



REPUBLIC OF TURKEY

ALTINBAŞ UNIVERSITY

Institute of Graduate Studies

Political Science and Public Administration/Politics and
International Relations

**EU GOOD GOVERNANCE PROMOTION IN
EDUCATION POLICY FOR REFUGEES IN
TURKEY: EU AID, DOMESTIC NETWORKS AND
POLICY CHANGE**

Okan KUŞ

Master's Thesis

Supervisor

Assoc. Prof. Diğdem SOYALTIN COLELLA

Istanbul, 2022

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The thesis titled EU GOOD GOVERNANCE PROMOTION IN EDUCATION POLICY FOR REFUGEES IN TURKEY: EU AID, DOMESTIC NETWORKS AND POLICY CHANGE prepared by OKAN KUŞ and submitted on 16.05.2022 has been **accepted unanimously** for the degree of Master of Science in Political Science and International Relations

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Signature

DEDICATION

I would like to thank my thesis advisor, Diğdem SOYALTIN COLELLA, for her outstanding efforts during this process and for the determination and motivation she gave me. I would like to express my gratitude to my family for their support during this process. Also, I would like to thank Ayşe Nur Özdemir for her attitude towards me during my thesis period.



ABSTRACT

EU GOOD GOVERNANCE PROMOTION IN EDUCATION POLICY FOR REFUGEES IN TURKEY: EU AID, DOMESTIC NETWORKS AND POLICY CHANGE

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Date: June/2022

Pages: 131

This thesis will examine how and under what conditions the EU's promotion of good governance affects education policies for refugees in Turkey. The high number of refugees in Turkey has led to the formation of policy areas for refugees and the development of these policies. Education policies for refugees became a policy area that failed to attract public attention in the first years of the crisis. One of the most important actors of the issue, which was later brought to the international arena, is the EU. The EU is basically an actor that supports integration policies towards refugees to ensure its own border security. In this context, the EU provided financial and technical support to Turkey and supported its education policies for refugees. While the EU supported education policies for refugees, it provided incentives based on good governance criteria and conditionality. Education policies for refugees have changed over time with the contribution of the EU and resulted in an increase in policy networks. It experienced a low level of change in the period of 2011-2014. Educational policies for refugees were marked by a community-based approach and “laissez faire” attitude in this period. However, the regular increase in the number of refugees in 2014, the thought that the Syrian crisis will be permanent, and the increasing costs of the need for

education have led to the transfer of education policies towards refugees to the international arena. In addition to these developments, the endangerment of EU border security as of 2015 resulted in the EU's support for education policies towards refugees in Turkey.

Keywords: European Union, Good Governance, Refugees, Educational Policies, Policy Networks



ÖZET

AB'NİN TÜRKİYE'DEKİ MÜLTECİLER İÇİN EĞİTİM POLİTİKASINDA İYİ YÖNETİŞİM TEŞVİKİ: AB YARDIMI, YURTIÇİ AĞLAR VE POLİTİKA DEĞİŞİKLİĞİ

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Tarih: Haziran/2022

Sayfa Sayısı: 131

Bu tez, AB'nin iyi yönetim teşvikinin Türkiye'deki mültecilere yönelik eğitim politikalarını nasıl, ve hangi koşullar altında etkilediğini inceleyecektir. Türkiye'deki mülteci sayısının yüksek olması, mültecilere yönelik politika alanlarının oluşmasına ve bu politikaların geliştirilmesine yol açmıştır. Mültecilere yönelik eğitim politikaları, krizin ilk yıllarında kamuoyunun ilgisini çekemeyen bir politika alanı haline geldi. Daha sonrasında uluslararası arenaya taşınan konunun en önemli aktörlerinden biri de AB'dir. AB temelde kendi sınır güvenliğini sağlamak için mültecilere yönelik entegrasyon politikalarını destekleyen bir aktördür. Bu kapsamda AB, Türkiye'ye mali ve teknik destek sağlamış ve mültecilere yönelik eğitim politikalarına destek vermiştir. AB, mültecilere yönelik eğitim politikalarını desteklerken, iyi yönetim kriterleri ve koşulluluk ilkesine göre teşvikler sağlamıştır. Mültecilere yönelik eğitim politikaları, AB'nin de katkısıyla zaman içinde değişmiş ve politika ağlarının artmasıyla sonuçlanmıştır. 2011-2014 döneminde düşük seviyeli bir değişim yaşamıştır. Mültecilere yönelik eğitim politikaları, bu dönemde toplum temelli bir yaklaşım ve “laissez faire” tutumu ile damgalanmıştır. Ancak, 2014 yılı ile birlikte mülteci sayısının düzenli bir şekilde artması, Suriye krizinin kalıcı olacağı düşüncesi ve eğitim ihtiyacının

artan maliyetleri, mültecilere yönelik eğitim politikalarının uluslararası arenaya taşınmasına neden olmuştur. Bu gelişmelerin yanı sıra, 2015 yılı itibarıyla AB sınır güvenliğinin tehlikeye girmesi, AB'nin, Türkiye'deki mültecilere yönelik eğitim politikalarına destek vermesiyle sonuçlanmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa Birliği, İyi Yönetişim, Mülteciler, Eğitim Politikaları, Politika Ağları



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ABBREVIATIONS

3RP	: Refugees Resilience and Response Plan
ACP	: African-Caribbean and Pacific
ASAM	: Association for Solidarity with Asylum Seekers and Migrants
CCT	: Conditional Cash Transfer
CCTE	: Conditional Cash Transfer for Education
CEE	: Central and Eastern Europe
CWW	: Concern Worldwide
DAAD	: Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst
EC	: European Community
ECE	: Early Childhood Education
EU	: European Union
EUGS	: European Union Global Strategy
FRIT	: Facility for Refugees in Turkey
IBC	: International Blue Crescent
IMF	: International Monetary Fund
IOM	: International Organization for Migration
JDP	: Justice and Development Party
KfW	: Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau
LFIP	: Law on Foreigners and International Protection

MFL	:	Ministry of Family, Labor and Social Services
MoNE	:	Ministry of National Education
NGO	:	Non-governmental Organizations
NMP	:	Nationalist Movement Party
PIKTES	:	Promoting Integration of Syrian Kids into the Education System
RPP	:	Republican Peoples Party
SuTP	:	Syrians under Temporary Protection
TECs	:	Temporary Education Centers
UN	:	United Nations
UNFPA	:	United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF	:	United Nations Children Fund
VET	:	Vocational Education and Training
WB	:	World Bank

1. INTRODUCTION

The Syrian civil war was an unexpected event both in terms of its beginning and its development. The events that began in April 2011 led to one of the largest mass displacements in the world. The resulting conflict has triggered a wide range of policy changes in the areas of human security and refugee protection, particularly in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq. Turkey has hosted the largest number of refugees in the world since 2014 (Mencütek, Gökalp Aras & Balamir Coşkun, 2020: p., 94). As of 03.03.2022, the number of registered Syrian refugees in Turkey is 3.747.734. This is the highest number recorded since 2011. There are 1.778.628 children and youth in education age (0-18 years old) in Turkey, which is the country hosting the highest number of Syrian refugees. This number corresponds to 47.45% of the registered Syrians in the country. Apart from registered Syrian refugees, there are also Syrian refugees living in cities without being registered within the borders of Turkey. This population also necessitated education policies for refugees and the authorities had to take action on this issue.

As the Syrian civil war was an unexpected event, after the start of the civil war, the world public opinion, especially the countries neighboring Syria, saw this war as a war with a temporary character. However, the increasing violence in the Syrian civil war has signaled that the war will continue for many years, and the increasing violence has led to the continuation of the Syrian refugee influx to neighboring countries.

During the increasing migration of refugees every year, the number of refugee children is too high to be ignored. In addition, there are Syrian children born within the borders of Turkey who have never seen their home country. Interior Minister Süleyman Soylu, in his statement on 19 September 2019, stated that the number of Syrian babies born in Turkey is around 450.000.

The high number of young refugees necessitated the design of education policies for refugees. The temporary character of the war has caused Turkey to implement temporary solutions on refugee education. However, the increase in violence, the continuous migration of the refugee wave to Turkey and the increase in the refugee youth population have led to permanent policies replacing temporary solutions. In summary, the changing character and effects of war have led to policy changes. Implementation of permanent policy changes is not only a matter of concern to Turkey, but also an issue that has international dimensions, requires the participation of many countries,

and concerns millions. Education policies for refugees have undergone significant transformations since 2011. After being governed through informal means and with a temporary character, the education policies for refugees have started to have a structure that is identified with permanence and integration, involving multi-level stakeholders.

1.1. PURPOSE, FINDINGS AND RELEVANCE OF THE RESEARCH

Relations between the EU and Turkey have progressed with ups and downs since Turkey became a candidate country in 1999. The period of bilateral relations, which started with the EU factor being very influential on Turkey, resulted in the loss of the EU factor over time. Until 2016, EU effectiveness decreased. With the year 2015, when the refugee crisis turned into a serious problem for Europe, a new "cooperation and partnership period" has been entered in EU-Turkey relations. This thesis, which deals with the contributions of the EU to education policies for refugees, seeks to reveal the effects of the EU on the refugee governance in Turkey.

This thesis examines the educational policies for Syrian refugees in Turkey. In the field of education policies for refugees, the EU has emerged as an important actor especially after 2015. The EU's contribution to education policies is important both for the Union and for Turkey. Its importance for the Union is basically ensuring the security of its borders and remoting its resilience. However, it is more important for Turkey. When the war began in Syria in 2011, Turkey did not have the capacity to handle the massive influx of refugees alone. At this point, the EU has become an important cooperation partner for Turkey. For this reason, in this thesis, while examining the education policies for refugees in Turkey, EU's project based financial and technical supports are also explained.

There are many studies in the literature on the education of Syrian refugees in Turkey. These studies are generally related to the problems experienced by Syrian refugees in Turkey in the Turkish education system, the steps Turkey has taken towards refugee education, and the situation of refugee children in education age. However, there is no research in the literature that examines the contribution of the EU to education policies for refugees within the context of good governance. This thesis contributes empirically and theoretically to the literature on Syrian refugees in Turkey. Firstly, the EU's financial and technical assistance to Syrian refugees in Turkey has been examined within the framework of good governance criteria. It has been demonstrated in

this thesis that the technical and financial support provided by the EU to third countries is provided by taking into account the principles of good governance (transparency, accountability and participation). It is important that the EU aid is provided by considering good governance principles, that the quality-of-service increases, that the assistance provided is more effective, and that the financial/technical assistance is more inclusive. In addition, the distribution of the EU aid in line with the good governance principles is important for the fight against corruption. Education policies for refugees is a newly emerging policy area. Since it is a newly formed policy area, it is a policy area open to corruption in terms of resource allocation. Financial and technical assistance provided by the EU for refugees within the scope of Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRIT) is provided on a project basis. The aid provided within the scope of the projects, the implementing partners, the aims of the projects, the target audience, the progress of the projects are shared with the public in a transparent manner by the EU.

While explaining the education policies for refugees, this thesis only criticizes the financial aid from the EU. EU contribution to education policies for refugees is very important. However, in this thesis, it is emphasized that among the factors affecting the education policies towards refugees, actors other than the EU are also very important. Local actors and local factors have made significant contributions to the field of education policies since the refugees entered the Turkish borders. While the structure of education policies for refugees was centralized in the period of 2011-2014, it has turned into a decentralized and network-based structure over time.

Secondly, the transformation of the single-actor structure adopted by Turkey in the field of education policies into a multi-actor and participatory structure in the early stages of the refugee influx is explained in this thesis and supported by concrete examples. In this way, the policy change in Turkey was emphasized. The involvement of international, local and civil actors in the process has been described as a step taken within the framework of good governance criteria. Third, empirically, this thesis brings insights from the EU official documents to highlight the concrete contributions of the projects which put into practice within the scope of the EU's education policies for refugees.

Contrary to studies that only deal with the EU aid superficially, this thesis examines the EU's contribution to the structure of education policy for the refugees after 2016. The fact that the EU took concrete steps within the framework of good governance criteria in education policies for

refugees resulted in a rising policy network. Therefore, the education policies have a multi-actor structure today. Uncovering emerging policy networks in education policy is a theoretical contribution of this thesis to the literature.

EU good governance policies are a top-down policy area. In this thesis, a bottom-up explanation has been made as an alternative to the top-down structure of EU good governance policies. In addition, the EU, after joining the education policy network for refugees, is an actor that triggers bottom-up change by cooperating with non-state actors as well as implementing its directives from the top down.

1.2. RESEARCH METHOD

This thesis is a qualitative case analysis study. Qualitative research stands out with the advantages it provides in terms of description and explanation. Case analysis includes examining a specific individual, group, audience, event, policy area or institution for research (Süleymanoğlu-Kürüm, 2021; George & Bennett, 2005; Bennett, 2004). Qualitative research method facilitates understanding and interpretation. In addition, the qualitative research method provides flexibility. Due to its flexible nature and the fact that fewer cases are studied, qualitative case studies allow to deepen the case(s) studied. In addition, fewer case studies allow establishing a cause-effect relationship between variables.

Turkey is selected as a case in this thesis. The reasons for examining the education policies towards refugees in this thesis are as follows; Turkey has been the country that has hosted the most Syrian refugees since the beginning of the Syrian civil war. Majority of those who migrated from Syria to Turkey are refugees of education age (0-18 years). In addition, the number of refugee youth born in Turkey and starting their education life within the Turkish borders is quite high. Education policies towards refugees have emerged as a new policy area. Since it is a new policy area, its legal basis has been established recently. The emergence of the field of education policies towards refugees as a new policy field is the reason why this policy field is open to corruption. EU good governance principles are seen as effective tools in the fight against corruption. In this context, education policies for refugees have been examined within the framework of good governance criteria.

Between 2011 and 2014, the legal basis of education policies for refugees began to be established. However, in this period, urgent education needs were met in the field of education policies, and education policies for refugees could not attract enough attention from the public and the government. As a result of this, education policies for refugees developed on a community basis between the period of 2011-2014. Increasing costs have caused the field of education policies for refugees to move to the international platform after 2014. The combination of costs and EU border security factors resulted in a rising policy network in the field of education policies, the EU basically made project-based investments in the field of education policies for refugees in order to ensure its own border security by integrating refugees into Turkey. The transparent provision of the aid provided by the EU under certain conditions is the main reason for examining the education policies for refugees within the framework of EU good governance criteria.

In this thesis, process tracing method was used. Process training is a fundamental tool of qualitative analysis (Collier, 2011). The thesis examines the education policies towards refugees from 2014 to the present (2021) and the EU's contributions to this policy area. In this process, different approaches have been adopted in the field of policy. In order to explain these differences more clearly, this thesis is divided into 2 different periods (2011-2014/ 2014-2021).

The data collection techniques in this thesis are document review, content analysis and observation which are compatible with qualitative case analysis. Empirical findings come from EU official documents, government reports, field studies and secondary literature. In this context, the EU official website, reports prepared by local, national and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working in Turkey, documents and reports shared by the Ministry of National Education with the public, and presentations have been deeply examined.

The hypothesis of the research is that; “The EU's promotion of good governance works more effectively and leads to a high level of policy change when Turkey supports a multi-actor structure in education policies for refugees, cooperates with different actors (EU and EU institutions, local, national and international NGOs etc.) and brings an international dimension to the education policies for Syrian refugees.”

The variables of the research are as follows;

The dependent variable; Education policies for refugees in Turkey

Independent variables; External factors (EU aid, resilience policy), internal factors (economic costs, political costs and veto players and cooperation with non-governmental organizations).

In this thesis, the dynamics affecting the education policies for refugees and the conditions under which education policies are affected will be explained. Since the education policies for refugees are affected by various factors, internal and external networks, it has been chosen as the dependent variable.

What should be understood from the high-level change is the increase in participation in education policies for refugees, the more transparent formulation of policies, the transparent use of resources allocated to education policies, and the high accountability of actors. On the other hand, low-level change is characterized by low level of participation in education policies, exclusionary network, weak link between actors, and ineffective use of resources.




Figure 1.1. Variables

In the research, the EU, internal economic cost, internal political cost and veto players and cooperation with the NGOs are the independent variables. Independent variables interact with each other. Domestic adoption costs includes economic and political costs. The financial assistance provided by the EU tries to reduce the internal economic costs of education policies for refugees. Internal economic costs and internal political costs and veto players are in direct proportion. Rising economic costs incur political costs. The EU's financial aid also indirectly affects domestic political costs for governments in front of their electorates. The EU's resilience policy includes steps towards social cohesion and integration. In this way it tries to absorb internal political costs. The NGOs try to reduce domestic economic costs by cooperating in the local, national and regional projects. In addition, NGOs try to reduce the domestic political cost by trying to promote social cohesion between the host community and refugees. The effect of independent variables on the dependent variable varies according to years. For example, between 2011 and 2014, the EU's impact on education policies for refugees is low; the policy change was also low as expected by the arguments putting emphasis on the EU aid. However, the high level of policy change after 2014 cannot be only explained by increased amount of EU aid but increasing policy networks. The impact of policy networks has been an ignored variable in the literature which put too much emphasis on the EU-level factors.

1.3. OUTLINE OF THESIS

This thesis consists of four parts except the introduction part. The first part examines the EU as an exporter of good governance. The historical background of the EU's concept of good governance is included in this section. In addition, the approaches and tools used by the EU in the concept of good governance are explained. The functions of these approaches and tools in education policies towards refugees in Turkey have been examined.

In the second part, the refugees in Turkey were examined with numerical data. Since the refugees in Turkey is a recent phenomenon, the numerical data may vary within the study. Some data may be older than others. The numerical data may have been updated because the access dates to the data are different. In addition, in this section, education policies towards refugees in Turkey are examined in three different periods, from the beginning of the refugee problem to the present. In this section, the projects developed and implemented by the EU in the field of education policies for refugees are included.

In the third part, the variables affecting the education policies towards refugees are examined. Variables are divided into internal factors and external factors. External factors include the EU. The EU title has two sub-titles as financial aid and resilience policy. Internal factors, on the other hand, have three subheadings as internal economic costs, internal political costs and veto players and cooperation with the NGOs. The impact of internal and external factors on the formulation of education policies for refugees is examined in this section. In addition, in this section, the PIKTES project implemented by the EU in Turkey has been examined within the framework of good governance criteria.

The fourth chapter includes the results and evaluations of the study. The evaluation of the EU-Turkey relations in terms of education policies towards refugees and the recommendations in the literature are examined in this section.

2. EU AND GOOD GOVERNANCE PROMOTION

After the Cold War, international organizations started to adopt the concept of good governance for the development strategies of third countries (Börzel & Risse, 2004; Börzel, Pamuk & Stahn, 2008; van Hüllen & Börzel, 2015; Zanger, 2000; Hough, 2013; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015; Hackenesch, 2016). The European Union is no exception (Börzel, Pamuk & Stahn, 2008). The European Union (EU) is a supranational organization that has been providing various aids to third countries since its establishment. It includes many types of aid such as technical aid, financial aid, humanitarian aid. The EU aid to third countries is not a new phenomenon. Looking at official development assistance, the EU and EU member states have provided and continue to provide much more aid than its closest follower, the United States.

The EU's model of promoting good governance is concerned with making political decisions in the interest of the public and effectively solving societal issues and social problems. In this view, good governance is about solving societal problems and societal issues effectively and efficiently. The state and its administrative capacities are very important in good governance. According to the EU, a more or less functioning state is necessary if public resources are managed and, accordingly, good governance is ensured. The role of non-state actors is also important in good governance. Alternatives to hierarchical and monopolized decision-making processes can be provided by non-state actors. Monopolization of public resources can be avoided in this way. Non-state actors can also help to increase governance legitimacy. They do this by holding governments accountable and forcing them to be more transparent and accountable (Börzel, Pamuk & Stahn, 2008, p. 9).

2.1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF EU'S PROMOTING GOOD GOVERNANCE

The EU is a governance exporter (Börzel, Pamuk & Stahn, 2008; van Hüllen & Börzel, 2013; Börzel & Risse, 2004). Governance exports first emerged under the Lome IV agreement signed in 1989. The Lome Agreements are a set of agreements negotiated by the EU for African, Caribbean, and Pacific nations (ACP). The Lome I agreement entered into force in 1975. Governance exports were not covered by these agreements until the Lome III agreement.

The former colonies of EU member states and ACP countries have long been the main target of EU development programs (Hout, 2010). Relations with the former African colonies began in 1975

with the Partnership Regime. Between 1963 and 1975, these relations continued with the Yaounde Convention. Between 1975 and 2000, there were transformations in the relations with the Lome agreements, and political conditionality (with the Lome IV agreement) came into effect alongside the economic conditionality.

EU-ACP relations initially developed economically. Countries covered by Lome are former European colonies states. Therefore, the EU made economic concessions to the ACP countries in its first contacts, economic concessions formed the basis of its development policies. Taxes on exports to ACP countries were abolished, and ACP countries were allowed to enter the EU market. In this way, it is aimed to develop the ACP countries economically. Although contributions have been made to the economies of the ACP countries, this has also had its disadvantages. The most important disadvantage; ACP countries lagged behind in other areas due to developing economic relations (Hout, 2010; Börzel & Risse, 2004). Until the end of the Cold War, good governance issues were scarce in the EU development programme. In 1991, the link between development and good governance was established with the Council of Europe and the Council of Ministers of Development in Luxembourg. Following these councils, development was founded on democracy, human rights, the rule of law, transparent and responsible governance, and anti-corruption efforts. At this point, the scope of the governance profile has expanded.

The ACP countries were the first to receive the governance profile. The development policies and governance profile prepared for the ACP countries were later used as a reference by the EU. The profile was created as a "programming tool," with the main goals of "assisting in the identification of specific areas of collaboration (weaknesses) and agreeing on benchmarks and targets for reform (Government commitments), or sectoral performance indicators, if governance is a focal point" (Hout, Will, 2010). The EU aimed to design the governance profile alone. However, the content of the governance profile should be prepared in partnership with the target country. The joint preparation of the content of the governance profile between the EU and the target country is cited as an example of intergovernmental interaction.

Both the economic and political conditionality of the EU's development policies is the Lome IV agreement. In the previous agreements, the ACP countries could easily turn the scope of the agreements to themselves. With the Lome I, Lome II and Lome III agreements, the ACP countries fell behind in many areas such as democracy, human rights and freedoms. With the Lome IV

agreement, the EU took political conditionality as an important point along with economic conditionality.

Principles such as human rights, the rule of law and democracy were entered into the contract with the Lome IV-bis agreement. The concept of good governance has also started to be used against target countries with the Lome IV agreement. In addition to all these, together with Lome IV-bis, the concept of political conditionality, as well as economic conditionality, has started to take place in the development policies of the EU. With Lome IV-bis, rewards-incentives and enforcement mechanisms came into play. However, the EU did not resort to the negative conditionality instrument. This is because this mechanism is considered to be negative in promoting good governance.

The Lome IV and Lome IV-bis agreements required the ACP countries to undergo a political overhaul. Otherwise, the penalties in the carrots and sticks method used by the EU could have come into play. In addition, the Lome IV agreement draws attention to the capacity building of the public sector. This means increasing state capacity.

It is argued that significant differences are created in six problem areas of EU development assistance. "The link between trade and development," "regional integration and collaboration," "supporting macroeconomic policies and encouraging equitable access to social services," "transport, food security and sustainable rural development," and "institutional capacity building" are among them (Hout, 2010, p. 5).

2.1.1. Change in the millennium

As of 2000, the Lome agreements were replaced by the Cotonou Agreement. The Cotonou Treaty was valid for the period 2000-2020. With the Cotonou Treaty, the Lome system has lost its validity. With the Cotonou Treaty, the level of good governance between EU-ACP countries has increased even more. The most important difference of the Cotonou Treaty from the Lome system is the introduction of negative conditionality. The article to suspend the membership and aid process was limited to the basic elements. However, serious corruption cases were subject to serious sanctions. The suspension clause applies to serious corruption offences. However, there should be a constructive dialogue process between the EU and the target country before sanctions are applied.

Constructive dialogue includes information exchange, situation analysis, and seeking solutions to rectify the situation.

The reason why the EU applies negative conditionality in serious corruption crimes is that according to the EU, corruption is the biggest obstacle to good governance. The biggest obstacle to good governance is corruption, which causes resources to be used for individual benefits, reduces the efficiency of goods and services, and brings inequality to resource distribution. With Lome IV-bis, a relationship between democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and good governance was established. The scope of development cooperation has widened as a result of the Cotonou Treaty. The economic, social, and cultural dimensions of development have all been considered. By integrating these concepts, it is aimed to build peace and prevent conflicts.

Unlike the Lome system, the EU stopped enforcing unilateral development policies with the Cotonou Treaty. Rather, goals and principles should be developed in collaboration with developing nations and assessed collaboratively using previously established benchmarking standards (Börzel & Risse, 2004). This shows that with the Cotonou Treaty, political dialogue was strengthened as well as conditionality.

With the Cotonou Treaty, political dialogue has become an important tool for promoting good governance. With the strengthening of the political dialogue mechanism, the EU had the chance to evaluate the target countries on governance. Political discussion has been referred to be the fundamental tool for promoting good governance in general (Börzel, Pamuk & Stahn, 2008). Negative conditionality has lost its significance. An attempt was made to create a "partnership approach" and "ownership" through the political dialogue tool. Greater participation of non-state actors was encouraged using the political dialogue tool. The EU has never suspended association agreements and used the negative tool of political conditionality.

