

**ATILIM UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL AND RELATIONS
INTERNATIONAL AND RELATIONS MASTER'S PROGRAMME**

**TURCO-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS DURING THE PRESIDENCY OF
MOHAMMED MORSI: 2012-2013**

Master Thesis

Melek akırcalı

Ankara, 2017

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Supervisor
Prof. Dr. Hasan Ali Karasar

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ACCEPTION AND APPROVAL


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ÖZ

ÇAKIRCALI, Melek. 2012-2013 Muhammed Morsi başkanlığı dönemi Türkiye-Mısır İlişkileri, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ankara, 2017

Bu çalışmada, Mısır'ın Muhammed Mursi dönemi ve bu dönemin Mısır'ın Türkiye ile ilişkisindeki ticari, ekonomik ve özellikle siyasal etkilerinin hangi yönde değiştiği incelenecektir. Buna ek olarak, Türk hükümetinin 2012-2013 dönemindeki dış politikası ve Arap Baharı ve Türkiye'nin Arap Baharı'na bakış açısı ve Mısır'da Arap Baharı sonrasında ki siyasal olaylar ve ülkedeki etkileri ve Mısır'da siyasal bakımdan hangi değişiklikler olduğuna ve değişen Türkiye-Mısır ilişkisinin Ortadoğu'daki etkisine değinilecektir. Bu çalışmanın asıl amacı, iki Orta Doğu müslüman toplumunun Muhammed Morsi başkanlığında değişen ilişkilerinin incelenmesi yönünde olacaktır. Bu doğrultuda, Türkiye'nin Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi'nin ideolojilerinin Müslüman Kardeşler'in ideolojileriyle hangi açıdan benzer olduğu ve Mursi'nin yeni hükümetinin dinamikleri ve Mısır hükümetinin iç ve dış politika dinamikleri de incelenecektir. Ayrıca Mursi dönemdeki Mısır hükümetinin Türkiye ile olan ilişkisine geniş ölçüde yer verilecektir. Çalışmada, Mısır devletinin Türkiye hükümetine bakış açısı ve bu ilişkide Türk ve Mısır hükümetinin iç ve dış politikalarının göz önüne alınarak değişen ilişkilerinin ardında yatan sebeplerde araştırılacaktır. Bunun yanı sıra, Türkiye'nin Morsi'nin başkanlığındaki Mısır hükümeti üzerinde nasıl bir etkisi olduğu ve Türkiye ile Mısır arasındaki ilişkinin nasıl ilerlediği 2012-2013 yılları arasında iki ülkedeki ekonomik ve siyasi ilişkiler incelenerek çalışılacaktır.

Anahtar Sözcükler

Arap Baharı, 2012 Başkanlık Seçimi, Muhammed Mursi, Mursi ve Türkiye, 2013'te Mısır

ABSTRACT

ÇAKIRCALI, Melek. Turco-Egyptian Relations During The Presidency of Mohammed Morsi: 2012-2013, Master Thesis, Ankara, 2017

This study aims at the analysis of Mohammad Morsi period in Egypt and how this period affected the commercial, economic and especially political relations of Egypt with Turkey and in what aspects changed two states' bilateral relations during this period. In addition, the Turkish government's 2012-2013 foreign policy and the Arab Spring and Turkey's view of the Arab Spring and political events after the Arab Spring in Egypt and the effects on the country, and what changes took place in Egypt in political terms and the effect of the changing Turkey-Egypt relationship in the Middle East region will be tried to be examined in this study. The main purpose of this study is to examine the changing relations of two Middle Eastern Muslim communities during the presidency of Mohammad Morsi between 2012-2013. In this respect, in what directions the ideologies of the Justice and Development Party of Turkey are similar to those of the Muslim Brotherhood and the dynamics of Morsi's new government and the domestic and foreign policy dynamics of the Egyptian government will be sorted out through this study. In addition, the relations of the Egyptian government with Turkey in the Morsi's period will be studied in a detailed way. The Egyptian government's view of the Turkish government and the reasons laid behind the changing relations of two states when the internal and external policies of both the Turkish and the Egyptian governments were taken into will be aimed to be examined in the study. Besides, what kind of effects of Turkey over the Egyptian government throughout Morsi's presidency and how the relationship between Turkey and Egypt progressed between 2012 and 2013 based on the political and economical relations will be tried to be analyzed in this study.

Keywords

The Arab Spring, Mohammed Morsi, 2012 presidency election in Egypt, Morsi and Turkey, Egypt in 2013

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INTRODUCTION

Over the centuries, Egypt became one of the most prominent societies taken place in the North Africa region. On the basis of its geostrategic situation, Egypt was attracted the interests of other nations such as the Ottoman Empire. The relations of Egypt and Turkey dated back to the invasion of the Ottoman Empire to Egypt in 1517. Until the British occupation, Egypt survived as the biggest and the most powerful province in the territory of the Ottoman Empire. Aftermath of Egypt's declaration of its independence in the 20th century, Turkey and Egypt's relations were transformed into bilateral ones. In 1925, Turkey and Egypt started to establish the diplomatic relations, which have been continued until today.

Although two Middle Eastern muslim states confronted with each other during the Cold War period due to some political problems, their relations were reformed again after a while. In terms of economy and policy, two countries have made a number of agreements throughout the years. Before the outbreak of the Arab-Spring, it can be easily said that Turkey and Egypt were not on a familiar terms compared to the past. However, the post-revolution period aftermath of the Arab-Spring, it can be definitely pointed out that everything completely changed in terms of the bilateral relations between Egypt and Turkey.

The main objective of the thesis is about the changing affairs of two Middle Eastern muslim societies during the presidency of Mohammad Morsi. The thesis provides information about the dynamics of Morsi's new government, and the establishment of his domestic and foreign policy under the influence of Turkey's ruling party since the ideologies of Turkey's Justice and Development Party are the same as the Muslim Brotherhood's ideals, which were tried to be adopted by Morsi. Therefore, Turkey and Egypt was seen to get closer at Morsi's period.

The thesis stands on the causes lies behind the rapprochement of Turkey and Egypt and Egypt's point of view about Turkey and its consideration about the domestic and foreign policies of the Turkish government. Besides, what extend

Turkey affects Egypt at Morsi's presidency and how the relationship between Turkey and Egypt was advancing is analyzed in terms of the economical and political sphere from 2012 to 2013 in the thesis.



FIRST CHAPTER

RESEARCH QUESTION

The thesis specifically tries to answer the following questions:

- a) What are the reasons lying behind the rapprochement between Egypt and Turkey from 2012 until 2013?
- b) What aspects did Egypt change its point of view towards Turkey during Mohammed Morsi's presidency aftermath of the Arab Spring?
- c) What extend was their past relations effect on the rapprochement of two Middle Eastern states?
- d) How did Turkey and Egypt find a common ground to establish collaboration with each other during the presidency of Morsi?
- e) What can the possible effects of their rapprochement over the other Middle Eastern muslim states be?
- f) What can the advantages of the newly established rapprochement of Turkey and Egypt between 2012 and 2013?
- f) How was their changing relation regarded by other muslim states in the Middle Eastern region from 2012 to 2013 as well as the US and Israel?

1. Methodology

The thesis was written on the basis of Egypt and Turkey's relationship during Morsi's presidency. The origin of the subject of the thesis actually was derived from Nael Shama's book named as "Egyptian Foreign Policy from Mubarak to Morsi". The last chapter of his book contents the information about the post-revolution period of Egypt and Mohammed Morsi's presidency, from which the topic subject of the thesis was emerged. The information that gave a way to the emergence of the subject of the thesis can be seen below:

“In the new regional order, Egypt will certainly not adopt an outright, anti-US stance and will keep its cordial relations with the Gulf states, but Mubarak’s sheer antagonism to Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah will fade away. Under Morsi, Egypt’s Muslim Brothers- who view Turkey’s Justice and Development Party with a great deal of admiration-sought to strengthen Egypt’s political and economic ties with Turkey. The Turks, for their part, reciprocated, providing much-needed financial assistance to increase Egypt’s dwindling foreign exchange reserves.”¹

This quotation, which was taken by N. Shama’s book about Egypt’s domestic and foreign policies from Hosni Mubarak to Mohammed Morsi in the Middle East in terms of the Egypt’s presidents’ regime securities and their national interests behind their authorities and policies, is sorted out the original idea of the thesis. When the quotation was examined in a detailed way, it can be clearly understood that Egypt leaned to Turkey in a positive way, which was also caused by an unprecedented approach by the Turkish government. As it was seen in the quotation that was given above, the proximity of Egypt and Turkey was seen as an unlogical act of Morsi by other Arab states but there were actually different reasons under his attitude towards Turkey during his presidency covering the period 2012-2013.

In order to examine Turkey and Egypt relation in this sense, it can be absolutely mentioned that the analysis of Turkey’s foreign policy also plays an important role in the thesis. At that point, Egypt and Turkey’s foreign policy theories from 2012 to 2013 were studied to be analyzed for the description of the explanation of the relationship between Turkey and Egypt at Mohammed Morsi’s presidency. These foreign policy theories are stated as follows:

- a) The analysis of Egypt’s “reformfromwithin” policy in the domestic sphere during Mubarak’s presidency and the reflection of this policy to Morsi’s “rejuvenated backing foreign patrons” policy in the foreign sphere and the effects of Morsi’s narrow, partisan interest policy in its relation with Turkey
- b) Turkey’s “Strategic Depth” foreign policy towards the Middle Eastern muslim states aftermath of the Arab-Spring

¹ Shama, Nael Mohammed. *Egyptian Foreign Policy from Mubarak to Morsi* “Against the National Interest”. Routledge Press: London and New York, 2014, p. 236.

- c) Turkey's "Neo-Ottomanism" foreign policy derived from "Strategic Depth" policy over the Middle Eastern states and Egypt aftermath of the post-revolution period of the Arab-Spring
- d) Egypt's forming internal alliances with the domestic security apparatus and its effect to its relations with other states especially with Turkey
- e) Turkey's ruling party's "modern Islam democratization" ideologies and its influence to the newly established government of Morsi
- f) Egypt's admiration to Turkey's "modern. Islam democratization" domestic policy and their proximity on this basis and after the collapse of Egypt's "barriers of fear" policy such as the the other Arab states.

2. Literature Review

The thesis was emerged as a result of the analysis of varied books and articles related to Egypt's history, its domestic and foreign policies as well as its regimes and its relations with other states throughout the centuries. After conducting the analysis from the books and articles, it can be easily said that Egypt has always been a favourite country that attracted other countries' attention in terms of its geostrategic position, its culture and its socio-dynamic situation.

With the invasion of the Ottoman Empire, Egypt became a crucial point for the European societies such as the British and the French. Initially, the French appeared at the stage of history. At those times, Napoleon Bonaparte was the emperor of the French and he was famous for his ambition and success. Being aware of Egypt's significance for the French's development, it can be implicitly said that Bonaparte dreamed of the occupation of Egypt, which is stated in his speech:

"Peoples of Egypt, you will be told that I have come to destroy your religion... Do not believe it! ... I worship God more than the Mamluks do, and... I respect His prophet Mohammed and the admirable Koran... Tell the people that the French also are true Muslims. All Egyptians shall render thanks to God for the destruction of the Mamluks, saying in a loud voice, 'May God preserve the glory of the Ottoman

Sultan! May God preserve the glory of the French army! May God curse the Mamluks and bestow happiness on the Egyptian nation!’ ”²

As it was mentioned above, it can be easily said that Egypt has never lost its popularity as one of the most powerful states in the Middle East region as well as its important geostrategic situation. In 1801, the French occupation of Egypt ended. Then, Egypt was occupied by the British after much efforts in 1882. As for the French, Egypt also played an important role for the British throughout the years. Until 1946, Egypt was under the British rule. Afterwards, Egypt became an independent state and everything changed. However, it can be definitely said that Egypt came to a head during Nasser’s presidency, which is also implied in a speech of Leonard Binder, who was one of the historians:

“Egypt is one of a restricted group of developing countries whose politics have assumed a special significance as test cases of opposing models of development. Egypt shares with India, China, Algeria, Yugoslavia and Cuba the analytical interest of partisan and academic observers for the light its experience may shed upon the competing theories of development and for the possibility that its history may reveal a unique and unanticipated model.”³

As it is understood from the quotation above, Egypt developed itself much more in Nasser’s presidency in contrast to other periods. For the Egyptian society, Nasser is the most powerful, revisionist and admirable president in the history, who created the “Egypt for Egyptians” or “Nasserist ideology” as well as many logical restorations in the purpose of the growth of Egypt and restored its domestic affairs and foreign relations with other states on the basis of the national interest of Egypt, which is pointed out in Malcom Kerr’s speech:

“It was a remarkable display of the impact a powerful personality can have on negotiations: Nasir always supremely confident, always steering the discussion in the direction of his choice, always conscious of the substantive or psychological point at issue, blunt, forceful, clear and often witty in his expression, alternatively charming or bullying according to his purpose, not hesitating at times to harass, interrupt or

² Herold, J. Christopher. *Bonaparte in Egypt*. Hamish Hamilton, London, 1962, p.95-96.

³ McDermott, Anthony. *Egypt From Nasser to Mubarak: A Flawed Revolution*. Croom Helm Publication, 1988, p. 27.

embrace his visitors and decisively rejecting his opposing claims or criticisms whenever he did not fancy their implication.”⁴

Although Nasser was seemed to followed. “Egyptinization” policy as well as Pan-Arab.policy in the foreign policy of the country, it can be stated that he was not able to fulfill his ideologies at all due to the other problem occurred unprecedented such as the Arab-Israeli War and its disadvantageous outcomes for Egypt.

Aftermath of the end of the presidency of Nasser, Anwar Sadat became the new ruler of Egypt. In contrast to Nasser, Sadat was actually not a revisionist leader of Egypt as much as Nasser but Sadat became a more popular figure than Nasser in a short span of time, which is clearly mentioned by David Hirst in *The Guardian*:

“Most Egyptians seem to like what they seem emerging. Contrasts, strictly private ones of course, are being drawn with his predecessor and they are not unfavourable. There are even those who maintain that in his own way Sadat is more popular than Nasser was. Nasser was the great charismatic father figure, but he was also greatly feared. He was moved by high for Egyptians, exhausting ambitions. By contrast, Sadat seems natural, approachable, human. He is also revealing an intelligence which few people credited with him. There are still plenty of jokes, usually in a different vein from those which used to portray him as a mental defective. His well-ordered, eloquent speeches, very different from Nasser’s ramblings, are much appreciated here now.”⁵

From the quotation, it can be implicitly figured out that Sadat was one of the prominent leaders of the Egyptian society who played the key role on the behalf of Egypt’s future during the important events occurred at his presidency such as the 1973 Arab-Israel War. However, Sadat’s presidency ended with his assassination in a tragic way. As a result, Hosni Mubarak became the new president of Egypt.

Mubarak’s presidency began in 1981. Although Mubarak was initially met with the enthusiasm, he was not a popular figure compared to Nasser and Sadat due to his unrevisionist and traditional policy not only in the domestic sphere but also in

⁴ Kerr, Malcolm. *The Arab Cold War. Gamal Abd Al-Nasir and his rivals, 1958-1970*. Oxford University Press, 1971, p.34-35.

⁵ Hirst David and Irene Beeson. *Sadat*. Faber and Faber Press, London, 1981, p. 13-14.

the foreign area, which is also seen in one of the Egyptian scholars; in other words, Cantori's speech:

"Mubarak initially had benefited from the contrast with Sadat. He was calm, quiet, administratively and technically competent and free from an aura of corruption. With time, however, Mubarak welcomed personal qualities have become less attractive."⁶

Rather than Nasser and Sadat, Mubarak's restoration attempts were limited because of his security concern, which was also stated by Amer, who was one of the Egyptian scholar as it is seen below:

"Egypt continues to maintain a special relationship with one superpower and normalized relations with the other, calling balanced relations."⁷

Throughout his presidency, Mubarak tried to protect his authority and did everything for the survival of his regime based on his security concern, which was also seen in his foreign policy. What Mubarak aimed is to provide the status-qou.of the country by following a foreign policy in this sense, which is inferred from his argument about the post- war period between Israel and Egypt:

"What is the meaning of the annulment of the Camp David Agreement? ... Shall I return Sinai to Israel? ... It means the declaration of a state of a war with Israel. If I want to declare a state of war, it is imperative form e to be militarily prepared. In other words, I should halt development and focus on the evolution of military services. I should concentrarte al my efforts on war. Who will foot the bill for war? The Arabs? I do not know. Suppose that we obtained the necessary funding from them-no less than 50-60 billion forarmaments to enable the army to stand its ground. Who will give me arms to fight Israel? The US will not give me arms to

⁶ L. Cantori, "Egypt Reenters the Arab State System,"in *The Middle East From the Iran-Contra Affair to the Intifada*. Robert O. Freedman (ed), Syracuse: Syracuse UP, 1990, 344-45, cited in Shama, Nael Mohammed. *Egyptian Foreign Policy from Mubarak to Morsi* "Against the National Interest". Routledge Press: London and New York, 2014, p. 41.

⁷ M.Y. Amer, *Egypt between the Superpowers: Continuity and Change in Egyptian foreign policy under Mubarak*, California: Naval Postgraduate School, 1984, 118, cited in Shama, Nael Mohammed. *Egyptian Foreign Policy from Mubarak to Morsi* "Against the National Interest". Routledge Press: London and New York, 2014, p. 41.

fight Israel. Furthermore, Europe also will not give me arms. (As for the Soviets, they)... will impose terms on us.”⁸

Mubarak’s narrow perspective on how to run the political policies and how to control political forces in the domestic sphere and how to enhance legitimacy in the society and how to arrange the social and economic issues of the country in a better way were caused by his uncontrollable security concern and made the society’s lose their faith to the existing law and order and the Egyptian people revolted against his authority as in the other states like Tunisia, Libya, which was called the Arab-Spring.

After the chaotic interim period following the Arab-Spring, Morsi was elected as the new president of Egypt in 2012. At the beginning, Morsi was seemed to follow Mubarak’s domestic and foreign policies but then his arbitrary attempt between Israel and Hamas presented that Morsi would be better situated to establish a bridge between Israel and the Arab world compared to the previous presidents, which is also mentioned in *The New York Times* columnist Thomas Friedman article:

“If Morsi threw his weight behind an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal, it would be so much more valuable to Israel than the cold peace that Sadat delivered and Hosni Mubarak maintained. Sadat offered Israelis peace with the Egyptian state. Morsi could offer Israel peace with the Egyptian people and through them with the Muslim world beyond.”⁹

Besides, it can be definitely said that Egypt’s perspective towards Turkey also changed with the new president after the post-revolution period in Egypt. Since the ideologies of the Turkish ruling party were the same as the Muslim Brotherhood’s, Morsi started to get close to Turkey by removing all obstacles between two countries depended on Turkey’s support for stepping down of the Mubarak’s authority. In addition, Turkey’s recognition of Morsi’s newly established government as a first country in the Middle East region also contributed to improve their relations. For Morsi, both the domestic and foreign policies of the Justice and Development Party

⁸ Quoted in Kenneth W. Stein, “Continuity and Change in Egyptian-Israeli Relations”, 307, cited in Shama, Nael Mohammed. *Egyptian Foreign Policy from Mubarak to Morsi* “Against the National Interest”. Routledge Press: London and New York, 2014, p. 173.

⁹ Friedman, T. “Morsi’s Moment”, *New York Times*, 24 November 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/25/opinion/sunday/friedman-morsis-moment.html?_r=0,

could be the best governmental model for the future of Egypt. As a result, Turkey and Egypt began to advance their relations between the years 2012-2013, which is studied in the thesis in a detailed way.



CHAPTER TWO

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

2.1. EGYPT: Geography, Demography and Its History Under The Ottoman Rule (1517-1882)

2.1.1. Early Ottoman Period

In 1517, the Ottoman Sultan Selim I (1512-20), who is known as Selim the Grim, defeated the Mamluks and conquered Egypt. Indeed, the origin of the Turkish dates back to the Turkish-speaking tribes who came to Baghdad in the 10th century. However, they were defeated by the Mongols in the thirteenth century and they were assimilated.¹⁰

In the thirteenth century, Osman Bey (1280-1324), who is the founder of the Ottoman Empire, sent an expedition to Egypt. His expedition became an amirate in Egypt; in other words, his expedition turned into one of the largest and longest amirates in history when the Ottomans conquered almost the whole Arab provinces, including Egypt during the reign of Selim I. After Selim I invaded Egypt, he put Khair Bey as the ruler of Egypt because Egypt became a province of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, he ruled Egypt in terms of the Sultan's orders.¹¹

In the first century of Ottoman rule, the governors of Egypt, sent by the Ottoman Sultans, tried to prevent the intervention of Mamluks to the internal affairs of Egypt. Thanks to their attitudes towards the Mamluks, the governors acted their duties in accordance with the Sultans' politics about Egypt. However, between the late sixteenth century and the early seventeenth century, a great deal of revolts occurred due to various events brought about different reasons. Also, there was an awakening about the military structure of the Mamluks, which had a destructing

¹⁰ Stanford J. Shaw, *The Budget of Ottoman Egypt, 1596-1597*. The Hague and Paris Publishing, 1968, p 35-36.

¹¹ Winter, Michael. *Society and Religion in Early Ottoman Egypt: Studies in the Writings of 'Abd Al-Wahhab Al-Sha'rani*. Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 2009, p 34-35-36.

impact on the authorities of Egyptians' vassals sent by the Ottoman Empire. In fact, it can be definitely understood that the military awakening of the Mamluks was an expected situation since their survival is inexplicable throughout the Egyptian history and the Ottoman period, which is emphasized by one of the historians:

One obstacle to tracing their history is the scarcity of source material dating to the first decades of Ottoman rule. Another lies in the fact that after conquest Mamluks were no longer called by the Turkish names that had distinguished them from their Arabic-speaking subjects. Now, they were a part of a larger military ruling elite that was Turcophone. It was impossible, then, for the Mamluks to be given Turkish names.¹²

It can be easily said that Egypt was the widest province conquered by the Ottoman Empire. As well as being the largest, Egypt is also important in terms of its strategic and economic position for the Ottoman Empire. Besides, it was seen as a crucial point in the Red Sea region since it covered the area from Yemen to Hijaz. As a result, the area of Suez port was enlarged, which caused the Ottoman Empire to undertake the building of a canal in Suez port. Although the revival of the Mamluk's military was clearly seen in Egypt, the Mamluks did not give any importance to the construction of the Suez Canal unlike the Ottoman Empire. However, the Portuguese discovered an easy sea route, which prevented the Indian space trade via the route of the Middle East to India. As Egypt was a province of the Ottoman Empire, it was protected by the Ottoman navy. No matter how the Ottoman navy made a stand against the Portuguese, they became unsuccessful. In other words, the Ottomans were whipped out by the Portuguese.¹³

¹² David Ayalon, "Studies in Al-Jabarti," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, London 1967, p. 152, cited in: Michael Winter, "Ottoman Egypt, 1525-1609" *Egyptian Society under Ottoman Rule 1517-1798*, chap. 8, in M.W.Daly (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Egypt: Modern Egypt from 1517 to the end of Twentieth Century*, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p 12-13-14.

¹³ David Ayalon, "Studies in Al-Jabarti," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, London 1967, p. 155, cited in: Michael Winter, "Ottoman Egypt, 1525-1609" in M.W.Daly (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Egypt: Modern Egypt from 1517 to the end of Twentieth Century*, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p 18-19-20-21-22.

As it is emphasized above, the annexation of Egypt to the Ottoman Empire can be seen as the annexation of the province having the most economic, strategic and financial advantages among other ones. Apart from its territory including the significant areas in the Arab island and the construction of the Suez Canal providing an easier sea route for Indian space trade, Egypt was also a prominent source of income for the Ottoman Empire in terms of the taxation. There were a number of taxes such as land tax, urban taxes, and custom taxes, which were important financial sources obtained from Egypt.¹⁴

For Egypt, it can be easily stated that the seventeenth century was a milestone because a great deal of regulations occurred in social, political and cultural structures of Egypt. Actually, in terms of the provinces of the Ottoman Empire, the seventeenth century was an important period as there were many important changes caused from the discontinuation of the Ottoman Empire's enlargement policies. In other words, this was accepted as the initial point of the Ottoman Empire's deterioration. When the Ottoman Empire in the seventeenth century was studied, it can be understood that the Ottoman Empire concentrated on its military power instead of its political position to restore its power. Through this policy, the Ottoman Empire was able to conquer the holy cities such as Mecca and Medina, apart from Egypt and Hijaz, which gave significant responsibilities to the Ottoman Sultans. Nevertheless, Egypt remained the most precious province among the other provinces existing in the Ottoman Empire based on its strategic and economic situation. Egypt's military condition was also crucial since there were many Mamluk officers in the army. Although the Ottoman Empire defeated the Mamluks, they promised to be loyal to the administrations of the Ottoman Empire in Egypt. However, it can be easily that the Mamluks were not a minor group, which brought about a threat to the Ottomans. Therefore, the Ottoman Empire attempted to make them *Ottomanize*; in other words, they tried to make them *sanjaq beyi* so as to restrict their influence on political and military structure of Egypt.¹⁵

¹⁴ Winter, Michael. *Society and Religion in Early Ottoman Egypt: Studies in the Writings of 'Abd Al Wahhab Al-Sha'rani*. Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 2009, p 38-39.

¹⁵ Winter, Michael. *Society and Religion in Early Ottoman Egypt: Studies in the Writings of 'Abd Al Wahhab Al-Sha'rani*. Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 2009, p 38-39-40.

Besides, it can be inferred that some demographic changes including land taxation and financial resources emerged in Egypt during the early of the seventeenth century. When tax-farming was introduced within the territories of the Ottoman Empire in the beginning of the century, it also caused changes in Egypt. After tax farming, the separation between the soldiers and sanjaq beys disappeared and the conflicts between them –both groups were actually based on the Mamluk origin– finished. However, the new regulations on tax-farming put a differentiation between the governor of the Egypt, who was appointed by the Ottoman Sultan, and the *sanjaq beys* since the tax-farming was a changed form of *iltizam*, which was a taxation taken by an authorized person on the behalf of the Ottoman Sultan.¹⁶

In the eighteenth century, the impact of the Mamluks over the political affairs of Egypt proceeded due to the passive attitude of the governors or the *pashas* appointed by the Ottoman Empire. Also, it can be clearly emphasized that there was an unignorable impact of European powers on Egypt economy, which increased with the markets of coffee and rice grown in Yemen and Egypt while the Ottoman Empire began to lose its voice on Egypt's administration and its economic affairs. In the administration of Egypt, Shaykhal-Balad, who was the representative of the city and also Amiral-Hajj, which was the title given to the commander of annual Hajj pilgrim, came from the Mamluk beys. They attempted to undermine the authority of the vassal of the Ottoman Empire and they declared themselves as the headship of the community. Indeed, the Mamluk beys not only rejected the governors of Egypt but they also refused to join their *Divans* or *councils*. Instead, they organized their own councils by claiming that the governor had an executive power on Egypt.¹⁷

¹⁶ Halil Inalcik (ed) with Donald Quartet, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914* (Cambridge and New York Publishing, 1994, p.11-13, <http://www.academia.edu/5720965/AnEconomicandSocialHistoryoftheOttomanEmpire13001914>. Ed.byHalilInalcikwithDonaldQuataert.

¹⁷ David Ayalon, "Studies in al-Jabarti I: Notes on the Transformations of Mamluk Society in Egypt under the Ottomans", *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, p.32-33, 1960, cited in: Jane Hathaway, "Egypt in the seventeenth century" in M.W.Daly (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Egypt: Modern Egypt from 1517 to the end of Twentieth Century*, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p 36.

Since Egypt was the largest province of the Ottoman Empire, its economic condition had a crucial effect. Throughout the 18th century, Egypt was not only the most convenient trade route for the European merchants but it also manufactured a number of goods, which were sold in the Ottoman markets and were transferred to the Ottoman markets to export with Europe. Indeed, Egypt did not have a wide range of industries when it was compared to Europe because of its small production area. However, the economy of Egypt began to decline as some products such as sugar, coffee and rice could be grown cheaper. Also, these products caused a noticeable decline since they were preferred instead of other ones in Egypt. Meanwhile, the European powers attempted to persuade the Ottomans about the concessions over the Suez Canal as the circumstances were not in favour of the European powers. Especially, the French merchants, who were a big flourishing community in Egypt, insisted on privileges about the Suez Canal.¹⁸

In 1724, Ismail became the ruler of Egypt but he was killed by Shirkas Bey, who was a pasha from a faction in Egypt. Shirkas Bey was supported to replace the position of Shaykh al-Balad. However, he was killed in 1730 and Othman, who was one of the founders of his faction, was elected after his death. In 1743, Othman Bey was attacked by Ibrahim and Ridwan Bey but they were killed after a short time. Then, Ali Bey al-Kabir, who was one of the important figures in the history of Egypt, became the head of Mamluk beys and devoted himself to avenge the death of Ibrahim Bey.¹⁹

Ali Bey al-Kabir took support of Mamluks and other adherents, which made him Shaykhal-Balad in 1760 but after a while, he was compelled to leave his position. In 1769, Ali Bey was demanded to employ 12,000 men by the Porte during the Russo-Turkish War in 1768–1774 but he refused this order sent by the Ottoman Empire by taking supports of Mamluks, who were also opposed to this demand. Afterwards, Egypt declared its independence. However, the Porte could not take any

¹⁸ Holt P.M. *Egypt and Fertile Crescent 1516-1922: "A Political History"*. Longsman, London Publishing, 1st Edition, 1966, p 79-80.

