

A DELEUZIAN READING OF TIME IN JEANETTE WINTERSON'S *ORANGES
ARE NOT THE ONLY FRUIT* AND *SEXING THE CHERRY*

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis analyses the notion of time in Jeanette Winterson's *Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit* and *Sexing the Cherry* in order to demonstrate how the form and content of these novels show her changing views towards the nature of time and its relation to history. Therefore, the study construes the temporal narrative fluxes and the explorations of time and history in these novels, by investigating the character-narrators' internal and external journeys. It does a Deleuzian reading of the novels in line with Deleuze's three syntheses of time that appear in close interaction with his notions of repetition and difference. Such an inquiry reveals how and why in *Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit* the ideas in the first synthesis prevails whereas the ideas in the third synthesis come forth in *Sexing the Cherry*. Ultimately, the study asserts that *Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit* illustrates how the intradiegetic narrator Jeanette inclines towards the familiar in life by holding onto the repetition of the habits and the expectations within the living present. On the other hand, *Sexing the Cherry* displays how the narrators' conflicting approaches towards time blend together ultimately within the character-narrator Jordan's pursuit of the unknown in the empty time and the eternal return of difference. Thus, the thesis reveals two

differing but complementary instances that shed light on evolving views on the nature of time and history.

Keywords: Jeanette Winterson, Gilles Deleuze, Time, History, Three Syntheses of Time



ÖZ

JEANETTE WINTERSON'IN *TEK MEYVE PORTAKAL DEĞİLDİR* VE *VİŞNENİN CİNSİYETİ* ADLI ROMANLARINDA ZAMANIN DELEUZECÜ BİR OKUMASI

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Bu tez, Jeanette Winterson'ın *Tek Meyve Portakal Değildir* ve *Vişnenin Cinsiyeti* adlı eserlerindeki zaman nosyonuna odaklanarak, yazarın romanlarında biçim ve içeriği bağdaştırmasının zamanın doğasına ve bunun tarihle ilişkisine dair değişen görüşlerini nasıl ortaya koyduğunu göstermeyi amaçlar. Bu nedenle çalışma, yazarın romanlardaki zamansal anlatı akışları ile zaman ve tarih tartışmalarını irdeleyerek karakter-anlatıcıların iç ve dış yolculuklarını çözümler. Deleuzecü bir okuma yapan tez, romanları Deleuze'ün tekrar ve farklılık kavramlarıyla yakın etkileşim içinde bulunan üç zaman senteziyle inceler. Böyle bir inceleme, *Tek Meyve Portakal Değildir* adlı romanda birinci sentezin, *Vişnenin Cinsiyeti* adlı eserde ise üçüncü sentezin baskın olduğunu gösterir. Nihayetinde tez, *Tek Meyve Portakal Değildir* adlı eserde intradiegetik anlatıcı Jeanette'in yaşamdaki alışkanlıkların ve beklentilerin tekrarına tutunarak hayatın bilinen tarafına nasıl meylettiğini ortaya koyar. *Vişnenin Cinsiyeti* adlı romanda ise anlatıcıların zamana karşı zıtlık gösteren yaklaşımlarının, karakter-anlatıcı Jordan'ın bilinmeyeni arayışı sırasında nasıl boş zamanın ve farklılığın ebedi dönüşün içerisinde birbirine karıştığını gözler önüne serer. Böylece

tez, zamanın ve tarihin doğasına ilişkin zamanla değişen görüşlerini sergileyerek hem farklı hem birbirini tamamlayan iki örneğe ışık tutmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Jeanette Winterson, Gilles Deleuze, Zaman, Tarih, Zamanın Üç Sentezi



To My Parents and My Brother



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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

D&R	<i>Difference and Repetition</i>
Oranges	<i>Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit</i>
STC	<i>Sexing the Cherry</i>
Why Be Happy	<i>Why Be Happy When You Could Be Normal?</i>



CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

“The present is the repeater, the past is repetition itself, but the future is that which is repeated” (D&R 94).

In 1990, Jeanette Winterson joined an interview in which she said, “it’s important for me to find a form which fits my content” (“Fantastic Voyage” 17). Accordingly, Winterson’s *Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit* and *Sexing the Cherry* offer differing but complementary examples that harmonize the form and the content in order to expose Winterson’s views on time and its relation to history. This thesis does a Deleuzian reading of the two novels, asserting that Jeanette Winterson’s view of time in these novels can be analysed through Gilles Deleuze’s ideas on the nature of time and its three dimensions of the past, the present and the future. Therefore, the study explores both novels’ temporal narrative fluxes, and focuses on the relationship between time and history within the framework of Gilles Deleuze’s ideas in his *Difference and Repetition*, in which the philosopher introduces his three syntheses of time in line with the notions of difference and repetition. It illustrates how Deleuze’s first synthesis of habitual time is considered in relation to habits and expectations while the third synthesis of demented time is seen in association with transformation and change. In parallel with this, it maintains that repetition in the first synthesis occurs to generate similarities and analogies among the past, the present and the future whereas repetition in the third synthesis of time offers a kind of repetition that deals with difference. Accordingly, the thesis attempts to demonstrate instances of form and content that reveal the novels’ intradiegetic narrators’ perspectives towards the past, the present and the future. For that purpose, it explores the character-narrators’ internal and external journeys, during which they constantly investigate

and experiment with time. With such an inquiry, it demonstrates that time can be mainly explored through Deleuze's first and third syntheses in *Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit* and *Sexing the Cherry*, respectively.

Considering all these, the thesis reveals two differing but complementary instances. It is possible to see that *Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit* constitutes an example for Winterson's approach to time from the perspective of the Deleuzian first synthesis. This is deducible through the intradiegetic narrator Jeannette's discussions of and experiment with the past, the present and the future in line with her mother's habits and expectations. Jeannette is an adopted child, whose history has been reshaped by her mother with the aim of bringing her up as a missionary. Thus, Jeanette grows up in the habitual time of her mother in line with the habits and expectations of her living present. This habitual life initially urges Jeanette to question her mother's truths, triggering her to escape and build her own living present. In this regard, Jeanette aims to achieve and fulfil her own expectations from the future. This not only causes Jeanette to take internal journeys in which she inquires about her own life with tales in order to designate her own beginning and ending to her history, but it also leads Jeanette towards making an external journey to escape from her present life. Nevertheless, it becomes clear that Jeanette cannot detach herself from the binding of her mother's present. This can be derived both from the tales that ultimately diverge from her own story in one way or another and the open and unfathomable ending of her narrative. In this regard, *Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit* illustrates how the intradiegetic narrator Jeanette inclines towards the familiar in life by holding onto the repetition of the habits and the expectations within the living present. On the other hand, *Sexing the Cherry* constitutes an example for Winterson's approach to time from the perspective of Deleuze's third synthesis. Unlike *Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit*, Jeanette Winterson's *Sexing the Cherry* presents multiple narrators, whose conflicting views on the nature of time allow the writer to demonstrate her evolving views on the nature of time and history. Initially, the novel displays how the intradiegetic narrators Dog-Woman and Jordan perceive the past, the present and the future with differing and complementary ideas. The novel argues that Dog-Woman perceives time in line with the Deleuzian first synthesis and shows how and why his son Jordan's similar perspective towards time

in line with the habitual time of the first synthesis transforms towards the demented time of the third synthesis. Consequently, *Sexing the Cherry* exhibits how the narrators' conflicting approaches towards time blend together within Jordan's pursuit in the eternal return of difference. In general, Winterson's form and content in her two novels enable her to display her changing views on time and history. Her novels offer a melting pot of clashing aspects of the Deleuzian three syntheses of time. Eventually, *Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit* exhibits Winterson's view of time and history as linear, stable and irrevocable whereas *Sexing the Cherry* illustrates how the writer's perspective has evolved to dwell more on time and its relation to history in line with the ideas of transformation and change.

Indeed, making use of both form and content to explore the themes of time and history is a common endeavour in Winterson's oeuvre, such as in *Boating for Beginners*, *Written on the Body*, *Art and Lies*, *Gut Symmetries*, *Powerbook* and *The Stone Gods*. To briefly explain, in *Boating for Beginners*, Winterson both makes a religious-historical retelling and manipulates the events with the discursive elements of narrative time. *The Passion* features the memories of the French soldier Henri, where he questions the irrevocability of time and history, and experiments with memories in the making of history. *Written on the Body* offers a narrative where the present and the past blur into each other in the image of lovers' bodies. *Art & Lies*, *Gut Symmetries* and *The PowerBook* deal with the linearity and non-linearity of time from varying perspectives. Through such experimentation with the themes of time and history, Winterson constructs a link between the form and the content of her works.

However, two of her early novels, *Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit* and *Sexing the Cherry* provide a ground for the writer to improve upon her attempt to harmonize formal qualities with content. In her post-publication preface to *Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit*, Winterson defines her work as "an experimental novel" whose "interests are anti-linear" (*Oranges* 11). She expresses that her experimentation with linearity presents a novel with a "spiral narrative" that "is fluid and allows infinite movement" (*Oranges* 12). A spiral narrative offers a mode of movement that can have many directions at once, such as "backwards or forwards" and "height or depth" (*Oranges* 12). The writer resembles this structure to our

“mental processes [that] are closer to a maze than a motorway, every turning yields another turning, not symmetrical, not obvious” (Oranges 12). These mental processes do not yield “chaos”, but rather they reveal “a sophisticated mathematical equation made harder to unravel because X and Y have different values on different days” (Oranges 12). This convoluted spiral narrative structure is gradually developed in her later novels, as she openly states, “a spiral narrative suits me very well and I have continued to use it and to improve upon it in *The Passion and Sexing the Cherry*” (Oranges 12). The fusion of spiral form with the temporal content of her novels begins from her debut novel and continues to transform itself with different meaning and narrative representation of repetition and difference in the nature of time in her following works. Both *Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit* and *Sexing the Cherry* revolve around the intradiegetic narrators’ journeys, not only towards their internal worlds that reflect their reasoning about the past, the present and the future, but also their journeys in the external worlds that show the way they deal with life. When construed together, these journeys offer versatile but complementary implications regarding the Deleuzian three syntheses of time, particularly the first and the third syntheses, in Winterson’s perspective on time and history.

Speaking of repetition and difference, it can be said that both the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze and the English writer Jeanette Winterson share common points in their understanding of the nature of time. Similar to Winterson, Deleuze deals with time through the ideas of familiarity, stability, similarity and analogy as well as unfamiliarity, movement, change and multiplicity. The notions of repetition and difference enable one to analyse these in terms of their constant interaction in the formation of various outlooks on time. Thus, a Deleuzian reading of Winterson’s view of time paves the way for understanding how differing relations between the ideas of repetition and difference pave the way for versatile understandings and outcomes of time in an individual’s handling of life and history.

Although it is possible to encounter scattered ideas in the majority of Deleuze’s work, *Difference and Repetition* offers a thorough account of his views on the relationship between repetition, difference and time through his three syntheses. These three syntheses can be respectively defined as (1) the habits and expectations of the living present, (2) the memories and reminiscences of the past, and (3) the

empty time and eternal return of the future. As Deleuze terms it, the first synthesis of time, which is related to the habits and expectations, constitutes the foundation of time whereas the third synthesis of empty time and eternal return maintains time's ungrounding. On the other hand, Deleuzian memories and reminiscences, which constitute the second synthesis of the past, constitute the ground of time. Thus, the second synthesis constitutes a grounding for the others, namely, the present and the future. The second synthesis of time as the ground could be said to appear in Winterson's *The Passion*, which chronologically comes in the middle of *Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit* and *Sexing the Cherry*. *The Passion* carries dominant characteristics of the second synthesis with the intradiegetic narrator Henri's recounting of his memories within his diary. Therefore, it carries the basic qualities of time that are also apparent in the other two novels. This study concentrates on *Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit* and *Sexing the Cherry* to illustrate the characteristics of repetition and difference of time via certain aspects of the first and the third syntheses. It bases its arguments on the assumption that, by grounding their employment and discussions of time on the memories and the reminiscences of the past, *Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit* and *Sexing the Cherry* comply with the two poles of the Deleuzian understanding of time, which are illustrated through his first and third syntheses.

Regarding the traces of Deleuzian time in Winterson's works, in the writer's debut novel *Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit*, the first synthesis of the living present comes forth with an approach to repetition in time in line with the ideas of the familiar, stability, similarity and analogy. The auto-diegetic narrator Jeanette tells the story of her past life with her Evangelistic family, mainly touching upon the reminiscences of her strict adoptive mother in her self-development process. Jeanette's mother adopts her to train her as a servant for God. She gives Jeanette home-schooling until the age of seven – mostly through readings of the Bible. Growing older, Jeanette realizes that her life story has been a construction of her mother. Ultimately, Jeanette moves out to the city in order to escape from her childhood neighbourhood. However, she cannot help but return home for a visit. This event that leaves the story with an open ending implies that Jeanette still cannot help

but seek the familiar in her life and history through the iterative forces of habits and expectations.

On the other hand, in *Sexing the Cherry*, Winterson offers the repetition of time in association with difference that carries the qualities of the unfamiliar, movement, change and multiplicity. The novel maintains two foci character-narrators -Jordan and Dog-Woman- as well as two complementary intradiegetic narrators - Nicolas Jordan and the chemist woman- whose stories appear to be interwoven together in diverse temporal circumstances. It opens in seventeenth-century England with Jordan's first memory. The memory introduces his mother Dog-Woman, who adopts the boy that she finds at the muddy river bank. This first memory is followed by a series of other memories and reminiscences of Dog-Woman, where she explains how as Jordan grows older, he develops a passion for sea voyages and discovery. In fragments, the narrative slips from Jordan's pursuit of a dancer to meeting with the eleven dancing princesses. Ultimately, Jordan meets Fortunata, the twelfth dancing princess. After this encounter, he returns to his mother with a pineapple. As Jordan and Dog-Woman prepare to present the fruit to the King, the contemporary-day Nicolas Jordan decides to join the Navy as a result of his passion for model ships that he sails on the pond. In the meantime, a female chemist fights the pollution created by a factory on the River Thames. The river consequently poisons the woman and causes hallucinations in her mind. As Nicolas Jordan and the chemist decide to burn down the factory, Jordan and Dog-Woman escape down the Thames from a fire in the city. These interwoven stories are finalized with the seventeenth-century Jordan's travel into emptiness and lights. Although it is possible to observe the influence of the living present that link the idea of repetition with stability, similarity and analogy in the earlier phases of the narrative, the novel ultimately brings together qualities of difference through instances of repetition with an aim to pursue the unfamiliar. Through the convoluted temporal fluxes of the narrative, the sharp edges of chronological time and objective history blur into a mixture where past, present and the future exist simultaneously. In *Sexing the Cherry*, habits and expectations which would form the temporal habits and expectations turn into an empty time and the eternal return of difference. Ultimately, a Deleuzian reading displays how Winterson's kaleidoscopic blend of form and content in the two novels produces

versatile implications for time's repetition and difference through the strife between the familiar and the unknown.

Overall, this study bases its arguments on three reasons for analysing the notion of time and its relation to history in Winterson's two novels from a Deleuzian perspective. Firstly, when construed from a Deleuzian perspective, the two novels provide the earliest examples of the development of Winterson's views on time and history. Winterson explains that her work emerges from major themes, such as time and its relation to history, that "do occur and return, disappear, come back amplified or modified, changed in some way" (Reynolds 25). She concludes that "it's been my journey, it's the journey of my imagination, it's the journey of my soul in those books" (Reynolds 25). Accordingly, *Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit* and *Sexing the Cherry* not only offer a ground for comparison both between themselves and other works, but also constitute a base for Winterson's exploration of time in the rest of her oeuvre.

The second reason is that when their perspectives are considered side by side, both Deleuze and Winterson affiliate the notion of time with the ideas of repetition and difference. Both of Winterson's novels provide versatile implications for the repetition and the difference of time within the framework of Deleuzian syntheses through the character-narrators' internal and external journeys. Likewise, the constant conflict between the familiar and the unknown is reflected through the discussions of time and history. Consequently, Winterson's *Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit* and *Sexing the Cherry* offer a solid base for construing the foundation and the ungrounding of time, and its subversive relation with the notion of history in the writer's work. Each mode of time within the syntheses mirrors different aspects of the relation between the Deleuzian understanding of time and the notions of difference and repetition. Each one also provides a peculiar contribution to the discussion on the strife between the familiar and the unknown as an outcome of the interaction between difference and repetition. As a result, both novels offer cases of a Deleuzian understanding of time. The philosopher's approach to time also appears in close affiliation with the idea of history. Likewise, the novels explore the relation of the notions of repetition and difference together with the ideas of history and historiography. Thus, the link between time and history is discussed through two

different modes of Deleuzian forgetting, which refers to history either as repetition of difference or as a display of representation. This discussion reveals how Winterson, similar to Deleuze, tends towards subverting absolutist views on the nature of history. Ultimately, Deleuze's three syntheses allow *Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit* and *Sexing the Cherry* merge together like pieces of a jigsaw puzzle. In turn, they embody Deleuze's three syntheses of time as a whole. This way, the novels provide a holistic outlook on Winterson's evolving views on time and its relation to history, and they constitute a foundation for Winterson's engagement with time in her later works.

Thirdly, this thesis aims to bring novelty to the corpus of studies that analyse the notions of time and history in the two novels from different perspectives. Before explaining how the thesis aims to contribute to the literature on Winterson, it is necessary to touch upon previous studies. Generally speaking, thematic studies on *Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit* and *Sexing the Cherry* revolve around the topics of religion, feminism, gender, identity, ideology, language and reality while formal and narrative analyses often focus on the novels' engagement with parodic or meta-historiographic literature, intertextuality and unreliable narration.

Some studies dwell on *Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit* and *Sexing the Cherry* together in order to provide a general outlook on the writer's aforesaid thematic, formal and narrative endeavours. Among the examples of the studies that analyse the notions of time and history in line with the topics of gender, sexuality and identity, Rebecca L. Sturgeon's 1995 work questions the notion of time through the topics of religion and feminism by focusing on narrative techniques while Jana L. French (1999) construes the ideas of identity and desire in line with the notion of history. In addition, Kathryn Allan (2004) makes a Foucauldian and Butlerian analysis of history and gender, and Merja Makinen in *The Novels of Jeanette Winterson* (2005) looks into the narrative strategies and discussions regarding the issues of gender and sexuality to analyse the notion of time in Winterson's work. Some other studies tend to construe time and history in terms of the ideas of reality and fantasy. Susana Onega in *Jeanette Winterson* (2006) explores the notions of time and history through the novels' thematic, formal, narrative and ideological aspects. On the other hand, Margaret J-M Sönmez and Mine Özyurt Kılıç in *Winterson Narrating Time and*

Space (2009) and Patrik Krejčí (2015) suggest that *Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit* and *Sexing the Cherry* explore the notions of history and time by blending reality, fantasy and storytelling.

Besides, there are studies that deal with either of the novels. Regarding the literature on *Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit*, it is possible to see an inclination towards the scrutiny of history. Several studies¹ concentrate on the question of the relation between history and reality in line with other topics, such as ideology and identity while several others² scrutinize the notions of time and history by questioning the topics of gender, patriarchal influence and totalizing perspectives. Among most relevant to this thesis can be shown the studies of Wendy Lisa Weber (1999), Xiaowei Chen (2014) and Marija Vilimonovic (2017), which concentrate on the relation of history to the use of language and narrative strategies, such as intertextuality, and elements of narrative discourse, which are narration, causality, chronology and linearity. When it comes to the corpus on *Sexing the Cherry*, it can be said that thematic and formal concerns begin to incline more towards the notion of time. Some studies³ explore the novel's narrative strategies, such as magical realism, intertextuality, hyperbole and fantasy, and thematic concerns, such as fantasy and reality, as part of historiographic metafiction while some other studies⁴, approach the notions of time and history in terms of gender issues and patriarchal norms. Besides, it is possible to encounter a corpus⁵ that dwells on time and its relation to history in line with the topics of story-telling, retelling, truth, reality, multiplicity and fantasy. On the other hand, the works that comply more with the interests of this thesis are those of Ann Heilmann and Mark Llewellyn (2004), Barbara Wiercińska-Popko

¹ See Mara Reisman (2011), Howard Holland (2012), Alexandra Mattson (2017) and Xinze Li (2019).

² See Andreja Radetič (2009), Amy Benson Brown (1997) and Mine Özyurt Kılıç (2004).

³ See María del Mar Asensio Arostegui (2008), Mustafa Kırca (2009), Gökçen Usman (2011) and Isha Malhotra (2013).

⁴ See Marry Bratton (2002), Jeffrey Roessner (2002), Petra Burianová (2016), Mahinur Gözde Kasurka (2020), Mehtap Demirtürk (2020), Mustafa Kırca (2021) and Zeynep Yılmaz Kurt (2021).

⁵ See Tatjana Pavlov-West (1989), Milada Franková (2000), Angela Marie Smith (2005), Emilie Walezak (2011), Milada Franková (2015), Mehmet Fikret Arargüç (2016) and Konstantinos D. Karatzas (2018).

(2009), Emily Spiers (2012) and Kate Haffey (2019), which analyse the implementation and narrative representation of the nature and structure of time and history in line with ideas, such as linearity, cyclicity, fluidity, revocability and non-objectivity.

It should be noted that Winterson's novels have also been subject to studies that engage with Deleuze's other ideas, such as his concept of the rhizome in *A Thousand Plateaus*. On the other hand, this thesis aims to centre itself on the writer's attempt to harmonize formal qualities and content in terms of her views on the nature of time and its relation to history from a Deleuzian perspective. Differing from previous studies that employ Deleuzian or other approaches to understand the themes of time and history in Winterson's two novels, this thesis mainly focuses on Deleuzian views of repetition and difference in the nature of time and history. This way, it intends to reveal the implications of these notions within the character-narrators' internal and external journeys, where they face the conflict between the familiar and the unknown throughout. It conducts its analyses in line with Deleuze's three syntheses of time and explores why the first and the third syntheses respectively prevail in the two works. A Deleuzian analysis through the three syntheses of time enables this thesis to provide a proper illustration of the implications of the repetition and the difference of time in *Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit* and *Sexing the Cherry*.

In this regard, the second chapter offers a comprehensive explanation of Gilles Deleuze's discussion of time. Deriving its discussions from his *Difference and Repetition*, the chapter pays particular attention to the book's second chapter titled "Repetition for Itself". In this way, it introduces and discusses Deleuzian views on time and history through his three syntheses.

The third chapter provides a Deleuzian analysis of Winterson's *Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit*. Firstly, it journeys with the character-narrator Jeanette in her internal and external journeys, in which she constantly experiments with the past, the present and the future. Thus, it demonstrates the strife between the familiar and the unknown in the novel and illustrates the peculiar implications of the repetition and the difference of time. In this way, it shows why the narrative focuses more on the notion of history. This investigation allows it to shed light on how and why the first

synthesis prevails in the temporal fluxes and the discussions regarding the notions of time and history in *Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit*.

The fourth chapter provides a Deleuzian analysis of *Sexing the Cherry*. It begins following the internal and the external journeys of the character-narrators, Dog-Woman, Jordan, Nicolas Jordan and chemist woman, who experiment with the present, the past and the future within a convoluted narrative structure. It illustrates the strife between the familiar and the unknown in the novel and points to the peculiar implications of the repetition and the difference of time. In this way, it explains why the narrative focuses more on the notion of time, and consequently, how and why the third synthesis prevails in the temporal fluxes and the discussions regarding the notions of time and history in *Sexing the Cherry*.

Within the framework of Deleuze's three syntheses of time, the conclusion chapter includes a comparative summary of the multifaceted discussion of time in the works of Jeanette Winterson. In this way, it aims to provide a final analysis of the versatile implications of repetition and difference through their interaction with time and history. For that purpose, the last part of this thesis provides a comparative analysis of the themes of habitual life, escape and return in both novels and how they display Winterson's multidimensional perspective towards time and its relation to history from a Deleuzian perspective. Finally, this chapter attempts to propose possible future studies that can derive their inspiration from this work.

CHAPTER 2

UNDERSTANDING DELEUZIAN TIME

2.1. The Notions of Repetition and Difference

The notions of repetition and difference offer both complementary and diverging definitions. The term “repetition” basically means the act of repeating an action or a phenomenon. This act of repeating does not have to be immense in its effect. Repeating can include slight recurrences of a prior element. This element can be a part of an idea, object, event, and even time. It can also occur in large quantities or in the whole of an element. Either slight or grand, the basic definition of repetition depicts mimetic qualities that tend to recreate the similar, the analogous or the same. In such a repetition, the act of repeating does not aim to yield actual difference. Indeed, the term “difference” exists through an organic interaction with repetition. In the Deleuzian ideal, when something reoccurs, it contains certain changes whether in its quantity, quality or the state of being. But difference does not offer fixed outcomes or representations. It subverts speculations, inferences and assumptions that incline towards the ideas of identity, similitude and opposition. In this sense, the notion of difference enables questioning the traditional Western philosophy that “has privileged identity over difference” (Vanhanen 11).

In contemporary philosophy, the notions of repetition and difference are frequently associated with ontological and epistemological questions. From an ontological point, difference enables us to investigate the sources and the causes of a phenomenon as a differential. Repetition, as the recurrence of the similar or the same, attempts to clarify or simplify the convoluted or ambiguous processes of the differential. Repetition, as the iteration of difference, on the other hand, allows investigating and subverting the irrevocable and fixed nature of truth and reality in time and history. Such an ontological inquiry on the existence of difference along

with repetition, in turn, allows the discovery of time's connotations of transformation, change and novelty. In this sense, despite their individual definitions, the ideas of repetition and difference ultimately merge together in an organic manner in the Western philosophy of time and history. The next section presents one of the substantial representatives of Western philosophy of time and history in Gilles Deleuze's engagement with the notions of time and history through his three syntheses of time in *Difference and Repetition*.

2.2. Deleuze's Three Syntheses of Time

Twentieth-century French philosopher Gilles Deleuze elaborates on the nature and history of philosophy through his authentic premises that would confront the traditional metaphysical understanding of Western philosophy. His outlook on philosophy as a phenomenon that must free itself from absolutist, essentialist and discriminating reflections on thought and life puts forward a reformatory stance that goes against the ideas of identity, analogy, resemblance and opposition. Nevertheless, Deleuzian metaphysics does not aim to terminate contrary beliefs. In contrast, it incorporates the prior understandings and views into its body. Put differently, it repeats them in order to produce difference that would constitute, enlighten and reinforce his ideas.

Contemplations on time and its relation to history are significant embodiments of Deleuzian philosophy due to their association with the ideas of repetition and difference. Deleuze's *Logic of Sense* and *Difference and Repetition* offer a vast discussion of his views on time and history. Specifically, his ideas on the nature and the processing of time gain a solid appearance in *Difference and Repetition*. Implied by its title, Deleuze employs the ideas of difference and repetition throughout his book in order to discuss his views not only on the nature of philosophy, but also on the notion of time. In the work, the repetition and difference of time are contemplated particularly in the chapter "Repetition for Itself". This chapter introduces Deleuze's views on time under the taxonomy of the three syntheses of time. Accordingly, the following section will touch upon these syntheses. Upon its explanation of Deleuze's taxonomy, the second part will include an inquiry into the relation between Deleuzian time and history.

2.2.1. The First Synthesis

Also named the living present, Deleuze's first synthesis of time constitutes the foundation of time. With his contemplations on belief, habit, imagination and understanding, the empiricist thinker David Hume provides the basis for Deleuze's first synthesis. Accordingly, the chapter "Repetition for Itself" that discusses Deleuze's taxonomy of time begins with a reference to Hume that states, "*Repetition changes nothing in the object repeated, but does change something in the mind which contemplates it*" (D&R 70). Deleuze begins his depiction of the three syntheses by openly stating that both repetition and difference occur in the mind. It does not affect the being of the repeated object. The habitual perception of time in the first synthesis urges that "when A appears, we expect B with a force corresponding to the qualitative impression of all the contracted ABs" (D&R 70). The idea of expectation and belief is at the core of repetition within habitual time. Habitual time enables us to achieve a pattern of iterative cases. This refers to "a contractile power", which is "the imagination" where "the independent identical or similar cases are grounded" (D&R 70). The imagination refers to the sphere of the mind. In this sense, what repeats in the first synthesis exposes the sense of associationism in the mind between the befores and the afters of the living present. The contraction of cases in the imagination paves the way to the organism's expectation that when case A happens, it will be followed by case B. In this way, repetition is expected to lead to the similar or the analogous.

The imagination contracts and repeats the cases in a cyclical fashion. Deleuze also terms this as a "simple circle" that repeats itself to end with analogous consequences (D&R 91). He states that "contraction is essentially asymmetrical: it goes from the past to the future in the present, thus from the particular to the general, thereby imparting direction to the arrow of time" (D&R 71). The contraction begins from the past and goes towards the future on the arrow of the living present. However, neither the past nor the present appears as independent of this present. Instead, they compose the living present. In this way, the living present repeats itself in its cyclical structure. In line with that, Deleuze expresses that "each instance of AB generates "a difference, something new *in the mind*" outside itself (D&R 70). In this sense, repetition can be regarded as "a process that unfolds temporally, through

individual acts of iteration and contemplation” (Herzog 143). Deleuze emphasizes “the role of imagination in drawing together different impressions” and “insists on excluding understanding and memory from the contraction of the past in the present” since contraction is not equal to reflection (Williams 21). He asserts that the repetition of instances neither affects the material being of events of the causality nor does it lead into change in the objects of contemplation. It just occurs in the mind.

Deleuze associates the living present with *Habitus* that appears in relation to the ideas of retention and expectancy. Contraction in the imagination occurs through habits which refer to the “present of the present” (Deamer 220). Habit contains “past of the present” as retention and “future of the present” as expectation (Deamer 220). Retention amounts to a reservoir of instants synthesized from the present whereas expectation amounts to expecting a succession between before and after (Deamer 220). In other words, retention means a past that has not been changed by the contractive forces of the mind. On the other hand, the mind tends to reproduce the retention in line with habits and expectations. Defined as “time as a contraction of instants with respect to a present” (81), habit can be associated with the past “in so far as the preceding instants are retained in the contraction” (D&R 71) whereas expectations can be associated with future since the expectation of the future “is anticipated in this same contraction” (D&R 71). Habits come from the familiar of the past and tend to lead into the organism’s urge to recreate the familiar in the future. In this way, the living present can preserve its status-quo. Deleuze maintains that “the passive synthesis of habit constitutes the living present in time and makes the past and the future two asymmetrical elements of that present” (D&R 81). The connection between habit and expectancy appears with a particular rhythm, namely, a pattern, which Deleuze exemplifies with a chicken that eats a grain as it already expects another one (D&R 76). Therefore, it can be assumed that in the first synthesis “past and future do not appear as independent moments but rather as dimensions of the present itself and their sense is organic: within the living present, past is heredity and future is anticipation” (Yinon 210). As can be seen, the present has a nature that deals with a cyclical and contractive mode of time that tends to bind both the past and the future through habits and expectation in the imagination. As it includes the succession of the lived, it is what makes Deleuzian first synthesis the living present,

in which contraction shows an inductive pattern and exposes time's "simple circle" (D&R 55).

Deleuze also relates the first synthesis with the binding effect of *Habitus*, by observing the living present through the lenses of *Id* in Sigmund Freud's psychological outlook. In Freudian terms, the principle of pleasure is affiliated with the *Id*'s aspiration to fulfil its needs and ambitions immediately. If these needs are not fulfilled, it causes anxiety in the *Id*. According to Deleuze, habits and expectations in the first synthesis offer an influence that is "'beyond' the [pleasure] principle" (D&R 98). They appear to be a force that attempts to fulfil the organism's need to obtain the familiar to satisfy its necessity of safety and order. In this sense, the first synthesis goes beyond the material sense of the pleasure principle by extending beyond bodily needs towards psychological needs. The Deleuzian pleasure principle tends to fulfil its needs through binding itself with the living present's habits and expectations. Deleuze puts that the "local egos" in the *Id* forms the authentic time of the living present and conducts "binding integrations" (D&R 97). These local egos that he points to are explained in terms of their narcissistic nature which manages to extract its "self-image" from the contemplation of "the excitation that it binds" (D&R 97). The narcissistic nature of egos creates a binding effect between them and excitations. Excitations can be rendered as the ideal other(s) of the organism that will satisfy its needs and enable it to achieve completeness. In this way, there emerges a "'hallucinatory' satisfaction" within the ego (D&R 97). When the ego completes itself with the ideal other, it has the hallucinatory sense of being whole. In this way, it achieves the sphere of the familiar that provides senses of safety and order. The binding effect of *Habitus* repeats the excitation and this "implies the pleasure principle along with its future and past application" (D&R 98). It can be concluded that "the ego literally becomes what it synthesizes, and thus reproduces the excitation in the contemplation of the excitation" (Hughes 107-108).

Speaking of *Habitus* and its binding effect in the first synthesis, it is essential to mention Deleuze's idea of signs, particularly the artificial signs. He associates signs with "habitudes or contractions" and explain that they "always belong to the present" (D&R 77). In this sense, through signs the present is always in relation with the past. Deleuze illustrates this relation by resembling the signs to a past scar. He

says that “a scar is the sign not of a past wound but of 'the present fact of having been wounded” (D&R 77). More specifically, he expounds on artificial signs, defining them as signs which show the past and the future as separate strata of the present while simultaneously making the present itself dependent on these dimensions (D&R 77). This means that the imagination of the living present illustrated by artificial signs is to be in constant link with “the active faculties of reflective representation, memory and intelligence” (D&R 77). Therefore, artificial signs differ from the signs of the present as they do not simply refer to the scars of the present. They carry the wounds and their lived impacts in the past or probable effects in the future into the living present of the first synthesis through “reflective representation, memory and intelligence” (D&R 77).

In conclusion, the first synthesis maintains an understanding of repetition that seeks for similarity and analogy through its living present. In this synthesis, the past and the future do not exist as diverse components of the living present. Rather, they are presumed and shaped by the present's habits and expectations. Therefore, the living present tends to repeat itself in order to preserve its habits of the past and the expectations of the future and produce a basic circle. Time becomes a representation of what the imagination aims to achieve. In other words, the first synthesis of time offers the representation of the habits and expectations of its living present. Thus, the understanding of repetition here does not intend to generate a liberated difference. It only produces the representation of difference by leading into modifications in the mind that processes and ponders upon time.

Overall, the first synthesis appears as a foundation for the entirety of Deleuzian time as “the active syntheses of memory and understanding are superimposed upon and supported by the passive synthesis of imagination” (D&R 71). However, the foundation requires a ground to exist upon. Therefore, upon introducing the first synthesis of the living present as the foundation, it is essential to move on to the second synthesis of time that provides the ground for the whole of Deleuzian syntheses.

2.2.2. The Second Synthesis

Deleuze's second synthesis of time is referred to as the ground of time. Deleuze maintains that "the past, far from being a dimension of time, is the synthesis of all time, of which the present and the future are only dimensions" (D&R 82). The second synthesis "which is peculiar to memory itself" derives the inspiration from Henri Bergson's idea on time, particularly from his ideas on memory, duration and pure past in *Matter and Memory* (1896). Deriving its roots from the Bergsonian understanding of time and memory, Gilles Deleuze's second synthesis consists of voluntary memory and involuntary memory, that is, reminiscence. Voluntary memory reduces the whole past into "the former present that it was, or to the present present in relation to which it is past" (D&R 84). Thus, it deals with the retentions of the past. On the other hand, reminiscences are formed by the representations of the pure past. The pure past means a past that is stored in the involuntary memory to be transformed by experience and perception, and become the representation of what is reflectively retained. Therefore, the pure past is "a general, *a priori* element of all time" and "makes the former and the present present (thus the present in reproduction and the future in reflection) two asymmetrical elements" (D&R 81-82). Deleuze expresses that the second synthesis as the ground is in direct relation with the concept of representation for it is "to borrow the characteristics of what it grounds, and to be proved by these" (D&R 88). It remains with "representation that it grounds" since "it elevates the principles of representation - namely, identity, which it treats as an immemorial model, and resemblance, which it treats as a present image: the Same and the Similar" (D&R 88).

Deleuze maintains that the relation between the pure past and reminiscence exhibits the in-itself of the past (D&R 84). At this point, it should be noted that Deleuze uses memory as a two-folded term. Memory means both the area of storage where time is preserved and what is preserved in that sphere. Deleuze explains that memory offers "the entire past [that] is conserved in itself" (D&R 84). However, he would like to find a way to "penetrate into" this in-itself past as habits of the first synthesis does. Thereby he comes up with the idea of reminiscence that allows permeating into the whole of the pure past by including experiences and senses in its formation. As one repeats the reflection of retentions in the memory, it transcends

the realm of the pure past and transforms into an asset of the self. In other words, the organism through reminiscences manages to save the past for itself.⁶ In this way, repetition in the second synthesis leads into the difference of time through the production of the representation of pure past in line with the organism's perception and experience.

Speaking of memory and its reminiscence, Deleuze emphasizes two types of forgetting, which are, empirical forgetting and essential forgetting. He describes essential forgetting as the driving force of reminiscence. He explains that in the "empirical memory... what is recalled must have been seen, heard, imagined or thought" (D&R 140). On the other hand, essential forgetting offers what can be grasped for one time and is forgotten for a second time because "forgetting has effaced or separated us from the memory" (D&R 140). In other words, the pure past moves away from its retentions in the process of empirical forgetting. This can be rendered as empirical forgetting's denial of the representation of the past in its present recalls. Empirical forgetting expects that repetition of the past should only refer back to its pure being. Since this is not empirically viable, it eliminates the possibility of repetition of the past and remembering it for a second time. On the other hand, essential forgetting deals with the reminiscences of the past, in other words, what is recalled after being processed through one's perception of the past. Thus, Deleuze also calls this forgetting as "transcendental" and "active". Deleuze explains that in essential forgetting "the *forgotten* thing ... does not address memory without addressing the forgetting within memory" (D&R 140). Therefore, "transcendental memory" accepts from the first moment that recalling does not emerge without some forgetting. It offers "not a contingent past, but the being of the past as such and the past of every time" (D&R 140). The past does not remain intact in active (transcendental) forgetting and remembering. This past reappears in the present mind filtered by its experiences and associations. In consequence, the first synthesis engages with a combination of the empirical and transcendental forgetting whereas the third synthesis seeks for active (transcendental) forgetting within its eternal return. The first synthesis might be negating some part of the pure past as

⁶ Deleuze questions how can one manage to extend beyond the pure past by saying, "The entire past is conserved in itself, but how can we save it for ourselves, how can we penetrate that in-itself without reducing it to the former present that it was, or to the present present in relation to which it is past? How can we save it *for ourselves*?" (D&R 84).

being forgotten through empirical forgetting while affirming some other part due to its inclination towards implementation of representations. On the other hand, Deleuze openly states that “The genius of eternal return lies not in memory but in waste, in active forgetting” (D&R 55). This amounts to the idea that the third synthesis inclines towards the repetition of the past as pure difference.

Returning to the second synthesis, it can be said that Deleuze further ponders upon the nature and processing of repetition in the second synthesis by referring to Sigmund Freud’s reality principle and Jacques Lacan’s views on the virtual. He maintains that the second synthesis of time that concerns “Eros-Mnemosyne” offers another principle, also beyond the pleasure principle, in relation to the unconscious (D&R 108). In Freudian sense, the reality principle amounts to a contradiction to the pleasure principle as it urges the mind to abide by the reality and norms of the world outside the subject. Since the self tends towards the virtual other in order to fulfil itself, the reality principle works with Ego. This process of fulfilment evolves towards the self’s urge to assign the virtual as the beginning point (D&R 109). However, Deleuze puts that assigning the virtual as a departure point is not possible because *“neither of these two series [the former and the present presents] can any longer be designated as the original or the derived”* (D&R 105). The process of fulfilment that includes the virtual blurs out the distinction between the original and the derived versions of the self. Therefore, repetition of the self does not occur “from an (earlier) present to another (actual) present – as it did in the series of real objects” (Rölli and Hertz-Ohmes 241). Instead, it departs from the pure past towards reminiscence. As the repetition continues, the representation embedded in the reminiscence opens itself for difference, as well. In this sense, the virtual cannot constitute an origin since it “is always missing from its place, from its own identity and from its representation” in the process of repetition (D&R 105). Deleuze explains it by expounding on the mother’s place in people’s relationships with other people in the later phases of their lives as *the virtual object*. Virtual object is expressed as “x”, which can have varying displacements throughout one’s life and “the mother occupies a certain place in relation to the virtual object in the series which constitutes our present, a place which is necessarily filled by another character in the series which constitutes the present of another subjectivity” (D&R 105). Thus,

both the displacement of the virtual object and the real that is acted upon by the virtual object constitute fundamental elements for “difference, movement and disguise”, and become “the elements of repetition itself” (D&R 109). The virtual can only repeat the unfamiliar because, in the second synthesis of time, “it is only the strange which is familiar and only difference which is repeated” (D&R 109). This shows that the second synthesis, contrary to the first one, approaches an understanding of repetition that yields difference with the proceeding of the arrow of time from the past towards the present.

As can be seen, the second synthesis of time maintains the ground for the whole taxonomy with its memory of the pure past and reminiscences. This synthesis also echoes the idea of representation in the embodiment of time by suggesting that what is shown as time is a reflective outcome of perception and experiences that tend to influence the pure past and make it a product of the memory. Thus, the reminiscences are produced. On the other hand, Deleuze puts that as repetition deals with copies in the second synthesis, the original and the derived come together to repeat themselves ultimately yielding the virtual or the reminiscence that displays neither the original nor the derived fully. Therefore, the representation of time in the second synthesis offers an understanding of time that inclines towards the simulacra of a demented time. Consequently, Deleuze proposes a third synthesis of time that embodies how “the simple circle” of time becomes “a tortuous, more nebulous circle” that only repeats itself with difference (D&R 91).

2.2.3. The Third Synthesis

Deleuze’s third synthesis of time is termed as the ungrounding of time and derives its inspiration from German philosophers Immanuel Kant’s empty form of time and Friedrich Nietzsche’s eternal return. Deriving from Kantian and Nietzschean views, Deleuze proposes a third synthesis of time which is “the final end of time” that makes all there syntheses a whole. He initially defines the third synthesis as

...demented time or time outside the curve which gave it a god, liberated from its overly simple circular figure, freed from the events which made up its content, its relation to movement overturned; in short, time presenting itself as an empty and pure form. (D&R 88)

Deleuze begins his discussion on the third synthesis of time by referring to Kant's view of time as the empty form of time. Referring to the Kantian "receptivity of intuition", Deleuze expresses that for Kant "I think" is able to determine the undetermined only by the determinable effect of time, which allows "the pure and empty form of time" to create "the fractured I" (D&R 86). He exemplifies the idea of the empty form time in Kantian understanding of time with a reference to Shakespeare's "Hamlet", in which the Northern Prince says "time is out of joint" (D&R 88). Here the time out of its joints illustrates that "the movements by which time had been measured are disrupted, leaving only an empty form of time that eschews the unity of the subject" (Reynolds 62). Therefore, empty form of time means time liberated from any kind of movement, be it the universe or natural phenomena. As Daniel W. Smith puts it, "Time is liberated: it ceases to be a cosmological or psychological time in order to become a formal time, a pure deployed form" (39). Therefore, Hamlet's statement "time is out of joint" points to a "demented time" that breaks its straightforward circle to exhibit itself "as an empty and pure form" (D&R 88).

