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Euroscepticism in Poland

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ABSTRACT

Over the last few years, Poland has been subjected to heavy criticism within the European Union due to its actions and attitudes that may be considered contrary to the fundamental values of the Union; the dose of criticism within the EU has increased since the Law and Justice party came to Power in 2015. In this context, to understand the dynamics of Euroscepticism in Poland through the example of the Law and Justice Party, this study aims to understand Euroscepticism and the process of Europeanization that continues throughout European integration. In other words, this study attempts to reveal how Europeanization and the European issue are understood in Poland in the Central and Eastern Europe conjuncture and its possible impacts on the developing Eurosceptic tendencies in the Polish Law and Justice Party case.

Keywords: Europeanization, Euroscepticism, Poland, Law and Justice Party

ÖZET

Polonya, son birkaç yıldır birliğin temel değerlerine aykırı sayılabilecek eylem ve tutumları nedeniyle Avrupa Birliği içerisinde ağır eleştirilere maruz kalmış, 2015 yılında Hukuk ve Adalet Partisi'nin iktidara gelmesinden bu yana AB içerisindeki eleştirilerin dozu artmıştır. Bu bağlamda, Polonya'daki Avrupa şüpheciliğinin dinamiklerini Hukuk ve Adalet Partisi örneği üzerinden anlamak için bu çalışma, Avrupa şüpheciliğini Avrupa entegrasyonu boyunca devam eden Avrupalılaşma süreci ile birlikte anlamayı amaçlamaktadır. Diğer bir deyişle, bu çalışma Orta ve Doğu Avrupa konjonktüründe, Polonya'da Avrupalılaşma ve Avrupa meselesinin nasıl anlaşıldığını ve bunun Polonya Hukuk ve Adalet Partisi örneğinde gelişen Avrupa şüpheci eğilimler üzerindeki olası etkilerini ortaya koymaya çalışmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupalılaşma, Avrupa Şüpheciliği, Polonya, Hukuk ve Adalet Partisi

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CEE: Central and Eastern Europe

CEECs: Central and Eastern European Countries

CBOS: Public Opinion Research Center

LPR: League of Polish Families

MRP: The Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland

PiS: Law and Justice

PO: Civic Platform

PSL: Polish Peasants'Part

Samoobrona: Self-Defence

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this study is to examine Euroscepticism through the case of Poland, which has also become controversial within the EU, in an attempt to strengthen the argument that the concept of Euroscepticism, which accompanies the process of European integration and Europeanisation, develops at different levels in each country.

1.1 General Statement

The source of the opposition to integration has mostly stayed same since the Bruges speech, which was the first genuinely explicit example of Eurosceptic political rhetoric that is opposed to further integration beyond inter-state economic cooperation. Although European integration has gone through many crises and has emerged from them more robust, Euroscepticism has found space to manifest itself as European integration has grown and deepened, and European affairs and European integration have become central issues in political debates, as Leconte (2010:12) points out: "As European integration has developed, Euroscepticism has accompanied it, and as the scope of European integration has widened, deepened, and gained momentum, the salience of Euroscepticism has grown. In this respect, this study aims to provide an overview of the manifestation of Euroscepticism in Poland, which has been the subject of substantial debates on the issue of Euroscepticism.

1.2 Research Question

Political parties' ideological profile, values and supporters' interests play a crucial role in the way of political parties view the European issue and increase their incentives to oppose the European Union (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2003 & Vasilopoulou, 2011). Based on this argument, while the political parties' handling of the European issue and taking a position against it is shaped according to the political parties' position in the country, their ideologies and their supporters, this thesis intends to examine the Euroscepticism in the Polish case by first looking at political elite-based and public-based Euroscepticism and then examining political party-based Euroscepticism throughout the PiS (Law and Justice) party. From this point of reference, it will focus on the following question: How does the mainstream Law and Justice party in Poland problematise Europe, and the European integration in domestic party politics and how and why does it use Eurosceptic political rhetoric?

1.3 State of the Art

Euroscepticism, which is theoretically explained as a negative stance towards European integration, has been the subject of many critical studies in the field of European integration. In this sense, it can be argued that Paul Taggart was the first scholar to theoretically provide the most cited definition of Euroscepticism theoretically in the literature. According to him, Euroscepticism is an "encompassing term" which refers to "an idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as the outright and unqualified opposition of to the European integration process" (Taggart, 1998: 366). When Taggart's first definition was found to be too broad in time, they developed their most well-known "hard" and "soft" Euroscepticism definitions. (Sczerbiak and Taggart, 2001). Another striking definition was provided in the article of Kopecky and Mudde (2002) as criticism towards Sczerbiak and Taggart's hard-soft Euroscepticism distinction. Therefore, they proposed a two-dimensional alternative classification of European Integration; first, Europhiles and Europhobes, and the second dimension is EU- optimists and EU-pessimists which is based on how they perceived European integration. Following Kopecky and Mudde's classification, Flood (2002) has developed six different categories that take the debate further and are intended to encompass all possible positions towards European integration. This categorisation includes rejectionist, revisionist, minimalist, gradualist, reformist, and maximalist attitudes towards European integration. Another important study of these successive concepts, which is nevertheless considered too broad, has been provided by Sorensen (2008) in the literature, who has addressed the economic, democratic, and sovereignty-based concerns that triggered Euroscepticism. On the one hand, how the public perceives European integration has also played a crucial role in the study of Euroscepticism, and many scholars have studied public, individual-based Euroscepticism (Boomgarden et.al., 2007; Krowel and Abts, 2007; Vasilopoulou, 2017 & Wessel, 2007).

Other essential studies in the study of Euroscepticism, which are focused on member states, have been analysed from the perspective of candidate states by scholars such as (Henderson and Schimmelfennig, 2008). When it comes to the tendency to oppose the EU, brought about by the EU's conditionality for candidate states, has made it necessary to examine the party-based Euroscepticism in the field, and many studies have been carried out regarding the party-based Euroscepticism (Sitter, 2003; Mair, 2008; Mudde, 2012; Sczerbiak and Taggart, 2008 & Vasilopoulou, 2011). In particular, according to (Mair, 2008: 154), there are three main research areas in the literature on political parties and European integration, and these are briefly classified as follows (1) the study of transnational party federations and their efficiency in

creating significant party activity at the European level, (2) the study of the internal dynamics of the parties and party systems in the European Parliament, (3) the study of the role of Europe, mainly its impact on party systems, party ideology, party programmes, and party competition in national level. From this point of view, while this thesis takes Poland as a case study to illustrate the impact of European integration on political party politics and the multidimensional manifestation of Euroscepticism in political parties, this thesis can be considered belonging to the last research domain of Mair's mentioned classification here. However, while academics provided their conceptualizations and interpretations regarding party-based Euroscepticism, there is no consensus classification or categorisation regarding party-based Euroscepticism, and much of the studies have revolved around whether party-based Euroscepticism is derived from an ideological or strategic basis or whether different types of parties have different stances towards the EU. From this point of view, the reflections of Euroscepticism in the West and the East European countries have also created a separate field of study, and Euroscepticism in both West and Central and Eastern Europe has been studied. While studies on Brexit became a turning point in European integration and the study of Euroscepticism (Hobolt, 2016), Euroscepticism in the West has generally focused on party-based Euroscepticism, which focuses mainly on the radical left and right parties' stances towards the EU (Dunphy, 2004; Halikipoulou, and Vlandas, 2018; Usherwood and Startin, 2013; Startin, 2015). On the other hand, the dynamics of Euroscepticism in Central and Eastern European countries have differed from those in the West and have examined identity, nationalism, value-based scepticism as well as political party-based Euroscepticism (Ágh, 2008; Ayata, 2014; Hartleb, 2012; Riischøj,2004; Toomey, 2007; Winston, 2018).

In the context of Euroscepticism in Central and Eastern Europe, there have been many studies on Poland which is a significant case of European integration and the subject of analysis of this dissertation. Most of these studies have examined Euroscepticism in Poland by focusing on the political, and social structure in Poland before the EU accession and the post-accession period, and some of the studies examined Poland in the light of Brexit and the highly debatable possibility of a potential Polexit scenario (Cislak and Pyrczak, 2020). In this regard, outright studies regarding Euroscepticism in Poland have focused on the milestones in the relationship between the European Union and Poland (Bajczuk, 2011; Malgorzate and Kaluzynska et. al., 2009; and Piatkowski, 2013). On the other hand, some of the studies provided broad research regarding important breaking points in Poland- EU relations in the period of crises such as the Eurozone crisis, the migration crisis, and its impacts on Euroscepticism in Poland (Chesi, and

Zgut, 2020; Flamm, 2012). Furthermore, when it comes to Euroscepticism in Poland, noteworthy studies have been focused on the role of the Catholic Church in Poland and its impact on Eurosceptic politics in Poland since it is also the strong impact of established value-based Euroscepticism in the Polish case (Leszczyńska, 2017; and Napieralski, 2018). In the context of party-based Euroscepticism, Poland has also taken a prominent place in the research on party-based Euroscepticism and has been broadly studied by scholars both in the studies on Euroscepticism in Central and Eastern Europe and on Polish domestic politics (Bugajski,2002; Grosse,2018; Matkowski and Tucker, 2010; Taggart and Sczerbiak, 2004; Zuba, 2006). In the light of research regarding the Euroscepticism in Poland, Alex Szczerbiak has provided a noteworthy comprehensive study about Poland in the European Union in her book, which is titled 'Poland within the European Union: New awkward partner or the new heart of Europe?'(2012) and her study has shed light on the ongoing discussions on how significant Poland is in the context of European integration and how and to what extent Euroscepticism has taken shape in the country. The ongoing debates on whether Poland is an awkward partner of the EU, as she discussed in her book, have also played an important role in the choice of Poland as a concrete example in this thesis.

1.4. Rationale of the Research

Given the considerable number of studies on Euroscepticism until now, the field of research is broad in itself. Even though the literature presents a wide range of different conceptualizations and approaches to Euroscepticism in candidate and member countries, political party-based, identity, value-based or Euroscepticism in Western and Eastern Europe on a regional basis, when the literature is examined in line with the purpose of thesis work, it is obvious that although there are numerous studies in the field of political party-based Euroscepticism, when it comes to the Polish case, the existing studies primarily focus on Poland in the context of Poland-the EU relations in the pre-accession and post-membership periods. For this reason, most of the literature reveals the reasons and conditions under which Euroscepticism has developed in Poland within the parameters of the pre-membership and post-membership period. In this sense, the literature presents a cursory glimpse of how a mainstream political party in a ruling position, such as the Law and Justice Party in Poland, uses Eurosceptic rhetoric in its national politics or is limited by the fact that the vast majority of accessible sources on this issue are only in Polish. Therefore given the of lack of coverage of English literature in this field and in order to contribute to English literature, this thesis aims to focus on Euroscepticism in Poland, by examining the mainstream ruling Law and Justice party and in order to address a

more recent timeframe, it will reveal how the Law and Justice party problematises the EU and how their Eurosceptic stance is reflected in the election manifestos of 2015, when Euroscepticism peaked in Poland, and in the recent 2019 election manifestos. Furthermore, in order to reveal whether the political elites and the public-based Euroscepticism influence each other and their diverging and converging aspects, this study will use specific public opinion polls which are considered significant in the context of this study. In light of the findings of the study, it aims to establish a connection between the Europeanization phenomenon throughout European integration and the Euroscepticism in Poland.

1.5 Methodology

Given that the main aim of this thesis is to explore the question of how the mainstream conservative Law and Justice (PiS) party in Poland problematises the European issue in its domestic politics and why and how it uses Eurosceptical rhetoric in its domestic politics, the methods of content and discourse analyses were selected for this study since the most common method of evaluating books, documents, speeches, laws, constitutions (Babbie,2006: 296). (Zúñiga, 2006). Furthermore, content and discourse analysis offer the possibility of detailed analysis by focusing on the selected data and by extracting codes from the phenomena and events that are frequently emphasised in the selected data, allowing interrelated factors to be separated and interpreted (Merriam and Grenier, 2019). From this point of view, the relevance of content and discourse analysis to this study, while the content analysis allows us in this study to trace the evolution of the Law and Justice party's attitudes and position towards Europe over time by its political party programmes, discourse analysis provides a rich understanding how meanings are constructed in a social and political context. (Howarth, 2000). The Manifesto Project (database of political manifestos) and CBOS (centre of public opinion in Poland) surveys were used as data sources in order to identify the years and areas in which Euroscepticism started to manifest itself in Poland and the parallels between Euroscepticism between public and the political elites. Since the original versions of the election manifestos of the PiS party from The Manifesto Project database are only available in Polish, manifestos have been used with English translations. In other words, the research sample was selected from the CBOS surveys and the Manifesto Project database, and the surveys were selected from the years 2003, 2004 when the favourable attitude towards the EU in the Public base was mainly very high, and 2015, 2019, 2022 to show the areas where support was started to break down, accordingly the PiS party’s national parliamentary election manifestos of 2015 and 2019 were selected since 2015 is the year of entering Euroscepticism into the parliament and the 2019

manifesto since it is the most recent one. The selected manifestos aim to show how it forms Eurosceptical rhetoric is embedded in the political discourse of the PiS party election manifestos, while the public opinion polls analysed aim to show to what extent the mass and elite-based scepticism are influenced by each other. Also, the following hypotheses, which are derived from the literature on Euroscepticism, party-based Euroscepticism and public mass Euroscepticism are presented and will be evaluated in accordance with the research question.

H1: When it comes to phenomena such as sovereignty, nationalism and national interests, Euroscepticism becomes salient both at party and mass levels.

H2: The fact that Eurosceptic parties are being elected is an indication that Eurosceptic attitudes are also prevalent at the mass level.

1.6 Scope of the Study

There are five chapters of the dissertation, which start with the introduction and end with the conclusion. Therefore, Chapter 2 presents a broad literature on Europeanisation and the theoretical framework of the study, then reveals the West and the East Europeanisation in order to understand the different regional dynamics of Europeanisation, and finally, for the purpose of the study, the Europeanisation of political parties.

Chapter 3 reveals first presents a broad conceptual framework of Euroscepticism in order to establish a link between Europeanisation and Euroscepticism, then it will introduce the concept of party-based Euroscepticism in line with the purpose of this study, and finally, it presents the impact of the European issue on the national politics of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Western Europe, revealing the different dynamics of Euroscepticism in Western and Eastern Europe.

Chapter 4 presents the research design of the thesis and presents empirical analyses of Euroscepticism in Poland in order to answer the research questions of the study and discuss the hypotheses. Firstly, after explaining why Poland was selected as a case study, turning points in Polish-EU relations, it will discuss the elite and the mass level Euroscepticism; following some prominent public opinion polls on the EU, it discusses the major crises in Poland- EU relations, it will look at the general characteristics of Eurosceptic parties in Poland in terms of party-based Euroscepticism, followed by discussing the rising Euroscepticism and democratic backsliding debates in Polish domestic politics, it will provide an in-depth look at the Law and Justice party's 2015 and 2019 national parliamentary election manifestos.

The fifth concluding chapter establishes a link between Europeanization and the politics of Euroscepticism in the light of the findings of the study, and it concludes with a discussion of the extent to which Europeanization has been understood in the Polish case helps to understand Eurosceptic approaches and how this issue can be a subject in future research.

1.7 Limitations

In this thesis, while the research subject is Euroscepticism in Poland within the framework of the PiS (Law and Justice) party, there are some weaknesses and limitations. A conceptual limitation is necessary in order to keep the research cohesion. From this point of view, Populism is not included in this research, although there are examples where the PiS party shows Euroscepticism in a populist manner. Also, since 2015 was the period of intensification of Euroscepticism and 2019 was the year of the last election's manifesto, these two dates were chosen to make a reasonable time limitation in the research. In addition to conceptual and time limitations, the scope where the research shows weakness is developed in the manifesto reviews regarding the fact that majority of the sources are only available in Polish has led to difficulties in reaching primary sources; therefore, secondary data sources and English translations of the manifestos were used in the manifesto analyses.

CHAPTER II

EUROPEANIZATION AS A FRAMEWORK

The chapter on Europeanization will examine the literature on Europeanization to demonstrate the contentious traits of the concept of Europeanization, which is the subject of notable discussions in the field of European integration studies. Firstly, it will take a deep look at the conceptualisation of Europeanization, and by doing so, it will look at how Europeanization literature developed. Secondly, as it is significant for this study, it will provide a broad literature on the evolution of Europeanization in Central and Eastern Europe and subsequently, on political parties and Europeanization.

2.1. The Conceptualizing of Europeanization

The absence of a common definition of Europeanization has been a main source of criticism throughout the beginning of European integration. So, one of the first remarkable definitions regarding Europeanization was made by March and Olsen (1989) based on two institutional logics as follows: (1) (The rationalist) 'logic of consequences and (2) (the constructivist) 'logic of appropriateness' initiated the specification of Euroscepticism that is to say, the logic of consequences asserts that actors prefer the course of action that maximizes their utility under the given circumstances, while the logic of appropriateness assumes that actors prefer the course of action that is suitable with their role in society and social norms in the given circumstance. After that, Olsen added another definition of Europeanization and defined the concept as a "fashionable one" based on its usefulness in understanding European transformations (Olsen, 2002: 921). Although being immensely fashionable, this new research focus has been working to establish a solid scientific reputation ever since some academics began to cast doubt on its analytical validity or more precisely, its theoretical worth or originality over time (Radaelli, 2004). However, on the other hand, the lack of a common definition and the range of definitions proposed to describe it, and the variety of applications enhance the conception of Europeanization, resulting in an extensive research strand in the literature on the European integration since the description and explanation of European integration process were the primary concern of scholars in the field of European Studies, and there was barely any space for systematic assessments of the constant relationship between the regional and political regimes. So, this is the starting point of the formation of Europeanization as a new phase in the integration studies (Caporaso, 2007).

The roots of Europeanization research are based on traditional integration approaches. First, regarding neo-functionalism and its more present interpretations, supranational governance, and multilevel governance (Hooghe and Marks, 2001; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, 1998). From this point of view, the idea of "attaching" local societal preferences at the EU level inspires for the literature on Europeanization. Secondly, an emphasis on the local authority resources of European decision-making and their implications for the structure of the EU institutions and policies is what motivates Europeanization in terms of the intergovernmental approach. However, The Europeanization concept focuses primarily on the domestic level as a different target than the classical European-centred integration ideas. Undoubtedly, since the middle of the 1990s, the domestic "shift" has been incorporated into the administrative components of domestic patterns of adaptation to the EU membership (Börzel, 1999; Hanf and Soetendorp, 1998; Kassim et al., 2000; Rometsch and Wessels, 1996; Zeff and Pirro, 2001). In light of these contributions, studies that explicitly focused on Europeanization (Harmsen, 1999; Olsen, 1996) reveal a distinct shift in focus from those that are primarily concerned with local administrative adaptation while also considering "organizational" changes. Changes in "national political systems" related to European integration, or more broadly, national policy fostered by the EU membership and policy-making reasoning (Goetz and Hix, 2000).

The domestic implementation of EU policies was the primary analytical focus of the studies throughout the early phases of the development of the Europeanization study (Börzel, 2001; Mastenbroek, 2003). The concept behind the implementation studies is that as long as European regulations are not carried out as intended, European integration will remain an unfinished political endeavour (Sverdrup, 2007). In fact, when it comes to the first outstanding empirical emphasis of Europeanization research, environmental policy (Knill, 1998), transport policy (Heritier et al., 2001), and cohesion policy have been the most developed European policy domain (Benz and Eberlein, 1999; Conzelmann, 1998). Furthermore, political sociologists and political scientists are both becoming more aware of how significant the EU has become to national politics as an advanced example of regional integration since the study of domestic politics and policymaking has more focused on 'European' analytical lenses thanks to research on Europeanization.