¹⁹ Holt P.M. *Egypt and Fertile Crescent 1516-1922: "A Political History"*. Longsman, London Publishing, 1st Edition, 1966, p 80-81.

measures against the suppression of Ali Bey, who tried to establish his own power through expeditions against both the north and the south Egypt. Actually, he tried to make reforms about the financial affairs of Egypt, and improve the administration of justice in Egypt. In six months, Ali Bey obtained the greater part of Arab peninsula. At the same year, he invaded Syria but he was forced to make some secret negotiations with the Porte in order to restore Egypt under the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire, which was actually opposed to Ali Bey's demands. This request of Syria's ruler was rejected by Ali Bey who declared his own independence against the Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, Ali Bey was compelled to sign an agreement, which was offered by Zahir Al-Umar, who was the ruler of Syria.²⁰

On 1 February 1773, Ali Bey was informed about the issue that Abu-'l-Dhahab, who was his son, had made himself Shaykhal-Balad at Cairo, which caused Egyptians call for the return of Ali Bey. Therefore, Ali Bey waged a war against Abu-'l-Dhahab but his army was defeated.²¹

After Ali Bey's death, Egypt was governed by Abu-'l-Dhahab, who was Shaykh al-Balad under the title of *pasha*. Also, it was clear that Egypt became more dependent on the Porte compared to Ali Bey's reign. Unlike Ali Bey, Abu-'l-Dhahab was an unpopular figure in Egypt, who was obsessed with the idea of the invasion of Syria. Therefore, he made some efforts to receive permission from the Ottoman Empire to conquer Syria. He was able to get permission from the Ottoman Empire about the invasion of Syria but he actually intended to punish Zahir al-Umar but he suddenly died without completing his dream. Later on, Ismail Bey became the Shaykh al-Balad in Egypt. However, he was compelled to abandon Egypt because of a dispute with Ibrahim and Murad, who were the two important figures that had effective voices in political affairs of Egypt. Nevertheless, Ismail Bey tried to resist and he made Ibrahim Bey and Murad Bey leave Egypt by deposing them from their positions, which brought about a distrust between two beys. In response to Ismail

²⁰ Holt P.M. *Egypt and Fertile Crescent 1516-1922: "A Political History"*. Longsman, London Publishing, 1st Edition, 1966, p 81.

²¹ Shaw, Standford, Jay. *The Financial and Administrative Organization and Development of Ottoman Egypt, 1517-1798*. Princeton University Press, 1962, p 61,62.

Bey's action, Murad Bey declared the south part of Egypt whereas Ibrahim Bey claimed some parts of Suez and Alexandria. Although their demands were met by Ismail Bey, both Murad Bey and Ibrahim Bey tried to made profit from their demands, which caused many struggles. Suddenly, a civil war broke out and Ibrahim Bey and Murad Bey had to made a peace agreement and decided a joint rule together. Meanwhile, the forces of the Ottoman Empire, which was led by Ghazi Hasan Pasha, was destroyed by the forces sent by Murad Bey and Ibrahim Bey. Until 1786, they led the way to the politcal affairs of Egypt but an expedition was sent by the Porte to restore the Ottoman supremacy in Egypt and changed everything. Both Murad Bey and Ibrahim Bey was easily defeated by thePorte sent by the Ottomans.²²

For the restoration of the order in the society, strict measures were taken in Egypt and a new government was established. Ismail Bey became Shayhk al-Balad again. Because of a terrible plague in Egypt, Ismail Bey died. Therefore, Ibrahim Bey and Murad Bey were again.assigned to keep their duty in the government by the Ottoman Empire but they abused this situation by levying heavy taxes on both native and foreign merchants as well as other people in order to avenge their loss when they were disposed by Ghazi Hasan Pasha after a while. Their attitude made Egyptian trade worse than before and foreign merchants, especially the French merchants reacted their heavy tax action, which was supported with the warning of the French government against the Egyptian government.²³

2.1.2. Napoleon Bonaparte Period in Egypt (1798-1801)

It can be easily inferred that Napoleon Bonaparte was the first person, who recognized how Egypt was important for European powers and attracted Britain's attention to the importance of Egypt. Indeed, the French occupation wasinitiated by

²² André Raymond. "Soldiers in Trade: The Case of Ottoman Cairo", *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 18 (1991), 16-37, cited in: Daniel Crecelius (ed.), "Egypt in the eighteenth century" in M.W.Daly (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Egypt: Modern Egypt from 1517 to the end of Twentieth Century*, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p 61-62.

²³ André Raymond. "Soldiers in Trade: The Case of Ottoman Cairo", *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 18 (1991), 16-37, cited in: Daniel Crecelius (ed.), "Egypt in the eighteenth century" in M.W.Daly (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Egypt: Modern Egypt from 1517 to the end of Twentieth Century*, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p 62-63.

London publishers, who were publishing and selling the French journals in Egypt after the French Revolution. The most important nationalists, authors and scientists of Britain and France such as Bonaparte, Kléber, Nelson, Sidney were also well-known in Egypt thanks to London publishers.²⁴

Indeed, Bonaparte's military attack on Egypt was France's military assault towards Britain. It was clearly seen that Bonaparte intended to conquer Egypt since it was a crucial route for the French merchants as well as its strategic position, which had an essential impact on Britain because of its colonies. At the same time, the Ottoman Empire was declining and losing its control over Egypt, which triggered Bonaparte to make plans about the invasion of Egypt. From this point, it can be emphasized that Bonaparte made rational preparations before the invasion of Egypt. Firstly, he purposed to make good relations with the Ottoman Empire to take the Egyptian society as well as the Mamluks under its control though they were very loyal to the Ottoman Sultan due to their faith. Secondly, Bonaparte aimed at establishing a new regime in Egypt, which would be made through tyranny, oppression and exploitation of Egypt. However, this was not easy as it was seen. It can be obviously emphasized that the first plan was what Bonaparte dreamt about, which was easily understood by his proclamation:²⁵

"I was full of dreams. I saw myself founding religion, marching into Asia, riding an elephant, a turban on my head and in my hand the new Koran that I would have composed to suit my need. In my undertaking, I would have combined the experiences of the two worlds, exploiting from my own profit the theatre of all history, attacking the power of England and by means of that conquest, renewing contact with the old Europe."²⁶

Thirdly, Bonaparte intended to use the Egyptian society's loyalty to their religion, which can be seen in his proclamation:

²⁴ Louis-Alexandre Berthier, *Relations des campagnes du Général Bonaparte en Egypt* (Paris, 1800), trans. B. Ballard (Paris, 1980), cited in: Darrel Dysktra (ed.), "The French occupation of Egypt" in M.W. Daly (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Egypt: Modern Egypt from 1517 to the end of Twentieth Century*, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p 113.

²⁵ Chandler, David. *The Campaigns of Napoleon* New York, Macmillan, 1966, p.122.

²⁶ Chandler, David. *The Campaigns of Napoleon* New York, Macmillan, 1966, p.122-123.

“Peoples of Egypt, you will be told that I have come to destroy your religion... Do not believe it! ... I worship God more than the Mamluks do, and... I respect His prophet Mohammed and the admirable Koran... Tell the people that the French also are true Muslims. All Egyptians shall render thanks to God for the destruction of the Mamluks, saying in a loud voice, ‘May God preserve the glory of the Ottoman Sultan! May God preserve the glory of the French army! May God curse the Mamluks and bestow happiness on the Egyptian nation!’ ”²⁷

Indeed, the French had a friendly attitude towards villages and towns which they invaded. In order to remove the negative atmosphere against them, the French also declared a proclamation, which was not seemed to convince many Egyptians. Afterwards, an occasion broke out, which was named as the Battle of Imbaba (it is also commonly known as the *Battle of the Pyramids*). Afterwards, a municipal council was founded in Cairo consisting of people from the ranks of the sheiks, the Mamluks, and the French merchants in order to solve the turmoil atmosphere caused by the Battle of Imbaba. In fact, the main duty of this council was to control of the French commander, who continued to exercise a dictatorial power upon the Egyptian society but Bonaparte did not allow to this.²⁸

Since Bonaparte’s main aim was to intervene with Egypt’s economic and financial affairs, he made the municipal council establish. Except for this innovation, he made other things such as the introduction of a new tax system. Afterwards, he also tried to impose his “Islamic policy”, which was his dream that he had declared in his proclamation that is mentioned above. At the same time, Bonaparte tried to associate with Muslim leaders in Egypt for his new regulations via *diwan*, that was established after his occupation and consisted of popular local people of Egypt, because he targeted to use *diwan*, while carrying out his new regimes.²⁹

On 25 December 1798, the new two *diwan* system was introduced by the Turks. There was a special *diwan* including 14 people whereas the general *diwan*

²⁷ Herold, J. Christopher. *Bonaparte in Egypt*. Hamish Hamilton, London, 1962, p.95-96.

²⁸ Herold, J. Christopher. *Bonaparte in Egypt*. Hamish Hamilton, London, 1962, p.96-97-98.

²⁹ Charles Jones Fedorak. “The French Capitulation in Egypt and the Preliminary Anglo-French Treaty of Peace in October 1801: A Note”, “*International History Review*”, 15 (1993), 525-34, cited in: Darrel Dysktra (ed.), “The French occupation of Egypt” in M.W. Daly (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Egypt: Modern Egypt from 1517 to the end of Twentieth Century*, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p 132.

was expected to meet on emergencies. However, this was seen as an obstacle by Bonaparte, so he aimed at recovering Egypt by force in reply to this two *diwan* systems. Also, with the help of the British force commanded by Sir Sidney Smith, he was able to defeat the Ottoman army easily.³⁰

After that, Kléber was appointed by Bonaparte as he was expected to govern Egypt during Bonaparte's absence. Due to the harsh attitude of Kléber about the recovery of Egypt, an expedition was sent by the Sublime Porte (in other words; the Ottoman Empire) and the French reached their goals shortly after. Due to their wrong action, the Ottoman Empire was forced to make a convention. Indeed, the aim of the agreement was to make French quit from Egypt. However, the British government was opposed to this agreement and Sir Sidney Smith decided to forbid the carrying-out of the convention. In response to the British, Kléber cancelled all orders that were previously given, which put the country in a state of defence and he bombarded Cairo. Then, Murad Bey made an agreement with Kléber, and established the government of Egypt. After a while, Kléber was assassinated and killed.³¹

2.1.3. Khedives Period (1798-1801)

2.1.3.1. Mohammad Ali Period (1805-1848)

After a short time, the French withdrawal can be clearly seen in Egypt. As well as the French withdrawal, the power of Mamluk beys decreased, which caused the Ottoman Empire to struggle with the Mamluks. Meanwhile, Mohammad Ali was appointed to deal with the situation by the Ottoman Sultan. With the help of his loyal Albanian troops, Mohammad Ali managed the control over the Mamluks in Egypt, which enabled him to gain power spreading around Egypt. As a result of the dispute

³⁰ Charles Jones Fedorak. "The French Capitulation in Egypt and the Preliminary Anglo-French Treaty of Peace in October 1801: A Note", *International History Review*, 15 (1993), 525-34, cited in: Darrel Dykstra (ed.), "The French occupation of Egypt" in M.W. Daly (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Egypt: Modern Egypt from 1517 to the end of Twentieth Century*, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p 133-134.

³¹ Chandler, David. *The Campaigns of Napoleon* New York, Macmillan, 1966, p.128.

between the Ottomans and Mamluks, Mohammad Ali achieved to obtain the support of the general public.³²

Even though Mohammad Ali became the ruler of Egypt again in respect to the demands of the Ottoman Empire and the Egyptian society, it can be easily understood that Mohammad Ali was worried about his position, which was easily seen in his regulations during his reign. As a result, Mohammad Ali was wary at the first decades of his reign since he thought that he would be deposed by the Ottoman Sultan at the first opportunity.³³

By the way, the power of Mamluks was still a threat for Mohammad Ali because they had been in Egypt for more than 600 years. Also, they had a voice in political affairs of Egypt, which was seen as a dangerous situation by Mohammad Ali. In order to destruct their power. Mohammad Ali organized an event, in which all Mamluk leaders were invited to the celebration in honor of his son, named Tusun. When all Mamluks came together in Cairo, Mohammed Ali's forces surrounded them and opened fire upon them. His plan became successful and he managed to destroy the power of Mamluks by killing their leaders. In fact, the end of the Mamluk presence in Egypt can be mentioned as Mohammad Ali's one of the best successful actions because he carried out what the Ottoman Sultan's had been trying to do for centuries. By removing all obstacles step by step, Mohammad Ali was about to reach his big dream, which was the establishment of his own regional power in Egypt by eliminating the role of the Ottoman Empire, which can be easily inferred from his own speech: ³⁴

"I am well aware that the (Ottoman) Empire is heading by the day toward destruction... On its ruins I will build a vast kingdom..up to the Euphrates and the Tigris."³⁵

³² Gillespie, Charles C., "Scientific Aspects of the French Egyptian Expedition 1798-1801," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, Princeton University Press, 1989, p.133. <http://jstor.org/stable/986871>.

³³ Herold, J. Christopher. *Bonaparte in Egypt*. Hamish Hamilton, London, 1962, p.100-101.

³⁴ Herold, J. Christopher. *Bonaparte in Egypt*. Hamish Hamilton, London, 1962, p.100-101-102

³⁵ Herold, J. Christopher. *Bonaparte in Egypt*. Hamish Hamilton, London, 1962, p.103.

Like Sultan Selim III (reigned 1789–1807), who believed the need of reformatations to modernize the Ottoman Empire especially in military, Mohammad Ali also believed the necessity of the same changes. The purpose of Mohammad Ali was to establish his own hereditary dynasty without any interference of the Ottoman Sultan. In this way, he believed to reorganize Egyptian society as well as establishing a modern military power. At first, Mohammad Ali made a reformation and declared a proclamation and nationalized all *iltizam* lands of Egypt. Thus, the government became the official owner of all productions of the lands in the country.³⁶

In terms of Mohammed Ali's land reformatations, all productions of the producers were taken by the state. Then, their goods were resold by the state and all producers got their interests during the second phase of this selling process. By the way, their productions were also sold in foreign markets with the support of the state. In order to maintain this process, Mohammad Ali extended all areas, which were used for agriculture.³⁷

In addition to the reformatations for the agricultural, Mohammad Ali gave importance to the military industry and the productions of weapons. As well as weapons, Mohammad Ali demanded to construct a navy. After a short time, Egypt's war industries improved and they produced different types of weapons in addition to many warships. Also, he aimed at establishing a new army system. Firstly, he was intended to collect men from the Ottoman Empire to serve in his new and modernized army. Secondly, Mohammad Ali purposed to create his new army, which was only expected to serve Mohammad Ali without questioning his rules.³⁸

Except from these reformatations of Mohammad Ali, another purpose of him was to destroy Mamluks' power. To reach his goal, the Wāli had to replace the governmental roles of the Mamluks, which made Mohammad Ali the only representative of the central authority. Therefore, he aimed at ruling Egypt by himself and separated Egypt into ten provinces, which were ruled by his sons. By

³⁶ Herold, J. Christopher. *Bonaparte in Egypt*. Hamish Hamilton, London, 1962, p.104-105.

³⁷ Herold, J. Christopher. *Bonaparte in Egypt*. Hamish Hamilton, London, 1962, p.104-105-106.

³⁸ Herold, J. Christopher. *Bonaparte in Egypt*. Hamish Hamilton, London, 1962, p.108-109.

appointing his sons as the governors of these provinces, Mohammad Ali aimed at governing Egypt by himself as a autonomus country.³⁹

Meanwhile, Mohammad Ali declared a war on the behalf of Mahmud II, who was the Ottoman Sultan at those times. From that point, it can be easily understood that Mohammad Ali aimed at abusing the Ottoman Empire in regard to the Ottoman's deteriorated affairs with the European powers. Based on this circumstance, he sent his expeditions to Arabia and Greece to wage wars against the French, the British and the Russian by declaring that their combined fleet threatened the presence of the Ottoman Empire, which was also stated in his letter to Mahmud II:⁴⁰

“We have to realize that we cannot stand in front of them, and the only possible out come (if we do) will be sinking the entire fleet and causing the death of up to thirty or forty thousand men... Taking the responsibility of wasting such numbers is no easy task. I have, therefore, stopped sending letters to my son urging him to fight on. Wars are not won only by depending on God and trusting Him, but also by putting all possible human effort into it. God has ordered us in His Book to stand up to the enemy and to spare no effort in confronting him. This, however, necessitates a thorough knowledge of the art of war. Unfortunatley, my dear friend, although we are men of war... the Europeans are way ahead of us and have already put their theories of war into practice. (Then seeing that there was no way out but to grant the Greeks their independence, he added) Here I am at a loss: shall I grieve at the calamity of the Ottoman State or at my own lost effort. I am most sorrowful and anguished.”⁴¹

Meanwhile, the Ottoman Empire was being threatened by ethnic rebellions in its European territories. Awaring of this situaiton, Mohammad Ali was proceeding his expansion in the Arabian peninsula but there was a riot occured in the Greek provinces of the Ottoman Empire while Mohammad Ali was dealing with the Arabian issue. Therefore, Mohammad Ali was demanded to put down the riot by Sultan Mahmut II of the Ottoman Empire.⁴²

³⁹ Herold, J. Christopher. *Bonaparte in Egypt*. Hamish Hamilton, London, 1962, p.109-110-111.

⁴⁰ Crosland, Maurice P. *The Society of Arcueil: A View of French Science at the Time of Napoleon I*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967, p.265.

⁴¹ Crosland, Maurice P. *The Society of Arcueil: A View of French Science at the Time of Napoleon I*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1967, p.266.

⁴² Gillispie, Charles C. “Scientific aspects of the French Egyptian expedition: 1798-1801. *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, Princeton Universty Press, 1989, p.447-448. <http://jstor.org/stable/986871>.

Mohammad Ali immediately sent an army. Since the Greeks were being supported by Britain, France, and Russia, the Egyptian navy, which was sent as the representative of the Ottoman Empire, was defeated. In order to recover his unsuccessfullness, Mohammad Ali asked the Ottoman Empire for the territory of Syria. However, the Ottoman Sultan rejected his request, which caused Mohammad Ali to conquer Syria because he thought that Syria was a very rich territory in terms of its natural resources and it was also an important route of international trading community.⁴³

After a while, the “Peace. Of Kutahia” was signed on May 1833, which consisted of the declaration of Mohammad Ali as a rebellious against the Ottoman Sultan as well as limiting his power by underlining his position only as the *Wāli* of Egypt.⁴⁴

However, it can be easily inferred that Mohammad Ali was not satisfied with the terms of this convention. Nevertheless, based on all these occasions, Mohammad Ali was forced to comply with Mahmud II’s offer by the European powers since their intent was to protect the maintainance of the status quo within the Ottoman Empire’s territory. Thereupon, “Convention for the Pacification of the Levant” was prepared by the European powers with the leadership of the British government and Mohammad Ali was compelled to sign. In terms of the convention, he was given an ultimatum about his withdrawal from the territory of Syria and Arabia. On the other hand, Mohammad Ali was also offered to establish his own hereditary in Egypt depended on the Ottoman Empire’s rules including some restrictions on his post.⁴⁵

After that, “Treaty of Balta Limani” was signed by the Ottoman Empire and the British government. It was not an equal trade agreement, whose terms were to the

⁴³ Gillispie, Charles C. “Scientific aspects of the French Egyptian expedition: 1798-1801.” *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, Princeton University Press, 1989, p.448. <http://jstor.org/stable/986871>.

⁴⁴ Gillispie, Charles C. “Scientific aspects of the French Egyptian expedition: 1798-1801.” *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, Princeton University Press, 1989, p.449-450-451. <http://jstor.org/stable/986871>.

⁴⁵ Crosland, Maurice P. *The Society of Arcueil: A View of French Science at the Time of Napoleon I.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967, p.268-269-270.

detriment of the Ottoman Empire because the Ottoman Empire was demanded to allow all monopolies as well as the rights for full access of the British merchants to the Ottoman markets like the local merchants, which ruined Mohammad Ali's all plans.⁴⁶

2.1.3.2. Tawfiq Pasha Period (1879-1892)

2.1.3.2.1. The Urabi Revolt (1881-1882)

During the 1870s, it can be easily understood that Egypt was in a financial collapse because of its huge debts, which drove Egypt into desperation. Indeed, the debts were caused due to the misgovernment of the Egyptian rulers and their inability to restore the economy of Egypt no matter how they tried. Furthermore, the European powers caused to increase the Egyptian's debts though they seemed to help them to get rid of their financial ruin because this desperate situation of Egypt stood the British and French governments in good stead. Though the Egyptian rulers attempted to overcome this economic depression, it can be easily understood that their efforts were undermined by the European powers, which was began during the Ismail Pasha's reign.⁴⁷

Even though Egypt had run into debt before Ismail Pasha's reign, it became the main issue for the European powers when he became the ruler of Egypt, especially for the British government rather than the French. Since Egypt was an important point for the British government due to its colonial route, the British acted as they allied with Egypt to help them to pay their debts. In order to carry out their plan, they established a bank in Egypt. Through this way, the British government had a voice on Egypt's financial resources. However, Ismail Pasha was not pleased with this situation as their attempt was seen as a threat to his authority in Egypt. Also, the

⁴⁶ Crosland, Maurice P. *The Society of Arcueil: A View of French Science at the Time of Napoleon I.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967, p.272-273.

⁴⁷ A.G. Hopkins, "The Victorians and Africa: A Reconsideration of the Occupation of Egypt, 1882" *Journal of African History*, 27 (1986), 379, cited in: Donald Malcolm Reid (ed.), "The Urabi revolution and the British conquest, 1879-1882" in M.W.Daly (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Egypt: Modern Egypt from 1517 to the end of Twentieth Century*, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p 222.

Egyptian people supported Ismail while the British supported Tawfiq Pasha, who was the son of Ismail Pasha.⁴⁸

From all these things mentioned above, it can be pointed out that there was a European domination in Egypt. In spite of its huge debts, its economy was held by European powers, especially by the British, who aimed at setting at odds Egyptians with its rulers. The dominance of Europeans can be clearly seen in every aspects of Egypt such as in the Egyptian army and their trade affairs. In contrast to the domestic people in Egypt, Europeans living in Egypt actually paid more taxes but not as high as the peasants, which caused many struggles among different ethnic groups in the society. In spite of the fact that all classes of Egypt were buried under the heavy taxes that were changed in terms of the British interference to their financial affairs, the *fellahin*, who mainly consisted of the Egyptian peasants, paid heavy taxes in contrast to other classes in Egypt.⁴⁹

Besides, Turco-Circassians and Albanians were major groups that gave a way to the domestic affairs of Egypt a lead. Unlike Turco-Circassian groups, who had a voice in the Egyptian army, Albanians were supported by the native Egyptians. Beginning from Mohammad Ali's first years as the ruler of Egypt, it can be definitely said that the Egyptian army got the support of Albanian forces and their support helped Mohammad Ali to take Egypt under his control, which can be given as an example of the effect of Albanians in Egypt.⁵⁰

However, there were some changes carried out in the army system at those times. Though the military forces had been reformed by the previous rulers of Egypt, Tawfiq Pasha took nothing into considerations and reduced the numbers of armed men in the army by referring to the fiscal crisis caused by the economic depression in

⁴⁸ Mayer, Thomas, *The Changing Past: "Egyptian Historiography of the Urabi Revolt", 1882-1983*. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1988, p.32-33-34.

⁴⁹ Mayer, Thomas, *The Changing Past: "Egyptian Historiography of the Urabi Revolt", 1882-1983*. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1988, p.45-46.

⁵⁰ Mayer, Thomas, *The Changing Past: "Egyptian Historiography of the Urabi Revolt", 1882-1983*. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1988, p.47-48.

Egypt. As a result of these changes, a revolt was initiated in the army on September 1, 1881.⁵¹

In fact, The Urabi Revolt began as a respond to the British and the French interventions to the Egyptian economy as well as the authority of Tawfiq. The Urabi Revolt took its name from Colonel Ahmad Urabi, who started this upheaval to challenge not only with the European powers but also with the Mohammad Ali dynasty. For Tawfiq's supporters and the Westerners, the Urabi movement was a revolt whereas for others, it was not only seen as a military revolt. Actually, it began as arevolt but it can be accepted as arevolution for Egypt as it included Egypt society's involvement, which created a social depth in Egyptian's history.⁵²

When it is examined what lying behind the Urabi Revolt, it can be implicitly figured out that the slogan "Egypt for the Egyptians" had a significant impact over the Egypt society. After a short time, a tension occurred between Tawfiq Pasha and Ahmad Urabi, who was in search of supporters to this revolt began on September 9, 1881. In a respond to this movement, Tawfiq Pasha ordered Ahmad Urabi and his supporters to leave or be punished but his attempt was unsuccessful and the revolt could not be stopped. What Ahmad Urabi and his advocates demanded was the establishment of a new government including only native Egyptians. At first, Tawfiq was determined to refuse this demand but later, he was compelled to agree his offer since the Urabi Revolt rendered him helpless and a new government was established, who consisted of the Urabi Revolt's advocates.⁵³

Besides, the interference of European powers also triggered the uprising since they were opposed to Ahmad Urabi and his followers. The French and British

⁵¹ Mayer, Thomas, *The Changing Past: "Egyptian Historiography of the Urabi Revolt", 1882-1983*. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1988, p.63-64.

⁵² Mayer, Thomas, *The Changing Past: "Egyptian Historiography of the Urabi Revolt", 1882-1983*. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1988, p.64.

⁵³ Mayer, Thomas, *The Changing Past: "Egyptian Historiography of the Urabi Revolt", 1882-1983*. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1988, p.65-66.

supported Tawfiq Pasha and they declared that they would reject the newly established government led by the Urabi advocates.⁵⁴

In a larger scale, it can be definitely stated that this movement was totally opposed to the interests of the British and the French governments over Egypt. Being bounded hand and foot, Tawfiq Pasha appealed for help from the Ottoman Sultan, Abdul Hamid II on September 15, 1881. However, it was an unreasonable attempt. Since the Ottoman Sultan was the caliphate of Islamic community, Tawfiq Pasha's demand was seen as a pointless demand because the struggle was between two Muslim groups.⁵⁵

After one year, another political chaos emerged by Ahmad Urabi, which began to spread to other provinces of the Ottoman Empire on June 11, 1882. Especially in Alexandria, the supporters of the Khedive Tawfiq and the advocates of the Urabi Revolt faced off against due to the idea of fall of the government of Tawfiq Pasha in Cairo. In order to soften up the catastrophic atmosphere in Egypt, the Ottoman Sultan attempted to make an agreement with Ahmad Urabi, which was later accepted by him secretly. Nevertheless, this could not prevent the revolt as the Ottoman Empire was too powerless to take the Urabi Revolt under its control due to the dispatched condition of its army. Being aware of the importance of the situation, the British prejudiced this revolt in favour of itself. As a result, the British government sent an ultimatum to the Urabi supporters to show their support to the government of Tawfiq Pasha intentionally. After their ultimatum was declined by the Urabists, the British waged a war.⁵⁶

By suppressing the revolt, the British gained the sympathy of the Egyptians and the Khedive Tawfiq, which was planned as their main goal. In fact, it can be certainly inferred that the British reached their aim, which was to capture and to

⁵⁴ Mayer, Thomas, *The Changing Past: "Egyptian Historiography of the Urabi Revolt"*, 1882-1983. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1988, p.90-91.

⁵⁵ Mayer, Thomas, *The Changing Past: "Egyptian Historiography of the Urabi Revolt"*, 1882-1983. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1988, p.91-92.

⁵⁶ Mayer, Thomas, *The Changing Past: "Egyptian Historiography of the Urabi Revolt"*, 1882-1983. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1988, p.100-101.

occupy Egypt under the name of helping Tawfiq Pasha in the process of suppressing the Urabi Revolt. However, neither the Ottoman Empire nor the Khedive Tawfiq understood the purpose of the British government. The intervention of the British was seen as a support rather than an invasion.⁵⁷

Although the British and the Khedive Tawfiq described the Urabi Revolt as an uprising against the status-quo of Egypt, all other European powers and especially the Egyptian society expressed their opinions in favour of the Urabists and defined the Urabi movement as a revolution which was created for the absolute independence of the Egyptians and a remarkable struggle against the foreign intruders based on the slogan “Egypt for the Egyptians”. Therefore, the chaotic atmosphere could not be solved in the society.⁵⁸

2.1.3.2.2. Nubar Pasha (1878-1893)

Between 1878 and 1895, Nubar Pasha was one of the important political figures that became the First Prime Minister of Egypt. From Ismail Pasha's reign, he served as the Prime Minister by leading a way to the political affairs of Egypt. In the process of the construction of the Suez Canal, Nubar Pasha made a lot of contributions, which were awarded not only by the Khedive Ismail but also by the Ottoman Sultan.⁵⁹

Meanwhile, Egypt was on the verge of bankruptcy. It can be clearly deduced that Ismail Pasha was not able to restore the economic destruction in Egypt, and he was opposed to Nubar Pasha's attempts. However, Nubar Pasha gained the supports of the British and the French parliaments, which became a threat for the Khedive Ismail. They aimed to destroy the authority of Ismail Pasha by supporting Nubar Pasha's actions. Indeed, the main goal of the British and the French was to keep

⁵⁷ Mayer, Thomas, *The Changing Past: “Egyptian Historiography of the Urabi Revolt”*, 1882-1983. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1988, p.101.

⁵⁸ Mayer, Thomas, *The Changing Past: “Egyptian Historiography of the Urabi Revolt”*, 1882-1983. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1988, p.105-106.

⁵⁹ Mayer, Thomas, *The Changing Past: “Egyptian Historiography of the Urabi Revolt”*, 1882-1983. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1988, p.106-107-108.

