

T.C.
ISTANBUL KÜLTÜR UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF GRADUATE STUDIES

**THE IMPACT OF ILLIBERAL REGIONAL POWERS IN WESTERN
DEMOCRACY PROMOTION IN RUSSIA AND CHINA REGIONS: RUSSIA AND
CHINA IN PERSPECTIVE**

MA Thesis by

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Department: International Relations

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OLABODE OMOWAYEOLA GABRIEL

DEDICATION

**I DEDICATE THIS WORK TO THE UKRANIAN PEOPLE WHO LOST THEIR LIVES
IN THE COURSE OF DEFENDING THEIR TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND TO ALL
DEMOCRACY ENTHUSIASTS GLOBALLY.**



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KISA ÖZET

Huntington (1991:13) 'Üçüncü Dalga: Geç Yirminci Yüzyılda Demokratikleşme' adlı eserinde üç demokratikleşme dalgası sundu: Batı Avrupa ve Kuzey Amerika'da 19. yüzyılın 'yavaş' dalgası, 1945'te İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan sonraki dalga ve 1970'lerin ortalarında Güney Avrupa'da. Demir Perde'nin yıkılmasıyla sonuçlanan 1989 Devrimlerinden sonra demokratik kazanımlar oldu. Ancak Freedom House raporlarına göre, demokrasi büyümesi yalnızca endişe verici bir şekilde yavaşlamakla kalmadı, aynı zamanda özellikle Rusya ve Çin bölgelerinde düşüştü. Bu çalışma ilk olarak Rusya ve Çin'in ekonomik ve askeri yükselişlerini demokrasinin teşvikine karşı silahlandırdığını öne sürüyor. İkinci argüman, ileri demokrasilerin, Rusya ve Çin'in sömürmesi için açık yerel demokratik zayıflıklar bıraktığıdır. Bu çalışma, Ukrayna ve Gürcistan (Rus bölgesi) ile Hong Kong ve Tayvan'da (Çin bölgesi) demokrasi teşvikinin sınırlandırılmasında Rusya ve Çin'in stratejilerini incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Genel amaç, Rus ve Çin etkisi için gerekli demokrasi teşvik modelini anlamaktır.

Anahtar Kelime: Demokrasi, rekabetçi otoriterlik, melez rejimler, demokrasinin teşviki, Çin, Rusya

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ABSTRACT

Huntington (1991:13) in his ‘Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century’ presented three waves of democratization: the ‘slow’ wave of the 19th century in Western Europe and Northern America, the wave after WWII in 1945, and the mid-1970s in Southern Europe. There were democratic gains after the Revolutions of 1989 which culminated in the fall of the Iron Curtain. However, according to Freedom House reports, democracy growth has not only slowed alarmingly, but is on the decline, particularly in Russian and China regions. This study first argues that Russia and China weaponize their economic and military rise against democracy promotion. The second argument is that advanced democracies leave open domestic democratic weaknesses for Russia and China to exploit. This study seeks to examine the strategies of Russia and China in limiting democracy promotion in Ukraine and Georgia (Russian region), and Hong Kong and Taiwan (China region). The overall aim is to understand the model of democracy promotion necessary for the Russian and Chinese impact.

Keyword: Democracy, competitive authoritarianism, hybrid regimes, democracy promotion, China, Russia

LISTS OF TABLE

Table 1: Table showing grants for Georgia’s democracy funding 1992-2018 (Million €)



ACRONYMNS AND MEANINGS

AP Action Plan

NGOsNon-Governmental Organizations

CEPS.....Centre for European Policy Studies

CERMA.....Centre for Enterprise, Management and Restructuring

CFSP.....Common and Foreign Instrument Joint Actions

CIS.....Common wealth of Independent States

CoE..... Council of Europe

CRRC.....Caucasus Research Resource Center CUG– Citizens Union of Georgia

DFID.....Department for International Development

EAGGF.....European Agricultural Guarantee and Guidance Fund

EC..... European Communities

ECHO.....European Community Humanitarian Office

ECU..... European Currency Unit

EED.....European Endowment for Democracy

EDPRP.....Economic Development and Poverty Reduction strategy

EEC.....European Economic Community

EFP.....European Foreign Policy

EIDHR.....European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights

FMF.....Foreign Military Funding

EPC.....European Policy Center

EPF.....Eurasia Partnership Foundation

ETC.....Early Transition Countries

EU..... European Union

EUMM.....European Union Monitoring Mission

EURATOM....European Atomic Energy Community

GDC.....Georgian Dream Coalition

GDP.....Gross Domestic Product

GEPLAC.....Georgian-European Policy and Legal Advice Centre

ICCPR.....International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

IDP.....Internally Displaced Persons

IES.....Institute for European Studies

IMF.....International Monetary Fund

IOM.....International Organization for Migration

ISFED.....International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy

MFA.....Macro-Financial Assistance

NATO.....North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NIP.....National Indicative Programme

ODIHR.....Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

OSCE.....Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

OSGF.....Open Society Georgia Foundation

PACE.....Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe

PCA.....Partnership and Cooperation Agreement

PRGF.....Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility

PRSO.....Poverty Reduction Support Operations

RARP..... Rural Agricultural Reform Programme

SEA.....Single European Act

SIDA..... Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency

SIGMA.....Support for Improvement for Governance and Management

SME.....Small and Medium Enterprises

SSTA.....Small-scale technical assistance

TEU.....Treaty of European Union

TFEU.....Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

TI.....Transparency International

TRACECA.....Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia

UNWFP..... United Nations World Food Programme

UNDP..... United Nations Development Programme

UNFPA.....United Nations Population Fund

UNHCR.....United Nations High Commissioner

VLAP.....Visa Liberalization Action Plan WB– World Bank

WHO.....World Health Organization

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CHAPTER ONE

1:1 INTRODUCTION

Huntington (1991:13) in his 'Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century' presented three waves of democratization to show where democracy was gaining and losing: the first wave which he considered 'slow' wave of the 19th century, brought democracy to Western Europe and Northern America. The second wave he argued, took place after WWII in 1945, and a third wave beginning in the mid-1970s in Southern Europe. He argued that this was followed sequentially Latin America and Asia. Much democratic gains were also gathered after the Revolutions of 1989 culminated in the fall of the Iron Curtain. Democracy promotion continued in the early to mid-1980, with the democracy assistance of the United States under the presidency of Reagan. However, democracy growth has slowed alarmingly according to Freedom House reports. While there are other factors, the impact of illiberal regional powers like Russia and China are notoriously problematic.

This study seeks to examine the strategies of Russia and China in limiting democracy promotion in Ukraine and Georgia (Russian region), and Hong Kong and Taiwan (China region) respectively. The study seeks to understand the model of democracy promotion necessary for the Russian and Chinese impact. This study argues that Russia and China weaponize their economic and military rise against democracy promotion. The second argument is that advanced democracies leave open domestic democratic weaknesses for Russia and China to exploit. This study is important for state and non-state actors of democracy promotion as the findings will further strengthen democracy promotion model and approach amidst the increasing push back from illiberal regional powers such as Russia

and China. By filling the gaps in literature, this study contributes immensely to knowledge, and future researchers will profit from the result of findings.

Democracy promotion, which in alternative terms implies democracy assistance as is the case technical case with the European Union, democracy support, and even democracy building, is one of the strands of foreign policies of the United States, European Union and some international organizations that are involved in the spread of democracy as a political system across the globe. Among the rationales for supporting democracy and its spread include the assumption that states with the democratic political system are less likely to go to war, are more likely to be more socially harmonious, and even more likely to be economically better off. (Burnell, 2008:26-28). Democracy building process therefore includes the strengthening of democracy through the consolidation of democratic institutions and related programme: judiciary and constitutions, press, legislature, and political parties. (Mesquita& Bueno de, 2004:42). In the case of United States, some critics have argued that the United States has used often deployed democracy promotion in the justification of military intervention abroad. (James, 1996:16).

In terms of democratization, although scholars are divided on the precise number of democratic waves, Huntington presented three waves of democratization: the first wave which he considered 'slow' wave of the 19th century, brought democracy to Western Europe and Northern America. The second wave he argued took place after WWII in 1945, and a third wave beginning in the mid-1970s in Southern Europe. He argued that this was followed sequentially Latin America and Asia. Much democratic gains were also gathered after the Revolutions of 1989 culminated in the fall of the Iron Curtain. In this regard, a wave of democratic transitions played out in the former Communist states, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe where many countries democratized. Based on the report from the Freedom House, the number of democracies increased from 41 out of the total of 150 countries in 1974 to 123 out of 192 countries in 2006. (Freedom House, 2007 & 10). However, the pace of democratic transition relatively slowed at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The reduction in pace prompted the discourse on whether or not democracy and its promotion was under threat. While this slowed pace took place, in the early twenty-first

century, democratic deficit was also simultaneously taking place in states where democracy was already in place. These states included Britain, the United States and the European Union. However, within the economic dimension, democracy promotion grew from 2% of aid for democracy in 1990 to 20% aid for democracy in 2005. (Matanock, & AilaM. 2020:211-216).

Both the US and the EU are democratic powers who seek to externalize the constitutive values of democracy. However, until the late 2000s, the US alone was mainly concerned with global active civil society (Wolf-Wurm, 2011:32). The subsequent establishment of the European Endowment for Democracy (EED) ensured that the EU converge with the US to engage active civil society. The formation, constitution and empowerment of the EED was the EU's strategy to engage active civil society in a way that brings adjustments to its traditional democratic script while increasing its leadership position within the actors of democracy promotion. The establishment of the EED subsequently paved the way for the creation and activation of the Civil Society Forum. One of the immediate impacts of the EED and the Civil Society Forum is the systematic coordination of democracy promotion engagements between the US and the EU. Before the EED and the Civil Society Forum, there was no institutionalized coordination and cooperation mechanism between the US and the EU to save crisis situations in target countries. In Ukraine therefore, the EED and the Civil Society Forum, was on ground as the first institutionalized coordination and cooperation mechanism between the US and the EU to save the Ukrainian crisis situations.

Although existed as a private organization devoted to external democracy promotion right from its formation in 1984, it received \$18 million annual budget to fight the 'war of ideas' with the Soviet Union. The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) as a democracy promotion actor was subsequently eclipsed both in scope and effectiveness by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The United States Agency for International Development marked the diminishing of the National Endowment for Democracy, and the beginning of the new trend of democracy promotion. Chile, Paraguay,

Haiti, South Korea, Philippines, Pakistan etc are few of the beneficiaries of the US democracy assistance efforts in the second half of the 1980s. Since then, many countries across all the continents have been impacted directly or indirectly with the multiplication and rise of other actors of democracy promotion like the European Union, and other international organizations. Illiberal regional powers like Russia and China often conceive democracy promotion as anti-communist end, and have often strategically developed authoritarian laws, principles and practices to limit democracy promotion internally and externally.

Democracy promotion has not stopped since the emergence of the current wave which started in the early to mid-1980, beginning with the democracy assistance of the United States under the presidency of Reagan. But while there has been numeric multiplications of actors and models of democracy promotion for over three decades, the consistency in the waves of results has slowed alarmingly of recent times from the reports of Freedom House. While there are other factors, the impact of illiberal regional powers like Russia and China are notoriously problematic.

State and non-state actors of democracy promotion have since increased their commitment with increased democracy promotion and assistance aids. They have also expanded on the models of democracy promotion, using political and economic leverages. (Young, 2006). Democracy promotion of the United States and democracy assistance of the European Union have sponsored the spread of democracy across the world.

The US and the EU have stepped up their democracy promotion policies and strategies in terms of number and reform. This increase in democratic enthusiasm leads to renewed convergence, and has delivered some key results across the world, including illiberal regions like Russia and China. There are Taiwan and Hong Kong to mention in the China region, while Ukraine and Georgia are there in the Russian region. Due to convergence of targets and goals, the democracy promotion policies and strategies of US and those of the EU derive from same traditional interests and rationales; democracy, security and economy (Youngs, 2016:2).

