveness of global climate change governance.

Motivations behind Russia’s signature to the Kyoto Protocol in 2004 rooted in its international targets as well. On the one hand, its participation in the Protocol was seen as connected to Russia’s international image. The concerns about establishing Russian identity containing the open-to-cooperation portrait and the image of a responsible partner in the world community were some of the drivers of Russia’s action (Henry & Sundstrom, 2007: 52). At this point, President Putin expressed that he interpreted the signing of the Kyoto Protocol as a move in “the right direction”

and the main driver for their action was inspired “by good ideas and aims, rather than by considerations of immediate economic benefit” (“Kyoto Protocol is”, 2003).

On the other hand, as the arbiter of the future of the Protocol, Russia found an opportunity to improve its prestige related to its relations with European states. The potential partnership with Russia in the field of climate change pleased Europeans since the foreseen failure of the Protocol cannot be tolerated by them (Makarov, 2016: 537). Many argue that the sensitivity of European countries to the fate of the Protocol compelled them to make concessions to the Russian scheme regarding foreign trade (Makarov, 2016: 537). Therefore, most observers contemplate that the EU member states agreed to support the membership of Russia to the WTO (Henry & Sundstrom, 2007: 58; Andonova & Alexieva, 2012: 616; Tynkkynen, 2014). In this respect, although President Putin said that they did not associate their membership to the WTO and the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, he disclosed the role of the EU in encouraging Russia within the process of the Kyoto Protocol by announcing that “[t]he EU accommodated Russia by signing the WTO protocol. We will speed up the movement towards the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol” (“Putin says Russia supports”, 2004).

Thus, the Russian reluctance to make any pre-commitment brought results by both increasing its visibility in the international arena and satisfying its broader foreign policy ambitions. Moscow also did not have to take any serious measures to comply with the commitments under the Kyoto Protocol and utilised this advantage. Still, Russia perceived a change in its international status and reputation, and thus adjusted its discourse in accordance with the arguments that cover the ethical dimension of its actions. In the post-Kyoto ratification period, Russia also cemented its image of constructive partner and leading role in the politics of climate change, and international politics in general.

With the confidence brought by its increasing influence, Russia voiced the main resolve of the Umbrella Group once again. In this regard, Moscow remarked on the rising emissions rates of developing countries, including China, India and South Africa, and aired the discontent with these countries’ status free of any reduction commitments (Rowe, 2009: 604 and 606). President Medvedev (2008-2012)

indicated the significance of the involvement of the prominent actors whose contributions became necessary for global efforts against climate change (“Medvedev: Climate change”, 2008). As a result, Russia reformulated its stance on climate change problems which were initially considered as a situation occurred in industrialised economies and then became a topic requiring the engagement of both developed and developing countries.

The high-growth period, especially from 2000 to 2008, helped the Russian economy to recover its devastated industrial and agricultural sectors and transform from the transition economy to the league of emerging powers. Russia succeeded in ensuring nearly 6.9% annual GDP growth from 1999 to 2008 (World Bank, 2021). Thus, Russia’s integration into the world economy through its WTO membership and into global climate change governance through its function for the Kyoto Protocol’s effectiveness proved its ability to play a greater role in international issues, as expected in this Chapter.

In 2009, Russia indicated that it may undertake new reduction commitments, if major emitters, especially the U.S., China, and India, would accept their responsibilities and make binding commitments in terms of global GHG reduction (Makarov, 2016: 539; Kokorin & Korppoo, 2013: 37; Andonova & Alexieva, 2012: 617). Furthermore, Russia backed that Annex I and II division among states went out of date because of dramatic growth in negative contributions of developing countries to climate change, increase in their economic and technical capabilities, and fast-growing GDP rates (Gordeeva, 2014: 174-175). At this point, Russian unwillingness to take part in the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol became apparent because of the lack of fair participation of high carbon emitters from the developing world in emissions reduction efforts (Kokorin & Korppoo, 2013: 3; Sharples, 2013: 687).

Minister of Natural Resources and the Environment Yuri Trutnev (2004-2012) marked the notions of not only Russia’s responsibilities at the global level and its ambition to appear as the leading actor in the talks on post-Kyoto arrangements but also the need to share this burden with the biggest GHG emitters from developed and developing states as the items driving Russia’s policies (“Russia insists post-Kyoto”, 2009; “Russia to step up”, 2009). In line with this, as announced by the President’s

Aide Arkady Dvorkovich (2008-2012), Russia expected the active involvements of developed countries from the EU or the G-8 and developing states cooperating within the framework of the BRIC[S] (“Medvedev to participate”, 2009). This announcement proves that Russia regarded the BRIC[S] as an influential platform having a role in global climate change governance and attached weight to their contribution in the direction of the fight against climate change problems.

While the second phase of the Protocol was being planned to cover the timeframe between 2013 and 2020 until a new global deal would be reached, the COP-15 in Copenhagen in 2009 was supposed to be the meeting where the successor of the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol would be designed. For Russia, the main objective was to include major emitters like the U.S., China and India in the process (Andonova & Alexieva, 2012: 617). Although the voluntary emission reduction pledges were a significant step for the major emitters from the developing world and these moves brought those countries closer to the Russian position, decision-makers from those advanced developing economies did not put the legally binding emissions reduction targets on their agenda. Still, their ready-to-take-responsibility approach to global climate change governance differed them from the rest of the large body of the developing world and, as argued by the Chapter, presented Russia new potential partners referred as emerging powers.

President Medvedev (2009a) announced in his speech delivered in the COP-15 that a new global agreement should be framed on the grounds of the principles of fairness and common responsibility, but the level of development should determine the share of responsibilities of different countries. For Medvedev (2009b), Russia’s future efforts to install more energy-efficient mechanisms and reduce GHG emissions would not be depended on whether or not an international agreement is achieved. Moreover, Medvedev treated modernisation through adopting energy-saving technologies and developing renewable energy sources as the answer to curb GHG emissions and to convert into the model of worldwide green economy and green investment (“Russia ready to cut”, 2009; “Russian president’s speech”, 2009). Hence, the remarks of President Medvedev pointed out that Russia’s search for building the image of a responsible and constructive partner inspired its discourse on the basis of fairness and common responsibilities. Additionally, the Russian

perspective on the concept of common responsibility to reduce GHG emissions converged the non-binding and voluntary emissions reduction pledges addressed by advanced developing states. Thus, Russia's recognition of differentiated obligations of developed and developing states indicates a level of sympathy for the arguments delivered by the developing world. Both Russia and those emerging powers also connected the efforts for responding to climate change and environmental problems with the development of and transition to energy-saving technological infrastructures. This supports the argument introduced in this Chapter as Brazil, India, China, and South Africa embraced the traits of being emerging power, their policy stances and perceptions started to converge with the Russian Federation.

Furthermore, the Russian view regarding the future climate change arrangements started to take shape in this time period. According to Russia, future climate change agreements should be built up on the basis of the bottom-up approach (Gordeeva, 2014: 175) and responsibility-sharing as oppose to the notion of historical responsibility (Tynkkynen, 2014). Regarding the document that would set up the rules in the post-Copenhagen period, Medvedev favoured an arrangement relying on the principles of justice, responsibility-sharing, and differentiated approach to the capacities and development priorities of developed and developing states ("New document on", 2009; "Climate problems should", 2009). Therefore, Russia's ideational reformulation and identity perception progressed within the framework of an internationally efficient actor who welcomes the contributions of the major countries emerging from the developing world on the basis of the principles of fairness and common responsibilities.

In summary, international talks on climate change had appeared for Russian policy-makers as a way to represent their country as a member of the international community after the end of the Cold War. Having comprehended the necessity of their participation in international climate change negotiations, Russian officials, however, adopted a passive position due to a decrease in their country's industrial activities and GHG emissions. Russia could not maintain this position since it was a country rich in fossil resources. Aligned itself with other resource-laden countries, Russia disaffirmed the division of states within the framework of the Annex-based structure of the Kyoto Protocol and invited advanced developing states to make a

contribution to global emissions reduction efforts at every opportunity. The overall Russian policy formulation was based on the fair contribution of developed and developing countries to combat climate change. Hence, emissions reduction pledges of Brazil, India, China, and South Africa at the Copenhagen Climate Change Summit brought these countries closer to Russia's perspective. Recognising their new responsibilities and capabilities, these states realised that they can play a greater role in global climate change governance, and so opened a new page in their relationships for cooperation and coordination in the near future.

3.2.3. Emerging International Climate Change Politics of India

The ideological association of and the principal foundations in India's policy understanding had shaped its climate change strategy. Jawaharlal Nehru (1950-1964), the first Prime Minister of India, had essentially intended to promote "Panchsheel principles of equality, mutual respect, mutual non-interference and nonaggression, and peaceful co-existence" in conjunction with multilateralism (Rastogi, 2011: 129).

In the light of Panchsheel principles, India had repeatedly portrayed itself as the leader of the Third World and the voice of the world's poor. The idea of the Third World refers to the combination of ideational factors and material forces.

Incorporating the spirit aroused in the Bandung Conference, the NAM aimed at reducing the dependence of the Third World on the Northern states and strengthening the solidarity of the developing nations against global inequality (Gray & Gills, 2016: 558). At this point, India emphasised its position in the NAM as the founding member (Rastogi, 2011: 129). Due to its long history of anti-colonialism, India embraced the role of moral leadership in the developing world with an emphasis on unity and solidarity among the post-colonial nations in Africa and Asia (Sahu, 2016: 172-173). The act of the NAM appeared as an attractive option for many developing states since it enabled them to attain a degree of freedom, preserve their newly gained independence, stay away from the tension of the bipolar system, and have access to the military and economic aid programmes of both the West and the East. In this respect, the NAM was one of the earliest entity where the developing world groupings and solidarity among the Global South took form.

The fundamentals of the NAM have been “the respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-interference, equality of nations, the sanctity of the UN Charter, non-aggression and peaceful coexistence”, and the right to development of the developing world was another essential component in this respect (Sahu, 2016: 173). The intellectual base laid by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi (1966-1977 and 1980-1984) in the 1970s spliced this overall Indian foreign policy to its environmental policy. According to this perspective, whereas the goals related to socio-economic development were in conflict with the efforts for environmental protection, Northern developed countries were held guilty of global environmental problems (Mohan, 2017: 40). In this context, the Third World built its position on its vulnerability to environmental problems, the perceived trade-off between the environment and their developmental ambitions, the need for financial and technological transfers from the developed nations, and required resource endowments for their capacity building in consideration of the division between the North and the South (Williams, 2005: 55-56).

Although accelerated globalisation process and shifts in global politics after the end of the Cold War were discussed as the reasons why the concept of the Third World became irrelevant (Williams, 2005: 50), the forged feeling of solidarity preserved the importance of the idea of the Third World among the group constituents (Vihma, Mulugetta, & Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, 2011: 315). Thus, as a continuation of its foreign policy during the Cold War period, the principles of national sovereignty, non-alignment, autonomy, and independence of choice and action urged Indian policy-makers to be in solidarity with other developing countries (Mohan, 2017: 13-14).

Whilst the NAM and the G-77 continued to provide multilateral institutional structures for cooperation among developing states of the Third World, the G-77 emerged as the representative of the Third World coalition in climate change negotiations (Williams, 2005: 54). The NAM, whose main function became to give voice to the interests and goals of developing countries, provided India with a platform where relations with the G-77 plus China can be coordinated and enhanced in the post-Cold War era. From the environmental viewpoint, India placed emphasis

on its affiliation with the G-77 states and resisted any internationally monitored climate mitigation initiative in order to be able to ensure its national sovereignty (Mohan, 2017: 14).

In line with its experience of colonial history and quest for autonomy, India put a premium on its international space for economic development and its interest in economic growth which was regarded as the part of the Indian identity as a former colony and a current developing country (Isaksen & Stokke, 2014: 113).

International climate change politics and global pressures to mitigate climate change-related problems were seen as the underlying factors of global injustice and the actual threats for Indian economic impetus. This understanding empowered the Third World discourse in India's environment policy (Isaksen & Stokke, 2014: 113).

Especially, the report produced by the Centre for Science and Environment influenced India's climate policy just before the Rio Earth Summit in 1992. This report put forward that the Global South became the subject of environmental colonialism imposed by the Global North. After differentiating luxury emissions of the rich from survival emissions of the poor, the report maintains that industrialised economies had been the main responsible for climate change as a result of their historical contributions to GHG emissions. Hence, the report proposes that the concept of per capita allocation of emissions should be determined for distinguishing the degree of responsibility among developed and developing countries (Agarwal & Narain, 1991).

On the basis of the arguments presented in this report, the Indian government employed the concept of historical emissions and the principle of CBDR during the negotiations of the UNFCCC (Thaker & Leiserowitz, 2014: 109). For the developing world, India included, their economies needed to pursue their developmental objectives and eradicate poverty. Thus, they called for evading emissions reduction measures, unless the future actions would be assisted through financial support and technology transfer from the developed world. From the standpoint of developing states, the unequal distribution in material capabilities narrows down a country's ability to deal with climate change. In this regard, the Global North should take the lead to tackle climate change. In the UNFCCC negotiations, the recognition of

historical responsibilities through the principle of CBDR and the acknowledgement of the differences in material resources between developed and developing countries under the notion of Respective Capabilities corroborated India's general strategy (Mohan, 2017: 4-5; Rastogi, 2011: 129; Saryal, 2018: 7).

Having articulated by the then Foreign Minister Madhav Singh Solanki (1991-1992), India advocated that developing states were at a technological and material disadvantage to boost their economic growth (Mielniczuk, 2013: 1082). As an extension of this position, its stance during the negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol also portrayed India's adherence to the distinction between developed and developing countries on the basis of asymmetrical responsibilities for climate change mitigation (Mohan, 2017: 6). Hence, the support of developed countries in technology and funding continued to be on India's agenda.

Furthermore, India maintained its endorsement in and contribution to SSC in the second half of the 1990s. Despite the calls for avoiding any development that would lead to the replacement of the East-West divide with a North-South division, the member states of the NAM regarded SSC as a unity rested on their shared history of struggles and considered it as a stage where the interests of the developing world can be protected, multilateralism against unilateralism in international governance can be promoted, and so SSC can be intensified through improving coordination and collaboration with the G-77 ("NAM XIII summit", 2003). At this point, Indian decision-makers, such as Inder Kumar Gujral who served as Prime Minister between 1997 and 1998, believed that the NAM preserved its relevance in the post-Cold War period because of the patronage of a few states in international organisations and unfavourable positions of the developing nations in international politics and economy (Mielniczuk, 2013: 1082).

However, the more India recorded a high rate of economic growth, the more India's high-ranking officials experienced a change in their point of view on the roots of environmental degradation. For instance, Prime Minister Gujral marked that in the time of Stockholm Conference in 1972, they assumed "environmental concerns were some kind of Western conspiracy which were aimed at thwarting our development programmes" (Agarwal, 1997). After admitting how they were wrong by thinking of

“poverty is the biggest polluter”, he defined economic growth as a “double-edged sword” causing pollution (Agarwal & Narain, 1997). As a result, India adopted more dynamic participation in international climate change negotiations thanks to its economic transformation. By preserving its image as the leader of the developing world and leaning to the Third Worldist motives, India appeared sometimes as the deal-maker among the proponents from the Global North and South until the mid-2000s (Michaelowa & Michaelowa, 2012: 576-577). Still, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee (1996 and 1998-2004) maintained India’s argument that “[it] has been in the forefront in echoing the concerns of the developing nations through various international fora” (“PM call to avert”, 1998). During this time period, India also stuck to the argument that the rich nations should bear the bulk of responsibility for climate actions since the poor nations have lack of capabilities and resources to engage in climate change initiatives (Saryal, 2018: 9). Therefore, India aimed to continue to be the voice of the developing world and their expectations from developed countries whilst searching for possessing an active position at the international level thanks to its rising economic indicators. This confirms the argument proposed in this Chapter.

Disclosed another dimension of the industrialised countries’ actions, Prime Minister Vajpayee underlined the transfer of “highly polluting technologies to the developing world as ‘Proven Technology’ or as ‘Low Cost Technology’” and hinted at the importance of establishing an efficient system for dissemination of environmentally-sound technologies to the Third World (“Developed world transferring”, 2000). Likewise, the official paper entitled “Dealing with the Threat of Climate Change” shows the growing awareness of India that the detrimental impacts of global climate change problems, global warming in particular, would not remain limited with the developed world (Government of India, 2005). Accordingly, this paper states that developing economies need to put lower carbon-intensive measures in the context of decarbonisation of their economies by making no concessions to the efforts for boosting the levels of their citizens’ living standards and their national development objectives.

In line with this, Prime Minister Vajpayee had already grasped the central role of sustainable economic growth and he considered the actions for ensuring sustainable

development as the common responsibility shared by both the rich and the poor nations. Having criticised those economic activities and consumption patterns of the developed world, Prime Minister Vajpayee favoured energy-saving technologies to improve living standards and eradicate poverty in the developing world (“PM for making eco-protection”, 1998). In conformity with the Chapter’s argument, economic growth and transformation in India affected its climate change policy, and so Indian officials changed their initial approach based on protecting its economic impetus against the so-perceived Western intrigue and recognised the omnipresent negative impacts of environmental problems and challenges induced by climate change. Also, the less carbon-intensive techniques started to be considered as one of the prominent instruments in dealing with climate change.

Indian top officials also expressed that their country arrived at the cutting edge of economic, technological and developmental take-off after the second half of the 2000s (Mielniczuk, 2013: 1083). As its economy was keeping on growing rapidly, India could not neglect its contribution to GHG emissions. Thus, India lost its advantage to primarily associate itself with the least developed countries. This strategy had been serving India in resisting the international community’s demands (Saryal, 2018: 14). Under these circumstances, India realised that its long-held equity considerations in international climate change negotiations lost its credibility among its partners from the developing world since India had been recording remarkable economic prosperity (Betz, 2012: 16). For the reason that India opened up through economic liberalisation, the Indian foreign policy perspective was reframed around the considerations of national interest rather than the principles of equity and justice in international relations (Mohan, 2017: 15). This situation also complies with the argument of this Chapter as accelerating economic dynamism and contribution to the global GHG emissions led India to reconsider its status among the large body of developing states and readjust its position inherited from the Cold War period.

Whereas Indian officials specifically noted in their statements that their pursuit for economic growth and development would not produce per capita emissions in their country to exceed the per capita emissions of developed countries, they signalled that India was ready to play a greater role once developed countries would employ more ambitious actions to overcome challenges of climate change (“Intervention at major

economies”, 2008; Saran, 2008). In line with the argument made in this Chapter, India, which perceived strength owing to its economic power and dynamism, experienced a strategic reorientation accompanied by growing flexibility and activism in its international climate change policy. Therefore, Indian policy-makers discerned their dissimilarities with other poor states and started no more to regard themselves as a member of the large group of poorer developing countries. This transformation also reflected the fact that India ceased its insistence on resource transfer from developed countries to initiate actions on emissions abatement (Michaelowa & Michaelowa, 2012: 585 and 587).

The material gains and consequently its increasing visibility urged India to broaden its perception of world affairs and assess new potential partnerships. As suggested by the argument in this Chapter, Indian policy-makers thus took initiative for reformulating the state discourse at the international level and built India’s new position as distinct from its traditional alliances but similar to other emerging actors in global affairs. Accordingly, in the lead up to the Copenhagen Summit, India employed a *co-benefits approach* in formulating its climate change policy. In keeping with this approach, while economic development was being the primary objective of India, the activities for both ensuring national energy security and embracing the measures against climate change appeared as the co-benefits of sustaining economic growth (Dubash, Raghunandan, Sant, & Sreenivas, 2013: 47). The relationship between economic growth and efforts for climate change mitigation started to be considered as not necessarily a zero-sum situation (Isaksen & Stokke, 2014: 114). Designing a development path on the basis of the commitments to less carbon-intensive growth and a green economy indicated the shift in India’s practices (Saryal, 2018: 11). The statement made by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh (2004-2014) demonstrates the expected complementarity relationship between India’s goal of rapid economic development and the objective for environmental improvements. According to this approach, the future models for development need to embrace environmental obligations and leave the Western style of development path and modern consumerist societal habits (“Western styles of living”, 2005).

Therefore, the *Win-Win discourse* began to take the place of the Third World rhetoric in India’s climate change policy. As a part of the *Win-Win discourse*, Indian national

identity was constructed as an emerging economy which made use of transformation in the energy sector and production technologies for its economic growth, accepted international responsibilities in pursuing constructive and pro-active involvement in international climate change debates, and so sought to enhance its reputation and international legitimacy (Isaksen & Stokke, 2014: 114-115).

While a transformation in Indian discourse was surfacing, Indian officials also wanted to merge the rising awareness of environmental problems with the leading figures of Indian politics and India's civilisational legacy. For example, then Prime Minister Singh (2008) quoted the phrase of Mahatma Gandhi which appreciates the sufficiency of the Earth's resources "to meet people's need, but [...] not to satisfy people's greed". Foreign Minister Shri Pranab Mukherjee (1995-1996 and 2006-2009) also promoted the image of Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi as the pioneering icons in the global environmental movement. He connected their motivations at international conferences to the Indian philosophy and its teaching with respect to the harmony between Man and Nature (Mukherjee, 2008).

Besides that, the comments made by Jairam Ramesh (2009-2011), who served as the Minister of Environment and Forests in the COP-15, cleared up India's stance before the Copenhagen Summit. Minister Ramesh considered the efforts for environmental protection as a necessary constituent in providing sustainability to the national economic development and announced that their actions were taken in the light of their conscience rather than international pressures (Pathak, 2009). In this context, India left its hard-line approach behind and proposed bottom-up style pledges in the form of voluntary emissions reduction commitments (Betz, 2012: 5). These self-imposed targets for emissions reduction in Copenhagen enabled India to forge new coalitions with the group of advanced developing economies apart from its traditional association with the G-77 which is mostly composed of poor developing countries (Michaelowa & Michaelowa, 2012: 579; Saryal, 2018: 15).

Although Prime Minister Singh and Foreign Minister Mukherjee continued to present India's interest as overlapping the vision of the rest of the developing world on the basis of targets for economic growth and development, diffusion of technologies, transfer of financial resources, and rejection of global inequality, the

necessity of partnership between the developed and the developing nations in reducing GHG emissions was recognised (“PM to focus on”, 2007; “Developing world cannot take on”, 2007; “Manmohan: Third World”, 2007; “Do not ape West”, 2007). Yet, in the light of the new vision set by Environment and Forests Minister Ramesh, India sought to be a deal-maker rather than a deal-breaker, and bring some flexibility by adopting a level of leadership and independence and expanding its vision beyond the traditional stance of the G-77 (Kahn, 2009; “No question of change”, 2009; “I want to position India”, 2009; “Environment minister says”, 2009). This approach supports the argument of this Chapter as it points out the ideational reorientation in India’s international climate change policy with respect to the perceived differences from the rest of the developing world.

Whereas Shri Shyam Saran (2009), the Special Envoy to Prime Minister on Climate Change, expressed that India consulted with all other major developing countries and improved the level of within-group coordination in the multilateral negotiations, other emerging powers also made identical promises in the light of the understanding that these major developing economies distinguish from the G-77 in terms of their carbon footprints. Consequently, these emerging powers have shared a collective responsibility to solve global challenges and intended to stay clear from the accusations of being deal-breakers (Betz, 2012: 10).

Furthermore, Special Envoy Saran, who issued a press statement reflecting on the positions of the BRICS states, declared at Copenhagen that:

We must be sure that UN framework convention on climate change is not in any manner diluted, its principles and provisions must be reaffirmed. [W]e must remain in the parameters of the UN framework convention on the climate change. This is something which all four countries are entirely agreed (“BRIC favours Kyoto”, 2009).