Egypt's economic and control in their hands so the authority of Ismail Pasha was a threat for them as his reformations gained popularity in a large scale by the Egyptian people. Therefore, Ismail Pasha was deposed in consequence of European powers' campaigns and his son, whose name was Tawfiq, became the new ruler of Egypt in 1879. Although the ruler of Egypt changed, Nubar Pasha continued to serve as the Prime Minister until 1884 but he was forced to leave his position because of the British parliament. For the British, Nubar Pasha fomented trouble about the new administration system of Egypt. As Nubar Pasha was opposed to the British government's demand by pointing out his authorization as the Prime Minister, he was deposed by Tawfiq Pasha, which had been the plan of the British government to get him away from Cairo.⁶⁰

2.2. Egypt under the British Rule (1882-1922)

The dominance of the British began in 1882; in other words, it started when the Urabi Revolt came out of. During the Urabi Revolt, the Khedive Ismail could not get any help from the Ottoman Empire, which enabled the British to apply their plans by acting as a protector of Egypt. After taking the uprising under control, the British government represented by Lord Baring acted as if they were a friend of the new ruler the Khedive Tawfiq. By supporting Tawfiq Pasha, the British tried to carry out the occupation of Egypt in terms of politics rather than waging a war against the Egyptian force. Indeed, the British seemed to occupy Egypt by stopping "the Urabi Revolt". However, their real intention was not to invade the territory but to use this situation in terms of its advantage since Egypt was one of the richest provinces of the Ottoman Empire, which also had a strategic importance in the route of Indian trade and other colonial trade of the British. Thus, the British focused on the restoration of Egypt's political and financial stability.⁶¹

After a little while, Sir Evelyn Wood was appointed as the general of the British force in Egypt in 1882. As long as he came to Egypt, Wood made some

⁶⁰ Mayer, Thomas, *The Changing Past: "Egyptian Historiography of the Urabi Revolt", 1882-1983*. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1988, p.110.

⁶¹ Tignor, Robert. *Modernization and British Colonial Rule in Egypt 1882-1914*, Princeton UP, 1966, p. 102-103.

changes about the capitulations, *the Caisse de Latte*. However, he could not be successful though he made some alterations in terms of the capitulations and the *Caisse de Latte*, which had crucial effects on Egypt's financial policy. As a result, Lord Cromer (Sir Evelyn Baring) was appointed in place of Sir Evelyn Wood to construct the financial and political stability in Egypt because Egypt was on the verge of bankruptcy.⁶²

Once Lord Cromer was appointed, immediate emergency measures were taken. Unlike Sir Evelyn Wood, Cromer was on the side of the maintenance of the khedival system for the restoration of the political affairs of Egypt. In other words, the system of the Egyptian council of ministers was not restored and it remained the same as before but it became dependent to the advice of the British advisors in practice. Actually, the end of the period of the British conquest began when the Khedive Tawfiq died. Due to the unsuccessful attempts of Cromer, the Egyptian people tried to create a return to the conventional economy model, the establishment of law and order as well as the reformation in administration and legacy issues. Also, what the Egyptians wanted to carry out was that the separation of Egypt from the Ottoman Empire.⁶³

On the other hand, during the Cromer's administration period, it can be implicitly figured out that the debts of Egypt reduced compared to the past. Besides, taxes and debts of the Egyptian government were reduced and the government's income was raised. Moreover, Sudan was reconquered. All these carried out by Cromer, which was emphasized as important successes of him in contrast to the narrow-minded point of view of the Egyptians, who had divergent plans about the administrative and financial system of the regime. However, Cromer did not have a snowball's chance in the hell. In other saying, the Cromer's administrative leadership had a failure. Cromer purposed the maintenance of the Khedive constitution but there were no attempts to strengthen the authority and the constitution of the Khedive

⁶² Tignor, Robert. *Modernization and British Colonial Rule in Egypt 1882-1914*, Princeton UP, 1966, p. 103.

⁶³ Tignor, Robert. *Modernization and British Colonial Rule in Egypt, 1882-1914* (Princeton UP, 1966), p. 103-104.

Tawfiq, which emphasized that the British government had an interest behind its stabilized political and economical strategy.⁶⁴

After a short time, Cromer got into the act to meet the expectations of the British government, which was about staying a long-term in Egypt and he was aware that the permanence of the financial situation of Egypt was important to create the political and financial restorations in Egypt. Therefore, Cromer planned long-term reformation policy about agricultural resources and products. He aimed at developing a watering system around Nile River. Besides, the construction of the Nile Barrage and a large number of canals that were also planned to be built, were constructed for the irrigation system in Nile River.⁶⁵

Actually, it should be pointed out that the target of the British government was to remove the nationalist groups in Egypt by making some reformations for the sake of them, which would make them tied hand and foot. Then, the British nationalist groups started to appear in Cairo due to the ineffectiveness of the Egyptian nationalist groups in terms of the political and financial affairs of Egypt. After a while, Cromer had to leave his position and Sir Eldon Gorst became the British Chief Representative. Like Cromer, Gorst also promoted to protect the authority of Tawfiq Pasha. In other words, he supported self-governing institutions to conciliate the Khedive Tawfiq Pasha but he could not be successful.⁶⁶

No matter how he tried to make moderate reforms, Gorst was unable to carry out Cromer's dream. After that, Lord Kitchener was appointed when the first World War broke out and blocked social and economical reformations that were expected to be made by Kitchener. In addition, the outbreak of the World War I affected the situation of the British government in Cairo, which caused them to create Egyptian political parties. In fact, the decline of the Ottoman Empire, the brutality of the

⁶⁴ Tignor, Robert. *Modernization and British Colonial Rule in Egypt, 1882-1914* (Princeton UP, 1966), p. 104-105-106.

⁶⁵ Tignor, Robert. *Modernization and British Colonial Rule in Egypt, 1882-1914* (Princeton UP, 1966), p. 105-106.

⁶⁶ Marlowe, John. *A History of Modern Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Relations: 1800-1956*, Cresset Press, 1954, p. 132-133.

British occupation, the influence of the European powers in respect of their political philosophy and their plans about the recovery of the Egyptian economy brought about a change in the political dimension and made a way for coming into being the political parties in Egypt.⁶⁷

In 1907, the anti-British National Party (Hizbal-Watani) was established by Mustafa Kamil and it survived until 1908. Later on, Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid's Umma Party appeared and it made a connection with the British to carry out social and economical developments that were planned by the British government for the independence of Egypt. Lastly, the Constitutional Reform Party of Shaykh Ali Yusuf was founded and supported by the Khedive Tawfiq Pasha.⁶⁸

Apart from these parties, many parties, which were smaller than the parties mentioned above, were established as a reaction against the occupation of the British. By the way, the Ottoman Empire declared a war in 1914 by making an alliance with the German, which also dragged Egypt into the war as Egypt was dependent to the Ottoman Empire legally; that is to say, the Ottoman Sultan was accepted as the caliphate of all Muslims around the world and the Egyptian people also had to take part in the Islamic world as the subjects of him. As a result, the Ottoman Sultan initiated the jihadist movement and ordered all Muslims to fight on the behalf of him.⁶⁹

In the meantime, Egypt declared its annexation to the British by ignoring the Ottoman Sultan's order. However, their demand was declined, which brought about the declaration of a "protectorate" led by the British government. Since the Khedive Abbas Hilmi, who was the son of the Khedive Tawfiq Pasha, turned down this protectorate, he was forced to leave his position through the British campaigns and his uncle Husayn Kamil became the new ruler of Egypt. Although the Egypt people felt that they had to take part in the Ottoman Sultan's call to jihad, the British

⁶⁷ Marlowe, John. *A History of Modern Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Relations: 1800-1956* Cresset Press, 1954, p. 137-138.

⁶⁸ Marlowe, John. *A History of Modern Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Relations: 1800-1956* Cresset Press, 1954, p. 138.

⁶⁹ Marlowe, John. *A History of Modern Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Relations: 1800-1956* Cresset Press, 1954, p. 138-139.

government proposed them to embark this burden by stating “protectorate” as a process of being independent but their real intent was to separate Egypt from the Ottoman Empire to take the state under their own control rather than helping them to become independent, which can also be mentioned as the real meaning of “protectorate”. By being between a rock and a hard place, Egypt was driven to the side of the British and they started their actions by defending the Suez Canal against any probable attacks under the name of being “protectorate”.⁷⁰

Afterwards, Egypt became a home for the British in the Mediterranean region, which initiated the British abuse in Egypt. They interfered with everything such as Egyptian labour, camel transportation, their precious buildings and animal sales. Furthermore, the British tried to abuse cotton, which was the most crucial production of Egypt and cause a reduction in the production of the cotton as well as the decline of the peasant’s income. Nevertheless, the British proclamation for being “protectorate” was supposed to be a milestone in the process of gaining independence of Egyptians but the death of Husayn Kamil changed the British plans about Egypt in 1917. The British government declared not only constitutional concessions but they also demanded capitulatory concessions, which directly affected the Egypt people’s dreams about being independent.⁷¹

By the way, the new ruler Ahmad Fu’ad Pasha was not able to take a stand against the British parliament’s decisions about Egypt’s future as he came to the throne with their support, which made him to accept their orders to strengthen the British authority in Egypt. While the Egypt people looked forward to become a state of self-government, the British government tried to make Egypt a dependent state to themselves, which was exactly inferred from all their policies about Egypt. Though they supposed that the Egyptians were unaware of the seriousness of the situation, some ex-ministers of Egypt named as “Wingate”, figured out what the British

⁷⁰ Marlowe, John. *A History of Modern Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Relations: 1800-1956*, Cresset Press, 1954, p. 139-140.

⁷¹ Mansfield, Peter. *The British in Egypt*, Weildenfield and Nicolson Publishing, 1928, p.75-76.

attempted to carry out under the name of restoration policies and demanded the complete independence of Egypt.⁷²

One of the prominent figures of the group was Sa'd Pasha Zaghlul, who was the former minister of education and a delegate of Wafd, became the leader of the nationalist group, which was opposed to the presence of the British government in Egypt. While Sa'd Pasha Zaghlul insisted on the independence of Egypt, Rushdi Pasha and his followers had a collaboration with the British parliament and did not make any attempts to provide the independence of Egypt, but when it is compared to Rushdi Pasha and his followers, it can be easily emphasized that the members of Zaghlul's party consisted of people, who had enough administrative experiences to make actions for the independence of Egypt, which was also gotten support from Egyptian lawyers, educated people as well as farmers and peasants. As a result, Zaghlul; in other words, "the Wingate group" was able to prevent Rushdi Pasha's policies about Egypt and the members of the Wingate group encouraged the Egyptians to call for the independence, which caused a riot in Egypt. After this uprising, the British tried to suppress the outbreak through the help of its allies and the protectorate of the British was recognized. In fact, the revolt was exactly defined as the opposition of the Egyptians towards "the protectorate" as well as the necessity of an alteration in the political status of Egypt and of the British government in Egypt. However, nothing changed. Instead, by taking the approval of the United States and its other allies, the British government declared the structure of the new constitution of Egypt established in terms of "the protectorate" and tried to illustrate that this was the best solution to restore the peace of Egypt rather than the idea of demanding self-governance. Therefore, Zaghlul was compelled to make an agreement with Milner, who was appointed by the British parliament as the new British Chief Representative. Under "the protectorate", Milner claimed to recognize Egyptian independence by demanding a permanent British army and other

⁷² Mansfield, Peter. *The British in Egypt*, Weildenfield and Nicolson Publishing, 1928, p.76.

provisions, which was rejected by Zaghlul. Instead Sa'd Pasha Zaghlul offered a new treaty by trying to persuade the new Prime Minister, Adli Pasha Yakan.⁷³

At last, the British government had to accept the new declaration in 1922 due to Sa'd Pasha's attempt which is mentioned above. The British were seemed to be forced to accept this new declaration which was about the removal of the protectorate by stating the British parliament's four orders: the defense of Egypt, the contacts of the British, the protection of Egypt against the foreign powers and "Sudan".⁷⁴

2.3. Egypt as an Independent Kingdom (1946-1952)

To figure out the ideology of the British invasion in Egypt, the four demands of the British played a significant role and made the Egyptians think that they would not rule their own country by themselves without excluding the British from Egypt because the British continued to interfere with Egypt's political affairs by trying to sabotage the sovereignty of their own country from 1922 until 1946. Indeed, this was caused from the uncertainty of Egypt's political status from 1805 because Egypt tried to leave from the Ottoman Empire from the beginning of 1800s but it could not be successful.⁷⁵

In meanwhile, the British force attempted to invade Egypt under the name of the "protectorate" by using the Urabi Revolt during the reign of Tawfiq Pasha, which dragged Egypt into a different political status. However, all these incidents actually brought about an alteration in the legal status of Egypt. As a result, Egypt announced its independence by stating its separation from the Ottoman Empire as well as abolishing the British protectorate. For its full independence, Egypt also declared that the status of the state was changed from the province which recognized Egypt as a dependent state to the Ottoman Empire to a kingdom. In addition, the new ruler of Egypt, Fuad I became the king of Egypt. Lastly, Egypt announced its independence

⁷³ Mansfield, Peter. *The British in Egypt*, Weildenfield and Nicolson Publishing, 1928, p.77-78.

⁷⁴ Mansfield, Peter. *The British in Egypt*, Weildenfield and Nicolson Publishing, 1928, p.83-84.

⁷⁵ Daly, M.W. (1988). *The British Occupation, 1882-1922*. Cambridge University Press, 1988, p.152-153-154-155.

through the Unilateral Declaration of Egyptian Independence in 1922, which was accepted as an official announcement of their sovereignty around the world.⁷⁶

During this enormous transformation of Egypt, the British parliament did not keep silent and tried to use Sudan against Egypt. In fact, Sudan was dependent to Egypt and this situation did not change though the status of Egypt was altered but the British never gave up since they were aware that there was a powerful British effect on Sudan's policy, which caused the British to make campaigns based on their influential authority. Except for the British provoking actions, the Wafd Party also came into activity although it was established against the British occupation policies. However, the party faced off against the king of Egypt and the new administrative system. Like the British parliament, the Wafd Party also attempted to have a say in the Suez Canal issue and tried to promote the native Egyptians by claiming that the British would handle the control of the Suez Canal from the Kingdom of Egypt in exchange for the independence of Egypt. In spite of the fact that the new administration and the revolutionary alteration in Egypt, a great deal of political parties came into existence such as Communist Party, which was founded in 1925 and the Muslim Brotherhood Party, which appeared in 1928. While the chaotic atmosphere brought about many occasions, the first king of Egypt, Fuad I died in 1936. His successor became King Farouk I.⁷⁷

At the beginning of his reign, Farouk I was threatened by the issue of Ethiopia since Italy attacked Ethiopia in 1936. Though Egypt became a kingdom by declaring its sovereignty officially, it was a nominal declaration for the British parliament and they attempted to monopolize Egypt's foreign affairs, which was definitely understood from their interference to the Sudan issue and tolerated the occupation of Ethiopia. In despair, Farouk I had to make an agreement with the British parliament called Anglo-Egyptian Treaty in 1936, which was accepted as the presence of the sovereignty of kingdom of Egypt by the British government. In terms of the treaty, Farouk I demanded the evacuation of the British government as they had plans over

⁷⁶ Daly, M.W. (1988). *The British Occupation, 1882–1922*. Cambridge University Press, 1988, p.167-168.

⁷⁷ Daly, M.W. *The British Occupation, 1882–1922*. Cambridge University Press, 1988, p.175-176-177-178.

the Suez Canal that was later seen during the Second World War. No matter how the British attempted to be permanent in the Suez Canal Region, they were unable to reach its aims due to the campaigns of the anti-British groups in Egypt. Derived from these occasions, there was a revolt in Egypt named as the Egyptian Revolution. After this event, the Kingdom of Egypt was destructed, the administrative of Egypt was transformed into the Republic of Egypt and Fuad II became the new ruler. In meantime, the Sudan issue was discussed in detail and it officially became independent in 1956.⁷⁸

2.4. Republican Egypt and the Middle East (1952-2011)

2.4.1. Egypt under Gamal Abdel Nasser (1952-1967)

2.4.1.1. Republic of Egypt (1953-1958)

When the Second World War broke out, the Suez Canal became a crucial point for the British parliament, which was one of their purposes during the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty in 1936. After the war began, they tried to use the Suez Canal as a headquarter, which caused a struggle between Egypt and the British in 1942. Actually, the struggle was brought about by the Wafd Party since it was established by a group of people who were anti-British and came out against the British's attitude of the British about the Suez Canal region. In order to stunt the struggle, the British compelled Farouk I to make an alliance with the Wafd Party, which was an impossible task to carry out. Farouk I tried to meet their demand by making some plans but the British knew that he could not make any coalition with the Wafd Party, which later enabled them to put their into practice. After a short time, what the British had foreseen became the real and Farouk I was deposed by the British.⁷⁹

In fact, the British allied with the Wafd Party and changed the leader of the party, which had been arranged before they asked Farouk I to negotiate with the

⁷⁸ McLeave, Hugh. *The Last Pharaoh: Farouk of Egypt*. New York: McCall Publishing, 1970, p.205-206-207.

⁷⁹ McDermott, Anthony. *Egypt From Nasser to Mubarak: A Flawed Revolution*. Croom Hell Publication, 1988, p. 21-22-23.

party. Being unaware of this condition, Farouk I was dismissed from his throne and the British government gave support to Nahhas to establish a new administration and to become the Prime Minister of Egypt. However, the British was not able to reach their goals at will. Though Nahhas Pasha founded a new government and the British made a coalition with the Wafd Party, the native Egyptians promoted neither the Wafd Party nor the British parliament.⁸⁰

All these occasions brought about the tension between the British and the Egyptians. On July 1952, there was an uprising occurred in Cairo named as the Free Officers Movement or the 1952 Egyptian Revolution. The riot was led by the Muslim Brotherhood Party secretly after the Arab-Israel War, which broke out in 1948. The prominent figures of the Muslim Brotherhood Party were Muhammad Naguib and Gamal AbdelNasser, who were influential officers in Egyptian army. They started the riot due to the attitude of the British government during the World War II and the Arab-Israel War. As well as the British government, King Farouk was seen as a puppet of the British although he pretended to be opposed to the presence of the British government in Egypt.⁸¹

As it was mentioned above, the Arab-Israel War (1948) was one of the essential points to be taken as a cause for the 1952. Egyptian. Revolution. Indeed, the 1948 Arab-Israel or the first Arab-Israel War broke out because of the State of Israel's claim about the Palestine issue. At that time, Palestine was a mandate state of the British, which disturbed not only Arabs but also Jewish people. Therefore, Arabic people revolted against the British authority. On the other hand, it can be pointed out that the Jewish also started an uprising against the British about Palestine rather than uniting with the Arabs and this turmoil turned into a civil war.⁸²

⁸⁰ McDermott, Anthony. *Egypt From Nasser to Mubarak: A Flawed Revolution*. Croom Helm Publication, 1988, p. 22-23.

⁸¹ McDermott, Anthony. *Egypt From Nasser to Mubarak: A Flawed Revolution*. Croom Helm Publication, 1988, p. 24-25-26.

⁸² McDermott, Anthony. *Egypt From Nasser to Mubarak: A Flawed Revolution*. Croom Helm Publication, 1988, p. 26-27.

In order to put an end to the war, the United Nations separated Palestine into three areas. Also, the Egyptian army participated in the military coalition of Arabs against the State of Israel and the British parliament but the war was ended with the Israel Declaration of Independence, which led an important change for the Arabs. In other words, the war resulted by going against the whole Arab world. By claiming the wrong policies of Farouk I during the 1948 Arab-Israel War as well as its ineffective political strategies in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood decided to make an alteration in the administration system of Egypt by making a revolution in 1952.⁸³

Afterwards, the Muslim Brotherhood established a new government by abrogating the previous one made by Farouk I. With the declaration of the new constitution, Egypt transformed its status into a republic in 1953, which was seen as a revolutionary action of the Muslim Brotherhood Party led by Gamal Abdel Nasser. After a short time, this occasion spread through all Arab world, which brought about Arab socialism under the leadership and opened the way that put an end to the dynasty of Muhammad Ali by changing the structure of the monarchy based on acceptable reasons such as the wrong policies in the 1948 Arab-Israel War and the annihilation of the British interference to the Egyptian policies by announcing the declaration of Republic of Egypt in 1952. Aftermath of the establishment of the Republic of Egypt and the change of the administration and the constitution system, Muhammad Naguib was appointed as the first President of Egypt Republic. In order to ensure the maintenance of the Republic of Egypt, all political parties were forced to unite under the name of “Liberation Rally Party”, which was seen as a rational action to conserve the authority of the republic.⁸⁴

Even though the Muslim Brotherhood Party was recognized as a milestone political group in the process of the transformation of Egypt into the status of the Republic, other political parties united under the Liberation Rally Party were seemed to be opposed to this idea and there was a struggle between the advocates of the two

⁸³ McDermott, Anthony. *Egypt From Nasser to Mubarak: A Flawed Revolution*. Croom Helm Publication, 1988, p. 33-34-35.

⁸⁴ Beattie, Kirk J. *Egypt during Nasser years: ideology, politics and civil society*. Westview Press, 1994, p 60-61.

parties. The struggle could not be resolved until Gamal Abdel Nasser became the leader of the Egyptian Revolutionary Command Council, which was established to provide the control over Egypt and Sudan in 1952. However, the RCC (the abbreviation of the Egyptian Revolutionary Command Council) only remained two years, and then it was disabled in 1954. By the way, Muhammad Naguib was deposed from his position and Nasser was considered to be the new Prime Minister of Egypt in 1954.⁸⁵

Due to the fact that the turmoil atmosphere could not be untied, Nasser was not be appointed as the Prime Minister of Egypt until 1956. Apart from the effects of the new status of Egypt on its internal affairs, this transformation also had a greater impact on its foreign affairs. Though the British was forced to leave from the Suez Canal region in 1949, they again put in a claim for the control over the Suez by refusing the new regime in Egypt, which was occurred before the RCC dissolved itself. Towards the unlawful action of the British government, the RCC tried to conciliate with the US and the USSR, who were the two great powers of the world.⁸⁶

Like the RCC, both the United States and the Soviet Union demanded the British to give up its claim over the Suez Canal Region but they became unsuccessful. Under the custody of the United Nations, Egypt made a treaty about the evacuation of the British military from the Suez Canal in 1954. However, the British again was opposed to this treaty but it was forced to sign. At first, the British resisted but later they left the Suez Canal Region two years after they signed the treaty. At that point, it can be clearly understood that the complete evacuation of the British from Egypt and the Suez Canal Region was carried out in 1956, which gained a full control to Egypt over the Suez Canal Region. After that, Egypt again focused on the regulations of its new administrative and constitution system.⁸⁷

⁸⁵ Beattie, Kirk J. *Egypt during Nasser years: ideology, politics and civil society*. Westview Press, 1994, p 62-63.

⁸⁶ Beattie, Kirk J. *Egypt during Nasser years: ideology, politics and civil society*. Westview Press, 1994, p 63-64.

⁸⁷ Beattie, Kirk J. *Egypt during Nasser years: ideology, politics and civil society*. Westview Press, 1994, p 64-65-66-67.

In 1956, Nasser officially became the President of Republic of Egypt and he established a new administrative structure. According to this structure, the president was the only authority and had right to appoint or depose ministers in the government. In fact, the structure of the newly established administration and constitution was emphasized as the same with the former one, Nasser gave importance to the National Union system and asked to preserve the National Assembly in accordance with the National Union aspect of the Republic of Egypt.⁸⁸

At the beginning of his presidency, Nasser aimed at the growth in economy through land reforms and agricultural productions. He developed some reformations about the land of Egypt. Actually, what he targeted with these land reformations was to increase the amount of the productions that were produced from agricultural areas and he reached his goal after a short time. Then, Nasser made these products to be sold to the Egyptian storekeepers and other domestic people to raise the revenue of the country to preserve the internal money flow in the country. In addition, Nasser continued to make political reformations to develop the foreign affairs of Republic of Egypt. At that time, the Cold War period had already began between the two great powers of the world; the US vs. the USSR. Both the US and the USSR established some political groups such as NATO and Warsaw Pact to create alliances for themselves. However, Nasser took part neither in NATO nor in Warsaw Pact and to get rid of the pressures of these two great powers, he established Non-Aligned bloc and gathered independent nations, which were reluctant to participate in NATO or Warsaw Pact.⁸⁹

Apart from the Non-Aligned group, Nasser was also called with the Baghdad Pact in 1955. Like Egypt, the Middle East had also been a significant area in aspect of its strategic situation. As a result, the British planned to unite all states under the Baghdad Pact to ensure its complete control over the Middle East Region, which was necessary to make the Arab Nations set at odds. As Egypt was accepted as the

⁸⁸ Baker, Raymond William. *Egypt's uncertain revolution under Nasser and Sadat*. Harvard University Press, London, 1978, p. 42-43.

⁸⁹ Baker, Raymond William. *Egypt's uncertain revolution under Nasser and Sadat*. Harvard University Press, London, 1978, p. 45-46-47.

leading power among other Arab nations, the British offered Nasser to join into the Baghdad Pact. However, Nasser was aware of the real interest of the British hidden behind the name of the Baghdad Pact, which was about the destruction of Arab unity by creating struggles among Arab states. Therefore, Nasser refused to participate in the Baghdad Pact, which frustrated the British and caused them to provoke Jordan against Nasser. Since Jordan was one of the neighbours of Egypt, the British offered Jordan to join to the Baghdad Pact and forced Jordan to become a part of the Baghdad Pact to make Nasser alone in the region as the only country that declined the part but Nasser also interfered with this situation and deterred Jordan from taking a part into the Baghdad Pact.⁹⁰

As a matter of fact, Nasser understood the purpose of the British about Jordan's membership into the Baghdad Pact and it can be easily that Nasser also planned to use Jordan in terms of his own country's interest. Although being a member of the Baghdad Pact would affect Jordan's policy in accordance of its both internal and external affairs, which was seen as the primary subject that Nasser dealt with, he actually aimed at establishing his own authority over Jordan by preventing its membership from the Baghdad Pact. Thus, Nasser implemented an anti-British policy in Jordan through Egyptian campaigns and tried to convince King Hüssein, who was the ruler of Jordan about the rejection of the Baghdad Pact. In order to persuade King Hüssein, Nasser made a claim about the possibility of the government reshuffle in case of Jordan's membership into the Baghdad Pact by making rational speeches over Egypt's policy after its refusal of the Baghdad Pact. Through this way, Nasser attempted to reach his goal over Jordan by claiming that the British planned to overthrow the Jordan regime and King Hüssein by using the Baghdad Pact. Actually, Nasser also emphasized that some changes for King Hüssein's regime was necessary to cope with the British and the rejection of the Baghdad Pact was also an advantageous decision for King Hüssein.⁹¹

⁹⁰ Baker, Raymond William. *Egypt's uncertain revolution under Nasser and Sadat*. Harvard University Press, London, 1978, p. 50-51-52.

⁹¹ Baker, Raymond William. *Egypt's uncertain revolution under Nasser and Sadat*. Harvard University Press, London, 1978, p. 58-59-60.

After all these occasions, King Hüssein turned down to be a member in the Baghdad Pact in respect of Jordan's future. Also, it can be figured out that Nasser achieved to persuade King Hüssein about the unity of Arab Nationalism, which brought about some alterations occurred against the British in Jordan. In other words, King Hüssein got enough courage to make the British leave from Egypt aftermath of the decline of the Baghdad Pact. As a result, King Hüssein demanded the British General John Bagot Glubb to leave from Jordan in 1956. By the way, Nasser was dealing with the construction of the Aswan High Dam, which was a crucial project for Egypt but there was not enough money to afford this project, which led Nasser call for help from the World Bank in 1956. Also, the Soviet Union offered Nasser to give necessary loan for the completion of Aswan High Dam, which was immediately accepted by Egypt. However, the agreement between the Soviet Union and Egypt enraged the founders of the World Bank (the British and the US).⁹²

Also, the USSR helped Nasser by supplying military equipment aside from the agreement. Based on all these events, the US and the British parliament called off money supply that was supposed to be provided by the World Bank. Indeed, Nasser was seemed to accomplish his goal, which was a complete sovereignty over the Suez Canal, which was actualized in 1956 but there were still some amount of the British share of the company in the Suez Canal Region. However, the rapprochement of Nasser with the USSR emerged a great alteration for the British relation of Egypt, which increased the tension between Egypt and the British.⁹³

In meantime, the construction of Aswan High Dam project was began with the financial supply provided by the USSR. In addition to the loss of its share at the company located in the Suez Canal Region, the British was also taken a knock from Egypt through the aid of the USSR, which also disturbed the US due to the presence of the USSR behind Egypt. Because of all these occasions, the British and the French parliaments made a plan to destroy Nasser's authority by persuading the United

⁹² Baker, Raymond William. *Egypt's uncertain revolution under Nasser and Sadat*. Harvard University Press, London, 1978, p. 60-61.

⁹³ Dawisha, A. I. *Egypt in the Arab world: The elements of foreign policy*. Macmillan, London, 1976, p. 83-84-85.