Bilateral meetings between the EU and target countries at the political level allowed the exchange of views on the enlargement process, aid to be provided and issues of common interest. Political dialogues have been important tools to clarify the terms of membership. The Association Councils brought together the European Commission and the target countries in the context of a political dialogue tool. The EU and target countries evaluate the problems and disagreements related to the determination of the *acquis* and harmonization of the *acquis* within the framework of political

dialogue and try to reach a solution. Political dialogue also gave the EU the chance to closely monitor the target countries.

One of the most important issues where the Cotonou Treaty differs from the Lome system on good governance exports is the limits of capacity building. Capacity building in the Lome system was limited to the public sector. However, with the Cotonou Treaty, civil society and non-state actors were also taken into account in capacity building, and it was aimed to strengthen civil society and non-state actors. Non-governmental players, such as the private sector, are given the right to be consulted and participate in political discussions. The involvement of non-state actors in the political dialogue process paves the way for the EU's exports of good governance. With the Cotonou Treaty, the EU for the first time makes the involvement of non-state institutions an official target. The participation of civil society and non-state actors in the process will strengthen the democratic structure of the society and bring positive effects in the export of good governance. Involving civil society and non-state actors in the preparation of development programs increases local ownership. Thus, the adoption time of the decisions taken decreases and the efficiency of the decisions increases.

With the Cotonou Treaty, besides negative sanctions (suspension clause) and political dialogue, the programming tool came into effect. In 1989, the concept of programming made its way into EU literature. They suggest that rather than individual initiatives, EU funds should be provided to programs. The distribution of resources is determined by a set of criteria. These include the identification of mid-term development goals, the formulation of short-term plans to achieve these goals, the allocation of EU funds for a five-year period, and the periodic monitoring and evaluation of the first three parts. These four criteria provide the EU with a chance to examine thoroughly in which areas its aid is being used. The resources that the EU provides to the recipient countries depend on the reform practices of the target country and the performance of the recipient country. Unlike Lome IV, the EU now has complete control over development funding allocation. In the Lome agreements, the receiving countries could easily turn the process in their favor. However, this does not mean that the EU will act as it wishes in resource allocation. Resource allocation is also subject to negotiations.

As a result, the EU's development policies and, accordingly, good governance exports have changed significantly since 1975. Economic concessions were the basis of good governance

exports, which began with the Lome I agreement in 1975. However, economic development alone has not been sufficient for both the EU and the target countries. The EU used the development policies it created for the ACP countries as a reference in the later period. The scope of the Lome agreements has expanded over time, and concepts such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law have become the basis of development policies. Tools such as the suspension clause, negative sanctions, political dialogue and programming have been used. Capacity building has been expanded beyond the public sector to include both the public and private sectors. In terms of local ownership, civil society and non-state actors' participation in the political debate process has become increasingly crucial. Thus, the scope of good governance exports has also undergone certain transformations. The EU's development policies are guided by the notion of good governance. Conditionality and aid have been used in EU enlargement policy to encourage administrative reforms. By trying to improve the legitimacy of the output in this way, the EU tried to develop both the government wing and the civil society wing of the countries it helped within the scope of its enlargement policy. The principle of conditionality is one of the most important principles for the EU to export good governance. The policies implemented by the EU depend on the conditionality principle.

22 EU GOOD GOVERNANCE PROMOTION: APPROACHES, INSTRUMENTS AND OUTCOMES

2.2.1. Approaches

The EU uses a number of tools and approaches when promoting good governance in third countries. The first approach is the effective government approach. In this approach, the EU essentially seeks to improve governance that will strengthen the government and its will. The better the administrative capacity of the government, the more effectively and efficiently it uses public resources. In this way, financial and technical resources are made available to the public. The second approach is the output-oriented approach. In this approach, the EU tries to involve non-state actors in the policy making and policy implementation process. Non-state players play a role in the process, assisting in the implementation of policies. As a result, the EU focuses on non-state organization development and strengthening while encouraging good governance. The third approach relies on the intergovernmental channel. The EU is attempting to establish a space where states can safeguard their interests while supporting input-oriented goals with this strategy.

Understanding democratic governance is the fourth strategy. This strategy tries to connect the transnational channel with the reform movement that focuses on inputs. In order to improve the democratic quality of decision-making processes, the EU intends to empower non-state players in public policymaking (Börzel, Pamuk & Stahn, 2008; Börzel & Risse, 2008).

2.2.2 Instruments

The EU uses three tools to promote good governance in third countries. These are political dialogue, conditionality and EU assistance (Börzel, Pamuk & Stahn, 2008, p. 10).

It uses strategies of political dialogue, persuasion and learning. By holding high-level meetings, it is tried to bring up the problem in any policy area in third countries. The EU uses the political dialogue tool for the relevant government to take action and take concrete steps regarding the issue raised.

Assistance (technical and financial) is provided to build or increase capacity to institutionalize good governance. Financial and technical assistance is aimed at adopting the third country's standards of good governance.

With conditionality, it is aimed to have a country do a cost-benefit analysis. The EU gains sanction power by using its positive and negative incentives on countries that have progressed or regressed in the field of good governance. The conditionality tool tries to manipulate the cost-benefit analysis to get third countries to adopt good governance criteria. The conditionality tool is a tool that needs to be examined in depth when Turkey-EU relations are taken into account.

2.2.3. Conditionality

Conditionality is the main strategy used by international institutions to encourage national governments to comply with their own rules, norms and policies (Balkır & Soyaltın, 2018). Conditionality is an extremely powerful tool. It creates pressure for reforms in the economies, health and education systems, national defense reforms, and national political situations of the recipient countries.

The conditionality strategy entered the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) literature before it entered the EU literature. The principle of conditionality in the credit policies

of these two institutions has often been associated with economic conditionality. In addition, political conditionality is another related context. While the scope of use of economic conditionality has long been wide, the scope of use of political conditionality has recently expanded.

EU conditionality and WB, IMF conditionality have similar origins. WB and IMF allocate resources to their members, provided that the target country implements certain policies. Conditionality refers to two things in international economic law: the precise policies that a state must follow in order to have access to certain financial resources, as well as the methods for implementing and monitoring such policies (Ioannidis, 2014).

The IMF model is one of the most complex and successful kinds of conditionality. For nearly eighty years, the IMF model has applied the conditionality concept. The IMF's conditionality paradigm can be argued to have been replicated by the EU. EU model has transferred some of the features and procedures of conditionality, IMF model conditionality.

2.2.3.1 EU model conditionality

The new topos of EU economic governance is conditionality (Ioannidis, 2014). EU conditionality is the most demanding and comprehensive of the EU-IMF-WB conditionals. Funding is the main benefit to be obtained if the target country implements specific economic policies within the scope of IMF and WB conditionality. But EU conditionality does not provide immediate benefits if certain rules and procedures are followed. EU conditionality has a process that develops within itself. Conditions are more complex compared to other institutions. General and uncertain conditions exist in EU conditionality. There is no single model that must be followed. Separate programs are prepared for each region and each country, taking into account the conditions (economic, social, political and cultural) of that country.

The basic strategy followed by the EU conditionality principle is rule transfer (rule transfer) and compliance with these rules at the national level. The norms of liberal democracies are a means of transforming candidate countries for the EU. The most important incentive and reward of the EU is EU membership. The national adoption of the norms of liberal democracies is also an indispensable criterion for EU membership.

The EU's experience in conditional lending dates back to the 1970s. According to Article 235 of the European Community Treaty, as it was then called, the condition for the buyer countries to get credit is how much they apply the measures taken for the balance of payments.

Conditionality requires multiple institutions and organizations to work together. The various EU institutions and the recipient country's national-level institutions work together on how loans and aid will be used. The process is carried out by negotiation methods. For this reason, the aid provided by the EU cannot be shown in a single document. It is revealed by a series of documents prepared by a number of institutions and with which they collaborate.

The political and economic prerequisites required to become a full member of the EU were more explicitly established during the European Council Summit in Copenhagen in 1993.

In 2004-2007, the EU experienced its last enlargement round. Conditionality is formalized by the 1993 Copenhagen/1995 Madrid criteria (Aydın & Akgül-Açıkmeşe, 2009, p. 267). In 1993, the policies that should be followed and implemented by the countries wishing to become EU members were announced. In 1995, at the Madrid Summit, judicial and administrative capacity building was added to the candidate countries as a condition for the implementation of the *acquis*. There are requirements for Accession Partnerships, Regular Reports and Strategy Papers, and Negotiation Frameworks. This is the concrete indication that the above-mentioned conditionality is based on a number of documents.

The most common rationale underlying EU conditionality is a reinforcement by reward negotiation technique, in which the EU offers external incentives for a target government to comply with its terms (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004). This prevailing logic of conditionality, on the other hand, can be substituted by rule transfer. EU conditionality may be inclusive for a country, but it may not help that country's primary issue areas or rule transfer in a beneficial way.

The majority of EU conditionality is based on a reward-based reinforcement strategy (Schimmelfennig *et al.* 2003:496-7; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004, p. 671). The EU awards in this plan if the target government meets the conditions. The EU becomes the carrot in the reward plan. However, conditionality has positive aspects as well as negative aspects. In negative conditionality, the stick is based on the suspension of the membership process, the freezing of negotiations, financial/technical assistance, international condemnation and punishment.

Although the carrots and sticks model creates pressure to comply with EU rules and requirements, in some cases, recipient countries may move into a rapid reform process to reap the rewards. These reforms may remain on paper and may not be implemented effectively and efficiently.

Negotiation is required on conditionality. The negotiation of the EU and the target country within the scope of the conditionality criterion can directly affect the government of the target country. Or, the government of the target country may be indirectly affected by the EU's authorization of local actors in the target country. In the latter case, the conditionality principle provides opportunities for local actors, civil society, the media and other actors, and may limit the bargaining capacity of the target country's government. However, the adoption of EU rules ultimately depends on the EU and the government of the target country.

The usefulness of the external incentive model, according to Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004, p. 672), is determined by four criteria. The determinacy of conditions, the magnitude and speed of incentives, the credibility of conditionality and veto players, and the adoption costs are all factors to consider.

Given an internal balance in the non-member country, the external incentives model predicts that EU rules will not be adopted until they are specified by the EU as requirements for awards. The rule is more likely to be enacted and enforced if EU conditionality is stable. A rule's clarity and formality are referred to as determination. The higher the level of determination, the clearer the consequence of a condition or rule, and the more legalized that rule/condition is.

Specificity, on the other hand, is important for the target government to understand what it must do to receive the rewards. Certainty increases the credibility of conditionality. This contributes positively to the adoption and implementation of the conditions/rules by the receiving country. However, if a condition has been set, the EU cannot unfairly argue that a rule has not been followed. In addition, the EU cannot give up the promised award due to the uncertainty criterion. In this case, certainty becomes a means of two-sided influence.

The speed and size of rewards are also important to conditionality. When promising an award, the EU should consider the circumstances of the recipient country and provide appropriate assistance in an appropriate amount. If the EU pays rewards late to recipient countries, recipient countries are

less likely to comply with the rules and conditions. For this reason, the EU should make the transfer of the promised rewards to the target country fast.

Third, when the incentive strategy is awarded, the EU must first have a superior bargaining power. Second, the EU must provide certainty on payments. If the EU lacks superior bargaining power, the conditionality strategy and the "sticks" within this strategy will not be credible. If the schedule and amount of payments are not clear and precise, the recipient country is less likely to comply with the conditionality. The amount payable and the time payable should be clear (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004, p. 673).

When awarding awards, the EU should choose low-cost or no-cost awards. The level of dependency on the country to which the award is given must be at a minimum. For example, when providing aid to Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, these countries were of low importance to the EU. However, the economy of CEE countries was dependent on the EU. In other words, interdependence should be minimal or nonexistent. For the conditionality strategy to work properly, the EU should not be dependent on target countries. In addition, the EU should promise rewards according to its own capacity while giving awards, otherwise the probability of the target country to adopt conditionality and to transfer rules will decrease.

The pre-accession process should not be too long. The longer this process, the greater the EU's "sunk costs". A longer process means that the receiving country requests and receives more assistance to comply with EU conditionality. If the process is interrupted or sanctions are imposed on the candidate country, more money and resources are lost.

Consistent distribution of rewards means more incentives to comply with EU rules. Regarding conditionality, if there is inconsistency or internal conflict within the EU, the perspective of target countries can be adversely affected.

Finally, the EU should be better off than other beneficiaries (such as the People's Republic of China recently), choosing its terms better than other actors. Otherwise, EU conditionality will be negatively affected if other actors offer better terms than the EU and make more attractive offers to target countries.

Fourthly; If non-member states are confronted with determinate and credible conditionality, and if they are offered equally beneficial rewards, the external incentives model postulates that the size of domestic adoption costs and their distribution among domestic actors determine whether they will accept or reject the conditions (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004, p. 674). Adoption policies can be quite expensive. The EU, on the other hand, pays for this. The effectiveness of conditionality is determined by the government's and other veto actors' choices. The more veto actors, the less likely it is to comply with EU conditionality and adopt EU rules.

"Conditionality" is described by Smith as "a state or international organization connecting advantages requested by another state to the fulfillment of particular criteria." Conditionality is the EU's most effective foreign policy tool in its ties with third nations, operating on the principle of "reinforcement by reward." In other words, the EU gives rewards in return for the rules it wants to be adopted by third countries.

2.2.4. Outcomes of EU Good Governance Promotion

The EU good governance incentive has three consequences. These can be defined as effective governance, bad governance and good enough governance. In this thesis, while distinguishing three different concepts, the effects of the decisions taken on the society were taken into consideration.

Effective governance is a transnational and output-oriented approach (Börzel, Pamuk & Stahn, 2008). The output-oriented approach qualifies the impact of the decisions taken on the public. In the effective governance concept, all resources are collected in a single pool. Its goal is to include non-state players in the policymaking process in order to generate better policies. In this context, effective governance serves the principle of participation. If there are no government agencies that help better enforce policies, effective governance is concerned with building and strengthening institutions. In 2000, the EU called on ten Central and Eastern European countries to comply with the Copenhagen Criteria for effective governance (Börzel & Grimm, p. 117). The Copenhagen Criteria formed the basis of effective governance. Effective governance building also played an important role in the Balkan countries gaining the right to EU membership.

The second consequence is bad governance. Bad governance stems from weak capacities. Developing or less developed countries do not have the same governance institutions as developed

countries. This lack of institutional capacity is among the major obstacles to increasing economic growth and welfare. Bad governance can be found in countries where economic growth and prosperity are lacking. Weak capacities are not the only reason for poor governance. Some governments and/or leaders in developing countries may view good governance criteria as an obstacle to their own interests and may be reluctant to adopt them (Carbone, 2010). If the country's rulers and/or political leaders are reluctant to adopt the criteria for good governance, decisions may become less output-oriented and result in poor governance as a result. The governance literature highlights the lack of capacity. For the adoption and implementation of good governance criteria, there must also be the capacity to adopt and implement them. If the capacity of the aid country is not strengthened, the aid will be meaningless. In fact, these aids and resources can be used ineffectively, leading to poor governance. Bad governance is often found in Southern countries. According to Mick Moore (2001) political underdevelopment is at the root of bad governance. Political underdevelopment has seven components. These are: unnatural birth, incomplete state formation, history of external control, the declining cost of military superiority, international criminal networks, unearned state income and competitiveness of aid donors (Moore, 2001, p. 388-389).

The third and final result is good enough governance. Grindle (2007) maintains that strong enough governance does not have to address all governance deficiencies at the same time, and that institutional and capacity building take time. Good enough governance requires that initiatives that aid economic and political progress be examined, prioritized, and customized to each country's unique conditions. In this context, the concept of good enough governance is in contrast with the EU's "one size fits all" view. Good enough governance means providing minimum governance conditions for political and economic development to take place. The "what to do" agenda can be constrained by adopting the concept of good enough governance. Thus, urgent governance needs can be prioritized. Considering the different development levels and institutional capacities of countries, the importance of the concept of good enough governance can be understood. Good enough governance aids in the decision-making process about which governance reforms should be implemented in a given country.

2.3. EU GOOD GOVERNANCE PROMOTION IN EDUCATIONAL POLICIES FOR REFUGEES IN TURKEY

In this thesis, education policies towards refugees are examined in three different periods. The criterion adopted while dividing the periods is the use of the EU's good governance tools on education policies for refugees. While using good governance tools, the EU has adopted different attitudes according to periods. Good governance approach and good governance tools have been taken as the basis of time change in order to clearly see the change in the EU's contribution to education policies for refugees over the years. In order to explain these differences more clearly, this thesis is divided into 2 different periods (2011-2014/2014-Present). However, the 2016-2018/2019 period has been examined in more detail under the title of the second period.

2.3.1 Effects of Variables in the Period of 2011-2014: Low Level of Policy Change

In the period of 2011-2014, EU contribution to education policies for refugees is weak. The short-term and temporary perception of the civil war that started in 2011 and the lack of public attention to mass displacements caused the EU not to adopt any approach to refugees. During this period, NGOs and local people made local and regional studies on education policies for refugees. The attitude adopted towards refugee education in the period of 2011-2014 has been the "laissez-faire" attitude. The measures taken and the work done by the Turkish state are also in line with this attitude.

During this period, Turkey formulated temporary solutions for refugee education. The lack of any legal basis for these solutions reduced the effectiveness of the formulated solutions. In addition, temporary solutions do not coincide with an inclusive perspective in the education of refugee children. During this period, the urgent educational needs of the children in the camp were met. In the early years of 2011-2014, the steps taken in the field of education policies for refugees were generally taken by local people, local and regional NGOs and philanthropists. EU's political dialogue, assistance and conditionality tools were not effective in this period.

Due to the fact that the refugee crisis was seen as temporary and the EU and EU institutions were not sufficiently involved in the process, there was a low level of policy change in this period. The legal steps taken were also taken to respond to urgent training needs.

In the period of 2011-2014, there is no project-based EU support in education policies for refugees. In this period, Turkey's institutional and legal infrastructure was not prepared for such a large migration wave. The supports have been more socially based. In this period, Turkey tried to respond to urgent education needs, and the institutional and legal infrastructure of education policies for refugees started to be formed as of 2014.

2.3.2. Effects of Variables in the Period of 2014-Present: High Level of Policy Change

Education policies for refugees did not attract the attention of the public until 2013. The period after 2014 is the period when all of the independent variables affect education policies for refugees.

With the year 2013, the number of refugees coming to Turkey started to increase rapidly, and the population of refugees out of camps became evident. While there was mass migration, it was necessary to put education policies on a legal basis. In this period, the domestic economic costs of education policies for refugees started to create a burden on Turkey, and international calls for help were voiced more loudly.

In this period, the EU adopted an effective government approach on Turkey. Efforts were made to increase the capacity of the government and government-affiliated institutions. The effective government approach has been one that has been adopted in terms of serving EU interests and EU security.

The EU's political dialogue tool has become more important in Turkey-EU relations with the increase of refugees' migration to Europe in 2015. The political dialogue tool was emphasized in the 2016 Turkey-EU Statement. The political dialogue tool has started to be used in the EU's contribution to the education policies for refugees.

Assistance (financial and technical) tool has also become an important tool in 2015. The EU has taken steps to support an effective government approach through its assistance instrument. The capacity of government and government agencies on refugee governance and refugee education has been enhanced through the Assistance tool. Education policies for refugees have begun to be formulated permanently. During this time, the Turkish government, local, national, and international NGOs, EU and EU institutions, and EU project implementing partners have taken real steps to integrate refugee children into the Turkish educational system. These steps are an

indication that the assistance tool contributes to capacity building in education policies for refugees.

The conditionality tool has always been important in Turkey-EU relations, but in early 2015 it emerged as a tool whose effectiveness was reduced. The conditionality tool stands out as an important tool that is used more effectively in 2016. The reason for this is related to both EU interests and border security, as well as internal economic costs and internal political costs/veto players within Turkey.

The financial aid of 3+3 billion Euros, which the EU has committed to provide, is provided within the framework of the conditionality criterion. Although the aid is provided in theory to help Turkey with refugees, the practical aim is to limit the migration of refugees to Europe by integrating refugees into Turkey.

The constant increase in the amount of money Turkey spends on education policies for refugees has led to reactions to the Justice and Development Party (JDP - Turkish acronym AKP) government in domestic politics. The Turkish people, political parties and many people, especially the local people in the regions where refugees are concentrated, have complained about the financial burden of policies towards refugees. The public effects of rising economic costs have resulted in domestic political costs. Aid provided under the conditionality instrument is expected to reduce these reactions.

The resilience policy adopted by the EU is about an effective government approach. The EU serves its own interests by increasing Turkey's social, economic and political resilience. Resilience policy is a policy implemented by the EU to ensure its own border security by supporting some of Turkey's economic costs by reducing the domestic political costs and the effects of veto players. Resilience policy aims to keep refugees within Turkish borders by supporting the social integration of Syrians into Turkey.

As a result of all these developments, education policies for refugees have undergone a high-level transformation in the 2014-present period. As a result of this period, rising policy networks emerged in the field of education policies for refugees. Especially after 2016, the effect of the policy network on policy change has become more remarkable.

In the 2014-Present period, EU incentives resulted in good enough governance in Turkey. The EU did not address all the governance gaps in its education policies for refugees at once, but spread it over time. Primarily, it was aimed to increase the capacity of public institutions and organizations in Turkey in the field of refugee education and studies were carried out accordingly. Afterwards, the needs in the field of education policies for refugees were listed and assistance was provided in order of priority. The EU has tried to eliminate Turkey's capacity problems regarding the integration of Syrians into Turkey after 2015. In this context, the EU has adopted an effective management approach and focused on capacity building.

2.4. POLICY NETWORKS AND GOVERNANCE

Politics is regarded as “the practical search for a set of ideas and institutional arrangements for their realization” (Hjern, 1987, p. 3; Sandström & Carlsson, 2008). This definition suggests that politics emerge as people organize to realize their ideas. In this context, network governance stands out as an approach that serves the policy-making process as it brings together different actors. As a result, policymaking is the result of organizational processes that take place within collective action networks (Bogdanor, 1987, p. 113; Sandström & Carlsson, 2008, p. 498). In other words, policy networks can be perceived as problem-specific entities that organize a policy space through different forms of collective action.

Network governance differs from hierarchical modes of governance by including horizontal relationships. In the hierarchical management system, there are top-down layers within the organization. The lower layers wait for directions and directives from the upper layers. When directives are applied, its effect spreads from the lower layers to the upper layers. Therefore, in hierarchical management modes, the process is documented and responsibilities are clearly defined. This may cause timing problems and create inefficiency (Wilikilagi, 2009, p.2). In this context, network governance emerged as a more effective, efficient and productive mechanism for solving policy problems that arise in government and society. Because of the rising complexity of the difficulties they face, governments have been more reliant on social actors in recent years. Dependence on social actors stems from governments' willingness to achieve their goals in varying complexity. Many of these issues entail competing ideals, necessitating multifaceted and increasingly horizontal governments to solve them (Kickert et al., 1997; Sorenson & Torfing, 2007, Klijn, 2008). Many policy issues are considered multifaceted and complex to be addressed

by traditional government. For instance, although borders between both different levels of governmental units and different policy sectors are administratively defined, societal problems are characterized by their interdependent and cross-scale nature (Berkes, 2002; Hanf & Scharpf, 1978; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; Scharpf, 1991; Sandström & Carlsson, 2008, p. 497). This complex environment and the difficulties faced by political decision makers cause the need for inter-organizational cooperation to increase. At this point, network governance emerges as an alternative theory for the complex environment and challenges and contributes to the policy-making process.

Jones, Hesterly, and Borgati (1997) argue that network governance is a coordination characterized by bureaucratic structures within institutions and firms and informal social systems rather than formal contractual relationships between them. In this context, network governance is concerned with the exchange and interaction patterns and the flow of resources between individual entities. Network governance is increasingly used to coordinate complex service delivery in uncertain and competitive environments.

The term governance network is used by Klijn and Skelcher (2007, p. 3) to explain how public policy is made and implemented through a network of ties between government, corporate, and civil society players. New mechanisms for debating, deciding, and implementing public policy are linked to governance networks (Pierra and Peters, 2000; Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004; Klijn and Skelcher, 2007). Governance networks are based on interdependence between public, private and civil society actors. Networks develop because participants need each other and share the advantages of joint action (Sandström & Carlsson, 2008, p. 505). Resource interdependence in network governance connects actors in the network both horizontally and vertically. However, it is not necessary for the actors to be equal in this interdependence. According to Coleman (1990), the interconnectedness of actors in the network facilitates performance due to the creation of shared norms and the possibility of restricting opportunistic behavior (Burt, 2000; Coleman, 1990; Lin 2001b; Sandström & Carlsson, 2008, p. 505). Governance networks are frequently connected with new hybrid organizational forms, such as quasi-governmental agencies, public-private partnerships, and multi-organizational boards, that play a key role in creating and delivering public policy to citizens and communities (Klijn & Skelcher, 2007, p. 3). In the governance network, institutions have more legal flexibility. They have the potential to gain efficiency in making and implementing public policy.

