

T.C.
MARMARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ
AVRUPA ARAŞTIRMALARI ENSTİTÜSÜ
AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ SİYASETİ VE
ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM DALI

**THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE CONCEPTION
OF SECURITY IN NATO AND THE EU: THE CASES OF
BOSNIA AND KOSOVO**

Yüksek Lisans Tezi

FERHAN DAVUTLU

İstanbul, 2019

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Jüri Üyeleri:

Doç. Dr. Münevver CEBECİ

Danışman

Doç. Dr. Çiğdem NAS

Jüri Üyesi

Dr. Öğr. Üy. İbrahim MAZLUM

Jüri Üyesi



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GENEL BİLGİLER

İsim ve Soyadı	: Ferhan Davutlu
Anabilim Dalı	: Avrupa Siyaseti ve Uluslararası İlişkiler
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ÖZET

AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ VE NATO’NUN GÜVENLİK DÖNÜŞÜMÜ

Soğuk Savaş’tan sonra, güvenlik tanımı ve tehdit algısı değişmiştir. Güvenlik çok boyutlu ve çok katmanlı olarak incelenmeye başlanmıştır. Güvenlik alanındaki bu dönüşüm ve değişim uluslararası örgütleri de etkilemiştir. Özellikle AB ve NATO yeni ortaya çıkan tehditler ve güvenlik ortamında güvenlik konseptlerini dönüştürmeye başlamışlardır. AB güvenlik kaygısı temelinde kurulmuş bir örgüt olsa da , ekonomik ve politik alanda gelişmeye ve derinleşmeye başlamıştır. Kuruluşunun ilk yıllarında AB güvenlik alanında yeterince başarı sağlayamadı, ancak özellikle Maastricht Antlaşması’ndan sonra AB güvenlik alanında büyük değişiklikler ve dönüşümler göstermeye başladı. Günümüzde, AB kendine özgü bir güvenlik kurumsallaşması göstermektedir. Diğer bir uluslararası örgüt olan NATO, üyelerine kolektif savunma sağlama amacı ile kurulmuş bir uluslararası güvenlik örgütüdür. Yeni güvenlik ortamının yarattığı tehditlere karşı güvenlik konseptini geliştirmeye ve dönüştürmeye başlamıştır. Kolektif güvenlik temelinde başlayan dönüşüm, günümüzde Kooperatif güvenlik konsepti temelinde devam etmektedir. Ancak, NATO yeni güvenlik ortamının yarattığı tehditlere karşı kolektif güvenlik ve kooperatif güvenlik konseptleri temelinde dönüşümünü sürdürmüş olsada, NATO’nun hala kolektif savunma konseptini ön plana alan güvenlik örgütü olduğu görülmektedir.

Bu çalışma ile Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde AB ve NATO'nun güvenlik dönüşümleri Bosna ve Kosova Savaşları incelenerek anlatılmaya çalışılmıştır.



GENERAL KNOWLEDGE

Name and Surname	:Ferhan Davutlu
Field	:European Politics and International Relations
Supervisor	: Assoc.Prof.Dr. Münevver Cebeci
Degree Awarded and Date	: Master- September 2019
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ABSTRACT

THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NATO

The meaning of security and the threat perceptions have changed since the Cold War. Security has started to be examined as multi-dimensional and multi-layered. This transformation and change in the field of security has also affected international organizations. In particular, the EU and NATO have begun to transform security concepts in emerging threats and the security environment. Although the EU is an organization established on the basis of security concerns, it has started to develop and deepen in the economic and political sphere. In the first years of establishment, the EU failed to provide enough success in the field of security, but especially after the Maastricht Treaty, the EU began to show great changes and transformations in the field of security. Today, it can be said that the EU has evolved into a sui generis security institutionalization. NATO, another international organization, is an international security organization established to provide collective defense to its members. It has started to develop and transform the security concept against the threats posed by the new security environment. The transformation started on the basis of collective security and continues on the basis of the concept of cooperative security. However, although NATO has begun to transform against the threats posed by the new security environment on the basis of collective security and cooperative security concepts, NATO still appears to be a security organization that prioritizes the concept of collective

defense. In this study, I tried to define the transformation in the security conceptions of NATO and the EU after the Cold War through an analysis of their stance on the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo



ÖNSÖZ

Soğuk Savaş'tan sonra, yeni güvenlik ortamı ve tehdit algısı ortaya çıkmıştır. Uluslararası örgütler, yeni güvenlik ve tehdit ortamına karşı güvenlik konseptlerini dönüştürerek tedbir almaya çalışmışlardır. Özellikle NATO ve AB bu kapsamda değişim ve dönüşüme başlamış, ilk ciddi sınavlarını ise Bosna ve Kosova Savaşında vermişlerdir. Bu çalışma ile Soğuk Savaştan sonra AB ve NATO'nun güvenlik konseptlerinin dönüşümleri, Bosna ve Kosova savaşında ki tutumlarını analiz ederek ortaya koymaya çalıştım. Bu çalışmayı sonuçlandırmamda çok değerli görüşleri ile eşsiz katkıda bulunan çok değerli hocam Doç.Dr. Münevver Cebeci'ye ve uzun yıllar boyunca desteğini benden esirgemeyen eşim Selin Davutlu'ya çok teşekkür eder, çalışmamın tüm ilgililere yararlı olmasını dilerim.

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Ferhan DAVUTLU

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
ESDP	European Security Defence Policy
ESDI	European Security Defence Identity
EU	European Union
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
UN	United Nations
EDC	European Defence Community
EPC	European Political Cooperation
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EURATOM	European Atomic Energy
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
KFOR	Kosovo Force
SFOR	Stabilisation Force
PfP	Partnership for Peace
WEU	Western European Union

INTRODUCTION

The meaning of security and threat perceptions have changed since the Cold War. Security is an “essentially contested concept” (Buzan, 1991, p. 11). Buzan defines essentially contested concepts as those that create unsolvable debates about their meaning and application because of their ambiguity which causes theoretical discussion and contestation about them (Buzan, 1991, p. 11). Furthermore, security is not a static concept. Its meaning has evolved through time. During the Cold War, the concept of ‘security’ was understood in military terms, and was dominated by the East-West confrontation (Park, 1998, p. 11). The primary strategy for states was increasing military capabilities to achieve security during Cold War period. Security policies revolved around the topics of defence, deterrence, alliance-management with allies and confidence-building with adversaries (Park, 1998, p. 11). The structure and the functions of security institutions also reflected these topics. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact were expected to deter military aggression and prepare to defend in any attack, while the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, now OSCE) represented a different way of increasing security by reducing military threat perceptions, military capabilities and the mistrust and suspicions which lay behind them (Park, 1998, p. 11).

After the Cold War, as the world changed (2003, p.135), different meanings of security emerged and we also witnessed significant change in Europe’s institutional architecture which became more complex (Hyde-Price, 1991, p. 189). As Kupchan (1991, p.114) said;

“Europe’s strategic landscape has been transformed. Whether we like it or not, the architecture of the post-war order is outmoded. The Warsaw Pact has been disbanded. NATO is struggling to define a role for itself; the threat it was built to resist may soon be non-existent. Profound and probably irreversible change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe means that we must confront the difficult task of erecting new security structures for new era” (Kupchan, 1991).

The post-Cold War era came with different threat perceptions in the form of insecurities, instabilities and uncertainties and security structures had to be adjusted accordingly. The transformation of the European security architecture was inevitable. In addition, this was an opportunity, some argued, a necessity, to develop a security architecture more specifically suited to the wider Europe's circumstances (Miall, 1994, p. 2).

During the Cold War period, Western security organizations were focused on the threat from the Soviet Union. Western European countries had to align their foreign and security policies, economies, and especially their defence policies, both through international institutions such as NATO and the European Union (EU) and also through various forms of cooperation (Cottey, 1998, p. 43).

NATO is an intergovernmental military alliance of 29 countries from North America and Europe committed to fulfilling the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty¹ signed in Washington on 4 April 1949. The organization constitutes a system of *collective defense* whereby its member states agree to mutual defense in response to an attack by any external party. The principle of collective defense is enshrined in Article 5 of the Treaty². It means, briefly, that an attack against one Ally is considered as an attack against all Allies³ (NATO Encyclopedia, 2018). In accordance with the Washington Treaty, the fundamental role of NATO is “to safeguard the freedom and security of its member countries by political and military means”. NATO safeguards the Allies' common values of individual liberty, democracy, the rule of law and the peaceful resolution of disputes and promotes these values throughout the Euro-Atlantic area (NATO Encyclopedia, 2018).

¹ The Treaty was signed in Washington DC on 4 April 1949 by 12 founding members. These are Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States (NATO Encyclopedia, 2008).

² Detailed information about Article 5 is given in the first chapter.

³ According to Article 4 of the Washington Treaty “The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.” The principle of Collective defense is not guarantee without any consultation (NATO Encyclopedia, 2008). Detailed information was given within the thesis.

The European Union, on the other hand, was established with the aim of making war unthinkable and materially impossible between Western European Powers (especially France and Germany) as stated in the Schuman Declaration of 1950 (European Commission, 2017). The EU has its origins in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Economic Community (EEC) and European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), formed by six countries⁴. Founded in 1952, the ECSC began to unite Western European states through putting the production and distribution of the two basic industrial and war materials under supranational control in order to secure peace in the continent. To further this idea of peace and to achieve economic integration among Western European countries, in 1957, the Treaty of Rome created the EEC and EURATOM. In 1993, the European Union was established with the Treaty of Maastricht, which also introduced the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as a crucial step for achieving political and security integration, succeeding the European Political Cooperation of early 1970s. The Lisbon Treaty which is signed in 2007 and came into force in 2009 (EU, 2019) further brought a mutual defence clause, envisaging common defence as a goal to be achieved once the European Council so decides. Today, the EU is an economic and political union of 28 European states⁵.

When the reasons of their establishment are considered, it can be understood that NATO and the EU are different international organizations. NATO was founded as an intergovernmental collective defense organization, whereas the EU was established as a mainly economic union with supranational characteristics, which has gradually become a political union. They have both changed their security understanding and policy, gradually adopting approaches which became similar to each other. Their approaches started to get transformed from collective security in the case of the EU and collective defense in the case of NATO more into cooperative security. Accordingly, their approaches towards crisis management have come close too.

⁴ The six founding countries are Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.

⁵ With Brexit (if it happens), this number will drop to 27.

But NATO is more efficient than the EU about military crisis management because of its experience since its foundation. On the other hand, EU is more successful in peace building operations (taken here as post-conflict rehabilitation and stabilisation) mostly civilian crisis management rather than peacemaking operations.

After the Cold War, security transformations of NATO and the EU affected the crisis management capacity of these international organizations. Expectations were high that traditional security⁶ measures would have been able to deal with disputes or conflicts. But the fact was different from the expectations. In the post-Cold War era, the imbalance of power which emerged after the dissolution of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) has caused conflicts and created instabilities in the Balkan region. Balkan countries especially Bosnia and Herzegovina⁷ and Kosovo have tragic memories about conflicts in region. The Srebrenica massacre has still have effects. International community did not display a decisive position to solve the crisis. The United Nations (UN), the OSCE and the EU could not take effective decisions to prevent the conflicts before Srebrenica massacre. Moreover, NATO could not take early decisions about preventing mass violations of human rights and killing in Bosnia and Kosovo.

This thesis aims at defining the transformation in the security conceptions of NATO and the EU after the Cold War through an analysis of their stance on the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo. The main research question of this thesis is “how have NATO and the EU revised their approach to security and regional crises according to lessons taken from the cases of Bosnia and Kosovo?”. The major argument of the thesis is that NATO and the EU have changed their security understandings with the lessons taken from the cases of Bosnia and Kosovo and have revised their approaches which became similar to each other: Although NATO is still a collective defence organization it started

⁶ Traditional security (collective defence and collective security) measures are explained in the first chapter of this study.

⁷ The official names of these countries are Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republic of Kosovo. They are sometimes used in my study as a Bosnia and Kosovo.

pursuing cooperative security. On the other hand, the EU has transformed into an organization with a collective defence dimension, but mainly pursuing collective and cooperative security – specifically prioritizing cooperative security.

The methodology employed here is the application of certain concepts in the comparative analysis of two cases. For pursuing the arguments of the thesis, the chapters take security transformations of NATO and the EU in conceptual framework and compare them with each other analytically with a case-specific approach. Rather than maintaining a single theoretical stance, the thesis is built on the conceptual frameworks of collective defence, collective security and cooperative security. Each case is evaluated with its own dynamics. Thus, it involves theory guided but mostly conceptual approach. The official texts, declarations and documents of NATO and the EU are used as primary sources whereas the secondary sources of the thesis are the scholarly articles, research papers, books and chapters in books which form the literature on this subject. The time-frame of this thesis is 1948-2009; i.e. the year 1948 in which the post-World War II European Security architecture started to be built and the year 2009, when the Lisbon Treaty was adopted. The EU and NATO missions in Bosnia and Kosovo that constitute the test cases of this study and the evolution of their understandings of security have mainly occurred within this period, causing a change in the two entities' understanding of security and this is the reason why specifically this period is chosen for analysis.

The thesis is composed of three chapters: the first chapter is the conceptual overview part which focuses on collective defence, collective security, and cooperative security as the major concepts employed to prove the arguments of this thesis. It provides an intensive literature review for understanding the transformation and the evolution of the conception of security in Europe, as defined and applied by NATO and the EU as well. This chapter portrays what collective defence, collective security and cooperative

security are and what principles they have. It also looks into the conditions that allow such structures to take shape and preserve peace, and, organizations that can be given as examples about how such understandings of security are applied while keeping in mind the third chapter . The second chapter involves a historical overview conceptual framework of the security transformations of NATO and the EU. The third chapter is the case study part. It inquires into the Bosnia and Kosovo Wars with a view to understanding the effects of transformation process of NATO and EU. The chapter involves a comparative analysis of the approaches of NATO and the EU to the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo.

The thesis concludes that with its new interest in defence and security, the EU is moving toward becoming sui generis security institutionalization, whereas NATO is still a collective defence organization. Nevertheless, both of them have transformed in such ways that they have increasingly been adopting approaches which can be analysed within the framework of as cooperative security the conception of which has also widened and deepened through time.

1. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: DEFINING COLLECTIVE DEFENCE, COLLECTIVE SECURITY, AND COOPERATIVE SECURITY

This chapter sets the conceptual framework on which this study is built. It provides an intensive literature review of the definition of the concepts of collective defense, collective security and cooperative security. For a better understanding of the concept of security, it starts with a discussion on the definition of the term “security” and moves on with the explanations of different conceptions of the term by various analysts. Moreover, it clarifies what collective defense, collective security and cooperative security are, what principles they have, what the conditions that allow such structures to take shape and preserve peace are, and which organizations are the examples of these security systems in the light of the historical evolution of the conception of security.

1.1 CONCEPT OF SECURITY

Security means being free from threats. When the security concept is defined in the framework of international relations, the most known definition is avoiding threats to its territory and sovereignty. However, there is no consensus on the definition of security. There are various definitions of security concept in the field of international relations.

Barry Buzan (1991, p.3) defines security as “an underdeveloped concept”. Because of the lack of “conceptual literature on security” prior to the 1980s. He makes five possible explanations for this situation (Buzan, 1991): First one is the difficulty of the security concept. Second, is the intersection between the concepts of security and power. Third, is the lack of interest in security by non-realists. Fourth, is that scholars are interested in new developments in technology and policy and they do not have enough time to study security issues. The last one is that policy-makers find the ambiguity of “national security” useful.

Buzan depicts security as an “essentially contested concept”(1991, p.7). He means that there is an unsolved debate about the meaning of security among scholars in theoretical discussions. He points to the ambiguity of the security concept with this definition. He saw this situation as the reason of not having a single security definition. On the other hand, David Baldwin (1997, p.5) confronted this situation in a positive manner. He states that one single definition can prevent the transformation of the concept and various definitions about the security concept should be made by different schools (the Copenhagen School, Realist, etc.) (Baldwin, 1997, p.10). For him, essentially contested concept itself is contested.

On the other hand, the content of security concept has also enlarged and become multi-dimensional; including individual security, societal security, national security, international security, global security etc. Helga Haftendorn (1991, p.2) defines the term security as “ambiguous in content”. She has tried to understand the term of security by defining what it means, what its goals are, and whether it is a goal or a discipline. In her view, security is multi-dimensional and its meaning changes according to the context within which it is defined (Haftendorn, 1991, p.3). Thus, it can be national, individual or even global.

After the end of the Cold War, different definitions of security have emerged in different dimensions. Ken Booth (1991, p.319) defines security from a non-state-centric point of view and places the humanbeings (the individual) at the center of his definition. He defines security through the concept of “emancipation” which means as “the freeing of people (as individuals or groups) from those political and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do” (1991,p. 319). Surely, war and the threat of war can be defined as one of those constraints, together with societal and structural problems such as poverty, political oppression, etc (Booth, 1991, p.319).

This “emancipation-oriented approach” (Bilgin, 2003, p. 210) confronts the problem of defining what emancipation means. There could be different approaches about the meaning of emancipation in different parts of the world. But emancipation is mostly defined with reference to the individual. Individual security is defined as synonymous with human security and human rights by Cohen (2001, p. 2). The individual’s perception of threat and security is the core unit of analysis in security studies according to critical scholars. It evolves in parallel with threat perceptions of individuals at this level and then it affects all levels of the system especially the national and international security (Dedeoğlu, 2014, p. 37).

In contrast with critical conceptions of security, realist definitions are state-centric and refer to the security needs and interests of the states. In this realist conception, “security” includes concepts such as threat, risk, terrorism, enemy, defence, deterrence etc. These are the indicators of how the security is defined by the state, still as the main actor in international politics. Most of the analysts refer to the security of the state as “national security”. The historically dominant definition on security is based on the national security, mostly in relation with military power. Stephen Walt (1991) and Walter Lippman (1950) define security in military terms. Stephen Walt (1991) defines security in relation with the term of “survival”. When the state maintains its survival, then it can seek other goals such as profit or power. According to his definition, security is about the control of military force to provide survival (Walt, 1991, p.212). On the other hand, Baldwin (1997, p.13) defines security in terms of values to be protected. Nevertheless, political independence and territorial integrity of the states are also some of these values (Baldwin, 1997, p.13).

On the other hand, Richard Ullman defines security as a “tradeoff between liberty and security” (1983, p.130). All over the world, in every society, individuals or groups seek security against the state about their rights such as freedom of speech or travel, just as they ask for the state to protect them against the enemies. From this perspective, tradeoff between the liberty

and security is about the threats. Defining the threats is more important for the national and individual security level of analyses. The balance of freedom and security must be well established. The government should not restrict its citizens' freedom while providing security for them. But the security measures to be taken should be enough to eliminate the threat. There must be a balance. And also not all threats can be regarded within the security framework. This can vary according to definition of threat. If something is named as an existential threat, the process of 'securitization'⁸ starts.

Security can also be defined in societal terms. According to Ole Waever, societal security is the "ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats [...] the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and national identity and custom "(Waever, 1993, p.23).

At the level of the international, security refers to a set of complex relationships with external and internal security issues of actors (e.g. states, international organisations), which are the subsets of the international system and which are also related to the international security as a whole. According to the realists perspective, following Waltz, Walt (1991, p.219) states that the international system is anarchic and the highest end is security (Walt, 1991, p.219). On the other hand, for liberal institutionalists, interdependence is the basic assumption of international security. According to Helga Haftendorn, the security of one state is affected by other states (Haftendorn, 1991, p.9). She argues that security of one state is linked to the other states. Namely, all countries have been linked each other in different dimensions in international environment. Security is "relational" and it "is mostly about how human collectivities relate to each other in terms of threats and vulnerabilities, although sometimes it addresses the ways such collectivities relate to threats from the natural environment" (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, 1998: 10). This

⁸ Securitization refers to the process of declaring something as a threat and dealing with it through the use of extraordinary measures (Waever, 1996).

means that states and human collectivities need to act together to counter certain threats. This sometimes takes the form of collective defence, sometimes the form of collective security and sometimes cooperative security. They might form security communities (Deutsch, 1957), they might seek to achieve common security or even common defence.

Another level of analysis in security studies is global security that refers to taking measures against global threats such as environmental hazards, transnational crime, international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) etc. which can only be dealt with the participation of countries at the global level. Helga Haftendorn describes the global security with the “common security”⁹ approach (Haftendorn, 1991, p.9). Common security is based on the idea that security must be sought not against one’s adversaries but with them. This approach is also important for the cooperative security concept. It contains compromise and coordination even with the enemies to mitigate global security threats.

As it is seen above, different definitions related to security have been made. The point of view of all of them is different. What we observe with regard all these definitions of security is that security may mean many things from being safe from direct physical threats, to the preservation of the values and wealth of a state or successful pursuance of national interests. In this study, the term security is used in an eclectic way, borrowing from different theoretical views when necessary to explain the concepts of collective defence, collective security and cooperative security.

