

**DEMOGRAPHIC AND ETHNIC CHARACTERISTICS OF CENTRAL ASIA AND
THEIR FUTURE IMPACTS ON THE SOCIAL, ECONOMICAL AND POLITICAL
ASPECTS OF THE REGION**

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ABSTRACT

**DEMOGRAPHIC AND ETHNIC CHARACTERISTICS OF CENTRAL ASIA
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Supervisor of the study: Prof. Dr. Sunday Uner

“Demographic and Ethnic Characteristics of Central Asia and Their Future Impacts On Social, Economical and Political Aspects of the Region” is a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Ph.D. of Social and Economic Demography to Institute of Population Studies, Hacettepe University.

The objective of the study is to analyze the demographic and ethnic composition of the Central Asia in close connection with its geographical, historical, cultural, social and economic aspects, to describe these factors from a historical perspective, to give a detailed picture of the present day Central Asia in regard to its demographic, ethnic, economic, and social aspects and finally, to analyse the impacts of the Regions demographic characteristics on its future developments

The general approach of the methodology of the study is inductive, holistic, descriptive and analytic.

As can be seen from the Table of Contents of the Study, first of all the Region have been described by historical, cultural, geographical and climatic means. Then a brief history of the Region, including some of its anthropological aspects, up to Russian-Soviet period is presented, since they are the early roots of the present situation and developments which are taking shape in the Region.

Central Asia during the Russian-Soviet period has been analysed in detail, since this period highly influenced, even determined the present-day situation of the republics of the Central Asia.

A special importance has been given to the demographic and ethnic structures of Central Asian republics after their independence. Almost all of the most updated data is presented for every republic and for the sake of comparison, summary tables which includes Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan is disposed, including their analytical wording. Also related data of Turkey and the world is presented in order to make healthy comparisons and to show the demographic development levels of the Central Asian republics.

Relations between Central Asian republics and Turkey after independence has been introduced briefly in order to show the future role of Turkey in the Region. Finally, present and future impacts of Demographic and Ethnic structures on social, economic, and geo-political aspects of the Region has been discussed.

Here I want to emphasize the special situation of Republic of Azerbaijan, a turkic republic which has many anthropologic, linguistic and ethnic similarities with Turkey and Central Asian republics. Azerbaijanians migrated from Central Asia to their present homeland around 11th Century. From that time on, their historical, social and economic developments has been grown much differently than Central Asia, mainly because of their integration to Trans-Caucasian Region. That's why Azerbaijan, although it is a turkic republic, excluded from this study, but relevant demographic data about Azerbaijan have been presented in the main tables for comparison and additional information. Also, some detailed demographic data of Azerbaijan, without comments, is presented in the *Appendix*.

A special survey for data collection regarding the study has not been conducted because of the geographical, political and financial reasons. Instead, a very detailed and extensive literature reading has been done, totalling almost 45 000 pages of books,

articles, periodicals and URL (Uniform Resource Locator) documents. All these documents which were utilized during the study are presented in the *Bibliography*.

The demographical data of Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan regarding the post-independence period are considered to be "exclusive" by the official authorities of these republics. I obtained these data from the state bodies of these republics through "friendly relations", which is formed by very intensive and trustworthy relations between them and myself since two decades. As a consequence, the demographical data presented in this study for the post-independence period of these republics are "unique" in the world literature. We hope that these data which is directly translated from Russian to English from the exclusive official documents will be fruitful for the future studies of other demographers which are interested with the Region.

Also I believe that, my studies and direct observations in the Region which lasted almost 20 years, contributed a lot to this study.

The findings and conclusion of the study can be summarized as follows;

1. From 2nd century B.C. to 15th century A.D., Central Asia played a determining role in the world history. Nomadic empires of Central Asia changed the path of history by their raids to Europe, Middle East, India and Russia. During this period the mode of production in Central Asia can be defined as "nomadic pastoralism". Sedentary civilisations could only be found in the "oasis region" of Central Asia.

Nomadic raids from Central Asia came to an end in the 15th century. Especially in the "Timurides period" Central Asia lived through its golden age. Samarkand, Bukhara, Khiva became the scientific and artistic centers of the World. Discovery of naval trade routes marked the end of this period by shifting emphasis away from traditional trade routes such as the silk-road and spice-road which had been supplying great material wealth to the region. Also, wide use of fire arms ended the supremacy of the nomadic cavalry which had been the main military advantage of the nomadic empires.

From the 16th century to the Russian invasion which took place in the late 19th century, Central Asia lost its significance in world affairs. Poverty and religious fundamentalism were the main characteristics prevailing in the region during this period. Tsarist Russia saw the region as a source of raw materials, and especially cotton. No visible major changes in the economic or social life of the region could be perceived during this period.

After the "Great October Revolution" Central Asia, which up to that time was known as "Turkestan" was divided artificially by the Soviets into different republics. Soviets also spent great efforts to reidentify – Russify the people of the region, but could not accomplish their aim. Soviets also considered the Region as a source of raw materials to supply the industrialized parts of the USSR. During the Soviet period, the region suffered great ecological disasters for the sake of fulfilling the "plan targets" that were drawn up directly by Moscow. In spite of all the adverse developments, we must admit in all fairness that during the Soviet period in Central Asia, many positive changes also took place in the spheres of industry, education, health-care, transport, etc.

2. We do not have any data regarding the population of Central Asia before the end of the 19th Century. There are only some assumptions based on the social and technological levels of the Central Asian societies for different periods, and, different kinds of mode of production.

The first census was held in the Region by the tsarist Russia on 1897. Second census was held by the Soviets on 1926, which is followed by the regular censuses until 1989. After 1991, the year of independence of Central Asian republics, demographical data collection in the Region, to an extent, lost its routine and standardization, because of the different standards and needs of each republic, and further, because of lack of specialists, know-how and money.

3. Starting from the Russian invasion in late 19th Century, the ethnic structure of Central Asia dramatically altered by the immigration of the Slavic population. This

immigration accelerated after the ``Great October Revolution``, and, after the second world war reached the peak. As a consequence of this enormous immigration, in mid-1970's, more than half of the population of Kazakhstan consisted of non-indigenous population, while Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan also had a considerable proportion of Slavic population.

Besides Russians, Tatars, Germans, Jews and Koreans also immigrated, or in more proper words, forced to immigrate to the Region starting from 1941, which increased the proportion of non-indigenous population in the Region

4. The demographic aspects of the Region changed fundamentally starting from 1920's: Despite the demographic catastrophes (genocides) caused by Stalin's ``ideological cleanisation``, collectivisation campaigns that was held in 1930's in Kazakhstan, and the second world war, we observe a steady population growth in the Region for the period 1926-1945. But the main ``population boom`` is observed in the Region after this period. In Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan throughout the 1960's and 1970's, the total population grew at least three times faster than they had during the previous two decades. Similar patterns of overall population growth were witnessed to a lesser degree, in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.

During the same period, life expectancies at birth increased, infant and child mortality rates decreased significantly. Also health services and the status of women in the society improved.

5. Since the non-indigenous population of Central Asian republics already passed the period of ``demographic transition``, and hence, having low population growth rates for the same period, we can easily observe that the ``population boom`` witnessed in Central Asian republics for this period stemmed from the very high fertility rates of the indigenous population.

During this period indigenous people of Central Asia preserved their traditional big families, married earlier, and attained very high fertility rates, which, is also encouraged by the state policies.

6. Total Fertility Rates of the indigenous population of the Central Asian republics tend to decrease starting from the mid-1970's. Also women's age at first marriage has been reached the low limit of what is demographically termed the "European marriage pattern", especially in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Although this modernisation patterns are observed in all Central Asian republics, it is expected that the "demographic momentum", affected by still high fertility rates and the young age structure of the population, which is a consequence of the very high fertility rates of the recent past, will continue in the coming decades. This is especially true for the southern republics of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan

7. Uzbekistan is the most populous republic in Central Asia and its population density exceeds both the world and low and medium income level countries' (LMIC) average. Although Kazakhstan has the second largest population, due to its vast territory, the population density is very low. Kyrgyzstan stands in the mid-way. In this respect, a special importance must be paid to Turkmenistan. Turkmenistan's population and population density is rather low, but since the large part of the country consists of deserts, the population density is very high in the rare oasis zones of the country, scattered through Amu-Darya river.

Infant mortality rates of Central Asian republics increased after the independence in accordance with the deteriorating economic and social spheres, and became considerably higher than the world and LMIC averages. The highest rate is observed in Turkmenistan, the poorest and socially least developed country among Central Asian republics.

Life expectancy at birth of males also decreased after the independence, and became lower than the world and LMIC averages. For females life expectancy at birth is almost at the same level with LMIC countries.. Again, Turkmenistan has the lowest life expectancy for both males and females, because of the reasons stated for the high infant mortality rate of this republic.

Percentage of urban population of Central Asian republics are lower than the world average, except Kazakhstan. But we must note that the urban population of Kazakhstan, to a great extent consists of Slavic population, and, rural population is almost completely of titular nationality. In Turkmenistan, the big majority of the urban population is living in the only big city of the republic, Ashgabad city.

8. The annual population growth rate of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are around null as of 1996. This is due to the continuing emigration of the non-indigenous population from these republics. The emigration of Slavic nationalities from these republics slowed down since mid-1990's. As a consequence we might expect that in the coming decade the population growth will increase and the percentage of the titular nationalities will rise in these republics due to the still high fertility rate among the same.

In Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan the annual population growth rate is above 2 percent annually for 1996, in spite of the continuing emigration of non-indigenous population from these republics.

9. Age dependency ratio is considerably high in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan due to the excess population in 0-15 age group, which is a natural consequence of high fertility rates. In Kazakhstan this ratio is rather low, because of the high percentage of Slavic population in the republic.

These high age dependency ratios are creating serious burdens on the already deteriorated economies of Central Asian republics.

Also marriage rates are declining and the divorce rates are growing in Central Asian republics in the recent years, because of the worsening economic and social conditions.

10. In sum, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, with their high fertility rates, large families, desire to have more children, high age dependency ratios, high percentage of rural populations and high infant mortality rates, demonstrating a typical profile of a third-world country which is experiencing "Demographic Transition", However, in

However, in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, starting from the mid-1970's fertility began to decline and did not reverse. We might assume that these two republics already passed to the "second stage of demographic transition" which is characterized by the slight but steady decline of the fertility rates. The population boom in these two republics will continue in the coming decades, because of the still high fertility rates and the age structure of the population created by the very high fertility rates of the recent past.

The indigenous populations of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan demonstrates similar patterns, although more moderate, with their neighbours. This similarity is much more obvious in the rural areas and in the southern regions, where indigenous population consists the large majority. Today the population growth rate of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan is null, because of the high emigration. But since the emigration is losing its importance in the recent years, we might expect that the annual population growth rates of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan will rise in the coming years due to the high fertility among the indigenous population. This is especially true for Kyrgyzstan, where fertility rates are higher and the percentage of non-indigenous population already dropped to a mere 15 percent.

11. The immigration of Slavic population to Central Asia came to an end in mid-1970's, and, reversed starting from the end of the same decade. The emigration of the non-indigenous population from the Region continued in the 1980's, and after the independence, reached the peak. Although the emigration pattern slowed down after 1995, it is still continuing in the the present day. The main reason of this huge emigration is the different ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious legacies of the European population living in Central Asia, which, could not accomplish social-identification with the existing cultures of the titular nationalities. Today, almost all the Germans and Jews left the Region, and the only reason of the slower rate of emigration of Russians after 1995 is the deteriorating economic and social conditions in Russia, Ukraina and Belorussia. As a consequence of this emigrations -and due to the high population growth of the indigenous population, in 1997, for the first time in their history the Kazakhs became majority in

their republics. Also, the Slavic population decreased to 15 % of the population in Kyrgyzstan, and, to less than 10 % in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.

12. One might come to the conclusion that the huge emigration of the non-indigenous population from the Region is beneficiary for the Central Asian republics, hence, as a result of this outflow, the ethnic structure of these republics will become more homogenous, and, in the long run the ethnic problem will be solved. But the emigrating European population is the most well-educated, urbanised, skilled labour-force of Central Asia and the mass-scale emigration of these, creates a serious burden on the economies of the Central Asian republics.

13. In spite of the worse-case scenarios that were mentioned in many of the studies regarding the region, today, Central Asia seems to have attained social stability, at least for the near future. To attain long-run stability, to overcome the problems that have accumulated through centuries and also to satisfy the growing needs of its fast-growing young population, Central Asia must sustain a steady economic growth. Without the inflow of foreign means of production it seems almost impossible to achieve this goal. Today the inflow of foreign capital, technology and know-how to Central Asian republics is still not sufficient to attain a steady economic growth. The economic, social and psychological conditions that these countries inherited from the Soviet period also play a negative role. We regret to say that their legacy which is displayed by lack of democratic institutions, corruption, excessive bureaucracy, lack of entrepreneurship, violation of human rights, etc. is still going on at full speed in these republics. All these negative phenomena, together with the concern over the long-term stability of the region limit the inflow of foreign investments to the region.

14. If the Central Asian republics can not achieve a steady economic growth in the long-run, the most probable future scenario for the Region is the ethnic conflicts between Kazakhs and Russians in Kazakhstan, which, inevitably will spread to Kyrgyzstan, and severe social and political turmoils in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, due to the growing

influence of any radical ideology- i.e. fundamental islam, on the young, unemployed masses of youth, formed by the high population growth in these republics.

The creation of independent states in the region, with viable economies and stable political systems is still a distant ideal. There are modest opportunities for constructive involvement by outside powers to facilitate trade and flow of technology, promote educational development, and attend to some of the ecological disasters in the region. But should conflicts within the region grow, as seems likely, outsiders' temptation to intervene is likely to be great, with destructive and unpredictable consequences.

• Perhaps it is too much to hope that the new political leaders in these states realize that independence depends upon their capacity to reduce ethnic conflicts within their borders, avoid quarrels with their neighbours over disputed territories, and establish cooperative economic and political relations with one another and with their neighbours. Should they fail to do so, they will not only jeopardize the independence of their own states, but they will also increase the possibility of wider regional conflicts.

The most effective way to influence the events in a positive way in the Region is to establish strong, continuous economic presence of the developed nations which can be able to make large scale investments, to transfer the finance and technology to the Region which can solve the growing economic bottle-necks. Republic of Turkey established very fruitful economic, political and cultural ties with the Region since their independence, albeit some mistakes done in the initial period. Also Turkish companies completed many medium and large scale projects in the Region, and thousands of small scale Turkish companies are active today especially in the service sectors of these republics. Thus, Turkish companies accumulated a great experience and know-how in the Region, which is also backed by the cultural and historical similarities between Turkey and the Region. Turkey must utilize this great advantage by establishing economic cooperation with the developed countries which has the capital and high-technology, through joint-ventures and other joint investments, which is urgently needed in the Region. In this case, Turkey will contribute a lot to the general economic re-building, thus, political stability of the

Central Asia. However, Western firms require stable governments before they will consider doing business in these countries, and none of the current regimes in Central Asia is likely to prove sufficiently stable in the long run.

Central Asia, not for the first time in its long history, is in flux. The forces for and against stability are evenly balanced. If the economic situation begins to improve and confidence returns, it is likely that the republics will consolidate their independence and achieve a high level of prosperity. If, however, the tensions within society are heightened, the region could descend into internecine civil strife, as in Tajikistan. The situation is complicated by the fact that it is not merely domestic events but also the influence of external forces that will determine the outcome.



PREFACE

“Demographic and Ethnic Characteristics of Central Asia and Their Future Impacts On Social, Economical and Political Aspects of the Region” is a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Ph.D. of Social and Economic Demography to Institute of Population Studies, Hacettepe University.

The aim of the study is to analyze the geographical, historical, cultural and economic aspects of the Central Asia in close connection with its demographic and ethnic composition, to describe the factors from a historical perspective, to give a detailed picture of the present day Central Asia in regard to its demographic, ethnic, economic, and social aspects and finally, to analyse the impacts of the Regions demographic characteristics on its future developments.

A special survey for data collection regarding the study has not been conducted because of the geographical, political and financial difficulties. Instead, a very detailed and intensive literature reading has been done. Most of the literature regarding the demographical aspects of the Region is in English language. Also there is a rich collection of studies which presents valuable economic, social and demographic data about the Region in Russian language. Since the author is fluent in Russian, these data has been fully utilized during the study. In addition to the above mentioned, the author paid a special visit to the Region on April 1998, and collected the most recent studies of the local scientists, and “exclusive” official demographical data regarding the subject. Therefore, some of the data presented in this study is “unique” in the world demographic literature.

The historical, geographical, anthropological and political aspects of the Region is also analysed in close connection with the demographical structure of the Region. The main aim of this detailed analyse is to provide the reader a full picture of the Central Asia, in an holistic and intertextual approach, since without this background one can not fully

understand the future impacts of the demographic aspects on the political, economic and social spheres of the Region.

Corresponding demographical data of Turkey is presented together with the demographical data of Central Asia for the sake of comparison. Also relations between Republic of Turkey and Central Asian republics have been introduced briefly, since Turkey is expected to play a very important role in the future socio-economic stability of the Region.

I believe that my experience, which I accumulated in the Region since 20 years, contributed a lot to this study. I hope that this study will be useful for the further studies of the demographers who are interested with the Region.



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Finally, I would like to gratefully acknowledge the help I have received from many others whose names have not been mentioned here.

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Central Asia

Kazakhstan

Uzbekistan

Kyrgyzstan

Turkmenistan

Tajikistan


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Kazakhstan


Russia


600 km
600 miles



Uzbekistan

300 km
300 miles





CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A. OBJECTIVES, METHODOLOGY, LITERATURE & DATA OF THE STUDY

The objective of the study is to analyze the geographical, historical, cultural, social and economic aspects of the Central Asia in close connection with its demographic and ethnic composition, to describe the factors from a historical perspective, to give a detailed picture of the present day Central Asia in regard to its demographic, ethnic, economic, and social aspects and finally, to analyse the impacts of the Regions demographic characteristics on its future developments

The general approach of the methodology of the Study will be inductive, holistic, descriptive and analytic.

As can be seen from the Table of Contents of the Study, first of all the Region will be described by historical, cultural, geographical and climatic means. Then a brief history of the Region, including some of its anthropological aspects, up to Russian-Soviet period shall be presented, since they are the early roots of the present situation and developments which are taking shape in the Region.

Central Asia during the Russian-Soviet period will be analysed in details, since this period highly influenced , even determined the present-day situation of the republics of the Central Asia.

A special importance shall be given to the demographic and ethnic structures of Central Asian republics after their independence. Almost all of the most updated data shall be presented for every republic and for the sake of comparison, summary tables which includes Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan shall be disposed, including their analytical wording. Also related data of Turkey and the world should be presented in order to make healthy comparisons and to show the demographic development level of the Central Asian republics.

Relations between Central Asian republics and Turkey after independence shall be introduced briefly in order to show the future role of Turkey in the Region.

Finally, present and future impacts of demographic and ethnic structures on social, economic, and geo-political aspects of the Region shall be discussed.

Here I want to emphasize the special situation of Republic of Azerbaijan, a turkic republic which has many anthropologic, linguistic and ethnic similarities with Turkey and Central Asian republics. Azerbaijanians migrated from Central Asia to their present homeland around 11th Century. From that time on, their historical, social and economic developments has shifted to a completely different path, mainly because of their integration to Trans-Caucasian Region. That's why Azerbaijan, although it is a turkic republic, excluded from this study, but relevant demographic data about Azerbaijan shall be presented in the main tables for comparison and additional information. Also, some detailed Demographic data of Azerbaijan, without comments, shall be presented in the Appendices.

A special survey for data collection regarding the study has not been conducted because of the geographical, political and financial reasons. Instead, a very detailed and extensive literature reading has been done, totalling almost 40 000 pages of books, articles, periodicals and URL documents. All these documents which were utilized during the study are presented in the *Bibliography*.

Here I must underline that there is a literature boom regarding the social, economic and demographic aspects of the Central Asia, which started in the late 1980's and accelerated after 1992. Regret to inform that the contribution of Turkish social scientists to this literature boom, at least up to today, is almost null, except some sufficient studies regarding the early history of the Central Asia, which were published in 1950's, and 1970's. Most of the literature regarding the present aspects of the Region is in English language. Also there is a rich collection of studies, which presents valuable economic, social and demographic data about the Region in Russian language. Since Osman Aray is fluent in Russian, these data were fully utilized during the study.

The demographical data of Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan regarding the post-independence period are considered to be "exclusive" by the official authorities of these republics. We obtained these data from the state bodies of these republics through "friendly relations", which is formed by very intensive and trustworthy relations between them and ourselves since two decades. As a consequence, the demographical data presented in this study for the post-independence period of these republics are "unique" in the world literature. We hope that these data which is directly translated from Russian to English from the exclusive official documents will be fruitful for the future studies of other demographers which are interested with the Region.

Also I believe that, my presence , studies and direct observations in the Region which lasted almost 20 years, contributed a lot to this study.

B. HISTORICAL, CULTURAL & GEOGRAPHICAL ASPECTS OF CENTRAL ASIA & ASUMPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

1. Historical and Cultural Concept of Central Asia

Central Asia as presented in this volume, is a cultural rather than a geographical concept. Man's subjugation of wild animals to his own use has been one of the most significant factors in human civilization. We now know that the wild horse was first domesticated on the steppes of Central Asia, and it was from this region that the "horse-culture" - the use of horse for driving and later for riding - gradually spread to other parts of the world. (Sinor, 1990, p. 8)

Central Asia was characterized by the co-presence of two sharply contrasting ecologies: nomadic pastoralism and agriculture, each an extreme of development. Nomadic pastoralism (horse-culture, in other words) meant abandonment of arable farming, even where this was meteorologically possible, and concentration on stockbreeding in a particular way: not just sedentary runholding but moving herds from pasture to pasture round a fixed cycle. (Adshead, 1993,p. 16)

In principle, commercial prospects between the steppe and sedentary civilizations seemed ideal. The former could provide the latter with a commodity of prime importance, the horse, and could receive in exchange much appreciated goods such as textiles (silk and linen), tea, spices and especially grain, desperately needed when the herds fell victim to some natural catastrophe. (Roux, 1984, p.90)

The arid steppe which does not give way to agriculture, except in some negligible cases, neither allows high population concentrations or growth. According to Ratzel's calculations, maximum population per square mile in a hunting and gathering economy varies between 0,005 to 0,025. This number increases in nomadic pastoralism to 2-5 people per square mile. In extensive and intensive agriculture economies these figures are 10-25 and up to 100 respectively. (Avcioglu, 1978, Vol. 1, p. 321)

The most important common factor of the civilizations surrounding Central Asia is their agricultural economy. In Central Asia however, the common factor is the problems arising from inadequate supply of water, brevity of growing seasons, edaphic problems, and difficult terrain which is the most important physical geographic impediment to the development of sedentary agriculture. In suitable and relatively small areas farming has been and is being practised, but it has played only a marginal role in the economy of the whole region. The vast stretches of the steppe are favourable only to extensive animal husbandry, which has remained the most characteristic occupation of the Central Asian peoples down to modern times. Rivalry between the steppe and the sown, between the nomads and sedentary farmers may well be one of the oldest conflicts of the modern civilization.

During these armed conflicts, the massacre of the sedentary people was usually carried out by nomad conquerors. Was it because nomads were blood-thirsty, sadist beasts who "enjoyed" killing for many centuries? Was it the extremely harsh conditions of the steppe according to which the character of the nomad warrior was formed? We believe that the answer is no. The answer lies in complex unity of demographic-economic-military conditions. The number of nomadic conquerors was much less than the number of conquered sedentary people. It was not possible for the conquerors to spare a special armed force to control the occupied area which was

densely populated. Indeed, there were no regular army units in the modern sense. Every nomad was also a warrior in the nomad army. To maintain an "army" for the control of the conquered lands was practically impossible, and even if it were done, it would inevitably lead to the assimilation of the conquerors by local inhabitants. Using agrarian peasants as slaves was also not possible. The law of diminishing returns ruled the nomadic pastoralist economy. Hordes of slaves could not economically contribute to the nomadic way of life. No surplus-value could be achieved through enslaved workers. So, in order to open new pastures for their live-stock the nomad armies destroyed agriculture and all kinds of settlements on their way. They also massacred the agrarian population which was not of any economic value for their way of life and mode of production. The harsh geography which shaped nomadism was ruthless. One had to kill the other in order to survive. (McGovern, 1939, p.6)

From the second century B.C. to the fifteenth century A.D., Central Asia played a determinant role in the world history. Its nomadic pastoralist economy which took shape in the "steppe zone" of the region with its horse culture and mounted archer cavalry units, not only deeply affected the surrounding sedentary civilisations, but also shaped the modern nations of our times by the "migration of nations" caused by waves of invasions by the turkic steppe nomads to many regions of the world, especially to Eastern and Central Europe.

The nations, or in more precise terms tribal confederations which were pushed Westwards from the Inner Eurasian continent by the invading Turkic steppe nomads, were able to establish sedentary-agricultural civilisations in West Europe by taking advantage of favourable climatic and geological conditions of Western Europe in a rather short period of time. First emerged a sedentary-agrarian feudal Europe, followed by industrialist-capitalist Europe which derived its impetus from the economic surplus value created by the preceding agrarian feudal Europe, supported by the favourable physical environment prevailing in the region.

During the same period, social and economic developments in Central Asia were much different and quite unfavourable. The sedentary-agrarian civilisations which were established in the "oasis-region" of Central Asia were under the destructive pressure of nomadic raids which continued up to the 15th Century.

The nomadic raids to the sedentary "oasis-zone" of Inner Asia and to the other parts of the world came to an end in the 15th century. This date also coincides with the wide range usage of fire-arms which put an end to the superiority of the nomadic cavalry in the battlefields. The last of the great nomadic raids which poured out from the heart of Central Asia was Tamerlane's, which had a adverse effect on the growth of another Turkic Empire, the Ottomans.

After the end of the nomadic raids, sedentary-agrarian civilisations in Central Asia started their golden age. Samarkand, Bukhara, Khiva became the scientific centers of the world, where many important philosophers, mathematicians, astronomers etc. created their masterpieces. In this period, Central Asia caught the opportunity to narrow the gap of development between the region and Western Europe where the sedentary-agrarian civilization had been adopted almost a 1000 years earlier. Unfortunately, this historical turning point was interrupted by another historical phenomenon which blocked the momentum of the region, and this time, for a very long period of time; the oncoming of the age of "great discoveries" deprived Central Asia from its main economic revenues.

The discovery of the sea trade routes from Europe to India and to the Far-East negatively affected the traditional silk-road and spice-road which extended from the Far-East and India to Europe and passed through Central Asia both from the East-West and North-South axis. Central Asian Khanates, which had been established during the Timurid period, were gaining great material wealth from these caravan routes. The sudden collapse of these routes brought financial catastrophe to the Region. Deprived of their main source of wealth, Central Asian Khanates experienced serious financial difficulties and thus lived through extreme social distress.

From the 16th century to the Russian Invasion which took place in the late 19th century, Central Asia lost its significance in the world affairs. Poverty, backwardness, epidemics and religious fanaticism were the main characteristics of the region during this period.

By the Russian invasion, Central Asia had entered a new period, the effects of which are more or less continuing in our time. Although Russians came to the region with a colonial mentality and mainly for raw materials, and most of all for the raw cotton, they also brought with them modern technology, transport facilities and social dynamism.

The October Revolution of 1917 ended up with the formation of the USSR in 1922. Turkestan Soviet Socialist Republic in Central Asia was the first state to be established within the borders of the USSR and it passed through political reshaping several times up to 1936. With problematic border rearrangements and with settlement of different ethnic groupings, four different republics, namely Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan were established. The main principle of all the dominating powers, "Divide et Impera" played a determinant role in these political re-shaping procedures. During the Soviet rule, Central Asia was exploited as a raw material source by the industrial parts of the USSR. In all fairness, many positive changes, such as widespread literacy, adequate health services, proper housing, infrastructure etc. were also secured during the same period.

After the sudden and unexpected collapse of the USSR in 1991, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan became independent states. Their struggle is continuing at full speed to design a proper way of development and to integrate their social and economic structures with the Western world.

2. Geography & Climate of the Region

Central Asia geographically means the region stretching from the Caspian Sea on the West to the Altai Mountains on the East and from the borders of Siberian forests (taiga), approximately 50° altitude, to the Western branches of the Himalayas and Northern Afghanistan. Newly independent states of Republic of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tadjikistan and Northern Afghanistan and Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomus Region of China (East Turkestan) are located in the geographical boundaries of Central Asia.

The Central Asia of world history was a portion of Inner Asia. It comprized the central part of the steppe, the segment of the Southern oasis rim of the desert, with margins in the mountain spokes coming out from the Pamir knot; the Tien Shan, the Kara Koram and the Hindu Kush. The intervening deserts of the Kara Kum, Kizil Kum and Taklamakan were of lesser historical significance except as barriers within the major components of steppe and oasis in Central Asia, there were, however, considerable differentiation of terrain, resources and spatial organizations.

The centerpiece of Central Asia was Western Turkestan; Transoxania, Mawara-an-nahr, the land within rivers, "Mesopotamia". Here was Samarkand, the metropolis of Central Asia at most times, its largest agricultural settlement and main international trading center. In terms of terrain, Western Turkestan was dominated by its two great rivers, the Oxus or Amu-darya and Jakartes or Syr-darya.

One of the lessons which can be drawn from the geographical and climatic conditions of Central Asia is that the most important physical geographic impediments to the development of sedentary agriculture in this region are the inadequate supply of water and moisture, the brevity of growing seasons, edaphic problems and diffucult terrayn . In the extensive deserts and most of the steppes of this region, crop cultivation is confined to scattered oasis because rain-farming or a network of irrigation facilities are impossible or impractical.. Another physical problem hindering agricultural development in the arid and semiarid zones is wind erosion, stemming from the frequent windstorms in the deserts and desert-steppes or from the strong, hot winds which emanate from the vicinity of the Caspian Sea and dessicate the steppe lands on their path. The widespread salinization of soils in the arid zone is an additional diffuculty, which prevents the expansion of farming and is also a persistent problem for oasis agriculture. The lands of Central Asia are far more suited to extensive forms of agricultural activity than to the intensive types of the adjacent sedentary civilizations. The dominance of pastoral nomadism in the rich grasslands reflect quite well the land-use constraints and opportunities derived from physical formations as well as from the technology, organization and cultural values of Central Asian societies throughout the history. (Adshead, 1993, pp. 8-13)

3. Early Inhabitants of Central Asia

During the paleolithic and neolithic periods, two different kinds of people inhabited Central Asia: Europoids with long skulls (dolichocephalites) and the Mongoloids with wide skulls (brachycephalites). Most probably these two different kinds of people also spoke different languages. Europoids spoke Indo-European languages and the Mongoloids, Altaic languages.

At one time, Indo-European languages were spoken by Europoids throughout Central Asia as far as East as Kansu, in both steppe and oasis. Scythians and Sarmatians in the North and Bactrians and Sogdians in the South were known examples of this lingual pattern. Subsequently, first in the steppe before 13th century as a result of Hun, Avar and Turkish advance, and then after 13th century as a result of the Mongolian expansion, Indo-European languages lost their predominance in Central Asia except in Afghan Turkestan and the enclave of Tadjikistan.

Neglecting these theories, we may say that during Pre-historic times, two different kinds of people and languages existed in Central Asia, and most probably intensive racial and linguistic exchanges took place between these two cultures. (Renfrew, 1988, pp. 71-74)

From the very early times of history, today's Mongolia and the adjacent regions have been the motherland of fierce tribesmen who from the Mongolian Plateau have poured in wave after wave of invading hordes who at times reduced every one of the Asiatic Empires to subjection, and more than once made themselves dictators of half of Europe.

If we take a quick look at the earliest human geography of Central Asia, we might see this picture: In the very East, Manchuria inhabited by proto-Tunguz, Eastern Mongolia and Western Manchuria by proto-Mongols and most of the Mongolian Plateau and to the West up to Lake Balkash, inhabited by Turks. The rest of Central Asia was inhabited by Indo-Europeans and Paleo-Asiatics. Starting from 300 BC Turks gradually started moving to the West and South, pushing the Indo-Europeans further to the West and South, sometimes mixing with them, sometimes enticing them to accept the Turkic language and culture, and again gradually emptying

the Mongolian Plateau to the Mongols, following them from the East. (Roux, 1984, p.41) Ethnic mixing of Turks and Mongols started very early and continued for centuries by exogamy, or through the acceptance of the language of the dominant clan whether Turkic or Mongol, by the other "vassal" clans again whether Turkic or Mongol. Nevertheless history tells us that the Jenghiz-Khanites Mongolized many apparently Turkic tribes; the Naiman of the Altai, the Kerayit of the Gobi, and the Ongut of Chahar. Vice versa many Mongol tribes were Turkicized such as Juan-Juan and presumably Tartars from 6th to 9th-century. It should be remembered however, that in the West and East Turkestan, Turks were late-comers and that their ethnic influence in the Altai may not make itself felt until the first century AD, in the East Turkestan not before 9th century and in Mavara-un-Nahr (Transoxania) not before the tenth. The urban population of both East and West Turkestan consisted of Turkicized Indo-European stock (Grousset, 1970, pp. 24-25) mainly of Scythian, Sarmatian and Sogdian origin. (Berkay, 1995, P. 68)

After the mixing of Turkic people for many centuries with the Mongols and Indo-Europeans in Central Asia, "racial" features of Turks, which were very heterogeneous and showed significant differences through the East-West axis of the region, got formed and kept their main characteristics up to the present time. Without going into details, the anthropological features of Turkic people according to different scientists, can be summarized as follows:

According to Laurater (1854, p.164) Turks are a mixture of Mongoloids and Europoids. Morton (1839) states that Turks who were originally Mongoloids, mixed with other Europoids and lost their original features. In "racial classification" of Blumenberg (1865, P.300) Turks are classified as a member of the white (Caucasoid) race. Turkish historian Akçura defines Turks in the Indo-European group. Gorn (1964, P.159) tries to explain the existing physical features of the Turks by natural selection caused by geographical conditions of Central Asia. According to him, Turks are neither fully "white" nor fully "Mongoloid". According to Vallois (1967, pp.42-43), because some features of Turks resemble Mongols, many scientists have accepted Turks as a member of the "Yellow Race". Vallois believes that this is a mistake and describes Turks in the Caucasoid race which extended deeply into Central

Asia. Weiner (1971, pp.284-286) points to the similarities between Turks and Caucasoids and Alpines, hence placing Turks in Europoids. Thoma (1975) shares the view of Baker and describes Turks as an intermediate between the white race and yellow race. (Guvenc, 1995, p.24) Ozbek (1978, p.157) defines a typical Turk as of medium height, dominantly round-headed with straight or wavy black hair, oval face, flat or slightly concave nose, prominent cheekbones, very slightly slit eyes and slightly swollen eye lids (epicanthus type).

Although Ozbek defines the physical features of a "typical" Turk as stated above, these features show great diversities among Turkish people in geographically East-West axis, since in the East - i.e. Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Uighur - the Mongoloid characteristic are much more apparent, where as in the West, - i.e. Turkish people in the Anatolian Peninsula and Balkans they are almost nil. For example, research conducted by anthropologist Coon showed that the morphological features of the Anatolian Turks are very similar to those of their neighbours, the Greeks. The only differences which are found are that Turks are a little slimmer and their faces are slightly more round than the Greeks. Apparently this is because of the higher degree of mixing of the Turks with Mongols in the East and with the Europoids in the West. (Avcioglu, 1978, Vol. 1, pp. 295-310. Also, Ozbek, 1978, p. 158) In short, anthropologically the people of Central Asia may be grouped as follows: the Uzbeks belong to the Caucasoid "race", they are brachy-cephalic, of medium height and have dark hair and eyes. Mongoloid features are apparent among the Uzbeks of Northern Khorezm and the Kypchak, Uzbeks of Fergana. Among the Uzbeks of Southern Khorezm no Mongoloid features are observed.¹

¹ The careful reader might have noticed that certain words and phrases, such as "race" round-headed (brachicephalic), long-headed (dolicocephalic) regarding the biological nature of mankind have been used for defining certain groups of people in this study. We must strongly underline the fact that, these terms are only used to show the physical anthropologic differences that exist between these groups of people. We don't have any intentions nor beliefs that any human "race" is inferior or superior to the other one, or to be a member of a certain "race" will bring any kind of privilege to a ethnic group, culture or nation. But it is a fact that different people in different geographical and climatic zones of the world, have different physical properties such as skin colour, height, eye shape, skull, and even blood group. Whether these minor physical properties shape different human races or not is still an unsolved discussion among the anthropologists. This question was studied in a meeting which was held by UNESCO in Paris, 1951, with the contribution of Dr. Julian Huxley and Dr. Theodosius Dobzhansky. In the memorandum which was published after this meeting describes the "race" as: human groups which are determined by different body features, caused by natural selection, mutation, diffusion and isolation, which are apparent and also genetical. On the other

The Kazakhs and Kyrgyz belong to the South Siberian type formed as a result of the mixing of the Central Asian Mongoloids with the ancient Caucasoid population of Kazakhstan. Consequently although the Mongoloid features of the Kazakhs, and even more of the Kyrgyz, are more evident than those of the other peoples of Central Asia, they are not typical representatives of the Mongoloid "race". It is interesting to note that the Kyrgyz which are known to have inhabited the upper reaches of the Yenisey River between the sixth and ninth centuries, are described by Chinese records as "very ugly, yellow haired, red bearded, blue eyed, tall people". Kirgiz people first appeared in their present homeland during the twelfth century, having been brought from Yenisey by the invading Karakitays. Barthold thought it possible that Kyrgyz might have entered their present home during the tenth century, at the time of Karakhanids. Kyrgyz people completely lost their Indo-European features and adopted Mongoloid characteristics during the centuries. The Karakalpaks occupy a position midway between the Uzbeks and Kazakhs, somewhat closer to the latter. In some respects Turkmens are in a different ethnic group. They have predominantly Caucasoid physical features, but unlike the Caucasoid Uzbeks they are dolichocephalic and considerably taller. Their type, which is sometimes called the Khorasan type, is related to Mediterranean group and includes a small though clearly distinguishable Mongoloid elements. (Wheeler, 1975, pp. 9-10. Also, Ozbek, 1978, pp. 157-160)

Anthropological research made by Inan in 1939, among 64,000 people of the Republic of Turkey showed that 76% of the people are round-headed (brachycephalic). Extreme brachycephalic feature is observed mostly among Bektashi and Tahtaci religious-cultural sects, which apparently have shamanistic elements in their beliefs, which can be traced back to the very early times of Turkish history. Dinaric (a Europoid race) and Indo-European characteristics were also observed among Turkish people in this survey.

hand. the third memorandum which was published by UNESCO in 1964, neglects the word "race" and uses "society" instead (M.Özbek, 1979, p.45). It is up to the reader to define certain physical features of different human groups as "race" or "society", but whatever word is used, from our point of view, there is no superiorities or privileges which can be attributed to any kind of human "race" or "society" whatsoever.

Other anthropological surveys (Bingöl 1970 and Güvenç 1991) made according to genotypical characteristics, such as blood groups, showed that Turkish people are a midway between Mongoloid and Europoid people. (Guvenc, 1995, p.22)

4. Ethnic Origins of Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz & Turkmen

a. Uzbeks

Uzbeks descended from a grandson of Jenghiz Khan, Shayban, brother of the Kipchak Khans Batu and Berke. At Jenghiz Khan's death, Shayban was allotted the territories East and South-East of the Southern Ural River, including a large part of the province of Aktyubinsk and Turgai. Shayban and his successors continued a nomadic way of life between the Ural Mountains, the River Ilek (tributary of the Ural River South of Orenburg), and Sary-Su. About the middle of the fourteenth Century, the hordes subject to the Shaybanids took the name of Özbek or, in the spelling now usual, Uzbek, by which they are known to history, the name being variously interpreted as "free man".

The conquest of Transoxania was achieved by Abul Khayr's grandson, Muhammed Shaybani who led the Uzbeks from 1496 to 1510. For twenty years after the death of Abul Khayr, we hear and know little about them. After establishing leadership, Muhammed Shaybani moved to the steppe North of Yasi in the middle Syr-Darya, where he was appointed governor of the town by the Moghul Khan. Yasi was a commercial centre on a North-South trade route, but more importantly, it contained the tomb, rebuilt by Tamerlane, of the famous twelfth century dervish, Ahmad Yassawi. It was the headquarters of Yassawiya, the other big dervish order in Central Asia beside the Nakshibandiyya, which specialized in missions to nomads. Here Shaybani reconstructed the Uzbek state as a secular arm of the Yassawiya. (Grousset, 1970, p.483)

It is clear that the Uzbek state, at any rate until the latter part of the sixteenth century, was a polity rather than an empire. It was a loose confederation of aristocratic-led nomad clans quartered on the various city states. Nomadic, pastoral

values thus coexisted with agricultural and commercial infrastructure in a system of ~~endonomadization. In the cities themselves, the Uzbek chiefs worked closely with the~~ dervish orders, especially the Nakshibandiyya. The result was clericalism, of which, Nakshibandiyya was the prime beneficiary. Other orders or "tarikats" (ways), such as Yasawiyya, Kubrawiyya and Kalenderis also existed, but the Nakshibandis were predominant in Transoxania. (Adshead, 1993, p. 158)

b. Kazakhs

Uzbek Khan Abul Khayr resumed contacts with the sedentarists and established links with the Nakshbandi opponents of the Timurids in Transoxania. Probably he sought further elements of trade and culture to consolidate his state. The new policy of Abul Khayr towards sedentarization was too much for some clan chiefs who revolted and in 1456 formed a new nomad secession. Also the heavy defeat of the Uzbeks by the Kalmuks (Oirats) in 1457, greatly impaired Abul Khayr's authority. Two vassal clan chiefs Quarai and Janibeg had deserted him for Esen-Bugha II of Chagatai. They asked Esen-Bugha for land, and he settled them on the steppes of Moghulistan. In the years that followed, notably around 1465-66, a great number of nomad clans formerly subject to Abul Khayr left him to join Quarai and Janibeg and enjoy an independent life.

After their separation from the Uzbek Khanate, these nomads became known as Kazakhs (which means adventurers, rebels) as they will henceforth be called. Their secession was of considerable historic importance, as may be realized by a consideration of the extent of the territory which they soon occupied and where even today roam their descendants; the territory of the Middle Horde (or djuz, meaning hundred or "a lot of people", or the steppes between Aktyubinsk and Semipalatinsk, the territory of the Little Horde (Djuz) from the mouth of the Ural to the Sary-Su, and that of the Great Horde (Djuz) from the town of Turkestan (Yasi) to the South shores of lake Balkash. A fourth Horde (Djuz), called the Inner or Bukey horde (from the name of its Khan), was later formed out of the Little Horde, and occupied the country between the lower reaches of the Ural River and the Volga. (Wheeler, 1970, p. 10)

Abul Khayr was killed in 1468 in a final battle against the Kazakhs, whom he ~~was trying to bring back into his fold. About three years later, Yunus, the Chagatai~~ Khan of Moghulistan, scattered the last remnants of the Uzbek loyalists. As for the dissident Uzbeks, or Kazakhs, they formed a purely nomadic state, which after the death of their two chiefs was governed by the chiefs' sons, Baranduk and Qasim. (Grousset, 1970, p.480)

The basic unit of Kazakh society was the patriarchal or joint family. Such families combined together to form an "aul" a term which is nowadays used for a village, but in Kazakh nomad society only had such an application during the winter when men and herds were stationary. The "aul" was considered as a sub-division of the clan (uru) but none of these divisions or sub-divisions were at all clear cut. The clan system, which was originally based on the union of a number of families related to one another and sharing a communal economy, had begun to change by the seventeenth century by the increase of wealth resulting from the conquests by the Kazakhs of some of the Southern cultivated areas and by the partial introduction of agriculture.

At the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Kazakh economy was still based on animal breeding. During the sixteenth century Kazakh encroachment on the semi-desert region lying to the South of the Steppe Region had resulted in some urban development and agriculture and also in a certain amount of trade with the settled population of Semirechiye and Transoxania. In the North and West, too, there were the beginnings of commercial relations with the Russians. Wealth became increasingly concentrated in fewer hands; but it was wealth which consisted entirely of livestock. The whole Kazakh life was regulated by the search for summer grazing grounds with adequate water, and winter pastures sheltered from the wind and cold and particularly from the dreaded "dzud" the freezing over of previously thawed snow which made it impossible for cattle to reach fodder. Most of the perpetual tribal wars were due to quarrels over winter pastures and the general condition of insecurity made life for the Kazakhs hard and precarious.

Before the coming of the Russians the gradual infiltration of Islam had very little effect on the social structure of the Kazakhs or even on their legal system. The

main effect of Ýslam among the Kazakhs was on their culture, and even here the effect was strictly limited by the conditions of nomadic life. Ýslam, however, brought the art of writing, and such education as there was, was based on the Arabic script and on Arabic and Persian literature. There had always existed an oral literature in the Kazakh language and occasional attempts were made to transcribe it into the Arabic script. A considerable Arabic and Persian loan vocabulary began to find its way into the Kazakh language mainly for the expression of abstract ideas. (Wheeler, 1975, pp.31-35)

c. Kyrgyz

Southern Siberia was one of the great breeding grounds of early Central Asian civilization, and like other nomadic people, the early Kyrgyz left behind rock painting and stone idols in their nomadic camps, which archeologists have subsequently discovered both in Siberia and along the route South that the Kyrgyz took. During their migration South and in Tien Shan, the Kyrgyz merged and intermarried with other tribal clans; the Uzuns, the Sacae, the Huns and the Köktürks. Six hundred years before Jenghiz Khan, the Kyrgyz were a formidable power in Central Asia, famous for their fighting prowess and their hardiness in coping with living at high altitudes. They developed fine pottery skills and made superb gold and silver vessels that have been unearthed by archeologists. The development of the Kyrgyz tribes demonstrates again how the nomadic nationalities in Central Asia were formed less by the growth of their own numbers than by absorbing the fragments of tribes that floated around them. By the fifteenth century the Kyrgyz had assimilated smaller tribes such as Kipchaks, the Kumans, and the Ghuz. Many such tribes were the victims of larger nomadic movements, hunger or defeat in battle. They came to the Kyrgyz territories for shelter, and later became part of their tribal structure.

Kyrgyz tribes lived a seasonal-nomadic way of life in the Tien Shan region for centuries. The geographical and political isolation of the region made Kyrgyz nomads peripheral to the empires that rose and fell in Central Asia. The internal conflicts between the Kyrgyz clans and disputes with Uzbek and Kazakh tribes continued and

unable to beat back conquerers such as Uzbeks, Kyrgyz often retreated into Sinkiang for survival.

As Russia extended its advance into Central Asia, in the 1850's, the first Russian expeditions reached Tien Shan. In the unprecedented freezing winter of 1859-60, the Kyrgyz suffered a catastrophe, losing 80 per cent of their flocks. Thousands died in the snows of the Tien Shan as people tried to flee to Sinkiang. In the next decade, the Kyrgyz chiefs, depleted of resources and starving, had little choice but to accept Russian sovereignty in order to escape economic hardship and attacks by their neighbours.

Today Kyrgyz people number over 4 million with 100,000 living in Chinese Xinjiang and some 35,000 living in the Wakhan corridor of Afghanistan who have migrated to Turkey after the Afghan war began in 1980. Kyrgyz people are Sunni Muslims, but a strong streak of pre-Islamic Shamanism is still evident in many of their traditions and daily life.

For many centuries the Kazakhs and the Kyrgyz were called Kazakh-Kyrgyz or Kyrgyz by many Western historians. Neglecting the difference among these people, by Kyrgyz, they meant the Kazakhs, while the Kyrgyz proper, as we know them today, were called the "Kara-Kyrgyz" meaning (Black-Kyrgyz). (Rashid, 1994, pp.138-141)

d. Turkmen

The present day Turkmens migrated from the Altai region in Eastern Turkestan to the Caspian sea in the tenth and eleventh centuries, as part of the larger migration of Oghuz Turks. They built up a formidable reputation as raiders and warriors, who attacked caravans along the Silk Route and raided settled areas in Persia, Afghanistan and Central Asia. The loot from these raids comprised mostly of slaves, whom Turkmens traded with Arabs and later with the Khanates of Khiva and Bukhara. Much of the early Turkmen history concerns either resistance to the Persians and to the Khanates of Khiva and Bukhara or fighting on their behalf. Unable to build an empire of their own from their desert wastes, Turkmens frequently helped others to build theirs. Turkmens took part in Khiva's affairs either as mercenaries or as part of a complex power struggle waged by successive khans with the local

Uzbeks. The Turkmen were often used by the Khans as a security force to keep marauding Kazakh and Kyrgyz nomads away from the city and to keep the ambitious Uzbeks off balance. Persian kings tried to keep Turkmen in check with punitive military expeditions, but they rarely managed to penetrate or control the Karakum desert, to which Turkmen would immediately retreat when faced with an external threat. When the Persian king Nadir Shah invaded Central Asia in 1741, the Turkmen tribes first put up fierce resistance, but once they were defeated they joined Nadir Shah's armies.

Turkmen first came into contact with Russians in the early part of the sixteenth century when Russian caravan trading with Central Asia passed through Turkmen territory. From 1834, under the pretext of securing their trade routes, the tsars built a series of forts on the Eastern shores of the Caspian, slowly encroaching into Turkmen areas. The largest and most powerful of the Turkmen tribes, the Tekkes, resisted the new Russian forts which frequently sent out military expeditions to harass the nomads and seize their flocks.

In 1870 there were some 200,000 Turkmen tents, holding an estimated one million people, divided into some twenty-four tribes, scattered across the desert. The Tekkes, the Yomut and Goklan lived in the South and East of the region. General Kaufman, who finally subdued the region for the tsar, called these tribes the most formidable light cavalry in the world and the greatest marauders in Asia.

In the eighteen and nineteenth centuries many Turkmen migrated into Mesopotamia and Anatolia. There are still 170,000 Turkmen living in Iraq and another 80,000 in Syria. Tens of thousands more Turkmen live in Turkey. The Turkmen of Central Asia have remained Sunni Muslims, but many of the Middle Eastern Turkmen have become Shiite. Although they are assimilated with the predominant local culture, they still identify themselves as Turkmen. (Ibid. pp.189-191)

5. Emigrations From Central Asia to Anatolian Peninsula

We know that in the 11th century, with the Turkmen raids from the East, considerable numbers of Turkmen-Oghuz tribes settled in Anatolia. We also know that before 11th century, many Turkic tribes, Pechenegs, Guz, Khazars etc. were settled in Anatolia by the Byzantium Empire. The main migration of the Turks to Anatolia started after the victory of the Seljuk Turks in Malazgirt, 1071. This intensive migration of Turkish tribes to Anatolia continued up to Kösedag Battle in 1242 between the Seljuks and Ilkhanites, and after this Battle the second big wave of migration from Central Asia and Khorezm to Anatolia began, which together with other events gradually formed the new ethnic structure of Anatolia, as Turkish population became the majority in the region. To analyse the Turkization procedure of Anatolia, we must answer the following questions:

1. What was the population of Anatolia in 11th century?
2. What was the population of the Turkish tribes that migrated to Anatolia starting from the 11th century? What was the influence of these migrations in the region and what changes occurred for the local inhabitants of Anatolia?

Unfortunately, concrete answers to these questions cannot be given since we do not have adequate historical or demographical data concerning them. Many historians, depending on different assumptions, and in some cases depending on different political points of view, give different answers to these questions. Let us begin with the first question.

