AN ANALYSIS OF RADICALIZATION MODELS WITH EXAMPLES OF LONE-WOLF TERRORISM

MASTER'S THESIS

MELDA BELKIS KÜPELİ

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<u>MERSİN</u>
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ABSTRACT

This paper focuses on the radicalization process of one of the most relevant forms of political violence, which is the phenomenon of "lone wolf" terrorism. This research proposes that the rise of lone-wolf terrorism, along with its implications for both right-wing extremism and online spheres, requires examination through the process of radicalization. Furthermore, this paper uses the "Radicalization Model of Lone Wolf Terrorism," based on Mark S. Hamm and Ramon Spaaij's radicalization model, to break down the components of the process. Initially, this paper focuses on terms associated with political violence within the radicalization literature. Secondly, this paper studies the chosen model and analyzes its elements to comprehend the commonalities between three terrorism cases: the 2011 Norway attacks, the 2019 Christchurch mosque shootings, and the 2022 Buffalo shooting. As a result, this paper reaches conclusions that can help to understand the radicalization cycle of lone wolf terrorism through its components and various commonalities that emerge from the terrorism examples.

Keywords: Radicalization Literature Review, The Radicalization Model of Lone Wolf Terrorism, The 2011 Norway Attacks, The 2019 Christchurch Mosque Shootings, The 2022 Buffalo Shooting.

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ÖZET

Bu tez çalışması, siyasi şiddetin en yaygın biçimlerinden biri olan "yalnız kurt" terörizminin radikalleşme sürecine odaklanmaktadır. Bu araştırma, yalnız kurt terörizminin artışının hem aşırı sağ kesimine hem de çevrimiçi alanlara etkileriyle birlikte, radikalleşme süreci aracılığıyla incelenmesi gerektiğini öne sürer. Ayrıca bu araştırma, radikalleşme sürecinin bileşenlerini ayrıştırmak için Mark S. Hamm ve Ramon Spaaij'ın radikalleşme teorisine dayanan "Yalnız Kurt Terörizminin Radikalleşme Modeli"ni kullanmaktadır. Bu makale öncelikle radikalleşme literatüründe siyasi şiddetle ilişkilendirilen terimleri ve daha sonra seçilen modeli inceler. Sırasıyla 2011 Norveç saldırıları, 2019 Christchurch cami saldırıları ve 2022 Buffalo saldırısı olarak belirlenen üç terör vakası arasındaki ortak noktaları anlamak için radikalleşme unsurlarını analiz eder. Sonuç olarak bu çalışma, yalnız kurt terörizminin radikalleşme döngüsünü ve bileşenlerini terörizm örneklerinden ortaya çıkan çeşitli ortak noktalar üzerinden anlamaya yardımcı olabilecek sonuçlara ulaşmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Radikalleşme Literatür Taraması, Yalnız Kurt Terörizminin Radikalleşme Modeli, 2011 Norveç Saldırıları, 2019 Christchurch Cami Saldırıları, 2022 Buffalo Saldırısı.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I would like to thank my advisor, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Buğra SARI, for his invaluable feedback and guidance throughout the course of this study. I would also like to thank our esteemed professors who provide education at Mersin University for their academic advice and assistance. Thanks to the thesis defense committee for their valuable insights and suggestions. I am sincerely grateful to my family and friends for their support, patience, and encouragement. Finally, many thanks to everyone who has directly or indirectly helped me during this research.

Melda Belkıs KÜPELİ

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND SYMBOLS

Abbreviation	Definition
ADL	Anti-Defamation League
ANC	African National Congress
ANFO	Ammonium nitrate–fuel oil
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
Col.	Colonel
COVID-19	Coronavirus Disease 2019
CREST	Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats
EDL	English Defense League
EOKA	National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (Greek: Εθνική Οργάνωσις Κυπρίων Αγωνιστών)
EU	European Union
EUROPOL	European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation
FARC	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Spanish: Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia)
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
Flak	Herman and Chomsky's propaganda model pointing at negative responses to media (German: Flugabwehrkanone)
FrP	Progress Party (Norwegian: Fremskrittspartiet)
GPI	Global Peace Index
KKK	Ku Klux Klan
Loci	Locus (or place)
Nazism	National Socialism (German: Nationalsozialismus)
NIJ	National Institute of Justice
NYPD	New York Police Department
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IRA	Irish Republican Army
IRB	Irish Republican Brotherhood
PEGIDA	Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West (German: Patriotische Europäer Gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes)
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party (Kurdish: Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê)
TMT	Turkish Resistance Organization (Turkish: Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı)
TNPA	Turkish National Police Academy
TRT	Turkish Radio and Television Corporation
TVNZ	Television New Zealand
UK	United Kingdom
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
US	United State
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

1. INTRODUCTION

The rise of "lone wolf" terrorism is one of the most crucial aspects of contemporary terrorism today. The new trends in the Global Terrorism Index indicate a surge in lone-wolf terrorist attacks in the West.[1] According to the Global Terrorism Index, there have been more instances of far-right terrorism in the West, notably in Western Europe, North America, and Oceania. Moreover, the overall number of events has climbed by 320% in the last five years.

On May 14, 2022, an 18-year-old white man carried out a deadly mass shooting motivated by hate in Buffalo, New York. The lone actor demonstrated repeating practices of extremist right-wing violence while live-streaming his terrorist attack. There were already signs of familiar patterns even before the media shifted its attention to the attacker's manifesto that was shared online. Similar to how the 2019 Christchurch mosque shootings were inspired by the 2011 Norway attacks, the 2022 Buffalo shooting was revealed to be a copycat attack that was inspired by both of the previous acts of political violence.

These reoccurring "lone wolf" terrorist attacks elicit critical questions such as: What does the radicalization literature offer for explaining the radicalization process of terrorism? How are individuals radicalized toward political violence, specifically lone-wolf terrorism? What are the components of their radicalization process? What drives their motivation? How do they instrumentalize their motives? What role does the Internet play in it? Considering the significance of these events and the questions they raise, this paper aims to understand the phenomenon of the radicalization process of lone-wolf terrorism by analyzing the chosen cases with the "Radicalization Model of Lone Wolf Terrorism."

1.1. Importance of the Research and Questions

This research has great significance, particularly due to its efforts in developing an analysis of the radicalization cycle of lone-wolf terrorism. Additionally, this paper seeks to bring attention to different components of the radicalization process of individuals, such as personal and political motives, as well as the factor of online radicalization. This paper also strives to contribute to the literature on the field of terrorism by analyzing the radicalization frameworks offered by different theories and concepts. The interpretation of the terms related to political violence is complex since there is no internationally agreed definition regarding the term "terrorism," making it more challenging to detect different kinds of terrorism and its

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[1] Global Terrorism Index (n.d.) *The Rise of the Self-Radicalised Lone Wolf Terrorist*. Vision of Humanity. Retrieved November 12, 2022, from https://www.visionofhumanity.org/increase-in-self-radicalised-lone-wolf-attackers/

radicalization processes. By asking critical questions and analyzing case studies with the radicalization model of choice, this paper recognizes the difficulties of the research field and seeks to shed light on various commonalities within the radicalization cycle of lone wolf terrorism.

When radicalization brings hate speech, propaganda, and marginalization to the forefront, attributing the terrorist label to specific groups within society gradually changes the perception of security within nations through various means. Considering that this situation fuels radicalization even further by increasing prejudice, this study is of great importance in terms of explaining how radicalization, which is fed by ideological motivations, is used by the alternative and extreme right.

1.2. Methods of Inquiry

The research methodology helps to build the structure upon which the method of inquiry is built and justifies the use of suitable research methods (Lucas et al., 2018: 215). The proposed methodology for this paper aims to conduct qualitative research. As the title of the research suggests, the main objective of this study is to create an analysis. Instead of foreseeing or explaining a phenomenon, qualitative analysis places priority over "sense-making" or comprehending it (Bhattacherjee, 2012: 113).

Initially, this study uses the literature review method on radicalization, which includes relevant radicalization models. The purpose of a literature review is to deliver background information about the concepts and outline crucial theoretical frameworks that will improve the research (Lloyd, 2017: 4). It is both a method of evaluating the literature and a demonstration of what already exists.[2] Because it also contains a critical assessment of the sources, a literature review differs from a literature report in this regard.[3]

To develop an adequate understanding of the radicalization cycle, this paper uses the case study method on lone-wolf terrorism examples and the discourse analysis method on lone-wolf radicalization processes. In addition, there is also an emphasis on radicalization processes within models, specifically the radicalization model of lone-wolf terrorism presented in the book "The Age of Lone Wolf Terrorism," written by Mark S. Hamm and Ramon Spaaij. As the chosen radicalization model, it becomes the basis of the analysis with its components.

Case studies are widely applied in a range of academic fields and are especially common within the social sciences as a method of research (Crowe et al., 2011: 1). It is a type of method

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[2] The University of Edinburgh. (2022). *Literature Review.* Institute for Academic Development. Retrieved January 3, 2023, from https://www.ed.ac.uk/institute-academic-development/study-hub/learning-resources/literature-review
[3] (see Footnote 2)

that studies sophisticated matters in "real-life context"[4] by producing a thorough, multidimensional evaluation (Crowe et al., 2011: 1). The discourse analysis method questions the effects of phenomena on society at large as well as their "implications" for individuals (Shaw & Bailey, 2009: 413).

The values of the explanatory variables in political science studies are frequently determined by "nature" or "history" rather than by researchers; thus, selecting instances and conducting observations is where researchers have the most influence in this typical scenario (King et al., 1994: 139). Taking this factor into account, the dependent variable that is discussed in the research is the model of the radicalization cycle. This paper identifies the independent variables that comprise the radicalization process in the context of lone-wolf terrorism in the chosen cases.

This paper explores the proposed questions and matters by gathering information from various sources, such as books, academic publications, scientific articles, audio and visual data, as well as primary and secondary sources obtained from libraries, academic databases, and the internet. Through broad research and observations on various digital platforms, this research gathers data to analyze the terms and factors regarding political violence, radicalization models, and cases of choice.

1.3. Organization of the Study

Following the introduction, the second chapter of this paper focuses on the key definitions of relevant terms and their implications for political violence. A literature review is conducted to ensure that radicalization concepts are understood and integrated into the research. While this study concentrates on contemporary radicalization and terrorism in the 21st century, it also investigates the historical backgrounds of these terms to provide a comprehensive understanding.

After the brief analysis of the literature review, the next chapter focuses on terrorism as well as lone wolf terrorism and the chosen radicalization model for lone wolf terrorism. The third chapter concentrates on the major contributors to the radicalization cycle together with its components, which in the next chapter will form the basis of the analysis.

In the fourth chapter, where the case examples are studied, the components of the "Radicalization Model of Lone Wolf Terrorism" are implemented within the lone wolf terrorism examples to find commonalities. The cases are thoroughly examined and compared when deemed necessary for the flow of the analysis. Each section of the fourth chapter is also divided

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[4] As Crowe et al. (2011: 4) note, Yin (1999: 1211) stresses the "real-life context" when it comes to his definition of a case study.

into different segments where the relevance of the components is also discussed. The purpose of this chapter is to dwell on the radicalization cycle of lone-wolf terrorism by staying relevant to current trends. In the final chapter of the research, the findings of each chapter are briefly discussed while pointing out important findings from the analysis.

This paper uses the analysis and discourse methods to evaluate the terrorism cases of the 2011 Norway attacks, the 2019 Christchurch mosque shootings, and the 2022 Buffalo shooting, as well as their indications in the final chapters. By asking and answering the questions proposed earlier, this paper draws attention to evaluations that adhere to prominent conclusions. With inductive reasoning, this research explains the concept of the radicalization model of lone wolf terrorism by conducting case studies.

2. RADICALIZATION: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

First and foremost, it should be noted that radicalization as a term does not point to a static state in this paper, nor does it represent a stagnant condition in the literature. Radicalization starts a chain reaction, and radicalization is a process in which individuals are in a cycle, not at the final destination. Understanding radicalization has significant importance since radicalization builds the basis for various forms of political violence, including terrorism. "Radicalization" has become a widespread analytical paradigm for interpreting and explaining the phenomena of political violence during the last decade, particularly in research on jihadist terrorism and right-wing extremism. Taking these factors into account, this literature review aims to bring clarity to the term radicalization by dwelling on its process and the reactionary phases of individuals depending on the content they are exposed to while being radicalized or while radicalizing themselves.

2.1. Etymology and History of Radicalization

When looking at the etymology of the term radicalization and its origins, one can see that the general usage of the word used to be the basis of things, foundations, and initial as well as fundamental notions. The word "radical" is derived from the Latin word radix, which means root when translated; moreover, radicalization refers to the act of returning to one's origins (Kaya, 2021). It's about the roots of things, whether these are terms, plants, or numerals (Kaya, 2021).

Similarly, according to one of the world's most trusted dictionaries, Compact Oxford English Dictionary of Current English (Oxford University Press, 2008: 842), the term "radical" originated from the Latin word "radicalis." The modern description of the word radical has slightly changed over the years; furthermore, as an adjective, "radical" primarily means: "relating to the basic nature of something; fundamental..." and, secondly means, "supporting complete political or social reform." or thirdly means, "departing from tradition; innovative or progressive."

Radicalization, as a term, has been used to reference various concepts during different time periods. The main objective of this segment is to give a brief historical introduction to the concept of radicalization and its variables. This conceptional outlook focuses on the modern western radicalization tradition. This segment is not an effort to contradict claims about the existence of pre-modern radicalism or the post-modern versions of radicalization, nor is it an effort to dispute the presence of non-Western radicalism (McLaughlin, 2012: 40).

As there are different approaches when it comes to defining the terms "radical," "radicalism," and "radicalization," or its variables, there are also mixed debates about when radicalism started. Gossman (1975: 19) explains in his article "The Origins of Modern British Radicalism: The Case for the Eighteenth Century" that, contrary to Simon Maccoby's confident assertion on the birth of modern British radicalism between the years of 1762 and 1782, several objections were raised against Maccoby's statements. For instance, Christopher Hill argues that the inception of British radicalism goes way back to the 17th century.

During the 18th century, the word "radical" was generally used in connection with the age of enlightenment, the French Revolution, and the American War of Independence. A revival of middle-class radicalism in England throughout the 18th century was prominent (Liggio & Cody, 1980). After the Restoration, the previous 17th century English radicalism, which had its intellectual peak during the English Revolution, lost much of its luster (Liggio & Cody, 1980). In this period, there were many more reasons for middle-class English radicalism to arise. Liggio & Cody (1980:4-5) argue that "with the Bill of Rights of 1689 and the Whig ascendency, English radicalism was free to reemerge."

Regardless of the exact historical starting point of radicalism, the concept of radicalism entered the realm of politics to describe violent revolutionary leaders in England around the 18th century. The National Archives of the UK states that popular rights concepts began to flourish in the latter part of the 18th century. In the 1760s, most of these ideas concerned John Wilkes, MP.

According to Day (2022), in the 45th issue of The North British, Wilkes issued an assault against King George III and his government. In a speech, the king lauded the Paris Treaty, which had put an end to the Seven Years' War. The monarch's praise was not acceptable to him. After his opposition, Wilkes was arrested and taken into custody based on a general warrant, which describes the alleged offense but not the suspect's identity. The general warrant was contested by Wilkes, who ultimately prevailed. These incidents gave rise to the chants of "Wilkes and Liberty!" and other well-known pro-free speech catchphrases as a form of protest against illegitimate power.

There are various reasons why the Wilkes movement is so recognized, as Day (2022) also notes. Initially, 49 individuals were also detained like the Wilkes. In addition, living standards were sinking. Attacks against structures and equipment in Blackburn, Bolton, Chorley, Wigan, and Preston in 1779 were prominent instances where there was a strong indicator of the rise of radicalization. A large portion of the workers believed that the machinery was interfering with pricing and salary levels.

In the 18th century, radicalism saw a turning point in England with the Wilkes' movement. However, signs of radicalization were not absent prior to the second half of the 18th

century. In his paper "Eighteenth-Century English Radicalism before Wilkes," Colley (1981:4) argues that the Whig understanding of English radicalism is false. Increasing industry, urbanization, literacy, and population expansion had reached a point where they were combustible; hence, the political ordeal did not take place after I760. Instead, a series of high-level politicians made opportunistic forays into extra-parliamentary politics throughout the eighteenth century, which gave various public frustrations meaningful political expression. Although there have been developments in the social movement regarding promoting rights, neither the mobilization of people nor the achievement in advancing rights has been evident throughout this time. Instead, public rights were once again made a recognizable ideal at this time.

18th-century radicalism is also strongly linked to the French Revolution and the new political view it introduced. Furthermore, to understand the origins of radicalism, one should also look at the roots of the French Revolution. The publication and widespread distribution of Tom Paine's Rights of Man in 1791 was initially restricted to radical Dissenters and dramatically influenced the late French counterpart of the 1688 British Revolution (Belchem, 1996: 16). Paine's work, which most likely "sold between 100,000 and 200,000 copies in the first three years after its publication," fueled French revolutionary enthusiasm (Belchem, 1996: 16).

During the majority of the late 18th century, critics of the ruling class became a prominent topic in the press to spread propaganda against corruption and the abuse of executive power and authority (Dickinson, 1994: 222). On the one hand, politically, society was ruled by aristocrats and the governing elite in Britain. The growing size of the middle class, the expanding urban population, and the developing press, resulted in numerous political demands for reform. By the end of the 18th century, the concept reached France and was used to describe progressive revolutionaries in center-left wing parties that still continue to use the word "radical" in their names in parliament. In line with this ideological fashion, radicalism became a doctrine during the 19th century. In the early 19th century, radicalism was widely used by political movements that aimed to reform social and political structures within different countries.

The relationship between society and family has changed rapidly since the 19th century with the arrival of individualism (DuBois, 1975: 64). Individualism and family values coincided, forming social movements to work towards their ideal society. With individualism emerging, the social roles attained through family have also become less relevant. Nonetheless, unlike men in general, women were unable to leave their family roles (DuBois, 1975: 64). Throughout the 19th century, especially in the west, women challenged the male monopoly within the political and public sphere by demanding rights of their own, including the right to vote. These radical

activist women were the main actors in women's suffrage, and they started a mass movement that was carried to the next century (Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopaedia, 2022a).

In the 19th century, radicalism advocated republicanism along with liberation in Europe against absolute monarchical regimes. One of the notable radical movements of the 19th century was the Irish revolutionists. During the 18th century, Irish nationalism was not prominent, even though a minority of Irish protestants were ruling the majority of Irish Catholics. After a failed attempt at insurgency in 1848, Irish revolutionists re-emerged as the Irish Revolutionary Brotherhood (IRB) in Ireland and as the Fenians in the United States (Demetriou, 2012: 400). With time, radicalization turned into violence, and the revolutionary war became a guerilla war in which political violence took place against British politicians.

The anti-landlord movements led by the Land War in the second half of the 19th century provoked protestant landlords to be targeted. As a response, Irish radicals who are Protestant formed an anti-revolution and unionist organization called The Orange Order, which resulted in brutal, violent attacks in Londonderry (in 1883) and Belfast (1886) (Demetriou, 2012: 401). While distancing itself from electoral politics, the Irish Revolutionary Brotherhood preserved itself for the next century.

Apart from the Catholic Irish resurgence, insurgencies against the government and radical political ideologies were huge indicators of radicalization toward political violence in the 20th century. Noteworthy examples of such violent radicalization not only resonated with the Irish but also appeared in countries like Palestine and Cyprus.

The main reason for the rise of Arab extremism was strictly related to the ever-growing influence of Zionist nationalistic ideologies of Jewish immigrants in the region, together with the colonization of Palestine by Jewish settlers during the period of Mandate between the years 1920 and 1948 (Demetriou, 2012: 294). Nationalism and similar sentiments have repeatedly caused one or both parties to take radical actions that have generated violence.

Another example of radicalization caused by nationalistic notions occurred in Cyprus between 1914 and 1959. At the time, Cyprus was ruled by Britain, and elite Greek Cypriots were pushing for the unification of Cyprus with Greece (Demetriou, 2012: 404). Gradually, with the formation of an underground militia, The National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA), ethnic cleansing against minority Turkish Cypriots took place, causing Turkish Cypriots to form a countering militia for resistance, namely the Turkish Resistance Organization (TMT). Both of these examples, along with Irish revolutionary movements, indicate that from the 19th century to the 20th century, growing nationalistic and revolutionary tendencies have changed the face of radicalization accordingly.

After the First World War, in the thirties and forties, the New Dealers[5] and, throughout the sixties, advocates of the Great Society[6] shaped some of the notable radical and social movements in the United States during the 20th century (Cottrell, 1986: 27). Throughout the 20th century, radical movements thrived with leftist ideologies and reformist tendencies. Civil rights movements became more appealing to radical activities, encouraging people to support socialism, women's rights, or anti-Vietnam war campaigns (Cottrell, 1986: 49).

In the 20th century, the activism movements, growing student resistance, and incidents such as the May 1968 revolts raised interest and the number of participants in the radical scene. Calhoun (2011:204) argues that "Sometime after 1968, analysts and participants began to speak of "new social movements" that worked outside formal institutional channels and emphasized lifestyle, ethical or "identity" concerns rather than narrowly economic goals." These new social movements questioned the political sphere; therefore, "broadened it to include issues which had been considered outside the domain of political action," which changed the interest of the masses towards reaching political goals that are related to feminism, peace, animal rights or environmental action (Calhoun, 2011:204).

During this time period, some of the most notable factors that romanticized the idea of the social movement field together with collective behavior were the ongoing "aestheticizing of the self and a wide variety of engagements with aesthetic criteria," which played a great role in the 1960s student movements (Calhoun, 2011:223).

American social movements of the 20th century were also influenced by other ethnic groups in the US. A new generation of academics started studying the black movements in the 1990s. Regarding black communities, Mullen & Smethurst (2003: 183–204) state that the majority of us are still unaware of the significant cultural and political work carried out by Americans of African descent during the Cold War era, the severity of the repression they endured, or the extent to which Cold War pressures had a profound impact on racial issues.

The US was not the only country where the level of radicalization and support for social movements increased in the 20th century. The turn of the century also turned the Chinese nation towards modern radical ideologies. China's global marginalization produced marginalized intellectuals, and despite movements like the May Fourth[7], not all levels of

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[5] The New Deal was a domestic initiative of the Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) administration, which operated from 1933 to 1939 in the United States. It included measures to improve the economy immediately, as well as changes in finance, labor, housing, and the use of waterpower (Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia, 2022b).

[6] The Great Society is the political catchphrase that U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson (who served from 1963 to 1969) used to describe his legislative agenda for sweeping societal change (Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia, 2020).

[7] Chinese society underwent an intellectual revolution and a sociopolitical transformation during the years 1917–1921, known as the "May Fourth Movement." The movement aimed to restore society

intellectuals were radicalized, nor were all parts of China (Yü, 1993: 147). Nevertheless, the 20th century was a momentous era for the formation of a modern Chinese radical scene. Even though it hasn't occurred in a wide range of areas or places, it has transpired both socially and politically; moreover, it happened when it was required and where it was a must.

Fast forward to the 21st century, most things have changed significantly with the expanding influence of media along with new technologies within global cross-cultural societies. Due to its relation to these changes, the way radical, radicalism, or other derivatives of radicalization became more complex to define, creating a lack of a joint international definition for the word, much like the phenomenon of terrorism.

21st-century radicalism is far more global and harder to combat internationally. There are various reasons why, instead of an increased joint effort against worldwide radicalization and terrorism, the world is faced with a growing level of controversy regarding political violence. Some of these reasons are related to inequality that arises from the current world order, and some are related to economic, social, and psychological lack of support or the ideologies individuals hold onto that have fundamentalist and violent tendencies. However, the radicalization process might not arise for any of these reasons, especially in 21st-century societies where certain groups of the community are capable of enjoying an adequate welfare system. Nevertheless, it could still be argued that radical notions emerge regardless of where individuals come from or the satisfactory components of their lives.

Following September 11, 2001, debates concerning the success of the "War on Terrorism" approach, implemented globally against Al-Qaeda and its associated groups under the leadership of the USA, compelled countries to search for new and comprehensive anti-terrorism strategies. The focus on radicalization processes in the fight against terrorism has resulted from the fear and anxiety that foreign terrorist combatants who have joined terrorist organizations active in Iraq and Syria, as well as terrorists referred to as "Lone Wolves," have stoked in the West.

Since the formation of new methods of political violence, the world has witnessed the rise of a new threat, which has urged the implementation of new security strategies revolving around terrorism. The development of these strategies has also increased interest in the terminology of political violence and violent extremism. In the growing number of terrorism studies conducted since the September 11 attacks in New York (2001), the March 11 attacks in Madrid (2004), and the July 7 bombings in London (2005), terms such as "radicalism," "extremism," and "counter-terrorism" have gained prominence. Particularly from 2006 onwards, it appears that policymakers in the US and Europe have started using the terms

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and culture while achieving national independence and individual liberation (Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia, 2019).