This statement shows that the BRIC countries endorsed the principles of the Convention, including the principle of equity and CBDR, and backed the idea of global partnership transferring financial and technological support from developed states in the name of the poor nations. India’s expanding network evidence that emerging powers began to mutually exchange their ideas and produced similar and overlapping policy contents as expected by the argument built in this Chapter.

In sum, whereas its identity as a former colony and a current developing country had defined India's stance on international climate change negotiations, its traditional ties with the NAM and the Third Worldist motifs dominated its discourse which emphasised the differentiated responsibilities and disproportional emissions profiles among developing and industrialised countries. In line with the argument framed in this Chapter, the upward trend in its economic growth and consumption level forced India to take action against environmental degradation. Having introduced a development path that embraced a less carbon-intensive and greener model, India also underwent an ideational transformation and internalised its proactive approach to climate change-related problems by connecting this dynamism with the roots of India's civilisation at the discursive level. Lastly, by acting on the basis of collective responsibilities, New Delhi produced a policy stance together with other emerging powers at the Copenhagen Climate Change Summit.

3.2.4. China's Involvement in International Cooperation on Climate Change

Under the guidance of Deng Xiaoping, China adopted a new economy policy in the late 1970s. The 24-character strategy framed by Deng constituted the pillars of Chinese foreign policy understanding. This 24-character formula advises Chinese decision-makers to “observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; [...] never claim leadership; [and] make some contributions” (Wang, 2012: 84).

Accordingly, the primary purpose of Chinese policy-makers was poverty alleviation and making progress in the quality of their citizens' life by strengthening the sectors of agriculture, industry, technology, and defence (Heggelund, 2007: 158). Moreover, Chinese officials condemned unfair economic order which led to disparities in development levels and the growing gap between the Northern and Southern nations (Mielniczuk, 2013: 1083).

Although a trade-off between economic growth and environmental concerns was perceived, the priority of Chinese authorities was to promote the welfare of their country and boost modernisation endeavours (Heggelund, 2007: 159). Furthermore, the credibility and legitimacy of the Chinese party-state system were linked to its

ability to bring prosperity and therefore any environment-related issue was attributed as having secondary importance (Hilton & Kerr, 2017: 50; Tangen, Heggelund, & Buen, 2001: 243).

After the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989, global condemnation of Chinese authorities posed a risk for their export-oriented economic model and the country's international integration. This development invigorated the fundamental principles of Chinese foreign policy such as "mutual respect for sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, non-interference, [...] and peaceful coexistence" (Mielniczuk, 2013: 1083). Yet, Chinese policy-makers needed to silence those international pressures on and criticisms at their authority. For that reason, China attached high importance to its involvement in the UNFCCC negotiations at the beginning of the 1990s. The main objectives were to represent China as a responsible actor in the international arena and a respected member of the international community (Conrad, 2012: 441). In line with this goal, the first formal environmental diplomacy agenda was generated by Song Jian (1987-1992), "then the State Council commissioner and director of its environmental protection committee", in 1989 (He, 2010: 14). From this perspective, Chinese engagement in global discussions on climate change and the environment should serve to improve the country's international influence, advance its relationship with other developing countries, and thus reinforce its status.

Additionally, the mindset concentrating on national economic growth affected Chinese international climate change negotiation strategies at the beginning of the 1990s (Hilton & Kerr, 2017: 50). The main arguments of Chinese leaders were that their country should take place under the category of developing country and the developing nations were in need of technology transfer from developed states to establish a just environment for economic development (Mielniczuk, 2013: 1084). In the light of this overall foreign policy trajectory, the Chinese international stance on climate change issues took shape under the leadership of Li Peng, the Premier from 1987 to 1998 (Stalley, 2013: 1). The bases of the Chinese negotiation blueprint were the protection of its national sovereignty against foreign interference under the pretext of environmental protection (Li, 2016: 49), recognition of historical responsibilities of the developed world, the necessity of technology and financial resource transfers from industrialised countries (Chmutina, 2010: 2), and priority of

the developing nations' social and economic development (Li, 2009). Similarly, President Jiang Zemin (1993-2003) firmly opposed "some advanced countries using so-called environmental diplomacy as a pretext to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries" ("China attacks "environmental diplomacy"", 1996).

Still, President Jiang mentioned that solving climate change-related problems is the common task of all countries, but the historical disparity in terms of economic development should be kept in mind in allocating responsibilities and obligations among industrialised and the developing nations ("Chinese President stresses", 1999). In this sense, China, as a country experiencing rapid industrialisation and urbanisation, unequivocally rejected any externally dictated emissions reduction objective since such initiatives would curtail its efforts for economic development (Zhang, 2013: 7-8), might create negative macro-economic setbacks (Tangen, Heggelund, & Buen, 2001: 243), and scale down financial assistance and technology transfer from developed states (Bjørkum, 2005: 30).

In consideration of its strict opposition to any imposition of binding emissions targets on the developing nations and emphasis on the division between industrialised and developing countries' responsibilities, China promoted the *Environmental Justice* argument (Stalley, 2013: 1 and 3). Accordingly, an interpreted version of the principle of equity was embedded in the Chinese international climate change negotiation strategy as its moral fundamental. China argued that states may contribute to global efforts to combat climate change, but moral obligations of industrialised countries due to their historical GHG emissions, their superiority in technologic and economic capabilities, and the distinction between the forms of the survival and luxury emissions should be the determining factors while allocating responsibilities amongst the states for fighting global climate change (Stalley, 2013: 11-12).

By means of this, China discussed the climate change-related subjects on the basis of the North-South dichotomy in respect to the principle of CBDR. Although China was not the intellectual founder of this principle, it played a key role in the construction process of the principle and emerged as its one of the most enthusiastic adherents. The lack of trust between two different socio-economic and political hemispheres in

the world and the perceived connection between global inequality and climate injustice enabled China to use the principle of CBDR in rejecting any binding emissions targets by considering the notions of justice and fairness. Thus, China carved an appropriate environment for galvanising the Southern states on the grounds of shared identity and the sense of solidarity among the developing world (Stalley, 2013: 3-4). In this regard, Chinese leadership took the initiative for encouraging cooperation among developing countries to pursue their developmental goals by utilising South-South relations (Mielniczuk, 2013: 1084). Therefore, China was the leading actor in cementing a consolidated body composed of developing countries in international climate change negotiations (Chmutina, 2010: 1). At this point, the G-77 came to the forefront.

Having built upon the viewpoint that the international society is predominated by structural disadvantages, the G-77 came into existence in 1964 as a platform solidifying cooperation within the Third World (Vihma, Mulugetta, & Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, 2011: 315). As they had had a limited influence on global issues, the G-77 had been providing an opportunity for the developing world to form a common position at the global level, advance their collective economic interests, and constitute a bargaining weight in international negotiations (Lewis, 2008: 162). In the course of time, the G-77 occurred as the primary coalition bloc of developing states in a wide range of subjects including climate change. The preservation of their control over natural resources and the search for a fair deal in international climate change negotiations by taking the historical responsibilities of the North into account had been being the central concerns of the G-77 (Vihma, Mulugetta, & Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, 2011: 317-319).

Moreover, the idea of *ecological debt* corresponded to the call of the G-77 for the need of industrialised countries' practices to ameliorate their collective harm to the environment by the reason of colonialism and neocolonialism (Harris, 2013b: 275). The neocolonialist activities resulted in the exploitation of labour in the developing world through the delocalisation of industries and services, and the repatriation of profits reaped from natural resources of the developing nations (Amin, 2017: 612). Under these conditions, the common perception of an unjust world system led to a trust deficit between the members of the G-77 and the developed world (Vihma,

Mulugetta, & Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, 2011: 329). Within this framework, the G-77 questioned the propensity of the international community to occupy itself with environmental problems of the developed nations. Thus, the developing states expressed their own priorities in dealing with climate change (O'Neill, 2009: 52).

Engagement of the G-77 with China³ enabled this large group of the developing nations to benefit from Beijing's leadership in common policy generation and take side with China during their engagements on the global scale (Lewis, 2008: 162). Accentuated its developing country image owing to its low per capita emissions, China also acted jointly with the G-77 (Heggelund, 2007: 175).

During the negotiation process of the Kyoto Protocol, China continued to be the key actor influencing the general standing of the G-77. Whereas the enduring Chinese position on the environmental issues comprised the basis for the common stance among this large body of the developing nations (Chmutina, 2010: 7), China together with the members of the G-77 did not hesitate to air their voice in respect to flexible mechanisms designed in the Kyoto Protocol (Bjørkum, 2005: 28). For them, these flexible mechanisms were the instruments of Annex I countries to evade actions at the domestic level, impede technology and financial transfers to the developing world, shift the burden on the shoulders of developing countries, and install emissions requirements for developing states (Bjørkum, 2005: 28; Stalley, 2013: 6).

However, China revised its sceptical judgements on flexible mechanisms in the COP-6 negotiations in Bonn in 2001 because these mechanisms were seen as a means to reduce the cost of mitigation, obtain financial assistance, and conform to the methods of sustainable development (Zhang, 2013: 9). The main reason for this change in Chinese position was related to the transformation of its economy. China realised that the assistance of developed countries would help it to enter into the path of low-carbon development (Conrad, 2012: 441). Minister of the State Environmental Protection Administration Xie Zhenhua (1998-2005) admitted that overseas funds and investment may resolve the shortage of Chinese domestic funding

³ Although China is not a formal member of the G-77, Chinese authorities are closely associated and side with the G-77 in the UNFCCC negotiations. Thus, this tight cooperation produced the concept of the G-77 plus China (Vihma, Mulugetta, & Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, 2011: 319).

for environmental projects. So, Minister Xie pointed out the inclination in China to explore the potential advantages of the CDM (Baoxia, 1999; Ansfield, 2002). As expected in this Chapter, this represents a shift in Chinese policy understanding from sovereignty-related concerns over any foreign initiative to the acceptance of beneficial aspects of foreign investment.

As its economy experienced an economic boom since the early 2000s, Chinese politicians also sought remedy for reinvigorating the 24-character strategy by accommodating the policies of the peaceful rise and peaceful development (Wang, 2012: 85). Therefore, they intended to find a way for rendering their industrialisation and economic expansion harmless.

Initially, President Jiang acknowledged the connection among modernisation, population control, resource management, environmental protection, and sustainable socio-economic development (“President outlines key”, 2001). Then, President Hu Jintao (2003-2013) aimed at blending the practical necessities with theoretical rationalization. Firstly, President Hu said that as economic development cannot be pursued at the expense of environmental soundness and depletion of natural resources, a new kind of industrialisation process needs to be introduced in compliance with the concept of sustainable development (Hsieh, 2003). While he was stressing the central significance of embracing sustainable development which refers to install the harmony between humanity and the environment, and to convert into civilized development, the President highlighted the idea of Three Representations, consisting of “development trend of China’s advanced productive forces, the orientation of China’s advanced culture and the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people” to ensure the mobilisation of the social productive forces and the adaptation of socialism to new circumstances (“Chinese president’s speech”, 2004; “China’s leaders on”, 2004). This articulation of ideational modification signalled the reconstruction of the socialist identity of China together with the portrait of a state that adjusts itself to the concept of sustainable development by considering the indispensable unity between humankind and the natural environment.

During this period of time, Chinese authorities became aware of the country's vulnerability to climate change as well (King et al., 2012: 45). Extreme weather conditions and natural disasters began to threaten social development, agricultural production, and economic dynamism in China (Heggelund, 2007: 166; Li, 2009). In conjunction with these challenges, China, which wanted to present itself as a responsible stakeholder committed to peaceful rise, had to find a balance between its carbon-intensive rapid economic growth and decade-long position regarding environmental issues. At this point, the shift in its global power inevitably confronted with its image of a low-profile actor from the developing world.

In the lead up to Copenhagen, China respectively earned the titles of “global leader in annual CO₂ emissions in 2006, surpassing the global per capita emissions average in 2008 and world champion in energy use in 2009” (Conrad, 2012: 436). Even though China took advantage of the G-77 to reject any attempt to introduce a state category of upper-tier developing countries consisting of more advanced developing economies (Bjørkum, 2005: 27), its status as a major emitter economy caused the legitimacy loss of China's self-portrait as the advocate of developing countries' interests in climate change issues. Moreover, with changes in its interests and needs in terms of energy security, sustainable development, and internal political stability, China started to recalibrate its international orientation by allying itself with major developing countries, such as India (Conrad, 2012: 439-440; Zhang, 2013: 4). From another aspect, the growth in its economic development and emissions level did not allow China to cover itself among the larger coalition of developing countries. Under these circumstances, the ideational transformation stimulated a new policy outlook on China's rapid economic growth and introduced new concepts such as the peaceful rise and low-carbon development. In line with the Chapter's argument, China's position appeared as converging with other emerging powers, and Chinese officials incorporated and promoted new discursive elements.

On the road to Copenhagen, official statements delivered by Chinese high-ranking officers demonstrate the attempts to tie the Chinese growth-oriented perspective up with rising concerns over challenges growing out of climate change. Zhou Jian, the then Vice Minister of State Environmental Protection Administration, took the climate change-related problems caused by the economic globalisation era into

account and underscored the importance of integrating the methods of sustainable development, implementing resource-saving practices, and strengthening the environment-friendly social structure (Zhou, 2007a). Defining China as a responsible developing country, Vice Minister Zhou advocated that China was trying to accomplish a development pathway balancing economy, society, and environment because of the immediate climate change-related problems it faced (Zhou, 2007b). Moreover, President Hu evidenced that China tried to stay in tandem with the developing world and developed states, and he introduced the concept of a *harmonious world*. Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing (2003-2007) elaborated on this concept and said that:

Such a world should seek peaceful, harmonious, scientific and sustainable development. To help build a harmonious world, China last year assumed more global responsibilities too, economically and politically, in the face the multi-challenges facing the world (Tian, 2007).

Thus, China redrew its position as the bridge of the harmony between the environment and developmental ambitions, so Beijing offered its efforts to take new responsibilities at the global level. In this framework, Wu Xiaoqing, the successor of Zhou Jian, underlined that while all countries in the world share the burden to take action against environmental degradation, the contribution of each country should be considered in keeping with their different national conditions (Wu, 2007).

Coming to Copenhagen, China announced its goals for emissions reductions as other emerging economies did. While this move was assisting the progress of global emissions reductions and promoting its status and image of a responsible power acting at the global level (Conrad, 2012: 442; He, 2010: 15), it also led to the reinterpretation of the principle of CBDR and revived the meaning of this principle which invites the contribution of developing countries in proportion to their domestic capacities. This development supports the argument that emerging powers discovered their potential for making a greater contribution to dealing with climate change and acted in coordination with each other.

As a result, the outcome of the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Summit was the erosion of the strict distinction between developed and developing countries since all the major

emerging economies voluntarily took the pledge for emissions reductions. Consequently, the preliminary hints of the future framework of international climate change negotiations were revealed (Zhang, 2013: 2).

In this respect, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi (2007-2013) assessed the Copenhagen Conference as “not a destination but a new beginning” (Wong, 2009). For Yang, the Conference:

upheld the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, [...] made a solid step forward in promoting developed countries’ binding emissions cuts and developing countries’ voluntary mitigation actions, [and] produced important consensus on the key issues of long-term global emissions cut targets, funding and technology support to developing countries (“Chinese premier’s attendance”, 2009).

In conclusion, China had initially intended to utilise its involvement in international climate change negotiations to portray itself as a responsible actor in the international arena and a respected member of the international community. Although China had attached significant importance to its relationship with other developing countries at the body of the G-77, and, therefore, objected to the flexible mechanisms which were regarded as the ways of foreign interference, Chinese authorities were obliged to revise their firm stance in order to improve their national welfare and modernisation. Its economic boom urged Chinese officials to present their country as a responsible stakeholder committed to peaceful rise, leave its low profile developing country identity behind, and act with other emerging powers. From the environmental viewpoint, China’s move at the COP-15 served for invigorating its ties with other emerging powers and attaining a responsible emerging power status on the global scale in the 21st century.

3.2.5. A Brief Analysis of Climate Change Politics of South Africa

Although African states mostly failed to determine a unified position regarding environmental issues in the early years of international climate change negotiations, they achieved to develop two main standpoints in time. The increasing demand among African states to generate a collective stance crystallised on the basis of the *African Common Position* which addressed the concept of injustice in reference to

negative impacts of developed countries' behaviours on the living standards in Africa. This common position also linked climate change to other vital issues for the continent, such as food security, health, and economic development (Nelson, 2016: 112).

The search for *Forging a Continental Coalition* was the second outcome of the efforts among the African nations to coordinate their strategies as a continental group within the framework of the African Group⁴. Therefore, their aims were to facilitate their participation in international organisations, increasing their influence, and solidifying the credibility of their positions (Nelson, 2016: 114-115).

Despite the pursuit of generating common ground, differences in their geopolitical positions, energy mix, level of development, and vegetation cover indicated the sources of policy variations across the Continent (Nelson, 2016: 113). Apart from the dynamics which are directly representing intra-Africa characteristics, international political conditions gave shape to South Africa's stance on climate change. Following the dissolution of the apartheid system in South Africa, the most prominent object of the post-apartheid government was to overcome international and regional isolation, and exclusion experienced in the past (Rennkamp & Marquard, 2017: 452). In this sense, South Africa under the leadership of the first post-apartheid President, Nelson Mandela, got a chance to get fully involved in global affairs (Nelson, 2016: 123) and portray itself as the representative of the disadvantaged by means of SSC (Mielniczuk, 2013: 1085). Hence, the country proved its eligibility to sign the UNFCCC treaty despite the initial disallowance for becoming a party to the treaty in the early 1990s (Rowlands, 1996: 165).

By recognising its liabilities to and assuming a political and economic leadership status of the continent of Africa (Hochstetler, 2012: 974; Nelson, 2016: 122), South Africa strived for making contributions to the African Group (Worthington, 2015).

⁴ African Group, or the Group of African States, "at the UN General Assembly works to forge a consensus on key issues of Pan-African interest, such as development, trade, debt cancellation, infectious diseases, small arms and light weapons, nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, climate negotiations, transnational crime prevention, and the election of Africans to various UN activities and bodies" (Murithi, 2012: 665).

At the dawn of democracy, South Africa drew up a low profile in international climate change debates but did not ignore the subjects such as poverty alleviation, health issues, technology transfer, and financial assistance subsidised by developed countries (Hochstetler, 2012: 974; Nhamo, 2011: 11). In this respect, President Nelson Mandela (1994-1999) realized the importance of the environmental issue in South Africa's agenda by saying that "[w]e need to find ways to harness the positive links between development and the environment so that each objective promotes the other" ("SAfrican development must", 1995). In accordance with the argument offered in this Chapter, this is the evidence that South Africa engaged in a process of policy adaptation on the basis of a non-zero-sum understanding between environmental concerns and developmental targets because of both changes in its material requirements and shifts experienced in its ideational structure.

As a key part of the post-apartheid intellectual agenda, Thabo Mbeki (1999-2008), who served as the President after Nelson Mandela, promoted the concept of *African Renaissance*, which invokes the idea of "African political renewal and economic regeneration" (Ajulu, 2001: 27). In addition to Mandela's emphasis on human rights and his moral-oriented foreign policy understanding, South Africa's foreign policy gained a new dimension referring to its active involvement in governance mechanisms. Advancing South Africa's leadership was the veiled aspiration of President Mbeki's large-scale vision termed under the *African Renaissance* (Neethling, 2017: 42). "We Africans are intent on placing the proud image of our continent back on the face of the world map, and to enable it to take its rightful place among the community of nations" were the words of President Mbeki to describe the origins of the *African Renaissance* and to encourage the self-sufficient economic growth and development within the framework of "Millennium African Renaissance Partnership Programme" ("African rebirth good", 2001). Therefore, this intellectual background urged South Africa to participate in the African Union, the African Ministerial Conference on the Environment, and the African Group of Negotiators (Rennkamp & Marquard, 2017: 452).

Incorporating the common position adopted by African states at the international negotiations, South Africa denounced the so-called global system of apartheid between rich developed countries and poor developing nations. President Mbeki

(2007) linked the exacerbated climate change-related problems to the starvation of poor people and exploitation of their natural resources with no beneficial return to their heritors. At this point, President Mbeki aimed at building the moral basis of South Africa's influence by criticising the disparity between the industrialised and the developing nations. He described the current division as "islands of wealth surrounded by a sea of poverty" (Verrengia, 2002). Therefore, he rejuvenated the image of South Africa's struggle against discrimination and used the term "global apartheid" in his interview to point out the role of sustainable development for alleviating the gap all around the world (Costello & Hunter-Gault, 2002). Thus, South African leaders promoted the developing country identity whose primary objects were to eradicate poverty and underdevelopment (Mielniczuk, 2013: 1086). As Deputy Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism Rejoice Mabudafhasi (1999-2009) had already expressed that "the issues of development and the environment are fundamental to the daily struggle against poverty" ("2002 Earth Summit", 2000). These statements proved that South Africa, like other developing countries, considered the issues of poverty and underdevelopment as the underlying factors jeopardised environmental security and sustainable development.

Additionally, President Mbeki (2006) assessed the NAM and the G-77 plus China as the sister organisations and attributed great importance to their potential in strengthening multilateralism, SSC, and struggle against exclusion and marginalisation in terms of international politics, economics, and social aspects. At this point, Jacob Zuma (2008), who is the successor of Thabo Mbeki from 2009 to 2018, put in his speech delivered at the 15th Conference of the NAM that South Africa remained grateful for the efforts of major coalitions of developing countries such as the NAM and the G-77 for the abolishment of the apartheid regime in South Africa (Nel, 2010: 967). As a result, South Africa coordinated its stance in accordance with the outlook of the G-77 plus China (Masters, 2009: 14) and emerged as a *bridge-builder* between industrialised and developing countries owing to its stable economy and attraction for foreign investment (Atteridge, 2011). In line with its vision of being a *bridge-builder*, South Africa envisaged that improving South-South relations would serve to reach more equitable North-South relations (Lemon, 2000: 33; Sidiropoulos, 2008: 110).

However, the second term of Mbeki brought new aspects into South African foreign policy and his new tune towards foreign affairs affected South Africa's position during international climate change negotiations. In addition to its non-permanent membership in the UN Security Council between 2007 and 2008, its increasing material capacities and the advancement in its country profile by means of its growing economy triggered a new phase for South African policy-makers to reassess their place in international affairs (Sidiropoulos, 2008: 110 and 113; Atteridge, 2011). They moved beyond playing a *bridge-builder* role between the North and the South, and aligned themselves with like-minded countries outside Africa (Sidiropoulos, 2008: 110 and 113). Thus, South Africa pursued an international policy towards building a more inclusive international regime in dealing with global issues (Nhomo, 2011: 12) and gained confidence in articulating its bold demands regarding distributional issues, including concerns about climate change (Nel, 2010: 959).

President Mbeki highlighted that although the poor nations cast a great role for the UN to solve their problems related to poverty, underdevelopment, impoverishment, environmental degradation, and distributional disparities, international institutions reflect the prevailing power structure, serve to preserve the status quo, and carry out the programmes that respond the interests of the dominant and the powerful actors (Masango, 2007). Therefore, in line with the argument of this Chapter, South Africa's material gains paved the way for political benefits by forging new ties with other advanced countries from the developing world. At this point, South Africa re-evaluated its status and posited itself over the rest of the developing states as it assumed the role to express their concerns over and viewpoints on global climate change issues.