1.2 COLLECTIVE DEFENCE

Collective defence refers to the formation of an alliance, the member states of which pledge to come to each other’s rescue in a case of an armed attack on any of the members. Williams and Jones (2001: 88) argue that collective defence “implies an ‘alliance’ which comes into existence to

⁹ “Common Security” approach was used in the independent commission on Disarmament and Security Issues under the chairmanship of Olof Palme in 1982, called the Palme Commission (Galtung, 1983).

confront a perceived and perhaps very tangible adversary”. In their view, this further implies that the number of the members of the alliance will be limited and it would cover “a defined geographical area” (Williams and Jones, 2001: 88). This alliance logic is based on a collective defence guarantee (i.e., a pledge to come to defence of an ally when it is militarily attacked or threatened by an attack), nevertheless, this obligation “is only likely to be activated in a carefully defined set of circumstances” (Williams and Jones, 2001: 88) (Williams and Jones, 2001: 88) and it may not always be automatic (for example, WEU’s collective defence guarantee is automatic whereas NATO’s guarantee requires the invocation of Article IV before the invocation of Article V) (Duke, 2000: 39-40).

1.2.1 Historical Background

The Cold War divided the world into two parts (enemy camps) as the basic feature of the bipolarity. Threat perceptions were mainly at the national security level in this context and they brought about the creation of collective defense organizations such as NATO and the Warsaw Pact¹⁰. Western European countries were faced with the need of economic and political reconstructions after the Second World War, where they received the major support from the US. The Second World War had been devastating for European countries and their industries, economies and militaries were considerably destroyed. Moreover, they were concerned about the expansionist policies and methods of the Soviet Union from 1945 to 1949. Nevertheless, the Western governments had to cut their defence budgets because they needed funds to reconstruct other sectors. They did not have enough funds to restructure and rehabilitate their military forces and reconstruct their economies (other industrial sectors) at the same time. To the contrary, the Soviet Union continued to maintain its own military forces and capabilities at full strength. This situation has become an increasing concern in Western governments (NATO Handbook, 2006, p. 16). Moreover, as understood from

¹⁰ Warsaw Pact was a collective defence organization as well.

the ideological aims of the Soviet Communist Party, it was evident that appeals for respect for the United Nations Charter, and for respect for the international norms reached at the end of the Second World War, would not guarantee the national sovereignty or independence of democratic states faced with the threats which arose from outside or inside of their countries. “Undemocratic forms of government and the repression of effective opposition, basic human and civil rights and freedoms in many Central and Eastern European countries compounded these fears” (NATO Handbook, 2006, p. 16).

The concepts of “cooperation” and “alliances” have been common features of the history of mankind, but the terms ‘collective defence’ and ‘collective security’ are inventions of the last century that were emphasised with the establishment of security and defence organisations, especially NATO (Cohen, 2001, p. 5). Between 1947 and 1949 a series of political events took place. The most important one was the signing of Brussels Treaty by five Western European countries¹¹ in March 1948. The Brussels Treaty was the first step in the process leading to the creation of the North Atlantic Alliance. It has also shown the determination of these countries to develop a common security system and to strengthen the links between them in a manner which would enable them to resist the ideological, political and military threats to their security posed by the Soviet Union. Moreover, it represented a crucial step in the post-war reconstruction of Western European security system and brought the Western Union, and its defence arm Western Union Defence Organisation into being (NATO Handbook, 2006, p. 17).

The term “*collective defence*” started to be used during the days of the Cold War (Cohen, 2001, p. 6). The effective usage of this term can be seen in the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, founding treaty of NATO. The origins of Article 5 can be found in the Dunkirk Treaty of 1947, a bilateral United Kingdom(UK)-French agreement aimed at countering a possible German military resurgence. Article 2 of the Dunkirk Treaty committed each country to

¹¹ The signatory countries were Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

give “*all the military and other support and assistance in his power*” in case of a German attack or failure by Germany to abide by its commitments¹² (Tertrais, 2016, p. 1). It may be said that this is the first step for putting together the European countries in a collective defence meaning. The Brussels Treaty of 1948¹³ extended this mutual commitment among five European countries, without any reference to Germany and exclusively for self-defence (Tertrais, 2016, p. 1).

1.2.2 What is Collective Defence ?

The founding Treaty of NATO –the Washington Treaty – is the major document to clarify and understand the definition of collective defence, its principles, and its usage. The most known definition of the term of “*collective defence*” is that it commits all the states, which signed the treaty, to help to each other’s defence in the event of any member is threatened by, or is subjected to, military attack by a state or states outside the treaty area (Cohen, 2001, p. 7). This meaning can exactly be seen in the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty because it provides the principle of collective defence. Because Article 5 provides the most important example of a collective defence guarantee, it would be useful at this point to elaborate on how the meaning and the principle of collective defence was enshrined this article.

“The Parties agree that an *armed attack* against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of *individual or collective self-defence* recognised by Article 51 of

¹²“Should either of the High Contracting Parties become again involved in hostilities with Germany, either in consequence of an armed attack, within the meaning of Article 51 of the Charter of the UN, by Germany against that Party, or as a result of agreed action taken against Germany under Article 1 of this Treaty, or as a result of enforcement action taken against Germany by the UN Security Council, the other High Contracting Party will at once give the High Contracting Party so involved in hostilities all the military and other support and assistance in his power”. Treaty of alliance and mutual assistance between the United Kingdom and France (Dunkirk, 4 March 1947).

¹³ “If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power”(The Brussels Treaty of 1948).

the Charter of the United Nations¹⁴, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area” (NATO, Art.5, 2017).

This article clearly states that if a NATO Ally is the victim of an military attack, each and every other member shall consider this act of violence as an armed attack against all members and shall take the action it deems necessary to assist the Ally attacked (NATO, 2017). Moreover, it is deliberately ambiguous as per the exact nature of the response with which an attack would be met, which is left to the discretion of the parties (NATO, 2017). We have seen this kind of armed attack in the USA on 9/11 in which Article 5 of the treaty first invoked by NATO against the terrorists¹⁵. In this way, it can be said that Article 5 works also as a deterrent.

According to Bruno Tertrais (2016), the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty is meant as “exceptional” and “temporary” measure to cope with military threats. It is exceptional because of the parties commit themselves to avoid conflict and settle international conflicts in a peaceful manner and deter threats by developing individual and collective capabilities to resist the aggressions (Williams, 2009, p. 25). And it is also temporary which is meant as a stopgap until Security Council has dealt with the crisis. It provides that an attack on one member would be considered an attack on all (Williams, 2009, p. 25). This is the provision of “one for all, all for one” commitment.

According to Cohen (2001, p.5), the term of collective defence implies formal commitment between groups of states for the long-term, however, it is not certain that the security interests of individual members will be fully

¹⁴ Article 51 of UN Charter: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of *individual or collective self-defence* if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security” (United Nations, 2018).

¹⁵ See Buckley (2011).

protected within their common spheres (Cohen, 2001, p. 5). He mentioned with the “protecting” that looks outward to defend its members from external aggression. The word “*outward*” is more important to understand the concept of collective defence. With this word, it can be said that the signatory states will not have any problems with each other in any way. Logically, no government of a member state could invoke it if attacked by another member state.

1.2.3 The Principles of Collective Defence

Because NATO is the most suitable model for the usage of collective defence concept, principles of collective defence can easily be defined considering the Washington Treaty. The Washington Treaty binds its members together, committing them to protect each other (NATO, 2017).

The essential purpose of the Alliance is to protect security and freedom of all its members through political and military means and to defend them jointly (NATO, 2017). The values that the Allies share about democracy, human rights and the rule of law are said to contribute to peace and stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area (NATO Handbook, 2006, p. 18). The guiding principle by which the Alliance works is “common commitment” and “mutual cooperation” among sovereign states in support of security for all its member states. In other words, NATO tries to ensure the freedom and security for all its members in terms of military and political values. It aims to fulfill this commitment in accordance with the fundamental values of democracy, human rights and legal rules. Considering Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, there are some basic principles on how collective defense should be perceived. These principles are;

- To resolve international disagreements through *mutual diplomacy* without using force.
- To develop *social and economic cooperation* among the members and to unify their powers.
- Increase defense strength against individual movements and provide cooperation against armed attack.
- In case of threats to members, counseling between institutions.

- It is to assure *mutual help* and *solidarity* by accepting the attack against one member against all members” (NATO Handbook, 2006, p. 23).

These are the key principles of collective defense to comprehend the usage of it. To solve the international crisis with diplomacy and peaceful ways and to fight against possible armed attack in a manner of cooperation and solidarity are particularly the most important principles. “All for one, one for all” principle – “*accepting that an attack against one member is considered as an attack against all members*” – also provides mutual trust among members.

1.3 COLLECTIVE SECURITY

“*Collective security*” is an arrangement or a policy that brings together countries agreeing to a regional or global stance on security which prioritizes peaceful resolution of disputes and achieving stability. Alvin Bennett (1991) claims that “there are at least six methods of attempting to settle international disputes”. These are respectively; “no action taken by the disputing parties, allowing the dispute to remain unsettled over a period of time” (Bennett, 1991); settlement through the parties; intervention by an international agency to facilitate peaceful settlement; *collective action by international agencies to restore peace and order*; coercive self-help, including recourse to war between the parties; and outside intervention by other states to promote their interests (Bennett, 1991). Collective security pertains to “collective action by international agencies to restore peace and order” in Bennet’s definition. It is an arrangement in which countries agree to get into a collective action of responding to threats to peace and security. The distinguishing feature of collective security (especially vis-a-vis collective defence) is that it is not directed towards a predetermined enemy (Williams and Jones, 2001,p.88). On the other hand, the expectation in collective security is that the participating states will not attack each other. This is especially the case with “concert-based collective security” (Kupchan and Kupchan 1991, p.116) which can be traced back to the Concert of Europe (1815).

Collective security seeks to unite regional and global perspectives. The assumption about collective security is that all nations share a primary interest in maintaining peace (Bennett, 1991). Thus, it can be argued that collective security is about establishing an order in world politics. This idea has a long history and its conception has evolved over time. But for analytical utility only the post-Cold War understanding of collective security is scrutinized here.

1.3.1 Historical Background

With the end of Cold War, bipolarity of the international system came to an end, and, a new world order came into being with a new security environment, new threats and security concerns (Cottey, 1998, p.43). According to Ole Waever (1993), the new threats have been rather diffuse and not necessarily susceptible to military solutions. These are environmental problems, human rights, terrorism, economic problems, drug and weapons smuggling, human trafficking in international security environment (Park, 1998, p.15). This change in the security environment has led to the redefinition of security concepts. In the post-Cold War security environment, the need for collective defense has diminished due to the disappearance of the bipolarity and the possibility of a direct attack on the West, and efforts have been made to establish regional collective security.

The ideological roots of collective security can be found in the idea of perpetual peace put forward by Kant which refers to the creation of “one federation of free states” (cited in: Aleksovski, Bakreski and Avramovska, 2014, p. 275). Kant studied the theoretical, political and legal aspects of the aim of perpetual peace, tried to clarify how a world without war can be possible and how perpetual peace could be established (Solomon, 2003). He referred to a “*pacific federation*” as a “*particular kind of league*” that “*would seek to end all wars for good*” (Solomon, 2003). This is about the possibility of promoting and maintaining international peace through an extensive partnership of committed states.

Historically, the Concert of Europe might be regarded as the first serious attempt to maintain collective security. The creation of a collective security system was also extensively discussed after World War I, and it took shape with the establishment of the League of Nations in 1920, and, in the Charter of the United Nations after World War II. After World War I, Woodrow Wilson emphasized that peace should be achieved through collective efforts, building on Kant's views (Solomon, 2003). Wilson found power balance arrangements unreliable and dangerous. He underlined that confidential agreements did not bring peace to the world. Both Kant and Wilson pointed out that organise common peace instead of hostilities is the necessity (Yost, 1998, p. 11).

According to many scholars, the first fully institutionalized attempt to maintain collective security in the international system for preventing war was the establishment of the League of Nations in 1920 (see, e.g., Aleksovski, Bakreski and Avramovska, 2014, p. 276). Collective security concept has mainly been viewed as a method of controlling war in a world of sovereign states (Goodby,1993,p.299). Wilson made contributions to establish the League of Nations and to develop a system of collective security with fourteen principles. The 14th article¹⁶ of Wilson's principles was on the establishment of the League of Nations(Solomon, 2003). He was firmly committed to the argument that collective security would stop or prevent wars, and, he guided the efforts to incorporate a collective security concept into the League of Nations Covenant (Solomon, 2003). However, League of Nations was not fully successful about preventing war, that is to say, it has not taken enough measures to prevent the war on time, but still, it put the first efforts as an institution to prevent war.

The term "collective security" has been marked by disagreement in its structuring and regulation of the international system since its first embodiment

¹⁶"A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to *great and small states alike*"(Fourteen Points,1918). It means this is a system that would protect the rights of small states equally with those of the powerful (Miller, 1999, p.306).

in the League of Nations. During the period between the two world wars, the collective security concept has been stated as the reason of League of Nations could not take measures to prevent war.

After the end of Second World War, a new and revised attempt to reorganise the scope and functionality of the collective security concept resulted in the establishment of the United Nations. A *particular kind of league* has established with the UN, but it can not be said that it prevented all wars. Collective security was the main purpose and philosophy behind the establishment of UN, just as it was the main purpose of its predecessor, the league of Nations: in other words, their major purpose was to eliminate, as far as possible, the states' recourse to war.

Moreover, in the 1970s, another international organisation, the CSCE¹⁷ was established for providing collective security to all countries in the Eurasian-Atlantic region (Cohen, 2001, p.6). Both the CSCE/OSCE and the UN have been partly effective in achieving collective security. But there were certain points on which they could not be fully successful, especially in crisis management¹⁸ operations which are also regarded as significant features of providing collective security. The most remarkable reason is the ineffectiveness of decision-making procedures. According to Goodby (1993, p.303), "the procedures that the international community uses to *make decisions* about collective security are critical to the problems of understanding the nature of crisis, defining political objectives and measuring military, economic and other means necessary to achieve these objectives." Goodby (1993, p.312) emphasizes the importance of decision-making procedures to

¹⁷ Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) has been transformed to the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in 23 July 1998. "The OSCE has a comprehensive approach to security that encompasses politico-military, economic and environmental, and human aspects. It therefore addresses a wide range of security-related issues, including arms control, confidence and security-building measures, human rights, national minorities, democratization, policing strategies, counter-terrorism and economic and environmental activities." OSCE (2019).

¹⁸ Crisis management is one of NATO's fundamental security tasks. It can involve military and non-military measures to address the full spectrum of crises – before, during and after conflicts – as outlined in the 2010 Strategic Concept. (NATO, 2017). See chapter 2 for detailed information.

understand the environment in which crisis occurs. When the Balkan crises were examined, particularly, the Bosnia and Kosovo conflicts, the weakness of the decision-making procedures of international organizations to preserve the peace can be seen.

1.3.2 What is Collective Security?

There have been many discussions about the definition of “*collective security*” concept. As Goodby (1993, p. 305) states the “concept of collective security is entailing many different shades of meaning”.. According to George Schwarzenberger (1951) “collective security is machinery for joint action in order to prevent or counter any attack against an established international order” (Schwarzenberger, 1951). It means taking collective measures to cope with the threats to peace (Palmer and Perkins, 2007)¹⁹. Van Dyke (1957) defines “collective security as a system in which a number of states are bound to engage in collective efforts on behalf of each other’s individual security”. Schleicher asserts that the term “collective security is an arrangement among states in which all promise, in the event any member of the system engages in certain prohibited acts (war and aggression) against another member, to come to latter’s assistance” (Schleicher, 1954). According to Claude (quoted in Sheehan 1996, p.156) collective security is a “system for the maintenance of international security” which has evolved as a “revised balance of power system”²⁰. Mearsheimer argues that a collective security system is one “in which states make automatic and legally binding commitments to respond to aggression wherever it occurs”(Kupchan, 1995, p.53). As can be seen in these various definitions, for realist thinkers, collective security hardly different from collective defence: i.e. refers to “a commitment by each member to join a

¹⁹ Quoted here from Joseph C. Ebegbulem, 2012.

²⁰ “*Balance of Power*” has different meanings through history and the key thinkers and statesmen have influenced its development. According to Palmer and Perkins, “balance of power assumes that through shifting alliances and countervailing pressures no one power or combination of powers will be allowed to grow so strong as to threaten the security of the rest”(quoted in Sheehan, 1996, p.3). The importance of concept is that it is the key to understanding the recurrent patterns of behaviour of states living in a condition of ‘international anarchy’(Sheehan, 1996: 194-195).

coalition to confront any aggressor with opposing preponderant strength” (Kupchan and Kupchan 1991,p. 18). Ebegbulem defines it as “security for individual nation by collective means”, that is, by membership in an international organization made up of states which have pledged to defend each other from attack (Ebegbulem, 2012). On the other hand, liberal thinkers see it mainly in terms of state cooperation in finding collective ways to deal with threats to peace and security.

The most convenient definition of collective security for this study is the mixture of all these definitions. But briefly, collective security can be seen as a method for maintaining peace through an organization of sovereign states, whose members have a commitment to limit their tendency to go to war, and to achieve peace and security, and in some cases, to defend each other against attack. In this part of the thesis, particularly the UN Charter and also some articles of League of Nations are analysed for understanding the meaning and principles of collective security.

Collective security concept cannot be implemented in the absence of a specific commitment by sovereign states. This requires both a treaty defining the types of aggression unacceptable to members of the community and a clear definition of how the community would respond to the illegal action. Collective security is mainly based on an institutionalized structure in which the members of the community can determine when conditions requiring their collective action have risen. The League of Nations was the first effort to create such an institution (Miller, 1999,p.305). In article 10 of League of Nations, the first modern collective security organisation has been mentioned.

“The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as *against external aggression* the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled” (Covenant of League of Nations, 1924).

According to this article, all members have taken the responsibility to

prevent conflicts and to respect and preserve against “external aggression” in any means; in particular military means. On the other hand, according to Cohen (2001, p.6), collective security looks inward, i.e., to ensure security within a group of sovereign states. The League of Nations members also pledged to protect each other from attack by other nations within that group (Cohen, 2001, p.6). In other words, aggression by one or more members against another member would be opposed, if necessary by force, by the other member states of the League. The principle of “common concern” was also added to the League of Nations Covenant in article 11:

“Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of *concern to the whole League*, and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations” (The Covenant of the League of Nations, 1924).

Whittaker (1995, p. 3-5) states that the principle behind the United Nations is that “states unite to maintain, develop and protect a world progressively freed from conflict, poverty and threat”. The Charter of the United Nations²¹ is the founding document of this organisation which codifies its rules and practices. The term collective security is not clearly stated in the charter certain articles can be deemed as pertaining to its achievement. As emphasised in the Preamble of the UN Charter, the purpose is:

- “To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective *collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats* to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.
- To develop *friendly relations* among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;
- To achieve *international cooperation* in solving international

²¹ The Charter of the United Nations was signed on 26 June 1945, in San Francisco, at the conclusion of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, and came into force on 24 October 1945.

problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion;

- To be a *centre for harmonizing the actions of nations* in the attainment of these common ends”(United Nations, 2018).

These purposes combine the different but necessary aspects of collective security. They relate to “collective measures for prevention and removal” of threats, “friendly relations” and “international cooperation”. The final purpose defines the institution as a “centre for harmonizing the actions of the nations” again, making an explicit reference to cooperation. The UN Charter aimed to establish a system of collective security which would help deal with international crises and prevent war or aggression or threats to peace in any part of the world.

Collective security is currently regarded as the most promising approach to international peace. Because this is a system that guarantees the security of each state of the world against any war or aggression which may be committed by any state against any other state. It is like an insurance system in which all the nations are bound to protect the victim of an aggression or war by neutralizing the aggression or war against the victim. This clearly shows that there are not any clear lines that separate the definitions of collective defence and collective security and especially for realist thinkers collective security means collective defence.

1.3.3 The Principles of Collective Security

Hans Morgenthau (1953, p.142), as a prominent classical realist, states that “the organizing principle of collective security is the respect for the moral and legal obligation to consider an attack by any nation upon any member of the *alliance* as an attack upon all members of the alliance”. He explained that the alliance to which he referred was a “universal alliance against potential aggression” (Morgenthau, 1953, p.142). This clearly shows that realists’ definition of collective security is almost the same as the definition of

collective defense. The only difference that Morgenthau puts forth in this regard is that collective security refers to a “universal alliance” where member states do not seek national interests. This seems paradoxical, as realists prioritize national interest. Niou, Ordeshook and Rose (1989: 159) point to this paradox, arguing that “whatever ‘moral and legal’ imperatives exist, their basis lies in the egoistic motives of individual states”, and, thus, collective security is not different from “balance of power alliances”.