When we look at the growth of the Europeanization literature, we can see a peak in significant publications around the end of the 1990s and the beginning of 2000. Therefore, it is significant to reveal why Europeanization in the second half of the 1990s became quite prominent in European integration studies. It is primarily due to the following two primary reasons: the first

is related to the requirement to advance in EU studies and the decline in analytical attractiveness of the nearly four-decade-old dispute between "neofunctionalists" and "intergovernmentalists." Alternatively, one may claim that it was the outcome of a research effort which wanted to analyse the "next stage" of European integration studies and the influence of the European Union on its member states (Green Cowles et al., 2001). In addition, after the Maastricht Treaty was ratified, there was an increase in interest in EU policies and institutions, which is the second factor. Political players in the second half of the 1990s, just like in national parliaments, were learning about new domestic responsibilities related to expanding of the EU powers and had to adjust to a new multi-level political game. Moreover, domestic political actors had to deal with the consolidation of, or the emergence of new skills in a variety of policy domains, including social policy (Graziano, 2003), immigration policy or foreign policy (Tonra, 2001).

To conclude, by extending the research horizon to previously under-researched subjects like the effect of the EU institutions and policies on domestic political systems, Europeanization as a research agenda has succeeded in putting an end to the worn-out debate between (neo)intergovernmentalists and neo-functionalists (Graziano and Vink, 2013).

There have been some literary attempts to define the concept of "Europeanization" before the definition discussion in the literature on European integration became fully established. The notion of "Europeanization" was first introduced by Ladrech in his 1994 contribution, he described it as a methodological process that gradually changes the nature of politics in such a way that national politics and the organisational logic of policy which are influenced by EU economic and policy forces. (Ladrech, 1994: 69). Also, Europeanization was conceptualized by Bulmer and Burch (1998: 602) as to how much EC/ EU conditions and policies influenced the formulation of member states' policy agendas and goals, as well as the extent to which EU practises, operating procedures and administrative values have influenced and become embedded in member states' organizational practices. After this definition, Risse et al. structured Europeanization as the emergence and development of different governance structures at the Europe level, such as political, legal, and social institutions that shape interactions between actors and are associated with the resolution of political problems in the first systematic and comparative study of Europeanization processes (Risse et al., 2001: 3). After that, Radaelli's prominent contribution to the literature on Europeanization came to the front. In 2003, he defined it as a collection of processes for the construction, diffusion, institutionalisation, and the "ways of doing things" of informal and formal rules, practices, policy frameworks and styles and shared beliefs and norms that are first established and

solidified in the making of EU decisions before being incorporated into identities, domestic discourse, public policies, and political structures (Radaelli, 2003: 30).

Given the abovementioned definitions, the first definition by Ladrech (1994) takes the most innovative aspects of Europeanization and refers to local "adaptative processes" linked to the changed or changing European environment. The second definition by Risse et al. (2001), which emphasizes the "loyalty shift" to the European level, is very similar to Haas' definition of European political integration. However, Radaelli (2000) also makes the following contribution, which will bring a new discussion to this issue: "There is no need to develop new terms with outdated definitions; thus, we should not confuse the terms of "Europeanization" and "European integration". However, later, several contributions motivated by the previously indicated definition deal with Europeanization from the top-down. In line with this, Börzel (2002: 93) defined the meaning of top-down Europeanization as a Europeanization is a two-way process. It involves both top-down and bottom-up dimensions. The former emphasises the formation of European institutions as a synthesis of new norms, regulations, and practises, while the latter discusses the impact of these new institutions on the political structures and practises of member states.

Cowles et al. (2001) have been also presented nearly the exact definition of Europeanization, like Börzel's definition, and they acknowledge the interaction between various actors and policy networks at the national and EU levels and consider Europeanization as a two-way process. Their alternative definition of Europeanization is as follows: Europeanization is the formation and development of various governance structures at the European level, i.e., institutions connected to political problem-solving that formalise interactions between the actors and policy networks focused on the formulation of binding rules. In other words, Europeanization addresses the evolution of the new policy visions interacting with old policies (Cowles et al., 2001: 3). From this point of view, it can be said that since the development of European institutions is being prioritised rather than input from member states whose activities have an impact at the European level, it may be claimed that their vision is more centred on a bottom-up approach.

According to Beichelt (2008), 'the concept of misfit' also corresponds to the domestic compatibility of domestic structures of candidate states vis-à-vis the pressure of the process of Europeanization. So, as the core of this top-down approach consists of a specific view of the concept of compatibility, which in perspective is systematically regarded as a structural defect at the domestic level, the term 'misfit' has also been used to describe Europeanization. In that

sense, the willingness for domestic transformation would be higher if the greater misfit or the lowest goodness of fit as the domestic political actors do not have the desire to make reform without pressure (Beichelt,2008: 3).

On the other hand, (Tonra, 2015) emphasized the EU membership's effects on the national foreign policies of the member states, also Brian White (2001) argued that national foreign policies of member states had crucially changed or partly transformed over time by policymaking at the European level. in this sense, Baun and Marek (2013) also figured out that the foreign policies of the member states have been transformed. However, they also stress that homogenising member states' foreign policies or agreeing on a single EU policy stance are not a must-have requirement for Europeanization. Moumoutsiz (2011) identifies three domains as evidence of Europeanization as follows: first, an upsurge in national foreign policy goals in favour of European standards. Second, when national policy strategies and the application of foreign policy instruments have evolved to match European patterns, and third, when the EU procedures have an impact on national actors who engage in policymaking process.

Schimmelfennig (2015) studied Europeanization beyond Europe and analysed the effectiveness of the EU and the Europeanization effects in candidate and/or potential candidate countries in terms of democracy, human rights, European neighbourhood policy and regionalism. In this regard, according to him, when it comes to "quasi-members" or candidate countries, Acquis Communautaire locates the core of Europeanization. On the other side, Regionalism still can be counted as a European goal, but he underlines that if effectively chased, it would lead to Europeanization beyond Europe. However, other significant targets like human rights, democracy, and stability are less related to the EU's external relations from the perspective of Europeanization beyond Europe.

Nevertheless, the United Kingdom's Brexit referendum in 2016 has drastically changed the literature on Europeanization since the Brexit offer threatened the borderlands of the Northern Island where they see Europeanization as an ongoing process that becomes an essential part of the way of life. Also, another effect of Brexit is that it shows how Europeanization has restructured relations between Northern Ireland, and the UK (De La Baume and Marks, 2017). Furthermore, in their view, they consider Europeanization as a strategy that influences their everyday life and ongoing process which also increases their social and economic living standards, and that is why they have had such a fear that all standards derived from integration would change dramatically (Anderson, 2018).

Since the Eurozone crisis and the subsequent migration crisis and the following pandemic that affected the EU governance, more recent studies have explored the possibility of a halt in the process of Europeanization, or even a 'reverse gear' of previous transformations (Grave, 2016) and in the first instance, Brexit can be seen as a turning point for the concretisation of this 'reverse gear' and the differentiated Europeanization studies that comes afterwards (Wolff and Piquet, 2022).

Last but not least, according to Jañczak (2010), the process of Europeanization may also lead to de-Europeanization and counter-Europeanization. From this point of view, when the process of Europeanisation is considered as a non-linear process, the process of Europeanization can also lead to de-Europeanisation and counter-Europeanization. In this vein, according to Jañczak (2010) There are four key reasons that led the process of Europeanization to de-Europeanization, and these are stated as follows: (1) member states may gradually reduce the level already achieved by Europeanization, the level of Europeanization may decrease, or new issues may replace it (Refocusing). (2) member states may try to tailor the Union to their own interests. (Customization). (3) member states can set new priorities after achievements in Europeanization in certain areas. (Priority setting). (4) or the broadest scope of the de-Europeanization is withdrawal from membership (Withdrawal). However, it should be noted that de-Europeanization does not only occur in member states but can also occur in candidate states such as Türkiye that have adopted European solutions for a long time but still have not achieved membership; this situation can reverse the motivation for Europeanization and manifest as de-Europeanization. In the case of counter-Europeanization, it focuses on the reactions of some actors who oppose the process of Europeanization (Jañczak, 2010: 100-110).

One of the most important developments in terms of the research agenda from the perspective of this study's aim is the extension of the Europeanization framework to encompass candidate states, in particular in the CEE context. In this regard, according to (Heritier, 2005), the concept of Europeanization of the candidate countries, where embedded in Eastern enlargement, is evaluated to be a particular subject of a broader research agenda called "Europeanization East" in the Europeanization study. From that point, it is indispensable to show the concept of Europeanization East and reveal its particulars in contrast to the literature on West Europeanization.

2.1.1 The Concept of Europeanization in Central and Eastern Europe

In the history of the EU enlargement, Central and Eastern Europe Countries (CEES) declared their willingness to be a part of the European Union. In 2004 and 2007, the European Union welcomed twelve new member states, including ten former communist countries, in its largest round of enlargement so far. Thus, the EU has completed its enlargement process, which is called as the most effective, comprehensive, and clear in the case of CEECs countries. (Sedelmeier, 2006: 4). Also, this last enlargement enabled the completion of the long 'return to Europe' process that began with the democratic and market-economic transitions of the new member states from the early 1990s (Schimmelfennig et al., 2018). Afterwards, the EU put forward its assessment and monitoring conditions to see efforts during the enlargement process, those new member countries have gone through an extensive "Europeanization" process which is a transformation process in their political, economic, and administrative systems that is driven or influenced by the EU. So, the influence of the EU has been the most effective, comprehensive, and obvious in the Central and Eastern countries (Sedelmeier, 2006). Early analyses regarding the CEEs' Europeanization focused on the period when the CEE countries were preparing, negotiating, and aspiring for membership. In this regard, in the beginning, scholars in these transition countries also consider Europeanization mainly as a process that focuses on the democratic transformation of political institutions in the EU (Ágh and Kurtán, 1995). However, the focus switched from political institutions to public policies with the start of accession negotiations. It was later found out and Europeanization turned a desire into a requirement (Grabbe, 2001).

The literature on the accession period also generally agrees that CEECs Europeanization was an effective and massive process driven by membership incentives (Sedelmeier, 2011). To answer the question of why it was massive and effective, it was realised that the transfer of the EU law has empowered Central and Eastern European countries to transform their political, economic, and administrative systems into liberal democracies, market economies and accountable rule-of-law bureaucracies which is an essential regulatory change for any member state. To put it differently, it was also influential because the countries of Central and Eastern Europe had a strong desire to 'return to Europe' and when we consider all these, conditions have resulted in Europeanization being more effective in the candidate countries in Central and Eastern Europe than in the older EU member states (Héritier, 2005). Moreover, these membership requirements also concentrate on a wide range of economic and political criteria that cover many rules, such as democracy and minority rights, for which the EU institutions do

not have legal competence vis-à-vis full member states (Sedelmeier, 2010). After this point, the analysis of the Europeanization of the candidate states started to be framed by looking at the conditionality of the EU in the context of CEECs (Bauer et al., 2007; Grabbe, 2006; Hughes et al., 2004; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005). Therefore, these studies have begun to focus on Europeanization and establish the Europeanization of candidate states as a subfield. In line with this, the EU set conditions for membership under the name of 'Copenhagen Criteria' which emphasizes liberal democracy, the rule of law, and the adoption of human rights and not surprisingly, most of the studies have focused on the EU's conditionality (Schimmelfennig et al., 2003) and transformation of the Central and Eastern Europe Countries.

Schimmelfennig and Sedelmier's (2005) vision of Europeanization in CEECs essentially reduces the process of Europeanization to governments adopting the EU regulations. In this sense, the adoption of the EU rules is the dependent variable in the context of Eastern Europeanization, while the presence of the EU laws and regulations is the independent variable. So, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmier identified three different approaches adopting of EU rules as formal, behavioural, and discursive ways of adaptation. In this respect, if we briefly describe each of them, first, according to the formal adaptation, rule adoption composes of the reflection of EU rules in national law and the establishment of formal institutions and procedures in accordance with the EU rules. Secondly, according to the behavioural adaptation rule adoption depends on which behaviour conforms to the rules. Thirdly, the discursive adaptation claims that adoption is indicated by the positive reference of a rule in discourse at the domestic level (Schimmelfenning and Sedelmier, 2005: 8).

Concerning the rule adoption conceptions, Sedelmier and Schimmelfennig (2005) claim that the differences between the rationalist and sociological institutionalism lead to two divergent logics of action, referred to as "the logic of consequence" and "the logic of appropriateness." Therefore, actors are viewed by rationalist institutionalism as goal-oriented actors who engage in strategic interactions to increase their utility. This viewpoint allows for the possibility of seeing Europeanization as a political opportunity. The opposing view, known as sociological institutionalism, contends that actors are directed by a collectivist conception of what constitutes proper, socially acceptable action under a certain rule system. Thereby, Actors who are guided by collectivist understanding try to meet social expectations rather than their subjective desires. From this point of view, Europeanization can be defined as the emergence of new rules, norms, practices, and meanings that member states are exposed to and must implement into their internal structures.

In that sense, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmier strongly support the idea that the two logics of change usually run simultaneously; neither one is more important than the other nor that one excludes the other, but rather that both dominate different stages of the adaptation process.

On the other hand, according to Sedelmeier, the literature has given less attention to the political Europeanisation of CEECs, such as the Europeanization of political actors, citizens, interest groups, political parties and political processes (Sedelmeier, 2011).Therefore, it became inevitable to ask the question of how the Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe has changed after the accession and how much the impact of Europeanization was seen in the politics and economies of the region.

It will be necessary to mention the mechanisms of how we measure Europeanization for the candidate countries during the accession process. So, the first well-known mechanism is the EU's conditionality which the EU drives for candidate countries. As it stands here, it would definitely not be wrong to say that conditionality in the accession period has clearly dominated the Europeanization in Central and Eastern Europe. Conditionality the EU top-down and directly promotes its policies to the candidate states' governments. This conditionality basically works like a reward mechanism. Mainly, it presents rewards vis-a-vis governments and promises eventual full membership through reward initiatives such as financial aid and participation in policy regimes depending on the adoption of EU policies. Additionally, The EU provides additional support under the name of 'capacity building' to fulfil its requirements. However, the effectiveness of the EU's conditionality depends on the size of the EU's rewards, the costs of adopting policies in the target state, and the credibility of the EU's conditionality. The credibility of the conditionality depends on the credibility of the EU's promise to monitor the fulfilment of the conditions and to withdraw the rewards if they are not met. The EU's bargaining power also enhances its credibility because if the EU less need to cooperate with the target state, it can make better feel to the target state the possibility of withdrawing of reward. However, superior bargaining power also may undermine the credibility of the reward mechanism. The fact remains that if the EU's conditionality is credible enough, the target states adopt the EU policies even if the benefits of the EU rewards outweigh the cost of policy change (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 12-16).

Effective conditionality policies were used mainly during the Eastern enlargement process. First and foremost, the EU offered full membership to the Central and Eastern countries as the 'most enticing carrot' and then the threat of the withdrawal reward was strong thanks to the superior bargaining power of the EU. Moreover, there was no absolute political opposition to

the Eastern enlargement of the EU. Full membership of Central and Eastern European countries was supported conditionally by both public opinion and member state governments. Besides that, member states delegated to the European Commission, which is a largely technocratic body, the monitoring and assessing of the candidates regarding whether they fulfil the conditions. These factors increased the credibility of the membership promise, and as if in support of it, the EU membership became the number one foreign policy goal in CEECs and became quite popular. Considering all this, Europeanization was limited and selective before the EU offered membership. Afterwards, the EU conditionality became the fundamental driving force behind Europeanization. The adoption of the EU's political norms, rules, and policies by CEECs has primarily been based on the credibility of the parties involved, and the threat of rejecting candidates who do not accord with the EU's promises and conditions to accept compliant candidates is also a significant factor that motivates non-EU countries to fulfil conditions (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 210-211).

Schimmelfennig and Sedelmier (2005) also pointed out that the Europeanization of the CEECs is a process that consists of three different kinds of rule adoption models as following: the external incentives model, the social learning model, and lastly the lesson drawing model. As to how these models are categorised, there are two significant points. Primarily, whether the main actor is defined as the EU or The CEECs. Namely, it is important to determine the question of whether the origin of the EU rules is EU-driven, or CEE driven. Secondly, whether the logic of rule adoption depends on the logic of consequences or the logic of appropriateness. In this regard, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmier (2019) revealed how the external incentive models (EIM) emerged as an outcome of the intersection between the EU as the leading actor and the logic of consequences as a primary logic of rule adoption in Central and Eastern Europe.

According to them, the EIM is a model of rational bargaining, and it assumes that independent actors would engage in a negotiation in which they would exchange information, promises and threats in order to achieve their desired outcome. In this way, they compare the pros and cons of possible deals and either reject those that result in net costs or seek those that maximize their benefits. According to Moravcsik (1993) whether they would be able to achieve their desired outcome depends on their bargaining power. The asymmetric interdependence of actors determines bargaining power, and Actors who have less need for a deal or promise alternative deal options than their negotiating partners have superior bargaining power and are in a better position to influence the bargaining outcome. In that sense, according to the EIM, the fundamental instrument of Europeanization is conditionality (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier,

2005). So, the EU determines the adoption of its rules and norms as conditions that target states must fulfil in order to receive an award. But the EU is free to determine both conditions and the reward. Hence, EU conditions apply to both political (the rule of law, democracy) and regulatory conditions regarding the EU's public policies. The external incentives model differs from political conditionality and acquis conditionality; that is to say, rewards range from financial and technical assistance to full membership, while the more comprehensive and higher rewards are subject to more demanding conditions. It is worth remembering that the target or candidate states are also free to accept or reject the adoption of the EU conditions, but it makes difference if they perceive that the benefits of the reward outweigh the cost of adoption of conditions, they will accept to comply with the EU requirements.

In sum, when the rewards that are offered by the EU are material and tangible, conditionality is more likely to be effective in situations where the rewards enhance the welfare and power of the state. Most and foremost, the issue of when rewards would be received is a matter, as distant rewards reduce the willingness of the target countries' governments to comply with the costly conditions. When it comes to conditions, especially governments attach importance to determinacy, which is understood as a certainness. They must understand precisely what to do to fulfil the conditions and obtain the reward. In this sense, the clearer the EU signals that the conditions are a must, the more likely the governments will prioritise and meet them. Additionally, The EU raises commitment by clearly stating the conditions and providing regular feedback. The Credibility of the EU promises also depends on the target governments' compliance with the conditions before receiving the reward. For this reason, the term 'credibility' refers to both the EU's threat to deprive of the reward if the conditions are not met and the EU's promise to obtain a reward if the conditions are met. Furthermore, Credibility may increase or decrease over time due to the distance between the reward and the target state. Distant rewards can make the EU's credibility questionable over time. As the negotiations, the EU invests in improving target states' conditions, and the EU promise's credibility enhances while the threat decreases. On the other hand, costs are, in this context, the extent of domestic adoption costs that determine whether target governments would meet the EU requirements, depending on the size of the award and the speed with which it is achieved. However, regardless of how high or reasonable these costs may be, the most important determinant for the target governments is that they are reluctant to fulfil conditions if this would lead to them losing elections, coalition partners or power. Conversely, if the EU conditions and rewards are more popular with voters, interest groups, government agencies, and opposition parties then the

government will likely be willing to comply with them. But lastly, the government may be disposed to comply with the conditions but may not have the financial and administrative capacity and expertise to fulfil them.

Suppose we resume on Schimmelfennig and Sedelmier's (2005:18) other categorisations of rule adoption models, unlike the external incentives model, the social learning model and lesson-drawing model stem from the logic of appropriateness. In the social learning model, the main actor is the EU while the main actor is CEE in the lesson-drawing model. The social learning model conforms to the basic principles of social constructivism and generates the most obvious alternative to rationalist explanations of conditionality and Europeanization (Börzel and Risse, 2000). In this regard, according to the social learning model, demands that are regarding the adoption of the EU's rules and conditions depend on how these conditions are reasonable and appropriate for the non-EU member states' norms, values, and collective identity. (Schimmelfennig 2003: 83-90). So, they choose the most appropriate or legitimate one among the alternatives. Therefore, the most general aspect of the social learning model is that a state adopts EU rules if it is convinced that the EU rules are convenient.

