T.C.
ISTANBUL AYDIN UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF GRADUATE STUDIES

INTERGOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY ON DEVELOPMENT(IGAD) AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN SOMALIA

MASTER'S THESIS

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Political Science and International Relations Program

SEPTEMBER, 2022

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APPROVAL PAGE

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the study “Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and Conflict Resolution in Somalia”, which I submitted as a master thesis, is written without any assistance in violation of scientific ethics and traditions in all the processes from the project phase to the conclusion of the thesis and the works I have benefited are from those shown in the Bibliography. (19/09/2022)

Yasin IBRAHIM

FOREWORD

First and foremost, I must thank God for the blessing of patience and strength to complete this thesis, then I would like to thank all my family members, especially my mother Hawa Abdi Aden, my uncle Ali Matan Ibrahim and my uncle Hussein Abdi Aden for their full sponsorship to achieve this success. The distinguished academic support was provided to me by my thesis advisor, Assist. Professor. Dr. Tuğçce Kafdağlı Koru all thanks and appreciate her for her guidance and support for the completion of the thesis. İn conclusion, I would like to thank my professors, friends, colleagues, and everyone who has been credited with supporting me.

September 2022 Yasin IBRAHIM

INTERGOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY ON DEVELOPMENT (IGAD) AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN SOMALIA

ABSTRACT

This study examines the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and conflict resolution in Somalia. For more than two decades, Somalia has been the only country in the world without a functional government. While Somaliland and Puntland have been relatively peaceful since 1991, the southern section of the country has been torn apart by conflict between numerous tribes, warlords, and Islamist organizations. Regional and international organizations have expressed alarm over the continued violence in Somalia, which occurs in one of Africa's most unstable areas.

IGAD has been actively attempting to end Somalia's long-running civil war. While the international world has ignored this crisis chiefly, IGAD member nations have invested their resources, time, and energy in resolving it. However, the main hurdles to numerous peace endeavors are found in Somalia itself. Due to the war, power distribution, resource distribution, land ownership, and property have become more difficult. Clan rivalries have also been exacerbated, allowing political elites to further their agenda to the detriment of the country as a whole. Politicians and others who stand to gain from the current state of instability have multiplied, leading to the failure of several efforts.

There is no evidence that foreign parties impacted Somalia's war. States and non-state entities have provided weaponry and financial support to various fighting parties at multiple points. The crisis in Somalia has pulled in neighboring countries, Arab countries, and Western countries for various reasons, including terrorism and security concerns. Converging national interests among IGAD member nations was challenging since they all have their interests at heart. Inter-state and intra-state wars, poverty, and humanitarian crises weaken IGAD member nations, reducing the organization's ability and focus.

As a whole, IGAD has its share of issues. Organizational autonomy and capability are lacking in a war as complicated as that in Somalia. In addition, it lacks the financial resources to effectively and firmly forward its peace efforts. Despite these difficulties, IGAD's efforts to raise awareness of the Somali situation have been essential.

Even though the African Union has been involved in Somalia, it has been primarily insignificant as a regional body. A peacekeeping force from the African Union (AU) has been dispatched to Somalia, but the organization is struggling to establish itself. Currently, the government's military and insurgent groups are engaged in combat, and the Mission has been thrust into the middle. However, Somalia's tenuous Transitional Federal Government (TFG) is assured to continue to stay in power because of its presence in the nation.

Because of regional and international institutions, many diverse parties have been able to address the Somali conflict. Several organizations in Somalia have taken the lead in generating funds and assisting with various initiatives. Those IGAD efforts would have assisted Somalia to avoid the civil war. By working together, these organizations and their member nations may be able to restore peace to Somalia and rid the country of terrorists and pirates, refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs), and small arms. Despite this, IGAD has focused all of its efforts on finding a solution to political as well as clan or tribal issues. Despite this, the IGAD did not achieve its goals. So, the study focused on these research questions, the main question of this study: Is it possible for IGAD to find a solution to the conflicts in Somalia? Besides, this study aims to find answer those question: What are the roots of the conflict in Somalia? What are the prospects of IGAD in Somalia’s conflict resolution? What are the interventions regarding Somalia’s conflict resolution? What are the difficulties that the IGAD is encountering in preserving Somalia’s conflict resolution? This thesis has found that the IGAD has failed to bring long time stability and peace to Somalia because of a lack of financial efforts and lack of expertise in dispiriting resolution.

Keywords: Conflict, Conflict Resolution, Peace-building, Civil War, Somalia, IGAD

SOMALİ'DE HÜKÜMETLER ARASI KALKINMA OTORİTESİ (IGAD) VE ÇATIŞMALARIN ÇÖZÜMÜ

ÖZET

Bu çalışma, Somali'deki Hükümetler Arası Kalkınma Otoritesini (IGAD) ve çatışma çözümünü incelemektedir. Yirmi yıldan fazla bir süredir Somali, işlevsel bir hükümeti olmayan dünyadaki tek ülke olmuştur. Somaliland ve Puntland 1991'den beri nispeten barışçıl olsa da, ülkenin güney kesimi çok sayıda kabile, savaş ağası ve İslamcı örgüt arasındaki çatışmalarla parçalanmıştır. Bölgesel ve uluslararası kuruluşlar, Afrika'nın en istikrarsız bölgelerinden birinde meydana gelen Somali'de devam eden şiddet konusunda endişelerini dile getirmişlerdir.

IGAD, Somali'nin uzun süredir devam eden iç savaşını sona erdirmek için aktif olarak çalışmaktadır. Uluslararası dünya bu krizi esas olarak görmezden gelirken, IGAD üyesi ülkeler kaynaklarını, zamanlarını ve enerjilerini bu krizi çözmek için harcamaktalar. Ancak, Somali'de barış girişiminin önünde sayısız temel engeller bulunmaktadır. Savaş nedeniyle, güç dağıtımı, kaynak dağıtımı, arazi mülkiyeti ve mülkiyet daha zor hale gelmiştir. Klan rekabetlerinin de şiddetlenmesi siyasi elitlerin gündemlerini bir bütün olarak ülkenin zararına olacak şekilde ilerletmesine yol açtı. Politikacılar ve mevcut istikrarsızlık durumundan kazanç sağlayan diğerleri arttı ve bu da birçok çabanın başarısız olmasına yol açmıştır.

Yabancı tarafların Somali'deki savaşı etkilediğine dair hiçbir kanıt yoktur. Devletler ve devlet dışı kuruluşlar, birçok noktada çeşitli savaşan taraflara silah ve mali destek sağlamıştır. Somali'deki kriz, terör ve güvenlik kaygıları da dahil olmak üzere çeşitli nedenlerle komşu ülkeleri, Arap ülkelerini ve Batılı ülkeleri çekmiştir. IGAD üyesi ülkeler arasında ulusal çıkarları birleştirmek, hepsinin özünde kendi çıkarları olduğu için zorlayıcı olmaktadır. Devletlerarası ve devlet içi savaşlar, yoksulluk ve insani krizler, IGAD üyesi ülkeleri zayıflatarak örgütün yeteneğinin ve odağının azalmasına neden olmuştur.

Bir bütün olarak, IGAD'ın sorunlarda payı vardır. Somali'deki kadar karmaşık bir savaşta örgütsel özerklik ve kapasitesi yoktur. Ayrıca, barış çabalarını etkin ve sağlam bir şekilde ilerletmek için mali kaynaklardan yoksundur. Bu zorluklara rağmen, IGAD'ın Somali'deki duruma ilişkin farkındalığı artırma çabaları çok önemlidir.

Afrika Birliği, Somali'ye dahil olmasına rağmen, bölgesel bir yapı olarak öncelikle önemsiz olmuştur. Afrika Birliği'nden (AU) bir barış gücü Somali'ye gönderildi, ancak örgüt kendini kurmak için mücadele ediyor. Şu anda, hükümetin askeri ve isyancı grupları çatışma halindendir ve Misyon tam ortasına itilmiştir. Bununla birlikte, Somali'nin zayıf Geçici Federal Hükümeti'nin (TFG), ulustaki varlığı nedeniyle iktidarda kalmaya devam edeceği garanti edilmektedir.

Bölgesel ve uluslararası kurumlar sayesinde, birçok farklı taraf Somali çatışmasını ele alabilmiştir. Somali'deki çeşitli kuruluşlar, fon yaratma ve çeşitli girişimlere yardımcı olma konusunda öncülük etmiştir. Bu IGAD çabaları, Somali'nin iç savaştan kaçınmasına yardımcı olacaktır. Bu örgütler ve üye ülkeleri birlikte çalışarak Somali'de barışı yeniden sağlayabilir, ülkeyi teröristlerden ve korsanlardan, mültecilerden ve ülke içinde yerinden edilmiş insanlardan (IDP'ler) ve hafif silahlardan kurtarabilir. Buna rağmen, IGAD tüm çabalarını siyasi olduğu kadar klan veya aşiret sorunlarına da çözüm bulmaya odakladı. Buna karşın, IGAD hedeflerine ulaşamadı. Dolayısıyla, çalışma bu araştırma sorularına odaklanmıştır, bu çalışmanın ana sorusu şu olmuştur: IGAD'ın Somali'deki çatışmalara bir çözüm bulması mümkün m? Bunun yanında çalışma şu sorulara da cevap bulmayı amaçlamaktadır: Somali'deki çatışmanın kökleri nelerdir? Somali'nin çatışma çözümünde IGAD'ın beklentileri nelerdir? Somali'nin çatışma çözümüne yönelik müdahaleler nelerdir? IGAD'ın Somali'nin ihtilaf çözümünü korumada karşılaştığı zorluklar nelerdir? Bu tez, finansal çaba eksikliği ve çözüme yönelik uzmanlık eksikliği nedeniyle IGAD'ın Somali'ye uzun süreli istikrar ve barış getirmediğini ortaya koymaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Çatışma, Çatışma Çözümü, Barış İnşası, İç Savaş, Somali, IGAD

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ABBREVIATIONS

AAU: **:** Addis Ababa University

AMISOM: **:** African Union Peacekeeping Mission in Somalia

ARS-D: : Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia-Djibouti

AS: **:** Al-Shabab

AU: **:** African Union

CEWARN: : Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism

COMESA: : Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa

CSOs: : Civil Society Organizations

ECOWAS: **:** Economic Community of West African States

EU: : European Union

ICG: **:** International Crises Group

IGAD: : Inter-Governmental Authority on Development

IGADD: : Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Desertification

IGASOM: : IGAD Peace Keeping Mission to Somalia

IPF: : IGAD Partners Forum

NFD: **:** Northern Frontier District

NGO: : Non-Governmental Organizations

OAS: : Organization of American States

OLF: : Oromo Liberation Movement

ONLF: : Ogaden National Liberation Front

PSC: : Peace and Security Council

RECs: : Regional Economic Communities

SADC: : Southern Africa Development Community

SALW: : Small Arms and Light Weapons

SIPRI: **:** Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

SNM: : Somali National Movement

SOMRAF: **:** Somali Minority Rights and Aid Forum

SPLA: : Sudanese People's Liberation Army

SSDF: : Somali Salvation Democratic Front

STFG: **:** Somali Transitional Federal Government

TFG: : Transitional Federal Government

TFG II: : Transitional Federal Government II

TNC: : Transitional National Government

UIC: : Union of Islamic Courts

UK: **:** United Kingdom

UN: : United Nations

UNHCR: : United Nations High Commissions for Refugees

UNITAF: **:** Unified Task Force

UNICEF: **:** United Nations Children's Fund

UNOSOM: **:** United Nations Operation in Somalia

UNSC: **:** United Nations Security Council

USA: : United States of America

USC: : United Somali Congress

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I. INTRODUCTION

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)'s purpose in Somalia is historic regarding peace in Somalia. However, the was a high expectation that IGAD would be able to achieve a positive outcome in resolving the conflict in Somalia. This study investigates the IGAD's endeavors to aid in conflict resolution in Somalia.

IGAD was established by the Intergovernmental Authority for Drought and Desertification. Established in 1986, it is responsible for fighting drought and deforestation. IGAD was also instrumental in mediating regional security and political dialogue, particularly in the 1990s. In the 1990s, the founding members left IGADD to revitalize the organization into a comprehensive regional, economic, trade, and security structure, Like SADC and ECOWAS, regional economic communities in West and Central Africa. The Addis Ababa Summit on 18 April 1995. At a meeting of the State and Government Heads, an agreement was reached on establishing the administration and developing cooperation. On March 25, 1996, at the second summit in Nairobi, Kenya, the State, and Government Heads signed an agreement to transform IGADD into IGAD. (Burke, 2016).

Looking at the Horn of Africa, IGAD's approach to peace and security concerns is unique since it deals with complicated challenges daily. In nations like South Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia, the organization has taken up a peacekeeping role at the local level. (Roach, 2016, P. 343-359). In other words, many regional developments have been mediated by IGAD. Somali peace negotiations benefited greatly from its involvement in the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) as well as the issue of the Darfur region in Sudan. In areas of Somalia. Since then, IGAD has played a significant role in Somalia's reconstituted as a legitimate country, with the 14th endeavor to get Somalia back on the right path being spearheaded by IGAD, which assembled the transition phase government of President Yusuf. (Frances, 2008). One of IGAD's top priorities is bolstering local capacity in the Horn of Africa countries like Somalia, where cross-border concerns

like transnational ethnic groups help to promote international approaches. (King, 2015). In this way, the IGAD encourages policy harmonization across countries. The organization's capacity-building efforts include international migration, trade harmonization, and the free movement of commodities and people themselves. (Awolich & tiitmamer, 2015).

Across the East African sub-region, the 1996 IGAD principles of the agreement included the peaceful resolution of problems, territorial peace, establishment and security, and the preservation of natural rights. The agreement also covered the principles of the contract. Additional goals included the promotion of peace and stability in the area and establishing regional institutions for the prevention, management, and settlement of crises between and within nations via discussion (Michael & Lawrence, 2010). As a result, the IGAD Secretariat was reformed to meet the new purpose of the organization, which resulted in the development of a division responsible for peacekeeping in Somalia, which is a nation that falls under IGAD's territorial jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the transformation of the IGAD’s institutions is beyond the result of an objective political process in Somalia (Burke, 2016).

As soon as Siad Barre was removed from power, chaos erupted in Somalia. As a result, the Somali people and the international community have attempted more than a dozen times since then to put together a government from among the rabble that has plagued the country for much of its existence. Despite all of these efforts, no new administration has been able to construct a long-lasting governance framework for a united nation that has persisted for a prolonged time. When it comes to food, there are now many different militia groups fighting for control of their tuffs, which might lead to an all-out civil war.

Thus, as a consequence of the TFG’s endeavors, it enabled the Somali electorate to participate for their state to become an autonomous nation in the Somalia referendum on Jan 9, 2011. Although IGAD played a massive part in assisting the TFG, it failed to address several existing problems specified in the negotiated settlement, including the emergence of militia and military intervention of the state, which resulted in the deaths of numerous innocent civilians. Some have been dislocated and forced to flee their homes, fleeing persecution in other nation areas or bordering countries. After Barre's rule ended, many Somalis gained access to

a weapon and other unlawful weapons, causing an increase in the free flow of such weapons. Uninvited weapons numbers are increased in circulation in Somalia had reached unprecedented levels two years after Barre's deposition was unthinkable. By now, Godwin Murunga has noticed this., "there were more weapons in Somalia than there was food." It must be seen that president Barre spent a fortune on the project the construction of his military and the acquisition of various types of armor. Even though scholars are still debating the motivations for such a massive military buildup, regional strategy and anti-immigration sentiment may have been the most significant factors, according to some. The only thing Barre had to do to get military assistance at this point in the Cold War was to follow the lead of either the United States or the Soviet Union and their allies. He was able to win the support of either American or Soviet Socialist Republics and their allies during his reign because Somalia's geostrategic importance made it easy for him to do so. (Brooks, 2013: p. 35-68).

Sally Healy, Mark Bradbury's wife. Between 1988 and 1991 (the Cold Conflict period), civil war raged throughout Somalia. The breakdown of the state led to clan warfare, hunger, and international humanitarian response in the 1990s. To achieve these goals, they describe how specific Somali communities have turned to traditional institutions for reconciliation and the establishment of local systems of government. International and regional initiatives to bring about reconciliation in Somalia will be examined, as will their impact on conflict, peace, and the country’s sovereignty. In Somalia's two decades history, the formation of various Islamist organizations aiming to build an Islamic state has been a critical element. There is something for everyone here, from conventional Sufi orders to progressive Islamist organizations, including organizations like Al-Ittihad al Islamiyah, which are motivated by a regional or global objective. Due to the power vacuum and subsequent upheaval, many armed groups started battling for dominance in the southern half of the nation. The temporary collapse of customary law was one of the consequences of the fighting between 1990 and 1992. The arrival of Unified Task Force (UNITAF) and United Nation Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) peacekeeping forces in December 1992 resulted from this development. In the south, factionalism was still alive and well. (Brooks, 2013L p. 35-68).

The absence of a central government led to Somalia being labeled a "failed state," which has stuck ever since. The United Nations evacuated in 1995 after suffering significant casualties, but no central authority had been re-established. Most nations returned to customary and religious law after the fall of the central regime. Also, in the northern part of the country, two independent regional administrations were founded, the first in 1991 and the second in 1998As a result, Somalia was omitted from SIPRI's list of significant armed conflicts in 1997 and 1998. SIPRI. An international peace research institute based in Stockholm, Sweden. (Brooks, 2013: p. 35-68). However, From the theoretical perspective, A problem-solving approach will be used in this study, which will acknowledge that conflict is a natural part of human life and take steps to minimize its negative impact on the existence of people. (Richmond, 2013: p. 763-783). it aims to create systems and structures that will help partitioned societies cooperate and reduce the effects of conflict.

The problem-solving approach to analysing the conflict rejects and downplays the central role in conflict resolution. There is a theory that suggests that the power track to conduct the conflict, although resolution reclines in the parties to conflict recognizing and building bridges that guide to a self-sufficient relationship after the conflict has been resolved. (Weiss-Wik, 1983: p. 706-739). Since most of those involved in the Somali conflict have decided to return to a consistent framework, a problem-solving approach would be ideal. (Herbert C. Kelman, 1992: p. 64-96). According to Herbert C When a conflict is in its pre-negotiation stage, the problem-solving approach is the most efficient strategy to adopt since it attempts the parties to the issue for official track-one mediation. (Herbert C. Kelman, 1992: p. 64-96). The use of problem-solving sessions, a development of the paradigm of global society, has been a significant contribution to track-two diplomacy (Burton, 1996: p. 5-24). Truck-two diplomacy is thought to be the most efficient method early on in the conflict as a supporting player in formal negotiation, because problem-solving sessions help to highlight conflictive differences and attempt a redefining of the dialogue, (Burton, 1996: p. 5-24).

The strength of the problem-solving approach, according to (Mwagiru, 1998), is to establish a normative framework within which conflicting parties can cooperate without further disrupting social order in contrast to official negotiations, it allows

the parties to engage in a dialogue with one another. To begin the healing process, it must first lay the groundwork by establishing a safe environment in which the entities can achieve without trying to accuse one another. This is accomplished by fostering an open dialogue between the parties about their respective conflicts' origins. Acknowledging and grieving the losses they have suffered as a result of the conflict, and coming to an agreement on their future relationship are all steps in this process. (Mwagiru, 1998).

Therefore, one significant defect in the problem-solving approach is that it refuses to accept the adoption of force in conflict resolution and does not place sufficient emphasis on foreign affairs assessment. (Mwagiru, 1998). This approach proposes a potential-based approach to conflict resolution. certainly, resolution reclines in the conflict receptions reperceiving their strife interrelations and reconciliation through the creation of supporting various structures in the post-revolutionary period. These are only hypotheses at this point that may not be held within the situation of Somalia. By refusing to accept the use of force in conflict resolution and contradicting the importance of foreign affairs, the approach is weakened. It also leaves a mark on the future of politics, although it is also important for the future (Mwagiru, 1998). As long as the majority of those involved in the Somalia situation have returned to the path of foreign affairs, the problem-solving approach applies to this study. Approaches such as this one focus on long-standing conflicts like Somalia’s attempt to bring out the underlying emotions of the parties involved to find a solution.

Furthermore, in the contextual perspective, as a result of frustrations over clan wars, rising inequality, and poor management in Somalia, the Somali people are highly susceptible to conflict. IGAD’s support of teaching the Somali people about war's hazards and repercussions, it has helped to bring peace and stability to the nation. In addition, at various points, it has played a significant role in the training of Somali soldiers to ensure that the Somali people are well-prepared to defend their country while also learning more about peace and security.

The role of IGAD in Somalia is both security-oriented and the political-oriented methods are key that the United States are mentioned to achieve this goal, which relies on a strong security system and the ongoing defeat of insurgents. Also included is a description of the difficulties that the IGAD faced in Somalia, which

will include the legacy of Black Hawk Down, Ethiopia’s army thrust in shadow, African Union (AU) capacity issues, the warm climate in Somalia, and devising an appropriate departure plan from the country. These are the five major hurdles to overcome in this situation. However, it is hoped that this study will fill in some of the knowledge gaps regarding the work of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in Somalia, in addition to its successes and setbacks as it attempts to maintain stability in the country.

The conflict in Somalia was going on. Since 1991, Somalia has been without an effective government. Islamist insurgents have carried out assaults virtually daily since a transitional government supported by Ethiopian forces ousted them from the city in December 2006. 20,000 people evacuate crisis zones every month. As many as two million Somalis rely on food aid to stay alive every year. Al-Shabab is the name given to the group of young Islamist militants who have been waging a campaign of terror in the area. Al-Shabab, the militant wing of the Union of Islamic Courts, was recently added to the United States' list of "foreign terrorist organizations" United Islamic Court (UIC). Largest of all Al-Shabab and Al-Qaeda announced their merger in a joint video in February 2012. (Ndukong, 2013).

In December 2006, Security Council members have agreed to send a peacekeeping force to Somalia's army, (IGASOM). According to the United Nations Security Council resolution 1725, the mission does not include countries that border the area. States that border Somalia later joined the mission because of the financial burden that was being placed on the other non-bordering countries. International support for the (IGASOM) Peace Support Mission in Somalia was non-existent. Ethiopia entered Somalia on December 6, 2006, after being invited by the Somali Transitional Federal Government (STFG). Under the African Mission in Somalia, a peacekeeping force was authorized by the United Nations Security Council on February 21, 2007. (AMISOM) (Demeke, 2014: p. 248-257).

From 2006 to 2013, IGAD has served as the Somali government's development authority, focusing on Mogadishu. Uganda, Burundi, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, and Sierra Leone are all members of IGAD. Its mission is to assist the Somali federal government while also fostering communication within the Somali community. In addition, it is a regional agreement that has been approved by the UN Security Council. Intergovernmental authority's involvement in Somalia's

development and conflict settlement is investigated as a consequence of this inquiry. (Buer & Eric: 2001, p. 47). So, the study focusing these research questions, the main question of this study is. is it possible for IGAD to find a solution to the conflicts in Somalia? And What are the roots of the conflict in Somalia? And What are the prospects of IGAD in Somalia's conflict resolution? And What are the interventions regarding Somalia's conflict resolution? And What are the difficulties that the IGAD is encountering in preserving Somalia's conflict resolution? Despite In Somalia, the IGAD has focused all of its efforts on finding a solution to the political as well as clan or tribal issues. Despite this, the IGAD did not achieve its goals. IGAD's inability to resolve conflicts is due to a variety of issues, including: A severe lack of personal resources, Coordination between IGAD's regional initiatives, as well as national ones, has not been effective, Due to lack of expertise in dispute resolution, Deficiency of funds, Disorganization of the Logistical Plan.

A. Statement of the Problem

Since the fall of the Siad Barre's regime in 1991, Somalia has been wracked by a slew of issues that require attention. In addition to poverty and environmental degradation, there are high rates of unemployment and the black market, as well as the radicalization of youth, terrorism, and fragmented society, to name a few of the issues. (ICG, 2006: P. 752-758).

IGAD is a group that was founded in 1986 with the intention of tackling the environmental issue of degradation in the Horn of Africa; however, in 1996 it underwent restructuring and extended its scope to include the resolution of potential conflicts in its region of authority. Included in this was the turmoil in Somalia (IGAD, 2007). Even though the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was weak, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has coordinated various peace initiatives in Somalia since 1991. One of the accomplishments of an IGAD peace initiative occurred in 2004. The TFG benefited from the backing of the international community, and the IGAD is attempting to build on that support to facilitate further reconciliation. (IGAD, 2007).

However, IGAD's attempts to restore stability in Somalia have run across several obstacles. The Somalia clan leaders' lack of political will to settle disputes is one of these internal and external difficulties, a lack of resources a lack of military

and logistical aid from contributors, wider spread inters stand and intra-state conflicts in the horn of African region as well as high poverty levels, all these factors increase the high rates of the volatility of the region (IGAD, 2007). IGAD's conflict settlement initiatives in Somalia will be examined as part of the study. IGAD's roadblocks in the planning process to conflict resolution in Somalia address ways through which IGAD can effectively contribute to conflict resolution in Somalia. The major issue of the study is to identify whether or not, the IGAD's conflict resolution approaches used in managing the Somalia conflict contributed to regional stability as well as global peace and security.

B. Significance of the Study

This investigation aims to shed light on the origins of Somalia's conflict and the destruction it has caused. At the latest, it would also provide insight into how IGAD's processes for peacekeeping operations, managerial staff, and resolution operate. IGAD's role in resolving conflicts will also be highlighted in this study. A clearer picture of the conflicts in Somalia and indeed the impact of IGAD within those regions would be gained. Other studies could use this information as well.

In the fields of international relations, conflict resolution, civil conflicts, and peacekeeping, this study will be useful to academics who study these issues. This study will assist the researcher in developing skills and knowledge about conflict and instability concerns, which he or she might put to use while applying for a position in a relevant organization.