The concept of collective security has been built on the commitment of international law that any aggression to one state will be confronted with collective sanctions. These sanctions occur in two ways. Firstly, the existence of collective power of all the members will act as a deterrent against an aggressor. Secondly, through the promotion of cooperation rather than competition, it “mitigates the rivalry and hostility of a self-help world” and creates a less war prone environment (Kupchan & Clifford, 1995, p. 52-53), which refers to a liberal institutionalist explanation. In a self-help world, the protection of the legal interests of the states against violations from other states is left to the state whose right is violated. International law authorizes the state, i.e., the individual member of the international community, to resort, in case of a violation of its rights, to reprisals or war against the other state which is responsible for the violation.

The concept of collective security is based on the idea that peace in the international community can be maintained through a binding, predetermined agreement to take collective action to preserve it (Miller, 1999, p.303). Its logic is that any illegal threat or use of force by any sovereign member of the international community against another should trigger the combined force of all the rest. It is “not a balance of power or not organized common peace, but a community of power” (Miller, 1999, p.303). Üstün (2010, p. 43) asserts that “a state’s aggression against other states poses a threat to the state itself [...]

Since the end of Second World War, UN, which is the main representative of “collective security”, has made significant contributions to world peace. It is a proper model for understanding the principles of collective

security. The principles of “collective security” is at the very heart of the UN Charter. The principles of collective security can easily defined considering the UN Charter. For example Article 33 of Chapter VI lays down principled which can fit in the definition of collective security:

“parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice”.(United Nations, 2018).

Chapter VII of the UN Charter lists the collective measures for prevention and removal of threats. It contains 13 Articles, from Art. 39 to 51, which together provide for a collective system for preserving international peace and security. It can be argued that the UN Security Council has been assigned the responsibility and the power to initiate collective security action for preventing any threat to international peace by war or aggression. Article 39 gives the UN Security Council the power to determine these threats or acts of aggression (United Nations, 2018). Article 40 is about the first step towards preventing the aggravation of the situation involving a threat to or breach of international peace and security. The Security Council can take provisional measures like cease fire, and call upon the concerned parties to comply with these. Article 41 links to economic sanctions in terms of interruption of economic relations (United Nations, 2018).

“The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the *use of armed force* are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of *economic relations* and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations”(United Nations, 2018).

This reminds one of “collective security” because it obliges member states to jointly react to threats or aggression, by isolating aggressors economically and through other soft measures. Articles 41 and 42 of the UN Charter obliges member states to “preserve and restore international peace and security” (United Nations, 2018). Article 42 empowers the Security Council to

take military action for securing or maintaining international peace and security.

“Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be *inadequate or have proved to be inadequate*, it may take such action *by air, sea, or land forces* as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations”(United Nations, 2018).

Article 43 makes it the responsibility of all the members of the UN to give their support, efforts, resources and forces for achieving collective security when the Security Council decides to take action under Article 42. The next four articles of the Charter of the UN (44-47) are about the procedure for raising, maintaining and using the UN Peace Keeping Force for purposes of collective security.

On the other hand, Article 51 acknowledges the right of the states “to individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security”(United Nations, 2018). This surely pertains to collective defence but all these provisions of the UN Charter can be considered to be defining the meaning and principles of the concept of collective security for preservation of international peace and security.

Collective security is *mainly a system based on norms*. Under collective security, states agree to abide by certain norms and rules to maintain international peace and stability and, when necessary, act together to stop aggression. Stability means here the absence of war. Members of a collective security organisation are expected to act together against any country that violates these norms and to minimize threats via using military, economic or diplomatic sanctions (Lida, 1994, p. 18). Also, transparency has an important role in ensuring the balance against threats and stability of the concept among the member states, so that there is no atmosphere of inequality and mistrust among the member states (A.Kupchan, 1995, p.54).

In collective security concept, member states are likely to join the coalition, because they have made either explicit or implicit commitments to do so and they have interests in protecting an international order that they see as beneficial to their individual security (A.Kupchan, 1991, p.126). In this way, collective security concept provides effective balance between the member states against aggressors (Mearsheimer, 1995, p.27). And also, it provides for more effective balance against aggressors, to promote trust and cooperation. Thus, an atmosphere of inequality and mistrust in the military structuring of the member states is avoided.

Mearsheimer²² (1995, p.30) states that “collective security is an incomplete theory because it does not provide a satisfactory explanation for how states overcome their fears and learn to trust one another”. Trust and cooperation can be defined as the main problems of this concept. Maybe, institutionalization can be the answer for developing trust. The deepening of cooperation member states with institutionalization will mitigate the rivalry and hostility. Thus, the member states will be able to defend their interests within the institutional structure and decrease the practices that reach to the hostility. In brief, the answer to the question of how the countries mentioned by Mearsheimer trust each other is hidden in institutionalization. However, it should not be forgotten that member states can make decisions in the interests of their own. The sanctions (military or economic) that can be implemented to provide deterrence must be well-defined in treaties that strengthen

²² According to Mearsheimer who is a structural realist, “all great powers are created equal. When they catch the opportunity to do so, great powers will take advantage of one another, fearful of being exploited later if they do not”(Kupchan, 1995, p.59). Moreover, he has explained the reasons of World War I, World War II, and the Cold War were nothing more than great powers acting as they must, given the exigencies of anarchic, self-help World. From within this worldview, collective security, and international institutions are more matter at the margins(Kupchan, 1995, p.59).

On the contrary, According to Charles Kupchan, “all great Powers are not created equal. Although the behaviour of major states is heavily influenced by balance-of-power considerations, domestic problems, beliefs, and norms matter too, and not just at the margins”(Kupchan, 1995, p.60). World War I, World War II, and the Cold War came about not from the international competition, but as a result of the emergence of aggressor states, such as Wilhelm's Germany. In his worldview, not only power politics but also the nature of both domestic and international societies affects great-power behaviour(Kupchan, 1995, p.60).

institutionalism and deepening trust and cooperation (A.Kupchan, 1995, p.54-59).

1.4 COOPERATIVE SECURITY

The term “*cooperative security*” has become popular since the end of the Cold War. It has been generally used to describe a more peaceful, but rather idealistic approach to security through increased international harmony and cooperation. The terms common security and comprehensive security are also often used, where common security means that states are affected equally by a common threat, such as nuclear war or environmental problems, and where comprehensive security means a security regime that encompasses both the so-called traditional threats associated typically and specifically with state actors, and non-traditional threats (Dewitt, 1994). To minimize the conceptual confusion, the term “cooperative security” is used in this thesis to describe cases where states work together to deal with global security problems which also include non-state threats and challenges (such as environmental problems) and collaborate in arms control, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, crisis-management, etc.

1.4.1 Historical Background

The challenges of the post-Cold War era have led to a change in the conceptual framework of international security. The content of the concept of security has broadened to cover new areas of concern besides military security. Conflict prevention, crisis management, humanitarian aid, human rights, all became subtopics of security concept. During the Cold War period, the perception of a common threat was the most effective way for establishing a security system in Western Europe. Because governments were willing to work together against a common threat, they developed a common identity that transcended national borders and intensified their sense of a common purpose (NATO, 2006, p. 9-11). After the Cold War, the threat perceptions has also changed for Europe. Corruption, organized crime, migration, epidemic

diseases, environmental catastrophes, and terrorism were added as new threats. Such complex and mixed problems or new kinds of threats can only be overcome by common action across national boundaries. Traditional concepts and institutions such as NATO were created by the threat perception of the Cold War years. With the end of the Cold War and the emergence of new threat perceptions, security concepts and institutions have also entered a new phase of transformation. Cold War security concepts and institutions have become unresponsive to new threat perceptions.

In contrast to the way it has been frequently presented, cooperative security is not too new at all. It can be seen practically throughout the history of diplomatic relations. It was first expressed in the development of the arms control concept in the early sixties by Schelling and Halperin²³ who emphasized “the necessity to cooperate even with potential enemies in order to prevent the outbreak of wars” (Schelling and Halperin, 1961). During the Cold War period, it has gained popularity, and was frequently presented as alternative security concept. After the end of the Cold War, it finally emerged as a crucial principle of European security policy, enshrined in relevant documents in particular in the context of the CSCE/OSCE²⁴ (Vetschera, 2007). Ironically, at the same time when the concept of cooperative security became the main principle of European security policy, Europe experienced the fiercest breakout of violence with the secession wars in former Yugoslavia. Cooperative security became one of the mechanisms through which European countries aimed to prevent armed conflicts and re-establish security (i.e., peace building) after the conflict.

²³ “A nation’s military force, while opposing the military force of potentially hostile nations, is also bound to collaborate, implicitly if not explicitly, in avoiding the kinds of crises in which withdrawal is intolerable for both sides, in avoiding false alarms and mistaken intentions, and in providing reassurance that restraint on the part of the potential enemies would be matched by restraint on one's own side”(Schelling and Halperin,1961).

²⁴ Michael Mihalka says that “OSCE is more like a bazaar than a factory - states and international organizations can pick and choose how they wish to cooperate”(Mihalka,2001,p.58).

Over the last two decades, preventive (rather than simply deterrent) approach to security has gained momentum from the development of the concept of common security which means achieving security with others, not against them. Because security is multidimensional in character, not only political and diplomatic disputes but also economic underdevelopment, trade disputes, and human rights abuses have become its major concerns. The term cooperative security has thus become popular in describing a more peaceful, but rather idealistic, approach to security through increased international harmony and cooperation after the end of Cold War (Cohen, 2001, p. 1). It has become a way of life in Western Europe and North America (liberal democratic states). Mihalka (2001, p. 30) contends:

“In Western Europe, cooperative security has become the norm. Its citizens assume that they will never again go to war against each other. Consequently, such international organizations as the European Union (EU) are characterized by increasingly dense institutionalization of contacts and the continuing denationalization of security policy. NATO has fostered this process, adopting a wide range of entirely new missions that can best be characterized as cooperative security.”

West European countries are liberal democracies. NATO has encouraged this process, adopting a wide range of entirely new missions such as Bosnia and Kosovo missions that can best be characterized as cooperative security (Mihalka, 2001, p. 64). The success of cooperative security depends on several factors. Above all, it requires the belief that European countries share a “common future”, and this cooperation offers the best possible means of achieving their national interests when compared with unilateral action (Mihalka, 2001, p. 29).

1.4.2 What is Cooperative Security?

Cohen (2001, p. 1) argues that “the term ‘cooperative security’ has become popular since the end of the Cold War” and “although it does not yet have a generally accepted definition, it has been widely used to herald a new approach to international relations”. In his view, cooperative security

“appeared to offer an escape from narrow Cold War ‘zero-sum’²⁵ strategies into international peace and harmony” (Cohen, 2001, p. 1). Cooperative security is used as an activity among states to lessen the possibility of war (Mihalka, 2001, p. 35). Although the concept has become popular after the end of Cold War, the concept of cooperative security is not a post-Cold War invention. Indeed, Immanuel Kant introduced the idea in the late 18th century. He claimed that “the law of nations shall be founded on a federation of free states” (Kant, 1996). Nowadays, the concept has become much more popular as strategists and policy-makers struggle to make a new approach against for new threats.

Cooperative security as a term is often used rather loosely in the international relations literature (Mihalka, 2001). The term often simply means that states will work together to solve common problems, and is often used synonymously with collective security which is defined above. However, collective security also often has a more specific meaning in the international relations literature: it is used to describe a kind of security system in which states agree to act together against one of the members of the system that takes aggressive actions against others.

In 1992, Ashton Carter, William Perry, and John Steinbruner have started to speak of cooperative security in terms of providing new avenues toward world peace. “Organizing principles like deterrence, nuclear stability, and containment embodied the aspirations of the Cold War [...] Cooperative Security is the corresponding principle for international security in the post-Cold War era.”(Carter, Perry and Steinbruner,1992). In 1994, former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans described cooperative security. According to his definition, the term tends to “connote consultation rather than confrontation, reassurance rather than deterrence, transparency rather than secrecy, prevention rather than correction, and interdependence rather than unilateralism” (Evans, 1994, p.7). These attempts to define and shape the

²⁵ In game theory, “a ‘zero-sum game’ is defined as where any gains could only be achieved at the expense of the other side, in particular when it comes to power politics”. (Vetschera, 2007).

concept of cooperative security generally reflect a liberal/idealistic view of the future of world security.

According to Michael Mihalka (2001), cooperative security means as “sustained efforts to reduce the risk of war that are not directed against a specific state or coalition of states” (Mihalka, 2001, p.38). If we think of his definition in wide perspective, cooperative security can only take place when countries develop a sense of a common future. Countries begin to realize that unilateral attempts to increase their security may be doomed to failure because one state’s actions cause reactions by another state, decrease the security of both sides. That is why, countries believe that they have much to gain from working with each other to decrease the likelihood of conflict, as opposed to acting unilaterally or to forming military alliances (Mihalka, 2001, p. 63).

According to Janie Leatherman, “cooperative security” is:

“a demilitarized concept of security that has resulted in imbuing security with political and human dimensions, and in basing security on confidence and cooperation, the elaboration of peaceful means of dispute settlement between states, the consolidation of justice and democracy in civil society, and the advancement of human freedom and rights, including national minority rights” (quoted in Baylis, 1999, p.16).

This approach to security can be seen in some of new institutions and mechanisms. According to Nolan (1994, p.4-5), cooperative security is “ a strategic principle that seeks to accomplish its purposes through institutional concert rather than through threats material or physical coercion.” As understood from the definition, the key factor of the concept is institutions. It shows a move from traditional security concepts based upon coercion and confrontation towards a concept which attempts to find solution for security problems in cooperation even with potential enemies with the institutions. Another definition of the concept is;

“the central purpose of *cooperative security* arrangements is to prevent war and to do so primarily by preventing the means of successful aggression from being assembled, thus also obviating the need for states so threatened to make their own counterpreparations. Cooperative security thus displaces the centerpiece of security planning from preparing to counter threats to preventing such threats from arising- from deterring aggression

to making preparation for it more difficult. Cooperative security differs from the traditional idea of collective security as preventive medicine differs from the acute care.” (Carter, Perry, and Steinbruner 1992, p. 7)

Carter, Perry, and Steinbruner (1992, p.7) emphasize the necessity to cooperate even with potential enemies in order to prevent the outbreak of wars. Moreover, a new model about “cooperative security” was introduced by Richard Cohen. According to Cohen (2001, p.1-2) cooperative security comprises four items; individual security, collective security, collective defense and promoting stability. He called these four items “rings of security” (Cohen, 2001, p.4). According to his model, “cooperative security” is a strategic system for the liberal democratic countries linked together in a formal or informal alliances and institutions that are characterized by shared values and economic, political and defence cooperation (Cohen, 2001, p.4). In his model, individual security is in the core of cooperative security concept. Individual states’ national security objectives are linked by four rings of security (Cohen, 2001, p. 9-10). These are shown on below on the figure 1.




Figure 1: Cooperative Security-The “Four Rings”, Cohen (2001, p. 10).

The new elements of his model are “individual security” and “promoting stability”. “Individual security” is mostly used as synonymous with the human security or human rights. It stands at the center of any international security system built around liberal democratic ideals. Violations of human rights in one state become very quickly known to the citizens of other states. Damage to the security of individuals in one country, by external or internal forces, means that other peoples and their governments feel that their own security is diminished. Recent gross violations of the individual security of large numbers of human beings in Kosovo, Bosnia and Rwanda have had impact on the international community. The second new element of his model is the fourth and outer ring of cooperative security, “promoting stability”. It means that the active promotion of stability outside the boundaries of the states forming the cooperative security concept. Instability in any part of the world can be serious security problem that influence the other countries. Stability can be upset by the conflict between the states or mass violations of individual security. According to Cohen (2001), non-member countries that exist “within” this fourth ring will also benefit from increased security and from cooperation with states inside the system. But there is a problem about using the active promotion. What does it mean and what are the limits of using active promotion? It could be seen as a license for unwarranted intervention by large powers or international organizations. Active intervention must be carefully defined as a diplomatic, economic and military.

Given the above definitions, the most convenient definition for this study is the mixture of all these definitions. Briefly, it can be said that cooperative security can be seen as a mechanism or system to reduce the possibility of war against any aggressor or a state with using not only traditional security concepts but also new concepts. Moreover, it can be said that “a more pragmatic approach to cooperative security is necessary in an unstable and dangerous world” (Mihalka, 2001, p.5). In other words, a way of operationalizing the term must be found. A realistic and effective approach must be constructed. Therefore, expectations about what cooperative security concept can achieve must be defined clearly. A new security system based

upon mechanisms and institutions already in place, i.e., institutions that have proven themselves effective in providing relative peace, stability, and prosperity must be built.

1.4.3 The Principles of Cooperative Security

Almost all scholars believe that cooperative security is desirable, but few agree on exactly how best to achieve it. This question is the key factor for the transformation of the concept. Traditional concepts do not provide adequate solutions to the current disputes of interstate conflict and regional instability. Many countries claim to engage in cooperative approaches. According to their view, security, in fact, means only cooperation. But, this is more than simple cooperation. Given the principles of security concepts, “cooperative security” concept has some differences. There have been many discussions about cooperative security concept between scholars especially the principles of concept. In this study, description of Heinz Vetschera was used to classify principles of cooperative security concept. Heinz Vetschera (2007, p.38) described the main features of the concept. The principles of cooperative security concept described below.

- Cooperative security concept should contain *no coercive measures* at all (Vetschera,2007). It could be characterized by finding solutions for security issues in cooperation even with potential enemies.
- Cooperative security must have strategies which have *peaceful meanings* (Vetschera,2007). They should not aim at deterrence but at preventing conflicts from emerging, or at least preventing political disputes to grow into armed conflict.
- This concept’s instruments aim at improved predictability, the reduction of misunderstandings, and conflict prevention by negotiations and consultations (Vetschera,2007).
- In the context of game theory, traditional concepts are zero-sum game, where any gains could only be achieved at the expense of other side. But cooperative security is different. It characterized as non-zero-sum games

(Vetschera,2007). All sides could achieve higher gains or reduce their losses significantly by cooperating, rather than competing with each other²⁶.

- This concept supposes that all sides are interested in maintaining security for all. They aim at security with each other, rather than from each other. (Vetschera,2007).

- A pre-condition for cooperative security concept is *willingness* which is the most important principle (Vetschera,2007). This concept depends on the willingness by all actors to cooperate with each other. If one actor would not be ready or willing to cooperate, this concept has little chances to maintain security for all actors. It aims at least eliminating misunderstandings or misinterpretations. All actors have to be in willingness to cooperate and ready to give up some elements of the issues at stake, in order to achieve a compromise.

- Cooperative security is *preventive* (Vetschera,2007). The concept embraces a variety of strategies to resolve, or at least lessen disputes by relying on non-military methods-essentially the peaceful means which are described in Article 33 of the UN Charter.

“the parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, *seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements*, or other peaceful means of their own choice” (United Nations, 2018).

If it proves unsuccessful, the UN Charter authorizes the security council to act-first request for the sides to a dispute within the cooperative framework of Chapter VI, but in case of further escalation also to take coercive measures for the enforcement of international peace and security under Chapter VII, imposing non-military measures, Article 41 of the charter which are mentioned above. As seen in UN Charter cooperative approaches and instruments are the first step for preventing armed conflict or aggression. If this concept fail to

²⁶ This is the essence of the “prisoner’s dilemma”. It describes the problems that arise when a state unilaterally improves its own security, and another state responds in same way, resulting in both states being less secure than before. For example, two countries face the same choice: to arm or not to arm. If one side arms, and the other does not, then one side gains a unilateral advantage. It is, therefore, rational for both sides to arm (Mihalka,2001).

maintain security, then traditional concepts are taken the responsibility to establish peace via non-military and military means. The cooperative security concept must also be proactive. Its members must be prepared to engage in collective diplomatic, economic, and, if necessary, military action in areas outside their common space which may threaten their welfare and stability (Cohen, 2001).

1.5 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SECURITY CONCEPTS

Collective defence refers to the organisation of collective instruments for meeting any aggression by the enemy against any member of the collective defence system. A collective defence security system is made by a group of countries which have a common perception of threat to their security from a common enemy. Collective defence system is usually organised as an alliance involving a regional defence system. As against this, collective security is a universal system in which those states which come together undertake to meet any aggression anywhere in the world, and against any aggressor. It is designed to provide as a deterrent against any aggression or any offensive country.

Collective defence involves mutual guarantees for the members of the organization. These guarantees concern to act together in case of an attack or the threat of an attack on one of the member countries, to defend that country against the aggressor. Collective security reflects a wider and more selective approach when compared with collective defence. It is wider in the sense that it refers not only to a specific threat on a specific country but also to any threats against the security and the stability of the region concerned. It is selective in the sense that the members of the collective security organizations themselves define the threat. This threat may not always be military or necessarily upon an attack.

