PERCEPTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN ISRAEL

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ABSTRACT

PERCEPTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN ISRAEL

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Outsiders' perceptions on the European Union (EU) as a research area is relatively new, bridging together the EU actions and capabilities in the foreign policy, and the EU's identity by putting the receivers of the EU message at the center of analysis. The EU has portrayed itself as a normative, civilian, and responsible power, acting as a force for good and leading by example in promoting liberal and democratic values. Israeli context, however, poses significant challenges to the EU's identity. By studying EU perceptions in Israel, thesis aims to give a comprehensible answer to the questions on what the main constituents of the EU perceptions in Israel are and whether the Israelis perceive the EU as a coherent, legitimate, and credible actor. Based on the lexicometric analysis, the thesis demonstrates that Israeli perceptions of the EU are determined by a number of variables, namely; Holocaust, anti-Semitism, Iran and related security concerns, migration, and the issue of Jerusalem dominantly. However, shared values, cooperation, and prosperity have a marginal place, indicating that observing identity characteristics that the EU attributes itself is not possible in Israel. Thesis also argues that the EU image in Israel is characterized by the EU's lack of cohesion among the members, as well as decreased credibility and legitimacy. It is evident that historical narratives run even today in

perceptions of the EU in Israel. However, high level of bilateral economic relations and the EU's efforts to have a common foreign policy are not reflected as a positive perception.

Keywords: European Union (EU), Israel, Normative Power, Perceptions, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

ÖZ

İSRAİL'İN AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ ALGISI

GEÇECİ, Esra
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü
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Yabancıların Avrupa Birliği (AB) hakkındaki algılarının incelenmesi nispeten yeni bir araştırma alanıdır. AB dış politikasını ve AB'nin kimliğini oluşturan kendine dair algılarını bir araya getiren alan, AB'nin mesajlarının alıcılarını analizin merkezine oturtmaktadır. AB kendisini, liberal ve demokratik değerleri teşvik etmede iyi bir güç olarak hareket eden ve örnek olarak liderlik eden normatif, sivil ve sorumlu bir güç olarak tanımlamaktadır. Ancak İsrail bağlamı, bu kimliğe karşı meydan okumalar içermektedir. Bu tez, İsrail'deki AB algılarını inceleyerek, İsrail'deki AB algılarının temel bileşenlerini ortaya çıkarmayı ve İsraillilerin AB'yi tutarlı, meşru ve güvenilir bir aktör olarak algılayıp algılamadıkları sorusunu yanıtlamayı amaçlamaktadır. Lexicometric analiz sonuçlarına dayanarak, tez, İsrail'in AB algılarının Holokost, Yahudi düşmanlığı, İran ve ilgili güvenlik kaygıları, göç ve Kudüs sorununun ağırlıklı olduğu bir dizi değişken tarafından belirlendiğini göstermektedir. Ancak ortak değerler, iş birliği ve refahın analiz sonuçlarında marjinal bir yere sahip olması, AB'nin kendisine atfettiği kimlik özelliklerini İsrail'de gözlemlemenin mümkün olmadığını göstermektedir. Bu tez aynı zamanda İsrail'deki AB algısının, üye devletler arasında uyum eksikliği ve azalan güvenilirlik ve meşruiyet ile karakterize olduğunu iddia etmektedir. Ayrıca

tez, tarihsel anlatıların bugün bile İsrail'deki AB algısını etkilediğini savunmaktadır. Ancak ikili ekonomik ilişkilerin üst düzeyde olması ve AB'nin ortak bir dış politikaya sahip olma çabaları olumlu bir algı olarak yansımamıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa Birliği (AB), İsrail, Normatif Güç, Algılar, İsrail-Filistin Çatışması

To my beloved mother and father…

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFD	Alternative for Germany
AP	Action Plan
API	Arab Peace Initiative
ARK	Automated Research Kit
BDS	Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CJEU	Court of Justice of the European Union
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation
CSDP	Common Security and Defense Policy
DOP	Declaration of Principles
DW	Deutsche Welle
EC	European Community
ECJ	European Court of Justice
ECTR	European Council on Tolerance and Reconciliation
ECU	European Currency Units
EDA	European Defense Agency
EEAS	European External Action Service
EEC	European Economic Community
ENP	European Neighborhood Policy
ESDP	European Security and Defense Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
EPC	European Political Cooperation
EPE	Ethical Power Europe
EU	European Union
EUBAM	EU Border Assistance Mission
EUGS	EU Global Strategy
EUROMED	Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
EUPOLL COPPS	European Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support

ESS	European Security Strategy
HR	High Representative
ICC	International Criminal Court
IDF	Israeli Defense Forces
IGOs	Inter-Governmental Organizations
IR	International Relations
JCPA	Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
MGoI	Military Government of Israel
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCRE	National Centre for Studies on Europe
NIF	New Israel Fund
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NPE	Normative Power Europe
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation
OPEC	Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries
PA	Palestinian Authority
PESCO	Permanent Structured Cooperation
PLC	Palestinian Legislative Council
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PNA	Palestinian National Authority
PNC	Palestinian National Council
REDWG	Regional Economic Development Working Group
R&D	Research and Development
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SU	Soviet Union
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UEMOA	West African Economic and Monetary Union
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VP	Vice President
WEU	Western European Union
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO	World Trade Organization
WWII	Second World War

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Studying EU External Perceptions

In the international system, state behaviors are motivated by several factors, such as, threats, interests, gains, identities, etc. International Relations (IR) theories have different explanation about the reasons of those motivations. However, the answers generally ignore the very basic question that "how states perceived each other" and "when and why threats are perceived". This necessitates the inclusion of perceptions as an integral part of the analysis. Initially, focusing on national decision makers' beliefs about the world and their images of others were the central themes in the context of perceptions. According to Jervis, perceptions are a variation of the images in the world as the actor sees it. In other words, perceptions are derived from the "psychological milieu" of decision makers (Jervis, 2017, pp. 1–28). In time, public opinion was added in the analysis of perceptions. This time, journalists turned into political actors and news media became political institution in society. The two shape the perceptions of public by linking the experiences of people in society, by effecting their political behaviors, and by facilitating or diminishing the opportunities of collective action (Semetko, 2004). Outsiders' perceptions on the EU as a research area, on the other hand, is relatively new in the literature of IR. It was 2002, when the very first systematic example of the study appeared in the National Centre for Studies on Europe (NCRE), University of Canterbury, New Zealand. Prof. Natalia Chaban and Prof. Martin Holland have become the pioneers in this area (*EU Global Perceptions*, 2021). Their studies have focused on the two central themes: "'What are the dominant images and the leading perceptions on the EU in the external public discourses internationally?' and 'What is the impact of these images and perceptions on the policy-making?'" (Chaban & Holland, 2008, p.

5). They defined the emergence of the area as an innovation bridging together the EU actions and capabilities in the field of foreign policy, and EU's identity by putting the receivers of the EU messages at the center of the analysis (Chaban & Holland, 2015, p. 395). They explain this aspect as; "The findings – drawn from the receiver of the EU messages – can shift the focus in the EU diplomacy's monologue to a meaningful dialogue and effective collaboration" (Chaban & Holland, 2015, p. 403).

Between 2004 and 2005, "Public, Elite and Media Perceptions of the EU in Asia Pacific Region: a comparative study" was conducted in the NCRE. The study focused on media, public and elite perceptions in nine countries (*The EU in Asia Pacific Region (2004-2005)*, n.d.) According to the results demonstrated in a book edited by Chaban and Holland in 2008, media have a significant impact on not just the public's perceptions but also the perceptions of crucial national decision-makers about the EU (Chaban & Holland, 2008, p. 205). Up until today, Chaban and Holland supervised research projects that aim to undercover the EU perceptions in different geographies and on different subjects. These projects can be listed as "New Zealand Historical Perceptions of European Integrations" (2002-ongoing), "The European Union in the Eyes of Asia" (2006-ongoing), "After Lisbon: The Images of the EU in Asia-Pacific" (2011-2012), "External Images of the EU as a Global Energy Actor" (2012-2014), "Normative Power Europe: EU International Identity and Foreign Policy" (2014-2017), "EU Perceptions in 10 Strategic Partners: Analysis of the Perception of the EU and EU's Politics Abroad" (2015), "Civil Society of the Eastern Partnership in Dialogue: Mutual Perceptions of the Eastern Partnership Countries, Russia and the EU" (2015-2016), "Crisis, Conflict and Critical Diplomacy: EU Perceptions in Ukraine, Israel and Palestine (C3EU)" (2015-2018), "EU in the Eyes of Taiwanese" (2016), and "E-Youth: Perceptions of the EU and the EU-Ukraine Relations in Ukraine and the Baltics" (2018-2020) (*National Centre for Research on Europe*, n.d.). Constructed upon these research projects, dozens of books, articles, conference proceedings, and research papers had been published. Apart from Chaban and Holland, the area has attracted attention of

other scholars as well. As a result, today there is an emerging growing literature on the EU perceptions.

Studying external perceptions of the EU is important from several aspects. One is related with the problem of the widespread EU-centrism in the literature of the EU foreign policy (Keuleers et al., 2016). This EU-centrism nurtured the idea of Europe as a special global power. With the inclusion of the study of perceptions, there emerged interesting results showing whether such a perception of distinctiveness is shared by people. The findings in those studies on external perceptions challenged the EU's self-representation and academic literature reflecting the EU as a profoundly different global actor. Moreover, those studies have potential to contribute the EU identity formation, broader understanding in the EU's role in the world, and understanding of the conditions in order for the EU policies to be effective. Finally, studying non-Europeans' perceptions can help partially overcome aforementioned strong Eurocentrism in the EU literature (Lucarelli, 2014a, pp. 1–2). In other words, studying external perceptions functions as a "reality check" for the EU's international actorness with all of its implications in the EU self-perceptions (Chaban & Holland, 2014, p. 1).

Ole Elgstörm focused on the place of the external perceptions in shaping the external views of EU leadership. He stated that the EU foreign policy is bound by others' expectations, resulting in that other people's perceptions of the EU's function contribute to the evolution of specific international responsibilities. In other words, both the EU's self-perception of itself as a leader and external people's perceptions of the EU as a leader matter. A leader needs to have followers to insert influence and the perception of the others on a self-proclaimed leader determines people's decision to whether or not to follow that leader's lead (Elgström, 2007, p. 447).

Constructing a bridge between perceptions and effectiveness, Torney showed that positive external perceptions may also lead to limited EU effectiveness. By investigating the EU's rhetoric of 'leadership' with respect to international climate

change policy, he found that other countries could resist attempts by the EU to secure their participation through new commitments although their perception of the EU on the issue had been positive (Torney, 2014, p. 1370).

Ole Elgstörm and Natalia Chaban stated that "the effect of the EU actions is influenced by its perceived credibility, legitimacy, and coherence" (Elgström & Chaban, 2015, p. 18). Legitimacy and perceptions are interrelated. In defining legitimacy, the power of the audience should be included in the analysis as the audience has significant authority to discredit the performance of an organization (Neilsen & Rao, 1987, p. 524). Based on this argument, legitimacy can be defined as "a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions" (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). In other words, the subjectivity is inherent in it along with its being relational between actor and institution, and its being defined by the actor's perception (Hurd, 1999, p. 381). In terms of international relations, it is an important question why a state follows other state's advice. The answer is related with the issue of legitimacy along with the fear of punishment and self-interest rested in following the advice. Thus, the feeling of an actor that a rule is legitimate is an important part of affecting others' behavior (Hurd, 1999, p. 379). Legitimacy and power are complementary in that politics is not just about power struggle but it is also a contest for legitimacy. From that perspective legitimacy is a source of power and it enhances a state's soft power (J. S. J. Nye, 2007, p. 177) Likewise, "legitimacy is about the power of ideas" (Williams, 1997, p. 67). Javier Solana, the EU High Representative (HR), drew the attention to the link between legitimacy and power in 2007:

> A key benefit of acting multilaterally is legitimacy, which in turns enhances effectiveness. Once again, this means bringing in new centers of power. But legitimacy also means bringing our publics along. If decisions are increasingly taken at the international level, people have to see these as legitimate. We therefore have two imperatives: to create greater effectiveness in global governance but also to uphold democratic legitimacy. To do so will be difficult as it

> requires new ideas and a sense of compromise. But I really see no real alternative (Solana, 2007).

It is important to define input-oriented legitimacy and output-oriented legitimacy here. Input-oriented legitimacy requires for an actor to make possible for all the people affected by a problem can participate in decision making and make sure that decisions are taken on consensus. Output-oriented legitimacy derives from an actor's capacity to solve the collective problems (Scharpf, 2011, pp. 7–11). Considering the EU in international arena, input legitimacy refers to the Union's involvement in an institution's decision-making procedure as a recognized player in that institution. In the intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), the EU's place as a recognized player varies. In the World Trade Organization (WTO) for example, the EU has full membership and is represented by the Commission. However, in the majority of the other IGOs, because of the EU's not being a full member, its position is represented by the country holding the EU Presidency. The overwhelming instancy of the second situation generates questions about the actorness of the Union, inevitably affecting the level of effectiveness of the EU policies. Regarding the output legitimacy of the EU, the economic contributions of the EU to the other states become the issue. These contributions vary; they can be in form of development assistance or can be for mitigating climate change. In the resulting picture, it is expected that the perceived legitimacy of the EU is increased as a result of those contributions (Elgström & Chaban, 2015, pp. 21–22).

The input and output legitimacy definitions are short in answering questions like "why expectations need to be fulfilled and what makes practices acceptable". This makes them lacking of concern with the value systems and normative aspect of the legitimacy (Williams, 1997, pp. 13–14). Here, Mark Suchman's definition sheds a light on the normative side: "Legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions" (Suchman, 1995, p. 574).

Organizations aspire to be seen as legitimate actors in order to increase their credibility. The external credibility of an actor is affected by its domestic political situation. The actors having veto power in domestic political domain is important here. If those domestic actors do not support the actor's commitment to a certain purpose, this will have implications for the actor's external credibility. For the EU, the position taken by the Commission or the presidency in the international arena may not get the support of the Council majority. This will at the end decrease the bargaining power of the EU, leading to diminishing its credibility (Elgström & Chaban, 2015, pp. 22–23). The studies conducted on the external perceptions of the EU list several shortcomings which have detrimental impact on the EU's credibility and legitimacy. First of all, the EU is perceived as an actor who imposes double standards on similar issues. In the Middle Eastern context, the EU is accused of responding Israeli human rights violations in a soft way while it advocates itself as promoting human rights and democracy in rhetoric. Secondly, the outsiders perceive that there is inconsistency in the EU's different external policies. For example, the EU trade and development policies received criticism on this ground as they are incoherent with each other. Thirdly, the EU's position with respect to the US in the diplomatic negotiations is perceived as nothing more than as a subordinate position vis-à-vis the US (Lucarelli, 2014b, pp. 54–56).

Coherence on the other hand has several aspects. These aspects are; consistency between words and deeds (implementation coherence), consistency over time (chronological coherence), consistency between different parts of the EU machinery (horizontal coherence), consistency in external relations regardless of the fact that decisions are taken in supranational or intergovernmental context (institutional coherence), and consistency between the Member states, and between the member states and the EU institutions (vertical coherence) (Elgstörm & Chaban, 2015, p.23). Based on the empirical studies, the EU has institutional coherence as well as chronological coherence in the multilateral negotiations. However, the EU is perceived most of the time as incoherent concerning the vertical, horizontal, and implementation coherence. For example, the protectionist agricultural policy of the

EU is in contradiction with the principal EU policy of free trade, meaning horizontal incoherence. Concerning the problems in implementation, on the other hand, the EU's motto of "partnership for sustainable development" can be good example. This rhetoric is perceived by developing countries as empty words (Elgström & Chaban, 2015, pp.23-24). As understood, together with the legitimacy and credibility, coherence has profound effects on the EU perceptions in the eyes of others.

1.1. Scope of the Thesis, Methodology, and Sampling

Based on this background, this thesis aims to put forward an answer to three basic research questions by looking at three different media outlets and the official press releases in Israel. The first and foremost research question is the question of; "What are the main constituents of the Israeli perceptions of the EU and do Israelis perceive the EU as a coherent, legitimate, and credible actor?".

Note that, in the thesis, the level of analysis is set as the perceptions of the EU. So that answering the question of "do bilateral relations of member states with Israel have an impact on the Israeli perceptions of the EU?" will not be part of analysis. Answering this question entails measuring magnitude and direction of the effect of bilateral relations, which can be part of further research in a PhD. However, when the EU-Israel relations are explained from the historical perspective in the first chapter, the thesis inevitably refers to the historical perspective of bilateral relations of the EU member states with Israel, because it is not possible to think the EU perspective separate from historical bilateral relations. In other words, although the level analysis is set as the perceptions of the EU here, the relations of the EU member-states with Israel are incorporated into the thesis as part of the historical analysis. This leads to the second research question: "Do historical perspectives affect the perceptions of the EU in Israel today?".

In addition to addressing the place of historical burdens and/or blessings in the EU perceptions in Israel today, the thesis strives to find out; "Is it possible to observe

identity characteristics that the EU attributes itself in Israeli perceptions?", marking the third research question. Apart from these major questions, there are sub-research questions as well: "Has the EU's efforts to increase its capacity in foreign policy contributed to positive reflections in EU perceptions in Israel?". "Do the problems in decision making in foreign policy field reflect itself in the Israeli perceptions as weak and divided Europe?". "Do high level of bilateral economic relations have an effect in the Israeli perceptions of the EU in a positive way?". "Do the EU-Israel Association Agreement, Association Council, the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), and the Action Plan (AP) contribute to positive perceptions of the EU in Israel?"

It is important to note that the EU-Palestine relations are outside the scope of the thesis. Similarly, the impact of these relations on the perceptions of the EU in Israel is not explored. Acknowledging the importance of the EU-Palestine relations on the one hand, and the limits of a master thesis on the other, this aspect can be incorporated into a further research agenda in future. The scope of the thesis is also narrowed down by the limitations of the analysis method employed here. There is little question that the availability of massive textual corpora constitutes an unprecedent opportunity for scientists, as well as a vital resource. Moreover, computer assistance delivers exceptional and essential information. However, neither the data nor the algorithms represent novel science or answers to scientific issues in and of themselves. Statistical regularities are maps, indeed very good maps, of dynamic processes. Having lovely colored geographical maps of a country, however, does not mean that one knows that country. Phenomena must be not only described and shown, but also explained and, as Max Weber[1] stated many years ago, comprehended and interpreted in their proper context (Castelfranchi, 2017, p. 8).

[1] Here, it is referred to Max Weber's interpretive sociology. This theoretical approach, as well as the research methodologies that accompany it, are founded in the German term "*verstehen"*, which means "to understand," specifically to have a meaningful comprehension of something. To perform interpretative sociology is to try to comprehend social phenomena from the perspective of individuals who are involved in them. It is, in a sense, attempting to walk in someone else's shoes and experience the world through their eyes. Thus, interpretive sociology is concerned with comprehending the significance that individuals being studied place on their ideas, values, actions, behaviors, and social interactions with others and organizations (Crossman, 2021).

The language barrier, stemming from the writer's unfamiliarity with Hebrew, Israeli native language, constitutes three important limitations. The first and obvious one is the availability of texts in English is fewer than Hebrew ones. This indicates a smaller sample size, reducing the quality of analysis. However, note that, in the Israeli context, English language newspapers are rich in their content, partially compensating the reduction in sample size. The second limitation is related with the analysis method employed here as it has its origins in linguistics. As will be explained below, lexicometric analysis is based on the calculation of words in a certain vicinity to a keyword. Considering every language has unique rules on the order of the words in a sentence, there will be difference in the sequence of words in a sentence in Hebrew and in English, indicating differences in the outcome of the analysis of the same text corpora. Thirdly, there can be a difference between the same newspaper's Hebrew edition and English edition in coverage. The tone of voice in Hebrew edition may be lower or higher than the English one because they don't address the same audience. This situation, of course, is not peculiar to Israel or Hebrew language. The same is almost always valid everywhere. Even in direct translation of the news, the issue of nuance matters.

In the thesis, arguments are based on the fact that the international reality is not only the outcome of military and economic power but is a socially constructed phenomenon in which the power of knowledge, ideas, culture, ideology, and language interact and shape the events. The arguments in the thesis are grounded on the fact that "(…) people act towards objects, including the actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them." (Wendt, 1992, p. 397).

Constructed upon these arguments, the coverage of the EU in three major online English newspapers of Israel; *Haaretz, The Jerusalem Post*, and *The Times of Israel* are analyzed between 1 December 2017 and 30 June 2018 using the lexicometric analysis method. Haaretz is a daily newspaper and a leading source of information in English on Israel both on domestic and international issues. It distinguishes itself from other news outlets with its especially liberal outlook. It was founded in

Jerusalem/Al-Quds by a group of Jewish immigrants mainly from Russia in 1919. The publication has managed to survive today. The paper's op-ed page is likely best known for its senior columnists' reflections on current events, which include some of Israel's most prominent journalists and analysts. Besides, Haaretz is widely read in government and decision-making circles and has a key role in reflecting liberal public opinion in Israel to the outside world (*Haaretz*, n.d.). In Israeli political context, Haaretz is classified as a left-wing paper, sometimes being hypercritical of Israeli policies. Nonetheless, it is referred as a symbol of free media in Israel and a source of Jewish self-criticism (Jewish Federation, n.d.). The Jerusalem Post, on the other hand, is well-known for its centrist stance. Founded back in 1932, it is the oldest and the largest English daily newspaper in Israel (The Jerusalem Post, n.d.). Although the paper refers to itself as having a balanced approach, its political stance is seen by outsiders as a right-of-center, conservative, and favoring the right-leaning government (Augustyn, n.d.; The Media Bias/Fact Check, 2021). As the newest among the three, the Times of Israel is an online daily based in Jerusalem/Al-Quds that was formed in 2012 to cover events in Israel, the Middle East, and the Jewish world. It includes a variety of analyses and opinion pieces. It wants to be seen as apolitical, conveying news in a balanced manner. However, its editorial orientation is seen as left-of-center, slightly favoring the left (The Times of Israel, n.d.; Media Bias/Fact Check, 2021b; Tucker, 2012). Overall, the three newspapers are chosen for their capacity to reflect perceptions of the EU in Israel from three different political stances; the left, the center-of-right and conservative, and the center-of-left.

While the sample for the Israeli popular corpus is constructed as such, Israeli official corpus used for the analysis consists of the press releases of Israeli Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Benjamin Netanyahu, Israeli President Reuven Rilvin, and Knesset, Israeli parliament, between 1 December 2017 and 30 June 2018.

The period that this thesis analyses is between 1 December 2017 and 30 June 2018 deliberately because there had been a number of important developments affecting

the EU policies and creating Israeli reactions at that time. The first major development in this period was the United States (US) President Donald Trump's decision to recognize Jerusalem/Al-Quds as the capital of the State of Israel and to relocate the US Embassy to Israel from Tel Aviv/Yafa to Jerusalem/Al-Quds on 6th December 2017. The decision was grounded on the plain facts and the realist US foreign policy ("Proclamation 9683 of December 6, 2017," 2017). The status of Jerusalem/Al-Quds has been a final status issue to be determined as a result of a negotiated long-lasting peace between the two sides of the conflict. In the wake of Trump's decision, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) discussed the issue in a special meeting. 14 of the 15 members of the Security Council, except the US, expressed their disagreement with the decision (*Security Council 8128th Meeting SC/13111*, 2017). The move was totally against the EU's long-lasting, expensive and exhaustive two-state solution policy. As a result, it was expected by the outsiders that the EU would put forward a unified policy. However, Hungary blocked a joint EU statement on the issue. Given this, the EU HR Federica Mogherini herself, expressed her disagreement with the decision in a press conference and warned about potential consequences that would trigger the already volatile context to go backward (Schultheis, 2017).

The second major issue of the period covered in the thesis is Gaza Border Protests or the Great March of Return which had started 30 March 2018 onwards. Israeli reaction to the protests increased the humanitarian concerns within the EU. The events can be seen as a test case for the EU's commitment to promote democracy and human rights as a normative power. The EU called for the investigation of the Israeli military's harsh response to the civilians, which caused the deaths of dozens of Palestinians in mass protests (The Times of Israel, 2018j).

At the beginning of May, the US President Trump made another controversial announcement. He declared that the US would withdraw from the nuclear deal with Iran which was reached in 2015. The EU was part of the deal and had invested time and energy in the arduous discussions which had lasted over two years. The US

reimposed the tough sanctions it had imposed on Iran before the agreement, as well as new restrictions (Landler, 2018).

While the Israeli military was attacking the protesters, the US put the decision of moving its embassy to Jerusalem/Al-Quds into practice on the 14th of May (Underwood, 2018), becoming the fourth major issue of the period covered here. Besides, on 15 May 2018 the 70th anniversary of the establishment of State of Israel was commemorated.

Overall, these major events turned the period into an important time frame that has significant potential to reflect Israeli perceptions on the EU. By looking at the nature of the developments, it is assumed that the visibility of the EU in the newspaper coverage in Israel would increase along with more reference to the EU in the official press releases.

In the thesis, the lexicometric analysis method is employed in order to analyze Israeli perceptions on the EU. The lexicometric analysis has its roots in linguistic studies. The essence of the method can be summarized as "You shall know a word by the company it keeps" (Firth, 1962, p. 11). However, the lexicometric analysis of a text, that is, the use of statistical tools that apply to words in speeches, interviews, archival documents, political statements, and press articles, etc. is little used in the study of international relations. At the crossroads of language, statistics, and computer science, it brings together quantitative methods for processing textual data. There are significant potentials of using lexicometry for analyzing textual data. When properly considered, lexicometry provides statistical facts which increase the methodological rigor of the analysis of language data. It is a valuable aid for interpretation. It is a tool for objectifying the corpus, for formulating and verifying hypotheses (Baillat et al., 2016, p. 228). The method allows the researcher to analyze large volumes of textual data. In fact, it is better to have voluminous textual data to increase the quality of the statistical results in this method. Besides, it is essential to group together texts similar in form (semi-structured interviews, open-ended

questions, press articles, speeches etc.) to compare what is comparable (Baillat et al., 2016, p. 230). This is a corpus-driven approach. Unlike a corpus-based approach in which hypotheses are first constructed and then tested, it allows for the discovery of lexical structures that reveal discursive formations that the speaker may not be aware of. As a result, it has the potential to surprise the researcher with unexpected results, allowing for breaks with established expectations conveyed by hegemonic discourse and empirical results (Mattissek, 2008, p. 123; cited in Tristl et al., 2015, p. 73).

In the first layer of the analysis, all texts which contain the search terms "European Union", "Europe", and "the EU" are selected among the newspapers and press releases. In this way, the text corpora which will be used for the examination of co-occurrences is constituted. In the second layer, the collocation method is used. As a part of Corpus Linguistics, it illustrates the words that occur within a certain range around keywords and rank these words according to their frequency. The keyness score is used to map relative frequencies of the keywords grouped under certain themes using the **collocates,** the words that co-occur with keywords under pre-defined themes (Cheng, 2013). In this research; collocation method was used to list and rank the collocates within 30 words range. The keywords chosen for to determine colocation are "the European Union", "Europe", "the EU", "Euro" and "Eurozone". Each word occurring before and after the keywords within 30 words range were listed using Voyant Tools, an online computer-assisted analysis tool (*Voyant Tools*, n.d.). The collocate lists based on each newspaper and press briefing were grouped under the themes *"International Relations", "Policy", "Governance", "Economy", "Human Rights*" and "*Security"*. The keywords under each thematic category are selected mostly from the top 200 words in the collocation results of the newspaper and press releases corpora. Some of the keywords falling below in the list, though, such as HAMAS, are selected for their significance in the EU-Israel relations.

The keyness score of the words can be calculated based on the "log-likelihood" for each word or the "chi-square value" of the words. While the log-likelihood calculation solely focuses on the frequency of chosen words within the corpus, ranking the words based on their chi-square value helps to detect words occurring in a certain group of texts significantly more than other groups. Therefore, chie-square value method was chosen to map the collocates occurring within each newspaper/press briefing. The keyness score of the collocates were calculated and used to produce charts and Keyness score tables using ARK, a mixed-method data analysis software (*ARK*, 2021). Equation (1) illustrates the calculation of the chi-square values.[2]

$$x_c^2 = \sum \frac{(O_i - E_i)^2}{E_i}$$

(1) X^2, ***p < 0.0001, critical value: 6.63.

Based on this calculation, circular diagrams are produced for each newspaper group and all press briefings. The words with the highest keyness score appear in the center of the diagram, and the most frequent words have the biggest font size. For example, in Figure 1, the words "Israelis" and "Somalis" have a smaller font than "European" or "Union"; however, they are in the center of the diagram with "Israel" because they appear in Haaretz articles significantly more than they appear in the Jerusalem Post, the Times of Israel or the press briefings.

In this way, it is aimed to find out the EU perceptions in different newspapers of Israel and in the official press releases of then Israeli Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Benjamin Netanyahu, Israeli President Reuven Rilvin, and Israeli Parliament, Knesset.

[2] In the analysis, calculation of collocation in the Voyand tools and calculation of the keyness scores in the ARK program by using chi-square value, which necessitated to know statistics and technical information, are done with help of İlkyaz Kabadayı.



Figure 1. Results of the Lexicometric Analysis of Haaretz between 1 December 2017 and 30 June 2018.

Table 1. Result of the analysis of keyness score of each corpus, illustrating the most frequent 10 collocates and their keyness scores based on their chi-square value per newspapers and press briefings.

Rank	Press Briefings corpus (966 words)			Haaretz corpus (4375 words)			The Jerusalem Post corpus (5970 words)			The Times of Israel corpus (23969 words)		
	Frequency	**Word**	**Keyness**	**Frequency**	**Word**	**Keyness**	**Frequency**	**Word**	**Keyness**	**Frequency**	**Word**	**Keyness**
1	25	Attacks	176.343***	277	Israel	180.057***	66	EU	241.496***	304	Europe	150.898***
2	21	Affairs	148.056***	143	Israelis	178.707***	40	anti	112.307***	35	Israelis	60.106***
3	21	Cooperation	148.056***	110	Somalis	174.678***	82	Dangerous	98.214***	329	Jews	50.571***
4	15	Fear	105.677***	90	People	142.697***	77	Migration	92.195***	374	Jewish	49.601***
5	14	Millions	98.620***	89	Open	141.100***	74	Antisemitism	88.586***	1398	EU	41.637***
6	13	Intelligence	91.564***	82	U.S.	129.932***	71	City	84.978***	351	Palestinian	35.781***
7	45	Security	86.246***	60	Palestine	94.911***	70	Map	83.775983	194	World	35.212***
8	12	Austrian	84.510***	219	European	91.955***	81	Synagogues	83.187***	590	Union	33.289***
9	12	Islam	84.510***	56	Roma	88.556***	64	Diaspora	76.565***	733	President	33.201***
10	11	Belgian	77.458***	29	Iran	81.398***	28	Netanyahu	71.858***	543	Minister	24.425***

1.2. Structure of the Thesis

The thesis consists of six chapters. In the introduction, the research topic of the thesis is conceptualized and the need for the research is justified, scope of the thesis is defined, research questions are stated, the methodology and sampling is outlined, and an overview of the structure of the thesis is given. The second chapter focuses on the background of the EU-Israel relations from historical perspective from 1957 till 2020. The third chapter draws attention to the important themes, frameworks, and agreements which draw the major lines of EU-Israel relations today along with providing a detailed analysis of the evolution of the EU foreign policy in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. The fourth chapter tries to shed a light on the self-perceptions of the EU. In the fifth chapter, the results of the lexicometric analysis are shown in a detailed way. By doing so, the thesis is able to give a detailed account of the EU perceptions in Israel in the sixth chapter.

CHAPTER 2

EU-ISRAEL RELATIONS IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT

2.1. Introduction

For the EU, Israel is not merely a country in its southern neighborhood. Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not limited to the region between Jordan River to Mediterranean, and Golan Heights/Al-Jawlan to the Gulf of Aqaba. It has wider regional repercussions that have been affected by the dynamics of regional and international balance of power along with ideologies such as Arab nationalism. The EU and its involvement in the conflict also go beyond Israel or the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). There are other factors that determine the two main parties' policies. The US factor is an integral part of understanding Israeli policy. Arab nationalism and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) factor -at least during the Cold War- are indispensable from the PLO and Palestinian cause. Albeit at varying degrees from time to time, those extra regional and ideological factors have always been present at the center of the issue.

The chapter will analyze the historical aspect of the EU-Israel relations as most of the problems between the two have their roots in history. To begin with, the main tenets of the official EU's approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are parallel with the UNSC Resolutions of 242 and 338. From early on, the European Community (EC) did not accept the Israeli acquisition of territory by force in 1967. However, the first collective attempt of the EC to develop a policy towards the Arab-Israeli Conflict happened to be after 1973 Yom Kippur War (Benli Altunişik, 2009, p. 106). Under the pressure of the Organization for the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) Crisis, the EC made a declaration in Brussels in 1973 that mentioned the "legitimate rights of the Palestinians" (European Economic Community, 1973a). In 1974, Euro-Arab Dialogue was created but it remained as a

vague concept limited to ad hoc conferences and informal contacts (D'alancon, 1994, p. 42). In 1977, the EC further detailed "the legitimate rights of Palestinian people" in the London Declaration with adding the need for a homeland for Palestinian people. Moreover, the inclusion of the Palestinian representation in negotiations is also referred in the same document (European Council, 1977, p. 2). In 1980, the seminal Venice Declaration stated that PLO would have to be associated with the negotiations (*Venice European Council Declaration*, 1980).

While this is the case for the EC side, the gap among the Arab states had been widening in the second half of the 1970s. After Egypt's departure from Arab nationalism by agreeing with Israel at Camp David, Arab states' substantive commitment for Palestinian cause became seriously vulnerable. It had started to be highly difficult to refer an Arab unity on the issue. Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon revealed this general crisis of Arab nationalism. When Beirut was besieged and then occupied by Israeli army there was no significant support from Arab countries, except Syria (De La Gorce, 1997, pp. 12–13). The situation deteriorated during the First Intifada at the end of 1980s concerning the Arab world's commitment to the Palestinian issue. A Fatah Central Committee member, Khalid Hasan's words summarized the situation in 1989 after Arab League's Casablanca Summit: "the Arab stand no longer exists. It is no use saying that the Arab stand is disunited, fragmented, or tentative-it is now less than zero. As far as the Palestine question and the intifada are concerned, there is no Arab stand." (cited in Stein, 1990, p. 80).

The EC, on the other hand, went on to issue declarations in the rest of the 1980s after Venice Declaration. However, it failed to take concrete steps to enact these measures. The EC's influence was further hampered by the US and Israeli opposition to its active involvement. The end of the Cold War and the subsequent Gulf War of 1990–91 ushered in a new geostrategic era in the Middle East. The US, now the world's only superpower, dreamed a "modern Middle East" and claimed that settling the Arab-Israeli Conflict would be a precursor to achieving the vision. Madrid Peace Conference, a US initiative, was convened under this atmosphere. The EC was not

a co-sponsor along with the US and the USSR, its role was limited to be the chair of the largest multilateral track, namely the Regional Economic Development Working Group (REDWG). EC's given role as the financier of the peace process in Madrid was reinforced in the upcoming Oslo Peace Process. In Oslo, the long-standing EU aspirations of convening a peace conference, mutual recognition of Israel and the PLO of each other, and references to the UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338, became real (Benli Altunişik, 2009, pp. 107–108). After the demise of the Oslo Process, the Quartet was established by the US, Russia, the EU and the United Nations (UN).

The EU role has been constrained by history to contributing to maintaining of the current status quo rather than changing it (Shikaki, 2021). Bearing the responsibility of the Holocaust, Germany, in particular among the other EU members, has to be very careful not to offend Israel by its actions.

2.2. EU-Israel Relations from Historical Perspective

Relations between the EU and Israel dates back to the early days of the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957 upon the signing of the Treaty of Rome. For Israel, the creation of the EEC was both an opportunity and a severe threat politically and economically. During the late 1950s, trade deficit was a problem for Israeli economy with an import-export ratio of more that 3:1 in 1956. In order to overcome this problem, Israel needed to increase its exports. Besides, while the EEC members represented 30% of the Israeli exports in 1960; a united external trade barrier was to be established by January 1962 among the members of the EEC. In the resulting picture, this trade barrier constituted a substantial impediment for Israeli authorities to increase exports, indicating a major challenge to Israel's survival (Heimann, 2015, pp. 88–89). Seeing this from early on, the Israeli government considered the issue seriously to cope with long term economic repercussions of the initial steps of the formation of a free trade area among its main trade partners and its exclusion from it. Full membership to the EEC, an association with the EEC, or a at least a limited trade agreement with the EEC, on the other

hand, were seen as a solution for Israeli economic problems along with the political implications of them as freeing Israel from isolation and relieving Israel's existential anxiety (Heimann, 2015, pp. 86–93). Because of the detrimental economic and political consequences of possible exclusion, Israel chose to pursue the prospect of full membership to the EEC in the meetings secretly held between then Israeli director-general of the Ministry of Defense Shimon Peres and Jean Monnet as early as 1957. Peres, being very close to Israel's first Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, argued in a memorandum written in 1957 that apart from geographical proximity, there is also the cultural aspect of Israeli consideration of the EEC as a natural partner. Considering the Cold War bipolar world order, Peres envisaged a future tripolar world in which the newly established EEC would ascend to a superpower status (Pardo, 2013, pp. 901–905). In those clandestine meetings with Monnet, Peres is said to be informed by Monnet that Israeli desire to become a full member of the EEC was not practical. Instead, he proposed Israel fully pursue an association with the Common Market (Pardo, 2011). Following this, Israeli authorities requested to open a diplomatic mission in Brussels as the third country after Greece and the US in 1958, and subsequently, the year 1959 marked the beginning of the full diplomatic relations between Israel and the EEC (Pardo & Peters, 2012, p. xxvii). The first ambassador to Brussels, Rafael Gideon, refers to his customary farewell visit to Ben-Gurion in his memoir before his departure to the new post. It is evident that in this visit, Ben-Gurion related the future economic and social progress of Israel with the emerging European Community, signaling utmost importance he attached to the promotion of the relations between Israel and the Community. Moreover, he suggested that Israeli people had been at the foundations of Europeans' spiritual values (Gideon, 1981, p. 100). For Ben-Gurion, considering Israel's economic and political isolation in the region, the relationship with the EEC was vital (Heimann, 2015, p. 96).

While this is the case for the Israeli side, the Europeans were not so eager about it. For West Germany, forging close relations with Israel meant severing relations with Arabs with whom it had economic interests. When Italy was considered, the rivalry

with Israel in the agricultural area decreased the possibility of Italian support for Israeli association to the EEC under Article 238 of the Treaty of Rome which provided associate countries many of the economic and institutional benefits exclusive for member states. Besides, any association with third countries was required unanimous approval of the Six members under Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome (Heimann, 2015, p. 88). The other members of the EEC were also against Israeli association; the only exception was the Netherlands. Still, Israel stayed optimistic and applied for the association officially in 1960, subsequently rejected by the Council of Ministers. By the way, in mid-1962, even Ben Gurion agreed to give up on the dream to achieve the EEC membership or signing an association agreement with the EEC. He concluded that Israel's prospects to sign a trade agreement with the EEC would be a practical goal to achieve under the circumstances (Heimann, 2015, pp. 98–104). The rounds of talks to conclude a trade agreement between EEC and Israel had started, yet the documents of that time indicate the fact that even during those negotiations, Israel was trying to get an association agreement cleverly camouflaged by a trade agreement (Pardo & Peters, 2012, p. 58).