According to Turnbull (2003), network governance is a method used to establish and manage complex systems that are decentralized, decentralized, pluralistic and based on relational relationships. Network governance has a flexible and branching structure, a structure that fulfills a specific function or emerges in different ways specific to a task. The flexible nature of network governance allows it to emerge in different ways according to different policies and services.

According to Carlsson and Sandström (2008, p. 38), the “network approach” in policy analysis focuses on problem-solving structures created by the actors involved and their relationships. These structures are called policy networks (Carlson, 2000, p. 508; Carlson & Sandström, p. 38). The evolution of a policy web is considered to be the result of some purposeful action taken by individuals with self-interest. Actions arise from the urge to maintain or procure different resources. These resources can be money, information or legitimacy. So networking is about the exchange of resources. In this sense, network governance refers to a set of interactions involving two or more players and a resource exchange.

Hassal (2009) argues that networks exist in many different forms, that they are self-grown or top-initiated. According to Hassall, networks contain loose and informal contacts. Networks can be intra- or inter-agency and short-term or permanent. Permanent networks may evolve into official networks over time. According to Hassall, network governance has four advantages and five disadvantages. Advantages are; specialization; innovation; speed and flexibility; and increased reach (Wilikilagi, 2009, p. 9). Disadvantages are; goal congruence; loss of oversight; communications; fragmented coordination; and accountability (Wilikilagi, 2009, p. 11).

According to Wilikilagi (2009, p. 9), network governance can be termed as a collection of individuals or institutions participating in a policy dialogue without responsibility to the state. The state may initiate the formation of the network and take on the task of directing the network. Networks can facilitate the free flow of information by interacting in an open, free and trusted environment. In addition, networks specifically target a policy issue. Wilikilagi borrows the advantages and disadvantages of network governance from the advantages and disadvantages offered by Hassall. Firstly; networks are created in relation to a particular problem that requires policy intervention. Therefore, they are specialized by nature. Because networks are loose in nature, they allow some freedom in terms of deciding who joins the network. This slackness benefits the network as a whole, in technical matters and where participants need to be experts.

The second advantage is innovation. When a growing number of institutions and individuals with diverse areas of knowledge and techniques network and present their perspectives on a similar policy area or problem, innovation develops. Networks bring together many actors that would not normally meet. Thus, networks can lead to solutions and policies that cannot be reached or formulated when policy making in a limited and hierarchical bureaucracy. In terms of public-sector innovation, network governance targeted at collaborative innovation in public policymaking and service delivery is considered as a viable alternative to uniform, top-down bureaucratic reforms and public-sector-led NPM-inspired innovations (Hartley, 2005; Considine et al, 2009; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2012). In the empirical study by Sandström and Carlsson (2008), the network, which developed a new concept that has not been applied before, also contributed to the collaboration with its innovative approach. In addition, the new concept developed brought together many new actors. In this empirical study, the network with the highest level of heterogeneity was accepted as the most innovative network. Accordingly, adopting the actor diversity approach increases the innovation rate in the network by allowing different ideas to come together. Thus, innovation is supported by heterogeneity. Therefore, networks that bring together actors from different sources who want to create and promote something new should be created (Sandström & Carlsson, 2008, p. 515). Old and well-established policies involving actors with similar ideas, values and approaches can be effective in achieving the desired goal; however, they do so at the expense of innovation (Sandström & Carlsson, 2008, p. 518).

Third, networks provide the speed and flexibility to handle rapid changes. At the same time, networks can be created quickly when a particular problem arises. Members log in and out of the network can be fast and flexible as networks are informal.

Finally, networks make public-private collaborations possible. The use of public-private partnerships in networks improves access to public policymaking and the delivery of public goods and services. Public-private partnerships in resource use provide financial and technical support to the government where the government is lacking in the delivery of goods and services.

The first of Hassall's disadvantages is goal congruence. Defining targets will be difficult as networks are multi-actor and these actors have expertise in their respective areas of interest. Each network member will try to maximize his own goal. Therefore, there may be disagreements about the compatibility of goals. Teubner (2009) implies that, given the complex relationships in large

networks, information overload and divergent perspectives can cause the goals and objectives of actors in the network to become blurred.

Second, public goods and services provided by the private rather than the public sector may result in a loss of government oversight. Lack of regular government oversight of projects and policies designed by networks may result in the loss of government oversight over networks. In areas where network governance is implemented, there will be a natural loss of oversight of the state and administrative machinery. The loss of state oversight can cause actors in the network to take steps in their own interests. For networks to work effectively, public administrators must interact with various stakeholders (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2012, p. 597)

Communication is another challenge. Networks are multi-actor and each of these actors may have their own communication patterns, communication cultures. Effective communication will become a challenge as the number of actors increases. Networks encourage the flow of information horizontally and vertically. The absence of communication problems is important in ensuring the flow of information. If there are no communication patterns among the actors in the network that will accelerate the information flows and encourage the information flow, this will negatively affect the overall network. According to Coleman (1990), enhanced communication positively affects performance in the network.

Finally, accountability is an inherent challenge for network governance. The informal nature of networks results in the absence of a legally binding relationship. In a self-governing network that is not legally binding, it will be difficult to hold network actors responsible for the consequences of their actions.

The tradition of policy networks, according to Klijn and Koppenjan (2012, p. 4), focuses on the relationships between the state and interest groups. It focuses on service delivery coordination difficulties, and the network management tradition aims to tackle complicated policy issues by coordinating horizontally across interconnected players. Governance network theory is especially well suited to complicated public concerns involving a large number of interconnected parties. According to the theory of network governance, organizations need the resources of other institutions and organizations to survive. Because of this need, different actors interact and thus informal or formal networks emerge. Networks are considered as tools in service delivery and

service implementation. According to Klijn and Koppenjan, there are four criteria that characterize governance networks. These are; actors, interdependency and frames; interactions and complexity; institutional features; ve network management (2010, p. 5).

First, policy and service delivery emerge from networks of interconnected actors. It is interdependence that initiates or sustains networks. However, actors in the network have different perspectives on the world. Therefore, they can look at problems and solutions from a different perspective. Second, complex negotiation processes and patterns of interaction emerge when solving problems, providing services, and implementing policy. This is because of the interdependence between the actors and the various strategies they have. According to Klijn and Koppenjan's governance network approach, the outcomes of policies and services are the result of many interacting actors. Third, actors' unique communication patterns result in the institutionalization of relations between actors. Institutional relations reveal the rules that regulate the behavior of actors in the network. Having rules makes interaction on the network easier and lowers transaction costs. Network performance is positively affected. Finally, processes in networks are complex. The complexity of these processes requires directing and managing interactions between actors. Network management aims to find different ways to facilitate interaction between actors, to organize interaction between actors.

Although network governance offers advantages such as expertise, innovation, speed and flexibility, and increased access, it has some practical problems. According to Hassall, network governance has practically six problems. These are; (1) who is entitled to participate in networks, (2) who should lead networks, (3) the funding of networks, (4) arbitration of network disputes, (5) who is the custodian of the public interest, and (6) can networks be representative (Hassall, 2009, p. 23; Wilikilagi, 2009, p. 13)?

The first problem arises as to who should be included in the policy network when policy networks are being created. Network membership is usually determined by the actors who initiate the formation of the network and continues with the actors contacted by new members proposing additional members. Here, too, there is a case of partial representation. In a given policy, equitable representation and fair participation of all interested parties can create problems. Carlson and Sandström (2008) argue that network engagement problems involve not only the public sector but also the private sector. It is important to adopt the principles of transparency and accountability in

participation in networks. People affected by the consequences of the policies that networks create will want to see responsible stakeholders in the network. Wilikilage believes that the ultimate owners of any government policy are the people (2009, p. 14). Therefore, participation in networks should be in the public interest. Members of the policy network should be chosen in a transparent manner.

The leadership of networks is the second issue. The inefficiencies of bureaucratic systems and traditional hierarchical modes of governance prompted the creation of network governance (Wilikilagi, 2009, p. 14). Teubner (2009), on the other hand, feels that because decentralization of decision-making and authority is a key component of network governance, the question of who will offer the necessary leadership and direction for networks arises. Goal congruence, lack of oversight, fragmented coordination and accountability can be addressed if a certain degree of centralization is provided in the networks or if effective leadership is provided to ensure the management and direction of the network's efforts (Hassall, 2009; Wilikilagi, 2009; Accar, Guo & Yang, 2008). However, while Wikilagi advocates promoting network governance in public policy formulation, he argues for some degree of centralization and hierarchical power element in the policy network.

Another problem area of policy networks in practice is who will finance the networks. In the classical hierarchical mode of governance, all public policy formulations were financed by the state (Wilikilage, 2009), however, who will be responsible for financing becomes blurred given the flexible nature of networks, the loosely interconnected nature of actors, and the possibility of involving individuals, institutions and organizations from many fields (generally the public and private sectors). Carlsson and Sandström (p. 37) argue that public-private partnerships mean a cost-sharing when creating a public formulation. However, the issue of financing networks must be properly addressed in terms of a fair cost-sharing. Since each of the actors in the network will want to maximize their own interests, the financing issue of the networks should also be planned to reflect the advantage that each actor will gain.

It is always possible and logical for arguments and disagreements to arise in the public formulation network, as each actor in the network seeks to maximize its own benefit. The decentralization of the decision-making phase and the more horizontal distribution of authority rather than the vertical emphasizes that, in theory, every actor in the network is equal. But this emphasis on equality


underscores the problem of who should judge network disputes. Because network interactions are not legal, network disputes are difficult to prosecute. This makes the network more complex.

Networks are privatized in nature because most of the actors in the network are privatized institutions and organizations in the delivery of public goods and services. Because of this specialized nature, the public interest may suffer. Eggers (2008) argues that public purposes, public interests and value lines are blurred in networks. In an environment where the lines are blurred, the government needs to set some core values to protect the public interest. At every step of the public policy-making process, the government's job is to protect the public interest, and public officials are responsible for protecting the public interest. Governmental responsibility for the protection of the public interest can be counterproductive to the privatized, loosely tied and non-legally binding nature of networks. However, the fact that government is responsible for protecting the public interest may confirm the idea that "government should have a certain degree of power in the policy network" advocated by Wikilagi.

The fact that network actors form informal partnerships and are not legally bound raises the question of whether networks are democratic. Bogason and Musso (2006) argue that network governance provides speed and flexibility in the provision of public goods and services and policy formulation. However, they also argue that serious democratic problems arise in terms of the applicability of democratic principles in network processes and interactions of actors in the network. Networks may not be democratic, given the actors in the network, public demand, accountability, and participation in the network. Klijn and Koppenjan (2012, p. 595) state that networks may not be democratic when closed to stakeholders, but can contribute to democratic criteria when opened to stakeholders (Sorensen & Torfing, 2007; Klijn & Skelcher, 2007; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2012).

3. EDUCATION POLICY AGAINST SYRIAN REFUGEES IN TURKEY

Having received immigrants from various races, countries and nationalities since the beginning of the 2000s, Turkey switched from being a transit country to a receiving country in 2011. With the entry of 252 Syrian convoys through the Cilvegöz border gate on April 29, 2011, the Syrian refugee migration has increased.



Source: World Bank, available at: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SM.POP.REFG?locations=TR>

Figure 3.1. Numbers of Syrian Refugees

Table 3.1. Distribution of the number of Syrians by age

AGE	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
TOPLAM	2.018.191	1.732.271	3.750.462
0-4	257.652	240.426	498.078
5-9	296.208	278.514	574.722
10-14	229.495	295.868	445.363
15-18	141.213	121.857	263.070
19-24	273.889	206.731	480.620
25-29	233.218	166.599	399.817
30-34	167.034	122.842	289.876
35-39	130.208	100.211	230.419
40-44	88.322	74.692	163.014
45-49	61.118	59.521	120.639
50-54	46.131	45.160	91.297
55-59	36.362	36.604	72.966
60-64	23.556	24.542	48.098
65-69	15.439	16.658	32.097
70-74	9.402	10.364	19.766
75-79	4.520	5.502	10.022
80-84	2.456	3.308	5.764
85-89	1.170	1.695	2.865
90 and above	798	1.177	1.975

Source: Directorate General of Migration Management, Temporary Protection, Access date: 13.03.2022, available at: <https://www.goc.gov.tr/gecici-koruma5638>

As of 13.03.2022, there are 1.781.233 Syrian refugees between the ages of 0-18 in Turkey. Of this number, 498.078 are between the ages of 0-4, 574.722 are between the ages of 5-9, 4245.363 are between the ages of 10-14 and 263.070 are between the ages of 15-18. Looking at these data, it is understood that Syrian refugees cannot return to their own countries until they reach primary school age, therefore they enter the education age in Turkey.

Turkey has experienced 3 different periods in its education policy towards refugees in the period from 2011 to the present. The first period is the period between 2011-2014. This period was marked by a vision of impermanence, and Turkish government officials adopted a "laissez-faire" attitude in their education policies towards refugees. During this period, there was a low-level change in education policies for refugees. The second period is the 2014-present period. By 2014, it was clear that the Syrian war would not be over soon, and the Syrian youth population's educational needs had grown to a point where they could no longer be neglected. The reason for this is the increase in the young population in Turkey. After this period, efforts to integrate Syrian youth under temporary protection into the Turkish education system were initiated. The third period is the period between 2016-2018/19. With the steps it took in the third period, Turkey tried to maintain the policies it adopted in the second period. Syrians under temporary protection have been tried to be integrated into the co-education model in Turkey, and these efforts of the government have been supported by various institutions, primarily the EU, with financial and technical assistance. There has been a significant amount of change in education policies for Syrian refugees under temporary protection from 2014 to the present.

Turkey's approach to Syrians in the country's education has progressed from virtually complete indifference and a laissez-faire attitude toward education offered by diverse civil society actors to one defined by a thorough integration strategy (Unutulmaz, 2018). This transformation is not pre-planned, but is characterized by the increase in the young Syrian population in the society and accordingly the need for education becomes more evident over time.

3.1. EDUCATIONAL POLICIES FOR REFUGEES IN TURKEY


Turkey has taken many concrete steps under the umbrella of education policies for refugees since the beginning of the migration of Syrians to Turkey in 2011. The need to take concrete steps in the field of education policies for refugees arose due to the rapid increase in the Syrian young population within Turkish borders and the decrease in the probability of this population returning to their country over time. Although Turkey exhibited a low-level change in this area until 2014, it experienced a high-level change after 2014.

Educational policies for refugees can be examined in 2 periods. The first of these periods begins in 2011, when the refugees began to enter the country, and extends to 2014, when the Law on

Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP) was adopted. The second period begins in 2014, when the legal basis for Syrian refugees was established and continues until today. The third stage began in 2016, when Turkey and the EU signed an agreement on March 18, 2016, to halt the current flow of irregular migration through Turkey to Europe. The feature that distinguishes the third period from the second period is the stigmatization of Syrian refugees with their full integration into the Turkish education system. The mixed education model was applied to the entire refugee youth population.

3.1.1. 2011-2014 period – Low level change and Low level network governance

During this period, refugee migration increased from year to year. According to the recorded data, 14 .257 Syrian refugees in 2012, 224.655 in 2013 and 1.159.286 Syrian refugees in 2014 entered the borders of Turkey.



Source: Directorate General of Migration Management, Temporary Protection, Date of access: 3.12.2021, available at: <https://www.goc.gov.tr/gecici-koruma5638>

Figure 3.2. Distribution of Syrians Under Temporary Protection By Year

This period is marked by a vision of impermanence. The public, lawmakers, and Syrians have all agreed that the current events in Syria will be brief, that the conflict will end shortly, and that Syrians will return to their homeland soon. The rules for Syrian children's education were designed with the premise that the Syrians will return in the first place, and these short-term plans were primarily designed for Syrian children in the camps (SETA, 2016). During this time, the Ministry

of National Education (MoNE) supported Syrians' education with an Arabic curriculum rather than Turkish. This point of view caused Syrians not to have legal status and to be referred to as "guests" until 2014.

The vision of impermanence was also emphasized in the statements of government officials. Ömer Dinçer (2011-2013), Minister of National Education at the time, said in his statement on July 31, 2012;

Classes will be given in Arabic according to our own curriculum. While we do not neglect the education of children there, we try to do it in a style that is far from an attitude that will reinforce the families' stay in Turkey.

The emphasis on the vision of impermanence in these statements was repeated in later statements. Ömer Dinçer said the following on 3 October 2012;

We did not attempt to teach Turkish to Syrian children. We see them as guests in our country and we expect them to return to their own country after the situation in Syria improves.

According to these statements, the Turkish government will take steps to meet the urgent educational needs of the children in the camps. However, there is no approach regarding the education of children outside the camps.

During this period, there were training facilities in the camps established by the Turkish Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD). However, these camps were only home to a certain group, namely the minority. The majority of children living in cities did not have secure channels to access education.

During this period, local actors, philanthropists, municipalities and some Syrians and NGOs established by Syrians made efforts to establish Temporary Education Centers (TECs). As a result, "informal schools", which were established in informal networks and were not physically sufficient, emerged. During this phase of community-based education, local NGOs and the community itself provided the majority of the finance and physical infrastructure, which was insufficient (Unutulmaz, 2018).

During this period, local people, NGOs and local governments acted with a collaborative approach. One of the reasons why the government remained in the background in this period may be the government's desire to escape from the economic costs and political risks of education policies for refugees. Syrian refugees obtained legal status in April 2014, when Law No. 6458 on LFIP went into effect. With the entry into force of the LFIP, education for refugees also settled on a legal basis. Although a legal basis was prepared for Syrian refugees and this legal ground paved the way for the legalization of education policies for Syrian youth, there was a low level of change in this period. In the first period covering the years 2011-2014, the most important educational institution that emerged for Syrian refugees was the Temporary Education Centers.

3.1.1.1 Temporary Education Centers (TECs)

TECs are primary and secondary education centers for school-aged Syrian children and youth that operate both inside and outside of the AFAD-run camps in 25 provinces, delivering instruction in Arabic and following the Syrian curriculum (MEB, 2014; SETA, 2016). The curriculum applied in education is the Syrian curriculum. Although the state control was not intense in the period of 2011-2014, expressions supporting the Syrian regime were removed from the curriculum by the Turkish government. Although there are TECs in all of the camps, TECs outside the camps are not available in every province. TECs have been opened with the support of many associations, foundations, benevolent Turkish and Syrian citizens, local actors and local governments. The training here is provided by Syrian teachers or volunteers. Although their numbers were high in 2011-14, they gradually stopped receiving new registrations after 2014. Their numbers have decreased over time. The reason why the language of TECs is Arabic, as explained by government officials, is the desire to avoid approaches that would strengthen the chances of Syrians settling in Turkey. TECs will be transformed after 2014.

3.1.1.2. Legal Steps in Educational Policies for Refugees Between 2011-2014

The issue of education policy for Syrians, which could not find a place on the agenda until 2013, took more place on the agenda in 2013. In response to the increasing number of refugees and the correspondingly increasing need for education, some circulars have been issued. The circular titled “Measures Regarding Syrian Citizens Hosted Out of Camps in Our Country” is the first circular issued by the Ministry of National Education on the education of Syrians on April 26, 2013. The

most comprehensive circular on Syrian education is the MoNE circular titled "Educational Services for Syrian Citizens Under Temporary Protection in Our Country" dated September 26, 2013.

3.2. 2014-PRESENT PERIOD – PERMANENCE VISION AND HIGH LEVEL OF CHANGE

The issue of education policies for Syrian refugees, which could not find a place on the agenda until 2013, has been on the agenda more since the end of 2013. By 2014, 1.519.286 registered refugees entered the borders of Turkey. When 2013 and 2014 are compared, there has been an increase of 1.294.631 people in the number of Syrian refugees. This increase is the highest number recorded since the beginning of the Syrian refugee migration.

After the adoption of the LFIP, there have been changes in education policies for Syrians who have legal status. In addition, the most important reasons for the transformation in education policies towards refugees are the increasing number of Syrians and the expectation that Syrians will stay in Turkey longer. By 2014, the war in Syria did not cease, on the contrary, it turned into a harsher intervention. Because of these developments, the Turkish government has started to adopt the idea that refugees will be permanent in Turkey. For this reason, integration policies towards refugees have begun to come to the fore and to be implemented step by step.

After community-based education and the “laissez faire” attitude in education policies for Syrians under temporary protection became unsustainable, state control over the centers where refugees receive education began to increase. The government's most serious concern was its failure to control the education in these schools. The government's laissez-faire attitude began to draw criticism from within various public institutions, who claimed that it was creating a huge security vulnerability (Unutulmaz, 2018). The main reason for this security concern is that the language of instruction in TECs is Arabic, the curriculum is different from the national curriculum, and the education given to Syrians cannot be followed due to the language of education.

In the statements made, it was argued that the curriculum in TECs prepared refugee children for life in Syria. Understanding that it will take a long time for many refugees to return to their country, the Turkish government said that the curriculum should be revised to prepare refugees for their lives in Turkey.

The year 2014 can be characterized by the Turkish government's realization of security concerns and taking steps in this regard. Moreover, in the period after 2014, a high level of change is observed in education policies for Syrians under temporary protection. In order for the policies to be long-term, the government has changed the legal legislation since 2014. The majority of public and policy discussions on migrant and refugee integration have arisen as a result of Turkey's EU affairs, which need the harmonization of applicable rules with the EU *acquis* (Schwenken & Russ, 2014; İçduygu & Şimşek, 2016). Combining the factors of shifting migration patterns and EU accession negotiations, the Turkish government had to prepare legal status for the education of refugees.

In this period, the financial burden of the policies towards Syrians under temporary protection created a heavy burden on the government. By 2015, Turkey had spent \$8 billion on 2.1 million Syrian refugees¹. Because of this financial burden, the Turkish government began to seek international support for its policies towards refugees.

3.2.1. Legal Legislation of Educational Policies for Syrian Refugees between 2014-Present Period

The entry into force of the LFIP in April 2014 formed the legal basis of education policies for refugees. After the LFIP, the community-based network structure of education policies for refugees changed and a state-centered network was formed.

After this development, the circular named “Education and Training Services for Foreigners” signed on October 23, 2014 was distributed to the provincial education authorities. "This circular envisioned actions and procedures related to the coordination of education activities aimed at foreigners (Tezel McCarty, 2018) "and this circular spelled out in detail the education rights and procedures for foreigners in Turkey, including those under temporary protection (Unutulmaz, 2018)." Refugees gained the right to enroll in the official education system after the temporary protection regulation and the 2014/21 circular.

¹Türkiye 2011’den bu yana 2.1 milyon Suriyeli mülteciye 8 milyar dolar harcadı, available at: <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/turkiye-2011den-bu-yana-2-1-milyon-suriyeli-multeciye-8-milyar-dolar-harcadi-40007235>

After the circular, it became official that a foreign identity document would be sufficient instead of a residence permit for refugees to enroll in public schools. Syrian children were able to enroll in public schools as a result of this action. This move by the government is a move towards increasing the schooling rate and integrating Syrian refugees.

With the MoNE's understanding that the Syrian refugees would be permanent, the 2014/21 circular came into effect. With this circular, the Ministry of National Education aimed to overcome the obstacles to the schooling of refugees. The MoNE's desire to remove barriers is an indication that refugees have adopted the idea of integration.

Another important feature of the circular is as follows; With this circular, the state granted “semi-official” status to TECs operated by non-state actors. Thus, the government not only distributed its financial burden to other actors, but also took control of the TECs.

With the 2014/21 circular, it also brought a control mechanism to the opening of TECs. According to the circular, TECs that used to be freely opened by local actors, NGOs and philanthropists will now be opened under provincial/district national education directorates with the approval of the governor. TECs have been the institutions that serve both to prevent the loss of years of students who want to return to their country, and to prevent the loss of years of students who want to continue their education in any institution affiliated to the MoNE and who want to continue their education in Turkey. In other words, TECs, where Syrians received education as if they were going back to their country in the 2011-2014 period, are now formulated to serve both permanent and temporary students.

3.2.2. Why Turkish Government Started to Adapt Centralist Behavior - Problems About TECs

After 2014, TECs came under stricter control than in the past. Although the main reason for this is security concerns, the combination of various reasons caused the government to change its perspective on TECs after 2014.

In today's world, where mass displacements and refugee crises are increasing, the debates on the education of refugees have started to take place on the agenda and should. In terms of Turkey; TECs have emerged as unique institutions for refugee education. However, due to various reasons,

TECs have become "institutions that need to be transformed" since 2014.

First of all, TECs are against the national education law based on monocultural education content. A curriculum independent of the national curriculum, education in a language other than the national language reinforces this defense. The curriculum prepared by the Temporary Syrian Government in TECs and supervised by the MoNE is presented to students in Arabic.

Second, the Turkish state provides limited support for the education of non-Turkish languages, historically spoken by ethnic groups. However, after the refugee crisis, education in Arabic was very much tolerated by the Turkish government. This situation caused the ethnic groups living in Turkey to react for years.

Third, the initial establishment of TECs by non-state actors may cause conflicts between different actors over these institutions. Power relations may not be well balanced. In addition, the question arises of what "legitimate information" is in TECs put into service by different actors.