In collective defence possible threat is known, but this is not the case in collective security. In collective defence threat to security is known from the beginning, in collective security threat to security might occur at any time. Any

war or aggression by any country against any other state is covered under the system of collective security. In collective defence enemy is known in advance, but in collective security the enemy is not known. All aggressors in all over the world are the risks for the collective security system.

Collective defence can make advance planning against threat, collective security does not or cannot. Advance planning is possible in collective defence because the enemy is known in advance. In collective security it is not possible because no pre-defined country is the target. It comes into operation when any aggression or war or threat of war and aggression is committed by any member of the international community.

Cooperative security, on the other hand, is rather a non-military concept. It aims at security with political and human dimensions and bases security on trust and cooperation. These include the peaceful means of solving disputes between countries, the consolidation of justice and democracy in civil society, and the advancement of human freedom and rights including national minority rights (Leatherman,1993, p.414).

Traditional concepts are repressive, based on deterrence. Their approaches to conflict prevention is based on the threat or potential aggressor eliminate or mitigate. It means high readiness of their countries to prevent war. Traditional concepts are for the threats but on the other hand, cooperative security are mostly for the risks potentially developing out of a situation and turning into threats. Cooperative security is preventive and also proactive. It prevents the conflicts before they transform into war, with non-military means such as negotiation, mediation, conciliation, judicial settlement etc. It is proactive because they are ready with all means to prevent war any where in the world against any aggression.

2. THE EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS: THE ROLES OF THE EU AND NATO IN PROVIDING SECURITY

During the Cold War, the major threat to the security of Western Europe (the Soviet threat) was met primarily by the collective defence efforts of NATO, which was built on political cooperation and military coordination. After the end of the Cold War, threats to European security have been countered with the cooperative and collective security efforts of countries through several institutions, especially NATO and the EU, which led the efforts to adapt to the new security challenges facing Europe (Sens, 2007, p.6).

2.1 TRANSFORMATION OF EUROPEAN SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS AND THE EU

The idea of security cooperation in Western Europe had developed in the context of the Soviet threat after the Second World War. The first efforts came in the form of the Anglo-French Dunkirk Treaty of 1947 and the subsequent Treaty of Brussels of March 1948. However, there were uncertainties about whether the Brussels Treaty would suffice to protect its signatories against the emerging threat of the Soviet Union. That role was taken on by NATO in 1949. Lord Ismay who was the first Secretary-General of NATO, described NATO's purpose as "keeping the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down" (Sens,2007). The Alliance became the dominant security organization in Europe, and, under NATO protection, the European integration process could be maintained. European integration was initiated with the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 later to be followed by the establishment of the European Economic Community and the Euratom by the Rome Treaty which was signed in 1957 and went into force in 1958.

It can be argued that the European integration process started with a security logic, because the major motivation behind it was to make the

recurrence of war in Europe “not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible”, as stated in the Schuman declaration of 1950 (European Commission 2017). The Schuman Plan envisaged “the pooling of coal and steel production” with a view to changing “the destinies of those regions which have long been devoted to the manufacture of munitions of war, of which they have been the most constant victims” (European Commission, 2017). Thus, the European Coal and Steel Community was established in 1951, representing the first step to be taken for European integration. In the early 1950s, after the successful establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community as a supranational authority in the field of coal and steel production in Europe, attention was turned into integration in the fields of security and defense policies.

2.1.1 The European Defence Community

After the Second World War, Western European countries lost considerable military and economic power. Germany was divided into two, and major powers such as France, the UK and Italy experienced significant loss of power. The US and the Soviet Union began to play an active role in European security. Western European countries aimed to establish a supranational community in which the member states would share their sovereignty in the realms of foreign policy, security and defence. They thought that the establishment of a European Defense Community could unite Western Europe after the Second World War. It was expected that the establishment of a European Defense Community²⁷ would make a significant contribution to the creation of a security community among its member states (Burrows and Irwin, 1972, p. 2). It can be said that this was the first attempt to establish collective defence organization in Western Europe without US and UK involvement. It

²⁷ The treaty was signed on May, 1952. It consists of 132 articles and annexes; among them the military, financial and jurisdictional protocols, the protocols concerning the relations between the European Defense Community and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Convention relating to the Status of European Defense Forces.

would have a limited number of members, just some Western European countries.

The idea of European defence integration was first proposed by French Prime Minister Rene Pleven on 24 October 1950. With this proposal, known as the “Pleven Plan”, France proposed the creation of a unified European army which envisaged common defence, incorporating the armies of six nations, including Germany and Italy, with a single uniformed, single-flagged and single European political and military authority (Kanter, 1970, p. 203) and, thus, having not only a European Commander but also a European Defence Ministry. This European army would be independent of the United States, and it would be supported by the UK from the outside. This meant that the European army would unite the military forces of European countries, including Germany, in a supranational structure. This would only allow for the creation of West German troops within the European army but it would not allow for the full rearmament of West Germany. Nevertheless, the Soviet threat was growing and the US was insisting on West Germany’s rearmament. Under these circumstances it soon became clear that it would not be possible to continue with the Pleven Plan as it was too ambitious in terms of the creation of a supranational structure totally independent of NATO and the US and too restrictive in terms of West Germany’s rearmament which made it rather unrealistic in coping with the Soviet threat.²⁸

The EDC was thus developed as a more modest initiative to replace the Pleven Plan. In the draft of the EDC Treaty; it was envisaged that the parties to this treaty would assist each other; would establish a European army under a joint command; and would allocate their land, air and naval forces, except overseas units, to this supranational structure (Sens, 2007, p.7-8). Here, the guiding principle was collective defence but it also had supranational aspects which still made it a common defence initiative. The principles of “common commitment” and “mutual cooperation” among sovereign countries in support

²⁸ Information given in this paragraph is mainly taken from Duke (2000).

of security for all its member states – all, collective defence principles – could be observed in the EDC Treaty. In 1952, the EDC was founded with six countries: France, Benelux, Italy and West Germany. The UK did not share the same federal vision of the future of Europe and remained outside, pledging to support the EDC in case of an attack on its members. The US did not like the plan as it could potentially undercut NATO's role in European security. In addition, Article 18 of the EDC Treaty envisioned the allocation of the European army to NATO in the peacetime.

“The competent Supreme Commander responsible to the NATO shall, except as provided in Section 3 of this Article, be empowered to satisfy himself that the European Defense Forces are organized, equipped, trained and prepared for use in a satisfactory manner [...] The European Defense Forces shall receive technical directives from the appropriate bodies of the NATO within the framework of the military competence of such bodies.” (EDC Treaty, 1952).

Despite the fact that the creation of the EDC was a French idea, the French Parliament that was formed by the De Gaulleans and socialists in majority, did not ratify the proposal. There were several reasons for this. The major reason was that with the decolonization war in Indo-China, the French saw that they might have to fight decolonization wars on different fronts and thus became reluctant to allocate their forces to the European Army. Furthermore, the memories of war were fresh, and the French did not want to cooperate with West Germany within a supranational defence framework. The failure of EDC led to efforts to revitalize the Treaty of Brussels.²⁹

2.1.2 Western European Union

Western Union (WU) was established by the Brussels Treaty of 17 March 1948 as an economic, social and cultural cooperation organization which also had a collective defence arm called the Western Union Defence Organization (WUDO). The Brussels Treaty was signed by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The failure of the EDC

²⁹ Information given in this paragraph is mainly taken from Duke (2000).

meant that an alternative way had to be found to integrate the Germany into the Western security system. Thus, the Brussels Treaty of 1948 was amended by the agreements signed in Paris in 1954, which modified and completed the treaty; establishing the Western European Union (WEU). The new treaty was named as the “Modified Brussels Treaty” and it was signed by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Italy, West Germany and the United Kingdom.

In 1988 Spain and Portugal became full members of the WEU, after they joined NATO and the EEC. In 1992, Maastricht Treaty³⁰ was signed by the European Community, which included a Declaration on Western European Union. According to this declaration, WEU was declared as the defence arm of the EU and the European pillar of NATO. Also the declaration created two new forms of membership in addition to the full membership status of WEU, observer and associate member statuses, calling Greece, at the same time to become a full member. Later a new type of membership was also introduced (associate partnership) and finally there were four types of membership in WEU: full membership, associate membership, observer status and associate partnership.

The main feature of WEU was the commitment to mutual defence should any of the signatories be the victim of an armed attack in Europe. This is the main principle of collective defence. It means that WEU was a collective defence organization since its establishment. Nevertheless, with the declaration attached to the Maastricht Treaty it defined its new role in the post-Cold War security environment as crisis management, whilst the Article V guarantee of the Modified Brussels treaty remained as the major principle of the organization.

³⁰ “States which are members of the European union are invited to accede to WEU on conditions to be agreed in accordance with Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty, or to become observers if they so wish. Simultaneously, other European Member states of NATO are invited to become associate members of WEU in a way which will give them the possibility of participating fully in the activities of WEU...” (The Maastricht Treaty, 1992). More detailed information about the treaty will be given below.

According to Paris Aggrement objectives³¹, from 1954 to 1973, WEU played an important role by promoting the development of consultation and cooperation in Western Europe, in the aftermath of the Second World War. It authorised with the integration of the Germany into the Atlantic Alliance, the restoration of confidence among Western European countries by assuming responsibilities for arms control, settlement of the Saar problem and consultation between the European Community founding Member States and the UK (WEU, n/a). In this respect, it can be said that WEU transformed to a collective security organization with the Paris agreement. Given the authorizations of WEU, in particular providing cooperation and negotiations with the members, maintaining consultation with EC members and the UK were the examples of the principles of collective security.

Between 1973 and 1984, WEU's remained inactive. This happened because it lost its crucial function of providing a platform for the UK and the EC countries to discuss European matters when the UK joined the EC. The WEU survived the Cold War, but could never be more than a diplomatic and military paper plan Duke (2000).

The reactivation of the WEU was undertaken by the foreign and defence ministers of the Belgian and French Governments meeting in the Rome in October 1984. It was marked as the "Rome Declaration", the founding text of WEU's reactivation (WEU, n/a). They worked on the definition of a European security identity, and, the gradual harmonisation of WEU members' defence policies were among the stated objectives of this reactivation. WEU became visible in 1988. During the Iran-Iraq conflict, WEU was led to conduct

³¹ Paris Agreements clearly stated their three main objectives in the preamble. These are the creation of European economic recovery in Western Europe, assistance to each other in resisting any policy of aggression and promotion of the unity and encouraging the progressive integration of Europe (WEU, n/a).

a mine-clearance operation (Operation Cleansweep)³² because of the risks to the transit of the European merchant ships created by the mining of the Gulf (Vierucci, 1998, p.103). This operation was an example of collective security. Similar operations were also set up by the WEU during the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. In particular, WEU organized the mission of monitoring the embargo which had been authorized by the UN Security Council against the former Yugoslavia in 1991(Vierucci,1998,p.103). “Monitoring the embargo” was also an example of an operation in the context of collective security. It can be said that after its reactivation, WEU played role in European security as a collective security organization rather than collective defence organization.

2.1.3 European Political Cooperation

The European Political Cooperation (EPC) represents the EC’s first attempt at extending its economic power to foreign affairs. This was a product of the Luxembourg Report of 1970. Later it gained treaty basis with the 1987 Single European Act (Dover, 2010, p. 242).

The EPC came to the agenda to create a stronger political unity and cooperation in foreign policy in the EC in 1970s. Its roots can be traced back to French President De Gaulle’s Fouchet Plan, designed to prepare a strategy of political unity in the EC. The Fouchet Plan composed of 18 titles. This plan envisaged a union based on cooperation in the areas of science and culture, defense of human rights, fundamental freedoms and democracy. The plan was about determining the common interests of the EC member states, adoption of a common foreign policy, and strengthening the member states’ security through the adoption of a common defense policy within an intergovernmental framework (Bache and George, 2006, p.515). Nevertheless, the Fouchet Plan caused controversy within the EC especially in two points: First, Belgium and the Netherlands declared that in the absence of UK, such a union would

³² For detailed information on the factual aspects of this operation and the ones which have been set up by WEU in the former Yugoslavia see Vierucci (1998).

become a French-dominated project. Furthermore, they were against more intergovernmentalism; to the contrary they insisted that the organizational structure should definitely be supranational and federalist tendencies should be supported. Second, France aimed at the creation of autonomous European defense organization - i.e., independently of NATO and the United States. On the other hand, the other EC countries defended the idea that the defense should remain under the NATO umbrella and preserve the Transatlantic link. As seen, political differences between the parties prevented the acceptance and implementation of the Fouchet Plan.

After several failed attempts at political cooperation, the foreign ministers of the EC countries on 27 October 1970 have adopted the Luxembourg Report. The report highlighted the importance that the EC members give to foreign policy cooperation. The report established the EPC and it was decided that member states should consult each other on all foreign policy-related decisions without binding commitment (Kocamaz, 2010, p. 954). The EPC was an intergovernmental framework, based on the consensus among the member states' foreign ministers, and its main aim was foreign policy cooperation in Europe. It was aimed to provide a platform for consultance and coordination among the member states on foreign policy. EC member states have begun to cooperate and consult with each other on major international policy issues since October 1970. The EPC was mainly pursued through reports and declarations, and there was no provision for the EPC in the founding treaties until the adoption of the Single European Act in 1986 (Efe, 2008, p. 68).

The EPC was principally a means of coordinating meetings between foreign ministers. It was mainly managed by the troika process, led by the country holding the EU Presidency. The problem with this system was that the Presidency changed every six months, and as such there was limited time for continuity and long-term planning. This was one of the reasons of lack of common positions (Dover, 2010, p.242).

Although the EPC did not have a treaty basis and a security dimension since the Single European Act, it can be claimed that some of its policies had security impact. The EC's role in setting the agenda for the CSCE and negotiating the Helsinki Declaration in early 1970s is significant in this regard (White, 2001, p. 83). Especially the Venice Declaration of 1980 had a crucial security impact as the EC recognized the suffering of the Palestinian people and their right to self-determination and the right of Israel to exist as a Jewish state in 1967 territories at the same time (White, 2001, p. 81). The Venice Declaration was unprecedented and opened the way for the peace process initiated in 1990s (Cebeci, 2011a, p. 135-136). Similarly, certain sanctions were imposed on the Soviet Union (upon declaration of martial law in Poland in 1981), Iran (upon the American hostage crisis of 1979-1981), Argentina (upon its invasion of the Falkland islands in 1982), and South Africa (against the apartheid regime in 1986) in the course of the EPC, and, all cases were about security. With the Single European Act, the EPC did not only gain a treaty basis, but economic and political dimensions of security were also added to the list of areas to be covered by the EPC. All these mean that the EPC displayed certain cooperative security characteristics such as cooperation in dealing with global security challenges and dealing with regional conflicts through non-military means.

With the end of the Cold War, significant developments took place in the EC/EU and NATO. The most important step for the EU was the creation of Common Foreign and Security Policy and declaration of the WEU as the defence arm of the EU with the Maastricht Treaty. After the Cold War, until its demise in 2001, WEU thus began to play an important role in the European security and defense as well (Dover, 2010, p. 244).

2.1.4 The Maastricht Treaty, Common Foreign and Security Policy and the new role of WEU in European Security

The Maastricht Treaty played an important role in creating a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The Maastricht Treaty was signed in

1992. It established the CFSP as one of the three pillars of the EU. It formed the second pillar of the European Union. Pillar 2 (CFSP) was to be intergovernmental, involving very little input from the European Commission and European Parliament (Dover, 2010, p.244). The CFSP was seen as a tool to reflect the desire of member states to develop common policies through “joint actions”³³ and “common positions”³⁴. “Joint actions” were used as a mechanism for specific issues in which operational action by the EU was deemed necessary. In other words, they were operational actions undertaken within the CFSP (Sens, 2007). “Common positions” were defined as the general policy approach taken by the EU on a larger foreign policy or geographic region and member states would be expected to pursue them in international for a (Sens, 2007). In other words, they required member states to adopt national policies that comply with a stated EU position on a particular issue (Sens, 2007). It can be seen as a systematic cooperation between member states in the conduct of policy (Sens, 2007).

Given these positions, it can be said that collective security principles can be observed in the conduct of joint actions. On the other hand, cooperative security principles can be seen in the adoption of common positions. Common positions generally used the soft power tools for preventing conflicts. The EU has used common positions generally to pressure the aggressors and prevent conflict or war. Briefly, the EU has started to play a more visible security role which combined the collective security and cooperative security principles to prevent conflicts or wars, especially with the enactment of the Maastricht Treaty.

³³ As examples for the Joint Actions, Bosnia and Kosovo war applications can be seen. 11 March 2002, Joint Action 2002/210/CFSP established the European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was the first EU civilian crisis-mangement operation under CFSP. Another example was about Kosovo. 4 February 2008, Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP was set up to support Kosovo’s legal framework and to promote the rule of law through active mentoring (Dover,2010).

³⁴ As examples for the Common Positions, Myanmar application can be seen. The EU had a common positions on Myanmar. These were bans visas for senior members of the government, military, and security forces, freezes any assets held in the EU and suspends all high-level political visits from the EU. With these common positions, the EU aimed to bring pressure on the Myanmar government to change its policies towards the opposition (Dover,2010).

In the Maastricht Treaty, two key political priorities for CFSP implementation were highlighted. First political priority was that the EU aimed to make EU diplomacy in the international system more effective in the field of foreign policy and security through the CFSP mechanism. The second one was the creation of a more effective European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI)³⁵ with the WEU mechanism. On the other hand, in J.1 (2) of the Maastricht Treaty, the objectives of the CFSP were defined as follows:

- “ to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union;
 - to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways;
 - to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter;
 - to promote international cooperation;
 - to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms”
- (Maastricht Treaty, 1992).

To achieve these objectives, the tools of the CFSP were described “common positions” and “joint actions” which are mentioned above (Maastricht Treaty, 1992). Given the objectives of CFSP, it can be said that the EU wants to strengthen the security of its members within the cooperative security principles. Moreover, some norms such as democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights etc. were mentioned. These norms have provided a common identity for the member states. The commitment to “inform and consult each other” also meant cooperation regarding security concerns. These can be seen as characteristics of cooperative security.

The Maastricht Treaty has also played an important role in defining the new function of WEU in the post-Cold War era. WEU was named as the defence arm of the EU in the WEU Declaration attached to the Maastricht Treaty. It was also stated that the WEU was not an alternative to NATO, but

³⁵ ESDI means strengthening the European security measures within the confines of transatlantic alliance. The USA accepted to support ESDI just in one condition. That is the integration of European Security measures as long as they are within the bounds of the NATO alliance. See Whalen (1999) for detailed information.

would strengthen the European pillar of NATO (Efe, 2008, p.8). In this context, the WEU was given the function of implementing the decisions and actions related to the defense of the EU. Moreover, it was foreseen that it would be an institutional component that will shape the European pillar³⁶ of NATO. This reminds one of a collective security function, maybe not in terms of a universal alliance protecting international peace against potential aggressors but at least in terms of European crisis management activities in the world.

In June 1992, WEU Council of ministers met in Petersberg to determine the new role and tasks of the WEU. As a result, the “Petersberg declaration” was issued. The Petersberg Declaration determined that humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking, would become the new tasks of WEU; which came to be known as the “Petersberg Tasks” (WEU, n/a). As WEU had become the defence arm of the EU, this whole spectrum of crisis management tasks could be performed upon the EU’s request from WEU.³⁷ Units would come from forces belonging to the WEU Member States, including forces with NATO tasks and would be organised on a multinational basis, with personnel from more than one branch of the armed forces. WEU member states also decided to set up and organise the training of appropriate capabilities to enable WEU military units to be deployed by land, sea or air in order to carry out these tasks (WEU, n/a).

However, in practical terms there were significant limitations to the CFSP. The policy framework specifically allowed for member states to express

³⁶ In 1990, France and Germany established a Franco-German Brigade (later a Corps), which was made available to the WEU and the “European Pillar” of NATO. By the mid-1990s, additional countries joined and the name of the formation was changed to the EuroCorps. From the WEU Petersberg Council onwards, the forces were gradually designated: the European Corps or Eurocorps, the UK/NL Amphibious Force, and then the multinational division Centre. The same applied to the Franco-British joint European Air Group (EAG) created by the Chartres Agreement of 18 November 1994 and later opened up to other countries, and also Eurofor or Euromarfor (1995), the Staff of the first German-Dutch corps (1997) and the Spanish-Italian amphibious force (1997) (Ağca, 2010, p. 156).