From the social learning model perspective, three factors that are strengthening the EU's conditionality are identified respectively: first, the legitimacy of rules and process, secondly identity; and third, resonance. In this respect, legitimacy is addressed to the quality of the EU rules together with the rulemaking and rule-transfer process. In this viewpoint, the legitimacy of the EU rules, and as a consequence of legitimacy, most likely rule adoption increases in the case of rules are formal and member states have to imply them. Furthermore, the rule transfer process meets basic negotiating standards, and the EU rules are shared by other international organisations. When it comes to identity, the rule adoption is expected to be more likely if the target state and society identify with the EU community. Lastly, as for resonance, adoption will be facilitated if there are no conflicting local rules or if the EU rules are linked to existing or traditional domestic rules (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004).

Contrary to the social learning model, in the lesson-drawing model, non-member states are firmly willing to adopt the EU rules regardless of the power of the EU's incentives or persuasion. So, the lesson-drawing model can be considered a response to dissatisfaction with the given status quo (Rose, 1991: 10,12). From this aspect, the most general proposition of the lesson-drawing model is the following: A state adopts the EU rules if it strongly believes that these rules effectively solve its domestic policy problems. So, according to the lesson-drawing model, policymakers investigate the operations of policies and rules in place elsewhere and

make a prospective assessment of their transferability, regarding whether they can work effectively in their internal context (Rose, 1991: 23-4). Afterwards, if they convince to transfer these rules to their domestic policy, they would be willing to adopt the EU-driving rules.

Considering all the literature we have reviewed thus far; it is essential to include discussions on how Europeanization differs in the East and The West context in this study. In this regard, Heritier's study (2005) reveals the basic features of the Europeanization West, and firstly she constitutes three theoretical frames as follows: rational institutionalism, historical institutionalism and lastly sociological institutionalism. In addition to institutionalism, putting forward several factors as the explanatory parameters for the analysis of the Europeanization West's outputs. So, the first factor is the assumption that all countries which are under examination encounter identical EU policy demands and pressure. The second assumption is the existence of rational strategic actors. The third is the examination of prevalent domestic policy and policymaking practices with the lens of the goodness of fit approach. The fourth one is in the context of veto players, conceptualising the institutional and political structures. Lastly, Heritier asserts that the 'national colours' underlying the member states' policy implementation identify their differences or similarities to EU policy demands (Heritier, 2005: 201).

On the other side, concerning ways in which the consequences of Europeanization have been studied, research on Europeanization in the West has focused on the policy-level consequences of Europeanization. By doing so, it has dealt with this mainly in terms of 'short-term implementation or medium and long-term- behavioural adjustments. (Heritier,2005:201). Mainly, a broad range of literature is emerging on the question of How the EU policy demands lead to changes in existing political and administrative structures and processes by creating new requirements for administrative procedures and organizational measures or by favouring some national political actors over others (Heritier, 2005).

Contrary to Europeanization in the West, The Europeanization East differs considerably in terms of its starting point. In the first instance, it is natural that Central and Eastern European Countries differ substantially since from the beginning, Europeanization East starts in the shadow of the pressure of conditionality brought about by accession negotiations. Given these conditions, the research agenda of the 'Europeanization East' literature has reached a broader scope than that of its Western counterpart. in addition to that, while policies and changes in policymaking in East Europeanization are assessed in the context of the implementation of the overall acquis, the Europeanization agenda in the West focuses on narrow policy issues from the narrow perspective of Europeanization West research.

Last and not least, it is acknowledged that "Europeanization West" is a "two-way street" where member states influence EU-level policies and policymaking by enforcing their preferred policy measures. Nevertheless, the Europeanization of CEEC countries begins with the accession process, and CEE countries do not have the capability to actively shape the EU policy measures like other Western European countries. Therefore 'Europeanization East' is viewed as a one-way street process of influence (Heritier, 2005: 207). In that sense, the most important point to be emphasized is that the Europeanization of member states and candidate states in CEECs differs greatly in terms of its characteristics.

Similarly, Grabbe (2002) reveals three other significant factors that considerably differentiate the Europeanization experiences of Central and Eastern European countries from those of Western Europeanization. Accordingly, the first differentiating factor is "speed of adaptation" The formal accession process aims at adapting CEE institutions and policies to the EU in a much faster and more comprehensive way than the other EU member states. Secondly, the CEECs are more open to adjusting the EU influence. In other words, the post-communist transformation process has constituted less institutional resistance to EU policies compared to the Western member states. The third factor is the extent to which the EU's agenda in CEE is broader than in the West, implying a commitment by the CEE candidate countries of the CEE adopt an ultimate version of EU policies without offering the possibility of giving up parts of the agenda of the EU (Grabbe, 2002: 4).

2.2 Political Parties and Europeanization

Parties have rarely occupied a convenient place in the study of European integration. However, when they have, the focus has usually been on transnational party federations of "Europarties" rather than national parties (Bardi, 2003). As far as national parties are concerned, the most studied issues have been the attitude of national parties towards the EU. From this perspective, the following part of this study will deal with Europeanisation from the perspective of the Europeanisation of political parties, but in order to better understand the concept of Europeanisation of political parties, first how modern political parties were formed, and how political parties are categorised will be examined, and the process of Europeanisation of political parties will be discussed at the end of this chapter.

2.2.1 Formation of Modern Political Parties

Political Parties are part of the state and are organized groups that seek to achieve their goals through government; It has certain ideological and political relations with other organisations:

and its political activities correspond to party systems and various possibilities of sharing political will formation within society (Matakovic and Mraovic, 2015:112).

One of the most used definitions of a political party is offered in 1770 by Edmund Burke as follows: A party is a group of people who are united by common endeavours to advance the national interests and are committed to the same set of principles (Burke, cited in Sartori 2005: 8). In his opinion, political parties are suitable institutions for implementing their shared goals with the authority of the state. In other words, parties are a group of legislative representatives who agree to work together for shared goals (Burke cited in Krouwel, 2006: 50).

Another prominent definition of the political party is pointed out by Robert Huckshorn in his book regarding the political parties in America. According to him, a political party is a self-governing group of citizens to nominate candidates and contest elections to gain control of governmental power through the capture of public offices and the organisation of government (White, 2006: 5).

In a similar vein, political parties are essential instruments to leading government actions which are primarily caring for to win the election. contrary to his view, although political parties have representative and expressive functions that are inevitable for their existence, the most important characteristics of political parties are their expressive functions (Sartori, 2005). Following this viewpoint, Sartori classifies three components of political a party based on their expressive functions as follows: (1) parties cannot be viewed as factions, (2) a party is a part of a larger whole; (3) parties are means of expression.

A political party ties individuals to a certain form of governance. From this point of view, a political party exists in a party system and is distinguished by its capacity for the benefit of the entire population since it is a part of 'pluralistic whole' (Sartori,2005:24). Consequently, political parties are thus described as organisations that provide a forum for the expression, dissemination, and implementation of the demands of the ruled, and political parties serve a more significant role in channelling and expressing the desires and demands of the general populace than they do in representing them.

2.2.2 The Categorisation of Political Party Models

Since party organizations have been an object for analysis for political scientists for centuries, various typologies and models of political parties have been developed to understand parties and their characteristics. Inevitably, the literature has been enriched with a wide variety of party models, and some of those have been admitted as 'classics' by scholars. However, a

considerable number of scholars still believe that existing models of political parties are not able to capture sufficiently to entire variations of party types that exist in the world and that diverse party typologies based on a variety of definitional criteria cannot be structured in a cumulative theory (Gunter and Diamond, 2003).

First, the vast majority of party typologies stem from studies of Western European Parties. Also, some of the political parties' distinctive characteristics are derived from temporal and geographical contexts. in this regard, parties that function in other parts of the world have been also greatly influenced by the different social environments. The matter of formation by the social environment is factual in particular for parties in developing countries whose populations are significantly ethnically, religiously, or linguistically diverse (Beck, 1997).

In a similar manner, many of the late-twentieth-century parties have distinct characteristics that cannot be captured by the previous traditional party typologies that emerged a century earlier. For example, television which did not exist during the classical party typologies that were developed had transformed arguably the most crucial mass communication between political parties and voters to facilitate political communication among almost all modern democracies during the later stage of party development (Gunther and Mughan, 2000).

Among the party typologies developed over time, Gunther, and Diamond (2003) contributed to the literature with three different criteria. So, their party typologies are based on three criteria and the first one relates to the nature of the party's formal organization, which make some parties organizationally weak while others may be well-organized through allies or subsidiaries. The second criterion deals with the source of parties' programmatic commitments, which means that some parties build their programmatic commitments on well-articulated political sentiments while the others are either more pragmatic or have less structured commitments. The third criterion concerns whether parties are tolerant and pluralistic in order to assess a party's attitudes towards its opponents and the means it will pursue to achieve its objectives (2003:171).

On the basis of these three criteria, they introduce five different comprehensive and specific party models to address the need for conceptual and terminological clarity in the literature on party models. These political party types are elite-based parties, mass-based parties, ethnic-based parties, electoral parties, and movement parties (Gunther, 2003). In order to analyse these models of parties, it would be appropriate to briefly describe each of them. First, if look at the emergence of the first modern political parties, in the 19th century, especially in Western and

Southern European countries, politically immobilised peasants who were mostly illiterate and living in isolated rural areas constituted a considerable part of the society and within these segments of society, the traditional elite or 'local gentry' had considerable influence. Therefore, elite-based parties have emerged, although they were not so strong organizationally. After the emergence of the first elite-based parties, the first modern parties have been defined in the literature as "elite caucus and cadre parties" as a party whose leaders are prominent individuals, organised in closed groups and with a minimum level of extra-parliamentary organisation (Krouwel, 2006: 250). 'Elite-based' parties have basic organizational structures that are based on elites and pertinent business networks in a specific geographic arena. These parties are not ideological in their programming, and regardless of the national party structure, the alliance between the locally based elites is crucial. The main electoral campaigns of elite-based parties involve the distribution of essential benefits to those living in a geographically defined electorate or to the 'clients at the bottom of the boss-client hierarchy. Such parties have no hegemonic ambitions and are tolerant and cooperative towards each other in a parliamentary regime, regardless of whether it is democratic (Gunther, 2003).

The second party model encompasses mass-based parties whose main characteristics are extra-parliamentary mass mobilization of politically excluded social groups (Krouwel, 2006: 250). These parties have emerged in many European countries as a manifestation of the political mobilization of the working class, these mass-based parties have a considerable number of dues-paying members and even between elections members remain active in party affairs to spread their ideology and build an active membership base. the trade unions and other social and religious organisations which affiliate with these parties are not only political allies but also, serve to penetrate the party's aims to various fields in social life. (Barnes, 1967) mass-based parties are also divided into various categories itself. To put it simply, the first category composes of the party's unifying belief system, ideology, and commitments. Typically, there are various forms of adherence to nationalism, sociologism, or religion. On the other hand, the second category includes to what extent each of them is tolerant and pluralistic, or to the extent that it is determined to achieve a hegemonic position within the political system and impose its radical programmatic commitments on society (Linz, 1978:28-45). The pluralist mass-based parties try to win the elections as the main way to achieve their programmatic goals, and for this purpose, the party militants undertake a variety of tasks to reach the electorate. In contrast, proto-hegemonic mass-based parties attach more attention to the discipline, commitment, and loyalty of party members to conduct political conflict both in the electorate and non-

parliamentary areas. On the other hand, class-mass parties within their class electorates through groups organised both geographically and with local branches and functionally- with unions. Pluralist nationalist parties another type of mass-based party, involve collaboration with party organizations, cultural organizations and sometimes trade unions and one of the main aims is to intensify their identification. However, there are also ultranationalist parties which have an extreme structure that favours a race or race that hates the minority (Orlow, 1963 and 1973). The final mass party type is the religious fundamentalist party, and in this party model, there is no separation between religion and state affairs. Given these parties' far-reaching goals and their strict interpretation of religious texts, their relations within the party are mostly hierarchal, anti-democratic and even absolutist.

The party model is a "catch-all" party which is derived from mass parties and the most crucial goal of this tolerant and pluralistic type of party is to win elections and govern by maximising its votes. In order to achieve this aim, they strive to bring together as many different social interests as possible (Kirchhemier 1954, cited in Krouwel, 2006). The fourth party type is the cartel party which is proposed by Katz and Mair (1995); they put forward to 'cartel party' model, which encourages the party leaders to utilise the expanded resources of the state and perpetuate themselves in power. The final party model is movement parties, which is primarily visible in Western Europe in two types as left-libertarian parties and post-industrial extreme right parties. in this regard, Herbert Kitschelt describes the left-libertarian variety of movements party as parties that represent economic interest groups and those primarily concerned with issues of economic (Kitschelt, 1989, cited in Gunther, 2003).

On the other side, it would be appropriate here to mention how mainstream and marginal political parties are positioned in the literature on political party species. In that sense, Marks et al. (2002:558) categorise mainstream parties as follows: (1) parties that have gained enough votes to enter parliament. (2) parties that have a chance to join the government can be categorised as mainstream parties. As for marginal political parties, those are parties that fail to enter the government or do not have this chance to enter parliament.

2.3. The Europeanization of Political Parties

When the Europeanization of political parties has been studied, previous works in the literature mostly focused on the organisation and elections of the parties in the European Parliament (Hix and Lord, 1997: 6). The term Europeanization has also been used by scholars to determine changes in certain parties' policies and strategies involving a transition from a critical to a

supportive stance towards to the EU membership (Moxon-Browne, 1999) and (Daniels, 1998:10). Mair (2000) then turns to national party systems and finds that the impact of European integration on national party systems is minimal. Afterwards, (Ladrech, 2002) asserts that of the many areas of domestic politics that may have been influenced by Europe, it is perhaps party systems in particular that have proved most resistant to change. With Mair's statement, he argues that there has been little or no change in the format and mechanism of party systems. In addition, Mair (2008) identifies three major research sections. The first one investigates the establishment of transnational party federations and their potential to generate significant party activity at the European level. (Mair 2008:154) The second part gives insight into the nature and dynamics of life in the European Parliament, including various parties and party systems. The third pillar of the research focuses on Europe's impact and contribution to development of political parties, including their party systems, ideologies, and its party competition at the national politics (Mair, 2008: 154).

The fundamental research focus in the literature of party Europeanisations is first, the extent to which the process of European integration provides advantages or disadvantages for the national actors involved in it. Second, the politics of Euroscepticism and third, the degree to which Europe plays a role in national politics and party systems (Mair, 2008:154).

On the other hand, Robert Ladrech (2002) has identified five critical dimensions for analysing the Europeanization of political parties as follows: (1) policy/programmatic change; (2) organisational change; (3) patterns of party competition; (4) party-government relations; (5) and relations beyond the national political system (2002: 396-400). According to Ladrech, one of the most apparent examples of Europeanization is the changes in party programs. Secondly, affiliation with European-level institutions has led to some organizational changes. The third dimension which is patterns of party competition refers to the politicization of the EU can lead to domestic political competition and a range of factors can cause the tactics and strategies of parties designed to take advantage of the 'EU issue' to change. The fourth area deals with the analysis of party-government relations which focuses on the impacts of the government's participation in the European forums, and it is concerned with whether participation in the EU forums can lead to notable changes in the nature of party-government relations over time. The final dimension deals with the t new organizational and programmatic activities are fostered by the Europeanization may lead to fresh perspectives for cross-border collaboration with parties from the other member states of the EU.

Mair (2008) also pointed out the direct and indirect impacts of Europeanization on national party politics. from this point of view, European rules, and norms may directly be adopted in national politics, but also with an indirect effect, the national party competitions may change, national electoral competitions can change, and as a direct effect of the Europeanization, it can lead to provide an atmosphere in national political arena to the formation of pro-European coalitions, also may lead to the formation of non-partisan channels (Mair, 2008: 161).

When it comes to the indirect effects of Europeanisation on party politics Mair asserts that Europe indirectly may result in the de-politicization of national party competition since it is claimed that Europeanisation may limit the capacity of national governments and reduce their range of policy instruments to compete (Mair, 2008: 160). Nevertheless, from this perspective, as it will be examined in the following chapters of this study, the Europeanization of political parties is wider than constraining the capacity of national governments and political parties to mobilize the masses in line with their political agendas. In this regard, how political parties consider Europe differs. Political actors thus employ various strategies to incorporate European norms into the public policies, national, political structures, and the logic of national discourses. However, it is essential to underline that this study intends to reveal the extent to which there is evidence about the extent to which political parties are Europeanized, as well as how they interpret Europeanization in their political programs. From this point of view, the example of Poland will be examined in the context of Central and Eastern Europe.

* * *

This chapter presented the development of the literature on the Europeanization of political parties and, in doing so, has shown how European integration has influenced domestic politics. In doing so, it has revealed that Western European Party-based concepts and analytical instruments can contribute to understanding the Europeanisation of Central and Eastern European party systems. In the following third chapter, this study will examine the concept of Euroscepticism and its different dynamics, which appear in different strands to make a connection between the Europeanization and the Euroscepticism it does so by revealing Eurosceptic party attitudes towards European integration.

CHAPTER III

THE POLITICS OF EUROSCEPTICISM

This chapter will first review the conceptual framework of Euroscepticism, followed by party-based Euroscepticism. Finally, it will examine Euroscepticism in both Western and Eastern Europe concepts to reveal the different motivations that develop a Eurosceptic stance.

3.1 The Concept of Euroscepticism

Euroscepticism is a widely used term identifies negative attitudes towards the EU and European integration. Therefore, there have been many attempts to by scholars to conceptualize and define Euroscepticism. However, the lack of a commonly acknowledged concept by all scholars has also brought with it discussions that have grown and developed over time.

The term Euroscepticism has taken on different meanings over time and by region, and early uses of the term "Euroscepticism" are first embedded in specific British political and historical contexts (Harmsen and Spierig, 2004: 16). By this means, Euroscepticism initially emerged as a British phenomenon, it contributed to the country's sense of 'otherness' in relation to a political and economic integration project in continental Europe. In this regard, it would be appropriate here to refer to Margaret Thatcher's well-known speech to the College of Europe which is known as the first outright manifestation of radical Euroscepticism as follows:

> *"In a world populated by numerous other powerful states and groups of nations, European Community can effectively provide its members' the future security and well-being. It is not required for power to be centralised in Brussels or for decisions to be made by appointed bureaucracy in order to cooperate more. So, we do not desire a European super-state that rules from Brussels with a new level of dominance. Our goal should be to deregulate, not to impose ever-more-detailed regulations from the centre.*
>
> *Margaret Thatcher, "The Bruges Speech",22\ September 1988.*[1]

Margaret Thatcher's outright famous speech to the College of Europe was considered as the first explicit Eurosceptic discourse in European integration history that led to an extensive

[1] Speech to the College of Europe" (The Bruges Speech). Margaret Thatcher Foundation. 20 September 1988. Retrieved 12 July 2022

debate about the nature and direction of European integration within the political landscape of the European Union.

Eurosceptic attitudes have become more prevalent in other EU member states as European integration has progressed. The ratification of the Maastricht treaty is widely acknowledged to have acted as a motivator for Eurosceptic attitudes and behaviour (Taggart, 1998). with the rise of anti-EU voices among European citizens and political elites there has inevitably been a surge interest in the study of Euroscepticism (Vasilopoulou, 2013). As academic interest in Euroscepticism has grown, the question of how to define Euroscepticism has come to forefront and the first definition was provided by Taggart (1998) who distinguished between European integration and the EU. According to Taggart's first attempt to define Euroscepticism, there are three types of Euroscepticism as follows: (1) those who oppose both European integration and the EU; (2) those who support the principle of integration but criticise the EU for being too inclusive; (3) those who support integration but believe the EU is too exclusionary for some (Taggart, 1998: 366). Also, he provided another further definition of Euroscepticism as "the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration."

Taggart's (1998) definition is also significant since it is broad enough to include everyone who is sceptical about the EU as an institution. In later studies, Taggart's first definition provided an important for further definition attempts by other scholars. In further studies of Taggart and Szczerbiak (2001) provided their prominent hard- soft distinction of Euroscepticism to redefine Euroscepticism. According to their definition, Hard Euroscepticism corresponds to the rejection of Europe's entire project of political and economic integration, as well as the opposition to joining the EU or staying as a member of the EU. Therefore, hard Euroscepticism advocate to withdraw from the EU membership as a consequence of their contradiction with the EU's understanding as a project.