States that they had made a mistake by making the Muslim Brotherhood Party as the party in power. As a result, the French and the British made alliances towards Egypt, which was also supported by Israel and their attitude towards Egypt named as the Anglo-French-Israeli tripartite. According to their alliances, the control of the Suez Canal Region would be taken by the British and the French and the territory of Egypt would be taken by the Israel government after the destruction of Nasser authority.⁹⁴

In fact, Israel made an alliance with the British and the French government due to the popularity of Nasser's authority. By way of explanation, Nasser's "Egyptionization" politics was discerned as a threat by Israel since Egypt was the most powerful neighbour of Israel. Henceforth, Israel joined the group established by the British and the French to remove the regime of Nasser. On the other hand, the two European powers had a different plan rather than Israel's plan. Indeed, the European powers planned to use Israel as a pattern to Egypt about the Suez Canal issue since Nasser was supposed as a menacing factor by Israel. Based on this reason, the British and the French made Israel break out a war against Egypt and Gaza and Sinai were bombarded by Israel forces on 29 October, 1956.⁹⁵

Aftermath of Israel attack, the two European powers took action to make an assault towards the Suez Canal through their naval forces due to a term of the Suez Canal Treaty that gave a permission of a right to provide law and order at the Suez Canal Zone in case of a war. By using this term of the Treaty that was mentioned above, the British and the French planned a military landing to Egypt as well as a naval operation to the Suez Canal area. Despite their operation plans, they faced an obstacle. Though they were supposed to occupy Egypt and the Suez Canal Region by defeating Nasser's army. That is to say, the United States intervened their actions by asserting their economic dependence. As there was an economic recession in Europe aftermath of the Second World War, the economies of the European powers were also affected and had to take financial support by the US. At that point, it can be

⁹⁴ Dawisha, A. I. *Egypt in the Arab world: The elements of foreign policy*. Macmillan, London, 1976, p. 87-88-89.

⁹⁵ Dawisha, A. I. *Egypt in the Arab world: The elements of foreign policy*. Macmillan, London, 1976, p. 92-93.

easily said that their economies could survive with the investments based on the US companies especially some American oil companies, which made a great deal of capital investments in Britain and France. Hence, the two European powers had to withdraw their forces on account of the United States' compulsion since the plans of the British and the French about Egypt was a handicap for the enlargement of the United States' oil companies in the Middle East Region.⁹⁶

By the way, the US also laid an oil embargo on Britain, which caused the deterioration in the British economy. Like the British, the French was also treated as a kick in the teeth because of the oil embargo laid by the United States but the French acted in a different manner in contrast to the British. The French government set against the US by accusing them of doing their best to carry out their interest in the Middle East without making any alliances with the British and the French. Instead, the French attempted to make propagandas against the US to undermine their hegemonic policy based on Arab nationalism and anti-colonialism to destroy the presence of the two European powers.⁹⁷

Consequently, the United States flied in the face of the actions of the two European powers towards Egypt, which also emphasized the certainty of the loss of British sovereignty over Egypt and the Suez Canal Region. In additon, all British investments and companies were forced to be sold to Egypt in order to nationalize them and to remove the presence of the British overall. What can also be inferred from this outcome was that the United States resistance against the British and the French's expansion over the Middlle East was actually an action, which illustrated the Western superioty policy derived from the United States prevailed the European dominance policy, which had been lasted for centuries. In other words, the British plan of taking the control over the Suez Canal Region was ended through the Muslim Brotherhood Party Movement, the 1952 Egyptian Revolution and lastly the

⁹⁶ Dawisha, A. I. *Egypt in the Arab world: The elements of foreign policy*. Macmillan, London, 1976, p. 93-94-95.

⁹⁷ Kerr, Malcolm. *The Arab Cold War: Gamal Abd-Al Nasir and his Rivals, 1958-1970*. Oxford University Press, 1971, p.85-86-87.

opposition of the US against the Suez Canal Treaty, which also stated that the US supremacy defeated the European supremacy in the Middle East issue.⁹⁸

2.4.1.2. United Arab Republic (1958-1971)

In 1958, Nasser set up the United Arab Republic, which opened the way Egypt's union with Syria. However, Syria's changing regime led to the detachment of the country from the United Arab Republic in 1961 but Egypt remained a member of the union and continued its presence until the UAR was dissolved itself in 1971. When the point of origin was examined, it can be clearly emphasized that the United Arab Republic derived from pan-Arabism was the predominant movement especially in Syria towards the end of the 1950s. Since Nasser became a prominent figure in the Arab world after taking the control of the Suez Canal overall in 1956, Egypt also aroused Syria's interest, which emerged the idea of the union with Egypt promoted by the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party in Syria. Also, the communist movement was spread fast through Syria as it was supported by its political figures but this caused the Syrian Civil War occurred in 1957. In fact, the Civil War was based on the struggle between the Syrians promoting the union with Egypt and the other group opposing to this union idea since they were communists. The promoters of the union called for help from Nasser and Nasser advised them to dismiss the Syrian communists from their assembly as the Syrian government could not prevent the campaigns of the Syrian Communist Party. For all these reasons, the Syrian government was supposed to believe that the participation of Syria into a unity with Egypt was the only way to get rid of the communist supporters in the assembly in Syria.⁹⁹

Consequently, Syria accepted to set up the United Arab Republic with Nasser though the Syrian government disagreed with some terms of the charter that was prepared for the United Arab Republic (UAR). In the end, Syria and Egypt came together under the name of the United Arab Republic (UAR). After the unification, Egypt and Syria began to carry out political and economic works to bring into

⁹⁸ Kerr, Malcolm. *The Arab Cold War: Gamal Abd-Al Nasir and his Rivals, 1958-1970*. Oxford University Press, 1971, p.89-90.

⁹⁹ Kerr, Malcolm. *The Arab Cold War: Gamal Abd-Al Nasir and his Rivals, 1958-1970*. Oxford University Press, 1971, p.103-104.

balance between two countries in 1960. In this sense, Nasser tried to make reforms in economy based on the nationalization of foreign companies and firms in Syria as he had done in Egypt before. Also, he made land reformations, which had been done in Egypt. In order to increase the income taken from the agricultural productions, Nasser made some land reformstions the same as in Egypt. Through all these implemetations about the reformations, Nasser aimed at making Syria keep pace with Egypt. However, his attitude was misunderstood by the Syrians since Nasser was the only leader of the United Arab Republic and drafted all these implementations on the behalf of Egypt and Syria, which emerged the secession of Syria from the union. Without setting up a new administrative system for the United Arab Republic, Nasser focused on the restoration works for Syria to develop the country and to make Syria at the same level with Egypt.¹⁰⁰

Besides, Nasser rejected to get help from Syria to rule the union which could be seen as the most essential factor of the discountenance of Syria. Meanwhile, the Ba'ath Party began to lose its power while the National Union Party started to rise dependent on Nasser's insufficient policies. After a short time, the National Union Party won the election and overthrew the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party and Sarraj became the new president of Syria in 1961.

All these rapid changes made Nasser think about the necessity of the establishment of a new authority for the survival of the United Arab Republic by ignoring the annoyance of the Syrian people. On the pretext that Sarraj was deposed by Nasser's demand, the Syrian military started a revolt, which was later converted into a coup to remove the party in power and to make the secession of Syria from the United Arab Republic. Shortly after, the Syrian military group announced the seperation of Syria from the UAR by protesting Nasser's implementation projects as unequal and they declared the sovereignty of Syria. In response to this, Nasser remained unresponsive because his forces had been neutralized by the Syrian military before the revolt took place. All in all, the United Arab Republic collapsed

¹⁰⁰ Kerr, Malcolm. *The Arab Cold War: Gamal Abd-Al Nasir and his Rivals, 1958-1970*. Oxford University Press, 1971, p.106-107-108.

in 1968 but the union actually dissolved itself in 1971 when Nasser realized that his “Arab Union” idea was a futile dream.¹⁰¹

2.4.2. Egypt under Anwar Sadat (1967-1980)

2.4.2.1. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War (1973)

The Arab-Israeli War, which was also called the Yom Kippur War, broke out between Israel and the union of the Arab States, which was gathered under the command of Egypt and Syria. The reason of the emergence of the war was the result of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, in which Israel took over Sinai located in the border of Egypt and the Golan Heights in Syria. With the intervention of the United Nations, Israel was compelled to halt the invasion and withdraw from the territories that they had occupied during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. By ignoring the UN’s overture, Israel offered to make an agreement with Egypt and Syria about the Sinai territory and the Golan Heights located in Syria. According to the agreement drafted by Israel, Israel accepted to withdraw from Sinai and the Golan Heights on the condition that the strategic areas located in both Sinai and the Golan Heights would be disarmed and these areas would be under the administration of Israel, which was turned down by violent means. In addition, the Arab states union including Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Sudan, Kuwait, which was guided by Egypt and Syria, met at the 1967 Arab Summit and declared that they would neither recognize nor negotiate with Israel for making a peace settlement or a treaty.¹⁰²

Aftermath of Nasser’s death, Anwar Sadat became the new president of Egypt and followed a moderate policy towards Israel rather than Nasser. Sadat proposed Israel to withdraw completely in return for the recognition of its sovereignty by Egypt. As a matter of fact, what was implied under Sadat’s offer to Israel was that Egypt, as one of the Arab states met at the 1967 Arab Summit, attempted to show its

¹⁰¹ Kerr, Malcolm. *The Arab Cold War: Gamal Abd-Al Nasir and his Rivals, 1958-1970*. Oxford University Press, 1971, p.109.

¹⁰² Quandt, William. *Decade of Decisions: American Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967-1976*. Berkely: University of California Press, 1977, p. 53-54.https://www.jstor.org/stable/23447199?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.

accommodationist attitude about making a peace agreement with Israel to change the resolutions about the Sinai territory and Gaza. Even though Israel was not seemed to lean towards Egypt's offer, Egypt insisted on its offer and Sadat was not seemed to give up the Gaza Strip issue or the Sinai border, which frustrated Golda Meir, who was the Prime Minister of Israel unlike the United Nations Security Council. Apart from the United Nations, the United States also showed its reaction to Israel's aggressive rise against Egypt's overture by stating Israel's interest over the Sinai area. As a result, Sadat asserted that the official territory of Egypt could be changed in terms of the Sinai area through the supports of the US and the UN to Egypt.¹⁰³

On the other hand, Syria was of different opinions from Egypt. Making a negotiation or a peace treaty with Israel was believed as impossible by the Syrian government. Thus, the only way to take the Golan Heights back from Israel was to attack suddenly according to the Syrians. In spite of the fact that Sadat was opposed to the idea of the emergence of a war between Israel and Egypt, he was aware that Israel was not seemed to accept his proposal due to the strategic importance of the Sinai area. Furthermore, Sadat was not a popular figure as much as Nasser and the setback of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War was seen as Sadat's failure. For this reason, making a successful attack plan against Israel was seemed to be logical by Sadat and the possibility of the defeat of the Israel forces would be attainable as long as Egypt made an alliance with Syria, which was ready to destroy the integrity of Israel's territory.¹⁰⁴

In order to take the revenge of the Israel's instantaneous attacks against the territories of Egypt and Syria, the two Arab states made all Arab countries gather to make an alliance towards Israel and created the Arab union bloc to attack Israel suddenly as Israel had done to them in 1967. However, neither Egypt nor Syria got expected reactions from other Arab states due to Henry Kissinger's campaigns about the probability of the loss of Egypt and Syria in a war against Israel. As far as it goes,

¹⁰³ Quandt, William. *Decade of Decisions: American Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967-1976*. Berkely: University of California Press, 1977, p. 54-55. https://www.jstor.org/stable/23447199?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.

¹⁰⁴ Cleveland, William L. and Bunton, Martin. *A History of the Modern Middle East*. Westview Press, 6th Edition, Boulder-Colorado, 2012, p.308-309.

Henry Kissinger, who was the United States Secretary of States, also made a suggestion to Sadat in order to prevent a potential war between Israel and Egypt-Syria but Sadat refused Kissinger's proposal by stating that his proposal was the same as Israel's offer about the strategic points located in the Sinai area. As a result, the conciliation of Kissinger meant nothing for Sadat since the war was the only rational solution to gain the confidence of the Egyptians for the safety of Sadat's authority and to take the Sinai territory back from Israel.¹⁰⁵

When in fact, there was a struggle between Israel and the two Arab states, the two hegemonic countries; that is to say, the United States and the Soviet Union also intervened in the occasion. To put it in different way, Egypt-Syria and Israel called for help from both the Western bloc and the Communist bloc, which can be understood from Sadat's visit to the USSR aftermath of the offer of Henry Kissinger. During his visit, Sadat demanded a military aid from the Soviet Union by declaring the importance of the USSR's help for Egypt. On the basis of the Sinai area, Sadat uttered his target and his fear about the US interference in case of the absence of the Soviet Union's support. In order to convince the USSR, Sadat even offered to have a go at the USSR's ammunition when a probable war broke out between Israel and Egypt-Syria. As late as, it can be easily understood that this was only Sadat's draft, which was out of the Soviet Union's interest. For the USSR, it was an unreasonable plan, which was seemed to incite them in a new crisis with the United States. Almost immediately, the USSR and the US met to discuss this situation of Israel and Egypt. In the end, both the Soviet Union and the United States showed their consents about the protection of the integrity of Egypt-Syria and Israel territories. Also, the USSR informed the US about a probable assault of Egypt against Israel by stating Sadat's demand about the ammunition from them.¹⁰⁶

For all these reasons that were mentioned above, Egypt and Syria made assaults against the territory of Israel with the help of the Arab union bloc on 6

¹⁰⁵ Cleveland, William L. and Bunton, Martin. *A History of the Modern Middle East*. Westview Press, 6th Edition, Boulder-Colorado, 2012, p.309.

¹⁰⁶ Cleveland, William L. and Bunton, Martin. *A History of the Modern Middle East*. Westview Press, 6th Edition, Boulder-Colorado, 2012, p.310-312.

October, 1973. Indeed, the date of their attack was also one of the factors that triggered Israel because they intentionally planned to wage the war on Yom Kippur, which was a religious date for the Jewish people. The beginning of the war took place in the Suez Canal Region, where Egypt violated the terms of the truce that had signed at the end of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. By neglecting this truce, Egypt made a military landing into the Sinai area on 11 October, 1973. At the same time, the Syrians made an attack against the Golan Heights as Israel had overtaken the territory of the Golan Heights aftermath of the ceasefire made between Syria and Israel. However, the Syrian forces were repulsed by the Israeli military and then, Israel countered into the territory of Syria and marched towards Damascus.¹⁰⁷

By the way, Anwar Sadat ordered to make an attack to Sinai, which was supposed to weaken Israel but they could not achieve their goal through their offensive attempt against Israel. Like Syria, the Egyptian forces were also repulsed by the Israeli military as a defense. Afterwards, Israel made a counter-offensive against Egypt and dropped bombs to the Suez Canal Region and Egypt. On 3 December, 1973, the war between the Arabs and the Jewish escalated due to the resistance of Egypt. At the east of the Suez Canal Region, Egypt continued to resist though the other Egyptian troops had already been defeated by the Israeli army. At that point, it can be definitely said that the US intervention became compulsory for the sake of Egypt because of the Suez Canal issue.¹⁰⁸

To tell the truth, the United States stood up for being abstaining towards the Arab-Israeli War but Kissinger tried to persuade the US government about the US ammunition to Israel. On the contrary to the US National Security Council's inference about Israel, Kissinger stood behind the possibility of the victory of Israel at the end of the war. Based on this idea, Kissinger upheld the necessity of the US aid to Israel to gain an alliance about their policy in Arab peninsula, which became logical to the United States Defence Department. During the war, the US Air force

¹⁰⁷ Cleveland, William L. and Bunton, Martin. *A History of the Modern Middle East*. Westview Press, 6th Edition, Boulder-Colorado, 2012, p.312-313.

¹⁰⁸ Sheean, Edward R. F. *The Arabs, Israelis and Kissinger: "A Secret history of American diplomacy in the Middle East"*. Readers Digest Press, 1st Edition, New York, 1976, p. 50-51-52.

gave weaponry supply to Israel for its operations against the Arab union bloc guided by Egypt and Syria. As it was mentioned above, it can be absolutely understood that the US tried to make an arbitration between Israel and Egypt despite of its military aid to Israel during the triggered course of the war. Even, the United States extravagated by asserting the UN resolution to make Israel pull back from Egypt and the Suez Canal Region but nothing stood in front of Israel and Israel continued its military operations at the Suez Canal Region; in other words, Israel tried to destroy the Egyptian third (last) army so as to end the Egyptian resistance completely. After a short time, Israel reached its goal and gained the victory against the Egyptian trapped troop in the Suez Canal Region, which caused a ceasefire between Israel and Egypt.¹⁰⁹

However, the war could not be halted by the ceasefire due to the ongoing Egyptian operations to Israel. Though Israel's military superiority and the defeat of the Egyptian army were undeniable facts, Sadat still insisted to withstand against Israel by ignoring his army's heavy loss. No matter how Egypt withstood, they failed to turn the faith of the war for the good of themselves. Being unaware of the deteriorated situation of his country, Sadat decided to pull back and put an end to this war. Also, Egypt was inadequate in terms of the military supply to push the Israel defense forces from the Suez Canal Region. Besides, the Israel defense forces had already broken into Egypt and captured Cairo beforehand Sadat's resistance at the Suez Canal Region. As a result, it was an unreasonable attitude to proceed the war for Egypt, which was seemed to be a late decision.¹¹⁰

By the way, Syria, which took the ammunition from the USSR like Egypt, became unsuccessful against the Israeli army on the Golan Heights but as its ally, Syria also withstood against the Israeli forces. As well as the USSR aid, Syria got help from Iraq like its ally Egypt, which took help of Jordan. Since Jordan was one of the neighbours of Israel, Jordan informed that their military aid to Egypt was not

¹⁰⁹ Sheean, Edward R. F. *The Arabs, Israelis and Kissinger*: "A Secret history of American diplomacy in the Middle East". Readers Digest Press, 1st Edition, New York, 1976, p. 52-53.

¹¹⁰ Sheean, Edward R. F. *The Arabs, Israelis and Kissinger*: "A Secret history of American diplomacy in the Middle East". Readers Digest Press, 1st Edition, New York, 1978, p. 53-54-55.

seemed to be an indicator of waging a war against Israel as an ally of Egypt, which prevented the misunderstanding of Israel. In contrast to Jordan, Iraq had a different attitude against Israel. As a military aid to Syria, Iraq suddenly attacked to the Israel defense forces, which ended up with the loss of the Iraqi army on 20 October, 1973. Then, the Syrian army tried to resist to the Israel defense forces through its limited ammunition. In order to prevent the Soviet Union's military supplies to Syria, the Israel defense forces made air operations against the USSR air forces, which had landed in Syria. Aftermath of its successful air operation, Israel cut Syria's military aid from the USSR and drafted Syria into the setback. On that account, Syria demanded to make an end of the like Egypt in 1973.¹¹¹

To make these attacks occurred between two neighbours out of nothing, the United Nations intervened since it also affected both the Western and the Communist bloc and tried to persuade for the conciliation, which was rejected by Israel. However, there was an armistice made between Israel and Egypt-Syria by the compulsion of the United States and the Soviet Union but Israel continued its military operations by neglecting the ceasefire. Therewith, Kissinger butted in and gave support to the UN's new resolution for the war between Israel and the Arab States. Kissinger made a call to Israel to abide by the resolution of the UN by emphasizing its ongoing attacks, which was seen as the mediation initiative attempts of the US. By the way, it can be clearly understood that Egypt offered to negotiate with Israel without the presence of any reconcilers. Indeed, it was an advice of Kissinger to Sadat to make Israel understand that Egypt was the supporter of conciliation.¹¹²

2.4.2.2. The Arab-Israeli Peace (1979)

After a short time, Kissinger declared that the US opinion about the necessity of the adherence of the UN resolution for Israel as well as by pointing out the Arab union's concern about the territories that Israel had invaded by claiming that these

¹¹¹ Sheean, Edward R. F. *The Arabs, Israelis and Kissinger: "A Secret history of American diplomacy in the Middle East"*. Readers Digest Press, 1st Edition, New York, 1978, p. 60-61-62.

¹¹² Sheean, Edward R. F. *The Arabs, Israelis and Kissinger: "A Secret history of American diplomacy in the Middle East"*. Readers Digest Press, 1st Edition, New York, 1978, p. 61-62.

areas were under its own sovereignty. As a result, Israel was convinced and the talks for negotiations were began.¹¹³

On 1 December, 1973, the United States and the Soviet Union held a summit in Geneva, in which all countries in the war (Israel, Egypt, Syria, Jordan) were asked to take part in the conference. Actually, the conference was derived from the resolution of the United Nations Security Council. However, Syria rejected to attend te summit, which changed the course of the ceasefire. Based on the Syrian refusal, Kissinger stepped in and the conference, which was supposed to be held in Geneva, was resulted in a misfortune and arranged reciprocal negotiation between the Arab states and Israel. In line with this target, Kissinger focused on the suspension of arms as the first step of the mutual negotiations between Israel and Egypt. Through the term of the suspension of arms, Israel withdrew not only from the Suez Canal Region, but also from Egypt except for the Sinai area. In terms of the resolution, the United Nations drew a security line by getting 10 miles from the territory of Egypt including the Sinai area. From that point, it can be implied that Israel reached its aim about the Sinai area thanks to the UN's resolution. With regard to the resolution, the United Nations Disengagement and Observer Force (UNDOF) determined an area between the borders of Israel and Egypt. Although the Sinai area was divided into two in an equal way, Israel gained ground about the Sinai area under favour of the UN's resolution in the agreement made with Egypt whereas the half of the Sinai area was bereaved from Egypt due to the security zone among Israel and Egypt. Likewise, Kissinger also made reciprocal conciliations between Israel and Syria, which was based on the suspension of arms that was the same as with the agreement between Israel and Egypt. In addition, the UN Disengagement and Observer Force (UNDOF) stated the safe zone in the Golan Heights in Syria as it had been done between the borders of Israel and Egypt before.¹¹⁴

¹¹³ Dayan, Moshe. *Breakthrough: A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1981, cited in Melvin A. Friedlander. *Sadat and Begin* "the domestic politics of peacemaking". Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1983, p.99-100.

¹¹⁴ Dayan, Moshe. *Breakthrough: A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1981, cited in Melvin A. Friedlander. *Sadat and Begin* "the domestic politics of peacemaking". Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1983, p.100

All these indicate that the Arab-Israel War destroyed both the integrity of the Egyptian and the Syrian territories. Also, the mediation initiative attempts of the United States between the Arab states and Israel became a pacesetter action, which led the 1978 Camp David Accords. To tell the truth, the 1978 Camp David Accords was the another name of the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty. In contravention of the peace agreement, both Egypt and Syria had planned to take the Golan Heights and the Sinai areas by means of the war with Israel but the contrary to their expectations, the result of the war gave rise to an adverse outcome; that is to say, Israel proved its military superiority over the Arab world while Egypt lost its reputation as the most powerful country in the Arab world.¹¹⁵

Nevertheless, Egypt and Syria embraced the peace treaty with Israel. Besides, Sadat held out the olive branch to Israel by stating that he aimed at meeting with the President of Israel, whose name was Menachem Begin. After a short time, Sadat made a direct negotiation with Menachem Begin to provide a more steady agreement with Israel by indicating that Egypt was ready to recognize the sovereignty of Israel through establishing intimate relations with them. At that point, it can be easily figured out that Sadat's attitude towards Israel was seen as a milestone action since Sadat was the first Arab President, who made direct talks with Israel by underlining the recognition of Israel by Egypt. From that point, it can be exactly concluded that the peace treaty progress got over between Israel and Egypt thanks to the reconciliation works of the US. Without slowing down, the peace agreement progress went on under the supervision of the United States and the United Nations.¹¹⁶

In this sense, Sadat and Begin got together at a summit that was held in Camp David by the United States on 5 September, 1978. As the summit was held in Camp David located in the United States of America, the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt was named as the Camp David Accords, which was signed on 17 September,

¹¹⁵ Dayan, Moshe. *Breakthrough: A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1981, cited in Melvin A. Friedlander. *Sadat and Begin* "the domestic politics of peacemaking". Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1983, p.103-104.

¹¹⁶ Dayan, Moshe. *Breakthrough: A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1981, cited in Melvin A. Friedlander. *Sadat and Begin* "the domestic politics of peacemaking". Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1983, p.104.

1978. The Camp David Accords emphasized that Israel and Egypt made a long lasting peace agreement. In terms of the peace treaty, Israel gave the Sinai area to Egypt completely, which strengthened their relations afterwards. Unlike Egypt, Syria made nothing for the reconciliation with Israel and there was not any official peace treaty made between Syria and Israel. By the way, Egypt's intimate relationship with Israel got negative reactions from the other Arab states, especially from the ones, which Egypt had asked for the military supplies during its war with Israel. After a short time, the exclusion of Egypt from the Arab States League was occurred based on the Arab states' anger towards Egypt about its relationship with Israel in 1979.¹¹⁷

In addition, Sadat lost his reputation for the second time on the eyes of the Egyptian people as well as on the eyes of the Arab world. In fact, Egypt's situation can be described ideally with an idiom; "pay a left handed compliment" because on the one hand, Egypt took a major step to make good relationships with Israel and managed to establish a stable relation with Israel through the Camp David Accords. On the other hand, the Arab world recognized Egypt's intimate relation with Israel through the peace agreement as a betrayal to themselves, which caused Sadat's death by an assassination during a celebration in Cairo, Egypt in 1980.¹¹⁸

2.5. Egypt under Hosni Mubarak (1981-2011)

Aftermath of Anwar Sadat's death, Hosni Mubarak, who was the vice president of Sadat, was elected as the new president of Egypt. Before the beginning of Mubarak's presidency, there was a chaotic atmosphere in Cairo based on the political restrictions made under the name of reformations by Sadat. By the way, there were some new political parties came into existence at the end of Sadat's presidency. Among these parties, the National Democratic Party (1978-2011) was the most well-known and appreciated one compared to others. Although Mubarak was the vice

¹¹⁷ Dayan, Moshe. *Breakthrough: A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1981, cited in Melvin A. Friedlander. *Sadat and Begin* "the domestic politics of peacemaking". Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1983, p.104-105.

¹¹⁸ Dayan, Moshe. *Breakthrough: A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1981, cited in Melvin A. Friedlander. *Sadat and Begin* "the domestic politics of peacemaking". Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1983, p.126-127.

president at Sadat's Presidency, he was also a member of the National Democratic Party. In order to solve the disorder in political situation of Egypt, it can be clearly understood that a plebiscite became compulsory for the restoration of Egypt's policy. Ultimately, a plebiscite was carried out for the restoration of Egypt and Mubarak won the election as a member of the National Democratic Party by a long way.¹¹⁹

As far as it goes, the National Democratic Party was the most powerful one in contrast to the other political parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood Party though the Muslim Brotherhood Party was the most long-established one throughout Egypt's political history at that time. However, the Muslim Brotherhood Party was based on religious doctrines since its campaigns consisted of religious issues and its members also made religious speeches, which caused the party to lose its electors. Therefore, it can be easily said that the victory of the National Democratic Party became inevitable in the plebiscite held in 1981. In spite of the fact that Mubarak was elected as the fourth president of Egypt after Sadat, there were a great deal of antipathetical political groups that were totally opposed to Mubarak's presidency at that time. As well as these political groups, there were some uprisings such as the 6th April Youth Movement, (which is also called the bread and butter uprising) occurred in Cairo to rattle the result of the election. Since Mubarak was elected a few months later after Sadat's assassination, there were some outbreaks happened which was mentioned above due to the absence of an authority in Egypt but Mubarak recognized that there was a tendency towards the Islamist regime ideology in the army. Thus, Mubarak gave importance to gain the loyalty of the army, which had been destructed by Sadat because of his foreign policy aftermath of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. At that point, it can be clearly understood that the Mubarak's regime was unable to put an end to these uprisings without the support of the military.¹²⁰

¹¹⁹ Amer, Mohammed Youssef. *Egypt between the Superpowers: Continuity and Change in Egyptian Foreign Policy under Mubarak*, California: Naval Postgraduate School, 1984. cited in Shama, Nael Mohammed. *Egyptian Foreign Policy from Mubarak to Morsi* "Against the National Interest". Routledge Press: London and New York, 2014, p. 61-62.

¹²⁰ Amer, Mohammed Youssef. *Egypt between the Superpowers: Continuity and Change in Egyptian Foreign Policy under Mubarak*, California: Naval Postgraduate School, 1984. cited in Shama, Nael Mohammed. *Egyptian Foreign Policy from Mubarak to Morsi* "Against the National Interest". Routledge Press: London and New York, 2014, p. 62-63.