Nonetheless, not an association but a non-preferential trade agreement was signed between the EEC and Israel in 1964. With the Agreement, the Community reduced tariffs on some goods having special interest for Israel. When the limited scope of the Agreement was considered, the European Parliament members resented that the Agreement did not cover solutions to some of the most important problems of the Israeli economy. In that regard, speaking for the Socialists, member of the Parliament representing West Germany, Mr. Herbert Kreidman mentioned the Agreement as a small step to realizing Israeli accession to the Common Market. However, the President of the Common Market, Dr. Walter Hallstein, did not agree with the idea that the Agreement did not solve problems that Israel had been experiencing in exporting goods to the Common Market. He added that there was no possibility to discuss Israeli association under the Treaty of Rome because Israel was not a European country (Pardo & Peters, 2012, pp. 33–39).

While there was this difference between the EEC institutions as to how they handle the Israeli issue from an economic perspective, there were divergences among the Six on the political grounds as well. The Six Days War in 1967 between Israel and the coalition of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria became a test case for the EEC to reveal whether the Six would be able to give a common and unified response to the crisis. The result was disappointing as the EEC members responded to the War differently depending on their national stances in the Arab-Israeli Conflict. The very fast and unexpected success of Israel, on the other hand, produced a more militarily confident Israel which proved itself as a regional actor having the capacity to change the curse of the events in the Middle East (Martins, 2016, p. 156).

Although during the war, Israel unlawfully occupied Golan Heights/Al-Jawlan, Sinai Peninsula, Gaza Strip, and West Bank, it/she managed to sign a preferential trade agreement with the EEC in 1970, which was replaced by the 1975 EEC-Israel Cooperation Agreement. The Agreement created a free trade area between the two. The economic relations between the Community and Israel gradually increased with those agreements, eventually reaching the edge to sign an association agreement in 1995. While the Agreement's whole provisions entered into effect in 2000, the scope of cooperation between the two parties had already started to widen as of 1996 based on it. The association agreement envisaged additional bilateral agreements. In this manner, one of the most important of those bilateral agreements, Israel became an associated member of the Fourth R&D Framework Programme (1994-1998) in 1996. Since then, Israel continued its status as an associated member in subsequent Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Horizon 2020 (2014-2020) R&D Framework Programmes of the EU (Don Harpaz, 2008, p. 395). As of February 2020, under the Horizon 2020 Framework, Israel has been granted 972,4 million Euro for R&D projects, equal to the 23,18% of the associated countries total, by the EU (European Comission, 2020).

The cooperation initiatives between the EU and Israel have not been limited to the bilateral trade agreements; the EU's initiatives for the Mediterranean and its neighbors also cover Israel. Barcelona Process, or widely known as Euro-

Mediterranean Partnership (EUROMED), launched in 1995, became the defining element of the EU-Israel relations in the regional context. The ENP, on the other hand, became an instrumental tool for deepening the cooperation between the EU and its neighbors in a wider context with the European enlargement in 2004. Within this context, the EU and Israel launched the EU-Israel AP at the end of 2004. The AP represents one step further for developing a strategic partnership in which "Israel and the EU will strive to intensify political, security, economic, scientific and cultural relations, and shared responsibility in conflict prevention and conflict resolution" (Commission of the European Communities, 2004, p. 7).

On the economic grounds, the relationship between the EU and Israel flourish to the extent of strategic partnership. However, the political aspect of the issue was not that bright. Starting from especially the Six Days War in 1967, Israel lost the support of France, the country that once the relationship between the two was called as "special" (Pardo & Peters, 2012, p. 73). During the war, France refused to make any assistance to Israel, supported the UN Resolution 242 mandating the Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, block the recommendation of the Commission to the Council of Ministers to resume the talks with Israel until towards the end of 1968, condemned Israel and imposed an arms embargo against Israel (Jerusalem Centre for Public Affairs, 2005; Pardo & Peters, 2012). Throughout the Yom Kippur War in 1973, France's stance did not change, and the United Kingdom (UK), the new member of the EEC, joined the ranks of France (CVCE, n.d.-a).

The Venice Declaration in 1980 was a critical point in the EC relationship with Israel. With the declaration, EC asserted that Israeli settlements in the occupied territories were illegal and "constitute a serious obstacle to the peace process in the Middle East." Unilateral actions aiming to change the status of Jerusalem/Al-Quds were not acceptable because the city should be open to everyone. Moreover, the EC saw the Palestinian problem as an issue which was not limited to the refugees, but an issue wide enough to include the right to self-determination for Palestinian people. More importantly, the Declaration stated that the PLO should be included in

the peace negotiations (*Venice European Council Declaration*, 1980). Expectedly, the Israeli government reacted to the declaration fiercely and understood it in the context of security and survival of the Jewish state:

> Not since Mein Kampf was written have more explicit words been said, in the ears of the entire world, including Europe, about the desire for the destruction of the Jewish state and nation (Pardo & Peters, 2012, p. 159).

Nonetheless, the declaration cast a shadow over the Israeli perceptions of the EU, which has been persisting up until now, and "Israeli leaders regarded the EU as much a part of the problem as of the solution" (Pardo & Peters, 2012, p. 153). Israeli annexation of Golan Heights/Al-Jawlan in 1981, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and Israel's excessive use of force against civilians in the First Palestinian İntifada in 1987 received condemnation and criticism from the EEC. Foreign Ministers of the EEC issued a statement concerning the Israeli annexation of Golan Heights/Al-Jawlan, stating that the extension of Israeli jurisdiction over the Golan Heights/Al-Jawlan was contrary to internal law, impeded the implementation of the UNSC Resolution 242, and therefore jeopardized and complicated the search for peace in the Middle East. As a result, the unilateral decision of the Israeli Parliament, Knesset, was invalid in the eyes of the EEC (*Bulletin of the European Communities (12-1981)*, 1981, p. 69). In 1982, The EEC responded to the crisis resulting from Israel's invasion of Lebanon by suspending arms sales informally to Israel, blocking 22-million-pound financial protocol with Israel, and calling for the involvement of the PLO in the peace negotiations (Collins, 1982, p. 156). Imposing trade sanctions on Israel was considered by the EEC as well, but that consideration could not be realized. When the individual responses of the EEC members were taken into account, the Netherlands' response is worth to be mentioned. The Dutch Parliament, the Parliament of the strong supporter of Israel, condemned the invasion (Collins, 1982, p. 150). At the end of 1987, the First Palestinian Intifada, which lasted towards the end of 1993, started. In 1989, the European Council initiated a declaration in the face of a constant increase in the number of deaths and wounded in the Occupied

Territories[3]. It called for an international conference to convene under the UN umbrella (*Bulletin of the European Communities (6-1989)*, 1989, p. 16). However, then Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Arens stated that Israel did not approve such a peace plan initiated unliterally by the EC without consulting Israel (Los Angeles Times, 1989a). Moreover, then Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir increased the level of criticism and said that the EC was siding too much with the Palestinians to play an active role in any peace process (Los Angeles Times, 1989b).

The beginning of the 1990s brought about a historical opportunity by the dissolution of the Soviet Union, meaning the end of the Cold War's bipolar world order. Naturally, every region had been affected by this change, but the Middle East, as one of the most important playgrounds for the two superpowers, was no exception. Moreover, in the international community, especially in the Western public, there was a sense of euphoria, revealing itself in the so-called "End of History"[4] paradigms. Those changes had ramifications for the EEC and the Israel-Palestinian Conflict as well in several ways. Firstly, there emerged an optimism and enthusiasm in world politics with the end of the Cold War that termination of all the conflicts was possible. Secondly, thanks to the transformative process of the Maastricht Treaty of 1991, the EU had more room to assert actorness in world politics. Thirdly, the PLO became highly weakened on the regional level due to its support to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Neither the Gulf States nor the international actors approved such involvement. After the end of the Gulf War, The United Arab Emirates (UAE) ended its financial support to the PLO with a ban on financial

[3] Occupied territories refer to the areas that Israel has occupied since the "preemptive" war in 1967. These are lands taken by force and under Israel's effective rule through the Military Government of Israel (MGoI). From a territorial perspective, the term covers the West Bank, including Jerusalem/Al-Quds and the Gaza Strip in Palestine, as well as Syria's Golan Heights/Al-Jawlan.

[4] In 1989, Francis Fukuyama referred the developments that signaled the end of the Cold War as "end of history", making an analogy to Karl Marx who borrowed the term from Georg Frederic Hegel. The concept defines the history as a "dialectical process with a beginning, a middle, and an end" (Fukuyama, 1989, p. 3). Basing his arguments on this, Fukuyama suggested that the end of the Cold War was not passing of a particular period of history but end of the history itself in that human ideological evolution reached the ultimate point marking Western liberal democracy as the "final form of human government" (Fukuyama, 1989, p. 4).

support to the territories as a punishment for PLO's support to Saddam Hussein. Moreover, some 300 thousand Palestinians were dismissed from Kuwait after the end of the Gulf War. They became refugees in Jordan. 20 thousand among them were allowed to return the territories, adding up to the unemployed people there. Palestinian unemployment in the territories had already became a concern after the emigration of 400 thousands of USSR Jews to the territories with the end of the Cold War. The new-comers took over the jobs from Palestinians in a gradual manner. After four years, in 1994, the unemployment rate in Gaza had reached to 50% (Retta Sivolella, 1996, pp. 15–16). Besides, there was no longer a Soviet Union (SU) to support liberation movements, limiting the PLO's room for maneuver even more. Likewise, Israel was also challenged by those changes in the international system. Israel understood the new realities that, with the SU's demise, its strategic position turned into a liability in US policymakers' eyes. Further to that, the US threatened Israel to withhold economic and military aid as a pressure to make them participate in the peace process (Banishamsa, 2012, pp. 152–153). In other words, both regional and international atmosphere were suitable for the emergence of something unique in the history of Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, along with the two conflicting parties' own circumstances.

Reflecting the mindset and circumstances explained above, the US President George H. W. Bush told the US Congress on March 6, 1991 that "the moment has come to put an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict". Following Bush's announcement, the US Secretary of State James Baker engaged in eight months of vigorous shuttle diplomacy, ending in the Madrid Peace Conference in October 1991. Israeli, Egyptian, Syrian, and Lebanese delegations, as well as a combined Jordanian-Palestinian mission, attended the conference, which was co-chaired by Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. For the first time in history, all sides to the Arab-Israeli conflict had assembled for direct talks -an extraordinary occasion. The Conference took place from October 30 to November 4, 1991 (US Department of State, n.d.).

According to the letter of assurances, the negotiations would take place in phases in Madrid, starting with discussions on temporary self-government arrangements. The target of these discussions was to obtain an agreement within a year. Interim self-government provisions, on the other hand, would be in place for five years once they are agreed upon. Besides, negotiations on permanent status would begin in the third year of the temporary self-government agreement phase. These permanent status talks, as well as those between Israel and the Arab states, would take place under the framework of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 (Journal of Palestine Studies, 1992, p. 121).

The most important outcome of the Madrid Conference was the adaptation of bilateral negotiation model with Israel and Arab neighbors. Madrid was considered as a great victory for the Palestinian national movement as Palestinian nationality, a controversial term up until that time, had to be recognized. Still, Palestinians had to be part of the Jordanian delegation (Retta Sivolella, 1996, p. 17). Yet, it is important to note that the US' commitment was critical to the conference's success. Determined presidential leadership, a strong secretary of state with a close relationship with and the president's solid support, a very positive inter-national and regional environment, and sustained and focused American diplomacy were able to overcome regional leaders' resistance -particularly Shamir, al-Asad, and Arafat— to weave together a compelling peace initiative. Moreover, by bringing in Russia as a co-sponsor and encouraging the EU and the UN to participate— a prelude to the Quartet diplomacy a decade later— the US created a global endeavor that prevented Arabs and Israelis from using outside parties against each other (Kurtzer et al., 2013, p. 29).

During the Madrid process, the EC/EU was responsible for the REDWG and excluded from bilateral talks. In 1992, Israel rejected the participation of Palestinians coming outside from the West Bank and Gaza Strip from the first REDWG meeting. This simply meant the rejection of the Tunis-based PLO participation in the meetings. However, the EC did not accept Israeli demand and

started the sessions without Israeli representations in the face of Israeli threats to boycott the meeting (Soetendorp, 2002, pp. 286–287). The importance and practicality of the REDWG diminished due to the beginning of the secret talks between Israel and the PLO through the Oslo channel.

Madrid paved the way for continuation of bilateral and multilateral talks for the solution to the conflict. In the talks in Moscow on January 1992, and Washington after that, on practically every subject, there were significant differences between Israel and Palestine. Palestinians requested complete control over all occupied territories, including full authority over land issues; Israel framed its approach to self-government as referring to the people, not the land, and left out Israeli settlements and Jerusalem/Al-Quds. Palestinians wanted an elected political authority to exercise all of Israel's powers (except security); Israel proposed delegating twelve categories of powers and responsibilities, subject to coordination and cooperation, with all other powers remaining with Israel as residual powers. Palestinians envisioned a powerful presidency, a legislature with legislative authority, and a judiciary; Israel defined self-government as mostly administrative and functional, with no legislative authority. Palestinians demanded that Israel withdraw to the 1967 border, with UN forces and specific arrangements established for external security; Israel proposed a local Palestinian police force, with all other security tasks remaining in Israel's control (Kurtzer et al., 2013, p. 31). In the coming decades, it is seen that the situation in the territories under the Palestinian Authority (PA) control resembles to what Israel suggested more 30 years ago as mentioned above. This has led to the criticisms that the peace process started at Madrid "enabled and solidified Israeli occupation" (Hawari, 2021). The EU-Israel relations after Madrid had developed mostly within the frameworks of Oslo Process and the Quartet. This process will be explained in the subsections with respective titles below.

2.2.1. Oslo Peace Process

As the positive atmosphere that led to the formal bilateral talks between Israel and Palestine faded away in time after Madrid Peace Conference, Israel and the PLO initiated covert back-channel talks in Norway in January 1993 (Palestinian Journeys, n.d.). The resulting breakthrough of this back-channeled talks came true in August 1993, in Oslo, Norway's capital city. The Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (DOP), or Oslo I, was initialed during a secret ceremony in Norway by the chief Palestinian negotiator, Abu Ala Ahmed Qurei (a.k.a. Abu Ala), and his Israeli counterpart. Based upon the Palestinian self-government in Gaza and Jericho, it laid down the principles for a gradual establishment of peace between Israel and the Palestinians. The official ceremony was held in Washington in September 1993 (Norway Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999). However, to reach this historical moment, many closed-door efforts were exerted by the parties involved. In the beginning, Norwegian leaders were inspired by the post-war European Community experience. Mutual hatred between Germany and France had transformed into friendly relations thanks to economic interdependency under the EEC umbrella. They hoped the same phenomenon repeat itself in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Makovsky, 1996, p. 15).

Nonetheless, Norwegian leaders were aware that they did not have the luxury to make the same mistakes in the Madrid Conference, which took place in 1991. During the Madrid Conference, direct contact between the PLO and Israel was not possible owing mostly to the negotiations' being more or less in public, blocking the conflicting parties' representatives from having a constructive dialogue. Under the atmosphere free of public pressure, the main problems blocking the direct negotiation, which were Israeli reluctance of recognizing the PLO and the PLO's aim of destructing Israel, had to be eliminated. To this end, initially, an academic committee involving Israeli and Palestinian academics started to work in January 1993. In May 1993, the committee presented the first unofficial draft agreement, and then, the meetings were upgraded to official negotiations. In the end, with the letters

of mutual recognition exchanged between Arafat, the chairman of the PLO, and Israeli Prime Minister Ishak Rabin on 9 September 1993, the first phase of the Oslo Accords was completed (Norway Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999).

In the Oslo process, which started in this way, the parties signed significant agreements. The first one of those most important peace agreements produced by the process is the aforementioned DOP or Oslo I. It drew a framework for the Oslo process and the permanent status of the negotiations. The aims of the negotiations were listed in the agreement as; establishing a Palestinian Interim Self-Government, which would serve as the elected Council for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip for a temporary period limited for five years, and leading to a permanent settlement at the end of the peace process based on the UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338 (land for peace formula). Israel would withdraw from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area. The permanent status negotiations would start as early as possible but not later than the beginning of the third year in the interim period. The issues to be covered in the permanent status negotiations were "Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbors, and other issues of common interest" (*Declaration of Principles*, 1993). The reference to the UNSC resolutions 242 and 338 security council is critical because those resolutions refer to the Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories.

DOP was succeeded by the Gaza-Jericho Agreement or Cairo Agreement signed on 4 May 1994. With its associated annexes and correspondence, it provided detailed regulations for security issues and borders, economic relations, and transfer of authority from the Israeli administration to the PA (Norway Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999). Indeed, the agreement established the PA with territorial, functional, and personal jurisdictions over the Gaza Strip and Jericho area. Those jurisdictions were not extended to the settlements, Military Installation Area, and Israelis. Moreover, the Palestinians would have no jurisdiction over civil actions in which an Israeli is a party unless that action relates to property in the autonomous area, or an ongoing Israeli business located in the autonomous area, or the Israeli in question

has consented to such jurisdiction (*Main Points of Gaza-Jericho Agreement*, 1994). Foreign relations, too, were not under the authority of the PA. In other words, no types of foreign missions abroad for the PA nor their establishment in the Gaza Strip and Jericho area were permitted. Only representative offices could be open. According to the agreement, Israeli military forces were scheduled to withdraw from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area within three weeks. The five-year interim period for the peace negotiations started immediately after signing the agreement (*A/49/180*, 1994).

The beginning of the Oslo Process marked a change in the policy of the EU. Having realized that "significant economic commitment would have political implications," the EU launched the policy of financial involvement in the peace process anticipating greater political influence and promised the 38% of the 2.4 billion dollars pledged at the 1993 Washington Conference (Miller, 2006, p. 643). In 1993, Israel and PLO mutually recognized each other and signed the DOP, signaling a breakthrough (European Parliament, 1999, p. 1). The reflections of these developments to the EU-Israel relations can be seen in the upgrade of the importance the EU attached to Israel following the Oslo Accords. In the Conclusions of the Essen European Council in 1994, Israel was referred to as a partner that "should enjoy special status in its relations with the EU" (European Council, 1994).

In July 1994, Yasser Arafat, the PLO Chairman, paid his first visit to Gaza Strip and Jericho area. The EU welcomed this visit and defined it as the "evident proof of the progress already achieved in the Middle East peace process" (*A/49/230*, 1994, p. 2). In addition to the existing euphoria, read through these words, the parties reiterated their willingness to implement Oslo Accords with the Oslo Declaration on 13 September 1994. The difficulties related to the international assistance to Palestinians along with the importance of the provision of monetary arrangements for PA's expenditures (e.g., for the police), the coordination between donor countries, and the setting up of the PA's revenue collection system were among the main issues covered in the Declaration (*Oslo Declaration*, 1994).

The Oslo II/The Interim Agreement is the most significant and most comprehensive agreement to date between Israel and the PLO (over 300 pages) (Norway Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999). This agreement's main purpose was to implement the Oslo I Agreement by extending Palestinian self-government on the West Bank through the withdrawal of Israeli military forces and democratic elections. According to the agreement, except for the issues that would be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, the West Bank and Gaza Strip would come under the Palestinian Council's jurisdiction gradually to be completed within 18 months after the inauguration of the Council. Moreover, with the agreement, the West Bank was divided into three zones; Areas A, B, and C. While in Area A, the Palestinian Council would have full responsibility for internal security and civil affairs; in Area B, the Council was responsible for civil affairs only. In Area C, however, Israel would have control in all aspects (The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement (Oslo II), 1995).



Figure 2: West Bank according to the Interim (Oslo II) Agreement, Taba, 28 September 1995 (Passia, 1995).

Palestinians had been obliged to observe the trade policy requirements determined by Israel between 1967 and 1994. In 1994, the Protocol on Economic Relations ("Paris Protocol") of the Gaza and Jericho Agreement, and minor changes adopted

on it with the Annex V of the Interim Agreement, the PA's jurisdiction over the economic area had been designated in four sectors; labor, trade relations, fiscal issues, and monetary arrangements. During the interim period, these arrangements suggested that Israel collect import duties, income tax deduction for Palestinian workers in Israel, and Value Added Taxes on behalf of the PA to transfer them to the PA monthly. In terms of monetary arrangements, a Palestinian Monetary Authority was established, which had functions of a traditional central bank but without issuing currency by the Protocol (*Paris Protocol*, 2016).

On 4 November 1995, a right-wing Jewish extremist, who opposed the Oslo Process, assassinated the Israeli Prime Minister Rabin, and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres became the acting Prime Minister (CNN, 1995) until the elections would behold in 1996. Meanwhile, the EU started the Euro Mediterranean Partnership (EUROMED) with the Barcelona Declaration towards the end of November 1995. Isma'i rightly points out that without the Oslo Process, it is almost impossible for the EU to make the Arab States or Israel negotiate with each other under the framework of a partnership agreement with the EU (Isma'i, 2011, p. 20).

For the Palestinian people, the year 1996 began with a very historical, if not romantical, moment for their long and painful resistance against the Israeli occupation. The First Presidential and Legislative Elections of Palestine were held on 20 January 1996 under the guiding principles of Article II of the DOP. In the elections, in which voter turn-out was 75.86%, Yaser Arafat won a splendid victory, gaining 87,1% of the votes. While Hamas boycotted the elections, Fatah gained 58% of the Assembly seats, although it received 30% of the votes in the ballot (Ghanem, 1996, p. 526). The EU was responsible for coordinating the whole international observation in the elections in line with the invitation in the Oslo II/Interim Agreement. To this end, the EU established an Electoral Unit, deployed in the field by mid-November. The Unit opened five operational offices to coordinate the approximately 600 international observers' activities apart from employing 300 EU observers in the field. Apart from that, as early as April 1994, the European

Commission started to extend financial support to prepare the elections. This aid amounted to ECU 7.5 (European Currency Units-some 9 million US dollar), which dispersed among the drafting the electoral law and determining the geographical boundaries for the electoral districts, training election officials, provision of technical equipment, etc. The EU also covered the cost of observing the elections, which amounted to ECU 10 million (some 12 million US dollar) (European Commission, 1996).

The year 1996 witnessed the Israeli elections as well. In the elections, Benjamin Netanyahu, the right-wing Likud member and an outspoken opponent of the Oslo Process, replaced Peres as the Prime Minister (*Oslo Timeline: 20 Years of Failed US-Led Peace Talks*, 2013). To better understand Netanyahu's view on the Oslo Process, and with whom the EU dealt in the peace process after Rabin, it is essential to read his statement to Knesset on 23 September 1993 upon the signing of DOP. That day, he had pointed out his criticisms to Prime Minister Rabin;

> When you read this agreement, even if the words Palestinian state are not mentioned there, you do not need a sign. This is a Palestinian state. This is where you are leading us (…). Looking straight out the window, you can see the area that, according to this agreement, belongs to Arafat (Journal of Palestine Studies, 1994, p. 142).

In another instance, he criticized the Oslo Accords as: "One of the most important boosts Islamic terrorism has received since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in Iran has been the creation of the PLO enclave in Gaza in the wake of the 1993 Oslo accords" (Netanyahu, 1995, p. 104).

As understood from the passage above, the transition of power in Israel had profound implications for the peace process' future. Expectedly, the year 1996 was very intense politically not only for Israel but also for the EU. Throughout the year, Israeli change in power and associated results; construction of new settlements, and the imposition of Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) redeployment from West Bank city, Hebron/Al-Khalil, were the matters at stake. Following the elections, the European

Council issued a strong statement, named Florence Declaration, on 22 June 1996. It was highly strong in the sense that the EU commitment to peace process was reiterated, *inter alia,* as: "It (EU) will continue to do everything possible to ensure that the work already begun is pursued and brought to its conclusion." (*Florence European Council Presidency Conclusions*, 1996, p. 15). Virtual stagnation after the elections was addressed too in the speech of the President of the European Council, Dick Spring, in the Middle East and North Africa Economic Summit in Cairo in November 1996. He said that the times like that necessitates the EU support for the peace process more than ever (Peters, 1999, p. 296). The referred stagnation meant that the envisaged IDF redeployments scheduled to be completed by 28 March 1996 had not been realized (Copans, 1996). Although there were many delays made by Israel in the Oslo agreements' timeline before this incident (State of Palestine Negotiations Affairs Department, 2016), after Rabin's assassination, due to the reality of the new political environment, and the Israeli decisions on construction of new settlements, the situation became more complicated. Concerning the settlements, President of the European Council Spring called the Israeli government to halt constructions in the UN General Assembly in September 1999. On behalf of the EU, he stated that there was no other issue doing more harm to the peace process than the continuing construction of settlements. It was also the settlements that undermine the PA's ability to deter extremists. He ended his remarks by referring to the importance that the EU attached to the peace process as the biggest donor and said that the EU would work hard to make sure its success (*UN General Assembly 6th Plenary Meeting A/51/PV.6*, 1996, pp. 11–12).

While Israel was moving away from the Oslo Process, having invested heavily in it, the EU did not have the privilege to give up easily. Accordingly, French President Jacques Chiraq made a six-day long visit in October 1996 to Jordan, Israel, Palestine, and Syria, which proved to be very controversial but still maintaining the European policy of increasing its involvement in the peace process more. During the visit, Chirac's statements concerning the establishment of a Palestinian state and end of the Israeli occupation of Golan Heights/Al-Jawlan and southern Lebanon

were not welcomed by Israel. Moreover, Chirac engaged in an argument with the Israeli security guards to visit East Jerusalem/Al-Quds ash-Sharqiya. Going further, he reminded Israeli authorities of the Oslo principle of "land-for-peace" and in a threatening manner that the ratification process of the Association Agreement signed between the EU and Israel in 1995 had not been finalized. All in all, it can be said that his visit served to reaffirm the French and the EU's role in the Middle East Peace Process (Marlowe, 1996; Olson, 1997, pp. 84–86). For the EU, the conditions of a more active role for the Union in the peace process replacing the role of the US were not there yet. Instead, the EU policy of that time was trying to work together with the US (Whitney, 1996). In line with these developments, high ranked EU officials repeated the EU's commitment to the Oslo Process during those years. Manuel Marin, then Vice President (VP) of the European Commission, stated this reality explicitly that the Oslo agreements had to be respected and implemented in full, and there was no credible alternative to the Oslo blueprint (Marin, 1997).

The deadlock in the process, with failure in the imposition of the IDF withdrawal from Hebron/El Halil, and resumption in the Israeli settlement construction, decreased trust between the parties. The resulting picture led to the violence and casualties throughout Jerusalem/Al-Quds, West Bank, and Gaza. On 1 October 1996, the EU Council of Ministers issued a statement concerning the events. According to the Council statement, the root cause of the unrest in the territories was the absence of actual progress in the peace process. Because of this, the EU called upon Israel;

> (…) to match its stated commitment to the Peace Process with concrete actions to fulfill its obligations, as well as to refrain from any action likely to create mistrust about its intentions. The Union notes that the particular events which triggered the current crisis concerned the fears of Palestinians that their position in Jerusalem was being further eroded. The Union recalls that parties have agreed, under the terms of the Declaration of Principles, not to take any action which would prejudge the outcome of the Permanent Status Negotiations. It will work to ensure that this commitment is implemented by both sides (European Commission, 1996).

Simultaneously with the Council statement, the conflicting parties came together in Washington, without the EU representation, to halt the violence and to resume the process with the invitation of the US president Bill Clinton. However, there was no agreement at the end of the meeting (*Chronological Review of Events/October 1996*, 1996).

Despite being the principal financer of the peace process and being the country's number one trade partner, Israeli opposition to the EU continued throughout 1996, and the EU was unsuccessful in turning its indispensable economic role to political influence in both the peace process and in the Israeli economy. Moreover, the EU was confused over what policy to pursue in the peace process. What is more interesting is that even the Chirac government could not dare to impose economic sanctions on Israel (Wood, 1998, pp. 570–571). As a sign that apart from the financial issues, it started to engage in the political issues concerning the peace process, the EU established the post, titled as "The EU Envoy to the Middle East" in October 1996. Considering the developments, Israel did not want the EU to take more stake in the process, and as a result of Israeli resistance EU's first Middle East Envoy, Miguel A. Moratinos, was allowed restricted access to the negotiations, which was limited only to monitoring and reporting (Olson, 1997, p. 86). Nonetheless, Moratinos played an important role in the realization of the long-delayed Hebron Agreement in January 1997. Netanyahu and the US Special Envoy Dennis Rose invited Moratinos to honor its appointment. In the gathering, both Netanyahu and Rose agreed to the EU to give a collateral letter of assurances to Palestinians for the first time. When the previous policies of Israel and the US against the EU's involvement are considered, this represented a successful level up in the EU role. The letter of assurances given by the EU to Arafat was stronger than the US one in terms of the assurance given to Arafat that Israel would not allow retaining large areas of the West Bank after the redeployment. Palestinians received assurance letters from Egypt and Jordan as well. For them, this balanced the inequality which was created by the US-Israel close relationship (Micheal Jansen, 1997). With "collateral letter of assurances" given by the EU to the Palestinians, the

Protocol could be finalized (Micheal Jansen, 1997). According to the Protocol, the IDF would withdraw from 80% of Hebron/Al-Khalil within ten days; and from the whole West Bank areas, apart from settlements and military locations, in three phases (*Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron*, 1997). Many circles welcomed the Protocol, so was the EU, as it could provide the energy to reinvigorate the peace process. However, the Note for the Records of the Protocol revealed that even in the confidence-building measures, which were relatively minor issues used for creating trust between the parties, earlier disagreements continued to exist as sources of conflict (Weiner, 1997, p. 425). Nonetheless, Hebron Protocol was considered as an advancement under these circumstances. The aim was to get the parties to come together in a new phase in the negotiations (Weiner, 1997, p. 379). While Israel was withdrawing from Hebron, it also decided to establish new settlements in East Jerusalem/Al-Quds ash-Sharqiya by mid-February, aiming to isolate the city from Palestinian territories. The EU opposed the Israeli government's decision with various Presidency statements and parliamentary resolutions (European Parliament, 1999, p. 44).

The peace process was stalled again in the coming months of 1997 because 4 May 1997 must have been the due date for the start of permanent status negotiations. Not to mention the Israeli failure to fulfill the Hebron Protocol's whole requirements apart from withdrawing from 80% of Hebron/Al-Khalil city and stopping new settlements, along with the PA's failure to stop terrorist attacks inside Israel and the Occupied Territories. In the face of these, as one of the last efforts to save the Oslo Process, the parties signed the Wye River Memorandum on 23 October 1998. It scheduled a new timeline for Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and stated the immediate resumption of the permanent status negotiations (*The Wye River Memorandum*, 1998). In the negotiations of the Memorandum, the EU Special Envoy's room for inclusion was limited to monitoring (Banishamsa, 2012, p. 159). This limited engagement signifies the marginalization of the Special Envoy's role compared to the Hebron Protocol period. Indeed, the title of the European Special Envoy was symbolic in that the mandate of the Special Envoy Moratinos was not

well-defined and explicit. There was uncertainty concerning the primary roles he would play. Likewise, the ways in which his role can improve the enforcement capacity of EU's foreign policy was not explicit. These factors paved the way for Moratinos to end up being a marginal figure for the best part of the Oslo Process (Peters, 2010, p. 517).

On the French side, interesting changes were happening concerning Israel in 1997. Just several months after Chirac threatened Israel on the non-ratification of the EU-Israel Association Agreement, French Parliament ratified the Agreement in March 1997 under the strong pressure of Chirac's government on the ratification (Wood, 1998, p. 571). The changes were present on the Israeli side as well. In the words of Dutch Foreign Minister Hans van Mierlo, the enduring Israeli policy of opposition to the EU's increasing role in the peace process had come to an end in June 1997 (Jewish Telegraphic Agency, 1997).

Nevertheless, the end of the interim period came without any permanent status agreement on 4 May 1999. Still, this due time did not provide the grounds for a unilateral Palestinian declaration of statehood as Section 31(7) of the Oslo II Agreement prevented both parties from taking unilateral actions on the status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip until a permanent status agreement is reached (Singer, 1999, p. 27). In the Berlin Declaration, the EU urged all the parties to continue to final state negotiations in an extended period, not more than one year. Moreover, the EU gave a guarantee to Palestinians as:

> The European Union reaffirms the continuing and unqualified Palestinian right to self-determination, including the option of a state and looks forward to the early fulfillment of this right. It appeals to the parties to strive in good faith for a negotiated solution on the basis of the existing agreements, without prejudice to this right, which is not subject to any veto (European Comission, 1999).

Along with the US, the EU blocked the unilateral declaration of Palestinian statehood by the PA at the end of the interim period in 1999 (Musu, 2006, p. 12).

As a last effort to save the Process, on 4 September 1999, the parties signed the Sharm El-Sheikh Memorandum on the implementation of the timeline of the previous agreements along with the issue of resumption of permanent status negotiations and conclusion of a comprehensive peace agreement within one year ("The Sharm El-Sheikh Memorandum," 1999). However, towards the end of the one year, there was still no glimpse of a permanent peace agreement. Against this backdrop, under the auspices of the US, the parties came together in Camp David Summit in July 2000 to negotiate the final status agreement. Concluding arguments in the Camp David suggested that the Summit ended without an agreement (IMEU, 2005). Given this orientation in the Process, Knesset Member Ariel Sharon paid a poorly timed visit to Temple Mount/Harem El Sherif, exacerbating the already tense situation. Following the visit, the Second Palestinian Intifada/Al-Aqsa Intifada started on 29 September 2000 (Demirel et al., 2001), marking the collapse of the Oslo Process.

The end of the Oslo Process was as dramatic as its initiation because historical levels of expectations turned into a real disappointment. However, the reality on the ground created by the Process endured. Today, the division of the West Bank has been persisting mostly without change. While 2.8 million Palestinians have to live in only 39% of the West Bank's crowded cities, Israel has retained the control of the 60% of the West Bank and goes on its illegal settlement policies in this area (Al Jazeera, 2019). The anticipated State of Palestine could not be established at the end of the Process, and the PA became permanent. In other words, the legacy of the Oslo Process is still alive with the institutions it led to creating.

To sum up, throughout the Process, the main focus of the EU was on creating an environment that would facilitate the conditions to reach a lasting peace in the region, rather than contributing directly to the political solution. To this end, from the beginning of the interim period, the EU had adopted a policy focusing on the following three main tenets: supporting the peace process financially, supporting Palestinian state and institution building, and making an effort for regional

stabilization and search for multilateral solutions (Asseburg, 2003, pp. 174–175). In line with these aims, there had been two important EU declarations on the Middle East. Firstly, the EU issued a "Call for Peace" document in mid-June 1997. In the document, the EU called upon Israel "to recognize the Palestinians' right to exercise self-determination, without excluding the option of a State" (Amsterdam European Council, 1997). The EU supported Palestinian self-determination openly since the Venice Declaration of 1980, but the document took the EU support one step further by referring to a Palestinian State (Palestine & the UN, 1997). Secondly, just before the due date for the interim period, on 25 March 1999, in the Berlin European Council Presidency Conclusions, the EU declared that it was ready to consider the recognition of a Palestinian State in due course under the frameworks of the Madrid, Oslo Process and subsequent agreements, along with the UNSC Resolutions of 242 and 338 (*Berlin European Council*, 1999).

At the end, contrary to the hopes attached to the Oslo Process, the critics state that the resulting situation has provided Israel with effective political cover to maintain a prolonged occupation. Besides, the prospects for Palestinian self-determination through a two-state solution have largely been undermined. Moreover, the political and financial costs of the Israeli occupation have been externalized. The reality on the ground today is an open-ended occupation, the financial costs of which is mainly on the EU's shoulders. Along with these, Israel remains an occupying power that denies being held accountable for its obligation under international law (Dajani & Lovatt, 2017, p. 1).

2.2.2. The Quartet

In September 2000, all those hopes attached to the Oslo Process gave way to disappointment revealing itself in the form of a popular uprising in Al-Aqsa, leading to the collapse of the Process. The EU's role in the process was to support building institutions for the future Palestinian state. This has become a permanent role for the EU as the temporary Oslo mechanisms became enduring realities on the ground for

the years to come. As the tensions increased between Israel and Palestine, the humanitarian situation had become worse due to the Second Intifada/Al-Aqsa Intifada. Under these circumstances, the Middle East Quartet was formed by the US, the EU, Russia, and the UN on 10 April 2002. Just five days after the formation of the Quartet, the EU put forward a new initiative to end the violence in the occupied territories and to promote peace between the parties. German Foreign Minister Joschka Ficher was the father of the new Seven Point Plan. The plan was in line with the previous EU position in the peace process. It endorsed a two-year period for the creation of a Palestinian state in line with the UN resolutions 242 and 338 (ReliefWeb, 2002). The plan transformed into the "Middle East Quartet Roadmap," which was declared on 4 June 2003. According to the Roadmap, comprehensive settlement for the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict would be realized by 2005 (*The Middle East Quartet Roadmap*, 2003).

When looked at the background of the emergence of the Quartet, it is evident that the humanitarian situation in Palestine became a concern as Al-Aqsa Intifada / the Second Intifada and the Israeli-Palestinian violence intensified. On the other hand, the change in the US administration culminated the situation to become worse. After taking the office in January 2001, the President G.W. Bush disengaged the US from the Middle East Peace Process. This political vacuum left by the US coincided with the election in Israel in February 2001. The hardline Liqud leader Ariel Sharon became the Prime Minister of Israel according to the election results. While Palestinian side wanted international intervention to protect civilians, Israel declined to be part of any negotiation without the full cessation of violence. Under these circumstances, 9/11 marked a turning point for the Middle East. The terrorist attacks to the US started President Bush's "war on terror" which affected the Second Intifad/Al-Aqsa Intifada as well. Consequently, the relations between Palestinians and the US strained much more. The result was the further deterioration in security and compelled the US to reengage. On 25 October, the first unofficial meeting of the Quartet took place in Ramallah. The representatives from the UN, the US, the EU and Russia met with Arafat to discuss security measures. In brief, the emergence

of the Quartet can be understood in the context of the humanitarian crisis and security considerations in the face of the political disengagement of the US from the conflict (Elgindy, 2012). Starting in this way, the Quartet has two aims; the one is to mediate the Middle East Peace Process, the other is to support Palestinian economic development and institution building (The Middle East Quartet, n.d.).