"radicalization" and "counter-radicalization" in addition to or perhaps instead of the terms "terrorism" and "counter-terrorism." (Githens-Mazer, 2010:3-6)

2.2. Definition of Radicalization and Violent Extremism

Defining radicalization has never been easy. With our ever-growing knowledge of numerous fields and our experience gained from various global events, the definition of such phenomena and notions related to them have gotten relatively more complicated. Defining radicalization as a term and differentiating the word from similar terms such as extremism and terrorism has been complex, especially within the social sciences. Radicalization involves the endorsement and execution of radical behavior, which raises the question of how radicalized behavior is defined.

Cambridge Dictionary (2022) describes the word "radical" as "believing or expressing the belief that there should be great or extreme social or political change,"[8] and "radicalism" as "the belief that there should be great or extreme social or political change."[9] Although the mainstream definition of "radicalization" slightly differs depending on the source of information, Oxford Dictionary (Lexico.com, 2022) defines it as "The action or process of causing someone to adopt radical positions on political or social issues."

When it comes to defining radicalization in the academic context, a crucial misperception might arise due to the recent usage of radicalization within research papers. Especially after the September 11 attacks, there had been an influx within terrorism studies, which included the repetition of the words such as radicalization, extremism, and political violence. According to Schmid (2013: 1):

"The popularity of the concept of 'radicalisation' stands in no direct relationship to its actual explanatory power regarding the root causes of terrorism. It was brought into the academic discussion after the bomb attacks in Madrid and London in 2004 and 2005 by European policymakers who coined the term 'violent radicalisation'. It has become a political shibboleth despite its lack of precision."

Similarly, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2018) states that:

"The notion of 'radicalization' is generally used [by some States] to convey the idea of a process through which an individual adopts an increasingly extremist set of beliefs and aspirations. This may include, but is not defined by, the willingness to condone, support, facilitate or use violence to further political, ideological, religious or other goals. (Report A/HRC/33/29, para. 19)."

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[8] Cambridge Dictionary (2022a). "Meaning of radical in English," Cambridge Dictionary. Retrieved May, 26, 2022 from https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/radical
[9] Cambridge Dictionary (2022b). "Meaning of radicalism in English," Cambridge Dictionary. Retrieved May, 26, 2022 from https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/radicalism

According to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (2009), radicalization is the process in which individuals, typically young individuals, are exposed to an ideology or belief that explicitly encourages a shift away from moderate, mainstream opinions toward extremist viewpoints. However, although radicalization can, in most cases, lead to extremism that causes violence, the RCMP distinguishes the actual definition of radicalization from the possible political violence it can generate.

When individuals enter into the process of radicalization towards extremism, there is a threatening chance that this process can reach the level of political violence; however, radical behavior based on the meaning of the term points to political change. As mentioned in the historical implications of radicalism and social movements, radical movements do not indicate that all individuals involved in them are willing to commit violent acts. From this point of view, radicalism and radical behavior aim to alter society while advocating for social and political transformation. However, radicalization can also give birth to extremist ideologies that are likely to encourage individuals toward violence. Furthermore, some researchers define violent radicalization as a process that always leads to actual violent behavior, whereas different experts describe it as the simple embrace of various concepts that support or excuse violence (Alonso et al., 2008: 5).

Considering radicalization as a process, one can argue that it includes violence when the individual chooses political violence to realize targeted goals, which eventually turns the actions into terrorism. Nevertheless, what makes the radicalization process a two-sided coin lies in the fact that it is the pathway individuals take toward their goals. A notable example of this distinction is made by McCauley and Moskalenko (2017: 213) with the two pyramids model, which explains the importance of differentiating the radicalization of opinion from the radicalization of action.

There is also the term "violent extremism" that needs to be examined. Radicalization has been used as a term since the 18th century, whereas extremism is a more recently coined term compared to it (Bötticher, 2017, p. 73). Bötticher (2017 p.74-75) also gives a very long consensus definition of radicalization, which can be summarized as a "political doctrine embraced by socio-political movements favouring both individual and collective freedom, and emancipation from the rule of authoritarian regimes and hierarchically-structured societies." Besides this explanation, the definition also underlines the factor of 'hostility against the status quo and its establishment.'

According to Cambridge University Press (2022), the word "extremism" means "the fact of someone having beliefs that most people think are unreasonable and unacceptable."[10] It is

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[10] Cambridge Dictionary (2022c). "Meaning of extremism in English," Cambridge Dictionary. Retrieved Sep, 14, 2022 from https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/extremism

fundamental to examine the concept of political extremism to understand the focal points of this research while comprehending the relationship between the spread of violent approaches and terrorism. When it comes to determining the meaning of violence-related terms, it usually changes from one country to another. As in the case of the description of "radicalization" or "terrorism," the definition of "extremism" can become ambiguous from various points of view.

There are governmental and intergovernmental understandings regarding these terms, and according to UNODC (2018), the FBI acknowledges violent extremism as "encouraging, condoning, justifying, or supporting the commission of a violent act to achieve political, ideological, religious, social, or economic goals" which gives an idea about the definition of radicalization. Although the definition of violent extremism gives an idea about the definition of radicalization, radicalization and violent extremism are separate concepts.

Extremism is a term that appears along with radicalism, as demonstrated in the first figure; nonetheless, violent extremism appears comparatively closer to terrorism. Hence, one can argue that extremism emerges in a more negative context when it comes to the process of radicalization as well as the process of recruitment compared to radicalization. Whether radicalization and/or extremism gradually transform into terrorism or not, both terms are still part of a process that can result in political violence.

Figure 2.1. Dynamic model of violent radicalization (Noppe et al., 2011, based on McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008)

Source: Pauwels et al., 2014: 38

There is also no international consensus over the definition of violent extremism. It is a term that has no official definition neither by the United Nations nor by the European Union (Glazzard & Zeuthen, 2016). However, USAID defines it as "advocating, engaging in, preparing, or otherwise supporting ideologically motivated or justified violence to further social, economic or political objectives" (Glazzard & Zeuthen, 2016).

The globalization of radicalization has been recognized as a recurring problem in many countries. Nations around the world are grappling with rising radical sentiments that lead to violent extremism and terrorism. These tendencies have been identified as a security threat within the international sphere, primarily when they result in social and political unrest. As demonstrated in Figure 2.1, Noppe et al. (2011) designed a dynamic model of violent radicalization that contains the main stages of radicalization of an individual towards terrorism. The relationship between these terms has great significance when it comes to understanding how terms such as radicalization and extremism can be defined in the theoretical context.

It is essential to underline that the pyramid shape does not suggest a linear deterministic evolution from base to top (Pauwels et al., 2014: 38). An individual who has been radicalized at the bottom of the pyramid does not always transform into a terrorist. The progress could get interrupted or eradicate completely. According to Pauwels et al. (2014: 38): "The higher in the pyramid the smaller and more isolated the group. The process can stop, speed up, slow down, turn around, or skip steps."

2.3. The Process of Radicalization and Radicalization Theories with Models

The radicalization process differs depending on various factors, including the individuals who are getting radicalized or those who are radicalizing themselves. It is far more complicated to entirely explain the process of radicalization since there are many forms of it, as well as various settings to consider and psychological elements to take into account. All these aspects, combined with new technological developments and tools, require a review of various models of radicalization. Moreover, the development of new models to comprehend contemporary radicalization also becomes necessary. In this section, the main objective is to explore notable models of radicalization as well as different theories concerning radicalization processes within the existing literature.

2.3.1. King and Taylor's "Models of Radicalization" Table

As King and Taylor (2011: 605) examine in their paper, inter-theoretical radicalization models are demonstrated in the table below to see the differences and similarities between

them while providing a better understanding of the radicalization process by examining different stages and factors together.

Table 2.1. Models of radicalization

Author	Type of model	Stages or factors
Borum (2003)	Linear, progressive	1. Social and economic deprivation 2. Inequality and resentment 3. Blame and attribution 4. Stereotyping and demonizing the enemy
Wiktorowicz (2004)	Linear and emergent	1. Cognitive opening 2. Religious seeking 3. Frame alignment 4. Socialization
Moghaddam (2005–2006)	Linear, progressive	1. Psychological interpretation of material conditions 2. Perceived options to fight unfair treatment 3. Displacement of aggression 4. Moral engagement 5. Solidification of categorical thinking 6. The terrorist act
NYPD (Silber & Bhatt) (2007)	Linear	1. Pre-radicalization 2. Self-identification 3. Indoctrination 4. Jihadization
Sageman (2008)	Non-linear, emergent	1. Sense of moral outrage 2. Frame used to interpret the world 3. Resonance with personal experience 4. Mobilization through networks

Source: King & Taylor, 2011: 605

2.3.1.1. Borum's Theory on Process of Ideological Development

Borum (2003:7–10) repeatedly emphasizes the significance of understanding the mindset of an individual's ideological development by questioning its origins, motives, and directions to prevent possible violent reactions that occur once the individual reaches the

endpoint of the radicalization process. In Borum's paper, it is also underlined that a behavioral understanding of radicalization that leads to violence is as vital as understanding the ideological motives of terrorism (Borum, 2003: 8). Borum attributes an individual's development of an ideology to justify terrorism to a psychological process, which he explains in four stages in his paper "Understanding the Terrorist Mind-Set," published in an FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin.

At the beginning of the radicalization process, the individual considers his situation to be unacceptable. In other words, he or she views it as "it's not right." The individual complains about the position he or she is in. At this stage, Borum focuses on the context of ideological development due to social and economic deprivation. These circumstances can be either economic, such as poor living conditions like poverty and unemployment, or social predicaments like the restriction of state-based freedoms.

Figure 2.2. Borum's model of the process of ideological development
Source: Borum, 2003: 9

The second stage is "it's not fair," which is when the individual compares his or her situation with others, especially with those who are better off. As a result, people consider this inequality to be unlawful. Additionally, certain individuals or groups are held accountable for this inequality. The sense of inequality, combined with the resentment that comes with comparison, leads people to judge other members of the targeted responsible groups, in other words, progressing to the third stage of "it's your fault." Once these groups are identified as the targets and the source of the current injustice, individuals begin to see the target groups as inhumane; therefore, they begin defaming them constantly. Blaming the target groups and attributing to them negative stereotypes thus forms the fourth and final stage, "you're evil."

The last stage of the process of ideological development paves the way for violence. The pathway to violence continues with aggression against individuals and groups that are associated with negative stereotypes, as mentioned earlier. Individuals who are radicalized

through this process justify their actions since they consider these outgroups to be knowingly and willfully harming others. Moreover, the groups held responsible will be deemed to have deserved any attack, as it is seen as a genuine source of evil. Eventually, those who live under these adverse conditions and those who have almost reached the end of the radicalization process will not see themselves as the bad guys. They will elicit a reaction by generalizing and stereotyping, dehumanizing and demonizing their adversary (the cause); furthermore, they will ultimately regard violence as a legitimate means of achieving transformation (Borum, 2003: 8-9).

2.3.1.2. Wiktorowicz's Model of Joining the Cause

In his research, Wiktorowicz does not use the word "radicalization" directly. Instead, the paper outlines four steps that lead to a person joining an Islamic extremist organization. These four stages are listed in order as follows: cognitive opening, religious seeking, frame alignment, and socialization.

The first step, referred to as "cognitive opening," is frequently the outcome of a personal crisis that leaves a person open to ideas they previously would have dismissed. While social factors such as experiencing racism, political discrimination, humiliation, or financial factors like losing one's job can be seen as crises, these crises may also involve more personal issues such as the loss of a family member, victimization through crime, or domestic enmity. Disagreements with members of an Islamic extremist group might also result in a crisis (Wiktorowicz, 2004: 7-8).

Individuals' receptivity to new ideas that began in the first stage begins to shift to religion in the second stage, which is "religious seeking." This religious seeking phase, along with exposure to new ideas, predisposes one to examine the dangerous worldviews of radical Islamic groups. Individuals who have no prior religious understanding, in particular, may be led to accept what they have acquired through this process without question.

After individuals get introduced to radical Islamic ideologies, they explore the extremist notions, which guide their progress to the third stage of "frame alignment," in which individuals start to agree that the extreme Islamic worldview and their own are compatible. To realize this progress, the radicalized individual must have a certain level of respect for the theological competence of those who embrace the radical Islamic worldview; otherwise, the radicalization process may end there (Wiktorowicz, 2004: 8-9).

Figure 2.3. Wiktorowicz's model for joining radical or terrorist groups

Source: Beutel, 2007

When the radicalized individual learns more about the ideology and the group and is welcomed as a member of the movement while embracing the new identity, individuals reach the final stage of joining extremist groups, which is "socialization and joining." Individuals are further isolated from society at large after becoming members and maintaining their ideology. Although face-to-face encounters are more effective, socialization can also take place via the Internet, such as in private chat rooms (Beutel, 2007). While their group identity is preserved through interactions with other members of the movement, individuals are also increasingly alienated from the rest of society. Individuals become tied to their group ideology at this point and simultaneously assimilate, causing their identity to be recast (Wiktorowicz, 2004: 10-11).

2.3.1.3. Moghaddam's Theory of The Staircase to Terrorism

Moghaddam describes the radicalization process with a staircase metaphor (King and Taylor, 2011:606). In each of the six steps of the ladder, certain elements can potentially lead

the individual to further radicalization. King and Taylor (2011: 606) state that Moghaddam's staircase to terrorism can be defined as a decision tree since it can be observed whether the individual will proceed to the next stage by looking at his or her reaction to the components at each step.

On the ground floor of the staircase, there are feelings of injustice, unfairness, and disappointment as the first factors in the path of the process that will ultimately lead to legitimizing terrorism. Although these feelings may occur out of objective struggles, in most cases, individuals form unfavorable feelings due to their personal understandings of their material conditions. In his paper, Moghaddam highlights the consequences of perceived deprivation. Besides, he claims that when individuals recognize that their group is deficient through group comparisons, they are more inclined to continue dimbing the radicalization ladder (Moghaddam, 2005: 163). People who feel deprived, such as those who are affected by group-based inequality and injustice, will be driven to enhance their group's status.

Figure 2.4. Moghaddam's model of the staircase to terrorism
Source: Muro, 2016: 3

People who choose to fight what they perceive as unfair treatment will start their radicalization process by taking the first step of the staircase to terrorism. Two societal factors will impact how people choose to deal with the low status of their group at this stage: social mobility and procedural justice (King and Taylor, 2011: 606). Individuals are not as willing to take extreme measures when there are real opportunities to elevate their low social status. Radicalization becomes less likely if people see decision-making as fair and have opportunities to participate in the process. Dissatisfaction without social mobility or procedural justice to

restore their present status takes individuals to the next level of the staircase (Moghaddam, 2005: 164).

When moved to the second step of the staircase, dissatisfaction can be seen as a directive approach when it comes to forming an "us-versus-them" mindset. There may be a displacement of aggression instead of focusing on the actual causes of injustice. Western countries like the United States are held responsible for the lack of individuals' rights along with their low status (Moghaddam, 2005: 164). Some of those who easily channel their violence may begin to consider radical options for countering unfairness. Those considering this option will take the stairs to the next floor, making it easier for them to move to the third step of the radicalization staircase. These individuals frequently associate with others who share their beliefs. These like-minded people, mostly young men, are the ones who try to justify terrorism on moral grounds. They discuss their increasingly radicalized beliefs with one another, which further radicalizes them and causes them to distance themselves from society (King and Taylor, 2011: 606). In the third stage, people maximize the contrasts between themselves and the groups they see as enemies. Any act of violence becomes psychologically easier to carry out as a result of this distinction.

Those who continue down the path of radicalization will eventually reach the fourth level, where they will officially join a terrorist group. The thoughts become stronger and more categorized; the mentality of us against them becomes more prevalent on this floor. The individual takes on a specific role in the terrorist organization at this point, like fundraising, recruiting, or constructing a bomb (King and Taylor, 2011: 607). The fourth stage is also critical since individuals who enter this step are unlikely to leave the terrorist group they are a member of alive, making their move to the fifth stage systematic.

Those who reach the final and the fifth floor are those who want to commit terrorist acts. In this final stage, compliance, and obedience that foster brutality compel individuals to be "psychologically prepared and motivated to commit acts of terrorism, sometimes resulting in multiple civilian deaths." (Moghaddam, 2005: 166).

2.3.1.4. The NYPD's Model of Radicalization

The New York Police Department's (NYPD) Intelligence Division suggests a radicalization model that consists of four phases. These four stages explain the radicalization processes an individual goes through. Silber and Bhatt examine five key domestic terrorism attacks in North America and Western Europe to form their radicalization model.

Figure 2.5. The NYPD's model of jihadization
Source: Borum, 2011b: 41

The model's initial "pre-radicalization" phase describes a person's life before radicalization. Silber and Bhatt identify several similar characteristics even though "there is no specific psychological profile that characterizes those at risk for radicalization (King and Taylor, 2011: 607)." Some of those common traits are related to the individual's background, such as their environment, education, beliefs, neighborhood, and lifestyle. The study looks at the individuals' lives prior to their radicalization process and indicates that young, middle-class Muslim males from various ethnic backgrounds, usually from the second or third generation, are more prone to becoming radicalized (Silber and Bhatt, 2007: 25). These individuals, who live in liberal western democracies, are conveyed to be educated, recently converted, with little or no criminal history. They are also not considered radical or even devout Muslims before their radicalization process with ordinary lives.

The "self-identification" phase starts for those with the particular characteristics mentioned, and the radicalization process settles in for the individuals. The main driving force in this phase is the individual's conversion to Islam in response to a personal issue (King and Taylor, 2011: 607). Furthermore, personal matters might arise from distinguishing circumstances "such as losing a job, or the result of an ongoing situation, like discrimination or an identity crisis." Individuals may turn to Islam to cope with a personal crisis, despite their limited knowledge of religious teachings, and become exposed to misinterpretation of the religion when they begin to doubt their previously held values. These misinterpretations, as well as radical interpretations of Islam, lead individuals towards extremist ideologies such as Salafism. These extreme tendencies, combined with media coverage of western aggression in

Muslim countries and online networking between extremists, further radicalize individuals and provide them with a new battleground in the virtual space (Silber and Bhatt, 2007: 39, 85).

In the third step, referred to as "indoctrination," the individual completely adopts the jihadist-Salafi ideology and favors violence against non-Islamic targets. As their growing religiosity has become politicized, everything is interpreted as evidence of a war waged by the West against Islam. Hence, one moves from having personal and individual pursuits to impersonal and collective objectives that focus on protecting Muslims or taking revenge. Silber and Bhatt (2007: 38-39) claim that when individuals reach this stage, they tend to withdraw from mosques since their level of extremism cannot be satisfied with that of the mosque. In addition, individuals join groups of more extreme ideologies and seek out like-minded people who are holding private meetings with more radicalized agendas.

Individuals end up in the final phase, "jihadization," when they "self-designate themselves as holy warriors or mujahedeen" and adopt violence as a way to jihad (Silber and Bhatt, 2007: 45). When individuals reach this final stage, they start militant training either abroad or simply preparing themselves and the members of their groups for an attack (Silber and Bhatt, 2007: 46). Once again, extremist internet platforms and media outlets play a prominent role in passing on their violent ideologies to others. Ultimately, the final step of jihadization is conducting "the actual attack." Terrorists have both the intention and the capacity to carry out an attack, and the odds of law enforcement and intelligence agencies halting or preventing one are extremely slim (Silber and Bhatt, 2007: 47–48).

Regarding NYPD's report and analysis of the radicalization process, Aziz Huq presents his concerns about NYPD's methodology and conclusions, which he critiques as questionable and stigmatizing. According to Huq (2007: 1), "the Report applies a highly questionable methodology to draw conclusions unwarranted by its insufficient data set, conclusions that likely will result in racial and religious profiling deleterious both to civil liberties and to genuine efforts at attaining security."

The first concern Huq (2007: 2) presents the poor methodology, which only analyses five cases that are associated with terrorism. The NYPD links religious behavior with this limited number of cases and forms signs of radicalization from vague interpretations of the cases. Some of these signs include ordinary religious behavior such as "doctrinally mandated prayer," which is practiced by millions of Muslims without having any relation to radical or extremist ideologies, let alone violence.

Similarly, the report contains discriminatory language towards the Muslim population, which suggests that most Muslims in the US are posing a threat to society in general (Huq, 2007: 3). Although political and social activism is protected by the First Amendment, the report stigmatizes Muslim activists even though other ethnic and religious groups are known for

committing violence historically (Huq, 2007: 3). Besides, Huq (2007) criticizes the report for making dangerous claims about the "pre-radicalization" phase, where individuals have not amplified their ideologies nor become extreme enough to be convinced to carry out violent action; however, the report presents these individuals as an "irreducible threat."

2.3.1.5. Sageman's Theory of Radicalization

Similar to the previous theories of radicalization, Sageman also stresses the importance of understanding the radicalization process that leads to violence. Nevertheless, unlike previous theories that describe phases in chronological order, Sageman claims that radicalization is the result of the complex interactions of four components, or "prongs," denoted as "a sense of moral outrage, a specific interpretation of the world, resonance with personal experiences, and mobilization through networks (King and Taylor, 2011: 608; Sageman, 2008: 225)."

Figure 2.6. Sageman's model with four prong
Source: Elaborated by the author

One of the notable statements Sageman makes is that radicalization that leads to terrorism affects ordinary people, and it is not the product of widely regarded social, economic,

or mental issues. These factors can accelerate the procedure, yet the message conveyed by Islamic radicals contains the foundation of ideology that develops the radicalization process.

To combat terrorism arising from a radicalization process that includes cognitive and sociological factors, Sageman emphasizes the need for a deeper understanding of the behavioral aspects of the hostile group. These groups are mostly made up of young males who are seeking political change through the use of violence, following so-called Islamic ideologies. One of the problems when it comes to deradicalization arises with the style of aggression towards Islam, especially with the biased media portrayal of the religion. According to Sageman (2008: 224):

> "It is this very media image of a war against Islam that increases the pool of young Muslims susceptible to the message of the terrorists, namely, that they are the only ones who defend Muslim interests and honor against Western cultural and physical aggression."

These constructed ideas and views build the cognitive factors of "a sense of moral rage" and "the frame used to interpret the world" that fuel the radicalization process (King and Taylor, 2011: 608). Alongside the idea that the west waged war against Islam, King and Taylor (2011: 608) state that incidents such as the invasion of Iraq changed the perceptions of individuals and, as intelligence agencies described, eventually became the "primary recruiting vehicle for violent Islamic extremists."

The third prong comes into play when individuals face personal situations in which they are discriminated against or feel anger stemming from unemployment. Sageman compares American and European Muslims by cultural tradition and social background to explain why European Muslims are more likely to get radicalized. According to Sageman (2008: 226-227), most American Muslims still believe in the American Dream and feel less discriminated against within the labor market. The ethnic diversity within the United States as a result of continuous immigration and a melting pot society, as opposed to the salad bowl examples of European countries where people do not feel like they belong in the nation of their home country, creates a difference in how people react to coexisting. In most cases where radicalization arises, individuals consider this social structure as a part of the western hostility against Islam, and rage emerges from frustration.

Besides these cognitive factors, which can affect or cause one another, the last prong, "mobilization through networks," focuses on the mobilization of radicalization and tools for realizing the process. Sageman repeatedly underlines the role the internet has played in the radicalization process.

The transition from smaller face-to-face groups of individuals to constructing online echo chambers that exacerbate moral outrage and resentment made a huge difference in the radicalization we see today. These online echo chambers produce extremist groups cut off from mainstream society, acting as a quick and globally accessible instrument that permanently

alters the radicalization process. Whether the process takes place in the physical or virtual world, King and Taylor (2011: 608) argue that Sageman regards the present waves of terrorism inspired by Al Qaeda as a societal movement rather than a cohesive plan implemented by a hierarchical organization.

2.3.2. Muro's "Four Visualizations of Socialization into Violent Extremism"

To understand what radicalization looks like, Muro (2016: 2-4) examines four different models of radicalization. Muro (2016: 2) emphasizes how challenging it is to recognize the mental process in which radical ideas are adopted, which he notes as "Radicalisation towards violent extremism is a complex and multifaceted process that takes place at a variety of levels (individual, organizational, and systemic)." Depending on these levels, the way radicalization transitions into extremist tendencies might differ. Likewise, radicalization to political violence exists in various kinds of terrorism movements, whether these ideologies come from right-wing, left-wing, or religious sources. The message these movements convey changes, yet they retain processes that demonstrate similar characteristics.

Muro's article aims to visualize four analytical models of radicalization that apply to all forms of terrorism. Muro (2016) illustrates prominent radicalization theories with titles in the following order: "Radicalisation as a Process," "The Four-Stage Model," "Staircase to Terrorism," and "The Pyramid Model of Radicalisation."

The second visualization, the Four-Stage Model, references the work of Randy Borum (2003) and focuses on the mindset of terrorists. The third model references the theory of Fathali M. Moghaddam (2005), Staircase to Terrorism, and explains how lesser people reach the top of the radicalization staircase and get involved in acts of terrorism. Since these models have already been covered in the previous section of the literature review of radicalization, this segment explores the other two illustrations: "Radicalisation as a Process" and "The Pyramid Model of Radicalisation."

2.3.2.1. Explaining Radicalization as a Process

When it comes to distinguishing factors among terms such as radicalization and terrorism, there is a lack of international consensus over their definition. In the case of radicalization towards extremism, Schmid (2013: 1-2) contends that despite difficulties with sophisticated definitions, academics agree that radicalization is a process. Radicalization is a process in which gradual cognitive changes trigger contrasts in the individual's behavior towards acts of violence and eventually encourage the individual to take part in them.