By the way, Mubarak was also anxious about the spread of the Islamic fundamentalism ideology, which was derived from the phenomenon that was about making Egypt a non-aligned power again. During Nasser's presidency, the non-aligned movement was one of the ideologies of that was effective in Egypt but nothing remained the same after Nasser. As it is inferred from the part about Nasser, neither Sadat nor Mubarek were not compared to him in terms of the ideologies and revolutions that Nasser had made before them on the eyes of the Egyptians. Therefore, it can be understood that the Islamic fundamentalism was emerged by the Islamist military officers as a reaction to the Mubarak's authority, which was also mentioned in the well-known political magazines such as *The Sunday Times* and *The Guardian*. However, foreign countries such as the United States had an anti-optimistic perspective towards Mubarak's challenge with the Islamist reaction. At that point, it can be exactly said that after Mubarak had entered upon his office, he actually tried to restore the law and order in Egypt but nothing was changed in the administrative or the constitution system of Egypt. From Sadat's presidency, the administration system of Egypt was a kind of a semi-presidential one but there were some emergency law rules that came into play in case of emergency. All these remained the same after Mubarak's presidency.¹²¹

Moreover, Mubarak focused on foreign affairs, which were needed to be restored immediately. Initially, Mubarak aimed at establishing a good connection with the Arab states again. In this sense, Mubarak gave a start for negotiations to reenter the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, which was established in 1969, since Egypt was dismissed in 1979 because of Sadat's sincere relation with Israel. However, Mubarak attempted to rejoin and Egypt was accepted to the union (OIC) again in 1984. Besides, Mubarak set sight on the Arab League, which was established in 1945. In spite of the fact that Egypt was one of the charter members of the union, it was disposed due to the same factor that was mentioned above. However, Mubarak

¹²¹ L. Cantori, "Egypt Reenters the Arab State System," in *The Middle East From the Iran-Contra Affair to the Intifada*. Robert O. Freedman (ed), Syracuse: Syracuse UP, 1990, 344-45, cited in Shama, Nael Mohammed. *Egyptian Foreign Policy from Mubarak to Morsi* "Against the National Interest". Routledge Press: London and New York, 2014, p. 65.

never gave up and reached its aim at last, which was about the adhesion of Egypt to the Arab League and Egypt again was a member of the union in 1989.¹²²

In a short time, Egypt became the prominent figure in both unions based on its own cultural background, socio-demographic structure and economic potential compared to other Arab states. Like Sadat, Mubarak was also aware that the US superiority over the USSR was an incontestable fact as the United States dominated the world economy, which made the US the hegemonic power of the world. Therefore, Mubarak focused on improving the relationship with the US rather than the USSR as Sadat had done before. At that point, it can be easily inferred that the Camp David Accords was the milestone step for the beginning of the intimate relations not only with Israel but also with the US, which had been a reconciler between Egypt and Israel. Afterwards, Egypt accelerated its relation with the US in the purpose of getting profit by the US, which was definitely seen in Mubarak's policy towards the US.¹²³

In this regard, Mubarak was expected to do everything in accordance with the US orders, which can be understood from Egypt's ally with the US during the Gulf War in 1991. Under the leadership of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Syria, the Saudi Arabia and Egypt and other 30 states made a coalition and organized a military operation towards Iraq, which had invaded Kuwait. Although Egypt used its military power near its full capacity, the economic situation of Egypt was never affected. Instead, it can be easily said that the war enriched Egypt government's budget through the US enormous financial support to Egypt. As well as the US support, the European powers also gave financial support to Egypt to encourage Mubarak during

¹²² L. Cantori, "Egypt Reenters the Arab State System," in *The Middle East From the Iran-Contra Affair to the Intifada*. Robert O. Freedman (ed), Syracuse: Syracuse UP, 1990, 344-45, cited in Shama, Nael Mohammed. *Egyptian Foreign Policy from Mubarak to Morsi* "Against the National Interest". Routledge Press: London and New York, 2014, p. 66-67.

¹²³ L. Cantori, "Egypt Reenters the Arab State System," in *The Middle East From the Iran-Contra Affair to the Intifada*. Robert O. Freedman (ed), Syracuse: Syracuse UP, 1990, 344-45, cited in Shama, Nael Mohammed. *Egyptian Foreign Policy from Mubarak to Morsi* "Against the National Interest". Routledge Press: London and New York, 2014, p. 68.

the Gulf War in 1991. However, they had different intentions under their actions, which came out of in Mursi's presidency.¹²⁴

Unlike Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak followed the same policy both in foreign affairs and internal subjects of Egypt. To put it more explicitly, Sadat and Mubarak were not concerned with making Egypt a regional hegemonic state by extending his country's sovereignty in the world with the help of the US and the USSR, which was the major foreign policy of Nasser. Instead, it can be understood that Sadat and Mubarek believed the superiority of Egypt over other Arab states after the Camp David Accords, which was an initial point for Egypt to make great strides in its relation with Israel. Therefore, the Arab states had no way but to accept the supremacy of Egypt, which definitely emphasized Sadat's shift from Nasser's policy to creating a status-quo power policy. However, Sadat's policy made Egypt be excluded from all Arab associations that it had taken part in before. According to Sadat, establishing a good alliance with the United States was the best way for the development of Egypt in terms of its economy and technology, which was also followed by Mubarek. Similar to Sadat, it can be clearly seen that Mubarak also concentrated on the implementations for the modernization of Egypt, the maintenance of the adherence of the peace agreements and taking the financial support from the US.¹²⁵

While Mubarek was dealing with these issues, his security concern was seemed to continue explicitly. The security concern of Mubarak was so serious that it can be definitely understood that it affected Egypt's foreign policy directly as well as its domestic policy. In order to protect the uniformity of the country, Mubarak focused on the preservation of Egypt's status-quo in terms of regional issues because his constant anxiety about his personal safety and the security of his regime was completely related to Egypt's regional issues. At that point, the dispute over the

¹²⁴ L. Cantori, "Egypt Reenters the Arab State System," in *The Middle East From the Iran-Contra Affair to the Intifada*. Robert O. Freedman (ed), Syracuse: Syracuse UP, 1990, 344-45, cited in Shama, Nael Mohammed. *Egyptian Foreign Policy from Mubarak to Morsi* "Against the National Interest". Routledge Press: London and New York, 2014, p. 68-69.

¹²⁵ A. Radwan, "Mubarak's Dynasty", Time Europe, 27 November 2000, online. Available HTTP: <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599.2050574,00.html>, cited in Shama, Nael Mohammed. *Egyptian Foreign Policy from Mubarak to Morsi* "Against the National Interest". Routledge Press: London and New York, 2014, p. 69.

border between Saudi and Qatar can be given as an example to Mubarak's rightfulness about his security concern, which was solved through the arbitration of Egypt in 1993. Also, the tension between Turkey and Syria was also ended by the mediation attempts of Egypt in 2000. Besides, during the continuous conflict between Israel and Palestine, Egypt played a reconciler role as usual.¹²⁶

These regional occasions caused the growth of Mubarek's security concern related to Egypt's status-quo power. However, Mubarak also knew that the success of Egypt foreign policies directly depended on the protection of the ruler's authority and the economic growth of the country, which actually emphasized Mubarak's policy-steering. Therefore, it can be easily that the political structure of Egypt's organization system was changed several times throughout the presidency of two rulers but Mubarak departed from this tradition. As a beginning, there was the Liberation Agency during Nasser's presidency. After a short time, the Liberation Agency, which was the basis of the Egypt's political organization structure, was converted into the National Union system but then from the National Union, it was transformed to the Arab Socialist Union (ASU). Briefly, the Egypt's political organization structure was changed three times from the beginning of Nasser's presidency until the end of his death.¹²⁷

Throughout the Sadat's regime, there were also some alterations carried out as it had been in Nasser's presidency. The Arab Socialist Union (ASU), which was established at last days of Nasser's office, was later transformed into the National Democratic Party. Unlike Nasser and Sadat, the National Democratic Party, which was the Egypt's last political organization structure, was not changed into a different political organization. At that point, it can be definitely that understood that Mubarak was not a revisionist man as much as Sadat or Nasser. From the beginning of his presidency, Mubarak tried to protect the status-quo of Egypt. He never aimed at

¹²⁶ A. Radwan, "Mubarak's Dynasty", Time Europe, 27 November 2000, online. Available HTTP: <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599.2050574,00.html>, cited in Shama, Nael Mohammed. *Egyptian Foreign Policy from Mubarak to Morsi* "Against the National Interest". Routledge Press: London and New York, 2014, p. 70.

¹²⁷ A. Radwan, "Mubarak's Dynasty", Time Europe, 27 November 2000, online. Available HTTP: <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599.2050574,00.html>, cited in Shama, Nael Mohammed. *Egyptian Foreign Policy from Mubarak to Morsi* "Against the National Interest". Routledge Press: London and New York, 2014, p. 70-71.

changing the Egypt's political organization structure compared to Nasser and Sadat. Thus, Mubarak was seen as a status quo-oriented president because he never attempted to make reformations except for few changes in the administration and constitution systems of Egypt. As a result, it can be clearly inferred that all these things mentioned above were directly related to Mubarak's security concern. Withal, his security obsession brought along some restrictions in the decision-making process about Egypt's foreign and domestic policy.¹²⁸

Besides, Mubarak's anxiety over his personal security and his regime's safety was began to be seen in different aspects. At those times, Egypt was mostly destructed by a huge earthquake in 1992 and many institutions including schools were badly damaged. Normally, Mubarak was expected to make amendment aftermath of this destruction but he did not meet the expectation. Even though Mubarak was aware that the restoration and the improvement of the Egypt's educational system was the most crucial factor, which would later contribute to its economic condition, he did nothing to make the education system better. Instead, Mubarak chose to believe and convince people about the good quality of Egypt's education system in contrast to other Arab States.¹²⁹

When it was examined in a detailed way, Mubarak's security concern again appeared because Egypt's economy was not enough to go on with enhancing the education system in Egypt. In order to make an advancement in the education of Egypt, Mubarak would raise the wages of public school teachers by creating a financial resource through curtailing the incomes of such governmental institutions as Interior Ministry and Defense Ministry. However, this was impossible in Mubarak's regime because he was in search of security since he had security concern, which was a disadvantage for his regime policy. Therefore, what was implied through Mubarak's security concern was that the quality of the Egyptian

¹²⁸ B. Slavin, "Egypt' Mubarak 'Doesn't Take Risks", *USA Today*, 6 June 2002, online. Available HTTP: <http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2001/06/06/mubarak-usat.htm>, cited in Shama, Nael Mohammed. *Egyptian Foreign Policy from Mubarak to Morsi* "Against the National Interest". Routledge Press: London and New York, 2014, p. 71.

¹²⁹ B. Slavin, "Egypt' Mubarak 'Doesn't Take Risks", *USA Today*, 6 June 2002, online. Available HTTP: <http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2001/06/06/mubarak-usat.htm>, cited in Shama, Nael Mohammed. *Egyptian Foreign Policy from Mubarak to Morsi* "Against the National Interest". Routledge Press: London and New York, 2014, p. 72.

education system started to go down. As Mubarak was opposed to the improvement of the education in Egypt, it affected the society in bad way. To set an example, during the end of the 1980s, the number of the girls in public schools were seen to decline compared to the number beforehand the earthquake in 1992. Besides, there was not an educational equalization between the girls and the boys in Egypt.¹³⁰

To tell the truth, Mubarak was conscious of this situation and he deliberately did not give any significance to the education system although it was a direct primary element related to the economy of the country. However, Mubarak's security concern turned everything upside and down. According to Mubarak's security sense, the stability was the best choice in every aspect and by making the education system of Egypt keep up with at the same level in contrast to other presidents meant the backward of the Egyptian education system. That is to say, Mubarak's ignorance about the education system meant that all bets were off to protect the maintaining of the status-quo of Egypt.¹³¹

Towards the end of the 1990s, it can be clearly understood that Mubarak's security concern increased, which brought about Mubarak to be indifferent to everything that he saw as a threat to his regime. Nevertheless, Mubarak was unable to prevent the aggression of the Egyptian society towards his authority. From the beginning of 2000s, a chaotic political atmosphere surrounded Egypt, which was based on political and economical disorders in the society. However, Mubarak did not overcome the problems of policy and economy in Egypt, which was resulted in his overthrow due to the Arab Spring came into Egypt in 2011.¹³²

¹³⁰ A. Radwan, "Mubarak's Dynasty", Time Europe, 27 November 2000, online. Available HTTP: <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599.2050574,00.html>, cited in Shama, Nael Mohammed. *Egyptian Foreign Policy from Mubarak to Morsi* "Against the National Interest". Routledge Press: London and New York, 2014, p. 74.

¹³¹ A. Radwan, "Mubarak's Dynasty", Time Europe, 27 November 2000, online. Available HTTP: <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599.2050574,00.html>, cited in Shama, Nael Mohammed. *Egyptian Foreign Policy from Mubarak to Morsi* "Against the National Interest". Routledge Press: London and New York, 2014, p. 76-77

¹³² A. Radwan, "Mubarak's Dynasty", Time Europe, 27 November 2000, online. Available HTTP: <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599.2050574,00.html>, cited in Shama, Nael Mohammed. *Egyptian Foreign Policy from Mubarak to Morsi* "Against the National Interest". Routledge Press: London and New York, 2014, p. 77.

CHAPTER THREE

TURCO-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS IN THE 20TH CENTURY

3.1. Trade Relations

When the economic relations of Egypt and Turkey are examined, one can definitely say that the partnership between them dated back to the early Ottoman period, even before this period. After Egypt was occupied by the Ottoman Empire, it became the most productive province in contrast to other societies in the territory of the Ottoman Empire since it had a significant geographic condition.¹³³

At those times, the mining resources of Egypt as well as other agricultural productions such as wool, silk, varied fruit and vegetables were bought by the Ottoman merchants and other foreign merchants with a lower price to be sold or used from a higher price. Especially the productions, which were at a premium, were preferred by them. Furthermore, Egypt was one of the points that was located on the Spice Trade Route, which was the most crucial trade way that made a bridge between the historical societies from Asia, Europe and North Africa. Therefore, Egypt was not only a rich country in terms of its resources but it also a good market for non-natives, which has made Egypt an important state throughout the centuries.¹³⁴

From the 16th century to the 19th century, Egypt was known as a province of the Ottoman Empire although it was invaded by Napoléon Bonaparte in 1798. Apart from its geostrategic situation, Egypt was always seen as a fertile land that was able to produce crucial resources that would contribute to a state's financial growth in any means according to the states that were seeking power. Since Bonaparte attracted the attention on Egypt, Britain also focused about Egypt by making long-terms plans. In 1882, Britain reached its goal and made Egypt a state under its yoke. In addition,

¹³³ Izumi, Atsushi, "The Rise of Middle Eastern Think Thanks", *NIRA Review*, Spring 1996. Retrieved: URL: <http://www.nira.or.jp/past/publ/review/96/spring/izumi.html>. p. 165.

¹³⁴ Izumi, Atsushi, "The Rise of Middle Eastern Think Thanks", *NIRA Review*, Spring 1996. Retrieved: URL: <http://www.nira.or.jp/past/publ/review/96/spring/izumi.html>. p. 165-166.

they constructed a canal named as the Suez Canal, which easily became a prominent trade route for importation and exportation of many goods via Egypt. From that point, it can be easily understood that Egypt was still a favorable place for the other state because of its geostrategic situation as well as being a popular trade point. Apart from their other interests, Egypt was believed to be one of the crucial points due to its agricultural richness and the suitable trade opportunities by the powerful states such as the Ottoman Empire, France and Britain.¹³⁵

After gaining its independence, the rulers of Egypt also gave importance to the agricultural sector for economic growth and it can be clearly seen that there were many reforms made by the rulers of Egypt about agriculture since they were aware that Egypt had a remarkable productive power in agriculture as well as its other resources. By using this capacity of the country, they aimed at improving economic growth with the help of some regulations. However, the lack of industrial power and the wrong policies made for the restoration of financial affairs of the country, it can be exactly understood that Egypt was abused by the world's leading powers, which affected its domestic affairs at an important level. In order to restore the economic order again, the government of Egypt tried to make some attempts such as the FTA and the EU-Egypt Association Agreement.¹³⁶

In 1998, Egypt and Turkey met in order to lay the foundation of a trade union. After several meetings, Turkey and Egypt drafted a free trade agreement, which comprised of both Egypt and Turkey's financial gains but especially on the Egyptian side. Eventually, both countries made a final draft and signed in 2005. On March 1, 2007, this drafted trade agreement was officially recognized in the Euro-Med

¹³⁵ Izumi, Atsushi, "The Rise of Middle Eastern Think Tanks", *NIRA Review*, Spring 1996, Retrieved: URL: <http://www.nira.or.jp/past/publ/review/96/spring/izumi.html>. p. 166.

¹³⁶ Dessouki, Ali E. Hillal, "The Primacy of Economics: The Foreign Policy of Egypt", in *The Foreign Policies of Arab States: The Challenge of Change*, 2nd edn, ed. Bahgat Korany and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, 156-85 Boulder: Westview Press, 1991, cited in Shama, Nael Mohammed. *Egyptian Foreign Policy from Mubarak to Morsi "Against the National Interest"*. Routledge Press: London and New York, 2014, p. 170.

financial sphere. Not only Egypt but also Turkey made this free trade agreement (FTA) in order to establish a better trade relations between two countries.¹³⁷

According to the new trade agreement, all of the productions can be sold through the way of unrestricted market systems except for some agricultural productions. In other words, the tariff rate quotas are removed with some exceptions about a few products by thinking that it would contribute the future of agricultural trade relation of Egypt and Turkey. At that point, it can be easily said that the aim of the agreement was about the nonagricultural products. Although there were some limitations over some goods, both countries planned to meet through the bilateral meeting that would hold to discuss the process of the agreement in terms of the WTO negotiations. After the agreement became official between two countries, Turkey showed its commitment immediately whereas Egypt followed a slow and sure policy about its important industrial and agricultural products by offering 12 years validity based on some tariffs.¹³⁸

Thanks to the FTA, both Turkey and Egypt aimed at improving the liberal trade expansion as well as making a remarkable contribution to the Egyptian economy. From that point, it can be definitely said that Egypt is expected to improve its economic situation by increasing its trade with Turkey in regard to the free trade agreement that was planned by 2020 but it was also seen as a handicap for Egypt because Egypt's trade relations would be affected in a bad way due to the fact Egypt's rising imports rate with Turkey. However, the FTA meant much more financial advantage for Egypt. Thanks to the FTA, Egypt's exports rate in terms of the trade relation with Turkey would decrease, which would be expected to decrease at its export trade relations with other countries around the world.¹³⁹

¹³⁷ Al-Naggar, Ahmed Al-Sayed, *Egypt, Iran and Turkey: Economic Realities and European Relations*, Cairo: Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, 2003, cited in Shama, Nael Mohammed. *Egyptian Foreign Policy from Mubarak to Morsi "Against the National Interest"*. Routledge Press: London and New York, 2014, p. 182

¹³⁸ Al-Naggar, Ahmed Al-Sayed, *Egypt, Iran and Turkey: Economic Realities and European Relations*, Cairo: Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, 2003, cited in Shama, Nael Mohammed. *Egyptian Foreign Policy from Mubarak to Morsi "Against the National Interest"*. Routledge Press: London and New York, 2014, p. 182-183.

¹³⁹ Al-Naggar, Ahmed Al-Sayed, *Egypt, Iran and Turkey: Economic Realities and European Relations*, Cairo: Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, 2003, cited in Shama, Nael Mohammed. *Egyptian Foreign Policy from Mubarak to Morsi "Against the National Interest"*. Routledge Press: London and New York, 2014, p. 183.

At that point, Turkey also aimed at improve its financial situation with the FTA. The main target of Turkey would be the increase rate of trade diversion through the import and export relations with Egypt in terms of the productions derived from the minerals and the metals but the biggest benefit of the FTA actually consisted of different things. What Turkey and Egypt aimed at improving the trade relations based on resources produced by the chemicals and manufacture sectors. Besides, service trade was another important factor that was puposed to be developed. Inspite of the fact that service trade was different from other means of trade, it also had a crucial contribution to the financial affairs of two states indirectly. In accordance with the FTA, service trade was completely related to the decreasing the tariffs over agricultural and non-agricultural productions, which was expected to be made through the free implemetations of transportation. All these show that the FTA consisted of many positive gains for Egypt in contrast to Turkey.¹⁴⁰

In addition, it can be clearly understood that the FTA was a more advantageous trade agreement when it was compared to Egypt-EU Association Agreement. To tell the truth, the Egypt-EU Association Agreement was prepared in a wider scope rather than the FTA. Beforehand the Egypt-EU Association Agreement, the European and Mediterranean countires met and prepared the Barcelona Declaration, which provided a free trade area for the states through bilateral cooperations about financial issues related to trade gotten off the ground in November, 1995. Afterwards, Egypt was asked for participating in this Euro-Med free trade area unity since it is also one of the countries located in the Mediterranean region. As it was seen as a sound like a plan for Egypt, it immediately accepted the EU's offer and the EU-Egypt Association Agreement was signed between them in 2001. At that point, it can be definitely stated that this agreement was made under the Euro-Med cooperation union such as the agreement between Turkey and Egypt.¹⁴¹

¹⁴⁰ Al-Naggar, Ahmed Al-Sayed, *Egypt, Iran and Turkey: Economic Realities and European Relations*, Cairo: Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, 2003, cited in Shama, Nael Mohammed. *Egyptian Foreign Policy from Mubarak to Morsi "Against the National Interest"*. Routledge Press: London and New York, 2014, p. 184-185.

¹⁴¹ Al-Naggar, Ahmed Al-Sayed, *Egypt, Iran and Turkey: Economic Realities and European Relations*, Cairo: Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, 2003, cited in Shama, Nael Mohammed. *Egyptian Foreign Policy from Mubarak to Morsi "Against the National Interest"*. Routledge Press: London and New York, 2014, p. 185.

When it was examined in a detailed way, the FTA was derived from the Euro-Med cooperation unity and the terms of the agreement were also based on the Egypt-EU Association. In other words, the bilateral or diagonal trade agreements between the states located in the Europe or Mediterranean region were encouraged by the Euro-Med cooperation union. However, the union allowed the agreements, in which the partner countries provide other countries trade within the Euro-Med context. In this regard, it can be clearly understood that Egypt and Turkey established a free trade area to make contributions to their financial situations as well as the inputs of other countries thanks to this trade agreement.¹⁴²

Furthermore, the FTA also included the future economic plans about the partner countries. That is to say, the FTA provided future economic opportunity to Egypt and Turkey in terms of the agricultural productions and trade. In Egypt, the rate of tariffs on the imports of the agricultural productions were much lower when it was compared to Turkey. Therefore, the agricultural producers of Egypt were suggested to be informed about the regulations of the tariffs in accordance with the demands of Turkey's markets. At that point it can be said that the FTA was not a simple trade agreement between Egypt and Turkey that was made to increase their financial gains through their trade relations. Indeed, the FTA provided many advantages to Egypt. Through the FTA, the exportation of Egypt was expected to increase thanks to the Turkish industries. Also, the perspectives of the other countries around the world was believed to change in a positive way. In other words, the FTA enabled Egypt increase its confidence towards other states as well as its domestic investors. The investments to Egypt and Turkey was another significant factor of the FTA including the future plans for both countries. Since the FTA provided much more opportunities for establishing substantial investments not only in Egypt but also in Turkey, it was also expected to develop the industry sector as well as the employment and agriculture.¹⁴³

¹⁴² Al-Naggar, Ahmed Al-Sayed, *Egypt, Iran and Turkey: Economic Realities and European Relations*, Cairo: Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, 2003, cited in Shama, Nael Mohammed. *Egyptian Foreign Policy from Mubarak to Morsi "Against the National Interest"*. Routledge Press: London and New York, 2014, p. 188-189.

¹⁴³ Al-Naggar, Ahmed Al-Sayed, *Egypt, Iran and Turkey: Economic Realities and European Relations*, Cairo: Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, 2003, cited in Shama, Nael Mohammed. *Egyptian Foreign Policy from Mubarak to Morsi "Against the National Interest"*. Routledge Press: London and New York, 2014, p. 189.

As a result, it can be pointed out that the FTA removed all limitations and difficulties between Egypt and Turkey and their trade relations with other countries. With the regulations over the tariffs, the tariff rate quotas and the other different barrier about the import and export of goods enabled Turkey and Egypt establish a free trade area and gave an opportunity to improve their markets in respect of their own interests to make contributions their economies.¹⁴⁴

3.2. Cold War Years

Throughout the Cold War period, it can be obviously understood that Egypt and Turkey did not get along with each other, which was based on Turkey's misunderstanding in terms of its "Westernization" ideology as its foreign affair policy and Nasser's Pan-Arab ideology over the Middle East region. After the end of the Second World War, Turkey planned to follow "Westernization" policy by being an ally of the US, which was one of the most powerful countries at those times. For Turkey, making alliance with the US provided the country the advancement of the military power as well as other advantageous matters for the development of the country.¹⁴⁵

Also, the US was a popular increasing power of the world, which was one of the essential factors for Turkey that would give a way to increase its political action in the international sphere. With its "Westernization" policy, Turkey actually aimed at taking the military and financial support to improve the country's power beside taking the US' political support that would make the country a regional power in the Middle East. At that point, it can be emphasized that Turkey's geostrategic situation had an important place in the Middle East plans of the US, which was long-term interest hidden behind its support to Turkey.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁴ Al-Naggar, Ahmed Al-Sayed, *Egypt, Iran and Turkey: Economic Realities and European Relations*, Cairo: Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, 2003, cited in Shama, Nael Mohammed. *Egyptian Foreign Policy from Mubarak to Morsi "Against the National Interest"*. Routledge Press: London and New York, 2014, p. 190-191.

¹⁴⁵ McDermott, Anthony. *Egypt From Nasser to Mubarak: A Flawed Revolution*. Croom Helm Publication, 1988, p. 99-100.

¹⁴⁶ McDermott, Anthony. *Egypt From Nasser to Mubarak: A Flawed Revolution*. Croom Hell Publication, 1988, p. 100-101.

In Egypt, it can be clearly said that the influence of the Eastern bloc was seen to be effective rather than the West bloc. In contrast to Turkey, Nasser followed a different policy by making alliance with the USSR, which brought about the tension in the relations of Turkey and Egypt during this Cold War period. In Nasser's presidency, the British purposed to establish a union to gather the Arab states in the Middle East region. The main of the British was to control the Middle Eastern Muslim societies easily through this unity. Since Egypt was the pioneer figure among the Arab states, the British initially planned to negotiate with Egypt. However, nothing went to be planned and Nasser rejected their offer by stating their interests behind the unity named as the Baghdad Pact, which made the British took negative reaction against Nasser.¹⁴⁷

Afterwards, the British started negotiations with Jordan about the Baghdad Pact and Jordan was seemed to lean towards their offer but Nasser interfered with the situation. Referring to the previous actions of the British, it can be said that Nasser followed an anti-British policy in Jordan to undermine the British influence in Jordan and achieved to persuade King Hüssein at last by putting a claim about his regime. As in the former occasions led by the British, Nasser asserted that the main interest of the British was the overthrow of King Hüssein through the Baghdad Pact since this unity gave a direct control to the British by making an integrity of the economic and political affairs.¹⁴⁸

As a result, Jordan left from the Baghdad Pact due to its relation with its neighbour. Actually, the British aimed at making Egypt alone in the region as the only country which was opposed to the Baghdad Pact. In this sense, the British made plans to convince Turkey to become a member of the union. Unlike Egypt, Turkey believed that the aim of this union was to make the integrity of the states in the Middle East region. Therefore, Turkey accepted to take part in the Baghdad Pact as a result of some negotiations with the British.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁷ McDermott, Anthony. *Egypt From Nasser to Mubarak: A Flawed Revolution*. Croom Helm Publication, 1988, p. 102.

¹⁴⁸ McDermott, Anthony. *Egypt From Nasser to Mubarak: A Flawed Revolution*. Croom Helm Publication, 1988, p. 103-104-105.

¹⁴⁹ McDermott, Anthony. *Egypt From Nasser to Mubarak: A Flawed Revolution*. Croom Helm Publication, 1988, p. 106-107.

Beforehand the Baghdad Pact issue, it can be easily said that the relationship of Egypt and Turkey started to deteriorate because of Turkey. After the Arab-Israel War occurred in 1948, Turkey was the first Middle Eastern muslim country that recognized the sovereignty of Israel. At that point, Nasser changed his perspective towards Turkey since Turkey's recognition was a threat for his policy about the Middle East region. What Nasser was trying to do was actually to remove the British influence over the Middle East by establishing an ideology based on Pan-Arab identity. However, Turkey's attitude towards the Baghdad Pact, which was seen as a British based unity by Egypt made the relations of the two countries get worse. On the eyes of Nasser, Turkey attempted to destroy Nasser's Pan-Arab ideology by presenting its approval about the Baghdad Pact. At that point, it can be definitely stated that Nasser's ideology was being undermined by the British in order to provide the security of Israel in the Middle East region. When it was examined in detailed way, one can easily understand that Pan-Arab ideology was a big threat for the sovereignty of Israel as the region mostly consisted of the Arab states.¹⁵⁰

To make a block for the Pan-Arab or Nasserim ideology, establishing a unity for controlling the Arab States was seen as the best way such as the EU founded to control the European states. In such a critic issue, Turkey's agreement increased the tension between two countries. After a while, Nasser made a counter attack to destroy the British led organization. In 1958, Egypt made a declaration about the establishment of a union with Syria but it was not the same as the Baghdad Pact. At that point, it can be exactly stated that Nasser planned to establish a more steady union with Syria in contrast to the Baghdad Pact. Also, by establishing this unification with Syria, Nasser aimed at destructing the plan of the British behind the Baghdad Pact which was based on the periphery security ideology of Israel in the Middle East region. However, this situation also disturbed Turkey as a neighbour of Syria, which caused the struggle between Turkey and Egypt. In other words, it turned into a crisis, which was later solved by negotiations aftermath of the establishment of the unification of Turkey and Egypt.¹⁵¹

¹⁵⁰ McDermott, Anthony. *Egypt From Nasser to Mubarak: A Flawed Revolution*. Croom Hell Publication, 1988, p. 107-108.

¹⁵¹ McDermott, Anthony. *Egypt From Nasser to Mubarak: A Flawed Revolution*. Croom Hell Publication, 1988, p. 108.