While the EU had started to work with the Quartet, it also continued to issue declarations on the situation in the Middle East. In Seville Declaration of 2002, the EU put strong emphasis on the importance of the continuation of the peace process with stating that "a settlement can be achieved through negotiation, and only through negotiation". The issue of Jerusalem/Al-Quds and the problem of Palestinian refugees would be also part of this final settlement. The 1967 borders would be the ultimate borders marking the State of Palestine, if necessary, with minor changes agreed by the parties. The Declaration referred the Israeli Military Operation Defensive Shield in the West Bank by stating that "military operations in the occupied territories must be ceased". Parallelly, the terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians were condemned by the EU in the Declaration. Moreover, referring to the Separation Wall in the West Bank which was started to be built by Israel in June 2002, the EU stated that "walls will not bring peace". The need for the reform in the PA was also stated as being essential, along with the EU's commitment to assist the reform efforts in the PA (European Council, 2002, pp. 35–36). The importance of the Declaration lies in its clear-cut statements on what is the EU's understanding in the final solution for the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. The Quartet, on the other hand, represents a practical way for the EU to tie its position with the US in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. It also represents a broader consensus for the two-state solution (Pijpers, 2007, p. 5). One of the most important contributions of the Quartet is the aforementioned Road Map, which was put forward in 2003. It was aimed to correct the fundamentals flaws of the Oslo Process in three-phases, namely; normalization, transition, and permanent status agreement (Elgindy, 2012, pp. 55–56; U.S. Department of State, 2003). To begin with, during the Oslo Process, Palestinians were expected to fulfill their obligations first. Instead of this conditional

implementation, the Road Map envisaged parallel implementation in which Israelis and Palestinians fulfill their obligations simultaneously. The other important question neglected in Oslo was who would be in charge of checking parties' compliance to the Road Map. This issue of monitoring and accountability was central to Quartet mindset. The Road Map envisaged an informal, agreed and transparent monitoring mechanism in Phase I. However, after so many years, any Quartet monitoring mechanism has not been established. The Road Map's failure on the monitoring was very much linked to the Bush administration's inaccurate policy, going back and forth between engagement and disengagement (Kessler, 2003). The Road Map envisaged a final agreement settling down the Israeli Palestinian Conflict by 2005. However, there were no clear specifics of a final agreement in the plan. Instead, it leaves those "final status" questions to be worked out later. As a result, some experts regard the road map as more like a cease-fire arrangement or a general framework than a detailed blueprint for peace (Otterman, 2007).

The Quartet's Road Map started to be irrelevant due to several developments. Firstly, Israeli Knesset put 14 reservations on the Road Map. One of those reservations made the Road Map's parallel implementation principle impossible; "The first condition for progress will be the complete cessation of terror, violence and incitement. Progress between phases will come only following the full implementation of the preceding phase" (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003).

The other blow came from Sharon's Disengagement Plan. According to the plan, Israel would unilaterally disengage from Gaza Strip. Still, it is stated clearly in the plan that Israel would go on to build the Security Fence (Israel Prime Minister's Office, 2004). Which means that Disengagement, like the Oslo process, provided a means for Israel to break from Palestinians demands without having to end the occupation (Elgindy, 2012, p. 18). Nonetheless, the Quartet and the EU declared support for the plan, marginalizing the Road Map further (European Union, 2005; Quartet, 2005a). For Israel, the unilateral disengagement from Gaza Strip was a

precaution to the demographic challenge that Arabs would outnumber Jews there soon. In that case, Israel would lose the majority in democratic elections. On the other hand, the Quartet could transform the disengagement plan into a tool to strengthen Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas's political influence. The disagreements among the Quartet members made it impossible to use the opportunity. At the same time Quartet body was not successful to turn Israeli unilateral action into a peace agreement with Palestinians. The Hamas victory in the elections held in January 2006 had connections with the Quartet's fundamental failures as well. First of all, unsuccessful peace process diminished the belief among Palestinians to Fatah rule, which was already corrupt and unable alleviate the social and economic grievances (Bauman, 2009, pp. 166–185). Secondly, the Quartet supported inclusion of Hamas into political issues by disarming it (Quartet, 2005b, 2005c). While Fatah was losing support, Hamas was gaining trust among people in Palestine as answer to their daily sufferings. Under these conditions, the leading Quartet member, the US and its Bush administration, pressured Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to held the elections without further delay in accordance with its democratization ideal in the Middle East. However, when the elections were held, the Hamas victory changed the scene of the peace process forever. Quartet statement made it clear for Hamas that the international assistance would be conditional of its recognition of three principles; "nonviolence, recognition of Israel, and acceptance of previous agreements and obligations, including the Roadmap" (Quartet, 2006). The UN Envoy to the Quartet, Alvaro de Soto, reflected on this decision of Quartet, which also represent the disagreement among the Quartet members on the decision of boycotting Hamas. According to his report, the decision:

> (…) effectively transformed the Quartet from a negotiation-promoting foursome guided by a common document [the road map for peace] into a body that was all-but imposing sanctions on a freely elected government of a people under occupation as well as setting unattainable preconditions for dialogue (de Soto, 2007, p. 19).

While the UN tried to avoid those conditions in Kofi Annan period, his successor Ban Ki-moon is said to accept them unreservedly (Elgindy, 2012, p. 22).

After the stalemate, a power sharing agreement, Mecca Agreement, between Fatah and Hamas was signed on 8 February 2007. A government was formed in which Ismail Haniyeh became the prime minister (Palestine National Authority, 2007). The agreement did not include the three Quartet provisions for the resumption of assistance and diplomatic contact: the current government would "respect", rather than "abide by" the previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements; it would not recognize Israel; and it had not renounced violence. As regards to the one year-long heavy pressure on Hamas, these provisions reminded how little concessions had been extracted from Hamas (International Crisis Group, 2007a). However, the EU very welcomed the agreement as it was a way out from the deadlock situation for the EU. Günter Gloser, President in Office of the European Council, reflected on the agreement as a window of opportunity ending the sole Hamas rule. The power-sharing agreement between Hamas and Fatah, according to him, made it possible to have a fresh start in the Middle East. The formal contacts with the Cabinet members who accepted the Quartet criteria had also resumed. He stated that President Abbas deserved the EU's full support. Besides, he mentioned Salam Fayyad, the minister of finance, as the EU's main contact in establishing transparent financial institutions in the PA. In order for the PA's financial situation to improve, he referred to the issue of release of the customs and tax repayments of the PA which was retained by Israel. He stated that the EU called for the release of them on different occasions (Gloser, 2007).

The EU had also seized the opportunity presented by the end of sole Hamas rule to make a fresh start in Middle East policy, and the foreign ministers had resumed contact with the Cabinet members who accept the Quartet criteria. However, the Mecca Agreement could not live long and did not meet the Quartet's expectations. In June 2007, Hamas took over the control in Gaza Strip, while Fatah controlled the West Bank. The EU strongly condemned Hamas's takeover of power in Gaza (Deutsche Welle, 2007). As regards the Quartet, the body of four welcomed the formation of a new government which totally excluded Hamas. It praised the Salam Fayyad's government on the grounds that it abided itself by the Quartet principles.

Besides, the rapid and direct financial assistance and other forms of aid to the PA were encouraged in order to help the government in reforming and developing institutions and infrastructure (Quartet, 2007).

The division between Hamas and Fatah both on political and geographic terms may have paved the way for the Quartet relieving its mind from the burden of dealing with Hamas. The critics says that the US and the EU, by their words and actions, persuaded key Fatah figures that the unity government formed after the Mecca Agreement was temporary and that Fatah's previous dominance over the PA could be re-established. They also assisted in persuading key Hamas figures that the unity government was a trap, that time was running out, and that they needed to act before their opponents were too strong. In other words, the Mecca Agreement did not trigger the crisis; rather, the crisis was result of those mentioned deliberate attempts of the US and the EU (International Crisis Group, 2007b).

In the wake of Hamas' take over, Israel imposed land, sea and air blockade on Gaza, where 1.8 million Palestinians resided in. Gaza population was denied access to the remainder of the territory and the outside world (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2021). The PA assisted Israeli blockade by imposing its own sanctions on Gaza as well. Public prosecution service was halted, payments to Gaza's governors were strictly reduced, and the PA's law enforcement agencies in Gaza were prevented to cooperate with Hamas. Employees who did not go on strike, as well as those working after Hamas seized power in March 2006, were judged to be cooperating with Hamas and faced being fired from their employment. The Fayyad government, whom the EU backed heavily, only paid salaries to "non-essential staff" including hospital cleaners and municipal workers on an irregular basis (International Crisis Group, 2008, p. 3). Hamas has survived under the severe economic conditions in the coming years. In the face of resulting deterioration in the humanitarian situation in Gaza, the Quartet continued to issue statements, which had proved themselves ineffective so far.

By the way, the US President George W. Bush organized a summit at Annapolis, Maryland, on 26-27 November 2007, to revive the peace process. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and the PA President Mahmoud Abbas met with Quartet and Arab League representatives. It was decided that more talks will take place with the objective of obtaining a peace agreement by the end of 2008 (Deutsche Welle, 2021). However, Annapolis Conference shared the same fate with other peace initiatives so far. The main reason for the failure can be attributed to the fact that in his first term, Bush did not pay attention to Israeli-Palestinian Conflict due to 9/11 attacks. This led to missing diplomatic opportunities. The other reason was the lack of enforcement mechanisms for the implementation of the Annapolis Peace Conference provisions. Besides, the three leaders were politically weak during and after the Annapolis Peace Conference, indicating another reason for the Conference's failure (Silva, 2010, pp. ii–iii).

The failure in the Annapolis resembles the one last effort of a dying body to breath. The body here is the Quartet itself consisting of four major world powers. This giant body was not flexible enough to respond the crisis on time. As a result, over the years, the Quartet has received several criticisms due to its inability to establish itself as a truly multilateral or successful negotiating body. Its policies have mirrored either the EU's failed attempts to frame American initiatives within a multilateral framework or the US's strong attempts to provide multilateral cover for unilateral actions. Against all the odds, the Quartet's worth cannot be overstated if it can be expanded and reshaped as a platform for establishing a revived international agreement on the Arab-Israeli conflict if it is to serve a useful purpose (Tocci, 2011, p. 1). It had served as a durable and active diplomatic mechanism between 2002 and 2014, yet without achieving tangible success. To put it in another way, Quartet's diplomacy did not prevent the loss of lives and devastation of infrastructure in Gaza after 2006. Israel military operations of Operation Cast Lead (Gaza Conflict) (2008-2009) and Operation Protective Edge (2014) were two extreme examples of those bloodshed. The UN, one of the four members of the Quartet, established a fact-finding mission to investigate human rights violations in the Gaza Conflict. The

mission's report, widely known as Goldstone Report, concluded that Israel committed war crimes and violated the rule of customary international law and fourth Geneva Convention (Goldstone, 2009). European Parliament called all EU member states to support the report in the UN General Assembly and hence bring it before the International Criminal Court (ICC) in order to persecute the responsible persons of such crimes described in the report (European Parliament, 2010). However, the leading Quartet member, the US, was strongly against the report. The US Senate called the UN to rescind the report because of "numerous unsubstantiated assertions against Israel" and downplaying of "the overwhelming evidence that Hamas deliberately used Palestinian civilians and civilian institutions as human shields against Israel" (Senate of the United States, 2011). The Quartet envoy at that time, Tony Blair, also rejected the report on the same grounds as well (Holstun, 2009). It is obvious that there is a severe division in the Quartet. This kind of division leaded the peace process nowhere. The Quartet principles have remained nothing but words only. After the collapse of the negotiations in 2014, the high-profile role of the Quartet vanished as well. There was no statement issued after 2016. Recently, there was an effort for the resurgence of the Quartet amid the covid-19 crisis. However, sceptics say that the time of re-emergence of the Quartet is not arbitrary. There is an election coming for the PA. With respect to this fact, according to critics, Quartet principles are being resurfaced against any Hamas victory (Dalloul, 2021).

After it became apparent that the Quartet no longer provided necessary ground for peace talks, other peace initiatives have been put forward by other actors but the EU has not taken part in these initiatives. One of the leading EU members, France, tried to make a fresh start to peace talks. In 2017, representatives from over 70 countries met in Paris, to discuss Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Neither Israeli nor Palestinian representation was present at the conference. Netanyahu denounced the talks as "rigged" against his country. French Foreign Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault's remarks at the beginning of the conference summarized the aim of the gathering as "a two-state solution is the only one that is viable". However, this effort too ended up being

in vain (Deutsche Welle, 2021). The gathering did not provide any hope for future settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.

2.2.3. Story After the Demises of Oslo Peace Process and the Quartet

The EU has employed a carrot-and-stick policy for Israel after the peace process had failed. For example, in July 2013, the EU issued guidelines, outlining the conditions under which the European Commission would carry out important requirements for the provision of EU assistance to Israeli firms or their operations in regions occupied by Israel since June 1967. These guidelines aimed to guarantee that EU policies and pledges on the EU's non-recognition of Israel's sovereignty over lands seized by Israel since June 1967 be respected in accordance with international law. This would be realized by exclusion of Israeli entities having place of establishment beyond pre-1967 borders of Israel from the EU grants, prizes, and financial instruments (European Union, 2013a). This was the first example of the operationalization of the EU differentiation strategy between Israeli proper and the occupied territories (Persson, 2018b, p. 193). This meant for Israel that the EU sanctioned Israeli settlements. Besides, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu referred to the guidelines as the biggest failure in his political career up to date (Ravid, 2013). Tzipi Livni, Israel's Justice Minister, voiced worry that the new guidelines "may constitute the first step toward Israel's isolation from the rest of the world" (The Jerusalem Post, 2013). Yuval Steinitz, Israeli minister for intelligence, international relations and strategic affairs, complained that the EU imposed double standards on Israel by imposing these guidelines, indicating that the EU did not impose similar guidelines on another contested territory, the Turkish Cyprus (Gur, 2013). However, in December 2013, just several months after the upheaval in Israel against the guidelines issued, the EU offered Special Privileged Partnership to Israel as well as Palestine. Different from the EU guidelines, which have symbolic value and related to the area of security and survival metaphors in the Israeli context, it focuses on the formal issues in the EU-Israel relations. The wording of the document is intentionally vogue, and the treatment of Israel and Palestine is the same in the

document. With the proposal, the EU offered reinforcing technical, economic, and political ties with both Israeli and Palestinian sides as an incentive to reach a final solution to the long-lasting conflict between the two parties. However, the partnership proposal, which is said to be closest to the EU membership, did not create the anticipated effect on the Israeli side. Although, throughout 2014, it was repeated by the EU officials frequently, in 2015, it was omitted from the official statements. In other words, the difference in the understanding of fundamental political issues cannot be changed by applying formal institutional settings (Martins, 2016; The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies & Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2016).

In 2015, the European Commission published labeling guidelines according to which the agricultural and food products originated in the Occupied Territories should not be labeled as "made in Israel," instead "the expression 'Israeli settlement' or equivalent needs to be added" (European Commission, 2015). Israel's Foreign Ministry vigorously opposed it and accused the EU of applying a double standard when Israel was concerned because the EU ignored the other territorial disputes around the world (BBC News, 2015). However, the labeling guidelines were implemented only in a limited fashion among the EU member states. On the matter, in November 2019, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) released its judgment ruling that foodstuffs coming from the Occupied Territories must bear the indication of the territory of origin (*Judgment in Case C-363/18*, 2019). The implementation of the ruling is mandatory, but, as of March 2020, an EU-wide unified procedure for labeling has yet to be seen. Recently, in January 2020, the US came up with a new initiative on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. The so-called Trump Plan was created with the US and Israel unilaterally without the inclusion of the Palestinian side. The EU HR and VP Joseph Borrell said that the plane departed from the internationally agreed parameters. He stated that to decide the final status of the conflict, direct negotiations between the parties must take place. More importantly, he added that the EU did not recognize Israeli sovereignty over the occupied territories since 1967 and urged that "steps towards annexation if implemented, could not pass

unchallenged" (Borrel, 2020). While the top-level diplomat of the EU responded in this way, there is still the risk that these words might end up only as a rhetorical move. In the face of the EU bureaucracy, namely the need for consensus on foreign policy issues, Israel's closest allies -Hungary and Czech Republic- can block even the preparatory steps of any EU action against Israel (Emmott & Guarascio, 2020).

Although there is a wide range of options for the EU, Borrell himself did not put forward any concrete suggestion as to what will be the countermeasures if the annexation is implemented. The problem is not related to the availability of the options for the EU but related to deciding to use those options (Jensehaugen et al., 2020). Recognition of the State of Palestine, with East Jerusalem/Al-Quds ash-Sharqiya as capital, is the first option for the EU. With a viable diplomatic backing along with excluding the settlements to benefit from preferential access to European markets, institutions, and programs; this could be effective in applying pressure to Israel. Additionally, taking action in smaller groups among the EU member states can be effective in overcoming the consensus-driven aspect of the EU foreign policymaking. As another policy option, *inter alia*, the EU can reconsider its policy of non-contact with Hamas. Since Hamas' victory in 2006, there have been no parliamentary elections that took place in the PA. In other words, democracy has paid the price for the EU's policy of non-contact. The EU's contact with Hamas can be effective in reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah, and national elections can take place (Oppenheim, 2020). Despite this variety of policy options, there is hardly anything indicating that the EU, as an entity, can employ any one of these policies. It is expected that the EU will continue to support the status-quo on the ground, i.e., continue to fund undemocratic PA and to preserve the strategic relationship with occupier Israel (Jensehaugen et al., 2020).

By the way, it is important to refer to Hamas (Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement) briefly, concerning its place in the EU-Israel relations. Hamas was established in 1987, following the First Intifada, as political and military extension of Muslim Brotherhood (Bader, 2013, p. 68; Quell, 2021). The military wing of

Hamas was included in the EU's first-ever terrorist blacklist, which was created in December 2001. Two years later, Hamas' political wing was also banned by the EU (Vincenti, 2015). In September 2010, Hamas petitioned the General Court[5] to challenge its ongoing inclusion on the EU terrorist list. In December 2014, the General Court overturned the Council's decision to keep Hamas on the list on procedural grounds. The Council resolved to appeal the General Court's decision on January 19, 2015. The General Court's decision is suspended until the appeal procedure (European Council, n.d.). If Hamas is delisted, already strained EU-Israel relations are likely to be put to the test once more. Israel frequently criticizes the EU for being too soft on terrorism and bluntly rejects EU criticism on settlements (EURACTIV, 2017). As mentioned earlier, the 2006 Hamas election victory meant for neglect of Hamas by the EU in the form of no-contact policy. Starting from 2007, Hamas has been governing Gaza with the costs stemming from the EU's policy. Looking from 2021, Hamas is seen to have been able to absorb the costs of the EU's no-contact policy. However, there is now an EU that has absolutely no leverage on Hamas (Tocci, 2021).

The issue of Hezbollah, which was designated as a terrorist organization by the US, has been a matter of tension in the EU-Israel relations for so long. On July 12, 2006, Hezbollah attacked Israel, killed several Israeli soldiers, and fired rockets at Israel from Lebanon. The response of Israel was unprecedently harsh; a 25-day long military attack started on July 13 on Lebanon, destroying the country's infrastructure and causing billion-dollars damage. On July 31, in an extraordinary session to address the situation in Lebanon, the European Council called for the immediate cessation of hostilities to be followed by a sustainable cease-fire and supported the efforts of the UN to reach a solution (Council of the European Union, 2006). Two days later, the Finnish Presidency of the EU announced that Hezbollah would not be put into the EU terrorist list as three of the 25 EU members, namely France, Spain, and Ireland, did not agree on the matter (Gestenfeld, 2006). In 2012, an Israeli

[5] Court of Justice of the European Union consists of two courts; the Court of Justice and the General Court (Court of Justice of the European Union, n.d.).

tourist bus was bombed in Bulgaria, and two other terrorist plots had been foiled, one again in Bulgaria, the other in Cyprus, earlier in the same year. Although Hezbollah denied any involvement, in 2013, as a result of these developments, the European Council designated Hezbollah's military wing a terrorist organization (Council of the European Union, 2013). However, this decision did not satisfy Israel. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu criticized the distinction made between the armed and political wings of the organization and said that Israel saw Hezbollah as a unified organization (EURACTIV, 2013). Hezbollah has been an active participant in Lebanese politics for years, being part of the governments formed. Recently, in January 2020, a new government in Lebanon backed by Hezbollah was formed (Francis, Ellen; Bassam, 2020). Now, the EU is facing more pressure from the US and Israel to ban the organization entirely. However, considering France's involvement in Lebanon, a unanimous EU decision to ban Hezbollah entirely remains to be seen (Stern, 2020).

Another issue that the EU should face in its relations with Israel is the US factor. The US President Donald Trump's recent Middle East Peace Plan put forward in January 2020 created new tensions in the EU-Israel relations. EU foreign policy chief, Josep Borrell, mentioned Trump's plan as departing from internationally agreed parameters, and if the annexation of lands in Palestine were implemented, it could not remain unchallenged. Israeli Foreign Ministry Spokesman Lior Haiat, in a fierce tone, tweeted that "Pursuing such policies & conduct is the best way to ensure that the EU's role in any process will be minimized" (Reuters, 2020). However, Borrell could not manage to get the required unanimity among the EU members to condemn the plan. It is reported that six EU members, including Italy, Hungary, Austria, and the Czech Republic, blocked the EU resolution (The Times of Israel, 2020). In 2017, the EU, again, had rejected Trump's decision to move the US Embassy in Tel Aviv/Yafa to Jerusalem/Al-Quds as the de facto acknowledgment of the city as Israel's capital (Mortimer, 2017). The other instance that the EU and the US fall apart occurred in 2019 when Trump declared that Washington would recognize Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights/Al-Jawlan.

The decision directly violates the UN resolutions on the matter, and the EU did not recognize Israeli sovereignty over the territory occupied since 1967 by Israel, adding new tensions to the EU-Israel relations (The Times of Israel, 2019). Although, the EU criticized the US policies on the peace process from time to time as these examples indicate, it has not challenged the US position as the primary mediator so far (Asseburg, 2019, p. 38). The EU HR Federica Mogherini put this reality into words as: "Nothing without the United States, nothing with the United States alone" (Mogherini, 2018).

Apart from the US, as historical narrative showed above, Israel itself hardly come to the terms with the EU policies on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Given her dissatisfaction with the EU's foreign policy and activities, Israel has followed a path of strengthening ties with regional blocs in the EU, notably with Central and Eastern European States. In other words, Israel has been exploiting the existing division within the EU to change the EU's critical attitude toward Israel. Members of the Visegrád group (V4) -Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, and Slovenia-, Baltic, Balkan, and Hellenic nations (Greece and Cyprus) are Israel's most important allies in this respect. Besides, there has been an erosion of trust concerning the traditional allies of Israel, because of increased number of condemnations of Israel, and official meeting cancellation etc. Germany, France, Ireland, and Sweden fit best in this category (Ronen & Goren, 2019, pp. 23–24). Judy Dempsy says that, in Israeli eyes, Europe returned to be a continent of nation states: some hostile, some friendly, and some others in between (Dempsey, 2021).

In the historical context of the EU-Israel relations, one last issue has to be mentioned, which is the bitter memory of Holocaust. Being the heir of the main perpetrator of Holocaust, Germany, is still haunted by it. It can be described as a never-ending moral obligation, which create constraints on Germany's and the EU's ability to react to Israeli wrong-doings. The delicate nature of this background paved the way for Israel to emerge at the center of German foreign policy. The Federal Foreign Office of Germany describes the nature of the bilateral relations between

Germany and Israel as “unique”, standing as a “cornerstone” in the German foreign policy. The Federal Office adds that this derives from Germany's role in the Holocaust, the systematic genocide of six million European Jews under National Socialism. The matter of reparations has been a key political issue in ties between the State of Israel and the Federal Republic of Germany since the Luxembourg Agreement of 1952 (reparations agreement). So far, Germany has paid more than 74 billion euros in reparations for the victims of Nazi persecution (Federal Foreign Office- Germany, 2022).

It is no doubt that since the end of the WWII, Germany has been haunted by Nazi[6] persecution against Jews. During Holocaust (Shoah), it is estimated that one-third of the world Jewish population and roughly two-thirds of the Jewish residents of Europe at the time was murdered. This equals to murder of six million Jews and forced deportation of millions more Jews and non-Jews. As these numbers and the memory of the concentration camps indicate, there have been profound effects of Holocaust in politics since the end of the WWII, mainly on Germany (Forster et al., 2020, p. 210; Holocaust Encyclopedia, n.d.). In that respect, West German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, specified on various occasions that the decision to make reparations to Israel was motivated by a “compelling moral obligation”. This indicated for West German authorities that they had a moral obligation to strive to remedy the wrongs done to Jews throughout Europe. However, before the Luxemburg Agreement, Germany had already been paying reparations for individuals since 1949. It is important to note here that, this compelling moral obligation was extended to cover the State of Israel itself with the Luxemburg Agreement. This was motivated by a logic to cover the settlement expenditures of the Jews who had to fled Germany to find a shelter in British Mandate of Palestine between 1933 and 1945. Moreover, Germany had excepted the Zionist claim that

[6] Nazism is a totalitarian movement led by Adolf Hitler who governed Germany from 1933 to 1945. Nazism had many common characteristics with Italian fascism, such as passionate nationalism, popular appeal, and dictatorial authority but it is considerably more radical. Charismatic dictator's will is emphasized as the primary source of inspiration for people and a nation in Nazism. The purpose of the Nazism is to achieve Aryan Volk by annihilation of all enemies, mainly Jewish people and Bolshevism (Britannica, n.d.-a).

the State of Israel is the legitimate representative of all Jews, which can be considered as a second motivation to payment of reparations to individual Jews as well as the State of Israel itself (Lewan, 1975, pp. 44–48). Besides, until the German unification, under the provisions of the 1952 Luxemburg Agreement, West Germany was not held accountable to pay reparations to any state, other than Israel[7], for the damages caused by the WWII. By this way, after 1952, West Germany started to play a significant role in building up Israel. However, it soon became apparent that the West Germany's role was not limited to paying reparations. Germany started to provide military aid for Israel as early as 1957. Not to offend Arabs, this arms shipment was kept as secret until 1964 when German newspapers exposed the scandal. The arms shipments were suspended at the end. To compensate the suspension, the long delayed issue of establishing diplomatic ties between Germany and Israel was realized on May 12, 1965 (Belkin, 2007, p. 3). In the same year, Ludwig Erhard, then Chancellor of the West Germany, defended the policy of helping Israel's armament in that they owed nobody an explanation for their support for Israel's survival (Lewan, 1975, pp. 50, 58).

West Germany was also involving in diplomatic endeavors to increase the security of Israel. To this end, in 1965, Germany tried to persuade Camel Abdul Nasser, the Egyptian President, to recognize the state of Israel in exchange for discontinuance of military aid to Israel by Germany. However, Germany and Egypt failed to come up with an agreement at the end (Lewan, 1975, p. 60). This incident was followed by Israel's victory and occupation of the territories unlawfully in 1967 war. While the victory gained the Christian Democrat's admiration, the Social Democrats framed Israel as an aggressive expansionist state and started to take a more robust stand toward the conflict, differentiating from Israeli narrative (Fischer, 2019, p. 29). However, the oil embargo of 1973 necessitated Germany to put its Middle East policy toward a European path. Under the framework of the Euro-Arab Dialogue, Germany and the PLO started to know each other. The PLO representatives paid

[7] Note that this situation changed in the following years. In 1956 Federal Republic paid Yugoslavia 60 million marks; and in 1959 it promised to pay certain amounts to eleven Western European states and Austria to compensate the Nazi persecution (Lewan, 1975, p. 49) .

two visits to West Germany in 1976 and 1977 (Al-Dajani, 1980, p. 94). While in the 1970s, the aforementioned external developments shaped the German-Israel relations and Germany's attitude to Arab-Israeli conflict, from 1980s onwards to today, it has been the domestic factors that determine the course of developments. Concerning the 1980s, Israel invasion of Lebanon in 1982 was a critical point because the violence was able to be televised. Bonn's silence in the face of worldwide condemnation of Israel for severe human rights violations on the battle ground created question marks in German public. "The permissibility of German criticism of Israel" started to emerge in public discourse in Germany (Fischer, 2019, p. 30). Likewise, Helmut Scmidt, Chancellor of West Germany from 1974 to 1982, stated that how his early admiration for Israel shifted to a neutral posture throughout his government, and how historical responsibility stopped him from fully developing his true feelings, which lay with the Palestinians. Germany's historic duty for the world's Jews made it co-responsible for the Middle East peace, but it did not appear to Schmidt to need a unique connection with Israel (Feldman, 2012, p. 39). By the way, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl started to embark on a policy to rehabilitate German nationalism. In his address to Israeli Parliament, Knesset, in 1984, he used the expression "in the grace of late birth" to refer Germans who are supposedly too young to bear collective responsibility for Nazi crimes (BAMPFA, 1989).

The unification of Germany in 1990 defined by Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin as the "fourth Reich", indicating the anxiety on Israeli side (Feldman, 2012, p. 170). This was coupled with the Iraqi missile attacks targeting Israel in 1991. Germany was accused to "help Iraqi President Saddam Hussein building up his war machine" by providing Scud missiles and chemicals used for biological weapons. Public opinion in Israel of that time was significantly negative toward Germany. It was accused of learning nothing from the lessons of the Holocaust. However, although being offended, Israeli government chose to be pragmatic and went on to accept generous economic and military aid provided by Germany (Laub, 1991). At the end of the decade, two parties managed to overcome the negative implications of a

unified Germany and intensified their cooperation in military, intelligence, and diplomatic fields (Feldman, 2012, pp. 170–172).

With respect to the fact that the EC/EU has increased the tone of voice when criticizing Israel; Germany followed a cautious policy. Rather than trying to change the basic direction of the EC/EU's policy, it chose occasionally limit the Union's impact. Amending the language of the Venice Declaration is one example. Furthermore, at the time of the Berlin Declaration, Germany guaranteed compensation for Israel by its admission to EU's the Fifth European Framework Programme for Research and Technical Development. Besides, when voting of a resolution critical of Israel at the UN takes place, it is frequent that Germany abstains or rejects the resolution, rather than following the EU direction (Feldman, 2012, p. 181). For example, Germany voted against Palestine's full membership to the UN and UNESCO in 2011, sparking a foreign policy rift in the EU (The Local, 2011). In 2012, this time Germany abstained in the UN General Assembly vote for granting Palestine non-member observer state status in the UN. Although Germany did not vote in favor of Palestinian bid, its abstention created a shock in Israeli government circles. For Germany, the reason for her abstention in the voting was Israel's systematic ignorance on Germany's resentment to the continuation of construction settlements (Ravid, 2012). Altogether, from 1990s onwards, the blame of the EU's being unable to use economic measures to change Israeli policy has been mostly on Germany as Berlin has repeatedly blocked the EU from taking action (Feldman, 2012, p. 181).

It is important to make a direct quotation from German Chancellor Angele Merkel to communicate the degree of Germany's capacity to make a move against Israel:

> (…) every German Government and every German Chancellor before me has shouldered Germany's special historical responsibility for Israel's security. This historical responsibility is part of my country's *raison d'être*. For me as German Chancellor, therefore, Israel's security will never be open to negotiation. And that being the

> case, we must do more than pay lip-service to this commitment at this critical point (Merkel, 2008).

Considering the wide range of implications of the words “Israeli security”, it can be inferred that Germany’s hands are tied with the chains of Holocaust. In fact, being able to direct criticism against Israel without being labeled as anti-Semitic in Germany becomes more difficult day by day. The Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement, which was launched by Palestinian civil society was identified as anti-Semitic with a resolution passed from Bundestag, the chief legislative body of Germany, on May 2019. The resolution passed with an overwhelming majority with the support of the ruling parties (Christian Democrats and Social Democrats) and the majority of the opposition (Green Party and Liberal Party). Although it is non-binding, it still reflects the marginalization of criticism of Israel in Germany (Jegic, 2019). In the same way, Mearsheimer and Walt referred to anti-Semitism as “the great silencer”, meaning accusing people critical of Israel as anti-Semitic refrains people from expressing their ideas (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007, pp. 317–321). In this respect, Deutsche Welle (DW), Germany's international broadcaster, is another example. It is well known that it has long been criticized for its biased coverage of Israel. The most recent example of this attitude emerged in 2021 spring. The editorial board of DW has prohibited its reporters and editors from referring Israel as a colonial state or apartheid regime in a new reporting guide distributed to the employees. The document cited the country's responsibility for the Jewish state because of the Holocaust (Anadolu Agency, 2021).

After all, there are others thinking that, Germany's particular connection with Israel, which successive administrations have valued since the 1950s, has shifted recently. For example, Patricia Daehnhardt states that while remaining one of the closest allies of Israel, as well as, continuing to being committed to security and survival of the state of Israel, Germany is aware that the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict is at the heart of several unresolved issues in the Middle East and its support for a two-state solution to the Israel-Palestinian Conflict necessitates a more widespread approach to the conflict. Furthermore, she adds that, German public opinion has begun to

distinguish between Germany's unwavering support to security and survival of Israel and Israeli actions on the ground, which have grown more open to criticism (Daehnhardt, 2011, p. 43).

To sum up, there is a reality that the moral implications of the memory of the Holocaust shapes Germany's Israel policy. Reflecting this, assisting Israel has been a priority of successive administrations in Germany since the end of the WWII. This resulted in the fact that Germany has become the one of the two closest allies of Israel following the US. Besides, Germany is the second largest trading partner of Israel, not to mention the immense defense and scientific cooperation between the two. However, there is also another fact that German public opinion has started to become more critical against Israel (Belkin, 2007, p. 1).

2.3. Concluding Remarks

This chapter has sought to give a detailed understanding of the relations between the EU and Israel in historical perspective. But how will the analysis conducted above be instrumental in understanding the perceptions of the EU in Israel? The first answer to this question concerns with the importance of history in understanding the nature of people and society, tendencies they have, and the role conceptions they accumulated so far about themselves and the other party. Besides, foreign policy is inextricably linked to history. Government officials, whether consciously or subconsciously, rely on their grasp of the past to address what is occurring today; they endeavor to make new and difficult challenges more readable by pulling lessons from history. In other words, both people and governments are affected by the gravity of events they experienced in their relations with another country (Brands & Suri, 2016). Besides, the dictionary definition of perception reads as "the interpretation of sensory information using both the raw data detected by the senses and previous experience" (Oxford Reference, n.d.). The details on the historical aspect of the EU-Israel relations are all revelations of the layers of the "previous experience" which was regarded as one of the two parts of the raw data that will be

used in the formation of interpretation of sensory information -the action that forms perception. This justifies the chapter which evaluated the historical aspect of the EU-Israel relations. With the help of historical insights, it will be possible to trace whether or not there are some historical developments influencing the perception of the EU in Israel today. Put it in another way, it will be possible to reach the roots of some perceptions in historical developments. For example, the legacy of Holocaust, come forward as a crucial factor in Germany's relations with Israel. Or the institutions of the Oslo Peace Process are still valid and for better or worse governs the current frozen situation in the conflict. So, all these kinds of historical narratives have a role in current relations between the EU and Israel. Having this background in mind, the reader will be able to trace their reflections, if ever, in the EU perceptions in Israel.

After analyzing the EU-Israel relations from a historical point of view, it is concluded that especially after the end of the Cold War, the EU pursued a more active policy to impose its normative goals of self-determination for both Israeli and Palestinian people along with the two-state solution through diplomatic and economic instruments. However, the inefficient usage of economic means has brought about the emergence of a gap between the anticipated outcomes and reality on the ground (Tocci, 2009, pp. 397–399). Another problem in the EU-Israel relations is that the EU tries to manage Israeli political problems applying normal tools such as diplomacy or international law, while Israel tends to associate the very same problems with notions of survival and security (Martins, 2016, p. 165).

Apart from these, there is also the issue of EU's making agreement with Israel on economic matters without clearly stating the exact scope of the agreement from the territorial aspect. The other problem is that some EU measures, such as labeling the products originated from the settlements, are not imposed strictly by the EU, making it difficult to create a unified EU policy. Moreover, the EU should consider the effect of the US on Israel before it propose policy on the peace process. Particularly after the Trump administration's generous offers for Israel on the issues within the scope

of the definition of Israel's security and survival context, the EU's economic initiatives will have little effect on Israeli policy, considering that the EU had already provided Israel a special privileged position with unprecedented support.

Looking ahead with bearing in mind these aforementioned issues, the explicit duality in the relations between the EU and Israel -considering the intensity of economic relations and differentiation on political grounds- will probably remain to be the reality at hand for the time being. The EU's long-lasting two-state policy and its role as the financier of the peace process will also remain and will continue to create tensions between the two. Concerning a high level of economic interdependence, the EU and Israel relations are a marriage of convenience, certainly having a stillborn child, the peace process.

CHAPTER 3

EVOLUTION OF THE EU FOREIGN POLICY AND ISRAELI CONTEXT

3.1. Introduction

From the times of the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC) to today, the EU and Israel have enjoyed close political and economic relations thanks to the cooperation established in economy, finance, Research and Development (R&D), culture, security, and trade. Receiving 21.1% of the total goods exported from Israel, and representing the origin of 32.2% of the goods imported to Israel, the EU emerges as the number one trading partner of the country in 2019. Israel benefits from visa-free regime and the number of the Israeli students and academics travelled to the EU is 8415 during 2015-2020 period. Israel participates in Horizon programs of the EU on equal bases with the member states. In 2017-2020 period, Israeli research projects had received 170 million Euros per year under the Horizon 2020 framework (European Commission, 2021c). Israel also benefits from the loans provided by the European Investment Bank to finance infrastructure and investment projects. For example, the Bank provided 150 million Euros to the projects for desalination in 2020 (European Commission, 2021c; European Investment Bank, 2020). Israel is also a beneficiary of EU thematic programmes such as the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights or Development Cooperation Instrument. The EU provides technical assistance to Israeli public administration through Technical Assistance and Exchange Instrument. Together with Palestine, Israel benefits from the European Peacebuilding Initiative which aims to promote the conditions for resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (European Commission, 2021c).

However, a leading EU role in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict has not been the case for many decades. Fabbri and Frontini link this failure with two main reasons. One is the high political complexities of the dossier and the other is the inner difficulties in securing a strong consensus among the EU member states on acting concretely on the ground (Fabbri & Frontini, 2016). In this respect, it is becoming more and more difficult for the EU even issuing a declaration on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, let alone playing a leading role. Moreover, playing such a role necessitates taking risks. In this respect, some sarcastically criticize the EU foreign policy toward Israeli-Palestinian Conflict as being toothless (Kausch, 2021). Likewise, it is stated that complying the US is a safer option for the EU, considering the lack of unified position among its members toward the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.

There are also debates in the literature for years addressing those problems under the banner of the "capability-expectation gap" evident in the EU foreign policy. It is an important term as it has implications for the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict as well. According to Christopher Hill, who coined the term firstly, there are potential future EU roles in the context of the post-Cold War world. Firstly, the EC/EU might fill the vacuum left by the dissolution of the USSR in the global balance of power. Secondly, the EU has the potentials to be a regional pacifier, global intervenor, mediator of conflicts, bridge between rich and poor, and joint supervisor of the world economy. However, these possible roles are challenged by the components of the capability-expectation gap, namely; ability to agree, resource availability, and the instruments at the EC's disposal (Hill, 1993).

In order to address these problems, the EU introduced new policies in the post-Cold War era and tried to engage more in the periphery surrounding itself. To this end, the ENP to which Israel is a party was introduced. In the second section, the chapter will focus on the ENP, EU-Israel Action Plan, EU-Israel Association Agreement, and the EU-Israel Association Council, all of which constitute the main framework agreements between the EU and Israel. In the third section of the chapter, main foreign policy framework of the EU will be addressed within the context of the EU-

Israel relations. Firstly, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) replaced the decades-old European Political Cooperation (EPC) as the main foreign policy framework of the EU. Then, the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) was established, and the post of High Representative (HR) for CFSP was created.

After this brief introduction, the chapter will give a detailed account of explanation and in-depth analysis of those aspects below.