Figure 2.7. Radicalization as a process
Source: Muro, 2016: 2

As Figure 2.7 suggests, the radicalization process of an individual or collective group is linear and has stages that can lead individuals gradually toward violent extremism or terrorism (Schmid, 2013: 18–19). According to his phased process, radicalized ideological engagement might be accelerated if the person experiences a "Catalyst Event," increasing the danger of political violence (Muro, 2016: 2-3). As Muro (2016: 3) examines, such events are also characterized by Wiktorowicz as the "cognitive opening."

There are numerous types of catalyst events that can result in a cognitive opening. Some of these events are related to one's personal experiences that can arise from their social, economic, or political situation, whereas other cases might result from a shocking event that scarred an individual or group, causing them to change their opinion as well as their behavior (Muro, 2016: 3). Individually or collectively, facing a catalyst event does not automatically translate into further radicalization, either. Furthermore, Wiktorowicz (2005: 24) argues that: "Not everyone who experiences a cognitive opening is drawn to al-Muhajiroun; in fact, most never experiment with radical Islam.

2.3.2.2. Visualizing Radicalization with The Pyramid Model

The pyramid model distinguishes different levels not only by their characteristics but also by the number of individuals or groups that are involved. In the pyramid model, violence becomes prevalent towards the top; therefore, the higher the level is located, the more

determination is required to adhere to the ideology. With this trend, ideological radicalization also prevails and causes extremism that will trigger violence.

Figure 2.8. The pyramid model of radicalisation
Source: Muro, 2016: 4

The pyramid model of radicalization is formed by McCauley and Moskalenko (2008) and concentrates specifically on individual and mass radicalization. While making distinctions between the radicalization of individuals, groups, and masses. McCauley & Moskalenko (2008: 418) present the table below for pathways to violence. In correlation with the pyramid model, the table indicates some of the critical factors that affect different levels of society.

Table 2.2. Pathways to violence: Mechanisms of political radicalization at individual, group, and mass-public levels

Level of radicalization	Mechanism
Individual	1. Personal victimization
	2. Political grievance
	3. Joining a radical group—the slippery slope
	4. Joining a radical group—the power of love
	5. Extremity shift in like-minded groups
Group	6. Extreme cohesion under isolation and threat
	7. Competition for the same base of support
	8. Competition with state power—condensation
	9. Within-group competition—fissioning

Table 2.2 Continued

Mass	10. Jujitsu politics
	11. Hate
	12. Martyrdom

Source: McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008: 418

Taking these mechanisms into account, to move from the base of the pyramid to the apex, where violence takes place physically, individuals go through the listed instruments to connect their personal beliefs and ideologies to the greater masses and create a more collective understanding, which makes the importance of evaluating radicalization towards extremism more evident. Even if the majority of people remain at the bottom of the pyramid, with the proper mechanism and process, individuals can be taken to the top of the pyramid and recruited for terrorism.

In light of the models and theories examined, radicalization processes are diverse and complex. The radicalization theories and models mentioned in this chapter are referenced repeatedly in radicalization studies; nevertheless, none of the models specifically focus on lone-wolf terrorism. This literature review observes that the studies on the radicalization models were insufficient in creating a radicalization model for the chosen lone-wolf terrorism cases in particular. This factor becomes more evident when the types of terrorism, copycat attacks, motivations, and online implications regarding the case studies are revealed. Since this research aims to develop an analysis of lone wolf terrorism with case studies, a more relevant model is required.

In addition to this inference, to lay the theoretical basis of the study, the next chapter focuses on a radicalization model that concentrates solely on lone-wolf terrorism. Furthermore, the following chapter examines lone wolf terrorism along with Hamm and Spaaij's "Radicalization Model of Lone Wolf Terrorism" to achieve more precise conclusions about the already sophisticated radicalization processes of the case studies.

3. THE RADICALIZATION MODEL OF LONE WOLF TERRORISM

As mentioned earlier, most of the well-known radicalization models considered milestones in the literature do not cover the radicalization process that explains how radicalization toward lone-wolf terrorism works. In addition, they focus heavily on a single type of terrorism, such as homegrown terrorism or religious terrorism. Therefore, the deficiency regarding radicalization models focusing on lone-wolf terrorism urges this paper to focus on lone-wolf terrorism together with radicalization models appropriate for demonstrating individuals' radicalization processes similar to those in the case studies. Moreover, this chapter aims to build a hypothesis regarding the significance of understanding lone-wolf terrorism as well as its fragments within the radicalization literature.

3.1. Understanding Terrorism in the 21st Century

In the age of the internet, where globalization and digitalism have developed rapidly, the fact that international terrorism has kept pace with these changes has come to the surface. While this situation requires the redefinition of old notions regarding security issues and international terrorism, it also points to the need to examine these concepts through new radicalization processes. However, looking at one of the most fundamental terms, such as terrorism, one can realize the challenging complexity of creating a universal definition of the essential term. Gunn and Demirden (2019: 12) underline that there is no universally accepted definition of the phenomenon of terrorism within a conceptual framework.

Like other terms related to violence, there are difficulties when it comes to the definition of terrorism. Terrorism becomes overly inclusive and challenging when different parties consider separate acts as terrorist violence; moreover, this situation makes terrorism almost impossible to define as a wholeWhen considering this serious issue, one can argue that the definition of terrorism should have salient attributes to grasp from previous cases of terrorism, such as the IRA bombing of the Grand Hotel in Brighton in 1984, al-Qaida's fatal destruction of the Twin Towers in 2001, the attack on the London Underground in 2005, and many more (Hodgson & Tadros, 2013: 496). There is a lack of a legally binding international definition for terrorism, as Lord Carlile (2007: 47) also states in his conclusion over the description of the word: "There is no single definition of terrorism that commands full international approval."

To bring clarification to the international legal definition of terrorism requires endeavoring a normative approach to the term as well as forming concepts that can contribute to combating international terrorism. Obstacles to such ideal formations are listed as "the

dubious status of wars of national liberation" and "the highly treasured right of states to grant asylum to political offenders" by Dugard (1974: 75).

In-depth research on the definitions of terrorism is necessary for understanding terrorism on a large scale. Although there is not a single definition for the term, various definitions of the word share common characteristics that could help form an idea about the identification of terrorism. Firstly, it should be noted that terrorism could arise from different and complex reasonings within societies. Along with violence, terrorist actions communicate with their targets by demonstrating their strength to their followers while frightening their rivals for their ultimate objectives (Teymur et al., 2009: 3).

Definitions of terrorism as a term vary and are controversial as well as complicated. The expressions of fear and brutality that generally appear in the definition of terrorism stem from the intense extremist tendency inherent in terrorism, which also acts upon violence. Terrorism came closest to its current meaning in the 1790s to express the terror used by revolutionaries against their opponents during the French Revolution (Jenkins, 2021). If we look at the actual meaning of terrorism for the formation of the conceptual framework, the word terror (terrorism) originates from the Latin word "terrere," which means "trembling with fear" or "causing trembling" (Yayla, 2015: 335).

Over the years, there have been many definitions of terrorism developed by governments, scholars, and international organizations. When compared, different definitions of terrorism include equivalent or the same characteristics. To broaden the understandings of terrorism as well as to glance at the common elements within definitions, Schmid (2017: 5-6) examines 109 definitions of terrorism in the early 1980s. As shown in table below, his analysis demonstrates that there are twenty-two characteristics of terrorism with changing frequencies found in the 109 different definitions. This research benefits us while identifying terrorism by considering mentioned elements to be more dominant within terrorist violence.

Table 3.1. Frequency of definitional elements in 109 definitions.

Element	Frequency
1. Violence, force	83.5%
2. Political	65%
3. Fear, terror emphasized	51%
4. Threat	47%
5. (Psych.) effects and (anticipated) reactions	41.5%
6. Victim-target differentiation	37.5%
7. Purposive, planned, systematic, organized action	32%

Table 3.1. Continued

8. Method of combat, strategy, tactic	30.5%
9. Extranormality, in breach of accepted rules, without humanitarian constraints	30%
10. Coercion, extortion, induction of compliance	28%
11. Publicity aspect	21.5%
12. Arbitrariness; impersonal, random character; indiscrimination	21%
13. Civilians, non-combatans, neutrals, outsiders as victims	17.5%
14. Intimidation	17%
15. Innocence of victims emphasized	15.5%
16. Group, movement, organization as perpetrator	14%
17. Symbolic aspect, demonstration to others	13.5%
18. Incalculability, unpredictability, unexpectedness of occurrence of violence	9%
19. Clandestine, covert nature	9%
20. Repetitiveness; serial or campaign character of violence	7%
21. Criminal	6%
22. Demands made on third parties	4%

Source: Schmid & Jongman, 2017: 5-6

Another essential factor to consider while defining terrorism is the distinguishing features terrorism holds. Tilly (2004: 8) argues that "...in social science, useful definitions should point to detectable phenomena that exhibit some degree of causal coherence—in principle all instances should display common properties that embody or result from similar cause-effect relations." If the definitions of terrorism include prevalent aspects such as violence and the use of force in common, is it possible to distinguish terrorism from separate acts of violence?

To bring clarity to this question, Schmid and Jongman (1988, as cited in Guelke, 1995: 18-19) define terrorism as "Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-)clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators."

Schmid (2005: 127) also states that "Many acts of terrorism can be considered as peacetime equivalents of war crimes, performed by clandestine groups to provoke, intimidate,

coerce, impress, or persuade target audiences in the struggle for political power." These efforts on the definition of terrorism show that terrorism, as a form of destruction, can be differentiated from other forms of violent acts; nevertheless, recognizing the distinctions of terror acts still remains to be dependent on the reviewing parties since there is still international discourse over the definition of the term.

Table 3.2. Required Conditions for an Incident to Be a Terrorist Attack

Required Conditions:	Conditions Restated as Questions:
1. The attack was done by a *nonstate actor*—that is, a private individual or group, or a clandestine state agent—not a person or group officially acting for a government.	1. Was the attack done by a *nonstate actor*?
2. The attack aimed or threatened physical *violence* at *noncombatant targets*—that is, civilians (in general), military personnel in noncombatant status, or property.	2. Was the *violence* aimed at physically harming or threatening *noncombatant targets*?
3. The attack was intended to *elicit responses* from *third-party targets*—that is, people, governments, organizations, and groups other than the victims/property attacked.	3. Was the attack intended to *elicit responses* from *third-party targets*?
4. The attack had a *political* purpose—that is, the attack was intended to advance a political goal.	4. Did the attack have a *political* purpose?

Source: Yamamoto, 2017: 191

Looking at the elements and qualities of terrorism, Yamamoto (2017: 191) claims that "the conditions that an incident must meet to be a terrorist attack can be determined." As illustrated in Table 3.2 and Table 3.3, by analyzing characteristics of terrorism, Yamamoto (2017: 191) devises a series of required conditions and questions that can distinguish terrorist attacks from other forms of violence.

Table 3.3. Required Conditions to Be a Terrorist Attack: Comparison of Incidents

Incident → Required Conditions to Be a Terrorist Attack ↓	9/11 Attacks, 2001	Vail Ski Resort Attack, 1998	Oklahoma City Bombing, 1995	Battle of Gettysburg, 1863	Shooting Rampage, Columbine High School, 1999	Mugging (Common Crime)
1. Was the attack done by a *nonstate actor*?	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
2. Was the *violence* aimed at physically harming or threatening *noncombatant targets*?	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
3. Was the attack intended to *elicit responses* from *third-party targets*?	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
4. Did the attack have a *political purpose*?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Was the incident a terrorist attack? (Were all required conditions met?)	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No

Source: Yamamoto, 2017: 191

While defining terrorism, it should also be noted that although scholars and researchers are producing important academic or international definitions of terrorism, they are not the only factors when it comes to the actual meaning of the word. There are factors outside of the norms that can highly affect what we see as terrorism in the minds of citizens, students, and civilians. On this matter, Greene (2017: 414) states that: "Terrorism therefore is a social construct, its meaning shaped by the subjective perspectives of the categorizer."

This subject has also been questioned by other scholars, which makes a fundamental shift in the understanding of terrorism from the eyes of the greater masses. For instance, Hülsse and Spencer (2008: 571) argue that: "From a constructivist point of view, terrorism is a social construction." The same authors continue criticizing how terrorists are becoming the main actors while looking for a definition. Studies ask questions about terrorism based on the assumption that terrorists will lead to knowledge about how terrorism works. However, Hülsse

and Spencer (2008: 572) underline the importance of the constitution of terrorism, which promotes the examination of the terrorism discourse.

3.1.1. Motivations of Terrorism

The terms violence and fear are among the most common words associated with the phenomenon of terrorism. The norms that have international validity, particularly in the efforts to enable the fight against global terrorism, are the General Assembly resolution 49/60 of the United Nations General Assembly, which was taken in 1994. In the draft "Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism," international norms were constituted to define terrorism, which has become a global threat (Kaşıkçı, 2016: 5).

Since there is no internationally agreed definition, it is crucial to interpret the concept of terrorism according to the motivations of terrorist acts. According to the United Nations General Assembly resolution 49/60, terrorism is defined in article 3[11] as: "Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them."

Developing an internationally recognized legal definition of terrorism has great importance due to the growing influence of the globalizing terrorist organizations. When it comes to distinguishing factors, violent acts must have a motivation behind them to be labeled as terrorism. Berger (1976: 29) reasons this approach to the phenomenon of terrorism as follows: "The motive distinguishes terrorism from ordinary crime, the goal from acts of violence of a more functional character (such as, for instance, sabotage)." That also includes the reasons behind terrorist movements. Terrorist acts stem from different motivations that vary in forms, rationales, and patterns.

Regarding the different causes of terrorism, Schmid (2012: 159) remarks that: "The motivations to engage in terrorism cover a broad range, including redress for alleged grievances, personal or vicarious revenge, collective punishment, revolution, national liberation and the promotion of diverse ideological, political, social, national, or religious causes and objectives." Combining the mentioned motives with various acts of violence creates a fearful environment that can be used to manipulate society and bring attention to specific issues that terrorists desire.

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[11] United Nations. (1995). General Assembly Decision No. 49/60, A/RES/49/60. Retrieved September 20, 2021, from https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/49/60

The process of transforming different motivations into acts of violence has a critical place in understanding global terror attacks. So much so that this process has been tried to be interpreted with different security theories. Atalan and Hocaoğlu (2019) refer to this issue in their article titled "Lone Wolf Terrorism in Specific to the Christchurch Attack": "According to the theory called 'securitization' in international relations, politicians and decision-makers define something as a threat and legitimize taking political, military and economic steps over that thing."

The violence factor, which develops, especially in the ideological structures of radicalized individuals, is triggered by the misinterpretation of social and political events and the development of the wrong perception. From this point of view, propaganda plays a significant role in the realization of terrorist activities. Buzan, Wæver, and De Wilde (1998: 21), in their work titled "Security: A new framework for analysis," argue that the unusual nature of security threats justifies the use of extraordinary measures to deal with these threats, along with the development of security understanding (the innovation of security), they argue, is the key to legitimizing the use of force.

Policies that are compatible with the securitization theory, which for a long time caused the perception of terrorism to be processed through people belonging to the religion of Islam, restricted the understanding of the threat that terrorism poses; thus, made terrorism activities caused by different motivations less visible. On the one hand, Middle Eastern Muslims and Africans have been greatly harmed and marginalized by the perception of terrorism; especially, due to the "War on Terror" that started in 2003 (Kartal, 2018: 47). On the other hand, the effects of the horrific attacks carried out by terrorists who belong to the white supremacist ideology are continually called "lone wolves." In addition to labeling them with different terminology, most lone-wolf cases have not been subjected to the same securitization sanctions. Moreover, Harwell and Timberg (2019) state that:

"Federal authorities in the United States — mindful of constitutional protections for the free-speech rights of Americans and, in some case, their links to mainstream political actors — have long been reluctant to gather intelligence among potential domestic terrorists in the same intrusive ways they do among foreign terrorist groups, said Clinton Watts, a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and a former FBI counterterrorism expert."

The writers emphasize the reality of the user profile of these online communities and how they attract people globally. Authorities have been criticized for turning a blind eye to these communities, as Watts put it, "making it part of one of the bureau's legal blind spots in combating domestic terrorism." The reason behind this statement comes from a tricky question: why are they treated differently? These types of domestic terrorism cases are planned the same way as the foreign Muslim extremist threats, such as encouraging, radicalizing, and preparing

terrorist attacks. Nevertheless, Watts adds a significant twist to the plot, as Harwell and Timberg (2019) report: "There was one key difference in the political and legal dynamics, however: "Domestic terrorists vote. Foreign terrorists don't."

Especially fueled after the 9/11 attacks, major western targets of so-called Islamist terrorists started to invest in security studies and the media's coverage of terrorism. This kind of approach to counterterrorism created disproportional attention towards Islamic radicalization; moreover, "this propaganda may not simply ignore right-wing terrorism but actually foster it" (Corbin, 2017: 485). This situation jeopardizes political and social integrity by resulting in emerging political and social polarization, which has violent consequences in the long run. Whether it is far-left/far-right extremism or Islamic radicalism, this polarizing practice continues to emerge from increasing perceptions of "the other." Additionally, this pattern in the global world order finds the right place to settle, causing more harm to counter-radicalization efforts.

3.1.2. Types of Terrorism

Despite numerous efforts to differentiate various types of terrorism, no single set of terrorism types encompasses all aspects of terrorism (Jenkins, 2022). Besides, the political environments in which terrorist organizations operate are as different as their objectives, constituents, ideologies, and resources (Jenkins, 2022). Moreover, when the operational background is considered, some types of terrorist attacks are carried out by lone actors.

According to Jenkins (2022), one of the primary typologies for political terrorism is divided into three types: "revolutionary, subrevolutionary, and establishment." The most prevalent type of the three is the revolutionary type of terrorism, in which individuals desire the total replacement of an existing political system with a new one (Jenkins, 2022). Examples of this type of terrorism could be noted as partisan and resistance groups in Yugoslavia during the Second World War, Irish revolutionaries, as well as terrorism resulting from "internal wars" like those in Vietnam and Morocco[12] (Hutchinson, 1972: 395).

The second type of terrorism, according to the same typology, is sub-revolutionary terrorism. In this type of political terrorism, the objective is to achieve a level of transformation within the political body without changing the system altogether (Shultz, 1978: 10). The ANC's efforts to eliminate apartheid in South Africa can be viewed as an example of sub-revolutionary terrorism (Britannica, 2022).

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[12] The author references the National Liberation Front (FLN), which engaged in a guerrilla war against France during the Algerian War that lasted between 1954 and 1962 (Britannica, 2022).

The last class of terrorism in Wilkenson's[13] typology is establishment terrorism. Furthermore, Shultz (1978: 10) defines the term as terrorism conducted by "an established political system" towards "external and internal political opposition." Established terrorism is also referred to as "state terrorism," and one of the most notable factors regarding this type of terrorism is the efforts of states to cover it up, thus leading to ambiguity, secrecy, and denial (Britannica, 2022). For instance, during the Cold War, the Soviet Union and its allies were accused of funding international terrorism (Britannica, 2022). The U.S. is also known for supporting terrorist movements overseas[14], particularly in the Middle East and Africa (Britannica, 2022). The established systems of the South American[15] dictatorships between the 1960s and 1980s also demonstrated established domestic terrorism, in which the state terrorizes its citizens (Britannica, 2022).

Another typology worth mentioning is assessed through the motivational backgrounds of political violence. Since motivations are one of the key components of every radicalization process, discerning terrorist acts accordingly is necessary. The Turkish National Police Academy (TNPA) reports a typology that comprises three types of terrorism: "incorrect and inappropriate interpretations of religion," "perception of unequal treatment towards ethnic structure," and "desire to implement extreme political ideologies."

Gunn and Demirden (2019: 12) argue that in the case of religiously motivated terrorism, those motivated by an incorrect and inappropriate understanding of religions "misinterpret divine orders or are in an extreme deception that distorts the truth." They also give the example of the terrorist organization Daesh for this type of terrorism. It should be noted that this kind of mindset can emerge from any religion, widening the range of possible sources of misinterpretation.

While giving the terrorist organization PKK as one of the examples of the type of terrorism that arises from "perceptions of unequal treatment towards ethnic structure," Gunn and Demirden (2019: 12) suggest that "these groups see themselves as independent ethnic nations or seek confirmation of their status in the form of a more autonomous status within that country or separation from that state."

Ideological terrorism encompasses the whole spectrum of political ideologies. All ideological groups and subgroups, from left to right, fall into this category once they resort to political violence to achieve their goals. Gunn and Demirden (2019: 12) define one of the distinguishing factors of this type of terrorism as the fact that "the only condition for joining

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[13] Shultz (1978:9) references this typology as the Wilkenson typology.
[14] Britannica (2022) notes that there are claims about U.S. involvement with the acts of rebel terrorist groups such as UNITA (the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola).
[15] Examples here refer to state terrorism in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile (Britannica, 2022).

ideological terrorist groups is to follow their ideology or be willing to carry their political values " as the report states, referencing "neo-Nazi" terrorist groups as an example.

In addition to Gunn and Demirden's typology, Yaşa (2021: 802) divides ideologically motivated terrorism into two types: "Right-Wing Extremism" and "Left-Wing Extremism." Moreover, he mentions a separate type of terrorism that specifically focuses on a single "issue,"[16] like the terrorist organization "Army of God" and the "Animal Liberation Front."

Yaşa (2021: 802) states that the main motivations of the right-wing extremists are particularly concentrated on protecting the "white race," which results in goals that focus on halting immigration and refugee flows. Some of the most significant examples of such groups are the Pegida and the Ku Klux Klan (KKK). The same source also explains the motivations of left-wing extremism as fighting against capitalism and advocating for a fair distribution of income. Some of the more notable examples of this type of terrorism are the Red Army as well as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).

There are other typologies that distinguish domestic and international forms of terrorism, as well as those that explain modern terrorism types such as cyber terrorism; however, due to the primary focus of this study, this paper will focus on lone wolf terrorism in the following section. This research focuses on three terrorism cases that share common characteristics when it comes to the radicalization process. Thus, the motivational background and the type of terrorism it generates will be analyzed through case studies. Operational background-wise, this study specifically studies lone-wolf terrorism, which will be examined in the next segment and analyzed with the cases.

3.2. Lone-Wolf Terrorism

There are many different aspects to lone wolf terrorism. Etymologically, "lone wolf" is used as a metaphor for humans. Wolves exist as a pack in their natural habitat (Berntzen & Bjørgo, 2021: 132). Therefore, lone wolves refer to individuals that have been separated from their group or who have been abandoned by their "pack" (Berntzen & Bjørgo, 2021: 132). Burton and Stewart (2008) describe a lone wolf individual as someone "who acts on his or her own without orders from — or even connections to — an organization."

The lone wolf concept explains a type of terrorism that conceptualizes a combination of commonalities among terrorist attacks committed by a single individual who organizes and carries out terrorist activities on their own. The concept of lone wolf terrorism is criticized

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[16] The same type of terrorism is also addressed as "single-issue terrorism" in the EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) by the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (EUROPOL).

repeatedly (Berntzen & Bjørgo, 2021: 133). As indicated in the figure below, three main forms of critique need to be examined to fully understand the highs and lows of the term.

Figure 3.1. Conceptualization, Normative, and Classification: A Venn Diagram of the Three Main Forms of Criticism Regarding the Use of the Term "Lone Wolf"
Source: Berntzen & Bjørgo, 2021: 133

The critiques claim that the metaphor, which denotes both abnormality and carnivorous behavior, may readily be exploited to imply that the offender has no ideological or social affiliations at all (Berntzen & Bjørgo, 2021: 133). The metaphorical nature of the word "lone wolf" gives rise to the type of criticism with the normativity issue, which claims that the term's many connotations are available to several interpretations that are susceptible to being "loaded" with diverse values (Berntzen & Bjørgo, 2021: 133).

The third and last major objection focuses more on the research problem that arises from a classification issue and claims that many terrorists who were previously labeled as "lone wolves" were misdiagnosed (Berntzen & Bjørgo, 2021: 134). Academics have consequently suggested using a different title entirely to avoid these numerous connections and the associated cultural baggage. "Lone actor" and "solo terrorist" are the two primary ideas that have been put out (Berntzen & Bjørgo, 2021: 134).

White nationalists Tom Metzger and Alex Curtis popularized the phrase "lone wolf" in the late 1990s as a way to exhort other racists to act alone in conducting violent acts for tactical reasons (Bakker & de Graaf, 2010: 2). The labels "leaderless resistance" and "freelance terrorism" have also been used to denote similar or equivalent types of political violence (Bakker & de Graaf, 2010: 2). Col. Ulius Louis Amoss developed the notion of leaderless resistance, and on April 17, 1962, he published the initial version of his concept (Beam, 1992). His organizational theories were mainly intended to counter the possibility of a Communist takeover in the United States (Beam, 1992).

Lone wolves were responsible for at least 34 threats or attempted attacks in addition to the 171 assaults they carried out prior to September 11, 2001(Hamm & Spaaj, 2015: 6). The number of lone individuals planning and executing political violence has been increasing, and the post-9/11 age has seen a rise in threats and foiled plots as a result of technological advancements (Hamm & Spaaj, 2015: 6). Understanding lone-wolf terrorism becomes more urgent considering these factors.