Deleuze expands on Kant's empty form of time by suggesting three series of time, which are the before (experience), the caesura, and the after (metamorphosis). The caesura constitutes the point of fracture in the I (D&R 89). The before and the after appears as unequal parts of the entirety of time that is both divided and tied together by the caesura (D&R 89). The experience refers to the past even if it has not empirically happened or occurred yet (D&R 89). The metamorphosis can be associated with the present as becoming-capable of the act (D&R 89). The past of experience is "repetition by default" and lays the base for "this other repetition constituted by the metamorphosis in the present" (D&R 90). The future lies in the third time, that is, the caesura. The determined can only occur in the third time of the temporal series, which is the caesura (D&R 90).

Deleuze suggests that the three temporal series in this synthesis can be related with the repetitions of the narcissistic ego in the forms of Id, Ego and Superego. He associates the repetition in the three series of time with the repetitions of narcissistic ego. He relates the before with the *Id (the condition)*, the after with the *Ego Ideal (the agent)* and the caesura with the *Superego* (D&R 110-111). Such an association

comes from his understanding that in the formation of the narcissistic ego, the “I” becomes fractured into Id and Ego by the Superego. The Superego is reflected as the caesura. Rölli and Hertz-Ohmes explain this by stating that “the fracture in the [narcissistic] ego comes from the caesura that conclusively sets the boundary between before and after” (Ohmes 246). This leads into the Kantian empty form. When the narcissistic ego repeats itself in the form of superego, both Id and Ego are “annihilated” (D&R 111). Deleuze links the annihilation of the Id and Ego with the narcissistic ego’s repetition of itself as the Superego via the *death instinct*. When the Id as the present (the condition) and the Ego as the past (the agent) are terminated or become dead by the emergence of the Superego of the future, “the straight line of time forms a circle again, a singularly tortuous one” (D&R 115). The interaction between the death instinct and empty form of time exhibits the way the story of time is finalized, that is, “by undoing its too well centred natural or physical circle and forming a straight line which then, led by its own length, reconstitutes an eternally decentred circle” (D&R 115).

Deleuze further illustrates the interaction between the empty form of time and the death instinct through Nietzsche’s eternal return. It is generally assumed that Nietzsche’s eternal return repeats itself with the return of the same. However, Deleuze rejects the idea that assumes repetition to be the return of the same in Nietzschean return, suggesting that what repeats is always the new, the different itself. This return is a repetition of the future that is associated with constant difference. Therefore, in the eternal return of the third synthesis “what is produced, the absolutely new itself, is in turn nothing but repetition: the third repetition, this time by excess, the repetition of the future as eternal return” (D&R 90). Deleuze considers it “a belief in the future” because “eternal return affects only the new, what is produced under the condition of default and by the intermediary of metamorphosis” (D&R 90). The condition of the default refers to the past, and the intermediary of metamorphosis amounts to the present. As can be seen, Deleuze’s association of the Freudian terms of Id, Ego and Superego are once again echoed in his idea of the eternal return of difference. This is deducible by the fact that Deleuze considers the condition of the past and the metamorphosis in the present come together and repeat themselves to lead into a new subject, that is, the difference of

future. In this sense, the future appears to be the fractured I that loses all its contact with fixed identities and genealogical roots. The future becomes Hamlet's time out of its joints and merely produces change and novelty by demolishing the stabilizing forces of the living present and the pure past. Consequently, the eternal return does not offer a circle in a simplified sense but reveals "the decentred circle of difference" (D&R 91). In other words, the eternal return of difference decentres its simple circle assumed by the living present of the first synthesis so that time can break apart from its joints and become liberated.

In relation to this, Deleuze defines eternal return as "a force of affirmation" (D&R 115). The thought of affirmation is crucial in Deleuze's rendering of the Nietzschean outlook in the sense that the eternal return which Deleuze underlines does not negate the ontological or epistemological being of the repetition and the repeated. David Couzens Hoy in *The Time of Our Lives* (2009) states that "Deleuze reads Nietzsche's eternal return, not as the return of the Same ... [but] as the selective return of affirmative repetition" (162). In other words, it does not intend to negate repetition as repeating the singularity of time. Instead, it affirms this singularity, positing that the only singularity is the multiple in itself. In this sense, the eternal return always affirms the repetition, but it solely affirms the difference in it. Therefore, Deleuze considers affirmation as the force that paves the way for the constant transformation of time that yields *the multiple*. This means affirmation only affirms the multiple; it does not affirm "the One, the Same and the Necessary" (D&R 115).

Deleuze further explains that the eternal return possesses an immanent "differentiator" in order to constantly affirm the difference (D&R 117). Deleuze terms this in-itself "differentiator" (117) as a "dark precursor" (D&R 120). This dark precursor enables the coexistence of the before and after within a chaos (D&R 124). Put differently, it does not negate either the before/the past or the after/the present, but only affirms their integration that generates the difference of the future. In this sense, the dark precursor affirms that repetition merely produces difference in the eternal return. Deleuze illustrates the interactions between repetition and difference in the eternal return with the notions of *simulacra* and *phantasms*. According to Deleuze, simulacra and phantasms are not simple copies or instances of similarity to

the origin (D&R 127). Contrary to earlier philosophers such as Plato that attempted to offer a binary of “cosmos” and “chaos” in order to achieve a tamed circle, Deleuzian eternal return offers “a thoroughly tortuous circle” with the amalgamation of “chaos and cosmos” into its body (D&R 128). Therefore, repetition within simulacra and phantasms tend to decentre the circle of the eternal return and produce difference because simulacra internalize difference and externalize similarity (D&R 128). In Deleuzian sense, “time out of joint means that the ideal is removed from the circle; we therefore are left with simulacra with no principle of resemblance” (Williams 88). Although repetition as an illusion generated by the external force of similarity leads into simulacra, their internalized difference inevitably yields constant transformation and newness. Repetition in Deleuzian eternal return does not internalize any similarity, analogy or sameness to repeat itself. The difference it repeats and generates “shows several things or tells several stories at once” (D&R 128). One story? cannot be taken as “a model” for any other story; therefore, one story is not supposed to be considered the originary while the other one as the derived (D&R 125). Consequently, “stories unfold simultaneously”, and one story cannot be put before the other story (D&R 125). In this sense, “resemblance and identity are only functional effects of that difference which alone is originary within the system” of simulacra (D&R 125). Deleuze terms the originary in this system as the Nietzschean “will to power” (D&R 125). The will to power, which amounts to an organism’s perpetual desire for self-determination, is seen as the initiator of the everlasting process of becoming and change. In this sense, Joe Hughes in *Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition* points to the philosopher’s differentiation between will to power and eternal return, stating that “the will to power is difference, but the eternal return is the affirmation, reproduction, repetition or return of difference” (63). Deleuze ultimately explains that repetition in eternal return eliminates “all the categories of representation” (D&R 126). The notion of representation inevitably brings along the ideas of similarity and analogy. On the other hand, Deleuzian third synthesis asserts that the same and the similar are “illusions” created by the eternal return (D&R 126). It is only the eternal return itself, which is the same and the similar, and this return possesses the in-itself difference that solely generates “the

same of the different, the one of the multiple, the resemblant of the dissimilar” (D&R 126).

Deleuze as a philosopher of difference consequently proposes this third synthesis that only affirms and repeats the singularity of difference. In the third synthesis, Deleuze emphasizes the empty form and the eternal return of time, explaining that in this synthesis the assumed cycle of time is decentred by the forces of differentiation towards the chaos that rejects universal resemblances and analogies. In this sense, the third synthesis defies the ideas that try to draw similarities between the movements of the universe and natural phenomena. Instead, it locates time in chaos and proposes that time can only repeat itself with difference. The third synthesis, Deleuze argues, is the ultimate point where the arrow of time arrives at the eternal return that can only repeat change and novelty. Thus, the third synthesis deals with the time of the future which is not predetermined by any habits, expectations or reminiscences. Instead, the future embraces all other syntheses within the repetition of its demented or out-of-joint time. Upon discussing the Deleuzian three syntheses, it is vital that this study introduces Deleuze’s ideas on time’s relation with the notion of history. In this sense, the next section briefly touches upon Deleuze’s ideas on the nature of history in his *Difference and Repetition*.

2.3. The Relation between Deleuzian Time and History

It can be said that from the twentieth century onwards, approaches to history and historiography begin to incline towards considering history as a means of the reproduction of the reality in line with subjective, ideological or political concerns. While earlier approaches render history in relation to reality and socioeconomic relations, philosophers of the twentieth century, who are greatly influenced by the deconstructionist ideas of the postmodern movement, tend to see history as a means of representation. French philosopher Gilles Deleuze can be regarded as one of the thinkers who dwell on the topics of reality and representation in terms of their relation to the notion of time. Although his works do not initially seem to cover the topic of history as a focal point, a closer look into his work would reveal that he actually deals with this topic in his discussions on the nature of time and its processing in both the physical world and the mental world.

One of the earliest examples of Deleuze's engagement with the notion of history can be found in his *Difference and Repetition*. In the work, the notion of history does not appear as a main topic of scrutiny. Instead, the work introduces its discussions on history in a scattered manner and focuses on history's relation to the notion of time and time's three pillars, which are the past, the present and the future. Similar to his engagement with the nature of time, Deleuze also utilizes the ideas of repetition and difference in his approach to the notion of history. In general, the work exhibits how the Deleuzian understanding of history and historiography differs from the dominant scientific historicist understanding in Western thinking. It illustrates that Deleuze's views aim to "deliver thought from the chains of transcendence, preventing it from teleological, deterministic or genealogical tendencies" (Gioli 5).

Deleuze construes the notion of history through his inquiry of the history of philosophy and its relation to the topics of reality and representation. He asserts that "commentaries in the history of philosophy" possess "a double existence" since they are not only influenced by some other texts but also influence the text they are included in (D&R xxii). This interaction between the former and the present texts constitutes a "pure repetition" (D&R xxii). The *double existence* is the reason why Deleuze indicates that his text also includes "historical notes" (D&R xxii). In line with this idea of *double existence*, Deleuze not only integrates *historical notes* that present scientific and forward-progress approaches to history into his text, but also blends them with his contemplations and reviews in order to discuss the relation between his authentic view of time and history. Among his references to earlier philosophical approaches can be found German philosopher Karl Marx's approach to the nature of history. Deleuze asserts that diverging from Hegel's abstract ideas, Marx "indicates rather than develops, an essentially 'theatrical' idea" (D&R 10). Deleuze puts that when history is seen as theatre, repetition appears as "a condition of movement under which the 'actors' or the 'heroes' produce something effectively new in history" (D&R 10). Deleuze calls this "the theatre of repetition", which confronts "the theatre of representation" (D&R 10). Ayesha Abdullah explains the theatre of representation, stating that

the actor fills up the space of a role that is always in relation to other roles and a distinctive point in relation to several historical access points. What is

integral, however, is that movement is enacted without mediation, without intermediary. (23)

The movement here conditioned by repetition similarly confronts the idea of conceptualization and representation (D&R 10). In the theatre of repetition appears “the whole apparatus of repetition as a 'terrible power'” (D&R 10) which leads to the affirmation of difference by destroying the ideas of the same, the identical and the analogous that emerge within conceptualization and representation. Thus, the notion of history can be said to introduce in general two types of destruction. One can be found in a politician’s destruction which “is above all concerned to deny that which 'differs', so as to conserve or prolong an established historical order, or to establish a historical order which already calls forth in the world the forms of its representation” (D&R 53). Here the politician destroys the idea of difference by subordinating repetition to “an established historical order” (D&R 53). The other can be seen as the poet’s destruction “in the name of a creative power, capable of overturning all orders and representations in order to affirm Difference in the state of permanent revolution which characterizes eternal return” (D&R 53). According to Deleuze, “history progresses not by negation and the negation of negation, but by deciding problems and affirming differences” (D&R 268). It can be suggested that “In re-playing the positive/negative opposition, Deleuze thus invokes another rhythm of the political than that inherent in Marx’s thinking” (Coole 84). His idea of the theatre of repetition is therefore concerned with the poet’s destruction that perpetually affirms difference within the ever-lasting revolution of the Nietzschean eternal return.

However, Deleuze maintains that the idea of eternal return does not only refer to a single definition that belongs to Friedrich Nietzsche. Deleuze argues that prior to the Nietzschean eternal return can be shown the eternal returns of *the Moderns* and *the Ancients*. He considers that the distinction the philosophy of history makes between the “historical time” of the Moderns and “the cyclical time” of the Ancients in order to differentiate between the varying forms of eternal return is insufficient (D&R 242). He explains that this distinction claims that the cyclical time proposed by the Ancients tend to “revolve” whereas historical time proposed by the Moderns tend to “progress in a straight line” (D&R 242). However, this distinction can only produce “a meagre achievement” (D&R 242). One reason he points out is that the

eternal return of the Ancients solely refers to repetition in either a “physical” or an “astronomical” sense; therefore, it illustrates return “as a 'law of nature'” (D&R 242). In this way, it can only generate “a simple and very general resemblance: for the 'same' qualitative process, or the 'same' respective position of the stars determine only very crude resemblances among the phenomena they govern” (D&R 242). Deleuze suggests that considering eternal return as a law of nature turns it into a generality. He exemplifies this by pointing to Heraclitus’ idea of fire, stating that “the great year of Heraclitus was only the time necessary for that part of fire which constituted a living being to transform itself into earth and back into fire” (D&R 242). The idea of fire in Heraclitus refers to everything’s origin and means a consuming element that makes the return possible. Heraclitus proposes that there is a constant flux in the universe; therefore, nothing is permanent. However, Deleuze points out that the change in the being of the earth eventually is followed by the fire, creating a generality in the repetition. It is deducible by this example that when eternal return is regarded as a generality, it is only seen as an element for resemblance that only explains the process of the phenomena. Such an eternal return does not attempt to distort the order of the universe and its continuous cycle.

Consequently, Deleuze goes so far as to ask this question: “Why did Nietzsche, who knew the Greeks, know that the eternal return was *his* own invention, an untimely belief or belief of the future?” (D&R 242). Vernon W. Cisney asserts that Deleuze thinks “eternal return is formulated by Nietzsche as a concept of repetition in a world where Identity, the Same, and the Similar have already been abolished” (43). Therefore, the philosopher considers that Nietzsche owns his authentic idea of an eternal return since it “is in no way the return of a same, a similar or an equal” as in the Ancient approach. Being a “complete metamorphosis, the irreducibly unequal”, Nietzschean eternal return refers to “the superior form” (53) of time that deals with “the univocity of the different” (D&R 54). The idea of univocity amounts to the idea that difference does not stem from “an historical relativism”, namely, the relative distinction between chaotic creation and representation (D&R 53). Difference does not consist of degrees of difference between oppositional elements. Deleuze expresses that “things must be dispersed within difference, and their identity must be dissolved before they become subject to

eternal return and to identity in the eternal return” (D&R 241). Therefore, he differentiates between “the average forms and the extreme forms (new values)” in the sense that extreme forms do not arise from their oppositional difference from the average forms, nor can they be attributed with “infinity” (D&R 53). Eternal return as the superior form is not “infinite”; it is “the eternal formlessness of the eternal return itself, throughout its metamorphoses and transformations” (D&R 54). Therefore, “eternal return is what differs or makes difference by creating the superior form of everything” (Hallward 150).

Deleuze links the Nietzschean eternal return with Marx’s idea of historical repetition. Depicted as a *theatre of repetition*, history in association with the Nietzschean eternal return is formed by “historical actors or agents [who] can create only on condition that they identify themselves with figures from the past” (D&R 91). Referring to Harold Rosenberg, Deleuze further clarifies that the action of the historical actors turns into “a spontaneous repetition of an old role” (D&R 91). Such an impromptu repetition of the past generates “the revolutionary crisis, the compelled striving for “something entirely new”, that causes history to become veiled in myth...” (D&R 91). The historical action itself is composed of historical repetition. However, this repetition does not amount to the repetition of the same. Even though the historical actors identify themselves with the actors and circumstances of the past and do not intend to produce novelty, their action always consists of difference. Deleuze puts forward that the theatre of repetition ultimately produces a history that does resemble neither the reality nor the representation. This history merely belongs to the present and the present actor that repeats. It does not carry qualities of similarity or analogy within its body. Instead, it becomes an authentic account that has its roots only in itself. In this regard, it shows a self-reflective nature by making its only source of truth its own being. In conclusion, the eternal return blurs the line between reality and representation, and history “become[s] veiled in myth” (D&R 91).

Deleuze asserts that the blend of reality and representation is embedded in the nature of historical repetition itself and does not stem from “the reflection of historians” (D&R 91). He argues that what some historians term as repetition between the past and the present is only the detection of resemblance (D&R 90). It is

not possible to derive “empirical correspondences” that would decode repetition in history since “repetition is never a historical fact, but rather the historical condition under which something new is effectively produced” (D&R 90). Deleuze explains that the agents in history repeat other agents “from the historical past” and generate the new. Such a repetition is not determined by “the historian's reflection”, but it is created by the actors’ will to repeat “once in the mode which constitutes the past, and once more in the present of metamorphosis” (D&R 90). The past and the present are not only “in itself repetition”, but they also “repeat each other” (D&R 90). Therefore, the historian’s finding “empirical correspondences” between the past and the present only means finding resemblances (D&R 90). This shows “Deleuze believes that imitating the past (which is itself also a repetition) by merely passively copying without regard to the radicalness of differentiation for its own sake is not relating authentically or ethically to the past” (Price 101). Deleuze suggests that the historian can only work through representations of the past. Thus, the historian should be aware an imitation of the past does not reveal the intact origin of the past, namely, the pure past. Even if they see historiography as an act of passive copying, the existence of difference at each instance of imitation, that is, the repetition of the past will include an in-itself differentiator of the origin. Inevitably, repetition within and between the past and the present detaches itself from identity and opposition and immerses itself in a perpetual state of transformation within the Nietzschean eternal return. Each repetition ultimately paves the way to novelty, that is, difference to some small or great degree, and each instance of difference erases the distinction between reality and representation in history as it “become[s] veiled in myth” (D&R 91).

It can be seen that Deleuze proposes two main understandings of history, namely, history as theatre of representation and history as theatre of repetition. The theatre of representation can be mainly associated with the first two syntheses while the theatre of repetition can be linked the third synthesis. The first and second syntheses, with their particular concern and engagement with representation of the past and observing repetition as a force to sustain this representation, can be said to deal with history as a theatre of representation. On the other hand, the third synthesis with its idea of eternal return that decentralizes the simple circle of time and offers a

tortuous, chaotic one deals with the theatre of repetition. In this way, the third synthesis goes beyond the degrading and adjusting form of representation by blurring the lines between the original and the derived. Ultimately, the reality of history in the theatre of repetition becomes the simulacrum of reality. This way, repetition in history turns out to be generating only difference within the demented cycle of the eternal return.

Overall, this chapter has introduced Gilles Deleuze's authentic views on the nature of time, its convoluted proceedings and its multi-folded relation with history. The next two chapters intend to embody Deleuze's ideas on time and history by providing solid examples that exhibit the influence of Deleuzian three syntheses on the interaction of the characters in *Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit* and *Sexing the Cherry* with the past, the present and the future. To gather its analyses under analogous pillars, the study revolves around three themes, which are habitual life, escape and return, and investigates each theme in line with French philosopher Gilles Deleuze's approach to time and history. In this way, it mainly attempts to shed light on complementary and distinctive implications of Deleuze's habitual and demented time in the mentioned two novels. The following chapters construe the changing balances between the notions of repetition and difference within the intradiegetic narrators' contemplations on time, history and historiography. Thus, they not only try to understand how the characters' varying perspectives towards the familiar and the unfamiliar in life, but also observe the contribution of complementary ideas in these novels, such as the ideas of linearity, irrevocability, veracity, representation and multiplicity. Ultimately, a Deleuzian reading of Winterson's two works intend to shed light on the writer's evolving views on time and its relation to history.

CHAPTER 3

DELEUZIAN TIME IN *ORANGES ARE NOT THE ONLY FRUIT*

Published in 1985 as the debut novel of Jeanette Winterson, *Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit* offers an introduction to the writer's exploration of the themes of time and history. Throughout the novel, the reader follows the intradiegetic narrator Jeanette's internal and external journeys amid temporal narrative fluxes that provide fragmentations of her life, consciousness and imagination. When analysed from a Deleuzian framework, it can be realized that *Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit* discusses the notion of time mainly through ideas that can be found in Deleuze's first synthesis of the living present. Consequently, its scrutiny on time centres on the living present's interaction with habits and expectations respectively associated with the past and the future. The impact of the first synthesis is especially apparent in the novel's profound inquiry into the nature of history.

The novel's character-narrator Jeanette tells the story of her life and self-development process through a convoluted narrative. She is adopted and brought up by a Pentecostal family, mostly under the shadow of the mother, who is prone to follow absolutist views on life and values. Jeanette becomes a close follower of the teachings of the Church. Her school life is shaped by her mother's spiritual teachings, and her views on life and relationships are primarily affected by her mother's ideas. Her mother's binaristic thinking influences the way younger Jeanette perceives life. She grows up with a past constructed by her mother. This upbringing indicates her mother's aim to designate a future for Jeanette in line with her spiritual ideals. However, the constant clash of the past, the present and the future within Jeanette's mind gradually demonstrates her desire to escape into her own present detached from her mother's absolutist and binaristic ideas. This urge is largely

reflected in the narrative through her investigation of the nature of time in its relation to history and historiography.

The novel's content regarding Jeanette's concern with generating a present of her own and her dilemma in the decision-making process is reflected in the formal qualities of the work, as well. Generally speaking, it can be said that "*Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit* takes shape through multiple, fragmented and non-linear narratives that tend to echo a variety of other literary styles, from biblical ones to fantasy and fairy tale" (Hutchison 365). Complementarily, Merja Makinen in *The Novels of Jeanette Winterson* (2005) maintains that

The 'narrative collage' of the novel illustrates the impossibility of encompassing an identity within any single genre or text, and suggest that such a mix of fairy tale, myth and autobiography rejects the binary opposites initially set up by the mother. (40)

This shows that formal qualities such as temporal narrative fluxes and intertextual elements serve to illustrate the intradiegetic narrator's attempt to detach herself from her mother's living present.

On the other hand, the reminiscences of the past revived by temporal fluxes in her inner journeys as well as the fragmentation of fairy tales and biblical stories confuse Jeanette's resistance against the habits and expectations of her mother's living present, by triggering her reliance on the senses of familiarity and safety offered by that present. Since her views towards life and social issues seem to transcend her mother's absolutist and binaristic thinking, Jeanette ultimately becomes obliged to leave her habitual life and her home. Later on, she decides to escape from the neighbourhood in which she grows up into the city in order to finalize her detachment. Nevertheless, her desire to obtain a present of her own and designate a pursuant future is constantly disrupted by the binding influence of her mother's living present. This binding becomes apparent with her return home for a family visit. The open ending of the novel implies that Jeanette cannot completely detach herself from the living present of her mother which offers a constructed past and designated future for her.

3.1. Habitual Life

The temporal fluxes of Jeanette's narrative are initiated through her inner journey to the past with a generalization, as she expresses that "like most people I lived for a long time with my mother and father" (Oranges 15). In Deleuzian view of time, it is openly stated that the past offers the ground for all times, namely, the present and the future. In this regard, Jeanette grounds her story on her past life with her family. Besides, the generalization regarding the commonality of living with the family in early ages provides an advance notice for the character-narrator's detailed portrayal of her past habitual life in the family house.

At the core of this habitual life is the contraction of the living present. The contraction can be defined as reducing "the successive independent instants into one another, thereby constituting the lived, or living, present" (D&R 70). Deleuze explains it by referring to the Humean succession of ABs. He puts that in the living present "successive independent instants" occur "when A appears, [thus] we expect B with a force corresponding to the qualitative impression of the entire contracted ABs" (D&R 70). Such a succession points to the habitual nature of the living present. Such habitual nature of her life with family, especially of her mother, which not only initiates, but also composes her narrative largely, is further conveyed when Jeanette continues that "my father liked to watch the wrestling, my mother liked to wrestle; it didn't matter what. She was in the white corner and that was that" (Oranges 15). Jeanette depicts her mother as a woman who creates binaries out of which she would take one side because for her mother "there were friends and there were enemies" (Oranges 15). Therefore, life seems to constitute a contracted and decisive pattern of instants for Jeanette's mother. Jeanette exemplifies the predetermined and absolutist nature of her mother's actions, mentioning how "she hung out the largest sheets on the windiest days" and how "at election time in a Labour mill town she put a picture of the Conservative candidate in the window" (Oranges 15-16). These instances display that the mother tends to act in analogous or same ways when she encounters repetitive events.

Jeanette's mother's habitual lifestyle does not only show itself through her actions, but also in the way she contemplates on and perceives life. To clarify, Jeanette gives the example that on Sundays "she always prayed in exactly the same

way” (Oranges 15-16). Deleuze explains that habit extends beyond “qualitative impression[s]”, such as “instantaneous action which combines with another to form an element of repetition” (D&R 70), towards “a contemplative soul” (74). In this sense, the habits of the living present not only influence the person’s acts and behaviours, but also the mind’s mode of thinking. Deleuze explains the impact of contraction in creating a pattern for contemplation within present time, stating that “contraction also refers to the fusion of successive tick-tocks in a contemplative soul” (D&R 74). Jeanette explains that the rigid spiritual stance of her mother embodies such “successive tick-tocks” (D&R 74). In this regard, Jeanette’s mother conducts her spiritual endeavours with regular contemplative practices. Her praying does not tend to differ in content since she leans her habitual life on Evangelistic teachings. Therefore, Jeanette states her mother “was Old Testament through and through” (Oranges 16). In this way, the mother blurs her earthly time within her spiritual living, in which she is “out there, up front with the prophets, and much given to sulking under trees when the appropriate destruction didn’t materialise” (Oranges 16). Besides, the mother founds her living present on absolutist and binaristic views of earthly issues. This contraction of habitual life through spiritual contemplation is repeated in a cycle through its dialectical impact so that the spiritual contemplation in turn influences the formation of habitual life. Deleuze clarifies this by stating that, in the living present “we are contemplations, we are imaginations, we are generalities, claims and satisfactions” (D&R 74).

In this regard, Jeanette’s past life with her family, particularly with her mother, moulded by such “generalities, claims and satisfactions” lays the base for the domination of her mother’s living present in her narrative by influencing her view of life from early ages (D&R 74). As a formal element, the image of the fruit “orange”, beginning from the title of the novel, shows her mother’s influence on Jeanette’s approach to life. As Mine Özyurt Kılıç puts it,

the “talismanic” title she gives to the first novel of her cycle is integral to this innovative and pluralist attitude towards history: “Oranges are *‘by no means’* the Only Fruit”. The novel unfolds a personal history defying the accepted norms, which find diversity thrilling in its reductionist pose and thus equal fruit with Oranges only. (128)

Throughout Jeanette's narrative, the image of the orange repeats itself in order to point out the mother's rigid perspective towards life and its influence on the intradiegetic narrator's contemplations of her present life. The fruit of orange for the majority of Jeanette's narrative appears to be the only fruit her mother accepts to consume and make her daughter eat. Thus, with the image of the fruit, Jeanette not only conveys her mother's idea that Oranges are to be seen as the only fruit, but also how for the majority of her past life her approach had tended to follow the thinking of her mother. The image of the orange expands beyond its literal meaning as a fruit in Jeanette's narrative and represents her engagement with the notion of time, as well. Jeanette develops an understanding of time as only formed by the habits and expectations of her mother. Thus, her perception of the past and time's relation with history is influenced by the binaristic and absolutist views of her mother. Nevertheless, the more she seeks ways to detach herself from the living present of her mother and generate her own present, the more she detaches from seeing the oranges as the only fruit. In the mother's habitual life, the idea of repetition is associated with the notions of analogy and similarity. Therefore, the repeating image of the orange in her living present conforms to this understanding of repetition, which comes up with certain expectations from the future in line with the habits that compose the present. Since the mother's life is shaped by her spiritual habits, she expects the future time to abide by her habits. The image of the orange refers to the mother's desire to preserve and transfer her rigid views on life and human relations to her daughter. Although the idea of repetition becomes more associated with the idea of change in Jeanette's view of life as she takes more steps to detach her present from that of her mother, it seems to take a long time for Jeanette to develop divergent views than her mother's absolutist and binaristic perspective towards the nature of time and history.

Not only the habits of her mother's living present, but also its expectations that shape Jeanette's history accordingly attempt to modify the character-narrator's present. Jeanette's constructed history can be rendered as an act to designate a point of departure for Jeanette's ontological status. Deleuze explains that the living present tends to form a simple cycle and "goes from the past to the future which it constitutes in time, which is to say also from the particular to the general whom it develops in

the field of its expectation” (D&R 71). Thus, contraction provides a “direction to the arrow of time” (D&R 71). This is apparent when Jeanette begins her narrative, not by touching upon how she came to the world, but rather with a generalization on family life and descriptions on her mother’s habits. It shows that Jeanette associates her beginning with her mother, which is the source of the familiar for her. Therefore, the early stages of Jeanette’s life derive their roots from a history constructed for the narrator by her mother aiming to fit Jeanette into the expectations of her living present. Employing a cycle that departs from her constructed past can be interpreted as Jeanette’s inclination towards understanding her history under the influence of her mother’s living present. She reveals how she became the daughter of her mother by directly referring to her mother’s memory of the past, as she says, “She had a mysterious attitude towards the begetting of children... So she did the next best thing and arranged for a foundling. That was me” (Oranges 15). Deleuze suggests that the past of the past, which consists of reminiscences of involuntary memory, is “no longer the immediate past of retention but the reflexive past of representation” (D&R 71). This stems from the fact that “memory reconstitutes the particular cases as distinct, conserving them in its own 'temporal space'” (D&R 71). Grounding her past on the accounts of her mother, Jeanette accepts to proceed her present within the framework of her mother’s habitual lifestyle. This tendency can be seen as a reduction of repetition into similitude.

Deleuze further associates the reduction of repetition into similitude within the living present with the “contractile power” of imagination that grounds “independent, identical or similar cases” (D&R 70). This contractile power of imagination which seeks to build similarities between cases is apparent through Jeanette’s inclusion of fairy tales into her narrative. In-between her retrospective internal journeys that revisit the occurrences of her past life, Jeanette annexes a tale to her narration that confirms her attachment to the history constructed by her mother. The tale conveys the story of “a brilliant and beautiful princess, so sensitive that the death of a moth could distress her for weeks on end” (Oranges 20). Years pass and on a forest walk, the princess meets “an old hunchback who knew the secrets of magic” (Oranges 20). The old lady desires to leave her responsibilities to the princess. When she accepts, the old lady dies. It is noteworthy that Jeanette

places this tale between the accounts of how her mother has chosen a spiritual life, leaving behind “the things she couldn’t be”, such as speaking French and playing the piano, and how her mother has adopted her to “train”, to “build”, to “dedicate it[her] to the Lord” (Oranges 20-21). Jeanette’s mother forms her living present by denying her past life by shifting into a spiritual present. In line with her ideals, she reconstructs Jeanette’s past in order to fit her into her own living present and bring her up in accordance with the expectations of the future that conforms to her present habits. This refers to the mother’s desire to bring up Jeanette as a missionary for God. Therefore, the placement of the tale between the mother’s recalls of her spiritual transition indicates the impact of her mother’s spiritual aims on Jeanette’s present. This impact embodied by the contractile power of imagination seems to appear in the form of fairy tales during the initial phases of Jeanette’s life.

Not only Jeanette’s personal history but also her approach to the notion of history is influenced by her mother’s living present. Jeanette defines her mother as living in her mind “out there, up front with the prophets” (Oranges 16). This refers to the place of spiritual teachings in the habitual life of mother. Being a part of her mother’s living present, young Jeanette perceives history and the operations of the world through her mother’s lessons. She takes her mother’s views as reference points in building her approach to the notion of time and its relation to history. She maintains that she has “developed an understanding of Historical Process through the prophecies in the Book of Revelation, and a magazine called The Plain Truth, which ... [her] mother received each week” (Oranges 27). This shows that Jeanette’s understanding of the notion of history depends upon her mother’s approach to history and it amounts to a view of history as a “spontaneous repetition of an old role” (D&R 91). Although with the passing of time it becomes apparent that these teachings as products of historical repetition are subverted by authentic reflections of Jeanette’s present, they initially serve to confirm the mother’s living present. Kathryn Allan explains that “Jeanette's initial understanding of history comes from her mother's religious instruction” (34). Consequently, the knowledge of the “Historical Process” (Oranges 27) that young Jeanette receives from her mother’s sources determines what Jeanette could expect from her life through the filter of “the reflected generality of understanding” that “weights the expectation in the imagination in proportion to

the number of distinct similar cases observed and recalled” (D&R 71). Being fed by the sources provided by her mother keeps Jeanette’s perception of life in line with her mother’s perception. This can be derived from the instance when the mother feels uncomfortable with the idea of her daughter’s beginning to school. She does not like her daughter to attend school because she believes it would “lead you [her] astray” (Oranges 26). This shows that she assumes it would introduce Jeanette a different point of view dissociated from the habits and expectations of her living present. In order to keep Jeanette a part of her habitual life, the mother believes Jeanette should be influenced only by her own teachings derived from her spiritual ideals.

Ironically, the teachings and lessons at school do not trigger the sense of questioning in Jeanette and disturb her contemplations on the nature of time and history. The lessons she takes at school do not interfere with Jeanette’s attachment to her mother’s spiritual life. Instead, a memory of Jeanette that marks the first day of school triggers her questioning. Lies Xhonneux asserts that “rather than proceed[ing] linearly through the story, Winterson’s first-person narrator, Jeanette, let her imagination make connections to guide her along” (103). The beginning of her diversion from her mother’s strict ideas is set by a Deleuzian “artificial sign”, which marks the occasion of Jeanette’s first day of school. Deleuze argues that artificial signs enable one to pass from “spontaneous imagination to the active faculties of reflective representation, memory and intelligence” (D&R 77). The artificial sign of her imagination that causes this passage towards “reflective representation” appears to be her pyjama top, which makes her regularly have sore ears (D&R 77). In the first school morning, Jeanette’s ears are once again hurt by the top. The incident causes Jeanette to leap into a prospective recall through which she contemplates on the constructed nature of history and the compelling nature of her mother’s living present. With the sense of being hurt by the pyjama top, Jeanette remembers that due to the narrowness of it with a “neck hole the same size as the arm holes”, “once I [she] went deaf for three months with my [her] adenoids” (Oranges 30). She conveys that the incident of going deaf is interpreted both by the church community and her mother as “a state of rapture” (Oranges 30). This shows the modifying nature of her mother’s living present so as to alter and adapt a pathological incident as a spiritual incident. It implies that in order to fit Jeanette and her life into her living present, the

mother tends to infuse the reality with her ideals. This demonstrates that the mother is willing to erase the reality and construct complying truths in order to protect her habitual life, and she does not want to accept any incident that goes against her living present.

When Jeanette is hurt by the pyjama top and taken to a hospital, the doctor examines her and announces that she has gone deaf due to the injury. Learning the real reason of her deafness, Jeanette's mother loses interest in her daughter's condition. Thus, the medical examination reveals in a crystal-clear manner that once the reality diverges from her living present, Jeanette's mother is willing to exclude or modify it. Her tendency towards altering or modifying also triggers in Jeanette the urge of questioning as it shows to her that her mother's living present cannot an ultimate truth based on religion that can truly explain the processing of world. This dilemma can be understood by her statement that "Since I was born I had assumed that the world ran on very simple lines like a larger version of our church. Now I was finding that even the church was sometimes confused" (Oranges 34). On the one hand, the statement "since I was born" can be read as an indicator of Jeanette's attachment to her mother's past as the beginning point of her history. In a Deleuzian sense, Jeanette seems unable to detach herself thoroughly from her mother's living present because its *Habitus* is still effective in steering her mind to find a point of beginning in the past to proceed cyclically towards the future. So to speak, Jeanette associates her moment of birth with the moment of foundling and accepts that point as her beginning. She also mentions that what has shaped her perspective towards life have been the teachings of Church. On the other hand, the fact that Jeanette's condition turns out to be a medical problem seems to have falsified her mother's expectations that ascribe her deafness to be sign of religious rupture. Therefore, the mother leaves Jeanette alone in the hospital. The recession of her mother from Jeanette's present opens an area for her to investigate the nature of time and history. This shows how "Jeanette as a subject in a constant flux raises objections to grand narratives generated by patriarchy" (Yakut 75). Jeanette's dilemmatic contemplation indicates that while she cannot completely detach herself from the habitual life provided to her by her mother, the irrevocable influence of the Church on Jeanette is shaken with the incident.

Jeanette's questioning of the nature of history as divergent from her mother's constructed reality becomes more apparent with her building of "igloo[s] out of orange peels" (Oranges 34). This activity points to Jeanette's investigation of the modified nature of history through the nature of stories. She conveys that

I tried to build an igloo out of the orange peel but it kept falling down and even when it stood up I didn't have an Eskimo to put in it, so I had to invent a story about 'How Eskimo Got Eaten. (Oranges 34)

This recall shows the impact of imagination on the construction of history in the mind. It illustrates how the imagination "gathers the traces of the former present and models the new present upon the old" by interfering with the reality of stories (D&R 104). In this sense, history becomes composed of invented stories. Inventing stories, as Jeanette recalls, has "made me [her] even more miserable" because she accepts that "it's always the same with diversions; you get involved" (Oranges 34). In the case of orange peels, the only lived reality is that Jeanette has eaten some oranges and tried to build things which did collapse immediately. On the other hand, the disguised event brings forth the story of the Eskimo, namely, the "diversion" in the history of the orange peel constructions (Oranges 34). Accepting her subjective involvement with the reality of orange peel igloos, Jeanette also puts forward that the construction of histories compels the constructor to have personal ties with the product. Hayden White explains the constructor's involvement in the reality of history, stating that in history-making

the events are made into a story by suppression or subordination of certain of them and the highlighting of others, by characterization, motific repetition, variation of the tone and point of view, alternative descriptive strategies, and the like—in short, all of the techniques that we would normally expect to find in the employment of a novel or a play. (84)

With the case of the igloo, Jeanette points to her realization that when you come up with stories within your imagination, you become affected by the action of the subject of the invented stories in one way or another. In this way, "Winterson uses history to explore the present. She magnifies the individual's role in historymaking..." (Radetič 205). Here, Jeanette cannot miss the misery since with

the story she has made up regarding the fate of the Eskimo, she “get[s] involved” in the history of Eskimo and is affected by its eventual sensations. This explains why her mother feels uncomfortable learning that her daughter has a medical condition rather than a spiritual one. Deleuze explains that

...it matters little whether or not the former present acts in its objective reality, or rather, in the form in which it was lived or imagined. For imagination intervenes here only in order to gather up the resonances and ensure the disguises between the two presents in the series of the real as lived reality. (D&R 104)

Jeanette’s mother does not aim to come up with the “objective reality” for her daughter; instead, she wants her to believe in “the disguises” as if they referred to the “lived reality” (D&R 104). Tom Lundborg explains this, stating that most of the time “there is the part of the event that clearly seems to belong to ... a person since it is “I” who embody it” (5). Since the mother wants to build a future for Jeanette in line with her living present, she desires the disguised stories to comply with her expectations for the future of Jeanette. This shows that

the “event” is neither a complete whole, nor a static entity that exists independently of the subject, and against an established background or context. Rather than being static, the “event” remains open to movements and processes, according to which it is refigured and recreated in different ways. (Lundborg 8)

However, Tom Lundborg also maintains that “there is always one part of the event that remains impersonal and therefore ungraspable. It cannot be grasped, actualized or realized because it appears to have no relation to me as a person” (5). Similarly, Jeanette’s stay in the hospital provides her with some time for contemplation away from the influence of her mother’s living present. It enables her to ponder upon the nature of “objective reality” and how it is affected by subjective interventions (Lundborg 8). The word “diversion” that she prefers to use to describe the effect of subjective interventions in the creation of disguises points out to the invented nature of stories (Oranges 34). Jeanette understands that even though the Eskimo is the main object affected by the history constructed by her through those “the disguises”, it ultimately creates the same sense of misery within her who is the constructor

(D&R 104). The realization of her influence on another's history and its mutual impact on her mind ignites in Jeanette the spark of questioning the veracity and the irrevocability of her mother's living present as the ultimate shaper of her present.

During her healing period, Jeanette not only ponders upon the constructed nature of history, but also realizes the veil of representation, that is, "a site of transcendental illusion" on reality (D&R 265). Referring to Susanna Onega, Emma Hutchinson puts that with *Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit*

Winterson, again, provides fictional but all-to-real stories that show us why we should distrust so-called "totalising" or "grand narratives" of history. The numerous twists and turns in her stories, the manner in which they construct layers of meaning that did not exist previously, reveal in a compelling manner that we can never get a complete grasp of either the present or the past. (366)

Although Jeanette's mother leaves her in the hospital alone, her mother's church mate Elsie visits Jeanette every day and tells her stories. Elsie wants Jeanette to see that "stories helped you to understand the world" (*Oranges* 35). She says contemplating on the stories themselves will enable to unveil the curtain of representation on the reality as "what looks like one thing ... may well be another" (*Oranges* 36). This both shows the kaleidoscopic nature of reality and allows capturing that this changing nature is not a result of external conditions. When someone eliminates the external veil of representation formed by another person, the past and the present become available to be processed by the mind to create a future for her/his own. Elsie explains the power of the mind in the creation of an unchained future, stating that "If you think about something for long enough ... more than likely, that thing will happen... It's all in the mind" (*Oranges* 36). Unless one eliminates someone else's veil of representation on reality and begins to process it within her/his own mind, s/he remains to live in the reality and construction of someone else, and expect the future to be shaped by the contemplations of that person.