C. Objectives of the Study

1. To investigate IGAD's role and challenges in conflict resolution in Somalia.
2. To gain an understanding of the IGAD and the conflicts in Somalia.
3. To investigate IGAD's role in Somalia.
4. To understand the specific types of conflict in Somalia.

D. Research Questions

Main Question: is it possible for Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to find a solution to the conflicts in Somalia?

Sub Questions:

1. What are the roots of the conflict in Somalia?
2. What are the prospects of IGAD in Somalia's conflict resolution?
3. What are the interventions regarding Somalia's conflict resolution?
4. What are the difficulties that the IGAD is encountering in preserving Somalia's conflict resolution?

E. Hypothesis of the Study

In Somalia, the IGAD has focused all of its efforts on finding a solution to the political as well as clan or tribal issues. Despite this, the IGAD did not achieve its goals.

IGAD's inability to resolve conflicts is due to a variety of issues, including:

- A severe lack of personal resources.
- Coordination between IGAD's regional initiatives, as well as national ones, has not been effective.
- Due to lack of expertise in dispute resolution.
- Deficiency of funds
- Disorganization of the Logistical Plan

F. Scope of the Study

1. Geographical Scope

It was conducted in the Horn of Africa country of Somalia. More importantly, the study was conducted in Djibouti City, the headquarters of IGAD. It is the capital city of Djibouti, which is found in the Horn of Africa and has a population of over one million. Djibouti's easternmost city is 21 kilometers from the Somaliland border

in eastern Djibouti. The only protected harbor on the other side of the Tadjoura Gulf is in this seaport. The Ambouli wadi cuts through the city, dividing it into two sections: the old city and the Balbala neighborhood. Desert or semi-desert landscapes surround Djibouti's coastal lowlands and the city itself. Siesta Beach and Heron Beach Somalia are two of the city's many sandy beaches. As a result of its mandate to end conflict and restore peace, the IGAD possesses a wealth of understanding of the issue.

2. Content Scope

The study examined IGAD's efforts to resolve the conflict in Somalia, as well as the obstacles the organization faces in doing so. It also made suggestions for how the international community can help.

3. Time Scope

The study will span since 2000. The period was chosen because it was throughout this timeframe that Somalia's conflict grew and IGAD was most aggressive in its endeavors to resolve the conflict.

G. Research Methodology

The analytical method is required since the research aims to understand the various origins of the Somali war and how it influenced regional and worldwide security. In this instance, discussions, conferences, and IGAD activities are examined briefly; this technique is mostly descriptive. Consequently, this study employs both analytical and descriptive methods

Academic books, journals, articles, and other electronic sources will be used for primary data collection and secondary data analysis in this study. and also, this study will be used a qualitative method.

H. Thesis Structure

The study will be organized into three chapters: the first chapter will be the theoretical Background of Conflict Management and Resolution processes, while the second chapter will be an Overview of the Conflicts in Somalia, and the third chapter will be holding the role of IGAD in conflict resolution in Somalia.

II. CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION PROCESSES

A. Conflict Management

The term "conflict management" refers to any endeavor to control or contain a continuing dispute between politically motivated actors acting at the state or sub-state level, generally via the engagement of a third party. (Butler, 2009: p. 30) This is the best way to understand what conflict management is. (Butler, 2009: p. 30). One of the most important purposes of conflict management is to lessen the harm that a conflict may do to the people or groups directly engaged in it. When a third party is concerned about the disruptive and destabilizing effects of the disagreement on other parties engaged or not involved (horizontal escalation), conflict management is often motivated by this concern. Additionally, this concern may extend to limiting the conflict's ascent up the ladder of violent goals and means (vertical escalation). Conflict management is based on the belief that escalation or deepening of an already existing conflict is not a compulsion. Instead, the goal of conflict management is to prevent the aggressors from succeeding, or maybe more specifically, to prevent aggressiveness from being helpful. Depriving the aggressors of their capacity to attain their aims is the best way to do this.

Approaches to conflict management are those that are applied in situations in which the chances for conflict resolution seem to be dim, yet the mechanics of the conflict require that something be done to control it. (Butler, 2009: p. 30). Third parties may intervene in situations when the escalation or intensification of a dispute seems imminent without any overarching controlling body. When it comes to resolving international issues, third parties have a variety of techniques. Four main approaches to international conflict management have been grouped by two notable experts in this field. (Bercovitch & Regan., 2004: p. 249-272). These strategies, which are distinguished by a combination of actor goals and methods used, are as follows:

- The use of force and other instruments to coerce other parties, as well as threats of force and other means.
- Use of coercive diplomacy, such as threats and the use of force, in order to prevent other parties.
- Adjudicatory systems (covering legal, extra-legal, and ethical institutions and techniques) are those that are used to create legal arrangements with other entities and to obtain agreements with those entities.
- To achieve a win-win outcome for all parties concerned, an accommodationist strategy is used (using both conventional and non-traditional diplomatic approaches to negotiate an agreement).

These categories reflect the common approaches used by the parties involved in a specific conflict to the core disagreement at the center of that conflict. When it comes to pursuing an interest, threat-based and deterrence-based techniques are most closely related to the deployment of 'hard' (coercive) force in pursuit of the desired outcome. An adjudicatory method relies significantly on the identification and appeal to a system of norms and rights and a legal architecture encased around them as a final point, methods based on accommodation stress the value of soft (persuasive) power in order to promote goals. There are a variety of ways that may be used to deal with conflict and its management, each of which has its own set of advantages and disadvantages and can be successful or unsuccessful in particular situations.

B. Conflict Resolution

According to Wallenstein (2007), the term "conflict resolution" refers to a scenario in which fighting parties come to an agreement to resolve their irreconcilable aims, acknowledge each other's existence, and cease all violent activities against one another. He brought up important points that are essential to ensure that the dispute resolution process is successful. One of the problems is that the opposing factions can't work together. A neutral third party is required to facilitate agreement between the organizations. The incompatibility that has been affecting the parties will be resolved as a result, and a neutral ground will be provided for signing an agreement. According to Tarekegn (2005), the primary goals

of conflict resolution are to put an end to hostilities, get an accurate knowledge of the factors that contribute to conflict, and find solutions to these problems. Other essential characteristics include pursuing distinct aims and acknowledging one another as separate parties.

The research of Boulding 1976 and Burton 1990 takes the problem of conflict resolution to a higher level by introducing new ideas such conflict transformation and peace rebuilding. According to the two authors, the primary objective of conflict resolution is to bring about a mental change in the views, attitudes, and inconsistencies held by the various parties involved in the dispute. They concluded by stating that the regulated dissemination of knowledge has the potential to bring about permanent cessation of all types of violence. The settlement of conflicts in today's world depends on psychological expertise and places a greater emphasis on positive peace than on negative peace.

C. Conflict Management differ from Conflict Resolution

The link between conflict management and conflict resolution is one of the most contentious areas for fuzziness and, as a consequence, misunderstanding. This is because of the prominence of this issue. As was said earlier, conflict management refers to the efforts that are made by third parties in conjunction with the disputants to restrict the growth or escalation of a dispute, reduce suffering, and establish an atmosphere for interaction that does not include the use of violence. As a direct consequence of this, conflict management and conflict resolution exist on a fundamentally different conceptual plane from one another. Contrary to the goal of conflict resolution, which is to foster reconciliation at the most fundamental level of a conflict by resolving the underlying grievances at the heart of a particular dispute to the satisfaction of all parties involved, the goal of conflict management is to keep the conflict at a more surface level. As a result, the goals of conflict management are far more modest than those of conflict resolution, which attempts to alter the human beliefs, cultural practices, as well as societal and political laws and structures that are maintaining a conflict. (Butler, 2009: p. 32)

Instead, then concentrating on full-fledged conflict resolution, conflict management approaches and practitioners tend to shy away from such far-reaching attempts and instead prioritize the containment of conflict as a necessary step in the

process of resolving a disagreement. When it comes to conflict management, there is a far greater likelihood of accepting the assumption that a given issue is convoluted, deeply ingrained, and impossible to settle at a certain point. Managing the negative impacts of a dispute, rather than addressing the issues that led to the disagreement in the first place, should be the primary focus of attempts to manage conflicts. As a result, the goals of conflict management, despite their confinement, are often realizable and appropriate in a broad variety of contexts. (Butler, 2009: p. 32)

D. Conflict Management Mechanisms

Participation in the management of conflicts is entirely optional. It provides swift methods for the resolution of disputes, more control over solutions by people who are closest to the concerns, and more flexibility for the construction of solutions in comparison to formal legal systems. When they are effective, they not only save time but also save money. However, the most effective mechanism of resolving conflicts include negotiation, mediation, and peacebuilding.

1. The Negotiation

The process of negotiation is essential to the management of intercultural and transnational interactions by actors. Whether or whether the engagement is referred to be a negotiation by the parties involved, governments are engaging in negotiation whenever they communicate in order to resolve a perceived discrepancy. The existing system of international relations is the product of nations participating in communication, exchange, compromise, and concession in order to accomplish achievements that none of them could have achieved alone. Although negotiating is used often, there is no guarantee that it will be successful. The road leading from conflict to settlement is almost never a direct one. The process of negotiating is often difficult and may sometimes be tense. Numerous talks are unsuccessful for a variety of reasons. The annals of history are strewn with the metaphorical and physical skeletal remains of confrontations that were never resolved because the parties involved were either unwilling or unable to negotiate a compromise or come to an agreement. To better understand the negotiation process and its role in the management of international conflict is a task that faces both spectators and practitioners in the field, as well as academics and other researchers. (Butcher &

carter hallward, 2020: p. 27)

Negotiation has long been used as a means of resolving disagreement in society. Contrary to popular belief, governments have been engaging in negotiations for a long time before modern nation states emerged in the seventeenth century. A history of at least 4,500 years of dispute resolution and collaboration building on the principles of dialogic negotiation and exchange can be traced back to city-states, kingdoms, and empires all over the world (Cohen& Meerts, 2008: p. 150)

Negotiation is now the primary method used by countries to settle disputes with one another and has taken center stage in international politics. The Charter of the United Nations is perhaps the most visible manifestation of the desire for negotiation in a global society. To rescue future generations from conflict, the UN Charter specifies that countries may only do so via diplomacy and engagement, which was forged during World War II (Preamble). Governments are required by the United Nations Charter, in accordance with Article 2 (3), to settle disputes peacefully. Negotiation has been "the major, customary, and preferred technique" of resolving disagreements, according to the charter, which mentions a range of conflict management methods, including negotiation, inquiry and mediation. (Bilder, 1986: p.20) Some have termed the post-World War II period the "age of negotiations" because of the importance of talks (Zartman and Berman, 1982: p.3).

a. Armed Conflict

The possibility of armed war is the most important topic that governments deal with during negotiations. Wars are ended by diplomatic negotiations, conflicts are settled with military force, and proliferation of armaments is controlled. American combat operations in Vietnam ended not by triumph or loss on the battlefield, but through compromise in Paris at the end of the decade-long struggle. In conflict-prone locations, negotiation has been an important tool for reducing violence. With Egypt (1979) and Jordan (1994), Israel achieved official peace in the Middle East via negotiations. (Butcher & carter hallward, 2020: p. 28)

Alternately, negotiation may be employed to prevent an argument. Throughout the Cold War, tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union centered on Berlin. It was situated in East Germany but was legally and administratively part of West Germany, therefore tensions between the United States

and the Soviet Union arose often over its status. Despite a number of instances, the two heavily armed adversaries were unable to escalate their conflict to war. Many times, governments on both sides of the Iron Curtain would rather negotiate a peaceful solution to a crisis than resort to military action. (Butcher & carter hallward, 2020: p. 28)

b. Global Society

Negotiation has been utilized by governments to deal with a wide range of technological, regulatory, and social issues. A complex network of international organizations sprang out of interstate negotiations. These and a slew of other global governing bodies were born out of negotiations and serve as forums for states to settle differences and foster cooperation on issues that have a direct bearing on the health and well-being of people around the world. They are all part of the global health and well-being framework. (Butcher & carter hallward, 2020: p. 29)

States' relations with one another and their own inhabitants are governed in large part by the corpus of legal standards that have emerged via negotiations. International human rights legislation was founded in 1948 with the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was drafted by member nations of the newly formed UN. It has been used as a model for the negotiations of numerous human rights conventions since then, including the Convention against Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), and the Convention of Rights on Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). (Butcher & carter hallward, 2020: p. 29)

c. Theoretical Approaches

There is a great deal of nuance to negotiation as a social phenomenon. Scholars have devised a slew of theories and frameworks to help them make sense of this bewildering occurrence by concentrating on certain aspects of it. Below, we'll take a look at three popular ways. There are three main areas of attention in these essays: the structure of a negotiation, the strategic options of the negotiators, and the cultural effect on the negotiators and the negotiation process. (Butcher & carter hallward, 2020: p. 31)

2. Mediation

A procedure for resolving conflicts without resorting to violence, mediation is a process in which a third party (or parties) supports opposing nations or intrastate actors as they attempt to negotiate a settlement to their dispute. Mediation may take place either in-person or over the phone. Even though it often takes place in the midst of current or threatening violence, the goal of mediation is to either avoid or put an end to violent conflict via the process of discussion with the assistance of an impartial third party. Theories, processes, and skills associated with mediation are increasingly being utilized in the resolution of conflicts both within and between nation-states, as well as between governmental and non-governmental organizations that are attempting to collaborate in order to provide humanitarian aid or put an end to violent conflict. The term "mediation" has evolved into a catch-all phrase that is frequently used to refer to collaborative problem-solving and consensus-building processes. These processes are typically led by a mediator and are utilized to make group decisions regarding a wide variety of issues, such as the environment, trade, and diplomacy. However, the vast majority of academic interest and published work is concentrated on diplomatic mediations, despite the fact that the majority of mediations that take place on a global scale concern commercial issues (virtually every international trade treaty contains dispute resolution provisions, most of which include options for arbitration and mediation) (i.e., country-to-country). (Butcher & carter hallward, 2020: p. 41)

Over the course of the previous quarter of a century and a half, there has been a tremendous rise in both the usage of mediation and the level of academic study. Our capacity to determine the optimal time for a mediation intervention, often known as "ripeness," has risen as a result of the abundance of research that has been conducted (Coleman et al. 2008: p. 3-42). Other scholars concentrate their attention on the styles and techniques of mediators (Kressel 2007: p. 251-83), the use of mediator power vs mediator neutrality (Cohen et al. 1999: p. 341-48), and the ways in which third-party governments may play key roles throughout the whole of the mediation process (Bercovitch 2007: p. 163-94). Regrettably, there is still a notable divergence between individuals who are actively involved in the practice of international mediation and researchers who are developing new information. In order to bridge this gap, many influencing elements and possible negotiating partners

are being considered. The globe is becoming a place with less violence (Pinker 2011; Russett and O'Neal 2001), and mediation is an important instrument in the movement toward avoiding and resolving international conflict.

3. Peacebuilding

It was in 1975 that Johan Galtung's works gave birth to the idea of peacebuilding. Galtung defined the phrase as including all three methods of achieving peace—peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace building—in his explanation of what the term meant. He differentiates between a peace that is destructive and a peace that is constructive. A peaceful society in which all rootcauses of violence have been eradicated and trigger factors have been removed is referred to as a positive peace, while a negative peace means that there has been an end to violence but that the root causes of violence and the factors that cause violence still exist (Galtung 1975). A peacekeeping strategy may be used to eradicate physical violence, but a peacebuilding strategy is needed to remove the structural sources of conflict, he claims. Peacemaking, according to Johan Galtung (1975), is the process of reducing hostilities between warring parties, while peacebuilding is the process of establishing structures and institutions that help to maintain a stable peace. Justice, equality, and collaboration are the main points of contention here. All of the core causes of violence will be removed as a result of this policy.

Ghali's "An Agenda for Peace" study in 1992 sparked a wave of interest in peacebuilding as a concept. This text is often seen as a key stepping stone in the process of establishing peace. For further information, see (Heather Show 2008: p. 36). International armed and violent conflicts must be managed according to this paradigm. To assist disputing nations stabilize after war, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon urged that the UN take a more proactive role and enhance its efforts in peacekeeping missions. Post-conflict activities are the characteristic of peace building. the goal of peace-building, according to Paffenholz and Spurk (2006), is to stabilize negative peace by preventing wars and allowing the nation in question to grow. The following are the most important events in sparks' point of view.

Disarmament, destruction of weapons, repatriation of refugees, training of security personnel, election monitoring and observation, and promotion of human rights all fall under this broad category of work. Even while some of these actions

are short-term in nature and others may be more long-term, they all aim to bring about good peace. However, positive peace is not always the result of these efforts. Therefore, the Agenda for Peace document, which is often seen, contains certain holes that need to be addressed (Haugerudbraaten 1998: p. 17-26).

Conflicts like those in Namibia, Mozambique, El Salvador, and Cambodia might be better served by a peace agenda. This is because the cold war affected all of these conflicts, but the contemporary battles in Somalia, Yugoslavia, and the 1994 Rwandan genocide have proved very hard to apply the Agenda for peace principles. The latest disputes are more complicated, which is why this is the case. If peace building is to be re-conceptualized, it must include preventative measures, but they are not always linked to peacekeeping operations, hence the notion of peace building has to be enlarged to cover a larger range of explanations. Universally, the two-fold approach to peacebuilding has been seen as short- and medium-term aims to change institutions, the national rebuilding of nations, and the formation of liberal democracies in order to achieve constructive peace (Galtung 1975)

E. IGAD and Conflict Resolution in Somalia

The world is divided into regions in politics. Africa seems to be a zone of global politics divided into several subregions, some of which overlap. There may be organizations specific to particular sub-regions. As a result, the Horn of Africa is well-represented within IGAD (Mwuara, Gunther, & Bethuel, 2002: p. 100).

Through IGAD and its member nations, civil society, community-based organizations, and other vital NGOs can join forces to help advance peace efforts in Somalia and Sudan. As a result, IGAD has appointed Sudanese and Somalian permanent secretaries to disseminate further its peacemaking efforts (Mwuara, Gunther, & Bethuel, 2002: p. 100). Additionally, the worldwide community has been recruited in this endeavor. Twenty nations have supported two peace processes, the UN, the World Bank, the EU, the IGAD, and the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) (Mersha, 2004: p. 54).

IGAD's primary goals include the development of human resources, disseminating information, and the early detection of potential conflicts. An early warning and response mechanism for intra-state conflicts in the Horn of Africa was

established in September 2002 as a critical goal; Intrastate disputes may take various forms. Conflicts between clans (tribes), ethnic groups (ethnic groups), and even terrorist groups are examples of this kind of violence in action (Mersha, 2004: p. 54).

The transitional administration and Al-Shabab have been at odds over the possession of state authority in Somalia. Al-Shabab insurgents assaulted the transitional government. Terrorism is a concern that affects all members of the IGAD, not only Somalia. After that, in Khartoum in January 2002, the IGAD Heads of Government and State meeting adopted a resolution on regional cooperation in the fight against terrorism (Mersha, 2004: p. 54).

1. Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution Mechanism

Harmonizing and coordinating efforts to promote peace and security in the Horn of Africa has long been a top focus. the Horn of Africa, where IGAD focuses on conflict prevention, management, and resolution. Peace and security are increasingly linked to economic development and poverty alleviation measures. Consequently, a shared sense of safety must be in place (Mwuara, Gunther, & Bethuel, 2002: p. 100-19).

After the reactivation of IGAD and the expansion of its development mission, the subject of peace and security in the Horn of Africa has been elevated to the top of the agenda. At its conference in 2003, IGAD approved its strategy for promoting peace and security. IGAD has separate agreements and systems to ensure the safety of the collective aim of its member nations. The conflict resolution and prevention protocols were developed from this group, and conflict early warning and response mechanisms. It has been recognized as a crucial area of emphasis in the institution's Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution mission, as part of the peace and security agenda, to establish a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanisms (CEWARN) for IGAD (IGAD, 2003: p. 9).

Conflicts between and among countries in IGAD's subregion may be prevented, managed, or resolved via communication and the creation of channels to interact. Nonetheless, "the mechanism must become an important element of the Inter. Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Participation in this mechanism is limited to "member nations that have ratified this protocol." (IGAD, 2003: p. 9).

The Mechanism can do 12 different tasks:

- IGAD member nations should cooperate and share information on conflict early warning and response.
- Collect, process, and analyze conflict-related details; set up a network of early warning and response cooperation among the member nations.
- The area's early warning databases should be created, managed, and disseminated.
- Improve communication and coordination among the member nations' early warning and response systems.
- Cooperate with similar international and subregional mechanisms throughout Africa, notably via the exchange of information.
- Inform and analyze decision-makers using this information and analysis.

Concerning the protocol of CEWARN cooperation, notably in implementing the mechanism's mission, the member states work together and collaborate. They work together. In the formation of CEWARN, the mechanism offers technical support to the member states with the agreement of the executive secretary. Additionally, the Council of Ministers of IGAD has approved the instrument to engage with international and non-governmental organizations. The mechanism can form alliances with other comparable mechanisms (IGAD, 2003: p. 9).

A director in charge of the mechanism will report to the Executive Secretary, who will have operational control over the system. When it comes to IGAD, the Executive Secretary serves as the organization's Chief Executive Officer (CEO). However, the IGAD secretariat and the mechanism share as much as feasible regarding staff, facilities, and equipment. The mechanism will leverage the Secretariat's (the Authority's executive body) documentation facilities. The member nations will be able to utilize the documentation facilities as they see fit (IGAD, 2003: p. 9).

IGAD's assembly of heads of state and government, acting on the recommendation of its council of ministers, approves contributions from member states and grants, donations, and other sources to fund the mechanism. The mechanism will have the authority to request and receive funding and subsidies to

fulfill its duties in coordination with IGAD's chief executive officer. Protocol disagreements must be resolved amicably or harmoniously; if not, they must be brought to the IGAD Heads of State and Government for resolution. The CEWARN framework project is titled "A Conflict Earning and Prevention Mechanism for the IGAD Member States for Implementation." (IGAD, 2003: p. 9).

F. The IGAD-AU relations in Conflict Resolution

Coexistence, collaboration, competitiveness, and conflict are all ways to describe the interaction between any two entities. For the most part, the African Union's Departments of Peace and Security, Political Affairs, and Economic Affairs collaborate with IGAD's liaison office. IGAD participates in African Union Peace and Security Council sessions through its Addis Ababa Liaison office (Kidist, 2009). Information regarding IGAD's shared stances is disseminated throughout meetings. As a result, the liaison office serves as a point of contact for employees from both companies. The AU has embraced IGAD's resolutions on various issues, facilitating policy convergence (Kidist, 2009). IGAD's cooperation with the African Union (AU) and other regional economic communities has been formalized by signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in 2008. In addition, when Amazon was deployed, IGAD and the AU showed a substantial amount of collaboration (Kidist, 2009).

IGAD, via its facilitator's office, has monthly coordination meetings in Nairobi with the African Union and the United Nations to discuss the organization's well-known views on peace and security. As well as exchanging information, coming to an agreement on future actions or plans, and assigning tasks to minimize duplication of effort. During the meeting, member states are represented by their respective resident Ambassadors from their respective countries. This may demonstrate the IGAD and the AU (Kidist, 2009).

G. Co-operations and Interferences among the Members of IGAD in Conflict Resolution

The member nations of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), notably Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya, have made significant contributions

to resolving the prolonged war in Somalia and the rest of the region. The member nations also demonstrated their commitment when they decided to create a peacekeeping operation, such as in Somalia in 2005, which showed their promise. The member nations are prepared to change the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) mandate, which did not allow deploying soldiers to remember circumstances. Although they are working together, the major obstacle to their success is an agreement by IGAD member nations concerned about sovereignty and internal affairs (Kidist, 2009). When hostilities erupted in the Horn of Africa area, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) member nations got entangled in one another's affairs, contributing to regional instability. In a way, there is animosity and competition between the two groups. At the same time, they are indirectly interfering with one another. They also collaborate on problems that affect them all, including border disputes, tribal wars, terrorism, and other concerns (Kidist, 2009).

In Djibouti, ethnic tensions between the Afar and Issa have persisted throughout the 1990s. A key point of contention is Somalia and Eritrea interjected the dispute over state authority control. Civil conflicts were out in Uganda between the early 1990s and 2006 over the question of autonomy, in which Sudan later intervened. A civil conflict erupted in Sudan from 1993 until 2005, including the SPLA (Sudan People's Liberation Army), the central government, and Ethiopia and Uganda (Kidist, 2009). Many countries have intervened in the battle because of the ongoing conflict for control of state authority, important cities, and ports in Somalia (including Mogadishu and Berbera). In addition, there are conflicts between member nations (Kidist, 2009).

Furthermore, a civil war raged in Kenya between the 1960s and 1991 for control of the country's governmental authorities. In addition, Sudan and Somalia were active participants in the conflict. Ethiopia has been embroiled in intra-state strife since 1991, with the OLF and ONLF and the central government vying for control of state authority and eventual success. After that, Eritrea and Somalia became involved (Kidist, 2009). All of the evidence, as mentioned above, points to IGAD member nations cooperating and interfering with one another. Although the long-running dispute is sensitive to sovereignty and internal affairs, IGAD member nations have continually invested their efforts, time, and resources in finding a

solution. Alternatively, member governments collaborate to resolve disputes in the Horn of Africa. To do so, they collaborate with IGAD and themselves while meddling with one of its members. Indeed, member nations often intervene indirectly in the affairs of other countries for political reasons, as was discussed above (Kidist, 2009).

H. IGAD As Compared with the OAS and Arab League

There are no restrictions on what actions the OAS may take to restore or preserve peace and security amongst OAS members, as stated in article 7 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. Article 6 of the Arab League's treaty gives it the authority to take steps to thwart any violating state's hostility towards a member state (Berhankun, 1976: p. 20-31).