As with the definition of terrorism, "lone-wolf" terrorism has ambiguity when it comes to defining the term. According to Hamm (2013): "Lone-wolf terrorism is the term used to describe someone who acts alone in a terrorist attack without the help or encouragement of a government or a terrorist organization." To define different types of lone wolf terrorism, Marlatt (2019: 3) cites Joel Capellan as follows:

> "...[various] authors have identified a continuum of lone wolves base on offenders' levels of connection to, direction, and support from formal terrorist organizations or networks. On one end of the spectrum, you have isolated lone wolves. These individuals have no formal affiliation, nor have they received any type of support, material or otherwise, from extremist organizations or networks. They radicalized, planned, and executed their attacks alone. On the other end, you have connected lone wolves. While they also operate alone, connected lone wolves belong to formal terrorism organizations or networks. Consequently, they are under the direct influence of a leader who provides instruction and support during the planning stage."[17]

Capellan's distinguishing definition has significance since it emphasizes that lone wolf terrorism does not mean individuals enter a radicalization process completely alone or they reach to commit political violence without any instructions. Furthermore, his description stresses that lone wolf terrorism might be loosely connected, yet one should not overlook its networks and connections.

Table 3.4. Raffaello Pantucci's Typology Categories

Loner	acts alone, no connection with any extremist group
Lone Wolf	appear to act alone but have some level of contact with extremists
Lone Wolf Pack	group of individuals who are self-radicalized
Lone Attacker	individual who acts alone but has clear command and control links with an extremist group

Source: Marlatt, 2019: 4

Although lone wolf terrorism does not arise from a hierarchical organization, there are no limitations on how an individual might have interacted with enablers. Marlatt (2019: 4) also

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[17] Originally cited from "Killing Alone: Can the Work Performance Literature Help Us Solve the Enigma of Lone Wolf Terrorism?" in "Terrorism in America," 177.

references Raffaello Pantucci's Typology Categories, which distinguishes "Four Possible Types of Lone Wolf Terrorists"[18] in the table above. Further examination into this subject could potentially show that the four groups that have been proposed are not as distinct as the author had assumed (Pantucci, 2011: 38). A broader dataset could demonstrate how, in reality, ties to extremists that seem to set groups apart might be more distinctive or, in contrast, interconnected (Pantucci, 2011: 38). More comprehensive research is required to determine the different variables of lone wolf terrorism.

Table 3.5. Huang's Key Differentiators Between Single Person Crimes, Lone Wolf Crimes, and Lone Wolf Terrorist Attacks

	Ideological Motive	Political Motive	Offender Acquainted with Victim
General Single Person Crimes	No	No (excl. political assassinations)	Yes
Lone Wolf Crimes	No	No (excl. political assassinations)	No
Lone Wolf Terrorist Attacks	Yes	Yes	No

Source: Huang, 2017

As demonstrated by the table above, Huang (2017) focuses on the differentiators between single-person crimes, lone-wolf crimes, and lone-wolf terrorism attacks. To determine the different variables, Huang studies three distinctive elements among the three types of crimes. Initially, Huang looks at ideological motives, which separate Lone Wolf Terrorist Attacks from the other two types of crimes. He states that: "The motives for general single person crimes and lone wolf crimes are seldom connected to religious, separatism, or nationalism ideologies, while the actions of lone wolf terrorists often are driven, at least in part, by ideology."

Secondly, Huang studies the political purposes of the types of crimes, which separates Lone Wolf Terrorist Attacks from the other two types of violence once again. According to Huang,

"Most single person and lone wolf crimes, except for political assassinations, rarely involve political purposes, while the attacks of lone wolf terrorists are often connected to clear political goals. Lone wolf terrorists are usually dissatisfied with certain governmental policies and attract

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[18] Pantucci, R. (2011). A Typology of Lone Wolves: Preliminary Analysis of Lone Islamist Terrorists.

the attention of the government through extreme terrorist attacks in an attempt to force the government to change policies."

The last section inquires about the offender-victim acquaintanceship of individuals. In this variable, general single-person crimes come forward as the odd one out. Huang explains it as follows:

"In most single person crimes, the offender is acquainted with the victim. Therefore, police and prosecutors are usually able to find evidence that leads to solving the crime by tracing the people, incidents, objects, and records related to the suspect. However, the offenders and victims of lone wolf crimes and lone wolf terrorist attacks are usually unacquainted and have no connection whatsoever."

3.3. Hamm and Spaaij's "Radicalization Model of Lone Wolf Terrorism"

Figure 3.2. The radicalization model of lone wolf terrorism

Source: Hamm & Spaaij, 2017: 159

The primary reason for using "The Radicalization Model of Lone Wolf Terrorism" in this article is that this distinctive model is the first to specifically address the radicalization process of lone wolf terrorism (Hamm & Spaaij, 2017: 158). Because of its relevance to lone-wolf terrorism and its method, this model is appropriate for analyzing the case studies in this paper as well as depicting the common points between the separate radicalization processes. Additionally, by examining affinity with online sympathizers or extremist groups, this model highlights the impact of online connections within the radicalization process of lone-wolf terrorism, which aligns with one of the main focuses of this paper.

The majority of research on radicalization focuses on jihadist terrorism and Islamist extremism (Schmid, 2013). Similarly, many of the models of radicalization exclusively focus on the radicalization of Islamists (Hamm & Spaaij, 2017: 159). Likewise, the milestones of the radicalization literature and their proposed models of radicalization also share the common characteristic of focusing solely on jihadist terrorism. Unlike most other models concentrating on a particular ideological type of radicalization towards terrorism, Hamm and Spaaij's model covers all motivations and ideologies of lone wolf terrorists.

It is noteworthy to point out the distinction between having extreme opinions and acting upon them. As McCauley and Moskalenko (2017: 213) state, "Rather than theorizing "radicalization," it is necessary to separately theorize radicalization of opinion and radicalization of action." As indicated below, the two pyramids model serves as a counterbalance to the extremes of eliminating radical belief through radical activity and eliminating extreme sentiment through extreme violence. Instead of this approach, the two pyramids model of radicalization distinguishes the radical opinion from the radical action.

Figure 3.3. Two-pyramids model

Source: Mccauley & Moskalenko, 2014: 71, 73

Despite the fact that radicalization models frequently show routes to extremism, not every extremism leads to terrorism (Hamm and Spaaj, 2017: 159). Likewise, Hamm and Spaaj

(2017: 159) reference Neumann's work regarding their notion that there are two types of radicalization: cognitive radicalization, which stresses extreme ideals, and behavioral radicalization, which emphasizes violence. Hamm and Spaaj (2017) argue that the cases they analyzed to build their radicalization model all resulted in acts of terrorism or attempted acts of terrorism, and their model reflects the latter, which is behavioral radicalization. Since the same characteristics are evident in the cases of this paper, The Radicalization Model of Lone Wolf Terrorism is once again suitable for this paper and its method of analysis.

Another relevant factor related to Hamm and Spaaij's model is its case-study method. Even though their model is derived from earlier studies, each element of their model is empirically tested with 106 cases of lone-wolf terrorism in their database (Hamm & Spaaij, 2017: 159). In addition, their model does not show a sudden radicalization process from personal and political grievances to terrorism but instead concentrates on one of the main characteristics of radicalization, which is its process through different stages.

Initially, Hamm and Spaaij's research led them to create the "American Lone Wolf Terrorism Database," where they found that, between 1940 and the middle of 2016, 123 cases—or all known instances of American lone wolf terrorism, according to their description—met this definition. (Hamm & Spaaij, 2017: 24). The data was widely accessible from a variety of sources for some of the more well-known people, including Theodore Kaczynski, James Earl Ray, Eric Rudolph, and Nidal Hasan; therefore, information on the 123 instances was not disseminated equally (Hamm & Spaaij, 2017: 24).

Through the use of 21 distinct factors, the database organizes 123 instances, producing 2,583 unique data points, which makes this database on lone wolf terrorism the biggest and most comprehensive one ever made (Hamm & Spaaij, 2017: 24). The database opens with the lone wolf's case number, name (along with the number of years they have lived), and the year they were active (Hamm & Spaaij, 2017: 24). Following this foundational introduction, the next 20 variables are discussed:

Table 3.6. The twenty variables of the American Lone Wolf Terrorism Database

Attacks/Plots
Fatalities/Injuries
Weapons Used
Age at Time of Attack/Plot
Race/Ethnicity
Prior Criminal History
Personal/Political Grievance
Military History

Table 3.6 Continued

Employment Status at Time of Attack/Plot
Mental Health Problems
Affinity with Extremist Groups
Marital Status
Broadcasting Intent to Commit Terrorism
Enabler of Terrorism
Locus of Radicalization
Triggering Event
Capture/Arrest
Popular Culture Influence
Influence on Popular Culture
Source

Source: Hamm & Spaaij, 2017: 24-25

These twenty different variables are essential when analyzing lone wolf terrorism cases; nevertheless, the Radicalization Model of Lone Wolf Terrorism focuses on a narrower scope that helps identify lone wolf terrorism efficiently. According to the model, the radicalization process that precedes a terrorist attack has five components. However, unlike most of the previous models, which show different stages of radicalization in a linear form, the radicalization model of lone wolf terrorism connects the terrorism component of the model to personal and political grievances to create a loop. The reason behind creating a cycle model where terror attacks result in grievances is to highlight the possibility of copycat attacks.

Since this model does not follow a stage-by-stage progression where a person must pass through each level before becoming a lone-wolf terrorist, an individual could initially come across an enabler before being exposed to a group of internet sympathizers (Hamm & Spaaij, 2017: 159). Similarly, broadcasting intent might happen both before and after a triggering event (Hamm & Spaaij, 2017: 159). Also, after coming into contact with enablers or supporters, one may construct personal and political complaints as a reaction (Hamm & Spaaij, 2017: 159). Any encounter at any step can result in another step towards terrorism, which ultimately may or may not result in political violence. The path to terrorism is not one-way; therefore, one can accelerate the process of radicalization by skipping some of these steps.

According to Hamm and Spaaj (2017: 159), "...none of the facets of radicalization achieved 100 percent empirical verification, as should be the case with any instance of credible social science research." It should be noted that radicalization is still a complex phenomenon,

and theorizing models for understanding its processes towards terrorism has its difficulties. The key is that this radicalization model works as a tool for identifying signs of radicalization that may prompt action. Moreover, this radicalization model proves to be appropriate for this study, whether from a methodological point of view or in terms of its suitable components for the case studies.

3.3.1. Personal and Political Grievance

To understand the pathways to radicalization, The Radicalization Model of Lone Wolf Terrorism presents six components of radicalization. These different components create the loop of the radicalization cycle. At the top of the cycle, one can spot the motivations of individuals, which stem from personal and political grievances. This stage has great importance since it builds the foundation for one's ideological background.

There are many possible causes for individuals to enter the cycle of radicalization. These reasons can be derived from various motives. It is common for lone wolves to combine their personal and political issues to interpret their situation in society. Depending on whether a lone wolf attack is driven by a personal grievance, a political grievance, and/or by ideology, the sort of offender you are dealing with changes (Leenaars & Reed, 2016: 7). When ideology is present, it's classified as either political, religious, or single-issue (Leenaars & Reed, 2016: 7). According to McCauley, Moskalenko, and Van Son (2013:4),

> "Individuals can resort to political violence as a result of personal grievance, such as perceived mistreatment by the government of self or loved ones. Individuals may also be radicalized by political grievance, a perceived mistreatment of people the individual identifies with but does not know personally."

Both personal and political grievances are evident across the history of lone-wolf political violence. Evidence of both motifs was discovered for the pre-9/11 lone wolves in 30 of the 38 incidents, or almost 80% of the cases. Evidence of both themes was discovered for post-9/11 lone wolves in 36 of the 45 incidents, or 80% of the cases, demonstrating that both motives are a commonality for lone wolf terrorists (Hamm & Spaaj, 2015: 7). This evidence proves personal and political motives to be a hallmark of lone-wolf terrorism, which separates loners from organized terrorists who share collective grievances (Hamm & Spaaj, 2015: 7).

Ganor (2021: 27) argues that "the "lone wolf's" decision to attack is seldom driven by one sole motive; it is rather the outcome of an aggregate combination of ideological, personal, or psychological motives." Furthermore, Ganor (2021: 27) visualizes the combination of different motivational factors in a bathtub model. As demonstrated below, faucets represent various sources that allow different motivations to fill the bathtub.

Figure 3.4. The "Bathtub Model" - "Lone Wolf" Attack Execution Threshold
Source: Ganor, 2021: 27

The bathtub references the decision-making process of lone wolves, almost like a vessel getting attacked by a water source, which will trigger a possible capsize (Ganor, 2021: 27). According to this model, once an individual is affected by a combination of various factors, which fill "the motivation bath," it eventually overflows, driving individuals to carry out attacks. Ganor (2021: 27) also notes that motivations that are represented by the water or faucet role can appear at different velocities and densities.

Besides the combination of motives, the attacks might arise from one main motive, like leaving only one faucet open while others are closed or dripping (Ganor, 2021: 27). Additionally, the upper threshold of the bathtub model represents individuals' maximum level of capacity to contain motives prior to the overflow (Ganor, 2021: 28). The higher the threshold, the more motivations and reasons derived from personal and political grievances there are (Ganor, 2021: 28). In contrast, when the threshold is lower, a person might commit political violence earlier since motivations would fill enough room for reasoning; thus, the upper threshold might change from one individual to another and emphasize the importance of personal experiences and capabilities besides one's ideological background. This conceptual model gives a theoretical explanation that stresses how the motivations behind lone-wolf terrorism can be complex. Also, it indicates how critical it is to comprehend the radicalization process toward terrorism through motivational background.

Lone wolves sometimes create their own ideologies by fusing personal grudges with religious or political concerns (Spaaij, 2010: 10; Stern, 2003: 37). In contrast to organized jihadists, whether they are big or small in scale, lone wolf terrorists, both with their beliefs and actions, are more peculiar (Hamm & Spaaij, 2017: 66). They challenge conventional academic

attempts to attribute to terrorism "such ideal-typical motives as "Islamic extremism" and "jihad," "rightwing racism," or "black militancy" by combining various political causes with any number of highly personal vendettas in complex and extremely individualized ways (Hamm & Spaaij, 2017: 66). Given these considerations, personal and political grievances are significant in understanding the motivations behind terrorist attacks and are thus a crucial component of the radicalization cycle.

3.3.2. Affinity with Online Sympathizers or Extremist Groups

The concept of "affinity" suggests that lone-wolf terrorists sympathize with extremist organizations and that their ideologies are consistent with a well-defined organizational unit (Hamm & Spaaj, 2015: 8). Furthermore, Hamm and Spaaij (2015: 8) state that "The analysis shows that 63% of the pre-9/11 lone wolves had an affinity with organized extremists, including Southern segregationist and neo-Nazi groups, Palestinian movements; and anti-abortion groups." However, there is a new trend with an affinity for extremist groups since fewer individuals have an affinity for organized extremists. Hamm and Spaaij (2015: 8) explain that "Only 42% of the post-9/11 lone wolves were found to have an affinity with extremist organizations, including al-Qaeda, Tea Party Patriots, and the neo-Nazi National Alliance."

These data analyses show individuals are moving toward a different kind of connection. Nevertheless, the overall conclusion suggests that lone wolves may be looking for guidance through channels other than organizations, notably through networks of like-minded activists discovered online or on cable television. This result is in line with the radicalization trends of contemporary organized terrorists (Hamm & Spaaj, 2015: 8).

The vast data pit of negative messages online rapidly serves as a grounding place where actions that go against the law are encouraged. Online extremism is not a new trend. In fact, Conway, Scrivens, and Macnair (2019) argue that it has a long "online history dating back to the earliest days of the pubic internet." For instance, American white supremacist Louis Beam established and run a bulletin board system from at least 1984 (Conway, Scrivens, and Macnair, 2019).

Another considerable change for ideological expansion came with the digital age, and the formation of the digital world has also increased the amount of globalization that connects radicalized groups through online platforms. Specifically, the more people got access to the internet, the faster the radicalized groups were working online. Figures 3.5 and 3.6 show that only one lone wolf from the pre-9/11 era was radicalized online, which is not surprising considering the technologies available at the time. The percentage increased from 3 to 26

percent after 9/11. In this context, one could argue that the introduction of the internet has changed the locus of lone-wolf terrorism.

Figure 3.5. Pre-9/11 loci of radicalization

Source: Hamm & Spaaij, 2017: 60

Figure 3.6. Post-9/11 loci of radicalization

Source: Hamm & Spaaij, 2017: 61

Behr, Reding, Edwards, and Gribbon (2013) argue that "terrorism cases in the UK without a 'digital footprint' are increasingly rare." In their study on radicalization in the digital era, the authors also mention how the internet works as an "echo chamber," which causes online users to reinforce their opinions despite its violent biases. These trends indicate that online users hide behind their screens under the comfort of their anonymity and use the digital environment to cover up their normally unacceptable behaviors (Behr, Reding, Edwards, and Gribbon, 2013: 18).

This illusion that the virtual world creates for online community members gives them the freedom that increases radicalization toward extremism, primarily when there is not

enough moderation within the online platforms where individuals interact with other users. Besides their findings of how the internet functions as an "echo chamber," Behr, Reding, Edwards, & Gribbon (2013) also conclude that "the internet creates more opportunities to become radicalized" in all cases.

Another prominent role of online platforms is the impact they have on the interaction of online news. A study conducted by examining news shared on Twitter, Reddit, and 4chan concluded that these digital networks influence the flow of alternative news on Twitter (Zannettou et al., 2017: 9). These flows of alternative news and conspiracy theories in addition to mainstream news, cause the masses to misinterpret things. This misinformation strategy can be used to radicalize people or draw their attention to the platforms where more of these flows occur.

Besides radicalization through online group interactions, there is also self-radicalization. When it is on the internet, there are no boundaries, from jihadist[19] communities to neo-Nazis, and anti-government militias, and KKK internet users can self-taught and act upon that (Johnson, 2018). There are many examples of lone-wolf terrorism violence caused by self-radicalization. In this sense, radicalization is far from confined to online communities. Additionally, when self-radicalized people met in Charlottesville, Virginia, in 2017, the radicalization of people was proven to be possible by the online interactions as well as being isolated from the real world (Johnson, 2018).

3.3.3. Enablers

Lone wolves are made possible by either direct methods, such as those who unintentionally help plan attacks, or indirect means, such as those who serve as sources of inspiration for terrorism (Hamm & Spaaij, 2015: 8). A personal facilitator is someone who either inadvertently performs duties that make an attack feasible or someone who indirectly supports terrorism by example, in contrast to having an affinity with extremist groups, which is better defined as intellectual reinforcement of ideas (Hamm & Spaaij, 2015: 8). According to Hamm and Spaaij (2017: 83),

> "During the pre-9/11 era, 57 percent of the lone wolf terrorists in the database were enabled by others. In the post-9/11 era, the figure rose to 70 percent. These figures indicate another signature of radicalization. For the post-9/11 lone wolves, nearly all of the enabling was indirect."

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[19] According to Başmısırlı (2017: 28), "The Arabic word Jihad does not actually mean "holy war" or "just war." jihad has the specific sense of fighting for the sake of God." He also further elaborates on the origins of the word by referencing Lewis (2003) as follows: "The word Jihad comes from the Arabic word root of "J-h-d", which literally means, "striving." In various Islamic traditions like Sufism it is also interpreted as a form of "moral striving."

As mentioned earlier, enablers can appear both directly and indirectly when it comes to encouraging attacks. Leroy Moody's situation serves as an example of direct enabling prior to 9/11 (Hamm & Spaaij, 2017: 81). In 1989, fifty-five-year-old Moody, a violent racist, and talented conman, killed, attempted to kill, and threatened to kill judges and court employees across the American South (Applebome, 1990; Hamm & Spaaij, 2017: 81).

Two direct enablers were facilitating Moody's activities: the first, Ted Banks, helped Moody with the welding of various pieces of pipe used in the attacks he planned to carry out in 1989, and he also gave his old cellmate a tear-gas canister (Hamm & Spaaij, 2017: 81). The second direct enabler was Moody's wife, Susan McBride Moody, who was abused by her husband. She carried out any assignments she was given, including getting bomb-making supplies and a typewriter to use for his letters to the media (Hamm & Spaaij, 2017: 82).

The case of Eric Rudolph before 9/11 serves as an example of an indirect enabler. The Waco tragedy infuriated radicals, who declared April 19 to be the Day of the Rope and adopted bombing as their favorite method of subverting the government (Hamm & Spaaij, 2017: 82). Therefore, even though Eric Rudolph never met Timothy McVeigh, by setting an example in Oklahoma City, McVeigh indirectly encouraged Rudolph to become radicalized. Indirect enablers also include historical individuals who no longer exist because individuals draw inspiration from earlier examples of violent extremism and terrorism (Hamm & Spaaij, 2017: 82). Adolf Hitler still serves as a source of inspiration for lone-wolf terrorists 70 years after his death (Hamm & Spaaij, 2017: 81).

Osama bin Laden and Anwar al-Awlaki were the most prevalent enablers of jihadists in the years after September 11, 2001 (Hamm & Spaaij, 2015: 9). The Turner Diaries author and National Alliance founder William Pierce, as well as internet celebrity Alex Jones, were the most prominent enablers of white nationalists and anti-government radicals during the post-9/11 era (Hamm & Spaaij, 2015: 9).

3.3.4. Broadcasting Intent

One of the most critical stages when it comes to preventing individuals from actually carrying out political violence is realizing their intentions. It is vital to realize the challenging identification procedures of lone wolf terrorists before their attack, such as recognizing and analyzing digital traces from the online activities of potential terrorists (Brynielsson et al., 2012: 204). However, in certain incidents, individuals contact the outside world to inform or threaten their intentions. These efforts are called "broadcasting intent," "seepage," or "signaling," in which the desire to launch an attack might be expressed openly or can be hinted at (Hamm & Spaaij, 2017: 91).

Acccording to Hamm and Spaaij (2015: 9), "Evidence of broadcasting can be found in 84% of the pre-9/11 cases, including some the most crucial cases (the Unabomber, Eric Rudolph, Joseph Paul Franklin, and Leroy Moody)." and "Among the post-9/11 lone wolf terrorists, 76% broadcasted their intent, often more than once." Broadcasting intent can happen anytime before an attack. Also according to Hamm and Spaaij (2017: 92),

> "Broadcasting intent is about how radicalization is displayed, not about who is radicalized or why. In this way, broadcasting intent can be viewed as the most important commonality from the standpoint of prevention: If lone wolves typically announce their intentions to commit violence beforehand, then presumably steps can be taken to stop them."

This factor can be observed in the case of the Unabomber. David Kaczynski first began to wonder if his brother Theodore was the Unabomber when the anonymous "Unabomber Manifesto" was published. David's alerting the police and giving the FBI information about Kaczynski's location immediately resulted in his arrest (Hamm & Spaaij, 2017: 92).

As the term "terrorize" suggests, one of the main goals of terrorism is to frighten people. By creating an atmosphere of danger, terrorists aim to bring light to their personal and political grievances, and contemporary instruments allow them to reach larger masses more efficiently. According to Jařab (2005): "Modern terrorism is media terrorism." Jařab (2005) states that the destruction of the World Trade Center Twin Towers in New York City as a result of hijacked passenger flights on September 11, 2001, is the most shocking terrorist attack in modern history, and he emphasizes the new implications for media and the public since the live television broadcasts of the attacks attained a new level of media impact on society.

The global digital age has truly changed how the public views media as well as the range of content they are exposed to on numerous platforms; likewise, it has altered how terrorists utilized broadcasting intent. With the technological advancements and new streaming platforms available to all, the possibilities for broadcasting political violence have expanded. However, one should realize the underlying messages of such motives. The broadcasting intent of "lone wolf" terrorists is focused more on compelling society to see the world from their point of view than on killing potential targets (Hamm and Spaaj, 2017: 91). The broadcasting intent component of the radicalization cycle points to the significance and power of intelligence over the radicalization processes of individuals.

3.3.5. Triggering Event

Triggering events can arise from personal and political reasons or a combination of both. Sometimes triggering events are "sharp" or immediate. Other times, a series of "escalation thresholds" allow events to progressively build up over time until the lone wolf cracks under

the pressure, committing the act of terrorism (Hamm & Spaaij, 2015: 10). In 84% of the pre-9/11 instances and 71% of the post-9/11 cases, there was proof of a triggering event (Hamm & Spaaij, 2015: 10).

This last component of the radicalization process before reaching terrorism is when individuals are catalyzed by the triggering incident, and members of terrorist organizations frequently experience similar situations (Hamm & Spaaij, 2015: 10). Even after getting de-radicalized (rehabilitated) or disengaged, "former terrorists" can still play the catalyst (trigger) role (See, 2018:12). Furthermore, there are critical ramifications of catalyst factors for recidivism among disengaged terrorists, where former terrorists revert to their previous ways and continue triggering the radicalization process of other individuals (See, 2018:12).