According to Vryonis (1971, p.25) the population of Anatolia was 9-13 million in the 11th century. Turkish historian Barkan estimates a total population of 5 million for the 16th century. Güvenç (1995, p.125) states that the population of Anatolia might be between 3 to 13 million, with an arithmetic mean of 8-9 million for the 11th century. In order to place the discussion on a more concrete basis, we can state that according to the results of the first Census made in the Republic of Turkey in 1927, the population of the Republic was 13.4 million. Taking into consideration the continuous wars, famines, epidemics and high mortality rates, we can assume that the population growth of Anatolia was very low in spite of high fertility rates. A total

population of 7-9 million might be realistic for the 11th century. Also some historians believe that because of great turmoils caused by Turkish and Ilkhanite invasions and the Crusader campaigns, the population of Anatolia decreased to 6 million in the 13th century. (Vryonis, 1971, p.26)

We face the same difficulties when we try to answer the second question. We therefore find different results.

According to Cahen (1979, P.26) it is impossible to give the concrete number of the Turkish tribes that migrated to Anatolia between 11th and 13th century. Cahen states that this number cannot exceed 200.000-300.000, since various conditions of the period do not allow greater numbers of people to migrate such long distances within a given period. Turkish historians Kafesoğlu's and Yinanç's estimations are 600 thousand and one million respectively, while Evemeer puts the figure between 600 thousand to one million (Guvenc, 1995, pp.25-26). From the mentioned estimations, we might assume that the population of the Turkish tribes that migrated to Anatolia consists of roughly 10% of the total population of the region in the 13th century. (Roux, 1984, p.184)

The last migration from Central Asia to Anatolia took place after the 1402 Ankara Battle between the Ottomans and Tamerlane, which resulted in the occupation of Anatolia by the Turkic armies of Tamerlane, which went on for several decades. Although not very significant in numbers, we might assume that at least some elements of the victorious army of Tamerlane and the Turkic tribes which followed them settled down in Anatolia in that period.

6. The Oil Factor and the Geo-Politics of the Region

After independence, new independent states of Central Asia became the focus of the "Great Game" of the superpowers of the world. The reason for this attention is well known: the enormous underground resources of the region, especially oil and natural gas.

The total area of Central Asia and Azerbaijan is 3,937,600 km²; Kazakhstan 2,717,000 km²; Uzbekistan 447,400 km²; Turkmenistan 488,100 km²; Kyrgyzstan

198,500 km² and Azerbaijan 86,600 km². This area is nearly 5 times bigger than the area of the Republic of Turkey and it is almost 2/3 of the area of the whole European continent. The region is land-locked, only Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan are bordering with Caspian Sea, which also is a land-locked lake, except a narrow access to the open seas through the Volga-Don river-canal system. Although the region stretches through such vast territories, it is scarcely populated, except for some oasis areas of Uzbekistan; Tashkent, Bukhara, Samarkand, Khiva and Ferghana Valley and urban regions of Azerbaijan such as Baku, Sumgait, Genje.

This huge land mass contains enormous underground wealth. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan together own the third largest oil reserves in the world, after the Middle East and Siberia. Also Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan own almost half of the known natural gas reserves of the world. Besides oil and natural gas, the region is very rich in strategic resources such as uranium, gold and non-ferrous minerals. Since the capital, technology and know-how which are necessary to exploit these resources do not exist in these countries, the resources will have to be exploited and transported to the world markets by the superpowers of the world. Also, the neighbouring countries which will host the pipeline systems of oil and natural gas to the open seas and consumer markets are deeply involved with the developments in the region.

Central Asia has once more become the focus of interest in the world affairs because of its enormous underground energy resources, which is the most essential factor for Western civilization

7. The Importance of the Region for the Republic of Turkey

Although the social contact between the Western Turkish world (including Ottomans, Republic of Turkey and the Balkans) and the Eastern Turkish World (including Central Asia, Azerbaijan, Xinhang Autonomous Republic of China and Northern Afghanistan) has been cut off for a very long period of time due to various and rather complex historical developments, the people of modern Turkey and the

people of Central Asia still share many common cultural, historical, anthropological, linguistic, ethnologic characteristics.

Contact was re-established between these two regions after the independence of the Central Asian republics in 1991. This time, efforts were directed to base the relationship on mutual economic interests of the two regions, although some non-realistic, emotional factors were also present. The Republic of Turkey, utilizing the experience and know-how which it had accumulated since the formation of modern Turkey approached Central Asia with long-term credits, experienced contracting companies and with small, medium and to an extent big entrepreneurs. In spite of many mistakes which were done in the initial period, Turkish companies have successfully completed many big size projects in Central Asian republics in the past 7 years, and many other projects are either in the planning stage or under construction. As a result, thousands of Turkish workers are employed and numerous Turkish contracting companies are active in the region. We might assume that these mutually beneficial economic relations will continue in the future.

Turkey is also deeply involved with the future energy pipe-line projects which will carry the underground energy resources of the region to the world markets. If realized, the planned Baku-Ceyhan; Tengiz (Kazakhstan) - Caspian Sea - Ceyhan; and Turkmenistan - Iran - Ceyhan oil and gas pipe-lines will provide Turkey with a great strategic control over the energy lines which will stretch from Central Asia to Europe and the Mediterranean.

8. Determining Role Of the Demographic & Ethnic Factors in Political and Economic Stability of Central Asia.

In the previous paragraphs, we tried to underline the importance of Central Asia both for Turkey and for the world economy. Here we must emphasise a very determining factor which is highly crucial for the further development of the region and hence, for transferring its natural wealth to the world markets. In the coming decades Central Asia must be politically stable in order to integrate its economy to the world market. As it is widely accepted, political stability highly depends on economic

and social stability. Unfortunately the region today, lacks the necessary capital, technology and know-how to start and sustain a steady economic growth. In terms of capital, technology and know-how, the region is almost completely dependant on foreign resources. On the other hand, foreign sources are very - and sometimes over-sensitive about the social and political stability of the regions in which they are planning to invest.

At present, the region seems to have attained political stability. However, if we examine the existing ethnic and demographic aspects of the region, we can easily come to the conclusion that the social structure of the region is potentially fragile.

First, throughout Central Asia, and especially in Kazakhstan, the existing Slavic population, which has completely different ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious peculiarities creates a great potential destabilization factor for the Central Asian republics. For example, in 1989 in the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Slavic population was almost 60 per cent of the total population, That means indigenous Kazakhs are in minority in their own Republic. In the Northern oblasts (provinces) of Kazakhstan, the percentage of Slavic population rises to 80-85 %. If we consider that Kazakhstan shares a border of almost 3000 kms in length with the Russian Federation, we might imagine the severity of the problem. A similar problem also exists in Kyrgyzstan, which has a more or less identical structure with Kazakhstan. Other Central Asian republics also have considerable Slavic minorities.

Second, since mid-1980's, there is a steady out-migration of Slavic population from the region. One might assume that this is a favourable factor for the region, since it will reduce the number of the Slavic population, and hence in the long run, will solve the ethnic problem. But it is a mixed blessing. The migrating Slavic population constitutes the most educated and skilled labour force of Central Asia. The mass scale out migration of this sophisticated labour force, although it decelerated in the recent years, exerts a serious strain on the economies of the Central Asian republics.

Third, there is the demographic factor. Beginning in the 1950s, demographic trends in the Soviet Central Asian republics have been marked by fundamental changes in population size and composition: the total republican populations began to grow rapidly, and the local nationalities began to comprise an increasing proportion of

these total populations. These changes were due to a high rate of natural growth and low mortality among the indigenous populations, and to a lower fertility level and declining mortality among the Slavs.

The high population growth in Central Asia is a burden on the social and economic spheres of the Central Asian republics, and it is expected to remain the same in the coming decades. The population growth is higher in the Southern part of the region (Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Southern Kazakhstan and Western Kyrgyzstan), where the indigenous population is the majority.

As it is mentioned before, Central Asian republics, at least for the present moment, are short of means of production such as capital, technology and know-how needed to sustain a steady economic growth. Inflation, although reduced from 2,500 % in 1992 to a mere 60 % in 1996, is also continuing.

In addition to these economic hardships, economies of the Central Asian republics are under the increasing pressure of rapid population growth of the indigenous nationalities especially for the southern republics of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. For example, if we assume that the total population of four Central Asian republics is roughly 50 million for the mid-1990's, and the average annual population growth rate is 2 % - which is much higher within indigenous population - we will get the figure of 1,000,000 natural population increase annually for the region. As we have emphasized before, the situation is more acute in the Southern regions of Central Asia, and among the indigenous population. In short, four Central Asian republics must feed, accommodate, educate, find jobs, supply health services etc. to an additional one million young people every year.

If we take into consideration the growing expectations of the population which rise parallel to the increase in their contacts with Western standards, and if we keep in mind the limited means of official and private institutions in these republics, we can easily assume that Central Asian republics are going to face severe difficulties in solving the problems springing from rapid population growth in the coming decades.

It is a well known fact that social and ethnic disturbances which are widespread in the contemporary third world countries are fueled by the poor,

uneducated, unemployed etc. masses whose expectations are dim and who fail to foresee any future prospects for themselves in their homelands. These disillusioned masses are expanding each year due to the increase in population. Indeed, the number of young people who gravitate towards ideologies with false promises of a bright future is escalating.

We might face the same phenomena in Central Asia which might de-stabilize the region as a whole, prevent inflow of foreign means of production, and even obstruct the outflow of Central Asian energy resources to the world markets. Still, these adverse phenomena might be provoked by some foreign powers with high hopes of including the region in their scope of influence. Unfortunately, insufficient democratic conditions prevailing in these republics might act as another detrimental factor aggravating the situation.

Here we would like to underline an important fact regarding the stability of the region. In the studies which were abundant in the early 1990's, many scholars and politicians estimated that to attain political stability in Inner Asia was the most unlikely scenario. Ethnic chaos in Kazakhstan, emergence of fundamental Islam in Uzbekistan, bloody political struggles in Azerbaijan, etc. were predicted as the most plausible developments for these countries in the near future. However, disregarding some relatively minor incidents, the region today seems to possess a political stability in spite of all the existing problems. In our opinion, this stability will continue in the near future. However, maintaining long-term stability in Inner Asia highly depends on the flow of capital, technology and know-how to the region from developed countries, since their capabilities in these respects are hardly sufficient to sustain a steady economic growth, thus, social stability.

C. RUSSIAN & SOVIET RULE OVER CENTRAL ASIA

1. Russian Invasion

Russians interested in the potential markets of the Khanates, intended a large scale penetration into the area. With this purpose they initiated establishment of diplomatic affairs. Russian formal annexation of the Kazakh steppes was completed in 1840's. For the first time in its history, this region was occupied by a sedentary power. By 1847 Russia had reached the Syr-Darya river, thus threatening the independence of the Central Asian Khanates. In 1860, without any serious difficulty, Russia invaded Kyrgyzia. (Rywkin, 1990, p.7)

In the middle of the nineteenth century, the backward, medieval Khanates of Khiva, Bukhara and Khokand, lacking internal cohesion, quarrelling among themselves, and deprived of the protective buffer of the Kazakh Steppes, found themselves face to face with a European great power, Russia, ready and eager for an easy colonial acquisition to match the exploits of other European powers. Meanwhile, the Khanates of Bukhara and Khiva, rivalled over the domination of the region. This struggle was also supported by Russia. Russian interference was so evident that because of the serious threat from the Bukhara Khanate, Khiva Khanate applied to Russia to grant them overlordship. (Becker, 1968, p.12)

There were other reasons of the Russian interests in the Region one of which was regarded as the most crucial one, which resulted in the increase of special attention of Russia towards the region between the years 1860-62. Europe, at that time was severely affected by cotton shortage due to the American Civil War in 1861-1865, as America was a major cotton supply source for the textile industry. Central Asian cotton fields were a kind of a hidden treasury for Russia. (Riasanowsky, p.180) Meanwhile, many of the traders from Moscow demanded from the state that it control the cotton fields of Central Asia.

In 1864 the Khokand Khanate (located in today's Southern Kazakhstan) was invaded. Tashkent, the first large town in Central Asia was invaded on June 1865. Russians chose Tashkent as the centre for their conquest. Despite the hovering

Russian menace, the rival khans of Khokand and Bukhara still continued to struggle with each other, which facilitated Russian interference into the region. In 1868, a Peace Treaty between Bukhara and Russia was signed and in 1872, Bukhara was annexed to Russia, and without any significant resistance on May 29, 1873, the capital was taken. Following this, on Feb. 19, 1876, Khokand Khanate was totally abolished, to be replaced by the region of Ferghana, under a military governor. (Becker, 1968, pp. 144-145)

After the invasion of Khiva Khanate, the only way of Russian advance was viable through the defeat of recalcitrant Turkomans. In 1877, Russia attacked Goktepe region. However until 1880, Russians, for the first time in their invasion of Central Asia were defeated. Nevertheless, starting from 1881, Russian attacks turned out to be a bloodbath, and in December of 9th 1881, Russians were able to formalise their occupation through a border treaty signed between Russia and Iran. (Hayit, 1995, pp.111-116)

During tsarist times the official Russian policy in Central Asia was calculated to ensure continued domination by keeping peace and order in the area, but interfering as little as possible with native religion, customs and way of life, thus ignoring the role of Islam among the Muslim community. However, this ignorance had nothing to do with an attitude of accepting Islam as a part of the society, but rather with denying the presence and the influence of religion in daily affairs and attempting to introduce Russian traditions into the administrative structure. Even Russian urban settlements were kept separate, albeit adjacent to local cities. This Russian policy of feigning ignorance of the structures of traditional society and breaking the prestige of local authorities were not successful. In 1886, Russian Generals stated that Islam, is gaining rapidly among the nomads. One of the signs of this new trend, which amounted to another Russian failure, was the nomads' frequently expressed desire to give up customary law and adopt Muslim law (*Shariat*). Finally Russians felt that, the authority of the traditional leaders had hardly suffered from the Russian efforts, because of their deep-respect towards the already established Islamic law. (Ibid. pp. 159-160)

This relative mutual ignorance continued until 1890's. Between the years 1891-92, a massive wave of Russian and Ukrainian peasants came to the region especially into Kazakhstan. Their number reached 1 million between 1896-1916 and influenced social, political and economic events. These people settled in the regions of Turgay, Akmolinsk, Semipalatinsk and in the Kyrgyz lands, causing a brutal construction in the nomadic territories, a reduction of livestock, and a lowering of the nomads' standard of living. (Rashid,1994, p.112)

Soon however three problems emerged which were to dominate the development of the area:

1. The first was the cotton boom in Turkestan. The needs of the Russian and Polish textile industry for cheap domestic cotton, the fertility of the rich soil of the Ferghana Valley, and the successful introduction of the American cotton (around 1884) in the area made cotton a key product. The cotton boom had a decisive influence on other fields of industry. First while cotton production increased, grain production recorded a deficit. Central Asia, previously self-sufficient in grain, had to rely increasingly on grains imported from Russia. Industrial development was centred on cotton. It is significant that Central Asia, while exporting cotton, was increasing its imports of Russian cotton textiles. The cotton boom created a real basis for a money economy. Central Asian markets were opened to Russian industrial goods. Unable to compete with the Western manufacturers on equal terms, Russian manufacturers were in need of a protected market with tariff barriers to check foreign competition.

2. Second was the problem of so called "surplus lands" in the Kazakh steppe and in Kyrgyzia. There the lands of the nomads, wherever suitable for agriculture, were bought, seized, or expropriated by the Russians. The number of Russian settlers in the steppe grew rapidly, while the natives, classified as primitive, alien people, like the American Indians, were forced to move out into less desirable areas. Prior to 1861 abolition of serfdom in Russia, the only Russians who settled in Kazakh territory were the free Cossacks, and they settled only along the lines of fortifications on the edge of the Kazakh steppe. After emancipation, peasants from Tomsk and Tobolsk provinces started to settle in Northern Kazakhstan.

3. The third problem was, the fact that Central Asia had become a choice protected market for Russian-manufactured goods. Commerce between Russia and Central Asia shifted from the hands of the previously favoured Muslim merchants into the hands of the now privileged Russians, who were finally free to dominate trade. (Rywkin, 1990, pp.14-15)

Together with the cotton production, also a number of minor industries were established, including several cigarette factories, wineries. In all of the region, the ownership of the new factories was formed overwhelmingly of Russians. The construction of the railway system facilitated the trade in the region and the influx of the Russian labour into Central Asia, thus leading to the employment of the Russian labourers in skilled occupations. However, the unskilled labour force were, as it was elsewhere, formed of local inhabitants. With Russian control established, the Tsar ordered that millions of acres of prime Kazakh-Kyrgyz land should be given to Russian and Cossack settlers, who were to be exempted from taxes and military service. Every settler received 25 acres of the best grain-producing land and subsidies for fifteen years, as the first of many Russian migrations began into the region. Similar moves in Kazakhstan and other regions of Central Asia in the coming century were to fuel anti-Russian resentment. (Becker, 1968, pp. 184-185. Also, Rashid, 1994, p.141)

2. Central Asia Under Soviet Rule

When the 1917 Revolution took place, Central Asia was at least a century behind Russia. Their socio-economic backwardness was indeed grave before the advent of Soviet power in Central Asia or "Turkestan" as it was known then. After its conquest by Tsarist Russia, it came to be known as "Russian Turkestan". The noted 19th century historian of Turkestan, V.V. Barthold aptly described the region as the most backward country in the Muslim world. That was on the eve of the Russian conquest of Turkestan in the second half of 19th century. Obviously, the neighbouring Islamic countries were far more advanced (Sharma, 1996, p.37). A handful of industrialists, merchants and a small proletariat concentrated largely in Tashkent

where railways had reached. They were drawn almost entirely from Russian settlers. Tashkent was only in the very first stages of industrialization. The plantation style cotton economy that Russia imposed allowed the tribal and landed elite to continue exercising power in the countryside. Where Russia was looking towards socialism as the ideology of the future, Central Asia was still emerging from a tribal and nomadic society that was trying to get to grips with the first rumblings of nationalism and capitalism.

In 1917 the peoples of Central Asia were also discovering nationalism. This took first an intellectual and later a more populist form of expression in Pan-Turkism - the desire to unite the Turkic speaking peoples of Central Asia (which also included the Persian-speaking Tadjiks) - in an independent state free of Russian control. It was a natural progression from the highly separate tribal identity that most Central Asian peoples had until the arrival of Russian colonialism. There was no sense yet of dividing people into separate national groups, which the Bolsheviks were to do later. Thus Uzbeks or Kazakhs identified themselves first by their respective tribes, then as being Muslims, and finally to an extent, as being part of a wider Turkic speaking world of Central Asia. (Rashid, 1994, pp. 25-27)

Soviet rule was established in Central Asia between 1918 and 1922. This was the prelude to a period of fundamental social transformation. The first step in this direction was the creation, within the framework of the Soviet Union, of proto-nation-states. This territorial division, known as the National Delimitation of Central Asia, was based on the assumption that ethnic and linguistic affiliations coincided, and that together they formed the markers of "national" identity. In Central Asia, however, although awareness of "national" group identities was by no means entirely absent, they were not nearly as important as clan or tribal affiliations. The new territorial divisions, which cut across the boundaries of the Khanates and the tribal groupings, were an attempt to obliterate previous forms of self-definition by providing an alternative focus for regional, sub-state identities, the state identity being Soviet. (Akiner, 1994, p.10)

Administratively, following April 1918, the territory which had constituted the General-Governorship became the Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic

(TASSR), under the jurisdiction of the RSFSR (Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic). The revolutionary changes in the TASSR quickly spilled over Bukhara and Khiva. With the intervention of Red Army troops, the regimes in both of these Khanates fell in 1920; they were soon transformed into the Bukharan Soviet People's Republic, the Khorezm Soviet People's Republic. After a time the TASSR and the two Soviet Republics were all dissolved, and entirely new political units were established. (Fierman, 1991, pp. 16-17)

National Delimitation took place in 1924. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan were immediately given full Union Republic status, while Tadjikistan, including the "Pamir Province", later renamed Gorno-Badakhshan, was created as an Autonomous Republic within Uzbekistan. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan were given the status of Autonomous Republics (the latter was initially an Autonomous Province) within the Russian Federation. In 1929 Tadjikistan acquired Union Republic Status, followed by Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in 1936; Karakalpakstan, originally part of the Kazakh Republic, became an Autonomous Republic within the Russian Federation in 1932, and was transferred (with the same status) to the Jurisdiction of Uzbekistan in 1936. There was some readjustment of borders during the Soviet period (e.g. Khojent province was transferred from Uzbekistan to Tadjikistan in 1929), but in broad outline the territories of the newly independent republics of post-Soviet Central Asia are those that were delimited in 1924. (Akiner, 1994, p. 11)

The National delimitation which took place in 1924, was part of the Bolsheviks' solution to the potential threat of pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism. While the establishment of national republics is usually viewed in terms of a Moscow policy of (divide et impera). Significantly, the Bolsheviks decided not to divide Central Asia in such a way as to leave a Bukharan or a Khorezmian unit. Moreover, the units which were created were not ethnically or linguistically homogeneous. Many of the inhabitants of Uzbekistan's first capital, Samarkand were Tadjik speakers. How were the Kazakh and Kyrgyz nomads, who had lived together for centuries, to be differentiated now? There was confusion in cities like Tashkent where people had to choose, for the benefit of their identity cards, whether they were Tadjik or Uzbek, when they themselves were frequently a mixture of both. As for the failure to create

Bukharan and Khorezmian units, perhaps the Bolsheviks feared that such states would command genuine political loyalty. The integral cultural and social unity of Central Asia and hopes of pan-Islamic or pan-Turkic movements were shattered, which is exactly what Stalin wanted. The loss of Turkestan deprived the people of a common homeland, a common language and a common destiny. Stalin's policies were to pit one republic and one ethnic group against another. (Rashid, 1994, p. 38)

3. Soviet Ethnic Policies in Central Asia

Even most sceptical observers accepted the claim that modernization under the Soviet rule brought significant benefits to the region, notwithstanding the cost of transforming a feudal imperial backwater into a showcase of Soviet Socialism. The Soviet-style modernization was comparable in many respects to that introduced by Western imperial powers in their colonies, but it was more sweeping and was characterized by ideological and political constraints. A mass based education system, operating both in local languages and in Russian stimulated the emergence of modernized elites. Development of indigenous cultures was promoted, modern communications systems were developed, and a network of state-run social and health services was set up. However inadequate the results were by Western standards (or even in comparison with the Soviet West), and however staggering the price, this change meant progress in a society whose growth had been arrested in the Middle Ages, and it compared favourably with neighbouring countries.

Among the costs were the break-up of the region's natural unity and the destruction of the traditional society, which led to the suppression of Islam and violation of its cultural norms. It also meant the obliteration of successive generations of indigenous leaders who dared to defend local interests and deaths of millions during the collectivisation campaign. It also brought total subordination of local interests to Moscow. Caught between new Soviet (de facto Russian) values and their traditional Islamic roots, and their dependence on Moscow and their need for support based in old kinship and regional ties, the new elites acted as a go-between but did not fully identify either with the old or with the new community.

Central Asia was flooded by Russians, other Slavs, members of other groups in pursuit of a warmer climate and better wages, and by successive waves of involuntary settlers. "Enemies of the people", individuals, as well as entire social groups such as the "kulaks" and Soviet Germans and Crimean Tartars, were deported to the region. The Muslim masses, on the other hand, continued to dominate the countryside of cotton growing "kolkhozes" and "sovkhozes" and persisted in their traditional life, refusing a change that would mean an acceptance of foreign ways. The masses' social resistance can be measured by their lack of progress in learning Russian, the effective language of Universal Communication in the Soviet Union and the indispensable tool for progress up the social, political and economic ladder.

The alienation between the rural/traditional/indigenous and urban/modernized/immigrant communities created an ideal breeding ground for ethnic conflict that became visible with the post-Stalin thaw, when central control and repression mechanism were reduced and undermined. (Rakowska-Harmstone, 1991, pp. X-IX)

Soviet policies towards Central Asia can be periodised in four distinct policy phases following the civil war, although they were all aimed to achieve the same goal, full integration of the region into the Soviet system. Neglecting the details, each policy phase corresponded to the requirements of what the leadership perceived as the paramount needs of the time from the point of view of long-range integration of the region into the new Soviet state, periods of concessions altering with attacks on the Muslim society and traditions. Within the overall framework of the nationality policy applicable to all of the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union, the policy in Muslim areas was adjusted to take into account specific conditions there.

Two aspects of these policies which were implemented after 1956, were of great importance in Central Asia: the new drive for linguistic Russification, and a major effort to introduce new "Soviet customs and traditions" as the replacement for the old "reactionary" ones. The new drive for linguistic Russification in effect reversed Lenin's old policy of making all languages equal (Central Asia is a prime example of success in the effectiveness of the policy of the development of national languages), and aims to restore the Russian language to its old position of the imperial

language of “inter-nationality communication”. Efforts to make Russian everybody’s second language had been evident from the beginning, and in the thirties much was being made of its being the language of the “true” civilization. (Rakowska-Harmstone, 1983, pp. 24-39)

4. Education, Language and Re-Identification

The patriarchal and feudal way of life of the Turkestanis hardly aided the spread of literacy among the various segments of the population. The 1897 census shows that in Central Asia (including Kazakhstan) the percentage of literacy for the indigenous population among men was 4.2, and among women 0.5. The level of literacy remained low throughout the Revolutionary period and early Soviet rule. The Kazakhs had a literacy level of two per cent upon the assumption of Soviet power. The percentage of literate Kyrgyzs was one to two per cent, and of Uzbeks, 1.6 per cent. According to the 1920 census, the percentage of literate Turkmen males was 1.1 and a zero percentage was given for females (only 25 literate Turkmen women were counted). (Pennar & Bakalo, 1971, pp. 281-283)

Mass education served not only to create a more efficient work force, but also to politicise the population and thereby incorporate it into the new system. According to the first Soviet census (1926), the average rate of literacy amongst the Uzbeks, Tadjiks and Turkmen was less than 3 per cent, and amongst the Kazakhs and Kyrgyz 6 per cent. A massive programme of teaching, training and the provision of textbooks was initiated, and by 1932 it was estimated that some 50 per cent of the population had achieved a basic level of literacy. This had risen to almost 70 per cent by 1939 and in the 1970 census was recorded as over 99 per cent. Compulsory education for all children, male and female, was introduced, beginning with limited primary curriculum which was gradually increased to an eight-year, later a ten-year, and finally an eleven-year programme of study.

The policies of Soviet state was reinforced by the forms of graphic representation: in the 1920s, use of the Arabic script was still permitted, but it was replaced by the Latin script around 1930 and by the Cyrillic in 1940. (Akiner, 1994, p. 12)

Language policies of Soviets in Central Asia can be studied in three main periods : (1) 1917-38; (2) 1938-59; (3) 1959-85.

The first period, between 1917 and 1938, may be characterized as egalitarian. It saw enormous efforts to construct new alphabets, open non-Russian schools, and limit the role of the Russian language in the non-Russian areas. The model “national school” was one in which all subjects were taught in the national (native) language of the non-Russian pupils. In this period of “nativization” (*korenizatsiia*) the Russian language might be studied as a subject, but was not usually mandatory.

The second period was one of differentiated bilingual education. During this time Russian became a mandatory subject of study in the non-Russian schools, but the model “national school” remained one in which the non-Russian language served as the primary medium of instruction. It became acceptable for non-Russians to attend Russian-language schools. As educational attainment increased, and greater numbers of non-Russians attended secondary schools, the earlier differentiation of native-language schooling opportunities was more or less frozen into established policy.

The third period was one of highly differentiated bilingual education. It dated from the 1959 education law, which nominally changed the study of the Russian language by non-Russians from an obligatory to a voluntary act and gave parents the right to choose the language of instruction for their children. But, there was a sharp decrease in the 1960s and 1970s in the number of languages used as the primary medium of instruction, as well as in the higher grade level at which the non-Russian languages might serve in that capacity. To preserve their national languages as the medium of instruction, groups below the SSR level had to have a large population and be concentrated geographically. The use of the non-Russian languages for purposes of instruction became more closely linked to formal status in the federal system. (Anderson & Silver, 1994, pp. 108-109)

Russification policies conducted by Soviets had little effect on Central Asian people. According to the Survey conducted by Barbara Anderson and Brian Silver regarding ethnic re-identification, the twenty-six nationalities of the USSR, including Russians, may be classified into three main groups: (1) “re-identifiers”; (2) “groups with little change”; (3) “gainers”.

TABLE 1 : RATES OF ETHNIC RE-IDENTIFICATION AND HALVING

TIME

FOR THE COHORT AGED

0-38 IN 1959

	Annual Rate of Decline per 1,000	Halving Time in Years
A. Groups with Net Loss through Ethnic Re-identification between 1959 and 1970		
Karelians	17.2	40
Mordvinians	15.0	46
Udmurts	8.9	78
Komi	8.0	87
Chuvash	7.8	89
Mari	7.5	93
Bashkirs	6.8	103
Yakuts	5.9	118
Tuvinians	4.8	144
Buryats	3.4	203
B. Groups with Little Net Change in Ethnic Self-Identification between 1959 and 1970		
Kyrgyz	2.9	241
Estonians	2.2	320
Tadjiks	2.1	333
Tatars	1.9	370
Moldavians	1.4	505
Turkmen	1.3	525
Azerbaijanis	1.1	639
Latvians	1.1	655
Ukrainians	1.0	671
Uzbeks	.2	2,954
Belorussians	-	-
Kazakhs	-	-
Lithuanians	-	-
Armenians	-	-
C. Groups Gaining through Ethnic Re-identification between 1959 and 1970		
Georgians	-	-
Russians	-	-

Source: Barbara A. Anderson and Brian D. Silver, "Estimating Russification of Ethnic Identity among Non-Russians in the USSR," *Demography*, vol. 20, no. 4 (November 1983), pp.461-89.

Kyrgyz, Turkmen, Azerbaijanis, Uzbeks and Kazakhs all fall in the category of "Groups with little change". Since the annual rate of decline of these nationalities

spanned the zero point, it is plausible that there was no ethnic re-identification among these nationalities as a whole.

5. Economic Developments: Cotton, the ``White Gold``

Analysing the economic developments in Central Asia during the Soviet era in details is far beyond the scope of this study. Still, some words on cotton must be said in order to have a clear picture of the Region, since it shaped the Economic and Political developments of Central Asia during the Soviet period. Central Asia's economy was among the most specialized in the Soviet Union. In Central Asia, cotton is the king.

Cotton from Central Asia was one of the important exports of the USSR, which ranks among the world's leading exporters of this staple. In 1983 Uzbekistan alone produced almost as much cotton as the entire United States. Cotton exported from the USSR was sent to more than 30 countries. For the period of 1965-1983, the Soviet share of the world's production of cotton fiber rose from 15 to 21 per cent. According to data for 1983, the largest producer in the world was China, followed by the USSR, with the United States in third place. In the early 1980s, however, the volume of cotton exported by the USSR declined sharply: Cotton exports had risen by 55 per cent in the 1970s, but they fell by 25 per cent between 1980 and 1985. Production too declined, though not as drastically. In Uzbekistan for example, output fell only by 6 per cent.

Despite the favorable demographic conditions in Central Asia, cotton production had encountered steadily mounting problems of insufficient labor. The primary reason was that the rural population in Central Asia had been migrating to the cities in recent years; secondarily, the population that remained preferred other types of employment to the cultivation of cotton. Hence, it had become routine for cotton farms to recruit auxiliary labor to work in the cotton fields by mobilizing significant contingents of people from other sectors of the economy as well as school children and students, with prolonged diversion from their regular work and studies. Cotton had been cultivated on many fields, without interruption, for some 50 years and that

exhausted the nutrients in the soil. Tractors crossed a field up to 30 times a year. Cotton machines mercilessly compressed the soil, destroying its microorganisms. Because cotton has a low immunity to disease and infection, massive quantities of pesticides were used, killing every living thing in the fields.

The sowing of cotton also pushed out the other agriculture crops traditional to Central Asia, including fruits and vegetables, and pasture lands for livestock were cut back. Even the trees around peasants' houses were cut down to make way for cotton - and that amidst the scorching sun of Central Asia. Fertile soils were depleted, and the acreage under cultivation reached its absolute outer limits, given available water supplies. Yet Moscow, operating as ever on the principle that one must surpass the "attained level", constantly raised the plan targets.

Central Asia was the cotton base of the USSR, but it had only a minor role in the manufacture of cotton textiles. Uzbekistan produced some 70 per cent of the nation's cotton fiber, but it had a negligible share in textile output; just 2.7 per cent in 1940, 3.7 per cent in 1980, and approximately 4 per cent in 1984. Only 4 to 5 per cent of the region's cotton production remained there, the rest was shipped to the European part of the country, where more than 70 per cent of the USSR's output of cotton textiles was produced. Moreover, the largest textile factories in Central Asia (in Tashkent and Ferghana) had significantly better economic indices than the analogous plants in Moscow, Ivanova, and Vladimir oblasts of European Russia. The abundance of labour in Central Asia, increased by the large number of people outside the official labour force (especially among the female population), constituted an important argument in favour of establishing textile mills in the region. Indeed, providing employment opportunities (especially for the population of small towns, where industry was completely absent) was a critical economic and social desideratum for the region. (Rumer, 1989, pp. 62-74)

6. Political developments in Central Asia During the Soviet Period

Since 1920s, there have been periodic direct assaults on the existing status quo (producing turmoil and upheaval) followed by the center's retreat and retrenchment as

a new equilibrium took shape. The resulting accommodation registered Moscow's recognition of the need for some reconciliation in the wake of partial success, and sometimes in the face of abject failure. (Carlisle, 1991, p.93)

In the 1920s and 1930s tens of thousands of Central Asian people were deported to Siberia. Kazakhs and Kyrgyz nomads fled to China rather than surrender to the Red Army. More than half the livestock in Central Asia was destroyed, enormous tracts of land were rendered fallow by the killing of farmers, and the subsequent famines consumed much of the remaining population. The Basmachis (Anti-Soviet guerrillas) reappeared as a force in 1929, pushed out of semi-retirement in Afghanistan and Persia by the horrors inflicted upon their people by the collectivization programme. This programme was followed, between 1934 and 1938, by the Great Terror, the purges within the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) carried out by Stalin. Thousands of local communist leaders and cadres who had evolved from Jadids, Basmachis or soldiers in the Red Army into loyal communists were purged for being deviationists. Hundreds were put on trial and executed, with the result that the newly created Central Asian intelligentsia was decimated. Those communists suspected of promoting the interests of their nationality under the economic changes launched by Moscow were the first to be shot. Kazakhs and Kyrgyz were accused of being agents of British imperialism, while Turkmen were accused of promoting Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism.

The purges did not stop at the political elite. Writers and poets were executed. So were astronomers, biologists, scientists, doctors, engineers and military officers. People who had just struggled up the communist ladder by educating themselves were brought down, humiliated and executed. Of 700 writers, many of them from Central Asia, who met at the First Congress of the Union of Soviet Writers in 1934, only a few survived to see the Second Congress in 1954. Fewer than 2 per cent of the rank-and-file delegates to CPSU congresses in the 1920s still held their positions in 1939.

Thus it was that many Central Asian people in the private confines of their homes turned to Islam and the Sufi orders for spiritual sustenance.(Rashid, 1994, p. 30) Large parts of Kazakhstan, like Siberia, were turned into gulags. In 1937 in the vast Karlag complex of labour camps around Karaganda, there was a revolt by

inmates which was forcibly put down after 440 prisoners were shot dead. After the purges, came the World War Two, in which some 20 million Soviet citizens lost their lives, of whom again a considerable proportion were from Central Asia. Between 1920 and 1945 it is estimated that more than a quarter of the population of Central Asia died a violent death.

The war saw a relaxation of communist propaganda in Central Asia as Russian leaders mobilized the population on the basis of patriotism against the Germans. However, the end of the War saw a renewed tightening of communist control. Under Khrushchev in 1955, attacks against Islam in Central Asia intensified. Veil-burning ceremonies were given widespread publicity and Khrushchev revived the former Bolshevik 'Union of the Godless' in 1958, which shut down the few Islamic schools and mosques still open. Islamic weddings and funerals were banned, and in 1959 the end of the era of the veil was officially announced, with the ceremonial burning of the last veil in Bukhara. (Ibid. pp. 33-34)

The socio-economic structure of Central Asia was extraordinarily complex. It included several key - and contradictory - elements. Some key traits were quintessentially Soviet; the monopolistic and absolute authority of the party elite over all spheres of public life, the absolute control exercised over the nationalized economy, the rigid centralization of authority, and the population's subjection to terror and political apathy. All these elements were endemic to the Soviet system, but in Central Asia they had fused with clan and Islamic traditions to produce a phenomenon peculiar to Central Asian society. Though one can find analogues for particular aspects in the premodern and contemporary world, Central Asia nevertheless remains unique.

What is more, clan and tribal consciousness in Central Asia have not only survived, but have become even stronger in Soviet era. It is easy to see why; reinforcement and development of tribalism was a natural, spontaneous form of resistance to the assimilation policies that Moscow pursued in an effort to divide national communities. Clan unity and solidarity made possible spiritual and material survival under the adverse conditions of Soviet life. A majority of the national cadres remained loyal to their clan and tribe.

Religion was a further distinctive factor in Central Asian politics. In contrast to Russian Party members, the Central Asian Party cadres and nomenklatura elite, though theoretically Marxists and hence atheists, had never sundered their ties with people from their tribe and clan who remained devoted to Islam. As a result, Central Asia had been marked by a solid unity of elites and masses, despite Moscow's efforts to weaken Islam's grip on the population. Those efforts had been unavailing; indeed, Islam has not only remained firmly rooted in the masses, but has even gained a new foothold in the national elites.

The clan structure, with extraordinarily high degrees of tribal fealty, had created especially propitious conditions for the development of illicit economic activity and its corollary, organized crime. The Mafia-like clans formed such resilient units that even (apparatchiki) from Moscow were at a loss to smash this sticky web of tribal connections. (Rumer, 1989, pp. 147-149)

CHAPTER II

DEMOGRAPHIC AND ETHNIC ASPECTS OF CENTRAL ASIA UP TO 1991

A. ETHNIC ASPECTS AND MIGRATIONS

The Slavic immigration to Central Asia which started in 1870's and accelerated after 1880's, highly shaped the ethnic structures of today's Central Asian republics, and also greatly influenced their demographic aspects during the 20th Century. Taking into consideration of this fact, before analyzing the demographic aspects of the Region in Russian-Soviet period, we will start with the ethnic aspects and migrations in Central Asia for the same period.

1. Immigrations To Central Asia

Russians initially came to the area in the first half of the seventeenth Century, when the Cossacks set up posts on the western end of the Kazakh lands. (Olcott, 1996, p. 59) The mass migration of the Russians and the other Slavic people to Central Asia began in late 1870's and accelerated after 1880, the year which Central Asia fell completely under Tsarist Russia's domain

The 1897 census showed 197,420 Russians in the guberniia (principality) of Turkestan (including Transcaspia) of which 95,465 were in Semirechie oblast (province). By 1910 the number had risen to 382,688, of which 188,016 were in Semirechie, reflecting the attraction of this area of dry farming for the Russian peasant. There were large numbers of Russian Cossacks as well as peasants in the region and, around 1910, Cossacks were farming 1.6 million acres in Semirechie, while in 1908 the Russian settlers had occupied about 624,000 acres. The

only other oblast with a large Russian population was Sir Darya, which had 101,289 settlers in 1910, while the more densely populated oblasts of Ferghana and Samarkand, with their predominantly irrigated agriculture, had only attracted 29,000 and 23,000 Russians, respectively, by 1910.

By no means all of this Russian population of the Turkestan guberniia lived in rural areas, and the growth of the cities was to a considerable extent due to Russian immigration. Tashkent by 1914 had a large Russian section, built along European lines, with a population of 84,500 or 31 percent of the total population of 271,000, while Samarkand in 1908 had 11,650 Russians out of a total population of 80,700. Ferghana, which was established as an industrial center by the Russians, had a predominantly Russian population, with about 70 percent of the 1911 population of 11,000 being Russian. In the same year the 36,000 inhabitants of Vernyi included 26,000 Russians, while Frunze had a Russian population of 8,000 out of a total of 14,000.

The vassal states of Bukhara and Khiva began to attract a small core of Russian population. The 1897 census showed 12,150 Russians in Bukhara and 3,951 in Khiva. By 1911 there were 27,000 Russians in Bukhara state, including troops, of which 8,000 were in Charjuy, 6,000 in Termez, and 5,000 in Karki Kagan and 3,000 Russians, while the city of Bukhara itself had only about 2,000.

By the 1917 revolution a solid core of Russian population had developed in the whole area of Central Asia, and by 1911 about 40 percent of the total population of the Steppe oblasts were Russians, compared to only 6.3 percent of the total population of the guberniia of Turkestan. (Matley, 1994, p 105)

However they represented a trend which was to accelerate rapidly during the Soviet period , as can be seen from Table 2;

TABLE 2: ALIENS RESIDING IN CENTRAL ASIA

	1926 census	1939 census	1959 census
Russians and Ukrainians	2,726,000	-	7,300,000
Tartars	119,000	-	786,000
Germans	61,000	-	791,000
Koreans	-	73,000	213,000

Source; Ian Murray Matley, 1994, p.106.

For the same periods, the population of indigenous peoples of Central Asia can be seen from Table 3;

TABLE 3: CENTRAL ASIANS RESIDING IN CENTRAL ASIA

	1926 census	1939 census	1959 census
Kazakhs	3,968,000	3,099,000	3,581,000
Uzbeks	3,905,000	4,844,000	6,004,000
Tadjiks	979,000	1,229,000	1,397,000
Turkmens	764,000	812,000	1,004,000
Kyrgyz	763,000	884,000	974,000
Karakalpaks	146,000	186,000	173,000
Taranchis	53,000	-	-

Source; Ian Murray Matley, 1994, . p.107

In spite of lack of specific data, the drop in Kazakh population between 1926 and 1939 is explained due to the of loss of lives during the collectivisation campaign in Kazakhstan during the same period... The figures quoted in Table 2 show that the total Kazakh population of the Soviet Union (a few thousands live outside the boundaries of the Central Asian republic) decreased between 1926 and 1939 by 869,000 or by 21.9 percent.

Between January and March 1930 10 million peasant holdings were brought into the collective farm system across the Soviet Union . In Central Asia a rigid definition for kulaks (rich peasants) was impossible and at times anyone who owned a cow was termed a kulak and killed or deported. Nomads were forcibly

collectivised in massive roundups by the red army that resembles cattle roundups. More Kyrgyz and Kazakhs fled to China , while the Turkmen migrated to Afganistan, Iran and Iraq.` (Rashid, 1994,p. 54)

As a cosequence of these emigrations a spill over of Central Asian people in the neighbouring countries emerged

TABLE 4 : SPILL OVER OF ETHNIC POPULATIONS

	1978	1983
People's Republic of China		
Uzbeks	14,000	13,000
Tadjiks	20,000	26,500
Kyrgyz	120,000	115,000
Kazakhs	840,000	930,000
Iran		
Turkmen	550,000	650,000
Azerbaijani	5,800,000	6,200,000
Tadjiks	40,000	44,000
Afghanistan		
Uzbeks	1,300,000	1,500,000
Tadjiks	3,000,000	3,500,000
Kyrgyz	10,000	5-8,000
Turkmen	300,000	350,000
Turkey		
Turkmen	100,000	120,000

Source : Lee Scwarts, 1992, p.48.

The details given in the 1959 census show quite clearly the large number of Russians in the Central Asian region.

In Kazakhstan the census reported 4,014,000 Russians and 762,000 Ukrainians, who together made up 51 percent of the total population of the republic, as compared to 2,755,000 Kazakhs comprising about 30 percent of the total population. If to the figure for Russians and Ukrainians are added the total given for other nationalities in Kazakhstan who have come from outside the Central Asian area, it is clear that no less than 64 percent of the population is alien to the region. This predominance of foreigners is even more marked in the Tselinnyi Krai, where out of a total population of 2,753,100 in 1959, 46.2 percent were Russians, 14 percent were Ukrainians, 12.1 percent Germans, and only 19 percent were Kazakhs.

To a lesser extent, the same trend can be seen in the other Central Asian republics. In Kyrgyzstan in 1959 there were 624,000 Russians and 137,000 Ukrainians, together forming about 37 percent of the total population, while there were 837,000 Kyrgyz living within the boundaries of their own republic, making up only 40 percent of the total population, compared to 52 percent in 1939 and 66 percent in 1926. Most of the remaining population of the republic consisted of other Central Asian ethnic groups as well as some Tartars. Uzbekistan had 1,101,000 Russians and 88,000 Ukrainians at the same date, but these formed only 15 percent of the population, the 5,026,000 Uzbeks making up 62 percent of the total, compared with 65 percent in 1939 and 74 percent in 1926.

Turkmenistan is the only area where a slight gain over the Russian increase has been registered by the local population in recent years. The number of Turkmens living in their own republic rose slightly from 720,000 in 1926 or 72 percent of the total population, to 740,000 in 1939, or only 59 percent, as Russians and others moved into the area in greater numbers.

However, by 1959 the number of Turkmen in the republic reached 924,000 and formed 61 percent of the total population, a greater proportion than before the war. The number of Russians in the Turkmen republic did not increase significantly during this period, being about 226,000 or 18 percent of the population in 1939, and 263,000 or 17 percent in 1959." (Matley, 1994, pp.296-297)

Beginning in the 1950s and 1960s, however, the importance of migration in Central Asian population dynamics began to diminish. The local populations remained relatively immobile, retaining, if not increasing, their high rates of natural growth but still exhibiting practically no outmigration from their republic. The level of immigration to Central Asia from Slavic areas for the most part remained steady or declined, in either case lagging behind rates of natural growth. Thus, for example,

"...migration had accounted for more than 42 percent of Uzbekistan's total population growth from 1939-59, from 1959-70 it accounted for only about 10 percent, and from 1971-76, only about 4 percent. By 1979, 99 percent of each of the Central Asian titular nationalities were residing in Central Asia; fewer than 1 percent – or slightly over 100,000 people - were residing in the RSFSR. Indeed, the late 1970s to early 1980s saw for the first time a net emigration of Europeans out of Soviet Central Asia rather than into it, resulting in continued high population reproduction and a growth in the indigenous nationalities as a proportion of the total republican populations.

The 1989 census data have shown an increasing net immigration from Central Asia to other republics. Between 1979 and 1989, for example, more than 500,000 people emigrated out of Uzbekistan to other republics or roughly 11.2 percent of the population increase; in Kirghizia, this figure was roughly 20 percent of the natural increase, and in Turkmenistan, 11 percent of the increase." (Lubin, 1991, pp. 48,49)

The emigrants, however, continued to be overwhelmingly of the non-indigenous nationalities. Indeed, in addition to citing social, economic and political factors as accounting for low migration among the local populations, most Soviet demographers underscore the inter-republican migration among the indigenous. Central Asian nationalities can hardly be expected to increase before intra-republican mobility - especially migration from rural to urban areas - increases, and this, too, remains on an exceedingly low level. Thus today, while migration still accounts for a relatively small part of population change in Central Asia, the result has been to leave behind a more rapidly growing and ethnically homogeneous population than these republics have seen for some decades.

TABLE 5 : BALANCE OF MIGRATIONS, (000)

	1961-1970	1979-1989
Kazakhstan	431	-789
Uzbekistan	257	-507
Kyrgyzstan	126	-157
Turkmenistan	457	-850

Source; Valery A. Tishkov; 1995, p.291

a. Other Immigrations To Central Asia

Apart from the large numbers of Slavs who have appeared in the Central Asian region over the last hundred years, there are some smaller groups which are worthy of comment because of their unique character. Perhaps the most unusual of these groups has been the Korean. The 1959 census listed 139,000 Koreans in Uzbekistan, 74,000 in Kazakhstan, and 2,400 in Tadjikistan. Many of these Koreans had moved to Central Asia from the Far East in the 1930s, probably because of their resistance to collectivization and also possibly because of fears that they might prove to be an unreliable element in case of war with Japan. They were employed mainly in scattered areas where rice was grown.

The German population had grown in size considerably since 1926. In 1959 there were about 700,000 Germans in Kazakhstan, 40,000 in Kyrgyzstan, and 33,000 in Tadjikistan. About half the Germans in Kazakhstan lived in the area of the Tselinnyi Krai, many of them being Volga Germans, deported to the area like the Crimean Tartars during World War II when their republic on the Volga was abolished. Some were also no doubt prisoners-of-war who were never returned to Germany after the war.

Although they cannot be classified as one of the indigenous nationalities of Central Asia, the Tartars as a group have increased greatly in size and importance during the last hundred years. Many Tartars arrived during the Tsarist period as political or commercial agents of the Russians, who assumed, not always correctly, that the Tartars, being Muslims, would be acceptable to the Turkic-speaking Muslim people of Central Asia. Between 1897 and 1911 the number of Tartars in the guberniias of the Steppe and of Turkestan rose from 60,074 to 87,015, of which about two-thirds lived in the guberniia of the Steppe. By 1926 the number of Tartars in Central Asia had reached 119,000.

In the census of 1959 no fewer than 786,017 Tartars were recorded in Central Asia, of which 450,987 resided in Uzbekistan and 191,925 in Kazakhstan. This great increase in the Tartar population has without doubt accounted for not only the traditional emigration of numbers of Tartars from the Volga region to other parts of the Soviet Union and Central Asia in particular, but also by the deportation of the Crimean Tartars to Central Asia in punishment for alleged collaboration with the Germans during World War II. Unlike such groups as the Kalmyks and Chechen-Ingush, the Crimean Tartars have never been restored to their homeland, probably in view of the strategic and somewhat sensitive nature of the Crimean location, and continue to live among their Turkic-speaking fellows in Central Asia. (Matley, 1994, pp.110-111)

2. The Socio-Economic and Cultural Position of Russians

In Central Asia

The newcomers from Russia had played a major part in the development of agricultural production, in irrigation and expansion of arable land, in building railroads and towns, and in the emergence of heavy and mining industries in Central Asia

Under Soviet rule, the influx of migrants from Russia increased, owing mainly to the Soviet government's doctrine of accelerated industrialization, in which the new arrivals - specialists and workers - were largely instrumental. Engineers and technicians, scientific and medical personnel, professionals in education and the arts arrived in the cities of Central Asia and Kazakhstan. In the 1930s, settlements of deported populations from Russia and Ukraine were formed in different regions, mainly in Kazakhstan. During the war of 1941-45 a great number of factories complete with personnel were evacuated to Central Asia. Ninety large factories and about 1,000,000 people were moved to Uzbekistan alone. Many of those people stayed there after the war was over. In the postwar decades the stream of immigrants continued. In Uzbekistan, for instance, they accounted annually for eight-nine percent of the urban population growth. In large measure the influx to the cities and industrial regions was generated by extensive industrial development and housing construction (especially in Tashkent) and the workforce recruiting campaign for the new industries. The 1950s also saw a mass resettlement in Kazakhstan's 'virgin lands' of people from Russian rural areas; the Volga, Central Russia, and Western Siberia.

The Russians in Central Asia and Kazakhstan were employed primarily in the development of industry, transport and urban construction. Their social and professional pattern was basically different from the employment pattern of the local nationalities. Indeed, traditionally, it was mostly Russians who worked in industry, transport, construction and communications where their share exceeded their proportion in the working population many times over. Among the intelligentsia they comprised the majority of the specialists in technical fields and in the exact sciences. Only in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan was the percentage of Russians employed in agriculture were high; they worked mainly as machine operators and agricultural and animal

husbandry specialists. In contrast, people of the titular nationalities were predominantly employed in agriculture. In the cities, Russians worked mostly in trade and the services, among white-collar workers they comprised the majority of managerial personnel, cultural workers and the professional intelligentsia.

