

ON THE BEAUTIFUL AS THE SYMBOL OF THE MORALLY GOOD
IN KANT'S AESTHETICS

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ABSTRACT

ON THE BEAUTIFUL AS THE SYMBOL OF THE MORALLY GOOD IN KANT’S AESTHETICS

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This study analyzes the meaning and role of the analogy between beauty and the morally good introduced in Kant’s *Critique of Judgment* by his famous statement: “beautiful is the symbol of the morally good.” By examining this analogy, this thesis investigates the possible relations between aesthetics and morality with regard to Kant’s aesthetics, it argues that aesthetic experience is a source of motivation for the continuity of our moral acts. By claiming that natural beauty has superiority in providing moral motivation among all aesthetic experiences, the scope of this thesis consists in our aesthetic experience of nature. Aesthetic experience of natural beauty has two important outcomes. First, it strengthens our moral feeling and enables us to regard nature *as if* it is an appropriate place for our moral acts. That is, it makes us feel as if in harmony with nature. This harmonious look toward nature leads to the second outcome of appreciating natural beauty, that is, it provides unity indirectly to the critical

philosophy. These two outcomes of analogical thinking of the beautiful and the morally good are grounded by investigating the function of the principle of subjective purposiveness in aesthetic judgments of beauty.

Keywords: taste, natural beauty, aesthetic pleasure, purposiveness, sublime



ÖZ

KANT ESTETİĞİNDE AHLAKİ İYİNİN SEMBOLÜ OLAN GÜZEL ÜZERİNE

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Bu çalışma, Kant'ın *Yargı Yetisinin Eleştirisi*'ndeki ünlü ifadesiyle ortaya koyduğu güzellik ve ahlaki açıdan iyi arasındaki analojinin anlamını ve rolünü analiz etmektedir: "Güzel, ahlaki iyyinin sembolüdür." Bu analojiyi inceleyerek, Kant estetiğı açısından estetik ve ahlak arasındaki olası ilişkileri araştıran bu tez, estetik deneyimin ahlaki eylemlerimizin sürekliliğı için bir motivasyon kaynağı olduğunu savunmaktadır. Doğal güzelliğın tüm estetik deneyimler arasında ahlaki motivasyon sağlamada üstünlüğe sahip olduğunu iddia eden bu çalışmanın kapsamını doğaya ilişkin estetik deneyimimiz oluşturmaktadır. Doğal güzellikle girilen estetik deneyimin iki önemli sonucu vardır. Birincisi, ahlaki duygumuzu güçlendirir ve doğayı ahlaki eylemlerimiz için uygun bir yermiş gibi görmemizi sağlar. Yani, kendimizi doğa ile uyum içinde hissetmemizi sağlar. Doğaya yönelik bu uyumlu bakış, doğal güzelliğı takdir etmenin ikinci sonucuna yol açar: eleştirel felsefeye dolaylı olarak birlik sağlar. Güzel ve ahlaki iyiyi

analojik düşünmenin bu iki sonucu, güzel yargılarında öznel amaçsalılık ilkesinin işlevinin araştırılmasıyla temellendirilir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: beğeni, doğal güzellik, estetik haz, amaçsalılık, yüce





In memory of my mother

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The secret strength of things
Which governs thought, and to the infinite dome
Of heaven is as a law, inhabits thee!
And what were thou, and earth, and stars, and sea,
If to the human mind's imaginings
Silence and solitude were vacancy?¹

If trees were only there for us to build the houses we live in, plants to feed us, and horses to take us to our destinations, i.e., if everything, without exception, served a purpose, and all we ever did was to use the things around us according to their purpose, what a dull place the world would be to live in! Our finite lives are worthy of living only in so far as we can give meaning to them. Fortunately, we live a meaningful life since we can create a meaningful world. But how?

Human beings are unique in seeing trees not merely as an object to eat fruits from. We also make judgments, and know about the relationship between the veins and the leaves of trees. However, the meaning of the tree itself remains unanswered. The sciences help us understand nature in certain regularities, but they provide no satisfactory answer to the purpose of nature itself. Hence, they are inadequate to fill the vacancy we feel in the world. Nevertheless, we are *not only* animals who see a tree as an object

¹ Shelley, Percy Bysshe. "Mont Blanc." *Selected Poems and Prose*. Penguin Classics, 2017.

to eat its fruit, *nor* are we *only* rational beings. We can find a flower, a piece of music, or a bird beautiful and take pleasure from such aesthetic experiences. We have feelings.

Can our aesthetic experiences of nature help us find the meaning we seek in life? First of all, we are moral beings, and there is no doubt that morality plays a crucial role in our search for meaning in ourselves and in the world. The main reason why the world is meaningful *is* that we are moral beings. A bird does not give sense to a tree; we are the ones who give meaning to the world. Unlike birds, we are moral agents who can act freely and determine their actions. Our freedom is what makes it possible to provide ourselves with meaning. And we want the meaning to be in harmony with nature. That is, *we want to be in harmony with nature* and to be sure that nature is a place where we can actualize our freedom. However, there arise certain difficulties in the search for this harmony.

We have free will so that we can determine our actions. We can prefer acting either with good will or not. Yet, nature is determined by certain universal laws. The facts happening in nature are in a causal relation of which we cannot entirely be in control. The reason is that while we determine our actions with freedom, nature is subject to deterministic laws; hence, we act freely in a deterministic world. Attaining an exact harmony might be impossible. But what if we can *feel* that there is harmony? When we experience nature as beautiful, we feel ourselves as if in harmony with nature. And we naturally *assume* that nature might be a place where we can exercise our freedom. This assumption may be a clue as to why Kant examines the relationship between aesthetics and morality. As we will see throughout this study,

aesthetic experience can provide insights into our relation to nature. And this may be one of the most important aspects that make Kant's aesthetics theory striking. More specifically, the guiding issue that drives me in this research is Kant's analogy between the beautiful and the morally good, which states that the beautiful symbolizes the morally good. How do we regard the beautiful as the symbol of the morally good? What *features* of the beautiful and the morally good make them analogical?

In this thesis, my aim is to explain the meaning and function of the analogy that "the beautiful is the symbol of the morally good" in Kant's *Critique of Judgment*.² Since Kant continually compares aesthetic judgments with moral judgments throughout the "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment," the claim that the beautiful is the symbol of the morally good plays a significant role in this comparison. As to the role this analogy might play in the third *Critique*, we shall ask the following questions: Can aesthetic judgments be universally valid and necessary without being grounded in moral judgments? Can it be that what makes an object beautiful is that it symbolizes the morally good? Do we draw this analogy to talk about possible relations between aesthetics and morality, or is this analogy a natural consequence of those relations? Each answer to these questions offers a different perspective on Kant's aesthetics.³ To keep my study from straying from the main topic and turning into a general survey of

² Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of Judgment*. Translated by W. S. Pluhar. Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987. (Hereafter, *CJ*).

³ The term *aesthetics* shall be used in narrow sense throughout the text, as in the science of the beautiful. It has a broader meaning in the Kantian philosophy. It is used in the "Transcendental Aesthetic" of the first *Critique*, in which Kant examines the conditions of the possibility of sense-perception.

the relationship between aesthetics and morality, I will try to distinguish the conditions that allow us to establish the analogy from the other relations between aesthetics and morality. While analyzing the possible links between aesthetics and morality, I shall argue that natural beauty has a more significant role in this relation. It is more important because the harmony we feel in natural beauty allows us to assume nature *as if* it is a place in conformity with our final purpose: to be morally good. These discussions help us also find clues as to why Kant claims that the *Critique of Judgment* provides unity to the critical system. For the harmony we feel in nature might be the key to unifying the deterministic nature with our freedom. My fundamental aim, however, is neither to understand the *Critique of Judgment* thoroughly nor to argue whether it brings unity to the critical system. Instead, while keeping these considerations secondary, I will primarily discuss the meaning and the role of the analogy between the beautiful and the morally good and look for answers to the relationship between aesthetics and morality.

Kant's critical philosophy aims to offer a systematic unity. Although the scope of this thesis is limited to the "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment," discussing briefly the critical project will help us find and determine the place and role of aesthetic judgments in Kant's philosophy. Therefore, in the second chapter, I shall introduce an overview of Kant's philosophy and identify aesthetic judgments' position in the critical system. To set the stage for the discussion, I will briefly explain Kant's Copernican revolution and how he constructs his theoretical and practical philosophy upon this revolution. This brief outlook on the theoretical and practical judgments will give us an insight into why there is a "gap" between them and how aesthetic judgments

might have a role in bridging this “gap.” Theoretical and practical judgments differ from aesthetic judgments. To clarify how they differ, I will be referring to the similarities and differences between determinative and reflective judgments. We shall see that when judging aesthetically, we use reflective judgment. Thus, aesthetic judgment does not determine its object but is a matter of reflection. After specifying the position of aesthetic judgment, I shall ask how the a priori principle of reflective judgment operates in our reflective judgments. By discussing this question, we shall see that the principle of purposiveness provides us with a harmonious look toward nature.⁴ And this is the crux of aesthetic judgment since the feeling of harmony that arises in aesthetic experience might be the key to regarding ourselves and nature in unity. Setting all these, finally, will lead us to expound on the essential characteristics of aesthetic judgments: they are based on a *feeling of pleasure* and are merely *subjective*. Together, the second chapter shall provide a general outlook on the position of aesthetic judgments in the Kantian critical system. Thus, we will have a path to follow in analyzing the judgments about beauty.

The third chapter, then, aims to explicate the characteristics of aesthetic judgments. The main question will be, “how do we declare something to be beautiful?” Hence, we shall investigate the conditions by which we can judge something as beautiful. To do this, my direction will involve explaining the “Four Moments of Judgment of Taste” in the “Analytic of the Beautiful.” Each moment reveals one formal feature of judgments of beauty and constructs the conditions of how we judge something as beautiful.

⁴ This principle is a subjective principle when it is used aesthetically. It can also be used in the teleological judgments, as objectively. Due to the scope of this study, our main focus shall be on the subjective principle of purposiveness of judgment.

By examining these features, we will realize that Kant's primary concern is not to discuss what *beauty* is, but rather how we *judge* something to be beautiful. This is a transcendental investigation of aesthetics, and transcendental philosophy must provide a valid justification for its subject matter. Hence, we will seek an answer to whether Kant successfully gives a justification for the validity of pure aesthetic judgments. In a transcendental project, justifying the validity of judgment amounts to showing that it is both universal and necessary. Yet, all aesthetic judgments are based on the *feeling* of pleasure, i.e., they are merely *subjective*. Accordingly, we will examine whether a mere *feeling* can be universally shareable and necessary. A possible answer to this question shall be given in the fourth chapter. However, the ground to discuss this matter shall be provided in the examination of the four moments of beauty within the third chapter. In the light of these, we shall also scrutinize the judgment of the sublime. This part will mainly include a comparison between the beautiful and the sublime. This comparison will ground the discussion in the fourth chapter on whether the sublime has a role either in the analogy with the morally good or in the relations between aesthetics and morality.

Overall, analyses so far shall help us to specify the meaning and the role of the analogy between the beautiful and the morally good in the *Critique of Judgment*. Thus, the fourth chapter shall finally deal with the conditions to make this analogy possible and the implications arising from this symbolic expression of the morally good with the beautiful. First, I shall clarify the analogy by pointing out the formal similarities between the judgments of beauty and morality. This part will hopefully illuminate that our way of reflecting on both makes this analogy possible. In this

regard, the exhibition of the morally good is possible with all modes of beauty (whether artistic or natural). Thereafter, I shall scrutinize whether the analogy justifies the validity of aesthetic judgments. My aim in this section will be to show that the analogy does not have a role in justifying the judgments of beauty. Hence, I will keep searching for an answer to whether the analogy has a function in the *Critique of Judgment*. We shall see that considering the beautiful and the morally good analogically provides us insight into Kant's aesthetic theory. Kant maintains that we make such an analogy *naturally* by pointing out our natural disposition in relating aesthetics to morality. I will then ask how we make associations between the beautiful and the morally good. In the light of this question, I will consider the role of the analogy in a twofold way. The first one comprises *our* aesthetic experiences in relation to morality, and I will offer that natural beauty has superiority in this relationship over the sublime and artistic beauty because it may strengthen our *moral feeling*. Grounding this claim on the *subjective principle of purposiveness* will hopefully support that natural beauty has a peculiarity among aesthetic experiences. The superiority of natural beauty is twofold. The first one is that the principle of purposiveness is applied better in natural beauty, and the second is that the intellectual interest arises solely through the appreciation of the beauty in nature. Examining natural beauty and morality in this manner will bring us to the second possible role of the analogy: the unifying role of the aesthetic power of judgment in Kant's critical system. There, I will propose that in so far as we have an aesthetic relation with nature, our assumption toward nature as if it is purposive for us gets strength. More precisely, I will seek the connection between our natural attitude toward natural beauty and the *subjective principle of purposiveness*. This connection will

hopefully show us that the possibility for completion of the critical project might come with the *subjective purposiveness of nature*, which is merely a *presupposition* we make toward nature.



CHAPTER II

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF JUDGMENT IN KANT'S PHILOSOPHY

The main purpose of this chapter is to present the significance of the power of judgment regarding the three *Critiques*, and to determine both the position and the function of aesthetic judgments in the Kantian philosophy. To accomplish these aims, I shall present the framework of Kant's critical philosophy. This brief framework shall provide us with a considerable insight into Kant's transcendental method applied in all the *Critiques*. Since the Kantian Copernican revolution can be seen as the crux of the transcendental philosophy, I will firstly expound what it means to make a revolution in philosophy as Copernicus did in astronomy; and secondly, explicate the ways in which Kant introduces the conditions of the theoretical and practical cognition. By examining these two types of cognition, we shall be able to see the ways in which Kant needs a critical inquiry of the power of judgment in his critical system. This introductory framework will finally bring us to the matter of reflective judgment which is also the main concern of Kant's *Critique of Judgment*. We will see that judgment in its reflective operation has an a priori principle on its own. Our focus will be mainly on the employment of this principle in aesthetic judgments. In doing so, we will hopefully have a ground to discuss what it means to judge something as beautiful.

2.1. The Kantian Critical Philosophy

The Kantian critical project consists in the self-criticism of pure reason which can be considered as the novelty Kant has brought into the Western philosophical tradition. In pursuing this critical project, Kant successfully and systematically tries to answer the questions of how and to what extent human reason is capable of cognition of any given kind. As the result, he has demonstrated the limits, the scope and the nature of our cognition by investigating the legitimate ground of making valid judgments about the objects. The significant outcome of the project Kant has undertaken can be illustrated by pointing out what has been called the Copernican turn (or revolution) in philosophy, which is analogous to Copernicus' striking revolution in astronomy. To understand what all these mean, let us first examine what Kant's Copernican revolution in philosophy amounts to.

2.1.1. The Copernican Turn

In the "Preface" to the *Critique of Pure Reason*,⁵ Kant makes an analogy between what Copernicus has accomplished in astronomy and his own strategy in the critical project. Before Copernicus' revolution in astronomy, movements of heavenly bodies were being taken into consideration from the point of the spectator who is simply taken to remain stable. Copernicus' achievement is to offer a novel way of understanding the relation between them. He pointed out that it may well be the spectator who revolves, and the heavenly bodies which are observed to revolve around the spectator may remain at rest. So, Copernicus drew our attention

⁵ Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of Pure Reason*. Translated by Norman Kemp Smith. London: Macmillan Co. LTD., 1929. (Hereafter, *CPR*).

to the spectator's position and movements. He has shown how the movements and the position of the spectator affect our observations of the movements of the heavenly bodies. Just as Copernicus changed our perspective on the relation between the spectator and the heavenly bodies, Kant has changed the epistemic relations of the knowing subject and object. As he puts it in the *CPR*,

Hitherto it has been assumed that all our knowledge must conform to objects. But all attempts to extend our knowledge of objects by establishing something in regard to them *a priori*, by means of concepts, have, on this assumption, ended in failure. We must therefore make trial whether we may not have more success in the tasks of metaphysics, if we suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge.⁶

The shift from seeking the ways in which our cognition conforms to the objects to seeking the ways in which objects conform to the forms of cognition has been a novel outlook concerning knowledge, and it is in fact a revolution in metaphysics. It is because the traditional view before Kant assumes that the knowledge is of the objects independent of our minds. The Copernican turn, however, claims that human beings are active in the constitution of objective knowledge. On this view, the human mind has a formal structure to receive sensible content and gives this sensible content a conceptual determination and constitution. That is, it is we and our cognitive structure which form the given intuitions, and hence, produce knowledge. The focus is directed to the knowing subject and the cognitive faculties that make any claim of knowledge possible in and through the universal and necessary conditions. This analysis requires reason to criticize itself in order to set the transcendental conditions of

⁶ *CPR*, Bxvi.

knowledge. So, by this Copernican turn in philosophy, Kant gives an active role to the subject.

We can talk about two significant outcomes of the Kantian Copernican revolution. First, as it has established a brand-new epistemological subject-object correlation which we have just seen, it challenges all the metaphysical understanding employed by Kant's predecessors. Secondly, it has radically changed the ideas about what and how we know. Kant's novelty lies in the fact that he analyzes the powers of human reason and lays the ground of legitimacy of the judgments that we make by means of our cognitive powers. In this regard, he opposes both rationalists and empiricists. He differs from rationalists in denying that metaphysics can yield knowledge about the things as they are in themselves. For Kant, rationalists mistakenly assume that human reason has the capability of a priori knowledge about things as they are in themselves. He regards this rationalistic metaphysics as dogmatic. He also differs from the empiricists. While empiricists maintain that all knowledge comes from sensory experiences, Kant considers sensory experiences as a necessary but not a sufficient condition for any kind of theoretical knowledge. For, empirical knowledge by itself does not provide any necessity or universality toward the objects. For him, there must also be an a priori basis for any claim of knowledge. In contrast, empiricists reject the possibility of a priori knowledge. In considering a priori knowledge to be impossible and basing knowledge solely on sensory data, empiricists fall into skepticism, which is avoided in the Kantian philosophy by embracing the Copernican turn. Thus, the striking aspect of Kant's philosophy is that experience must consist of both the sensory data and our active contribution to this sensory data by employing the a priori

rules of reason, and this differentiates him from both empiricists and rationalists.

Kant defines the metaphysics as the “battle-field of [the] endless controversies” at the beginning of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.⁷ He does so because the so-called dogmatic metaphysics fails in the sense that it both leads to contradictions and errors and is unable to detect its own errors. Kant’s apparently negative attitude toward metaphysics in the first *Critique* might be mistakenly considered as he destroys metaphysics. He does destroy in fact a kind of metaphysics which is held by the predecessors of Kant; however, he also gets rid of the inextricable contradictions of reason. He shows that the dogmatic metaphysics fails because it in no way arrives at truths about God, freedom and immortality of the soul. Since empiricism fails to give a justification for objective knowledge, and rationalism speculates on the ideas (of God, freedom and the immortality of the soul) for which it cannot give a proper demonstration of their objective existence and justification with regards to their objective reality, there arises a skepticism about the power of reason. The way that Kant chooses to eliminate this skepticism is to examine reason itself. “By means of its self-examination, reason is simultaneously released from its contradictions and protected in its empirical employment: the ambitions of transcendent metaphysics are curbed, but (Humean) skepticism is defeated, and we are let off the see-saw of dogmatism and skepticism.”⁸ This skepticism is the inevitable outcome of the era starting from Descartes’ rationalism until Hume’s empiricism. And it is simply based upon the problem of

⁷ CPR, Aviii.

⁸ Gardner, Sebastian. *Routledge Philosophy GuideBook to Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason*. London: Routledge, 2000., p. 24.

justification. Both empiricists and rationalists before Kant failed to give a proper justification for any kind of objective knowledge. In order to give a proper justification for any type of cognition, Kant will be pursuing the a priori conditions for any possible cognition. Kant's aim is to ask the question of whether and how synthetic a priori cognitions to be possible, i.e., how judgments that are necessary (a priori) and also amplify and augment (synthetic) the given cognition is possible.⁹ As we will see, Kant will be using this question in various formulations to answer the "deepest questions of philosophy, such as the questions about the unconditional authority of the moral law and even about the universal validity of judgments of taste."¹⁰

Beside these discrepancies from his predecessors, as the second outcome of the Copernican turn, Kant presents an examination on the conditions of the possibility of any kind of cognition by questioning and criticizing the capabilities of human reason. This examination includes finding and determining the scope and the limits of our cognitive powers. In the critical project, the Copernican turn leads us to make a distinction between the things as they appear to us and things as they are in themselves. This distinction regards the objects as having two aspects, that is, we consider the one and the same object either as it appears to us, or as it is in itself. In the first *Critique*, Kant proposes that human beings are not capable of knowing the things as they are in themselves, and that our knowledge is limited to the cognition of objects as they appear to us, that is, to the objects of possible

⁹ For the possible definitions for the terms of "a priori" and "synthetic," see *CPR*, A7/B11; *CPR*, B3, also, *Prolegomena*, §2, 4:266 and §5, 4:275-6. "Kant, Immanuel. *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*. Translated and edited by Gary Hatfield. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004."

¹⁰ Guyer, Paul. *Kant*. New York: Routledge, 2006., p. 45.

experience. This is because the objects of possible experience can only be given to us in space and time, i.e., in pure forms of intuition, and this is how they appear to us. Kant's transcendental idealism is grounded on this distinction between things in themselves and their appearances.

By *transcendental idealism* I mean the doctrine that appearances are to be regarded as beings, one and all, representations only, not things in themselves, and that time and space are therefore only sensible forms of our intuition, not determinations given as existing by themselves, nor conditions of objects viewed as things in themselves.¹¹

Since space and time are merely the forms of intuitions, and we can cognize only the objects in space and time, the objects in space and time cannot be taken to be objects that exist independently of our intuitions. Neither those appearances, nor their properties, nor their relations are the things in themselves. We do not *know* about things in themselves, but only their appearances. Things as they are in themselves can only be considered as the unknown source of appearances. They only affect us and lead to the existences of appearances or representations in us. With the active contribution of the subject to the constitution of knowledge, which we have discussed above, Kant abandons the old idea that we can know the absolute reality, i.e., the thing in itself.

In the scope of the present work, this distinction between the appearances and things in themselves shall not be taken to imply

¹¹ CPR, A369.

to the existence of two distinct worlds.¹² Rather, I shall take this distinction to mean that there is only one world, and one and the same object has a dual aspect. So, by following this double-aspect view, I do not consider this distinction as metaphysical. Rather, an appearance is the one aspect in which we perceive our object in space and time. The aspect of the object as it is in itself, however, cannot be given in sensibility, so we can *know* only the appearances. So, it is an epistemological distinction upon what we *can know* and what we *cannot know*. Kant, after declaring our unfortunate situation regarding the insufficiency of our capabilities, takes our cognitive powers under examination in order to discuss and determine their scope and limitations. In this regard, he defines and analyzes the conditions and the functions of our cognitive capabilities. So, we shall now shortly introduce some Kantian terminology related to our cognitive powers and their functions in the process of any cognition.

¹² It can be asked whether this distinction implies a metaphysical thesis claiming that there are two classes of objects, or it is only an epistemic distinction between the appearances and the things in themselves. A kind of metaphysical approach considers the transcendental idealism as it presents two different worlds. In this view, the world of appearances is not as real as the world of the things as they are in themselves since they reduce the appearances to the mental representations while they also consider the things as they are in themselves as independent of the knower subjects. This approach is called as the “two-world” or “two-objects” view in literature. Against this view, there is also the defenders of the “one-world” or “two-aspects” interpretation. Due to the scope of this thesis, I will not go into detail in this discussion. See, for example, ‘Oberst, Michael. “Two Worlds and Two Aspects: on Kant’s Distinction between Things in Themselves and Appearances” in *Kantian Review* 20 (2015): 53-75,’ or ‘Aquila, Richard. “Things in Themselves and Appearances: Intentionality and Reality in Kant” in *Archiv Für Geschichte Der Philosophie* 61(1979): 293-308,’ or ‘Allison, Henry. *Kant’s Transcendental Idealism*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004.’

2.1.2. Theoretical and Practical Determinations

Kant sets forth the conditions of the possibility of knowledge in the first *Critique* by determining the conditions of knowledge with intuitions and concepts. Both intuitions and concepts are representations,¹³ and an intuition is a singular representation, while a concept is a universal representation of an object.¹⁴ “Intuition and concepts constitute ... the elements of all knowledge, so that neither concepts without an intuition in some way corresponding to them, nor intuition without concepts, can yield knowledge.”¹⁵ Hence, all knowledge must contain both intuition and concepts, which are provided by the two fundamental sources of the mind; the former is that of sensibility and the latter is the understanding. “[S]ensibility is the faculty of intuitions, ... the understanding is the faculty for thinking, i.e., for bringing the representations of the sense under rules.”¹⁶ Through the sensibility an object is given to us, so it is *receptive* in the sense that it receives the given representations. That is, “the capacity (receptivity) for receiving representations through the mode in which we are affected by objects, is entitled *sensibility*.”¹⁷ Through the understanding, these given representations can be *thought* of, so it is the power of *knowing* an object.¹⁸ Theoretical

¹³ “*Vorstellung*.” This term is also translated as “presentation.”

¹⁴ CPR, A320/B377.

¹⁵ CPR, A50/B74.

¹⁶ Kant, Immanuel. “The Jasche Logic.” *Lectures on Logic*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992., §1, 11.

¹⁷ CPR, A19/B33.

¹⁸ CPR, A50/B74, B75/A51.

knowledge is possible only through understanding's employment of its concepts to the given representations. It makes us know the things empirically outside us in the phenomenal world because it has a priori concepts and can also produce the empirical concepts as well. Furthermore, it has a right to apply those concepts (whether pure or empirical) to the given sensory intuitions. So, understanding has an active role in all theoretical knowledge. By employing its concepts to what is sensible, it legislates and gives laws to the phenomenal nature. That is how theoretical use of reason provides an account of empirical cognition. If we put together what all stated so far, we can infer that the necessity of requiring both intuition and concepts shows that all knowledge requires both the given sensory data and the active contribution of the mind. The object must be given in sensibility so that the mind organizes it. As Kant puts it, "thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind" because "without sensibility no object would be given to us, without understanding no object would be thought."¹⁹ These are the necessary conditions which make any theoretical cognition possible. With practical cognition, however, we legislate the supersensible realm, and it is by way of a different set of operations of the mind. How Kant differentiates these two operations of reason is as follows.