On the other side, Soft Euroscepticism differs from hard Euroscepticism in its simplest definition as follows: it is not a principled opposition to the EU, but it is basically concerned about some policies of the EU (2001:10). Although Taggart and Szczerbiak's definition of Euroscepticism has most widely acknowledged definition in the literature, it has been also criticised by Kopecky and Mudde (2002) who have criticised it since their distinction is too broad, and the definition of 'Soft Euroscepticism' is too general to identify any disagreement with the EU, In that sense, Kopecky and Mudde draw on Easton (1965, cited in Kopecky) and suggest a two- dimensional conceptualisation of Euroscepticism that distinguishes between

diffuse support which is general support for the idea of European integration and specific support which refers to support for the EU's practical implementations. Hence, Kopecky and Mudde (2002) suggest an alternative categorisation for European integration. and according to their categorisation, the first dimension is categorized as Europhiles and Europhobes. In this regard, Europhiles support the fundamental values of European integration by emphasizing institutionalised cooperation within the EU, built upon the pillars of sovereignty and an integrated liberal market economy. In other words, they tend to strongly believe the idea of integration regardless of how integration can be defined and realised.

On the other hand, Europhobes, as the name suggests, do not support, and even oppose the idea of the European integration. On the contrary, they also prefer this attitude toward the EU due to their nationalists, an isolationist concerns and see the idea of European integration as foolish since the diverse nature of the European nations.

The second dimension of Kopecky and Mudde's categorisation suggests EU-optimists and EU-pessimists. According to this typology, EU- optimists differ from EU- pessimists since EU optimists believe in the EU as it is and as it is developing because they are satisfied with the form of integration in which the EU has been established and developed, and they are also optimistic about the future of the EU's development (Batory, 2001).

On the contrary, EU-pessimists do not mean that EU-pessimists are totally against the EU, but they are not satisfied with the way the EU is heading or do not support the EU as it is by hoping the change it as a better version of it.

These two dimensions mentioned above, lead to emerge of four type of party positions in Europe (Kopecky and Mudde,2002: 302) as follows: (1) The Euroenthusiast, which refers to Europhile and Eu-optimists. (2) Eurosceptics which refers to Europhile and Eu-pessimist positions. (3) Eurorejects which correspond to Europhobe and EU-pessimist positions. (4) The Europragmatists that include Europhobe and EU-optimist positions. Put it simply, Euroenthusiasts supports general ideas of European integration, they support the EU as it is, and they believe that the EU's general ideas that lead to its establishment, have been institutionalized or will be soon. On the other perspective, Eurosceptics although they support the general ideas of the EU, they have some concerns about the direction of the EU will take and what it will turn into the future. When it comes to Eurorejects, unlike the Eurosceptics, they are simply rejecting the fundamental ideas of the EU integration or the EU in a general manner (Kopecky and Mudde, 2002).

Flood (2002) has taken the discussion further, reflecting on the label of Euroscepticism, and has introduced six different categories that try to cover all possible positions regarding the EU. This categorisation includes rejectionist, revisionist, minimalist, reformist, gradualist, and maximalist. These categories that proposed by Flood may relate to all EU projects and structures or only to specific policy areas. The intention is to allow for a more specific identification of positions towards the EU and to allow for the categorisation of political parties' shifts from one position to another over time, especially when they move towards Eurosceptic policies. In that sense, this typology has developed by Flood while aiming for a dynamic characterisation instead of a static character. If we take a close look at what each of these six main categories means: (1) rejectionist is basically oppose to the EU membership and they are against to participate in some core EU policies. (2) revisionists tend to transfer only some particular basic policies to state policies. (3) minimalists emphasize the maximum achievable status quo for the whole community structure but only for some specific areas. (4) gradualists support a broader integration for the whole. (5) reformists favour further European commitment and support a further gradual improvement in European integration. Finally, (6) maximalists seek for maximum integration in the whole structure of the EU (Flood, 2002:92-117).

Returning to the conceptualization developed by Harmsen and Spiering (2004) Euroscepticism, for a rational and/or emotional reasons being completely against EU integration or being distant from EU integration for various reasons. Moreover, although scepticism towards the EU is underpinned by the urge to preserve national sovereignty and interests, they may also see advantages in integration since they believe that they may face threats in some areas, and while they may not reject the idea of integration outright, they may distance themselves from more profound integration. On the other hand, if those adopt strict critical attitude against the EU, the functioning of its organs and the understanding of integration, it means that they indicate a precise opposition to the EU, and it may be evaluated as an ideological attitude. In this sense, within the concept of Euroscepticism, it can be observed that gain/loss approaches to the EU that structure debates in both candidate and member states; so, while Eurosceptics emphasize the potential drawbacks of the entire or a single pillar of the integration process, pro-EU approaches emphasise the potential benefits and contributions of the EU (Harmsen and Spiering, 2004:15-20).

Thus far, when the literature is analysed, new conceptualisations have followed one after the other, for example the definition which is made by (Kopecky and Mudde, 2002; Taggart, 1998,

2004) was found to be too broad or should be improved. Therefore, following these attempts, another conceptualization that has been most widely mentioned was made by Hille (2005).

According to Hille, it is the sense of nationalism that underlines anti- European discourses and expressions. From this perspective, European integration as an idea is seen as a danger to nationalist reflexes and brings "us and others" discrimination. Moreover, European Union as an institution is even considered as undermining the sense of national belonging. Hence, according to the nationalism based Eurosceptics, state control over the society is only tolerated where necessary when national common interests are at stake. Otherwise, the existence of a supranational organisation in both economic and political matters is underlined as "hegemonic and exploitative." (Hille, 2005).

On the other aspect, According to Hille, for those who are Eurosceptics, the main target for both strengthening and the popularisation of sceptical arguments is society itself since they assume that their political and economic views may have an impact on society when they spread their voices on cultural, ethnic, and economic grounds. Therefore, if the idea of integration, which allows for multiculturalism and plurality, leads to exclusion; being surrounded by others and anxiety and uncertainty about the future, Eurosceptic sentiments undoubtedly may find place in the European Society (Hille, 2005:221).

Another crucial definition in the literature of Euroscepticism was provided by Sørensen (2008), and she put forward four different classifications to Euroscepticism. Accordingly, she divided Euroscepticism into four categories: Euroscepticism which is driven by economic, political, democracy and sovereignty concerns. In short, the economic grounds that causes Euroscepticism focus on what will ultimately be gained or lost from the integration, while prioritising the gains and losses of possible deeper integration. Sovereignty-driven Euroscepticism worries that the EU directives will erode its sovereignty since it fears that the sovereign state structure will be constrained or minimised by the Community acquis. When it comes to democracy-based concerns, it criticizes the lack of democracy in the EU itself, its functioning, and institutions. By doing so, they criticised the EU's decision-making mechanism and, in this way, while they portray the EU as elitist, bureaucratic, and centrist, emphasize the democratic deficit of the EU. Forth and lastly, policy-based Euroscepticism differs from the other categories in that it views the EU's policy-making processes and reforms as "too" liberal and criticise that not all segments of the society are adequately secure in terms of the security and the economic issues. Policy-oriented Euroscepticism can be regarded as more disruptive

can even be regarded as an explicit example of scepticism that led to the rejection of the EU constitutional treaty.

Discussion over the definition of Euroscepticism in the literature are generally not adequately prominent to examine individual level of Euroscepticism. Therefore, scholars that examine the public Euroscepticism are generally doing research through survey questions. In this regard, the most commonly used survey questions relate to general EU project, questions based on EU membership or questions on identity (Vasilopoulou, 2017).

In several contributions on public Euroscepticism, the problem of the definition has been dealt with in some detail, not only on one- dimensional questions, but also by Krowel and Abts (2007), who show the multidimensionality of the concept. According to Krowel and Abts, Euroscepticism may also include sceptical, cynical, or oppositional attitudes which are related to a political discontent. So, they developed a two-dimensional conceptualisation of what they termed a "political discontent." The authors first distinguish between 'targets of discontent', namely attitudes towards the European authorities. According to them, the reason why citizen differentiate their attitude towards European authorities, communities, and European regime within a framework of political discontent is that citizens assess European authorities based on their political actors' honesty and competence. As an outcome, citizens evaluate the European political system and its institutions by considering how well the EU is able to meet the needs and aspirations of the people. namely people consider the European community as a project that provide peace and security for the people and these attitudes determine their commitment to European Union. Secondly, the authors distinguish attitudes towards the European union on the basis of their degree of reflexivity. This differentiation composed of three elements as follows: (1) the level of political environment monitoring (2) the degree to which the relevant information is analysed, and (3) to degree to which the targets are differentiated (Krowel, Abts, 2007: 254). Based on these two dimensions political attitudes, Euro-confidence, Euro-distrust, Euroscepticism to Euro-alienation, and significantly, According to Vasilopoulou (2017: 5) in order to influence both people's reflexivity and the level of negative attitudes toward European integration, populist parties can take advantage of these political orientations.

Similar to the contribution, which is developed by Krowel and Abts, another distinction is made by Wessel (2007) between the public attitudes towards the authorities, the, regime, and society as a whole. In this sense, he suggests that these public orientations should be conceptualised in a hierarchically. That is to say, the political community must come first in this hierarchical

order and in fact, feeling like a ‘European’ can even prevent political discontent and Euroscepticism.

Boomgaarden et.al.’s (2011) definition of public attitudes towards European integration can be assumed to be more comprehensive than the previous definitions. Their contribution offers a comprehensive definition with five dimensions of public attitudes towards the European integration as follows: performance, identity, affection, utilitarianism, and strengthening. (1) the performance dimension refers to perceptions of how the EU institutions function. (2) identity dimension relates to affiliation to the EU with its symbols and its history. (3) the affective dimension refers to anger or fear towards the EU. (4) the utilitarian perspective of European integration considers the benefits of the membership in the EU and EU reinforces peace and stability for all members. (5) the final dimension concerns policy transfers to the EU, and support for the future of the European integration. The authors claim that such a multidimensional comprehensive analysis of attitudes towards the EU is necessary since given the complexity of the EU project as a whole, one- dimensional evaluations are insufficient. However, according to some, while these arguments are logical, the vast majority of the attempts have been confined to public opinion surveys, as it would be a costly and time-consuming exercise to examine the different dimensions of multifaced Euroscepticism in public opinion.

On the other aspect, according to Szczerbiak and Taggart (2004), Euroscepticism categories have been developed to apply mainly to the member states. However, scholars who are interested in candidate countries have developed new frameworks, most of which continue to frequently attempt to replicate the same categories for candidate countries, which has led to substantial limitations. In the light of critics, Taggart and Szczerbiak have improved their previous typology, which better emphasised its focus on member states rather than candidates.

According to Henderson (2008), it will be pretty different from the viewpoint of the political actors of the candidate states to the EU as the political and economic “Copenhagen Criteria”- which only pertain to domestic reforms that the candidate country must enact to their countries in order to become a member of the EU- does not accurately reflect the political and economic dimensions of the EU project for the existing member states (Henderson, 2008: 109).

In addition to previous debates regarding the Euroscepticism in candidate countries, According to Schimmelfennig (2008), Euroscepticism in the eyes of candidate countries is a reflection of the EU’s declining pragmatic legitimacy and it may take two forms: firstly, the EU’s principle

of conditionality for candidate countries may lead to pressure from the EU, which lead to internal evaluations that leading to cost-benefit calculations, and secondly, it can lead to reservations in candidate states against non-standard possible pressures from both the EU and the EU members. In line with Schimmelfennig (2008), when high compliance costs make the fulfilment of the EU's conditionality problematic. So, when the high costs outweigh the expected benefits of membership, the candidate country's willingness to become a member is undermined. In that regard, the political parties of many candidate countries tend to reconsider the EU, where sceptical voices are raised against the EU because the negotiations are not fair to candidate countries. However, according to Szczerbiak and Taggart, when party-based Euroscepticism is mentioned, the factors that shape the attitudes of the parties towards the EU are generally composed of fundamental support or opposition to the European Union project, or attitudes towards the expansion of the EU's powers rather than their opposition to or support for the membership of their countries (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008: 242).

Vasilopoulou (2009) she classified party-based Euroscepticism into three dimensions: (1) rejecting Euroscepticism which refers to rejection of the principles of integration of the EU and its functioning, (2) conditional Euroscepticisim which considers only some benefits of the membership and it leads to see only positive aspects of being a member of the EU, (3) compromising Euroscepticism refers to accepting a position in favour of cooperation with the EU only if the EU respects their national interests, in order to ensure economic prosperity of their state (Vasilopulou, 2009: 3-33).

Vasilopoulou (2011) has made a new contribution to the debate in party-based Euroscepticism while providing a new definition of Euroscepticism and new indicators regarding the positions of political parties on the issue of European Union project. In this regard, she developed four different perspectives regarding the EU and the EU integration as follows: the development of a shared cultural definition of Europe, the principle of multilateral European cooperation, the policy implementation of the EU and desire to create a European politics in the future (Vasilopoulou, 2011: 224). According to her these indicators enable to categorise Euroscepticism into three models as rejectionist, conditional, compromising in case of the radical right parties. For example, the common definition of Europe, which may correspond to a continent bound together by cultural, historical, and religious ties serves the conceptions of the radical right parties since they tend to have a common culture. On the contrary, in the case of other party families, they tend to define Europe often in terms of geographical and economic indicators.

Another crucial point is in the literature of Euroscepticism, and many scholars pointed out that the various crises that occurred throughout the European integration process, have an undeniably important effect in the construction of European integration. For example, the Refuge crisis, which was exploited in 2015, affects the whole Europe with its neighbours. In other words, although the Refugee Crisis may initially appear to be an external crisis for the EU, it has had a profound impact on the internal politics of the EU and the domestic politics of the member states. Therefore, the EU's handling of the Refugee Crisis has also been highly criticised, which has led to a focus on national solution strategies by member states and a growing Euroscepticism. At the same time, Eurosceptic voices have been fuelled by the fear of losing their own identity and the hostility brought about by the obscurity against those who are not like "European."

When it comes to hostility against immigrants, Luedtke (2005) emphasizes the impact of identity on anti-immigrant attitudes since migration creates separation and identity issues between the citizens of the country, and those who are coming from other countries. Accordingly, the issue of how people perceive others becomes the main question. (Luedtke,2005:86) in the realm of identity, according to Sniderman et al. (2000: 62-68) They assert that people tend to categorise themselves and others into groups and that is the most important predictor in immigrant discrimination. In short, national identity, immigration, and viewing the "other" as a threat all have an impact on one another. All of these factors influence sceptical attitudes toward European integration.

McLaren (2002:151) emphasizes that national sentiments and national pride may escalate hostility towards foreigners and according to her, while national sentiments and national pride may bring support or hostility to European integration. However, those sentiments most likely escalate a perception of hostility towards foreigners. So, how people perceive foreigners, migrants, refugees, and 'others' might indeed change. Moreover, attitudes towards European integration are likely influenced by how people perceive the 'other' as integration entails increased interaction with 'other' strangers and made possible foreigner policy makers on domestic politics. The major fear here is that foreigners who come from outside of national borders may change, and dominate the existing indigenous culture, since every culture has its own characteristics (De Master and Le, Roy, 2000 :425).

In a similar vein, McLaren recognises that people may fear integration since they are concerned it will endanger their culture (McLaren, 2002: 554). Furthermore, Hooghe and Marks (2005) examined through the perspective of group psychology that shows how social identities like

ethnic or national identities constrains support for the European integration. Likewise, according to Kriesi and Lachat (2004) those who are firmly attached to their national group and strongly believe in exclusionary standards in a society, may also tend to see European integration as a threat to themselves and it leads to the rise of Euroscepticism.

McLaren (2002), who emphasizes the importance of migration-related issues in determining support for or opposition to European integration, point out that when individuals think of European integration, they are concerned about the possibility of the breakdown of the nation-state. In other words, they perceive a threat of disruption posed by integration as a threat to their country rather than an individual threat. Also, it is undeniable that many issues, such as immigration, multiculturalism, and globalization, may be seen as a danger to national unity of a nation state. However, one of the most reasons for sceptical attitudes towards the EU is that significant factors like immigration, multiculturalism, and globalization lead people to fear that their countries may lose their welfare and jobs may be taken by immigrants due to a migration wave. Whether the migrants mentioned here are from EU countries or from any other country, citizens often feel that these losses are not for themselves but for other citizens. Therefore, according to McLaren, it is fair to say that criticism towards the EU will be inevitable, as people fear and worry about any changes in the nation-state, seeing the EU as an institution that jeopardizes the diversity of national cultures and the exclusive control of the nation-state over its sources (McLaren, 2002: 554). In this regard, people tend to oppose policies that they think endanger their way of life and European integration certainly has the capacity to pose such a danger.

Considering that there are many variations in the definition of Euroscepticism, Riishøj (2007: 508-509) has provided the most comprehensive classification of Euroscepticism as follows: (1) Euroscepticism based on concerns about the conflict between national and European identities (2) Cleavage-based Euroscepticism which based on fundamental cleavages in a society like religion- secularism etc. (3) policy- based Euroscepticism which including opposition to specific EU policy issues such as common currency, Euro, etc.(4) institutional-based Euroscepticism refers to discussions on the legitimacy of EU institutions vis-à-vis national institutions.(5) national interest-based Euroscepticism correspond to the conflict between national interests and common European interests. (6) Experience-based Euroscepticism which arise from the concerns that negotiations on EU membership are undulant and asymmetric. (7) party-based Euroscepticism which is built on the political rhetoric used by political parties and their leaders. (8) Atlantic-based scepticism which implies a clash among the pro-European and

pro-American positions in the context of a common European defence. and finally, (9) practice-based scepticism which based on the concern that the Copenhagen criteria are interpreted differently, but it does not reject Europe and Europeanization outright.

In light of the conceptualizations as mentioned above, and classifications, it is acknowledged that there is no consensus on the underlying causes and classifications regarding Euroscepticism. But it is also significant to take into account Euroscepticism as an independent variable that might be utilised to explain a wide range of political concerns in Europe. Major crisis such as the Refugee crisis, with a large influx of refugees and irregular migrants into the EU; and the Brexit which caused Euroscepticism to peak, increased the visibility and influence of Eurosceptic actors at both national and European levels. In this regard, there has been a rising shift in Eurosceptic political party discourse, negative public perception of the EU, and public endorsement of Eurosceptic political parties which are opposed to further European integration (Hooghe and Marks, 2018; Schimmelfennig, 2018; Vasilopoulou, 2018: 22).

3.2 Party-Based Euroscepticism

Political parties have a crucial role at the national level regarding their attitudes towards European integration and how they perceive the EU. In this conjuncture, where each political party analyses and perceives European integration from different perspectives, some parties may oppose European integration while others may support it. Moreover, these political parties even steer the national debates on European issues, in doing so, are in a position to influence all segments of society. It is therefore important to study Euroscepticism from the perspective of party-based scepticism to analyse it in all its dimensions particularly, in line with the purpose of this study.

It is significant to note that there is also no consensus on the definition and classification of party-based Euroscepticism, as most academics present their conceptualizations and definitions. The literature shows various reasons for political parties to adopt a Eurosceptic stance. Concordantly, scholars have tried to measure and analyse the extent to which parties are Eurosceptic through different means such as manifesto reviews, surveys, and leader discourses. Therefore, it is necessary to define questions of how party-based Euroscepticism is defined conceptualized and measured understand the causality of Political parties' motivations to take Eurosceptic positions.

Party-based Euroscepticism has been seen as the "touchstone of opposition" as it is mentioned in Taggart's famous definition of Euroscepticism. In the 1980s, when political party-based Euroscepticism was not quite common, Eurosceptic attitudes were limited to opposition parties. That is to say, opposition parties consider opposition to European integration as a way of distinguishing themselves from the mainstream parties, in which case Euroscepticism was commonly considered as opposition politics (Sitter, 2002). In line with this point of view, party-based Euroscepticism analysed as a product of ideological, (Hooghe, Marks and Wilson, 2002; Ray, 2007) or religious (Madeley and Sitter, 2005) extremism. However, it is also agreed that Eurosceptic party stances is not only limited to opposition parties since mainstream parties may also have Eurosceptic attitudes in different manners.