³⁷ Maastricht Treaty Article J.4 stated: “The Union requests the Western European Union (WEU), which is an integral part of the development of the Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications. The Council shall, in agreement with the institutions of the WEU, adopt the necessary practical arrangements.”

their independent character, and decisions on common foreign and security policies were subject to the consensual decision-making procedures of the EU (Whalen, 1999, p.264). In practice, the crisis in Yugoslavia revealed the lack of a cohesive foreign policy identity, the CFSP was subjected to serious criticism, particularly because of its performance in international conflicts in Europe, and its effectiveness was soon questioned. Indeed, the EU has not been able to form a common policy in the conflicts in the territory of the former Yugoslavia (Croatia's recognition by Germany, Greece's refusal to recognize Macedonia by its name, its inactiveness regarding the genocide in Bosnia, its attitude in Kosovo), and the member states continued their traditional foreign policies (Whalen, 1999, p.264). The EU appeared to lack a determined collective commitment that to transform the ESDI from theory to reality – defined as “genuine European Security and Defence Identity” by the WVEU Declaration attached to the Maastricht Treaty.

2.1.5 The Amsterdam Treaty and Common Foreign and Security Policy

The Intergovernmental Conference, which was launched in Turin in March 1996 to determine the process for revising the TEU according to the enlargement of the EU, was completed with the Amsterdam Summit held on 16-17 June 1997 (Dover, 2010, p.247). On 2 October 1997 the Treaty of Amsterdam was signed and went into force on 1 May 1999. The Amsterdam Treaty revised the Maastricht Treaty.

There were some disagreements among the member states in the conference. In particular, British and French governments disagreed at Amsterdam as to how the security and defence policy should develop. The British felt that the Yugoslav experience confirmed that the EU was incapable of formulating a common foreign policy, whilst the French government argued that the Yugoslav experience demonstrated why a common defence policy was required (Dover, 2010, p.245). The CFSP had achieved very little in its first few years. There seemed to be hardly any tangible cooperative and collective work on foreign policy amongst member states.

According to the Amsterdam Treaty, the CFSP remained intergovernmental. Although it was hoped that CFSP would be strengthened so as to allow the EU to play a greater role on the international issues, only minor amendments were made in order to improve its capacity for action. These amendments are listed below.

- “the European Council was given the right to decide on “*common strategies*”,
- a policy planning and early warning unit was created,
- a High Representative for the CFSP was introduced to assist the six-monthly Council Presidencies, which remained responsible for its implementation.
- The rule of unanimity persisted, however, and was only marginally affected by the provision on constructive abstention that allowed Member States who disagreed with a decision to opt out from its application without preventing others from carrying it forward.
- The right to veto also remained, even with regard to implementation measures adopted by qualified majority” (cvce.eu, 2019).

Regarding the institutional framework provided by the Amsterdam Treaty, innovations resulting from the Treaty concerned the progressive framing of a common defence policy, cooperation in the field of armaments, the concept of constructive abstention³⁸ in the Council, a reinforced role for WEU, creation of the post of High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and establishment of a policy planning and early warning unit were the most important progressive steps to strengthen the ESDI. Moreover, from the legal instruments, in addition to joint actions and common positions adopted by the Council, there was a new tool, the “common strategy”, available to the European Council for its role in defining principles and general guidelines for the CFSP.

The Amsterdam Treaty created the post of High Representative for the CFSP to advise the Presidency of the Council of Ministers on CFSP matters. The High representative represent the Council of Ministers abroad, thus enabling Europe to speak with one voice. This post is a good sign of the concept of collective defence. The Treaty also provided for the gradual development of a common defence policy, although it did not commit member

³⁸ “*Constructive abstention*” enabled less than a third of member states to opt out of a joint action without vetoing it for the others.

states to a common defence. This amendment can be evaluated within the collective defence concept. Moreover, the Treaty also integrated the WEU into the EU as its military component, and formally incorporated the Petersberg Tasks into the CFSP framework. The Amsterdam Treaty reaffirmed aim of “build up WEU in stages as the defence component of the European Union” (WEU, n/a). The Amsterdam Treaty has the signs of collective security as it made the Petersberg tasks the crisis management tasks of the EU, and in terms of the coordination of member states’ security policies in non-military realm it also has the characteristics of cooperative security.

2.1.6 The Saint Malo Summit and Common Foreign and Security Policy

The crises in the Balkan region in the 1990s was a really big challenge for the EU to assess the functionality of its security and defense initiatives. Both the Bosnian crisis and the conflict in Kosovo showed that the EU cannot pursue an independent foreign policy and security strategy without NATO military assets (Dover, 2010, p.247).

In December 1998, France and UK issued a bilateral declaration at a summit that they held in Saint Malo in France. This summit opened a new phase in European foreign policy cooperation. The summit also contributed to a gradual militarization of the EU. They agreed that the EU could intervene in international crises, where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged, with military force if necessary. As a result of the summit, the UK also lifted its veto in the field of defense and security, about forming a CFSP independent from NATO. Thus the summit became a cornerstone for European defense integration (Sens, 2007).

As a result of the summit, the UK and France agreed on the need to give the EU the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, in order to respond to international crises when the Atlantic Alliance is not involved. To avoid unnecessary duplication, it is decided that the EU should take into account the assets of WEU (cvce.eu, 2015). After this summit,

more serious discussions of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) have started. It can be said that St.Malo summit was a backbone for the European security. This summit allowed the EU to achieve gradual militarization to the point of collective defence. This enabled the EU to have the capacity for conducting a military operation.

2.1.7 The Cologne Summit and European Security and Defense Policy

During the Kosovo crisis, the EU was particularly ineffective and inadequate to end the crisis. Therefore, at the Cologne Summit European leaders agreed on a common European security and defense policy, to give the EU an autonomous defense capability, by the end of 2000. They decided to establish a military force within the common European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The Cologne Summit was an important step in the formation of the ESDP within the CFSP framework.

“... the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO. The EU will thereby increase its ability to contribute to international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter” (European Council,1999).

The Cologne European Council agreed that the responsibility of implementing EU decisions with defence implications such as Petersberg Tasks would be transferred from WEU to the EU. It means that the implementation of humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management including peace-making were handed over to the EU with this summit. It was also agreed that upon the completion of this transfer, WEU would cease to exist.

The aim was to strengthen the CFSP by the development of a common European policy on security and defence. This required a capacity for autonomous action backed up by credible military capabilities and appropriate decision making bodies. It was also an important step for collective security

and collective defence purposes. They strengthened the CFSP in the principles of collective defence, but on the other hand, they still limited EU action with the Petersberg Tasks in the context of military missions, keeping a collective security dimension whilst defining collective defence as an endeavour. On the other hand, cooperative security remained as the main function of the EU in its security and defence policy.

2.1.8 The Helsinki Summit and European Security and Defense Policy

The Helsinki Summit was held by the EU on 10-11 December 1999 and set out the Headline Goal for the ESDP (Dover, 2010, p.249). The declaration underlined the EU's determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises. The aim was to establish EU military forces capable of carrying out all the Petersberg Tasks, including the most demanding ones. And also, it was mentioned that they would avoid unnecessary duplication of military assets, which already exist in NATO. They also announced that this did not mean the creation of a European army. According to the Headline Goal, the EU would establish an EU Rapid Reaction Force of up to 50000 and 60000 military personnel, deployable in 60 days and sustainable for one year. Further, an institutional framework was introduced which included the creation of Political and Security Committee (PSC), European Union Military Committee (EUMC) and European Union Military Staff (EUMS) (European Council 1999b).

In brief, it can be said that framework to establish a collective defence capability was formed by the EU with the Helsinki Summit. But these were all in theory, on paper, and, in reality a lack of military assets was observable. Given the collective security or cooperative security concepts, it can be said that the features of collective security concept were seen to a certain extent, but the principles of cooperative security were always present.

2.1.9 The Feira Summit, the Capabilities Commitment Conference and European Security and Defense Policy

In June 2000, the Feira Summit was held. According to summit declaration, important decisions were taken regarding the ESDP. First of all, civilian aspects of crisis management were strengthened with the decision to keep 5000 police officers ready for deployment in crisis areas (cvce.eu, 2012). The Feira Summit listed the four priority areas in crisis management in which the EU would acquire concrete capabilities; the police, strengthening the rule of law, civil administration and civil protection (cvce.eu, 2012).

In this summit, the EU reaffirmed its commitment to building a Common European Security and Defence Policy, capable of reinforcing the Union's external action through the development of a military crisis management capability as well as a civilian one (cvce.eu, 2012). The Union's determination underlined in its approach to conflict prevention and crisis management to assume fully its Petersberg tasks responsibilities as referred to in Helsinki. In this summit civilian aspects of crisis management strengthened (cvce.eu, 2012). In this context, characteristics of cooperative security again could be observed. While the EU was seen to establish a collective defense aspect (and a limited collective security one), it was also seen to use cooperative security features (cvce.eu, 2012).

On the other hand, in order to fulfil the Helsinki Headline Goal, the EU member states had to commit forces to a catalogue of military forces. In November 2000, the Capabilities Commitment Conference drew up a catalogue of forces that member states agreed to earmark to meet the overall objective (Council of the EU, n/a). The EUMS concluded that the target number of troops had been met, but the inadequacies in terms of strategic lift, deployable operation headquarter and Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence (C3I) assets were underlined. (Council of the EU, n/a)

2.1.10 The Nice Summit and European Security and Defense Policy

The Nice Treaty was signed by the Heads of State on 10 March 2001. It modified some of the sections contained in the Amsterdam Treaty related to CFSP and added a number of annexes dealing with ESDP, whose implementation are not subject to treaty ratification (Dover, 2010, p.250). In this summit, it was agreed that most of the functions of the WEU would be transferred to the EU. This has meant the setting up of new military and political structures in the EU. The military structures were the EUMC and the EUMS. The new political body is the Political Security Committee (PSC). Article 25 in Title V of the Nice Treaty establishes PSC (Treaty of Nice, 2001). The objectives of PSC stated on the below.

“... a Political and Security Committee shall monitor the international situation in the areas covered by the common foreign and security policy and contribute to the definition of policies by delivering opinions to the Council at the request of the Council or on its own initiative. It shall also monitor the implementation of agreed policies, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Presidency and the Commission” (Treaty of Nice, 2001).

Secondly, the EU has decided to develop an EU military force of up to 60000 troops can be deployed at 60 days and with the ability to sustain itself for at least one year. Thirdly, arrangements have been agreed for NATO-EU consultation and for involvement of non-EU NATO members candidate countries and other partners in EU-led crisis management operations. Fourthly, the EU is to take full responsibility in the area of conflict prevention and policies were agreed to strengthen EU capabilities for civilian aspects of crisis management. These include the establishment of a police force of 5000 police officers to be operational by 2003, measures to strengthen the rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection (Treaty of Nice, 2001).

The military side of the ESDP was introduced at Helsinki summit with the Headline goal and developed at the Nice summit. This summit also provided the institutional structures (PSC) that support the policy (Dover, 2010, p.249). This developments strengthened the cooperative security side of

European security. Military side (i.e., collective defence side) strengthened in the Helsinki summit.

2.1.11 The Laeken Summit and European Security and Defense Policy

At the summit in December 2001, which was held after 9/11 attacks on the US, it was declared that the EU became self-sufficient in crisis management operations and the EU pointed out the importance of creating the emergency response force in 2003. The EU was capable of carrying out a range of crisis-management operations. However, it was also acknowledged that the military capabilities of the ESDP were inadequate to achieve the objectives of the Helsinki Headline Goal (European Council, 2001).

In the summit, member states decided to continue development of the ESDP, the strengthening of its capabilities, both civilian and military, and the creation of appropriate structures within it. The EU was determined to finalise arrangements with NATO. These would enhance the EU's military capabilities to carry out crisis-management operations over the whole range of Petersberg tasks. It was also emphasized that, development of the means and capabilities would enable the EU progressively to take on more demanding operations. (European Council, 2001).

At Cologne in June 1999, the Council had stated that these tasks included the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks. At Helsinki, to fulfill these missions, particular attention was paid to the means necessary for effective crisis management: deployability, sustainability, interoperability, flexibility, mobility, survivability and command and control. At Laeken in December 2001, where ESDP was proclaimed operational, it was emphasised that the development of means and capabilities would allow the EU “progressively to take on more demanding operations” (European Council, 2001). In reality, the scope of these missions in practice were determined

according to the EU's military capabilities and the ESDP could not become operational until 2003 when the Berlin Plus Arrangements were completed³⁹.

2.1.12 The Seville Summit and European Security and Defense Policy

At the Seville Council of Europe Summit held on 21-22 June 2002, the issue of terror has come to the fore, and it has been discussed what kinds of functions the ESDP would play in the fight against terrorism. It was emphasized that the ESDP and CFSP would play a role in the fight against terrorism and the EU would cooperate with the US on terrorism (European Council, 2002a). Draft declaration of the European Council on the contribution of CFSP, including ESDP, in the fight against terrorism was also mentioned. In this declaration, the decision taken in Article 6 of Annex V,

“ ESDP will strengthen further as Member States enhance their military and civilian capabilities for crisis management. In this context, the development of ESDP must take fuller account of the capabilities that may be required, in accordance with the Petersberg tasks and the provisions of the Treaty, to combat terrorism” (European Council, 2002a).

The characteristics of cooperative and collective security can clearly be seen in the Seville Summit's emphasis on countering terrorism and developing the EU's military and civilian crisis management capabilities. The EU reaffirmed that it was in a position to take charge of crisis management operations, and, in this context, the UN police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina was taken over by the EU as of 1 January 2003 and thus the EU's first civilian crisis management operation, the EU Police Mission (EUPM) and thus the first ESDP mission started. The EUPM was one example of the EU's commitment to stabilise post-conflict regions, and to help establish the rule of law. By promoting stability, including by strengthening local law enforcement capabilities, norms and standards, the EU would help statebuilding which also had an aspect of countering terrorism and fighting organized crime. In addition,

³⁹ For more on the Berlin Plus Arrangements, see Cebeci (2011b and 2012)

the willingness of the EU to take over the NATO task force in the North Macedonia mentioned (European Council, 2002a).

If terrorism is regarded as a common threat to humanity, then, the EU's aim of countering terrorism can be interpreted as part of achieving collective security. On the other hand, characteristics of cooperative security can also be seen in countering terrorism. According to Cohen's model, promoting stability is the fourth ring of his model. And also 'norms and standards', 'the rule of law' are mentioned in the principles of cooperative security concept. Moreover, collective defence principles can also be observed in this kind of operations. Because there is a common determined threat which is terrorism. And member states of the EU fight against terrorism to prevent conflict and specifically protect the EU member states against such a threat within the principle of solidarity among members against aggression by third parties.

2.1.13 The Copenhagen Summit and European Security and Defense Policy

At the Copenhagen Summit held on 12-13 December 2002, decisions have been taken about the ESDP. With the Copenhagen Summit Conclusions, the issue of EU access to NATO means and capabilities was solved. A comprehensive agreement was reached with NATO. According to agreement, Southern Cyprus and Malta (as countries which remained outside the Partnership for Peace framework of NATO) would not take part in EU military operations conducted through the use of NATO assets (Cebeci, 2012b). This summit arranged the relations with non-EU NATO members and thus contributed to collective and cooperative security whilst opening the way for the EU to develop its own defence capability operationally and thus also fed into the creation of collective defence within the EU.

2.1.14 The Thessaloniki Summit and the European Security Strategy

At the Thessaloniki Summit held on 19-20 June 2003, decisions have been taken about the ESDP and a strategy document prepared by the High

Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana, was submitted to the summit. It was the first draft of the European Security Strategy. On that occasion, he was tasked with the preparation of a strategy paper to outline a common threat-based European approach to global security. Accordingly, the final version of the strategy was expected to be ready for the following European Council to be in December 2003 (EU-ISS, 2003). In his outline of the paper, Solana (EU-ISS, 2003) stated:

“today’s complex problems could not be tackled by any single country alone. Threat perception has changed. The key threats the world was facing were more diverse, less visible and less predictable than during the Second World War and Cold War” (EU-ISS, 2003).

International terrorism, proliferation of WMD, failed States and organised crime were declared as new threats. They were significant threats by themselves but their combination constituted a radical challenge to security. In addition to cope with the threats, three strategic objectives for the EU were proposed: First, making a particular contribution to stability and good governance in the EU immediate neighbourhood. Second, building an international order based on effective multilateralism. Finally, tackling with the new and old threats. Overall, the EU would be more active, more coherent and more capable in countering those threats (EU-ISS, 2014).

2.1.15 The Brussels Summit and the European Security Strategy

At the Brussels Summit held on 17-18 June 2004, the issue of terrorism was once again the most important issue on the agenda. International cooperation in the fight against terrorism was emphasised in the summit. The European Security Strategy was adopted at the European Council in December 2003 and it provided a basic framework for policy-making (EU-ISS, 2005). The European Council also decided on the establishment of an operation centre by 1 January 2006 at the latest. The establishment of a small EU cell at the

SHAPE⁴⁰ was agreed according to NATO liaison arrangements with the EUMS (EU-ISS, 2005).

European Security Strategy was adopted at this summit, with several changes brought to the draft submitted to the Thessaloniki European Council. The major change was the inclusion of traditional threats such as regional conflicts to the list of threats that were facing the EU and its member states. The inclusion of regional conflicts are crucial for this thesis because its major test cases are two regional conflicts in Europe (Bosnia and Kosovo cases) and their inclusion has collective security, collective defence, and cooperative security aspects. The collective security aspect is about contributing to world peace through conflict prevention and crisis management, whereas collective defence aspect is about seeing regional conflicts as a threat to the EU and its member states. On the other hand, it is about cooperative security because regional conflicts can only be solved through multilateral cooperation as well as achieving good governance through statebuilding.

The threats (other than regional conflicts) listed in the strategy were: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, organized crime and state failure. The Strategy (as different from its draft) named preventive engagement (rather than pre-emptive engagement, as put forward in the draft) as one of the methods in tackling international crises (Cebeci, 2004). On the other hand environmental problems and poverty were listed as challenges to international security.

European Security Strategy can be explained with reference to the traditional security concepts. Given the principles of collective security concept, it can be said that this document has a global perspective. It defined the new threat perception for the peace in the world. On the other hand,

⁴⁰ SHAPE is the acronym of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe in NATO military structure. According to SHAPE vision, Allied Command Operations (ACO) is a top-quality command responsible for the planning and execution of combined, joint, effects-based operations. And also their mission is defined as preparing for, planning and conducting military operations in order to meet NATO's political objectives (NATO, 2018).

collective defence principles can be observed. This document defined the common approach against new threats for the EU's member states. Also some principles of cooperative security can be seen: to cope with the new threats, some objectives were proposed such as enhanced multilateralism and good governance. In brief, CFSP or ESDP was transformed as a mixture of traditional and new security concepts with the European Security Strategy.

2.1.16 Headline Goal 2010

After the Helsinki Summit, progress which is about the means and capabilities was seen insufficient in the ESDP field. The EU approved a new plan, namely, the Headline Goal 2010 in May 2004, focusing primarily on the EU's rapid response capability especially through the creation of Battle Groups, composing of 1500 troops to be deployed in 15 days and sustained for 2 months. The new Battlegroup concept was regarded as an important part of the implementation of the defence aspects of the 2003 European Security Strategy and as an integral part of the new Headline Goals 2010. The objectives of the Headline Goals 2010 described below (Quille, 2006):

- “ ...the establishment of a civil-military cell within the EUMS, with the capacity rapidly to set-up an operation centre for a particular operation;
- The establishment of the Agency in the field of defence capability development, research, acquisition and armaments (European Defence Agency) in the course of 2004. This will also support, as appropriate, the fulfilment of the commonly identified shortfalls in the field of military equipment;
- The implementation by 2005 of EU Strategic lift joint coordination, with a view to achieving by 2010 necessary capacity and full efficiency in strategic lift(air, land and sea) in support of anticipated operation;
- Specifically for Airlift the transformation of EACC into the European Airlift Center (EAC) by 2004 is welcomed, as is the intention on the part of some Member States who so wish to develop a European Airlift command fully efficiently by 2010;

- The complete development by 2007 of rapidly deployable battlegroups including the identification of appropriate strategic lift, sustainability and debarkation assets;
- The availability of an aircraft carrier with its associated air wing and escort by 2008;
- To improve the performance of all levels of EU operations by developing appropriate compatibility and network linkage of all communications equipment and assets both terrestrial and space based by 2010;
- To develop quantitative benchmarks and criteria that national forces declared to the Headline Goal have to meet in the field of deployability and in the field of multinational training” (Headline Goal 2010)

The Headline Goal 2010 was especially important in that targeted goals meant serious progress in the field of ESDP, if they could be enacted. One of the goals was the creation of European Defense Agency (EDA)⁴¹, which started its activities in the fall of 2004, was a cornerstone for the capability improvements. The creation of EDA is not only important in terms of maintaining interoperability among EU members in crisis management, which is an important aspect of collective security, but it is also and mainly about collective defence which might in time lead to common defence because it is about creating a common approach to defence procurement and armaments. On 22 November 2004, the EU Defense Ministers decided to establish the Battle Groups to be made ready by the year 2007 (Quille, 2006). This Headline Goal can be observed in the principles of collective security as it is about conflict prevention and crisis management. The EU has so far aimed to strengthen its military capabilities to prevent conflicts and wars all over the world. Establishment of the EDA and creation of Battle Groups we important in this regard.