3.2. EU's Foreign Policy Framework in the Context of the EU-Israel Relations and Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Whether the EU can be considered as a unitary actor in foreign policy making has been questioned for years in the academic circles, especially by the realist school thinkers. As a supranational organization having *sui generis* characteristics, the EU has been evaluated from the European Coal and Steal Community to today's EU with integration policies in various fields. While the integration in the economic area led to the political integration, the story did not continue flawless. The political integration has been considered as problematic even today as the anti-EU, populist, and nationalist movements gain ground in the EU member states.

From the beginning, the proponents of the European integration aimed to create a common defense policy between the member states. From this perspective, in the face of problems necessitating hard power capabilities in their even peaceful resolutions, the actorness of the EU would be more assertive. However, integration in the area of defense has remained sidelined with its delicate position in the sovereignty understating of the member states. By the way, the EC started to feel potential of its power as an organization in the international relations at the beginning of the 1970s due to decrease in the tensions between the two superpowers. Yet, being able to have a European foreign policy, meaning that the EC's own foreign policy as an organization, had emerged as another challenge which has lived today. The European Political Cooperation (EPC) was put forward in 1970 under

this atmosphere for the coordination in the foreign policy making in the EC. After this time, it has been a matter of discussion that whether the EU is bigger than sum of its parts or not. Note that the answer of this question is not within the scope of the thesis (see Introduction chapter). The level of analysis in the thesis has been set as the EU. What is aimed in this section is to make a clear description of the evolution of the EU foreign policy with references to its reflections in the EU-Israel relations. In order to have a comprehensive assessment of the EU-Israel relations, main frameworks of the EU foreign policy should be explored. To this end, the CFSP and the position of the HR; and CSDP and its applications on the ground, European Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EUPOL COPPS) and EUBAM Rafah, will be dealt with below.

3.2.1. Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)

The end of the Cold War necessitated new approaches to global politics for all actors in the international relations. The EC was not an exception. As an example of successful economic integration and a regional economic power, political integration became a necessary factor for the EC to become a full global power. In order to overcome drawbacks in the foreign policy making process of the EC which was cumulated over the years since the initiation of the EPC in 1970, CFSP was established in 1993 under the Maastricht Treaty. Created in this way, the CFSP seeks to maintain peace and improve international security in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations (European Commission, n.d.-a). However, the first decade of the CFSP period proved that making a formidable difference from the times of EPC in the foreign policy of the EU was not an easy target. Reaching consensus persisted to be tough even when the national interests are not far apart. Moreover, EU states' lack of military capabilities and coordination were still the case and 1999 Kosovo war became the bitterest reflection of this reality (Toje, 2008, pp. 125–126). In the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, during the 1990s the EU attempted to weave a regional network of multilevel cooperation through its Barcelona process. On a purely financial basis, the EU became the Oslo

Peace Process's most powerful sponsor. However, it is evident that the EU's CFSP in this period lacked political depth in dealing with the conflict. A clear example is that the EU was not included in the Camp David Summit, which convened under the US auspices as an attempt to overcome the deadlock in the Oslo Process in 2000. Failure in Camp David brought about the Second Intifada /Al Aqsa Intifada (Aoun, 2003, pp. 293–294).

Under these circumstances, the European Security Strategy (ESS) Document of 2003 was put forward. Security, with its hard and soft aspects, is described as a precondition for development in the document. Due to the political atmosphere of the post-9/11 era -the US invasions of Afghanistan for terrorism and Iraq for weapons of mass destruction-, the document lists terrorism and weapons of mass destruction among the primary threats to peace and security of the EU. Regional conflicts, state failure, and organized crime are the other threats addressed in the document. However, apart from rhetorical references, the ESS lacks the real policy recommendations on with which instruments and how the EU might tackle with those challenges. (European Council, 2003). "An effective and balanced partnership with the USA" was described as an aim as well (European Council, 2003, p. 15). However, the ESS failed to break the US unilateralism. In other words, the EU-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) strategic crises management to be complemented with working together with the UN remained as a false promise (Mälksoo, 2016, p. 379). The US invasion of Iraq did not prove itself to be the best answer to fight against the threats directed at peace and security. Moreover, the large-scale political instability as a "by product" of the invasion became a nest for many different terrorist groups, including Daesh. Thinking together with the Arab Spring, the instability in the Middle East created new set of security problems for the EU different from the 2003 period. In the Arab-Israeli context, the short-lived Muslim Brotherhood period in Egypt, for example, evoked enough considerations for the future of the Israeli-Egyptian relations in the EU corners (Möller, 2012). Iran and its proxy ally Hezbollah have been increasing their influence. Arab Spring served as surfboard flowing over the popular uprisings and taking Iranian influence

to every corner of the Middle East, which has widespread repercussions for the Arab-Israeli conflict. The recent reproachment between the Gulf states and Israel also can be understood in this context. The regional rivalry between Iran and the Gulf states legitimizes the latter's stance. Yet, the policy conceives unexpected outcomes as well. If the public support in the Arab world for the Palestinian cause increases, the normalization of relations between Israel and Gulf may increase the Iranian-Hezbollah hand (Rahman, 2019). In other words, without a comprehensive peace treaty, any normalization has the possibility to end up in marginalization and insecurity in the region.

While the Arab world was experiencing a turmoil, the EU's response to the new challenges was shaped under the EU Global Strategy Document (EUGS) in 2016, which replaced the ESS. The EUGS' narrative softened the predecessor's transformative tone of voice -due to resistance to normative understandings of the EU as a global actor- as well as introduced more integrated institutional practices and policies, especially in security and defense (Barbé & Morillas, 2019, p. 754). Strategically, the EU identity put forward by the EUGS is less transformative. Contrary, it draws a more securitized and politicized EU. The envisaged orientation of the EU foreign policy is summarized in the document that "in this fragile world, soft power is not enough". The issue of increasing EU's capacity to respond effectively and rapidly to current crises with all means from diplomatic to military operations is given primacy. Moreover, there is a strong refence to further political integration to meet the needs of a politicized foreign policy (Barbé & Morillas, 2019; European Union, 2016, pp. 44, 47).

The EUGS predetermines the current strategy of the CFSP. In the foreword of the document, former HR/VP of the EU, Federica Mogherini, highlights the need of a new way of working for the Union in order to realize its vast potential globally. She states that the EU is among the three largest economies in the world. For almost every nation on the globe, the EU is the first trade partner and the first foreign investor, spending more in development cooperation as a group than the rest of the

world put together, she adds. However, it is obvious that it is not completely exploiting the capacity. She concludes that partners of the EU expect it to play a major role, including as a global security provider (European Union, 2016). Israeli Palestinian conflict is an example of this EU dilemma of economic involvement and political exclusion. However, the EU agenda has been full of security concerns and issue of immigration especially after the Arab Spring. This led to change in the EU orientation in the Mediterranean region. Concerning the Arab Israeli conflict, this paid the way for the EU to downgrade its ambitions from conflict resolution to barely crisis management (Azhar & Pinfari, 2017, p. 65).

It is stated in the EUGS that;

> On the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the EU will work closely with the Quartet, the Arab League and all key stakeholders to preserve the prospect of a viable two-state solution based on 1967 lines with equivalent land swaps, and to recreate the conditions for meaningful negotiations (European Union, 2016, p. 34).

From the statement, it is explicit that the EU position towards the conflict will be the same in coming years. It is also explicit that the EU positioned itself not as a leading party but as a complementary actor in the conflict in spite of all those words on the EU's transformation to a global security provider.

The downgrade in the EU's role becomes more accurate in 2019, when the EUGS's three years in action is evaluated in a document prepared by the office of HR/VP Magherini. Although it is stated that normative and soft power aspects of the EU ideal are supported by hard power elements in the past three years, it is hard to find a clear reference to the Arab-Israeli conflict in the document. It is merely stated in the document that, in the three years period the EU continued to invest in the Middle East Peace Process (*The Euroepan Union's Global Strategy Three Years on, Looking Forward*, 2019, pp. 10–12, 47).

To conclude, while the CFSP has been transformed over the years, its contribution to the solution of the Arab Israeli conflict has remained marginalized. The EU was not able to erase its image of a sidelined actor on the issue. Its longstanding policy of two-state solution has been losing ground day by day. In the face of all those challenges, the EU's CFSP did not manage to use its economic leverage on any of the parties. Israel has been continuing the construction of settlements, and destruction of the EU-sponsored buildings in the occupied territories. Palestinian regime has remained corrupt and authoritarian. The hope for a comprehensive peace treaty between Arabs and Israelis in accordance with the EU proposals lives only in the EU declarations. Without contributing structural changes that will back the EU proposals, the CFSP and the EU's declaratory policy will remain at odds with the regional dynamics.

3.2.1.1. Role of High Representative for CFSP

Institutional uncertainty and crowdedness have traditionally hampered EU foreign policy leadership coordination. In order to address the problems in the EU foreign policy making, the Treaty of Amsterdam introduced the role of "High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy" ("Treaty of Amsterdam," 1997). However, this role was subordinated to the rotating presidency, with careful wording and referring to the HR just in a sentence length-paragraph (De Ruyt, 2005, p. 6). In the Lisbon Treaty, EU member states agreed to assign institutional leadership roles in the area of foreign and security policy to the EU HR in order to strengthen the European Union's coherence, integration, and representation as a global player – core tasks they had previously undertaken in the rotating EU Presidency. Furthermore, the HR's position was strengthened by combining it with that of VP of the European Commission (Aggestam & Hedling, 2020, p. 301). The HR, in collaboration with the European External Action Service (EEAS), drafts decisions, presents them to Council bodies, and then applies the policies agreed by EU foreign ministers at Council meetings, where the HR chairs. The intergovernmental character of the CFSP was not altered by the Lisbon Treaty

(German Federal Foreign Office, n.d.). What had actually been aimed at in the Lisbon Treaty was to mitigate long-standing frictions between the Commission and the Council as well as between the political and economic aspects of the EU's external action (article 18, TEU Lisbon). Because of this, a double-hatted HR for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy post was created (Juncos, 2013, p. 30).

The Lisbon Treaty entered into force in December 2009, a decade after the position of the HR was created. During the interim period between 1999 and 2009, Javier Solana fulfilled the role of the HR. But his role was subordinated to the rotating presidency. His first significant personal accomplishment occurred during French presidency, in Autumn 2000, when he was sent as the Union's sole delegate to a conference in Sharm El Sheik intended to deter the Middle East Peace Process from collapsing after the breakdown of the Camp David negotiations and the start of the Second Intifada / Al Aqsa Intifada (De Ruyt, 2005, pp. 6–7). But it was not the presidency or the member states that included Solana into Sharm el Sheikh, but a direct invitation from Egyptian president. However, successive presidencies did not let Solana have enough room to further involvement in the Middle East peace process in those initial years. In December 2001, Belgium PM Verhofstadt, who was holding the EU presidency, took a last-minute decision and went to the Washington on a mission on the Middle East himself instead of Solana. In 2002, Solana was invited by then UN-Secretary General Kofi Annan to represent the EU in the Quartet, but Danish Foreign Minister and European Commissioner for External Affairs escorted him in the meeting (Crowe, 2003; The Middle East Quartet, 2002).

The personality of Solana and his previous high profile international role made him very assertive in his dealings. In November 2001, the Economist referred him as "Charlemagne Javier Solana: The EU's voice in foreign affairs talks loudly, but lacks a stick". The article criticizes Solana's insistence that the EU had been on its way to getting all the assets that a country had in dealing with international crisis. The lack of united military capacity, which must back his argument, was criticized: "And how many troops does the pope have? asked Stalin, when told of the pontiff's

disapproval. For all his diplomatic wiles, Mr. Solana still cannot answer that question for the EU" (The Economist, 2001).

In one of the most challenging situations in the Israeli-Palestinian context, the EU faced during his tenure, was the election victory of Hamas in 2006. In the coverage of the news representing the EU view, its seen that Solana was able to become one voice representing the EU. He stressed that Hamas had to renounce violence and recognize Israel (Deutsche Welle, 2006). In the last months of his second term, in 2009, Solana stated that after a fixed deadline, a UNSC resolution should proclaim the adoption of two-state solution, including border parameters, refugees, control over the city of Jerusalem/Al-Quds and security arrangements (Reuters, 2009). However, this stance did not go beyond a wish.

After Solana, Catherine Ashton became the first HR with the title of VP, armed with the Lisbon Treaty. After she assumed the role, there emerged high expectations because of the wide scope of capacity of the post. That's because, the president of the EU's executive European Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso, claimed to have found a response to a question attributed to former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger for years: "Who do I call if I want to call Europe?". With having Catherina Ashton: "(…) the secretary of state of the United States should call Cathy Ashton because she is our foreign minister," he said (Brunnstrom, 2009).

It is important to note here that although the position of Ashton implies the role of a "foreign minister", the title used for her was HR/VP. Compared to the role of a foreign minister, the HR/VP role is more constrained due to the fact that Ashton was not part of a decision-making apparatus. On the other hand, the HR/VP's portfolio is considerably larger than that of a national foreign policymaker (Ondejčíková, 2013, pp. 8–9).

During her term, Ashton was successful on the development of the EU External Action Service (EEAS), and the brokering of the Kosovo-Serbia agreement, along

with her role in between Iran and the EU (Rettman, 2014). However, in terms of Israeli-Palestinian issue, it can be said that Ashton had not been able to use all the merits of her position to take an active and a leading role. For example, the resignation of Salam Fayyad from the PA Prime Ministry office in 2012 meant loss of a close EU partner, working hard for years in establishing Palestinian institutions in the way of statehood. In the face of this, neither she was able to persuade him to stay in his office nor she made a declaration upon his resignation. In her silence, foreign ministers of the individual EU members expressed their regret (Khader, 2014, p. 357). In another instance, in 2010, 26 former EU leaders and commissioners, including her predecessor Javier Solana, sent a letter to take concrete measures in the face of Israeli settlement activities. Her response to the letter indicated that her approach to the issue would remain unchanged. Her stance is consistent with the United States' long-held view for the EU's position in the region. The role assumed for the EU by the US was funding Palestinian state building and providing security and stability in the PA territories, while Washington was focusing on the issue of settlements (Rettman, 2010). Parallel to that, Ashton became part of another polemic on the Middle East Peace Process in August 2010. She said that her presence in the peace talks in Washington "would have no substantial influence on the talks" as a response to French Foreign Minister's statement that "it would be a shame if there were no European representation" (Mara, 2010). Likewise, a significant issue came to the fore in 2013. The PA pressured the EU on the issue of settlement enterprises and the place of their products in the EU preferential trade agreement with Israel. Concerning the events, 19 former senior EU officials, including Romano Prodi, the ex-President of the EU Commission, sent a letter to Ashton, in a stunning tone of clarity and courage:

> The occupation is actually being entrenched by the present Western policy and later generations will see it as unforgiveable that the Europeans not only allowed the situation to develop to this point of acute tension but took no action now to remedy the continuing destruction of the Palestinian people's right of self-determination (EECP, 2013).

More than two months after this letter, Ashton sent a letter the related-EU officials to take necessary measures on the reformulation of guidelines on labeling products. As a result, on July 19, 2013, the EU issued a historic order banning funding or investments to institutions operating in the settlements (Khader, 2014, pp. 357–358). In other words, not Ashton but former senior officials took the lead in the development of the labelling policy of the EU. As the examples represented, during Ashton's term the EU remained in sidelines in the Israeli-Palestinian problem although there was a strong demand in the EU circles to take more action. Weather her inexperience or her own choice refrained her from taking an active leading role or the combination of both factors led this outcome is not clear. What is clear is that her post was strengthened by the Lisbon Treaty. Yet she was not able reflect this institutional strength into the foreign policy of the EU.

Federica Mogherini, unlike her predecessor Asthon, tried to exhaust the borders of her mandate. Mogherini, as the EU's HR for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, as well as the European Commission's VP and Chair of the Commissioners' Group on External Action, presented a Global Strategy, going beyond the first European Security Strategy provided by Solana. The "European" Security Strategy in Solana's limited mandate as HR for the CFSP, transformed into a "Global" Strategy under Mogherini's extended mandate including not only on the security aspects of the policy, but also on trade, growth, migration, oil, climate change, and other issues (Tocci, 2016).

In her era, the turmoil in the Middle East, mainly in Syria, Libya, and Yemen, reached to a level overshadowing the developments concerning the Palestinian issue. Although the policy of statement related critics towards Israel and financial assistance to the PA went on, no upgrade in the peace process was realized during this period. Yet, Israeli critics found enough room to criticize her as being pro-Palestinian, pro-Iranian, and pro-Russian as well. While having slammed Israel on the settlements, she opened the way for trade with Iran with INSTEX "barter mechanism" for avoiding US sanctions (Frantzman, 2019). Other critics referred to

her as “Europe’s High Representative for Appeasement: Iran, Cuba, North Korea and Russia have a friend in Brussels” (Lake, 2018).

Josep Borrell, a socialist from Catalonia, and a vocal opponent of Israel, succeeded Mogherini at the end of 2019. Following Borrell's appointment, Israeli media emphasized his previous pro-Palestinian stance as foreign minister, which included calling for Spain's unilateral recognition of a Palestinian state and widespread condemnation of Israeli military activities in Gaza (Wermenbol, 2019). As of 2021, it is still too early to make an analysis of his term in terms of Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Yet, some examples from 2020 and 2021 may cast a light to his future policy towards the issue. First of all, VP/HR Borrell reacted to Trump Peace Plan with “if implemented, could not pass unchallenged” (Reuters, 2020). As a response to Trump’s plan, Borrell stated that there had been discussions to relaunch the Middle East Peace Process in the EU Foreign Affairs Council (Paton, 2020). Note that, no major development took place concerning an EU Middle East Plan so far. Secondly, Borrell welcomed the normalization of ties between Israel and the UAE, Bahrain, and Sudan in autumn 2020, as part of the Abraham Accords. However, he made it clear in the European Parliament that normalizing Israel's relations with Arab states alone would not solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He added that the Israeli annexation attempts must be totally abandoned, not temporarily postponed. These examples from the first year in his term suggest that, he took the advantage of the opportunities to emphasize the EU's official stance on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. In other words, in his first year in office, Borrell has acted in a manner that is largely consistent with the EU’s stated priorities on the issue (Osiewicz, 2021).

After more than two decades in action, the EU's HR position have lived through a series of politically crucial moments, especially those that have shaken the EU's overall security. Along this timeline, four individuals held the role of HR of the Union, each with a unique identity, each marking the position on an administrative and instrumental basis, but most importantly demonstrating HR's entrepreneurial capacity. Each HR/VP redefined the scope of the post in accordance with his/her

capacity to lead and shape the EU policy on Israeli-Palestinian issue. Some went beyond the capacity of his/her position, making the position a center of gravity, others may well be short of fulfilling the expectations from the office. Despite being in place for years, the HR post remains mired in mystery, either because of the nuanced nature of the Commission-Council relationship or because of the hybrid nature of its roles, which often oscillate between a strong bargaining profile and reduced administrative assistance. Nonetheless, the position of HR/VP has grown since its inception, increasing the degree and scope of cooperation between the various EU bodies (de Deus Pereira & Kaunert, 2020, p. 8).

3.2.2. Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP)

The area of defense has been a widely debated issue and can be considered as a challenge in the European integration history. The idea of a common European defense goes back to the early 1950s. Jean Monnet drafted a declaration proposing to the establishment of European army along with a European Minister of Defense. He thought that a political Europe to be constructed, the idea of the European army had a singular potential to accelerate the process (Dwan, 2001). After two years of intense negotiations the six members of the European Steal and Coal Community signed the "Treaty Establishing the European Defense Community". However, French Parliament voted down the treaty in 1954. This failure in 1954 put an end to the idea of common European defense for the rest of the 20th century (Junker, 2017). Although, decades of economic and political integration of Europe without a European army with such qualities proved Monnet wrong, today the EU is facing challenges related with not having a successful integration in the area of defense. Not to mention the importance of improving external capacity of the EU in the face of increasing global crises.

To this end, the EU has laid down CSDP, aiming to improve its capacity in the fields of conflict prevention and crisis management. As an integral part of the EU's CFSP, CSDP includes a framing of common EU defense policy (EUR-Lex, 2021). In June

1999, at the European Council in Cologne, the EU's CSDP was first formulated. Concordia, the EU's first mission, was established in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 2003. In more than 30 operations since then, civilian specialists, police officers, and troops have aided in the promotion of peace and security (German Federal Foreign Offiice, n.d.).

The basis for EU political and military institutions, military and civilian missions, and operations abroad is laid down in the CSDP. The current plan for the CSDP is set out in the 2016 EU Global Strategy, while the Lisbon Treaty clarifies the institutional aspects and enhances the position of the European Parliament. In order to resolve security threats and popular demand for increased EU responses, the CSDP has recently undergone significant strategic and organizational changes (Legrand, 2020). Normally, the Council of the European Union takes decisions on the CSDP in a unanimous way. However, now there are several exceptions, where qualified majority voting is used. Such instances occurs when the Council adapts a decision on the implementation of a EU decision, or for some decisions on the European Defense Agency (EDA) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) (EUR-Lex, 2021). It is important to note that neither EDA nor PESCO can be considered as ends in themselves. The answer to the question of what the real success of the two requires is related with these frameworks' ability to develop projects that the EU would otherwise not undertake. And for PESCO, a particular important goal should be the integration of European militaries (Lazarou, E., & Lokker, N., 2019). With the Brexit, one of the fiercest opponents of more integration in the area of defense in the EU, the UK, is now out of the game. It is unclear that whether the remaining members will have enough enthusiasm to go further to have a common defense mechanism yet. National sovereignty versus European sovereignty is still the case after more than half century of integration in Europe. Under the CSDP, the EU deployed two civilian missions on the ground concerning the Israeli Palestinian conflict, namely, the EUPOL COPPS and the EUBAM Rafah.

3.2.2.1. European Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EUPOL COPPS)

Beyond doubt, the law enforcement capacity is among the most important elements, which a state provides its citizens. Likewise, after the Oslo Accord of 1993, the envisaged Palestinian self-rule needed to provide security in the areas designated under its control. To this end, a police force of its own was needed to be built. 1994 Cairo Agreement detailed the structure and composition of the Palestinian police force. Built in this way, the Palestinian police force became abusive and a tool of repression in time. In 2002, in the face of the Israeli Operation Defensive Shield to quell the second intifada, Palestinian police force came together with criminal elements and gangs on the ground. In 2005, Mahmoud Abbas succeed Arafat as the president and the international community saw an opportunity in this positive atmosphere to make reform in the security sector of the PA (Kristoff, 2012, pp. 1–5).

In this context, it is understandable for the EU to invest in the security sector of the PA in order to support Palestinian state building. For this reason, initially, the EU Coordination Office for Palestinian Support was established within the Office of the EU Special Representative for the Middle East Peace Process. In 2004, when the EU leaders expressed their readiness to support the PA in taking responsibility for law and order, the way was opened to the EUPOL COPPS mission, which was established on 1 January 2006 as a Police Mission. In 2008, a Rule of Law section was added to the Police Mission. The Mission mainly deals with the reform and development of the Palestinian Civil Police and Criminal Justice System, improvement of the Prosecution-Police interaction, and coordination of the external donor assistance to the Palestinian Civil Police (*EUPOL COPPS*, 2020). It is mainly a civilian mission without an executive mandate, meaning that the mission staff do not have executive power to implement policies themselves. This turns the mission into technical and advisory in character (Bouris & İşleyen, 2020, p. 430). As a result of this mandate, the mission focuses on improving technical skills of police force

such as arrest techniques and crowd control, without focusing on protecting and securing citizens (Kristoff, 2012, p. 10).

On 25 January 2006, just a few weeks after the beginning of the deployment of the mission, Palestinian elections took place. According to the election results, Hamas became victorious, creating a number of challenges for the mission at the very beginning. The EU boycott of the Hamas made it impossible to work together with a Hamas-led Interior Ministry affiliated police force. The crisis brought about the internal division in the PA, with Fatah taking control of the West Bank, and Hamas of Gaza in 2007. Since then, EUPOL COPPS has been dealing with the police force in the West Bank, thus, excluding some two thirds of the civil police in Gaza from its training, equipment, reform, and advice (Asseburg, 2010, p. 78).

Related with the election results, the issue of Hamas has created further challenges for the EU in the EUPOL COPPS mission in the context of human rights and institutional reform. First and foremost, the EU is criticized for turning a blind eye on some security branches' human rights violations when the issue becomes Hamas. In addition, due to the boycott of Hamas, the security forces under Hamas' control are not part of the reform. In that sense, it is hard to deny that the EU's policy culminates in the division between the two PAs still further by creating two separate security apparatus. Not to mention that the EU involvement in this manner indirectly supports Israeli security and Israeli policy of isolating Gaza from the West Bank (*Arbitrary Arrest and Torture Under the Palestinian Authority and Hamas*, 2018; Schulz, 2012, pp. 72–73). Secondly, the EU is criticized with being the sponsor of an authoritarian regime in the West Bank, prioritizing stability over peace and security. As Tartir argues about the EUPOL COPPS that the "EU-sponsored 'reform' has contributed directly to the 'professionalization' of Palestinian authoritarianism" (Tartir, 2018, p. 365).

Israeli occupation, on the other hand, is a very powerful impediment for the EUPOL COPPS to increase the effectiveness and legitimacy of the Palestinian police force.

According to an EUPOL COPPS official, the mission needed Israeli approval on everything. Israeli restrictions that the mission faces ranges from the scope of trainings, to aid and equipment. The degree of effectiveness of police force is useful for Israel to the extent that the security threats to Israel emanating from the PA territories are suppressed by the police, not more. This situation decreases the legitimacy of the police force in the eyes of the local community. Their expectations of protection are only secondary after the Israeli needs. Moreover, the Palestinians ultimate idea about security is related with the end of Israeli occupation. The Palestinian police's cooperation with the occupiers paves the way for lack of trust between Palestinians and the police service. The EUPOL COPPS mission is not answering these untechnical issues, marginalizing its role. Despite these drawbacks, the mission yielded some positive results as well. It maintained a basic standard of law and order in the West Bank and countered terrorism by decreasing militia activity (Kristoff, 2012, pp. 4–12).

3.2.2.2. EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) Rafah

Israel's unilateral decision to disengage from Gaza in 2005 resulted in the conclusion of an agreement between Israel and the PA on Movement and Access at Rafah Crossing Point. With the agreement, a third party was designated to be present at Rafah Crossing Point between Egypt and the PA (*Agreement on Movement and Access*, 2005). Initially, the US was proposed to play the third-party role. However, the US declined and the resulting picture led Israel to accept an EU role at Rafah. An Israeli official summarized the dismay on their part that "Nobody was really satisfied but we didn't have another option so we thought it would be good to give Europeans a role to play" (Bouris, 2012, p. 95). The EU was eager to play more active role in the conflict for years and it accepted the deal willingly. On 24 November 2005, the Council of the EU launched EUBAM Rafah. It is a civilian mission established under the EU CSDP. On 30 November 2005, the mission was launched as the neutral third party on the ground to contribute the building up the Palestinian capacity along with monitoring operations and improving cross-border

cooperation at Rafah. The communication between Palestinian, Israeli and Egyptian authorities in all aspects regarding the management of Rafah Crossing Point is also under the EU responsibility. However, the mission had been operational only until 9 June 2007, when the Rafah Crossing Point was last opened. Since then, EUBAM Rafah has remained on standby, retaining its ability to redeploy to the Rafah Crossing Point as soon as the political and security situation permits (European Union External Action, n.d.).

3.3. Main Framework Agreements between the EU and Israel

3.3.1. EU-Israel Association Agreement

Starting from 1960s, Israel sought to sign an association agreement with the EC/EU. The long-awaited aim was realized in 1995 with signing of the EU-Israel Association Agreement which replaced the 1975 Cooperation Agreement. After parliamentary approvals, it came into effect in 2000 (European Research Executive Agency, 2000). The agreement provides Israeli goods preferential tariff treatment. After the European Commission signed an Association Treaty with the PLO, customs officials in Europe stopped treating items from the occupied territories as Israeli imports. This irritated Israel and sparked heated debate between the European Commission and Israel (Hauswaldt, 2003, p. 591). Starting from November 1997, Israeli products coming from the Occupied Territories, to which the EU closed its eyes up until that time, started to be mentioned in the trade relations between the two. Israel was, naturally, against the inclusion of a political issue in the trade matters. Efraim Halevy, Israeli ambassador to the EU institutions in Brussels at that time, based the Israeli argument on the explanation that "it is not the European Union that will determine the borders of Israel while dealing with economic matters" (cited in Pardo & Peters, 2012, p. 187). Indeed, the problem with the origins of Israeli products of that time arises from an orange juice affair in which Israeli business people imported juice from Brazil and resold it to the EU as an Israeli product. Although, in the ranks of the EU, there was the discussion about

applying the rules of origin to the products coming from the Occupied Territories especially under the troublesome peace process and with an unpopular Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu in the European capitals; the spokesman of the European Union delegation in Israel, David Kriss, said that "It is true that there is such an argument, but for the moment the Commission is not dealing with this matter and is focusing exclusively on the question of the orange juice, which is purely technical and economic" (Pardo & Peters, 2012, pp. 221–222). Nevertheless, the issue did not remain just technical and economic; it became a matter of problem sitting at the center of the EU-Israel relations. In 2002, a German-based company named "Brita" applied to the German authorities for some imported goods to be released for free circulation, as it imported those goods from an Israeli company. German authorities initially exempted those products from duties under the preferential tariff applied for, but later, they requested for Israeli customs authorities to indicate "whether the goods in question had been manufactured in Israeli-occupied settlements in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem or the Golan Heights." The request remained unanswered, and as a result, Germany refused the preferential treatment it had granted previously. The company took legal action, and the matter came in front of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). In 2010, CJEU ruled in the Brita Case that "the German customs authorities could refuse to grant, in respect of the goods at issue, preferential treatment as provided for under the EC-Israel Association Agreement, on the ground that those goods originated in the West Bank" (*Case C‑386/08, Firma Brita GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Hafen*, 2010). The exact area that the agreement covered was identified officially only in 2010 with the CJEU rule on the Brita case, too little too late.

The EU's policy considering the Jewish settlements beyond the Green Line is interrelated with its policy of using trade agreements as a tool to foster change in the attitude of its trading partner. In line with this, by implementing the rules of origin, or economic nationality of products, the EU gave a message to Israel that building industry in the Occupied Territories would not be advantageous (Gordon & Pardo, 2015, p. 78). The HR of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine

Ashton, expressed the EU position on the settlements clearly that “they are illegal under international law and an obstacle to peace” (Ashton, 2010). The CJEU rule in the Brita case became binding for the political process ahead of it. In 2013, the EU issued “guidelines,” which prevented the goods produced in Israeli settlements in the Golan Heights/Al-Jawlan, the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem/Al-Quds ash-Sharqiya, from benefiting from the trade privileges that Israeli companies have (European Commission, 2013).

3.3.2. EU-Israel Association Council

The Association Agreement, signed in Brussels on November 20, 1995, serves as the legal foundation for Israel's contacts with the European Communities. It replaces the 1975 Cooperation Agreement, while also broadening the scope of the predominantly trade-related agreement's implementation to other regions. After adoption by the 15 Member States' parliaments, the European Parliament, and the Knesset, the Agreement went into effect in 2000. The resolution created the EU-Israel Association Council, which is backed up by an Association Committee (Israeli Mission to the European Union, n.d.).

One of the most important issues on the table of the Association Council since 2001 had been the issue of the position of the products originating from settlements in the preferential trade agreement between the EU and Israel. The question was forwarded to the Association Council, but they were unable to resolve it. Every year since then, the matter has been put on the agenda of the Association Council, with the same conclusion: the EU and Israel must find a "technical solution" to this issue. Ehud Olmert, Israel's then-Minister of Trade and Industry, gave the European Commission the intended "technical solution" in November 2004. According to the “Olmert arrangement”, settlement goods can be distinguished from proper Israeli goods with identification of their origin properly and the EU countries’ customs authorities could recover the duties for the products coming from the settlements. At first glance, Olmert’s proposal can be seen as compromise made by Israel.

However, in the proposal, there was no reference that the products coming from the settlements are not products from Israel proper. In other words, it maintains a customs link between Territories and Israel. Furthermore, its application can be seen as a trap for the EU with legal consequences. According to the Article 45 and 31.2.a. of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, there would be two important consequences if the Association Council had adopted the proposal. Firstly, the EU would lose its right for invocating the ground of suspension of the treaty. Secondly, the malpractice of the Association Agreement would be permissible. Taken into consideration these possible legal bitter fruits, the Association Council refrained from endorsement of the proposal and took necessary steps to avoid all the EC institutions' formal acceptance of the proposal. Nonetheless, Olmert's proposal was put into practice in February 2005 by taking necessary measures by the Customs Cooperation Committee (Agnés, 2010; Voltolini, 2015). By doing this, it seems that the EU detached itself from aforementioned legal consequences.

Up to 2012, 11 Council meetings took place. Since then, the Council has not been convened as a protest to expansion in settlement activities of Israel. European High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission Joseph Borrel is said to be highly in favor of the reestablishment of the EU-Israel Association Council and trying to convince the EU members of its merits. However, this is not a new attempt. The then High Representative Mogherini also sought to reinvigorate the Council in 2017 but met with opposition from particularly France and the UK. Today's attempt by Borrel also met with suspicion as it came after Israel froze the plan to annex the parts of the West Bank (Alhaq, 2017; EuroMed Rights, 2017; Harkov, 2020). It seems that rewarding Israel for not doing something which is already illegal under the international law has not appealed some EU members again.

3.3.3. European Neighborhood Policy (ENP)

Before the largest wave of enlargement in the EU history which took place in 2004, the EU had begun to invest time on reformulating its policy on defining frontiers and relations with the old and new neighbors starting from 2002. The future enlargement made the EU to face the need to penetrate deep into the regions in its East and South more compared to its previous geography. Wider Europe Initiative was born out of this need and turned into the ENP, which was initiated in 2003 and established throughout 2004 (Herman, 2006, p. 371). The ENP governs the relations between the EU and its 16 neighbors resided in Eastern and Southern regions. Israel, Palestine, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria -the six of the most important parties in the Arab Israeli conflict- are part of the ENP. In 2011, the conditions of Arab Spring necessitated the ENP to be reviewed. The further review of the ENP, which determines its current outlook, took place in 2015. The catchword for the revised version of the ENP is stabilization. Stabilization in the surrounding regions in terms of political, economic, and security related issues is given priority (European Commission, n.d.-b). The ENP was informed by and built on three factors concerning the Israel-Palestinian Conflict; two-state solution with a sovereign Palestinian state on the 1967 Green Line, the continuing recognition of the US's key role in the Middle East Peace Process, and the acceptation of the EU's collective action problem as something to be overcome. Build on in this way, the ENP has strengthened diplomatic ties and economic cooperation between the EU and its southern Mediterranean partners. The timing of the ENP was also important because after several years without Oslo Process, an EU action toward the fundamental actors of the Arab-Israel conflict promised parties closer diplomatic and economic relations in exchange for steps toward a two-state solution in the Israeli-Palestinian issue. From a critical point of view, however the ENP was reviewed and transformed in years, it is far from being perfect. The current ENP model looks to be at best outdated, at worst counter-productive. It has ceased to be a transformative instrument concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the sense of a vanishing two-state solution. Instead, it has been a tool for maintaining what would otherwise

be an unstable status quo as a result of Israel's long occupation (Lovatt, 2016). Along with those failures, it is important to mention the 2012 Agreement on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance for industrial products, the bilateral aviation agreement (Open Skies), and Israel's accession and successful participation in EU scientific research and technological development programs (including the 'Horizon 2020') as accomplishments achieved under the ENP framework (Reich, 2015, p. 619). Besides, as part of the ENP framework, the EU-Israel Action Plan was initiated.

3.3.4. EU-Israel Action Plan

The AP is part of a larger framework of the EU-Israel partnership in political and economic domains. Since its initiation in 2005, it aims to promote Israeli integration in the European policies and programs. The core ideas of the AP are promoting democracy, improving respect for human rights, rule of law and fundamental freedoms (European Commission, n.d.-c). It further reinforces the EU and Israel affiliation with defining their relations as “strategic”. In terms of economic relations, the AP refers to the ENP as a tool ascending cooperation, enabling “a significant degree of integration” between the EU and Israel (European Commission, 2005). While the ENP was intended to be built on existing structures, the AP seems to provide more in terms of legal structure. This is true in all three major issue areas of the overall system for services exchange, financial services, and people movement. The AP offers the ability to go beyond the Association Agreement in many of these fields, and in some circumstances, such as e-commerce and reciprocal acceptance of professional services, add new concepts that were not included in any previous legislative arrangement or process. As reported in the ENP, implementation of the AP would pave the way for a new contractual arrangement to replace the Association Agreement (Herman, 2006, p. 389).

It is important to note that before the negotiations for the AP started, the relations between the EU and Israel had already strained due to several reasons. Firstly, Israeli government decided to construct a so-called security fence/wall. The problem with

that decision was that nearly 90% of the wall's total path is within the West Bank, eating up land to the east of the Green Line (1949 Armistice Line). The separation wall is nearly 750 kilometers long, more than twice the length of the Green Line (Saddiki, 2017, p. 6). While the EU was highly critical on this issue, Israel was not comfortable with the EU's stance on both the wall and on the EU's political support for Arafat and financial support for the PA. Under these circumstances, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon warned the EU foreign policy chief, Javier Solana, there would be no hope of EU participation in the peace process without a dramatic shift in the European position. Solana made the EU's assertiveness clear by stating that whether the Israeli government liked it or not, the EU would play a part in Middle East peace process (Michael Jansen, 2004). Indeed, the AP can be a good point to test this assertiveness. And that's because it took a lengthy process, one and a half year, to conclude the negotiations for the AP. The main difference in the EU position from the past Wider Europe initiative times was the positive conditionality that the EU started apply it in its relations with Israel. On the other hand, what Israel wanted was the upgrading of economic relations with no or few strings attached to it. In return for economic concessions, the EU insisted on Israel for a written commitment for the EU role in the peace process. This implied the Israeli acceptance of the principles of Road Map, the two-state solution, and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) non-proliferation. North European EU members also sought to have an explicit Israeli commitment to International Law and the Geneva Conventions. Moreover, they sought to have a reference to the decision of the International Court of Justice on the separation wall. For the rest of the EU members, Israel's commitment to refrain from disproportionate use of force was enough. At the end of this painful process, the AP included the titles of political dialogue and cooperation; economic integration in order to prepare Israel to compete in the EC market; cooperation in justice and home affairs issues; environmental cooperation; people-to-people contacts; and cooperation in the fields of transport, oil, research, and technology (European Commission, 2005). However, the irreconcilable differences in the EU and Israeli attitude ended up with most of those provisions of the AP being strikingly elusive. For example, the elusiveness in the definition of

terrorist organizations and combating terrorism masked the EU-Israeli disagreements on the issues. While the plan included concreate provisions on combating anti-Semitism, it was not the case for the issue of human rights. A number of important measures were listed to combat anti-Semitism but there was a remarkable ambiguity when the issue becomes respecting human rights. The resulting text brought about very different interpretations, decreasing the possibility of its success and downplaying the concessions made by Israel such as acceptance of an EU role in the peace process, principles of the Road Map and having dialogue on the WMD (Sarto, 2007, pp. 61–71).