As in the theoretical cognition, in practical cognition a determination occurs as well. Both theoretical and practical cognitions are determinative in the sense that each applies its own a priori rules or concepts to the given particulars. However, what we determine practically is our *will*,²⁰ rather than a sensible

¹⁹ CPR, B75/A51.

²⁰ "A will which can be determined independently of sensuous impulses, and therefore through motives which are represented only by reason, is entitled

object.²¹ And as different from the theoretical reason, here there is no given intuition to the practical reason in order for it to determine its object. For, we do not have an *intellectual* or a *supersensible* intuition. So, a question arises: if not intuition, then what is given, and what is the a priori principle of our practical cognition? Kant states that “a free will – as independent of empirical conditions (i.e., conditions belonging to the world of sense) – must nonetheless be determinable,”²² and the *moral law* is the determining basis of the free will.²³ So, practically, what we use as an a priori principle is the *moral law*, and this law is the determining ground of our rational will.²⁴ This law is also the one that is given to us by the pure practical reason. Since the moral law is given to us a priori, we can determine our will according to it, so we can act as free moral agents. This is the determination of our free will. We can act morally in accord with the law in such a way that we perform also our freedom. So, determination here does not refer to determining what a sensible object is as in the theoretical cognition, but here we *make* our object *actual*.²⁵ That is, by employing the given universal moral law to our actions, and since we are free practically in the supersensible realm, we can

freewill (arbitrium liberum), and everything which is bound up with this will, whether as ground or consequence, is entitled *practical*” (CPR, A802/B830).

²¹ CPrR, 15.

²² CPrR, 29.

²³ This law is a universal law given by our pure reason. As Kant puts it: “Pure reason is practical by itself alone and gives (to the human being) a universal law, which we call the *moral law*” (CPrR, 31). And the law commands us: “So act that the maxim of your will could always hold at the same time as a principle of universal legislation” (CPrR, 30).

²⁴ CPrR, 28, 42.

²⁵ CPrR, 89.

determine our will. Here, determining the free will indicates our moral actions.

So, as we have just seen, there are two operations of reason which are both subject to their own a priori laws. As Kant puts it:

The legislation of human reason (philosophy) has two objects, nature and freedom, and therefore contains not only the law of nature, but also the moral law, presenting them at first in two distinct systems, but ultimately in one single philosophical system. The philosophy of nature deals with all *that is*, the philosophy of morals with that which *ought to be*.²⁶

So, both the human reason and philosophy deal with two different objects; nature and freedom. The former is theoretical and generates theoretical knowledge about the world of appearances (i.e., the sensible world) the latter is practical and here is where we act freely as moral agents. Accordingly, neither our experiences in the sensible realm can be determined by the laws of the supersensible realm, nor vice versa. It is because the laws they are subject to and the ways they operate differ from each other. Still, there is and must be a connection between them since we are the ones who hold both theoretical and practical cognitions together. We seem to possess two different grounds which provide us with a right to legislate a priori both the sensible and supersensible realms. Even if we are subject to the law of freedom in the supersensible realm, we still make our actions in the sensible world. So, we cognize ourselves both as an intelligible being and with a determination in the world of sense.²⁷ In this regard, our practical cognition both *accords with* and *goes beyond*

²⁶ CPR, A840/B868.

²⁷ CPrR, 105-6.

the world of appearances. It accords with the theoretical realm because our moral actions too are the events occurring in the world of appearances. However, because our any moral action is subject to the law of freedom, and not to the natural laws, it also goes beyond our theoretical cognition. That is, it transcends our sensibility. Accordingly, our moral actions also belong to the conduct of intelligible beings.²⁸ What has been said so far presents the features of two of our higher mental powers – theoretical power and the power of desire – and they are the concerns of the first two *Critiques*, respectively. However, with the third *Critique* we see the third one of these higher mental powers: the power in its reflective use, *the feeling of pleasure and displeasure*; and it has an a priori principle on its own as well. Kant presents these three mental powers in the third *Critique*: the cognitive power, the power of desire (will) and the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. The cognitive (theoretical) power is the understanding, and it applies its lawfulness to nature; the power of desire is reason, and it applies its a priori principle of final purpose (to be a moral agent) to freedom. And the feeling of pleasure and displeasure lies in the power of judgment. The a priori principle of judgment is purposiveness, and it applies this principle to art. (*CJ*, Introduction IX, 197-198).

After this short introduction for the terminology, we shall now look at the critical project with regards to all three *Critiques*.

²⁸ *CPrR*, 65.

2.1.3. The Need for the Question of Hope

Kant systematically follows his critical project and the Copernican turn in all three *Critiques*, and keeps asking whether, how, to what extent and in what right human reason has a priori conditions to make any cognition possible. All examinations upon the limits of each operation of reason, whether it is theoretical or practical, deal with different types of judgments. So, what the critical project does is to analyze and determine the conditions of the possibility of each kind of judgment. Kant gathers the main concerns of three *Critiques* under three main questions: what can I know, what ought I to do, and what may I hope?²⁹ Each *Critique* deals with one of the questions in order. In this regard, the first *Critique* questions what we can know, and it examines the theoretical use of reason and questions the a priori conditions which make any theoretical knowledge possible. The theoretical realm is governed by the rules of the power of understanding and displays the features of a deterministic view of the world. That is, the nature as we know it, i.e., the phenomenal world, is based on some a priori categories of the understanding so that we can make certain universal and necessary inferences about the world. For instance, we can make theoretical claims about the world by making causal relations between events, and these inferences are to be both universal and necessary because they are grounded in a priori concepts of understanding (e.g., the pure concept of causality). And these claims of universal knowledge about nature present a deterministic and mechanistic view of the world. Both the second *Critique* and *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of*

²⁹ CPR, A805/B833.

Morals,³⁰ on the other hand, question what we *ought to do*, and their concern is the practical use of reason. Here is where Kant considers human beings as moral agents and questions the concept of freedom. In contrast to the theoretical realm, here we are not subject to the pure concepts of the understanding but to the concept of freedom. This means that in spite of the causal relations and determinism in nature, human beings can also act freely. This is possible only in the practical realm, where we use the concept of the freedom of practical reason and where we act in accord with the moral law. So, we are not being *determined by* certain necessary rules, but *we* determine our actions so that we can also determine our free will. In this sense, our moral decisions and actions are what we determine freely in the practical realm. So, the practical use of reason determines its object by making it actual. Accordingly, the first *Critique* can be seen as dealing with the rules that legislate our sensibility while the second concerns the laws governed in the supersensible side of us. This distinction brings us to the third question of the critiques: *what may I hope?* In order to answer to this question, first we shall look at why we need to hope.

As we have just seen above, there are two realms ruled by different laws. And their objects differ in the sense that the object of the theoretical realm is the phenomenal nature while the object of the practical reason is our moral actions. The object of the former is sensible while that of the latter is intelligible. So, a question arises: do these realms affect each other? Apparently, they are not in a causal relation. “For just as the concept of nature has no influence on the legislation through the concept of

³⁰ Kant, Immanuel. *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*. Edited and translated by Allen W. Wood. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2002. (Hereafter, G).

freedom, so the latter does not interfere with the legislation of nature” (CJ, 175). We can think of such moments when we act with a good will but fail to accomplish our aim with a good result. We sometimes act in such a way that we try to act according to the moral law, with a good will, which finally ends up in a failure, and we cannot perform our good action, or we cannot achieve our good will. This is because neither can the concept of freedom be legislative in the phenomenal world, nor can the concepts of the understanding be applied to the supersensible realm. This gap between these two realms brings us to the matter of hope: “If I do what I ought to do, what may I then hope?”³¹

As moral agents, in so far as we act for the sake of the moral law, we expect that we are worthy of happiness. This means neither that we act with a good will because of a purpose of being happy in the end, nor that in any condition we are worthy of happiness. Rather, we basically assume that we deserve to be happy thanks to our moral conduct. Happiness in this sense can be defined as an “exact proportion with the morality of the rational beings who are thereby rendered worthy of it.”³² Or, we can define happiness with a correlation to being virtuous. This characterization of happiness – that is, being in proportion with our moral conduct – is regarded as the *highest good* by Kant.³³ In other words, the highest good is the condition where being both virtuous and happy are attained by the subject. So, what we hope for, as moral agents, is the highest good. That is to attain happiness as much as we practically deserve. In this sense, Kant regards hope in

³¹ CPR, A805/B833.

³² CPR, A814/B842.

³³ *Ibid.*

relation with happiness.³⁴ Accordingly, what we hope for, i.e., the highest good, is kind of a moral motivation for us to pursue acting in accordance with the moral law. However, it is also needed, at least, to hope that there is a chance to attain the highest good eventually. In other words, we need to at least believe that the highest good is achievable even though we cannot achieve it in a finite life. The achievability or attainability of it should be open to us. It is needed for us to pursue the moral law. However, what happens in sensibility stays in sensibility; and what happens in morality stays in morality. The rules, principles, or laws of one of these realms do not affect and cannot determine the ones in the other. So, even if we become the most virtuous human being in the world, happiness is not guaranteed. For we are not capable of determining who is virtuous, even for ourselves, and even if we can detect those who are virtuous, still we cannot make those people happy. So, what we hope for is actually a divine being who can grant the highest good. But neither the highest good nor a divine being can be justified theoretically. For, the way the power of understanding legislates is limited with our sensibility. Since we are not capable of knowing the attainability of the highest good, what we can do is only to hope that there is a divine being who provides us with happiness as much as we deserve it in proportion to our moral worth. We need a hint suggesting that it is possible. The hint that we expect cannot have an objective basis since neither we have an intellectual intuition, nor any given sensible intuition of any object has such a feature to make us assume that there is a divine being. However, Kant points out that since to further the highest good is a duty for us, “it is also morally necessary to assume the existence of God,” and further

³⁴ CPR, A805/B833.

adds that “this moral necessity is *subjective*.”³⁵ The idea of the possibility to attain the highest good, or the ground for us to hope that the highest good is achievable, come with the a priori principle of the power of judgment: *the principle of purposiveness of nature*. It is the a priori principle of the power of judgment which makes us assume that nature is purposive for us. This principle can be used either aesthetically or teleologically. Let us give an example for its employment in a judgment about beauty. Imagine you are at the top of a hill, watching the sunset, birds are singing, and you are only watching the view. In such a moment, it is possible that you start to contemplate nature: “How did such a harmony arise?” Such a contemplation never ends with an exact answer. Your contemplation does not provide you with theoretical knowledge about nature’s unity. Yet, you get pleasure from the harmonious look of nature when watching the view; you also feel that you are as well in harmony with nature. Even if your contemplation on nature does not give rise to theoretical knowledge about the unity or the purpose of nature, the beautiful daisy to your right or the dove flying away in front of you may well make you think as if each of them has a purpose that you cannot determine. The claim basically is, “if you change how you look to nature, then you may feel a harmony between you and nature so that you can also assume that there might be a divine being who creates such beauty.” This assumption gives us a *hint* about the attainability of the highest good.

Although the moral law itself commands us to act in accord with the morally good, we still need a kind of facilitator to motivate us to pursue our moral duties. That is, at least we need to hope for

³⁵ CPrR, 125.

the highest good. This is the reason why both the highest good and the idea of God are morally necessary. They provide us with a motivation to keep acting morally.³⁶

Accordingly, the ground of *hope* might come with a new outlook toward nature. “The source of man’s unhappiness is his ignorance of Nature” says Holbach.³⁷ Yet, by employing this principle of purposiveness, we might find a ground in nature to hope for, and hence, also a ground for the possibility of happiness. This is because this principle enables us to see nature harmoniously and strengthens the meaning we give to both nature and ourselves. Moreover, the unity pursued in the critical system is also provided by this principle of the power of judgment. In order for us to examine what these all mean, let us first look at how Kant considers the power of judgment in the third *Critique*. Afterwards, we will be comparing the determinative and reflective use of

³⁶ In this motivation, the role of the power of teleological judgment cannot be disregarded. Judgment in its teleological operation provides us with a look to nature as if it is an organic unity. Hence, the mechanistic nature that we know theoretically appears as an organic nature by which we assume that nature is in accord with our freedom. Guyer states that, “Kant regards it as necessary and inevitable that once we have been compelled to see individual organisms in nature as internally purposive systems that are the apparent products of intelligent design, we will also see nature as a whole as a purposive system (CJ, §67, 5:379; §75, 5:398)” From “Guyer, *Kant*, p. 349.” Accordingly, we will regard ourselves in harmony with nature so that we can assume that nature is in harmony with our freedom. Hence, the presupposition that the highest good is attainable is provided by the assumption of an organic nature. Kant further states that the ultimate purpose in nature is *us*: human beings, and regards happiness of human beings as one of the purposes of nature. (CJ, 429-430). Put it briefly, regarding nature as an organic nature brings about the idea of a systemic unity so that we assume that we can attain our final purpose in nature. You can also see, “Guyer, *Kant*, pp. 349-358.” Due to the scope of the present study, I shall neither consider the role of the teleological judgment in the completion of the critical system, nor discuss the application of the principle of purposiveness in the teleological judgment.

³⁷ Holbach, Baron. *The System of Nature or Laws of the Moral and Physical World*. Translated by H. D. Robinson. Kitchener: Batoche Books, 2001.

judgment and find a way to understand the significant role that is assigned to aesthetic judgments in Kant's critical project.

2.2. The Critique of Aesthetic Judgment

2.2.1. The Power of Judgment

Our all cognition about objects is expressed through judgments. If one has multiple intuitions, the ability to judge shapes these intuitions into a form. Judgment has neither a magical role, nor a surprising meaning. Judging, in the simplest sense, is to form our way of thinking. In the frame of the Kantian philosophy, judgment should not be understood as if it is a proposition. Rather, it should be taken as a power or a faculty that is active.³⁸ The power of judgment (*Urteilstkraft*) is simply our ability to make (individual) judgments (*Urteile*).³⁹ Judgment is a power which is necessary for both theoretical and practical knowledge.⁴⁰ Without the power of judgment, no understanding about the world would be possible. Yet, as we will see later, judgment can be used in different operations, and the a priori conditions of judgments of theoretical or practical cognition differ from those of taste. In addition to the role of the judgment in theoretical and practical cognition, in the third *Critique*, Kant questions whether the power of judgment has

³⁸ "*Vermögen*." It is both translated as "power" and "faculty." Since I use Werner Pluhar's translation of the *Critique of Judgment* in my thesis, I will follow his suggestion to use "power" rather than "faculty." He prefers using "power" in order to avoid reifying the powers of the mind; that is, in order for powers not to be misunderstood as if they are compartments *in* the mind. Power refers to an "ability" rather than a psychological entity (CJ, Preface, 167fn).

³⁹ CJ, Translator's Introduction, p. xxiii.

⁴⁰ Practically, for example, "applying the moral law to the will is a matter of judgment" (Gadamer, Hans-Georg. *Truth and Method*. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 1998., p. 31). Or, applying the concept of causality and to shape all representations into a form in order to determine the relation between two successive events is also the work of judgment.

its own a priori principle. This principle, however, cannot be derived from a priori concepts since if this were the case, then these principles would belong to the understanding and judgment would only apply them (CJ, 169). He maintains that a critique of pure reason which aims at a system of pure philosophy would be incomplete if it does not include a treatise on the power of judgment since it is also a cognitive power and lays claim to a priori principle (CJ, 168).

The a priori principle that Kant is looking for is the principle of purposiveness, and it is expected to bridge the gap between the realms of the sensible and supersensible. In the “Introduction” to the third *Critique* Kant states that the power of judgment is the mediating link between understanding and reason (CJ, 177). What exactly does the power of judgment unify? Firstly, we know from the first *Critique* that the understanding employs its laws to nature so that we can have theoretical knowledge. For theoretical knowledge to be possible, we need sensible intuitions to be ordered and organized by the understanding. The theoretical knowledge forms a mechanistic and deterministic understanding of nature. Secondly, we know from the second *Critique* that besides reason’s theoretical employment, reason also has a practical employment, in which we act as moral beings. This practical realm is under the sovereignty of the idea of freedom so that human beings can be considered as moral agents and they are not subject to deterministic laws of nature. This is the meaning of having free will and being autonomous, and this is how we consider ourselves as moral subjects. Kant differentiates the practical and theoretical employments of reason in respect of the domains they have.

Our cognitive power as a whole has two domains that of the concepts of nature and that of the concept of freedom, because it legislates a priori by means of both kinds of concept. Now philosophy too divides, according to these legislations, into theoretical and practical. ... Only in the practical sphere can reason legislate; with regard to theoretical cognition (of nature), all it can do is to use given laws to infer consequences from them, which however remain always within nature. ... Hence understanding and reason have two different legislations on one and the same territory of experience. Yet neither of these legislations is to interfere with the other. For just as the concept of nature has no influence on the legislation through the concept of freedom, so the latter does not interfere with the legislation of nature (*CJ*, 174-5).

Although the theoretical and practical cognitions have different domains, they both happen to be in the same territory because “understanding and reason have different legislations on one and the same territory of experience” (*CJ*, 175). It must be noted here that there is only one reason. How practical and theoretical reason differs from each other is by way of their operations and their fields of application. So far, we have seen that theoretical and practical reason have different legislations and domains. Understanding, while giving laws to nature a priori so that we cognize nature as appearances, leaves the supersensible substrate of nature *undetermined*; and the practical reason gives this supersensible substrate *determination* (*CJ*, 196). Seemingly, there is a gap between the two. But there is still a hope for bridging this gap since in the third *Critique*, we encounter a brand-new power, i.e., the power of judgment. Even though the power of judgment lacks “a realm of objects as its own domain” (*CJ*, 177), it still “contains an a priori principle of its own” (*CJ*, 178). Through the a priori principle of purposiveness of nature, it might be possible a transition from the lawfulness of nature to the pure practical lawfulness, since the power of judgment “provides nature’s

supersensible substrate with *determinability by the intellectual power*” (CJ, 196).

Thus, in its most basic sense, the role expected from the power of judgment is a mediation between the theoretical use of reason and the practical, and between the first *Critique* and the second, or between the deterministic nature and freedom. It is expected from the reflective power of judgment to unify and to complete the critical system. So, the third *Critique*, while examining both aesthetic and teleological judgments, will be also searching for this mediation. But the claim that the power of judgment unifies the critical project has not yet been proved and requires a strict examination of the conditions of judgment, particularly of the reflective type. As it stands now, following questions remain: Does the power of judgment have an a priori basis? How would it even unify the critical system? Kant’s answer to these is both clear and ambiguous in different aspects. Possible answers to the question of how the power of judgment achieves these goals will be examined throughout this study. The ground for such an examination will be hopefully given especially while examining the principle of purposiveness, and while explicating its relation with the judgments about beauty. For now, however, we can talk about the possible motivations behind this expectation from the power of judgment.

The possible motivation behind the idea that the power of judgment is bridging the gap between the first and the second *Critique* might stem from the idea that all human experiences cannot be reduced solely to theoretical or moral judgments. There seems to be more to human experience than theoretical and practical cognitions. There indeed is. We can also make

judgments about beauty when we find something beautiful. When we judge something aesthetically, our aim is neither to judge it theoretically to produce knowledge about the world, nor to determine what exactly this object is. What we formally do is merely to find it beautiful. In this sense, the power of judgment is being used in a different manner than it is used in both theoretical and practical judgments. This operation of the power of judgment is not determinative but reflective. And since when this power is used in determinative judgments, it does not have its own a priori principle, Kant searches for the power of judgment's a priori principle in its reflective use when it is employed both in aesthetic and teleological judgments. So, what is more to human experience than our theoretical and practical cognitions is our way of judging both aesthetically and teleologically. And the a priori principle of the power of judgment is applicable either aesthetically or teleologically. The peculiarity of the power of judgment in its reflective use lies in that it gives rise to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure –when it is used aesthetically. When we judge an object aesthetically, we have a certain feeling. This feeling brings about a new dimension to human experience since neither theoretical nor practical cognitions must give rise to any feeling. Aesthetic judgments are necessarily based on the feeling of pleasure or displeasure. In this sense, aesthetic experiences are reminders that besides our theoretical or practical cognitions, there is also an affective dimension of human experience. And Kant regards the feeling of pleasure as the one which provides a “transition from the domain of the concepts of nature to the domain of the concept of freedom,” i.e., a “transition from understanding to reason” (CJ, 179). For, “the power of desire is [also] necessarily connected with pleasure or displeasure” (CJ, 178-9). A curiosity arises, then: How does a mere *feeling*

accomplish all these? In order to give an answer to this question, as a first step, we shall look at how a reflective judgment differs from a determinative one, especially when it is used aesthetically.

2.2.2. Determinative and Reflective Judgments

Kant introduces a distinction between determinative and reflective judgments. Any judgment is determinative if the universal (a universal can be a principle, a rule, a concept, etc.) is given and the particular is subsumed under it. Determinative judgments are the cognitive judgments, and they can be either theoretical or practical. Understanding's employment on the given sensible intuitions can be considered under this heading, where particular intuitions are given and understanding employs its categories to determine them. Let me put it another way, in the determinative operation of judgment we determine our object by subsuming it under a pre-given a priori universal. A determinative judgment is the judgment that you determine the object of your experience in which the intuition of the object is given. Imagine you are intuiting a flower. The process of determining that it is a flower or what flower this is, and to declare, for instance, that "it is a daisy" is the work of determinative judgment. If the concept of daisy is already in your understanding, then your empirical intuition directly corresponds to that concept and the intuited object is determined by that concept, so you can have the judgment that "it is a daisy." If, however, you do not yet exactly know what you are intuiting (in this case, suppose you have the concept of flower, but you do not have the concept of daisy), then through the expansion of the concepts you have already had (e.g., the concepts of flower, white, etc.), you can specify what you are intuiting and finally

determine it (as a daisy). This case above exemplifies an empirical judgment.

In the case of reflective judgment, the particular object is only given and the universal has yet to be found. So, in this case, no universal is given but there is only an undetermined particular object. This undetermined particular object in a reflective judgment can also be a “daisy” as in an empirical judgment. We still determine it as a “daisy” when we find it beautiful. When you call an object beautiful, you determine what your object is. In order to declare that “this daisy is beautiful,” first you determine that this is a daisy, and then by reflecting on its form you call it beautiful. Here, even in judging aesthetically, a determination occurs. We determine our object as a daisy. However, when it is judged aesthetically, the aim of the cognitive process is not to determine what the object is. What we cannot determine in an aesthetic judgment is not what the object is, rather the feature of being beautiful. Since being beautiful is not a property of an object, and since the universal we are searching for is not the “concept” of beauty, we are left only with an undetermined particular, and a feeling of pleasure. So, in the reflective judgments of beauty, judgment cannot determine its object, but it only reflects on itself. Accordingly, we just find it beautiful, and we have a pleasure in that experience.

There is a principle of reflective power of judgment which is either used aesthetically or teleologically: *the principle of purposiveness of nature*.⁴¹ When it is used aesthetically, it is a subjective (or

⁴¹ It would be misleading to read the third *Critique* as if it only aims at constituting an aesthetic theory. It should be kept in mind that Kant investigates the “judgment” in its reflective operation. There are two parts that

formal) principle. Since judgments of beauty are aesthetic judgments, the subjective principle of power will be our focus in what follows.

2.2.3. The Purposiveness of Nature

“Where man is not, nature is barren.”⁴²
-William Blake

In the “Introduction” to the third *Critique* Kant observes that we presuppose a harmony in nature. For him, this presupposition comes from the power of judgment. It derives from the concept of a purposiveness of nature, and “it is judgment that presupposes this condition a priori” (CJ, 196). Put another way, the purposiveness of nature is an a priori concept of reflective judgment, and by employing this concept, we reflect on nature *as if* there is a unity or a harmony there. As Kant puts it,

through this concept we present nature *as if* an understanding contained the basis of the unity of what is diverse in nature’s empirical laws. Hence the purposiveness of nature is a special a priori concept that has its origin solely in reflective judgment. For we cannot attribute to natural products anything like nature’s referring them to purposes, but can only use this concept in order to reflect on nature as regards that connection among nature’s appearances which is given to us in terms of empirical laws. This concept is also quite distinct from practical purposiveness (in human art or in morality), though we do think it by analogy with practical purposiveness (CJ, 181).

There is a diversity in nature in the sense that there are various empirical laws. That is, the power of understanding employs its laws in a way that nature is determined by multiple empirical

constitute the book, one of which is about aesthetic judgments and the other of which is about teleological judgments.

⁴² Blake, William. From “Proverbs of Hell” in *The Marriage of Heaven and Hell*.

laws, and this multiplicity of empirical laws gives rise to a diversity in nature. Yet, this multiplicity or diversity in nature seems to have a harmony, but understanding is not able to bring this diversity together, “for though the universal natural laws do make things cohere in terms of their genus as natural things as such, they fail to provide them with specific coherence in terms of the particular natural beings they are” (CJ, 184). It is the principle of purposiveness that unifies this diversity. For, as Allison puts it, without such a principle, an “empirical chaos” would arise.⁴³ There would be a disorder at the empirical level in which the laws given by the understanding could not fit into an empirically accessible uniformity.⁴⁴ With this principle, however, we gather all our possible knowledge about nature together systematically and harmoniously so that a chaotic frame in nature is prevented.

Fiona Hughes states that this a priori concept of reflective judgment helps us to make sense of nature.⁴⁵ “To make sense of nature” is a very suitable phrase to define the function of the power of judgment. To see a unity in the diversity of nature by employing a higher a priori principle of judgment can be understood as to give a meaning to the world, that is, beyond all the multiplicity in nature, we nevertheless see a harmony there. We know from the first *Critique* that reason’s attempt to bring a unity to the multiplicity ends up with antinomies and understanding “achieves only a formal framework within which

⁴³ Allison, *Kant’s Theory of Taste.*, p. 38.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ Hughes, Fiona. *Kant’s Critique of Aesthetic Judgement: A Reader’s Guide.* London: Continuum, 2010., p. 4.

knowledge is possible, but which is ultimately not coherent with moral agency.”⁴⁶ Hughes claims that this a priori concept of judgment opens up a new possibility. This new possibility refers to a bridge between the mechanical order of nature and us —as moral agents exercising rational purposes. In my opinion, what she meant by this possibility of bridging the gap between the mechanical nature and moral agency is bound up with the idea that we grasp the harmony in nature *as if* it is *for us*. When we reflect on nature and the diversity in it, by the aid of the concept of purposiveness, we consider the world *as if* there is also a purpose for us. This purpose refers to our moral vocation. So, as moral agents, as it were, we find a place for ourselves where we can exercise our rational ideas. We make sense of the nature outside us by seeing a subjective purposiveness in it, which also helps us to locate ourselves in nature with our moral vocation.