⁴¹ For detailed information; European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) strategy, May 2007; European Armaments Cooperation (EAC) strategy, October 2008; European Defence Research & Technology (EDRT) strategy, 10 November 2008; Capability Development Plan (CDP), 2008 (for 2008-2012, updates: ‘2013-2018’ and ‘2025 and beyond’).

2.1.17 Non-ratified Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe

The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe was adopted by the European Council on 18 June 2004, and signed in Rome, later that year approved by the European Parliament (EUR-Lex,2004). The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe did not enter into force because the treaty was not ratified by France and the Netherlands. It was rejected by France (29 May 2005) and the Netherlands (1 June 2005) in their national referenda. However, it made a great contribution to the creation of the the Lisbon Treaty.

The draft Constitution made significant changes in the area of external action in particular institutional modifications. The creation of the Minister for Foreign Affairs was one of them. According to treaty, he or she would conduct the EU common foreign and security policy, chair the Foreign Affairs Council and would also serve as Vice-President of the Commission. Moreover, he or she would be responsible for carrying out the EU external policy as a whole. He or she would represent the EU alone or with the Commission, and would be supported by a European External Action Service (EEAS) (EUR-Lex, 2004).

Considering the Draft Constitutional Treaty, in connection with CFSP/EDSP, the position of certain Member States on neutrality was safeguarded in the text of the Treaty. In particular, this was by the unanimity requirement in conjunction with ‘constructive abstention’. Article I-40 Para. 6 referred this issue.

“European decisions relating to the common foreign and security policy shall be adopted by the European Council and the Council *unanimously*, except in the *cases referred to in Part III*. The European Council and the Council shall act on an initiative from a Member State, on a proposal from the EU Minister for Foreign Affairs or on a proposal from that Minister with the Commission's support...” (EUR-Lex, 2004).

The relevant parts of Part III are chapters 1 (general) and II (CFSP). Art. 294 repeated that all areas of foreign and security policy were covered.

The member states would support the CFSP actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. They would work together to enhance this and refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the EU or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations. These were the statements of constitutional significance and binding all members generally, but it is clear that the main functional principle is unanimity, as emerges from Article 295 Para 1, “the European Council shall define the general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy, including for matters with defence implications” (EUR-Lex, 2004). According to draft treaty, in brief, unanimity remained as the method of decision-making in the areas of CFSP/ESDP. In the area of CFSP, member states would build “enhanced cooperation” conditional upon a unanimous decision of the Council. Moreover, 'permanent structured co-operation(PesCo)' would be put in place in the area of defence enabling a group of member states to build closer cooperation and to jointly undertake more complex military tasks (EUR-Lex, 2004).

When the draft treaty is examined, the principles of collective defence can be clearly observed. In particular “mutual commitment” is significant. This meant that the EU would strengthen its political effectiveness in the area of external action, especially in terms of defence.

2.1.18 The Treaty of Lisbon (The Treaty of EU)

The Treaty of EU was signed on 13 December 2007 and came into force on 1 December 2009. The Treaty combined most elements of the failed Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, including those relating to the external relations of the EU and CFSP. Most of the provisions relating to the CFSP/CSDP were similarly reinserted into the Lisbon Treaty. The Lisbon Treaty constituted a milestone in the development of the CSDP and brought important institutional developments to increase coherence and efficiency of the policy by reorganising the EU institutions. The new CSDP-related

provisions of the Lisbon Treaty are listed below and then explained in the sub paragraphs (The Treaty of Lisbon, 2007).

- An empowered role for the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (Art. 9E, 13A, 14 19, TEU).
- The creation of a European External Action Service (Art. 27.3, TEU).
- The introduction of “Permanent Structured Cooperation” in the area of defence policy (Art. 42 (6), TEU).
- The possibility of allowing a group of member states to undertake CSDP tasks (Art. 44, TEU).
- The creation of a mutual assistance clause (Art. 42.7, TEU).
- The establishment of the solidarity clause (Art. 222, TEU).

The Lisbon Treaty brought possibilities for the strengthening of EU defence cooperation, by addressing institutional changes to the EU foreign policy system. It aimed to establish a more coherent and efficient framework for EU external action, especially by means of an empowered role for the High Representative for Foreign Affairs, to be supported by the European External Action Service (EEAS). The treaty also contains specific provisions to the CSDP. The establishment of the “permanent structured cooperation” (PESCO) allowed for a group of member states that fulfil certain criteria in defence to enter into closer cooperation to enhance European defence capabilities. Moreover, provisions on “mutual assistance clause” in case of armed aggression against member states and “solidarity clause” to be enacted in case of a terrorist attack against or natural or man-made disaster in a member state were created.⁴²

The Lisbon Treaty brought the new position of the President of the European Council as well. The President who would be elected for a term of two and a half years, with the possibility of serving a second term. In the previous system, it was difficult for the President of the Council to build up a

⁴² The information given in this paragraph is a summary of information taken from The Treaty of Lisbon (2007).

relationship with other world leaders as head of the EU in changing every 6 months.

The Lisbon Treaty changed the name of and gave new tasks to the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The main role for the High Representative (HR) is to conduct the CFSP, to preside over the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC), to represent the EU externally and to conduct dialogue with third countries. In order to increase inter-institutional coherence and efficiency, the HR is also announced the vice-president of the European Commission (The Treaty of Lisbon, 2007). The Lisbon Treaty also created an External Action Service to back up the work of the HR. This service was established to assist the HR with all her duties to work in coordination with the diplomatic services of the member states.

The Lisbon Treaty's creation of the "permanent structured cooperation" brought some significant new possibilities for cooperation within the CSDP. The vision of having some member states enter into a more ambitious form of cooperation is not a new idea. It appeared in the draft of the Constitutional Treaty that was mentioned above and reflects the continuous reality for European defence cooperation. With the article 42 (6) of TEU, the new CSDP brought a greater flexibility by allowing groups of member states that are willing to enhance military integration between themselves within the framework of the EU (The Treaty of Lisbon, 2007).

"Those member states whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework "(The Treaty of Lisbon, 2007).

The Lisbon Treaty provided for member states to strengthen their military cooperation and capability development by creating "permanent structured cooperation" where a group of member states that fulfils certain criteria⁴³ can

⁴³ Certain criteria were described on the Protocol 10 annexed to the Lisbon Treaty. These are such as making certain budgetary and deployability commitments. The protocol also states the

enter into closer cooperation to enhance European defence capabilities. Similarly, with the article 44 of the TEU a group of member states were allowed to undertake CSDP tasks (i.e., CSDP operations and missions) in cooperation with the HR.

“The Council may entrust the implementation of a task to a group of member states which are willing and have the necessary capability for such a task. Those Member States, in association with the High Representative shall agree among themselves on the management of such task” (TEU, Art.44, 2007).

It can be said that this provision is about CSDP operations and missions. But, it does not mean to create a new category of EU operations and does not extend the scope for possible CSDP missions. It aims to facilitate the deployment of CSDP operations by creating a framework that allows “a group of member states” to go ahead to an operation.

Another notable change brought by the TEU is that it aims to take CSDP beyond external crisis management with the “mutual assistance” and “solidarity” clauses allowing member states to engage in collective defence. The mutual assistance clause was explained in the article 42(7) of TEU:

“if a member state is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other member states shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power” (TEU, Art.42(7), 2007).

And also, this provision suggests that the obligation has a traditional alliance character that entails an intergovernmental obligation under international law for member states to come to the aid of other member states against an armed attack, commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under NATO, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum

European Defence Agency (EDA) will be able to access the performance of the participating member states. It aims to develop military capacities, to ensure operational commitments by the involved member states and to ensure government investments in defence (The Treaty of Lisbon, 2007).

for its implementation (TEU, Art. 42(7), 2007). Moreover, according to the “solidarity clause” of TEU (Title VII), member states shall

“act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a member state is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or manmade disaster. The Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States” (Art. 222, TEU).

It can be said that these provisions created a collective defence mechanism within the EU. With these clauses, member states take over to assist one another in the face of armed attacks, natural or man-made disasters, emergencies and crises on EU territory.

By examining the Lisbon Treaty changes to the CSDP, and assessing how these affect security and defence policy, one can see some implications about the EU’s understanding of security. Especially, the principles of collective defence can be openly seen in the “mutual assistance” and “solidarity” clauses. As mentioned above, the solidarity clause put together member states against common threats (terrorist attack). On the other hand, collective security aspects can be seen in these clauses as the treaty gives the EU more coherence and flexibility in rapidly reacting to international crises.

In this part of the thesis⁴⁴, the transformation of the EU’s conception of security was analysed. Various aspects and principles of the security concepts that are examined in the first chapter, can be observed in this transformation. Eventually, it can be said that there is a common approach in member states to create a security environment for their people and the EU is moving toward to develop a “sui generis security institutionalization”, that contains principles of all security concepts that are mentioned in the first chapter.

⁴⁴ All summits, treaties and institutions of the EU were not mentioned in this chapter. Only those ones that impacted on the transformation of the EU’s security understanding were chosen.

2.2 Transformation of NATO

After the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991, some scholars began to question whether NATO was still necessary as a military organization. After the Cold War, one of the key issues was how the loss of NATO's fundamental dynamic in its establishment – the Soviet threat, or the threat of a direct armed attack on NATO soil – would affect its future. In the post-Cold War era, NATO has transformed into a successful security organization, which aimed at collective and cooperative security besides its major function of collective defence. What is being questioned about the organization today is not the existence of the organization but its boundaries.

2.2.1 What is NATO

NATO was established on April 4, 1949 by 12 countries⁴⁵ with the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington. The headquarters of NATO is located in Brussels, the capital of Belgium. On different dates 17 more countries participated to the Alliance. These new members has made NATO more efficient as a military actor in international environment. Today, NATO is a political and military organization that consists of 29 independent member states⁴⁶. NATO was established with the aim of providing a common defense against the attacks from third countries. The most important feature of NATO is that the attack on any of the member countries, which is also mentioned in the Treaty, is accepted as made to all member states (Art.5)⁴⁷. NATO was created by gathering countries with common benefits to provide

⁴⁵ Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States.

⁴⁶ Albania(2009), Belgium(1949), Bulgaria(2004), Canada(1949), Croatia(2009), Czech Republic(1999), Denmark (1949), Estonia(2004), France(1949), Germany(1955), Greece(1952), Hungary(1999), Iceland(1949), Italy(1949), Latvia(2004), Lithuania(2004), Luxembourg(1949), Montenegro(2017), Netherlands(1949), Norway(1949), Poland(1999), Portugal(1949), Romania(2004), Slovenia(2004), Slovakia(2004), Spain(1982), Turkey(1952), The United Kingdom(1949), The United States(1949). On June 5, 2017, Montenegro became NATO's 29th and newest member, despite Russia's objections. Moreover, NATO membership is open to "any other European state in a position to further principles of Washington Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area" (NATO,2006). For detailed information <https://www.nato.int/nato-welcome/index.html>.

⁴⁷ Article 5 of Washington Treaty which was mentioned in the first chapter.

peace and security for member countries that recognize the rule of law and freedoms, and to support each other militarily, socially and culturally NATO (2006).

NATO's fundamental role and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of its member countries by political and military means (NATO 2006). Fair share of the risks and burdens that member countries are exposed to is one of the elements that make the alliance successful and indispensable (NATO 2006). NATO's political objective is to support democratic values, to consult the defense and security issues of the member countries, to cooperate, to build trust and to provide opportunities to prevent conflicts in the long term (NATO 2006). Military purpose of the Alliance firstly is to help settle disputes between countries peacefully (i.e., partially using principles of collective security concept). If NATO fails to settle disputes in using peaceful tools such as negotiation, possible military operations come to the fore to increase pressure to the uncompromising countries.

2.2.2 The Purpose of NATO

NATO is usually seen as a collective defence organization based on the mutual solidarity of its members. The main aim of the organization is to ensure a solidarity between the members and the unity of defense (NATO 2006). The founding member countries of the organization agreed to consider “an attack against one as an attack against all”, along with consultations about threats and defense matters.⁴⁸

The main objective of the Alliance is to provide collective defense for its member states. However, since the end of the Cold War, NATO's structure and policies have been adapted to provide a stable and peaceful framework for political dialogue between the Allies and neighboring countries, to improve overall security in Europe. In response to these improvements, which the national governments have been trying to provide for a long time in the

⁴⁸ For detailed information, see The USA Department of State (n/a)

security environment, the Alliance also took over additional responsibilities. This included the task of combating regional and ethnic conflicts that pose a threat to European security. Today, the Alliance is engaged in more diverse and comprehensive activities designed to cooperate with other countries and to actively address the security problems that could harm the interests of member states and their people.

2.2.3 Structure of NATO

NATO's highest decision-making body, based in Brussels, is the North Atlantic Council (NAC). The NAC is a broad discussion and coordination forum among the allies. It was the only body established by the Treaty in 1949. The North Atlantic Council has only one type of voting for taking decisions and it is consensus. The Council maintains its meetings with the participation of the permanent representatives of each member state at the level of the ambassador and this gives continuity to the Council. The Council meets at this level, at least every week. The meetings of the Council are chaired by the Secretary-General. In addition, it meets twice a year at the level of ministers of foreign affairs and three times a year at the level of ministers of defence.⁴⁹

The military policy is discussed at the Defense Planning Committee, which is composed of the member countries participating in NATO's common defense structure. The Committee meets at certain level of ambassadors at regular intervals such as the Council, and twice a year at the level of defense ministers. The Committee is the most competent body in military matters. It presides the main organs and committees such as the North Atlantic Council, the Defense planning committee, the Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee, the Nuclear Planning group, and at the same time the president of the International Secretariat, the highest officer.⁵⁰

⁴⁹ The information given in this paragraph is a summary of the information in NATO Encyclopedia, (2018)

⁵⁰ The information given in this paragraph is a summary of the information in NATO Encyclopedia, (2018)

The military structure of the organization consists of the General Staff of the member countries or military personnel who can decide on the behalf of that rank. This alliance is for defensive purposes, but it also aims deterrence while maintaining unity. It guarantees the protection of the territorial integrity of the Member States. In addition, it aims to eliminate any security weakness that might hinder the development of the country.⁵¹

The most authoritative and oldest permanent body in NATO's military structure is the Military Committee (NATO Encyclopedia, 2018). It consists of the Chiefs of Staff of the member states. It advises the Council on military matters and guides NATO High Command. The committee, normally held three times a year at the level of the General Staff of the member states, has continuity with permanent military representatives. The Military Committee provides for the execution of policies and decisions of the NAC (Wagner, 2006, p.212). It is the primary source of consensus-based advice to the North Atlantic Council and the Nuclear Planning Group on military policy and strategy, and it provides guidance to the two Strategic Commanders – Supreme Allied Commander Europe and Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (NATO Encyclopedia, 2018). In brief, it can be said that NATO is a security organisation that combines the political decision-making process and a comprehensive military structure.

2.2.4 Historical Background

NATO's roots can be traced back to the Brussels Treaty which was signed on 17 March 1948 by Belgium, the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. It was a collective defense treaty against the Soviet threat at the beginning of the Cold War. This treaty was the pioneer of NATO's establishment. In 1948, European leaders met with US military and diplomatic representatives at the Pentagon. These negotiations resulted in the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty on 4 April 1949 (Ringmose, 2010, p. 320). In addition to the five states that signed the Brussels Treaty, the United States,

⁵¹ The information given in this paragraph is a summary of the information in NATO Encyclopedia, (2018)

Denmark, Italy, Iceland, Canada, Norway and Portugal also signed the North Atlantic Treaty against the threat posed by the Soviet Union. But this is partially true. The establishment of NATO was part of a broader effort to serve three purposes: “deterring Soviet expansionism, forbidding the revival of nationalist militarism in Europe through a strong North American presence on the continent, and encouraging European political integration” (NATO Encyclopedia, 2018).

While the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty had established NATO, it had not created a military structure that could effectively coordinate their actions. This situation changed when growing worries about Soviet Union intentions and in the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. By the early 1950s, international developments, which reached their highest point with the outbreak of the Korean War, increased their efforts to create the military structures (NATO Encyclopedia, 2018). These structures needed to fulfill the common defense promises of Western countries against threats. NATO had to develop military plans. The Military Committee called for the establishment of conventional (negotiated) military forces (NATO Encyclopedia, 2018). North American forces, which came to Europe at the request of European governments, helped to dissuade the Soviet Union from thinking that its aggressive attitude would succeed. Moreover, as time passed, more states became members of the Alliance.

The end of the Cold War in 1989 and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 eliminated NATO’s Soviet enemy. With the disappearance of its traditional enemy, some analyst have begun to believe that there is no need for NATO (Kansikaas, 2017, p.8). This development led NATO to make strategic changes in its mission. This change began in 1990 in Paris with the Conventions of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, signed between NATO and the Soviet Union, aimed at reducing military forces. NATO began to reduce military spending. In the post-Cold War era, NATO's military force was reduced; emergency response forces were created instead of regular

military forces (Kansikaas, 2017, p.8). With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the military balance in Europe was changed. In this context, in 1999, the new Conventional Armed Forces Agreement was signed in Istanbul.

In 1991 as in 1949, NATO was seen the foundation stone for a larger, pan-European security architecture. In 1991, NATO established the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), which was renamed as the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 1997. This forum established for the aim to bring the Allies together with their Central European, Eastern European, and Central Asian neighbours for joint consultations. Moreover, in 1994, NATO established the 'Mediterranean Dialogue' with six non-member Mediterranean countries⁵². It aimed to contribute to security and stability in the Mediterranean region through mutual understanding. As part of this evolving effort, in 1994, NATO established the Partnership for Peace programme (PfP). The PfP program allowed non-NATO countries to share information with NATO and to modernise their militaries in line with modern democratic standards. Partners were encouraged to choose their own level of involvement with the Alliance (NATO Encyclopedia, 2018). With the PfP program, the Eastern European countries started to prepare themselves to become members of NATO one by one (Koops, 2017, p.317). All these developments signalled a strong cooperative security characteristic, where the former enemies of NATO as well as its Mediterranean neighbours got involved in the cooperative framework created by NATO through various policy initiatives. Following these developments, NATO began to expand to Central and Eastern European countries. It directed its activities to political and humanitarian areas, which it had never been interested in before.

NATO gained experience about non-military operations during the dissolution of Yugoslavia. These experiences demonstrated that NATO was the only military power to provide security and peace for Europe. During the Cold War, NATO had been a static military organization whose mere existence was enough to deter the Soviet threat. The Yugoslav Conflict in the Balkans caused

⁵² Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia, with Algeria also joining in 2000.

the Alliance's transformation into a more dynamic and responsive military organization. Accordingly, the Alliance issued a new Strategic Concept describing the Alliance's purpose and priorities. The previous Strategic Concepts had been classified. In 1991, the Alliance had adopted, for the first time, an unclassified Concept in the wake of the Soviet Union's decline. This document was mainly about the insecurities and uncertainties witnessed in Europe after the demise of the Soviet Union and aimed at extending a cooperative hand to former adversaries; reflecting a cooperative security approach. In its 1999 Strategic Concept, with the lessons taken from Bosnian and Kosovo wars, it was stated that since the end of the Cold War, the world had come to face "complex new risks to Euro-Atlantic peace and security, including oppression, ethnic conflict, economic distress, the collapse of political order, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction" (NATO Encyclopedia, 2018). The 1999 Strategic Concept, thus involved provisions on a more flexible response to crises, in this strategic concept the collective security approach was more visible.

The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon demonstrated to the Allies that political disorder in distant parts of the globe could have consequences in NATO territory. NATO invoked its collective defence clause (Article 5) for the first time in its history. Similar attacks, including the Istanbul bombings in November 2003, the attack of the Madrid commuter train system on 11 March 2004 and the attack on the public transport system in London on 7 July 2005, showed that violent extremists were determined to target civilians. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, according to collective defence clause, a coalition of countries – including many NATO Allies – militarily intervened in Afghanistan in the fall of 2001 (NATO Encyclopedia, 2018).

Meanwhile, the NATO continued to accept new members and to build new partnerships. The NATO-Russia Council was established in 2002. They worked with each other as equal partners on security issues of common interest

with this council. In 2004, NATO launched the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative as a way of offering practical bilateral security cooperation to countries of the broader Middle East region (NATO Encyclopedia, 2018). This shows that while pursuing its major function of collective defence, NATO continued to develop a cooperative security approach as well, which increasingly got prioritized in those years.