At the end of 2006, the European Commission published the first assessment report of the AP. During one and a half year of the AP at work, several important developments took place. Firstly, Israel and the PA signed an "Agreement on Movement and Access" in November 2005, which included agreed-upon guidelines for the Rafah crossing (Gaza), with the EU as a third party. Secondly, the European Council voted to create the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) Rafah, tasked with monitoring the border crossing point's operations. Thirdly, the EU-Israel Chamber of Commerce was established. Besides, Israel expressed interest in participating future EU programs such as Fiscalis 2013 and Customs 2013 (Commission of the European Communities, 2006). In 2013, the agreement for the integration of the air transportation markets of Israel and the EU was signed. The Aviation Agreement (European Union, 2013b).

After one and a half decade since its implementation, now it is time to evaluate the impact of the AP on human rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. In 2020, Israel continued its policy of excessive use of force. As of October 5 2020, Israeli security forces had killed 20 Palestinians and injured at least 2,001 others in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem/Al-Quds ash-Sharqiya. Settler violence against Palestinians and construction of settlements have continued. In the West Bank and Jerusalem/Al-Quds, Israel applies harsh military law to Palestinians, while settlers enjoy civil law. The difficulty of obtaining building permits from Israeli

authorities in Area C, 60% of the West Bank, couples with forced evacuations and home demolitions imposed on Palestinians. Even a covid-19 testing center in the East Jerusalem/Al-Quds ash-Sharqiya was shut down by Israeli authorities as it was founded by the PA. Freedom of movement of Palestinians has been limited further by the separation wall (Roth, 2020; United Nations, 2020). While this is the case for the violation of human rights by Israel, the EU has been Israel's first trading partner with overall trade of approximately €36,2 billion in 2017 (European Commission, 2020). In other words, the initial EU assertiveness to apply positive conditionality in its relations with Israel did not go beyond a wish. Likewise, the AP, with its vague wording, no timetable for implementation, no performance assessment, and no public review mechanism; has contributed too little -at best- for the improvement of the human rights situation in the Occupied Territories. In terms of economic integration of the EU and Israeli economies, on the other hand, as noted above, the AP contributed to the intensification of relations between the two parties to the highest degree.

3.4. Concluding Remarks

This chapter has sought to provide an account of the main agreements and frameworks drawing the lines of the EU-Israel relations from an institutional perspective. The chapter started with a brief introduction, which included the data indicating the importance of the EU in Israeli economy. It is important to underline the vital EU role as Israel's number one trade partner in the thesis in order to find out whether or not the EU is able to turn this role into positive perceptions. In other words, in order to answer the question "do high level of bilateral economic relations have an effect on the EU perceptions in Israel in a positive way" in the thesis conclusion, it is important to refer to the economic relations between the EU and Israel in this chapter.

In the second section, the EU foreign policy framework was examined in the context of the EU-Israel relations and Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Foreign policy decisions

in the EU need consensus among member states. Unanimity represents the member states' resolve to meet on a common ground on foreign policy and reflects the EU's level of political integration. As a result, evaluating the EU Foreign Policy framework itself and its reflections on the EU-Israel relations can provide information regarding the capacity of the EU to change the behavior of the third countries. Moreover, the EU's actorness in international relations is very much related with its success in formation of a unified foreign policy (Akşemsettinoğlu, 2020, p. 164). Because the EU is not an international actor in traditional sense, its foreign policy framework has *sui generis* characteristics in terms of institutionalization and realization. In the section, it was aimed to explain briefly the evolution, limitations, and failures of the main pillars of the EU foreign policy framework. The section covered the CFSP, and the role of high representative in the EU foreign policy, CSDP, EUPOL COPPS, and EUBAM Rafah. By assisting the PA under those frameworks, the EU contributes to Israeli security indirectly. Also, those pillars define the ways how the EU can contribute to the efforts for the peaceful solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict politically. The section will contribute to give insights into fundamental questions on the relevance of the EU actorness in Israeli context. Do the EU's efforts to increase its capacity in foreign policy contribute to positive reflections in Israeli perceptions? Do problems in decision making in foreign policy field reflect itself in the perceptions as weak and divided Europe? Or conversely, do all those efforts in the foreign policy contribute to a coherent EU in the eyes of Israelis?

Then, the chapter focused on the EU-Israel Association Agreement, Association Council, the ENP, and the AP which constitute the main frameworks of the EU-Israel relations. These provided Israel to integrate into the EU market even more. Besides, they constitute the basic framework for Israeli integration in the European programs in political, economic, and scientific domains. At the same time, the EU wanted to promote human rights, rule of law, democracy, and fundamental freedoms with these tools. Thanks to these institutionalized processes, Israel has been enjoying a special status in its relations with the EU. They contributed to the

integration of Israel into the EU institutions and market. However, the question whether these contributed to positive perceptions of the EU in Israel needs to be answered, marking the second way that the chapter will contribute the analysis of the perceptions.

CHAPTER 4

EU SELF-PERCEPTIONS: LOOKING AT A DISTORTING MIRROR?

4.1. Introduction

Alexander Wendt argues that, actors have always, even in the most constrained situations, have agency to decide the roles they play. In his words "actors have always capacity to character planning" (Wendt, 1992, p. 419). From this respect, it can be said that the EU, an international actor[8] having *sui generis* characteristics, has agency to construct and represent its identity. Moreover, the character of the EU's international identity has a significant impact on the EU's relationship with the rest of the world. Both the EU's history and ideals and how the EU has been understood by others play a significant role in establishing its international identity. Constructed in this way, the EU's identity is represented in the ways the EU portrays itself and the ways in which this portrayal are reflected in the minds of others (Manners & Whitman, 2003, p. 383). In other words, the EU draws lines of boundaries between itself and others with identity formation process (Rumelili, 2004, p. 28). Political integration of the EU is stated by some scholars as one of the main factors in the formation of the EU identity. The proponents of this aspect argues that the Copenhagen Council in 1993, followed by the Treaty of Lisbon, served as launching pads for the EU's self-image; in legal terms, these political moves gave the EU a stable political identity. This shared political identification has elevated the actor's profile on the international scene (Risse, 2018, p. 128; Yılmaz, 2014, p. 47). Besides, the EU's enlargement toward Eastern Europe is regarded as a major driving factor in the formation of the EU's current character. As a result, every political criterion is political conditionality and may be regarded as a reinforcement

[8] Note that the actorness of the EU is a contested concept among various IR theories. This aspect is not part of the argument here. For those interested please read: "(Cladi & Locatelli, 2012)".

of reward, revealing itself as being accepted as a member to the EU. In this way, the EU's enlargement played a practical role in the dissemination of the values of solidarity, respect for human rights, and equality, all of which has been embodied in the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the EU (Yılmaz, 2014, p. 57). Note that the EU's distinct identity needs a unified voice in the foreign policy making to demonstrate effectively its distinct character (H. Smith, 2002, p. 77). Besides, the developments like the German unification (Dedman, 2010, pp. 166–186), and the immigration and asylum policies have affected the EU identity (Mclaren, 2006, p. 137).

The first EU document on the European identity was put forward in 1973. The document underlined the need to define European Identity in light of the Community's changing character. This entails better defining the Nine EC members' interactions with other countries, as well as their obligations and position in international affairs. "The principles of representative democracy, of the rule of law, of social justice-which is the ultimate goal of economic progress-and of respect for human rights" were listed as the fundamental elements of European identity (European Economic Community, 1973b, pp. 48–49). In the face of economic depression and unemployment in the EC, Leo Tindemans, Prime Minister of Belgium, reminded the member states the distinctiveness of the European identity in 1976:

> Our peoples are conscious that they embody certain values which have had an inestimable influence on the development of civilization. Why should we cease to spread our ideas abroad when we have always done so? Which of us has not been surprised to see the extent to which the European identity is an accepted fact by so many of the foreigners to whom we speak? It is not only from within that there is a call to the countries of Europe to unite. (Tindemans, 1976, pp. 11–12).

In 1984, in a report prepared for the European Council, it was stated that it was critical for the Community to react to the aspirations of European citizens by taking steps to reinforce and promote Europe's identity and image in the eyes of its citizens

and the rest of the world (Adonnino, 1984, p. 5). In 1985, in the report prepared by James Dooge, Chairman of the *ad hoc* Committee for Institutional Affairs of the European Council, it was stated that "European external identity could be achieved only gradually within the framework of common action and the European political cooperation (EPC)" (Dooge, 1985, p. 21). In a 1993 report prepared for the European parliament, it was accepted that people's perceptions of European identity had yet to be formed. However, according to the report, Europeans still shared a number of principles, including the rejection of war, the battle against poverty and unemployment, environmental preservation, human rights, freedom, and democracy, and the depth and diversity of European culture. These ideals might serve as the foundation for a European identity (Clercq, 1993, p. 2). In 2003, the ESS underlined the relevance of conditionality, targeted trade, aid, assistance programs, confidence building, and arms control regimes in the promotion of the EU norms in globally (European Council, 2003, p. 12). Moreover, the document underlined that "the European Union is inevitably a global player... it should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world" (European Council, 2003, p. 3).

After looking briefly at the implications of the formation and the evolution the EU identity from a historical perspective, the chapter will move on to analyzing the role conceptions formalized as a result of this process. Firstly, the conceptualization of the EU as a "civilian power" will be examined. Secondly, the notion of responsible Europe will be dealt with. Thirdly, the arguments on "normative power Europe", its reflections in the Lisbon Treaty, and in the EU policies such as CFSP, CSDP, and ESS will be analyzed.

4.2. Civilian Power Europe

The arguments on the kind of power that the EU yields go back to 1970s. Those years were in the middle of the Cold War period. The almost twenty-year intense rivalry between the US and the SU came to a point that they started to look for the

ways of cooperation on strategic issues. In Europe, and by extension, in world politics, a new era had begun. François Duchéne defined the new era as the one that regardless of hidden tensions and rivalries, the period of postwar history known as the cold war in Europe was clearly drawing to an end. He stated that this process was frequently referred to as *'détente*' in the West because it involved some relaxation of the energies that, like two wrestlers locked in apparent immobility, went to maintain the East-West balance, particularly in Europe (Duchéne, 1971b, p. 457). Duchéne stated that at a time when East Asia was re-emerging as the new epicenter of great-power rivalry, Europe was showing indications of settling down. Between the post-Stalin "thaw" of 1953 and the apprehensive "period of discussions" of 1971, he added, eighteen years of practically imperceptible progress passed. But now, the entire constellation of talks between the SU and its major Western adversaries, centered on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)[9], Ostpolitik[10], Berlin, force reductions, and convening of a security conference, appeared to be ratifying the painfully reached stalemate between the two blocs in Europe (Duchéne, 1971a, p. 69). The effect of zeitgeist was the emergence of the term "civilian power" which was defined by Duchéne to refer to the EC in the contexts outlined above (Duchéne, 1972). The idea was that the EC did not have military power to exert influence on other states as the US or the SU had but the EC had civilian power. According to Duchéne, a civilian power was defined by its two main pillars: being "long on economic power and relatively short on armed force" (Duchéne, 1973, p. 19) and representing "a force for the international diffusion of civilian and democratic standards" (Duchéne, 1973, p. 20). In his argument, the most

[9] The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) were a series of talks between the US and the SU aimed at limiting the proliferation of nuclear-capable strategic missiles. The original agreements, known as SALT I and SALT II, were signed in 1972 and 1979, respectively, by the US and the SU, with the goal of limiting the arms race in strategic (long-range or intercontinental) ballistic missiles armed with nuclear warheads. It was the US President Lyndon B. Johnson who first proposed strategic arms limitation talks in 1967. The two superpowers agreed in the summer of 1968, and full-scale negotiations started in November 1969 (Britannica, n.d.-c).

[10] The word "Ostpolitik" means "Eastern Policy" in German. It refers to the West German foreign policy adopted in the late 1960s toward the East Germany and Soviet-bloc countries. It involved recognizing East German government along with establishing commercial ties with the Soviet-bloc countries. The policy was one of *detente* with the Soviet-bloc countries. In 1970, treaties were concluded and the parties renounced the use of force in their relations (Britannica, n.d.-b).

important factor in the civilian forms of influence and action was economic power. Western Europe, with its being one of the four major economic centers of the world, could become “the exemplar of a new stage in civilization” by exerting civilian forms of power which could enable the EC escaping from being a colonized victim of balance of power politics (Duchéne, 1973, p. 19).

Duchéne stated that collective nationalism, a real nuclear force, and strong central authority were the tenets of being a superpower, meaning that it was not possible to refer to the EC as a superpower in that sense. Parallel to this, he added that the EC might be among the five major powers but “major power” did not mean “super-power”. That’s why he concluded that “Europe's leverage cannot be exerted along traditional lines” (Duchéne, 1973, p. 13). Like collective nationalism, Duchéne did not give credit to the collective neutrality as a policy option for the EC as well. Only really small states had the neutral effect in their environment. However, the EC could not be neutral with that much population, output, monetary reserves, and trade volume. Moreover, the EC cannot be a military power either. The EC represented a city-dwelling population, with rights, ideals, and comforts to protect, for the 'democratic' and civil standards of the suburbs over the armed camp and the balance of power. The EC’s interest as a civilian group of countries laid with more on economic might and relatively less on military might. That civilian aspect meant to domesticate interactions between states as much as possible, both those between its own members and those with countries outside its borders. This entailed attempting to introduce to international issues a sense of shared responsibility and contractual politics frameworks that had previously been identified almost entirely with 'home' and not with foreign, that was, alien, matters (Duchéne, 1973, pp. 19–20). Duchéne stated clearly that the EC “must be a force for the international diffusion of civilian and democratic standards or it will itself be more or less the victim of power politics run by powers stronger and more cohesive than itself” (Duchéne, 1973, pp. 20–21).

Duchéne was later criticized on the grounds that he did not put forward a full-grown vision on what he meant by civilian power Europe in a comprehensive scheme.

Critics accused Duchéne of disregarding the importance of military force, arguing that a civilian power would not be able to deal with the uncivilized world (Zielonka, 1998, pp. 226–227). The height in the tensions between the two superpowers in the 1980s paved the way for the resurgence of realism. Hedley Bull was one of the strongest critics of the notion of civilian power. In his article Bull referred to civilian power as "a contradiction in terms" (Bull, 1982, p. 149). He stated that the civilian power Europe arguments of the 1970s had resembled to the idealist interpretations in 1920s. Just as the 1930s proved them wrong, the end of the *détente* discredited the civilian power argument. He stated that the influence or power exerted by the EC was dependent on the strategic environment provided with the other states' military might. Unless, he mentioned, the EC countries possessed military power, the EC would not become an effective international actor (Bull, 1982, pp. 150–151). While Bull's arguments showed that the civilian power Europe notion had become absolute in the East-West context, Alfred Pijpers questioned the viability of the notion in the North-South context (Pijpers, 1988, p. 151). He focused on the limitations of the existing EC tolls in crisis management or in arms trade. Moreover, he stated that the outcomes of well-known EC policy to use economic instruments such as trade, aid, and association policies for political purposes in the Third World[11] were highly uncertain. The same could be applied for assessing the effects of economic sanctions, he added (Pijpers, 1988, pp. 155–156). However, there were still others advocating the idea that economic or 'civilian' alternatives appeared to provide the EC with more leeway than the use or threat of armed forces. In that respect, Nicholas van Praag stated that in the Third World, money was a lethal weapon. Bilateral financial incentives had been offered to several Southern African republics in support of the EC's stance, most notably to Mozambique as compensation for revenue lost due to the closure of her border with Rhodesia. However, those incentives' bilaterality, rather than their Europeanness, had been most visible (Praag, 1982, pp. 143–144).

[11] The term "Third World" as a synonym for "underdeveloped world" was coined by French historian Alfred Sauvy in a short piece titled "Three worlds, one planet" in 1952. At that time, the most common understanding of the term was economic or socioeconomic, with a focus on the phenomena of underdevelopment. As a result, the Third World is now widely seen as a collection of poor, underdeveloped countries with a deplorable standard of living (Solarz, 2012, pp. 1561, 1563).

The structural change in the international politics with the end of the Cold War brought about the idea that a new age of increased civilian power was ahead with the demises of the overwhelming requirements of defense and the nuclear standoff (K. E. Smith, 2000, p. 11). In the same way, at this turning point of history, Joseph Nye suggested to focus on "the real issue -how power is changing in world politics" rather than trying to figure out the future of balance of power with inappropriate analogies between the today's US and the Great Britain in the late 19th century. He stated that the reliance on military might and conquest that characterized previous centuries was fading. Technology, education, and economic growth were becoming increasingly crucial in international power, while geography, population, and raw materials were becoming less so. He argued that in international politics, all major states would have to address the shifting nature of power (J. S. Nye, 1990, pp. 153–156).

While Nye focused on the changing nature of power, Hans Maull argued that the new circumstances provided for a historic opportunity to go beyond the world of nation-state system with its inherent problems of security dilemma and inclination to adjust change through war. He suggested that the US would have to evolve towards a new type of international power of which Germany and Japan were the two protypes. He called this as civilian power. His argument included a new definition of the "civilian power" in the context of the post-Cold War world. According to Maull, being a civilian power implied:

> a) the acceptance of the necessity of cooperation with others in the pursuit of international objectives;
> b) the concentration on non military, primarily economic, means to secure national goals, with military power left as a residual instrument serving essentially to safeguard other means of international interaction; and
> c) a willingness to develop supranational structures to address critical issues of international management (Maull, 1990, pp. 92–93).

Maull's definition of civilian power is criticized on the grounds that it emphasized largely civilian means and a willingness to work with others, which is more a

question of how the means are utilized than what they are used for. In other words, his definition above referred only to national aims. The details about the goals of a civilian power were absent other than to say that transferring sovereignty enables for the growth of the rule of law in international relations, which accelerates the process of 'civilizing' international politics (K. E. Smith, 2005, p. 66). He did, however, called for the creation of a set of values that include "solidarity with other societies, and a sense of responsibility" (Maull, 1990, p. 106) for the world's future - notably the global environment (K. E. Smith, 2005, p. 66).

Christopher Hill turned the attention to the potential future EU roles in the context of the post-Cold War world. Firstly, the EC/EU might fill the vacuum left by the dissolution of the SU in the global balance of power. Secondly, the EU had the potentials to be a regional pacifier, global intervenor, mediator of conflicts, bridge between rich and poor, and joint supervisor of the world economy. However, these possible roles were challenged by the components of the capability-expectation gap, namely; ability to agree, resource availability, and the instruments at the EC's disposal (Hill, 1993).

In 1992, Western European Union (WEU) [12] member states announced in Petersberg, Germany, that they were prepared to support conflict prevention and crisis management in Europe, particularly in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) [13] and UNSC peacekeeping operations, by

[12] After the failure to complete the ratification process of the European Defence Community Treaty, the Paris Accords establishing the Western European Union ? were signed by France, the UK, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy and the West Germany in 1954 as an alternative solution to the failed plan for a European Army, establishing the WEU (CVCE, n.d.-b).

[13] With 57 participant and 11 associate states spanning from Vancouver to Vladivostok, the OSCE is the biggest regional security organization in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian realm. The predecessor of the OSCE, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was founded to serve as a multilateral venue for conversation and negotiation between East and West at the beginnings of the early 1970s détente. The CSCE included a number of major pledges on political-military, economic-environmental, and human-rights concerns. Until 1990, the CSCE was primarily a series of meetings and conferences that developed and extended the commitments of the member states. However, with the end of the Cold War, the CSCE embarked on a new path that resulted in the establishment of permanent institutions and operational capacities. In 1994, the name was changed

developing their operational capabilities. It was the first time that the European military action was predicted in highly specific circumstances. According to the Petersberg Declaration, military units of the WEU member states acting under the WEU authority could be utilized for “humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking tasks" (Troncho, 2001, p. 3; WEU Council of Ministers, 1992, p. 6). However, it was with the Maastricht Treaty of 1993 that the foundations of the EU’s defense cooperation was put forward (Lazarou & Dobreva, 2019, p. 4).

Afterwards, arguments have taken place on whether or not acquiring military means constitutes a challenge to civilian characteristic of the European power. Karen Smith reflected upon the Maastricht Treaty's inclusion of defense dimension as a factor diminishing the EU’s image as a civilian power (K. E. Smith, 2000, p. 11). She listed three assumptions of the proponents of adding military means to support the civilian power Europe. The first assumption was that in order to raise European integration in foreign policy to the level of statehood the EU must acquire security and defense means. Secondly, in order for the CFSP to be effective, the EU must have military instruments. Thirdly, there were leaders in the world who were willing to resort to military power to achieve their goals. In this uncivil world, trusting civilian means only was of limited utility. Smith stated that focusing on military dimension excessively ended up overlooking the key problem in the foreign policy making of the EU: the member states themselves. There would be no common foreign policy, unless the member states agree with each other. Secondly, according to her, the usefulness of military force was also not clear especially when the intrastate conflicts were still at the combating phase. Furthermore, intervening without a clear internationally agreed mandate proved problematic (K. E. Smith, 2000, pp. 17–23). She deduced that increasing the EU's military resources came at a cost: it conveyed the message that military action was still relevant and essential, and that it should be employed to further the EU's interests. It would put an end to the possibility of

from the CSCE to the OSCE as part of the institutionalization process (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.).

completely embracing civilian power. And this entails foregoing too much for far too little (K. E. Smith, 2000, p. 28).

Hans Maull, on the other hand, came up with a counter argument. He analyzed Germany's participation in NATO's Kosovo campaign in 1999 in order find out the effect of this military campaign on Germany's civilian power posture. First of all, participating in the campaign represented a challenge for civilian power Germany ideal as there was no Security Council mandate for military action. Maull stated that Germany had to choose between a fundamental human rights emergency and avoiding use of force. Thus, he concluded that participating in a military intervention did not constitute for Germany a fundamental departure from its post-war identity as a civilian power (Maull, 2000, p. 72). Stelios Stavridis reflected on Maull's study of Germany's role in Kosovo war as a case study showing that the civilian power was relevant not in spite of but because of the militarizing EU. Because of militarization, he argued, the EU might one day be able to serve as a true civilian power in the world, that is, as a force for the external promotion of democratic values. He stated the necessity to shift from a "by default" civilian power Europe to one "by design", meaning that military means were to be on one end of a long spectrum with non-military means on the other. Sometimes, he said, civilian values had to be supported by military means as civilian power was not equal to pacificism (Stavridis, 2001, pp. 43–44, 46, 50).

While the debates in the academy was evolving in this way, French and British governments signed an agreement at St. Malo in December 1998, paving the political path for the EU countries to announce the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) at the European Council meeting in Cologne in June 1999. According to the St. Malo Declaration, in order to respond to international crises, the EU must have the capability for independent action, backed up by credible armed capabilities, the ability to choose to use them, and the readiness to do so (Grevi et al., 2009, p. 13). Concerns had been expressed about the EU's status as a "civilian power" as a result of the establishment of the ESDP. Whereas most people are

concerned about the eventual replacement of civilian policy instruments with military power, Wolfgang Wagner focused on the ESDP's implications for democratic control of the security and defense policy. He claimed that the Europeanization of defense policy had resulted in a democratic deficit because the ESDP had weakened national parliaments' ability to control executive decisions to use military force, and neither the European Parliament nor the former WEU assembly had been able to compensate for this loss of parliamentary control. He concluded that this democratic gap might jeopardize not just the legitimacy of the EU-led military deployments, but also the EU's capacity to lead by example (Wagner, 2006, p. 200). Wagner stated that former colonial powers are generally allowed to deploy troops without having to consult national governments. He gave the example that the governments of France and the UK chose to join in NATO air operations against Serbian targets without consulting their parliaments in 1999 (Wagner, 2006, p. 204). He drew his ideas generally upon the report prepared by the Assembly of the WEU on the national parliaments' scrutiny of intervention abroad by armed forces. According to the report; in Spain, Belgium, and Greece, no legislative consent is necessary. In contrast, prior to any deployment of soldiers, Germany, Austria, Denmark, Sweden, Ireland, and several of the new EU members from Central and Eastern Europe need to take the permission from their parliaments. Governments in Italy and the Netherlands have seen parliamentary approval as essential, despite the fact that there is no constitutional duty to do so (Troncho, 2001, pp. 6–20). Wagner concludes that the dark side of the international cooperation, the democratic deficit, is felt in different degrees in the EU countries concerning the security and defense policies of the Union, negatively effecting the perceptions of the EU as a civilian power (Wagner, 2006, p. 205).

As mentioned above, acquiring defense capabilities challenged the soundness of civilian power Europe from several aspects. However, throughout the 1990s, the US power suffered from a declining legitimacy, while the European aspirations in global trade, environment, and security related issues were increasing. This paved the way for the revival of civilian power Europe arguments in the 2000s (Orbie, 2006, pp.

123–124). Andrew Moravcsik contributed to the civilian power Europe debate in this aspect. He challenged the supporters of the views that the EU was "an economic giant but a political dwarf"[14] and that "the US fights, the EU funds and the UN feeds"[15]. He stated that Europeans already had as much effective control over peace and conflict as the US, but they did so quietly, through "civilian power." That was found in the quiet promotion of democracy and development through trade, foreign aid, and peacekeeping, rather than in the deployment of battalions or bombers. America had complete immunity when bombing aggressors. When the fighting ended, however, only the Europeans, Moravcsik stated, would be able to play the role of superpower in maintaining peace, rebuilding economy, and supporting democracy. Apart from these roles, he added that 84% foreign troops in Kosovo and half of those in Afghanistan are non-American, mostly from Europe. Likewise, in Sierra Leone and Albania, the UK and Italy took the leading role respectively. As a result, Europeans had suffered more military losses in such missions than Americans during 1990s. He concluded that as much as American military superiority helped to international peace, Europe's silent successes did as well although mostly neglected (Moravcsik, 2002).

To sum up, defining the EU as a civilian power has its roots in the 1970s *détente* period. The decrease in the tensions enabled thinkers, first and foremost Duchéne, to come up with a different power contemplation other than the power model represented by the two super powers having enormous military capabilities. The EC was stated to have capacity to change the behavior of other states with civilian means such as economy, trade, aid etc. However, with the revival of the Cold War power politics in the 1980s, the civilian power argument lost its relevance compared to the previous period. This led to the critics, such as Bull, to argue that the EC's civilian power arguments were valid only when the US military power provided the security

[14] The expression was first appeared in a New York Times article written by Richard Grunberger (Grunberger, 1971).

[15] The expression was first coined by Dominique Moisi (Klein, 2002) and has been used widely since then.

environment. On the other hand, when the Cold War ended, the beginning of the 1990s opened a window of opportunity for the revival of the civilian power Europe. This time, acquisition of security and defense capabilities by the EU became the issue at stake on civilian power debates at the academic corners. While some argued that the increasing military capabilities of the EU was as a positive development because of the fact that those capabilities enabled the EU to enforce its civilian power, the others saw the inclusion of military aspect as a dead warrant for the civilian power Europe in the eyes of outsiders. The democratic concerns over deploying troops without having to consult national parliaments emerged as another challenge for the EU's civilian power character. All in all, as a decades-old term, civilian power Europe managed to survive today and even inspired emergence of new power conceptualizations for the EU, such as normative power Europe, which will be dealt with below after the title of Responsible Europe.

4.3. Responsible Europe

With the end of the Cold War, the EU enlarged and assumed new tasks. Intra-state wars replaced the proxy wars between the US and the SU. The crisis in Eastern Europe as well as in distant areas such as Rwanda necessitated the EU to be more willing and capable. Many Europeans regard the EU as the world's preeminent moral authority. They believe it can set a good example on a number of global governance issues. This positive self-concept is also entrenched in the EU's treaties and agreements with other nations. This takes us to the notion of the "Responsible Europe" (Vogt, 2006, pp. 2–3). Here, the notion's emergence, evolution, and implications for the EU self-perception will be dealt with. In other words, the analytical foundations and terminological distinctions of the problem of institutional responsibility and the EU will not be covered.

The concept of responsibility has entered systematically innumerable agendas, announcements, and speeches in the frameworks of policy and development. Its emergence dates back to the 1986 Single European Act. In the document, the EC

bound itself with a responsibility to contribute to the preservation of international peace and security in accordance with the UN Charter. In order to do so, it was stated that Europe was aware of the need to speak with one voice and act with consistency and solidarity in order to more effectively protect its common interests and independence, in particular to demonstrate the principles of democracy and compliance with the law and with human rights to which they are attached (European Community, 1987, p. 2).

In 1991, with the Treaty of Maastricht, the EU's aims and powers and responsibilities in international realm were defined as "to preserve peace and strengthen international security, to promote international cooperation" (CVCE, 1991, p. 5). Moreover, asserting its identity on the international scene "through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might, in time, lead to a common defense" was set as the objectives of the EU (CVCE, 1991, p. 3). (CVCE, 1991, p. 5). The WEU was also given a role to "draw up and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defense implications" (CVCE, 1991, p. 6). In 1992, the WEU adopted the Petersberg Tasks. It was declared by the WEU member states that they were ready to put their armed forces into service of the WEU, the EU and the NATO for the:

> Humanitarian and rescue tasks; conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking; joint disarmament operations; military advice and assistance tasks; post-conflict stabilisation tasks (EUR-Lex, n.d.).

With the Amsterdam Treaty, the EU's crisis management was levelled up in 1997. Instead of relying on external players, the EU would then strive to act autonomously. A consensus was quickly created on a new idea of the EU's foreign agency, on the EU's need for autonomous action in the world, including the acquisition and use of military means.

Responsibility was listed as one of the EU's guiding principles in the European Security Strategy of 2003. In the document, the EU declared its "willingness to share in the responsibility for global security" (European Council, 2003, p. 3) by sanctioning violators of international rules, promoting regional stability, preventing conflicts, and facing a number of complex security threats (Ojanen, 2006, p. 36). Furthermore, the Treaty of Lisbon includes a common defense clause[16], implying that it intends to have a role in the defense policy of its member states (Ojanen, 2006, p. 36). Moreover, several top EU leaders have frequently said that the EU must be internationally powerful while remaining responsible. Programmes and seminars such as "Vision of a Responsible Europe" and "Europe's Responsibility in the One World" were organized as early as 2004 (Vogt, 2006, p. 2).

As stated earlier, with the establishment of the ESDP, the EU took on new objectives as well as new – civilian and military – ways of acting as an international security actor (Ojanen, 2006, p. 36). In 2009 review of ghe European Security Strategy document, the Union pledged to "share the responsibility for global security and in building a better world " (Council of the European Union, 2009, p. 28).

In the most recent writings, the Responsible Europe has been defined as a marriage between pragmatism and idealism to create a pan-continental security order at the EU-Russia neighborhood which is circled by the US and China in the wider perspective. The gradual formation of a new European order in a dynamic world necessitates the adoption of a guiding principle by the EU, its members, Russia, and the states that lay between them. This guiding principle is defined as "Responsible Europe". Even as the global balance of power inclined to move eastward, this new European paradigm emphasizes Europe's role in the creation of international norms. Assuming that the EU and Russia continue to compete in their common neighborhood, "responsibility" demands all parties to take a realistic but ambitious

[16] Article 10 C: (a) of the Treaty of Lisbon: "The Union's competence in matters of common foreign and security policy shall cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union's security, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy that might lead to a common defence" (European Union, 2007, p. 25).

stance aimed at strengthening the foundations of all three OSCE components – politico-military, economic-environmental, and human-security. It is defined as a starting point for a conversation and possible roadmap toward a cooperative European security system that restores confidence, supports common interests, and ensures long-term peace. Placing responsibility at the center of the debate, it aims to eliminate self-serving power conflicts. It also suggests to going beyond the Cold War thinking, which envisaged the small states a role being just a "buffer zone" between major powers. Even if Europe now is obviously divided, the idea of a united Responsible Europe remains relevant. Moreover, the unsolved issues encountered at the end of the Cold War remain on the agenda today. If Europe is to remain an autonomous pillar of global order, avoiding to become a mere peninsula on the margins of a more connected and strategically important Eurasia is significant. To do so, both Russia and the EU have their roles to play. It is important for Russia to believe that it can have a beneficial effect on the form of world order outside of its strategic cooperation with China, while for the EU establishing a good balance between the transatlantic relationship and its own strategic autonomy is vital. Bearing in mind that the current state of uneasy relationship between the EU and Russia hinders a stable and institutionalized European security architecture, the EU and member states have a clear interest to reintegrate Russia as a responsible stakeholder in the European affairs (Hansen & Paikin, 2020, pp. 4–7). Today, the asymmetric dependencies characterize the region consisted of six small states at the EU-Russia neighborhood, namely Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Dzmitry Halubnichy and Alla Leukavets argue that in order for a Responsible Europe to emerge, all these small states' individual and collective interests must be supported responsibly. Afterwards, a more stable, inclusive, and predictable regional order will be the case. Halubnichy and Leukavets refer to the crisis in Ukraine in 2014 as a test case for the validity of the Responsible Europe argument as a remedy for current problems. The existing uncertain security environment left Ukraine weak and reliant, eroding its ability to pursue its own goals (Leukavets & Halubnichy, 2020, p. 11).

4.4. Normative Power Europe (NPE)

The notion of NPE was first coined in 2002 by Ian Manners. Manners defined the key elements of a civilian power as; "centrality of economic power to achieve national goals; the primacy of diplomatic co-operation to solve international problems, and willingness to use legally-binding supranational institutions to achieve international progress" (Manners, 2002, pp. 236–237). Constructing his arguments upon these, Manners argued that the EU has the "ability to shape conceptions of normal". He defined the basic norms of the EU as; peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (Manners, 2002, pp. 240, 242). International law, human rights and democracy promotion are stated as the three pillars of NPE (Siniver, 2012, p. 82). The EU claims that these above-mentioned norms guide all its policies internally and externally (Zamfir & Dobreva, 2019, p. 1). These norms are reflected in the legislations of the EU. It is stated in the Treaty of Lisbon that:

> The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail (Treaty of Lisbon, 2007).

It is explicit that the norms and principles mentioned in this article are exclusive for the EU member states. However, the Article 10 A of the Treaty suggests that the EU will not limit itself in the promotion of those values to the borders of the EU. It is stated that the Union's international action will be guided by the founding principles of it. The article states that the EU seeks to advance democracy, rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, and among the others respect for the principles of the UN Charter and international law (Treaty of Lisbon, 2007).

Following the Lisbon Treaty, Manners developed his NPE argument in accordance with the provisions of it. He defined the constitutionalization of the normative

principles with the Lisbon Treaty as "crystallization and completion of norms and practices" that have evolved over the last 15 years (Manners, 2008, p. 48). He described substantive normative principles of the EU as; sustainable peace, social freedom, consensual democracy, associative human rights, supranational rule of law, inclusive equality, social solidarity, sustainable development, and good governance (Manners, 2008, pp. 48–54).

After Manners, there emerged a rich literature on the NPE argument. Among them, Thomas Diez argued that the identity defined with the norms is constructed by the EU "against an image of others in the 'outside world'". He went on with defining the different forms of othering as instrumental in constructing the image of self and other in international relations and traced them in NPE argument. According to him, the other can be represented in four different ways; as "an existential threat", as "inferior", as "violating universal principles", or as merely "different" without being inferior or representing a threat. He states that the Copenhagen Criteria[17] turned out to be the representative of the European image of self (Diez, 2005, pp. 614–616).

Richard Youngs turns the attention to the issue of self-interest in the NPE. He refers to the EU funding for human rights reforms in a wide range of geographies from Balkans and Asia and to the Middle East. He concludes that the EU funding is not channeled to Islamic Non-Governmental Organization (NGOs) in any of the regions; instead, the EU chooses to fund pro-Western NGOs. Moreover, in some regions, the EU chooses to divert the funding to the governments from the NGOs. The PA is a good example in this manner. During the Oslo Process the EU funded Arafat's PA to achieve success in the peace process at the expense of civil society. At the end, Arafat's centralization of power itself turned out to be a concern for the

[17] The Copenhagen criteria relate to the overarching requirements that candidate nations to the EU must satisfy as a prerequisite for becoming members of the European Union. The Copenhagen European Council outlined the criteria in broad terms in June 1993 as the stability of institutions ensuring democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities; the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the ability to deal with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU; and the ability to accept membership obligations, including adherence to the goals of political unification as well as Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) (OECD, 2013).

EU. The same is valid for Boris Yeltsin era in Russia too. More inclusive democracy versus more stable democratic change were the options of the EU at that time. Stability prevailed once more for the EU. However, he states that it may neither be true nor easy to differentiate the normative policies from strategic interests. So that, in promotion of human rights policies, it is not reasonable to hope to find a pure idealistic and value-driven attitude of the EU. Regarding the EU's human rights policies as consisting of the reflection of mere self-interest is equally unreasonable (Youngs, 2004).

Now, it is important to define how the EU approaches the conflicts as a normative power. It is the ESS that elaborates on the EU's conceptualization and understanding of conflict drivers and how they should be avoided or handled. It is obvious from the document that the nexus between security and development is at the center of the EU's conflict management strategy. The ESS, is constructed upon a variety of liberal approaches. Consequently, it focuses on the economic causes of conflicts and the role of political and economic development in conflict management. It also addresses the EU's self-interest in gaining security achieved by the conflict management (Council of the European Union, 2009; Hughes, 2009).

The EU poses itself as an actor employing not only soft power but also elements of hard power to cope with challenges against peace and security (European Union, 2016). Here emerges the issue of the place of the military power in the civilian and normative framework of the EU. The counter arguments suggested that gaining military capabilities and deploying military missions abroad meant the death of the civilian power EU (K. E. Smith, 2005, p. 12). Proponents of the argument stated that increase in the military capabilities meant an increase in the crisis management capabilities as long as the military operations worked under the UN mandate and on a clear normative basis (Manners, 2006, p. 195). Moreover, other forms of power in international relations, particularly economic and military power, may promote the normative power (Diez, 2005, p. 616). The deployment of military forces in highly violent conflicts would be predicted by a normative framework, with the

dreadful humanitarian consequences driving European publics to demand intervention. However, proximity, relevance as raw material exporters, involvement in disputes with anti-EU actors, and high levels of violence determine the fate of military operations (Pereira De Magalhães, 2020, pp. 23–24). This aspect also creates challenges to decide whether the military intervention was norm driven or sole reflection of the self-interested EU behavior. The selective nature of the EU's interventions supports the suspicion.

The EU's commitment to combating threats to world peace, security, and democracy via its CSDP and CFSP has grown dramatically via legislation, funding, and the establishment of new structures. A major portion of EU funding is directed at fragile states and challenges connected to peacekeeping. The EU's 'new consensus on development' emphasizes the need of development cooperation in averting violent conflicts, minimizing their repercussions, and assisting in their resolution (Lazarou, 2020).

As explained in the previous chapter, under the CSDP, the EU deployed two civilian missions on the ground concerning the Israeli Palestinian conflict namely the EUPOL COPPS and the EUBAM Rafah. Normally, The Union's policy on is to preserve the unitary states instead of supporting secession. In other words, on both normative and interest-based reasons, the Union typically respects the concept of territorial integrity, in accordance with the rest of the international community. There are only a few instances that the EU supported secession; one was in the former Yugoslavia concerning Kosovo and Montenegro. The other is definitely the case in Israel-Palestine, where the Union has advocated for a two-state solution along the 1967 boundaries. It is unusual for the EU to openly promote a two-state solution to an ethno-political dispute. In this regard, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is a remarkable exception. This is due to the EU's support for both Israeli and Palestinian rights to self-determination through statehood, as well as its desire to work in coordination with the US on the Middle East issue (Tocci, 2007, pp. 8–9).