Alongside, the harmonious look of nature comes from us, and the harmony seen in nature is merely subjective. Put it another way, this harmony is not to be found in nature because it is not a concept of an object. Rather, by the principle of subjective purposiveness of nature, we reflect on nature as if in harmony:

this transcendental concept of a purposiveness of nature is neither a concept of nature nor a concept of freedom, since it attributes nothing whatsoever to the object (nature), but [through] this transcendental concept [we] only think of the one and only way in which we must proceed when reflecting on the objects of nature with the aim of having thoroughly coherent experience. Hence it is a subjective principle (maxim) of judgment (CJ, 184).

⁴⁶ Hughes, *Kant's Critique of Aesthetic Judgement.*, p. 4.

The power of judgment makes us reflect on the multiple natural appearances and unite them as if there is a purpose in nature. When we reflect on the natural objects, we presuppose that nature is so arranged that it must conform to our cognitive powers. In other words, we are “attributing to nature, on the analogy of a purpose, a concern, as it were, for our cognitive power” (*CJ*, 193). Yet this reflection on nature is necessary. Kant maintains that this unity which judgment brings about is a necessary presupposition “since otherwise our empirical cognition could not thoroughly cohere to [form] a whole of experience” (*CJ*, 183). It should be stressed here that although this principle is necessary, it is also merely a subjective (i.e., formal) principle.⁴⁷ It must be subjective because our human mind is not capable of knowing nature as a whole, and the unity of nature is not something which is possessed by nature itself objectively. And even if this would be the case, we still could not have grasped this unity in nature objectively due to the fact that we do not have an intellectual intuition. We grasp nature only as conditioned, and partially. In the range of what is given to us through sensibility, that is, at the empirical level, we are not capable of grasping this well-ordered unity in nature objectively. Rather, because we do not have an intellectual intuition, we are able to presuppose this harmony only in conformity with our cognitive powers. So, the harmony here indicates a harmony between the form of the object

⁴⁷ Kant makes a distinction between the subjective (formal) purposiveness and objective (real) purposiveness of nature. The former is being applied in aesthetic judgments, while the latter is being used when we judge nature teleologically. These two differ from each other in the sense that while aesthetic judgments rest on the feeling of pleasure, teleological judgments rest on the understanding and reason. So, the latter is to judge according to the concepts, hence objective (*CJ*, 192-3). Since the scope of this thesis is limited with aesthetic judgments, throughout this study, “purposiveness” as a principle of judgment indicates only the subjective (formal) purposiveness and not objective purposiveness, unless the otherwise is especially stated.

of our experience (i.e., nature) and our cognitive powers. (*CJ*, 192). We, only after by way of reflection, can presuppose that the nature is well-ordered and has a unity.

To sum up, regarding the a priori principle of the power of judgment, we firstly stated that the purposiveness of nature is the principle of reflective judgments. In addition, this principle is a presupposition since we do not see this purposiveness in nature itself, but it only helps us to see the diversity in nature as a whole. We further said that aesthetic judgments are reflective judgments, so aesthetic judgments too must be governed by this principle. Then, it can be asked what the function of the principle of purposiveness is in any aesthetic judgment.

2.2.3.1. The Principle of Purposiveness in Judgments of Beauty

We have seen above that the purposiveness of nature is the principle of the power of judgment in its reflective use. However, it is a bit mysterious how we use this principle in any judgment about beauty. How Kant relates this subjective principle to the judgments about beauty is through the feeling of pleasure which is also the basis of aesthetic judgments in general. Kant states that this subjective (formal) purposiveness proper “rests on the pleasure we take directly in the form of the object when we merely reflect on it” (*CJ*, 192). For when we try to determine a purpose theoretically, i.e., when the understanding tries to apply the concept of a purpose to nature, it fails because it leaves its object wholly undetermined (*CJ*, 194). Understanding does this because it cannot detect any determinate purpose in nature. What happens when we judge something aesthetically is, on the other

hand, that the object judged as beautiful is commensurate with our cognitive powers, and a feeling of pleasure arises. The distinctive factor here is the feeling of pleasure arisen in aesthetic judgments. So, the key to the question of how a judgment about beauty is related to the principle of purposiveness lies in this feeling.

The pleasure that arises in experiencing beauty is neither in connection with the power of desire nor with a sensuous pleasure. It is, rather, a universally shareable pleasure which rests on a harmonious *free play* of our cognitive powers. Even though the conditions for such a harmonious free play among our cognitive powers are to be examined in the next chapter, for now, we can say that it is by way of this free play, a pure aesthetic pleasure arises. The harmony that arises in experiencing beauty is, in fact, due to the application of the subjective principle of purposiveness to the object. Now, just like in judging nature, in judging something to be beautiful too, we cannot determine what the purpose of our object is. We do not determine a purpose, but we feel a harmony between us and the beautiful object. This harmony indicates an attunement of our cognitive powers with the form of the object. While using this principle in nature, the harmony we assume is of the nature as a whole, and that is how we find a unity in nature. When this principle is used in experiencing beauty, however, the unity we find is of the form of a singular object. That is how a beautiful object looks purposive for us.

2.2.4. Aesthetic Judgment

Throughout all the *Critiques*, the concern of Kant's critical philosophy is said to search for legitimacy of any type of cognition.

To achieve this, reason must delve into itself; that is, it must criticize itself, which provides a ground for the critical philosophy. This ground is to ask the transcendental question of knowledge; strictly speaking, the question of “how are synthetic *a priori* cognitions possible?” We apply the same transcendental question to the aesthetic judgment: how are synthetic judgments of taste possible *a priori*? Accordingly, we can say that the “Copernican revolution was a turn to the subjective conditions of cognition, and the judgment of taste considers the object just insofar as it relates to these subjective conditions.”⁴⁸ So, the investigation here is not empirical, nor metaphysical, but transcendental.

The scope of the “Critique of Aesthetic Judgment” includes mainly two types of judgments: judgments of taste and judgments of the sublime. They both exhibit the features of an aesthetic judgment because they are based on the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. Kant defines taste as “the ability to judge the beautiful” (*CJ*, 203). So, to make an analysis on judgments of the beautiful, Kant examines aesthetic judgments in general. But firstly, we need to clarify the place of judgments of taste among aesthetic judgments. The judgment of taste is a subcategory of aesthetic judgments. Aesthetic judgments are of several types; judgments of the beautiful, of the agreeable and of the sublime can be listed under this heading. Their common aspect is that all aesthetic judgments are reflective judgments; viz., they are not determinative cognitive judgments which are formerly based on any *a priori* principle or categories. Rather, they are based on merely a subjective feeling: pleasure or displeasure. The judgments about beauty and sublimity differ from those of the agreeable in the sense that they

⁴⁸ Kukla, Rebecca. “Introduction: Placing the Aesthetic in Kant’s Critical Epistemology.” *Aesthetics and Cognition in Kant’s Critical Philosophy*. Edited by Rebecca Kukla. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006., p. 26.

are considered to be pure (i.e., they can be grounded on an a priori principle, so they both can be shared universally), while the judgments of the agreeable are based on a merely private and personal feeling. Accordingly, the “Critique of Aesthetic Judgment” is divided into two books: “Analytic of the Beautiful” and “Analytic of the Sublime.” The main concern of the former is to expose the distinctive and peculiar aspects of the judgments of the beautiful while the second examines the judgments about the sublime.

Kant uses the expressions of “judgments of the beautiful” and the “judgments of taste” interchangeably since he regards *taste* as “the ability to judge the beautiful” (CJ, 203fn). In this study as well, the two shall be used interchangeably. In addition, since the judgments about beauty and sublimity are to be grounded a priori, both refer to the “pure aesthetic judgment,” so they will also be occasionally referred to by this expression throughout this study. After this remark on the terminology, now we shall start analyzing the “Critique of Aesthetic Judgment.”

Kant first states that all judgments of taste are aesthetic judgments. Aesthetic judgments are those whose determining basis is subjective. They are neither cognitive nor logical judgments, so their “determining basis *cannot be other than subjective*” (CJ, 204, emphasis in original). All types of aesthetic judgments have this feature of subjectivity because the basis for an aesthetic judgment comes from a feeling: the feeling of pleasure or displeasure (CJ, 169; see also CJ, 177-8). The pleasure is something to be found only in the subject, not in the object; it must be a state of the subject. It is because when we judge something to be beautiful, our basis for making such a judgment seems to be a *liking* toward that beautiful object. This

liking gives rise to the feeling of pleasure. In other words, to call something beautiful is related to liking it or related to a feeling we have in that aesthetic experience. And to have pleasure from any experience designates a very subjective state because “the ‘ability to cause pleasure’ does not serve as a predicate of objects.”⁴⁹ However, any experience of beauty refers to more than an ordinary, simple liking. For when we judge something to be beautiful, we consider the object as if it has the property of being beautiful inherently, so we expect from others to see the beauty we see in that particular object. Accordingly, besides its subjectivity, the judgments of taste are also expected to exhibit a universal character. So, we will be in search of the conditions which make a reflective aesthetic judgment both subjective and universal. Since the feeling of pleasure is the determining basis for the aesthetic judgments in general, the conditions to make any aesthetic judgment universally possible are to be found in its relation to the feeling of pleasure. Yet, as we will see later on, Kant assigns a peculiar type of universality to the judgments of taste. Universality in the determinative judgments is provided with their objectivity. What objectivity brings about in them is the concepts of the understanding or reason. However, in the reflective use of the aesthetic power of judgment, e.g., in judgments of taste, we do not see such an operation of either understanding or reason. That is, there is not a universal concept formerly given to us in order for us to subsume our particular intuition under that universal. This sense of universal in pure aesthetic judgments is “unlike the [sense of universal in cognitive judgments] in that it alludes not to

⁴⁹ Kemal, Salim. *Kant's Aesthetic Theory*. London: Macmillan Press LTD., 1997., p. 25.

a plurality of objects, but rather to a plurality of subjects.”⁵⁰ So, as opposed to both theoretical and practical judgments, here we will be seeking for the conditions of a subjective universality –or intersubjectivity.



⁵⁰ Ginsborg, Hannah. “Thinking the Particular as Contained under the Universal.” *Aesthetics and Cognition in Kant’s Critical Philosophy*. Edited by Rebecca Kukla. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006., p. 36.

CHAPTER III

EXPLICATION OF PURE AESTHETIC JUDGMENTS

*'I think I know the meaning of the proverb
"beautiful things are difficult."'*⁵¹

The "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment" concerns two main questions; first, exactly what do we declare when we judge something to be beautiful –what does it mean to say that something is beautiful; second, do we have a right to make universal judgments of the beautiful? How is it possible for judgment, which is based on merely the subjective feeling of pleasure, to have a demand for universal shareability of the pleasure taken from the presentation of an object? The difficult task of this critique lies in its attempt to bring so many aspects of judgment together. That is, judgments of taste are expected to be both subjective and universal; viz., they are expected to be universally shareable although they are based on the feeling of pleasure which is merely subjective. Additionally, as Kant puts it: "beautiful is what without a concept is cognized as the object of a necessary liking" (CJ, 240), so judgments of beauty are supposed to have a necessity, although they are not based on any concept. Another characteristic of judgments of taste is that each aesthetic judgment is singular. That is, aesthetic judgments have the form "x is beautiful," and each aesthetic judgment refers to a particular aesthetic experience. This is to say, I can only find *a daisy* beautiful and declare that "*this daisy* is beautiful." A

⁵¹ Socrates to Hippias, from "Plato. *Hippias Major*."

general judgment about daisies also can be made. Anyone can declare that “daisies in general are beautiful,” yet, this judgment would be a logical judgment and not an aesthetic judgment.⁵² So, we are investigating the conditions of universality and necessity for singular judgments. All these aspects of judgments of taste initially seem to be hardly gathered, and it is disputable whether Kant’s critique of judgments of taste gives a satisfactory deduction for these kinds of judgments. How Kant deals with these difficulties is as follows: the feeling of pleasure is the basis of aesthetic judgments in general. In this regard, Kant will be connecting the feeling of pleasure with other characteristics of aesthetic judgments. While analyzing these, we shall be seeing that both the demand for universality and the necessity of aesthetic judgments will be connected to the shareability of the pleasure. Accordingly, a strict examination of this feeling will be the main path to be followed.

This chapter mainly aims to explicate the pure aesthetic judgments, especially the judgments of taste. To do this, we shall first scrutinize the four moments of beauty. Here is where Kant examines the formal characteristics of judgments of beauty by following the four logical functions of judgment. This examination provides us with an insight whether the validity of a judgment of taste can be justified. Thereafter, the judgment of the sublime shall shortly be expounded. We shall mainly try to present the differences between the beautiful and the sublime. Now, let us first scrutinize the “Analytic of the Beautiful,” where the analyses of the formal structure of judgments of taste are found.

⁵² For this issue, i.e., the singular feature of aesthetic judgment, you can further see, ‘Cohen, Ted. “Three Problems in Kant’s Aesthetics.” *British Journal of Aesthetics* 42, no.1 (2002): 1-12.’ and ‘Rind, Miles. “Kant’s Beautiful Roses: A Response to Cohen’s Second Problem.” *British Journal of Aesthetics* 43, no.1 (2003): 65-74.’

3.1. The Formal Characteristics of the Beautiful

The aim of the “Analytic of the Beautiful” is to expose the conditions of judgments of beauty, i.e., the expressions which have the form “this is beautiful,” and to analyze their formal structure and ground. Allison states that “the Analytic of the Beautiful is concerned, not with the nature of beauty *per se*, but rather with the *judgment* through which the beauty (or lack thereof) of a particular object of nature or art is appraised.”⁵³ So, Kant’s analyses are not about the beautiful itself but rather about the judgments of the beautiful. But still, this formal analysis of judgments of taste will show us how the experience of beauty is possible, what the beautiful is, and what is required to call an object beautiful (CJ, 203). In his analyses of the expressions such as “this flower is beautiful” or “this painting is beautiful” Kant makes use of the logical functions of judgment, which are also utilized in the first and the second *Critiques*.⁵⁴ In the first *Critique*, he says: “If we abstract from all content of a judgment in general, and attend only to the mere form of the understanding in it, we find that the function of thinking in that can be brought under four titles,” and they can be listed as quality, quantity, relation and modality.⁵⁵ However, these logical functions are used in a different manner than they are used in cognitive judgments. Here they are used in the reflective use rather than in the determinative use of judgment. So, our analysis is not on the judgments which determine what our object is (as a daisy), rather, we will be

⁵³ Allison, Henry. *Kant’s Theory of Taste: A Reading of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001., p. 68.

⁵⁴ CPR, A70/B95; CPrR, 66-7.

⁵⁵ CPR, A70/B95.

dealing with how we call it beautiful after determining it (as a daisy) by reflecting to its form. In the “Critique of Aesthetic Judgment” this fourfold division of the logical functions of judgment provides him with a ground to expose the formal structure of the expressions stating that something is beautiful. This formal analysis, however, will also shed light upon the content of the judgments of taste; that is, we will have an insight toward the meaning of the predicate of “beautiful.”

In the third *Critique*, the analyses of the structure of judgments of beauty are presented under the “Four Moments of the Judgments of Beauty,” and each moment corresponds to one of the logical functions of judgment listed above. Each moment addresses one necessary condition of being a judgment of taste. Now, I start explaining the first moment of beauty; that of quality. It should be noted that this is not arbitrarily chosen as a starting point “because the aesthetic judgment about the beautiful is concerned with it first” (CJ, 203).

3.1.1. Disinterestedness: How the Beautiful Differs from the Agreeable and the Good

The first moment concerns quality, and the quality of a judgment of taste is its being *disinterested*. Kant defines interest as “what we call the liking we connect with the presentation⁵⁶ of an object’s existence” (CJ, 204). The liking for an object’s real existence is how Kant defines having an interest, and it is tightly bound up with desire toward the object’s real existence. Depending on this, Kant defines the liking in the judgments of taste as being devoid

⁵⁶ *Vorstellung*.

of all interest. Kant's definition of this feature of taste is as follows. "Taste is the ability to judge an object, or a way of presenting it, by means of a liking or disliking *devoid of all interest*. The object of such a liking is called beautiful" (CJ, 211). A small explanation on the nature of the pleasure we have in judgments of taste can illuminate what disinterestedness is. Kant defines a special kind of pleasure in his *Metaphysics of Morals*, which is quite similar to the disinterested pleasure characterized in the third *Critique*. His definition of contemplative pleasure is as follows:

[T]he pleasure which is not necessarily connected with a desire for an object and which, therefore, is really not a pleasure taken in the existence of the object of the presentation, can be called mere contemplative pleasure, or passive liking. The feeling of [this] kind of pleasure is called taste.⁵⁷

The mere contemplative pleasure described above is similar to disinterested pleasure in the judgments of taste. In the case of the judgments of beauty, we have a disinterested attitude toward the presentation of the object. To have an interest in an object, on the other hand, implies a liking to the object's real existence rather than the presentation of it, and this liking implies a desire for the object's existence. The judgments about the agreeable and the good are interested in their objects. So, if the judgments of the beautiful are differentiated from that of the agreeable and the good, we will understand better what *disinterestedness* means.

⁵⁷ Kant, Immanuel. *Metaphysics of Morals*. Translated by Mary J. Gregor. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991., p. 27.

3.1.1.2. The Beautiful, the Agreeable, the Good

Kant distinguishes judgments of beauty from those of the agreeable and of the good, indicating that the latter two are interested with their objects. “We call agreeable what gratifies us, beautiful what we just please, good what we esteem or endorse” (CJ, 210). The difference between these three types of judgment lies in the difference of the liking arisen in each of them. In the case of the agreeable, there arises an interest because the liking in this case rests completely on sensation. Kant’s definition for the agreeable is “what the senses like in sensation” (CJ, 206). Kant describes this kind of liking in the agreeable as *gratification* rather than merely liking. The pleasure felt as well is merely that of the sensible object, as someone’s liking chocolate. That is, it implies a desire toward eating chocolate, and the desire proper is related to sensation. So, the pleasure in this context is also a pleasure in sensation. We should be careful while stating that something is pleasurable in this context since the pleasure felt in the agreeable and in the experience of beauty are of different kinds. Think of the moments when you are in hunger and looking forward to bite a piece of your favorite food. Quite possibly you and I have just thought different foods, and the pleasure we would possibly have when eating our favorite foods depends on several conditions such as how hungry we are, or our relation and inclination toward foods in general. Here interestedness of experience is how you approach to food, and the pleasure in the agreeable is mostly associated with desire, and it is strictly based on sensation. Or the music you played on, *as a background* while having dinner, can be counted as an example of the agreeable since the aim of that music is only to please while eating. So, it has an interest toward music, and it pleases solely the sensation. The liking for

the good is interested as well. “*Good* is what, by means of reason, we like through its mere concept” (CJ, 207).

The liking for the good arises either when we find something useful, in this case it is seen as a *means*, or when we like it for its own sake. For the good in the former sense, you can think of such a moment, for example, when you prefer buying a desk chair not because how it looks (e.g., its color) but because it looks steady and comfortable. Here what defines the goodness of the chair is its usefulness, so the liking for the chair is in an interested manner. The good as in the latter sense (when we like it for its own sake) is the *morally good*. It can be exemplified with the times you act in such a way that your moral action is determined with the purpose of the *good*. It can also be called *intrinsically good*. In either way, the good contains a concept of purpose, so it, as regards to each sense, has an interest.

In the case of judgments of beauty, on the other hand, we do not use concepts. Rather, experiencing beauty is a matter of contemplation. As Kant puts it:

A judgment of taste is merely *contemplative*, i.e., it is a judgment that is indifferent to the existence of the object: it considers the character of the object only by holding it up to our feeling of pleasure or displeasure. Nor this contemplation, as such, directed to concepts, for a judgment of taste is not a cognitive judgment (whether theoretical or practical) and hence is neither based on concepts, nor directed to them as purposes (CJ, 209).

The liking in the experience of beauty must be purely contemplative. It does not carry any concept within it, nor must it have an interest toward the object. Being indifferent to the existence of the object means that in the judgments of beauty, what we reflect on is not the existence of but the presentation of

the object. In other words, it is not a desire toward eating and exhausting the chocolate itself as in the agreeable, but what we reflect on is our own presentation of the object, and it is about how we respond to our own presentation. That is, neither the knowledge of the object nor the usefulness of it is important, but how we reflect on its presentation matters. This is where disinterested pleasure arises. It does arise when I am indifferent to the existence of the object of my experience.

Yet, it might be still confusing how an experience can give pleasure and lacks any interest in its object. This confusion arises because there is an ambiguity about how and where the pleasure arises in a pure aesthetic experience. Depending on how such a pleasure arises, the universality of a judgment of beauty will either be secured or will fail in being justified. The “quantity” of judgment of taste is where the relation between pleasure and its universal shareability is scrutinized. The function of “quantity” examines how the feeling of pleasure is *expected* to be shared universally. The following section aims to explain the source of this expectation.

3.1.2. Universality of the Judgments of Beauty

In the previous moment, the quality of a judgment of taste is characterized with its *disinterestedness*. Now, we discuss whether the awareness of having a disinterested pleasure in an aesthetic experience can lead to a demand from others to feel the same pleasure we have. So, we shall question in what sense a judgment of taste is universal. In the discussion about the universality of a judgment of taste, I will focus on two things. The first one is *how we demand* universality from such judgments. I aim to explain

the demand of universality by referring to the disinterested nature of aesthetic judgments. Second, how we *justify* the demanded universality. This justification, however, does not come from the disinterestedness of pure aesthetic judgments but from the *free play* of the cognitive powers.

Let us start with explaining how the universality claim comes from disinterested pleasure. Kant basically argues that if someone who is having an aesthetic experience is conscious of the disinterestedness of the experience in particular, then this means that he could not find any private condition under this liking. So, the awareness that there is no private inclination in the particular aesthetic experience gives rise to a normative demand for others to experience the aesthetic pleasure in a similar manner as well. “If someone likes something and is conscious that he himself does so without any interest, then he cannot help judging that it must contain a basis for being liked for everyone” (CJ, 212). The main claim of this moment of beauty is that the disinterested nature of the aesthetic experience leads to a demand for a universal communicability. Put it another way, being aware of the fact that the particular aesthetic experience has no private condition (due to its disinterested character) leads the subject of the experience to demand a universal shareability. This demand basically comes from the idea that when we have a liking to an object in a disinterested manner, we judge it *as if* the beauty is a property of that object; i.e., we treat our object as if it has beauty inherently. This tendency toward the object *as if* it has this property of being beautiful leads us to expect that anyone having this particular aesthetic experience would have the same pleasure. You can think of such experiences that you are almost sure that it is impossible for someone to dislike this experience. Say, it is the rise of the

Sun you are watching upon the top of the hill. You neither have a benefit from the Sun, e.g., you like the Sun not because you need the Sun in order to grow your plants, nor you are trying to know the scientific facts about the Sun. So, you have no particular purpose toward the Sun in this context. Your pleasure arises only because you are enjoying the moment when you are watching the whimsical rise of the Sun. It is even hard to imagine a person who declares that they find no beauty in watching the sun rising. How can any person have no pleasure at all in this experience!⁵⁸ Or, say, you recommended one of your friends to listen to a suite of Handel's, and they declared that they found nothing to like in this music.⁵⁹ The first reaction you would probably have would be neither to agree with them in that there is really nothing to like in this music, nor would you think that it is their own *taste*. To think that it is their own taste would imply that "[e]veryone has [their] own taste" (CJ, 212, emphasis in original), and that it is a taste of sense rather than a taste of reflection. So, rather, you would probably think that they have not practiced listening to music enough to judge it and they should improve their *taste* in order to have a pleasure from listening to Handel's music. The focus in this example is not on the reaction of your friend but on *your awareness that your liking is not merely a personal liking*. Thus, you demand an agreement to your judgment about Handel's music.

According to my reading, the transition from being aware of the disinterestedness of any aesthetic experience to expecting from

⁵⁸ This experience with the Sun would place under the experience of the sublime, not of the beautiful. But still a valid example, since sublimity also demands universal shareability.

⁵⁹ While giving this example, the music on my mind was: Georg Friedrich Handel, "Suite I in B Major, Livre 2, HWV 434: Minuet," Cristiano Holtz, 2011.

others to feel the same way as we do in that particular aesthetic experience refers only to a *demand* for universality. That is to say, Kant, by stating such a transition, does not give a justification for a universal aspect of judgment of taste. Rather, he maintains that when we find no personal inclination or interest when we experience beauty, “we believe we have a universal voice, and lay claim to the agreement of everyone” (CJ, 216). What Kant means by “universal voice” is that we think *as if* we speak for everyone when we make an aesthetic judgment. So, the universality here is not actually the characteristic of the judgment itself but how our singular judgment of taste seems to us. And what is postulated by the universal voice is not the agreement itself but the *expectation* of the agreement. By agreement, Kant does not mean that every judging subject agrees with my judgment. It is not an empirical investigation. Our aim here is not to ask everyone to check if they agree with me or not. First of all, to do this would be impossible since each aesthetic judgment is singular. Secondly, even if we could do this, it would have been different investigation than we aim to do here because it would be based on merely an empirical method rather than a transcendental one. To sum up, the expectation proper is not that the others *will* agree with my judgment but they *ought to* do so. Hence, it is a normative demand. Yet, the demand itself must be justified. Does a mere awareness of disinterested liking give us a right to demand from other persons to agree with our judgment?

3.1.2.1. The Free Play

The second point of this section is to explain how Kant justifies the *demand* of universality of pure aesthetic judgments. The justification comes with a reference to our cognitive powers. In §9,

Kant is questioning whether the pleasure precedes the judgment or the judgment precedes the pleasure, and notes that answering this question is the “key” to the “Critique of Aesthetic Judgment” (CJ, 216-217). For it would shed light on how Kant raises the universality of judgments of taste. If we say that pleasure precedes the judgment of taste, then it would be contradictory to what we have all said. For it would imply that the pleasure in the aesthetic experience would rest entirely on sensation (CJ, 217). That is, our judging would depend on merely a feeling and that would make our judgment a judgment of the agreeable. In the case of a pure judgment of taste, aesthetic pleasure must come after the judgment. In other words, first we judge something to be beautiful and then there arises aesthetic pleasure. This pleasure is that which makes an aesthetic judgment a pure aesthetic judgment, and the pleasure proper is a necessary condition for pure aesthetic judgments.