“According to the 1979 data, the share of Russians employed in industry ranged from 22.4 to 32.6 percent of the entire working population in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tadjikistan and Turkmenistan, and in construction, from 12.2 to 18.2 percent. For the titular nationalities the respective figures were from 9.2 to 11.1 percent in industry and from 4.8 to 8.4 in construction. The proportion of Russians working in agriculture was 10.2 percent in Kyrgyzstan, and from 2.7 to 3.4 percent in the other republics, while the figures for the titular nationalities were from 52.6 to 56.9 percent. According to the 1989 data, 22.4 percent of the Kazakh population and 52.6 percent of the Russian population of Kazakhstan were employed in industry. The share of Russians engaged in agriculture was steadily decreasing and in 1989 stood at 17.7 percent in Kazakhstan, 6.8 percent in Kyrgyzstan, 0.6 percent in Uzbekistan, and 0.7 percent in Turkmenistan and Tadjikistan. However, Russians accounted, respectively, for 20.4 percent, 13.9 percent, 4.2 percent, 5.9 percent, 3.9 percent of farm managers and agricultural specialists and 26.8 percent, 17.5 percent, 1.3 percent, 2.1 percent, 2.2 percent of machine operators.” (Tishkov, 1995, P.292)

**TABLE 6 : THE PERCENTAGE OF RUSSIANS AMONG
SPECIALISTS, SENIOR MANAGERS AND HIGHLY SKILLED
WORKERS 1979-1989**

‘URBAN POPULATION PARTICIPATION INDEX’

Republic	Specialists and senior managers		Highly skilled workers	
	1979	1989	1979	1989
Uzbekistan	128	121	115	113
Turkmenistan	128	129	101	101
Kazakhstan	98	99	107	105
Kyrgyzstan	107	106	100	99

The table was compiled on the basis of the USSR censuses of 1979 and 1989.

* The participation index is calculated by the formula:

$$\frac{\text{Percentage of Russians in this category of manpower}}{\text{Percentage of Russians in the gainfully employed population}} \times 100$$

The higher the participation index, the greater the Russian representation in the given category. The value of the index below 100 shows that Russian representation in the given category is lower than in the gainfully employed population.

Source; Vallery A.Tishkov; 1995, p.293.

The social and professional differentiation along ethnic lines was and remains greater than in other regions of the former USSR. The local population is keeping within its traditional village-agrarian economy niche, although in the past few decades it made a dramatic breakthrough into the more prestigious spheres of management, public education, public health and law, and quite recently also into trade and commerce, light industry and urban services. (Tishkov, 1995, p. 293)

In the former USSR Russians enjoyed for decades the comfortable status of a people dominating all the major socio-cultural areas. The Russian language and culture

were reference points for all culture that was transmitted forcibly from the centre to the periphery via the educational system, the mass media, party and government structures, and especially via the system of training managerial and intellectual élites, and military service. Under these circumstances, Russians residing in the union republics had no overwhelming motivation to learn the languages of the titular nationalities and integrate into the non-Russian ethno-cultural environment.

- Apart from the socio-political and language situation that was comparatively favourable for the local Russians, possibilities for meeting their wider cultural requirements also existed in Central Asia and Kazakhstan up until the USSR's disintegration. All levels of education were available in Russian, and the media and cultural activities (cinema, theatre, libraries, etc.) were predominantly Russian. Russian was the language of office work and social services.

As a result, in Central Asia and Kazakhstan Russians (about half of whom were first generation settlers) basically retained their cultural profile, even though influenced to an extent by some of the local population's values. As far back as the 1970s, for instance, analysts noted that Russians in Central Asia married at an earlier age than in other regions, especially as compared to the Baltic republics. This undoubtedly was influenced by the marriage behaviour of the local nationalities.

Although there were intensive inter-ethnic contacts and a high level of linguistic Russification in all former Soviet republics, in this region the Russians and the titular population kept a cultural distance from one another and were in effect isolated communities within their own social niches and circles of everyday contacts. Mixed marriages between Russians and people of the local nationalities were and remain rare. Marriages between Russians and Ukrainians, Germans, Tartars and Koreans were much more frequent.

“The percentage of Russians with a free command of the titular nationality's language is insignificant, from 4.5 percent in Uzbekistan to 0.9 percent in Kazakhstan, as compared to 38 and 34 percent respectively, in Lithuania and Armenia.” (Ibid., p. 294)

3. Ethnic Structure Of Central Asian Republics Up To 1991

The immigration of Russians and Other Slavic people to Central Asia as well as Tatars, Koreans, Jews, Germans, came to an end in the early 1970's. Starting from the late 1970's, a reverse migration pattern, emigration of "European" population from Central Asian republics to western parts of the USSR is observed. Up to the complete disintegration of the USSR in 1991, this pattern was rather slow, but increased geometrically after this year, which again reshaped the ethnic and cultural structure of the new independent states of Central Asia.

During the last two decades of the USSR, in 1970's and 1980's, the ethnic structures of the former Soviet Socialist Republics of Central Asia was rather complex. The immigration of Slavic and other nationalities to the Region which lasted almost 100 years, and the political-social engineering methods that is used by Stalin during the determination of the borders of these republics was the main reasons of this complexity. As a result of these consequences, in 1970's and 1980's, all the Central Asian republics had considerable amount of Russian minorities - as in the case of Kazakhstan, Slavic people were in majority – and again, all the Central Asian republics were having other minorities, which ethnically tied up to other neighbouring republics. Tadjiks living in Southern Uzbekistan, Uzbeks living in Southern Kazakhstan, Southern Kyrgyzstan and in Turkmenistan can be cited in this respect.

In this section of the study, we will try to analyse the ethnic structures of Central Asian republics, up to their independence in 1991.¹

¹ In some of the Tables, related figures to Azerbaijan is also given without comments for the purpose of comparison.

TABLE 7: PERCENTAGES OF NATIONAL GROUPS IN EACH CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLIC'S POPULATION

National Group M: Muslim	Uzbek SSR		Kazakh SSR		Kyrgyz SSR		Turkmen SSR	
	1970	1979	1970	1979	1970	1979	1970	1979
Uzbeks (M)	64.7	68.7	1.6	1.8	11.3	12.1	8.3	8.5
Kazakhs (M)	4.6	4.0	32.4	36.0	0.8	0.8	3.2	2.9
Kyrgyz (M)	0.9	0.9	-	-	43.8	47.9	-	-
Tadjiks (M)	3.8	3.9	-	-	0.7	0.7	-	-
Turkmen (M)	0.6	0.6	-	-	-	-	65.6	68.4
Karakalpaks (M)	1.9	1.9	-	-	-	-	-	-
Tartars (M)	4.8	4.2	2.2	2.1	2.4	2.0	1.7	1.5
Uighurs (M)	-	-	0.9	1.0	0.8	0.8	-	-
Dungans (M)	-	-	0.1	0.2	-	-	-	-
Koreans	1.3	1.1	0.6	0.6	-	-	-	-
Russians	12.5	10.8	42.8	40.8	29.2	25.9	14.5	12.6
Ukrainians	1.0	0.7	7.2	6.1	4.1	3.1	1.6	1.3
Belorussians	-	-	1.5	1.2	-	-	-	-
Jews	0.9	0.6	-	-	-	-	-	-
Armenians	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.1	1.0
Azerbaijani (M)	-	-	-	0.5	-	-	-	0.9
Others	3.0	2.6	10.7	9.7	6.9	6.7	4.0	2.9
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Sources:

1. USSR Central Statistical Administration, Narodnoe Khoziaistvo SSR v 1970 g. (USSR National Economy in 1970) (Moscow, Statistika, 1971), pp. 18-21;
2. USSR Central Statistical Administration, Naselenie SSR, po dannym Vsesoiuznoi perepisy naseleniia 1979 goda (population of the USSR; data from the 1979 All-Union Census) (Moscow, Izd. Politcheskoi Literatury, 1980), pp. 27-30.

As can be seen from the TABLE 7, Turkmen and Uzbeks are holding the majority in their republics; 65.6 % in 1970, 68.4 % in 1979 in Turkmenistan, and 64.7 % in 1970, 68.7 % in 1979 in Uzbekistan. Both had considerable amount of Slavic (Russian, Ukrainian, Belorussian) minorities, 16.1 % in 1970, 13.9 % in 1970 in Turkmenistan, and 13.5 % in 1970, 11.5 in 1979 in Uzbekistan.

In Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan the indigenous people were in minority. Only 32.4 % in 1970, 36.0 % in 1979 of the population was ethnically Kazakh in the republic of Kazakhstan. The corresponding figures was 43.8 in 1970, 47.9 in 1979 for the Kyrgyzstan.

We can observe that the percentage of the Russian population is decreasing slightly in all republics between 1970-1979. We can explain this phenomena by the low fertility rate of the Russians and the continuing high fertility rate of the indigenous peoples of the Central Asian republics. Also, emigration of the Russian and other “European” population from the Region which started in the late 1970’s, played a role in this pattern.

Uzbeks are the second biggest minority in Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan, 12.1 % and 8.5 % in 1979, respectively. In Uzbekistan, Tatars 4.2 % and Tadjiks 3.9 %, are the main minorities after Russians.

Slavic population consists 48.1 % of Kazakhstan and 29.0 % of Kyrgyzstan in 1979.



TABLE 8 : POPULATION OF ETHNIC GROUPS BY REPUBLICS, 1989
(Ethnic Groups Having A Population Of More Than 500,000)

Ethnic Groups	General Total	Total	In Turkish Republics				
			Azerbaijan	Kazakhstan	Kyrgyzstan	Uzbekistan	Turkmenistan
Russian	146,156	9,524	392	6,228	917	1,653	334
Ukrainian	44,184	1,225	32	896	108	153	36
Belorussian	10,037	238	8	183	9	29	9
Uzbek	16,696	15,342	1	332	550	14,142	317
Kazakh	8,136	7,470	2	6,535	37	808	88
Georgian	3,980	30	14	9	1	5	1
Azerbaijani	6,771	5,988	5,805	90	16	44	33
Lithuanian	3,066	14	1	11	-	2	-
Moldovan	3,355	46	2	33	2	6	3
Latvian	1,458	5	-	3	-	1	1
Kyrgyz	2,528	2,419	-	14	2,230	175	-
Tadjik	4,216	998	1	26	34	934	3
Armenian	4,623	497	391	19	4	51	32
Turkmen	2,728	2,664	-	4	1	122	2,537
Estonian	1,024	4	-	3	-	1	-
Tartar	6,632	993	28	328	70	468	39
German	2,031	1,103	-	958	101	40	4
Chuvash	1,816	22	-	22	-	-	-
Bashkir	1,434	82	-	42	-	35	5
Jew	1,369	108	25	18	6	65	-
Mordvinian	1,140	42	-	30	-	12	-
Polish	1,115	60	-	60	-	-	-
Czech	949	50	-	50	-	-	-
Udmurt	740	16	-	16	-	-	-
Mari	663	12	-	12	-	-	-
Avar	592	44	44	-	-	-	-
Osset	593	13	1	4	-	6	2
Others	8,705	7,121	274	538	172	1,058	79

Source: State Institute of Statistics (SIS), Republic of Turkey, Statistical Indicators, Republics of the Former USSR, 1993, pp. 26-28.

TABLE 8 indicates similar results as the previous one, this time in more detailed ethnic scale and in absolute terms.

It is interesting to note that the German population in Kazakhstan reaches to 958,000, and in Kyrgyzstan to 101,000 in 1989. These figures were higher in 1979 census results, since it is known that considerable amount of German population left Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan between 1979-1989. This is also true for the Jewish population of the Central Asian republics.

TABLE 9: PERCENTAGES OF ETHNIC GROUPS POPULATION BY REPUBLICS, 1989

Ethnic groups	General Total	In Turkish Republics					
		Total	Azerbaijan	Kazakhstan	Kyrgyzstan	Uzbekistan	Turkmenistan
Russian	100.0	6.6	0.3	4.3	0.6	1.1	0.2
Ukrainian	100.0	2.8	0.1	2.0	0.2	0.3	0.1
Belorussian	100.0	2.4	0.1	1.8	0.1	0.3	0.1
Uzbek	100.0	91.9	0.0	2.0	3.3	84.7	1.9
Kazakh	100.0	91.8	0.0	80.3	0.5	9.9	1.1
Georgian	100.0	0.8	0.4	0.2	0.0	0.1	0.0
Azerbaijani	100.0	88.4	85.7	1.3	0.2	0.6	0.5
Lithuanian	100.0	0.5	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.1	0.0
Moldovan	100.0	1.4	0.1	1.0	0.1	0.2	0.1
Latvian	100.0	0.3	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.1	0.1
Kyrgyz	100.0	95.7	0.0	0.6	88.2	6.9	0.0
Tadjik	100.0	23.7	0.0	0.6	0.8	22.2	0.1
Armenian	100.0	10.8	8.5	0.4	0.1	1.1	0.7
Turkmen	100.0	97.7	0.0	0.1	0.0	4.5	93.0
Estonian	100.0	0.4	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.1	0.0
Tatar	100.0	14.1	0.4	4.9	1.1	7.1	0.6
German	100.0	54.3	0.0	47.2	5.0	2.0	0.2
Chuvash	100.0	1.2	0.0	1.2	0.0	0.0	0.0
Bashkir	100.0	5.7	0.0	2.9	0.0	2.4	0.3
Jew	100.0	7.9	1.8	1.3	0.0	4.7	0.0
Mordvinian	100.0	3.7	0.0	2.6	0.0	1.1	0.0
Polish	100.0	5.4	0.0	5.4	0.0	0.0	0.0
Czech	100.0	5.3	0.0	5.3	0.0	0.0	0.0
Udmurt	100.0	2.2	0.0	2.2	0.0	0.0	0.0
Mari	100.0	1.8	0.0	1.8	0.0	0.0	0.0
Avar	100.0	7.4	7.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Osset	100.0	2.2	0.2	0.7	0.0	1.0	0.3
Others	100.0	24.4	3.1	6.2	2.0	12.2	0.9

Source: SIS..., pp. 30-32.

The most interesting fact which can be observed from table 9 is that the main body of the indigenous people of Central Asia were living in their own republics, despite of the great incentives given to them by the central government in Moscow to make them immigrate to other parts of the USSR, especially to Siberia. The main purpose of those incentives was to distribute the peoples of Central Asia to other parts of the USSR thus, assimilating them, and to utilize the surplus manpower of Central

Asia created by high fertility rates in these republics in vast areas of Siberia, where manpower is in great need to extract its natural resources.

In 1989, 80.3 % of the Kazakhs, 88.2 % of the Kyrgyz, 84.7 of the Uzbeks and 93.0 % of the Turkmen were living in their republics.

TABLE 10: ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF KAZAKHSTAN BY YEARS, (000)

	Census Years				
	1939	1959	1970	1979	1987
Total Population	6,082	9,295	12,009	14,684	16,464
Kazakhs	2,307	2,787	4,234	5,289	6,535
Russians	2,447	3,972	5,522	5,991	6,227
Germans	92	660	858	900	957
Ukrainians	656	761	933	898	896
Tatars	107	192	288	313	328
Uzbeks	102	136	216	263	332
Belorussians	31	107	198	181	183
Uighurs	35	60	121	148	185
Koreans	96	74	82	92	103
Azerbaijans	12	38	58	73	90
Dungans	7	10	17	22	30
Others	190	498	482	514	598
	In Percentage of the total Population				
	100	100	100	100	100
Total Population	100	100	100	100	100
Kazakhs	37.9	30.0	32.6	36.0	39.7
Russians	40.2	42.7	42.5	40.8	37.8
Germans	1.5	7.1	6.6	6.1	5.8
Ukrainians	10.8	8.2	7.2	6.1	5.5
Tatars	1.8	2.1	2.2	2.1	1.9
Uzbeks	1.7	1.4	1.7	1.8	2.0
Belorussians	0.5	1.2	1.5	1.2	1.1
Uighurs	0.6	0.6	0.9	1.0	1.1
Koreans	1.6	0.8	0.6	0.6	0.6
Azerbaijans	0.2	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.6
Dungans	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2
Others	3.1	5.4	3.7	3.6	3.7

Source: Uchoti Prepis Nasaleniya Kazakhstana, 1996, p. 55.

Table 10 shows how the Kazakh indigenous population percentage in the total population decreased between 1939 and 1959, although it increased in absolute terms. Russians population percentage in the total population increased from 40.2 % in 1939

to 42.7 % in 1970, then to 37.8 % in 1987, although in absolute terms Russian population increased by 705,000 during the same period. Absolute means of decrease observed in Ukrainian and Belorussian populations starting from 1979 census years.

The German population grew considerably from 1939 to 1959 due to the exile of the Germans living in the USSR to the Region during the Second World War.

TABLE 11: ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF KAZAKHSTAN, 1989-1992

Ethnic group	1989		1992	
	000	Percent	000	Percent
Kazakhs	6,585	39.7	7,297	43.2
Russians	6,270	37.8	6,169	36.5
Ukrainians	896	5.4	875	5.2
Germans	962	5.8	696	4.1
Uzbeks	332	2.0	364	2.2
Tatars	332	2.0	335	2.0
Others	1,209	7.3	1,156	6.8

Source : Goskomstat Kazakhstan, 1993, P. 112

Table 11 shows the detailed ethnic structure of the Kazakh SSR in 1989 and Republic of Kazakhstan in 1992 which has the most complicated ethnic structure among Central Asian Republics. A significant increase of the Kazakh population is observed in a rather short period of time. The number of Russians, Ukrainians and Germans are decreasing in the same period.

TABLE 12: SLAVIC PROPORTION OF URBAN POPULATION IN KAZAKHSTAN, 1993, (%)

City	Slav	City	Slav
Almaty	59.1	Akmolinsk	54.3
Karaganda	55.6	Petropavlovsk	77.4
Chimkent	39.3	Kustanai	60
Semipalatinsk	59.5	Temirtau	66.5
Ust-Kamenogorsk	81.5	Uralsk	65
Dzhambul	43.2	Shevchenko	54

Source: Goskomstat Kazakhstan, 1993, P. 115

There are significant differences in the ethnic composition and the urban-rural distribution of groups in various regions of the country. These resulted, among others, from natural and climatic conditions, as well as from the historical settlement and economic development of each area.

The majority of Kazakhs live in the oblasts of southern, western and central Kazakhstan. The oblasts of Atyrau and Kzyl-Orda, whose natural and climatic conditions are among the most adverse, are predominantly Kazak.

The Slavic, and more broadly, European population living in the northern and central regions of the country, as well as in the Capital, form a strong territorial and demographic base. This includes the territory adjacent to the Russian Federation, with which Kazakhstan shares an extensive border. Moreover, the Slavs and Europeans in general, make up a substantial majority of the urban population of many predominantly Kazak oblasts. According to demographers, this situation will remain unchanged for the next few years. Since towns are the centers of economic, social, political and cultural life, it is likely that the Slavic population will retain positions of strength and importance in the Republic.

**TABLE 13: ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF UZBEKISTAN, TURKMENISTAN
AND KYRGYZSTAN, 1979-1989**

Uzbekistan					
Nationality	Population (000)		1989 as % of 1979	Percent of Total	
	1979	1989		1979	1989
Total Population of Which :	15389	19810	128.7	100	100
Uzbeks	10569	14142	133.8	68.7	71.4
Russians	1666	1653	99.3	10.8	8.3
Tadjiks	595	934	157.0	3.9	4.7
Kazakhs	620	808	130.3	4.0	4.1
Karakalpaks	298	412	138.3	1.9	2.1
Tatars	531	468	88.1	3.5	2.4
Crimean Tatars	118	189	160.6	0.8	1.0
Kyrgyz	142	175	123.0	0.9	0.9
Koreans	163	183	112.3	1.1	0.9
Ukrainians	114	153	134.6	0.7	0.8
Turkmen	92	122	131.7	0.6	0.6
Turks	49	106	—	0.3	0.5
Jews	74	65	88.6	0.5	0.3
Armenians	42	51	119.3	0.3	0.3
Uighurs	29	36	122.9	0.2	0.2
Germans	40	40	100.7	0.3	0.2
Azerbaijanis	60	44	74.3	0.4	0.2
Bashkir	26	35	134.6	0.2	0.2
Other	161	194	120.5	1.1	1.0

Turkmenistan					
Nationality	Population (000)		1989 as % of 1979	Percent of Total	
	1979	1989		1979	1989
Total Population of Which :	2765	3523	127.4	100	100
Turkmen	1892	2537	134.1	68.4	72.0
Russians	349	334	95.6	12.6	9.5
Uzbeks	234	317	135.8	8.5	9.0
Kazakhs	80	88	110.4	2.9	2.5
Tatars	40	39	97.3	1.5	1.1
Armenians	27	32	119.6	1.0	0.9
Azerbaijanis	24	33	141.7	0.9	0.9
Baluchis	19	28	152.2	0.7	0.8
Belorussians	5.3	9.2	174.3	0.2	0.3
Persians	4.8	7.6	158.2	0.2	0.2
Kurds	3.5	4.4	124.6	0.1	0.1
Germans	4.6	4.4	97.2	0.2	0.1
Bashkir	3.9	4.7	119.5	0.1	0.1
Other	40.6	49	120.7	1.5	1.4

(continued)

Nationality	Kyrgyzstan Population (1000s)		1989 as % of 1979	Percent of Total	
	1979	1989		1979	1989
Total Population of Which :	3523	4258	120.9	100	100
Kyrgyz	1687	2230	132.2	47.9	52.4
Russians	912	917	100.5	25.9	21.5
Uzbeks	426	550	129.1	12.1	12.9
Ukrainians	109	108	98.8	3.1	2.5
Germans	101	101	100.2	2.9	2.4
Tatars	72	70	97.7	2.0	1.6
Kazakhs	27	37	136.0	0.8	0.9
Uighurs	30	37	123.3	0.8	0.9
Tadjiks	23	34	144.4	0.7	0.8
Koreans	14	18	126.8	0.4	0.4
Azerbaijanis	17	16	91.7	0.5	0.4
Kurds	9.5	14	149.4	0.3	0.3
Belorussians	7.7	9.2	119.7	0.2	0.2
Jews	6.3	5.6	88.8	0.2	0.1
Other	81	111	137.0	2.3	2.6

Source: Data from the State Committee for Statistics (Goskomstat), Moscow, May 1990.

Table 13 shows the detailed ethnic composition of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan in 1979 and 1989. Percentage of indigenous populations of these republics increased significantly between 1979 and 1989 census years; Uzbeks from 68.7 % to 71.4 %, Turkmens from 68.4 % to 72.0 %, and Kyrgyz from 47.9 % to 52.4 %.

Percentage decrease of Slavic population in all three republics are significant for the same period.

TABLE 14: PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION OF MUSLIM ORIGIN AND MUSLIM TITULAR NATIONALITY, BY TOTAL, URBAN AND RURAL POPULATION OF THE FORMER UNION REPUBLICS, 1979 AND 1989

Republic	Total Population		Urban Population		Rural Population	
	1979	1989	1979	1989	1979	1989
Percentage Population of Muslim Origin						
Azerbaijan	82	87	72	80	95	96
Kazakhstan	43	47	27	33	61	67
Kirgiziia	66	72	43	51	81	85
Tajikistan	86	90	62	70	99	99
Turkmeniia	84	88	68	74	99	99
Uzbekistan	86	89	68	74	98	99
Thereof: Percentage Titular Nationality						
Azerbaijan	78	83	68	77	89	90
Kazakhstan	36	40	21	27	54	57
Kirgiziia	48	52	23	30	63	66
Tajikistan	59	62	43	51	67	68
Turkmeniia	68	72	48	54	87	87
Uzbekistan	69	71	48	54	83	83

Source: Tolds, 1995, P. 233

Table 14 gives a brief summary of Table 13. Here, we can observe the same pattern; the Muslim and more specifically, the indigenous population percentages had been increased between 1979 and 1989, in all the Central Asian republics.

The percentage increase is much significant in urban areas where Slavic population is living and already started to emigrate from the Region during the decade.

**TABLE 15: INCREASE IN NUMBERS OF RUSSIANS IN CENTRAL ASIA
FROM 1959-1989, (000)**

Republics	1959	1970	Change (%)	1979	1989	Change (%)
Uzbekistan	1.092	1.473	+35	1.665	1.652	-0.8
Kazakhstan	3.972	5.522	+39	5.991	6.226	+3.9
Kyrgyzstan	624	856	+37	911	916	+0.5
Tadjikistan	263	344	+31	395	386	-2.3
Turkmenistan	263	313	+19	349	334	-4.3

Source: Carrere D'Encausse, 1979, P. 54.

Table 15 shows the rigid increase of Russians between 1959-1970 in Central Asia. The lowest increase in this period took place in Turkmenistan.

The pattern was completely reverse for the period 1979-1989. In Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan the number of Russians decreased in absolute terms, and in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan the percentage increase of Russians fell to symbolic quantities.

B. DEMOGRAPHIC ASPECTS OF CENTRAL ASIA UP TO 1991

1. Demographic Changes In The Region Up To 1960

Prior to the Russian conquest of Central Asia, little was known about the number of people living in the region.

“Not until the Tsarist census of 1897 did accurate population statistics for the guberniia of Turkestan first appear. At this date the total population for the region (including Semirechie) was 5,281,000. An estimate of the population of the same area in 1911 was 6,493,000, giving an increase of 23 percent during the period, or an annual rate of over 1.5 percent. Assuming a rate of increase of 1 percent per annum for the period 1885-1897, this would give a total population in 1885 for the guberniia of Turkestan (in terms of the 1911 boundaries) of some 4.7 million, which makes the estimate for that date look very low, even allowing a very generous addition of one million inhabitants of Semirechie and other territories which were possibly excluded from this estimate.” (Matley, 1994, p. 93)

The census of 1897 did not include the vassal khanates of Bukhara and Khiva, and, until their incorporation in the Soviet state, figures for their population were recorded locally on the basis of family units.

“In 1885 the population of Bukhara was calculated by the Russians to comprise 2 million and that of Khiva 400,000 inhabitants. In 1913 the Bukharan population was put at 2.5 million, or not less than 2.25 million and probably not as high as 3 million. The population of Khiva then was said to be 550,000. Adding these estimates to the 1909 figure for the guberniia of Turkestan of 6.48 million produced a total of 9.53 million population of the guberniia and the khanates at that date. Another estimate of the Bukharan population in 1913-14 was

3.6 million, and for Khiva 800,000. Adding these to the total population of the guberniia of Turkestan of 6,761,000 gives a total population of 11,161,000 for the guberniia and the khanates in 1913-14.'' (Ibid, p. 94)

If the 1897 census total of 5,281,000 inhabitants for the guberniia of Turkestan is accepted as the only reliable report for the prerevolutionary period, the figure of 6,761,000 for the same area in 1913-14 represents an annual increase of about 1.6 percent, which seems reasonable for the period under consideration. The high totals for Bukhara and Khiva are probably more reliable than the lower, as underestimation of the population of less-developed countries was as common at that time as it is today. Whatever the accuracy of these various estimates may be, there is little more to go on in attempts to arrive at an accurate picture of the prerevolutionary population of Central Asia.

Direct comparison of the population of Central Asia during the Soviet period with that of the prerevolutionary period is impossible because of the boundary changes which took place in the region in 1924 and 1925. The area described in Soviet publications as "Central Asia" (Uzbekistan, Tadjikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan), and so designated in the population censuses from 1926 on, is smaller than the total area of the old guberniia of Turkestan plus the states of Bukhara and Khiva by the removal from it of parts of Semirechie and Sir Darya oblasts and their addition to the republic of Kazakhstan. Between the censuses of 1926 and 1939 several changes took place in the areas of the republics, which make direct comparison of the population figures given in the two censuses difficult.

However, Soviet statisticians have made allowances for these boundary changes, as well as for minor changes occurring between 1939 and 1959, so it is possible to compare directly the population totals for Central Asia as given in Table 16. Titular nationalities within the republics are also shown.

**TABLE 16 : POPULATION OF CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS WITHIN
BOUNDARIES OF SEPTEMBER 17, 1939**

Republics	1926 census	1939 census	Average ann. growth 1926-39 (percent)	1959 census	Average Ann. growth 1939-59 (percent)
Kazakh SSR	6,074,000	6,094,000	-	9,310,000	2.7
Kazakhs	3,713,000	6,094,000	-2.2	9,310,000	0.2
Kyrgyz SSR	1,002,000	1,458,000	3.5	2,066,000	2.1
Kyrgyz	661,000	760,000	1.2	837,000	0.5
Tadjik SSR	1,032,000	1,484,000	3.4	1,980,000	1.7
Tadjiks	619,000	890,000	3.4	1,051,000	0.9
Turkmen SSR	998,000	1,252,000	2.0	1,516,000	1.1
Turkmens	720,000	740,000	0.2	924,000	1.3
Uzbek SSR	4,565,000	6,336,000	2.9	8,106,000	1.4
Uzbeks	3,299,000	4,080,000	1.8	5,026,000	1.2
Central Asia	13,671,000	16,624,000	2.2	22,978,000	1.9
(Soviet Union)	(147,000,000)	(190,678,000)	(1.2)	(208,827,000)	(0.5)

Source: Ian Murray Matley, 1994, P.95.

By the time the Red Army had defeated the Whites, the economy of Central Asia was well and truly destroyed, its population dramatically reduced, and 50 per cent of the cultivated land lost. Between 1917 and 1920 the nomads lost an estimated 1 million horses and camels (two thirds of their stock), 7 million sheep and goats (three quarters of the total stock) and half their cattle. In settled areas peasants lost up to 60 per cent of their animals.

Before Central Asia had recovered from this devastation, it was to be subjected to forced collectivization, a process in which more than 1 million people died. The deaths of the nomads, the kulaks (rich peasants) and urban dwellers are computed for the whole of the Soviet Union, the total deaths come to some 6.5 million people. Collectivization was to coincide with the devastating famine of 1932-33 in which another 7 million people died across the Soviet Union.

World War Two had a dramatic and positive effect on Central Asia. The German invasion forced Stalin to move industries away from Russia. He did so in a remarkable but draconian fashion, in which factories were lifted in their entirety including the labour force and moved to locations East of the Ural mountains, in Central Asia and Siberia. Stalin also shifted entire ethnic groups eastward merely on the suspicion that

they might fraternise with the advancing Germans. Between October 1943 and June 1944 people of seven small national groups were accused of treason and deported to Central Asia and Siberia. They included 1 million Volga Germans, 408,000 Chechens, 92,000 Ingush, 75,000 Karachays, 43,000 Balkars, 134,000 Kalmyks and 200,000 Crimean Tartars. Most of them were only allowed to return to their homelands after the 1957 Twentieth Party Congress in Moscow. (Rashid, 1994, pp. 54-55)

a. Urbanisation Process In The Region Up To 1960's

With the movement of industrial rather than rural workers into the region it is not surprising to find that the rate of urbanization increased rapidly during World War II. This can be seen in Table 17.

TABLE 17: PERCENT OF URBAN POPULATION , 1926-1959

	1926	1939	1959
Kazakh SSR	9	28	44
Kyrgyz SSR	12	19	34
Tajik SSR	10	17	33
Turkmen SSR	14	33	46
Uzbek SSR	22	23	34
(Soviet Union)	(18)	(32)	(48)

Source: Population statistics from 1926 on are from various statistical year-books as well as from I. Iu. Pisarev, *Narodnonaselenie SSR* (Moscow, Sotsekgiz, 1962), and P.G. Pod"iachikh, *Naselenie SSR* (Mosco, Gosizdatpolitlit, 1961). Mentioned, ALLWORTH, 1994, P. 97.

This compares with an urban population in the guberniia of Turkistan of 13.8 percent of total population in 1897 and 16.3 percent in 1911 (Allworth; 1994, p. 97).

Table 18 gives some idea of the different rates of growth and decline experienced by some of the major cities and towns of southern Central Asia since the beginning of the period of Russian control.

Many Central Asian cities of some importance during the pre-revolutionary period either stagnated during on the Soviet period or actually lost population.

“Such were Bukhara and Qarshi (Behbudiy), the second city of the emirate, with an estimated 70,000 inhabitants in 1911 and only 19,000 in 1959. Osh, with about 52,000 inhabitants in 1914, had only 65,000 by 1959, and Shahr-i Sabz dropped from an estimated 33,000 in 1910 to 16,000 in 1959. The ancient city of Khiva dropped from its 1910 population of 20,000 to 17,000 in 1959, being eclipsed by Urganch, which had 44,000 inhabitants in 1959. Mari (Merv) on the other hand has shown a steady, if not spectacular growth, from an estimated 2,000 inhabitants in 1870 to 16,000 in 1910 and 48,000 in 1959.”
(MATLEY, 1994, P. 99)

TABLE 18: POPULATION OF KEY CITIES IN SOUTHERN CENTRAL ASIA

	1877 (Schuyler)	1897 census	1910 Russian estimate	1914 Russian estimate	1926 census	1939 census	1959 census
Tashkent	120,000	156,000	234,000	271,000	324,000	50,000	911,000
Alma Ata	12,000	23,000	36,000	43,000	45,000	222,000	455,000
Dushanbe	-	-	20,000	-	5,000	83,000	224,000
Frunze	-	7,000	14,000	14,000	37,000	93,000	217,000
Samar kand	30,000	55,000	90,000	98,000	105,000	136,000	195,000
Ashkhabad	-	19,000	44,000	-	52,000	127,000	170,000
Chimkent	-	11,000	16,000	20,000	21,000	74,000	153,000
Andijan	20,000	47,000	76,000	87,000	73,000	85,000	129,000
Namangan	-	62,000	74,000	81,000	74,000	80,000	122,000
Jambil	-	12,000	19,000	20,000	25,000	63,000	113,000
Khokand	75,000	82,000	114,000	120,000	69,000	85,000	105,000
Bukhara	-	75-100,000	100,000	-	47,000	50,000	69,000

Source: Matley, 1994, p. 98.

TABLE 19: ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF CAPITAL CITIES OF CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS AND KAZAKHSTAN (AS PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL POPULATION OF THE CITY)

Capital City	Indigenous National Groups		Russians		Other Immigrant Groups	
	1959	1970	1959	1970	1959	1970
Alma-Ata (Kazakh SSR)	8.5	12.1	73.0	70.3	18.5	17.6
Tashkent (Uzbek SSR)	33.8	37.0	44.0	40.8	22.2	22.2
Dushanbe (Tajik SSR)	18.9	26.3	47.6	42.0	33.5	31.7
Ashkhabad (Turkmen SSR)	29.4	38.3	50.0	42.6	20.6	19.1
Frunze (Kyrghyz SSR)	9.1	12.3	68.6	66.1	22.3	21.6

Source: B.M. Ekkel, "Opređenje indeksa mozaichnosti natsional'nogo sostava respublik, kraev i obslastei SSR" (Definition of the index of "mosaicity" of the national composition of republics, regions and provinces of the USSR) *Sovetskaia Etnografiia*, no. 2 (March-April) 1976, p. 38. Mentioned, Harmstone, 1983, P. 21.

One of the reasons for the loss of population in some of the cities, as can be seen from Table 18, and the relatively slow growth of others between 1914 and 1926., was the disastrous famine of 1919. It is not possible to deduce these losses from the census figures because of the considerable changes in administrative areas which occurred between the two dates, but local nationalist leaders quote an official figure of 1,114,000 dead in southern Central Asia, and state that probably about one-third of the population, or three million people, died during the famine. (Chokayev, 1931, P. 410. Ment. Matley; 1994, P. 100). However, the larger figure seems high and in any comparison of the census figures it is difficult to account for such a great loss of life.

Most of the cities with a striking rate of growth during the Soviet period have been centers of industry and administration, often with no significant economic function during the pre-Russian period. Some of these cities were established during the Tzarist period, such as Farghana (Skobelev, Novyi Margelan), Krasnovodsk, Frunze (Bishkek), Alma Ata (Vernyi), Termez, and Kagan (Novaia Bukhara). Frunze, originally a Khokand fort, Alma Ata, and Termez achieved some importance at an early time as Russian military posts, the first two later developing into important administrative and

industrial centers. Krasnovodsk was primarily a port and railroad town, while Kagan and Farghana were small industrial centers. When the railroad was extended to Bukhara in 1907 Kagan lost its reason for existence, but Farghana has continued to grow from an estimated 13,000 people in 1914 to 80,000 in 1959, reflecting its importance as a petroleum-refining and cotton-ginning center and having the growth of its three important industrial neighbors, Andijan, Namangan, and Khokand.

Chimkent, one a trade center between the nomads of the plains and the sedentary farmers, owes its increased population in the Soviet period to its importance as a processing center for the metallic ores from the nearby Qaratau, and is the largest producer of lead in the Soviet Union. Jambil (Auliye Ata), once considered in the 1870s as a possible capital for the guberniia of Turkistan, has also become an important industrial center during the Soviet period, and has a large superphosphate plant, sugar refinery, and footwear factory (Matley, 1994, p. 101).

Of all the cities of Central Asia Tashkent has shown the most remarkable growth. Although the exact date of the city's founding is not known it is probable that a settlement existed on the site of present-day Tashkent in the first or second century B.C. The location of this settlement in the valley of the Chirchik River was favorable for the development of trade links between the inhabitants of the mountains and the plains as well as between the sedentary farmers and the nomads. These factors account for the rise of Tashkent as a trade and handicraft center of some significance before 1865, but a center of only secondary importance when compared with Bukhara, Samarkand, or Khokand. The rapid growth of Tashkent during the Tzarist period was due to its selection as the administrative center of the guberniia of Turkistan, and the development of the Trans-Caspian and Orenburg-Tashkent railroads was also instrumental in ensuring the further economic growth of the city. Tashkent became, during this period, the largest city of Central Asia and its main administrative, trade, and industrial center.

During the Soviet period the expansion of Tashkent, now the capital of Uzbekistan, has continued at an even greater rate than before. Added to its administrative and economic functions are those of a major center of education with the foundation of a large university and other educational establishments. Industrialization

has proceeded speedily, and a present about half the labor force of the city is employed in industry with about a quarter employed in government and educational establishments. Its convenient location in regard to the capitals of the other Central Asian republics, whether by design or accident, enables this center of Russian domination to exercise a strong economic influence over the whole of the Central Asian region.

In contrast to Bukhara, Samarkand has maintained its importance as a trade center throughout both the Tsarist and Soviet periods. Once the railroad reached Samarkand in 1888, having bypassed Bukhara, the former developed more rapidly and during the Soviet period became one of the largest industrial centers in Uzbekistan, apart from Tashkent and the industrial cities of the Farghana Valley.

It should be noted that the cities of Andijan and Khokand, apart from their present industrial significance, also owed their growth in the prerevolutionary period to their importance as trade and administrative centers for the Farhgana Valley. Andijan became one of the termina points of the Trans-Caspian Railroad in 1898, while Khokand had been the capital of the khanate and the administrative center of an uezd in czarist times, which accounts for its rapid growth during the prerevolutionary period. Khokand lost its place as an administrative center after the revolution to the rising industrial center of Farghana, and suffered a drop in population. The growth of its cotton-ginning industry and the addition of metalworking and chemical fertilizer industries have helped to revitalize the city, and in recent years its population has again been on the increase (Ibid. pp. 101-104).

2. Demographic Changes In The Region Between 1960-1991

Beginning in the 1960s, demographic trends in the Soviet Central Asian republics have been marked by fundamental changes in population size and composition: the total republican populations began to grow rapidly, and the local nationalities began to comprise an increasing proportion of these total populations. These changes were due to

a high rate of natural growth and low mobility among the indigenous populations, and to a lower fertility level and declining mobility among the Slavs.

The more rapid growth of the total population was in sharp contrast with other parts of the USSR, where both the effects of past "demographic catastrophes" (two world wars, collectivization, purges, etc.) and declining fertility levels led to a decline in the rate of population growth. In Uzbekistan, Tadjikistan and Turkmenistan, for example, throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the total populations grew at least three times faster than they had during the previous two decades: while Uzbekistan's population had risen by 28 percent over the twenty-year period 1939-59 (from 6.3 to 8.1 million people) it rose by almost 90 percent over the following twenty-year period, from 8.1 million people in 1959, to 15.4 million people in 1979. Likewise, while the population of Turkmenistan grew by 16 percent between 1940 and 59, it grew by more than five times that rate, or by 82 percent between 1959 and 79. And similar patterns of overall population growth were witnessed in Tadjikistan and, to a slightly lesser degree, in Kyrgyzstan. By contrast, the population of the RSFSR grew by 8 percent and 17 percent during the same time span. Between 1979 and 89, population increase remained roughly what it was during the preceding ten-year period. Thus, between 1959-70, 1970-79, and 1979-89, levels of population growth in the Central Asian republics were generally between three and four times the average for the USSR as a whole, and two to three times more rapid than they had been during the previous two decades, as can be seen from Table 20 and Table 21;

**TABLE 20: POPULATION SIZE AND PERCENTAGE GROWTH,
CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS, RSFSR, AND THE USSR, 1940-89**

Republics	Total Population (in thousands)					Percent Growth		
	1940	1959	1970	1979	1989	1940-59	1959-79	1979-89
Uzbekistan	6551	8119	11,799	15,389	19,810	23.9	89.6	28.7
Turkmenistan	1302	1516	2159	2765	3523	16.4	82.0	27.4
Kyrgyzstan	1528	2066	2934	3523	4258	35.2	70.8	20.9
RSFSR	110,098	117,534	130,079	137,410	147,022	6.8	17.0	7.0
USSR	194,077	208,827	241,720	262,085	285,762	7.6	25.7	9.0

Source: Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSR v. 1983 godu, P. 8.

**TABLE 21: TOTAL POPULATION, ANNUAL GROWTH RATE
AND POPULATION DENSITY**

Republics	Population '000			Area 1000 Km ²	Annual pop. Growth 1970-1989	Population density	
	1970	1989	1990			1970	1990
USSR	241,720	286,734	288,624	22,275.7	9.0	10.9	13.0
Turkish republics	35,018	51,303	52,133	3,937.9	20.1	8.9	13.2
Azerbaijan	5,117	7,038	7,131	86.6	16.8	59.1	82.3
Kazakhstan	13,009	16,536	16,691	2,717.3	12.6	4.8	6.1
Kyrgyzstan	2,934	4,290	4,367	198.5	20.0	14.8	22.0
Uzbekistan	11,799	19,905	20,322	447.4	27.5	26.4	45.4
Turkmenistan	2,159	3,534	3,622	488.1	25.9	4.4	7.4

Source: State Institute of Statistics (SIS), Republic of Turkey; Statistical Indicators, Republics of the Former USSR; 1993, p. 20.

As it can be noticed from Table 20, Kazakhstan is excluded from other Central Asian Republics for the period 1940—1989. This is due to the fact that, according to the Soviet concept, Kazakhstan was not considered as a part of Central Asia, but a different and unique entity. That is why, in all statistical data obtained directly from Soviet statistics, does not includes Kazakhstan.

Since the aim of this study is not to discuss the reasons of this “artificial” division, we will directly give the figures for Kazakhstan for the corresponding period as it is stated in the Soviet statistics.

**TABLE 22: POPULATION OF KAZAKHSTAN BY CENSUS YEARS &
URBAN-RURAL DISTRIBUTION**

Census Year	Total Population (000)	Urban Population %	Rural Population %
1913	5,597	10	90
1926	6,037	9	91
1939	6,082	28	72
1959	9,295	44	56
1970	13,009	50	50
1979	14,684	54	46
1989	16,537	57	43

Source : Uchoti Prepis Nasaleniya Kazakhstana, 1996, p. 55

The level of the population in Kazakhstan decreased noticeably during the war years due to a reduction of the birth-rate, a proliferation of infectious diseases and an increase in the death-rate. The Second World War caused a series of demographic complications: the sex-age structure of the population was upset, the number of marriages decreased and the population's rate of reproduction fell. At the same time, the structure of the population was affected by the influx of workers from other Soviet Republics to Kazakhstan for the industrial enterprises, research organisations, and institutes of science and culture thus rapidly increased the urban population.

The mass campaign of development of the Virgin Lands in the 1950s resulted in the resettlement to Kazakhstan of hundreds of thousands of people, mainly from Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. The campaign took place at a time when the Volga Germans and other ethnic groups were being resettled in Kazakhstan and when prisoners released from the concentration camps decided to remain in the Republic – which contributed to the proportion of ethnic Kazaks being well below the levels of 1926-1930. While between 1950 and 1970 the average annual population growth was approximately 325,000, the proportion of Kazaks in comparison with the overall population continued to decline. At the time of the 1989 population census, Kazaks constituted only 39.7% of all residents of the republic (see: Table 10).

Kazakhstan's demographic profile has been shaped by various factors. The extensive social investments in education and health, made after the Russian revolution, led to major structural changes in society, such as increased life expectancy and lowered mortality rates. Female participation in the labour force was increased. Combined with improvements in health indicators living standards and literacy rate, the collective impact on fertility behaviour was substantial. The natural rate of growth of Kazakhstan's population declined due to such modernising influences. Another important factor has been the enormous impact of migration on the demographic balance of Kazakhstan. This physically large territory has historically been sparsely populated, the low density, especially in relation to its vast resources, has periodically attracted migrants.

In sum, historically Kazakhstan is not burdened by a population growth problem, on the contrary, its vast territory with a low population density was mitigating some economic problems.

As can be seen from Table 20 and Table 21, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan demonstrated the highest population growth in Central Asia starting from 1960. Table 23 and Table 24 gives the population growth of these republics in more details for selected years.

TABLE 23: MIDYEAR POPULATION OF UZBEKISTAN BY YEARS

(000)

Years	Total Population	Urban Population	Rural Population
1979	15565.1	6414.0	9151.1
1980	15951.9	6552.2	9399.7
1981	16359.4	6735.5	9623.9
1982	16792.8	6914.7	9878.1
1983	17013.0	6991.5	10021.5
1984	17461.8	7209.6	10252.2
1985	17925.7	7293.2	10632.5
1986	18422.6	7473.9	10948.7
1987	18936.1	7671.9	11264.2
1988	19429.4	7920.4	11509.2
1989	19880.2	8119.0	11761.2
1990	20322.3	8304.0	12018.3
1991	20708.2	8366.1	12342.1

Source: Chislenost Naseleniya Respublika Uzbekistan Gosudarstvenniy Department Statistiki, 1998; pp. 6-14.

TABLE 24: POPULATION OF TURKMENISTAN BY YEARS**(By the end of the year, 000)**

Years	Total Population 000	Urban Population 000	Rural Population 000	Urban %	Rural %
1941	1,336	476	860	36	64
1959	1,516	700	816	46	54
1970	2,159	1,034	1,125	48	52
1971	2,218	1,059	1,159	48	52
1976	2,555	1,229	1,326	48	52
1979	2,759	1,323	1,436	48	52
1981	2,897	1,385	1,512	48	52
1982	2,970	1,412	1,558	48	52
1983	3,042	1,443	1,599	47	53
1984	3,118	1,477	1,641	47	53
1985	3,197	1,515	1,682	47	53

Source: Turkmenistan v Sifrah, 1985, p. 5.

The striking rates of population growth in Central Asia – for decades the highest of any region in the USSR- may be explained by a combination of factors which still operate: high fertility, with the traditional preference for large families (typically five to six or more children) and the rural character of most indigenous communities, combined with the typically young age of brides at marriage. In sharp contrast to the average size of families of recent generations of Russians and other Europeans settled in Central Asia, the larger Muslim families have gradually served to increase the proportion of the indigenous nationalities in each of the four republics.

a. Fertility And Birth Rates

The Muslims marry early, their divorce rate is the lowest, and they opt for a greater number of children than any other group in the ex-USSR. A USSR survey conducted in the seventies (Harmstone, 1983, p.22) among married women to find their preferences for an ideal number of children, revealed that Muslim women, even those resident in urban areas, preferred six children or more, as contrasted to European women's preference for two or three children. In fact fertility and family size seemed to have increased in the sixties: the average size of rural Uzbek families increased from 4.8

in 1959 to 5.8 in 1970, and the number of women who received aid from the state for bearing seven or more children ("Mother-Heroine") in 1975 was 6.7 times the 1958 figure, while the number of women of child-bearing age increased in the same period by only 1.5 times. A survey of 1,500 women in two oblasts (provinces) of Uzbekistan published in 1978 showed an average of 7 children per women. All of this means that the Muslim population of Central Asia grows at about three times the rate of the European population (Ibid. , 1983, p. 22).

From 1940 to 1988, the birth rate in the RSFSR (Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic) declined by more than half, and in the USSR as a whole, by more than one third. By contrast, despite some fluctuations, throughout this almost fifty-year period, birth rates in the Central Asian republics in 1979 and 1988 were about the same level they had been in 1940 and 1959. Natural growth in the Central Asian republics, while reaching a peak during the 1960s, was about the same level in 1988 as it had been in 1970 – and in some cases, such as in Tadjikistan , it was higher.

TABLE 25: VITAL STATISTICS FOR CENTRAL ASIA, THE RSFSR, AND THE USSR, 1940-1988

(per 1000 population)

Republic	1940			1960			1970			1980			1988		
	BR	DR	NG	BR	DR	NG	BR	DR	NG	BR	DR	NG	BR	DR	NG
Uzbekistan	33.8	13.2	20.6	39.8	6.0	33.8	33.6	5.5	28.1	33.8	7.4	26.4	35.1	6.8	28.3
Tajikistan	30.6	14.1	16.5	33.5	5.1	28.4	34.8	6.4	28.4	37.0	8.0	29.0	40.0	7.0	33.0
Turkmenistan	36.9	19.5	17.4	42.4	6.5	35.9	35.2	6.6	28.6	24.3	8.3	26.0	36.0	7.8	28.2
Kirgizia	33.0	16.3	16.7	36.9	6.1	30.8	30.5	7.4	23.1	29.6	8.4	21.2	31.2	7.4	23.8
USSR	31.2	18.0	13.2	24.9	7.1	17.8	17.4	8.2	9.2	18.3	10.3	8.0	18.8	10.1	8.7
RSFSR	33.0	20.6	12.4	23.2	7.4	15.8	14.6	8.7	5.9	15.9	11.0	4.9	16.0	10.7	5.3

BR; Crude Birth Rate, DR; Crude death Rate, NG; Natural Growth rate

Source: TSSU, Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSR ve 1983 godu (Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1984), pp. 32-33. Goskomstat SSR, Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSR v 1988 godu (Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1989), P. 26.

Against a background of generally high fertility, vast disparities in patterns of natural growth among the nationalities accounted largely for the ethnic shifts among the populations. In 1989, the birth rate among the indigenous population of the Uzbek SSR

was twice as high as among the Europeans living in this republic. This is certainly supported by data for Uzbekistan for the intercensal period 1959-70: while the birth rate for Uzbekistan as a whole in 1970 was quite high - at 33.5, close to twice the USSR average - it was more than twice as high among the Uzbeks (39.2 per thousand) as it was among the Russians (19.3 per thousand) in Uzbekistan, and was significantly higher among the Asian populations than among the Slavs as a whole.

TABLE 26: CHANGES IN THE CRUDE BIRTH RATE BY NATIONALITY, UZBEKISTAN, 1959-70

Nationality	Birth Rate		1970 as Percentage of 1959	Percentage Increase/Decline 1959-70
	1959	1970		
Russians	23.7	19.3	81.0	-19.0
Ukrainians	26.0	23.0	88.4	-11.6
Belorussians	34.4	25.1	73.0	-27.0
Kazakhs	34.3	36.9	107.6	+ 7.6
Uzbeks	41.7	39.2	94.0	- 6.0
Tajiks	38.2	34.3	89.8	-10.2
Kirgiz	29.4	31.6	107.5	+ 7.5
Turkmen	32.1	32.8	102.2	+ 2.2
Karakalpaks	39.1	33.5	85.7	-14.3
Other	36.0	22.8	63.3	-36.7
Total	37.0	33.5	90.5	- 9.5

Source: R. Mulliadzhanov, *Naselenie Uzbekkoi SSR*, P. 117.