At those times, it can be exactly said that Nasser was the ally of the USSR and got military supply based on the agreement whereas Turkey was on the side of the US due to its Westernization policy. Even though Egypt was supported financially as well as the military aid by the USSR, this was not enough for the restoration of the economy. Meanwhile, the Suez Canal crisis was still going on because of the British share of the company in the Suez Canal, which also affected by Nasser's approach to the Baghdad Pact.¹⁵²

As Turkey was seen as an ally of the US by Egypt, Turkey broke the confidence of Egypt because the turmoil atmosphere in the Middle East was not dissolved due to Israel. In a respond to Nasser action, Israel planned to make a counter action since Nasser's Pan-Arab ideology was a threat for itself. For Israel, Egypt was the most powerful country compared to its other neighbour and Nasser had the capacity to practice his ideology over these states. Based on this idea, Israel aimed at destroying the Nasser's regime by making alliance with the British and the French as they had interests over the Suez Canal region. To tell the truth, Israel's plan was logical for both of them since they were feared about Nasser's ideology and his popularity among the Arab States. By the way, Turkey was also supported by the US on the one hand. However, the US also used the geostrategic position of Turkey against the USSR, which was its opposing bloc during the Cold War period. Though the relations of Egypt and Turkey was seemed to be solved, Egypt actually disapproved Turkey's foreign policy as an ally of the USSR, which caused new struggles between two countries in terms of the Suez Canal region and trade. For Egypt, Turkey was in service of the US' interest, which was on the same bloc with the British and the French and Israel.¹⁵³

At the same time, Egypt was seemed to be on the edge of a new war with Israel, which was started with the bombardment of Israel to Gaza and Sinai in 1956. Also, the British and the French made attacks over the Suez Canal region to carry out

¹⁵² McDermott, Anthony. *Egypt From Nasser to Mubarak: A Flawed Revolution*. Croom Hell Publication, 1988, p. 108.

¹⁵³ McDermott, Anthony. *Egypt From Nasser to Mubarak: A Flawed Revolution*. Croom Hell Publication, 1988, p. 109-110.

their plan through not military but also naval operations. However, the US made an unprecedented reaction and stopped their attack by stating the effects of the war over their economies as well as their relation with the US. Since the financial affairs of both the French and the British were damaged due to the World War II, they were seemed to be deterred from the US' threat; that is to say, its interference.¹⁵⁴

Aftermath of this occasion, the relation of Turkey with Egypt also changed. In fact, what laid behind the US intervention was its own interests about the petroleum in Egypt but it was not seemed at all due to the US' fake alliance attempts to stop the attacks of the British and the French towards Egypt. Based on the relations of Egypt and the US, Turkey again became a trustworthy member of the Middle East region for Egypt. At that point, it can be definitely understood that the British influence in Egypt as well as in the Suez Canal region came to an end with attempts of Nasser and the US, which also caused the cancellation of the Suez Canal Treaty in 1952.¹⁵⁵

3.3. Competition for Leadership in the Islamic World

Inspite of the fact that both Turkey and Egypt were the Middle Eastern Muslim societies, their domestic political dynamics were different from each other. In Turkey, Turkish nationalism was defined within the context of Turkish nationalism, the history and their identity. In other words, Turkey's main ideology was based on Turkish nationalism and history but it can be easily said that the nationalism and history were connected to Turkish religious identity too. However, generally, the Kemalist identification was the most influential domestic political identification based on the dynamics of the country until the Justice and Development Party became the new government of Turkey.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁴ McDermott, Anthony. *Egypt From Nasser to Mubarak: A Flawed Revolution*. Croom Hell Publication, 1988, p. 110--111.

¹⁵⁵ McDermott, Anthony. *Egypt From Nasser to Mubarak: A Flawed Revolution*. Croom Hell Publication, 1988, p. 112.

¹⁵⁶ Ibrahim, Saad Eddin, "Egypt's Landed Bourgeoisie", in *Developmentalism and Beyond: Society and Politics in Egypt and Turkey*, ed. Ayşe Öncü, Çağlar Keyder and Saad Eddin Ibrahim, 19-43. Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1994, cited in Shama, Nael Mohammed.

After the beginning of the reign of the Justice and Development Party, the domestic political dynamics of Turkey began to change. That is to say, Turkish Islamistic side was seemed to come to the fore front by overlapping the Turkish national identity. Unlike the previous governments in Turkey, the doctrines of the Justice and Development Party were also based on democratic Islam ideologies, which was believed to create a new atmosphere in contrast to the former regimes. Therefore, the center of the domestic policy of Turkey was changed as an initial point.¹⁵⁷

In this regard, the Turkish government also changed its foreign policy. Rather than following the Westernization policy, Turkey was seemed to follow the modern Islam policy due to its domestic policy and its economic relations with the Arab states. When it was compared to the previous governments, the Justice and Development Party gave weight to the economical integration with the Arab states in the Middle East and in the Saudi Arabia, which attracted the attention of Egypt. Since Egypt was one of the leading countries in the Arab economic and political unions, Turkey's increasing relations with the Arab states was not expected in a good way.¹⁵⁸

In order to increase its economic engagement with the Arab world, Turkey also regulated visa requirements for the Arab states, which opened the way for more strenght economic relations between Turkey and the Arab countries. However, Egypt did not lean towards Turkey's attitude. For Egypt, Turkey aimed at dipossessing the position of Egypt, which was implied from the economic forums held on the basis of the Arab-Turkish economic relations. To set an example, Turkey asserted that both the Arab and Turkish people's free trade movement would create a more flexible and trustworthy economic engagement as well as their economic integration. At the 5th

Egyptian Foreign Policy from Mubarak to Morsi "Against the National Interest". Routledge Press: London and New York, 2014, p. 203-204.

¹⁵⁷ Ibrahim, Saad Eddin, "Egypt's Landed Bourgeoisie", in *Developmentalism and Beyond: Society and Politics in Egypt and Turkey*, ed. Ayşe Öncü, Çağlar Keyder and Saad Eddin Ibrahim, 19-43. Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1994, cited in Shama, Nael Mohammed. *Egyptian Foreign Policy from Mubarak to Morsi* "Against the National Interest". Routledge Press: London and New York, 2014, p. 204.

¹⁵⁸ Ibrahim, Saad Eddin, "Egypt's Landed Bourgeoisie", in *Developmentalism and Beyond: Society and Politics in Egypt and Turkey*, ed. Ayşe Öncü, Çağlar Keyder and Saad Eddin Ibrahim, 19-43. Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1994, cited in Shama, Nael Mohammed. *Egyptian Foreign Policy from Mubarak to Morsi* "Against the National Interest". Routledge Press: London and New York, 2014, p. 206-207.

Arab- Turkish Forum in 2010, Turkey also emphasized that the free movement of people in economic terms would be expanded from Turkey to the Gulf of Aden with the integration of the Arab and Turkish economic relations.¹⁵⁹

Besides, Turkey offered to establish “Close Neighbours Economic and Trade Association Council” with the Middle Eastern Muslim states such as Syria, Jordan and Lebanon, Iraq, which emerged a tension with Turkey and Egypt. For Egypt, all efforts of Turkey was seemed to be an attempt to establish an union with the Arab states by excluding Egypt although Turkey did not have such an interest. At that point, Egypt declared that Turkey was not an Arab state though it was one of the muslim country located in the Middle East region. In addition, Egypt emphasized that Turkey was a member of the NATO and was still seen as an ally of the US, which put Turkey to the counter side of them when their relationships with Israel was taken into consideration. Therefore, Egypt presented its disapprove that the integration of the Arab states with Turkey would not be a reasonable act for the Arab states especially the ones located in the Middle East region. From all these that were mentioned above, it can be easily reached to the point that there was a dispute emerged at the Arab world led by Egypt. Actually, it was definitely created by Egypt since Egypt was opposed to Turkey’s union efforts with the Arab states on the basis of Islam ideology.¹⁶⁰

Throughout the years, Egypt was always the leading power among the Arab states and the founders of some Arab unions established for providing the economic and political integrations between themselves. Now, Turkey was trying to take Egypt’s leader role through holding such economic and political forums with other Arab states, which created a competiton between two countries. At that point, it can

¹⁵⁹ Ibrahim, Saad Eddin, “Egypt’s Landed Bourgeoisie”, in *Developmentalism and Beyond: Society and Politics in Egypt and Turkey*, ed. Ayşe Öncü, Çağlar Keyder and Saad Eddin Ibrahim, 19-43. Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1994, cited in Shama, Nael Mohammed. *Egyptian Foreign Policy from Mubarak to Morsi “Against the National Interest”*. Routledge Press: London and New York, 2014, p. 207.

¹⁶⁰ Ibrahim, Saad Eddin, “Egypt’s Landed Bourgeoisie”, in *Developmentalism and Beyond: Society and Politics in Egypt and Turkey*, ed. Ayşe Öncü, Çağlar Keyder and Saad Eddin Ibrahim, 19-43. Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1994, cited in Shama, Nael Mohammed. *Egyptian Foreign Policy from Mubarak to Morsi “Against the National Interest”*. Routledge Press: London and New York, 2014, p. 210-211-212.

be clearly understood that Turkey was not able to carry out its plans about the advancement of its relationship with the Arab states due to Egypt's negative reactions. That is to say, Turkey's approach not only brought about the deterioration of its affairs with Egypt but it also affected its affairs with the Arab states because of Egypt's negative speech towards its actions. Meanwhile, the Arab Spring broke out in the Middle Eastern muslim countries including Egypt, Lebanon, Tunisia, which also affected Turkey's policy in a bad way. Since the Arab Spring movement changed the countries completely by destructing their domestic dynamics as well as their economies, Turkey's affairs with the Arab states also worsened. However, there was an unexpected situation between Egypt and Turkey.¹⁶¹

After the post-revolution era in Egypt, Mohammad Morsi was elected as the new president of the country. As Morsi's government was supported by the Turkish government and his regime was based on the same ideologies with the Justice and Development Party, it can be clearly stated that Turkey and Egypt's relations became better and they became getting closer rather than the past. At that point, it can be exactly pointed out that the competition about the leadership between Turkey and Egypt at the Arab world was seemed to come to an end since there was not a rivalry situation at the Arab world although the Arab Spring was not a long-term movement. As a result, one can understand that the dispute over Turkey's approve to the Arab world in terms of economic and political integration was put aside with the emergence of the Arab Spring, which caused the advance the political and economical affairs of Turkey and Egypt.¹⁶²

¹⁶¹ Ibrahim, Saad Eddin, "Egypt's Landed Bourgeoisie", in *Developmentalism and Beyond: Society and Politics in Egypt and Turkey*, ed. Ayşe Öncü, Çağlar Keyder and Saad Eddin Ibrahim, 19-43. Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1994, cited in Shama, Nael Mohammed. *Egyptian Foreign Policy from Mubarak to Morsi "Against the National Interest"*. Routledge Press: London and New York, 2014, p. 213-214.

¹⁶² Ibrahim, Saad Eddin, "Egypt's Landed Bourgeoisie", in *Developmentalism and Beyond: Society and Politics in Egypt and Turkey*, ed. Ayşe Öncü, Çağlar Keyder and Saad Eddin Ibrahim, 19-43. Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1994, cited in Shama, Nael Mohammed. *Egyptian Foreign Policy from Mubarak to Morsi "Against the National Interest"*. Routledge Press: London and New York, 2014, p. 214-215.

3.4. The Arab Spring in Egypt

There were lots of uprising occurred, which were organized by different groups of people. In fact, this situation was seen as normal since Egypt consisted of different kinds of ethnic groups. At that point, it can be said that such groups were easily manipulated by self-seeker states since they had new intentions about their administration. As a result, Egypt was also suffered from this action because of its diversified social structure and all these occasions turned into a enormous revolt, which was started in Tunisia on 18 December 2010.¹⁶³

Actually, the revolt was started in Tunisia very violently. Then, it later became a revolutionary movement based on riots, protests and even internal conflicts to overthrow the governments in power in Arab states. After Tunisia was shaken by the Arab Spring, it jumped into Egypt one year later with the start of an unexpected protest against the Mubarak's regime. At the end of eighteen days, Mubarak was forced to leave from his position as the president of Egypt and the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) came in power since the protest of the Egyptians could not be suppressed. At that point, it can be pointed out that the Egyptian society believed the new regime will make Egypt more democratic and free. In point of fact, the society lost its belief towards Mubarak and his regime, which was the inclining factor in the way of the uprising. According to the Egyptian people, the overthrow of Mubarak's regime would pave the way for the change of the Egyptian republic. However, there was a logical reason behind their outbreak, which can be explained through the results of the elections held in 2010.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶³ McCormick, Ty, "How Revolutionary is Egypt's Post Revolution Foreign Policy", *Foreign Policy*, 11 July 2011. Online. Available HTTP: http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/07/08/how_revolutionary_is_post-revolution_egyptian_foreign_policy. cited in Shama, Nael Mohammed. *Egyptian Foreign Policy from Mubarak to Morsi* "Against the National Interest". Routledge Press: London and New York, 2014, p.210-211.

¹⁶⁴ McCormick, Ty, "How Revolutionary is Egypt's Post Revolution Foreign Policy", *Foreign Policy*, 11 July 2011. Online. Available HTTP: http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/07/08/how_revolutionary_is_post-revolution_egyptian_foreign_policy. cited in Shama, Nael Mohammed. *Egyptian Foreign Policy from Mubarak to Morsi* "Against the National Interest". Routledge Press: London and New York, 2014, p.212-213

During the elections, the party in power run the good race in order to make a new constitution in Egypt. Due to Mubarak's security concern, making reformatons meant the loss of his thirty-year authority for him. For this reason, the only way to maintain his regime was to win the elections and to make reformatons by adding new regulations on the existing regime rules in order to break the uneasy atmosphere in Egypt. As late as, nothing was gone to be planned for Mubarak because of the Arab Spring. Aftermath of the succes of the change of the Tunisian regime caused by the Arab Spring, it can be obviously understood that the Egyptian people's belief increased in that vein.¹⁶⁵

Similar to the Tunisian people, the Egyptian society also intended to show the superiority of the power of the society over the power of the overstated authority, so nothing could withhold the Egyptian people to make Mubarak overthrow but there was an imporant point that differenciated the Egypt revolution from the others. When it was compared to other revolutions made in the twentieth-first century, it can be inferred that the society seized the power of the Egyptian authority. Rather than taking charge, the Egypt society made the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) come to power during the cessation until Mohammad Morsi was elected.¹⁶⁶

From that point, the Egyptian society's hope to the military about restoring the democratic authority in the absence of a president can be definitely understood. Instead of a new ruling party, the Egyptian people believed that the military; that is to say, the faction from the military, which was derived from the doctrines of the previous regime beforehand Mubarak. Therefore, the SCAF became the temporary ruling power in Egypt by the time new elections were held. By the way, Egypt's foreign affairs became a matter of debate for the Israel government. In point of fact, the Israel government were concerned about Egypt's future foreign policies in terms

¹⁶⁵ McCormick, Ty, "How Revolutionary is Egypt's Post Revolution Foreign Policy", *Foreign Policy*, 11 July 2011. Online. Available HTTP: http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/07/08/how_revolutionary_is_post-revolution_egyptian_foreign_policy. cited in Shama, Nael Mohammed. *Egyptian Foreign Policy from Mubarak to Morsi* "Against the National Interest". Routledge Press: London and New York, 2014, p.213.

¹⁶⁶ Brown, Nathan, "Egypt's Ambiguous Transition", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 6 September 2012. Retrieved: URL: <http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/09/06/egypt-s-ambiguous-transition/drsl#>, p.213-214.

of its relation to Israel aftermath of the overthrow of Mubarak's regime. However, the SCAF convinced the Israel government about the adherence to the Camp David Accords as well as the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. At that point, it can be absolutely inferred that the unchanging structure of the Egyptian foreign policy was not only related to the dominance of the ambiguous atmosphere in Egypt, but it was also associated with the ruling coalition's attitude. Though the authority of Mubarak was subverted, the Egypt's ruling coalition intended to follow the foreign policy of Mubarak as if he were still the president of Egypt. To tell the truth, the policy of the ruling coalition of Egypt aftermath of the dynasty of Mubarak emphasizes an important fact about the structures of the Middle East states.¹⁶⁷

When it was examined in a detailed way, one can understand that the regimes in the Middle East only affected the top of the government, which was clearly seen in the subversion of the regime of Mubarak in 2011. Except for Mubarak's deposition, nothing changed because the nature of the regimes took place in the Middle East was emerged by the promote of groups of people from different institutions and different classes of the society.¹⁶⁸

Although persons' deteriorated authorities were seemed to be the cause of the change of their regimes, it was actually including intermingled layers of the ruling government and actors from the institutions composing layers. In this sense, the attempts of the revolutionaries that supported to the former regime before the existing status-quo regime by reflecting their opposite attitude against a new revolution can be explained properly.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁷ Brown, Nathan, "Egypt's Ambiguous Transition", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 6 September 2012. Retrieved: URL: <http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/09/06/egypt-s-ambiguous-transition/drsi#>, p.214.

¹⁶⁸ Brown, Nathan, "Egypt's Ambiguous Transition", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 6 September 2012. Retrieved: URL: <http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/09/06/egypt-s-ambiguous-transition/drsi#>, p.215-216.

¹⁶⁹ Brown, Nathan, "Egypt's Ambiguous Transition", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 6 September 2012. Retrieved: URL: <http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/09/06/egypt-s-ambiguous-transition/drsi#>, p.216-217.

As a conclusion, it can be pointed out that there were no reformatations or a new constitution or a new administration system were made in Egypt during the temporary rule of the SCARF.¹⁷⁰

3.5. The post-revolution period of the Arab Spring in Egypt

After the Arab-spring, the domestic political system of Egypt changed while the foreign policy system was carried on as in Mubarak's period because the Arab Spring came occurred against Mubarak's government and his regime; that is to say, it was not related to his foreign policy. During the interim period, the Supreme Council of the Armed (SCAF) took over the control until Morsi's regime began.¹⁷¹

In point of fact, the revolt steered the foreign policy unintentionally through the anti-Mubarak propagandas centering around Mubarak's government which was seemed to give weight to the interests of USA and Israel rather than those of Egypt. There were a number of demonstrations made especially about the Israel and Saudi Arabi. What they wanted was actually about the safety of the Egypt and Palestine exiles living in the Gulf region.¹⁷²

At that point, it can be easily said that the post-revolution period was not understood as a disadvantageous situation for Egypt. By contrast with Egypt's perception, it can be easily said that Israel and Saudi Arabia acted as if they were allies of Egypt throughout the post-revolution period and Egyptian army was permitted to deploy its forces to the unarmed Sinai region. However, these became inefficient to suppress the on-going uprising in Egypt. For the anti-Mubarak advocates, Egypt's alliance with Israel as well as Saudi Arabi could not be seen as a

¹⁷⁰ Brown, Nathan, "Egypt's Ambiguous Transition", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 6 September 2012. Retrieved: URL: <http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/09/06/egypt-s-ambiguous-transition/drsl#>, p.217.

¹⁷¹ Fortna V. P. & Huang, R. (2012). "Democratisation after the civil war: a brush-clearing exercise." *International Studies Quarterly*. 56, 801-802. cited in Kurun, İsmail. *Democratisation in Egypt From A Historical Perspective: Problems, Pitfalls and Prospects* <http://www2.bayar.edu.tr/yonetimekonomi/dergi/pdf/C22S12015/183-199.pdf>

¹⁷² Fortna V. P. & Huang, R. (2012). Democratisation after the civil war: a brush-clearing exercise. *International Studies Quarterly*. 56, 804. cited in Kurun, İsmail. *Democratisation in Egypt From A Historical Perspective: Problems, Pitfalls and Prospects* <http://www2.bayar.edu.tr/yonetimekonomi/dergi/pdf/C22S12015/183-199.pdf>

positive development for the post-revolution since it was one of the reasons that brought about the overthrow of Mubarak's regime.¹⁷³

Actually, it can be pointed out that Saudi Arabi gave support the development of Egypt's alliance with the US and Israel intentionally on the purpose of preventing Iran's effect over the Middle East region. Also, it can be definitely inferred that Saudi Arabi was not on the side of the anti-Mubarak supporters as the overthrow of Mubarak was incommmodity about the possibility of the advancement of Egypt in the Middle East region by developing its relation with Iran and Turkey.¹⁷⁴

On the other hand, it can be seen that the US promoted Egypt to overthrow Mubarak's regime under the name of transition; that is to say, the power shift from the political base to the military group guided by General Omar Sulemain, who was the previous vice president during Mubarak's regime and Muhammad Hüsein Tantawi. At that point, it can be exactly said that the regime of Egypt should be analyzed. In this regard, there was not a proper democratic in Egypt before the Arab-Spring, which was the major reason that caused the upheaval in the country.¹⁷⁵

After the insurrection happened in Egypt, it can be absolutely stated that nothing changed during the interim period covering one year known as the post Mubarak's term. To put in a different way, there were no fundamental change in Egypt's foreign policy in the post revolution period but SCAF took the upper hand, which was seen as the protector against the internal and external dangers over Egypt as well as its peace-keeper role with Egypt's affairs with the US and Israel. From the view point of Israel and the US, it can be clearly observed that their interests and

¹⁷³ Fortna V. P. & Huang, R. (2012). Democratisation after the civil war: a brush-clearing exercise. *International Studies Quarterly*. 56, 804-805.cited in Kurun, İsmail. *Democratisation in Egypt From A Historical Perspective: Problems, Pitfalls and Prospects* <http://www2.bayar.edu.tr/yonetimekonomi/dergi/pdf/C22S12015/183-199.pdf>

¹⁷⁴ Burnell, P. (2013). Democratisation in the Middle East and North Africa: perspectives from democracy support. *Third World Quarterly*. 34(5), 830.cited in Kurun, İsmail *Democratisation in Egypt From A Historical Perspective: Problems, Pitfalls and Prospects*<http://www2.bayar.edu.tr/yonetimekonomi/dergi/pdf/C22S12015/183-199.pdf>

¹⁷⁵ Burnell, P. (2013). Democratisation in the Middle East and North Africa: perspectives from democracy support. *Third World Quarterly*. 34(5), 830-831. cited in Kurun, İsmail *Democratisation in Egypt From A Historical Perspective: Problems, Pitfalls and Prospects* <http://www2.bayar.edu.tr/yonetimekonomi/dergi/pdf/C22S12015/183-199.pdf>

attitudes remained the same though the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) took control during the post-revolution era after Mubarak.¹⁷⁶

Besides, SCAF put a stop to the turmoil in the state by cutting down the tension carried out by the Muslim Brotherhood and other political groups. At the same time, SCAF removed the atmosphere brought about by the Egypt society's fiery propogandas towards Mubarak's regime and enhanced the state institutions established throughout Mubarak's term make the cooperation with the military of Egypt. Despite the fact that the power in the country seemed to shift from Mubarak to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), it can be absolutely emphasized that the power was preserved and either the domestic affairs or the foreign policy of the state were not changed.¹⁷⁷

Afterwards, the next aim of SCAF was about meeting the expectation of the citizens of Egypt. In that aspect, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces asserted that it was on the purpose of making the political power hand over the Egyptian society. Then, SCAF assigned a Constitutional Reform Committee to work over the previous constitution that was prepared by Mubarak's presidency. Even though SCAF's the newly established committee were critized severely, which was based on the reason that the members of the committee mostly included the Muslim Brotherhood advocaters, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) convinced the Egyptian people about the rightful regulations of the Constitutional Reform Committee.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁶ Burnell, P. (2013). Democratisation in the Middle East and North Africa: perspectives from democracy support. *Third World Quarterly*. 34(5), 835-836. cited in Kurun, İsmail *Democratisation in Egypt From A Historical Perspective: Problems, Pitfalls and Prospects* <http://www2.bayar.edu.tr/yonetimekonomi/dergi/pdf/C22S12015/183-199.pdf>

¹⁷⁷ Burnell, P. (2013). Democratisation in the Middle East and North Africa: perspectives from democracy support. *Third World Quarterly*. 34(5), 838. cited in Kurun, İsmail *Democratisation in Egypt From A Historical Perspective: Problems, Pitfalls and Prospects* <http://www2.bayar.edu.tr/yonetimekonomi/dergi/pdf/C22S12015/183-199.pdf>

¹⁷⁸ Burnell, P. (2013). Democratisation in the Middle East and North Africa: perspectives from democracy support. *Third World Quarterly*. 34(5), 838-839. cited in Kurun, İsmail *Democratisation in Egypt From A Historical Perspective: Problems, Pitfalls and Prospects* <http://www2.bayar.edu.tr/yonetimekonomi/dergi/pdf/C22S12015/183-199.pdf>

In a moment, it can be explicitly seen that the Committee presented some reforms about the clauses for the candidates that were necessary in the next election of the president of Egypt. Also, the Committee regulated the administrative control over the elections and the designation of a deputy president during the interim period in accordance with the emergency law. No matter how SCAF tried to provide the order in the country, a great number of political and secular groups stood up to the new amendments that were held by SCAF. In spite of these protests, SCAF managed to pass all regulations that were mentioned above after the referendum was held in Egypt.¹⁷⁹

As a result, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) announced that the election for the new president of Egypt arranged to be held in September 2011. Except for some regulations made by the Constitutional Reform Committee, the Shari'a laws, which were based on the Islamic rules, were not changed in any way and submitted as the official constitution of Egypt. However, these revisions included some provisions for the most debatable questions about the establishment and the presence of political parties. With the articulation over the political party dynamics in Egypt, SCAF managed to supervise the candidate assignments during the establishment process of the new parliament.¹⁸⁰

Moreover, SCAF introduced a new election system, which protected the candidates from any legislative or authoritative restrictions during the parliamentary election. By this means, it can be easily pointed out that this new election system can be seen as a democratic milestone that softened the election process for the foundation of the new government.¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁹ Maugiron, N & B. (2011). Egypt's path to transition: democratic challenges behind the constitution reform process. *Middle East Law and Governance*. 3, 41-42. cited in Kurun, İsmail *Democratisation in Egypt From A Historical Perspective: Problems, Pitfalls and Prospects* <http://www2.bayar.edu.tr/yonetimekonomi/dergi/pdf/C22S12015/183-199.pdf>

¹⁸⁰ Maugiron, N & B. (2011). Egypt's path to transition: democratic challenges behind the constitution reform process. *Middle East Law and Governance*. 3, 41-42-43. cited in Kurun, İsmail *Democratisation in Egypt From A Historical Perspective: Problems, Pitfalls and Prospects* <http://www2.bayar.edu.tr/yonetimekonomi/dergi/pdf/C22S12015/183-199.pdf>

¹⁸¹ Maugiron, N & B. (2011). Egypt's path to transition: democratic challenges behind the constitution reform process. *Middle East Law and Governance*. 3, 43-44. cited in Kurun, İsmail

In the meantime, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) was attempting to make some amendments to carry out a democratic and fair presidential election and political parties were dealing with the candidate selections to participate the parliamentary elections. Having the longest-standing background in the political history of Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood also nominated one of his followers known as Mohammed Morsi. After the elections were held in June.2012, Mohammad Morsi became the new president of Egypt. In fact, this election was seen as one of the turning points in the history of Egypt because it was the first democratic election that was made for Egypt's new president.¹⁸²

Although Morsi's presidency was adjudicated through a fair election, it can be easily observed that there were a lot of opposed people from media, press, business class, universities etc. However, it can be definitely figured out that Morsi was aware of the Egyptian's insecurity concern about either his presidency or his government due to the events that the Egypt society had experienced in Mubarak's reign and later on. Therefore, Morsi made some revolutionary alterations in the administrative system of Egypt in order to provide the security of his regime.¹⁸³

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<http://www2.bayar.edu.tr/yonetimekonomi/dergi/pdf/C22S12015/183-199.pdf>.

¹⁸² Saikal, A. (2011). Authoritarianism, revolution and democracy: Egypt and beyond. Australian Journal of International Affairs. 65(5), p.537-538. cited in Kurun, *İsmail Democratisation in Egypt From A Historical Perspective: Problems, Pitfalls and Prospects*
<http://www2.bayar.edu.tr/yonetimekonomi/dergi/pdf/C22S12015/183-199.pdf>.

¹⁸³ Saikal, A. (2011). Authoritarianism, revolution and democracy: Egypt and beyond. Australian Journal of International Affairs. 65(5), p.540. cited in Kurun, *İsmail Democratisation in Egypt From A Historical Perspective: Problems, Pitfalls and Prospects*
<http://www2.bayar.edu.tr/yonetimekonomi/dergi/pdf/C22S12015/183-199.pdf>.