At this point, it can be asked whether the process of judging and the judgment itself are the same or they differ. Judgments of the beautiful require an awareness that we are experiencing pure beauty. So, the judging subject must be conscious that their experience depends on certain necessary conditions in order to declare that their judgment is a pure aesthetic judgment. The questions of under what conditions one can be sure that their judgment is pure, and whether it is possible to be completely sure can also be asked. There is no strict way to be completely sure that our any aesthetic judgment is pure, yet it still requires a kind of awareness that the pleasure felt in an aesthetic experience is to be shared universally. Here the stress is on the peculiarity of the feeling of pleasure as its being disinterested, and the awareness of it. Now, the question is, how do we regard the awareness of this

peculiar feeling of pleasure and the universally shareability of this feeling in the experiences of beauty? Guyer suggests that there are two distinct acts of reflective judgment in experiencing beauty.⁶⁰ According to his interpretation, this “two-acts” model of aesthetic judgment includes first the reflective act of judging the object which gives rise to pleasure, and second reflecting on the pleasure which leads to the judgment that the pleasure is universally valid. In this interpretation, the first reflective act brings about the harmony of cognitive powers, so arises pleasure, and the second reflective act is the actual judgment of taste.⁶¹ For Hannah Ginsborg, on the other hand, there is only one judgment; the judgment which gives rise to pleasure and the judgment which includes the claim that this pleasure is universally valid is one and the same judgment.⁶² If we are to cling to the text, Kant nowhere seems to talk about two different acts of judging. Yet Guyer’s attempt to differentiate the actual judgment of taste from the act of judging which gives rise to pleasure is to secure us from the “absurdity” that we encounter.⁶³ In order to understand what this “absurdity” refers to, let us consider this issue first with reference to Kant’s own words: “it must be the universal communicability of the mental state, in the given presentation, which underlies the judgment of taste as its subjective condition, and the pleasure in the object must be its consequence” (CJ, 217). As we will see right after this discussion, by the mental state,

⁶⁰ Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Taste.*, pp. 98-101. You can further see, ‘Guyer, Paul. “Pleasure and Society in Kant’s Theory of Taste.” *Essays in Kant’s Aesthetics*. Edited by Ted Cohen and Paul Guyer. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982., pp. 21-54.’

⁶¹ Guyer. *Kant and the Claims of Taste.*, p. 98.

⁶² Ginsborg, Hannah. “On the Key to Kant’s Critique of Taste.” *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 72, no.4 (1991): 290-313., pp. 299-300.

⁶³ Guyer. *Kant and the Claims of Taste.*, p. 99.

Kant refers to the pleasure. So here is where the absurdity that Guyer speaks of arises. Pleasure seems to locate both in the subjective condition of a judgment of taste and in the consequence of it. To avoid this circularity, Guyer suggests the “two-acts” view. As opposed to Guyer’s account, Ginsborg offers a more plausible reading of this part of the text. She argues that there is only one act of reflection in a judgment of taste, and she calls this account as “self-referential act of reflection.” According to her account, one and the same judgment presents the feature of both giving rise to a pleasure and of the claim of universal communicability of this pleasure. This account presents the idea that a judgment of taste has a self-referential structure. Ginsborg accuses Guyer of putting these two acts in a “causal relation.” That is, he approaches the latter pleasure as the consequence of the first one. Ginsborg, however, argues that there is not a causal but an “intentional relation” in a judgment of taste. According to her account, both the pleasure and the awareness of its universal shareability is grounded in the free play of cognitive powers. So, the pleasure that arises from the free play includes the awareness that it is universally shareable. This is what she meant by the intentional relation. She strengthens her argument by referring to some passages from the third *Critique* and Kant’s other writings. One of the definitions in the third *Critique* tells us that pleasure is “the consciousness of the causality of a representation in respect of the state of the subject, to maintain it in the same state.”⁶⁴ By referring to this definition, Ginsborg argues that awareness is included in the pleasure felt in a judgment of taste.

Here I will follow Ginsborg’s account over Guyer’s for at least two reasons. The first is that Ginsborg’s account is more

⁶⁴ Ginsborg. “On the Key to Kant’s Critique of Taste.” p. 301.

comprehensively embedded into Kant's aesthetic philosophy and provides more textual evidence than does Guyer's. Since my aim here is to explicate Kant's general understanding of aesthetic judgment, Ginsborg's account will be a more suitable option for the main purpose. The second is that, as also Ginsborg mentions, it would be implausible to assume that Kant presents an apparent contradiction in the section where he considers it as the "key" to the critique of aesthetic judgment. So, my position in this study will be to consider a judgment of taste as having one reflective act of judging.

Having decided which interpretation to use in what follows, we can now proceed to discuss the free play of cognitive powers in aesthetic judgment and the type of pleasure it involves. What are then the conditions for an aesthetic judgment to bring about this peculiar type of pleasure? Exactly where and when does the pleasure arise? Kant defines this pleasure as a mental state. And the harmonious *free play* of the cognitive powers refers to this mental state. He states that when we experience the beautiful,

the cognitive powers are brought into play ... because no determinate concept restricts them to a particular rule of cognition. ... Now if a presentation by which an object is given is ... to become cognition, we need *imagination* to combine the manifold of intuition, and *understanding* to provide the unity of the concept uniting the presentations. This state of *free play* of the cognitive powers, accompanying a presentation by which an object is given, must be universally communicable; for cognition, the determination of the object with which given presentations are to harmonize (in any subject whatever) is the only way of presenting that holds for everyone (CJ, 217).

The *free play* of the cognitive powers arises because in the case of an aesthetic experience no concept is given, and in this reflective act of judgment our cognitive powers are free from the

determinative effect of any concept. He firstly grounds the aesthetic pleasure in the *free play*, and then, shows that the powers of imagination and understanding that bring about the *free play* are common in all human beings. And these cognitive powers are also applied in all cognitive judgments. The difference is that while in cognitive judgments, imagination and understanding do not enter into a harmonious free play, in aesthetic judgments they do. For this reason, in cognitive judgments no pleasure arises.

The word of “free” in the phrase “free play” explicates more than it shows at first glance. Our cognitive powers are free in the sense that imagination is not restricted with the laws and concepts of the understanding. So, it is actually where the imagination is *free*, and the meaning of being free here is to not be restricted with an act of determination. Without pre-given rules that determine the experience, and without understanding’s insistence for determining the object of experience, imagination can act *freely*. The difference between a judgment of taste and that of cognition can be illustrated by an example. Imagine a marine biologist and a layman diving into the ocean together. While the marine biologist’s task is to examine the mating behaviors of octopuses, the layman just enjoys the submarine view. Here the kind of judgments the biologist aims to arrive at is theoretical because the biologist tries to specify and identify the behaviors of the octopuses by applying the pre-given rules to determine the object of their experience. In contrast, the layman would probably be amazed by the corals and octopuses and has no agenda to arrive at any kind of a theoretical judgment. Since the layman has no theoretical aim or interest, her understanding and imagination can come into a *free play*, which leads to an aesthetic experience.

This is the meaning of being *free* in an aesthetic experience. An aesthetic experience is where we have no *purpose* to judge our object to *know* it. The layman in the ocean may well enjoy the view without an interest in determining the behaviors of octopuses around.

So far, we have seen that the universal character of the judgments of taste initially is elaborated in a two-stage fashion. First, Kant claims that being aware of the disinterested aspect of judgments of beauty leads to a *demand* for universal shareability; and second, he argues that the pure aesthetic pleasure arises due to the free play of our cognitive powers. However, both of these two stages are controversial in literature.

Regarding the first stage, Guyer argues that from the disinterested nature of aesthetic experiences we cannot arrive at its universal character. According to him, in the case of a judgment of taste, being aware of taking pleasure without having a desire or an interest does not imply that this particular judgment is valid for everyone.⁶⁵ Guyer accuses Kant of being unable to prove the universality of such judgments by depending on their disinterestedness, for the reason that it is also possible that anyone, who is directed by other private condition rather than interest, can have pleasure. In contrast to Guyer, Allison argues that Kant only *points out* the connection between disinterested liking and universality in respect of judgments of beauty.⁶⁶ For him, Kant's aim here is not to logically deduce the universality

⁶⁵ Guyer, Paul. *Kant and the Claims of Taste*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997., pp. 116-7.

⁶⁶ Allison, Henry. *Kant's Theory of Taste: A Reading of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001., pp. 99-103.

from the disinterested nature of judgments of taste, but rather just to provide a “psychological” bridge between them. That is, when the judging subject is aware that she is disinterested in the object, she is also aware that her liking is not a personal liking. Accordingly, she may well think that others too find that object beautiful. So, Allison takes this issue from the subject’s point of view and gives a reason why there might be a demand for shareability. For him, Kant only refers to a psychological state of the subject, and does not aim to deduce universality from disinterestedness. My interpretation is in line with Allison’s. Kant only maintains that being aware of disinterestedness leads to a demand for universal shareability of pure aesthetic experiences. The justification for such a demand is in what follows.

In the theoretical realm, validity of judgments is provided by the laws of the understanding. That is how cognitive judgments are universal and necessary objectively. Aesthetic judgments, however, lack any concept which determines its object. The universality we are searching for is, then, of a different type, and it is grounded on the pleasure that arises from the free play of cognitive powers. The similarity between the cognitive judgments and judgments of taste in terms of universality is, then, that both provide their validity in cognitive powers. Cognitive judgments have objective validity, while pure aesthetic judgments have subjective universality. I shall accept this difference between cognitive and aesthetic judgments. Nevertheless, I also claim that to know that we all share the same cognitive powers may well lead to assume intersubjectivity of pleasure. But still universality of both is grounded on the cognitive powers that all rational beings share. Accordingly, we must only ground that the feeling of

pleasure is shareable between the subjects. Yet, this does not imply that everyone has exactly the same pleasure when judging the same daisy aesthetically. Rather, only the conditions for the shareability of pleasure must be plausibly provided so that a demand for universality is also justified. What we need is to show that we are *capable* of feeling the same pleasure, not that we do share the same pleasure with everyone. Hence, basing the aesthetic pleasure in our cognitive powers grants this condition.

3.1.3. The Form of Purposiveness: The Condition for a Harmony Between the Subject and Object

The third moment concerns the function of *relation*, and the issue here is the purposive character of judgments of taste. As the title directly says: “a judgment of taste is based on nothing but the form of purposiveness of an object” (CJ, 221). So far, Kant has introduced some necessary conditions for universality regarding the judging subjects of the aesthetic experience. We have seen certain criteria for judging subjects. With the third moment he presents another basis for strengthening the claim of universality, yet this time the focus is on the object of aesthetic experience rather than the condition of judging subjects. Kant simply states that there must be, not *in* the object but in the *form* of the object, something which enables us to demand universal shareability of pleasure, which arises from the aesthetic experience proper. That is how the form of the object is relational with the subject of experience. What does this even mean? Which relation are we talking about? Is it the relation between the aesthetic object and the predicate beautiful, or is it the relation between the judging subject and the object judged as beautiful? The former question analyzes the relation between the “rose” and the predicate

“beautiful” in the judgment “this rose is beautiful.” The latter, however, refers to the relation between the judging subject of the experience and their declaration for something to be beautiful.

Before any further examination of this relation proper, we shall clarify two things: the notions of the “form,” and the “purposiveness.” In the third moment, Kant defines beauty as “an object’s form of *purposiveness* insofar as it is perceived in the object *without the presentation of a purpose*” (CJ, 236). First, it is the *form* of the object that we are talking about when it comes to judgments of beauty, and second, this form is the form of *purposiveness*. So, we must make these two notions clear, respectively. We can make use of the distinction between the agreeable and the beautiful again. The color of an object can be given as an example of the agreeable since the liking in it is not about the form but the matter of the object. As stated above, liking in the agreeable is private and a personal liking since it pleases sensation. “We cannot be certain about the sensations of others because they are of necessity private.”⁶⁷ This is to say that there is not even a possibility to be sure of what someone else’s sensation is. Judgments of the agreeable are distinguished from the taste of reflection. Accordingly, any private sensation cannot be used in justifying the demand of universal communicability of the beautiful since we cannot be sure that any other person has the same sensation as ourselves. Now, we will pursue one of two: either the privacy of sensation as in the agreeable, or the conditions of intersubjective validity as in the experiences of beauty. The answer is clear. We will follow the latter. So, two things must be remembered. First, we still pursue the a priori

⁶⁷ McCloskey, Mary A. *Kant’s Aesthetic*. London: The Macmillan Press LTD, 1993., p. 61.

conditions of the judgments of taste, second, the focus in the third moment is on the object instead of the judging subject. Since sensation in no part can be a ground for the a priori conditions, we must seek for something other than the sensuous properties of the object. So, we are left with the “form” of the object. With regard to the taste of reflection, what we judge is the form of the object. But what kind of form of the object are we talking about? This question brings us to the notions of *purpose* and *purposiveness*. According to Kant, the form of the object that we are interested in aesthetic judgments is the form of purposiveness.

Kant defines the purpose as “the object of a concept insofar as we regard this concept as the object’s cause (the real basis of its possibility)” and defines purposiveness as “the causality that a *concept* has with regard to its *object*” (CJ, 220). Thus, for Kant, an object’s purpose is the end for which it is created or designed. For example, chairs are designed to be sat on. Yet, in the case of experiencing beauty, what exactly this purpose is is not determined as in the chair case. Hence, it is not possible to *know* the purpose of the object of the experience of beauty. We merely have the apprehension of the purposiveness of the object without any determinate purpose, and therefore without any determinate concept. We are not presented with a determinate purpose in the experience, but with merely the purposiveness of the object, i.e., that *as if* it has a purpose. This is because the purpose of the artwork or the natural beauty cannot be determined by any rule or concept that governs experience, yet it seems to us as if it has a purpose by a *feeling*. “[Kant] holds that whether a given form is or is not final [purposive] for perception cannot be determined by

applying a formula but can only be 'felt'."⁶⁸ We have seen from the first moment that this peculiar pleasure is devoid of all personal inclinations, and the second moment tells us that this pleasure arises because of the free play of the cognitive powers. Now Kant gives another definition of pleasure in the third moment:

Consciousness of a presentation's causality directed at the subject's state so as to *keep* him in that state, may here designate generally what we call pleasure; whereas displeasure is that presentation which contains the basis that determines [the subject to change] the state [consisting] of [certain] presentations into their own opposite (i.e., to keep them away or remove them) (CJ, 220).

Now we see the relationship between the form of purposiveness and the feeling of pleasure. And this is where we can find the *relation* between the judging subject and the beautiful object. The form of purposiveness is what makes us keep in a state of mind so that this state is pleasurable. That is, the pleasure arisen in the free play of cognitive powers is by virtue of the form of purposiveness. As Kant puts it:

An aesthetic judgment instead refers the presentation, by which an object is given, solely to the subject; it brings to our notice no characteristic of the object, but only the purposive form in the [way] the presentational powers are determined in their engagement with the object. Indeed, the judgment is called aesthetic precisely because the basis determining it is not a concept but the feeling (of the inner sense) of that accordance in the play of the mental powers insofar as it can only be sensed (CJ, 228).

Notice here that this does not mean that the object directly affects us and we feel pleasure, rather it is by way of reflection we find that experience pleasurable. By reflecting we feel as if there is a

⁶⁸ McCloskey. *Kant's Aesthetic.*, p. 61.

purpose. “Form, then, is not only identified in the object as the origin of the movement of the mind but is also, at the same time, that which is made present by that movement.”⁶⁹ “Movement” refers to reflection. That is, to feel pleasure is to reflect on the presentation of the form of the object. What we encounter when we reflect on the presentation, then, is the form of purposiveness. It is a kind of purpose that you cannot catch. It is not something to be known but only to be felt. At the second moment, we have seen that there is a harmony between our cognitive powers so that the pleasure arises. With the third moment we confront a different type of harmony; i.e., a harmony between the given object and our cognitive powers. The given object harmonizes with our power of cognition in general. That is the meaning of the *relation* that the third moment deals with: a *relation between* the judging subject and the beautiful object.

3.1.4. Necessity of the Judgments of Beauty

The necessity of aesthetic judgment concerns the fourth moment, which is examined under the function of *modality*. But what is “necessary” in a judgment of taste? Is it that the liking in a judgment of taste necessarily arises, or is it a normative necessity that makes us think that everyone else *ought to* agree with my judgment when I find something beautiful? The first necessity refers to a relation between the judging subject and the object judged as beautiful. The second kind of necessity designates the necessary relation between the judging subjects. Let us recall the function of the modality to answer the question above. Modality concerns the scope of the judgment. Since our examination goes

⁶⁹ Friedlander, Eli. *Expressions of Judgment: An Essay on Kant's Aesthetics*. USA: President and Fellows of Harvard College, 2015., p. 31.

over the aesthetic judgment, which has a subjective necessity, we shall grope about the condition which makes it necessary intersubjectively.

Kant expounds a “conditional” necessity. Different from unconditional necessity in cognitive judgments which have a determinative objective principle, necessity in the judgments of taste is conditional (CJ, 237). It is conditional in the sense that whenever the liking arises for one, the liking *ought to* arise for everyone (CJ, 237). So, we can talk about two types of necessity. The first, in judging something beautiful, a liking necessarily arises. The latter necessity refers to the necessity of the demand. Kant shows the former with introducing the “exemplary necessity,” and satisfies the latter with introducing the idea of “common sense.” The explanation of the former is as follows. Kant defines the beautiful in the fourth moment as “what without a concept is cognized as the object of a *necessary* liking” (CJ, 240), although it is a special necessity which is merely subjective. Here, what Kant means by necessity is that the liking in a pure aesthetic experience necessarily arises when encountering a beautiful object, however this necessity is neither as in the theoretical nor in the practical judgment but only an ‘exemplary’ necessity (CJ, 237). The condition of the necessity is given by the previous moments. When we reflect on the form of the beautiful object, imagination and understanding go into free play; hence, an aesthetic pleasure arises. These are the conditions for a necessary liking. Nonetheless, it can only be an “exemplary” necessity because each aesthetic judgment is singular. It is necessary because we regard our singular judgment “as an example of a universal rule that we are unable to state” (CJ, 237). That is, we regard each pure aesthetic judgment as an example of a universal

rule which we cannot determine. Although we cannot determine the universal rule we applied, we regard our judgment itself as a universal rule. Thus, we think that we have a right to demand an agreement. Accordingly, we have come to the second necessity: the necessity of universal communicability.

Kant maintains that a judgment of taste must have a principle to be pure (CJ, 238). This principle is the idea of common sense, and common sense is the effect of the free play (CJ, 238), so it is not an outer sense but a necessary presupposition that we make. It must also be subjective because it is based on a feeling. This principle refers to the idea that *we presuppose* that we all have common sense, i.e., we have the same ground to share a feeling. Recall that by the free play, we have shown that we have a *right* to demand universal shareability. The subjective principle of common sense adds to this demand a conditional necessity. That is, whenever we make a judgment of taste, we necessarily demand everyone else to agree with our judgment (CJ, 237-8). In this regard, the fourth moment makes our demand a normative demand.

So far, we have seen the formal characteristics of aesthetic judgments. From our analysis on the distinguishing features of the aesthetic judgments, we can say the following; as an alternative to universality which depends on the concepts, as in the theoretical or practical realms, we have found a peculiar type of universality which is merely subjective, or perhaps we can call this universality as intersubjective. It is both subjective and universal in that it is shareable. Moreover, the power of judgment is *free* and not restricted with the rules of other mental powers in the aesthetic experience, and this is what Kant refers to by “free

play.” In addition, aesthetic judgments are based on a feeling of pleasure which is derived from the free play. We all human beings have the same capacities, so we may share the aesthetic pleasure as well. This is how we can interpret the subjective universal character of aesthetic judgments.

While discussing the meaning of the analogy between the beautiful and the morally good, we will see that the analogy neither depends on the ordinary similarity between the two nor is made in an entirely arbitrary fashion. Instead, there is a formal ground upon which we can build an analogy. Formal characteristics of beauty examined so far shall be helpful in analyzing the analogy. Yet, the formal features of the judgments of the sublime are pretty similar to those of taste. Thus, even though Kant makes the analogy proper only between the beautiful and the morally good, I shall ask: can the sublime also be a symbol of the morally good? To discuss this, now we shall examine the sublime, and its similarities and differences between the beautiful.

3.2. The Sublime Experience of Nature

What does the notion of the sublime evoke? What is the first image you think when you hear the word sublime? I suppose that all of you have such moments in your life when you feel tense and agitated at the same time, for instance, upon hearing the sound of a thunderbolt or watching the street from your window when a heavy storm drags leaves and trashes around. Even the tsunami videos you watch can be counted as an instance of such moments. Those are the moments when nature, as it were, reminds us that it is so powerful and magnificent. In the face of

this reminder, you probably feel a bit of fear and admiration at the same time. Those moments are when we experience the sublime in nature. We can talk about the sublime in art, as well. Some paintings especially from the romantic era or a gigantic cathedral standing in front of you can be given as examples to the sublime. For example, “The Monk by the Sea” from Caspar David Friedrich is one of the most awe-inspiring paintings I have ever seen. In this painting, we see a man (most probably the monk) standing on the shore and looking at the sea, in the horrible mist, all alone. The dark clouds evoke the threat of a storm, and the man seems too small in this frame.⁷⁰ Our consideration here will be mainly on the sublime in nature rather than in art, and Kant also seems to do so.⁷¹ Yet the painting of Caspar Friedrich still makes sense for our aim since even in the painting we describe the sublime through nature (and through the relation of a person to nature). That the man in the painting seems too small tells us something important for the sublime since Kant defines the sublime as “*absolutely large*” and that “*what is large beyond all comparison*” (CJ, 248). So, he qualifies the sublime with magnitude. He also states that “only a state of mind can truly be sublime” (CJ, 245; see also CJ, 264). That is, no object whatsoever, whether it is in art or in

⁷⁰ “The Monk by the Sea” (1808-10), Caspar David Friedrich. You can also see some other paintings of him related to this issue of the sublime, such as: “The Wanderer above the Sea of Fog” (1817-18); “The Chasseur in the Forest” (1814); and “Chalk Cliffs on Rügen” (1818).

⁷¹ The sublime in nature is superior to that of art because “the sublime in art is always confined to the conditions that [art] must meet to be in harmony with nature” (CJ, 245). Kant elsewhere states that “if the aesthetic in question to be pure ... and if we are to give an example of it that is fully appropriate for the critique of *aesthetic* judgment, then we must point to the sublime not in products of art ... where both the form and the magnitude are determined by a human purpose, nor in natural things *whose very concept carries with it a determinate purpose* (e.g., animals with a known determination in nature), but rather in crude nature (and even in it only insofar as it carries with it no charm, nor any emotion aroused by actual danger), that is, merely insofar as crude nature contains magnitude” (CJ, 252-53).

nature, can be sublime: “true sublimity must be sought only in the mind of the judging person, not in the natural object the judging of which prompts [the] mental attunement” (CJ, 256). Given these two characterizations, we can say that it is by way of an “*absolutely large*” and “*what is large beyond comparison*” thing in nature, a *sublime state of mind* can evoke in us. If we go back to the painting again, the man standing in that atmosphere provides a better understanding for this issue. Since even in looking at the painting, the sublimity we attribute to the painting seems to be strengthened with the presence of a person in the frame. Any person in such an atmosphere as in the painting –any person standing at the monk’s point, would probably have a state of mind which they can call that state of mind as sublime. Having familiarized with the sublime experience, now we shall look at how Kant expounds it in the third *Critique*.

3.2.1. A Comparison between the Beautiful and the Sublime

Kant begins the “Analytic of the Sublime” with a comparison between the beautiful and the sublime. There are significantly many common aspects between the two. Both the judgments of the beautiful and of the sublime are,

made by the aesthetic reflective power of judgment, [the analytic] must allow us to present the liking for the sublime, just as that for the beautiful, as follows: in terms of *quantity*, as universally valid; in terms of *quality*, as devoid of interest; in terms of *relation*, [as a] subjective purposiveness; and in terms of *modality*, as a necessary subjective purposiveness (CJ, 247).

So, the logical functions that are applied to the judgments of the beautiful are also applied to the sublime, of course, with some additions and changes. In order to explicate the judgments about

the sublime; we should look at the similarities and the differences between the beautiful and the sublime in more detail. They are as follows:

- i. Both are the judgments of reflection, and our liking in neither of them depends on determinate concepts.
- ii. Both are singular judgments, yet they claim to have universal validity (this claim refers to the shareability of a feeling rather than a cognition of the object).
- iii. The beautiful is related to the form of the object; our liking in the beautiful is toward the object's form. In the cases of the sublime, what we like can be a formless object (e.g., a storm, a thunderbolt, misty weather, etc.).
- iv. Our liking differs in kind: In the beautiful, our liking is about quality while in the sublime it is about quantity (remember the descriptions of the sublime such as "*absolutely large*" or "*large beyond all comparison*").⁷²
- v. The liking for the beautiful "carries with it directly a feeling of life's being furthered," while the pleasure in the sublime arises only indirectly: "it is produced by the feeling of a momentary inhibition of the vital forces followed immediately by an outpouring of them that is all the stronger" (CJ, 245).

So, it seems that the pleasure in the experiences of beauty reveals a *feeling of life* while the sublime state of mind produces a

⁷² Kant makes a distinction between the *mathematically* and *dynamically* sublime. The sublime is what is "*absolutely large*," and "*large beyond comparison*." The mathematical sublime is large in *extension* or *size* while the dynamical sublime is large in *power* or *force*. A huge cathedral or the Mountain Everest can be thought of as examples of the *mathematical* while a heavy storm for the *dynamical* (CJ, 248-66).

withdrawal from this kind of a feeling. We feel pleasure in experiencing the natural beauty because we feel a harmony. That is the reason why beauty in nature reveals a *feeling of life*. This is also the meaning of the free play of the cognitive powers that we analyzed under the second moment of the beautiful. The product of the free play is pleasure because we feel a harmony between ourselves and the beautiful object. The sublime state of mind, on the other hand, pulls us back from this kind of a harmonious feeling. Experiencing the sublime, then, creates a *seriousness*, rather than a harmonious free play of the powers. This seriousness is due to the fact that “the liking for the sublime contains not so much a positive pleasure as rather admiration and respect, and so should be called a *negative* pleasure” (CJ, 245, emphasis mine). The sublime should be considered with a mixture of feelings. Kant repeatedly relates the feeling of the sublime with displeasure, agitation, even with fear since “the mind is not just attracted by the object but is alternately always repelled as well” (CJ, 245; see also CJ, 247, 258, 260). So, the sublime experiences are accompanied by a bit of discomfort.