In an increasingly interdependent international affairs where the illiberals also have targets and interests, the democracy promotion programmes of the United States and the European Union can no longer be regarded as the only game in town (Levitsky & Ahmad, 2021:15). The US and EU are some of the powers in the contemporary international system that seek to globalize their political ideologies of democracy, human rights, rule of law and liberty (Carothers, 1997: 110). While there are some individual states and international organizations such as the United Nations, the Council of Europe, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe which are also involved in the programme of promoting democracy, none of the aforementioned currently matches the scale of the US and EU when we consider the size of their economic and political leverage on target countries and regions (Allison & Beschel, 1992:121).

Although the democratization achievements of the West under its myriads of models and programmes are comprehensively convincing, the general impact of the West in terms of democracy promotion and the leadership within actors of democracy promotion have increased the confrontations of illiberal regional powers such as Russia and Ukraine, especially in their regions (Freyburg& Richter, 2020:4-7). The time of EED establishment coincided with the presidential second term of Barack Obama who expanded chances for new policies, strategies and convergence between the US and the EU. This development however prompted the starting point of renewed special interest on the activities of democracy promoters by illiberal powers (Chen & Kinzelbach, 2015:12). Ukraine and Georgia became special cases for contest in the Russian region, as China took to special counter response mechanism in the China region (Delcour&Wolczuk) China renewed its strategy and determination to stop democracy promotion, this time, not merely internally, but also regionally. The Communist Party since then appears to be unconcerned about democratization externally, depending on its own external interest, but deepened its hold on Hong Kong and its Taiwan unification agenda (Chen & Kinzelbach, 2015:21). Hackenesch, (2018:19) argued that while China's rising economic cooperation with African countries has the potentials to minimize democracy promotion effects of the West, China is not bothered by the democratic conditionality of the West.

In Russia on the other hand, Babayan, (2017:37) argues that China inter alia conceives democracy promotion in its region as humongous threat to its geostrategic interests. In reaction in Ukraine and Georgia, Russia renewed its counteracting mechanism. What its leadership deployed is economic satisfaction in exchange for freedom, so that it does not explicitly promote autocracy in its near-abroad and gamble regime. Ukraine and Georgia therefore as Eastern European instances witness Russia as demonstrates counter-intuitive threats. This counteraction has however strengthened the influence of the US and the EU in both Ukraine and Georgia while simultaneously bolstering pro-Western orientation of both Georgia and Ukraine. Delcour & Wolczuk, (2015:2). In this situation, (Börzel & Risse, 2003:28) argues through some theoretical and policy implications of her findings, that actors of democracy promotion in their renewed strategy may inadvertently strengthen autocracy, same way as illiberal regimes may unintentionally strengthen liberalism through its counter attacks.

According to (Mitchell, 2016:62) democracy promotion of the US in early 2012 faced severe setback when about nineteen workers of U.S. democracy assistance organizations, also including the Freedom House, the National Democratic Institute (NDI), as well as the International Republican Institute (IRI), were arrested by the post-Mubarak military regime in Egypt where nothing much in terms of democracy has been achieved. Several months before those arrests, there were many semi-authoritarian regimes beginning with Bishkek to Tunis which collapsed. The collapse of those semi-authoritarian powers occurred without the official democracy assistance community. The Color Revolutions were also peaceful uprisings that occasioned the collapse of corrupt regimes like Georgia in 2003, Ukraine in 2004, and Kyrgyzstan in 2005.

On the impact of rising powers on the future prospects of democracy promotion, (Carothers, 2007) argues that the US is in danger of seeing rising powers like Brazil and India reaching low level of contributions to democracy promotion on the global stage over

rising concerns for domestic democracy. This is especially the case of Brazil. There is therefore the growing concerns over these rising powers' contributions for democracy promotion. One of those reasons is their over-concentration on their domestic economic and political affairs. With Russia and China increasing their military and economic influence across their region and beyond, the task of democracy promotion will outweigh US if rising powers like India and Brazil are not prepared enough to fit into the shoes of US. However, while the author might be right, he seems to forget to recognize, or rather simply chooses to neglect the role of other state and non-state actors of democracy promotion like the EU and other international organizations like the United Nations' agencies for democracy promotion and civil society groups. Such magnitude of overgeneralization- 'US being the only actor of democracy promotion' is apparently one of his usual oversights. Again, the US has maintained a prolonged solid ground and result of its democracy promotion agenda that provides prospects in abundance. This is basically important if we consider the trajectory of the US democracy promotion efforts.

CHAPTER TWO

2.1 WESTERN PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY

Introduction

This section discusses landmark argument on western democracy promotion. It addresses the questions of what democracy promotion entails, the origin, the aims, the instrument and the experience and impact of western democracy promotion. It provides also for conceptual clarifications.

Western democracy promotion generally aims at encouraging state and non-state actors to pursue political reforms that have the potentials to create ways for countries to democratize. Funding of non-governmental organizations to promote human rights features

prominently on the foreign policy agenda of western actors of democracy promotion such as the US and EU. Thus, Western democracy promotion involves political, economic and social support for states in order for democratization to take place. This democracy promotion model involving financial support has yielded significantly in Europe, Latin America, Africa and Asia. The democratic gains gathered from the aftermath of the Revolutions of 1989 which resulted into the fall of the Iron Curtain have bearings with the financial model of western democracy promotion. The wave of democratic transitions that played out in the former Communist states was hugely impacted by the financial-based model. As report from the Freedom House, the number of democracies increased from 41 out of the total of 150 countries in 1974 to 123 out of 192 countries in 2006. (Freedom House, 2007 & 10). However, in cases where there is no correlation between a specific model and the recipient's cultural context, the existing differences between both groups usually have the potentials to widen further, as is the case of the US in some parts of the Middle East. (Ketola, 2017:17).

Under this donor context, there are donor country development agencies within the West such as USAID for the United States, the Council of Europe comprising of 47 countries in Europe, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID) which organize and fund democratic programs in accordance with their interests and the local needs of targeted country. There are also international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and groups operating under same or similar objectives. In comparison, both the United States and the European Union have different institutions for democratic agenda but similar procedure. For the United States, in accordance with its overall foreign policy objectives, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) prioritizes the promotion of democratic transition and good governance. (Carothers, 2007:52). The Council of Europe on the other hand was primarily established to promote democracy, protect human rights and ensure the practical existence of the rule of law in Europe. The United States generally adopts the latter bottom-up approach through the provision of funds for international organizations institutionalized to strengthen the bases for gradual, but consistent democratic transition

(Kocamaz, 2014:26). In this approach, the order is; the rule of law, accountability of government institutions, and increasing political competition and participation.

The West in democracy promotion is situated in the broader context of internationalism and development. There is an increasing recognition of this context even among regional illiberal powers such as Russia and China. Within this background, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) outlines democracy and governance (DG) as irreplaceable requirements for the realization of United Nations' overall developmental objectives, including the Millennium Development Goals. This is principally because of the democratic narrative that the work of the Developmental Goals is part of creating and strengthening responsive governing institutions that provide greater inclusiveness, rights, liberties, rule of law, and of basing governance on democratic principles (Friedberg, 2018: 46). The concept and operation of democracy and governance by the West is in two approaches: one perceives democracy and democratization as a political contestation between democrats and authoritarians, allocating aids toward the establishment and operation of political institutions and processes such as civil society groups, political parties, and elections; and the second approach conceives democratization as a long term process toward the gains of democratic values, and hence commit aids to a wider spectrum involving politics and economy.

The emergence of the current wave of democracy promotion started in the early and mid-1980s with US democracy assistance in form of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). The process was funded by President Reagan's strategic Cold War policy. Although existed as a private organization devoted to external democracy promotion right from its formation in 1984, it received \$18 million annual budget to fight the 'war of ideas' with the Soviet Union. The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) as a democracy promotion actor was subsequently eclipsed both in scope and effectiveness by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The United States Agency for International Development marked the diminishing of the National Endowment for Democracy, and the beginning of the new trend of democracy promotion. Chile, Paraguay, Haiti, South Korea,

Philippines, Pakistan etc are few of the beneficiaries of the US democracy assistance efforts in the second half of the 1980s. Since then, many countries across all the continents have been impacted directly or indirectly with the multiplication and rise of other actors of democracy promotion like the European Union, and other international organizations. Illiberal regional powers like Russia and China often conceive democracy promotion as anti-communist end, and have often strategically developed authoritarian laws, principles and practices to limit democracy promotion internally and externally (Carothers, 2007: 46).

Various researches on democracy and democratization have shown in the most reliable and valid measure that democracy promotion can create diverse outcomes like stable liberal democracy where human rights, rule of law, freedom, liberty and peace will flourish (Carothers, 2002; Schmitter, 1995). The fear that the introduction of democracy in the name of freedom and peace creation often create chances for political and social instability for the democratizing country, is often the argument of anti-liberalists. However, liberalists assume that democracy promotion promises and delivers far more than the idea of sustaining security and order. According to Mitchell (2016:19), economic growth and cooperation-oriented security prosperity are parts of the liberalists' assurances in the idea of democracy promotion. Like many democracy literature, Mitchell's highlights the ways and areas in which democracy promotion gains and misses out at the same time.

Mitchell (2016:34) in his 'The Democracy Promotion Paradox' published with the Brookings Institution Press, Washington, recorded that democracy promotion in early 2012 took a shape that caused the arrest of about nineteen workers of U.S. democracy assistance organizations, also including the Freedom House, the National Democratic Institute (NDI), as well as the International Republican Institute (IRI), by the post-Mubarak military regime in Egypt where nothing much in terms of democracy has been achieved. The author's account is that, several months before those arrests, there were many semi-authoritarian regimes beginning with Bishkek to Tunis which collapsed. His argument implies that the collapse of those semi-authoritarian powers occurred without the official democracy assistance community. The author also mentions the Color Revolutions, stating that there

were also peaceful uprisings that occasioned the collapse of corrupt regimes like Georgia in 2003, Ukraine in 2004, and Kyrgyzstan in 2005 to discredit the democracy promotion claims of the liberalists. However, the author uses this paradox of democracy promotion to argue in support of democracy promotion without emphatic externalism.

The empirical observations derived from the framework of the liberalist perspective demonstrate exceptional democratic disposition to not only widen the scope of international economic and political cooperation, but to through that medium pass the cultures and values of democracy from one state to the other. (Wolff et al., 2002:221-226). The benefits step further into reinforcing the socio-economic promises and services of the democratizing environment (Ikenberry, 1999:61). It has become increasingly clear, looking at the cost evaluation of democracy promotion, that there are reasons to refrain from authoritarianism for common good (Bueno de Mesquita 2006:24). The fundamental implication of promoting democracy is the fact that promoting democracy tallies with creating the enabling conditions for global peace and development. The complexity of democracy promotion and often conflict-ridden process of democratization has been used by authoritarians to not only water down the values of democracy promotion, but to strategically limit it.

2.2 Definition of concepts

In the academic discussion on democracy and democracy promotion, Robert Dahl (1971:26) in his 'Polyarchy' emphasized on inclusiveness and competitiveness for the reign of democracy. Dahl however provided seven criteria which are summarized into inclusiveness and competitiveness. These criteria for democracy are either partly or completely demonstrated in the views of most scholars of democracy such as Juan Linz, Alfred Stepan and Carothers. Juan Linz & Alfred Stepan for instance in their "Toward Consolidated Democracies," published in the Journal of Democracy in April 1996, argued that "free and contested elections on the basis of expansive inclusiveness and voter eligibility

is necessary but by no means sufficient to meet the seven institutional requirements for democracy in Dahl's polyarchy (Juan Linz & Alfred Stepan, 1996:3).