The Agreement Establishing IGAD recognizes the organization's potential to take collective action, similar to that of the Organization of the American States and the Arab League, to mitigate threats to regional cooperation, peace, and stability. IGAD's stated goal is to develop efficient methods for collaboration and consultation for the peaceful sentiment of differences and disagreements and to reach a consensus among member nations to first attempt to resolve disputes within this semi-framework, rather than referring them to other regional or international bodies. The goal of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is to promote the sovereign equality of all member states, refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of member states, and use dialogue to resolve intra- and inter-state conflicts (IGAD, 1996). Last but not least, this is a contentious issue inside and between nations. In addition, IGAD has established procedures for working together with other international bodies and its member states to address these challenges. Consequently, IGAD has several challenges, like as budgetary difficulties and rivalry among its member states.

III. THE OVERVIEW OF THE SOMALI CONFLICT

A. The causes of the Somali conflict

According to most scholars, the Somali conflict and subsequent state dissolution may be traced to two main factors: the clan system and the colonial legacy.

1. The root causes

As mentioned above, the root causes of conflict in Somalia are clan, which leads to territorial disputes. In the same way, the Somali government based on clan-based distribution of resources due to superiority of these clans.

a. The clan system

Somali people speak the same language, practice identical religions, and belong to the same race, which is occasional in Africa. Even though the fact that such uniformity should have been a benefit to building a nation-state, Clannishness has historically hampered inner cohesiveness in Somalia. DIR, HAWIYE, DAROD, RAHANWEYN, and ISAQ are prominent clans (SAID S, 1988: p. 24). However, the system of the clan structure is the most significant social feature when it comes to Somalia. And also, this clannism structure has sub-categories; clan family, clan, and mag paying. (Gundel, 2006: p. 4-5).

In most cases, clans are limited to a single family. The number of generations back to a common ancestor in a clan family is not set and may go as high as 30 (Gundel, 2006: p. 4-5). They tend to have territorial exclusivity, following their regular seasonal moves for pasture and semi-permanent colonies. Agnatic ancestry rather than a feeling of geographical belonging binds clan members together. Instead of having an administration or government, a clan acts as the upper limit of political activity, has certain geographical features, and is often headed by a clan head. The main lineage is the clan's most distinct descending group, defined as the lineage to which a person self-identifies as belonging (most often between 10 and 20

generations). When two people from different families marry, it helps break up the long-running rivalries. (Gundel, 2006: p. 4-5).

The mag-paying group, or Diya-paying group as often referred to in the English language, is the most basic and functional lineage unit. The most significant level of social structure for any person is the Mag-paying group. Only a few hundred to a few thousand men make up this tiny, tightly knit collective who trace their ancestry back four to eight generations and can afford to pay the mag (the equivalent of 100 camels in Shariah) if necessary. In this way, all men's social and political relationships are determined by their membership in a mag-paying group and by contracts known as xeer Somali customary rules made inside and between mag-paying groups (Gundel, 2006: p. 5). Even though the fact that mag-paying communities' continued existence depends on their members' capacity to collectively pay off their blood debts (mag), the rising cost of these compensations owing to rising violence and deaths, as well as declining cattle populations due to environmental degradation, threatens their very survival. (Gundel, 2006: p. 5)

Individuals are entitled to any legal and political position. Individuals cannot pay for 100 camels on their own without the help of others. Hence, they are not legitimate political units. In this sense, a man is compelled to give up his rights and interests to protect the mag payers' collective rights and interests. The jiffo group is a sub-division of the mag group that is further subdivided (40 or 33 camels depending on the area) (Gundel, 2006: p. 6)

i. The evolution of the clan system

With the evolution of the clan system, there should be no doubt that the segmentary lineage system presented is not immutable but instead in a permanent state of relative change. Because of population expansion, main lineages also increase (Gundel, 2006: p. 6). Splitting occurs when there are too many disagreements, and two parties can each pay for 100 camels; this is the point at which a split indeed occurs. Clan groupings' genealogical reference points (i.e., their names) alter throughout the time when political breaks occur, and the old reference point is no longer relevant. The new groups refer to their own. Nevertheless, Using the same technique to show that "we are one huge family," "we are powerful," and "we are a bloc," mag-paying organizations allude to their primary clan families in their political rhetoric (despite infighting between themselves on the clan or sub-clan

level). They also re-instate the former reference point whenever groups combine, which happens when they move back in time. (Gundel, 2006: p. 6)

ii. Customary law (xeer-dhaqameed)

The Somali term for customary law is the basis of the traditional 'political contract,' which binds members of a mag-paying group to support one another in political and legal responsibilities, particularly in the payment and receipt of compensation for acts committed by members of one group against another even across vast distances, since kinship binds them. The elders of the mag-paying tribes are responsible for ensuring that the stipulations of the xeer are upheld (Gundel, 2006: p. 6). Unlike fixed law, they are constantly developing, with future choices depending on decisions made in the past, unlike limited regulation.

In rural places where contemporary political institutions are lacking, the xeer has gained traction recently. The xeer established by traditional elders and used in conflict resolution and reconciliation between ordinary folks and business people, is also used in metropolitan regions with municipal authorities. Even in Northern Somalia, where the xeer is used to resolve 80% to 90% of disputes and criminal cases, the xeer's role cannot be overstated.

The old xeer is progressively being replaced by rigid Sharia law in southern Somalia due to the growing influence of radical Islamic organizations. Although being a force for justice and social cohesiveness, it is possible that the xeer would be in contradiction with Islamic Sharia law and international norms for human rights. The xeer's imposition of collective blame on mag-groups is often seen as absolving individuals of culpability for their misdeeds (Gundel, 2006: p. 3).

iii. Traditional Authorities

There are many degrees of elders in the clan's juridical-political leadership hierarchy. Sultan, Ugaas, or similar terms refer to the highest-level elders, who have a primarily judicial function and represent the clan members symbolically but do not have any absolute political authority. In most cultures, the blood compensation (mag-paying) group is represented at the lowest level of elders. Many of these elders maintain track of their family members' movements to locate them if a group is obligated to pay blood recompense. “As a result of the breakdown of the state during the civil war of 1990, traditional authorities have recovered a significant amount of

power. They still play an essential role in ensuring that common resources like grazing lands and water are available. As a lawmaker, executors, and judges, the clan elders play a crucial role in this situation. Male clan elders make decisions under consensus, which effectively marginalizes women and subordinates their interests to those of the whole clan (Gundel, 2006: p. 4).

iv. Clan and minority

The clan and minority in Somalia are sometimes depicted as a nation with culturally and linguistically homogenous people. Af-Maxaa-tiri (i.e., the noble clans of Darood, Hawiye, Dir, and depending on one's viewpoint the Isaaq), which became the official language of Somalia after independence, is the majority of the people. Digil-Mirifle, or Rahanweyn, refers to the inter-riverine territory between the Juba and Shabelle rivers in southern Somalia, where the predominantly sedentary agro-pastoralist people live. They use the dialect of Af-Maay-tiri, which is unique from Af-Maxaa-tiri in its pronunciation and vocabulary. Outside of this uniformity, minorities may be found as well. The clans are like living creatures. It's almost impossible to create a complete chart of all their relatives, making identifying them much more difficult.

Politically, the TFG created 2000 the so-called "4.5 formula" to guarantee that the four major clans (designated as Hawiye, Darood, Dir, and Rahanweyn) are equally represented in government. This formula is still in use today. In the remaining "0.5," all groups not included in the significant clans, such as minorities, women, civil society, and others, will be accommodated. However, Somalia's raging civil war in the country's south-central region shows that this formula is very controversial in resolving the conflict there.

According to Somalis, clans are often inflated in their size to show their power. Southern Somalia, the region between the Juba and Shabelle rivers, has a much higher population density than the nomadic areas. Consequently, the Rahanweyn groups may account for 25 to 30 percent of the total population and are more significant than popularly thought. The Bantus often thought of as a minority ethnic group with a population of little more than 6 percent, may make up 20 percent of the country's total population, with specific areas in South Central accounting for as much as 50 percent. However, Somali leaders who support the nomadic clans repress and hideaway these organizations on the political front.

They are founded on precedents, which means that they are constantly growing, with future judgments relying on decisions made in the past, unlike established legislation. Xeer is especially significant in rural places where contemporary political institutions are scarce. Traditional elders' xeer, found in metropolitan areas with local governments, is often the first option in a conflict management, resolution, and reconciliation process among both ordinary inhabitants and business people. There can be little doubt that the xeer has a significant role in resolving conflicts and criminal matters in Northern Somalia.

The traditional xeer is progressively being replaced by strict Sharia law in southern Somalia, where there is a growing presence of violent Islamic organizations. Even international humanitarian norms and Islamic Sharia law may be at odds with the xeer's ability to promote societal harmony. The xeer's imposition of collective guilt on mag-groups is perceived as absolving individual criminals of culpability (Gundel, 2006: p. 6).

v. Clans

(a) The nomadic group

There is a mythical idea among the pastoral Somalis that they are descended directly from the forefather Samaal and the household of the prophet Mohammed, namely from the Qurayshi clan and specifically from Aqiil Bin Abi-Talib. All of the Somali lineages share this concept. According to various sources, today's segmented clan structure is represented by three to four primary clan families descended from Darood, Hawiye, Dir, and, depending on who you ask, Isaaq (Gundel, 2006: p. 5),

- **DAAROOD:** Ogaden, Marehan, and Harti are three of Darood's most well-known ensembles. The Majerteen, Dulbahante, and Warsangeli are members of the Harti tribe; they inhabit mainly Puntland, Somaliland, and the Horn of Africa region. Most of Puntland is shared by the Majerteen clan. The Gedo area in south-central Somalia is home to the Marehan, the major ethnic group. In Southern Somalia, where they have taken over parts of Lower and Middle Juba in recent years, the Ogaden also have strongholds in Ethiopia and Kenya. The greatest pro-Somali nationalists are the Darood, who lives in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Kenya's north, south, and central regions.
- **HAWIYE:** In terms of the Hawiye, the Habar Gedir and the Abgal are the

two most significant and often utilized sub-divisions, respectively. This ethnic group may be found in central and southern Somalia, with the Abgal and Habr Gedir clans, in particular, dominating the capital city of Mogadishu. The Hawiye are not as prevalent in the other regions of Somalia, and they are typically pleased with their authority over the territory of South-Central Somalia.

- **DIR:** Groups like as Issa, Gadabursi, and Biymaal are represented on the Dir. Dir groups may be found in Somaliland and Somalia's southern and central regions.
- **ISAQ:** As previously stated, there is some debate about whether the Isaaq is considered a separate clan family from the rest of the Isaaq. The Isaaq themselves have said that they are a part of the Dir, although southern Somalis and the Majeerteen maintain that they are not. The Isaaq are related to other Dir communities such as the Biymaal, Issa, and Gadabursi via cousins. The Isaaq are most of Somaliland's residents (although its current president is from the Gadabursi group).

(b) Agro-pastoralist groups

It is believed that the Somali agro-pastoralists are descended from the tribe of Saab and that they are comprised of the two tribes of Mirifle and Digil Rahanweyn. They are frequently referred to be identical to Mirifle and Digil, which is not entirely accurate. The clan structure of agro-pastoralists differs significantly from that of nomadic communities. Unlike the nomads, the Rahanweyn do not trace their lineage back very far; instead, their clans are made up of 4-7 jilib who work together to pay Diya, which is one of the primary characteristics that sets the Rahanweyn social structure apart from that of other civilizations. As a result, the Rahanweyn have a unique kinship system based on diya payments, which sets them apart from the pastoralists. In contrast to the pastoralists, they make collective Diya payments at a considerably higher ancestry level. (Gundel, 2006: p. 30).

These distinctions are since these communities do not engage in transhumance travel in the same manner as nomads do but rather engage in agriculture. They also retain camels as a last option approach in a severe drought, in which case they may be forced to relocate. But this must be separated from nomadic

migratory methods, which are also prevalent today. As a result, their identity is based on their geographical location, with their home state being more significant than their clan. Their system of elders is far more hierarchical and closely linked to the villages and home states than that of the rest of the world. With the advent of political Islam in Somalia, the Rahanweyn clans have steadily established dominance over their own districts, such as Bay and Bakool, located in the inter-riverine region between the Juba and Shabelle rivers in southern Since the Rahanweyn were historically tolerant citizens who were not engaged in the first civil conflict, this is no longer the case. They now have developed their private army and attempt to gain authority over their territories. However, they do not seem to be very concerned with maintaining power over other regions.

(c) Minorities

The Somali Nomadic clans refer to minorities as "clans," however, this is a misnomer since they aim to include them into their system. The 'outcaste' or bondsmen communities, commonly referred to as sab, and ethnic Bantu tribes and coastal groups, including those of Arabic heritage, such as the Bajunis and Barawanis, are among the minority populations. There is little recognition or respect for minorities and their languages and traditions in the United States.

First and foremost, it should be highlighted that being a member of a minority does not indicate whether or not one is in danger of being targeted. Second, the concept of "minorities" might be deceptive regarding its numerical representation. Various minorities, like the Bantus, are, in reality, local majorities in many parts of South-Central Somalia, even though they are classified as minorities. nevertheless, they are subjected to oppression by the militarily more powerful nomadic tribes. They are a minority in the Somali setting globally since they are not the majority. The sab is an exception to this since they constitute a distinct minority in terms of numbers since, unlike the Bantus, who are concentrated in certain areas, they are dispersed across the country.

The third point to note is that some clan groups (such as the Biymaal) live in pockets of groups in some areas and can thus be referred to as "minorities" on the local level with some justification, but not on the global Somali level since they are members of a powerful clan-family, which is the case in some areas. As a result, they may typically leave places where they are a "minority" and get security in areas

where their clan is a majority (even if the idea of being "dominant" does not imply complete control, as there are always various clans and "minorities" present in South Central Somalia). However, this often results in these groups described below under the heading "groups that are not minorities" being forced to leave their home communities, where they have likely been living for generations. It said that it should be highlighted that such broad generalized knowledge and information on clans and minorities is of little use when it comes to determining an individual's risk of being targeted. Particularly relevant in asylum processes, as choices based on generalizations about the situations of specific groups might result in asylum decisions being made based on erroneous premises. As a result, it must be stressed that every asylum application should be regarded as a unique instance when each asylum seeker's case is handled according to the principles of international refugee law, based on the severity of their specific persecution and danger.

(d) Sab

Traditional bondsmen of pastoralist clan groupings, the sab can only have connections with the Somali via an abba, a middleman between the two peoples (Somali patron). Internally, the sab may have segmented lineage systems and the Somali pattern, which is possible. It is neither permitted nor tolerated for these minority/sub-minorities to marry into the noble nomadic clans, who are themselves minorities. They have typically been denied the right to possess land or animals, engage in local companies, participate in the market economy, or participate in political life.

The sab practices a variety of professional abilities that are often hated. As a result, sab often refers to groups that have been classified according to their vocation. To protect themselves, they keep their affairs hidden. This is their sole means of resisting the control of the Somali nomads since it causes the latter to become reliant on these groups when it comes to home building and different types of handicrafts. They have their language, which is rapidly vanishing, but they communicate in English. Sab is comprised of the following organizations:

- **Gabooye/midgan**: It is made up of Tumaal (blacksmiths), Midgan (shoemakers and poison makers), and Yibir (hairstylists) in the North. The Madhibaan, Muuse Dhariyo, Howleh, Hawraar Same, and Habar Yaquup are

among the Gabooye/many Midgan's ethnic groups. Southern Somalia is also home to a number of these groups**.**

- **Yibir:** Along the shore in Mogadishu and the towns of Bosasso, Borama, and Burco, the Yibr or Yibro (some say Yibro is a mispronunciation) well. It is said that they are not the same as the Gabooye in the South. Many people believe the Yibir are descended from ancient Hebrews who made their way to the Horn of Africa. Because the Yibir has found a means to honor their pariah position via the 'Hebrew' notion, it is not an anti-Semitic fabrication but rather a Yibir-created one. However, even though this claim is contested, it is not without merit. Even though a myth about their descent developed in the 1970s as part of a political campaign to discredit them by playing on anti-Semitic sentiments, some historical evidence supports the notion that ancient Somali people, before Islam and Christianity, did have a connection to Jews or similar religions. As a result of an ancient religious dispute at Aw-Barkhadle (a religious center commemorating Sheikh Yusuf Al-Kownin) in present-day Somaliland, a popular pilgrimage destination located between Hargeysa and Berbera, it is possible that the present group descended from the 'losing' side. This, on the other hand, requires more investigation outside of our current focus.

In traditional Somali culture, members of Yibr performed mythical roles such as collecting Samanyo (a birth gift) from newborn newborns and newly-married females in return for granting them good fortune. Members of Yibr no longer perform mythological activities such as collecting Samanyo. Through this superstitious tradition prevalent among the Yibr before independence, the Yibr were historically protected, albeit it is no longer frequently practiced now. As a result of the government's prohibition of the Samanyo ritual and other associated customs after independence, they suffered.

The advent of radical Islamic organizations like Al-Shabaab, which have strong anti-Jewish views, has led to a growing suspicion among Somalis that the Yibir, who claim historical lineage from the Hebrews, have a radical Islamic tendency. As a result, despite being Muslims today, members of the Yibir tribe in South Central Somalia may be targeted. Yahhar, Galgalo (woodcarvers), Boon, and Eyle are some sab groups that may be found in the southern hemisphere.

(e) Ethnic and minority groups

- **Somali Bantus (jareer):** The Bantus are primarily found in the southern regions of the country, where agriculture is concentrated. The Bantu people are known by various names, depending on where they live. For example, Gosha, Makane, Shiidle, Reer Shabelle, and Mushungli are all names for the Bantu people. They communicate primarily in Bantu, with some speaking Arabic and Swahili. Generalized assimilation of minority populations by Somali nomadic tribes is intended to maintain control. The Bantus, in particular, are perceived as being too different from being assimilated and, as a result, must be marginalized by many nomadic clans, which has resulted in a situation of impunity for attacks against Bantu groups (whom the 'noble' nomadic clans hope to exploit for the cultivation of the fertile lands). This has evolved throughout time, partly because Bantu communities have begun to organize and equip themselves in response to the threat of armed conflict. As a result, Bantu communities have grown in power and can now fend for themselves in some areas.
- **Coastal groups:** The Benadiri, Barawani, Bajuni, and Jaaji (or Reer Maanyo) are just a few coastal tribes that make up this list. Barawani and Bajuni are ethnically Arabic peoples who speak the Arabic language.

(f) Minority and other groups with affiliations to major clans

- **Reer Hamar:** Since the Rer xamar is a part of the Benadiri, they might be considered minorities in terms of language and culture. They reside in the center areas of Mogadishu, in the neighborhoods of Hamarweyne and Shangani, where they own land and buildings. The Rer Hamar, mostly of Arabic heritage, are not a homogeneous ethnic group in the traditional sense. Nonetheless, a reference is made to the early urban residents of Mogadishu's Hamar and Shangani Districts, which are considered the city's historic core. There are at least two primaries 'lineages,' notably the 'Gibil Cad' and the 'Gibil Madow,' related to the Gibil Cad (mixed of Somali descent). For example, when it comes to the Benadiri, I've been informed that a tiny group known as 'Qalimoshube' (part of Gibil Madow) is discriminated against by the other Benadiri "Rer Hamar" because of their darker color and vocations.

Today, the Rer Hamar are seen as 'not without power,' They can participate in the political game with the main clans, even though other clans seldom attack them. It is based on the altered context that had developed in Mogadishu over the past eight years, in which the 'Rer Hamar' community is no longer subjected to the kind of targeted violence committed with impunity by the major warring clans that were the case during the early civil war years when they were targeted partly because of their influence and positions in the previous Somali government and because they lost any protection provided to them with the collapse of the last Somali government. This does not rule out the possibility of prejudice against the Rer Hamar community. As a result, various mitigating variables are now available to them, which they might use.

First, The Rer Hamar, who were successful in obtaining asylum in another country, was also successful in raising awareness of their plight internationally, which helped raise awareness of them as a community both within Somalia and among members of the transitional governments who were seeking international assistance. Secondly, as a result of this, the Rer Hamar in Mogadishu now has political posts within the transitional government and several important positions within the regional administration of Benadir and the local government of Mogadishu. Thirdly, Because of growing activism, political power, and the "Mukulal Madow" (black cat) phenomena of protection, they are no longer attacked with impunity as the "Jareer" organizations are. – Through marriage, for example, 'Hawiye Abgal and Habr Gedir' clans, such as those belonging to the "Rer Hamar" family, have built close ties with the "Mukulal Madow" clan. Families in Rer Hamar with daughters married into powerful clans will now have some protection from these families.

The Rer Hamar's relatives in Merka, the Benadiris, gave me a strong sense of how their communities have tried to prevent the unfair abuses they were subjected to unpunished via different tactics. Because the Benadiri have been residing in the same cities for a millennium, they have a built-in advantage over other Somali minorities because they are so nearby. They learned to compromise and negotiate with the more powerful clans to forge relationships as a second strategy. If they couldn't merge, they could at least adapt and conform to their neighbors' xeer (customary laws), which gave them some legal security. What weaker groups in Somalia "join" more prominent organizations to seek more excellent protection and rights is an area that

needs more study. I'm not sure how much Rer Hamar has changed in practice due to the Somali Xeer, but I wouldn't be shocked if that were the case.

In the event of slaughter between them and a Somali tribe, they will negotiate Diya payment on their behalf. The Rer Hamar reside in Hamarweyne and Shangani, where they own land. However, they do not speak English. However, it may be difficult for them to relocate to another part of Somalia, purchase land, or get clan security. Once again, this varies from place to location, and it may also be dependent on what the particular 'Rer Hamar' person has to offer in terms of contributions. He may be warmly welcomed if he arrives with a significant enterprise that will benefit the town. However, although the Rer Hamar is not armed collectively in the same way that several other prominent clans are, Rer Hamar business individuals in Mogadishu may be engaging in armed security in the same way that all other Somali business people do.

- **Biymaal:** The Biymaal are a clan that belongs to the Dir clan group. As a result, the Biymaal cannot be termed a minority, despite being crushed by the Hawiye, against whom they have fought mainly in the Lower Shabelle and Middle and Lower Juba districts, as well as by the Ogaden / Darood clans.
- **Sheikhal:** In general, the Sheikhal (or Sheikhash) is given to religiously transmitted lineages. Sheikh Faqi Omar, who roamed over Somalia, marrying brides everywhere he went, is the progenitor of all of them, according to Virginia Luling (Luling & Virginia, 2009). In most cases, they get preferential access to all areas of Somalia because of their religious position. The following article may include more information about the numerous groups referred to as Sheikhal in Southern Somalia (Luling & Virginia, 2009).

The majority of the Sheikhal is now linked with the Hirab part of the Hawiye, which is an intriguing example of how a politically 'weak' clan may shift its clan affiliation to gain power, protection, and strength in the community. As a result, after the civil war (1990-92), the Sheikhal from Mogadishu and southwards to Kismayo/Lower Juba attempted two significant initiatives for acquiring influence: In one instance, they placed a strong emphasis on developing and dominating the educational sector in Mogadishu, primarily through the nonviolent Islamic

organization Al-Islah, and the establishment of the Formal Private Education Network in Somalia, which serves as an umbrella organization for private-sector education (FPENS). Second, the Hawiye and General Aideed sought to form a political alliance with the Hawiye political section of the United Somali Congress (USC). Now-dead Sheikhal General Liiqliliqato detailed how the Sheikhal got affiliated with the Hawiye known as "Martileh Hirab" in his book, which is now out of print (literally meaning guests of Hirab). Sheikhal still holds three of the 61 Hawiye parliamentary seats.

- **Asharaf:** It is common to refer to the Asharaf as a minority population. I'm referring to the Digil-Mirifle Asharaf in particular, not the Benadiri Asharaf when talking about the Asharafs. Several Asharaf families have settled in Somalia alongside other Somali clans. The Asharaf are typically thought to be a pious people and instructors of religion who trace their lineage back to Fatima, the daughter of the prophet Muhammad. Their lives are generally intertwined into the communities they have chosen to dwell in, such as Digil-Mirifle or Benadiri. The gatherings usually protect them since they are considered connected to the Prophet and hence have a special religious status. The argument is that they are not being targeted as a minority in the traditional sense. Nonetheless, it may have the same difficulties as its 'host' clans. The Benadiri people targeted the Benadiri Asharaf during the early stages of the civil war. That Current, one of Sheikh Shariff's most influential ministers and friends, Sharif Hassan, is sprung from the Asharaf tribe. At that moment, the Digil-Mirifle/Asharaf may be targeted by the al-Shabaab Islamist group, in part because the latter does not recognize the religious status of the Asharaf and in part because they oppose Shariff Hassan, who, along with President Sheikh Shariff, was the driving force behind the 2008 Djibouti agreement.

- **Garre:** Although the Garre are typically regarded as part of the Digil/Rahanweyn group, they are also occasionally classified as a separate group in their own right.

- **Bagadi/Iroole:** It is believed that the Bagadi and Iroole are a subset of the Digil and Rahanweyn clans in Lower Shabelle, where the local clan makeup also includes the Biymal and Benadiri groupings. As a result of the civil war,

the Digil groups, even though they did not constitute a minority, were repressed by the Hawiye and the other tribes. When Al-Shabaab recently swept in and gained control of this region, they did so on the premise of backing the Digil and the Biymaal and other organizations that the Hawiye had repressed up until that point in time.

b. The colonial legacy in Somalia

In late nineteenth-century Somalia, colonialism by European powers had a lasting impact on the country. It led to the division of their country into five distinct governmental units by upsetting the concord of a homogenous population. The foundation of the Horn of Africa's dilemma lies in the colonial history of the Somali people. Many worldwide challenges have been caused by Somalia's nationalist ambitions and the stubbornness of Somalia's neighbors. When the Somali Republic was established in 1960, it was simply the beginning of a long and arduous fight for national unity. This brought together Somalis who had previously been governed by colonial powers such as Italy and the United Kingdom. Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti, all of which gained their independence from France in June of that year, were omitted (Fitzgibbon, 1982: p. 28).