Conceptualization of party-based Euroscepticism are often developed around what is being opposed and to what degree. In this sense, while a wide range of factors may determine a party's stance towards European integration, when we take a glance at the literature on party-based Euroscepticism, scholars have primarily concerned whether party strategies or ideology are sufficient to understand and explain party- based Euroscepticism. Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008:254) address this issue as follows: According to them, 'ideological-programmatic party competition' or 'strategic-tactical party rivalry factors' are the primary rationalisations for Euroscepticism. Therefore, the first approach considers ideology as the main determinant of party-based Euroscepticism while the latter one analyses the Eurosceptic stance of political parties through their strategic moves. Accordingly, Marks et al. (2002: 965-989) argue that the main reasons why parties have taken Eurosceptic positions in Europe can be found in historical cleavage, which has resulted in the emergence of the main ideological party families of Christian democrats, liberals, social democrats, and conservatives.

According to Mudde (2012: 193) there are two significant approaches which help to improve the literature on party-based Euroscepticism, and Mudde classified these approaches as the Sussex School and the North Carolina School. If we briefly explain these two approaches importance to improve party-based Euroscepticism literature, firstly, the Sussex School asserts the importance of strategy; while the North Carolina School asserts the importance of ideology as two main factors that shape party's Eurosceptic stances. In this sense, these two schools' work was based on different analytical approaches while the Sussex school observes party programs/manifestos, leader statements and parliamentary debates, the North Carolina Schools examines party-based Euroscepticism through expert surveys and questionnaires. (Mudde,2012:196) The Sussex School and the North Carolina School differ from each other

according to their arguments as well. The Sussex School argues that such matters of national importance, such as the structure of party system, the electoral system, the prospects of their access to office or the position of their opponents, determine a political party's stance towards European integration. On the other hand, the North Carolina School focuses mainly adheres to cleavage theory on party stances in European integration emphasizing the impact of traditional socio-economic differences in the formation of political party positions towards the European integration (Vasilopoulou, 2013:156). According to the cleavage theory, political cleavages that have grown through a period of time political parties' positions on European integration. in this way, the political parties' pre-existing political ideas shape and filter the debate over European integration.

In light of these two Schools' approaches regarding the importance of strategy and ideology on party-based Euroscepticism, many scholars such as (Flood and Soborski, 2011; Gabel and Hix, 2005; Hix et al., 2007; Hooghe et al., 2004; Kopecky and Mudde,2002; Marks and Wilson, 2000) emphasize the importance of ideology since the common internal identity of party politicians, core members and supporters are based on ideologies, that is to say ideologies may enable some alliances while sometimes prevent others (Flood and Soborski, 2018: 45). In this sense, Kopecky and Mudde (2002:320) also accept that ideology generates general positions towards European integration and emphasise that ideology creates a party's support for the principles that established the process of European integration. In addition, when it is claimed that party attitudes towards the European integration have developed with ideology, it is also possible that different attitudes towards the EU may be developed by the same party over time due to ideological change (Conti and Memoli, 2018: 92).

When it comes to the second approach which emphasises the importance of strategy in shaping the party positions towards European integration, the party-based Euroscepticism is viewed as a strategic positioning issue (Flood, 2002; Taggart,1998; Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008). In that sense, the strategic approach tries to find a rational answer why a political party adopts a Eurosceptic attitude. However, it is not possible to determine the party's positions towards European integration by only looking at which ideology that party has.

Taggart and Szczerbiak (2008: 256) have provided two significant factors to determine party positions towards European integration as follows: (1) the party's general ideological stance and ideals, (2) the interests of its electorate. In this sense, it is important to consider other significant factors besides ideology. Additionally, according to Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008: 258), how these factors affect the parties will differ according to the goals and objectives of the

party in question. For example, a political party with specific programmatic and ideological objectives tends to prioritise ideology to reach its specific goal. In the other perspective, when it comes to a party which is driven by interests and aims to reach a certain level of office will prioritise the interest of its supporters, and these kinds of parties will tend to consider European integration mostly from a cost-benefit perspective in order to consider the interests of its supporters.

Sitter (2003: 240) also acknowledged the importance of strategy in determining the position of political parties towards European integration and argues that the adoption of a Eurosceptic stance by political parties may be underpinned by party strategy or by competing interests, such as votes, office-seeking or party survival which drive inter-party competition. Therefore, according to this understanding, political parties have to make strategic decisions, if need be, to get votes, hold office, or even just to survive, and their decision regarding adopting a Eurosceptic stance or to changing their Eurosceptic position. Thus, it can be said that these decisions stem from their concerns and whether or not to develop a Eurosceptic position may always be changed.

Sitter (2003) also provides three different strategies to determine party-based Euroscepticism: catch-all, interest, and protest. According to the catch-all model, if parties have a Eurosceptic stance, it is driven by political concerns since the most crucial goal here is to maximise votes and achieve office, and they behave as of ideology and policy commitments are not so important. On the other side, in the interest model, when a political party is organised around a particular identity or interest, it tends to formulate policies on behalf of the interests of its supporters. The third and last, in the protest model, policy preferences and ideology are highly interconnected and Eurosceptic stance appears as a party strategy. In other words, in protest model, political parties more likely tend to take Eurosceptic positions (Sitter, 2003:250).

Taggart and Szczerbiak's outright 'Principled (Hard) and contingent (Soft)' distinction of Euroscepticism (2001) also addresses party-based Euroscepticism. in this sense, Party-based Hard Euroscepticism can be found in parties that have principled opposition to the EU and the European integration, and therefore consider that their country must withdraw from membership. Party- based Soft Euroscepticism on the other aspect, can be found in parties where there is not principled opposition to the European integration or whole EU project but where concerns about one (or more) policy areas lead to an expression of qualified opposition to the EU, or where it is believed that the EU would harm national interests of their country (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2002: 7).

On the other aspect, another comprehensive conceptualization has provided by Kopecky and Mudde (2002: 301-302) based on Taggart and Szczerbiak's Hard-Soft Euroscepticism dichotomy. They claim that the definition of soft party-based Euroscepticism is very inclusive and broad enough to include even the smallest disagreement with the EU. Secondly, they argue that supporting or opposing EU is not a fundamental distinction that can be explained by the Hard-Soft Distinciton of Taggart and Szczerbiak. In that sense, According to Kopeck and Mudde, they provided four types of positions towards the European integration; Euroenthusiast, Europragmatists Eurosceptics and Eurorejects as I mentioned above in the conceptualization of Euroscepticism. In that sense, political parties may tend to have Euro-optimists or EU-pessimist stances it specified in Kopecky and Mudde's conceptualization, which means either supporting EU integration for their own benefit and simply because they like the idea of European integration or taking an extremely hostile stance which is entirely opposed to integration.

Conti (2003:17) makes another alternative categorisation regarding the party attitudes towards the EU which is based on Taggart and Szczerbiak's Hard-Soft distinction of Euroscepticism. So, his categorisation composed of hard, soft Euroscepticism, no commitment/no mention at all, identity Europeanism and functional Europeanism. According to him, no commitment/ no mention implies an ambiguous position on European integration, but functional Europeanism correspond to support for European integration as long as it serves national interests or the goals of a political party. In such a case there is no further commitment to integration unless European integration serves interests. On the other hand, the main goal of identity Europeanism is further integration so as which provides widespread support for the EU.

As can be seen many different scholars in the literature of party-based Euroscepticism have provided different categorisations over time based on Taggart and Szczerbiak's famous Hard-Soft Euroscepticism distinction, and there is still desire to develop new categorisations on the basis of new developments in party-based Euroscepticism. In this sense, to examine the impact of European integration on party politics, it would be appropriate to include Party-based Euroscepticism in both the West and the East conjunctures to seek answers to how it differs from each other.

3.3. Euroscepticism in Western Europe

The first notable study in the study of Euroscepticism in Western Europe was provided by Taggart (1998) as the first systematic attempt to look at party-based Euroscepticism at the

domestic level in Western Europe. In this regard, it is significant to note that Euroscepticism in Western Europe, party affiliation and party positions within party systems are frequently used to analyse Euroscepticism in Western Europe. With the logic that political parties manifest Eurosceptic attitudes in different ways for different purposes, Taggart asserts that Euroscepticism in political parties can be manifest in four different ways. Firstly, "single-issue" parties which are founded entirely on the principle of anti- EU. The general aim of such parties to attract voters by politicising the EU issue and taking a Eurosceptic position. As an example of such parties is People's movement and against EC union can be included to this "single-issue "parties category (Taggart, 1998: 369). Secondly, the Eurosceptic protest-based parties whose main goal is to oppose political parties' functioning. These parties not only show ani-EU positions but also, they adopt an opposition stance against their existing system of representation. In this sense, communist parties in France and Greece can be considered as an example of such parties. The third kind of party that shows Eurosceptic tendencies is an established-mainstream parties that adopts Eurosceptic stance as a strategy of political contestation or for ideological reasons. The Left Party in Sweden, and the Centre Party in Norway are the most well-known parties in this group. United and the Democratic Unionist party in the United Kingdom. The last type of opposition comes from the Eurosceptic factions of existing parties supporting European integration. from this point of view, British Conservative Party's Eurosceptic wing can be an example of this last type of opposition to European integration (Taggart, 1998:373).

On the other hand, some of the significant turning points that have occurred throughout the process of European integration, such as the Euro crisis, the 2004 enlargement, the migrant crisis, the Brexit referendum etc., have provided the basis for the formation of radical left, radical right parties in Western Europe and have also laid the groundwork for the development of Eurosceptic politics.

Some scholars pointed out four main turning points that led to the emerging radical right parties in Western Europe. First, the new wave of politicisation of European integration in the early 1990s, signalled by the Maastricht treaty that addresses a name change from community to union, was the first turning point for the Radical Right Parties (RRP) to gain a foothold (Usherwood and Startin, 2013). For instance, the outcome of the 1992 Maastricht referendum in France was a proof of the strategic importance of the vote within the EU for Radical Right Parties that seeking to expand their electoral support since leaders such as Jen Marie -Le pen

and Jörn Haider immediately exploited Maastricht Treaty as a tactic of differentiating themselves from the mainstream (Wood, 1997: 142).

The EU enlargement process is the second significant turning point identified as contributing to the emerging of the RRPs toward a 'hard' Eurosceptic position. The 2004 enlargement, in particular, the accession of ten new member states, eight from Central and Eastern Europe, was a historic opportunity to reunite Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of Communism in Central and Eastern Europe, but it was also a turning point for the rise of Radical Right parties, especially in Western Europe. The starting point of their anti-EU rhetoric is the security concerns and unemployment in their own countries as a result of the waves of immigration from Central and Eastern Europe after the 2004 and 2007 enlargements (Startin, 2015: 315).

The third turning point is the economic 'crisis'. Although the crisis originated outside the Eurozone, the Euro crisis from 2008 onwards was suddenly blamed as the cause of all socio-economic inequalities and the bailouts, especially in countries such as Greece, Portugal, Ireland, and Spain, with their increasing unemployment, contributed to strengthening the populist rhetoric of radical parties within Western Europe and the deepening Eurosceptic rhetoric (Startin, 2015).

The fourth central turning point that reinforcing the RRPs' hard Eurosceptic attitude towards the EU was undoubtedly the European Refugee/migrant crisis which emerged as a significant humanitarian crisis in early 2015 and reached the EU borders. The fact that the majority of refugees and migrants from Muslim-majority countries such as Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq reinforced the problem, e.g., Steeve Briois, the vice president of the Front National (FN) has stated that they will formulate a firm policy for the repatriation of refugees (Clavel, 2015).

As for the Euroscepticism of the Radical Left Parties (RLP) in Western Europe, the factors that trigger Eurosceptic positions are slightly different. Dunphy (2004) states that ideology, public opinion, party factionalism, transnational links, party rivalry, and leadership have been influential in shaping the RLP positions towards European integration. In this regard Halikipoulou (2014) pointed out that in Southern Eastern Europe Countries such as Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Spain (PIIGS) in the conjuncture of the Economic crisis, the Radical Left Party Euroscepticism have shaped and in order to legitimise their anti-EU stances, they have campaigned for the renegotiation of the bailout packages and for the restriction of EU powers

on the basis of national sovereignty. Volkens (2004:123) also pointed out that Eurosceptic politics in Scandinavia is more motivated by national contexts.

Another dramatic turning point was the Brexit vote, and which shocked everyone across Europe and had a profound impact on the rise of Eurosceptic voices. Many consider the UK's Brexit vote from an economic point of view and try to explain the relationship between the Eurosceptic attitude and economic performance. In the case of the UK, Economic insecurity can be explained as an important reason for Euroscepticism and the rejection of low-performing economic policy as a result of the EU's policy implementations (Halikipoulou and Vlandas, 2018: 446).

On the other hand, Vasilopulou's (2011) three categories regarding the Euroscepticism as rejectionist, conditional or integrationist Euroscepticism is significant framework to understand Radical Left Party Euroscepticism. in this sense, the Greek Communist Party (KKE), Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) and the Danish Red-Green Alliance took a rejectionist position towards the idea of European integration under the view of defence of national sovereignty. Also, parties that can be categorised conditional Eurosceptics, on the other aspect, largely accept the requirement for some level of European decision-making but they also seek for the regain powers of nation states. In the context of Radical Left Parties in Western Europe, the parties of Sinn Féin (Ireland) SP and the Party of Animals (The Netherlands) are examples of conditional Eurosceptic Parties, and they tend to oppose supranational power of the EU (Dan Keith: 2018: 92). Lastly, the integrationist/expansionist Eurosceptic Radical Left Parties such as Left Front (France), Syriza (Greece), Die Linke (Germany) rejects deeper integration with the EU and Nationalism is the key point that they adopt a sceptical position towards the EU political or economic integration. But it also be argued that at some points, the ideologies of opposition to capitalism and neoliberalism through a more integrated federal Europe, which drive the Eurosceptic stance in the RLPs are influential (Dunphy and March: 2013).

Although the EU can be described as a multi-level political form, it is an institution in which national authorities retain ultimate authority in areas that may affect national sovereignty, even if member states appear to have agreed to delegate their sovereignty at micro level. However, the fact is that even in pro-integration countries such as Netherlands, France, Eurosceptic voices has been raised and Euroscepticism has been encountered in many European countries. That is to say, Euroscepticism in Western Europe has a complex characteristic with its different internal dynamics and aspects throughout the process of integration.

3.4 Euroscepticism in Central and Eastern Europe

In the early 1990s, the European question was less controversial in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Primarily, accession to the Union was seen an essential for these states after the communist regimes, and reform-oriented parties in CEECs were enthusiastic about joining the EU. The need for protection from neo-imperial Russia and the desire to establish democracy and the rule of law, combined with the defence of human rights and minorities, played a significant role in their ambition for membership. However, contentious severe conflicts have arisen after the accession of CEECs since Euroscepticism in CEECs has fundamentally different characteristics than in the old member states. According to Hungarian political scientist Attila Ágh (2008) 'Post-EU-Accession syndrome' which is the motivation for the most discussed Eurosceptic attitudes in CEECs, is a result of disappointed expectations, especially regarding economic development concerns. That is to say, new member states expect high economic prosperity besides being members of the EU, however they encountered a great disappointment in the face of the Eurozone crisis (Ágh, 2015). Furthermore, another factor which fuels dissatisfaction with the EU among the CEECs is perceived as the dependence on the old member states, which EU accession has caused through its closely integrated development with production structures in Western Europe (Agh, 2015: 31).

For countries like Poland and Hungary, Czech Republic, accession to the European Union means that economic prosperity and security (Styczнska, 2014: 126). Also, accession to the EU was a symbolic confirmation of being 'European' and a strategic goal to be integrated to Western frames of cooperation in the foreign policy of the post-communist states (Góra and Mach, 2010).

According to Hartleb (2012), Euroscepticism in Central and Eastern Europe has a different root than in Western Europe since it has different historical background. Compared to the former member states, the CEE countries have undergone significant changes in the economic, social, and political areas and have been introduced to the concepts of pluralism, democracy, economic prosperity etc., which are customary in Western Europe much later, as they did not experience them during the socialist regime (Ayata, 2014).

As regards the debate on Euroscepticism in Central and Eastern European countries, it is clear that nationalism plays a crucial role in influence Eurosceptic attitudes (Toomey,2007). Especially in the Czech Republic and Poland, Euroscepticism is mostly articulated by anti-German sentiments since they believe that European Union is too strongly connected to the

Germany and Germany's efforts to reinforce its interests from the European integration (Hartleb, 2012; Toomey.2007).

Winston (2018) argues that, for the members of CEECs, multiculturalism, and ethnic diversity that comes with the European integration, evocate an association with problematic interwar period and Soviet era.

On the other hand, Anti-EU rhetoric has been aroused alongside European integration. in order to understand Eurosceptic rhetoric in CEECs, it would be significant to mention again Kopeck and Mudde's (2002) outright classification as "Euro-rejects and Euro-sceptics" (See also Conceptualization of Euroscepticism). Euro-rejects tend to oppose all European integration and Eurosceptics can support the idea of integration but can be also opposite specific policies or implementations of the EU.

Regarding Euroscepticism in CEECs it is significant to point out that identity-based Euroscepticism comes at the forefront. What is meant by identity-based Euroscepticism is that in most of the CEE countries identity is linked to national culture, tradition, and religion. therefore, to some extent, European integration and accession to the EU is a melting pot of many different cultures, which has led to fears that accession could damage their identity and values. Even some Critics argued that EU membership would undermine the role of the Catholic Church and undermine the traditional position of the family in society (Riischøj, 2004). Besides the identity-based concerns, Riischøj (2004) argues that policy-based and institution-based Euroscepticism can be observed in Central and Eastern Europe, Such as lack of support for specific policies of the EU like policies regarding the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the common currency. Another example is based on the legitimacy of national institutions versus the EU institutions since the low trust in national institutions may increase the trust for the EU institutions and the EU as a whole. For many Eurosceptics in CEECs the EU should not provide deeper integration but remain a loosely affiliated community of member states cooperating at the economic level. This view became more visible during the migration crisis and resettlement issue of migrants across Europe (Styczyńska, 2018: 141).

Based on the anti-European discourse and implementations of political parties in Central and Eastern Europe, it would be possible to say that they all have some common characteristics which determine the discourse and actions of them, are follows: (1) disappointments regarding (2) economic expectations, fears, based on the immigration crisis and misunderstandings about how the EU works in this regard, (3) populist policies and discourses in political spectrum that

raise Eurosceptic rhetoric. To exemplify with the two Central and Eastern Europe countries, in case of Poland, for some, Europe only makes sense when it is Catholic, or at least Christian. For this reason, the secular EU was perceived as a threat to traditional polish identity (Góra and Mach 2010: 240). Even before the accession, concerns about the economic dimension were centred around being governed by the larger member states, being seen as second-class member and worries that membership would be less profitable than expected. In the post-accession period, Eurosceptic parties redefined themselves and while some have flourished as Eurosceptics, some of them (Euro rejects) have vanished from political arena. For instance, the league of Polish Families (Liga Polskich Rodzin) was a conservative right-wing party that oppose accession to the EU since the EU was perceived as threat for Polish traditional identity (Zuba, 2009). Also, Self-Defence (Samoobrona) The Farmers' Union turned into a political party that criticised European integration on key economic issues and had a combination of Eurosceptic and Euro-reject features (Samoobrona 2003, cited in Styczyńska,2018). On the other hand, the Law and Justice Party which has a 'soft' Eurosceptic feature, is a key player in Polish politics and they emphasized Polish national interests and the need to secure it; also underline the importance of Europe's Christian roots and the need for including this Christian identity in the future constitutional treaty (PiS 2003, cited in Styczyńska,2018).