Fourth, a nation-state with a centralized educational administration may have problems in providing education to large numbers of foreigners. Providing education may be more difficult. The balance between universal rights, culture and language can be disrupted. A new political dimension can be added to education and an international dimension can be added to education, which is against the understanding of national education that the nation-state has. The political and economic interests of the host state can influence education policies towards refugees. For example, due to its ideological stance, the AKP government encourages refugees to be placed in imam hatip public schools.

The conversion of TECs is indicative of the high level of change during this period. Although TECs are an institution that emerged to ensure that Syrians do not fall behind in education when they return to their countries, Turkey has closed these centers and paved the way for integrating Syrian children into the Turkish education system. As new students are not accepted to TECs, Syrian refugees have no choice but to switch to the coeducational system, and integration policies have gained importance in this case. The high cost of integration has led Turkey to seek international support. International support has led to the addition of new actors to the education policy network for Syrians.

3.3. FROM 2016 UNTIL TODAY – INTEGRATION OF SYRIANS UNDER TEMPORARY PROTECTION INTO THE MIXED EDUCATION MODEL: HIGH LEVEL OF CHANGE & HIGH LEVEL OF NETWORK GOVERNANCE

After the developments in 2014, namely the establishment of the legal basis for the education of refugees, the mixed education model for Syrians emerged. Between 2014 and 2016, there were 3 alternative ways for Syrians to continue their education. First, to enroll in public schools, as Turkish citizens do; secondly, to attend any TEC inside or outside the camps, to take Arabic lessons from Syrian volunteer trainers accredited by the MoNE, in accordance with the curriculum arranged by the MoNE; the third option is to enroll in a community-based Arabic education program that is coordinated and funded by local, national, or NGOs (see Unutulmaz, 2018).

After 2016, efforts have been made to integrate Syrian refugee children into public education and to localize them. In the 2016-2017 academic year, the policy of not admitting new students to the first-year education given at TECs has been put into practice. This policy was continued in the period of 2017-18 as well.

Table 3.2. School-age Syrian Refugees²

School type	2014/2015	2015/2016	2016/2017	2017/2018	2018/2019	2019/2020
A.Public school	40,000	62,357	201,505	387,849	552,546	659,450
B.Temporary education center	190,000	248,902	291,039	222,429	90,512	25,278
C.Total children enrolled A+B	230,000	311,259	492,544	610,278	643,058	684,728
D.Total school-age	756,000	834,842	833,039	976,200	1,047,536	1,082,172
E.School-age not enrolled D-C	526,000	523,583	340,495	365,922	404,478	397,444
Overall enrolment C as % of D	30%	37%	59%	62.5%	61.4%	63.3%

Since the 2014-2015 period, the number of Syrian refugees of educational age has increased gradually. 756.000 (49.76% of the refugee population) in the 2014-2015 period; 834.842 (33.35%) in the 2015-2016 period; 833.039 (29.39%) in the 2016-2017 period; 972.200 (28.37%) in the 2017-2018 period; in the 2018-2019 period, 1.047.536 (29.91%) and 1.082.172 Syrian children reached school age in the 2019-2020 period. The education of this population at all levels has been in different institutions.

There are 3 alternative ways for pre-school education of refugee children. These are community-

² European Commission, Strategic Mid-term Evaluation of the Facility for Refugees in Turkey 2016-2019/2020 Final Report

based education, Special Early Childhood Education (ECE) and kindergartens. Primary education (1-4th grade) has 2 alternatives. These; They are public schools and private schools in Turkey. Secondary school education (5th-8th grade) has 3 alternatives. These; Public schools (general schools and imam hatip schools), open secondary schools (minimum age 14) and private schools in Turkey. There are also 3 alternative paths for high school education, but the options on these paths are very diverse in number. These ways; Public schools in Turkey (High Schools; Anatolian High Schools, Science High Schools, Social Sciences High Schools, Fine Arts High Schools, Sports High Schools, Vocational and Technical Education Vocational High Schools, Imam Hatip High Schools and Vocational Education Centers), private schools and open high schools in Turkey.

During this period, the number of Syrian students who had access to education increased gradually. 230.000(30%) in the 2014-2015 period; 311.259 (37%) in the 2015-2016 period; 492.544 (59%) in the 2016-2017 period; 610.278 (62.52%) in the 2017-2018 period; 643.058 (61.39%) students in the 2018-2019 period and 684.919 (63.29%) students in the 2019-20 period were able to access education.

It can be said that the Turkish government has achieved success in the integration of Syrian refugees into education. However, if we look at the other side of the coin, a different picture is seen. There are young people who cannot access education as well as children who can access education. 526.000 in 2014-2015; 523.583 in the 2015-2016 period; 340.495 in the 2016-2017 period; 365.922 in the 2017-2018 period; 404.478 in the 2018-2019 period; In the 2019-2020 period, 397.253 children could not access education³.

Schooling rates also differ according to education levels. In pre-school education, 34.718 children were schooled. This corresponds to 30.77% of the number of refugees in this age category. There are 16.964 girls and 17.754 boys in this category. In primary school age education, 339.541 out of 382.357 children went to school. This corresponds to 88.80% of the population. There are 164.816 female and 174.725 male students in this number. The enrollment rate in secondary school age is 70.13%. Out of 318.251 children, 223.182 were in school. The distribution of this population is

³ See more: T.R. Ministry of National Education, General Directorate of Lifelong Learning, Department of Migration and Emergency Education, January 2020

109.875 female students and 113.307 male students. Looking at the high school level education, a sharp decrease is observed compared to the previous category. Out of 268.730 children, 87.478 were in school. Of the schooled population, 45.161 are girls and 42.317 are boys. The most common reasons for the low schooling rate in high school are; it may be that boys start working for the family economy and girls get married/married at an early age⁴.

The Turkish government's strategy of integrating Syrian children is shown in the increase in the number of Syrian students in public schools. According to the MoNE data, 529.753 of the Syrian students are educated in official schools, while 23.849 of them study in camps and 84.755 in refugee schools outside the camps⁵. The schooling rate, which was 30.42% in 2014-2015, increased by 32.87% until 2019-2020 and became 63.29%⁶.

Education policies for Syrian refugees in Turkey have not yet completed the transition from the second stage to the third stage. However, Turkey has gained the appreciation of the world public opinion on the education of refugee children. The help of international institutions and organizations in this success cannot be ignored. EU aid is one of the most important factors in this regard.

3.4 PROJECTS FOR THE EDUCATION OF SYRIANS UNDER TEMPORARY PROTECTION AND EU SUPPORT

As of 2.12.2021, the number of registered Syrian refugees under temporary protection is 3.736.760. 1.771.065 of this population is young population between the ages of 0-18 who need education. In the first period (2011-2014 - community-based education and laissez faire attitude) a community-based education approach and "laissez faire" attitude were adopted in the education of the 0-18 age group, in the second period (2014-present - the vision of permanence), the state turned to refugee education. has brought its position to the central actor position in the education network. This attitude has increased the financial burden of the state, and has brought the state's

⁴ See more: T.R. Ministry of National Education, General Directorate of Lifelong Learning, Department of Migration and Emergency Education, January 2020, available at:

https://hbogm.meb.gov.tr/meb_iys_dosyalar/2020_01/27110237_OCAK_2020internet_BulteniSunu.pdf

⁵ [Indigodergisi.com/2021/08/meb-acikladi-530-bin-suriyeli-devlet-okullarinda-egitim-goruyor/](https://indigodergisi.com/2021/08/meb-acikladi-530-bin-suriyeli-devlet-okullarinda-egitim-goruyor/)

⁶ See more: T.R. Ministry of National Education, General Directorate of Lifelong Learning, Department of Migration and Emergency Education, January 2020, available at:

https://hbogm.meb.gov.tr/meb_iys_dosyalar/2020_01/27110237_OCAK_2020internet_BulteniSunu.pdf

need for international and non-state actors to light. While transitioning to the third period (2016-2018/19 – coeducational model and full integration for Syrians under temporary protection), the coeducational system has been adopted and the economic burden has increased. Due to the low rate of access to education for children outside the camps, the burden of education policy towards refugees has become more challenging. In order to provide these refugee children with an education, international engagement is needed (Aydin & Kaya, 2017). Turkish politicians stated that Turkey spent 5.6 billion dollars for Syrians until 2015, but they did not receive enough support from the international arena⁷. However, there are various rumors about the amount of money Turkey spends on Syrians. Numan Kurtulmus, the deputy prime minister of the time, claimed in his statements in September 2015 that 7.6 billion dollars was spent for Syrians⁸.

The necessity of international assistance has prompted the EU to act on the education of Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey. The EU has started to implement projects to support the education of Syrians in Turkey under the headings of humanitarian aid and development. The EU is not the only actor in the projects. There is a multi-actor structure in the nature of the projects, the EU has worked with different partners on the financing of the projects and the implementation of the projects in Turkey.

The need for the EU in policies towards refugees is not just for economic reasons. The EU should help Turkey with refugees. The most important reason for this is the security issue. Turkey has been a transit country in terms of migration during periods of mass migration. Regarding the refugee migration to Europe, Turkey is a country that keeps Syrian refugees who want to go to Europe illegally within its borders. In order for the EU to ensure security within its borders, it is necessary to assist the Turkish state in the integration of refugees into Turkey. Turkey's call for international assistance began roughly in the second half of 2012. In addition to Syrians residing in Turkey, the EU also supports Turkish citizens in vulnerable situations.

As of April 2014 “the European Union, including the EU Commission and individual member states, has given around 3,6 billion dollars (Kirişçi, 2014). By January 2015, the Turkish

⁷ **Suriyelilere 5,6 milyar dolar harcandı**, available at: https://bigpara.hurriyet.com.tr/haberler/genel-haberler/suriyelilere-5-6-milyar-dolar-harcandi_ID1423121/

⁸ **Türkiye Suriyelilere kaç para harcadı?**, available at: <https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2017/ekonomi/turkiye-suriyelilere-kac-para-harcadi-1682465/>

government has spend around €5,1 billion on accomodating Syrian redugees (Bircan & Sunata, 2015). In the news reflected in the Turkish press, it is claimed that Turkey spent 5.6 billion dollars for Syrians until 2015⁹.

The EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRIT) was established in 2016 to boost Turkey's refugee-assistance efforts. The EU has invested €2.4 billion in humanitarian aid in Turkey through the Facility¹⁰.

3.4.1 The EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRIT)

The EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey, which manages a total of €6 billion in two tranches, establishes a collaborative coordination structure to ensure that the needs of refugees and host communities in Turkey are met in a coordinated and comprehensive manner¹¹. The Facility is a mechanism for coordinating the mobilization of resources available under the EU budget as well as additional contributions from Member States that are incorporated into the EU budget as external assigned revenue¹².

The declaration signed between Turkey and the EU on 18 March 2016 is a commitment of the EU to provide financial assistance to Turkey for refugees. With this declaration signed, “EU has committed to allocate new funds, apart from the Pre-Accession Financial Assistance Fund (IPA), which is allocated and foreseen to be allocated to Turkey in order to cope with the difficulties of individuals under temporary protection (Yanardağ & Zubaroğlu Yanardag, 2019). FRIT has six priority areas. One of these priority areas is education (other priority areas are humanitarian support, migrant management, health, municipal infrastructures, social and economic support).

The EU, which is the provider of the funds, has acted in favor of using the funds by the international development organizations, with the work coordinated by the EU, instead of using the funds directly by the Republic of Turkey.

⁹ **Suriyelilere 5,6 milyar dolar harcandı**, available at; https://bigpara.hurriyet.com.tr/haberler/genel-haberler/suriyelilere-5-6-milyar-dolar-harcandi_ID1423121/

¹⁰ ec.europa.eu/echo/where/europe/turkey_en

¹¹ avrupa.info.tr/en/eu-response-refugee-crisis-turkey-710

¹² Fifth Annual Report on the Facility for Refugees in Turkey

The Facility has allocated more than €1,5 billion to the priority area of education including €545 million for educational structure¹³. 394.577.144 Euros were funded by the EU between 2016 and 2018 (Yanardağ & Zubaroğlu Yanardağ, 2019). There are three education-related projects with budgets exceeding \$100 million. These are respectively; Education for All in Times of Crisis II with €255 million; Promoting Integration of Syrian Children into Turkish Education System (PIKTES phase 1), with 300 million Euros; and PIKTES II with 400 million Euros¹⁴.

Applications for the education of school-age children were carried out with large-scale projects, especially the PIKTES project supported by the EU. EU projects have a positive effect on the schooling rate. EU projects also promote vocational training. Vocational training is important for refugee integration and integration of refugees into Turkey. Vocational education is also the first step in the integration of refugee children into the economy in the future.

EU funding for refugee education aims to promote social cohesion. In this context, Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) increases the schooling rate and contributes to the education of children. In order to encourage social cohesion in education, 470.000 children's families were assisted in line with the CCT program. 6.768 children benefited from transportation aid, 9.267 children benefited from non-formal education activities. Support training was provided to more than 43.000 students. Prefabricated schools have been built, existing schools have been repaired, and school construction continues. CCT in Education continues to be implemented successfully¹⁵. Refugee families are provided with monthly payments, provided that students attend school regularly, thus supporting refugees' enrollment and attendance at school. As of December 2020, the number of children who benefited from the Conditional Cash Transfer program at least once is 670.000. Conditional Cash Transfers benefited 90 percent of the refugee children enrolled in school.

According to the statement made by the EC in 2019, the EU has signed an agreement to undertake to provide aid of 400 million Euros, followed by 100 million Euros, to be used in the field of education. However, the 6 billion Euros committed by the EU in the EU-Turkey Statement signed

¹³ Fifth Annual Report on the Facility for Refugees in Turkey, 2021

¹⁴ https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/enlargement-policy/negotiations-status/turkey/eu-facility-refugees-turkey_en

¹⁵ Based on the year 2020.

in 2016 is not enough to solve the Syrian crisis in Turkey. This leads to the displacement of refugees within the borders of Turkey.

The 2016 EU-Turkey declaration included FRIT as a key component, signaling a considerable increase in EU funding for refugees in Turkey. FRIT consists of 2 parts. Aid amounts in the first part and the second part are divided into 3 billion Euros. FRIT's first tranche, established in 2016, comprised of EUR 1 billion from the EU budget and EUR 2 billion in contributions from Member States. In the second tranche, the contribution of the EU budget is 2 billion Euros and the contribution of the Member States is 1 billion Euros. The first tranche will be used to support initiatives that will last until at least mid-2021 (extensions excepted). The second tranche will be used to support initiatives that will last until at least mid-2025 (most projects will finish earlier)¹⁶.

FRIT supports refugees in Turkey in the long term in terms of livelihood, socio-economic conditions and education. Support in education helps children access primary and secondary education, as well as improving educational infrastructure, including school buildings and educational materials.

The facility is funded with €3 billion from the EU budget and €3 billion from EU member states. Since 2016, the EU has collaborated with Turkish ministries, EU member state development banks, international financial institutions, UN agencies, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to implement over 100 refugee projects in Turkey. By July 2021, the entire €6 billion has already been contracted, and over €4,3 billion would have been disrupted¹⁷. The remaining funds will be disbursed until the Project is completed, with the majority in 2022 and 2023 and some in 2025.

Between 2016 and 2019, the EU provided 2.4 billion Euros to Turkey within the scope of the FRIT. If we look at the EU documents updated on 31.10.2021, the aid amounting to 4.3 billion Euros (first term 2016-2017, second term 2018-2019) is health, basic needs, protection, administrative expenditures, socio-economic support, infrastructure needs, education and training. Expenditures such as infrastructure have expense items. Until 31 October 2021, 1.560.743.011

¹⁶ https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/system/files/2021-12/frit_factsheet.pdf

¹⁷ [ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood_enlargement/system/files/2021-11/Facility%20table_October%202021.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/system/files/2021-11/Facility%20table_October%202021.pdf)

Euros of the 3 billion Euros second aid package was distributed¹⁸. All EU projects have different implementing partners. This shows the multi-actor nature of the EU's aid and projects for refugees.

Within the scope of FRIT, assistance was provided to all cities in Turkey. While some of the projects are regional and some are city-based, some projects have been implemented in all provinces of Turkey.

3.4.2 EU Projects for the Education of Syrian Refugees under Temporary Protection under The FRIT

All provinces of Turkey have received aid in the EU's education projects for Syrian refugees under temporary protection¹⁹. Within the scope of The EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey, the EU implemented 14 training projects for refugees in Turkey and provided financial contribution to all projects. The EU has not implemented these projects alone. Projects have different implementing partners and different action implementing partners. With 8 different implementing partners [Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst (DAAD), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW), World Bank (WB), Ministry of National Education (MoNE), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), Concern Worldwide (CWW), International Organization for Migration (IOM)] of 14 projects, the EU has established a multi-actor network in education projects for refugees.

3.4.2.1. HOPES - Higher and Further Education Opportunities and Perspectives for Syrians

The priority area and focus priority area of the HOPES project is education only. The implementing partner of the project is DAAD. HOPES is a Madad Fund-funded project that aims to provide Syrian refugees and disadvantaged students from host countries with access to higher education²⁰. The action implementation partner is the Ministry of Culture and Tourism of the Republic of Turkey, Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities; and Istanbul, Karabük, Adana

¹⁸ ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood_enlargement/system/files/2021-11/Facility%20table_October%202021.pdf

¹⁹ See more: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/enlargement-policy/negotiations-status/turkey/eu-facility-refugees-turkey_en

²⁰ <https://www.daad.de/en/information-services-for-higher-education-institutions/expertise-on-subjects-countries-regions/refugees-at-higher-education-institutions/hopes/>

and Gaziantep Universities²¹. The start date of the project is 26.04.2016. The duration of the project is 52 months. The budget allocated to the project is 2.700.000 Euros.

The HOPES Project's goal is to improve young Syrians' prospects and contribute to Syria's post-crisis reconstruction planning²². The specific goal of this project is to promote participation and improve access to quality further and higher education possibilities for vulnerable Syrian youth as well as host communities in the surrounding region²³. The provinces where the project is implemented are Istanbul, Karabuk, Adana and Gaziantep Universities. Syrian refugees in higher and further education, disadvantaged Turkish youth, and university personnel are among HOPES' target populations.

A consultation mechanism has been established with HOPES to provide young Syrians with information and support about the opportunities available for further and higher education. Stakeholder communication, networks, and information tools have helped to better coordinate responses in the higher and further education sector in response to the Syrian crisis. Higher education institutions' and young Syrians' and other vulnerable groups' ability to access further and higher education possibilities has substantially improved.

HOPES' main activities include education counseling, university scholarships, the Higher Education English Access Program, a call for proposals for short projects to increase the number of Syrian students enrolled and trained in higher education programs, and stakeholder dialogue, networks, and information tools²⁴.

Refugees who want to study have vastly different levels of knowledge and skills. Apart from giving scholarships, one of the most significant aspects of the project is to provide academic counseling and information on available scholarships (including from other sources). Short-term remedies are

²¹ <https://www.avrupa.info.tr/en/project/hopes-higher-and-further-education-opportunities-and-perspectives-syrians-8002>

²² <https://www.avrupa.info.tr/en/project/hopes-higher-and-further-education-opportunities-and-perspectives-syrians-8002>

²³ Ibid

²⁴ Ibid

also promoted, as are English language classes in preparation for academic pursuits.

Within the scope of HOPES, 90 higher education scholarships were given to Syrian refugees. In addition, 108 training personnel were trained.

3.4.2.2. Access to Higher Education for Syrian Refugees and IDPs to Prepare for Post-Conflict Reconstruction of Syria and Integration in Host Communities

Only education is a goal and emphasis area for the Access to Higher Education for Syrian Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons to Prepare for Syria's Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Integration into Host Communities project. Stichting SPARK is the project's implementation partner (SPARK). Implementing partners of the project are The Council of Higher Education, Republic of Turkey Ministry of Culture and Tourism Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities, University of Gaziantep, Harran University in Sanliurfa, Mustafa Kemal University in Hatay. The start date of the project is 15 August 2016. The duration of the project is 53 months. The budget allocated by the EU for the project is 5.969.655 Euros²⁵.

The overall goal of Access to Higher Education for Syrian Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons to Prepare for Syria's Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Integration in Host Communities is to provide services that enable Syrian youth, as well as disadvantaged youth from host communities, to pursue further education with the goal of improving their socioeconomic perspectives in life²⁶. The project's specific goals are to provide Syrian youth and disadvantaged youth in host communities with access to higher and vocational education, as well as to establish additional support mechanisms for entrepreneurship, transportation, and access to university facilities for students enrolled in these programs. The places where the project is implemented are Gaziantep University, Şanlıurfa Harran University and Hatay Mustafa Kemal University. Vulnerable youth, primarily among Syrian refugees, but also in underprivileged host communities, are the project's target groups.

According to the most recent update, dated March 31, 2020, a mechanism was devised and

²⁵ <https://www.avrupa.info.tr/en/project/access-higher-education-syrian-refugees-and-internally-displaced-people-prepare-post>

²⁶ Ibid

implemented within the scope of the project to enable transparent registration and selection procedures for students. 84 students received full undergraduate scholarships, including transportation and per diem. A communication mechanism was designed and implemented with students using social media. Student help desks were set up. In this project, 609 scholarships were provided and all scholarship students benefited from the support service.

According to the last update dated March 31, 2020, the project is still ongoing.

3.4.2.3. Yarını Kurmak / Building Tomorrow - Quality Education and Livelihoods Support for Syrian under Temporary Protection in Turkey

Establishing Tomorrow / Building Tomorrow - Quality Education and Livelihoods Support for Syrian under Temporary Protection in Turkey's priority area and focus priority area is only education. The implementing partner of the project is Ireland's largest aid and humanitarian organization CWW. The institution has been providing services in Turkey (with the EU) for 8 years²⁷. The action implementation partner of the project is the MoNE. The start date of the project is 14 December 2017 and the duration of the project is 39.5 months. The budget allocated to the project by the EU is 17.280.000 Euros.

The overall goal of Yarn Kurmak / Building Tomorrow - Quality Education and Livelihoods Support for Syrians in Turkey under Temporary Protection is to increase the resilience of vulnerable Syrian refugees in Turkish host societies and enable them to better integrate through education and livelihoods opportunities²⁸.

The project has two specific goals. These; Improving formal education opportunities for school-age refugees while facilitating Syrian refugees' access to formal education; improve Syrian refugees' access to livelihood opportunities through vocational training, job placement and business grants. The project is implemented in four provinces (Kilis, Gaziantep, Hatay, Şanlıurfa). Syrians seeking temporary asylum in Turkey are the project's target audience. According to Concern Worldwide, more than 1,000 school-aged Syrian boys and girls were assisted in entering

²⁷ <https://www.concern.net/where-we-work/turkey>

²⁸ avrupa.info.tr/en/project/yarini-kurmak-building-tomorrow-quality-education-and-livelihoods-support-syrian-under

the formal education system in 2018. Out-of-school children were also helped to enroll in the re-education system. These activities are complemented by social cohesion activities such as sports and entertainment activities aimed at bringing Turkish and Syrian children together.

Within the scope of the project, social assistance services are provided to 1000 households with school-age children. 30 Public Education Centers are determined to support the activities within the scope of the project. 120 professionally trained teachers were selected and trained. Daily transportation is provided to 6480 students. Materials and equipment for safe environments for children have been donated to 30 Public Education Centers. The MoNE has agreed on a list of age-appropriate Turkish and Arabic novels. 21 libraries are established/revised and a library-book package is provided for 21 libraries. 120 social and social cohesion activities are carried out. The essential equipment and machinery were installed in 20 vocational high schools that were rehabilitated. 735 refugee youth received Turkish language instruction. A total of 1050 young individuals (735 Syrians and 315 Turks) were discovered and enrolled in vocational high schools. A total of 200 teachers were chosen to take part in teacher professional development. Materials for teacher education in suitable teaching practices and teaching multi-level groups, as well as tactics to stimulate inquiry and critical thinking, are being developed. Within the scope of the project, 1050 young people attend career counseling and life skills training. 150 hours of intensive Turkish lessons are provided to 3,600 Syrian and non-Syrian men and women to support integration into the Turkish labor market. Vocational training classes are provided by 40 teachers to 800 beneficiaries to assist their involvement in the labor market, both young people and adults. For on-the-job training, 800 recipients were paired with Turkish firms. Two workshops will be held to help participants gain unique abilities in 3D printing, software design, and electronics.

The project's main activities are as follows: providing community support to encourage children under temporary protection to benefit from educational opportunities and to address barriers to education; providing community support to encourage children under temporary protection to benefit from educational opportunities; providing community support to encourage children under temporary protection to benefit from educational opportunities; providing community support to encourage children under temporary protection to benefit from educational opportunities Providing education and psychosocial support programs, as well as make-up lessons and Turkish courses, at Public Education Centers (6-13 years old) (12.000 children in 30 locations throughout

seven provinces); Transportation to Public Education Centers that is safe; Providing secure settings for children in public education centers; Providing children and youth in 21 different refugee camps with access to libraries containing Arabic and Turkish books in order to encourage them to participate in home learning initiatives; organizing social activities and social cohesion events for children attending Public Education Centers and coming from the host community; rehabilitating vocational high schools and equipping their workshops; To provide Turkish language courses to Syrian students before they go to vocational high schools. Within the scope of the project, one-time financial support is provided to Syrian and Turkish students attending vocational high schools. Teacher professional development is available to vocational high school instructors. Syrian and Turkish students enrolled in vocational high schools receive monetary incentives. Syrian and Turkish students in vocational high schools receive career guidance and life skills help. Social cohesion activities are organized for young people who attend vocational high schools. Adults in Syria enroll in Turkish language classes to help them integrate into Turkish society and the labor market. Adults who are vulnerable in Syria and Turkey are given accredited technical and vocational training as well as on-the-job training. Accessibility and transportation allowances are provided to vulnerable Syrian and Turkish people who participate in courses and training. Adults from Syria and Turkey who participate in courses or training receive career guidance and life skills training. Vulnerable Syrian and Turkish people who finish on-the-job training are assisted in transitioning to formal work. It also aims to create gender-inclusive community-building workshops to encourage skill-sharing and social cohesiveness between Syrian and Turkish communities²⁹.