Another artificial sign that shows how Jeanette's mother as she represents the reality of her daughter's past and present is the book she reads her, called *Jane Eyre*

(1847). *Jane Eyre* is the eponymous character of the novel *Jane Eyre* written by Charlotte Brontë in the nineteenth century. Regarded as a significant example of British realist literature, the novel both features a love story and reflects the social conditions of the Victorian era. The realist approach in the novel attempts at a down-to-earth demonstration of the protagonist's life and the events she goes through. In a way, the novel proposes a representation of the protagonist's history as the objective reality. The first time *Jane Eyre* appears in Jeanette's narrative is her contemplation of Jane Eyre's courage against the unfortunate occurrences in her life. Jeanette thinks of times her mother would read this novel to her as an example of piety for a woman to deal with problems in life. Her contemplation on the novel creates a soothing impact in Jeanette as it reminds her of the familiarity and safety of her mother's living present. Jeanette explains that her mother would "read the book to me [her] whenever she felt sad; she said it gave her fortitude" (Oranges 34). The book appears to be a Deleuzian "continuity" in her mother's habitual life (D&R 77). In Deleuze's terms, continuity refers to habits in the sense that

...there is no continuity apart from that of habit, and that we have no other continuities apart from those of our thousands of component habits, which form within us so many superstitious and contemplative selves, so many claimants and satisfactions. (D&R 77)

Consequently, *Jane Eyre* read by her mother serves as a model of courage for Jeanette and perpetuate her links with habit that embed "so many superstitious and contemplative selves, so many claimants and satisfactions" of her mother's living present in Jeanette's perception of reality (D&R 77).

Another instance accentuates why *Jane Eyre* (1847) can be considered a Deleuzian artificial sign in Jeanette's perception of the present. Deleuze puts that artificial signs can "refer to the past or the future as distinct dimensions of the present, dimensions on which the present might in turn depend" (D&R 104). With a completing prolepsis, Jeanette reveals that the version of *Jane Eyre* read by her mother as an embodiment of a woman's piety and courage has also been a construction of her mother's imagination in order to impose her living present on Jeanette. Jeanette discovers that her mother has actually intervened in the ending of the novel and changed it as the way she would like Jane Eyre's story to end.

Whenever Jeanette's mother reads the novel to her, she ends it with the marriage of Jane Eyre and St. John Rivers as an example of courtesy and ideal love. This can be associated with Jeanette's mother's desire to draw a line on her own past as a mistake by immersing herself into a life of spiritual habits. Thus, her intervention into the ending of the novel turns it into an artificial sign for Jeanette as the constructed past of Jane Eyre provides a ground for Jeanette's present and future. In other words, the *Jane Eyre* reproduced through the mother's imagination turns into a reflective representation of Jeanette's past in the present. Jeanette reveals how her mother has changed the ending of the novel and how it has affected her present as follows:

...what my mother didn't know was that I now knew she had rewritten the ending. Jane Eyre was her favourite non-Bible book, and she read it to me over and over again, when I was very small. I couldn't read it, but I knew where the pages turned. Later, literate and curious, I had decided to read it for myself. A sort of nostalgic pilgrimage. I found out, that dreadful day in a back corner of the library, that Jane doesn't marry St John at all, that she goes back to Mr Rochester. (Oranges 73)

It can be said that, in a Deleuzian sense, "any expectation is possible when there is passive synthesis of time; the past is projected into the future through the present" (İsmet 44). This means that expectations are to be fulfilled through drawing assumptions from the past in the living present. However, in order to achieve her projection, Jeanette's mother deliberately turns the objective history of the past into a constructed one. Therefore, Jane Eyre as an artificial sign constitutes an embodiment of Jeanette's mother's desire to designate a future for her daughter. However, Jeanette confesses that one day she has read the novel herself and understood the projection of her mother. She sees that the pious choice of Jane Eyre by marrying St John as the ideal expectation of her mother actually has completely different roots. Elif Önal puts that by rewriting the ending, "the mother equates Jeannette with Jane in her mind and sees a similar choice awaiting Jeanette in the future" (32). This shows that Jeanette's mother wants to shape her daughter's future in line with the spiritual ideals of her living present. Deleuze explains this, stating that in the first synthesis

the past and the future do not designate instants distinct from a supposed present instant, but rather the dimensions of the present itself in so far as it is a contraction of instants. The present does not have to go outside itself in order to pass from past to future. (D&R 71)

Therefore, when the objective reality of the present does not comply with her expectations, Jeanette's mother does not avoid making modifications to the past in line with her expectations. She seems to consider that "by means of habit, we only have a sense of the direction from the past to the future as expectancy" (İsmet 44). Accordingly, the rewriting of the ending of *Jane Eyre* with spiritual connotations, in which the protagonist would marry St John, can be closely associated with her project to "build" and "dedicate" her daughter for God as a missionary (Oranges 20-21). Put differently, the mother can be claimed to think that she can impose her habitual time on Jeanette's present in order to bring up a projected child.

The discovery of her mother's rewriting of the ending of *Jane Eyre* is also associated by Jeanette with her genealogical concerns. Looking back at her story from the present, Jeanette attempts to reach out to a genealogical revelation that would show her where her story actually started. However, the discovery of her mother's rewriting of *Jane Eyre*'s past creates a sense of dreadfulness in Jeanette since within her consciousness she associates the change of the novel's ending to the modification of her beginning. She explains that "it was like the day I discovered my adoption papers while searching for a pack of playing cards. I have never since played cards, and I have never since read *Jane Eyre*" (Oranges 73). Jeanette begins her story not by telling how she was born, but by conveying how her mother attained her as a foundling and has aimed to bring her up as a missionary on the way of God. It can be said that "Jeanette's mother is thus the source of her initial identity and also the model for an imaginative personal history" (Allan 37). However, the constructed status of her history regarding how her beginning actually occurred confuses Jeanette. This confusion is further demonstrated with her retention of the day her "natural mother had come to claim me [her] back" (Oranges 93). Kathryn Allan explains Jeanette's situation, stating that "both 'lies' undermine not only the trust she had in her mother, but also the foundational stories that made up her personal history" (37). The recall of the day, when she learns that her biological mother had come to see her and get her, invokes the sense of uncertainty in Jeanette. The sense

of uncertainty does not only derive from the loss of trust in the past she knows, but also the uncertainty of not knowing who she is and how she has come to the world. Growing up within the familiar and the certain atmosphere of her mother's living present, she cannot abruptly cut her ties with the living present of her mother and step into an unfamiliar future.

Therefore, the realization that she has been deceived by the expectations of her mother with the rewriting of *Jane Eyre's* ending leads Jeanette to draw two dilemmatic conclusions regarding the nature of time. On the one hand, she seems to acknowledge that by rewriting the ending of *Jane Eyre*, her mother attempts not only to rewrite her daughter's past, but also designate her a future in line with her spiritual ideals. The parallelism Jeanette builds between her discovery of her adoption papers and the rewritten ending of *Jane Eyre* shows that she ultimately understands that her history is not a reflection of the pure reality. Rather, what she knows as her beginning has been a representation of the reality by her mother in line with her desires. On the other hand, she does not appreciate the uncertainty of her genealogical reality. Thus, she names the day, in which she learns that she has known as her past was a product of her mother's imagination rather than a product of retention, as an "Awful Occasion" (Oranges 93). Consequently, she confesses that she has never played cards again. The avoidance of playing cards refers to her hesitation to face the uncertainty of her beginning. She tries to avoid any uncertainty that would disturb both her genealogical point and the cyclical structure of time. Therefore, she avoids playing cards in order not to encounter her adoption papers again. Avoiding the cards, she also tries to discard any object and memory that would remind her of the ambiguity of her past. In this sense, she further thinks that "it was a good thing I was destined to become a missionary. For some time after this I put aside the problem of men and concentrated on reading the Bible. Eventually, I thought, I'll fall in love like everybody else" (Oranges 75). Thus, she seems to continue to hold onto the habitual life provided by her mother. Nevertheless, the rewritten story of *Jane Eyre* demonstrates to her that once you begin producing stories, you become involved since you come up with products of your own imagination, not those of retention. Since she realizes the influence of representation on the reality of history, Jeanette begins to develop a different approach to the

constructed nature of history. It is essential to note that she does not intend to cut her ties with her constructed past and habitual present immediately. Instead, upon discovering her mother's lies, she comes to think that if one cannot leave the familiarity and safety of the habitual life, s/he should produce her/his own present that will include her/his own habits and expectations. Thus, she understands that she wants to "invent" her own stories in which she would "get involved" (Oranges 34).

The next chapter "Deuteronomy", namely, "the last book of the law" shows Jeanette's desire to invent her own history in a clear manner (Oranges 87). María del Mar Asensio Aróstegui asserts that the chapter's title is an irony of "the monologic nature of History and of its claims to universal truth" (57). From a Deleuzian perspective, the title can be said to constitute an attempt to subvert the understanding that "human History has always been shaped upon an ontology of a teleological oriented Time" (Gioli 1). This can be derived from the assertion of Giovanna G. Gioli, as she says, "Deleuze elaborates a new conception of Time whose aim is to dismiss the solidarity between Time and History, saving the creative force of both life and thought" (4). From this perspective, Deuteronomy as the title of this chapter can be interpreted as an embodiment of Jeanette's questioning of the unchanging nature of the Bible as the absolute truth on the past, the present and the future.

Following the title, Jeanette begins the chapter by putting forward "time is a great deadener" (Oranges 88). Jeanette further implies that what time deadens is history since within the flux of time "people forget, get bored, grow old, go away" (Oranges 88). Emma Hutchison associates the deadening effect of time with subjectivity, by stating that "in 'Deuteronomy', we are reminded of the inevitable subjectivity of history" (365). This subjectivity that derives from the deadening effect of time can be associated with forgetting. It can be said that with time people tend to modify history through forgetting. Forgetting here means an empirical forgetting rather than transcendental active forgetting which Deleuze explains as follows:

There is a considerable difference between this essential forgetting and an empirical forgetting. Empirical memory is addressed to those things which can and even must be grasped: what is recalled must have been seen, heard, imagined or thought. That which is forgotten, in the empirical sense, is that which cannot be grasped a second time by the memory which searches for it (it

is too far removed; forgetting has effaced or separated us from the memory). (140)

This can be inferred by Jeanette's interpretation of the nature of time, as she says, "there was a time in England when everyone was much concerned with building wooden boats and sailing off against the Turk. When that stopped being interesting, what peasants there were left limped back to the land, and what nobles there were left plotted against each other" (Oranges 88). Empirical forgetting in Jeanette's investigation of the nature of time refers to its deadening effect as once things are empirically forgotten, they cannot be revoked. In this sense, the act of forgetting bears out multiple different stories related to a single history. Therefore, when Jeanette mentions the story of people who were "much concerned with building wooden boats and sailing off against the Turk", she not only introduces the process of empirical forgetting of the past but also how it is reshaped and multiplied in the present (Oranges 88). She expounds on this, stating that,

Of course that is not the whole story, but that is the way with stories; we make them what we will. It's a way of explaining the universe while leaving the universe unexplained, it's a way of keeping it all alive, not boxing it into time. Everyone who tells a story tells it differently, just to remind us that everybody sees it differently. (Oranges 88)

In relation, Barbara Wiercińska-Popko suggests that "Winterson further stresses her point by demonstrating that even a single person will apprehend the same events in a distinctly varying way from the perspective of time" (125). So to speak, the deadening effect of time leads to the modification of the past within every living present. For Jeanette making the stories "what we will" is subversively "a way of keeping it all alive" through their representations (Oranges 88). In other words, the deadening effect of time enables to keep the past alive through representation. Deleuze explains that "an essential feature of representation is that it takes a bare and material repetition as its model, a repetition understood in terms of the Same and explained in terms of the negative" (286). In this sense, time as a deadener paves the way to stories which are told differently every time they are recited. This is caused by the fact that "everybody sees it differently" (Oranges 88).

As the representation of reality multiplies it in accordance with habits and expectations of every living present, Jeanette claims that “some people say there are true things to be found, some people say all kinds of things can be proved. I don’t believe them. The only thing for certain is how complicated it all is, like string full of knots” (Oranges 88). This can be associated with Hayden White’s assertion that

history came to be set over against fiction, and especially the novel, as the representation of the "actual" to the representation of the "possible" or only "imaginable." And thus was born the dream of a historical discourse that would consist of nothing but factually accurate statements about a realm of events which were (or had been) observable in principle, the arrangement of which in the order of their original occurrence would permit them to figure forth their true meaning or significance. (123)

In this sense, White puts that “... history is no less a form of fiction than the novel is a form of historical representation” (122). The idea of historical representation can be also associated with James Williams’ claim that

according to Deleuze’s work on time, no settled history could lay claim to represent the past... It means that in addition to representing the past in the present event, we must also critically analyse how any such representation is a process of change, a selection and the creation of itself with the past and the future. (James Williams 19)

Thus, historical representation affirms the metaphor of a “string full of knots” that is used to explain the convoluted and constructed nature of history (Oranges 88). This metaphor can be linked with how people tend to rewrite the past in the way they desire, which makes it much more complicated. In this way, history becomes a product of the historical agent that repeats it.

Milada Frankova takes this claim a step further, stating that, “In ‘Deuteronomy’ she [Jeanette] also outlines her preference for keeping history in untidy knots interwoven with stories, because clearly stated facts are easily discarded when they become uncomfortable” (*The Mercurial Time* 67). Such an understanding can be said to constitute a completing idea to Jeanette’s avoidance of playing cards and reading *Jane Eyre* ever again. Jeanette openly acknowledges that although she looks for a beginning for her story, she also knows that it is “hard to find the beginning and impossible to fathom the end” (Oranges 88). This shows that she does

not deny the modified nature of her own past and present by the living present of her mother. Therefore, she accepts the represented nature of history, stating that,

The best you can do is admire the cat's cradle, and maybe knot it up a bit more. History should be a hammock for swinging and a game for playing, the way cats play. Claw it, chew it, rearrange it and at bedtime it's still a ball of string full of knots. Nobody should mind. (Oranges 88)

Jeanette considers history as a "cat's cradle" that becomes more and more complicated with the flux of time (Oranges 88). This amounts to the idea that under the deadening effect of time "history becomes subjective, limited, biased, and open to revision and (re)contextualisation..." (Aróstegui 24). In this sense, Jeanette believes that one should stick with her/his own living present and "should [not] mind" the convoluted nature of history composed of individual pieces of stories (Oranges 88). Thus, the stories that make up history should be accepted as products of the mind that tend to be modified. In this sense, Jeanette accepts history as stories, stating that, "It's an all-purpose rainy day pursuit, this reducing of stories called history" (Oranges 88). "Reducing of stories called history" refers to the close relation between the imagination and history since stories become imaginations of the time's reality within the mind aiming to fit it into the habits and the expectations of the first synthesis (Oranges 88).

Jeanette further dwells on the relation between stories and time by investigating the implications of storytelling in the making of history. For Jeanette, "story is a way of organizing and interpreting perception and experience in order to explain both the past and the present" (Bork 162). Thus, storytelling reshapes the retentions in a way that they become reminiscences for future desires as well as reminiscences that would comment on the past. She explains how labelling certain events as storytelling allows choosing between what to believe and what not to believe as follows:

People like to separate storytelling which is not fact from history which is fact. They do this so that they know what to believe and what not to believe. This is very curious. How is it that no one will believe that the whale swallowed Jonah when every day Jonah is swallowing the whale? I can see them now, stuffing down the fishiest of fish tales, and why? Because it is history. Knowing what to believe had its advantages. It built an empire and

kept people where they belonged, in the bright realm of the wallet...
(Oranges 88)

Jeanette maintains that people tend to distinguish between storytelling and history, claiming that stories do not offer the fact that is provided by history. However, she opposes it finding such an approach “very curious” (Oranges 88). This opposition suggests that “Winterson collapses history into storytelling, questioning claims of the objectivity of traditional history” (Hutchison 365). This shows that Jeanette asserts that the veracity of history is a selective phenomenon. It depends on what complies with one’s living present as well as its habits and expectations. In a Deleuzian sense, “habit here manifests its full generality: it concerns not only the sensory-motor habits that we have (psychologically), but also, before these, the primary habits that we are; the thousands of passive syntheses of which we are organically composed” (D&R 74). Carol Denise Bork explains the selective nature of history telling in line with Deleuze’s first synthesis of time, by putting an emphasis on the absolutist views towards the idea of truth in history as follows:

...the absolutists in Jeanette's world claim to know a fixed reality and see anyone who perceives, proposes, or attempts to narrate a different reality as simply wrong. In revealing the hidden relativism of the absolutists, the novel begins to establish the possibility for narrative agency: rather than simply accepting "history," and ignoring the "lens" through which it is presented, we can admit to the ways in which we create the past through our "tinted, tilted, smashed" views” (167).

Such a perspective enables people to sustain their habitual lifestyles in which the history that is chosen to be believed is said to have “built an empire and kept people where they belonged, in the bright realm of the wallet...” (Oranges 88). Deleuze calls this “the problem of habit” (37). James Williams explains the problem of habit by focusing on the selective nature of the living present, stating that

We live as time makers – anything exists as a maker of time. This means that the passive syntheses drawn together in any changing thing are processes making time as a living present through that thing. There are therefore many and multiple living presents. ... problematically, whenever we associate them with active representation we capture a side of them and lose another” (37)

Jeanette sees that such a selective understanding of time in relation to history affects not only her past and present, but also her future. In this sense, Jeanette does not distinguish between story-telling and history-telling. She believes the general practice of history-telling, just like story-telling, inclines towards selected truths of the habit and expectation by subordinating the act of storytelling into the active representation of the first synthesis. Therefore, she states that “very often history is a means of denying the past. Denying the past is to refuse to recognise its integrity. To fit it, force it, function it, to suck out the spirit until it looks the way you think it should” (Oranges 88). This shows that people tend to rewrite the past and the present “to fit it, force it, function it, to suck out the spirit until it looks the way you think it should” (Oranges 88). Just like Jeanette’s orange peel igloo and how it hides untold stories behind, people tend to “get involved” in what they believe to be the fact of history (Oranges 34). Yet, what they actually come up with is denying the “integrity” of history as they rewrite the past in the way it would yield expected future (Oranges 88). In this sense, denying the past, as Jeanette suggests, feed selectivity of the living present and protect the realm of habit and expectation. Ultimately, history becomes a product of imagination, in order to protect “the overly simple cycles, the one followed by a habitual present (customary cycle) as much as the one described by a pure past (memorial or immemorial cycle)” (D&R 94).

Jeanette refers to Pol Pot as a straightforward example. Rachel Loewen Walker suggests that in the living present “... we are simply accountable to our storytelling (history telling and future making) by virtue of having put a particular story, and not another, into the world” (Loewen Walker 22). Similarly, Pol Pot denies his past and tries to get rid of it as it does not fall in line with his living present but does not deny the inevitable position of story-telling in the making of history. Rather, he acknowledges it and instead of modifying the past to fit it into his habits and expectations, he terminates it. Jeanette explains this stating that, “We are all historians in our small way. And in some ghastly way Pol Pot was more honest than the rest of us have been. Pol Pot decided to dispense with the past altogether. To dispense with the sham of treating the past with objective respect” (Oranges 88-89). Jeanette puts that Pol Pot refuses the past; however, he does not attempt to recreate

it. Instead, he prefers to create a present without a past. Although people do not tend to accept the selective nature of the living presents, Jeanette puts that

...people have never had a problem disposing of the past when it gets too difficult. Flesh will burn, photos will burn, and memory, what is that? The imperfect ramblings of fools who will not see the need to forget. And if we can't dispose of it we can alter it. (Oranges 89)

The comparison between Pol Pot and the rest of the people, including Jeanette, reveals that people choose to ignore and reshape the past when it does not comply with their living present. But they do not tend to accept that it is a selective act and what they are doing is an activity of subjective story-telling. However, Jeanette puts that Pol Pot can give up on his past and create a groundless present being honest to his actions.

Upon this, Jeanette once again touches upon the relation between the idea of time as “a great deadener” and the notion of history through her discussion on the nature of memory (Oranges 88). She defines memory as “the imperfect ramblings of fools who will not see the need to forget” (Oranges 89). This refers to the Deleuzian understanding of modified nature of memories, which present the past as the reflexive past of retention. This makes memories “imperfect ramblings” (Oranges 89). The people who prefer these memories over forgetting can be claimed to oppose the deadening effect of time. Jeanette depicts the image of the dead as follows:

The dead don't shout. There is a certain seductiveness about what is dead. It will retain all those admirable qualities of life with none of that tiresome messiness associated with live things. Crap and complaints and the need for affection. You can auction it, museum it, collect it. It's much safer to be a collector of curios, because if you are curious, you have to sit and sit and see what happens. (Oranges 89)

This shows that the dead are purified of any change and undesired qualities. Besides, the dead retain their coherence. However, the dead also appears to be a representation of reality through the lenses of other's living presents. Such a living present that is composed of representations of reality belong to the collector as “... the collector of curios will surround himself with dead things, and think about the past when it lived and moved and had being. The collector of curios lives in a

derelict railway station with a video of various trains. He is the original living dead” (Oranges 89). The collector is defined as someone who “lives in a derelict railway station with a video of various trains” (Oranges 89). This shows that the collector does not seek for the real trains. Instead, he shows interest in their representations in the video. The deadening effect of time here becomes a tool for the repetition of similarity, not difference. The collector collects the past as a repetition of the similar. In a Deleuzian sense, the collector chases what disturbs Nietzschean Zarathustra. This can be associated with Zarathustra’s indictment, where he says, “You have turned Eternal Return into a ‘reprise’, you have degraded Eternal Return into a formulation that is well known and much familiar” (Nietzsche qtd. in Deleuze, *Nietzsche* 41, *my translation*). The collector watches the video of trains over and over again, without any exact change or newness. The time becomes stranded with the monotony of habit and expectation of the living present for the collector. Even though he collects “curious” things, they become the repetition of the similar or the same within the deadening effect of time. In this sense, the collector within the living present becomes “the original living dead” (Oranges 89).

As can be seen, Jeanette in her questioning of the nature of time and history does not deny the assimilating impact of the living present over the past and the future. Thus, the idea of modification in Jeanette’s perception of history tries to offer an order for time’s flux. This order aims to sustain the security and the familiarity of the living present. Jeanette says “the past, because it is past, is only malleable where once it was flexible. Once it could change its mind, now it can only undergo change” (Oranges 89). The past is, as an object, affected by the imagination in the living present through repetition, and change does not occur in it as the object but “in the mind which contemplates it” (D&R 70). In this sense, it is the mind that thinks about the past that is modified by the repetitive occurrence of ABs, which aims to create an order for time’s flux. Jeanette explains the ambition for creating an order of time as follows:

What matters is that order is seen to prevail... and if we are eighteenth-century gentlemen, drawing down the blinds as our coach jumbles over the Alps, we have to know what we are doing, pretending an order that doesn’t exist, to make a security that cannot exist. There is an order and a balance to be found in stories. History is St George. (Oranges 89-90)

Setting an order to the flux of time provides the sense of familiarity. So to speak, it creates a feeling of safe zone against the flux of time. This is done through creating a balance within stories. Mine Özyurt Kılıç further puts that “When later Jeanette says “History is St George”, she actually summarises the way she sees the History with capital H; she senses that the sum total of History is also made up of stories of the great church fathers, the great patriarchs” (129). Therefore, to create an order one should acknowledge that it exists via contemplation. This enables to construct a pattern among memories of the past. In this way, the constructed order of history leads into the belief that it offers facts and truths. However, Jeanette acknowledges that the order of time is inevitably constructed through subjective aims. Therefore, it produces a “sandwich” that is “laced with mustard of my [her] own” (90):

And when I look at a history book and think of the imaginative effort it has taken to squeeze this oozing world between two boards and typeset, I am astonished. Perhaps the event has an unassailable truth. God saw it. God knows. But I am not God. And so when someone tells me what they heard or saw, I believe them, and I believe their friend who also saw, but not in the same way, and I can put these accounts together and I will not have a seamless wonder but a sandwich laced with mustard of my own. (Oranges 90)

Similar to her stories regarding the history of the orange peel igloo and the non-existent Eskimo, Jeanette considers history as constructed through stories with people’s intervention in the flux. In other words, it can be said that “...both the narrator and the novel advocate a construction of the past that admits to its constructedness and to its own discrepancies— the “sandwich laced with mustard of [our] own” rather than the “seamless wonder”” (Bork 167). The mustard that ties the components of history together belongs to individuals. Thus, each one sees and creates different histories that fit into their living presents. Through the image of a sandwich, Jeanette seems to admit that both her beginning and her expected ending has been a project shaped by her mother’s living present. Özyurt Kılıç and Sönmez assert that “drawing an analogy between ready-made food and official history, she suggests that to stay healthy, i.e., not to be manipulated by these lies, one should “make one’s own sandwich” (xiv). This shows that upon her questioning of the notion of time and its influence on history as the “great deadener”, Jeanette comes to

the conclusion that since the urge for “the balance to be found in stories” in line with people’s living presents cannot be eliminated, “if you want to keep your own teeth, make your own sandwiches ...” (Oranges 90).

3.2. Escape

The desire of making her sandwiches urges Jeanette to construct and live in her own present detached from her mother’s living present. This urge is complemented by the idea of escape. Mainly the “awful occasion” (93) revokes the feeling of escaping into her own present in Jeanette. When Jeanette learns that her biological mother has come to see her but her mother has not let her in, she has a quarrel with her mother. The occasion makes it clear-cut for Jeanette that her past has been modified by her mother in a sense that it has become another past made of her mother’s memories. Even so, her mother seems to make herself believe that she is the actual mother of Jeanette whereas Jeanette’s biological mother is only “a carrying case” (Oranges 94). However, the living present her mother imposes on her suffocates Jeanette. This urges her even to dare to leave behind the familiar of that living present with its habits and expectations. Right after the quarrel, Jeanette gets out of her home and runs to the hill where she could see the whole town. She realizes that the town remains the same as always. However, Jeanette thinks, “I had rather gaze on a new ice age than these familiar things” (Oranges 94). This shows the sense of escape in her.

Another thing that makes Jeanette want to escape is the consequences of her “unnatural” relationship with Melanie (Oranges 97). Since her mother reflects the habits and the expectations of her own living present on Jeanette through a spiritual mirror, she opines Jeanette to abide with the rules and restrictions of religious doctrines uttered by the pastor of their Church and their faction. She believes that her adoption of Jeanette has determined her destiny. However, Jeanette’s mother only perceives the deterministic side of destiny. On the other hand, Jeanette can be said to perceive the idea of destiny from a Deleuzian perspective. Deleuze explains destiny as follows:

Consider what we call repetition within a life - more precisely, within a spiritual life. Presents succeed, encroaching upon one another. Nevertheless, however strong the incoherence or possible opposition between successive presents, we have the impression that each of them plays out 'the same life' at different levels. This is what we call destiny. Destiny never consists in step-by-step deterministic relations between presents which succeed one another according to the order of a represented time. Rather, it implies between successive presents non-localisable connections, actions at a distance, systems of replay, resonance and echoes, objective chances, signs, signals and roles which transcend spatial locations and temporal successions. (D&R 83)

As Deleuze puts it, destiny does not work with the “step-by-step deterministic relations between presents” (83). Rather, Deleuze contends that

we say of successive presents which express a destiny that they always play out the same thing, the same story, but at different levels: here more or less relaxed, there more or less contracted. This is why destiny accords so badly with determinism but so well with freedom: freedom lies in choosing the levels. (83)

In this regard, Jeanette's desire to decide for her own destiny that goes hand in hand with the idea of freedom urges her to escape towards the creation of her own present. She wants to be away from the prevention of making decisions on her own by the Church and her mother. Therefore, she gradually realizes that the way of having the freedom to make her own choices is to have her own present.

Jeanette's desire to have the opportunity of “choosing the levels” is accompanied by her will to decide for her own destiny (D&R 83). The idea of making her decision constitutes a completing analepsis for her desire to escape due to her mother's opposition to her “unnatural passions” with Melanie and its shows itself as she goes to visit her upon the exposition of their affair among the church community (Oranges 97). This incident is fragmented by two internal journeys, in the first of which, she walks through the “city of Lost Chances” (Oranges 102). Indeed, dreaming is a recurrent occurrence for Jeanette in the moments of crisis that helps her encounter her unconscious fears and desires. With a transition from the external world towards her internal world, Jeanette sees a bookshop in which an assistant explains to her that it is

where everyone is who can't make the ultimate decision, this is the city of Lost Chances, and this, the Room of the Final Disappointment. You see, you can climb as high as you like, but if you've already made the Fundamental Mistake, you end up here, in this room. You can change your role, but never your circumstance. (Oranges 102)

"The Room of Final Disappointment" hosts those who have not decided for themselves but abided by the expectations of others' living presents (Oranges 102). This subordination to such expectations without trying to make a decision is regarded as "the Fundamental Mistake", which is irrevocable (Oranges 102). Jeanette sees that if she accepts the providence cut out for her by her mother and continues, she will be stuck in the fixed destiny of her mother's living present.

Jeanette's inclination to diverge from her mother's providence becomes more apparent when she learns that Melanie has accepted the destiny cut out for her by the Church and become submissive. In order to find out more, Jeanette visits and questions Melanie and understands that she will not go against the will of the Church. Thus, she returns home where the pastor and her mother wait for her to discuss her deeds, and falls into "a glandular fever" (Oranges 103). This second loss of consciousness causes her to lose all her keepsakes from Melanie because, when she is unconscious, her mother burns down all the material evidences of her past in the backyard of their house. However, this evokes in Jeanette the feeling that her mother is not the protective queen of her life anymore, as she thinks, "She burnt a lot more than the letters that night in the backyard. I don't think she knew. In her head she was still queen, but not my queen any more, not the White Queen any more" (Oranges 102). The protection of her mother and the safety of life with her are represented with the imagery of walls. Jeanette begins to think that "walls protect and walls limit. It is in the nature of walls that they should fall. That walls should fall is the consequence of blowing your own trumpet" (Oranges 103). The idea of "blowing your own trumpet" signals her determination to build her own living present (Oranges 103). She questions "she [her mother] had a heart of stone. Who will cast the first stone?" (Oranges 103). This also means that she believes she needs to take a step to get away from the living present of her mother. This can be inferred by her thoughts that one should not be frightened by the "stone lion", the "gryphon made of stone" and the "stone turret" (Oranges 104). She tries to sooth her mind by

thinking “do not be afraid. These are the ancients. Weathered and wise as they are, respect them, but they are not the everlasting substance. The body that contains a spirit is the one true god” (Oranges 104). The image of the wall refers to the walls of the living present, the *Habitus*, surrounding Jeanette with the promise of safety and familiarity. Jeanette is taught by the spiritual teachings of her mother that if she tries to escape from the *Habitus*, she will be damaged by the uncertainty of time. Önal suggests that “In Jeanette’s case, the walls belong to the church which surrounded and protected her till then. However, her assertion of her own choice brings about the fall of the secure walls of the church for her” (35). Through her inner journey where she visits the city of Lost Chances, Jeanette realizes that unless she breaks the walls surrounding her present, she will become one of the resident of that city “who chose the wall” and failed in life (Oranges 104).

The situation leads Jeanette to question certain binaries within her life that keeps her in her mother’s habitual time. She associates this habitual time with the image of home that comes with the ideas of protection and safety. Therefore, she questions whether she has to “wander unprotected through the land” or “to live without a home” in order to step out of the habits and expectations of her mother’s living present (Oranges 104). Jeanette also thinks that “it is necessary to distinguish the chalk circle from the stone wall” and “it is necessary to distinguish physics from metaphysics” (Oranges 104). She moves onto a dilemmatic reasoning in her internal world, thinking that “it is necessary to distinguish physics from metaphysics” (Oranges 104). This can be regarded as a completing analepsis that refers to her mother’s construction of her history from a spiritual perspective, bringing her up as the child that will become a servant to God. Jeanette’s dilemmatic reasoning shows that she cannot completely detach herself from the living present of her mother. This can be inferred by her acceptance that she still cannot make a radical differentiation between any of these, as she thinks, “yet many of the principles are the same” (Oranges 104). The only distinction she can make is between the external and the internal worlds, acknowledging the existence of “a wall for the body, a circle for the soul” (Oranges 104). While walls are physical forces that keep her with her mother, the circle will become a hindrance that surrounds her soul. This distinction is further linked to former occurrences, such as the discovery of her adoption, the awful

occasion and her mother's hindrance on her preferences in life, each of which leads Jeanette to question whether her perspective towards life is the same with her mother. This enables her to realize that, "I had often thought of questioning her, trying to make her tell me how she saw the world. I used to imagine we saw things just the same, but all the time we were on different planets" (Oranges 105). More and more, Jeanette comes to the realization that home constitutes a physical force that keeps her within the walls of her mother. She sees that unless she leaves home, she cannot detach herself from her mother's perspective towards life.

It can be seen that with varying images and memories of incidents, Jeanette repeatedly questions the binding impact of her mother's living present on her life and reasoning. However, she still approaches the idea of repetition not as a matter that would facilitate her decision making process. This complies with Deleuze's assertion that people tend to see the idea of repetition as a play, in which

even when he is given a situation of chance or multiplicity, he understands his affirmations as destined to impose limits upon it, his decisions as destined to ward off its effects, his reproductions as destined to bring about the return of the same, given a winning hypothesis. (D&R 116)

This is observable in Jeanette's approach to the repetitive appearance of the orange demon at the decision-making moments. Relating the orange demon to the evil as taught by spiritual teachings, Jeanette aims to get rid of it in order to be healed from her subversive desires. The demon instructs her not to go back; yet, the habitual nature of the present prevents Jeanette from not diverging from the regular road she has taken. The demon says to Jeanette, "in fact you're recovering, apart from a few minor hallucinations, and remember, you've made your choice now, there's no going back" (Oranges 104). The demon indicates the moments of Jeanette's inner journeys where she tries to find the open gate to escape from the living present of her mother. In a way, it shows Jeanette the Deleuzian sense of repetition which "concerns instead excessive systems which link the different with the different, the multiple with the multiple, the fortuitous with the fortuitous, in a complex of affirmations always coextensive with the questions posed and the decisions taken" (116). This shows that time in her internal world and external world differ as she actually inclines towards on the one side of the habitual time of the living present that binds and on the other

side the escaping from it. Wendy Lisa Weber suggests that “in *Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit*, Jeanette's journey takes her away from her sheltered existence. As she ventures into the world, she distances herself from the church both physically and spiritually” (53). Consequently, the “rough brown pebble” thrown in her palms by the demon in her internal world constitutes a repeating prolepsis that shows the triggering force for Jeanette’s upcoming decision to escape from her constructed past and to dive into an unknown future (Oranges 104).

On the other hand, in her external world, Jeanette seems to stick with the *Habitus* that binds her to her mother’s habits and expectations. She accepts it when Church prevents her from her affair with Melanie and thinks that, “I hadn’t seen the orange demon for ages, so I felt that my life must be back to normal” (Oranges 105). The living present of her mother appears to be the “normal” for Jeanette even though she gradually begins to question her life and the story that has been built for her by her mother (Oranges 105). The “normal” can be associated with the habitual time, in which Jeanette finds the genealogical point, that is, the history written for her by her mother and the stability that is offered by the binding effect of *Habitus* (Oranges 105). Deleuze explains that

At the level of each binding, an ego is formed in the Id; a passive, partial, larval, contemplative and contracting ego. The Id is populated by local egos which constitute the time peculiar to the Id, the time of the living present there where the binding integrations are carried out. The fact that these egos should be immediately narcissistic is readily explained if we consider narcissism to be not a contemplation of oneself but the fulfilment of a self-image through the contemplation of something else: the eye or the seeing ego is filled with an image of itself in contemplating the excitation that it binds. (97)

The binding effect of the living present derives from the organism’s desire to find a narcissistic other to itself. Although Jeanette does not want to bind her desires and pleasures to the *Habitus* offered by her mother, she has a dilemma whether or not she can get away from the safety of her house and familiar life. Therefore, demolishing the “normal” (115) is explained as her “sudden nervousness and the worry that I [she] was getting ill again” (Oranges 112). Her mother does not want her to have unnatural passions and constantly implies that such passions will not be tolerated in their home. The reappearance of the image of the wall once again constitutes a

repeating prolepsis, as Jeanette says, “So at dusk you say goodbye to the place you love, not knowing if you can ever return, knowing you can never return by the same way as this. It may be, some other day that you will open a gate by chance, and find yourself again on the other side of the wall” (Oranges 112). The idea that repetition brings difference at each instance is noticeable in this reflection of Jeanette’s internal world. Jeanette resembles the instance of being inside her mother’s wall to being in a place that one loves; however, she also hints that every return shall yield a difference. Jeanette realizes that even though she is courageous enough to once again get out of the wall, the present will become a former present whose future has been shaped by the expectation in habitual time.

Jeanette’s leaving home for a new life becomes apparent in the chapter “Judges”, in which she is expected by her mother to leave the house since she has not been compliant with the expectations of her mother’s habitual present. Jeanette’s subversive actions against the expectations of the Church and her mother disrupt the stability in the first synthesis. Her mother’s decision for her to leave is conveyed through a sudden inclusion of an intertextual element, where Jeanette once again resembles her mother to the Queen, as she conveys: “‘Now I give you fair warning’ shouted the Queen, stamping on the ground as she spoke; ‘Either you or your head must be off:’” (Oranges 115). This intertextual revelation of her mother’s decision on her present is followed and concluded by a double dot in her narrative as to imply a threshold to the narrator’s passing into an unknown world, which she explains as “my mother wanted me to move out” (Oranges 115). The anxiety of leaving the familiar is paralleled by Jeanette with an incident that she had fallen down a hill and her dog came to save her. She states,

Once, trying to reach a huge icicle, I fell down on to a quarry ledge and couldn’t climb back again; the earth kept crumbling away. She [her dog] barked and spluttered and then ran off to help me. Now, here we were, on a different edge. (Oranges 115)

The transition from the familiar into the unfamiliar creates a similar sense of falling down and the earth’s disappearing under her feet. The future seems unknown to her. Although the home with her mother’s walls is the place that keeps Jeanette away from making her own decisions in life, it is also the home that amounts to safety and

protection. Leaving home means to step into the unfamiliar. Deleuze explains the sense of familiar one feels in the living present with its binding effect as follows:

The first passive synthesis, that of *Habitus*, presented repetition as a binding, in the constantly renewed form of a living present. It ensured the foundation of the pleasure principle in two complementary senses, since it led both to the general value of pleasure as an instance to which psychic life was henceforth subordinated in the *Id*, and to the particular hallucinatory satisfaction which filled each passive ego with a narcissistic image of itself. (108)

The *Id* in the first synthesis, as Deleuze terms it, tends to reach its pleasure in the most comfortable way possible. The habitual time of her mother provides Jeanette with a foundation to build up her narcissistic self reflected through her mother. Leaving her house and her mother seems to mean falling apart with this narcissistic self for Jeanette. It can be asserted that if it was left to Jeanette's decision, she would stay with her mother's habitual life even if she fears ending up in "the city of Lost Chances" (Oranges 102). Nevertheless, her mother's withdrawal of her living present from Jeanette's life obliges the character-narrator to break apart from her narcissistic self and step into a discovery of her own present.

One of the first instances that initiates Jeanette's estrangement from her familiar neighbourhood appears following her mother's order to leave their home. This incident is paralleled by the intertextual tale of Sir Perceval's departure from the circle of Arthur. The story begins as "Sir Perceval, the youngest of Arthur's knights, at last set forth from Camelot" (Oranges 116). It is conveyed that King Arthur does not want Sir Perceval to leave and even "begged him not to go" (Oranges 116). The image of the Round Table, which is illustrated through the gaze of King Arthur, is described to have been "decorated with every plant that grows growing circular-wise like a target. Near the centre is a sundial and at the centre a thorny crown" (Oranges 117). The circular shape can be linked with the shape of the first synthesis of time. However, this present is blurred by the reminiscence of the past, as "Arthur thinks of before, when there were lights and smiles" (Oranges 117). The nostalgia for the past grounds the present in a way that for Arthur everything seems "Dusty now" (Oranges 117). Dust can be interpreted as a metaphor which indicates that "we can sense that a time is passing away by reference of the capability of a pure past to express itself in the present" (İsmet 51). Thus, the dust also cover the pure past that is related with the

actual past under the influence of King Arthur's nostalgic yearning. Therefore, the dust constitutes a reminiscence of the past for him. Deleuze associates the reminiscence with "a mythical present" which is "enveloped within the sign, must be at once never-seen and yet already-recognised, a disturbing unfamiliarity" (142). The nostalgia that arises from the reminiscence is accentuated by King Arthur's wish that "oh, Sir Perceval, come and turn cartwheels again" (Oranges 117).

Jeanette's obligation to leave house is urged by the revelation of her second affair, when she has a relation with Katy. As her mother learns her second affair, she loses her temper. In order to get far away from her mother's anger, Jeanette runs out of the house for a while. She arrives at Elsie's since the only person who listens to her remains to be Elsie, who had also helped her in her childhood when she was in hospital. Jeanette mentions the time she spends at Elsie's house as, "We didn't talk about it, not the rights or wrongs or anything; she looked after me by giving me what I most needed, an ordinary time with a friend" (Oranges 119). The time she spends with Elsie is regarded as "an ordinary time" which does not expect her to fit in certain beliefs and habits. It represents a time that is away from the habitual time of her mother (Oranges 119). Therefore, Jeanette feels sad to leave that ordinary moment as she says, "I have to go now Elsie" (Oranges 119). She continues, "I got up, sadly, as the clock ticked on" (Oranges 119). This points out to the duration, the internal time, from which Jeanette does not want to be apart. However, the tick-tock of the clock in the external world shows her that her life proceeds towards a junction that will separate her from the home in which she has grown up with her mother.

Jeanette's binding towards the idea of home is seen with an instance after she leaves Elsie's house. When Jeanette arrives at the street of her home, she leans on "the wall", the wall that she has always known (Oranges 120). The wall constitutes a memory, the past of past in her mind, as something familiar. Jeanette mentions that she is looking into a window but does not specify into whose or house's window she is looking. Yet, she expresses it as "the window", which suggests that she might have looked at that window before (Oranges 120). She conveys what she sees there, saying, "through the window I could see a family round the fire. Their tea table had been left, chairs, table and the right number of cups" (Oranges 120). Before she goes into her own house, she focuses on the view of the family. She continues "I watched

the fire flicker behind the glass, then one of them got up to close the curtains” (Oranges 120). Her plunge is interrupted by the act of closing the curtains. She is pulled back into the external world and the ticking of the clock. The quick transition leaving the wall and approaching towards her own house is described to take some time as she does not know what to expect. Jeanette states, “I lingered outside my own front door for a few minutes before going in. I still didn’t know what to do, wasn’t even sure what the choices were or what the conflicts were; it was clear to the others, but not clear to me...” (Oranges 120). It is apparent that Jeanette “returns to her mother because of their bond as a family. She thinks that this bond is permanent and there is no way she can get rid of it. Yet, she also makes it clear that her home is no more a source of happiness and hope for her” (Önal 68). Jeanette feels daunted by the infinite possibilities of the future that will be shaped by the Church and her mother. She not only hints at her anxiety for losing the familiarity of her home, but also her dilemma about the ambiguous road she will take.