In Hungary, another example is similar to Poland, the willingness for become a member of the EU has started to decrease after accession since due to same reasons as Poland case in terms of economic and political problems that people may expect from membership. In the political arena, two parties can be given as an example as Fidesz, and The Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik), Fidesz can be considered as Eurosceptic due to its Eurosceptic rhetoric and Jobbik can be perceived as Euro-rejects since they described themselves as a conservative and patriotic Christian party that works for Hungarian values. Jobbik uses anti-Semitic, xenophobic, and anti-Roma rhetoric as an anti-European Euro-reject party. Even the party did not take part in the 2004 EU parliamentary elections as a signal of their opposition to the EU (Nagy et al., 2012).

In sum, Euroscepticism in Central and Eastern Europe has different than in Western Europe, given the different directions in which Euroscepticism has developed in CEECs with the changing of conjunctures before and after the accession, and the fact that Euroscepticism in CEECs is mainly linked to populism, and especially on the verge of their membership, Eurosceptic populist discourses have been quite influential.

* * *

In this chapter, key conclusions are first, it is widely accepted that how political parties understand the EU defines their attitudes towards the EU, and political parties' opposing stances towards the EU mainly regarding some specific policies and because of their political and domestic politics. Lastly, this chapter reveals how East and West Euroscepticism differ from each other with different dynamics. In the following fourth chapter, this study will take Poland as a concrete example to demonstrate that Euroscepticism is not always an attribute of extreme marginal party politics, especially by analysing the PİS (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość) party which exhibits varying degrees of Euroscepticism.

CHAPTER IV

EUROSCEPTICISM IN POLAND

This chapter will reveal Euroscepticism in Poland by outlining the key dynamics in the history of the Polish-EU relationship; first, it will examine Euroscepticism among the mass and elite level, then examine the Eurosceptic parties, accordingly the selected manifestos of the PiS party towards the EU in order to understand how Euroscepticism has developed in Polish party politics.

4.1. Case Selection: Why Poland?

Poland is a significant case to study Euroscepticism since it manifests varying degrees of Eurosceptic tendencies towards the EU. Furthermore, it has even become a subject of an important debate as to whether it is an "awkward" partner of Europe (Szczerbiak, 2012). From this point of view, Poland's accession to the EU has led to two important debates: Is Europe returning to us, or are we joining Europe? So, no doubt that these questions reflect different stances of the EU. The idea of Europe returning to us arose from those who felt and retained a sense of abandonment by Europe, and accession to the union was perceived as the return of Europe to Poland. On the other hand, those who believe that the country has never ceased to be an integral part of Europe emphasises that the country's forced isolation from Europe is the cause of "civilizational decline". Also, throughout the 1990s, surveys revealed two basic attitudes towards accession as Euroenthusiastic and Eurosceptic attitudes. The Euroenthusiasts considered accession as an inevitable part of globalization, economic modernization, enriching its culture and strengthening its rule of law. On the contrary, Eurosceptics considered membership as a rivalry between nation states and accession would mean an economic subjugation to Brussels and a limitation of national sovereignty and a cosmopolitan influence on Polish national identity. From this point of view, when we come to the question of Why Poland is still a significant case for studying Euroscepticism, some fundamental points come to the fore as follows: (1) the changing social, political, economic, spectrum of Poland since its accession to the EU, and the attitudes towards the EU depending on these developments. (2) while pre-accession public opinion was so enthusiastic about accession, post-accession The Euroscepticism has been on the rise among political elites, and there has been a noticeable increase in sceptical voices both in their own national policies and in EU policies. (3) the attitude of Poland during crisis times such as Eurozone crisis, migration crisis and corona

pandemic that the EU went through. (4) in December 2017, European Commission's attempt to initiative the Article 7 procedure against Poland on the grounds that the rule of law and the fundamental EU rules in Poland are at stake. (5) Poland's contentious democratic backsliding under the rule of PİS (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość) government (Kałużyńska and Smyk et.al., 2009: 14-19). In this sense, it is undoubtedly a case worth examining within the scope of Euroscepticism studies.

4.2. Poland's Relationship towards the EU through Years

This section of the study will provide a brief overview of the relationship between Poland and the EU through the years in order to understand the nature of Polish Euroscepticism, in doing so, it will explain important milestones in Poland-EU relations. As a starting point, the impact of the EU membership on Poland is widely recognized by academics, politicians since of the ten mostly post-communist parties that joined the EU, none has benefited as much as Poland. Some scholars even go further, arguing that Poland has gone from a post-communist and backward country to a European economic growth leadership (Adeyoka, 2014 and Kolodziejczyk, 2016). Although enthusiasm for membership that started with the 'Return to Europe' approach and in the years following membership, Poland has continued with the gains from EU membership, the arguments that membership undermines Poland's values have also reached an important point in time to the point of damaging Polish- EU relations. From this point of view, this section and its sub-sections will provide a broader look at important milestones between Polish- EU relationship from the first years of accession until now through examining the beginning of accession period, and outright public opinion surveys, the differentiation of Euroscepticism at the elite and the mass level, specific crisis times in Poland-EU relations throughout the years, and finally will close look at Eurosceptic politics in the view of Political parties.

4.2.1 Accession

The accession of Poland to the EU was intimately connected to the broader post-communist transformation process. The EU was the key international and regional organisation that post-communist Poland aspired to join since it was the major focus of Western Europe's successful economic and political integration (Szczerbiak, 2012: 9). Eventually, Poland was finally admitted to the European Union on 1 May 2004, having fulfilled a series of criteria for the EU accession following the application for membership to the EU in 1994, following the requirement to fulfil a series of criteria which are known as Copenhagen Criteria for

membership, together with the transformation process that took place after the end of the communist regime since 1989. In other words, Poland entered into a comprehensive harmonisation process in order to fulfil the criteria after the negotiations started in 1988. Following the signing of the accession treaty in April 2003, and the subsequent referendum on accession held on 7-8 June, in which the public voted in favour of Poland's accession to the EU, Poland joined the EU together with nine countries, the majority of which are from Central and Eastern Europe (Kałużyńska et al., 2009: 6). Despite the long preparations for membership, Poland's accession to the EU was in many respects a step into uncharted territory, that was difficult to foresee, but a few years after accession, research clearly demonstrated the obtainments that membership brought to the country and the uncertainty disappeared, and public opinion polls showed significant information about how people perceived the integration process. In this sense, support for EU membership increased consistently among Poles in the first years after accession (Balcerowicz, 2007). For instance, in May 2004, 71 per cent of the population was in favour of membership, while those opposed made up 20 per cent of the population. However, only two years later in 2006, polls demonstrated that the number of supporters had risen to 86 per cent, while the number of opponents of the EU has fallen to 10 per cent (Balcerowicz, 2007).

On the other hand, even though support for the European Union had increased with the belief that Poland would benefit from EU membership, for the first time in 2004, when Poland gained the right to participate in the elections to the EU parliament, Poland's support for the EU has not reflected these parliamentary elections since its participation rate was only 21 per cent. From this point of view, Poland, the country with the lowest participation rate compared to all member states, was hesitant to support of the EU in the first years (Cichocki, 2011). Accordingly, satisfaction with Poland's EU membership has steadily increased. The most frequently perceived changes related to the accession are regarding freedom of movement, the opportunity to work and study in other EU countries, the improvement of the situation in the agricultural sector and the Polish economy in general, the improvement of the situation in the local labour market and Poland's growing role in the international arena (Kałużyńska et al., 2009: 14). Although the natural results of participation vary in different fields, it can be listed as follows: As a result of economic cooperation with the other EU member states under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), there have been many crucial improvements in agriculture. Moreover, the impact in areas such as education, culture and health are inevitable, and the impact of EU structural funds in specific areas notably influences improvements.

The EU membership has considerable influence on Poland specifically on economic areas. In other words, EU membership contributed to Poland's economic growth in the following areas. For example, GDP per capita in Poland increased from 43% of the EU-15 average in 2003 to almost 51% in 200. The indicator of labour productivity also increased from PLN 31.21 to PLN 41.57 per hour worked in same period (Ibid.16). The labour market has also improved in parallel with economic improvements. Even during the global economic crisis in 2008, the EU structural funds were an important instrument to counteract possible downturns in the labour market (ibid:16). At the same time, between 2004-2007, there was an explosion in the number of Poles who recruited in EU countries, and during this period the number of entrants in EU countries increased from 1 million to 2.3. million, and the consequences of this large amount of labour migration have resulted in improving the income situation of Polish families in Poland, developing new career models, etc. (ibid.17). Another positive economic impact has been the increase in FDI (Foreign Direct Investments) in the country as a result of accession to the EU, which has had an indirect impact on Poland's credibility, macroeconomic stability, and attractiveness for foreign investors. It has also had a positive impact on Polish trade, and in the first five years of accession, the volume of trade increased by 18.7% and additionally, the inflow of FDI boosted to improve trade structures related to highly processed goods (ibid.18). Poland's accession to the EU has enabled positive changes in the rural sector, increased the profitability in agriculture through improvements under the CAP, improved the financial situation of farmers, although not for all, but still accelerated the process of modernisation of the rural agricultural sector and diversification of income sources (ibid.18). Poland's EU accession has contributed to the growth of government activity in the field of pursuing pro-innovation programmes and initiating many legislative procedures. However, the analysis of innovation indicators and trends observed after Poland's accession to the EU showed that (for first 5 years) Poland's innovation level remains far below the EU average. another significant development was the inclusion of Poland in the Schengen area after an intensive process of preparation process. Accordingly, border controls between Poland and the EU member states were abolished, which meant a great freedom of movement for Polish citizens. In the economic and social sphere, the positive consequences of joining the Schengen area have also been realised in the field of trade and tourism (ibid. 22). In the field of education Polish schools, universities, university students, academic and research staff, have increasingly had the opportunity to benefit from Community education programmes such as Erasmus etc (ibid. 23). When it comes to the health sector, thanks to Poland's integration to the EU, the rights of Polish patients have been greatly extended, and thanks to regulations over better coordination of social security

system, it allowed patients to receive medical care all around the EU member states territory (Ibid. 23). In addition to improvements in the mentioned areas, the EU enabled Poland to strengthen its position in the world, thus contributing to good relations with member states, neighbours, and involvement in regional cooperation and activities in the forum of international organisations. Furthermore, EU membership inevitably provided Poland with a new perspective and field of interest for its foreign policy (Ibid.28).

4.2.2 Popular Polls Towards the EU

Polish public opinion polls conducted by CBOS provide significant overviews of the different views of Poles on EU issues. Accordingly, this section will present some notable polls on the EU in 2003, 2004, 2015, 2019, and 2022. Also, while support for the EU is generally high in Polish public opinion, it is intended to show where favourable views of the EU differ.

Figure 4.1: 2003 Public opinion on the EU



Source: CBOS (2003)

As shown in this figure above, while 2003 pre-accession public interest on the EU was higher than half of the population in 2004 (See in figure 2). After accession, polls asked the public about the benefits of EU membership, and the 43 per cent who thought that EU members benefited more from membership than Poland did in that year suggest that the EU was perceived as such by the public, who were not yet fully informed about the benefits of membership or had not fully experienced the advantages of membership.



Figure 4.2: 2004 Public opinion on the EU
Source: CBOS (2004)

Figure 4.3: Public opinion on the EU's migration policy



Source: CBOS (2015)

On the other hand, as will be discussed in the following sub-sections, in 2015, when Euroscepticism was on the rise with Law and Justice winning the elections, at the same time the refugee issue was profoundly affecting the EU, the people was asked in the pools of that year about the EU's policy regarding the relocation of refugees in Europe, and the public disagreed with the EU's policies on this issue to a considerable extent (See in figure 3).

Figure 4.4: Public opinion on 15 years of Poland's membership in the EU



Source: CBOS (2019)

2019 is also worthy analysing since it is the 15th year of Poland's EU membership, and as it is shown in the poll (See in figure 4) in the 15th year of the membership, when asked whether the country would be better or worse if Poland were not a member of the EU, 74 per cent of the population answered that Poland would be worse off if it were not a member of the EU.

Figure 4.5: Sovereignty based public opinion on the EU.



Source: CBOS (2022)

When it comes to the current polls in 2022, which measure whether the EU is undermining Polish sovereignty and independence in the eyes of the public, it reveals where support for the EU was wavered and how vital the issue of sovereignty is for Poland.

In sum, these polls try to show that although public interest and support for the idea of the European Union is considerably high when it comes to some specific policies of the EU i.e., migration policy, there is more opposition than support. Accordingly, as the 2022 survey reveals, the concept of national sovereignty is still a great issue for Poles, and even in the case

of the EU, there is still a concern that national sovereignty and independence would somehow be undermined. In other words, as can be seen in the manifestos of the PiS party in this study, for both the public and the political elite, attitudes, and support for the EU change significantly when it comes to identity, value, and sovereignty issues. Therefore, these value and sovereignty-based issues are breaking points in the interest and satisfaction with the EU membership. From this point of view, it is appropriate to consider how Euroscepticism differs between the elites and the mass level in the following section.

4.2.3 Elite-Mass Level Euroscepticism

As many variables that shape Euroscepticism studies, the discussion of the driving factors behind Euroscepticism has also been debated throughout the integration process. In light of these debates, the question of how scepticism in ways they diverge or are influenced by each other has also been worthy of studies in the field of Euroscepticism.

In the case of Poland's Euroscepticism, while some scholars claim that political elites take Eurosceptic attitudes from their electorate and incorporate them into their political agenda, others argue that the attitude of the public opinion is shaped by the information received by the political parties (De Vries, 2007 and Steenbergen, Edward et al., 2007). From this point of view, scholars argue that Euroscepticism is a product of reverse causality, which means that political elites and the public can influence each other, which is why Euroscepticism between elites and the mass has become a worthwhile research strand. In a similar vein, attitudes towards the EU can be formed both from the bottom up or from the top down. In this case, political elites influence the public mass, or the mass can influence the elites; in both cases, both directions can strengthen Eurosceptic attitudes towards each other. According to Steenbergen et al (2007), this reciprocal interaction may be derived from different factors such as electoral rivalry, party attributes, and attributes of the electorate. However, scholars claim that elite level Eurosceptic attitudes is higher than mass level in case of members from CEECs like Poland, Czech Republic, etc (Toomey, 2007).

In accordance with the aim of this research, elite-mass Euroscepticism in Poland has been observed in the following ways, but in different forms: if we look at first the ways in which mass-based emerged, for example, the EU referendum before Poland's accession to the EU showed that EU membership was supported by the vast majority of voters, even Polish farmers was majority but not a great one. On the other hand, after joining the EU in 2004, Poland was

considered one of the most sceptical new member states. It was obviously seen in the opinion polls conducted immediately after the accession, and 41% per cent of the Polish people reported that they did not trust the Union (Eurobarometer, 2004). Moreover 31% of people believed that Poland was not ready for the membership, and they felt that they would not benefit from it (ibid. 5). Nevertheless, the situation improved somewhat in early 2005 although many of the negative aspects remained. Although these findings initially painted a gloomy picture, by the end of 2005, the general public opinion had changed substantially in a positive direction even over fifty per cent of opinion towards the EU was positive (Eurobarometer, 2005). Although Poland was above the EU average in terms of public support for the EU, there was also a general suspicion towards the EU institutions at the mass level; the polls showed that more than half of the people, with a ratio of 53 per cent, thought that their voices were not heard when it comes to decision-making in Brussel (Eurobarometer 66, 2006). On the other hand, if we look at the most recent Eurobarometer survey in the summer of 2022, it would not be possible to say that the mass level of Euroscepticism against the EU is high in Poland, with 63% of the population still trusting the EU. In addition, they are also satisfied with the EU's handling of the war in Ukraine, even though they fear that the war in Ukraine would spill over into other European Countries (Eurobarometer, 2022).

The mass popularity of the EU in Poland starkly contrasts the position of some political parties especially the current ruling party. In this respect, when it comes to the elite-level Euroscepticism, the first Eurosceptic attitudes at the elite level started to appear when Poland was still in the pre-accession stage. For instance, after the defeat of President Walesa, an apparent realignment to the right led to the emergence of anti-EU elements in political parties (Millard, 1999: 209). Moreover, while many important institutions such as the Catholic Church and Trade Unions had a positive attitude towards the EU, this positive attitude was replaced by scepticism due to concerns about the nature of the European Union and how membership would affect Polish culture and traditions (ibid. 210-211). From this perspective, it can be argued that elites in Poland are more sceptical than other EU member countries that have gone through this process, especially with regard to its accession process. An analysis of Poland's representation in the EU parliament indicates that at least twenty-three out of 52 Polish MEPs hold positions in parliamentary groups with have explicitly or implicitly Eurosceptic attitudes, which summarizes the situation. More importantly, while it is common to generalise that anti-EU parties are predominantly either extreme right-wing or left-wing, the 23 members mentioned here are notable for their affiliation with the mainstream PiS party which manifests Eurosceptic

tendencies.[2] However, elite-based Euroscepticism was also manifested differently in pre-accession-and post-accession. In this respect, before the accession of 2001 Polish parliamentary election was interpreted as a 'Eurosceptic Backlash' due to the success of EU-critical parties like the Polish Peasant Party (PLS) and Law and Justice Party (PiS) (Szczerbiak, 2022: 8) in the pre-accession period, PiS's Policy towards European issue was rather ambiguous and favoured Poland's EU membership as their only realistic foreign policy objective.

Nevertheless, during the 2001 election campaign, the PiS opposed to the acceleration of Poland's EU membership and argued that even accession negotiations should be stopped if Poland was promised a 'second-class' membership (Ibid. 8). On the other hand, PLS also took a very pessimistic stance towards the EU during the 2001 election campaigns. According to them, their Eurosceptic attitude was resulted from their EU- realistic behaviour since they have taken a hard line in order to defend Polish interests and not to be exploited by the 'rich man's club' (ibid. 8). The Self Defence (Samoobrona) party, like the PLS adopted a Eurosceptic policy out of economic concerns, accusing the West of exploiting Poland and specifically blaming the EU in its election programme (ibid. 7). The League of Polis Families (LPR) party's sceptical attitude towards the EU was not based on economic concerns, but on a principled objection to the EU, out of concern for the continuation of Poland as a sovereign statehood (ibid. 9).

Although sceptical attitudes continued after membership, it has changed its shape in some ways. For example, in 2004, the Law and Justice (PiS) party prepared manifestos specially for the European Parliament elections, emphasising the EU as a 'Europe of Nations', which is a union of sovereign states based on Christian Values (Staszcyz, 2016, cited in Anders et al., 2021). For the same reason, PiS opposed all federalist tendencies within the EU and argued that the European Commission must remain as independent as possible and that the European Commission should be an independent decision center which is capable of resisting the pressure of 'powerful members' of the EU, and the stated that this was in the interest of Poland (PiS, 2011: 223, cited in Anders et al., 2021).

in the following part of the study, political- party based Euroscepticism and elite rhetoric will be analysed in detail in the following sections in order to maintain research coherence. First, however, the following important questions arises here as follows: (1) why is the Polish public mass largely pro-EU, while the political elites are Eurosceptic? And (2) Why do pro-EU Poles vote for Eurosceptic leaders? First, while the mass level focuses on the benefits of membership

[2] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meps/en/search/advanced?name=&countryCode=PL

and as polls show, the public mass is generally expresses their satisfaction with the EU, as far as the political elites concerned, almost all major political parties are sceptical towards the EU; it is occasionally deriving form ideological or strategical grounds in order to defend Poland's national interests and preserve Polish traditions, culture, and sovereignty (Kopecky and Mudde 2002, Riishøj, 2010). Secondly, as for the question of why the pro-EU public elect Eurosceptical leaders, the thing should be remembered here is that European agenda rarely shapes Polish domestic political life and electoral decisions of the mass. From this perspective, the main reason for the public's choice of the PiS leaders is not about their view of Europe (Kaczynski, 2008:15). However, in order to understand the background of the Eurosceptic tendencies of political elites, it would be appropriate to include the major crises that occurred throughout the Poland-EU relations in the following subheading of the study.