- vi. We saw that the beautiful carries with it a purposiveness in its form, and the beautiful object “seems as it were predetermined for our power of judgment” (CJ, 245). This means that it is subjectively purposive for our power of judgment. What about the sublime? The sublime “incommensurate[s] with our power of exhibition, and as it were violent to our imagination, and yet we judge it all the more sublime for that” (CJ, 245). So, unlike the beautiful, the sublime is *contrapurposive* for our power of judgment. This means that the sublime is not in cooperation with our

cognitive powers, especially with the imagination, as in the beautiful.⁷³

This *contrapurposiveness* is what creates sublimity. However, when comparing the sublime with the beautiful above, we said that it also carries with it a subjective purposiveness as the beautiful. It indeed does. Yet the purposiveness proper here is based within ourselves, not outside ourselves. Now, let us make this clearer. The principle of purposiveness works very well in experiencing beauty so that we can see nature *as if* it has a purpose for us, so natural beauty is capable of making us regard nature as a whole. Through this principle, we “present nature as a system in terms of laws whose principle we do not find anywhere in our understanding” (CJ, 246). So, what we reflect on and what we see purposive in experiencing the natural beauties is *nature*; i.e., the object of our experience. The sublime, on the other hand, harms this kind of a presentation of nature. It is a chaotic frame we are facing off. This is a more indirect way to like something. The experiences of the sublime begin with a dislike and

⁷³ In the judgment of beauty, the imagination is the co-worker of the understanding, so arises the harmonious free play and pleasure. In the experience of sublimity, however, the imagination cooperates with reason. It is because, in the experiences of the sublime, imagination fails to provide an adequate exhibition. It tries to apprehend an object that we call the “sublime,” and fails in exhibiting its object because the object of the sublime experience is either so big (e.g., a vast ocean that we cannot grasp at once) or chaotic and formless (e.g., a heavy storm) that imagination cannot exhibit its object in its entirety. Reason, at this point, demands from the imagination to exhibit the object as an absolute totality. Yet it fails to exhibit it on the face of the object’s magnitude since imagination can apprehend only in comparison and cannot provide the exhibition of the idea of absolute totality that reason demands. And reason “makes us unavoidably think of the infinite (in common reason’s judgment) *as given in its entirety* (in its totality)” (CJ, 254). Accordingly, the inadequacy of imagination to the ideas of reason arouses “in us of the feeling that we have within us a supersensible power” (CJ, 250). To sum up, the inadequacy of imagination in apprehending its object leads reason to evoke in us the idea of infinity. That is why imagination is not in attunement with understanding but with reason.

displeasure because it presents itself as *contrapurposive* for the power of judgment. So, “with the sublime, the liking arises *in spite* of the appearance of the object, not because of it.”⁷⁴

3.2.2. A Comparison between Nature and Us: We are the Sublime!

By considering what has been said in the above comparison, now we can explicate and clarify some points related to the sublime. The last matter of the comparison refers to a different kind of a subjective purposiveness and a different kind of a harmony from the ones in the beautiful. These differences are the key to place the judgments of the sublime in the critique of aesthetic judgment, also to discuss in the next chapter the position of the sublime in its relation with morality.

When we encounter a huge thing, whether in spatial extension or power, we feel overwhelmed. Therefore, we characterize the sublime with discomfort, seriousness and *contrapurposiveness*. Consider a horrible scene with heavy storms, trees are falling over, mist is obstructing the sight. In such a moment, Kant claims, “the mind is induced to abandon sensibility and occupy itself with ideas containing a *higher* purposiveness” (CJ, 246, emphasis mine). That is, since it gets harder to see a purposiveness outside us; i.e., in nature, sublimity directs us to find a basis for purposiveness in *ourselves* (CJ, 253-4, 256, 258, 259, 260). Accordingly, it still secures the condition of subjective purposiveness of pure aesthetic judgments, but in a different manner than the beautiful does. Here, we see an indirect way of

⁷⁴ Allison, *Kant's Theory of Taste.*, p. 311.

purposiveness, and it is in *us* where we find purposiveness. This can be the reason why Kant calls this purposiveness a *higher* purposiveness. What “higher” indicates here is that it is a purposiveness in ourselves rather than outside us. It is *higher* in the sense that it is *our* purposiveness. “*Sublime is what even to be able to think proves that the mind has a power surpassing any standard of sense*” (CJ, 250, emphasis in original). By way of directing it into ourselves, our reflection to the sublime in nature makes us aware that we are rational beings. So, it is a reminder of our rationality. Through this awareness, we feel *respect*⁷⁵ for ourselves. Kant states that the experience of the sublime can either create the feeling of respect or admiration (CJ, 245). The reason for this association is that the liking in the sublime is a *negative* pleasure as in the feelings of respect and admiration (CJ, 245). He defines respect as “[t]he feeling that it is beyond our ability to attain to an idea *that is a law for us*” (CJ, 257), and likens the feeling of admiration to the feeling of respect by pointing out that while respect is felt toward *persons*, admiration is toward *things*.⁷⁶ Respect is felt when one encounters something that is over and above everything else. That is, when one encounters something that is impossible to fully attain. Remember also that Kant says that only the mental state can be said to be truly sublime, not an object in nature:

Hence sublimity is contained not in any thing of nature, but only in our mind, insofar as we can become conscious of our superiority to nature within us, and thereby also to nature

⁷⁵ “Respect” in the Kantian philosophy, especially in his practical philosophy, is a crucial notion. It is not an arbitrary feeling. It refers to the *feeling of respect for the moral law*. Thus, Kant calls respect as the “*moral feeling*.” He further maintains that respect is felt towards persons (CPrR, 76), so we feel respect for ourselves since we hold the moral law.

⁷⁶ CPrR, 76.

outside us (as far as it influences us). Whatever arouses this feeling in us, and this includes the *might* of nature that challenges our forces, is then (although improperly) called sublime. And it is only by presupposing this idea within us, and by referring to it, that we can arrive at the idea of the sublimity of that being who arouses deep respect in us, not just by [its] might as demonstrated in nature, but even more by the ability, with which we have been endowed, to judge nature without fear and to think of our vocation as being sublimely above nature (CJ, 264).

By this, Kant refers to the fact that upon the sublime experiences, we return to ourselves and aware of our vocation. So, the sublimity here designates our mental state of the sublime which we found within ourselves. Here two things seem to be possible candidates for being respected in the experiences of the sublime: either nature or ourselves. Nature has magnitude, but we seem to be placed over and above any natural power; that is, we realize our peculiarity as human beings over nature –we realize our freedom and freewill (our moral vocation). So, since “[r]espect always applies only to persons, never to things,” what we feel toward ourselves after contemplating the sublime in nature is *respect*.⁷⁷ What we feel respect is ourselves (as moral agents). What we feel toward nature is then *admiration*.⁷⁸ This is what he meant by *subreption* (CJ, 257). Over an admiration toward nature, we think of ourselves as being sublimely over nature and hence, we feel *respect* for our moral vocation. To put in a nutshell, the sublime experience brings about a comparison between nature and ourselves. Think of it like a *competition*; either nature *wins* or us. Hence, we compare ourselves with nature and are conscious of our superiority over nature. We have a peculiarity –we are *rational beings*, hence also *free*. So, it is not only fear but also strength that we feel within us leads to the sublime state of mind

⁷⁷ CPrR, 76.

⁷⁸ CPrR, 76.

(CJ, 262). The strength and superiority come with the awareness that we are independent of nature; independent in the sense that we are *free, rational, and moral* beings. This awareness, surprisingly, makes us hold on to our rational and moral side, so in an indirect way, a kind of harmony and attunement arise (*that we find in ourselves*).

Specifying the position of the sublime against the beautiful brings us finally to the end of this chapter. Let us now examine what it means to symbolize the morally good with the beautiful.

CHAPTER IV

ON BEAUTY AS THE SYMBOL OF MORALITY

4.1. The Explanation of the Analogy

In daily life, we use analogies to make sense of the things poorly understood by making use of the things we have a better understanding of. Analogical thinking in some cases may produce satisfactory outcomes. It might help us gain a better understanding of or good insight into the things we are not familiar with. Analogies, however, never justify the validity of the judgment about the thing it symbolizes. A poet, for example, never declares knowledge about the world when she uses an analogy to express her ideas. Analogical thinking can provide only a way of explaining or understanding some thoughts. Even in our daily lives, be it consciously or not, we draw analogies about the things we do not know in sensibility. We tend to associate passion with red, innocence with white, freedom with birds, or diligence with bees, and so on. Whether you form the same associations is not important. The point here is that we naturally associate some ideas with certain sensible things. This tendency reveals an aspect of our way of thinking: we naturally symbolize the things that are not sensibly given to us with the things given in sensibility. Kant's usage of the term analogy is not so different from ours.

Toward the end of the "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment," Kant impresses the readers with a striking analogy which is indeed puzzling, and hardly to comprehend: "The beautiful is the symbol

of the morally good” (CJ, 353). Upon declaring this analogy, Kant points out the naturality of making the analogy and our expectation from the others to do the same as a duty (CJ, 353). To wit, drawing the analogy is quite natural and simply expected, which might be the very reason why he did not spell out the details of the analogy further.

This analogy between the beautiful and the morally good is ambiguous in several aspects. Firstly, Kant does not say much about it, and leaves the reader alone in finding its meaning. The passages where Kant talks about the relation between aesthetics and morality are inadequate to provide hints. This is mainly because analogies, while providing some insights into things in a symbolic relation, do not yield clear and distinct knowledge about the relation itself. Secondly, besides its meaning, the analogy has further implications. Among the passages about the relation between morality and aesthetics, it is troubling to differentiate the passages about what makes the analogy possible from the passages about its further implications. In order to eliminate potential ambiguities and widespread misunderstandings about it, we shall scrutinize two opposed views in literature. Some argue that the analogy is drawn to justify the validity of judgments of taste.⁷⁹ On this view, the deduction⁸⁰ part of the “Critique of Aesthetic Judgment” is completed only with the analogy between the beautiful and the morally good. For others, on the other hand, the analogy becomes possible only after the validity of judgments

⁷⁹ 'Crawford, Donald. *Kant's Aesthetic Theory*.' and 'Elliott, R. K. "The Unity of Kant's Critique of Aesthetic Judgment."' Both Crawford's and Elliott's positions regarding this issue shall be discussed in this chapter.

⁸⁰ "Deduction" here means to "give a justification." These terms shall be used interchangeably throughout this study.

of taste is justified.⁸¹ In this study, I will favor the latter interpretation and argue that the justification in question is successfully given in the four moments of beauty with the completion of the deduction part of the *Critique*.

If the analogy does not give a justification for judgments of taste, then what is its role? To answer the question, I shall investigate the possible relations between aesthetics and morality in the scope of the third *Critique*. In doing so, we will see that the apparent relations between beauty and the morality might also involve the sublime in certain respects. Consequently, whether also the sublime can symbolize the morally good or not will be another question to answer. This inquiry aims to illuminate the position of aesthetic experiences in morality. The relation between them is reciprocal. In this reciprocal relation, I will argue, beauties in *nature* have a superiority over the beauties in art. This is how the sublime experiences in *nature* might play a significant role in this relation. The concern of this chapter is, then, to find both the meaning and the function of this analogy in the third *Critique*. While pursuing this aim, as secondary, we will also be seeking to answer the question of whether the possible relations between aesthetics and morality are capable of unifying the critical system.

⁸¹ 'Allison, *Kant's Theory of Taste*.' and 'Allison, "Beauty and Duty in Kant's Critique of Judgement."' For the further discussion of the deduction of taste, see, 'Rogerson, Kenneth. "The Meaning of Universal Validity in Kant's Aesthetics." *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 40, no.3 (1982): 301-308.' and 'Crowther, Paul. *The Kantian Sublime, From Morality to Art*.' or, 'Guyer, Paul. *Kant and the Claims of Taste*.' or, 'Maitland, Jeffrey. "Two Senses of Necessity in Kant's Aesthetic Theory."'

4.1.1. The Beautiful as the Symbol

In explicating what he thinks an analogy is, in *Prolegomena*, Kant states that an analogy “does not signify, as the word is usually taken, an imperfect similarity between two things, but rather a perfect similarity between two relations in wholly dissimilar things.”⁸² Here he gives a hint about the analogy between the beautiful and the morally good because they are dissimilar things in that the former is sensibly given, and the latter is a rational idea. Yet, we will find a perfect similarity between two relations in these dissimilar things. Due to our way of reflecting on them, considering the beautiful as the symbol of the morally good will be possible. The morally good is supersensible and there is no sensible intuition which directly corresponds to it.⁸³ The morally good is basically to act in accordance with what is morally good. In the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant defines the morally good as an idea “that, in terms of the object, is [suprasensible], so that nothing corresponding to it can be found in any sensible intuition; hence the power of judgment under laws of pure practical reason seems to be subject to special difficulties which are due to [the fact] that a law of freedom is to be applied to actions as events that occur in the world of sense and thus, to this extent, belong to nature.”⁸⁴ The difficulty that the power of judgment has here is to apply this supersensible idea to the actions that occur in the sensible world. For, there is not an exact correspondent of the morally good in sensibility. Considering the morally good analogically with something sensible might provide a better

⁸² *Prolegomena*, 4:357-8.

⁸³ *CPrR*, 69.

⁸⁴ *CPrR*, 68.

outlook to it. Hence, the analogy between the beautiful and the morally good is of a significance in this respect. Now, let us clarify the analogy proper. How Kant refers to analogy in the third *Critique* is as follows.

The “symbol” is defined in comparison to “schemata.” Both are called *hypotyposis*. “Schemata contain direct, symbols indirect, exhibitions⁸⁵ of the concept” (CJ, 352). Both function to “[make] a concept sensible” (CJ, 351). So, they both seem to link a concept to an intuition. The difference, however, is that while schematic exhibitions are demonstrative, symbolic ones use analogy in [indirectly] presenting their objects. Rational concepts, i.e., ideas, are not able to be exhibited at the sensory level. Kant gives some other examples for symbolic *hypotyposes* such as substance or God which do not have any direct intuition. No intuition is adequate for their demonstration. Only by analogy, they are symbolized. Kant exemplifies the symbolization with analogies such as the one between the relation of monarchy ruled by constitutional laws and a living body, or between monarchy ruled by an individual’s absolute will and a machine (e.g., hand-mill). Although these two (such as a monarchy ruled by constitutional laws and a living body) has no similarities in themselves, Kant’s ground to make this analogy is the similarity of the rules by which we reflect how the two work (CJ, 352). In other words, while a reflection on a living body brings about the idea of purposive unity, a reflection on a hand-mill evokes the idea of mechanism.

⁸⁵ “Exhibition” here indicates “*Darstellung*.” The translations of “*Vorstellung*” and “*Darstellung*” may lead to confusions regarding the literature. For “*Vorstellung*” can be translated as both “presentation” and “representation,” and “*Darstellung*” can be translated as both “representation” and “exhibition.” In this study, both presentation and representation are being used interchangeably to address “*Vorstellung*,” and “exhibition” is used only for “*Darstellung*.”

In this manner, they associate the monarchy ruled by constitutional laws and a despotic monarchy, respectively. These examples are not demonstrative and contain indirect exhibitions. Only when indirectly exhibited, a rational idea finds a correspondent in intuition. Now, we shall look at how the beautiful symbolizes the morally good.

As all above points have demonstrated, we can deduce two conclusions. First, since the morally good is a rational idea, no intuition corresponds to it in any given sensibility. So, the morally good cannot be schematized but can only be symbolized. Second, it is by analogy that the beautiful is the symbol of morality, and it is only a one-direction analogy.⁸⁶ That is, the analogy is based on the beautiful being the symbol of the morally good, and it cannot be introduced in the other way around. If we take the hand-mill and monarchy example, it would be clearer. Monarchy is a rational idea and does not have an adequate intuition in sensibility. So, it cannot symbolize something that has intuition in sensibility. What can be a symbol should itself have sensible intuition. Hence, the beautiful can symbolize the morally good, but not the other way around. Notice that the ground to make an analogy between the monarchy ruled by an individual and a hand-mill is not their similarities but the rules by which we reflect on them. In the same manner, the ground to make the analogy between the morally good and the beautiful is not the similarity of their content. Rather, the structural similarities between the judgments of morality and taste make the analogy possible. These structural similarities indicate how we reflect on them. As also

⁸⁶ The symbolization is asymmetrical. For why this is the case, you can see, "Cohen, Ted. "Why Beauty is a Symbol of Morality."

Guyer puts it: “In the case of such a symbolic representation,⁸⁷ what agrees with the concept is not the actual content of the intuition but ‘merely the form of reflection’ on it.”⁸⁸ In other words, our consideration on two things makes us draw an analogy between them. In this sense, one shall not take the analogy between the beautiful and the morally good as indicating that any beautiful thing is the exact correspondent of the morally good. Rather, certain corollaries between our way of reflection on the beautiful and the morally good make the analogy possible. Next, I shall ask if it is legitimate to make such an analogy depending on similarities of how we reflect on them.

4.1.2. A Comparison between Judgments of Morality and Taste: The Right to Make Such an Analogy

The next task, then, should be to find the structural similarities which make the analogy possible. Kant sets forth four features of the judgments of the beautiful, and expounds its similarities and dissimilarities with the morally good:

- i. liking in the beautiful is immediate, and the morally good pleases immediately, too, (the former pleases in intuition while the latter does in the concept);
- ii. liking in both of them is without an interest (in morality we do have an interest but it does not precede our judgments);
- iii. experiencing the beautiful frees our cognitive powers, and it brings a harmony (between imagination and

⁸⁷ “*Darstellung*,” or exhibition.

⁸⁸ Guyer, Paul. “Feeling and Freedom.” *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 48, no.2 (1990): 137-146., p. 142.

- understanding), while in a moral judgment freedom of the will bring a harmony according to universal laws of reason;
- iv. they are both universal in a similar way, (and judgment of the beautiful is not knowable by a universal concept while in the case of morality the universal is applicable) (*CJ*, 354).

Accordingly, it might be said that their operations are similar. Notice each feature listed above corresponds to one of the four moments of the judgments of taste. This seems to provide us with the required structural similarities which are supposed to render the analogy possible. Thus, the analogy between the beautiful and the morally good makes sense, only if these formal characteristics of the judgments of beauty are taken into consideration. This parallelism, which is suggested by the correspondence between the four moments of taste and the four features listed above, justifies a ground to build upon such an analogy.

This parallelism also shows that our way of reflection in both taste and morality is analogous. For when we reflect on the beautiful, we like it immediately. The same also holds for our reflection on the morally good. The liking in both of them is formerly disinterested. They both bring about a kind of harmony. They strike us as universal. What I mean here is that these formal structures do not only indicate the formal features of the judgments of taste and morality, but also indicates a parallelism between our way of reflecting on them –or our way of judging the beautiful and the morally good.

Elsewhere, while explicating the *sensus communis* (common sense) in the “Deduction” part, Kant reveals how our reflection on

such judgments works. He states that we “put ourselves in the position of everyone else” (CJ, 294), and we reflect on our “own judgment from a *universal standpoint*” (CJ, 295). How we do this is as follows:

we compare our judgment ... with the merely possible judgments of others, and [thus] put ourselves in the position of everyone else, merely by abstracting from the limitations that [may] happen to attach to our own judging; and this in turn we accomplish by leaving out as much as possible whatever is matter, i.e., sensation, in the presentational state, and by paying attention solely to the formal features of our presentation or of our presentational state (CJ, 294).

So, what we do is basically to abstract the personal features of our judging so that we can assume that anyone else would have the same judgment about the particular beautiful object. This is possible through reflecting on the formal features of our judgment. In this regard, the way we judge something as beautiful is similar to the way we act in accord with the moral law. The moral law tells us to act in such a way so that our action could be a universal law.⁸⁹ There is both a structural similarity, and also a similarity about how we approach to judge something to be beautiful and how we act morally.

Having seen how Kant provides a ground to make the analogy, next, we can ask its role in the third *Critique*. Some argue that its role is to give a justification for judgments of taste. In the next section, I shall try to rebut this position by showing that the justification of judgments of taste is already given elsewhere, and keep looking for the role of the analogy.

⁸⁹ CPrR, 30.

4.2. On the Justification of the Judgments of Taste

To explain whether and how the validity of judgments of taste is justified is of capital importance for this study. For if we can justify their validity, then we have a basis to draw an analogy between the beautiful and the morally good on. If we cannot show that judgments of taste are both universal and necessary, then its role of symbolizing the morally good would become suspicious. This is mainly because if an aesthetic judgment were a merely personal judgment, then it would rest on sensation. How could a judgment of the agreeable symbolize the morally good? How does a liking which is merely based on a sensuous desire symbolize the morally good? Our reflection on liking the chocolate is far different from our reflection on the morally good. Additionally, if we show also that the validity of the judgments of taste is justified by something other than the analogy proper, then we will have to find the role of the analogy elsewhere. These concerns bring us firstly to the discussion whether judgments of taste are justified only by the analogy between the beautiful and the morally good; viz., aesthetics' relation with morality. After examining the defenders of this view, we will analyze some reactions to this approach. The main reason why there are two distinct approaches to the analogy is this. Kant names the sections between 30-38 as the "Deduction of Pure Aesthetic Judgments," and presents a justification there; however, in section 60, under the heading of "Dialectic," he says:

However, taste is basically an ability to judge the [way in which] moral ideas are made sensible ([it judges this] by means of a certain analogy in our reflection about [these ideas and their renderings in sensibility]); the pleasure that taste declares valid for mankind as such and not just for each person's private feeling must indeed derive from this [link] and from the resulting

increase in our receptivity for the feeling that arises from moral ideas (and is called moral feeling) (CJ, 256).

Because of such passages, commentators are sharply divided in two. The first camp which shall be scrutinized next mainly focuses on the later parts of the “Critique of Aesthetic Judgment.” So, their arguments are mainly grounded on the claim that the deduction of pure aesthetic judgments is secured with their relation to morality because Kant seems to suggest in the above passage that the pleasure in taste can only be valid if it is related to moral feeling. Let us look at how this camp considers the analogy within the justification problem.

4.2.1. Does the Analogy Function Merely to Give a Justification for Taste?

Donald Crawford, in his *Kant's Aesthetic Theory*, argues that the deduction of judgments of taste can be considered as complete only if the analogy between the beautiful and the morally good is made. He argues that deduction of the judgments of taste is set forth within five stages and contends that the analogy introduced in §59 is the last step of the transcendental deduction. The first four claims are presented by the four moments of beauty while the last one rests on the claim that the beautiful is the symbol of the morally good. His argument can be reconstructed as follows:

- I. A universally communicable mental state is the ground of the pleasure in the beautiful.⁹⁰

⁹⁰ Crawford, *Kant's Aesthetic Theory*., p. 73.

- II. This mental state is the harmony of the powers and the ground of it is the same as that which makes cognition in general possible.⁹¹
- III. The harmony of the powers is based on the formal purposiveness of the object.
- IV. The subjective principle which is the ground of judgments of taste is that which is the ground of any judgment. Reflective act of judging appears not only in judgments of taste but in all kinds of judgments, so there is a common element in all judgments. Common sense can be assumed as a necessary condition for any experience.
- V. The beautiful is the symbol of the morally good. The indeterminate concept of the common sense is the same with that of the subjective purposiveness of the object. And this indeterminate concept rests on the idea that nature is designed for our cognition. This idea is tantamount to the ends in the moral realm, and therefore the beautiful is the symbol of this idea.

According to Crawford, the first four stages show that aesthetic judgments can have a universality. However, to show that they are also necessary, aesthetic judgments must have a connection with moral judgments. Put it another way, the first four stages successfully show that the pleasure arising in pure aesthetic judgments are shareable, so they are in this sense universal. Yet, their necessity can only be shown by its connection with morality. What this connection does is to give a justification for the universal agreement of judgments of the beautiful. He bases his argument by stating that the “beautiful in nature and in art, and

⁹¹ Crawford, *Kant's Aesthetic Theory.*, pp. 75-7.

the sublime as well, symbolizes the basis of morality by leading us to the contemplation of the supersensible.”⁹² And since Kant presents this analogy as a duty to make, Crawford asserts that this claim involves the “categorical assertion,” and states further that “this is the conclusion of the transcendental deduction of judgments of taste.”⁹³ The reason for this inference is his consideration that the normativity of judgments of taste, i.e., their demand for universal shareability from others as an “ought,” is provided by the moral duty. He argues that in order for someone to be aware of duty regarding taste, they must beforehand be aware of moral duty that the Categorical Imperative commands. For, the experience of beauty happens to be in the phenomenal (or empirical) world, and the underlying principle of judgments of taste is a subjective principle. And such a subjective principle by itself of the empirical experiences does not reveal an awareness for our duty. He argues that to be aware of our duty in taste requires “being able to recognize or determine what is one’s duty” in the moral sense.⁹⁴ So, since the necessity of judgments of taste consists in their demand from others to agree with one’s judgment as an “ought,” Crawford suggests that this “ought” is provided only by aesthetic judgments’ kinship to morality. He basically argues that if judgments of taste are not grounded in morality, then their necessity cannot be shown. Hence, deduction of them cannot be completed.

I agree with Crawford that pure aesthetic experiences make us contemplate on the supersensible and that Kant presents the

⁹² Crawford, p. 157.

⁹³ Crawford, p. 156.

⁹⁴ Crawford, pp. 156-9.

analogy as a duty. In contrast to Crawford, however, in my reading of Kant's justification of judgments of taste, this duty is not necessarily a moral duty. By holding that it is not a moral duty, I also reject that to be aware of duty in taste does not necessitate being in a relation to the Categorical Imperative. He argues for this mainly because taste is grounded in a subjective feeling, and we are not capable of realizing our duty in taste empirically. However, we do need to justify their validity *even though* aesthetic judgments are essentially directed at the *empirical* and *subjective*. Crawford apparently undermines these features of judgments of taste in his interpretation for their justification.