Another issue in which interests and norms come across is related with the EU's dedication to promote democracy. Arab world can be a good example to assess the EU's norm shaping effect. Democracy is a part of the EU's and Arab world's principal cooperation agreements and platforms, such as the EUROMED and the ENP, as well as bilateral agreements. However, the presence of other agendas such as "war on terror" jeopardized the EU's democracy pledge. Europe appears to be supporting governments with low democratic credibility in exchange for involvement in counter-terrorism efforts. Moreover, while democracy promotion entails encouragement for the civil society involvement in the decision-making process, the elements of the civil society were excluded from the negotiations of the EU APs with Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia (Ziadeh, 2009, pp. 1–7). From another glance, there are critics arguing that the NPE is just another reflection of hegemonic process. For example, Figueroa focused on the internationalization of higher education with the Bologna Process. He analyzed the Mexican and Chilean examples and concluded that "Bologna Process is a European hegemonic instrument of NPE" with tyranny of European ideas and language. He said that the EU plays the role of persuader and the language becomes a vehicle for hegemonic practices (Figueroa, 2010, pp. 247, 254–255).

Another type of power that is applicable to the EU is what is known as 'model'. The EU wields influence merely because it symbolizes the historically powerful continent 'Europe', or because it seems to be a viable alternative to the US. This has frequently been articulated in the EU's own rhetoric as 'leading by example' (Vogt, 2006, p. 8).

The process of European integration, although it has still been underway, is considered as an example/model to the world. European integration has served as an inspiration for various regional integration projects in terms of policy agenda or institutional evolution. The West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA), for example, has sought to emulate some of the EU's standards, legal provisions, institutions, and policies (Bilal, 2007, pp. 3–4). European Commission

states that regional integration is an important tool to integrate the developing countries into world economy. This integration in turn promotes peace and security, and enables to face cross-border challenges in an effective way. For these positive results, the EU strives to support the regional integration efforts in developing countries with its expertise and instruments (European Commission, 2000, p. 8). Climate change is the other area that the EU strives to lead by example. The President of the European Council published a document titled as “Taking the Lead on Climate Change”. He stated that it was aimed to make Europe first climate-neutral continent by 2050. It is stated in the document that “the EU is determined to set an example for the rest of the world” (Michel, 2021).

There is also an ethical dimension of the EU power. The EU's self-perception as an ethical power entails 'doing good' globally. Similar with the appearance of civilian power or normative power notions, the notion of Ethical Power Europe (EPE) is a response to the necessities of time. It emerged as a representation of the EU's rising strategic importance in the globe by acquiring a larger range of power capabilities. Concept of EPE differs from civil and normative power. It is a melting pot in which civilian, military, social and material power notions come together to create a new synthesis, transcending civilian and normative power Europe notions (Aggestam, 2008, p. 2).

Manners focused on the normative ethics of the European power. He defined three qualities of normative ethics in the EU actions: “‘living by example”; by duty of its actions in “being reasonable”, and by consequence of its impact in “doing least harm'”. 'Living by example' entails ensuring that the EU's policies are both normatively coherent and consistent. Coherence means ensuring that the EU is not merely pushing its own rules, but with bearing in mind that the normative principles are also part of a strategy for world peace. 'Being reasonable' necessitates ensuring that the EU justifies and rationalizes its external activities through engagement and dialogue mechanisms. Engagement requires initiating and institutionalizing regular and transparent patterns of communication or partnership. Dialogue involves

engaging in two-way deliberation and discussion as part of weighing the benefits of external actions. Ensuring the EU to regularly consider the impact of its policies on partner countries and regions means 'doing least harm' (Manners, 2008, p. 46).

The EU's self-image as a force for good, on the other hand, advocates that the EU's actions are motivated mainly with promotion of common values not the self-interest. The emergence of the term dates back to 2003 ESS paper in which the EU stated that "acting together, the European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world" (European Council, 2003, p. 15). Neven Mimica, the EU Commissioner for International Development, referred to the EU as a force for good which had been providing financial aid to the people around the world for 60 years. He stated that:

> Today, the European Union is the world's largest development and humanitarian actor, active in around 150 countries. 75% of our support goes to the world's poorest countries, and we are the only donor to be present in all fragile or conflict-affected countries (Mimica, 2017).

Parallelly, Javier Solana, former EU HR for the CFSP stated in 2007 that:

> The peaceful unification of our continent has been our great achievement, and now our main challenge is to act as a credible force for good. From a continental agenda, we should move to a global agenda. From building peace in Europe to being a peace-builder in the world (Solana, 2007).

Following the ESS, the ENP was launched in order to fulfill the expectations placed upon its image as a force for good in its interactions with neighboring countries. With the ENP, the EU aimed to generate "stability, security, and well-being for all" along with supporting democracy and human rights (Barbe & Johansson-Nogués, 2008, p. 81). However, the EU democracy promotion policy received criticism from many circles on the grounds that the EU supported authoritarian regimes in exchange for stability. However, it is important to mention the words of the European Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy Stephan Füle

as they represent the first-hand self-criticism. In his speech in the European Parliament, referring to the regimes in North Africa, he said that "Europe was not vocal enough in defending human rights and local democratic forces in the region. Too many of us fell prey to the assumption that authoritarian regimes were a guarantee of stability in the region" (Füle, 2011).

4.5. Concluding Remarks

This chapter has sought to demonstrate the narratives used by the EU when it presents itself to the world. It is important to know the main demarcation lines shaping the EU self-perceptions in order make a comparison between a self-proposed EU and the EU in the eyes of Israelis. The dichotomy between the images of the US and the EU powers in terms of means and ends has created a vivid debate on the description of the EU's distinctive power characteristic as an international actor since 1970s. From that time on, the novel characteristics of the EU in the international relations were tried to be conceptualized by the EU itself and by IR scholars. By giving the details of mainly civilian power Europe and the NPE arguments, the motivations of the EU foreign policy actions are tried to be uncovered. However, it is still problematic to reach a conclusion on some highly debated issues surrounding the EU power conceptualizations. First and foremost, the place of military power in civilian power Europe argument is still debated. Some scholars have advocated military power so as to increase the success of civilian power Europe in such a contested world today. Still others have called for the notice of death of civilian power Europe after armed forces were included the equation. Secondly, it is very difficult to detach the interests from the normative motivations in foreign policy actions. As mentioned above, the EU normative power calls for the promotion of democracy, human rights, security, stability, and well-being for all in the EU foreign policy actions. However, there are various examples that the EU has supported authoritarian regimes in exchange for stability.

All in all, with the insights of this chapter, the findings of the following chapter will be utilized in a way to compare the EU in the mirror and the EU in the eyes of Israelis.

CHAPTER 5

HISTORICAL BURDEN MEETS WITH CURRENT REALITIES: EUROPEAN UNION PERCEPTIONS IN ISRAEL

Perception precedes reality.
Andy Warhol

5.1. Introduction

As Andy Warhol once said, perceptions have an upper hand in the formation of reality. The dictionary definition of "perception" reads that "the way you think about something and your idea of what it is like" (Longman, n.d.), and "an idea, a belief or an image you have as a result of how you see or understand something" (Oxford Learner's Dictionaries, n.d.). Beyond doubt, newspapers are a good source of reference point to understand the perceptions in a country on a specific issue. This is the case in Israeli context as well. Moreover, there are important newspapers which are published in English in Israel. This lets the international audience to grasp the Israeli perceptions without waiting in front of the language barrier. Apart from that it is possible to reach official statements in English as well. In this chapter, the results of the lexicometric analysis of Israeli newspapers; *The Times of Israel, The Jerusalem Post, and Haaretz*, and of the official press releases will be examined. Lexicometric analysis showes the words determining the trends in Israeli perceptions concerning the EU first-handedly. Not only word frequency, but also the keyness rates of the words can be detected by looking at the diagrams.

The categories at the outer ring of the circular diagram indicate the significant issue areas between the EU and Israel. They are; *International Relations, Governance,*

Security, Human Rights, Economy, and *Policy*. The categories and designation of words to each of these categories are determined by the writer based on the results of the collocation analysis done with Voyand Tools (see Introduction).

The category of *Policy* refers to the policy frameworks that is dominant in the Israel-EU relations. The words under the category are generally related with the EU's two-state solution policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. The EU's institutional policies and member states' individual policies concerning the Jews in the Europe are also frequently addressed under the category. The *International Relations* category, on the other hand, refers to key actors and people affecting the dynamics in Israel-EU relations. The main issues related with Israel's security appear under the category of *Security*. Under the category of *Economy*, the dominant themes in EU-Israel economic relations are tried to be covered. Although, the EU is Israel's main trading partner, it is striking that there were few words referring to economic issues at hand after collocation analysis. The category of *Governance* ends up being the most abstract category among the others. The names from Israeli government, the words corresponding to government offices, and words related with legislation are categorized under this category. The words referring to EU's reform-oriented policies, promotion of democracy, and rule of law are tried to be shown under the category but most of the time it was not possible to encounter those words in the collocation analysis. Last but not least, the category of *Human Rights* collects the words such as anti-Semitism or Holocaust as the dominant issues in Israeli human rights concerns in its dealings with the EU.

5.2. EU Perceptions in Israeli Newspapers

5.2.1. The Times of Israel



Figure 3. Results of Lexicometric Analysis of *The Times of Israel*, 1 December 2017- 30 June 2018.

The word having highest rate of keyness is EUROPE; whereas when frequency is considered, ISRAEL and EU come forward. The central position of the word Europe which is an abstract word compared to the word EU, represents that the newspaper differentiates between the EU and Europe significantly. As referred to in the newspaper, France far-right National Front leader, Marine Le Pen's words summarizes this distinction in a clear way: "Because we love Europe, we accuse the EU of killing Europe" (The Times of Israel, 2017e). The word Europe is much more related with nation-states on the continent. However, the word EU refers to the supranational body to which nation-states delegated authority.

The highest number of keywords in the diagram is under the category of *Policy*. It is surprising given the fact that in other three diagrams the category is paid relatively less attention. The word JERUSALEM comes forward with high frequency which is unsurprising given its being the predominant issue of the covered period. The word STATUS and EMBASSY are most of the time collocated with Jerusalem. The word RECOGNIZE generally appears in the same context as well. The PA demanded from the EU to recognize Palestinian state as a response to Trump's Jerusalem decision. Although, during the analyzed period, several EU states had considered to recognize an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, they did not realize this. Up to now, only 9 EU members recognized Palestinian state out of 27. The major EU countries, predominantly Germany and France, however, chose to delay recognition at a time of a viable peace in line with the policy of two-state solution (Lehrs, 2020). In terms of wider regional dialogue, the EU shared its policy on Jerusalem in a meeting between the EU and ARAB League foreign ministers. The EU foreign policy chief Federica MOGHERINI reaffirmed that the special status and character of the city of Jerusalem must be preserved. (The Times of Israel, 2018h).

The word ABBAS appears at the outer circle of the diagram, which indicates low keyness. After Hamas election victory in 2006, the EU policy concerning Palestine was choosing to become a party in Fatah-Hamas-split, meaning that the EU continued its support to the PA and President Mahmoud Abbas, while Hamas was ignored. As a result, it is unsurprising to see the word Abbas in collocation with the EU. Abbas wanted the EU to play a more outstanding role in the face of increasing US' biased policy against the Palestinian side. The other frameworks in which Abbas and the EU come together generally in the newspaper are the issues of recognition of Palestinian state and of increasing the EU funds to the UNRWA. Abbas was covered in a negative way due to his remarks on Jews in Europe during the Holocaust. The EU's criticism against his remarks along with major European countries' frustration over those words are the themes that the newspaper draws attention on the issue.

In terms of keyness in the newspaper's corpora, the words JEWS and JEWISH are ranked in the third level together. This signifies that the modes of thinking in Israel on the EU is mostly framed in the context of these words. They were used in the contexts of the European Jewish Association, European Jews, and Jewish symbols, etc. The newspaper covers the issues on the Jews in Europe in a pessimistic way. The arguments are circled around the insecurity, the hatred and anti-Semitism posed mainly by Muslim migrants.

The words CONDEMNS and INVESTIGATION indicate the EU's stance between Israel and Hamas during Gaza border protests. "Investigation" refers to the EU's calls for investigation of the Israeli Army's response to the protestors at GAZA border. The "condemnation", on the other hand, is related with the rocket attacks to Israel from Gaza. The EU's criticism to both Israeli authorities and HAMAS finds place in the newspaper's corpora. However, the word "condemns" has both higher keyness and frequency compared to the word "investigation". This indicates that, the newspaper focused slightly more on the Hamas's wrong-doing than Israeli military responses to the protestors. The appearance of the word HAMAS in the diagram, although with lower frequency and keyness, is important considering the EU policy of ignoring Hamas. The newspaper refers Hamas as terror group in line with the EU policy.

PEACE, PROCESS, and SOLUTION along with OCCUPATION and OCCUPIED are among the most important words in the framework of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. The appearance of the words in the collocation of the EU, although with each word having different frequency and keyness rates, represents that the newspaper takes into consideration the EU role in the peace process. Moreover, these words appear in the collocation of the EU only in this diagram, indicating that only a fragment in Israeli perceptions draws attention to the EU role in the peace process. However, this role is covered frequently under the shadow of the US. For example, the reports that Trump administration would soon announce a peace plan titled as "Deal of the Century" are framed within the EU efforts to convince the US

to make necessary changes to fit the plan into main tenets of the two-state solution (Toameh, 2018b). The EU's ambassador to Israel, Emanuele Giaufret's planned participation to an event titled as "50 years of Israeli Occupation in the West Bank" is framed within the context of harsh Israeli criticism toward the EU in the newspaper's coverage. Concerning the EU's policy on occupied territories, the newspaper draws attention to the hardships that the EU faces to come up with a unified policy:

> A number of European Union states have refused for several months to approve a formal meeting with Israel's government due to a lack of unanimity among members on how to treat Israeli settlement construction and to express frustration over stalled peace efforts (The Times of Israel, 2017a).

SANCTIONS, on the other hand, is framed in the context of Iran's nuclear deal issue. The prefix PRO and words SUPPORT and ABBAS indicate the EU-Palestinian relations. EU's alleged pro-Palestinian stand, and support for the PA and PA's President Mahmoud Abbas are covered in the newspaper. The dominant framework that the word RESOLUTION appears is the UN General Assembly non-binding RESOLUTION rejecting Trump's recognition of Jerusalem as Israeli capital. The European Parliament's resolution denouncing Hamas as a terrorist group that uses human shields is another subject with which the word is related.

Under the category of *Governance,* the words DEMOCRACY and REFORM appear. While reform and democracy promotion are the roles ascribed by the EU as an actor, the newspaper draws attention to the trends within the EU that are detrimental to that role. For example, the NEW legislation proposed by Poland's conservative ruling party was criticized by the EU on the grounds that those controversial judicial reforms threaten the rule of law. The EU's consideration to impose sanctions on Poland with stripping of its voting rights in Brussels is mentioned as well (The Times of Israel, 2018f). LAW is used in a very broad context but it's usage in the Jerusalem Residency Law context is significant. The new Israeli Law permits the interior ministry of Israel to revoke the residency rights of East

Jerusalem residents if they are part of terrorist activities against Israel. The newspaper covers the EU External Action Service statement concerning the Law:

> The new law could make the residency status of Palestinians in East Jerusalem, a protected population under international humanitarian law, even more precarious than it already is today. The new law could be used to further compromise the Palestinian presence in East Jerusalem, which would further undermine the prospects of a two-state solution (Newman, 2018).

The words of NETANYAHU, GOVERNMENT, PRESIDENT, MINISTER, and PARLIAMENT is framed under a wide range of different contexts from Israeli domestic affairs to represent figures from the EU countries. NETANYAHU, however, is featured predominantly in all four corpuses analyzed here. Given his being the Prime Minister of Israel, the appearance of the word with high frequency in the collocation of the EU related themes is not surprising. It shows, at the same, the centrality of the figure of prime minister in Israel as a political actor in the EU context. The contexts Netanyahu is covered can be summarized as his criticism to the EU policies, his personnel meetings with the EU leaders, and his close links with Trump. However, the newspaper refrains mostly from referring to the accusations of corruption made against Netanyahu. Netanyahu accused the EU of hypocrisy and double standards, and of spoiling the Palestinians. His remarks went on as: "I asked [the EU foreign ministers]: How many times have you spoken about settlements? And how many times have you told the Palestinians to recognize Israel as a Jewish state?" (Ahren, 2017).

Under the category of *International Relations;* EU, UNION, and BRUSSELS come forward with high frequency. The word EU is the most significant word of the category. The highest keyness and frequency rates of the word reflects that the EU has an important place in Israel's relations with the world. The words GERMANY and MERKEL appear with considerable frequency. They are framed generally within the contexts of migration, Merkel's re-election for the fourth term as chancellor, and oppositions within the EU countries to further European integration.

It is important to note that the newspaper used "Muslim asylum seekers" term in the context of Germany's 2015 decision to open its borders to the refugees. Specifying the religious affiliation of asylum seekers in many instances in the newspaper is part of the threat perception that those people allegedly pose to Jews in Europe. Here, it is important to note that, the newspaper covers Hamas' criticism against Germany as well. It is stated that, in honor of the 70th anniversary of Israel's establishment, Germany's Parliament Bundestag passed a resolution which restated the country's commitment to Israel's security and bilateral ties along with rejection of the BDS movement. In the face of Israeli occupation, settlement building, and siege on the Gaza Strip, Hamas was annoyed with the fact that the resolution described Israel as a state embracing western European values. Moreover, the newspaper draws attention back to 2008 when Merkel stated that "Israel's security is part of Germany's *raison d'etre"* (Ahren, 2018).

The word RUSSIAN occupies a more important place in terms of keyness ahead of the major EU countries and the word TRUMP, indicating the importance attributed by the newspaper to the place of Russia between the EU and the US. The word is used with several connotations. Firstly, it is used in the context of diplomatic moves that the PA employed to restrain the US role in the peace talks equations after the Trump's Jerusalem decision and his threats to defund the UNRWA. The PA seeks Russia and the EU to step in to compensate the US bias in favor of Israel (Toameh, 2018a). Secondly, it is used in the Holocaust context. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's statements accusing the EU countries to downplay the role that Soviets played in the WWII finds place in the newspaper. He stated that it was the Soviet soldiers who sacrificed their lives to rid the world of Nazis. Their sacrifices helped to ensure the peace and stability in Europe (The Times of Israel, 2018d). Thirdly, it is used in the wider context of the war in Syria. Russia supports the Assad regime and Iran in the region while the EU is on the opposite side.

The word POLAND appeared predominantly in the context of Holocaust denial. During the analyzed period, the relations between Israel and Poland soured due to a

Polish legislation which criminalized the mention of Polish involvement in Nazi crimes. This makes the country come forward with negative connotations in the newspaper. However, in some other rare instance, Poland is stated as "one of Israel's staunchest allies in the European Union" as Polish leaders refrained from criticizing Trump's Jerusalem move (The Times of Israel, 2017d).

The appearance of the words HUNGARY, CZECH, and ZEMAN is not surprising given the fact that they constitute the strongest supporters of Israel in the EU. Hungary's support to Israel in the UN and the EU is praised along with the election victory of Hungary's Prime Minister Viktor Orban in the newspaper. However, the threat of rise of populism in Europe and its reflections in Hungary are not adequately covered. Moreover, the newspaper attributes the low number of the anti-Semitic incidents in the country mostly to the robust enforcement of the legislation against hate crimes. The Hungarian Jewry's watchdog on anti-Semitism, TEV, is covered in the newspaper with their statement that Hungary deserves credit for this (Liphshiz, 2018c). Like Hungary, the President of the Czech Republic, Milos Zeman, is covered in a positive way as well. He presented himself as a defender of Israel and said that: "The European Union, cowards, are doing all they can so a pro-Palestinian terrorist movement can have supremacy over a pro-Israeli movement" (The Times of Israel, 2017b).

Moreover, it is stated that in EU politics, he has emerged as a strong anti-migrant advocate as well as a prominent pro-Russian voice (The Times of Israel, 2018b).
ITALY falls behind Hungary, Poland, and Czech Republic in terms of keyness. The country is framed with the election results. The populist and right-wing parties' coming to power in the country is covered with their promises of shutting down migrant camps, deportation of migrants, and tackling with danger of Islam. Their motto of taking back the control of Italy is referred as a bad sign for the EU (Daley, 2018).

It is evident that, in the newspaper's discourse, the EU countries are categorized as friends or foes. The supporters of Israeli policies find extensive coverage with a positive tone of voice while the countries which are deemed to be critical of Israel are covered generally within the contexts of rise of anti-Semitism, hatred and the threats of Muslim immigrants to the Jews in those countries.

The words under the category of *Economy* appear at the edges of the circular diagram, indicating significantly low keyness. The word FUND comes forward with the highest keyness with considerable frequency in the category. The EU funds are important factors in the Israel-EU relations and play a significant role in the Israeli economy. The predominant place of the EU in Israeli economy from trade, and technical and financial cooperation to the R&D projects are realized through the frameworks of the EU-Israel Association Agreement, the EU Research and Technological Development Framework Programmes, and the ENP (*Israel and the EU*, 2016). For example, under the Horizon Europe which is the EU's main research and innovation financing program with a budget of €95.5 billion accessible over seven years from 2021 to 2027, the EU provides Israel with the opportunity to participate in the program on equal terms with the EU member states (European Commission, 2022). Under the Horizon 2020, with a budget of nearly €80 billion for the period from 2014 to 2020, Israel received €1.28 billion for R&D projects (European Comission, 2020; European Commission, n.d.-d). The analyzed period fell under the Horizon 2020 period. However, in the newspaper's coverage, the word FUND does not come forward with the EU funded projects. There was only one piece of article in the newspaper that covers a research project funded by the EU. While the fate of EU funds to Israel is negligence in the newspaper, the EU funds, for example, to Jordan is framed with extensive information from the number of billions of Euros within three years period to the range of programs they were used in (Su, 2018). In the newspaper, the predominant theme related with the key word is the UNRWA funds which is framed within the US cuts. This signifies that the EU's role in Israeli economy falls well behind the political discourse in Israel. In a rare instance, the word is used to refer to the organization New Israel Fund (NIF) in

the newspaper. The organization opposes to Israeli settlements and works for the promotion of human rights and democracy in Israel (New Israel Fund (NIF), 2022). It is framed around the issue of deportation of African migrants in Israel to Rwanda and Uganda. Netanyahu accused both the EU and NIF on Rwanda's withdrawal from a previous agreement on the return of the refuges from Israel to Rwanda (The Times of Israel, 2018k).

The word TRADE has the highest frequency in the category. Given the fact that the EU is the number one trade partner of Israel, it is a normal result. Beyond doubt, EUROZONE is an important determinant in European integration. The appearance of the word in the diagram, although with low keyness and frequency rates, shows that the EU's fault lines on deeper economic integration have a place in Israeli eyes in the formation of the perception of the EU in the country. The word appeared in the context of reform proposals from Germany and France for deeper integration in eurozone. However, given the increasing anti-EU trends among the member countries, the two leading EU countries had struggled to gain support. The word SOROS however appeared in a different context. As known, George Soros is an American Jewish billionaire who allegedly uses his financial power to reach political ends. He is framed in the newspaper with the accusations of the Hungarian government on encouraging illegal migration into Europe by funding NGOs which support illegal migration. He is also covered with the accusations of funding anti-Brexit groups in the UK.

The word BOYCOTT appeared generally in the contexts of Israeli settlement goods, BDS Movement, and the PA's boycott of US administration figures after Trump's Jerusalem decision. The word's coverage appeared in negative connotations in the collocation of the words EU or Europe. Firstly, it is important to look at the EU policy on the issue of goods produced in the settlements. The EU excluded Israeli settlement goods from the treatment of preferential agreement since 2005. Moreover, the labeling of products coming from settlements became mandatory with the EU's Court of Justice rule in 2019. The European Commission had issued

guidelines for the labelling back in 2013. While Israeli authorities considered this action as de-facto boycott of Israel, the EU reiterated its policy of not considering the occupied territories as part of Israel. The labelling of the products from those territories is considered by the EU only as a reflection of its long-standing policy (Ahren, 2015). Secondly, the EU policy on the BDS movement is worth to mention. The EU Vice President Mogherini states that the EU policy on the BDS movement is related with the EU's firm position on protecting freedom of expression and of association. The EU does not oppose the BDS actions unless those actions attempt to isolate Israel. She adds that the EU is opposed to any boycott of Israel (Mogherini, 2016). The newspaper covers the statements and political actions supporting the BDS movement from different EU countries. For example, the newspaper covers the Navarre state in Spain as the first state in country to endorse the BDS movement. While the Navarre BDS motion condemns Israel for the deaths of Palestinians in Gaza border protests, the article notes, it fails to mention Israeli right to defend itself, or Hamas, or the violence created by those protestors on Israeli border (The Times of Israel, 2018n). This creates an impression on the reader that Israel army's use of live bullets against the unarmed Palestinians can be normalized under the pretext of Israel's right to defend itself. In the third aspect, the newspaper refers to the report published by Israel's Strategic Affairs Ministry which includes a list of groups receiving EU funds yet calling for boycotts against Israel. Among them, some have links with terror groups, it is stated. As a result, the EU money allegedly reaches at the hands of terrorists. Israeli government calls the EU to halt financing those organizations (The Times of Israel, 2018l).

There is a density of words at the outer circle of the diagram under the category of *Security*. The words DEAL, IRAN, NUCLEAR, IRAN, and IRANIAN have the highest frequency among the others. The word "deal" has the highest keyness and frequency in the category and refers most of the time to the Nuclear deal known as Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPA) which was reached between Iran, and P5+ Germany, and the EU in 2015. In the face of the US withdrawal from the deal in the analyzed period, the EU chose to back the deal:

> The EU deeply regrets this decision but remains fully committed to the continued, full and effective implementation of the JCPOA, as long as Iran also fully respects its nuclear-related commitments. The lifting of nuclear-related sanctions allowing for the normalisation of trade and economic relations with Iran constitutes an essential part of the JCPOA (European External Action Service, 2020, p. 5).

The deal's predominant place under the security category of the newspaper's corpus is important, indicating the place of the EU in Israeli perceptions in the subjects of the security and survival of the country. SYRIA, WAR, and HEZBOLLAH along with TERROR, TERRORIST, THREAT, SPY and SECURITY appeared most of the time in the context of Iran as well. The EU policy on Syria is important here. The EU imposes sanctions on Syrian regime since 2011. The normalization of the relations between the EU and Syria is out of question unless Syrian regime takes meaningful steps in to fulfil the conditions mentioned in the UNSC Resolution 2254. This entails Syrian regime ending repression along with releasing detainees. For the EU, under current conditions, the country is not safe for the return of refugees. One of the EU's main policies in Syrian war is to contain the spill-over of terrorist activities. For combating Daesh and al-Qaeda, the EU supported the countries affected by those terrorist organizations from North Africa and the Middle East to the Western Balkans as a non-military partner in the Global Coalition against Daesh (Borrel, 2021). Besides this, the leading member states put their political and military support on the Coalition.

The newspaper quotes Netanyahu lumping together the ramifications of war in Syria with Iran, and Europe: "The presence of Shiite militias in Syria will intensify the Shiite-Sunni struggle and strengthen terror groups like [Islamic State] and al-Qaeda, which will bring a renewal of the refugee problem in Europe" (The Times of Israel, 2018a).

The operations in Germany against Iranian spies gathering information on Israeli embassy in Berlin and on local Jewish community are the other aspects of the keywords covered in the newspaper. The remarks of the Israel's ambassador to

Germany that this incident should be considered as a warning not only for Germany but also for all of Europe is covered as well (The Times of Israel, 2018c). This indicates the well-known Israeli inclination to remind the Europeans that they are in the same boat. In rarer instance, the word SPY is related with the US and the EU countries' expulsion of important number of Russian diplomats on the grounds that they are engaging in intelligence gathering. The newspaper also draws attention to the EU's diplomatic role between Israel and Iran. The EU passed Netanyahu's warning on the activities of the Revolutionary Guards in Syria and Lebanon to Iranian President Hassan Rouhani (The Times of Israel, 2018g). Besides, the accusation to the EU by Daniel Schwammenthal, director of the American Jewish Committee's Transatlantic Institute, on Union's dealings with Iran is covered: "All too often, EU leaders fail (…) to publicly confront Iran. Predictably, this has only served to embolden Iran's aggression" (The Times of Israel, 2018e).

To sum up, the security domain in The Times of Israel is framed mostly with Iran related issues in the context surrounding the EU.

The word HOLOCAUST comes forward with the highest keyness in the category of *Human Rights*. This indicates that, according to the newspaper, it is the central theme that shapes the Israeli perceptions on human rights in its dealings with the EU. The word is frequently collocated with "distortion". It appears in the context of the coverages on the Eastern European countries. Individual policies of countries from Eastern Europe on Holocaust as well as the term "Eastern European Holocaust distortion" are framed. The words HUMAN and RIGHTS most of the time collocated with each other. Likewise, the prefix ANTI and the word SEMISTISM are used together frequently. The definition of anti-Semitism including the demonization of Israel is adopted by Macedonia, Romania and Bulgaria is covered by the newspaper. However, concerning the EU's policy on the definition of anti-Semitism the newspaper states that:

> The EU dropped its definition following lobbying by pro-Palestinian activists and pulled it from the website of its anti-racism agency. In

> response to a query about the removal, an EU spokesman told JTA in 2013 that the definition was never official. Israel protested its removal (The Times of Israel, 2018m).

Several European countries and the European Parliament adopted the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance's definition of anti-Semitism. This definition allows for people to criticize Israel in a way similar to any other country. However, it outlaws the criticism targeting Israel as a Jewish collective. It is stated in the newspaper that the racist people target Jews -often Muslims- seeking payback for the actions of state of Israel. This is called as the new anti-Semitism (The Times of Israel, 2018i).

What is distinctive in the category is the appearance of the word PROTEST. It appeared in three contexts. Firstly, it refers to the protests at Gaza border. Secondly, it refers to protests in Iran organized against Iranian regime. It is stated in the newspaper that the European leaders did not throw their support for protestors apart from stacking into general statements calling on Iran to respect the people's right to protest (The Times of Israel, 2018a). The protest rallies in several EU countries after Trump's Jerusalem decision is also covered. The newspaper frames those protests in a strikingly negative way such as people chanting about shooting Jews or relating an attack on a synagogue in southern Sweden with those protests (The Times of Israel, 2017c). The newspaper refers to the protest letter of Israeli Strategic Affair Minister to Irish education minister on the issue of Leila Khaled's planned speech in Irish National teachers' Organization. The newspaper states that Khaled is a Palestinian hijacker and she had been allowed to speak in the European Parliament in the previous months. In the speech which receives the condemnation of the Parliament afterwards she said that Zionists were worse than Nazis (Bachner, 2018).

5.2.2. The Jerusalem Post



Figure 4. Results of Lexicometric Analysis of *The Jerusalem Post*, 1 December 2017 - 30 June 2018.

The word EU appeared at the center of the diagram in the Jerusalem Post. This strikingly high keyness of the word represents that the newspaper exclusively used this word yet with medium frequency in its coverage. It appears often with the words of “leaders”, “summit”, “states”, “system” etc. Given this, it can be said that the newspaper most of the time framed the EU as an institution.

The category of *Policy* reflects the dynamics of the research period with the words CITY and MAP with high keyness and with the word JERUSALEM with high frequency. The EU’s previously mentioned decision not to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel is the dominant theme. It is stated in the newspaper that the EU’s consideration of Jerusalem as part of its two-state solution policy is irrelevant. It is

mentioned that the primary reason for EU's refusal to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel is 1949 UN General Assembly Resolution 303-IV. The resolution called for the internationalization of Jerusalem and Bethlehem. In last 20 years, the Europeans are stated as they have generally recognized Bethlehem as part of Palestine. The newspaper asks if the EU cannot recognize West Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, then how they can explain their recognition of Bethlehem as part of Palestinian territories. The newspaper defines the EU position on Jerusalem as contradictory at best (Kalev, 2017).

IRAN and SANCTIONS appear in the outer circle of the diagram with low frequency. The EU choose dialogue over imposing sanctions on Iran. The EU policy on Iran is reflected under the category of Security with its implications as a threat to the survival of the state of Israel. JEWS and JEWISH communities in Europe are framed mostly around HOLOCAUST, ANTISEMITISM, Nazi Germany, neo-Nazi sentiments, and the rise of right-wing extremism.

The category of *International Relation*s frames the most significant actors and themes in the Israel-EU relations. The category includes relatively large number of keywords, yet mostly with lower keyness. It is the general high frequency of these terms in the reference corpus that results in this low keyness. DIASPORA comes forward with the highest keyness among the others in the category, indicating the newspaper's special focus on the contexts that the word represents. All the words under the category appear in the newspaper corpora with more or less the same frequency except the words EUROPE, EUROPEAN, and UNION. The words of historian Yehuda Bauer mentioned in the newspaper is important concerning these three words. He said that "European, yes. United, no" (G. Cashman, 2018). Parallel to this, the problems of solidarity and coherence among the EU member states are mentioned in the newspaper in many instances. An article in the newspaper specifically collects the opinions from Israel on the EU. Firstly, Sharon Pardo, academician from Ben-Gurion University of Negev mentioned his optimism on the EU as being a leader of liberalism and TOLERANCE. Nonetheless, he admitted his

worries on rise of neo-Nazism and far right in Europe. Academician Amichai Magen, on the other hand, portrayed a different Europe. He said that "we are seeing the erosion, weakening and collapse of Europe" (G. F. Cashman, 2018). But not all of the articles try to give a balanced approach toward the EU. In one of harshest pieces in terms of tone of voice concerning the EU, it is stated that:

> Europe is the epicenter of the political war against Israel. Europe fights Israel on the streets of Europe. Europe fights Israel in the corridors of power in Brussels, other Western European capitals and the UN. Europe fights Israel in Israel itself. Europe's war against Israel is a passive-aggressive campaign fought and denied simultaneously (Glick, 2017).

TRUMP and AMERICA appear in the diagram with almost the same keyness and frequency rates. However, the newspaper attributed the US leader and the US itself more significance compared to GERMANY, FRANCE, MERKEL and MACRON. The words Germany and Merkel have slightly higher frequency than France and Macron and are used in several different contexts. Primarily, it is important to mention that the dominant word pair in the newspaper concerning the country is "Nazi Germany". The other contexts appears occasionally but Nazi past sheds a dark shadow which prevails other subjects in Israeli perceptions on the country in the newspaper as the number one framework. Under this shadow, it is covered in several contexts. Firstly, it is used in the context of a crisis in coalition government over the issue of migrants. A German company is covered in the newspaper for firing an employee because she defended Israel (Weinthal, 2018b). Germany is referred to in an article as a country that "usually does not vote in favor of resolutions critical of Israel" in the UN. Still, it is stated that Germany voted for the UN General Assembly resolution annulling Trump's Jerusalem declaration (Tenenbom, 2018). Germany is featured in another instance in relation to a Hungarian law which limits foreign funding for NGO activities. It is stated that the European Commission was against the law on the grounds that it went against the values of the EU. A Soros-founded NGO's ideas that Germany has a leverage on Hungary which can be used for overturning the law are referred as well. German investors and German companies

is covered in the newspaper under the title of "how a Soros-funded NGO lobbied one EU country against another" (Harkov & Sharon, 2018). The newspaper referred to German neo-Nazi NPD party of the European Parliament with party's support to Iran on giving the country another chance. The member's question of "where are the sanctions against other states that violate human rights and commit war crimes: the United States of America, Saudi Arabia, Israel" is mentioned in the newspaper along with the party's previous calls to boycott Israel, and denial of the exact number of Holocaust victims (Weinthal, 2018a). Besides, the EU-US divide over the Iranian deal is covered in the newspaper in a detailed way involving economic aspects. The EU expected the US to exempt the EU companies from sanctions reimposed by Washington on Iran (The Jerusalem Post, 2018b). Germany is accused of having pro-Iranian foreign policy. The newspaper states that Gulf states can play a crucial role with their economic might to change Germany's and Europe's policy on Iran (Weinthal, 2018c). TURKEY is framed with the accession talks to the EU, the EU-Turkey deal on Syrian migrants, and PKK in Syria. Moreover, Turkey's Erdogan is accused of hypocrisy. It is stated that not trust and common values but fear dominates relations between the EU and Turkey (The Jerusalem Post, 2018a).

The words under the category of *Economy* in the diagram has relatively high keyness compared to their place in the Times of Israel's and Haaretz's diagrams. This indicates that the Jerusalem Post frames the strong Israel-EU economic relations with relative weight in its coverage. The same result is seen in the Israel official press releases' diagram (see Figure 5). The word GAS is framed mostly with the pipeline project between Israel and the EU. The word GAS is used in the context of EU-Russia relations as well. Russia's Gazprom is stated as the EU's biggest gas supplier.

Under the category of *Governance*, the words appear with lowest keyness compared to the other categories in the diagram. However, the category is home for the word ISRAEL which comes forward as the most frequent word in the diagram. Polish PARLIAMENT appeared in the newspaper corpora in a negative way mostly

because of the new law criminalizing statements suggesting Polish involvement in the Nazi crimes.

Under the *Security* category the words DANGEROUS and DANGER come forward with high keyness. The words are covered mostly with regard to Sweden. Sweden is stated as the most dangerous country for Jews in Europe. It can be a danger for Europe itself (Samuels, 2017). Despite this, the newspaper stated in another instance that Israel and Sweden must be open to possibilities for cooperation even if Israel might have taken a hardline position towards Sweden (Levitan, 2017). Besides, the word "dangerous" is used in the coverage of grievances of the Jews in Poland. The representative of the Jewish community in the country criticized the Polish law which they said to criminalize even stating "Polish Death Camps". They deplored that Jews were facing threats and insults in increasing numbers (Zieve, 2018). The word WAR appears frequently in the contexts of the WWII, Nazi war criminals, and war in Syria.

The words IRAN, NUCLEAR, SANCTIONS, HEZBOLLAH, and HAMAS appear in the context of the security threat that would be posed by a nuclear Iran to Israel. The JCPOA is referred as a piece of paper. The newspaper does not count even on the sanctions to stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. The only way that would stop Iran is employing military means. It is hoped that the US-Israel dialogue would produce a more muscular American position (Inbar, 2018a). The EU is stated as being short of understanding the realities surrounding the security domain in the Middle East by looking from its strategic paradise (Inbar, 2018b). Sometimes the criticism for the EU's Iran policy becomes too harsh in the newspaper:

> While the government keeps its boot on the throat of the people, Europe's 'human rights' preachers stood shoulder to shoulder with the regime. The only thing they didn't do is attend a public execution and ask if they could press the button at a hanging Frantzman, 2018).

The EU is covered with regard to its policy on Hezbollah as well. The EU designated not the whole organization but only the military wing as terrorist organization in

2013. The US VP Mike Pence's remarks to encourage the EU to fully designate all of Hezbollah as a terrorist organization is mentioned in the newspaper. The US remarks on Hezbollah and Hamas that they are part of Iran's proxy network is covered as well with reference to the US sanctions targeting them (Wilner, 2018).