In the eyes of many Somali nationalists, establishing the Somali Republic was a necessary step toward the full realization of the Somali people's national identity. Almost all of Somalia's foreign policy since independence in the 1960s has been centered on the goal of uniting all Somalis under a single state. 'A conundrum where Somalia remains a country yearning for a state' resulted from this reality. The cornerstone of Somali ambitions was the concept of "unification of all Somalis." (Fitzgibbon, 1982: p. 28)

i. Territorial Dispute

Under the terms of the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreements of 1942 and 1944, Britain ceded the Somali territories of Ogaadeen and Hawd to Ethiopia, which are located in Western Somaliland.

The region that Somalia has claimed in Ethiopia is substantial, accounting for one-fifth of the country's total land area. She also claimed the Northern Frontier District (NFD), known as the North-Eastern Province of Kenya, as part of her territory (Salwe, 1993: p. 60).

A significant portion of the Somali population remained beyond the country's borders ceded to Somalia by the colonial powers (Salwe, 1993: p. 60). For present politics, Somali history has had the most disastrous effect because a large majority of Somali tradition does not exist inside the borders provided to Somalis by colonial forces. Their plight as second-class Kenyans and unwelcome Ethiopian subjects continues today. For many, water and grassland on both sides of the border serve as lifelines. Somalia's current political turmoil has been exacerbated by a tremendous yearning by many Somalis to unify under a single state's flag, making this painful situation even more difficult to bear. Because of a boundary dispute between Ethiopia and the Italian Trusteeship of Somalia under UN auspices, the UN advised Italy and Ethiopia to resolve their disagreements in the 1940s (Salwe, 1993: p. 60).

Nevertheless, Ethiopia was keen to extend its boundary into Somali territory despite having previously obtained the Ogaadeen and Hawd via Anglo-Ethiopian accords. It was argued that the limit was east of the shore, close to the sea. Contrary to what was stated in the interim line, Italy argued that the border lay westward. There was an UN-appointed arbitration panel headed by former UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie to advise on the case. It was impossible to reach a conclusion owing to Ethiopian stubbornness. Ethiopia and Somalia agreed upon a definitive solution in December 1959, but the temporary British border remained in place until then. When Somalia became an independent state in 1960, a territory issue remained unresolved (Salwe, 1993: p. 60).

ii. The problem of colonial boundaries for independent Africa

Africa's newly developing nations were expected to be a source of strife in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The borderlines imposed by the colonial powers were seen as unrealistic and unfair by the country's indigenous peoples. Changes to them might significantly impact the survival of certain countries. With the establishment of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), a regional organization created in Cairo in 1963, several severe African concerns, including boundary disputes, were addressed. When colonial powers departed Africa, they left behind a set of boundaries that the OAU agreed to keep in place. Somalia rejected the OAU's stance on colonial boundaries. (Fitzgibbon, 1982: p. 28)

Many African governments were susceptible and skeptical of any challenge to the colonially imposed borders for fear that the framework of political entities on

the continent would be washed away in the chaos of tribal and other wars that they believed would occur. It was difficult for the newly independent African republics to deal with the squalor left behind by colonial rule. Somalis saw it as a validation of another African state's colonial control over another. For the Somalis, this was a question of life and death. If this agreement is accepted, we may expect fewer pastoralists to travel to and from Western Somaliland. In the rainy seasons, April to June and October to November, Western Somaliland's pastures are abundant, and animals don't require much water since they may drink from the lush foliage. Due to this, pastoralists would go to eastern Somalia during the dry season with their livestock. The typical reaction to drought is for pastoralists to roam around as much as possible therefore restricting their movements puts them at risk. As a result of overgrazing, deforestation and desertification will take place in the long run, as Louis Fitzgibbon put it in his famous quote (Fitzgibbon, 1982: p. 28).

Deserts and shrubs cover the vast majority of the Ogaden. However, despite having limited water and pasture supplies, it is "home" to the Somali nomad pastoralists. After the scramble for Africa,' British colonialists guaranteed its safety. Between 1890 to 1954, the Somalis handed it up to their long-time nemesis, Abyssinia, piece by piece. It's been a century since that treachery caused so much sorrow and death, and now people who want to keep their country may have a role in how it's disposed of (Fitzgibbon, 1982: p. 28).

2. Aggravating Factors

a. Barre's Dictatorship

In a bloodless military takeover in 1969, General Siad Barre seized control of the country after deposing the civilian administration. Self-help community initiatives and creating health and educational facilities were the first steps he took to win over the people's support. As a result, he ended up being an opportunistic dictator who cared nothing about the lives of his subjects. While in office, Barre's regime was well-known for its bribery, nepotism, individualistic management style, and lack of possibility for compromise in Somalia, which had the poorest record in human rights. According to African Watch, sixty thousand people were reportedly slain by Barre when he was in power (Hussien & Adam, 1995: p. 18-22).

b. The Ogaden War

As part of Somalia's long-held goal of uniting the whole country under the banner of Greater Somalia, the Ogaden war, which ranged from 1977 to 1978, was launched by the Somali government. Somali nationalism was supposed to be strengthened, and, as a consequence, the country was brought together as a single nation-state by incorporating Ogaden into the better Somali Republic. After Ethiopia's defeat in 1978, the battle deteriorated for Somalia, which the Soviet Union and Cuba had supported. In addition, Barre's failure in Somalia tarnished his political reputation and sparked public outrage at home. (Mulugeta, 2008: p. 19-37). There were multiple unsuccessful attempts at a coup in 1978, and rebel groups created with the support of Ethiopia launched operations against Barre. This only made the situation tenser. (Brons, 2001: p. 25-37).

c. Cold War Legacy

Somalia's proximity to both the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean has made it a target for the United States and the Soviet Union, who are both keen on securing control over Middle Eastern oil supplies. Diplomatic and economic aid from the Soviet Union poured into Somalia throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Barre turned to the West, especially the United States, for assistance when the Soviet Union withdrew its support for Ethiopia in 1977. The repeated reinforcement of the two superpowers enabled Barre to maintain his dictatorship, despite mounting domestic resistance and the final breakdown of the state (Zartman, 1995).

d. Intensification of the Armed Struggle against Barre's Rule

In reaction to Barre's violence and his program of division and control, several clannish revolt organizations arose in Somalia in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), Isaaq-dominated Somali National Movement (SNM), and Hawiye-dominated United Somali Congress (USC) carried out military attacks (USC). Law and order collapsed due to the inability of the numerous rebel groups to agree on a sustainable post-Barre administration (Sorenson, 1995).

B. Tribal (clan) Conflicts and Inter-state Conflict in Somalia

The Somalis are all fluent in the same language. They are both members of

the same faith. In addition, they are members of the same ethnic group, which is uncommon in African countries. Even though this sort of homogeneity is required to establish a nation-state. On the other hand, the Somalis have been hampered by clan or tribe conflicts.

In Somalia, the five prominent clans are essential. The characters' names are Darood, Hawiye, Rahanwyeen, Issaq, and Dir. Each clan has several sub-clans. Throughout Somalia, clans and sub-clans play an essential role in defining the country's political, economic, and social landscapes. As Samatar put it, clannism is somewhat tied to the Somali pastoralist culture of a centralized administrative system and emphasizes devotion to one's kin and clans, a component of the centralized organizational system. With rivalry for scarce natural resources, elite manipulation, and political favoritism, the Somali clans Somalia Somali has been more fractured over time (Samatar, 1988: p. 135-38)

1. Tribal (Clan) conflict in Somalia

a. The Root of conflicts

i. The pre-colonial era

For the last 2,500 years, Somalia has been home to many ethnic groups, but mostly Somalis. Clans (or "tribes") in Somalia are known as Sumad, and each one has a different name and symbol that distinguishes them from the others. Clans are regarded to be the landowners in their territories. Each clan has a chief who has authority over the tribe, although their power is limited (I.M, 1965). A location is recognized as home to each of the several Somali clans. Each clan or collection of clans within this group has its social structure. They have a set of norms for dealing with other clans in Somalia (Hussein, 2018). In the same way, as Laitin and Samatar explain, the word 'tribe' has been banned from Somalia's vocabulary even though tribalism has not disappeared—by a series of national governments concerned with enforcing on the Somalis a determine of centralized authority in place of traditional clan rule (Samatar, 1988: p. 135-38).

As a nomadic people, the Somalis have been referred to as "nomads" who live in a society marked by a watchful cycle of transhumant mobility. When the clouds of colonial conquest finally collected in 1884, the modern era officially started. Until recently, most efforts to understand Somalia's violent conflicts were

dominated by the idea of clans or tribes' reverence. Disregarding environmental degradation and depletion in Somalia's regional competitions and treating them as strictly political or ethnic-tribal conflicts will lead to a distorted view of the actual situation and, in turn, severely limit the possibility of genuine conflict resolution in Somalia (Medhane, 2003: p. 1-3).

ii. The Worsening of Somalia's Clan (Tribal) Conflict

Daily, the number of individuals belonging to various clans and clusters of clans grows. Tribal (clan) disputes arose due to this, resulting in the loss of state authority, land, water, and other resources. The competition for resources exacerbates conflicts between Somalia's clans. A cause of instability in Somalia has always been disputes over scarce resources like water, cattle, and aging (Kidist, 2009). Legum, 1998 identifies the following as the primary variables contributing to the escalation of clan (tribe) violence in Somalia:

Clan membership continues to be the most critical factor in determining a social identity for the average Somali in the field or the camel camp. In the current context, a clan is no more a tiny group with smaller sub-divisions but rather a much more significant connection of clans that may number a million or more individuals, all of whom claim a common ancestor. By Prof. I.M Lewis as the 'clan family.' In contemporary Somalia, all political movements are based on clan affiliations. Because of the challenging climate these clans live in has always been fierce competition for access to rare resources such as grazing lands and water holes, which has fueled their feuding for generations. When it comes to the current state, this fight for access to limited resources has been chiefly transferred from competition among nomadic pastoralists to acquiring power at the heart of government (Waldamāryām., 1999).

A heated battle for control of the state economy is taking place in Somalia in return for a more significant portion of the country's renewable resources, primarily arable land, and freshwater. Because of economic benefit and political control, the participants brought attention to sub-ethnic clan differences but then soon forgot about these clan lifestyles due to their participation. Neither the discontinuation of renewable resources nor the supply limitation guarantees outcomes in this scenario. One of the primary reasons for conflict in the Horn of Africa is access to national and social resources. Other factors contributing to conflict include justice, fairness,

equitable distribution, and equal development. Consequently, conflict research is increasingly being conducted in politics and the economic command and control state. Therefore, technical solutions to violent disputes are no longer enough (Medhane, 2003: p. 1-3).

Natural resource monopolies are a frequent source of national struggle, and the violence in Syria is an example of this. The horn may appear in several ways at different stages of its development. Political power struggles inside a state, regional wars, and local disputes, such as warlordism, are all instances of power struggles within a state or territory. Throughout Somalia, each of these characteristics contributes to the deterioration of clan (tribal) conflicts (Suliman, 1991)

b. Tribal (clan) Conflict in the post-colonial period

i. The post-colonial periods

The Horn of Africa continues to face a significant problem due to ongoing conflicts. In contrast to interstate conflicts, which can be tracked and handled from the outset, it is difficult to pinpoint where and how internal conflicts begin and escalate. When we talk about internal disputes, we're talking about disagreements within a country's boundaries. In the words of (Medhane, 2003), even though external causes have a role, internal disputes generally revolve around state governance, identity, and resource allocation (Kumar, 1999: p. 15-16). During a media workshop on the 15th of February in Washington, DC, Howard Wolpe, the United States' special envoy for African conflicts, provided the following analysis:

Conflicts in Africa are not primarily driven by ethnicity or tribe. Compared to conflicts on other continents, the nature of competition in Africa is no more special than violence everywhere else. Modern African Wars are not based on conventional conflict patterns or old animosities. Urbanization and economic and social upheaval have spawned most conflict groups (Herald, 1997). In Somalia, the post-colonial battle for state authority was based on obtaining the country's most valuable resources. Due to a lack of essential amenities and economic mismanagement by successive governments, poverty and unhappiness have risen in recent years (Kidist, 2009).

General Said Barre (1969-1991) used a divide-and-rule strategy based on clans to establish his system of selecting loyal political agents from his clan to

govern and control civil institutions and military organizations, which he maintained until he died in 1991. Throughout the economic system, he assisted his clan, the Marehan clan of Darood. Barre's tactics resulted in mutual suspicion and hostility amongst the clans due to their experiences. Somalia was also divided due to the competition for few resources among numerous tribes and sub-clans (Samatar, 1987: p. 669-690). The Barre's rising consolidation of power, mainly in the hands of his clan, the Matheran, elicits resistance from the other clans, who are overwhelmingly far more significant in size than the Barre. It expressed itself in the armed battle that erupted in opposition to Barre's government and resulted in five competing armed camps, each with its own set of rules (Samatar, 1987: p. 669-690). With two current language groupings, English and Italian, the other rivalry aspect dates back to the colonial era. As a result of the higher control exerted in the south by individuals living in the former Italian colony, Somaliland's former Anglophone protectorate has complained that their faith is being disregarded (colin, 1992).

Renaming clan chiefs as "peacekeepers" and integrating them into the state bureaucracy was Said Barre's effort to dismantle all clan-based social organizations in Haiti. He tried to impose his will on Somali society and politics by claiming total control of both. In 2000 the regime aimed to develop a dependency on the state to replace the can system. Both towns are located in northern Somalia: Hargeisa, the capital of Somaliland, where a de facto government maintains law and order while conflict rages across the rest of Somalia, and Mogadishu, the northern Somali city where the research will take place in the area, there has been some expansion and development. Legal systems in Hargeisa and Boroma are poor since there is no central authority; elders as informal mediators of conflicts have evolved in their stead (colin, 1992)

Military and civil leaders in Somalia have spent decades attempting to prevent the collapse of the government and the subsequent breakout of clan warfare. At the same time, these Somalian officials have been forced to divide among themselves as a direct consequence of the unsuccessful policy efforts implemented by the nation. Authoritarian administrations, such as the one led by Said Barre in Somalia, have received financial help from other countries, who have done so to further their own national goals. They undermined the foundations of cooperation and collective action for the common good, which increased the risk of conflict

within the community. This was accomplished by undermining trust between people and communities (Medhane, 2003: p. 17-22).

The possession of significant land is often the root cause of tensions between Somalia's several clans and sub-clan groups. It is not unusual for two Somali clans, Ogaden and the Issaq of modern-day Somaliland, to struggle overgrazing in the Eastern Ogaden. Examples of such clans include those mentioned above. Both the Issa Somaliland and the Afar are now embroiled in a territorial conflict. Given that Ogaden and ISSAQ are both parts of the same clan yet reside in different countries, it would seem that they are engaged in a battle that crosses national boundaries. The content of clannism in Somalia's present-day politics is unique from that of the rest of Africa, both before and after the advent of colonialism on the continent (Medhane, 2003: p. 17-22). In Somalia, "tribalism" refers to disputes between people who share the same kinship. Tribal warfare occurs in other regions of Africa, but in Somalia, the term "tribalism" relates to these conflicts. The segmentation of Somali society acts as both centrifugal and centripetal functions simultaneously. On the one hand, it weaves the Somali people together in a social fabric based on affinity, and on the other, it separates them in a complex maze of clan conflicts. The categorization of Somali in this way is an intriguing topic (Samatar, 1987: p. 669-690).

The degree to which Somali society will be able to flourish in the years to come is directly influenced by the degree to which it is politically and structurally fractured. Both at home, where politics is driven by worries about who has power and how that power is divided, and abroad, where it is difficult to accept the international restrictions that isolate Somalia, these differences may be felt. Politics in both places are driven by concerns about who has power and how that power is distributed (Samatar, 1987: p. 669-690). The fall of the Barre government, which made it essential to cite tribalism, clan rivalries, and fratricidal battles in the eyes of the international world, rendered post-colonial Somalia an even more terrifying place to live. IGAD, the African Union, the Arab League, and the United Nations are all organizations in which Somalia has had membership (Waldamāryām., 1999).

ii. The Effects of Tribal Clan Conflicts

Somalia has been because of external and internal factors, such as its colonial past, foreign interference, clannism, Said Barre's dictatorship, and the escalation of armed resistance. It continues to be the state in the world that is most riven by

conflict and prone to instability. This is the case both historically and currently. As a direct result of the problems' root causes, Somalia is now grappling with all of those problems' repercussions (Kidist, 2009).

General Said Barre pursued an approach based on divisiveness and centralized authority in his military operations. In Somalia, throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s, the country's dictatorial regime was the impetus for a series of clan-based uprisings. This reveals that he used his position of power to his advantage to maintain their distance from one another. The colonial legacy left by European powers separated Somalia into various areas, which resulted in the clans of Somalia being first split up among themselves. As a consequence of this, clan-based insurgent organizations such as the Somali Salvation Democratic Movement (SSDF), the Somali National Movement (SNM), and the United Somali Congress (USC) were established to overthrow Barre’s regime and begin armed operations against it. Despite Barre's regime being overthrown (I.William & Zartman, 1995).

The conflict in Somalia had a tremendous impact on society and the governmental and economic systems of the country. However, the political and ethnic conflicts in Somalia have worsened the country's humanitarian crisis. Since the collapse of Barre's government in 1991, Somalia has been mired in the throes of a humanitarian crisis. Therefore, out of the nine million people who live there, over 3.2 million require immediate humanitarian assistance, 1.2 million have been displaced, and hundreds of thousands have died in civil wars fought over the clan and political differences. Additionally, up to 300,000 children are diagnosed with acute malnutrition each year, making it the country with the highest annual rate of acute malnutrition (UNHCR, 2009).

Britain is a significant player in the political scene. Since 1991, Said Barre's control over Somaliland has been overthrown, and the country is now free. Almost immediately after the conclusion of this conflict, Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf reestablished clan-based regional authority in the northeastern Punt area. On the other hand, this form of governance proved successful in establishing a measure of peace and order in the northern region of Somalia. Clan strife, which resulted in many deaths, instability, and the rise of Islamist organizations like Al-Itihad, the UIC, and ultimately Al-Itihad, allowed Al-Shabaab and other Islamist groups to thrive in the southern and central regions of Somalia. This was because clan strife

was the cause of many of the deaths (Mersha, 2004).

Islamist organizations have benefited from the rise of clan politics in recent years. Even though Al-Shabaab was an organization made up of members from several clans, Since most of its forces were stationed inside territory ruled by the clans, it was able to adjust to the tribe relations rather rapidly. The Rahanweyn family influences the affiliates of Al-Shabaab both Bay and Bokol. The Hawiye family were the ones who gained the most significant gains from the collapse of Mogadishu's state because they were able to grab the feeling of belonging that had been shared by the city's inhabitants. Clans are opposed to establishing any form because they are concerned that they will lose control of their companies and become the subject of retaliation from other clans (Melandri, 2019).

Along with tribal warfare, inter-state issues in Somalia are a source of stress not just inside Somalia but also across the Horn of Africa and beyond afield. One of the problems is the plight of the refugee. According to the report that the UNHCR put out in 2008, Somalia is the third-largest source of refugee arrivals. The first two are Afghanistan and Iraq. There are repercussions for the governments of the surrounding areas regarding these refugee-hosting people's economics, politics, and security (UNHCR, 2009). The proximity of Somalia's coast to the Gulf of Aden, which acts as a passageway from Asia to Europe, and the inference of terrorism from the conflict, are why the international community is worried about piracy. The piracy problem has hurt global trade, including goods, ships, and insurance companies. Conflicts inside Somalia's borders, such as those brought on by inter-tribal violence, significantly impact the spread of small arms and light weapons (Melandri, 2019).

2. Inter-State Conflict in Somalia

a. The Ethio-Somalia war of 2006

i. The causes of the war

War has been a persistent problem in Somalia. After the fall of Barre's dictatorship, Somalia has never had a functioning government. Because of its failure, a chaotic environment emerged, which was made worse by the hardships of war, Islamic groups based on faith and tribe, and other foreign participants (Dareskedar, 2008).

Security was one of the Ethiopian government's primary concerns over Somalia's influence. Ethiopia was obligated to act because of Somalia's threat to its national security. The protection of Ethiopia was in peril. Initially, the Islamic State of the Gulf faced strategic challenges either due to the division of water resources or the presence of militant Islamists in the region. Second, the CIA assisted the armed opposition groups so that they could launch covert attacks against Ethiopia. Anarchy was brought about not just by a lack of economic and political growth but also by a loss of a feeling of security at home due to the dangers that existed inside the nation. In 2002 Statement made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Union of Islamic Courts released into the public domain an official plan for the Islamic State in Somalia, often known as ISIS (UIC). The radicalization of Islam put the safety of the Horn courtiers in jeopardy (Tadesse, 2008).

On November 30, 2006, the Ethiopian government decided to go to war with the UIC because of its threat to its national security. This decision was supported by the majority of the members of parliament. Foreign powers aggressively extended Ethiopia's territory by declaring war on the country and using military opposition; as a result, Ethiopia responded against them by using military resistance of its own. Because of the irredentist campaign that the UIC ran, the Ethiopian government decided to justify the war as a defensive measure. Retaliation was the driving force for Eritrea's hostility against Ethiopia after Ethiopian successes in the battles in 1988 and 2000. Eritrea had high hopes that it might pose a danger to Ethiopia with the assistance of Ethiopia's opposition (Weber, 2008). Even though Ethiopia is home to a sizable Somali population, the expansion of the UIC was seen as a potential threat because of the possibility that some Somalis would seek independence from Ethiopia and the establishment of Islamic rule in Somalia. These individuals believe that conflict is necessary to protect their interests (Dareskedar, 2008).

The Ethiopian government has sponsored and is assisting the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in weakening the United Islamic Court (UIC). At the same time, the UIC is receiving backing from international countries to rule Mogadishu. Ethiopia and Kenya formed a coalition to support the continuation of a conversation mediated by the Arab League that was due to take place in Sudan. This was done to improve the political climate in Somalia. Although Ethiopia played an active role in the peace talks between the TFG and the UIC, there was no interaction

between the two groups. This demonstrates that Ethiopia had a crucial part in the political process of Somalia (ICJ, 2007). It was decided to end the so-called "war on terror" that the Bush administration had been waging against Islamic extremists in various parts of the world; Somalia was one of the nations targeted in this conflict. According to the United States, Somalia's goals were in line with those of the ARPCT, and the strategy of the United States was to bring the UIC into the fold of the ARPCT. Even though the Unit ed States helped facilitate Ethiopia's involvement and the peace process between the Transitional Federal Government and the United Islamic Courts, the United States also pushed the United Nations to pass Resolution 1725 (2006), allowing armed intervention in Somalia. This was done even though the United States helped facilitate Ethiopia's involvement. On the other hand, the UIC did not agree with the UN resolution or Ethiopia's participation (Melandri, 2019).

The United Islamic Courts (UIC) was ready to fight Ethiopian soldiers because of the political upheaval that followed the election in 2005 and the general displeasure with Ethiopia's government. Consequently, the UIC considered this public gathering a suitable basis for going to war with Ethiopia. This was since the Ethiopian government had been weakened due to the widespread demonstrations. As a direct consequence of this turn of events, the UIC intended to act against the Ethiopian government. Despite this, the UIC was not successful in its endeavor to bring down the government of Ethiopia (Dareskedar, 2008).

ii. The courses of the war

The government of Ethiopia started getting ready for the war by covering Somalia's political activities in the media. They did this because they believed it was their public relations job to do so. On the other hand, several prominent public figures, members of the legislative body, intellectuals, and other individuals shared their perspectives on the conflict between the invading forces and the UIC and other resistance groups. Because of the vast majority of voters supporting the war cast in parliament, the government was entitled to begin legal action against the UIC on November 30, 2006. General Samora Yenus, who serves as Ethiopia's chief of staff, has said that the government is working to bolster its armed forces to safeguard its territorial integrity better (Dareskedar, 2008).

According to the authorities in Ethiopia, as long as the UIC and Jihadists can develop their operations in Somalia, Ethiopia will continue to be a victim of their

expansion into the Horn of Africa. After completing their mission in Somalia, the Ethiopian army will withdraw from the country as promised by the Ethiopian government. On the other side, Ethiopian soldiers stayed in Somalia for a far longer than initially planned (Dareskedar, 2008).

iii. The consequences of the war

The discussions between the UIC and the TFG were made more accessible by the participation of third-party international organizations like the Arab League. The IGAD was the second organization, and it was responsible for organizing three rounds of negotiations between the parties (the first in Khartoum in June 2006). Despite the agreement, they could not make any significant forward during the second round of negotiations. The first necessary precondition is that During the third discussion on efforts made by individuals, the UIC requested the withdrawal of the Ethiopian army first. As a direct consequence of this, the first meeting took place in October 2006, and the meeting that followed it took place in December 2006. The United Nations Security Council immediately enacted resolution 1725 (2006), which calls for a peaceful discussion and includes all parties involved, building Transitional Federal Institutions and their security forces and forming a "protection and training mission in Somalia." The resolution did not recognize it as an equal to the TFG; instead, it acknowledged that it was subject to the charter that the TFG had established (Melandri, 2019).

When Ethiopian troops entered Somalia simultaneously as UIC's forces, the UIC did not stop its push northward into Baidoa, Puntland, and Somaliland. On October 25, 2006, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi made a statement that might be interpreted differently on the existence of a "technical war" against UIC. The United International Church has labeled the conflict in Ethiopia as a "holy war." As a result, the UIC was routed, and Mogadishu was set free on October 29, the same day the Prime Minister informed parliament that the war had been effectively concluded. At some point in time, the Shura Council was abolished, and the UIC combatants were given safety (Seifert, 2008). Upon the request of the TFG, the Ethiopian military was stationed in Somalia for a length of time to assist in the process of restoring order. By resolution 1749 of the United Nations Security Council, Ethiopia's decision to pull its troops out of Somalia in reaction to the deployment of AMISOM was also applauded by the international community (2007).