4.2.4 Crisis

In Poland, between 2003 and 2007, the ruling right-wing party Law and Justice (PiS) represented a national conservatism and soft Euroscepticism under the Prime Minister Lech Kaczynski (Flamm, 2012: 312). However, in 2007, while PIS lost the elections, and the liberal-conservative PO (Platforma Obywatelska) won the election, The EU was struggling heavily with the economic crisis. While the EU was struggling with the economic crisis, Poland was the only country in the region, compared with the other CEE countries, to avoid recession. Nevertheless, the crisis slowed Poland's economic growth due to the effects of the crisis, which was strongly felt in other neighbouring countries (Meardi and Trapmann,2013; Reichard, 2011). On the other hand, while the crises continue to hit Europe, the most noticeable change of attitude in Poland has been the adoption of the Euro. In other words, adopting Euro while Europe was struggling with the effects of the crisis, was increasingly associated in Poland with the losing national identity. Since adopting the Euro was considered as a loss of national identity, the attachment to the national currency, Zloty has increased (Winstone, 2018). At the same time, Poland's national bank claimed that the Euro crisis had dissipated the beliefs of the Euro for Poland (Meardi and Trapmann, 2013). Therefore, Poland still has not adopted the Euro to date.

After the Euro crisis, which was drastically effective experience for Europe, the refugee crisis, the effects of which are continuing and probably continue in the coming years, has had a great impact on the whole of Europe and has led developing of harsh political discourse in Polish politics and the rise of Eurosceptic voices. In 2015, when the refugee/migration crisis erupted in Europe and the EU's policies regarding the issue which included the relocation of refugees

throughout Europe, Kaczyński accused the EU of acting against the interest of the Polish people and portrayed the EU as the manifestation of the incompetent political elite (Chezi and Zgut, 2020:10). For example, in this much-referenced speech in 2015, Kaczyński emphasised the violation of the principle of the constitution, the citizenship rights, and the breaking of the sovereignty of the people. Also, he blamed the European Union for colonization in which Poland did not participate and claimed that they have to right to protect their country from this smear campaign conducted by 'Poland's mortal enemies'. Also, he was bringing a point that it is an issue about the protection of their identity as follows: he emphasised that they must defend themselves against possible external attacks such as attacks on fundamental values, attacks on the family, on the church and attacks on their freedom, even if these freedoms no longer exist everywhere in Europe (PAR, 2015, cited in Chezi & Zgut, 2020).

Later in 2016, the security concerns of immigration were emphasised and Poland's strict adherence to Christian values and national sovereignty emphasised and clearly stated "We do not accept to take foreigners!" (Ibid. 10). Also, in 2018 referring to some EU member's long history of colonisation, he emphasised that Poland did not exploit the countries from which the refugees came, that Poland did not invite them to Europe, and that they were opposed to a social catastrophe that the EU was trying to impose on Poland in return for EU funds (Ibid. 10).

In 2017, Law and Justice also introduced a new judicial reform broadly debated under the violation of the rule of law. The adopted acts on these reforms of the ordinary courts, the National Council for the Judiciary and the Supreme Court took place a very controversial atmosphere and were met with warnings from both national legal experts and foreign ones - from the EU commission and the EU general Jagland- these controversial reforms were also encountered with mass protests and the opposition called reforms as 'deform' but the desired systematic change was finally realised (Kaczyński, 2019: 9). However, the issue here is that it was not about only simple changing the law; therefore, an important part of the law was changing judges, forcing them to retire, intimidating or controlling their appointments (Ibid. 9). Moreover, these controversial reforms were already discussed by Kaczyński in 2014, even before the PIS returned back to power, and when the PIS came back to the power in October 2015, the PIS started to change the structure of the Constitutional Court, and took over the media, turning it into a propaganda organ of the state under the so-called "new media order" (Lazowski, 2016). After all these rule of law concerns, the European Commission adopted several rules of law recommendations in 2016 and 2017 which stating its grave concerns about the judicial reforms and the threat to the rule of law in Poland (Buras and Dalhuisen et al.,

2019). Given the circumstances of the country's justice system, European Commission has decided to start the Article 7 procedure, which escalates the situation in Poland. Aftermath of the Article 7 procedures, Populist national sovereignty rhetoric increased in Poland, and Kaczyński called critics of the judicial reforms 'The worst of Poles' and added, 'we will not allow anyone in the EU to tell us which path to follow' (Chesi and Zgut, 2020) which fuelled the debate between the government and the EU.

With regard of the democracy in Poland, which was already questionable, Kaczyński used a populist argument which exploited the antagonism between the people and the elites, emphasising that the Poles or the government elected by them had to right to restore the republic against the will of elites (2017 CON, cited in Chesi & Zgut, 2020).

As seen in from the crisis periods discussed above, although Poland was the only country that suffered the least from the Eurozone crisis in the CEE, the subsequent migration crisis has also provided a basis for the rise of Eurosceptical voices. Moreover, the question of democracy in the country, which is increasingly moving towards an authoritarian regime, with the recent regulations regarding the judicial system and media reform in contradiction with the fundamental principles of the EU and the European commission's concerns about the developments in Poland have gone so far to invoke the Article 7 procedure. However, in this context, such an explicit Eurosceptic attitude in Poland requires an understanding of the country's internal dynamics and Eurosceptic party systems. For this purpose, the following sub sections will examine the main features of Eurosceptic party systems in Poland and move on to examine the year 2015 when the Eurosceptic politics came to the front again in the country.

4.3. The Main Characteristics of the Polish Eurosceptic Party System

The growing political importance of the Polish debate on European integration is reflected in the recent local government elections in 2019, when European issues were more important than domestic issues. Therefore, it is clear that the role of the EU has been gradually increasing since Poland's accession to the EU in 2004, and the rise of Eurosceptic politics in both national and European politics in Poland has thus become even more important to examine. From this perspective, before describing the Eurosceptic parties in Poland, it is important to look how the phenomenon of party-based Euroscepticism in Poland emerged, and how scholars have defined it. Szczerbiak and Taggart (2004), who analysed party-based Euroscepticism in Central and Eastern European Countries, identified three 'hard' Eurosceptic parties (the Polish Agreement, Self Defence, and the Union of Real Politics). Also, they described three 'soft' Eurosceptic

parties (the Christian National Union, the Polish Peasants' Party, and the Movement for the reconstruction of Poland). They also concluded that the level of Euroscepticism in Poland was lower than in other Central and Eastern European countries and the 'hard' type of Euroscepticism is even less than 'soft' Euroscepticism. This argument was valid on that time of their article, but soon during the 2001-2004 parliamentary elections, Eurosceptic parties strengthened its votes and following the 2005-2007 elections, Law and Justice government with its junior 'hard' Eurosceptic partners League of Polish Families and Self-defence.

Kopeck and Mudde (2002) analysed party-based Euroscepticism in four candidate countries in Central and Eastern Europe, and according to their categorisation in the Polish case, they categorised Polish political parties as follows: (1) euro-enthusiasts: Civic Platform, the Democratic Left Alliance, the Polis Peasants' Party, and Freedom Union, (2) Eurosceptics: Solidarity Electoral Action, and Law and Justice. (3) Euro-rejects: Self Defence and the League of Polish Families. In their categorisation, there was no Euro-pragmatics party in Poland in the late 1990s.

Markowski and Tucker (2010) also determined two Eurosceptic parties in Poland as the League of Polish Families and the Self- Defence. According to them Law and Justice and Polish Peasants' Party cannot be included in this categorisation since they considered the Law and Justice party's shift to a more Eurosceptic discourse after 2004 as an electoral tool rather than a strategic programmatic goal and Polish Peasants' Party also cannot be included in the Eurosceptic category because of its changing European Policy over time (Markowski and Tucker, 2010).

Another classification of Polish Eurosceptic parties was also provided by Zuba (2006), and he brought three-dimensional categorisation of party-based Euroscepticism in Poland as follows:

Table 4.1: Zuba's three-dimensional categorization of party-based Euroscepticism

Euro-enthusiasts	Euro-realists	Eurosceptics
Pro-integration	Ambivalent attitude towards integration	against integration

Source: Zuba (2006)

According to the author, he believed that Euro-enthusiast is already a self-explanatory part of the category. However, when it comes to Euroscepticism, it was defined as being opposed to joining the EU or supporting the idea of withdrawal from the EU. According to him, this perspective required another categorisation for ambivalent attitudes towards the EU. Zuba has

observed concluded that some parties may be in favour of integration in principle, but their proposals for alternative ways of integrating Europe, may not be entirely realistic. In other words, while Zuba (2006) brought Taggart and Szczerbiak's 'soft' Euroscepticism to his category of Euro-realists, his Euroscepticism was limited to the 'hard' Euroscepticism of Szczerbiak and Taggart.

In the Polish case, Zuba classified (2006) as Eurosceptic the League of Polish Families, Self-Defence, the Polish Agreement, the Movement for Reconstruction of Poland, and the Union of Real Politics. Also, he put Law and Justice, Polish Peasants' Party, the Christian National Union, and Solidarity Electoral Action into the Euro-realists category.

In light of the definitions as mentioned above and categorisations, briefly describe each Eurosceptic party in order to identify the nature of Eurosceptic parties in Poland. First and foremost, the Christian National Union was the first Party which is founded in 1989 and an important example to Eurosceptic parties in Poland since it had a tight association with the Catholic Church, and the party was following the Catholic Church's directions regarding the role of religion, the family, and abortion in public life, Although the Party successfully participated the 91 and 93 elections, after 2001, it could not enter the Sejm, and gradually lost its function (Napieralski, 2015: 104). On the other hand, Zuba (2006) asserted that most of the Eurosceptical tendencies of the party derived from its perception of the EU as an organisation that threat Polish national identity based on Christian identity and values.

In 1999, after the breaking of the Christian National Union, radically anti-EU politicians formed a new party under the name of the Polish Agreement, whose main element of party activity is opposition to Poland's membership in the EU and NATO. Also, in 2001 the Polish Agreement joined the newly formed the League of Polish Families, but this coalition also ended in 2003.

The League of Polish Families (LPR) was formed in 2001, and their party programme primarily focused on criticising the EU in, economic, political, and ideological aspects. (Zuba, 2006, cited in Zuba, 2009). The Party even opposed the EU accession during the referendum campaign, and they called for rejection of the accession treaty, and they carried an 'No' campaign before the accession referendum. So, in terms of their European policy, one can say that LPR was the most Eurosceptic Party in Poland.

The Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland (MRP), which is formed by former Prime Minister Jan Olszewski in 1995, was also a conservative Party which was vehemently opposed to liberalization and anti-abortion law, and party's stance towards the EU was ambiguous and

they preferred to stay silent about the EU issue. However, the party's policy gradually returned to the anti- EU position (Bugajski, 2021: 398).

Self-Defence (Samoobrona) was founded as a farmer's union, and the populist-agrarian characteristics of Self-Defence made it a protest party. However, in terms of its attitudes to the EU, Self-Defence can be considered as Eurosceptic since, after the 2001 elections, strong criticism of the EU became one of the central policies of the party, which appealed especially to the rural electorate and put forward a vision of the EU membership as a threatening institution for Polish farmers (Lepper, 2003, cited in Yuba, 2009). Moreover, their 2003 referendum campaign used a slogan such as 'The EU? Choice is Yours!' in a very enigmatic, critical way. Also, according to Szczerbiak (2012), Self-Defence is a protest movement without any strong values or ideology or even a well-organized party programme. But after 2006, the party did not participate any European debate and make any influence on European Policy.

Polish Peasants' Party (PSL) was ambivalent about the EU. For example, the party's stance towards the EU in the 2001 elections was in favour of continuing negotiations with the EU and receiving full subsidies for farmers from the EU, while on the other hand, it was demanded that the sale of Polish agricultural lands to foreigners be prohibited for 18 years. (Zuba, 2009: 332). However, after the accession to the EU, the PSL the EU issue became a secondary issue, and they only declared that they would support a constitutional treaty if it would be to Poland's advantage and if it would include resolutions with an emphasis on Christian values of the Union (PSL, 2004, cited in Zuba, 2009). On the other hand, when it comes to the 2005 elections, the PSL dropped its criticism of the EU, by referring to the opportunity created by the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) to modernise of Polish agriculture. On the other aspect, party retreated from its Eurosceptic stance. However, it remained cautious regarding the possibility of introducing the Euro in Poland and criticised the Constitutional treaty while it was supporting the idea of Common European Foreign and Defence Policy, a common Energy Policy and further enlargement of the EU (Kaczyński 2008, cited in Bugajski, 2020).

Law and Justice (PiS) had an ambivalent attitude towards the EU issue from the very beginning (2001). On the one hand, it argued that Poland is already historically anchored in Europe, but on the other hand, the party did not hesitate to stress the possible cultural and economic risks of membership. In addition to its ambivalent attitude, PiS strongly criticised the conditions of Poland's accession to the EU that was negotiated by under the Leszek Miller government. Nevertheless, at the congress on 18 January 2003, PiS behaved in favour of Poland's EU

accession to the EU, despite the different views within the party on the accession issue. On the other hand, after accession, PiS started to oppose EU's Constitution resolutions strongly; therefore, declared that they would only accept the European constitutional treaty if it referred to the Christian roots of Europe and if the European Constitutional treaty renounced its supremacy over national constitutions (Zuba, 2009). When the party came to power in the 2005 election, although the party has always maintained the general assertation that 'they will valiantly defend Polish interests in the EU, it has refrained from explicit criticism of the EU.

After the fall of the Law and Justice coalition government and its subsequent loss of power in 2007, the party decided to intensify its Eurosceptic discourse by turning back to the 'Euro-realisim' and endorsing the Gaullist notion of a 'Europe of Nations'. In this regard, the Law and Justice, as emphasised by Ryszard Legutko who is a member of the EU parliament, opposes a federalist model in the EU and believes that a federalist European State would be to the detriment of Poland, and Law and Justice certainly do not want to give any more powers to Brussels (R. Czanercki, 2013, cited in Napieralski,2020).Another important characteristic of the Law and Justice Party's Eurosceptic rhetoric was its Anti-German sentiments. The stereotypical belief that a federal Europe which is dominated by the German vision of Europe does not apply to Poland, or that saying 'more Europe' is an implicit expression of saying more Germany, is also often found in Polish Eurosceptic rhetoric (ibid.108).

Finally, the outright elements of the Party's European Policy are the protection of national sovereignty and Christian values as an inseparable part of Polish identity. So, their perspective to protect their national sovereignty and independence is protecting their social order from liberal trends are represented by the EU since they consider it as endanger to their national-traditional values.

In sum, all those Eurosceptic parties changed their attitudes towards the EU throughout the years during the pre-accession and post-accession periods; Self-Defence changed its attitude from Eurosceptic to Euro-Realist, and Polish Peasant's Party changed their attitude more considerably from Eurosceptic to Euro-Enthusiasts. In this respect, The Law and Justice Party adopts a 'soft' Eurosceptic stance, although it has sometimes also pursued a Euro-Realist policy. However, since Law and Justice maintain a considerably more Eurosceptic policy than these other parties moreover, since it is still a highly controversial issue within the EU, this study aims to deeply examine in the following sections the formation of Eurosceptic rhetoric of the Law and Justice in Polish Politics and its impact on the EU level.

4.3.1. Euroscepticism Entering the Polish Parliament and the Democratic Backsliding since 2015

In autumn of 2015, after the Polish Parliamentary elections, the coalition government under the Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwo´s´c— PiS) party came back to power, benefiting from a shift in the popular vote to the PiS party due to public discontent with reforms carried out under the previous Platforma Obywatelska (PO) government (Marcinkiewic and Stegmaier, 2016). During the election campaigns, PiS's focus on social agenda such as family, education, pensions, etc. received broad support, moreover, they received considerable support from young voters (Śliwiński, 2016). At the same time, the refugee crisis that peaked in Europe in September 2015 influenced the PiS policies. In this crisis atmosphere anti-migrants rhetoric was added to the election campaigns, claiming that refugees would bring disasters to Europe. Furthermore, The PiS did not miss the opportunity to use these arguments as an election campaign, saying that Poland would have to take more than 100,000 refugees unless Poland changed its government (Burak and Knaus, 2018). This Anti- refugee rhetoric played a considerable role in the PiS's electoral victories, as the EU was also considering of relocating a few thousand refugees in Poland in the wake of the massive wave of immigration in those years, and this was encountered with fear among the population.

In the immediate aftermath of the elections, a series of developments occurred in Poland that triggered debates about the democratic backsliding of Poland and its status as Europe's 'awkward' partner. Following the elections, controversial issues such as Prime Minister Szydlo's decision to remove the European flag from the rostrum at a press conference, the declaration of a plan to dismiss 27 judges of the country's highest court, government attempts to rein in the media, the relocation of refugees issue, and the feeling of Europe's oldest forest came to the fore. However, the most commented on subject was the government's judicial reform, which triggered the Article 7 procedure of the Treaty of the European Union and procedures for violating the rule of law (Dulak, 2021:157). As a result of the highly controversial judicial reform, which was raised concerns that the retirement age for dismissals will be from 70 to 65 and that this will pave the way for the Polish government to appoint powerful pro-government figures as judges of the highest court, the European Commission has announced that it is putting in place the Article 7 procedure, which would theoretically strip Poland of its voting rights in the EU's organs (Becker, Müller, and Schult, 2018). However, the sanctions that could have been taken unanimously have unfortunately been blocked since Hungary has announced that it will veto any possible decisions against Poland. In addition,

judges affected by the dismissals due to the aforementioned judicial reforms resisted, and this resistance turned into protests involving thousands of people across the country.

On the other hand, the changes regarding the Polish media are also noteworthy when it considered Poland was seen as a success story in developing an independent and pluralistic media in the 1990s after the end of communist era (Babownika, 2018).However, following the media reforms, PiS has carried out many attacks to silence independent media, critical journalism, and watchdog journalism, disabling media freedom and as a consequence of these attempts, almost all media outlets in the country have become propaganda tools of the state, and the primary goal of these reforms was to "repolonise" and "deconcentrate" the media (MFRR, 2020).

The PiS, which has repeatedly described itself as a defender of Polish culture, values, and identity […], has stated that it will prevent some 'risky' cultural values that try to influence Polish society in a supranational manner and are not accepted by a large part of the society from finding a place in the country (Fomina, 2017:146). It is also clear that what is meant here in terms of some risky values and externally imposed values are the promised equality for the LGBT community and the legalization of abortion (Adekoya, 2014). According to Hoppe and Puhl (2016) What the PiS sees as a threat to Polish culture and what it opposes are the EU, the liberals, those who benefit from globalisation, those who want to recognise same-sex marriages and those who would bring in large of numbers of Muslim refugees […] if they had the chance.

The PiS government frequently criticise the EU for not being democratic and transparent. In addition, it demands more sovereignty for nation states by combining this with anti-German rhetoric since they think that Germany is an aggressor member of the EU who interfere with Poland's domestic politics and damage its country (Puhl, 2018).

The growing Eurosceptic attitude and increasing isolation in Polish politics show that Poland's old trauma of being surrounded by enemies persists. So much so that Poland still considers the EU as unreliable and too weak and disunited to be trusted (Hoppe and Puhl, 2016). In January 2023, the government explicitly announced that they were demanding and insisting on war reparations from Germany for Polish losses in the World War II, demonstrating that Poland's anti-German rhetoric is still strong and How Poland interprets its past and emphasises its victimhood (DW, 2023).

4.3.2. European Union Policy of the Law and Justice Party in the Election Manifestos

Since the end of the communist era in 1989 and the beginning of the Polish transformation, Poland has always seen itself as an integral part of Europe, and the issue of "Return to Europe" has always existed in Poland. Accordingly, European Policy has always found a broad place in its domestic politics.

As was tried to be examined in the previous sections of this study in the section on Eurosceptic parties in Poland, the attitudes of Eurosceptic Political parties have changed over time. Some Political parties like PSL and Self-Defence were Eurosceptic, especially before the accession. However, later PSL changed its Eurosceptic attitudes and pursued moderate EU Policy, and Self-Defence did not participate in any EU debate over time. On the other hand, parties such as the Christian National Union, and League of Polish Families, were Eurosceptic before the accession. However, they could not gain a place in parliament with their harsh rhetoric. At the same time, however, the Law and Justice (PiS) which has been the ruling party in Poland for many years, supported by the public in 2005-2007 and since 2015, has continued its ambivalent Eurosceptic discourse and actions. For this reason, this has been the subject of this study, and the last two election manifestos of 2015 and 2019 will be analysed to look at how Eurosceptic rhetoric is reflected in the Law and Justice's election manifestos and what are the main concerns for being Eurosceptic to the EU.