According to experiences of the Alliance in the Afghanistan war, as in Bosnia and Kosovo, NATO understood that military power is no longer enough to ensure peace and stability. Peacekeeping became at least as difficult as peacemaking. During the Cold War years, NATO provided security and defence for the members of North Atlantic Treaty; now the definition of “security” has expanded to include the individual’s freedom from the violent extremism bred by instability and failed states.

In this context, in 2010, the new Strategic Concept was adopted. The Alliance committed itself to dealing with “all stages of a crisis – before, during and after” – an all-embracing principle that implies a greater role for cooperative security (NATO Encyclopedia, 2018). When one thinks of this strategic concept in military perspective, a “comprehensive approach” is at the heart of this concept. New security threats or instabilities require complex remedies that combine military forces, diplomacy and post-conflict stabilisation process. The widest possible coalition of international actors are essential for this concept's success. This coalition can provide all elements of this approach, however. Accordingly, NATO was not only developing security partnerships with other countries but it was also reaching out to other fellow international organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The 2010 Strategic concept openly referred to cooperative security as an “essential core task” of NATO, besides “collective defence” and “crisis management” as the other core tasks, and stated:

“Cooperative security: The Alliance is affected by, and can affect, political and security developments beyond its borders. The Alliance

will engage actively to enhance international security, through partnership with relevant countries and other international organisations; by contributing actively to arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament; and by keeping the door to membership in the Alliance open to all European democracies that meet NATO's standards." (NATO 2010)

2.2.5 The Transformation of NATO after the Post-Cold War

This section inquires into how NATO is adapting itself to this process of change, and how and to what extent this effort results. Shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Soviet Union broke up, Central and Eastern European countries were freed from Soviet influence, Germany got re-unified and the Warsaw Pact disappeared. The radical change in the Soviet and European political geographies combined with the regime change and reform process in Russia, the Soviet threat. The phenomenon of globalization gained momentum with the collapse of the bipolar structure that dominated world politics. One cannot yet say that the new international system has completed its formation. Globalization is an ongoing process. Social, political and economic activities exceed state borders. Threats have also taken a transboundary nature. For example, civil wars or economic crises in unstable regions cause immigration and might feed into terrorism and organized crime in multiple ways. The economic crisis that has begun in a country affects the whole world (Shifrinson, 2016, p.38).

As a result of the development of communication and transportation systems around the world, all kinds of relations and transactions at the global level are gaining increasing speed. Perhaps most importantly, as a result of all these developments, the national and the international (as well as the local and the global) have become increasingly intertwined. In other words, inter-communal common interests and areas of activity appear beyond interstate interdependencies (Massey, 1991). For example, it has become mandatory to cooperate with other states and non-state organizations to combat terrorism,

criminal organizations and environmental issues. Today, fight against terrorism has become a common interest and activity area.

Another effect of globalization is that values and norms such as democracy, human rights, the rule of law and pluralism are have become universal. There is a widespread belief in the connection between these values and norms and regional and global stability and peace, especially in the western community. This understanding increases the geopolitical value of the states governed by democratic regimes in NATO and generally in Western society. And also, this understanding refers mainly to individual security which is covered by fourth ring model in Cohen's (2011) definition of cooperative security. This means that with increasing globalization, NATO has also gradually developed a cooperative security aspect.

On the other hand, NATO's major function is collective defence and it still maintains this function. By linking North America to Western Europe's defense, the Alliance has shown that any political or military pressure against Western Europe would fail. Through the Alliance, Western Europe and North America have not only protected their sovereignty in common, but also maintained unprecedented stability. Indeed, the security provided by NATO is defined as the 'welfare oxygen', which forms the basis of European economic cooperation and integration (Shehu, 2017, p.162). NATO has also created an environment for the end of the Cold War and the end of the division of Europe in the early 1990s.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the threat of military invasion disappeared with the end of the Cold War, but instability was seen in some parts of Europe. In the former Yugoslavia and some parts of the former Soviet Union, regional conflicts, often fueled by ethnic tensions, arose and threatened to spread. NATO countries thus realized that the best assurance of their collective defense commitments and security was still cooperation through NATO.

Moreover, although the possibility of military invasion has been reduced, new structures in the field of political and military cooperation were needed to intervene in regional conflicts and to maintain peace and stability in

Europe. In fact, internal reform was needed to adapt military forces and capabilities to new missions, such as crisis management, peacekeeping and peacemaking operations, as well as, to enable these forces to carry out basic defense duties on a regular basis. In response to new security threats, NATO has become a focal point for partnerships of nations that have cooperated in a broader security field, rather than remaining as an alliance of fundamental defense responsibility. This means that collective and cooperative dimensions of security gained significant basis after the end of the Cold War.

2.2.6 NATO's Strategic Concepts

NATO's Strategic Concepts outline the Alliance's purpose and nature, and its fundamental security tasks. They also identify the central features of the new security environment especially new threats. They also specify the elements of the NATO's approach to new security challenges and provide guidelines for the adaptation of its military forces against the new security environment (NATO Encyclopedia, 2018).

Bipolar confrontation between the East and the West dominated international relations from 1949 to 1991. Mutual tension and confrontation were emphasised more than dialogue and cooperation in bilateral relations. This led to a dangerous security environment and expensive arms race. During this period, various Strategic Concepts⁵³ were issued. In addition, two key reports⁵⁴ were published. These two reports provide a basis to assess the Strategic Concepts in a wider framework as well. NATO announced its strategic concept that was called 'Massive Retaliation' in 1957. It maintained that if the Soviet Union attacked the Allies, NATO would respond with nuclear weapons. The intended effect of this doctrine was to deter the Soviet Union.

⁵³ Two important Strategic Concepts issued in this period are especially mentioned in this thesis, whereas the other Concepts are deliberately ignored.

⁵⁴ These are the Report of the Committee of Three (December 1956) and the Harmel Report (December 1967).

This strategy relied heavily on the US nuclear weapons capability and its will to defend European territory in the case of a Soviet nuclear weapons attack. Simultaneously, this strategic concept allowed European NATO members to focus their energies on economic growth rather than on maintaining large conventional armies (NATO Encyclopedia, 2018). As soon as NATO's 1957 Strategic Concept was adopted, a series of international developments occurred that put into question the Alliance's strategy of massive retaliation. The United States started to show a stronger non-nuclear posture for NATO and to emphasize the need for a strategy of 'flexible response'. After the Cuban Missile Crisis, 'Flexible Response' doctrine⁵⁵ replaced the 'Massive Retaliation' in 1967 (NATO Encyclopedia, 2018). This new doctrine enhanced NATO's conventional defence posture by offering military response short of a full nuclear exchange in the event of conflict. There were two key features to the new strategy: 'flexibility' and 'escalation'. The deterrent of the Alliance was based on flexibility (NATO Encyclopedia, 2018). This means that it would prevent the potential aggressor in a different way. Three types of military responses against aggression to NATO were identified: The first one was the 'direct defence' in which the aim was to defeat the aggressor on the level at which the enemy chose to fight. The second one was 'deliberate escalation' which added a series of possibilities to defeat the aggressor by progressively raising the threat of using nuclear weapons as the crisis escalated. The last one was 'general nuclear response' that was seen as the ultimate deterrent (NATO Encyclopedia, 2018). These were all collective defence measures.

As NATO was setting its strategic objectives for the near future, it also decided to draw up a report that provided a two-way approach to security: political and military. This report was called the 'Harmel Report' or the 'Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance' (NATO Encyclopedia, 2018). This report was about a broad analysis of the security environment since 1949. And also, the need to maintain adequate security was emphasized while

⁵⁵"Flexible Response" was the US President John F. Kennedy's strategy. It sought to replace absolute dichotomy of peace or total nuclear war of the Massive Retaliation doctrine (NATO Encyclopedia, 2018).

seeking a relaxation of tensions in East-West relations and working towards solutions to the underlying political challenges dividing Europe. It defined two specific tasks: political and military (NATO Encyclopedia, 2018). Political tasks were about the formulation of proposals for balanced force reductions in the East and West. The Military tasks were about the defence of exposed areas, especially the Mediterranean. The Harmel Report introduced the notion of deterrence and détente. In that respect, it set the approaches for NATO's first steps toward a more cooperative security approach to security issues that would emerge in 1991.

In 1991, a new era started. The Soviet Union dissolved and Russia, together with other former adversaries, became NATO partners and Central and Eastern European countries later became NATO members. This period was characterised by dialogue and cooperation, as well as other new ways of contributing to peace and stability such as multinational crisis management operations by the Alliance. During the post-Cold War, the Alliance issued two unclassified Strategic Concepts that advocated a broader approach to security than before. These were the 1991 and 1999 Alliance's Strategic Concepts.

The 1991 Strategic Concept differed from preceding strategic documents. Firstly, it was released to the public, i.e., it was the first unclassified NATO Strategic concept; and secondly, while maintaining the defence of its members as its constant purpose (i.e., collective defence), it sought to improve and expand security for European territory as a whole through partnership and cooperation with former adversaries. It also aimed at the reduction of the use of nuclear weapons to a minimum level. Thus, security for its members was provided, peace and stability were preserved for European territory. In other words, NATO took on collective and cooperative security tasks. According to Part V-Conclusion, Art.57 of 1991 Strategic Concept;

“This Strategic Concept reaffirms the defensive nature of the Alliance and the resolve of its members to safeguard their security, sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Alliance's security policy is based on dialogue; co-operation; and effective collective defence as mutually reinforcing instruments for

preserving the peace. Making full use of the new opportunities available, the Alliance will maintain security at the lowest possible level of forces consistent with the requirements of defence. In this way, the Alliance is making an essential contribution to promoting a lasting peaceful order” (NATO, 1991)

In 1999, NATO issued a new Strategic Concept that underlined its members’ commitment to collective defence and peace and stability of the wider Euro-Atlantic area. This concept was based on a broad definition of security which emphasized the importance of political, economic, social and environmental factors in addition to the defence dimension. With this new concept, the new risks that had emerged since the end of the Cold War, which included terrorism, ethnic conflict, human rights abuses, political instability, economic fragility, and the spread of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons were identified (NATO 1999). Security, consultation, and deterrence and defence were defined the Alliance’s fundamental tasks. Crisis management and partnership concepts were also emphasized for enhancing security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. The strategy stated that the development of the military capabilities needed for the full range of the Alliance’s missions, from collective defence to peace support and other crisis-response operations (NATO, 1999). It also stipulated that NATO would keep a proportional mix of nuclear and conventional military capabilities for foreseeable future. Again, collective and cooperative security characteristics could also be clearly seen in this document.

The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon brought the threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction(WMD) to the fore. NATO needed to protect its people both in its territory and abroad. Therefore, major internal reforms to adapt military structures and capabilities to equip members military forces for new tasks were made. NATO also proceeded to deepen and extend its partnerships. It accelerated its transformation to develop new political relationships and stronger operational capabilities to respond new security threats and more challenging world.

New and emerging security threats, NATO's crisis management experience in the Balkans and Afghanistan, and importance of working with partners all over the world drove the Alliance to reassess and review its strategic concept. Thus, the 2010 Strategic Concept "Active Engagement, Modern Defence" was issued by NATO. The Alliance's core tasks and principles, its values, the evolving security environment and the Alliance's strategic objectives for the next decade were defined in this document.

This Security Concept described NATO as "a unique community of values committed to the principles of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law" (NATO, 2010). It presented NATO's three core tasks as collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security. The collective defence commitment of Allies was stated as: "NATO will deter and defend against any threat of aggression, and against emerging security challenges where they threaten the fundamental security of individual Allies or the Alliance as a whole" (NATO, 2010). Another core task was crisis management. NATO described itself as a unique and robust set of political and military capabilities to address the full spectrum of crises – before, during and after conflicts (NATO, 2010). NATO emphasized its decisiveness to employ an appropriate mix of those political and military tools to help manage developing crises that have the potential to affect Alliance security, before they escalate into conflicts (NATO, 2010). The last core task was cooperative security. NATO emphasized that political and security developments beyond its borders could affect its security (NATO, 2010). Therefore, the Alliance showed its decisiveness to enhance international security to engage, through partnership with relevant countries and other international organisations (NATO, 2010). This can be interpreted as a collective security commitment. Alliance solidarity, the importance of transatlantic consultation and the need to engage in a continuous process of reform were also emphasized (NATO, 2010).

The 2010 Strategic Concept underlined that collective defence was the Alliance's constant responsibility and "deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, remains a core element of NATO's

overall strategy” (NATO, 2010). It provided a comprehensive list of capabilities the Alliance aims to maintain and develop to counter new security environment threats. These threats are the proliferation of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons, terrorism, cyber attacks and fundamental environmental problems (NATO, 2010). On the other hand, NATO adopted a holistic approach to crisis management. This approach means envisaging NATO involvement at all stages of a crisis: “NATO will therefore engage, where possible and when necessary, to prevent crises, manage crises, stabilize post-conflict situations and support reconstruction” (NATO, 2010). Moreover, it set how NATO aims to promote international security (i.e., promoting stability) through cooperation. Reinforcing arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, emphasising NATO’s open door policy for all European countries, and enhancing its partnerships were described as means of cooperative security to maintain peace and stability. The principle of seeking security “at the lowest possible level of forces” (NATO 2010) by supporting arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation by supporting arms control was defined to provide cooperative security (i.e., promoting stability). “Partnership” is also a fundamental component of cooperative approach to security. It means engagement with non-NATO countries, as well as with other international organisations and actors.

Both NATO and the EU have developed dense networks of multilateral institutions that encourage the denationalization of security policy and that serve to preserve international peace and security. NATO and the EU promote liberal democracy in all parts of the world via various mechanisms as explained above. They promote the idea that security is better assured cooperatively among countries that have adopted the liberal democratic form of government. Interdependence, especially economic interdependence, is also key in this respect (NATO, 2006, p. 197-199). They show that liberal democratic values and a shared economic system permit much higher levels of cooperative security. The closer the interaction among states and their citizens, the more they will find ways to further their security cooperatively. Liberal democracy

may not be necessary for cooperative security to begin or to continue, but it expands the range of options and benefits for all (Mihalka, 2001, p. 65).

Although NATO is formally only a collective defense organization, the Alliance and its members provide individual security to their citizens, collective and cooperative security in the world, and have been very active in promoting stability outside the NATO area with a large number of cooperative programs and initiatives and crisis management operations, such as SFOR and KFOR.



3. THE CASES OF NATO AND EU ENGAGEMENT IN THE CONFLICTS IN BOSNIA AND KOSOVO

In the late 1980s, communist regimes in Eastern Europe began to dissolve and the collapse of the Soviet Union caused ethnic conflicts and security problems in the Balkans. The disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, the abolition of the iron curtain, and the break-up of Yugoslavia brought about significant changes in the structure of the Balkans (Simpson, 2016, p.75). Yugoslavia, which was the closest member of the socialist world to the West during the Cold War, began to disintegrate as of mid-1991 with the effect of its specific conditions and the 1989 Revolution. The biggest issues in international relations after the Cold War became the wars that broke out during the collapse of Yugoslavia. A balance was established with Yugoslavia's 1974 adopted constitution. When this balance began to collapse, it was inevitable that Yugoslavia would be torn apart. With the start of the disintegration process of Yugoslavia, the republics have declared their independence and as a result, a series of wars began until 1995.

3.1 The EU and the Conflict in Bosnia

The question why the EU and the EU's attempts to prevent the militarist-nationalist policies of Yugoslavia in the process of disintegration and Serbian aggression, is the most important question. The Allies initially adopted a cautious approach to the problems and conflicts in the region. Because there was no direct threat to them. They were not sure what the consequences would be if there was military intervention. To this end, NATO initially supported the UN, until the UN gave mandate for intervention which increased NATO's competence in the Bosnia War. Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), which declared its independence after the disintegration of Yugoslavia, was attacked by Serbs. Western Europe did not pay much attention to this situation. Because they saw this problem as the internal problem of Yugoslavia (Popovic, 2018, p.13).

Initially, the US remained indifferent to this conflict. When three US diplomats were killed in Bosnia, the US entered into conflict in 1995. A comprehensive NATO airstrike was launched. The international community preferred to solve the problem through peaceful means, but this was not accepted by Serbian military forces. In February 1994, NATO issued an ultimatum for Serb military forces and called for Serbs to withdraw their weapons or be released to UN control. Europe did not want the integrity of the country to break down in the years when Yugoslavia was falling apart. The reason behind this was to avoid creating a precedent for other ethnic-national societies for engaging in establishing their own national states and thus mobilizing a chain of conflicts and instability that would spread to Eastern Europe or even to the territory of the former USSR, and thus threaten Europe.



Figure 2: Bosnia -Herzegovina Political Map, Semercioğlu (2017, p.1339).

In the meantime, European states did not demonstrate a common foreign policy on whether or not to adopt the state's independence. The problems between France and Germany were also reflected to the conflicts in the Balkans. While Germany was open to the independence of the Croatian and

Slovene, France feared that in this way Germany would increase its influence both in the Balkans and Europe (Harnisch, 2018, p.2).

The fact that Germany declared its recognition of the independence of Croatia and Slovenia, which declared their independence on 1991, showed that the resolution of the Yugoslavian conflict reached an irreversible point and the EU showed a common foreign policy weakness (Lucarelli, 1997). The report of the Badinter Commission⁵⁶ was in favour of recognition of Slovenia but not Croatia, due to the minorities in the country (Radan, 1997), thus Germany's move to recognize the two countries was controversial. Internally, Germany responded to the public opinion which was in favour of recognition. Externally, Germany had the intention to display leadership in this issue and its weight in the EU has played a role behind this policy. Furthermore, Germany also anticipated a wave of immigrants fleeing from the war. On the other hand, the EU sought to back down in the process of disintegration of Yugoslavia, and preferred to deal with the problems through supporting other international organizations. NATO has also fulfilled this situation in Europe in the context of the UN's mandate and has been continuing its existence in Kosovo.

The European Union Force took over NATO's Stabilisation Force (SFOR), and launched EUFOR Operation ALTHEA in BiH on 2 December 2004, upon UN Security Council Resolution 1575, authorising the deployment of EUFOR in BiH. The operation mainly aimed at contributing to the maintenance of the safe and secure environment in BiH (EEAS, 2019). EUFOR is responsible for the implementation of the military provisions of the Dayton Peace Agreement (EEAS, 2019). It supports the promotion of "a climate in which the peace process can continue" in BiH (EEAS, 2019). The EUFOR has gradually transferred the responsibility for the execution of many tasks to "the local authorities according to the principle of 'local ownership' and in line with BiH's path towards EU membership", however, it "retains full responsibility and authority to re-take control, if the situation so requires" (EEAS, 2019). EUFOR also supports "combined and collective training

⁵⁶This commission drew the legal framework of the disintegration process, thereby making the European Community obliged to support this policy.

activities and exercises with the Armed Forces of BiH” (EEAS, 2019) to contribute to state-building in Bosnia. The EU’s military mission and its efforts in BiH can be regarded as carrying the characteristics of collective security and cooperative security, as it aims at contributing to international peace and it is conducted in cooperation with other countries.

The EU has also conducted a civilian crisis management operation in BiH (EUPM Bosnia), to support stabilization of the country and to contribute to the establishment of the rule of law since January 2003. This is also a mission which mainly functions to achieve state-building in Bosnia. However because it is a civilian crisis management operation it is not mentioned here in more detail. It would suffice to state here that this operation also carries the characteristics of cooperative security.

3.2 NATO and the Conflict in Bosnia

The collapse of Communism had given way to the rise of nationalism and ethnic violence, particularly in the former Yugoslavia. At first, NATO hesitated to intervene in what was perceived as a Yugoslav civil war. Later, the conflict came to be seen as a war of aggression and ethnic cleansing, and the Alliance decided to act. Initially, NATO offered its full support to UN efforts to end war crimes, including direct military action in the form of a naval embargo. Soon the enforcement of a no-fly zone led to airstrikes against heavy weapons violating UN resolutions. Finally, the Alliance carried out a nine-day air campaign in September 1995 that played a major role in ending the conflict. In December of that year, NATO deployed a UN-mandated, multinational force of 60000 soldiers to help implement the Dayton Peace Agreement and to create the conditions for a self-sustaining peace. This was named as NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) and it was followed by the NATO-led SFOR, which ended in December 2004 (NATO 2019). In 2004, NATO handed over this role to the European Union.