To facilitate the withdrawal of the emergency security measures, no security must be in place (Seifert, 2008).

On October 1, 2008, the Ethiopian army officially started withdrawing from all of its positions in Somalia after being stationed there for two years. The aftermath of this has resulted in the focus of the world being diverted away from efforts to enhance peace discussions in Somalia and towards piracy. Ethiopia's troops pulled out of Somalia in December of 2008, ending its presence there. The schism that developed within the UIC between moderates and extremists offered a fresh opportunity for the TFG and Ethiopia, and discussions for peace were carried on with the moderates (Dareskedar, 2008).

In conclusion, this chapter focuses on the internal and international issues plaguing Somalia. For almost twenty years, Somalia's internal instability has impeded peace attempts, particularly following the fall of Barre's leadership. This was especially true after the transition of power in 1991. In addition, throughout its history, Somalia's neighbors and the country's government have often been at odds with one another. As a consequence of this, each of these factors contributes to the instability that exists in Somalia. Since that time, the IGAD has been instrumental in resolving several conflicts via a variety of means. The role that the IGAD plays in the process of conflict resolution will be the focus of this study

C. The Implication of Somali Conflict

1. Local Implications

Due to a lack of governmental institutions, factionalism, and foreign meddling. There has been an overall influence on Somalia's economy, society, and politics due to the country's long-running war.

a. Economic and Social Implications

The violence in Somalia impacts the country's official economic structure. Following 1991, the expansion of the black market (an unregulated market that includes kat, bananas, and ash) benefited only a small number of organizations or persons both within and externally Somalia. These, in turn, were patrons of the various rebel organizations and warlords that arose across the region. Furthermore, given the truancy of a central authority, the percentage of unemployment has climbed

at an alarming pace throughout the years, with "47 percent of the economically active people in Somalia jobless," according to the International Labor Organization. (Maimbo, 2006). Up to 40% of urban families rely on remittances, making up the vast bulk of the population. Due to the present financial and economic crisis, some say remittances have decreased significantly (Brons, 2001). The country has the lowest access to public health care and public education globally.

b. Humanitarian Implications

It has been the most horrific humanitarian calamity since Somalia's state breakdown in 1991. Nearly three-quarters of a million people require humanitarian aid; 1.2 million people have been forced to flee their homes; hundreds of thousands have perished in the civil conflict; and up to 400,000 children are critically malnourished each year, the worst incidence of acute malnutrition in the world. (UNHCR, 2008). Several reasons contribute to the deterioration of the humanitarian situation, including conflict, drought, rising food costs, piracy, rising inflation, and targeted assassinations of humanitarian workers.

Since Al-Shabaab gained control of more extensive territory in Somalia's southern and central regions, the supply of humanitarian assistance has decreased significantly. This is mainly owing to the danger posed by certain Al-Shabaab groups, as has been the case in Bidoa and Jowhar, among other places. According to a UNICEF source, 42 relief workers have been slain or kidnapped since the beginning of the year. According to the United Nations Children's Fund, an estimated $3 million worth of UNICEF humanitarian goods were seized and destroyed by the Al-Shabaab in Jowhar on May 17, 2009, according to the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF, 2009).

Making things worse, assistance to southern Somalia has been banned by the UN and the US. The former was concerned about Al-Shabaab attacks, while the latter was worried that help would fuel the conflict and wind up in the hands of militants. Both were right (ICG, 2008). It was asked to depart after it refused to accept requests including "the removal of women from all positions and the payment of US$ 20,000 for protection every six months" (Daniel 2010) from Al-Shabaab, which the world food program (WFP) claims (Daniel 2010). As a result, some argue that donors have a legitimate cause. In contrast, others believe that they are using assistance as a weapon to force people to fight the Al-Shabaab, which is being

blamed for the significant decline. According to some commentators, Somalia does not need any assistance since the population there is not starving.

c. Political Implications

Political consequences of the Somali war vary from region to region in Somalia. In 1991, British Somaliland declared its independence, but the international world has yet to acknowledge it. In 1998, Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf established a clan-based regional authority in Puntland, in the northeast. In the northern region of Somalia, the formation of this style of government helped to restore a degree of stability. Although Somalia's southern and central areas remain unstable, the fierce clan rivalry for state power, cities, ports, and other economic resources has resulted in many deaths and anarchy, and eventually the growth of Islamist movements: Al-Itihad, the Union of Islamic Courts, and finally the Al-Shabaab (Waal, 2007).

i. Al-Itihad

Al-Itihad is the most influential Islamist organization in Somalia, and it has its roots in the late 1950s. However, it only began to operate formally after Barre was removed from power in 1991, since under his administration, Barre established "scientific socialism," which outlawed political Islam and declared political Islam to be illegal. According to the organization, most Al-top Itihad officials have received religious education at Islamic institutes in Saudi Arabia and Egypt. To achieve its goal, al-Itihad sought to construct an Islamic state that would include all Somali-inhabited lands in the Horn of Africa.

The organization has been disseminating its ideas and recruiting adherents in mosques, schools, and refugee camps, among other places. It has also been involved in delivering social services to the people of southern Somalia, which has helped it gain popularity among the local population. When it comes to financial assistance, ideology, military training, and weapons, Arab governments have been the most generous sponsors of Al-Itihad. Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt were among the countries that provided aid and humanitarian assistance to the organization in the past. The Somali Diaspora in the Western world was also a significant source of financial support. Islamic charity also assisted Al-Itihad with financial assistance, food, and medication (ICG. 2007). With the establishment of prosperous enterprises in Somalia, Al-Itihad retained close commercial links with

Arab countries. To facilitate unrestricted trade, Al-Itihad benefited from a flourishing black economy after 1991. In the internal struggle of Al-Itihad, clan politics and the dominance of faction leaders and warlords were significant hurdles to its success. After launching a series of terrorist operations in Ethiopia in 1996, the organization was forced to flee after Ethiopia effectively assaulted and evicted it from its strongholds in Luuq and Buulo Hawa in late 1996 and early 1999 group its end (medhane, 2002).

ii. The Union of Islamic Courts (IUC)

There is a great deal of debate and ambiguity surrounding the development of the Islamic courts in Somalia, which serve as the foundation for the United Islamic Courts. Its growth has been associated with clans, with some seeing it as a type of local reaction to the existing anarchy, while others believe it is founded on a specific clan. Others associate the formation of the UIC with the business sector, which needed more security and improved commercial transactions. The rise of Al-Itihad is likewise connected to the construction of the UIC. When Al-Itihad was defeated by Ethiopian troops and was unable to maintain political authority in Somalia, the group modified its tactics. It began to grow its influence as a "grassroots movement for order, stability, and moral rectitude" by establishing Islamic courts throughout the country (Abraham, 2006).

The UIC's ascent to political power started with constructing an umbrella body known as the Supreme Council of Sharia Courts (SCSC) in 2004, which brought together the leadership of several Islamic courts under a single administrative framework. The primary goal of the UIC was to fill the legal vacuum created in the aftermath of the collapse of the state and restore some sense of order via the implementation of a Sharia law system. Al-Itihad infiltrated the UIC and gained control of their political objectives, which they used. They have remained committed to Al-Itihad aims of creating an Islamic state, Islamizing the Horn of Africa, and advancing the Greater Somalia ideology (Kidist, 2008).

The Islamic courts had their militias to protect them. In return for their security, the business community contributed financial assistance to the UIC through private donations to the organization. Furthermore, the UIC became more popular than prior administration systems particularly within the Hawiye clan and the people decided to pay taxes due to this acceptance and popularity. Ten of the eleven Islamic

courts in Mogadishu belonged to the Hawiye tribe, which accounted for most courts (Kidist, 2008). Even though Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, a former Al-Itihad leader, maintained great power as a vice-chairman, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, a moderate leader, was chosen as the chairman of the UIC. When the UIC took control of Mogadishu in June 2006, the warlords who had ruled Somalia for the last sixteen years were defeated. Several towns and ports in southern and central Somalia, including Jowhar, Bay, Bakool, Baldawayne, Hobyo Port, and the newly built Mogadishu Port, were successfully managed by UIC during July and August 2006. Ethiopia intervened in 2006 and dissolved the UIC (ICG, 2007).

iii. The Al-Shabaab

The Al-Shabaab was a militant Islamist organization that dominated Somalia's political arena at its founding. It operated as the military branch of the United Industrialists of China (UIC). When the United Islamic Courts (UIC) political leaders departed Somalia during Ethiopia's involvement, the Al-Shabaab opted to remain and continue a guerrilla war against Ethiopia, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), and AMISOM forces. As a result, the Al-Shabaab gathered significant public support in 2008 by positioning itself as a nationalist organization (ICG, 2008). To impose a rigid Wahhabi philosophy throughout the Horn of Africa and the rest of Africa by military involvement is the primary goal of the Al-Shabaab, which does not have a precise written or announced policy.

Al-Shabaab had a dispersed top-down structure. A minimum of three autonomous entities operates in Mogadishu and central Somalia; the Jubba Valley, Bay; Bakool; and Shabelle areas. Somalia's central and southern regions were under Al-Shabaab’s control. including the critical cities of Bidoa, Merka, Jowhar, and the port of Kismayo, which was their most lucrative stronghold. Initially, it was multiclan, but the Al-Shabaab swiftly adapted to clan dynamics since the units operate primarily in regions controlled by their clans. There is a strong connection between Muktar Robow, who heads the Al-Shabaab unit in Bay and Bokol, and the leading tribe in the region, the Rahanwyens. Among the teams, there is disagreement over Islamic doctrine and within-clan rivalries. Groups inside the Islamic State assist with humanitarian organizations while others threaten them, alleging that doing so is against Islamic law (Ali & abdissaid, 2008).

Financial assistance was provided to Al-Shabaab by both domestic and international sources. Local mosques, religious leaders, and community networks offer long-term financial support for Al-Shabaab operations. In the regions it controls, Al-Shabaab is also alleged to run businesses. There was also a claim that the Kismayo port provided a net profit of $2 million each month to the organization. (Ali & abdissaid, 2008). There are also reports that the Somali Diaspora and international Islamist benefactors, mainly from the Arab nations, are funding the extremists. As a result, they have enough funds to purchase weapons and recruit soldiers (Hansen, 2013).

Al-Shabaab now claims we have 3,000 soldiers, while others estimate that number to be 10,000. The Al-Shabaab has a well-oiled recruitment machine both domestically and internationally. Giving them money, training, ideology, and weaponry can draw in tens of thousands of young people who are jobless and without a job inside their ranks. Disputes rage about the amount of money spent on military personnel. US$20 to US$600 a month is the average monthly cost. According to International Crises Group (ICG), the monthly fee is $70, which is still rather exorbitant by Somali standards. Al-Shabaab utilized the Internet and local radio stations, newspapers, and other media outlets to spread its message further to recruit fighters both inside and abroad (Mulugeta., 2009). Several Al-Shabaab fighters comes from outside the country, and they help train the group in various aspects of Islamic warfare. Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Nigeria are among the foreign militants who have joined the group. Security and Development Policy Group (2008), see also ICG 2008 and Shinn 2009; nonetheless, their number is disputed, ranging from 20 to 600. The group's ideology influences Al-Shabaab's recruits. This may be a true Jihad, according to some. Eritrea has been accused of funding, training, and equipping extremists (Hansen, 2013).

The United States has designated Al-Shabaab a terrorist organization, claiming its ties to Al-Qaeda. However, this claim is unsupported by substantial evidence. There is an ideological affinity between the two groups. Several Al-Shabaab leaders—such as Ahmed Abdi Godane, Ibrahim Haji Jama, and Mukhtar Robow, who trained in Afghanistan, were killed by a US attack on April 8, 2008. Exaggerating their supposed ties to Al-Qaeda, the Al-Shabaab claims that Osama Bin Laden gave them direct commands to gain the support of overseas Islamist

supporters (ICG, 2008). Public opinions on the Al-Shabaab's backing are strongly polarized. According to some analysts, the Hawiye clan is a major backer of the organization. When the Somali government fell apart, the Hawiye clans gained the most,

According to the proponents of the argument above, the Hawiye clan leaders in Mogadishu are well-respected. They have the authority to end Al-Shabaab operations if they so choose. The Al-Shabaab has the backing of the elders because it offers security by creating tiny Sharia courts. The Somali clans of Murursade and Duduble, based in the country's central region, are considered Al-Shabaab strongholds. There are a number of them. On the other hand, Observers claim that the Al-Shabaab is not well-liked in Somalia, particularly among the elderly. It is said that most Somalis who follow traditional Islamic customs oppose the group's harsh application of Islamic regulations, which include amputations, beheadings, cutting off hands, and stoning to death. It is also said that the Al-Shabaab lacks credibility in the south due to the clan factor since some of the organization's most prominent individuals are derived from the Isaaq clan of Northern Somaliland (ICG, 2008).

The Al-Shabaab has widespread support in Somalia for its ability to provide much-needed security, despite it being difficult to corroborate the two points of contention. But despite overwhelming support for the implementation of Sharia as the country's primary legislation, significant unhappiness with the stringent of Al-Shabaab's interpretation of Islamic law continues to exist. Consequently, the Al-Shabaab is encountering resistance from organizations such as Al-Sunna Wal-Jama, striving to protect traditional Islamic rituals, such as circumcision. As a result of clan struggle for resources and control over cities and ports, the Al-Shabaab has additional difficulties in delivering efficient government. However, the Al-Shabaab continues to be a pretty formidable combat force in Somalia, and the population is wary of the organization (Mulugeta., 2009).

2. Implications for the Regional states and the International Community

The anarchy in Somalia directly impacted the people of Somalia, but it also had a ripple effect on the rest of the world. Over the last two decades, the international community has been preoccupied with terrorism, refugees, piracy, the trafficking of armaments, and human trafficking.

a. Refugees

After Afghanistan and Iraq, Somalia is the third-largest country of origin for refugees, according to the UN Refugee Agency's 2008 report (UNHCR, 2008). Somali refugees may be found in countries around the globe. The majority of Somali refugees are housed in front-line countries like Kenya. Over 320,000 refugees are estimated to be living in Kenya, according to the UNHCR (UNICEF, 2009). In 2008, 60,000 additional Somali refugees came to Kenya from Somalia Human Rights Watch (HRW 2009). Besides Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Yemen, many Somali refugees have also found asylum in these other three countries. The security, politics, and economics of hosting migrants are all complicated. Asylum seekers may constitute a security risk to their new nation. For example, Al-Itihad carried out a series of terrorist assaults in Ethiopia in the mid-1990s, including the bombing of Ras Hotel in Dire Dawa (February 2, 1996); Ghion Hotel (January 18, 1996); and Wabi Shebelle Hotel in Addis Ababa (January 17, 1996). (August 5, 1996). (UNICEF, 2009).

b. Terrorism

International criminal and terrorist activities flourished in Somalia due to the post-1991 vacuum, which became a worry to the international community. Somalia is widely believed to have been a transit and safe haven for Al-Qaeda operatives, who carried out a series of attacks throughout Eastern Africa. The Al-Qaeda branch in East Africa's primary contact in Somalia was claimed to be a revolutionary Islamist party in Somalia. In this regard, Western powers, particularly the United States, have kept a careful eye on Somalia to catch a few Al-Qaeda members and prevent the formation of a Taliban-like administration. The United States also sponsored and protected any organization or regional state that supported its endeavors, regardless of geography (ICG, 2008).

c. Piracy

The piracy off the coast of Somalia also worries the international community. According to the International Maritime Bureau, Somali pirates targeted two hundred seventeen ships in 2009, of which forty-seven were seized, and 867 crew members were kept prisoner. Since 2008, there have been over 134 incidents, which represents a tremendous rise. Among the 406 reported pirate events in 2009, more than half were committed in Somalia, according to the most recent global piracy figures (IMB,

2010). There has been a significant rise in recorded assaults along the Somali coast and the Gulf of Aden, causing considerable disruption to international commerce (Middleton, 2008). In terms of economic impact, piracy has a disproportionately large impact on shipping firms, insurance companies, and governments. Ships and cargoes of all significant shipping firms are insured against loss or damage. However, the premiums would rise significantly while traveling via the Gulf of Aden, which insurance firms consider a high-risk zone. Recent research predicts that a journey across the Gulf of Aden would increase insurance and transportation expenses by between US$500 to US$20,000 (Mulugeta., 2009).

Despite the low level of force used by the Somali pirates, the international community is concerned about piracy's toll on its victims. Of the 889 crew members kidnapped in 2008, 815 were seized in Somalia. As a consequence of Somali pirate raids, four individuals were killed, fourteen are still missing, and two crews were wounded. Piracy occurrences might also lead to environmental deterioration. Pirates have fired rocket Propelled Grenades in an attempt to capture prospective victims. As a consequence of violent attacks on chemical and oil tankers, the Horn of Africa might suffer a vast oil disaster and environmental devastation (CSI, 2008).

Naval troops have been deployed around Somalia's coast in response to increasing danger, an expensive answer. A maritime force stationed off the coast of Somalia receives an annual budget of around EUR 80 million from the EU alone. While naval personnel were on the scene, piracy was temporarily put on hold. Despite this, the ongoing unrest in Somalia has made achieving adequate maritime security more challenging (Blokker, 2012).

d. Armed Smuggling and the Proliferation of Somali Arms

Thousands of small guns and light weapons are claimed to be in Somalia's arsenal. When the Cold War was in full swing, large quantities of armaments were gathered. The instability that followed the events of September 11, 1991, provided an additional window of opportunity to spread small guns and light weapons. In Somalia, where there is no law, there is an unrestricted flow of armaments from state and non-state entities. As a result, Somalia is one of the major suppliers of small arms and light weapons in the Horn of Africa. Because of the chaos in Somalia, the porous border, and Somali refugees and nomadic tribes in surrounding countries, it was simpler to transport weapons out of the country than before (ICG, 2005).

One of the most notorious weapons dealers in the Horn of Africa was Al-Itihad, a violent Islamist organization in Somalia. One of the leading causes of instability in the area is the spread of small arms and light weapons. Conflicts were fostered and prolonged, and criminal activity increased as a result. According to an ICG study, weapons smuggled from Somalia were used in the 1998 terrorist assaults and the unsuccessful 2002 attempt on an Israeli charter plane (Farah, Aisha, and Daud 2006; Eaves 2002). Armed conflict, pirate attacks, and acts of terrorism are all challenges that have emerged from Somalia and pose a danger to the surrounding area and the global world.

D. Current development

As Somalia attempts to heal, rebuild, and renew after decades of strife and civil war, we may learn from their experiences. A wide range of public expectations exists, not the least of which is developing a brighter future for the residents of Somalia via improved service delivery in education, health, housing, nutrition, water supply, employment, and security. With its many tribes and factions, the nation has been wracked by an ever-shifting civil war since 1991, fought between the country's significant entities, warlords, and Islamist organizations. We've seen a substantial breakdown in all of the government's institutions.

Despite decades of international efforts to strengthen Somalia's government and government institutions. There has only been a low implementation influence and defensive ability of national administrations located in Mogadishu across much of Sudan. As a result of the country's intra-clan political struggles, they’ve been unable to do anything. Local communities have been deprived of crucial administrative assistance because the official state conflicted with military opponents and separatist movements. If not the most vicious, Islamist factions have proved to be the most effective in stabilizing Somalia. More than anyone else in the fight for dominance, they've managed to rise above clan rivalry and impose a single law while protecting minority clans and administering justice in a fashion that is swift, predictable, and devoid of corruption. (Brown, 2018).

In the international community and among Somalis, jihadi groups' rule has been rejected for various reasons, including their links to global jihadist movements, their participation in lethal terrorist actions domestically and internationally, and

their major human rights abuses. There have been several occasions when foreign or Somali armed forces have liberated areas. Still, the state has failed to offer practical and equitable government, resulting in clan warfare and discrimination (Brown, 2018).

In Somalia, there is a war between al Shabab, also known as al Shabab al-Mujahideen, and the Islamic State. This breakaway al Shabab faction controls large portions of the country. Somalia's capital, Mogadishu, was taken over by the al-Shabab terror group in 2009 and 2011. The Somali government forces have been battling against Al-Shabab since 2012 and are made up of soldiers from five African countries: Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Burundi, and Djibouti (AMISOM). In collaboration with the global community and the residual Somali national forces (SNF), the al Shabab terrorist group has lost control of a substantial portion of Somalia. Since 2015, AMISOM's presence in Somalia has decreased, although the Somali national army's capabilities remain poor. The capacity to provide pan-clan management, on the other hand, has helped Al Shabab establish itself and stay unchallenged. Consequently, violence and unrest are very sure to worsen shortly. A crucial step forward has been made in international efforts to strengthen the Somali government's capacity. The country held two presidential and legislative elections rounds despite several flaws. In addition, it has begun the process of drafting a new constitution and establishing federal states (Brown, 2018).

1. The Political Development in Somalia

Somalia's political climate is as volatile and fractured as the current security condition. Since 2015, Somalia has begun building sub-federal states, which is a very positive trend. Still, interstate and state-federal governments are fighting for territory, command of armed forces, collaboration, and power devolution. Clan rivalry and discrimination against minorities are the root causes of prejudice towards minorities and federal political infighting. (Brown, 2017).

The legal formalization of the 2012 temporary constitution and the legal formalization of several of Somalia's six current states has not yet occurred. New electoral legislation has resulted in attempts to establish pan-clan political parties and change the impeachment rules to limit this frequently used threats and demands for money and power tool. Additionally, there is anticipation that the government's

ability to generate funds for federal institutions will be improved, reducing political and clan warfare (Brown, 2018).

Somalia, despite being the world's weakest, least established, and highest crumbled and crooked country, is significantly reliant on external assistance. Somalia. Outside of major cities and financial hubs, developing governmental institutions or establishing any legislative assemblies' official representation is still a long way off in some countries. Because they don't receive anything in return, many company sector members ask why they have to pay taxes at all. In order to fund these types of public services, taxes must be collected. The current government of President Mohamed has been managed to increase tax collection at the Mogadishu airport and ports despite widespread corruption and theft of aid and tax money (Brown, 2018).

As long as tribal and political feuding continues, al Shabab has a continual supply of new blood. These clan feuds and the greedy and predatory misuse of power by official governing institutions, including land theft, continue to be adroitly inserted by it to win local support or at least acceptability. A remarkable amount of efficiency is shown in minimizing clan conflict, and it does not seem to be bound to any specific clans. It prefers to provide its protection to minority clans against dominating clans (Brown, 2018). A continual source of life for al Shabab is the ongoing clan and political infighting. It continues to cleverly insinuate itself into these clan conflicts and the greedy and predatory misuse of power by official governing bodies, including land theft, to gain local support or at least acquiescence. A remarkable amount of success is shown in minimizing clan strife, and it does not seem to be bound to any specific clan. However, when al-Shabab is expelled militarily, clan strife and related land and resource theft tend to burst, replacing a cruel rule with a new sense of fear. Despite many Hawiyes in the group's ranks, it is a primarily non-clan organization (Brown, 2018).

The Somali people and the country's political elite are not insulated from al Shabab. When they're not involved with Al Shabab, Al Shabab's members might be seen mingling with the people in their villages. Members of al Shabab and the government forcers may communicate inside a household. Political and corporate leaders alike often depend on al Shabab to protect their economic interests and ensure their exclusivity in certain regions in return for zakat payments to al Shabab.

Fighting in Somalia has little value for many financial solid players involved in exclusionary monopolistic arrangements and brutality against their competitors (Brown, 2018).

2. The Issue of Security

a. The Field of Arms

More than half of the country's main roadways are controlled by the Al Shabab militant group, which still holds large swaths of rural areas in Somalia's central and southern regions. It often takes significant towns over, especially when AMISOM soldiers from Ethiopia begin to depart. As a result, AMISOM has struggled to fulfill its mission due to a lack of information, logistical support, and internal strife among its members. If you're looking for a military force capable of launching a fast counterattack, you will have to go elsewhere. A lack of clarity also besets the endeavor in terms of funding. Anxiety and unhappiness with AMISOM payments escalated in January 2016. (Brown, 2018)

Due to several factors, including reducing the EU's stipend contribution to AMISOM troops, the EU reduced its stipend contribution by 20%. EU financing for AMISOM was still up in the air as of September 2018 (Brown, 2018). After exhausting their offensive and counterinsurgency capabilities at the expense of heavy human casualties in several member nations, AMISOM soldiers have primarily remained in a static garrison lockdown since 2015. When ground forces launch fresh offensive operations against al Shabab, they are led chiefly by clan militias and local warlords and their political organizations, with the assistance of local or state police units known as darawish in some instances (often mostly more institutionalized militias). After completing operations, military holding capability has not been built by either AMISOM or the Somalia National Army (SNA). In places where it has garrisons because of linguistic difficulties, overstretch, and a poor force-protection posture, it seldom interacts with the local community (Brown, 2018).

Consequently, clan and warlord militias are again in charge of providing the critical holding role. Like the SNA, AMISOM depends on and employs clan militias. However, they do not abide by international rules of behavior and are not held accountable for human rights breaches, which often include the recruitment of children. Militias operating in Somalia cannot receive legal international salary

assistance, only clandestine income from foreign intelligence services operating in Somalia, which they use to extort and prey on local communities and discriminate against rival clans and steal resources like land or water from them. However, many militia members there may be, there is presently no plan to demobilize them. But local populations also complain of SNA and Somali National Police extortion, predation, and theft of land and resources (SNP). The SNA and SNP have been infiltrated by al Shabab agents, much as Somalia's intelligence agencies (Brown, 2018).