Both scholars argue that even such elections with expansive inclusiveness and voter eligibility are not sufficient to complete a democratic transition, unless political actors govern democratically through the rule of state laws. They posit that in many cases in which free and contested elections have been realized, "the resulting government still lack the de jure and facto power related to the determination of policy in many important areas of government "due to the fact that even executive, legislative, and judicial powers are still decisively constrained by some interwoven set of reserve domains such as authoritarian enclaves or military prerogatives. They both argue under this background that a political regime cannot be considered a democracy except its political leadership govern in a democratic way. The authors' argument is that "If freely elected political actors like the executive, act contrarily to the constitution, in terms of the violation of human rights, and encroaching upon the constitutively legitimate functions of the legislature, their regimes cannot be considered as democracies in any way."(pg.1)

Hybrid regimes have various alternative names due to their positions as neither democracies nor autocracies (Mesquita & Bueno de, 2004:23). The Freedom House uses the designations 'partial democracy' and 'Partly Free' as designations given to regimes expected to transit into full democracy by many scholars in their academic writings. The generalization by some scholars that these regimes are undergoing prolonged transitions to democracy semantically follows that they argue that such regimes are moving in a democratic direction and would eventually arrive. Unfortunately, as with the strong argument of Jeffrey Herbst & Carothers, (2012:13), these regimes do not often transit into full democracy, but instead went distinctly back into authoritarian structures and practices, like the cases of Azerbaijan and Belarus. However, this is without prejudice to some of the hybrid regimes that actually underwent democratic transitions in the 90s like Mexico, Senegal, Taiwan etc, and those regimes that consolidated their hybridity like China, Russia which are central to this study. Both countries represent illiberal regional powers. They are

illiberal regional powers because of their political, economic and military superiority, influence and leverage over other states within their regions.

2.3 Democracy Promotion: Meaning, Purpose, Tools and Western Experience

Carothers (2008) in his 'Does Democracy Promotion Have a Future' defined democracy promotion in relations to providing economic, political, diplomatic and military support for states to meet the four conventional minimum criteria of democracy: executives and legislatures are chosen through free, fair and open periodic elections, voting rights to virtually all adults without disenfranchisement of any form: ethnic, religious, sexual, economic, etc., political rights and civil liberties encompassing freedom of the press, freedom of association, and freedom to criticize the government without reprisal, and elected authorities having real authority to govern without subjection to tutelary control of religious individuals or the military. Many scholars such as Kentola (2011:32) argued that Western aids for human rights promotion have often been deployed without putting the recipient vision and culture into context, and hence, democracy promotion through that strategy has often not delivered the expected results. However, scholars of democracy promotion often categorize systems of democracy promotion into top-down and bottom-up approaches. The top-down approach to democracy promotion is a top-down transition to democracy in which the authoritarian or dictatorial governing elite is made to adopt liberalizing reforms that pave the way for democracy and democratization through political, economic, or military leverage. The bottom-up approach is the system of funding organizations, groups and individuals to seek human rights through liberalization. Both approaches have been widely used.

According to Mitchell (2016:34), economic growth and cooperation-oriented security prosperity are parts of the liberalists' reasons for democracy promotion. Like many democracy literature, Mitchell's highlights the ways and areas in which democracy promotion gains and misses out at the same time. Schmitter (1995:21) also argued that

democracy promotion can create diverse outcomes like stable liberal democracy where human rights, rule of law, freedom, liberty and peace will flourish. This also form the rationale behind democracy promotion. Critics have always argued that democracy leaves states in security risks. Russia and China have often been deployed that the absence of democracy does not affect economic growth and security disability. They argue instead that democracy gives too much room for political instability, lawlessness and disorderliness. The fear that the introduction of democracy in the name of freedom and peace creation often create chances for political and social instability for the democratizing country, is often the argument of anti-liberalists. However, liberalists assume that democracy promotion promises and delivers far more than the idea of sustaining security and order.

According to Huntington (1991:13), there are three waves of democratization: the first wave is the slow wave of the 19th century, which happened in Western Europe and Northern America. The second wave happened after the Second World War in 1945, and the third wave started in the mid-1970s in Southern Europe. According to Huntington, Latin America and Asia followed afterwards. Some scholars also make reference to a certain wave after the Revolutions of 1989 which culminated in the fall of the Iron Curtain. In all of these waves, democracy promotion was related (Chamberlain, 2017:110) and the West was involved either directly or indirectly. This is related US President Harry Truman's Marshall Plan of April 3rd 1948 to provide economic aid to Europe. The economic cooperation between the US and Europe as established by the Marshall Plan eventually became a US leverage to transport its version of democracy to Europe.

However, democracy promotion as led by the West became more focused and strategic in the early to mid-1980, with the democracy assistance of the United States under the presidency of Reagan. Western democracy promotion started with a formal financial model in form of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). The process was funded by President Reagan's strategic Cold War policy. Although existed as a private organization devoted to external democracy promotion right from its formation in 1984, it received \$18 million annual budget to fight the 'war of ideas' with the Soviet Union. The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) as a democracy promotion actor was subsequently

eclipsed both in scope and effectiveness by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The United States Agency for International Development marked the diminishing of the National Endowment for Democracy, and the beginning of the new trend of democracy promotion. Chile, Paraguay, Haiti, South Korea, Philippines, Pakistan etc are few of the beneficiaries of the US democracy assistance efforts in the second half of the 1980s. Since then, many countries across all the continents have been impacted directly or indirectly with the multiplication and rise of other actors of democracy promotion like the European Union, and other international organizations. Illiberal regional powers like Russia and China often conceive democracy promotion as anti-communist end, and have often strategically developed authoritarian laws, principles and practices to limit democracy promotion internally and externally.

Conclusion

This section has answered the questions related to democracy promotion. Beginning with a historical background to western democracy promotion, the section outlined the various instruments used for democracy promotion while providing for the aims, western experience and impact. The section has shown how funding for civil society and human rights play significant role in both top-down and bottom-up approach to democracy promotion.

CHAPTER THREE

3.1 HYBRID REGIMES

This section discusses hybrid regimes and the impact they have on western democracy promotion in Russia and China regions. Competitive authoritarianism as a version of hybrid regime is also discussed under this section. The essence is to understand and explain what hybrid regimes are, what constitute competitive authoritarianism as a version of hybrid regime, and how these constituents impact on western democracy promotion specifically in Russia and China region.

Hybrid regimes have various alternative names due to their positions as neither democracies nor autocracies (Mesquita& Bueno de, (2004:23), but the Freedom House uses the designations ‘partial democracy’ and ‘Partly Free’ as designations given to regimes expected to transit into full democracy by many scholars in their academic writings. The generalization by some scholars that these regimes are undergoing prolonged transitions to democracy semantically follows that they argue that such regimes are moving in a democratic direction and would eventually arrive. Unfortunately, as with the strong argument of Jeffrey Herbst & Carothers, (2012:23), these regimes do not often transit into full democracy, but instead went distinctly back into authoritarian structures and practices, like the cases of Azerbaijan and Belarus.

3.2 COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIANISM AS A VERSION OF HYBRID REGIMES

Competitive authoritarian regimes are political regimes which have formal institutions of democracy, but these formal democratic institutions are utilized for the acquisition of political power rather than the primary essence of democracy. (Krouse, 1982:65).The author assume that under such conditions, authoritarian regimes do not meet the conventional minimum standards for democracy. According to Juan Linz (1935:13), in his ‘Dictatorship’, competitive authoritarian regimes are more properly designated and classified as ‘diminished form of authoritarianism’ since there are more authoritarian than democratic. Providing for the submission of Juan Linz and some other scholars therefore implies that competitive authoritarianism must be distinguished from democracy on the one

hand and full-scale authoritarianism on the other. This is perfectly because a modern democratic regime must meet four conventional minimum criteria to be considered a democracy. These minimum criteria according to Dahl (1971) are:

1. Executives and legislatures are chosen through free, fair and open periodic elections.
2. Voting rights to virtually all adults without disenfranchisement of any form: ethnic, religious, sexual, economic, etc.
3. Political rights and civil liberties encompassing freedom of the press, freedom of association, and freedom to criticize the government without reprisal.
- 4) Elected authorities have real authority and power to govern without subjection to tutelary control of religious individuals and institutions, as well as the military.

According to Carothers (2012:32), fully democratic regimes which meet the aforementioned four conventional minimum criteria for democracy could sometimes violate one or more of these criteria. However, such level of violations are not systematic violations in their broadness and frequency, and therefore do not critically impede democratization and systematically alter the levelled playing ground between incumbents and oppositions. Compared to competitive authoritarian regimes, the broadness and frequency of the violations of one or more of the four minimum criteria for democracy are systemic, and therefore possess huge potentials to provide far better political leverage for incumbent governments over their opposition counterparts. (Linz, 2011:63). As it is often the case with competitive authoritarian regimes, there may be regular elections which are open, free and fair. However, incumbent governments routinely put state resources into opposition repression by limiting and manipulating their supporters, media privileges and election outcomes. (Amslem, 2011:3). Competitive authoritarian regime leaders often use bribery, arrest and detention, harassment, threats, murder and exile as repression instrument. This is the principal reason why regimes characterized by such magnitude of systemic power abuses cannot be designated as democratic (Dimitrova, 2015:2).

From the foregoing, it is crucial that competitive authoritarianism is not classed on the same level with democracy simply because some democracies violate one or more of the four conventional minimum criteria for democracy, and could therefore be flawed and ineffective in the process. (O'Donnell, 2016:2). Guillermo O'Donnell is one scholar who developed the 'delegative democracies' idea to assert this point while using the term to provide the destination for the differentiation. He asserted that 'delegative democracies' are characterized by low levels of checks and balances with the kind of horizontal accountability that abusive executives use in the discharge of their political power. (Murphy, 2017:21). He argues that such regimes with low levels of checks and balances still meet the conventional minimum requirements for democracy regardless, and should not be put side by side with competitive authoritarianism which fall short of the minimum standards for democracy (Wishnick, 2017:11).

3. 3WHY RUSSIA IS A COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIAN REGIME

In Russia, elections are conducted periodically. However, the existing elections are autocratically guarded from serious contestations and inclusiveness. (Peterson, 2012:15, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights'). In Dahl's 1971 'Polyarchy' this makes Russia missing the minimum criteria for being a democracy. In competitive authoritarian regimes, there are large usually a scale abuse of state resources, institutions and powers that define the major features of the electoral process and outcome. Opposition parties and candidates are therefore prevented or denied participation as the case of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny who was arrested and jailed on January 17 2021. (CNN, January 17 2021). Unlike in consolidated democracies, there are no involvement of external or international observers and the utilization of parallel vote-counting procedures in competitive authoritarian regimes which do increase the capacity of incumbents to engage in large-scale fraud. (Sasseu, 2004:3). And in-depth assessment of the four arenas of contestations is made in light of demonstrating how Russia and China are competitive authoritarian regimes.

Incumbents in competitive authoritarian regimes may routinely manipulate the minimum standards for democracy by abusing the existing institutions of democracy and breaking the laws, yet, they cannot permanently remove those institutions or eliminate the laws. (Levitsky& Way, 2012:34). The authors argue that as it is often the case scenario, bribery and acts of co-optation, and even subtle persecution like using state agencies like tax authorities to suppress critics and repress oppositions. However, persistence and consistence on the parts of democratic institutions have greater potentials to pave significant ways for opposition forces to constantly and effectively challenge regimes with authoritarian tendencies and practices. Consequently, while democratic institutions may be badly flawed, competitive authoritarianism is different from regimes where electoral institutions exist but without meaningful power contestation. (Fukuyama, 2022:6).

The Arenas of Democratic Contestation

The four arenas of democratic contestation are the avenues wherein opposition forces in competitive authoritarian regimes can terminally challenge and possibly win autocratic incumbents in contested elections. (Ozekici, 2017:3). In Russia, it is clear that contestations are a mirage in Putin’s political handling of the state. (Caithlin, 2018). This is possible because of the irremovable existence of meaningful institutions of democracy in competitive authoritarian regimes. The four arenas of contestation through which opposition forces can periodically challenge, and possibly unseat autocratic incumbents are: (1) the electoral arena, (2) the legislative arena, (3) the judiciary arena, and (4) the media arena¹

The Electoral Avenue of Contestation.