However, this development should not be interpreted as South Africa's disengagement and disassociation with Africa and its African identity. Representation of coordinated and inclusive African position on climate change had been continuing to be a crucial component of South African policy at the international level (Masters, 2009: 14). In this regard, after his election, President Zuma had a tendency to utilise multilateral channels (Atteridge, 2011) and expand the country's international network by improving the relations with other emerging

powers, especially with Brazil, Russia, India, and China within the framework of the BRIC cooperation, through the instrumentality of South Africa's strength in representing the Continent (Nelson, 2016: 123). Therefore, its rapprochement with other emerging powers in the field of climate change modified its low profile in international climate change debates (Hochstetler, 2012: 974). From a climate change policy point of view, these countries shared the perspective that they have the responsibility to perform dynamic and necessary engagement in the efforts to tackle the subject of climate change (Nhamo, 2011: 11).

Without renouncing its African identity and its liabilities for the continent of Africa, its upper hand in engaging in the international economy and its recent political gains at the level of international and regional organisations inspired South African policy-makers to cast their country a new role in world affairs. As brought forward by this Chapter, such ideational readjustments and material advances made South African decision-makers believe that their country can take its part among the leading actors arouse from the developing world and shoulder new responsibilities in global climate change governance.

With the objective to negate the gloomy memories left from the apartheid system, South Africa worked for softening its image in its region and at the international stage. While its active involvement in climate change negotiations has been serving for this purpose, the ideas such as green growth, green economy, and low-carbon development started to take place in South African climate policy formulation (Nelson, 2016: 124; Nhamo, 2011: 11) together with the increasing emphasis on its vulnerability to climate change (Hochstetler, 2012: 975). Water and Environmental Affairs Minister Buyelwa Sonjica (2009-2010) also underscored the key role of low carbon growth to ensure the country's energy security, achieve developmental trajectory, and contribute to the global efforts for emissions reduction ("S.Africa won't compromise", 2009). Hence, in accordance with the argument generated in this Chapter, South Africa comprehended the need for integrating environment-friendly techniques into its economic development programme as a result of shifts in the material world due to rising overall GHG emissions levels and worldwide economic activities.

In his address to the 64th UNGA Debate and High Level Summit on Climate Change, President Zuma (2009a; 2009b) called attention to the devastating impact of climate change on the continent of Africa and its impediment to the pursuit of development and poverty alleviation. Therefore, the President had faith in an inclusive, fair, and effective global agreement to find an extensive solution. These motivations prompted South Africa under the Presidency of Jacob Zuma to introduce an emissions reduction pledge at the COP-15 in Copenhagen (Atteridge, 2011; Masters, 2013). Zuma addressed that whereas contributions from all nations are expected to reach a sustainable future, South Africa assumes an international responsibility in curbing the level of global emissions rate in spite of the country's 1 percentage share in total GHG emissions of the world (Talliard, 2009). This development points out that South Africa acknowledged the need to incorporate a greener tone into its discourse and reduce GHG emissions to be recognised as a responsible international actor.

Although South Africa underlined the need for an inclusive, fair, and effective outcome during the negotiations, its reduction pledge could not initially escape from the criticisms directed by some African states since Pretoria, for those countries, exhibited a great shift from the long-held position of the developing nations (Hochstetler, 2012: 976). Furthermore, this move of South Africa was considered that it abandoned the general position within the framework of *climate political friendship and togetherness* as it would drag other developing countries into emissions reduction pledges (Nhamo, 2011: 17). In his address, Lumumba Di-Aping, the lead negotiator of the G-77 in Copenhagen, reported that "SA had been key to division [...] within the Africa group" as a result of its emissions cuts; thus, he directed severe criticism by saying that "South Africa must stop selling the continent to the highest bidder" (Bega, 2009).

Nevertheless, South Africa upheld developing countries' traditional stance regarding climate change. For example, Marthinus Van Schalkwyk (2008), Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism from 2004 to 2009, underlined the lack of commitment and concrete steps of developed countries in providing technology, finance, and capacity-building techniques for developing states. In this sense, South Africa advocated that it would not be part of any binding emissions reduction targets and developed countries should bear the cost of climate change mitigation to a large

extent. In his speech, President Zuma mentioned that “[while] all developed countries must commit to ambitious, legally binding emission reduction targets, developing countries should commit to nationally appropriate mitigation action, to achieve a decline in emissions” on the condition financial transfer and technological support provided by developed states (“Rich world needs”, 2009). In this regard, for South Africa, developed countries need to take the initiative for greater emissions reductions, allocate further financial assistance, and technology transfer (Nhamo, 2011: 11 and 18).

Yet, the speeches of President Zuma at the UNFCCC in Copenhagen invited developing countries to determine “nationally appropriate mitigation action” to take their part in emissions reduction activities and fulfil their moral obligations to the future generations (“President Zuma arrives”, 2009; Zuma, 2009c). President Zuma intended to demonstrate the importance he attributed to the issue of climate change by saying that “[i]t’s a matter of life or death for the population of the globe. Our view is we are dealing with an issue that threatens the very survival of humanity” (“Factbox-Quotes from Copenhagen”, 2009). This change in South Africa’s international climate change policy pointed out that whereas South Africa did not renounce the notion of responsibility of developed countries and historic disparity in terms of climate change, it acknowledged the need for a reduction of GHG emissions as a reflection of its ambition to be recognised as a responsible international actor and its multilateral cooperation with other emerging powers. Hence, the dynamism in South African foreign policy concerning climate change opened a new phase for advancing its network within multilateral platforms in addition to its traditional commitments to and connections with the continent of Africa.

Overall, South Africa’s apprehension of international and regional isolation and exclusion had encouraged it to get actively involved in international climate change negotiations. Keeping African interest on its agenda, South Africa also endeavoured to express its gratitude towards the NAM and the G-77 by acting in coordination in the field of climate change. However, its economic growth and potential in international politics paved the way for the reassessment of its place in international affairs and the expansion of its international network. Incorporating ideas such as green growth, green economy, and low-carbon development, South Africa revised its

low profile in global climate change governance, forged new bonds with other like-minded emerging powers, such as Brazil, Russia, India, and China, and coordinated its international climate change strategies accordingly.

3.3. Conclusion

Past experiences in the colonial era cultivated a sensitivity to protecting state sovereignty, and thus resist any externally imposed action since such pressures were perceived as foreign interference. This ideational milieu mainly urged Brazil, India, China, and South Africa to pursue their autonomy and act in solidarity with other developing states during the 1990s. These countries' ambitions to achieve socio-economic development and combat poverty and underdevelopment at the domestic level explained their alignment with the NAM and/or the G-77. Their developmental objectives made them side with the rest of the developing world and advocate the right to pursue their economic growth. In this regard, Brazil, India, China, and South Africa before the establishment of the BRICS platform aspired to function as the voice of the developing nations in international climate change negotiations, represent themselves as part of the larger developing world, and firmly resist any attempt to introduce emissions commitments for developing countries. Accordingly, by assuming a trade-off between economic growth and environmental protection, these countries also articulated the difference between luxury emissions of the rich from survival emissions of the poor. For them, developed countries were responsible for technology transfer and financial assistance to developing countries in accordance with the principle of CBDR and their historical responsibilities in the context of climate change problems.

With their rapid economic growth rates, increase in their technical capabilities, and their contributions to the global carbon footprint, especially after the mid-2000s, Russia consistently invited major emerging economies, including Brazil, India, China and South Africa, to perform greater engagement with mitigation efforts since changes in their material capabilities made the division of Annex I and II irrelevant. As a result of the pressure created by their economic and political prominence on the international scale, Brazil, India, China and South Africa recognised the need for their active involvement in addressing climate change.

Though these states had favoured less binding implementations since the time of the Kyoto Protocol, they announced their voluntary commitments to reduce emissions in the Copenhagen Climate Summit of 2009 owing to their growing self-confidence and ability to act independently which are the extensions of their increasing technical capabilities and rapid economic growths. Confirming the argument presented in this Chapter, their move of 2009 in the lead up to the Copenhagen Summit was the reflection of emerging economies, especially Brazil, India, China, and South Africa, to what extent they reached a convergence in adopting a new set of ideas, realising their dissimilarities with the large body of developing countries, and embracing their newly surfaced common responsibilities and *collective identity* which was coined under the term of emerging powers. Furthermore, the arguments such as common responsibilities and their moral obligations for humankind were articulated to legitimise and justify their voluntary emissions reduction actions and indicated a transformation in their discourse. These states also blended their morally supported international responsibilities for climate change-related issues with the idea of sustainable economic development and environment-friendly energy production and consumption methods.

Additionally, the Copenhagen Summit set the conceptual grounds for future negotiations. The leaning to the bottom-up approach, the erosion of the strict division between developed and developing countries, and the willingness of emerging powers to take action against climate change-related problems indicated ideational changes. Thus, as argued by this Chapter, a new policy stance taking shape around Brazil, India, China, and South Africa overlapped with Russian expectations from the advanced developing economies. Furthermore, the statements delivered by high-ranking officials from the future BRICS associates attributed importance to the platform's itself by acknowledging its potential and capacity in the field of climate change.

As a result, the period after the end of the Cold War to 2009 indicates the origins of the *collective identity* formation and the common climate change policy formulation processes among emerging powers consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. The common features of these actors are that they became aware of

their dissimilarities in comparison to the rest of the developing nations, demonstrated their readiness to take action in international relations and assume new responsibilities in global climate change governance, and reconstructed their discourse around the concepts of being the voice of small and less developed countries and caring about the good of humankind and the earth.

The next two Chapters will examine the process of how the establishment of the BRICS cooperation has manifested itself in the production of a common stance among the BRICS states on global climate change-related issues from 2009 onwards.



CHAPTER 4

FROM THE COPENHAGEN CLIMATE CHANGE CONFERENCE TO PRESENT: EXAMINING CLIMATE CHANGE POLITICS OF THE BRICS CLUB

Chapter 3 traced the process of how the shared ideas, beliefs and values formed the basis for ideational alignment among the BRICS states and, moreover, the shift in the material world led to the change in the ideational structure of the BRICS countries by the time of the Copenhagen Climate Summit. This shift encouraged them to generate overlapping discourse on and accomplish a level of cohesion in their policy formulations regarding the issue of global climate change. At this point, the argument built in Chapter 3 serves to analyse a specific time period that the BRICS had initially stuck to their long-held ideational ties rooted in the developing world. Thus, the quasi-causal connection between material shift and ideational reorientation is neither an ontological prioritisation nor a rejection of their mutually-constitutive relationship. Having been situated in divergent material conditions in terms of their leading industrial sectors, economic size, demographic profiles, population growth, share in total emissions, and roles in the energy market, the BRICS experienced concurrent trends. Hence, this discussion just unpacks the onset of the BRICS' climate change approach on the basis of how similar advances in their economic development, improvements in their capabilities, and increase in their emissions profiles had differentiated them from the rest of the developing world and how they had gone through a process that induced them to generate overlapping positions and laid the basis for their future cooperation.

With regard to the post-Copenhagen period, the issue areas of climate change and sustainable development are categorised as the BRICS' efforts remaining at the policy level and becomes the subjects of analysis in Chapter 4. In addition, the themes of green growth and the NDB reflect the BRICS' activities that have direct implications to the material world as examined in Chapter 5. Thus, the dissertation investigates the BRICS partnership by dividing it into two parts.

By extension, this Chapter focuses on the approaches to climate change politics at the global level presented within the BRICS following its establishment as a separate platform. In this framework, this Chapter first discusses the explanatory powers of three Mechanisms regarding the BRICS cooperation and collaboration in the fields of climate change and sustainable development, and then returns to the analysis of these themes in the light of the official documents of the BRICS platform and the high-ranking policy-makers' statements as those releases and political speeches are the means to measure the concept of identity and capture the shared ideas (Allan, 2016: 21 and 35).

4.1. Alternative Explanations and the Argument of the Dissertation

Theory-testing process tracing invites to deduce mechanisms from the existing literature to explain the phenomenon at hand. In the light of this guidance, three Mechanisms from the competing theories were developed to understand the BRICS cooperation especially in the field of climate change. While the Mechanism which relied on the Neorealist account proposes that the BRICS states cooperate with the reformist intentions to proceed to a multipolar international system by *balancing* the unilateral actions of the U.S., the Mechanism drawn from Liberal Institutionalism puts forward that the BRICS cooperation in the area of the climate change is the product of their *functional cooperation* on the basis of their utility calculations. Lastly, the Mechanism built on the Constructivist research agenda explains intra-group cooperation and collaboration among the BRICS members as the outcome of their increasing interactions, changes in their material capabilities, and consequently their in-group cohesion based on their *collective identity*.

In the second stage, *what if* question is asked to test whether these hypothesised mechanisms exist in reality. The expected outcome of the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference, which constitutes the critical juncture for the BRICS partnership in the field of climate change, would vary within the theoretical framework of each Mechanism.

From the perspective of Neorealist theory, the BRICS states would have acted in a less cooperative manner regarding challenges of climate change since they would have sought to obtain material gains by exploiting nature to gain the political and economic advantage over the U.S. in order to attain a multipolar world order. However, the empirical evidence in Chapter 4 do not support that the BRICS states aim at forging a new coalition to counter the position of the U.S. or any other Western state as in the case of the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement. This example may have been provided an opportunity for the BRICS grouping to be able to galvanise a large coalition against the actions of the U.S., discredit the role of the U.S. in global climate change governance, and question the existing international structure. On the contrary, the BRICS members tried to act as a partnership that invites all actors to make fair and equitable contributions, urges developed states to fulfil their commitments, gives voice to the apprehensions of the developing nations, and encourages them to take some actions instead of being labelled as free-riders.

The multilateral platforms composed of a small number of states became prominent at the international level. Representing those interests specified by its member states, these platforms would expose the shortcomings and failures of the existing international organisations. As a result, the Liberal Institutionalism viewpoint allows to argue that it could have been easy to express and act on the narrowly defined interests. This limited membership would have facilitated to pursue the economic incentives and have integrated other relevant topics into in-group cooperation areas thanks to similar utility calculations. However, these small coalitions would have made it difficult to reach agreements on a global scale. Nevertheless, it has not been the case at the body of ongoing international negotiations for climate change. Yet, the cooperation within the framework of the BRICS platform has not remained limited with the shallow economic gains, but the post-Copenhagen period provided evidence in Chapter 4 that the BRICS partners demonstrated a standpoint taking care

of the well-being of both their own and their partners' citizens. They also framed the nature of their cooperation without abandoning their close connection with the larger developing world, accepted their new roles and responsibilities affiliated with the status of emerging powers, and aimed at incorporating a moral dimension into their partnership.

Constructivist agenda recognises that the shift in the material world encourages the BRICS states to explore and express their overlapping policy stances, act as responsible and constructive actors in line with the new roles cast for them. These developments create an appropriate environment for increasing their interaction, generating common discourse, and getting involved in the process of *collective identity* formation. Their shared identity defined under the status of emerging power differentiated the BRICS from the developing nations, albeit preserving the ideational affinity with the rest of the larger developing world to a certain extent.

After the Copenhagen Conference, the BRICS exerted themselves to appear as active contributors to the efforts of combating climate change and worked to produce tangible policy positions in this regard. Importantly, they ceased to explain the contemporary problems with the old concepts. The BRICS countries have articulated neither the image of being a bridge between the Global North and South, nor the claim of assuming the leadership role in the developing world since Copenhagen. Therefore, the Mechanism guided by the Constructivist approach preserves its validity in explaining the phenomenon at hand. Thus, this theoretical assumption becomes the main argument of the dissertation.

4.2. The Topic of Climate Change Within the Framework of the BRICS Platform

Although the discussions related to global finance and economy constituted the main agenda items, in particular in the first years of the BRICS Summits, the issue of climate change has appeared as a prominent subject within the framework of the BRICS format and been mentioned in every single declaration of the Leaders' Meetings since 2009. The members of the BRICS club acknowledged that climate change is one of the most challenging problems disturbing global development and

stability. In this regard, the BRICS states made it clear that they shared the incentives to address the issue of climate change in a joint manner (Brütsch & Papa, 2013: 321).

4.2.1. The Attempt to Make a Joint Definition of the Concept of Climate Change

The joint definition of a concept is an initial sign that the BRIC countries determined a fixed meaning for a problem they have faced, so this cognitive agreement would shape their collective expectations and behaviours. Accordingly, when the 2nd BRIC Leaders' Summit was held in Brasilia in 2010, expanding intra-group political consensus was unfolded by the BRIC members (Martins, 2019: 179). During this meeting, climate change was jointly defined as a serious threat that can be overcome by strong global actions (BRIC, 2010). While this definition proves that the BRIC associates unquestionably noticed the detrimental impacts of climate change endangering the living conditions, they believed that only global efforts covering the developed world and the developing nations can offer a remedy for this problem.

In this sense, the BRIC promoted the same notion with the purpose of framing the social world and setting the ground for actions. Regarding the 16th COP to the UNFCCC in Mexico, the BRIC states expressed that they favoured the negotiations which would be conducted more inclusively (BRIC, 2010). The emphasis on the term inclusivity was made to count the voice of the developing nations during the negotiations and to counter any attempt of developed states to impose their terms on developing countries. This is the evidence that in terms of the social category of the BRIC grouping, each partner country tended to see itself as the relentless proof against the unilaterally determined policy formulations of developed states and as the responsible actor for increasing the voice of the developing world in global governance. It indicates the theoretical limits of Neorealism in understanding the role of second-tier states. This stance of the BRIC is not an attempt for *soft-balancing* strategy isolated from ideological factors but evidence of their increasing confidence in promoting their preferences reflecting their ideological, historical, and cultural roots.

This inference confirms the theoretical assumption that when an individual state takes its place in a group, its identity displays itself in association with the social

category of that group (Allan, 2016: 22). Thus, as the fundamental component of the argument of the dissertation, gradually advancing cohesion among the BRIC states supports the empirical presence of their *collective identity* perception—as the powers who attach weight to global responses whilst feeling responsible for balancing the concerns of the developing nations against the demands of developed states—to explain the BRICS cooperation in the field of climate change.

The 3rd Summit was the first time when the current five members of the BRICS cooperation came all together. In the BRICS Leaders' Meeting held in Sanya in 2011, the participants regarded climate change with its dimension threatening the daily life and even the survival of humankind. So, the BRICS states expressed their intention to improve their cooperation in the direction of adapting their economies and societies to climate change (BRICS, 2011). The statements made by some of the high-ranking officials from BRICS also implied a similar aspect that considers climate change with its social and economic dimensions.

Therefore, the way how climate change was defined as a problem framed the policy proposals of the BRICS states. For instance, Chinese decision-makers revived the notions of ecological civilisation, and green and low-carbon development to correspond to the concerns over ecological protection (Zhou, 2013). Similarly, President Zuma (2011a) considered climate change as a “sustainable development challenge”. In this connection, Alf Wills, Deputy Director-General for Environmental Advisory Services of South Africa from 2012 to 2018, defined sustainable development as the essence of his country's National Climate Change Response Policy which is both developmental—that leads to economic growth, create new jobs, and alleviate poverty—and transformational—that supports low-carbon, efficient, equitable, and competitive economic structure—(Wills, 2013). In her remarks during the COP-17, Izabella Teixeira (2011), Minister of the Environment in Brazil from 2010 to 2016, underlined the necessity to incorporate the efforts for sustainable development and fight against poverty into their actions on climate change. These comments are indicating that the BRICS states are eager to internalise the concept of sustainable development in dealing with the subject of climate change. In this sense, the issue of sustainable development was closely

associated with climate change, whilst acknowledging climate change as a problem with its social and economic risks.

To portray this formulation of the BRICS states in Wendt's (1994: 385) terms, corporate and collective identity becomes relevant. Corporate identity refers to generating interest in and appetites for development. These kinds of interests "are intrinsic to states" and not social constructions (Wendt, 1999: 233-234). If the constituent members of the BRICS cooperation had reflected on the issue of development by referring to the search for a better life only in their own countries, this would have marked the implications of the corporate identity. However, they favoured an approach to enhance the welfare of their partners in the BRICS group and beyond. According to Wendt (1994: 386), "the positive identification with the welfare of another" refers to the existence of collective identity. After recognising interests as the product of identity (Hopf, 1998: 176), the ideas cultivating their *collective identity*, which is affiliated with the status of emerging powers, encouraged the BRICS group to have an interest in the sustainable method of production without abandoning their developmental ambitions whilst supporting the actions against climate change and eradicating poverty in both their countries and other developing nations. In compliance with the main argument of the dissertation built on the Constructivist perspective, their increasing interaction forged the cohesion on the basis of the *collective identity* construct and this catalysed the process of embracing shared expectations and common agenda among the BRICS. This perspective goes beyond the contour of the utility-maximisation concept which is promoted by Liberal Institutionalism and has narrow understanding in dealing with normative notions such as solidarity. So, the common standpoint of the BRICS countries regarding the notion of climate change treated the concepts of sustainable development and pursuing developmental targets as integral parts of their policy proposals.

On the one hand, as emphasised by the BRICS Environment Ministers (BRICS, 2015a; 2016a; 2017; 2018a), social development, high-quality economic growth, and ecological progress were presented as the rationale integrating adequate responses to climate change ("President Xi Jinping's special representative", 2019; "UN climate action summit", 2019). On the other hand, transition to green manufacturing, change

in the habits of energy consumption and production, and the use of the methods of renewable energy was viewed as the necessary steps in the process of climate-resilient development (“UN climate action summit”, 2019; Putin, 2021a; Modi, 2019). Thus, the main argument of the dissertation becomes valid in explaining the BRICS cooperation that the joint definition of climate change connected to their *collective identity* of being emerging power whose developmental ambitions should be aligned with the concerns over social risks. While changes in the material world obliged the BRICS states to improve and integrate new policy items into their efforts, the topics of sustainable development and green production techniques emerged as an integral part of their vision of climate change.

By extension, the BRICS group published the document “Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership 2025” for the purpose of determining the development path of the BRICS states and the fundamentals of their cooperation. The document set the basic principles of the BRICS cooperation encompassing respect for economic sovereignty, each members’ social systems, economic models and development paths, commitment to international law, openness in decision-making, adherence to multilateralism, sustainable development, and inclusive growth (BRICS, 2020a: 4). Specifying priority areas of the partnership, the document indicated that the “BRICS intensified interaction in the fields of addressing climate change, [and] enabling sustainable energy consumption and generation” (BRICS, 2020a: 10). The BRICS group was entrusted with the tasks to effective implementation of the UNFCCC and its Paris Agreement, reduction of GHG emissions through technological innovation and sustainable lifestyle, and financing low-carbon development projects (BRICS, 2020a: 10 and 11). This strategy paper is the manifestation of the BRICS’ abilities to cooperate on the basis of the shared values, ideas, and principles in the medium-term and conceptualise constitutive norms regulating in-group interactions with regard to determined proper behaviours. At this point, the argument, which is expected to function in line with the theoretical presumptions of Constructivism, has explanatory power in the process of how repeated interactions among the BRICS states, material improvements in their technological and economic capabilities, and the challenges brought by climate change generated an ideational consensus among the BRICS countries, produced a discursive alignment, encouraged them to expand the web of intra-group cooperation, and deepened the level of their cooperative and

collaborative relations. As a result, this ideational consensus helped them to realise and conceptualise the shared goals, values, and interests in responding to climate change.

In line with the argument of the dissertation which highlights the mutually reinforcing relationship between increasing interactions among the group members and the flourishing in-group agenda setting, their joint definition further detailed the BRICS efforts for generating a common stance on how to respond to the climate change-related problems. Whereas a change in the material structure had been observed in terms of both their economic powers and GHG emissions, the BRICS countries defined those challenges brought by climate change as threats to daily life and even the existence of humankind. This provides evidence that they considered these challenges as collective problems. Hence, the BRICS group produced a level of positive identification which can emerge once material structure creates incentives to solve the collective problem (Wendt, 1994: 389). BRICS believed that their joint responses were necessary for combating climate change and, therefore, agreed on making contributions on the basis of the bottom-up approach in line with the design of nationally appropriate mitigation actions –which are demonstrated in sub-sections 4.2.2. and 5.2.4.–.