The instrumentalization of online platforms increases the level of exposure to propaganda, where former terrorists play different roles as "virtual planners," "leaders," and "enablers" while being veterans (See, 2018:13). Besides former terrorists, the media once again can contribute to the development of triggers or create a shock effect for individuals that can trigger a collective action problem.

Abanoz and Sütcü (2018) point to the logic of collective action, referring to Ostrom's "Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action" (1990), which states that collective action occurs when the efforts of two or more individuals are necessary to achieve the aimed result. Since all of the components of the radicalization cycle relate to each other to some extent, triggering events can be intertwined with other factors; thus, triggering events can gradually develop for individuals to reach the level of catalysts. When individuals believe there is a lack of collective action towards their goals, they might consider taking matters into their own hands, and over time, it can build up.

Facilitators
Terrorist belief systems or narratives
Identity processes
Activities that demonstrate commitment to a terrorist group or cause
Connections with terrorists in one's offline social network
Connections with terrorists via the internet and/or social media
Group dynamics
Grievances
Triggering events

Figure 3.7. Facilitators of Radicalization Supported by Multiple NIJ-Sponsored Projects

Source: Smith, 2018: 13

Even what seems to be spontaneous combustion is frequently started by a catalytic event (Bakker & de Graaf, 2011:6). There are important types of probable catalytic events or triggers in lone-wolf radicalization processes. As demonstrated in the Figure 3.7., an NIJ-sponsored study provided empirical support for the role that triggering events—crises or other situations that can make people feel driven to take action—play in the process of radicalizing individuals towards terrorism (Smith, 2018: 16).

It is evident from the analysis of Hamm and Spaaij's "Radicalization Model of Lone Wolf Terrorism" that there are crucial trends in lone wolf terrorism that require examination. When the literature evidence base and the chosen model for this study are combined, one can argue that there are significant stages to individuals' radicalization processes. Specifically, within this chapter, this paper focused on some of the key components of the radicalization model of lone wolf terrorism, which will be used to analyze three separate cases in the next chapter.

4. CASE STUDIES WITH THE RADICALIZATION MODEL

After obtaining a comprehensive understanding of the selected terrorism cases, this chapter intends to construct a framework that will explain the various stages of radicalization that individuals go through before reaching the level of violent extremism. These stages will be studied with the "Radicalization Model of Lone Wolf Terrorism" and explained according to its components. Moreover, this research intends to generate an analysis that examines the case study's subjects within the chosen radicalization model.

4.1. 2011 Norway Attacks

Norway was the target of two vicious attacks on July 22, 2011, carried out by right-wing terrorist Anders Behring Breivik. Attacks on Oslo and the island of Utøya in Norway on July 22, 2011, often known as the "July 22 attacks," resulted in 77 fatalities, making it the bloodiest incident to occur on Norwegian soil since World War II (Ray, 2022).

The Oslo government district was the scene of the first attack, in which a car bomb explosion was carried out (Sollid et al., 2012). Right outside of Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg's office in Oslo's government district, Breivik parked a van minutes before 15:30, which blew up shortly after he left (de Roy van Zuijdewijn, 2019). The explosive device was a "fertilizer bomb" made of an ANFO (ammonium nitrate/fuel oil) combination (Sollid et al., 2012). The explosion claimed the lives of eight people (Sollid et al., 2012).

Figure 4.1. Locations of the Norway attacks
Source: BBC, 2012a

A political youth camp on Utøya island, about 40 kilometers from Oslo, was attacked by a lone shooter two hours later, who killed 69 individuals (Sollid et al., 2012). Breivik traveled to the island of Utøya via ferry while disguised as a police officer (Ray, 2022). He entered a youth camp run by the Norwegian Labour Party by claiming to conduct a security check related to the bomb attack in Oslo (Ray, 2022).

Around 5:26 PM, police received reports of a shooting on the island (Ray, 2022). The shooter spent the following hour meticulously aiming his automatic rifle and handgun at the approximately 600 people, mostly children, in the camp (Ray, 2022). Upon being confronted by police on the island, where he committed a killing spree, the Norwegian terrorist surrendered by laying down his weapon and raising his hands (Reuters, 2011a).

The trial of Anders Behring Breivik began on April 16, 2012, and lasted until June 22, 2012, in Oslo District Court (Leer, 2012; BBC, 2012b). The verdict for the trial was announced on August 24 (BBC, 2012b). During his hearing, Breivik argued that the attacks were required to halt Norway's "Islamization" and claimed he was sane while refusing to plead guilty (BBC, 2012c). On Breivik's sanity, court-appointed psychiatrists had divergent opinions. His initial examination team diagnosed him as a paranoid schizophrenic, while the second team concluded he was sane (BBC, 2012c). Breivik stated that receiving psychiatric care would be "worse than death" prior to the verdict (BBC, 2012c).

According to the Oslo district court's verdict, Breivik was not psychotic when he committed the deadly rampages that left 77 dead and 242 injured (Townsend, 2012). Breivik received the maximum penalty of 21 years in jail, which may be further increased[20] at any time after his conviction for terrorism and premeditated murder (Townsend, 2012; BBC, 2017).

Breivik's attorney, Oeystein Storrvik, states that the Norwegian terrorist Anders Behring Breivik changed his name to Fjotolf Hansen in 2017 (BBC, 2017). He distributed a 1,500-page manifesto before perpetrating the attacks under the pseudonym "Andrew Berwick," which is his name in anglicized form (BBC, 2017). For committing the biggest crime committed in peacetime in Norway, he has never shown any regret (BBC, 2017).

After the horrific attacks of July 22, gun laws were revisited in Norway. Norway currently does not allow individuals to possess automatic firearms. Seven years have passed since the 2011 Norway attacks, and Norway announced in 2018 that the government intends to ban semi-automatic gun ownership by 2021, except for hunting and sports (Jackson, 2021).

In 2022, the 42-year-old Breivik, who has served 10 of a 21-year term for the attacks, exhibited no indication that his violent extremist views had changed during his time in prison

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[20] According to Townsend (2012), "Although Norway has a maximum prison sentence of 21 years, Breivik could be sentenced to "preventive detention," which can be extended for as long as an inmate is considered dangerous to society."

(Engelbrecht & Libell, 2022). On January 18, when the parole hearing got underway, he made a Nazi-style salute in the courtroom (Engelbrecht & Libell, 2022). Engelbrecht and Libell (2022) report that he carried and displayed placards retaining racist slogans, such as "Stop your genocide against our white nations." After being found guilty of terrorism and murder in 2012, Breivik (Fjotolf Hansen) portrayed the neo-Nazi fringe's extreme viewpoints within the nation (Engelbrecht & Libell, 2022).

4.2. 2019 Christchurch Mosque Shootings

In March 2019, two deadly rampages were carried out by a lone attacker in Christchurch, New Zealand. The Christchurch mosque shootings were marked as the deadliest attack in the country's modern history (Bailey et al., 2019). The gunman who fired shots toward people within point-blank range in two mosques identified himself as an Australian (BBC, 2019). The prime minister of Australia, Scott Morrison, referred to the suspect as an "extremist, right-wing" terrorist. (BBC, 2019).

The timeline of the terrorist attack has notable details since Brenton Tarrant, who was 28 years old at the time he carried out the shootings, left his digital footprint online before he actualized his violent extremist ideas. At 1:34 p.m., Tarrant started to stream on Facebook Live (Ganor, 2020: 7). He said to the GoPro camera he had mounted to his helmet, "Let's get this party started," and then drove toward the Al Noor mosque and began shooting men, women, and children (Ganor, 2020: 7). Around 1:40 p.m., Tarrant started his killing spree at the Al Noor Mosque while Friday prayers were being held and hundreds of people were inside the mosque (History.com Editors, 2020).

Radio New Zealand reports that, at 1.41 p.m., the first 111 call reporting the incident was received by police. At 1.46 p.m., as he departs Masjid Al Noor to return to his car, the shooter fires at people running down the street, and a minute later, the first police officers show up at Masjid Al Noor. At his first target, where he caused the most damage, Tarrant killed 42 people (Bailey et al., 2019).

After getting out of his car again around 1.55 p.m., initially, the terrorist shot a couple outside and continued his rampage at the Linwood Islamic Centre by shooting its windows (Bailey et al., 2019). Tarrant killed another eight people and wounded many others at his second target (Bailey et al., 2019). One of the many people he injured was Zekeriya Tuyan, who died later in the hospital from the severity of his situation, raising the death toll to 51 (Graham-McLay, 2019).

Figure 4.2. Locations of the Christchurch mosque shootings
Source: Bailey et al., 2019

Tarrant was confronted by Abdul Aziz, who picked up a credit card machine and used it to avoid gunfire while distracting the terrorist (Otte, 2019). When Aziz followed him back to the mosque with a shotgun, Tarrant dropped his gun and ran toward his car before he took off (Otte, 2019). He live-streamed the attacks on Facebook for 17 minutes and got arrested by the police while he was on his way to the third shooting (Stubbs, 2019). According to TVNZ (2019), Police Commissioner Mike Bush stated that vehicles stopped by the police were fitted with IEDs (improvised explosive devices). Commissioner Bush emphasizes that although the Defense Force secured the bombs, the gravity of the situation remains evident (TVNZ, 2019).

Tarrant was heavily armed and was responsible for the deaths of 51 people as well as the injuries of 50[21] others who were gathered for Friday prayers (Menon, 2020). According to the "New Zealand crime timeline," the terrorist "used five weapons, including two semi-automatic assault rifles;" it also claims that if the bravery of unarmed people in both mosques and by police officers had not been displayed, the death toll would have been higher.

The next day, at 8:30 a.m., the accused murderer of the Christchurch shootings made his court appearance in Christchurch District Court (Livingston, 2019). He has been kept behind bars until April 5 without a plea (Livingston, 2019). Menon (2020) reports that for the first time in the nation's history, New Zealand police charged someone with terrorism. He states that on

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[21] *'New Zealand crime timeline',* URL: https://nzhistory.govt.nz/culture/nz-crime-timeline, (Ministry for Culture and Heritage), updated 30-Nov-2022

June 14, 2019, Tarrant pleaded not guilty to all 92 charges, and on March 26, 2020, Tarrant changed his plea to guilty. On August 24, 2020, the trial got underway in a Christchurch court, where many of the victim's relatives met Tarrant for the first time (Menon, 2020). On August 27, 2020, the judge sentenced Tarrant to life in prison without parole, marking the first time a court in New Zealand has ever done so (Menon, 2020).

The bloodiest attack in New Zealand until the Christchurch mosque attacks was a neighbor dispute in Aramoana in 1990, which resulted in 13 deaths (Brockell, 2019a). Following this attack, New Zealand tightened its gun laws in 1992 (Brockell, 2019a). Likewise, after the Christchurch mosque attacks, semi-automatic weapons and assault rifles were banned by the New Zealand parliament (Westbrook & Greenfield, 2019).

In 2022, Tarrant appealed his conviction and punishment after receiving a life sentence without the possibility of parole; however, no hearing date has been established yet (Mao, 2022; Pietsch, 2022). The judge observed that he exhibited no sorrow, regret, or humiliation for his deeds (Mao, 2022). Radio New Zealand (2020) reports that Judge Cameron Mander, who sentenced the terrorist in 2020, stated: "Even if you are detained until you die, it would not exhaust the requirements of punishment and denunciation."

4.3. 2022 Buffalo Shooting

On Saturday, May 14, 2022, another mass shooting took place at a Tops Friendly Markets supermarket in Buffalo, New York, where the teen who committed the terrorist act killed ten people and wounded three others before surrendering to the police (Helmore, 2022). Payton Gendron, 18, was identified as the attacker. Gendron is from Conklin, New York, a town about 200 miles (320 kilometers) southeast of Buffalo. (Helmore, 2022).

The reason for Gendron's visit to Buffalo and to that specific supermarket was not immediately apparent. Gendron live-streamed the attack on his Twitch channel, which showed him driving to the grocery store and leaving his car in military-style clothing (Bekiempis & Helmore, 2022; Helmore, 2022). Soon after, he started to fire his rifle, shot four people outside, and continued his killing spree in the store (Bekiempis & Helmore, 2022).

The shooting began at around 2.30 p.m. in the parking lot of the store, where three people were killed and one was injured (Petri, 2022). The shooter then moved inside the supermarket, where he was confronted for the first time by Aaron Salter; however, the bullet he shot was blocked by the heavy armor Gendron was wearing (BBC, 2022a). Initially murdering security guard Salter, who was a former Buffalo police officer, Gendron continued to murder other victims inside the supermarket (Bekiempis & Helmore, 2022; Helmore, 2022). He shot eight more people inside the store, causing the deaths of six of them (Prokupecz et al., 2022).

Figure 4.3. Location of the Buffalo shooting
Source: BBC, 2022b

Following the shooting spree, the terrorist was encircled by police in the store's foyer (Marcus, 2022). Before the cops could convince him to lay down his weapons and surrender, he placed his gun to his neck (Marcus, 2022). BBC (2022b) reports that after a tense standoff, the gunman gave over his firearm and was taken into custody. In his racially and hate-motivated rampage, Gendron targeted a predominantly black community (BBC, 2022b). The terrorist shot 13 people, 11 of whom were black, and only two of the victims were white (Petri, 2022).

The suspect has been charged with domestic terrorism as well as first-degree murder motivated by hate, and since the incident on May 14, the suspect has been in police custody (The Guardian, 2022). According to The Guardian (2022), "The charge, domestic acts of terrorism motivated by hate in the first degree, is punishable with a sentence of life imprisonment without parole." However, there is a possibility that, if found guilty, Gendron could receive the death penalty (Bekiempis, 2022). The following is a timeline of the terrorist's trials, custody status, and charges:

Dates

DATE	EVENT	Location
June 15th 2022	Complaint Filed	United States District Court
June 16th 2022, 10:30am	Initial Appearance	United States District Court 7th Floor
July 14, 2022	Indictment Returned	United States District Court
July 18, 2022, 11:00 a.m.	Arraignment	United States District Court 7th Floor
December 9, 2022, 10:30 a.m.	Status Hearing	United States District Court

Custody Status

Date	STATUS
As of June	In the Custody of the United States Marshal Service

Charges

COUNT	DATE	Charge
10 Counts	6/15/2022	Hate Crime Resulting in Death
3 Counts	6/15/2022	Hate Crime Involving Bodily Injury and Attempt to Kill
10 Counts	6/15/2022	Use of a firearm to Commit Murder During and in Relation to a Crime of Violence
3 Counts	6/15/2022	Use and Discharge of a Firearm During and in Relation to a Crime of Violence

Figure 4.4. Payton Gendron's case information

Source: United States Department of Justice, 2022

Payton Gendron, who previously pleaded not guilty[22], switched positions and pleaded guilty on Monday, November 28 (Franklin & Olson, 2022). The death penalty is not enforced in New York; therefore, Gendron is expected to be sentenced to life in prison without parole for domestic terrorism alone (Mckay, 2022). Mckay (2022) reports that Gendron's "sentencing is scheduled for Feb. 15." Kirkham and Clifford (2023) report that on February 15, 2023, Gendron apologized in the courtroom and was "sentenced to life without parole."

Following the Buffalo shooting, Governor Kathy Hochul signed a new legislative package on New York's gun laws (Governor Kathy Hochul, 2022). With the Ten-Bill Package, more control over purchasers under the age of 21 is imposed, and authorities are encouraged to take away firearms from those deemed a threat (BBC, 2022d). Although a few states, such as New York or California, have passed legislation outlawing or tightly regulating the possession of

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[22] BBC (2020c). *Buffalo shooting: Suspect charged with domestic terrorism.* BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-61669403

assault weapons, there are no gun laws banning the ownership of guns all across the United States (BBC, 2022e).

4.4. Analyzing the Cases with the Radicalization Model of Choice

Immediately categorizing terrorists as "lone wolves" usually turns out to be faulty when details confirm they are a part of greater networks on a personal, political, or operational level (Schuurman et al., 2019). The operational background of political violence makes a significant difference when it comes to determining the form of terrorism. For instance, to give a better description of the concept of "lone-wolf" terrorism, Ganor (2020: 7) defines a lone-wolf attack as follows: "As a rule, terror attacks may be classified into three categories: lone-wolf attack; independent local network attack; organized attack. A lone-wolf attack is an attack carried out by a single individual without any operational ties to a terror organization."

Ganor (2020: 7) also argues that the majority of lone-wolf terrorist attacks in recent years have been motivated by terror organizations; therefore, the term "lone wolf" may be misleading. In some instances, the perpetrators consider themselves "soldiers," "agents," or "supporters" of a specific terror organization. They occasionally disclose their goals to others, seek their advice, and, in some circumstances, receive assistance from them. Despite this, what distinguishes them as "lone wolves" is the absence of any operational links to terror organizations. Lone wolves do not receive any logistical or other types of support from an organization for the attack they carry out, nor do they get recruited by it or receive any training from it.

The popularity of the term "lone wolf" in academic writings exploded in 2013, and use levels have remained high ever since (Berntzen & Bjørgo, 2021: 139). Likewise, Berntzen & Bjørgo (2021: 139) state that the term "lone actor" has gained prominence over the past seven years and is now poised to surpass "lone wolf" in academic terrorism research. Furthermore, they argue that the outcomes further support their supposition that the terrorist acts of July 22 had an impact on academia. Although numerous other reasons are contributing to these trends, the 2011 Norway attacks are a particular incident that has been crucial to the sudden rise.

It should be noted that there are counterarguments on whether the usage of the term "lone wolf" terrorist is appropriate or not in terms of its indications and the three perpetrators mentioned earlier. However, the term "lone actor" is used in various scholarly fields to refer to a wide range of actors, not only single individuals who commit political violence (Berntzen & Bjørgo, 2021: 139). Additionally, "lone actor" is unlikely to continue to be connected with terrorism in other academic domains due to the term's abstract character (Berntzen & Bjørgo, 2021: 139).

Table 4.1. Required Conditions to Be a Terrorist Attack with cases

Incident → Required Conditions to Be a Terrorist Attack ↓	2011 Norway Attacks	2019 Christchurch Mosque Shootings	2022 Buffalo Shooting
1. Was the attack done by a *nonstate actor*?	Yes	Yes	Yes
2. Was the *violence* aimed at physically harming or threatening *noncombatant targets*?	Yes	Yes	Yes
3. Was the attack intended to *elicit responses* from *third-party targets*?	Yes	Yes	Yes
4. Did the attack have a *political purpose*?	Yes	Yes	Yes
Was the incident a terrorist attack? (Were all required conditions met?)	Yes	Yes	Yes

There are commonalities among all three cases of terrorism chosen for this study; furthermore, to show how they fit the definition of "lone wolf" terrorism introduced earlier, this chapter will also test the cases with the terrorism models. As demonstrated above, by asking the questions that were illustrated in Table 3.3 previously—which determine whether an attack falls under the "terrorism" category or not—one can confirm that all three attacks of the chosen cases fit the definition of terrorism.

This paper acknowledges that the term "lone wolf terrorist" is controversial; nonetheless, since the model of choice utilizes the term "lone wolf terrorism" to define the radicalization process towards the specific type of political violence that fits the cases, this paper also implements the common terminology to preserve its core message. Hereby, the attacks are also examined in light of the contents of Table 3.5. In the following table, which indicates why all three of the attacks can be regarded as examples of lone-wolf terrorism, other commonalities between the cases are displayed.

Table 4.2. Required Conditions to Be a Lone Wolf Terrorist Attack with cases

	Ideological Motive	Political Motive	Offender Acquainted with Victim
Lone Wolf Terrorist Attacks	Yes	Yes	No
2011 Norway Attacks	Yes	Yes	No
2019 Christchurch Mosque Shootings	Yes	Yes	No
2022 Buffalo Shooting	Yes	Yes	No

From the terrorist as a lone-wolf actor to the socially constructed dilemmas within extremist ideologies, all three cases require a wide range of instruments to understand the radicalization process of an individual. Various components should be examined to understand why and how the attacks were planned. Some of these components were discussed in the previous segment of this chapter; however, this segment will cover the main components of the chosen radicalization model specifically. Since the main focus of this study is the radicalization process of individuals, factors that fall outside the scope of the radicalization model for lone wolf terrorism will be briefly mentioned, such as the modus operandi and locus of the attacks.

4.4.1. Motivations and Manifestos

To fully understand the motives behind the attacks and conduct a case study that discusses the role of ideological backgrounds, this segment of the fourth chapter focuses on the terrorist manifestos. Initially, manifestos are analyzed to see the operational background of attacks. Next, this chapter asks the following questions for the chosen cases: Were the attackers (terrorists) driven by personal and political grievances? If so, what do they mean for the radicalization process of individuals, and what are their implications?

As mentioned earlier, when a terrorist attack has operational ties to another organization, that is an essential factor in determining its form. In the chosen cases, however, the operational background of the attacks is planned and executed by the individuals alone. The first example of this argument is the 2011 Norway attacks, where Breivik's modus operandi revolves around his planning of the attacks years before the July 22 attacks.

In the case of the 2011 Norway attacks, determining the main motivation and its relationship to the operation is critical. Macklin & Bjørgo (2021: 15) report that Breivik admits to the police that his violent acts were motivated by his will to advertise his manifesto, which he delivers as "one of the most important motives for the operation."

His manifesto, which is called "2083 – A European Declaration of Independence," is a 1,500-page manifesto where Breivik presents his ideology along with operational advice regarding how to plan a terrorist attack (Kundnani, 2012). The first two parts of the manifesto, which discuss history and ideology, contain direct or indirect quotations from various right-wing writers (Macklin & Bjørgo, 2021: 15). The third "military" part was mostly written by him (Macklin & Bjørgo, 2021: 15–16). This section of the manifesto provided future "militant nationalists" whom he believed would follow in his footsteps with tactical and strategic guidance (Macklin & Bjørgo, 2021: 16).

As it can be concluded from the third "book" of his manifesto, Breivik plotted how to prepare and carry out an attack as a lone actor, and since he had the intention to spread his ideologies that could construct his ideals, he also left details about how to operate political violence in his manifesto. Yet that is not the only evidence of how he planned his operation. Breivik states that he began seriously planning the deadly attacks in 2006 (Pidd, 2012).

Breivik admits to planning the attacks on his own and explains his operational background to the police after getting arrested. For instance, Breivik discloses that he prepared the bomb himself in a farmyard while making sure he avoided his friends from visiting him after moving away from Oslo (Pidd, 2012). Evidence found by the prosecution shows that two years of meticulous planning also included membership in an Oslo shooting club, travels around Europe to purchase weapons and ammo, and online purchases of fertilizer, uniforms for the military, and other gear (Pidd, 2012).

In the case of the Norway attacks, Breivik also instrumentalized the social suspicions as an operational advantage. He deceived the public with his camouflage by convincing them he was the police. It is noteworthy that when radicalization is mentioned, there is a tendency to place certain radical groups as the ones that require prior focus. El-Said (2011: 200) argues that violent extremism does not belong to any culture or belief in particular; nonetheless, he phrases Islamic radicalization as "the most prominent form of radicalization" today by citing Coolsaet and de Swielande (2008). One could argue that this notion could hinder the realization of other radicalized groups and overshadow other radicalized groups that are opposing threats, causing these groups to continue their recruitment without getting the same amount of attention.

For example, Breivik pretended to be a police officer dispatched to secure the area following the bomb attack before setting foot on the island of Utoya (Macklin & Bjrgo, 2021: 15). Since he was already dressed as a police officer and looked nothing more than a Norwegian, nobody batted an eye; however, Norway was experiencing a more intriguing failure of expectation at the time: in the hours following the Oslo bombing, most had assumed that a radical Islamist had finally carried out his first successful attack (STÆRK, 2013: 89). That day, many people faced abuse because of the color of their skin (STÆRK, 2013: 89). The shooter was

arrested about an hour after the shooting and turned out to be the antithesis of a radical Islamist—an Islamophobe and a neo-Nazi (STÆRK, 2013: 90).

Besides spotting hints about the operational background of the attacks, analyzing Breivik's manifesto also reveals that he had violent and extremist ideologies that arise from personal and political grievances. The manifesto contains hate speech and targets Muslims as well as people who hold leftist values. Breivik primarily targeted the Labor Party because he saw them as traitors since the party had permitted Muslim immigration to Norway (STÆRK, 2013: 90). Breivik emphasized his desire for the attacks to start a civil war against Muslims and their "cultural Marxist" supporters in his manifesto, which was disseminated on the day of the attack (STÆRK, 2013: 90).

Similar to Breivik's case, Tarrant also had developed a plan years prior, and he intended to "inflict as many casualties as possible" by burning down the mosques (BBC, 2020a). In order to target mosques when they would be the most crowded, he acquired information about them by looking at locations, floor layouts, and other characteristics (BBC, 2020a). In addition, he visited Christchurch in the months before the assault, when he used a drone to fly over his main target, the Al Noor mosque (BBC, 2020a).

Reuters (2019) states that Tarrant wrote in his manifesto that while it was not the initial target for the attacks, New Zealand was eventually selected for the attacks as a "target rich of an environment as anywhere else in the West." Especially as an island nation, being more isolated from terrorist attacks may have made such a location more appealing to a terrorist like Tarrant. A terrorist act carried out in this way naturally draws more attention and provides a stronger foundation for the feelings of terror and fear, which serves the purpose of the terror attacks better.