Hallucinations are important in understanding Jeanette’s dilemmatic decision making process. Deleuze puts that “neuropaths and psychopaths perhaps explore this original ultimate ground, at the cost of their suffering, the former asking *how to shift the problem*, the latter *where to pose the question*” (107). He further explains that

It is here that it [the question] discovers its properly ontological import, the (non)-being of the question which cannot be reduced to the non-being of the negative. There are no ultimate or original responses or solutions, there are only problem-questions, in the guise of a mask behind every mask and a displacement behind every place. (107)

In this sense, questionings in the form of hallucinations do not aim at reaching concrete resolutions in Deleuzian understanding. This shows that although Jeanette also utilizes hallucinations to pose questions, she still cannot fulfil a Deleuzian questioning which would enable her to understand the process itself. Rather, Jeanette tries to dissolve the ambiguity of her future by associating it with examples. Therefore, Jeanette’s departure from home by refusing the norms imposed by her mother and the church is again associated with a hallucination. Jeanette sees Sir Perceval proceeding in the wood after he leaves the circle of King Arthur. Jeanette’s dream conveys Sir Perceval’s condition after he has left the court of King Arthur and

his thinking of his past life with King Arthur. The new situation of Sir Perceval is conveyed as “Sir Perceval has been in the wood for many days now. His armour is dull, his horse tired” (Oranges 121). The armour which once seems bright and open for Sir Perceval turns out to be “dull” as he proceeds in his new life (121). His horse which has been vigorous at the beginning of the road is depicted as “tired” (121). The general portrayal of his life is linked to Sir Perceval’s dreaming of the past “of his hounds and his falcon, his stable and his faithful friends” (Oranges 121). The loss of his past and its becoming reminiscences is further associated with the idea of the dead. Sir Perceval thinks “his friends are dead now. Dead or dying” (Oranges 121). Upon this, Sir Perceval “dreams of Arthur sitting on a wide stone step, holding his head in his hands,” then “Sir Perceval falls to his knees to clasp his lord, but his lord is a tree covered in ivy. He wakes, his face bright with tears” (Oranges 121). Sir Perceval wants to turn back to the intact past with his King. However, the past blurs into the present as he awakens from his dream. The pure past is away from him in his present. Sir Perceval fears about his future in the unknown and wants to go back to his past life. This leads him into tears. The image of the tear signifies Sir Perceval’s desperation to return to the living present of King Arthur’s court where he could have habits and expectations. The future appears to be empty of expectations after he leaves the King’s court. When he tries to reach back at his past, he awakens to his current present with “his hands [that] were full of thorns” (Oranges 121). He sees his life has changed drastically. Dreaming that Sir Perceval leaves his past and proceeds into the unknown, Jeanette signals her own fear of unfamiliarity in an ambiguous future. She cannot dare to step into the unknown by leaving the habitual life at her mother’s house. It seems fearful to leave what she knows best even if it does not fit into her own expectations from her life. This stems from the fact that her mother’s living present still continues to impose a binding effect on Jeanette’s expectations. This hinders Jeanette from having her authentic expectations from the future.

After waking up, Jeanette takes a first step towards claiming her own expectations from the future by refusing her mother’s and the church’s projections. When the parlour asks Jeanette “‘Will you repent?’ she sharply answers, ‘No.’” (Oranges 122). Jeanette acknowledges that she has lived the constructed past that her mother has cut out for her and her present has been shaped by that past. She states

“my mother had painted the white roses red and now she claimed they grew that way” (Oranges 122). Jeanette shows she is determined to break the pattern of expectation imposed by her mother. The imagery of roses can be associated with Deleuze’s ideas of the theatre of representation, in which the past is tried to be altered in the desired way to achieve a desired present. With repeating narratives, Jeanette indicates that she is aware of the contractedness of her past by her mother. Also introducing the tale of Arthur and the story of queen, she implies her hesitations to step out of the familiarity of her current life. Nevertheless, she indicates that staying with the familiar will lock her in “the city of the Lost Chances” (Oranges 104). Since she wants to achieve her own future, she determines to leave her mother’s habitual life behind. She thinks of the future as “bleak, but not so bleak as staying there” (Oranges 123).

Living through all these, Jeanette goes through a comparison process in her mind by calculating alternative presents and decides that staying at her mother’s house in the life that has been cut out for her would be more desperate than leaving it. She accepts her anxiety, stating that, “in fact I was scared to death and going to live with a teacher who had some care for what was happening. I was driving an ice-cream van on Saturdays; now I would work Sundays as well, and try to pay the woman as best I could” (Oranges 123). The obscurity of change makes her scared of her future life outside her mother’s house. Her mother’s living present means for her stability and familiarity. Jeanette does not deny this, by once again referring to the image of oranges. She illustrates that she feels it hard to fall away from the familiar fruit and work with unfamiliar fruits. She confesses “the only thing that worried me was the thought of having to work on a fruit stall. Spanish Navels, Juicy Jaffas, Ripe Sevilles” (Oranges 123). Thus, she assures herself “I’ll go in the tripe works first” (Oranges 123). Indeed, she expresses that she did not dwell on the unfamiliarity of the future much in those days. She says “at that time I could not imagine what would become of me, and I didn’t care. It was not judgement day, but another morning” (Oranges 123). Time and events transform so fast in Jeanette’s life that she does not have time to ponder upon or resist them. Besides, she knows the future is still surrounded by some familiarity because she continues to live in her neighbourhood. Therefore, her hesitations do not stop her.

With Jeanette's decision to leave home, the narrative begins the chapter "Ruth" (Oranges 124). Lindy Weber conveys that Biblical stories offer a sense of cyclical time at the end of which the hero gains an understanding of his/her self. She explains that

the journey is important in Biblical literature and in the religious communities that are portrayed in the novels. ... The journey gives meaning to an individual's sufferings by depicting either a metaphysical purpose that is only comprehensible at the end of the journey or by taking on a metaphysical outcome so that in the end, the character has a better understanding of self or God or the surrounding world. (Oranges 10)

The cyclical structure of biblical stories can be associated with the Deleuzian second synthesis since the past of the second synthesis "creates a circle: it introduces movement into the soul rather than time into thought" (Oranges 88). With the chapter "Ruth", Jeanette's leaving home is resembled to travelling in the old times. At the beginning of the chapter, Jeanette says, "a long time ago, when the kingdom was divided up into separate compartments like a pressure cooker, people took travelling a lot more seriously than they do now" (Oranges 125). She continues to sort out obvious problems of travelling as "how much food do you take? What sort of monsters will you meet? Should you take your spare blue tunic for peace, or your spare red tunic for not peace?" (Oranges 125). On the other hand, she also mentions, "the not-so-obvious problems, like what to do with a wizard who wants to keep an eye on you" (Oranges 125). Leaving the queen's castle and the walls the queen has built means that Jeanette will meet the unknown in her travelling. Jeanette suggests that in the past, namely, "in those days, magic was very important, and territory, to start with, just an extension of the chalk circle you drew around yourself to protect yourself from elementals and the like" (Oranges 125). The circle presents a repeating analepsis to when Jeanette talks about the walls her mother has built for her. Anne DeLong explains that "etched in the ephemeral medium of chalk, the circle is more mutable than the wall. It serves as a temporary scaffold to protect the subject as she/he quests" (272). Just like the walls, the magical chalk circle also guard one from the dangers of the outside world because "it's a force field around yourself, and as long as our imagining powers are weak, it's useful to have something physical to remind us" (Oranges 125).

Imagination in the first synthesis seems to be a protective power for Jeanette. It helps with the force of habits to be ready for dangers from the unknown. Jeanette believes that “the chalk circle” is useful “because the principle of personal space is always the same, whether you’re fending off an elemental or someone’s bad mood” (Oranges 125). She also acknowledges that grasping such a skill is hard:

The training of wizards is a very difficult thing. Wizards have to spend years standing in a chalk circle until they can manage without it. They push out their power bit by bit, first within their hearts, then within their bodies, then within their immediate circle. (Oranges 125)

The wizards try to step out of the circle of habitual time to free themselves. This takes a gradual advance. However, it is not manageable easily. Stepping out of circle means to be open to any change hidden in the future. Jeanette puts that “it is not possible to control the outside of yourself until you have mastered your breathing space. It is not possible to change anything until you understand the substance you wish to change” (Oranges 125). Jeanette suggests that one’s control of his/her own life begins from the closest environments. If you let someone else draw the circle for you, you will lose control of your closest space. This shows her desire to build her own present for herself.

Change in the third synthesis does not equal modification because changing the substance means a pure difference in time. In order to conduct change in the sense of the third synthesis, it is essential to “understand” it first (Oranges 125). It means to possess one’s own retention of the past without the intrusion of external influences. One can witness difference in his/her present if his/her past is true to its nature. On the other hand, change in the first synthesis can be associated with modification that serves to save the status-quo of time. Jeanette calls the modification in the first synthesis “fallen powers” (Oranges 125). Understanding amounts to a full comprehension of the essence of the substance. Jeanette suggests that “to change something you do not understand is the true nature of evil” (Oranges 125). By calling modifications as “fallen powers”, Jeanette implies and parodies “the strict and intolerant attitudes of the church towards the people that are outside its norms and its endeavour to either exclude or convert the so called anomalous people” (Çeker 58). This implies that she also acknowledges what she tries to do with her life is far from

a change but a modification. Deleuze explains the nature of the modification in the first synthesis as follows:

Repetition disappears even as it occurs, how can we say 'the second', 'the third' and 'it is the same'? It has no in-itself. On the other hand, it does change something in the mind which contemplates it. This is the essence of modification. (70)

Deleuze puts that repetition in the first synthesis does not produce change in the object repeated. It effects and modifies the mind. This does not amount to understanding the essence of change and how it causes the repetition to disappear at the end of a return. Jeanette hints that even if she leaves home, this will not change that fact that she resides in the living present of her mother. The end of return will not provide her a future of her own. Since she cannot leave the safety of the circle provided by her mother, she can only “mutilate and modify” (Oranges 125). Therefore, she expresses her despair that she is not able to gain the ability to draw a circle of her own. She explains that the chalk circle is not in use in the modern world and that “it’s gone out of fashion now, which is a shame, because sitting in a chalk circle when you feel threatened is a lot better than sitting in the gas oven” (Oranges 125). Feeling threatened feels more uncomfortable for Jeanette than sitting in a chalk circle. Nevertheless, Jeanette acknowledges that unless she learns how to draw a circle of her own, it will be her mother’s circle draw around her soul. Her desire to sit in the chalk circle of her own indicates her will to makes a change in the first synthesis of time. Yet, this still does not lead in a change in the sense of the third synthesis. Jeanette does not want to be completely liberated from the protection of a circle around her soul. She wants to circle herself with familiar things that belong to her own present. Since she does not intend to make profound changes to liberate her soul and make it open for the unknown, she can be regarded not to truly understand the essence of substance she changes.

At this point, Jeanette’s narrative slips into the story of Winnet Stonejar. Howard Holland comments on the contribution of Stonejar’s story in “Ruth” as follows:

It [Ruth] is a chapter about power: the power of imagination, witchcraft, protection, manipulation, power of others to take over your personal space and identity, incomprehension, power of words, naming and language, making choices and difficult decisions, manipulating time and, most importantly, the power of love". (66)

Confirming what Holland above refers to as "imagination, witchcraft", Winnet Stonejar's story begins by Winnet's trip in a magical forest (66). As she wanders there, she sees "a strange bird following her, a black thing with huge wings" (Oranges 125). Upon losing the sight of the bird, Winnet realizes "the sorcerer" (Oranges 125). As she tries to get away from him, she hears in fright that he calls her "I know your name" (Oranges 126). She becomes afraid of being "trapped" because "naming meant power" (Oranges 126). Naming can be associated with the living present's binding effect that would assign a fixed beginning point to the organism. In other words, naming and its power on the self can be associated with genealogical concerns in Jeanette's narrative. Naming means to detect a stable beginning to an organism and offers a binding effect for one's life. Deleuze reads Freudian "binding" as "when these 'habits' or differences become fixated then there is a process called "binding" [Bindung] in which the charge of excitation passing through the neurons is trapped in the complex of V nerves" (Faulkner 108). Winnet thinks "Adam had named the animals and the animals came at his call" (Oranges 126). Naming gives the power to pull back one when he or she tries to get away. Therefore, naming presupposes a planned future at the hands of the one who is at the power of calling one's name. However, Jeanette does not believe in the sorcerer that he really knows her name. Therefore, when he calls her to the other side of the river that divides them claiming that he knows, Winnet Stonejar thinks "the sorcerer's territory must lie across the stream; here at least she was safe" (Oranges 126). She continues to stray away from him and encounters challenging conditions of environment throughout the day. At the end of the day, she realizes that she has not been very far away from the sorcerer. As the sorcerer promises her not to harm and give some of her favourite food, Winnet is convinced that they can make a deal and she can be free afterwards. She believes that "She would share his table, then he was to tell her what he wanted, and they'd hold a competition to decide" (Oranges 126).

At the end of their meal, it becomes clear that the sorcerer desires Winnet to be an “apprentice” to him (Oranges 127). He wants to teach her the deeds of magic. This can be considered a completing prolepsis to Jeanette’s mother’s desire to bring up Jeannette as a disciple in the way of God. Jeanette’s real life events are represented through the story of Winnet Stonejar. The sorcerer tells Winnet that he would not force her; however, it seems threatening when he says, “There’s just one small thing; unless you tell me your name, you’ll never get out of that circle, because I can’t release you, and you don’t have the power” (Oranges 127). As stated, Winnet steps into the circle drawn by the sorcerer. Therefore, her destiny is subject for someone else’s determination. As Winnet thinks “what fiendish game they must play to decide the contest”, the sorcerer offers to play “Hang the Man” (Oranges 127). With the game he attempts to know Winnet’s name. If he knows it, Winnet accepts to go with him. The sorcerer names a few letters to guess her name, but when she announces that it is not in her name, he says “You ought to give me a clue ... after all we aren’t using magic arts” (Oranges 127). Indeed, it can be said that sorcerer is playing with Jeanette’s mind because he has already confessed that it is his job to trick people. Nevertheless, Jeanette tells of a rhyme, “*To some my name is almost a bird, To others a vessel for keeping the curd*” (Oranges 128). Towards the night, the sorcerer manages to guess her name and surname in its exact correctness and to that, Winnet does not show a great disappointment. She only thinks, “At least he can cook” (Oranges 128). The fact that Winnet does not resist going with the sorcerer can be rendered as an advance notice regarding the repetitive nature of her meeting with the sorcerer and her submission to him in the later phases of her story.

When Winnet gets to the sorcerer’s castle, she asks him “how long have you been a sorcerer?” (Oranges 128). The sorcerer’s answer to this question reveals the parallelism between Winnet’s sorcerer father and Jeanette’s mother in the sense that both the sorcerer and the mother perceive time as only consisting of their living present, in which nothing changes and the repetition of time only brings similarity. This can be deduced by the sorcerer’s reply that “Oh, I can’t say ... you see I am one in the future too, it’s all the same to me” (Oranges 128). Winnet as a new-comer to the castle does not believe such an understanding of time as unchanging is possible. Therefore, she says, ““but you can’t be ... it’s not possible to talk about time like

that” (Oranges 128). Winnet implies that time is subject to change. However, the sorcerer maintains that he has always been a sorcerer in the past and the present, and his life will not witness any change in the future. His life offers a habitual understanding of time that aims to bind subjects to its nature. Thus, the sorcerer explains, “not possible for you my dear, but we’re very different” (Oranges 128). It should be noted that Winnet’s story is told by a third voice, who is supposed to be Jeanette. At this point, the voice conveys that “this at least was true, so Winnet turned her attention to the room instead” (Oranges 128). It is interesting that the third voice, namely, Jeanette seems to know what is inside Winnet Stonejar’s mind. This might be implying that Jeanette is able to know what is next in Winnet’s story by comparing it to her own story. In this regard, Winnet’s story can be seen to offer parallelism to Jeanette’s.

On the other hand, the fact that Winnet is still able to observe the room and process it in her mind shows that she has not been captivated by the sorcerer’s living present, yet. She still possesses the power of questioning of unusual things around the castle. For example, as she and the sorcerer go on touring the castle, she realizes “an enormous embossed ear trumpet” (Oranges 128). This unusual object raises her curiosity and when she asks the use of it, the sorcerer answers “Well, I’m not always as old as I am now, and when I’m older, I can get a bit deaf. That’s so that I can listen to the nightingales at night, when I’m lying on that couch” (Oranges 129). The sorcerer gives a hint of his living present in which one can expect certain things at certain periods of life. This living present ensures that repetition repeats the similar. In order to protect the order of his living present, the sorcerer can even make up regularities that do not exist. For example, the couch he mentions does not appear to Winnet when she first glances, and at her second glance she sees it. This foreshadows that the tricks and the magic are going to be used to shape Winnet Stonejar’s present in line with the sorcerer’s living present. Jeanette marks this trick of sorcerer as “only the beginning of Winnet’s adventure at the castle” (Oranges 129).

The more Winnet stays with the sorcerer, the more she becomes a part of his living present, that is, his habitual life. It is conveyed that “as she stayed there, a curious thing happened. She forgot how she had come there, or what she had done

before” (Oranges 129). Gradually, Winnet forgets all about her past and her own present. Staying in the castle longer, “Winnet actually believes that he is her real father, and that she has been with him in the castle since the day when she was born” (Chen 29). She begins to believe that “she had always been in the castle, and that she was the sorcerer’s daughter. He told her she was. That she had no mother, but had been specially entrusted to his care by a powerful spirit” (Oranges 129). The sorcerer even intervenes not only in the present, but also the beginning of Winnet’s life and erases her actual past. Consequently, Winnet does not continue questioning as before since “Winnet felt this to be true, and besides, where else could she possibly wish to live?” (Oranges 129). This shows that the sorcerer binds the past, the present and the future of Winnet to his living present by erasing her real history. He attempts to rule Winnet’s history in line with the expectations of his own living present. Winnet is stranded within the sorcerer’s habitual time in which all dimensions are the repetition of the similar.

As long as Winnet remains within the boundaries of his father’s habitual time, she continues a peaceful and calm life. Nevertheless, the living present of his father is broken with the arrival of a stranger boy to their town. Winnet wants his father to accept the boy and gives him a gift. This can be associated with Deleuze’s claim that

The self does not undergo modifications, it is itself a modification - this term designating precisely the difference drawn. Finally, one is only what one *has*: here, being is formed or the passive self *is*, by having. Every contraction is a presumption, a claim - that is to say, it gives rise to an expectation or a right in regard to that which it contracts, and comes undone once its object escapes. (79)

In the first synthesis, repetition generates modification. Both the object and the modification mutually need each other to preserve the status quo of the habitual time. Deleuze puts that if the object leaves the living present, the modification “comes undone” (79). Likewise, being a product of his father’s habitual time, Winnet never attempts to behave outside the sorcerer’s living present until she meets the boy. His father assumes that he could shape Winnet’s future, as well. But he realizes “what will be will be” (Oranges 129). This implies the fatalistic understanding of the sorcerer’s view of the future as determined by the present. Besides, it can be

rendered as an advance notice of the simple circle of the sorcerer's living present, in which he will attempt to keep Winnet by magic. Winnet persuades the boy to go to her father and to say that he does not have any intention towards her. The sorcerer is disappointed by his daughter's protection of a stranger. He does not desire any intervention that would disturb his the cycle of his living present. Thus, he tells Winnet: "Daughter, you have disgraced me ... and I have no more use for you. You must leave" (Oranges 130). The arrival of the stranger causes Winnet's departure from the village.

Initially, Winnet does not want to leave the familiarity of her house and the life she is accustomed to. Similar to Jeanette's story, the castle as her home is thought to sustain familiarity and safety through the contractile forces of the first synthesis. The contractile forces assure both Winnet and Jeanette that they will be surrounded by what they know and the future will yield what is expected. Therefore, Winnet also thinks the house provides her with safety. The sense of safety is further linked with the magical powers that Winnet believes to have been granted by her surroundings. Therefore, she does not want to lose the protection of her magical powers which she associates with her house. Nevertheless, her conversation with one of the three ravens that the sorcerer rules reveals the otherwise. The raven, whose good will Winnet believes in, ensures her that she will not lose her magical power if she leaves. Instead, it says Winnet is going to "use it differently" (Oranges 130). The raven adds that "sorcerers can't take their gifts back, ever, it says so in the book" (Oranges 130). Winnet knows that leaving her father's castle opens up an unknown future for her. Yet, if she stays, she also knows she will not be satisfied. The raven explains the despair that will be caused by remaining with her father as "you will find yourself destroyed by grief. All you know will be around you, and at the same time far from you. Better to find a new place now" (Oranges 130). This shows that her father's habitual time will endure if she does not leave the castle. However, the familiar will not satisfy her needs. She will not desire to live by the habits and expectations of her father. She aspires to achieve her own. Therefore, the familiar will feel as unsettling as the unfamiliar itself. It should be noted that Winnet, just like Jeanette, does not immediately plan to step out of the first synthesis of time, breaking its circle. Instead, she desires to possess her own present and future. Therefore, she is

not in a process of change, but a process of modification. Even if the familiar will remain the same around her, her perception of the familiar is supposed to be modified. Consequently, Winnet decides to leave, by wishing to take what she feels would remain as familiar to her. That is, she asks the raven to leave with her. However, the raven replies that he is bound to the sorcerer. Even if he cannot accompany her, he gives her his heart which is “made of stone” since he “chose to stay” (Oranges 131). The stone heart implies the stagnancy of the sorcerer’s time. The stone heart does not live; it just belongs to the living present of sorcerer. It encompasses all the past as reminiscences. Therefore, the present is shaped by the modifications imposed by these reminiscences. A heart turned into stone is useless for mobilizing the raven to demolish the walls of the sorcerer’s living present. Seeing all these, Winnet determines to pull away in order to save her own heart from turning into stone although leaving is hard.

Paradoxically, the sorcerer who commands Winnet to leave also wants to keep Winnet in his own habitual life. Even if he orders her to leave, he does not really want Winnet to be free from his binding present. In this way, he believes he can have a chance to bring her up as a disciple. This intention is apparent from his first encounter with Winnet in the forest. Therefore, he wants to bind her to his own habitual time even when she accepts to leave. The binding effect of the living present is symbolized with the image of thread tied to the button of Winnet by the mouse. The mouse appears to be a disguise for the sorcerer to achieve his binding. As Winnet is having a conversation on leaving with the raven, it is conveyed

The raven, struck dumb, could not warn her that her father had crept in, in the shape of a mouse, and was tying an invisible thread around one of her buttons. As Winnet stood up the mouse scuttled away. She did not notice, and when morning came, she had reached the edge of the forest, and crossed the river. (Oranges 131)

The image of the invisible thread can be rendered as both a repeating prolepsis and an intertextual element that refers to the binding effect of time. The image can be associated with the thread of Ariadne in Greek mythology.⁷ Both in the myth and

⁷ The myth derives from the story of an endless labyrinth commissioned by Minos, the ruler of Crete. Minos becomes the ruler of Crete with the help of the bull sent by the sea god Poseidon. In turn, Poseidon wishes Minos to sacrifice the bull for himself but Minos does not do that. Therefore, Poseidon urges the consummation of love

Winnet's story, the thread can be seen as a means to reach back the past if one becomes lost in the future. In this sense, it can be interpreted as the thread of the present which appears as a guide to find way back from an unwanted condition in the future. The mythic thread can be associated with father's invisible thread in the sense that it binds Winnet to the living present of the sorcerer. As a diversion from the myth, the thread here is granted to Winnet without her permission. Although Winnet desires to achieve her own present by leaving her father's habitual time, the thread acts as a bound that would enable the sorcerer to tug Winnet back to his own time. The sorcerer knows that Winnet would refuse the binding so he ties an invisible one. He wants Winnet to belong to his living present forever. It is noteworthy that the sorcerer repeatedly uses magical tricks, such as the game of "Hang the Man" to know her name or the invisible thread disguising as a mouse, to bind Winnet to his habitual time. Each instance shows that the sorcerer's living present has a repetition that tends to repeat the similar. This repetition of the similar creates empirical forgetting in Winnet, which means to rip her from her actual history and reality. Therefore, it has the power to repeat events in Winnet's life by modifying them in accordance with the will of the sorcerer. Consequently, Winnet cannot leave her father's living present, but repeats time in a simple circle. As she believes that she leaves her father, she actually finds herself in the same forest in which her life with the sorcerer begins. Nevertheless, she is unaware of the simple circle of time due to the empirical forgetting, which causes her to live through the same story as if it was a different one. This shows the modifying effect of the first synthesis. In the first synthesis, time does not repeat itself to bear difference. The only difference that occurs is in the mind of the object, which merely produces modifications. This enables the sorcerer to make Winnet believe she wanders around to make a new life for a while. But the completing prolepsis that appears later on in Jeanette's narrative will show that it is only an illusion of freedom created by the sorcerer. The sorcerer tugs at the thread when he likes Winnet to return his living present.

between Minos' wife and the bull, and Minotaur is born. Minos wants to captivate Minotaur in a labyrinth. Therefore, he wants the architect Daedalus to build one. Minotaur is supposed to eat anyone who enters the labyrinth. When Minos conquers Athens, he orders that seven boys and maidens to be sacrificed to Minotaur each year in the labyrinth. Theseus, who is the son of former king of Athens, joins the group of sacrifice. But Minos' daughter Ariadne falls in love with Theseus and gives him a thread to find his way in the labyrinth when he encounters Minotaur.

As aforesaid, the tale of Winnet Stonejar can be rendered as a repetition of Jeanette's past life with her mother, who has modified it in the way she desired. Jeanette does not want to be stuck in the living present of her mother, but still longs for the safety and familiarity of her home. Her upbringing and her mother's teachings can be considered binding forces for Jeanette. However, Jeanette also questions whether she should stay within the walls and circle built by her mother throughout her life. The repetition of her life story through Winnet's story does not mean that she can achieve similar endings by having a comparison story. Winnet's story repeats Jeanette's story by differing from it. Winnet is tricked by the delusion of his father and thinks that she is powerless. She is under the spell of empirical forgetting. But Jeanette does not forget that she has been adopted and her past has been changed. She knows her beginning and still wants to stay with her mother. Thus, she feels the need to forget. Even when she has to leave home, she initially stays in her neighbourhood to hold on to the familiar. However, Jeanette gradually realizes that her expectations from future fall on a different direction than her mother's and she cannot achieve them unless she obtains her own present. Therefore, she decides to escape from her neighbourhood to live in the city.

In the first parts of her narrative, Jeanette uses formal indicators that inform her audience she is journeying towards her inner world. However, towards the end she begins to make blurred transitions between her external world and internal world. This shows the increasing dominance of imagination in Jeanette's perception of events. For instance, her narration of Winnet Stonejar's journey towards the city melts into her own journey. Just as Winnet crosses the river, Jeanette slips into her memories of leaving home and beginning to work at an ice cream van. When Jeanette first gets out of her home, she still stays near her neighbourhood. It is the death of Elsie that accentuates Jeanette's decision-making towards escaping from her life presumed and shaped by her mother. On a Saturday when she drives the van near Elsie's house, she sees a crowd in front of the woman's house. She learns by her mother's short explanation that "Elsie's dead" (Oranges 131). The death of Elsie strikes Jeanette and opens up her way to escape to the city and build her own present. Upon conveying Elsie's death, Jeanette's narration returns to Winnet Stonejar's story without openly explaining that she is the teller. It is expressed that after leaving her

father's castle, Winnet crosses the river and finds "herself in a part of the forest that looked the same but smelt different" (Oranges 135). Winnet does not have a plan to proceed with, therefore she chooses "the most obvious path" (Oranges 135). A while passes and a woman finds Winnet and provides a shelter for her in a village. It is stated that "they had heard of Winnet's father, believed him mad and dangerous, and so Winnet never spoke of her own powers, and never used them" (Oranges 135). In the village, "the woman tried to teach Winnet her language, and Winnet learned the words but not the language" (Oranges 135). Winnet wants to have mutual communication with others, but villagers do not speak of issues she is interested in. Winnet desires to think about and experiment with the world, and investigate questions regarding her beginning and being. She realizes that villagers can only offer a different type of habitual time like her father. That is why the woods look the same but smells differently at this side of the river. Eventually, Winnet desires to escape from her stagnant present and dreams of going to city. More and more she begins to associate the sense of safety with having freedom in her own living present. She indicates that the city would provide freedom to her, believing that "if only she could get there, she felt sure she'd be safe" (Oranges 135). As Winnet is determined to take a journey towards the city, it becomes clear that Jeanette has also made up his mind to escape from her neighbourhood. She states that the first time she talks about her plans to somebody is with Mrs Jewsberry after Elsie's funeral. The funeral marks her leaving of the ice cream van Elysium Fields, as well. At this point where Jeanette is determined to leave the familiar surroundings for an unknown life, it becomes clear that she has "finished school and been offered a full-time job in a mental hospital" (Oranges 139). She does not appear to enjoy the idea of working in a mental hospital; yet, the place will provide her a space to have her own present, or as she says, "a room of my own, at least" (Oranges 139). For Jeanette, leaving home means to leave behind the walls built by her mother, and leaving her neighbourhood all together means to leave the circle drawn by her mother to protect her soul. This space surrounded by her mother's walls and circle also serves for the domination of her habitual time in Jeanette's life. But Jeanette assures herself that having a room of her own will enable her to step into a freer time, in which she can embrace her own expectations from the future. Although her dilemma between staying with the

familiar and leaving for the unknown continues, she states: “But I went, nevertheless, comforting myself with my plan” (Oranges 139). The narrative duration she spends between this statement and her transition to telling Winnet’s story appears to be in an uninterrupted flow. Upon expressing her inner effort to persuade herself with the soundness of her plan, Jeanette conveys Winnet’s dilemma about leaving the village for the city. Winnet thinks that “in a place where truth mattered, no one would betray her, and so her courage grew, and with it, her determination” (Oranges 139). Narrative fluxes between her own story and Winnet’s story actually play a significant role in exhibiting Jeanette’s gradually increasing pace between her internal and external journeys. This increasing pace can be taken as a sign for Jeanette’s increasing desire to escape by leaving her stagnant life behind.

Jeanette continues to interrupt her own story. She conveys that when Winnet takes the road, she sees the river that arrives at the town where she used to live and that opens up to the sea which she has never sailed. Therefore, she learns from a blind man the art of sailing. Jeanette narrates the night before Winnet leaves the village as follows:

She decided to sleep outside, where she could sniff and sense the earth she was leaving. The wind blew and it didn’t seem important, but tomorrow when the wind blew, it would be important. All the familiar things were getting different meanings. (Oranges 140)

In a Deleuzian sense, Winnet acknowledges that the next day as she proceeds towards obtaining her own present, her mind will undergo a modification process. Her perception towards the familiar will differ. Sailing away from familiar surroundings will not make a change in the familiar things, such as the wind itself. Instead, Winnet will begin to sense the wind differently. Her dream before the sail towards the unknown city perpetuates her sense of modification in perceiving familiar things. Winnet sees in her dream that

her eyebrows became two bridges that ran to a bore-hole between her eyes. The hole has no cover, and a spiral staircase starts, and runs down and down into the gut. She must follow it if she wants to know the extent of her territory. ... Then she finds a roundabout horse, and that gives her a chance to look at things more than once, and she thinks she doesn’t change anything as she looks, but

she must, because every time she goes round, the same things are different. She's getting dizzy, if she doesn't jump she'll fall off. (Oranges 140-141)

The hole between her eyes enable her to walk into her own mind and explore the "extend of her territory" (Oranges 140). She notices that even though the objects are not changing themselves, her perception makes modifications on them at her every look. Winnet goes down the stairs questioning the constant modification. Each return brings alterations and this frightens her. The spiral shape of the staircase can be interpreted as subversion to her simple circle. However, she does not want her simple circle to be broken. When she wakes up crying, the old man, who teaches her to sail, tells Winnet "not to worry about being afraid" (Oranges 141). Living a life shaped by her father's and villagers' habitual times, Winnet is expected to fear from the unknown. Winnet gradually admits that the sea brings up the vast future and accepts that "one thing is certain; she can't go back" (Oranges 141). The idea of going back is not possible because Winnet knows that the living present should proceed as an arrow. Therefore, taking a sail towards the city would mean to leave her past behind to be able to create her own present. By interrupting her own story with Winnet's dilemmatic decision making process, Jeanette also finalizes her own process of reasoning by deciding to leave her past behind to achieve her own present and future.

3.3. Return

Before her life in the city, Jeanette seems to associate the space she is surrounded by with the influence of her mother's living present over her own present. She considers that the influence comes from external factors. However, during her life in the city she continues to think about her past life within her mother's habitual time. The reminiscences of the past constantly intervene into her present by making her question whether she should ever return. Thus, the idea of escape is inevitably followed by the idea of return in Jeanette's narrative. Return appears to be a sign of longing since Jeanette cannot fully detach herself from the binding effect of her mother's living present. Eventually, return seems inevitable for Jeanette, who points out to the thread tied by her mother around her button. Merja Makinen explains Jeanette's attachment to her mother as follows:

Where the intertexts unite in their stress on exile and questing, they also offer differing versions and a variety of outcomes. This relates in particular to the representation of the mother, who can be seen as both persecutor and desired object, and the representation of the quest's progress which involves both an escape from her and a return to her. (44)

Therefore, the idea of return displays the Deleuzian binding of the first synthesis in Jeanette's life. Deleuze explains that the binding occurs when "the Id is populated by local egos which constitute the time peculiar to the Id" (D&R 97). This peculiar time is named as the living present organised by the *Habitus* (D&R 97). *Habitus* is the present's organiser through past habits and its clairvoyant through expectations. Jeanette initially expresses that switching her neighbourhood with the city would enable her to achieve an empirical forgetting because she explains "I thought in this city, a past was precisely that. Past. Why do I have to remember? In the old world, anyone could be a new creation, the past was washed away" (Oranges 141). In order to fulfil her desire to create a present of her own, Jeanette wants to "dispose of" the past (Oranges 89). She wants to be "washed away" from its influences (Oranges 141). However, the questions she is asked do not allow Jeanette to negate her past. Upon being asked "don't you ever think of going back?", Jeanette maintains that this is a "silly question. There are threads that help you find your way back, and there are threads that intend to bring you back. Mind turns to the pull, it's hard to pull away. I'm always thinking of going back" (Oranges 141). This shows once again the binding effect of her mother's living present and how it constitutes an unbreakable tie that tugs at Jeanette in order to bring her back. Cox explains that through this binding effect "movements away from source is held taut by the constraint of a rope or thread which represents the tie to the past" (Cox qtd. in van der Wiel 197). In this sense, Jeanette's acknowledgment of her mother's thread shows that she cannot deny her past. Instead, she finds herself acknowledging it, which urges her to return home for a Christmas holiday.

Even when she decides to return, Jeanette accepts that her mother's habitual time does not affirm difference. It only deals with the representation of retentions. According to Deleuze, "representation fails to capture the affirmed world of difference. Representation has only a single centre, a unique and receding perspective, and in consequence a false depth. It mediates everything, but mobilises

and moves nothing” (55-56). Therefore, representation does not affirm change that would decentre the simple circle of time. Instead, it attempts to fit the retention into that simple circle by adjusting the reality with modifications. Jeanette knows that when she goes back, her community will not accept any novelty she will bring along. They will try to see her through the lenses of their own habits. Jeanette explains that “going back after a long time will make you mad, because the people you left behind do not like to think of you changed, will treat you as they always did, accuse you of being indifferent, when you are only different” (Oranges 141). However, Jeanette tries to get rid of the habits of her community by escaping into the city. She knows that her mother’s living present can only offer a stable time. In that living present, change is not accepted because it will make it possible to think of alternative lives. Yet, habitual time seeks for order in life, not change. It accepts modifications that would comply with its order. The mother’s intervention into Jeanette’s history constitutes an advance notice for that. Therefore, Jeanette expresses that engaging with change will put one in an uncomfortable position in the living present of her mother. She believes that if she goes back to her past life, she will have to give up on her own expectations from the future. She exemplifies her presumption, stating that “when Lot’s wife looked over her shoulder, she turned into a pillar of salt. Pillars hold things up, and salt keeps things clean, but it’s a poor exchange for losing yourself” (Oranges 141). She thinks that “people do go back, but they don’t survive, because two realities are claiming them at the same time” (Oranges 141). Accordingly, Alexandra Mattsson explains “the two realities refer to her background and her present life, both affecting the construction of her identity” (30). Jeanette knows that within her mother’s habitual time her own present cannot exist. However, the binding of her mother’s present makes Jeanette unable to ignore its tugging. She knows that answering a question like “when did you last see your mother” is hard for her because she cannot ignore her past (Oranges 141). She believes that these questions inside her mind are only representations of her real feelings and she must go deeper in the reminiscences of the past to find their actual meaning. She says, “I know what I think, but words in the head are like voices under water. They are distorted. ... You will have to be a bank robber and listen and listen to the little clicks before you can open the safe” (Oranges 141). The next question “what would

have happened if you had stayed” illuminates her speculations about alternative lives she could be living if she has stayed. (Oranges 141). She says,

I could have been a priest instead of a prophet. The priest has a book with the words set out. Old words, known words, words of power. Words that are always on the surface. Words for every occasion. The words work. They do what they’re supposed to do; comfort and discipline. The prophet has no book. The prophet is a voice that cries in the wilderness, full of sounds that do not always set into meaning. (Oranges 141-142)

The priest refers to someone who would abide by the habits and expectations of her mother’s living present. But as someone who has left, Jeanette sees herself as a prophet who is courageous enough to voice the chaos of her own present. Jeanette knows that having her present does not provide her an equally solid life that offers particular solid expectations from the future, namely, “words for every occasion” as it would be in her mother’s living present. However, Jeanette is still willing to live a life of a prophet as “a voice that cries in the wilderness, full of sounds that do not always set into meaning” (Oranges 142).

As Jeanette struggles with questions in her mind regarding her past life and return, she once again slips into Winnet’s story. This time, she does not even specify that she conveys Winnet’s escape into the city. The blurring of escapes into one another refers to the parallelism Jeanette tries to build between her own story and Winnet’s. In this way, Jeanette seems to see her future more clearly. The city, into which both Jeanette and Winnet escape, seems to have failed to provide them a completely free place. Instead, Jeanette conveys that

This ancient city is made of stone and stone walls that have not fallen yet. Like paradise it is bounded by rivers, and contains fabulous beasts. Most of them have heads. If you Drink from the wells, and there are many, you might live forever, but there is no guarantee you will live forever as you are. You might mutate. The waters might not agree with you. They don’t tell you this. I came to this city to escape. (Oranges 142)

The city, which had been seen as a place to escape from their mother and father’s habitual time, does not satisfy Jeanette’s desire to be free from other people’s walls surrounding her life. She realizes that even when she is away from her home and neighbourhood, another place like the city will contain walls and contractile forces of

other people's living present. She notices that it is also possible to drink from someone else's "well" and "mutate" in the city (Oranges 142). She expresses that she had assumed the city would allow her to see fully what she expects from her own present. But ultimately she says "this city is full of towers to climb and climb, and to climb faster and faster, marvelling at the design and dreaming of the view from the top. ... Wouldn't it be nice to sit on the ground again? I came to this city to escape" (Oranges 142). Although Jeanette goes to the city to escape, she still yearns for her mother's habitual time as the "ground" (142). She accepts that she cannot fully escape modifications both in her past and her present life. She admits that pure change cannot occur because "if the demons lie within they travel with you" (Oranges 142). The image of the demon makes it clear that by referring to Winnet's escape, Jeanette actually questions the consequences of her own. By observing her own escape through the lenses of Winnet's story, Jeanette concludes that she cannot steer the arrow of time and break its simple circle because the past lies within herself. Thus, she decides to return home to complete it. Anne DeLong explains her decision, stating that "going back would mean retracing one's thread or rewriting one's own chosen path. Going home may be the culmination of the circular journey, as it is for Jeanette" (274).

The first signs that Jeanette re-arrives at her home for Christmas is depicted as "the wind blew, and my shoes got darker and damp as I slithered past the town hall, Christmas pine radiant, crib courtesy of the Salvation Army" (Oranges 143). The place she has grown up in immediately urges Jeanette to seek for its sameness in the objects as she says, "'Ten blocks, twenty street-lamps.' I counted automatically" (Oranges 143). She continues "the last few flags and suddenly I'm outside my front door again" (Oranges 143). This shows that even after acknowledging the other wise, Jeanette still assumes that she can encounter changes in her past life. Besides, she believes the change is to occur in the object repeated rather than her mind. Therefore, when she steps into her home and faces "mother sitting in front of what is best described as a contraption", she assumes her mother's life has undergone certain changes (Oranges 143). She learns that her mother has broken contact with the Society for the Lost as there was fraud in its workings. However, she gradually realizes that even if the objects of her past seem to have changed, her mother's mind

has not witnessed any changes. Her living present has only received modifications of the reality so that her mother's expectations would be met.

Upon her arrival and undetailed conversation with her mother, Jeannette decides to head for sleep. During her sleep, Jeanette returns to her dreaming of Sir Perceval's journey. She sees that Sir Perceval longs for his past, that is, the time when he was at the familiar surroundings of King Arthur's Round Table. He has gained glory and become a warrior, but he considers himself as a "warrior who longed to grow herbs" (Oranges 146). He does not really know the exact reason why he has left his habitual life at the Round Table. Going through the reminiscences of the past, and remembering Arthur who "had cried like a child", Perceval regrets his decision (Oranges 146). It is stated that "Sir Perceval curses himself for leaving the Round Table, leaving the king, and the king's sorrowing face" (Oranges 146). The regret Perceval feels can be associated with the Deleuzian idea of reminiscence, which is seen as a way to "save" the pure past for oneself (D&R 84):

The entire past is conserved in itself, but how can we save it for ourselves, how can we penetrate that in-itself without reducing it to the former present that it was, or to the present present in relation to which it is past? How can we save it *for ourselves*? It is more or less at this point that Proust intervenes, taking up the baton from Bergson. Moreover, it seems that the response has long been known: reminiscence. In effect, this designates a passive synthesis, an involuntary memory which differs in kind from any active synthesis associated with voluntary memory. (D&R 84-85)

Deleuze puts that reminiscences allow us to "penetrate" into the pure past and "save it for ourselves" (84). This means that through reminiscences the retentions of the past become one's own representation of the reality of the past. It is filtered by the person's perception. Similarly, the road he takes in the unknown disturbs what Perceval has known for his whole life. Therefore, the past which once seemed something to escape from becomes something to be longed for for Sir Perceval. He knows that if he had stayed in Arthur's castle, nothing would have changed. Sir Perceval's realization of his longing for habitual time at Arthur's castle and his regret of the road he has taken are depicted as follows:

On the first day and the second day and the third day, Perceval could have turned back, he was still within the sphere of Merlin. On the fourth day, the

woods were wild and forlorn, and he did not know where he was, or even what had driven him there. (Oranges 146)

The more Sir Perceval gets away from the sphere of Merlin, the more confused and tired he becomes. As he proceeds towards the unknown of the future, he more and more longs for the familiar times of the past. This past can be regarded as the reminiscences of the pure past. It detaches itself from pure retentions with the passing of external time and adding of new experiences. As Sir Perceval gains life experiences outside the Round Table, his past looks more appealing. Time even makes him forget the reason why in the beginning he has set off for the journey. Deleuze explains such shifts in one's perception of the past hence:

If there is an in-itself of the past, then reminiscence is its noumenon or the thought with which it is invested. Reminiscence does not simply refer us back from a present present to former ones, from recent loves to infantile ones, from our lovers to our mothers. Here again, the relation between passing presents does not account for the pure past which, with their assistance, takes advantage of their passing in order to reappear underneath representation: beyond the lover and beyond the mother, coexistent with the one and contemporary with the other, lies the never-lived reality of the Virgin" (85).