Elliott's understanding is similar to Crawford's in certain respects. Elliott's aim is to find a unity in the "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment." He asserts that to unify the "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment," firstly the relation of aesthetics with morality must be clarified, and secondly natural beauties as well must be shown to have aesthetic ideas as artistic beauties do. For the present purpose, I will only deal with the former issue. Like Crawford, Elliott also argues that the deduction of judgments of taste can be completed only by connecting it with morality. He agrees with Crawford also in holding that the "Deduction" part of the *Critique* which is expected to end within §38 does not provide a proper justification for the judgments of taste. He shares the same confusion with Crawford that the "ought" in judgments of taste is a "moral ought." Nevertheless, the most striking aspect of Elliott's argument is that he takes the principle of purposiveness⁹⁵ as the crux of the account of justification. He, first, regards this principle

⁹⁵ Elliott prefers using "principle of finality" rather than "principle of purposiveness."

as the indeterminate idea of the reason, and second, argues that the privacy of judgments of taste is secured by the relation of this principle with metaphysical ideas.⁹⁶ This is also to say that aesthetic judgment's own principle (subjective purposiveness) is not sufficient to justify its normativity, and it requires something else (metaphysical ideas; e.g., God) for a proper justification. His argument is as follows. Notice firstly that in all judgments of beauty, the subjective principle of purposiveness is to be applied. Elliott expects from this principle to provide a normativity of judgments of taste, but this is a failure. For an experience of beauty *by itself* does not lead to an awareness for our moral purposes. If it cannot provide this, how do we cultivate taste as a duty, and expect from others to agree with our judgment? He argues that if the principle of purposiveness is connected to the idea of God, then we can justify the normativity of judgments of taste. Since "[r]eason demands that we achieve holiness of will (moral perfection) and that we enjoy happiness in proportion to merit" (that is the *highest good*), and since "if all our necessary purposes are to be achieved, it must be possible for Nature to exhibit a total beauty."⁹⁷ Yet, such an exhibition is not possible within the phenomenal world. That is how the presupposition of God arises. Elliott maintains that with the presupposition of God, we can conceive our final purpose. The "[purposiveness of nature] ... refers indirectly to God, and that every experience of beauty gives a hint of the existence of God and therefore of the possibility of the [*highest good*], and the authenticity of the categorical imperative."⁹⁸ According to Elliott, these hints provide the subjects

⁹⁶ Elliott, R. K. "The Unity of Kant's Critique of Aesthetic Judgment." *The British Journal of Aesthetics* 8, no.3 (1968): 244-259., p. 255.

⁹⁷ Elliott, p. 256.

⁹⁸ Elliott, pp. 256-7.

with an awareness of their moral purposes. For him, these hints can be found ultimately in the basis of judgments of beauty. That is, he discusses that taste is secured from its skeptical aspect, i.e., its private character, by being grounded in religion and morality. Taste, by its relation to religion, gives a hint about our moral vocation, and hence makes us regard our final purpose in harmony with nature and freedom. According to him, these conditions are prior to any judgment of beauty.⁹⁹ And “if it were not for the moral analogy, there could be no [judgment] of taste.”¹⁰⁰ As is shown, Elliott bases all judgments of beauty in morality, and even in religion. By doing so, he aims to show that the “ought” in judgments of taste is a “moral ought.” I disagree with Elliott that justification of aesthetic judgments relies on the assumption on God. Firstly, if it were depended on a rational idea like the assumption of God, then this would damage the autonomy of such judgments. Autonomy was one of the decisive criteria for being pure aesthetic judgment. Such judgments should not depend on anything external. Even if some metaphysical ideas may relate to the judgments of beauty, they must not be prior to our judgments. On the contrary, the purposiveness of a beautiful thing may lead to the metaphysical assumptions about beauty. Hence, the priority that Elliott holds about purposiveness and the assumption of God must be the other way around.

Elliott might have overlooked the points where the justification of judgments of beauty begins, and where the relation of aesthetics with morality can really be found. This is mainly because Kant occasionally makes ambiguous claims about the relation between

⁹⁹ Elliott, p. 259.

¹⁰⁰ Elliott, p. 259.

aesthetics and morality. These ambiguities lead to confusion about which one is a prerequisite to the other. If morality is a prerequisite to taste, then there arise some problems. If we ground taste in morality, then the transcendental investigation that Kant pursues in aesthetics would be a failure. Aesthetic judgment must be valid by its own a priori principle. That is, if aesthetic judgment relies on the principles of morality, then it cannot be universal and necessary by itself. This entails that aesthetic judgment lacks an a priori principle. However, to show that aesthetic judgment is both universal and necessary is a puzzle due to its subjective nature. That is why Crawford and Elliott liken aesthetic judgment to morality. They want to be sure of the validity of aesthetic judgment. However, both Crawford and Elliott ignore Kant's assertion that the "Deduction" ends within §38. The reason, I believe, is that their aim is to synthesize everything Kant says about the relations between aesthetics and morality. By doing so, they aim to remove all ambiguities about the deduction of taste. Yet, their solution brings about inconsistencies regarding the third *Critique*. They contradict what Kant presents in the third *Critique*. Kant argues that aesthetic judgment has its own a priori principle and is autonomous. Crawford and Elliott want to ensure the validity of aesthetic judgment by ignoring Kant's aim in his aesthetic theory.

To recap, despite their insightful suggestions, both Crawford's and Elliott's arguments are flawed for at least three reasons. First, the way Kant presents the justification for the validity of the judgments of taste shows that the deduction has already finished before he begins drawing the analogy. The structure of the book can also give us a clue about where we can find the deduction of the judgments of taste. Second, Kant nowhere explicitly asserts

that the deduction of the judgments of taste is dependent on their relation to morality. Even though there are some implications of it, none is explicitly claimed. And lastly, in my reading, for an analogy between the beautiful and the morally good to be possible, it must first be shown that the judgments of taste are universal and necessary. Thus, the role of this analogy is not to give a justification for the judgments of taste. We shall grope about its role elsewhere in the third *Critique*. For it is unambiguously clear that it does not function as to give a justification for judgments of taste. In this study, I will follow Allison's approach that aesthetic judgments do not need morality to justify their validity. So, I will not regard the analogy as a ground to justify the validity of judgments of taste. Now, let us look at how Allison approaches the role of the analogy regarding the issue of justification.

Allison argues that judgments of taste do not need a relation to morality to justify their validity.¹⁰¹ However, this shall not be taken to reject the relation between them. What he means is that the justification for the validity of judgments of taste is not built upon their relation to morality. The judgments of taste are autonomous, and their autonomous character makes the connection between the two possible. Additionally, he claims that the transition from aesthetics to morality is not thanks to the beautiful's similarity to the morally good. Rather, it is made possible by the fact that "we reflect on the beautiful in a way that is analogous to the way in which we reflect on the morally good."¹⁰² Put differently, there is a structural similarity between

¹⁰¹ Allison, *Kant's Theory of Taste*. p. 222.

¹⁰² Allison, Henry. "Beauty and Duty in Kant's Critique of Judgement." *Kantian Review* 1 (1997): 53-81., p. 71.

these two types of reflection. Hence, analogy between them is possible. In fact, the autonomous aspect of judgments of beauty is presupposed in making an analogy between aesthetics and morality. He insists that the beautiful could not have served “as a symbol of morality unless the legitimacy of its demands is assumed.”¹⁰³

For Allison, Kant accomplishes the relatively modest aim to ground that we have a right to demand everyone’s agreement on aesthetic judgments.¹⁰⁴ He argues that the deduction consists of two parts. The first is to “set forth ... the subjective principle of taste as an a priori principle of the faculty of judgment,” and the second is to provide “this principle with a transcendental grounding.”¹⁰⁵ As to the first step, he argues that as opposed to understanding and reason, judgment legislates its principle to itself.¹⁰⁶ In other words, judgment applies the subjective principle of purposiveness to itself. “Thus, in claiming that x is beautiful, I am claiming that my representation of x is purposive for judgment, ... so the judgment is about the suitability for judgment of a given object or its representation.”¹⁰⁷ We also know that, as to universality, aesthetic judgments “must ... concern the sphere of

¹⁰³ Allison, “Beauty and Duty in Kant’s Critique of Judgement.” p. 71.

¹⁰⁴ Allison, *Kant’s Theory of Taste*. p. 160.

¹⁰⁵ Allison, *Kant’s Theory of Taste*. p. 160, 168, 172.

¹⁰⁶ The claim that the judgment applies its principle to itself (which is called as *heautonomy*) together with the application of subjective purposiveness brings about a harmony. This process is due to the operations of our cognitive powers. Allison argues that it is quite reasonable to expect that other persons’ cognitive powers too uniformly operate.

¹⁰⁷ Allison, *Kant’s Theory of Taste*., p. 173.

judging subjects to whom the feeling is applicable.”¹⁰⁸ So, we are not pursuing a justification for an objective universality but an intersubjective universality. Everyone has the same cognitive capabilities, and hence has the same conditions for a cognition. Accordingly, the application of the a priori principle of judgment may well lead to the purposiveness for everyone. That is how he connects the a priori principle of judgment with the demand of agreement. His formula is basically: “If x is subjectively purposive for me, then it must be subjectively purposive for everyone.”¹⁰⁹ That is, when I judge a daisy to be beautiful, it looks purposive to me (because I apply the subjective principle of purposiveness). Due to our common cognitive capabilities, I have a right to assume that this daisy is subjectively purposive for everyone. So, the basis of the demand is not to expect that every other person will have the same experience that I had. Rather, the claim is that what looks purposive to me may well look purposive for any other. Notice that Allison does not argue that any other subject necessarily has the same experience with me when I judge something to be beautiful. This is impossible for several reasons. First of all, to be completely sure that my aesthetic judgment is pure is impossible. Second, the basis of an aesthetic judgment is a feeling, and a proper aesthetic judgment is to be free of any concept. Third, it has a subjective basis, and the necessity we are looking for is not of the object and the subject. In arguing these, Allison does not reject the normativity of a pure aesthetic

¹⁰⁸ Allison, *Kant's Theory of Taste*, p. 77. (Remember also that the universality is examined under the function of quantity. Quantity designates the scope of a judgment. And Allison warns us that the scope of an aesthetic judgment “cannot be understood according to the model of the logical quantity of a cognitive judgment about objects (‘All S are P).” Rather, the scope of a pure aesthetic judgment is an intersubjective universality).

¹⁰⁹ Allison, *Kant's Theory of Taste*, p. 176.

judgment. Yet, he does not ground this normativity in morality, as Crawford and Elliott did.

According to Allison, the “Deduction of Pure Aesthetic Judgments” is where judgments of taste’s validity is justified, and there is no need for further justification by relating them to morality. In fact, the connection with morality becomes possible only because the judgments of taste are justified beforehand.¹¹⁰ According to my reading of the third *Critique*, the deduction of judgments of taste is provided even before the section of “Deduction,” within the Four Moments of Beauty. The “Deduction” provides an organized outlook to the discussion of the four moments. In the Four Moments of Beauty, Kant abstracts all empirical content of judgments of beauty and examines their formal characteristics. By doing this, he sets forth the criteria for aesthetic judgments to be merely pure. Presenting these conditions also provides the ground for judgments of taste to be shared universally and necessarily. This also grounds the autonomy of judgments of taste, which Allison seeks for the analogy.

Kemp also argues that the normativity of a pure aesthetic judgment is not that of morality. For him, the deduction of judgments of taste in literature is considered to be completed with morality just because the judgments of taste have a kind of normativity.¹¹¹ They are indeed normative in the sense that whenever we judge something to be beautiful, we expect that everyone else *ought to* agree with our judgment. Crawford’s and

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.* p. 222.

¹¹¹ Kemp, R. S. “Revisiting Kant’s Deduction of Taste: The Easy Solution to the Particularity Problem.” *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 34, no.2 (2017): 175-194., p. 176.

Elliott's arguments stated above are in line with this view.¹¹² However, as Kemp points out, this normativity does not necessarily imply a normativity as that of morality. This expectation could be a sort of epistemological demand as in the cognitive judgments. For instance, while applying the concept of dog, "the demand for universal assent is grounded ... in a common capacity to represent objects ... and social agreement regarding the concept that refers to a given representation."¹¹³ So, in the cognitive judgments as well, we expect from others to agree with our judgments. Basically, when we see a dog and judge it as a dog, we expect from others to declare that it is a dog. For we all have the same cognitive capacities. Accordingly, the demand in judgments of taste does not necessarily imply the normativity of morality. At this point, we can argue against Kemp by pointing out that a judgment of taste is eventually not a cognitive judgment. After all, as opposed to aesthetic judgments, an agreement on a cognitive judgment is provided by a concept. Anyone who applies the concept of dog to the given particular intuition, will judge that animal as a dog. There is a concept at hand to apply for the given intuition. So, an expectation for someone to have the same judgment about that particular dog seems more legitimate. It is true that in the cases of taste, the ground of our expectation is more like in the judgments of morality. In moral cases, agents expect that "others ought to judge

¹¹² Rogerson also considers the judgments of taste as a species of imperatives. He articulates his argument simply by stating that a judgment about beauty demands universality in a normative way; with an "ought to." He also presents a fruitful discussion whether the idea of common sense is a constitutive principle or a regulative idea. He discusses this depending on possible implications occurring between taste and morality. 'Rogerson, Kenneth. "The Meaning of Universal Validity in Kant's Aesthetics." *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 40, no.3 (1982): 301-308.'

¹¹³ Kemp, p. 176.

[...] precisely as they judge themselves,” although they “can never *really* know whether their own actions are performed from duty.”¹¹⁴ In judging something to be beautiful, we are in a similar position. While we expect from others to agree with our judgment, we are not capable of knowing whether we have really a pure aesthetic judgment. There is no agenda to check and to be completely sure about it. However, “people are capable of pure aesthetic judgment” just because we all have the same cognitive capabilities. Kemp relates our cognitive powers to the universal shareability of judgments of taste through disinterestedness. He maintains that we cannot be sure whether our judgment is interested or not, yet we “have the ability to engage disinterestedly with objects in virtue of cognitive abilities that [we] share with others.”¹¹⁵

Remember that the demand of universality is related to the awareness of disinterested attitude we have toward the object. This awareness is the condition to have such a demand. Now, Kemp argues that we can never know whether our attitude is really disinterested. However, even if we can never be sure of it, we are capable of having such an attitude. After all, the ground of aesthetic pleasure is our cognitive powers. Accordingly, we can liken judgments of taste to both theoretical and moral judgments in different aspects. On the one hand, the normativity in question does not have to be a moral normativity. On the other hand, the demand for universality is akin to the moral judgments in the sense that in neither of them we can be sure if our judgment is pure. However, in either case, we all have the same cognitive capabilities, and hence we can share the same pleasure. So, we

¹¹⁴ Kemp, p. 189.

¹¹⁵ Kemp, p. 189.

have a right to demand universality. The fact that judgments of taste have a kinship both to the theoretical and moral judgments does not imply that their validity is dependent on theoretical or moral judgments. Judgments of taste are expected to have similarities with theoretical and moral judgments, at least in the Kantian frame. For they are all possible due to our cognitive powers. And this brings us to the point in which the justification for judgments of taste really lies.

4.2.2. The Justification for Judgments of Taste

As regards to a valid justification, the main work is already done in the previous chapters. In this section, I will put them together, and demonstrate how they together constitute a justification. Remember that in the Kantian critical project, to justify a judgment is to show its necessity and universality. Accordingly, we need to show how judgments of taste are necessary and universal. In my interpretation, I try to keep in mind that this is a transcendental investigation. What we are after is not whether the judging subject can be sure that the experience she is having is pure. Nor an empirical investigation which aims at asking people if they also agree with my singular aesthetic judgment. We are looking for the conditions of the possibility of a pure judgment of taste. In his explication of “Four Moments,” Kant eliminates all the empirical content and tries to reach to the formal conditions of such judgments. The difficulty in this investigation is that such judgments depend on a subjective principle. However, if we take our cognitive powers as the ground, we might reach a justification because we all share the same cognitive powers.

There are three things that we must take notice of. The universality regarding the judgments of taste is not an objective universality, and the necessity we are searching for is not a necessity of an objectively universal judgment but that of a singular one. So, the validity we pursue here is not as in the cases of cognitive judgments. Validity here is to be justified if the demand for such a universality is justified, or if the conditions for shareability between subjects is justified. Due to the subjective nature of judgments of taste, what we are looking for is not a guarantee to share the pleasure universally but that we have a universal ground to share it. The last point to make is that in order to accept the normativity of taste and ground this normativity, autonomy of taste must be secured. Autonomy of aesthetic judgments is similar to that of morality in one respect. “Kant regards [moral agents] as a kind of sovereign legislator not bound to any external authority, with the power to give law through their willing.”¹¹⁶ This refers to the self-legislation of the will, and self-authority. Analogously, a pure judgment of taste must not also be bound to any external authority. As Kant puts it, a judgment of taste “must rest, as it were, on an autonomy of the subject who is making a judgment about the feeling of pleasure, ... it must rest on [the subject’s] own taste” (CJ, 281). He further says that “[t]aste lays claim merely to autonomy; but to make other people’s judgments the basis determining one’s own would be heteronomy” (CJ, 282). Practically, we are free in the sense that we can determine our actions autonomously. Nevertheless, autonomy in taste does not refer to any kind of determination, nor implies a legislative operation. When judging something to be

¹¹⁶ Reath, Andrews. *Agency and Autonomy in Kant’s Moral Theory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2006., p. 4.

beautiful, we must judge *freely* so that our judgment does not depend on any other person's taste.

Returning to the justification of judgments of taste, in my interpretation, Kant successfully gives the justification firstly by showing that the pleasure in a pure aesthetic judgment is universally shareable and we have a cognitive basis to do this, and secondly by showing that we have a right to demand universality in judgments of taste. The former indicates the universality, and the second does the necessity. He introduces the former by presenting the similarities between the judgments of taste and cognitive judgments. He firstly grounds the pure aesthetic pleasure in the free play, and then, shows that the powers of imagination and understanding that bring about the free play are common in all human beings. These cognitive powers are also being used in all cognitive judgments. Remember again that the universality in aesthetic judgments does not attach to the judgment itself but to the expectation of assent from everyone. To do this, Kant firstly states that judgments of beauty have a subjective universality. It must be subjective because aesthetic judgments are grounded in a feeling. Yet, the universality comes from the expectation that this feeling is shareable. When I declare something to be beautiful, I see myself as a "universal voice," and this is the ground of this expectation. It is not an expectation that others will agree upon but they *ought to* agree with my judgment. So, it is in this sense a normative expectation (though not a moral normativity). And this is what provides the necessity of aesthetic judgments. We think we speak for everyone when we judge something to be beautiful. Introducing the "common sense" provides a justification to the claim that any judging subject who experiences the same object with me would agree with my

judgment. That we all have “common sense” justifies the normative demand of universal shareability. Hence, my interpretation of Kant’s justification differs from those who rely on the relation of judgments of taste and morality such as Crawford’s and Elliott’s. While I agree with Crawford that pure aesthetics experiences lead us to think about the supersensible, in my interpretation the universal demand in pure aesthetic experiences does not rely on a moral duty as Crawford argues. Contra Elliott, in my interpretation, justification does not depend on metaphysical ideas such the assumption of God. Rather, such an assumption may occur only after judging something as beautiful, hence it is not prior to the judgment of the beautiful. Further, I agree with Allison and Kemp that the normativity in taste is not formerly a moral normativity.

To sum, the justification of the judgments of taste is twofold. The first gives a justification for the shareability of the pleasure. The crucial point here is that this justification presents the “shareability” of the feeling. It does not mean that an aesthetic pleasure is to be shared, but only entails that we have the same cognitive powers, and aesthetic pleasure arises due to these powers, so that we can share the feeling of pleasure as well. The second step of the justification is to provide a ground to “expect” or “demand” the universally shareability of the feeling of pleasure. This ground is provided with the idea of a common sense discussed in the third chapter. Accordingly, the first step of the justification provides a transcendental ground to show that judgments of taste are universally valid due to our cognitive powers. And the latter indicates their intersubjectivity which is justified with the idea of common sense. The idea of the common sense also secures the necessity of judgments of taste because it

justifies in what right we expect from others to agree with our judgment. The judgments of taste are subjective, so the validity of them is secured with their demand of universal shareability.

Having hopefully shown that judgments of taste are justified, we have also shown that they do not need morality to be valid. We have also shown that due to their autonomous character, an analogy between the beautiful and morally good is possible. Accordingly, the ground for such an analogy is also secured. Within these, now we shall turn back to the analogy to examine it in detail, and analyze further relations between aesthetics and morality.

4.3. Further Implications of the Analogy: Possible Relations between Aesthetics and Morality

4.3.1. Is the Analogy Possible only with the Beautiful?

We have shown that the beautiful can symbolize the morally good. But we can ask: can something other than the beautiful symbolize the morally good? Why not any other aesthetic judgment but only the beautiful? Or we can ask whether there is a difference between the artistic and natural beauty when it comes to symbolizing the morally good. My position holds that for something to symbolize the morally good, it must be universally shareable. Among aesthetic experiences, experiences of beauty secure this condition while those of the agreeable cannot.

The main aim in what follows is to find the true correspondents for the symbol of the morally good. To do so, I shall use the comparison above between the beautiful and the morally good.

For these comparisons reveal our way of reflecting in both. We shall now investigate the sublime, and both the artistic and natural beauty, respectively.

As already pointed out, the sublime experiences are also somehow related to our moral conduct. They evoke the idea of freedom and remind us that we are rational moral agents (*CJ*, 246, 257, 264). Thus, the sublime too is in a way in relation with morality. Apart from this relation, there are also some other reasons why an analogy between the sublime and the morally good might be possible. Judgments of the sublime too are universally shareable, and the structure of the judgments about the sublime is similar to that of the judgments of beauty. First, they are based on a disinterested pleasure. Second, they exhibit a subjective universal character as judgments of beauty. Third, they are also judged aesthetically, and free from the concepts. Fourth, they require a reflective operation of judgment (*CJ*, 247). Do all these characteristics not provide an adequate ground to make an analogy between the sublime and the morally good? Apparently, besides these similarities, they have also fundamental discrepancies from the experience of beauty. The sublime experiences fail to symbolize the morally good in some respects. Or, even if they eventually satisfy the conditions, they only do so indirectly. The first reason is that the liking in the sublime does not occur directly, so we do not have an immediate pleasure in it. Second, a harmony arises only indirectly.¹¹⁷ These two aspects of the sublime result from the fact that the principle of subjective purposiveness is hardly applicable to the sublime experiences.

¹¹⁷ In the experience of beauty, a harmony arises between the imagination and understanding. In morality, the freedom of the will brings about a harmony between the will itself and the universal laws of reason (*CJ*, 354).

There arises formerly a *contrapurposiveness* and a displeasure (CJ, 245). Only after the judging agent is aware of their moral vocation, *contrapurposiveness* can lead to a purposiveness (CJ, 246, 253-4, 256, 258-260). Hence, the sublime experiences are a matter of contemplation upon our position against nature. Pleasure and purposiveness arise only indirectly. What formerly the sublime brings forth is a displeasing state, and it is indeed a bit frightening and chaotic rather than a harmonious look to nature.

Thus, overall examination on the sublime shows that the sublime experience does not provide us with a harmonious feeling as the beautiful does. Rather, we regard nature as *contrapurposive* for us. It is due to the nature of the sublime. It is either so big that we cannot grasp it entirely or so frightening that we feel overwhelmed. In any case, the sublime presents a chaotic frame in which we cannot feel in harmony with it. For the sublime to be able to symbolize the morally good, our reflection on both must be similar. How would we reflect on the sublime? More precisely, how would we reflect on a chaotic and frightening frame which also produces “the feeling of a momentary inhibition of the vital forces[?]” (CJ, 245). Recall that to be morally good is our final purpose. Something that creates *contrapurposiveness* cannot symbolize our final purpose. For these reasons, our reflection on the sublime differs from that of the morally good. Hence, I do prefer excluding the sublime from the analogical relation to morality.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁸ Excluding the sublime from the analogy does not indicate that the sublime has no interaction with morality. On the contrary, the sublime experience reveals the moral feeling as the beautiful does and has an undeniable effect on the awareness of our moral conduct. However, since this study's primary concern is the analogy between the beautiful and the morally good, the main focus shall be on the relation between the beautiful and morality.

Now, let us differentiate beauty in art from that of nature in order to examine them in their relation to the analogy. Regarding the symbolization of the morally good, exhibition of aesthetic ideas through artworks gives both an advantage and a disadvantage to artistic beauties. Kant states that an artist “presupposes a determinate concept of the product, namely, its purpose” (CJ, 317). Thus, an artwork is created within a purpose which is expressed through “aesthetic ideas” (CJ, 317). This entails that an artwork has a purpose. (CJ, 317-8, 320). However, the subjective principle of judgment is better applied when there is no determinate purpose whatsoever. Gadamer maintains that “[t]he advantage of natural beauty over artistic beauty is only ... natural beauty’s inability to express something specific.”¹¹⁹ Yet, we can also state that aesthetic ideas might lead to a moral feeling. Allison claims that aesthetic ideas play a crucial role in making an analogy between the beautiful and the morally good.¹²⁰ He basically argues that the aesthetic ideas “constitute a significant subset of possible symbols of rational ideas, namely, those that express or exhibit the corresponding idea independently of a determinate concept”¹²¹ Remember that the role of the analogy is to present a symbol for a rational idea, and Allison argues that a rational idea can be exhibited through artworks.¹²² I agree with Allison in the sense that rational ideas are exhibited through artworks, and it is true that a moral idea can be expressed in a painting. The theme of a painting can be “justice” or “innocence”

¹¹⁹ Gadamer, *Truth and Method.*, p. 47.

¹²⁰ Allison, *Kant’s Theory of Taste.*, pp. 256-263.

¹²¹ Allison, *Kant’s Theory of Taste.*, p. 258.

¹²² With this claim, he does not exclude natural beauties from the analogy, rather he maintains that natural beauties as well include aesthetic ideas. See, “Allison, *Kant’s Theory of Taste.*, pp. 256-261.”

so that we contemplate on these ideas. And this contemplation might lead to moral feeling. However, we can further ask, what is the case when an artwork lacks a moral idea? An artwork does not have to carry a moral idea within it. Due to this, does an artistic beauty fail to symbolize the morally good? I offer to give rational ideas in artworks a secondary role for the analogy, and consider our way of reflection in beauties in general. Even if an artwork lacks a moral idea, our reflection on both artistic and natural beauties is of the same kind. The outcome of the reflection on beauty - the feeling of pleasure - is common in both artistic and natural beauties. That is, all beauty (whether artistic or natural) has the same judgmental structure, and we reflect on all beauty in a similar manner. We feel the same kind of pleasure. We like it immediately, and our liking must be disinterested. We reflect on the form of the object. We expect from others to agree with our judgment. In this regard, artistic beauty and natural beauty hold the same features. Hence, an artwork as well can symbolize the morally good.