In May 2017, Somalia's government unveiled a national security accord that defined Somalia's national security architecture with the support of foreign partners and the support of Somalia's federal states. SNA troops were to be integrated into the regional forces of the federal states under the Security Pact that envisioned Somalia's security system as "competent and responsible, affordable and acceptable" to the Somali population. There were also plans to incorporate some of the militias into the state and national police agencies. There will not be enough room in the official security sector for many current state, clan, and warlord militia members due to the proposed size of the SNA at 18,000 and the size limit on future federal and state police at 32,000. The army’s structure is not the only issue to be addressed. As a result, the federal states' commitment to this integration of forces seems to have evaporated due to the ongoing crises between the federal government and the federal states. (Brown, 2018)

However, Somalia's military is renowned for its incompetence and corruption. Many incompetent battalions in the SNA cannot partner with AMISOM for joint operations, much alone offensive activities against al Shabab. Even though much money has been poured into training, the SNA is still a jumble of local clan forces and militias. This has led to a lot of conflict between the different groups, primarily over control of checkpoints that may be used to collect illegal rent. Only 12,000 of the 29,000 people employed by the Somali Ministry of Defense may indeed be warriors, with the remainder being widows and the elderly. Money given by the international community for Mogadishu police and soldiers' wages is often stolen, which has a debilitating effect on the government's forces. SNA command and control, training, equipment, logistical and enabling support, morale, corruption, and factionalism were all lacking by the Somali government's Operational Readiness

Assessment of the SNA in late 2017. If the federal government can't carry out the essential changes, it will be interesting to watch what happens (Brown, 2018)

So, AMISOM started relying more heavily on Somali soldiers in Somalia in 2018, after the informal departure of Ethiopian forces in 2017. The United Nations Security Council extended AMISOM's mission in July 2018 because of the Somali security forces' appalling lack of preparation and al Shabab's entrenchment. As originally envisaged, AMISOM's operation would not conclude until 2020, but Somali security forces will continue in the lead. Somalia's political economy is complex, and AMISOM's country contingents are involved in multiple legal and illicit activities, including charcoal and fuel trafficking and smuggling. AMISOM's transition preparation has been minimal. Several Ethiopian military units withdrew unexpectedly from Somalia, leaving large power voids quickly filled by al Shabab and worsened dramatically for local civilian populations. As a result, Al Shabab has been able to broaden its geographic scope and reclaim some lost ground. A transition plan was agreed upon in early 2018. However, implementation has been far behind schedule (Brown, 2018)

AMISOM's drawdowns and ultimate pullout will leave huge gaps between the Somali troops' preparedness and AMISOM's exit. Despite AMISOM's security duty being filled by the SNA, the SNA remains ill-equipped. An estimated 2,000 to 3,000 Al Shabab fighters are now on the battlefield. In 2017, al Shabab stepped up its recruiting efforts among Somalia's many jobless young men and increased the number of youngsters they kidnapped. Security events decreased in 2017, but their intensity rose, from the brutal terrorist strikes in Mogadishu to takeovers of communities near thirty kilometers from the Somali capital. Al Shabab has also resorted to imposing zakat taxes on all economic activities, occurring more often. (Brown, 2018).

Al Shabab is most active in Somalia's southern regions, such as the Juba and Shabelle valleys, but this does not limit the group's reach. In the northern federal states of Puntland and Somaliland and south of Puntland, its presence is ubiquitous, such as the levying and collecting taxes. Al Shabab bombings and killings often target Mogadishu and the rest of Somalia, and significant terrorist acts have also been carried out in Kenya (previously also in Uganda). Like those in Kismayo, where Ahmed Madobe's militia and the Kenyan Defense Forces dominate, Anti-Shabab

troops might be encircled by al-Shabab territory (Brown, 2018). US airstrikes are relied upon by anti-Shabab entities like AMISOM and the Somali national army to prevent al Shabab from launching assaults on their locations. In 2017, the number of U.S. forces stationed in Somalia doubled, reaching more than 500. (Brown, 2018). On the other hand, Al Shabab was able to capitalize that such assaults on al Shabab rose considerably in the second half of 2017 and purportedly resulted in civilian fatalities and aggravated clan tensions. (Brown, 2018) As a result of the lack of holding troops, bombings by the United States have just dispersed al Shabab to other regions, such as Mogadishu, even though the United States is trying to target al Shabab vehicles to prevent them from moving. In addition to providing air support, the US Special Operations Forces also conduct operations on the ground, conducting counterterrorism operations against al Shabab and the Islamic State while providing advice and assistance to Somalia's elite commando troops. However, even high-value target operations are limited in their final efficacy until Somali forces' security capabilities are upgraded and governance is restored. (Brown, 2018). Other violent groups are operating in Somalia besides al Shabab. In the nation, clan and warlord militias and many other militant organizations, such as the Sufi al-Sunna or the Islamic State, are involved in the conflict. Due to its origins as an offshoot of al Shabab, the Islamic State has spent much of its time in Puntland, a critical entry point for illegal trade and was formerly home to Somali pirates. The Islamic State seems to have recently extended its activities to include Mogadishu. Even yet, it's a considerably lesser violent force than al Shabab (Brown, 2018)

b. Non-Military Approaches

There is little hope for dialogue between the Somali government and al Shabab. The international community and the Somali government have depended on the military to defeat al Shabab militarily. Convinced that military counterinsurgency efforts had reached their limits, the Somali government opted to end its military campaign by issuing amnesty to al-Qaida militants, striking short-term political deals with breakaway factions, and implementing DDR-style initiatives for both defectors and those still living under the militant rule in Somalia. They're out to degrade al Shabab's position in the field of combat. Officials in Somalia and foreign implementers say that tens of thousands of al Shabab defectors have gone through these programs (Brown, 2018).

The Somali government has made no equivalent DDR-like attempts toward the many clan and warlord militias. Non-governmental initiatives and traditional judicial processes have both played a role in efforts to reintegrate ex-combatants from al Shabab and elsewhere, as well as in efforts to reconcile clans and communities. Somalia's government is implementing two non-punitive processes: 1) political deals with so-called "high-value defectors," which include red carpet treatment, protection, and no accountability or scrutiny for their past behavior; and 2) DDR-like rehabilitation programs for al Shabab defectors who Somali intelligence officials assess to pose a low risk of returning to violent terrorist activities and proselytizing or providing aid. An outreach, reception, screening, rehabilitation, and re-integration program are in place to assist those who have defected from the regime. Two foreign implementing partners oversee the rehabilitation of low-risk defectors at three facilities: the Serendi facility in Mogadishu, the Baidoa center, and the Kismayo center (Brown, 2018). High-risk defectors and prisoners are brought to military tribunals that are primarily regarded as not adhering to international norms of human rights protection. In most cases, the courts impose the death penalty on individuals found guilty. The international community has established a civilian court in Mogadishu to trial high-risk defectors and prisoners in civilian tribunals instead of the military courts (Brown, 2018).

There is little information on how African Union soldiers or Somali authorities deal with defectors. It's possible that those who lived under al-Shabab control and were compelled to work for al-Shabab, even in simple duties like cooking and washing, get caught up in the screening process and are considered low-risk defectors. A significant danger of arbitrariness remains in determining who is classified as high risk and so likely to be sentenced to death, despite establishing draft standard operating procedures for screening to lessen high-risk and low-risk decisions (Brown, 2018). More than any other government-led campaign, it has had significant success in the separation of children from their exploitative caregivers and in enhancing departure processes for those who are low-risk defectors. As a result, defectors were typically held in the facilities for years before being released, and detention institutions overlapped with the facilities. However, significant difficulties continue. This includes the controversial role and presence of Somali intelligence services at rehabilitation facilities; little coordination across centers; the absence of

rehabilitation facilities for female defectors, detainees, and women who lived under al Shabab rule; the underdevelopment of reinsertion and rehabilitation programs for receiving communities and the reconciliation of former al Shabab associates (Brown, 2018).

In addition to the lack of legal framework, high corruption, and lack of adherence to international human rights laws by Somali government institutions, these programs face several other significant challenges, including high clan conflict and discrimination, a lack of a parallel effort to disarm and transform clan and warlord militias, and the country's general politics of exclusion and marginalization (Brown, 2018). For high-value defectors, high-risk detainees and high-risk defectors, and low-risk defectors, all three processes are adversely affected by difficulties in balancing forgiveness and pragmatism on the one hand with accountability and justice and victims' rights on the other hand, and thus society's acceptance or disquiet with such measures. Perceptions that high-value al Shabab defectors are treated with complete impunity by the Somali government and low-level defectors receive support such as literacy, numeracy, vocational training, and religious deradicalization. At the same time, the receiving communities remain poor and without any government services, creating resentment. Non-punitive tactics, such as the high-value and even low-risk defector programs, are also seen as threatening Somalia's multiple challenges by many Somali civil society members. Female legislators often express such opinions (Brown, 2018).

Mukhtar Robow, a former al Shabab spokesperson and the group's second-in-command, exemplifies this complexity and sensitivity. Robow, who had been on a US capture-or-kill list for years and was widely accused of human rights atrocities, made a deal with Somalia's government in August 2017 and has since become a key political figure in Mogadishu, the South West State of Somalia. As a result, he maintained his militia, whose members, like him, have not been subject to any court or amnesty procedure or other accountability or truth-telling requirements. As a result of this utter impunity and complete disdain for victims' rights, Somalia's civil society has become very enraged (Brown, 2018). It was believed that either Robow would take up arms against al Shabab or that he would use his clout within the Rahaweyn clan to sway the other Rahaweyns still fighting for al Shabab. However, these hopes have not come to fruition. Robow, on the other hand, has been involved

in a fierce power battle in the South West State, which is ruled by the Rahaweyn tribe. Although the federal government has opposed Robow's bid for the president of South West State in November 2018, he has been campaigning for the office. Because of international sanctions against him, the federal authorities tried to prevent him from standing for office. However, the South West State's elections commission head gave him the all-clear. For now, who can select who may run in federal elections is unresolved since there is no established and recognized constitution. The head of the elections committee has now resigned, but Robow continues to run for office, violating the federal government's oversight and influencing local politics (Brown, 2018)).

Al Shabab veterans, clans that have linked themselves with the group because of earlier discrimination, and communities that have lived under its control all need non-punitive ways. Individuals who suffered under the leadership of al Shabab may help prevent further injustice and minimize bloodshed while also establishing lasting peace by preventing additional cycles of violence and prejudice. A durable peace requires an innovative approach to holding offenders accountable and ensuring that victims' rights and restitution are protected (Brown, 2018).

IV. THE ROLE OF IGAD IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION

A. An Overview of IGAD

1. The Origin of IGAD

In response to natural disasters that caused food insecurity and famine in the Horn of Africa, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD) was established in 1986. Due to the prevalence of interstate and intrastate violence, the UN agencies determined an immediate need for a regional coordinating agency to address the difficulties posed by famine and drought. Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Somalia, and Uganda were inaugural members. Following independence in 1993, Eritrea became a member of the Organization. The organization's principal office may be found in Djibouti. With a population of nearly 200 million people and a land area of 5,222,520 square kilometers, it is one of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) that has been declared by the African Union (AU).

At IGADD summits, member states may get together to work on other issues that are of mutual importance. This is in addition to the core emphasis of IGADD, which maintains peace and security. IGADD backed peace efforts between Ethiopia and Somalia. By 1994, the members of IGADD had concluded that the region faced significant hurdles in terms of its economic and social growth that went beyond the effects of the area's deteriorating environment. This was on March 21, 1996. The reorganization of IGADD into the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) was approved by a majority of the member nations of IGAD. On November 25–26, 1996, in Djibouti, the new IGAD was shown to the public for the first time (IGAD, 2001).

The establishment of IGAD emphasized the need to resolve regional crises to achieve long-term economic growth peacefully. As part of the IGAD agreement, member states committed to: a) adopt practical collective actions to reduce risks to regional cooperation, peace, and stability; b) develop effective procedures of

consultation and cooperation for the peaceful resolution of differences and disagreements, and c) undertake to deal with disputes between member states within this sub-regional mechanism before they are submitted to other regional or international organizations (IGAD, 1996). To accomplish this goal, three key areas were singled out: the avoidance of conflicts, the management of existing disputes and humanitarian affairs; the development of infrastructure, together with food security; and the environment. One of the primary drivers behind IGAD's growth was the organization's involvement in the Somali and Sudanese peace processes. Regional economic integration was also a significant focus of the conference.

The positive relationships that already existed amongst IGAD member nations served as inspiration for the organization's rebirth. The conclusion of the Cold War brought the fall of authoritarian governments in Ethiopia and Somalia, as well as "the ideological divisions and military clashes connected with it." Today's so-called "rising leaders" advocated for measures to foster peaceful relations and usher in a new age of cooperative and harmonious living. As a result, there was renewed interest in addressing regional security concerns via the medium of an updated regional organization and political will to do so (Kinfe, 2006).

2. Vision, Mission, Principles, and major Activities of IGAD

IGAD aims to become the "preeminent regional organization for attaining peace, prosperity and regional integration for the Horn of Africa." It is the goal of the IGAD to aid and support the member nations' efforts to promote greater cooperation.

- Protection of the environment while also ensuring food security.
- Peace and security promotion and preservation.
- Economic integration and collaboration.

IGAD's ideals and principles include:

- Establishment of democracy and openness as a foundation for effective government and the safeguarding of human rights.
- Establishment of democracy and openness as a foundation for effective government and the safeguarding of human rights.

According to the IGAD Strategy, the following are IGAD's primary activities:

- Encouraging policies that are consistent within the IGAD's strategic areas.
- Developing tactics and ideas that apply to the local context.
- Strengthening Organizational Capability.

Adopting growing regional and worldwide challenges is essential for IGAD's strategy.

3. The Organs of IGAD

The Authority's highest policy-making body is called the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, and its members come from all across the world. It gets together once a year to set the IGAD's goals, rules, and programs responsible for making such decisions. Each member nation gets a vote to choose who would serve as Chairman. The Council of Ministers is the other essential institution that IGAD has. It comprises the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and an additional Focal Minister appointed by each member state. During the twice-yearly meetings that it holds, the Council is responsible for formulating policies and approving the work program and an annual budget of the Secretariat. The meetings of the Council of Ministers take place twice every year (IGAD, 2001).

The IGAD member nations' Ambassadors or Plenipotentiaries accredited to the IGAD headquarters in Djibouti make up the Committee of Ambassadors. The Executive Secretary's Advisory Committee meets as often as necessary. In charge of IGAD's executive branch, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government appoints a Secretary-General for a four-year term that may be extended once. Members of the Secretariat support member states in creating regional projects in the priority areas, enabling coordination and harmonization of development strategies, and mobilizing resources to execute regional projects and programs authorized by the Council (IGAD, 2001).



Figure 1 IGAD Organizational Structure

Source: IGAD, 2001

The Executive Secretary is assisted by four directors and heads one of four divisions: There are four pillars of international cooperation: economic cooperation, social development, agriculture and the environment, and international peace and security. As of December 2008, the IGAD Secretariat has a staff of thirty experts. (IGAD, 2008)

IGAD's Violence Early Warning Network (CEWARN) was established to facilitate the exchange of pertinent information between member states to prevent violence in the area. By strengthening border controls and boosting judicial proceedings against terrorism, IGAD's security sector program, ICPAT, aims at improving member states' national capabilities against terrorism while enhancing regional security cooperation. ICPAT. In addition, members of the IGAD maintain liaison offices in their home nations. The Kenyan office is in charge of environmental problems, while the Ugandan office is in order of HIV/AIDS concerns. On a day-to-day basis, it is the responsibility of the liaison office in Mogadishu to bring IGAD up to speed on what is occurring in Somalia. To maintain track of the situation in Somalia, the IGAD Facilitation Office in Ethiopia was set up. In addition, a liaison office with the African Union has been established. (IGAD, 2008)

4. Draft Peace and Security Strategy of IGAD

It should be no surprise that having a regional peace and security plan is

essential. This will allow for the limitation and management of conflicts in the region and harmonise and coordinate actions aimed at peacemaking and peacebuilding. At the summit in 2003, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) endorsed its first strategy for preserving peace and security.

The obligations outlined in the African Union Constitutive Act and the United Nations Charter that members of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development's (IGAD) peace and security framework are required to uphold have already been met. The collective aspirations of the member states for mutual security are reflected in IGAD-specific agreements and mechanisms, such as the Agreement Establishing IGAD (1996), the Program on Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, the Protocol on the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN, 2002), IGAD Capacity Building Against Terrorism (ICPAT), and the policy framework for the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade. (IGAD, 2005)

Consultants from the IGAD Secretariat have been hard at work developing a plan for the region over the last four years. According to what was covered in the prior conversation, this encompasses 2010 to 2014. According to the strategy for peace and security, the significant responsibility for ensuring the safety and well-being of the populace is with the nation's governments. The overarching strategic objective includes the promotion of preventive diplomacy, an increase in cooperative efforts to address common threats to peace and safety, and increased cooperation in other domains that are not directly connected to the management and settlement of conflicts. Respect for the norms of international law; non-interference in the internal affairs of member states; mutual respect; refraining from the use of force; respect for the integrity of territories; fair utilization and equitable distribution of transboundary resources for the territorial integrity of countries. The concept of a country's unbroken sovereignty and geographical integrity underpins this strategy. (IGAD, 2010). According to the mission statement for the strategy, "our objective is to enable member states, the Secretariat, and people in our area to contribute to peace and security in our region actively." This mission statement was created.

B. IGAD’s Role in Somalia

1. IGAD member States and Somali conflicts

IGAD was founded in the most dangerous region of Africa. Conflicts between and among states, economic hardships, natural disasters like drought and famine, and social unrest are all too prevalent in this region. The Horn region is also linked by European colonialism, history, geography, and the fact that the same ethnic group lives in countries occupied by Europe with inadequate resources. Each stage in the process directly affects the next, causing a chain reaction. To put it another way, practically all IGAD's members are affected by the Somali problem.

a. Ethiopia

Ethiopia It has a 1,600-kilometer-long unmarked border with the Somali Republic. Ethiopia's Ogaden area is home to ethnic Somalis. In 1963 and 1978, Ethiopia and Somalia fought for the Ogaden. Somalia-based radical Islamic organizations operating out of stateless Ethiopia pose a threat to Ethiopia because of the ethnic and territorial tensions. Armed smugglers use the porous border as a shortcut, putting Ethiopia's safety at risk. The refugee crisis puts Ethiopia and other nearby nations under a lot of strain. The OLF and ONLF are two prominent Ethiopian rebel organizations fighting for the independence of their respective ethnic groups in Ethiopia. Both use Somalia as a base from which to recruit, train, operate, and execute assaults. Therefore, Ethiopia is one of those active actors in Somali affairs that considers Somalia a national security concern. (IGAD, 2005)

b. Kenya

Kenya is endangered by the conflict in Somalia and shares a border with that country; the northeastern section of this nation is populated by people of Somali descent, making it particularly vulnerable to the situation. Kenya, much like Ethiopia, is susceptible to terrorist strikes carried out by organizations based in Somalia. Another thing that the administration is worried about is the influx of Somali refugees since most Somali refugees are already located in Kenya. (IGAD, 2005)

c. Djibouti

Djibouti Since it shares a border with Somalia and the ease with which illegal

weapons and migrants may enter the nation, it is likewise at risk of experiencing a catastrophe. The ethnic Somali community in Djibouti accounts for around half of the nation's total population. (IGAD, 2005)

d. Eritrea

Eritrea Between 1998 and 2000, the United States was heavily engaged in Somalia after the end of the country's border conflict with Ethiopia. Ethiopia's role in Somalia is counterbalanced by numerous factions supported by the United States. To put it another way, Eritrea's primary goal in Somalia is to diminish the position of its arch-enemy in the area. (IGAD, 2005)

e. Uganda and Sudan

Uganda and Sudan Even though they do not have a land border with Somalia, they are apprehensive about the possibility of terrorist strikes coming from that country. In addition to this, the nation contributes the most troops to AMISOM, making it the leader in this category. Sudan does not actively participate in the affairs of Somalia, nor does it have a border with the country of Somalia. This may be due to issues inside its organization. Nevertheless, Somalis and Sudanese have a religious link gives the Sudanese a moral duty to be concerned about what happens to the Somalis. (IGAD, 2005)

2. The Eldoret Peace Process

At the IGAD Summit in Khartoum in January 2002, attendees reached a consensus on a new peace process. IGAD, responsible for its oversight, would manage this procedure. An organization that the leaders of IGAD referred to as the "IGAD Technical Committee" was given the responsibility of beginning the peace process as a mission that they delegated. This group comprised the governments of the directly engaged countries in the war. Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya were all members of this committee. Because of the increased struggle between Ethiopia and Djibouti for control of the TNG, Kenya was considered unbiased. As a result, it was chosen to serve in place of the IGAD Technical Committee. (ICG, 2002)

The evidence that ICG presented led to the conclusion that the premise was that "the partisanship of Ethiopia and Djibouti would balance each other out, leaving Kenya to provide unbiased leadership." The Kenya proposed plan received support

from the ambassadors of other IGAD member states located in Nairobi. The conference was held at Eldoret, situated in the African country of Kenya**.** (ICG, 2002)

There are three basic processes to achieving peace in this process. Politicians, military personnel, members of traditional groups, and members of civil society make up the first 300 attendees. Consequently, the Somali participants felt that they influenced the planning process. Roadblocks marked the second stage of the peace process to the fundamental problem. The establishment of the federal government, disarmament, demonization, reintegration, real estate, local issues, economic recovery, and regional and international issues are all being worked on by six reconciliation committees. At the moment, this portion of the process is still in its preliminary phases. The plenary would be responsible for selecting every seventy-five delegates to make up the reconciliation committee. After discussing various topics, the group would submit their findings to the whole. (Healy, 2009)

The final half of the meeting was devoted to the plenary discussing and approving the committee's findings. Following this, the paper discusses how to form a government that represents a wide range of people and can carry out its functions. As the peacemaking process progressed, the issues of power-sharing and representation were given significant consideration. When it came to excluding non-IGAD parties like Egypt, Yemen, and Libya from the peace process, IGAD's ownership helped guarantee it. Because of its peace-making efforts, IGAD has gained worldwide credibility and recognition as the only venue for resolving disputes in Africa's Horn. (Healy, 2009)

3. The Arta Conference

Djibouti proposed civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in 2000 as a new tactic. According to IGAD's leaders, they fully backed the company's bottom-up strategy in 1998 and still do so now (IGAD 1999). A bottom-up approach aimed at limiting the influence of warlords while enhancing the role of civil society in Somalia is the only way to achieve lasting peace, according to IGAD. (IGAD, 1999). After the IGAD's decision, the Somali Reconciliation Conference was held in Djibouti in May of 2000. This conference brought together 400 delegates for months of discussion. There were a few clan heads from Somalia and representatives from CSOs there. On the other

hand, Arta was shunned by several influential faction leaders and Somaliland and Puntland. They saw it as being unrepresentative and imposed from outside Somalia. Following the discussion in August of 2000, Dr Abdiqasim Salad Hassan was selected to lead the Transitional National Government as chairman (TNG). Although all IGAD member nations gave their official support to the process, the level of commitment shown by each state to the process and the result of the process varied. Eritrea and Djibouti were two of TNG's most trusted friends.

Even though Ethiopia was in charge of all the conference's organizational details, it developed an antagonistic attitude against TNG after being disturbed by allegations that TNG had connections to Islamist and terrorist organizations. As a direct consequence, Ethiopia started lending its support to a rival coalition of organizations known as the Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Council (SRRC). Neither Kenya nor Uganda wanted Somalia to serve as a base from which the TNG might conduct attacks against other countries. As a direct consequence of this, the overwhelming majority of IGAD's members declined the opportunity to support the TNG. Instead, the International Crises Group discovered that "regional powers lined up behind their various proxies, funneling arms and ammunition into the country." (ICG, 2007)

4. The challenges of IGAD in conflict resolution

Over the last two decades, Somalia has been stateless. For instance, IGAD has a variety of difficulties in the Horn of Africa's conflict settlement, notably in Somalia. Conflict settlement was challenging in the aftermath of Somalia's break up because of the interplay between issues of representation, power, resource distribution, and reconciliation. Somalia's instability and the difficulties of IGAD conflict settlement have been hampered by clannism. People and organizations profited from the flux or disarray that disrupted peace efforts. (Mulugeta, 2009). After the fall of Barre's dictatorship, the weapons and ammunition were left behind. Civil conflicts, poverty and lawlessness, were exacerbated by militarization. People are unwilling to give up their guns out of fear. Disputes over land and property were made worse by the colonial government, clan strife, a lack of clarity about who owned what, and shifting settlement patterns. Again, the Somali people relied on international handouts for their survival. (Mulugeta, 2009)

In 2008-09, an armed confrontation broke out between Eritrea and Djibouti over the Migingo islands, and in 2006-2008, Ethiopia and Somalia engaged militarily. From 1998-to 2000, Eritrea and Djibouti fought a full-fledged war over territorial issues. (Mulugeta, 2009). In any organization, the interdependence of its member nations is closely proportional to its overall strength. This is the first-time member countries have worked together rather than competitively. Competition has shown that the region is in flux. Rivalry in Somalia's peace process has resulted in a constant level of competition. Even Eritrea and Ethiopia aid their allies in Somalia's proxy war. An alternate path of action may appeal to the other individual. While in certain EU countries, it's not proper in others. It is challenging for IGAD to carry out its responsibilities and address regional security concerns appropriately. (Mulugeta, 2009)

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Disputes over neighboring nations' internal affairs have hampered development in the Horn of Africa for a long time. IGAD cannot take a cohesive position in Somalia because of the lack of a common security strategy. Drought and desertification have wreaked havoc on the Horn of Africa. Because of their proximity to settlement and religion, the Arab countries' involvement presents an entirely new challenge. Indirectly, countries from throughout the world helped these groups. Consequently, finding a solution to the issue would be tough for IGAD. (Mulugeta, 2009). The absence of regional authority creates problems. In the Horn of Africa, no country is burdened by its fellow IGAD members. The Horn of Africa's most populated and powerful nation in Ethiopia. It may be possible for someone else to run it, but it lacks the financial clout to be a regional leader.