According to the Global Terrorism Index, New Zealand ranked 122nd with a score of 0.143 in 2018 (The Institute for Economics and Peace, 2020). When the Christchurch mosque attacks took place, New Zealand's security score dropped to 4,337, ranking it 42nd (The Institute for Economics and Peace, 2020). In both 2018 and 2019, the Global Peace Index (GPI) ranked New Zealand as the second-most peaceful country in the world (The Institute for Economics and Peace, 2020). In addition to being one of the most peaceful countries in the world in the Global Peace Index, New Zealand's very low crime rate has widened the scope of the attacks and caused a greater shock (World Population Review, 2021).

Regarding Tarrant's modus operandi, there is strong evidence that shows him planning the events and carrying them out on his own. In terms of his operational background, Tarrant's digital trails leading to the attack were recovered from his SD card, which showed his

documents about planning and budgeting as well as his notes and digital footprint.[23] The "Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Attack on Christchurch Mosques on 15 March 2019" reports that these documents show how Tarrant planned his trips abroad, along with his military-style gear that was covered with messages and symbols. The same report also states that, according to an investigation by the New Zealand Police, the attacks were entirely self-funded by Tarrant and cost NZ$60,000. Furthermore, nothing in the data suggests that the terrorist attacks were financially supported by any other party. This analysis is one of the determining factors about Tarrant's operational background in relation to the criteria for a lone wolf terrorism case.

As a non-state actor, the terrorist perpetrates a violent crime that aims to cause fatal damage to non-combatants who were victims gathered for the Friday prayer. The attack was designed to elicit responses from third-party targets by broadcasting the shootings live on the internet alongside a manifesto that threatened a larger group of targets with politically motivated ideologies.

The 74-page manifesto of the terrorist who carried out the attacks, published under the title "The Great Replacement," is in harmony with the ideological discourses of the extreme right, as its content is full of xenophobic, Turkophobic, and Islamophobic conspiracy theories. The fact that the logo of his manifesto is the Black Sun symbol used by neo-Nazi groups and that there are references to the Fourteen Words ideology used by the same groups defines Tarrant's overall ideological background. Tarrant's description of himself as a racist and fascist "ordinary white man" in his manifesto instills a collective action problem mentality in "ordinary" masses like himself by camouflaging his extremely violent views and behaviors.

The terrorist's political aspirations and inspirations are openly mentioned throughout the manifesto. With neo-fascist ideology, anti-immigration, and Islamaphobia, Tarrant shows admiration towards former right-wing terrorists like Anders Behring Breivik, who carried out the Norway attacks of July 2011 (Walden, 2019).

It should also be underlined that these attacks were not only affected by the extreme right but also influenced the extreme right. Copycat attacks are particularly common in White Supremacist terrorist attacks. According to The New York Times study of recent terrorist incidents, at least one-third of white extremist killings since 2011 have been motivated by those who have committed similar crimes, have voiced admiration for them, or have expressed an interest in their methods and operational strategies (Cai & Landon, 2019).

There is a strong correlation between all three of the attacks; while they are affected by the previous attackers, they also influence future attacks. In this case, both Tarrant and Gendron's attacks are notable examples of copycat attacks, which also support the theory of the

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[23] Royal Commission of Inquiry into the terrorist attack on Christchurch masjidain on 15 March 2019

radicalization cycle since radicalization does not end after an individual commits terrorist acts. In contrast, it can even trigger an individual to carry out political violence for their own ends.

When compared with the previous terrorism cases, each case shows indications of increased usage of digital tools when it comes to the modus operandi of individuals. The case of the Buffalo shootings shows far more details of online interactions since the shooter had his own Discord server and kept an extensive journal on it.[24] The Office of the New York State Attorney General Letitia James (2022: 27–28) reports that to make sure he achieved his goal to "kill as many blacks as possible" in a short amount of time and in the safest way possible, the attacker used a variety of online platforms as one of his main resources. It is also reported that he used these networks to learn about the operational background of the weapons and military equipment he purchased. Moreover, his Discord records demonstrate months of research on armor, ballistic helmets, firearms, and other gear.

The report also states that besides his interactions on Discord, his manifesto also consists of parts condensing the knowledge he had learned about weapons, gun parts, and body armor from his internet research. Furthermore, the report gives information about Gendron's mentions regarding how he educated himself about the weaponry side of his modus operandi through Youtube videos and the /k/ board of 4chan. For example, Gendron also finds a Discord channel from the /k/ board called "Plate Land," which helps him learn about armor for his protection during the attack.

The 180-page manifesto he released was extensively disseminated online (Abbas et al., 2022). Besides explaining the motives behind the attacks and how to conduct such an attack, his manifesto, under the title "You Wait for a Signal While Your People Wait for You," also credits the Christchurch mosque shooter and claims that Tarrant's actions caused him to become radicalized. The manifesto continues to make references to the Great Replacement.[25]

Te Mana Whakaatu Classification Office (2022: 14) reports that the terrorist lists his three main objectives as follows: "Kill as many "blacks" as possible," "Avoid dying," and "Spread ideals." The report also notes that the attacker believes in the "Great Replacement" theory as a legitimate and actual threat that justifies engaging in terrorism and maybe even risking one's life for it.

This segment concentrated on the manifesto along with the operational background of terrorist attacks to conclude that all three cases meet the criteria of lone-wolf terrorism

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[24] Office of the New York State Attorney General Letitia James. (2022). Investigative Report on the role of online platforms in the tragic mass shooting in Buffalo on May 14, 2022. NEW YORK STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL. https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/buffaloshooting-onlineplatformsreport.pdf

[25] Te Mana Whakaatu Classification Office. (2022). Publications from the 2022 Buffalo, New York mass shooting Release of information about classification decisions (Report No. 2200197). Inspectors of Publications of the Department of Internal Affairs. https://www.classificationoffice.govt.nz/media/documents/20220614_Buffalo_proactive_release.pdf

motivated by right-wing extremist political discourse. The operational background of all three cases indicates that lone-wolf terrorism is the relevant type of terrorism; however, when the ideological backgrounds of the attacks are evaluated, one can conclude that right-wing terrorism is prevalent. Moreover, this part also draws attention to the relationship between the three cases and how copycat attacks are prominent in white extremist terrorism attacks. The next segments will focus on the extreme ideologies and motives that make terrorists consider themselves justified in their actions.

4.4.1.1. Far-Right Politics, Disinformation and Conspiracy Theories

"Know your enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril." — Sun Tzu[26]

Understanding the subjects of the cases and their personal and political grievances is vital for any terrorism research. As quoted by Borum (2003: 7) above, the importance of knowing one's enemy is emphasized by the famous Chinese General Sun Tzu in one of the translations of his book "The Art of War." Ideological origins that give birth to violent motives play a huge role in individuals who commit such atrocities. Interpreting such thought processes is valuable and can help prevent similar patterns from repeating for other individuals. The real enemy in this metaphor is the extremist views that cause political violence; thus, understanding them is a priority in this part of the research.

Considering the pros and cons of profiling terrorists, this part will only question the profiles of terrorists to find clues about their ideological development. This part of the research examines the personal and political grievances of the case subjects, their relations with enablers, and how all of the components combined slowly build up triggering factors. It is essential to ask the question in the chosen cases: Are there any signs of direct or indirect enablers of the attack? Were there any indications of a pre-attack catalyst event (or events)?

This paper does not directly address the psychology of terrorism, nor does it attempt to develop counter-terrorism strategies that include individual deradicalization; however, this paper is aware of its relationship to radicalization and terrorism studies and the significance of terrorist profiles. One of the most frequently cited forms of profiling is demonstrated below.

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[26] Borum, R. (2003). Understanding the terrorist mindset. *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin.* pp. 7–10. Retrieved May 29, 2022, from https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/201462.pdf

Table 4.3. Russell & Miller Profile

AGE:	Generally 22-25 for members
SEX:	80% of operations led and directed by males
MARITAL STATUS:	Most unmarried
URBAN/RURAL:	"Most urban terrorists are natives or long-time residents of metropolitan areas,"
SOCIOECONOMIC:	Predominantly middle and upperclass for members and leaders.
EDUCATION:	Two thirds had at least some university training.
RECRUITMENT SITE:	Large universities are the primary sites.
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY:	The three tendencies at play in terrorist organizations at the time were anarchism, Marxism-Leninism, andnationalism.

Source: Borum, 2004: 37

The Russell and Miller Profile is developed by analyzing around 18 different terrorist groups and the over 350 terrorist members within them (Borum, 2004: 37). However, there are problems with profiling terrorists since it can narrow the scope of prevention when the terrorist does not fit the profile (Borum, 2004: 37). Profiling terrorism could result in incorrect assessments of individuals who will never carry out political violence or disregard those who are planning possible attacks (Borum, 2004: 37). Moreover, it can even consult individuals or organizations about avoiding suspicion by changing their profiles accordingly (Borum, 2004: 37).

First, this part inquires about the profiles of the attackers. Who are the terrorists, and what could be their grievances? In all of the cases, the perpetrators of the attacks are white men who engaged in white extremism. White extremism is defined as "an umbrella term encompassing white nationalist, white supremacist, neo-Nazi, xenophobic, anti-Muslim, and anti-Semitic ideologies" by Cai and Landon (2019).

As Hamm and Spaaj (2015: 6) point out, American lone-wolf terrorists are predominantly single white males who are less educated and older compared to other terrorist groups. Even though the chosen cases for this study bear a striking resemblance to their research, the age profile of each case becomes younger in the chosen cases for this study. The shooter in Norway was 32 years old when he carried out the attacks, followed by the Christchurch terrorist, who was 28 in 2019. The most recent case subject was the youngest, aged 18 at the time of the attacks in 2022.

Regarding the case of Norway's attacks, Anders Behring Breivik is the subject, who was born in Oslo in 1979 to a diplomat father in London and a nurse mother (BBC, 2012d). His parents split when he was one year old, and Breivik's relationship with his father broke when he was a teenager. A child psychologist's reports have shown that the mother of the four-year-old Anders Breivik "sexualized" and smacked her son, as well as frequently expressing her wish for his death (Orange, 2012). Social workers suggested that Breivik be taken away from his mother to prevent "further serious psychopathology" from developing after Breivik's father, Jens Breivik, lost a child custody battle with Ms. Behring, but their recommendation was disregarded (Orange, 2012).

Breivik went to Handelsgymnasium High School to study business and seemed like a normal guy outside of online platforms (BBC, 2012d). Breivik chose to be baptized into the Protestant Church when he was 15 years old, and after this conversion, he showed interest in becoming a member of the more traditional Catholic religion (Walshe, 2011). However, Breivik became more and more paranoid about the so-called Muslim invasion of Europe and started to convince himself to justify what he planned to do (BBC, 2012d).

Breivik's passport showed evidence of his travels to Liberia and London from the Ivory Coast (Pidd, 2012). When his travels were later investigated, it was discovered that his true goal was to meet a "Serbian warrior" who would instruct him in "militant nationalism," demonstrating the extent of Breivik's radicalization (Pidd, 2012). Besides joining a firearms club, Breivik also used to be a member of an anti-immigration[27] Norwegian right-wing political party called the Progress Party (FrP) before he left it in 2007 (BBC, 2012d).

Walshe (2011) reports that, in his manifesto, Breivik also conveys his beliefs that particularly urge his actions in the following words: "Christian war to defend Europe against the threat of Muslim domination". In his crusade against liberal immigration policies and the spread of Islam, Breivik referred to his attacks as "atrocious" but "necessary," hence showing the existence of far-right political ideologies behind his actions even further (Abbas, 2011). Breivik's violence and extremist views inspired many other attacks later on, including the Christchurch mosque shootings. One could claim that a terrorist's personal and political grievances can lead to another individual's radicalization process or even become the triggering event(s) for them.

Brenton Harrison Tarrant was born in 1990 in Grafton, New South Wales, Australia, to a garbage collector father and a teacher mother (Brown, 2020). When Tarrant was young, his parents got separated.[28] The same source discloses that, according to his mother, Tarrant's

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[27] Abbas, M. (2011). *Analysis: Norway massacre exposes incendiary immigration issue.* REUTERS. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-norway-multiculturalism-idUSTRE76O3H220110725

[28] The information above regarding the terrorist was collected from the report, "Royal Commission of Inquiry into the terrorist attack on Christchurch masjidain on 15 March 2019," which was published on

demeanor had changed as a result of his parent's divorce and the loss of their home in a fire, and he had suffered from social anxiety since he was a child.

Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Attack on Christchurch Mosques on 15 March 2019 reports that his mother stated how her new partner was violent and abusive towards her and the children. Besides that, the report also includes information about Tarrant being bullied at school and his enthusiasm for video games since he was about six or seven years old. However, Tarrant's online interests were not limited to games, as he told his mother in 2017 that he had been using 4chan since he was 14 years old.[29]

According to the same source[30], Tarrant was dealt with by an anti-racism contact officer because of his anti-Semitic comments in high school, together with his remarks toward his mother's then-partner, who was of Aboriginal descent. In addition, the subject also received limited counseling because of the violent partner his mother had after the separation of his parents.

The Counter Extremism Project notes that he worked as a personal trainer in Grafton, and at shooting ranges close to his house, Tarrant practiced using weapons.[31] The same source also reports that Tarrant started posting on white nationalist message boards in 2010 after the loss of his father. After his father's death, Tarrant also acquired ownership of around $500,000 (Brown, 2020). Tarrant is known for quitting his job to travel overseas, and he has been to different countries in both Europe and Asia (BBC, 2020b).

Brown (2020) explains that after obtaining the money he inherited, Tarrant started to share his inquiries about how to make investments in an online forum, where he stated the following after being confronted by another user of the platform: "My self respect is through the roof, I can truly do anything I put my mind to." Tarrant also added that: "I am a goddamn monster of willpower, I just need a goal or object to work towards." Nevertheless, Tarrant ended up visiting various locations overseas instead, most of them being historical sites where different nations of Europe and the Ottoman caliphate fought (Brown, 2020). According to his grandmother, these travels had a noticeable impact on him, completely changing him (BBC, 2020b).

The Buffalo shooting, like the Christchurch mosque attacks, was a copycat attack inspired by Tarrant. One of the main indicators of this discourse is the manifesto written by Gendron. BBC (2022f) reports that Gendron mentioned Tarrant as his primary source of inspiration and entry point into the realm of "online extremism and white supremacy." The

November 26, 2020. Online access to this material is provided at:
www.christchurchattack.royalcommission.nz
[29] (see Footnote 28).
[30] (see Footnote 28).
[31] Counter Extremism Project. (n.d.) *Brenton Tarrant.* Retrieved December 16, 2022, from
https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/brenton-tarrant

shooter in the case of Buffalo is Payton S. Gendron, who was born in 2003 in Conklin, New York.[32] Both of Gendron's parents are civil engineers, and Gendron was following in their footsteps to become an engineer himself at Broome County Community College (Celona & Meyer, 2022).

The owner of the market, where Gendron used to be a worker for about four months before quitting around three months prior, claimed that Gendron was "very quiet," just like one of the gunman's neighbors also reported (Prokupecz et al., 2022). The terrorist's old classmates had similar claims about Gendron, who said that although he had a tendency to be a loner or strange, he was "nice," and he wasn't a violent person (Prokupecz et al., 2022).

According to law enforcement officials, a local high school in June 2021 contacted police in Broome County, New York, with information that Gendron had threatened to open fire at graduation or at that time (Zaru, 2022). Even though he did get therapy and a mental health assessment after the situation, no charges were brought against him after a police inquiry (Zaru, 2022).

Online platforms played a significant role in the radicalization of individuals in all three cases. In the case of the Buffalo shooting, the attacker states in his manifesto that he was "bored" during the period when the coronavirus pandemic began in early 2020; therefore, he claims that he started to get exposed to more extremist content and started radicalizing on 4chan (Acevedo et al., 2022).

Unlike the two previous cases and their travels, which might have slowly built up their triggering events, in the case of the Buffalo attacks, one could argue that the pandemic caused a chain of events that triggered or accelerated an individual's radicalization. Gendron also frequently mentions the terrorist behind the Christchurch mosque attacks and goes in parallel with Tarrant's extremist views (Acevedo et al., 2022). When these events are taken into account, there are both personal and political occurrences for the attackers that might have been escalating the series of thresholds that cause the triggers and carry individuals towards political violence. There will be some examples of similar circumstances in the following:

There are also particular instances mentioned by Breivik in his manifesto that might have been the catalyzing events for his radicalization process (Martinez, 2011). For example, Breivik claims that his ideological course changed when his Muslim friend celebrated the news announcing missile attacks against American soldiers during the first Gulf War when he was young (Martinez, 2011).

However, according to Martinez (2011), Breivik specified the critical event, which could be the triggering event, as "the NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999," since he was sympathetic to

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[32] The New York Times. (2022). *Gunman kills 10 at Buffalo Supermarket in racist attack.* The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/05/14/nyregion/buffalo-shooting

Serbia's persecution of ethnic Albanian Muslims in Kosovo. In addition, Breivik wrote that after a year, he was convinced that the "Islamization of Europe" could only be prevented with violence (Martinez, 2011). It is not crystal clear whether there is a singular catalysis event or not; nevertheless, in the case of Breivik, one can argue that the triggers slowly evolve from personal expectations and a longing for collective action toward his extremist views.

In the case of the Christchurch shooter, there is proof that Tarrant began a more violent discourse online after the death of his father, which links personal events and political impasses at once. This kind of trend is noticeable in all three cases, yet it is more evident in Tarrant's case since he also receives money after the loss of his father.

Evaluating possible personal and political grievances of individuals, as well as the signs of triggering events, has proved that there are strong indications of far-right politics and its conspiracy theories that cause disinformation. Regarding the importance of politicization within the radicalization process and its translation into extremist political discourse, the next part of this segment will analyze the main driving political ideologies of white extremist attackers.

4.4.1.1.1. White Supremacy and the Great Replacement Theory

"He who strikes terror in others is himself continually in fear." — Claudius Claudianus

There is a deep-rooted fear that feeds the need to terrorize the public in different examples of terrorism motivated by the "great replacement" theory. In the case of right-wing radicalization, those who engage in extremist and far-right political discourse, whether politicians or those who commit political violence as "fireworks"[33] of their published manifestos, amplify this fear, causing a domino effect. In all three cases chosen for this paper, white supremacy and its conspiracy theories paint a picture where a certain type[34] of group is considered a threat to the white population. This ideology is engraved within terrorist motives, which can be spotted in their manifestos. So, what exactly is white supremacy, and what is the infamous conspiracy theory known as the "Great Replacement"?

The "Great Replacement" theory, as can be understood from its name, referres to the so-called "white genocide conspiracy theory," which is a commonly used political rhetoric. The term "white genocide" was first popularized by white supremacist David Lane (Davey & Ebner,

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[33] Macklin & Bjørgo (2021:15) report that after getting arrested, Breivik stated in police interviews that the attacks were only "the fireworks" to present his manifesto.

[34] There are no ambiguities regarding the white supremacist belief that there is a so-called invasion against the declining white population; however, all three cases focus on a different group within society as the main focus of the threat: in the case of the Norway attacks, the main target for the psychical operations was chosen as the leftists (Marxists according to Breivik), in the case of the Christchurch shootings, Muslims, and in the case of the Buffalo shootings, black people.

2019). Lane has argued that the phrase has been replaced by immigration, integration, abortion, and violence against the white population (Davey & Ebner, 2019).

In 2011, French philosopher and writer Renaud Camus was the first person to use the term "Great Change" in his book Le Grand Remplacement (The Great Replacement) (Davey & Ebner, 2019). The Great Replacement Theory, also known as the Replacement Theory, differs from the White Holocaust Theory, which is often explicitly linked to anti-Jewish conspiracy theories (it refers to the deliberately orchestrated population change by the Jewish people) (Davey & Ebner, 2019). Since then, Camus has become one of the most influential thinkers of Europe's Nouvelle Droite (New Right) and youth wing, the Identitarian Movement (Davey & Ebner, 2019).

Office of the New York State Attorney General Letitia James (2022: 15) argues that this idea, which claims that birth rates of the white population are falling and being exceeded by those of other races, has a long history that dates back to around the 19th century. It sparked the 20th-century eugenics movement and has evolved into a guiding philosophy for white nationalist fanatics all across the world.[35]

The far-right and relevant political tendencies are gaining ground in most of the western world, including European nations with dark pasts regarding far-right politics. This growing trend has existed beyond Europe, developing and expanding in numerous democracies. This reality might seem like it does not pose a considerable threat; nevertheless, the consequences of extremism coming through such sentiments indicate that the rise of the far-right is endangering the peace within western societies as well as the rest of the world.

Due to an inflow of migrants and refugees fleeing wars in the Middle East and Africa, Europe has witnessed a rise in far-right and xenophobic violence in recent years (Cai & Landon, 2019). As indicated below, the Times made an analysis based on information from the Global Terrorism Database, which documented approximately 350 acts of terrorism by white extremists in the western world (Cai & Landon, 2019). Furthermore, Cai and Landon (2019) argue that with the example of the 2011 Norway attacks, Breivik set a new trend for copycat attacks carried out by other imitator lone-wolf terrorists.

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[35] Office of the New York State Attorney General Letitia James. (2022). *Investigative Report on the role of online platforms in the tragic mass shooting in Buffalo on May 14, 2022.* NEW YORK STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL. https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/buffaloshooting-onlineplatformsreport.pdf

Figure 4.5. The rise of white extremist terrorism attacks in Europe, North America, and

Australia

Source: Cai & Landon, 2019

In the case of the Norway attack, the white supremacist mindset is not only surrounded by Islamaphobia but also combined with the crusader approach. The neo-Nazi ideology of "race war" exhorts white people to rebel against governments they believe to be covertly ruled by Jews and whose purpose is to erode the racial purity of white people by facilitating black immigration (Kundnani, 2012). According to Kundnani (2012), Breivik reframes this ideology by replacing race with culture, black people with Muslims, and Jews with multiculturalists. Moreover, Kundnani (2012) draws attention to subtle changes in the reconstruction of neo-Nazism, where Breivik opts for a reframed concept of "culture war" instead of referencing "race war."

For instance, the Battle of Vienna, in which the troops of European Christendom defeated the Ottoman forces in 1683, is referenced in the title Breivik gave to his manifesto: 2083 (Richards, 2014: 43). According to Richards (2014: 44), Breivik believed that much of the west was under Muslim invasion, which he believed would result in a large conflict; thus, he envisioned "post-revolutionary scenarios" about crusades.

When the case study is focused on the Christchurch mosque attacks, it is possible to see the motivations of Tarrant in a similar light. White supremacist Brenton Tarrant, who confessed to his guilt, documented his two-year preparations for the detailed terrorist act within conspiracy-filled far-right "manifesto" (TRT World, 2019). Furthermore, Tarrant emphasizes that "nowhere in the world was safe," and he discloses his beliefs as follows: "...the invaders were in all of our lands" in his manifesto (Reuters, 2019).

Besides the understanding that no place in the world is safe, Tarrant's visit to New Zealand from Australia to carry out this bloody act is another indicator of the impact of globalization on terrorist activities as they are organized virtually and carried into the physical world cross-continent. This factor shows the ironic side of the attacks since, despite the terrorists' claim that nowhere was safe due to immigrants who were not of the "white" race, Tarrant, a white man, migrated to a western country to carry out political violence, which caused much harm not only to immigrants but also to the western establishment. The same situation is evident in all three cases, albeit in different ways.

In terms of ideological approaches, Sönmez (2019: 3) evaluated Tarrant's understanding as follows: "An important inference that can be drawn from Tarrant's discourse and the "messages" on his rifle is the historical traumas and humiliations that come to life as a common theme among many far-right groups. It is a strong anti-Turkish sentiment, or Turkophobia, taken together with Islamophobia." Likewise, same patterns were evident in the case of Breivik.

Both of the terrorists, who were radicalized with far-right ideologies, gave meaning to the historical and current events he referred to in his manifesto and listed the issues that require collective action. Considering that the Christchurch mosque attacks were against minorities, specifically Muslims, one of the main issues necessary to be solved according to the ideology this terrorist action advocate is immigration and the foreign population that comes with it.

Types of collective action can turn into actions that bear fruit in peaceful and socially beneficial areas. Many innovations and revolutions have emerged as a result of collective action; nevertheless, the use of collective action methods may not have positive consequences for all segments of society. Furthermore, Oberschall (2004) argues that four dimensions of collective action should have a positive value for terrorism in the following order: discontent, ideology-feeding grievances, capacity to organize, and political opportunity. From this point of view, the motivation conveyed through the manifesto becomes clearer and more comprehensible.

When it comes to the collective action problem of terrorists and those who have their mentality, the collective goal of these individuals with extreme and hateful thoughts is to divide society and achieve this goal with violent actions. Individuals who do not see collective action in areas of their interest may consider ends justifying the means, which can turn into a set of violent responses as various strategies and tools are used to achieve their personal goals. The concept of collective action, which has a notable place in social sciences concerning social problems, has also been altered to fit the characteristics of the modern age.

According to Mancur Olson's (1965) assumption, individuals cannot overcome social problems unless they are limited by externally imposed and enforced rules to act in the common interest (Sethi, 2010). In this regard, lone individuals act upon their personal need for

collective action by utilizing the tools that technology provides for their political goals. However, it is only in the perception of extremists that there is a need for political violence to achieve collective action in certain social and political spheres.