4.3.2. Beauty in Nature and its Superiority Regarding the Relation between Aesthetics and Morality

Having decided which aesthetic judgments can be thought analogically with moral judgments, now we shall examine the possible relations between aesthetics and morality. In order to find a way to follow, I ask: What is the point of making such an analogy? Although it is indeed a bit difficult to get a direct answer to this question, Kant indubitably was a clever man who did not disregard to leave some hints throughout his book that we can make use of to relate the analogy to his aesthetic theory. Moreover, how the analogy functions in the Kantian philosophy is

not the only question. We can also ask how it functions in our experience of beauty, or morality. In the Kantian philosophy, the analogy might have a role in unifying the critical system by providing a transition from the sensible to the supersensible realm. Nevertheless, there are also other effects of aesthetic experiences on us concerning morality. Kant states that we make this analogy *naturally*, so other than its role to unify the critical system, regarding the beautiful and the morally good as analogical is a way of thinking that we naturally perform. So, we must examine the role of this analogy in a twofold way. Firstly, by regarding it as the condition for bridging the gap between the two realms, and secondly considering it as our natural disposition toward the relation between aesthetics and morality. While explicating this twofold role of the analogy, we will see that the latter role is in fact the reason why we ascribe the first role to the analogy. That is, regarding the analogy as our natural attitude will also reveal both the possible relations between aesthetics and morality, and the reasons why these possible relations between the two might unify the critical system. Hence, we shall first examine our natural disposition toward the analogy, or the relation between aesthetics and morality.

My aim in this section is to show that judging nature aesthetically has superiority over judging a beautiful artwork in their effects on morality because an artistic beauty carries a purpose within. Among such experiences, we have both natural beauties and the sublime. The superiority of aesthetic experiences *in nature* lies in its more intimate relation with our moral vocation. Or, we can say that we expect from nature to give us a hint about the relation between us and nature. Yet, we cannot know the purpose of nature but know only of ourselves. So, we pursue a harmony

between us and nature on a subjective ground, which is hopefully given by our aesthetic experience in nature. Our examination shall hopefully show that aesthetic experience in nature has a significance for the awareness of our moral conduct. Between them, I give superiority to the natural beauties for three reasons. The first one is that the subjective principle of judgment is applied better to a natural beauty because the sublime experience leads to a *contrapurposiveness*. Second, Kant presents another feature of natural beauties: the *intellectual interest* that arises solely in a natural beauty. For intellectual interest in a natural beauty leads to moral feeling. Third, a “feeling of life” is expected to arise within an aesthetic pleasure, but the sublime inhibits vital forces. Regarding these three reasons, I take the natural beauty as the ground for analyzing the relation between aesthetics and morality. Kant says that “make yourself more perfect than mere nature created you.”¹²³ We may find a tempting way to be more perfect, i.e., in appreciating the natural beauty.

Appreciation of beauty has a significance for our moral life. They make us aware of our moral vocation. This awareness is not only due to our aesthetic experiences. First, morality is autonomous, and it cannot depend on anything else. Second, it would be quite implausible to claim that someone who has taste also must be a morally good person. There is not –and cannot be – a causal or an intrinsic relationship between aesthetics and morality in the Kantian philosophy. Yet, aesthetic experience might lead to the moral feeling, or give a motivation for us to pursue our moral duties. Now, we shall clarify some points. The moral feeling, in the Kantian terminology, indicates the respect for the moral law. So,

¹²³ Kant, *Metaphysics of Morals*. Taken from ‘Guyer’s “Feeling and Freedom.”’ p. 139.’

let us first recall the account of *respect*. The feeling of respect is presented as a necessity since moral law is cognized a priori.¹²⁴ Kant maintains that “[r]espect always applies only to persons, never to things.”¹²⁵ Accordingly, we can deduce that we feel respect for ourselves and for the other persons due to the moral law that we hold. Elsewhere, he regards respect as an incentive to act in accordance with the moral law. He says, “respect for the moral law must be regarded as ... a subjective basis of activity, i.e., as an *incentive* to comply with the law, and as a basis for maxims of a way of life conforming to it.”¹²⁶ Accordingly, if the moral feeling, i.e., respect, is to be regarded as an incentive to the morally good, then the possible effects of aesthetics on morality might also be regarded as a motive to act according to what is morally good. Regarding this, the experience of beauty and the sublime in nature have a peculiarity in this relation. The former does so because Kant maintains that the intellectual interest in natural beauty leads to the moral feeling. The latter does so since by the experience of the sublime, we have an awareness of our moral vocation, and we feel respect for ourselves. Yet, since the sublime provides the awareness of our moral vocation only indirectly as opposed to natural beauty, we shall first scrutinize the intellectual interest that arises in natural beauty.

¹²⁴ *CPrR*, 73.

¹²⁵ *CPrR*, 76.

¹²⁶ *CPrR*, 79. He elsewhere further says that “[m]oral feeling is the capacity to be affected by a moral judgment. My understanding may judge that an action is morally good, but it need not follow that I shall do that action which I judge morally good: from understanding to performance is still a far cry. If this judgment were to move me to do the deed, it would be moral feeling.” (Kant, Immanuel. *Lectures on Ethic*. Translated by Louis Infield. New York, 1963, 44-45).

Kant makes a connection between the morally good and experiencing beauty by differentiating the experience of beauty which contain a direct intellectual interest in natural beauty from other aesthetic experiences (CJ, 298-9). That is, we can have an intellectual interest only in natural beauty. Let us look at how we can have an intellectual interest. As a starting step, we need to accept that we have an interest in such experiences to be able to see their universal communicability as a duty. There are two options for such an interest. It could be either an empirical interest, or an intellectual interest that can be facilitated by the moral law.¹²⁷ As Kant shows, it cannot be empirical interest because “[i]t is an interest, Kant suggests, that arises within society as a *means* to advance communication, which is thus not only indirect but also mediate and consequently empirical.”¹²⁸ Thus, it must be an intellectual interest. Such an interest must be devoid of sensible charm although it is directed to the existence of the object. So, such an intellectual interest likes a natural beauty not only due to its form, but also “its existence;” however, in this liking, “no charm of sense is involved, ... [or] ... any purpose whatever” (CJ, 299). Imagine someone who has an intellectual interest in natural beauty is put in an environment where the objects around her have the form of natural beauty, but they are artificial. Consider that those objects are perfect replicas of natural beauties, and she does not realize that they are artificial. She can reflect on the form of the trees, birds, flowers and so on, and may well judge them as beautiful. Unless she knows that all these are artificial, she has an intellectual interest. However,

¹²⁷ Allison, Henry. “Beauty and Duty in Kant’s Critique of Judgement.” p. 58.

¹²⁸ Gasche, Radolphe. “Linking Onto Disinterestedness, or the Moral Law in Kant’s Critique of Judgment.” *Between Ethics and Aesthetics: Crossing the Boundaries*. Edited by Dorota Glowacka and Stephen Boos. New York: State University of New York Press, 2002. (pp. 49-71), p. 63.

when we tell her that all these are artificial, not real, her interest either disappears or transforms into some other kinds of interests. Once she realizes that they are not natural, her approach toward those objects would transform into, for example, an interest in decorating her home. Those flowers, birds or trees are no more natural beauty to contemplate on. Rather, they now turn into mere decoration objects. This example shows that intellectual interest is not only in the form of the natural beauties, but also in their *existence*. The reason for such an interest toward nature is that we expect from nature to give a hint to us. Since we suppose that our cognition and nature are in harmony, we naturally have a direct interest in nature. So, we have an expectation from nature *as if* it can show us the ground of the harmony between us.

In judging nature aesthetically, with the subjective purposiveness, it seems only purposive. We regard nature, as it were, there is a purpose in it, although there is none anywhere outside us. So, we shall look inside, where we can see the final purpose of our existence (our moral vocation). With this reflection on ourselves, what seems as aesthetically purposive now becomes morally purposive. For Kant, this moral purposiveness arises for a lover of beauty only if she has “at least a mental attunement favorable to moral feeling” (CJ, 298-9). Since moral feeling indicates solely to the respect for the moral law, the lover of beauty must have contemplated about her moral vocation beforehand. However, this does not mean that morality is a prerequisite for an experience of natural beauty. Rather, a prior attunement to moral feeling may lead the judging subject to the morally purposive when she judges nature aesthetically. I do not take the relation between aesthetics as morality as one precedes the other. A moral attunement does

not necessarily lead to an urge to develop taste, nor vice versa. Yet, a person who has the moral feeling might be in search for a harmony between her and nature. This is pretty acceptable. A person, who is after such a harmony, naturally tends to regard nature as if it has a purpose. Purposiveness of nature, eventually, is an assumption that we make toward nature, when it is judged aesthetically. So, an attainment of harmonious look may well lead to the idea that nature is also morally purposive. "When we find the beautiful forms of nature beautiful, this discovery points beyond itself to the thought 'that nature has produced that beauty.'"¹²⁹ This is the reason why we expect from nature to give us hints. We regard it as if it can *speak* to us in some way or another. Hence, when we feel a harmony, we think that there might be something more in our experience than solely an aesthetic pleasure. We basically assume that our moral conduct may well be welcome in nature. Consequently, when we take nature as morally purposive, we regard it as an arena in which we can perform our moral actions. What we mean by harmony is, then, that we can assume a nature which is in accordance with our moral vocation.

This is the reason why natural beauties have a superiority over other kinds of aesthetic experiences. Remember also that the sublime state of mind as well leads to an awareness of our moral vocation, and gives rise to the feeling of respect. However, what creates sublimity is *contrapurposiveness*. Due to the *contrapurposiveness*, we feel displeasure instead of pleasure. The pleasure in the experiences of beauty reveals a *feeling of life* while the sublime state of mind produces a *withdrawal* from this kind of a feeling. We feel pleasure in experiencing the natural beauty

¹²⁹ Gadamer, *Truth and Method.*, p. 46.

because we feel a harmony. That is the reason why beauty in nature reveals a feeling of life. The sublime state of mind, on the other hand, pulls us back from this kind of harmonious feeling. Given these, the sublime experiences may strengthen our moral feeling only secondarily and indirectly. It is secondary because it leads to moral feeling not by exhibiting a harmony between nature and us. Rather, it pulls us back from the harmonious feeling so that we consider nature not in harmony with us but *as if it is hostile* to us. So, the moral feeling, in the case of the sublime can only come after our self-reflection, not from the moral purposiveness we attribute to the nature. The role of the sublime might be to give rise to a stronger awareness of our moral vocation, yet it remains only secondary in relating aesthetics to morality.

As we can see here, the intellectual interest is also connected to the principle of purposiveness. May it be directly or indirectly, applying purposiveness to nature leads to an awareness of our ultimate purpose, i.e., the morally good. This is the crux of the superiority of pure aesthetic experience in nature over those of art. We regard nature as if “it has something to say to us. As beautiful, nature finds a language that brings to us an intelligible idea of what mankind is to be.”¹³⁰ That is the reason why in regarding nature as morally purposive, we assume a harmony between nature and us. This is the fundamental relation we *naturally* make between aesthetics and morality.

What is revealed so far can also give us some hints regarding how aesthetic power of judgment is expected to unify and systematize

¹³⁰ Gadamer, *Truth and Method.*, p. 47.

the critical system. Now we shall briefly point out one possible way for the aesthetic power of judgment to do this.

4.3.3. The Subjective Principle of Purposiveness as the Unifying Principle

Although Kant occasionally mentions judgments of taste as the unifying judgment of the critical project, it remains vague and controversial exactly how they achieve this unification. This expectation from the aesthetic power of judgment lies in its subjective principle, namely, the principle of purposiveness. Theoretical reason that concerns empirical knowledge, and the practical reason that concerns our moral duties are of two different operations of reason. The following could be one way how judgments of taste might unify both. Theoretical knowledge is directed to only the appearances. The supersensible remains totally indeterminate in theoretical cognition. In contrast, practical reason imposes a determination on the supersensible. Yet, practically determining it is not a matter of knowledge but of action. So, while one leaves it undetermined, the other makes it determinate. However, the realm for both is the same realm while the rules or laws of theoretical and practical reason are completely different from each other. Moreover, as also pointed out earlier, they are not in a causal or intrinsic relationship. That is, they are not capable of affecting the other. How does the same reason lead to these two distinct positions? And how do both legislations of reason occur in the same realm while their rules are completely different from each other? There is a gap between them, which is supposed to be bridged by the judgment of taste. The distinctive feature of the aesthetic power of judgment is to bridge this gap by the subjective principle of purposiveness. When we judge a daisy

beautiful, what makes us judge it as purposive is this principle. It makes us consider the daisy as in harmony with us, so it looks *as if* it has a purpose *for us*. Still, we cannot determine which particular purpose it has. So, it has no determinate purpose according to the theoretical reason. There is no given intuition in sensibility to grasp its purpose. In this sense, the purpose of that daisy remains completely indeterminate. That is, the daisy has also a supersensible *substrate* which is completely unattainable by our cognitive powers. This is the meaning of being indeterminate. However, it can become *determinable* (but not determinate) when the subjective principle of purposiveness is applied. That is, we can assume as if we cognize its supersensible *substrate*. Thus, we take the supersensible as *determinable*. It is aesthetic judgment, “through its a priori principle of judging nature, ... provides nature’s supersensible substrate (within as well as outside us) with *determinability*” (CJ, 196). The principle of purposiveness makes us regard that daisy as if it has a purpose, so we have an impression that we get a *hint* from nature about its supersensible *substrate*.

Put another way, the things in nature that we only know are appearances. The experience of beauty adds *something more* to the objects in nature that we can know only as appearances. This “*something more*” is the assumption that we get a hint about the supersensible *substrate* of nature. Accordingly, we can say that in so far as we contemplate natural beauty, we are closer to *getting hints* from nature. This is the reason why I offered that the second role of the analogy might be to unify the critical system.¹³¹

¹³¹ By saying this, I do not claim that the unity of the critical system is secured solely by our contemplation of nature. Apparently, Kant grounds his claim to complete the critical project on the transcendental principle (of the purposiveness of judgment) and discusses this issue in more detail. Yet, my

Reflection on the relation between natural beauty and morality might strengthen the assumption we make about nature.

Judging aesthetically provides us a new outlook to nature: an outlook which we think as if there is a harmony between nature and us. Hence, we can also assume that our moral duties are also suitable to the nature that we theoretically know. This is the reason why Kant states that “it is through [the principle of purposiveness] we cognize the possibility of [achieving] the final purpose” (CJ, 196). Yet, recall that this is only an assumption that we make toward nature. When we judge nature aesthetically, we have a feeling that our freedom accords with sensibility, nevertheless, it is only an assumption. Accordingly, the principle of purposiveness in its aesthetic operation provides us to change our perspective to nature. This new perspective might be the one which brings about a “*feeling of life*,” or even a ground to *hope* for the attainability of the *highest good* eventually. We find a way to ground our *hope* for the attainability of the *highest good* because we can presuppose that the purpose of nature is in accord with ours. Thus, *we feel more alive*. It might be the reason why Schiller, as a proponent of Kant, has “transformed the transcendental idea of taste into a moral demand and formulated it as an imperative: Live aesthetically!”¹³²

concern in this study is not to discuss whether the critical project is unified. Rather, examining the role of the relation between aesthetics and morality indirectly brings us to the account of whether the “gap” is eventually bridged. Moreover, discussing whether the critical system is unified requires also an examination of the teleological judgment, which is apparently beyond the scope of this thesis.

¹³² Taken from “Gadamer, *Truth and Method*. p. 74.”

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Throughout this thesis, I searched for an answer to a question: what is the meaning and role of the analogy between the beautiful and the morally good in Kant's aesthetic theory? I tried to understand how beauty symbolizes the morally good. Kantian philosophy deals with the *judgments* of beauty and morality rather than analyzing the "beautiful" and the "morally good." Thus, I scrutinized aesthetic judgment in detail and looked for its similarities with morality. This examination directed me also to analyze the relation between aesthetics and morality. While seeking the possible links between them, I realized that aesthetic experience in nature has superiority over artistic beauty regarding aesthetics' relation to morality. Hence, I focused mainly on natural beauty.

Although the heaviness of the terminology might sometimes veil the meaning of the claim that experiencing nature aesthetically leads to moral feeling, the crux of the idea is simple. We *appreciate* nature. Feeling pleasure while walking in a forest is familiar to all of us. Nature, as it were, comprises a *rhythm* within itself; seasons come and pass in circularity, birds migrate regularly, trees consistently blossom and wilt, and the rise of the Sun and Moon follow each other every day. This apparent harmony may well lead us to contemplate nature. However, we fail to explain nature's purpose satisfactorily, for we cannot grasp nature entirely. Reflecting on nature aesthetically, on the other

hand, makes us *assume* that nature has a purpose. And this assumption we make about nature is the key to this thesis's claim. My claim is as follows.

The role of the analogy is twofold. The first one is strengthening our moral feeling and motivating us to pursue our moral vocation. The second one unifies the critical system by bridging the gap between the theoretical and practical realms. I take the latter as the outcome of the former, hence as secondary.

Regarding nature as purposive, we reflect on ourselves and be re-aware of our final purpose (to be moral agents). By drawing an analogy between the beautiful and the morally good, we also think of nature and ourselves analogically: "*nature, as it were, has a purpose of pursuing, and so do we.*" Nevertheless, we know our final purpose –i.e., to be morally good. This is the reason why reflecting on natural beauty gives rise to moral feeling. It indirectly reminds us that we are moral agents. Yet, we are also mortal agents who are subject to deterministic laws of nature. So, the curiosity about whether the *indeterminate* purpose of nature is *in harmony with* our purpose arises naturally. We want to be in harmony with nature to ensure the attainability of our final purpose. That is why we expect nature to give hints to us and have an *intellectual interest* in natural beauty. We take nature's beauty as a hint. Through the harmony we feel in appreciating natural beauty, we assume that nature's purpose conforms with our purpose: we regard nature as purposive *for us*. This *assumption* is what motivates us to pursue our moral vocation. What is stated so far expounds on the first role of the analogy: the effect of making this analogy on the judging subjects. I grounded this claim in Kant's assertion that we make this analogy *naturally*.

He points out our attitude toward the relation between beauty and morality. Hence, I examined what this attitude is, and the crux of this attitude brings us to the second role of the analogy: unifying the critical system.

It is *us* who assume that nature is in harmony with us through our aesthetic experience in nature by applying the "*subjective principle of purposiveness*." This principle is also expected to unify the critical system by bridging the gap between the theoretical and practical realms. As is hopefully shown throughout this study, this principle is applied best in judging nature as beautiful. Thus, I offered that this principle unifies the critical system because it changes our perspective on nature. Let me clarify the reasons. Recall that Kant regards the principle of purposiveness as the unifying principle. To show that it is a successfully applicable principle also entails that this principle successfully works. Hence, it can satisfy our expectation to unify the critical system. I proposed that natural beauty is where we can employ this principle better. By applying this principle to nature aesthetically, we *assume* that nature conforms to our final purpose. It is solely an assumption, and yet a necessary assumption. In the light of these, we can make a simple inference. The *hope* for completion of the critical system relies on an *assumption* we make. In other words, what unifies the critical system is *us* who *change their perspective on nature*. This is the reason why I argued that this role of the analogy is the outcome of the former. Accordingly, I first examined whether and how we change our perspective on nature, i.e., how we assume that nature is purposive for us. The answer I found was the experience of beauty. Yet, since considering natural beauty analogically with the morally good

strengthens our assumption that nature is purposive for us, the analogy indirectly plays a role in unifying the critical system.

Kant's novelty in aesthetics is not only his consideration of beauty with our cognitive structure but also presenting a new outlook on ourselves. First, grounding aesthetic experience subjectively provides us with a basis to examine beauty by analyzing the structure of our experience. Through this basis, we regard beauty neither as merely personal, arbitrary feeling nor as if it is a property of the object. Instead, we find a formal analysis to discuss beauty. Examining beauty as in the former threatens the philosophical significance of beauty. For, to find a ground to discuss a merely private liking is hardly applicable. Alternatively, we could regard beauty on a conceptual basis. Why, then, cannot we agree with the beauty of a tree like we all agree that it is green? Kant's transcendental investigation attempts to solve these difficulties, which I believe that he does so. Second, Kant's aesthetic theory offers us a new look regarding the role of beauty in our lives. A role, we might say, which gives rise to a feeling of life and helps us create a more meaningful life. Thus, Kant's aesthetic theory reveals not only an examination of the beautiful but also presents a suggestion to make the world a more livable place.

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APPENDICES

A. TURKISH SUMMARY / TRKE ZET

Kant'ın estetik teorisinde bir nesneyi gzel diye yargılamak, onun yalnızca hořa gitmesinden te ve fazla bir řeydir. "Gzel" zerine olan yargılar, kiřisel duygulara ve eęilimlere dayanan řahsi yargılar deęildir. Bir nesnenin gzel olduęunu ifade ederken duyduęumuz haz znel fakat kiřisel olmayan bir hazzdır. Yani gzel, řahsi zevklerimizin dıřında bir haz imknı sunar. Bu imkn, gzel yargılarının Kant felsefesine konu olmasını saęlayan řeydir. Dięer bir deyiřle, gzel deneyimindeki hazzın kiřisel bir haz olmadığı varsayımı, bu hazzın zneler-arası paylařılabirlięini sorgulamamıza n ayak olur. Ve bylece, gzel zerine transandantal bir arařtırma; yani, gzel deneyimindeki hazzın evrensel ve zorunlu olarak paylařılabirlięi zerine bir arařtırma mmkn hale gelir. O halde, *Yargı Yetisinin Eleřtiris'i*'nde (*Kritik der Urteilskraft*) estetik zerine yapılan transandantal arařtırmanın, estetik yargılar iin *a priori* bir zemin arayıřı olduęu sylenebilir. Buna ek olarak, Kant, estetik yargı yetisinin eleřtirel sistemi tamamladıęını iddia eder. Bir bařka deyiřle, estetik yargının Kant'ın sistematik felsefesini btnlęe ulařtırmak gibi bir rol vardır. Bu rol, en basit ifadeyle, teorik ve pratik felsefeyi birleřtirme roldr. Deterministik doęa ile zgrlęn, duyulur olanla duyulurstnn, *olan* ile *olması gereken*'in birleřmesinin umudu, estetik yargı yetisinde filizlenir. Bu duruma iliřkin olarak basite sylenilebilir ki; estetik yargılarla ahlak arasında bir eřit iliřki vardır. Peki, bu ne trden bir iliřkidir?

Bu alıřmadaki ama, Kant'ın *Yargı Yetisinin Eleřtirisi*'nde ne srdğ “Gzel, ahlaki iynin semboldr” iddiasının anlamını ve roln incelemektir. alıřma, *Yargı Yetisinin Eleřtirisi*'nin ilk blm olan “Estetik Yargının Eleřtirisi” ile sınırlandırılmıřtır. Temel olarak řu soruya cevap aradım: Kant'ın estetik teorisinde gzel ve ahlaki iyi arasındaki analoginin anlamı ve rol nedir? Kant felsefesi "gzel" ve "ahlaki iyi"yi analiz etmekten ziyade gzellik ve ahlak yargılarıyla ilgilenir. Bu nedenle estetik yargıyı detaylı bir řekilde inceledim ve ahlak ile benzerliklerini arařtırdım. Bu inceleme beni estetik ve ahlak arasındaki iliřkiyi analiz etmeye de ynlendirdi. Aralarındaki olası baėlantıları arařtırırken, estetiėin ahlakla iliřkisi konusunda doėal gzelliėin sanatsal gzelliėe gre stn olduėunu fark ettim. Bu nedenle, esas olarak doėal gzelliėe odaklandım. Bu alıřmadaki temel iddiam, doėal gzelliklerin doėayı adeta *doėa bizim iin amasal mıř gibi* grmemizi saėlaması fikri zerine kuruludur. Estetik yargı yetisinin temel ilkesi olan “znel amasallık ilkesi,” doėayı sanki doėa bizim iin amasal mıř gibi grmemizi saėlayan ilkedir. Bunun neticesinde, doėa ve kendimiz arasında bir uyum hissederiz. Gzel ve ahlaki iyiye analogik olarak dřnmek ise, bu varsayımı glendirecek bir etkidir. Bu nedenle, bu analoginin birincil rolnn bizi doėayla uyum iinde hissetmemizi saėlayarak ahlaki edimlerimizin devamlılıėı iin bir motivasyon kaynaėı olduėunu ileri srdm. Bu rol, bizi dolaylı olarak ikinci bir sonuca gtrr: eleřtirel sistemin birliėi. Eleřtirel felsefenin tamamlanması, duyulur alan ile duyulurst alanın arasındaki “bořluk”un kapanmasından geer. Bu “bořluk”u kapatacak řey, bizim duyulur olarak bildiėimiz doėaya bakıř aımızı deėiřtirmemizin bir sonucudur. řayet doėayı bizim iin amasal bir yermiř *gibi* grebilirsek, belirlenmiř mekanik doėa ve zgrlėmz arasında bir uyum hissederiz. Bylelikle, teorik

olarak bildiğimiz fenomenal dünyayı özgürlüğümüzü gerçekleştirebileceğimiz bir alan olarak görebilmenin kapısı aralanmış olur. Güzel ile ahlaki iyi arasındaki analogi kendi başına bu boşluğu kapatacak şey olmasa bile, ahlaki iyiyi güzel ile analogik olarak düşünmenin bu umudu dolaylı olarak destekleyebileceğini ileri sürdüm.

İkinci bölümdeki asıl amacım, Kant'ın eleştirel felsefesinde yürüttüğü yöntemin ne olduğuna dair bir fikir oluşturmak ve “Estetik Yargının Eleştirisi”nin amacını ve eleştirel sistem içindeki yerini ortaya koymaktır. Kant, *Saf Aklın Eleştirisi*'nin (*Kritik der reinen Vernunft*) başlarında, kendisinin felsefede yaptığı çarpıcı hamleyi, Kopernik'in astronomide yaptığı devrime benzetir. Kopernik'e kadar, göksel cisimlerin hareketi anlaşılmaya çalışılırken gözlemcinin konumu ve hareketi göz ardı ediliyordu. Nasıl ki Kopernik bu geleneksel fikri ters yüz ederek gözlemcinin konumunu da hesaba kattıysa, Kant da özne ve nesne arasındaki epistemolojik ilişkiye dair bu türde bir yeniliğe gitti. Kant bu hamleyle birlikte, nesnenin zihinden bağımsız olduğu fikrini bir kenara bırakıp, nesne – özne arasındaki ilişkide öznenin etkin bir rolde olduğu fikrini önerir. Bu doğrultuda, Kant, eleştirel felsefesini iki ayrı koldan yürütür: Doğa felsefesi *olan* ile, ahlak felsefesi ise *olması gereken* ile ilgilenir. Birincisi *Saf Aklın Eleştirisi*'nin konusudur ve burada nesnel bilginin imkanının koşulları araştırılmıştır. İkincisi *Pratik Aklın Eleştirisi*'nin konusudur ve ahlaki edimlerimizin imkanının koşulları burada incelenir. Burada önemli olan nokta, her iki *Eleştiri*'de de araştırmalar yargı tiplerinin incelenmesi üzerine kuruludur; sırasıyla, teorik ve pratik yargı. Teorik yargıda bulunurken, verili duyusal temsillere [ampirik ya da saf] kavramlarımızı uygulayarak nesnemizi belirleme yetisine sahibizdir. Bu yeti anlama yetisidir.