4.2.2. The BRICS Opinion on the Content of Climate Pledges

Prior to South Africa's admission, the 2009 Joint Statement of the BRIC Leaders showed the commitment of the member states to the principle of CBDR and articulated their readiness to take part in constructive dialogue for fighting climate change. Whereas the BRIC countries stated that they would disregard any unilateral pressures of developed states, they announced their incentives to conjoin actions against climate change with socio-economic development endeavours and participate in international talks (BRIC, 2009). This stance was complying with their position that they would present at Copenhagen as they both rejected the pressures imposed by developed states and recognised the need to offer their concrete contributions to the actions for protecting the climate without curbing their developmental ambitions. As Chapter 3 demonstrates, this approach adopted by the BRIC countries pointed out their ideational reorientation from being one of the members of the larger developing

world to the category of emerging power who becomes more willing to take action in comparison to an ordinary developing country and whose contributions are necessary for fighting climate change.

Additionally, following voluntary emissions reduction pledges of the BRIC states –which are interpreted in Chapter 3 as the turning point in global climate change policy understandings of BRIC plus South Africa and considered as the action leading to policy convergence and further cooperation at the body of this platform–, these four countries expressed their expectations during the 2nd BRIC Leaders’ Summit to reach fair and binding results in the COP-16 for the implementation of the United Nations Framework Convention and the Kyoto Protocol without prejudicing the principle of CBDR (BRIC, 2010). To exemplify, both Luiz Alberto Figueiredo (“Brazil signals cautious”, 2010), the chief negotiator of Brazil at the COP-16, and Jacob Zuma (2010), the President of South Africa, revealed within the framework of their comments on the COP-16 that their countries favoured a legally binding agreement. This policy proposal indicates that they designed a common agenda regarding global climate change governance and entered a new stage in their collaboration since none of the BRICS states had ever considered an agreement in the form of instituting legal obligations.

The Delhi Declaration mentioned an important item that is directly related to the BRICS’ policy implementations in the field of climate change. The Declaration expressed the BRICS’ favour of “[the] preparation and implementation of nationally appropriate mitigation actions of developing countries” (BRICS, 2012). The presentation of the concept of nationally appropriate mitigation actions was momentous progress in the BRICS strategy since this concept would serve to the BRICS states to offer another option to replace the top-down solution suggestions because these proposals were considered as if they were formulated under the guidance of developed countries’ policy understandings. So, the phrase of nationally appropriate mitigation actions points out to the bottom-up approach which started to take place in BRICS’ perspective on global climate change governance and illustrates an alternative way of how emerging powers and the developing nations present their contributions under the guidance of a widely accepted concept. Wendt (1994: 387) asserts that identities and interests can “be treated as dependent variables

endogenous to interaction”. As proposed by the mechanism built under the guidance of Constructivism, the change in the BRICS countries’ approach to the nature of envisaged adequate responses to climate change exposes how their increasing interaction facilitated to create relative stable conceptions regarding their common position to the possible solution to climate change, generated positive identification towards in-group associates, and led to shared interests in pursuing a bottom-up approach to formulate mitigation actions. By extension, these repeated acts of cooperative behaviours among the BRICS states enabled them to agree on the same concepts in the field of climate change. Therefore, the required involvement of emerging powers in the efforts to find a solution to climate change problems and their ability to make meaningful changes reveal the theoretical limits of the Neorealist account.

In addition to their tendency to recognise their potential role in introducing concrete actions, to reach a fair and binding agreement, and to determine their contributions on the basis of nationally appropriate responses, the Fortaleza Declaration of the BRICS group, which is the outcome of the 6th BRICS Leaders’ Summit, invited the rest of the Parties for acting in accordance with the decisions and conclusions arrived in the UNFCCC intending to build a legally applicable protocol by 2015. Thus, the BRICS states expressed their adherence to the principles of CBDR-RC in the process of forming a protocol in the near future (BRICS, 2014a). In conformity with the principles of CBDR-RC, the representatives of Brazil, Russia, and China underlined in their speeches at the level of the UN that although developed and developing countries may differ from each other in terms of their legal, political, and moral obligations to responding to climate change, humankind is equally responsible for combating it (Rousseff, 2014; Bedritsky, 2014; Gaoli, 2014). This approach evidences the ideational transformation among the BRICS states. Whereas they had treated developed states as the main responsible actors that should bear the cost of actions against climate change, the BRICS countries gradually focused on the term common responsibilities and recognised that every single party needs to do its part in fighting climate change. In contrast to Liberal Institutionalism which holds an ahistorical stance, this process evinces the main theoretical argument in the dissertation as it reveals that their increasing interaction and consolidating *collective*

identity perception led the BRICS partners to embrace the ideas of equal and common responsibilities in addressing climate change.

The final draft of the Paris Agreement was adopted on 12 December 2015. The Paris Agreement ended the bifurcation between Annex I–developed–countries and non-Annex I–developing–parties, and brought a universal action plan on climate change requiring that all parties do their part whether they are rich, poor, developed, or developing. This provision to some extent instantiated the BRICS call for reaching a fair and binding agreement. The hybrid nature of the Agreement made the international processes, such as monitoring, reporting, and reassessment of country targets, to be imposed on the parties, but the envisioned notion of nationally determined contributions remained as country-level voluntary objectives despite the fact that parties should “pursue their mitigation measures with the aim of achieving the[ir] objectives” (Paris Agreement, 2015: 4). So, the nature of the Paris Agreement as binding, all-inclusive, and respecting national conditions correspond to the expectations of the BRICS countries.

Although the Paris Agreement held an indisputable milestone for the decades-old international climate change negotiations, the Agreement was not a game-changer within the boundaries of the BRICS cooperation since the BRICS states had designed their common agenda and already pledged to make concrete contributions to combat climate change in Copenhagen for the first time. Therefore, the Paris Agreement is not a critical juncture in terms of intra-BRICS cooperation and cohesion.

However, the Paris Agreement envisages the concept of INDCs which refers to the efforts of each party to reduce its national emissions regarding the post-2020 climate actions (“Nationally determined contributions”, n.d.). Table 3 shows the commitment levels and ambitions of the BRICS states for reducing their emissions within the framework of their INDCs and updated NDCs⁵ which are evidence of their belief that they should exert concrete efforts to address climate change.

⁵ A country’s INDCs turn into NDCs when it formally joins the Paris Agreement.

Table 2: INDCs and NDCs of the BRICS Countries Under the Paris Agreement 2015.

Country	INDCs by 2030	NDCs by 2030
Brazil	Reduce GHG emissions by 43% compared with 2005	Reduce GHG emissions by 50% compared with 2005
Russia	Limit GHG emissions to 70-75% of 1990 emissions	Reduce GHG emissions to 70% to the 1990 level
India	Reduce the emissions intensity of GDP by 33-35%	Reduce the carbon intensity by less than 45%
China	Lower CO ₂ emissions per unit of GDP by 60% to 65% from the 2005 level	Lower CO ₂ emissions per unit of GDP by over 65% from the 2005 level
South Africa	Limit annual GHG emissions between 398 and 614 Mt CO ₂ -eq	Limit annual GHG emissions between 350-420 Mt CO ₂ -eq

Source: All NDCs (n.d.), United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.

Setting its targets for GHG emissions reduction, Brazil had already achieved to decrease its emissions by 41% in 2012 compared with 2005 (Nationally Determined Contributions of the Federative Republic of Brazil, 2015: 1). Equally, while China succeeded in 2015 to reduce its CO₂ emissions per unit of GDP by 38.6% below the 2005 level and by 21.7% below the 2010 level (Climate Change Department of National Development Reform Commission, 2016: 33), India had already achieved to lower its GDP emissions intensity by 21% between 2005 and 2014 in the light of its goal for reducing its emissions intensity by 20 to 25% by the year of 2020 compared with the 2005 level (Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change of Government of India, 2018: 99). In addition, Russia's GHG emissions excluding emissions and removals from land use, land-use change and forestry dropped by 32.7% between 1990 and 2017 ("Report of the subsidiary body", 2019: 29).

Still, the year 2017 witnessed a critical decision of President Donald Trump (2017-2021) to withdraw the U.S. from the Paris Climate Change deal. Even though the reactions of the BRICS states on President Trump's deal-breaker move could have been revanchist, the statements of the BRICS countries' officials drew a solution-based approach rather than accelerating the tension. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying announced that China would remain committed to the Paris Agreement and continue its position favouring global cooperation regardless of

other countries' attitudes (Smith-Spark, 2017a). Recognising the key role of the U.S. for the effective implementation of the Paris Agreement, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov underlined Russia's adherence to the Agreement (Smith-Spark, 2017b). In a similar vein, India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi (2014-ongoing) stressed India's ambition to implement the Paris Agreement in "letter and spirit" at the meeting of BRICS Leaders held on the sidelines of the G-20 Summit ("Committed to climate change", 2017), irrespective of other countries' political practices. Likewise, the media statement of the South African Government and the joint statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Environment of Brazil expressed their countries' regret over the decision of President Trump but emphasised their stand on the side of the implementation of the Paris Agreement (Department of International Relations and Cooperation of Republic of South Africa, 2017; "Joint press-release", 2017).

In all these remarks and statements, the BRICS states elaborated their commitments on the pursuit of the goals in the Paris Agreement on the basis of their position favouring multilateral dialogue and confirming the common responsibilities. Therefore, these official announcements provide evidence that the aims of the BRICS countries for the operativeness of the Paris Agreement were related to the motives of global responsibilities to humankind, the effectiveness of initiatives for global climate change governance, and the cooperative and constructive dialogue rather than disgracing the country image of the U.S.. Although the alternative explanation drawn from Neorealism urges to count on the importance of the U.S. in regards to international efforts to fight climate change, the evidence do not support that the BRICS was involved in forming a bloc *balancing* against the U.S. action. As a result, the argument relying on Constructivist understanding is better streamlining within the framework of the narrow research question of the dissertation.

Therefore, the argument of the dissertation ably performs in explaining the motivations behind the BRICS cooperation. Rather than aiming to pursue a soft-*balancing* strategy against the U.S., the BRICS partners advanced their pledges presented in Copenhagen in line with their emerging power status. Having accepted their role in building an environment in good condition by offering their concrete contributions, the BRICS group took a step further and favoured a fair and binding

agreement determining responsibilities for each stakeholder in the light of their different national circumstances. Hence, the more they interact at the body of the BRICS platform, the more they agree on new policy proposals as part of the values they share. The BRICS states promoted the concept of the bottom-up approach in order to replace top-down implementations. This indicates two sides of holding the *collective identity* of emerging power. On the one hand, the BRICS countries intended to protect other developing countries against the demands and attempts of developed states to carry the burden of climate change on the developing nations. On the other hand, the BRICS group had to act responsibly towards global climate change problems and facilitate the future contributions of the developing world.

4.2.3. Global Responsibilities for Developed States and the BRICS Club

In accordance with the remarks of President Zuma (2010), at the meeting of the UNFCCC, and Preneet Kaur (2010), Minister of State in the Ministry of External Affairs of India from 2009 to 2012, resource transferring in the fields of finance and technology have been regarded as necessary actions to redress a balance between climate and developmental imperatives in developing states. In this sense, Edna Molewa (2010), the Minister of Water and Environmental Affairs of South Africa from 2010 to 2014, voiced the need for financial and technology support from the developed to the developing nations in her statement during the COP-16. Also, President Medvedev (2010) noted both developed and advanced developing countries' global responsibilities in providing assistance to the less developed states in their struggle with climate change. As a result, although developed states were treated as the main actors that would provide financial and technological support to the developing nations in the pre-Copenhagen period, the idea that those countries in the category of emerging powers may take advantage of their potential to assist the developing nations for supporting their efforts against climate change got off the ground. Additionally, the statements of both the BRIC and South African officials revealed that the issue of climate change cannot be separated from the developmental aspirations of developing states. Also, these texts show that the remarks of South African officials overlapped with the overall stances of the BRIC countries in the greater scheme before it became a member of the club.

After becoming the BRICS, the members continued to prioritise financial and technology transfer to developing states. For example, at the UN Summit in 2015, Foreign Minister Lavrov (2015) mentioned that lending necessary assistance for the nations in need was one of the conditions to achieve global stability. While Russia continued to articulate the sensitiveness of emerging powers to the needs of developing states, Xi Jinping (2015a), President of the People's Republic of China since 2013, advocated at the Paris Conference that all parties should take responsibility to prevent the logic of the zero-sum game.

Differently, the BRICS definition of climate change also determined their common sense on how to benefit from the financial and technological transfers in the developing world. President Zuma (2015) expressed his opinion that transfers to the developing nations should help them reach affordable and accessible clean energy. In this respect, Dilma Rousseff (2015), President of Brazil from 2011 to 2016, pointed out her expectation from the new agreement and said that it might set a framework for reducing inequalities and helping developing countries pursue the low-carbon economy and eradicate poverty. These statements reveal that the BRICS highlighted the critical connection between the obligations imposed on developed states and the contributions that would be made by developing countries. Equally, whereas the Goa Declaration of the 8th BRICS Summit and the press release of the meeting of the BRICS Ministers of Foreign Affairs highlighted the responsibilities to assist the developing world in terms of capacity building, and financial and technological support for the implementation of the Paris Agreement (BRICS, 2016b; 2016c), the BRICS states gave coverage to the implementations of how resource transfers from developed states should be utilised. Failing in understanding ideological and historical factors shaping actors' practices, Liberal Institutionalism has no explanatory power with respect to international climate change politics on the basis of the North-South split and normative notions such as fairness and responsibility. However, in line with the propositions of the argument presented in the dissertation, their increasing interactions at the body of the BRICS cooperation enabled them to adopt similar policy proposals and discursive expressions.

In this context, the BRICS states kept on defining developing states as they have been in need of improving their response capabilities to climate change-related

problems. In line with this general standpoint, President Xi advised seeing the efforts to help them as the duty of the rest of the world (“President Xi Jinping’s special representative”, 2019). This phrase exposes the main argument introduced in the dissertation that BRICS constructs an identity of emerging powers who give voice to the needs of the developing nations while recognising their own abilities to provide assistance to the developing countries, so they consider themselves as the constituents of the category in between developing and developed states. Additionally, all these texts indicate that changes in their material capabilities set the ground for a social context where they promote the shared values as being the supporter of the developing nations and faithful to international agreements and principles. Thus, this dynamic nature of identities and ideas and how they influence the actors’ interests indicates the lack of necessary analytical tools of the Neorealist school of thought.

While the BRICS documents of 2019 marked their commitments to the principle of CBDR-RC and the Paris Agreement (BRICS, 2019a; 2019b; 2019c), a special emphasis on the category of Annex II was made in the Declaration of the 11th BRICS Summit on the purpose of inviting those countries taking part in Annex II “to scale up the provision of financial, technological and capacity-building assistance to developing countries to support mitigation and adaptation action” (BRICS, 2019b). Annex II countries are composed of the OECD members of Annex I. But it does not cover the economies in transition, which is the category that Russia is included in. Therefore, the support of industrialised OECD states for developing countries in their financial, technological, and capacity improvements against the challenges of climate change was highly regarded by the BRICS states. The distinction between Annex I and II countries in terms of their responsibilities is a blueprint to explicitly separating Russia from the category of industrialised states, an articulation to reveal Russia as the part of *we*—emerging powers/the BRICS states—, and an endeavour for fostering *we*-ness of the BRICS platform. So, the perception of significant other plays role in the process of building their *collective identity*. Assigning industrialised states the main responsibility to provide financial and technological assistance to developing states, the BRICS wanted to speak for the developing nations and presented them as the parties in need whilst picturing themselves as the actors who may also allocate resources to the developing world. This serves to distinguish themselves from the

larger developing world. Confirming the argument of the dissertation, changes in the material world in favour of BRICS cultivate their *collective identity* and conceptualise the policy suggestions by extension of their common agenda.

4.2.4. The Mark of the COVID-19 Pandemic on the BRICS Climate Change Policy Framing

During the 12th BRICS Summit, the BRICS Leaders (2020b) could not ignore the adverse impacts of COVID-19 as this pandemic exposed the gentle relationship between the environment, human health, and the course of the global economy. As a result, COVID-19 left its mark on the talks on climate change within the framework of each BRICS group dialogue and the statements of the representatives from the BRICS countries.

The statement of the 6th BRICS Environment Ministers Meeting reminded the delicate balance between the environment and humankind (BRICS, 2020c). In his message at the UNEP, Shonisani Munzhedzi (2020), the Department of Environment, Forestry and Fisheries Deputy Director General of South Africa, also indicated the fragile harmony between biodiversity and human life. Still, this fragile connection re-stressed the responsibilities of humanity as the BRICS Environment Ministers recognised (BRICS, 2020c). These responsibilities are also closely associated with climate change, environmental health, and economic activities. According to the South African speaker, such a global challenge once again unmasked the “societal vulnerability to systemic and multidimensional risks of climate change and biodiversity loss” (Munzhedzi, 2020).

At this point, the BRICS states indicated the disruptive impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the achievements in the fields of climate change, environmental protection, and eradication of poverty (BRICS, 2021a). As emphasised by the BRICS Ministers of Foreign Affairs, pursuing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development gains significance in dealing with the negative consequences of the pandemic (BRICS, 2021b). Despite the fact that the pandemic generated an interrelated effect as it is directly related to the natural balance with all its parts and has an impact on the decline in the emissions levels (China Daily, 2021), Chinese

President Xi (2020a) acknowledged that the efforts for tackling climate change cannot be relaxed by considering such a downtrend, and he continued to mark the central role of the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the transition to green and low-carbon development (“Xi Jinping attends”, 2021). Thus, the design targeting the post-pandemic development agenda proves that countries cannot embark on the old high-pollution and high-emission path in such a world where human health directly depends on the health of other components of the environment and should merge the responses to the pandemic with green recovery (Xinhua, 2021).

Whilst referring to the triangle among nature, compassion, and solidarity, Deputy Director General Munzhedzi underscored the slogan of *LNOB* to pursue inclusive development and recovery in the post-COVID-19 period (Munzhedzi, 2020). With respect to the motto of *LNOB* and the BRICS’ perception of global responsibilities—which are discussed in sub-section 4.2.3.—, the BRICS Environment Ministers stated that the setback experienced in the global economy required meaningful contribution of developed states to allocate adequate financial resources for and share knowledge with developing countries in drafting climate-positive economic recovery programmes (BRICS, 2020c).

In this regard, the BRICS platform reiterated its stance on international financial support to the developing world for alleviating the negative impacts of the pandemic within the framework of global development partnership (BRICS, 2021a). The BRICS Leaders also cast a greater role in the international organisations in the post-pandemic period. At the general debate of the 75th session of the UNGA, President Xi (2020b) stated that COVID-19, which is treated as the evidence of the common fate of humanity living in an interconnected world, was the warning of nature to human actions exploiting resources in the name of economic development at the cost of “Mother Earth”. After mentioning the long-term impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on the global economy in his speech at the same UNGA session, President Putin (2020a) recognised the relevance of the UN conventions and the targets set in the Paris Agreement as well. Moreover, the BRICS states’ Ministers of Foreign Affairs requested active involvement of international organisations and institutions in ensuring social and economic recovery and promoting the right to development to

sweep away the detrimental consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic (BRICS, 2020d). These statements unveil that the BRICS group revived the idea of multilateralism by emphasising the rightful roles of international organisations.

Still, the BRICS Ministers of Foreign Affairs expressed their appreciation with respect to the NDB's initiatives for social infrastructure and sustainable development financing in accordance with Sustainable Development Goals (BRICS, 2021b). While the NDB provided loans through the Emergency Assistance Programme and Facility to combat the pandemic, intra-BRICS cooperation gained a new dimension once the BRICS Vaccine Research and Development Centre was launched (BRICS, 2021a). As Naledi Pandor (2020), the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation of South Africa since 2019, highlighted the critical role of the BRICS partnership during the pandemic, Carlos França (2021), the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Brazil since 2021, welcomed intra-BRICS solidarity in terms of vaccine cooperation.

Although this expressed intra-BRICS cooperation tolerates the shortcomings, challenges, and burden in the BRICS states, the existing inequity in access to vaccines indicates the immunization gap between wealthier and poor nations (BRICS, 2021a). Cyril Ramaphosa (2021a), President of South Africa (2018-ongoing), treated this disparity as a problem that should be fixed. In accordance with the New Delhi Declaration (BRICS, 2021a), Minister Pandor (2020) articulated that BRICS sought to support countries, including low- and middle-income states, to address the pandemic by means of financing and facilitating the export of vaccines rather than gain political or economic benefit.

The Potential Mechanism 2 is useful in forging a link between the joint efforts of the member states and the expanding network within this BRICS platform. However, their partnership cannot be explained within the theoretical limits of *functional cooperation*. In line with the Potential Mechanism 3, these evidence supports that how the BRICS states utilise their increasing material capabilities and maintain their active policies to help the rest of the developing world in accordance with their emerging power status. Additionally, their increasing interaction enabled them to

establish new initiatives in response to current challenges as a part of their intra-group partnership.

However, this inequality is also the consequence of vaccine nationalism. The leaders from the BRICS states disclosed their concerns over rising unilateralism, protectionism, and national egoism in connection with the pandemic conditions (Ramaphosa, 2021b; “Fostering a new development paradigm”, 2021; Lavrov, 2021). Minister Lavrov (2021) rejected the emerging tendencies among his Western counterparts which aim at promoting the rules in contradiction to the multilateral system. Thus, President Ramaphosa (2021c), President Putin (2021b), and President Xi (“Fostering a new development paradigm”, 2021) revived the function of the BRICS forum in upholding multilateralism against de-globalisation and economic decoupling. Minister Pandor (2020) defines the BRICS formation as a major global initiative in promoting multilateralism before and after the pandemic. In her speech revealing “BRICS Approach to the Post-COVID-19 Recovery”, she also underlined that BRICS works “towards a more representative, democratic, equitable, fair and just international political and economic order [...] within the context of the shared principles and values [...] including the principles of mutual respect, sovereign equality, democracy, inclusiveness and strengthened collaboration”.

The Potential Mechanism 1 facilitates understanding the tension between unilateralism and multilateralism by adopting a structuralist perspective in analysing the international system. Yet, the BRICS states do not act with the intention of *balancing* the U.S. at the international level. Thus, the Potential Mechanism 3 nicely streamlines the underlying dynamics of the BRICS policy framework. The BRICS position favouring multilateralism in the global system strengthens the sense of *we-group* among the members. In addition to how this perception contributes to the consolidation of their *collective identity*, intra-group cohesion creates a social context where they can determine their policy stances on the basis of their shared principles and values and agree to set a common vision for international political and economic order.

The developments following the COVID-19 pandemic is an implication area of the common standpoint of the BRICS grouping rather than a new phase aligning

endeavours to address environmental problems with sustainable development methods. In support of the main argument, their increasing interactions at the body of the BRICS cooperation facilitated to produce common policy agenda and discursive stances as a response to the changes in the material world created by the COVID-19 pandemic. Thus, BRICS did not neglect to admit the linkage between the conditions leading to the pandemic and the environmental degradation, so articulated that the detrimental impacts of human activities produced an existential threat to humanity. They sought a solution by relying on multilateralism, shared principles and values, and encouraging resource transfer to developing states in line with the motto of *LNOB*, which marks the discursive alignment among the BRICS associates. Most importantly, the BRICS outlined a way out to bounce back in the light of their shared stance on the issue of climate change and they underlined that human activities have to be in alignment with the borders set by environmental conditions.