Similarly, the decline in fertility that occurred in Uzbekistan in the 1960s and 1970s occurred largely among the European nationalities living there - i.e., among those nationality groups with the lowest birthrates in the first place. As illustrated in Table 26 for example, between 1959 - 70, birth rates among the Russians living in Uzbekistan declined by 19 percent, falling from 24 to 19 per thousand in the eleven-year period; during the same time period, birthrates among the Central Asians in Uzbekistan declined by one-third to one-half as much, and from a much higher rate. The Uzbek birth rate declined by 2.5 percent, from 41.7 to 39.2 per thousand; the Tajik, from 38 to 34 per thousand; and the birthrates among the Kazakhs, Kirgiz and Turkmen populations living in Uzbekistan, already high in 1959, actually rose, by 7.6, 7.5, 2.2 percent respectively, over the same eleven-year period. Thus, between 1959 and 1970,

Uzbekistan's European population exhibited large declines in population reproduction from an already comparatively low level, while the Asian populations were characterized by more moderate declines, relatively stable rates, or even by slight rises.

More fragmentary data suggest that differentials in birthrate declines by nationality remained high well into the 1970s and 1980s. Another set of nationality data, for example – again for Uzbekistan – illustrates the vast differentials between the Slavic and Central Asian nationalities between 1970-78. According to these data, the annual crude birth rates among the indigenous Central Asians averaged between 40 and 45 births per thousand in the 1960s, and except for the Kirgiz, where the drop was more dramatic, fell to between 38 and 42 births per thousand. Among the Russians in Uzbekistan, on the other hand, the corresponding drop was from 19.0 to 16.5 per thousand, levels similar to those among the Slavic nationalities as a whole. According to these statistics, therefore, the Central Asian birth rate was almost two and one-half times higher than that of the Russians, and had declined more slowly than the Russian birthrate by comparison with the preceding decade. As illustrated, even by the late 1980s, Central Asian birthrates in the USSR remained very high, and wide disparities between Slavic and Asian birthrates had not significantly diminished.” (Lubin, 1991, pp. 46-47).

In 1979, average family size in Uzbekistan was 6.2 people, a rise from 4.6 people in 1959. Among Uzbeks, more than 43 percent of all Uzbek families were comprised of seven or more members. Among Russians in Uzbekistan, on the other hand, average family size was about half that of the Uzbeks, and only 1 percent of all Russian families contained seven or more members. As illustrated in Table 27, similar disparities were exhibited in Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, and to a lesser extent in Kyrgyzia.

**TABLE 27. AVERAGE FAMILY SIZE BY NATIONALITY,
CENTRAL ASIA AND THE RSFSR, 1979**

Republic and Nationality		Average Family Size	Families with seven or more children as percent of total families of given nationality
Turkmenistan	Total	5.5	32.4
	Turkmen	6.3	44.7
	Russian	3.2	1.2
Uzbekistan	Total	5.5	32.2
	Uzbek	6.2	43.2
	Russian	3.3	1.7
Tajikistan	Total	5.7	35.5
	Tajik	6.6	48.4
	Russian	3.2	1.2
Kyrgyzstan	Total	4.6	20.3
	Kirgiz	5.7	35.4
	Russian	3.3	1.5
RSFSR	Total	3.3	1.9
	Russian	3.2	1.0

Source: Chislennost i Sostav Naseleniia SSR no Dannym Vsesoiuznoi Perepisi Naseleniia 1979 goda, PP. 288-89.

Likewise, total fertility rates in the Central Asian republics and among the Central Asian nationalities – while declining, as shall be discussed in the coming section – are likely to remain high well into the next century. Fertility rates in the Central Asian republics in 1979-80 were at about the same level they had been at in 1958-59. While these rates declined in the late 1970s and early 1980s, in many instances this decline was slight and not evident in some of the most productive age groups, such as among those in their early twenties. Further decline is projected for the coming decades. But current data suggest that the rate and magnitude of fertility declines has so far been relatively slight; they have occurred only after a rise in the mid-1970s and from a very high base; and they will certainly not be enough to offset a generally high rate of population reproduction in the near future. As Uzbek demographers stated in 1989, the high population growth of the population of Central Asia, will be maintained well into the foreseeable future. By the end of the 1980s, the

exceedingly high birthrates and population structures of the four Central Asian republics suggested that overall population growth from natural increase, particularly among the Central Asian nationalities, would remain high for many years to come (Ibid, pp. 47-48).

Central Asia has the highest birthrates in the Soviet Union, and women there expect to give birth to large families. However, according to a study conducted in 1985, they actually bear fewer children than they expect.

“This survey asked how many children married women ages 18-44 expected to bear. The average figure nation-wide was 2.5, whereas Turkmen women reported that they expected to bear 6.3 children, Tajik women 5.9 children, Kirgiz and Uzbek women 5.6 children, and Kazakh women 4.3 children. For every thousand women nation-wide only 51 said that they wanted to have 6 or more children, whereas 593 Turkmen women, 510 Tajik women, 437 Uzbek women, 430 Kirgiz women, and 231 Kazakh women responded positively to this question” (OLCOTT, 1991, P. 297).

Findings of Borisov for the year 1989 exposes similar figures, as can be seen from Table 28.

TABLE 28: AVERAGE NUMBER OF CHILDREN EXPECTED (INCLUDING ALREADY BORN) BY CURRENTLY MARRIED WOMEN OF MUSLIM TITULAR NATIONALITIES OF THE FORMER UNION REPUBLICS, BY AGE GROUPS, 1985

Nationality	Age of married women				
	20-24	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44
Total population					
Azerbaijanis	3.44	3.59	4.02	4.39	4.93
Kazakhs	3.48	3.71	4.24	4.83	5.65
Kyrgyz	4.98	5.15	5.85	6.42	6.98
Tajiks	5.44	5.85	6.61	7.43	7.47
Turkmen	5.91	6.03	6.49	7.12	7.13
Uzbeks	5.11	5.28	5.80	6.29	6.52
Urban population					
Azerbaijanis	2.97	3.11	3.42	3.65	3.89
Kazakhs	2.97	3.06	3.45	3.73	4.44
Kyrgyz	3.84	3.92	4.36	4.60	5.09
Tajiks	4.42	4.51	4.97	5.72	6.17
Turkmen	4.81	4.88	5.43	5.78	5.88
Uzbeks	4.05	4.16	4.60	5.05	5.29
Rural population					
Azerbaijanis	3.97	4.28	4.98	5.59	6.20
Kazakhs	3.78	4.13	4.75	5.50	6.21
Kyrgyz	5.36	5.64	6.37	7.05	7.37
Tajiks	5.78	6.40	7.29	8.18	8.02
Turkmen	6.33	6.45	6.88	7.55	7.48
Uzbeks	5.52	5.76	6.38	6.96	7.13

Source: V.A. Borisov, Naseline mira: Demograficheskii spravochnik, 1989, PP 43-44

Not surprisingly, Olcott's study revealed that women with more education have fewer children. (Olcott, 1991, p.239) Unfortunately the data are available only by republic and not by nationality, and in each case the birth rate for the republic as a whole is lower than that of the titular nationality. However given that the overwhelming majority of the population of Tadjikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are indigenous Central Asians the data from these three republics is of particular value.

In Tadjikistan women with only primary education had an average of 5.3 children, those with incomplete secondary education 4.0 children, and those with higher education 1.7 children. In Turkmenistan the respective averages were 4.7, 4.0 and 1.8 respectively; and in Uzbekistan 5.0, 5.0 and 2.0.

These data support the conclusions of early studies, most particularly the research of the Uzbek demographer O.B. Ata-Mirzaev, whose research from the late 1970s showed a clear correlation between the educational level of an Uzbek woman and the number of children that she bore. The average number of children borne by Uzbek women in his sample with higher education was 2.3 children, compared to 5.1 by women with only primary or incomplete secondary education. (Ibid, P. 239).

Many different demographic indicators are necessary for an overall assessment of fertility dynamics. Among these is the average number of children ever born to women at various ages. A well known demographer, Mark Tolds, in his recent publication 'Modernization of Demographic Behavior in the Muslim Republics of the Former USSR' studies the demographic trends in Central Asia and finds some interesting results, which concludes that fertility levels in Central Asia had been falling since 1970's and 1980's considerably. Since this publication also includes detailed demographical data regarding the Region, we will directly quote some of his comments and findings.

Comparison of the 1979 and 1989 census results shows that in Muslim titular nationalities average number of children ever born to a woman fell for all ages between 20 and 44. In many cases this decrease was very pronounced. For example, at ages 30-44 the average number of children ever born to Azerbaijani and Kazakh women decreased by one child, at ages 35-39 by 1.7 children for Kazakh women and 1.4 for Azerbaijani women, 1.2 for Kyrgyz women, and by one child for Turkmen and Uzbek women.

Completed fertility, which is usually measured at ages 45-49, also fell among Azerbaijanis and Kazakhs, but in 1989 was still higher among all other nationalities than it had been in 1979. However, this rise was caused by an increase in marital fertility in Soviet Central Asia in the 1960s. The women aged 45-49 in 1989 was at their most fertile in the 1960s. This indicator is dependent, at each age, on the fertility history of that particular cohort." (Tolds. 1995, p. 233)

**TABLE 29: AVERAGE NUMBER OF CHILDREN EVER BORN TO WOMEN
OF MUSLIM TITULAR NATIONALITIES OF THE FORMER
UNION REPUBLICS,(a) 1979 AND 1989**

Nationality	Age of Women in Respective Census						
	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	45-49
Azerbaijanis							
1979	0.02	0.61	2.19	3.51	4.76	5.32	5.46
1989	0.03	0.57	1.58	2.54	3.38	3.97	4.65
Kazakhs							
1979	0.02	0.66	2.16	3.71	5.52	6.22	6.23
1989	0.03	0.63	1.70	2.75	3.80	4.75	6.09
Kyrgyz							
1979	0.03	0.98	2.88	4.58	6.37	7.00	6.50
1989	0.04	0.88	2.30	3.75	5.14	6.21	7.32
Turkmen							
1979	0.02	0.83	2.90	4.63	6.41	7.12	7.11
1989	0.02	0.54	2.18	3.98	5.42	6.38	7.20
Uzbeks							
1979	0.04	1.04	3.00	4.67	6.13	6.67	6.68
1989	0.04	0.96	2.52	3.98	5.16	6.00	6.71

(a) Inside respective former union republic

Sources: 1979 and 1989 censuses - Mark Tolts; 1995, p.234

To attain an overall assessment of the fertility level for a given year, demographers use the total fertility rate (TFR). This indicator is the summary of all the age-specific fertility rates for the given year, and it signifies the average number of children that a woman would bear in her lifetime, on condition that the current fertility level remain constant throughout her fertile period (usually from 15 to 49).

“During 1978-79 to 1988-89, the TFRs fell among all analysed Muslim nationalities for their total, urban and rural populations. The drop was as much as 1.0-1.1 children on average per each Azerbaijani and Kazakh woman, and about two children per each rural Kyrgyz, Turkmen and Uzbek woman.

For an assessment of the overall level of their demographic modernization by the end of the 1980s, we compared the TFRs of former Soviet Muslims with those of Middle Eastern and North African populations for the same period. In 1988-89, the TFR was 2.9 for Azerbaijanis and 3.6 for Kazakhs; there are no such low levels in the Muslim countries, which we compared. Even in the well-known examples of Muslim demographic modernization the TFRs were higher: in 1986-90, 3.8 in Turkey and 3.9 in Tunisia.” (Ibid. P. 236)

**TABLE 30: TOTAL FERTILITY RATES OF MUSLIM TITULAR
NATIONALITIES OF THE FORMER UNION REPUBLICS,(a)
1978-79 AND 1988-89**

Nationality	1978-79	1988-89	1988-89 as % of 1978-79
Total population			
Azerbaijanis	3.93	2.94	75
Kazakhs	4.68	3.58	76
Kyrgyz	6.67	4.83	72
Turkmen	6.55	4.90	75
Uzbeks	6.22	4.66	75
Urban population			
Azerbaijanis	3.16	--	--
Kazakhs	3.74	3.03	81
Kyrgyz	4.30	3.34	78
Turkmen	5.58	4.66	84
Uzbeks	4.29	3.72	87
Rural population			
Azerbaijanis	4.77	--	--
Kazakhs	5.21	4.07	78
Kyrgyz	7.35	5.45	74
Turkmen	7.08	5.05	71
Uzbeks	7.09	5.12	72

(a) Inside respective former union republic.

Sources:

E.M.Andreev, L.E.Darskii, T.L. Kharkova, *Naselenie Sovetskogo Soiuza: 1922-1991* (Moscow: Nauka, 1993), p.90

G.A.Bondarskaia and L.E.Darskii, 'Etnicheskaia differentsiatsiia rozhdaemosti', *Vestnik statistiki*, 12 (1988), p.19.

L.E.Darskii and N.B.Dworak, *Fertility Indicators and Characteristics of the Potential Market for Modern Contraception*, P.12. Mentioned: TOLDS,P.236

"The TFR for Kyrgyz, Turkmen and Uzbeks was 4.7-4.9 children, which is very close to Egypt's level of 4.5 and about the same as Morocco's level of 4.8, but noticeably less than that of Algeria: 5.4. The Tadjiks had a TFR of 5.95; but at the same time Iraq had a rate of 6.2, Iran, 6.5, and Syria's TFR reached 6.7 children.

A decrease in overall fertility can be caused by changes in marriage and marital fertility. In fact, in some Arab countries most of the fertility decrease has been attributed to later age at first marriage.

Traditionally among Muslims, women's age at first marriage has been low. But since men marry for the first time considerably later, the age gap between spouses was very pronounced. Thus, according to the date of the 1897 census, in Tsarist Central Asia, the mean age at first marriage was 17.7 for females and 27.4 for males. That is, the difference in mean age of brides and grooms was about ten years.

By the 1970s and 1980s, the situation was changing dramatically. According to the data of the 1989 census, mean age at first marriage was as high as 23.6 for Kazakh women and 23.9 for Azerbaijani women. These ethnic groups reached the low limit (23-24 years) of what is demographically termed the 'European marriage pattern'.' (Ibid. P. 237)

**TABLE 31: SINGULATE MEAN AGE AT MARRIAGE (SMAM) OF MUSLIM
TITULAR NATIONALITIES OF THE FORMER UNION
REPUBLICS,(a) 1979 AND 1989**

Nationality	Males		Females		Difference in SMAM of males and females	
	1979	1989	1979	1989	1979	1989
Azerbaijanis	26.2	25.8	23.5	23.9	2.7	1.9
Kazakhs	25.1	25.2	22.8	23.6	2.3	1.6
Kyrgyz	23.6	24.0	21.3	21.8	2.3	2.2
Turkmen	23.3	23.8	21.5	22.9	1.8	0.9
Uzbeks	23.1	23.1	20.9	21.0	2.2	2.1
Urban population						
Azerbaijanis	--	26.4	--	23.7	--	2.7
Kazakhs	--	25.4	--	24.7	--	0.7
Kyrgyz	--	24.9	--	24.0	--	0.9
Turkmen	--	24.2	--	23.0	--	1.2
Uzbeks	--	23.8	--	21.6	--	2.2
Rural population						
Azerbaijanis	--	25.2	--	24.2	--	1.0
Kazakhs	--	25.1	--	22.5	--	2.6
Kyrgyz	--	23.7	--	20.8	--	2.9
Turkmen	--	23.5	--	22.8	--	0.7
Uzbeks	--	22.7	--	20.7	--	2.0

(a) Inside respective former union republic

Sources: 1979 and 1989 censuses. Mark TOLTS; ibid, p.238

Between the 1979 and 1989 censuses, singulate mean age at first marriage rose among women of all the nationalities analysed here, except Uzbeks among whom it remained almost constant. The rise in age was steepest among the Turkmen women (1.4 years over the decade), and their SMAM reached 22.9, which is very close to the already noted low limit of the 'European marriage pattern'. According to the data of the 1989 census, the mean age at first marriage for Kyrgyz women was 21.8, a medium level. However, the rural Kyrgyz women, as well as rural Tadjik and Uzbek women have SMAMs under 21 years and they still act according to the 'non-European marriage pattern', whereas the urban Kyrgyz, Azerbaijani and Kazakh women have already attained the low limit of the 'European marriage pattern': 24 years.

According to the data of the 1989 census, the mean age at first marriage for men was 25-26 years for Azerbaijanis and Kazakhs, and 23-24 years for all other Muslim titular nationalities of the former union republics. In all of these populations, the difference in mean age of brides and grooms reached a moderate level of about two years or less. This is far from the pronounced difference of 4-7 years which was registered recently in most Muslim countries of the Middle East and Northern Africa. (IBID. P. 240)

Another important characteristics of marital structure is the proportion of females currently married in given ages. Fertility is, of course, linked to these proportions. Demographers use a special indicator to give an overall assessment of these proportions, namely the average number of years spent in married status within the fertile ages. This indicator for the entire fertile period from 15 to 49 years can be broken down into two parts: from 15 to 29, and 30 to 49 years.

“According to the data of the 1989 census, for women of all titular nationalities, the average number of years spent in married status in the fertile ages had decreased in comparison with the data from all preceeding post-war censuses. This decrease was largely caused by the dynamics at ages 15-29, that is, the result of the increase in age at first marriage.

As opposed to the low findings for ages 15-29 from the 1989 census, the same source showed a consistent rise for ages 30-49 from the 1959 census, a less consistent rise from the census of 1970, and even the decrease from the 1979 census was moderate. However, at precisely these ages the drop in age-specific fertility rates occurred, and has intensified. Thus, we must seek another explanation as to the primary reason for the fertility drop among Muslims in former Soviet Central Asia.” (Ibid. PP. 240-241)

TABLE 32: AVERAGE NUMBER OF YEARS IN MARRIAGE IN FERTILE AGES AMONG FEMALES OF MUSLIM TITULAR NATIONALITIES OF THE FORMER UNION REPUBLICS^(a) 1959, 1970, 1979 AND 1989

Nationality	1959	1970	1979	1989
At ages 15 - 49				
Azerbaijanis	23.7	24.8	23.7	23.4
Kazakhs	25.5	25.4	24.0	23.3
Kyrgyz	27.2	27.2	26.1	25.1
Tadjiks	27.3	28.3	28.0	27.2
Turkmen	26.3	27.4	26.5	25.1
Uzbeks	27.0	27.7	27.1	26.8
Thereof: at ages 15 - 29				
Azerbaijanis	8.7	7.9	6.5	6.5
Kazakhs	9.5	8.0	6.9	6.7
Kyrgyz	10.7	9.4	8.3	7.9
Tadjiks	10.5	10.0	9.4	8.8
Turkmen	10.5	9.4	8.2	7.0
Uzbeks	10.1	9.5	8.7	8.7
Thereof: at ages 30 - 49				
Azerbaijanis	15.0	16.9	17.2	16.9
Kazakhs	16.0	17.4	17.1	16.6
Kyrgyz	16.5	17.8	17.8	17.2
Tadjiks	16.8	18.3	18.6	18.4
Turkmen	15.8	18.0	18.3	18.1
Uzbeks	16.9	18.2	18.4	18.1

(a) Inside respective former union republic

Sources: 1959, 1970, 1979 and 1989 censuses, Mark Tolts; 1995,

According to data from the 1989 census, the average number of children ever born to currently married women in Soviet Central Asia was lowest at ages 25-29 and over, among Kazakhs, and highest at ages 20-24 and over, among Tajiks. At the same time, the data indicated large discrepancies between the urban and rural populations.

**TABLE 33: AVERAGE NUMBER OF CHILDREN EVER BORN TO
CURRENTLY MARRIED WOMEN OF MUSLIM TITULAR
NATIONALITIES OF THE FORMER UNION REPUBLICS,^(a)
1989**

Nationality	Age in the 1989 census						
	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	45-49
Total population							
Kazakhs	0.40	1.15	2.12	3.14	4.16	5.09	6.40
Kyrgyz	0.33	1.31	2.65	4.09	5.46	6.53	7.63
Tadjiks	0.26	1.33	3.03	4.82	6.45	7.55	8.09
Turkmen	0.36	1.09	2.44	4.14	5.60	6.62	7.47
Uzbeks	0.35	1.32	2.75	4.18	5.36	6.23	6.95
Urban population							
Kazakhs	0.41	1.06	1.87	2.66	3.35	3.93	4.91
Kyrgyz	0.34	1.11	2.18	3.24	4.11	4.73	5.25
Tadjiks	0.30	1.24	2.69	4.06	5.16	6.07	6.67
Turkmen	0.36	1.10	2.25	3.62	4.82	5.54	6.38
Uzbeks	0.37	1.26	2.44	3.56	4.41	5.02	5.72
Rural population							
Kazakhs	0.39	1.22	2.31	3.50	4.72	5.83	7.05
Kyrgyz	0.33	1.37	2.81	4.38	5.88	7.06	8.11
Tadjiks	0.25	1.36	3.16	5.13	6.98	8.15	8.62
Turkmen	0.36	1.09	2.54	4.43	6.03	7.21	7.98
Uzbeks	0.34	1.35	2.87	4.48	5.83	6.88	7.53

Source: 1989 census, Tolds, 1995, P 241.

(a) Inside respective former union republic,

Expectedly, the urban population began its fertility decline earlier, and by the end of the 1980's had reached a more advanced stage of modernization of fertility behavior. Completed marital fertility, measured by the indicator at ages 45-49, was clearly lower in the urban than in the rural population : by 1.6 children among Turkmen, by 1.8 among Uzbeks, by 2.0-2.1 among Kazakhs and Tajiks, and by as much as 2.9 among Kyrgyz.

TABLE 34: CRUDE BIRTH RATES, CRUDE DEATH RATES AND NATURAL GROWTH OF MUSLIM TITULAR NATIONALITIES OF THE FORMER UNION REPUBLICS (PER 1000 POPULATION), 1979 AND 1989^(a)


(In Thousands)

Nationality	Birth rate		Death rate		Natural Growth	
	1979	1989	1979	1989	1979	1989
Total Population						
Azerbaijanis	27.5	28.9	6.3	5.8	21.2	23.1
Kazakhs	30.3	31.1	6.6	6.3	23.7	24.8
Kyrgyz	38.4	38.3	7.7	6.3	30.7	32.0
Tajiks	42.1	42.9	7.7	6.1	34.4	36.8
Turkmen	38.1	38.6	7.2	7.6	30.9	31.0
Uzbeks	38.6	37.4	6.6	5.9	32.0	31.5
Urban Population						
Azerbaijanis	26.7	26.7	5.4	4.9	21.3	21.8
Kazakhs	32.3	32.0	6.4	5.5	25.8	26.5
Kyrgyz	41.0	35.4	4.5	3.8	36.5	31.6
Tajiks	36.5	35.6	6.4	4.6	30.1	31.0
Turkmen	36.6	40.6	6.2	7.0	30.4	33.6
Uzbeks	30.6	32.2	5.5	5.2	25.1	27.0
Rural Population						
Azerbaijanis	28.2	31.2	7.1	6.7	21.1	24.5
Kazakhs	29.5	30.6	6.7	6.7	22.8	23.9
Kyrgyz	37.8	39.1	8.4	7.0	29.4	32.1
Tajiks	43.9	45.6	8.1	6.6	35.8	39.0
Turkmen	38.9	37.6	7.8	7.9	31.1	29.7
Uzbeks	41.7	39.7	7.0	6.2	34.7	33.5

(a) respective former union republic

Source: Inside Goskomstat SSSR, Demograficheskie Ezhegodnik SSR. 1990, pp. 184-7.

FIGURE 1: CRUDE BIRTH RATES, CRUDE DEATH RATES & NATURAL GROWTH RATES OF MUSLIM TITULAR NATIONALITIES OF THE FORMER USSR (PER 1000 POPULATION), 1979 & 1989



In 1989, the number of births was between 37 and 39 per 1000 Kyrgyz, Turkmen and Uzbeks, and 43 per 1000 Tajiks, but only 29 and 31 per 1000 Azerbaijanis and Kazakhs, respectively. In all cases but the Kyrgyz and Uzbeks, these rates were higher than in 1979. This was caused by the rapid growth in the number of females of fertile age. For example, between 1979 and 1989, the number of women of the titular nationalities in the Central Asian republics aged 20-29 rose by 1.6-1.8 times, and the number of women of this group aged 30-39 more than doubled.

In the Middle Eastern and North African Countries, during the period 1976-80 and 1986-90, the crude birth rates per 1000 population fell: notably from 45 to 35.5 in Algeria, 39 to 36 in Morocco, 39 to 35 in Egypt, 36 to 29 in Tunisia, and from 32 to less than 30 in Turkey. In other, Muslim countries of this region there was no such decline, and this rate was, for 1986-90, as high as 40 in Iraq, 43 in Iran and 44 in Syria. That is only the birth rate of the Tajiks approaches the highest cited indicator. On the other hand, the rates for Azerbaijanis and Kazakhs were about as low as those in Tunisia and Turkey. Also, only peculiarities of age structure can explain the higher levels of crude birth rates among the urban, as opposed to rural, populations, as seen from the 1989 data on Kazakhs and Turkmen. (Tolds, 1995, P.244)

From Told's analysis we see that in the 1980's modernization of demographic behavior among the titular nationalities of Soviet Central Asia progressed. However, various ethnic groups reached different stages of demographic modernization. Marriage and fertility data show that the Kazakhs belong to the vanguard of demographic modernization, whereas other nationalities are still at the less advanced stage of this process.

Today, while reproduction remains high, total fertility rates seem to be declining slowly, as is desired family size. But the existing demographic structure in the Central Asian republics – such as low levels of urbanization, high reproduction in the rural areas, and the age structure of the population – suggests that these changes cannot be expected to be enough to significantly offset population trends until well into the next century.

The age, sex, and nationality structures of the Central Asian republics also suggest that high population growth will be perpetuated for some time to come. Central Asia's population has been growing younger over the past two decades, so that a larger proportion falls into the lower age groups today than even ten or twenty years ago. In 1990, the proportion of women of childbearing age was almost double the 1970 figure, and by the year 2000, 269 percent that level. Thus, even should fertility rates continue to decline, a drop in the number of births per thousand women of childbearing age would be partly offset by the "demographic momentum" set in motion or by the greater number of women of childbearing age relative to the population as a whole. This will be exacerbated by the fact that a greater proportion of the younger populations will be comprised of the indigenous nationalities, which are more oriented toward having large families than their European counterparts. And it will also be encouraged by the favourable sex ratio in the Central Asian republics as opposed to that in the republics to the north. In other words, a decline in fertility among the indigenous nationalities would still be slow in making itself felt in the republican birthrate and in population growth as a whole. (Lubin, 1991, P.52)

TABLE 35: AGE SPECIFIC FERTILITY RATES OF KAZAKHS, KYRGYZ, TAJIKS, TURKMEN, AND UZBEKS (PER 1000 WOMEN), 1978-79 AND 1988-89^(a)

Age group	Kazakhs			Kyrgyz			Turkmen			Uzbeks			Tajiks		
	1978-79	1988-89	1988-89 as % of 1978-79	1978-79	1988-89	1988-89 as % of 1978-79	1978-79	1988-89	1988-89 as % of 1978-79	1978-79	1988-89	1988-89 as % of 1978-79	1978-79	1988-89	1988-89 as % of 1978-79
15-19	19.5	30.6	157	37.9	40.9	108	16.3	15.7	96	35.6	43.1	121	36.9	37.6	102
20-24	222.0	232.0	105	297.9	296.1	99	271.5	223.8	82	307.6	312.5	102	348.7	316.2	91
25-29	252.5	208.2	82	281.5	261.3	93	360.7	323.1	90	339.9	272.5	80	369.1	314.4	85
30-34	201.4	140.1	70	314.1	186.8	59	300.1	225.4	75	270.1	176.8	65	171.1	251.1	147
35-39	142.9	75.8	53	231.9	114.8	50	209.1	128.7	62	177.8	88.8	50	118.2	167.2	141
40-44	79.4	26.8	34	134.3	55.5	41	122.3	55.9	46	92.8	33.9	37	75.1	86.8	116
45-49	14.6	2.9	20	31.3	9.6	31	25.8	6.9	27	17.0	4.1	24	18.4	14.6	79
50-54	2.9	...	...	4.1	...	...	4.9	...	...	2.7	...	...	4.1	...	...

(a) Inside respective former union republic

Sources: Bondarskaia and Darskii, 'Ethnicheskaiia Differentsiatsiia Rozhdaemosti, P.


The actual dynamics for each age group during the last decade can be found by comparing age-specific fertility rates for the end of the 1970s and the end of the 1980s. These rates show a drop

in the fertility of all the nationalities aged 25-29 and older. The indicators for rural Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (where almost the entire population is, Muslim) show a decline even from ages 20-24.

The noted reduction was, in all cases, more pronounced among the more advanced fertile ages. From 1978-79 to 1988-89 the number of births per 1000 women aged 40-44 fell by as much as 2.4-3 times-among the Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and Uzbeks, and by more than two times among the Turkmen. During the same period, this indicator declined by more than four times for ages 45-49 in rural Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.'' (IBID. P.235)



FIGURE II: AGE SPECIFIC FERTILITY RATES OF KAZAKHS, KYRGYZ, TURKMEN AND UZBEKS, 1978-79



Age specific fertility rates of Kazakhs, Turkmen and Uzbeks reaches their peak in the age group 25-29 for the period 1978-79. The decrease observed in age specific fertility rate of Kyrgyzstan for the same age group, although there is no concrete evidence, might be explained by misreporting of the births for this age group or by miscalculation of the official data.

FIGURE III: AGE-SPECIFIC FERTILITY RATES OF KAZAKHS, KYRGYZ, TURKMEN AND UZBEKS, 1988-89




TABLE 36: AGE-SPECIFIC FERTILITY RATES OF RURAL POPULATION OF AZERBIJAN, TAJIKISTAN, TURKMENISTAN AND UZBEKISTAN (PER 1000 WOMEN), 1978-79 AND 1988-89

Age group	Azerbaijan			Tajikistan			Turkmenia			Uzbekistan		
	1978-79	1989	1989 as % of 1978-79	1978-79	1989	1989 as % of 1978-79	1978-79	1989	1989 as % of 1978-79	1978-79	1989	1989 as % of 1978-79
15-19	15.8	30.7	194	38.2	38.6	101	15.0	15.3	102	38.4	42.1	110
20-24	219.5	212.0	97	357.0	331.7	93	277.2	224.0	81	341.8	325.4	95
25-29	288.5	208.8	72	375.5	323.0	86	379.5	315.1	83	366.0	280.1	77
30-34	215.5	123.4	57	328.6	257.9	78	334.6	228.2	68	305.8	182.9	60
35-39	128.5	54.1	42	256.8	172.7	67	223.4	129.6	58	202.3	93.3	46
40-44	53.7	19.2	36	141.1	84.0	60	141.8	55.9	39	108.4	37.1	34
45-49	7.8	1.8	23	27.0	14.2	38	30.4	7.4	24	20.7	4.9	24

Source: Goskomstat SSSR, Demograficheskiy Ezhegodnik SSSR, 1990, PP. 310-315.

TABLE 37: AGE SPECIFIC MARITAL FERTILITY RATES OF KAZAKHS, KYRGYZ, TAJIKS, TURKMEN, AND UZBEKS (PER 1000 MARRIED WOMEN), 1978-79 AND 1988-89^(a)

Age group	Kazakhs			Kyrgyz			Turkmen			Uzbeks			Tajiks		
	1978-79	1988-89	1988-89 as % of 1978-79	1978-79	1988-89	1988-89 as % of 1978-79	1978-79	1988-89	1988-89 as % of 1978-79	1978-79	1988-89	1988-89 as % of 1978-79	1978-79	1988-89	1988-89 as % of 1978-79
15-19	...	528	...	...	405	...	...	403	...	...	395	...	...	321	...
20-24	432	449	104	442	463	105	415	468	113	430	428	99.5	432	424	98
25-29	308	271	88	319	316	99	388	368	95	370	304	82	392	351	90
30-34	229	169	74	344	215	63	318	242	76	287	192	67	179	270	151
35-39	161	90	56	255	131	51	224	140	63	190	97	51	125	179	143
40-44	93	32	34	150	64	43	134	62	46	101	37	37	80	94	118
45-49	18	4	22	37	12	32	30	8	27	19	5	26	21	16	76
50-54	4	...	...	5	...	...	6	...	...	3	...	...	5	...	...

(a) Inside respective former union republic

Sources: 1979 and 1989 censuses, Tolds, p. 252.

TABLE 38: AGE SPECIFIC MARITAL FERTILITY RATES FOR RURAL POPULATION OF AZERBAIJAN, TAJIKISTAN, TURKMENIA, AND UZBEKISTAN (PER 1000 MARRIED WOMEN), 1978-79 AND 1989.

Age group	Azerbaijan			Tajikistan			Turkmenia			Uzbekistan		
	1978-79	1989	1989 as % of 1978-79	1978-79	1989	1989 as % of 1978-79	1978-79	1989	1989 as % of 1978-79	1978-79	1989	1989 as % of 1978-79
15-19	293	394	134	294	322	110	246	373	152	323	379	117
20-24	447	421	94	430	427	99	409	446	109	446	432	97
25-29	359	286	80	395	353	89	402	352	88	393	308	78
30-34	241	150	62	342	272	80	349	239	68	322	196	61
35-39	142	62	44	269	182	68	237	138	58	215	100	47
40-44	54	22	41	150	90	60	154	61	40	117	40	34
45-49	9	2	22	41	16	39	35	8	23	23	6	26

Source: 1979 and 1989 censuses, TOLDS, p. 253.

The actual dynamics for each age-group during the last decade can be seen by comparing the age-specific marital birth rates for the end of the 1970's with those for the end of the 1980's. These rates show a fertility drop among all the titular nationalities of Soviet Central Asia from ages 25-29 and over. In all cases, the decline in fertility was greater among more advanced fertile ages. A comparison of the percentage drop of the age-specific fertility rate (Table 35) with that of the age-specific marital fertility rate (Table 37) shows that they are very similar in most cases. Thus, we see that the dynamics of marital fertility were the main reason for the overall fertility decline. This conclusion is further confirmed by data on rural Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. (Table 38, which, data should be compared with Table 36). From 1978-79 to 1989, at ages 45-49, the number of birhs per 1000 married women fell by as much as 4-4.5 times in rural Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

b. Population by Age, Life Expectancy at Birth and Infant Mortality Rate

TABLE 39: POPULATION BY AGE GROUPS, AND LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH

Republics	0-14 Years		15-64 Years		Life expectancy
	%	%	%	%	
	1990	2010	1990	2010	1991
Azerbaijan	33.1	23.1	61.3	69.1	71.2
Kazakhstan	31.9	23.2	61.7	68.3	68.7
Kyrgyzstan	38.2	28.9	56.2	65.4	69
Uzbekistan	41.6	30.2	54.2	65.3	69.2
Turkmenistan	41.3	29.7	54.7	66	65.9

Source: State Institute of Statistics, 1993, P. 25

The lowest life expectancy is observed in Turkmenistan by 65.9 years. The life expectancy of other republics are fairly close to each other, around 69 years.

The non-working age group of 0-14 reaches to more than 41% in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, where titular nationalities compromise around 80% of the total population and having very high fertility. Projections made for the year 2010 assumes that with the decreasing fertility levels, this group will consist 23-29% of the population of the Central Asian republics in this year. It is quite obvious that for the present moment, the non-working age group of 0-14 creates a big burden on the economies of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, and to a slighter degree, of Kyrgyzstan

Although infant mortality rates have certainly declined over the past seventy years in Central Asia, they were significantly higher than the national average. In 1987, the infant mortality figure for the USSR was 25 per 1000, compared to 38 per 1000 in Kyrgyzstan, 46 per 1000 in Uzbekistan, 49 per 1000 in Tadjikistan, and 56 per 1000 in Turkmenistan. In 1988, the infant mortality rate in Turkmenistan was 58 per 1000 compared to 19 per 1000 in the RSFSR.

The highest infant mortality figures occur in the area around the Aral Sea; in Karakalpakia in 1988 there were 111 infant deaths per 1000 live births. In this region

the pollution from the dying Aral Sea and poisons from the local cotton economy have led to the contamination of all the available drinking water.


Even in the cities of Central Asia the infant mortality rate was much higher than in European Russia. The highest urban mortality rate in the USSR for 1988 was recorded in Ashkhabad, 53 per 1000, compared to 29 per 1000 in Frunze, and 28 per 1000 in Tashkent, while in Vilnius and Riga there were 11 deaths per thousand live births. The real picture may be far worse, given the repeated complaints that many hospitals simply fail to report their mortality statistics. (Olcott, 1991, PP. 238-239)

As we will see in the coming sections of the study, the figures of Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) figures for infant mortality rate for 1996 is much higher than the official figures represented in this section. Also the figures for the life expectancy at birth of CIA is lower than the official figures of the Central Asian republics.

TABLE 40: INFANT MORTALITY RATES, SELECTED YEARS, 1970-93

	(Per 1,000)			
Republic	1970	1980	1990	1993
Kazakhstan	25.9	32.7	26.4	28.4
Kyrgyzstan	45.4	43.3	30.0	31.9
Tadjikistan	45.9	58.1	40.7	47.0
Turkmenistan	46.1	53.6	45.2	45.9
Uzbekistan	31.0	47.0	34.6	32.0

Sources: Goskomstat SSSR, *Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR*; CIS Statistical Committee, *Statisticheskyy byulleten*. Kaser and Mehrotra; 1996; p.287

FIGURE IV: INFANT MORTALITY RATES, BY SELECTED YEARS, 1970-93**(Per 1,000 births)**

The most important indicators of child health and nutrition are infant (IMR) and under-five mortality rates (U5MR). Developing countries with a “very high” U5MR had a median IMR of 116 per 1000; the “high” U5MR countries had a median IMR of 66; the “middle” U5MR countries had a median IMR of 30 (while in the “low” category IMR was 8). Table shows that IMRs for the Central Asian states are much higher than in the rest of the USSR, and higher than the median IMR (30) in the middle U5MR countries of the world. However, what is significant is that the Soviet definition of IMR was different from the WHO definition (eg. A baby born before the 29th week of pregnancy which died within the first 7 days of birth was treated as a miscarriage in the former USSR but as a live birth by WHO), and hence understated the IMR. The causes of under-five mortality in Central Asia are similar to those found in other

developing countries – mainly acute respiratory infections and diarrheal diseases. However, unlike in developing countries, the level of low-birth-weight babies is low (7 percent under 2.5 kg. in Tajikistan and 4.8 percent in Turkmenistan); second and third malnutrition is only about 10 to 12 percent.” (Kaser & Mehrotra, 1996, P. 288)


c. Urbanization

TABLE 41: PERCENTAGES OF URBAN AND RURAL POPULATIONS

Republics	1970		1979		1990	
	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural
Azerbaijan	50.1	49.9	53.1	46.9	53.8	46.2
Kazakhstan	50.3	49.7	53.9	46.1	57.4	42.6
Kyrgyzstan	37.4	62.6	38.7	61.3	38.1	61.9
Uzbekistan	36.6	63.4	41.2	58.8	40.8	59.2
Turkmenistan	47.9	52.1	48.0	52.0	45.2	54.8

Source: State Institute of Statistics, 1993, P.23

FIGURE V: PERCENTAGES OF URBAN RURAL POPULATIONS



As elsewhere in the world, urbanization in Central Asia can be expected to curtail high population reproduction. The urban population of the Central Asian republics has grown over the past several decades, rising in two of the Central Asian republics, for example - in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan - from only 36.6 and 50.1 percent in 1970 to 40.8 and 57.4 percent of the 1990 populations respectively. But with high natural growth and low mobility particularly among the indigenous populations, this process has slowed and in some cases has reversed itself. In Turkmenistan, for example, the proportion of the population that was urban either remained the same or declined between 1970-90.

There are two complicating factors, however, to interpreting these statistics. First is the question of what is urban. Many Central Asian cities differ little from rural areas; in part this is because "urbanization" has occurred largely as a result of natural increase and reclassification rather than rural to urban migration, and the growth of new cities is occurring slowly. This suggests that even as they become more urban, the local inhabitants are not necessarily transforming their way of life as much as one might expect from the demographic data; and it suggests that even urbanised Central Asians may often live in the same traditional homes and conduct their lives in the same manner as in the countryside. Often, therefore, the effect on native fertility may be more gradual than statistics alone might suggest.

Second, regardless of the rate at which urbanization has occurred, the indigenous have not been altogether included in that urbanization process and have remained largely in rural areas. In 1959, for example, only 21.8 percent of all Uzbeks in Uzbekistan lived in urban areas; in 1970, that proportion had risen only three percentage points, to 24.9 percent. In 1989, that proportion was back down to only 20 percent of the republic's indigenous nationalities. (Lubin, 1991, p. 51)

Urbanization, moreover, is not occurring to the exclusion of the growth of Central Asia's rural populations; their population reproduction is far more rapid, and thus rural population growth has been much higher. While an average of 37.0 births per thousand population were recorded for Uzbekistan in 1987, for example, that figure was 28.5 in urban areas and 43.2 in rural areas. And while natural growth for the republic as a whole

was 30.1 in 1987, that figure was 21.9 in urban areas and 36.0 in rural areas. These figures were similar for all of the Central Asian republics. Indeed, because of high rates of population reproduction, in 1987 alone, between 60 and 75 percent of the natural growth in the four Central Asian republics occurred in the countryside - versus 24 percent in the RSFSR. (Ibid. p. 52)

c. Marriages and Divorces

TABLE 42: MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE RATES (%)

Republics	Marriages			Divorces		
	1970	1980	1989	1970	1980	1989
Azerbaijan	6.8	9.8	10.4	1.3	1.2	1.7
Kazakhstan	9.5	10.6	10.0	1.6	2.6	2.8
Kyrgyzstan	9.2	10.7	9.7	1.2	1.8	1.9
Uzbekistan	9.1	10.6	10.0	1.1	1.4	1.5
Turkmenistan	8.6	9.8	9.8	1.2	1.4	1.4

Source: State Institute Of Statistics, P 48.

As can be observed from Table 42, percentage of marriages in Central Asian republics didn't changed significantly between 1970-1989. On the contrary, divorce rates increased significantly in all republics, except Turkmenistan for the same period. The highest increase is observed in Kazakhstan, where Slavic population consists almost half of the total population.

While finishing the Chapter, I would like to give the Table, prepared by T.R. Harmstone, and which summarises the ethnic and demographic characteristics of the Central Asian republics and the USSR from 1950 to 1979.

TABLE 43: CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS' POPULATION INDICATORS

Republics	Territory (000 sq. km.)	Population total (in thous.)		Urbanization			
				% of urban population		% change	% of urbanization of titular group
		1970	1979	1970	1979	1970-79	N.A.
Kazakh SSR	2,715.01	12,849	14,684	51	54	3	27
Uzbek SSR	449.6	11,960	15,389	36	41	5	-25
Turkmen SSR	488.1	2,159	2,765	48	48	0	31
Tajik SSR	143.1	2,900	3,806	37	35	(2)	26
Kirghiz SSR	198.5	2,933	3,523	37	39	2	15
USSR	22,402.3	241,720	262,085	36	62	6	-

Republics	Ethnic Distribution							
	% of titular group in the republic population			% of Russians in the republic population			% change 1959-1979	
							Titular group	Russians
	1959	1970	1979	1959	1970	1979		
Kazakh SSR	29.8	32.4	36.0	43.2	42.8	40.8	6.2	(2.4)
Uzbek SSR	61.1	64.7	68.7	13.5	12.5	10.8	7.6	(2.7)
Turkmen SSR	60.9	65.6	68.4	17.3	14.5	12.6	7.5	(4.7)
Tajik SSR	53.1	56.2	58.8	13.3	11.9	10.4	5.7	(2.9)
Kirghiz SSR	40.5	43.8	47.9	30.2	29.2	25.9	7.4	(4.3)
USSR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Republics	Vital Rates per 1,000							Average Size of Family
	Birth Rates			Death Rates		Natural Increase		
	1950	1970	1977	1950	1970	1950	1970	1979
Kazakh SSR	37.6	23.3	23.9	11.7	6.0	25.9	17.3	4.1
Uzbek SSR	30.9	33.5	33.7	8.8	5.5	22.1	28.9	5.5
Turkmen SSR	38.2	35.2	24.2	10.2	6.6	28.0	28.6	5.5
Tajik SSR	30.4	34.7	36.5	8.2	6.4	22.2	28.3	5.7
Kirghiz SSR	32.4	30.5	30.2	8.5	7.4	23.9	23.1	4.6
USSR	26.7	17.4	-	9.7	8.2	17.0	9.2	3.5

Source: Teresa Rakowska - Harmstone, 1983, p. 20

CHAPTER III

SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROFILES OF CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS AFTER 1991

It is a well known fact that demographic and ethnic structure of any society highly depends on the socio-economic changes that occurs in the same. For that reason, one must analyse the socio-economic changes in any society in connection with the demographic and ethnic developments, in order to have a clear picture of the social patterns which is taking shape in that society. Taking into consideration of that fact, before analysing in details the demographic and ethnic aspects of the Central Asian republics after their independence, I would like to present a brief socio-economic outlook of these countries for the same period.

A. GENERAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK OF CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS

After the demise of USSR, NISIA countries encountered mainly 3 problems in their economy, in addition to political instability:

1. Termination of budgetary subsidies provided by Moscow,
2. Decline in trade between the former Soviet Republics,
3. Acceleration in the emigration of Slavic professionals and technicians.

Furthermore their dependency on trade, especially with Russia, is another negative factor affecting their economic performance. Trade T/GDP ratios of the 4 republics usually fluctuated between 40-50 %, which is similar to ratios of African states.

What is more, the sharp decline in output further contributed to deep economic crises, such as skyrocketing prices, deteriorating income distribution and budget deficits. Production declined sharply in all countries especially in the energy sector, with the exception of Uzbekistan. There are 3 main reasons for this:

1. Consumption of industrial goods decreased parallel to decrease in aggregate output;
2. High prices is yet another factor to contribute to the decrease in consumption;
3. None of the countries received proper payment in energy trade.

Regarding the agricultural sector, due to excessive use of chemicals and fertilisers, it is likely that land and water pollution will be one of the most important problems in the coming years.

Now we shall submit some overall data regarding the Central Asian republics.

**TABLE 44: GROSS SOCIAL PRODUCT OF CENTRAL ASIAN
REPUBLICS(1995)**

(1990=100)

Republics	%
Azerbaijan	53.0
Kazakhstan	53.0
Kyrgyzstan	50.0
Turkmenistan	n.a
Uzbekistan	82.0

Source: "CIS, Kazakhstan and EC" Facts and Figures Interregional
Intersectoral Association "INFECOM-ASIA". Almaty, 1995.

**TABLE 45: INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION OF CENTRAL ASIAN
REPUBLICS, 1995**

1990 = 100

Countries	%
Azerbaijan	48.0
Kazakstan	48.0
Kyrgyzstan	32.0
Turkmenistan	65.0
Uzbekistan	99.1

Source: ``CIS, Kazakhstan and EC`` ..., p: 57

TABLE 46: PRODUCTION OF FOODSTUFFS

(average per year)

Countries	Meat in carcass weight (1000 tons)		Milk (1000 tons)		Eggs (min)	
	1991- 1993	1994- 1995	1991- 1993	1994- 1995	1991- 1993	1994- 1995
Azerbaijan	120	80	866	806	785	475
Kazakhstan	1364	1288	5465	4795	3643	2298
Kyrgyzstan	224	189	1013	868	543	175
Turkmenistan	102	109	547	722	286	270
Uzbekistan	493	514	3591	3699	2011	1403

Source: ``CIS Kazakhstan and EC`` ..., p: 50

TABLE 47: STOCK-BREEDING**End of the year (1000 head)**

	Cattle			Pigs			Sheep and goats		
	1990	1993	1995	1990	1993	1995	1990	1993	1995
Azerbaijan	1,832	1,621	1,600	157	48	30	5,419	4,539	4,600
Kazakhstan	9,756	9,347	6,860	3,224	2,445	1,623	35,657	34,208	19,584
Kyrgyzstan	1,205	1,062	900	393	169	100	9,968	7,322	4,300
Turkmenistan	829	1,104	1,200	267	159	100	5,481	6,314	6,500
Uzbekistan	4,581	5,291	5,500	716	391	300	9,230	10,187	10,500

Source: "CIS, Kazakhstan and EC" ..., p: 48

TABLE 48: PRODUCTION OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS**(average per year, 1000 tons)**

	1991-1993								1994-1995 gross harvest of cereals
	Corn		Cereals and beans	Potatoes	Vegetables	Fruits	Sugar-beet	Raw cotton	
	total	including wheat							
Azerbaijan	1,232	867	12	163	616	1,129	-	387	961
Kazakhstan	21,037	12,253	95	2,336	904	174	937	245	12,980
Kyrgyzstan	1,465	633	1	332	354	106	118	50	989
Turkmenistan	741	364	1	32	329	182	-	1,358	1,120
Uzbekistan	2,096	817	6	396	3,294	1,026	17	4,336	2,841

Source: "CIS Kazakhstan and EC" ..., p: 46

TABLE 49: INDICES OF THE CONSUMER PRICES

(In % to the previous year)

	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
Azerbaijan	212	1,012	1,229	1,764	510
Kazakhstan	179	1,615	1,758	1,977	280
Kyrgyzstan	213	950	1,310	378	150
Turkmenistan	212	970	1,731	2,814	...
Uzbekistan	197	515	1,332	1,650	420

Source: "CIS, Kazakhstan and EC"..., p: 39

TABLE 50: INDEX OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, 1997

Countries	Index of Human Development	Place Acc. To Index of Human Development (Among all Countries)	Level of Literacy of the Grown up Population	Combined Percentage of total Number of students	Per Cap. Inc. (Parity of Purchasing Capacity)
Russia	0.792	67	99	78	2284
Kazakhstan	0.709	93	98	73	2718
Uzbekistan	0.662	100	97	73	2438
Azerbaijan	0.636	106	96	72	1670
Kyrgyzstan	0.635	107	97	73	1930
Turkmenistan	0.723	85	98	90	3469

Source: CNG v Sifrah, P. 34

TABLE 51: AVERAGE PRICES OF FOOD-STUFFS, ON 30 SEPTEMBER 1997 (USD per kg)

	Beef	Pork	Butter	Milk	Eggs (ten)	Wheat Flour	Bread	Potato
Almati	2.47	2.95	4.20	0.55	0.95	0.46	0.67	0.27
Moscow	2.71		4.13	0.73	0.84	0.75	0.89	0.38
Bishkek	2.32		3.08	0.27	1.04	0.40	0.35*	0.13
Dushanbe	2.01	-	3.75	0.18	1.27	0.60	0.39	0.19
Tashkent	3.70	-	6.00	0.67	2.04	0.74	0.59	0.30
Shimkent	2.13	2.46	3.10	0.31	0.98	0.45	0.41	0.20
Taraz	1.69	2.17	3.44	0.29	0.91	0.41	0.44	0.13
Talas	1.78	2.21	3.12	0.23	0.86	0.43	0.35**	0.09
Aktubinsk	2.01	2.14	3.35	0.30	0.81	0.47	0.59	0.30
Kostanay	1.93	2.28	3.28	0.32	0.74	0.47	0.70	0.21
Kurgan	2.08	2.64	3.74	0.48	0.75	0.44**	0.53**	0.20

Remark: The absence of the price for some kinds of food-stuff means that at the moment of registration it was not on sale in the shops covered by this study.