According to the progress report dated March 31, 2020, the progress and evaluation of the project are as follows; Within the scope of the project, there are 4999 refugee youth and children registered in non-formal education. 423 training personnel were trained. 9 Syrian refugees and host community members benefit from employment-related services. There are 1722 Syrian refugee youth and children registered with transportation services. This project serves young people and children who are both Syrian and Turkish citizens.

²⁹ <https://www.avrupa.info.tr/en/project/yarini-kurmak-building-tomorrow-quality-education-and-livelihoods-support-syrian-under>

3.4.2.4. Social and Economic Cohesion through Vocational Education

The priority area of the Social and Economic Cohesion through Vocational Education project is socio-economic status and livelihoods. The focus priority area of the project was recorded only as livelihoods. The implementing partner of the project is the KfW³⁰. The action implementation partner of the project is the MoNE. The start date of the project is 16 November 2017. The duration of the project is 43 months. The financing allocated by the EU for the project is 50 million Euros.

The overall objective of the project is to promote the social and economic cohesion of Syrian refugees and Turkish society by improving the employability and qualifications of Syrian refugees and Turkish citizens. The specific goal is to improve Syrians under Temporary Protection (SuTP) and Turkish teenagers' access to inclusive, high-quality vocational education and training (VET) in high-demand trades³¹. The provinces where the project is implemented are Adana, Bursa, Gaziantep, Hatay, Istanbul, Kilis, Mersin and Şanlıurfa. The target group of the project is Syrian and Turkish adolescents (grades 9 to 12, ages 14-17).

There are 3 expected outcomes within the scope of the project. The first of these is to provide equipment for the workshops of vocational education and training institutions, to install the equipment and to use it sufficiently. The second is to ensure that Syrian students under temporary protection access vocational training by providing support packages (for transportation, training and practice materials, and lunch). Finally, it is aimed to raise awareness of Turkish youth and Syrians under temporary protection about vocational education and training opportunities through communication and information activities.

The project has three main activities. The first is to determine the schools to be trained and to evaluate the needs of the determined schools. The main reason for identifying schools and assessing their needs is to ensure success in the education of Turkish students and Syrian refugees under temporary protection, thus ensuring social and economic cohesion. Secondly, within the scope of the project, student support packages are provided to encourage vocational education and training among young Syrians and Turks. Finally, it was expected that awareness-raising activities

³⁰ As of 2014, it is the world's largest national development bank, and as of 2018, Germany's third largest bank by balance sheet.

³¹ <https://www.avrupa.info.tr/en/project/social-and-economic-cohesion-through-vocational-education-7382>

on vocational education and training opportunities would be established among Syrian and Turkish teenagers and parents, as well as private companies and labor unions.

According to the progress report dated 31 March 2020, there are schools (unspecified number) that have been upgraded to the required standards. There are 3014 Syrian children and youth registered with transportation services. There are 53.086 Syrian refugees and host community members registered in vocational education and training institutions supported by the facility.

3.4.2.5. Education for All in Times of Crisis II

The priority area and focus of the Education for All in Times of Crisis II project is education. The implementing partner of the project is the KfW³². The implementing partner of the project is the MoNE, relevant governorships and relevant municipalities. The start date of the project is December 5, 2016. The duration of the project is 55 months. The EU budget for this project is 255 million dollars.

The overall aim of the project is to provide education (especially for children) to meet the long-term development needs of IDPs. The project has two specific objectives. The first is to increase the access of Syrian and Turkish children and youth to inclusive primary and secondary education opportunities. The second is to increase the implementation and management capacity of MoNE in cooperation with international donors and financing institutions. Thus, it is aimed to make the MoNE suitable for the multi-actor structure in the education services network for refugees. The provinces where the project is implemented are Adana, Adıyaman, Ankara, Bursa, Diyarbakır, Gaziantep, Hatay, İstanbul, İzmir, Kahramanmaraş, Kayseri, Kilis, Kocaeli, Konya, Malatya, Mardin, Mersin, Osmaniye and Şanlıurfa. School-aged Syrians under temporary protection (5-17 years) and, if applicable, Turkish youngsters in provinces with high refugee populations are the project's target groups.

The expected results of the project are to build 129 schools, complete their equipment and make them ready for operation. Secondly, MoNE is expected to integrate and implement school projects in line with the common requirements arising from the refugee context.

³² <https://www.avrupa.info.tr/en/project/education-all-times-crisis-ii-7083>

The main activity of the project is to provide technical support to MoNE with the construction of new schools and the completion of their equipment, so that schools affiliated to MoNE become more qualified in education for refugees. According to the progress report dated March 31, 2020, 56 schools were built within the scope of the project.

3.4.2.6. Promoting Integration of Syrian Children into Turkish Education System (PIKTES)

The priority area and focus priority area of the Promoting Integration of Syrian Children into Turkish Education System (PIKTES) project is only education. The implementing partner and action implementation partner of the project is the MoNE. The start date of the project is October 4, 2016. The duration of the project is 33 months. The EU has allocated 300 million Euros for this project under the FRIT2-IPA fund.

The project's overall goal is to help Syrians in Turkey who are receiving temporary protection gain access to education. The project's specific goal is to aid the MoNE's attempts to integrate Syrians under temporary protection into the Turkish educational system. The provinces where the project is implemented are Istanbul, Hatay, Kayseri, Osmaniye, Kilis, Şanlıurfa, Ankara, Batman, Konya, Kocaeli, Mersin, Mardin, Malatya, Bursa, İzmir, Antalya, Siirt, Diyarbakır, Gaziantep, Adana, Kahramanmaraş, Adıyaman and Sakarya. The groups targeted by the project are Syrians under temporary protection, host community members and Turkish authorities responsible for education services.

There are 15 expected outcomes from the project. First of all, it is expected that 390.000 Syrian children who attend and do not attend school will be given Turkish education. Secondly, it is expected that 10,000 Syrian children who attend and do not attend school will be taught Arabic. Third, it is expected that 10,000 Syrian students who are out of school will be given make-up lessons to encourage them to return to school. The fourth expectation is that the 20,000 Syrian students lagging behind the curriculum will be provided with additional support training to catch up with the curriculum. Fifth, 40,000 Syrian students under temporary protection are provided with transportation to school for 13 months. The sixth is the distribution of supplementary education materials for school, 390,000 for Turkish education and 10,000 for Arabic education, to 500,000 Syrian children. Seventh, Syrian families under temporary protection are expected to attend awareness raising meetings in 23 provinces. To ensure this participation, audio-visual

materials, 5 research reports and a draft strategy for the education of Syrians in Turkey were prepared. The eighth is the revision of the curriculum, the distribution of 390.000 Turkish and 10.000 Arabic education materials. Ninth, it is expected that an examination system will be developed to evaluate the academic level and Turkish language skills of Syrian teachers and students, and 400.000 test sets will be prepared and implemented. For the full integration of Syrians into the Turkish education system, it is important that they successfully complete the proficiency exams prepared by the Turkish authorities. Tenth, it is expected that 500 expert personnel assigned in schools and other relevant institutions will provide psychological counseling services to Syrian students. The eleventh expected result of the project is to provide daily cleaning and security services to 500 public schools and Temporary Education Centers. Thus, employment can be provided at the local level. The twelfth expected result is equipping 500 schools and Temporary Education Centers with sufficient and sufficient number of educational materials and materials. The thirteenth is the training of 15,000 teachers on the education of Syrian students. The fourteenth is to increase the capacity of 2,000 MEB administrative staff to solve the problems of Syrian students. The final result expected from the project is the development and use of a web-based software to monitor the project.

The PIKTES project has 12 main activities. These are; providing Turkish and Arabic language lessons to Syrian children both in and out of school; providing make-up lessons outside of school for Syrian children; providing additional (make-up) education courses for Syrian children in schools and technical training centres; providing school bus services for Syrian children; distribution of complementary learning materials for Syrian children.; raising awareness about educational opportunities for Syrian students; revision, development and purchase of educational materials; establishing an examination system that will determine the academic level and Turkish language skills of Syrian teachers and students; ensuring a safe, hygienic and appropriate learning environment in schools and educational institutions; equipping schools and technical training centers with educational equipment; providing training for teachers, administrative staff and other personnel of the MoNE; and monitoring and evaluation activities³³.

According to the progress report dated 3 July 2019, 19.342 training personnel were trained.

³³ <https://www.avrupa.info.tr/en/project/promoting-integration-syrian-children-turkish-education-system-7010>

Improvements were made to the standards of the existing 798 schools. 245,276 Syrian refugee children were enrolled in the Turkish language course. 3,998 Syrian refugee children were enrolled in the Arabic language course. 32,124 Syrian refugee children and youth were registered for transportation services. 9,717 education personnel received salaries or incentives.

3.4.2.7. Enhancing Protection in the Humanitarian Response in Turkey Through Better Addressing Basic Needs, Supporting Access to Education and Integrated Service Provision

There is no information about the project on the EU official site or EU official documents. The budget of the project is 8 million Euros. The implementing partner of the project is IOM. The places where the project is implemented are Ankara, Istanbul, Canakkale, Balıkesir, İzmir, Aydın, Muğla, Antalya, Mersin, Adana, Gaziantep, Batman, Kayseri, Adıyaman, Malatya, Hatay, Şanlıurfa, Mardin.

3.4.2.8. Education and Protection Programme for Vulnerable Syrian and Host Community Children, in Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey

Education and protection program for vulnerable Syrian and host community children, in Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey project's priority area and focus priority area is only education. The implementing partner of the project is UNICEF. The action implementation partners of the project are the MoNE, the Ministry of Family, Labor and Social Services (MFL), the GAP administration, the Turkish Red Crescent, the Association for Solidarity with Asylum Seekers and Migrants (ASAM) and RET International. The start date of the project is 01.01.2018. The length of the project is 16 months. The financing allocated by the EU for this project is 31,382,891 Euros.

The project's overall goal is to invest in the future of children and youth in Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey who have been affected by the Syrian conflict. This action in Turkey builds on two EUTF-funded provision actions that have helped the Turkish government respond to the Syrian refugee influx by providing sustained and expanded inclusive access to quality education, as well as protective environments and youth engagement opportunities for Turkish and Syrian children and youth, with a focus on out-of-school children, particularly girls³⁴. The specific purpose of the

³⁴ <https://www.avrupa.info.tr/en/project/education-and-protection-programme-vulnerable-syrian-and-host-community-children-lebanon>

project is not disclosed in EU sources. The geographical scope of the project has been expanded to cover the whole country, with priority given to the provinces in the southeast of Turkey. However, in the last 2 years, cities in the west of the country (eg İzmir, İstanbul, Ankara) with more refugees due to internal movements have been included in the project as new priority provinces. In other words, the project started by focusing on the southeastern provinces, but the geographical scope of the project changed due to in-country refugee movements, and western provinces became a priority. Target groups of this Project are refugee and Turkish children, including adolescents and education personnel.

There are five items in the expected results of the project. First of all, it is expected that Syrian children under temporary protection will have access to formal education opportunities and will be increased within the scope of the project. Providing an adequate, convenient and child-friendly learning environment is one of the expected results. Second, the quality of inclusive education for Syrian and vulnerable Turkish children is expected to improve. Third, the project should expand school opportunities and ECE opportunities for refugee and Turkish young students. Fourth, increasing Gender-Based Violence and psychosocial support services and improving the quality of specialized child protection interventions are among the expectations of the project. Finally, the project is expected to expand opportunities for positive participation for Turkish and Syrian adolescents and youth.

The project's main activities are: providing teacher incentives to Syrian volunteer teachers working in TECs; supporting school maintenance costs in TECs to ensure safe, healthy, and conducive learning environments; providing essential learning materials to Syrian and Turkish children; strengthening the capacity of Syrian and Turkish educational personnel to provide quality inclusive education through training opportunities; and providing essential learning materials to Syrian and Turkish children; maintenance of the network of community-based centres that provide a range of multi-disciplinary and quality child protection services, including Gender-Based Violence services, psychosocial support programs, adolescent programs, referral to and provision of specialized child protection services, as well as community awareness raising for children, parents, and caregivers; implementation of Gender-Based Violence services, psychosocial support programs, adolescent programs, referral to and provision of specialized child protection services,

as well as community awareness raising for children³⁵.

Since the project has a length of 16 months, the progress report was published on April 30, 2019, after the end of the project. Within the scope of the project, 16,063 refugee and host community children enrolled in Early Childhood Education programs. 144,974 training personnel were trained. 35,864 refugees received mental health and psychosocial support services. 26,026 refugees and host community members participated in social cohesion activities. 2,505 education personnel received salaries or incentives. 283,043 Jordanian, Lebanese, Syrian and Turkish children, youth, women and teachers benefited from the project³⁶.

3.4.2.9. Increased Access to Education and Protection for Vulnerable Syrian and Non-Syrian Refugee Children and Families in Turkey

There is no information about this project in the EU official website and official documents. The budget of the project is 34 million Euros. The project has been implemented throughout Turkey. The implementing partner of the project is UNICEF.

3.4.2.10. Increased Access to Education and Protection for Vulnerable Syrian and Non-Syrian Refugee Children and Families in Turkey (CCTE)

Increased access to education and protection for vulnerable Syrian and non-Syrian refugee children and families in Turkey (CCTE) project falls under the Social Policies category³⁷ and its implementing partner is UNICEF. Turkey; It has been successfully implementing the Conditional Education Assistance program since 2003. The National Conditional Education Assistance program has assisted millions of families and children for the past 15 years. The National CCTE Program was expanded to include school-aged refugee children under temporary/international protection in Turkey in 2017, thanks to collaboration between the MFL, the Ministry of National Education, the Turkish Red Crescent, and UNICEF. Program is funded by the EU, Norway and

³⁵ <https://www.avrupa.info.tr/en/project/education-and-protection-programme-vulnerable-syrian-and-host-community-children-lebanon>

³⁶ Education and Protection Programme for Vulnerable Syrian and Local Community Schoolaged Children In Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey Project Factsheet, available on: https://ec.europa.eu/trustfund-syria-region/system/files_hr?file=2020-02/36-unicef_turkey_jordan_and_lebanon.pdf

³⁷ The Conditional Education Assistance program is available on the UNICEF official website under the Social Policy category.

the USA³⁸. The EU has set aside 50 million euros for the CCTE initiative, which aims to improve access to education and protection for vulnerable Syrian and non-Syrian refugee children and families in Turkey³⁹. The project is funded by the European Union Humanitarian Aid Agency⁴⁰. The project consists of two separate components, a cash component and a child protection component. The cash component of the project is implemented in all cities of Turkey.

Eligibility conditions and aid amounts within the scope of the program for Turkish children benefiting from the National Conditional Education Assistance Program; It also applies to Syrian refugees and other refugees who benefit from the Conditional Education Assistance Program for refugees. Beneficiary families receive biweekly monetary assistance through the Red Crescent Card if their children attend school consistently (at least 80%) throughout the previous school months.

The Conditional Education Assistance Program for refugees has 2 components, a cash component and a child protection component. Through the cash component, the program; It aims to alleviate financial difficulties, one of the main obstacles to the education of refugee children. This component is implemented in all provinces. Within the scope of the child protection component, child protection services are provided to the families of children whose conditional education assistance is terminated because they cannot provide adequate attendance (they are absent for 4 days or more in a month). Turkish Red Crescent case workers contact children and their families to conduct a risk assessment, and if necessary, children and families are transferred to appropriate support and protection agencies. The Conditional Education Assistance Program's child safety component is implemented in the 15 provinces with the highest number of refugees, and it helps to reduce child protection risks that are linked to socioeconomic disadvantages.

3.4.2.11. Education for All in Times of Crisis III

Education for All in Times of Crisis III project's priority and sole focus is education. The implementing partner of the project is KfW. The action implementation partner of the project is the MoNE. The start date of the project is 10.08.2019. The length of the project is 42 months. The

³⁸ <https://www.unicef.org/turkey/sartli-egitim-yardimi-programi-sey>

³⁹ <https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/system/files/2020-10/gaziantep.pdf>

⁴⁰ <https://www.unicef.org/turkey/media/12856/file>

EU has allocated EUR 100 million to this project under the FRIT2-IPA fund⁴¹.

The overall objective of the project is to increase access to education for Syrians under temporary protection and host students in the provinces of focus. The first specific goal of the project is: Building safe and high quality schools and public education centers for Syrians under temporary protection and host children to accommodate 32,860 student capacity, and accordingly, increasing school capacity. The second specific objective is to demonstrate the developed capacity of MoNE to design and build schools that incorporate international best practices. The provinces where the project is implemented are Şanlıurfa, Gaziantep, Hatay, İstanbul, Adana, Kahramanmaraş, Mersin, Diyarbakır, Kilis, Mardin, Osmaniye, Ankara, Bursa, İzmir, Kayseri, Konya, Adıyaman, Kocaeli, Malatya. The target groups of the project are Syrian and Turkish children between the ages of 3-17.

Two results are expected from the project. First, providing quality educational infrastructure and equipment for Syrians under temporary protection and host children; the second is to support the personnel capacity of MoNE by providing technical expertise and facilitating information sharing. The project has 2 main activities. First; construction of about 10 primary and secondary schools, 170 kindergartens (the final number of schools depends on the average number of classes per kindergarten) and 1 public education centre. The second one is to facilitate information sharing through activities/design workshops/seminars/study visits, to provide individual project consultants and to build approximately 10 pilot schools (out of 181 schools) according to innovative and sustainable model designs.

In the 31 March 2020 progress report, no information was given as the project was ongoing.

3.4.2.12. Promoting Integration of Syrian Kids into the Education System (PIKTES) II

The priority area and focus priority area of the Promoting Integration of Syrian Kids into the Education System (PIKTES) II project is only education. The implementing partner and action implementing partner of the project is the MoNE. The start date of the project is 21.12.2018. The length of the project is 36 months. The EU's contribution to the project is 400 million Euros under

⁴¹ <https://www.avrupa.info.tr/tr/proje/kriz-zamanlarinda-herkes-icin-egitim-iii-10395>

the FRIT2-IPA fund⁴².

The overall objective of the project is to contribute to Syrian children's access to the Turkish education system. The specific objective of the project is to support the efforts of the MoNE to increase Syrian children's access to higher education and their integration. The project is implemented in 3 different groups and 26 provinces. The first group includes Istanbul, Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa, Hatay, Ankara, Mersin, Adana, Bursa, Kahramanmaraş, Kilis. The 2nd group includes Konya, İzmir, Kayseri, Osmaniye, Mardin, Kocaeli, Malatya, Adıyaman and Diyarbakır. The 3rd group includes the provinces of Samsun, Sakarya, Antalya, Çorum, Eskişehir, Yalova and Batman. The target groups of the project are Syrians under temporary protection and Turkish authorities responsible for education services.

There are 4 expected results from the project. The first is to improve Syrian students' access to education in the provinces where the PKTES project is active. Second, improving the educational quality of Syrian students. Third, enhancing educational institutions' and personnel's operational capacity. The fourth is to support the social integration of Syrian students and parents.

The project has 23 main activities. Its main fields of activity have wide-ranging qualifications. The first of these is the provision of Turkish language lessons to Syrian children both inside and outside of school. The second is the provision of Arabic language lessons to Syrian children both inside and outside of school. Third is the provision of pre-school education for Syrian and Turkish children. The fourth is the provision of compensatory education for Syrian children outside of school or in Temporary Education Centers. Fifth, public schools should provide additional lessons for youngsters. Sixth, providing transportation to and from school for Syrian and Turkish kids who are socioeconomically challenged. Seventh, providing the stationery needs of Syrian and Turkish students who are socioeconomically deprived. The eighth, is to provide scholarships to Syrian and Turkish students pursuing vocational and technical education. The ninth is to inform Syrian families about educational opportunities. Organizing awareness-raising initiatives to aid Syrian children's absorption into the educational system is the tenth. Eleventh, the development and revision of the Turkish education program. The twelfth is the purchase of educational materials,

⁴² <https://www.avrupa.info.tr/tr/proje/suriyeli-cocuklarin-egitim-sistemine-entegrasyonunun-desteklenmesi-piktes-ii-10396>

revision and content creation. Thirteenth, the creation of an assessment system to assess Syrian students' language skills and academic performance. Fourteenth, providing school guidance and counseling support for Syrian students. Fifteenth, providing a safe, hygienic and appropriate learning environment in schools and educational institutions. Sixteenth, provision of educational equipment in case of more students than expected. Seventeenth, Project related research activities and conference events. Eighteenth, the training of teachers. Nineteenth, training for MoNE administrative staff and other staff. Twentieth, monitoring and evaluating the whole process and the actors involved. Twenty-first, organizing social integration activities for Syrian and Turkish students. Twenty-second, organizing social integration activities for Syrian and Turkish families. The twenty-third and last one is Turkish language education for Syrian parents.

As can be seen, the main areas of activity of the project vary from pre-school education to make-up lessons, from providing transportation services to cash scholarships, from involving Syrian and Turkish parents to the development of the education program. With this project, aid is provided to Syrian and Turkish students in areas of need. With the participation of families in the education process, it is aimed to increase the schooling rate of children and to encourage parents to participate in the education process. Syrian parents who receive language education will be aware of what kind of education their children receive, so they will support their children's inclusion in education institutions in Turkey without any doubt. Transportation services are especially important in transportation to TECs. Most of these centers are located inside the camps. The number of students outside the camps is higher than the number of students inside the camps. Problems may arise in the transportation of children outside the camps to these centers or any educational institution. The transportation services provided within the scope of this project are an important step in accessing education.

According to the 31 March 2020 progress report, 95,529 refugee and host children were enrolled in pre-school education. 38,203 Syrian refugee children and youth attended study and make-up classes. 1976 training personnel were trained. The standards of the existing 2,998 schools have been improved. There are Syrian refugees who have completed a Turkish language course outside the formal education system (the number is unknown). There are refugees and host members participating in social cohesion activities (number unknown). 60,948 Syrian refugee children enrolled in Turkish language courses. 1878 Syrian refugee children enrolled in an Arabic language

course. 43,658 Syrian refugee children and youth registered for transportation services. Syrian refugee and host community students enrolled in vocational education and training institutions were financially supported. 9,934 education personnel received salaries or incentives.

3.4.2.13. Increased Access to Education and Protection for Vulnerable Syrian and Non-Syrian Refugee Children and Families in Turkey (CCTE)

There is no information about this project in the EU official website and official documents. The budget of the project is 70 million Euros. It has been applied throughout Turkey. The implementing partner of the project is UNICEF.

3.4.2.14. Education Infrastructure for Resilience Activities in Turkey

The priority area and focus of the Education Infrastructure for Resilience Activities in Turkey project is only education. The implementing partner of the project is the WB. The action implementation partner of the project is the MoNE, relevant governorships and municipalities. The start date of the project is 22.12.2016. The duration of the project is 54 months. The EU provided 150 million Euros from FRIT-IPA resources to this project⁴³.

The general aim of the project is to support education infrastructure investments such as building schools, equipping schools and increasing the capacity of the MoNE in these areas. The project does not have a specific target set by the EU. The target groups of the project are Syrians under temporary protection who need access to education and local community residents living in designated areas.

The expected results of the project include the construction of 56 schools and a public education centre, the completion of their furniture and equipment and making them ready for education, and increasing the capacity of the MoNE in the field of project management and in technical fields. The main activities of the project are supporting investments in school infrastructures, increasing the quality of educational environments, and infrastructure-oriented project management and technical capacity building activities.

⁴³ <https://www.avrupa.info.tr/en/project/education-infrastructure-resilience-activities-turkey-7502>

According to the 31 December 2020 progress report, the construction of 1 school was completed within the scope of the project. 74.69% of key applications in the construction of schools have been completed.



4. FACTORS AFFECTING EDUCATIONAL POLICY CHANGE FOR REFUGEES

Educational policies are necessary for mass displaced persons to adapt to the country they had to migrate to. The Syrian crisis that broke out in 2011 and the resulting mass migration were seen as temporary in the first years, and it was assumed that the refugees would one day return to their own country and continue their remaining lives there. However, the increasing violence in Syria caused the vision of transience to be replaced by the vision of permanence over time. On top of the vision of permanence, the increase in mass migration and the increase in the number of refugee children within the borders of the host country have caused the host countries to make longer-term plans.