2015 National Parliamentary Elections

Since the 2015 parliamentary elections were characterised by a succession of post-election decisions that brought Poland and the EU Commission into confrontation, therefore it is appropriate for this study to analyse the PIS party's 2015 election manifesto. In the 2015 national parliamentary election manifesto, the first thing that stands out is how they describe their vision of the EU. They call their European Policy as "Euro-realism instead of aggressive political correctness." As follows:

> "We reject political correctness, i.e., the restrictions imposed today not only through cultural aggression but also through administrative measures and criminal representations, which affect many Europeans more than ever. We do not accept the uncontrolled erosion of the sovereignty of European homelands. We will resolutely defend our freedom in Poland by introducing the most robust possible legal barriers against such practices. This is our Eurorealism […] (PiS,2014); the PIS which defines itself as Euro-realist, has included in its manifesto their opposition to any attempt to foundation of Federalist European Union.:

> "Poland is a sovereign member state of the European union, this membership is beneficial to Poland as well as the organisation as a whole, and it cannot be a way to build structures of a federal state […] (PiS, 2014).

On the other hand, the Party which takes a stance against attempts to deepen any kind of integration that might undermine the Polish culture, national identity, and traditions in case of deepening the European integration, also expressed this stance as follows:

> "We will not introduce Poland into any voluntary solution deepening the degree of European integration, which will not meet the criterion of any unequivocally favouring Polish interests, and we will resign from the objectively unfavourable solutions of deeper coordination in which Poland has already been included. Furthermore, will definitely protect Polish national identity, traditions culture […]" (PiS,2014).

Another striking policy is their insistence on not joining the Eurozone, and the way they express it indicates that they are pursuing this policy to protect Polish interests.

> "The law and Justice will take effective measures to shape the conditions of Poland's membership in the EU in a way that preserves, and where necessary to restores, the primacy of Polish interest. Naturally, this applies to maintaining the Zloty and subjectivity as Poland's national currency. […]" (PiS, 2014:159).

Emphasising that the European Union viewed through the prism of Polish interests, the PiS proposes that the EU should pursue a Euro-realist policy and, while saying this, that the logic of' 'being dominated by the strongest' should be reversed, as follows:

> "Poland proposes a reversing of the flawed logic of European politics that prevails today. Instead of pipe dreams of Europe or visions of European domination by the strongest, we propose a Eurorealistic community of nations and states. We consider the European Union through the prism of Polish interests […]" (PiS, 2014).

The PiS also explain their European programme, which they call 'returning Europe to its roots in three points as follows:

> "The Law and Justice Programme for Europe is a Union of common sense, that is why we preach a programme to return Europe to the roots of its integration. We declare the necessity to put the Union back on its feed. Our European Union model is (1) A union many regional centres rather than divided into a single decision-making centre in the Euro area and dependent periphery. (2) A Union of equal states, not hierarchy between states. (3) Union of de-regulation, not more sanctions, bans, orders" (PiS, 2014).

The PiS, which places national sovereignty above the EU, declares that there is an established belief that the progress of integration within the EU should naturally be accompanied by a reduction in the importance of the functions and organs of its nation-state, which they are totally against it in any case.

> "The basic thinking of political and legal elites associated with the ruling camp, must change, regarding the effects of European integration. In Poland, it seems there is a belief that the progress of integration must be accompanied, as it were naturally, by the declining importance of the functions and organs of our nation-state. According to this concept, 'more Europe must mean less Poland' it is also argued that sovereignty is irresponsibility. We disagree with this and say clearly: this trend of thinking and acting must lose its impact on Polish Policy. [….] (PiS, 2014:149).

As it will be shown hereinafter, similar patterns of their EU policies, adorned with proposals on national sovereignty, independence, national values, and a return to the EU to its roots, are also present in the 2019 manifesto.

2019 National Parliamentary Elections

In its 2019 national parliamentary election manifesto, the Law and Justice Prawo i Sprawiedliwo´s´c— PiS) openly described its viewpoint regarding the EU as "Our Eurorealism" stating as follows:

> "While we appreciate the importance and achievements of the European Union, we believe that it needs to change. For us, The European Union is first and foremost "a union of nations". We favour a "Europe of the homelands." We want treaties to be respected and principles of subsidiarity to be respected. We reject political correctness, i.e., restrictions on freedom of expression and opinion, which increasingly affect many Europeans, and are we now imposed not only through cultural violence but also through administrative measures and criminal repression. We do not accept the uncontrolled erosion of the sovereignty of the European nations. We will resolutely defend our freedom by introducing strong legal barriers against such practices" (PiS, 2019).

Furthermore, they describe Polish Europeanness as: "Poland has been part of the European tradition from the very beginning of its history, we combined it with the adoption of Christianity, which introduced us to the classical heritage-Greek Philosophy and Roman law; these three trends permeated Polish culture and ennobled the Polish national experience. […] During our resistance to communism, we aspired to become an internal part of Western

Civilization while fighting for Polish independence. The fall of communism has allowed us free to enjoy "our" European heritage (PiS, 2019).

They do not neglect to refer to the Christian roots of Europeanness.: "Poles feel a lively connection to their Western heritage while at the same time being committed to Christianity. […] Poles are still Europeans in the Christian sense. This Europeanness- both in the past and today- is largely due to the strong presence of Christianity and, in particular the Catholic Church. All past and present interventions in Polish identity detach us from European heritage and replace it with ideological projects of a new society which are dangerous for Europe and Poland" (PiS, 2019).

The party also emphasises that Europe is strong thanks to its cultural diversity, refers to the diversity of cultures of "Europeans" and says that the creation of an artificial "supranational" culture would undermine the union: "We advocate a strong Europe in diversity. However, the realities of today's Europe make us question our relationship with the ideas that underpin European unification. We believe that Europe's current crisis is the result of a move away from these ideas, and while we reject any attempt to cultural unification, at the same time, we reject the hegemony of one of two states' culture in our continent" (PiS, 2019).

In addition to European policy, which is developed in line with the values and principles of the party, there has been a strong emphasis on the notion of "sovereignty" as an outright element of Polish Euroscepticism, most notably in the areas of countryside, agriculture, defence, and foreign policy. The party emphasize that in order to protect the Polish land will not become easy prey for foreign investors in favour of Polish farmers, and in particular, accuses the PSL representatives, of accepting the EU's discrimination against Polish farmers in terms of subsidies as follows:

> "If today, especially PSL representatives ask why subsidies are still not equalised, our answer is this: the governments with PSL participation have servilely agreed to discriminate against Polish farmers" […] (PiS, 2019).

On the other aspect, the PiS always stressed Poland's meaningful existence in Europe by saying: "Law and Justice is a Euro-realist party and 'Poland is the heart of Europe" […] Europe will be stronger thanks to a subjective and dynamic Poland, but that membership in any international organisation should not harm the Polish state. […] (PiS, 2019).

The PiS also referred to the EU parliamentary elections, which took place in the same years as the Polish parliamentary elections and considered the support of Poles for their party in the EU Parliamentary elections as a sign to continue its European policy: "In the 2019 European elections, Poles showed great confidence in Law and Justice, which we perceive as an imperative to continue our European Policy. As the intergovernmental negotiations and the election of the new President of the European Commission have shown, we are strong and effective in pursuing Poland's interests in the EU, we did not hesitate to oppose the decisions of the EU majority, which clearly contradicted Poland's interests" (PiS, 2019).

The PiS also criticised the EU's refugee policy, stressing that it had withdrawn its approval for the relocation of migrants in Poland despite various pressures and that it was leading the EU to change its policy on this issue: "The Polish government immediately withdrew its consent to the relocations of migrants in our country, and we also caused a change in EU policy on this issue towards voluntariness […] (PiS, 2019).

Poland's long-standing policy of not adopting Euro was also repeated in the 2019 manifesto as: "We were in favour of the zloty remaining the Polish national currency. But, as our predecessors did, we gave the euro an economic, not an ideological meaning. At present, we see no economic reasons for the introduction of Euro in Poland" (PiS, 2019).

* * *

In short, as the 2019 manifesto specifically states, the PiS, which defines itself as the hearth of Europe, has a Euro-realist perspective, shaping European policies through the prism of its interest and emphasising on all occasions its opposition to any attempt to create a supranational federalist institution or supranational European culture by placing national sovereignty and values above the EU, and no doubt that expressed this in similar ways in both the 2015 and the 2019 election manifestos. Therefore, in the light of its Euro-realist policies, and as supported by the previous sections in this chapter, sovereignty, national independence, values, and Poles' Christian roots, have been a sore point for Poland, as seen in the deepening of the European integration, the established fear of violating these values has been the basis for ambivalent and sceptical European policies, even though they describe this as a 'Euro-realistic' vision.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

This dissertation aimed to examine Euroscepticism in Poland through the mainstream PiS party, which manifests varying degrees of Euroscepticism in light of the existing frameworks pointed out by numerous scholars in the literature. For this purpose, the concept of Europeanization, which was prominent through European integration, tried to establish a connection between the development of Euroscepticism in Poland, which was the subject of considerable debates throughout the European integration; therefore, this study aims to reveal how Poland, which was initially eager to integrate into Europe and already considered itself as European, has become a country that can be labelled a Eurosceptic country in the heart of Europe.

Europeanization, which is defined in the broadest sense, as the study of how existing member states and prospective members has been the subject of various studies in the literature with such broad research strands such as the Europeanization; chapter two of this dissertation is devoted to showing Europeanization literature on Europeanization of candidate states, and new members have developed alongside the EU harmonisation process that candidate states in Central and Eastern Europe have undergone prior to accession. Although the literature on Europeanization seems to define three areas of differentiation between policy, polity, and politics, most of the Europeanisation literature has devoted significant focus to the development of institutions at the European level, policy implementation and institutionalisation in decision-making processes in domestic politics at the national level, however, when it comes to the domestic politics of countries, party systems, party politics, and competition between political parties have become important where the concrete consequences of Europeanization. Nevertheless, it has been argued that European integration does not have a direct effect on the national political parties of the EU member states and may have only a limited impact (Mair,1999:30). Given the findings of this study, the mainstream Polish Political party PiS demonstrates the necessity for a reconsideration of Mair's argument and provides tangible examples of how European issue shapes party position and attitudes towards the European Union. From another perspective, Based on Janzcak's (2010: 10) argument that Europeanization may turn into de-Europeanization or counter-Europeanization, the chapter on Poland reveals that Counter Europeanisation tendencies, meaning the stagnation of Polish Europeanization over time, are manifested in national party manifestos with discourses that avoid deeper integration at the expense of national sovereignty and national interests etc.

The chapter on Europeanization also shows that Europeanization in the East differs from Europeanization in the West with different dynamics and starting points. In the broadest sense, the Europeanization process in Central and Eastern European countries coincides with the transition to democracy and market economy. At the same time, the Europeanisation process in Central and Eastern European countries starts with the conditionality of EU membership exerting tremendous pressure on the candidate countries. While this approach emphasises the differences of Eastern Europeanization from its Western counterpart and concludes that the national context of each country largely shapes the impacts and outcomes of Europeanization. Moreover, while the Europeanization literature has initially assumed a convergence effect of Europeanization for member states and candidates, the empirical analysis of the manifestos of the mainstream ruling PiS party in the Polish case reveals that the Europeanization of national politics has led to more divergence than convergence due to the party's specific approaches towards the EU. Especially in the late 1990s, in the first years of the post-communist rule, the 'Return to Europe' approach, emphasising the advantages and disadvantages of joining the European Union, initiated debates that tried to distance Poland from European idealism. Hence, given the attitudes towards the EU in those years, EU accession became a significant subject of debate at the mass and political elite levels, and politics of Euroscepticism found its own place in Poland's party systems and politics in different forms.

In general, an overview of what can be seen in the analysis of the Political parties in Poland, which are categorized as Eurosceptic due to their policies and which have been involved in politics under different names over time, reveals that their Eurosceptic stance, which is based on common codes such as the principle of preservation of the traditional family structure, the fear that Western Europe would damage Polish values, and the view of Poland as the last bastion of Christianity in Europe has been manifested in almost all large or small-scale Eurosceptic parties in Poland since the late 1990s. In a similar vein, these common codes have led to the adoption of anti-EU rhetoric not only by marginal ones, but also mainstream parties on issues where Poland's national interests are perceived to be at stake and anti-EU rhetoric has become a common expression at both Political sphere and mass level.

Chapter 3 of the dissertation, which presents different conceptualizations on the Euroscepticism, has revealed significant findings relating to the party-based Euroscepticism as this study takes the Polish mainstream political PiS party as a concrete example of Eurosceptic parties. Therefore, the key findings are in this section as follows: How political parties understand the European issue has been the main determinant of their attitudes and policies

towards Europe. From this point of view, the role of ideological and strategic factors in party-based Euroscepticism has been discussed with the North and Sussex school' approaches to how the role of ideological and strategic factors shape Euroscepticism, and it is revealed that Sussex School argues that ideological factors are a significant determining factor of Euroscepticism also reflected in the Polish PiS party policies which are directed with ideological concerns has also confirmed the Sussex School understanding.

On the one hand, in order to reveal the divergent dynamics of Euroscepticism in Western and Eastern Europe, it has been discussed here, and it has been revealed that the members of Eastern Europe have undergone significant changes in the economic, social, and political sphere that the Western Europe have had for a long time. Therefore, it is concluded that Euroscepticism in the East has different roots than Euroscepticism in the West as it has experienced radical transformations in the areas mentioned above and it has different dynamics Euroscepticism in the West, as it understood that pre- and post-accession conjuncture and expectations in Eurosceptic attitudes.

As for fourth chapter of this dissertation which examines Poland as a concrete example of Euroscepticism in the heart of Europe in order to answer the research question of the dissertation, present findings and to test the hypotheses of the study with empirical data, the fourth chapter of the study discussed the Euroscepticism in Poland through the PiS party and addressed the issue from several aspects. Therefore, before analysing the Euroscepticism in the specific case of the PiS party, this chapter briefly discussed the turning points in Poland-EU relations, then draws attention to the crises in bilateral relations that have fuelled Eurosceptic attitudes both in the elite and mass levels, accordingly, presented some significant opinion polls regarding public attitudes towards the EU that has been published in some significant dates in the Poland-EU relations. Furthermore, in order to analyse the dynamics of Euroscepticism at the mass and the political elite levels, it is discussed separately and, most importantly, addresses one of the main issue that the study seeks to demonstrate that Euroscepticism can manifest itself not only in radical marginal parties but also in mainstream political parties, Polish Eurosceptic political parties have been analysed in general terms and more depth with the national election manifestos of the mainstream ruling PiS party, which is also the subject of debates within the EU with its controversial Eurosceptic attitudes.

Chapter four also presents significant findings to answer the question of this dissertation of how the mainstream Law and Justice party problematizes Europe and European integration in domestic politics and why and how they use Eurosceptic rhetoric. Therefore, the significant

findings that can answer this dissertation's question are as follows: firstly, both the 2015 and the 2019 party manifestos revealed that even though the Law and Justice party defines itself as 'Euro-realist' in both manifestos, it shows "soft" Eurosceptic characteristics by not openly opposing the EU, and its general view on the EU issue is shaped around the fact that while recognising the importance of the EU as a union and appreciating its achievements, they declare that the EU needs to change or be reorganised, and they clearly state that a change is a must. Secondly, both manifestos underline their opposition to any supranationalist imposition in cultural, social, and political spheres, emphasizing that Poland contributes value to the European Union but that membership in the Union should not be to the detriment of the Polish state. In a similar way, while criticising some of the EU policies, the major criticisms generally revolve around the fact that the EU should not impose anything detrimental to Poland's national sovereignty and that they are opposed to any deepened integration that, if deepened, could undermine Poland's national sovereignty, ideology, identity, religious, socio-cultural structure, and its economic interests. In parallel with this, they are against any attempt to establish a Federalist European Union; therefore, they are opposed to all kinds of restrictions imposed by cultural, administrative, and penal means that restrict them, and they always keep the interests of Poland above the EU, and they are constantly emphasizing that they are considering the EU through the prism of Polish national interests.

On the one hand, the Law and Justice, which emphasizing that it has always seen itself as a part of Europe, points out that Poland is European, in the Christian sense as well, and that any interference in Polish identity and values distances Poland from Europe, past and present, and is a danger for both Poland and Europe. Another striking argument of the party is that they are in favour of the cultural diversity of Europe and argue that any attempt to create a supranational culture above nations could undermine the Union. Thus, they refuse the hegemony of one any one culture within Europe. Hence, although the Law and Justice party describes itself as a 'Euro-realist' party in both manifestos, the finding shows that the major crises throughout Polish EU relations, the ideological path the party has taken, and sovereignty, as mentioned earlier, socio-cultural, and ethically based concerns have fuelled their Eurosceptic rhetoric.

On the other hand, the last chapter of this study discussed the elite and the mass level Euroscepticism, which is significant for understanding the distinctive features of Euroscepticism in Poland. Therefore, it revealed worthwhile findings. In this sense, this study, which sees the necessity to shed light on how political elites construct Eurosceptic rhetoric, while at the same time revealing how the EU issue is being understood at the mass level in

Poland has demonstrated on the basis of the polls it has selected, that the general attitude towards the EU at the mass level is notably high in a positive sense, but at the same time, although there is a high level of general satisfaction and enthusiasm at the mass level towards the EU, when it comes to the notions of national sovereignty, national interests, ethics and moral values on which the Law and Justice party based its Eurosceptic arguments, there has been a notable drop in the attitude towards the EU at the mass level, leading to the following conclusion that Although the Poles can be considered one of the most Euro-enthusiast nation among the European countries, when it comes to issues such as national sovereignty, ethics, morals, values, national interests, etc., they are just as Eurosceptic as the political elites.

In light of the findings, although this study's one of the hypotheses regarding the election of Eurosceptic parties means that Eurosceptic attitudes are also predominate at the mass level can be partially proven on the basis of the findings. However, it cannot be argued that the public mass is absolutely Eurosceptic. That is to say, the findings of both Eurobarometer and CBOS polls reveal that the general level of satisfaction with Europe among the Polish public is still relatively high. From this perspective, we cannot say that the public is electing Eurosceptic parties purely out of Eurosceptic concerns. On the other hand, another hypothesis of the study, which argues that Whenever concerns about phenomena such as sovereignty, nationalism and national interests rise, Euroscepticism is evident at both party and mass levels, can be proven by the findings of the study, as it has been observed that Eurosceptic voices have been raised both at the mass level and among the political elites, when national sovereignty, social, ethical, values and national interests are at stake, as well as the political elites have reflected their Eurosceptic attitudes in their domestic party politics.

Since one of the main aims of this study is to examine how Europeanization and, thus European issue is understood in domestic party politics and how it can be transformed into a Eurosceptic stance in the case of Poland through the Law and Justice Party, this study presents that one of the main assumptions of the Europeanization on political parties namely that the pledge of full membership to the EU has distanced political parties in Central and Eastern Europe from Eurosceptical political discourses and anti- EU policies, can be also confirmed, the top-down approach of Europeanization on the other hand can lead to the rise of sceptical voices against the EU and cleavages within the Union.

Although Poland has shown sceptical tendencies both among the mass and the political elite levels when it comes to issues such as sovereignty, national interests, and moral values, there is still a considerable level of general satisfaction with Europe at the mass level. Therefore, the

idea of leaving the EU, as in the case of the United Kingdom, is almost impossible for Poland. However, it is concluded that Polish Euroscepticism is more about re-organizing the EU than about leaving the EU. Hence, based on the findings of this thesis, I believe that it is worth further exploring why the concept of sovereignty in Poland is still such a sensitive issue today, and given the stagnation points of Europeanization can open up another set of questions about the question of whether the Counter-Europeanization occurring in Poland in the areas of ethical and sovereignty based issues since the Law and Justice came to power in 2015, could lead to de-Europeanization in the future.

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