At first, the member states considered the problem as the internal problem of Yugoslavia as mentioned before. Despite increasing massacres and

pressures, the EC and the United States tried to resolve the issue by diplomatic means, but when this did not work, they realized that the only thing to do was to support the region by air-supported NATO intervention. The main objective of NATO's intervention in the region was to ensure that Yugoslavia was seated at the negotiating table and signed peace agreements (Demir, 2017, p.111). As Bosnia and Herzegovina became important for NATO, the Alliance started to participate in international efforts to stop the fighting in the former Yugoslavia. When violence broke out in 1991, the EC and then the UN headed the efforts to end the conflict and ensure peace and stability. NATO's first intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina failed to change the political realities in the region and led many analysts to question the Alliance's usefulness in the security environment of the post-Cold War era (McGoldrick, 2003, p.178). Because of such a great human disaster in an area called as NATO's backyard, many of the analysts found NATO's role in the Balkans worrying (McGoldrick, 2003, p.178). Both NATO supporters and opponents often kept saying that the Alliance would be out of work if it did not go out of its territorial space (McGoldrick, 2003, p.178).

In 1992, Bosnian War broke out after the collapse of Yugoslavia. As the situation worsened in the region, Bosnia and Herzegovina's airspace was closed with the decision of the UN Security Council on August 12, 1993. A number of economic and military embargo decisions on Yugoslavia were carried out through the sea with Sharp Guard Operation until June 1993-October 1996. The consequences of drilling these flight bans will be experienced very soon. Four Bosnian Serb aircraft were shot down by NATO on 28 February 1994 in the region, which was a flight ban. This was the first act of the organization in the war.

During the Bosnian War in 1994, the UN mandated a NATO bombing of Bosnian Serb military outpost in Gorajde. Immediately after this attack, 150 UN personnel were taken hostage on April 14th as retaliation. On April 16, British Sea Harrier was shot down by Serbs in the gorges of Gorajde. During

the Srebrenica massacre, a NATO intervention was launched against the Serbs. Then a two-week NATO bombing against the Serbs (Operation Stable Force) was launched.

NATO's intervention in Bosnia was conducted by the US, Turkey, Germany, France, Great Britain, Holland, Italy and Spain troops. The NATO intervention, which was military and political, forced the administration of the Bosnia Republika Srpska government to lift the siege of Sarajevo and withdraw the heavy weapons, quickly reached its goal. As a result of NATO's operation, Serbs stopped bombing the capital, Sarajevo, three years and four months after the war that began in 1992, and had to remove the city's siege.

In parallel with this NATO-led and partly land-based intervention, the Bosnian Army has taken action against the Serbian Army. In these operations, the Bosnia Republika Srpska Army suffered a large loss of land in central and northwestern parts of Bosnia. With the NATO attacks to Serb forces, the Serbs were persuaded to sit at the peace table. On 21 November 1995, the Dayton Peace Agreement, which silenced weapons in Bosnia was signed at Wright-Patterson Airbase in Dayton, Ohio, USA. It terminated the war between Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Croatia. The Yugoslav War ended after the signing of the Dayton Agreement on 14 December 1995, while the airstrikes continued. In the framework of the treaty, NATO directed the crisis management forces to the region. A NATO-led multinational force, called the Implementation Force (IFOR), started its mission on 20 December 1995. IFOR was given a one-year mandate (SFOR, n/a). NATO troops that was consist of 60000 soldiers and soldiers from countries not involved in the organization joined the operation. After a while, these forces were halved and transformed into small SFOR(Stability Force) troops of 32,000 soldiers. Since December 1996, SFOR conducted this mission. The region has transferred this security mission to the EU Force Althea in December 2004.

NATO's military intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina was not the last military intervention of the international community in the Balkans in the 1990s. The international community took its course in Bosnia, so NATO intervened early on Serbian forces that began massacres against Albanians in

Kosovo. As a result of early intervention, the massacres in Kosovo were prevented. The last storm in Kosovo, such as the Bosnian marketplace massacre, was the massacre of 45 civilians, including a 12 year old boy and a 99 year old man, in the Serbian village of Rachak on 15 January 1999. Following this massacre, the international community and NATO, which focused on Kosovo, launched an air campaign on 24 March 1999 against Serbs' attacks. This campaign lasted until June 10, 1999, the Serbian targets were shot (MacDonald, 2002, p.237).

By the end of the decade since its entry into force, the Dayton Peace Agreement has not yet been able to fully resolve the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the peace process has not yet become self-sustaining (Morgan-Jones , Loizides and Stefanovic, 2015). There are currently more than 7,000 troops in the country, and many of them have been deployed under the auspices of the EU since December 2004. International organizations continue to play an interventionist role in the political life of Bosnia, and often override the decisions of local officials (Chandler, 2000). Nevertheless, the Dayton Peace Agreement was able to end the most bloody conflict in Europe after the Second World War, which killed more than 100,000 people in the four years before its entry into force. It enabled Bosnians to rebuild their country and create a better future for them. Although it took a long time for the Alliance to provide the political consensus to intervene in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Alliance was once able to deal with the causes of the conflict, and to develop ways to end the violence and to create peace. (Borogovac, 2016, p.20.) In this way, this operation launched a new era for NATO in which it displays collective and cooperative security characteristics.

3.3 The EU and the Conflict in Kosovo

With the start of the disintegration process of Yugoslavia, the republics have declared their independence and as a result, a series of wars began until 1995. In fact, Kosovo was not given the status of republic during the establishment of Yugoslavia. When the Serb pressures on the Albanian

Muslims in Kosovo increased, the EU and the US, which had remained indifferent, decided to solve the conflict in the NATO axis.

During the initial phase of the Kosovo crisis, the EU was caught in an unprepared. The CFSP, which was in the process of establishment by the Maastricht Treaty, lacked conflict prevention and early warning mechanisms and the fact that there was no independent military power played an important role in the ineffectiveness of the EU (Kastrati, 2017, p.285). Moreover, EU members have not reached consensus on the means and methods needed to end conflicts in Yugoslavia. With the onset of the crisis, the EU has tried to develop a common foreign policy, but it has prevented member states to act individually because of their different historical proximity to the conflicting parties (Germany-Croatia, France-Serbia) (Pezo, 2016, p.74). The fact that the massacres in a region, which can be described as a backyard for the EU, could not be prevented, caused the EU to lose its reputation. The EU has seen that an instability in the Eastern Europe also affects its own stability because of the refugees, increased arms and human trafficking (due to the inability to control existing borders).

The EU has shown an increasingly active approach to conflicts in Kosovo and Macedonia after Bosnia. The EU, which has delayed the option to use a military force to stop conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina, raised the threat of using a decisive force on Kosovo much earlier (Batakovic, 2018, p.105). The reason for the EU's approach is that the Kosovo issue is primarily related to Albania and Macedonia, and then to almost all countries in the region (Timmer and Senden, 2016, p.124).

Since 2008, the International Civilian Office Management (COM) has started to serve in Kosovo, where the audit has been transferred to the EU. The aim of COM is to determine the status of Kosovo and to contribute to the European integration. International Civilian Representative and EU Special Representative in Kosovo Pieter Feith defines the main function of COM as supporting Kosovo's supervised independence (Hoti & Gërguri, 2015, p.30).

The EU has set a plan to compensate for the failure of the Bosnia-Herzegovina problem. According to Kosovo plan, it is envisaged that the country will be supported by the EU on political, economic and social issues. In this way, it can be said that principles of cooperative security concept are using in this region. The rule of law, democracy and social reforms aim to protect and develop the values of the EU. Thus, Kosovo is expected to be an EU member if it meets meeting the relevant criteria. However, to date there has been no common stance in Kosovo within the EU. According to the Lisbon Treaty, a country must be accepted by all member states to enter the EU. Nevertheless, EU members such as Spain, Greece, Cyprus, Slovakia and Romania, who do not recognize Kosovo, are worried about triggering ethnic problems within themselves. This situation prevents the EU from pursuing a common foreign policy on Kosovo.

At least Serbia's membership in the EU also causes controversy over the Kosovo issue. Many high-level EU officials point out that Serbia's EU membership is linked to addressing its problems with Kosovo. Serbia should improve relations with Kosovo to become a member of the EU and that good neighbourly relations are one of the requirements of the Hague Convention (Vachudova, 2014, p.128).

The EU has a rule of law mission in Kosovo, the EULEX Kosovo, which was launched in 2008 as the largest civilian mission under the CFSP (EULEX Kosovo, n/a). EULEX assists “the Kosovo authorities in establishing sustainable and independent rule of law institutions” (EULEX Kosovo, n/a). EULEX works under the framework of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (EULEX Kosovo, n/a). EULEX Mission aims at achieving the rule of law in Kosovo based on the principles of “effectiveness, sustainability, multi-ethnicity and accountability”, and being “free from political interference and in full compliance with EU best practices” (EULEX Kosovo, n/a). The EULEX performs “monitoring activities” and “has limited executive functions” and it

supports the Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor's Office in line with relevant Kosovo legislation (EULEX Kosovo, n/a).

3.4 NATO and the Conflict in Kosovo

In 1999, NATO troops intervened in Kosovo and began to soften the environment. This was one of the events that were influential in NATO's search for a new concept which mentioned in the second chapter of this thesis. Since the international community has dealt with the Kosovo problem as the internal problem of Yugoslavia, the issue has not been on the agenda of international organizations and global powers for some time (Radovanović et.al., 2017, p.146). NATO's passive stay during the Bosnian war has led countries to think of NATO's intervention in Kosovo, and they have agreed to solve the problem in the NATO axis because they have no other choice.

In the aftermath of the Cold War, it has done many works in the sense of expanding the NATO concept and has decided to continue its expansion towards Eastern Europe. NATO, which declared its establishment as a collective defense organization, conducted operations for the interests of the member states in the light of principles such as humanitarian intervention and democratization within the framework of the UN under the direction of the US. (Keohane, 2009, p. 127). The most important one of these operations was the 1999 Kosovo War, and NATO conducted effective airstrikes against the region. NATO was founded by Western European countries against the threat of communism, and after the post-Cold War, it was directed its efforts to Eastern Europe to protect its existence. The Kosovo War was a clear indication of these efforts.

Intervention in Kosovo has been delayed for many reasons, such as the different perception of the Kosovo problem in every country in Europe, the priorities of the EU and the US, the territorial integrity of the Yugoslavia federation and the different interests and relations of each country in the Balkans. With the support of Russia and China, Milosevic continued its military operations. For this reason, the idea of intervening to provide peace

and security was accepted by the international community. NATO Kosovo operation began in 1999. Initially this operation was planned for 10 days, but lasted for 78 days as a result of Milosevic's resistance (Karcic, 2018, p.493).

By the end of 1998, over 300000 Kosovar Albanians had fled their homes during conflict between Albanians in Kosovo and Serbian military and police. Following the failure of intense international efforts to resolve the crisis, the Alliance conducted air strikes for 78 days and flew 38000 sorties with the goal of allowing a multinational peacekeeping force to enter Kosovo and cease ethnic cleansing in the region. On 4 June 1999, NATO suspended its air campaign after confirming that a withdrawal of the Serbian army from Kosovo had begun, and the deployment of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) followed shortly thereafter. Today, KFOR troops are still deployed in Kosovo to help maintain a safe and secure environment and freedom of movement for all citizens, irrespective of their ethnic origin.

The deepening of the problems between the Kosovo Albanians and the Serbs in the past has motivated Serbs to the massacres that started in this region. As a matter of fact, in 1999, NATO launched its air-assisted intervention in the region, based on the above-mentioned reasons. The massacres and ethnic cleansing of Serbs against Albanians in Kosovo has prevented by NATO. This operation of NATO was a first in many respects on its own initiative, for the first time in nearly 50 years and without relying on a decision of the UN, took a military intervention in the territory of an independent state for humanitarian purposes (Latawski and Smith, 2018, p.12).

The US and its European Allies has had different views on the crisis in Kosovo. Some Allies support the independence of Kosovo and some do not. Actually it was thought that if Kosovo declares its independence and recognized by other countries, it will give rise to the demands of other minorities in Europe (Spain and Southern Cyprus, for example do not support independence), and will lead to the re-emergence of problems based on ethnic basis. On the other hand, Russia's approach to the independence of Kosovo is

entirely pro-Serbian. Russia opposes the independence of Kosovo and supported the Serbia about to give autonomy to Kosovo. Undoubtedly, the recognition of the independence of Kosovo, caused new security concerns based on ethnicity in Eastern Europe, the Balkans and the South Caucasus. NATO's view of these new possible developments will be an important test to determine how successful the new concept (cooperative security concept).

NATO's KFOR can be regarded as a mission which not only helps stabilization in Kosovo, but also helps the preservation of international peace and security. Thus, it can, again be regarded as a mission which carries the characteristics of collective and cooperative. In this regard this supports the argument of this thesis that although NATO remains mainly as a collective defence organization it has gradually acquired collective and cooperative security characteristics as well.

3.5 Conclusions for EU and NATO Responses to the two Conflicts

During the Bosnian and Kosovo Wars in the 1990s, the main challenge for the international community was how to intervene and the timing of the intervention. International organizations such as the EU, UN and NATO all aimed to prevent the conflicts before they transformed into a war. The failure in preventing war in Bosnia has led NATO and the EU to become more serious and decisive for preventing war in the Kosovo conflict. The European Community remained far from taking a serious decision on Bosnia and Herzegovina and NATO intervention came rather late. Initially NATO had a tendency to remain outside the Bosnian conflict as well.

As collective defence organization, NATO was succesful in military intervention in both conflicts, although in the Bosnian case this intervention was rather late. It also pursued policies which carried the characteristics of collective and cooperative security in these two conflicts.

The most comprehensive Balkan policy launched by the EU in the region following the NATO bombardment in Kosovo was called Stabilization

and Association Process⁵⁷. It was a long-term policy that was about economic, human resources and political efforts. The process was launched on a basis where the Western Balkan countries would have the opportunity to integrate with the EU. Each country would be assessed according to their own situation in this process. (Ayhan, 2008, p.120). The process consists of four stages. The first phase is the signing of the Stabilization and Participation Agreement. The second phase is the negotiations and completion of the Stabilization and Participation Agreement. The third stage is to facilitate the completion of the Treaty with EU financial support. The final stage is the signing of the Stabilization and Association Agreement and the beginning of the EU accession process (Acar, 2015, p.117). This carried the characteristics of support for the maintenance of stability and security in the region, also helping state-building and development of good governance. These can also be regarded as cooperative security efforts.

Cooperative security concept has been increasingly adopted as a mechanism for furthering international security. The EU supports the idea that common values and a common economic destiny leads to a more cooperative security environment. The more dense the interaction among states and their citizens, the more they will find ways to further their security cooperatively. The Bosnian and Kosovo Wars showed that traditional concepts have proved inadequate to deal with security issues. The nature of new security challenges and historical failures have lead to the increasing use of collective and cooperative security instruments in all international institutional platforms, especially in NATO and the EU.

⁵⁷ The Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) between Kosovo and the EU was signed in October 2015 and entered into force in April 2016. By signing this Agreement Kosovo, for the first time, entered into a contractual agreement with the EU (EU-KOSOVO SAPC, 2018).

CONCLUSION

This study has aimed at evaluating the security approaches of NATO and the EU according to lessons taken from the cases of Bosnia and Kosovo. The objective has been to find out whether their security approaches got transformed and became similar to each other after the Cold War. The major argument of this thesis has been that although NATO is still a collective defence organization, it has increasingly engaged in collective and cooperative security activities whereas the EU, which mainly pursued and prioritized cooperative security has increasingly gained collective security and collective defence characteristics.

For this purpose, in the first chapter, the conceptual framework has been formed. This part has focused on collective defence, collective security, and cooperative security as the major concepts to define the security approaches and roles of NATO and the EU. For this purpose, firstly, various definitions of security have been examined. Security concepts have been briefly defined. The chapter has also explained the transformation and the evolution of the international system and conception of security in Europe as defined and applied by NATO and the EU. It has provided an intensive literature review for understanding the security concepts.

The second chapter has provided a historical overview of NATO and the EU security transformations. A comparative analysis of the transformations of organizations has been made. The official texts, declarations and documents of NATO and the EU were analysed to prove the arguments of this thesis.

Finally, in the last chapter, an analysis of the EU and NATO response to the Bosnian and Kosovo Wars have been made to understand their effect on the transformation processes of NATO and EU. Also, differences between NATO and the EU in terms of their security understandings and their consequent responses towards the crises were examined.

The conclusion reached is that the European Union (EU) has so far developed a sui generis security institutionalization, prioritizing cooperative

security but creating collective defence characteristics, as well, whereas NATO still remains as a collective defence organization, which sometimes performs collective and cooperative security functions. However, both organizations aim to bring stability and prosperity to the world and especially to the area around them.

This thesis have mainly been conducted through a review of primary sources (i.e. official documents of the EU and NATO) and an extensive literature review on the conception of security and the transformations of NATO and the EU. Based on the findings of this thesis, it can be argued that for a better understanding of security transformation of NATO and EU, face to face interviews with officers who serve in the NATO HQ can be added to the research process in future studies.

After the Cold War, the bipolar international system was replaced by a multipolar international system. The multipolar international system's dominant economic and political ideology was liberalism. During the post-Cold War era, structures and values of liberalism have affected the rest of the world. With the developing technology the political and economic liberalism implications commenced a transformation between the structures of the countries. As a consequence of these changes; the states' perceptions of security and threat were also changed. Therefore, evolution of this change was observed in the security concepts, which are directly related to security and threat perceptions of the states.

First changes were observed in the traditional security concepts. They have broadened from the military dimension to economic, social, human, environmental and others. These alternative security dimensions were mainly caused by liberalism and globalization. New economic and political approaches of the countries affected their security and threat perceptions. Thus, the national security was no longer focusing only on the state. In this new international system, there was no other bloc to identify under the concept of enemy. Accordingly, national security's focus shifted towards non-military threats in the West. Nevertheless, military conflicts which had the potential to

negatively affect regional and world security have also endured especially in the Balkans.

The conflict between Bosnia and Herzegovina is called the greatest disaster after Second World War. Thousands of people died and thousands became refugees in the war. During the events that began with the disintegration process of Yugoslavia, firstly, Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence, followed by Bosnia and Herzegovina. The disintegration process of Yugoslavia, which has many ethnic identities, became very painful. Over time, conflicts that have turned into Serbian ethnic cleansing and have deeply affected the Croatian and Muslim people in the region. At first, the international community has tried peaceful ways to solve the problem but could not be successful. The EU, which described this matter as the internal issue of Yugoslavia, was not involved to the conflict at the beginning. Finally, NATO did not remain silent to the massacre in the heart of Europe and conducted military operations to establish peace again in the Balkans.

Since its founding in 1949, the transatlantic Alliance's flexibility, embedded in its original Treaty, has allowed it to suit the different challenges of different times. In the 1950s, the Alliance was a purely collective defence organisation. In the 1960s, NATO became a political instrument for détente. In the 1990s, the Alliance was a tool for the stabilisation of Eastern Europe and Central Asia through the incorporation of new Partners and Allies, as a collective security organization. In the first half of the 21st century, NATO and international community faces an ever-growing number of new threats. As the representative of transatlantic peace and freedom, NATO understood that it is not possible to fight against these new threats alone. Therefore, new security concept that is called cooperative security, has formed to provide peaceful security environment. Means and ways of cooperative security concept that are more effective to prevent conflicts are mentioned in the 2010 Strategic Concept of NATO. But, it cannot be said that NATO has completely transformed to cooperative security organization. When we think of the Russian military operations in the backyard of NATO and the EU, collective defence are still the first priority of NATO. In addition, collective defence takes part in the North

Atlantic Treaty (Art.5) and in the official texts of NATO, especially in 2010 Strategic Concept (current strategic concept) which mentioned in the third chapter of my thesis. NATO is still collective defence organization, but it was seen that it also employs other security tools to prevent conflicts, especially the cooperative security mechanisms. NATO also uses the principles of collective security concept to solve the problems just like a forum.

When the performance of the EU during the Balkan conflicts in line are examined, it can be seen that the EU has a sui generis approach to security. Because of the military capability gap and other reasons which were mentioned in the second chapter of this thesis, it can not be said that the EU has acquired full-fledged collective defence characteristics. Rather, the EU has worked for improving the capability of collective security measures, such as diplomatic and economic measures. It has especially tried to provide this by strengthening its unity. It can be said that it was successful, but not wholly. Moreover, in the context of crisis management, it has tried to use cooperative security measures for preventing conflicts.

The EU displays the characteristics of a mixture of all these security concepts – collective defence, collective security and cooperative security. It is a sui generis organization with a unique conception and institutionalization in security terms. But NATO is a full-fledged collective defence organization, which is more efficient than the EU about military crisis management (i.e. collective security), but sometimes it also uses tools for cooperative security. On the other hand, EU is more successful in peace/state-building operations, conducting mostly civilian crisis management rather than peace-making operations (i.e. it pursues civilian aspects of collective security and cooperative security).

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