According to Levitsky& Way (2012:23), the electoral arena is the most important of the four arenas of democratic contestation. In authoritarian political structural regimes, it is either that elections are inexistent or the existing elections are autocratically guarded from

serious contestations. The implication is that, according to the rule of thumb, regimes in which presidents are re-elected into power with more than 70 percent of the vote count can generally be considered non-competitive electoral regimes because the possibility of repression are high in such elections (Carothers, 2007:22).

One of the consequences that authoritarian incumbents deal with when manipulating electoral results is the economic cost of repression which has the potentials to cost them the same power they spend hugely to acquire. (Gel' man, 2008:2). Taking the Peruvian scenario into account for instance, while Fujimori succeed in his massively repressive re-election bid in 2000, what followed months later was his unavoidable resignation following massive outcry over financial mismanagement and other related scandals. (Sushko, 2008:1). A similar account was the Serbian president Milošević's wasteful public spending on his authoritarian political scheme to manipulate the year 2000 Serbian election results, leading to critical regime crisis that culminated in his unpreventable removal. Other case scenarios of authoritarian regime fall from the impact of electoral result manipulation were countries like Mexico in 1988 and Armenia in 1996. (Gel'man 2008:2). These various examples represent the lesson point for current competitive authoritarian regimes who continue to use state resources and democratic institutions to repression opposition forces.

The Legislative Avenue of Contestation

A second arena of contestation after the electoral arena is the legislature. The legislature in competitive authoritarian regimes tend to be practically weak, whereas in full-scale authoritarian regimes, there are either no legislatures or existing legislatures are comprehensively controlled by the political finger of the regime head. (Levitsky& Way, 2012:4). The authors assume that, even though in competitive authoritarian regimes, legislatures tend to be relatively weak, they however periodically become focal points of opposition activity. Instances abound in both the 1990s' Russia and Ukraine during which the presidents of both countries were intensely challenged by the existing recalcitrant

parliaments of both nations. The parliaments were significantly dominated by former communist and other left-wing parties who repeatedly opposed every form of parliamentary subjugation by the regimes leaders. (Krouse, 1982:6).

Combined with an existing independent media where possible, opposition forces have the leverage to gather popular public support through media instrument which they can use to make calls for regime denouncement. (Stephan, 2008:3). Russia's legislature has been under the influence of President Vladimir Putin as long as he has been in charge (Elizabeth, 2013:4).

The Judicial Avenue of Contestation.

The judiciary is the third arena of contestation. In competitive authoritarian regimes, although the regime leader or government could routinely subjugate the judiciary through bribery, tax persecution, impeachment and co-optation mechanisms, yet, as it is often the outcome, the regime lose so much economy in repressing the judiciary to almost regime breaking points. (Carothers, 2006). One of the clearest and popular case scenarios was Peru where scores of judges, including several Supreme Court justices were politically intelligently blackmailed to the crescendo of opprobrium by Vladimiro Montesinos who was president Fujimori's intelligence chief. (Demiralp, 2021:2). Elsewhere in Russia, the then Russian president Yeltsin removed the telecommunication lines of the court, removed the court guards, and nearly completely subjugated the judiciary over the constitutional court's declaration of Yeltsin's 1993 decree disbanding the parliament to be unconstitutional and consequently non-binding. President Putin has continued this judicial repression since the very beginning of his presidency (Ozekici, 2017:6).

In some cases, governments resort to threats and violence where the legislature tries to check and balance executive excesses (Scartascini, 2018:8). In cases where judicial voice is

overshadowed by executive highhandedness, depending on the level of opposition's courage and media support, there is the potential for routine successful resistance. Otherwise, the regime's repression of opposition is hugely costly to regime change hope. (Levy, 2004:9). A popular example are seen in Slovakia where the Constitutional Court restricted the regime of Vladimír Mečiar from denying the opposition parliamentary seats in 1994. Levy mentioned elsewhere in Serbia, there was high judicial performance as courts legitimized and upheld local opposition electoral victories against the regime scheme.

The Media Avenue of Contestation

Independent media is designed to be a state watchdog not just to uphold freedom of speech, but to carry out certain obligations on government malfeasance in favour of transparent governance. A popular example of media independence and fearlessness in regime investigation and exposition in a competitive authoritarian government within South America was the Peruvian case scenario where the media investigated and fearlessly exposed a score of state abuses like the 1992 massacre of La Cantuta University students. There was also the media revelation of signature forgery by Alberto Fujimori and his political party to gift the party and Alberto Fujimori the Peruvian 2000 election qualification (Marbell, 1992:6). A case scenario within Europe is Russia, where the Independent Television Station of a popular media tycoon named Vladimir Gusinsky fearlessly served as significant channel of state criticism against President Putin's government.

The media as one of the areas of contestations in competitive authoritarian regimes has not been free in Russia, and especially under President Putin. (Elizabeth, 2013:2). As it is often the case with majority of full-blown autocracies, media ownership and censorship are exclusively state- ways, making repression systemically easier and extensive. Under this circumstance, there is absolute regime sabotage of top ranking television stations, radio stations, newspapers and magazines, using state laws, state resources and propaganda. (Sanchez, 2004:5). Subtle mechanisms of independent media repression often differentiates

the executives in competitive authoritarian regimes from their authoritarian counterparts. In Russia for instance, the government capitalized on the debt owed by Independent Televisions to Gazprom which was Russia's major gas company, to transfer the ownership of those independent Televisions to pro-government forces who were schemed to permanently eliminate the growing influences of oppositions. (Stephan, 2008:7).

Numerous instances abound where authoritarian governments operate with functional democratic institutions, allowing the coexistence of democratic rules and autocratic methods usually politically strategized towards the sustenance of power. (Levy, 2004). This is usually effective even though not permanently, so far as incumbents rights abuses, especially electoral manipulation are minimal. This is one way present competitive authoritarian leaders like China's Jinping Xi and Russia's Vladimir Putin manage their democratic challenges to exact domestic and international influence in order to sustain power. (Sushko, 2008). The periodic elections, functional legislatures, independent courts and media which are expected to institutionally provide opposition forces with periodic leverages are subtly utilized by most present-era executives of competitive authoritarian governments. (Bruce, 2018). Bruce argued that, as it is often the case with competitive authoritarianism, executive incumbents are situated within the circumstances of deciding between the violation of democratic rules, and facing a host of domestic chaos exacerbated by international ostracism, or ruling by democratic standards at the cost of possible regime power loss.

3.4 WHY CHINA IS A COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIAN REGIME

In competitive authoritarian regimes, power holders routinely manipulate the minimum standards for democracy by abusing the existing institutions of democracy and breaking the laws. However, they do not attempt to permanently remove those institutions or eliminate the laws. (Levitsky & Way, 2012:11). According to Carothers (2008:4), bribery and acts of co-optation, and even subtle persecution like using state agencies like tax

authorities to suppress critics and repress oppositions. The author argued that, persistence and consistence on the parts of democratic institutions have greater potentials to pave significant ways for opposition forces to constantly and effectively challenge regimes with authoritarian tendencies and practices.

In China, the Chinese Communist Party has gathered so much power and influence over the years that, capable oppositions that can create the history of changing the political landscape and narrative are hard to find, putting the Communist Party in charge and not really the national constitution. (Kuo-Chun, 1954:32). In 2018, the Chinese President changed the constitution to erase the presidential term limit. (Diaodong, 2019:2). Elections in China are therefore not competitive, neither is the media and legislature enjoying reasonable amount of freedom. (Cheng, 2019). Cheng argued that China has moved from being a competitive authoritarian regime, and the scholars need to find a special class for the state. According to Cheng (2019:24), the contestations and inclusiveness in Dahl's 1971 'Polyarchy' are missing as well as other conventional criteria for democracy. This makes China a competitive authoritarian regime.

The little difference between Russia and China as Cheng (2019:25) argued is that, unlike Russia, China does not abuse a huge scale of state resources to keep repress the media and institutions of democracy. The Chinese Communist Party instead uses much of laws that do not necessarily require so much economy to run against human rights and liberty. Opposition parties and candidates are not only limited, but prevented from political participation. In china also, there are no involvement of external or international observers and the utilization of parallel vote-counting procedures in competitive authoritarian regimes which do increase the capacity of incumbents to engage in large-scale fraud. (Sasseu, 2004:6).

3.5 IMPACT OF COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES ON WESTERN DEMOCRACY PROMOTION

According to Levitsky & Way (2012:20), the emergence of competitive authoritarianism in the 90s took three distinct regime paths. The author notes that, first, full-blown authoritarian regime became sick and eventually became uncreative and unattractive. Consequently, full-blown authoritarian regimes were compelled by both domestic and international pressures to establish democratic institutions, if there were none, for democratic transition. Although the preached democratic transition was not swift because opposition movements at that embryonic stage were weak, making transitions to fall short of democracy (Crothers, 2012).

The second path to competitive authoritarianism was the eventual collapse of full-blown authoritarian regime, with competitive authoritarian regime making the bridge between full-blown authoritarianism and democracy. (Levitsky & Way, 2012:22). In the wake of full-blown authoritarian breakdown, there was then the emergence of electoral regimes but democratically weaker ones. Neither was there full-blown autocracy anymore as it used to be, nor was there full-blown democratic traditions, because the weak civil societies that emerged upon the collapse of full-blown autocracy did not remove the existing opportunities for elected governments to autocratically govern. However, those competitive authoritarian regimes lacked the independence and capacity to consolidate authoritarian rule. (Krouse, 2001:2).

The erosion of democratic regime is the third path to competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky & Way:4). Circumstances of new form of severe political and economic crises paved the way for governments elected under democratic institutions to undermine the same democratic institutions which brought them to power with abuses of all kind. Although, the governments did not enjoy neither the will nor capacity to completely eliminate nor subdue the institutions of democracy. (Kucera, 2017:16). Instances of such transitions abound in the early 90s' Peru and certainly in our present Venezuela. The present proliferation of competitive authoritarian regimes is deeply rooted in the political and economic difficulties associated with the consolidation of both democratic and authoritarian regimes in this post-

Cold War era. These political cum economic difficulties however played significant role in democratic transitions (Kucera, 2017:17).

A vast majority of democratic transitions took place in the countries with experience of biting poverty and inequality. Those were aided by the role of states and civil societies' weakness which paved way for the institutional instability that most significantly shaped the trajectory of calls for periodic institutional leadership change. In the former communist world for example, the condition of economy, state of religious institutions and other dimensions of social activity were influential to the increasing call for regime change and transition. As the prospects for full-blown democracy and democratization remained infinitesimally limited in much of post-Cold War world, similarly were the prospects of consolidating full-scale authoritarian regimes in the post-Cold War world. (Kucera, 2017:19).

The triumph of Western liberalism over communism and the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union paved significant ways for the establishment of formal democratic institutions. (Shawart, 2015: 9). From the perspective of Andrew Janos, liberal hegemony has a way of placing a “web of constraints” on non-democratic governments enthusiastic of international viability and acceptability. Thus, during the short interval of liberal hegemony just after WW I, most of the authoritarian regimes in the region of Central Europe as elsewhere had no option than to tolerate strong pressures of allowing semi-free press, regular opposition criticisms from parliamentary oppositions, and a sort quasi-independent judiciary that interfered with their autocratic tendencies. But there are usually authoritarian counter-attacks on liberal interventions. When Western liberal states are counter-attacked by seemingly resistant authoritarian hegemonic powers, the countering authoritarian hegemonic powers in principle and practice make provision for alternative sources of regime legitimacy, while simultaneously weakening existing incentives under which formal democratic institutions thrive (Shawart, 2015: 9)

According to Shawart, (2015: 9), there were Central European hybrid regimes in the 1930s, but the emergence of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia as regional powers significantly impacted on the eventual collapse of those Central European hybrid regimes. The political, military and economic might of the Soviet Union influenced the creation of Leninist version of dictatorships within most part of the Third World during the period of the Cold War. (Sternberg, 2017:11), however, Western liberal hegemony marked much of the 1990s as it did in the 1920s although the 1990s' Western liberal hegemony was broader in scope and activities. (Schumpeter, 1942:12). Western liberal hegemony gained international attractions, influences and effects in many forms: demonstration effects, conditionality as criteria for European Union membership, democratic transition pressures in form of sanctions, foreign policy, democratic transition via military intervention, and the democratizing roles of transnational institutions and non-state actors. (Kentola, 2005:11).