4.3. Promotion of the Economic Development in a Sustainable Manner

The adverse impacts of environmental degradation show their faces not only in the fields of economic activities but also in relation to the quality of human life (Martins, 2019: 177). Their rapid economic growth and imported carbon-intensive branches of production activities from industrialised states endangered the BRICS in ensuring their outstanding productive economic performances in the long-term, maintaining their social stability, and managing the demands on environmental protection. As opposed to unsustainable development models, the necessity to progress towards more sustainable development pathways was comprehended by emerging powers (Freitas, Dantas, & Iizuka, 2012: 118; Fioramonti, 2014: 16).

The concept of sustainable development is composed of improving the quality of life, assuring the growth in quantity, and enjoying the natural resources in the long term. Although the idea of designing an environment-friendly economy is not a brand-new recommendation, the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 and blindness to environmental degradation over the years have promoted the notion of sustainable development in searching for a solution “to keep the global economy growing without causing irrevocable environmental damage” (Park, 2013: 212-213). Thus, economic sustainability proposes an improvement in the quality of economic growth through

distributing wealth and income in an equitable pattern, so reconciles the social and environmental dimensions (Park, 2013: 216 and 219). In this regard, the Foreign Ministers of the BRIC countries pointed out this significant matter just a few months earlier than the start of the Global Financial Crisis. These high-ranking officials recognised global sustainable development as the concept offering solutions to global problems, such as poverty, hunger, and diseases, and acknowledged the necessity of the creation of a fairer global economic system (BRIC, 2008).

4.3.1. Call for a Change in Economic Development Paradigm: Promoting the Concept of Sustainable Development

In June 2009, the BRIC Leaders came together in Yekaterinburg and discussed a broad range of issues related to sustainable development. In the Joint Statement of the 1st BRIC Summit, the Leaders backed the sustainable development agenda with reference to “the change of paradigm of economic development” that would be guided by the Rio Declaration⁶, Agenda for the 21st Century⁷, and other multilateral agreements (BRIC, 2009). By means of this remark, the BRIC states demonstrated that they acknowledged the old paradigm inherited from industrialised states became outdated, so the BRIC group associated the envisioned new paradigm with the international documents on sustainable development. Conforming the assumption which relies on the concept of *collective identity* perception which takes shape in accordance with the practices of Significant Other—industrialised states for the BRIC countries—, this attempt indicates the initial sign of the ideational alignment among BRIC and their collective intention which generates a common agenda for the BRIC cooperation.

Furthermore, the BRIC Leaders intended to follow an alternative perspective and rejected the perceived inverse relationship between economic growth and pro-

⁶ Rio Declaration is the document produced at the 1992 Earth Summit and is composed of 27 Principles which chiefly promote people-oriented sustainable development, eco-sensitive usage of natural resources, a balance between developmental and environmental needs, poverty eradication to increase the living standards, and cessation of unsustainable patterns of production and consumption (General Assembly, 1992).

⁷ Agenda for the 21st Century, shortened to Agenda 21, is the non-binding outcome document of the 1992 Earth Summit with the characteristic of an action plan. The Agenda is consisting of four sections and mainly focuses on social and economic dimensions of sustainable development, and the conversation and management of resources (United Nations Sustainable Development, 1992).

environmental steps. For example, in her speech in the 67th session of the UNGA, President Rousseff (2012) confirmed the urgency of embracing a new paradigm in compliance with the sustainable development agenda for the 21st century. This new paradigm must focus on the issues of employment generation, poverty eradication, and remodelling of the economic structures without scarifying economic growth. In this context, assuming Brazil as a responsible emerging power planning to reduce its GHG emissions, Minister Teixeira (2010) stated in her speech at the COP-16 that Brazil introduced a new paradigm of development strategy built on economic growth, social justice, and environmental protection. For Minister Teixeira, this new approach evidenced that economic development does not necessarily increase the level of emissions contrary to what is believed. Similarly, President Zuma (2010) emphasised the required balance between climate and economic development in Cancun. He favoured a perspective on development eradicating poverty, and undermining the taken-for-granted trade-off between economic growth and environmental preservation. These remarks reveal the overlapping policy formulations and the discursive harmony among the current five members of the BRICS club at the level of the UN. Additionally, this inference exposes the inability of Liberal Institutionalism in grasping the role of normative notions for uncovering international climate change politics of less powerful states and the bias of Neorealist understanding of international relations towards major powers and the concept of the power struggle, which result in overlooking the advancing importance and meaningful contributions of emerging powers.

As a continuity of their standpoints presented in the multilateral platforms, intra-BRICS cooperative dialogue expanded and deepened once the 5th Declaration was penned in Durban in 2013. The BRICS members stated their joint stand to explore “new models and approaches towards more equitable development and inclusive global growth” (BRICS, 2013). In accordance with this, Wang Yi, Foreign Minister of the People’s Republic of China since 2013, noted in his speech at the Leaders’ Dialogue of the UN on Sustainable Development that “the old way of ‘pollution first, treatment afterwards’” need to be replaced by a contemporary approach embracing economic growth, environmental protection, clean energy, and social issues for the common good of the international community and next generations (Wang, 2013). Similarly, Deputy Wills (2013) revealed South Africa’s transformational vision

supplementing sustainable development against the challenges of climate change through the creation of low-carbon, job-generating, and equitable economic structure. As put forward in the argument of the dissertation drawn from Constructivism, changing material conditions in terms of environmental degradation and economic necessities of the BRICS states motivated them to set distinctive goals specified by the group identity, which is represented under the label of emerging powers that aim at pursuing their developmental ambitions, but conceptualising pathways to be alternative to the old practices of industrialised state.

In addition to the BRICS' sensitiveness to economic growth, environmental protection, and poverty eradication which are covered under the topic of sustainable development, the BRICS Leaders (2016b; 2016d) revealed the mutually complementary roles of sustainable development and access to clean and renewable energy in ensuring wealth and saving the future of the planet. In line with this general standpoint, Li Keqiang, Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China since 2013, and Li Baodong, Vice Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China since 2013, emphasised at the UN that adequate development would produce the remedial results in dealing with the roots of the old problems—economic growth, poverty alleviation, people's livelihood, healthcare and education—and new challenges—climate change, refugee crisis—(K. Li, 2016; B. Li, 2016). Representing the same discursive and ideational standpoint of Premier Li and Vice Minister Li, the Johannesburg Declaration of the 10th BRICS Summit (2018b) exhibited the intention of the BRICS platform to cooperate in the field of environmentally-sustainable energy systems in advancing global sustainable development agenda and the welfare of their citizens. So, the topics such as universal energy access, security, affordability, pollution reduction, and environmental conservation became prominent. In compliance with the sustainable development agenda, the BRICS Environment Ministers introduced the approach of *circular economy* to minimise the waste of resources, provide their long-term usage, and succeed in energy efficiency (BRICS, 2018a). As put forward in the mechanism functioning in line with the theoretical assumptions of Constructivism, their increasing interactions over the past years enabled the BRICS states to agree on the policy formulations produced to overcome climate change-related problems and

environmental deterioration, and achieve their socio-economic development in harmony with environmental obligations.

Seeing the notion of sustainable development as an area for cultivating their partnership, the BRICS group set the agenda for strengthening and institutionalising in-group solidarity. In support of the main argument of the dissertation, the process of deepening intra-BRICS cooperation and solidarity at the multiple communication levels would produce shared values and common policy implementations. Hence, the BRICS states promoted their partnership in science, technology and innovation (BRICS, 2018b). As a result, the BRICS Ministers of Environment referred to technology transfer as the main mechanism that would serve to the implementation and operationalisation of SDGs (BRICS, 2018a). In this context, the BRICS group indicated that sustainable economic development and growth depend on infrastructure and international development assistance projects. By extension, they attributed great importance to the NDB in providing investment in those projects (BRICS, 2018b). Moreover, the BRICS Environment Ministers considered the notions of environmental recovery and *circular economy* as the solutions to poverty, inequality, and unemployment (BRICS, 2020c). As *circular economy* plays a vital role in energy efficiency, the BRICS Energy Ministers aligned sustainable development and global energy agendas and noted that energy policies need to be guided by the Principle 7 of SDGs (BRICS, 2020e), which encourages “global partnership to conserve, protect and restore the health and integrity of the Earth’s ecosystem” (General Assembly, 1992). As expected in the main argument, increasing interaction at the different levels of policy-makers and those who collectively embraced social purposes to eradicate poverty, protect the environment, and ensure development in a sustainable manner paved the way for cooperation in various areas and adoption of new concepts, such as *circular economy*, at the body of BRICS.

4.3.2. The Moral Dimension in the BRICS Policy Formulation for Achieving Sustainable Development

The 2nd Summit of the BRIC Leaders marked the process of increasing political rapprochement among the member states. The Joint Statement of the Leaders’ Summit reiterated their perception that the BRIC platform serves the “common

interests of emerging market economies and developing countries” (BRIC, 2010). Under the guidance of this perception, in the 2011 BRICS Sanya Declaration, all the current five of the BRICS group affirmed their commitment to the term sustainable development and assessed the issue of ensuring sustainable growth in developing economies as one of the serious challenges for the world. At this point, the BRICS states framed the eradication of poverty and hunger as moral, social, political, and economic obligations for humankind (BRICS, 2011). Thus, the efforts to struggle with human misery, and eradication of poverty and hunger showed relevance to the BRICS states’ perspective. As argued by the dissertation, this demonstrates that the dialogue and interaction among the BRICS member states enabled them to detail their joint agenda regarding sustainable development. Therefore, the BRICS countries built their arguments similar to the position they adopted on the issue of climate change, so they comprehended the necessity to promote sustainable development efforts as a moral responsibility of being emerging power.

At this point, Veerappa Moily (2012), Minister of State for Environment and Forests of India from 2013 to 2014, disclosed the perceived different viewpoints of the rich and the poor on environmentalism. For Moily, contrary to the financial accumulation of rich countries which was acquired by polluting the environment, the poor had to initiate their economic growth efforts with the problems and limitations of a polluted and exploited world (Moily, 2012). This approach restored the division between industrialised countries, which accumulated their prosperity by exploiting the environment, and emerging powers and developing states, who had to introduce an economic model for their development and alleviate their vulnerability to environmental problems and climate change-related challenges. Counting on social dimensions of the economic activities, this inference unveils that differentiating in-/out-group attributes with references to other collective identity entities serves to the process of group identity construct. This relational comparison exhorted the BRICS states to develop in a sustainable manner not to repeat the same mistakes that industrialised states did due to their path of old fashion environmentally-insensitive industrialisation process. For the BRICS, the disparity between developed and developing states in having access to and capitalising resources was regarded as the cause of difficulties experienced by the poor. Thus, the BRICS states moved the outmoded binary analysis focusing on economic development and climate change

towards the assessment considering the social dimension of climate change and moral incentives towards the developing world. Their discourse also took form in the direction of this change. Thus, neither the concept of *balancing* promoted by Neorealism nor the ahistorical perspective of Liberal Institutionalism relying on utility-maximisation and neglecting the division between the developed economies and the developing countries provide necessary analytical tools for understanding the BRICS policy conceptualisation.

In the 2015 Ufa Declaration (BRICS, 2015b), the BRICS Leaders affirmed their adherence to the post-2015 development agenda and its essential elements covering eradication of poverty and progress towards inclusive and balanced development. By setting the ground for further BRICS actions in the field of sustainable development, Prime Minister Modi (2015a) put forward that the more one actor increases its gains, the more it can share its resources with its friends. For Modi, “look[ing] at the world as one family” would encourage the actors to make a contribution to sustainable development efforts and fulfil their responsibilities for the future of the planet and next generations. Thus, thinking of their industrial development as the remedy for major global challenges and the way to reinforce their competitiveness, the BRICS Leaders announced their incentives to support South-South cooperation as the supplementary element for the usual assistance flow North-South en route (BRICS, 2015c). At this point, President Xi (2015b) stressed the decisive role of the BRICS cooperation in promoting dialogue with other emerging and developing countries, and deepening South-South cooperation. Therefore, in line with Constructivism-led assumptions of the dissertation, which argues that actors’ *collective identity* would produce a common agenda, the BRICS group positioned themselves at the centre of the dialogues of South-South and North-South by embracing a morally supported standing assuming new responsibilities on the global scale.

Whilst deeming the efforts for sustainable development on the global scale as moral obligations and casting themselves new roles together with industrialised countries, the BRICS Leaders shared the same cognitive features and discursive elements in understanding and expounding upon the morally defined relationship between economic growth, sustainable development, and environmental protection. At the UNGA, Michel Temer (2016a), President of Brazil from 2016 to 2018, reinvigorated

the discourse of the *Common Future* and advised integrating this perspective to be able to achieve socially balanced and environmentally-friendly economic growth. Statements of Minister Molewa overlaps with the discursive position of President Temer as well. Minister Molewa (2016) considered the actions against climate change as an opportunity to incorporate the principles of sustainable development and so control “the global implications of unchecked development on our planet”. These articulations indicate that Leaders from the BRICS countries agree on the idea that humankind shares the same future and ensuring the sustainability of the planet in the face of undisciplined economic activities is a moral responsibility.

In addition to the common responsibility argument, both the BRICS Leaders and the BRICS Ministers of Foreign Affairs reiterated the responsibilities of developed states in providing assistance to developing countries to implement the goals of sustainable development agenda (BRICS, 2016b; 2016c). At this point, the BRICS Environment Ministers revived the motto of *LNOB* in emphasising the disproportionate impact of environmental degradation on the poor (BRICS, 2016a). Thus, the Environment Ministers stated that the endeavours for eradicating poverty should be primarily concerned with unfair exploitation of natural resources. In this context, the speech of Harsh Vardhan (2017), Minister of Environment, Forest and Climate Change from 2017 to 2019, at the COP-23 is informative because he described safeguarding the access to clean air and water, and proper climatic conditions as the moral obligations and assessed that the pledge to the motto of *LNOB* ought to be essential for conditioning a liveable and green planet. Likewise, Russian high-ranking officials thought that solutions to the problems of environmental degradation should be in line with sustainable development agenda and their environment-friendly economic development would both produce mutual benefits for their BRICS partnership and promote dialogue with the developing world (Medvedev, 2010; Putin, 2017). These uphold the argument of the dissertation by showing that emerging powers, the *collective identity* of the BRICS states, pursue a policy understanding at the international level to represent themselves as the group of states who show their tendency to strive for the well-being of the global community and who recognise and understand the difficulties faced by the developing nations. Thus, these identity constructs incentivised the BRICS to adopt both the discourse of the *Common Future* and the motto of *LNOB*. They embraced these discursive items to underline the

future shared by both the developed and developing nations, and to mark the material and intellectual shortcomings in developed states.

As indicating the ideational dimension of the BRICS agenda, enhancing the quality of human life and maintaining the developmental activities by showing respect to social and environmental responsibilities reveal the moral sides of the BRICS cooperation. At the global level, the flow of assistance to the developing world is critical to carry out the measures guided by the motto of *LNOB*. However, the lack of adequate and sufficient funding at the international level threatens equal and fair participation of developing states in global economic and climate change activities. Therefore, the NDB has central importance for the BRICS partnership to demonstrate their role which compensates international financial deficit in the field of sustainable development assistance and understands the needs of the developing world better than Western-centric institutions of the Bretton Woods. For President Temer (2016b), it is a moral duty to stimulate global solidarity for enjoying the positive outcomes of economic development. In this framework, jointly embracing the motto of *LNOB* provides evidence that both increasing interactions among the BRICS and the intersubjective understanding of their social identity shaped their in-group expectations created an opportunity to utilise their growing material capabilities as presumed in the argument being founded on the Constructivist approach. Supporting this argument, these empirical evidence also unveil that both the increase in their material possessions and the expansion of the web of intra-group cooperation created a social context for the BRICS states to conceptualise a common agenda that connects their lead in expressing the concerns of the poor. Additionally, their *collective identity* acquires a character by comparing BRICS with the established Western powers and indicating its institutional capacity to compensate for the deficiencies of Western-centric institutions of the Bretton Woods.

4.4. Conclusion

The issue of climate change appeared on the BRICS agenda as a topic that the members expressed their willingness and readiness to address jointly. This led the BRICS states to generate a common definition of climate change. Agreeing on a definition of a problem is the first step for BRICS to become a group collectively

acting against that problem on the basis of fixed meanings that would shape their behaviours and expectations as a separate social construct. Having considered the challenges of climate change-related problems as existential threats to humankind, the BRICS recognised social and economic dimensions of environmental degradation as well. Although the BRICS cooperation reiterated the arguments for the responsibilities of the developed nations, they confirmed their own contributions in the form of INDCs and NDCs on the basis of respective capabilities. This policy change is critical to understand how the BRICS members determine proper behaviours differentiating them from other developing countries in compliance with the *collective identity* construct labelled as emerging powers.

As their dialogue intensified and their partnership institutionalised, this enabled the BRICS associates to consider the actions against climate change as a part of global responsibilities. In the light of this perception, the challenge of COVID-19 taught that neither economic growth nor social development can be achieved without taking care of the environment. Thus, the COVID-19 pandemic urged them to embrace the joint discursive instruments which articulate the poor as victims of climate change on the basis of *LNOB* and the delicate balance between humanity and the environment. Hence, their shared stance on climate change set the common agenda items to be integrated into their cooperation. Therefore, these empirical evidence that unveil the BRICS common agenda about climate change, their discursive alignment, and the values they share in determining their policy implementations prove the explanatory power of the main argument of the dissertation counting on increasing interaction, changes in the material world, and the *collective identity* formulation.

Table 3: The BRICS Framing of Climate Change.

Factors Agenda Item	Policy Agenda	Ideas	Discourse	Values	Policy Implementatio ns
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Climate Change	• Offer tangible contributions for emissions reduction • Reach a legally-binding agreement • Take responsibilities in supporting the developing nations for their struggle with climate change	• Every single party should do its part in fighting climate change • Climate change is a threat to the daily life and the survival of humankind	• Common Responsibility towards the planet • LNOB (in its sense that every actor should be supported in its struggle with challenges of climate change and endeavours to initiate climate resilient development)	• Bottom-up approach for producing a solution to climate change • Equal and common responsibility for combating climate change	• Nationally appropriate mitigation actions

Source: Author's own creation, 2021.

The common agenda of the BRICS countries about climate change also covers the linkage among the topics of climate change and sustainable development. BRICS conceptualised that the problems brought by climate change might cripple their developmental ambitions. To achieve their developmental goals, they should safeguard their socio-economic development. The old-fashion economic development model threatens social stability and economic sustainability. Hence, a new paradigm integrating a greener perspective for economic development needs to be designed to succeed in economic growth in practical terms. At this point, the term sustainable development occupies the BRICS agenda.

The BRICS states outlined in the early years of their interaction that there was a need for change in the economic development paradigm in the direction of aligning socio-economic development with environmental protection. Representing the platform as serving to the common interests of developing countries and emerging powers, the BRICS rejected the perception that there is a trade-off between economic growth and environmentally-friendly practices. By extension of their identity closely connected to the status of emerging powers, the BRICS countries formed close cooperation and cemented their ideational alignment as they endeavoured to conceptualise a new development paradigm differing from the conventional model. Additionally, the BRICS repeatedly reminded that the efforts for sustainable development are moral

actions to ensure socio-economic development in harmony with the environmental considerations. Therefore, they gradually promoted the discourse of *Common Future* and their concerns over the future of humanity rather than acted within the boundaries of selfish and greedy material interests. Thus, the BRICS partnership discovered a discursive alignment that integrates sustainable development agenda into the motto of *LNOB*.

Although the BRICS invited developed states to share their financial and technological resources with the aim of preparing the developing nations to involve in the global fight against climate change, they have recently tended to use the concept of global partnership rather than openly articulating the arguments of the historical responsibilities and burdens of industrialised economies since the new concept sounds more inviting and less coercive.

Thus, as opposed to other mechanisms, the argument on the basis of Constructivist account can better be serving since changes in the material world—the urgent need for harmonising developmental goals with environmental obligations—and the *collective identity*—emerging power that takes the welfare of the global community and the concerns of the developing nations into account and whose identity is constructed by the old practices of industrialised states playing the role of significant other in this process—explain the shared discourse—the *Common Future* and *LNOB*—among the BRICS states and their values—equitable development and inclusive growth at the global level— in producing common policy agenda—the efforts for building *circular economy*—.

Table 4: The BRICS Understanding of Sustainable Development.

Factors Agenda Item	Policy Agenda	Ideas	Discourse	Values	Policy Implementatio ns
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Sustainable Development	• Replace environmental ly-insensitive western development paradigm • Pursue a development strategy built on economic growth, social justice, and environmental protection	• Social and moral dimensions are inseparable parts of the economic activities, environmental problems, and climate change-related challenges • The developmental ambitions should be coordinated with the standards of sustainability in the fields of energy, environment, and labour force	• LNOB (in its sense that actors should be supported through initiating global partnership for sustainable development) • Common Future of the planet (with the emphasis on its moral dimension towards social and environmental well-being)	• Equitable development • Inclusive global growth	• Carry out the practices for installing circular economy as the solutions to poverty, inequality, and unemployment
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Source: Author's own creation, 2021.

Covering social and environmental aspects of economic activities, the scheme of sustainable development and the notion of the right to development without sacrificing the environment necessitate a modification in production methods and encourage the implementation of new and greener techniques for economic growth. However, the lack of international financial resources to support these efforts encouraged the BRICS states to launch their initiative, the NDB. The rest of the Chapter delves into those issue areas that came into view within the process of the cooperation and interaction among the BRICS states in the field of climate change-related issues.

CHAPTER 5

THE ACTIONS OF THE BRICS STATES TOWARDS GREENING THEIR ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES

Chapter 4 focuses on the topics of climate change and sustainable development and mainly reveals the policy positions of the BRICS partnership at the international level. This Chapter intends to go beyond the policy-based analysis and investigate the actions taken by the member states in practice under the umbrella of the BRICS platform in the light of their policy guidelines. In this respect, the Chapter starts with collating the Potential Mechanisms with each other. And then the rest of the Chapter exposes the specific BRICS plans and activities towards practical applications by relying on the official documents of the BRICS organisation, the statements of high-ranking representatives from the BRICS countries, and the documents submitted by the BRICS states to the UNFCCC.

5.1. Alternative Explanations and the Argument of the Dissertation

As expressed in Chapter 2, theory-testing process tracing encourages a research agenda that develops the mechanisms drawn from the existing literature. In line with this objective, there are three Mechanisms that compete to explain the phenomenon at hand.

Once the dissertation examines the actions of the BRICS states as a part of their policy positions concerning the subjects of climate change and sustainable development, the Mechanism drawn from Neorealist understanding of International

Relations would argue that BRICS would have employed the concept of green growth to gain material advantages in the global economic structure and would have mobilised the cumulative capacities for green practices as a means of soft-balancing attempts against the U.S. predominance. Rather, the BRICS states assess the efforts for the green economic model as the most reliable and civil tool for ensuring other developing countries' and their socio-economic development. Hence, the empirical materials show that the underlying the BRICS' motivations in the direction of transitioning to green techniques are not to comprise a political camp against the U.S. supremacy but to conceptualise a new paradigm for finding a remedy in the direction of environment-friendly economic development. In addition, although the BRICS refers to the lack of financial opportunities for and political sympathy to meet the needs of the nations from developing states in order to rationalise their NDB initiative, it is not an attempt to challenge the U.S.-led international financial institutions as Neorealism-guided Mechanism would have expected. Yet, the main target of the NDB was announced to supplement the activities of the existing organisations in the developing world.