In the category of *Human Rights* MIGRATION is ranked in the second place in terms of keyness following the prefix ANTI. The EU is framed in the newspaper with the divide over the issue of migration. Merkel's effort to overcome this division among the member states with steps to the direction of a common European ASYLUM policy is covered too within the context of migration. Anti-SEMITISM has nearly the same keyness rate with the word migration, meaning that along with the issue of migration, the discourse on anti-Semitism is very significant in Israel concerning the EU. It is stated in the newspaper that anti-Israeli attitudes were politically correct now. Muslim MIGRATION is stated to add this new layer to traditional anti-Semitism (Inbar, 2018b). Besides, the remark of Hungary's Orban calling Muslim migrants as "invaders" is covered in the newspaper with refences to his previous statements which faced criticisms of anti-Semitism. He called Horty, an ally of Hitler, as one of Hungary's "exceptional statesman" (Gold, 2018).

Eritrean ASYLUM seekers are covered in the context of deportation. It is stated that Israel had been rejecting all asylum seekers from Eritrea for years, which constituted a breach to international law. A court in Israel ruled that Eritreans who fled forced military service were eligible for refugee status. Even so, the newspaper refers to an official European Commission think tank, European Asylum Support Office, which reported that the majority of the Eritrean migrants deported from Israel, including men who had fled from military service, returned Eritrea on their own will (Eisenbud, 2018). Netanyahu's accusations on Soros for anti-deportation campaign for Eritrean migrants are covered in the newspaper as well (Keinon, 2018). HOLOCAUST is used with the words of "survivors", "victims" etc. The newspaper refers to Nazi war crimes in many instances in its coverage.

It is stated in the newspaper that the very idea of a European country is identified with Judeo-Christian HERITAGE of the West (Freund, 2018). The Foundation for Jewish Heritage's study to map the SYNAGOGUES of Europe is covered as well. It is stated that before the WWII, there were nearly 17000 synagogues in Europe. The study showed that only 3318 synagogues are left now (Liphshiz, 2018a). Jewish heritage in Portugal is mentioned as well with reference to Portugal's Tourism Minister Godinho's positive remarks mentioning that they would be very happy to see Jewish investment in their country (Liphshiz, 2018b).

TOLERANCE is a distinctive word, which appears only in the Jerusalem Post diagram. It is covered with reference to an international NGO called as The European Council on Tolerance and Reconciliation (ECTR) to fight against extremism, racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia. Former British PM Tony Blair is the chairman and former Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz is co-chairman of the organization (European Council on Tolerance and Reconciliation, n.d.). The organization gave European Medal of Tolerance to Prince Albert of Monaco. The newspaper stated that he apologized for Monaco's deportation of 66 Jews in 1942 without almost any public pressure. This makes his apology different from the previous apologies made by France, Belgium and Italy (Bassist, 2018). Given this, it can be said that the word tolerance is frequently also used in the context of Holocaust not in the context of the EU values.

5.2.3. Haaretz



Figure 5. Results of Lexicometric Analysis of *Haaretz,* 1 December 2017 - 30 June 2018.

The top two words in terms frequency -UNION and EUROPEAN- most of the time appeared in the newspaper in the company of other words such as European Commission, European Parliament, European Council. They reflected the EU's institutional dimensions. ISRAEL and ISRAELIS appear at the center of the diagram, indicating that these are the most important words appeared in the collocation of the EU related words concerning keyness.

The word SOMALIS appeared near the center of diagram showing significant keyness of the word in Haaretz. Haaretz focused on the young generation of Somalis who had immigrated to European countries within the context of the key triggers of

their radicalization. It is concluded that the European countries' inability to integrate young Somalis results in unemployment, alienation and discrimination, paving the way for their radicalization and making them a perfect target for Islamist terror recruiters (Einashe & Fangen, 2018). This coverage can be seen as a response to the coverages in *The Times of Israel* and *The Jerusalem Post* stating that Muslim migrants pose threat to Jews in Europe. That's why anti-immigrant politicians in Europe are mostly praised in the two newspapers. Haaretz, however, focuses on the causes that left migrant people helpless. By doing this, Haaretz gives the impression that with the elimination of those root causes of their marginalization and radicalization, the likelihood of migrants to pose threat to anybody, including the Jews, will be significantly diminished.

The place of the US President Donald TRUMP in the diagram showed low keyness in Haaretz corpora. He is the architect of the major events of the covered period so the other newspapers' diagrams also included his name. In other words, the low keyness is not surprising. Trump's recognition of JERUSALEM as the Israeli capital and decision to move the US Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem found extensive coverage in Haaretz. The EU's POSITION on the issue of Jerusalem is collocated with word RECOGNIZE. The EU's long-term POLICY of the two-state solution for the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian CONFLICT necessitates the East Jerusalem as the future Palestinian state's capital. As a result, the EU did not recognize Jerusalem as Israeli capital. The word PALESTINIAN also appeared most of the time in this context. The PA's demands from the EU to recognize the Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital as a response to the US move is covered as well. In another context, the newspaper mentions that Israeli authorities admitted to give settlers a land home to 700 Palestinians in East Jerusalem without proper checks (Hasson, 2018).

German's diplomatic warnings and concerns on the repercussions of the US decision appeared in the newspaper. Germany's foreign minister's remarks on the EU dimension in the face of the US unilateral move is mentioned as: "The European

Union can only survive if it defines its own interests and puts its power on display" (Landau, 2017).

The emergence of words ITALY, AUSTRIA, KURZ, HUNGARY, and ORBAN in the diagram are mainly related with the anti-Semitism and rise of far-right parties in the EU. The government formed after the elections in Italy is refereed by Haaretz as Eurosceptic and the symbol of rise of populism in Europe with implications of Xenophobia, Islamophobia, and hatred. Austria and Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz are referred by Haaretz with reference to the rising trend in the country to portray Muslims as the real danger for Jews. One of the ruling parties, the Freedom Party, is stated as having roots with Nazism and racism (Lis, 2018). The Coalition government is accused of exploiting Islamophobia. Austrian Jews are warned to see the danger of this exploitation. Hungary and Hungary's Prime Minister Viktor Orban are linked with the rise of populism in Europe. Normally, Hungary is one of closest allies of Israel in the EU. The country blocked a joint EU declaration against Israel in the analyzed period. However, in the newspaper, Orban's policies against Muslim migration and further European integration found extensive coverage.

ROMA in the corpora refers to the Roma people. They were the only ethnic minority persecuted by NAZIs during HOLOCAUST along with Jews. The rising populist discourse of the European leaders targeting Roma people increased the fears among European Jews who felt an emotional connection with them as a result of their shared bad fate. Besides, POLAND also appears in the context of Holocaust and Nazi history. LATVIA appeared in the newspaper within the same context as well. The annual march of the WWII veterans who fought under the banner of SS forces of Nazi Germany in Latvia was the issue at stake. Remarks that the EU needs to pressure Latvia to abandon this shameful event were included in the coverage (Haaretz, 2018b).

The economic problems coupled with the REFUGEE flow strengthen populist hands against GERMANY and German Chancellor Angela MERKEL in the EU. It is

stated in the newspaper that in the general elections which was held in September 2017, the far-right anti-immigrant party, Alternative for Germany (AFD), took almost 13% of the total votes. Anti-Semitic incidents in Germany and references to the Nazi war crimes also found place in the coverage of Haaretz. Merkel's condemnation of such assaults, and German Foreign Minister's remarks as it was their responsibility to protect Jewish life in Germany were extensively covered. Actually, it is not surprising to see Germany and Merkel in the diagram. Among the EU countries, Germany is the number one economic partner of Israel. Merkel, on the other hand, is an advocate of security of Israel. It was Germany that led the European countries to list the military wing of Hezbollah in the EU terrorist organizations list in 2009. Germany played a very significant role in reaching a nuclear deal with Iran in 2015 as well. Besides, an anti-Semitism Commissioner was appointed in Germany to fight against anti-Semitism in the country on May 2018 (Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community, n.d.). TURKEY also appeared in the collocation of the EU in the refugee context.

The second dimension that the refugee issue is covered is the US threats to cut its share of funds in the UNRWA budget. For the EU, supporting millions of Palestinian refugees through the UNRWA is vital in its strategy of contributing to the security and stability in the region along with keeping alive the prospects of a sustainable peace between the Israelis and Palestinians. The EU had committed to support the agency since 1971 (European Commission, 2021b). Some senior PA officials' remarks on the consequences of the US cuts or withdrawal are given place in the coverage of the newspaper. Besides, according to the PA officials, the threat of cuts of funds aimed to pressure them to accept the US position in future negotiations as well as to take the refugee issue of the table. So, they urged the donors, predominantly the EU, to increase their contribution to the agency to back their support of the two-state solution with operative measures (Khoury, 2018).

About half a million Jews live in FRANCE, making the country home for the highest Jewish population. However, thousands of Jews are stated to have left the country due to anti-Semitism.

The word JEWISH is generally used in the context of individual EU countries' policies toward Jews in that countries. Those policies reported by Haaretz are about imposing restrictions on Jewish religious practices by the authority of the territory such as banning of circumcision or of the slaughter of animals without stunning them first. It is also used in the context of reflecting the experiences of Jewish Communities in Europe about anti-SEMITISM incidents such as mobbing, discrimination, or even killing. Arguments on the definitions of anti-Semitism adopted by the different EU countries and the EU institutions find place in the coverage of Haaretz as well (Haaretz, 2018d). For the EU, anti-Semitism is against the core values that the EU represents -respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, and the respect for human rights including the rights of minorities. To fight against anti-Semitism, the EU put forward a strategy document covering 2021-2030 period, complementing the EU anti-racism Action Plan 2020-2025. The document targeted to prevent and combat all forms of anti-Semitism mainly by mobilizing EU funds and by further strengthening the legal framework (European Commission, 2021a). The frequency of the words Jewish and Semitism is nearly the same in the diagram. The word Jewish also goes, most of the time, hand in hand with MUSLIM in the coverage of Haaretz. When the report of discrimination of any kind against Jewish people in Europe, it was generally followed with the explanation that the discrimination also affected the Muslim community. The word Muslim appears in the context of radicalism as well. It is stated that apart from traditional anti-Semitism coming mostly from Christian Churches blaming Jews on the killing of Jesus, Muslim immigrants introduced a new strain of anti-Semitism related with the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Haaretz, 2018c). However, Haaretz is very critical about the European right-wing parties to attribute anti-Semitism to radical Muslims to "wash their hands" from the same anti-

Semitism. It is important to note that Muslim has higher keyness rate than Jewish in the diagram.

Shared VALUES of democracy, rule of law and HUMAN rights between the EU and Israel as repeated by the EU officials is referred by Haaretz as fantasy in the face of Palestinian misery. It is stated in the newspaper that "Palestinian human rights don't count" in the face of grave Israeli violations of International Humanitarian Law (Sha'ath, 2018). From this point of view, the newspaper seems to question the Normative Power Europe arguments. It is also related with Israel's policy of diverging the political and economic issues apart from each other when dealing with the EU. Apart from the normative aspect, there is also material aspect that perpetuates Palestinian people's misery. That is the lack of differentiation, in line with UNSCR 2334, between Israel proper and the occupied territories in most of the EU-Israel agreements:

> Of the 268 European agreements reviewed by ECFR, at least 158 were signed without any territorial definition defining their scope of implementation. A further 65 agreements contain either vague or ambiguous clauses, including definitions of Israeli territory according to 'the laws of the State of Israel' or 'the territory where it levies taxation' – descriptions that could justify the inclusion of Israeli settlements (Lovatt, 2019).

Actually, the guidelines issued by the EU in 2013 is stated in the newspaper as a first concrete step taken by a major international power. In the analyzed period, the Likud-led government approved the Cooperation Agreement with the EU, a provision of which excluded the settlements from the EU funding. Haaretz stated that the approval signified Israel's de facto agreeing to a boycott of settlements.

Coming after ISRAEL and ISRAELI, STATE is the most frequent word under the category of *Governance.* The category contains abstract words generally. The words NETANYAHU, NATIONAL, POLITICAL, STATE, and PARLIAMENT appears under the category -the most meaningful being NETANYAHU. His warnings on

Iran to various EU leaders is covered generally. He is covered in the context of Jerusalem, nuclear deal, and anti-Semitism as well.

It is well known that under the security context, IRAN is considered to pose extreme threat to the survival of Israel. The NUCLEAR deal known as JCPA was reached between Iran, and P5+ Germany, and the EU in 2015. The appearance of Iran in collocation of the key words on the EU is related mostly with this deal. On the Israeli side, the deal was not welcomed from the day one and was described as a "bad mistake" or "surrender to terror" (Beaumont, 2015). As stated earlier, the US President Trump declared the withdrawal of the US from the deal and reimposed sanctions on Iran. In Haaretz, the US Vice President Mike Pence's remarks about Iran as a state sponsoring terror, found place. He defined the nuclear deal as disastrous (Haaretz, 2018a).

On the issue of TERRORISM, Haaretz makes a self-criticism toward Israel, saying that they invented a new term, "popular terrorism" to refer the demonstrations by civilians against the armed soldiers. Moreover, the newspaper states that boycotts, the oldest tools of non-violent struggle, were criminalized by Israel as BDS terrorism. The newspaper adds that Palestinians were accused by Israel employing lawfare when they took their case to international courts. In Israeli context, even building schools are linked to terrorism. The article ends with a crucial sentence that "soon we will convict them of terrorist for their stubborn insistence on breathing" (Haas, 2018).

During GAZA Border protests, the EU called for investigation of the Israeli army's response to the demonstrators. At the same time, the EU condemned the rockets fired from Gaza to Israel. The newspaper covered these two sides of the word Gaza in relation with the EU. HAMAS is the smallest word in the diagram, showing low frequency. It appeared in the contexts of the words of Gaza and Iran. In the newspaper Iran is mentioned as one of the sponsors of Hamas. Haaretz referred high security issues such as RUSSIA's policies of annexation of Crimea or its hybrid

warfare capabilities as factors aiming to weaken the US and the EU. Russia is referred as a threat on the periphery of Europe as well as in the U.S. with increasing political influence in former and interference in the subsequent elections.

It is obvious from the diagram that economic aspect did not play a significant role in the corpora. It is a striking result given the EU role in Israeli economy. Reflecting this perception, under the category of *economy* only the words of WORK and AGREEMENT could find a place in the diagram. Mirroring this result, Haaretz pointed out the little effect of the economic relations between the EU and Israel in shaping Israeli behavior as; "It is not that the EU lacks practical tools vis-à-vis Israel. The EU's economy (in nominal GDP) is more than 50 times bigger than Israel's, but the EU has chosen not to use its economic leverage against Israel" (Persson, 2018a).

5.3. Official Perceptions



Figure 6. Results of Lexicometric Analysis of *Official Press Releases*, 1 December 2017- 30 June 2018.

The official statements of top Israeli political elites; President Regev, Prime Minister Netanyahu, and the Knesset Speaker Edelstein are covered in the diagram. The words AFFAIRS, COOPERATION and ATTACKS emerged with high keyness but with low frequency. This indicates that the words are particularly important in the Israeli official perceptions on the EU although they do not appear very often in absolute terms. It is also striking that those words correspond with the most basic aspects in the Israel-EU relations which are Politics, Economy, and Security. This finds place in the remarks of Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu as well: "Europe and Israel are important partners in three main areas: in the area of security, in the area of prosperity, in the area of peace" (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017).

The strong appearance of the category of *Economy* with six words -most of them with high keyness- reflects that the official press releases focused on Israel's strong economic interests in the EU. COOPERATION appeared with very high keyness and considerable frequency. The economic cooperation between Israel and the EU in the areas of innovation, agriculture, cybersecurity, and IT are attributed significant importance in the press releases. The key word is used most of the time as part of the phrase of "close cooperation between Israel and the EU". The word PROSPERITY reflects Israeli attributions to the EU as a model of prosperity. Natural GAS found in the Mediterranean Sea is important for Israel in its relations with the EU. Israel considers to export natural gas to the EU by constructing a PIPELINE. The European Commission funded the feasibility study of that pipeline with 35 million Euros. Being 2000 km long, it would be the world's longest pipeline (European Parliament, 2018).

The prefix ANTI is used mostly to refer to anti-Semitism in Europe. Apart from this dominant framework, Knesset Speaker referred to anti-Israeli statements by the EU leaders as a factor harming relations. The word VALUES, on the other hand, refers to European values of freedom, pluralism and equality. It appears as: "The Europeans have important and liberal principles and values. Israel is the only country in the Middle East which shares these values" (The Knesset, 2018b).

Under the category of *International Relations*, the words BELGIAN and AUSTRIAN have the highest keyness among the others. This represents that they come forward in the analyzed period in the official perceptions on the EU in Israel. Knesset speaker addressed Belgian Parliament on the Holocaust Remembrance Day. This had become the first instance that an Israeli senior official addressed Belgian Parliament. Netanyahu met with Austrian Chancellor Kurz in the analyzed period. Netanyahu gave credit to Kurz's remarks with which he accepted Austrian responsibility as a perpetrator of Holocaust. The word EU appears in the diagram of the official perceptions following these two countries in terms of keyness. Here, Knesset speaker Edelstein's statement on the EU is worth to mention to understand

the context the word is used in a critical way: “The EU can serve as a key player in the effort to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but it becomes irrelevant when it takes only one position” (The Knesset, 2018b).

The word DANISH is framed with the Danish Foreign Ministry’s announcement of the cessation of funding for Palestinian NGOs which have ties with terrorist organizations. The Israeli minister for strategic affairs praised the move as a win for Israel. The context in which the word appears shows the rate of concern that Israel attached to the EU funding to Palestinian NGOs.

It is not surprising that MERKEL and MACRON, the leaders of the EU’s leading countries, appear in the corpora. However, concerning frequency, France’s Macron is ahead of Germany’s Merkel, indicating that Israeli official corpora frequently referred to Macron while reference to Merkel is strikingly low. Netanyahu met with both leaders in the analyzed period. Netanyahu referred to Macron as his friend and addressed him with his given name, Emmanuel. He praised Merkel’s commitment to Israeli security. The predominant theme in the meetings with the two leaders is Iranian nuclear deal and the extreme threat that Iran’s presence in Syria posed for Israel and for the world. He conveyed Israeli concerns over the issue to both leaders. Netanyahu insisted the leaders of the EU countries to follow the US decision on JERUSALEM. It is not surprising that the US move is praised generously in the corpora.

The *Security* category comes forward with the word ATTACK with highest keyness in the whole diagram. It is used mostly as “ISIS attacks in Europe”. IRAN is featured mostly with security concerns over the issue of preventing it from acquiring nuclear weapons. The word appeared with high frequency. Almost always, Netanyahu referred to the Iranian threat in the colocation of the EU related terms in his speeches. Knesset Speaker followed Netanyahu’s path as well. He said to the EU Vice President Mogherini that "I would be interested in hearing how your deal with Iran guarantees that Iran will [not become a nuclear country]”. Moreover, the

speaker referred to Iran's increasing involvement in the Middle East as worrying (The Knesset, 2018a). Netanyahu's remarks on the EU's backing nuclear deal with Iran was very critical as well. He stated that the deal was funding Iran's terrorism (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018a). Netanyahu reminded the importance of Israel in the SECURITY for the EU. He defined security as a common interest between Israel and the EU in the Middle East (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018d). He said that Israeli INTELLIGENCE had prevented dozens of TERRORIST attacks in the European soil. RADICAL ISLAM is referred as a big security threat not only for Israel but also for the whole world. He stated that it is Israel which prevented the spillover of radical Islamic terror in Syria along with the human flow from Syria to Europe (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018b). He referred Iran as a radical Islamic regime as well. He deplores the European governments' silence over brave Iranian protestors. The word FEAR appeared in the context of these protests as well. Besides, he reiterated in many instances to the leaders of the EU countries that Israel would continue to retain its freedom of action to prevent Iran from holding a military presence in Syria. Moreover, in the context of the word "terrorist" Netanyahu stated that the 50 of the 62 casualties in Gaza border protests were Hamas terrorists (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018c).

5.4. Concluding Remarks

This chapter has sought to demonstrate the results of the lexicometric analysis of newspapers; *The Times of Israel, Haaretz,* and *The Jerusalem Post*, and of the official press releases. Among the newspapers, by looking at the contexts the words in the diagrams were used, it can be concluded that *The Jerusalem Post*, has a little bigger anti-EU position in its coverage. It is followed by *The Times of Israel*. *Haaretz*, on the other hand, is the least critical one among the three. Moreover, *The Jerusalem Post'*s overall attitude reflected in the diagram has more commonalities with the official press releases' diagram than the other newspaper's diagrams. For example, the words "danger" and "dangerous" under the category of security have their counterpart in the official press releases diagram with the word "fear". The

category of economy resembles each other too. Since the newspaper is stated generally as pro-government in Israel, these resemblances are expected results.

It is evident that issues of Holocaust, growing anti-Semitism, rise of populism, Iran, issue of Jerusalem, and threats posed by Muslim migrants and radical Islam in Europe are central themes in the diagrams under the category of *Human Rights*. However, while for *The Times of Israel* these aspects have covered in a very pessimistic way, *Haaretz* has a slightly different attitude with regard to for example Muslim migrants. The newspaper has warned the European Jews not let populist right-wing politicians to wash their hands of anti-Semitism by putting the whole blame on Muslims. Besides, it was *Haaretz* that extensively cover the threat of increasing populism in the EU. In the other two newspapers as well as in official press releases, populist leaders are generally praised for their support to Israel. The word "values" appeared marginally only in two diagrams, with low frequency and keyness. According to Israeli official statements, the EU and Israel share common values. Haaretz refers to these statements on shared values between Israel and the EU as fantasy in the face of human rights abuses that Palestinians have to endure for years. Besides, Jews living in Europe have appeared in the diagrams as a central theme. They are mostly framed with the insecurity they fell in the countries they reside in.

Iran dominated the category of *Security* in each diagram. Hezbollah, terrorism, proliferation of nuclear weapons, sanctions, deal, and the JCPOA appeared related with the issue of Iran as well. EU policy of employing diplomatic tools for these issues was not part of the solution for Israel.

Under the category of *International Relations*, the diagram included various country names, in respective contexts. The US and Trump appeared in the context of Jerusalem. Hungary and Czech Republic are among the strongest supporters of Israel and appeared in the diagrams with positive references. Note that Hungary, along with Italy, are part of another major theme in the diagrams, which is the rise

of populism in Europe. Poland and Latvia appeared frequently with negative connotations within the contexts of Holocaust denial and anti-Semitism. Iran, on the other hand, was part of the context of the security and survival of Israel. Germany's place in the diagrams was provided by its Nazi past, issue of migration, and Germany's continued support for Israel's security and survival.

The category of *Policy*, on the other hand, dominated by the themes of Jerusalem and Jews. Trump's Jerusalem move was the dominant themes in the covered period. Jews living in the Europe and the policies of the European states toward them were covered. The category of *Governance* in each diagram is very poor without almost always words related with the EU self-perception as a democracy and reform promoter. Rather, more general and abstract words appeared under the category.

Surprisingly, the category of *Economy* draws little attention in the diagrams. It is surprising, considering the level of cooperation that the EU provided for Israel in an unprecedent way. *The Times of Israel* referred to trade and Eurozone in brief instances within the respective contexts that the EU is the number one trade partner of Israel and the reform proposals for deeper integration in the Eurozone. *The Jerusalem Post* framed the strong EU-Israel economic relations with relative weight in its coverage and approached the issue in an opposite way. The same is applicable to the Israeli official press releases' diagram. *Haaretz*, on the other hand, concluded that the EU was not successful to use its economic leverage on Israel to reach political ends.

Based on the findings of the analysis above, the thesis will be able to give a comprehensive picture of the EU perceptions in Israel in the conclusion.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

In the introduction of this thesis, the emergence and evolution of the outsiders' perceptions of the EU as a research area and its contribution to the existing studies on the EU foreign policy were outlined. The scope of the thesis, methodology used in the thesis, and sampling method employed in the conduct of the analysis were explained in a sense to communicate the reader what this thesis has attempted to do, which tools it has employed to realize this attempt, and what the limitations of the study conducted here are. Constructed upon these, the objective of this study was to find out an answer to the following question: "*what are the main constituents of the Israeli perceptions of the EU and do Israelis perceive the EU as a coherent, legitimate, and credible actor?*". In order to propose a comprehensive answer, the thesis first focused on arguments on the elements of credibility, legitimacy, and coherence in the EU foreign policy. Then, examined the EU-Israel relations from a historical perspective in order to understand whether historical perspectives affect the perceptions of the EU in Israel today. Subsequently, gave a brief introductory information on the place of the EU in Israeli trade and economy to find out whether high level of bilateral economic relations have an effect in the Israeli perceptions of the EU in a positive way. Then, conducted a legal-institutional analysis of the CFSP and the CSDP, the nature and effectiveness of these instruments and their contribution to the development of a common EU foreign policy so as to decide whether the EU's efforts to increase its capacity in foreign policy contribute to positive reflections in Israeli perceptions and whether the problems in decision making in foreign policy field reflect itself in the perceptions as weak and divided Europe. Tater, turned attention to analyze respective places of the EU-Israel Association Agreement, Association Council, the ENP, and the Action Plan in the EU-Israel relations to decide whether they contribute to positive perceptions of the

EU in Israel. Afterwards, elaborated on the main characteristics of the EU self-perceptions for the sake of finding out whether it is possible to observe identity characteristics that the EU attributes itself in Israel. Finally explained the results of the lexicometric analysis with visual diagrams and in-depth analysis for the sake of establishing a clear ground for realizing the objective of this study.

In other words, the thesis aimed to bring together different aspects of the EU-Israel relations and the characteristics of the EU self-perceptions, and, by doing so, to achieve a better understanding of the results of the lexicometric analysis.

Until recently, the field of the study of external perceptions of the EU relied on traditional methods limited to semi-structured interviews, surveys, and content analysis (Elgström & Chaban, 2015, p. 33). The thesis intended to fill a gap in the literature by employing the method of lexicometric analysis in the Israeli perceptions of the EU for the first time. Studying external perceptions of the EU as a research area itself has already been instrumental in narrowing the gap between the EU actions and capabilities in the area of foreign policy, and the EU's identity. Putting Israel at the center of the analysis, the thesis offered a comprehensive understanding of the factors affecting the EU's image in such a contested country with respect to the challenges the EU has to face, posed by the nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. While historical narratives, current legal and institutional frameworks defining the scope of the EU-Israel relations, and the nature and effectiveness of the EU foreign policy making have their respective places in the Israeli context; the EU's role as a normative power prioritizes reform, democracy, rule of law, and respect for human rights and international law in its relations with the outside world. The analysis drew on the corpora of the three leading Israeli newspapers in English and the official press releases of Israeli Presidency, Prime Minister's Office, and the Israeli parliament, the Knesset, between 1 December 2017 and 30 June 2018. By doing so, in the fifth chapter of the thesis, the analysis laid out how Israelis perceive their relations with the EU.

The answer to the central research question "*what is the main constituents of the Israeli perceptions of the EU and do Israelis perceive the EU as a coherent, legitimate, and credible actor?"* has two dimensions. One is that Israeli perceptions of the EU are determined by a number of variables, namely; Holocaust, anti-Semitism (Jews, diaspora, heritage), Iran and related security concerns (terrorism, nuclear weapons, sanctions), migration (refuge flow and asylum seekers), and the issue of Jerusalem dominantly. Shared values, cooperation, and prosperity, on the other hand, appeared marginally in the results of the analysis. The other dimension is that the analysis provided an EU image characterized by lack of cohesion among the members, and by decreased credibility and legitimacy. The divisions among the EU members on certain issues are framed in Israeli perceptions extensively. Above all, the issue of migration (refugees or asylum seekers) constitutes one of main fault lines which reveals this lack of cohesion as well as posing threats to the values and the norms that the EU is grounded. Besides, the emphasis put on the religious affiliations of those migrants as Muslim migrants is related with the concerns appeared in the diagram on the welfare and security of Jews living in Europe. Those Muslim migrants are related with their possible effect to increase the levels of anti-Semitism in Europe. The frequent appearance of names of the EU member states in the diagrams with references to their vetoes for a joint EU declaration along with their conflicting remarks with the general EU policies on certain issues constituted another fault line on the issue of coherence. Likewise, the EU's external credibility and legitimacy have been shown to be severely wounded in the Israeli context. The analysis showed that the EU policies which fall in the domains of Israel's security and survival context are not desirable, proper or appropriate for Israel, indicating the decreased legitimacy. It is understood that for Israel, Iran constitutes the main threat to the country's survival. Issues of nuclear weapons, Iran's engagement in the war in Syria, Iran's support for terrorist groups, and Iran's export of its Shiite ideology in the Middle East are main concerns of Israel. These concerns are visualized in the diagrams with corresponding words. The EU is criticized for its Iran policy on the grounds that the Union does not understand the realities in the Middle East and what Israel faces. The US decision to withdraw from Iranian nuclear deal and to reimpose

sanctions on Iran are stated most of the time as a move the EU should adopt too. Moreover, the EU is criticized with siding with the PA, funding the Palestinian NGOs who allegedly have ties with terrorist organizations, and regarding its position on Jerusalem; all of which decrease significantly the legitimacy and credibility of the EU in the eyes of Israelis. These findings lead to the conclusion that the EU is perceived in Israel as a weak, divided, and biased actor.

This general conclusion leads to the following findings:

First and foremost, *the historical narratives contributed heavily to the perception of the EU in Israel today.* Based on the findings of the analysis, the Holocaust appeared as being "elephant in the room". Germany, as the heir of the perpetrators of the Holocaust, is covered in the Israeli newspapers almost always with reference to this bitter memory. German authorities themselves have admitted to be bound by ongoing moral responsibility of the Holocaust since the end of the WWII. However, the long and dark shadow of the Holocaust has not just fallen on Germany. The countries, such as Poland, where Nazis committed their crimes, appeared in the diagrams as well. It is concluded from the analysis that even if more than 70 years have passed after the Holocaust, Israeli perceptions on the EU still take shape around it. This can lead us to a conclusion that the political narrative of Israel as being the "victim" and some of the European countries responsible for the Nazi crimes as being "guilty" are still valid at most. As a result, it will be not wrong to state that the Holocaust has almost an untouchable place in Israel's perceptions on the EU. It does not a matter being a left-wing or right-wing newspaper, the issue is given a sacred place. The remembrance of the Holocaust, the Holocaust education in the EU, the Holocaust distortion, the Holocaust denial, and the Holocaust victims are dominant themes in the Israeli perceptions on the EU. Moreover, the issue of the Holocaust led to the emergence of another major theme in the EU perceptions in Israel, which is anti-Semitism. This, in turn, created an Israeli interest in the EU countries' domestic political developments. The political parties and election results from various EU countries were covered in the context of the rise of populism in

Europe with respect to its ramifications for Jewish diaspora in the EU. The perceived insecurity and threat felt by Jews living in Italy, Hungary, Poland, Latvia, and Austria were covered within this context. The issue of migration emerged in Israeli perceptions as a dominant theme. It is important both as a challenge to the EU's norms and as threat to the EU's unification. It also creates security problems. This is covered mostly around the term "Muslim migrants" with their radical Islamic inclinations. Note that the effect of 1980 Venice Declaration still in the atmosphere in Israel. The EU has been portraited siding with the PA most of the time in the analyses. Close scrutiny of these factors has shown that the projection of history of bilateral relations of Israel with the EU member states as well as the EU's historical foreign policy have affected the EU perception in Israel profoundly today.

Secondly, the analysis conducted in this thesis has shown that *the identity characteristics that the EU attributes itself were not reflected in the Israeli perceptions of the EU*. The results of the lexicometric analysis differ occasionally from the EU's self-perceptions as a civilian, normative, and responsible power acting as a force for good with the ability to lead by example. In other words, the perceptions on the EU in Israel are significantly different from the EU self-perceptions and the distinctiveness of the EU as an actor has a marginal place in the Israeli context. It is almost impossible to find words in the diagrams showing the EU as a model of regional integration, or as a successful normative power promoting peace and security of Israel and of the region by applying normative tools in its relations with Israel. Those words in the diagrams, especially under the security categories of each, speak for themselves most of the time that Israeli perceptions are oriented with realism. It is evident that the EU tries to address Israeli security problems applying normative tools such as diplomacy or international law, while Israel tends to associate the very same problems with the notions of survival. For Israel, nuclear Iran is a red line constituting an existential threat to the country. Appeasing Iran with deals is not part of the solution for Israel. The EU, on the contrary, frustrates Israel with its backing the nuclear deal, the JCPOA. Likewise, by looking at the analysis, it is not possible to find wide range of evidences showing

that the EU is perceived in Israel as a normative power exporting values of democracy and human rights. On the contrary, the EU is accused of closing its eyes to Iran's and the PA's democracy and human rights violations. On the issue of values, Israeli official statements identified that the EU and Israel share common values. Haaretz refers to these statements on shared values between Israel and the EU as fantasy in the face of human rights abuses that Palestinians have endured for years. All in all, the word "values" appeared marginally only in two diagrams, with low frequency and keyness, indicating its sidelined place in Israeli perceptions. Moreover, the category of governance in each diagram is very poor without almost always words related with the EU self-perception as a democracy and reform promoter. Rather, more general and abstract words appeared under the category.

Thirdly, *in the perceptions of the EU in Israel, it was not possible to find positive contributions of the EU-Israel Association Agreement, EU-Israel Association Council, the ENP, and the Action Plan.* Indeed, the territorial scope of these agreements have become a matter of problem in the EU-Israel relations. For many years, Israeli goods coming from the occupied territories and Israeli firms having their bases in the occupied territories constituted a direct breach of international law and respective UN Resolutions. Starting from 1997, the EU started to mention this aspect in trade relations with Israel, indicating the EU policy to use trade agreements as a tool to foster change in the attitude of its trading partner. In line with this, by implementing the rules of origin, or economic nationality of products, the EU gave a message to Israel that building industry in the Occupied Territories would not be advantageous (Gordon & Pardo, 2015, p. 78). However, these aspects of the frameworks mentioned above have casted a shadow in the the EU-Israel relations. Israel wanted economic and technical issues to be apart from political issues. When the EU started to embody political aspects in the frameworks mentioned above, Israeli perceptions have inevitably been affected. The EU Action Plan, for example, defined anti-Semitism as a major threat to the core values of the EU and mobilized EU funds combat it. The legal framework has been strengthened with the Action Plan on such an important issue for Israel. However, it was not possible to find

positive reflections of this kind of initiatives in the analysis outlined in the previous chapter. Contrary, it was the constant fear and feeling of living at risk on the European soils that dominated the Jewish narratives in the analyzed period. Moreover, the guidelines and labelling policies of the EU related with the EU-Israel Association Agreement have resulted in a negative image of the EU.

Fourthly*, the high level of bilateral economic relations between the EU and Israel have not contributed to a positive perception on the EU in Israel.* The poor representation in the categories of *Economy* and *Governance* in the results of the lexicometric analysis is surprising with respect to the immense web of relations under the frameworks mentioned above. In the analysis, Haaretz drew attention to the little effect of the economic relations. Interestingly, the newspaper reached out a conclusion that the EU deliberately had chosen not to use economic leverage on Israel. On the other hand, the references to the few instances that the EU chose to use economic leverage on Israel with guidelines or labelling policies, this in turn reflected negatively in the perception analysis. This time, the EU has been accused of hypocrisy and double standards.

Finally, notwithstanding the divided EU picture appeared in the analysis, *it was not possible to trace any positive reflection of the EU's efforts to increase its capacity in foreign policy in the EU perceptions in Israel.* The EU's efforts to speak with one voice with the development of the CFSP and the CDSP have seemed hampered by some member states' reluctance to follow the EU path in Israeli context. Hungary, for example, blocked a joint EU declaration against Israel in the analyzed period. This type of examples leads to the marginalization of the figure of HR for CFSP, a figure designed to act as the foreign minister of the EU. Moreover, these problems in decision making in foreign policy field reflect itself in the perceptions as weak and divided Europe. In the analyzed period, the EU failed to back its policy of two-state solution in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the face of US unilateral Jerusalem move, which was detrimental to the prospects of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem/Al-Quds ash-Sharqiya as its capital. In the analysis, the words indicating

the peace process in the collocation of the keywords appeared only in the diagram of *the Times of Israel*, indicating that only a fragment in Israeli perceptions draws attention to the EU role in the peace process. However, this role is covered frequently under the shadow of the US. For example, the reports that Trump administration would soon announce a peace plan titled as "Deal of the Century" are framed within the EU efforts to convince the US to make necessary changes to fit the plan into main tenets of the two-state solution (Toameh, 2018b). Thus, in the light of lexicometric analysis of the text corpora, the EU's efforts to utilize foreign policy instruments have not granted the political influence it aspires to have in the peace process with regard to the US role, which is seen as the only mediator in the eyes of Israelis.

In this way, the findings of the thesis with respect to the research questions have been outlined above. However, a further set of clarifications may be added to the considerations previously exposed. As underlined previously in this study, the context of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and the peace process have become one of the most challenging issues for the EU. Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict have been a stage to test the EU actorness for many years. Further, the conflict played a major role in underlining the need for a common foreign policy for the EC. The creation of the EPC in 1970 and the subsequent debates in the academic circles on the distinctiveness of the EC power were the early reflections of this reality. The complicated nature of the issue, with historical burdens, coupled with an overarching US factor, has posed further challenges for the EU's actorness. The EU has employed new foreign policy instruments to face those challenges. However, there are important EU member states which have been charged with historical developments, leading to a fragmented EU image in its dealings with Israel. In Israeli narrative, the analysis showed that the EU consists of friends and foes. Although, the study chose the level of analysis as the EU, it was impossible to detach the historical weight of bilateral relations from the EU perceptions in Israel as the results of the lexicometric analysis have shown. Besides, the legacy of history has led to a never-ending mistrust in Israel when the EU is the case. It does not matter

how much money has been invested by the EU to contribute to the Israeli security by funding Palestinian quasi-state foundation to prevent Palestinians from further marginalization or how many legal and institutional arrangements have been introduced by the EU to integrate Israel in the EU market or to combat anti-Semitism in Europe; Israeli perceptions are found in a cage barred with the words of fear, anti-Semitism, threat, terrorism, and foremost with the Holocaust.

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APPENDICES

A: TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

İSRAİL'İN AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ ALGISI

Yabancıların Avrupa Birliği (AB) algıları, Uluslararası İlişkiler literatüründe bir araştırma alanı olarak nispeten yenidir. Çalışmanın ilk sistematik örneği, Yeni Zelanda Canterbury Üniversitesi'ndeki Ulusal Avrupa Araştırmaları Merkezi'nde, 2002 yılında ortaya çıkmıştır. Prof. Natalia Chaban ve Prof. Martin Holland bu alanda öncü olmuşlar (EU Global Perceptions, 2021) ve çalışmalarında iki ana temaya odaklanmışlardır: "Uluslararası alanda kamu söylemlerinde AB'ye ilişkin baskın imajlar ve önde gelen algılar nelerdir?" ve "Bu imaj ve algıların politika oluşturma üzerindeki etkisi nedir?" (Chaban & Holland, 2008, s. 5). Chaban ve Holland alanın ortaya çıkışını, AB mesajlarının alıcılarını analizin merkezine koyarak, dış politika alanındaki AB eylem ve yeteneklerini ve AB'nin kimliğini bir araya getiren bir yenilik olarak tanımlamışlardır (Chaban ve Holland, 2015, s. 395).