This shows that when someone does not completely leave the habitual time behind and opens up for what future may bring, the future becomes less desirable as it seems vague and void. Therefore, reminiscences do not reflect the actual reality of the past. Instead, it reflects a "never-lived reality" that would satisfy the present needs of the person (85). Since Sir Perceval is tired of the journey he has taken, he wants to reach back at the calm and stable life at Arthur's table. He reflects the peace and the calmness of the past at the Round Table with the image of "growing herbs" (Oranges 146).

Likewise, Jeanette's dreaming of Sir Perceval, who is desperate about his present life and desires a chance to return to the past intact, can be rendered as her unconscious wish to return to her mother's habitual life. As Jeanette realizes that escaping to the city has not granted her complete freedom to achieve her own living present, she also perceives the past through its idealized reminiscences. Just as Sir Perceval wants to wake up to a morning from the past where nothing is different, Jeanette opens her eyes to a morning in which her mother awakens her "with a cup of

hot chocolate and a shopping list” (Oranges 146). Her mother’s act makes Jeanette feel that she has never leaved her past life behind. It shows that the repetitive cycle in Jeanette’s life is far from the Deleuzian eternal return. Deleuze explains that “repetition in the eternal return implies the destruction of all forms which hinder its operation, all the categories of representation incarnated in the primacy of the Same, the One, the Identical and the Like” (126). However, Jeanette wakes up to a similar morning from the past as if she had never taken a different path. Even if Jeanette leaves her habitual life, she never denies that time proceeds in its arrow to complete its simple circle. In this sense, Jeanette does not aim at pure difference in her time. She only tries to build her own circle. Returning home, she shows that she cannot resist the binding effect of her mother’s living present. Consequently, she finds herself in its stable circle again. This makes her even question whether she has ever escaped to the city:

I was beginning to wonder if I’d ever been anywhere. My mother was treating me like she always had; had she noticed my absence? Did she even remember why I’d left? I have a theory that every time you make an important choice, the part of you left behind continues the other life you could have had. (Oranges 148)

It can be seen that although Jeanette wants to escape from the binaristic thinking of her mother, her understanding of decision-making cannot detach itself from her mother’s mode of thinking. Jeanette seems to believe that when she makes a decision, she chooses one part of the whole and omits the rest. But she also sees that even if she tries to ignore the side she has not chosen, she cannot erase her links with that part. As a result, she finds herself returning to what she cannot erase. Jeanette thinks that

There’s a chance that I’m not here at all, that all the parts of me, running along all the choices I did and didn’t make, for a moment brush against each other. That I am still an evangelist in the North, as well as the person who ran away. Perhaps for a while these two selves have become confused. I have not gone forward or back in time, but across in time, to something I might have been, playing itself out. (Oranges 148)

This can be interpreted as an advance notice that Jeanette will realize that all the time she has thought to be finding her own present, she has actually remained bound to

the living present of her mother which had shaped her history and reality for the majority of her life. The past that has been constructed for her by her mother still follows her and the future that was cut out for her by her mother again dominates her present since her “two selves have become confused” (Oranges 148). Jeanette describes her default status in the living present of her mother as “I have not gone forward or back in time, but across in time, to something I might have been, playing itself out” (Oranges 148). Jeanette thinks that what she has chosen as her present is “playing itself out” and she becomes more and more willing to return her habitual life (Oranges 148). It is “the part of you left behind continues the other life you could have had” that prevents Jeanette from truly detaching herself from the living present of her mother (Oranges 148). Referring back to the sorcerer’s desire to know Winnet’s name, she thinks “naming is a difficult and time-consuming process; it concerns essences, and it means power. But on the wild nights who can call you home?” (Oranges 148). This implies even though she knows the influence of her mother’s living present over her future, Jeanette still cannot give up on the safety and the familiarity of life at home.

Repeating narratives are significant indicators of Jeanette’s dilemma throughout her narrative. Her idea of “time as a great deadener” constitutes an example to her use of repeating narrative to expound on her views on the nature of time and history (Oranges 150). The day she expresses how intact she feels on the morning of her return, she goes out to buy groceries. However, she does not return home immediately. She visits the hill she used to go with her dog. In this revisit, she again thinks of time as “a great deadener; people forget, get bored, grow old, go away” (Oranges 150). She remembers her past with her lover Melanie. This instance makes her think of history “a string full of knots, the best you can do is admire it, and maybe knot it up a bit more. History is a hammock for swinging and a game for playing. A cat’s cradle” (Oranges 150). Thinking of history as “a cat’s cradle” that one should not try to understand fully repeats her idea that if one cannot deny the past altogether, s/he can at least modify it (Oranges 150). Modification of history means generating its representation that would comply with one’s living present and its regularities. When time is seen as a great deadener, “you can ill treat, alter and recolour what’s dead. It won’t complain” (Oranges 150). Therefore, time makes

history open for modification. It is only through active forgetting that one can achieve eternal return of future. But if time becomes history in the Deleuzian sense of the theatre of representation, time does not deaden to pave the way for pure difference. It deadens to mutilate and alter, and does not engage with active forgetting. Barbara Wiercińska-Popko suggests a similar understanding of history as “a string full of knots” (150), stating that “memory and language are not capable of providing a uniform account of historical events, which, in turn, leads to varying and often contradicting interpretations” (131). Jeanette admits that active forgetting is accompanied by an “inevitable dying that comes with change” (Oranges 150). Such a death does not witness mutilation or deformation. Jeanette resembles this to the death of her dog. Preferring change, Jeanette seems to have willingly buried her anxiety regarding the unfamiliarity of future under the ground. But she has come to the realization that

...the things I had buried were exhuming themselves; clammy fears and dangerous thoughts and the shadows I had put away for a more convenient time. I could not put them away forever, there is always a day of reckoning. But not all dark places need light, I have to remember that. (Oranges 150)

Jeanette thinks that she cannot escape from her past altogether even if she leaves her familiar places behind. Unlike Pol Pot, who is able to deny the past and to focus on building a new present without it, Jeanette cannot deny her history. Even when she tries to bury them, they reappear in different disguises. Therefore, Jeanette prefers to go with the deadening effect of time which would turn history in a representation in which neither the original nor the derived can be distinguished. This can be interpreted as a sign that Jeanette does not see escape as a way to get rid of her past anymore. She knows that her memories of the past, “clammy fears and dangerous thoughts” are to be “exhuming themselves” even if she buries them as dead (Oranges 150). She just acknowledges that she needs empirical forgetting which would enable her to ignore some of the dark sides of her past. If she cannot ignore, she will try to alter and modify them. In this way, she intends to make her constructed past and its reality she knows and fears into something that would not disturb her present. However, she also believes that once she chooses some part of her past, she will have to give up on some other part. In this sense, she displays that her dilemma between

the familiar and the unfamiliar cannot end with choosing both sides. Yet, she cannot make herself choose one side only. Therefore, she both acknowledges that “there’s no choice that doesn’t mean a loss” and dares to lose some parts of the lived-reality inside “the never-lived” one (D&R 85) in order to deal with the burden of history (Oranges 150).

After all, Jeanette confesses that she cannot detach herself from neither her past nor her mother’s living present, thinking that “perhaps it was the snow, or the food, or the impossibility of my life that made me hope to go to bed and wake up with the past intact. I seemed to have run in a great circle, and met myself again on the starting line” (Oranges 152). This can be rendered as the simple circle of her mother’s living present which binds her. The dominance of her mother’s habitual in time Jeanette’s life even if she tries to separate herself can be further linked with Winterson’s own binding with her real-life mother as she explains in another novel that,

I have written love narratives and loss narratives – stories of longing and belonging. It all seems so obvious now – the Wintersonic obsession of love, loss and belonging. It is my mother. It is my mother. It is my mother. (Why Be Happy 146-147)

It can be seen that Winterson expresses her binding to her mother as the source of her novels. Her mother connotes the ideas of “longing and belonging” in her narratives (Why Be Happy 146-147). Similarly, in *Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit*, Jeanette’s binding to her past life at her mother’s house refers to her idea that she cannot truly detach herself from the thread of her mother’s habitual time and make a brand new present. Jesse Bordwin puts that “the adult Jeanette no longer accepts these influences [of her mother] as willingly as her former self does, but their appearance demonstrates, nevertheless, a continued affiliation with her past” (15). Jeanette now sees her life as forming a circle from the past to the present that inevitably contains reminiscences about her life with her mother. Thus, Jeanette cannot free herself completely from the simple circle of her mother’s living present, which makes her to return the beginning point how hard she tries otherwise.

Right after Jeanette conveys how she wants the past intact, she moves into telling the last part of Sir Perceval’s journey. Just like her smooth transitions to

Winnet's story, she begins to tell Perceval's story without warning the reader the upcoming shift. This implies that Jeanette also tries to build parallelism between her story and Perceval's story in order to foresee the ending of her own story. In a sense, it can be said that "Jeanette's alter egos in the stories within the story, Winnet Stonejar ... and Sir Perceval, are both questers who never reach the goals of their quests, but undergo a process of individuation, a process which will always remain unfinished" (Jørgensen 28). Similarly, Jeanette mentions that "Perceval had been angry that night. His journey seemed fruitless, and himself misguided" (Oranges 152). Perceval knows that "he had gone for his own sake, nothing more. He had thought that day of returning. He felt himself being pulled like a bobbin of cotton, so that he was dizzy and wanted to give in to the pull and wake up round familiar things" (Oranges 152). Sir Perceval initially aspires to achieve an empirical forgetting and leave the past behind altogether. However, he ends up with active forgetting which leads him to remember the past through its nostalgic reminiscences. Active forgetting means to affirm the loss for the sake of change. Thus, he sees "when he slept that night he dreamed he was a spider hanging a long way down a huge oak. Then a raven came and flew through his thread, so that he dropped to the ground and scuttled away" (Oranges 152). This means that his active forgetting cuts his ties with the binding of the living present in the Round Table and has given way towards the empty time of the third synthesis.

However, Jeanette feels that her thread has never been cut off. She still finds herself at the point she has left. Deleuze explains the repetition of the similar in the first synthesis as follows:

[In the first synthesis of time] the past does not cause one present to pass without calling forth another... It no longer exists, it does not exist, but it insists, it consists, it *is*. It insists with the former present, it consists with the new or present present. (82)

This indicates that even though the present turns into a new present, its accompanied by the past. Consequently, Jeanette feels in between escape and return. She believes she can neither have a family nor deny one. She explains that

families, real ones, are chairs and tables and the right number of cups, but I had no means of joining one, and no means of dismissing my own; she had tied a thread around my button, to tug when she pleased. (Oranges 154)

The image of thread tied around her button openly shows the binding effect of her mother's living present even after Jeanette escapes from her familiar surroundings. This shows the company of the past to the present. Jeanette also thinks that if she had a different past with a different self, it could have created a different present for her, expressing that "I knew a woman in another place. Perhaps she would save me. But what if she were asleep? What if she sleepwalked beside me and I never knew?" (Oranges 154). In order to look for a new present, Jeanette leaves home. Indeed, this is apparent from the very beginning of her narrative in which she says that after sometime of her life, she does not continue to live with her family. In her revisit to the home, she emphasizes her leave by saying "I stayed with them until just after Christmas" (Oranges 152). Although this might mean that she stops living with her family after that Christmas, she also admits that she has "no means of joining one [of the other families], and no means of dismissing my [her] own (Oranges 154). Jeanette knows that her thread has not been cut like Sir Perceval's thread. However, the tug also satisfies her dilemmatic needs of being bound to some genealogical past. As can be inferred by her escape, Jeanette wants to designate a different self to her being that would have a different beginning. However, she fears that the other self might be unaware of her or she might be unaware of that other self. In either case, she cannot dare to dismiss her mother and the history she provides. Having a beginning point would mean that she can have a point that she could return in her circle. Even though Jeanette seems disappointed by the tug of her mother, she also desires a family that she can return anytime. She also seems to accept that her past has been modified and mutilated by her mother so much so that she cannot escape into a completely separate life. This is accentuated by her mother's return to home in a fury, "throwing the letter on to the fire. [She says] 'If I'm not sharp I'm going to miss my broadcast'" (Oranges 154). The broadcast she refers calls "this is Kindly Light calling Manchester, come in Manchester, this is Kindly Light" (Oranges 154). This repeating narrative completes the cycle of Jeanette's narrative as it makes it return to the beginning when her mother would listen to the same podcast in the very beginning of her narrative that conveys her childhood. Jeanette's mother sticks to her

habits and sets stable expectations from the future within her living present no matter what she encounters. Consequently, the “collapse of temporal dimensions disrupts the laws of causality and chronology, and creates a non-linear narrative that binds Jeanette to her mother” (Cantrell 1). Consequently, Jeanette finds herself repeating a similar circle as her mother due to the tug of her thread (Cantrell 1).

Nevertheless, it is not only her mother or how she has been brought up that causes Jeanette’s time to repeat the similar. Jeanette seems to have noticed that her past has been modified and considers this modification as the work of the devil. On the other hand, change requires an active forgetting of all familiarity and leaving a guaranteed safety of her present. She leaves her narrative with an open ending that implies that although she wants to escape from the living present of her mother and its binding, she cannot accomplish it. The open ending shows that in the novel “the self becomes a constantly shifting entity, a product of language and narratives, and ultimately, a narrative in itself” (Gamallo qtd. in Preda 127). Jeanette does not specify whether she ever returns to her home ever again, nor does she mention whether she can manage to create her own present. The open ending only implies that Jeanette still wishes that the past was intact and ambulatory. In the meantime, she cannot get rid of the dilemma that she has different expectations from the future than her mother.

Ultimately, the first synthesis in Deleuzian taxonomy also makes habitual time dominant in Jeanette’s perception of life. Jeanette does not deny her engagement with the first synthesis of time and its living present. Instead, she wants to create a living present of her own to possess her authentic habits and expectations. But she gradually realizes that even when she makes spatial changes, she cannot completely free her internal time from the influence of her mother’s binding time. Therefore, each step she takes towards change returns to her as modification. By her narrative’s open ending, it can be deduced that while her journeys in external life might be directing her forward, Jeanette’s inner world keeps returning to her mother’s living present that is located between her habits of a constructed past and expectations of a predetermined future.

CHAPTER 4

DELEUZIAN TIME IN *SEXING THE CHERRY*

Jeanette Winterson's 1989 novel *Sexing the Cherry* begins with an epigraph that questions the nature of time and reality. Firstly, it mentions the Indian tribe Hopi, which uses "a language as sophisticated as ours, but no tenses for past, present and future" (STC 9). In Hopi tribe's understanding of time, the separation between these pillars does not exist. Secondly, it is stated that reality constituted by matter consists of "empty space and points of light" (STC 9). Beginning from this epigraph, Winterson investigates the flux of time and questions the irrevocability of reality. For this purpose, she employs the internal and the external journeys of intradiegetic narrators amid temporal narrative fluxes. This way, the novel aims to exhibit the strife between the habitual and the demented time in the lives of these characters. According to Deleuze, habitual time resides in the living present of the first synthesis and aims to sustain and fulfil its habits of the past and expectations of the future by completing its simple circle at the end of the arrow of time. In habitual time, repetition occurs in order to yield analogies and similarities. On the other hand, demented time come in close affiliation with idea of decentering the simple circle of time in the end by eliminating the time's habitual joints. In this regard, demented time offers a repetition of transformation and change in the mind and attempt to subverts the mainstream understanding of linearity and irrevocability attributed to time's nature and processing. Analysing the novel from a Deleuzian framework, the study attempts to show how the habitual time of the characters fade into the eternal return of demented time through their experimentations with time and reality. A Deleuzian reading consequently illustrates how the novel particularly engages with the repetition of time from the perspective of the third synthesis and thus displays how repetition eventually leads into genuine difference in life.

The novel begins in seventeenth-century England with assumingly the first memory of Jordan, in which he wakes up into the middle of a fog at night, walks in the cold and sees his face for the first time. Afterwards, the narrative slips into the narration of his mother, Dog-Woman. Dog-Woman never wants his son to leave him. However, Jordan hides a desire for journeying at the centre of his heart and this desire is unearthed by his encounter with John Tradescant by the Thames. Majority of the narrative demonstrates how Jordan's desire for never-ending travelling clashes with his mother's inclination towards staying within the sphere of the familiar. While Dog-Woman clings to her past in order to make sense of her present and avoids an unknown future, seventeenth century Jordan unfolds himself towards the vague future. During his journeys, Jordan constantly questions the nature of time, history and reality. The act of journeying visualizes this questioning by offering convoluted temporal fluxes to the novel's narrative and blending the past and the present in the eternal return of the future.

Initially, Jordan mimics his mother in his desire to achieve his own living present by setting the dancing princess Fortunata as his destination. He assumes that once he finds her, he will be satisfied with the end of his story. However, Jordan ultimately understands that his dream is actually not finding his destination and creating his own living present. Instead, he comprehends that he aspires for the voyages themselves and the genuine difference they would offer. Gradually, the novel erases the external understanding of time and makes it into a sphere of free fall. In this undefined time, the characters repeat their prior beings with the qualities of difference.

The last part of the novel opens up some years later with the narrations of Nicolas Jordan and the scientist woman, whose paths intersect in their activism for changing the mainstream system of the world that corrupts nature. Their union can be seen as a repetition of seventeenth century Jordan and Dog-Woman in a new period of time. This repetition that unfolds itself with difference contributes to the formal qualities of the novel. It highlights Winterson's desire to depict the demented time of life by complicating the temporal fluxes of the narrative. The novel allows intradiegetic characters to experiment with the notion of time and its relation to history, and points out to the effect of change in the processing of time. Ultimately,

Nicolas Jordan and the chemist woman burn down the factory that pollutes the Thames River near London while Jordan and Dog-Woman escape down the Thames from a fire in their city. The interwoven stories are finalized with the seventeenth century Jordan's travel into an unknown time. This constitutes a transition from habitual time of the first synthesis to the demented time of the third synthesis in *Sexing the Cherry*.

Although it is possible to realize the influence of the living present in the intradiegetic narrator Dog-Woman's view of life and history, her son Jordan desires to find the unknown along his journeys. Jordan's narrative offers a convoluted structure of time and history. Lee argues that "*Sexing the Cherry* in particular, with its suggestion of history's repetition-with-difference seems to be implying a way of connecting time past to time present in order to do something about the future" (Makinen 90). Through Jordan's perpetual journeys, the sharp edges of chronological time and objective history blurs into a mixture where the past, the present and the future exist simultaneously. In *Sexing the Cherry*, habits and expectations that initially yearn for a pattern of habitual time turn into demented time that pursues transformation and difference.

4.1. Foreshadowing the Demented Time

Sexing the Cherry begins by foreshadowing its focus on the ideas apparent in the Deleuzian third synthesis by subverting the expectation of a regular introduction to its narrative. The novel opens at an unfathomable point of Jordan's story. Upon exposing his name as "My name is Jordan", Jordan continues to describe what he calls as the first thing he has seen (STC 10). He continues with a detailed description of this instance, which he locates as the beginning of his memories of the past. The elaborateness of Jordan's description implies that his narration of his story does not begin with infancy. Thus, what he conveys as his first memory actually refers to the first thing he believes to remember. This separates his first memory from the retention of the past, which reflects the past without any distortion. Instead, Jordan narrates his story by its reminiscences, which are reflexive accounts of the past filtered through his experiences and perception. His dependence on reminiscences to convey his past can also be inferred by his use of language in describing the

surroundings through similes, metaphors and hyperboles. For example, he mentions, “the fog came from the river in thin spirals like spirits in a churchyard and thickened with the force of a genie from a bottle” (STC 10). The moment he opens his eyes, he sees the fog, whose movement he likens to “spirits in a churchyard” and whose density he conveys through exaggeration (STC 10). Likewise, he describes the environment as “the tops of the trees floated in the fog, making suspended islands for the birds” (STC 10). Jordan uses metaphorical imagery for depicting the view of trees as “suspended islands” in order to repeat his emphasis on the density of the fog (STC 10). He continues to reveal the influence of his perception and experiences on his narration by implementing anachrony. The mentioning of having “no hand-warmer”, which is an object that does not exist in the seventeenth century, refers to an anachrony that steers Jordan’s narration away from historical facts (STC 11). Also, he states “I began to walk with my hands stretched out in front of me, as do those troubled in sleep” (STC 11). The act of walking, echoing the detailed descriptions of the environment, implies that Jordan does not begin his story with his infancy. His narration of the past begins at an indefinite point and refers to a grown-up Jordan from a different time period than the seventeenth century. Amy J. Elias comments on the convoluted temporal structure of the entire novel as “in Jeanette Winterson’s *Sexing the Cherry*, historical periods seem blurred: while the novel is set in the seventeenth century, the characters espouse philosophies of history and time that seem characteristic of the late twentieth century” (112). The twentieth century offers a poststructuralist view of time and history that aim to subvert ideas of irrevocability and veracity regarding the nature of these time and history. Similarly, Winterson’s novel presents an understanding of time that runs out of its joints. This amounts to the idea that time appears to be innately multiple and makes possible many histories of a single body to exist simultaneously. Likewise, Deleuze maintains that in the demented time of the third synthesis “difference is at the centre and the Same is only on the periphery: it is a constantly decentred, continually tortuous circle which revolves only around the unequal” (D&R 56). In this synthesis, time repeats itself in the eternal return of difference. This eternal return encompasses the multiple in nature. Therefore, Winterson’s engagement with time and history in the later parts of *Sexing the Cherry* complies with Deleuze’s demented time of the third synthesis.

Another aspect of the novel that foreshadows its engagement with the ideas ideas that can be found in the Deleuzian third synthesis is the association between journeys and time. This association exposes the novel's inclination towards the third synthesis by providing instances of empty time and active forgetting. To start with, the link between the empty time and journeys are constructed through both merging and distinguishing external and internal journeys. Raunak Kumar suggests that the novel

...reverses the overall time-space contingency of a text by opening the linear timeline into multidimensional progression and it does so by joining the two usually distinct points of narration in the text whereby the sense of progression self-destructs. (171)

It is possible to see throughout the novel that –particularly- Jordan's story blends "the linear timeline" with "multidimensional progression" by investigating the nature of journeys from a temporal aspect (Kumar 171). Jordan divides journeys into two: the ones he has made and the ones he "might have made, or perhaps did make in some other place or time" (STC 11). Although Jordan's journeys proceed in a "linear timeline" in the external world, it is possible to see that his travels in his internal world exhibit "multidimensional progression" (Kumar 171). He suggests that "every journey conceals another journey within its lines: the path not taken and the forgotten angle" (STC 11). This indicates that every external journey hides behind other internal journeys. The amalgamation of these journeys provides a multidimensional essence to time. Time does not only proceed on an arrow from the past to the future. It also leaps among the past, the present and the future. This second type offers journeys that Jordan states to "wish to record" (STC 11). He defines them as "not the ones I made, but the ones I might have made, or perhaps did make in some other place or time" (STC 11). Maria Elena Stanborough suggests that Jordan's "adventures are of the "hidden life," not of the lives that have been recorded or charted, but rather, the matrix in which imagination, physical experience, history and place all meet" (30). Consequently, the relation of time and journeys in Jordan's story echo the Deleuzian third synthesis with its connotations of empty form of time. According to Deleuze, "the caesura, along with the before and after which it ordains once and for all, constitutes the fracture in the I" (D&R 89). In other words, the

empty time offers an I that is fractured by the caesura of the future. This “fracture” he calls the form of the empty time (D&R 284). This form makes the self empty of identities that would assign to it a fixed being. The journeys Jordan aspires to keep a record of are the ones that witness the caesura in the linear flow of time. Such journeys occur internally and offer an understanding of time that does not pass in a linear timeline. Instead, internal journeys enable the self to separate into other selves by fracturing the I. This means that the several selves of Jordan could take or have taken journeys simultaneously. Jordan believes some of the journeys he might not even be remembering. Consequently, the amalgamation of external and internal journeys not only creates a multidimensional understanding of time, but they also enable Winterson to “problematize the assumption of absolute and linear time” (Morrison 104).

As aforementioned, the relation between journeys and Deleuzian active forgetting is another means to employ the third synthesis of time in the novel. Ramadanovic defines active forgetting as “a process in which a past measure is abandoned and a new measure is continually reconstituted on the basis of new experiences. In this way measure is perpetually rediscovered, and so kept in synch with the difference that time introduces” (4). Ramadanovic emphasizes the link between active forgetting and the notion of difference it provides to time. It achieves difference by making the past repeat itself in constant transformation and change. Deleuze calls this the “waste”, in which “the genius of eternal return lies” (D&R 55). Deleuze derives the idea of eternal return from the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche. He interprets that the eternal return does not deal with memory; instead, it deals with an active process of forgetting which ultimately blurs the lines between the original and the derived remembrances and leads into a past of difference. According to Deleuze, Nietzsche thinks those who cannot perceive life as an eternal return will “know themselves for what they are: epiphenomena” and “this will be their absolute Knowledge” (D&R 55). This results from considering life as a repetition of the similar. However, the introduction of *Sexing the Cherry* offers a grown-up Jordan whose view of life affirms the eternal return and the decentred circle it offers. Jordan explains his process of active forgetting he has realized through his journeys as follows:

I discovered that my own life was written invisibly, was squashed between the facts, was flying without me like the Twelve Dancing Princesses who shot from their window every night and returned home every morning with torn dresses and worn-out slippers and remembered nothing. (STC 55)

Remembering nothing of what has happened and proceeding within a life written in invisible ink indicates the existence of active forgetting that would spin the circle of life only with difference. What is seen as the facts and truths of history become vague in the demented time and are subject to constant transformation. In this regard, Jordan puts that he does not want to convey his story “as you will find it in diaries and maps and log-books” or as “you could follow it then, tracing those travels with your finger, putting red flags where I went” (STC 11). He proposes that his life is like the Greek letters that were written both with ink and milk. It is those who know the trick that could make the lines in between visible by spreading “coal dust over it” (STC 11). In this way, Jordan maintains that “what the letter had been no longer mattered; what mattered was the life flaring up undetected ... till now” (STC 11). This statement emphasizes that it has taken a while for Jordan to understand that life is not composed of only external journeys. Besides, his internal journeys are not obliged to reach heroic achievements of the external ones. Jordan ultimately realizes that the journeys he makes towards his inner centre do not have to proceed in the arrow of time from the past towards the present and the future. Jordan confesses that throughout his narrative he “resolved to set a watch on myself [himself] like a jealous father, trying to catch myself [himself] disappearing through a door just noticed in the wall” (STC 11). The image of “a jealous father” constitutes a repeating prolepsis to the Twelve Dancing Princesses and an advance notice on Jordan’s never-ending journeys in his quest to understand the difference that governs the processing of his life (STC 11). Jordan accepts that he has primarily assumed to be able to “keep a log of” his travels that he makes inwards (STC 11). Nevertheless, he finally realizes that this is not an effective way to investigate his journeys. He acknowledges he cannot keep record of every memory or he cannot reach back at the original retentions of the past to retell his story in the present. Jordan notices that unless he accepts he goes through a constant active forgetting, he will end up with a “life flaring up undetected” (STC 11). As Jordan approaches perceiving life from the third synthesis of demented time more and more, he realizes that what he is to do is not

detecting what happens or has happened by the ticking of the clock. He comprehends that life is hidden within the Deleuzian “waste” produced by the process of active forgetting (D&R 55). This comprehension makes him steer towards discovering his life that is “written invisibly” and “squashed between the facts” (STC 55). Mihaela Cristina- Lazăr asserts that “memory and myth intertwine in Jordan’s representation of the world, making him a postmodern skeptical self” (176). Ultimately, Jordan sees that his journeys in life do not only proceed externally and on a linear timeline. It is not merely composed of the retentions of the pure past or the habits and expectations of the living present. Rather, he needs to find out what he forgets constantly, namely, the time that reappears with difference during his internal journeys. This leads him to discover what seems as the waste, but is actually the core of the eternal return of the future that repeats itself with transformation and change.

The last advance notice to the emergence of demented time in the novel that is emphasized in the introduction is the image of home. The image of home appears to emphasize the strife between the familiar and the unfamiliar. Home refers to holding onto the familiar, with its habits of the past and expectations from the future. However, leaving home for journeys indicates an interaction with the unfamiliar and discovering the unknown of time. This strife is an indicator that Winterson’s view of time is not mono-faceted. Rather, the strife provides a multidimensional nature to time. Deleuze’s three syntheses allow showing how this conflict between the familiar and the unfamiliar shapes the characters’ relation with the past, the present and the future. Jordan states that “what I loved was not going on at home” (STC 11). Home means a point that would prevent movement in Jordan’s life. Jordan wants to get to know the unfamiliar by discovering the world; therefore, he expresses that “I was giving myself the slip and walking through this world like a shadow” (STC 11-12). He explains “the longer I eluded myself the more obsessed I became with the thought of discovery” (STC 12). Jordan’s obsession with discovery allows him to explore the difference in time, namely, “to find evidence of the other life and gradually it appeared before me [him]” (STC 12). These discoveries occur within his internal world, where he loses the habitual impact of the living present and controlling influence of reminiscences. Engaging with the demented time of the third synthesis enables him to realize that his life is not one, but of the multiple.

Overall, the introduction shows that the novel begins by providing the reader with implications of ideas apparent in Deleuze's third synthesis of time. Although in *Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit*, Winterson presents a time submitting to the familiar of the first synthesis, *Sexing the Cherry* – from its introduction to the conclusion – illustrates how time aspires to experiment with the unknown within the third synthesis. The following analyses will show that, in *Sexing the Cherry*, Winterson actually employs all three syntheses of time and displays the versatile relations between the past, the present and the future from a comprehensive perspective. Nevertheless, opening her work by foreshadowing its gradual involvement with the third synthesis not only implies that the work will further dwell on the subversive link between repetition and difference in the formation of a demented, decentred time, but also exhibits the writer's evolving views on the nature of time.

4.2. Habitual Life

Following Jordan's deductions about the demented nature of time, the narrative moves onto Dog-Woman's telling of how she has found her son Jordan near the river Thames. She finds Jordan by the river covered in mud and hangs a medallion on his neck. The medallion says "remember the rock from whence ye are hewn and the pit from whence ye are digged" (STC 12). It hints that Dog-Woman wants to mark a beginning point for Jordan that would emerge from the moment she finds him. She aspires that Jordan's life does not have a past or future without her. Dog-Woman lives by the river and the mug of the same river gives Jordan a life by her side. Consequently, the river is the rock from which Jordan is "hewn" for the Dog-Woman (STC 12). Constructing Jordan a history out of her imagination, Dog-Woman tries to guarantee his stay within her living present. She also assigns herself a past that complies with her living present. Thus, neither Jordan's and nor Dog-Woman's understanding of the past derives from an actual point which would mark their biological birth. Jordan believes it as it is told by his mother, and Dog-Woman conceives it through the assumptions of the society about her. She explains, "I had a name but I have forgotten it. They call me the Dog-Woman and it will do. I call him Jordan and it will do. He has no other name before or after" (STC 12). Dog-Woman does not prefer to use the names that she is given by birth, but the names she has

come to know in her living present. She is not interested in what actually she or Jordan were called in another past. Toril Moi interprets her relation with naming as her “desire to regulate and organize reality” (160). Dog-Woman assumes that the knowledge of actual names would insist on a genealogical exactness for both of the characters. Therefore, she says that what they remember “will do”, and they do not need to go back to actual retentions of the past (STC 12). The fact that she states “he has no other name before or after” indicates that she does not want any history for Jordan that is before her (STC 12). She wants to mark the beginning point of him as herself. Making herself Jordan’s point of beginning, she wants to protect and preserve him in the habitual time of her living present.

Deleuze associates the habitual time of the first synthesis with the faith in expectations. He refers to the English writer Samuel Butler on his example of “the corn” whose growth is seen to be depended upon the “faith” that it will grow (D&R 75). The faith gives the corn the power to grow by transforming “the earth and moisture into wheat through the conceit of its own ability to do so” (D&R 75). This implies that the occurrence of an event in the understanding of faith depends on the organism’s expectations regarding the process and the consequences. Likewise, Dog-Woman expounds on her naming of Jordan and how it will determine his future, stating that “I wanted to give him a river name, a name not bound to anything, just as the waters aren’t bound to anything” (STC 13). But she immediately confesses that she regrets the freedom his name gives to Jordan, saying “I should have named him after a stagnant pond and then I could have kept him, but I named him after a river and in the flood-tide he slipped away” (STC 13). This confession constitutes an advance notice for Jordan’s enthusiasm for journeying and making discoveries. From his childhood, Jordan develops a passion to discover the world and this passion urges him to take external journeys. In the meantime, he also makes internal travels within his mind. Dog-Woman believes that if she had not named Jordan with the name of a river that is not “bound to anything,” (63) but named him “after a stagnant pond”, Jordan would not be so keen on pursuing discoveries (STC 13). Rather, he would have stayed with her. In this sense, Deleuzian faith appears in Dog-Woman’s approach to the deterministic nature of naming. She believes naming will set a destiny for Jordan and expects her faith to actualize itself. This shows the

contradictory nature of her thinking. While she wants Jordan to be free as waters, she also regrets grating him that freedom by naming him “after a river” (STC 13). The influence of her faith in determining the impact of naming on the future indicates that the act of naming by itself does not have a power. It is the power of faith to steer the past and the present, and disguise their reality under representations to fulfil its expectations regarding the future.

In line with her faith that Jordan will leave one day, Dog-Woman marks the outset of Jordan’s journeys as when she took “him to see a great rarity” at the age of three (STC 13). She sees this instance as her “undoing” since it initiates Jordan’s early enthusiasm for leaving his house for discoveries (STC 13). Being the owner of tens of dogs, Dog-Woman assumes that she can captivate Jordan within her habitual time by leashing him like his dogs. She says “I took Jordan on a hound-lead and pushed my way through the gawpers” (STC 13). Yet, the physical bound she puts on Jordan does not prevent him from travelling among times within his internal world. At the fair, she sees a banana and sets loose Jordan’s leash in shock. When she gets back to herself and has “pulled on the hound-lead in order to take Jordan away”, she realizes that Jordan has freed himself from the lead (STC 15). She gets into a flap, thinking “He was gone. My boy was gone” (STC 15). This incident points to the first time that Jordan voyages free from the living present of her mother and has his first journey for discoveries. Dog-Woman finds Jordan under Johnson’s table and looks at the direction he stares at. There she sees “deep blue waters against a pale shore and trees whose branches sang with green and birds in fairground colours and an old man in a loin-cloth” (STC 15). His vision of “deep blue waters against a pale shore” can be regarded as an early sign of his fractured future self, which will open the third synthesis for his exploration of difference in time. Paul Kintzele suggests that “the appearance of the banana at the beginning of *Sexing the Cherry* stages, albeit humorously, the confrontation between a social order and its beyond; it establishes the presence of a force that calls the norm into question” (67). Through his first internal journey, Jordan similarly hints that he will eventually break his bounds from his mother’s habitual time and leave for demented time.

The flashback of when Dog-Woman finds Jordan covered in mud by the river and brings him to the house to clean him consolidates her belief that Jordan

will leave. While she cleans the baby with her neighbour, the neighbour proposes a clairvoyance that Jordan is going to break his mother's heart as he grows older. Dog-Woman believes if she has eliminated her neighbour, the clairvoyance would be discarded. She tells "had I done so, perhaps I could have changed our fate, for fate may hang on any moment and at any moment be changed. I should have killed her and found us a different story" (STC 16). Dog-Woman assumes her future can be modified by removing one disturbing point in time. She thinks of fate as successive moments that follow an order to make a presumable pattern in life. She considers changing one instance will affect the whole of the destiny, by destroying the succession it designates. Kathryn Allan renders this as her "awareness of history's multiple "origins" and the possibility for change in "fate"" (55). This idea of multiple origins differs from the Deleuzian view of destiny. It refers to the reflexive nature of the living present that attempts to alter and modify the past in accordance with its expectations from the future. However, Deleuze explains, "destiny never consists in step-by-step deterministic relations between presents which succeed one another according to the order of a represented time. Rather, it implies between successive presents non-localisable connections" (D&R 83). This emphasizes that the Deleuzian understanding of destiny does not offer a rigid line of time that determines for one person a certain life and ending. It is not composed of present points that succeed on another in accordance with certain expectations. Nor does it involve erasable points. Deleuze thinks of destiny as having an unfathomable essence. Therefore, he argues that "what we say of a life may be said of several lives" (D&R 83). Jordan seems to realize this gradually and comes to the conclusion that his life, which is written in invisible ink, allows it to be composed of other possible lives. However, Dog-Woman's habitual time expects deterministic points that will create a desired pattern of time.

The divergence between Jordan's and Dog-Woman's view of time as Jordan grows up can be further inferred by Dog-Woman's quick shift to a flash-forward of older Jordan's return from voyages. She jumps from the first day she finds Jordan to a day when he comes back to have a sail with his mother on the large sea. The narrative fluxes become more and more convoluted as Dog-Woman gets deeper in the narration of telling how his son has left her behind for voyages, and they indicate

her anxiousness about losing her son. The memory of sailing appears in her present narration in the form of reminiscences, influenced by this sense of anxiety. Sifting through the representations of the past in her mind, Dog-Woman equates her experience of sailing on the sea with “seeing the world” (STC 17). She thinks that with the sail she has seen “the shining water and the size of the world” and that is all that can be discovered for the rest of her life (STC 19). She believes that going beyond the river near her home and seeing the sea is seeing the whole world. She also assumes that she has seen all that is possible in the world, such as seeing a banana. Such experiences refer to the successive points of time that allow forming her living present. Deleuze explains that the living present of the first synthesis repeats itself with “generality ... in so far as it forms a living rule for the future” (71). Thinking of life in terms of generality can be regarded as an aspect of Dog-Woman’s living present. She does not aspire to go beyond her familiar surroundings or distort her habitual life. These points of generality allow for the domination of faith on her future and help to preserve her living present. On the other hand, Jordan has a passion that extends beyond the limit of his familiar surroundings and makes him repeatedly discover the unfamiliar, as he states, “the shining water and the size of the world. I have seen both again and again since I left my mother on the banks of the black Thames” (STC 19). In this regard, the instance of sailing on the sea, which chronologically occurs years after Dog-Woman finds Jordan, demonstrates how the mother and son’s perception of time differ as Jordan grows up.

As can be seen, Dog-Woman wants to remain within the boundaries of her habitual time and keep her son within her living present. The fear of losing him causes her to show scepticism to those who would claim her son or cause him to leave. María del Mar Asensio Aróstegui interprets that “her actions ... invariably follow the dictates of causality, they are never gratuitous but rather reactions to specific external stimuli” (301). “The dictates of causality” refer to the generality in the first synthesis that sets certain rules to preserve habitual time (Aróstegui 301). Due to these “dictates”, Dog-Woman cannot help but react with scepticism to any attempt that would disturb her living present (Aróstegui 301). Her scepticism appears in this instance with three reactions. Firstly, she insists on indicating the time of the past with numerical indicators when narrating the incident. She mentions Jordan’s

meeting of a traveller named Tradescant by locating the past with numbers of the calendar, as she says “it must have been in about 1640, when Jordan was something close to ten, that he met John Tradescant on the banks of the boiling Thames” (STC 25). Numbering time enables her to build a chronological irrevocability between afters and befores. This way, Dog-Woman not only claims veracity to her telling, but also verifies the legitimacy of her stiff reactions to any “external stimuli” that would disturb her habitual life with Jordan. Secondly, her scepticism is apparent in her language describing the traveller, as she states, “I hurried myself, thinking it might be some smooth-faced rascal set to chivvy him away” (STC 26). Her statements such as “smooth-faced rascal” and “chivvy away” reflect her fear of the unknown. She does not like any stranger to intrude into her habitual time, changing any successive moment to alter their future with Jordan.

Dog-Woman wants Jordan’s time to remain fixed as “a stagnant pond” (STC 13). However, she soon learns that John Tradescant is a traveller and that “for years ... he had sailed to exotic places collecting such rare plants as mortals had never seen” (STC 27). What Tradescant tells Dog-Woman about the unknownness of the world constitutes a repeating prolepsis for Jordan’s idea about life: “The sea is so vast no one will ever finish sailing it. That every mapped-out journey contains another journey hidden in its lines...” (STC 27). Although Tradescant’s desire for discovering the unknown of the world finds echo in Jordan, his words do not influence Dog-Woman, who shelters in the stability of her living present. She states that “I pooh-poohed this, for the earth is surely a manageable place made of blood and stone and entirely flat. I believe I could walk from one side to the other, had I the inclination. And if a great body of us had the inclination there would be no part of the earth left untouched” (STC 27-28). Dog-Woman sees the world as a limited space that can be discovered and known all over. However, Jordan grows up to explore a world that extends beyond its spatial capacities towards the temporal sphere. His internal journeys cannot be mapped because they matter less concerning their spatial qualities and more concerning their layout within the internal sphere. Dog-Woman does not believe in “journeys folded in on themselves like a concertina” (STC 28). Namely, she does not believe that there can be other journeys internally in between the external and completable ones. She also states she does not believe in

other possible lives. She sees life as a straight line of time that flows in accordance with habits that come from the past and the expectations projected for the future. Her faith assures Dog-Woman of what she should expect from the future, that is, Jordan will desire to leave his habitual life and go for discoveries. In an advance notice she says, “as for Jordan, he has not my common sense and will no doubt follow his dreams to the end of the world and then fall straight off” (STC 28). Dog-Woman sharply believes that if Jordan attempts to leave her living present, he will lose the protection and safety it provides. She thinks dealing with the unfamiliar can only cause one person to “fall straight off” the edge of the world (STC 28). Denying the scientific discoveries regarding the world’s shape and accepting the dogmatic belief of world as a flat surface, Dog-Woman holds onto a superstitious and common belief regarding the proceeding of the universe. Rejecting the findings of discoveries, she also rejects any force of change that can affect her stable present. Nevertheless, her idea regarding Jordan’s fall off the edge of the straight world foreshadows that learning the vastness of the sea and the possibility of discoveries would urge Jordan to make discoveries like Tradescant. Malgorzata Wronka explains that:

At this moment Jordan becomes fascinated by travels ... The real life of John Tradescant is shrewdly used by Winterson to introduce an invisible passage between two worlds. The lulled reader is slowly moving from the restricted and linear reality to the endless universe unlimited by the hands of the watch. (248)

John Tradescant seems to be the driving force for Jordan to discover the world. Dog-Woman sees this as an intrusion to her habitual life that will inevitably take her son away. The “two worlds” Wronka mentions can be named as the external world and the internal world (248). Although the external world follows the linear flow of time and its simple circle as assigned “by the hands of the watch”, the internal world has free temporal fluxes that tend to decentre the time’s circle towards discovering “the endless universe” (248). Assured by her faith on Jordan’s future leave, Dog-Woman states, “I watched his [Jordan’s] thin body and black hair and wondered how long it would be before he made his ships too big to carry, and then one of them would carry him and leave me behind for ever” (STC 28). The more she desires Jordan to be stagnant in her present time and live with her as usual, the more she ponders that one day he will set sail into a future that does not belong to her. This implies that she

believes Jordan's life is not destined be like "a stagnant pond", but like the river whose waters flow with difference (STC 13).