5. The Efforts of IGAD in Conflict Resolution

IGAD has given Somalia the highest priority, and it has even been instrumental in the organization's revival. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) was working on several fronts to find a peaceful resolution to the conflict in Somalia. It is not unheard of, for instance, for the secretariat of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to release situation reports in preparation for the organization's regular meetings. It is responsible for collecting data, keeping that data up-to-date, and making recommendations to the Council of Ministers. (Mulugeta, 2009)

The IGAD Secretariat drafts a concept note in preparation for the regular meetings of the council of ministers. IGAD acknowledges the importance of several workshops and expert conferences for the production of concept notes. "Currently, the IGAD is researching the peace initiatives in the region and using its experts and consultants to address the challenges. In Somalia, an IGAD office staffed full-time has been established "the declaration is read aloud. Assistance in the development of TFG II's capabilities. (Mulugeta, 2009). Somalia's Facilitator Liaison Office was established in Ethiopia in October of that year by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Following the TFG and the Djiboutian agreement, facilitators are entrusted with promoting reconciliation, assisting with institutional and capacity building activities, and helping to mobilize financial and technical resources for the TFG II. (Mulugeta, 2009). To carry out its responsibilities and make progress toward resolving the problems in Somalia, the Office of the Facilitator has devised a strategic plan that calls for the formation of effective institutions in that nation. The strategy’s objective for the next two years (2009-2011) was to rebuild the country's administrative and security structures so that they could meet the most fundamental needs. On the other hand, it is expected that the member states of IGAD would accept the proposed modifications. (Mulugeta, 2009)

The IGAD member nations continue to play varied roles in Somalia to support the TFG II. Several countries, including Djibouti, organized and hosted the conference. On the other hand, Ethiopia and Kenya seem to be taking a wait-and-see attitude to train the TFG II security forces. Alternatively, Uganda is doing its share by sending soldiers to assist AMISOM. Finally, since Somalia is a stateless entity, IGAD attempted to play a substantial role in conflict settlement in the Horn of

Africa, notably Somalia. In terms of its efforts, IGAD took the positions taken by the individuals listed above. (Mulugeta, 2009)

C. IGAD's achievements in its effort to resolve the Somali conflict

1. The Continuous Engagement of IGAD

Since the fall of the Somali central government in 1991, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and its predecessor, the IGADD, have been engaged in efforts to resolve the war in Somalia. Between 1991 and 2002, IGAD was actively involved in supporting the projects proposed by its member nations. With no political or economic will to solve the Somali problem, members of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) were nonetheless determined to do so. In 2002, IGAD began a new two-year procedure under its aegis. IGAD has provided continued assistance for unstable governments after founding the TFG and GNU. An organization known as IGAD was instrumental in securing financial and diplomatic aid for the TFG. TFG II will get assistance from an Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Facilitator Office, which IGAD has planned to set up in Somalia. This action may imply a commitment to peace and stability in Somalia. Some believe that the Somali crisis would have faded from world consciousness if not for IGAD.

2. The commitment of the member states of IGAD

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) member states, especially Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya, have contributed significantly to resolving the protracted conflict in Somalia. Ethiopia and Djibouti have started and arranged several peace procedures despite the hopeless situation in Somalia.



Figure 2 IGAD offices for Somalia

Source: Compiled by the author

The IGAD Assembly and the IGAD Council of Ministers have convened to discuss Somalia. Only in 2008 did IGAD host two extraordinary summits and five special sessions of the Council of Ministers; Somalia was one of the primary topics of discussion at all of these events. In 2009, four Council of Ministers sessions were devoted only to the Somali conflict. The frequency with which IGAD institutions have convened demonstrates the members' commitment to Somalia. The responsibility of member states to the peace and stability of Somalia was most clearly shown during the Eldoret peace process. Even though the Somali actors were involved in an annoying level of competition with one another, they continued to stay invested in the process for over two years. (Kinfe, 2006)

When there was a significant shortfall in financial resources for the Eldoret process, Kenya, serving as the Chair of the Technical/Facilitation Committee, was responsible for covering the conference expenses. IGAD member states demonstrated their commitment to the Somalia peace processes by investing their limited resources in these efforts. In 2005, the member nations decided to send a peacekeeping operation to Somalia, demonstrating their commitment. A change to IGAD's mandate, which prohibits deploying soldiers to member nations, was available for member states. One way to look at it is that IGAD member nations, who are highly concerned about sovereignty and internal affairs, have agreed on the deployment of IGASOM. As part of the proposal for IGASOM, IGAD requested that member nations contribute financially to the project. IGAD members, even though the deployment of IGASOM could not be achieved for different reasons, are committed to building a functional central government in Somalia. (Kinfe, 2006)

3. The effort of IGAD's secretariat

IGAD has made addressing the situation in Somalia one of its top priorities. It is one of the key reasons why IGAD has been given a new lease of life. The Secretariat of IGAD has been active in several different initiatives, all of which have helped bring about a peaceful conclusion to the crisis in Somalia. It prepares reports on the current situation in preparation for the regular meetings of the IGAD organs. The Secretariat gets together for sessions on a semi-regular basis, often once or twice a year. Additionally, it gathers information, keeps it up to current, and provides the Council of Ministers with advice to help them make choices. (Kinfe, 2006)

The IGAD Secretariat prepares the concept notes used at regular sessions of the Council of Ministers. IGAD hosts several workshops and meetings with subject matter experts to generate concept notes. IGAD conducts research either using its in-house expertise or by contracting outside consultants to aid efforts made in the area to promote peace. The Secretariat is responsible for providing logistical support and putting together documentation for special meetings. In addition, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has established a permanent office in Somalia to assist the Transitional Federal Government II (TFG II) in improving its capabilities. (Kinfe, 2006)

4. IGAD as a forum for member states

For member nations to debate the Somali problem, IGAD offers a crucial platform. Since many member nations find it difficult to maintain strong bilateral contacts, the establishment of IGAD has made it possible for them to achieve critical decisions and shared views. IGAD was employed as a negotiation framework for the Eldoret peace process. The members of IGAD have continued to utilize the organization as a forum for promoting regional problems, notwithstanding the regional competition. Because of the straining of ties in 1995, the IGAD members were obliged to utilize the organization as a platform. In Somalia, the IGAD Secretariat plays a vital role in promoting IGAD's prominent position in various regional and international events. This is critical to the organization's operation. (Kinfe, 2006)

D. The challenges of IGAD in Somali peacemaking and lessons to be learned

Nearly two decades have passed since Somalia had a functional central government. Restoration of peace and stability had been a fundamental goal of the campaign. It is possible to point to the following reasons for the failure of the IGAD-led peace attempts in Somalia:

1. The complexity of the Somali conflict

It is impossible to build peace in Somalia since it is the sole contemporary incidence of state collapse. Somalia's state collapse made issues like representation, power, resource distribution, and reconciliation challenging to resolve. Achieving long-term stability also requires active participation from the country's population. For example, IGAD lacks true peacemakers inside. All of the peace efforts that have been undertaken since 1991 have been hampered by the persistence of tribal loyalties. In Somalia, reconciliation and power-sharing are difficult because of the clans' ongoing fighting and deepening tensions. Opportunistic warlords and other parties and people profited from the upheaval and thwarted the peace attempts. These organizations have no national interest, and they have broken and disowned countless accords they have ever signed. (ICG, 2003)

Since Islam was first brought to the eastern coastlines of Africa, Somalis have been exposed to the religion. It is well-known that Somalis reject the strict interpretation of Islam, and they have practiced a more moderate form of the faith. However, Islamist militants are putting strain on this religious culture. By unifying all Somalis in Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti, they want to impose a Taliban-style dictatorship across the Horn of Africa. Somalia's instability has been exacerbated by the rise of Islamists who pledge allegiance to the worldwide jihad movement. They have exacerbated the already tense situation in Somalia with their presence and political ambitions, making the problem both regional and international in scope.

Somalia was inundated with weapons and ammunition after the fall of a central authority with one of Africa’s largest militaries. As a result of the current state of civil conflict, poverty, and lawlessness, the danger of a militarized society has become even more acute. Most Somalis are hesitant to give up their weapons because of the constant feeling of fear. It has been challenging for the weak Somali

administrations to disarm the populace and monopolize physical force. Attempts to disarm in most instances resulted in further violence. The DDR Committee recommended in Eldoret that the militia forces be integrated into the national army. International troops may be necessary to achieve successful disarmament and demobilization because of the severe nature of this situation, the Committee concluded. (ICG, 2003)

One of the most challenging aspects of the current situation in Somalia is the question of land ownership. The intricacy of the land and property issues has been further exacerbated by the colonial administration, clan rivalries, the fluidity of ownership, and shifting settlement patterns. Any effort to rectify this issue via implementing a fair system needs widespread consent and a robust and operational government. (ICG, 2010)

Somalia is often ranked as one of the world's poorest nations. The people of Somalia rely on humanitarian aid provided by the international community. The warlords wind up with the lion's share of the significant portion of the country's domestic income, which is not nearly enough to make a dent in the mountain of social and economic issues built up over a long period. As a result, it has been difficult for the administrations founded after 1991, such as the TNG, the TFG, and the TFG II, to produce funds on the domestic front. For instance, in Eldoret, the Committee for Economic Recovery recommended a budget entirely funded by international assistance. It would total more than one billion United States dollars for the first two years. The current government of Somalia has also provided a budget for 2010, set at 108 million United States dollars. The administration anticipates that donors would fund 80 percent of their coffers. (ICG, 2010)

Table 1: Conflicts between Some of IGAD's Member States on the International Stage

Year	Types of inter-state conflicts	State involved	Major contentious issue or Area
1964	Brief armed conflict	Ethiopia-Somalia	Control of Ethiopia's Somali-inhabited territory
1960s	Tensions	Kenya-Somalia	Control of Kenya's Northern Frontier District
1977-1978	Full-scale war	Ethiopia-Somalia	Control of Ethiopia's Somali-inhabited territory
1994-1998	Tensions	Sudan-Eritrea	Islamist threat
1995-1998	Tensions	Sudan-Ethiopia	Sudanese link to the Mubarak assassination attempt
1998-2000	Full-scale war	Eritrea-Ethiopia	Territorial dispute
2006-2008	Intervention	Ethiopia-Somalia	Ethiopia intervened militarily
2006-2009	Brief armed confrontation	Eritrea-Djibouti	Territorial dispute
2009	Tensions	Kenya-Uganda	Territorial dispute over Migingo islands

source: Mulugeta, 2009

2. Regional Factors

a. Rivalry among member states

The connection between member states determines organizational strength. IGAD member nations, on the other hand, have a long history of conflict. There are political differences between almost all of them. The IGAD member nations' long-standing dispute reveals that the region is in severe turmoil. As a result, the company reflects this truth.

Rivalry among the UN member states has resulted in a never-ending race to frame and initiate peace procedures in Somalia. In Somalia, it is likewise challenging to agree on a perspective. Using Somalia as a front, Ethiopia and Eritrea have been escalating the conflict since 1998 by equipping and assisting various Somali

organizations. Ethiopia was opposed to the TNG's creation, whereas Eritrea favored it. Ethiopia and Djibouti displayed multiple perspectives on the Somali peace process. As a result, IGAD could not carry out its mandate and address regional security concerns due to internal dynamics. As a result, many people in the know believe that IGAD is unconscious. Although this is the majority position, some people believe the impact of the regional divide is overblown. The member nations put their differences aside and work together for the whole. The fact that over 70% of IGAD's Council of Ministers meetings were centered on Somalia shows that they are open to discourse when it is to their advantage. (Mulugeta, 2009: p. 38)

b. Regional Instability

The IGAD is addressing several regional concerns at the same time. The turmoil in the area is not limited to Somalia. Inter- and intrastate conflicts are wreaking havoc on IGAD member nations. For a long time, Ethiopia has been embroiled in civil strife and still faces small-scale armed opposition; Kenya is a precarious nation; neither Eritrea nor Uganda is faring well. Sudan is all of these things. All of the alarming news coming out of the IGAD member nations has roots in the region's state structure. (Tadesse, 2003) Despite the oppressive dictatorship, the country has a smattering of democratic institutions. There is a lack of effective governance, a poor record of human rights, and developing democratic culture and institution among the regimes we're discussing here.

The regional nations have traditionally supported rebel organizations as a means of interfering in one other's domestic affairs. Since distrust and non-cooperation rather than peaceful cohabitation prevail, a uniform security strategy and organization is almost impossible to imagine. IGAD is unable to reach a consensus on how to deal with Somalia. Additionally, internal and interstate problems have made it impossible for IGAD to concentrate on Somalia's anarchy from 1994 to 2005, IGAD spent a great lot of time and money trying to resolve the conflict in Sudan. Ethio-Eritrean and Eritrea Djibouti border impasses are two significant issues that IGAD is supposed to address. (Mulugeta, 2009: p. 39)

To make things even more complicated, the member nations of IGAD are continually faced with challenges like drought, desertification, and poverty. Consequently, the emphasis, energy, and capability of IGAD have been split so that it can address a variety of regional concerns that are equally important. In eroding the

function of IGAD, the role played by Arab nations cannot be discounted either. It is said that Qatari and Saudi Arabian allies provide the Al-Shabaab with financial backing and weaponry, respectively. Egypt and Libya are also being accused of the same things. Egypt has been accused of sabotaging the various peace measures that have been undertaken or supported by IGAD on several occasions. These governments are notorious for giving financial assistance to extremist organizations under charitable donations.

Table 2 Selected interstate conflicts in IGAD member states

Year	State	Type of Intra-state conflicts	Main contentious issue or area	IGAD member states involved
Since the 1990s	Djibouti	Ethnic tension between Afar and Issa	Control of state power	Somalia and Eritrea
Since 1991	Eritrea	Religious and ethnic tension	Control of state power	Ethiopia and Sudan
1960s-1991	Ethiopia	Civil war	Control of state power and secession	Sudan and Somalia
Since 1991		Small-scale armed resistance by OLF and ONLF	Control of state power and secession	Eritrea and Somalia
Since 1960s	Kenya	Ethnic tension preceding and following elections	Control of state power	Kenya and Somalia
Since 1991	Somalia	Civil war among clans, factions, militia groups	Control of state power, key towns, ports	Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya
1983-2005	Sudan	Civil war between SPLA and the government	Secession (South Sudan)	Ethiopia and Uganda
Since 2003		Darfur crisis	Autonomy and distribution of resources	Eritrea
Early 1990s-2006	Uganda	Civil war	Autonomy	Sudan

Source: compiled by the author from various sources

c. Lack of regional power

A further problem in the IGAD area is the absence of regional power. In terms of ECOWAS and SADC, Nigeria and South Africa are leading the way. No one state can assume uncontested regional leadership in place of the other IGAD member nations. Ethiopia does not have the economic clout to succeed in regional leadership. Kenya lacks the military might to impose its will on the rest of the region. Internal disputes also hamper Sudan despite its oil riches and geographical dominance. (Moller, 2009)

3. Different approaches in addressing the Somali conflict

a. Structure of the state

There are a variety of approaches being taken by the member nations of IGAD to deal with the situation in Somalia. There is a significant distinction concerning whether a system is unitary or federal. The countries of Djibouti, Eritrea, and Kenya are in favor of a unitary structure. They argue that this structure supports and safeguards Somalia's territorial integrity and unity. They believe that federalism would "balkanize" the nation and make it more divided. These nations have chosen to adopt this stance in light of the potential implications that federalism may have for their domestic political systems. As a result, Ethiopia and its allies in Somalia think that federalism would lead to a more functional political solution for existing regional entities, such as Puntland and Somaliland. Since Ethiopia has its federal state, a neighboring federal state may have political benefits for the country. These differences were evident in the Somali peace talks. As a direct consequence of pressure from the government of Djibouti, the government of Arta implemented a unitary form of governance. As a result, the summit in Eldoret, Ethiopia, supported a federal government structure for Somalia. Ethiopia exerted this pressure. Many diverse groups' leaders claim that the Technical Committee, which included Ethiopia, coerced them to sign the Eldoret Declaration despite its support for a federal government. That the IGAD and the other signatories to the Eldoret Declaration cannot agree on federalism is clear. (ICG, 2003)

b. Representation

The selection of local players as a basis for establishing a functional state in Somalia was the second source of differentiation in bringing peace to that country.

IGAD sponsored peace efforts that chose diverse players to participate at several different peace conferences. The Somali warlords were the primary players during the events at Sodere. After that, in the year 1998, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) adopted a strategy known as "building blocks," in which it used the pre-existing autonomous areas of Somalia, such as Puntland and Somaliland, as the foundation for the establishment of a functional federal government. At Arta, the focus turned away from the warlords and Somalia's civil society and clan leaders. This exclusion of warlords was intentional. The warlords and clan leaders of Eldoret were instrumental in bringing about peace in the city. During the Djibouti peace process, a particular focus was placed on Islamic organizations with moderate views. (ICG, 2003)

Inclusion issues have plagued the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) since different players have participated in several peace conferences. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) claims that its methods are inclusive, but in practice, this is not the case. The negotiations couldn’t incorporate all Somali players, including warlords, clan leaders, civil society representatives, the business sector, and Islamist organizations, since their involvement in peacemaking in Somalia was not recognized. For example, although several Islamist organizations have been operating in Somalia since the fall of the administration of Siad Barre, they were not widely acknowledged as significant participants in the peace negotiations until 2008. (ICG, 2010)

During the Eldoret peace conference, several Islamist groups were actively engaged in providing social services. On the other hand, the Eldoret peace process deprived them of any role or position. IGAD members, notably those in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Uganda, are not at ease. The UN-sponsored peace process in Djibouti was the first time that so-called moderate Islamist parties were acknowledged and represented. Since Sharif was granted the power to pick half of the legislators, the procedure is not inclusive, which has caused unhappiness among the clan leaders and the business sector. (ICG, 2003)

The influential business community in Mogadishu and the rest of southern Somalia was not asked to participate in several peace initiatives, including the conferences in Eldoret and Djibouti. People in business often have access to resources and use private security personnel. These companies have never been

responsible for paying taxes; if governments were founded, they would have no choice but to begin doing so, which was not under their goals. As a direct consequence of this, they opposed most peace attempts. Another critique of the peace talks is that there is no way for the Somali populace to be actively engaged. IGAD should have devised a way to communicate with Somalis outside of Somalia throughout the peace process. In the absence of a coordinated and victorious effort, the greater public was not made the owners of the peace process. As a result, the public has been made aware of their plight as targets of angry mobs. (ICG, 2003)

Some groups, such as elders and religious leaders, participated in IGAD peace talks, but their roles were unclear. Eldoret was a place where leaders had a lot to say about representations. This diminishes their credibility as peacemakers in Somalia since strong parties often buy them. As a result, diversity and inclusion are still a problem in Somalia. IGAD could not establish an all-inclusive peace strategy in Somalia due to several equally qualified and unfriendly players. Even more, complicating the crisis of representation was the member nations' desire to work with organizations or persons that might best represent their interests.

4. The limited capacity of the secretariat of IGAD

IGA's broad mandate was not fulfilled with sufficient talent, resources, and political backing. Administration and technical staff shortages have put the IGAD Secretariat at risk.

a. Lack of Sufficient Political Will

The function of the IGAD Secretariat is somewhat unimportant when considering issues of peace and security. The Secretariat does not have any impact on the choices that are made. Its only responsibility is to carry out the decisions made by the Council of Ministers and the Assembly. Even on occasion, members of the Secretariat were not present in the gatherings of the Council of Ministers. The participation of the IGAD Secretariat and Executive Secretary was scarcely noticeable during the whole of the Somali peace process, both before and during Eldoret. This was the case. The nations that were on the front lines were the ones responsible for managing the peace procedures. Some analysts believe that IGAD's member nations do not wish to perceive the organization as an influential regional power. They are all eager to further their agendas by using the organization as a

platform to do so. Sally Healy is quoted as saying (Healy, 2009)

The IGAD peace efforts were political initiatives conceived of and carried out by one or more member nations the vast majority of the time. The mediation was not given to the IGAD Secretariat, which meant that it did not have the jurisdiction or the ability to supervise and manage the peace efforts carried out in its name. Some observers maintain that IGAD did not need a complicated organizational structure despite this. Instead, what it needs is a framework that is streamlined and efficient. These observers believe that the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) should only implement its members' decisions. Therefore, it is believed that the institutional capacity it has is sufficient to accomplish the job at hand. This illustrates that various individuals have different opinions about what the organization should achieve, as seen by the fact that there are multiple suggestions presented here. (Healy, 2009)

Table 3: Total accumulated unpaid Contributions of the IGAD member states from 2000-2006

Year	Amount (US$)
2000	3,895,629
2001	3,999,408
2002	4,934,519
2003	6,107,245
2004	5,674,129
2005	7,165,158
2006	7,430,921

Source: This table is computed based on the annual financial report of the IGAD Secretariat

The fact that most of IGAD's member nations are also members of other regional organizations contributes to the organization's difficulties. This causes them to scatter their attention and lessens their commitment to IGAD. Both Uganda and Kenya are members of the East African Community (EAC), and except for Somalia, all of the countries of IGAD are also members of COMESA. In addition to that, the Community of Sahel-Saharian States includes Eritrea, Djibouti, and Sudan as members. (IGAD, 2008)

b. Financial Constraints

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) does not possess the essential institutional ability to play a meaningful role in the peace processes

taking place in Somalia. For the successful completion of its programs, IGAD has been reliant on donors, most notably the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF), which comprises donor governments and organizations. However, the payments made by member governments have been sufficient to fund the operating costs of IGAD. Except for Ethiopia, the other member nations of IGAD do not contribute a significant portion of the total sum due. As a consequence, IGAD confronts significant budgetary difficulties. (IGAD, 2001)

According to the table that can be found above, except for the year 2004, the total accumulated unpaid contributions of the IGAD member states have grown since 2000. This has resulted in a burdensome financial situation for both the Secretariat and the member states and impacted the capacity of IGAD to carry out its duties. The common consensus is that the IGAD's existing staff does not have adequate numbers to successfully handle the size of the organization's goal and purpose. There are just four professional staff members working in the office of the IGAD Facilitator for Somalia Peace and Reconciliation. There are no more than thirty people working for IGAD in overall capacity. One of the most challenging obstacles that IGAD must overcome is the relatively long duration of the recruiting procedure. (IGAD, 2001). It is sometimes said that the buildup of financial arrears may be attributed to the prevalence of poverty, persistent disputes both within and between member states, and a lack of political commitment. In addition, individual member states rely on help from outside sources to carry out their respective development goals. (IGAD, 2001)

c. IPF's Contribution

IPF (IGAD Partners Forum) was established in 1997 and has worked closely with the Secretariat to finance various programs and peace processes. However, the IPF is not providing significant financial help, and when it does, the financial resources do not arrive in time since every nation has its conditionalities and needs. This inhibits IGAD's independence and ownership of projects. Some observers claim that the IPF covertly impacts choices as they always have their agenda. Initiatives of the IGAD are accepted and supported financially if they are in line with the funders' objectives. This organization's initiatives are designed to expect contributors to provide funds. However, another IGAD source maintains that the IPF is neutral.

According to IPF, the unwillingness to finance specific projects is due to

difficulties such as disagreements among member states, huge unpaid membership arrears, lack of a defined policy, and a tiny secretariat that cannot monitor the execution of big projects (IGAD, 2001). According to a source from IPF, most IPF members are similarly doubtful about IGAD's position as a whole. It is widely believed that Ethiopians run the organization to further Ethiopia's regional interests. Neither Uganda nor Kenya's goal is undeniable, given their allegiance to the East African Community." (IGAD, 2001)

The fact that the IGAD secretariat is located in Djibouti does not provide the organization with the image and profile necessary for a regional organization. Addis Ababa is home to the majority of the world's benefactors. Djibouti is never the location of any meetings that are held. Because of this, vital projects, programs, and efforts for peace were shelved. It is fair to say that the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is an organization that is hampered by its reliance on assistance. The member states either do not commit to or cannot conserve their national financial resources. Consequently, the IGAD cannot function at its full potential, which adds to the organization's overall lack of strength. (IGAD, 2001)

d. Weaknesses of IGAD Secretariat

In addition to problems with ability, money, and political will, the IGAD Secretariat itself exhibits several severe flaws. It has been argued that the documentation and management of the peace process in Somalia are not up to par. It was especially noticeable during the Eldoret peace process since the secretariat did not offer the necessary conference services. (ICG, 2003) According to the ICG, this presented the most considerable risk to the process's possibility of success. In addition, it was believed that members of the IGAD personnel were more loyal to their respective national governments than to the IGAD itself, which negatively impacted the organization's actions. (IGAD, 2001) Because of the institution's intrinsic weakness and a lack of power, the Executive Secretary has failed to emerge in Somalia during the last two decades as a competent and impartial peace negotiator. During negotiations for peace, the Executive Secretary's name is seldom used. Instead, the terms of nations are constantly mentioned, demonstrating the Executive Secretary's less significant function. (IGAD, 2001)

The existing function of the Executive Secretary may also be rationalized from a different point of view. This finding suggests that the Executive Secretary

receives directives from the Council of Ministers. The Executive Secretary has some leeway to work within the parameters of her instructions. Nevertheless, the secretariat may only operate within the mandate parameters that its member states have provided. Consequently, the conditions on the front line have taken the majority of the initiatives and are more active. However, it is abundantly evident that whatever position the Executive Secretary was assigned, he should be an active and prominent participant in the regional peacemaking processes. This should be the case regardless of the role. In general, the Somali peace process became a cause of political friction among the member nations of IGAD due to the lack of a strong, effective, and impartial institution.