Through these various strategies and modus operandi, liberal democratic model succeeded in gaining unprecedented acceptability among post-communist and Third World countries. Added to this long list of Western liberal strategies was the enticing alternative sources of military and economic aid made available by Western governments and organizations for cooperating post-communist countries. (McColm, 2018:2). The effect of democratic pressures on autocratic countries varied across countries and regions. A vast majority of the regimes in middle-income and poor countries could not afford to lose the economic and military benefits of adopting formal democratic institutions. Non-compromising communist minded countries however opted to increase the costs of sustaining their overtly authoritarian regimes through increased repression. This accounts for why the cost of repression rose exponentially in the 1990s (Sternberg, 2017:4).

The potential autocrats of the time confronted challenging domestic obstructions to their consolidation design with available economic and political resources. (Wrobel, 2014:2). In order to consolidate their regimes, authoritarian elites exterminated sources of contestation either with systematic repression or opponent co-optation strategy. (Matsuzato, 2021:41). While in current times, sustaining such high level autocratic strategy has been

increasingly made difficult by resource scarcity and expansive international monitoring, the patronage networks that protected authoritarian state structures at the time still functionally exists, but in comparatively neutralized scope. Apart from resource scarcity and increasing international monitoring, formation of repressive organs and its hierarchical control, steps up the risk of civil war, and consequently makes the consolidation of authoritarian rule in pretty difficult (Wrobel, 2014:3).

According to Finkelstein (2017:31), the dispersal of control over different state and economic resources among different groups in most of the post-communist countries made it difficult for any single regime head to build solid absolute authority over the entire polity. Thus, considerable number of regimes in the 1990s surmounted domestic obstacles to democratic transition. (Mancini, 2013:3). On the way to transition, a chunk of regimes profited from the economic and security resources put forth to achieve the democracy and democratization agendas of Western foreign policy. There were regimes that utilized state revenues from valuable commodities like oil and gas, same way autocrats did for repression and opponent co-optation. Some other regimes profited from quasi-traditional elite networks that created and promoted neo-patrimonial regimes like those of Central Asia. For much of Latin America, post-communist Eurasia and Africa in the 1990s, autocrats: existing, emerging or potential ones, due to elite fragmentation, weakness of state, and international pressure, could not afford the skyrocketing cost of repression and co-optation (Finkelstein, 2017:32).

The overtly optimistic situation for democracy and democratization in much of the world has not remained the same. (Laruelle, 2015:2). A chunk of authoritarian regimes have even survived the “third wave” of democratization. Even where the collapse of a particular authoritarian regime was highly expected to result into democracy, a subtler version of non-democratic rule would emerge. Two decades have passed since the collapse of the Soviet Union, yet, a significant number of countries are still comprehensively nondemocratic. (Ozekici, 2017:7). The persistence of non-democratic governance across the globe is not good news for the prospects of democracy and democratization. Factors like Western liberal

hegemony, economic ideology, media advancement, and the growing influence of the networks of international liberal order aimed at promoting democracy and democratization have all contributed tremendously to the promotion of democracy and democratization. (Demiralp, 2021:4). While the aforementioned have succeeded in limiting the opportunities of authoritarian elites, and making some versions of authoritarian rule like totalitarianism and bureaucratic authoritarianism difficult or even impossible to consolidate or sustain, they have not been able to impressively deal with the present form of non-democratic communist regime types. Those non-democratic regime outcomes of the fallen authoritarian systems continue to gain grounds under their heads as we see in China's X Jinping Xi, and Russia's Vladimir Putin in their regions and target countries. (Kuo-Chun, 1954:3).

3.5.1 UKRAINE AND GEORGIA: THE WEST IMPACT VS RUSSIAN IMPACT

UKRAINE

Ukraine and the Ukrainian people made a historic preference of not just independence, but democracy, and the free market over a quarter of century ago, and her choice of sovereignty, democracy, and a free market state has not been without challenges from Russia. (Minakov, 2005:4). Although, Ukraine is an internationally established polity with internationally recognized sovereignty, its sovereignty is none the less disturbed by perennial aggression from Russia. (Sutela, 2012:8). The transition of Ukraine from Soviet republic to the side of the West in terms of democracy has faced authoritarian interferences from Russia. (Scartasini, 2018:9). These interferences which have become open and constant make it difficult for one to determine whether Ukraine's democracy and democratization is laid on a sustainable path. There is now an increasing democratic interest from the West, specifically the US and EU, and in the wake of the 2014 Euromaidan, the process of closer

political cum economic association and integration with the European Union and the US, and even the war in Donbas, there are many reasons to expect the escalations of tensions between Russia and the West over Ukraine. (Kentola, 2006:3). Democratic reforms are been made, but the sustainability of current reform efforts and democratic politics is under constant threats. (Borodin, 2014). Russian's resurgence of military resort is threatening, as the promise of proportional response from the West in the wake of an attack. Ukraine itself is not sitting on its hands as its pro-NATO movements are sharp and clear. (Marxwell, 2022:1).

It is worth noting that the attention of the West in Ukraine's democracy and governance as a whole, especially as impacted by Russia has yielded some key fruits. (Wexber, 2021:10). Ukraine is now a parliamentary-presidential republic system. (Matsuzato, 2021). The problems in Ukraine today as they bother governance and democracy started as governance issues of local governance in a domestic way. (Yanukovych, 2017:15). In the 1990s, local councils started losing power steadily to the central government in Kyiv, and by 2002, the president, the cabinet, and they had assumed too much power and authority from local governments in such a way that president Kuchman decided to consider limited decentralization reforms in order to reduce the burden on his government in terms of solving every bit of local issues and need. (Shushko, 2016:11).

According to Marxwell (2022), the decentralization was never successful because of fear of losing security and order through freedom. There was then constant erosion of local communities' authority up to the leadership regime of Yanukovych. 2014 however became a defining moment as under intense pressure from civil society for freedoms and rights, new voices in the Rada, amplified by Western actors such as the EU and US, launched a program of decentralization reforms in Kyiv. Fruits were visible almost immediately as local governments gained more responsibility for local services and better budgets. However, the national government under the president retained and controlled much stronger indecision-making mechanisms, and dictated regional development matters. The president equally

retained absolute appointment capacity as far as heads of local governments at the oblast' and rayon levels mattered. (Stephan, 2011:3).

One danger that arose along this line of democracy buildup was a rivalry between public institutions and financial-political groups. (Stuenkel, 2013:6). Issues of institutional reforms and control emerged among the elites, the Ukrainian population and existing enterprises, eroding both the strength and power of political parties as well as the trust of ordinary citizens at elections and in the electoral process at large. (Valerie, 2014:2). However, this did not take place for long as an evolution developed over the next five years, leading to the establishment of direct and majoritarian elections involving the strengthening of political parties. The Communist Party sustained a relatively strong and well organized parliamentary presence until 2014 before the Crimean invasion of Russia. The party gave birth to a more moderate Socialist Party, which also became equally influential. (Purnell, 2007:7).

The Russian gaze and interest in Ukraine saw its biggest open manifestation in 2014 in form of the Crimean invasion. (D'Anieri, 2014:5). Ukraine too showed its Western resolve in that particular Russian-Ukrainian unholy romance which has eventually occupied a huge space in the global agenda for conflict resolution. (Welsh, 2018:6). Russia conceives Ukraine NATO alliance dangerous, and requests the condition that Ukraine both at present and in future not becoming a NATO member as solution to its crisis with Ukraine. (Cameron, 2011:4). Russia perceives Ukraine's NATO membership as a serious threat to its communist principle, approach and system safety (Levy, 2004:17). Russia's reaction was a practical fall out with Ukraine as in what is vastly understood to be inconsistent with current international laws, Crimea was annexed by Russia after a controversial referendum which took place on March 16, 2014, disregarding the absolute objections of the Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians (Wrobel, 2014:19). On the other end of the conflict circle is the Pro-Russian separatists who firmly hold claims of control power over eastern Ukraine, including the Donbas region, which has been under their control for the past seven years.

In addition to Russia's provocative annexation of Crimea, the Pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovich, who is the fourth president of Ukraine, made an announcement on the suspension of Ukrainian's 2013 EU Association Agreement which was a strategic scheme aimed at preventing Ukraine from embracing the West in its political ideological approach (Valerie, 2014). This move to suspend Ukrainian Association Agreement with the EU in an attempt to pacify Russia became a sort of a game changer in the Ukrainian-Russian crisis as the West, particularly the US and EU, came out fullest from their shell to join the thousands of people who massively stormed the Kiev's Independence Square for several months in protest against a Yanukovich's decision to de-enlist Ukraine from EU Association Agreement deemed popularly unacceptable. (Wrobel, 2014:20).

GEORGIA

Georgia as a sovereign state is strategically situated at important crossroads where Europe meets Asia, and so, the state is expected to be of political interest to both the West and Russia. (Utiashvili, 2014:18). Georgia for different centuries was because of this fact, the object of rivalry between Persia, Russia, and even Turkey, before its eventual annexation by Russia in the 19th century. Georgia however became an independent sovereign state in 1991 upon the collapse of Soviet Union. Due to its strategic importance, Georgia has once again become the arena of conflicting interests, as Russia tries to limit Western democratic influence in the country. (Tamta, 2014:12). Georgia has been one of the United States' closest partners among the post-Soviet states that gained their independence after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. (Charles, 1997:10). The United States has a rich and long history

of strong economic aid and security cooperation with Georgia. (Elman, 1995:33). This economic aid and security cooperation with Georgia has significantly deepened and empowered US strategic partnership with Georgia, especially after Russia's 2008 invasion of Georgia and the 2014 invasion of Ukraine in Crimea by Russia. The U.S. policy that follows this invasions expressly recognizes and throw support for Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. By this stance, Georgia is a leading recipient of U.S. aid as far as Europe and Eurasia are concerned. (Vazbec, 2001:26).

According to Julien (1992:12), the increasing US economic and political influence via aid in Georgia is considered a source of concern for Russia. Again, like Ukraine, Georgia's aspirations to join NATO and the EU have seriously increased and taken center stage. Georgia's increasing tense relations with Russia is further exacerbated by Moscow's counter- support for the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This is the cause of the brief war in August 2008. (Janeliunas & Kirvelyte, 2009:3). Russia continues to pursue the agenda of former Soviet in terms of unification. History holds that most of present-day Georgia officially became part of the Russian Empire in 1801. (Rothstein, 1977:3). According to history's best-known Georgian, future Soviet leader Iosif Dzhugashvili (Joseph Stalin), was born in 1879 and his birth reflected his unification spirit which the present regime of Putin wishes to continue. (Amstrup, 1976:76). However, in 1918, the Independent Georgian state was declared in the wake of the Russian Revolution, but again, in 1921, the Red Army invaded, and Georgia was absorbed into the emerging Soviet Union. It was in the 1956 protests stationed against Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev called the de-Stalinisation policy that further calls for secession from the USSR meant Georgia was ready for the worst in terms of freedom and rights values and principles. Although, brutally crushed by the Soviet forces, the resolve did not vanish. (Handel, 1990:232)

The current Russian interference in Georgia's Western integration has its beginning in the 1990s. It centers on Russian communist interest in the region. Georgia's relations with Russia has been tensed since the 1990. (Charles, 2019:23). The Georgian authorities often accuse Moscow of deliberate obstruction of Georgia's Western integration. The pick of

Russia's anti-democratic move on Georgia was in the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia in order to stop the Georgian government from re-establishing and re-instituting legitimate control over the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. (Sanchez-Sibony, 2016:17). These regions broke away from Georgia in the early 1990s and became Russian protectorates informally. Many observers and analysts assume that Russia is in full support of the secession of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as a way to obstruct Georgia's NATO membership. (Ozekici, 2017:31). The Georgian government for over two decades has made NATO integration and EU membership a top priority. The US Congress has severally expressed firm support for Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity, with aid backing its support. (West, 2019:12).