CHAPTER FOUR

MORSI GOVERNMENT AND TURKEY 2012-2013

4.1. Mohammad Morsi's Government

The process, starting with the Arab Spring and providing the election of the first President of Egypt through a democratic struggle ended up in a bad way. Egypt was the second country of these popular social movements named as “Arabian Spring”, whose first step was taken in Tunisia. The events that started on January 25, 2011, was called “Day of Rage”. It can be definitely emphasized that what the Egyptians aimed was to get rid of the oppressive governance and ongoing economic crises in Egypt by making public demonstrations and slogans especially using the words “Freedom and Honor”. For the United States and other world powers, the Arab Spring was regarded as the Arab peoples uprising for justice and democracy.¹⁸⁴

In response to the increasing revolts, Hosni Mubarak ordered the military to intervene but the Egyptian army rejected Mubarak's command by alleging that the soldier was on the side of the society and they would not touch any Egyptians. When the uprisings within the country reached serious dimensions, Mubarak's government, which governed Egypt with an iron fist for 30 years, was overturned. As a result, Mubarak, who has been the President of Egypt and governed the country since 1981, had to resign on February 11, 2011. At that point, it can be explicitly figured out that the Egypt society took the first important step for the sake of the beginning of freedom and democracy. Aftermath of his resignation, Mubarak appointed Ahmet Sefik as the Prime Minister in his replacement.¹⁸⁵

Mohammed Morsi was first nominated by Ikhwan (the Muslim Brotherhood) in the parliamentary elections held in 2000. Then, Morsi served as a deputy in the

¹⁸⁴ “Mursi ve yarım kalan Mısır”, May 16 2015, Retrieved: URL: <http://www.turkiyegazetesi.com.tr/dunya/279286.aspx>

¹⁸⁵ “Mursi ve yarım kalan Mısır”, May 16 2015, Retrieved: URL: <http://www.turkiyegazetesi.com.tr/dunya/279286.aspx>

parliament between the years 2000 and 2005. However, Morsi, who was one of the members of board of the Muslim Brotherhood and the spokesperson of the MB, and some Muslim Brotherhood members were imprisoned due to their protests against Mubarak and his regime in 2011. Morsi and other arrested members of the Muslim Brotherhood came out of prison a few days later during the mass fleeing. Without a moment to spare, they established The Freedom and Justice Party. After a while later, the Freedom and Justice Party came out with a victory in the triple parliamentary elections completed in January 2012.¹⁸⁶

In the presidential elections held in 2012, Mohammed Morsi, who was the chairman of the Freedom and the Justice Party, Ahmet Sefik, who was appointed by Mubarak as the Prime Minister of Egypt, Abdülmünim Futuh, who was an independent candidate that had left from the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamdin Sabbahi, the chairman of of the Honorary Party, and Amr Musa, who was the former secretary general of the Arab League, were the candidates. In spite of the fact that Morsi and Sefik could not get enough majority during the election, it can be easily said that both of them took a crack at the election in the second round. In point of fact, it can be absolutely mentioned that there were innumerable propogandas and boycotts held by other opposition parties, Mohammad Morsi, known as the leader of the Freedom and Justice Party, managed to win the election by getting 51.7 percent of the vote. Thus, Morsi was elected the President of Egypt and became the first elected president of the country as well.¹⁸⁷

After the election, Morsi made his first speech in Tahrir in front of the Egyptians who greeted him with enthusiasm. In response to the society, Morsi laid stress on the importance of the public for his newly established government. When Mohammad Morsi took his office as the president of Egypt, it can be clearly understood that he followed the internal policy of Mubarak, which was totally based on giving little importance to the domestic issues. In fact, Morsi had no choice but to

¹⁸⁶ “Mursi ve yarım kalan Mısır”, May 16 2015, Retrieved: URL: <http://www.turkiyegazetesi.com.tr/dunya/279286.aspx>

¹⁸⁷ “Mursi ve yarım kalan Mısır”, May 16 2015, Retrieved: URL: <http://www.turkiyegazetesi.com.tr/dunya/279286.aspx>

pursue Mubarak's domestic policy due to the retrograde economic situation of Egypt and the reactions of anti-Morsi group. Besides, Morsi asked the United States to get their help about preventing the threat of the anti-Morsi group, which was also one of Mubarak's unrealized plans during its alliance with the US.¹⁸⁸

The beginning of Morsi's presidency was directly associated with the Egypt's post-Mubarak political period. At that point, the presidency of Morsi was exposed to the unsolvable dispute created by three crucial groups; Islamists, secularists, including the revolutionary youth group, and the Egyptian military. By the way, it can be said that the Muslim Brotherhood also rejuvenated and gave support to the Egyptian military since the army was seen as the most organized power of Egypt in contrast to the opposition parties during the interim period.¹⁸⁹

Although the revolt was emerged as an uprising to the existing regime of Mubarak, it later turned into Egypt's political revolution carried out in 2011. In other words, it can be defined as the political revolution derived from the Egyptian social revolt. As the root of the revolution was based on the social outbreak emerged by the Egyptian revolutionaries, it was not ended aftermath of Morsi's presidency. They called themselves "the young revolutionaries" and they believed that nothing was changed with the election resulted in the presidency of Morsi.¹⁹⁰

For the young revolutionaries, the revolution was not seemed to be real as it was distant from its main target. Before the new president of Egypt appeared, there were a great deal of parties came into being and they got together in terms of their interests but they were not effective and long-lasting. To set an example, the young revolutionaries made a coalition with various liberals, leftist and Nasserist parties to establish a powerful opposition party, which was later named as the National Salvation Front (NSF). The ideology of the National Salvation Party was rooted from

¹⁸⁸ Friedman, T. "Morsi's Moment", *New York Times*, 24 November 2012, Retrieved: URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/25/opinion/sunday/friedman-morsis-moment.html?_r=0, p. 228

¹⁸⁹ Friedman, T. "Morsi's Moment", *New York Times*, 24 November 2012, Retrieved: URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/25/opinion/sunday/friedman-morsis-moment.html?_r=0, p. 228-229.

¹⁹⁰ Friedman, T. "Morsi's Moment", *New York Times*, 24 November 2012, Retrieved: URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/25/opinion/sunday/friedman-morsis-moment.html?_r=0, p. 229-230.

the union of non-Islamic political parties against the newly established regime of Mohammad Morsi. However, their union became unsuccessful because many of them were not powerful enough to support the union politically.¹⁹¹

Rather than Sadat and Mubarak, it can be exactly stated that Morsi's presidency was not easy as much as it was expected. On the one hand, he dealt with the protests caused by the effects of the post-revolution. On the other hand, Morsi struggled with the destructed Egyptian economy and the insecurity problems of the society due to the transition period and the subsequent step known as the newly established Morsi's presidency.¹⁹²

In addition, it should be definitely stated that Morsi's presidency was tried to be undermined by the Supreme Constitutional Court, which put some restrictions to restrain the authority of the new president of Egypt. In another saying, the Supreme Military Council added some dimensional limitations against Morsi's probable presidency just before the second round of the election held on 17 June 2012. With these new clauses, the authority of the new president of Egypt about the appointments of the military officers and the solicitor general of Egypt. Besides, Morsi's presidency was not seemed to be enough convincing by the Egyptian military. After Morsi made his speech in front of the Egyptian people, the High Military Council demanded Morsi and his newly established government to carry out their democratic projects in 100 days to restore the chaotic atmosphere of Egypt.¹⁹³

On June 30, 2012, Morsi was the officially new president of Egypt by thinking that he would overcome the turmoil atmosphere of the country but nothing went to be planned. Before the election of the new president of Egypt held on June 30, 2012, it can be definitely understood that there was not a proper constitutional or a

¹⁹¹ Friedman, T. "Morsi's Moment", *New York Times*, 24 November 2012, Retrieved: URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/25/opinion/sunday/friedman-morsis-moment.html?_r=0, p. 230-231.

¹⁹² Friedman, T. "Morsi's Moment", *New York Times*, 24 November 2012, Retrieved: URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/25/opinion/sunday/friedman-morsis-moment.html?_r=0, p. 231

¹⁹³ Friedman, T. "Morsi's Moment", *New York Times*, 24 November 2012, Retrieved: URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/25/opinion/sunday/friedman-morsis-moment.html?_r=0, p. 231

parliamentary system of Egypt as well as a president. In spite of the fact that there was an election carried out on June 14, 2012, it was later cancelled on the basis of the claim of the Supreme Constitutional Court, which alleged that the election was illegal and the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCARF) intervened by stating the power of the Egyptian military over the political issues of the country. At that point, it can be obviously pointed out that the political authority of Egypt was held by the SCARF from the beginning of Mubarak's deposition until Morsi's regime. To tell the truth, the dominant power was the SCARF aftermath of Mubarak's presidency, which made him an ineffective ruler in the post-revolution period of Egypt. However, Morsi was aware of this situation and was seemed to be determined to change. What he aimed was to take the administration and the political life out of the jurisdiction and bureaucracy.¹⁹⁴

On August 12, 2012, Morsi made a major change in the Egyptian army by discharging some military leaders such as the Defense Minister Hüssein Tantawi, which emphasized the superiority of his authority over the military power. In fact, what Morsi intended to do was to break the political dominance of the army over the Egypt's policy by giving them a limited right about the security and the legislative subjects of the country, which brought about the union of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian military. In this regard, Morsi's attitude towards the army pushed both the army and the MB to make an alliance in terms of their mutual interests.¹⁹⁵

In fact, the rapprochement between the Egyptian military and the MB dated back to the post-Mubarak term; in other words, the beginning of Morsi's presidency. Based on the interim period and Morsi's reaction against the army during the post-revolution period, the Egyptian military changed its motive. Rather than the direct involvement to the political matters of the country, the best thing for the military was to keep its hands off because the more interference to the political issues caused the more deterioration of the dynamics and the leaders of the military, which was

¹⁹⁴ Friedman, T. "Morsi's Moment", *New York Times*, 24 November 2012, Retrieved: URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/25/opinion/sunday/friedman-morsis-moment.html?_r=0, p. 231-232.

¹⁹⁵ Friedman, T. "Morsi's Moment", *New York Times*, 24 November 2012, Retrieved: URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/25/opinion/sunday/friedman-morsis-moment.html?_r=0, p. 232-233.

mentioned in the former paragraphs above. Therefore, the SCARF preferred to concern with the security subjects of Egypt instead of other issues of the country.¹⁹⁶

Meanwhile, Morsi noticed that the maintenance of his regime actually depended upon the military. Since Egypt was still in the process of the newly established democracy emerged as a result of the revolution, the turmoil situation in the society was going on and the effect of the revolution and the new democratic phase of Egypt was the only matter of debate at that time. Besides, the perspective of the society against all institutions and the systems of the country changed but there was an exception: the military of Egypt. Morsi was also aware that the power of the army was always the same in the eyes of the Egyptian people apparently. Faced with various challenges during the beginning of his presidency, it can be certainly undertood that Mohammed Morsi took radical decisions by struggling to remove the remnants of Mubarak known as the previous overthrown leader.¹⁹⁷

After the end of Mubarak's presidency, the US began to give more importance to its relation with Egypt through making a closer connection with the MB. Also, the US was aware that Morsi was in search of unanimous power for standing behind his authority. At that point, it can be definitely said that the US followed an insidious policy in its relation with Egypt. On the one hand, it gave support to Morsi for economic and poltical matters of Egypt. However, it can be clearly inferred that the US to organize this hole and corner plan abut themselves. To set an example, the arbitration attempt of the MB during the struggle of the US pro-democracy NGO workers with the Egyptian military. Through the MB, the problem was easily solved and the MB gained the appreciation of the US.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁶ Friedman, T. "Morsi's Moment", *New York Times*, 24 November 2012, Retrieved: URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/25/opinion/sunday/friedman-morsis-moment.html?_r=0, p. 233

¹⁹⁷ B. Birnbaum, "Muslim Brotherhood Seeks US Alliance as it Ascends in Egypt", *The Washington Times*, 5 Aprl 2012, Retrieved: URL: <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/apr/5/muslim-brotherhood-seeks-us-alliance-as-it-ascends/?page=all>, p. 236.

¹⁹⁸ B. Birnbaum, "Muslim Brotherhood Seeks US Alliance as it Ascends in Egypt", *The Washington Times*, 5 Aprl 2012, Retrieved: URL: <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/apr/5/muslim-brotherhood-seeks-us-alliance-as-it-ascends/?page=all>, p. 236-237.

Morsi's conciliation between Israel and Hamas made the US give economic aid as well as political support to his regime. On the occasion, Morsi's peace-making diplomatic attitude gained such an appreciation that even Barack Obama praised Morsi uttered his attitude. To tell the truth, Morsi's arbitration approach at the struggle between Israel and Hamas soothed the US anxiety about the growth of the Islamists groups in the Middle Eastern Muslim states. Also, it can be clearly understood that Morsi supported Israel, which was seen as the shift of Egypt from the Arab states side to the Israel side rather than Mubarak. In contrast to Morsi, Mubarak followed a more diligent policy in terms of the Israel and the Arab states matters. However, Morsi aimed at his proclivity obviously by stopping the revolt of the Palestinian protestors. As a result, it can be easily stated that Morsi attempted to establish a new constitution system by following a complicated domestic and foreign affairs policy, which brought about the contradiction that threatened his authority.¹⁹⁹

Depending on all these reasons that are mentioned above, Morsi was in search of making a marriage of interest with the army in order to suppress the propagandas of the youth revolutionaries towards his authority and the political system of Egypt. As a result, Morsi changed his point of view by showing his appreciation to the military so as to gain their support, which was the compulsory factor for the existence of his authority.²⁰⁰

At that point, the alliance of the MB and the military was still going on, which gave a way to both the domestic and foreign policies of Egypt during Morsi's presidency. One can easily understand that Morsi finally achieved to take the support of the military as well as the MB in the sense of his regime. Moreover, Morsi called on a dialogue to all political dynamics of the society for further political participation and cooperation but it can be definitely emphasized that especially Mubarak's advocates called forward no reply to Morsi's reconciliation attempts. Instead, they

¹⁹⁹ B. Birnbaum, "Muslim Brotherhood Seeks US Alliance as it Ascends in Egypt", *The WashingtonTimes*, 5 Aprl 2012, Retrieved: URL: <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/apr/5/muslim-brotherhood-seeks-us-alliance-as-it-ascends/?page=all>, p. 237.

²⁰⁰ B. Birnbaum, "Muslim Brotherhood Seeks US Alliance as it Ascends in Egypt", *The WashingtonTimes*, 5 Aprl 2012, Retrieved: URL: <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/apr/5/muslim-brotherhood-seeks-us-alliance-as-it-ascends/?page=all>, p. 237

organized many protests against Morsi and his government which brought about Morsi to engage in judicial barrier.²⁰¹

Though there was an alliance formed between Morsi and the Egyptian army as well as the MB, it could not be not a long-termed due to the uncontrollable fierce of the society towards Morsi and his authority, which caused the military to seize the administration of Morsi's regime on 3 July, 2013.²⁰²

Initially there was a disagreement between some Islamist groups and the secular and the liberal leftist but what was actually targeted starting from the first year of his assignment was to make Morsi discredit. As a result, Tahrir Square became the demonstration area for some groups that were opposed to Morsi and his rule especially after the Referendum issue. The Constitutional Assembly, which is tasked with drafting the new constitution, completed its work and declared that the Constitutional Referendum would be started to be held on 1 December 2012 and would be supposed to be held on 15-22 December in two stages.²⁰³

Since the Constitutional Referendum got heavy reactions, there were many mutual demonstrations made by different groups. The referendum was accepted around the 57 percent of the vote rate in the first stage and it was again accepted in the second stage around the 64 percent of the vote rate, which created the anti-Morsi groups to have more harsh attitude against Morsi and his rule. At that point, it can be easily stated that the same events, which had taken place during Mubarak's overthrowing process, began to occur caused by ongoing fierce propagandas of Morsi opponents. On July 1, 2013, the mass protest of the anti-Morsi groups became the last step on the way to the emergence of the coup in Egypt.²⁰⁴

²⁰¹ "Mursi ve yarım kalan Mısır", May 16 2015, Retrieved: URL: <http://www.turkiyegazetesi.com.tr/dunya/279286.aspx>

²⁰² "Mursi ve yarım kalan Mısır", May 16 2015, Retrieved: URL: <http://www.turkiyegazetesi.com.tr/dunya/279286.aspx>

²⁰³ "Mursi ve yarım kalan Mısır", May 16 2015, Retrieved: URL: <http://www.turkiyegazetesi.com.tr/dunya/279286.aspx>

²⁰⁴ "Mursi ve yarım kalan Mısır", May 16 2015, Retrieved: URL: <http://www.turkiyegazetesi.com.tr/dunya/279286.aspx>

On July 1, 2013, the Egyptian army declared that the political crisis in the country should be resolved within 48 hours, otherwise the military threatened Morsi by stating that it would take over the administration of the country. On 3 July, 2013.

Abdulfettah Sisi, who was appointed as the chief of general staff of the Egyptian military and some military officials, Ezher Sheikh Ahmad et-Tayyib, Coptic Patriarch Tavadros, and Muhammad Abdulaziz, who was one of the representatives of Salafi Nur Party and Muhammad Baradei came together and declared that Egypt's first elected President Morsi was overthrown and his government was fallen. As a result, it can be definitely stated that the democratic transition process, which began with great hopes on January 25, 2011, ended with a military coup on July 3, 2013. Along with the coup, Morsi and the notables of the Muslim Brotherhood were first sentenced to travel and later brought to trial for death and lifelong imprisonment.²⁰⁵

In response to these, Morsi came up with an explanation that he did not accept any decisions after the coup, and said that he should resist those who supported him. Also, he added that he was the official president of Egypt and the commander of the military. In addition, Morsi stated that he came to the election from the first day of his presidency and he would go with the election but Morsi was taken into custody and kept under house arrest and the place where he was held in custody was kept secret for a long time. After the military seized the administration, the broadcasting of some television channels were stopped. The security forces detained thousands of people in various operations made in many different places.²⁰⁶

The Egyptian people who wanted to take possession of their votes for the first elected President of Egypt and their freedoms and future filled the Rabba al-Adawiya Square for civilian resistance. Rabba al-Adawiya Square became a symbol of civil resistance in Cairo when the opponents of the coup filled the Nakhdha Square in Giza. On 8 July, 2013, more than 50 people lost their lives during the fire on the protesters

²⁰⁵ "Mısır'da Mursi'ye darbe", July 4, 2013, Retrieved: URL: <http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/haber/misirda-mursiye-darbe>

²⁰⁶ "Mısır'da Mursi'ye darbe", July 4, 2013, Retrieved: URL: <http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/haber/misirda-mursiye-darbe>

who made propogandas by sitting in front of the Cairo Republican Guard building. On 11 August, 2013, the Egyptian army gave an ultimatum to the civil resistance and expelled them to vacate the squares as soon as possible. Despite the warning of the military, it can be explicitly figured out that the civil resistance continued and the Egyptian soldiers used force against the protestors who did not accept to disperse. By going further, the Egyptian military burned the tents of the pro-Mursi demonstrators in Rabba al-Adawiya Square and also demolished their settlements. Besides, they massacred many people and crushed the shrouded corpses with bulldozers and set them on fire in Rabba al-Adawiya Square. Therefore, the state of emergency was declared in Egypt.²⁰⁷

Aftermath of all these occasions, Mohammed Morsi's situation was again brought up. Morsi, who was imprisoned in Tora jail, and other 106 people including Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who was the President of the World Muslim Scholars Association, were sent to the Egyptian mufti to offer for his consideration about the death sentence given by the Egyptian court. With the final decision of the Chief Mufti, Mursi was sentenced to lifelong imprisonment for the "espionage case" and later he was sentenced to death based on the "prison raid case" but his death sentence was cancelled after a while.²⁰⁸

4.2. Arab World and Turkey-Egyptian role

Aftermath of the emergence of the Arab Spring in the Middle East, Turkey changed its attitude. In other words, Turkey planned to make a direct interference from time to time though it was seen to follow a far-distant policy unlike the policy mentioned above. Actually, it can be exactly said that Turkey was trying to implement a Neo-Ottoman policy in the Arab states, whose regimes changed after the Arab Spring. On the basis of the Neo-Ottoman policy, taking the territory of the Ottoman Empire back at the Middle East was the fundamental aim, which was drafted to be carried out with the imposing the Ottoman traditions as well as its

²⁰⁷ "Mısır'da Mursi'ye darbe", July 4, 2013, Retrieved: URL: <http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/haber/misirda-mursiye-darbe>

²⁰⁸ "Mısır'da Mursi'ye darbe", July 4, 2013, Retrieved: URL: <http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/haber/misirda-mursiye-darbe>

culture again. At that point, this Turkish foreign policy was called “modern Islam policy”, which was supported by the United States like the European Union.²⁰⁹

Besides, it can be obviously inferred that the Justice and the Development Party, which has been the party in power in Turkey since 2001, has been using this foreign policy -that was mentioned above- as the internal policy of Turkey and it is supposed that their ruling policy has been appreciated by the US, which caused Turkey to pursue this policy towards the Middle Eastern Muslim states such as Egypt, Libya and Tunisia. Since the Arab Spring damaged their governments and forced them to change their status-quo completely under the name of democratization, Turkey planned to practice its “modern Islam policy”, which was also seen as the basic compound of the Neo-Ottoman ideology. However, the United States’ supportive approach to the Justice and Development Party could not be ignored. At those times, the US pretended to support the internal and foreign policies of Turkey by presenting Turkey as being the most powerful ally of the United States in the Middle East region. For this reason, it can be exactly said that Turkey did not hesitate to follow “modern Islam. policy” in its relations with the Arab States, which were in a phase of a new administration and constitution system.²¹⁰

When the situations of the Arab States were examined beforehand the Arab Spring, one can clearly point out that the societies revolted against their rulers since they saw Ben Ali, Hosni Mubarak and Muammar Gaddafi as anti-revisionist because of their actions which were seen as opposing factors to any changing ideologies or developments for the sake of the societies. Therefore, Turkey easily intervened in the change of the political regimes in the Arab states located in the Middle East region. In contrast to their previous regimes based on Islamic doctrines and the practices of those doctrines to their political systems, Turkey’s policy was quite different from those ones.²¹¹

²⁰⁹ Ercan, Balçı. *Turkey and the Arab Spring*, Department of Linguistics at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Retrieved: URL: <http://global-ejournal.org/2012/02/08/turkey-and-the-arab-spring>. p.66.

²¹⁰ Ercan, Balçı. *Turkey and the Arab Spring*, Department of Linguistics at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. <http://global-ejournal.org/2012/02/08/turkey-and-the-arab-spring>. p.67-68.

²¹¹ Ercan, Balçı. *Turkey and the Arab Spring*, Department of Linguistics at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Retrieved: URL: <http://global-ejournal.org/2012/02/08/turkey-and-the-arab-spring> p.68.

By emphasizing the success of its domestic policy, Turkey made them change their regimes in accordance with democratic ideologies for the advancement of their domestic affairs. As well as their internal issues, following a more secular and democratic regime would also develop their relationships with the United States and the European Union countries, which was a theory asserted by Turkey by pointing out its own relations with US and the EU countries. For Turkey, the Arab Spring occurred as a reaction of the Arab States against the impractical political systems based on the Islamic regimes. Therefore, the president of the ministry of the Turkish foreign affairs encouraged them to follow a “modern Islam policy” model so as to restore the political structure of their countries by emphasizing that it was the best way for establishing a new political background.²¹²

Although only Turkey was seemed to interfere with the Arab States’ post-revolution situations, the US was actually hiding behind Turkey and using Turkey to make political intervention into the Middle Eastern Muslim societies. To tell the truth, the United States was feared about Iran’s attitude towards the post-revolution era after the Arab Spring because Iran had a totally divergent approach rather than Turkey, which was seen as a disadvantage by the US. In fact, the United States had rational reasons for this argument. Whereas Turkey claimed that the Arab Revolution (the Arab Spring) was an uprising against the political governance systems in the Middle East, Iran asserted that it was an Islamic awakening, which was caused by the anxiety about the policy of the US-Israeli cooperation over the Middle East region. As a result, the US made Turkey practice its “modern Islam policy” by emphasizing Turkey’s influential role compared to other countries.²¹³

Indeed, Turkey was concerned about the political situations of the Arab States during the post-revolution period because of its historical background. Since the Arab States in the Middle East region -which experienced the Arab Spring- had been

²¹² Hosseini, Diako. *Turkey’s Strategic Choice in Arab World Revolutions*, Retrieved: URL:<http://irdiplomacy.ir/Modules/News/Phtml/News.PrintVersion.Html.php?Lang=fa&Typeld=60&Newsld> p.66-67.

²¹³ Hosseini, Diako. *Turkey’s Strategic Choice in Arab World Revolutions*, Retrieved: URL:<http://irdiplomacy.ir/Modules/News/Phtml/News.PrintVersion.Html.php?Lang=fa&Typeld=60&Newsld> p.68-69.

the provinces of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey believed that the modern Islam policy could be the best solution for their new political regimes and the most trigger factor to practice the Neo-Ottoman policy. In this regard, Turkey planned to start from Egypt, which was the most powerful country among others in every aspect.²¹⁴

Besides, Egypt was the leading country in many political Arab unions, which made Turkey get close with Egypt to carry out its plans in the Middle East. In addition, it can be clearly understood that the Muslim Brotherhood Party in Egypt was the only long-established party though its political activity had been banned due to its religious political doctrines, the president of Egypt after the post-revolution era was Mohammed Morsi, who was known as an old member of the Muslim Brotherhood Party before joining the National Democratic Party.²¹⁵

In fact, when it was examined in detail, it can be absolutely emphasized that Turkey's ruling party was close to the Muslim Brotherhood Party in Egypt in the way of two parties' political thinking structures. Thereby, Turkey hoped that the foreign policy about the Middle Eastern Muslim societies would be applicable to Egypt in a better way rather than other Arab states but Turkey's modern or liberal Islam policy towards the Arab states in the Middle East brought about the tension with Iran because Turkey was supported by the US. Also for Iran, Turkey was trying to follow an expansion policy, which would become a threat for Iran's regional power. As a result, a conflict occurred between Iran and Turkey. Even though both Iran and Turkey were non-Arabic states, they were competing against one another to become the leader of the Middle East region that consists of mostly Arab societies. However, neither Turkey nor Iran were seemed to give up the competition. In order to prevent the expansion of Turkey's liberal Islam policy, Iran asserted that Turkey's

²¹⁴ Hosseini, Diako. *Turkey's Strategic Choice in Arab World Revolutions*, Retrieved: URL:<http://irdiplomacy.ir/Modules/News/Phhtml/News.PrintVersion.Html.php?Lang=fa&Typeld=60&Newsld>) p.69-70

²¹⁵ Hosseini, Diako. *Turkey's Strategic Choice in Arab World Revolutions*, Retrieved: URL:<http://irdiplomacy.ir/Modules/News/Phhtml/News.PrintVersion.Html.php?Lang=fa&Typeld=60&Newsld>) p.70.

political offer was actually including a part of the US-Israel collaboration plans over the Middle East region.²¹⁶

To put it in a different way, Turkey's political offer meant the US-Israel direct intervention to the Middle East, which was absolutely an inadmissible situation for Iran as it is one of the countries located in the Middle East region. For these reasons, Iran claimed that Turkey's intention was not a solely about making cooperation by mentioning some paradoxes in Turkey's political offer. However, Turkey did not give up its foreign political policy, which was actually derived from the "Strategic Depth" theory of Turkey's ruling party. In accordance with this theory, the advancement of Turkey's regional role as well as the development of its international situation in a large scale including the Middle East region were aimed.²¹⁷

As an initial point, the Middle East was seen as more important for Turkey rather than the Balkans due to the effects of the post-revolution in the Middle East region. In this sense, Turkey intended to play an active role by restoring the order and the security in the Middle East. At that point, Turkey planned to use historical attachment and its religion to become influential during the political restoration process in the Middle East aftermath of the Arab Spring. As a result, Turkey met with the Arab states in the Turkish-Arab cooperation meeting in 2010. What Turkey's main goal at the meeting was that the emphasis about both Turkey and the Arab states' geological copartnership situations. In this sense, Turkey offered to establish a geostrategic region unity from Turkey to the Gulf of Aden by economic and political integration, which was obviously seen as a reflection of the Neo-Ottoman ideology to the political sphere. Thus, Turkey intended to establish a regional partnerships with the Middle Eastern Muslim countries.²¹⁸

²¹⁶ Ercan, Balçı. *Turkey and the Arab Spring*, Department of Linguistics at th University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Retrieved: URL: <http://global-ejournal.org/2012/02/08/turkey-and-the-arab-spring>. p.65-66-67.

²¹⁷ Ercan, Balçı. *Turkey and the Arab Spring*, Department of Linguistics at th University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Retrieved: URL: <http://global-ejournal.org/2012/02/08/turkey-and-the-arab-spring>. p.67-68.

²¹⁸ Ercan, Balçı. *Turkey and the Arab Spring*, Department of Linguistics at th University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Retrieved: URL: <http://global-ejournal.org/2012/02/08/turkey-and-the-arab-spring>. p.68-69.

Also, it can be inferred that Turkey made a pivotal dislocation in respect to the Neo-Ottoman ideology because the advancement of Turkish influence was the essential point in the old territories of the Ottoman Empire. However, Turkey's expanding influence was definitely related to the political expansion in contrast to the Ottoman Empire's territorial policy. By the way, there were some occasions happened, which was seen as an advantage for Turkey as these events increased Turkey's influence automatically. The first one was about Erdoğan's harsh attitude against the President of Israel during the Davos World Economic forum. The second one was Turkey's struggle with China due to the torture over Turkish-oriented Muslims living in the territories of China. The last one was about the Gaza flotilla raid, which was actually caused by Turkey's dispatchment aid to the Gaza territory without notifying Israel.²¹⁹

All these occasions increased Turkey's popularity among the Arab states, which actually facilitated Turkey's influence in the Middle East region. However, Turkey was forced to change its policy towards the Arab revolution because Turkey's practices were seen as obstacles by the United States and Israel due to their interests about the Middle East. Therefore, Turkey decided to follow a different foreign policy. In this sense, Turkey targeted to remove the security problems between the countries in the Middle East by establishing a union for economic and political integration of the Middle Eastern Muslim states. Especially, gathering the Arab states under a union was very important for Turkey because their security problems would also affect Turkey's own security as well as its economy. Thus, Turkey aimed at becoming a prominent figure in the Middle East region through the union system.²²⁰

Furthermore, Turkey also planned to practice its foreign policy in that way to become one of the regional leaders of the Middle East. At that point, it can also be

²¹⁹ Ercan, Balci. *Turkey and the Arab Spring*, Department of Linguistics at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Retrieved: URL: <http://global-ejournal.org/2012/02/08/turkey-and-the-arab-spring> p.70.