5. The Neutrality and Enforcement Capacity of IGAD

a. IGAD's Enforcement Capacity

The IGAD has not effectively executed any of its resolutions thus far. IGAD frequently produces communiqués. Despite this, it is seldom taken seriously, even by the organization members that created it. And even if they do, they are limited in other ways and financial ones. There is a pattern of enforcing less politically charged and sensitive matters, such as those concerning the environment and public health. And the majority of decisions made by the IGAD are approved by nonmembers if those judgments are in the interests of those nonmembers. The IGAD organization itself is deeply fractured on the inside, and its member's priorities are the pursuit of their particular national interests. Somali politicians, scholars, and members of their diaspora did not often support IGAD's choices throughout the earlier peace negotiations in Somalia, further undermining its function. (IGAD, 2001)

b. The Issue of Neutrality

The many different and sometimes competing interests that its member nations have in Somalia have led many analysts to conclude that the IGAD cannot be considered impartial. The fact that all of the members represent diverse interests and, as a result, support a variety of organizations, the neutrality of IGAD has been severely undermined as a result. Members, for instance, were informally vetting the individuals who would be taking part in the Somali peace talks to guarantee that their interests were being adequately represented in the discussions. It is common practice to attribute the outcomes of the peace processes in Somalia to the results of the front-

line nations rather than IGAD. The President of Djibouti had personally selected the members of the Somali Parliament at the Arta peace conference; hence, the Transitional National Government (TNG) was primarily considered a construct of Djibouti. (IGAD, 2007)

In addition to this, Ethiopia has a dominant role in the peace negotiations being carried out in Somalia by the IGAD. The Sodere Peace Conference in 1996 and the international consultative sessions on Somalia in the late 1990s were sponsored by it. Ethiopia is claimed to have played a significant role in these negotiations and exerted considerable effort to facilitate the formation of a cooperative administration due to the Eldoret process. In the future, this gave many people the impression that the administration of Abdullahi Yusuf was too closely aligned with Ethiopia. (ICG, 2003). Ethiopia was also prosperous in garnering the support of all other members of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), except for Eritrea, for its participation in Somalia. Eritrea, which said that the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) favors Ethiopia and the United States, voiced significant opposition to IGAD's backing for the Ethiopian involvement. Eritrea withdrew from IGAD in 2007, ending its participation there. Some commentators claim that Ethiopia played a significant role in getting the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to identify Eritrea as an aggressor in Somalia. Some commentators believe that the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) should not have been so quick to call for sanctions on Eritrea. They argue that the organization should be more inclusive and that it would be a mistake to isolate Eritrea. Others contend that the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has been making efforts to include Eritrea in its operations. Still, these efforts have been fruitless due to President Issayas Afewerki's resistance. (IGAD, 2001)

Each of these analysts agrees that Ethiopia impacts the choices that IGAD makes on Somalia. Some people might argue that this is acceptable since the lack of a central government in Somalia poses a risk to the safety of Ethiopia. Some people believe that it undermines the role that IGAD plays and its legitimacy. As a result, they say that Ethiopia's position within IGAD has to be adjusted. To summarize, the perception of a lack of impartiality among IGAD member nations contributes to existing divisiveness. It makes it more difficult to find a solution to the Somali

conflict. (MOFA, 2009)

6. Lack of Regional Policy on peace and security

The Somali peace processes show that the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) does not have a comprehensive regional peace and security strategy addressing regional conflicts' fundamental causes. Although a draft plan has been under discussion for quite some time now, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) does not yet have a consistent approach and goal to regional security concerns. The efforts made inside IGAD to establish a uniform approach to conflict resolution have concentrated more on the revival of the organization than on standard security policy and strategy. This is because the rejuvenation of the organization is more critical. Gains in the near-term political arena are given top priority.

The formation of consistent policy is hampered by several variables, including the lack of political principles such as democracy, respect for human rights, tolerance for variety, and poor economic ties between individuals. In addition, most states in the area have not yet finished forming their shapes. As a result, territorial difficulties multiply, leading to intrastate and international wars that affect the whole area. In addition to this, no power dominates. The construction of an all-encompassing peace and security system is hampered. Several experts believe that the representatives are not able or ready to collaborate on a peace and security policy. This is their conclusion based on their assessment of the situation. This viewpoint was verified when the IGAD Council of Ministers opted against implementing the overarching peace and stability strategy, which had been in the process for more than three years. (IGAD, 2001)

7. Lack of Sufficient and Appropriate International Commitment

The Somali situation has received little attention from the international world. As recently as the Black Hawk Down tragedy, eighteen US troops lost their lives. This has never been truer. The global community has "forgotten" about Somalia (Bush, 1997: p. 17). It is not the collapse of Somalia's state itself that draws the attention of international players; instead, it is the fact that the country has become a source of instability worldwide. The United States government has a significant presence in Somalia because of its concern that the country may become a haven for

terrorist organizations operating on a global scale. The participation of the Bush administration in the conflict under the guise of the war on terror extended as far as providing financial support and arms to the warlords in 2006, who the UIC ultimately vanquished. (Bush, 1997: p. 17).

The piracy problem off the coast of Somalia caught the attention of the major countries, which resulted in the topic of Somali piracy being placed on the international community's agenda. As the situation has reached the stage where it constitutes a direct danger to their interests, the world powers have swiftly and cooperatively responded by stationing their naval forces around the coast of Somalia. As was noted previously, the European Union invests an annual sum of $80 million US dollars on its own for the operation known as Atalanta, which has the mission of discouraging, preventing, and repressing acts of piracy off the coast of Somalia. Despite this, the international community's total net direct financial assistance to the TFG II in 2009 was just $3 million.

The international world had a decreased level of involvement in the peace process in Somalia that IGAD headed. The United States and the European Union did not recognize the TNG, which emerged due to the Arta peace process. Despite making more modest financial contributions, the European Union and the United States did not significantly increase their diplomatic involvement in Eldoret. In addition, the United Nations, which was overseen by a Special Representative appointed by the Secretary-General, maintained a low profile. Because of this and the lack of interest shown by the Security Council, the United Nations' role was reduced to one of symbolism, and it was restricted to just monitoring the process. The sizeable financial debt incurred due to the Eldoret summit is a prime example of the absence of international backing for the peace process that IGAD is conducting. In addition, IGAD was unable to launch IGASOM because the global community could not provide the necessary political and financial backing. Even though United Nations issued the required exception in December 2006, the White House did not endorse the plan to relax the weapons prohibition. It did not go forward with removing the ban. Because of this, it required the TFG two years to arrive in Mogadishu finally (Dagne, 2009). It is surprising how little international support there has been for the Somali crisis response compared to the political and financial assistance given to the Southern Sudan peace process, which flourished under the

auspices of IGAD. Contrary to the parallel IGAD Sudan peace process, neither the United States nor any other Western nations were actively participating in the mediation process at Eldoret. (Healy, 2009)

Since the second Transitional Federal Government (TFG II) was established, there has been a significant increase in interest from the international community to assist, primarily in security. One Somali analyst claims that Somalis do not need firearms or other types of weaponry. They do not need any more assistance. He went on to say that the legitimacy of the TFG II could have been "purchased" by the world community if they had provided sufficient funding. Despite this, the importance of direct financial help is still negligible. Before they give the essential assistance, the international community needs individuals responsible for the catastrophe to be held accountable for their actions. One of the journalists working for AFP said that the donors virtually always explain why they cannot give financial support. In addition to this, he said that the TFG II was required to collaborate with the accounting firm Price water house Coopers to set up a system that assures financial accountability and transparency. However, later on, the donors concluded that they would not accept the proposal since the corporation in issue is not an entity established in Somalia. Even though it has not offered sufficient help toward these objectives, the international community still anticipates that the TFG II will expand its frontiers, strengthen its capabilities, and engage with the radicals. Some pundits think that the international community does not possess the patience required to commit to Somalia that will last for an extended. As a result, the Liaison Office acts as a mediator between the two organizations to ensure smooth communication. There have been several instances in which the resolutions proposed by IGAD have been approved by the AU, which has helped to promote policy harmonization. (Dagne, 2009)

In 2008, to institutionalize its interactions, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) signed a memorandum of understanding with the African Union and other Regional Economic Communities (RECs) to coordinate operations related to peace and security. When AMISOM was first deployed, IGAD and the African Union displayed a high collaboration. (Healy, 2009) Through its Facilitator's Office, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) participates in monthly coordination meetings in Nairobi with the United Nations and the African Union. They discuss the material and agree on the subsequent actions or

tactics. They also delegate activities to prevent working twice as hard on the same task. Each member state is represented by an ambassador currently based in that country during the sessions. The choices made by IGAD on Somalia are being more taken into consideration and recognized by the UN.

V. CONCLUSION AND RECCOMENDATIONS

A. Conclusion

Since 1991, Somalia has been plagued by ongoing civil war and instability. Because of the intricacy of the issue, at least 10 - 15 attempts to achieve peace have been unsuccessful. The regional and international communities impacted by the protracted situation have attempted various remedies to settle it, some of which have been antagonistic to one another. Although the imperial division of Somalia in 1897 was the fundamental cause of the current war, a wide range of problems, including human security concerns and the survival of tightly knit clan forms of government, are driving the current conflict. The war in Somalia revolves around the clan system. Since the collapse of Mohammed Siad Barre in 1991, the war has become a feud between clans, although peace-makers have mostly overlooked this. The study believes that a political vacuum is a fertile ground for political opportunism because the clans have been competing for the political space opened by the fall of the Somali state.

Furthermore, clan hegemony in Somalia's political setting is connected to the struggle for finite resources and the survival of clan influence in shaping the country's political destiny. As a result, the state-building approach to Somali conflict resolution is connected with clan warfare over limited resources. It has been skewed by the dire economic circumstances in Somalia, which are marked by hopelessness and poverty. A future state notion does not consider the duties and obligations of the state to provide the bare necessities of human security, such as life protection, food security, housing, and other state-functioning assurances.

Clan institutions have taken center stage in the collective security of their clans and society since there is no central authority. The crisis in Somalia and the Horn of Africa has been exacerbated by Cold War relics such as the spread of small guns and ammunition. Somalia's hyper-militarization has resulted in a scenario where guns are more readily available than food and other necessities. A political

vacuum has been created by Siad Barre's downfall that clan organizations have filled. Allowing the clan political unit, the opportunity to be a part of the peace-making process is essential. When implemented from the most minor localized units upward, the clan political unit structures may be successful when done from the bottom up. Clan political units rely on accepting and enforcing the elders' authority at the community level to function effectively. The warlords have exploited clan institutions as recruiting centers for their militias since conflict resolution techniques have not included them. As a result, warlords have relied heavily on clan formations as a source of political power.

Because of this, the warlord in Somalia is thriving, despite their illegal acts. During the discussions, clan leaders were given the right to make decisions on behalf of their clans, making the Boroma Peace Process successful. This process was also inventive when balancing the clan structures with those of elected officials. For Somali peace negotiations, impartiality is essential since the lack of neutral mediators has led to the failure of previous peace efforts. This lack of objectivity has repeatedly been shown by mediators interested in the process. Furthermore, the UN's decision throughout the Addis Ababa peace process and the ORH to marginalize General Mohammed Farah Aidid politically to maintain mediator impartiality was a significant blunder. This tactic has marginalized the United Nations (UN) in the stages leading up to the Addis Ababa procedure. This tactic has marginalized the United Nations (UN).

Somali mediation procedures have been plagued by two major issues: the ability of the mediators to make decisions and the conflicting interpretations of the agreed-upon agreements that have undermined ownership of the contract. After realizing that the UN was out to get him, General Aidid used the Habr Gidir Saad clan to argue that the UN was trying to colonies Somalia. This sentiment resonated with the Somali population, which had recently witnessed the humiliating defeat of the Pan-Somali ideology in the Ogaden War with Ethiopia. The poor US portrayal of Aidid exacerbated Aidid and UNOSOM's strained ties. The UN could not maintain its impartiality because the mission relied on US troops and funds. The United States' dominance goals in the UN mission in Somalia were mirrored in its foreign policy projections.

Ethiopia's invasion of Somalia in 2006 was a grave miscalculation of the

importance and effects of the IGAD-led peace negotiations. Somalia and other conflict zones in Africa have been further undermined because of the AU acceptance of the invasion and its subsequent denial of responsibility. When the United Nations Organization for Security and Co-operation in Africa (UNOSOM) intervened in Ethiopia, it rejected the lessons of the Ogaden Conflict in 1978, when Ethiopia was accused of stoking a civil war by defeating Siad Barre. During the invasion, clan leaders took the lead and convinced the United Nations Interim Committee (UNIC) not to allow Mogadishu to become a battleground for the Ethiopian army. UIC authority in Mogadishu and other Somali regions ended the warlords' grip on Mogadishu for a brief time. Since the collapse of Siad Barre in 1991, Mogadishu has been ruled by the United International Committee (UIC). Piracy in the Somali Seas has been demonstrated to be curtailed by the UIC as well. In the territories it controls, the UIC's extensive acceptability may be linked to the collaborative method in which bottom-up forms of governance were developed under its supervision.

Because of the Ethiopian government's belief that the UIC was tied to Al Qaeda, the United States was asked to provide military, financial, and spiritual help. In truth, the UIC was a fractured organization made up of moderate and extremist Islamic Sheiks, with little proof that it had a systematic and formalized ties with Al-Qaeda. It is a reality that the judicial system has radical components. Al-conceptual Qaeda's thought is based on Wahhabism and the Salafi sect of the Islamic religion. However, there is no evidence to support this claim. Most Somalis are Sufis, yet Sunni Islam remains the dominant religion in Somalia. When the United Islamic Courts (UIC) was in power for a short time, peacemakers missed an opportunity to aid the Somalis in resolving their dispute. Peace-making and peace-building measures would have taken precedence over state-building had it been acknowledged by UIC leaders that they had established an informal government structure. There was no benefit to the Bush Administration's war on terror and the overall categorization of Islamic organizations as possible Al-Qaeda ties in Somalia.

UNOSOM's lesson was ignored when the African Union (AU) was sent for peacekeeping objectives, namely that Somalis are always unified regarding foreign military action. AU’s military presence in Mogadishu has bolstered Mogadishu's UIC. In addition, the rise of Al-Shabaab is a response to the deployment of the AU peacekeeping operation in Somalia. Southern Somalia and sections of Mogadishu are

currently under the control of Al-Shabaab. The organization’s top priorities are defeating Ethiopian forces and resisting African Union peacekeepers in Mogadishu. As a strength, the Al-Shabaab requested that all non-governmental organizations and foreign agencies presently operating in Somalia leave the country. As a result, humanitarian groups were also ordered to leave the country. The relevant organizations followed the group's instructions without question, demonstrating that Al-Shabaab is, in fact, a significant player in the Somali struggle. Allegations that the Red Cross employed militias to guard its supplies during ORH may be based on the past behavior of the organization in the Somali war. Groups like Al-Shabaab now see themselves as active participant in the Somali struggle.

First and foremost, the African Union's mission in Somalia faces a significant obstacle: a lack of peace to protect. Another issue is that the parties in the dispute refuse to acknowledge the conflict's stated goal. As a result, it might be said that the AU failed to learn from previous UN and US operations that peace enforcement measures fail to resolve conflict. Because the AU Mission lacks funding, other parties can influence the process. However, it is ironic that the AU mission was dispatched to keep the UIC out of Mogadishu even though the UIC's current president, Abdillahi Yussuf Ahmed, resigned from the TFG in December 2008.In the ever-changing Somali adversary environment, it seems that there is no permanent enemy split. Today's adversaries may be tomorrow's buddies. There is a strong correlation between charismatic leadership and the success of the peace process, based on lessons acquired from past peace processes and Somalia.

Since the 1990s, IGAD has maintained a consistent presence in its efforts to address the Somali crisis. During the whole decade of the 1990s, it gave its member nations, particularly Ethiopia and Djibouti, the mission to address the problem. Common viewpoints have also been expressed by IGAD, which has endorsed efforts that member nations have made throughout this period. The Transitional Federal Government was established in 2004 as a direct result of the Eldoret peace process, in which IGAD had a somewhat conspicuous role. The member nations of IGAD have dedicated a significant amount of their time, energy, and money toward resolving the situation in Somalia. Despite the many attempts that IGAD member nations have made to end the violence in Somalia, they have often contributed to the issue rather than finding a solution. The competition and fighting that was going on

amongst member nations spilt over into Somalia and made the situation worse. Due to the divergent methods taken by member nations, it was difficult for the IGAD to come to a consensus on how to tackle the Somali problem. The members of IGAD were often at odds with one another over the neutrality issue, which hindered the organization's ability to address the Somalia crisis.

IGAD's contribution to resolving the war in Somalia was little since the organization lacks the institutional ability and the authority necessary to deal with the issue efficiently. The outstanding financial arrears are having an impact on the institutional capabilities of IGAD. Most IGAD member nations were late with their payments to the organization's budget. Its reliance on donations from other countries precludes it from amassing sufficient finances and preserving its autonomy in the long run. In addition to this, the organization has been struggling since there is not a regional authority that is actively expressing its position in the area.

IGAD's member nations are embroiled in inter-and intrastate conflicts, which are reflected in the organization. In the past, they had a history of interfering in each other's domestic affairs and aiding rebel organizations. These clashes have stymied IGAD's ability to make a difference in Somalia. In addition, the IGAD member nations are characterized by poverty, environmental degradation, the growth of small guns, terrorism, refugees, and pandemics. These issues have hindered IGAD's ability to concentrate on the crisis in Somalia.

Since it first began sending in peacekeeping forces in 2007, the African Union has also been actively involved in the turmoil unfolding in Somalia. AMISOM has been providing limited humanitarian help while defending TFG II from the devastating assaults the militants have carried out. The mission, on the other hand, has been hampered by a lack of appropriate personnel in addition to financial and logistical assistance. The international community has not shown that it is truly dedicated to providing the service that has been promised. Despite these challenges, AMISOM has maintained its presence in Somalia and continued its operations there. After pulling out of Somalia after its ended in failure military intervention, the United Nations has recently demonstrated a renewed interest in the country by sponsoring the peace process in Djibouti and providing limited assistance to the II TFG II to ensure that it remains in power. Currently, the scope of its aid has been restricted to the regional security spheres; AMISOM is responsible for addressing the

problem of maintaining peace.

IGAD’s peace building initiative are underline into five strategies, the firstly it established the control of the population. Building public trust is critical in this situation. Credibility is a prerequisite for power. A genuine reward (and disincentive) scheme will then allow the government to get critical information about the insurgency. Second, "disrupt insurgent-population relations." This method undermines rebels' credibility and population control. Government forces can only use Strategy 3 after implementing the first two. Third, the government employs a policy known as "direct targeting of the insurgents." Insurgents must be identified before this strategy can be used, which is the result of intelligence gathered during the execution of Strategies One and Two. Fourth, the international community helps target rebel infrastructure. This technique is crucial if the insurgency has outside assistance. If so, the government must establish its legitimacy and persuade foreign players to penalise insurgent backers. Developing "external legitimacy" with the world community is a fifth strategy. It is crucial to build international legitimacy since it will lead to more money, equipment, and other resources from the international community. Strategies Four and Five may be used simultaneously with the other three even though the optimal sequence for defeating rebels would be to follow them in numerical order. In addition, the circumstances may influence whether or not these approaches should be used in tandem. Prior to implementing Strategy Three, it is essential that Steps One and Two be completed.

Despite the many initiatives taken by local, national, and international organizations, the situation in Somalia has not improved much. There was not yet a government in Somalia that is fully functional and has the necessary resources to ensure the population's safety and provide essential services. The TFG II is still relatively ineffective, and its control is confined to some areas of Mogadishu. Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam, two extremist Islamic organizations, continue to challenge the survival of a government supported by the international community by carrying out a series of assaults and taking control of the majority of the territory in the central and southern regions of Somalia. As a result, the situation in Somalia has reached a critical stage, which calls for the concerted participation and commitment of regional and international organizations for the long term.

B. Recommendation

Politically, financially, and institutionally, the IGAD is weakened. IGAD has little power to aggressively and successfully deal with the Somali war, despite the pledge of its member nations to do so. Since internal and interstate disputes are shared among its members, it has little prospects for long-term strength. Disputes between member nations should be amenable to settlement by established international norms and standards. The Executive Secretary of IGAD should lead efforts to settle the rivalry by selecting a venue for debate and encouraging regional and international parties to alleviate regional tension. Respect, trust, and peaceful cohabitation would help IGAD deal more effectively with regional issues, especially the crisis in the Horn of Africa.

Due to funding restrictions, IGAD's work and peace measures in Somalia have been hampered. Conflicts and poverty afflict the Horn of Africa. As a result, this should not be used as an excuse. Member states of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) should strive to ensure that their organization receives the worldwide recognition and support it deserves. IGAD's ability to fulfil its mission in the region must be bolstered by free political and financial assistance. For example, the IGAD Secretariat is woefully understaffed and incapable of dealing with the Somali crisis. In the Facilitator's Office, there are just a few people who can help. Therefore, IGAD should work with academic and research institutes to fill the void and ensure that its ideas, proposals, and initiatives are more believable and attainable."

The Somali crisis is challenging because of the many interests and players involved. In addition, there are no signs of improvement as a variety of organizations vying for control of important cities, ports and airports, including extreme Islamists, clan militias and warlords, all backed by foreign players. There is still a stumbling block in the form of land, justice, and family relations in efforts to achieve world peace. Therefore, IGAD's existing competence is insufficient to deal with the war. Multilateral and long-term participation by all involved entities is thus required to ensure that the system is as efficient as possible. For this reason, IGAD should collaborate with the AU and UN to develop an approach that fosters ownership while also averting skepticism. In this way, it could readily get financial backing for its projects. Without IGAD, we would have discussed the need to establish a regional

body to handle regional issues together. There are many positive aspects of IGAD that the international community should not overlook. Recognize their constant efforts, despite their meagre resources. The Somali conflict threatens world security, and new approaches should be welcomed and built upon. A robust and trustworthy structure is the only way to deal with complicated regional issues. For regional peace and prosperity, strengthening IGAD is the only viable alternative at this point. As a result, the donors must provide their financial assistance immediately and without conditions. The international community should use the threat of piracy to increase its economic and moral support for Somalia.

AMISOM is unable to fulfil its mission because it is understaffed and underfunded. Due to the unstable security situation in Somalia and the lack of financial and political support, further soldiers are unlikely. AMISOM is doing all it can to ensure the safety of its troops and government representatives. There is a suitable chance radicals may target you due to rumors that the TFG II has been compromised. AMISOM will continue its work in Somalia despite the obstacles. The TFG II is supported by the international community as long as there is a perceived danger from radical Islamic organizations; given the present circumstances, the majority view is that there is no better choice than the current administration. For AMISOM to fulfil its mission and take on all of its obligations, the international community must provide financial and logistical assistance. However, there should be no expansion of AMISOM's mission to include defining the rules of engagement. AMISOM should do all in its power to keep civilians safe. AMISOM may get frustrated if there is no progress on the ground. Hence the TFG II security forces should be bolstered.

After a lengthy period of disengagement, the UN again assumes the lead in the Somali peace process. But it should be more devoted to its long-term viability. It needs to focus on long-term relationships and put in the necessary resources. There is little chance of deploying UN blue helmets in Somalia. Still, the United Nations should continue to support AMISOM in terms of planning, logistical, and financial support while also trying to bring various groups to form a governing coalition to make the TFG II, the UN's brainchild, more representative and credible. Given the present instability, the history of UN operations in Somalia and the challenge of coordinating multinational troops, deploying UN peacekeeping forces is likewise not

recommended. Finally, every peacekeeping deployment must be accompanied by an ongoing peace process that is both feasible and comprehensive.

No longer does the TFG II light up the sky. Some of its leaders are accused of being opportunists, and the country's institutions are reported to be broken. However, it should be kept in mind that it has only been in operation for a year. Despite Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam's devastating strikes, it has managed to hold on in Mogadishu. The security apparatus and institutions of the TFG II should be enhanced in the immediate term. Training, financing, and logistical help from IGAD members should continue. In any case, prudence and complete collaboration are required. To minimize Al-Shabaab infiltration and desertion, the recruitment of TFG II personnel for training should be done with caution. IGAD members and the TFG II should also step up their intelligence efforts to locate and capture hardened Al-Shabaab members.

Taking a purely military approach, on the other hand, may make things worse. Expanding the ruling coalition of the TFG should be taken very seriously. As it did with Al-Sunna Wal-Jama, it should deepen its relationships and negotiate power-sharing arrangements with various tribes and organizations in the region. More effort should be made to bring all parties together, even those who have associated themselves with Al-Shabaab for tactical reasons and are open to negotiations. The radicals' existing clan divisions should be exploited. In addition, the possibility of co-opting and purchasing Al-Shabaab militants should be investigated. In Afghanistan, the West is presently trying to negotiate with and purchase moderate Taliban forces; in Somalia, the same tactic should be used. However, military action against Al-Shabaab's most ferocious members is required. Since the TFG II's mandate expired in 2011, it must address its shortcomings, disagreements, and rivalries. IGAD, the African Union, and the United Nations should support and enhance the TFG II's accountability capability.

The revolutionary organizations in Somalia may be able to minimize their reliance on weaponry and money if Eritrea is sanctioned. For long-term stability in Somalia and the region, however, IGAD should look at peaceful procedures to get Eritrea on board and deal with Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam. Most of the local governments are ineffective in the southern and central regions of Somalia. Because of ideologically prepared opponents, armed religious groups, and outside influences,

a regional effort may take a long time to materialize. However, the parts of Somalia where peace has been achieved, such as Puntland and Somaliland, should be consolidated and further developed.

Member nations of the IGAD failed to approve the long-awaited peace and security policy. Promoting a shared plan for peace and security serves all members equally. The member nations should contemplate establishing a uniform approach to help IGAD deal with regional problems efficiently.

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