For the Mechanism derived from the Liberal Institutional School of Thought, the BRICS states would have evaluated green energy production methods and green economic models with the intention of reaping the externalities of these green efforts for their economic benefits and utility maximisation. Instead, the BRICS considers these activities with their social dimensions and as a moral responsibility to combating poverty, preserving the environment, and safeguarding the common future of humankind. Also, this Mechanism presumes that the subjects covering green growth and the NDB might have been the cooperation fields that are integrated by the BRICS countries into their partnership on the basis of their utility calculations. However, these issues have been closely related to the BRICS perception of responsibly on the global stage and ties with the developing nations. As revealed by the empirical evidence, the *collective identity* of the BRICS group as being emerging powers is the underlying motives of these ideational factors that explain the BRICS' interest in integrating these subjects into its agenda.

The Mechanism driven by the assumptions of the Constructivist Research Agenda enables to bridge the analytical gap between the changes in the material world and

the ideational factors framing the BRICS actions under the guidance of their policy understanding of climate change and sustainable development. Furthermore, the Mechanism captures the effect of increasing interaction at the body of the BRICS platform towards the institutionalisation process of the initiative and the production of common policy frameworks and discourse among the member states. In this direction, the BRICS associates as emerging powers operationalise their growing material capacities and do not stay as the effortless stakeholders coming from the larger developing world in the face of climate change-related problems. In other words, owing to the factors elevating them to the status of emerging powers, the BRICS has translated their converging policy positions in Copenhagen into their search to offer a new approach and dynamism to deal with global climate change. Thus, the dissertation accepts this Mechanism as the valid theoretical argument in explaining the BRICS cooperation and collaboration in the fields of green growth and the NDB.

5.2. Transition in the Energy Sector for Building Green Economic Structure

The notion of green growth defines the mutually complementary linkage between the environment and economic growth. The goals of green growth implementations are to install sustainable and eco-friendly economic growth with the assurance of environmental improvements. Sustainable economic growth, efficient usage of natural resources, innovation and investment in green sectors and technologies, and modifying brown industries in the direction of a greener perspective constitute the core of green growth (Park, 2013: 209-215).

This eco-friendly policy formulation brought a multifaceted approach incorporating a new energy model and a green scheme for economic activities. The green economic structure is the basis for the objectives of green growth, low-carbon and sustainable development through integrating a new paradigm for energy production that utilises renewable energy sources which are the assets “contribut[ing] to social and economic development, to energy access, to a secure and sustainable energy supply, and to a reduction of negative impacts of energy provision on the environment and human health” (Edenhofer et al., 2011: I and 130). The efforts for aligning economic development with energy use serve to social, political, and economic dimensions of

sustainable development which encompasses the eradication of human misery, improvement of air and water quality, and minimization of international cleavages between rich and poor countries (Martins, 2019: 179). Yet, the term green growth came to the fore when the international community was seeking for a formula to draw the countries out of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. The attempts at recovery concentrated on the new path of economic growth to build a low-carbon green economy without falling into a trap of leading to another cycle of problems in the areas of energy and the environment. Thus, green growth introduced a prospect for this transition (Park, 2013: 208).

The overriding objective of the BRICS states to sustain their economic growth obliged them to adjust their economies in compliance with present conditions implied by climate change-related problems and environmental changes. The BRICS countries strove for redressing a balance between their developmental ambitions and the actions taken against the detrimental impacts of climate change. In a broad sense, emissions reduction measures have been the principal strategy in dealing with climate change. As a result, cutting down the share of fossil fuels in the energy mix of the BRICS economies and preferring alternative, clean, and renewable energy production to environmentally-hazardous energy sources emerged as the response both to meet the growing demand for energy and address climate change (Ruppel & Ruppel-Schlichting, 2013: 566).

In this context, this sub-heading starts to investigate how the BRICS states understand the notion of green growth. Afterwards, the role of green energy in the overall approach of the BRICS to achieve the developmental goals and its perceived socio-economic impacts are discussed. Lastly, concrete actions and their results are uncovered to review the level of commitment and seriousness of the BRICS states in the green energy sector.

5.2.1. The BRICS' Consideration Towards Green Economic Development

Starting with the Sanya Summit in 2011, the BRICS group marked their mutual interest and incentives for cooperation in the development and use of renewable energy as a tool for dealing with climate change. In this respect, the BRICS Leaders

declared the Action Plan. According to this Plan, the topic of greening the BRICS economic activities was determined as an area of further exploration (BRICS, 2011). This supports the argument of the dissertation that changing circumstances in the material world urged the BRICS states to conceptualise joint agenda items by expanding the issue areas of their intra-group cooperation. Thus, for the high-ranking officials from the BRICS states, economic growth and development went hand in hand with the actions against climate change (Javadekar, 2014a; Gaoli, 2014). At this point, the statement of President Rousseff points out a required change in their understanding of the relationship between climate change and economic development (MMA, 2014). Wendt's (1999: 231) equation, "desire plus belief equals action", makes sense of this policy expression of the BRICS group. While interest is providing the actor to have motivational force, identity gives direction to its motivation. Therefore, the BRICS states' identity of emerging power motivates their interest in–desire for–pursuing their economic development in the direction of–belief in–the idea of non-zero-sum understanding between developmental targets and environmental concerns to take action against climate change.

While attributing a meaning to the effective responses to climate change as common causes of humankind for a better future—as revealed in sub-heading 4.2.—, the BRICS Leaders emphasised the urgent need for a change in the nature of economic activities. For example, at the UN Climate Summit 2014, Prakash Javadekar (2014b), Minister of Environment, Forest and Climate Change of India from 2019 to 2021, blamed Western fossil fuel-led industrialisation for creating global problems causing climate change and poverty. In his speech at the 69th Session of the UNGA, Prime Minister Modi (2014) disapproved of the acts of industrialised states and urged to exhibit decent and gentle behaviour towards the environment. Therefore, comparing their approach to the economy and the environment with industrialised states serves emerging powers to determine their framework for proper behaviours within the framework of the green economy. This supports the theoretical approach presented in the Potential Mechanism 3 as these statements mark that the BRICS states construct a *collective identity* which draws a profile differentiating them from the features linked to their Significant Other—industrialised states— so that they may promote the concepts of proper behaviours.

Also, their understanding of the past, the present, and the future forms their opinion about which behaviours may be considered proper. First, the Chinese Director General of the Department of International Cooperation, Xu Quinghua, stressed the importance of altering the unsustainable production, and lifestyle and consumption patterns of developed states (“Twelfth special session”, 2012). Although Prime Minister Modi (2012) acknowledged that the current needs for economic development and poverty eradication could be met by instituting the green growth perspective based on energy efficiency and green energy production, Minister Moily (2012) strongly rejected “a green washed greed economy”, revealed the failure of “the market driven green economy”, and invited all parties to contribute to creating a democratic green economic structure with the bottom-up approach. This shows that while the BRICS countries draw a green economy understanding free from those outdated patterns of production and consumption, the out-group practices shape the process of *collective identity* construction among the BRICS actors. This analysis confirms with the assumptions of the dissertation instructed by the Constructivist perspective which argues that changes in the material world—the worsening problems related to climate change and environmental degradation and the need for transition to a green economy—would create a prospective social purpose for the BRICS states and shape the *collective identity* formation among the BRICS which defines the Self with comparisons and references to out-group actions. This point also discloses the lack of explanatory power of Liberal Institutionalism in analysing the process of state preference formation as this theoretical stance does not interested in state behaviours with regard to the normative notions and actors’ identity perceptions.

Moreover, in the Delhi Declaration of the 4th BRICS Summit in 2012, the BRICS Leaders conceptualised the transition to a green economy as a process depending on technological capacities and economic structure at national levels. Hence, they recognised different national development levels, strategies, conditions, and priorities among each individual state (BRICS, 2012). This reflects the rejection of, antagonism and contestation against the notion of supremacy, which the BRICS has collectively associated with the Western outlook. Thus, the BRICS states aimed at building an in-group identity on the moral grounds of the Global South rather than an initiative to developing a *balancing* strategy.

In addition to how the concept of green growth is perceived within the framework of and serves to forge the *collective identity* formation among the BRICS states, the efforts for green economic development became a part of the BRICS' common agenda as expected from the argument to function in compliance with the Constructivism. While the BRICS considered the actions for green growth as tools to launch a remodelling of economic activities, the joint agenda of the BRICS cooperation reveals the expected positive outcomes from sustainable energy production in the sector of green growth. For Minister Javadekar (2014c), this model utilises unproductive and wasteful resources, and leads to sustainable production and consumption patterns that naturally eradicate poverty. Also, Minister Javadekar (2014a) pointed out the importance of lowering energy intensity in economic growth, advancing energy efficiency, and integrating the use of renewable resources to enable the poor people in developing countries to have space in pursuing their developmental ambitions sustainably. The envisioned modernisation in the economic growth model aimed at merging the developmental ambitions with the standards of sustainability in the fields of energy, environment and labour force. Thus, not only economic incentives but also social and environmental aspects explain the BRICS cooperation.

Their distinctive goals for establishing a green development and low-carbon economy are the reflection of their social purposes of being emerging powers, so the BRICS envisages a global solution by conceptualising a new paradigm on the basis of harmony among climate change responses, SDGs, and green growth practices in the energy sector. Supporting the main argument of the dissertation, the BRICS interaction and the *collective identity* produce a social context where they employ similar discursive expressions for the sake of green economic activities and uphold common agenda items serving to conceptualise collective intentions that bring them new responsibilities in terms of transition to green energy and social purposes specified by the group identity on the basis of in/out-group differentiations.

5.2.2. The Incorporation of the Concept of Green Energy into the BRICS Agenda

The initial evidence of the coordination of the actions against climate change by constructing a green economy was rooted in the early years of the BRIC partnership. Although it was too early to forge a detailed in-group perspective, the BRIC Leaders agreed in the Yekaterinburg Summit that investment in and infrastructure of new renewable energy methods would diversify energy resources in line with the purpose of establishing a stable and sustainable environment (BRIC, 2009). Then, the Joint Statement of 2010 gave place to the subject of greener energy mix under a separate heading. In this context, the BRIC Leaders regarded energy as one of the most significant elements to support and advance the living standards of their citizens.

Whilst building a cleaner, affordable, and sustainable energy network was being considered as a facilitating instrument to diversify the energy mix of the BRIC states, the positive outcomes of building an environment-friendly energy sector would be the creation of new jobs and the contributions to SDGs (BRIC, 2010). For instance, President Medvedev (2010) marked that Russia invested in efficient and alternative energy production techniques with the purpose of ensuring sustainable economic growth and increasing the level of income of its citizens (Medvedev, 2010). South Africa also displayed a similar standpoint on green activities in the aftermath of its participation in the BRICS platform. Assessing climate change-related problems as inseparable topics from the goals of pursuing development and eradicating poverty, President Zuma (2011a; 2011b; 2011c) intended to replace high carbon-emitting economic design with a green economy. For Minister Molewa (2011), transition to a low-carbon economy, poverty reduction, and improvement of life quality would be the means in accomplishing the sustainable development targets. Moreover, Prime Minister Modi (2011) articulated in his statement at the BRICS Leaders' Summit in 2011 that the BRICS states "prioritise the rapid socio-economic transformation of [their] people and those of the developing world". Thus, greening their economic activities would enable the member states to be able to efficiently respond to climate change without cutting the pace of their economic growth (Leal-Arcas, 2013: 3).

These show that the mutually-constitutive relationship between ideational and material factors shaped the BRICS outlook on how they would respond to climate change-related problems and achieve their developmental ambitions. As expected in the argument set by the theoretical standpoint of Constructivism, the *collective*

identity of the BRICS as emerging powers urged them to pursue their socio-economic developmental ambitions whilst acting responsibly towards climate change. They hereby promoted the idea of a green economy relying on a greener energy mix in their efforts for achieving eco-friendly economic growth, poverty eradication, and well-being of their citizens against the negative consequences of climate change. Approving the argument of the dissertation, the remarks of the BRICS' representatives also hint at the initial signs of the common BRICS agenda in favour of green energy production and transition to a low-carbon economic structure, so that they could pursue their socio-economic developmental goals without deteriorating the environment in the long-term.

In line with these arguments, President Putin's (2013) speech at the BRICS Summit is remarkable because he regarded financing the process of transition to a green economy and energy-saving technologies as a component of the joint agenda of the BRICS states. President Putin's stance mirrors the overall BRICS solidarity to achieve their transition to a green economy. In his speech delivered at the UN Forum on Sustainable Development, Minister Wang (2013) also recognised green development and the low-carbon economy as tools for protecting their long-term interests. In this sense, the BRICS Leaders highlighted the linkage between renewable and clean energy and sustainable development in the Fortaleza Declaration of 2014. The BRICS group believed that the investment in and deployment of renewable and clean energy, and energy-efficient technologies will provide to attain universal access to energy and contribute to upgrading living standards of their citizens (BRICS, 2014a). Therefore, the green revolution in the energy sector can offer a solution for social, economic and climate change-related problems, and help the BRICS to meet the increasing needs of their populations and fulfil their obligations to future generations (Sahu, 2016: 41). Supporting the argument that a *collective identity* defines the intra-group cooperation and collaboration within the BRICS partnership, these discursive evidence reveal that each BRICS partner holds a positive identification with the economic, social, and environmental achievements in other member states.

Within this scope, the BRICS Leaders encouraged the use of the BRICS' potential in the field of renewable resources for ensuring their sustainable economic development

and aimed at expanding intra-group cooperation on energy efficiency (BRICS, 2015b). Hence, the first official meeting of the BRICS Energy Ministers was held in 2015 and ministers issued a “Memorandum of Mutual Understanding in Energy Saving and Energy Efficiency” (BRICS, 2015d). Once again, this supports the theoretical assumption built on Constructivist thought as the change in material structure in favour of the BRICS states strengthened their *collective identity* perception of emerging powers since this document incorporated the NDB into the efforts for sustainable energy projects and infrastructure investment through financial resource provisions without applying the institutions dominated by Western states and being a subject of their conditionality (Ufimtseva, 2016: 58). This is important because the BRICS states conceptualised an initiative removing any patronising practice and the sense of superiority between donors and recipients.

At this point, the collective intentions of the BRICS members to stimulate green transition generated new responsibilities and created a shared narrative of improving the living standards of their citizens. In keeping with the argument of the dissertation relying on Constructivism, the positive identification of each BRICS state with the impending efforts for achieving socio-economic development in other group members also promotes the *collective identity* within the platform. Furthermore, the ideational factors and discursive elements converging with their emerging power status allow the BRICS countries to jointly pursue their interests in building green and energy-efficient economic systems in response to climate change-related problems and economic development in a sustainable manner.

5.2.3. Socio-Economic Dimension of the Transition to Green Energy Production

The BRICS Leaders underlined the social dimension of green growth by aligning the transition to green energy production with the efforts for achieving sustainable development targets in the direction of addressing the negative consequences of climate change and environmental problems. Michel Temer (2011), during his Vice Presidency between 2011 and 2016, set out the view on the green economy by saying that this notion should be “analysed within ‘the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication’ [...] as an ‘operating concept’ of sustainable development”. In this context, both President Xi (2015c) at the 70th Session of the UNGA and Prime

Minister Modi (2015b) at the COP-21 brought forward the need for exploring the path of a lighter carbon footprint to support the growth of developing countries in a sustainable manner and the importance of a global partnership for the sake of a collective future of humanity. In view of *Saving The Planet*, President Xi (2015c) believed that building an ecological civilisation would provide a way of low-carbon, green, and sustainable development allowing humankind to save the environment. Thus, the future of humanity would be dependent on a civilisation taking care of nature rather than dreaming of old-fashioned growth-based GDP economies. In harmony with the Constructivism-driven argument of the dissertation which treats the notion of shared discourse as an indicator of the existence of cohesion on the basis of the *collective identity* among the group members, the discourse of *Saving The Planet* completes the BRICS perception on proper behaviours to be regarded as civilised.

Recognising energy efficiency, energy-saving, and clean energy technologies as the core of achieving SDGs, the BRICS Leaders announced both in the Goa Declaration and after their meeting on the margins of the G-20 Summit that universal access to energy would contribute to the collective well-being of the global population and the future of the world (BRICS, 2016b; 2016d). Thus, they acknowledged the role of clean energy generation in reducing GHG emissions with respect to the principles and the roadmap of the Paris Agreement (BRICS, 2016b) and in pursuing sustainable development goals. Welcoming the overlap between the objectives of the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda, Brazilian Environment Minister Sarney Filho (1999-2002 and 2016-2018) said in his speech at the plenary session of the COP-22 that transition to low carbon economic structure makes way for more prosperous living conditions under the guidance of the motto of *LNOB* (MMA, 2016). Hence, green activities would produce positive outcomes for the disadvantaged parts of the social strata without leaving any constituent of the society behind. In line with this, Minister Molewa (2016) underlined the socio-economic dimension of transition to a green economy and its function to generate employment.

As evidence of the BRICS' motivation to associate their attempt for greener energy matrix with their actions to respond to climate change and accomplish their socio-economic development in a sustainable manner, the Johannesburg Declaration,

which was released after the 10th Summit of the BRICS Leaders, reiterated the incentives of all member states to boost their transition to environmentally-sustainable energy grids that support global SDGs, economic growth, and the collective socio-economic prosperity of their citizens (BRICS, 2018b). Furthermore, the BRICS Leaders (2019b) announced at the 11th Summit that having access to clean, sustainable, and affordable energy was critical for their citizens, so the energy transition should be integrated into each member state's agenda with relevance to varying national circumstances. These statements uphold the main argument presented in the dissertation as the BRICS states rely on the shared values such as respect to national circumstances in contrast to the western top-down approach. At this point, Neorealism fails to comprehend the potential of second-tier states in shaping the international responses to global climate change and Liberal Institutionalism cannot serve to uncover the role of normative motives and historical experiences in framing states' stances towards climate change. In this regard, the BRICS determined common policy agenda items in the light of their *collective identity* formation of being emerging power whose perceptions of identity concept and proper behaviour are shaped by the practices of western countries—Significant Other—.

5.2.4. The BRICS' Steps for Greening Their Energy Mix

To display the level of commitment and seriousness for transition to low carbon emission economy and green energy mix, NAMAs of the BRICS states are significant indicators because NAMAs are the agreed outcome of the COP-18 as an extension of a national governmental initiative to reduce emissions in the context of sustainable development (“Nationally appropriate mitigation actions”, n.d.). Brazil determined NAMAs in the fields of hydroelectric power generation, alternative energy supply, biofuels usage, and energy efficiency. In the 2018-2019 period, Brazil added 8,337 MW to its hydroelectric power capacity, installed 6,441 wind and solar plants, added 79,674,000 m³ to its fuel mix, and reduced 44,590 GWh electricity consumption thanks to its efforts for energy efficiency (Ministry of Foreign Affairs / Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovations of Federative Republic of Brazil, 2020: 64-67).

Under the guidance of its 12th FYP-Period National Strategic Emerging Industry Development Plan, China also determined energy conservation and environment protection and new energy vehicles as strategic industries. In this regard, China targeted to carry out Energy-Saving Retrofit Project, Energy-Saving Technology Industrialization Demonstration Project, Nationwide Energy Conservation Action, and Developing Wind and Solar Power. In this regard, China decreased its energy consumption per unit of GDP by 18.4% against the 2010 level in 2015 (Climate Change Department of National Development Reform Commission, 2016: 68). Controlling its coal consumption and promoting non-fossil fuels, China decreased 8.4% coal's share in its total energy mix compared to the 2005 level and the share of non-fossil fuels reached 12.0% in 2015 with a 4.6% increase against the 2005 figure. Thus, its low-carbon energy production including non-fossil energy and natural gas met 17.9% of China's total energy consumption (Climate Change Department of National Development Reform Commission, 2016: 39 and 50). Furthermore, China installed 130.75 GW of wind power which adds 3.2% to the 2005 level and 42.18 GW of solar power which adds 0.7% to the 2005 level (Climate Change Department of National Development Reform Commission, 2016: 70).

For India, Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission and National Mission for Enhanced Energy Efficiency have had great importance in addressing climate change, promoting sustainable development, and integrating green energy practices into its economic structure. Hence, whereas India installed 23,280 MW of solar power and created Green Energy Corridors in 2018, its solar power capacity reached a level of 9 times that for 2014 and its non-fossil fuel capacity for electricity generation increased 35.5%. Within the framework of India's target for producing 40% of its cumulative electric power from non-fossil fuel-based resources by 2030, 21% of India's electricity capacity mix consisted of renewable resources which grew from 2.15% to 20.44% between 2005 and 2018 (Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change of Government of India, 2018: 101-103). By 2020, India achieved to increase its non-fossil fuel-based energy resources by about 38.18% and its power generation capacity from renewables was accounted for 23.92% of its installed power capacity. The share of its non-fossil resources in electricity generation grew from 32.31% to 37.99% between 2014 and 2020 (Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change of Government of India, 2021: 205).

Moreover, Russia merged its endeavours to establish a green economic structure with its mitigation actions as well. For its long-term socio-economic development, Russia aimed at taking measures and implementing action plans such as Resolution No. 752 for “reducing GHG emission by 2020 to a level not exceeding 75% of the 1990 emission level”, Resolution No. 504 setting the Action Plan for Resolution 752, and Decree No. 2344-P which is the “plan for implementing a set of measures for improving the State regulation of GHG emissions”. Russia also determined its energy strategy with Decree No. 1715-P, the state programme for energy efficiency and energy development with Decree No. 321, and measures for producing electricity based on renewable energy sources with Order No. 1839-P and Decree No. 499 (“Report on the technical review”, 2019: 8-9). The cumulative anthropogenic release of greenhouse gases in the Russian Federation, excluding land use, and changes in land use and forestry corresponds to 67.6% of the total ejection of 1990. In terms of the development of low-carbon and renewable energy sources, Russia decreased its fuel consumption per power output from 330.6 KWh to 309.8 KWh between 2011 and 2018. Additionally, it exponentially continued with the construction of renewable energy facilities that grew from 5.25 MWh to 376 MWh in the 2014-2018 period. Russia also achieved to improve its energy efficiency by limiting the loss of electricity from the generation from 11.97% in 2012 to 9.7 in 2018 (Russian Federation, 2019).

Last but not least, South Africa employed mitigation actions under the themes of energy efficiency, electricity generation, diversification of energy resources, and renewable energy. National Energy Efficiency Strategy, Industrial Energy Efficiency Improvement, SASOL Energy Efficiency Projects, and Renewable Energy Independent Power Procurement Programme are some of the prominent mitigation actions in South Africa for achieving their green transition. These projects aim at increasing the share of renewable resources, reducing pollution, improving resource efficiency, and utilising waste energy (Department of Environmental Affairs of Republic of South Africa, 2017: 62-63). By means of Integrated Resource and Energy Plans, South African Wind Energy Programme, and Green Economy Initiative, South Africa intends to ensure its energy security, minimise environmental impacts, invest in renewable energy, maintain its socio-economic and

environmentally-sustainable growth, and greening its economy through cleaner production (Department of Environmental Affairs of Republic of South Africa, 2017: 79, 81 and 98). Therefore, South Africa's works for energy efficiency contributed to emissions reductions accounted for 83%, 83%, and 80% in 2010, 2012, and 2014 respectively (Department of Environmental Affairs of Republic of South Africa, 2017: 71). As taking the year 2000 to be the base year, South Africa achieved an annual GHG emissions reduction of 6.48 Mt CO₂ in 2001, 41.73 Mt CO₂ in 2005, 66.36 Mt CO₂ in 2010, and 104.23 Mt CO₂ in 2015 in the energy sector (Department of Environmental Affairs of Republic of South Africa, 2017: 134-135).