Education is one of the most important factors for IDPs to integrate socially, economically and politically into the countries they migrate to. Before the Syrian crisis in 2011, Turkey did not have sufficient equipment and capacity for the education of refugee children. In times when refugees were stigmatized with a vision of impermanence, Turkey focused on resolving short-term crises in its policies towards refugees. With the year 2014 and the following period, the realization that refugees are permanent caused the steps taken and policies adopted by Turkey regarding refugees to change.

By 2015, with the increasing number of refugees and consequently the increase in the number of refugees out of camps, Turkey started to be unable to meet the cost of refugees alone. Thereupon, the state called for international assistance. In these periods when refugees were stigmatized with the vision of permanence, it was necessary for Syrian refugees to adapt to Turkish social, economic and political life. In this study, however, the basis of the integration of refugees is seen as education.

Education policies for refugees are too costly for an institution, organization or government to address alone. The design, implementation and technical and financial financing of education policies for refugees is a situation that many actors can come together and overcome.

Education policies for refugees in Turkey is a policy area where many national, local and international actors work together. The presence of more than one actor in the education policy network means that there are many actors that affect education policies. Many actors in the network work locally, nationally or regionally in the field of education policies for refugees.

In this section, internal and external factors affecting education policies towards refugees will be examined. First, the economic cost of its policies towards refugees for Turkey will be examined. The high economic cost has enabled non-state actors to enter the process in the field of education policies. Then, the political cost of education policies towards refugees and the veto players in education policies towards refugees will be examined. In the next section, NGOs, which generally have local and national effects, are examined within the scope of education policies for refugees. In this section, the studies of different NGOs within the scope of education policies for refugees are examined.

After 2015, the EU provided financial and technical financing to education policies for refugees. The EU's desire to integrate refugees into Turkey for its own border security and its own interests has caused it to contribute to education policies to facilitate the adaptation of refugees to Turkey. In the pre-2016 period, the EU had adopted a democracy promotion strategy for a long time. However, after the failure of this policy, the EU adopted the "building resilience" strategy in Turkey. In the following sections, the EU is examined as an external actor in education policies towards refugees.

The variables affecting the education policy towards refugees are divided into two as internal and external factors. External factors are the dynamics that affect the education policy for refugees in 2014 and beyond. In the internal factors section, there are dynamics affecting the education policies for refugees since 2011. The economic cost has had an impact on education policies since the day refugees started to migrate to Turkey, but concrete signs of its effects have been evident since 2013. Political cost and veto players started to become effective after the effects of Syrian refugees on social, political and economic life in Turkey. NGOs, on the other hand, have been actors influencing education policies since the beginning of Syrian refugee migration in 2011. However, the missing link to explain the variation in the policy change has been the policy network which gained significance after 2014, particularly in the post 2016 period.

4.1. EXTERNAL FACTORS

4.1.1. European Union

Due to the recent increase in cross-border migration and the emergence of asylum seeker and refugee problems, the EU has increased its cross-border aid. According to OECD development

statistics, the humanitarian aid of EU institutions and member states in 2017 was \$7.9 billion (Cihangir-Tetik & Müftüler-Baç, 2020). Among the countries most affected by refugee migration are Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. When the resources of the countries are compared, “Turkey has greater resources than the other countries, which also means that they receive less assistance (Culberston & Constant, 2015)”. The irregular migration of refugees to Europe in 2015 resulted in EU aid to Turkey for its own benefit. Aid has been provided within the framework of certain projects.

Fostering a shared European identity and the dissemination of common European values such as democracy, human rights, rule of law, good governance, market economy principles, and sustainable development emerge as the EU's key political driver in aid allocation (Haskenesch, 2011; Cihangir-Tetik & Müftüler-Baç, 2020). At the same time, the main purpose of the assistance provided by the EU to refugees in Turkey after the declaration signed with Turkey in March 2016 is the desire to protect its borders from irregular refugee migration. Education policies are among the most important of these policy areas for the EU, which designs and wants to implement projects for integration in order to ensure that refugees stay on Turkish borders. The EU instrumentalized its aid to the education category, which is a subcategory of the social infrastructure and services category, to prevent refugee migration and to integrate refugees into Turkey.

The EU's aid to refugees in Turkey showed its effect in the summer of 2015, when refugee migration to Europe peaked. “According to IOM estimates, while approximately 1 million immigrants and refugees migrated to Europe in 2015, the number of people who migrated decreased to 363.401 in 2016, in the first two months of 2017, the number of people migrating to Europe by sea reached 13,924 (IOM, 2017; Şimşek, 2019).” The reason for this decrease in the migration of refugees to Europe is the assistance provided by the EU to refugees in Turkey by considering its own border security and its own interests, the integration policies it is trying to implement and the benefits brought by the concrete steps it has taken to increase resilience in Turkey. The EU's goal is to implement projects for the integration of refugees into Turkey for its own safety and to ensure that refugees stay within Turkish borders. Education policies for refugees are also one of the most important issues in the integration of refugees into Turkey (in economic and social terms).

The EU's foreign aid allocation covers many policy areas. When it comes to foreign aid, social infrastructure and services are a priority for EU institutions, the EU, and its member states. The social infrastructure and services category includes education as a subcategory. When we examine at EU institutions' and DAC-EU members' foreign aid from 2005 to 2017, the category of social infrastructure and services appears as the most helped. In 2015, with the rise of the concerns about the EU's own border security, all foreign aid categories started to rise, and the most aid was given to social infrastructure and services.

The area in which the EU invested the most and provided support was social infrastructure and services. Subcategories of the social infrastructure and services category include subcategories such as government and civil society, education, emergency response, and other multisectors. In this category, the EU provides the most assistance in the field of government and civil society. Education is in second place⁴⁴.

Aid to the humanitarian field has increased sharply after 2011. One of the most important reasons for this rise is the massive cross-border movement caused by the civil war in Syria. Aids, which remained stable until 2011, increased by 700% from 2011, when the Syrian civil war started, until 2017. The category of social infrastructure and services, including education policies, is the second most aided category by the EU and EU institutions in the 2005-2017 period⁴⁵.

Turkey is one of the countries that benefited most from the EU's foreign aid. Turkey has called for international assistance after the onset of the refugee crisis and the increasing number of refugees within its borders. As the refugee wave reached Europe, the EU started to provide project-based funds to Turkey through official means since 2016. One of the factors affecting education policies for refugees is the financial assistance provided by the EU.

⁴⁴ See more: A comparison of development assistance policies: Turkey and the European Union in sectoral and humanitarian aid, p.9, **Sectors of EU Institutions and DAC-EU Members**

⁴⁵ See more: A comparison of development assistance policies: Turkey and the European Union in sectoral and humanitarian aid, p.9, **Sub-sectors of EU Institutions and DAC-EU Members**

4.1.1.1 Financial Aid

Educational policies for refugees are not an issue that Turkey can handle economically alone. Protection and care of refugees is an international responsibility (Kirişçi, 2014). The international community has to support the situation Turkey is in. The problems that arise due to the mass displacements caused by the Syrian crisis are the problems of the international community as well as Turkey. In this context, the EU has an important role in Turkey's coping with the refugee crisis with the financial assistance it provides to Turkey.

The increase in the young refugee population and the problems that arose during the provision of education services necessitated international assistance. The EU's financial support for education policies for refugees has helped the AKP government's capacity to deal with this problem.

The EU has provided financial support to all cities in Turkey for the education of refugees. However, it is the Southeastern Anatolia region, which is adjacent to the Syrian border and where the refugee population is high, where financial aid and projects for refugee education are concentrated. Among the ten provinces with the highest number of Syrians under temporary protection are three provinces (Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa, Kilis) from the Southeastern Anatolia region. As of 10.02.2022, the total number of Syrians under temporary protection in these three provinces is 996.239⁴⁶.

The financial assistance provided by the EU to the education policies for refugees is provided on a project basis. The purpose of the EU in project-based use of the financial funds provided by the EU “was to establish partnerships with non-state actors (Sunata, 2020)”. The fact that all projects have different implementing partners ensures a more transparent use of EU financial aid. The EU meets its transparency and accountability criteria by publishing the funds it provides for projects on its official website. In this way, it is known by which institutions and organizations financial funds are used, and project contents and real activities can be compared. The fact that the AKP government's transparent disclosure of the financial funds provided by the EU during the 11-year

⁴⁶ Ministry of Interior, Presidency of Migration Management, Statistics, available at: goc.gov.tr/geçici-koruma

period in which the expenditures for the education of refugees were not published transparently is an incentive for Turkish institutions to adopt good governance.

The EU's financial funding for refugee education is more than 1.3 billion Euros. The EU contributed to refugee education with 14 projects in Gaziantep, 15 projects in Şanlıurfa and 13 projects in Kilis. The most important partner of the EU in the implementation of these projects is UNICEF. UNICEF is the implementing partner of 5 projects (see Project Table).

The basis of the EU's financial assistance for refugee education is the EU-Turkey Summit held in 2015, followed by the Turkey-EU Statement signed on 18 March 2016. As a result of the signed declaration, the EU announced that it would provide financial assistance for Turkey to keep refugees within its borders⁴⁷. The Turkey-EU Summit Statement, dated 18 March 2016, is the first statement/agreement signed by the EU to overcome the problems of illegal immigrants.

The most comprehensive of the projects implemented by the EU in Turkey is the PIKTES project. The entire budget of PIKTES is financed by the EU through direct grant method within the framework of the “Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRIT) agreement⁴⁸. The project, which started on 3.10.2016, continues in 26 provinces of the country. The second phase of the project, which started in December 2018, will continue until October 2022.

The PIKTES project is an EU project carried out jointly by the EU with the Ministry of National Education, where the EU supports Turkey financially and technically for the integration of refugee children into Turkish education. The project consists of two phases. The budget of the first phase is 300 million Euros and was implemented in 2016-2018. The budget of the second phase is 400 million Euros. PIKTES II project started to be implemented towards the end of the second quarter of 2019 for the integration of Syrian children and their access to high quality education. Financial support from the EU is covered by FRIT and IPA. It is important that financial support is covered

⁴⁷ Turkey-EU Summit Statement dated 18 March 2016, available at:
https://www.ab.gov.tr/files/AB_Iliskileri/18_mart_2016_turkiye_ab_zirvesi_bildirisi_.pdf

⁴⁸ piktes.gov.tr/eng/Home/Hakkimizda

by the IPA. €3,553 million was provided between 2011 and 2020 under IPA, and the priority area of these funds is democracy and governance⁴⁹.

Table 4.1. Distribution of 2014-2020 IPA Funds by Candidate Countries

COUNTRIES	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018- 2020	TOTAL
ALBANIA	83.7	86.9	89.7	92.9	296.3	649.5
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA	39.7	39.7	42.7	43.7	-	168.8
MACEDONIA	85.7	88.9	91.6	94.9	303.1	664.2
KOSOVO	83.8	85.9	88.7	91.9	295.2	645.5
MONTENEGRO	39.6	35.6	37.4	39.5	118.4	270.5
SERBIA	195.1	201.4	207.9	215.4	688.2	1508
TURKEY	620.4	626.4	630.7	636.4	1940	4453.9

Source: THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS IN REGIONAL POLICIES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: AN ASSESSMENT FOR TURKEY

As of the end of June in the 2019-2020 academic year, 686,581 Syrian children were trained within the scope of PIKTES⁵⁰. The number of Syrian students who completed make-up courses increased from 80,243 to 90,233. In order to support the teaching capacity of the education system, a total of 3954 education personnel were given salaries or other financial incentives. 177,019 education personnel were trained to respond to the special needs of refugee children.

⁴⁹ (See more - European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, available at; https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/enlargement-policy/overview-instrument-pre-accession-assistance/turkey-financial-assistance-under-ipa-ii_en).

⁵⁰ Fifth Annual Report on the Facility for Refugees in Turkey, 2021

4.1.1.1.1. Participation in the PIKTES project

Funds provided by the EU for the PIKTES project are not sent directly to the government. Funds provided by the EU are provided to international implementing partners within the scope of projects. In this way, inefficient or improper use of the aid provided is prevented. In addition, the participation of different actors in the process is encouraged. Besides MEB, “Open Society Foundations, South Eastern Anatolia Project, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, numerous German foundations and Siemens actively participated in the PIKTES project (Park et. al., 2018; Sunata, 2020). The implementation of the principle of participation expands the scope of services, depending on the cooperation and coordination of many actors in service delivery. In addition, participation brings innovation. An increasing number of institutions and individuals with different fields of expertise and approaches can encourage efficiency with their new ideas during the implementation of projects.

Within the scope of PIKTES, many institutions, organizations and NGOs, especially the EU and MoNE, act in cooperation. The EU tries to provide experience, cooperation and coordination by bringing together actors who would not normally encounter each other in the network of education policies for refugees, and allows everyone to participate in the process. The high number of actors also affects the outcome of the project. According to Klijn and Koppenjan (2012), the outcomes of policies and services are the result of many interacting actors. There is no individuality in this. In this context, the results of the PIKTES project depend on the responsibility of many actors.

4.1.1.1.2. Transparency and Accountability in the PIKTES Project

Monitoring and evaluation reports of the activities carried out within the scope of the PIKTES project are shared with the public. These reports are also evaluated by a wide stakeholder group. Access to monitoring and evaluation reports by a broad stakeholder group is very important for accountability. It is not a common practice to share the monitoring and evaluation reports of large-scale projects carried out by the MoNE with the public (Tüzün, 2017). The fact that the EU ensures that the reports prepared within the scope of PIKTES are shared with the public can set an example for Turkish institutions, the relevant segments can put pressure on the government and make the institutions more transparent and accountable.

Sharing the number of refugee families and children benefiting from the PIKTES project, the type of assistance they receive and the financial support they receive with the public encourages transparency. E.g; Improvement of the standards of 798 schools within the scope of PIKTES; training of 19,342 training personnel; enrollment of 248,276 Syrian refugee children in Turkish language courses; 32,124 Syrian refugee youth and children benefiting from transportation services; and 9717 education personnel receive salaries and/or incentives are published on the EU official site.

Projects to be made within the scope of PIKTES are shared with the public in accordance with the open tender procedure. This sharing of tenders promotes a transparent tendering environment.

4.1.1.2. Resilience Policy

The EU's external policies mainly consist of financial and diplomatic instruments through which it builds cooperation with third countries (Ozcurumez, 2021). The EU has long recognized the promotion of democracy and state-building as the main remedy to prevent the collapse of governance in areas of limited statehood and to combat violent conflict. However, efforts towards democratization, state-building and stability under EU neighborhood policy have largely been unsuccessful. Where it was not completely unsuccessful, quite complex problems arose. This failure of the EU has pushed the EU to seek new solutions to the complexities, especially on its Eastern and Southern borders. The Eastern and Southern borders were specifically chosen because of the presence of "fragile" or "failed" states in these regions. One of the most important reasons for the failure of the EU's democratization, state-building and stability policies is that this approach is state-centered. The countries on the Eastern and Southern borders, which are already struggling with the lack of capacity, could not fully implement the policies that the EU wanted to implement due to their insufficient capacity. The EU has provided financial support, including cash injections, to countries on its Eastern and Southern borders in the post-2011 period to help them develop their capacity to deliver public services. However, these programs do not appear to be capable of reversing the worsening economic situation or the "democratic decline" (Diamond, 2021; Ozcurumez, 2021).

After the refugee wave reached the European borders in 2015, EU member states began to worry about the security of the Union. EU member states have shown different reactions to refugee

migration. Austria, for example, is an anti-immigration country. Poland has refused to admit refugees as part of the EU's resettlement program. Incoming Syrian refugees are referred to in Hungary as "Muslim invaders." Germany is pursuing more humane policies. Bulgaria, Romania and especially Greece are seen as key actors in stopping irregular migration. These three countries commit human rights abuses while fending off refugees. Due to the differing views of EU member states on immigrants and the failure of the policies adopted in the pre-2015 period, the EU needed to adopt a new policy on its Eastern and Southern borders.

Resilience is defined as the ability to deal with, adapt to, and recover from a variety of external and internal obstacles (Chandler, 2017; Stollenwerk, Börzel & Risse, 2021). "Resilience has increasingly been seen as a new type of governance in politics and international affairs, in particular as a "anticipatory form of governance" (Cooper and Walker, 2011) and governance "from a distance" (Juncos, 2017). In its 2016 Global Strategy, the EU embraced the concept of resilience, replacing past priorities such as state-building, democracy promotion, and stability (Stollenwerk, Börzel & Risse, 2021). Fostering resilience has become a critical tool in the quest of effective global action under the European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) (Ozcurumez, 2021). Resilience is defined as "the ability of an individual, a household, a community, a country, or a region to withstand, cope, adapt, and quickly recover from stresses and shocks such as violence, conflict, drought, and other natural disasters without jeopardizing long-term development" in development, humanitarian, and disaster and risk reduction management policies (European Commission, 2016; Juncos, 2017). One of the reasons resilience appears so frequently in the EU Global Strategy is that it refers to a wide range of referent objects: the EU aims to strengthen "critical infrastructure, networks, and services," foster "democracy resilience," and invest "in the resilience of states and societies to the east stretching into Central Asia, and to the south down to Central Africa" (Wagner & Anholt, 2016).

The term resilience-building is the EU's new approach to the areas of limited statehood on the border of the South and the East, and to countries with disputed order problems. For the EU, resilience is a key mechanism to prevent the deterioration of governance and prevent violent conflicts in countries covered by the EU's neighborhood policy. Resilience helps to peacefully combat risks arising in restricted state areas and disputed order areas.

There are 3 sources for the resilience mechanism to work. These are social trust, legitimacy and institutions. Resilience requires inclusive relationships of trust so that people in society can engage in peaceful change in the face of emerging risks. A properly functioning social order increases the capacity to deal with problems and provide effective governance, even in the absence of the state. Legitimacy is the second source of resilience. The legitimacy of governance actors has a key role in preventing the collapse of governance and preventing violent conflict. If society accepts the governance actors and institutions as legitimate, they will mostly follow the rules of the governance actors. Moreover, if governance actors are deemed legitimate, they do not have to rely on more costly mechanisms to ensure compliance and cooperation. In order for governance institutions to be effective in a certain area, it is necessary to take appropriate actions. When the sources of resilience are adapted to the EU; The EU needs to build trust with society where governance is damaged, collapsing and violent conflicts exist. Secondly, the EU should be seen as legitimate by the people where it will implement the resilience mechanism. Thus, the society will comply with the EU's institutions and rules to a certain extent, and will take steps to prevent the collapse of governance and prevent conflicts. Finally, in order for EU institutions to be effective in areas of limited government and where there is disputed order, they must act on purpose.

According to Özçürümez (2021, p. 1302), the massive influx of IDPs into a country, the constant entry into that country, and the risks posed by long stays caused by long-term conflicts can create a “cascading tipping point” in the host country. This can lead to the collapse of governance and the emergence of violent conflicts. Promoting societal resilience in host countries can help absorb the situations created by risks. The EU could not help third countries to develop cooperation with third countries, to support third countries by using financial and diplomatic tools, to break out violent conflicts and to control the mass influx of refugees. The failure of financial and diplomatic instruments has prompted the EU to support resilience in countries experiencing mass migration.

For the EU to be successful, it must meet three sources of resilience. The EU should establish social trust in the host country for social resilience. However, the EU seems far from achieving social trust in Turkey. While confidence in the EU was 9.4% in 2014, it decreased to 4.6% in 2020. In order for the EU to provide resilience, it is important that the EU demonstrates that it acts in accordance with the principle of legitimacy. However, the EU cannot fully meet the principle of legitimacy. The EU invests heavily in border controls for refugees attempting to immigrate to the

EU. For example, the EU has sent military force, military equipment (e.g. drones for maritime border checks) to the Greek border, and financial aid and support to the Greek government to control border movements. In addition to this stance of the EU, the fact that it tries to increase social resistance against the migration of refugees in another country creates a contradiction. This contradiction, in turn, jeopardizes the legitimacy of the EU and results in the inability to fully implement EU policies in host countries. Because policy partners have doubts about the EU. The fact that EU member states adopt different policies against refugee migration causes countries hosting refugees to question the legitimacy of EU rules and to question the institutional designs proposed by the EU. The difference of opinion in the action plans of EU members for refugees jeopardizes the view of the EU as an actor trying to build social resilience. While dealing with migration governance in the region, the EU has failed to strike the balance in balancing human rights and security concerns and has appeared less credible. The EU supports the provision of public services and social assistance to refugees in order to ensure adequate international protection and promote societal resilience in host countries, but does not impose any strict conditions on these countries' compliance with liberal norms such as human rights, rule of law, and good governance during implementation (Ozcurumez, 2021). Building resilience does not happen overnight. Building resilience in the host community is a long-term project because of the social changes it entails. The EU has promoted moderate societal resilience to the risks posed by the refugee wave in countries experiencing mass migration, but has failed to instill long-term societal resilience. Institutions are also very important for building resilience. The lack of pluralistic and inclusive institutions in the host country increases the likelihood of impaired governance. The EU supported Turkey with financial and technical support to increase the state's resilience and aimed to reduce the risks. The EU has succeeded in mitigating the impact of risks, but has failed to build long-term and sustainable societal resilience. The difficulties in the working environment of EU institutions negatively affected the work of EU institutions in the region. The EU has found itself in an environment of changing state networks, non-state networks, limited commitment to intra-regional cooperation and different institutional capacities with different needs. Due to the volatile policy environment, EU institutions have had problems with building resilience.

Turkey does not have the institutional capacity to meet the costs of the mass refugee wave in terms of institutional capacity during the periods of mass migration due to the civil war that broke out in

2011. Turkey's procedures for dealing with forced migration and international protection were sketchy in 2011. In 2011, the AFAD responded to an emergency with a humanitarian aid effort mostly funded by Turkish resources. The Directorate General of Migration Management was established by the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 2013 to coordinate local, national, and international actors in the sphere of migration governance. In an institutionally unprepared Turkey, it has been difficult for the EU to build resilience. Syrians in Turkey are perceived as a threat to public order.

The perception that refugees benefit from social assistance and that vulnerable and vulnerable people in local communities are neglected increases the hostility towards Syrians in the Turkish public opinion. In this case, the EU needs to demonstrate to the public that it acts fairly when programming and implementing humanitarian aid. Confidence of local communities, vulnerable and vulnerable people in the justice of EU actions should be increased. The lack of trust in EU institutions, planning and implementation is an obstacle for EU institutions to build resilience.

One of the most prominent policy instruments for regional cooperation for forced migration governance in the region is the 3RP (Refugee Resilience and Response Plan), established in 2015 to facilitate collaboration and coordination among international organizations, states, and non-state actors in Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, and Iraq (Ozcurumez, 2021). The 3RP program has been put in place to replace the Regional Response Plan. Although it contains long-term goals and solutions, the RRP has responded to the urgent humanitarian challenges posed by the refugee crisis and is more focused on acute emergency management. Since short-term programs will have little support for building resilience in Turkey, 3RP has been implemented in the region. The 3RP included supporting long-term educational activities. With the announcement of resilience-related policies, the 3RP enabled many actors to participate in the process and brought an innovative approach. The EU has acted in the region as a major donor of the 3RP. Since 2017, the most supported ministries and institutions within the scope of 3RP are the MoNE, DGMM and the MFL. After the 3RP, there has been an increase in policy initiatives to support societal resilience. However, 3RP has resulted in moderate societal resilience in host countries.

The rapid influx of Syrian refugees to Europe in the summer of 2015 caused the EU to adopt the "promotion of resilience" policy. Until 2015, the EU had adopted the strategy of promoting democracy for Turkey. Due to the failure of this policy, the EU has prompted Turkish institutions,

public opinion and the AKP government to build resilience so that Turkey can keep Syrian refugees within its borders in order to keep refugees away from its borders.

The EU's contribution to education policies for refugees in Turkey has been made to increase Turkey's resilience in migration governance. The FRIT mechanism, described in the 2016 Turkey-EU Statement, provided financial assistance to keep the forcibly displaced in Turkey within the country. Through the FRIT, SuTP have received humanitarian, educational, socioeconomic, and health support (Ozcurumez, 2021). Financial and technical assistance to support the social cohesion of refugees in Turkey are steps taken to increase Turkey's social resilience. By integrating refugees into Turkey, the EU aimed to ensure its own border security and act on behalf of its own interests. The FRIT mechanism focuses on cooperation, regulation, management of irregular and short-term migration, includes training, monitoring, guidance and counseling services to strengthen social resilience. Within the scope of FRIT, in August 2016, MoNE adopted the “roadmap” on the education of Syrian children. Adoption of the roadmap highlights the big difference between the period 2011-2015 and the post-2016 period. A new institutional structure was created with the roadmap, and the “Migration and Emergency Education Department” was established within the General Directorate of Lifelong Learning. With the new planning, the opportunity for refugees to access rights and services in the national system in the field of education has been regulated and the integration of Syrian children within the Turkish education system has been determined as the main target (Erdoğan, 2019).