Kendrali (2020: 15) describes radicalism as a "non-normative collective action" and peaceful activism as a "normative collective action." Radicalism and activism are distinguished by Moskalenko and McCauley (2009) since they suggest executing political goals differently: radicalism is ready to commit violence, whereas activism intends to engage in peaceful action (Kendrali, 2020: 5). Distinguishing these two types of political action matters; nevertheless, one can argue that both are derived from a need for collective action towards a political goal.

In the terrorist's manifesto, Tarrant lists his motivation as "to take revenge on the invaders for the hundreds and thousands of deaths caused by foreign invaders." With provocative words such as "to take a stand to ensure a future for my people" as the reason for carrying out his attack, he gives examples of both a collective action goal and a collective action reason to carry on his message. Here, the violent statement is turned into a terrorist act while aiming to reach its goal by creating an "atmosphere of fear."

Today, one of the social problems that the extreme right and the right-wing organizations that act with it most frequently apply to is immigration and the issues that arise from it. According to this viewpoint, immigration is not a sufficient threat on its own, so thinkers with extreme ideologies combine their ideologies with conspiracy theories, turning immigration into a problem of collective action and legitimizing extremist methods in solving it. While it is true that there is a global (im)migration crisis and the population is aging in Western societies, it is part of extremist policies to polarize society by holding a certain segment of society responsible for these realities.

The shooter of the Buffalo attack follows a similar path by mentioning the Great Replacement theory in his manifesto (BBC, 2022g). According to officials, Grendron's manifesto contains racist and anti-Semitic slurs throughout the document (Zaru, 2022). Most right-wing extremists believe the Jewish community is behind the so-called "white genocide." While casting the white population as the victim, Gendron also repeatedly blames the Jewish community for orchestrating all of the actions, making them the "real" foe in his eyes (Abbas et al., 2022).

When his internet posts were examined, it was found that Gendron extolled previous mass shooters (Zaru, 2022). Zaru (2022) reports that these terrorists were radicalized through right-wing extremism and had racist discourse, such as the "South Carolina church shooter Dylann Roof, the New Zealand mosque shooter Brenton Tarrant and the Pittsburgh Tree of Life synagogue shooter Robert Gregory Bowers."

This report indicates that the subjects of all three cases were predominantly influenced by the real-world reflections of far-right ideologies and were disinformed through conspiracy

theories. In the next part, this paper will analyze another type of disinformation, namely propaganda, and draw conclusions from its comparison to its older versions and its current strategic use.

4.4.1.1.2. The Common Strategies of Old and New Nazi Propaganda used by Right-Wing Extremism

"History never repeats itself, but it does often rhyme." -Mark Twain[36]

As stated earlier in the methodology segment, this paper not only inquires about definitions of terms and analyzes cases through theories and frameworks but also briefly explores their histories to make better sense of the present issues. Hence, this part of the chapter inquires about the radicalization process of former Nazis, which inspires and enables the "new" Nazis of today. Enablers can be both direct and indirect, as mentioned in the previous chapter; thus, this part also tries to answer the following question: Are there any signs of direct or indirect enablers of the attacks? And what are its connections to the past?

There are numerous examples of how neo-nazi rhetoric and the ideologies of case subjects overlap. Breivik's ideology mostly focuses on the idea that the mass immigration that was allowed by the left-wing authorities was destroying Europe's Christian heritage (Martinez, 2011). Likewise, Tarrant also agrees with Breivik's argument, and both of the terrorists claim to be members of a group called "Knights Templar."

In his manifesto, Breivik borrowed phrases from the "Unabomber" and fantasized about leading a crusade of Knights Templar members who would overthrow the government of Europe in a series of coups d'etat (Martinez, 2011). Martinez (2011) reports that Breivik describes himself as a nationalist, patriot, and Christian conservative. He also disdains neo-Nazis as "underprivileged racist skinheads with a short temper," in addition to his proclaimed anti-Muslim sentiments.

Despite looking down on neo-Nazis, in 2012, when trials began, Breivik entered the courtroom and gave a "clenched fist salute."[37] In 2016, at the start of the hearing, the terrorist arrived back in court while demonstrating a Nazi salute.[38]

In his manifesto, Breivik also boasts about his membership in the English Defense League (EDL), a UK far-right organization (Taylor, 2011). He further claimed that at the Knights Templar Europe's inaugural assembly in London in 2002, he was given the pseudonym "Sigurd

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[36] Lagarde, C. (2018). *When History Rhymes.* International Monetary Fund.
https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2018/11/05/blog-when-history-rhymes
[37] The Associated Press. (2021). *Norway's July 22, 2011, terror attack: a timeline.* AP NEWS.
https://apnews.com/article/europe-norway-bd6c9d2efd6ce2148c3d85cb79d73af9
[38] (see Footnote 37)

(the Crusader)". Breivik expressed his support for the far-right group online and claimed to have interacted with EDL members before, yet the leader of the EDL, Stephen Lennon, who uses the alias Tommy Robinson, denied ever having met Anders Breivik. (BBC, 2011).

Neo-Nazi groups along with far-right entities are recruiting members from all over the world using a wide range of tools. These tools vary from political representatives to youth organizations that can ensure their relevance and future. One of the key strategies these organizations are using is the tools of propaganda. Propaganda was an effective way to radicalize people in the past; in fact, it was one of the most noticeable strategies of Adolf Hitler's Nazism. Considering how propaganda remains an essential tool when it comes to the recruitment of people within these radical and eventually extremist ideologies, unfolding the truth behind their propaganda has a distinguished significance.

Nazism is another political ideology that right-wing extremists are attempting to revive to its old popularity. Neo-Nazi ideology is prevalent in today's politics among supporters of white supremacy and the replacement theory. As it is also becoming mainstream in its right-wing league, individuals who carry this ideology are also highly driven when it comes to altering reality for political interests.

Nazism, originally "Nationalsozialismus" in German, meaning National Socialism, is a "totalitarian movement led by Adolf Hitler as head of the Nazi Party in Germany" (Britannica, 2020). Because intellectual or theoretical approaches were almost nonexistent in the face of Adolf Hitler's charismatic leadership, who was perceived as the inspirational dictator and protector of the Aryan Volk, propaganda was by far the driving source of Nazi ideology.

Looking at today's Nazi movements, most of the former Nazi approaches resonate. Even though the aims of Nazism were disrupted with Germany's defeat in 1945, traces of Nazi ideology remained in Germany following Hitler's suicide, "and a small number of Nazi-oriented political parties and other groups were formed in West Germany from the late 1940s, though some were later banned" (Britannica, 2020). Despite all the efforts, after the Second World War, the Nazi ideology carried onto the next generation, creating a new movement of neo-Nazism, which seeks to revive Nazi fascism. The propaganda that made former Nazism appealing to the masses is what makes neo-Nazism appealing to the masses today.

As the twentieth century began, there had been a tremendous advancement in technology that involved communication. Since then, communication has been used intensively to achieve political propaganda that could generate behavioral changes. In his work "The Theory of Political Propaganda," Laswell (1927: 627) defines propaganda as the following: "Propaganda is the management of collective attitudes by the manipulation of significant symbols." In addition, he touches upon the ever-changing world and the technological or social

progress it brings along. Some of these developments have, as he argues, increased communication between the people and the rulers.

In his journal article titled "Propaganda Analysis," Cantril (1938) underlines the fact that although propaganda has been used in various forms throughout history, "propaganda on a large scale was first used during World War II." When it comes to the question itself, "What is this thing called propaganda?" Cantril (1938: 217) argues that: "...propaganda is expression of opinion or action by individuals or groups deliberately designed to influence opinions or actions of other individuals or groups with reference to predetermined ends." Similarly, Ellul (1965: 63) argues that "Propaganda as it is traditionally known implies an attempt to spread an ideology through the mass media of communication in order to lead the public to accept some political or economic structure or to participate in some action."

Reviewing Hitler's propaganda literature, some of the most relevant materials are related to Goebbels' Principles of Propaganda. Among the Nazi documents recovered by American officials in Berlin in 1945 was a manuscript written (dictated) as a diary by Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels (Doob, 1950, p. 419). This work, which was composed as a diary, had its gaps; however, it covered the period from "January 21, 1942, to December 9, 1943." This diary as material for propaganda studies is not necessarily considered historically correct since it might have been altered as propaganda for the targets of the readers. Nonetheless, the script was discovered to be mostly written by Goebbels, providing a valuable source of information about Nazi propaganda.

In his work titled "Goebbels' Principles of Propaganda," Leonard W. Doob (1950) lists various principles that are generated by Goebbels within the Nazi propaganda strategy. To explain Hitler's propaganda effectively, Doob (1950) emphasizes the importance of the principles of Goebbels by listing the required elements of propaganda as follows:

"Obtaining intelligence concerning events and public opinion, maintaining one authority over all propaganda strategies, taking the consequences of the strategies into account, affecting the enemy's policy and action, increasing the availability of declassified, operational information, keeping the usage of attention-getting communications medium, securing credibility, analyzing enemy propaganda, practicing censorship, diminishing enemy's prestige, preferring black rather than white propaganda, facilitating propaganda by leaders with prestige, being careful with the timing, creating distinctive phrases or slogans to label people or events, preventing the raising of false hopes, reinforcing anxiety concerning the consequences of defeat, diminishing the impact of frustration, and specifying the targets for hatred."

Last but not least, Doob (1950: 440) argues that "propaganda cannot immediately affect strong counter-tendencies; instead it must offer some form of action or diversion, or both." This long list of propaganda principles resembles much of the modern world's propaganda strategies, prompting the question of how it might have influenced the propaganda of neo-Nazi

groups hoping to sway public opinion in their favor. To answer this question, the technological advancements in communication within our era have to be considered. Here, the digital world and the new tools it generates for propaganda play a striking role.

In his work "Propaganda 2.0: Herman and Chomsky's Propaganda Model in the Age of the Internet, Big Data and Social Media," Fuchs (2018: 80) criticizes Herman and Chomsky for not properly explaining the dimension of Flak. He describes "Flak" as a military jargon that was used by the Nazis as an abbreviation for the word "Fliegerabwehrkanone." Fuchs (2018) reveals the significance of this term by stating:

> "Herman and Chomsky define flak the following way: '"Flak" refers to negative responses to a media statement or program. It may take the form of letters, telegrams, phone calls, petitions, lawsuits, speeches and bills before Congress, and other modes of complaint, threat, and punitive action. It may be organized centrally or locally, or it may consist of the entirely independent actions of individuals. In the digital age, lobbying for certain interests has been extended to social media and is no longer simply aimed at centralised media organisations, but now aims to directly transmit political messages to as many internet users as possible."

When it comes to lobbying online and the term "Flak," far-right groups are using this strategy efficiently. One of the best instances of extremism online is the exposed online affiliations of neo-Nazi terrorists such as Anders Breivik. This new form of extremist propaganda is resembling the usage of the media and communication technologies in Hitler's Nazi Germany, aligning with Goebbels' principles.

While talking about the new tools of propaganda, the repetitive rhetoric of these messages should be observed. According to Lee (2018: 170): "Nazism and neo-Nazi thrive on the degradation of the other, on dehumanizing the other. Paradoxically, an attack on the other does not boost the self, but the opposite" He illustrates these labeling strategies by highlighting how politicians are leading the charge to increase polarization. Lee (2018: 175) states that "certain tales are taken as the truth, and with a limited view of history and politics, the narrative of the past is rewritten. Wilders calls Moroccans 'scum', Hitler called Jews 'vermin'."

The misreading of reality was also critical to convincing the masses to undergo political and ideological transformations. O'Shaughnessy (2016) argues that "The Nazi propaganda regime was heavily informed by a (mis)reading of history, according to which the British had won the First World War due to the negative impact of Lord Northcliffe's enemy propaganda department at Crewe House on the morale of the German army." This misinformation was keeping the idea of victimizing Germany" moreover, was growing the hatred towards "the enemies of the German Volk."

Today, far-right neo-Nazi movements use similar misinformation methods to victimize white supremacists. According to Lee (1997: 388): "The jackals of the extreme Right believed they found the crucial pressure point when they seized upon immigration as the main issue to

rally around." Nowadays, the same propaganda strategy works with misinformation and misinterpretation of events as well as social problems; nevertheless, the victim stays the same. Goebbels also underlines this approach by saying, "propaganda must not investigate the truth objectively- but it must present that aspect of the truth which is favorable to its own side" (Campbell, 2012: 128).

To divide societies into more distinctive groups, neo-Nazi groups identify "the others" and continue the discrimination that comes with marginalization. One of the most notable ways far-right movements conduct this act is by creating comic posts online. Many of these posts are created in the format of memes. Memes function similarly to Hitler's propaganda posters. Bogerts and Fielitz (2019) state: "Reconquista Germanica hit the headlines in the context of the German federal elections of 2017 by attempting to subvert online discourses, to intimidate supporters of democratic parties and to support the election of the AfD."

Figure 4.6. Side by side comparison of the Kekistan flag and the Nazi war flag.
Source: The State Press, n.d.

As shown above, the flag for the Kekistan meme used by alt-right communities demonstrates a striking resemblance to that of the Nazi war flag. Another popular propaganda tool in both neo-Nazism and Hitler's nazism is the slogan and concept of degeneracy. Fürstenau (2020) reports that "From 1937, the Nazis confiscated such works from German museums. In a traveling exhibition, "degenerate art" was held up for public ridicule." The term "degeneracy" is widely used by members of neo-Nazi groups to ridicule progressive left-wing politics.

Slogans of Hitler's propaganda included "Blood and Soil" (Blut und Boden) to "evoke the idea of a pure "Aryan" race and the territory it wanted to conquer" and Jews as a threat to the pureness of the Aryan nation (the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum). Nazis at the time were accusing Jews of being responsible for "Germany's cultural, political, and economic degeneration." Similarly, neo-Nazis use "fourteen words" as a slogan, which was coined by

David Lane (Ridgeway, 2008). 14 words stand for "We must secure the existence of our people and a future for white children,"[39] which has an uncanny similarity to the Nazi slogans.

In his manifesto, the Buffalo shooter questions his own motivation and responds to it with neo-Nazi rhetoric by using the "fourteen words." Feuer (2022) states that Gendron also used the "sonnenrad"[40] in his manifesto, which is a common symbol used by Neo-Nazis. The SS, SA, and the Nazi Party all occasionally employed sonnenrad symbolism in Nazi Germany.[41] As demonstrated in the Figure 22, Tarrant uses the black sun symbol as well as writings carrying far-right ideologies on his equipment, which he used while carrying out the Christchurch mosque shootings (Brockell, 2019b). Since symbolism was a strong feature of the former Nazi propaganda strategy, similar symbols used then are appropriated into neo-Nazi symbolism today.

Figure 4.7. Tarrant's bulletproof vest, covered with the black sun symbol.
Source: Brockell, 2019b

When it comes to propaganda, the succession of the ideological foundation can be strengthened by passing down the Nazi ideology to the younger generations. That was the motivation behind the establishment of the Hitler Youth. According to Blakemore (2018), "By

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[39] Ridgeway, J. (2008). *Fourteen Words that spell racism.* The Guardian.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/uselectionroadtrip/2008/oct/28/uselections-obama-racism
[40] The Anti-Defamation League defines this symbol as an ancient European symbol repurposed by the Nazis. Sonnenrad is also known as the "sun wheel" and the "black sun."
[41] Anti-Defamation League (n.d.). *Sonnenrad.* ADL. Retrieved January 13, 2023, from https://www.adl.org/resources/hate-symbol/sonnenrad

1939, over 90 percent of German children were part of the Hitler Youth organization." The organization of a modern Hitler Youth is diverse in its forms and shapes.

One of the most prominent far-right organizations in Europe is Generation Identity. The main objective of Generation Identity is to remove immigrants across the European territories, and the main argument they use to back their claims is the Replacement Theory. DW (2019) reports that "Germany's domestic intelligence service has identified the country's Identitarian movement as an extremist entity. The group, which claims to defend European identity through ethnopluralist ideology, has gained traction."

It is evident within the literature and comparative research that the role of propaganda is remarkable when it comes to shaping and controlling public opinion. There are many indicators that similarities between neo-Nazi propaganda and former Nazi propaganda exist within the historical context; furthermore, this phenomenon continues to exist today.

4.4.2. Right-Wing Extremism Online

When it comes to the physical locations of attacks, they differ in all three cases, even though each terrorist chose a location that required them to travel. Regardless, there is evidence that all three individuals were ideologically and politically influenced by online platforms when it comes to the true locus of radicalization toward violent extremism. Radicalization of lone wolf terrorists includes both offline and online elements (Hamm & Spaaj, 2015: 7).

Before 9/11, most of the lone wolves used to be members of the extremist organization, but they left it (Hamm & Spaaj, 2015: 7). Nonetheless, especially since the 9/11 attacks, there has been a shift in the locus of radicalization, with increased connections via online social networks and mass media (Hamm & Spaaj, 2015: 7). Analyzing the loci[42] of radicalization is critical in this paper since it focuses on understanding the radicalization process of individuals as well as their affinity with online sympathizers or extremist groups, which will be thoroughly examined in this segment.

The digital disruption is known to have started the "digital age," which is also known as the "information age." In addition to the overall capacity for sharing and posting violent content, violent online interactions and the digital platforms that pave the way for this interaction are globally open to online access on an almost unlimited basis. As Harwell & Timberg (2019) suggest: "To experts in online extremism, the performance echoed another brand of terrorism — that carried out by Islamist militants who have long used the Web to mobilize followers and

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[42] The place (locus) of radicalization is crucial since it highlights the social setting or mechanism in which individuals get radicalized toward terrorism (Hamm, Spaaj, 2015; 7).

incite violence. Their tone, tactics and propaganda were eerily similar. The biggest difference was their ambitions: a white-supremacist uprising, instead of a Muslim caliphate."

This shift in different branches of extremism is noteworthy since the ideologies of radical Islamism might not be attractive to the western audience; meanwhile, the racist undertones inserted in online posts within digital networks are "funny" or "relatable" for the young white audience. These subtle forms of extremist online interactions push young men into the stages of radicalization; additionally, they make it extremely difficult to target them until they become radicalized to the point where they justify carrying out their violent ideologies in the physical world.

Considering the regular usage of online communities like 8chan and how many other digital networks work, there are real threats to global security. Digitalized networks are an essential tool of the globalization of radicalization in the 21st century; therefore, it is necessary to comprehend how these online interactions work. The effects of digitalized extremism beg questions such as "how do they operate?" and "how do they manage to radicalize people to become lone-wolf terrorists?" as in the example of all three attacks. This chapter seeks to answer how globalized online communities radicalize individuals for violent extremism by combining globalized online communities and radicalization processes.

4.4.2.1. The Role of Online Communities

Along with less moderated websites such as chan boards on the path of violent radicalization, countless platforms in the vast virtual world should not go unnoticed. Despite the fact that two of the case studies in this paper have connections with chan boards, mainstream platforms that were open to more people's access hosted threatening posts, even if these platforms had more regulation and moderation.

These communities were also posing indirect threats to the radicalization of individuals. All of these different platforms are also interconnected with each other. The most important features of these platforms are that they have active audiences who spend time in digital environments. Platforms such as YouTube have become a tool for people who want to spread extreme ideas by conveying their ideas in accordance with the platform's terms and conditions.

One of these issues became more prominent after the broadcasting of the Christchurch mosque attacks via the Facebook live broadcasting system and the distribution of the images of the event to other corners of the internet via Facebook. Other platforms that have larger communities and are easier to reach include video games or video-sharing platforms like Youtube.

Video game platforms are another online space where radical and extremist contents exist. Although there are many different types of gaming platforms, the common characteristic they share is that they allow access to violent games as well as controversial gaming communities, which play a role in the radicalization of other players. The connection of video game culture with other internet cultures, such as internet "meme" culture, causes radicalization to spread faster in online networks. This connection also shows how interconnected different online communities are.

In his Facebook account, Breivik claims to be a fan of games like "Call of Duty" and "World of Warcraft."[43] This paper does not argue whether video games pose a threat in the sense of game content; however, this paper emphasizes the importance of video game platforms where individuals might find themselves in echo chambers. Because gaming communities have a strong connection with online forums, the politicization of individuals is unavoidable with political memes that use game templates. It is the consumers who decide how goods are used; similarly, a person with extremist opinions can spread his ideologies through video games and establish gaming communities that can further expand the "filter bubbles" for gamers.

Pariser (2011) argues that a customized set of information that is tailored to individuals' needs by algorithms is what he refers to as the "filter bubble" in his book.[44] Pariser (2011) underlines the risk, which prevents individuals from seeing other viewpoints. Furthermore, the "filter bubble" isolates internet users and narrows their perspectives, which also establishes a base for a radicalization environment.

Caolan Robertson, a former alt-right YouTuber, explained to The Irish Times the methods they used to create their videos (Metz, 2021): "We would choose the most dramatic moment—or fake it and make it look more dramatic. We realised that if we wanted a future on YouTube it had to be driven by confrontation" says Robertson. Robertson has produced videos for right-wing YouTube personalities on both sides of the Atlantic, including Lauren Southern, Stefan Molyneux, and Alex Jones (Metz, 2021). The videos are often adapted for the "echo chamber" created by social media networks such as YouTube. YouTube offers videos similar to what you've watched before to keep you watching, but the longer a person watches such videos, the more extreme the videos can become (Metz, 2021).

Similarly, Williamson (2020: 9) argues that "online far-right community members actively frame and perpetuate a worldview in line with their values; the result is content funnelling, but another important funnelling feature occurs too. This refers to how social media algorithms create echo chambers through continuously personalising content. Social media was

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[43] Martinez, E. (2011). *Anders Behring Breivik: Profile of anti-Muslim hater in confessed Norway terrorist's manifesto.* CBS NEWS. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/anders-behring-breivik-profile-of-anti-muslim-hater-in-confessed-norway-terrorists-manifesto/
[44] Pariser, E. (2011). *The Filter Bubble: What the Internet is Hiding from You.* Penguin Press, London.

built to learn as we use it, meaning when you view content, the algorithm will provide you with similar content and tailors your feed according to what you view and interact with..."

According to Clement (2022), there are over three billion gamers in the world. Gaming culture is tied to a cross-platform interaction chain. Gamers engage in additional platforms such as Discord and Twitch to share their gaming experiences with others while streaming as well as communicating through voice and video chats (Schlegel & Amarasingam, 2022: 4). G2A Data[45] on the rise of gamers since the COVID-19 pandemic also suggests gaming communities are busier than ever. The same data suggests that gaming is seen as a crucial aspect of people's lives under lockdown.

The number of users attracted by online communities also attracts those looking to recruit new members for their extremist group. According to Koehler et al. (2022), online platforms such as Discord build a "social hierarchy" in the virtual world that guides members of extremist Discord communities towards actions to realize a certain agenda.

There are about "19 million active servers per week, 150 monthly active users, and 4 billion server conversation minutes daily" on Discord.[46] Discord has a history when it comes to radicalization through its communities and its violent extremist reflections. According to Discord, "...the 2017 Unite the Right Rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, utilized Discord to plan their hateful activities."[47] Another example is the 2022 Buffalo Shooting in New York; the terrorist who committed the hate crime has traces on Discord. Discord[48] reports Gendron's activity on his private server, where he kept a diary that became visible when he shared a link that directs other users to his private server on public servers and through private messages to people half an hour before the attacks. Only 15 members of the Discord community have joined the server, and none of them have reported any action (Discord, 2022). The terrorist's account was banned following the attack, and his server was archived for investigation (Discord, 2022).

Sharma et al. (2022: 5599) cites Fairchild (2020) and bring attention to the crucial role that gaming communities play in promoting the dissemination of extremely racist content as opposed to more general groups that support moderately racist content. A striking aspect of the relationship between video games and online communities was that video games were not the direct recruitment tool used by right-wing extremists; however, online communities where individuals with similar interests share insights were prominent in terms of ideology exchange (Koehler et al., 2022). For instance, one of the reports in Koehler et al.'s (2022) study indicates

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[45] G2A.CO. (2020). *Lockdown sees the rise of over 60s gamers, G2A data reveals.* G2A. Retrieved December 15, 2022, from https://www.g2a.co/lockdown-sees-the-rise-of-over-60s-gamers-g2a-data-reveals/

[46] Discord. (n.d.). *Our story.* Discord. Retrieved January 15, 2023, from https://discord.com/company

[47] Graggle. (2021). *How trust & safety adresses violent extremism on discord.* Retrieved January 16, 2022, from https://discord.com/blog/how-trust-safety-addresses-violent-extremism-on-discord

[48] Discord. (2022). *Our response to the tragedy in Buffalo.* Discord. Retrieved December 7, 2022, from https://discord.com/blog/our-response-to-the-tragedy-in-buffalo

that children playing history-related strategic games were approached by those who held far-right ideologies.

In his article titled "Gaming culture and the alt-right: The weaponisation of hate," Duff (2019) evaluates the live broadcasting of the attack by the terrorist who carried out the Christchurch mosque attacks in terms of its similarity to FPS (first-person shooter) games and video games. He underlines that the terrorist is an integral part of the subculture of which he is a part. This connectedness and familiarity within the subcultures of the internet also make members of these communities feel related to the terrorist; therefore, ultimately, it becomes an instrument to construct the radicalization process of an individual faster and more organically.