At this point, as a reflection of their shared ambitions for ensuring their economic development and socio-economic improvement, South African Minister of Energy Radebe (2018) determined the transition to environmentally-sustainable energy profile as the strategic focus area of intra-BRICS cooperation. For this reason, a critical role fell on BRICS. In this respect, President Putin (2019) saw the BRICS as a platform that enables its member states to broaden and deepen their partnership in the process of a gradual transition to environmentally-friendly energy systems supporting their economic growth. For Minister of Mines and Energy of Brazil, Bento Albuquerque (2019-2022), this Platform would also strengthen intra-bloc cooperation and align the progressive transition in the energy sector with the goals of sustainable development agenda (MME, 2019). Hence, the BRICS group established the BRICS Energy Research Cooperation Platform to assist the process of attaining SDGs and stimulating the development of environmental sustainability. This Platform intends to facilitate intra-group cooperation in the energy sector, transition to energy-efficient and sustainable networks, and increase the voice of the BRICS states in global discussions on the subject of energy (BRICS, 2019d). Furthermore, in 2020, the BRICS Energy Ministers released a communiqué after the meeting they held in Moscow and emphasised the constructive and productive role of the NDB for new energy projects (BRICS, 2020e). At this point, Yang Jiechi— China's former State Councilor (2013-2018) – expressed at the First BRICS Sherpa Meeting that the five countries have the great potential in promoting dialogue with other emerging and developing countries, and sustaining global development while intensifying South-South cooperation (Yang, 2017).

At this point, the BRICS states utilise the platform to expand their cooperation in dealing with challenges resulted from climate change by functionally incorporating new areas such as transition to green energy. This instrumentalisation of the BRICS partnership encourages to recognise how the Potential Mechanism 2 can partially capture incentives of the BRICS partners to reach their common interests in terms of energy transition and create synergy to achieve it. Still, the third Mechanism does better job within the scope of the narrow research question outlined in this dissertation. As emerging powers, the BRICS states comprehended that they should pursue their developmental targets. While energy has been one of the main ingredients in the economic production process, its harmonisation with sustainable development implementations became vital since the GHG emitting energy production methods emerged as the perpetrators of environmental problems and climate change. Thus, they realised that a greener energy mix and production would offer a solution. Yet, intra-BRICS solidarity and their aggregated capabilities needed to be mobilised in line with this purpose. This supports the argument of the dissertation since increasing interaction within the BRICS platform encourages the members to make use of and expand the web of intra-group cooperation and promote a common agenda. The process of the institutionalisation of the BRICS cooperation paved the way for acting on the basis of their collective interests and serve to understand their collective intentions and enrich the sense of *we-ness*.

5.3. The Envisioning for the Potential of the New Development Bank

The failure of the international institutions to grant equal roles, rights, responsibilities, and influence for the actors from the developing world in their institutional structure and in producing solutions to global financial, food, and other crises legitimised the actions of emerging powers to establish their own platforms independent from the existing multilateral organisations (Kirton, 2015: 4). Although the WB had been treated as the main institution for lending to the poorest developing states and emerging powers in order to break the so-called middle-income trap, the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 weakened its lending capacity (Chin, 2014: 368). Additionally, the traditional donor governments affiliated with the G-20 had almost nothing to offer to encouraging the WB's actions towards or funding infrastructure investment projects (Chin, 2014: 369-370).

To meet the requirements of the sustainable development agenda and integrate green economy policies, the BRICS states and other countries from the developing world required financial support that understand their needs and national conditions, and help them to design and carry out relevant projects. At this point, for Kirton (2015: 9), the shortcomings and setbacks encountered at the body of the WB constituted the fundamental motivation for the BRICS states to create the NDB in 2014. By means of their rising relative capabilities, emerging powers have acted within the framework of classic South-South development cooperation, so the phenomenon of the emerging donors started to come to the fore (Li & Carey, 2014: 11-12).

5.3.1. The Origin of the Idea of Establishing the New Development Bank

Although the establishment of the NDB dates 2014, the discontent of emerging powers with the performances of the Bretton Woods institutions in dealing with global financial and economic problems, and the way these multilateral structures engaged in the struggles of the poorest countries took place in the Joint Statement of the BRIC Leaders in 2010. Accordingly, the Leaders thought that global political and economic stability could be ensured via inclusive growth and the commitments should be honoured by providing aid to developing states for reaching the MDGs⁸ (BRIC, 2010). Thus, the 2010 Declaration indicates that the international financial organisations fell short of ensuring sufficient resources responding to the needs of the developing world. This confirms the Potential Mechanism 3 as changes in material world in favour of the BRICS states facilitate to share discursive stance and a common agenda at the international level. By extension, their sympathy for the larger developing world expresses itself in connection with their *collective identity*.

During the 3rd BRICS Leaders' Summit, the idea of financial cooperation among the BRICS states' Development Banks, which was the initial step leading to the NDB, was mentioned in the Action Plan attached to the Sanya Declaration. After this initial

⁸ MDGs are eight items agreed on in September 2000. The Goals range from poverty, hunger, disease and illiteracy to environmental degradation and discrimination against women. The objective is to meet the needs of the world's poorest by the target date of 2015 ("Millennium development goals", n.d.).

attempt, the New Delhi Summit in 2012 announced the decision on the creation of a development bank (Degaut & Meacham, 2015: 9). This decision was the most prominent outcome of the New Delhi Summit since the BRICS states were tasked with the item of the Action Plan, which envisaged the purpose of “strengthen[ing] financial cooperation among the BRICS Development Banks” (BRICS, 2011). Despite the initial disagreements among the BRICS states regarding the issues such as the amount of original capital allocations, voting shares, the location of the Bank’s head square, and the appointment of the President, the members agreed on a compromise which revealed the fair-mindedness in respect to sustaining intra-group cooperation (Roberts, Armijo, & Katada, 2018: 95-96).

While the process leading to the creation of the NDB was taking place, as mentioned above, the BRICS countries addressed the rationality of their initiative. First, Western-centric institutions of the Bretton Woods disdained many developing countries through economic rehabilitation mechanisms and imposed high-interest rates on these actors (Petrone, 2019: 21). For Duggan (2015: 19), the envisioned development bank was the reaction of the BRICS states to the frustrating bureaucratic procedures in receiving funds from the Bretton Woods institutions. Second, Multilateral Development Banks refrained from infrastructure investment because the paradigm of the Washington Consensus replaced the old paradigm of development assistance with the programmes targeting institutional reforms in the developing world (Vazquez, Roychoudhury, & Borges, 2017: 14). To confirm this, Chin (2014: 369) cited an interview of a Chinese Foreign Affairs Ministry Official who revealed the fact that the WB staff advised African leaders to maintain the process of liberalisation and institutional adjustments for becoming more attractive to foreign investors. Therefore, both heavy-handed bureaucracy and disinterest in allocating resources to development programs were brought forward as the reasons to indicate the shortcomings of the prevailing organisations.

In addition to the above-exemplified apathy on the side of the WB cadres, the lack of a sufficient amount of funding was put forward as the prime rationale why developing countries struggled with operationalising infrastructure projects and promoting their development. Still, developing states needed new infrastructure systems to reduce inequality and adopt environmentally-sustainable, greener, and

climate-resilient economic development models covering investment in the area of renewable energy. However, any deficit in financing infrastructure investment would impair developing countries' and emerging powers' prospective economic growths, and deprive millions from developing states of having access to environmentally-sustainable lifestyles (Griffith-Jones, 2014: 1-7). So, BRICS advocates that any effort in the direction of achieving sustainable development must be assisted. As President Zuma (2011d) uttered that there was a trust deficit between developed and developing states and a space needed to be created for developing countries to go after their developmental goals in a sustainable fashion, the BRICS Leaders indicated the lack of adequate funding for initiating projects to achieve this transition to a low-carbon economy. For them, a new development bank would offer worthwhile resources to overcome the systemic challenges, cope with the shortcomings in international financial flows, and encourage South-South cooperation (Temer, 2016c; "Full Text: Remarks", 2017; "Comment by the Information and Press Department", 2017).

At this point, the Potential Mechanism 1 helps to notice the significance of the Western-backed international financial institutions and to realise their weight once the BRICS states develop their common policy agenda. The Potential Mechanism 2 also facilitate to affiliate the establishment of the NDB with the broadening and deepening intra-BRICS cooperation efforts. Still, the Potential Mechanism 3 performs better in analysing the narrow research question of the dissertation. Therefore, it does not limit its explanatory power with either the concept of *soft-balancing* efforts against the U.S. and Western institutions or consider the creation of the NDB as an outcome of *functional cooperation* among the BRICS states. Rather, the Potential Mechanism provides a complex scheme identifying the NDB with the *collective identity*—which refers to the status of being emerging powers per changes in material world in their favour—and their ideational positioning which is built on the gap as a result of the incapability of the Western-centric institutions in providing the sufficient and well-planned financial assistance according to the needs of the developing world.

As argued by Vazquez, Roychoudhury, and Borges (2017: 14-15), while developing states were craving for the infrastructure investment that they desperately needed to

eradicate poverty, reduce unemployment, and ensure inclusive, equitable and environmentally-friendly development, the establishment of a new development bank that understand the concerns, wishes, and requirements of the developing economies became a meaningful initiative for the BRICS cooperation by acting within the framework of economic growth–poverty eradication–environmental protection triangle. As sharing similar developmental ambitions with developing states and becoming the subject of adverse impacts of environmental degradation and climate change on their economic performances, the BRICS cooperation generated a sense of *we-group* by making relational comparison to and revealing the defects within the existing international initiatives led by Western industrialised states. In this context, articulations of inequalities and flaws in the global economic system and the detrimental consequences of these inequalities for climate change-related issues are the sources and components of the discursive alignment among the BRICS states and enabled them to obtain the moral high ground.

Accordingly, the BRICS aimed at providing additional finance, responding to unmet needs in the fields of infrastructure and environmentally-sustainable development, and extending the voice and representation of the Global South in the development finance architecture (Petrone, 2019: 21 and 24; Griffith-Jones, 2014: 7). In this regard, the Delhi Declaration of the 4th Leaders' Summit reiterated the tendency of the BRICS states towards the paradigm of sustainable development to find solutions for poverty, malnutrition, unemployment, economic dilemmas, and climate change-related problems, and underlined the importance of infrastructure and sustainable development projects for the sake of global growth and development. As a result, the five members of the BRICS platform purposed a new institution differing from the Western-dominated models in its basic functions as it was designed to prioritise the investment in infrastructure and sustainable development projects (BRICS, 2012). In line with the argument of the dissertation, their growing material capacities encouraged the BRICS countries to adopt a common agenda which is the product of their social identity shaped by the process of relational comparison with and references to other *collective identities* based on in/out-group differentiations.

5.3.2. The Presented Purposes of the New Development Bank Funds

The severe impacts of climate change on the BRICS countries obliged them to take action for promoting intra-group cooperation to ensure the success of their economic development. At this point, Wendt's (1999: 349) concept of *Common Fate*, which is defined as an efficient motive for the collective identity construction, has explanatory power on the collective identification among the BRICS states in terms of shared awareness of and concerns over their common fitness and welfare in the face of challenges brought by climate change. As a reminder, levelling up their fitness in the face of changing environmental conditions and ensuring their long-term welfare were one of the underlying reasons why the BRICS group aimed at utilising the NDB to generate funds for the efforts of sustainable economic development.

Hence, the 4th Summit witnessed a significant development as a new development bank was envisioned for the purpose of “mobilizing resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects” (BRICS, 2012). Accordingly, the eThekweni Declaration of the 5th BRICS Summit unveiled that the new development bank's objective would be to complement rather than substitute the existing multilateral and regional financial institutions, so the Declaration announced the objective of a new development bank to allocate financial resources to BRICS and other developing countries in the areas of infrastructure and sustainable development (BRICS, 2013). As a result, the expected role that would be assumed by a new development bank might pertain to present a solution to reduce the dependency on ineffective western financial assistance, go around the trust deficit between the developed and the developing nations, and provide the funding in conformity with the needs of developing states.

In this sense, the envisioned portfolio for the future development bank's activities forges the features differentiating it from other international institutions. Thus, forming new partnerships in line with these objectives and purposes, and instituting new investment and financing platforms would assist the efforts for achieving sustainable development through the instrumentality of clean energy, energy saving, emissions reduction, and green production. In compliance with the argument drawn from a Constructivist perspective, their *collective social identity* as emerging powers—who grasp the current condition and necessities in the developing world, and demonstrate their eagerness to utilise their material capacities for generating

solutions to pursue their developmental goals—constituted the group interest in providing financial tools for setting eco-friendly growth to increase their and other developing countries' common fitness and welfare—*Common Fate* of the developing world—.

The 6th BRICS Summit in Fortaleza, Brazil, in July 2014, carried the agreement of the NDB into effect. After noting the need for conceptualising new and progressive paths for helping countries in terms of finance and knowledge sharing, the BRICS states stressed the potential contribution of the NDB to their collective ambition for ensuring strong, sustainable, and balanced growth (BRICS, 2014a). The Leaders also referred to the NDB at their meeting on the margin of the G-20 as this Bank would play a remarkable role in promoting the stability of the global financial system (BRICS, 2014b); thus they considered the NDB as an instrument to collectively integrate the Southern sources into global development finance (Hochstetler, 2014: 3).

In this regard, the statements delivered by the BRICS Leaders show to what extent they attributed importance to the NDB. For instance, President Rousseff (2014) articulated Brazil's satisfaction with the establishment of the NDB in her speech at the 69th UNGA after pointing out the perceived disparity between the growing role of developing countries in the world economy, and their inadequate representation and participation in the decision-making mechanisms of international financial institutions. Likewise, Prime Minister Modi (2014) treated the creation of the NDB as the evidence of the ever-increasing capacity of the BRICS states, so they found an opportunity to exert their influence by building an institution on the global scale and offering a new approach to the endeavours for promoting growth and stability in the light of their own experiences.

As a result, these assertions disclosed the enthusiasm and in-group drive of BRICS for taking part in global economic governance and their proactive approach to overcome the problem of their representation in international financial organisations. Hence, the NDB created a positive outcome for BRICS on the road to achieve their purpose to bring their representation in international institutions in conformity with

their increasing material capabilities. In support of this inference, the admission of United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Bangladesh, and Egypt as the new members to the NDB strengthens its claim to be one of the premier development institutions for emerging markets and developing countries by utilizing the Bank's capabilities and expertise installed by the BRICS ("NDB initiates membership expansion", 2021; "NDB admits Egypt", 2021). These bonds would enable the BRICS to expand its space of activity in the near future.

To indicate the influence of the BRICS' initiatives stimulating intra-group capabilities over the international economic and political relations, Gladun and Ahsan (2016: 17) regard the NDB as the evidence of the end of the old approach which was rooted in the "strict division of responsibilities between developed and developing countries". Confirming the argument of the dissertation, this assessment evinces that changes in material capabilities of the BRICS states enabled them to establish an institution reflecting the common agenda and facilitated to determine and crystallise their collective purposes. Therefore, its analytical lack of interest in the process of preference formation hints at the shortcoming of the Liberal Institutional perspective in analysing the connection between the BRICS preferences and the envisioned scheme of the NDB.

Still, the main function of the NDB is closely related to the areas of climate change and sustainable development. Article 9.2 of the Paris Agreement aimed at enlarging the donor pool and encouraging the parties different from developed countries "to provide or continue to provide such support voluntarily" (Paris Agreement, 2015: 13). So, the Agreement brought a new dynamism, rationalised, and opened new opportunities to blossom the BRICS partnership on the basis of mobilising their resources for the NDB. Having introduced green projects in the blueprints of BRICS's economic transformation (Liu, 2016: 450), the BRICS Environment Ministers encouraged the exploration of potential involvement of the NDB in environmentally-sound projects in terms of financing during the first inter-ministerial meeting in 2015 (BRICS, 2015a). In this regard, the BRICS states considered the NDB as a mechanism that may strengthen in-group synergy and reinforce economic cooperation among the member states (BRICS, 2015b).

As indicated above, the shortcomings and lack of understanding of the developing nations' needs catalysed the discontent of the BRICS states with the existing Bretton Woods organisations. After determining the collectively accepted notions such as openness, solidarity, and mutual assistance as the principles of their cooperation within the framework of the BRICS format, the member states declared their decision to institute a new development bank for infrastructure investment and environmentally-sustainable development by means of their increasing economic powers. Once the NDB became operational, its main focus was on the financing of renewable energy projects. Table 6 brings the number of the NDB investments related to climate change issues and the environment to light as of November 2021.

Table 5: NDB-financed Projects in Sectors Related to Climate Change and the Environment by the End of 2021.

Sector	Beneficiary Countries	Number of Projects
Clean/Renewable Energy	Brazil	1
	Russia	2
	India	1
	China	6
	South Africa	5
Green Transportation	Brazil	-
	Russia	1
	India	-
	China	2
	South Africa	-
Water Resource Management	Brazil	-
	Russia	2
	India	4
	China	2
	South Africa	1
Sustainable Infrastructure and Urban Development	Brazil	8
	Russia	3
	India	2
	China	2
	South Africa	-
Other Target Sectors	The BRICS Members	42/76

Source: "List of all projects", n.d..

In practice, more than half of the NDB's operations have been conducted in the target sectors which are closely connected with climate change issues and environmental subjects. This is an indicator that the BRICS states strive to perform

in fulfilling their promises which were introduced in “NDB’s General Strategy: 2017 and 2021”. This document was published by the Board of Governors of the NDB in 2017 and laid out the general strategy for the mandate. So, two-third of the financing commitments of the NDB were planned to be allocated to sustainable infrastructure development (“NDB’s general strategy”, 2017: 3 and 20). This perspective reflects on the motto of “Building Sustainable Future” (“Mission and values”, n.d.) as it aligns the vision of ensuring financial resources for the initiation of sustainable development projects in favour of those developing nations in urgent need. As expected to function, the Potential Mechanism 3 marks that increasing interaction among the BRICS states and their growing material capacities comply with their *collective identity* as being emerging powers which are the actors mobilising their capabilities to respond to the needs of the developing states and pursuing a development pathway integrating sustainable initiatives. Thus, they underscore the profile differentiating them from the rest of the developing world and embracing the current necessities to deal with environmental and developmental challenges.

Although the investments carried out within the framework of the NDB have not been transferred outside of the BRICS states, it was intended to expand the sphere of influence of the NDB and its opportunities for future cooperation by signing various Memoranda of Understanding with African Development Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, Eurasian Development Bank, and Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (“List of current MoUs”, n.d.). In this regard, the COVID-19 pandemic may be a litmus test for the NDB activities and efficiency in non-BRICS member states whether it would expand its pool of beneficiary countries by means of these Memoranda of Understanding. During the meeting of the BRICS Heads of State and Government in 2020, President Putin (2020b) underlined the increasing expectations from the NDB to overcome the social unease, the recession in industrial production and finance, and the conditions threatening the efforts for economic recovery. By extension, the BRICS states believed that the process of economic recovery in developing countries from Africa, Asia, and Latin America would consume their resources and time, so there would be in an urgent need for additional assistance in terms of capacity building, technology transfer, and development resources (BRICS, 2020b). As a result, the NDB could assist these countries “to contain the disease and rebuild [their] damaged economies”

(Ramaphosa, 2020). Thus, the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic may justify the funded project profile within the scope of the NDB and pave the way for achieving its goal to become a multilateral institution action on the global scale in the light of the motives created by the motto of “Building Sustainable Future”.

In the final analysis, the creation of the NDB enabled the BRICS five to focus on the concepts of sustainable development, climate change, and green economic growth in a more institutionalised manner (Gu, Renwick, & Xue, 2018: 678). Moreover, the NDB allowed the BRICS cooperation to look beyond the economic dimension of the term sustainable development and associate this term with its ecological and environmental aspects (Hochstetler, 2014: 4). Supporting the assumption presented by the argument of the dissertation guided by the Constructivist approach, the worldview collectively shared by the BRICS platform reveals their cognitive alignment in understanding the importance of the environmental dimension of their prospective economic growth model.

5.3.3. The Features of the New Development Bank Projects

In 2016, the NDB planned to allocate the first set of loans to finance renewable energy projects in association with the target of transition in the energy sector. This decision provided concrete evidence of how the NDB would be utilised in the field of sustainable development (Downie & Williams, 2018: 403). In this context, Mr. K. V. Kamath, the President of the NDB from 2015 to 2020, considered renewable and green energy projects as the tools for stimulating the developmental practices in all BRICS countries (“First set of loans”, 2016). The BRICS Leaders also articulated their satisfaction with the NDB’s motive for assisting these projects in their countries (BRICS, 2016b; 2016d). Thus, the NDB would strike a balance between economic, social, and environmental dimensions of development by mobilising resources for renewable energy projects.

As a tool for merging the emerging power status of the BRICS with their growing material strength, the NDB proposes an alternative path for achieving the developmental ambitions by offering sustainable development investment on the

basis of green infrastructure model and energy projects which are its distinguishing features from other multilateral development banks (Cooper, 2017: 276-278).

Behaving in the light of mutual benefit, respect for national sovereignty, and the principle of equality, the NDB appeared as a mechanism emerging from the Global South and proved its distinctive characteristic by comparison with existing multilateral development banks (Li & Carey, 2014: 12 and 14; Cooper, 2017: 281). This analysis reflects the argument which emphasises increasing interaction and changes in the material world in favour of the BRICS states shaped their cohesive standing on the basis of the *collective identity*, so the social context produced the shared values and generated a platform for practising their material interests.

Having treated infrastructure development and integration as an instrument for constructing closer economic ties, the BRICS Leaders welcomed the approach of the NDB during the 10th BRICS Summit that would mobilise the resources for the social, economic, and environmental well-being of the investee country (BRICS, 2018b). As the NDB constituted an integral part of the architecture of multilateral cooperation among the BRICS member states by providing a platform to outline and conduct environmentally-friendly projects (“Comment by the Information and Press Department”, 2017), Kamath (2018) noted that the actions of the NDB to improve sustainability and infrastructure network of the recipient countries through renewable energy projects were the evidence of their commitment to build better and sustainable future for the citizens of the member states rather than a symbolic gesture. These evidence supports the argument instructed by Constructivism since the existence of the positive identification with the welfare of the member states’ citizens discloses the process of *collective identity* construction together with the contribution of increasing institutionalisation in the BRICS format.

Furthermore, the NDB indicates the innovative power of the BRICS initiatives in generating its capital base. In this sense, the BRICS Leaders expressed their appreciation of the successful issue of the first set of green bonds (BRICS, 2016b; 2016d). Green bonds are the instruments that particularly will provide funding for climate and environmental projects, and allow to produce creative responses to climate change (Cooper, 2017: 276 and 280). Both the endeavours to design green

infrastructure projects and the issuance of green bonds demonstrate the ideational ability of the BRICS cooperation in addition to its material strength.

Together with their innovative approach in the financial sector, the BRICS states started to embrace and promote new ideational elements in setting the rules and the nature of their cooperation. The assessment of the overall economic, environmental, and social impacts of the NDB initiatives were integrated with the intention of minimising their adverse consequences (“NDB’s general strategy”, 2017: 7 and 12). This approach unveiled that the NDB went beyond “business as usual outcome” by adopting its own investment guidelines in line with the sustainable development and climate change agendas (Vazquez, Roychoudhury, & Borges, 2017: 37). By extension, as argued by the dissertation, the frequent interaction within the BRICS format allowed the member states to produce their own medium-term strategies and determine their mutual interests in the material world. This conjuncture paved the way for developing new types of investment guidelines on the basis of their shared expectations, beliefs, and values.