²²⁰ Ercan, Balci. *Turkey and the Arab Spring*, Department of Linguistics at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Retrieved: URL: <http://global-ejournal.org/2012/02/08/turkey-and-the-arab-spring> p.70.

understood that Turkey intended to be the only regional proxy power in terms of the establishment of an union and the union's relations with the United States and Israel. At that point, it can be definitely emphasized that Turkey was encouraged depending upon its relation with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. From this point of view, Turkey believed that other Middle Eastern Muslim societies would support its democratic Islam policy after Egypt showed its positive approach explicitly.²²¹

Also, it should be mentioned that Turkey's changing foreign policy aftermath of the post-revolution in the Middle East landed with its relation with the European Union but Turkey took a risk by presenting its main foreign policy shift from being a member of the EU to being a member of an Arab States Union.²²²

4.3. Cooperation

As it was mentioned above, Egypt was very significant for Turkey since Egypt was seen as the initial step in terms of the practice of Turkey's "modern Islam policy". Another important point was the common ideologies that were shared with the Muslim Brotherhood supporters as well as their mutual backgrounds dated back to the Ottoman Empire. In addition, Egypt was the most powerful country, which had a long-political history rather than other Arab states located in the North Africa Mediterranean region.²²³

²²¹ Kirişçi, Kemal. "The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State", *New Perspectives on Turkey*, No.40, Retrieved:URL:<https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/new-perspectives-on-turkey/article/transformation-of-turkish-foreign-policy-the-rise-of-the-trading-state/3B1A7313566DB27DC73ABBC396D99FA5>.p.52

²²² Kirişçi, Kemal. "The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State", *New Perspectives on Turkey*, No.40, Retrieved:URL:<https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/new-perspectives-on-turkey/article/transformation-of-turkish-foreign-policy-the-rise-of-the-trading-state/3B1A7313566DB27DC73ABBC396D99FA5>.p.52-53.

²²³ Kirişçi, Kemal. "The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State", *New Perspectives on Turkey*, No.40, Retrieved:URL:<https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/new-perspectives-on-turkey/article/transformation-of-turkish-foreign-policy-the-rise-of-the-trading-state/3B1A7313566DB27DC73ABBC396D99FA5>.p.54.

Thereby, Egypt was seen as the most suitable ally for Turkey. In this regard, it can be definitely seen that Turkey's ruling party was the most prominent promoter of the revolution in Egypt. In other words, the overthrown of Mubarak was also supported by Turkey based on these reasons mentioned above. To set an example, it can be easily said that the president of Turkey went to Egypt aftermath of the Arab revolution by presenting his support as the first foreign leader visiting Egypt. Through this way, Turkey actually reached its aim because most of the Egyptians believed that Turkey's "modern Islam policy" model was rational and would be applicable as a new political regime of the Egyptian society.²²⁴

Since the Muslim Brotherhood was the only long-established political group and never lost its popularity despite the fact that its political activity had been banned, Turkey's "modern or liberal Islam policy" was the best regime considering the long span of the Justice and Development Party. Furthermore, the Muslim Brotherhood adopted Turkey's policy so much that they planned to establish the Justice and Development Party in Egypt too, which was stated in the speech of one of the popular members of the Muslim Brotherhood known as Khalidal-Zaferani.²²⁵

After a while, Mohammed Morsi was invited to the "Turkish-Egyptian Business Forum" held at the TOBB Center in Ankara and hosted by M. Rifat Hisarcıklıoğlu, who was the president of TOBB and DEİK in Turkey. Indeed, the "Turkish-Egyptian Business Forum" was held at TOBB Center in Ankara due to Morsi's arranged visit to Turkey. During this visit, Morsi gave striking answers to the questions directed to him about the agenda. Initially, the Egyptian President expressed his opinions about the violence in Syria said:

"People are being massacred every day and their houses are being demolished as well. This needs to be done. For the end of these tragic events, we had to say stop

²²⁴ Kirişçi, Kemal. 2009. "The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State", New Perspectives on Turkey, No.40, Retrieved:URL:<https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/new-perspectives-on-turkey/article/transformation-of-turkish-foreign-policy-the-rise-of-the-trading-state/3B1A7313566DB27DC73ABBC396D99FA5p.54-55>

²²⁵ "Mursi: Türkiye'yi ikinci vatanım olarak görüyorum". 03 July 2013, Retrieved: URL: <http://www.yenisafak.com/dunya/mursi-turkiyeyi-ikinci-vatanim-olarak-goruyorum-412478>.

this brutality. How can be blinded to this wildness of the age? If we act together, the people of Syria will have the transparency that they longed for.”²²⁶

In the forum, Zafer Çağlayan, who was the Minister of the Turkish Economy, Hatem Salah, who was the Minister of the Egyptian Trade and Industry, and Ahmed El-Wakeel, who was the President of the Federation of Egyptian Trade Chambers, made speeches as well. At that point, it can be definitely said that this forum was the most influential milestone between Turkey and Egypt, which was actually directly associated with Morsi’s intimate cooperation approach towards Turkey. In one of his speeches, Morsi stated that Turkey was his second homeland.²²⁷

By emphasizing their presence in very important contacts, Morsi mentioned that there are similarities between the two sister states and pointed out:

“We are in an identity of views. Our aim is to make sure tomorrow is superior today. What we want is to the reign of the brotherhood and the stability between two states. There is no competition between us. We do not want war and restlessness.”²²⁸

Having looked at the possibilities in the two countries, Morsi also stated that they should benefit from these opportunities in his speech:

“I participated in the Justice and Development Party Congress. We had the opportunity to see the steps taken in the field of the development of Turkey. We understood that serious breakthroughs have been realized under the leadership of the Justice and Development Party. Through good governance and transparency, significant improvements have been made by government members’ works day and night.”²²⁹

Besides, Morsi made a statement about his own society and said that the Egyptian people will produce the products they need with their forehead and wrist strength. According to Morsi, there is nothing that Turkey and Egypt cannot do as

²²⁶ “Mursi: Türkiye’yi ikinci vatanım olarak görüyorum”. 03 July 2013, Retrieved: URL: <http://www.yenisafak.com/dunya/mursi-turkiyeyi-ikinci-vatanim-olarak-goruyorum-412478>

²²⁷ “Mursi: Türkiye’yi ikinci vatanım olarak görüyorum”. 03 July 2013, Retrieved: URL: <http://www.yenisafak.com/dunya/mursi-turkiyeyi-ikinci-vatanim-olarak-goruyorum-412478>

²²⁸ “Mursi: Türkiye’yi ikinci vatanım olarak görüyorum”. 03 July 2013, Retrieved: URL: <http://www.yenisafak.com/dunya/mursi-turkiyeyi-ikinci-vatanim-olarak-goruyorum-412478>

²²⁹ “Mursi: Türkiye’yi ikinci vatanım olarak görüyorum”. 03 July 2013, Retrieved: URL: <http://www.yenisafak.com/dunya/mursi-turkiyeyi-ikinci-vatanim-olarak-goruyorum-412478>

long as the private sectors of two countries have valuable representatives. In this sense, Morsi paid attention to the free travel issue between two states without a visa. The removal of taxes from customs is another crucial subject that Morsi pointed out in the forum. Moreover, Morsi asserted that both Turkey and Egypt were expected to do away with the preventions that could be caused possible problems in the business of two Middle Eastern states. For him, Turkey and Egypt needed to build a cultural bridge as soon as possible. By opening up new ways of transportation, it can be easily inferred that Morsi believed to consolidate the connection of Turkey and Egypt. Towards the end of his speech, Morsi emphasized that the Justice and Development Party were expected to share the similar views.²³⁰

Furthermore, Morsi stated that either Turkey or Egypt are willing to make a stable connection, which required the means to implement it. Therefore, it can be concluded that Morsi was of the opinion that the aimed cooperation of Turkey and Egypt would be envied by the other states. With the beginning of his presidency, Morsi underlined the changing attitude towards the business world and the implementations that would be expected to enhance the economy of Egypt. In this regard, Morsi pointed out how his newly established cabinet gave to a great importance to the business world of his country. He also mentioned the restorations in the Egyptian administration by underlining the presence of a transparent administration system, which prohibited the corruption as it provided the supremacy of law in Egypt in contrast to the previous regime.²³¹

Since the forum was held to improve the economic connection of Turkey and Egypt, the Turkish Economy Minister Zafer Çağlayan stated that the trade figures between Turkey and Egypt reached a significant level. Between the years of 2002-2012, it can be clearly seen that the two countries grew their trade transfer around 8

²³⁰ “Mursi: Türkiye’yi ikinci vatanım olarak görüyorum”. 03 July 2013, Retrieved: URL: <http://www.yenisafak.com/dunya/mursi-turkiyeyi-ikinci-vatanim-olarak-goruyorum-412478>

²³¹ “Mursi: Türkiye’yi ikinci vatanım olarak görüyorum”. 03 July 2013, Retrieved: URL: <http://www.yenisafak.com/dunya/mursi-turkiyeyi-ikinci-vatanim-olarak-goruyorum-412478>

times but Çağlayan said that Turkey wanted to increase this rate around 10 billion dollars, then 15 billion dollars.²³²

In spite of the fact that Turkey's intimate relation with Egypt, its relation with Iran went through a bad patch. Turkey never took a step back but Turkey attempted to convince Egypt to practice its policy to become a pivotal Islamic country by establishing the cooperation with Iran as well as Turkey by pointing out Iran's geostrategic power in the Middle East region. As a result, it can be definitely said that Egypt was seemed to practice Turkey's foreign policy to gain its power after the Arab Spring.²³³

In this sense, Egypt planned to become one of the most powerful regional countries as it was in the past. However, Egypt's restoration plans along with both Iran's and Turkey's collaborations was seen as a threat by Israel. In order to undermine Egypt's plans about the restoration of its political regime, Israel asserted that the plan of Egypt was to become a power by taking the support of Iran and Turkey, which would not be a good idea for its relation with its neighbour Israel in the future. Therefore, Israel actually hectored about Egypt. For this reason, Egypt created two different policies with regard to its foreign and internal affairs. In accordance with Egypt's foreign affairs, Iranian foreign policy model was more suitable rather than the Turkish model, which was believed to be more practicable in the domestic sphere.²³⁴

Meanwhile, the turmoil atmosphere in Egypt was still going on although Morsi became the newly elected president of Egypt through a fair election held in the country after the interim period. However, nothing prevented the chaos, the constant revolts went on against Morsi. Despite the fact that Turkey was aware of this situation, the Justice and Development Party could not give any reactions as a

²³² "Mursi: Türkiye'yi ikinci vatanım olarak görüyorum". 03 July 2013, Retrieved: URL: <http://www.yenisafak.com/dunya/mursi-turkiyeyi-ikinci-vatanim-olarak-goruyorum-412478>

²³³ Friedman, T. "Morsi's Moment", *New York Times*, 24 November 2012, Retrieved: URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/25/opinion/sunday/friedman-morsis-moment.html?_r=0, p. 239.

²³⁴ Friedman, T. "Morsi's Moment", *New York Times*, 24 November 2012, Retrieved: URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/25/opinion/sunday/friedman-morsis-moment.html?_r=0, p. 239.

supporter of Morsi and his newly established regime, which led to a paradox in the Turco-Egyptian relations. As a consequence, there was a tension occurred between Egypt and Turkey, which was resulted with Egypt's counter reaction against Turkey by pointing out about Turkey's harsh attitude and its intervention attempts to Egypt's domestic policy. By preventing Turkey's interference to itself, Egypt intended to establish a new political regime based on the Muslim Brotherhood policy. For Egypt, this policy would make the country become a regional power.²³⁵

At that point, Iran asserted its support to Egypt and also suggested to make a cooperation by stating Egypt's historical background as well as its regional dynamic capacity to become a pivotal power such as Iran. However, it can be definitely mentioned that Egypt would not be successful without putting an end to its internal conflict before planning its foreign policy.²³⁶

²³⁵ Friedman, T: "Morsi's Moment", *New York Times*, 24 November 2012, Retrieved: URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/25/opinion/sunday/friedman-morsis-moment.html?_r=0 p. 239-240.

²³⁶ Friedman, T. "Morsi's Moment", *New York Times*, 24 November 2012, Retrieved: URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/25/opinion/sunday/friedman-morsis-moment.html?_r=0 p.240



CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

This thesis sought to analyze the relation of Egypt and Turkey between 2012-2013. The main focus of is that what extend have the relations of Egypt and Turkey developed between the years 2012-2013? Based on the affairs of two countries in the previous periods, their former governmental models, the analysis of their trade relationships and their cooperation with each other, the thesis aims at forming an estimate of Egypt and Turkey's advancing relationship during Mohammed Morsi's presidency dated from 2012 to 2013.²³⁷

Although Egypt had been the biggest state surviving in the territory of the Ottoman Empire for centuries, it can be easily understood that Turkey had not regarded Egypt as its Middle East neighbour by the time the Justice and the Development Party came into power. Once Turkey changed its regime through democracy by being a republic country, the main point of the foreign affairs of the country centered around "Westernization" but the Middle East never lost its significance as a crucial issue playing a key role for Turkey's foreign affairs. However, the boot was on the other foot for Turkey. To put it in a different way, it can be stated that Turkey gave more importance to the Middle East in its foreign policy especially after the Arab Spring in 2011. In this context, Egypt was the major concern of Turkey.²³⁸

Beforehand, it should be pointed out that there was a rivalry affair between two Muslim states derived from being the leader of Islamic world in the Middle East region. At those times, their political and economical relations came to a stopping point. In other saying, Egypt was not seemed as a keystone by Turkey until Morsi's regime. No matter how Turkey tried to establish a bridge to advance the affairs with

²³⁷ Brown, Nathan, "Egypt's Ambiguous Transition", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 6 September 2012. Retrieved: URL: <http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/09/06/egypt-s-ambiguous-transition/drsi#> .216.

²³⁸ Brown, Nathan, "Egypt's Ambiguous Transition", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 6 September 2012. Retrieved: URL: <http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/09/06/egypt-s-ambiguous-transition/drsi#> p.216-217.

Egypt through making a free trade agreement in 2005 and a military coalition in 2008, it can be clearly said that these were futile attempts in the way of promoting the bilateral relations between two countries compared to Morsi's tenure, which was directly related to the attitude of the Justice and Development Party of Turkey. However, this situation changed due to the outbreak of the Arab-Spring and the post-revolution, which was resulted in the beginning of Morsi's presidency and the attitude of Turkey's government towards Morsi.²³⁹

In the thesis, it can be understood that the Arab Spring caused the Arab states to deal with their domestic problems for a long time apart from their foreign affairs. When Egypt was taken into consideration, it can be said that Egypt got a wiggle on about the change of the administration and constitution system of the country rather than the other Arab states, which came into existence through the election of Morsi as a president after a one-year interim period but the post-revolution period of Egypt was tortuous until the beginning of the presidency of Morsi, which affected the foreign affairs of Egypt as well as its domestic policy. During the interim period, Turkey did not interfere with the internal chaos of Egypt but it can be easily stated that Turkey asserted its opinion about the new regime and the new government of Egypt, which was on the side of the Muslim Brotherhood supporters. Despite Turkey's abstaining attitude towards the Arab-Spring in Egypt, its interference laid behind its support was welcomed due to Morsi's point of view against Turkey's ruling party. At that point, it should be emphasized that the Prime Minister of Turkey disclaimed Mubarak's regime by declaring that nothing could be the best than Mubarak's ouster. As a result of its approach, Turkey gained appreciation in Egypt and was seen as the biggest foreign supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood advocates. Once Mubarak laid down his office, Turkey forced the pace in favour of itself.²⁴⁰

²³⁹ Brown, Nathan, "Egypt's Ambiguous Transition", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 6 September 2012. Retrieved: URL: <http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/09/06/egypt-s-ambiguous-transition/drsi# p.217>.

²⁴⁰ Hosseini, Diako. "Turkey's Strategic Choice in Arab World Revolutions", Retrieved: URL: [http://irdiplomacy.ir/Modules/News/Phtml/News.PrintVersion.Html.php?Lang=fa&Typeld=60&Newsld\)16002.p.68-69](http://irdiplomacy.ir/Modules/News/Phtml/News.PrintVersion.Html.php?Lang=fa&Typeld=60&Newsld)16002.p.68-69).

During the beginning of the interim period covering 2011-2012, Turkey made some attempts such as introducing “Turkish modern Islam policy” model to the Egyptian society. Under Turkey’s government’s secular Islam model, what was purposed was the creation of the modern Islam policy in Egypt, which was the same as in Turkey. Underlining their success and the supports of the US and Israel, Turkey tried to encourage Egypt to change its regime in the direction of secularism and modern Islam policy by pointing out the advantages for them.²⁴¹

After a while, Turkey’s expectation became true and Mohammed Morsi, who was known as an old member of the Muslim Brotherhood Party, was elected from the National Democratic Party and became the new president of Egypt after the post-revolution period. As it was mentioned about in a chapter of the thesis, it can be definitely said that the ideologies of both the Muslim Brotherhood Party and Turkey’s ruling party; that is to say; the Justice and Development Party were seemed to be close to each other because Turkey’s liberal Islam policy was appreciated by the Muslim Brotherhood Party and even being identified by Morsi’s new government. In addition, Morsi asserted that the Justice and Development Party should be established in Egypt for the future of the country by stating its consistency and successful modern Islam policy in the domestic sphere.²⁴²

Although the turmoil atmosphere was still going on after the election of Morsi as a president, Turkey got supported him. However, it should be pointed out that Turkey could not forecast the short life-span of Morsi’s term while promoting Egypt about the change of their regime within the context of secularism. For Turkey, it can be said that it was actually an important period in terms of its relationship with Egypt as well as its Middle East policy based on the spread of liberal Islam democratization policy to carry out its aim about being a leader of the Arab world.²⁴³ Therefore, Turkey pulled out all the steps to fulfill its goal over the Middle East region. In this

²⁴¹ Hosseini, Diako. “Turkey’s Strategic Choice in Arab World Revolutions”, Retrieved: URL:[http://irdiplomacy.ir/Modules/News/Phhtml/News.PrintVersion.Html.php?Lang=fa&Typeld=60&Newsld\)16002.p.69-70](http://irdiplomacy.ir/Modules/News/Phhtml/News.PrintVersion.Html.php?Lang=fa&Typeld=60&Newsld)16002.p.69-70).

²⁴² Ghanbarlou, Abdollah. 2011. “The Role of Transnational Actors in 2011 Movements in the Arab World” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Volume 14, No.52. Retrieved: URL:<http://en.journals.sid.ir/ViewPaper.aspx?ID=282371p.220-221>.

respect, Turkey overstepped the mark by making comments about the previous situation of Egypt until the Arab Spring as well as the criticism about the affairs of Egypt with the US and Israel.²⁴⁴

According to the Turkish ruling party, Egypt took yet another turn after the uprising, which coincided with the decreasing of the US influence in the Middle East region but this new era would be good for the sake of Egypt's relation with Turkey since two nations shared the same interests in the Middle East. After a short time, it can be explicitly deduced that the Turkish government put its plan into action by arranging a naval operation with Egypt. In addition, Turkey loaned 2 billion dollars to Egypt when Morsi officially became the president of Egypt. Actually, it can be seen as a deliberate move of the Turkish ruling party since Egypt could not get any financial aid from other countries. In order to show the recognition of Morsi's regime and his government, the Justice and Development Party made an attack and helped Morsi to restore the economic situation of Egypt. On this basis, the thesis analyzes the political and economical relations of Egypt and Turkey.²⁴⁵

From the chapters that are mentioned in the thesis, this study also sorts out the analysis of the close relationship of Turkey and Egypt during Morsi's government in terms of Turkey's perspective. That is to say, Turkey walked tall after the Arab-Spring and believed that its Neo-Ottoman policy can be carried out under the name of the restoration attempts in Egypt. In this regard, Egypt was the most suitable and amenable country among the other Middle Eastern muslim states that experienced the Arab-Spring. Also, the Turkish government was aware that Morsi was an Egyptian follower of the Justice and Development Party and its policy along with the historical backgrounds of two countries. Therefore, it can be implicitly said that Turkey stood behind Morsi and his government and presented their recognition to

²⁴⁴ Ghanbarlou, Abdollah. 2011. "The Role of Transnational Actors in 2011 Movements in the Arab World" *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, Volume 14, No.52. Retrieved: URL:<http://en.journals.sid.ir/ViewPaper.aspx?ID=282371p.221-222-223>.

²⁴⁵ Ghanbarlou, Abdollah. 2011. "The Role of Transnational Actors in 2011 Movements in the Arab World" *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, Volume 14, No.52. Retrieved: URL:<http://en.journals.sid.ir/ViewPaper.aspx?ID=282371p.224>.

this newly established government by visiting the country as the first state in the Middle East region.²⁴⁶

With the beginning of Morsi's presidency, it should be emphasized that the Turkish ruling party concentrated on Egypt issue more than ever in the political sense centering around the Middle East region. In this regard, the Justice and Development Party offered Egypt to make a collaboration about the Syria and Palestine issues, which were known as unresolvable Middle East political matters for years. At that point, Turkey tried to act together with Egypt on the purpose of accomplishing its own plan over Egypt. In contrast to the US and other European countries, it can be easily figured out that Turkey was the major supporter of Morsi's regime; that is to say, the newly established government of Egypt, which was also seen as a step building up the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood.²⁴⁷

In spite of the fact that Turkey had some disputes with Israel based on the Palestine issue, their relations were restored in a short period, which got Egypt's attention. Besides, Turkey was not affected by the Arab-Spring though it was one of the muslim states that has an important geostrategical situation in the Middle East, which again aroused interest in Egypt. For Egypt, the Turkish ruling party's liberal Islam policy both as its domestic policy and foreign policy was seemed to be successful and was appraised by the US and Israel from the point of view of Egypt. In order to smooth its relation with Israel, which was seemed to be curious about the post-revolution period of Egypt, Morsi believed that Turkey's policy would be the best one to practice in its foreign policy especially in terms of its relation with Israel because Israel was seen as a threat against its the newly established presidency of Egypt.²⁴⁸

²⁴⁶ Kirişçi, Kemal.2009. "The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State", *New Perspectives on Turkey*, No.40, p.29-57. Retrieved: URL:<https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/new-perspectives-on-turkey/article/transformation-of-turkish-foreign-policy-the-rise-of-the-trading-state/3B1A7313566DB27DC73ABBC396D99FA5p.55-56>.

²⁴⁷ Kirişçi, Kemal.2009. "The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State", *New Perspectives on Turkey*, No.40, p.29-57. Retrieved: URL:<https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/new-perspectives-on-turkey/article/transformation-of-turkish-foreign-policy-the-rise-of-the-trading-state/3B1A7313566DB27DC73ABBC396D99FA5p.57>

²⁴⁸ Kirişçi, Kemal.2009. "The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State", *New Perspectives on Turkey*, No.40, Retrieved:URL:<https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/new-perspectives-on-turkey/article/transformation-of-turkish-foreign-policy-the-rise-of-the-trading-state/3B1A7313566DB27DC73ABBC396D99FA5p.57>

As far as it goes, all these efforts of Turkey can be considered that Turkey gave weight to empower its relations with Egypt in different aspects by preparing some agreements based on transportation, trade health etc. rather than caring about Morsi's government and his new regime. However, the Turkish ruling party's attempt to constitute an unification with Egypt was seemed to be an useless action.²⁴⁹

In point of fact, it can be definitely mentioned that the approach of the Justice and Development Party towards Egypt was the same as its manner to Iran. Unlike Egypt, Iran responded negatively since Turkey was a threat for Iran because of its actions about being the leader in the Middle East. On that note, it can be deduced that Egypt assessed Turkey's promoter movements out of its countenance, which can be observed in Egypt's arbitration interference about the debate with Israel and Hamas brought about by an Israel soldier.²⁵⁰

Also, it can be easily said that Egypt had sincere relations with Iran and played a peacemaker role about the tension between Iran and Syria when it was compared to Turkey's uncooperative attitude over the situation. Therefore, it can be absolutely observed that the Turkish government was seemed to be interested in its own affairs with Egypt rather than Morsi's other relations with the rest of the Middle East region. In another saying, Turkey was only regarded as the ally of Morsi because the Justice and Development Party displayed a divergent behaviour in contrast to the Egypt society's insurrection towards Morsi's regime, which brought about Mohammed Morsi's wrong policy-making movements during his tenure.²⁵¹

When the Egyptian people demanded for Morsi's resignation by making harsh propogandas, Turkey continued to support Morsi and his government and blamed Western countries for provoking the revolt under the name of destructing Morsi's regime. After that, Turkey asked the UN to interfere with the domestic turmoil in

²⁴⁹ Baran, Zeyno. *Torn Country: Turkey between Secularism and Islamism*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2010, p. 69-70.

²⁵⁰ Baran, Zeyno. *Torn Country: Turkey between Secularism and Islamism*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2010, p. 70-71.

²⁵¹ Baran, Zeyno. *Torn Country: Turkey between Secularism and Islamism*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2010, p.71.

Egypt due to the reaction of Egypt against Turkish embassy in Cairo; in other words, the accusation of Egypt about the Turkish ambassador by claiming his comments about Morsi's unseat. Despite the Turkish government's attitude, Egypt asserted that Turkey remained unresponsive against Morsi's unjust rule based on by decree and paid no mind to the demonstrations emerged as the response of Morsi's non-legal acts.²⁵²

Nevertheless, it can be explicitly understood that Turkey's approach was the same over Morsi's overthrown regime whereas other countries especially the US and Israel were seemed to disagree with Turkey but the Turkish ruling party ignored their point of view and carried on its furious remarks by indicating Israel as the organizer of this chaotic atmosphere. However, it can be clearly deduced that the US replied Turkey in a harder way than it was expected by reprimanding the Justice and Development Party severely due to its uncertain and annoying statements. Henceforth, it can be exactly observed that the Turkish government took a firm stand on this issue and the Prime Minister of Turkey criticized the US attitude in a tougher line. Furthermore, Turkey put its two fingers at Egypt's Islamic clergyman since Ahmed Al-Tayeb stood idle by Morsi's ouster and gave support to the new government which was planned to be established in Egypt.²⁵³

In fact, other Middle East countries also can be seen as the masterminding of Morsi's ouster because Turkey's support and the reappearance of the growing influence of the Muslim Brotherhood, which was encouraged by the Turkish ruling party as well as its advocates, were considered as a threat by other Arab societies such as Saudi Arabi. Therefore, it can be easily understood that Turkey became isolated as the only country supporting to Morsi's presidency whereas other countries were opposed to Morsi and his government by claiming his impolicy. After a while,

²⁵² Meliha Altunışık, "Turkey's Middle East Challenges: Towards a New Beginning?" in Idris Bal, ed. *Turkish Foreign Policy in Post-Cold War Era*, Boca Raton: BwornWalker Press, 2004, p. 369-370. cited in Edelman, Eric S. *The Roots of the Turkish Conduct: "Understanding the Evolution of Turkish Policy in the Middle East"*. <http://www.silkroadstudies.org/resources/pdf/publications/1312BPC.pdf>.

²⁵³ Meliha Altunışık, "Turkey's Middle East Challenges: Towards a New Beginning?" in Idris Bal, ed. *Turkish Foreign Policy in Post-Cold War Era*, Boca Raton: BwornWalker Press, 2004, p. 370. cited in Edelman, Eric S. *The Roots of the Turkish Conduct: "Understanding the Evolution of Turkish Policy in the Middle East"*. <http://www.silkroadstudies.org/resources/pdf/publications/1312BPC.pdf>.

Morsi's presidency was ended and the regime shift was occurred in Egypt and recognized by all states except for Turkey. At that point, it can be definitely said that Egypt also were not seemed to appreciate the Turkish ruling party's attitude, which can be observed in Egypt's demand for removal of the Turkish ambassador in Cairo.²⁵⁴

Besides, it can be explicitly deduced that Egypt marginalized Turkey and broke down its relation with Turkey by decreasing its diplomacy with the Turkish government to "charged'affaires" but Turkey tried to smooth this high tension with Egypt and came up with an explanation about the long historical and timeless relations of two states dated back to the Middle Ages. In addition, the Turkish ruling party stressed on the significance of the presence of Egypt in the Middle East region and how Turkey gave weight to its affairs with Egypt in terms of the preservation of the balance in the Middle East. Even though the Justice and Development Party displayed a mild approach, it can be clearly stated that Egypt took a different approach rather than Turkey. According to Egypt's new government, the tension was not restored through this way. What Egypt demanded was about the end of the Turkish ruling party's support over the Muslim Brotherhood. At that point, it can be easily pointed out that this situation was so annoying for Egypt that the new government of the state threatened Turkey to appeal to the International Criminal Court about the secret organizations of the Justice and Development Party's with the Muslim Brotherhood supporters.²⁵⁵

In a nutshell, what is emphasized in this study is about the closer political settlement between the Justice and Development Party with Morsi and his government especially covering the period between 2012 and 2013. In other words, this short-term period was significant for both countries regarding their previous

²⁵⁴ Meliha Altunışık, "Turkey's Middle East Challenges: Towards a New Beginning?" in Idris Bal, ed. *Turkish Foreign Policy in Post-Cold War Era*, Boca Raton: BwornWalker Press, 2004, p. 371. cited in Edelman, Eric S. *The Roots of the Turkish Conduct: "Understanding the Evolution of Turkish Policy in the Middle East."* <http://www.silkroadstudies.org/resources/pdf/publications/1312BPC.pdf>

²⁵⁵ Anthony Shadid, "Turkey Predicts Alliance with Egypt as Regional Anchors," September 18, 2011. cited in Edelman, Eric S. *The Roots of the Turkish Conduct: "Understanding the Evolution of Turkish Policy in the Middle East"*. <http://www.silkroadstudies.org/resources/pdf/publications/1312BPC.pdf>.

political and economical relations that were mentioned in the former chapters. During this one-year old process, Turkey and Egypt were seemed to find a common ground originated by the domestic and foreign policies of Turkey's ruling party and thereflection of these policies over its relation with the US and Israel and the influence of Turkish government over Morsi and his policies in this sense.²⁵⁶



²⁵⁶ Anthony Shadid, "Turkey Predicts Alliance with Egypt as Regional Anchors," September 18, 2011. cited in Edelman, Eric S. *The Roots of the Turkish Conduct*: "Understanding the Evolution of Turkish Policy in the Middle East". <http://www.silkroadstudies.org/resources/pdf/publications/1312BPC.pdf>.

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