Yakın zamana kadar, AB'nin dış algılarının incelenmesi alanı, yarı yapılandırılmış görüşmeler, anketler ve içerik analiziyle sınırlı geleneksel yöntemlere dayanmaktaydı (Elgström & Chaban, 2015, s. 33). Bu tez çalışması ise, İsrail'in AB algılarını incelerken ilk kez *lexicometric* analiz yöntemini kullanarak literatürdeki bir boşluğu doldurmayı amaçlamıştır. AB algılarını bir araştırma alanı olarak incelemek, AB'nin dış politika alanındaki eylemleri ve yetenekleri ile AB'nin kimliği arasındaki boşluğu kapatmada etkili olması bakımından önemlidir. Tez, İsrail'i analizin merkezine koyarak; İsrail-Filistin çatışmasının doğası gereği AB'nin yüzleşmek zorunda olduğu zorluklarla ilgili olarak AB'nin böylesine tartışmalı bir ülkede imajını etkileyen faktörlerin kapsamlı bir analizini yapmayı amaçlamıştır. AB-İsrail ilişkilerinin kapsamını tanımlayan tarihsel anlatılar, mevcut yasal ve

kurumsal çerçeveler ve AB dış politika yapımının doğası ve etkinliği İsrail bağlamında ayrı ayrı yer alırken; AB'nin normatif bir güç olarak kendisine biçtiği rol, dış dünyayla ilişkilerinde reform, demokrasi, hukukun üstünlüğü ve insan haklarına ve uluslararası hukuka saygıyı ön planda tutmaktadır.

Tezde, lexicometric analiz yöntemi kullanılarak İsrail'in çevrimiçi İngilizce yayın yapan üç büyük gazetesi -Haaretz, The Jerusalem Post ve The Times of Israel- 1 Aralık 2017 ile 30 Haziran 2018 tarihleri arasında incelenmiştir. Haaretz günlük bir gazetedir ve İsrail hakkında hem yerel hem de uluslararası konularda önde gelen bir İngilizce bilgi kaynağıdır. Özellikle liberal bakış açısıyla diğer haber kaynaklarından ayrılmaktadır. 1919 yılında ağırlıklı olarak Rusya'dan gelen bir grup Yahudi göçmen tarafından Kudüs'te kurulmuştur. Yayın günümüze kadar gelebilmiştir. Haaretz, hükümet ve karar alma çevrelerinde yaygın olarak okunmaktadır ve İsrail'deki liberal kamuoyunun dış dünyaya yansıtılmasında kilit bir role sahiptir (Haaretz, n.d.). İsrail siyasi bağlamında, Haaretz solcu bir gazete olarak sınıflandırılmaktadır ve bazen İsrail politikalarına aşırı eleştirel yaklaştığı belirtilmektedir. Bununla birlikte, İsrail'de özgür medyanın sembolü ve Yahudi özeleştirisinin kaynağı olarak anılmaktadır (Jewish Federation, n.d.). The Jerusalem Post ise merkezci duruşuyla bilinmektedir. 1932'de kurulan gazete, İsrail'deki en eski ve en büyük İngilizce yayın yapan günlük gazetedir (The Jerusalem Post, n.d.). Gazete, dengeli bir yaklaşıma sahip olma iddiasında olsa da siyasi duruşu merkez sağ, muhafazakar ve sağ eğilimli hükümetleri destekleyen bir gazete olarak görülmektedir (Augustyn, n.d.; The Media Bias/Fact Check, 2021). Times of Israel ise 2012 yılında İsrail, Orta Doğu ve Yahudi dünyasındaki olayları ele almak için kurulan Kudüs merkezli bir çevrimiçi gazetedir. Apolitik görünmek, haberleri dengeli bir şekilde iletmeyi hedefleyen gazetenin editoryal yönelimi merkezin solu olarak görülmektedir (The Times of Israel, n.d.; Media Bias/Fact Check, 2021b; Tucker, 2012). Tezde, İsrail'deki AB algılarını üç farklı siyasi duruştan (sol, sağın merkezi ve muhafazakar ve solun merkezi) yansıtma kapasiteleri nedeniyle analize temel oluşturan verilerin kaynağı olarak bu üç gazete seçilmiştir. İsrail'in resmi açıklamalarının yer aldığı korpus ise İsrail Başbakanı ve Dışişleri Bakanı Benjamin

Netanyahu, İsrail Cumhurbaşkanı Reuven Rilvin ve İsrail Parlamentosu Knesset'in resmi basın açıklamalarından oluşturulmuştur.

Tezin kapsadığı zaman diliminin 1 Aralık 2017 - 30 Haziran 2018 tarihleri olarak belirlenmesinin temel nedeni ise bu dönemde İsrail'de AB'nin İsrail'e yönelik politikalarını etkileyebilecek bir takım önemli gelişmeler yaşanmasıdır. Bu dönemde yaşanan ilk büyük gelişme, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri (ABD) Başkanı Donald Trump'ın Kudüs'ü İsrail Devleti'nin başkenti olarak tanıma ve ABD'nin İsrail Büyükelçiliğini Tel Aviv'den Kudüs'e taşıma kararıdır. Karar, açık gerçeklere ve ABD'nin Realist dış politikasına dayandırılmıştır ("Proclamation 9683 of December 6, 2017," 2017). Kudüs'ün statüsü, İsrail-Filistin çatışmasının iki tarafı arasında müzakere edilmesi gereken kalıcı bir barışın bir sonucu olarak belirlenecek bir nihai statü meselesidir. ABD'nin aldığı bu karar, AB'nin uzun süreli, pahalı ve kapsamlı iki devletli çözüm politikasına tamamen aykırıdır. Bu bakımdan, AB'nin bu karara karşı yeknesak bir duruş ortaya koyması dışarıdan bekleniyordu. Ancak konuyla ilgili olarak ortak bir AB bildirisi bile Macaristan engeline takılarak yayınlanamamıştır.

Tez kapsamında ele alınan dönemin ikinci önemli gelişmesi ise 30 Mart 2018 tarihinden itibaren başlayan Gazze Sınır Protestoları veya Büyük Dönüş Yürüyüşüdür. İsrail'in silahsız protestoculara karşı kullandığı orantısız güç, AB içindeki insani kaygıları artırmıştır. Bu olayları, AB'nin normatif bir güç olarak demokrasiyi ve insan haklarını destekleme taahhüdü bakımından bir test olarak ele almak mümkündür. AB, İsrail ordusunun kitlesel protestolarda düzinelerce Filistinlinin ölümüne neden olan sivillere yönelik sert tepkisinin soruşturulması çağrısında bulunmakla yetinmiştir (The Times of Israel, 2018j).

Mayıs ayının başında, ABD Başkanı Trump tartışmalı bir duyuru daha yaparak ABD'nin İran ile 2015'te varılan nükleer anlaşmadan çekileceğini açıklamış ve anlaşma öncesinde İran'a uyguladığı sert yaptırımların yanı sıra yeni kısıtlamaları da uygulamaya koymuştur. Anlaşmanın iki yılı aşkın süren zorlu hazırlık sürecinde

ciddi zaman ve enerji harcayan AB için bu karar uluslararası sorunları diplomatik yolla çözmeyi amaçlayan politikasına aykırıdır. (Landler, 2018). ABD büyükelçiliğinin Kudüs'e taşınma kararının 14 Mayıs'ta uygulamaya koyulması burada ele alınan dönemin dördüncü büyük meselesi olmuştur. Bunun yanında, 15 Mayıs 2018'in, İsrail Devleti'nin kuruluşunun 70. yıl dönümü olması da tez çalışmasında bu zaman aralığının seçilmesinde etkili olmuştur.

Tezin giriş bölümünde, AB'ye dışarıdan bakanların algılarının bir araştırma alanı olarak ortaya çıkışı, gelişimi ve AB dış politikası ile ilgili mevcut çalışmalara katkısı ana hatlarıyla belirtilmiştir. Tezin kapsamı, tezde kullanılan metodoloji ve analizin gerçekleştirilmesinde kullanılan örneklem yöntemi, tezin amacı ve bu amaca ulaşmak için kullanılan araçlar ile yapılan çalışmanın sınırlılıkları açıklanmıştır. Tezde, analiz seviyesinin AB olarak belirlenmiştir. Bu bağlamda, "Üye devletlerin İsrail ile ikili ilişkileri İsrail'in AB algısını etkiliyor mu?" sorusunun yanıtı analizin bir parçası olmayacaktır. Bu sorunun cevabı, ikili ilişkilerin etkisinin büyüklüğünü ve yönünü ölçmeyi gerektirmesi bakımından doktorada daha ileri araştırmaların bir parçası olarak değerlendirilebilir. Ancak tezin ikinci bölümünde, AB-İsrail ilişkileri tarihsel perspektiften açıklanırken tez kaçınılmaz olarak AB üyelerinin İsrail ile ikili ilişkilerinin tarihsel perspektifine atıfta bulunmaktadır. Diğer bir deyişle, tezde analiz seviyesi AB'nin algıları olarak belirlense de AB üyelerinin İsrail ile ilişkileri tarihsel analizin bir parçası olarak teze dahil edilmiştir.

AB-Filistin ilişkileri ise tezin kapsamı dışındadır. Benzer şekilde, bu ilişkilerin AB'nin İsrail'deki algıları üzerindeki etkisi de araştırılmamıştır. Bir yanda AB-Filistin ilişkilerinin önemi, diğer yanda bir yüksek lisans tezinin sınırları göz önüne alındığında, bu bağlam gelecekte daha ileri bir araştırmanın konusu olabilir. Burada kullanılan analiz yönteminin sınırlamaları da tezin kapsamını daraltmaktadır. Çeşitli programlar kullanılarak, çok sayda metinin analizinin yapılması şüphesiz büyük bir kolaylıktır. Bununla birlikte ne veriler ne de algoritmalar kendi başlarına bir sonuç olarak değerlendirilemezler. İstatistiksel sonuçlar, dinamik süreçleri gösteren çok iyi haritalarıdır. Ancak olgular yalnızca betimlenip gösterilmemeli, Max Weber'in

yıllar önce belirttiği gibi açıklanmalı ve uygun bağlamlarında kavranmalı ve yorumlanmalıdır (Castelfranchi, 2017, s. 8).

Yazarın İsrail'in ana dili olan İbraniceye aşina olmamasından kaynaklanan dil engeli ise tez için üç önemli sınırlama oluşturmaktadır. Bunlardan ilki ve bariz olanı, analiz için kullanılabilecek İngilizce metinlerin sayısının İbranice olanlardan daha az olmasıdır. Bu, daha küçük bir örneklem boyutunu gösteren ve analiz kalitesini düşüren bir etkendir. Ancak, İsrail bağlamında, İngilizce yayın yapan gazetelerin içerik bakımından zengin olduğunu ve bunun örneklemdeki küçülmeyi kısmen telafi ettiğini belirtmekte yarar vardır. İkinci sınırlılık, tez çalışmasında kullanılan analiz yöntemiyle ilgilidir. Kökeni dilbilime dayanan leksikometrik analiz, bir anahtar kelimeye belirli bir yakınlıkta bulunan kelimelerin hesaplanmasına dayanır. Her dilin cümle yapısında kelimelerin sıralanması konusunda kendine özgü kuralları olduğu düşünüldüğünde, İbranice ve İngilizcedeki farklı cümle yapılarına bağlı olarak, aynı metin külliyatının analizinin sonuçlarının iki dilde birbirinden farklı olabileceği göz önüne alınmalıdır. Üçüncü olarak ise, aynı gazetenin İbranice baskısı ile İngilizce baskısı arasında söylem farklılıkları olabilmesi sorunudur. Aynı kitleye hitap etmedikleri için gazetelerin İbranice ve İngilizce baskılarındaki üslup birbirinden farklı olabilir. Bu durum elbette İsrail'e ya da İbraniceye has bir durum değildir. Haberin birebir tercümesinde bile nüans farkları oluşabilmektedir.

Tezde argümanlar, uluslararası gerçekliğin yalnızca askeri ve ekonomik gücün sonucu oluşmadığı; bilgi, fikir, kültür, ideoloji ve dil gücünün etkileşime girdiği ve olayları şekillendirdiği sosyal olarak inşa edilmiş bir fenomen olduğu kabulüne dayanmaktadır. Tezdeki argümanlar, "(…)insanların, aktörler de dahil olmak üzere nesnelere karşı, nesnelerin onlar için taşıdığı anlamlar temelinde hareket ettiği" (Wendt, 1992, s. 397) fikri üzerine bina edilmiştir.

Tezde, İsrail'in AB'ye yönelik algısını analiz etmek için leksikometrik analiz yöntemi kullanılmıştır. Yöntemin muhtevası, "Bir kelimeyi yanındaki kelimelere bakarak tanırsınız" şeklinde özetlenebilir (Firth, 1962, s. 11). Bununla birlikte, bir

metnin leksikometrik analizi, yani konuşmalar, röportajlar, arşiv belgeleri, siyasi açıklamalar ve gazete yazılarının analizinde istatistiksel araçların kullanımı, Uluslararası İlişkiler alanında çok az uygulanmıştır. Dil, istatistik ve bilgisayar biliminin kavşağında, metinsel verileri işlemek için nicel yöntemleri bir araya getiren leksikometrik analizin bu bağlamda önemli potansiyelleri vardır. Dil verilerinin analizinin metodolojik titizliğini artıran istatistiki veriler sağlamasının yanında yorumlama konusunda da değerli bir yardımcıdır (Baillat ve diğerleri, 2016, s. 228). Yöntem, araştırmacının büyük hacimli verileri analiz etmesine olanak tanır. Aslında bu yöntemde istatistiksel sonuçların kalitesini artırmak için hacimli verilere sahip olmak daha iyidir. Ayrıca, karşılaştırılabilir olanı karşılaştırmak için form olarak benzer metinleri (yarı yapılandırılmış röportajlar, açık uçlu sorular, basın makaleleri, konuşmalar vb.) bir araya getirmek önemlidir (Baillat ve diğerleri, 2016, s. 230). Bu, korpus odaklı bir yaklaşımdır. Hipotezlerin önce oluşturulduğu ve ardından test edildiği korpus tabanlı bir yaklaşımın aksine, konuşmacının farkında olmayabileceği söylemsel oluşumları ortaya çıkaran leksikometrik yapıların keşfedilmesine olanak tanır. Sonuç olarak, bu analiz yöntemi, araştırmacıların hegemonik söylem ve ampirik sonuçlar tarafından iletilen yerleşik beklentilerden kopmalara izin vererek onları beklenmedik sonuçlarla şaşırtma potansiyeline sahiptir (Mattissek, 2008, s. 123; aktaran Tristl ve diğerleri, 2015, s. 73).

Analizin ilk aşamasında gazeteler ve basın bültenleri arasından ilgili zaman diliminde yayınlanan metinler arasından; “European Union”, “Europe”, and “the EU” arama terimlerini içeren tüm metinler seçilmiştir. Bu şekilde bir arada bulunan kelimelerin incelenmesinde kullanılacak temel korpora bütünü oluşturulmuştur. Analizin ikinci aşamasında ise kolokasyon yöntemi kullanılmıştır. Bu yöntem, anahtar kelimeler etrafında belirli bir aralıkta geçen kelimeleri göstermekte ve bu kelimeleri sıklıklarına göre sıralamaktadır (Cheng, 2013). Kolokasyon analizi için “the European Union”, “Europe”, “the EU”, “Euro” ve “Eurozone” anahtar kelimeleri seçilmiştir. Kolokasyon analiziyle anahtar kelimelerin 30 kelime sağı ve solundaki kelimeler listenmiş ve sıklıklarına göre sıralanmıştır. Bu aşamada çevrimiçi bilgisayar destekli bir analiz aracı olan Voyant Tools (Voyant Tools, n.d.)

kullanılmıştır. Bundan sonra ise kolokasyon sonuçları listesi baz alınarak kelimelerin Keynes puanı hesaplanmıştır. Keynes puanı, önceden tanımlanmış temalar (“Uluslararası İlişkiler”, “Politika”, “Yönetim”, “Ekonomi”, “İnsan Hakları” ve “Güvenlik”) altında gruplanan kelimelerin göreli sıklıklarını haritalamak için kullanılmıştır. Her tematik kategorinin altındaki kelimeler, gazete ve basın bültenleri korpuslarının kolokasyon listesindeki ilk 200 kelimeden seçilmiştir. HAMAS gibi listelerde bazen daha aşağıda yer alabilen bazı kelimeler ise AB-İsrail ilişkilerindeki önemleri nedeniyle tematik grupların altına dahil edilmiştir.

Kelimelerin keynes puanı hesaplanırken, “log-likelihood” veya “chi-square değeri” esas alınarak iki farklı yol izlenebilmektedir. Log-likelihood hesaplaması yalnızca tümce içinde seçilen kelimelerin sıklığına odaklanırken; kelimeleri chi-square değerlerine göre sıralamak, metinlerdeki kelime odaklarının farklarını ortaya koyabilmektedir. Böylece, bir metinde belirli bir kelimenin diğer metinlere nazaran anlamlı derecede daha fazla yer aldığını tespit edebilmek mümkün olmaktadır. Bu nedenle analizde, gazete/basın açıklamalarındaki keynes puanını hesaplamak için chi-square değeri yöntemi seçilmiştir. Hesaplanan keynes puanları tabloları ise karma yöntemli bir veri analiz yazılımı olan ARK (ARK, 2021) kullanılarak haritalandırılmıştır.

Bunlar üzerine inşa edilen bu çalışmanın amacı, İsrail'in AB algısının temel bileşenlerinin neler olduğunu ortaya çıkarmak ve İsraillilerin AB'yi tutarlı, meşru ve güvenilir bir aktör olarak algılayıp algılamadıklarını sorusuna cevap bulmaktır. Bu temel soruya kapsamlı bir cevap vermek için tez; öncelikle AB dış politikasında güvenilirlik, meşruiyet ve tutarlılık unsurlarına ilişkin tartışmalara odaklanmıştır. Sonrasında, tarihsel perspektifin İsrail'deki AB algısını etkileyip etkilemediğini anlamak için AB-İsrail ilişkilerini tarihsel bir perspektiften incelemiştir. Daha sonra, yüksek düzeydeki ikili ekonomik ilişkilerin İsrail'in AB algılarına olumlu bir etkisinin olup olmadığını anlamak için AB'nin İsrail ticaret ve ekonomisindeki yeri hakkında kısa tanıtıcı bir bilgi verilmiştir. Ardından, AB'nin dış politika kapasitesini

artırma çabalarının İsrail'in AB algılarına katkıda bulunup bulunmadığına karar vermek için Ortak Dış ve Güvenlik Politikası (ODGP) ve Ortak Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikasının (OGSP) yasal-kurumsal bir analizi yapılmıştır. Bu politikaların nitelik ve etkinlikleri incelenerek ortak bir AB dış politikasının geliştirilmesi yolundaki rolleri ele alınmıştır. Böylece, İsrail'in AB algılarında bu politikaların olumlu etkilerinin olup olmadığı ve dış politika alanında karar almadaki sorunların zayıf ve bölünmüş Avrupa algısı olarak yansıyıp yansımadığı sorularına cevap verecek temel oluşturulmak istenmiştir. Sonrasında, AB-İsrail Ortaklık Anlaşması, Ortaklık Konseyi, Avrupa Komşuluk Politikası ve Eylem Planı'nın AB-İsrail ilişkilerindeki analiz edilerek, bu başlıkların İsrail'de AB'nin olumlu olarak algılanmasına katkıda bulunup bulunmadıklarına dair bir çerçeve oluşturulmaya çalışılmıştır. Bunları takip eden bölümde ise, AB'nin kendisine atfettiği kimlik özelliklerini İsrail'de gözlemlemenin mümkün olup olmadığını anlamak için AB'nin öz algılarının temel özellikleri üzerinde durulmuştur. Son olarak, bu çalışmanın amacını gerçekleştirmek için açık bir zemin oluşturmak adına leksikometrik analiz sonuçları görsel diyagramlar ve derinlemesine analizlerle açıklanmıştır.

Başka bir deyişle, tez, AB-İsrail ilişkilerinin farklı yönleri ile AB'nin kendi algılarının özelliklerini bir araya getirmeyi ve bunu yaparak leksikometrik analiz sonuçlarının daha iyi anlaşılmasını sağlamayı amaçlamıştır.

Tez böylece, temel araştırma sorusu olan "İsrail'in AB algısının temel bileşenleri nelerdir ve İsrailliler AB'yi tutarlı, meşru ve güvenilir bir aktör olarak mı algılıyorlar?" sorusunun cevabını verebilmiştir. Bu cevabın iki boyutu vardır. Birincisi, İsrail'in AB algısı bir dizi değişken tarafından belirlenmektedir; Holokost, anti-Semitizm (Yahudiler, diaspora, miras), İran ve ilgili güvenlik endişeleri (terörizm, nükleer silahlar, yaptırımlar), göç (sığınmacılar) ve Kudüs meselesi. Paylaşılan değerler, iş birliği ve refah ise analiz sonuçlarında ancak marjinal bir yere sahip olabilmiştir. Analizin ulaştığı diğer sonuç ise; İsrail'deki AB imajının, üyeler arasındaki uyum eksikliği ve azalan güvenilirlik ve meşruiyet ile karakterize

olduğunu ortaya koymuştur. AB üyeleri arasında belirli konulardaki bölünmeler, İsrail algılarında kapsamlı bir şekilde yer almıştır. Her şeyden önce göç konusu (mülteciler veya sığınmacılar), bu uyumsuzluğu ortaya çıkaran ve AB'nin temel aldığı değerlere ve normlara tehdit oluşturan ana fay hatlarından birini oluşturmaktadır. Ayrıca bu göçmenlerin Müslüman göçmenler olarak dini aidiyetlerine yapılan vurgu, Avrupa'da yaşayan Yahudilerin refah ve güvenliğine ilişkin kaygılarla ilgilidir. Bu Müslüman göçmenler, Avrupa'daki anti-Semitizm düzeylerini artırmadaki olası etkileriyle ilişkilendirilmiştir. Diyagramlarda, AB üyesi bazı devletlerin adlarının sık sık ortak bir AB deklarasyonunu engellemelerine atıfla yer alması ve bazı konularda bu devletlerin genel AB politikalarıyla çelişen ifadelerine sıkça değinilmesi, AB içinde üye devletler arasındaki uyum konusunda başka bir fay hattını ortaya koymaktadır. Aynı şekilde, AB'nin dış güvenilirliği ve meşruiyetinin İsrail bağlamında ciddi şekilde yaralandığı görülmüştür. Analiz, İsrail'in güvenlik ve hayatta kalma bağlamında ele aldığı konulara yönelik AB politikalarının İsrail için arzu edilir politikalar olmadığını ve bunların İsrail'de uygun karşılanmadığını göstermiştir. Bu da İsrail'de, AB'nin azalan meşruiyetine işaret etmektedir. İsrail için ülkenin bekasına yönelik ana tehdidin İran'dan kaynaklandığı anlaşılmaktadır. Nükleer silahlar, İran'ın Suriye'deki savaşa katılması, İran'ın terörist gruplara desteği ve İran'ın Şii ideolojisini Orta Doğu'ya ihraç etmesi İsrail'in temel endişeleridir. Bu endişeler, ilgili kelimelerle diyagramlarda görselleştirilmiştir. Bu noktada AB, Orta Doğu'daki koşulları ve İsrail'in karşı karşıya olduğu gerçekliği anlamadığı gerekçesiyle İran politikası konusunda İsrail'de sıkça eleştirilmektedir. ABD'nin İran Nükleer Anlaşmasından çekilme ve İran'a yeniden yaptırım uygulama kararı, AB'nin de benimsemesi gereken bir hamle olarak çoğu zaman dile getirilmiştir. Ayrıca AB, Filistin Yönetimi'nin yanında yer almakla, terör örgütleriyle bağları olduğu iddia edilen Filistinli STK'ları finanse etmekle ve Kudüs konusundaki tutumuyla eleştirilmiştir. Tüm bunlar, İsraillilerin gözünde AB'nin meşruiyetini ve güvenilirliğini önemli ölçüde azaltmaktadır. Bu bulgular, AB'nin İsrail'de zayıf, bölünmüş ve taraflı bir aktör olarak algılandığı sonucunu ortaya koymuştur. Bu genel sonuçtan hareketle, aşağıdaki bulgulara ulaşılmıştır:

Her şeyden önce, tarihsel anlatılar bugün İsrail'de AB algısının şekillenmesinde büyük rol oynamıştır. Analiz sonuçlarında Holokost bariz bir gerçek olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. Holokost'un faillerinin mirasçısı olan Almanya, İsrail gazetelerinde hemen her zaman bu acı hatıranın bağlamı içinde yer almaktadır. Halihazırda Alman yetkililer, İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nın sona ermesinden bu yana Holokost'un devam eden ahlaki sorumluluğuna bağlı olduklarını kabul etmektedir. Bu sorumluluğun sonucu olarak Almanya'nın İsrail'e karşı daima temkinli hareket etmeye çalıştığı görülmüştür. AB'nin en güçlü devleti olarak görülen Almanya'nın bu tavrı İsrail'in uluslararası hukuk ve insan hakları ihlallerine karşı AB'nin de daha iddialı bir politika izlemesinin önüne geçmektedir. Ancak Holokost'un uzun ve karanlık gölgesinin sadece Almanya'nın üzerine düşmediği de aşikardır. Polonya gibi Nazilerin suçlarını işlediği ülkeler de diyagramlarda bu bağlamda sıklıkla yer almışlardır. Buradan hareketle, analiz sonuçlarına göre, Holokost'un üzerinden 70 yılı aşkın bir süre geçmesine rağmen, İsrail'in AB algılarının hala onun etrafında şekillendiği sonucuna varılmaktadır. Bu da bize, İsrail'in "kurban" ve bazı Avrupa ülkelerinin Nazi suçlarından sorumlu "suçlu"lar olduğu şeklindeki siyasi anlatının hala geçerli olduğunu göstermektedir. Sonuç olarak, İsrail'in AB algısında Holokost'un neredeyse dokunulmaz bir yere sahip olduğunu söylemek yanlış olmayacaktır. İncelenen gazetelerin siyasi duruşları fark etmeksizin konuya neredeyse kutsal bir önem verdikleri görülmüştür. Holokost'un anılması, AB'deki Holokost eğitimi, Holokost çarpıtması, Holokost'un inkarı ve Holokost kurbanları İsrail'in AB algılarında baskın temalardır. Ayrıca Holokost konusu, İsrail'deki AB algılarında bir diğer önemli tema olan anti-Semitizm'i ortaya çıkarmaktadır. Anti-Semitizm konusu İsrail'de AB üyelerinin iç siyasi gelişmelerine karşı sürekli bir ilgiyi de beraberinde getirmektedir. Analizde, çeşitli AB üyelerinin siyasi partileri ve seçim sonuçları; AB'deki Yahudi diasporasına etkileri bakımından ve Avrupa'da popülizmin yükselişi bağlamında ele alındığı görülmüştür. İtalya, Macaristan, Polonya, Letonya ve Avusturya'da yaşayan Yahudilerin algıladıkları güvensizlik ve tehdit bu kapsamdadır. Göç konusu İsrail algılarında bir diğer baskın bir tema olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. Hem AB normlarına bir meydan okuma hem de AB'nin bütünleşmesi için bir tehdit olarak göç önemli bir konudur. Aynı zamanda güvenlik

sorunları yaratmaktadır. Bunun İsrail algılarında, çoğunlukla radikal İslami eğilimleri olan "Müslüman göçmenler" terimi etrafında ele alındığı görülmüştür. 1980 Venedik Deklarasyonu'nun etkisinin İsrail'de hala hissedildiğini de belirtmekte fayda vardır. Analizler, AB'nin İsrail'de çoğu zaman Filistin Yönetiminin tarafını tutan bir aktör olarak algılandığını göstermiştir. Bu faktörlerin yakından incelenmesi, İsrail'in AB üyesi ülkelerle ikili ilişkilerinin tarihsel izdüşümünün ve AB'nin tarihsel dış politikasının bugün İsrail'deki AB algısını derinden etkilediğini göstermiştir.

İkinci olarak, bu tezde yapılan analiz, AB'nin kendisine atfettiği kimlik özelliklerinin İsrail'in AB algılarına yansımadığını göstermektedir. Leksikometrik analizin sonuçları, AB'nin kendisini, örnek olarak liderlik etme yeteneği ile iyilik için bir güç olarak hareket eden sivil, normatif ve sorumlu bir güç olarak algılamasının İsrail'de büyük oranda karşılık bulmadığını göstermiştir. Diğer bir deyişle, İsrail'de AB'ye ilişkin algılar AB'nin kendi algılarından önemli ölçüde farklıdır ve AB'nin bir aktör olarak ayırt edici özelliği İsrail bağlamında marjinal bir yere sahiptir. Diyagramlarda AB'yi bir bölgesel entegrasyon modeli veya İsrail ile ilişkilerinde normatif araçlar uygulayarak İsrail'in ve bölgenin barış ve güvenliğini destekleyen başarılı bir normatif güç olarak gösteren kelimeleri bulmak neredeyse imkansızdır. Her bir diyagramın özellikle güvenlik kategorileri altında yer alan kelimeler, çoğu zaman İsrail algılarının Realizm etrafında şekillendiğini göstermektedir. Buna karşın AB'nin İsrail'in güvenlik sorunlarını diplomasi veya uluslararası hukuk gibi normatif araçlar kullanarak çözmeye çalışması, İsrail aynı sorunları hayatta kalma kavramlarıyla ilişkilendirme eğiliminde olduğu için başarısızlığa mahkum olmaktadır. İsrail için nükleer İran, ülkeye varoluşsal bir tehdit oluşturan kırmızı bir çizgidir. İran'ı anlaşmalarla yatıştırmak İsrail için çözümün bir parçası değildir. Bu bağlamda AB'nin, İran Nükleer Anlaşmasını desteklemesi İsrail'i en hafif tabirle hayal kırıklığına uğratmaktadır. Aynı şekilde, analize bakıldığında, İsrail'de AB'nin demokrasi ve insan hakları değerlerini ihraç eden normatif bir güç olarak algılandığını gösteren geniş bir kanıt bulmak mümkün değildir. Aksine AB, İran'ın ve Filistin Yönetimi'nin demokrasi ve insan hakları

ihlallerine gözünü kapatmakla suçlanmaktadır. Değerler konusunda İsrail resmi basın açıklamaları, AB ve İsrail'in ortak değerleri paylaştığını belirtirken; Haaretz, İsrail ve AB arasındaki ortak değerlere ilişkin bu açıklamaları, Filistinlilerin yıllardır maruz kaldığı insan hakları ihlalleri karşısında bir fantezi olarak nitelendirmiştir. Sonuç olarak, "değerler" kelimesi, İsrail'in AB algılarındaki ikincil yerini gösteren düşük sıklık ve keynes değerleriyle, yalnızca iki diyagramda marjinal olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. Ayrıca, her diyagramda yönetim kategorisinin çok zayıf olduğu görülmüştür. Diyagramlarda, yönetim kategorisi altında, AB'nin bir demokrasi ve reform destekçisi olmasına yönelik algıyı oluşturacak kelimeleri bulmak neredeyse imkansızdır. Bunun yerine kategori altında daha genel ve soyut kelimeler ortaya çıkmıştır.

Üçüncü olarak, İsrail'deki AB algılarında AB-İsrail Ortaklık Anlaşması, Ortaklık Konseyi, Avrupa Komşuluk Politikası ve Eylem Planı'nın olumlu katkılarına rastlamak mümkün olmamıştır. Aslına bakılırsa, bu anlaşmaların bölgesel kapsamı AB-İsrail ilişkilerinde bir sorun haline gelmiştir. Uzun yıllar boyunca, işgal altındaki topraklardan gelen İsrail malları ve merkezleri işgal altındaki topraklarda bulunan İsrail firmaları, uluslararası hukukun ve ilgili Birleşmiş Milletler kararlarını doğrudan ihlal etmiştir. AB'nin ticaret anlaşmalarını, ticaret ortağının tutumundaki değişimi teşvik etmek için bir araç olarak kullanma politikasını göstermesi bağlamında 1997 yılından itibaren AB, İsrail ile ticari ilişkilerinde bu hususta bahsetmeye başlamıştır. Bu doğrultuda AB, İsrailli yerleşimcilerin ürettiği ve Avrupa'ya ithal ettiği ürünlerin işgal altındaki topraklarda üretildiklerine dair özel olarak etiketlenmesi ve işgal bölgelerinde üretilen malların gümrüksüz olarak AB'ye girmesinin engellenmesi gibi kurallar getirerek İsrail'e işgal altındaki topraklarda endüstri kurmanın avantajlı olmayacağı mesajını vermiştir (Gordon & Pardo, 2015, s. 78). Ancak yukarıda bahsedilen anlaşmalara AB'nin bu yönleri eklemesi AB-İsrail ilişkilerine gölge düşürmüştür. AB'nin AB-İsrail Ortaklık Anlaşması ile ilgili yönergeleri ve etiketleme politikaları, AB'nin olumsuz bir imaja sahip olmasına neden olmuştur. İsrail, ekonomik ve teknik meselelerin siyasi meselelerden ayrı olmasını istemektedir. Bunlara karşın AB İsrail'in

hassasiyetlerine yönelik de önemli adımlar atmıştır. Örneğin AB Eylem Planı, anti-Semitizm'i AB'nin temel değerlerine yönelik büyük bir tehdit olarak tanımlamış ve bununla mücadele için AB fonları harekete geçirilmiştir. İsrail için böylesine önemli bir konuya ilişkin Eylem Planı ile AB içinde yasal çerçeve güçlendirilmiştir. Ancak bu tür girişimlerin İsrail'in AB algılarına olumlu yansımalarını bir önceki bölümde özetlenen analizde bulmak mümkün olmamıştır. Tersine, analiz edilen dönemde anlatılara hakim olan tema, Avrupa'da yaşayan Yahudilerin Avrupa topraklarında sürekli risk altında yaşadıklarına dair korku duygusu olmuştur.

Dördüncü olarak, analiz sonuçları AB-İsrail ikili ekonomik ilişkilerinin yüksek düzeyde olmasının, İsrail'de AB'nin olumlu olarak algılanmasına katkıda bulunmadığını göstermiştir. Leksikometrik analizin sonuçlarında Ekonomi kategorisindeki zayıf temsil, AB-İsrail ekonomik ilişkilerinin büyüklüğü açısından şaşırtıcıdır. Analizde Haaretz, ekonomik ilişkilerin etkisinin çok az olmasına dikkat çekmiştir. İlginç bir şekilde gazete, AB'nin İsrail üzerinde ekonomik kozunu kasıtlı olarak kullanmamayı seçtiği sonucuna varmıştır. Öte yandan, AB'nin yönergeler veya etiketleme politikalarıyla İsrail üzerinde ekonomik koz kullanmayı seçtiği birkaç örnek de, yukarıda belirtildiği gibi olumsuz bir algı olarak yansımıştır. AB bu kez ikiyüzlü olmakla ve İsrail'e çifte standart uygulamakla suçlanmıştır.

Son olarak, analizde ortaya çıkan bölünmüş AB tablosu göz önüne alındığında, AB'nin dış politikadaki kapasitesini artırma çabalarının İsrail'deki AB algılarında olumlu bir yansımasını izlemek mümkün olmamıştır. AB'nin ODGP ve OGSP'nin gelişimiyle tek ses halinde konuşma çabaları, bazı üye devletlerin İsrail bağlamında AB politikalarını takip etme konusundaki isteksizlikleri tarafından engellenmiş görünmektedir. Örneğin Macaristan, analiz edilen dönemde İsrail'e karşı ortak bir AB bildirisini engellemiştir. Bu tür örnekler, AB dışişleri bakanı olarak görev yapmak üzere tasarlanmış bir figür olan OGDP Yüksek Temsilcisi figürünün marjinalleşmesine yol açmaktadır. Ayrıca dış politika alanında karar vermede yaşanan bu sorunlar, Avrupa'nın zayıf ve bölünmüş olduğu algılarına da yansımaktadır. Analiz edilen dönemde AB, ABD'nin başkenti Doğu Kudüs olan bir

Filistin devleti kurulması beklentilerine zarar veren tek taraflı Kudüs hamlesi karşısında, İsrail-Filistin ihtilafında iki devletli çözüm politikasının ardında duramadı. Analizde, barış sürecini gösteren kelimeler sadece Times of Israel'in diyagramında yer almakta alması ise, İsrail algılarında sadece bir parçanın AB'nin barış sürecindeki rolüne dikkat çektiğini göstermektedir. Ancak bu rol sıklıkla ABD'nin gölgesinde ele alınmaktadır. Analiz sonuçları AB'nin dış politika araçlarını, barış sürecinde sahip olmayı arzuladığı siyasi etkiyi sağlama yönünde kullanma çabaları, İsraillilerin gözünde tek arabulucu olarak ABD'nin görüldüğü gerçeğini değiştirememiş ve sonuç vermemiştir.

Bu şekilde tezin araştırma sorularına ilişkin bulgular yukarıda özetlenmiştir. Bununla birlikte, daha önce ortaya konan düşüncelere bir dizi başka açıklama eklenebilir. Daha önce vurgulandığı gibi, İsrail-Filistin Çatışması bağlamı ve barış süreci, uzun yıllardır AB'nin aktörlüğünün test edildiği en zorlu konulardan biri olagelmiştir. Ayrıca, çatışma AB için ortak bir dış politika ihtiyacının altını çizmede önemli bir rol oynadı. 1970 yılında Avrupa Politik İş Birliği'nin kurulması ve ardından akademik çevrelerde Avrupa Topluluğunun gücünün farklılığı üzerine tartışmalar bunun ilk yansımaları olmuştur. AB, bu dönemden itibaren kendisini bir dış politika aktörü olarak ortaya koymak amacıyla yeni dış politika araçları geliştirmiştir. Ancak, Holokost'la suçlanan önemli AB üyelerinin varlığı, dış politikada AB'nin İsrail'e karşı etkinliğini kısıtlamış ve bu durum parçalanmış bir AB imajını doğurmuştur. İsrail algılarında, AB'nin dost ve düşman ülkeler olarak ayrıldığı görülmüştür. Her ne kadar çalışma analiz düzeyini AB olarak seçse de leksikometrik analiz sonuçlarının gösterdiği gibi, ikili ilişkilerin tarihsel ağırlığını İsrail'deki AB algılarından ayırmak mümkün olmamıştır. Ayrıca bu tarihi miras, İsrail'de AB söz konusu olduğunda bitmeyen bir güvensizliğe yol açmıştır. AB'nin, Filistinlilerin daha fazla marjinalleşmesini önlemek için Filistinli Yönetimi'ni finanse ederek İsrail'in güvenliğine katkıda bulunmak için ne kadar para harcadığı veya İsrail'i AB pazarına entegre etmek ve Avrupa'da anti-Semitizm'le mücadele etmek amacıyla ne kadar yasal ve kurumsal düzenleme getirdiği bu güvensizlik karşısında önemini yitirmiştir. Tez çalışması, İsrail'in AB algılarının demir

parmaklıkları; korku, anti-Semitizm, tehdit, terör ve en başta Holokost kelimelerinden oluşan bir kafese kapatılmış olduğunu göstermiştir.

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