After his meeting with Jordan by the Thames, Tradescant goes away for a while but eventually comes back to take Jordan with him. Dog-Woman once again marks the date by stating, "one morning, soon after the start of the Civil War that should have been over in a month and lasted eight years, Tradescant came to our house looking for Jordan" (STC 30). Using numerical indicators, she associates her own history with the history of her nation so as to highlight its veracity. This can be read as a sign of Deleuzian history as the theatre of representation. This approach to history assumes that the historical actor repeats the past with reflexivity and representation. Deleuze explains "historians sometimes look for empirical correspondences between the present and the past, but however rich it may be, this network of historical correspondences involves repetition only by analogy or similitude" (D&R 90). It means that when seen as a theatre of representation, history is expected to find "correspondence" between the past and the present (D&R 90). However, Deleuze implies even when there is "analogy" and "similitude" between these two times, it does not necessarily indicate direct causality (D&R 90). By associating her history with her nation's history, Dog-Woman also tries to find a straight relation between her present and her nation's past. Although this appears to be an attempt to prove the veracity and irrevocability of her own history, it actually opens both her history and her narration of the past into question. It also shows that she tries to create a history of her own that would support and verify her living present. This way, she aims to keep her habitual life with Jordan intact. Consequently, when Tradescant returns to take Jordan with him to raise him as "a gardener's boy at Wimbledon", Dog-Woman thinks "But how could I lose Jordan, so dear to me and my only comfort?" (STC 33). On the one hand, her dependence on national history to reinforce her own also implies her loyalty to the court. On the other hand, Jordan means a major habit for her life as she sees him as her only comfort in life. He gives her the assurance that everything flows in its usual way and reminds her of the safety of her surroundings. This creates a dilemma in the Dog-Woman as both losing Jordan and losing her loyalty to the court would disturb her efforts to build and preserve a living present.

As a result, she offers Tradescant that she will accompany Jordan on his stay at the Queen's place in Wimbledon. Dog-Woman does not want to leave her home and habitual life. But she is convinced that she will not be able to hinder Jordan from leaving with Tradescant. This can be deduced by her contemplation on the contradiction between her own expectations and Jordan's expectations from the future as follows:

I breed boarhounds as my father did before me and as I hoped Jordan would do after me. But he would not stay. His head was stuffed with stories of other continents where men have their faces in their chests and some hop on one foot defying the weight of nature. (STC 40)

Dog-Woman has projected that Jordan would stay in her living present and continue her habits that derive their roots from her past life. She expects her son to "breed boarhounds" as she does (STC 40). She cannot deny that Jordan's mind is full of aspiration for discoveries. She also cannot help but see Jordan as part of her habits in the living present. Therefore, she unwillingly prefers to leave her home to keep Jordan near her.

In the meantime, the narrative moves into Jordan's narration of his internal travel "in the city of words" (STC 23). This city is where he first sees the dancing princess Fortunata. He supposes the people of the house he has seen Fortunata would remember her, but soon realizes that "no one in the house recalled her, though how that was possible with her loveliness that devoured the rest of the company in tongues of flame I do not know" (STC 35). His recall of the dancer when no one does can be seen as an advance notice to his tendency towards demented time. Even when he travels away from his mother's living present externally or internally, Jordan still cannot detach himself completely from holding onto a habitual and anticipatory attitude towards his future. Following Fortunata still means to him having a destination to follow and end his journeys with. It makes Jordan aspire to follow the arrow of time to complete the circle and reach Fortunata. Therefore, he also shows implications of faith that ensures him of finding Fortunata one day. Consequently, he does not give up on making travels among imaginary cities to find her. During this pursuit, he begins to work at some women's fish stall. One day, he is carried away by a bird, which wants a fish, to "the windowsill of a well-appointed

house in a town I [he] did not recognize” (STC 39). In Jordan’s opinion, it looks like a usual house, from whose window he could see a lively market. When he expresses this to the girl who lives there, she refuses by claiming that they are “at the top of a sheer-built tower” (STC 44). Upon hearing this and looking outside, Jordan also sees the house in the way the girl conveys. Intrigued and frightened, he cannot comprehend why she is captive in the house. She replies that it is only she herself that keeps herself in that tower under lock. This hallucinatory tower could be said to constitute a metaphor for Deleuze’s distinction between the first and the third syntheses. According to Deleuze, in the first synthesis,

it matters little whether or not the former present acts in its objective reality, or rather, in the form in which it was lived or imagined. For imagination intervenes here only in order to gather up the resonances and ensure the disguises between the two presents in the series of the real as lived reality. Imagination gathers the traces of the former present and models the new present upon the old. (D&R 104)

The living present does not struggle to present an “objective reality”; rather, it deals with the representation of reality as filtered through lenses of personal experience and perception (D&R 104). Likewise, the girl in the tower, by locking herself at will, desolates herself from the rest of the world that faces change. She remains in her living present of the first synthesis due to her imagining of fear and horror. Habitual time is expressed in extremity by the rotting smell of the girl’s disappearing face as she offers “rats” to Jordan to eat (STC 44). On the other hand, Jordan symbolizes the time out of its joints with his desire to defy stagnancy and discover the world through journeys. This life the girl lives seems unbearable to Jordan. Without thinking of his well-being, he jumps off the house’s window in the market that is only apparent for him. He further learns by the people market that there was a tower built after “a young girl caught incestuously with her sister was condemned to build her own death tower. To prolong her life she built it as high as she could, winding round and round with the stones in an endless stairway” (STC 45). Later on, the girl’s death tower is crushed and the house was built there. But the girl’s tortuous living present that can only be sustained by the death tower remains to haunt the new house. Nevertheless, Jordan seeks for a different “destination” in life than the girl’s relentless living present (STC 45).

Upon his fall from the tower, he mentions to the villagers that he is looking for a dancer. Although the villagers do not help him find Fortunata, they urge him to question the actual objective of his search. Jordan asks himself, “Was I searching for a dancer whose name I did not know or was I searching for the dancing part of myself?” (STC 47). This questioning can be considered as the first traces of the fracture in Jordan’s self. This implies Jordan’s future engagement with the third synthesis, which is explained by Deleuze as follows:

As for the third time in which the future appears, this signifies that the event and the act possess a secret coherence which excludes that of the self; that they turn back against the self which has become their equal and smash it to pieces, as though the bearer of the new world were carried away and dispersed by the shock of the multiplicity to which it gives birth: what the self has become equal to is the unequal in itself. (D&R 90)

Jordan initially sees Fortunata as his ideal and complete self. This leads him to believe that finding Fortunata, he will eventually become complete. However, his question “was I searching for the dancing part of myself” implies Fortunata might not even be a separate being to him (STC 47). Deleuze asserts that the fractured self merely “become[s] equal to ... the unequal in itself” (D&R 90). Therefore, he rejects the possibility of “coherence” in “the self” within the third synthesis of time (D&R 90). He asserts that in the third synthesis, the self becomes “equal” to “the event and the act” (D&R 90). However, once Jordan’s self assumes this equivalence, it is fractured both by his act and the event of finding Fortunata to become “unequal” (D&R 90). Consequently, even when Jordan takes journeys, makes discoveries and arrives at his destination Fortunata, he will have a fractured self due to the dispersing impact of the third synthesis. Jeffrey Roessner puts that “while his love for Fortunata inspires Jordan's journeys, he finally questions whether she is the object of his quest or a symbol” (111). Jordan finally figures out that Fortunata refers to the fracture of the unequal in his self. Reaching at Fortunata means to him understanding how his intact self would be. This can be inferred in the later parts of the narrative by Jordan’s association of a dancing life with the notion of still life in painting. Still life refers to a type of painting that depicts unmoving or dead objects. Likewise, Fortunata can be an implication of Jordan’s stable self that holds onto the habits and

expectations of the living present. She cannot be the ideal self that Jordan aspires to find and equate himself with.

His travel to another imaginary city reinforces this process of being fractured. Jordan is to go through within the third synthesis of the future. Jordan describes a city

whose inhabitants are so cunning that to escape the insistence of creditors they knock down their houses in a single night and rebuild them elsewhere. So the number of buildings in the city is always constant but they are never in the same place from one day to the next. (STC 51)

The inhabitants of the city repeat two clashing acts. Jordan expresses that “in the city the inhabitants have reconciled two discordant desires: to remain in one place and to leave it behind for ever” (STC 52). The city eliminates the possibility of returning to the past of the same each day. This means no one in the city can repeat the same life for the next day. This can be associated with the Deleuzian third synthesis and its fracturing. Deleuze relates the fracturing effect to time’s caesura, as he explains that, “The caesura, along with the before and after which it ordains once and for all, constitutes the fracture in the I (the caesura is exactly the point at which the fracture appears)” (D&R 89). The city constantly witnesses the production of the unequal from the equal by its inhabitants’ repetition of the same act every day but generating different circumstances. The movement of the inhabitants can be interpreted as their journey to find their fractured selves at different spots each day. Therefore, this city simultaneously offers mobility and immobility. Their perpetual movement subvert the sense of linear and irrevocable time “because the nature of time is fragmented and broken into pieces it can be read twofold – objectively (by the use of clocks) and subjectively (“the time we feel”)” (Ágota 1). This city can be taken as a symbol for time’s representation in the novel. The external time ticks-tocks by the clock’s passing. Yet, the internal time does not abide by the external world’s flow. It repeats itself in a Deleuzian sense within the empty time of the third synthesis. Mobility serves as an in-itself differentiator for all the buildings in the city. Every day the building and its habitants move to another spot and begin a new story. For example, when the museum is replaced by a windmill, it offers Jordan a new chance of finding

Fortunata. The miller he meets there tell Jordan the story of Twelve Dancing Princesses and this paves the way for Jordan's meeting with the sisters of Fortunata.

When Jordan knocks at the princesses' door, he is welcomed by the eldest princess. The princess introduces their story to Jordan mentioning "the silver city" to where they used to fly secretly and dance at nights (STC 55). Milada Franková interprets this city as a symbol for Winterson's "threefold sense of time: the chronological story time, historical time and fabular time, all of them merging seamlessly into a sense of timelessness" (*The Postmodern* 235). This city provides a magical sense of time that liberates the princesses from the custody of their father. Dancing in this city, they let go of their link with external time. The intertextual inclusion of their story in between Jordan's journey for finding Fortunata also subverts the linearity of the story time and historical flow. The princess continues that their father who is suspicious of their fly commission young men to solve the mystery and marry one of his daughters. One prince, who is able to unveil their action, brings along his eleven brothers. Eleven princesses get married to eleven princes. Eventually it becomes clear that the separate stories of these princesses exhibit a similar pattern of events as all the princesses marry, become upset with marriage and leave their husband in one way or another. In the end, eleven princesses meet at the same room they used to fly from and begin to live together. When Jordan inquires why the princesses are only eleven, the princess who has allowed him enter the room conveys that the princess he searches for, who was supposed to marry the prince who had solved the secret, has "flew from the altar like a bird from a snare and walked a tightrope between the steeple of the church and the mast of a ship weighing anchor in the bay" (STC 69). They tell she was "the best dancer" and "did it because any other life would have been a lie" (STC 69). Their conviction about the twelfth sister's passion foreshadows how the missing princess had seen dancing as her passion and gone away to sustain for herself a life on her habit of dancing. This constitutes an advance notice that this princess, similar to her sisters, had preferred to create a living present of her own. The sisters believe their sibling must be in a similar condition to them, stating that in the past she had a body "so light that she could climb down a rope, cut it and tie it again in mid-air without plunging to her death" (STC 69). Since they remember their sister in reminiscences and expect her to

be older as their current selves, the eleven princesses state that “she must be old now, she must be stiff. Her body can only be a memory. The body she has will not be the body she had” (STC 69). This indicates how their living present leads the princesses to have certain expectations regarding their sister’s present condition. They take their present circumstances as the reference to anticipate their sister’s life. At the end of the story, Jordan learns that the princess’ name was “Fortunata” (STC 69). Including the stories of twelve dancing princesses in between Jordan’s story, Winterson can be said imply the impact of the first synthesis on Jordan’s view of time. The name Fortunata, which belongs to the princess whom Jordan accepts as his destination at this point of his story, can be seen to highlight Jordan’s engagement with the living present, as well.

At this point, the narrative moves to another chapter called “1649” (STC 71). This title once again points to Dog-Woman endeavour to use the time of THE calendar and history to highlight the veracity and irrevocability of her own present. From a Deleuzian perspective, the analogy she tries to draw between the historical past and her present shows in fact “how analogy essentially belonged to the world of representation” (D&R 302). Although Dog-Woman uses numerical indicators to prove she only talks of facts, the existence of the analogy indicates she actually provides representations of reality. She considers the history of her King’s country can provide stability to her own living present. Therefore, she states “there was no real feeling that the King would not win as he had always won, as kings have always won, whomever they fight” (STC 72). She thinks the King’s present would save its status quo all the time and this protects her living present by providing predetermined results of future acts. She assumes that the King would remain in his position forever. Thus, she believes repetition in time would yield only the same consequences of history. However, “20 January 1649” marks the day of the beginning of the King’s trial and the process that leads to his execution (STC 74). This divergence between the Dog-Woman’s expectations from the future and how it turns out to be can be interpreted as an advance notice to the novel’s subversion of the first synthesis of time further on.

Dog-Woman’s faith in the stability the King’s present and its unexpected demolition is repeated through her return to her home with Jordan from Tradescant’s

place. Dog-Woman believes to have achieved a “success in the world” through their stay with Tradescant (STC 72). Nevertheless, she chooses to return because she desperately wants to maintain her familiar life. She marks the passing time in cardinal numbers, stating “Jordan was nineteen and stood as tall as my chest” (STC 74). She still wants to believe that after all the years have passed, she can always return to an unchanged past. Petra Burianová interprets Dog-Woman’s aspiration for stability as “Dog-woman fights for the old ways, she is clearly set against progress, which at that time meant the start of the age of Enlightenment” (30). Upon returning, she desires to find her home and surroundings as it had always been. However, her return illuminates that once she leaves, it may not be possible to keep the past intact. Although she finds her neighbourhood unchanged with “the smells were the same, the river was still filthy, the dredgers still bobbed about up to their necks in rubbish”, she realizes her home, which would guarantee her the intactness of the past, is in danger of being demolished (STC 74). As she nears the house, she sees “smoke coming from the hole in the roof” (STC 74). She finds “Neighbour Firebrace and Preacher Scroggs” burning her house (STC 74). They say that the house has been given to fire because she owned papers that are against the king. Upon the incident, Dog-Woman burns down any papers that would create suspicion on her commitment to the king. The relation between the burning of her house and her loyalty to the king becomes a subversive force to highlight how Dog-Woman holds onto certain people and objects to preserve her living present. Both her king and her home mean to her that she can continue a stable life in which she does not have to deal with anything unknown to her. When Dog-Woman leaves her house to stay with Jordan, who consists of a significant part of her habitual life, she dares to leave behind another significant element of her living present, that is, her home. The relation between the fire at her house and her alleged disloyalty to the king reinforces the paradoxical nature of her endeavours to stay within the first synthesis of time. It turns out she regrets her decision to leave her house. She confesses that “I fancied I had never been away and that all our adventures and troubles were a dream” (STC 77). This shows how the living present insists on habits to preserve itself. As Deleuze explains, the living present of time necessitates that the past and the future belong to itself (D&R 70). Dog-Woman persuades herself that her living present can only be

sustained within her habitual environment. She links the thread of losing her living present to leaving her home. As she sees fire as an erasing force, she even thinks of burning the unknown future along with the big fire they start to burn the trouble-making papers with. She desires: “if only the fire could be kept burning, the future might be kept at bay and this moment would remain” (STC 77). Eventually, her faith in Jordan’s eventual leave convinces Dog-Woman that she cannot preserve her living present by accompanying her son in his travels. Now that she has lost contact with her nation’s stable history to verify her own history, she wants to save the stability of her own life by protecting her home. This becomes clear-cut with her visit to the king’s trial and execution, which she believes to have brought “bad luck” not only to the nation’s history, but her own history because it means a sublime change (STC 81). After the trial, it turns out that Jordan is determined to go for travels with Tradescant. Dog-Woman repeats the dictate of her faith, stating “I saw the look on Jordan's face and my heart became a captive in a locked room. I couldn't reach him now. I knew he would go” (STC 82). Convincing herself that she cannot make her son stay, she dares to lose Jordan in order to continue her habitual life around her familiar surroundings.

As his mother releases the grip of Jordan’s present and allows him to leave their habitual life, the narrative fluxes accentuate towards demonstrating how Jordan also deters from his desire to be a part of Fortunata’s living present. As mentioned, Jordan sees Fortunata as his final destination in the future. The name Fortunata refers to a predetermined understanding of destiny that is expected to provide Jordan the future he desires. During his travels, Jordan conveys that he comes across with Fortunata at a remote place. She teaches her pupils dancing; “she spins them, impaled with light, arms upraised, one leg at a triangle across the other thigh, one foot, on point, on a penny coin, and spins them, until all features are blurred, until the human being most resembles a freed spirit from a darkened jar” (STC 83). Jordan illustrates this as the dance of infinity in which “the spinning seems to stop, that the wild gyration of the dancers passes from movement into infinity” (STC 83). The moment the young dancers fall down exhausted “Fortunata refreshes them and the dance begins again” (STC 83). The image of the coin on which the dancers spin for infinity provides a centre to their return. Therefore, Fortunata’s life differs from

Deleuzian eternal return because in the eternal return time does not return to complete a centred circle. The return of time in the third synthesis aims at eliminating any centre that would keep time under the influence of analogy and similitude. It makes the time run out of its joints. The time in eternal return only moves for difference. Seeing the centred return in the princess' dancing, Jordan admits ultimately that his passion for Fortunata was only an extension of his habitual life. He confesses that "on more than one occasion I have been ready to abandon my whole life for love. To alter everything that makes sense to me and to move into a different world where the only known will be the beloved" (STC 85). Looking for another woman that would provide him with a similar living present with his mother, Jordan understands that one day he would have to leave either his mother's or another woman's habitual life to fulfil his never-ending desire for discovering the unknown of the world. He finally accepts he "had finished with that life [of his mother], perhaps, and could not admit it, being stubborn or afraid, or perhaps did not know it, habit being a great binder" (STC 85). He notices that his passion for the dancer had resulted from the binding effect of the first synthesis. Consequently, Rebecca L. Sturgeon asserts that "Jordan's search for Fortunata thus leads him away from Western ideas about the linearity of time. His search for her takes him through a number of adventures that open up his sensibilities to different ways of relating to the world..." (46). Therefore, Jordan notices his expectations under the guidance of the first synthesis of time are to change, stating that:

The pain is when the dreams change, as they do, as they must. Suddenly the enchanted city fades and you are left alone again in the windy desert. As for your beloved, she didn't understand you. The truth is, you never understood yourself. (STC 86)

Jordan sees that arriving at the destination of his passion does not enable him to understand his own self. He comprehends that he does not actually desire to be living in the first synthesis of time forever. He does not want to be living in a habitual life as he would be if he stays with her mother or Fortunata. He realizes his own aspiration is for the journey to find the unknown. He aspires to be in constant movement for discovering life. He grasps that his dream is actually not finding the destination itself, but following the unknown path along the decentred and eternal return of difference.

4.3. Escape

Realizing that the “true aim” of his journeys is not finding a final destination steers Jordan’s story towards the third synthesis of time and changes his perspective towards the idea of escape (STC 92). He expresses that

When I left England I thought I was running away. Running away from uncertainty and confusion but most of all running away from myself. I thought I might become someone else in time, grafted on to something better and stronger. (STC 92)

Previously, Jordan believes his mother’s living present would give him an ambiguous future because its expectations do not meet his desire for making discoveries. Therefore, he sets Fortunata as his destination and tries to reach her as his final stop. He believes this would prevent any ambiguity the future would bring into his life. This way he tries to eliminate the contradiction between his desire for discoveries and achieving a habitual life. Brought up in his mother’s living present, he assumes he is to be living in another woman’s habitual time. He also cannot help but setting off for discoveries. As a result, he tries to combine his aspiration for discoveries with a destination. He ultimately runs away from England and his habitual life with his mother. This way he attempts to find a solid future. He believes escaping from his surroundings and finding Fortunata would make him a hero just like Tradescant. In this way, his future life will provide him with the ideal life a hero would pursue. He links the idea of becoming a hero with the status of being “grafted on to something better and stronger” (STC 92). He expects travelling with Tradescant towards his destination will produce a similar hero. Upon finding Fortunata, he sees what he has projected does not relate to the reality. He understands that he does not belong to Fortunata’s living present. He imagines throughout that he would be able to marry her and have the happy ending. When he accomplishes his dream, it becomes clear that his journey after the dancer is no more a journey for finding the final destination. Brittany K. Rigdon explains that

Once Jordan acknowledges that his view of the world is but a partial glimpse of a much larger picture, he is then, able to actively seek out new possibilities; he

imagines and encounters other possible paths or worlds; and achieves the power to create these possibilities, paths, and worlds. (85)

As a result, Jordan admits that in order to discover the depths of his own heart he might have been “searching for a dancer who may or may not exist” (STC 92). He realizes his escape from his habitual life in England in pursuit of a destination has been actually an escape from his own self. Since he finds himself incomplete and fancies Fortunata as having the ideal completeness, he indeed tries to escape from his own being. Having always thought that he was running away from England to find his destination, he comes to understand that his journey was actually a journey inwards and he indeed “was never conscious of beginning this journey” (STC 92). He sees discovering his destination or being a hero like Tradescant will not make his future safe and assumable. He explains that “I saw that the running away was a running towards. An effort to catch up with my fleet-footed self, living another life in a different way” (STC 92-93). Ultimately, he feels that running away from the ambiguity of his own time will only make him journey towards his own self. Isha Malhotra asserts that “in *Sexing the Cherry*, explorations into the nature of subjectivity lead to theories of the self as able to transcend time and space in the construction of a new concept of time and space as flexible and at the command of the self” (481). Consequently, the ambiguity of the future becomes not something to be escaped, but something to appreciate the multiplicity of selves.

Diverging from reaching an ideal and singular self, Jordan also realizes that the journeys he takes are not singular in themselves. He becomes able to distinguish between external and internal journeys, and how the external ones invisibly blend with the internal travels. He admits that “I gave chase in a ship, but others make the journey without moving at all” (STC 93). Along these journeys, time is also revealed to have a multiplistic nature. Jordan acknowledges that he cannot define time in a mono-dimensional manner because he admits “time has no meaning, space and place have no meaning, on this [internal] journey. All times can be inhabited, all places visited. In a single day the mind can make a millpond of the oceans” (STC 93). According to María del Mar Asensio Aróstegui, “this presentation of his journey perfectly suits the basic tenets upon which the novel has been built: the refusal of linearity in the presentation of events, the particular understanding of time as the sum

of present moments” (246). Such an understanding also suits the Deleuzian eternal return of time which does not restrict time with spatial or linear qualities. Deleuze’s demented time is what Jordan asserts by stating that time does not belong to any particular space and lexicological definition. He further maintains that “the [internal] journey is not linear, it is always back and forth, denying the calendar, the wrinkles and lines of the body” (STC 93). Jordan’s comprehension towards the non-linear and non-numerical nature of time during his internal journey refers to its eternal return “in its esoteric truth” (D&R 90). The “esoteric” or unfathomable nature of eternal return makes it “a belief of the future, a belief in the future” (D&R 90). This future deals with difference that decentres the time’s simple circle in the first synthesis. This clearly explains why even though Jordan firstly sees Fortunata as his destination- his centre- to fulfil his objective of discovery, he finally realizes that he indeed journeys inwardly denying the rules of external travels. He sees that his journey is in the demented time which makes it “always back and forth, denying the calendar, the wrinkles and lines of the body” (STC 93). He understands “its esoteric truth” grants Deleuzian eternal nature a multiplistic nature (D&R 90). Consequently, the self within the eternal return of time also has a multiplistic nature. The self “is not contained in any moment or any place, but it is only in the intersection of moment and place that the self might, for a moment, be seen vanishing through a door, which disappears at once” (STC 93). Maximillian Coghlan suggests “for Jordan, these maps are insufficient in that they cannot display the private mapping through memory and experience” (50). In this regard, Jordan deters from the idea of mapping journeys because internal journeys cannot be stranded within the boundaries of maps. He begins to think that the earth one journeys “is round and flat at the same time. This is obvious. That it is round appears indisputable; that it is flat is our common experience, also indisputable” (STC 93). Merja Makinen suggests that Jordan’s perspective towards the multiplicity of the earth relates to a multiplistic understanding of time as follows:

Jordan believes both that the world is round and that it is also flat, and the sense of time within the novel challenges traditional notions of linearity and of distinctions between past and present and future, to argue for a simultaneity of different presents... (106)

According to Jordan, reading a map urges him to travel through imaginary places in his internal world. Yet, when he takes external journeys and find the place he sees on the map, it stops belonging to his imagination. Jordan believes his imaginary places reflect the reality better than the ones shown on the maps. He says “maps, growing ever more real, are much less true” (STC 94). His conviction derives from his comprehension that journeys are not done to be completed by reaching at a destination. Rather, time cannot be mapped with points as in the first synthesis. It is not possible to discover the whole of time as one can do with mapping the earth and following it “faithfully” (STC 94). This shows that the multiplistic reality of time can only be discovered through the multiplistic reality of journeys. Jordan decides that it is essential to find the unknown that lurks behind what is seen on the maps. This shows that he opens up to the unknownness of the third synthesis, by rejecting the familiarity of habitual time in which both the past and the future appear to be precise. Time for Jordan is only concerned with producing difference at each return. This Deleuzian sense of time as demented means that discovery has an infinite sphere with the multi-dimensional interaction among the past, the present and the future. This implies the only way to achieve the eternal return of time is to become equally demented.

The emergence of demented time finds its reflection in the convoluted temporal fluxes and the discussions on the nature of hallucination in the section, “Hallucinations and Diseases of the Mind” (STC 94). With this section, the novel openly begins to confuse the identities and temporal existences of the character-narrators and erases the line between the one who sees and the one who speaks. The main concern of “Hallucinations and Diseases of the Mind” can be described as the nature of time in relation to the nature of reality and representation (STC 94). It starts by sorting out two objects, through which a woman and a man remember the past. Yet, the objects reveal that past is recalled not in its pure form; rather through its reminiscences shaped by the woman’s and man’s hallucinatory minds. In “Objects I”, the woman cannot recognize her belonging and cannot remember the location of her home (STC 94). When she returns home with the written address she finds, she encounters a man and kills him. He turns out to be her husband. Similarly, in “Objects 2”, the man “visits a famous country house” and believes that it is his house

where all his memories have been formed. It turns out that the house is “a National Interest” (STC 94). These examples point out to the modifiable nature of the past through reminiscences. These reminiscences are transferred into the demented time of the third synthesis as the mind’s hallucinations erase the difference between original and derived realities, and evolve into simulacrum.

The section continues by sorting out two times. In “Time 1”, a young man hears of the burial of King Charles. He thinks “he knows of no King, only a Queen” (STC 95). Suddenly the young man sees that “he is face to face with John Tradescant” on a ship (STC 95). This suggests that time is not mono-dimensional as the self can project itself in several other times simultaneously. The external world will offer you some numerical time but the self can find itself in another time that it perceives to be true. In “Time 2”, a girl from contemporary times is bullied by her friends due to her looks. As the girl runs away and approaches her home, the home turns out to be “her hut” in which she expects to find Jordan even if he is not bodily there (STC 95). This shows that within the demented time of the mind, the self can experience multiple realities by smoothly transferring among multiple times. By these examples it can be inferred that through his demented time in the third synthesis “Deleuze argues that the liberation of time puts the concept of truth in crisis” (Smith 41).

The crisis in the notion of truth is further revealed by the seven lies that exhibit the unstable nature of time and reality in Deleuzian demented time. By giving the list of these lies, Mine Özyurt Kılıç and Margaret Sönmez assert that Winterson “startles her readers by telling them that everything taught to us about time and history is a lie” (xiv). The first lie puts that “there is only the present and nothing to remember” (STC 95). This lie refers to the claim of the first synthesis that time should exist only as the living present with its habits and expectations. The discovery of demented time eliminates this idea by highlighting the future as an affirmation of change and novelty. The second lie, “time is a straight line”, can also be associated with the first synthesis’ sharp assertion that time flows on an irrevocable arrow (STC 95). However, the third synthesis shows neither time nor its relation to history can be observed in straight and linear fashion. Time offers a perpetual process of transformation within the eternal return of difference. The third lie which says “the

difference between the past and the future is that one has happened while the other has not” also contradicts Deleuze’s demented sense of time (STC 95). Deleuze suggests in the third synthesis, neither the past nor the future points out to particular temporal points. Demented time deals with the past, the present and the present as a whole (STC 95). The past, the present and the future do not refer to simple before and afters, but a demented circle of becoming. This idea of simultaneity also shows the multiplistic nature of time. As a continuation to the discussion on multiplicity, the fourth lie says “we can only be in one place at a time” (STC 95). Throughout the narrative, it can be seen that journeys do not only occur externally, but also they take place within the internal worlds of the characters. The self can be, as Jordan suggests in an advance notice, at several places and can take multiple journeys simultaneously. When a body is present at a location, the mind can be disappearing through the walls for other discoveries. Just as the space cannot be fixed, time does not exist in successive points on a line. It offers a multiplistic nature that merges the past, the present and the future all together. On the other hand, the fifth lie strengthens the idea of eternal return as it sees a lie in “any proposition that contains the word ‘finite’ (the world, the universe, experience, ourselves...)” (STC 96). Deleuzian eternal return complies with Winterson’s assertion in the sense that it only affirms difference by offering a time that can only be affiliated with infinity. Likewise, the sixth lie which proposes “reality as something which can be agreed upon” conforms to the multiplistic nature of reality in the demented time (STC 96). Ultimately, the seventh lie, “reality as truth”, shows that neither time nor history can be accepted as finite truths that offer irrevocability and absolute veracity (STC 96). The reality of time can be observed only through its representations. Overall, these seven lies comply with Deleuze’s demented time, whose “eternal return ... affirms everything of the multiple, everything of the different” (115). Put differently, they show the demented time does not deal with a monolithic view of time and history, but with the multiplicity and difference of reality.

In addition to the discussions regarding the relation between demented time and reality, the novel offers another section called “The Nature of Time”, in which Jordan describes his experience with time in comparison to his “experience with maps” (STC 105). Jordan indicates that his initial experience with the nature of time

was through the first synthesis under the influence of her mother. He describes this time as “flat, moving in a more or less straight line from one point to another” (STC 105). The living present, as Deleuze mentions, combines both the past and the future within its body without demonstrating them as its strata. It offers a non-dimensional time where both the habits of the past and the expectations of the present are shaped by the present itself. Likewise, Jordan states that being in this linear direction of time is being “in a continuous present” (STC 105). Namely, it “is to look at a map and not see the hills, shapes and undulations, but only the flat form. There is no sense of dimension, only a feeling for the surface” (STC 105). Jordan implies that his internal journeys get him closer to the third synthesis of time by enabling him to discover time’s strata. They allow him to think about the sense of time that is “more dizzy and precipitous” (STC 105). Comparing the senses of being in time and thinking about time indicates a Deleuzian differentiation, which shows that thinking of time opens up the gate for discovering its demented nature. Mustafa Kırca puts that “seeing past, present and future intermingled with each other, ... makes it possible to grasp past and present simultaneously” (*Postmodernist Historical Novels* 79). By pointing to the third synthesis’ engagement with multiple strata at once, Jordan suggests that thinking of time’s demented nature

...is like turning the globe round and round, recognizing that all journeys exist simultaneously, that to be in one place is not to deny the existence of another, even though that other place cannot be felt or seen, our usual criteria for belief. (STC 105)

His association of spatial simultaneity with temporal simultaneity shows that his understanding of time is far from the sense of fixity embedded in the act of mapping. Accordingly, Malgorzata Wronka explains that in this section “Winterson emphasises the multiplicity of places, simultaneity of events and parallelism of lives. Every moment is equal and every place possible to be visited, therefore, the notions of time and space are relative” (248).

The idea of the relativity of space and time are further discussed through Jordan’s deduction that thinking about time leads to see the existence of “two contradictory certainties” (STC 105). These appear to be “our inward lives” and “our outward lives” (STC 105). He states that on the one hand “our outward lives are

governed by the seasons and the clock”, on the other hand “our inward lives are governed by something much less regular” (STC 105). Annabel Margaret van Baren also explains this dichotomy of external and internal lives, stating that in this way “Jordan reflects on the difference he experiences between internal time and external time: the former is characterised by its freedom and movement, the latter by its restrictive, defined or technologically-mediated nature” (15). Between the two, Jordan continues to emphasize internal time, which he describes as

an imaginative impulse cutting through the dictates of daily time, and leaving us free to ignore the boundaries of here and now and pass like lightning along the coil of pure time, that is, the circle of the universe and whatever it does or does not contain. (STC 105)

Jordan here refers to the external time as “pure time” and suggests that the internal time enables one to “to ignore the boundaries of here and now” (STC 105). This time is not bound to the movement of the universe or the time the external world dictates. Isha Malhotra suggests that the emphasis he puts on the significance of internal time indicates “the fact that Jordan can cross the boundary separating the world of common day from the world of fantasy suggests the complementarity and reversibility of the real and the unreal, of the imagined and the actually lived” (77). This can be Jordan’s increasing interaction with demented time, in which the “role of the imagination, or the mind which contemplates in its multiple and fragmented states, is to draw something new from repetition, to draw difference from it ...” (76). Deleuze further assures that “far from ensuring the occurrence of the cycle and analogy, the third time excludes them” (297). The time in inward life is out of the boundaries of the time that is measurable by the laws of the universe and its movements. Jordan explains internal time shows an out-of-its-joints nature as it continues

outside of the rules of daily time, not to be is as exact as to be. We can't talk about all that the universe contains because to do so would be to render it finite and we know in some way, that we cannot prove, that it is infinite. So what the universe doesn't contain is as significant to us as what it does. (STC 105)

This shows that internal time indicates the demented time in which “not to be is as exact as to be” (STC 105). This understanding enables to think of time beyond the

limits of the known and the “finite” and shows that it does not proceed as successive and causal points on a line (STC 105). Through his engagement with the internal time, Jordan is able to detach from the time of the universe, namely, the external time, and surrounds himself with the demented time. Jordan further discusses why time cannot be linear, arguing that

we have dreams of moving back and forward in time, though to use the words back and forward is to make a nonsense of the dream, for it implies that time is linear, and if that were so there could be no movement, only a forward progression. But we do not move through time, time moves through us. (STC 106)

The statement, “time moves through us”, shows the relation between mind and time (STC 106). Demented time requires that time moves through our minds and such an understanding necessitates non-linearity. Internal time subverts the rules of the external time that is kept in the custody of clocks and calendars. On the other hand, Milada Frankova asserts that “the fluidity of time in *Sexing the Cherry* is complete. It has no rules or boundaries, it flows back and forth...” (*The Mercurial Time* 69). This implies the dominance of the third synthesis of time in the novel. Consequently, both Jordan’s narrative and his understanding of time see time as composed of convoluted temporal fluxes. These fluxes indicate that the self does not proceed through a linear time with a “forward progression” (STC 106). Nor does time follow a successive and causal order, in which everything is linked to what comes before and after. Demented time has a convoluted structure, in which every repetition produces difference.

As a result, Jordan concludes that “we cannot move back and forth in time, but we can experience it in a different way. If all time is eternally present, there is no reason why we should not step out of one present into another” (STC 106). This shows Jordan sees the present different from Dog-Woman, who considers it from the perspective of the first synthesis. Instead, Jordan suggests convoluted temporal fluxes allow to “step out of one present into another” (STC 106). In such an understanding of time, before and after do not flow in linearity, and the self can move beyond one present towards another. Kathryn Allan suggests that through her emphasis on the relativity and the non-linearity of time in internal lives “Winterson

establishes the possibility of multiple selves that are not bound to time and place” (Allan 55). Therefore, Jordan says “the inward life tells us that we are multiple not single ... When we say, 'I have been here before,' perhaps we mean, 'I am here now,' but in another life, another time, doing something else” (STC 106). The self that one knows of is just one of the other selves to be discovered along the way. Life is not predestined by habits and expectations, but it contains many other lives. Therefore, time cannot be singular and fixed. It offers a singularity that only affirms multiplicity. In this regard, his engagement with the third synthesis enables Jordan to discover the multiplistic nature of life.

As an embodiment of this, Jordan considers some people as “superconductors for time” (STC 106). He claims that these “superconductors”, such as “artists and gurus” are able “to experience time as a larger, all-encompassing dimension and so be in touch with much more than the present” (STC 107). This relates them with the ideas in the Deleuzian third synthesis, in which the past, the present and the future “coexist and together provide a complete view of time irreducible to any one of its elements or to an overall rule for their articulation” (140). Therefore, they interact with a larger sphere that extends beyond habitual time. Jordan explains that art enables one to become a “superconductor” (STC 106). Art allows the self to be “no longer bound by matter, matter has become what it is: empty space and light” (STC 107). Jordan argues that “our rate of conductivity is probably determined by ability, learned or innate, to make the foreground into the background, so that the distractions of the everyday no longer take up our energy” (STC 107). The force of conductivity derives from the self’s “ability, learned or innate, to make the foreground into the background” (STC 107). This means diving and exploring deeper in demented time, rather than staying within the safety and familiarity of habitual time, namely, the foreground. Art, as Jordan asserts, allows inquiring into hidden side of time and life. He believes that

paintings show us how light affects us, for to live in light is to live in time and not be conscious of it, except in the most obvious ways. Paintings are light caught and held like a genie in a jar. The energy is trapped for ever, concentrated, unable to disperse. (STC 107).

Jordan argues that paintings offer a trapped light, which is physically free of boundaries, but become boundaries themselves by reflecting only a part of the whole

in a painting. The painting shows what it emphasizes by that particular light. In other words, the focus is determined by the light itself. However, at the background of every painting is an energy that can be dispersed when it is noticed. Jordan thinks that living in this light “is to live in time and not be conscious of it, except in the most obvious ways” (STC 107). People believe that they live through life and their lives proceed in linearity and causality. However, Jordan believes that time concerns all strata of life with all its dimensions existing simultaneously. Therefore, one can be living many lives at once because one can be living in the past, the present and the future at the same time. The inquiry of art allows the deeper meaning of life. Nevertheless, people tend to have a shallow look at the light in paintings and see what is on the foreground. Jordan defines this life on the foreground, trapped in light as “still life” (STC 107). Still life refers to a kind of painting that depicts objects such as fruits or dead animals that are to be dead or unmoving in the painting. Such paintings offer habitual time, in which one lives in the midst of time but is not conscious of it. Consequently, Jordan creates a link between “dancing” and “still life” stating that “still life is dancing life. The dancing life of light” (STC 107). This constitutes a completing analepsis to Jordan’s initial accounts of the dancing princess and how she and her disciples eternally repeat their return within that still life.

Upon his comments on the relation between art and time, Jordan introduces his impressions on Italian painter Paolo Uccello’s painting “A Hunt in a Forest” (STC 107). He says that “when I saw this painting I began by concentrating on the foreground figures, and only by degrees did I notice the others, some so faint as to be hardly noticeable” (STC 108). The idea of seeing the foreground at first glance reinforces the idea that staying in the first synthesis of time can just enable you to perceive it through representations. Deleuze explains the shallow nature of representations stating that “representation fails to capture the affirmed world of difference. Representation has only a single centre, a unique and receding perspective, and in consequence a false depth” (D&R 55). This is echoed by Jordan when he expresses that

my own life is like this, or, I should say, my own lives. For the most part I can see only the most obvious detail, the present, my present. But sometimes, by a

trick of the light, I can see more than that. I can see countless lives existing together and receding slowly into the trees. (STC 108).

Seeing the present is seeing only one dimension. However, Jordan more and more realizes that engaging with the third synthesis of time “by a trick of the light” will offer multiple layers that enable him to see the past and the future simultaneously (STC 108). It can be asserted that Jordan’s reference to Uccello’s painting to expound on the nature of still life stems from the painter’s emphasis on the use of linear perspective. Jordan mentions that Uccello’s painting presents “the coming of perspective” with its effort to reflect the depth in the painting with linearity in drawing (STC 108). Complementarily, Merja Makinen puts that

Time is a theme the novel has in its sights, particularly in how it intersects with consciousness to create a sense of identity. ... As the narrative voice attests, childhood memories are flawed; we all remember things that did not occur and forget ones that did. (93)

In this regard, perspective in a painting can be related with the notions of memory and remembering. Jordan’s contemplation on the painting is completed by his thinking on the nature of time in “Time 4” (STC 108). In “Time 4”, Jordan explains that what he remembers of the past is not its retentions, but its reminiscences. He acts sceptically about these reminiscences, questioning their veracity by asking, “Did my childhood happen? I must believe it did, but I don’t have any proof. ... I will have to assume that I had a childhood, but I cannot assume to have had the one I remember” (STC 108). His questioning of the truth of past is mimicked by Burianová who asks: “As imagination is borne in our mind the same way memory is, how are we able to distinguish fact from fiction, that is, how do we know that our memories are not invented?” (25). As an answer to that, Jordan thinks the present does not take him into the depth of time, and the past does not appear in the present as it has been but as what he believes to remember of it. He says

Everyone remembers things which never happened. And it is common knowledge that people often forget things which did. Either we are all fantasists and liars or the past has nothing definite in it. I have heard people say we are shaped by our childhood. But which one? (STC 108).