From this perspective, even Tarrant's customization of his weapons and equipment while performing the attack can be seen as a reference to the equipment customization culture found in many games. References made in this way may cause players watching the videos of the attacks to sympathize with the attacks. Such symbolism and gestures are important because they encourage violent extremism for those who can read the message within them. Likewise, Gendron also inscribed racist and white nationalist slogans on his gun, similar to Tarrant (Sardarizadeh, 2022).

As demonstrated in Figure 4.8 and 4.9, both the AR-15 rifle[49] used by Tarrant in the Christchurch mosque shootings and the Bushmaster XM-15 rifle[50] used by Gendron in the Buffalo shooting are covered with racist slurs as well as references to "Christian and Nazi military commanders."[51] Additionally, as Figure 25 presents, the Flashback skin of the M4A1-S style rifle model in the game Counter-Strike: Global Offensive (CS: GO) appears with a similar weapon design. However, this skin was added to the game on November 29, 2016.[52]

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[49] Wilkinson, J. (2019). *AR-15 rifle parts used in Christchurch mosque attacks ruled illegal by police.* Radio New Zealand. https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/national/398220/ar-15-rifle-parts-used-in-christchurch-mosque-attacks-ruled-illegal-by-police

[50] Sullivan, B. (2022). *The Buffalo suspect bought a rifle months after cops ordered a psychiatric evaluation.* npr. https://www.npr.org/2022/05/16/1099186443/buffalo-suspect-gun-rifle

[51] TRT World. (2019). *The Islamophobic signs that defined the Christchurch terrorist.* TRT World. https://www.trtworld.com/asia/the-islamophobic-signs-that-defined-the-christchurch-terrorist-24982

[52] CSGOStash. (n.d.). M4A1-S | Flashback. Rifles. Retrieved January 13, 2023, from https://csgostash.com/skin/825/M4A1-S-

Figure 4.8. The AR-15 rifle used by Tarrant in the Christchurch mosque shootings.

Source: Harwood, 2021

Figure 4.9. The Bushmaster XM-15 rifle used by Gendron in Buffalo shooting

Source: Crane, 2022

Figure 4.10. M4A1-S | Flashback

Source: CSGOStash, n.d.

A Steam user below comments on his observations regarding the behaviors of users within the Steam community. According to his statement, some users also noticed the

resemblance and reacted by using hate speech to reference the attacks. One could argue that both terrorists in the case studies targeted individuals familiar with the gaming culture and used it to show familiarity and even to generate sympathy for it. Nevertheless, whether that was the actual reason behind the symbolism or not, these stains on the weapons became a propaganda instrument and attracted attention to the ideologies of terrorists.

Figure 4.11. A Steam user comments on General Discussions regarding the M4A1-S Flashback.

Source: Steam, n.d.

Given the investigation regarding online communities, the interaction within these different platforms causes a remarkable transformation within our societies, creating a chain reaction that has an impact on a global scale. These communities are fed not only by right-wing extremists seeking to broaden their audience but also by those who sympathize with such groups. The increasing negative consequences on a larger scale create concerns about global security and urge the international community to act upon them. According to the analysis of the evidence base, there is an undeniable trend toward online radicalization; thus, some of the most relevant forms of online radicalization will be examined in the next segment of this chapter.

4.4.2.1.1. Hate Speech and Internet "Meme" Culture on 4chan and 8chan Platforms

4chan, one of the platforms that form the basis of internet culture, was created by Christopher Poole in 2004 as an image board where online discussions focusing on Japanese anime can be made (Bernstein et al., 2011). Poole, nicknamed "moot," created 4chan by copying the format of Futaba Channel, another popular Japanese discussion forum based on anime and online culture (Bernstein et al., 2011). It has grown to encompass sixty different topics, from anime roots to politics to fashion to science. Although 4chan's aesthetic may seem quite simple and plain, it is known for having confusing and messy content.

Figure 4.12. 4chan
Source: Sardarizadeh, 2022

Founded in 2013, 8chan is a message board dedicated to extreme free speech and anonymity (BBC, 2019a). Users create discussion areas, or "boards," and administer the site in chaos. Despite hundreds of subject areas, the site is most famous for its "/pol/" board, short for "politically incorrect" (BBC, 2019a). Although 8chan may seem like a version of 4chan that emerged for greater freedom of opinion, the real reason 8chan was created is to perpetuate hate speech with less moderation. With the formation of 8chan, 4chan's "politically incorrect" board has not disappeared. Extremist rhetoric that fuels radicalism continued on both platforms.

The productivity together with the richness of topics that emerge from these sites is one of the main factors that make Chan boards appealing to users. So much so that the majority of today's well-known "meme" posts originated from these message boards. As a result of his studies on "memes," which constitute a significant part of internet posts and culture, Shifman (2013: 362) reaches the following conclusion:

"Ever since Richard Dawkins coined the term in 1976 to describe gene-like infectious units of culture that spread from person to person, memes have been the subject of constant academic debate, derision, and even outright dismissal. Recently, however, the concept once kicked out the door by many academics is coming back through the Windows (and other operating systems) of Internet users. In the vernacular discourse of netizens, the phrase "Internet meme" is commonly applied to describe the propagation of content items such as jokes, rumors, videos, or websites from one person to others via the Internet. According to this popular notion, an Internet meme may spread in its original form, but it often also spawns user-created derivatives."

One of the best examples of the usage of internet memes for political and social change was the increasing and effective spread of right, alt-right, and far-right memes during the 2016 United States presidential election (Kenneth, 2019: 48). Until the internet memes that were popularized by alt-right communities, memes on the internet were mostly viewed as harmless bits of humor. Al Jazeera (2017) reports that:

"The alt-right is a loosely knit coalition of far-right groups that includes populists, white supremacists, white nationalists, neo-Confederates and neo-Nazis. Many alt-rightists promote various forms of white supremacy, white nationalism, anti-Semitism and Holocaust denial.

The term "alt-right" was first coined by US white supremacist Richard Spencer in 2008 to provide an alternative to the neoconservative politics that dominated the Republican Party establishment in recent decades."

From this point of view, although the memes shared on the internet may seem innocent, they have become a tool where extremist ideas and violent discourses are masked and marketed under the guise of ironic humor. These internet posts, which have become a propaganda tool, remind us of the poster propaganda of the Hitler period and the humor propaganda of the Nazi period. In the "Memetic Irony and the Promotion of Violence within Chan Cultures" report published by the Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST) in December 2020, Crawford et al. (2020) underline the prominent structure of memes. The report highlights the aesthetic aspect and humor of these internet posts as the way chan culture attracts people, and in addition to this argument, it emphasizes the impact of memes on online radicalization since such online posts hide behind the so-called "dark humor" to spread misinformation and propaganda.

One of the most notable examples of the negative transformation of memes is the case of Pepe the frog. In 2016, the Anti-Defamation League included Pepe the Frog in its hate symbols database (Echevarria, 2020). In the "Boy's Club" comics created by artist Matt Furie, Pepe made his debut in 2005 (BBC, 2016). Though often crass or offensive, Pepe the Flog was neither political nor extremist at the beginning of its appearance online (Echevarria, 2020).

Figure 4.13. Pepe the Frog
Source: BBC, 2016

Both the cartoon and the phrase "Feels good, man" became famous after Pepe the frog was shared on 4chan's random board (/b/) in 2008 (Z., 2015). On 4chan and the Body Building Forums, an altered version with the phrase "Feels bad man" and a distraught-looking Pepe went viral in 2009 (Z., 2015). Different types of Pepe began to take over the internet. Different emotions were integrated into the meme, and Pepe became a mainstream meme. It was the most widely shared meme of 2015, according to Tumblr (Echevarria, 2020). The internal joke, however, was starting to lose its humorous impact at this time since Pepe was being used a bit too frequently (Echevarria, 2020).

People started making "rare Pepes," fresh iterations of the meme that had never been produced before, to keep the joke going (Echevarria, 2020). However, emotions were not the only thing integrated into the Pepe memes. The more popular it got, the more political the Pepe memes became. With its excessive usage in online forums and communities, Pepe got integrated with racist and "alt-right" views[53], which resulted in hate speech circulating online under the mask of "memes."

According to Nuzzi (2017) after the meme was used by several celebrities and became more mainstream, a white supremacist on Twitter claimed that "they" were running a campaign "to reclaim Pepe from normies[54]." This claim was supporting the argument that extremist movements online were using their political agenda to create their kind of rare Pepes, which resulted in Pepe the frog being associated with hate speech.

Chan boards contain all kinds of violent content. It is an internet culture channel that mainly consists of content related to racism, misogyny, and conspiracy theories. While the word "channel" is a good metaphor for chan boards' memes and the continuous flow of content streams, most thread sections have a very short lifespan, and new threads are created with the continuation of the stream (Bernstein et al., 2011). Leaving the majority of 8chan's moderation to the board's users in terms of managing and selecting topics has made 8chan a particularly viable platform for organizing extremist campaigns.

The feature that distinguishes 8chan from many other message boards is that 8chan is a platform where almost anyone can join anonymously, but the only rule of this platform is that users should not post content that is illegal in the United States, such as child abuse materials. Wong (2019) explains the reason why 8chan was created as follows:

"But extremism has been central to 8chan identity since it was founded in 2013 by a computer programmer and self-proclaimed eugenicist Fredrick Brennan. (Brennan has since distanced himself from his earlier writings and beliefs and has cut ties with the site.)

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[53] Anti-Defamation League. (n.d.). *Pepe the Frog.* Hate on Display. ADL.
https://www.adl.org/resources/hate-symbol/pepe-frog
[54] Merriam-Webster defines the term "normie" as "one whose tastes, lifestyle, habits, and attitude are mainstream and far from the cutting edge, or a person who is otherwise not notable or remarkable."

The site was modelled on another message board called 4chan. But with a key difference, 4chan's founder had the power to delete individual boards, while Brennan was committed to near absolute free speech. When 4chan banned the discussion of the misogynistic harassment campaign known as Gamergate in 2014, 8chan gained in popularity as a staging ground for the campaign."

Within six months, the perpetrators of three different mass shootings sent a "manifesto" to 8chan: Christchurch gunman Brenton Tarrant in March 2019, Poway synagogue shooter John Earnest in April 2019, and El Paso shooter Patrick Crusius in August 2019. The mass murder that took place at the California garlic festival in July is also thought to be linked to 8chan (Thomas, 2019). While the "Anonymous" and "Occupy Wall Street" activism caused by 4chan showed the possibility of online organization for a common goal, 8chan quickly brought radicalism to the dimension of violent extremism by spreading Qanon conspiracy theories and revealing their connection to mass shootings, crimes, and terrorist acts.

Perry (2020) reports that despite frequently visiting the extreme right-wing message boards 4chan and 8chan, Tarrant claimed that YouTube was much more important in obtaining knowledge and "inspiration." Gendron also mentions 4chan boards, specifically on firearms, and claims that the "politically incorrect" (/pol/) board radicalized him (Sardarizadeh, 2022). Additionally, he talks about other extreme websites he visited, such as The Daily Stormer, which is known as a neo-Nazi website (Sardarizadeh, 2022).

Figure 4.14. Pepe the Frog meme, referencing Tarrant
Source: Thorleifsson, 2022: 294

Just like how the two were radicalized online, users still glorify lone-wolf terrorists in online communities such as 4chan. Following the terrorist attacks in New Zealand, anonymous users shared hate speech content, particularly at /pol/ (Thorleifsson, 2022: 296). Pepe the frog,

as shown above, instrumentalized in another form of right-wing extremist propaganda, referencing Tarrant and his terrorist acts through symbolism and terrorist attire. Also, Figure 4.15 demonstrates how terrorist propaganda is used within different meme formats, which aims to recruit people through "memetic warfare."

Figure 4.15. Accelerationist meme referencing Tarrant
Source: Thorleifsson, 2022: 297

Eordogh (2019), who talked about the deletion of the terrorist incubation forum known as 8chan after the El Paso attack in line with the resolution of Congress, attributes the reason why 8chan was not deactivated before to the privilege of most of the users being of white ethnicity (white privilege). Keen (2020) mentions in his work titled "After 8chan" that after 8chan was shut down, its users (most of whom are members of the alternative right and alternative culture movements) united in a new platform called 8kun. According to Keen, 8kun users see global events as opportunities to accelerate conflict and violence by promoting "race war" in the United States and beyond.

4.4.3. Broadcasting Intent and Live Streaming Political Violence

Broadcasting intent is visible in all three cases of terrorism, which is of the most critical components of the radicalization cycle of terrorism. When investigated carefully, broadcasts of intent can help officials prevent political violence. Since it usually happens right before the

attacks take place, this component is also one of the last stages of the radicalization process toward terrorism.

In the case of the 2011 Norway attacks, Breivik broadcasts his intent through email. Less than an hour and a half prior to his bombing of Oslo, Breivik emailed his manifesto to 1,003 email addresses at 2:09 PM[55] on Friday (Taylor, 2011). Breivik sent each recipient an email with his manifesto and a YouTube video link attached, mentioning himself as Andrew Berwick (Taylor, 2011). As the news coverage report noted, Breivik referred to each recipient as a "Western Europe patriot," which was followed by the message: "It is a gift to you... I ask you to distribute it to everyone you know."

In addition, hours before carrying out the attacks, Breivik uploaded a 12-minute video titled "Knights Templar 2083" on YouTube. According to Reuters (2011b), images of the terrorist who carried out attacks appear at the end of the video, which advocates war against Islam, showing him aiming with an automatic rifle. The video has been taken down; nevertheless, Breivik demonstrated different ways to broadcast one's intent.

In 2012, a government commission declared that the July 22 attacks might have been stopped entirely or partially by Norwegian police and security agencies (Koranyi, 2012). The Commission's report includes a lack of action for prevention as well as incompetence in intelligence services (Koranyi, 2012).

Operations and broadcasting have become tools for conveying extremist ideological ends within manifestos. Although Breivik did not broadcast his operations live, the other two attacks inspired by him utilized more relevant techniques to attract attention.

The Christchurch mosque attacks are distinctive from various points of view compared to other terrorist attacks. In addition to live-streaming the terrorist attacks on the internet, how the attacker carried out his attack conveys messages about the operational side of modern political violence. Although the attacker was arrested and sentenced to life imprisonment, the footage of the attacks was complemented by his manifesto, which contains extremist ideologies and radicalization pathways that inspired other individuals who enter the radicalization cycle of lone wolf terrorism.

On the day of the shootings, at 1:26 p.m., the perpetrator posted links to seven different file-sharing websites along with a copy of a manifesto he had written outlining his justification for the terrorist attack he was about to carry out on Facebook.[56] Afterward, at 1:28 p.m., he

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[55] The Associated Press. (2021). *Norway's July 22, 2011, terror attack: a timeline.* AP NEWS. https://apnews.com/article/europe-norway-bd6c9d2efd6ce2148c3d85cb79d73af9

[56] The above information about the shootings was gathered from the Report of the "Royal Commission of Inquiry into the terrorist attack on Christchurch masjidain on 15 March 2019," which was published on November 26, 2020. Online access to this material is provided at: www.christchurchattack.royalcommission.nz

anonymously posted the following statement on the 8chan message board, which was popular among those who held white supremacist and anti-immigrant sentiments[57]:

Figure 4.16. Screenshot of Tarrant's original post to 8chan/pol just prior to his attack, with the
first reply post
Source: Baele et al., 2020: 18

The link to his Facebook profile was included in this message. The intention was to use the internet community to spread information about the terrorist attack, the manifesto, and the footage he would later broadcast using his GoPro camera.[58] He used Facebook Messenger to send his last messages, at 1.31 and 1.32, to his mother, Sharon Tarrant, and sister, Lauren Tarrant.[59] Additionally, at 1:32 p.m., Tarrant sent an email to 34 recipients, including the Prime Minister's Office, the Leader of the Opposition, media outlets, and the Parliamentary Service. The message in the email was as follows[60]:

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[57] (see Footnote 56).
[58] (see Footnote 56).
[59] (see Footnote 56).
[60] (see Footnote 55).

Date: 15 March 2019

From: [the individual]

To: [34 recipients]

Subject: On the attack in New Zealand today

I was the partisan that committed the assault. I have attached my writings to explain my actions and beliefs as well as provided links to webpages to download the documents below.

[link to file sharing websites that contained copies of his manifesto]

Figure 4.17. The content of Tarrant's email.
Source: Royal Commission of Inquiry into the terrorist attack on Christchurch masjidain on 15 March 2019

New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern said in a statement that her office received the manifesto about nine minutes before the attack, yet "It did not include a location, it did not include specific details," she said (TRT World, 2019).

One of the most striking aspects of the shootings was the online affiliations of the terrorists. There is a shred of strong evidence that the terrorist was using digital networks such as 8chan to spread his violent acts. According to Palmer, Cunningham, Jenkins, and Bell (2020): "The footage was discussed as it emerged on the web-based message board 8chan, an anonymous forum known for its vitriolic and extremist commentary."

Following the New Zealand mosque attacks, Twitter suspended Brenton Tarrant's account. When we look at the last posts of the terrorist before his account was suspended, it is seen that he shared the "white genocide" conspiracy theory and extremist ideologies included in his manifesto. It is a common situation since hate speech is more common in online circles due to the broad freedoms provided by online networks. In the case of New Zealand, this reality has come to the fore with all its clarity and revealed the gravity of the situation. Before carrying out the terrorist attacks, Tarrant wrote on 8chan, and shared his final posts on the controversial online community (Brown, 2020). He broadcasts his intent prior to the shootings, as shown in Figure 31.

Tarrant clearly states that it was time to make a physical attack in these two posts, in which he confessed his plans in the jargon that is frequently used on online communities like 8chan. "Shitposting," used in this sentence, is an ironic name given to "meme" posts that are

irrelevant and generally not funny within internet culture. In the first sentence, the terrorist shares his aim to carry the ideology of his online posts into the real world.

Tarrant's messages on 8chan were accompanied by a link to his Facebook profile and a 74-page manifesto. 28-year-old Tarrant (taking the year 2019 into account), who broadcast his attacks live on his Facebook profile, announced the bloodiest attacks in New Zealand's history both before and after he realized the shootings online. So why was it not detected before Tarrant carried out his attacks? Why aren't law enforcement and intelligence agencies watching this board? Thomas (2019) answers this question as follows:

"They are. Unfortunately, that doesn't mean they can always determine whether the threats are real, identify and physically locate the posters and mobilise officers in time to prevent every attack. In the case of the El Paso shooting, the shooter's manifesto was uploaded shortly before the attack, which meant there was a very small window of time to respond."

Authorities reported that Gendron placed his manifesto online before he executed the shootings (Zaru, 2022). The gunman also lists the time and location of his deadly rampage in this post, noting that he picked that particular spot due to the area's large population of black people (Zaru, 2022).

Although Gendron was only able to live stream the attack for two minutes on Twitch, which is a popular streaming website among gaming communities, "screenshots of the broadcast were circulating online.[61]" The Washington Post claims that while just 22 people watched the show live on Twitch, a copy that was posted to a different streaming platform had more than three million views before it was taken down (McMahon & Vallance, 2022). The copy was also linked to Facebook, which was not taken down for more than 10 hours, during which the link to the copy was shared more than 46,000 times (McMahon & Vallance, 2022).

The efforts to remove copies of such content online are difficult, especially when the footage and manifesto have already been spread in such high numbers. To make sense of the hardship better, an ISD official explains as follows: "The primary issue here is that there are well known sites such as 4chan where users share the latest links to uploads, so even when one is taken down, there will always be other uploads to take its place."[62]

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[61] Browning, K. (2022). The gunman broadcast the attack on a livestreaming site. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/14/nyregion/twitch-buffalo-shooting.html

[62] McMahon L. & Vallance, C. (2022). Social platforms' Buffalo shooting response called inadequate. BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-61466049

5. CONCLUSION

Studies concentrating on terrorism have surged significantly after the 9/11 attacks, which also increased the number of studies focusing on radicalization. Throughout history, the meaning of radicalization has been connected to different ideologies and motivations while protecting the core objective of the term, which is to generate fundamental change, especially in social and political areas.

Radicalization as a term does not have a negative meaning; however, researchers studying radicalization towards terrorism cover the damaging consequences of extremism as well as political violence. Over time, these studies have reshaped the connotation of "radicalization" without changing its definition. After analyzing various radicalization models, some of which are considered milestones in the radicalization literature, this paper concludes that there is a lack of research in radicalization models that specifically explain the radicalization process of lone wolf terrorism.

Examining the models within the literature studied in this paper also revealed a common misconception that arises from labeling different types of terrorism. When an individual is radicalized through religious ideologies, specifically through so-called Islamic teachings, it becomes a "jihadist" terror case; meanwhile, when it is a neo-Nazi carrying out an attack, the terrorists are labeled as "lone wolves," despite having an affinity or relationship with terror groups. This research has already reviewed some of the debates regarding the criticism of the "lone wolf" terminology; however, the use of the term "jihad" leads to an intellectual fallacy since the word does not inherently imply political violence. Thus, this research concludes that such terminological issues within the literature require redefinition.

While some radicalization models adopt a faster transformation, most radicalization models propose a more gradual process. The chosen radicalization model for this paper does not follow a step-by-step process of radicalization, nor does it argue that the process will ultimately result in terrorism. Also, it presents a cycle in which individuals move from one component to another, emphasizing that terrorism is not the last destination in the radicalization process. Besides, Hamm and Spaaij's Radicalization Model of the Lone Wolf Terrorism does not focus on one particular political motive; instead, it includes all types of ideological backgrounds that can drive the process toward political violence. These factors make this model suitable for many cases of lone terrorism, especially the ones analyzed in this paper.

When three of the case studies are analyzed with the "Radicalization Model of Lone Wolf Terrorism," both the components of the model, their notable indications, and the significance of

online radicalization are highlighted. In order to summarize the key questions and responses, the table below demonstrates the key findings of this research.

Table 5.1. Analysis of the Cases with the Components of the "Radicalization Model of Lone Wolf Terrorism"

Incident → **Required Conditions to Be a Terrorist Attack Radicalized Through the Components of the "Radicalization Model of Lone Wolf Terrorism"** ↓	2011 Norway Attacks	2019 Christchurch Mosque Shootings	2022 Buffalo Shooting
1. Was the incident a terrorist attack? (Were all required conditions met?)	Yes	Yes	Yes
2. Was the attack carried out by a lone wolf terrorist?	Yes	Yes	Yes
3. Was the attacker (terrorist) driven by personal and political grievances?	Yes	Yes	Yes
4. Does the terrorist display affinity with online sympathizers or extremist groups?	Yes	Yes	Yes
5. Are there any signs of direct or indirect enablers of the attack?	Yes	Yes	Yes
6. Did the attacker broadcast his intent?	Yes	Yes	Yes
7. Were there any indications of a catalyst event(s) preceding the attacks?	Yes	Yes	Yes
Was the incident a terrorist attack radicalized through the components of the "Radicalization Model of Lone Wolf Terrorism"? (Were all required conditions met?)	Yes	Yes	Yes

The cases for this study were chosen carefully to indicate strong relations with the model and its components; however, the main focus of this study is to understand different theories surrounding the phenomenon of radicalization and its process toward lone wolf terrorism rather than to test the cases according to the model. Considering this essential aspect of the study, this paper conducted an analysis of various concepts and frameworks as well as three different examples of lone wolf terrorism by using the components of the "Radicalization Model of Lone Wolf Terrorism."

As the chosen model proposes, there are no criteria for lone-wolf terrorism cases in terms of providing evidence for each component or demonstrating a linear progression in the same order in which they are represented. Whether all components are apparent or not, this research observes that all the examples follow the general process of radicalization within the cycle.

Although individuals who have entered the online radicalization wheel are usually ordinary, the collective action task imposed on them encourages the masses to engage in violent behavior through brainwashing and propaganda. Such trends should be viewed as a security threat; additionally, early identification of radicalization can divert people away from extremist ideologies and prevent further radicalization.

In conclusion, by using the questions listed in Table 5.1, one can determine whether a terrorist attack was radicalized through the chosen radicalization model or not. Distinguishing these terrorist attacks from other types of terrorism allows researchers to better differentiate the radicalization processes of those who commit such violent acts. Moreover, this study is also significant since it aims to bring awareness to the aftermath of similar attacks. Considering the components of the radicalization cycle, precautions against online extremism should be realized through modern counter-terrorism tools and deradicalization measures. Early steps are necessary to break the vicious cycle of copycat attacks, which can prevent future attacks of similar nature.

As a result, besides the evaluation of the operation styles of online channels, this paper concluded that the moderation of these platforms, where new digital generations are raised, is necessary. The conspiracy theories that pave the way for disinformation need to be unraveled; thus, the spread of online posts that may lead to violent extremism needs evaluation. Taking into account the conditions of digital interactions with or without online communities, it has become an urgency to ensure the safety of digital platforms in the 21st century.

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ESERLER (Makaleler ve Bildiriler)

1. Küpeli, M., Koç, M. & Koç, F. (2022). China's financial rise and human rights dilemma. *International Journal of Human Rights and Constitutional Studies,* 9(2), 194-204. https://doi.org/10.1504/IJHRCS.2022.121979