* Rate of the National Banks of the Countries

** First Quality Wheat Flour, Bread from the Wheat Flour of First

Quality

Source : Kazakhstan i Straniy CNG
01, 1997; p. 36

TABLE 52: AVERAGE MONTHLY SALARY, 1996

(In USD, Proceeding From The Exchange Rates Of The National (Central) Banks Of the CIS Countries)

	I Quarter	II Quarter	III Quarter	IV Quarter	Janua
1997					
Kazakhstan	102,9	111,2	117,3	119,8	106,7
Azerbaijan	26,0	28,9	31,6	32,0	20,4
Kyrgyzstan	31,3	33,0	36,8	37,1	39,2
Russia	149,3	163,1	170,9	171,0	157,9
Turkmenistan	34.2	44.7	48.8	52.8	15.3
Uzbekistan	53,9	51,9	53,8	51,9	62,2

Source: Kazakhstan i Straniy CNG; p.39

TABLE 53: AVERAGE NOMINAL MONTHLY PENSIONS
(At the Beginning of the Year)

	1996	1997
Kazakhstan, Tenge	1876	3283
Azerbaijan, Manat	17314	25540
Kirgizstan, Som	197	247
Russia, Thous.Roubles	273,6	319,7
Turkmenistan, Manat	3970	60046
Uzbekistan, Sum	780	1472

Source: Kazakhstan I Straniy CNG, p. 43

TABLE 54: PRODUCTION OF ELECTRICITY
(thsd.min.kWh)

Countries	Total volume of production		
	1990	1993	1995
Azerbaijan	23.2	19.0	17.0
Kazakhstan	87.4	77.4	65.7
Kyrgyzstan	13.4	11.1	12.3
Turkmenistan	14.6	12.6	9.8
Uzbekistan	56.3	49.1	47.4

Source: Kazakhstan I Straniy CNG, p. 60

TABLE 55: EXTRACTION OF THE MAIN KINDS OF FUEL

Countries	Oil, including gas condensate (min. tons)			Col (min. tons)			Gas (thsd.min.cu.m.)		
	1990	1993	1995	1990	1993	1995	1990	1993	1995
Azerbaijan	12.5	10.3	9.2	-	-	-	9.9	6.8	6.6
Kazakhstan	25.8	23.0	20.5	131.4	111.9	83.2	7.1	6.7	5.9
Kyrgyzstan	0.2	0.1	0.1	3.7	1.7	0.5	0.1	0.04	0.04
Turkmenistan	5.7	4.9	4.7	-	-	-	87.8	65.3	32.3
Uzbekistan	2.8	3.9	7.6	6.5	3.8	3.1	40.8	45.0	48.6

Source: Kazakhstan I Straniy CNG, p: 63

As it is explicit from the tables presented above, the overall economic performance of the Central Asian countries almost collapsed after the demise of the USSR. The GDP's of these countries almost declined by 50% as compared to the production levels of 1990.

Another problem in these countries is related to labour. First of all labour productivity in these countries is quite low. That was one of the reasons for the decline in USSR's economy. Secondly, skilled labour in these countries was basically Slavic in origin. After the disintegration of USSR, Slavic people migrated from these republics mainly into the Russian Federation, thus leaving the crucial industries of these republics mainly to the local and unskilled labour force which led to decline in output. Also, high employment of local people in the agricultural sector resulted in low per capita income as productivity in agriculture is always lower than it is in industry.

However, one interesting result of this reflected itself in consumption. As compared with Slavic ex-Soviet Republics, due to high population in rural areas in Central Asian countries, consumption in these republics did not alter dramatically, as

retail price subsidies, price-controls, free or low-cost services continued. However, especially after 1996, with the economic reforms these subsidies are planned to be removed one by one.

Just after the dissolution of the USSR high and sometimes unrealistic economic expectations prevailed in these countries, such as immediate flow of capital from the West, sharp increases in the living standard of the society (e.g. luxurious cars, houses). However, as it is explicit from the tables presented, between the years 1992-1995, the economies of these countries hit the bottom. On the other hand, with the liberalization programs, certain trend of recovery is also visible as well, such as in cases of inflation and trade volume. Although it was expected that these countries would be having severe economic crisis in addition to political chaos, it could be stated that economic and political stability is obtained to a degree, but it is worthwhile to mention that the share of these countries in world trade is still negligible. Furthermore their development mostly depends upon the revenues which would be received after marketing their energy resources.

B. BRIEF ECONOMIC COMMENTS BY REPUBLICS

1..Kazakhstan

Kazakstan has rich mineral and mining resources such as coal, lead, and zinc. Furthermore oil and natural gas resources are attracting foreign capital and it is a self-sufficient country in grain production. The diversified production in the country seems to be advantageous, however the inadequacy of skilled labor and low amount of population for 2.7 million km² of land are underlined as a potential problem for future investment policies. The problem of rural, unskilled labor-force is in fact also valid for Kazakh population. On the other hand, Slavic population in Kazakhstan, which amounts roughly to 50 % of the total population is usually formed of skilled labor-force. High percentage of Slavic population might be counted as an advantage for the economic development of Kazakstan, if ethnic and political stability, which exists

today, continues in the future. If Kazakhstan could mobilize its enormous amount of resources and areas, and at the same time sustain political stability, it is possible to claim that Kazakhstan can turn into the most prosperous economy in the region.

2. Kyrgyzstan

The most liberal country in economic sense, among the Central Asian republics is Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyzstan was able to drop inflation and increase their volume of trade within a short period of time. However after 1991, the share of industry in GDP declined but share of agriculture increased. Today, Kyrgyzstan still continues to have rich water resources and gold mines, which could be one source for country's hope in raising its revenues. Furthermore, President Akaev declared that in the near future, Kyrgyzstan would be the Switzerland of Central Asia by:

- a) Attracting foreign capital for the investments over high-tech industrial plants
- b) Evaluating its tourism potential with its virgin nature.

However at least in the short-run, these ideals seem to be too optimistic for Kyrgyzstan, as historically, Kyrgyzstan has always been an isolated part of Central Asia, being transferred between Kazak nomads, China and Central Asian khanates. What is more, poor transportation facilities and its distant setting from the region are other factors to the disadvantage of its future economic expectations. Its economic success largely depends upon the performance of the rest of Central Asian republics. If Kyrgyzstan's two neighbouring countries, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan cannot succeed in economic recovery, then Chinese influence over Kyrgyzstan might endanger stability and balances in Central Asia. Under these circumstances isolated Kyrgyzstan cannot overcome its economic bottlenecks. Kyrgyzstan's economic and social recovery highly depends on its Central Asian neighbours, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. The illegal opium production in the country and its alleged illegal trade may lead to Kyrgyzstan's further isolation by foreign investors.

3. Turkmenistan

Turkmenistan mainly relies on the rich oil and natural gas deposits. Furthermore, cotton production in Turkmenistan seems to be attracting foreign investors. The extraction of oil and natural gas from the resources of the Caspian Sea shelf mainly depends upon the consensus over the Status of the Caspian Sea. What is more, the inadequacy of skilled-labor force, low population and monocultural type of production are other factors impeding the establishment of new industrial plants. If Turkmenistan could sell its energy in favourable market conditions, it could be a rich, but a developing country, such as the countries of the Middle East.

4. Uzbekistan

Geographically located in center of the region, with high population per km² and with the newly discovered energy resources, Uzbekistan attracts considerable amount of foreign investment. However, monocultural production (cotton, which is quite difficult to be processed by Western textile producers and far away from the world markets) and existing ecological problems are sources of impediments for Uzbekistan's economic recovery. Newly discovered natural gas reserves promise a viable source for Uzbek economy. However, the population pressure which inevitable means new demands for infrastructure, schools, jobs ... etc, President Karimov's centralist policies and awkward bureaucracy could be cited as potential problems awaiting Uzbekistan.

Uzbekistan is the fourth largest cotton producer in the world. Therefore especially in Uzbekistan, marketing cotton poses yet another problem. In the Soviet period, Soviet textile industry was developed to accommodate the cotton produced in Uzbekistan. However after the collapse of the Soviet Union, due to decline in the intra-trade between ex-Soviet republics, the excess cotton is still waiting to be marketed.

In the final analysis, although all of the countries expected to be the “new heaven of Asia”, with poor transportation, failing communication infrastructure, loaded bureaucracy, inadequate amount of skilled labour-force and outdated industrial and financial institutions solely relying on foreign investments, it will be very difficult to say that these countries can meet the requirements of foreign investors in the short-run. However, rich energy resources, gold production and to an extent cotton production could attract foreign capital, which is essential for the economic development of these republics, thus, their social stability.

C. RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY & CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS AFTER INDEPENDENCE

1. Economic Relations

After Central Asian gained independence in 1991, Turkey became the first country which recognized them, and again the first country which opened its embassies in these countries. Furthermore, after 1991, Turkey was the first country which provided economic assistance to these countries. Starting from 1992 until 1995, with credits lend by the Turkish Eximbank, Turkey remained as the most active economic actor in the Region.

The economic activities of the Republic of Turkey in Central Asian republics could be analyzed under three groups;

- Great contracting projects, primarily in the construction sector, especially in the construction of hotels, business centers were realized by big size Turkish Construction Companies which were financed by Turkish Eximbank credits in Central Asian republics.

- There are also numerous Turkish small and medium sized firms, which are active in Central Asian republics.. They are usually engaged in the service sectors such

as restaurants, transportation, various manufacturing sites, gas stations... etc.. Neither the exact amount of their investments are known nor the exact number of the firms. However, it is estimated that the total number of these companies can be expressed in thousands, and their capital surpasses US \$ 4,5 billion, where shares of investments as of countries are; Kazakhstan- 1,5 billion, Kyrgyzstan- 300 million, Uzbekistan- 1 billion, and Turkmenistan- 1,6 billion Us \$ respectively.

a) Also it is estimated that, as of 1998, there are over 200 construction projects, either completed or continuing in the region, where Turkish firms acting as contractors.. However with few exceptions such as Koc Holding's investments in Uzbekistan, usually Turkish investments did not cover the issues of transfer of technology or reformation of industries in the region.

- The third group consists of trade relations between Turkey and Central Asian republics. Although trade statistics prove out to be improving, when compared to Turkey's total trade volume of approximately US \$ 70 billion per annum, the total amount of trade volume between Central Asian republics and Turkey, which is around US \$ 1,100 million , could be hardly considered as significant. The reasons for this poor performance are as follows.

a. Turkey mainly imports intermediate and investments goods. On the other hand, Central Asian republics, as they cannot be counted as industrialized nations, can not meet the demands of Turkey, because they are exporting raw materials.

b. Furthermore, Turkey is a self-sufficient country in production of cotton, non-ferrous minerals etc., which are the main export goods of Central Asian republics.. That is another reason for poor performance in trade relations. Also, Central Asian republics are urgently in need of high-tech investment goods, which Turkey is also an importer of, and these needs are usually supplied by other countries.

c. A third reason could be argued as the limitation in the transportation of goods. As trade between Turkey and Central Asian republics are realized through highways, the bureaucratic impediments set forth by Iran and Armenia and the political turmoil in Caucasus region, could be counted as other reasons for the poor performance in trade relations.

Economic relations between Turkey and Central Asian republics could also be analyzed under three periods.

- 1991-1995: Within this period, with the above mentioned Eximbank Credits, Turkey remained as the major economic power in the region.

- Starting from 1995, Western countries, and also Far Eastern and Pacific Countries especially South Korea and to an extent China are actively interested in the region's economic potential, which is manifested by the increasing amount of investments put in by these countries. The Turkish Eximbank could not continue with the provision of credits in the same level as provided between the years 1992-1995 and there were domestic financial troubles in Turkey, therefore economic relations between Turkey and the region entered into a period of stagnation. Furthermore, starting from 1996, the economic and political instability in Turkey reflected itself in the economic field. These are mainly;

- a. The establishment of the coalition government by pro-Islamic political party RP (whose activities were banned in 1998) which nearly resulted in the freezing of the affairs between the region and Turkey due to ever-present threat of Islamic fundamentalism in the region especially via Iran.

- b. The uncontrolled inflation in Turkey.

Central Asian republics, which attempted to view Turkey as a political and an economic model, revised their opinion due to altering conditions in Turkey and this damaged the image of Turkey in world public opinion.

- From 1997 on, the establishment of a new government, after pro-Islamists, redirecting Turkish government into a secular line, improved the political-economic affairs between Turkey and the region. Immediately after the change in Turkish government, the leaders of the Central Asian republics re-started their official visits and took serious steps regarding the already initiated economic affairs.

Despite these difficulties, Turkey, still remains as one of the most influential economic powers in the Central Asian republics. There are ten thousands of Turkish labourers currently employed in the region. Furthermore thousands of small and medium sized companies are almost rooted in these countries. Within 7 years of experience arising from not only economic but also close cultural and political relations, Turkey succeeded in establishing personal relationships with the high level bureaucrats or statesman. Main results of this argument could be that with linguistic, historical and cultural proximities, Turkey will be continuing its activities as an important regional power.

It is evident that, Turkey is inadequate with respect to sustainment of technology and financial resources. However Turkish labour force which is usually formed of skilled personnel, adapted to region's way of life and is working with relatively low salaries. This fact proves out to be its major advantage and the major reason why most of the Western countries prefer to realize their investments or projects in the region, subcontracting Turkish companies. As a result, the process of employment, permanence and integration for Turkish citizens in the region accelerates

2. Cultural Relations

Just after the independence after 1992, the Turkish government and private institutions gave special importance to the issue of cultural affairs, which could be presented as follows:

Turkish Radio and Television (TRT), immediately initiated TRT Eurasia channel to broadcast to NISIA Countries. The programmes focused mainly on the region and region's significant problems. But initially the wrong broadcasting policy of TRT such as the abundant amount of programmes regarding folkloric items, were not embraced by the local people. However with more realistic observations, TRT modernized its policy which resulted in increased public interest towards this channel. Also, it should be noted that although the rating dreg of this channel cannot claim to rank as a comer among the other television programmes, it still became successful in gaining some audience in the region..

The second policy of Turkish government was to assist Central Asian republics in their transition from Cyrillic Alphabet to Latin Alphabet, which would definitely be a vital factor in the enhancement of the relations between Turkey and them.

Today, there are several decisions regarding this alphabet transition steadily, and in Azerbaijan and to an extent Turkmenistan started to vitalize this transition. In order to assist and to share the burden of this difficult process, Turkey granted thousand of computers, printing and typing machines to the region. Also, there are some Turkish newspapers, being printed in the related country's language, exactly like the copy printed in Turkey.

Maybe the most important policy of Turkey is to accept students for secondary or higher education in Turkey from the regions where Turkic people or minorities are living which includes theCentral Asian republics, Russia and the Balkans. Furthermore, both the Ministry of National Education of the Republic of Turkey and

several private institutions or foundations have established a number of secondary schools and universities especially in the Central Asian republics such as Turkish-Kyrgyz Manas University and Ahmet Yesevi University.

These students either educated in Turkish schools/universities or in the schools/ universities opened in their countries receive a qualified educational programme. However, there are also several drawbacks regarding the mission of some of these schools established in the Central Asian republics due to the alleged involvement of some of the private institutions or foundations in the radical Islamic propaganda.

3. Political Relations

The reemergence of the Central Asian Turkic world and the establishment of political, economic and cultural relations between Turkey and the newly independent Turkic republics generated an emotional and enthusiastic public response in Turkey that bordered on euphoria. Public opinion polls as well as the more impressionistic coverage by the mass media showed that there was overwhelming public support for the government's efforts to cultivate close ties with the new republics. This emotional outburst of sympathy and friendship for the Turkic peoples was partly due to the joy felt by the majority of Turks upon rediscovering their long-lost ethnic cousins. It reflected a psychological reaction to the sense of rejection they felt in their relations with Western Europeans. At a time when Turkey's prospects for gaining membership in the EC appeared dim and public attitudes towards the Turkish migrants in Europe were increasingly intolerant, the warm welcome and respect Turkey received from the leaders of the Turkic republics proved to be an effective morale-building mechanism and a source of national pride. (Sayari, 1994, p.179)

The emergence of a whole new Turkish world also raises fresh identity questions for Turkey itself. Once isolated as the sole accessible Turkish state in the world, Turkey had few other options for alliance; an ethnically orientated policy was

not a viable alternative. Today the forces of Turkish nationalism on a broader plane have grown in Turkey, suggesting in some political circles consideration of a policy orientated toward leadership of the new Turkish world. While such a policy need not be mutually exclusive with a strong European orientation, in fact a 'Turkic orientation' that seeks to exert significant influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus could tend to alter Europe's perception of Turkey and the suitability of Turkish membership in the EC. (Fuller, 1994, p. 34)

The West pushed Turkey to play a modernizing and moderate role in Central Asia. NATO chief Manfred Woerner said in Moscow in February 1992 that Islamic fundamentalist were becoming increasingly strong in the Muslim republics and that this did not conform to NATO interests. NATO looked to Turkey to redress the balance. After a meeting in Washington on 13 February 1992, President George Bush and Turkish Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel pledged to expand aid and other help to Central Asia. Bush pointed to Turkey as the model of a democratic, secular state which could be emulated by Central Asia. 'In a region of changing tides, Turkey endures as a beacon of stability'. US companies were encouraged to find Turkish partners with whom to do business in Central Asia, and US diplomats encouraged Central Asian politicians and bureaucrats to travel to Turkey to see a modern country at work.

It was Turkey's geographical inability to offer a port and access to the sea that allowed Iran to become a serious economic rival to it and also forced Central Asian leaders to rethink their love affair with Turkey. By 1993 many leaders were highly skeptical that Turkey could deliver economic benefits. Turkish investment in industry was not forthcoming. Turkish television programmes were not widely popular, and Islamic fundamentalist promoted the idea that Turkey was just a stalking horse for the Americans, who wanted to deprive Central Asia of its Islamic heritage. (Rashid, 1994, p.211)

Turkey has got neither spare capital, nor possibilities for a broad economic exchange, nor advanced technology to render material aid to crisis-ridden Central Asia. Its resources and possibilities are limited. In this connection Turkish leaders started the development of an 'Asian Marshall plan', so that the post-Soviet Muslim states receive economic support under the auspices of the European Union and international financial organizations. Claiming leadership in rescuing its Muslim brethren from their political and economic deadlock, Ankara would like to rely on Western European and US resources and possibilities. (Vassiliev, 1994, P.143)

On a more positive note, Turkish firms are participating in a number of projects in Central Asia, often in joint ventures and partnerships with local companies and with others from, for example the US and Western Europe. This is one means of circumventing the problem of the lack of Turkish capital. Other states have begun to regard Turkey as an important trade and business partner in Central Asia because of its cultural-linguistic links, geographic proximity and the Black Sea port facilities.

4. Oil & Gas Pipelines

Turkey is one of the three fastest growing gas markets in the world. Almost all of its demand must be met by imports. Russia, which holds more than one-third of the world's gas reserves, currently supplies 85 % of Turkey's gas imports. Additional small volumes come from Algeria in the form of liquefied natural gas. Turkey has sought to identify additional sources of gas, in part to limit its dependence on any one source. Turkey and Russia have signed several agreements to increase gas purchases over the next fifteen years and Russia has proposed building a pipeline along the East coast of the Black Sea to transport some of that gas.

According to the AIOC report issued on July 1997, the costs of the pipeline routes are estimated as follows

1. Baku-Novorissisk costs \$ 2 billion

2. Baku-Supsa costs \$ 1,2 billion
3. Baku-Ceyhan costs \$ 3,2 billion
4. Burgaz-Dedeagaç costs 0.7 \$ billion (www.Cpss.Org/Casiabk/Chapt6.Txt)

Turkey is the major opponent of Russia in this undeclared war. By introducing limits on the passage of ships through the Bosphorus on July 1, 1994, Turkey not only strengthened the ecological security of Istanbul but also inflicted a considerable blow to Russia's plans to increase the transportation rates of oil through Novorossisk thus improving the chances of the pipeline's construction on Turkish territory.

If the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline is built and put into operation, and if the Kerkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline resumes operation after the UN lifts sanctions against Iraq, the total value of the oil transported can reach as much as 14 billion dollars a year. If this is the case, Turkey stands to gain 500 million dollars annually and save 3 billion dollars due to the reduction of oil imports. Not willing to lose the considerable profits from the transportation of Caspian oil through her territory, and as the still-remaining major regional power player in the important regions of Transcaucasia and Central Asia, Russia together with Greece and Bulgaria came forward with the initiative of building the Burgas-Alexandropolis pipeline. The main idea behind this project is to circumvent the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, thus evading Turkey's limits on the passage of large-capacity tankers, and deliver oil from Novorossiisk to the Bulgarian port of Burgas by tanker, and from there pump it over the pipelines to the Greek sea terminals in Alexandropolis. The pipeline is going to be 300 kilometers long and will cost 700 million dollars. It can be built within three years, according to Russian estimates.

Russia, Bulgaria and Greece give assurances that this pipeline will be at least ten times cheaper than the one that Turkey had suggested to run through its territory. The main argument is that building a pipeline in the mountains of Turkey will require large expenditures on the purchase and construction of the complicated mechanisms needed to regulate pressure in the pipes. It is assured that the countries of the

European Union (EU) have given their preliminary political consent to the Trans-Balkan pipeline. If all interested parties accept the offer to build the pipeline, large European banks are ready to give credits with low interest charges. Such readiness is explained by the fact that, according to the views of many specialists, the dependence of the members of the European Union on Central Asian oil exports will sharply increase in the next 25 years.

As for the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, the agreement on its construction has already been signed in Ankara. Its length is 1.920 kilometers, with an estimated capacity of 50 million tons of crude oil per year. Construction costs will be approximately 3 billion dollars. Turkey announced that it is ready to completely finance the construction of the section of the pipeline that runs through its territory.

The Greek pipeline is much shorter than the Turkish one. It will run through the territory of Bulgaria and Greece, states with stable political regimes. According to Greek and Russian point of view, The Turkish pipeline, on the other hand, will run through Eastern Turkey, where Kurdish rebels fighting for the creation of an independent Kurdistan are active. Again from an economic point of view it should be noted that the mountainous territory makes every kilometer of the Turkish pipeline more expensive than the Greek one. However, the Greek option has problems as well. From Novorossiisk the oil will have to be transported by tankers to Burgas; this will make transportation more expensive and will increase the ecological threat to the Black Sea. From Baku to Novorossiisk the shortest route runs across Dagestan, conflict-ridden Chechnya, and the generally unstable region of the Northern Caucasus.

Not only Azerbaijani but also Kazakh oil can be transported through the pipeline on Turkey's territory. Using the existing pipelines running from Atıray-Astrakhan-Grozny-Baku, Kazakhstan could transport the oil to the terminals of the Turkish port of Ceyhan on the Mediterranean, from where the Kazakh oil could easily

reach the world market. Another option is to transport the oil directly across the Caspian Sea, using pipelines or tankers. The outline of a project for a pipeline on the bottom of the Caspian Sea between Mangyshlak (Kazakhstan) and Apsheron (Azerbaijan) has already been completed; this pipeline will join an artery pipeline in Baku, the Black Sea ports of Georgia and then to Turkey.

Although discussions over the transportation routes are continuing, one thing that is clear is that there will be at least 4 or 5 pipeline routes for the transportation of the oil and natural gas reserves. In fact this attitude has been implicitly verified by officials in several meetings of the related countries. None of the countries, namely Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakstan explicitly supported any route. Although Azerbaijan declared its will to transport its oil through Baku-Ceyhan route, which was further supported by Western countries, the interests of other regional countries mainly, Russian, Iranian and Georgian usually differ over the pipeline routes.

Furthermore in the Istanbul meeting held by the foreign ministers of Turkey, Georgia, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Kazakstan on March 1st and 2nd of 1998, 5 of the countries' representatives could not agree upon a pipeline route, where all of the option were realized to be on the agenda.

Finally, it can be stated that, the discussions regarding the routes will continue until the year 2000's, after the completion of the oil and natural gas agreements, which most eventually be transported via more than one route of pipeline.

CHAPTER IV

DEMOGRAPHIC AND ETHNIC ASPECTS OF CENTRAL ASIA AFTER INDEPENDENCE

Up to this Chapter we tried to analyse various aspects of Central Asia, including its demographic and ethnic aspects until its independence in 1991. Central Asia became an independent political region after the collapse of the socialist system of statehood that had united diverse ethnic groups with a long history of complicated relations. The collapse of the Soviet Union led to a situation where these ethnic rivalries and conflicts began to reappear and reengage. Never in history has Central Asia had organised nation-states on its territory, the Soviet era included. In this region, the process of modern state building is still incomplete. Due to arbitrary demarcations between the republics created by the Soviets in the 1920s, the natural borders of settlement by native peoples were replaced by artificial, administrative separators. Peoples with ethnic, religious and cultural differences were thus forced into a single state. This created tensions throughout the Soviet period, and has the potential to generate wide regional conflict and demands for substantial redrawing of borders.

Up to its independence, Central Asia was viewed as a monolithic economic and social region within the USSR. Population censuses were conducted and other relevant statistical data was collected periodically by the central government which provided the researchers an easy access to detailed and comparative information, although to an extent distorted, again by the central government because of certain political purposes.

After the independence this situation changed dramatically in all the Central Asian republics. First, periodical population censuses no more conducted because of lack of money, specialists and know-how, similar to other statistical data. Second, although demographical data collection started again in these republics after 1995, due to the

different standards of every republic, these data doesn't allow the researchers to make healthy comparisons among these republics.

In spite of all these difficulties, in this Chapter we shall try to analyse the demographic and ethnic aspects of the Region by utilising the available data, which is obtained directly from the high ranking state bodies of these republics through 'friendly relations' which exists among ourselves since 20 years.

We shall again start with the emigrations and the ethnic structure, as we did in Chapter V, which, also greatly affected the demographic structure of the Region.

A. EMIGRATIONS AND ETHNIC STRUCTURE

There are more than 10 million ethnic Russians living in the five Central Asian republics, or 40 per cent of the 25 million Russians living outside Russia in the so-called "near abroad." Their status is assuming an undeniable political and strategic significance for Kazakhstan and the other Central Asian republics. (Hyman, 1996, p. 51)

The departure of Europeans from Central Asia actually began in the late 1970s. A flow of mainly younger, educated Russians left, gradually reversing the long trend of Slav migration and settlement in these southern republics. The majority of the people who emigrated from Central Asia from late 1980's to early 1990's were Russians leaving for Russia, though Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Tatars, Germans, Jews and Greeks were also part of this reverse flow.

Currently, many of the remaining ethnic Germans, Greeks and Jews are planning to leave Central Asia for their respective "homelands" (Germany, Greece and Israel), which offer them their "blood right" to resettle. The flow of Russians and Russian-speakers out of Central Asia continued in 1990's, though at a far slower pace than many had predicted. This slow down certainly reflected the Russian economic malaise.

In Kazakhstan, the emigration of Russian-speakers has often been attributed to nationalist policies and the zealous promotion of the Kazakh language. Thus, a basic inter-ethnic clash is formed in Kazakhstan, opposing the Kazakhs to the Russians.

Today the "legal" Kazakhs, or, to be exact, the avant-garde Kazakh political establishment, are attempting to assume the ungrateful role of the "big brother" once held by the Soviet Russians. In the Kazakh Constitution the Republic is defined as "the state of the self-defined Kazakh nation," with Kazakh the only state language. All non-Kazakhs become second rate, "non-native diaspora," while the language of the overwhelming majority of Kazakh citizens, Russians, is officially brought down to the status of the informal language of "inter-ethnic communication." (www.Cpss.Org/Casiabk/Chapiz.Txt.)

Migration was also reportedly on the increase in Kyrgyzstan. About 50,000 people left the Chu valley alone in ten months from January 1993 for Russia, Ukraine, Byelorussia, but also, interestingly, for destinations in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The basic causes of migration were said to be the economic crisis and increasing unemployment.

The turmoil that accompanied the break-up of the Soviet Union has set large numbers of people in motion. The figures on migratory trends in Russia mirror major socioeconomic developments there. The net balance of immigrants and emigrants rose steadily from 104,906 in 1991 to 914,597 in 1994, before subsiding again to 355,384 in 1996. During the 1980's, immigration to Russia consisted of both repatriation of Russians and inflows of other titular nationalities. Over the period 1990-96, some 2.4 million ethnic Russians were repatriated from other republics. (International Organization for Migration (IOM), CIS Migration Report, 1996.)

**TABLE 56: BALANCE OF EXTERNAL MIGRATION IN CENTRAL
ASIAN REPUBLICS, 1994**

(Per 1000 people)

Country	Balance
Azerbaijan	- 7.8
Kazakhstan	-12.0
Kyrgyzstan	-26.9
Turkmenistan	-1.8
Uzbekistan	- 2.5

Source: CIS, Facts & Figures, p. 22

As can be observed from Table 56, in 1994 the highest rate of emigration is observed in Kazakhstan where Slavic population reaches almost 50% of the total population of the republic (See Table 14). Also Germans, Jews and Koreans, the other major minorities of this republic, constitutes a significant portion of this emigration.

Kazakhstan is followed by Kyrgyzstan where Slavic population reaches to almost one thirds of the total population (See Table 14).

There is no available data regarding emigrations from Uzbekistan for 1989-1993 period, but according to one research half million people – Slavs, Jews – had left this republic between 1979-1989. (Hyman, 1996, p. 53). Since the emigration rate is 2.5 per thousand in 1994 in this republic, one can assume that this rate was higher for the period 1991-1993, when the emigrations from the Central Asian republics reached its peak.

The lowest emigration rate for 1994 is observed in Turkmenistan, where Slavic and other 'European' population consists the lowest percentage among all Central Asian republics. Like Uzbekistan, there is no available data for Turkmenistan regarding the emigrations for the period 1989-1997 . One survey gives the percentages of the emigrations by the country of destination for the 1991-1997 period as follows; To Russian Federation 50.3%, Uzbekistan 17.5%, Ukraine 9.1%, Kazakhstan 9.8%, and Azerbaijan 4.3%. (Turkmenistan Othchot po Chelovecheskomu Razvitio, 1997, p. 7)

Although there is no available data for the ethnic structure of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan for the 1990's, we can come to the conclusion that since the muslim-titular nationalities consisted around 10%-15% of these republics in 1989 (See Table 14), and since the emigration continued increasingly in early 1990's, we can assume that today the Slavic and other 'European' nationalities consists less than 10% of the population of these republics.

Ethnic composition of Kazakhstan in 1997 is shown in Table 57;

TABLE 57: ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF KAZAKHSTAN IN 1987 AND 1997 (000)

	Census Years	
	1987	1997
Total Population	16,464	15,861
Kazakhs	6,535	8,037
Russians	6,227	5,105
Germans	957	303
Ukrainians	896	720
Tatars	328	278
Uzbeks	332	359
Belorussians	183	-
Uighurs	185	-
Koreans	103	-
Azerbaijans	90	-
Dungans	30	-
Others	598	920
	In Percentage of the total Population	
	1987	1997
Total Population	100	100
Kazakhs	39.7	50.7
Russians	37.8	32.2
Germans	5.8	1.9
Ukrainians	5.5	4.5
Tatars	1.9	1.8
Uzbeks	2.0	2.3
Belorussians	1.1	-
Uighurs	1.1	-
Koreans	0.6	-
Azerbaijans	0.6	-
Dungans	0.2	-
Others	3.7	5.8

Source: Uchoti Prepis Nasaleniya Kazakhstana, 1996, p. 55.

As can be seen from Table 57, the total population of Kazakhstan decreased almost 600 000 from 1987 to 1997 due to enormous emigration of the Slavic and other nationalities. The decrease in Russian population is around 1.1 Million, in German population 650 000, and in other nationalities, 800 000. During the same period the Kazakh population increased substantially, nearly 1.5 Million. As a very important consequence of these developments, the Kazakh population, for the first time since the beginning of the 20th Century, exceeded 50% of the total population of the republic.

Ethnic composition of Kyrgyzstan in 1990's is shown in Table 58;

TABLE 58: POPULATION OF KYRGYZSTAN BY YEARS AND NATIONAL COMPOSITION

Years	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Population, 000	4257.7	4334.5	4389.5	4451.8	4469.3	4429.9	4450.7	4512.4	4574.1
National Composition %									
Kyrgyz	52.4	53.0	54.0	55.0	56.5	58.6	59.7	60.3	60.8
Azerbaijani	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.42
Armenian	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Belarus	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.16	0.15	0.15
Georgian	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
Dungane	0.9	0.9	0.87	0.8	0.89	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.0
Jew	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.04	0.03	0.03
Kazakh	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9
Korean	0.43	0.43	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4*	0.4	0.4	0.4
Latvian	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Lithuanian	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Moldovian	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
German	2.4	2.0	1.6	1.3	1.0	0.8	0.6	0.5	0.4
Russian	21.5	21.2	20.6	20.0	18.8	17.1	16.2	15.7	15.3
Tadjik	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8
Tatar	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.6	1.5	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.2
Turk	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.6
Turkmen	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
Uzbek	12.9	13.0	13.2	13.3	13.5	13.8	14.1	14.2	14.3
Uigur	0.9	0.9	0.88	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9
Ukranian	2.5	2.5	2.4	2.3	2.1	1.8	1.7	1.62	1.5
Estonian	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Others	1.35	1.35	1.31	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.1	1.1

Source: Natsional Staticheskiy Komitet Kirgizkoy Respubliki. Demograficheskiy

Ejgodnik, 1996, p. 10.

As can be observed from Table 58, the total population of Kyrgyzstan increased from 4.26 Million to 4.57 Million between 1989-1997. The percentage population of Kyrgyz increased from 52.4% to 60.8% during the same period, while percentage population of Russians decreased from 21.5% to 15.3%. Population of other 'European'

nationalities exposes similar patterns. It is interesting to note that the percent population of Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan increased from 12.9% to 14.3%, due to the decrease observed in 'European' nationalities.

In the proceeding part of this Chapter we would like to introduce a more detailed outlook of the emigration pattern that took place in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan after the independence. As we can see from Table 56 that the emigration flow from Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan ceased to relatively moderate levels starting from 1994. For these two republics, today, emigration is not the determining demographic factor, but the high population growth is the most crucial problem that might de-stabilise the social, economic, thus, political structures of these republics. This question will be discussed in details in the next Chapter of the study.

For Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan the demographic problem is vice-versa. Although today we are observing high population growth rates among titular nationalities of these republics, the low population densities in these republics can easily absorb these increases, and the high percentage of Slavic population in these countries, which has very low population growth rates, reduces the total population growth to moderate levels. For Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan the main demographic problem which might de-stabilise these countries in the near future is the ethnic structure and the continuing emigration of the well-educated, urbanised, skilful Slavic and other 'European' population from these republics, which, also shall be discussed in the next Chapter.

That is why a more close and detailed outlook of the emigration from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan is necessary for a healthy, overall evaluation.

1. Emigrations From Kazakhstan

In recent years, migration processes have intensified; however the scale, direction and structure of the flows have changed fundamentally. There has been a trend towards a return to "historical motherlands". Emigration has been a phenomenon involving predominantly Russians, Germans and Ukrainians. Among those who departed from Kazakhstan in 1994, more than 50 % were Russian and 26.5 % were German.

Kazakhstan has entered the ranks of those states losing population due to emigration. A comparison of emigration from and immigration to Kazakhstan from the CIS and other states shows that the decreases in population over the last three years amounts to approximately a million people.

The educational level of emigrants is generally high. In 1993 alone, more than 32,000 people with higher and specialised secondary education left Kazakhstan, 45 % of whom were Russian.

It is also evident that the processes of migration are ongoing. At present there is net emigration as Kazakhstan's citizens seek employment in other parts of the CIS and the world. This process is having repercussions on both the ethnic and skill composition of the work force. Since many of the emigrants are of Russian and German origin, the proportion of Kazaks in the remaining population is increasing. In 1994 alone, 400,000 people left the country, a number equal to 2.5 per cent of the population. At the same time, as is frequently the case, the most talented and skilled people find employment more readily in other countries. This has resulted in a loss of skills. At this stage, it is difficult to gauge whether this outflow of skills is temporary or permanent. If production and incomes revive in Kazakhstan, it is likely that some emigrants may return. However a prolonged slump may lead to a permanent loss of this skilled manpower. (www.Unap/nnar/kazakhstan/chapter2.htm, pp. 5-12)

“Changing trends in migration are having a similarly negative effect on the supply of labour. According to statistical data, more than 1 million people left the Republic during the last three years, including 400,000 in 1994. In 1993 the number of immigrants taking up residence in Kazakhstan was 111,000, compared to an outward migration of 333,000 – the difference being 3.8 times greater than in 1991. If this pattern continues and there is evidence that it will, its effect on the supply of labour will be considerable.

The industrial regions of Pavlodar, Jambly, Karaganda, Eastern Kazakhstan, Southern Kazakhstan, Mangistau and Almaty have sustained the highest losses as a result of migration. Of the total number of these emigrants Russians comprised 55 %, Germans 37 % and Ukrainians 7 %. Of these emigrants, 60 % were considered able-bodied (20 to 49 years of age). Over half of them had higher, and specialised secondary education. The largest groups were manual workers (20 %), health and education professionals (15 %), engineers and technicians (13 %).

Within the Republic the highest negative balances in migration have been recorded in oblasts with the most adverse ecological conditions. Semipalatinsk (11,200), Atyrau (3,200) and Kzyl-Orda (2,300). These migrants have a tangible effect on the labour supply at their destinations.`` (Ibid. p. 14)

The emigration pattern that took place in Kazakhstan during 1993-1997 is analysed in official Kazakh documents as follows;

``For the last 5 years 1997.5 thousand people took part in the migration process of Kazakhstan (the total of the arrived and departed). 25 thousands people have arrived from abroad and 440.4 thousands people have departed to abroad. 319.8 thousand people have arrived from CIS countries and 1212.3 thousands have departed to CIS countries.

The following tendencies have been formed for the period of 1993-1997:

- The decrease of the people, arriving from abroad and CIS countries. For this period total 344.8 thous.people have arrived.
- The departures had a fluctuating character. The highest'peak' of emigration is fixed in 1994 (480.8 thous.people), the following two

years there was the drop of emigration and in 1997 the increase of emigration has been observed (up to 299.5 thous. people).

In 1997 the main migration flows to CIS countries took place. The main part of the emigrants have departed to CIS countries, including: Russia- 72.4%, Uzbekistan- 2%, Ukraine - 2%, Belarus- 1.8%. The following number of emigrants has departed abroad: Germany-18.4%, Israel-0.6%, USA- 0.3%.

The remarkable migration of the population is observed from the industrially developed regions: Northern Kazakhstan - 51.3 thous. people, Kostanay - 39.5 thous. people, Akmola - 34.4 thous. people.

In 1997 the interior migrants have preferred for settlement Almati, Akmola, Pavlodar, Mangistau regions and Almati city.

The age and education level of migrants have considerable influence on the demographic situation of the country.

The analyses of the family structure of the departed and arrived migrants show, that the people, having families in other places are departing from the republic. Among the emigrants of the age 16 and older ,64.5% are married, 22.1% have been never married, 7.6%- widows and 5.8%- divorced.`` (Perepis nasalēniye i eyo sotsalno-ekonomicheskoye znachaniye, 1997, pp. 45-47)

**TABLE 59: EXTERNAL MIGRATION OF THE POPULATION OF
KAZAKHSTAN**

	Immigrated		Emigrated	
	1996	1997	1996	1997
TOTAL	53,874	38,067	229,412	299,455
Kazakhs	16,446	11,582	9,543	11,759
Azerbaijans	748	489	813	890
Belarusians	501	386	3,175	5,900
Germans	2,023	1,410	58,966	49,505
Russians	24,043	17,154	120,427	174,616
Tatars	1,530	981	5,754	8,239
Uzbeks	588	522	2,478	3,992
Ukrainians	3,038	2,349	16,459	29,080

Source: Statistical Bulletin Kazakhstan, 1997, P. 11

**TABLE 60: EXTERNAL MIGRATION FROM KAZAKHSTAN TO CIS
COUNTRIES, 1996**

Republic	Immigrated	Emigrated	Balance
TOTAL	51,600	155,787	104,187
Azerbaijan	793	327	466
Armenia	169	99	70
Belorussia	507	2,184	-1,677
Kyrgyzstan	1,936	2,678	-742
Moldovia	232	398	-166
Russia	31,888	138,693	-106,805
Tadjikistan	884	106	778
Turkmenistan	4,311	371	3,940
Uzbekistan	8,153	5,796	2,357
Ukraine	2,195	4,895	-2,700
Georgia	168	125	43
Latvia	34	22	12
Litva	307	79	228
Estonia	23	14	9

Source: Statisticheskii Ezhgodnik Kazakstana, 1997, p. 23

As can be seen from the official data which is presented in Table 59 , emigrants from Kazakhstan increased by 70 000 from 1996 to 1997. The majority of emigrants consists of Russians and Germans. Also the Russian Federation is receiving almost 80% of the emigrants from Kazakhstan to the CIS countries.

2. Emigration from Kyrgyzstan

In the 1989-1996 period, Kyrgyzstan experienced a huge outflow of population, with around 600,000 persons leaving the country, 227,049 entering it and a migration balance of – 370,871 persons. Immigration steadily declined by an average of 10 % per year, with the exception of 1991-1992 when a 30 % drop was recorded. Overall, the number of immigrants fell by 65 %, from 44,856 in 1989 to 15,910 in 1996. Concurrently, between 1989 and 1993 the number of emigrants more than doubled, from 60,815 to 143,619. Since then, emigration has notably decreased, and has reached roughly half the value of 1989. The migration balance has remained negative throughout this period and has followed a similar curve: it was of – 15,959 persons in 1989, - 120,604 persons in 1993 and – 11,674 persons in 1996. (www.iom.ch/rea/Kyrgyzstan.html p. 2)

TABLE 61: EXTERNAL MIGRATION, KYRGYZSTAN 1989-1996 (persons)

Year	Immigrants	Emigrants	Balance
1989	44,856	60,815	-15,959
1990	40,939	82,352	-41,913
1991	37,558	71,315	-33,757
1992	26,275	103,728	-77,453
1993	23,015	143,619	-120,604
1994	20,104	71,197	-51,093
1995	18,368	37,302	-18934
1996	15,910	27,584	-11,672

Source: Natsional Statichesky Komitet Kirgizkoi Respubliki. Demographicheskiy Ejegodnik, 1997, p.22

Despite the high level of emigration, the population of Kyrgyzstan has somewhat increased (from 4,334,500 in 1990 to 4,512,400 in 1996), mainly due to the high natural increase rate of Kyrgyz, and other Muslim minorities. (Ibid. P. 4)

Kyrgyzstan's migratory exchanges continued to take place predominantly with the Russian Federation and with the neighbouring Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Among non-CIS countries, the main migration partners were Germany and Israel. Half of the immigrants (8,195 persons, 51.5 % of the total) came from the Russian Federation, 20.4% (3,259 persons) from Kazakhstan, 12 % (1,912 persons) from Uzbekistan and 10.7 % (1,714 persons) from Tajikistan. Among emigrants, 54.7 % (15,094 persons) moved to the Russian Federation and 22.9 % (6,343 persons) to non-CIS countries. Among these, the overwhelming majority (5,507 persons) to non-CIS countries. The other countries of destination of emigrants were Uzbekistan, with 2,730 persons (9.8 % of the total) and Kazakhstan, with 2,448 persons (8.8 %). The migration balance was sharply negative with the Russian Federation (-6,899 persons) and non-CIS countries (-6,268 persons), followed at a distance by Uzbekistan (-818 persons), Ukraine (-130 persons) and Belarus (-71 persons). (Ibid. p.3-4)

TABLE 62: MIGRATION FLOWS BY COUNTRY, 1996 (No. of persons & percentage)

Country	Immigrants	%	Emigrants	%	Balance
Armenia	8	0.0	6	0.0	2
Azerbaijan	121	0.7	29	0.1	92
Belarus	75	0.4	146	0.5	-71
Georgia	16	0.1	16	0.0	-
Kazakhstan	3,259	20.4	2,448	8.8	811
Moldova	14	0.0	22	0.0	-8
Russian Federation	8,195	51.5	15,094	54.7	-6,899
Tajikistan	1,714	10.7	187	0.6	1,527
Turkmenistan	92	0.5	19	0.0	73
Ukraine	386	2.4	516	1.8	-130
Uzbekistan	1,912	12.0	2,730	9.8	-818
Estonia	5	0.0	1	0.0	4
Latvia	14	0.0	3	0.0	-15
Lithuania	-	-	15	0.0	-15
Other	75	0.4	6,343	22.9	-6,268
Not specified	24	0.1	9	0.0	15
Total	15,910	100	27,584	100	-11,674

Source: National Statistical Committee, 1997

``The main ethnic groups involved in migratory movements were Russians, Germans, Uzbeks and Kyrgyz. Russians represented 49.9 % of the immigrants (7,954 persons), followed by Kyrgyz (2,574 persons, 16.1 % of the total) and Uzbeks (1,031, 6.4 %). Among emigrants, Russians represented 50.8 % of the total with 14,020 persons, followed by Germans (4,039 persons, 14.6 % of the total) and Uzbeks (2,043 persons, 7.4 %). The migration balance was negative for almost all ethnic groups, and particularly for Russians (-6,066 persons), Germans (-3,639 persons) and Uzbeks (-1,012 persons).`` (Ibid. p.5)

TABLE 63: MIGRATION FLOWS, BY ETHNIC GROUP, 1996 (No. of persons & percentage)

Ethnic Group	Immigrants	%	Emigrants	%	Balance
Armenians	28	0.1	36	0.1	- 8
Azeris	233	1.4	111	0.4	122
Belarussians	57	0.3	117	0.4	-60
Dungans	194	1.2	100	0.3	94
Georgians	10	0.0	16	0.0	- 6
Germans	400	2.5	4,039	14.6	-3,639
Jews	19	0.1	235	0.8	-216
Kazaks	445	2.7	591	2.1	-146
Kyrgyz	2,574	16.1	1,661	6.0	913
Koreans	289	1.8	289	1.0	-
Moldovans	29	0.1	36	0.1	- 7
Russians	7,954	49.9	14,020	50.8	-6,066
Tajiks	271	1.7	115	0.4	156
Tatars	575	3.6	1,392	5.0	-817
Turkmens	10	0.0	6	0.0	4
Turks	153	0.9	85	0.3	68
Uighurs	110	0.6	170	0.6	-60
Ukrainians	967	6.0	1,773	6.4	-806
Uzbeks	1,031	6.4	2,043	7.4	-1,012
Estonians	4	0.0	7	0.0	-3
Latvians	5	0.0	10	0.0	-5
Lithuanians	6	0.0	14	0.0	-8
Others	546	3.4	718	2.6	-172
Total	15,910	100	27,584	100	-11,674

Source: National Statistical Committee, 1997

“The typical emigrant was relatively well-educated: 37 % of them had secondary education, 29 % had secondary specialized education and 13 % higher education. Married couples accounted for the majority of the migrants (62 %), whereas 22 % were single and 16 % were widowed or divorced.” (Ibid. p. 6)

Since 1991, Kyrgyzstan has experienced the largest decrease in its Russian-speaking population of all the Central Asian states, with the exception of Tajikistan. The

massive emigration of Russian-speakers has considerably changed the ethnic composition of Kyrgyzstan, leading to a drastic decrease in their share in the total population. While in 1989 Russians constituted 21.5 % of the population with 916,558 persons, by 1996 their share was 15.7 %, corresponding to 707,750 persons. Between 1989 and 1995, the number of Ukrainians decreased by 35,000 from 108,000 (2.5 % of the total population) to 75,700 (1.7 %). As for Belarussians, their number decreased from 9,200 in 1989 (0.2 % of the total population) to 7,000 in 1995 (0.16 %).

The massive emigration of Russian-speakers contributed to the internal migration of the Kyrgyz population from rural to urban areas. During the Soviet period, the Russian-speakers, increasing numbers of Kyrgyz moved to urban areas, as housing and job opportunities increased there. Most notably, Kyrgyz have been moving from the mountainous districts of the Naryn, Talas, Osh and Jalal-Abad regions to the cities of Bishkek, Osh, Jalal-Abad, Kara-Balta, Tokmok, as well as to the villages and towns of the Chui region.

The emigration of Russian-speakers furthermore reduced pressure on the labour and housing markets. Tens of thousands of plots of land near towns were allocated to young Kyrgyz, and favourable loans for housing construction granted to them. The low market prices for the dwellings of the departing Russian-speakers stimulated resettlement in the more developed regions of the country. Thus, tens of thousand Kyrgyz families have improved their housing conditions and found better employment, education and business opportunities.

On the other hand, the emigration of highly qualified Russian-speakers has resulted in acute shortages of skilled personnel in the construction, machine-building, electronics, defence and cotton growing sectors during the crucial period of transition to market economy. This led to a drastic decrease in industrial production, factory closures and mass unemployment, in turn encouraging the remaining Russian-speakers to leave the country. However, economic reasons alone do not provide a sufficient explanation for the high level of emigration of Russian-speakers. In fact, a new socio-political

context has emerged, which is less advantageous for Russian-speakers, who have lost their privileged status in the society.

During the last year and a half, the level of emigration of Russian-speakers has considerably decreased. This is partly due to the fact that efforts have been made at the governmental level to promote their integration. The language law was amended to account for the interest of the Russian-speaking population. In 1994, Russian became an official language, and is being actively used in all areas of life of the Kyrgyz society, both on the official and the non-official level. In order to promote the development of the Slavic ethnic groups and safeguard their culture, language and traditions, a Kyrgyz-Russian (Slavic) University was established. Concurrently, the remaining Russian-speakers are trying to adjust to the new realities, learn the Kyrgyz language, actively participate in the social and political life, and seek to establish themselves in modern Kyrgyz society. (Ibid. P. 7).

Since the early 1990s, the migration balance of the third-largest ethnic group in Kyrgyzstan, the Uzbeks, has been negative. This is due on the one hand to the drastic decrease in the number of Uzbek immigrants, from 4,594 in 1989 to 1,031 in 1996 (Table 5). On the other hand, between 1990 and 1993 Uzbek emigration sharply increased, reaching a peak in 1992 with 8,098 persons, and then gradually decreasing.

The main reason for the emigration of Uzbeks has been the ethnic conflict between the Kyrgyz and Uzbek youth stirred up in the south of Kyrgyzstan in the summer of 1990. The stabilisation of the social and political situation in the country has now reduced these flows, and today the Uzbeks are leaving for family, educational or employment reasons, rather than for ethnic reasons. Despite the high level of emigration, the Uzbek population in Kyrgyzstan continues to grow, owing to its naturally high increase rate. While in 1989 there were 566,000 Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan (13.2 % of the total population), by 1996 their number was 640,000 (14.2 %). (Ibid. p.8)

TABLE 64: MIGRATION OF ETHNIC UZBEKS; KYRGYZSTAN, 1989-1996

(persons)

Year	Immigrants	Emigrants	Balance
1989	4,594	5,016	-422
1990	4,039	7,902	-3,863
1991	3,925	7,341	-3,416
1992	2,509	8,098	-5,589
1993	1,779	7,766	-5,987
1994	1,275	4,384	-3,109
1995	1,068	3,010	-1,942
1996	1,031	2,043	-1,012

Source: National Statistical Committee, 1997

The Jewish population too has been emigrating from Kyrgyzstan in significant numbers relative to its size. In 1995, the size of this population was only 1,900 persons, as compared to 5,600 in 1989. Israel has been the main country of destination of these migrants. Tatars too have been leaving Kyrgyzstan in scores, heading towards Tatarstan (Russian Federation) or other CIS countries. The number of Tatars in the Kyrgyz Republic has decreased from 70,100 in 1989 (1,6 % of the total population) to 55,600 in 1995 (1.2 %).

Since 1991, huge numbers of Germans, who in 1989 numbered 101,000 persons (2.4 % of the total population), have been emigrating to Germany. In 1996, there were only 20,900 Germans living in Kyrgyzstan (0.4 % of the total population). In recent years, due to the difficulties involved in accommodating a rising number of ethnic Germans from the former USSR, Germany has provided funds to Kyrgyzstan to encourage ethnic Germans to remain there, in particular through job creation programmes and measures to support their cultural autonomy. (Ibid. p. 8-9)

3. General Consequences of the Slavic Emigration

Russian population movements are hard to track, since the Central Asian governments has stopped providing any information on this subject.. Many ethnic Slavs have specialized training that is valuable to the national economy, particularly in such

crucial sectors as energy; the government is anxious to avoid the disruptions that could occur if they were to leave. Furthermore, their exodus into the Russian Federation has become a source of irritation to the Russian government, which is ill-equipped to deal with them (Dixon, 1996; p. 86).