According to Senate report 110-220, January 20 2018, since 2017, the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) bilateral aid allocation to Georgia have increased significantly under this agenda and have totaled the sum of \$123millionayearonan average of \$131millioninFY2020, including \$40millionin Foreign Military Financing, or FMF, just to build Georgia into a sovereign state capable of protecting itself and its democratic interests against external encroachments. In buttressing Western commitment, for FY2021, the US Congress appropriated the sum of \$132 million in bilateral assistance to Georgia. This included the sum of \$35million in FMF. On the part ofFY2022, the State Department and USAID budget totaled the sum of \$120.6million, including bilateral aid. Since the FY2010, Georgia has therefore received U.S. military aid which majorly came through FMF,DepartmentofDefensecapacity-buildingprograms,andCoalitionSupportFunds- all of which are prepared to protect Georgia to defend its sovereignty and democratic advancements.

3.5.2 TAIWAN AND HONG KONG: WESTERN IMPACT VS CHINA IMPACT

TAIWAN

Taiwan is a country in East Asia sharing maritime borders with the People's Republic of China (PRC) to the Northwest, Japan to the Northeast, and the Philippines to the South. The main island of Taiwan which is formerly known as Formosa, has an area of 35,808 square kilometers which is 13,826 square meters. (Tsai ing, 2018:1). The capital of Taiwan is Taipei, which, together with New Taipei and Keelung, form the largest metropolitan area of Taiwan. Taiwan with a population of 23.45 million is among the most densely populated countries in the world. The Austronesian-speaking ancestors of Taiwan inhabited the island around 6,000 years ago as the dominant settlers. (Tsai ing, 2018:12) Chinese influence in Taiwan started majorly during the 17th century, when a large-scale of Han Chinese immigration into the western part of Taiwan started under a Dutch colony. This immigration continued under the Kingdom of Tungning until the island was annexed finally in the year 1683 by the Qing dynasty of China. (Tsai ing, 2018:24) However, the island was later ceded to the Japanese Empire in the year 1895. In 1911 however, the Republic of China overthrew the Qing, taking control of Taiwan on behalf of the World War II Allies after Japan surrendered in WWII in 1945 (Tsai ing, 2018:34) There was then the resurrection of the Chinese Civil War in which the ROC lost the mainland to forces of the Chinese Communist Party. There was then the retreat to Taiwan in 1949, and since then, legitimate jurisdiction has since been limited to Taiwan. During the early 1960s, Taiwan started a period of rapid industrialization that paved the way for increasing economic growth. The growth was so fast that it was termed the "Taiwan Miracle". Politically, it was in the late 1980s and in the early 1990s, in which the ROC transitioned from a one-party military dictatorship to a multi-party democracy with a semi-presidential system that Taiwan started looking towards full Western integration. (Tsai ing, 2018:36)

According to Cheng-gon (2019:56), China in response has been stepping up aggression, not only in Taiwan, but its neighbourhood. Chinese soldiers have clashed with Indian troops on the border on few occasions. Beijing has heightened efforts and advanced policies to assert major control and authority over the South China Sea, and in the process imposed a draconian security law in Hong Kong, expressing the “one country, two systems”

policy of China. China sees the re-unification of Taiwan as key agenda. Its military aircraft and ships continue to repeatedly cause uproars in the island's airspace and waters. (Cheng-gon, 2019:32).

HONG KONG

Hong Kong is already on the 15th year anniversary of the promulgation of its constitution- the Basic Law of Hong Kong introduced by China's National People's Congress. (Maas, 2018). The essence of the Hong Kong Basic Law was to establish a political framework in accordance with the late Deng Xiaoping's policy of "one country, two systems," so that Hong Kong will rule itself with greater autonomy. (Mass, 2018:23). Through the "one country, two systems," introduced by Deng Xiaoping, Hong Kong's capitalist system, the rule of law, the freedom of the people were to set to be ideologically and practically preserved. The law was meant to provide for a popularly elected Chief Executive and Legislative Council that should prioritize security over freedoms. Outside of defense and again, the foreign affairs, Hong Kong was under this law meant to be in charge. It means, foreign policy and defense wise, Hong Kong is to remain under the 'slavery' of China according to the framework of this law. (Tang, 2019;11). The law given by China promised not just universal suffrage, but the Basic Law also promised to restrict democratic establishments and developments during the first decade of the handover of Hong Kong to China's sovereignty. Consequently, full democracy is not permitted under the Basic Law. This is the point where Western democracy struggles to find greater expression. The West- US and EU continue to observe the developments in Hong Kong while inspiring democracy internally. (Heiko, 2019:12).

According to Weng (1987:23), some Hong Kong's leaders at the Legislative Council in 1985 voiced that the policy of "one country, two systems" is against the desire of Hong Kong people, and the law simply cannot work without the process of democracy. Deng who introduced the Hong Kong law had said: "With a good system, even evil men cannot do evil.

But without a good system, even good men cannot do good, but may be forced to do evil. (Weng, 1987:12). Therefore, for Hong Kong, the good system referred to in this expression is democracy. The policy of Deng can work only if China allows democracy. (Zhu, 2019:54). China unfortunately has resisted calls to refrain from interfering in Hong Kong's internal politics. On July 1, 2003, was the occasion of the sixth anniversary of the handover of Hong Kong to China. On that eventful day, over a million people took to Hong Kong's streets to peacefully protest what they consider was an anti-subversion bill aimed at terrorizing the freedom of the press, association and participation. The protest caused the postponement of the bill and later, its withdrawal. What followed was the resignation of the Secretary for Security. (Edwards, 1997:2). The effect of that demonstration included a significant change in China's policy towards Hong Kong in terms of democracy and democratization. Before the massive protest, China's interference in Hong Kong was covert in such a way that Hong Kong's Chief Executive, Tung Chee-hwa, was considered in charge, even though as merely a camouflage. The demonstration prompted China's government to lay a hands-on approach that looked like the Chief Executive was responsible. (Zhu, 2019:2).

On April 26, 2004, China announced a unilateral decision that prevented Hong Kong from having democracy in 2007. (Zhu, 2019:12). The Chief Executive of Hong Kong, Tung's resigned his position as Chief Executive immediately. Of course, Tung was clearly handpicked by the former Chinese President Jiang Zemin in 1996 and was publicly endorsed by Jiang for a second term in 2002. (Edwards, 1997). Tung was not a popular leader in the mind of Hong Kong people because he was handpicked and consequently worked with dictates, especially as a crony of big developers such as Li Ka-shing who was Hong Kong's richest person (Edwards, 1997:21).

The election of the next Chief Executive of Hong Kong saw the then Chief Secretary, Donald Tsang as the winner of China's handpicking process. (Cheng, 2011:21). Although the Basic Law prescribed a five-year term for the office of the Chief Executive, China dictated that the winner of the handpicking election was to only serve the remaining period of Tung's term, which was to end in June 30, 2007. (Cheng, 2011). For the eight years of Chinese rule,

China did not desire that anyone from Hong Kong govern Hong Kong for the five years legal prescription. This act was one of the greatest indictments of China's Hong Kong policy since 1997. Western democracy has suffered severely under China's Hong Kong policy since 1997. (Cheung, 2007:2). The Western democracy promoters- US and EU have equally been fruitful, and the demonstrations which had significant impact in China's policy in Hong Kong were embellished by Western democracy assistance and promotion programme. (Purnell, 2006). Even though the overall system lies in systemic change, and China is not willing, actors of democracy promotion can still continue to yield result from funding of civil rights and civil organizations. (Cheung, 2007:6). The way forward is not more control or suppression, but more trust and democracy. Deng's policy, of "one country, two systems," as enshrined in the Basic Law, is not problematic as China's new Security Law in Hong Kong passed in 2020, which criminalizes almost every action towards democracy. (Cheung, 2007:2).

3.6 CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF WESTERN POLICIES IN UKRAINE, GORGIA, HONG KONG AND TAIWAN

UKRAINE:

In a policy brief published by the Peterson Institute for International Economics, Aslund offers "An Economic Strategy to Save Ukraine." (Aslund, 2015:3). Among its key points are that the reformist forces that won the parliamentary elections need to agree as soon as possible on the formation of a highly competent coalition government. (Waegemans, 2014:2). This was achieved at a special evening session on December 2nd, when the new Parliament boldly added a new element of giving three ministerial portfolios to foreign nationals, one of them an American, Natalie Jaresko, who will take over the powerful Finance Ministry. (Natalie, 2001:2). The government is now positioned to implement the kind

of radical reforms contained in the Reanimation Package. These include cleaning up the government from the top down, including the purge of corrupt officials from the old regime, especially in the judiciary and police; abolishing the legal immunity of parliamentarians so that they can be held accountable for their acts; closing or merging superfluous or even harmful state agencies, and laying off excess staff while raising qualifications and salaries; cutting public expenditures by one-tenth of GDP in the next year; and reducing energy subsidies by unifying energy prices—meaning putting an end to the trading of gas between low state-controlled prices and high market prices, which Aslund calls “the main mechanism of corruption” in Ukraine. (Jaresko, 2018:2).

In addition to implementing such radical reforms, Ukraine will need much more financial support than it has received to date from the IMF and other international financial institutions—not in the form of credits, which Ukraine won’t be able to repay, but as aid to rebuild its collapsing economy. According to Jaresko (2009:43), Aslund has called for a Marshall Plan to save Ukraine, but for such a plan to work it will be necessary to stabilize Ukraine’s currency, a problem that needs to be given the highest priority by the international lending institutions. (Natalie, 2001:2) With the Parliament now having approved a new cabinet, Ukraine may be ready to rise to the challenge of radical reform. But it will not succeed in becoming a modern European state if the West does not rise to the challenge as well with concrete financial, technical, and political support. (Jaresko, 2002:4).

According to Rogov (2021:16), if anything, the challenge now confronting Ukraine is more difficult than the one faced by postwar Europe because it needs to rebuild economically while the war is still going on—in this case, the war caused by Russia’s continuing aggression in eastern Ukraine. Ukraine is now fighting a war of survival against a very brutal, dangerous, and powerful enemy. (Rogov, 2022:23). Russian forces have crossed the border into southeastern Ukraine with tanks, artillery and troops; and they have done so with impunity. Putin has totally ignored the September Minsk peace accords calling for the withdrawal of Russian troops from the region. (Kirill, 2022:11). As the Economist has noted, he denies violating the agreement because he claims that Russia has no troops in Ukraine in

the first place. Of course he's lying—a United Nations report issue on November 20th said that nine hundred and fifty-seven Russian troops have died in eastern Ukraine since the peace accords—but the West is not calling him on it. The Economist notes that Putin's standard operating procedure is to escalate the conflict and then agree to go no further in exchange for concessions, and he has been getting away with it. The paper quotes Kirill Rogov, a Russian political analyst at the Gaidar Institute in Moscow, as saying that "Putin likes to open talks by putting a knife on the table first." (Gershman, 2015:14).