The EU has allocated significant financial and technical resources to refugee education to support the integration of refugees into Turkey and to increase Turkey's resilience. In this context, the EU has taken steps to increase the capacity of schools with insufficient capacity in Turkey, and has given importance to school constructions. Trying to improve the equipment of existing schools, the EU has also provided school equipment assistance in this context. However, it was not enough for the EU to develop the capacity and equipment of schools for refugee education. For example, in the needs list prepared by the Ministry of National Education in 2017, it was determined that there are 1189 school needs for Syrian children. However, the number of "Schools to be Constructed in the Scope of EU Projects" was determined as 183 (15.3%). For example, in 2017, the number of school-age children in Şanlıurfa was 142.042 and the number of schools in need was 197 (Erdoğan, 2019). However, the "Number of Schools to be Built within the Scope of EU

Projects" in Şanlıurfa remained at 14. In order to ensure the integration of refugees into Turkey, the EU has implemented projects to promote Turkish language education. The EU aimed to increase the schooling rate by providing financial assistance to refugee children and the vulnerable and vulnerable local population. In addition, the EU has taken concrete steps to integrate refugees into the Turkish economy by financing projects for vocational training. The EU has taken steps towards the idea that refugees who are economically integrated into the country will not migrate to Europe. However, the EU carries out its policies and projects in cooperation with international organizations, state and non-state actors while taking steps towards refugee education. In this way, the EU does not present itself as an actor that intervenes abroad. In this case, the EU acts as an actor promoting participating institutions.

According to Özçürümez (2021), the EU's studies and efforts to date are far from creating participatory institutions and laying the foundations of long-term social resilience. The developments that overshadowed the achievements of the aid provided by the EU within the scope of FRIT, caused an increase in the reaction against the EU. For example, after the FRIT mechanism was introduced, the EU has characterized Greece as one of the key actors in the refugee crisis. As of 2016, the number of border guards in Greece has increased. Greek land borders were strengthened in 2018 and in 2019 Greece took a confrontational stance on migration governance. This stance of the EU overshadowed the success of financial and technical support for refugees and created controversy over migration governance.

The EU ignores the growing public discontent with refugees, as well as undermining its own legitimacy and security. The EU should adopt a capacity-building role to manage challenges in migration governance. In addition, the EU should support institutional design that can meet the requirements of longer-term and broader policies in the host country. The EU, which has different reactions to refugee migration within itself, must be seen as legitimate by third countries for its policies to be effective. In order to increase social resilience, the EU should adopt balanced policies. Not adopting a single idea against refugee migration within the EU negatively affects the legitimacy of the EU. The negative impact of legitimacy causes risks such as the non-adoption of EU policies by third countries. At the same time, the perception of the EU's proposed institutional designs by the host countries as designs that do not benefit refugees or host countries harms the perception of the EU as a resilience building actor. EU's external migration policy tools to build

resilience are seen by host countries as tools for the EU to build its own resilience rather than strengthening societal resilience. Host communities with this perception undermine the EU's effectiveness as an external actor and jeopardize the EU's role in building social resilience.

It is necessary for the EU to properly address the risks posed by refugee migration in the context of Turkey and to use its resources with a long-term strategy. The way the EU has so far addressed the risks posed by refugee migration has addressed short-term crises rather than fostering long-term societal resilience. The EU needs to build solid local partnerships with non-state actors to ensure long-term societal resilience. In order to keep its borders secure and to be a strong global actor in the governance of forced migration, the EU cannot short-term plan its interventions and afford to remain modest in its policy strategies.

"Basic directions based on decisions taken by institutions such as the Council of Europe and the European Commission for maintaining collaboration and concord in the sphere of education" is how the EU defines its education policy (Terzi, 2005; Sağlam, Özüdoğru, & Çıray, 2011). The EU's efforts to ensure the cooperation and coordination of state and non-state institutions in its education policies for refugees is in line with the EU's education policy.

4.2. INTERNAL FACTORS

4.2.1 Domestic Adoption Costs

Adoption has always been costly. If non-EU states believe in the reliability of the conditionality criterion and useful rewards are provided to these countries, the size of domestic adoption costs and the distribution of these costs among actors will vary. If the benefits of EU awards in the target country exceed the domestic adoption costs, the target country follows EU rules, otherwise veto players against the EU appear and confidence in conditionality is reduced. Therefore, doing a cost-benefit analysis, paying attention to the size and speed of the awards, and the credibility of the promises made by the EU are important for domestic adoption costs. Turkey aims to use EU financial aid to offset the adoption costs incurred by Syrian refugees. Adoption costs negatively and positively affected EU conditionality. In this thesis, domestic adoption costs in the field of education policies for Syrian refugees in Turkey are discussed as the economic and political costs of education policies for refugees.

One of the factors affecting the current situation of education policies for refugees in Turkey is the economic cost factor.

In the years when the refugee migration started, both the central government and local and national NGOs took action by resorting to informal means in the field of education policies for refugee children.

At the beginning of the refugee influx, the Turkish government thought that the crisis in Syria would be temporary and took the financial burden on its own responsibility. However, the increasing number of Syrians has caused the permanence policy to replace the temporary policy in 2015. Convinced that the war in Syria would be protracted, the government called for international assistance. The economic cost has affected education policies for refugees.

The foreseen funding requirements for Turkey in 2015 is over USD 624 million (EURO 560 million) only 20 percent of which is funded by international organizations. (Bircan ve Sunata, 2015). The increasing financial burden has revealed the pressure to seek international support for operations.

In 2016, the then Minister of National Education Nabi Avcı explained the financial impact of the education of refugees on Turkey;

... The cost of the education we, as the Ministry of National Education, is providing to Syrian students today is over 3 billion Euros, only as the Ministry of National Education. ... I am not counting the non-governmental organizations⁵¹.

Minister Avcı also emphasized the importance of camps and NGOs in education policies for refugees. Stating that 350.000 of the 750.000 Syrian students who are at school age in Turkey were educated by the Ministry of National Education, Avcı expressed that they were not satisfied with the sensitivity of the international community.

⁵¹ hurriyet.com.tr/egitim/bakan-avci-suriyeli-ogrencilerin-egitim-maliyeti-3-milyar-avronun-uzerinde-40076408

According to a news published in 2019, a significant portion of the money spent on Syrians in Turkey goes to education. 600.000 of the over 1 million Syrian children living in the country are in education. By 2019, Turkey's spending on Syrians amounted to \$40 billion⁵².

In November 2019, Vice President Fuat Oktay announced that 40 billion dollars was spent on policies towards Syrian refugees in 8.5 years, while EU resources only supported 3 billion Euros (3.5 billion dollars) in the last three years⁵³.

The financial support provided by the EU is important for the AKP government. The reason why the AKP government has activated the EU in its education policy network for refugees is the central government's desire to share power and ease the burden in the process. The EU should provide economic support to Turkey. This requirement derives from the EU's own border security. If the EU wants to secure its borders, it should support its policies for the integration of refugees into Turkey. In this context, within the framework of education policies, PİKTES-Supporting the Integration of Syrian Children into the Turkish Education System Project has been put into effect and is financing this project.

Turkey should not carry the cost of policy transition alone, according to Kemal Kirişçi. It is an international responsibility to protect and care for refugees (Kirişçi, 2014). The international community will gain from Turkey's success in the refugee issue.

The views of the Turkish public on the economic cost of their policies towards refugees have also begun to change. In the early years of the crisis, public opinion saw it as a moral duty to accept Syrians fleeing the war. Recently, reactions to the money spent on Syrians have been rising.

The EU's involvement in the process has made the economic cost, one of the factors affecting education policies for refugees, become more transparent and accountable. The amount of financial assistance provided to the AKP government along with certain projects is disclosed by

⁵² **Suriyeliler için 40 milyar dolar harcadık: Diğer komşular ne yaptı?** Available at: <https://www.yenicaggazetesi.com.tr/suriyeliler-icin-40-milyar-dolar-harcadik-diger-komsular-ne-yapti-233160h.htm>

⁵³ **Suriyeliler Türkiye’de kalsın diye harcanan paranın sadece yüzde 8’ini Avrupa ödedi**, available at: <https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2019/gundem/suriyeliler-turkiyede-kalsin-diye-harcanan-paranin-sadece-yuzde-8ini-avrupa-odedi-5475204/>

the EU. In this context, the EU has promoted good governance in Turkey when it comes to the content of its projects.

Another factor affecting the current situation of education policies for refugees in Turkey is the political costs and veto players.

Turkey has adopted an open door policy since October 2011. The open-door policy was not exposed to criticism as much as it was in the last period, when the idea that refugees were temporary was dominant. The political cost of the open-door policy and education policies for refugees became effective after it was understood that the refugees were permanent. The reactions are the reactions to the economic effects of the policies prepared for refugees and the increase in the number of Syrians living in the cities. Although hosting Syrian refugees was initially perceived as a temporary situation, it is now thought that most of the Syrians in Turkey will stay in Turkey in the future (Kağnıcı, 2017). The idea that refugees will stay in Turkey in the future causes social reactions.

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan reiterated his support for the open-door policy during his 2015 visit to Brussels;

Unfortunately, some politicians in our country are committed to sending Syrians and Iraqis back to Syria and Iraq. We can never surrender these innocent and oppressed people who took refuge in us to barrel bombs falling from the sky⁵⁴.

By 2016, the cost of policy areas for refugees has become a heavy burden on the Turkish state, and the importance of aid from international institutions and organizations has increased even more. When the economic cost problem was combined with the reactions from the public due to the increasing number of Syrians, the government discourses changed.

Speaking at the Young Businessmen Confederation of Turkey in February 2016, Erdoğan drew attention to the fact that the 3 billion Euro payment that the EU promised to give to Turkey has not

⁵⁴ **Açık Kapı Politikamız Devam Edecek**, available at; tccb.gov.tr/haberler/410/35526/acik-kapi-politikamiz-devam-edecek

come⁵⁵. Erdogan also said that if EU support is delayed, he can open the border gates for refugees to cross into Europe.

When it comes to 2021, President Erdoğan underlined in his message on 20 June World Refugee Day that the number of refugees has been constantly increasing for the last 9 years. Stating that global cooperation and an environment of solidarity on refugees are still not achieved, Erdoğan stated that it is essential to eliminate the reasons forcing refugees and asylum seekers to migrate, to ensure stability and to make efforts to return these people to their homes.

In Turkey, which embraced the Syrians who fled abroad the most after the bright civil war in Syria, the perspective of Syrian refugees, which was first embraced by "religious brotherhood" and "kinship" ties, has deteriorated over time. In 2015, it was desired to hold a rally in Şanlıurfa, where nearly 500.000 Syrians live. The Syrian refugee issue was also the top agenda topic of the election rallies of that period. According to the "Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Cohesion" research conducted in 15 provinces, 30.6% of the people want the Syrians to be sent even though the war continues⁵⁶.

While the EU was organizing refugee training and programs, Syrian pupils were being integrated into the Turkish educational system. Although the desire to keep refugees at Turkish borders was welcomed by EU countries, the AKP government had to bear the political burden. Turkish families stated that they do not want their children to study with Syrian students. The co-education model implemented in the Southeast Anatolian provinces, where the number of refugees is high, has received reactions from both Turkish and Syrian families. Among the reasons why Syrian students criticize the mixed education model in the Turkish education system; Turkish language skills are not sufficient; difficulties in adapting to the classroom climate, friends and social environment; and there are cultural differences in peer relationships.

Although the open-door policy of the AKP government and the policy areas in which it operates against refugees have been criticized by the Turkish public and Turkish political parties, this attitude of the AKP did not reflect much on the voter behavior. In the general elections of 2011,

⁵⁵ **Erdoğan'dan AB'ye mülteci krizi tepkisi: Alnımızda enayi yazmıyor**, available at: bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2016/02/160211_erdogan_omer_celik_multeciler_aciklama

⁵⁶ **Suriyelilere tepki büyüyor**, available at: dw.com/tr/Suriyelilere-tepki-buyuyor/a-18475031

when the crisis began, AKP received 49.83% of the vote. In 2014 local elections, AKP won 50 provincial municipalities with 45.54% of the votes. In Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa and Kilis, where Syrian refugees are concentrated, AKP, as the first party, became the owner of the provincial municipalities. In the general election of 7 June 2015, AKP failed to obtain a majority with 40.87%, and did not form a coalition alliance with any party. The effects of the refugee crisis and the discomfort felt by the increase in the number of Syrians in the cities can have an impact on voter behavior. In the election held on November 1, 2015, the AKP regained power with 49.50%. In the 2018 general elections, the AKP received 42.56% of the vote. Despite being in a coalition with the Nationalist Movement Party (NMP – Turkish acronym MHP), one of the reasons why the AKP lost 6.94% of the votes may be the continuation of its open-door policy.

Although the AKP is in alliance with the MHP, MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli criticizes the AKP's policy, saying that refugees can go to their own country on special days and it is not necessary for them to return.

Another veto player is IYI Party leader Meral Akşener. In 2018, Akşener criticized the AKP government regarding the refugee problem and suggested to the AKP government that Turkish citizenship should not be given to Syrians. Akşener argued that if it is announced that citizenship will not be granted, some of the Syrians remaining within our borders for Turkish citizenship will return to their countries, and Syrians who come to our borders for Turkish citizenship will be prevented. Akşener also stated that an agreement should be reached with the Syrian regime regarding the return of refugees.

In 2019, Akşener criticized the AKP's integration policies, arguing that refugees should be sent to their countries. The leader of the IYI Party argued that the return process for Syrians should be started and the implementation of the "open door policy" should be ended.

...We believe that everyone is happy in their homeland. Based on this fact, the return process needs to be started urgently in order to offer a happy, peaceful and prosperous future to both our Syrian guests under temporary protection and our citizens⁵⁷.

By 2021, Akşener continued her anti-refugee rhetoric. He argued that meddling in Syria's internal affairs is wrong, that the Assad administration should be talked to, and that refugees who want to return should be sent to their country. However, at the same time, Akşener also said that integration studies should be carried out for the Syrians who will stay.

Another veto player is the main opposition party, the Republican People's Party (RPP- Turkish acronym CHP) and party leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu. However, CHP expressed its criticism in a soft language. With the establishment of the "CHP Commission to Investigate the Problems of Refugees and Asylum Seekers" in 2015, the CHP has carried out various studies regarding the increasing refugee population within the Turkish borders every year. The studies also include the education of Syrian refugee children. While entering the June 2015 elections, the CHP's promise "We will send the Syrians back in Turkey after peace is established in Syria" was heavily criticized by the AKP. Upon these developments, the CHP included its promises regarding the Syrians in Turkey in the declaration "A Turkey to Live in", which they prepared while entering the 2015 elections. Making a statement in October 2015, Kılıçdaroğlu stated that they will act in cooperation with international organizations, especially UNICEF, so that the education life of Syrian refugees of education age is not interrupted. Establishing close cooperation with local and international organizations in order to prevent child marriages and increase the schooling rates of girls is among the declared targets. Kılıçdaroğlu aimed to reduce the rate of unschooled children by establishing information communication points in settlements where Syrians are concentrated. In addition, Kılıçdaroğlu stated that he wanted to organize an education curriculum so that school-age refugees would not experience equivalence problems if they returned to their countries. Then Kılıçdaroğlu

⁵⁷ **Akşener'den Suriyeli açıklaması: Geri dönüş sürecinin acilen başlatılması gerek**, available at: <https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2019/gundem/aksenerden-suriyeli-aciklamasi-geri-donus-surecinin-acilen-baslatilmasi-gerek-5513132/>

promised to provide psycho-social support for children of his age to avoid the negative effects of war⁵⁸.

In 2016, the CHP's most important point of criticism regarding Syrian refugees was granting citizenship to refugees. Özgür Özel criticized Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's words regarding the granting of citizenship rights to asylum seekers in Kilis.

First of all, the issue is not the President, but the government. It is the subject of the Ministry of Interior. The decision maker in this matter is the Turkish Grand National Assembly on behalf of all our citizens. Let's look at all the countries in the world, under what conditions they accept citizenship. What are the conditions regarding citizenship in Turkey? The fact that he is suggesting such a thing out of mouth all of a sudden, overnight, shows how badly managed Turkey, which is trying to be ruled by a single man, has become and what it has become⁵⁹.

Ozel said that he advocates for peace in Syria and for Syrians to get a chance to go home. He explained that in case of peace in Syria, Syrian refugees in Turkey should be encouraged to return to their countries. In addition, Özel argued that issuing identity cards to Syrians is not a solution to the problems of refugees.

In 2017, the CHP's criticism of policies towards refugees was again on the subject of citizenship. The CHP argued that the AKP government wanted to give citizenship to Syrians and turn them into “oymatik”. Kılıçdaroğlu also expressed his criticisms over the citizenship issue before the 2017 referendum. Kılıçdaroğlu, who claimed that if the "yes" decision was taken in the 2017 referendum, the AKP government would grant citizenship to Syrians, also stated that Turkish youth were martyred in Syria for Syria, but Syrian youth were in Turkey and even found a job and worked⁶⁰.

⁵⁸ **CHP: Suriyelileri ‘oymatik, sandıkmatik’e dönüştürmek siyasi ahlakla bağdaşmaz**, available at: <https://tr.sputniknews.com/20151001/1018082643.html>

⁵⁹ **CHP’li Özel’den, Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan’a ‘Suriyeliler’e vatandaşlık’ tepkisi**, available at: <https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2016/gundem/chpli-ozelden-cumhurbaskani-erdogana-suriyelilere-vatandaslik-tepkisi-1301825/>

⁶⁰ **Kılıçdaroğlu: Evet çıkarsa Suriyelilere vatandaşlık verecekler**, 5 Nisan 2017, available at: <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/kilicdaroglu-evet-cikarsa-suriyelilere-vatandaslik-verecekler-40417852>

In 2021, CHP leader Kılıçdaroğlu announced that if the CHP becomes the ruling party, they will send refugees to their own countries. Kılıçdaroğlu also stated that EU aid is insufficient, that the EU should increase its aid and support peace in Syria so that refugees do not go to the EU borders. Pointing out that Syrian refugees are working illegally in the Turkish economy and Turkish workers are taking their jobs, Kılıçdaroğlu made a soft statement about sending Syrians to their countries.

Syrians are our relatives, but they are happy in the land where they were born. Therefore, we will send our Syrian brothers to their countries in peace. By Allah's leave, when we come to power, I will solve the Syrian problem and the Syrian problem in 2 years. I am determined and we will do it. ... We will say goodbye to our Syrian guests and send them off to their hometowns in two years⁶¹.

As a result, the issue of Syrians and the government policies pursued in this regard have continued since the beginning of the crisis. However, after 2015, the criticism became polarized. While the AKP government is trying to take steps towards the full integration of Syrians, opposition parties have pledged to send Syrians back to their countries peacefully if they come to power. While these developments were taking place, criticisms came from both the ruling wing and the opposition wing that EU aid was insufficient. In addition, both sides criticize the EU's refugee policies.

EU aid did not have a positive impact on the political costs of the AKP government regarding policies towards refugees. This is because the EU funding for refugees is not sufficient, according to the AKP government's claims.

Turkey should be more transparent while implementing the EU's education policies towards refugees, and increase its institutional capacity to keep up with cooperation. The participation of different political parties in the process and their expressing their views may subsidize the AKP government and the negative benefits of its open-door policy. The higher the internal costs, the less effective Turkey's commitment to the EU acquis and education policies for refugees. The argument that the financial support from the AKP government's wing is insufficient should be

⁶¹ **CHP LİDERİ KILIÇDAROĞLU: “SURIYELİ KARDEŞLERİMİZİ, HUZUR İÇİNDE KENDİ ÜLKELERİNE GÖNDERECEĞİZ”** available at: <https://chp.org.tr/haberler/chp-lideri-kilicdaroglu-suriyeli-kardeslerimizi-huzur-icinde-kendi-ulkelerine-gonderecegiz>

reversed. The more the EU helps Turkey's political cost with financial support, the more it will both promote good governance in Turkey and lessen the political cost of the AKP government.

4.2.2. Non-Governmental Organizations

NGOs, especially international NGOs and institutions, have played an important role in the refugee crisis in Turkey (Erdoğan, 2019). Although international NGOs experience problems during their work in some periods, their success in education policies towards refugees is at a visible level. The complaint of NGOs is that they have very limited resources within the scope of education policies for refugees and that these resources are not shared with them sufficiently. Financial aid to refugees in Turkey is generally distributed autonomously. Sometimes it is among the concerns of NGOs that incoming aids have political purposes.

In Turkey, where authoritarian politics are on the rise, the relationship between civil society and the state apparatus is complicated, and civil society has primarily been used to maintain existing authority in various forms, in which NGOs and citizens face repression as well as bureaucratic and legal restrictions (Aras & Duman, 2018). In a political environment where NGOs are mostly used as tools by the state, NGOs have been prevented from working on education policies for refugees from time to time. However, EU assistance to NGOs operating in Turkey resulted in the active work of NGOs in such an environment.

NGOs are a tool for the EU. The EU aims at transparency, accountability and participation in education policies with the active work of NGOs. As a result of the EU's support of NGOs in education policies towards refugees, the interaction of NGOs, European institutions and Turkish institutions has increased, and the number of joint projects has increased. In this way, the financing provided by the EU has increased over time, which has contributed positively to both the number and efficiency of the actors in the education policy network for refugees.

In 2011, when the refugee crisis began, Turkey lacked the necessary legal infrastructure for NGOs to work towards refugees. It took several years for the legal process to be established. For this reason, the contribution of NGOs to education policies for refugees was made informally until the legal ground for NGOs was prepared. The lack of legality has narrowed the field of work of NGOs, and most local, national and international NGOs have had to engage in activities at the local level. In this period, the most important contribution of national and international NGOs to the education

policies for refugees was the opening of TECs as a result of the protocols they signed with the central government.

A lot of work has been done and continues to be done in the provinces and districts where the number of refugees is very high, in the national and international platform, in terms of providing services to Syrian refugees. Many national and international NGOs take an active role in the education policy network for refugees. Many national NGOs in Turkey follow international nongovernmental organizations while providing education services. However, there are different opinions about whether these NGOs are successful or not.

Although the central government established the institutional and policy foundations for implementing the temporary protection regime, they needed to be adapted to local administration, especially as over 95 percent of Syrian refugees live in cities (UNHCR,2018; Betts, Memişoğlu, Ali, 2020). While adapting to governance at the local level, NGOs have made the adaptation of Syrian refugees easier by engaging in local activities.

"Civil society is largely considered as a universally-accepted and legitimate non-state entity engaging for the public good, but business (Sunata, 2020)," according to Teegen et al (2004) and Baur & Palazzo (2011). According to Menashy and Zakharia (2017), the private sector is responsible for 64% of refugee education in Turkey.

The number of Syrians under temporary protection registered in Turkey at the age of education (1 million 771.339⁶² as of 10.02.2022 is equal to 47% of the total number of Syrians (3.741.251⁶³ as of 10.02.2022). The presence of such a high proportion of young people has led to an education crisis in Turkey. The presence of such a high proportion of young people has led to an education crisis in Turkey. It would be unrealistic to expect traditional national education to single-handedly deal with the education of incoming refugees given the limited state of their public resources (Sunata, 2020).

⁶² **Ministry of Interior, Presidency of Migration Management, Statistics**, available at: <https://www.goc.gov.tr/gecici-koruma5638>

⁶³ **Ministry of Interior, Presidency of Migration Management, Statistics**, <https://www.goc.gov.tr/gecici-koruma5638>

There is a parallel relationship between the help of NGOs in the education of Syrian refugees and refugee migration. Since 2011, when the civil war in Syria began, the migration of Syrian refugees to Turkey has continued to increase. Refugees were hosted in camps at the border. However, due to the camp's capacity, many Syrian refugees have also started to live outside the camps. As the number of refugees outside the camps increased, education services for refugees remained insufficient. “As of 31 December 2021, the number of refugees living in the camps is 51.471 people. This corresponds to 1.4% of the total population. The number of Syrians living in cities is 3.685.328 as of 31 December 2021. This corresponds to 98.6% of the total population⁶⁴.” Combined with the high number of Syrians living in cities and the high number of young people in need of education (1.764.687⁶⁵), the state called for help at the national and international level. National, international and Syrian non-governmental organizations are trying to be beneficial in their own service opportunities and to provide positive developments in the lives of refugees, since the services and aids provided to Syrian refugees exceeding 3 million are not sufficient (Türk, 2016).

Because the capacity of Syrian refugee camps was insufficient, some Syrian and Turkish NGOs, primarily religious organizations, created schools in 2021 that were initially not recognized by Turkish authorities to the (Aras & Duman, 2018). For example, the Turkish Diyanet Foundation (Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı – TDV) made the most important contribution to the emergence of TECs. Firstly, with the support of TDV in 2013, Syrians began to be trained in these buildings by making use of the physical facilities of the Quran courses in Nizip. TDV has also provided employment to Syrian teachers through this means. This application of TDV forms the basis of TECs.

The Social Support and Education Center (SDEM) opened in Ankara by the Turkish Diyanet Foundation's Women's Family and Youth Center (TVD KAGEM) also provides services to refugee education. In this center, it is aimed to adapt Syrian refugees to social life, to create employment opportunities and to contribute to their education life. On the basis of the education given at the

⁶⁴ **Mülteciler Derneği, Türkiye’deki Suriyeli Sayısı Mart 2022**, available at: mülteciler.org.tr/turkiyedeji-suriyeli-sayisi/

⁶⁵ **Ministry of Interior, Presidency of Migration Management, Statistics**, available at: goc.gov.tr/geçici-koruma

center, it is aimed to teach refugees in advanced level Turkish. The center provides service at 2 different points in Ankara⁶⁶.