A study conducted in the autumn of 1993 corroborates this assertion; many Slavs, having left Central Asia have discovered that their situation is little better in Russia. Furthermore, some found that their way of life as a colonialist people differed in important ways from that of the home country, and they were prompted by this feeling of estrangement to return (Melvin, 1993, pp. 208-210).

The social and professional differentiation along ethnic lines was and remains greater in Central Asia than in other regions of the former USSR. The local population is keeping within its traditional village-agrarian economy niche, although in the past few decades it made a dramatic breakthrough into the more prestigious spheres of management, public education, public health and law, and quite recently also into trade and commerce, light industry and urban services. The Russians have not expanded their social and professional profile in the 1990s but they have increased their share in the heavy industry work force and in the industrial and technical intelligentsia.

Even before the dramatic changes of the perestroika era began, then, the employment pattern of the Central Asian republics was marked by undercurrents of ethnic conflict, and the 'Russian problem' existed, although it had not surfaced. It was reflected in a major way in the inadequate Russian representation both in the service sector (teachers, doctors, lawyers, the non-scientific intelligentsia) and in the power structure, especially in the courts of law, the militia and republican and local level administration. The peculiarities of the Russians' social and professional composition, that previously made for their comparatively high living standard, have become definitely negative over the past few years, in view of the economic-sectoral and production reorientation: a reduction in heavy industry enterprises, including the military-industrial complex a general crisis in government-subsidized spheres and an upsurge of commercial, broken and financial activity (Tishkov, 1995, p. 294).

More active involvement of Russians in free enterprise could provide a partial solution to the problem. However, the prospects for such an involvement are limited as a result of insufficiently developed market relations and shortage of initial capital, which as a rule is accumulated illegally or in trade, coupled with misgivings regarding the status of Russians in the newly emerged states.

The situation is especially complicated for those of the Russian intelligentsia whose work involves contacts with the local population and use of the language of the titular nationality. Insufficient knowledge of the language of the titular nationality. Insufficient knowledge of the language of the titular nationality is a formidable obstacle for Russians working in public health, education, culture and administrative work and a principal argument in favour of their dismissal. Such a state of affairs may further reduce the already insignificant number of Russian teachers, doctors, lawyers, writers and population, including people of the titular nationalities close to Russian culture.

The problem of employment, education and professional training is no less acute for young Russians living in the former Soviet non-Russian republics. Starting with the 1960s and up to the end of the 1980s, the number of Russian university and college students declined steadily in all the republics. The curtailment in the past few years of Russian-language tuition in technical schools and institutes of higher learning, can be expected to exacerbate this trend.

“On the whole, Russians are highly qualified, possess organizational potential, technical skills, and extensive professional contacts in various regions of the Soviet Union and beyond its borders. Their chances to reconstruct their lives and find appropriate jobs both inside their republic and outside it are still quite good. The most favourable situation seems to obtain today in Kazakhstan, where the influence of Islam is weaker, economic reorganization is more intensive and Russian skilled workers, who constitute a considerable portion of the Russian

population, are already widely employed both in those branches of heavy industry that are changing their profile and in other spheres of the economy. In Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan the development of market relations is marking time for a number of reasons. The signs are that the going will be harder for the local Russian population in these republics: most of them are white-collar workers or employed in heavy industry, and as such have experienced a greater psychological shock from the loss of their social status, in addition to differing more sharply from the titular nationality regarding their spheres of employment. The large share of people – as compared with the titular population – employed in these types of work has changed for the Russians in the present post-communist period from a positive feature, from the point of view of their social status, to a negative one, for precisely these fields of employment have been subject to the greatest depression.'' (Ibid. pp. 296-297)

B. DEMOGRAPHIC ASPECTS OF CENTRAL ASIA AFTER INDEPENDENCE

The Central Asians are the fastest growing population group in the former USSR. However, the consistently high rate of growth conceals the ongoing processes of demographic behavior modernization among them. Changes in demographic behavior (first of all marriage patterns and marital fertility) are a very important part of general modernization, and these can be measured according to available data, whereas many other aspects of modernization are conjecture or are apparent. Analysis of demographic processes can be very useful for understanding the level of modernization as a whole among the Muslim populations of ex-Soviet Central Asia and can offer a perspective on the development of the newly independent muslim states.

Central Asian republics suggests that high population growth will be perpetuated for some time to come. Central Asia's population has been growing younger over the past two decades, so that a larger proportion falls into the lower age groups today than even ten or twenty years ago. In 1995, the proportion of women of childbearing age is expected to be almost 250% of the 1970 figure (Lubin, 1996, p. 52). Thus, even should fertility rates continue to decline, a drop in the number of births per thousand women of childbearing age would be partly offset by the "demographic momentum" set in motion or by the greater number of women in childbearing age relative to the population as a whole. This will be exacerbated by the fact that a greater proportion of the younger populations will be comprized of the indigenous nationalities, which are more oriented toward having large families than their European counterparts. And it will also be encouraged by the favorable sex ratio in the Central Asian republics as opposed to that in the republics to the north. In other words, a decline in fertility among the indigenous nationalities would still be slow in making itself felt in the republican birthrate and in population growth as a whole.

In this section of the study, we will analyse the demographic profiles of the Central Asian republics after their independence in 1991, by utilising almost all the available data. Also, relevant figures for Turkey shall be presented in order to show the similarities

and discrepancies between the Region and the Republic of Turkey, which is sharing many social, cultural and historical aspects, but attained different levels of economic and social, thus, demographic development. We will start with Kazakhstan.

1. Kazakhstan

Before analysing the demographic data of Kazakhstan, I would like to give the 'official' view of the Kazakh specialists regarding the existing demographic situation in their republic. The general approach of these specialists to the demographic problem and the terminology that they use is rather interesting and 'peculiar' ;

"The population of the country on 1 January 1998 was 15671.8 thousand people, including 8642.6 thousand (55%) -urban citizens and 7029.2 thousand (45%)- rural citizens. The territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan is 2724.9 thous/km² The population density per one sq. km is 5.8 people.

The stable decrease of the population is observed in Kazakhstan. In 1997 the total population of the Republic has decreased on 188.9 thousands people or on 1.2%, on 106 thousands people in the urban areas and on 82.9 thousands people in the rural areas. The growth of the population is observed only in three regions - Atirau (6.4%), Kizilorda (1%) and Southern Kazakhstan (0.4%). The decrease of the population is explained by the low birth rate and increase of the migrants from the Republic.

Total birth rate for five years has decreased from 19.1 up to 14.7 for each 1000 people. As a result the level of natural increase has decreased .

In 1997 in almost all regions of the country there is a tendency of the decrease of the birth rate and in the Central, Eastern and some regions of the Northern region and Almati net decrease of population is observed.

Starting from June 1995 the tendency of the gradual decrease of the death rate is observed. The number of people, died in 1997 in comparison with 1995 has decreased on 8.4 thous. people (5%) and is 160.2 thous.people The death rate for 1997 was 10.1 per 1000 people. The total deaths of the male population is 55.5% and of the female population is 44.5%.of the total deaths. 99.7 thousand deaths has been registered in the cities and 60.5 thousands- in the villages. 38% of the death cases fall to the able to work population. The death rate of the males in this age group is 3.6 % higher, than the females.

Last year, in comparison with the previous one, the decrease of the death rate is observed in the whole Republic except three regions- Atiraus, Mangistay and Jambil.

The important role among the death causes belongs to the heart and blood circulation diseases (47.7% of the total of the deaths). The remarkable place belongs to the accidents, poisonings and traumas (13.5%) and respiration diseases (8%). The deaths from the infection diseases has increased on 17% and from tuberculosis- almost on 5% in comparison with 1996.

For the last five years the infant mortality has decreased. In comparison with 1993 it decreased 3.9 per thousand and was 24.2 infants under 1 year old per 1000 born in 1997. The very high index of infant mortality is fixed in Mangustay (40.96), Jambil (30.41) and Kizilorda (29.13) regions. Mostly, the high mortality rate belongs to perinatal period (from 28 week of pregnancy, including delivery and first 7 days of life), and the main causes of these deaths are respiration diseases and congenital anomalies.

The ratio of the divorces to the marriages shows improvement. In 1996 395 divorces has been registered per 1000 marriages, in 1997-351. (Statisticheskoye obozreniye Kazakhstana, no:4, 1997, pp. 4-6).

After the brief introduction of the 'official' view of the Kazakh specialists regarding their demographic situation, we will give the population indicators of the republic which is quoted from the official publications of the CIA (<http://www.cia.gov/world fact book/kazakhstan/1997>)

Population:

16,916,463 (July 1996 est.)

Age structure:

0-14 years: 30 % (male 2,576,204; female 2,486,937)

15-64 years: 63 % (male, 5,203,035; female 5,451,404)

65 years and over: 7 % (male 384,341; female 814,542) (July 1996 est.)

Population growth rate:

-0.15 % (1996 est)

Birth rate:

19.02 births/1,000 population (1996 est)

Death rate:

9.65 deaths/1,000 population (1996 est)

Sex ratio:

At birth: 1.05 male(s)/female

Under 15 years: 1.04 male(s)/female

15-64 years: 0.95 male(s)/female

65 years and over: 0.47 male(s)/female

All ages: 0.93 male(s)/female (1996 est.)

Infant mortality rate:

63.2 deaths/1,000 live births (1996 est.)

Life expectancy at birth:

Total population: 64.09 years

Male: 58.56 years

Female: 69.9 years (1996 est.)

Total fertility rate:

2.36 children born/woman (1996 est.)

As we can observe from the data presented above, there are contradictions within the "official" data and the figures of the CIA regarding the demographical data of Kazakhstan. CIA's estimation of the birth rate for 1996 (19.02 per 1000 population) is significantly higher than the official estimate of 14.7 births per thousand population for 1997. Also, CIA's figure for infant mortality rate of 63.2 deaths/1000 live births for 1996 is again significantly higher than the official figure of 24.2 for 1997. This is partly due to the different methods used by the Central Asian republics to measure the infant mortality rate since the Soviet times. The Soviet definition of IMR was different from the WHO definition, eg. A baby born before the 29th week of pregnancy which died within 7 days of birth was treated as a miscarriage in the former USSR, but as a live birth by WHO.

Depending on our personal observations, we can assume that the figures of the CIA is much more realistic than the official figures, which does not depends on carefully conducted demographic research.

One of the fundamental problems facing Kazakhstan is the rapid pace of ethnodemographic and socioeconomic change that is to be expected over the next few decades. The indigenous Kazakhs, like most other turkic people, are in a period of rapid demographic growth, with an age structure heavily tilted toward the young. As we explained before, the decrease of population in Kazakhstan is due to the emigration of 'European' population and the low birth rate of the same.

A second important factor is the way in which the ethnic groups differ in the distribution of their age groups; the average age of the Slavic population is forty-six, while that of the Kazakh is twenty-two; 30% of the total population is aged fourteen or younger, and a further 17% is between fourteen and twenty-five. (Dixon, 1996, pp.84-85)

Kazakhstan has a comparatively young population resulting from a high birth-rate and high natural growth indices. However, a trend towards a decline of these indices has appeared recently. Between 1993 and 1994 there has been a n especially sharp decrease, from 19.4% to 14.9%, in the share of the 20-29age group, the most active in procreation and migration. A minor increase in the number of people over 60 has resulted in a further

reduction of the share of persons active in procreation.
(www.unap.org/unap/rocc/nnar/kazakhstan/chapter2.htm P.4)

The ratio of men to women in Kazakhstan has changed over years. While men prevailed in the pre-war period, since 1994 women become more prevalent in the 30-34 age group. The gap between women and men is one and a half times greater for 60-69 year olds, and increasing threefold after 70 years of age. This gender-age disproportion has emerged not only as a result of past wars and migration, but is also due to a higher rate of mortality amongst men. (Ibid p.5).

**TABLE 65: TOTAL NUMBER & URBAN-RURAL DISTRIBUTION OF
POPULATION OF KAZAKHSTAN**

(Beginning of 1997)

Total Population	Urban Population	Rural Population	% Urban	% Rural
15,860,700	8,748,600	7,112,100	55.2	44.8

Source: Komitee po Statistike I Analizu, 1997, p. 3.

As we can observe from Table 65, the official number of population of Kazakhstan for the beginning of 1997 is lower than CIA's estimate for 1996. Although 55.2 % of the population nationwide is urban, the cities, with a few exceptions, have Slavic majorities.

TABLE 66: POPULATION, BIRTH, DEATH, MARRIAGE, NATURAL INCREASE & INFANT MORTALITY RATES OF KAZAKHSTAN

Year	Population (000)	Crude Birth Rate o%	Crude Death Rate o%	Natural Increase o%	Infant Death Rate o%	Marriage Rate o%
1990	16,314	22.1	7.8	14.3	26.3	10.0
1991	16,382	21.4	8.1	13.3	27.3	10.1
1992	16,519	20.4	8.3	12.1	25.9	8.9
1993	15,516	19.1	9.4	9.7	28.1	8.8
1994	16,442	18.7	9.8	8.9	27.1	7.5
1995	16,151	17.2	10.5	6.7	27.0	7.2
1996	15,981	15.9	10.4	5.5	25.4	6.4

Source: Statistical Bulletin Kazakhstan 1997-4, P.9.

Families with many children were a characteristic feature of the republic, reflecting the traditions of its ethnic Kazakh component. Large families are considered to be those with four or more children. The south-western regions and rural areas have traditionally had higher birth-rates than Kazakhstan in general.

The current economic crisis has created additional responsibilities for women and has brought about a reduction in the number of large families. While at the beginning of 1993 there were 244 000 large families in the republic, by September 1994 the number had fallen by 4 000. A survey of 786 urban and rural mothers with many children revealed the following ; almost two-thirds had four children, more than a quarter had five children and only about one-eighth had six or more children.(Kazakhstan Human Development Report, 1996, p.32)

The tradition, particularly among the indigenous Kazakh population, of having large families is being declining since 1980's. In rural areas, low wages , delays in wage payments, a reduction in services and a deteriorating social infrastructure are increasingly depriving the population of the possibility of earning a living wage and contributing to the uncertainty of the future.

The mortality rate is the most objective and important index of the population's health status. In 1996, this index reached 10.4 per 1000. Overall mortality in Kazakhstan is lower than in Russia (12.2), the Ukraine (13.4), Hungary (14.4), but higher than in other Central Asian republics. (Ibid. p.17)

A consistently high level of mortality in the northern oblasts of the republic requires particular attention. It can be traced, in the first instance, to the social and ecological situation. Although in recent years other important factors of its growth have been political and economic instability, uncertainty about the future, and demographic changes- particularly the increasing exodus of Russian youths to the Russian Federation, leaving a larger proportion of older people.

Heart disease and cancer have traditionally been the most common causes of death in the Republic. The third most prevalent cause has become death resulting from accidents and trauma, which has surpassed respiratory diseases. Losses have been substantial; in 1992 alone 18 669 people died of other than natural causes. (Ibid. p.18)

What causes alarm is not only the growth of the number of deaths attributable to crime, but also the increasing number of suicides. It reveals to a great degree the deterioration of the moral and psychological state of the population, as well as the spread of alcoholism and drug addiction.

Infant mortality in 1993 was 25.4 per 1000 new- borns, according to the official figures. The nature of causes of children's deaths is traditional; diseases of the respiratory organs, intestinal infections, congenital anomalies, etc. (Ibid. p.18)

From 1992 to 1993 infant mortality increased from 25.9 to 28.1 per 1000 new- borns. Consistent growth of this index has been observed in the Jambyl, Kyzyl-Orda, Mangistau, Torgai and Semipalatinsk oblasts, the main part of their population being rural and indigenous.

In addition it is necessary to add that Kazakhstan follows the lead of other republics, such as Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, with high infant mortality. The main causes are the poor health of mothers, poor nutrition, poor sanitary conditions, infectious diseases, lack of drugs, lack of medical services in rural areas, and a worsening of environmental conditions.

Coming back to the population growth, demographically, time is on the side of the Kazakhs. Their population is much younger than the Russians'. The Kazakh baby-boomers of the 1960's and 1970's are just now reaching their prime productive age. Kazakhs continue to have much larger families than Russians which has led some local demographers to predict that by the year 2015 Kazakhs will make up more than 60% of the population. (Olcott, 1996, p.61)

TABLE 67: URBAN-RURAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION OF KAZAKHSTAN

(Beginning of 1997)

URBAN, 000		RURAL, 000		FEMALES PER 1000 MALES	
MALES	FEMALES	MALES	FEMALES	URBAN	RURAL
4158.3	4589.9	3449.9	3549.9	1103.8	1003.6

Source: Jenschini I Deti Kazakhstana, 1997, p. 4.

The excess female population in urban areas can be explained by the emigration of young Slavic males from the republic.

**TABLE 68: BIRTHS ACCORDING TO MOTHERS AGE & BIRTH
- ORDER IN 1996, KAZAKHSTAN**

	Mothers Age Groups						
	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	45-49
Total Births	32,916	97,997	64,704	37,887	16,834	3,046	230
First	30,225	55,946	16,395	5,572	2,117	336	14
Second	2,668	34,242	25,549	9,553	2,688	348	23
Third	19	6,843	15,267	10,717	3,785	449	26
Fourth	1	808	5,735	6,939	3,308	481	33
Fifth	-	89	1,339	3,329	2,331	455	26
Sixth	-	10	272	1,190	1,357	344	30
Seventh	-	-	49	389	713	253	29
Eight	-	1	11	112	333	147	15
Nineth	-	-	3	22	102	111	12
Tenth & More	-	11	9	14	67	108	22

Source: Jenshini I Deti Kazakhstana, p. 7.

The relatively high teenage motherhood that we observe in Kazakhstan is stemming from the early-age marriages of females in the rural areas of the country where indigenous population holds the majority.

“The age at which childbearing begins has important demographic consequences as well as important consequences for the mother and child. In many countries, postponement of the first birth, reflecting an increase in the age at marriage, has contributed greatly to overall fertility decline. The proportion of women who become mothers before the age 20 is also a measure of the magnitude of adolescent fertility, which, is a major health and social concern in many countries. Age of childbearing is increasing in Turkey gradually. The median has risen from 20.6 years among women age 45-49 years to 21.8 among women 25-29 years, despite these women not yet having reached their upper years of childbearing.” (Toros, in TDHS, 1993, P.30)

**TABLE 69: NUMBER OF THE MOTHERS UNDER 20 YEARS OLD,
KAZAKHSTAN**

	1995			1996		
	Total	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural
No of Mothers under age 20	36,096	17,868	18,228	32,014	15,916	16,098
Younger than 16 years	392	215	177	359	182	177
16	1,704	887	817	1,493	780	713
17	5,033	2,599	2,434	4,621	2,349	2,272
18	11,172	5,515	5,615	10,023	5,007	5,016
19	17,840	8,655	9,185	15,518	7,598	7,920
% of the total number of Births	13.0	14.1	12.1	12.6	13.4	12.0

Source: Jenschini I Deti Kazakhstana, p. 8.

As we can observe from Table 68 and 69, 12.6 % of the married women in Kazakhstan are giving birth to children before age 20. This figure is 17.8 % in Turkey for 1993. Proportion of these women are higher among the indigenous population. Since the percentage of urban and rural population of Kazakhstan is 55 % and 45 % respectively, we can assume that there are no main differences in teenage motherhood between urban and rural areas.

TABLE 70: DEATHS ACCORDING TO MAIN CAUSES, KAZAKHSTAN

DEATH CAUSES	(per 100,000 people)				
	1990	1993	1994	1995	1996
Total Deaths	784.4	944.8	981.8	1047.4	1042.8
Cancer	137.6	139.0	138.2	137.2	133.0
Heart & Vascular System Disease	349.6	437.0	471.9	498.6	496.0
Respiratory Diseases	74.9	87.6	90.5	96.7	90.6
Non-Natural Causes	105.4	136.6	129.0	144.5	145.5

Source: Statisticheskiy Ejegodnik Kazakstana, 1997, p. 22

As expected, heart and vascular system diseases holds the first place among death causes, and followed by cancer. Non-natural causes of death is significantly high, reaching 14%:

TABLE 71: MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE RATES BY YEARS, KAZAKHSTAN
(Per 1000 people)

Years	Marriages	Divorces
1970	9.5	1.6
1980	10.6	2.6
1985	10.1	2.6
1990	10.0	2.7
1993	8.8	2.7
1994	7.5	2.6
1995	7.2	2.4
1996	6.4	2.5

Source: Statisticheskiy Ejegodnik Kazakhstana, 1997, p. 22.

Steady decline of marriages per 1000 people which is observed through 1990's , can be attributed to the economic crisis. Divorce rates are stable since 1980.

TABLE 72: MARRIAGES BY AGE GROUP OF THE BRIDES

Bride's Age Group	Number of Marriages	Urban	Rural
Younger than 18	7,853	4,155	3,798
18-19	28,340	14,657	13,683
20-24	48,999	25,840	23,159
25-29	14,176	8,579	12,861
30-34	6,511	6,376	4,293
35-39	3,739	2,703	1,564
40-44	2,199	1,700	760
45-49	1,103	1,229	407
50-54	542	669	230
55-59	1,077	955	335
60-+	1,325	1,380	600
TOTAL	116,380	65,407	50,973

Source: Demograficheskiy Ejegodnik Kazakhstana, 1997, pp. 143-145 ;

As can be observed from Table 72, 26.8 % of the brides are younger than 20 years in Kazakhstan for 1996. Also, 42.1 % of the women who married for the first time in 1996 are in the age group 20-24. Unfortunately median age at first marriage is not available for Kazakhstan.

Turkish Demographic and Health Survey suggests that there has been an increase over the past 20 years in the age at first marriage in Turkey. The median age at first marriage among women age 25-29 is 20 years compared to 18.3 years among women age 45-49. (TDHS, 1993,P.XVI)

TABLE 73: ILLEGITIMATE BIRTHS IN KAZAKHSTAN

(% of the total births)

Years	Total	Urban	Rural
1990	13.2	15.5	10.9
1993	13.4	16.7	10.6
1994	14.5	18.0	11.5
1995	15.7	19.6	12.4
1996	17.6	21.5	14.1

Source: Demographicheskiy Ejegodnik Kazakhstana, p. 18.

Steady rise in the number of illegitimate births in Kazakhstan, especially in urban areas, are in direct correlation with the decreasing number of marriages, which is a natural consequence of the ongoing economic crisis.

Almost all women marry in Turkey and the percentage of the illegitimate births is neglectable. (Population of Turkey, SIS, 1995,P.18)

TABLE 74: ABORTIONS IN KAZAKHSTAN BY YEARS

Years	No. of Abortions
1994	261,834
1995	224,084
1996	194,187

Source: Kratkiy Staticheskiy Cpravochnih, 1998, p. 5.

Number of abortions are decreasing in Kazakhstan due to the continuing emigration of the Slavic nationalities which has a tendency of having fewer children, thus, high number of abortions.

In Turkey, the total abortion rates show a slight decrease since 1990. The decrease is from 21 per 1000 pregnancies in 1990 to 18 in 1992. (Dervisoglu & Ergor, in TDHS, 1993, P.52)

2. Kyrgyzstan

We will start to analyse the current demographic structure of Kyrgyzstan by giving the official figures of the CIA regarding the subject. (www.cia.gov/World Fact Book/Kyrgyzstan)

Population:

4,529,648 (July 1996 est)

Age structure:

0-14 years: 37 % (male 847,859; female 828, 889)

15-64 years: 57 % (male, 1,263,044; female 1,312,040)

65 years and over: 6 % (male 100,524; female 177,292) (July 1996 est.)

Population growth rate:

0.07 % (1996 est)

Birth rate:

26.02 births/1,000 population (1996 est)

Death rate:

8.83 deaths/1,000 population (1996 est)

Net migration rate:

-16.5 migrant(s)/1,000 population (1996 est.)

Sex ratio:

At birth: 1.05 male(s)/female

Under 15 years: 1.02 male's)/female

15-64 years: 0.96 male(s)/female

65 years and over: 0.57 male(s)/female

All ages: 0.95 male(s)/female (1996 est.)

Infant mortality rate:

77.8 deaths/1,000 live births (1996 est.)

Life expectancy at birth:*Total of population: 63.36 years**Male: 59.18 years**Female: 68.77 years (1996 est.)*

The population of the Kyrgyz Republic numbered 4.530 million in 1996. The Kyrgyz Republic has a high dependency ratio, 37% of the population, in 1996 was below the age of 15 and 6% was over the age of 65. This is high relative to the international average but similar to that of the other Central Asian republics. Because of the large percentage of young people in the population, the overall population is aging slower than in other CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) countries.

In 1994, 64.4% of the population lived in rural areas. This represented an increase from 62% in 1989 because much of the emigration was from the urban areas. (www.unap.org/kyrgyzstan/chapter2.htm).

TABLE 75: POPULATION OF KYRGYZSTAN ACCORDING TO SEX AND AGE


(1st January, 1997)

	Both Sexes	Male Population	Female Population
TOTAL POPULATION	4,571,211	2,258,249	2,315,873
Population by specific ages & age groups			
0	106,090	54,371	51,719
1	113,010	58,151	54,859
2	104,726	83,476	51,250
3	111,506	56,996	54,510
4	120,869	61,829	59,040
0-4	556,201	284,823	271,378
5	120,889	61,743	59,146
6	118,244	60,605	57,369
7	120,202	61,130	59,072
8	120,753	61,620	59,133
9	119,461	60,144	59,317
5-9	599,549	305,242	294,307
10-14	549,594	277,219	272,376
15	97,183	49,033	48,150
16	91,908	46,404	45,504
17	89,874	45,396	44,478
18	88,439	44,480	43,959
19	87,820	43,922	43,898
15-19	455,224	229,235	225,989
20-24	402,311	202,146	200,165
25-29	345,696	179,327	166,369

30-34	330,996	163,151	167,845
35-39	317,780	157,047	160,733
40-44	342,306	118,550	123,756
45-49	178,661	86,234	92,427
50-54	83,198	41,009	42,189
55-59	142,607	67,470	75,137
60-64	117,818	54,130	63,688
65-69	110,624	47,359	63,266
70-74	70,858	25,831	45,027
75-79	33,532	9,912	23,620
80-84	21,184	5,568	15,616
85+and older	15,982	3,997	11,985

Source: National Staticheskiy Komitet Kirgizkoy Respubliki. Demograficheskiy Ejegodnik, 1996, p. 10.



FIGURE VI: AGE PYRAMID OF KYRGYZSTAN , 1997

Age pyramid of Kyrgyzstan for 1997 reflects almost typical age pyramid of an developing country which is experiencing "Demographic Transition". The high percentage of young age groups are due to the high fertility rates observed in the recent past. These percentages of young age groups are slightly higher than the relevant percentages of Turkey for 1993. (TDHS, 1993, p.12) The sharp decline of population in the age group 50-54 is due to the enormous decline in births during the second world war, 1941-1945.

TABLE 76: NUMBER OF BIRTHS, DEATHS & NATURAL INCREASE IN KYRGYZSTAN, 1996

BIRTHS			DEATHS			NATURAL INCREASE		
TOTAL	URBAN	RURAL	TOTAL	URBAN	RURAL	TOTAL	URBAN	RURAL
108,007	28,700	79,307	34,562	13,639	20,923	73,445	15,061	58,384

Source: National Statisticheskiiy Komitet Kirgizkoi Respubliki, p. 53.

TABLE 77: NUMBER OF BIRTHS, DEATHS & NATURAL INCREASE BY SEX IN KYRGYZSTAN, 1996

BIRTHS		DEATHS		NATURAL INCREASE	
MALE	FEMALE	MALE	FEMALE	MALE	FEMALE
55,877	52,130	18,673	15,889	37,204	36,241

Source: National Statisticheskiiy Komitet Kirgizkoi Respubliki, p. 55

From 1989 to 1996 the population increased an average of less than one percent a year, in 1993 the population actually decreased. The low population growth rate reflects a decrease in the birth rate, an increase in the death rate, and a significant amount of emigration. The birth rate decreased steadily from 1989 to 1996, the death rate decreased slightly from 1989 to 1991 and then increased markedly. (Ibid, p. 56)

TABLE 78: LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH IN KYRGYZSTAN, 1996

Years	Total Population			Urban Population			Rural Population		
	Both sex	Male	Female	Both Sex	Male	Female	Both Sex	Male	Female
1989	68.5	64.3	72.4	69.8	64.9	74.1	67.9	64.1	71.4
1990	68.5	64.2	72.6	69.2	64.3	73.8	68.1	64.3	71.8
1991	68.8	64.6	72.7	69.4	64.8	73.6	68.5	64.7	72.2
1992	68.3	64.2	72.2	69.2	64.4	73.7	67.8	64.3	71.3
1993	67.3	62.9	71.7	67.1	62.1	72.3	67.7	63.8	71.7
1994	66.0	61.6	70.7	65.6	60.5	71.1	66.5	62.4	70.7
1995	66.0	61.4	70.4	65.3	60.3	71.0	66.4	62.4	70.1
1996	66.6	62.3	71.0	66.0	61.1	71.0	67.0	63.1	70.9

Source: Statisticheskiy Komitet Kirgizkoi Respubliki, p. 69.

There is a significant decrease in life expectancy of both sexes starting from 1991, which also coincides with the growing economic crisis in the republic. Again, we must note that the figures of CIA for the life expectancy at birth is lower than the official figures of the republic.

TABLE 79: NUMBER OF MARRIAGES & DIVORCES IN KYRGYZSTAN, 1996

	Marriages	Divorces	For 1000 People	
			Marriages	Divorces
Total	26,188	6,528	5.7	1.4
Urban	7,787	4,347	5.0	2.7
Rural	18,311	2,235	6.1	0.7

Source: Statisticheskiy Komitet Kirgizkoi Respubliki, pp. 71-72

Marriage rate of Kyrgyzstan for 1996 is similar to that of Kazakhstan. Divorce rate is significantly lower, due to the higher percentage of indigenous population in the Kyrgyz republic.

TABLE 80: NUMBER OF MARRIAGES BY BRIDES AGE GROUP, KYRGYZSTAN, 1996

Women's Age Groups	No of Marriages
16-19	9,431
20-24	11,703
25-29	2,468
30-34	1,049
35-39	576
40-44	348
45-49	190
50-54	86
55-59	148
60+	189
TOTAL	26,188

Source: Ibid p. 77

The age of marriages shows a similar pattern in Kyrgyzstan as of Kazakhstan. Highest percentage of the marriages among females are taking place in the age group 20-24. Teenage marriages are slightly higher than Kazakhstan due to the high percentage of the indigenous population in the republic.

TABLE 81: AGE SPECIFIC FERTILITY RATES OF KYRGYZSTAN (PER 1000 WOMEN), KYRGYZSTAN, 1996

	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	45-49	GFR	TFR
Total	54.33	201.77	170.29	105.72	51.06	13.17	2.22	95.99	2,993
Urban	41.54	130.54	113.33	74.65	33.99	7.05	0.77	65.1	1,997
Rural	60.24	250.4	211.39	124.74	62.41	17.64	3.43	115.80	3,668

Source: Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, 1997

TABLE 82: NUMBER OF BIRTHS ACCORDING TO THE AGE OF THE MOTHER AND BIRTH ORDER,
KYRGYZSTAN, 1996 (ALL WOMEN)

Number of the Children Born

	Total	First	Second	Third	Fourth	Fifth	Sixth	Seventh	Eighth	Ninety	Tenth
Kyrgyzstan (Total)	108,007	34,498	29,671	19,709	12,226	6,629	2,963	1,230	534	238	252
By Mothers Age Group:											
15-19	12,191	10,825	1,236	40	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
20-24	39,817	17,177	17,261	4,740	577	62	-	-	-	-	-
25-29	28,008	4,207	7,913	9,328	4,942	1,373	205	25	8	1	6
30-34	17,891	1,481	2,328	4,288	4,815	2,323	1,253	362	98	15	16
35-39	8,065	561	710	1,139	1,662	1,678	1,230	635	260	111	77
40-44	1,590	103	107	149	201	249	244	186	153	87	111
45-49	196	17	9	16	16	30	23	19	11	17	38
Urban	28,700	11,150	8,616	4,923	2,241	1,149	372	120	59	19	22
By Mothers Age Group:											
15-19	2,944	2,685	250	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
20-24	10,460	5,638	3,984	754	76	8	-	-	-	-	-
25-29	7,814	1,780	2,946	2,165	701	199	19	1	2	-	1
30-34	4,797	661	1,045	1,449	917	524	147	35	13	1	3
35-39	2,144	241	334	479	478	348	162	61	26	7	7
40-44	359	45	46	55	63	63	36	21	18	7	5
45-49	31	5	2	5	2	5	4	2	-	1	5
Rural	79,307	23,348	21,055	14,786	9,985	5,480	2,591	1,110	475	219	230
By Mothers Age Group:											
15-19	9,247	8,140	1,076	31	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
20-24	29,357	11,539	13,277	3,986	501	54	-	-	-	-	-
25-29	20,194	2,427	4,967	7,165	4,241	1,174	186	24	6	1	5
30-34	13,094	820	1,283	2,839	3,898	2,708	1,106	327	85	14	13
35-39	5,921	320	376	660	1,184	1,330	1,068	574	234	104	70
40-44	1,231	58	61	94	138	186	208	165	135	80	106
45-49	165	12	7	11	14	25	19	17	11	16	33

Source: Statisticheskii Komitet Kirgizskoi Respubliki, pp. 93-95

As can be observed from Table 81, age-specific fertility rates of Kyrgyzstan for 1996 fell for all age groups except 15-19, compared with 1988-1989 (See Table 35), assuming that the systematic and methodology of the two surveys does not differ from each other significantly. TFR of Kyrgyzstan for the same year is around 3 percent; 2 percent in urban Kyrgyzstan and 3.7 percent for the rural. The rural TFR of Kyrgyzstan is still high due to the very high percent of indigenous population in the same. The increase of TFR for the age group 15-19 can be explained by the emigration of Slavic population, thus, increasing the percentage of indigenous population in the age group, which has a tendency to marry earlier, and having more children.

For comparison, the TFR of Turkey for 1993 is 2.7 children born/woman; 2.4 for urban areas and 3.1 for the rural. (TOROS, in TDHS, 1993, P. 24)

Unfortunately, Table 82 is prepared not for "children ever born-CEB", but for distribution of the total births which took place in Kyrgyzstan in 1996 according to the mothers (married or not) age group, and for the birth order.

TABLE 83: ABORTIONS IN KYRGYZSTAN, 1996

No of Abortions	Total Births	Abortions for 1000 Alive Births	Abortions for 1000 Women of Age 15-49
34,113	108,007	315.8	30.4

Source: Statisticheskii Komitet Kirgizkoi Respubliki. P. 90

Abortions in Kyrgyzstan is defined as "...the sum of induced and spontaneous abortions during the first 28 weeks of pregnancy".

In Turkey the total abortions for 1000 live births in 1993 is 276. (Dervisoglu & Ergor, in TDHS, 1993, P. 52)

TABLE 84: DEATH RATE BY AGE GROUPS AND SEXES, KYRGYZSTAN, 1996

(per 1000 people)			
Both Sexes	Kyrgyzstan (Total)	Urban	Rural
0	25.94	29.92	24.46
1-4	2.67	1.73	3.01
5-9	0.56	0.47	0.60
10-14	0.48	0.41	0.51
15-19	0.84	0.77	0.87
20-24	1.55	1.41	1.63
25-29	2.33	2.00	2.56
30-34	2.97	3.23	2.81
35-39	4.11	4.53	3.85
40-44	5.78	6.73	5.11
45-49	9.07	10.29	8.08
50-54	12.64	13.52	11.99
55-59	17.44	19.43	16.08
60-64	25.74	29.02	23.83
65-69	35.67	38.82	33.70
70-74	51.39	51.91	51.03
75-79	75.86	72.68	78.33
80-84	114.96	111.18	118.33
85+	235.07	189.51	263.51
Males	8.30	9.93	7.48
Age Groups			
0	29.33	33.93	27.57
1-4	2.84	1.86	3.20
5-9	0.65	0.53	0.70
10-14	0.60	0.48	0.65
15-19	1.10	1.07	1.12
20-24	2.02	2.08	1.98
25-29	3.36	2.90	3.70
30-34	4.26	4.77	3.97
35-39	5.68	6.66	5.09
40-44	8.27	10.14	7.00
45-49	13.16	15.59	11.25
50-54	17.87	20.43	16.04
55-59	23.22	28.14	20.02
60-64	36.23	43.60	32.17
65-69	46.95	54.88	42.55
70-74	67.93	70.80	66.09
75-79	104.49	89.87	117.53
80-84	144.25	125.17	162.83
85+	255.42	178.45	312.34
Females	6.89	7.50	6.54
Age Groups	Kyrgyzstan (Total)	Urban	Rural
0	22.31	25.66	21.13
1-4	2.49	1.60	2.81
5-9	0.46	0.40	0.49
10-14	0.36	0.33	0.37
15-19	0.58	0.49	0.62
20-24	1.07	0.85	1.22
25-29	1.22	1.03	1.35

30-34	1.71	1.79	1.66
35-39	2.59	2.57	2.60
40-44	3.39	3.59	3.24
45-49	5.26	5.53	5.03
50-54	7.51	7.10	7.84
55-59	12.27	12.06	12.42
60-64	16.87	17.38	16.55
65-69	27.17	28.18	26.48
70-74	42.17	42.22	42.12
75-79	64.09	64.79	63.58
80-84	104.31	105.77	103.05
85+	228.07	193.87	248.18

Source: Statisticheskiiy Komitet Kirgizkoi Respubliki, pp. 116-118.

Infant mortality rate of Kyrgyzstan is presented as 25.94 per 1000 children born in the official documents. As Kazakhstan, this is partly due to the definition of the infant mortality. According to the figures of CIA, this figure is around 78 per 1000 children born. Also the child mortality rate is presented as 2.67, which adds up to 28.61 for under-five mortality, which also seems very low. For comparison, the infant mortality and under-five mortality rates of Turkey for 1993 are 53.9 and 61 respectively.

TABLE 85: DEATHS ACCORDING TO DEATH CAUSES, KYRGYZSTAN, 1996

DEATH CAUSES	No of Deaths	Deaths per 100,000 pople
Total Deaths, Kyrgyzstan	34,562	755.3
Infection Diseases	1,363	29.8
Cancer	2,867	62.7
Heart & Vascular System Diseases	13,794	301.5
Respiratory System Diseases	5,086	111.1
Gastro-Intestinal System Diseases	1,668	36.5
Non-Natural Reasons	3,838	83.9

Source: Statisticheskiiy Komitet Kirgizkoi Respubliki, p. 166.

It is interesting to note that the second major death cause in the republic is the respiratory system diseases which is an indicator of the poor health services.

TABLE 86: EXTERIOR MIGRATION BY YEARS; KYRGYZSTAN

(000)

	Y E A R S							
	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Immigrants	1.2	0.7	0.5	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2
Emmigrants	15.9	17.3	15.0	13.2	11.4	10.1	8.7	6.2
Balance	-14.7	-16.6	-14.5	-12.9	-11.2	-10.0	-8.5	-6.0

Source: Ibid, p. 226.

The movement towards ethnic homogeneity resulting from the emigration of non-Kyrgyz groups is not expected to add anything positive to the country . In fact, there is a danger of an increase in inter-ethnic tensions. The economic crisis and the process of the current social, economic and political reforms may also increase inter-ethnic friction concerning the problems of language, housing, construction, privatization, selections of officials, employment and so on.

3. Uzbekistan

For Uzbekistan, again we will start with the figures of CIA.

Population:

23,418,381 (July 1996 est.)

Age structure:

0-14 years: 40 % (male 4,732,585; female 4,618,503)

15-64 years: 55 % (male, 6,441,052 ; female 6,540,479)

65 years and over: 5 % (male 416,571; female 669,191) (July 1996 est.)

Population growth rate:

2.1 % (1996 est)

Birth rate:

29.86 births/1,000 population (1996 est)

Death rate:

8.02 deaths/1,000 population (1996 est)

Net migration rate:

-3.13 migrant(s)/1,000 population (1996 est.)

Sex ratio:

At birth: 1.05 male(s)/female

Under 15 years: 1.02 male(s)/female

15-64 years: 0.98 male(s)/female

65 years and over: 0.62 male(s)/female

All ages: 0.98 male(s)/female (1996 est.)

Infant mortality rate:

79.6 deaths/1,000 live births (1996 est.)

Life expectancy at birth:

Total of population: 64.6 years

Male: 60.44 years

Female: 69.87 years (1996 est.)

Uzbek Republic locates in the heart of Central Asia- Mavara un Nahr, it is the centre of antic agrarian civilizations of the Region, and Uzbekistan today has minority problems with its neighbouring countries. Uzbekistan does'nt have rich underground resourches, its economy depends on cotton monoculture, and the country is under the heavy burden of population pressure, adding almost 500 000 people to its population every year. Almost two-thirds of its land is desert which does'nt allows any kind of agrarian production, and the population density in the oasis-zone and the Fergana Valley of the republic is very high. From all these, we can assume that Uzbekistan is the most sensitive and fragile country among the Central Asian republics, and the population growth might de-stabilise the existing socio-political settings of the country in the future, which, inevitably will create a 'domino effect' on the neighbouring republics.

The population of Uzbekistan, according to a well-known Uzbek demographer Ata Mirzaev, will continue to grow by 500 000 people per year the decade 2000-2010. In the year 2005, he states, 30 million people will be living in Uzbekistan, and in the year 2010, Uzbekistan's population will reach 33 million people.(Lubin, 1996, p.54).

But the implications of demographic change in Uzbekistan are far more dramatic on a local scale, as the population growth raise more immediate and critical questions. For example, unemployment has been growing dramatically, at the same time that a rapidly growing population is placing increasing strains on local economies to meet both consumer and producer demands.

''In some areas unemployment has reached a level as high as one-third of the working age populations. According to one estimate, about 2 000 000 people are unemployed today in Uzbekistan, among whom a growing proportion are young. According to yet another estimate, one in eight able-bodied citizens in Uzbekistan is now jobless, with 250 000 people entering the labor market every year. And every year in Uzbekistan, reportedly more than 100 000 young people- mostly high school graduates – are joining the ranks of those

employed in household and private subsidiary work. Indeed, many observers in Uzbekistan believe that high levels of unemployment have become critical levels. Rising, according to one estimate, at a rate of 30 000 people per year in the Fergana Valley alone, high unemployment is considered to be one of the key reasons for the violent ethnic clashes that broke out between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in Fergana in June 1989." (Ibid. p. 55)

TABLE 87: MIDYEAR POPULATION OF UZBEKISTAN

(000)

Years	Total Population	Urban Population	Rural Population
1991	20708.2	8366.1	12342.1
1992	21206.8	8506.0	12700.8
1993	21702.7	8582.2	13120.5
1994	22192.5	8677.0	13515.5
1995	22562.4	8732.6	13829.8
1996	23007.2	8831.0	14176.2
1997	23443.7	8943.9	14449.8

Source: Chislenost Naseleniya Respublika Uzbekistan Gosudarstvenniy Department Statistiki, 1998; pp. 6-14.

As we can observe from Table 87, the population of Uzbekistan demonstrated a rapid increase between 1991-1997, in spite of considerable emigration. This is especially true for the rural areas of the Republic where the population increased more than 2 000 000 people in 6 years.

TABLE 88: CRUDE BIRTH AND DEATH RATES & NATURAL POPULATION GROWTH OF UZBEKISTAN

(for 1000 people)

Years	Birth Rate	Death Rate	Natural Increase
1990	33.7	6.1	27.6
1991	34.5	6.2	28.3
1992	33.1	6.3	26.8
1993	31.4	6.6	24.8
1994	29.4	6.6	22.8
1995	29.8	6.4	23.4
1996	27.3	6.2	21.1

Source: Ibid, p. 15. .

Table 88 indicates the decrease in birth rates, thus, natural increase of the population in the republic starting from 1991. Still, a considerable high birth rate of 2.73 %, resulting with the annual population growth of 2.11 % in 1996 means that the net population growth of the Republic is around 500 000 people annually, which is a big burden for the countries lacking economic means. Although the percentage growth rates are declining, absolute increase of population around 450 000-500 000 people is expected to continue in the coming decade.

TABLE 89: NUMBER OF BIRTHS, DEATHS & NATURAL POPULATION INCREASE OF UZBEKISTAN

(000)

Years	Number of Births	Number of Deaths	Natural Increase
1995	678.0	145.4	532.6
1996	634.8	144.8	490.0

Source: Yestetsvennoye Dvijeniye Nasaleniya Uzbekistan, 2a, 1997, p. 4.

TABLE 90: NUMBER OF TOTAL DEATHS BY CAUSES, UZBEKISTAN

	1995	1996	Per 100,000 of Total Population	
			1995	1996
Total Deaths; of which:	145,439	144,829	683.3	623.6
Heart & Vascular System	67,675	67,653	297.0	291.3
Cancer of All Types	10,126	9,904	44.4	42.6
Accidents & Non-Natural Reasons	10,373	11,475	45.5	49.4
Respiratory System Diseases	23,849	2559	104.7	97.1
Digestive System Diseases	7,336	7,881	32.2	33.9
Infection Diseases	7,786	6,805	34.2	29.3

Source: Yestetsvennoye Divijeniye Nasaleniye Uzbekistana, p. 12.

Heart and vascular system diseases are the main causes of the deaths in Uzbekistan. It is interesting to note that cancer stands in the fourth place in death causes, which is contradictory to the World figures.

TABLE 91: NUMBER & PERCENTAGE OF WOMEN IN TOTAL POPULATION OF UZBEKISTAN

(Beginning of the Year)

	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Total Females (000)	10909.8	11146.6	11329.1	11538.5	11747.7
% of Females in the Total Population	50.5	50.4	50.4	50.4	50.3
Females per 1000 Males	102.0	101.8	101.7	101.4	101.3

Source: Jenschini i Deti Uzbekistan, Statisticheskii Sbornik, 1998, p. 5.

**TABLE 92: NUMBER OF FEMALES ACCORDING TO AGE GROUPS,
UZBEKISTAN, 1997**

	Number of Females			% of Females in Total Population		
	Total	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural
Total Females	11,747,762	4,509,326	7,238,436	50.3	50.8	50.0
By age groups						
0-4	1,581,060	491,377	1,089,683	48.8	48.8	48.8
5-9	1,596,172	520,249	1,075,923	49.2	49.1	49.2
10-14	1,443,440	494,292	949,148	49.5	49.4	49.6
15-19	1,175,044	419,483	755,561	49.5	49.4	49.6
20-24	1,038,662	401,333	637,329	49.5	49.5	49.5
25-29	918,773	366,826	551,947	50.5	48.3	52.1
30-34	875,032	345,042	529,990	51.1	50.9	51.3
35-39	789,731	333,611	456,120	50.5	51.2	50.1
40-44	563,013	257,871	305,142	50.7	51.5	50.1
45-49	395,297	198,402	196,895	51.1	52.1	50.1
50-54	209,327	105,613	103,714	49.7	51.7	47.7
55-59	317,723	157,799	159,924	51.4	53.5	49.5
60-64	253,247	117,212	136,035	52.0	54.2	50.1
65-69	227,888	112,305	115,583	54.7	58.6	51.4
70-74	163,690	85,672	78,018	61.3	66.0	56.9
75-79	91,452	46,044	45,408	68.6	70.9	66.3
80+	108,211	56,195	52,016	68.3	72.5	64.3

Source: Jenshini I Deti Uzbekistan, p. 8.

The considerable number of females in the age-group 0-19, due to the high fertility, is another indicator of the future population trends of the republic.

TABLE 93: NUMBER OF CHILDREN UNDER AGE 16, UZBEKISTAN

(Beginning of the year, 000)

	1995			1996			1997		
	Total	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural
Total Children Under age 16, of which	9,656	3,199	6,457	9,800	3,226	6,574	9,912	3,242	6,670
0-2 Years	1,979	612	1,367	1,954	599	1,355	1,913	592	1,321
3-6 Years	2,614	845	1,769	2,640	844	1,796	2,663	841	1,822
7 Years	649	219	430	640	215	425	626	201	425
8-15 Years	4,414	1,523	2,891	4,566	1,568	2,998	4,710	1,608	3,102
% of Children Under 16 Years in Total Population	43.0	36.9	46.8	42.8	36.8	46.5	42.5	36.5	46.1

Source: Jenshini I Deti Uzbekistan, pp. 10-11.

In Uzbekistan the percentage of children under age 16 is reaching to 42.5 % of the total population in 1997. This accumulation is due to the high fertility in the republic and a strong evidence of the economic and social bottlenecks that Uzbekistan will face in the near future stemming from the rapid population growth.

TABLE 94: NUMBER OF MARRIAGES & DIVORCES, UZBEKISTAN

(000)

	Marriages			Divorces		
	Total	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural
1993	225.4	82.4	143.0	27.0	19.6	7.4
1994	176.3	67.0	109.3	24.3	18.0	6.3
1995	170.8	62.6	108.2	21.2	16.0	5.2
1996	171.7	63.3	108.4	20.2	14.7	5.5

Source: Janshini I Deti Uzbekistan , p. 28.

**TABLE 95: DIVORCES ACCORDING TO THE
AGE OF THE BRIDE, UZBEKISTAN, 1996**

Age of the Bride	No. of Divorces
Under 20	569
20-24	5,943
25-29	5,281
30-34	3,374
35-39	2,197
40-44	1,302
45-49	751
50-54	237
55-59	291
60 - +	201
Age not specified	86
Total Divorces	20,232

Source: Janshini I Deti Uzbekistan, p. 31.

It is rather surprising that the divorce rates, which is below the industrialized nations average and tending to grow, is declining in Uzbekistan. This might be explained by the emigration of the Slavic nationalities from the Republic, which has high divorce rates.

TABLE 96: NUMBER OF MARRIAGES BY AGE GROUP OF THE BRIDE, UZBEKISTAN, 1996

Age of the Bride	No of Marriages
Under 20	78,178
20-24	72,586
25-29	11,618
30-34	4,273
35-39	2,189
40-44	1,014
45-49	616
50-+	1,157
Age not specified	31
TOTAL	171,662

Source: Jenshini I Deti Uzbekistan, p. 29.

Teenage marriages in Uzbekistan are significantly higher than in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. This is due to the lower percentage of the Slavic population of the republic, and traditionally lower level of integration of the Uzbek society to the European cultures of the ex-USSR. As we explained before, although the mean age of the first marriage is rising in Uzbekistan in the last decade, still considerable number of the brides are under age 20 in 1996, which is stimulating the TFR..

TABLE 97: INFANT DEATH RATE BY YEARS, UZBEKISTAN

Year	Total %	Urban %	Rural %
1993	32.0	32.3	31.9
1994	28.2	28.8	27.9
1995	26.0	28.7	24.8
1996	24.2	26.8	23.0

Source: Jenshini I Deti Uzbekistan, p. 38.

According to the official data, infant mortality rate is falling in Uzbekistan since 1993. It is rather surprising that the infant mortality rate is higher in urban areas, again, according to the official data.

Here we must note again that the infant mortality rate given in the figures of the CIA for Uzbekistan 1996, is 79.6 per 1000 infants. Which, according to our personal observations seems to be more realistic.

TABLE 98: NUMBER OF FEMALES DIED DUE TO THE COMPLICATIONS OF PREGNANCY, DELIVERY & POST DELIVERY PERIOD, UZBEKISTAN

(Per 100,000 Pregnancies)

Year	Total %	Urban %	Rural %
1993	24.1	30.2	21
1994	17.3	18.8	16
1995	18.9	23.0	17
1996	12.0	19.2	8

Source: Jenshini I Deti Uzbekistan, p. 38.

According to the official statistics of Uzbekistan the number of females dying due to the complications of pregnancy, delivery and post delivery period is falling since 1993, and even falling more rapidly in rural areas. -Considering the deteriorating medical facilities of the republic since mid-1980's, these figures must be evaluated with suspicion.