Pratik yargılarda ise, belirlediğimiz şey özgür irademizdir. Ahlak yasasına uygun şekilde davranarak irademize şekil verir ve ahlaki edimlerimizi de işte böyle gerçekleştiririz. Bu bize şunu gösterir: deterministik bir dünyada aynı zamanda ahlaki edimlerde bulunan özgür failerizdir. Burada önemli olan nokta, teorik aklın belirlediği dünya ile pratik edimlerimizin gerçekleştiği dünya bir ve aynı dünyadır: duyulur dünya. Ne var ki, doğa yasalarına tabi olan dünyada aynı zamanda özgür edimler gerçekleştiriyor olmak bazı sıkıntılara yol açar. Ahlak yasasına uygun şekilde kararlar alsak da edimlerimizin kimi zaman istediğimiz şekilde sonuçlanmadığını görürüz. Bunun nedeni, duyulur dünyada işleyen yasalar ile duyulurüstü (ahlaki) alanda işleyen kuralların birbirinden farklı olması ve birbiri üzerinde hüküm sürememesidir. Bu bizi yeni bir soruya yöneltir: “Ne umabilirim?” Daha doğrusu, ahlaki olarak iyi olduğum sürece ve ahlaken üstüme düşen şeyi yapmayı sürdürdüğüm sürece ne umabilirim? Doğa bir şekilde ahlakla uyumlu olabilir mi?

Doğanın ahlaki edimlerimizle en nihayetinde bir birlik ve uyum içinde olabilmesini umarız. Kant bu sorunu “en yüksek iyi” üzerinden ele alır. “En yüksek iyi” ahlaki olarak hak ettiğimiz ölçüde mutlu olabilmemizdir. Fakat ne kadar erdemli biri olsak da mutluluğun bize açık olduğundan emin olamayız. Bu noktada Kant, “en yüksek iyi” ye ulaşabileceğine dair bir inancın, ancak bir Tanrı fikri ile mümkün olduğunu söyler. Tanrı, ahlaken iyi failer olduğumuz sürece, bizi “en yüksek iyi” ye ulaştırabilir olandır. Fakat Tanrı’nın varlığı, Kant felsefesi için hiçbir zaman bir bilgi konusu değildir. Şayet bilğimiz teorik alan ile sınırlıysa, bize fenomenal doğanın ötesi hakkında ipucu sağlayan şey, doğaya yeni bir bakış kazanmakla birlikte gelebilir. Doğal güzelliklerle girilen estetik deneyim, bu bakışı kazanmanın

anahtarı olabilir. Üçüncü *Eleştiri*'nin ilk iki eleştiriye bütünlük getirerek eleştirel sistemi tamamlaması buradan geçer. Teorik alanla pratik alan arasındaki boşluğu dolduran şey, yargı yetisinin *a priori* ilkesi ile doğaya karşı yeni bir bakış kazanmak ve doğayla kendimizi uyum içinde hissetmemizdir. Bu, bu çalışmanın ana konusu olmamakla birlikte, araştırmanın bizi doğal olarak götürdüğü yerdir. Bu yüzden, doğayla girdiğimiz estetik ilişkinin eleştirel felsefeye getirdiği bütünlük, bu çalışmanın ikincil çıktısı olarak görülebilir.

Üçüncü bölümde, saf estetik yargıların analizini sundum. Öncelikle güzeli, devamında ise yüceyi araştırdım. Güzeli yargılarının bu çalışmadaki önemi itibarıyla ağırlığı güzel yargılarının formel analizine ayırdım. Kant, üçüncü *Eleştiri*'nin “Güzeli Analitiği” bölümünde, güzel yargılarını dört ana durak (*Moment*) üzerinden inceler. İlk durakta, saf estetik yargının herhangi bir “ilgiden bağımsız” ya da “çıkarsız” olması gerektiğini söyler. İkinci durak, güzel yargısında ortaya çıkan hazzın evrensel olarak paylaşılabirliğine odaklanır. Eğer bir güzel yargısında bulunan kimse, aldığı hazzın herhangi bir ilgiden bağımsız olduğunun farkındaysa, bu hazzın duyusal ve şahsi bir zemini olmadığını düşünerek, başka kimselerce de paylaşılabir olduğunu düşünür. Fakat, nesnesine karşı ilgisiz bir hazzın, bulunduğumuz yargının evrensel olarak paylaşılabir olduğunu göstermeye yetip yetmeyeceği şaibelidir. Tezin bu kısmında, bu soruya dair bir cevap verebilmek adına, Guyer ve Allison'ın görüşlerinden faydalandım. Bu noktada Allison'ın tarafında durarak, estetik deneyimin hoşla gitmesinde nesneye hiçbir ilgi duymadığını fark eden kişinin diğer insanlarca da kendi aldığı hazzın paylaşılabir olduğunu düşünmesinin, estetik yargının evrensel olarak paylaşılabirliğini göstermek için bir argüman

olmadığını ileri sürdüm. Estetik yargıda açığa çıkan evrensellik talebinin gerekçelendirmesi, Kant'ın ikinci durakta öne sürdüğü “özgür oyun” ile gerçekleşir. Kant, bu durakta, saf estetik hazzın duyusal değil fakat bizim bilişsel yetilerimize dayanan bir haz olduğunu ileri sürer. Estetik yargının ayırt edici yönü, belirleyici değil, reflektif yargı tipi olmasıdır. Reflektif yargılar, nesnesini bir kavram kullanarak belirlemez. Anlama yetisinin nesneye uygulayabileceği bir “güzel” kavramı olmadığı için, bir belirlenim gerçekleşmez. Dolayısıyla anlama yetisi ve hayal gücü arasında Kant'ın “özgür oyun” olarak tabir ettiği durum oluşur. Hayal gücü, kavramın getirdiği sınırlandırmaya tabi olmadığı için, özgürce davranabilir. Estetik deneyimlerde açığa çıkan haz bu “özgür oyun” ile oluşur. Yani, Kant estetik hazzı bilişsel yetilerimize dayandırarak, bu hazzın herkesçe paylaşılabılır olduğunu da göstermiş olur: Hepimiz aynı bilişsel yetilere sahibiz ve dolayısıyla aynı türde bir hazzı da paylaşabiliriz. Üçüncü durakta Kant, deneyimin nesnesiyle deneyimleyen özne arasındaki ilişkiyi inceleyerek, estetik deneyimde ortaya çıkan haz ve uyum hissinin nesnenin amaçsallık formu taşıması üzerinden inceler. Nesnenin kendisinde değil ama formunda bir amaçsallık görürüz. Güzel nesne, bize sanki bir amacı varmış gibi görünür. Bu amacın kendisini saptayamasak bile, amacı varmışçasına görünmesi bir uyum hissine yol açar. Son olarak, dördüncü durakta Kant, güzel yargısının zorunluluğunu inceler. “Ortak duyu” (*sensus communis*) idesine sahip olduğumuzu öne sürerek, bunun hepimizde ortak olduğunu ve dolayısıyla bir nesneyi güzel bulduğumuzda aldığımız hazzın başkalarının da alması gerektiğini düşünmemizi sağlayan şeyin bu ide olduğunu belirtir. Dört ana durakta güzel yargısı üzerine işte bu yapısal incelemeyi sunar.

Yüce yargısı da güzel yargısı gibi saf estetik yargı biçimidir. Güzel yargısı ile çokça ortak özellik taşır. Fakat bu iki yargı tipini birbirinden ayıran önemli bir nokta vardır. Güzel yargısının tersine, yüce deneyiminde bir amaçlılık yerine *karşı-amaçlılık* açığa çıkar. Bir estetik deneyimi yüce deneyimi yapan da budur. Doğada kavrayamadığımız ve ürkütücü gelen bir büyüklük ile karşı karşıya kaldığımızda, doğal güzelliklerde hissettiğimiz uyum hissi yerine bir uyumsuzluk ve huzursuzluk hissederiz. Güzel deneyimde ortaya çıkan “yaşam hissi” burada yoktur. Fakat yine de doğaya bir hayranlık besleriz. Karşı karşıya kaldığımız doğa, bize kendi gücümüzü hatırlatır. Doğanın bu kaotik ve ürkütücü hali, bize özgür ve akıl sahibi varlıklar olduğumuzu hatırlatır. Karşılaştığımız ürkütücülükle, deyim yerindeyse, bir baş etme yöntemidir bu. “Doğa güçlü olabilir, fakat asıl biz güçlüyüz; yüce olan biziz!”

Dördüncü bölümün amacı, bu kısma kadar açıklanan ve tartışılanlar ışığında güzel ile ahlaki iyi arasındaki analogiyi incelemektir. Bu inceleme iki temel bölüme ayrılır. İlk kısım analoginin ne anlama geldiği ve hangi şartlar altında kurulabildiğini açıklamayı hedefler. İkinci kısım ise bu analoginin Kant felsefesinde ne gibi bir yeri olduğunu sorgular.

Bu analoginin üçüncü *Eleştiri*’de oynayabileceği role ilişkin, ek olarak şu soruları sordum: Estetik yargılar ahlaki yargılara dayanmaksızın evrensel olarak geçerli ve zorunlu olabilir mi? Bir nesneyi güzel yapan şey ahlaki iyiyi sembolize etmesi olabilir mi? Bu analogiyi kurmamızı sağlayan koşullar, analogiyi öne sürdükten sonra estetik ile ahlak üzerine kurduğumuz olası bağlantılardan hangi yönüyle ayrılır? Çalışmamın ana konudan sapıp estetik ve ahlak arasındaki ilişkinin genel bir incelemesine

dönüşmesini engellemek için analojiyi kurmamızı sağlayan koşulları estetik ve ahlak arasındaki diğer ilişkilerden ayırmaya çalıştım. Dolayısıyla, dördüncü bölümde, nasıl olup da bu analojiyi kurabiliyor olduğumuzu sorduktan sonra, estetik deneyimlerin ahlaka muhtemel etkilerinin neler olabileceğini araştırdım. Bu çerçevede, yargı yetisinin ilkesi olan “doğanın öznel amaçsalılığı” önemli bir rol oynamaktadır. Bu ilkenin doğal güzelliklere sanatsal güzelliklere ve doğadaki yüce deneyimine göre daha iyi uygulandığını öne sürerek, estetik deneyimin ahlaka olan etkisinde doğal güzelliğin ayrıcalıklı bir yere sahip olduğunu iddia ettim. Buna ek olarak, doğal güzelliklerin diğer estetik deneyimlere nazaran başka bir üstünlüğü daha vardır. Doğal güzelliklere “entelektüel bir ilgi” duyarız. Öznel amaçsalılık ilkesinin daha iyi uygulanabilirliği ve entelektüel ilginin yalnızca doğal güzelliklerde açığa çıkmasını esas alarak, doğal güzelliklerin ahlaken iyi davranmamıza bir motivasyon sağlayabileceğini öne sürdüm. Bu bölümdeki temel iddiam, güzel ile ahlaki iyi arasındaki analojiye ek olarak doğayla kendimiz arasında da bir analogik ilişki kurarak, kendi nihai amacımız hakkındaki farkındalığımızın arttığı ve doğal güzelliklerin bu farkındalığı artırmada diğer estetik deneyimlere göre üstünlüğü olduğudur.

Ahlaki edimlerimizi “ahlaki iyi” ye uygunluğuna göre yaparız ama ahlaki iyi yalnızca bir idedir. Analogik düşünmek tam da bu noktada işe yarar ve devreye girer. Ahlaki iyiyi duyulur alanda bir temsil nesnesi üzerinden düşünebiliriz. Güzelin ahlaki iyiyi sembolize etmesinin anlamı da en temelde budur. Günlük yaşantımızda bile, duyumuza gelmeyen şeyleri analogiler yoluyla anlamaya ve anlamlandırmaya çalışırız. Fakat bu tür analogiler, kendilerinde bir zorunluluk barındırmazlar. Bir analogide

ortaklaşırken diğesinde ortaklaşamayabiliriz. Peki güzel ile ahlaki iyi arasındaki analogi ne tür bir analogidir?

Kant, bu analogiyi doğal olarak kurduğumuzu ve bu analogiyi diğersanların da *adeta* bir görev olarak kurmasını beklediğimizi söyler. Bu analoginin keyfi bir analogi değil de zorunlu bir analogi olduğunu gösterebilmek için, bu analogiyi kurmamızı sağlayan koşulları araştırdım. Bunu incelerken, Kant'ın güzel ile ahlaki iyi arasında kendi yaptığı karşılaştırmadan yararlandım. Bu karşılaştırmaya göre:

- i. Güzeldeki haz da ahlaki iyideki haz da doğrudan açığa çıkar; dolaylı değildir.
- ii. Hem güzel hem de ahlaki yargılar herhangi bir ilgiden bağımsızdır; çıkarsızdır (ahlak yargılarında bir ilgi vardır fakat yargıyı öncelemez).
- iii. Hem güzel hem de ahlak deneyimleri bir uyum açığa çıkarır (güzel yargılarında anlama yetisi ile hayal gücü arasında bir uyum oluşurken, ahlaki yargılarda özgür irademizle aklın evrensel yasaları arasında bir uyum meydana gelir).
- iv. Hem güzel hem de ahlak yargıları evrenseldir (ahlak yargılarında bir kavram uygulanırken, beğeni yargılarında uygulanmaz).

Burada ilk göze çarpan şey, Kant'ın “Güzelin Dört Durağı”nda güzel üzerine yaptığı formel incelemeye bu karşılaştırmadaki maddelerin paralellik gösteriyor olduğudur. Başka bir ifadeyle, Kant, güzel ile ahlak yargısı arasındaki formel benzerlikler üzerinden bir karşılaştırma yapar. Buradan şu sonuca varabiliriz: Güzelin ahlaki iyiyi sembolize etmesinin sebebi; güzel ile ahlaki iyinin kendisi arasındaki ilişki, yani her ikisinin içeriğine dair

ilişki değildir. Daha ziyade, güzelin yapısal ve formel özellikleri ahlak yargıları ile ortaklık taşır. Fakat bu formel zeminin sağladığı başka bir şey vardır ki güzel ile ahlaki iyiyi analogik düşünmemizin sebebi de aslen odur. Güzele de ahlaki iyiye de benzer refleksiyonlar yaparız. Güzeli ve ahlaki iyiyi benzer şekilde ele alırız. Her ikisini de çıkarsızca ve doğrudan severiz, her ikisinde de uyum hissederiz, her ikisinin de evrensel olduğunu düşünürüz. Güzel ile ahlaki iyi arasında kurduğumuz analogiyi doğal olarak yapıvermemizin asıl sebebi budur.

Analojinin anlamına dair bir açıklama getirdikten sonra, bu analojinin Kant felsefesinde ne gibi bir işlevi olduğunu araştırmaya koyuldum. Ahlaki iyiyi güzel ile sembolize etmenin Kant felsefesine bir katkısı olabilir mi? Kant neden “Estetik Yargının Eleştirisi”nin sonunda böyle bir analogi ileri sürdü? Bu soruları cevaplamak için, literatürdeki iki zıt görüşten yararlandım. Crawford’a göre, beğeni yargılarının geçerli olduğunu gösterebilmek için güzel ile ahlaki iyi arasındaki analogiden yararlanmamız gerekir. Transandantal felsefede, bir yargının geçerli olduğunu göstermek demek, onun hem evrensel hem de zorunlu olduğunu göstermek demektir. Peki analogi bunu nasıl sağlar? Crawford beğeni yargılarının taşıdığı normativiteyi, yani bir güzel yargısında bulunurken başkalarından da aynı yargıda bulunmasını talep etmemizi, ahlaki bir görev olarak görür. Crawford’a göre, beğeni yargılarındaki normativite, ahlaki bir normativitedir. Bu argüman beğeni yargılarının geçerliliğini ahlaki yargılara bağımlı hale getirir. Ama eğer Kant’ın estetik teorisini Crawfordçı bir bakış açısıyla okursak, estetik yargıların özerkliğinden vazgeçmiş oluruz. Bir güzel yargısı, kendi başına, yalnızca kendi ilkesiyle evrensel ve zorunlu olamaz demektir bu. Bu görüş, tam da Kant’ın estetik felsefesinde kaçındığı şeydir.

Allison ise, güzel ile ahlaki iyi arasında bir analogi kurulabilmesi için, estetik yargıların bir özerkliği olması gerektiğini ve ancak estetik yargıların geçerliliği gösterildiği takdirde güzel ile ahlaki iyi arasında bir analogi kurmanın mümkün olduğunu savunur. Buna ek olarak, Allison, estetik yargıların bir normativite taşıdığını kabul etse de bunun ahlaki bir normativite olmadığını savunur. Ben bu tartışmada Allison tarafında yer alarak beğeni yargılarının geçerliliğinin ahlak üzerinden gerekçelendirilmediğini savundum. Peki, estetik yargıların gerekçelendirilmesi analogiden gelmiyorsa, nereden geliyor? Bu soruya tatmin edici bir cevap verebilmek bu çalışma için önemlidir. Çünkü eğer beğeni yargılarının evrensel ve zorunlu olduğunu gösterebilirsek, ahlaki iyiyi sembolize edebilecek bir aday olduğunu da göstermiş oluruz. Bunu iddia etmemin nedeni basitçe şudur. Güzel ve ahlaki iyi arasında analogi kurabilmemizin sebebinin her ikisine de benzer türde refleksiyon yapmamız olduğunu söylemiştik. O halde, ahlaki iyiyi sembolize edecek şeyin de evrensel ve zorunlu olması gerekmektedir. İşte bu yüzden, estetik yargıların geçerliliğini - evrensel ve zorunlu olduğunu- göstermek şarttır. Bedensel bir haz üstüne kurulan hiçbir yargı, ahlaki iyiyi sembolize etmek için iyi bir aday değildir. Bu noktada saf estetik yargıların hangilerinin ahlaki iyiyi sembolize edebileceğini sorguladım ve güzelin (doğal ya da sanatsal) gerekli koşulları sağlarken yüce yargılarının sağlayamadığını ileri sürdüm. Bunun nedeni, yüce üzerine olan refleksiyonlarımızın *karşı-amaçlılık* içermesinden ötürü yüceyi ahlaki iyiyle paralel düşünemeyeceğimizdir.

Estetik yargıların geçerliliğinin gerekçelendirmesine geri dönersek; estetik yargılar ahlak yargılarına dayanmadan evrensel ve zorunlu yargılar olabilir mi? Bu soruyu cevaplarken Kant'ın *Yargı Yetisinin Eleştirisi*'nde izlediği yolu takip ettim. Kant estetik yargının formel

özelliklerini “Güzelin Dört Durağı”nda serimler. Güzelliğin ne olduğunu değil, hangi şartlar altında bir estetik yargının saf olabileceğini araştırır. Başka bir deyişle Kant, bir estetik yargının evrensel ve zorunlu olabilmesinin koşullarını araştırır. Kant’ın “Estetik Yargının Eleştirisi”nde izlediği yol, ilk iki *Eleştiri*’de teorik ve pratik yargıları gerekçelendirirken yaptığından pek de farklı değildir. Tabii buradaki araştırmamızın belirleyici değil, reflektif yargı türü üzerine olduğunu unutmamak gerekir. Yani, incelediğimiz yargının evrenselliği ve zorunluluğu bir kavrama dayanmaz. Daha ziyade, bir hisse dayanır: haz hissi. Bu aynı zamanda, peşinde olduğumuz evrensellik ve zorunluluğun nesnel değil öznel olduğunu gösterir. Dolayısıyla, Kant’ın estetik yargının gerekçelendirilmesi için sunduğu öneri, bilişsel yargılardankinden oldukça farklıdır. Burada, bilişsel yargılardaki gibi evrenselliğin kendisi değil, *evrensellik talebi* onun evrenselliğinin zeminini oluşturur. Eğer kendi güzel yargımızın diğer insanlarca da - paylaşıldığını değil ama- paylaşılabilir olduğunu gösterebilirsek o halde evrensel olarak aynı hazzın paylaşılabilir olduğuna dair de bir gerekçelendirme sunabiliriz. Estetik hazzı “özgür oyun” üzerine temellendirerek, Kant, hepimizde ortak olan yetileri estetik hazzın kaynağı olarak göstermiş olur. Bir beğeni yargısının evrensellik talep edebilmesinin sebebi budur. Bu talebi adeta bir görev olarak yapmamız da beğeni yargısının zorunluluğunu gösterir. Bunu bir görev olarak görmemizin temelinde ise, hepimizin bir “ortak duyu”ya sahip olması vardır.

Dördüncü bölümün ikinci kısmı ise, estetik ile ahlak arasındaki olası ilişkileri bu analogi üzerinden incelemeye ayrılmıştır. Analoginin rolü iki yönlüdür. Birincisi ahlaki duygumuzu güçlendirmesi ve bizi ahlaken iyi davranmaya motive etmesidir. İkincisi ise teorik ve pratik alanlar arasındaki “boşluk”un

kapanmasına dolaylı olarak bir katkıda bulunmasıdır. Ben ikincisini birincisinin sonucu, dolayısıyla ikincil olarak ele aldım. Kant, doğal güzelliğe “doğrudan entelektüel bir ilgi” içeren güzellik deneyimini diğer estetik deneyimlerden ayırarak ahlaki açıdan iyi olan ile doğal güzellik deneyimi arasında bir bağlantı kurar. Bilişsel yetilerimiz ile doğanın uyum içinde olduğunu varsaydığımız için, doğaya karşı doğrudan bir ilgi duyarız. Doğadan bize kendisine dair bir ipucu vermesini bekleriz. Doğayla kendimiz arasında ahenkli bir görünümün elde edilmesi, doğanın ahlaki açıdan da amaçlı olduğu fikrine yol açabilir. Doğadan bize ipuçları vermesini beklememizin nedeni budur. Doğadaki saf estetik deneyimin sanattakine üstünlüğünün özü de buradan geçer.

Oysa bizim dışımızda hiçbir yerde böyle belirli bir amaç yoktur. Öyleyse, varoluşumuzun nihai amacını (ahlaki ereğimizi) görebilmek için kendimize bakarız. Kendimize dönen bu yansımayla birlikte, estetik olarak amaçsal görünen şey artık ahlaki olarak amaçsal hale gelir.

Doğayı sanki bizim için amaçsalmış gibi değerlendirdiğimizde, kendimiz üzerine de düşünür ve nihai amacımızın (ahlaki failer olarak) yeniden farkına varırız: “Doğanın olduğu gibi bizim de peşinden koştuğumuz bir amacımız var.” Doğal güzelliği takdir ederken hissettiğimiz uyum sayesinde, doğanın amacının bizim amacımıza uygun olduğunu varsayarız: doğayı bizim için amaçsalmış gibi görürüz. Doğal güzellik üzerine düşünmenin ahlaki duyguya yol açmasının nedeni budur. Dolaylı olarak bize ahlaki failer olduğumuzu hatırlatır ve bizi ahlaki ereğimizin peşinden gitmeye motive eder.

Buraya kadar ifade edilenler analojinin ilk rolünü açıklamaktadır: bu analojiyi yapmanın yargılayan özneler üzerindeki etkisi. Bu iddiayı Kant'ın bu analojiyi *doğal olarak* yaptığımızı söylemesine dayandırdım. Bu *doğal* tutumun ne olduğunu inceledim ve bu tutumun özü bizi analojinin ikinci rolüne getirir: eleştirel sistemi bütünlüğe kavuşturmak. Doğayı estetik olarak değerlendirdiğimizde, özgürlüğümüzün fenomenal dünyayla uyumlu olduğunu hissederiz, fakat bu sadece bir varsayımdır. Güzellik deneyimi, doğada yalnızca görünüş olarak bilebildiğimiz nesnelere *bir şeyler* daha ekler. Bu “daha fazla şey,” doğanın duyulurüstü yönü hakkında bir ipucu elde ettiğimiz varsayımdır. Buna göre, doğal güzelliği tefekkür ettiğimiz ölçüde, doğadan ipuçları almaya daha yakın olduğumuzu söyleyebiliriz. Analojinin ikinci rolünün eleştirel sistemi birleştirmek olabileceğini önermemin nedeni budur. Doğal güzellik ve ahlak arasındaki ilişki üzerine düşünmek, doğa hakkında yaptığımız “özel amaçlılık” varsayımını güçlendirebilir.

Özel amaçlılık ilkesini uygulayarak doğadaki estetik deneyimimiz aracılığıyla doğanın bizimle uyum içinde olduğunu *varsayan* biziz. Bu ilke aynı zamanda teorik ve pratik alan arasında köprü kurarak eleştirel sistemi birleştiren ilkedir. Çalışma boyunca gösterildiği üzere, bu ilke en iyi doğal güzelliklere uygulanmaktadır. Buradan yola çıkarak, doğal güzellik ile girilen deneyimin doğaya karşı yeni bir bakış kazandırarak eleştirel sistemi birleştirmede rolü olabileceğini öne sürdüm. Argümanım şu şekildedir. Kant amaçlılık ilkesini birleştirici ilke olarak görür. Eğer bu ilkenin başarılı bir şekilde uygulanabildiğini gösterirsek, bu ilkenin eleştirel felsefeyi birleştirme görevini de yerine getirdiğini söyleyebiliriz. Bu ilkeyi doğaya uyguladığımızda, doğanın nihai amacımıza uygun

olduğunu varsaymış oluruz. Bu yalnızca bir varsayım olmasına rağmen zorunlu bir varsayımdır. Bunların ışığında basit bir çıkarım yapabiliriz. Eleştirel sistemin tamamlanması umudu *bizim yaptığımız bir varsayıma* dayanır. Başka bir deyişle, eleştirel sistemi birleştiren şey, *doğaya karşı bakış açısını değiştiren bizleriz*. Analoginin bu rolünün bir öncekinin sonucu olduğunu savunmamın nedeni de budur: Doğayı bizim için amaçsalmış gibi görmek bu yeni bakış açısidir ve biz bunu doğayı estetik olarak yargılayarak yaparız. Özetlemek gerekirse; doğal güzellikle ahlaki iyiyi analogik olarak düşünmek doğanın bizim için amaçsal olduğu varsayımını güçlendirir ve analogi işte bu şekilde eleştirel sistemi birleştirmede dolaylı olarak bir rol oynar.

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