Having an indefinite nature, the past appears in reminiscences. This shows the reflexive impact of experiences in the recall of the retentions in the present. Jordan asserts that one cannot have a single childhood, but many childhoods as each remembering renders a different past. Thus, reminiscences not only belong to the second synthesis, but also constitute the base for the ungrounding of time in the third synthesis.

Upon his questioning of the nature of the past and the modifications it receives in the process of remembering, Jordan mentions a recall of a past incident that refers to the timelessness which he begins by stating, "I was walking around the island today when I found a deep pit full of worn-out ballet shoes" (STC 108). He once again touches upon his contact with the dancing princess, this time giving much more detail. He explains that he finds the princess on a short walk in an island that he stops by on his voyage with Tradescant. He is puzzled to see that both the dancing princess and her disciples "appeared to be ten points of light spiralling in a line along the floor" (STC 109). He continues, saying "then I saw a young woman, darting in a figure of eight in between the lights and turning her hands through it as a potter turns clay on the wheel" (STC 109). Watching the scene, he falls from "the door knobs" and passes off (STC 109). As he awakens, he conveys "opposite me, attentive and smiling, was the woman I had first seen at dinner, what seemed like years ago and might have been days" (STC 109). The appearance of the dancing princess contradicts the expectations of her sister. Her sister had suggested she must have become older. Yet, the depiction of Jordan indicates an understanding of time that has not moved along. The image of the princess amounts to timelessness. The contradiction between what has been projected and what is in the present shows that the first synthesis depends upon its faith and proceeds by particular expectations. Nevertheless, it should be noted Jordan is also talking about the past of the present. This means he is conveying the reminiscences of his second meeting with Fortunata. In this regard, what he depicts can be also rendered as showing the unstable nature of recalling the past, by eliminating the possibility of first a single truth. In "Memory I", Jordan accepts that what he is telling might be belonging to the eternal return of time as follows:

The scene I have just described to you may lie in the future or the past. Either I have found Fortunata or I will find her. I cannot be sure. Either I am remembering her or I am still imagining her. But she is somewhere in the grid of time, a co-ordinate, as I am. (109-110)

This shows that “Jordan’s uncertainty about the truthfulness and validity of memory extends to a concept of time that cannot be understood in linear terms” (van Baren 20). Belonging to any dimension of time, the recall of his meeting with Fortunata on the island implies the timeless nature of Jordan’s remembering. Such a remembering he mentions can be seen equal to imagining in the sense that it does not refer to a single truth, nor does it exhibit the actual event. María del Mar Asensio Aróstegui interprets that

Jordan’s digressions on the nature of time, matter, or memory undermine traditional perception of givens and reinstate them instead as cultural constructs, conventionally agreed upon. This attitude of his results in the destabilisation of ontologies and gives way to an alternative form of narrative representation which is extremely self-conscious and which evinces the narrator’s enormous potential of manipulation when fixed categories have been undermined and when everything depends upon discourse. (247)

It is stated that in *Sexing the Cherry* memory appears as a subversive force against the expectations towards a single truth in compliance with “cultural constructs” (247). The memory does not deal with retentions, but rather with the representations. Besides, the discourse plays an important part in shaping the perception of reality. Similarly, Jordan’s use of contradictory and probable statements regarding the actual state of reality acts to manipulate the expectations of the first synthesis and drives the truth into a demented time. The reality and imaginings blend together in the demented time and creates a purposeful ontological void that is not supposed to be filled. With its transition from the first synthesis of time to the third synthesis, it can be concluded that “*Sexing the Cherry* picks up on the nostalgia for stability embodied in a pastoral paradise but recognizes that it has, in fact, never existed; life is flux, quest, and challenge” (Langland qtd. in Makinen 100).

The unfixed nature of time also influences its relation with history by subverting its irrevocability and veracity. In his encounter with the dancing princess, Jordan realizes that what she conveys as the past of her story does not comply with the version told by her sisters. It turns out both Jordan and the princess question the

possibility of each other's account regarding the story of the twelve princesses' escape every night from their room to dance. As the princess doubts the possibility of flying away and walking on a rope, which was told as the truth by her sisters, Jordan equally asks "how could it be possible to fly every night from the window to an enchanted city when there are no such places?" (STC 111). The princess answers this with another question: "Are there not such places?" (STC 111). Their mutual doubt shows that the nature of reality is not irrevocable. The truth offers a virtual status that is prone to change with perception. The past and the present are consequently shaped by the sphere of experience and cannot be determined by particular habits or expectations. Jordan clarifies the revocable nature of truth in "Lies 8" by confessing that neither what he nor what Fortunata conveys as their first memory of the past is not exactly the first thing they saw. In other words, what they name as the first thing they saw is not the exact truth of the past. Jordan explains, "but before then we were like those who dream and pass through life as a series of shadows. And so what we have told you is true, although it is not" (STC 112). The starting point of their stories actually point out to an unfathomable instance, which they designate as the exact beginning point of their past. This stems from the fact that history does not offer a fixed truth, it is shaped by the mind's preferences and perceptions.

Another instance that shows Jordan's increasing engagement with the third synthesis of time is his leaving the medallion hang on his neck by his mother with Fortunata. Before he leaves Fortunata where he finds her for good, he hangs the medallion his mother gave him, on which is written "remember the rock from whence ye are hewn and the pit from whence ye are digged" (STC 117). This medallion construes a repeating narrative by referring to the living present's desire to designate a beginning point in the past to all stories. Leaving the medallion with the princess, it can be asserted that Jordan assumes to leave the desire to find a particular beginning to his own. Leaving the necklace behind, Jordan tries to detach himself more and more from the impact of the first synthesis. As Jordan is about to leave Fortunata, he once again draws attention to the distinction between external journeys and internal journeys, stating that

I already know, that she need not leave this island to see the world, she has seas and cities enough in her mind. If she does, if we all do, it may be that this

world and the moon and stars are also a matter of the mind, though a mind of vaster scope than ours. If someone is thinking me, then I am still free to come and go. It will not be like chess, this thoughtful universe, it will be a theatre of changing sets, where we could walk through walls if we wanted, but do not, being faithful to our own sense of the dramatic. (STC 117-118)

Jordan accepts that internal journeys defy the linearity of time by allowing temporal fluxes to freely occur. On the other hand, he acknowledges that most of us people tend to stay in the first synthesis “being faithful to our own sense of the dramatic” (STC 118). “The dramatic” here means the triangle of drama in which a beginning, a climax and resolution take place (STC 118). It has a succession and causality to its being. He also uses the image of chess and says internal journeys allow breaking the linear proceeding of a “chess” play, in which the destination of winning will end the journey (STC 118). He calls this freedom “a theatre of changing sets” (STC 118). He sees that the self can exist in all dimensions of time simultaneously if he leaves himself to the fluxes of internal journeys. As the journeys become more and more internal, he realizes that “there is no end to even the simplest journey of the mind” (STC 120). Each path as an “alternative route” appears to be multiple (STC 120). Jordan expresses that voyages in the mind are endless because the sphere of the mind is extremely vast. There is always something new to be found. Time’s return always gives birth to difference. This also amounts to the idea that Jordan realizes his self is not singular. The self also repeats with difference. Thus, Jordan realizes “perhaps I’m missing the point - perhaps whilst looking for someone else you might come across yourself unexpectedly, in a garden somewhere or on a mountain watching the rain” (STC 120). He expresses his idea of one’s finding her/his self as follows:

But it is not difficult to lose oneself, or is it the ego they are talking about, the hollow, screaming cadaver that has no spirit within it? I think that cadaver is only the ideal self run mad, and if the other life, the secret life, could be found and brought home, then a person might live in peace and have no need for God. After all, He has no need for us, being complete (STC 120-121).

Jordan asserts that people tend to look for an ideal other to complete themselves. For example, some inclines to think that when someone seeks for God, they are to forget about themselves. This means they think finding the ideal self, they will accomplish their own selves. Jordan sees that those who search for such ideal others are actually

looking for “the ideal self run mad” (STC 121). This self imposes the ego’s “screaming” to the person, making it believe finding the ideal other is the only way to achieve oneself. On the other hand, Jordan’s idea of one’s finding her/his self can be linked with Deleuze’s interpretation of “dead god” (D&R 91). Jordan puts that instead of finding “the ideal self run mad”, one should look for “the secret life” (STC 121). In this way, he believes the self can accomplish itself without finding the God. Similarly, Deleuze refers to the Nietzschean “dead god” (D&R 91), suggesting that

Eternal return affects only the new, what is produced under the condition of default and by the intermediary of metamorphosis. ... It allows only the plebeian to return, the man without a name. It draws into its circle the dead god and the dissolved self. (D&R 90-91)

People set as their ideal self what they believe to be superior to them. They think once they reach that ideal other, they will become complete, as well. However, the Nietzschean idea of the death of God indicates that one can accomplish herself/himself only by searching inwards. Their internal journeys to find their own core will show them “the secret life” (STC 121) and allow “only the plebeian to return, the man without a name” (D&R 91). Therefore, Deleuze believes the eternal return only deals with novelty by dragging “into its circle the dead god and the dissolved self” (D&R 91). “The man without a name” does not aim to reach God to fulfil himself (D&R 91). Instead, God is accepted to be dead in Deleuzian eternal return and this allows one an environment to discover the mysterious internal life and explore her/his own core. In this way, one can realize her/his fractured I infuses difference and novelty inside the self. Consequently, Jordan deters from his desire to find Fortunata as his destination and accepts that even when he thinks he would be back to Fortunata one day, it will never become true. He realizes that just like one does not need to find “the ideal self run mad” to achieve his own self, he cannot hold onto Fortunata (STC 121). He concludes that from that day on Fortunata “will elude me, she and this island will slip sideways in time and I’ll never find them again, except perhaps in a dream” (STC 121). As Fortunata cannot act as his ideal other, Jordan accepts he cannot look for himself outside. This idea of running inwards once again proves that his attempt to escape can only be a running inwards. Merely by

running inwards Jordan realizes his fractured self can accomplish himself in the eternal return of difference.

4.4. Return

Upon his journeys with Tradescant, Jordan returns to England and Dog-Woman with a pineapple. His return is again conveyed by Dog-Woman through numerical indicators as follows:

Mr Rose poked up his head from his abandonment amongst the dishes and reminded the company that this was an historic occasion. Indeed it was. It was 1661, and from Jordan's voyage to Barbados the first pineapple had come to England. (STC 122)

Dog-Woman tends to mark some events in her life with historical dates in order to prove their veracity and significance. Jordan's return constitutes an example for this intention. Dog-Woman's inclination towards the association of her personal history with national history can be related with her desire to stay within the realm of the living present. Dog-Woman approaches history as a theatre of representation, in which the actors try to repeat the historical action in similitude or analogy. Dog-Woman tends to consider her own history as an echo of her nation's history. This tendency locates the intradiegetic narrator in a distant position to Winterson's view of time and its relation to history in relation to Deleuze's third synthesis. This is apparent in Jeanette Winterson's amendment to her chapter name in *Sexing the Cherry* at the novel's second edition. *Sexing the Cherry* first appears in 1989 with publications from Bloomsbury Publishing and Grove Press. In the first edition, Winterson names the last chapter of her novel as "1990" indicating its contemporary roots with a certain date. Nevertheless, the second edition of the book in 1990 witnessed a change in the title of this chapter as "Some Years Later". María del Mar Asensio Aróstegui interprets this by amending the chapter name "Winterson succeeds in representing history in *Sexing the Cherry* as a juxtaposition of present moments and also makes her book transcend the temporal contingency..." (188). It can be commented that calling the chapter 1990 gives it a frame of temporality and prevents the chapter from reflecting a larger sense of time. On the other hand,

depicting the rest of the novel as dealing with sometimes later than the seventeenth century eliminates any boundaries around the senses of time and history in this part of the work. Thus, Winterson “enhances the spiralling structure of the text and insists on the mastery of the imagination and mythical time over historical and referential time” (Aróstegui 189).

Accordingly, this chapter moves on to two other intradiegetic narrator’s intersecting stories. The chapter begins with the depiction of “Painting 3” themed as “Mr Rose, the Royal Gardener, presents the pineapple to Charles the Second” (STC 129). Although the first two paintings have been depicted by seventeenth-century Jordan, this painting is depicted by Nicolas Jordan from contemporary times. Nicolas Jordan can be rendered as an instance of repetition for seventeenth-century Jordan in the modern time in terms of his desires and aspirations for the future. His story opens with the depiction of the mentioned painting. Nicolas marks his encounter with the painting as the first of the three things that coincided on his way to decide to “join the Navy” (STC 130). He explains his reason to choose such a career, stating “soon after I saw this painting I decided to join the Navy. ... I was straight out of school and eager for a career. Any career that would take me away” (STC 130). Joining the navy would mean to run away from his habitual life through sea voyages. The painting constitutes a metaphor for Nicolas Jordan’s desire discoveries. He imagines himself a hero of voyages by hiding a pineapple under his bed, and fancies that he has brought the fruit as a rarity to home and become a hero of his country. The second coincidence is “*The Observer’s Book of Ships*” (STC 131). The book enables him to make his “own model ship from the pictures” (STC 133). This ship appears to be a means of voyaging that will take him away from his habitual life at home. Throughout the novel, voyages are described as a way to discover and figure out the world and life. By such mobility, the characters seem to experiment with time. However, voyages do not occur only externally. The characters also take internal journeys among temporal fluxes. The existence of internal journeys is apparent in Nicolas’ account of a stranger man he meets when he is sailing his model boat. He conveys the instance of meeting a stranger as he is engaged with his boat. The man tells him that he “used to make them ... and sail in them too. I’ve been everywhere, but I still have a feeling I’ve missed it” (STC 134). The stranger explains what he has

missed as, “I think I may have missed the world, that the one I've seen is a decoy to get me off the scent. I feel as though I'm always on the brink of making sense of it and then I lose it again” (STC 134). Nicolas Jordan's encounter with the stranger man constitutes an anachronic detail due to the description of the man's clothing. It is revealed that the man that approaches Nicolas Jordan wears outdated clothes that make him look like “a nut” (STC 134). As the third coincidence, Jordan points to “*The Boys' Book of Heroes*”, which contains his “precis of heroes” (STC 135). This object from his past implies that Nicolas Jordan as a child wants to attach his own history to the history of heroes just like the seventeenth-century Jordan. Similar to Jordan, Nicolas finds heroes complete with all their aspects, explaining that “if you're a hero you can be an idiot, behave badly, ruin your personal life, have any number of mistresses and talk about yourself all the time, and nobody minds. Heroes are immune” (STC 137). What causes him to see heroes in this way derives from his binding to the living present of his father, who constantly watches war, submarine and ocean-going films. These movies make the mentioned heroes a part of Nicolas' habitual life and influence his expectations from the future by providing idealized others.

Susana Onega mentions that the contrast between “time and eternity” is an iterative motif in *Sexing the Cherry* (222). This is apparent in the repeating narrative of “the empty space and points of light” in the novel that allows questioning the relation between time and change (STC 139). The night before he leaves to become a naval cadet, Nicolas Jordan lies on his bed and thinks about going to the stars. The opposition of eternity and time can be associated with his bedtime contemplation over the sense of freedom that would be granted by a float at space among “the empty space and points of light” (STC 139). His contemplation on space stems from the movies his father watches. Under the influence of his father's habitual life, Nicolas links freedom with being at space. Since space lies at an unreachable distance, he assumes “the empty space and points of light” would eventually liberate him from his habitual life (STC 139). However, he soon questions that even if he could go to space, it would have an end to it. Consequently, he asks “when we've been everywhere, and it's only a matter of time, where will we go next, when there are no more wildernesses?” (STC 140). As in the prior repetitions in the novel, “the

empty space and points of light” can only provide a still life for the subject (STC 139). This life does not include any change, but merely the repetition of a void. Consequently, external journeys would make him reach “the empty space and points of light” as his destination, but reaching his destination would not fulfil his aspiration for discovery (STC 139). This inclines Nicolas towards having internal journeys that will grant him endless possibilities of explorations. He asks “will it take as long as that before we start the journey inside, down our own time tunnels and deep into the realms of inner space?” (STC 140). These internal journeys conducted in the eternal return of future enable him to discover all dimensions of time simultaneously. In this sense, Nicolas sees internal journeys would free him from the living present of his family, particularly of his father. His conviction becomes more apparent with the reappearance of the stranger he met as a young boy on the deck of the naval ship. After Nicolas Jordan joins the navy, he mentions a sea journey during which he goes outside to the deck with a friend, who tells him about space saying “you know, if we were turned loose in our galaxy, just let out there one day by ourselves, it wouldn't look like it does from here. We'd see nothing but blackness” (STC 140). Space once again appears as an empty sphere. As he listens, Nicolas feels he is “falling into a black hole with no stars and no life and no helmet” (STC 140). However, he does not journey upwards towards the external space, but the one inside him. At this point, he loses connection with the external reality and says he has “heard a foot scrape on the deck beside” (STC 141). A man appears beside him and tells the twentieth century Jordan of news from the seventeenth century, conveying that “they are burying the King at Windsor today” (STC 141). The news refers to the execution and burial of the King in the seventeenth-century. Nicolas Jordan becomes confused by how he could know the man, asking himself, “I knew him but from where? And his clothes nobody wears clothes like that anymore” (STC 141). Gradually, he loses his ability to differentiate between external and internal times. The external time that marks Nicolas Jordan's being in the twentieth century loses its veracity because internally he merges into one with the seventeenth-century Jordan. Nicolas conveys “I heard a bird cry, sharp and fierce. Tradescant sighed. My name is Jordan” (STC 141). Being a repeating narrative “my name is Jordan” depicts how time becomes decentred and demented inside Nicolas' mind (STC 141). A name that would normally carry

definitive and genealogical qualities cannot sustain its links with the reality and loses its power of identification by submitting itself to the eternal return of difference. Journeying within his mind along this demented time, Jordan also loses connection with his twentieth century self.

The influence of demented time is also apparent in another character-narrator's internal journey, that is, the chemist woman. The woman initially defines herself as, "I am a woman going mad. I am a woman hallucinating" (STC 142). Her state of hallucination implies her affiliation with the demented time of Deleuze's third synthesis. As hallucinations decentre the woman's sense of time and reality, she considers herself "a woman going mad" (STC 142). Giving more details about her status, she adds that "as a chemist with a good degree, and as an attractive woman whom men liked to work with, I could have taught in a university or got a job doing worthy work behind the scenes" (STC 146). Instead of living a habitual life as society would expect, she appears to be working with the pollution of mercury in the river and water. Her contact with mercury makes her hallucinate. Consequently, her internal reality takes over the external reality.

The woman begins by describing her subversive internal journeys among well-known institutions of the world, that are, the World Bank and Pentagon. She collects people of importance and decision-makers, and trains them "in feminism and ecology" (STC 143). Ultimately, she dreams that "the peoples of the earth keep coming in waves and being fed and being clean and being well. And when the rivers sparkle, it's not with mercury..." (STC 143). She adds "that's how it started, the mercury. That's where my hallucinations began, checking mercury levels in rivers and lakes and streams" (STC 143). Hallucinating appears to act as a counter-act to stop the people that shape the world in line with the ambitions and greed embedded in their living present. By hallucinating, the woman seems to be subverting the one-sided understanding of world leaders regarding the environment's wellbeing. She explains that "I started a one-woman campaign, the sort you read about in the papers where the woman is thought to be a bit loopy but harmless enough. They hope you'll go away, get older, and get bored. Time is a great deadener" (STC 144). The idea that "time is a great deadener" is repeated both in Winterson's *Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit* and this novel as pointing to one's tendency to wear out events and

retentions with the passing of time within the living present. This understanding suggests that history in its relation to time is open to modifications. As the past becomes reminiscences, the individual inclines to “get bored” and give up on his or her case (STC 144). However, the woman says she “didn't go away” (STC 144). She implies that her stamina does not stem from choosing the act of protest as a habit of her life, by rhetorically asking “did they really think I'd rather be camping by a polluted river than sitting in my own flat with my things about me?” (STC 144). She implies that by choosing the safe and the familiar, she could have taken a different path. She could have remained in a habitual life where she would abide by society's expectations and continue a life of welfare. She asserts that society tends to remain in the first synthesis as “people will believe anything” (STC 144). To sustain the living present, they would support what would save the status quo. However, the status-quo does not always refer to reality. Therefore, the woman suggests that people can believe everything, “except, it seems, the truth” (STC 144). The living present offers safety within life with all its expectations based on the present time. On the other hand, the chemist woman says she pays the price by losing her health due to her activism.

Even as a child, she explains to be a divergent kid against the expectations of her family. She says that “if there are no points of recognition, if the child is genuinely alien, they do their best to feed and clothe, but they [the parent] don't love” (STC 144). In this regard, the woman thinks to herself that she has always been alone. She shows this as the reason why she was big. She explains that “I wanted to be bigger than all the things that were bigger than me. All the things that had power over me. It was a battle I intended to win” (STC 144-145). Her war is a war against the expectations that stem from a habitual understanding of life. When her physical weight fades away, she adopts a Deleuzian understanding of self, which she explains as follows:

When the weight had gone I found out something strange: that the weight persisted in my mind. I had an alter ego who was huge and powerful, a woman whose only morality was her own and whose loyalties were fierce and few. (STC 145)

She creates an imaginary other to herself to protect herself from the devastating impact of other people's expectations. She conveys that she was aware of the fact that her present time was "a fantasy" in the beginning (STC 146). But her imagination takes over the external reality in time. The more she is influenced by the mercury, the more her engagement with time detaches from reality. She explains that

I have been alone for a long time, days and nights of time, so that time is no longer measured in the units I am used to but has mutinied and run wild. I do not measure time now, time measure me (STC 146).

Within her hallucinating state, time apparently becomes demented. It frees itself from external measures and begins to appear decentred. The woman knows that engagement with this demented time is stepping out of the habitual life and she indeed finds it "frightening" (STC 147). However, she cannot help but let herself blend into the reality of her hallucination under the influence of demented time. She says:

I have a calendar and a watch, and so rationally I can tell where I am in this thing called a year. My own experience is different. I feel as though I have been here for years already. I could be talked out of that but I couldn't be persuaded not to feel it any more. (STC 147)

Calendars and watches are means of measuring the external time in rational units. They enumerate time and fit it into a stable being. On the other hand, the chemist woman states her experience with time is multidimensional in the sense that time has stopped passing in accordance with natural laws. She feels that although external measurements show a shorter span, it has taken an extended duration in her internal world. Therefore, she says "so my strongest instinct is to abandon the common-sense approach and accept what is actually happening to me; that time has slowed down" (STC 147). This indicates her demented time works by duration, which, according to her, feels extended and slower than the actual time passing.

Just like Jordan, the woman also ponders upon the idea of escape from her present situation. She sees that the way she has chosen to live has her led to lose her sight of reality. She knows that she constantly goes from the external time to her internal time, as she explains that

There are so many fairy stories about someone who falls asleep for a little while and wakes up to find himself in a different time. Outwardly nothing is changing for me, but inwardly I am not always here, sitting by a rotting river. I can still escape. (STC 147)

However, she offers a different understanding of escape than seventeenth-century Jordan. For Jordan, escape is not running away but it means to run inwards. For the chemist, it turns out that escape means escaping from the habits of the living present, as she asks, “Escape from what? The present? Yes, from this foreground that blinds me to whatever may be happening in the distance” (STC 147). The notion of the foreground is repeated here to discuss that escaping from the living present means to dive into the depths of demented time to discover it. The chemist sees her being as having a multiplistic nature as follows:

If I have a spirit, a soul, any name will do, then it won't be single, it will be multiple. Its dimension will not be one of confinement but one of space. It may inhabit numerous changing decaying bodies in the future and in the past. (STC 147)

This refers to the ideas dominant in the Deleuzian third synthesis in which demented time occurs. The third synthesis offers an understanding of time that makes it possible for the self to have multiple existences in multiple dimensions of time. Being a scientist, the woman confesses her idea that the multiplicity of time can be only an assumption, stating that “I can't know this. I am only looking for a theory to fit the facts. That's what scientists do, though you may feel I am too far-fetched” (STC 147). With a completing analepsis, she adds that “I don't know if other worlds exist in space or time. Perhaps this is the only one and the rest is rich imaginings. Either way it doesn't matter. We have to protect both possibilities. They seem to be interdependent” (STC 149). She acknowledges the existence of both the external and the internal worlds, and believes that humans cannot dare to give up on either for another. It can be concluded that as a scientist she can neither fully detach herself from thinking about the notion of time from a positivist perspective, nor give up on hoping that alternative times exist simultaneously.

Consequently, her scientific stance is not enough to confine her to the first synthesis of time. Her subversive activism prevents her from sheltering in the safety

of the living present. She further uses science through the image of mercury in order to exemplify this multiplistic nature of time. She asserts that

Poisoned or not, the mercury has made me think like this. Drop it and it shivers in clones of itself all over the floor, but you can scoop it up again and there won't be any seams or shatter marks. It's one life or countless lives depending on what you want. (STC 147)

Mercury seems one-dimensional without any intervention in its body. But intervention can show its “countless” beings (STC 147). Therefore, the image of mercury refers to the Deleuzian view of the singularity of time. In Deleuzian terms, the singularity of time actually indicates its multiplistic nature within the eternal return of difference. This means the dimensions of time in the third synthesis are not irrevocable when scattered around. Rather, each instance of scattering shows the emergence of new pieces. In this sense, the pieces that form mercury repeat themselves with difference at every intervention. Each drop of mercury changes in size and shape. In the process of scattering, the indiscrete mercury is fractured by the caesura of the future being affected by the experience of the past and the transformation of the present. The experience of being fractured repeats itself by producing transformed drops so as to generate different impacts on the contacting organism's body. This demonstrates that although the scattered pieces of mercury can be gathered together seamlessly at every return, the circle turns out to be a new circle of transformed pieces.

At this point, the novel's narrative begins to display a similar mode of repetition to that of mercury by merging the memories of the chemist and Dog-Woman into a seamless whole. As the chemist thinks about the rotting river that she sits by, the narrative slips into Dog-Woman's narration of her boating with Jordan right after his return with the pineapple. Dog-Woman assumes Jordan has returned from his voyages for good and would stay with her thereafter. However, it becomes clear that Jordan is planning to leave again “for London immediately to present the King with his rarest find” (STC 151). This implies the contradictory nature of return for Dog-Woman and Jordan. Dog-Woman sees return as an act of keeping the past intact and regaining the past habitual lifestyle again. Yet, Jordan sees return as a repetition of the act of leaving. With each return, Jordan finds himself leaving for a

new adventure. Since Dog-Woman sees Jordan as belonging to her living present, she desires to keep him for herself. This includes not only keeping him physically but also emotionally. In this regard, her realization of the necklace of ballet shoes instead of her medallion on Jordan's neck concerns her as a thread that could disturb the stable flow of her life. As mentioned before, the necklace symbolizes Dog-Woman's will to designate herself as the beginning point of Jordan's past. However, she learns Jordan has replaced her medallion with the necklace that belongs to "a woman who does not exist" named Fortunata (STC 153). Hearing the name, Dog-Woman replies "I knew an Italian pirate of that name once" (STC 153). The analogy she draws between Fortunata and a pirate creates an irony that indicates Dog-Woman sees the dancer as someone who attempts to disturb her living present and steal Jordan from her. This associationism through names once again indicates Dog-Woman's dependence on her faith in shaping her future expectations. Since she is convinced by the removal of the necklace that Fortunata is an intruder on her stable present, she expects the dancer who is named the same as a pirate to show similitude in action to a pirate, as well. All these repeatedly show Dog-Woman's desire to keep Jordan beside her within a familiar and unchanging life.

On the other hand, Jordan's recall of the day Fortunata gave the necklace to him revokes a free association in his mind, which reminds him of the story of Artemis who had received Fortunata's service. Jordan mentions how Artemis wants to become free of any expectations regarding her life as she "begged of her father, King Zeus, a bow and arrows, a short tunic and an island of her own free from interference" (STC 153). Being alone, Artemis realizes that what she yearns for is being a hero as men would become. She then questions, "Would she find something different or the old things in different disguises" (STC 153). The act of journeying is once again associated with the idea of becoming a hero. Therefore, journeying can be said to also mean running away from herself for Artemis, as it had meant for Jordan. This can be derived from her thinking in the night by looking at the fire:

She saw herself by the fire as a child, a woman, a hunter, a queen. Grabbing the child she lost sight of the woman, and when she drew her bow the queen fled. What would it matter if she crossed the world and hunted down every living creature so long as her separate selves eluded her? In the end when no one was left she would have to confront herself. (STC 154)

Artemis tries to find her real self through different selves. But hunting each self would mean losing another one. Susana Onega puts that “Artemis’s essential transformation is more mysterious and complex than the hybrid mixing (or grafting) of male and female components and, as Fortunata explains to Jordan, can only be achieved by honest confrontation with the true self” (97). Therefore, through journeying, she wants to embrace her multiple selves, not to elude them one by one. While she wanders around in her mind to understand her essence, Orion arrives at her lonely island and abuses her. This traumatic incident is conveyed to the reader in a single sentence pointing to a very short period of time: “Orion raped Artemis and fell asleep” (STC 154). What follows, however, points out to an extended duration in the mind, stating that “She thought about that time for years” (STC 155). Although the incident, as Jordan conveys it, covers a shorter span of time in her past, it has the power to impact the present, as well. Deleuze explains that associationism derives its roots from “of resemblance and contiguity”, which implies that “in order to be represented the former present must resemble the present one, and must be broken up into partially simultaneous presents with very different durations which are then contiguous with one another and, ... with the present” (D&R 80). Thus, associationism goes in hand in hand with “artificial signs” (D&R 80). Put differently, a former present can bind itself to the present present in order to repeat itself continuously. For that purpose, it holds onto some “artificial signs”, namely, some person, object or event to represent the past incident” (D&R 80). Deleuze emphasizes that one’s binding to some former present can affect its duration in the mind. Although both the sentences explaining the incident take a similar narrative longevity, the first one refers to a momentarily act whereas the second one refers to its lasting influence “for years” (STC 155). Externally, the act takes a short period of time, but the mind repeats it and contemplates it for a longer period. The passing of external time does not affect the remains of the traumatic incident. This is explained by Jordan as “in a night 200,000 years can pass, time moving only in our minds. The steady marking of the seasons, the land well-loved and always changing, continues outside, while inside light years revolve us under different skies” (STC 155). The time of the mind does not have to conform to the time of the universe that is thought to pass in accordance with its movement. This ancient thinking does not explain how

an incident can remain in the mind of a present organism resisting the erasing power of external time. This shows that in Deleuzian demented time, time becomes free of the order of movement and the movement begins to subordinate time. Time ceases to pass only with external forces; it begins to determine its own movement. Jordan narrates that “Artemis lying beside dead Orion sees her past changed by a single act. The future is intact, still unredeemed, but the past is irredeemable. She is not who she thought she was” (STC 155). Orion’s act has the power to change Artemis’ past by changing what she defines of herself completely. It binds her to the dead Orion’s present to repeat itself in her mind for years and years. This also shows the first synthesis’ relation with history. In the living present, time is bound by the past through the burden of consciousness. For example, Artemis thinks she can never redeem herself for her past anymore. Besides, even though Orion’s act has a direct connection with the past by changing the present altogether, it also turns the future into something to be unredeemed. Even though the past cannot change the future in the living present, the present itself will have the power to dissolve the future’s intact being. Therefore, although in the present the future remains intact, it will require to be redeemed as time proceeds on its arrow toward the future. After the incident, Orion lies dead beside Artemis and she warms herself with the fire on the shore. She realizes that “the fiery circle surrounding her held all the clues she needed to recognize that life is for a moment contained in one shape then released into another” (STC 155). Although Artemis has always acted and lived her life with certain images of her own in her mind, she realizes that the images are not concrete. Once she would think of herself in a certain way and the other time can be changed in an unexpected way with the influence of an incident. She understands that time is doomed to get away from retention and turn into reminiscences. Therefore, history is not also made of retentions but reminiscences of the past. Although the mind repeats the past continuously, every repetition appears with difference. Therefore, Artemis thinks, “No resting place or palace could survive the light years that lay ahead. There was no history that would not be rewritten and the earliest days were already too far away to see” (STC 155). As the past is far away, it does not reappear in the present intact and unchanged. Therefore, Artemis’ view of history presents a sense of Deleuzian understanding of history. Deleuze explains that even though the historical actors

identify themselves with the actors and circumstances of the past and do not intend to produce novelty, their action always consists of difference (D&R 91). Ultimately, it blurs the line between reality and representation, and “that causes history is to become veiled in myth” (D&R 91). Orion’s act urges Artemis to step into the third synthesis as she comes to think “the stars show her how to hang in space supported by nothing at all. Without medals or certificates or territories she owns, she can burn as they do, travelling through time until time has no meaning any more” (STC 156). She wants to lose the meaning of time in order to break her binding with the past influenced by Orion’s wicked act. Before Orion, “she was lonely, not for friends but for a time that hadn’t been violated” (STC 156). However, she realizes that a time without violation was not complete freedom because it did not contain any risks. It would only eliminate some of her selves. She realizes that upon the experience caused by Orion, she is in the process of transformation as Artemis sees “she was not waiting, she was remembering. She was trying to find out what it was that had brought her here. What it was about herself” (STC 156). This shows that Artemis feels ready to leave behind the living present completely and discover her own self in the third synthesis of time.

The metaphor of alchemy can be seen as an indicator of Artemis’ decision to engage with the third synthesis. In alchemy, “the transformation from one element to another, from waste matter into best gold, is a process that cannot be documented. It is fully mysterious. No one really knows what effects the change” (STC 153). This unknown matter cannot be known as “the third is not given”, in other words, “*Tertium non data*” (STC 153). The change in demented time witnesses a journey from repetition to difference. Occurring within the mind, it does not include an external movement, though. The narrative puts that “...it is with the mind that moves from its prison to a vast plain without any movement at all. We can only guess at what happened” (STC 153). Therefore, Artemis stops looking for the third element in alchemy to start her transformation. She realizes that the dark precursor does not have to be apparent; it can be either Orion’s act or anything else. In the beginning, she always looks for a dark precursor but realizes that she only loses her selves by searching it. She tries to find a single image of herself. However, she understands that “the third is not given. All she knew was that she had arrived at the frontiers of

common sense and crossed over. She was safe now. No safety without risk, and what you risk reveals what you value” (STC 156-157). She knows that reminiscences of her past will be with her as the second synthesis is the grounding of time. However, she also finds the courage to step into the unfamiliar by leaving the safety and familiarity of the living present behind. She exceeds beyond habitual time by leaving “common sense” behind (STC 156). Eventually, she notices what she values is a time of difference only. Consequently, she notices running away from her own diverse selves will not be the solution because running away is indeed always running toward herself.

Upon conveying how Artemis’ engagement with time changes towards the third synthesis, Jordan reminds the reader of the epigraph at the beginning of the novel regarding the Hopi tribe’s engagement with time. Isha Malhotra states that the instance of Hopis “affects the conception of time in the novel, as it repeatedly dislocates our conventional understanding of time, questioning the metaphysical conceptions of time erected by language. (481). Narrated by the Dog-Woman, Jordan recalls the following:

On my travels I visited an Indian tribe known as the Hopi. I could not understand them, but in their company they had an old European man, Spanish, I think, though he spoke English to us. He said he had been captured by the tribe and now lived as one of them. I offered him passage home but he laughed in my face. I asked if their language had some similarity to Spanish and he laughed again and said, fantastically, that their language has no grammar in the way we recognize it. Most bizarre of all, they have no tenses for past, present and future. They do not sense time in that way. For them, time is one. The old man said it was impossible to learn their language without learning their world. I asked him how long it had taken him and he said that question had no meaning. (STC 157-158)

The Hopi tribe owns a language that does not show any similarity to other languages in the sense that it does not utilize any tenses of time. Time appears in a state of becoming in the Hopi language. It does not have dimensions of the past, the present and the future as time appears in the eternal return of difference. This language consequently reflects their perspective on life. It can be deduced that their understanding of time is free from the movement of the world as the external time does not have an influence on their understanding. The external time comes with its

dimensions and tends to reflect the movement of the universe. On the other hand, the Hopi language offers a unique view of time that reflects the perspective of the life of Hopis. Hopis live in their authentic world in which external time does not rule. Time moves in flux without any sections for the before and after. In order to understand the flux of their life, one has to understand their view of time as the flux. In this understanding of time, the living present cannot be dominant as it would come with its habits and expectations that would tend to categorize time. Instead, “the passage of time as it would be observable on a calendar becomes irrelevant in *Sexing the Cherry*, similarly to the Hopi view, since all temporal is contained in consciousness” (Buru 43). This refers to the demented time that allows all dimensions of time to exist simultaneously in the mind of the subject.

At this point, the narrative smoothly moves on to Nicolas Jordan, who hears of the chemist woman as a result of his friend Jack’s desire to fit everything into the living present. Jack is not glad that the chemist woman tries to dissolve the living present by opposing the market industry to dispose of their waste in the river. He thinks in an economist mode that “everybody wants jobs and money. How do they think we make jobs and money? There's always some fall-out, some consequence we'd rather not have, but you do have them and that's life” (STC 161). However, Nicolas Jordan does not agree with Jack, as he says “All rivers run into the sea” (STC 161). This shows that truth cannot be singular. In other words, what society or Jack believes as the truth is only a part of the multiplicity. Ultimately, the problem of disposal if ignored will cause a larger problem. In this sense, Nicolas Jordan believes that the chemist is right in her protest. Jack thinks that Nicolas Jordan does not abide by the expectations and habits of the world. He throws the newspaper to Nicolas Jordan and says “Here, keep up with the world, even if you don't want to join it” (STC 162). However, Nicolas Jordan considers the chemist woman a hero and does not understand why she would be vilified by others. It seems that although the chemist lives in danger to protect the environment, she does not conform to the habits and the expectations of the society. Therefore, she damages the arrow of the habitual time. However, Nicolas Jordan thinks “I felt I knew her, though this was not possible. Before I realized it I stood up and took down my kit bag. I would find her” (STC 162). Nicolas finds himself wanting to step in demented time.

In the meantime, Dog-Woman narrates that the death of the King has been devastating for her living present. She cannot accept this and looks at the present from the lenses of providence. In order to help those in need after the turmoil upon the execution, Dog-Woman gets out of her cottage. When she comes back, she finds that “Jordan was lying on his bed delirious with fever. He could hardly speak to me, and when he did his talk was of wild places and strange customs, and over and over again he repeated, ‘Fortunata’” (STC 165). However, Dog-Woman conveys “I am a resourceful woman and believe I can do almost anything if it falls within the mortal realm, but I could not find a woman who did not exist” (STC 165). This draws attention to the distinction between Jordan’s and Dog-Woman’s look at time. Dog-Woman thinks what is unknown cannot be found whereas Jordan considers that it is not the thing itself he wants to find. Even after he finds Fortunata and leaves her behind, Jordan knows that it is not the destination he wants to arrive at, but it is the road itself he wants to take to make discoveries in the eternal return of difference.

After the Plague is over, Dog-Woman says “I fancied that I still smelt the stench wherever I went. I couldn't rid my nostrils of the odour of death. I began to think of London as a place full of filth and pestilence that would never be clean” (STC 166). She is obsessed with the providence that “God's revenge is still upon us. ... We are corrupt and our city is corrupted. There is no whole or beautiful thing left...” (STC 166). However, she adds “then Jordan announced, suddenly ... ‘Will you go at once?’ I asked, full of fear” (STC 166). Dog-Woman fears that her living present will be further disrupted. But Jordan is determined to continue his journeys. Ultimately, Dog-Woman is left with her own obsessions and says “this city should be burned down” (STC 167). Since she realizes she cannot stop time’s transformation, she wants to destroy what time constantly changes. All of these show that Dog-Woman shelters beneath the living present whereas Jordan, even when “delirious with fever”, does not give up on proceeding towards difference in demented time (STC 165).

In the meantime, Nicolas Jordan arrives at the chemist woman’s place. His arrival lays bare the distinction between their observation of the pollution. Nicolas Jordan turns out to perceive the situation from a romantic perspective whereas the chemist talks of objective truth. Nicolas even makes comments such as “The river's

glowing” and “It reminds me of *The Ancient Mariner*, the slimy sea” (STC 167). But the chemist says “it’s phosphorus, the tests are conclusive” (STC 167). While the chemist looks from the glasses of science, Nicolas Jordan perceives the situation from a romantic perspective. Ultimately, the chemist woman proposes “let’s burn down the factory” (STC 168). This proposal sharply cuts the imaginary sight of Nicolas Jordan by destroying the stillness of time and opens it for the unknownness of the destruction.

Although the idea of fire begins in contemporary times, the physical fire is said to begin in seventeenth-century London. This shows that time becomes demented itself by losing all its dimensions into simultaneity. The past and the present of the future become intertwined as the experience and metamorphosis lose their ties with the external understanding of time. It is ironical that Dog-Woman marks the exact day of the fire’s beginning as “on September the second, in the year of Our Lord, sixteen hundred and sixty-six” (STC 168). This marking of the particular day points out to Dog-Woman’s perpetual aim to prove the veracity of her narration. Although the twentieth-century chemist proposes to start a fire, it is not clear who sets the actual fire. Dog-Woman asserts, “I did not start the fire - how could I, having resolved to lead a blameless life? - but I did not stop it” (STC 168). Her assertion to have lived “a blameless life” points out to the inconsistency in Dog-Woman’s memory as she remembers herself to be a completely pure and innocent person throughout her life regardless of her past deeds (STC 168). As the reality fades into hallucinations, both the identity of the characters and their minds blur into each other and veil the reality. Dog-Woman says to Jordan “Hurry, Jordan ... we have done with this time and place” (STC 169). Time becomes a sphere of timelessness.

They pack their belongings and Dog-Woman sails down the Thames to wait for Jordan. Jordan arrives beside her late, with a “pale” face and “his hands trembled” (STC 169). It turns out that as Jordan tries to reach Dog-Woman,

... the fog covered him and, hurrying, he had fallen and banged his head. He came to, and feeling his way, arms outstretched, he had suddenly touched another face and screamed out. For a second the fog cleared and he saw that the stranger was himself. (STC 169)

This memory of the fog can be traced back to the beginning of the novel in which Jordan once again finds himself and sees his face. At the beginning of the novel, Jordan does not specify what happens after he finds himself in the fog. He defines this memory as the first thing he saw, but later confesses that it was actually not. This shows that his story begins far from the beginning point and is supposed to depend upon an unfathomable instance. Jordan continues when he touches a face, he realizes he is touching his own face. This enables him to recognize his double self. This incident points out to the possibility Jordan mentions in the beginning that he is one of his several selves living several other lives... The present is not a singularity but it consists of multiplicity. Regarding Jordan's encounter with himself in the fog, which is also stated at the beginning of the novel, Miguel Mota asserts that "the multiplicity of the self invites us to read this as part of Winterson's critique of traditional definitions of identity" (194). Upon this, he says to Dog-Woman, "Perhaps I am to die. ... Or perhaps I am to live, to be complete as she said I would be" (STC 169). The Deleuzian death instinct refers to finding out the Superego of the future and means finalizing the story with the decentred circle of time. Therefore, Jordan sees the death instinct as paralleled with becoming complete. Becoming complete would mean eventually becoming decentred and free from the restrictions of the living present. Jordan conveys that this idea of becoming complete has been introduced to him by Fortunata. Upon hearing this, Dog-Woman says:

I looked at Jordan standing at the prow, his silhouette black and sharpened. I thought I saw someone standing beside him, a woman, slight and strong. I tried to call out but I had no voice. Then she vanished and there was nothing next to Jordan but empty space. (STC 169-170).