TABLE 99: NUMBER & PERCENTAGE OF THE URBAN AND RURAL POPULATION, UZBEKISTAN

(Beginning of the year, 000)

	1995	1996	1997
Total Population	22562.4	23007.2	23443.7
Urban Population	8732.6	8831.0	8943.9
% Urban	38.7	38.4	38.2
Rural Population	13829.8	14176.2	13339.8
% Rural	61.3	61.6	61.8

Source: Uzbekistan v Sifrah, Kratkiy Statisticheskiy Sbornik, 1997, p. 31.

38.2 % of the population of Uzbekistan is living in the urban areas. Tashkent, with a population of 2.3 Million people is the biggest city of the Republic. Samarkand, Bukhara, Khiva, are the other big cities of the Country.. Urban population is scattered through oasis zones of Amu Darya and Sir Darya, since the considerable part of the Republic consists of deserts. Except the oasis, Fergana Valley is the most densely populated area of the country.

4. Turkmenistan

We will start to analyse the demographic structure of Turkmenistan from the figures that are presented in CIA World fact book.([www.cia.gov/World fact book/Turkmenistan](http://www.cia.gov/World_fact_book/Turkmenistan))

Population:

4,149,283 (July 1996 est)

Age structure:

0-14 years: 39 % (male 826,637; female 804,385)

15-64 years: 57 % (male, 1,154,415; female 1,188,173)

65 years and over: 5 % (male 65,447; female 110,226) (July 1996 est.)

Population growth rate:

1.82 % (1996 est)

Birth rate:

29.12 births/1,000 population (1996 est)

Death rate:

8.839 deaths/1,000 population (1996 est)

Net migration rate:

-2.08 migrant(s)/1,000 population (1996 est.)

Sex ratio:

At birth: 1.05 male(s)/female

Under 15 years: 1.03 male's)/female

15-64 years: 0.97 male(s)/female

65 years and over: 0.59 male(s)/female

All ages: 0.97 male(s)/female (1996 est.)

Infant mortality rate:

81.6 deaths/1,000 live births (1996 est.)

Life expectancy at birth:

Total of population: 61.48 years

Male: 56.68 years

Female: 66.52 years (1996 est.)

Total fertility rate:

3.62 children born/woman (1996 est.)

Ethnic divisions:

Turkmen 73.3 %, Russian 9.8 %, Uzbek 9 %, Kazak 2 %, other 5.9 %

Urban population:

2045800

Rural population:

2103500

Before analysing the demographic data of Turkmenistan, I would like to present some official demographic data and comments concerning the Republic in order to convey the "official demographic stance".

"The population of Turkmenistan is 4.3 mlns. people by 01.01.1996.

Turkmenians are 72% of the country's population, Uzbeks - 9%, Russians - 10%. Turkmenian language refers to Turkic group of languages and is a state language. The demographic development of Turkmenistan is characterised by many peculiarities. The population number is fastly growing both in the cities and rural areas. The fast increase of the population is first of all explained by its high natural increase.

For the period between the censuses of 1979 and 1989 the total population has increased on 28.1%. The urban population has increased on 21.2 % and the rural one- on 34.4%. The average annual increase was 2.3; 2.3 and 2.6% correspondingly. Starting from 1990 up to 1994 the average annual increase of the population was 3.8%; urban population - 3.9% and rural one - 3.7%.

The high level of natural increase highly influences the peculiarity of the age structure of the population. The share of the children and teenagers (42.5%), and of the people able to work (49.9%) is quite important. The changes of sex composition of the population are quite noticeable. 51% of the total population are women. This index is stable during 15 years. 1030 females fall to each 1000 males. The big share of married women and low level of divorces are the

determining factors of the modern demographic situation in Turkmenistan. One of the characteristic features of the demographic structure of the republic is a high birth rate. However, at present there is a tendency of its decrease. In 1993 the total birth rate was 33.1 against 36 in 1985. The decrease of the birth rate is characteristic for both the urban and rural population. For the analysing period the birth rate in the urban areas has decreased from 31.2 up to 28.3 and in rural area - from 40.1 up to 37.0. Due to the relatively high birth rate 32% of the families consist of 7 and more people. The average turkmenian family consists of 5.6 people. The average size of the family is determined not only by the birth rate, but by such national traditions as living of several generation in one house, obligatory living of the younger son with the parents, desire to have a lot of sons, etc. Families with many children should be considered as a component of conscious reproduction behaviour, which is expressed in satisfaction of the woman or married couple to have children. Multi- children family is based on the traditions of the certain ethnic unity, traditional principles of social-ethnic environment, in which the formation of the personality, family and their orientation takes place.

The demographic policy of the state stimulates the high birth rate, which guarantees the favourable conditions for birth, occupation of the women and their social protection.

Death rate, together with the birth rate is the important component of reproduction of the population. For the period 1986-1993 the death rate had a tendency to decrease and was 7.9 against 8.1 per thousand respectively. In the urban and rural areas the death rate of the males is prevailing over the death rate of the females. Due to this fact the average life duration of the males is 62.3 and of the females is 69.3 years.

The stable tendency of the increase of the migration volume between rural and urban areas is related to the social-economic

changes in the rural areas. In the process of development of agriculture, growth of the education level and culture of the people the social and territorial mobility is increasing. The big share of youth in the population of rural areas stipulates the enormous possibilities and desire to change their place of living.

The labour migration under other equal conditions is proportional to the number of working places, dwelling conditions and availability of work at the industrial enterprises of the cities. These circumstances will be for a long time the most important factor of the flow of the rural population to Turkmenian cities.

The favourable demographic situation assists in formation of the recovery function of the population, which in respect to economy is the producer and consumer of the material wealth. The sex and age, educational, professional-qualificational and social structure of the population have the greatest influence on the development of the economy. All of them are defining the quality and quantity of the labour resources.

Education and demographic process are interconnected. The birth rate of the population stipulates the necessity to have sufficient schools. The quantity of pupils in schools, necessary quantity of the teachers, development of the system of post-school educational institutions depend on the birth rate. It is undoubtful, that the functioning of the education system depends on the subject of education and requirements of the population.

At present, the health protection, decrease of the diseases and death rate of the population are the main tendency of the demographic policy of the state.'' (Turkmenistan, otchot po chelovechskomu razvitiu, 1997. pp. 6-8

Turkmenistan is a big country with a total area of 488 000 sq. km., having the smallest population among the Central Asian republics, 4 500 000 (1996 est.) people. It's population density is very low (around 9.4 people/sq. km.), and its birth rate is the

highest among its neighbours. According to CIA the TFR of Turkmenistan is 3.62 children born/woman in 1996. This figure is significantly higher than the TFR of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and much higher than the TFR of Turkey -2.7, for 1993. One can come to the conclusion that this high population growth is favourable for Turkmenistan (as it is stated in the "official" view) since it will increase the existing very low population density, thus, increasing the manpower of the republic. But if one will look at the land use of the republic, which, arable land consists only 2 % of the total area, and the existing wide-spread unemployment, especially among the young generation, then will come up to a different result. Turkmenistan's economy, the poorest among all Central Asian republics, today can hardly cope with the high population growth, reaching 3 percent annually, according to the official figures. This figure means that Turkmenistan must feed, educate, employ, etc. additional 130 000 people in every coming year.

TABLE 100: CRUDE BIRTH RATE, CRUDE DEATH RATE AND NATURAL INCREASE OF THE POPULATION, TURKMENISTAN

(for 1000 people)

Years	Birth Rate	Death Rate	Natural Increase
1940	36.9	19.5	17.4
1965	37.2	7.0	30.2
1970	35.2	6.6	28.6
1975	34.7	7.9	26.8
1980	34.3	8.3	26.0
1981	34.3	8.5	25.8
1982	34.7	8.0	26.7
1983	35.1	8.4	26.7
1984	35.0	8.1	26.9

Source: Turkmenistan Otchet O Chelovecheskom Razvitii, 1997, p. 5

As can be seen from Table 100, the birth rate of Turkmenistan remained almost stable in a high level between 1940-1984. The natural increase of the population boomed in accordance with the falling death rates starting from late 1950's. Turkmenistan's population is expected to reach five million by the year 2000.

TABLE 101: POPULATION OF TURKMENISTAN

Year	Populaton
1991	3,714,000
1994	4,450,000
1996	4,580,000
2000 (Estimation)	5,008,000

Source: Turkmenistan Otchet O Chelovecheskom
Razvitii, 1997, pp. 81-85.

TABLE 102: DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF TURKMENISTAN

No	Years	Indicator
1. Natural Population Growth (Annual)	1991-1996	3.0 %
2. Natural Population Growth of 1990-1995 as % of 1985-1990	-	108.2
3. Duration of total population doubling	-	30 years
4. Crude Birth Rate	1991	4.1 %
5. Crude Death Rate	1991	1.1 %
6. Crude Birth Rate of 1991 in comparison with 1960	-	86.9 %
7. Percentage of women using contraceptives	1993	15.3 %
8. Population density (per km²)	1996	9.4
9. Average Life expectancy at birth (both sexes)	1994	63.9 years
10. Average age of the first marriage (both sexes)	1994	21.4 years
11. Mother Death Rate at 100,000 pregnancies	1994	49.6
12. Infant Mortality Rate (per 1000 infants borne)	1996	39.6
13. Child Mortality Rate (per 1000 children borne)	1995	70.2

Source: Turkmenistan Obzor Sektora Obrazovaniye, UNDP, 1997, pp. 4-47.

As can be observed from Table 103, the annual population increase in Turkmenistan between 1991-1996 is 3 percent, according to the official data.. The most interesting case is that the population growth of 1990-1995 is 108 % of the 1985-1990 period. Also, the birth rate increased significantly and reached 4.1 % in 1991. Here we would like to note the difference between the official figures and the figures of the CIA regarding the birth rate and annual population growth rate of Turkmenistan. The official figures are demonstrating significantly higher rates than the figures of the CIA for the

birth and the growth rates of Turkmenistan. Although these rates are falling in Turkmenistan in the recent decade, a mere annual growth rate of 1.82 percent seems to be "underestimated" and rather contradictory to the figures of 1979 and 1989 (See Table 34) , since a very sharp decline of the birth rate from 3.8 % in 1989 to 29.1 percent in 1996 seems to be rather unlikely. Depending our personal observations we might assume that the birth rate of Turkmenistan is somewhere around 3.5 percent and the population growth rate is 2.5 percent in 1996, but in any case not less than the Uzbekistan's figure of 2.1 percent for 1996.

Contraceptive usage among women is rather low, only 15.3 %.

Average age of the first marriage in 1994 for both sexes is 21.4. One can easily assume that this figure is lesser then 20 for females, another good reason for the very high birth rate

In Turkmenistan, mother death rate, infant death rate and child death rate is relatively higher than its neighbouring Central Asian republics. Age dependency ratio is 77.2 for 1996.

TABLE 103: URBANIZATION, TURKMENISTAN

	Years	Indicator
1 Urban Population	1996	44.4 %
2. Percentage of annual increase of urban population (Ashgabad excluded)	1993-1996	2.5 %
3. Percentage of annual increase of population of Ashgabad city	1994	12.1 %

Source: Ibid, p. 85.

In 1996, 44.4 % of the population of Turkmenistan is living in urban areas. Since there are no big cities except Ashgabad in Turkmenistan, we might assume that almost half of this urban population is living in Ashgabat city, with a population of 1 000 000. Annual increase of population of Ashgabad city is 12.1 %, causing the city to grow like an explosion, and thus, creating slumb-areas where the jobless young masses are wondering aimlessly, willing to accept any "ideology" which will offer them a bright future.

5. Comparative Demographical Data of Central Asian Republics & Azerbaijan

In this section of the study we will present all the available comparative data of Central Asian republics, together with Azerbaijan, which, to an extent have similar cultural characteristics with the Région. Since Azerbaijan has a different socio-economic structure and historical background, the demographical data of this republic shall be presented only for comparison.

We would like to draw the attention of the reader to the fact that some of the data presented in this section for the Central Asian republics is slightly different than the data which is presented in the previous chapters for the same. This is due to the fact that since data collection in these republics after 1991 is not in accordance with the international standards, different sources are giving different data on the same subject. Since for the present moment there is no possibility of conducting direct surveys in the Region and no way of adjusting the available data, we will make our comparative analysis with the existing material.

Although the aim of this study is not comparing the demographic structure of Central Asian republics with Turkey, main demographic data of Turkey shall also be presented briefly in order to act as an indicator for the overall demographic development of the Region.

TABLE 104: POPULATION GROWTH RATES & CRUDE BIRTH RATES OF CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS & TURKEY

Republic	Average Annual Pop. Growth Rate 1960-1994 (%)	Pop. Growth Rate (CIA Estimate for 1996, %)	Birth Rate 1994 %	Birth Rate (CIA Estimate for 1996 %)
Azerbaijan	1,90	n.a.	2,50	n.a.
Kazakhstan	1,50	-0,15	2,30	1,91
Kyrgyzstan	2,10	0,07	3,40	2,60
Uzbekistan	2,90	2,10	3,70	3,00
Turkmenistan	3,00	1,80	3,80	3,00
Source: Otchet o Cheloveckskom Razvitti, 1996, CIA world Fact Book, 1996				
Turkey	2,24*	n.a.	2,29**	2,26***
* Calculated from Population Censuses of Turkey, 1960-1997				
** Demographic & Health Survey, 1993, P. 24.				
*** The Population of Turkey, SIS, 1994, P.119				

Within the Central Asian republics Kazakhstan has the lowest population growth rate and birth rate, 1.5 % and 2.3 % respectively, for the period 1960-1994. These overall low figures for the republic are stemming from the high percentage of Slavic population of Kazakhstan which has very low birth rates and population growth rates. As we explained in the previous chapters in details, within the indigenous population of the republic these figures are much higher, especially in the Southern regions of Kazakhstan.

Kyrgyzstan stands in the third place in Central Asian republics by the population growth and the birth rate, 2.1 % and 3.4 % respectively for the same period. Again, high percentage of Slavic population of the republic is the major reason behind these relatively low rates. We know that the same rates are much higher in the indigenous population, especially again in the Southern regions, and in the first place in Fergana Valley, where Kyrgyzstan is bordering to its neighbours, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.

Uzbekistan is the most critical country by means of population growth in all Central Asian republics. It demonstrated an annual population growth rate of 2.9 % for the period 1960-1994. Although this figure is declining in the recent decade, it is expected

that the "demographic momentum" will continue in the early 2000's. As we stated in the previous section, the absolute annual population growth of Uzbekistan is around 500 000 people, which is creating a great burden on the republics poor economic situation. The cotton monoculture, the scarcity of arable lands, where efficient agriculture can only be done in oasis regions, makes the problem more acute for the republic.

Turkmenistan has the fastest population growth rate and highest birth rate among all the Central Asian republics, 3 % and 3.8 % respectively, according to the official figures. It is interesting to note that the population growth rate is increasing in the republic in the recent years, and the official stance of the government of Turkmenistan is favouring this trend. If one will take into consideration of the poor economic performance of the country, together with its wide spread unemployment and unfavourable natural conditions, it will not be a surprise that the population growth rate will effect the socio-economic situation of the country in a negative manner.

Turkey, with its 2.24 percent average annual population growth rate, stands in the third place after Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. As of 1994, Turkey has the lowest birth rate, 2.29 percent, compared with the Central Asian republics.

The lower figures of CIA for population growth rates of Central Asian republics in 1996 is due to the continuing emigration, which reached its peak after independence, and to some extent to the declining fertility levels that we observe in these republics in the last decade. Again, lower figures of CIA for the birth rates of 1996 are showing that birth rates are declining in Central Asian republics. In Kazakhstan birth rate has fallen to below 2 percent in 1996, which, according to some demographers (TOLDS, 1994; LUBIN, 1996), can be explained by the worsening economic situation in the republic. Although the pattern of declining birth rates are also observed in other Central Asian republics, they are still over 2.5 percent annually.

In Turkey, the crude birth rate has fallen to the lower twenties. As expected, birth rates are higher in rural areas (2.4 %) than in the urban areas (2.29) implies a rather low population growth rate even if the death rate is very low. (Toros, in TDHS, 1993, p.25).

Here we must emphasize an important point concerning the measurement concept of population growth. The main indicator of this concept is age-specific fertility rates and a summary measure of those rates which is the total fertility rate. Crude birth rates are not used in measurement of fertility, because changes in the general population structure by age and sex lead to changes in the birth rate without there being any change in actual childbearing rates by women.

Unfortunately there are no sufficient data regarding fertility patterns of Central Asia, since this important factor is not used widely as the main indicator of population growth since the Soviet times. We only have the TFR's of Kazakhstan (1996), Kyrgyzstan (1997-See Table 81) and Turkmenistan (1996). The TFR of Turkmenistan is 3.62 children born /woman in 1996. TFR of Kyrgyzstan for the same year is around 3 children born/woman, which, both are significantly higher than the TFR of Turkey. In Turkey , TFR (number of children a woman would bear if she lived through these rates throughout her reproductive life span) is slightly over three children (3.1) for woman living in rural areas, and decreases to around two children (2.4) in urban areas. The national average is 2.7 children per woman for 1993. (Toros, in TDHS,1993, P.25) Total fertility rate of Kazakhstan for 1996 is 2.36 children born/woman. We will come back to the comparative analysis of the TFR's of Central Asian republics in the next section of this chapter.

**FIGURE VII: POPULATION GROWTH RATES OF CENTRAL ASIAN
REPUBLICS, AZERBAIJAN & TURKEY, 1960-1994
PERIOD**




TABLE 105: TERRITORIES AND POPULATION DENSITIES

Country	Territory 1000 Km ²	Population Density, Person/Km ²						
		1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Azerbaijan	86.6	85	86	86	86	86	86	86
Kazakhstan	2717.3	6.2	6.2	6.3	6.2	6.1	6.1	5.9
Kyrgyzstan	199.9	22.1	22.4	22.5	22.3	22.4	22.7	23.0
Turkmenistan	488.1	7.6	7.8	8.7	8.9	9.1	9.4	9.5
Uzbekistan	447.4	46.3	47.4	48.5	49.6	50.4	51.4	52.4

Source: Meijosudarstvenniy Staticheskiy Komitet CNG,
Staticheskiy Byulleten za 1996, No: 13, p. 247.

The population density of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan is very low, 5.9 and 9.5 respectively. In Kyrgyzstan population density is reaching to 23, and this figure is much

higher in the southern regions. Population density reaches to 52.4 in Uzbekistan, and in the oasis zones of the country this figure is 4-5 times bigger.

Population density is 81 persons/Sq.Km. in Turkey for 1997.

**TABLE 106: POPULATION OF CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS AND
AZERBAIJAN BY YEARS**

(Beginning of the year, 000)

Country	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Azerbaijan	7186.6	7296.9	7367.9	7430.7	7486.9	7535.3	7574.5
Kazakhstan	16793.1	16963.6	16985.7	16942.4	16679.1	16543.8	16432.9
Kyrgyzstan	4422.2	4484.5	4502.0	4462.6	4483.4	4545.1	4606.8
Turkmenistan	3714.1	3808.9	4254.0	4361.3	4449.8	4516.8	4627.9
Uzbekistan	20708.2	21206.8	21702.7	22192.5	22562.4	23007.2	23443.7

Source: Meijosudarstvenniy..., p. 248.

As can be observed from Table 107, Kazakhstan lost a considerable population due to emigration during 1990's. There is a slight increase of population in Kyrgyzstan despite of heavy emigration of Slavic people. Populations of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan grew significantly, 2 735 000 and 914 000 respectively for the same period.

Between 1990 and 1997, population of Turkey grew from 56 473 035 to 62 865 574. Net increase of population in this period is 6 392 539 people.

**TABLE 107: LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH BY SEXES IN CENTRAL ASIAN
REPUBLICS & AZERBAIJAN**

Country	Year	Male	Female
Azerbaijan	1993	65	74
Kazakhstan	1990	64	73
Kyrgyzstan	1996	62	71
Turkmenistan	1991	62	69
Uzbekistan	1990	66	72

Source: Meijosudartsvenniy....p. 252.

Although there are no significant differences between life expectancies at birth in Central Asian republics, it is worth to note that the lowest life expectancy is observed in Turkmenistan, where the economic turbulences are the strongest.

The latest estimates put life expectancy in Turkey at 62.7 years for males and 67.3 for females. (SHORTER, Ment. TDHS, 1993, P. 5)

According to the figures of the CIA, life expectancy at birth is much lower than the figures presented in the official data of the Central Asian republics

TABLE 108: LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH, BY REPUBLICS, 1996.

	(Years)	
	Male	Female
Kazakhsztan	58,5	69,9
Kyrgyzstan	59,2	68,8
Uzbekistan	60,4	69,9
Turkmenistan	56,7	66,5

Source: CIA World Fact Book, 1996

Here we would like to draw the attention to the rather big difference between the male and female life expectancies at birth in Central Asian republics. In the world the difference between the male and the female life expectancies is around 4 years, and in Turkey less than 5 years. In Central Asian republics this difference reaches to 10 years, and in Kazakhstan to more than 11 years. According to our personal observations this difference is due to the excessive alcohol abuse among men in Central Asian republics.

TABLE 109: INFANT MORTALITY RATE BY REPUBLICS 1996

(Per 1000 live births)

	IMR.
Kazakhstan	63,2
Kyrgyzstan	77,8
Uzbekistan	79,6
Turkmenistan	81,6

Source: CIA World Fact Book, 1996

As can be seen from Table 109, the infant mortality rates of CIA is much higher than the official rates of Central Asian republics for 1970-1993. (See Table 40). This is

due to the different definitions of infant mortality as we explained in the previous chapter, deteriorating health conditions in these republics, and, distortion of the data by the Soviet authorities for ideologic purposes.

In Turkey, for 1993 infant mortality rate is estimated at 53 per thousand, the child mortality rate at 9 per thousand, and the under five mortality rate at 61 per thousand. (TDHS, 1993, p. XVI)

TABLE 110: DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION OF CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS & AZERBAIJAN BY SEX AND SETTLEMENT, 1996

Country	Male %	Female %	Urban %	Rural %
Azerbaijan	49.1	50.9	47.3	52.7
Kazakhstan	48.4	51.6	44.0	56.0
Kyrgyzstan	49.3	50.7	65.3	34.7
Turkmenistan	49.4	50.6	55.2	44.8
Uzbekistan	49.5	50.5	61.6	38.4

Source: CIS, Kazakhstan; Facts & Figures 1997, p. 21.

The urban population is highest in Kyrgyzstan and lowest in Kazakhstan among the Central Asian republics. But it is important to note that half of the urban population of Kyrgyzstan is living in Bishkek City, the only big city of the republic. The same is also true for the Turkmenistan and Ashgabad.

In Turkey the total sex ratio of the population is 102.7 Males/Females for 1997. (75. Ann., SIS, 1995, p.8).

Urban population, defined as the population living in the cities with a population more than 10 000, reaches to 65 percent in 1997. (Ibid. p. 12)

TABLE 111: POPULATION BY AGE IN CENTRAL ASIA & AZERBAIJAN

	Year	To 15 Years %	15-64 Years %	65-+%
Azerbaijan	1994	33.3	61.4	5.3
Kazakhstan	1991	31.4	62.6	6.0
Kyrgyzstan	1994	37.9	56.7	5.4
Turkmenistan	1992	40.3	55.8	3.9
Uzbekistan	1991	41.0	55.0	4.0

Source: CIS, Kazakhstan, Facts and Figures, p. 22

The percentage of working age population is highest in Kazakhstan among Central Asian republics where the percentage of Slavic population, which has a low birth rate, reaches to nearly 40 %. The lowest figures are observed in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan where the high population growth rate is continuing.

Turkey has a young population as a result of high fertility and growth rates of the recent past. The percentage of population under 15 years of age is 33%, 15-64 is 61.4 %, and above 65 years of age is 5.6 % for 1993. (TDHS, 1993, P.13). However, the absolute number of elderly is expected to rise in the near future.

The divorce rates are falling in all Central Asian republics in correspondance with the emigrating Slavic nationalities. Divorce rate is highest in Kazakhstan where the Slavic nationalities are consisting almost 40 % of the population.

“The universality of marriage in Turkey is observed in the proportions never married; at the end of the reproductive ages, in age group 45-49, only 1.6 percent of females were never married, whereas the corresponding figure for males in the same age group was 2.6 percent, according to the 1990 Population Census. Marriages in Turkey are also known to be very stable; divorce rates are very low.” (Hancioglu & Akadli Ergocmen, 1992, Ment. TDHS, 1993, P.5)



6. "Demographic Transition" in Central Asian Republics

The "Demographic Transition", which almost all countries experienced in the past or is experiencing one at present can be defined as a decline from high death and birth rates until both rates become relatively low and more or less balanced, so that population growth eventually stops. (Population of Turkey, SIS, 1995, p.3). Demographic Transition Period (DTP) has profound effects on the social, economic and political structures of the countries, and further consequences will be forthcoming.

The sequence of changes is not the same everywhere in the world or in world history. A great deal of scholarship has been devoted to the search for a generic or universal explanation of how transitions occur, when they start, and how long they take. However, there are so many differences in timing and details among the countries that this attempt to find a "Theory of Demographic Transition" has been abandoned. It seems that in each country, and even in sub-cultures of countries, there are unique conditions and complex historical as well as contemporary reasons for the way in which the demographic results occur over time. (Ibid)

This case is also true for the Central Asian republics, where demographic indicators varies significantly between indigenous-non indigenous population, to a slighter degree - between indigenous populations of of sothern and northern republics, and between urban and rural settlements.

In order to have a more clear-view about the "demographic development level" of the Central Asian republics, we shall try to compare some of their demographic indicators with the world figures, and with Turkey, which is experiencing its demographic transition since the foundation of the republic. Unfortunately, we will limit the comparison with the data which is available for all the republics. Instead of the official data, we will utilize the latest figures of the CIA, which we believe through our personal observations that are much more appropriate and realistic.

TABLE 113: SELECTED DEMOGRAPHIC INDICATORS OF CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS TURKEY & THE WORLD

INDICATOR	KAZAKHSTAN	KYRGYZSTAN	UZBEKISTAN	TURKMENISTAN	TURKEY	WORLD	Low Medium Income Countries*	High Medium Income Countries**
Area (1000 Km ²)	2,717	199	447	488	780	130,000	99,200	31,000
Population (1000)	16,916 (1996)	4,530 (1996)	23,418 (1996)	4,149 (1996)	62,810 (1997)	5,800,000	4,900,000	900,000
Population Density (per Km ²)	6,2	22,7	52,4	8,5	81	44	48	30
Total Fertility Rate (Children born/women)	2,4 (1996)	2,99 (1996)	n.a.	3,62 (1996)	2,7 (1993)	2,8 (1996)	3,0 (1996)	1,7 (1996)
Infant Mortality Rate (Deaths/1000 live birth)	63,2 (1996)	77,8 (1996)	79,6 (1996)	81,6 (1996)	53 (1996)	54 (1996)	59 (1996)	6 (1996)
Life Expectancy at Birth (Males)	58,6 (1996)	59,2 (1996)	60,4 (1996)	56,7 (1996)	62,7 (1996)	65 (1996)	63 (1996)	74 (1996)
Life Expectancy at Birth (Females)	69,9 (1996)	68,8 (1996)	69,9 (1996)	66,5 (1996)	67,3 (1994)	69 (1996)	67 (1996)	8 (1996)
Urban Population, %	57,4 (1990)	38,1 (1990)	40,8 (1990)	45,2 (1996)	65 (1997)	46 (1997)	40 (1997)	78 (1997)
Annual Population Growth, %	-0,15 (1996)	0,07 (1996)	2,1 (1996)	1,82 (1996)	1,51 (1997)	-	-	-
Crude Birth Rate (births/1000 population)	19,02	26,02	29,86 (1996)	29,12 (1996)	22,9 (1993)	-	-	-
Age Dependency Ratio	58,7 (1996)	75,4 (1996)	81,8 (1996)	77,2 (1996)	62,9 (1994)	-	-	-
Crude Divorce Rate	2,69 (1993)	1,24 (1994)	1,49 (1989)	1,38 (1989)	0,47 (1996)	-	-	-

* Less than 7000\$ per capital annually

** More than 7000\$ per capital annually

Source: Calculated from world Development Report, World Bank 1998 & Related Statistics of Central Asian Republics and Turkey.

Uzbekistan is the most populous republic in Central Asia and its population density exceeds both the world and Low and Medium Income level Countries' (LMIC) average. Although Kazakhstan has the second largest population, due to its vast territory, the population density is very low. Kyrgyzstan stands in the mid-way. In this respect, a special importance must be paid to Turkmenistan. Turkmenistan's population and population density is rather low, but since the large part of the country consists of deserts, the population density is very high in the rare oasis zones of the country, scattered through Amu-Darya river.

If we examine the TFR's of the Central Asian republics, we will see that except Kazakhstan, all the TFR's are above the world average. Although there is no data regarding TFR of Uzbekistan, we may assume that it is almost the same level of Turkmenistan, since other indicators, such as population growth rate, birth rate, and similar socio-economic background of the two republics suggests that Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan has very close TFR values. Therefore, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan both has TFR's exceeding the world average and the TFR's of the LMIC countries.

Also if we take into consideration of the percentage of non-indigenous populations of these republics reaching 10 percent of the total population, we may easily conclude that the TFR of indigenous population of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan is around 4 children born/woman for 1996. TFR of titular nationality of Uzbekistan for 1978-79 and for 1988-89 were 6.22 and 4.66 children born/woman respectively. For Turkmenistan the respective figures were 6.55 and 4.90 children born/woman for 1978-79 and 1988-89. (See Table 30) Considering these figures, we may assume that although the present TFR's of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are rather high, there is a steady decline in the TFR's of both republics since 1970's.

TFR of around 4 children born/woman of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan for 1996, roughly coincides with the TFR of Turkey for early 1980's, or TFR of East Region of Turkey for 1993. (See TDHS, 1993, P.25; Also Population of Turkey, SIS, 1995, P.14)

Relatively low TFR of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are stemming from the high proportion of Slavic population in these republics, which has low TFR's. According to our personal observations, the TFR's of titular nationalities of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, especially in the southern regions of these republics, does'nt differs from the TFR of the neighbouring Uzbekistan. The TFR of titular nationality of Kazakhstan for 1978-79 and 1988-89 were 4.68 and 3.58 children born/woman respectively. For Kyrgyzstan these figures were 6.67 and 4.83 children born/woman. (See Table 30) In the northern regions of Kazakhstan TFR of the titular nationality is even lower due to the excessive cultural relations with the Slavic population which lasted for centuries. We may also assume that the deepening economic deterioration in Kazakhstan during the last decade (See Chapter III) also lowered the TFR of the republic. In short, we may assume that the TFR'S of the titular nationalities of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are equal or above the TFR's of the LMIC countries.

**TABLE 114: AGE-SPECIFIC FERTILITY RATES OF
KYRGYZSTAN AND TURKEY**

<u>Age Group</u>	<u>Kyrgyzstan</u>	<u>Turkey</u>
15-19	54,33	56
20-24	201,77	179
25-29	170,29	151
30-34	105,72	94
35-39	51,06	38
40-44	13017	12
45-49	2,22	0
TFR 15-49	2,993	2,7

Sources: Demographicheskiy Ejegodnik Kyrgyzstana 1996, PP. 87-89; TDHS, 1993, P.24

As we can observe from Table 114 that the age-specific fertility rates of Kyrgyzstan for 1996 is higher than Turkey's figures of 1993, for all age groups except 15-19.

Infant mortality rates of Central Asian republics are considerably higher than the world and LMIC averages, and, Turkey. The highest rate is observed in Turkmenistan, the poorest and socially least developed country among Central Asian republics.

Life expectancy at birth of males is lower than the world, LMIC averages, and Turkey. For females life expectancy at birth is almost at the same level with LMIC countries and Turkey. Again, Turkmenistan has the the lowest life expectancy for both males and females, because of the reasons stated for the high infant mortality rate of this republic.

Percentage of urban population of Central Asian republics are lower than the world average, except Kazakhstan. But we must note that the urban population of Kazakhstan, to a great extent consists of Slavic population, and, rural population is almost completely of titular nationality. In Turkmenistan, the big majority of the urban population is living in the only big city of the republic, Ashgabad city.

The annual population growth rate of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are around null as of 1996. As we explained previously in details, this is due to the continuing emigration of the non-indigenous population from these republics. The emigration of Slavic nationalities from these republics slowed down since mid-1990's. As a consequence we might expect that in the coming decade the population growth will increase and the percentage of the titular nationalities will rise in these republics due to the high fertility rate among the same.

In Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan the annual population growth rate is 2.1 and 1.82 percent respectively for 1996, in spite of the continuing emigration of non-indigenous population from these republics. According to the CIA, the annual population growth rate of Turkmenistan is lower than Uzbekistan for 1996. Because of the reasons that we discussed in previous chapter, we believe that this figure is lower than the actual population growth rate of Turkmenistan. Since the official figure for population growth rate of Turkmenistan is 3 percent for 1991-1996 period, when the emigration was on its peak, we might assume that the annual population growth rate of Turkmenistan is higher than 2 percent, if not more, for 1996.

Annual population growth rate of Turkey for 1990-1997 is 1.51 percent.

Age dependency ratio is considerably high in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan due to the excess population in 0-15 age group, which is a natural consequence of high fertility rates. In Kazakhstan this ratio is below Turkey, because of the high percentage of Slavic population in the republic.

Taking into consideration of all the information stated above, we can come to the conclusion that Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, with their high fertility and birth rates, large families, desire to have more children, high age dependency ratios, high percentage of rural populations and high infant mortality rates, demonstrating a typical profile of a third-world country which is experiencing "Demographic Transition". However, in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, starting from the mid-1970's fertility began to decline and did not reverse. We might assume that these two republics already passed to the "second stage of demographic transition" which is characterized by the slight but steady decline of the fertility rates. The population boom in these two republics will continue in the coming decades, because of the still high fertility rates and the age structure of the population created by the very high fertility rates of the recent past.

The indigenous populations of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan demonstrates similar patterns, although more moderate, with their neighbours. This similarity is much more obvious in the rural areas and in the southern regions, where indigenous population consists the large majority. Today the population growth rate of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan is null, because of the high emigration. But since the emigration is losing its importance in the recent years, we might expect that the annual population growth rates of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan will rise in the coming years due to the high fertility among the indigenous population. This is especially true for Kyrgyzstan, where fertility rates are higher and the percentage of non-indigenous population already dropped to a mere 15 percent.

CHAPTER V

FUTURE IMPACTS OF DEMOGRAPHIC AND ETHNIC FACTORS ON THE GEO-POLITICS AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE REGION

Up to this chapter we tried to analyse the historical, social, economic, ethnic and demographic aspects of the Central Asian republics until 1997. It is seen from the information presented that the existing demographic and ethnic characteristics of the Region are among the most important factors that will determine the future stability of the four Central Asian republics. In this chapter we will analyse briefly the existing political, ethnic, social and economic problems of the region, then, we will come back to the demographical factors which is one of the most crucial determinant that will shape the future of the Central Asia.

A- POLITICAL, ETHNIC, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC FACTORS

Few peoples of the world have ever been forced to become independent nations. Yet that is precisely what happened to the four Central Asian republics. Russia, Byelorussia and Ukraine - the three original signatories of the U.S.S.R.'s founding constitution of 1922 - met in Minsk on December 8, 1991, and created a new Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

That action by the three Slavic presidents left Central Asian leaders with an unpleasant choice: they could go it alone - either singly or as a group - or they could shrug off the intended snub by their Slavic counterparts and agree to join the Commonwealth. After a hurried meeting in Ashkhabad, Turkmenistan's capital, they chose the latter course. If independence had to occur, it was best achieved gradually; the new Commonwealth structures, they conceded, would make it easier to regulate their interdependent economies.

"In general, these first years of independence have been very disappointing for the leaders of these new states, and extremely

difficult for the majority of the people living within Central Asia. ~~Optimism has yielded to pessimism as the Central Asian leaders~~ no longer assume that independence will create easy solutions to their economic development problems. No longer do these regimes expect that the attentions of their brother Turks, Persians, or Muslims generally will begin to turn the magic wheel of folktales that can spin their straw into gold. Nor do they expect any more that unconditional international financial credits will rain down upon them in the manna- like way that the unused rations from the Persian Gulf War and the European Community's "butter mountain" and other agricultural surpluses had so magically appeared on their streets under the name of "humanitarian assistance" at the end of the Gorbachev era." (Olcott, 1996, p. 4)

Despite their enormous potential natural resource wealth, none of the Central Asian states has entered the community of nations from any sort of commanding position. This is true even of Kazakhstan, whose Soviet legacy of nuclear weapons gained President Nazarbaev an invitation to the White House, but the Americans still seated Russian negotiators alongside the Kazakhs at the president's table.

As Western firms bidding for exploitation rights are discovering, even Kazakhstan's oil, gas, and mineral wealth cannot be exported without Russia's cooperation. This cooperation does not come cheaply, and the transit costs of shipping through Russia may be so expensive as to bring the financial viability of the development of these resources into question.

Kazakhstan's problems are not unique. Although it has more transit options than does Kazakhstan, fossil fuel-rich Turkmenistan is also discovering that development projects take longer to realize than originally assumed, and - worse yet - that as a small country, it lacks the clout to collect payment for the gas it has already delivered.

Kyrgyzstan has learned that democratic inclinations alone cannot turn a remote former Soviet republic into an "Asian Switzerland," and that no matter how enthusiastic Western countries are to aid a new nation, foreign assistance is governed by annual budget cycles and is allocated in accordance with strict procedures for project authorization and development.

Uzbekistan, too, is finding that there are subtle subtext in international relations, and that not all states are accorded the same stature by the international community. President Islam Karimov is learning that some states can commit human rights violations with impunity while others cannot, and that neither Uzbekistan's wealth nor its market potential is large enough for the international community to be willing to bend the rules of the game to Uzbekistan's benefit. At the same time, Karimov has gotten lessons in Russia's fickleness and has seen how strategic alliances do not always transform themselves into economic partnerships.

"Still, four of the region's four new states - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan - have managed to get through almost four years of independence with no bloodshed or profound economic and political dislocations. Indeed, judged by the criteria of other former Soviet and Yugoslav republics, this early period of independence could even be called uneventful, despite the fact that the leaders of the Central Asian states did not anticipate their independence and had little preparation for it."

(Ibid. p 7)

The emergence of a strong presidency in practically all nations of the region was a result of not only economic factors but also the national elite's need for consolidation, privatization and for securing its influence in the context of a new, capitalist mode of development. The Presidents of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are quite frank in stressing the authoritarian character of their regimes. Islam Karimov is openly looking to China as the model of market reforms in Uzbekistan: "Maximum freedom in the economy, minimum freedom in politics." In actual fact, there is no great freedom in the economy either. Turkmenistan's President Turkmenbashi (Niyazov), who established himself a cult of personality, has announced his rule to be "a decade of stability and prosperity."

rejecting in the name of his own personal vision any claim of potential opposition to political freedom. (www.Cpas.Org/Casiable/Chap 8.Txt).

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union there has been some degree of constitutional reform in all the republics. However, the trend has been to give the presidential incumbent ever greater powers. The nature of presidential rule in Turkmenistans is more blatantly dictatorial than in, for example, Kyrgyzstan, a republic that has a reputation for being more democratic. The constitutional positions in the two states, however, are far from dissimilar.

The same is true elsewhere in Central Asia. Personality cults, reminiscent of the Brezhnev period as well as that of the medieval Khans, have emerged in some places. The presidential hold on power has been further strengthened in all the republics by the creation of government-sponsored political parties. These have unrivaled (and in some cases unique) access to the media, as well as many other administrative privileges. They serve as mouthpieces for official views, and at the same time act as a symbolic counterbalance to independent political parties. They include a high proportion of establishment figures, many of whom are senior former communists. (Akiner, 1994, pp.17-18)

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have presidential systems of government, with separate executive, legislative and judicial bodies. Standards of respect for civil liberties tend to be low in the new Central Asian states. The Turkmenistan authorities consider expression of dissident views as gross ingratitude to President Niyazov and close to treason. Opposition has been driven underground, with all independent political groups harshly repressed. The *Agyzbirlik* movement was small even before its activists were arrested or intimidated. However, some analyses suggest that persistent rivalries between and within Turkmen tribes could become a destabilizing factor in the future.

Uzbekistan, with its population of 23 million to feed and with less ample supplies of gas to exploit, is facing severe economic dislocation. It is clearly in need of broader

foreign investment. Yet the ruling regime in Tashkent also rejected American promotion of human rights as a form of unwanted foreign interference.

“In their core beliefs the ruling parties in Central Asia differ little from the old communist parties, which assumed new names after independence was declared. They have scant respect for or even perhaps understanding of the ideal of freedom of expression, let alone a willingness to permit political opponents to express criticisms through the state-controlled TV, radio or press.

“Discipline and Order” is a favorite slogan of Karimov. The president’s firm style of government is approved by quite a few defectors from *Birlik* nationalist circles, who defend the failure of the Peoples’ Democratic party regime to grant concessions through another gradualist slogan: “First Independence, then Democracy.” They point to the dreadful example of Tajikistan, a state which collapsed into anarchy and violence, as the path which must be avoided at all costs.

Kazakhstan at least, unlike some of its neighbors, does not sponsor assaults on activists of the opposition parties. However, it permits only a low level of opposition political activities. Publications are heavily restricted, and one outspoken critic of Nazarbayev’s policies was put on trial for “insulting the honour of the president.”

In Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan is alone in tolerating the democratic ideal to the extent of giving its citizens freedom to publish their views even when they differ from those of the regime in power. President Askar Akayev, a former academic, is unlike the other leaders of the region in believing that capitalist reforms and a liberal political regime will create a market economy in this mountainous land with its diverse population (25 per cent of whom are Russians). Akayev’s vision is that this will attract Western investment to develop “the Switzerland of the Pamirs.” (Hymann, 1996, p.27)

Russia does of course have basic foreign interests in the region, and it cannot simply withdraw. The first is security. The now Christian-oriented Russian government is sensitive to threats of 'Islamic fundamentalism', which makes it especially concerned about its Southern frontier. Moscow calculates that it is more convenient to try to control possible infiltration from places such as Afghanistan across the shorter Southern borders of the former Central Asian republics than across their much longer boundary with Russia. The second core Russian interest in the region is control of the nuclear weapons that Kazakhstan inherited from the Soviet Union. The third core interest is transport: both ensuring that Russia has unrestricted access to rail links between Europe and Asia, at non-extortionate prices, and trying to ensure that as much trade as possible continues to flow between Europe, the Middle East and the Far East via Russia. Finally, Russia is vitally interested in the fate of Russians living in the neighbouring states of the former USSR, Central Asia included.

Nowhere was this more apparent than in the issue of the status of Russian citizens residing in Central Asia. This is an extremely sensitive issue in Russian politics. Throughout 1992 the nationalist press in Russia regularly printed articles on the exodus of hundreds of thousands of Russians who have in general been heightened by the much greater militancy of Islamic clergy in the Northern Caucasus. In any case the civil war in Tajikistan has certainly encouraged Russians living in the country to flee. The issue of the 'Russian-speaking hostages' was widely exploited during the election campaign in Russia in the Autumn of 1993 and contributed in no small way to the success achieved by Zhirinovsky's party. It is also hotly debated in the State Duma.

From Moscow's viewpoint the solution is for the other republics to treat Russians equally in all respects. Moscow's ideal is dual nationality for Russian citizens of other republics. Of course all the leaders of the Central Asian republics are aware of the threat to their regimes and their states, posed by ethnic conflict. President Nazarbayev, for example, coined the geographical but non-ethnic term 'Kazakhstaner' for use in the constitution, so as to emphasize that land and public property in Kazakhstan belonged to all the people living there, and not just to the dominant racial group. No one, however, was willing to concede the principle of dual nationality until a

breakthrough occurred at the Ashkabad summit of the CIS in December 1993, when President Niyazov announced that Turkmenistan intended to introduce this concept into its legal and political system.

Niyazov's action is part of a wider rapprochement between Turkmenistan and Russia. There was also an agreement for the joint stationing of Russian and Turkmen troops to guard the republic's frontiers. In future Russian border guards will be under their own command, and border patrols will be carried out by Turkmen troops under the command of Russian officers who are serving under contract. (Bondarevskiy & Ferdinand, 1994, pp. 40-51)

The economic prospects for Central Asia are not as rosy as either the governments or some press reports indicate. Central Asia faces a short-term crisis of great severity, after which longer-term structural problems have to be addressed. These problems are: a lack of competent institutions, a dependence on Russian subsidies and preferential access to Russian markets, a dependence on Russian workers, a lack of trade links among the Central Asian republics themselves, and an over-concentration on uncertain oil and gas prospects at the expense of agriculture.

The president of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov, has claimed that his country will 'reach the level of developed countries within a few years'. Such an unrealistic assessment typifies the optimistic school of thought which regards Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan as future Kuwait's of the Caspian, Uzbekistan as the new Klondike, and Kyrgyzstan the Switzerland of the region. There are two immediate obstacles to this. First, the examples of Angola and Iraq demonstrate that a large natural resource base need not imply a promising future. Second, the optimistic view ignores the depth of the current crisis, and the very different starting point of the Central Asian republics. Unlike the East European countries, the Central Asian republics have had to start

from scratch, by having to build up national economic institutions
(Apostolov, 1994, p 53)

1. Potential Ethnic and Border Disputes Between Central Asian Republics

Central Asia's borders had been designed to diminish the likelihood of regional cooperation. The four republics had been carved from the feudal states of Khiva and Bukhara and the colonial provinces of Turkestan and Kazakhstan in such a way as to create irredentist populations throughout the entire region. There are more than a million each of "stranded" Tajikis and Uzbeks living in each other's republics, and there are irredentist Kyrgyz and Tajik populations in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan respectively. There are some Turkmen and Kazakhstan and some Kazakhs in Turkmenistan, but the Turkmen's main pretension is to Uzbekistan which now contains their ancient capital of Khwarazm (which the Uzbeks renamed Khiva). For their part, the Uzbeks claim as their ancestral soil all of Khiva's lands, including those now in Turkmenistan. The Uzbeks also lament their loss of southern Kazakhstan and southern Kyrgyzstan, which in the early nineteenth century were part of Kokand; Kazakhs respond that in the previous century, Uzbekistan's present capital of Tashkent was on the lands of the Kazakh Great Horde.

Central Asia's biggest territorial losers were the Tajiks, since the region's two main Persian centers, Samarkand and Bukhara, were included in Uzbekistan, while the Tajiks were left with the backwater town of Dushanbe as their republic's capital. Central Asia's main zone of potential unrest lies not among the region's ancient capitals, but in the Fergana Valley, which was divided up among Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Small, irredentist Kyrgyz and Tajik populations were left in each other's republics, and tension exists between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan over similar issues; several districts in Uzbekistan are predominantly Kyrgyz, while nearly half of Southern Kyrgyzstan is Uzbek (Olcott, 1996, p. 42).

2. Islam

The floodgates of the Islamic revival opened in 1989. It was a cultural, social and religious phenomenon, as people publicly wanted to demonstrate their separateness from the communist system and Slavic culture. Yet popular knowledge of the religion of Islam was minimal and information on political activism, ideas and debates in the Islamic world beyond Central Asia was almost nonexistent.

Yet by 1992 in some areas such as Tajikistan and the Ferghana valley, the politics of Islam generated in the Middle East and South Asia were already being fought over with guns. Both the liberating aspects of the religion and culture of Islam and the unfortunate sectarianism that has plagued the Islamic world in the twentieth century arrived like a tornado in Central Asia. The revival was exacerbated by the violent reaction to Islam of the ruling elites, who refused to understand what was happening or to accommodate it as part of their political agendas.

Central Asia had been the home of vast Islamic empires that once ruled Russia and the world. At their own expense people rushed to build mosques and hire young mullahs to teach them the tenets of Islam. The bureaucratic structure of official Islam, that is, Islam sponsored by the state, was swamped by a public hunger for guidance and help in this revival. But the political leaders in Central Asia ignored these demands and failed to modernize, fund or support the official Islamic bureaucracy.

The vacuum created by the lack of leadership from the official Islamic hierarchy allowed fundamentalist groups to proliferate. The growing involvement of outside powers increased as Wahabi groups from Saudi Arabia, Iranian Revolutionary Guards and some Sunni fundamentalist parties in Pakistan took advantage of the unprecedented political opportunities. The refusal of Central Asian governments to allow Islamic education in government schools resulted in the spread of unofficial Islamic schools. (Rashid, 1994, pp. 244-245)

Today the Fergana Valley is the educational centre for Central Asia's fundamentalists. Most of Central Asia's religious figures are still in the 'proselytizing phase', more interested in training new clerics and increasing the level of religious learning among the population than in getting the laws of society to conform to those of Islam.

The popularization of Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia faces major obstacles. The majority of the population are Sunni Muslims belonging to the Hanafi tradition, and inculcating secretarian beliefs and dividing society along such lines will be difficult. Ethnic minorities will not join a movement led by an ethnic majority or vice versa, making it difficult for Islamic parties to build a movement that crosses ethnic lines. Moreover, ethnic divisions and rivalries, which are increasing across Central Asia, will militate against the unitary form of fundamentalism. High literacy levels, the continuing impact of Slavic and now Western cultural influences, the growth of a free-market economy and the chaos that Tajikistan and Afghanistan have descended into under Islamic regimes will remain important factors in dissuading people from joining such movements. (Olcott, 1995, pp. 33-35)

3. Prospects of Regional Stability

Current events in Central Asia are difficult enough for social analysts and policy makers to comprehend, let alone to attempt the far more difficult task of prediction. Central Asia, as is the case with every other part of the former Soviet Union, is still in a state of flux.

For nearly two hundred years the political and economic future of Central Asia has been shaped by events and decisions made outside the region; such a historical pattern will not change overnight. Without question, independence has broadened the range of decision-making options available to Central Asia's leaders, but it has not entirely transformed them from dependent political actors into adventurous leaders of independent states.

Three major factors will play a determining role in the future political developments of the Central Asian republics.

- a. External influences upon Central Asia,
- b. Future relations between Central Asian Republics,
- c. Internal stability of the Central Asian Republics

The prospects for regional stability in Central Asia in the near future are good. In four of the republics there is strong, centralized, authoritarian rule. In the fifth, Tajikistan, the chaos of civil war persists. The chief concerns of the population in all five republics are those connected with physical survival - the struggles to obtain food, fuel and accommodation. No opposition leaders have yet emerged who are able to offer credible solutions to the present problems, and the great majority of Central Asians are prepared to continue to place their trust in the current ruling elites. In Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan, the mandate of the incumbent presidents was reconfirmed by almost unanimous support in nationwide referendums held respectively on 15 and 30 January 1994. Presidents Karimov and Nazarbayev are not due for re-election for some years, but both have indicated that they expect to remain in office for the foreseeable future. (Akiner, 1994, pp. 31-32)

The long term prospects for stability in Central Asia are less encouraging. When the Soviet state disintegrated and newly independent pre-dominantly Muslim states emerged in Central Asia, a simple model for understanding their role in international politics was widely put forward. According to this model, the peoples of the Central Asian states will be drawn to an Islamic identity, long suppressed by Soviet rule, which might take a militant anti-Western form and thereby increase the regional power of Iran and the world-wide influence of fundamentalism. This 'clash of civilizations' between fundamentalist Islam and the West will attract other Muslims who, although not drawn to fundamentalism, are antagonistic to the West.

This model was soon recognized as overly simplistic, in part because it failed to recognize the differences between Islam in Central Asia and elsewhere in the Middle East, as well as the many significant differences among these republics with respect to

the nature, depth and impact of Islam on their national life and consciousness. In Kazakhstan, for example, Islam is of relatively recent origin (the conversion to Islam took place in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, i.e. a thousand years after the rest of Central Asia), and today some of the population is made up of non-Muslims; there is no established clerical hierarchy with a knowledge of the classical languages of Islam, i.e. Arabic or Persian.