Some NGOs contact needy Syrian families at home, identify children who are out of school and take the necessary steps to get them to go to school. The Association for Solidarity with Asylum Seekers and Migrants (SGDD-ASAM) is an NGO that carries out such studies. This organization conducts regular field scans with its mobile consulting team.

Some NGOs whose definition of service is not “aiding education for refugees” also work on the education of refugees from time to time. The Elbir Association, which was established in Konya, is an example of this. Elbir Association was established to respond to urgent needs such as shelter, health and nutrition. However, although the Elbir Association does not conduct regular screenings like ASAM, it detects the children who do not go to school during the distribution of aid in the field and takes action to bring them into school.

There are also NGOs that work more actively to identify children who do not go to school and ensure their access to school, and allocate special resources to this issue. In this context, NGOs such as Human Rights and Freedom and Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH) and Bülbülzade Foundation can be given as examples. IHH actively supports education at all levels, both in Turkey and Syria (Taştan and Çelik, 2017). IHH implements special projects to bring children outside the camps to school. For example, with the project implemented in Hatay's Reyhanlı district, IHH brought in more than 50 children who were selling handkerchiefs or begging on the street. Bülbülzade Foundation, on the other hand, carries out local activities. It implements various projects to increase the schooling rate in an area covering 94 neighborhoods in Gaziantep. The point where IHH is criticized by other NGOs and the public is that IHH has more information about refugees than other NGOs. The Turkish government has given a special position to IHH, which it considers ideologically close (see Özden, 2013).

Not only national NGOs but also NGOs established by Syrian refugees provide services regarding the education of refugee children. SAED Charity Association is one of them. SAED supports the education of Syrians at all levels, from kindergarten to higher education (Taştan and Çelik, 2017).

⁶⁶ **Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı**, available at: tdv.org/tr-TR/multeci-ailelere-egitim-ve-sosyal-destek/

It carries out its activities in four different schools. UNICEF pays the salaries of teachers serving in schools. SAED covers students' stationery and transportation expenses. Considering this situation, it is concluded that different NGOs act in cooperation with informal networks.

Activities of International NGOs in Refugee Education Education of Syrian refugees has become an international issue rather than a national issue due to the steady increase of the Syrian population and the consequent lack of services and resources. The Turkish government's calls for international assistance have received positive responses at the local and nationwide level.

Taiwan-based Tzu Chi Foundation is a foundation operating at the local level for the schooling of children and the provision of education and training materials in the Sultangazi district of Istanbul. Tzu Chi Foundation, which worked with the provincial directorate of national education in the opening of TECs in Sultangazi district, took care of all the expenses of GEMs until a certain period. Thanks to the special programs they have developed, they have brought 256 children under the age of 14 to school. In order to provide an incentive for these children, who belong to the child labor group, to go to school, financial support was provided as much as the money they earn daily. In addition, Tzu Chi Foundation supports children in Sultangazi for transportation. In addition, the Tzu Chi Foundation provided financial support (800 Turkish Liras) to the teachers working at TEC to ensure that education would not be disrupted.

The use of school uniforms is an important issue so that Syrian students do not feel like strangers in educational institutions during their schooling. Another support item of international organizations is school uniforms. Many international NGOs assist students with school uniforms and casual wear.

Most of the TECs are located according to the location of the children living in the camps. Due to the large population out of the camps, transportation to educational institutions has also become a problem. This problem has a negative effect on the enrollment rate. Switzerland-based IOM contributes to the transportation of Syrian students and, accordingly, to the increase in the schooling rate. IOM provides services for children in Şanlıurfa and Konya. A protocol was signed between the General Directorate of Lifelong Learning and IOM for the activity related to the transfer of 20.000 Syrian students to school (Taştan and Çelik, 2017).

The IBC Humanitarian Aid and Development Foundation is also an NGO active in refugee education. IBC's work in the world and in Turkey focuses on five main areas: emergency aid, rehabilitation, development, health and education⁶⁷. When designing projects on education, IBC considers the needs of the most vulnerable and disadvantaged groups. IBC believes that by bringing together international, national and local actors, it will have the maximum impact on education for the most disadvantaged communities. That's why it always tries to involve the actors in the network on refugee education in the process and make the most of their assistance. In this context, IBC collaborates with other NGOs, global donors, universities and research centers on education.

Malumat Association, operating in Gaziantep, is another local NGO operating in the field of refugee education. Malumat Association has started joint educational activities in order to ensure the integration of Syrian children with their Turkish peers. In this context, it brings together Turkish and Syrian students through language and computer courses. While the association provides support to education, its target group is not only refugees. Turkish students in difficult situations also benefit from these aids. The languages of instruction are Turkish, Arabic, English and Kurdish. In this way, policies become more inclusive. 1200 children benefited from the activities of the association⁶⁸.

In contrast to the lack of focus on international platforms at the state level, a large number of national and international NGOs have begun to operate in provinces and districts with substantial concentrations of Syrian refugees co(Aras & Duman, 2018). NGOs meet the principle of participation, which is one of the good governance criteria, by involving different actors in the process. The transparency of the projects carried out corresponds to the principle of transparency, which is another principle.

⁶⁷International Blue Crescent, Toplumsal Kalkınma, available at: ibc.org.tr/TR/CATEGORY_23/toplumsal-kalkinma

⁶⁸ Türk ve Suriyeli çocuklar ortak eğitimde buluşuyor, available at: haber7.com/Gaziantep/1787558-turk-ve-suriyeli-cocuklar-ortak-egitimde-bulusuyor

Although the activities of national, local and international NGOs on refugee education have brought positive benefits, there are still deficiencies and things that need to be corrected in this area.

Following the signing of the EU-Turkey agreement in 2016, EU support for NGOs was increased and NGOs started to cooperate with state institutions. The necessity of meeting the EU criteria has changed the skeptical attitude of the public towards NGOs over time. The public has adopted a more interested attitude towards the activities of NGOs, and the public has started to cooperate with many NGOs at the local level through informal means. The increase in cooperation of NGOs with government institutions and the public has prevented duplication of service and inefficiency has been largely eliminated.

In the period from 2016 to the present, NGOs have promoted transparency, accountability and participation in their education policies for refugees. NGOs, which have become more active with EU aid, have promoted good governance in education policies for refugees in Turkey.

Another important contribution of NGOs to education policies for refugees is as follows; Nation-states with centralized education administration may have the capacity to handle fewer refugees in terms of education. However, as the number of refugees increases, the provision of education carries the danger of upsetting the balance between the universal rights of nation and identity and the maintenance of culture and language. Cross-border mass displacements lead nation-states with central education administration to politicize education. International bodies such as NGOs try to ensure that education is not politicized while providing education for refugees.

4.2.2.1. Problems about NGOs

National, local and international NGOs operating to support refugee education in Turkey face some problems. These problems affect the service delivery of NGOs and make it difficult for the target group to access services and resources. In addition, the problems encountered reduce the quality of the services provided.

Most of the NGOs operating in the field of refugee education in Turkey are religion-oriented non-governmental organizations (eg Bülbulzade Foundation, TDV). After the refugee influx began, international NGOs, which started to operate with insufficient service provision, found themselves

in an environment where religion-oriented NGOs are active and the civil society-state relationship is complex. Caught unprepared for the massive influx of refugees, it took time for Turkey to establish the working conditions of NGOs on a legal basis. It took several years for the Turkish government to establish the necessary legal basis and work permits for NGOs to work in Turkey. Due to the slowness of the process, international NGOs that wanted to start their activities could not offer the services they intended to provide at first. Some international NGOs have been closed due to the cities in which they operate. For example, the government revoked the work permits of some NGOs on the grounds that they were operating in Diyarbakır and providing financial and humanitarian aid to the Syrian Kurds by cooperating with the Syrian Kurds in this region.

The cancellation of the work permits of various international NGOs at the beginning of 2017 and the restriction of NGOs' activities in the field of education became a source of serious concern and uncertainty for many organizations that carry out educational activities to empower refugee children (Tüzün, 2017). In this environment of anxiety and uncertainty, the quality of the service provided has also decreased.

The biggest problem of national, local and international NGOs operating in the field of refugee education is the lack of cooperation and coordination. The issue of refugee education is an issue that many international, local and national NGOs with different capacities and approaches should work together. These NGOs need to work in coordination with all actors at the vertical and horizontal levels. However, there are coordination and cooperation issues between NGOs and government institutions on the horizontal level, as well as between government institutions and NGOs on the vertical level. This autonomous choice of action and lack of coordination result in multiple provision of services in the field of refugee education by different actors.

Repetition of aid programs and education services results in suboptimal use of resources. In this case, inefficiency occurs.

The lack of a platform for NGOs to share their own work with other NGOs working in the same field also creates a situation of inefficiency. Some regions therefore benefit less or not from service delivery.

Another problem faced by NGOs during cooperation is the problem of insecurity. Some international, national and local NGOs attribute the lack of vertical cooperation and coordination

to the attitude of the government and believe that the state cooperates only with NGOs of the same ideology. The lack of cooperation and coordination at the vertical level limits the field of activity of NGOs serving in the field of refugee education.

The Turkish government's attitude towards NGOs differs at the beginning and after the Syrian crisis. In the early stage, NGOs had a primary role in supporting and assisting refugee education, but later on, the position of NGOs shifted from a primary to a secondary position. It has to do with the Turkish government's shifting stance on NGOs in refugee education (Sunata, 2020). After 2016, the refugee policy was built on the fact that refugees are not temporary. The education sector was hit the hardest by the temporary-to-permanent transformation. The MoNE has risen to the forefront of refugee education, relegating NGOs to a more passive and secondary role from their former central and primary position (Sunata, 2020).

4.3. THE MISSING LINK: POLICY NETWORKS IN EDUCATIONAL POLICIES FOR REFUGEES

Migration to Turkey due to the Syrian crisis that started in 2011 has created difficulties for Turkey in the field of policies towards refugees. Education policies are also one of the difficulties encountered. Recently, it has been mentioned that governments have become more dependent on social actors due to some difficulties and complexities encountered. The difficulties created by the education policies for refugees have caused Turkey to be more dependent on national, local, regional and international NGOs, supranational organizations such as the EU, EU institutions and organizations and local people. Among the reasons for this dependence, there are various factors, especially the economic and political costs created by education policies. Dependency has led to the adoption of horizontal modes of governance rather than vertical modes of governance. At this point, network governance has become an alternative theory for the complex environment and challenges.

4.3.1 2011-2014 Period

As of 2011, Turkey was not prepared in the field of education policies for refugees. The reason for the community-based stigma of the 2011-2014 period is that the central government sees refugees as temporary. Education policies for refugees have been provided by informal social systems rather than formal contracts. The education policies of this period developed on a community basis. The

relationship between government, local people, philanthropists, business world, NGOs has increased more in terms of education policies for refugees. In this period, the relations that developed in the field of education policies developed horizontally. This may be because the central government wants to avoid the financial burden of education policies and spreads the burden to different actors in the network. The government's dependence on non-governmental actors can also be explained in terms of economic costs.

The education policy network for refugees in the period 2011-2014 has developed in a decentralized, pluralistic and relational way. The network structure is flexible because there is no central actor in the field of education policy to oversee the actors entering and leaving the network. Networked actors come together with a focus on solving problems in education policy. In this context, networks conform to the definition of "network approach" by Sandström and Carlsson.

Expertise, which is one of the advantages of network governance, is very difficult to talk about in the period of 2011-2014, because education policies for refugees are both tentatively formulated in this period and there is no actor who can lead the network with an expert approach in this field. Although the loose nature of the networks created flexibility in entering and exiting the network, the actors in the network did not have sufficient expertise.

The emergence of the field of education policies as a new field of public policy, combined with the presence of many different actors and different views in the network, has made this policy field open to innovation. When TDV started teaching refugee children in a Koran course in Gaziantep's Nizip district, this idea inspired NGOs, philanthropists, local governments, and eventually the central government, and other actors also led to the opening of TECs. New concepts and approaches have also contributed to the cooperation between actors, increasing the number of actors in the network. Due to the increase in the number of actors in the network, constantly evolving ideas circulated freely in the network of education policies for refugees. The absence of old and well-established approaches has contributed to the development of innovative policies. The involvement of actors other than the central government in the policy-making process has also subsidized the central government's economic burden on resource use.

In the period of 2011-2014, the education policies that developed on a community-based basis and the network that developed accordingly caused the government's oversight over education policies.

The reason for the loss of oversight is the provision of education by private and non-state actors rather than the public sector, and the central government's failure to centralize itself in the network. Loss of oversight is likely in policy areas where network governance applies. Since the education given in TECs could not be controlled, the government would later position itself as the central actor.

The lack of a central actor equipped to coordinate education policies in the network between 2011 and 2014 caused communication breakdowns. Some services were repeated more than once in the same region, and there were refugees who benefited from the assistance more than once. In addition, the fact that the actors in the network have different communication patterns caused the information flow in the service area to be disrupted.

Among the most important issues of this period is the issue of who will lead the network. The decentralized nature of the network governance and the central government's inability to position itself in a central position in order not to bear the economic cost alone in this period created problems as to who would lead the network and who would direct the network. As the education provided in TECs cannot be audited, it does not coincide with the understanding of national education and reduces the supervisory capacity of the government, the network started to be centralized as of 2013.

The education policy network for refugees in this period consisted mostly of private actors. This specialized nature of networks has negatively affected the protection of the public interest. An example of this is that the education service offered cannot be followed by official authorities. Although this specialized structure, which is in contradiction with Turkey's highly centralized education administration (Tezel-McCarthy, 2018, p. 5), has a structure suitable for network governance, it does not coincide with public goals, interests and values. Moreover, as of 2013, the central government centralized its position in the network of education policies for refugees, leading to the building of new institutions to ensure inter-actor coordination.




Figure 4.1. Education Policy Network for Refugees Between 2011-2014⁶⁹

4.3.2 2014-Present Period

The education policy network for refugees of this period was different from the network of the 2011-2014 period in many ways. The number of actors in the network has increased, the structure of the network has changed, the coordination and communication patterns have differentiated, and the decentralized network structure has been replaced by a more centralized structure.

Among the most important reasons for the transformation are the economic cost, political cost and EU factor, which are independent variables that affect the education policies for refugees. The increase in the number of Syrian refugees and refugees who have legal status with the adoption of the YUKK is another important reason for the transformation. The idea that the war in Syria would be prolonged and the increasing number of refugees pushed the government to produce more

⁶⁹ This table has been prepared by the author himself on the basis of the educational policy literature and empirical events for refugees.

permanent solutions in policy areas for refugees, and increasing policy costs brought international calls for help and eventually international aid. Costs reaching \$8 billion as of 2015 may be one of the reasons for increasing the number of actors in the network.

As the community-centered education policy network ceased to be a sustainable model, a state-centered network was created. The circular called Education and Training Services for Foreigners, published on October 23, 2014, redefined the coordination of educational activities for foreigners. The circular stated that TECs, which were previously freely opened by local actors, NGOs and philanthropists, will now be opened under provincial/district national education directorates with the approval of the governorship affiliated to the central government.

With some degree of centralization of the network, the loss of oversight experienced by the central government in the period 2011-2014 was avoided. In addition, the centralization of the network also helps with who will lead the networks. The transfer of network leadership to the central government has led central government institutions to deal with coordination problems.




Figure 4.2. Education Policy Network for Refugees Between 2014-2016⁷⁰

⁷⁰ This table has been prepared by the author himself on the basis of the educational policy literature and empirical events for refugees.

With the summer of 2015, the migration of Syrian refugees to Europe has increased, and the EU has begun to worry about its own border security. The EU border security factor, combined with the economic and political costs of Turkey's education policies for refugees, has entered the education policy network as of 2016. The entry of the EU into the network has created differences in terms of financing, network leadership, equality of network actors, conflicts of interest in policy making, cooperation between actors, accountability and democracy of the network.

In network governance, actors connect informally and form informal partnerships. This results in no legal binding. However, education policy is a relatively new field, and because of its novelty, it is a policy area open to corruption. After 2016, the EU adopted legally binding in the education policy network for refugees and based its financial and technical support on official documents. This has resulted in the use of the information and support circulating in the education policy network for refugees in accordance with their purpose.

With the EU's joining the network, many new actors have entered the network of education policies for refugees. The fact that the implementing partners of the EU's project-based aids were different, enabled at least 8 different actors to enter the network. The participation of different actors in the network also serves the innovation criterion, which Hassall counts among the advantages of network governance. The education policy network brought together many actors that would not normally meet, pooling different ideas. In addition, the diversity of actors in the education policy network has increased innovation in the education policy network, as Sandström and Carlsson revealed in their empirical study. The content of 14 different projects implemented by the EU can be given as an example.

As the network governance literature underlines, “the evolution of a policy network is considered the result of some purposeful actions taken by individuals with self-interested interests.” Every actor in the network tries to maximize his own interests. The reason for the EU's entry into the network of education policies for refugees is to try to integrate refugees into Turkey in order to ensure its own border security. In this context, Turkey's interest is to subsidize domestic economic and domestic political costs, thanks to financial and technical assistance. It is in Turkey's interest that EU projects provide services to vulnerable Turkish citizens as well as refugee youth. The fact that the EU provides employment to teachers, helps households, opens libraries, provides transportation services, and provides material support within the scope of projects can be

interpreted as Turkey's interest. The fact that the EU tries to implement its resilience policy on Turkey may mean that it serves its own interests by integrating refugees into Turkey.

The EU's disclosure of its projects and their content is important for the accountability of networks. The EU meets the transparency criterion by publishing expected results and project progress on its official site. Also, who is responsible for the projects (8 different implementing partners) is also important for the accountability of the network.

The fact that the EU and Turkey preferred official ways instead of establishing mutual trust-based cooperation in the education policy network for refugees caused them to make complex legal agreements. Complex legal agreements have had a negative impact on speed and flexibility, which are advantages of network governance. Relationships based on trust in network governance reduce strategic uncertainty. However, the fact that there are not only trust-based relations between Turkey and the EU in the education policy network for refugees does not mean that there will be strategic uncertainty in the network. There is no strategic uncertainty based on projects in the network, as both parties clearly articulate their goals and take concrete steps in this direction.

On the leadership of the network after 2014; Turkey's positioning as the central actor after 2014 has changed after 2016. The EU has become a partner in the leadership in the network, and accordingly, it has a say in the entrances and exits of the network. Although the EU enables different actors to take action thanks to its projects, it communicates with the MoNE while the final result is decided.

In the post-2014 education policy network, NGOs are still among the important actors of the network. However, the main problem of NGOs in the post-2014 period is that NGOs close to the government have easier access to information and resources than other NGOs, and NGOs that are not close to the government try to continue their activities with insufficient resources. At this point, the question arises as to whether networks are democratic or not.

In addition, the central government's restriction of some of the NGOs operating in the field of education policy, the closure of some NGOs by the central government contributes to the question of whether networks are democratic or not. In this context, the opinion of Klijn and Koppenjan (2012) that if networks are closed to stakeholders, the network will not be democratic appears empirically.




Figure 4.3. Education Policy Network for Refugees Between 2016-Today⁷¹

⁷¹ This table has been prepared by the author himself on the basis of the educational policy literature and empirical events for refugees.

5. CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTION

In this study, education policies for Syrian refugees in Turkey are discussed. In this direction, the EU as external factors, EU aids and resilience policy, and internal factors as economic costs, political costs and veto players and NGOs (independent variables) were examined within the scope of education policies for refugees (dependent variable). Turkey is known as the country hosting the highest number of Syrian refugees in the world. Turkey's insufficient capacity to counter the irregular flow of refugees has caused refugees and policy areas related to refugees to become an international issue. In this context, although the education policies for refugees did not receive the necessary attention in the first years of the refugee crisis, the problem escalated in the following years. Turkey, which has a limited capacity to act on its own regarding refugees, has conveyed its loud messages to the world public opinion so that the issue can be addressed in the international arena.

In the field of education policies towards refugees, Turkey has adopted different attitudes since 2011 and has made different practices accordingly. Since the beginning of the Syrian civil war and the first refugee convoy to Turkey, Turkey has taken steps to respond to urgent education needs. The thought that the war would be temporary caused Turkey not to take adequate legal steps in the field of education policies for refugees. During this period, refugees were provided with community-based education, and in border provinces where the refugee density is high, education services were provided to refugees with the help of local and national NGOs and local people. However, it is clear that local people and NGOs with insufficient capacity cannot fight alone with the increasing number of refugees and the corresponding need for training.

It took 2013 for the need for education for refugees to become a serious issue. In the relatively late delivery of education services, the government has placed its position at the center of the network of education policies for refugees. The most important reason for the government to put itself in a central position was that the education given in TECs could not be controlled by the state. This situation, which is contrary to the understanding of national education, has led the state to assume the role of the main actor and coordinator in the field of education policies for refugees. However, in the structure where the state is the central actor, the economic and political costs of education policies towards refugees have prevented the state from taking concrete steps in the field of education policies.

The lack of capacity is the reason why the field of education policies for refugees under the control of the central government has brought it to the international agenda. The central government, which had difficulties in meeting the heavy costs and providing services, had to make calls to international actors for help. The network of education policies for refugees between 2011 and 2014, which had a small number of actors and had a limited range of action, has transformed into a network with more actors and flexible movement area as of 2015. The EU has come to the fore as one of the most important actors in the network after 2015.

In this study, it is argued that the financial and technical support given by the EU to the field of education policies for refugees is given within the framework of conditionality criteria. The supports provided within the framework of conditionality criteria have made Turkey more transparent and more accountable in the field of education policies for refugees. In addition, the central government had to build a more participatory structure. However, it was the rising policy network in this policy field generated high level of policy change and good enough governance.

This policy development happened at a time when the EU's support for refugees has been provided for its own interests and for its own border security. In 2015, the EU tried to revive the declining relations with Turkey in order to prevent irregular migration and secure its borders. However, the development of Turkey-EU relations in this period did not result in Turkey's EU membership, and the EU emphasized "cooperation" and "partnership" in its statements. The EU provided assistance to Turkey in the field of education policies for refugees on the condition that Turkey host refugees. For this purpose, the EU has carried out concrete activities in Turkey with financial aid and building resilience policy. In the field of education policy for refugees, the EU is an important partner for Turkey. Its projects on education have helped subsidize the financial burden of refugees' educational needs. In return, Turkey prevented the refugees from entering Europe and kept them within its borders. In addition, the integration of refugees into Turkey socially, economically and politically has served EU interests. In return for Turkey's hosting of refugees, 3+3 billion Euros of financial aid and educational projects were provided.

Turkey emphasizes that it will host refugees in the future as well. Government officials have and explained that Syrian refugees will not be sent back to their countries and that Syrian refugees can benefit from all opportunities by integrating them into Turkish life. Although the hosting and open door policy has caused reactions from the Turkish public, it serves the EU's own interests and

supports cooperation and joint work between the EU and Turkey. The heavy burden of the refugees and specifically the education policies towards refugees on the Turkish economy increases Turkey's need for EU support, resulting in the central government keeping refugees within its borders in order to benefit from EU aid. The reaction of other political parties and the Turkish people to these policies has not made a big difference until today, and the AKP government has emphasized that it will continue its open-door policy.

The number of refugee population of educational age in Turkey is increasing day by day. In direct proportion to this, Turkey's responsibility in the field of education policies towards refugees is also increasing. Turkey, which could not cope with the cost of refugee education alone in the previous periods, needs to keep its cooperation with international actors alive. The actions that prevent the work of international institutions and organizations on refugee education in Turkey cause these institutions and organizations to withdraw from Turkey. In addition, institutions and organizations whose movement area is blocked cause other actors not to take action in the field of refugee education. Turkey should show the world public that it creates a flexible working area for international institutions and organizations acting in the field of education policies for refugees.

Various ways and policies should be adopted and implemented to ensure that children outside the camps have access to education. Preventing child labor and early marriage is important in this regard. Due to economic needs, refugee children, mostly at high school age, leave their education and enter working life. Child labor and young marriages should be prevented by supporting refugee families economically. In this context, interest and relevance to refugee families should be increased, and refugee families should be brought together and meetings should be held. At the same time, refugee families need to be supported economically.

Efforts should be made to raise awareness about the education of Syrian children. In this context, the central government should increase the capacity of NGOs and keep itself in the position of coordinator. NGOs should be supported for field interviews and government-NGO cooperation should be established.

In order to reduce Turkey's financial burden, it is necessary to provide an environment of cooperation with international actors. In this regard, Turkey-EU relations are very important. Turkey needs to cooperate with the EU in the field of education policies for refugees and carry out

studies in a coordinated manner. Government institutions need to have the necessary capacity for cooperation and partnership. Therefore, the capacity of government institutions should be increased. Turkey should consider the possibility that irregular refugee migration may continue in the future, and should avoid taking steps that could disrupt its cooperation with the EU.

The educational policy area for refugees is a relatively new policy area. Therefore, it is an area open to corruption. It is very important for Turkey to fight corruption in this area and to use public resources efficiently. Cooperation and coordination should be established to avoid repetitive services. Good governance criteria (accountability, transparency and participation) should be adopted when providing financial aid and implementing projects. The EU needs to motivate Turkish institutions and organizations that are part of the policy networks to adopt good governance criteria in this regard. Otherwise, public resources and aid provided by international actors, especially the EU, may not be used in accordance with their purpose.

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