According to Gershman (2015:18), the German government called the most recent Russian moves into eastern Ukraine "incomprehensible," but they're perfectly comprehensible if one keeps a record of what has happened since the Crimean invasion. When the latest Russian advances into Ukraine occurred, the new foreign policy chief of the European Union, Federica Mogherini of Italy, urged moderation, saying that the West can't let the peace process break down because it will be so difficult to start it again. But what peace process was she speaking about? As a recent Wall Street Journal editorial pointed out, "Putin has never stood down"—not in Chechnya in 1999, when he used the Chechen war to take power; not in Georgia in 2008; not in 2012, when he whipped up anti-Americanism and domestic repression to crush his own anti-government street protests; and so far not in Ukraine. He will stand down only if and when he is forced to do so. (Gershman, 2015:3).

HONG KONG

Hong Kong has not practiced an electoral democracy. Full universal suffrage was not even granted by Britain to Hong Kong as its colony before Britain handed over Hong Kong to China in 1997. (Pepper, 1997:3). There were some democratic reform in 1984 that already set the tone for democracy in Hong Kong.(Pepper, 1997:2). The handover treaty between Britain and China contained human rights and freedom aspects, but democratic development in Hong Kong has not stopped being a major issue since 1997. The major obstruction to democratic development in Hong Kong is Deng's principle which allows Hong Kong to enjoy high autonomy in all areas exception of the areas of foreign relations and

defense, which are sole responsibilities of China. (Cheung, 2022:3). The Hong Kong's Basic Law which was adopted in 1997 after the handover, free Hong Kong's residents to cast their votes for local district councilors and also directly elect half of the region's legislators according to their freedom and limited electoral rights. (Langer, 2007). The democratic concern of Hong Kong people electrified after the first Chief Executive, Tung Chee-hwa, mishandled issues of human rights and universal suffrage based on China's scheme. The pro-democracy camp of the populace reacted with agitations which the West helped to amplify with media.

In 1984, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, ahead of the impending handover of Hong Kong to China, emphatically stressed that "The eyes of the world are on us" and the protection of the people's rights and freedom was going to be the difference. (Dolghi, 2009:23). China agreed the principle of the "one country, two systems" in the international treaty with Britain, but has put it to sword with the effective National Security Law in Hong Kong. There is now however a storm of criticism of the Xi regime by the United States and European Union who are now stepping up strategy to restore hope of possible future democracy. Democracy activists have been arrested as soon as the law became effective, and that in turn has raised the volume of criticism. Key of these pro-democracy arrests were the young activist Joshua Wong, 24, and a 72 years newspaper publisher Jimmy Lai, who have been put behind bars. One of the activists had said: "The only method we have left to struggle with is getting arrested." This implies the people's readiness for the worst case scenario. (Langer, 2007:11). Xi towards the Hong Kong policy has singled out Wong, Lai, and Tai and referred to them as the "most vicious traitors who deserve severe punishment." In an interview with a pro-Beijing magazine, Xi had labeled the trio as "rioters who are clearly and dangerously anti-China, instigating dangerous riots with extremely notorious acts." As expected, it is understandable that any form of draconian punishment melted out to the trio will raise even sharper criticism of China from the international community, which will be more desperate to act proportionally. (Cheung, 2022:5).

According to Zao (2021:20), the democracy movement in Hong Kong is not really doomed. The international community is not silent. They have been pressures on Beijing and there would even be more. It is still too early to make the conclusion that Hong Kong has bowed to China's anti-democracy stance. (Cheung, 2022:22).



CHAPTER FOUR

4.1 RUSSIA AND CHINA AS REGIONAL ACTORS: RECENT IMPACT

Introduction

This section discusses Russia and China as regional actors and the recent impact that they make on western democracy promotion in the regions. For Russia, it is Ukraine and Georgia, and for China, it is Hong Kong and Taiwan. It evaluates Russia's invasion of Ukraine and what that means for democracy promotion in the region.

Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022 at 10:00 (UTC+2), according to the presidential briefing of Volodymyr Zelenskyy who reported that Russian troops invaded Ukraine from the Northern side which is about 5 kilometers from the Southern part of the border. (CNN, February, 2022). The CNN reported on February 2022 that key areas where the Russian troops attacked majorly are the Kharkiv Oblast, Chernihiv Oblast, and near Sumy. The impact of Russia's invasion of Ukraine has reverberated around the world, but the impact on the Russian region is the focus of this study. Regional leaders, who have been appeasing both Washington and Moscow for almost a decade, are now being pressured to pick a side – but they still seem reluctant to do so. (Kammer, Zour, Selassie & Rhee, 2022). Most of them have publicly condemned the Russian invasion but refrained from taking any punitive measures against Moscow, while others are clearly neutral with Belarus remaining the key pro-Russian state in relations to the United Nations General Assembly Resolution ES-11/1 vote on March 2, 2022 in the 11th Emergency Special Session, which was documented with the code: A/RES/ES-11/1. (UNGA, Emergency Special Session, March 2, 2022).

Russia's invasion of Ukraine is having a critical impact on the region: migration, economy, politics, food, energy, alliance. They are varied economic expectations as energy and wheat importers are bracing for the worst, while oil producers are anticipating a bump

in revenues. But beyond the economy, the outcome of this conflict could have significant geopolitical implications for the region, including reshuffling alliances and re-charting gas pipeline routes. (Wallace, 2022).

Since Joe Biden's election as US president in November 2020, the pro-Western states in the Russian region have been working to reduce regional tensions and avenues of confrontations with Russia by rekindling strained bilateral relations.(Pepper, 2022:2). These governments do not want Russia's invasion of Ukraine to re-enact in their states or invalidate their efforts and trigger a new wave of polarization. Unlike the Middle Eastern leaderships who do not want Russia to experience a major defeat, which would reinforce American unilateralism and make it difficult for them to diversify their alliances, the pro-Western states in the Russian region have demonstrated that they seek a total humbling of Russia for their security and freedoms. These desires are the shaping events of the Russia's recent impact on the region. (Pepper, 2022:3).

Washington is currently focused on deterring and isolating Moscow and is working towards a possible nuclear agreement that might end Iran's economic isolation as part of western strategies to avert Russia's anti-democratic impact on the region and beyond. (The Washington Post, April 4, 2022)

Ukrainian officials asked the International Criminal Court to visit the mass graves seen in Bucha, a suburb northwest of Kyiv, so experts can gather evidence of possible Russian war crimes. (The Washington Post, April 4, 2022). Kyiv's mayor said the discovery of the graves could "only be described as genocide." Bucha's mayor told The Washington Post that about 270 residents had been buried in two mass graves, and he estimated that 40 people were lying dead in the streets. (CNN, April 2 2022). Some, he said, had been bound and executed — shot in the back of the head. Self-exiled Russian oligarch and vocal Kremlin opponent Mikhail Khodorkovsky has called on Russian billionaires and officials who have fled Russia to publicly denounce President Vladimir Putin's war in Ukraine as criminal, and disassociate themselves — "or we should be forced to suspect that you are acting on the Kremlin's behalf," he said.(The Washington Post, April 4, 2022).

Tharoor (2022:1) described Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's new set of challenges: He must keep up morale and the will to fight amid battlefield casualties, economic devastation and vast civilian suffering. He must retain the confidence of Western nations that Ukraine can prevail to ensure weapons keep flowing. He must also figure out what, if any, sort of political agreement with Moscow to end the war will be acceptable to Ukrainians. Tharoor (2022:1)

4.2 ANALYZING THE IMPACT OF THE WEST AND RUSSIA IN UKRAINE AND GEORGIA

Russia and China as dominant illiberal regional powers continue to wrestle it out with Western actors of democracy promotion. (Dibb, 2014:15). A huge chunk of their human and material resources have been deployed to emphasis on building not only leverage, but dominance through economic and military vehicles that project their interests and power domestically, regionally and globally. (Haukkala, 2021:21). The democratic challenges posed by Russia and China, as both pursues dominance around the world, have increased with the increase in economic and military strength of both regional powers (Sinem, 2019: 63). China places itself as a strategic peer competitor of the United States, and struggles to outclass the United States in terms of economy and global legitimacy, by constantly stepping up its economic globalization and investment. Russia, on the other hand, is arguably not on the same level of competition with the United States as China is, in terms of economic, but has developed tools deployed to limit and reverse the democratic doings of the West domestically and regionally (Wrobel, 2014:37).

In comparison with China, Russia seeks to level the playing field between it and the current world power, by subverting the international order in an attempt to limit US

influence and dominance. (Wrobel, 2014:39)Russia’s anti-democratic strategy is the altering of existing international status quo, which is not predicated on legitimacy but chaos. The only difference with the Chinese method is that it deploys massive economy in such a way that it competes with the United States economically, while investing in other countries to gain legitimacy and greater influence. This way, China appears to promote its CCP goals and objectives while countering Western democracy effort in its region, specifically in Taiwan and Hong Kong, just like Russia in its region with Ukraine and Georgia. (Haukkala, 2021:23).

According to Sinem, (2019: 63), China places itself as a strategic peer competitor of the United States, and struggles to outclass the United States in terms of economy and global legitimacy, by constantly stepping up its economic globalization and investment. Russia, on the other hand, is arguably not on the same level of competition with the United States as China is, in terms of economic, but has developed tools deployed to limit and reverse the democratic doings of the West domestically and regionally (Wrobel, 2014:37). In comparison with China, Russia seeks to level the playing field between it and the current world power, by subverting the international order in an attempt to limit US influence and dominance. Russia’s anti-democratic strategy is the altering of existing international status quo, which is not predicated on legitimacy but chaos. Considering the huge capabilities of Russia and China on the global stage, as well as the numerous high-profile cases of Russian and Chinese interference with the efforts of Western democracy promoters in the past several years, the exploration of each illiberal regime’s strategic model and interest are essentials to the overall comprehension of illiberal regional interference on democracy promotion (Roberts, 2017: 56).

According to Osward (2021:32), the impact of the West and Russia in Ukraine and Georgia is a mixture of gains and loss for both the Western democracy promoters and the Russian regime of Putin. While the West has succeeded in increasing the hope for future democracy in Ukraine and Georgia, through civil society groups empowerment and funding of human rights activities, it is the Russian regime of Putin that is searching for urgent

answers to obstruct further developments in that direction. (Roberts, 2017:12). The Russian military buildup in Ukraine is one headache Russia has created for both Ukraine and the West to solve. On one hand, Russia benefits from the fear instilled on the minds of the people of Ukraine. There are internal calls from some section of the people calling the West for concessions to avoid Russian invasion. While the West has sounded vehemently that such action would be met with proportional response, it is yet to be seen how Ukrainians would survive the implying hardship in a circumstance of full fledged confrontations. According to Oswald (2021), both Ukraine and Georgia have resolve to take the bull by the horn as far as pro-Western inclination is concerned. The governments of both states are stepping out each passing day from the remnants of Soviet ideologies, and will someday become fully Western ideologically should the West step up its democracy promotion programme in both states without inciting Russian violent confrontation

4.3 ANALYZING THE IMPACT OF THE WEST AND CHINA IN TAIWAN AND HONG KONG

According to Freyburg& Richter, (2020:3), although the democratization impact of the West and China in Taiwan and Hong Kong are comprehensively convincing, especially in terms of Western enlightenment and empowerment, the general impact in terms of democracy leadership has been limited by China's laws for Hong Kong; the Basic Law and the National Security Law. However, newer approaches are yielding remarkably, especially in Taiwan (Freyburg& Richter, 2020:23). The EED establishment coincided with the presidential second term of Barack Obama, who was prepared to expand the chances for new policies, strategies and convergence between the US and the EU towards greater achievements in the area of democracy. The China regions of Taiwan and Hong Kong topped this development which became the starting point of renewed special interest and focus on the activities of democracy promoters by illiberal regional powers as far as responding to Western democracy promotion became imperative (Chen & Kinzelbach, 2015:21). China took to special counter response mechanism in Taiwan and Hong Kong passing security laws to limit democratic movements (Delcour&Wolczuk, 2018:21)

The rise of Western interest in Taiwan and Hong Kong China comes with improved strategy and determination, and so China too has topped up its strategy and determination to stop democracy promotion, this time, not merely internally, but also regionally. Before this time, the Communist Party appeared to be less concerned about democratization externally, depending on its own external interest. (Chen & Kinzelbach, 2015:2). (Hackenesch, 2018:4) argued that while China's rising economic expansions has the potentials to minimize democracy promotion effects in Taiwan and Hong Kong, however, it is becoming bothered by the democratic interest of the West in Taiwan and Hong Kong.