Jordan initially believes that when he voyages to make discoveries of rarities, he would become a hero like Tradescant. As a destination for his passion for journeying, he sets Fortunata. However, when Jordan finds Fortunata, he realizes that finding her will not be an end to his journeys. He realizes that one can journey without taking external journeys and move to places without even moving her/his body. Eventually, he realizes that finding Fortunata is not a means to become complete because one can become complete being alone. Becoming complete does not mean finding another complementary soul. Completeness is achieved when one

realizes his/her other selves. When Jordan realizes his other self, the superego of the future, Fortunata disappears into the form of empty space. As Jordan calls it in an advance notice, he becomes complete alone because “for us, empty space is space empty of people” (STC 107). Being alone, Jordan thinks both his mother and Fortunata are complete. Thus, completeness is the realization of his other possible simultaneous selves for Jordan. When Fortunata turns into empty space, it shows that Fortunata turns back to still life, namely, she is left in the perpetual repetition of points of light. On the other hand, Jordan sets his way towards “a less simple and much more secret, much more tortuous, more nebulous circle, an eternally eccentric circle, the decentred circle of difference which is re-formed uniquely in the third time of the series” (91).

In this sense, Jordan’s story ends with the repetition of journeying toward empty time and the eternal return of difference. Jordan states “the future lies ahead like a glittering city, but like the cities of the desert disappear when approached” (STC 170). Lidia Curti depicts his journey into demented time, stating that “Jordan leaves the city for ever on his ship, like the river flowing incessantly from one country to another, towards the mirage of other cities and other futures existing only in his mind” (102). Ultimately, Jordan realizes that what repeats in his life is the movement itself. The future with its unknownness offers a time out of its joints. Jordan takes a sail to this constant becoming by not seeking for a destination to end his story this time. Deleuze explains this journey into timelessness: “this is how the story of time ends: by undoing its too well centred natural or physical circle and forming a straight line which then, led by its own length, reconstitutes an eternally decentred circle” (115). Deleuze suggests that in the third synthesis, the eternal return does not aim to reach a conclusive future. Feeling hope, Jordan appreciates that the cities he will see from afar will never be reached. It is the process of return that will produce difference all the time.

In this sense, Jordan understands that the future does have a defined or open being. He says “in certain lights it is easy to see the towers and the domes, even the people going to and fro. We speak of it with longing and with love. *The future*. But the city is a fake” (STC 170). He understands it is not possible to arrive at the future as if it is a physical city. The future does not offer a destination in the eternal return.

This refers to the Deleuzian idea of simulacrum, in which time “becomes a mere mental construct that allows for manipulation at will” (Buru 42). In the simulacrum of the future, neither the past nor the present remains in their original senses. Nor do they refer to derived ones. Simulacrum confuses the original and the derived in order to create a constant sense of movement in time. Jordan further explains that “the future and the present and the past exist only in our minds, and from a distance the borders of each shrink and fade like the borders of hostile countries seen from a floating city in the sky” (STC 170). The simultaneity of all dimensions of time in the eternal return makes the destination an unreachable point of difference in the demented mind. In the third synthesis of time, the dimensions of it, the past, the present and the future amalgamate together to form the decentred and demented circle. Within this circle, the past and the present become unparalleled.

In conclusion, *Sexing the Cherry* demonstrates that the future is only born of difference and what is seen as the single truth can only be the simulacrum. This also shows that history and historiography can only offer a theatre of repetition- that is a perpetual sense of difference- in its relation to time. As “the river runs from one country to another without stopping”, it forms a flux that carries multiplicity and difference continuously (STC 170). This is affirmed when Deleuze says “the repetition in the eternal return is the same, but the same in so far as it is said uniquely of difference and the different” (301). As a result, it can be stated that “time is not a flowing water/river in Winterson’s fiction,” (80) but “its fluid-like characteristics denote its borderless nature” (Kırca, *Postmodernist Historical Novels* 81). This means that time does not offer the movement of the universe or the successive points on a line that refer to any before and the after. Jordan concludes “even the most solid of things and the most real, the best-loved and the well-known, are only hand-shadows on the wall. Empty space and points of light” (STC 170). This indicates finding your destination and embracing it as the final point will not fulfil the idea of being complete. Achieving completeness in demented time is only possible by accepting the existence of the simulacrum. Leaving all objections to transformation and change behind with the fire, Jordan ends his story with his journey toward an unfathomable future, being a simulacrum of all characters within *Sexing the Cherry*.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

This thesis has attempted a Deleuzian reading of time and its relation to history by scrutinizing the form and content in Jeanette Winterson's *Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit* and *Sexing the Cherry*. It has conducted its analyses by investigating the novels' temporal fluxes and their discussions on the nature of time. It has focused on the external and internal journeys of the character-narrators and tried to shed light on their engagement and experimentation with the past, the present and the future. Doing a Deleuzian reading of these novels has revealed that the first and the third syntheses of time rival out each other in each work to reflect Winterson's evolving perspective toward the notions of time and history.

It has been shown that in *Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit*, ideas dominant in Deleuze's first synthesis of time prevail in the character-narrator Jeanette's open-ended story. Since Jeanette cannot help but desire to stay within the sphere of the familiar, she intends to achieve her own habitual time, detaching herself from her mother's living present. This implies she wants to have a habitual life as she had at home. Yet, she also wants to possess her own habits and expectations in life. In this regard, her attempts towards leaving behind her mother's living present do not cut her ties with Deleuze's first synthesis of time. Her narrative's open ending suggests her inclination towards not only the first synthesis, but also her mother's living present. On the other hand, *Sexing the Cherry* offers a variety of character-narrators, namely, Jordan, Dog-Woman, Nicolas Jordan and chemist woman. The study argues that the novel's opening foreshadows the emergence of Deleuze's third synthesis, by introducing itself with connotations of demented time. Initially in the story, it is conveyed that Dog-Woman lives her habitual time with her son Jordan and never wants her son to leave. On the other hand, Jordan sets as his destination a woman

called Fortunata and expects that he will achieve his own living present once he finds the woman. It turns out that when he manages to find Fortunata he does not actually aspire to be confined by the first synthesis of time, and he decides to continue his journeys inwards, which is an inclination towards demented time. Gradually the narrative slips into contemporary time and both the past and modern times blend into each other. As the novel ends, it becomes apparent that Jordan leaves behind his habitual life and takes an open-ended journey towards the eternal return of the future.

Winterson explains that her work has emerged from major themes that “do occur and return, disappear, come back amplified or modified, changed in some way” (Reynolds and Noakes 25). Time and its relation to history appear to be among these recurrent themes in the majority of her work. As early examples, Winterson’s *Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit* and *Sexing the Cherry* explore the topics of time and history through the intradiegetic narrators’ recurrent ideas and aspirations. To begin with, it is possible to see that both Jeanette and Jordan grow up in their mother’s habitual lives and they both attempt to escape for the purpose of finding their own living present as they get older. Jeanette cannot completely detach herself from her mother’s binding present. Nor can she get rid of her desire to conduct a habitual life. With the inclusion of intertextual stories, Winterson not only explores the relation between the idea of escape, internal quest and time from different perspectives but also shows how Jeanette’s authentic outlook on life and her dilemmatic decision-making process end with a different ending than the protagonists of these stories. In *Sexing the Cherry*, Jordan ultimately finds out that his actual aspiration is making internal journeys and discovering what remains unknown inside. In the meantime, the recurrent topic of escape shows that in both novels it is not possible for a character to leave behind history and erase the past completely. Both novels point out that even though the characters manage to escape externally, their inward lives resume the past in the present. This shows that the idea of escape can only mean escaping inwards towards understanding one’s own self.

Besides, the two novels repeat the idea of return, but they yield different consequences with varying perspectives of the characters towards the nature of time. In *Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit*, return means Jeanette’s returning to her habitual life and reveals her attachment to her mother’s living present. This makes her

narrative imply that return aims to achieve a simple circle in the first synthesis of time, rather than decentring that circle. However, the idea of return in *Sexing the Cherry* becomes a means to achieve the eternal return of time in order to be a part of its constant movement and transformation. It becomes clear that even when Jordan externally returns to his mother's habitual life, he is determined to discover the decentred circle of time by letting his voyages slip into empty time. This indicates that Jordan accepts and lets himself be fractured by demented time. Thus, he appears to subvert the idea of representation in the display of truth and the reality of time. His journey into the eternal return of difference exhibits that Winterson's prior view of time under the binding of the living present in her debut novel has shifted towards the third synthesis of time that deals with the multiplicity and the revocability of time.

Ultimately, a Deleuzian reading of Winterson's two novels allows us to see her changing perspective on the nature of time and history. It demonstrates that time becomes more and more demented in Winterson's work, opening it for subversive ideas. Her approach to time and history is reflected through the content and the form of her novels, by employing convoluted temporal narrative fluxes and sophisticated discussions on the nature of time. The evolving appearance of Winterson's views on time can be related with her idea of employing a spiral structure in her narratives. The shape of the spiral can be rendered as a Deleuzian repetition of difference in that as the line of the spiral revolves around, it inevitably produces novelty by eliminating the possibility of the convergence of the circle's two ends. In other words, Winterson's contemplations on the nature of time and history repeat themselves within decentred Deleuzian circles that do not attempt to return where they have started, but rather surrender to the eternal return of difference in which both the beginning and the ending of the circle can only refer to unfathomable middle points. This consequently eliminates the possibility of assigning time a predetermining beginning or ending. Instead, the movement of time complies with the decentred circle of Winterson's spiral narrative composed of authentic qualities of form and content. In this sense, the unstable and restless nature of the writer's narratives through the amalgamation of form and content can be seen as the motivation of

transformation for the writer's further engagement with time and history in her works.

All things considered, this thesis that has analysed the notions of time and history in Winterson's *Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit* and *Sexing the Cherry* within the framework of Gilles Deleuze's ideas in *Difference and Repetition* can be also seen as a source of inspiration for future studies that might choose to employ Deleuzian ideas to investigate not only these two novels, but Winterson's oeuvre in general. It is possible to come across several studies that analyse time and history in Winterson's works from other philosophical perspectives than a Deleuzian outlook. It can be suggested that future studies might as well explore complementary topics in Winterson's works, such as gender, sexuality or identity, from the perspective of Deleuze's views in *Difference and Repetition*. Another possibility is that further studies can dwell on Winterson's works not by focusing on the two syntheses of time only (namely, the first and the third syntheses). Rather, Deleuze's second synthesis can be used to enlighten unreliable narration or trauma narratives (such as in *The Passion*) in Winterson's literature. A Deleuzian reading, particularly of time and history, can also make it viable to question the reflections of modernist and postmodernist stances in the writer's novels. For instance, reading her novels from Deleuze's first synthesis of time can allow to question the sense of nostalgia in the modernist connotations of Winterson's work. Overall, it can be suggested that future studies consisting of Deleuzian analyses of Winterson's oeuvre can enrich existing views on her work.

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APPENDICES

A. TURKISH SUMMARY / TRKE ZET

Bu tez, Jeanette Winterson'ın *Tek Meyve Portakal Değildir* ve *Vişnenin Cinsiyeti* adlı romanlarında, biçim ve içeriğın harmanlanması yoluyla, yazarın zamana ve zamanın tarihle olan ilişkisine dair değışen görüşlerini nasıl sergilediğini incelemektedir. Romanların hem farklı hem birbirini tamamlayıcı örnekler sunduğunu öne süren bu çalışma boyunca, Winterson'ın zaman ve tarihe dair görüşleri Fransız düşünür Gilles Deleuze'ün zamanın doğası ve geçmiş, şimdi ve gelecek olmak üzere üç boyutu hakkındaki fikirleri aracılığıyla analiz edilmektedir. Bu amaçla, anlatıcı-karakterlerin dış ve iç dünyalarındaki yolculuklarında açığa vurulan zamansal anlatı akışları ve zaman ile tarihe dair tartışmalar Deleuzecü bir okumayla irdelenmiştir.

Çalışmadaki analizlerden bahsetmeden önce, tezin ikinci bölümünde sunulan kuramsal çerçeveye değinmek yerinde olacaktır. Tezde, Winterson'ın söz konusu romanlarını incelemek amacıyla Fransız düşünür Gilles Deleuze'ün *Fark ve Tekrar* isimli eserinde yer alan zamanın üç sentezine ilişkin fikirlerine odaklanılır. Deleuze'ün çalışmalarının çoğunda zamana dair görüşleri dağınık biçimde geçiyor olsa da, *Fark ve Tekrar* onun üç sentezi aracılığıyla tekrar, fark ve zaman arasındaki ilişkiye dair görüşlerini kapsamlı bir şekilde sunar. Kuramsal tartışmalarını Deleuze'ün *Fark ve Tekrar*'ına dayandıran bu bölüm, kitabın “Kendisi İçin Tekrar” başlıklı ikinci bölümü üzerinde yoğunlaşır. Böylece Deleuze'ün zaman ve tarihe dair görüşlerini üç sentezi üzerinden tanıtır ve tartışır. Bir fark felsefecisi olarak bilinen Deleuze, zamanın üç sentezini tartışırken de tekrar ve fark nosyonlarından yola çıkar. Tekrar ve fark fikirlerinden yola çıkması, düşünürün zamanı teklikten çokluğa ve tek yönlülüğten çok yönlülüğe geçiren bir bakış açısıyla incelemesini sağlar.

Deleuze'e göre birinci sentez, zamanın temelini oluşturur; ikinci sentez, zamanın zeminlenmesini sağlar; üçüncü sentez ise zamanın zeminsizleşmesine yol açar. İlk sentez yaşayan şimdi (living present) ile ilgilidir. Yaşayan şimdi, alışkanlıksal zamanı getirir. Bu nedenle, zamanın birinci sentezi, zamanı alışkanlıklar ve beklentilerle ilişkilendirir. Paralel olarak, ilk sentezdeki tekrar; geçmiş, şimdi ve gelecek arasında benzerlikler ve analogiler üretmek için gerçekleşir. Ayrıca, Deleuze birinci sentezin Freud'un haz prensibine benzer bir yönü olduğunu savunur. Ancak Freud'un haz prensibinin ötesine geçen bu bağlayıcı etki, organizmada alışkanlıklar ve beklentiler neticesinde bir bağlanma görülmesini içerir. Öte yandan, diğer iki sentezin (birinci ve üçüncü sentezin) zeminini oluşturan zamanın ikinci sentezi, zamanı bellek ve temsil yönüyle ele alır. Deleuze ikinci sentezi Lacancı bir perspektifle kurarak organizmanın bir virtüel-öteki arayışı içerisinde olduğunu, bu sebeple saf gerçeklikten ziyade temsile yöneldiğini iddia eder. Bu noktada, ikinci sentez, saf geçmiş olamayacağını; bellekte tutulmanın (retention) değişikliğe maruz kalacağını öne sürer. Bu durum kendisini anımsamalar (reminiscences) yoluyla gösterir. Bu nedenle, ikinci sentezde unutma eylemi öne çıkar. Son olarak, Deleuze'ün üçüncü sentezi zamanın basit halkasını kırarak zamanı merkezsiz hale getirir. Deleuze, üçüncü sentezin önce, sonra ve durak fikirleriyle ilişkisini Immanuel Kant'ın boş zaman düşüncesiyle ilişkilendirir. Burada benlik, geleceğin durağı tarafından parçalı hale gelir. Böylece zaman, yalnızca farklılığın tekrarını gerçekleştiren ve Nietzsche'nin bengi dönüşünden ilham alan bir sonsuz dönüş kendisini bırakır. Deleuze, bu nedenlerdendir ki üçüncü sentezi dizginlerinden kopmuş veya kaçık zaman olarak da tanımlar. Kuşbakışı bir yorumlamayla, ilk sentezin alışkanlıkların zamanına ilişkin şimdiye; ikinci sentezin anımsamalar ve temsile ilişkin geçmişe; üçüncü sentezin ise zamanı farkın tekrarına dönüştüren geleceğe ilişkin olduğu söylenebilir.

Fransız filozof Gilles Deleuze ile İngiliz yazar Jeanette Winterson'ın zamanın doğasına ilişkin anlayışlarında ortak noktaları paylaştığı söylenebilir. Winterson'a benzer şekilde, Deleuze de zamanı, aşinalık, istikrar, benzerlik ve analoginin yanı sıra alışılmamışlık, hareket, değişim ve çokluk fikirleri aracılığıyla ele alır. Tekrar ve fark kavramları, sentezler arasındaki devamlı etkileşimleri açıklamaya ve sentezlerin birbirinden ayrıştığı noktaları ortaya koymaya yardımcı olur. Bu çerçevede,

Winterson'ın zamana dair deęişen görüşlerinin Deleuze'cü bir okuması, tekrar ve fark fikirleri arasındaki farklı ilişkilerin, bireyin yaşamı ve tarihi ele alışında nasıl çok yönlü karar ve tercihlere yol açtığını anlamayı sağlar.

Jeanette Winterson'ın *Tek Meyve Portakal Deęildir* ve *Vişnenin Cinsiyeti* adlı romanları incelendiğinde, *Tek Meyve Portakal Deęildir* adlı eserde birinci sentezin ve *Vişnenin Cinsiyeti* adlı eserde üçüncü sentezin nihai olarak öne çıktığı görülür. Bu sonuca, anlatılardaki karakter-anlatıcıların geçmişe, bugüne ve geleceğe bakış açılarını ortaya koyan biçim ve içerik örneklerini inceleyerek ulaşılmaktadır. Dolayısıyla bu tez, argümanlarını ve zaman tartışmalarını ikinci sentezdeki geçmişin anıları ve hatıraları üzerine temellendirerek, *Tek Meyve Portakal Deęildir* ve *Vişnenin Cinsiyeti* romanlarının Deleuzecü zaman anlayışının iki kutbunu sergilediği varsayımını öne sürer. Bu amaç doğrultusunda, karakter-anlatıcıların zaman ve tarih üzerine düşüncelerine fırsat tanıyan ve bu düşüncelerini açığa vuran iç ve dış yolculukları analiz edilmektedir. Çalışmada, analizlerin belirli çatılar altında toplanabilmesi için her roman analizi üç temel temaya ayrılır. Bunlar alışkanlıksal yaşam, kaçış ve dönüş temalarıdır. Söz konusu temalar romanlardaki karakter-anlatıcıların düşünme ve karar verme süreçlerini özetleyen üç temel fikri ortaya koyar. Bu ortak fikirler çerçevesinde karakter-anlatıcıların birbirine benzeyen ve birbirinden ayrılan fikir ve kararlarını biçimsel ve içerik özellikleri sayesinde ayırt etmek mümkün olmuştur. Böyle bir ayırım, karakterlerin benzer süreçlerden geçmelerine karşın neden farklı zaman anlayışlarına yöneldiklerini ortaya koyma noktasında oldukça önem taşır. Nihayetinde, karakterlerin hayatlarında benzer sürçeler yaşansa dahi geçmiş, şimdi ve geleceğe bakış açılarında görülen çeşitlilikler zaman ve tarihle olan etkileşimlerini etkiler. Böylece, karakter-anlatıcıların zamanın farklı sentezlerine yöneldiği görülür.

Tezin üçüncü bölümünden itibaren roman analizi kısmı başlar. Jeanette Winterson'ın da ilk romanı olan *Tek Meyve Portakal Deęildir* tezde incelenen ilk eserdir. Genel anlamda çalışma, karakter-anlatıcı Jeanette'in geçmiş, şimdi ve gelecekle ilgili düşünme ve karar verme süreçlerinden geçtiği iç ve dış dünyadaki yolculuklarını takip eder. Bu yolculuklar sırasında, Jeanette'in karar verme süreçlerindeki bilinen ile bilinmeyen çatışmasına ışık tutar. Bu çatışma içerisinde, Deleuze'ün fark ve tekrar fikirlerinin yerine işaret eder. Böyle bir inceleme, *Tek*

Meyve Portakal Değildir'de zaman ve tarih nosyonlarının bağlantısına ve etkileşimine ışık tutar. Bu sayede, anlatının neden daha çok tarih kavramına odaklandığını da gösterir.

İncelemenin başında alışkanlıksal yaşam temasına değinilmiştir. Bu kısımda, romanın karakter-anlatıcısı Jeanette, çocukluk hikayesine giriş yapar. Anlatısının önemli bir özelliği, devamlı olarak anlatı akışı içerisinde kendi hikayesinden benzerlikler sunduğunu düşündüğü metinlerarası eklentiler yapmasıdır. Kendini geliştirme sürecini karmaşık bir zamansal akışta anlatmaya başlar. Jeanette dindar bir aile tarafından evlat edinilir ve büyütülür. Çoğunlukla annesinin gölgesinde yetişir. Annesi hayata ve değerlere dair mutlak görüşleri olan biridir. Jeanette de Kilise'nin öğretilerinin yakın bir takipçisi olur. Eğitim hayatı annesinin manevi öğretileriyle şekillenir. Hayata ve ilişkilere dair görüşleri öncelikle annesinin fikirlerinden etkilenir. Annesinin düşünceleri zıtlıkların çatışması şeklindedir. Bu düşünme biçimi, genç Jeanette'in hayatı algılama biçimini etkiler. Annesinin inşa ettiği bir geçmişle büyür. Bu yetiştirme, annesinin Jeanette için manevi idealleri doğrultusunda bir gelecek belirleme gayesini gösterir. Ancak Jeanette'in zihninde geçmiş, şimdi ve gelecek sürekli çarpışmaktadır. Böylece, annesinin mutlak ve zıtlıklarla şekillenen fikirlerinden kopmuş kendi yaşayan şimdisine kaçma arzusu Jeanette'in zihninde yavaş yavaş kendini gösterir. Bu dürtü anlatıya, Jeanette'in zamanın doğasını ve onun tarihçilikle ilişkisini sorgulamasıyla aktarılır. Jeanette'in kendi şimdisini üretme kaygısı ve karar verme sürecinde yaşadığı açmaz romana yalnızca içerik yönünden değil biçimsel yönden de yansır. Yine de Jeanette kendisini zamanın birinci sentezinden veya annesinin yaşayan şimdisinden tam olarak soyutlayamaz. Bunun sonucunda, Deleuze'ün üçüncü sentezine yönelmek yerine birinci sentez içerisinde kendi yaşayan şimdisini oluşturma isteğine kapılır. Bu bağlamda Jeanette, gelecekte kendi beklentilerini gerçekleştirmeyi hedeflemektedir. Fakat Jeanette'in annesi kızı kendi düşüncelerini ve yaşam tarzını sorguladıkça, kendi alışkanlıksal yaşamının zarar göreceği endişesine kapılır. Jeanette annesinin evinde, ailesiyle birlikte sürdürdüğü hayatın kendisine güven ve koruma hissi verdiğini bilir. Bu nedenle annesine bağlanma gösterir. Ancak, annesinin geçmişten gelen alışkanlıklarına ve geleceğe dair beklentilerine zıt düşmesi, ona güven veren evinden ayrılmasına sebep olur. Annesi artık aile evinde yaşamasını istemez. Jeanette ise başlangıçta

çocukluğunun geçtiği mahalleden kopamaz. Bir iş ve kalacak yer bularak hayatını burada sürdürür. İncelemenin ikinci kısmı olan kaçış teması, bu nedenledir ki son kısım olan dönüş temasıyla oldukça ilintilidir. Bu tema, Jeanette'in kendi geçmişinin başlangıcını ve sonunu belirlemek için masallarla kendi hayatını sorguladığı içsel yolculuklara çıkmasına neden olmakla kalmaz; aynı zamanda Jeanette'i şimdiki hayatından kaçmak için dış dünyada bir yolculuk yapmaya da iter. Jeanette zaman içerisinde okulunu bitirir ve şehre gitmeye karar verir. Kaçış teması, Jeanette'in anlatısında sürekli olarak kullandığı metinler arası eklentileri hem yoğunlaştırır hem de bu hikayeleri Jeanette'in anlatısı içerisine entegre olmaya iter. Jeanette, Winnet Stonejar ve Sir Perceval gibi hayali karakterlerin hikayesinde yalnızca bir dış anlatıcı olmayı bırakır. Bu anlatıların anlatıcı özelliklerini bulanıklaştırarak kendi hikayesiyle analogiler kurmaya çalışır. Ancak kaçış bölümü göstermektedir ki Jeanette kendine özgü bir hikayeye sahiptir. Yaşayan şimdisini kurmak için kaçtığı şehir zihninde sorular üretmesine ve dönüş temasına geçişe sebep olur. Dönüş, Jeanette için yalnızca aile evine dönüş değildir. Dönüş, geçmişe dönmek ve annesinin alışkanlıksal zamanıyla yüzleşmektir. Anlatısının bitiminde annesine olan bağlanmasına işaret eden iplik metaforu ve hikayesinin açık uçlu sonu metni içi anlatıcı Jeanette'in yaşamdaki alışkanlıkların ve beklentilerin tekrarına tutunarak tanıdık olana nasıl meylettğini gösterir. Deleuzecü bir çerçeveden bakıldığında, *Tek Meyve Portakal Değildir* adlı eserinde Winterson'ın zaman nosyonu ve onun tarihle ilişkisini temel olarak Deleuze'ün yaşayan şimdiki zamanına ait birinci sentezi üzerinden tartıştığı fark edilebilir.

Tezin dördüncü bölümü, *Vişnenin Cinsiyeti* adlı ikinci romanın Deleuzecü bir analizini sunar. Çalışma, analizleri sırasında, karmaşık bir anlatı ve zaman yapısı içinde bugünü, geçmişi ve geleceği irdeleyen Köpek-Kadın, Jordan, Nicolas Jordan ve kimyager kadın adlı karakter-anlatıcıların iç ve dış dünyadaki yolculuklarını takip eder. Kahramanların zihinsel süreçlerinde bilinen ve bilinmeyen çatışmasının incelenmesi, anlatının zaman nosyonu ile ilişkisini ortaya koyar. Nihayetinde, *Vişnenin Cinsiyeti* adlı eserde zaman ve tarih nosyonlarına ilişkin argümanların nasıl ve neden Deleuze'ün üçüncü sentezine yöneldiği tartışılır. *Tek Meyve Portakal Değildir*'den farklı olarak, *Vişnenin Cinsiyeti*'nde zaman ve tarih nosyonları birden fazla anlatıcının perspektifinden ele alınmaktadır. Çalışma boyunca, zamansal anlatı

akışları arasında metiniçi anlatıcıların iç ve dış yolculukları incelenir. Bunun için, romanın karmaşık zamansal akışı ve zaman ile tarihe ilişkin tartışmaları göz önüne alınır. Bu incelemeler sonucunda, karakter-anlatıcıların alışkanlıksal ve kaçık zaman ile etkileşimleri ortaya çıkmaktadır. Deleuze'e göre alışkanlıksal zaman, ilk sentezin yaşayan şimdisinde bulunur ve zamanın basit dairesini tamamlayarak geçmişin alışkanlıklarını ve geleceğin beklentilerini hayata geçirmeyi amaçlar. Alışkanlıksal zamanda tekrar, analogiler ve benzerlikler elde etmek için gerçekleşir. Öte yandan kaçık zaman, zamanın dizginlerini ortadan kaldırarak sonunda basit zaman döngüsünü merkezden uzaklaştırma fikriyle yakından ilgilidir. Kaçık zaman, zihindeki dönüşümün ve değişimin bir tekrarını sunar ve zamanın doğasına ve işleyişine atfedilen çizgisellik ve geri çevrilemezlik anlayışını yıkmaya çalışır. Burada zamanın düz bir ok üzerinde basit bir daire çizme amacıyla ilerlediği fikri bertaraf edilir. Böylece, Deleuzecü bir çerçeveden karakterlerin zaman ve gerçeklik hakkındaki düşüncelerini inceleyen tez, bu romanda alışkanlıksal zamanın ebedi dönüşe dönüşümünü gösterir. Diğer bir değişle, Deleuzecü bir okuma, romanın sonunda üçüncü sentezin zaman anlayışına hakim olduğunu ve bu zaman anlayışında tekrarın farka yol açtığını gösterir.

Vişnenin Cinsiyeti alışkanlıksal yaşam, kaçış ve dönüş temalarına ek olarak kaçık zamanın önceden belirtilmesi isimli bir tema sunar. Bu tema, incelemenin ilk başlığını oluşturur. Böylece, romanın giriş kısmında üçüncü senteze gittikçe yaklaşılacağını ima eden biçim ve içerik özellikleri dikkat çeker. Burada karakter-anlatıcı Jordan gelecekte geçmişe doğru bakarak, kendisinin zamanla olan ilişkisi ve algısındaki değişiklikleri yorumlar. Bu yorumlama zamanı çizgisellikten ve geri çevrilemezlikten sıyıran bir perspektif sunar. Ardından roman, *Tek Meyve Portakal Değildir*'de olduğu gibi alışkanlıksal yaşam temasına giriş yapar. Alışkanlıksal yaşamda, ilk olarak Jordan'ın annesi Köpek-Kadın'ın oğlunu kendi yaşayan şimdisinde tutma arzusuna şahit olunur. Köpek-Kadın, Jordan'a bir nehir ismi vermesinin onu kendisinden ayıracağına ve yolculuklara sevk edeceğine dair inancını açıkça belirtir. Jordan'ın kendisini bırakıp gitmemesi için onunla birlikte Tradescant'ın bahçesine bile gitmeyi göze alır. Ancak geleceğe dair inançları, onun kaderi öngörülebilir ve kesin noktalardan oluşmuş bir çizgi olarak görmesine yol açar. Noktalarda değişiklik yapmak yerine evine döner. Başlangıçta Jordan da,

Fortunata adında bir prensesi yolculuklarının sonunda ulaşmak istediği varış noktası olarak belirleyerek kendi yaşayan şimdisini elde etmek fikri noktasında annesini taklit eder. Fortunata'yı bulduğunda kendisine ait bir yaşayan şimdiye kavuşacağını düşünür. Ancak Fortunata'yı bulmayı başardığında, aslında zamanın birinci sentezinde takılıp kalmak istemediğini anlar. Jordan nihayetinde hayalinin aslında bir varış noktasına ulaşmak veya kendi yaşayan şimdisini kurmak olmadığını anlar. Bunun yerine, yolculukların kendilerini ve sunacakları gerçek farkı arzuladığını kavrar. Bu nedenle, anlatı kaçış temasına geçiş yapar ve Jordan iç dünyasındaki yolculuklar aracılığıyla üçüncü senteze doğru ilerlemeye devam eder. Yavaş yavaş roman, zamanın dış dünyayla bağını ortadan kaldırır ve onu bir serbest düşüş alanına dönüştürür. Bu belirsiz zamanda karakterler, önceki varlıklarını fark nosyonunun nitelikleriyle tekrar ederler. Kaçışın soyut manasını keşfeden Jordan, gerçeklik, doğruluk ve çokluk fikirleri çerçevesinde zaman üzerine düşünmeye başlar. Dönüş temasıyla birlikte, deniz yolculuğundan annesinin yanına dönse dahi Jordan'ın dönüşü, onun annesinin alışkanlıksal zamanında sabit kalmasını sağlayacak bir dönüş değildir. *Vişnenin Cinsiyeti*'nde dönüş teması, Deleuze'ün bengi dönüş düşüncesini çağırıştırır. Dönüş temasıyla birlikte, anlatının dönemi yavaş yavaş günümüze kayar. Bir süre sonra romanda hem geçmiş hem de modern zamanlar birbirine karışır. Bu bölüm, modern zamanlarda yaşayan Nicolas Jordan ve kimyager kadının anlatılarına geçiş yapar. Kimyager kadın Thames nehrinin fabrika tarafından kirletilmesini protesto etmek ve nehirdeki civa seviyelerini ölçmek amacıyla nehir kenarında yaşamaktadır. Nicolas Jordan ise kadının cesaretini görüp ona katılmak ister. Nehirdeki kirlilik sebebiyle yolları kesişen bu iki karakter, on yedinci yüzyılda yaşayan Jordan ve Köpek-Kadın'ın yeni bir zaman dilimindeki tekrarı olarak görülebilir. Farklılıklarla kendini gösteren bu tekrar, romanın biçimsel özelliklerine katkıda bulunur ve Winterson'ın, anlatının zamansal akışlarını karmaşıktırarak hayatın kaçık zamanını tasvir etme gayesini vurgular. Sonunda, Nicolas Jordan ve kimyager kadın, Londra yakınlarındaki Thames Nehri'ni kirleten fabrikayı yakmayı düşünürler. Jordan ve Köpek-Kadın ise şehirlerindeki bir yangından kaçmak için Thames Nehri'nin aşağısına yol alırlar. Roman sona ererken, Jordan'ın alışılmış hayatını geride bıraktığı ve geleceğin ebedi dönüşüne doğru ucu açık bir yolculuğa çıktığı görülür. Jordan'ın hiç bitmeyecek yolculukları sayesinde, kronolojik zamanın

ve nesnel tarihin keskin kenarları, geçmişin, şimdinin ve geleceğin aynı anda var olduğu bir karışıma dönüşür. Başlangıçta alışkanlıksal zaman için özlem duyan alışkanlıklar ve beklentiler, dönüşüm ve farklılık peşinde koşan kaçık bir zaman halini alır.

Winterson'ın incelenen iki romanında gerek biçim gerek içerik, yazarın zaman ve tarih konusundaki değişen görüşlerini sergilemesine olanak tanımaktadır. Jeanette Winterson, romanlarında tekrar eden temalar kullanma eğilimdedir. Her iki romanda da karakter-anlatıcıların iç ve dış dünyalarında alışkanlıksal yaşam, kaçış ve dönüş temalarına rastlamak mümkündür. Bununla birlikte, Winterson'da tekrar farklılığı getirir. Her ne kadar karakterler benzer süreçlerden geçse de zaman ve tarihle etkileşimleri ve bunlar üzerine düşünceleri farklılık gösterir. *Tek Meyve Portakal Değildir* isimli romanda zamanın, birinci senteze yakın fikirler üzerinden tartışıldığı ve anlatıda vücut bulduğu görülür. Jeanette anlatısını kurarken zamansal akışları sık sık metinlerarası anlatılar böler. Bu ara anlatılar sayesinde, Jeanette bahsi geçen üç tema arasında kendi yolunu bulmayan çalışan ikilemli karar verme sürecini sanki bir aynaya yansıtmaya çalışmaktadır. Fakat, romanın sonunda bu metinlerarası anlatılar Jeanette'in anlatısına ayna olmaktan uzak kalır. Özellikle Winnet Stonejar ve Sir Perceval'ın hikayeleri zaman anlayışı olarak üçüncü sentezin izlerini taşır. Bu yönleriyle, Jeanette'in hikayesinde iç ve dış dünyada geçen yolculuklarının zaman ve tarihle olan ilişkisinde nasıl zamanın birinci sentezine meylettiğini ortaya koyarlar. Denilebilir ki romanların zaman ve tarihle çok yönlü ilişkisi, Deleuze'ün birinci ve üçüncü sentezinin çatışan yönlerini bir arada sunar. *Vişnenin Cinsiyeti* isimli roman anlatıcı-karakter sayısını artırır. Böylece, *Tek Meyve Portakal Değildir*'den farklı olarak, değişik karakterlerin gözünden birinci ve üçüncü sentezin ayrışan yönlerine işaret eder. Bu durumu, tekrar eden alışkanlıksal yaşam, kaçış ve dönüş temalarına ek olarak romanın başında sunulan kaçık zamanın önceden belirtilmesi temasından da anlamak mümkündür. Karakter-anlatıcıların sayısının artması, Deleuze'ün farklı sentezleriyle etkileşimin nasıl sonuçlanacağını daha belirgin bir şekilde gösterir. Özellikle Jordan ve annesi Köpek-Kadın'ın alışkanlıksal yaşam teması sırasında sergiledikleri ikilemli karar verme süreçleri farklı tercihlere evrilerek Deleuze'ün ayrı sentezlerine yönelmelerine sebep olur. Köpek-Kadın evinden ve bildiği hayattan ayrılmamak için birinci senteze eğilim gösterirken, Jordan hayattaki asıl hedefinin

sürekli yolda olmak olduğunu anlar. Bilinen ve bilinmeyenin zihinlerinde yarattığı çatışmada, Köpek-Kadın yaşayan şimdisinde bilineni tercih ederken, Jordan geleceğin bilinmeyenine doğru yolculuğa hazırdır. Bu romanda, zamansal akışlar yalnızca kronolojik olarak karmaşıklaşmaz. Aynı zamanda, karakterlerin iç ve dış dünyaları arasındaki çizgiler önemsizleşir. Hatta Jordan kaçık zamanın izinde iç dünyasına doğru yolculuk yapmayı seçer. Böylece, romanın sonunda dış dünyadaki zamanlar ve anlatıcılar çoğalsa da, tüm bu çokluk Jordan'ın belirsiz geleceğin bengi dönüşüne doğru içsel yolculuğunda bir araya gelir. Böylece Jordan zaman ve tarihe ilişkin çokluğun bir simülakrumuna dönüşür. Özetle, *Tek Meyve Portakal Değildir* zamanın ve tarihin çizgiselliğine ve geri alınamazlığına vurgu yaparken; *Vişnenin Cinsiyeti*, zamanın dönüşüm ve değişim fikirleri doğrultusunda tarihle ilişkisini gösterir. Bütün bunlar dikkate alındığında tez, birbirinden farklı ancak birbirini tamamlayan iki örnek ortaya koymaktadır. Bu yönüyle, söz konusu iki roman aracılığıyla Jeanette Winterson'ın zamana ve zamanın tarihle ilişkisine dair görüşlerinde nasıl bir dönüşüm yaşandığını Deleuzecü bir okumayla ortaya koyar.

Romanlar karşılaştırıldığında, zaman nosyonunun yalnızca biçimsel değil içerik özelliklerinde de baskın bir etken olduğu görülmektedir. Bu durum, Jeanette Winterson'ın edebiyatında zamanın ve onun tarihle olan ilişkisinin hem tekrar eden hem de tekrarın sonunda farklılıklar getiren konular olduğunu gösterir. Winterson'da zaman, tek bir doğruya işaret etmez. Zamanın ontolojisine ve epistemolojisine dair mitolojiden modern zamanlara öne sürülmüş pek çok düşünce Winterson'ın zaman nosyonunu romanlarında işleyişine yansır. Bu yönüyle Winterson'ın edebiyatında zaman tekliğe değil, çokluğa işaret eder. Çokluk fikri içerisinde, zamanın diğer fikirlerle etkileşimini de barındırır. Böylece, zamanın biçimsel gösterimi ve içeriğe yansımaları yoluyla Winterson gerçeklik, doğruluk, temsil, bağlanma gibi farklı tartışmaları beraberinde getirecek fikirleri de ele alır.

Deleuzecü bir okuma, Wintersonun çokluğa ve farklılığa vurgu yapan tartışmalarına ışık tutma konusunda benzer özellikleriyle öne çıkar. Bir fark filozofu olarak anılan Deleuze, tıpkı Winterson gibi, *Fark ve Tekrar* adlı eserinde zaman nosyonunu ve onun tarihle ilişkisini birçok farklı düşünürün görüşleri ve tanımları çerçevesinde ele alır. Winterson'ın tekrar eden temalarını andıran bu yöntemiyle Deleuze, tekrarın sonunda oldukça farklı ve kendine özgü çıkarımlarla zaman

nosyonu tartıřır. Önceki fikirlerle kendi fikirlerini sentezleyerek zaman nosyonunun çok yönlülüğüne dikkat çeker. Denilebilir ki hem Fransız filozof Gilles Deleuze hem de İngiliz yazar Jeanette Winterson, zamanın doğasına ilişkin anlayıřlarında ortak noktaları paylaşırlar. Deleuze, Winterson'a benzer şekilde, bilinirlik, sabitlik, benzerlik ve analojinin yanı sıra bilinmezlik, hareket, deęiřim ve çokluk fikirleri aracılıęıyla zamanı ele alır. Böylece, Gilles Deleuze Jeanette Winterson'ın eserlerinin zaman tartıřmaları yönünden okunmasında uyumlu ve açıklayıcı bir kuramsal zemin sunar.

Tezin sonuç bölümünde, Deleuze'ün üç zaman sentezi çerçevesinde, Jeanette Winterson'ın eserlerindeki çok yönlü zaman tartıřmasının karşılařtırmalı bir özeti yer alır. Winterson'ın iki romanının Deleuzecü bir okuması, yazarın zamanın ve tarihin doğasına dair deęiřen bakıř açısını görmemizi saęlar. Winterson'ın çalıřmalarında zamanın giderek daha kaçık hale geldiğini ve onu yıkıcı fikirlere açtığını gösterir. Winterson zamana ve tarihe yaklařımını, romanlarının içerięi ve biçimi aracılıęıyla, zamanın doğası üzerine karmařık zamansal anlatı akıřlar ve yoğun tartıřmalar üreterek yansıtmıřtır. Sonuç bölümündeki özet ile çalıřma, karakter-anlatıcıların zaman ve tarihle etkileřimleri üzerinden tekrarın ve farklılıęın çok yönlü içerimlerinin nihai bir analizini sunmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu amaçla, her iki romandaki alıřılmıř yařam, kaçıř ve dönüř temalarının ve bunların Winterson'ın zamana ve onun tarihle olan iliřkisine yönelik çok boyutlu bakıř açısını nasıl sergiledięinin karşılařtırmalı bir çözümlemesini sunmaktadır. Aynı zamanda çalıřma, *Tek Meyve Portakal Deęildir* ve *Viřnenin Cinsiyeti* adlı romanların Winterson'ın edebiyatında tekrar eden zaman nosyonuna geniř bir bakıř açısı saęladığını ve yazarın deęiřim gösteren fikirlerinin bu romanlarla önceden bildirildiğini öne sürer. Bu doęrultuda tezin sonuç bölümü, Winterson'ın edebiyatının Deleuzecü bir bakıř açısıyla gelecekte nasıl incelenebileceğine dair fikirler sunmakta ve ilhamını bu çalıřmadan alabilecek farklı çalıřmalar önermektedir.

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A DELEUZIAN READING OF TIME IN JEANETTE WINTERSON'S ORANGES ARE NOT THE ONLY FRUIT AND SEXING THE CHERRY

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