On the other hand, in Uzbekistan, with a more urbanized culture, Islam has much deeper roots; there are great mosques, libraries, and madrasas and a revival of Islam is clearly under way. In all republics, several decades of secularization and official atheism have confined Islam for the most part to the arenas of spiritual faith, rituals and cultural identity, rather than a basis for communal associations and political organization. The only exceptions have so far been in Tajikistan, where Islamic groups in coalition with nationalist and democratic forces have been fighting the authoritarian control of the former communist elite (now supported by Moscow and the Uzbek government), and in the economically deprived Ferghana Valley (which straddles Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan), where economic hardships and grievances have already led to a militant Islamic resurgence movement.

Furthermore, in spite of their initial enthusiasm in approaching these republics, it has become increasingly apparent that both Turkey and Iran lack the economic resources that would enable them to exercise a dominating influence in this region. Neither have pan-Turkism or pan-Islamism had much appeal to populations of these states up to now. (Banauazizi & Weiner, 1994, pp. 11-12)

The growing Russian-Uzbek alliance, the rivalry between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, as well as a host of local ethnic and political problems could divide Central Asia before it is able to reach a consensus on forming a stronger economic union on the ASEAN model. Moreover, Stalin's borders in Central Asia are potential causes of future conflicts at both a political and an ethnic level. There are Russian claims on Northern Kazakhstan, Tajiks demand the return of their cultural centres of Samarkand and Bukhara from Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan has disputes with Uzbekistan demands the

return of the Uzbek-majority regions of Khodjent from Tajikistan and Osh from Kyrgyzstan. There are an estimated eighty potential border disputes simmering in the former Soviet Union and there is no mechanism for resolving them. (Rashid, 1994, p. 228)

There are similar tensions in all the republics which could, under pressure, rapidly deteriorate into violent clashes, if not the actual dismemberment of the state. In Uzbekistan there is tension between the traditional power bases of Samarkand, Tashkent and Fergana. In Kyrgyzstan there is acute disaffection amongst the Southern group of clans, who openly resent the dominant role played by the Northern group (President Akayev and many of the leading members of the government are from this group). The main tribal confederation in Turkmenistan is that of the Ahal-Tekke; it is unlikely that there will be a serious challenge to its hold on power, although there are rumours of friction with members of other tribes, such as the Ersary and Yomut, whose position is now strengthened by easier contacts with fellow tribesmen in Iran and Afghanistan. The situation in Kazakhstan, however, is the most finely balanced. Here there are not only clan rivalries (between the three Hordes), but also tensions between the two largest ethnic groups, the Kazakhs and the Russians. The latter live in compact groups in the North and at present have sufficient power in the areas in which they constitute the majority not to feel unduly threatened by the growing 'Kazakhification' of the republic. However, should there come a time when they feel discriminated against, or dissatisfied with the safeguards provided by the central government, they would undoubtedly seek secession, either to establish an independent state of their own or to unite with Russia. They would certainly have Russia's support in this and there would be little that the Kazakhs could do to prevent such a move. (Akiner, 1994, p. 33)

Next is the problems related to economic transition. It has now been accepted that changeover to a market economy will be as low and painful process. Before things get better it will certainly get much worse in the initial stages than what prevailed under the command economy. The conditions in Central Asia are particularly bad and the prospects even more gloomy. In times of economic difficulties inter-ethnic clashes become even more likely as recent events have already demonstrated.

The prognostication of economic transition in Central Asia can only be more pessimistic than in Russia. An optimistic time frame was spelt out by President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan in a major strategy speech for his country on 16 May 1992. According to this it will take another 20 years in three stages before the nation can join the ranks of "new industrial countries." (Banerjee, 1995, p. 182)

Another threat comes from the criminalization of society. Corruption has reached astronomic proportions. Crimes of violence are also on the increase. The law enforcement agencies are undermanned, underpaid and demoralized, hence they offer little protection, and inspire even less confidence. Drugg-trafficking has now been added to the other problems.

There are fears that arms and nuclear-related materials either already form part of these smuggling operations or soon will do so. The tactical weapons that were stationed on Kazakh territory have now all been withdrawn to Russia; the nuclear warheads still stationed there are under Russian control and appear to be well-guarded (President Nazarbayev has finally agreed that they, too, should be withdrawn). However, the danger exists that terrorist organizations, or aspiring nuclear states, might nevertheless succeed in acquiring some of this strategic arsenal. Given the deteriorating economic and social conditions, it is not improbable that some Central Asians will be tempted to assist in such operations.

Another form of instability is represented by the minority groups. There has been no organized discrimination against them, but there is a general perception that 'ethnocracies' are being created, in which those who do not belong to the titular nationality will be treated as second-class citizens. The language laws, which require that all official business be conducted in the state language, are felt to be symptomatic of a move to exclude the minorities from public life. This has prompted those who can find employment and accommodation elsewhere (inevitably, these are mainly the most highly qualified) to leave Central Asia. There has been a wave of emigrations from all the republics, but especially from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. This exodus of skilled workers and professionals is a serious blow to the already fragile economies of these

newly independent states. The republican governments would like to stem the hemorrhage, but are hampered by nationalistic considerations. (Akiner, 1994, p.35)

The existing political stability of Central Asian republics highly depends on the strong leadership of the present leaders which does not face any kind of strong political oppositions.

Inevitably the current period of transition will come to an end, just as a new post-Soviet generation comes to power. When that happens, the Central Asian states will then begin a new phase in the creation of national identities, and may begin to elaborate a new regional identity as well. It is uncertain how quickly this will occur, particularly since both Moscow and the current Central Asian elites, all former members of the Soviet *nomenklatura*, will try to stave off this second period of transition as long as possible. This has been amply demonstrated by the extension of presidential terms to 2001 in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, and the debate on this issue in Kyrgyzstan as well. At the same time however, it is certain that exercises in returning the old guard to power after new elites have attempted to take control are going to become even costlier, bloodier, and harder to achieve in the future as opposition groups and alternative elites become more politically seasoned. Nor should it be forgotten that even these first leadership "successes" were purchased at shockingly high costs.

Whatever the pace, though, it seems certain that by the beginning of the new century, Central Asian societies will have advanced to this second stage, as all of the region's current rulers will most likely have left, or be preparing to leave, the political scene. (Olcott, 1996, pp.154-159)

B. DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS

The most serious economic, political and social problems of Central Asia are all linked with the demographic processes that we tried to present in the previous chapters. At a time of enormous, and rising, economic, social and ethnic pressures throughout the Region, these demographic trends raise serious questions concerning the future of Central Asia. In the context of great economic, social and ethnic pressures in all of the Central Asian republics, what kind of strains might demographic pressures suggest for Central Asia? What might be the impact of a rapidly expanding Central Asian population, especially in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, on the Region as a whole? Will Central Asian republics necessarily imply greater Muslim influences or growing political, economic and ethnic unrest? In this section, we will try to examine the demographic trends as a backdrop for addressing some of these larger issues.

The collapse of the USSR has ushered in an era of transition in its successor states. Demographic characteristics and trends represent an important element of the setting in which the societal changes are taking place. These changes have taken a variety of forms, but certain similarities are evident. In many of these countries, life expectancies have fallen, especially among males. Some acceleration in the pace of fertility decline is observed as well. In addition, international migration has increased sharply in many countries in the Region.

Here, we will quote the demographic trends and population projection scenarios of the U.S. Census Bureau for Central Asia;

“The onset of sustained fertility decline did not appear in the indigenous Central Asian population until the mid-1970's. The Total Fertility Rates of the two Central Asian countries whose indigenous nationalities comprise predominant shares of the population (Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan) imply families in which children outnumber parents. The lower fertility levels of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan reflect the presence of sizeable contingents of Russians and other European nationalities in their

respective populations....Central Asian countries have experienced rising adult mortality for at least some portion of the period since 1970. Increasing mortality from accidents and cardiovascular disease typically has driven the rise in adult mortality, primarily among males. The consensus among analysts attributes this trend to increases in alcohol abuse, unhealthy diets, and other ``civilization diseases`` as these are called in the East European literature....For the Central Asian republics of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan we have assumed that fertility will decline through 1995 at the accelerated rates of the recent past, after which the pace of decline will slacken. From 2000 onwards, we assumed that the TFR's declined on logistic trajectories to an asymptote of 2.0. We have assigned Kazakhstan, whose population includes sizeable contingents of Russians and other European nationalities, a long-run asymptote of 1.8. We have otherwise treated it similarly to the other three Central Asian republics....Except for Kazakhstan, we see explosive growth in Central Asia, doubling over the projection period. In the case of Uzbekistan, we project the population in 2050 to exceed Ukraine's present population, 50 000 000....Among the high growth countries of Central Asia, Uzbekistan is a classic example of a child dependency burden. The young age groups are much bigger than the adult age groups. Among other things, this implies a burden on the educational system. One has to make a large share of the 25 year old population school teachers just to keep literacy from falling. By 2050, the situation does improve somewhat....An entirely different set of demographic problems and prospects characterizes the populations of Central Asian countries will have high population growth that entails major demands on limited local resources. In these countries, the need to feed, clothe, and house a rapidly growing population drains resources that could

otherwise be used for industrial development, environmental protection or other requirements. Unfortunately, further massive population increases appear inevitable, where we project a doubling of the population in the next 50 years, despite assumed reductions in fertility. However, the beneficial effect of a shift in age composition associated with declining fertility may help cushion the impact of population growth in these Region somewhat. (Kingkade & Dunlop, 1995, U.S. Census Bureau, www.blue.census.gov)

Now, we would like to analyse the main existing demographic and social problems of the Region which are very closely linked with the demographic pressure that we are observing in the Region.

1. Labour and Employment

The process of transition to a market economy in Central Asia has been accompanied by a decrease in production and a further decline in the labour productivity. Inevitably, the reorganisation of production and the effective redistribution of labour resources entails a reduction in employment. Yet the size of this reduction, as reflected in official statistics, has not been proportional to the fall in production. For example, in Kazakhstan, the official unemployment rate for 1993, based on the number of persons registered as unemployed, was unrealistically low at 1.1 %. However, the above rate does not take into account hidden unemployment. The estimates provided, by the Western institutions range between 15-20, could still be far short of the actual figure. (www.unap.org/unap/rbec/nnar/chapter/htm)

High unemployment, which some European countries experienced, is expected, although not yet officially acknowledged in the Central Asia. In the case of Central Asia, high unemployment has structural causes due to the transformation of the economy, and high population growth, as opposed to the developed western countries, where unemployment is caused by other factors. The problems of unemployment became

apparent in the labour market firstly because of the disruption in economic relations between the republics of the former USSR and because of the introduction in Central Asia of privatisation, the divestiture of state property, and the high population growth. The new situation demands workers with better skills and higher qualifications, as well as the ability to demonstrate creativity, independence and initiative. Despite unemployment, there are many unfilled jobs. In Uzbekistan these have tended to be in urban areas. The vacant urban jobs are often been for skilled workers in factories, and for specialists in certain fields. Also, in Uzbekistan, two-thirds of the population is living on 15 percent of the land, the remainder of the area being very sparsely populated. Consequently, the unemployment in areas of high population density should be shifted to the sparsely inhabited areas. But that means creating jobs and an attendant infrastructure, all of which requires additional capital investment.

An important peculiarity of the demographic situation in rural areas of Central Asia is a broad-based ``demographic pyramid`` - that is, a population with a high proportion of potential and actual parents, with a rough balance of men and women. The result is high reproductive potential. (Rumer, 1990, p. 111) These factors determine the high share of manual labor in agriculture, the low level of mechanical power employed, and the much smaller amount of fixed capital per worker.

``The high fertility rate has caused rising population density in rural areas (500 or more persons per square kilometer in the zone of irrigated vegetation). The resulting population pressure has caused the amount of arable land to decline from 0.59 hectares per capita in 1959 to 0.27 hectares in 1984. (Ibid. p. 112)

Rural overpopulation in cotton-growing areas has reached a critical level and triggered a spontaneous relocation of population to the sparsely settled and economically underdeveloped territories. These new settlements, especially those in mountainous areas, remain outside the field of vision of the authorities, planners, and statistical census-takers. Nor it is easy to control such developments ; many even lack electrification and road connections with more developed settlements.

The number of the unemployed with higher and special secondary education continues to grow. Among the unemployed, every second person is a skilled manual worker and every ninth a specialist (UNDP, Human Development Report, p. 18 www.unap.org). In addition to a high proportion of unemployed women, youth, and persons with secondary-level education, there appears to be a tendency towards an increasing unemployment amongst qualified specialists and people with records of long service. The continuing sharp recession, reduction of investment activity and other factors have caused an increase in the number of hidden unemployment.

The statistics do not take into consideration the fact that a large number of people are engaged in the shadow economy and informal individual labour activities, primarily in the service sector. An additional problem concerns rural youth migration to the urban areas in search of work opportunities.

The deepening economic crisis in the absence of radical preventive measures in Central Asia can result in a steep decline in employment and, eventually, mass unemployment.

2. Health

The Soviet health care model was based on the principles laid down in 1930's; it was owned, operated and planned by the state, free-of-charge, and oriented towards disease prevention. Central Asia, having been part of the USSR for 73 years, was bound to inherit both the merits and drawbacks of that model.

The public health system of the Soviet period could boast of the eradication of many infectious diseases, malaria and parasitogenic diseases in particular, as well as wide-scale disease prevention. This was accomplished through mass medical surveys, immunisation and education of the population concerning proper sanitary measures.

The Soviet public health system rightfully enjoyed a high standing in the world up to the end of the 1960's. Central Asian republics, as well as the entire USSR, manifested

obvious achievements; general mortality had decreased by three times compared with 1913, infant mortality by ten times and average life expectancy had more than doubled. The WHO/UNICEF international conferences on primary medical and sanitary assistance of the 20th century, noted that the USSR provided an example of how a state could solve issues of primary medical assistance and sanitary control. (UNDP, Human Development Report, www.unap.org/chap 2.htm p. 14)

The 1990's have witnessed a deterioration of the public health system in Central Asia. This has been due to a failure to reform the system and an inability to find the necessary means to finance it, given the economic upheavals that followed the dissolution of the USSR. In the face of looming poverty, health concerns have been pushed to the background.

All indices related to the health of women are showing more negative tendencies than those in developed countries. Moreover, the situation continues to deteriorate. Children have suffered most of all. The unprotected and vulnerable constitution of a child is bound to suffer adverse effects from the general deterioration of the ecological situation and the accompanying social stresses associated with the transition.

A sharp deterioration of the economic situation has brought about a similarly sharp reduction of state expenditures on national health services. The main policy remains financing of the health sector on the residual principle with budgetary subsidies being below the required sums. This situation is partly a problem of the slow pace of economic reforms and partly of a lack of budgetary resources, forcing the governments to pursue a rigid fiscal course. The reduction of financing of the national health services in Central Asia may cause serious problems. It poses a significant threat not only to the population's health, but also to the future potential of medical science and research, which is in need of radical reform and state subsidies.

3. Women in Central Asia

The position of women in Central Asia may be considered from two different perspectives. The first is related to the concept of "socialist" equality, introduced during the Soviet era, where all members of society, including men and women, were declared to be equal. Despite the positive aspects of this principle, which included the emancipation of women and the diminishing of the inequality of the sexes, there were also negative consequences. For example, "equal opportunity labour" often resulted in the need for women to acquire trades demanding hard physical labour, such as road construction, farm-machinery operation, and dairy farming. At the same time, housework, which itself requires considerable time and effort due to a low level of labour-saving devices, was not regarded as a contribution to common economic activities. Therefore women continued to be in an unequal position vis-a-vis men since they were expected to work outside the home and still keep up with their domestic chores.

The essence of the second perspective lies in the nature of society in Central Asia. It differs from European republics of the former USSR chiefly because of their Asian nature. Centuries of contact between Central Asians and Russians resulted in the mingling of the two cultures; the Asian in the form of a nomadic (Turkic) culture and European (Russian) in the form of an Eastern Slavic culture. The co-existence of the different cultures brought about the mutual adaptation of certain habits and cultural norms. This process was most intensive in towns where contact between different ethnic groups has traditionally been greater than in rural areas. For example, more and more Central Asian women, especially in the urban areas, use contraceptives in their family planning and want to have no more than one or two children, which does not correspond to the cultural norms of traditional Central Asian society. At the same time, the birth rate among Russian women in Central Asia is higher than in Russia, which to a certain degree testifies to the influence of the reproductive norms of the Central Asian societies. (Ibid. p. 31)

Current socio-economic conditions have caused a deterioration in the situation for women, especially in the spheres of employment, health care, and representation in governments. An illustration of the growing inequality between men and women can be

seen in employment and political administration. In rural areas the situation with respect to women's rights is worse than in towns, due to a more patriarchal life style and increasingly adverse working and living conditions.

The reduction of the number of working women is directly connected with the growth of unemployment that has accompanied the economic crisis and structural transformation of the economy. Just as the need to earn more money in order to support a family has become greater, more and more state-sector enterprises employing primarily women have had to reduce or halt production to survive in the conditions of market reform. Among the enterprises most affected have been those in the light industry sector, where the majority of the employees are women. Often enterprises employing both men and women try, in the first place, to dismiss women who, as a rule, are employed in the most unskilled areas and for whom enterprises have to pay benefits in connection with the birth and raising of children.

4. Other Related Problems

Social problems in Central Asian republics, which, to a great extent inherited from the ex-USSR, could be separated into at least three distinct groups. In the first group we find what was often referred to as antisocial behaviour. This included all varieties of crime, delinquency, prostitution, and corruption.

The second group consisted of various types of escapist behaviour, including alcoholism, drug addiction, and suicide (the ultimate escape). Escapist behaviour too had antisocial implications since it disrupted predictable social interaction, the routines of work and family life.

Third, there were various structural-situational conditions that constituted social problems particularly relevant to the Soviet case and to the relationship between politics and social problems. Such problems had the most direct connection with the political ordering (or disordering), of society. They included the various scarcities, especially of housing and consumer goods (and the corruption they elicited, which merged into

criminal conduct); deficiencies in public health; ; rural underdevelopment or uneven modernization; bureaucratic mismanagement; severe environmental problems; lack of work satisfaction; and the excessive mobility of labour. Old age was yet another social problem that fell into this group - it was not antisocial to be old, nor it represented a form of escapism or did it violate any social norms. It was a problem created by the combination of improvement in public health and the resulting longevity, with the changing family structure and social values (which reduced the respect accorded the old), and the lack of resources required to replace services that used to be provided by the extensive family.

Social problems in the Soviet society had three major sources, two of which can be defined as political. The first had been the general process of modernization, which always disrupted traditional ways of life, worldviews, modes of production, and stable communities.

The second had been the self-conscious application of political-ideological criteria to this process and the associated reorganization of the society, creating problems peculiar to communist one-party systems, such as rural backwardness.

Third, some social problems had been created by the application of official conceptions of rectitude and the corresponding definitions of deviance.

Many social problems undermine economic efficiency and challenge the social order, and the Soviet authorities were well aware of this. Such problems included alcohol abuse and disrespect for public property, undisciplined attitudes towards work, excess mobility of labour, and dissatisfaction with available educational and employment opportunities.

Social dissatisfaction of the masses, together with the distorted economy and the suppressing state system, created the phenomena of the shadow economy and the organized crime in the USSR, which became very wide spread especially after the early 1970's.

Regret to say that, today, all these negative phenomenas are continuing in full speed in the Central Asian republics, even in a more accelerated form, due to the worsening socio-economic situation in these republics , which were stated in the previous sections of the study.

5. Possible Impacts of Demographic and Ethnic Factors on Stability of the Region

From the information that we presented up to this section, we may come to the conclusion that the two main assumptions which is presented in Chapter I of this study, regarding the future impacts of demographic and ethnic factors of Central Asia on the geo-politics and socio-economic aspects of the Region are very likely to appear;

First, throughout Central Asia, and especially in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the existing Slavic population, which has completely different ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious peculiarities creates a great potential destabilization factor for these republics.

Second, there is the demographic factor. In addition to the existing economic hardships, economies of the Central Asian republics, especially Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are under the increasing pressure of rapid population growth of their indigenous population. We can assume that these republics are going to face severe difficulties in solving the problems springing from rapid population growth in the coming decades.

a. Of all the Central Asian republics, Kazakhstan appears most vulnerable to fragmentation. This reflects rising tensions between Kazakhs and Russians over the lowered status of the Russian language and a ostensible ``second class citizenship`` for the Russians. Although there are intensive inter-ethnic conflicts and a high degree of linguistic russification in all the former Soviet republics, in this region the Russians and the titular population kept a cultural distance from one another and were in effect isolated communities with their own social niches and circles of everyday contacts. Mixed marriages between Russians and people of the local nationalities were and remain

are. Marriages between Russians and Ukrainians, Germans, Tatars are much more frequent. The percentage of Russians with a free command of the titular nationality's language is insignificant, from 4.5 % in Uzbekistan to 0.9 % in Kazakhstan. (Arutunian, 1994, p. 196)

Russians and Ukrainians settled in the northern half of Kazakhstan dominate the plains where the oil and much of the mineral wealth of the state are concentrated.

“Compared to the rest of Kazakhstan, the northwestern region of Uralsk has a special character, as a classic Cossack borderland. In its demands for reunion with Russia the Union of Russian Cossack Forces claims “historical justice” for Uralsk Cossacks. But its spokesmen are careful to qualify this claim, emphasizing that they are not demanding that Kazakh settled in Uralsk should leave the territory they inhabit. The recent phenomenon of the Cossack revival spread rapidly in northern Kazakhstan. Well-organized Cossack groups have emerged as militant defenders of Russian rights, and their leaders- with backing from Russian army and security services- are actively promoting the right of Russians to achieve full autonomy and even secession and a merger with Russia.” (Hyman, 1996, p. 56)

The Kazakhs regard the shifting of borders as unacceptable, and respond to claims that such moves might be historically justified by demanding reparations for the three genocides the republic suffered at Russian hands, the first in the 1890's the second at the time of the revolution, and the third during collectivization. Kazakh demographers estimate that some three million Kazakhs died or were forced to emigrate as a result of Russian and Soviet policies during these three periods, leaving Kazakhstan with the distinction of being the only Soviet successor state where the titular nationality makes up less than half of the population. (Olcott, 1996, p.60)

The Kazakh situation is potentially the most volatile of all ethnic situations in Muslim Central Asia. The intensity of wounded Kazakh pride and nationalism, coupled with the desperation of their search to save their culture, nearly guarantees eventual confrontation with Russia. Loss of Northern Kazakhstan to Russia would almost

certainly push an angry and vengeful Kazakhstan into closer relations with China , as well as with Ukraine if that state should maintain hostile relations with Russia.

To redress its severe demographic problems *vis-a-vis* more powerful neighbours in Russia and Uzbekistan, the Kazakh government has an unspoken policy of encouraging the Kazakh diaspora of perhaps several million people to return to Kazakhstan from China, Mongolia, Uzbekistan, Russia, Turkey, Europe and elsewhere. Kazakhstan also has potential grounds for ethnic or territorial disputes with Uzbekistan, given the large number of Uzbeks who live in the Southern region of Kazakhstan along the Uzbekistan border.

The Karakalpak autonomous region of Uzbekistan is also ethnically closer to the Kazakhs than the Uzbeks, a potential trouble spot if borders in the region begin to be rearranged along more ethnic lines. (Fuller, 1994, p. 29)

The same ethnic scenario can be said for Kyrgyzstan, which has more or less similar peculiarities with Kazakhstan. Although the relatively more democratic atmosphere existing in the republic can act as a ``safety valve``, the possible ethnic disturbances in Kazakhstan will eventually spread to Kyrgyzstan which is having a large proportion of Slavic population.

It seems that – at least for the present moment – the great and regional powers of the world which have interests in the region will benefit from the continuation of stability in Central Asia. It is a well-known fact that any severe turmoil which will start in the region will quickly and inevitably spread to the neighbouring territories. Knowing this fact, all the powers in the region are very cautious in their dealings with the region. This is a great advantage for the countries of Central Asia.

b. The high population growth rates that we observe today in the southern republics of Central Asia - Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan - is very likely to continue in the coming decades. This fact is also true for the titular nationalities of Kazakhstan and

Kyrgyzstan, especially for the southern regions of these republics, which are bordering to Uzbekistan.

The high population growth is the most potential threat to the stability of this region in the near future. Starting from the mid-1980's the economic and social situation deteriorated considerably in all the Central Asian republics, affecting negatively all the indicators of welfare and daily life of the population. GNP's of the republics reduced to a mere 50 % of their 1990 levels, problems of health, housing, public catering, transportation, etc. became more acute. Today, almost half of the population in these republics are living below the poverty level, and, salaries and pensions can not be paid for 5-6 months because of the fiscal problems of the governments. Unemployment is wide-spread among the population, especially among the youth and women.

The continuing high population growth that we observe in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, together with the scarcity of the arable lands and lack of capital for the new investments, inevitably will create very serious social, thus, political problems in these republics. Taking into consideration of the growing influence of "political Islam" in these republics, continuing civil war in the neighbouring Tadjikistan, the existing ethnic and border disputes between Uzbekistan and its neighbours, we can come to the conclusion that the turmoils which can start in the southern republics will create a "domino effect" and spread to the other Central Asian republics. Although today, the existing regimes of Kerimov and Turkmenbashi is very sensitive on secularism, and the "great powers" of the world are highly concerned about the stability of the Region, in the long-run the unemployed, young masses formed by the high population growth, which will welcome any radical ideology that promises them a bright future, will inevitably create high political risks in the Region.

While analysing the stability of Central Asian republics, a special importance must be paid to Uzbekistan;

The Uzbeks have a profoundly clear sense of national identity and possess a self-assurance that stems from an awareness of their historical importance. The population, vastly exceeding that of any other Central Asian people, and the role of Tashkent as the

'Asian capital' of the Soviet Union in past decades, give the Uzbeks a dominant position in Central Asian politics. Russians make up less than 10 per cent of the population, and their skills are still needed by the new Uzbek republic. Nonetheless Uzbeks themselves possess a higher educational level, technical know-how and advanced scientific and technological institutes that guarantee their dominance as a people within the region. Because of the weight of Uzbek political and social culture, other smaller states in the region tend to feel intimidated by the Uzbeks and often refer to the threat of 'Uzbek chauvinism' Uzbekistan is the chief rival for Kazakhstan in terms of regional influence (Fuller, 1994, p. 29).

Conflict between Uzbekistan and its neighbours is most likely with Tajikistan. Given the large number of Tajiks (20.5 per cent of Tajiks in the former Soviet Union live in Uzbekistan), who perhaps even constitute a majority in the city of Samarkand, there are increasing demands from the Tajiks for greater cultural autonomy and more widespread use of the Tajik language. Equally significant is the large Uzbek population in Tajikistan (1.5 million according to Uzbeks and 7 per cent of the overall Uzbek population), mainly concentrated in the Northern part of the republic, who exert considerable influence within the Tajik government. If ethnic conflict should break out between Tajiks and Uzbeks, the possibility of secession of Northern Tajikistan and its consolidation into the Uzbek republic can hardly be excluded. Many ethnic Tajiks, concentrated in the traditionally Tajik cities of Samarkand and Bukhara in Uzbekistan, fear the rise of pan-Turkism and therefore support Karimov's efforts to suppress opposition groups espousing it. Should an opposition seize power that is identified too closely to pan-Turkist ideals, it is possible that these Tajik cities will erupt in rebellion. (Hale, 1994, p. 165)

Should the Russian-Kazakh border be changed, there would be immediate pressure to change a number of other borders in the region, particularly from Uzbekistan, which would see its interests served by expanding its borders in almost all directions. For the moment, these border issues are in abeyance precisely because they are considered to be highly volatile. None of the Central Asian leaders trusts any of the others, or indeed themselves, to place the interests of regional security above the national interest. In

addition to distrusting one another, Central Asia's leaders also do not trust Russia, although all accept the inevitability of Russia continuing to act as a regional hegemon.(Olcott,1996, p.154)



CHAPTER VI

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION OF THE STUDY

Up to this chapter I have tried to analyse the demographic and ethnic structures of Central Asia and their impacts on social, economic and political aspects of the Region.

The findings of the study can be summarized as follows;

1. From 2nd century B.C. to 15th century A.D., Central Asia played a determining role in the world history. Nomadic empires of Central Asia changed the path of history by their raids to Europe, Middle East, India and Russia. During this period the mode of production in Central Asia can be defined as “nomadic pastoralism”. Sedentary civilisations could only be found in the “oasis region” of Central Asia.

Nomadic raids from Central Asia came to an end in the 15th century. Especially in the “Timurides period” Central Asia lived through its golden age. Samarkand, Bukhara, Khiva became the scientific and artistic centers of the World. Discovery of naval trade routes marked the end of this period by shifting emphasis away from traditional trade routes such as the silk-road and spice-road which had been supplying great material wealth to the region. Also, wide use of fire arms ended the supremacy of the nomadic cavalry which had been the main military advantage of the nomadic empires.

From the 16th century to the Russian invasion which took place in the late 19th century, Central Asia lost its significance in world affairs. Poverty and religious fundamentalism were the main characteristics prevailing in the region during this period. Tsarist Russia saw the region as a source of raw materials, and especially cotton. No visible major changes in the economic or social life of the region could be perceived during this period.

After the “Great October Revolution” Central Asia, which up to that time was known as “Turkestan” was divided artificially by the Soviets into different republics. Soviets also

spent great efforts to reidentify – Russify the people of the region, but could not accomplish their aim.. Soviets also considered the Region as a source of raw materials to supply the industrialized parts of the USSR. During the Soviet period, the region suffered great ecological disasters for the sake of fulfilling the “plan targets” that were drawn up directly by Moscow. In spite of all the adverse developments, we must admit in all fairness that during the Soviet period in Central Asia, many positive changes also took place in the spheres of industry, education, health-care, transport, etc.

2. We do not have any data regarding the population of Central Asia before the end of the 19th Century. There are only some assumptions based on the social and technological levels of the Central Asian societies for different periods, and, different kinds of mode of production.

The first census was held in the Region by the tsarist Russia on 1897. Second census was held by the Soviets on 1926, which is followed by the regular censuses until 1989. After 1991, the year of independence of Central Asian republics, demographical data collection in the Region, to an extent, lost its routine and standardization, because of the different standards and needs of each republic, and further, because of lack of specialists, know-how and money.

3. Starting from the Russian invasion in late 19th Century, the ethnic structure of Central Asia dramatically altered by the immigration of the Slavic population. This immigration accelerated after the “great october revolution”, and, after the second world war reached the peak. As a consequence of this enormous immigration, in mid-1970’s, more than half of the population of Kazakhstan consisted of non-indigenous population, while Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan also had a considerable proportion of Slavic population.

Besides Russians, Tatars, Germans, Jews and Koreans also immigrated, or in more proper words, forced to immigrate to the Region starting from 1941, which increased the proportion of non-indigenous population in the Region

4. The demographic aspects of the Region changed fundamentally starting from 1920's. Despite the demographic catastrophes (genocides) caused by Stalin's ``ideological cleanisation``, collectivisation campaigns that was held in 1930's in Kazakhstan, and the second world war, we observe a steady population growth in the Region for the period 1926-1945. But the main ``population boom`` is observed in the Region after this period. In Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan throughout the 1960's and 1970's, the total population grew at least three times faster than they had during the previous two decades. Similar patterns of overall population growth were witnessed to a lesser degree, in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.

During the same period, life expectancies at birth increased, infant and child mortality rates decreased significantly. Also health services and the status of women in the society improved.

5. Since the non-indigenous population of Central Asian republics already passed the period of ``demographic transition``, and hence, having low population growth rates for the same period, we can easily observe that the ``population boom`` witnessed in Central Asian republics for this period stemmed from the very high birth rates of the indigenous population.

During this period indigenous people of Central Asia preserved their traditional big families, married earlier, and attained very high fertility rates, which, is also encouraged by the government policies.

6. Total Fertility Rates of the indigenous population of the Central Asian republics tend to decrease starting from the mid-1970's. Also the age of the marriages raised, especially in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Although this modernisation patterns are observed in all Central Asian republics, it is expected that the ``demographic momentum``, effected by still high fertility rates and the young age structure of the population, which is a consequence of the very high fertility rates of the recent past, will continue in the coming decades. This is especially true for the southern republics of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.

7. Uzbekistan is the most populous republic in Central Asia and its population density exceeds both the world and low and medium income level countries' (LMIC) average. Although Kazakhstan has the second largest population, due to its vast territory, the population density is very low. Kyrgyzstan stands in the mid-way. In this respect, a special importance must be paid to Turkmenistan. Turkmenistan's population and population density is rather low, but since the large part of the country consists of deserts, the population density is very high in the rare oasis zones of the country, scattered through Amu-Darya river.

Infant mortality rates of Central Asian republics increased after the independence in accordance with the deteriorating economic and social spheres, and became considerably higher than the world and LMIC averages. The highest rate is observed in Turkmenistan, the poorest and socially least developed country among Central Asian republics.

Life expectancy at birth of males also decreased after the independence, and became lower than the world and LMIC averages. For females life expectancy at birth is almost at the same level with LMIC countries.. Again, Turkmenistan has the the lowest life expectancy for both males and females, because of the reasons stated for the high infant mortality rate of this republic.

Percentage of urban population of Central Asian republics are lower than the world average, except Kazakhstan. But we must note that the urban population of Kazakhstan, to a great extend consists of Slavic population, and, rural population is almost completely of titular nationality. In Turkmenistan, the big majority of the urban population is living in the only big city of the republic, Ashgabad city.

8. The annual population growth rate of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are around null as of 1996. This is due to the continuing emigration of the non-indigenous population from these republics. The emigration of Slavic nationalities from these republics slowed down since mid-1990's. As a consequence we might expect that in the

coming decade the population growth will increase and the percentage of the titular nationalities will rise in these republics due to the still high fertility rate among the same.

In Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan the annual population growth rate is above 2 percent annually for 1996, in spite of the continuing emigration of non-indigenous population from these republics.

9. Age dependency ratio is considerably high in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan due to the excess population in 0-15 age group, which is a natural consequence of high fertility rates. In Kazakhstan this ratio is rather low, because of the high percentage of Slavic population in the republic.

These high age dependency ratios are creating serious burdens on the already deteriorated economies of Central Asian republics.

Also marriage rates are declining and the divorce rates are growing in Central Asian republics in the recent years, because of the worsening economic and social conditions.

10. In sum, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, with their high fertility rates, large families, desire to have more children, high age dependency ratios, high percentage of rural populations and high infant mortality rates, demonstrating a typical profile of a third-world country which is experiencing "Demographic Transition". However, in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, starting from the mid-1970's fertility began to decline and did not reverse. We might assume that these two republics already passed to the "second stage of demographic transition" which is characterized by the slight but steady decline of the fertility rates. The population boom in these two republics will continue in the coming decades, because of the still high fertility rates and the age structure of the population created by the very high fertility rates of the recent past.

The indigenous populations of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan demonstrates similar patterns, although more moderate, with their neighbours. This similarity is much more obvious in the rural areas and in the southern regions, where indigenous population consists the large majority. Today the population growth rate of Kazakhstan and

Kyrgyzstan is null, because of the high emigration. But since the emigration is losing its importance in the recent years, we might expect that the annual population growth rates of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan will rise in the coming years due to the high fertility among the indigenous population. This is especially true for Kyrgyzstan, where fertility rates are higher and the percentage of non-indigenous population already dropped to a mere 15 percent.

11. The immigration of Slavic population to Central Asia came to an end in mid-1970's, and, reversed starting from the end of the same decade. The emigration of the non-indigenous population from the Region continued in the 1980's, and after the independence, reached the peak. Although the emigration pattern slowed down after 1995, it is still continuing in the present day. The main reason of this huge emigration is the different ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious legacies of the European population living in Central Asia, which, could not accomplish social-identification with the existing cultures of the titular nationalities. Today, almost all the Germans and Jews left the Region, and the only reason of the slower rate of emigration of Russians after 1995 is the deteriorating economic and social conditions in Russia, Ukraine and Belorussia. As a consequence of this emigrations -and due to the high population growth of the indigenous population, in 1997, for the first time in their history the Kazakhs became majority in their republics. Also, the Slavic population decreased to 25 % of the population in Kyrgyzstan, and, to less than 10 % in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.

12. One might come to the conclusion that the huge emigration of the non-indigenous population from the Region is beneficiary for the Central Asian republics, hence, as a result of this outflow, the ethnic structure of these republics will become more homogenous, and, in the long run the ethnic problem will be solved. But the emigrating European population is the most well-educated, urbanised, skilled labour-force of Central Asia and the mass-scale emigration of these, creates a serious burden on the economies of the Central Asian republics.

13. In spite of the worst-case scenarios that were mentioned in many of the studies regarding the region, today, Central Asia seems to have attained social stability, at least for the near future. To attain long-run stability, to overcome the problems that have accumulated through centuries and also to satisfy the growing needs of its fast-growing young population, Central Asia must sustain a steady economic growth. Without the inflow of foreign means of production it seems almost impossible to achieve this goal, although it is vitally important for these republics. Today the inflow of foreign capital, technology and know-how to Central Asian republics is still not sufficient to attain a steady economic growth. The economic, social and psychological conditions that these countries inherited from the Soviet period also play a negative role. We regret to say that their legacy which is displayed by lack of democratic institutions, corruption, excessive bureaucracy, lack of entrepreneurship, violation of human rights, etc. is still going on at full speed in these republics. All these negative phenomena, together with the concern over the long-term stability of the region limit the inflow of foreign investments to the region.

14. If the Central Asian republics can not achieve a steady economic growth in the long-run, the most probable future scenario for the Region is the ethnic conflicts between Kazakhs and Russians in Kazakhstan, which, inevitably will spread to Kyrgyzstan, and severe social and political turmoils in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, due to the growing influence of any radical ideology- i.e. fundamental islam, on the young, unemployed masses of youth, formed by the high population growth in these republics.

The creation of independent states in the region, with viable economies and stable political systems is still a distant ideal. There are modest opportunities for constructive involvement by outside powers to facilitate trade and flow of technology, promote educational development, and attend to some of the ecological disasters in the region. But should conflicts within the region grow, as seems likely, outsiders' temptation to intervene is likely to be great, with destructive and unpredictable consequences.

Perhaps it is too much to hope that the new political leaders in these states realize that independence depends upon their capacity to reduce ethnic conflicts within their

borders, avoid quarrels with their neighbours over disputed territories, and establish cooperative economic and political relations with one another and with their neighbours. Should they fail to do so, they will not only jeopardize the independence of their own states, but they will also increase the possibility of wider regional conflicts.

The most effective way to influence the events in a positive way in the Region is to establish strong, continuous economic presence of the developed nations which can be able to make large scale investments, to transfer the finance and technology to the Region which can solve the growing economic bottle-necks. Republic of Turkey established very fruitful economic, political and cultural ties with the Region since their independence, albeit some mistakes done in the initial period. Also Turkish companies completed many medium and large scale projects in the Region, and thousands of small scale Turkish companies are active today especially in the service sectors of these republics. Thus, Turkish companies accumulated a great experience and know-how in the Region, which is also backed by the cultural and historical similarities between them. Turkey must utilize this great advantage by economic cooperation with the developed countries which has the capital and high-technology, through joint-ventures and other joint investments, which is urgently needed in the Region. In this case, Turkey will contribute a lot to the general economic re-building, thus, political stability of the Central Asia. However, Western firms require stable governments before they will consider doing business in these countries, and none of the current regimes in Central Asia is likely to prove sufficiently stable in the long run.

Central Asia, not for the first time in its long history, is in flux. The forces for and against stability are evenly balanced. If the economic situation begins to improve and confidence returns, it is likely that the republics will consolidate their independence and achieve a high level of prosperity. If, however, the tensions within society are heightened, the region could descend into internecine civil strife, as in Tajikistan. The situation is complicated by the fact that it is not merely domestic events but also the influence of external forces that will determine the outcome

APPENDIX: DEMOGRAPHICAL DATA OF AZERBAIJAN

**TABLE 115: TOTAL, URBAN & RURAL POPULATION OF AZERBAIJAN
BY YEARS**

Years	Total Population 000	Urban Population 000	Rural Population 000	% Urban	% Rural
1897	1806.7	305.1	1501.6	16.9	83.1
1913	2339.2	555.9	1783.3	23.8	76.2
1917	2353.7	560.2	1793.5	23.8	76.2
1920	1952.2	405.6	1546.4	20.8	79.2
1926	2313.7	649.5	1664.2	28.1	71.9
1939	3205.2	1156.8	2046.4	36.1	63.9
1959	3697.7	1767.3	1930.4	47.8	52.2
1970	5117.1	2564.6	2552.5	50.1	49.9
1979	6028.3	3200.3	2828.0	53.1	46.9
1980	6114.3	3247.5	2866.8	53.1	46.9
1981	6206.7	3301.5	2905.2	53.2	46.8
1982	6306.8	3355.9	2952.9	53.2	46.8
1983	6406.3	3407.0	2999.3	53.2	46.8
1984	6513.3	3459.8	3053.5	53.1	46.9
1985	6622.4	3524.5	3097.9	53.2	46.8
1986	6717.9	3588.0	3129.9	53.4	46.6
1987	6822.7	3651.3	3171.4	53.5	46.5
1988	6928.0	3722.6	3205.4	53.7	46.3
1989	7037.9	3790.0	3247.9	53.9	46.1
1990	7131.3	3839.8	3291.5	53.8	46.2
1991	7186.6	3864.9	3321.7	53.8	46.2
1992	7296.9	3919.9	3377.0	53.7	46.3
1993	7367.9	3933.2	3434.7	53.4	46.6
1994	7430.7	3952.8	3477.9	53.2	46.8
1995	7486.9	3967.1	3519.8	53.0	47.0
1997	7574.5	3974.0	3600.5	52.5	47.5

Source: Azerbaijan v Sifrah, Demograpicheskiy Sbornik, 1998, p. 5.

**TABLE 116: NUMBER OF BIRTHS, DEATHS, NATURAL GROWTH OF
THE POPULATION BY YEARS & BY URBAN-RURAL
DISTRIBUTION, AZERBAIJAN**

Year	Number of Births			Number of Deaths			Natural Growth		
	Total	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural
1950	90,280	37,804	52,476	27,746	12,933	14,813	65,234	24,871	37,663
1951	100,979	42,565	58,414	27,331	12,793	14,538	73,648	29,772	43,876
1952	106,687	44,751	61,936	30,244	15,131	15,113	76,443	29,620	46,823
1953	101,378	45,130	56,248	29,707	19,953	15,754	71,671	31,177	40,494
1954	117,428	50,327	67,101	28,855	14,558	14,297	88,573	35,769	52,804
1955	125,599	52,611	72,988	25,074	12,872	12,202	100,525	39,739	60,786
1956	134,594	54,003	80,591	23,931	12,625	11,306	110,663	41,378	69,285
1957	139,529	54,991	84,538	25,667	13,641	12,026	113,862	41,350	72,512
1958	147,534	56,866	90,668	27,119	13,109	14,010	120,415	43,757	76,658
1959	155,872	60,142	95,730	26,086	13,283	12,803	129,786	46,859	82,927
1960	165,849	65,985	99,864	25,918	13,537	12,381	139,931	52,448	87,483
1961	170,504	68,487	102,017	27,295	13,774	13,521	143,209	54,713	88,496
1962	168,341	68,801	99,540	90,901	15,166	15,735	137,440	53,635	82,805
1963	175,033	71,030	104,003	30,230	15,050	15,180	144,803	55,980	88,823
1964	176,546	72,068	104,478	31,841	15,293	16,546	144,705	56,773	87,932
1965	167,429	66,368	101,061	29,095	14,821	14,274	138,334	51,547	86,787
1966	166,545	65,980	100,565	31,657	15,327	16,330	134,888	50,653	84,235
1967	157,270	62,162	95,108	32,338	15,863	16,475	129,932	46,299	78,633
1968	158,962	64,543	94,419	32,950	15,918	17,032	126,012	48,625	77,387
1969	148,078	61,455	86,623	35,428	16,876	18,552	112,650	44,579	68,071
1970	150,976	63,285	87,691	34,506	16,816	17,690	116,470	46,469	70,001
1971	146,261	62,905	83,356	34,236	16,629	17,607	112,025	46,276	65,749
1972	137,752	60,870	76,882	35,658	17,259	18,399	102,094	43,611	58,483
1973	138,569	62,694	75,875	34,770	17,309	17,461	103,799	45,385	58,414
1974	139,084	63,200	75,884	36,082	17,834	18,248	103,002	45,366	57,636
1975	141,857	66,397	75,460	39,291	19,519	19,772	102,566	46,878	55,688
1976	147,199	69,825	77,374	38,029	19,406	18,623	109,170	50,419	58,751
1977	146,822	69,828	76,994	39,035	20,223	18,812	107,787	49,605	58,182
1978	148,812	71,491	77,321	39,936	20,198	19,738	108,876	51,293	57,583
1979	153,080	74,634	78,446	43,022	22,097	20,925	110,058	52,537	57,521
1980	154,974	75,585	79,389	43,064	21,999	21,065	111,910	53,586	58,324
1981	164,577	80,471	84,106	42,898	22,928	19,970	121,679	57,543	64,136
1982	160,425	78,154	82,271	42,376	22,097	20,279	118,049	56,057	61,992
1983	168,644	81,087	87,557	42,944	22,313	20,631	125,700	58,774	66,926
1984	174,437	85,178	89,259	44,845	23,351	21,494	129,592	61,827	67,765
1985	177,657	86,729	90,928	45,179	23,560	21,619	132,478	63,169	69,309
1986	186,609	91,530	95,079	45,344	23,687	21,657	141,265	67,834	73,422
1987	184,585	91,466	93,119	45,744	23,829	21,915	138,841	67,637	71,204
1988	184,350	89,689	94,661	47,485	24,750	22,735	136,865	64,939	71,926
1989	181,631	85,930	95,701	44,016	22,981	21,035	137,615	62,949	74,666
1990	182,989	86,008	96,981	42,819	21,804	21,015	140,170	64,204	75,966
1991	190,353	89,321	101,032	44,659	23,192	21,467	145,694	66,129	79,565
1992	181,361	84,593	96,771	51,259	26,179	25,079	130,106	58,414	71,692
1993	174,618	81,783	92,835	52,809	27,185	25,624	121,809	54,598	67,211
1994	159,761	74,332	85,429	54,921	23,372	26,549	104,840	45,960	58,880
1995	143,315	65,055	78,260	50,828	26,353	24,475	92,487	38,702	53,785
1996	129,247	55,609	73,638	48,242	24,688	23,554	81,005	30,921	50,084

Source: Azerbaijan v Sifrah... p. 20.

TABLE 117: CRUDE BIRTH RATE, CRUDE DEATH RATE, NATURAL GROWTH OF POPULATION BY YEARS & BY URBAN-RURAL DISTRIBUTION, AZERBAIJAN

Year	CBR			CDR			(per 1000 people) Natural Growth		
	Total	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural
1950	31.2	29.4	32.6	9.6	10.1	9.2	21.6	19.3	23.4
1951	33.7	31.5	35.5	9.1	9.5	8.8	24.6	22.0	26.7
1952	34.4	31.7	36.6	9.8	10.7	8.9	24.6	21.9	27.7
1953	32.0	30.3	33.5	9.4	9.4	9.4	22.6	20.9	24.1
1954	36.3	32.2	40.1	8.9	9.3	8.5	27.4	22.9	31.6
1955	37.8	32.9	42.3	7.6	8.0	7.1	30.2	24.9	35.2
1956	39.3	32.9	45.1	7.0	7.7	6.3	32.3	25.2	38.8
1957	39.4	32.6	45.7	7.2	8.1	6.5	32.2	24.5	39.2
1958	40.5	32.5	47.9	7.4	7.5	7.4	33.1	25.0	40.5
1959	41.5	33.2	49.1	6.9	7.3	6.6	34.6	25.9	42.5
1960	42.6	34.9	49.8	6.7	7.2	6.2	35.9	27.7	43.6
1961	42.1	34.3	49.4	6.7	6.9	6.6	35.4	27.6	42.8
1962	40.4	33.5	47.0	7.4	7.4	7.4	33.0	26.1	39.6
1963	40.8	33.4	48.0	7.0	7.1	7.0	33.8	26.3	41.0
1964	39.8	32.7	46.7	7.2	6.9	7.4	32.6	25.8	39.3
1965	36.6	29.2	43.8	6.4	6.5	6.2	30.2	22.7	37.6
1966	35.4	28.2	42.5	6.7	6.6	6.9	28.7	21.6	35.6
1967	32.5	25.8	39.3	6.7	6.6	6.8	25.8	19.2	32.5
1968	32.1	26.1	38.2	6.7	6.4	6.9	25.4	19.7	31.3
1969	29.3	24.3	34.3	7.0	6.7	7.3	22.3	17.6	27.0
1970	29.2	24.4	34.1	6.7	6.5	6.9	22.5	17.9	27.2
1971	27.7	23.6	31.9	6.5	6.2	6.7	21.2	17.4	25.2
1972	25.6	22.2	29.0	6.6	6.3	6.9	19.0	15.9	22.1
1973	25.2	22.3	28.3	6.3	6.1	6.5	18.9	16.2	21.8
1974	24.9	21.9	28.0	6.5	6.2	6.7	18.4	15.7	21.3
1975	24.9	22.5	27.6	6.9	6.6	7.2	18.0	15.9	20.4
1976	25.5	23.0	28.1	6.6	6.4	6.8	18.9	16.6	21.3
1977	25.0	22.5	27.7	6.6	6.5	6.8	18.4	16.0	20.9
1978	24.9	22.6	27.5	6.7	6.4	7.0	18.2	16.2	20.5
1979	25.2	23.2	27.6	7.1	6.9	7.4	18.1	16.3	20.2
1980	25.2	23.1	27.5	7.0	6.7	7.3	18.2	16.4	20.2
1981	26.3	24.2	28.7	6.9	6.9	6.8	19.4	17.3	21.9
1982	25.2	23.1	27.6	6.7	6.5	6.8	18.5	16.6	20.8
1983	26.1	23.6	28.9	6.6	6.5	6.8	19.5	17.1	22.1
1984	26.6	24.4	29.0	6.8	6.7	7.0	19.8	17.7	22.0
1985	26.6	24.4	29.2	6.8	6.6	6.9	19.8	17.8	22.3
1986	27.6	25.3	30.2	6.7	6.5	6.9	20.9	18.8	23.3
1987	26.8	24.8	29.2	6.7	6.5	6.9	20.1	18.3	22.3
1988	26.4	23.9	29.4	6.8	6.6	7.1	19.6	17.3	22.3
1989	26.4	23.1	30.1	6.4	6.2	6.6	20.0	16.9	23.5
1990	26.3	22.9	30.1	6.1	5.8	6.5	20.2	17.1	23.6
1991	27.0	23.6	31.0	6.3	6.1	6.6	20.7	17.5	24.4
1992	25.2	22.0	28.8	7.1	6.8	7.5	18.1	15.2	21.3
1993	24.2	21.3	27.6	7.3	7.1	7.6	16.9	14.2	20.0
1994	21.4	18.8	24.4	7.4	7.2	7.6	14.0	11.6	16.8
1995	19.1	16.4	22.1	6.8	6.6	6.9	12.3	9.8	15.2
1996	17.1	14.0	20.6	6.4	6.2	6.6	10.7	7.8	14.0

Source: Azerbaijan v Sifrah..., p. 21.

TABLE 118: MARRIAGES & DIVORCES, AZERBAIJAN, 1996

	No of Marriages	No of Divorces	Marriages, per 1000 people	Divorces, per 1000 people
Azerbaijan (Total)	38,572	5,595	5.1	0.7
Nahchevan Auto.Region	2,215	185	6.7	0.6
Region City of Baku	9,401	2,993	5.4	1.7

Source: Azerbaijan v Sifrah..., p. 36.

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