On the the impact of the West and China on the future prospects of democracy promotion in Taiwan and Hong Kong, Cheng (2007:3) assume that the West is in the hope of reaching higher level of contributions to democracy promotion on the areas than China is expected to achieve its re-unification goals. This is especially the case of Taiwan where the US presence has become so clear diplomatically. There is therefore the growing concerns for China over US contributions for democracy promotion in Taiwan. According to Wang (2020:3), between the last decades, the US has spent the total sum of 1.3 billion dollars ranging from FMF and funding for human rights. to One of those reasons is their over - concentration on their domestic economic and political affairs. With China increasing their military and economic influence across their region and beyond, one greater challenge for China is India which is fast increasing its military stake in the region. The task of democracy promotion will therefore will be easier with India's military watch. Many observers have pointed to the relevance of India in the region to limit China's military threats. The role of non-state actors of democracy promotion like the United Nations' agencies for democracy promotion and civil society groups have also established hope that democracy in Hong Kong and Taiwan is more of a matter of time. The US in particular has sustained a prolonged solid ground for democracy promotion, and threats are not enough for democratic pushbacks (Finkelstein, 44:56).

Conclusion

This section as addressed Russia and China as regional actors and examined the impact that their actions as regional actors have on democracy promotion in the regions. The section examined Russia’s invasion of Ukraine under this context and investigated the impact that it bears on democracy promotion in the region.

CHAPTER FIVE

5.1 EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION

5.2 EVALUATION

Democracy promotion is no longer ‘the only game in town’ with China and Russia also gaining points in their effort to promote anti-democratic ideas in their respective regions and beyond. The recent invasion of Ukraine by Russia is only one example of what Russia wants and how it wants it. Western democracy promotion too cannot be said to have seen its end from western coordinated response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Ukraine’s western inclination shows how much alive democracy promotion is, and how much people around the want desire freedom and fight for it. The Freedom House currently ranks Georgia a “global freedom” score of 60 out of 100 which makes it “partly free”. By this ranking, Georgia’s democratic ranking is one of the highest rankings among the post-Soviet states that became independent upon the dissolution of USSR. According to Minakov (2005:4), the historic choice in favor of democracy and free market made by Ukraine more than a quarter of century ago, has come under intense attack from Russia since the invasion of Crimea in 2014. Ukraine’s vision and inclination to a fully sovereign, democratic, and capitalist state has been backed by the West for over a quarter of century, and has been partially realized

through the impact of democracy promotion by the West, despite Russia's pushbacks. The West is no doubt behind Ukraine's clearly established democratic polity, as Russian aggression continues (Yuval, 2020:6). Under Western influence, Ukraine transitioned from Soviet republic to a fully democratic state in cycles. The resurgence of Russia since Crimean invasion begs the question as to whether Ukraine's democratic development has been set on a sustainable path. The 2014 Euromaidan which is the process of closer political and economic association with the European Union (EU) prove the answer on the affirmative. (Purnell, 2011:6). Ukraine itself has been assured by the Biden's administration of proportional response of the US on the event of Russia's attack. There are many reasons to hope for democratic sustainability in Ukraine, although Russia's resurgence of military resort is threatening such stability. (Purnell, 2011:7)

The West is also significantly involved in the democratic achievements of Georgia, with the US spending so much in Georgia in form of FMF and funding for human rights and democracy promotion programme (Mitchell, 2019:11). Georgia as a state has now become powerfully pro-West with NATO and EU inclinations significantly risen over the last decade. It has a parliamentary system of government that has been shaped by constitutional reforms over the last decade. The center-left which is Georgian Dream-Democratic party (GD) came to power in 2012 as the leading party within the electoral bloc. In 2016, the GD party won re-election with a majority of more than 75% of parliamentary seats in its control. (CNN, February 2016). In 2019, the GD party lost about one-fifth of its parliamentary deputies that happened over party disputes that were related to some of the judicial appointments as well as the party's withdrawal from a firmly made promise and commitment to proportional parliamentary elections in 2020. Wash (2021:5) hold, it is however not a decline in democratic efforts, but a kind of democratic growth inspired by expansion of political interest, participation and eligibility. (Kirill, 2007:2).

According to Freyburg & Richter, (2020:3), many observers assume that billionaire Bidzina I. Ivanishvili, who was former G.D party chairman and also a former prime minister, played excessive responsibilities not acceptable in democracy, in the area of policymaking and executive appointments. Ivanishvili through Western democracy promotion programme resigned from the position of GD party chairman in January 2021 to limit his political dominance. (Freyburg & Richter, 2020:2). Officially, since Georgia's most powerful executive is the prime minister, the current Prime Minister, Irakli Garibashvili, who assumed office in February 2021 is completely pro-democracy and Garibashvili's previously service as GD party secretary from March 2019 and as minister of defense from September 2019 could be said to be the foundation of Georgia's renewed pro-western assimilation. (Irakli, 2021:6). When Garibashvili served as prime minister once from 2013-2015, and as minister of internal affairs from 2012-2013, Russia's interference in Georgia's democratic and pro-western inclination was minimal and substantially ineffective (Irakli, 2021:2).

About Hong Kong, according to Zhu (2019:2), the democratic reforms which began in 1984 towards full universal suffrage under the colonial lordship of Britain before official handover of Britain to China in 1997 have been advanced through the people's crusade for democracy and the backup provided by actors of democracy promotion. However, democratic development in Hong Kong is now a critical issue since the transfer of sovereignty from Britain to the People's Republic of China in 1997. (Cheng, 2011:4). The key issue lies with the 'one country, two systems' principle which empowers China to advance its cause in Hong Kong. The system though allows Hong Kong to enjoy greater autonomy in different sections that do not include foreign relations and defense. Foreign relations and defense lie in the authority of the central government, and so China is able to push back on democratic movements. The Hong Kong's Basic Law, which was adopted after the 1997 handover of Britain to China, favor residents to vote for local district councilors, yet elections appear to lack competition. The first Chief Executive of Hong Kong, in the person of Tung Chee-hwa, was directly appointed and placed by China's Communist Party to control the human rights and universal suffrage issue. This is the focal points of the pro-democracy camp and actors of democracy promotion. (Cheng, 2011:3)

Yun (2021:6) argues that through the instrumentality of the West, a 2014 NPCSC decision made proposal for a universal voting to the Chief Executive of Hong Kong to be effective in 2017, but Beijing interfered and uttered the proposal to shield Hong Kong from then part of democracy. Disaffected students triggered the Umbrella or Occupy Movement, and protested for several weeks. (Yun, 2021:7). China makes it appear like democratic development is not prioritized by the Hong Kong government and people, however, the massive Occupy Movement showed the people's inclination to democracy and human rights. The impact is huge, as the media has re-shaped the way in which the people of Hong Kong are perceived in terms of their likeness or aversion for democracy (Yun, 2021:8)

With regards to Taiwan, it is three decades since Taiwan threw out authoritarianism. (Winckler, 1984:7). Despite China's threat of re-unification, Taiwan has speedily become a vibrant democracy with 24 million people. Taiwan's technology sector after three decades has formed a backbone of global supply chains with a growing economy already on the verge of the G20. (Winckler, 1984:11). Thanks to the dominant presence of actors of democracy promotion, particularly the US. Taiwan's growing strength was communicated in its notable success in suppressing Covid-19. Although, full recognition of Taiwanese statehood is not assured at present since that could risk triggering violent Chinese attacks. Most sovereign states have policies that acknowledge China's position that Taiwan is part of a single China. (Ngo, 2008:3). This means that democratic allies require to strike a delicate balance, providing democratic support to Taiwan and paying attention to China's retaliation possibilities. Western democracies can leverage on the encouragement of Taiwanese participation in international organizations to increase international support against Chinese intimation and possible attack. (Winckler, 1984:15).

Before China excluded Taiwan from Beijing in 2016, Taiwan for eight years took part as an observer in the World Health Organization's decision-making body and other multilateral bodies. Increased participation in non-governmental forums on internationally

relevant issues like diplomacy, security, economy and cybernetics can equally step up Taiwan's international relevance pro-western structure. (Winckler, 1984:4). This was proven when Taiwan in the 1960s, entered a period of rapid economic growth and industrialization prospered by the desire for democracy, human right, rule of law and pro-west inclination. The rapid economic and industrial growth termed the "Taiwan Miracle" has been sustained by the effect of Western democratic presence. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the ROC transitioned from a one-party military dictatorship to a multi-party democracy with a semi-presidential system, and was expected to continue the gradual transition to full democracy, but China's interference obstructed the transition process. (Winckler, 1984:3). When the island was annexed in 1683 by the Qing dynasty of China, and ceded to the Empire of Japan in 1895, it was thought that Taiwan was going to be on the part to democracy on the event of China's take over as one of the Allies. However, when the Republic of China, which had overthrown the Qing in 1911, took control of Taiwan on behalf of the World War II Allies following the surrender of Japan in 1945, China like Japan of the pre-WWII period sought to shelve democracy, rule of law, and human right in place of intense communism. The West has stepped up its democracy promotion in Taiwan, with the US taking the lead, economically, diplomatically and politically. US effort including FMF and Taiwan's military confidence is already building up. (Winckler, 1984:6).

China's response to US democracy promotion in Taiwan has been partly aggressive, not only in Taiwan but the entire China's neighborhood. Chinese soldiers have occasionally clashed with Indian troops on the border, with Beijing escalating efforts to assert control over the South China Sea, with waxing of military strength intended to torpedoing the "one country, two systems" arrangement it once proposed as a model for Taiwan. (Cheng, 2011:4)

This research examined the impact of Russia and China on western democracy promotion in Russia and China regions; Ukraine and Georgia (Russian region), and Hong Kong and Taiwan (China region). In doing this, the study is classified into five chapters. Chapter one is the introduction and it provided the background to the research. The research answered the question; what is the impact of Russia and China on western democracy promotion in Russia and China regions? This is the central research question of the study as

contained in chapter one. The study argued that; 1) Russia and China weaponize their economic and military strength rise against western democracy promotion in the regions. 2) Democracies leave open domestic weaknesses for Russia and China to exploit.

Chapter functioned as the literature review section and it reviewed landmark argument on western democracy promotion. Chapter two answered the questions on the motive behind western democracy promotion, the instruments used for democracy promotion, the objective of democracy promotion, western experience of democracy promotion and the impact so far in Russia and China regions. Chapter three examined hybrid regimes and competitive authoritarianism as a version of hybrid regimes. It outlines the strategies and objectives of the regimes in working against democracy promotion. It concludes with the impact that the regimes bear on democracy promotion in Ukraine and Georgia in Russian region, and Hong Kong and Taiwan in China region. Chapter four answered key questions on Russia and China as regional actors. The section has addressed the impact that Russia and China make as regional actors in their respective regions: Russia; Ukraine and Georgia; China; Hong Kong and Taiwan. This impact relates to the question of how Russia and China try to limit the promotion of democracy in their regions, the strategies, objectives and limitations. It addressed Russia's latest action as a regional actor in relation to its invasion of Ukraine. It shows the impact of their latest actions as regional actors on democracy promotion in the regions.

Chapter five is the conclusion and it sums up all of the issues discussed in the entire study. This study is important for state and non-state actors of democracy promotion as the findings will further strengthen democracy promotion effort amidst the increasing push back from illiberal regional powers such as Russia and China. By filling the gaps in this literature, this study contributes immensely to knowledge, and future researchers will profit from the result of findings.



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