Kamath (2019) also emphasised that the Bank does not want to reiterate the same mistakes of the past, so it prefers a transformative approach to the do-no-harm perspective. The NDB framed its new understanding in accordance with the concept of impact investing, which counts positive and negative externalities in the areas of the economy, environment, society, and climate change (Kamath, 2019). To this end, the projects would be designed to make a contribution to the sustainable development commitments of recipient countries on the basis of greener, climate-resilient, and welfare-generating infrastructure investments. In line with the main argument of the dissertation, this is the evidence that the establishment of new rules, determination of new proper behaviours, and formation of new shared expectations set the ground for future acts that are the reflection of the *collective identity* within the BRICS cooperation. Hence, the BRICS vision of the NDB does not represent limited options known as either balancing or bandwagoning strategies conceptualised in the Neorealist understanding of international relations.

5.4. Conclusion

The principle of CDBR has been the bedrock of the BRICS policy formulation but they also recognised that not only developed countries but also developing states should take action against the challenges of climate change. This policy perception demonstrates an emphasis in favour of the common responsibilities. Although their identity strongly linked to their developmental ambitions, the adjective of emerging appears to underline their increasing material capacities, growing abilities, and expanding sphere of influence. Yet, the BRICS states had to tackle poverty which is one of the most serious challenges to their socio-economic stability and development. Thus, the BRICS countries integrated SDGs and MDGs into their policy formulation which assesses the real economic activities as the leading engine of their national thrust. To align these development goals with climate change efforts, the concept of green growth was introduced in practical terms.

All the five member countries of the BRICS platform were eager to cooperate in the energy sector to ensure their green growth by utilising renewable energy resources and energy-efficient technologies. Thus, they shared the expectation that their transition to the green economic model would help them in their efforts for SDGs and struggle with poverty by creating green jobs. In line with the assumptions presented by the argument built on Constructivism, increase in their material capabilities and changes in the material world as the environmental deterioration reached a critical threshold were the underlying reasons that urged emerging powers within the body of the BRICS partnership to determine a strategy to maintain their developmental ambitions in harmony with environmental responsibilities. Following the Paris Agreement, the BRICS states put the arguments creating the division among the countries aside and adopted a universal aspect to the use of renewable resources in terms of ensuring global economic recovery and sustaining the collective well-being of the world.

The BRICS states also expressed their eagerness to enhance and deepen the intra-group cooperation for achieving their economic development and introduced the idea of an energy-efficient living style in responding to the challenges of climate change, changing the paradigm of production and consumption, and pursuing SDGs. In accordance with the argument of the dissertation, BRICS, whose *collective identity* perception is formed by perceiving developed economies as its Significant Other,

rejected industrialised countries' model for their own economic growth which acts within the framework of exploiting first and rehabilitating later. Thus, they attributed great importance to their works for green energy production and green economic structure to be an effective remedy for responding to environmental problems and to wipe out the image of effortless position in the global struggle with environmental degradation and climate change.

Table 6: The BRICS Perspective on Green Growth.

Factors Agenda Item	Policy Agenda	Ideas	Discourse	Values	Policy Implementatio ns
Green Growth	• Use the BRICS potential for transition in economic activities and energy sector • Align the new paradigm for green energy production with the path to build a low-carbon economic growth	• Green energy mix for green growth • Transition to green economy and energy production would respond to climate change-related problems, eradicate poverty, and ensure the socio-economic prosperity	• Save the planet (by prioritising the nature rather than dreaming of old-fashioned growth-based GDP economies) • Change the nature of economic activities for the common cause of humankind	• Respect to different national development levels in promoting green growth practices	• Run projects in the fields of renewable energy, alternative energy, and energy-efficiency and limit the share of GHG intensive energy sources • Establishment of working group and research cooperation

Source: Author's own creation, 2021.

Still, the BRICS partners reiterated the lack of international financing of and investment in green infrastructure development. The BRICS states aimed at rationalising their initiative for building a new development bank by revealing the ineffectiveness and insensitive position of the existing Multilateral Development Banks to the needs and conditions in the developing world. Within this direction, their enthusiasm continued to institute an organisation that would coordinate their growing material capabilities with their ideational alignment pursuant to the right to development without harming the environment on the contrary to the practices of the industrialised countries in the past. In compliance with the argument-driven by Constructivist perspective, BRICS revealed their shared understanding of proper

behaviours and displayed their collective intentions by adopting a new array of assessment standards not to repeat the mistakes of the past. This progress confirms that the increasing interaction among the BRICS states allows them to create an institution relying on their shared principles, values, expectations, and beliefs which strongly reflect on the process of *collective identity* formation among the group members.

Table 7: The NDB in the BRICS Agenda.

Factors Agenda Item	Policy Agenda	Ideas	Discourse	Values	Policy Implementatio ns
New Development Bank	• Overcome the incompetence of existing international institutions • Creation of a development bank to competently respond to the needs of the developing nations	• There is room for an institution that understands the concerns, wishes, and requirements of the developing economies • Environmentally-sustainable, greener, and climate-resilient economic development model can be achieved by building new infrastructure systems	• Building Sustainable Future	• Openness, transformative, solidarity, mutual assistance • Steady, adequate, predictable, and multiple access to long-term financing • Mutual benefit, respect for national sovereignty, and the principle of equality	• Financing the transition to sustainable, eco-friendly, and climate-resilient economic model through green infrastructure and energy projects

Source: Author's own creation, 2021.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

The dissertation has been driven by the puzzle of the expanding BRICS cooperation in global climate change problems. The dissertation asked why the BRICS members generated a common stance at the international level despite the existence of asymmetries and divergences in their emission profiles, economic structures, demographic trends, population sizes, energy needs, and roles in the energy market. Only a small number of studies address the growing coherent policy stances among the partners of the BRICS club concerning climate change-related issues. Additionally, the existing literature either isolates the BRICS countries from one another or does not relate to the pre- and post-establishment periods of the BRICS association (Chapter 1).

Whilst applying the process-tracing methodology to the analysis of how the converging policy stance of the BRICS grouping towards climate change, the dissertation had to bridge the periods before and after the establishment of the BRICS platform. The dissertation argued that both changes in ideational structure and shifts in material capabilities produced a convergence among the BRICS states in terms of their position in climate change-related subjects even before the grouping took a full-fledged formation. Also, this dissertation tested the explanatory power of three Mechanisms that explain the BRICS cooperation in the post-formation period by borrowing the concepts of *soft-balancing* from Neorealism, *functional cooperation* from Liberal Institutionalism, and the *collective identity* from Constructivism (Chapter 2). It found that constructivism is the most powerful tool in explaining the convergence of BRICS states' policies with regard to global climate

change. This concluding Chapter summarises my arguments and findings, and highlights the added value and the implications of this dissertation. Then, it follows by setting up a path for a future research agenda.

6.1. Summary, Arguments, and Main Findings

Building its methodological stance on the basis of the principles of the theory-testing process-tracing, the dissertation develops three hypothesised mechanisms derived from existing theories in Chapter 2 which have been utilised in the literature to explain the BRICS partnership. The first Mechanism borrows the concept of *soft-balancing* from the Neorealist Theory of International Relations (see sub-section 2.1.1.). The second Mechanism functions on the theoretical grounds of the Liberal Institutionalist perspective and employs the notion of *functional cooperation* and utility calculations (see sub-section 2.1.2.). The third Mechanism is guided by the Constructivist research agenda and focuses on the relationship between material and ideational factors, increasing interaction among actors, and the process of *collective identity* formation (see sub-section 2.1.3.). This dissertation utilises material and ideational factors as its conceptual framework. To that effect, Chapter 3 argued that material shifts starting in the early 1990s had been producing changes in the ideational world of each BRICS state. These changes urged them to realize their dissimilarities with the rest of the developing world; thereupon they started to experience a convergence in their policy formulations and positioning.

The past experiences in the colonial era cultivated a sensitivity to protect state sovereignty and, thus, resist any externally imposed action that was perceived as foreign interference. This ideational milieu mainly urged the BRICS countries to pursue their autonomy and act in solidarity with other developing states during the 1990s. Their ambitions to achieve their socio-economic development and combat poverty at the domestic level explain their alignment with the G-77 and less developed countries. Furthermore, their developmental objectives made them side with the rest of the developing world and advocate the right to pursue their economic growth. These findings confirm the Constructivist understanding regarding the role of perceived collective identity in determining the social purposes on the basis of the constitutive relationship between the Self and the Other.

For the developing world, the unequal distribution in material capabilities narrows down countries' ability to deal with climate change. Thus, the Global North should bear the bulk of responsibility for climate change actions due to their historical responsibilities in GHG emissions patterns. Based on the North-South dichotomy, the Global South aimed at rejecting any externally dictated emissions reduction objectives. In the light of the principle of CBDR, Northern industrialized economies should provide financial and technological assistance to the developing nations for scaling down their GHG emissions and ensuring their social and economic development without frustrating their pursuit of developmental impetus.

By taking an active part in international debates on climate change, Brazil, India, China, and South Africa sought for giving a voice to these arguments articulated by the developing world. Consequently, they aimed to earn a reputation as responsible stakeholders from the Global South. Similarly, in the post-Cold War era, Russia searched for cementing its image of a constructive partner to gain international acceptance and playing a leading role in global climate change politics to integrate itself into the international community as a reputable actor.

With their rapid economic growth rates, increase in their technical capabilities, and their contribution to the global carbon footprint, especially after the mid-2000s, Russia consistently invited both developed countries and major emerging economies, including Brazil, India, China and South Africa, to contribute to global emissions reduction efforts since changes in their material capabilities made the division of Annex I and II irrelevant.

While increasing GDP rates and rising amount of capital stock point out the material shift in favour of the BRICS economies, their CO₂ emissions profiles serve to link their dramatic economic thrust to the environmental dimension. Because of the fact that the BRICS countries paid close attention to their economic growth and define a direct connection between their economic development and their power, their economic size and dynamism, high growth rates, increasing industrial activities, and ascending GHG emissions left the BRICS states' policy-makers no choice but take some steps against environmental degradation.

As a result, the upward trend in their economic growth and changes in their material capacities differed BRICS from other developing nations, impelled them to expand their web of interaction and cooperation with other advanced developing states, and encouraged them to assume new responsibilities on the international scale. Whereas these material changes cast new roles for the BRICS countries and made their contribution and voice necessary for global climate change governance, the BRICS states adjusted their policy formulations, expectations, perceptions, preferences, and discourses. Thus, they primarily aimed at presenting themselves as responsible stakeholders, forged new bonds with other like-minded emerging states, and coordinated their international climate change strategies accordingly. This analysis upholds the explanatory power of Constructivism for exposing the dynamics between the change in material structure, the ideational world, and actors' behaviours.

The erosion of a strict division between developed and developing countries, and the willingness of emerging states to perform active involvement in global climate change issues initiated ideational changes. Consequently, they announced their voluntary commitments to reduce emissions in the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Summit. Their move of 2009 in the lead up to the Copenhagen Summit caused the emerging economies, especially Brazil, India, China, and South Africa, to adopt a new set of ideas, realise their dissimilarities with the large body of developing countries, embrace their new shared responsibilities and *collective identity* termed under the name of emerging powers.

A new policy stance taking shape around Brazil, India, China, and South Africa overlapped with Russian expectations from the advanced developing economies. Thereby, the emission reduction pledges of Brazil, India, China, and South Africa at the Copenhagen Climate Change Summit brought these countries closer to Russia's perspective. The convergence process ahead of the Copenhagen Conference opened a new page for cooperation and coordination among the future BRICS members. So, this newly emerging international stage created a favourable environment for common climate change policy position within the BRICS club in the post-Copenhagen period.

For this dissertation, the significance of the COP-15 stems from its role in opening up a new episode in which, for the first time, the views of the BRICS states on climate change-related problems and their policy positions converged exclusively at the juncture of Copenhagen Climate Change Conference.

This analysis extends the timeframe for the phenomenon of the converging positions adopted by the BRICS states. The evidence provided in this dissertation frames that this phenomenon belongs not only to the period from the late 2000s onwards but also that its initial signs go back to the second half of the 1990s. Also, this demonstrates that the motivation behind the convergence among the BRICS states in the field of climate change was not solely dependent on the expectations for economic gains. Rather, their ideational reorientation on the global scale is closely related to their newly arising status—associated with the label emerging powers—which evinces an eagerness to act as responsible and constructive stakeholders in global climate change governance as well as whose discourse align around the context of differentiating luxury emissions of the rich from survival emissions of the poor, developmentalism with environmental responsibilities, and *Common Future* of the planet.

Next, the dissertation examines the process of how the establishment of the BRICS partnership has shaped the production of a common stance among its members on the global climate change issues from 2009 onwards (Chapter 4 and Chapter 5). The analyses concerning the convergence among the BRICS states instrumentalised the official documents of the BRICS platform, and statements and speeches delivered by the BRICS' high-ranking representatives. In this respect, the main argument of the dissertation is formed by a Constructivism-guided Mechanism. This Mechanism proved its plausibility since it has extensive explanatory power in representing the phenomenon of the converging positions among the BRICS states in the field of climate change. It outlines that the increasing interaction among the BRICS states, changes in the material world and, as a result, the cohesion on the basis of the *collective identity* diversified and deepened the web of intra-group cooperation and collaboration within the club, so these actors embraced jointly shared ideas, discourse, and values on climate change.

In addition to annual BRICS Leaders' Summits, the platform enabled its members to establish a dialogue at the relevant ministerial levels, launched working groups, and even constituted an institutional body originating from the BRICS club' itself. Thanks to their increasing interactions, the issue areas composing the common BRICS agenda towards climate change spread to the topics of the environmental considerations, sustainable development, clean energy production, and the establishment of the NDB. As opposed to other mechanisms, the third mechanism performed better in examining the narrow research question of the dissertation by outlining that the *collective identity* held by the BRICS actors (re)defined their policy agenda, shaped their ideas, restructured their discourse, and so affected their policies.

By extension, the old concepts lost their power for the BRICS members to address contemporary global problems, and in particular climate change. They have articulated neither the old-fashioned image of being a bridge between the Northern and Southern hemispheres nor the claim of assuming the leadership of the developing world since Copenhagen. Instead, the BRICS thought that they should make a concrete contribution to international efforts for mitigating the negative impacts of climate change and work for producing tangible policy positions due to their status as emerging powers whose material capacities are increasing and abilities are growing. Although the principle of CDBR has underpinned the BRICS' policy formulation, they put emphasis on the part of Common Responsibilities by saying that not only developed countries but also developing states should take action against the challenges of climate change. Still, the BRICS states backed the developing world at the international level and aligned their discourse around the contexts of *LNOB* and embraced the bottom-up approach to the end that all stakeholders can meaningfully respond to climate change-related problems as much as those actors in urgent need can receive support and be encouraged to make their contribution per their different national circumstances by showing respect to their socio-economic developmental goals (see sub-heading 4.2.). Table 4 provides a summary of how BRICS frames the issue of climate change.

For the BRICS states, measures to fight climate change do not cripple but supplement the efforts to achieve their socio-economic development. However, environmentally-insensitive economic development models threaten the social

stability and economic sustainability of the countries. Hence, a new paradigm aligning socio-economic development with environmental protection needs to be laid out to succeed in economic and social areas. At this point, the term sustainable development conceptualises a perspective rejecting the trade-off between economic growth and environmentally-friendly practices, and brings moral obligations for developing countries and emerging powers in their pursuit of the right to development without sacrificing environmental protection. Displaying the characteristics attributed to emerging powers, the BRICS states acknowledged the importance of blending their economic growth with the notions of social justice and environmental protection in conformity with the standards of sustainability. On the basis of equitable and inclusive growth, the BRICS states believe that the actions should reflect on the ecological wisdom and, thus, economic activities incorporating this ecological awareness need to be promoted by global partnership acting within the framework of the motto of *LNOB*. Therefore, the concept of *circular economy* is a practical implication that would execute the idea of sustainable development with the aim of producing society-wide benefits and transition to renewable energy resources (see sub-heading 4.3.). Table 5 is the summary of the BRICS' understanding of sustainable development.

As an attempt to harmonise the social and environmental aspects of economic activities, the notion of sustainable development substantiates the implementation of contemporary green methods for economic growth (Park, 2013; Ruppel & Ruppel-Schlichting, 2013). The BRICS realised that environmental sustainability is the key to secure economic growth and ensure social development; thus they thought that their growing material capacities and technological abilities would create a great potential for succeeding in the modification of economy and energy areas. As part of their *collective identity*, emerging powers at the body of the BRICS club determined the transition to a green economic model and the instalment of the green energy mix as the developmental target for remaining committed to the efforts of SDGs and poverty eradication. Prioritising the collective well-being of humankind through revealing the negative consequences of the old-fashioned growth-based GDP economic structure, the BRICS acknowledged that the countries' capabilities would differ due to their national development level, so this transition needs to be encouraged on the basis of a bottom-up approach. Accordingly, the BRICS expressed

their eagerness to enhance and deepen the intra-group cooperation by instituting working groups and research cooperation and utilising the NDB (see sub-heading 5.2.). Table 7 displays how the BRICS partnership conceptualised the concept of green growth.

However, the BRICS repeatedly underlined the lack of sufficient international support to initiate infrastructure and sustainable development projects that would enrich the endeavours to accomplish sustainable development and green growth. By means of their rising material capabilities, the BRICS embraced the status of being emerging powers and presented themselves as actors who are more capable of understanding the needs of the developing nations and, accordingly, producing proper blueprints. Consequently, the BRICS decided to mobilise their own resources and instituted the NDB to promote the economic growth model in harmony with sustainable development requirements and green growth methods. As the constituent of their *collective identity* construction, the BRICS regards developed states as the Other of their *we-group* image and positioned themselves in between industrialised economies and developing world. In the light of the discourse of *Building Sustainable Future*, the BRICS accepted values such as openness, solidarity, equality, respect for sovereignty, and mutual assistance as the principles of their actions at the body of the NDB in contrast to the practices of the Bretton Woods institutions and therefore execute their collective intentions to launch a climate-resilient economic model by financing infrastructure investment and environmentally-sustainable development projects (see sub-heading 5.3.). Table 8 offers an overview of the function of the NDB in the BRICS agenda.

These findings confirm the Constructivist analytical framework as the change in the material world and ideational structure affect the actors' identity- and interest-formations as well as their behaviours. Thus, intersubjectively shared ideas, norms, and values play a central role in understanding the positions of actors in global politics. Empowering ideas, shared language and discourse allow revealing identity and actors' positions in relation to other group of states together with their policy preferences in regards to international climate change politics.

6.2. Contribution and Implications

The literature on the BRICS club primarily focuses on the topics related to global economic and financial governance. These studies aim at unveiling the role of the BRICS states to push for a degree of reform on the international economic and financial structure thanks to their growing economic might in the global economy, especially after the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. Once the BRICS countries are analysed with respect to the subjects of the environment and climate change, either their dissimilarities based on quantitative data or their divergent domestic characteristics are introduced to reason why the BRICS is less likely to pursue a jointly shared policy position regarding climate change. This dissertation substantiates that while the area of environment is certainly a relevant topic of analysis for the literature regarding the BRICS, the in-depth investigation exposes the level of their cooperation and convergence on the field of climate change-related subjects. Therefore, it presents a significant contribution to the literature by analysing an original sphere of cooperation among the BRICS club.

The dissertation provides a broader perspective on the roots of the convergence among the BRICS states. This highlights that this phenomenon does not only belong to the period from the late 2000s onwards but also that its initial signs go back to the first half of the 2000s. Moreover, the dissertation demonstrates that the motivation behind the convergence among the BRICS states in the field of climate change was not solely dependent on the expectations for economic gains. Rather, their ideational reorientation on the global scale is closely related to their newly arising status of being emerging powers accompanying the changes in the material world which evinces an eagerness to act as responsible stakeholders in global climate change governance.

Additionally, the dissertation covers a recent challenge that has caused significant impacts on the global scale in every respect by its very nature. The developments following the COVID-19 pandemic are an implication area of the common standpoint of the BRICS grouping. As a litmus test for whether the BRICS' policies and responses would be in line with their *collective identity* formations, the COVID-19 pandemic urged BRICS to framed their policy proposals and discourse, so this challenge showed BRICS joint ability to motivate their partnership at the level of the

BRICS platform. However, it still needs to be approached with caution since the scope of their cooperation and the way how their shared policy agenda would be translated to real actions are open to investigation.

Furthermore, the developments during and after the COP-26 in Glasgow confirm both the importance of the BRICS states in international climate change talks and their commitments to addressing climate change-related problems. The statements of India's Environment Minister Yadav (2021-ongoing) cultivated the *collective identity* of the BRICS. Despite critics of India's interference watering down the language of the final text adopted in the COP-26 (Depledge, Saldivia, & Peñasco, 2022), all BRICS states endorsed the agreement which has for the first time explicitly targeted phasing down a fossil energy source, coal. Also, Minister Yadav stated that the BRICS platform holds a very important place for India, and it plays a "very significant role in addressing [...] climate change" (Yadav, 2021).

From a theoretical perspective, the studies in the literature employ the most frequently used concepts to explain the emergence of the BRICS states and their policy stances. Therefore, the discussions are centred around the rise and decline of great powers or the role of the existing international institutions to make sense of the expanding influence of the BRICS. Yet, this dissertation indicates that the concept of *collective identity* has greater explanatory power to trace the dynamics of how the BRICS cooperation from its original emergence to the evolution of the shape of the in-group cooperation in accordance with the shifts in the material world and changes in ideational structure.

This point hints at the last but certainly not least important implication of the dissertation. Mostly, the literature takes the analysis back to the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 and then examines the post-crisis formation period of the BRICS club. However, this dissertation demonstrates that aligning the pre- and post-formation periods of the BRICS platform is crucial to discover the initial sign of the overlapping policy positions of the BRICS states and understand the bases of their convergence at the international level.

6.3. Paths for Future Research

Throughout the dissertation, the convergence among the BRICS partners in the fields of climate change-related issues is emphasised. As each BRICS state preserves its importance in international relations because of their growing material capabilities and expanding influence, the questions related to the BRICS associates and the platform's itself would remain relevant. Thus, this dissertation opens a path to ask a new set of questions that would shed light on a further research agenda.

This dissertation's central subject of inquiry is global climate change, and the related issue areas such as sustainable development and green growth. Still, the analysis can be advanced and expanded to cover the fields of wildlife protection, forestry, and water preservation in the BRICS policy framework. Additionally, while the Mechanism gains validity in explaining and understanding the phenomenon at hand, it could be operationalised concerning the cases where the outcome-converging policy stance of the BRICS grouping-presents itself in different issue areas.

Although it goes beyond the confines of this dissertation, further studies can also focus on the harmony between the policy positions of the BRICS actors on a global scale and their policy implementations at the domestic level. Therefore, it can be investigated to what extent their domestic policy implementations resemble those presented ideational factors and policy concepts in practical terms and to what extent the BRICS states could fulfil their promises.

Lastly, the BRICS cooperation is a newly-flourishing phenomenon and the partner countries achieved a considerable level of institutionalisation in a limited time period. Still, future studies may take into account the envisagement that either domestic level factors such as political instability or international level crises such as global economic and social turmoil arising from the fields of health or finance may sap the developmental ambitions of the BRICS. So, potential changes in the material world may trigger new ideas that undermine multilateralism, and international dialogue and cooperation. While the protectionist and isolationist sides of their national identities may come forward under these scenarios, these ideational transformations might keep the formation process and impact of the *collective identity* of the BRICS grouping in the background and limit the BRICS cooperation

in global climate change issues in terms of its productive, innovative, and dynamic nature.



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